


PALGRAVE MACMILLAN TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY SERIES



OTTOMANS IMAGINING JAPAN

EAST, MIDDLE EAST, AND NON-WESTERN MODERNITY
AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Renée Worringer



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
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Ottomans Imagining Japan

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Non-Western Modernity at the
Turn of the Twentieth Century

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*To my "wolf pack," then and now: Spock, Sulu, Arrow and Gem,
all of whom taught me about partnership in work and play.
And to the "pack leader," Stephen, for his quiet patience
when I often lost mine in this endeavor.*

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I claim sole responsibility for any shortcomings in this final product that has lingered on my hard drive for too long.

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Archival Abbreviations

Ottoman Prime Ministry Archives

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi	BBA
Meclis-î Vukelâ	MV
Dâhiliye Mütenevvia	DH.MTV
Bâb-ı Âli Evrâk Odası	BEO

Yıldız Palace Papers

Yıldız Evrâkı	Y
Sadrâzam Kâmil Paşa	Y. Kâmil Paşa
Yıldız Sadâret, Resmî Mâruzât	YA.RES
Yıldız Sadâret, Hususî Mâruzât	YA.HUS
Yıldız Mütenevvî Mâruzât	Y.MTV

Ottoman Foreign Ministry

Hâriciye Nezâretî	HR
Mütenevvia	HR.MTV
Hukuk Müşavirliği, İstişare Odası	HR.HMŞ.İŞO

Maritime Museum Archives

Deniz Müzesi Arşivi	DMA
D.(defter no.)/S.(sayfa no.)	
Mektûbî Bölümü I	MEK I
Mektûbî Bölümü	IIMEK II
Mektûbî Bölümü III	MEK III
Şûrâ-yî Bahriye Bölümü	ŞUB
Muhâsebe Bölümü	MUH

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Foreword

In this amply documented study of Ottoman responses to the rise of Japan at the turn of the twentieth century, Renée Worringer shows how our understanding of international history may be broadened in a transnational history framework in multiple ways.

First, although both the Ottoman Empire and Japan were players in the geopolitics of international relations—indeed, Japan’s war with Russia during 1904–1905 was clearly understood in those terms by all segments of the Ottoman population—they were also emerging “modern nations,” and how a people, a government, or a society contrives to establish a modern nation is an enduring transnational question. Europe and North America served as models, but many in the Middle East saw Japan’s example as an important and encouraging precedent. What attracted them to the Japanese nation was, the book shows, its non-Western identity, which seemed satisfy their quest for “non-Western modernity,” that is, the establishment of a modern nation that did not merely copy a Western model.

In this connection, Turks, Egyptians, Syrians, and others who constituted the broad Ottoman Empire were particularly interested in Japan’s cultural heritage as well as its racial identity that set it apart from the modern West. This theme is pursued throughout the book. How races and civilizations develop and interact with one another is a key theme of transnational history, and in the early twentieth century both Ottomans and Japanese were keenly aware of the prevailing “race science” and the hierarchic view of human history that put all non-white people below the white race, and all non-Western civilizations below the West. How the majority of humankind, who after all were non-white and non-Western, sought to acquire an alternative understanding of the world is one of the issues historians have been investigating for some time, and this book adds significantly to the literature.

The author also repeatedly shows that the Ottoman Empire was not a monolithic entity and consisted of a multiplicity of faiths, ideologies, classes, and political groups. Though the ruling elite, above all the Sultan, sought to perpetuate the status quo, others such as the Young Turks were eager to displace the existing political arrangements with an alternative system, while still others, especially non-Turkish Muslims and other minorities, had their own agendas. Each had a different understanding of what was happening in East Asia and sought to make use of it to argue for its relevance to what it was seeking to accomplish. These kaleidoscopic perspectives on the relationship between developments in East Asia and the Middle East can best be understood as another transnational theme worthy of investigation.

Above all, the book helps us understand the rise of “political Islam,” a transnational phenomenon that daily catches our attention. Although the

movement for a pan-Islamic nation, even a pan-Islamic empire, had arisen before the twentieth century, there was an important connection between the rise of Japan, a modern state under the emperor that seemed to retain its traditional civilization, and the struggles by Turks, Arabs, and others in the region to establish a national community that likewise revered its tradition and developed an identity of its own quite apart from the modern European model of nationhood. (Some believed, as the author notes, that in Japan even educated women retained their loyalty to traditional practices at home, a fitting example for a modern Islamic nation in which female domesticity would be retained.)

Readers will learn much from these and many other insights that inform this volume. It makes a welcome new addition to the Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series that seeks to promote a fresh understanding of the past in a cross-border, trans-regional framework.

AKIRA IRIYE
RANA MITTER

1

Introduction

The roots of today's "clash of civilizations" between the Islamic world and the West are not anchored in the legacy of the Crusades or the early Islamic conquests. Instead, it is a more contemporary story rooted in the nineteenth-century history of resistance to Western global hegemony. In this resistance, the Ottoman Middle East believed it had found an ally and a role model in Meiji Japan. As news spread of Japanese domestic and international achievements, a century-long fascination with Japan was ignited in the region that still manages to flicker now and again in the twenty-first century: most recently, in the aftermath of the US-led invasion of Iraq. Japanese troops arrived in Iraq in 2004; shortly thereafter, the Iraqi chairman of the newly opened Iraq Stock Exchange, Ṭalib Ṭabāṭī'e, was quoted as saying that "if I am permitted to dream, Iraq will develop into the Japan of the Middle East."¹

When representatives of the Ottoman government approached British officials in 1908 to discuss forging an alliance between the two powers following the Habsburg annexation of Ottoman Bosnia-Herzegovina, they did not describe themselves with that all too familiar Western epithet for the Ottoman Empire, the "Sick Man of Europe." Instead, the former Young Turk political exiles self-assuredly declared themselves to be the "Japan of the Near East" and expected the British to understand the potential merits of a partnership with them.² In identifying themselves this way, Ottoman statesmen invoked their newfound relationship to a particular trope—the modern Japanese nation—and all that it implied in the early twentieth century. In fact, this pan-Asian association with Japan was mainly a fiction generated by the imaginations of a vast number of Ottoman writers who searched for ways to ensure the empire's survival in the modern era. Nonetheless, it calls for historical inquiry into the reasons behind and the purposes of Ottoman formulations of solidarity with an alien, remote, and non-Muslim Japan.

Japan loomed in Ottoman consciousness at the turn of the twentieth century. The contemporary Japanese nation was an example for Ottomans of how to attain "non-Western" modernity in a global order defined mainly by the West. That is, Japan demonstrated to the Ottoman Empire how to become modern by "Western" standards without losing one's "Eastern" essence. Previous scholarship on Ottoman identity and modernizing efforts has overlooked the influence of Japan and assumed that the only pattern to aspire

toward was Europe, which is too simplistic an analysis given the complexities of nineteenth- and twentieth-century history. The historical analogy of modern Japan proved to be an attractive alternative that drew an enormous amount of attention in the Empire from the elite and nonelite alike.

The Ottoman endeavor to become modern at the turn of the twentieth century was informed by this discourse on the Japanese nation that addressed issues of technical modernization, social reform, nation-building strategies, and other factors considered to be the determinants of enlightened civilization in this historical moment. Inevitably this discourse also spoke to an Ottoman concern for the Empire's future place in the world, somewhere between two entities that were simply differentiated as "East" and "West." Yet this distinction was not so freely negotiated by the Ottomans. Once having had the upper hand in a rivalrous past shared with Christian Europe, they now sought to escape the current status to which they had been relegated—as inferiors to the West—even as they embraced many of Europe's contemporary intellectual foundations and material attributes. And it is this dilemma that resembles similar struggles to reach modernity in a variety of other "non-Western" societies: the quest of an often diverse cross-section of individuals within those communities to preserve what they considered to be certain essentialistic, indigenous qualities designated as "Eastern spirit," while absorbing and integrating into their states and societies suitable elements of Western science and technological civilization, a feat Japan was believed to have accomplished.

Just choosing an appropriate description for the particular set of political and intellectual influences exerted upon Ottoman individuals as they grappled with issues of identity and statehood in a changed world proved a more daunting task than expected for what may seem a rather trifling narrative of one empire's interest in another. Perhaps it is due to the complex forces at work under the surface of what initially appears to be nothing more than a mere passing fascination with an Asian country that accomplished in about fifty years of intense modernization what it took European nations much longer to achieve. Indeed the Arabic and Ottoman Turkish sources themselves frequently repeated the above comparison between the pace of European industrialization and the rapidity of Japanese modernization with a very obvious tone of satisfaction. What may not be apparent at the outset, however, is the level of imagining that was conceived of by a range of Ottoman writers, poets, political activists, journalists, and members of the ruling elite in the Empire, as well as non-elite Ottoman subjects, to express their sentient analyses of the emergence of Meiji Japan. Though the overused phrase "Rising Sun" seems perhaps a bit cliché in describing modern Japan's ascent to global power at the end of the nineteenth century, again the contemporary newspapers, journals, and books circulating in Ottoman lands did not resist using this teleological trope to express their evaluation of what was bound to happen all over Asia if proper steps were taken by those in power, unhindered by European interference: the "rise of the East," or an "awakening in Asia" that had been put in motion by "the Rising Sun."³ It was poetic and descriptive all at once for the rebirth of the Orient to commence with Japan, located on that furthest edge of Asia where the sun made its first appearance each day.

The Japanese islands had not captivated the Muslim imagination in quite this way before. Arab and Persian Islamic geographers of the ninth and tenth centuries first charted exotic lands perched in the Far East beyond China, which they called *Wāqwāq* (rendered from the Chinese name for Japan, *Wo-Kuo*).⁴ In Ottoman times the belief that the apocalyptic peoples of biblical and Qur'anic eschatology called the Gog and Magog were to come out of that far clime beyond mainland Asia on the Day of Judgment was still lending a measure of superstition to perceptions of the few Japanese people seen in Ottoman cities.⁵

But it was not until the late nineteenth century that the Islamic Middle East became enthusiastically aware of a nascent Asian power that had existed in isolation for centuries, now called *al-Yābān* in Arabic or *Japonya* in Ottoman Turkish. Up until this time, the Ottomans would have had little to glean from Japan other than the fine craftsmanship of Japanese lacquerware and ceramics, most samples of which made it into Topkapı Palace by way of foreign merchants or as gifts to the Sultans from visiting delegations who often were not themselves Japanese. Though the Portuguese and the Dutch had been involved with Japan through trade since premodern times, Europe effectively did not really become obsessed with things Japanese until the Victorian era, when their taste for Japanese cultural goods parodied the distaste they generally harbored toward the Japanese diplomatic and student missions resident in European capitals, whom they regarded as “peculiar Orientals.”⁶

Commodore Perry's forcible opening of Japan in the 1850s and, following this event, the Meiji Restoration of 1868 were the events that lured the world's attention toward what would become the Japanese national modernization miracle of subsequent decades. For the Ottomans, 1868 fell in the latter years of the *Tanzimāt* reforms (1839–1876) and around the time the Islamic modernist Young Ottoman movement was resisting the centralized, top-down nature of these reforms implemented by a powerful Ottoman bureaucratic clique. Activist samurai overthrew the Tokugawa Shogunate, assumed administrative control over Japan, and surrounded their newly empowered symbol of Japanese monarchical authority, the youthful Meiji Emperor; they became the famed Meiji oligarchs—the *genrō* of later decades that carried out dramatic reforms and guided modern Japan into its twentieth-century imperial stature. It was the next generation of Ottoman activists after the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks, who opposed Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909), and who would come to idealize the Meiji statesmen as their role models.

Japanese modernization did not hold any sustained Ottoman attention in the press nor elsewhere until after the first Japanese study missions had already come and gone from Ottoman ports in the 1870s and 1880s. The first visit, initiated by the new Meiji oligarchy as part of their policy to “seek out knowledge throughout the world” as delineated in the Charter Oath of 1868,⁷ must not have impressed the Ottomans tremendously. Fukuchi Gen-ichirō, the interpreter for the 1871–1873 Iwakura Mission to the United States and Europe, was dispatched on a side-trip to the Ottoman Empire. There, he was to investigate the Sublime Porte's juridical system in cases involving foreigners, as a prelude to the hoped-for revision by the Japanese of their despised Unequal Treaties that had been signed with Western powers by the Tokugawa Shogun

in 1858. Through some hobnobbing in Istanbul with a former diplomatic acquaintance, arrangements were made for the Japanese official to examine the Egyptian Consular court system in Cairo. Fukuchi submitted a detailed report to the Japanese Foreign Ministry upon his return in which he recorded his observations and conclusions regarding the Egyptian court system.⁸

In the 1870s, then, Japan was still pupil and not tutor for other non-European nations in international affairs; a change in roles was in the making however. The Yoshida Masaharu Mission of 1880–1881 was dispatched to Persia and the Ottoman Empire ostensibly to investigate the possibility of Japan opening trade relations with the two empires after the Qajar Persian Shah Nasir al-Din had made overtures toward the Japanese.⁹ Relations between the Japanese and Persian parties during the visit consisted of pleasantries and expressions of pan-Asian friendship as well as the Shah's inquisitive queries regarding the details of Japanese modernization. But as Yoshida's government report reflects, particularly in the last section entitled *Seiryaku* (Politics), Japan's true motives for the visit consisted mainly of investigating British and Russian activities in the region, as Japan was beginning to play the game of Great Power politics. The Japanese mission spent considerable time in the physical environs of the Russo-Persian and Russo-Ottoman border areas as they were aware of Russia's desire for southern expansion and the need to block it; they clearly anticipated war with Russia in the future. They also read British strategy in the Middle East very astutely:

The Russians seem to entice the Persians into undermining the Ottoman Empire from behind. As for Great Britain, to prevent this Russian intention and their cooperation with the Persians, they planned to create a bulwark state between the Ottoman and the Persian territories, which is expected to obstruct both the Ottoman and the Russian thrust into Persia. In brief, Great Britain has assigned the role of a bulwark to the revolting Kurdish people.¹⁰

In time, Japan would use its status as an Eastern model of nationhood and modern statecraft as a way to package itself for other Asians as an alternative to Western imperial powers bent on colonizing all of the non-European continent. But in reality, by the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Japanese too had firmly entered the arena of imperial, colonial competition.

Japan's self-image had been transposed after the renegotiation of the Unequal Treaties with Western powers in 1894 and Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. The threat of Western occupation and colonization had plagued the Japanese for decades after Commodore Perry first forcibly opened the country in the 1850s. But by the late 1890s, Meiji officials were exuding an attitude of Great Power confidence and imperial entitlement commensurate with a nation that was now "leaving Asia" to "enter the West," in the famous locution of Japanese intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi.¹¹ Japan had remained independent, promulgated a constitution, and rapidly modernized the country. Its military, retrained and retooled, proved itself a worthy opponent against much larger foes, allowing Japan to acquire its own colonial possessions (Liaotung Peninsula and Formosa [Taiwan] from China, 1895). With

these achievements, the Meiji ruling oligarchy increasingly began to situate Japan at the apex of non-Western peoples, and to actively promote its stature in the world. Meiji Japan assumed the mantle of a superior whose “benevolent” civilizing mission in the East consisted of both delivering modernity to the “less advanced” races, and rescuing Asians from colonization by direct military challenges to the imperialistic West. Success against Russia in 1905 confirmed to Japan and others its abilities in the latter regard,¹² and set the global stage for later confrontation with the West in the Pacific War of the mid-twentieth century. With Japan’s annexation of the Korean Peninsula in 1910, Koreans appeared quite alone in the world in their national resistance to what many Western and non-Western observers alike understood to be Japan’s active participation in the protection and modernization of a backward Asian country.¹³

Modernity at Empire’s End: The Ottoman Struggle with “East” and “West”

Japan emerged as an objectification of Eastern modernity in Ottoman discourse only after the empire had suffered a convergence of political, economic, and social crises that included European imperialist pressures from the outside and separatist national movements threatening the stability of the polity from within. Earlier in the nineteenth century, new ideologies had begun to swirl in the minds of Ottoman thinkers concerned about the Empire’s survival: the European Enlightenment and the French Revolution had left an indelible imprint on the Ottoman intellectual educated either in Europe or domestically in one of the many modern schools established as part of the Westernizing reforms of the *Tanzîmât* and after. Rational science, secularism, a patriotic sense of a national homeland, and participation in government through the parliamentary process became the mantras of Ottoman opposition to autocratic rule. As the model liberal democracies of Britain and France persisted in their seizure of Ottoman provinces in North Africa in the 1880s, however, Ottoman disillusionment with Western imperialism pushed intellectuals in the Empire to look in a new direction for a national pattern to emulate, which could still allow them to remain true to these ideals. As the contemporary nineteenth-century sources often reiterated, it was an almost natural inclination for Ottoman reformers to “glance East,” toward Japan,¹⁴ though the current historiography on modernization in the Middle East still frequently omits this fact.¹⁵

At this critical juncture, the demarcation we know today as East and West was being redefined once and for all on both sides of the divide. In large part the terms of the debate were determined by Europe, which then had the ability to dictate the power relations imbedded within this binary. More than merely an idea of division, this boundary was a historical trajectory whose point of origin scholars often debate—whether one takes as its defining moment the ancient Greco-Persian rift, the Latin-Orthodox Christian schism, the appearance of the Prophet Muhammad preaching the rectified Abrahamic faith of Islam and the subsequent Arab conquests, the medieval violence of the Crusades, the Ottoman *ghazi* state on Europe’s frontiers with its very real

ability to carry out threats of military invasion and political hegemony, or the arrival of Napoleon on the shores of Egypt armed with scholars as well as guns to take possession of the Orient.¹⁶

However it was conceived of in earlier times, as a demarcation between Occident and Orient, Christendom and Islamicate civilization, or in its latter stages between an emerging imperial Europe and an increasingly colonized Islamic world, this relationship was firmly theorized by Europe in the nineteenth century within the context of the global economy and Great Power politics, Social Darwinism, and racial assumptions: in short, in axiomatic forms also intellectually accessible to the very Easterners Europe had categorized. At this point, with the power balance having shifted in favor of Europe and rationalized into the consciousness of both Europeans and Asians subjected to the consequences of this hierarchy, the categories of East and West caused a historical anomaly to take place: the Ottoman Empire, an empire historically and geographically tied to Europe since its inception, was now looking to faraway, alien Japan in an innovative way, as fellow Asian brothers in the struggle for modernity and against European encroachment. It was partly the reflection of a new basis of identity at work in the modern world. The religio-dynastic realm and the religious affiliations that were the underpinnings of pre- and early modern identity were, in places and among some peoples, giving way to secular, biological, racialized, and ethnic categories of peoples, so that the Ottomans felt more affinity toward fellow Asian people such as the Japanese than they did to others. Similarly, the Japanese looked further west in Asia, to the Ottoman Empire, as a potential ally against Western (and especially Russian) advance on the Asian continent. These reorientations were driven by the global power structure that had evolved by the nineteenth century in which European empires had acquired colonies, wealth, and the military might to guarantee their expansion. The coalescence of physical, imperial colonization of much of the East by the West with scientific explanations for why human evolution yielded a hierarchy of peoples with various levels of civilization made possible this very anomaly.

Neither the Ottomans nor the Japanese, conversant in the scientific theories of the era defining Asians as inferior to Indo-European races, seriously attempted to reject the notion of a civilizational hierarchy that placed one people above another in the evolutionary ladder. They sought instead to reorder the power scheme within the established framework while leaving its foundational principles of Social Darwinism and cultural determinism intact. For the Japanese, the principles of a hierarchy of nations not only helped them to define who they were as a people, but also justified their later colonial mission in Asia. For the Ottomans, a hierarchy of civilizations indicated the potential for a reassertion of the Empire's former glory in relation to Europe, mediated by the notion that Herbert Spencer's Darwinian interpretation of the differentiation of species would steer the Ottomans on their own unique evolutionary path paralleling European progress. This Ottoman advance would in time lead them back—to that former and more comfortable position of superiority vis-à-vis the Great Powers. Modern Japan would be their guide: as the Young Turk journalist Dr. Abdullah Cevdet phrased it in 1905, Japan would be the "carrier of the torch."¹⁷

Pursuing a comparative study of Ottoman perceptions of Japan from the point of view of a specialist in the history of the Islamic Middle East allows for the opportunity to gain a fresh perspective on the complexity of meaning this East-West distinction meted out. In doing so, I am indebted to a Japan historian whose feedback alerted me to what could be called a “temporal paradox” in historiography. For those engaged in Islamic Studies, Edward Said’s opus on *Orientalism* is one of many theoretical approaches to the study of Islamic societies exposing the historiographical dilemmas of how the field emerged.¹⁸ Middle East and Islamic Studies specialists have been trained to understand the field as one plagued by Western definitions of the exoticized Other in combination with European imperialist politics inscribed into the region of the Middle East, so that the established polemic between the collectives called “East” and “West” has been virtually internalized without enough debate or disputation. Islamic civilization and more generally the entire East, or Orient, is understood to be in a rather constant, inherent state of resistance to a Western onslaught. For those of us whose perspective was limited by this presupposition, it would then seem rather natural for any group located within the entity defined as “the Orient” to identify with, or to commune with, another member of “the East.” Yet to presume this is ahistorical, as a mentor of mine was astute enough to point out.¹⁹ From the vantage point of Japan circa the early modern period and right up to the twentieth century, the Islamic world—and specifically for purposes of this study the Ottoman Empire—was undoubtedly in and an undeniable part of the West: physically, in its geographical positioning; spiritually, as the imperial guardian of Sunni Islam, an extension of the monotheistic, Abrahamic tradition beginning with Judaism and Christianity; and historically, in the shared experiences of the consequent relationships arising from these links. The early center of gravity for Judaism and Christianity was after all further East of Europe: “the Holy Land,” or Ottoman Palestine, as it was known from the sixteenth century onward. Christendom essentially had shifted West over the centuries. Yet Islam and Christendom possessed a single, intertwined history that wavered between competition and cooperation, stability and violence, wars and reconciliation.

Though retrospectively it may seem natural for the Ottomans to have linked themselves to the Japanese nation and its achievements as a comrade in the struggle against Western global hegemony, this is a postmodern illusion of our making. The actual reach toward Japan created a discursive dilemma for Muslims whose history was bound up in shared experience with Europe. To suddenly exit that history in favor of a mythological brotherhood with a foreign, non-Muslim (in effect pagan) nation tucked away in East Asia and about which little was known or had been considered in centuries or decades past required some creative explanation. The Japanese were part of a different cultural sphere comprising East Asians whose relations were forged through Chinese heritage and civilization; revolutionary connections had to be drawn up or constructed by Ottomans and Japanese that ranged from linguistic theories linking Turkish and Japanese languages in order to establish a rational association based on ancient history, to hopeful predictions on the part of Muslim reformers that the Japanese would soon complete their

metamorphosis into the most enlightened Eastern nation by mass conversion to Islam. Significantly, it was not until Japan's first encounters with the West in the nineteenth century that a relationship between the Islamic Ottoman Empire and modern Japan could even be contemplated, and not until the late nineteenth century could the convergence of historical circumstances create the precise terms of this dialogue.

Coincidentally, Japan's revision of its self-identity described earlier was related to its historical benefactors at that moment. First and foremost this process relied upon the reconceptualization of China, previously the civilizational and political center of Asia, which had profoundly contributed to the particular development of Japanese history and culture through the ages. As Stefan Tanaka has illustrated in his study of *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History*, the imperial prestige of *Chūgoku*, the Chinese Middle Kingdom, had to be reconfigured by Japanese intellectuals into the inferior status of a backward country they renamed *Shina* before Meiji Japan could venture out of its environment of the Far East and assume its post as the progressive leader of Asia.²⁰ This in turn facilitated Japan's search for new political and economic realms in which to participate as well as its pursuit of unusual partners to further Japanese global aims. It is in this moment that the Ottoman Empire similarly came into focus for Japan for the first time in the late nineteenth century.

The first half of the present work on Ottoman imaginings of Japan investigates the process of envisioning "non-Western" modernity at empire's end, in an Ottoman state and society at the turn of the twentieth century that both sought out modern in the world and struggled between locating itself in the East at one moment and in the West at another. I take into consideration the historical specificity of the Ottoman socio-cultural context and its particular set of challenges in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Ottoman endeavor was affected on the one hand by a crucible of powerful ideas to explain the rise of nations and empires that mapped out their present and their potential futures politically, economically, even socially; on the other hand, the emergence of a new global economic and political order now involved the Japanese state as a major actor—a modernized Eastern nation understood as upholding these ideologies while at the same time altering and reversing the gloomy destinies of colonial subordination facing many Asian peoples.

The theoretical underpinnings of the binary of East and West solidified in this moment even as some players transgressed these boundaries—and Japan was one of the nations able to move between worlds, perhaps even more freely than were the Ottomans. The possibility of this transformation was expressed most succinctly as a physical relocation, the aforementioned "leaving Asia" to "enter the West" uttered by the Japanese intellectual Fukuzawa in describing the Meiji Japanese journey toward *Bunmei Kaika*, or progress and enlightenment. Ironically this path frequently led non-Western nations hunting for modernity to "return" to their original cultural homes in an attempt to modernize while preserving the "eastern essence" that made them a "unique" nation to begin with. Or perhaps better stated, the nation ended up traversing back and forth over time in search of its identity, across the chasm of East and West. In Japan's case, a vehement nativist reaction against the West in

the twentieth century followed the radical Meiji-era over-Westernization that occurred as Japan rapidly modernized to become a respected imperial power. The Ottomans who embraced modern Japan as an example to emulate hoped to make a similar kind of migration into the modernized Great Power status, but first they had to leave Europe to “revisit” Asia, to discover and reinvigorate their Eastern potential, before returning to their familiar cultural sphere that was ineluctably fastened to European historical currents.

The ramifications of Japan’s choices and its abilities in this transformation were interpreted differently by Europe and by Asians even when they had access to the exact same information. The Western world noted with much trepidation and anxiety the implications of Japanese modernization and military might—in other words the rebellion it might incite all over the world among the Asians and Africans resident in Europe’s imperial possessions who desired liberation from the colonial yoke. This fear was aptly demonstrated in the prolific amount of racially prejudiced headlines and imagery splashed across the Western-language newspapers to the effect of a “Yellow Peril,” a rival Japanese Empire emerging that threatened Western imperial powers’ own colonial and economic might in the Orient and perhaps would even overtake the world in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War (see figure 1.1).²¹



Figure 1.1 The Knackfuss painting.

Note: This image was reprinted in several Arabic journals to depict the European fears of the “Yellow Peril.” Designed and commissioned by Kaiser Wilhelm in 1895, and titled “*völker Europas, wahrt eure heiligsten Güter*” (“Peoples of Europe, Guard Your Dearest Goods”), it is also known as “Knackfuss painting” after artist Hermann Knackfuss. The image circulated among Western rulers, and the Japanese also published it in their papers.

In contrast, Asian anticolonialists in various parts of the world swelled with pride over Japanese successes. The Chinese *Ch'ing-i* ("National Renovation Movement") in the last quarter of the nineteenth century that extended into the 1898 Chinese Reform Movement has been linked to Japanese influence there.²² The Vietnamese *Đông-đô* ("go East") movement typified the tendency among elites of non-Western societies seeking modernity to look selectively to Japan for guidance; Vietnamese intellectuals had Japan in mind as their cultural and national pattern to mimic.²³ The Indian nationalist struggle against the British Raj idealized Meiji Japan, and to complement the intellectual discourse on Japan and modernization, Indian nationalists made direct contacts with the Japanese to assist in demanding economic self-sufficiency and political self-governance. Indian political exiles and engineering students found a haven in Tokyo after 1900.²⁴ Indian nationalists instigated the 1905 Swadeshi Boycott of all foreign manufactured goods while allowing Japanese products to freely enter the country; indeed some of the first textile factories operating independently in India used Japanese machinery in them.²⁵ The Russo-Japanese War and Japan's defeat of Czarist Russia in 1905 had an immense impact on the entire world, whether among the colonized nations of Africa and Asia who now felt their liberation was at hand, such as those in the Dutch East Indies,²⁶ or those anticipating a revolution in the East that might alter their autocratic political system to favor constitutional arrangements, such as Persia.²⁷ Even the African American community wrangling with racist notions of white supremacy in the post-civil war, postslavery environment of the United States took notice of Japan as a symbol to further their cause. After 1905, black internationalists believed the Japanese to be a "champion of the darker races" whom they anticipated would be powerful enough in 1918 to guarantee a provision for racial equality be inserted into the League of Nations Covenant; President Wilson intervened, however, to defeat the amendment for racial equality.²⁸ Proximity to and direct experience of the Japanese ascent to power determined the rate and intensity with which a nation became disillusioned with the Japanese model, the Koreans and Chinese being the first to eventually resist Japan as a colonialist power. More distant peoples, however, could continue to imagine the ideal of modern Japan in any way they chose to portray it.

This solidarity of the so-called non-Western world found its deepest bonding experience in the mutual enthusiasm expressed toward Japan during the Russo-Japanese War and its astounding victory over the Czar's forces in 1905, and the Ottoman Empire was no exception. Japan suddenly came to personify collective Asian strength and potential to succeed against the odds: to take the best from the West in order to surpass it, due to some kind of preservation of Eastern cultural-moral superiority that was channeled into patriotic defense of the homeland as well as into the dedication to modernize technically and socially (see figure 1.2). Passionate anti-Western, anti-imperialist sentiment flourished again in Asia during the Second World War, when many colonized and semicolonized peoples flirted with Imperial Japan as their potential liberator. Japan's mid-twentieth-century "revolt against the West,"²⁹ culminating in the Pacific War and the Second World War against the Allies, was viewed with ambivalence by many of the colonized peoples of the Islamic world who had



Figure 1.2 Arabic weekly Newspaper *al-'Aṣr al-Jadīd* (The New Century) published in Cairo by Iskandar Chalhouh Bey.

Note: Front page of Egyptian newspaper *al-'Aṣr al-Jadīd* (September 16, 1904) during the Russo-Japanese War, picturing Japanese prime minister Marquis Itō, Russian general Smirnov, and Chemulpo (Inchon, Korea) Bay where the Japanese carried out a strike against the Russian fleet.

suffered at the hands of Europe before the First World War and after, during the Mandate period. For this reason the fascination with the Japanese miracle of progress quickly resurfaced in Arabic literature and elsewhere (Indonesia) in the postwar period though the wartime behavior of the Japanese seems to have violated the very values of liberation they had come to represent. Despite Japan having committed atrocities in Asia, it was a relatively short-lived occupation (with the exception of Manchuria, Taiwan, and Korea) compared to the extended and degrading colonial experience most Asians had had with European powers: Japan as an Asian liberator was certainly preferable to the imperialist West whose hegemony had been part of life on the Asian continent for decades or more.

This historical fact is perhaps not understood well enough even today, in light of a reinvigorated polemic that Samuel Huntington termed the “clash of civilizations,” which has arisen between certain sectors of the West and the Islamic world in the late twentieth century.³⁰ The current tension has an antecedent in the late nineteenth century, when the feelings of anti-imperialist frustration with the West on the part of many Asian Muslims in the world was such that they preferred modernity to be packaged in an alien Japanese form rather than as a direct export from Western (European) civilization. The following pages explore how this attitude was rationalized, if it could be rationalized, or if it was simply a matter of an imagined icon functioning to serve local Ottoman interest without serious regard for any historical reality. The following chapters interrogate current thinking regarding the viability of binary categories like East and West in the humanities field and in our view of the world at large—by demonstrating how they are constructed to assert political affinity, antagonism, or resistance in a particular moment. In addition, by illuminating the Ottoman ability to culturally straddle Europe and Asia at the turn of the century, I disprove the exclusivity of these entities in late Ottoman times and thus their functionality for the present. I hope to encourage readers to think differently about their understanding of the modern world by illustrating that ultimately boundaries perceived to have been firmly demarcated between civilizations or regions were actually much more fluid and shifting than once believed.

Modern Japan in the Ottoman Gaze

Exposing the relationships between the Ottoman Empire and modern Japan in all their richness and depth requires contextualizing them within trends and patterns of the post-Tanzimât Ottoman era from domestic, international relations, and intellectual history perspectives. Reforming ideologies such as Islamic modernism (to reconcile religion and Western civilization) and the emergence of nationalist movements in the Empire indisputably affected the discourse on modernity, as did the predominance of other Western ideas to explain the behavior of societies and nations. Interestingly, embarking upon a study of Middle East nationalism yields a secondary literature on this phenomenon littered with references to the Japanese. Almost every monograph written between the 1960s and 1990s about the development of Arab nationalism will briefly pay homage to Meiji Japan, stressing the significance of the Russo-Japanese War in having inspired peoples of Asia to recognize their distinctive identities, to act collectively to resist the West, and to establish themselves as independent nations.³¹ Usually it is no more than a brief footnote that does not satisfactorily point out that the Japanese victory in 1905 was a three-fold triumph: for East over West in the first technological war between the two in the modern era; as a symbolic defeat of absolutist, autocratic Czarist rule by the forces of the Meiji constitutional monarchy; and as a profound demonstration of the power and spirit of a patriotic, independent nation-state over an antiquated, multiethnic, multireligious empire past its prime. Ironically, to become modern and civilized in this era was synonymous with the ability to

sustain a bloody war and inflict the highest number of casualties upon your enemy as well as to have the most contemporary medical treatments available for your own wounded at the front.

Who was it in the Ottoman Empire that took note of Japan? Was it solely Ottoman officials that observed the Japanese nation-state or that engaged in diplomatic negotiations with its representatives, or did Ottoman society at large envisage the “Rising Sun” and its implications for the Empire? How did people in the Ottoman Empire view Japan and the Japanese, and what characteristics did they emphasize? These questions were often left unanswered in the secondary literature, and I answer them here. Certainly it was not the Ottoman state and its governing personnel alone that paid attention to Japan as a model for administrative practice and the reform of institutional structures. Ottoman civil society also participated in the production of a Japanese trope through observations and commentary in variegated forms. This mutual interrogation of the Japanese example by state and society affected the polity in ways that had dramatic repercussions.

The Ottoman imagining of modern Japan is a kind of theatrical synthesis of concrete and abstract experiences on the part of many different actors. The historical backdrop of our play is the stage of the late nineteenth to the twentieth centuries, when the empire was suffering from multiple crises. The scene consists of a series of official diplomatic encounters and unofficial communications between the two states and their respective representatives, much of which was documented in the archival records of several Ottoman ministries and elsewhere. The dazzling script for this drama, perhaps the star of the production itself, is the interpretive literary discourse on modern Japan appearing concurrently in the pages of the local Arabic and Ottoman Turkish press, the Ottoman and French press published by exiles resident in European capitals and smuggled into the empire, and other miscellaneous literary forms such as books, pamphlets, and poetry collections. All of these forms of expression verbalized and/or otherwise influenced Ottoman public opinion about the distant East Asian nation by extolling the virtues of Japan’s modernization program and the strength of its people’s moral character. And this narrative of Ottoman-Japanese interactions allowed for no distinction to be made between the real and the fictive, as one inevitably had an effect upon the other: as Ottoman and Japanese statesmen met behind the scenes to discuss the establishment of an official treaty, the locally consumed newspapers and the Ottoman populace at reading salons, barber shops, and coffeehouses speculated publicly about the potential benefits such an alliance might have for all parties involved, subtly remolding unsubstantiated rumor and enthusiasm into a set of images of Japan that would soon be reiterated as historical fact and taken as a model toward which the Ottoman ruling class and the ruled should aspire.

A few comments must be made about the construction of an image for specific purposes, both generally and particularly as it relates to a predominantly Muslim empire idealizing the actions of a non-Muslim one. More will be said in subsequent chapters about how Ottoman intellectuals managed to either address or avoid the issue of Japan’s non-Muslim character for the sake of a larger, pan-Asian argument. For now, the following considerations

apply: first, Ottoman individuals constructed Japanese images to reverse the nineteenth-century hierarchy of peoples, and/or to demand sociopolitical change for weaker elements within Ottoman society. This imagery was often not based upon historical fact, but instead upon the argumentative needs of the agents in this process. In other words, those who drafted the images selected what they perceived to be the most valuable or useful characteristics of Japan to emphasize as an Eastern nation-state entity. They presented them as fact, either to contrast European development, or to illustrate Ottoman shortcomings. They frequently omitted what might not be illustrative or useful to their argument. As one scholar explains,

The literary image of another country and its inhabitants, especially on the level of popular literature, is often the image held in reality... The literary stereotype takes on a life of its own, to the point that the images formed by domestic mental and verbal constructs dominate any emanating from the reality.³²

As such, and corroborating Said's work on Orientalism, these images contribute more to an understanding of the society in which they are produced than to the society about which they relate. Representations of the Japanese nation constructed by members of the Ottoman polity that I analyze in successive chapters appear at times to be no less than mere hopeful fantasies of their creators, yet

...to say that the history of opinion is necessarily so insubstantial as to be scarcely worth writing is almost to set aside the possibility of writing history at all, especially the sort of political history which concerns itself with the relationships of nations, so generally does the picture of their relationships spring not from any set of objective facts but from what people have believed—or chosen to believe—to be the facts.³³

Similarly, the social and political history of the people within the Ottoman Empire and their relationships with one another as they engaged in processes of nation building were informed by a discussion of Japanese images because "... we shall find that it is possible for two different and conflicting images to exist side by side in the same society, reflecting conflicts between those who hold them."³⁴

The "factual" data reaching the Middle East about Japan, it must be remembered, often emanated from Western sources so that it might contain certain distortions created by European perception or bias. Even more importantly, the Japanese historical analogy was very frequently derived directly from Japan itself. Japanese agency in constructing a particular self-image that would be consumed by the rest of the world should not be overlooked here. As a consequence of its obsession with recognition by the West, Japan had a vested interest in portraying itself to Europe and to other Asian "consumers" in a positive manner, as a beacon of enlightenment for the Eastern world and a Great Power worthy of treaty concessions and military alliances. Therefore Japanese political intentions in this study must be viewed as causative. Nonetheless,

the way in which these images of Japan were manipulated or interpreted once they reached the Middle East region is paramount to understanding internal historical development in the late Ottoman Empire.

Secondly, many of the constructed images of Japan produced to illustrate proper national or nation-state development, reform and modernization for the Orient, were either generated by or interpreted through Ottoman elite sectors of society. They had access to this information about Japan and as intermediaries for society they expanded upon it according to their own ideological predispositions. Comprehending this process requires mention of Benedict Anderson's discussion of the influence of "print capitalism" on the development of national consciousness among societies whose overarching religio-dynastic realm was in collapse. He notes that "print-as-commodity"—that is, the consumable printed word as it appeared in books, newspapers, and other literature—was influential because it "made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways."³⁵ Those active in the production of print capitalism in the late-nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire such as newspaper editors and publishers were eager to disseminate particular representations of the Japanese nation that would educate their readers in their views of what constituted an independent, Eastern nation. The press and other literature became the forum for propagating particular conceptions of a modern state and society. The press was the pedagogical vehicle whereby new elites could, as mediators of knowledge, suggest themselves as the members of society most qualified to oversee reform from above; they utilized Japanese societal and administrative models to demonstrate potential success in this endeavor for the Ottoman context, and in the process drew parallels between themselves and Japanese statesmen to emphasize their role as elites in contemporary society.

Ottoman elites wrote, but nonelites were still able to participate in the generation of this discourse through other channels. Local experiences on the ground in Ottoman lands related directly to what was happening in the larger world outside, and people made these connections. Ottoman officials certainly made their elitist views apparent in the correspondence they left behind in historical records, whether the memoirs of the Sultan himself, or else the writings and actions of his ministers and diplomats. The press, where perhaps the most striking and sustained public commentary about almost every aspect of Japanese state and society appeared, was the record of the literate middle- and upper-class intelligentsia of the Ottoman Empire who attempted to stake a claim in the ideological orientations of their government as well as in the minds of their reading audiences. They had access to education beyond a rudimentary level; they aspired to guide those less fortunate than themselves in issues ranging from reform of the Empire to national identity. Ottoman journalists engaged in print-capitalist enterprises to formulate "imagined communities" out of Ottoman Arab and Ottoman Turk communities of the Empire for example. They actively undertook "the invention of tradition" postulated by Eric Hobsbawm³⁶ with their respective publications that resulted in a literary renaissance. The vast number of Arabic newspapers to come out of the Arab provinces of the Empire was a result of the initial *nahḍa*, or Arabic literary

awakening of the mid-nineteenth century, and the *yeni Türkçe* (new Turkish) movement flourished among contributors to the Ottoman Turkish journal *Genç Kalemler*. In other words, the Ottoman imagination that rendered the Rising Sun for public consumption was shaped in large part by the ruling elite and the emergent middle class in the Empire involved in publishing ventures for economic livelihood as well as for a means of political activism. Nonetheless, nonelite Ottoman witnesses of the rise of modern Japan were quite capable of recognizing the significance of this nation's achievements for their everyday lives, and this recognition surfaced in the poetry they recited or the comments they made about Japan's war with Russia to foreign travelers passing through even the most remote areas of the Empire.

Postmodern historical analysis has recently demanded that we reexamine history to include subaltern voices that either were not allowed to seize any platform in the historical moment in order to make themselves heard, or at least that were not immediately discernible to the retrospective historian's ear. In other words, a critique of the overemphasis on intellectual elites as historical agents, and especially in the production of nationalist discourse, has appeared in many fields in recent years.³⁷ In Donald Quataert's essay on the state of Ottoman and Turkish studies in the United States, he put forth criteria for what a good study of Ottoman history should have as its basic pool of sources; he made precisely this demand to decenter elite perspectives on historians writing Ottoman history.³⁸ But as Ronald Suny and Michael Kennedy have written in their introduction to *Intellectuals and Articulation of the Nation*, intellectuals often "appear to have the greatest agency in the shaping of national understanding, propagating the values of the nation, disciplining the people internally, and enforcing the rules and boundaries of the constituent people."³⁹ Intellectuals are disproportionately involved in the

... "quiet politics" of nationalism that establishes the possibilities for what states and societies might do.... They do the imaginative ideological labor that brings together disparate cultural elements, selected historical memories, and interpretations of experiences.... [they] were enlighteners, liberators, the articulators of the national spirit that had to be revived, reborn, resurrected.⁴⁰

In the case of the Ottoman construction of a Japanese historical analogy, I tend to sympathize with their hypothesis that the role of intellectuals cannot be overstated when discussing the historical agency involved in producing nationalist ideological formulations that are palatable, attractive suggestions to nonelites on how to identify oneself and how to cope in the modern world.

Newspapers produced by Ottoman elites were read to the illiterate in coffeehouses and reading salons, and this shaped their views. Yet to allege that the lower classes, the peasantry, and people in remote rural areas of the Ottoman Empire had no convictions of their own, no independently reached attitudes about the changing world around them and how to deal with these new circumstances seems to ignore the influence of a large sector of society. Their search for a form of unity to survive in the modern world and to explain the

reality as it transpired on the ground was no less interconnected to the example of Japan than were the orientations of the Ottoman elite who compared themselves to Japanese statesmen. The widespread nature of the fascination with Japan emanating from so many regions, classes, religious faiths, and ethnic communities within the Empire is demonstrated in the variety of images that permeated everyday life in Ottoman Anatolia, the Levant, and Khedival Egypt. Classrooms exposed children to particular images of Japan.⁴¹ People repeated anecdotes of Japanese victories in the course of their daily exchanges. Poetry memorized by schoolchildren and adults or orally transmitted stories conveyed a distinct message about the Japanese nation.⁴² Even the memoirs of the renowned Turkish writer and feminist Halid  Edib Adivar indicate the overwhelming sense of fascination and awe Japan inspired in Ottoman times: like many parents who witnessed Japan's victory, she named her son after the Japanese admiral Togo during the Russo-Japanese War.⁴³ Sources show that Japan was on the minds of many peoples within the borders of the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the century and had a meaning both specific to each individual and common to others of various backgrounds within Ottoman society. The nineteenth-century experience of the Ottoman peasant in Anatolia with the Russian Empire may not have been more sophisticated than a sense of Russia as an historic enemy whose threatening position on Ottoman frontiers required the conscription of one's sons into the military to fight and die defending the Ottoman homeland. But this experience often coincided with reading (or hearing a recitation of) an Ottoman journalist's expos  on Japan in which he or she described in vibrant detail Japan's ability to fend off Western threats and even defeat Russia in war because of Japanese patriotism, love of homeland, and the preservation of a distinctly Japanese warrior ethos. The press vocalized in print the overwhelming emotions everyday events evoked in common people. The coffeehouse and other public gathering areas where literate folk read newspaper articles out loud to illiterates provided a forum for this synthesis to take place.

In effect the shared perception of the Japanese nation-state by members of various classes including the Ottoman ruling elite, middle-class journalists or political activists, and the rest of the Empire's subjects created a kind of dialogic bridge that vertically spanned state and society, a phenomenon in many ways rather new to an Empire formerly founded on a principle of rather marked separation (though not an impervious boundary) between the *askeri* (ruling) class and the *reaya* (the flock). Enthusiasm for the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 was almost universally celebrated in the Ottoman Empire, for example, with two noticeable exceptions: first, Sultan Abd lhamid II supposedly exhibited uneasy concern that his rule would be too closely equated with that of the defunct Czar after 1905, an issue with deeper implications for the Sultan during his struggle with the Young Turks. Second, the Balkan Christians of the Empire were overwhelmingly Slavic in ethnicity and Orthodox in faith. They identified most strongly with Russia, they sided with their Christian protector in the 1905 war, and they were reported to have frequently conducted church services to pray for a defeat of the Japanese, unlike Orthodox Christian Arabs in the Ottoman provinces whose journals were filled with exhortations of praise for the Japanese nation now awakened

in the East. The Ottoman state cared about public opinion toward Japan just as Ottoman subjects took an interest in diplomatic actions carried out by the Sublime Porte. Opinions held in common concerning the secrets of Japanese progress facilitated an inclusive sense of pan-Ottoman solidarity to an extent, across socioeconomic class differences.

Disparate viewpoints about Japan tended to reflect political contests between those commanding authority in the Ottoman Empire and those excluded from it. Some members of the Ottoman elite before the 1908 constitutional revolution and particularly after the 1909 counterrevolution saw Japan as their pattern for oligarchical government and centralized administrative control, whereas others emphasized the parliamentary nature of the Meiji constitutional monarchy as an endorsement for advancing democratic processes in the Ottoman system so as to allow greater civic participation. Egyptian demands for independence issuing from several nationalist camps tended to emphasize different aspects of the Japanese nation-state in their pleas to expel the British and acquire their own sovereignty, depending upon their proximity to nodes of power within the local Egyptian political system. The situation was complicated even further by the fact that a large number of Syrian Arab émigrés, many of whom were Christian, had a substantial role in both the British colonial administration in Egypt as well as in the publishing industry centered there. Their views at times corresponded with, and at other times contradicted, the indigenous Egyptian nationalist press in its reportage of Japanese modernity.

Views of Japan held in common by the ethno-religiously diverse population of the Ottoman Empire generated a horizontal bond of pan-Asian solidarity with one another—perhaps for the last time—in an empire being slowly pulled apart by the centrifugal forces of nationalist awakenings. Spurred on by the momentum of pan-Asian optimism generated by Japanese achievements, Ottoman ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional, and class differences were subsumed for the most part under the aspiration to somehow replicate Japan's success in the Ottoman realm. The general editorial opinions expressed about Japan's victory in 1905 by Muslim Young Turk exiles in Europe, such as the secular Positivist Ahmed Rıza, for example, were likely consistent with the views of an Egyptian Coptic Christian publisher in Alexandria, or with the pan-Islamist Egyptian nationalist Muştafa Kāmil, or with those of the Islamic modernist and Ottoman Druze notable Shakīb Arslān, or indeed with most comments on the subject made by Syrian Christian journalists resident in Damascus, Cairo, or Beirut.

Simultaneously, however, the specific Japanese traits emphasized by one Ottoman societal group or another tended to be indicative of the emergent ideological differences that would eventually see the empire dissolve during and after the First World War. Although members of Ottoman society overwhelmingly shared their enthusiasm for Japan as a model of reform and national development, they also defined themselves more strongly in contrast to other communities in the Empire through the medium of discussions of Japan. At precisely the moment when it was believed by more traditional elements of Ottoman society that indigenous Eastern culture and Western forms of science and technology (Islam and modern civilization) could be successfully assimilated, a formula Japan represented for many Islamists, the Ottoman

regime itself was moving toward the secularization and Westernization of culture and institutions to modernize the polity, and statesmen used the Japanese example to argue for it—especially so in the second constitutional period.

Some Ottoman Turks viewed Japan's "racial uniqueness" as the source of their tremendous capability in the international arena as well as their success in domestic modernization. This solidified their own Turkish identity as a racial group in the empire destined to remain its governing elite at the expense of the Arabs and other non-Turk elements. This belief served as an antecedent to the eventual willingness of the Turk-dominated Ottoman state to perpetrate policies designed to homogenize the homeland in the final years of the empire. They increasingly viewed themselves as an ethnic entity like the Japanese; some of those who perceived Japan in the most racialized terms, or who were the most influenced by this conception of race as it was framed in Western theoretical praxis and outlined in certain press and literature on the Turkish nation, applied it to Turkish identity. They acted on this understanding most profoundly in the twentieth century: as the architects of the Armenian genocide of 1915 as well as emptying Anatolia of unwanted minority populations that would contradict such an ethno-religious, racial understanding of a modern Turkey (though one ethnicity, the Kurds, was left in place that caused difficulties later). Japan embodied racial exclusivity and homogeneity for these Ottoman Turks.

In contrast, the Ottoman Arabs of the Empire saw a different metaphor of Japan. The Arab vision of the Japanese nation legitimated their demands for a special place for Arabs in the Ottoman Empire as the descendants of the pious ancestors—*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*—the early Arabs, founders of Islam and the original genius behind Islamic civilization (its current incarnation being the Ottoman polity). The inclusiveness of Arabo-Islamic cultural heritage symbolized by Arabic language, the Islamic faith, and a shared history with other Muslims and non-Muslims, and not necessarily a distinct racial connotation of the term Arab, prevailed in their consciousness. Interestingly, despite the potential for a strongly ethnic understanding of the term "Arab" to unite Arab Christians and Muslims where their religiosity divided them, most Arab Christian writers tended instead to delineate a mutually shared Arab identity in terms corresponding to those of Arab Muslims: as coinheritors of an Arab, Islamic tradition. Japan's reverence for its ancestors as a defining characteristic that buttressed its Eastern spirituality was taken to be the model for Ottoman Arabs of all Christian and Muslim denominations.

The Egyptian Arabs had their own ideas on what to learn from the Japanese example. Nationalists in British-occupied Egypt viewed modern Japan as inspiration for establishing an independent and constitutional country once they could dislodge British forces. Their comparative discourse on the Japanese nation-state possessed a heavily anticolonial tone that also emphasized the particularistic heritage of the Egyptians and thus disconnected them from the larger Ottoman Arab population in other provinces, who considered themselves part of a fledgling pan-Arab nation stretching across the Levant and North Africa.

As all these members of the Ottoman community shared in pan-Asian feelings of solidarity with Japan, an intimation of equality with one another could be said to have been etched into Ottoman consciousness despite

ethno-religious distinctions. However, at the very same moment, they inevitably also began to irreversibly differentiate themselves from one another. Discourse on modern Japan was a timely prism through which to discern these evolving debates and distinctions. Ottoman individuals worked out for themselves the achievements they attributed to a particular set of Japanese values or policies while conjuring up their versions of a “Rising Sun.” In turn they incorporated these ideas into their own communal self-views, setting themselves apart from other sectors of Ottoman society.

A study such as this one will require some introduction to the Ottoman predicament of the late nineteenth century before proceeding to unlock the precise meanings of discourse on modern Japan produced in the empire, how to study these perceptions, and how perception can affect historical outcomes. It will not be a strictly chronological progression, but rather the chapters are organized thematically. Part I, subtitled “Seeking out ‘Modern’ in the International Arena,” is broken up into three chapters. Chapter 2 explores the complexities of “non-Western” modernity by first clarifying the ways in which power is framed—the theoretical underpinnings of the hierarchy of nations as formulated in the nineteenth century and played out militarily through the seizure of colonies by European powers. The search for modernity caused people to look in various places for solutions. I explore the historiography of East and West as binary categories, then move on to look at the rise of Japan and the Chinese response to this in comparison to Islamic civilization’s relationship to the West. Japan reversed the global political order according to many Asian observers; I probe some of the relevant commentary made by Ottoman writers claiming that Japan had done precisely this, juxtaposing their views within the context of other Eastern or Asian attitudes toward Japanese modernity.

Chapter 3 reviews several factors determining the Ottoman Empire’s orientation as a polity, physically and intellectually situated between Europe and Asia. Incorporation into the world economic system on the periphery of the European core and a responsiveness among members of the Ottoman intelligentsia to Western currents of thought are the key links to the European continent affecting Ottoman life and reform efforts in the nineteenth century. In the case of the latter, this responsiveness started with ideas of the Enlightenment and influences from the French Revolution; in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, influential Western theorists, including the French sociologist Gustave Le Bon and the British philosopher-sociologist Herbert Spencer, explicated the racial-civilizational order in ways comprehensible to Ottoman intellectuals.

Against this intellectual milieu, Chapter 4 explores the efforts to conduct Ottoman-Japanese diplomacy as a very real response to challenges that both powers faced at the time. Though ultimately these attempts are a failed experiment between the “two citadels of Asia,” they are the backdrop for the Ottoman transformation from a “Sick Man of Europe” into the “Japan of the Near East”—in other words, the Ottoman migration out of Europe and into East. Due to the significant contributions of the Tatar Muslim political activist Abdürreşid İbrahim in attempting to forge this relationship, he will be discussed in a separate section.

Part II centers on how “modern” was defined in the Ottoman microcosm. In these chapters I elucidate the specific constructions of Japan imagery produced by Ottoman writers and intellectuals starting in the late nineteenth century and continuing through the First World War era, and how various groups wielded these images for domestic political effect. The Young Turks and Sultan Abdülhamid II were locked in a political struggle in which both sides found the Japan model to be an expedient tool for critique and defense, the focus of Chapter 5. This scenario is replicated again after the Committee of Union and Progress asserted its authority in the Empire more assiduously from around 1909. Constitutional, parliamentary government and universal education in one instance were the most important institutions behind Japanese success according to Young Turk exiles, provincial Arabs, and Egyptian nationalists; most of the Ottoman Turkish discourse from roughly 1912 onward distinctly shifts to interest in Japanese military strategy and modernization techniques as a response to wartime considerations, and the sources in general become scant after 1916.

Chapters 6–7 focus upon Ottoman definitions of *terakkî* and *medeniyet*—modern progress and civilization—and how to achieve these through the appropriate synthesis of “Eastern essence” and “Western science,” à la Japan. Obviously there was variation in how these concepts were conceived by Ottoman authors. Around the turn of the century, Arabic writings on Japanese nationhood underscored certain elements necessary for defining Arabo-Islamic heritage; this resembled the exposition on Japan put forth by Islamic modernists from various ethnicities in the Empire who often wrote in Ottoman Turkish and who expanded upon how to become modern without sacrificing indigenous Muslim culture and morality. At the same time, their exegesis contrasted much of the secular, proto-nationalist Turkish discussions of Japan produced by Ottoman elites in positions of authority that stressed racial identity as the essential ingredient of “Easternness” and that understood the Empire’s survival in the modern world as predicated upon Turkish leadership to guide them through. The importance of specific traits Ottoman authors attributed to the Japanese themselves or to their state-led reform program allows us to better understand the internal dynamics being played out between Ottoman groups.

In the framework of the Japanese example mediating non-Western identity and nationhood, turn-of-the-century Egypt possessed a peculiar set of circumstances (situated between Europe and Asia, linked to both by geographic proximity and history, its ongoing British occupation) that requires a separate chapter in this study, although the centrality of Cairo as a hub of journalistic enterprise that reached far beyond Suez makes it impossible to consider Egypt in complete isolation from Ottoman Arab intellectual trends. In any case, for many Egyptian nationalists, Pharaonic Egyptian past became synonymous with Japanese ancestral worship as two similar foundations of particularistic national identity reinforcing the ability of the collective to achieve independence. The fulfillment of Egyptian statehood necessitated first and foremost a withdrawal of British forces before the natural course of Egypt’s development could commence; this process was represented by the attainment of a constitutional government and a universal, compulsory education system similar to

those of Meiji Japan. Both institutions were to elicit as well as to propagate a sense of Egyptian pride and patriotism in the territorial homeland (*waṭan*), the other key signifier of modernity for the national community (*umma*). Syrian Muslim and Christian émigrés residing in Egypt who published newspapers added yet another layer to the dialogue on modernity taking place there. They contributed to the discourse on Japan in ways that subtly shaped thinking about what should be the proper sociopolitical principles underlying the emergent Egyptian nation. Their influence should be understood empire-wide, their ideas, indicative of the broader debates occurring over the place of religion and ethnicity in one's identity and in the formation of non-Western modernity.

Part I

Seeking out “Modern” within the
International Arena

2

Framing Power and the Need to Reverse

The so-called clash of civilizations some parts of the world believes it is currently witnessing between the West and Islam is better described as the latter stage of a process that began in the nineteenth century as “subaltern” resistance to Western imperial and civilizational hegemony. The voices of opposition to Western domination emanating from the Ottoman Middle East (and from other parts of the colonized world as well), fueled by a desire to assert agency in the international order and over their own destinies, expressed indignation at a formerly inferior Europe, which now appeared to have the upper hand in military, economic, and political affairs involving Asians and Muslims. Many non-Western intellectuals in the latter nineteenth century objected to the unjust, inhumane, and socially destructive aspects of “rationalist” Enlightenment thought that justified European colonial enterprises and the Western cultural supremacy that it came to imply. But the ideological principles underpinning the discriminatory framework in place at this historic juncture, including those which organized European, Asian, and African peoples respectively into a hierarchy of “advanced” and “primitive” nations, remained an accepted set of ideas upon which to formulate modernity for most of the West and non-West alike up until the twentieth century. The Ottoman Empire, as a state claiming both succession from earlier Islamic civilization and a history in and with Christian Europe, was intellectually inseparable from these currents of thought. Ottoman individuals wrestling with questions of modernity were constrained by these ultimately Western-centric ideals that subordinated the non-West to Europe. Not until recently could the final phase in this process—the dramatic redefinition of foundations for an alternative form of modernity that is a subtle rejection of this framework—be said to have occurred in the Islamic Middle East, with the rise of political Islam in the latter half of the twentieth century after the failure of secular regimes in the region, which had attempted to establish themselves as mirror images of Western nation-states.¹

In an era when modern progress and civilization was understood as universally possible provided certain Western-defined societal and political criteria were met, what Cemil Aydın has described as “the idea of a ‘universal West’

in non-Western intellectual histories during the first half of the nineteenth century,"² the idealization of Meiji Japan as a model nation and state by a diverse cross-section of Ottoman writers and political activists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries demarcates what I view as a creative and dynamic intermediary step in the Middle East's progression toward formulating an "alternative universalism"³ to that imposed upon it by the West; it would be Eastern-based and thus possess authenticity.⁴ Ottoman attempts to liberate the Empire from European manipulation through an articulated program of reform and modernization of both state and society, however, retained the conceptual agenda for modernity originating from the West. The Ottoman individuals who responded to this challenge assembled their powerful responses to European charges of cultural, racial, and civilizational inferiority and ineptitude not by definitively rejecting Western ideas or institutions; nor did they condemn their own non-Western, Islamic heritage as obstacles to true enlightenment, as some Europeans alleged was the case (though a few Ottomans did concur with this proposition). Instead, they refigured intellectual arguments in a way that resonated both among indigenous Ottoman audiences at home and with foreign powerbrokers in Europe: they reversed the entrenched hierarchy of peoples established by Western modes of thought through their deployment of the metaphor of an "Eastern" modern Japan, the bases of which were the very values Europe demanded non-Western peoples display in order to be considered among the civilized nations of the world. Meiji Japan had ascended to this status; the path had supposedly been cleared for other Asians to follow suit.

Imperialism and the Hierarchy of Nations

William McNeill and others have hypothesized that history occurs as a result of encounters between different cultures. This notion is still applicable, provided we concede that the theoretical by-product which this approach spawned, modernization theory as he explicated it earlier in his magnum opus *The Rise of the West*, has since been made obsolete by less culturally biased explanations of capitalist formation and development.⁵ Nonetheless, the generic axiom that contact by "less-skilled peoples" with foreign cultures provokes "a painful ambivalence between the drive to imitate and an equally fervent desire to preserve the customs and institutions that distinguish the would-be borrowers from the corruptions and injustices that also inhere in civilized life"⁶ is a recurrent phenomenon throughout human history, creating an unavoidable dilemma for the weaker element in encounters between societies and/or civilizations with differing levels of political, economic or military might. The ambivalent sentiments of the "lesser skilled peoples" (whoever they may be at a given moment) to simultaneously adopt foreign attributes while preserving native ones emerge during the attempt to exert agency over their destiny in the face of a (perceived) powerful, dominant, or threatening outside force that has altered or may alter the socioeconomic, political, or intellectual environment in some way. Christian Europe's lengthy involvement with the Islamic world conformed to this relational dynamic, though the "cultural-civilizational advantage" oscillated between the two over time.

The dialogue on modernity that arose in the modern era when Europe had assumed preeminence in the world should be understood from the perspective of this “ambivalence over assimilation” experienced by non-European peoples.

Most historians now recognize the dated Orientalist paradigms that generally assumed a state of perpetual hostility in Western-Muslim relations, either latent or blatant, to be inaccurate and overly simplistic, though this attitude still prevails today in some circles. In any case, medieval Islamic empires and more recently the Ottoman state had been able to claim cultural, economic, and military superiority over Christendom in a complex association that fluctuated at various times between wars, alliances, trade, and coexistence. But the Age of Discovery had yielded new wealth, power, and eventually colonies and new conflicts as the empires of Europe extended their tentacles to reorder the global economic system, explore uncharted territories, and exploit the world’s resources. According to Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system perspective, a sociopolitical, economic transformation ensued, which catapulted Europe into the position of ascendancy when different parts of Asia were incorporated into the world-capitalist system as elements of the semi-periphery or the periphery in relation to the European core.⁷ The crystallization of a hierarchy of nations in the nineteenth century is rooted in this dramatic reordering of the world that either altered prior balances of power between “East” and “West” or that created new dynamics between Europeans and Asians not known to one another before.

Western philosophy and biological science, it should be noted, accompanied Europe’s physical domination of much of the Asian continent, assisting in the building of empire, as Edward Said theorized in *Orientalism*. Enlightenment thought served several purposes here: to explain and to categorize in rationalist terms for the Europeans the new phenomena encountered, and by extension, then, to legitimate Western seizure of territories for imperial purposes and to justify the subjugation of native peoples by scientifically classifying them as backward and unable to attain civilization by themselves. About the determining factors used to categorize peoples as progressive or uncivilized more will be said in a moment.

The global economic transformation also influenced the emergence of new forms of identity, new systems of political organization, and radical ideas about public participation in these constructs among communities in the West, leading to what is called the rise of European nationalism and the nation-state. Benedict Anderson’s now-famous definition quoted here elucidates his theoretical idea of the nation and the historic process behind its genesis, about which the academic field now burgeons with works explicating the formation of national consciousness in diverse contexts. The nation, he writes, is

...an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.... The nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them...has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.... It is imagined as *sovereign* because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were

destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. . . . Finally, it is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.⁸

European expansion and the secular, scientific rationalism of the Enlightenment dictated the historicization of the nation-state. As the dominant narrative of development, the apogee of a logical, linear, Eurocentric progression toward modernity to which all other peoples and nations should aspire (what Prasenjit Duara calls “History” with a capital “H”), the concepts “nation” and “nation-state” would be understood as principal goals by all those who embraced modern scientific thought.⁹ The Western nation-state was implied to be and indeed was accepted as the norm demonstrating the successful achievement of progress and modernization in the current era. As Partha Chatterjee points out,

This type of nationalism [leading to a Western nation-state] shares the same material and intellectual premises with the European Enlightenment, with industry and the idea of progress, and with modern democracy. Together they constitute a historical unity . . . this gives the liberal-rationalist his paradigmatic form in which nationalism goes hand-in-hand with reason, liberty and progress.¹⁰

In effect, the historicized Western nation-state, with its claims of secular, rational science and humanism as base, combined symbiotically with European colonial expansion to generate a political and intellectual hegemony in which the “non-West,” the “East,” or the “Orient,” was relegated to the seemingly indisputable position of the subordinate. The “less-skilled peoples” in the modern era then were those peoples who had not yet formed into nation-states, whose societies were still ordered according to religious, dynastic principles, whose political authorities had not conducted economic, imperialist activities and succeeded in becoming true competitors with the West. Modernity measured in these terms created a losing proposition for those not adhering to these criteria: any deviation from the Western nation-state standard implied an incompleteness, an imperfection, and a dire need for drastic reform of the faulty society or state. In Rebecca Karl’s work on Chinese nationalism, she calls this far-reaching consequence “the uneven world of modernity.”¹¹ This unevenness, due to global political and economic circumstances, made the theorization of a duality, a binary of East and West possible in the nineteenth century, and it was a binary in which the former was a replica, a shadow, an imperfect, lesser copy of the latter, and not an original.

Partha Chatterjee explains in *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories* how colonial regimes “had on [their] side the most universalist justificatory resources produced by post-Enlightenment social thought.”¹² Rational science and Comtean Positivism paved the way for influential European philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Weber, Herder, Fichte, Ernst Renan, Haeckel, Herbert Spencer, and Gustave Le Bon to work out their intellectual contributions to what would become political economy and racialized

theories of the evolutionary stages in human development, replacing earlier conceptions of societal difference between Europe and the non-West that emphasized climatic effects for example.¹³ Social Darwinism, as it came to be called, came to explain economic and military competition and the grab for colonies among European imperial powers as part of a natural struggle for survival and the evolution toward a higher state of societal existence. Social Darwinism is defined (paraphrasing Claeys's definition from Mike Hawkins's study) as the fourfold belief in biological laws governing nature, including humans; the pressure of population growth upon resources generating a struggle for existence; those possessing certain physical and mental traits are at an advantage that can be passed on through inheritance; in time the cumulative effects of natural selection and inheritance account for the emergence of new species and the elimination of others.¹⁴ The Indo-European "species" of course was understood as the most evolved of human societies, "fittest" implying the most intelligent; Asians and Africans were considered "less developed" or even "barbaric." The double-edged European sword of Social Darwinism for non-Western peoples in the colonial era of the nineteenth century was that either the process of "survival of the fittest" dictated that "aiding the unfit may undermine the organic improvement of the race,"¹⁵ so that more advanced civilizations had the scientifically validated right to seize what they would from weaker races, or more gently put, "'civilised races... encroach on and replace' the savage... through the accumulation of capital and the growth of the arts"¹⁶; or in the more charitable attitude of Malthus, for example, the more advanced should assist those less capable but willing to persevere—a socioeconomic principle for societies to administer their poor that was easily reoriented internationally to justify colonizing Asia and Africa "for their own good." In either case the non-West was to be the passive recipient of coercive actions by the more evolved, more powerful Europe.

Crucial to ideological formation among nineteenth-century European and Asian intelligentsias who generated "scientific" definitions of "the nation" was the incorporation of Herbert Spencer's Social Darwinist philosophy that implied evolution toward an ideal type: the inevitable human progression from primitive organization to complexity and heterogeneity included the hereditary transmission of certain traits such as race, language, and morality that assisted in adapting to the environment and ultimately improving upon the species.¹⁷ After all, how could science be wrong? Spencer's determinist vision of social progress had several identifiable precepts that influenced European and non-Western world-views. First, militarism reflected an early phase of human conflict and evolution that would eventually be replaced by peaceful industrial competition in a *laissez-faire* economic order in which moral self-consciousness restrained baser instincts and guaranteed the system; second, biological differentiation could be applied to the structural "organism" of society as well as more broadly to races of people whose inherent traits demarcated their position in the world; third, the character of a people determined the functionality of its institutions; and fourth, developing out of Britain's acquisition of a host of imperial possessions in the nineteenth century, colonialism actually interfered with the natural progression of the "inferior races" toward a higher state of being.¹⁸

French sociologist Gustave Le Bon also emphasized a specific people's inherent character and morality, hypothesizing what he considered to be the essentialistic traits leading to a people's progress as follows:

Character is formed by the combination, in varying proportions, of the different elements... by the name of sentiments. Among the sentiments playing the most important part, perseverance, energy, and the power of self-control, as faculties more or less dependent on the will, must more especially be noted. We would also mention morality among fundamental elements of character... by morality we mean hereditary respect for the rules on which the existence of a society is based... the greatness of peoples depends in large measure on the level of their morality... the character of a people and not its intelligence determines its historical evolution, and governs its destiny.¹⁹

Le Bon's *Psychologie des foules* [Psychology of Crowds] and *Les lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples* [The Psychological Laws of the Evolution of Peoples] explicated race as possessing fixed psychological characteristics that could not be transmitted from one people to another. According to him, the relationship between the mental constitution of a particular race and their ancestral heritage, and the influence of environment upon a race's civilizational development all contributed to the formulation of a racial hierarchy.²⁰ Le Bon's approach claimed that

...the human races may be divided into four groups: 1) the primitive races; 2) the inferior races; 3) the average races; 4) the superior races... Among the average races, we shall place the Chinese, the Japanese, the Mongolians, and the Semitic peoples... Only the Indo-European peoples can be classed among the superior races... It is to them that is due the high level reached by civilisation [*sic*] at the present day.²¹

Le Bon's (and other Western intellectuals') rationale led to a so-called hierarchy of nations that was widely considered scientifically accurate at the time and was exploited by Europeans. Asians and other non-Europeans who were familiar with Le Bon's ideas generally detested the ranking of Indo-European peoples above others. However the actual framework and criteria for arranging humankind in this manner was for the most part considered methodologically sound and therefore difficult to refute (though in the next chapter I will elucidate the Ottoman use of Spencer's philosophy to turn the framework on its head).

Asian intellectuals and/or elites in non-Western societies who had access to European education, including members of the Ottoman ruling and nascent middle classes schooled in the modern educational institutions established in the Empire from roughly Sultan Mahmud II's reign onwards, were inundated with this cultural baggage attached to Western rationalism that informed much of their ideological thinking at the end of the nineteenth century. They

reacted favorably for example to Le Bon's scientific views on the formation of a people's character and morality (*The Psychological Laws of the Evolution of Peoples* [1894] was translated into Japanese, Arabic, and Turkish); but they were then forced to acquiesce (if temporarily) to the validity of a hierarchy of nations representing the current geopolitical environment in which the balance of power had tipped in favor of a more powerful Europe. In addition, Le Bon's enthusiasm for the achievements of Islamic civilization endeared him to many in the Muslim world who may have otherwise found his theories offensive and his science skewed. In any case, racial-civilizational schemes that today would be easily identifiable as prejudiced and driven by an Orientalist mentality were at the time considered scientifically based facts postulating a fundamental, essentialist duality between East and West, an undeniable division between peoples of Europe and Asia that actually seemed logical to both sides. If the framework measuring modernity was scientifically unassailable, then non-Indo-European peoples would have to adjust the rankings within the hierarchy somehow in order to reclaim agency in the shaping of their futures.

Post-Enlightenment ideals of the French Revolution (embodied in such documents as the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*) and their political manifestation—participatory governance by a willing civil society, constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy, equality before the law, a patriotic love of homeland, all the markers of a modern Western nation also made their way into non-Western societies, making it even more difficult to refute the “liberal” values espoused by European powers in this era of Western economic and colonial dominance. The dilemma of reconciling progressive Western principles being implemented in Europe with the contradictory deeds conducted abroad by European powers in the form of imperial conquests was left to Asians and Africans. The non-West was at the receiving end of actions by European states whose privilege it was to take any lands or resources it required, by force if necessary, but whose rhetoric concerning the obligation to deliver this superior scientific civilization to those “lesser races” with whom it came into contact was used to buttress its colonial behavior. As Chakrabarty aptly notes, “the European colonizer of the nineteenth century both preached this Enlightenment humanism at the colonized and at the same time denied it in practice.”²² Khalidi summarizes the uneasy sentiments triggered in the Middle East by the paradox of Western thought and reality:

The peoples of that region had already had lengthy experiences with the West....The positive aspects were associated with Western scientific, technical, educational, and cultural advances, military and governmental efficiency, and liberal values, all of which came to be appreciated by increasing numbers of people in the Middle East, particularly intellectuals, the educated, and the growing middle and urban working classes. The desire to emulate and reproduce these values gradually spread in these sectors of Middle Eastern society. On the other hand, the negative aspects...related primarily to the gradual domination and subjugation of the region...by European powers. This lengthy and painful process left

deep and lasting scars, and naturally affected the reception of Western values among Arabs, Turks, Iranians, and other Middle Easterners.²³

As in other parts of Asia, the Ottoman expression of “ambivalence over assimilation” to this Europe-centered contradiction was a creative, politically charged argument that decentered the West as the model for modernity and made possible the replacement of it with the alternative of Meiji Japan, a modern nation by Western standards that appeared to have reconciled Eastern essence with Western science.

The Ottoman Dilemma

The process of global restructuring that took place in the early modern period created a massive disruption within the Ottoman Empire, for which there were dramatic social, economic, and political consequences that became visible in later centuries. The Ottoman Empire’s incorporation into the world economic system after the sixteenth century as part of the periphery meant it was transforming into a source of raw materials for Europe and an export market for European manufactured goods.²⁴ Subsequently, a breakdown of Ottoman-Islamic unifying ideology and institutions eventually ensued that had far-reaching sociopolitical effects for the Ottoman Middle East.²⁵ Starting in the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire had suffered a series of setbacks and military defeats at the hands of European states (including the Russian Empire).²⁶ İslamoğlu-İnan describes how economic displacement undermined the Ottoman “integrative principle that focused on the state’s ability to direct the flow of goods inside the world-empire.”²⁷ The state was the mechanism by which to integrate society and economy; peripheralization had meant a weakening of the Ottoman centralized state’s ability to manage this process. She postulates that as a result, there was an attempt to regenerate state control in new forms during the mid-nineteenth century in what is called the *Tanzîmât* reform era, but with authority based primarily upon Western institutions so as to facilitate the Empire’s activities in the global system.²⁸ Carter Findley’s explanation of Ottoman recentralization hinges upon what he views as the state’s desire to strengthen the Empire militarily by increasing revenues through an improved and more efficient administration that could reassert power over the provinces, control the local notables, and reform the government through the use of Sultanic decrees, all of which created a new, professionalized bureaucracy.²⁹

What was significant in this process was that, first, there was inarguably a sense within the empire among different groups from this point onward that something had gone dangerously wrong, that the formerly invincible Ottoman state was falling behind the powers of Europe, and that serious action had to be undertaken to insure its survival.³⁰ The Ottoman Empire that had threatened Christian Europe and whose armies camped outside the walls of Vienna on several occasions in earlier centuries had now shifted to a defensive posture against Europe to retain its territories when, as Cemil Aydın succinctly put it, “there was a qualitative rupture in the relationship between the Muslim world and Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century owing

to globalization and the secularization of the international order."³¹ Many Ottoman bureaucratic elites at that moment would have agreed with McNeill's twentieth-century evaluation that "... any geographical displacement of world leadership must be prefaced by successful borrowing from previously established centers of the highest prevailing skills."³² In other words, a sector of the Ottoman ruling class of the mid-nineteenth century believed that reforming the Empire along European lines was the key to survival in the global environment of the times and to ultimately reclaim Ottoman grandeur.

The immediate problems of the empire were thought to require an overhaul of the Ottoman armed forces in order to reassert military prowess in the face of foreign challenges, or the expansion of the school system to harness science and technology, and to indoctrinate educated patriots to serve the empire, or to establish some institutional patterns that would effect a redefinition of the Ottoman subject's place vis-à-vis the state and other citizens. The Ottoman bureaucratic elite introduced drastic political measures they hoped would centralize and streamline the administration, strengthen the military, unite disparate elements of the multireligious, multiethnic society, and thus preserve the empire through their Westernizing Tanzîmât program enacted between 1839 and 1876.

The Tanzîmât reform process coincided with and was at least in part responsible for unleashing in the Ottoman Empire the energy of new identifications and contemporary political ideas engendered in the concept of "the nation." As Khalidi points out,

Most of the growing numbers of those educated in schools and who were incorporated into the reformed bureaucracy and advanced sectors of the economy soon came to admire and seek to have their societies implement Western political doctrines, notably the equality of citizens before the law, constitutionalism, and parliamentary democracy.³³

But commensurate with the Ottoman state's assimilation of Western institutions and political ideas directed by Westernized elites in the bureaucracy came the cultural ambivalence over the possibility that the empire would neglect or perhaps abandon completely its traditional Islamic character and thus altogether lose its "essence." The Young Ottoman movement emerged in the 1860s with precisely this concern. Comprising a generation of middle-class professionals, journalists, and intellectuals matriculated primarily from the newly established education system and whose goal was also to save the Ottoman Empire from European encroachment and internal decay, they demanded the Sublime State institute a consultative and constitutional government based upon *Islamic* foundations and contemporary science in order to modernize state and society while preserving Ottoman-Islamic heritage.³⁴ They were the pioneers of Islamic modernism who did not recognize any inconsistency between Islam and the philosophical, material principles of the nineteenth-century world—and they reconciled them using Islamic terminology to describe Western political institutions or principles (such as parliamentary democracy as *Şûrâ*). The beloved local birthplace from which a subject of the Ottoman Empire hailed, his *vatan*, translated for the Young Ottomans and

those who followed in their ideological footsteps into one's "national" homeland.³⁵ While attracted to current Western institutional structures and ideas, for them, modernity could only be achieved by adapting these to the religious underpinnings of an Islamic society.

Concern for cultural destruction in the Islamic-Ottoman Empire and the anxiety over assimilating Western civilizational attributes became more acute after Western powers continued to parcel off Ottoman provinces for their own colonial purposes (the empire suffered continuous territorial losses in the Balkans, North Africa, and the Caucasus) and increasingly interfered in Ottoman affairs (the Ottoman Debt Commission was set up with European representatives to oversee Ottoman fiscal policy after the empire's official bankruptcy in 1875). The Ottoman dilemma was twofold: first, as inheritors of a shared history with Europe in which Islamic empires had claimed a prior superiority that was now reversed, Ottoman intellectuals accepted Western-defined principles of modernity at the empire's cultural expense; it was an admission of current Ottoman subordination to Europe. Second, the paradoxical nature of European political behavior of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries was such that the pursuit of "liberalizing" policies at home was coupled with the brutalities of imperialism and colonization abroad. Racist, Orientalist paradigms of explanation were concocted to argue that it was necessary for the West to deliver civility and order to these less developed peoples in the world in what was often expressed as a "mission civilisatrice."³⁶ The burden fell upon Ottoman statesmen and other prominent figures themselves to rectify this hypocrisy between liberal ideals emanating from Europe and the actions carried out by Europe. As offensive and degrading as the Western air of superiority was to those Ottoman elites who were privy to European views of them as backward, inferior beings (Khalidi writes that "although the bigoted attitudes of many Europeans in this era are apparent, one has to read the memoirs of Middle Easterners of the period to see how deep was their resentment of these attitudes")³⁷, these elites nonetheless adopted not just the principles of Western-style governance, but along with them the implicit hierarchy that ranked nations into categories of civilized and uncivilized. The "uncivilized" even hired the "civilized" to assist in creating or reforming certain institutions that were considered fundamental to becoming modern: drafting a constitution, advising or training a reformed military, or reshaping the education system. The hegemony of Western modernity created a complex paradox for "the Orient" that would require an innovative riposte if ever the East was to assert agency again in the future.

East and West as Binary Categories

Though it may be expedient to simply assign responsibility to the West for creating fictive totalities to its advantage in the modern era that have come to be called a binary of East and West, or, as Harry Harootunian more expansively signifies them, the "West and the Rest,"³⁸ the evolution and trajectory of this binary is considerably more complicated. Relations between Occident and Orient came to incorporate not only conceptions of Self and Other, the civilized and the backward, but imbedded power into the quest for and the

acquisition of modern knowledge.³⁹ As explained above, modernity and the nation-state as dictated by Western historicism came to indict the entity loosely designated as the non-West, or the non-European world, as a more primitive, uncivilized, and incomplete Other. Chakrabarty calls this the displacement of the non-West into “an imaginary waiting room of history” due to the European colonialist diagnosis of an unreadiness among Easterners for the task of self-rule.⁴⁰

Theorizing this binary of an East and a West could not have occurred so decisively in the West or in the East before the nineteenth century. The political and economic circumstances of global reordering and the supposed rational science anchoring racial hierarchies intersected, legitimating one another in this specific historical moment, so that Western imperialist expansion was both justified by and proved the validity of European civilizational superiority, and vice versa. Herbert Spencer’s stagist theory of evolution argued that a phase of competition and conflict was inevitable and led to higher levels of human sociopolitical organization despite his general dislike of militarism and distrust of the state.⁴¹ The influential Victorian-era British economist and journalist Walter Bagehot viewed war as an agent of change conducted by advanced societies and thought that “contact between modern nations and primitive peoples revealed vividly the superiority of the western races, both militarily and in terms of biological fitness.”⁴² “Conquest,” Bagehot wrote, “improved mankind by the intermixture of strengths. . . . improved them by the competition of training and the constant creation of new power.”⁴³ Social Darwinism and global European expropriation of territory and resources dovetailed into a construct that divided the world materially and intellectually into civilized conquerors (West) and colonized inferiors (non-West).

Further, prior to the nineteenth century, the non-Western world, and the Islamic realm in particular, would not have recognized such a deep schism separating an Orient and an Occident, though the political force of this kind of thought linking conquest and civilization would likely have been attractive. Pre-modern Islamic states established through conquest simply did not take much notice of Europe as a source of power. Medieval Islamic empires with their high cultures and advanced civilizations had little to glean from a more primitive Europe until the modern era. Cultural adaptation had frequently taken place in Islamic societies and was a pattern of interaction that emerged early after the founding of Islam, when Muslim Arab armies moving out of the Arabian Peninsula encountered more advanced settled populations such as Sassanian Persia, the Byzantine Empire, India, and imperial China. Premodern confidence to assimilate traditions from various foreign sources by Muslim conquerors and a disposition of openness to learning resulted in the fluorescence of the high Islamic caliphal state that could look down upon the barbarians of Europe.

The Ottoman dynasty that followed in later centuries was decidedly more directly engaged with the Christian West, whether through conducting military campaigns or commerce, as it expanded its domains and included substantial portions of European territory. Ottoman self-assurance went so far as to encourage a few Sultans to view themselves as the true Holy Roman Emperors, in competition with the Habsburgs. But this confident spirit eventually gave

way to anxiety over Ottoman defeat in wars and unfavorable treaty terms imposed on the Empire after the seventeenth century.

In contrast to the earlier Islamic attitude toward the West, the intensity of Ottoman ambivalence over civilizational borrowing from Europe in the latter centuries of the empire, and the political and cultural implications of Westernization, profoundly influenced Ottoman discourse on becoming modern, causing a deepening belief in the bounded spaces of East and West. In the nineteenth century, rational science, Comtean Positivism, Social Darwinism, and the racial theories espoused by the likes of Ernst Renan, Gustave Le Bon, and Herbert Spencer surrounding the evolution of civilizations that had become popular among European philosophers had been extended to European-educated Eastern elites. What facilitated further divergence into the binary of East and West was that, as a consequence of Western dominance, the pressure of which was experienced directly by these elites, "...non-Western nationalists' intellectual strategies included a redefinition of Europe's Orientalist dichotomy by attributing positive qualities to Eastern, Islamic, and Asian countries and ways of life and negative qualities to Western and European ones."⁴⁴ In a historical era when Ottoman power in the world appeared to be on the wane, a reassertion of some kind of knowledge, if not material, then spiritual, was needed in order to counter Western hegemony. Chakrabarty explains the phenomenon this way: "The vision [Enlightenment humanism] has been powerful in its effects. It has historically provided a strong foundation on which to erect—both in Europe and outside—critiques of socially unjust practices."⁴⁵ Therefore while Europe may have dramatically leapt ahead of the Islamic world in its quest for material modernity, the West was believed to have lost its soul, resulting in, among other transgressions, the immoral colonizing behavior in the Orient and Africa of the nineteenth century.

In "Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse," Şādiq Jalāl al-ʿAzm differentiates between what Edward Said labels "Institutional Orientalism," "Cultural-Academic Orientalism," and what al-ʿAzm describes as "Ontological Orientalism."⁴⁶ One author defines the process of ontological categorization as a consequence of the "perception of the Self as deprived relative to the Other," which "often injures the Self-view."⁴⁷ In al-ʿAzm's words, "the persistent belief that there is a radical ontological difference between the natures of the Orient and the Occident—that is, between the essential natures of Eastern and Western societies, cultures, and peoples," involves

...emanations from a certain enduring Oriental (or Islamic) cultural, psychic, or racial essence, as the case may be, bearing identifiable fundamental and unchanging attributes. This ahistorical, anti-human, and even anti-historical "Orientalist" doctrine I shall call *Ontological Orientalism*.⁴⁸

Ahistorical Ontological Orientalism crystallized as a defining, polarizing framework for the world in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries among both Europeans and Asians who accepted this binary distinction as fact. Chatterjee identifies the recognition of difference as the "moment of departure," when it was ascertained that

... the superiority of the West lies in the materiality of its culture, exemplified by its science, technology and love of progress. But the East is superior in the spiritual aspect of culture.⁴⁹

Western imperial intervention in most of Asia exacerbated the ontological polarization between East and West. European Orientalists interpreted the division as one between an eternally superior Occident and a backward, inferior Orient, thus justifying the West's "civilizing" colonial endeavors in Asia and Africa. Eastern intellectuals, despite, ultimately, inadvertently reinforcing the presumption of Western authoritativeness in measuring modernity, nonetheless attempted to reorganize this duality in hopes of re-presenting a world where the Orient could be retooled as the superior civilization overtaking a morally corrupt, misdirected Occident that would soon start to fall behind. Ontological Orientalism, then, by its nature as essentializing East and West, had the unique capacity to be applied in reverse.

Chatterjee, whom I will quote at some length here, describes it as a "moment of manoeuvre" to initiate the process of reversal and to perform a scientific-spiritual assimilation of East and West. Eastern elites, enabled by their access to both orientations, had the "supremely refined intellect" to mobilize popular elements in (for example) an anticolonial struggle while simultaneously acting as mediators between these elements and the structures of the state. They would carry out the task of assimilation because "true modernity for the non-European nations would lie in combining the superior material qualities of Western cultures with the spiritual greatness of the East."⁵⁰ This bifurcation was spatial in character as much as it was civilizational:

The material is the domain of the "outside," of the economy and of state-craft, of science and technology, where... Western superiority had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully studied and replicated. The spiritual, on the other hand, is an "inner" domain bearing "essential" marks of cultural identity. The greater one's success in imitating Western skills in the material domain, therefore, the greater the need to preserve the distinctness of one's spiritual culture... to fashion a "modern" national culture that is nevertheless not Western.⁵¹

The recognition of such dissimilitude created tension for Asian elites in their attempts to reconcile the qualities of East and West while modernizing. Among both European and non-Western reformers, the historicized liberal-rational capitalist Western nation-state prevailed as the marker of true progress. The non-West desired to preserve its indigenous cultural essence (to varying degrees) because,

There is a fundamental awareness that those standards have come from an alien culture... "Eastern" nationalism, consequently, has been accompanied by an effort to "re-equip" the nation culturally, to transform it. But it could not do so simply by imitating the alien culture, for then the nation would lose its distinctive identity. The search was for

a regeneration of the national culture, adapted to the requirements of progress, but retaining at the same time its distinctiveness.⁵²

In fact, he theorizes,

The attempt is deeply contradictory: "It is both imitative and hostile to the models it imitates." It is imitative in that it accepts the value of the standards set by the alien culture. But it also involves rejection... "of the alien intruder and dominator who is nevertheless to be imitated... and rejection of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and yet also cherished as marks of identity."⁵³

To balance between contradictory currents and ease their "ambivalence over assimilation," modernizing intellectuals in Asia needed to maintain that a process of "selective absorption" of Western modernity was taking place. This phenomenon, spawned from Social Darwinist modes of thinking, caused non-European modernizers to argue that their respective societies' socioeconomic and political transformations were always mediated by or reconciled with certain immutable traits, or cultural traditions and practices, so that while mimicking Western patterns of organization, the Eastern nation's particular heritage and character still survived and in fact often mapped out the path to modernity. In effect, a modernized East could then still call itself uniquely "East." The science of Darwinian selectivity enabled the East to romanticize itself: East" was the receptacle housing an impeccable moral spirituality. As al-'Azm describes in his examination of two cases of "Ontological Orientalism in Reverse,"

The only new element is the fact that the Orientalist essentialistic ontology has been reversed to favour one specific people of the Orient... proving the ontological superiority of the Oriental mind over the Occidental one.⁵⁴

The paradox of Ontological Orientalism in the material world of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, was that in reversing the power arrangement on the surface, ultimately the original binary's inequity favoring the West was reinforced—through the almost universal acknowledgment of 'European primordial inventiveness' and worthiness for emulation concerning some characteristics (technological and scientific, social and political, etc.). In effect, reversed exoticism was still a zero-sum game, although the Orientalist's object of study, the Orient, would now become a subject who was able to rediscover its unique "essence," however essence may have been defined, to alter the power balance. At the end of the nineteenth century, in fact, Ontological Orientalist reversal for most of Asia, and for the Ottoman Empire in particular, was abstract and ideological in its motives, but not successful in its altering of physical power. It could not, that is, until the East could seize primacy both spiritually and materially. And in the late nineteenth century, a new archetype for this reversal appeared on the Asian horizon. The Orient would believe itself to be on the verge of rising under the leadership of Meiji Japan,

a Westernized country located deep in the East. The Japanese nation would, “under the banner of its *mission civilisatrice*,” to borrow al-‘Azam’s descriptive phrasing, “guide humanity out of the state of decadence to which Western leadership has brought it.”⁵⁵ Japan would assist the Orient in reclaiming its glorious past and its superior position in the hierarchy, showing both East and West the most evolved and balanced form of modernity.

The “Rising Sun,” the Chinese Case, and the Ottoman Empire

The so-called rise of modern Japan occurred within the constructed nineteenth-century ontology of East and West underpinned by post-Enlightenment European thought. Marked first by the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan’s ascendancy to Great Power status was confirmed by the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and victory over Russia in the war in 1905. Out of the remote reaches of the Far East (for that is how East Asia was spatially known in relation to Europe at the time), Meiji Japan’s dramatic appearance onto the international scene was a watershed event, stimulating in the East the beginnings of its long quest for an alternative universal modernity. In the eyes of peoples in Asia, the Japanese nation, so aptly known as “the Rising Sun,” emerged as an Eastern model for successfully achieving a modernity that both respected native culture and that was validated by European approval. In spite of the frequent disparity between realities and myths of Japanese modernization that circulated in the world, emphasis was on the following traits: the Japanese had repelled a prolonged foreign intrusion, maintained their independence, modernized themselves through social and technical reform, preserved their indigenous heritage, and had begun to assert their authority in the global arena as an equal to European powers. They had won wars (the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905), and they had been able to displace Western imperialism in East Asia. They challenged Western Orientalists, their Social Darwinian racial hierarchies and theories of Oriental despotism that arranged Asians on a lower rung of civilization, providing an escape route from the paradigm relegating the Orient to an eternal position of a subordinate to the West. Japan provided a way to reverse Ontological Orientalism: it had imitated a Western, liberal-national path of modernization to achieve independent statehood. Japan appeared to have rejected unnecessary Western cultural attributes while both preserving the appropriate indigenous elements crucial to Japanese identity and retiring to history those it deemed antiquated. These feats did not go unnoticed by those peoples in the non-West who celebrated what they believed was a long-awaited ontological and civilizational reversal through expressions of anticolonial, pan-Asian, nationalistic solidarity with the Japanese.

Japan had faced and appeared to have resolved its own dilemma concerning Western science and technology in the nineteenth century. Tokugawa Japan was near physical colonization by the West after Commodore Perry’s forcible mid-century opening of the formerly isolationist country. A debate raged over the extent to which Japan should accept knowledge from the outside world, if at all, as a strategy for survival. Sakuma Shōzan (1811–1864), a late Tokugawan era teacher and writer, made a distinctive ideological breakthrough

by maintaining that knowledge was not a possession belonging to any one nation; it was pure, universal truth. As such, it was available to all cultures, in any language, provided they sought truth. His philosophy liberated science and technology from culture in a way that allowed Japanese reformers to freely adopt Western methods for purposes of modernization without experiencing a sense of having compromised their culture.⁵⁶

Perhaps this groundbreaking philosophical innovation was a consequence of Japan's derivative cultural basis—the fact that Japan owed a great deal of its civilization to historical ties with and assimilation of traditions from imperial China that were deeply ingrained in Japanese identity up until the nineteenth century. Japan's premodern familiarity with the process of cultural adaptation from continental China was instructive, easing their encounter with another advanced foreign civilization in the modern period. Japanese intellectuals did eventually come to resent and reject China as a backward and traditionalist country imprisoned in its past, refiguring *Chūgoku*, the historic imperial repository of East Asian civilization, into the subordinate neighbor (*Shina*) that they would later defeat in battle and colonize. Japanese civilizational assimilation, this time from the West, was thus not an unfamiliar, nor tremendously uncomfortable or disparaging experience. Japan in the early Meiji era was able to wholeheartedly and vigorously assimilate Western cultural and material attributes without perceptible self-injury, and no serious countermovement against Westernization emerged in Japan to complicate modernization until the roughly the twentieth century.

China did not have the same luxury as Japan in dealing with the West. As the progenitor, the primary, primeval civilization of Asia, the advanced imperial Middle Kingdom of ancient times, Chinese attitudes tended to be relatively uninterested in the West and rather paternalistic toward other Asians, as parts of an outside world whose offerings were unnecessary or beneath them. The West seemed to have nothing to offer the Chinese. China's realization of its cultural arrogance came too late in the nineteenth century, when the West had surpassed China militarily and could impress its will and favorable trade arrangements upon the Chinese government quite effectively. This lesson was not wasted on nearby Japan, who witnessed China's unsuccessful confrontations with European powers in the Opium Wars and the whittling away of Chinese authority in Asia.

As Rebecca Karl shows, Chinese nationalists found themselves spatially shifted to a "periphery" in the late nineteenth century, after discovering that their notion of China's primacy in the world had been destabilized, the political and economic center having now become Europe.⁵⁷ She surmises that China found this a crowded periphery, misnamed "Asia" (for non-Asians were to be found there as well). In this space Chinese nationalists came to a new understanding of themselves and the modern world in association with others of the "non-West," many of whom had formerly resided on China's periphery as tributaries or as those it had otherwise held in contempt. China, unlike Japan, chose to stay in the non-Western sphere, on Europe's congested margins with all its Others, sharing with them a culture of loss and a nostalgia for a past before "History" (with a capital "H"). From this newly constructed space China undertook its pursuit of modernity that was intimately

connected to these Others whom it had not contemplated before. Japan, in contrast, consciously chose to “leave Asia” and “enter the West” in a bid to survive, modernize, and compete with European and American powers. And as a consequence, Japan, like Europe, would come to possess “History” too. When the Japanese ultimately did “re-enter” Asia in the twentieth century, they would not understand themselves as part of any periphery, but at the center and head of a new Asian order.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the nation of Japan, or more accurately, the image of the nation of Japan, generally represented for many Asians their inherent potential to acquire a form and character appropriate for the modern world, if given the opportunity. Consumed by the necessity of balancing the imitation of Western technological and scientific methods with the preservation of indigenous “Eastern” culture in seeking modernity—what was for Koreans “Eastern ways, Western machines” (*Dong-do Seo-ki*), for Chinese “Chinese learning, Western technology” (*Zhongti Xiyong*)—many Asians believed Japan was a model Eastern nation (until the realization of Japanese imperialist motives turned them away), for Japan had successfully demonstrated its ability to implement “Japanese spirit, Western talent” (*Wakon Yōsai*), becoming a major power in the world.⁵⁸ Japan had redeemed an Orient that had been disenfranchised by Western hegemony in the international environment of the late nineteenth century. Images of a modern Japan legitimated the international demand for increased political participation or cultural recognition by many non-Western peoples. This discourse often included a protest against the ascendancy of those exercising power or force (the West). Japanese successes represented an intrinsic Eastern aptitude for reforming supposedly backward sociopolitical structures and initiating the process of modernizing state and nation. In doing so itself, Japan had been able to enter the ranks of the “civilized powers” (European states), supposedly as an equal. In this paradigm, the alienated sector of the global order was the all-encompassing East—the ambiguous collection of peoples determined to be lower in the racial scheme according to “scientific” theory. For them, the rise of Japan justified demands for independence and self-determination, inspiring faith in their own ability, if given the opportunity, to become “modern” and “civilized” as defined by the prevailing Western modes of thought. Japan’s prominence also allowed the East to claim cultural and moral superiority in order to undermine European political or intellectual domination.

The Ottoman Empire was no exception to this trend in non-Western societies. The Ottoman state was still sovereign, but its authority over its territories had waned or become obsolete due to the influx of world-capitalist forces and Western imperialist penetration. As a result, an Ottoman sense of pan-Asian unity in regard to what was mutually understood to be the modern Japanese nation was a sentiment that transcended other boundaries between the Empire’s inhabitants: Japanese renegotiation of the Unequal Treaties with the West provided a pattern for the Sublime Porte to throw off the Capitulatory privileges it granted to European powers, which compromised Ottoman integrity; Ottoman society digested lessons about national unity from Japan’s patriotism. The Japanese example was adopted as a guide for modernizing and reforming both Ottoman state and society in order to stave off the empire’s

pending dissolution. But the Ottoman Empire, in reconciling its heritage with the needs of the modern era, straddled much more precariously between its Eastern (Islamic) essence and Western adaptations. Intellectual and geopolitical proximity to Europe and the East-West binary in combination with the sociopolitical bifurcations of Ottoman society made this balancing act a much more complex intellectual phenomenon in the Middle East.

A discourse of images exemplifying both the political and cultural achievements of the Japanese nation flourished in the Ottoman Empire using a new language of modernity; their purpose was to define the Ottoman place in the world order and its relation to Europe. Starting in the late 1880s, and subject to the reach and discretion of the Ottoman censor, discussions of virtually every aspect of Japanese state and society appeared in newspapers, periodicals, books, and popular literature in both Ottoman Turkish and Arabic languages, as well as in conference proceedings and private Ottoman government communications. It was widely believed that the example of Japan could instruct the Ottoman Empire in its own quest for "true enlightenment." Japan's history, national culture, heritage, and religion, as well as its political organization, military, and economy were just a few of the topics examined in these texts that illustrated what Ottomans writers of different backgrounds proposed to be successful development into a modern nation and state. Japan was perceived to have accomplished these two objectives through a successful integration of Eastern cultural heritage and the appropriate Western material attributes. Whether Japan's achievement of this synthesis was fact or fiction, it provided an escape for the Ottoman Empire from being labeled the "Sick Man of Europe." Mimicking Japanese strategy could help the Ottoman Empire truly be accepted as a member of the European Concert while promoting the preservation of what were defined to be "Eastern," or "Ottoman" values as a unique component of identity. Japan functioned as a condensed trope upon which these different groups almost arbitrarily at times mapped any arrangement of meanings, associations, or identifications they believed were necessary to bring about "progress" and "civilization." To discuss becoming modern at century's end inevitably involved questions of identity and nation-building just as it assumed a program of social and technological modernization; Ottoman officials, political activists, journalists, and other intellectuals almost unexceptionably deployed their own versions of the contemporary Japanese nation as a didactic tool for arguing the merits of what they recommended as solutions to the Empire's critical problems.

3

The Ottoman Empire between Europe and Asia

Islam and Christendom, Partners and Rivals

Imperial China and Islamic empires had much in common: both civilizations incorporated a vast geographical terrain and a diversity of peoples that were administered through a complex bureaucratic state apparatus. Continental China's millennia-long existence and contributions to world culture, and the Muslim expansion out of Arabia into a succession of religio-dynastic realms under which the arts and sciences flourished, created for each civilization a self-confident sense of identity bound up in their respective historical legacies. Such an intense sentiment of achievement makes possible several responses to outside influence, depending upon the circumstances. If there is no perceived threat, a tendency toward resistance and isolationism, whether actively or passively undertaken, can occur as a consequence of disinterest in or disdain for the foreign force. Or, there could also be a self-assured openness toward and responsiveness to outside influences. Where their pre- and early modern relationships to and perceptions of the West were concerned, both Chinese and Islamicate civilizations exhibited such tendencies. They were far advanced culturally and technologically in comparison to Europe, and could boast that they had nothing concrete to learn from European Christian barbarians prior to the sixteenth century.

For China, this attitude persisted until quite late into the modern era. Assisted by its geography, which precluded the possibility of shared borders and culture between Europe and itself, distant China continued to exist in relative isolation from the West (outside its economic relationships) until Europe's violent intrusion into Chinese sociopolitical affairs in the nineteenth century. Qing China suffered a social and intellectual crisis in the latter decades of the nineteenth century regarding China's changed place in the world in which it had become apparent to Chinese intellectuals that the Middle Kingdom no longer occupied a recognizable position of supremacy. China had become a field of colonial competition: European powers had forced detrimental trade arrangements upon China such as those resulting from the disastrous Opium

Wars; Meiji Japan had defeated Qing China in war in 1895 and was beginning to usurp China's privileged position in Asia.

In contrast, the Ottoman Empire, the last and longest-lived in the series of Islamic empires to control the Middle East, had inherited varying degrees of Muslim coexistence with Europe, ranging from outright hostilities and wars to political alliances and favorable trade relations. Qing China's predicament at the end of the nineteenth century is reminiscent of the Ottoman situation in which the empire was forced to acknowledge a fundamental shift in the power balance that elevated Christian Europe militarily, economically, and politically above its former Muslim rival. For a host of reasons, however, the similarities between the Ottoman Empire and Qing China cease here. First, geographic proximity to Europe ultimately made Ottoman isolationism an impossibility: Ottoman expansion into the Balkans and Eastern Europe in the early centuries of Ottoman rule (from roughly the mid-1300s) produced a common frontier through which warfare technology, personnel, material goods, culture, customs, and ideas passed. The Ottoman conquest of Byzantine Constantinople in 1453 and firm control of the Mediterranean from the reign of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (r.1520–1566) until the end of the sixteenth century further facilitated commercial relations between European powers and merchants in the Middle East and beyond that had developed in earlier centuries; as usual, this form of exchange brought with it other socio-cultural and political linkages that can be summed up as a shared history and heritage between the Ottoman-Islamic realm and the European West.

Second, and perhaps most fundamentally, Christendom and Islamicate civilization were bound together by their religious commonality—in other words, as monotheistic faiths mutually derived from the Abrahamic tradition, all of whose origins were located in the Middle East, causing an overlap of scriptural, spiritual, and territorial claims. Despite sometimes violent conflicts over whose religious tradition was heresy, whose was the valid Word of God, or who would control the Holy Lands, Christianity and Islam, and by extension Christian Europe and the Islamic Middle East, had much in common culturally and intellectually, a fact that cannot be underestimated when we examine how modernity came to be defined in the Ottoman Middle East. Both Christian and Muslim worlds laid claim to the sophisticated civilizations of ancient Greece and Rome as part of their own historic traditions.¹ Knowledge and learning tended in the premodern era to flow from East to West, and from Muslim capitals into Europe. This pattern was to reverse in the modern period, when Europe became the center of technological invention and political might, with the Ottoman Empire as a watchful pupil hurrying to catch up. Nonetheless, the dynamic between the West and the Islamic world was one of inseparability and coexistence, the likes of which significantly influenced nineteenth-century Ottoman attitudes when the debate in the empire over how to attain modernity intensified.

Third, unlike in Qing China, the Ottoman awareness of a shift in the balance of power between the empire and Europe actually began much earlier than the nineteenth century. The geographical, religious, economic, and intellectual bonds shared by Islamic societies and the West mentioned earlier are largely responsible for this situation. The Ottomans simply could not exist

in physical or intellectual isolation from Europe. The expanding Ottoman state, which had exerted pressure on Europe's eastern frontier for centuries, suffered a reversal of its fortunes, marked by the Ottoman failure to breach the walls at Vienna in 1683. More military defeats were to follow, and though the teleological term "decline" is no longer used to describe the Ottoman transformation that was occurring in the latter centuries of the empire (for how does one measure "decline," particularly when Ottoman territorial forfeitures were sometimes regained from European empires after the next war?), Ottoman viziers and other members of the ruling elite sensed that a restructuring of power in global proportions was in the making. As early as the sixteenth century, there were Ottoman intellectuals questioning the ability of the Ottoman Empire to perpetuate its hegemony; by the late eighteenth century, Ottoman statesmen were actively looking to Europe for ideas of how to improve the governing mechanisms of the Sublime Porte.² This orientation became more pronounced throughout the nineteenth century, especially during the reign of the Westernizing Ottoman Tanzîmât bureaucrats.

Islamic civilization, then, and the Ottoman Empire as the most recent manifestation of a Muslim state, inherited a past, a history with Christendom in which Islam had had the upper hand—and the prior claim on science and technology. As Yohanan Freidmann points out in his work on the history of religious tolerance in Islamic societies,

... Muslims faced the other religions from the position of a ruling power, and enjoyed in relation to them a position of unmistakable superiority. They were therefore able to determine the nature of their relationship with the others in conformity with their world-view and in accordance with their beliefs.³

Although Friedmann is referring to the intrasocietal dynamics between Muslims and non-Muslims in his "hierarchy of religions,"⁴ the same attitude could be said to have prevailed in Muslim thinking about the external world of the Christian infidel, the *Dār al-Harb* (the Abode of War). As a consequence of former interactions and this superior self-view on the part of Muslims, and of the advent of the modern era in which Muslim societies experienced a radical decentering similar to (but earlier than) that of Qing China, a culture of loss and a nostalgia for the previous era when Islamicate civilization was paramount in the world ensued in Ottoman consciousness. Peoples in the Islamic world, considering their prior contributions to world civilization, now grappled with the apparent loss of their status as the possessors of the most advanced knowledge and science, how to regain this privileged position from a now-powerful Europe that had once feared and respected Muslim empires, and, for the Ottomans specifically, how to recapture their military superiority over Europe.

Geographic proximity to and conflict with Europe complicated the issue of adopting Western knowledge in the modern era, so that rather than a free absorption of universal new ideas, the process for many Muslims inevitably came to imply a kind of denigration of Islamic culture and religion, and a "borrowing back" from the decadent, formerly subordinate West. Even worse,

this past led to a substantially less secure present of the nineteenth century in which the Ottoman Empire had become the “Sick Man of Europe,” to be propped up or dismantled according to European desires, its peoples seen as racially and civilizationally inferior. The need to imitate the West as a survival strategy in this contemporary global environment injured the Muslim self-view, creating a desire to perceive virtues lacking in the Western Other and possessed by the Self—by emphasizing the importance of the Islamic past, and by exaggerating an impeccable morality of the East as opposed to Western immorality. As a consequence of the tenacious nature of Christian-Muslim relations, and contrary to the achievements of Japanese philosophers mentioned earlier, who successfully liberated science from culture, with few exceptions Ottoman elites bore the burden of the inability to truly envisage knowledge as universal: rather, science and learning were regarded as cultural possessions that could be reappropriated by Muslim societies provided the right conditions were brought about.

Ultimately, the Islamic Ottoman Empire was constrained in the quest to contemplate and strive for modernity by two synchronous factors that would work in tandem to anchor future Ottoman modernity within a Western framework: the incapacity to dislodge itself from its shared past with Europe, and the gravitation toward Western intellectual thought. The Ottomans would have to navigate becoming modern while accompanied by the cultural baggage of a common history and heritage with Europe, a prospect dictating a Western-centric teleology of civilizational progress that did not currently accord Muslims the status they had formerly enjoyed, and from which they could not easily escape into a more favorable, alternative modernization scheme. Thus it was that in the nineteenth century, the adaptability of Islamic civilization and its openness for learning of earlier centuries transformed into a keen interest in European political thought that guided reform platforms in the Westernizing Tanzîmât period and beyond.

The Young Ottomans who opposed the autocratic style of the Ottoman bureaucrats implementing Tanzîmât policies, attracted as they were to Islamic tradition, were equally enamored with European science and Western-style patriotism, the two lynchpins of modernity they repeatedly deployed in their Islamic modernist discourse in the newspapers they published. Subsequent Islamic modernists such as Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, and Rashīd Riḍā’ responded to European challenges by devising a reconciliation between Islam and Western civilization, arguing that Islam would be the filter through which to select the appropriate elements from the West and establish a modern society. Their synthesis of Muslim spirituality with Western scientific rationalism was not a wholehearted resistance to entering a Western global order, but a means by which to function within it, using pan-Islamic unity and the model behavior of the pious Muslim ancestors (*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*) as principles around which to center Islamic society and to reclaim agency in a changed world.

Ottoman statesmen and Sultans desired to resist European arrogance and imperialism, yet they would not deny the utility of reforms based upon European state models to improve the functioning of the administration. Ottoman intellectuals did not reject outright the philosophical underpinnings of Western modernity, including the tenets of rational science that ranked them lower on

the evolutionary scale. The Young Turk movement that conducted a revolution in 1908 and eventually succeeded in assuming complete control over the Ottoman state after 1909 went further in the embrace of Westernizing, secularizing social and political reforms to modernize the Empire than any previous efforts; the trend continued into the twentieth century with the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the successive governments of the Arab Mandate states in the modern Middle East after the First World War.

But world events also swayed Ottoman identity, causing a discernible shift eastward in the late nineteenth century even as the Ottoman Empire's persistently entrenched history in and with Europe became a more pronounced physical and intellectual influence in the Hamidian and Young Turk eras. Whereas Chinese nationalists in late Qing China chose to remain among fellow "Eastern" Others lumped into that amorphous collective of the "non-West" on Europe's exterior, Ottoman elites, many of whom were now being educated in Europe, or in Ottoman schools modeled after a Western curriculum, or who resided in Europe's cities as diplomatic personnel or political exiles, considered themselves inextricably part of Europe and resisted permanent placement in the periphery. Seeking to become modern, the Qing Chinese ultimately could remain aloof enough from Europe to formulate an alternative to Westernized modernity that would be derived from Confucian, Asian, and indigenously Chinese cultural sources. Historic inseparability from the West, however, made Ottoman recognition of the altered balance of power a much more painful experience. The Islamic world, and the Ottoman Empire in particular, was locked into this binary with the West—perhaps an analogy can be made with the two sides of a single coin—the effects of which both alienated the Ottoman state from Europe, causing a desire in Ottoman elites to seek an alternative modernizing strategy, while simultaneously being attracted to the very ideological currents that served to marginalize the Ottoman Empire and its educated classes in the nineteenth century.

Because the Ottomans chose (?) in the end to linger in the Eurocentric global system, and to participate directly in it, they were forced ideologically to find a method to legitimate altering or in fact completely reversing the Western-informed ontological hierarchy for their own intellectual survival. Meiji Japan provided a way to reject their relationship of failure in the face of European encroachment: Ottoman elites used the historical analogy of modern Japan, its national awakening and entrance into the global arena, to refute Orientalist claims of Muslim and Asian inferiority and to reposition East above West in a defensive, anticolonial posture. In this exercise, Ottoman thinkers stepped symbolically outside the "West" and located themselves temporarily in the "East." Japan became the model to emulate that released the Ottoman Empire from its hopelessly subordinate position vis-à-vis Europe. Japan would come to represent an "Eastern custodian" of Western values. Representations of the Japanese were intimately connected to finding a place for the Ottoman Empire in the modern world, somewhere between Europe and Asia. Members of the Ottoman polity engaged in this quest at the turn of the twentieth century traversed the East-West divide, in part out of necessity, in part because Islam could not extricate itself from its past and present with Christian Europe, and in part as a creative exercise in debating modernity that transcended established historical boundaries.

Social Darwinism, Herbert Spencer, Ernst Haeckel, and Gustave Le Bon

The contemporary historian investigating the onset of modernity in the Middle East is compelled to posit why theories of racial-civilizational hierarchy that placed the Ottomans and other Asians in the category of “average,” below Indo-Europeans and superior only to African “savages,” would be palatable at all. How is it that Ottoman elites would endorse such a self-deprecating understanding of the world? What in this empirical, Western-centric framework could have been so alluring? And how could the non-West ever manage to overcome the limitations implicated in such a paradigm? First, we must remind ourselves of the influences at work in the international intellectual environment of the time. Douglas Howland, in an article on Japanese political theory, summarizes a more general pattern regarding discourse on civilization that is reflected in Japanese intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi’s ideas—that the “enlightenment model of progress,” which rested on the capacity of human reason and the development of the mind to harness nature and contains political tyranny, was being displaced by a “scientific model of progress.”⁵ According to the former model, human reason and action leading to higher forms of societal existence depended upon education for their fulfillment. Disparities in ability among those educated in the identical manner led intellectuals to question the interrelationship between enlightened behavior and education, causing them to increasingly rely instead upon racial and cultural determinism to explicate social evolution. In the rapidly changing epoch of the mid- nineteenth to the early twentieth century, European philosophers, biologists, doctors, economists, and other social scientists put forth the most convincing arguments explaining in rational, biological terms the newly formulated world of nation-states and empires turned colonizing powers. Though Charles Darwin had confined his findings initially to the animal world in *Origin of Species*, other scientists in Germany, Britain, and France applied his and their ideas to the human realm, begetting Social Darwinism, misnamed for the author of the theory of natural selection, but which explained scientifically the international inequities of power. As Peter Bowler has described, the preeminence of scientific thought and the application of Darwin’s theory to human societies developed out of the merging of German idealist philosophical thought and the Victorian-era need to explain social disruption in rationalist terms (through materialism, Positivism, evolution, etc.).⁶ Darwin later discussed social evolution in his *Descent of Man*, but unlike Social Darwinists, he merely theorized about it without prescribing specific activities as a means to succeed in nature’s competition.

At any rate, the modification from “enlightened” to “scientific” progress did not make education less relevant a tool to improve upon a given people’s level of civilization. But it was now a gift, to be bestowed by society’s elites (and thus the state) upon those less endowed, less intelligent, or less powerful. This view in turn was applied to the international arena, where the “superior” West was to guide and play tutor to the less capable and less civilized non-West, those predominantly “Eastern” peoples who were, from the point of view of biological science, inferior by birth and in need of assistance in order to progress and become modern, like Europe.

This scientific revision emphasizing racial and cultural determinants in the achievement of a nation's level of development did not occur in a vacuum but was absorbed by those outside the European continent, who nonetheless had access to such evolutionist epistemology. According to M. Şükrü Hanioglu's study of Ottoman political behavior for example, as an antecedent to the Young Turk movement, in the mid-1800s the notion of modern science also began to "usurp the authority of religious constructs in traditional Ottoman thought."⁷ Science and progress were those two magical concepts believed to be capable of shielding or rescuing the Ottoman Empire from European domination; they were interpreted variously by what Hanioglu defined as three intellectual camps within the Empire: the dominant Tanzîmât clique, composed of advocates of Western ideologies; the reactionaries who emerged soon after, claiming the preeminence of the Ottoman ulema and accusing Westernizers of alienating themselves from their Islamic culture; and third, those described as politically liberal and religiously conservative who generated the patterns of the Young Ottoman movement in reconciling Islam and Westernization in a formula of Ottomanism.⁸ Deep-seated differences surfaced at times between those adhering to one or another of these orientations. But these three outlooks generally held in common (with elites in European and other non-Western countries as well) an appreciation for scientific knowledge, though without a doubt virulent disagreement ensued as to how best to utilize this science in the interest of Ottoman society. As a result of the administrative creation of a modernized Ottoman school system, the opening of Western missionary schools in various locations in the Empire, and the dispatch of Ottoman student missions to Europe, all of which produced many of the Young Ottomans and, by extension, their political descendants the Young Turks, the Ottoman ruling elite was inundated by the influx of a new crop of graduates whose educational assets included in-depth exposure to the sciences of the West. The reformed, modernized Ottoman educational system matriculated its new recruits into the Ottoman governing bureaucracy; others came to form political opposition to the Ottoman center.

From the mid-nineteenth century onward, therefore, Ottoman elites who enjoyed an education in the modern sciences, military, medical, engineering, and so on were exposed to the intellectual currents of Europe that incorporated biological and cultural determinism to explain the modern progress of some nations. For many Ottoman "progressives," the scientific rationale of Social Darwinism encapsulated in Herbert Spencer's descriptive phrase, "the survival of the fittest," succinctly summarized current international relations. Domestic Ottoman interethnic, interreligious relationships were also defined from an elitist, Social Darwinist mind-set, particularly by the Young Turks who wielded political power in the Empire after 1908.

Locked into the civilizational hierarchy as "average" and less than European, and bound by legacies of the past, those Ottoman intellectuals who found themselves consumed by the scientific revolution could not fully deny Western theory in their discursive efforts to defend empire and society. On the one hand, the pressures of British and French imperial expansion, interference in, and insistence upon the reform of the empire imposed one set of influences upon Ottoman thought. On the other hand, the temptation to draw closer to Germany as a lesser European evil and possibly a reliable ally against the

former two served as the impetus for Ottoman ruling elites to adopt German technology, technique, training methods, and sociopolitical ideas. Together the push-and-pull of European interference and assistance would affect the Ottoman construction of an ideological worldview.

What were these various philosophical influences on elite Ottoman thinking? Auguste Comte's Positivism, the stagist civilizational eugenics in which humankind was understood to pass from a theological, to a metaphysical, and finally to a positivist scientific age defined by order and morality, resonated among members of the Ottoman polity who desired to institute modernized forms of organization and/or centralization in an empire crumbling under the weight of European demands, bankruptcy, and separatist national movements.⁹ Gustave Le Bon's sociological analysis concerning the cultural and environmental factors shaping a people's character, mentioned earlier, and especially his ideas justifying the division of labor within a society between those elites who guide and govern, and the ignorant masses, was also well-received by the Ottoman Young Turk intelligentsia, who viewed themselves as the most able figures to lead Ottoman society into modernity, in large measure due to their experience with a Western-style education. Additionally, French political philosophy supported cultural determinism; the French Revolution launched the liberal model of civil nationhood and political participation so that patriotism was an expression of devotion to the birthplace and society as well as to the state as possessed by the patriots themselves.

In the wake of successful German unification under the leadership of Bismarck and Germany's subsequent victory over France in 1871 began the amicable association between the Ottoman Empire and Germany. Those Ottoman statesmen, students, officers, and bureaucrats who forged the alliances, or who studied military science, engineering, and medicine in Germany, or who worked with German advisers stationed in the empire, stimulated Ottoman intellectual interest in German thought and the positive views of the German nation as a cohesive and powerful military state, to be emulated.¹⁰ The nineteenth-century European Romanticism movement combined with the German conception of the organic, racial nation ("blood and soil") was to become a major aspect of Ottoman ruling elite ideology, especially after 1909. Romanticism also had an effect on those inside and outside Ottoman ruling circles from various ethnicities around the turn of the twentieth century, leading to formulations of identity being founded upon certain primordial bases among Ottoman subjects.

Social Darwinism, historian Richard Weikart notes, had a firmly implanted basis in Germany already in the 1860s, in large part due to the scholarly contributions of biology professor Ernst Haeckel on the subject.¹¹ Haeckel, who deeply influenced the Ottoman Young Turk movement,¹² embraced evolutionary theory after reading Darwin's work.¹³ Haeckel and other Germans, mainly in academics, including Paul von Lilienfeld in the 1870s and Max Weber in the 1890s, emphasized the principle of economic competition as the impetus for social progress in their interpretations of Social Darwinism.¹⁴ As late nineteenth-century conservatism in Germany gained the upper hand, the collectivist German national ethos prevailed, and Social Darwinism increasingly justified militarism as a survival mechanism in the world, along with

imperialist behavior, and, unrepentantly, the notion of racial superiority and competition that would lead to the extinction of weaker, primitive races.¹⁵ In fact war and conflict were understood as an inevitable part of the process of human evolution on both a micro- and macrolevel: they required internal social harmony and cultural cohesion if the nation was to win the battle, and they violently eliminated weakness in humankind as a whole.¹⁶ This German Social Darwinist epistemology and its corollaries of military might, economic competition, social harmony, and racial determinacy certainly seeped into Ottoman elite consciousness where the empire's survival was concerned. After 1910, once the Ottoman Empire spiraled deeper into its own wars, first in a conflict over Italian occupation of Tripolitania in 1911 and then in the Balkans in 1912–1913 before the all-out engagement in the First World War starting in 1914, military strength appeared more and more to be its only means of self-preservation.¹⁷

British theorist Herbert Spencer deserves further mention, for ultimately it is portions of his philosophy that largely liberated the Ottoman Empire from its grim future predicted by European civilizational hierarchies and Social Darwinist evolutionary theories. Herbert Spencer is often seen as the granddaddy of Social Darwinism, as his outlook assumed nature's inevitable improvement in human society over time as a consequence of population pressure, Darwinian natural selection, and the endurance of only the most intelligent and adaptable humans.¹⁸ His positive stance toward *laissez-faire* economic competition conformed to this faith in nature to generate a higher level of existence; state interference in this mechanism was artificial and detrimental: whether societally to aid the poor, or internationally by imposing European will upon less advanced societies, which ultimately was none other than colonialism, Spencer considered intervention on behalf of those less developed as an intrusion into the process of human evolution that would yield a biologically inferior end product. The progression of human communities moved from the simple to the complex, amplifying the division of labor; from a warlike militant stage of existence societies moved to an industrialized phase including commercial competitiveness that also resulted in a liberalized political system in which an individual's rights were not delineated nor restricted by the state.

There were various reasons why Ottoman intellectuals were amenable to Spencer's antimilitarist, anticolonialist ideas. Spencer delineated a schema for the biological differentiation of species and the necessity of allowing evolution to take its natural course that was seen as scientifically sound grounds to demand that Europe keep out of Ottoman affairs. Differentiation among the human species implied that various nations, races, or peoples, no matter what stage of development they currently occupied, could all potentially arrive at a higher level of civility and modernity commensurate with their natures only if given the autonomy to evolve independently. Darwinian selectivity—the notion that an individual or a people has a certain unique set of characteristics that makes them who they are, and that guides their experience of adaptation—required this evolution to occur unhindered and uninterrupted by others. In effect, according to this line of argumentation, what not only preserved Ottoman self-identity in the process of

modernization but precisely what enabled progress for the empire was its unique (Islamic) history, heritage, and culture that would assist Ottoman thinkers in selectively adapting to the modern world. Spencerian philosophy was highly empowering for Ottomans and others among the politically disenfranchised in the global political order, restoring agency to “less advanced” peoples by making progress contingent upon the preservation of traits other Europeans often labeled as backward and traditional. Ottoman intellectuals could argue that if left alone, free of Western imperialist influence, they would evolve.

Ottoman reform-minded journalists and political activists of the late nineteenth century familiar with Spencer’s philosophy, particularly members of the Young Turk movement, eagerly reproduced his views on Western imperialist behavior and the defense against it in the press, to support the Ottoman case for a cessation of European intervention in the region and the abrogation of the Capitulatory privileges European powers possessed in the empire. Excerpts of Spencer’s famous correspondence with Japanese baron Kentaro Kaneko in 1892 were reprinted for example in *Mechveret Supplément Français*, the paper of Young Turk political activist and journalist Ahmed Rıza, published while he was in exile in Geneva. Rıza commented:

Spencer counseled Japan “to keep Americans and Europeans at a distance; to give them the least rein possible; to refuse foreigners not only the right to acquire land, but similarly to sign leases, and only grant them yearly renting; to prohibit foreigners from any involvement in the exploitation of government mines. Japan must preserve the domestic transport industry and prevent foreigners from seizing it.” Finally and especially, he implores the Japanese “to strongly repel from their shores all that might look like European influence, military or civil” (author’s emphasis). The Japanese, with the shrewdness that characterizes them, seems to have strongly retained these valuable recommendations. And we see with pleasure the real profit that they knew how to extract.¹⁹

In Cairo, another Young Turk publication, the weekly *Türk*, also reprinted Spencer’s letter to Japan in which the philosopher emphasized that “the day you open your doors to them and their goods is the day that you ask for annihilation. If you want to know what could happen, read the history of India”; *Türk*’s editors, “noticing the benefit of a translation since we Easterners ourselves have anxiety about the Capitulations, saw it favorable to publish it in our newspaper.”²⁰ Rıza and others applied Spencer’s notion of “equal social rights” to the current inequities of the international world system in order to demand Europe accord the Ottomans equal treatment, including non-interference in the Ottoman realm and a satisfactory revision of Western Capitulatory privileges.

European philosophical thought affected influential Ottoman elites beyond their views of Western imperialism and the intellectual defense against charges of Ottoman inferiority. Spencer and Le Bon provided a framework of the social collective and its differentiation according to abilities that coincided with Ottoman class differences, and that resembled the traditional

Islamic notion of a polity as a body with various limbs and appendages (*ra'* or head as central power, etc.) serving the different functions of the state. Many of the Young Turks predisposed toward Spencer's political philosophy of individual rights directly challenged the autocratic Ottoman Sultan on the one hand, and, after the revolution, justified their own privileged status once in power on the other. As a politically excluded class in the Hamidian era, they sought to reinstate the Ottoman constitutional system as a way to guarantee their future influence over government affairs, but they expressed this goal in a more subtle, egalitarian-sounding manner: by demanding the establishment of these "equal social rights." Once firmly in power after the 1908 Revolution and the suppressed countercoup in 1909, proximity to or actual membership in the ruling regime in the empire was as a consequence of their having "evolved" to the next stage of human development, and not a natural right granted to all any longer. The ruling Unionist regime became more authoritarian. Their differentiation was as a paternalistic elite possessing Western knowledge that thus granted them the ability to know best—and to be those who would drag Ottoman society into the modern world, to the exclusion of everyone else. This intervention, condemned by the Young Turks when conducted by the West in the East, would be a domestic necessity for their Committee of Union and Progress to ensure the Ottoman Empire's survival.

Japan Reverses the Order: Yellow Peril or Yellow Gold?

Pan-Asianist nationalist thought developed in parts of Asia as expressions of a reawakened Eastern cultural-civilizational superiority, with the final objective of different peoples achieving independent nation-state status in order to survive in the world system. For those elites who accepted the Eurocentric framework of racial hierarchy and who believed in differentiated social evolution as scientific facts of life, modern Japan conclusively proved to Asians in the world that Eastern subordination was only temporary. Japanese isolation and relative independence from Western interference had allowed the Meiji state the freedom to evolve to its fullest Darwinian potential. Japan's surprise success in a war with China in 1895 demonstrated its status as a formidable military power. Following Japan's participation as one of the allied forces putting down the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900 (thus opening the door to subsequent Japanese colonial rivalries with Russia in Manchuria), coupled with becoming a creditor nation around this time, and the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, Japan was firmly established as a modern nation worthy of engaging in international Great Power politics even before the advent of the Russo-Japanese War. Once Japan defeated Russia in 1905, non-Western intellectuals could argue that modern Japan was actually leading Asia out of its subordinate position in the global hierarchy by beating the West at its own imperial game. The East-West binary was being altered and in fact reversed; the hierarchy was being tipped on its head. In the eyes of many Ottomans, Persians, and Indians, the small country of Japan was the victor in a war over a vast, expansionist Russian empire which had threatened all three for more than a century. It rekindled feelings of pan-Asian solidarity

while illustrating that the power of the West was not invincible. As the Indian newspaper *Samay* put it,

We (the people in the East) who are hated as cowards and imbeciles, are proud of this triumph of the East in its terrible struggle with the West. We heartily congratulate thee, Japan, on thy wonderful courage, thy discipline, thy iron will, and thy indomitable energy... thou alone hast saved the honour of the East, the down-trodden East.²¹

Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 physically proved for Asia a reversal of fortunes. The Ottoman Empire had been plagued by several wars with Russia; geographic proximity had led to centuries of military rivalry between the Ottoman East and the European West. The tide had seemingly turned at last in favor of the East.

Japan had become larger than life for observers on both sides of the East-West binary. Modern Japan became an exoticized nation, a country of mythical capabilities, threatening for Western powers intent upon preserving their colonies, and a model to be emulated for Asians who imagined their own self-directed destinies, independent of Western control in the future. For the non-West, Japan was a nation that had preserved its "Eastern uniqueness" while modernizing, and had reversed the global order in favor of the East. Japan had demonstrated that this eugenic social evolution was possible, and that the end result was superior to the West. The contradiction implicit in Japanese colonial actions in Asia was not immediately acknowledged as yet another case of an anti-Spencerian intervention in the fates of peoples in the Orient, but instead was interpreted by Asian onlookers as an Eastern power guiding its protégés toward modernity.

For Europeans, Japanese success in reversing the hierarchy was viewed in a rather opposite manner: Japan was considered by the West as a dangerous threat on several levels. First, this rising Japanese power would be able to directly challenge Western military, economic, and political positions, particularly concerning European and American colonial possessions in Asia. Second, Japan could conceivably inspire the "inferior races" residing in Europe's colonial outposts to rebel against the "natural order," to rise up against their occupiers, and possibly to overrun Europe in what came to be known as a great "Yellow Peril." This phrase was coined in the 1890s amid fears of the impact of cheap Chinese import goods and Chinese immigration in Western countries due to the labor implications of their numbers (particularly in the United States, where newspapers and other writings expressed a concern for the demise of the American way of life should this influx of "Yellow peoples" that was a cheap labor force, not be stopped).

Interestingly, the derogatory notion of "Yellow Peril" to describe Asian advances into the West was turned upside-down by those who instead saw it as a positive force. Some Ottoman Arab writers reinterpreted "Yellow Peril" to mean an idyllic joining of Japanese modernization and leadership skills with Chinese manpower to form a "Yellow wave" that would sweep over Europe.²² For Fāris al-Khūrī, a Syrian Arab Protestant lawyer who served as dragoman for

the British Consulate and who eventually became involved in Syrian politics after the First World War, “yellow” (a reference to the prevailing European fear of “Yellow Peril”) was merely an outward manifestation of Eastern “gold”: the inner purity, the noble virtues, and the superior character of the Japanese, who currently represented the epitome of Asian culture. In 1904 he wrote to Syrian journalist Muḥammad Kurd ‘Alī (living in Cairo during the Russo-Japanese War):

Today I read a short story *al-Diyā’* published called “The Old Japanese Woman” in which she committed suicide in order not to obstruct her son from plunging into the deluge of war. I saw it as an extraordinarily good portrayal, and the quintessential line from it was a saying in Japanese: “If we are yellow, what harm is it for us? Does yellowing spoil gold?” If you come across the latest issue of *al-Diyā’*, read it and take pleasure in it.²³

An old Japanese woman and her warrior-son were the physical evidence of the Orient challenging Western hegemony: in a political sense, through engaging in warfare; morally, through supreme sacrifice for the nation. Combining superior Eastern heritage with modern science had allowed Japan in effect to move beyond the ephemeral achievements of the West, reversing the inferior position of Asia within the global hierarchy.

Europe was correct in assuming Japan would inspire peoples in Asia. In the Ottoman Empire, a bureaucrat named Ayanzâde Birecikli Nâmık Ekrem translated a book called *Japonya Şularında* as *Japonlar*. In it he explained what he understood to be this reversal stemming from Japan’s national character. Europeans should be amazed at the Japanese, Ekrem scolded, but typical of their prejudicial attitudes, Easterners were still regarded as inferiors. The West did not appreciate all that it had gained from the East. A European weekly claimed Easterners generally could not comprehend higher mathematics. There were famous mathematicians in the East, but they were merely occupied with and famed for simple mathematics. He went on to clarify how unsubstantiated these European allegations were:

In reality, in the countries of China, India, and the islands of Japan, for centuries they have been occupying themselves with higher mathematics. A lot of mathematicians lived in the Sind, in the basins of the Ganges River, in the vicinity of Turkestan, in the lands of Arabistan. Their knowledge was not limited to just engineering and accounting techniques.²⁴

Ekrem contended that European mathematical discoveries could not have come to pass had they not relied upon earlier works by Eastern scholars and philosophers from Central Asia and Arabistan, so it could be said that in actuality “the capital of European progresses was taken from the East’s bountiful lands.”²⁵ Discourse on the Japanese nation granted the East the chance to reclaim its self-confidence through pride in a civilization and heritage of global proportions.

In “Future of the East,” published in Aḥmad Ārif al-Zayn’s Lebanese journal *al-ʿIrfān* in 1910, the author separated the world into categories of Orient and Occident in this manner:

Westerners, their sun inclined to set due to natural law, and Easterners enjoying a perpetual radiance in their pure lands. . . . Easterners have a deep-rooted past. Civilization developed and reaped the fruits of its harvest in their lands and in the East today remains this civilization and progress—what Westerners reached in comparison with it is confusing and baffling, yet most of it had been achieved more than a thousand years ago! And these priceless vestiges are sufficient alone to indicate the complete predisposition of Easterners for progress.²⁶

The author explained that while the East had fallen into a state of ignorance, it was now emerging from that darkness to pursue “that beautiful radiance, of which the first indication that it started is today in the country of Japan, this advanced nation whose people call it ‘the rising sun.’”²⁷ The Japanese, he wrote, have both physical and spiritual strength that made them powerful enough to defeat Russia in war and also to develop their own products and institutions at home without the prolonged use of foreigners as advisers; they transported civilization to Korea, a country with a completely different culture and language, demonstrating not only their leadership in the East’s modernization process, but the inherent potential in other Asian nations to progress as well.²⁸ Japan had attained its progress “to the highest degree, Europe rivaled it as a mutual competitor, and [Japan’s] progress is spiritual and moral no less than material, it is not excessive, not false, and not fraudulent.”²⁹ Implicit in these remarks was a sentiment that European progress was specious and deceptive, because it was not grounded in the proper ethical basis. Still, he complained,

We do not strive to maintain the wonder which God has bestowed upon us, and if we had used our minds in this fashion, then our nation would have been among the utmost nations, for the propensity for progress present in the East is totally nonexistent in the West, and this invariable truth is as immutable as the sun in broad daylight.³⁰

For this writer, true progress was only possible in the East, where spirituality and material life were appropriately melded together to create the most advanced civilization. In Europe this simply was not possible.

Muḥammad Kurd ‘Alī’s Damascene newspaper, *al-Muqtabas*, ran an article by a prominent Ottoman Arab who expressed similar pan-Asian views concerning Japan’s recent rise to power within a global framework divided between Orient and Occident. Shukrī al-‘Asalī, a Syrian political activist elected to the Ottoman Parliament in 1911, viewed Japan’s victory as the initiation of a long-awaited Eastern awakening. According to one biographer, al-‘Asalī possessed the awareness to which Chatterjee alluded in his description of Eastern nationalism “re-equipping” the nation: al-‘Asalī believed in the preeminence of modern European education; he simultaneously showed concern about the temptation that led Syrian Arabs merely to adopt superficial aspects of Western

civilization after exposure to this learning, which in turn led to decadence because it eroded traditional morality and Arabo-Islamic culture.³¹ Those who recognized freedom as the fundamental principle of European progress and implemented it in society were increasingly Easterners who had remained committed to their indigenous traditions in the process.³² In "A Glance to the East," written in 1910, he summarized events that affected a growing national awareness among Eastern peoples:

We were confronted this century with the Russo-Japanese war which placed [Japan] on the same level as the Great Powers, and which introduced an opportunity to liberate Russia, so they carried out their revolution.... The awakening of Japan and the success of Russia's liberation encourage intellectuals in the East.... Constitutional government was established in the Ottoman Empire and Abdülhamid was removed, and the Ottomans became free.... The liberation of Persia took Teheran by surprise; they...got rid of [Shah Muḥammad 'Alī Khan], exiling him from their country, and exiling tyranny with him. Political parties in Egypt arose, demanding independence and that the [British] occupation withdraw, and they called for a constitution...we read the Egyptian papers and they inform us... "Egypt for the Egyptians."³³

The Iranian and Ottoman constitutional revolutions, and Egypt's protest against British occupation were all symptomatic of the current struggle to become modern in the Middle East, as Japan had already done. Al-'Asalī continued to describe in pan-Asian, anti-Western, constitutionalist language the similar independence movements initiated in India and China. The peoples of Siam, Java, and other Eastern countries, he wrote, were awakening to a new patriotic sensation, which also caused them to sacrifice themselves for their homelands, like Japan. He wrapped up the article in hopeful, prophetic words:

The East awakened... we have not yet reached the middle of the century but... Asia has become like Europe today... moving with Europe and America in the way of progress and success by the end of the twentieth century. Perhaps this lifeblood [patriotism] will creep into the Negroes of Africa and the peoples of Zanzibar and the Congo and Morocco in the beginning of this next century.... After that you will see each people ruling itself by itself, and ending the greedy ambitions of the Western nations. Perhaps that depends on the result of uniting the peoples of Asia before [the West's] ambitions. Thus an international court will be established and will solve problems.... Attention would be diverted away from wars, and if there were wars, they would be economic wars and boycotts.³⁴

By using discretion to absorb the pure essence of freedom, Easterners would unite in liberating themselves from Western domination and thus advance their own civilizations to a higher level. Justice would return to the global order.

Members of the Young Turk movement also inverted the meaning of “Yellow Peril” in referring to the impressive feats of the “yellow race” in their publications. Dr. Abdullah Cevdet and Ahmed Rıza both described Japanese efforts to disseminate modern scientific education in order to execute military prowess on the battlefields against Russia as goals to be emulated.³⁵ Rıza went a step further in defining and praising the Japanese in a monologue that railed against Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II’s autocracy. He demanded that

...for our part, it is this “yellow” civilization that we wish to see universalized because it is the fruit of a principled, faithful and highly intelligent organization, because it is based on a conception of human destinies that excludes holy icons and false sentimentalities, because, above all, it is the daughter of a constitutional government.³⁶

Ahmed Rıza, a member of the Ottoman educated elite, who became one of the prominent leaders of the Young Turk opposition movement in exile from the late 1880s, was a prolific political writer and newspaper editor, who repeatedly voiced his immense satisfaction over the Japanese upheaval of the racial hierarchy in the same breath as he condemned European imperialist actions. A committed Positivist, deeply influenced by European thought, he nonetheless found fault with the hypocrisy of liberal European values that contradicted Great Power actions. In fact, as has been pointed out by his biographers, Rıza’s anti-Westernism seems to have become especially acute in the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900, when the combined European, Russian (and ironically, Japanese) forces that put down the uprising opened the door to Russian occupation of parts of Manchuria.³⁷ Editorials in his French and Ottoman publication *Mechveret Supplément Français* that frequently recounted events surrounding and the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 revealed his frustrations. Rıza’s scientific rationalism had no place for religion; Christianity was as appalling in its violation of science as it was in its conceit:

There are multiple well-merited lessons that the war permitted the Japanese to give to the “superior races”.... One cannot doubt the pre-eminence of the social and political institutions of Japan, a so-called inferior race by most of those peoples upon whom the patent of superiority is conferred. The splendid victory of the Japanese has proved the Christian world arrogant; that it is not indispensable for a people to embrace Christianity in order to acquire morality, civilization, and an aptitude for progress.... Likewise events of the Far East have put forth evidence of the uselessness of interventions, frequent if pernicious, of Europe for reforming a people. On the contrary, the more isolated and preserved from contact with European invaders and plunderers a people is, the better is the measure of [their] evolution toward a rational renovation.³⁸

According to Rıza, and conforming with Spencer’s recommendations, Japan’s prior policy of isolationism had kept it from lengthy Western rivalry and

interference; in the eyes of Rıza and plenty of other Ottoman journalists (including Arabs), the Ottoman Empire was not so lucky.³⁹

The Ottoman perception of Japan during and after its victory over Russia in 1905 as the Eastern warrior, championing the cause of the downtrodden in Asia against the ruthless imperial onslaught of the West, was indicative of the shared sense of solidarity with the rest of the Eastern world that bridged other differences. Why would so many Ottoman subjects consider Japan's victory to be so great? First and foremost, the Japanese had beaten Russia, the most continuous and direct threat to the Ottoman Empire in the preceding century. Clearly the Ottoman Sultan and state understood the conflict in geopolitical terms.⁴⁰ But the level of awareness that Russia was the prime enemy cut across social boundaries—even the Ottoman peasantry in the countryside was affected by wars with Russia, for which their sons had often been drafted into the military and died while fighting the Czar's forces. A Druze sheikh and his entourage in a remote village in Lebanon who rejoiced at Russian defeats went so far as to claim the Japanese were actually an army of Druzes prophesied to arise out of the East to reconquer the world!⁴¹ Tatars and Crimean Turks such as Abdürreşid İbrahim, Yusuf Akçura, and İsmail Gaspiralı reached Ottoman lands bearing their frustrations over discrimination against and persecution of Muslims by the Czarist regime back in their native lands. Ottoman Muslim refugees who fled the conflicts with non-Muslims, such as those in the Caucasus or the Balkans, generally could blame Russia for their plight as well. Much of the Slavic Christian population of the Ottoman Balkans, including Greeks and Bulgarians, tended to rally behind Russian efforts in the war with Japan.⁴² Even so, Muştafâ Kâmil's Egyptian nationalist newspaper *al-Liwā'* printed in 1904 that "Most Greeks, Armenians, and Jews share in this sentiment [hating Russia], with [Ottoman Muslims]" because of their many wars.⁴³ And when asked about the favorable disposition of Muslims toward Japan during the Russo-Japanese War, Kâmil responded,

The most important reason is that we do not like Russia for its well-known historical enmity towards the Ottoman Empire.... On the other hand, we are amazed by Japan because it is the first Eastern government to utilize Western civilization to resist the "shield of European imperialism" in Asia.... The Japanese demonstrate their inclination towards Muslims like we demonstrate it towards them.⁴⁴

But Kâmil would go further in expressing grievances against Russia. Just as Ottoman citizens from all walks of life applied the lesson of Japan to their own particular circumstances, Kâmil would view the Russo-Japanese War through the eyes of an anticolonial Egyptian nationalist. In a letter to his French journalist friend Juliette Adam, Kâmil wrote that as an Egyptian, one would think he would have no sentiment for either of the warring parties in 1905. Yet while Japan had done absolutely nothing at all harmful to Egypt or to Islam, Russia, on the other hand, had struck the greatest blow to Egypt by sinking Mehmet 'Alî's fleet (at Navarino Bay in 1827 during the Greek insurrection). In league with the British, whose habit was to deceive, and with the complicit French, Russia had brought the greatest harm to Islam and Islamic countries,

and so it was their primary enemy.⁴⁵ In essence, Russia represented Western imperialism and Japan symbolized that abstract connection, the solidarity of the East, that traveler Gertrude Bell defined as a

... curious link which is so difficult to classify except by the name of a continent. ... However eagerly you may protest that the Russians cannot be considered as a type of European civilization, however profoundly you may be convinced that the Japanese show as few common characteristics with Turk or Druze as they show with South Sea Islander or Esquimaux, East calls to East... from the China Seas to the Mediterranean.⁴⁶

The notion of “Eastern” as it emerged in Asian societies in the late nineteenth century, and particularly following Japan’s success in 1905, was neither obvious nor old. In the Ottoman Middle East, where identity was still to a great extent predicated upon one’s religious affiliations, it would be expected that a mainly Muslim Empire would not so readily associate itself with a non-Muslim nation-state such as Japan. To put it another way, it was quite a radical transition to shift from Ottoman-Islamic sensibilities to Easternism as a unifying ideology. Yet a defining feature of the era, colonialism, tended to extend communal consciousness beyond religious borders. P. J. Vatikiotis described the advent of Islamic modernism in Egypt similarly:

Its original impetus came from the wider reaction of the Muslim world to an expanding European imperialism in Africa and Asia: France in North Africa, Britain in India and Africa, Russia in Central Asia, and Holland in Southeast Asia. A waning Ottoman Empire, bludgeoned by the encroachments of Christian Europe—both East and West—and partly dismembered by the successful separatism of the Balkans, further shaped the realization among Muslims of a weak and exposed Islamic community.⁴⁷

As a consequence, the Japanese were viewed alternatively—as a tool for the Ottomans to redefine their troubled and unequal relationship with the West. Denying this former historical partnership with Europe that had, in recent centuries, been one of repeated failures and humiliations, the Ottomans in one sense turned their backs on Europe in favor of a fictive “East” as personified by Japanese culture and civilization, as a means of escaping the “Sick Man” role. They reoriented the Empire away from its historical, geographical, and civilizational proximity to Europe, and realigned it with Japan and the East. Yet in doing so, the Ottomans ultimately desired a second chance with the West, a reentry into the European fold in which they would come equipped with Japanese-style modernization and progress as the cultural arbiter to gain inclusion for the Ottoman Empire. Modern Japan, retooled and refigured as a secular, progressive, capitalist, and Eastern nation-state, now mediated involvement with Europe for the Ottomans, proving the Orient’s potential. Japan’s Unequal Treaties were the Ottomans’ Capitulations; Japanese social and technological reforms were a prelude to Ottoman efforts. Japan’s own

turbulent history leading up to the Meiji-era recasting of itself subsequently gets conveniently overlooked in this process, as does its character as a non-Muslim nation, for the sake of the larger pan-Asian, anticolonial argument in which Japanese “Easternness” is in large part responsible for the miracle of achieving modernity. Additionally, rumors of the impending conversion of the Japanese Emperor and his nation to Islam (discussed in a future chapter) assisted in facilitating a positive view of the Japanese as future Muslim brothers in the struggle against European colonialism.

Easternism was thus a relatively new phenomenon, a subtle change in Ottoman identity, whose momentum grew mainly thanks to both world events and popular currents of thought regarding modernity. The victory of Japan over Russia in 1905 was viewed as one of East over West for the first time in the modern era. But it was also the triumph of constitutionalism over absolutism, and of nation-state nationalism over antiquated, multinational empires. Japan had redefined “East” to incorporate these modern concepts into the notion of an independent state. According to the Arabic scientific monthly magazine *al-Muqtataf*, interest in the fortunes of Eastern countries after the arrival of the Europeans was stimulated by the hope that

... all Orientals awaken to keep up with Europeans in the merits of their civilization. In order to return to them their former glory... littérateurs have written on this subject and the learned have urged this [progress] for fifty years in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and other provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and in Persia and the kingdoms of India. They were not satisfied with inciting and desiring, but they did not combine word and action in [their] lands as did the country of Japan.⁴⁸

Japan, it seemed, had been able to accomplish what others in the East had only dreamt of. A reprint in Arabic of an article by Alfred Stead in *The Fortnightly Review* predicted Japan would win the war as a defender of justice, of freedom, of modern Western civilization: in battles of ignorance versus knowledge, oppression versus enlightenment, and religious persecution versus freedom of religion.⁴⁹ The translation of another article from a Russian paper (*Novya Vremia*) described how this tide was transforming Asia:

Orientals learned as a result of the Russo-Japanese war that they can keep up with Europe in the fields of civilization and prosperity just as they know that they cannot keep up except by replacing their oppressive, absolutist governments with constitutional ones. They started attributing Japan’s progress in a short span of time to consultative assembly and constitutional administration and because of that, Chinese, Indians and Philipinos demand constitutions of their governments.⁵⁰

India and Persia were considered well on their way to modern progress after successfully demanding constitutions. Not only had the Japanese combined theory and action to attain Eastern modernity, but Japan had constructed a whole new standard of civilization for the Orient. All Asians were to strive

together, in solidarity, to reach this objective. Historian Bassam Tibi sums it up this way:

The emergence of Japan and her victory over the Russian fleet in 1904 played an extremely important role in encouraging the emergence of Pan-Asiatic nationalism. The Asian nationalists took Japan as an example, until the Second World War, when Japan misused "Pan-Asianism" for its own expansionist designs. Nationalists in the Arab world were also encouraged by the rise of Japan, though less so than their Chinese and South East Asian counterparts.⁵¹

Was this enthusiasm about pan-Asian solidarity, as reflected in Ottoman and Arabic literary and archival sources of the time, the consequence of a changing worldview on the part of peoples in Asia, or was it in part the result of the manipulation of information on the part of either the Ottoman or Japanese governments in order to promote a certain interest and to motivate the Ottoman masses to support the state and its actions? Ottoman intellectuals, officials, activists, and average citizens from just about every religious, ethnic, linguistic, and social background joined in the construction of Japan's image to argue for reform, modernization, and/or a "national" awakening of the Empire compatible with "indigenous Eastern" character, no matter how they may have differed from one another or disagreed with each other in other respects. Implicit in these representations was acceptance of the division of the world into East and West. However, the Ottomans who interpreted Japan's image attempted to redesign this dichotomy to alter the power relations formerly imbedded in such a discourse so that the East could now be equal or even superior to the West (even though they remained the shadowed secondary term of the binary). The means by and the extent to which Japan was utilized to illustrate the ideas of Ottoman intellectuals, statesmen, and subjects in the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries indicate that some broad conception of pan-Asianism, or Easternism, prevailed in the consciousness of Ottoman citizens during these years, over and above the preexisting identifications of Ottoman, Muslim, Christian, Turk, Arab, or Druze, et cetera. Further, both the Ottoman state and Japan recognized the sociopolitical power of the Japanese historical analogy and, when possible or necessary, both states encouraged or discouraged the spread of its message within Ottoman society.

In the process of imagining contemporary Meiji Japan as a model for modernity, the Japanese nation became exoticized and ahistoricized: Japan was conjured up in the minds of observers as a country whose people did not lose their uniqueness, their "Eastern essence," their "Japanese spirit," as they boldly embarked on the path of progress and reversed the global racial-civilization hierarchy. Of course the Japanese, desiring to be seen as equals with Europe, had a vested interest in promoting themselves for their own purposes—at home, in Europe, and in Asia—as this leader of the East. Japanese agency in this process cannot be ignored. The Japanese perpetuated a positive self-image for both European and Asian observers while reinforcing

the ontological distinction between East and West in the Ottoman post-revolution era.⁵² Their purpose was to provide the rest of the world with a particular view of Japan—one that would demonstrate Japan's civility and equality with the West for both Eastern and Western consumption. Japanese authors actually reversed the Orientalist pattern in their writings by emphasizing the inferiority and decadence of the West.⁵³ This was well received by Ottoman intellectuals concerned with salvaging the Ottoman Empire during crises such as the Balkan Wars.⁵⁴ Japan's civility was construed in ironic ways, through bloody victory first in the Sino-Japanese war against fellow Asians, and then over Russia in 1905. But, of course, the Russo-Japanese War left disparate impressions:

For Easterners this war and this victory caused a great danger. The Europeans, terrified by Japan, henceforth did not look with a tolerant eye upon the political actions and changes [taking place] in the other Eastern nations just like in Japan.⁵⁵

Japan's wars were almost always claimed in Ottoman literature to be "in defense of the homeland," and "to preserve its existence."⁵⁶ Japan had an alliance with England and other European powers; demonstrating its parity with the West had been contingent upon Japan ridding itself of the Unequal Treaties. It had been a long process to abrogate unfair and unbalanced agreements, one that had required Japan to reform and modernize from the inside first, in order to alter the external political situation, and it would be instructive for the Ottomans.⁵⁷

Yet another paradox surfaces however when we interrogate the notion of Japanese modernity as the assimilation of Eastern spirit and Western scientific methods. In actuality, Japan did pass through a stage early in the Meiji era in which it condemned its indigenous culture as antiquated and backward, in favor of a sometimes exaggerated display of Western cultural borrowings (including styles of dress, interior design in homes, etc.). Though the late Meiji era witnessed a nostalgia for, a pride in, and eventually an aggressive defense of traditional Japanese heritage, the rejection of Japan's earlier wholehearted adoption of Western cultural trappings took some time to take root. It was a contradiction very often ignored by the Ottomans (and other Asians) generating this discourse on modern Japan, who needed to present the Japanese as powerful custodians of Eastern values.

Pan-Asianism Lived: Abdürreşid İbrahim

The career and influence of the Tatar Muslim Abdürreşid İbrahim (figure 3.1) cannot be overlooked in this narrative of pan-Asian, anticolonial attitudes. He served as both a direct contact between the Muslims of Asia and Japan, and as a participant in constructing a particular image of the Japanese nation in the hearts and minds of the Islamic world. İbrahim's case is similar to that of many journalists and political activists resident in Ottoman lands in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, who




Figure 3.1 Abdürreşid İbrahim.

Note: Portrait from his travelogue *Alem-i İslâm ve Japonya'da İntişâr-i İslâmiyet* [The World of Islam and the Spread of Islam in Japan], h.1328(1910/1911).

wrote articles about Japan in an effort to argue for reform and modernization policies, to place emphasis upon newly emerging notions of identity, and/or to reject (or applaud) Western influences considered detrimental (or beneficial) to society. In this regard, İbrahim's life and work paralleled that of other intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire, whose writings and thought as they relate to Japan will be analyzed in subsequent chapters. In fact, İbrahim encountered or interacted with many Ottoman and Arab writers and activists on a personal level when he traveled to their individual homes, met in their study salons, or communicated with them from afar through articles submitted to their journals while he was overseas. His circulation among

these intellectual circles across national and imperial boundaries, whether in St. Petersburg, Istanbul, Mecca, Cairo, Damascus, Berlin, or Tokyo, managed to link events and politics of one region of Asia to another so that pan-Islamic, pan-Asian, or even pan-Turkist ideologies could actually function to create a broad sense of unity among various peoples on the continent. At the same time, he assisted in the mass construction of an image of Japan as an Eastern role model, with all its specificity of meaning, within Ottoman consciousness. He is also representative of the views and concerns affecting emigrant Russian Turks in Istanbul who influenced Ottoman society and stimulated Turkish nationalist thinking.

But he differs from other Ottoman and Arab writers with similar ideological leanings in one important respect: Abdürreşid İbrahim did not just shape the image of Japan in his anti-Western discourse that appeared in the press, but he was directly and personally involved in forging a concrete relationship between Muslims in Asia and Japanese operatives. İbrahim committed the majority of his life to the cause of mediating between the Islamic world and a powerful Japanese nation that he considered to be the only possible guarantor against continued Western colonial exploitation of Asia. In his articles and pamphlets, İbrahim presented his notion of the Japanese to Ottoman and Arabic readers just as he physically introduced Japanese “converts” to Muslims in Mecca and Damascus. While other writers may have only utilized the Japanese image to the point where it supported immediate ideological arguments, İbrahim acted upon his words in hopes of ultimately liberating the Eastern world completely from the West. His participation in the process of producing written discourse on Japan was paralleled by his direct involvement in Japan’s relations with Muslims in Asia.

Abdürreşid İbrahim’s life has been thoroughly examined elsewhere and thus details will only be recounted when they relate to his role as an unofficial link between the Islamic world and Japan, and his contributions to anti-Western colonial resistance. A Tatar Muslim refugee from Russia, İbrahim was at various times a teacher, Islamic judge, author, journalist, political activist, and wartime political operative who traveled from his birthplace in the Volga region of Siberia to Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, and from Mecca to Europe, to the shores of Japan, writing books, publishing articles and editing newspapers in the Tatar, Kazakh, Arabic, and Ottoman Turkish languages. Beginning with his active opposition to Russian rule over the various Muslim communities within the Russian Empire in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Abdürreşid İbrahim’s worldview eventually developed into a synthesis of pan-Islamic, pan-Asian, and pan-Turkish ideology that opposed Western colonial and imperial encroachment and that thrust Japan into the forefront of his political conceptions. To this end he became heavily involved in the activities of the Japanese *Kokuryūkai* (Black Dragon Society) in the twentieth century, disseminating propaganda among Muslims in Asia for this ultranationalist wing of Japanese elites who anticipated the Islamic world’s inclusion in their Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the interwar and war periods. More significant than arguments for or against his co-optation into the Japanese Empire’s war machine of the 1930s however is the evolution

of his own particular vision of the world as divided between East and West, formulated *before* he visited Japan in 1908 and established his lasting political relationship with the Japanese.

Abdürreşid İbrahim employed the press as the effective medium in which to develop and disseminate his ideas. His publications always complemented his bold political actions whether he was in Russia, Istanbul, Europe, or Tokyo. İbrahim's periodicals frequently functioned as the mouthpieces of organizations he established to gain cultural, educational, or political autonomy from a government authority. For İbrahim, the printed word itself was his expression of solidarity with Muslims, a solidarity that often fluctuated between old and new "national" identifications.⁵⁸

İbrahim's earlier experiments in publishing would demonstrate a definite pan-Islamic ideology based on anti-Russian sentiments and his exposure to the international Muslim community while on pilgrimage. His pan-Asian attitudes developed somewhat later, after Japan's success in the Russo-Japanese War and his travels throughout the Asian continent in 1908–1909, but in conjunction with his pan-Islamism and anti-Russianism. İbrahim's later Istanbul newspapers would also reflect the increasingly the pan-Turkish feelings of Ottoman colleagues and Muslim exiles from Russia surrounding him in the capital. During and after the First World War, with the solidification of new forms of national identity and the success of many separatist struggles in creating an entirely new global order of individual states, İbrahim had to realign these three principles to accommodate the struggle against Western colonialism and imperialism, this time in a global context culminating in his support for Japan's war to "liberate" Asia.

Abdürreşid İbrahim's early travels between the Ottoman Empire and Russia shaped his pan-Islamic outlook, culminating in the linkage of Muslim politics in Russia to issues concerning the larger Islamic community. In 1878 İbrahim stopped in Istanbul while on pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. His time in Istanbul was spent in the company of sufis and Muslim emigrants from Russia while he attempted to get to the Hicaz. After reaching Medina, he stayed on to study there and in Mecca with other Russian Muslim teachers and the local ulema for approximately six more years. These mentors encouraged him to support the Tatar community's struggle against Russian oppression, to nurture the idea of science and education as a key to guaranteeing a society's future,⁵⁹ and to espouse pan-Islamic ideology as a way to unite East against West. Though still a naive young man at this time by his own admission,⁶⁰ it was here that he formulated his political understanding of "Muslim unity," as he was also associating with political exiles from the Ottoman Empire (the Arabian Peninsula and Libya were Ottoman sites of exile, just as Siberia was for Russia) as well as with Muslim pilgrims who came from all over the world to pay their respects to the holy cities. When İbrahim eventually left Arabia in 1884 to return to his native Tara, he concerned himself with education of Muslims in Russia, as did his Crimean and Volga Tatar compatriots İsmail Gaspıralı and Yusuf Akçura, who had developed a new theory of education that incorporated modern sciences into the traditional Islamic curriculum (the *usul-ü cedid*, or new principles method).

İbrahim seized the opportunity while passing through the Ottoman capital to meet with several notable personalities in order to gather more information about the educational system there.⁶¹ After becoming a teacher at the local Tara *medrese* back in Siberia, he married, again traveled to Istanbul, the Hicaz, and back again in 1885. Around this time he published a pamphlet that was distributed illegally in Russia, called *Liva'ül-Hamd*, in which he encouraged Russian Muslims to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire.⁶² By 1892, after passing the required Russian language exam, İbrahim was appointed judge (*kadı*) and member of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly in Ufa.⁶³ However due to a disagreement with the Russian government and the local *müfti* because "his lively character was not suited for the strict formality of this work" and because he desired to "find broader possibilities to act [on behalf of the Muslim community]," İbrahim resigned from his post in 1895 and returned to Istanbul.⁶⁴ This time he remained for about two years, where he circulated among prominent Ottoman personalities and published several pamphlets, the most famous of which was his *Çolpan Yıldızı* (*The North Star*). In it he condemned Czarist Russian oppression of Turkic Muslims and the rumored attempts by orthodox missionaries to forcibly convert members of the Tatar community to Christianity. Demanding cultural and political autonomy for Muslims within Russia, the pamphlet was smuggled into Russia, where it caused a wide reaction. From 1895 to 1900, İbrahim journeyed between East Turkestan and Russia, to the Ottoman Empire, and to Europe, where he established ties with Young Turks as well as with Russian socialists. He returned to Russia in 1900, settled in St. Petersburg, and founded his first journal, the irregularly appearing *Mirât*.

At this time İbrahim made his first contacts with Japanese nationals in Russia, which would later affect his anti-Russian, anti-Western activities, and around 1902–1903, he made his first journey to Japan. One source speculates that he was invited by "one of the ultra-patriotic and expansionist-minded groups that were gaining prominence in that nation's military and political circles;⁶⁵ another claims that "there is some evidence pointing to the fact that Abdürreşid Bey's Japanese connection began prior to his trip in 1902," and that while he was in Japan, "he is believed to have been involved in anti-Russian propaganda that led to his deportation at the request of the Russian consul."⁶⁶ Considering the tensions that were about to erupt between Japan and Russia in 1904, it is plausible that the Japanese were interested in supporting his activities while at the same time being wary of the negative reaction it might incur from Russia. Upon his return to Istanbul in 1904, the Russian consul there was hot on his heels and requested his extradition from the local Ottoman authorities. He was incarcerated in Odessa without a clear legal reason for his arrest, but protests from other Muslims led to his release less than two weeks later.

According to US Office of Strategic Services Research and Analysis reports published during the Second World War, the Japanese were actively courting Muslims in Russia prior to the Russo-Japanese War, and Abdürreşid İbrahim was among them. Though information contained in these reports should be read with caution, as they were produced during wartime and thus reflect the

attitudes of a US government office at war with the subject of study, there are some clues present in these reports concerning İbrahim's relationship with Japan at an earlier date than was previously understood. For example, according to one report, Japanese intelligence officer and military attaché in Peking, Berlin, and the Balkans, Colonel Fukushima Yasumasa, traveled on horseback through the Caucasus, the Volga, the lower Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia between 1883 and 1897, gathering information and establishing contacts in Manchuria, Mongolia, Persia, Turkey, and Afghanistan.⁶⁷ The Black Dragons (*Kokuryūkai*), the Japanese nationalist organization founded in 1901 by Uchida Ryōhei and Tōyama Mitsuru that ran its own school and promoted foreign language schools in Tokyo and Osaka, included many high officials among the 10,000 members "active worldwide" in their cause to expand the Japanese Empire, and, in this case, to make preparations for the coming war with Russia.⁶⁸ In a publication produced by the Black Dragons, Fukushima is mentioned as a "war spy who made efforts to learn what the Russians were doing and to make friends with the Muslim peoples."⁶⁹ It is possible that he and İbrahim were in contact at some point, although İbrahim was in and out of Russia frequently. The OSS claimed that İbrahim's secret contacts with Japanese "patriots" led to "subversive movements of such nature that he was forced to flee for Japan."⁷⁰ The OSS report also mentioned a Japanese named Hattori who was said to have been dispatched by Uchida to set up a Japanese goods store in Russia; in 1897 this store was operating in Iman, Siberia, and he operated another that functioned as a clearing house for intelligence information during the Russo-Japanese War.⁷¹ Tokutomi Sohō, a Japanese journalist nominally affiliated with the Black Dragons, who initially endorsed Japan's expansionist mission in Asia, may also have come into contact with Abdürreşid İbrahim as he visited Russia and the Ottoman Empire on several occasions. Tokutomi's primary motivation for the trip to the region seems to have been educational; it is not clear whether or not he was seeking out Muslim allies for Japan during this visit.⁷²

Military attaché in France, Sweden, Switzerland, and Russia (1906), Colonel Motojiro (Mutsujiro?) Akashi was mentioned specifically in connection with İbrahim. On the eve of his departure for Europe in 1901, Akashi reportedly desired infiltrating Russia via the two leaders of an organization called the Japanese Black Sea Society, Uchida (then organizer of a jujitsu school in Vladivostok) and Sugiyama.⁷³ This same Colonel Akashi is said to have first journeyed to Russia "to organize popular uprisings in the Russian rear before the Russo-Japanese War"; the report continued, "acts of espionage and subversion by members of the All-Russian Muslim League and its heir, the Central Muslim League have been admitted by the Japanese."⁷⁴ In the appendix to this report Akashi and İbrahim are said to have obtained intelligence information from "Russian Muslims" during the Russo-Japanese War.⁷⁵ Akashi supposedly had a meeting with Abdürreşid İbrahim in the Russian capital around the time that İbrahim was publishing the Ottoman weekly *Ülfet* (1906), and he worked with İbrahim "in the organizing of Muslim resistance . . .," which could explain the Russians' closure of İbrahim's newspaper.⁷⁶ Colonel Akashi later

arranged for Abdürreşid İbrahim's son Ahmed Münir to be educated at Waseda University in Tokyo at the expense of the Black Dragons themselves.⁷⁷

İbrahim's involvement with these Japanese operatives coincided with his activities in Russia. His political strategy led to holding an all-Russian Muslim Congress in Nizhny-Novgorod in the summer of 1905, which created a "Union of Russian Muslims" (*İttifâk-ı Müslimîn*) that would eventually become an official political party in 1906 during the second All-Russian Muslim Congress in St. Petersburg.⁷⁸ Coinciding with his political activities was his publication of two weekly newspapers, both of which were closed down by the Russian authorities. The Ottoman Turkish *Ülfet*, described as "...pan-Islamic, jadîdist, in fact progressive, favorable towards the reformist movement and towards socialism...[and in which] his nationalism was oriented toward Turkey, the seat of the Caliphate and the 'land of promise,'" was shut in 1907.⁷⁹ İbrahim's Arabic *al-Tilmîdh*, self-billed as a scientific, literary, religious, and political weekly, first appeared in late 1906 and its last issue was seized by the Russian police in 1907, after thirty issues. An eight-page paper "written in excellent Arabic... covering information concerning the Muslim world and political life in Russia,"⁸⁰ it expressed İbrahim's conceptual outlook and corroborated his actions amid political currents at this critical moment in the Russian Empire. *Al-Tilmîdh* defined İbrahim's pan-Islamism, pan-Asianism, and pan-Turkism when these three ideologies were surfacing in his home country.

A thorough reading of *al-Tilmîdh*⁸¹ yields several themes in İbrahim's newspaper, the most prominent of which is resistance to Western colonialism in Asia and Africa, printed in the pages of *al-Tilmîdh* in almost every issue with such vociferous expressions as "the lot of the Christian nations are like a group of hunters who take their positions in the high hills, lying in wait for their prey."⁸² He reminded readers that the three Western nations that ruled over the most Muslims were Britain, France (in Algeria and Tunisia), and Russia,⁸³ and that Western civilization had become morally decadent, infecting those Muslim societies with which it came into contact.⁸⁴ Furthermore, Western civilization and its notions of democracy and parliament had originated from the Islamic concept of the *Shūrā* (consultative council).⁸⁵ Yet, the West did not understand the true spirit of Islam, slandered it in its books, and assumed Islam to be an obstacle hindering Muslims from modern progress, therefore mistakenly concluding that Islam could not possibly be a proper sociopolitical basis from which to administrate state policy accordingly.⁸⁶ İbrahim's solution was initially a pan-Islamic one: to safeguard the interests of Muslims the world over, everyone must generate a sense of religious unity under the banner of the Caliph, Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II.⁸⁷

İbrahim used the press to achieve political gain at home, by linking Russian Muslims' issues with a larger Islamic *ümmet* abroad and by locally organizing the various Muslims into an all-Muslim Union (*İttifâk-ı Müslimîn*) that would participate in the Russian parliamentary process. He also disseminated news of the Islamic world in the Arabic language in order to generate feelings of pan-Islamic solidarity among Muslims who hailed primarily from the Asian continent. His ideas in 1906 were ideologically pan-Islamic, and geographically pan-Asian.

İbrahim's pan-Islamic thought rapidly expanded into a more broad, pan-Asian conception that gradually reoriented his views away from the Ottoman Empire as protector of Muslims; İbrahim's new ally, Japan, would become his Asian bulwark against Western imperialism. İbrahim saw the keys to Muslim liberation at home and abroad as cultural, political, and economic autonomy, reform and secularization of the education system, and Muslim participation in the democratic constitutional process. Action was more important than words. And here İbrahim first contemplated Japan: an Eastern nation that had repelled the colonial powers and challenged European hegemony, Japan made good on its own reforms and modernization projects. The "land of the Mikadō" had seemingly achieved progress—modern education, parliament, freedom of the press—which in turn had influenced the choices of Iran and other nations in Asia.⁸⁸ Japan had proved itself in the Russo-Japanese War; it had reportedly even assisted Indian nationalists who opposed the British in India.⁸⁹ Japan was the actor capable of securing İbrahim's political aims. İbrahim increasingly believed the twentieth-century world required not only placing emphasis on pan-Islamic bonds to resist the West, but on creating a more united Asian front against Western encroachment into the continent. Japan would be the leader that would guide Asia out of its dilemmas with the Western Powers.

İbrahim's discovery of Japan and his championing of Japan as the non-Muslim, Asian nation that had successfully combined native Eastern ethics with Western science and technology in a way he believed the rest of Asia should emulate, coincided with his travels within Asia and his courtship by Japanese parties interested in surveying the Asian continent in search of political allies. İbrahim's newfound Japanese partnership eventually functioned in Ottoman lands through various channels: first, by way of his associations with Japanese converts and operatives who surveyed the area for sympathetic Ottoman citizens while traveling in the Middle East; second, through İbrahim's cooperative publishing endeavors that resulted in the distribution throughout the Middle East of an evocative pamphlet written by a Japanese Muslim entitled *Asia in Danger*, and third, via his contributions about Japan to *Sirât-ı Mustakim*, the prominent Ottoman Turkish journal with Islamic modernist leanings. İbrahim possessed a keen political sense in dealing with both his opponents and his Japanese cohorts. He was not merely a tool used by Japanese imperialists to further their expansion in Asia, but rather was a far-sighted political activist with pan-Asian, Islamic modernist ideological tendencies, who recognized at the turn of the century the need for a powerful, progressive ally to achieve his goals. Japan was as much a tool for İbrahim as he was for Japan.

İbrahim recounted his travels throughout Asia in 1908/9 in his famous Ottoman two-volume series titled *The Islamic World and the Spread of Islam in Japan* (*Alem-i İslam ve Japonya'da İntişar-ı İslamiyet*), which was published in Istanbul between 1908 and 1911.⁹⁰ This work has been analyzed in depth elsewhere,⁹¹ but it should be mentioned that İbrahim's writings gave Ottomans tremendous insight into Japanese culture and society through the viewpoint of a fellow Muslim who circulated among elite political circles in Japan. In it İbrahim recounted his meetings and accidental encounters with Japanese statesmen and intellectuals as well as with other resident alien Muslims. Members of the Black Dragon Society introduced him to figures such as former foreign

minister Count Okuma, Historical Society member Count Ohara, professor Ariga, the journalist Nakano, Economic Society president Omihara, Prince Itō Hirobumi, and members of the Japanese parliament.⁹² In 1909, İbrahim and many of these Japanese elites formed an organization called the “Asia Defense Force” (in Japanese, *Asya Gi Kai*; in Ottoman Turkish, *Asya Kuvve-yi Müddâfâsı*) in which they agreed to strive toward Muslim-Asian unity to liberate the East from the West. This organization published a journal called *Daitō* in Japanese (*Greater Asia*, or *Maşrik-i A'zam* in Ottoman Turkish). As a visible expression of this cooperation, they committed to building the first mosque in Tokyo, which was officially opened in 1938.⁹³ Together İbrahim and eight Japanese members drafted and signed the “Muslim Pact,” the society’s secret oath promising Muslim-Japanese cooperative efforts.⁹⁴

İbrahim maintained that the Ottoman Sultan should be consulted and his approval be sought concerning any religious ceremonies or decisions such as the building of mosques.⁹⁵ He believed that it was the duty of the ulema to spread Islam to other parts of the world and to protect the faith from the onslaught of the West, a conviction he openly expressed in the pages of Ottoman newspapers.⁹⁶ Despite shifting his allegiances toward Japan as a pan-Asian leader at this time, his pan-Islamic ideology required his notion of an Islamic caliphal authority as represented by the Ottoman Sultan to remain intact.

After departing from Japan a second time, İbrahim accompanied the first Japanese pilgrim to Mecca in 1909 after visiting with Muslims in Asia and examining their education systems. Originally an interpreter during the Russo-Japanese War, Mr. Yamaoka Kōtarō (later Ömer) may have met Abdürreşid İbrahim when he was in Japan, but according to İbrahim’s memoirs, he had received a telegram in Singapore explaining that a Japanese was being dispatched to Bombay to rendezvous with him.⁹⁷ When Yamaoka arrived in Bombay, he introduced himself as İbrahim’s new student, and sent regards from Ohara and Nakano, after which he presented a letter written by Ohara that described Yamaoka as someone “who, after becoming a Muslim in your presence, will be at your side at all times, taking pride in serving you.”⁹⁸ İbrahim witnessed Yamaoka’s utterance of the *Shahāda* in Bombay, and instructed Yamaoka in the tenets of Islam, giving him the Muslim name Ömer.⁹⁹ The next day they were received with hospitality by the Ottoman consul general in Bombay, Celâl Bey Efendi. Hoping to reach Mecca, they planned to catch a steamship in Bombay that was headed for the Arabian Peninsula. Nakamura maintains that the Ottoman consul general immediately issued an entrance visa for Yamaoka and gave him a free passenger ticket to Jedda, although İbrahim’s memoirs indicate no such Ottoman generosity occurred.¹⁰⁰

İbrahim’s respect for Yamaoka and his high esteem for the Japanese in general grew as he educated Yamaoka about Islam. But İbrahim was also keenly aware that people often had political motivations behind their adoption of a religious faith, a premise that he did not find unacceptable given the current threat of Western domination over the East. In this case, the Japanese were not simply acting out of brotherly love for fellow Muslims:

With regard to the temperament of the Japanese nation, along with pursuing a serious path in everything, it is a nation that always prefers

general political benefits to personal gain...I myself taught [Yamaoka] Islam, yet I looked after him always with the eye of a political Muslim, and accordingly tried to teach him. In any case as long as it does not show the Japanese any hope of an initial political benefit, Islam will never be able to occupy a place in the heart of a Japanese. I can say perhaps in general that a Japanese cannot become a Muslim blindly. Religions that are later inculcated enter into people's hearts in the first place precisely because of some definite intention.¹⁰¹

The OSS reports made more direct allegations about the character of this Japanese, implying that Yamaoka was some sort of operative dispatched to "investigate the Muslim areas of the Near East and the Caucasus 1898–1910...he then accompanied İbrahim to Russia but was apprehended by Russian military police and barely escaped."¹⁰² At any rate, in Mecca, Yamaoka and İbrahim remained as guests at the home of Nakşibendi Sheikh Muhammed Murâd Efendi from Kazan, where they discussed with other Muslims (including Jandarma instructor and Committee of Union and Progress member Hoca Ferit Efendi) Muslim unity in the East and the possibilities of Islam spreading in Japan.¹⁰³ İbrahim mentioned that the Egyptian Khedive, Prince 'Abbās Hilmî Paşa, had entered Mecca with his entourage while they were there and was received by Sharîf Hısayn Paşa of Mecca;¹⁰⁴ Yamaoka supposedly also dined with the Sharîf and was allowed to see inside the Ka'aba, "...the greatest honor for a humble subject of the Japanese Empire."¹⁰⁵

In Medina, the two pilgrims again met with other Muslims. İbrahim described a meeting there attended even by Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) officials, in which Yamaoka discussed the aims of the Japanese Asia Defense Force (*Asya Gi Kai*) and the benefits of expanding this Eastern unity. Yamaoka blessed his having become Muslim and brought tears to the eyes of his audience with his Russian speech, which İbrahim translated into Arabic.¹⁰⁶ Yamaoka and Abdürreşid İbrahim then continued on to Damascus, Beirut, and Istanbul, where Yamaoka and İbrahim often gave pan-Asian, pan-Islamic speeches along the way. An article called "Japan and Islam" that appeared in the February 18, 1910, issue of Muḥammad Kurd 'Alî's Damascene newspaper *al-Muqtabas (al-Umma)* reprinted Yamaoka's speech that he delivered in a CUP clubhouse (*nādī al-İttihād wa'l-Taraqqī*) the night before. It exemplified the kind of popular rhetoric that Yamaoka voiced:

Why didn't Islam spread to Japan until now? Japan, after obtaining its freedom forty years ago, started imitating Europeans by way of their modern civilization. Most Japanese at that time did not think of advancing patriotic feeling in the Japanese nation; rather they thought about procuring material gains. Oh Brothers, what do you think about this dangerous feeling which grows in the minds of the Japanese? That an example of this strong feeling, built on profit only, reduces the value of Japan and obliterates its future. The wise of the nation must find that religion is the best treatment for this material predilection.¹⁰⁷

Wherever Yamaoka went in the Ottoman Empire, İbrahim noted, he made a big propagation for a "Muslim awakening," melding Japanese imperial aims

in Asia with pan-Islamic ideology that proved attractive to his audiences, whether they were Syrian Arabs, Young Turk officials, Egyptian royalty, or others. Yamaoka couched his political agenda in exhortations of how the Japanese had shown that science was the key to national advancement, but only a religion like Islam could provide the proper direction for use of this knowledge; his “single political hope” was to try to establish connections of love and friendship with the Ottoman Empire and the Arab Middle East.¹⁰⁸ In this effort, Abdürreşid İbrahim was his comrade, his personal escort, and his partner.

İbrahim stayed on in Istanbul from 1910 to 1911 and published an Ottoman periodical, *Tearrûf-i Müslimîn*, while he contributed articles to the journal *Sırat-ı Mustakîm* (later renamed *Sebilürreşat*), edited by the Turkish poet Mehmed Âkif Ersoy. This journal represented the views of a group of conservative intellectuals who had disliked Sultan Abdülhamid II's (anti-Islamic) absolutism as much as they resented Young Turk secularism that granted equality to non-Muslims; Shaw described them as emphasizing “the perfect conformity of the Constitution with the democracy of Islam, with the Parliament representing the earliest Muslim practices of consultation among believers.”¹⁰⁹ According to an article from this weekly magazine, Ömer Yamaoka was in Istanbul at the Ekîn İttihâd ve Te'âvün Clubhouse on March 21, 1910, where he was given a copy of the Qur'ân during ceremonies that were held after several speeches were delivered by various Ottoman citizens on the virtues of Islam and the necessity of cultivating a relationship between the Ottomans and the Japanese.¹¹⁰ Among the prominent personalities present was Bursa deputy Tâhir Bey Efendi, who spoke at length about pan-Islamic bonds between Muslim brethren, about the slanderous writings of Greek priests that formulated the West's mistaken attitudes about Islam, about the spiritual connections between Ottoman and Japanese felt during the Russo-Japanese War by “even the most ignorant of our people” when they were victorious over the Russians at Tsushima and Mukden, about Yamaoka's status as the mediator between “these two great peoples” who should unite and make an alliance not for material reasons, but for spiritual ones, and about Yamaoka's duty to learn Islam not through the medium of English or French, but via Arabic.¹¹¹ To this Yamaoka agreed, saying that he would learn Arabic and would make certain to spread this knowledge among his countrymen upon his return home. He concluded his oration by promising to dispatch men to Istanbul and other areas of the Islamic world, but he requested that his audience send some individuals conversant in English to Japan in order that they explain to the Japanese the lofty truths of the Qur'ân.¹¹² Yamaoka journeyed home to Japan via the Russian Empire in 1910. But his fame was widespread and extended as far as Cairo, where in 1913 Rashîd Riḍâ' mentioned in *al-Manâr* Yamaoka's conversion and meetings in Ottoman society clubhouses.¹¹³

Yamaoka's efforts must have paid off. In 1911 *Sırat-ı Mustakîm* published the Ottoman translation of the official statement of purpose of the “Asia Defense Force,” the organization İbrahim helped form in Tokyo, and the role of its journal, *Daitō*, in disseminating the society's ideas, including the society's fifteen-point proclamation delineating the organization's structure, a four-point description of the society's intentions, and the writer's interpretation of this information.¹¹⁴ Among *Asya Gi Kai*'s activities were to be the preservation of

the current state of the existing governments in Asia and securing their progress in the areas of agriculture, education, economics, diplomatic relations between nations, and military affairs; a connection between the most important peoples in Asia (defined as China, Siam, Hindustan, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey) was to be established and this was to be achieved by members of this society who were dispatched to these lands in order to learn the present situation among the nations of Asia.¹¹⁵ The author reminded readers that the oldest civilizations and the greatest ideas all originated in the East, but that now Asians had become enemies of one another due to invasions of the West. This society would strive to arm and protect Asians, whose “morality is sound, whose customs are admirable, whose nature is peaceful, whose thinking is correct”; *Asya Gi Kaī* publicly requested all Asians’ participation and cooperation in this endeavor.¹¹⁶ As part of the oath to support and protect the East, *Asya Gi Kaī* funded not just Abdürreşid İbrahim’s son Münir in school in Tokyo, but two other Ottoman youths as well: Hasan Fehmî and Mehmet Tevfik.¹¹⁷ In an Ottoman translation of an article from *Daitō* that was published in *Sirât-ı Mustakîm* in 1911, the 1890 *Ertuğrul* shipwreck (to be discussed in the next chapter) was commemorated as the first real attempt to establish this Asian solidarity, with the author recounting the heroism of the drowned Osman Paşa, whose memory lived on as a reminder for Turks and Japanese to approach one another out of the affection shared between Turkey and Japan.¹¹⁸

Among the Japanese *Asya Gi Kaī* members with whom İbrahim had a personal affiliation around this time and who did just this duty for Asia was a Japanese intellectual named Hatano.¹¹⁹ Described in an OSS report as

Hassan Murshid Efendi Hatano, the earliest agent and contributor to the Black Dragons’ *Daitō* (*Greater Asia*), he was converted to Islam with much publicity in 1911 and has subsequently been publisher of *Islam* and *Islamic Unity* in Tokyo. He also sent articles in English to the Muslim press throughout the world, which we find reprinted in the Russian *Min-Islama*, the Italian [text unreadable], and the Indian *Review of Religion*, during the first twenty years of this century. Hatano’s articles, even when signed “a Japanese Muslim,” are written in a style distinctly his own and easily recognizable. They consist of pleading for Muslim missionaries and literatures in Japan, funds for the [text unreadable], descriptions of Japan which read like a tourist booklet, and professions of great humility with [text unreadable] to “what Islam can teach Japan.”¹²⁰

Along with another Japanese convert to Islam named Mehmet Hilmi Nakawa, Abdürreşid İbrahim translated into Ottoman a pamphlet written by Hatano in 1912 titled *Asia in Danger* and had it published by the press of the Ottoman paper *Sebilürreşat*.¹²¹ This Ottoman pamphlet, *Asya Tehlikede*, was distributed around many cities in the Islamic world and generated continued enthusiasm for Japan as a leader of the East. It outlined atrocities committed by Europeans on the Asian continent, including several grotesque photographs of Asians’ bodies being hung (see figure 3.2), and the author prescribed a pan-Asian alliance as the only hope for Asia to regain its freedom. Hatano explained that immediately following the signing of a Japan-China agreement, Japan should




Figure 3.2 *Asya Tehlikede* (Asia in Danger), inside cover with images of Western atrocities (1912).

strive to make a treaty first with the Ottomans, then with the Afghānīs and Siam. Persia would then outstretch its hand, as would India, Java, and others. A good Asian alliance had to have a far-sighted and savvy leader, and that leader was implied to be Japan.¹²² In another paragraph, Hatano discussed how a pact with the Ottoman Empire had the most significance in spite of its current position of inferiority vis-à-vis Europe, as Japan and the Ottomans were the two sentinels of the Asian continent, and if they strived together, they could conceivably prevent European imperialist activities in Asia.¹²³ He also blamed Europe’s meddling for the Japanese failure to negotiate an alliance with the Ottoman Empire until now, saying the Europeans had wrongly convinced the Japanese to insist on Capitulatory judiciary privileges. This pamphlet certainly circulated among the literate of Istanbul, including Ottoman journalists and statesmen. Japan was actively promoting itself as a leader of the East with the aid of political activists such as Abdürreşid İbrahim and the printing presses of Istanbul.

Letters İbrahim sent from Tokyo to his colleagues in Istanbul were published regularly in *Srât-ı Mustakîm* (*Sebilürreşât*), and these letters were the format for generating the typical pattern of an ideal Japan in the minds of

Ottoman citizens. For example, in one letter, İbrahim attempted to clarify the meaning of religion in Japan for his readers in a way that would not contradict Islamic values, knowing that Japan's non-Muslim status could be contentious. "The military, commanders and officers," he explained, "their religion and their beliefs are obedience to His Majesty the Emperor Mikadō who is their sovereign, and service to their nation."¹²⁴ Loyalty to the sovereign and patriotic service to the nation were not objectionable behaviors for Muslims; these were precisely the values Ottoman writers found most appealing about the Japanese example. İbrahim would also single out individual Japanese statesmen whom he credited with honorable tasks. He described Japanese marshal ōyama as "perhaps the foremost among those who took upon themselves the need to preserve this national morality (*ahlâk-ı millîye*)"; as a practical expression of this duty he was currently the director of a school in Japan.¹²⁵ But the patriotic duty involved in supervising a school meant that "...choosing the training for children directly, he wanted to raise children of the nation and the homeland *for* the nation."¹²⁶ Part of this responsibility consisted of managing a facility where all students ate together, slept together, and studied together, so that divisions between the upper classes and the poorer children could be eradicated. This system cultivated young patriots—comrades not divided in their devotion to the nation.

Other Russian Muslims contributed to this image of Japan in Istanbul from further East, probably at the behest of Abdürreşid İbrahim. An article by a Veliyullah Enverî in *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* that originated in Zayşan, on the Siberian-China border, extolled the virtues of the Japanese nation, praising their reforms of Japan's administration and military that culminated in a resounding victory against Russia in 1905.¹²⁷ In 1913, İbrahim's own son Ahmed Münir wrote enthusiastically from Tokyo in *Sebilürreşat* about the increasing influence of Islam in Japan, while at the same time criticizing how little Muslims have really done to contribute to the spread of Islam "...in a clever, progressive, and thinking country like Japan."¹²⁸ True to both his father's anti-Western outlook and to the influences upon Münir's younger generation in the modern world, Münir expressed precisely what was considered national progress in the eyes of the East in the early twentieth century when he claimed that

in Asia, nationalism (*milliyetperverlik*), patriotism (*vatanperverlik*), constitutionalism (*meşrutiyet perverlik*) and military technology have so rapidly advanced that Europe has not attained even one of these achievements in the same era of progress.¹²⁹

This article went on to discuss other intellectual, economic, social, and religious advances in Asia, most of which the author attributed to the expansion and reform of the school systems in various Asian countries, and most notably in Japan. But Japan's success had much to do with its people's values according to Münir, who observed at a recent international exhibition in Tokyo that "the ever-present proclivity of the Japanese nation toward modernization and progress which always strikes the eye is quite readily apparent if we take note of the visitors to this exhibition."¹³⁰ Like his father, Münir considered

the Japanese to be the most powerful role model for peoples in Asia. Münir's activities also seemed to parallel his father's involvement with the pan-Asian groups patronized by Japan: he was listed as a member of the Progressive Asian Student Society, along with others from the Ottoman Empire, China, India, Korea, Siam, and Japan (including the society's secretary, a Mr. Haruo Kubota of Waseda University), whose aim was to assist in Asia's moral, intellectual, scientific, and economic advancement.¹³¹

Abdürreşid İbrahim continued to work on behalf of the Islamic world to throw off the yoke of the West, a task that frequently put him into contact with powerful political circles in various places. During the Italian invasion of Tripoli in 1911, he struggled to organize local opposition forces there, an activity that perhaps first introduced him to Enver Paşa. In 1913, sanctioned by an Ottoman imperial edict, İbrahim accepted Ottoman nationality.¹³² In Istanbul he continued to publish journals while serving as president of the Tatar Beneficent Society, including *İslâm Dünyası* (1913–1914). With the start of the First World War, İbrahim went first to the Eastern Ottoman front in order to coordinate Muslim efforts against the Russians, and then to Europe as a member of the *Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa*, who would attempt to recruit Russian Muslim prisoners-of-war held in Berlin into an anti-Russian fighting force for the Ottomans.¹³³ After the war, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, İbrahim moved around a bit, lived in various cities, and met with Japanese operatives again before finally returning to Japan with his family in 1934. He continued his well-documented activities with the immigrant and Japanese convert Muslim communities in Tokyo, and during the Second World War, İbrahim produced war propaganda for Japan (directed primarily at the Muslim East Indies under Dutch occupation), until his death in 1944.¹³⁴

Abdürreşid İbrahim was an integral figure in the dialogue between Japan and the Islamic world for almost forty years. As a member of intellectual circles in Russia, Istanbul, Europe, and Tokyo, he operated as a conduit for pan-Islamic, pan-Asian ideology emanating from any one of these centers that revealed itself as political opposition to Western imperialism. The ease with which he moved between these circles and thus his usefulness as a spokesperson and organizing activist was apparent to those on both the Japanese and Muslim sides, but it would be naive to say İbrahim was unaware of his sponsors' intentions. A pragmatist who equally saw benefit for Muslims and Asians in allying with Japan, he was a man of action and one that was not easily fooled by those as politically savvy and motivated as himself.

İbrahim took risky actions that challenged the West's penetration of Asia, to the point where the British became obsessed with capturing him during the Second World War.¹³⁵ His pan-Asian principles propelled İbrahim into anti-imperialist action and into a symbiotic relationship with the Japanese in which he was the link between Asians, both Muslim and non-Muslim. In the late nineteenth century, Islamic modernism in the activist style of Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī was the ideology upon which Muslim resistance to Western imperialism and material culture was based, coupled with the acceptance of necessary scientific and technological advances to benefit Islamic society. İbrahim altered this doctrine to coincide with twentieth-century realities in the form of a "pan-Asian Islamic modernism" that located the Japanese nation

in a leadership role. This was a conceptual arrangement that constantly resonated in the pages of the Ottoman and Arabic press, unlikely as it may seem. While the circumstances surrounding the production of İbrahim's discourse on Japan may have varied from those of other Ottoman and Arab authors discussing Japan, especially given the fact of his personal relationship with the Japanese, the content of his writings closely resembled their ideas, indicating an overall trend in the Ottoman Middle East: the evolution of a pan-Asianist notion of modernity represented by (and in İbrahim's case, as a direct result of contact with) Japan.

4

Asia in Danger: Ottoman-Japanese Diplomacy and Failures

The question of agency in the production of the discourse on the Japanese nation as an Eastern model of reform and modernization leads to an examination of the actual contact made between the Ottoman state and its subjects, and Japanese officials and expatriates, since these interactions shaped how each side viewed the other. Attempts to forge an official Ottoman-Japanese alliance in the late nineteenth to early twentieth century were encouraged by statesmen and private citizens on both sides, yet were hindered by everything from natural disasters to issues of *realpolitik*. Although diplomatic ties with Japan were not officially recognized until 1924, after the founding of the Turkish Republic, an amicable relationship and the notion of eventually establishing a formal treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Japan was kept alive for decades by unofficial visits, by the exchange of gifts between the Ottoman Sultan and the Japanese emperor, and by public fervor about pan-Asian solidarity. An alliance between the two powers flanking each side of Asia that could conceivably contain Russian expansion and block further Western imperialist penetration into the continent became an ideal of almost mythical proportions among intellectuals, journalists, statesmen, and the public at large in the Ottoman Middle East and in Japan.

To simply read about images of Japan as they appeared in Ottoman and Arabic print would be a useless endeavor if there is no context provided that would allow for the historical interpretation of this discourse within the parameters of both Ottoman society and the concrete relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Japan, which spanned the reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) and the Young Turk era (1908–1918). And it would be inaccurate to believe that this particular political environment, whether it encouraged or obstructed the signing of an agreement, had no effect on the perceptions of Japan in Ottoman consciousness. The Ottoman “players” in the negotiations often generated representations of Japan themselves, or at least acted as agents transmitting and transforming the information coming to the Middle East concerning Japan. The Tatar Russian Muslim Abdürreşid İbrahim is one example of an individual whose actions forged real linkages between Japan

and Muslims in Asia, connecting the Ottoman Empire with the East Asian nation.

The Japanese had a high degree of agency in the construction of this imagery due to their strategic interest in the region. They had a vested interest in portraying Japan to the rest of the world as a major power, thus shaping their image for the Ottoman and/or Arab intellect.¹ Having survived as an independent country following their experience with foreign powers in the late nineteenth century, the Japanese were now becoming aware of their own capabilities on the international stage. Asia was to be the arena for their future colonial experiments; the more the Japanese knew about the continent, and the more allies they acquired, the more successful their imperialist campaigns in Asia would be in the face of Western competition.²

The extent to which the Ottoman state was privately skeptical of Japanese intentions regarding the establishment of an official alliance stands in stark contrast to the Ottoman public's staunch enthusiasm for Japan as an Eastern ally.³ Ottoman officials and the sultan himself were keenly aware of the geopolitical issues involved: Japanese designs on Asian territories, Japanese unwillingness to compromise on their demands for special economic privileges in Ottoman lands, and the ramifications of any action that would incur Russian hostilities were all on the minds of Ottoman statesmen during the failed negotiation process. But coinciding with the Ottomans' political savvy in this situation was their clear recognition of the power of the Japanese image and the weight it carried with people under their authority. Japan's domestic reforms and international achievements represented the hopes of Asian peoples to modernize country and society, to repel Western imperialism, to maintain their indigenous cultures. The Ottoman state needed to elicit support from and to better control its population who identified with a small, independent, East Asian nation-state, by drawing analogies between its actions or policies and those of Japan, but without making further sacrifices of Ottoman economic or political integrity. To openly refuse diplomatic overtures from a nation that could be a partner in resisting the West could be detrimental to the Ottoman state's precarious position, as it balanced the role of Islamic guardian with the demands of the European powers. Would Ottoman citizens remain loyal to a state that would not at least attempt to ally itself with a fellow Eastern country in order to counter Western aggression and to protect the Islamic community?

The solution to the Ottomans' dilemma was to pursue diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese as long as it did not threaten the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in any way. When the Japanese insisted on Capitulatory privileges, or posed a security problem through their investigative missions in Ottoman territories, when the European powers disapproved, or if the Russian Empire might be pushed to retaliate militarily, Ottoman statesmen would draft counterproposals unacceptable to the Japanese, politely ignore Japanese requests, lag in their responses, postpone or suspend negotiations altogether as means to safeguard the Empire. Ottoman diplomacy with the Japanese may be seen as a failure in that ultimately no agreement was ever signed. But the Ottomans' clarity of purpose in their protection of state interests should be

viewed as their successful maintenance of stability at home combined with an astute reading of the game of international politics.

In contrast to the realities of Ottoman-Japanese relations is the fantasy of Eastern solidarity as a force that would alter the destiny of Asia, a recurrent theme in the discourse produced on Japan. Generally speaking, this era marks a definite shift in identification on the part of peoples in the Middle East and Asia towards a concept loosely defined as "pan-Asian ideology" to combat Western imperialism. The degree to which people in the Islamic world identified with pan-Asianism can be demonstrated by exploring one particular issue extensively covered in the Ottoman Turkish and Arabic press: the overwhelming and hopeful belief of Muslim peoples in the possibility of Japanese conversion to Islam. The origins of and the responses by Muslims to speculation and rumor about the impending conversion of the Japanese Emperor and/or the general population of Japan indicate a pervasive enthusiasm in Ottoman lands for an Asian people that would be allied to Muslims in faith and capable of challenging European hegemony. These "predictions" were disseminated by the Japanese or by individuals within the Ottoman Empire who had specific purposes in mind. Depending upon one's situation (Egyptian nationalist under British occupation or the Ottoman Sultan/Islamic Caliph for example), there was both widespread optimism or deep fear of this potential event that would have political and social consequences for the Ottoman Empire should it come to fruition. However ludicrous the notion of Japan becoming Muslim may seem now, this idea found a very receptive audience in the Middle East at the turn of the century when an overarching pan-Asian ideology with pagan Japan as its champion was reconciled with Islam. If Japan were to convert, there would no longer be any discrepancy between identifying with the Islamic community and with the strength of Asian modernity as represented by Japan. The Japanese propagated this rumor when possible to further their own political goals and to facilitate relations with Muslims in various countries as a prelude to any future conflict with Russia. Ottoman intellectuals expectantly speculated on the potential for this conversion to increase the number of Muslims worldwide, thereby shifting the balance to challenge Western colonial claims. The Ottoman state wavered between encouraging solidarity with Asian Japan, the trope of an anticipated Ottoman future, and discouraging the glorification of this more successful Eastern nation that might destabilize the Ottoman position as the seat of the Islamic Caliphate.

Each side of the bilateral relation, Ottoman and Japanese, had an agenda during their encounters and negotiations to establish a formal alliance with one another, an agenda that often shifted as their surrounding domestic and international environments changed. The Japanese played a significant role in the generation of their national image as a powerful Eastern nation-state; the Ottoman public consumed it and often expanded upon it. The Ottoman state would often mediate this imagery according to its perceptions of Japanese actions during the diplomatic process, and according to its political needs in managing a large and diverse empire. Faced with national or proto-national movements within the Empire, which often deployed Japanese images to legitimize their arguments for new forms of identity, the Ottoman state had to

counter and actively engage in the discourse on Japanese modernity. In order to accurately assess the meaning of these images of Japan appearing in the Ottoman and Arabic literary sources of the period, then, they must be placed in the context of the interaction between the Ottoman Empire and Japan.

Ottoman-Japanese relations can be broken down into four distinct periods, each of which was shaped by the larger international political environment and by domestic circumstances within their borders, respectively. Let me summarize them here before delving into more detail. The first era consists of early contacts between the two countries spanning the 1870s to 1880s. Defined largely by Meiji Japan's explicit desire to revise the Unequal Treaties signed by the former Tokugawa Shogunate with Western powers in the 1850s, this phase reflects Japan's lack of Great Power status at the time, and the Japanese state's self-view as a pupil in the world, searching for new knowledge and solutions to its modernizing dilemmas. The Japanese approach to the Ottoman state was cautious, curious, and consisted mainly of gift exchanges and proclamations of friendship without much self-assurance in the ability to offer more than that to a fellow Asian country. Nonetheless, a slow transformation was taking place in Japanese identity as the Japanese increasingly attempted to assert themselves as a worthy power by insisting on certain preconditions when at the negotiating table.

The second phase was initiated with the arrival of the Ottoman frigate *Ertuğrul* to Japanese waters circa 1890. This historic voyage (and its tragic end) provided the stimulus to more serious diplomatic efforts to establish an alliance in subsequent years, as each side carefully weighed the benefits of allying with the other. The rescue and return of *Ertuğrul* survivors was perhaps the first real direct show of Japanese naval strength to the Ottomans; after their victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and the eventual renegotiation of the Unequal Treaties, Meiji Japan's standing in the world changed dramatically. The Ottomans were undoubtedly impressed. For the Japanese, the Ottomans were often a more trustworthy partner than Europeans or Russians, and they had one foot in Europe and the other in Asia; repeated professions of friendship by the Japanese with the Ottoman Empire may have uttered to conceal their strategic motives, but the Ottomans were not fooled by this.

The Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905 marks the third era in which a thoroughly modernized Japan has acquired Great Power status and inspired pan-Asian sentiments among non-Europeans. Just prior to this, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 firmly established Japan as a player in international politics. They were by now a colonial, imperial military power to be reckoned with and that encouraged Ottoman interest in diplomacy just as it generated European unease. Japan's sponsoring of a conference of religions in Tokyo in 1906 fueled Muslim optimism for Japanese conversion to Islam just as it triggered further animosity and distrust on the part of the West.

The final phase in Ottoman-Japanese relations was defined by a revolutionary Young Turk regime in the Ottoman Empire after 1908, which gained a newfound self-confidence in its decision making and diplomacy. Seeing themselves as a ruling oligarchy in charge of a constitutional state, not unlike the idealized Meiji cabal, the Young Turk leadership remained unwilling to sacrifice the interests of the Empire in order to gain an alliance with Japan. As a last

resort at diplomacy, they suggested a treaty that would consist of an exchange of embassies and consulates only, in order to avoid the issue of extending Capitulatory privileges to Japan. The Japanese approached the Ottomans as one of several regions of Asia to be investigated for strategic purposes, and, now perceiving themselves in a position of superiority, Japan again insisted upon conditions for an alliance that were unreasonable. Both sides remained uncompromising in their demands; no treaty was ever signed. But throughout this process, both sides continued to demonstrate rituals of “diplomatic civility”—gifts, medals, and other niceties were exchanged between the two powers as a show of their status as modern states deserving of Great Power recognition. After 1910, the Japanese seem to have lost interest altogether in forging an official treaty with the Ottoman Empire, perhaps due to their increasing involvement in their own colonial endeavors in the Far East.

Early Contacts between the Ottomans and the Japanese

One of the earliest Japanese missions to the Ottoman Empire was dispatched to Constantinople and Egypt to investigate the Mixed Court Systems there. Fukuchi Gen-ichirō, the interpreter for the Iwakura Mission of 1871–1873 that had traveled to the United States and Europe, arrived in Constantinople in 1873 to analyze Ottoman practice concerning court cases between locals and foreign citizens. The Japanese were interested in renegotiating the 1858 Unequal Treaties signed by the Shogunate with Western powers and hoped to find a temporary solution to their difficulties by adopting a legal system resembling the Ottoman one. Apparently in Constantinople he was denied access to the texts of Ottoman laws, but a former diplomatic acquaintance, the Russian ambassador Nikolai Ignatchev, was coincidentally in the Ottoman capital at the time, and suggested Fukuchi examine the Egyptian Mixed Court proposal instead. Nübār Paşa, the Khedival foreign minister and architect of this legal proposal (drafted in 1869), was also in Constantinople to negotiate court reform with the Ottomans and the European Powers (ratified in 1875), and so Fukuchi had a meeting with him. The Japanese official stayed thirteen days, then traveled further to Palestine and Egypt, where he remained for eight days before returning to Japan. Fukuchi submitted a detailed report to the Foreign Ministry upon his return in which he recorded his observations and conclusions regarding the Egyptian court system.⁴ In his report Fukuchi suggested that Japan adopt a similar Mixed Court system, with a few revisions, in order to safeguard the rights of the Japanese people while Japan expanded its foreign trade. A more permanent juridical solution could be arrived at later, but this would be an important first step toward gaining legal equality with the Great Powers.

Around 1875 British statesmen were encouraging then Ottoman Grand Vezir, Midhat Paşa, to establish an alliance with both Bismarck’s Germany and with Japan in order to counter Russian expansion, but he was too involved in instituting the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 to achieve any results.⁵ At the same time, the Japanese foreign minister Terashima Munenori and Prime Minister Sanjo Sanetomi started considering the benefits of establishing diplomatic ties with the Turks, “from whom we can learn much, since they, as a

non-Christian, non-Western nation who resemble the Japanese, have diplomatic ties with the Europeans.”⁶ Munenori sent a letter to the Japanese ambassador to Britain Ueno instructing him to discreetly approach the Ottoman ambassador to London about the enactment of an “agreement of friendship” between the two countries.⁷

The Japanese dispatched J. R. Davidson, British legal advisor for Japan’s Ministry of Technology and Industry, to Egypt in 1877 to further investigate the Mixed Court System there. Still trying to determine a solution to their Unequal Treaties a decade later, in the winter of 1886–1887, Hasegawa Takeshi was sent by the Japanese government to Egypt from Europe during the International Conference for the Compilation of Commercial Codes to conduct an on-the-spot investigation of the legal system. He stayed a couple weeks, interviewed Egyptian minister Nübār Paşa, and submitted a detailed report in which he argued against Japan adopting a similar legal code.⁸

A year or so after the Japanese battleship *Seiki* was allowed by the Sublime Porte to dock in Constantinople in 1878 as part of a naval training exercise,⁹ the Yoshida Masaharu Mission of 1880–1881 was dispatched to Persia and the Ottoman Empire to investigate opening trade relations.¹⁰ The Ottoman consul general in the Caucasus reported in 1881 on Yoshida’s arrival in Tiflis(T’blisi), the attention paid by the Persian authorities to it, and the mission’s essentially commercial character there.¹¹ A memo from the Japanese foreign minister introducing the Yoshida Masaharu Mission as it was about to reach Persia explained that Yoshida sought an audience with the Ottoman Sultan in order to convey the Japanese government’s gratitude for the warm reception and the medals given to the *Seiki* crew. The communiqué also requested information about Ottoman agricultural and manufactured products, commerce, and other related issues.¹² However Yoshida was explicitly instructed not to conclude any official trade agreement.¹³ In Yoshida’s closing remarks appended to his report, he indicated that the true motive of this investigation was Japanese interest in power politics and rivalries between Great Britain and Russia that were often played out within or between the Ottoman and Persian empires. Clearly Japan’s intent was not simply to establish a trade agreement at this time, but to make preparations for when

...the political situation in Central Asia will be extended to the Far East. Once the dissensions between Russia and China explode, it will be impossible for us to keep the rushing water from flowing over a low embankment. One man’s fault is another man’s lesson.¹⁴

Japan was already feeling the threat of Russian expansion southward. The Yoshida Mission in fact spent a lot of time inspecting the Persian and Ottoman border areas with Russia in anticipation of a future conflict with Russia over control of the Korean Peninsula.

Yoshida had an audience with Sultan Abdülhamid II on March 12, 1881, in which he was careful not to extend more than Japan’s gratitude for Ottoman cordiality shown to the Japanese naval officers of the year before.¹⁵ The Sultan, according to Japanese accounts, expressed a sincere interest in developing trade and communications between the countries and to this end was said

to have ordered Grand Vezir Mehmet Said Paşa and Foreign Minister Âsım Paşa to assist.¹⁶ Letters of gratitude were exchanged between Âsım Paşa and Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Inoue Kaoru.¹⁷ Ottoman Turkish sources indicate a more cautious attitude on the part of the Sultan toward Japan: after discussing the individuals responsible for Japan's progress and modernization and how they accomplished this feat, the Japanese delegation suggested to Grand Vezir Said Paşa that "if our government were to establish a political and commercial agreement with your government, it would be beneficial for both sides."¹⁸ Said Paşa was said to have wanted to answer, "Our Sultan desires this very much; let us enter into an agreement immediately," but as per the clear directive of Sultan Abdülhamid II, he could not. Abdülhamid II was very interested in reaching out to the Muslims of Central and East Asia through friendship with Japan, but Said Paşa recalled that the Sultan was also quite against arousing the suspicion of the Russian Czar, who might retaliate with a sudden military strike if the Ottomans were to forge an alliance with the Japanese.¹⁹ The Grand Vezir instead simply concurred with the Japanese representatives, proposing that after they return to Japan, they should meet with the appropriate personnel and explain the benefits of a trade agreement between the two. The exchange was merely the expression of aspirations and nothing conclusive; the Sultan's hospitality and the Grand Vezir's words and actions supposedly convinced the Japanese of their need to pursue this relationship.²⁰ Both parties were already operating on the basis of larger geopolitical concerns that precluded straightforward communication.

Yoshida submitted a report to the Japanese envoy in St. Petersburg, Yanagihara Yoshimitsu, who then presented an inquiry into judiciary, legislative, administrative, taxation, and commercial systems in the Empire to Ottoman ambassador to St. Petersburg, Şâkir Paşa.²¹ This questionnaire clearly demonstrated Japanese interest in how the Ottoman Empire extended Capitulatory privileges. Minister Yanagihara's view, which he conveyed to his government, was that official and private circles in Ottoman Turkey desired a trade agreement and that it would be appropriate for the Japanese government to reciprocate this desire; he outlined the steps involved in the negotiation of such an agreement.²² In March 1881, Ottoman foreign minister Âsım Paşa summoned Yoshida to inform him that by order of the Grand Vezir he had sent instructions to St. Petersburg ambassador Şâkir Paşa to prepare a friendship and trade agreement between the Japanese and the Ottomans. In an imperial decree signed by Grand Vezir Said Paşa, the Sublime Porte agreed to the idea of a bilateral commercial treaty in principle, recognizing that the Japanese planned to send their St. Petersburg emissaries to Constantinople to negotiate the necessary arrangements.²³ According to the edict, the Japanese mission had expressed clearly its aversion to any mediation on the part of the British or any other foreign ambassador in Constantinople. The delegation requested to be received without intermediary and to be informed directly about permission to continue on their journey afterward.²⁴ Soon after, another edict signed by Âsım Paşa mentioned his summons of the Japanese officials to debate and clarify their wish for a commercial treaty.²⁵ The Ottoman state stopped short of consenting to a treaty but promised that officials would conduct an investigation of the matter; the Japanese expressed gratitude and

spoke of investing either a special official or the Japanese ambassador in St. Petersburg with the authority to negotiate an agreement.

Grand Vezir Said Paşa recalled in his memoirs that the Japanese government submitted a proposal for a treaty to Ottoman ambassador Şâkir Paşa in St. Petersburg in May 1881 in which it suggested starting negotiations in a location the Ottomans would prefer. Said Paşa was convinced of the commercial benefit of making an agreement while the Japanese were still in the process of modernizing their country. He communicated that negotiations could take place between the two envoys in St. Petersburg, with disagreements in terms to be worked out by the Grand Vezir and his Japanese equivalent, with a final approval by the Sultan.²⁶ But the first difficulty arose when it was noticed that the Japanese assumed they would be granted “most favored nation status.”²⁷ Said Paşa felt it would not necessarily be an obstacle in a commercial sense, but that legally, the Ottomans would be at a disadvantage. While Japanese citizens residing in Ottoman lands would be subject to Consular Court jurisdiction due to established Capitulatory practice, the few Ottoman citizens resident in Japan would fall under local Japanese jurisdiction. He suggested an amendment to the proposal stipulating that international law would govern Japanese citizens in Ottoman territories. He departed from office soon after, but Said Paşa returned as Grand Vezir several times and continued his involvement in the Ottoman-Japanese negotiating process when in office.

Interestingly, commercial privilege was not considered as important as legal-political extraterritoriality according to the Ottoman position. The definition of “modern civilization” in the world at this time was based in large part on the ability of a nation to protect the civil and legal rights of its citizens, and to protect their personal property. The Ottomans seemed willing to concede economic Capitulatory privilege to the Japanese, and were prepared to allow them to function under some form of international law.²⁸ But the Ottoman government wanted to establish a new precedent by which to renegotiate with the Europeans in order to ultimately abolish the long-standing legal Capitulations. The Japanese, themselves still in the process of renegotiating their own Unequal Treaties with the European Powers, intended to present themselves as a power deserving the same concessions.²⁹ They needed to prove themselves through diplomatic agreements. They did not appear to consider the Ottomans as equals, but as a lesser Asian country, on par with China, which had already accepted a political-commercial agreement that granted Japan favored-nation status. The negotiations flagged.³⁰ Over the next several years, exchanges of imperial medals and other gifts were the only signs of contact between the two powers, to increase “friendly relations.”³¹

The Sublime Porte observed in 1886 that General Count Kuroda Kiyotaka, the Meiji Emperor’s personal advisor, was traveling in Russia with several other Japanese dignitaries. The Ottomans, keenly aware of the Japanese mission’s intention to “inspect civil and military administrative procedures in Siberia,” took note of their visit with the Russian Emperor and Empress and their plan to spend several days in Constantinople before continuing on to America via Athens, Rome, Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and London.³² Upon entering Ottoman territory via St. Petersburg, Kuroda’s party was to be shown laxity at customs and granted exemptions as per the instructions of the Ottoman foreign minister and Grand Vezir, with the Ottoman minister in St. Petersburg

reminding them the same treatment had been accorded to Japanese officials years before.³³ Around the same year Japanese minister of commerce and agriculture, General Viscount Tani, and his entourage requested permission to enter Constantinople via the petition of the Japanese Chargés d'Affaires to the Ottoman embassy in Vienna.³⁴

The year 1887 saw the first visit by a member of the Japanese royal family to Constantinople. The Mikadō's uncle, Prince (Marshal) Komatsu Akihito, launched an association between the sovereigns.³⁵ Prince and Princess Komatsu stopped in Constantinople after a sojourn in Europe where they had toured European capitals and observed military maneuvers for almost a year. They were warmly received by Sultan Abdülhamid II.³⁶ During the Prince and Princess' audience with the Sultan, they discussed the international situation, the focus of their attention being on their shared dilemma: how to contain Russian expansion. The Prince delivered a letter purported to be from the Meiji Emperor himself to the Sultan in which the Emperor voiced his desire to cultivate friendship and trade between the nations.³⁷ After the Prince's return, a letter of thanks for the sincere hospitality shown the Japanese visitors and medals for Ottoman statesmen including Grand Vezir Kâmil Paşa were sent to the capital,³⁸ as was a request by the Japanese government for the Ottoman Sultan to confer a medal of the appropriate degree upon the Emperor, to cultivate "...friendly relations between the Imperial Ottoman House and our Imperial family."³⁹ The Ottoman government fulfilled the request in 1889 when an official was dispatched to Japan to deliver the award; Osman Bey, commander of the frigate *Ertuğrul*, was eventually charged with delivering the medal to the Emperor.⁴⁰

The *Ertuğrul* Incident and Repercussions

Sultan Abdülhamid II had wanted to send an Ottoman ship to Japan for some time, but had been concerned whether this gesture would create a negative reaction among the European Powers and Russia.⁴¹ A reciprocation of Prince Komatsu's visit, however, would provide the perfect opportunity to cultivate this potentially beneficial relationship with the nation on Russia's Eastern shores without arousing too much suspicion in Europe. This voyage could also serve as the Ottoman Sultan's pan-Islamic gesture to Muslims in Asia, in his capacity as Caliph. The Sultan, his Grand Vezir Kâmil Paşa, and Naval Minister Hasan Hüsnü Paşa decided to send the Ottoman frigate *Ertuğrul* to Japan in 1889 as a training exercise for some recent graduates of the Naval Academy.⁴²

The *Ertuğrul's* voyage to Japan has been explored in depth elsewhere,⁴³ but a few aspects of the *Ertuğrul's* ill-fated journey will be summarized here: first, on July 14, 1889, after ceremonies were held, the *Ertuğrul* departed from Constantinople, under the command of Miralay (soon admiral) Osmân Paşa⁴⁴ and Süvâri Ali Bey and with a crew of 609 (or 612, the sources vary).⁴⁵ The ship's ports of call on the way to Japan were to be Marmaris, Port Said, Suez, Jedda, Aden, Bombay, Columbo, Trinkomali, Madras, Calcutta, Penang, Malakka, Singapore, Saigon, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Nagasaki and Yokohama; it was estimated to take six months to go there and back.⁴⁶ As a kind of foreshadowing the trouble that was to come, about two weeks into the journey, the *Ertuğrul* encountered intense winds and strong currents in the Suez Canal,

running aground on a sandbar and then breaking its rudder and sternpost.⁴⁷ The ship and crew were forced to remain in Egypt for two months until repairs were completed and the *Ertuğrul* could resume its expedition.⁴⁸ The *Ertuğrul* again set sail on September 23, 1889, stopped off and visited with Muslim leaders at its calls to port as acts of pan-Islamic solidarity, reaching Singapore on November 15, 1889.

While the *Ertuğrul* anchored there for about four months after losing a mast, a debate ensued among the Ottoman government officers about abandoning the voyage and sending the letter and gifts for the Japanese Emperor aboard a European postal steamboat instead.⁴⁹ The weather in these seas was too unpredictable to rely on sailpower, yet the Ottomans had no money in the budget for additional coal costs for the *Ertuğrul*. Osmân Paşa had even communicated to the Naval Ministry from Singapore his concern about hitting typhoon season on the return trip, suggesting that the ship wait out the weather at ports in China or Japan and then sail back after October, a plan that would cost the Ottoman government more money. An Ottoman warship flying the crescent and star that could dock at additional ports in Asia appealed to the Sultan's desire to leave a pan-Islamic impression there however, and so, on March 22, 1890, the *Ertuğrul* left Singapore.⁵⁰ The need to replenish the insufficient coal supply and adverse weather conditions continued to delay the *Ertuğrul* for about a month in Saigon, for a week in Hong Kong, and for several weeks in Nagasaki and Kobe. The ship and its crew finally reached the port of Yokohama on June 7, 1890, eleven months after departing from Constantinople.

The *Ertuğrul* was received with ceremony by Imperial Household Secretary Sannomiya and Master-of-Ceremonies Niwa in Yokohama.⁵¹ Few seamen were allowed off the ship, but Admiral Osmân Paşa and Lt. Reşât Bey were escorted to Yokohama by steamer before catching a train to Tokyo. They were treated as "a guest of the Court," with carriages taking them to the Rokumeikan; at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo they delivered the Sultan's correspondence, gifts, and a medal for the Mikadō during a state dinner and audience with the Meiji Emperor and Empress on June 13.⁵² Osmân Paşa spent about a month touring and making official visits to members of the Japanese royal family and to statesmen. The language of both Osmân Paşa and the Japanese in their addresses to one another during meetings continued to be that of careful expressions of friendship.⁵³

The *Ertuğrul* remained anchored in Yokohama until September 15, 1890, when, despite warnings of foul weather by the Japanese navy, the ship departed on its journey home.⁵⁴ On September 16, the *Ertuğrul* sank off the coast of Ōshima in a typhoon that killed all but 69 of its crew.⁵⁵ The survivors reported that intense winds and rough seas broke their navigational controls, then the boilers exploded, and the *Ertuğrul* finally foundered on the rocks, breaking in two and sinking in 5–6 minutes. Those who reached the shore found the Ōshima (Kashinozaki) Lighthouse and managed to communicate in English and maritime gestures what had happened.⁵⁶ Japanese Foreign Minister Count Aoki immediately sent a telegraph to the Ottoman government expressing his condolences, as did the Imperial Palace Minister on behalf of the Japanese Emperor and Empress.⁵⁷ The Japanese Naval Ministry and local authorities conducted a salvage operation to retrieve submerged equipment,



Figure 4.1 Shinto priest conducting services at the memorial in Ōshima. Courtesy of Istanbul University Rare Works of Art Library.

also recovering 280 bodies that were later interred on Ōshima Island.⁵⁸ The survivors were taken to Kobe by the German battleship *Wolf*.⁵⁹ The Russian envoy in Tokyo offered to transport the survivors free of charge from Nagasaki to St. Petersburg aboard a commercial steamer from their Vladivostok volunteer fleet, but after it was “rendered inconvenient” by Russia, Count Aoki then offered to return the survivors to Constantinople directly.⁶⁰

Several Japanese newspapers encouraged the local population’s sympathy for the stranded Turkish seamen. They took up collections for them and for the families of the shipwreck victims, to be sent with the survivors back to the Ottoman Empire aboard two Japanese warships, the *Kongo* and the *Hiei*.⁶¹ A monument to commemorate the drowned Ottoman seamen was erected in Ōshima, near the coastal site where the *Ertuğrul* sank, and Shinto burial ceremonies were conducted by the local Japanese authorities on March 7, 1891 (see figure 4.1).⁶² In late May, the Sultan conferred Ottoman medals upon many of the Japanese who rendered assistance during the *Ertuğrul* incident.⁶³ Several Japanese, including a young businessman named Yamada Torajirō, forwarded a letter to Ottoman foreign affairs minister, Said Paşa, expressing Japan’s sincere sympathy for the catastrophe that took the life of Osmân Paşa, who conveyed friendship on behalf of the Sultan and thus caused “great joy throughout our country.”⁶⁴ His words reflect Japan’s perceptions of the Ottoman Empire and of the Asian continent in 1890, suggesting future Japanese policy toward the region:

If we compare the continent of Asia to the several other kingdoms of the world, we shall find out that the kingdoms of Asia are the most ancient, it is the largest of the four quarters of the globe, the disposition of its

people are mild. They are renowned for their literature and military art, and they were the first inhabitants of the world.

The fortunes and conditions of Asia have changed since the middle ages. Annam has been overrun and its monarchy overthrown within the last few years. Persia, Afghanistan, Siam, Corea [*sic*], etc. are reduced and their ancient greatness disappeared; and now Turkey, Japan and China are the only three independent kingdoms which compare in power to the several other kingdoms of the civilized world, but we greatly feel dissatisfaction on account of the non-existence of a communication between each other.

Turkey has been the first to send an ambassador to our country to cement a friendship which we trust will continue to all eternity and insure the return of the former great influence and power of Asia.⁶⁵

The individuals who drafted this letter expressed their desire to cultivate a sense of pan-Asian solidarity among the surviving members of a superior Eastern civilization. It was a plea appealing to Ottoman sensitivities toward earlier cultural achievements and thus an attempt to link the concrete process of Japanese-Ottoman diplomacy to the more abstract goal of reasserting Asian pride in the face of Western imperialism.

Returning the surviving crew members to Ottoman lands proved to be illustrative of the kind of complicated negotiations between the Porte and Japan that plagued their every move, due to each side's concern for appearances and the desire to demonstrate imperial power. The Japanese warships *Kongo* and *Hiei* departed from Kobe with the survivors and set sail for Constantinople on October 11.⁶⁶ Their mission appeared to have triggered anxiety among Ottoman officials and the Sultan. Concerned about the potential international and domestic side-effects of such a visit, they wanted neither a public display of Ottoman affinity for Russia's emerging rival in East Asia, nor a reminder to its subjects and to the world of Ottoman naval blunders. Ottoman concern stemmed in part from a possible objection by "some other states" to allowing warships to enter the Dardanelles.⁶⁷ In addition, the Sultan had supposedly received *jurnal-ler* (informants' reports) claiming that if the Ottoman sailors were to be returned to Constantinople aboard Japanese warships, it would have negative connotations among the the Ottoman people. Both the Palace and the Sublime Porte intimated that "it would never be suitable for the surviving crew to be brought back by the Japanese warships," so an imperial edict pronounced it as

...categorically unacceptable to allow the Japanese to transport them, *it being evident what large-scale reaction it would cause* (emphasis mine)...so that permission for the afore-mentioned warships to enter the Dardanelles shall never be granted.⁶⁸

Those survivors who had regained their health or were not seriously injured were to disembark from the Japanese ships in Suez and be transported to Constantinople aboard postal steamships. Grand Vezir Kâmil Paşa recommended a small steamer bring the *Ertuğrul* crew to Constantinople that would

arrive after sunset in order that they return to their homes quietly, without drawing too much attention.⁶⁹ The Sultan dispatched Naval Captain Rıza Bey on a steamship to Port Said to intercept the Japanese naval officers and to debrief the survivors.⁷⁰ When Captain Tanaka, the Japanese officer, raised an objection to the change of itinerary, stating the Japanese Emperor had given him explicit instructions to deposit the survivors safely in Constantinople, a suitable excuse was concocted: due to cholera outbreaks in Japan and India, the survivors had to be quarantined in a particular area near Constantinople and the Japanese ships should sail to Izmir and await the Sultan's orders there. Captain Tanaka, not wanting to create a rift in the Ottoman-Japanese friendship, obeyed those orders and sailed to Izmir after the survivors were unloaded onto the steamship.⁷¹

The Ottomans did not want to cause a negative impression by appearing ungrateful for the Japanese Emperor's show of respect for the Sultan. The Emperor had manifested his good will by charging the ships with returning the wreck victims to Constantinople, and it would be inappropriate not to treat the Japanese carrying out this duty with the honor and respect they deserved. To avoid this, it was decided that the Japanese frigates were to sail on and remain in Beşik (a port south of the Dardanelles entrance that was protected from winds by Bozcaada) while the Japanese officers accompanied the survivors to the capital.⁷² The *Kongo* and *Hiei* were eventually granted authorization to pass through the Dardanelles. In Çanakkale the Japanese ships were officially greeted, ceremonies were held, and the Japanese commandant and a few officers were invited by the Sultan's order to stay in Dolmabahçe Palace.⁷³ The Japanese must have pressed the Ottomans to go further, for the ships anchored in the Bosphorus in front of Dolmabahçe Palace January 2, 1891,



Figure 4.2 Ottoman and Japanese naval officers dine together. Courtesy of Istanbul University Rare Works of Art Library.

where they were received with great enthusiasm by the Ottoman populace. They carried greetings, gifts, and a letter from the Meiji Emperor that was given to Sultan Abdülhamid II; he bestowed medals upon the Japanese naval officers.⁷⁴ They stayed forty days in Constantinople (see figure 4.2).

The Sultan's initial hesitation to show too much encouragement for the Japanese warships in Constantinople subsided as curiosity mounted. Although "not pleased at all by the people's contact with and especially their enthusiasm for all foreign ships," Abdülhamid II "decided to permit [public support] for several days out of respect for the Mikadō."⁷⁵ In a report to the Palace a month after the survivors were returned to Constantinople, the Beyoğlu governor suggested that action be taken to seize pictures of the drowned *Ertuğrul* crew that were being passed around and that a prohibition be enforced against them because their distribution "... would intensify sadness and mourning if seen by the relatives of those drowned."⁷⁶ Nonetheless, the Sultan recognized a potential political benefit in the *Ertuğrul* tragedy despite this naval embarrassment for the Ottoman Empire:

Sultan Hamit seemed quite pleased that he had been able to achieve the friendship with Japan that he had long since established in his imagination... he decided to extend the limits of what was allowable in the face of this sincere display... and [permitted] a delegation of the Turkish press to go to the Japanese ships.⁷⁷

Once aboard, the reporters met Japanese officers and one civilian: the journalist Noda Shōtarō from Tokyo's *Ji-Ji Shimbun* who had covered the *Ertuğrul*'s voyage in Japan.⁷⁸ Noda would later settle in Constantinople, convert to Islam ("Abdül-Halim Noda Efendi"), and, by order of the Sultan, was given a post in the Ottoman War Academy, where he drew a salary and taught Japanese to some Ottoman officers.⁷⁹ After their meeting with the Japanese sailors and a tour of the ship, the Ottoman contingent returned ashore, where a Palace aide awaited by them. They were escorted directly to Yıldız Palace where they were instructed by Başmabeyinci Osman Bey to each submit independent reports concerning what they saw and heard.⁸⁰ The Sultan even commissioned a local photographer to take pictures of the interior and exterior of the Japanese warships for photo albums.⁸¹ The Japanese were instructed to request any supplies they required while residing at Dolmabahçe Palace and guildsmen in the covered bazaar either gave goods to the Japanese seamen who wandered the markets, or else shopkeepers were paid out of the Sultan's purse (*Hazine-yi Hassa*) by a guide.⁸² The Japanese created quite a stir among the Constantinople population.⁸³ Sultan Abdülhamid II gave them gifts, medals, and a letter for the Japanese Emperor before their departure.

The Japanese soon contemplated reopening negotiations with the Ottomans regarding a commercial agreement. Japanese papers reported in October 1890 that

The *Kongo* and *Hiei*'s departure to Constantinople had caused... the time to come for the Japanese to establish a trade relationship with the Ottoman State... if Japanese traders had made an application to the gov-

ernment, it would have been accepted and they would have been given permission to enter Istanbul on these same ships.⁸⁴

Japanese businessman Yamada Torajirō served as the liaison between Japan and the Ottoman Empire, restarting official negotiations.⁸⁵ Yamada, well educated and well connected among the elite of Tokyo, set out for Constantinople in 1892 with funds he collected in Japan for the families of the *Ertuğrul* victims. Enlisted by Japanese foreign minister, Count Aoki Shūzō, to assist in forging a formal agreement between Japan and the Ottomans, Yamada carried letters of introduction from high-level individuals in Tokyo society.⁸⁶ After reaching Port Said in March 1892, Yamada attended a dinner on March 17 at the private residence of Egyptian prime minister Abdülkadir Paşa, bearing an introduction from an Ottoman Bank representative in Egypt, Anton Sururî Bey.⁸⁷ According to Yamada's recollection, the Egyptians expressed their admiration for Japanese reforms while he elucidated Japan's historical claims to Korea.⁸⁸ He arrived in Constantinople in April 1892, presented his papers to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, and later that day presented the funds to Foreign Minister Said Paşa himself, dining with him in his private residence. During Yamada's first audience with Abdülhamid II, he presented the Sultan with his family heirlooms: a samurai armor, a sword, and a helmet.⁸⁹ Yamada spent the next twenty years of his life in Constantinople where he established a close relationship with the Sultan and Palace. This sojourn began with his second trip to Constantinople around 1894, at which time he presented a letter from Minister Makamiya of the Japanese Commercial-Industrial Bureau in the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, to Ottoman Foreign Minister Said Paşa which stated Yamada "longed to establish [a] mercantile relationship with Turkey [and] is intending to go there again to transact some business for that purpose; we hope you will kindly assist him to effect his desires."⁹⁰ He and his fellow countryman Nakamura Eijirō opened two stores in Constantinople where they sold Japanese goods.⁹¹

Yamada also operated as a kind of "unofficial consul" who assisted Japanese travelers in the Empire, and frequently traveled between Constantinople and Tokyo to deliver gifts to the sovereigns or to mediate correspondence between the governments concerning the establishment of a formal alliance.⁹² In 1894 Rear-Admiral Tanaka of Japan sent a letter to Foreign Minister Said Paşa expressing his gratitude for the sympathetic and favorable treatment accorded not just to Yamada individually but also for the friendship existent between the two nations; he continued by subtly requesting that "Your Excellency continue to bestow Your aid and protection to Mr. Yamada."⁹³ Although personally and financially motivated to see the relationship between Japan and the Ottoman Empire develop, Yamada was conducting strategic state business for the Japanese in Constantinople, a fact that would become more clear with the onset of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904: besides providing an interested Sultan Abdülhamid II with information regarding the 1904–1905 conflict, Yamada observed the movements of the Russian Black Sea fleet as it passed through the Bosphorus Straits and into the Mediterranean, as per the instructions of Japanese ambassador to Vienna, Makino.⁹⁴ The Japanese state was clear in

its strategic objectives concerning friendship with the Ottomans by 1905; Yamada certainly must have been pleased with the public Ottoman sympathy and support for his nation's war victories. The Ottoman state, however, was privately very watchful of him and his business partner's wartime political activities.⁹⁵ Yamada returned to Japan with the outbreak of the First World War and was not to visit Istanbul again until the 1930s.

The same year as Yamada's initial entry into Constantinople (1892) and his presentation of gifts to the Sultan, the Islamic reformer Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī was in Constantinople. The Sultan had been contemplating expanding the parameters of the relationship with Japan to include a spiritual connection, as al-Afghānī's memoirs indicate:

Sultan Abdülhamid, when he wanted to dispatch a mission of Istanbul ulema to spread Islam in Japan according to the request of its Emperor, Jamāl ad-Dīn advised him not to agree to it...he said to the Sultan: "If the ulema drive Muslims away from Islam, is it not the case that they would repel the infidels [potential Japanese converts]? I think it would be in your interest to send gifts to the Emperor with a letter in which you promise to comply with his request. Then we will strive to train a number of ulema that will be appropriate for missionary work and who will enter into it with good judgement."⁹⁶

Sources do not indicate whether this letter was ever sent nor if and when a delegation of Ottoman ulema ever reached Japan.⁹⁷ But though Abdülhamid II was distrustful at times of the Japanese, this skepticism was tempered by his policy of pan-Islamism. The desire to see the Japanese become Muslim brothers and thus unite Asia in faith was a desire that would increasingly be expressed by the Ottoman and Arabic press of the time, particularly after the Russo-Japanese War.⁹⁸ Both pan-Islamists and Japanese operatives in Asia encouraged this unrealistic hope.

The Japanese assumed Yamada's reception was a green light for reopening treaty negotiations. Count Aoki Shūzō, now Japanese ambassador in Berlin, appealed to Foreign Minister Inamoto for permission to visit to Constantinople in order to examine Ottoman efforts in lifting the Capitulations and to rekindle dialogue with the Ottomans. The Ottoman Embassy in Berlin and the Foreign Ministry were led to believe that Aoki's primary reason for visiting the Ottoman capital was to personally thank the Sultan for the medal that was bestowed upon him while he served in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and to present the Sultan with a Japanese sword.⁹⁹ Aoki arrived in Constantinople in May 1893 and had an audience with the Sultan. This meeting was recorded in a report submitted to Tokyo by Aoki. According to him, the Sultan had expected Aoki's visit to be one in which he had been vested with the authority to sign an official agreement with the Ottomans. The Sultan was somewhat disappointed with Aoki's inability to conclude an immediate alliance. Aoki, whose diplomatic acumen made him careful to act within the bounds of international law and Great Power politics, expressed regret to Abdülhamid II that despite "...the present level of world communications, that at the turn of the nineteenth century one great power not recognize another great power and

they remain without diplomatic relations based on a treaty," but Japan had just initiated its own negotiations with the European Powers to amend its treaties and therefore "unless issues of commerce and navigation were regulated between Japan and Turkey, diplomatic relations would not be established... [though] a treaty of the simplest form [could] be ventured into as a means to satisfy the real need."¹⁰⁰ The Sultan responded favorably, suggesting Aoki and the Ottoman Foreign Minister communicate secretly after the Japanese government approved the procedure. The Ottoman cabinet would review the treaty proposal before its signature by both parties.

In a subsequent meeting with the Ottoman foreign minister, Count Aoki again alluded to establishing a commercial alliance between the two nations as a means to consolidate and strengthen the governments' amicable relationship.¹⁰¹ He hoped the Ottoman administration would consent so that a draft treaty could be drawn up that would be expanded upon as necessary. After returning to Berlin, Aoki committed himself to obtaining official authorization from his government to negotiate an agreement with the Ottomans; the Sublime Porte reserved the right to amend any proposal if necessary.¹⁰² Aoki emphasized in his report to the Japanese government that they should not reject the Ottoman offer.¹⁰³

The Japanese cabinet discussed Aoki's report and issued "The Joint Communiqué of the Turkish and Japanese Empires" in December 1893.¹⁰⁴ This draft suggested conditions intended to lead to an eventual diplomatic agreement. First, the ratification of a treaty was deemed necessary by both sovereigns in order to preserve the friendship of the two nations and to pave the way for commercial relations. Second, it outlined procedures for appointing appropriate envoys to negotiate the agreement, and the timeframe for implementation of the proposed articles. The articles themselves stipulated a very equal relationship between the two powers: diplomatic missions would be selected by the home country and approved by the host country. The citizens of both nations would enjoy the same economic and juridical privileges in the other's country based on a principle of favored-nation status. The proposal was based on equality between powers, yet the Japanese government could not agree on the final text and kept Count Aoki waiting in Berlin for two years for a decision. Most likely the Japanese cabinet disliked the idea of officially declaring themselves equal to what they considered in many ways to be a lesser, Asian power. They wanted to extract the same privileges that European nations had gained in Ottoman lands and that the Japanese had already procured in China.

While official treaty negotiations between the two powers stagnated again, unofficial visits by Japanese dignitaries continued, many of which illustrated the tactical motives of the Meiji government in its fact-finding missions to Asia that were disguised as friendly Japanese-Ottoman exchanges. In 1893/4, a relative of previous visitor Prince Komatsu, Prince Komatsu Yoritomo [sic?] traveled to the Ottoman capital via Odessa from St. Petersburg.¹⁰⁵ According to correspondence between the Japanese and the Ottomans, Prince Komatsu traveled "strictly incognito" while in Russia and Europe under the name of "Count Mishima," and while the purpose of this ruse was not clearly explained by the Japanese, they informed the Ottomans that he was a maritime officer

who was in St. Petersburg to study the navy. The Japanese ambassador there requested permission from the Ottoman government for Komatsu to visit Constantinople, saying Komatsu would like to do a similar study while delivering gifts from his father to the Sultan.¹⁰⁶ Given Japan's anticipation of war with China in 1894, and the potentially ill reaction it might elicit from Russia and Europe, it appeared that the Japanese camouflaged their strategic military endeavor in a gift-bearing visit to the Ottoman Sultan. The Japanese were willing to disclose the purpose of Komatsu's visit to the Porte, but they hid his identity and mission from the Russian government as well as from its European counterparts.¹⁰⁷

The Ottomans kept abreast of the news concerning the Sino-Japanese War and Japan's victory in this conflict.¹⁰⁸ The Ottoman embassy in Berlin reported on European attitudes toward the two sides in the Sino-Japanese War to the Sublime Porte, noting European neutrality for the most part during the conflict.¹⁰⁹ But while the outcome of the war surprised many, it also encouraged the hopes of some Ottoman statesmen. The Ottoman ambassador in Washington, keenly aware of the delicate balance of colonial European politics, expressed his opinion about the positive effects of Japan's war in the Far East: disputes that "frequently stemmed from Japan's progress" would clearly benefit the Ottomans in the future since "the above-mentioned conflicts will draw Europeans' attention, as rivals and competitors, to a country far from the Ottoman Empire."¹¹⁰ Japan's success impressed Ottoman officials but did not blind them when it came to negotiating an official alliance with the powerful Eastern nation.

After two years, Count Aoki requested an answer on the earlier draft proposal for an Ottoman-Japanese agreement from Japanese foreign minister Marquis Saionji. The Japanese cabinet again discussed the joint declaration and published a text authorized in August 1895, amending the original draft to include only favored-nation status in trade relations, omitting all other areas.¹¹¹ Aoki was granted full powers to negotiate with the Ottomans in September 1895. While Colonel Fukushima Yasumasa of Japan was in Constantinople as part of a mission to study military organization among Asian and European nations,¹¹² Aoki contacted the Ottoman ambassador to Berlin and conveyed the contents of the Japanese proposal to him. The Japanese seemed publicly optimistic about their political intentions; the Ottoman consul in New York reported to the Foreign Ministry in 1897 that the Japanese were seriously discussing the opening of an embassy in the Ottoman Empire.¹¹³ Russia had gained influence in Korea by this time; America and Japan were vying for influence in the Philippines and the Japanese were looking for international allies. To this end, the Japanese Emperor's son and the former prime minister, Itō, went on a mission to gain friends in Europe.¹¹⁴ After visiting Spain and England, they would go to Italy, Austria, and, hopefully, Constantinople in order to find help in containing Russian expansion in the Far East.¹¹⁵

But the Ottomans were uncomfortable with Aoki's provisional agreement. An imperial edict from May 1897 acknowledged a reciprocal draft memorandum put together by the Advisory Office (*İstişare Odası*) coinciding with the Japanese declaration; the Ottoman cabinet drafted a proposal concerning the adoption of negotiating procedures between the two nations aimed

at convincing Japan to renounce its desire for Capitulatory privileges.¹¹⁶ The fourteen-article Ottoman response to Aoki's proposal removed juridical privileges in the courts and insisted upon application of international law to citizens on the other nation's soil. The Japanese eventually rejected the Ottoman offer in April 1898.¹¹⁷ That summer, amid international tensions involving Japan and Russia over Manchuria and Port Arthur on the one hand, and the Ottoman Empire's Macedonian dilemma and hostilities with Greece (resulting in autonomy for Crete) on the other, the Japanese seemed more persistent in their desire to create an alliance with their friends on Russia's other front. Japanese ambassador to Vienna, Makino, was instructed to revive talks with the Ottomans via the envoy in Vienna.¹¹⁸ Contrary to Ottoman hopes, however, the Japanese maintained their insistence on Capitulatory privileges, and the concept of an alliance faltered again.

At about the same time, the Sultan entreated Yamada to retrieve some rare goods from Japan, perhaps believing Yamada could regenerate interest in establishing an agreement between the two powers. The Japanese Foreign Ministry did not hesitate to utilize this opportunity to try and rekindle negotiations favorable to Japan. In a letter dated October 8, 1899, they reminded the Ottomans that

... arising unfortunately out of no friendship treaty as of yet having been established between the two powers, and we, having neither an ambassador nor a consul in Ottoman lands, render it impossible to carry out the (legal) protection of Yamada, therefore I humbly request the favor and guidance of the Exalted Ottoman (Foreign) Ministry in manifesting this patronage from the Sublime Ottoman government.¹¹⁹

But the Ottoman government was annoyed by Yamada's request for equal treatment similar to that of the Great Powers who enjoyed Capitulatory privileges; the Sultan himself apparently had told the Japanese foreign minister that Japan should not impose Capitulations upon another nation after Japan had just saved itself from suffering the same fate with Western states.¹²⁰ Yamada returned to Constantinople in December 1899 with gifts and rare birds from Prince Higashi Fushimi, Count Aoki, and other Japanese notables.¹²¹ But Yamada's mediation did not shift the Ottoman position to granting Japan special privileges. The Sultan had other concerns in becoming too friendly with the Japanese: upon receiving the gifts, the Sultan expressed to his confidant, Ali Vehbi Bey, the tight predicament in which the Ottoman Empire found itself: Japan and the Ottomans shared a common foe, Russia, and the conclusion of an alliance, if only a commercial one, could be mutually beneficial. Japan did not truly comprehend the potential gain in establishing ties with the Empire, however, and even more significantly, the Ottomans needed to placate both friends and enemies (such as Russia) in the international arena in order to maintain the current political status quo.¹²²

Japan's preoccupation with its own colonial efforts in Manchuria and Korea seems to have caused the Japanese to temporarily lose interest in signing an official treaty with the Ottoman Empire, although unofficial visits to Constantinople may have been a subtle attempt to gain allies in Asia as Japan

expanded its empire prior to the Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1902. In 1899, the Japanese dispatched Prince Konoye to St. Petersburg and eventually to Constantinople for two weeks to study public instruction there.¹²³ Around April 1900 the Sublime Porte received a communiqué requesting permission for another high-ranking Japanese prince to visit Constantinople.¹²⁴ About two years later a Colonel Nagaoka of Japan was in Constantinople for some unknown reason.¹²⁵ In 1902 Prince Komatsu stopped off in Singapore en route to London. He and the Ottoman consul general to Singapore discussed establishing an Ottoman consulate in a locale nearer to Japan and soon thereafter placing an ambassador in Tokyo.¹²⁶

The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 secured an ally for Japan, but the threat of an oncoming conflict with Russia encouraged the Japanese to contact the Ottomans again in the hope of containing Russian expansion. Around the time of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), Japanese envoy to Vienna, Makino, approached the Ottoman ambassador there, but the Ottomans were hesitant to provoke a response from Russia and so it came to nothing.¹²⁷ The Egyptian nationalist newspaper *al-Liwā'* reported that the Japanese had proposed to reorganize the Ottoman fleet and to assign Japanese naval officers to carry out the task.¹²⁸ In 1904 an architect from a Japanese government academy, Dr. Itō, visited Constantinople and many Ottoman *vilâyet*s via the Baghdad Railway, ostensibly to examine and photograph Islamic buildings and archeological ruins, although he was likely conducting a strategic investigation of Ottoman lands and the Suez Canal area.¹²⁹ After his return to Japan, Dr. Itō's subsequent contacts with a religious figure named Hacı Mehmed Ali Efendi in connection with constructing a mosque in Yokohama worried some Europeans that either the Japanese were becoming Muslims, or that the Ottomans were actively trying to convert them.¹³⁰ The Japanese had gained access to Ottoman territories for strategic purposes in exchange for bolstering the Ottoman Sultan's pan-Islamic ideology.

The Russo-Japanese War and Ottoman Interest

The Sultan and the Ottoman government were quite interested in the outcome of the Russo-Japanese war.¹³¹ At the outset, the Sublime Porte discussed reciprocating Russian assistance rendered during the Greek-Ottoman conflict by setting up an Ottoman Red Crescent Society hospital and sending a medical team to the Russian Red Cross Society.¹³² In June 1904, personal confidant to the Sultan and Second Chamberlain (Arap) İzzet Paşa summoned Colonel Pertev Bey (b. 1871), an Ottoman officer and 1892 graduate from the Ottoman Military Academy, to Yıldız Palace. Pertev Bey (Demirhan) had served in the retinue of the Prussian military officer von der Goltz¹³³ and was currently a teacher at the Imperial War Academy in 1904. He was invited to discuss a letter that was received from the German officer suggesting that Pertev Bey be dispatched to the Far East war.¹³⁴ The next day Pertev Bey received a letter from von der Goltz himself that explained,

I am doubtful about this proposal being accepted. However useful war operations in Manchuria may turn out to be, I'm afraid that His Majesty

(the Sultan) will not consent to an officer being sent to the Far East because of political considerations.¹³⁵

Contrary to von der Goltz's opinion, however, the Palace did send Pertev Bey to Japan in 1904 and contemplated dispatching a representative to Russia in order to create an air of neutrality.¹³⁶ Pertev Bey stayed in East Asia for a year, served as a military attaché and observer in Port Arthur who sent back frequent reports to the Ottoman Empire on news of the war; he returned to Constantinople in 1906.¹³⁷ The Sublime Porte monitored European neutrality in the conflict and stayed informed about the events of the war, including the dramatic siege of Port Arthur, but chose not to take sides in order to avoid a confrontation.¹³⁸ Communiqués to the Porte on the effects of the war were wide-ranging: Ottoman intelligence in Bulgaria reported that high-ranking Russian and Serbian officials as well as the local populace attended church services in which everyone prayed for a Russian victory against Japan in the conflict.¹³⁹ The Ottoman consulate in Tabriz and the Tehran embassy noted the advantage to the Ottomans in seeing their historical foe, the mighty Russia, beaten in battle, and what it translated into for Asia: the Tabriz consul reported:

As a result of continuous defeats in the current war, today Russian political influence in these areas has in a measure noticeably dropped; it is circulating among people that the Ottoman government is occupying itself with war preparations in order to fight with Russia, and while a deep enmity is manifested by these people towards the Russians, towards us they are showing great friendship and affection.¹⁴⁰

The strategic location of Ottoman waterways and the Suez Canal did, however, force policy decisions on their use by states at war from either the Porte or the Khedival government in Cairo.¹⁴¹ Several Russian cruisers from the Black Sea fleet were allowed passage through the Bosphorus Straits before the siege of Port Arthur, with the full knowledge of the Ottoman government that Yamada was observing them.¹⁴²

Nonetheless, the Sultan harbored ambiguous feelings toward Japanese successes and the dangerous public enthusiasm they might generate. On the one hand, the Sultan saw that "...transporting most of Russia's forces to the Far East will lessen the threat of its forces in the Black Sea..."¹⁴³ and that "...Japan's victory pleases us, for their victory over Russia is considered a victory for us."¹⁴⁴ Russia's involvement with conflicts in East Asia would certainly keep the Czar's forces from causing trouble on the Ottoman frontier. But there were certain symbolic dangers in a Japanese victory: the Sultan was threatened by so much attention focusing on Japan as a leader of the East, potentially elevating the status of the Meiji Emperor beyond that of the Sultan in his role as Islamic spiritual leader and Caliph of Muslims in Asia. The Young Turk journal *Bâlkân* defined the extent of this threatening possibility in 1907, keenly noting Japanese participation in the propagation of rumors:

Tatar, Turk, Arab, Iranian, Indian, and Javanese newspapers, discussing in every single language that the Japanese honored the Islamic religion,

are summoning hope and affection for Japan's islands. Nor is Japan idle in this; there is financial assistance for newspapers that are published in Arabic and Malay in Singapore... [that] write like this...: "it is understood that the religion of Islam will be more suitable than other religions for the Japanese' souls, their customs, and their views."¹⁴⁵

Because of the Sultan's uneasiness at this prospect, Abdülhamid II warned the Constantinople press to maintain a relatively neutral stance when covering news of the Russo-Japanese conflict; he did not send a very fiery congratulatory declaration to the Mikadō after the war.¹⁴⁶

Christian missionaries in Japan were sometimes blamed for perpetuating the Sultan's paranoia about the Emperor usurping Caliphal authority, saying the missionaries decided to encourage convening a congress of religions that would misrepresent Islam so that they could then convince the government to legally prohibit its spread in Japan.¹⁴⁷ After an unsuccessful attempt to find and bribe collaborators among Indian and Egyptian ulema to abet their plans, missionaries convinced İsmail Gaspıralı, Crimean editor of *Tercümân*, to print an article stating the Japanese government would convene the conference in order to assist them in choosing a new official religion, and that the ulema should not miss their opportunity to spread Islam there.¹⁴⁸ Egyptian nationalist Muşţafâ Kâmil's paper *al-Âlam al-Islâmî* claimed that Abdülhamid II was going to send Ottoman representatives to the congress.¹⁴⁹ The Sultan had mixed feelings about this possible turn of events. On the one hand, if Japan converted to Islam, it would radically increase the number of Muslims in the world and would thus increase the significance of the Caliphate. On the other hand, due to false reports, the Sultan believed the Meiji Emperor was going to immediately proclaim his Caliphal authority to the Islamic world, rendering the Sultan's spiritual authority obsolete.¹⁵⁰ For this reason he apparently banned discussion of the 1906 congress in most of the Ottoman press.¹⁵¹ Interestingly, when Crimean Turk Ahmet Ağaoğlu pressed the Japanese ambassador in St. Petersburg to explain the purpose of convening the conference on religions, he claimed not to have any knowledge of it.¹⁵²

Skepticism about Japan's victory influenced Ottoman domestic policy as well, for instance where financial matters were concerned or where these successes might have encouraged clandestine activities against the state. For example, the Ottoman Minister of Public Security (*Zabtiye Nâzırı*), Safvet Paşa, sent a report to the palace concerning an investigation into Japanese businessman Nakamura's collection of donations in his stores for the Red Cross Society and Japanese victims of the "calamity."¹⁵³ Since the Porte did not consider it acceptable to donate funds to foreign countries in this manner, necessary precautions were to be taken to prevent its implementation.¹⁵⁴ The Ottoman state could share to a limited extent its enthusiasm in supporting Japan, but to allow Ottoman citizens to give monetary assistance to the Japanese was going too far. A 1904 encoded telegraph from the interior minister ordered that, due to some "harmful" passages in a publication from Paris about the Russo-Japanese War, copies already within Ottoman borders should be disposed of, and in the future, distribution of the publication would be prohibited.¹⁵⁵ Toward the end

of the war, the Ottomans obtained a letter sent from Japan, which was signed by the Japanese representative to Rome, Taro Hirakawa, commenting on the administration of "Arabistân." In it Hirakawa made statements to the effect that he desired to see the administration of all Arab lands "except English Arabistân" come under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire; while the palace expressed its "great pleasure at the afore-mentioned's good-intentioned statement," it was troubled by the exception this diplomat had made.¹⁵⁶

After the Japanese victory over Russia, the Japanese Emperor himself hoped to solicit Ottoman support in the truce negotiations held in The Hague. The Ottoman cabinet was aware of the Emperor's request to the Russians to hold a new conference in which the Ottoman Empire would also participate. But the cabinet was merely concerned with avoiding any changes in the international status quo; the Sultan encouraged the cabinet to focus upon Ottoman independence and territorial integrity while participating in the conference.¹⁵⁷ Clearly, the Ottoman state was not willing to challenge the power balance and jeopardize its interests for the sake of pan-Asian unity with Japan.

In the following years, Ottoman and Arabic newspapers continued to imply that the Ottomans and the Japanese were on the verge of signing an official treaty, creating pressure on the Sublime Porte to at least outwardly entertain the possibility. *Bâlkân* claimed that after the Russo-Japanese War, the Sultan had dispatched ambassadors to Japan and they were well received, so that "embassies will be established in Japan and Turkey respectively."¹⁵⁸ Several Egyptian nationalist newspapers in Cairo reported Japanese statesmen had visited the Ottoman capital around 1906.¹⁵⁹ But again a strategic purpose was shrouded in the guise of a publicly known, semi-official diplomatic mission by the Japanese: St. Petersburg ambassador Motono requested a letter of introduction from the Ottoman envoy there to facilitate the visit of dignitaries who would be coming to Ottoman lands. The Japanese government charged Captain Hirayama Haruhisa (Harushima?) of the Army Infantry and Dr. Nagase Hiosuke (PhD), to conduct numerous studies, including an examination of the Persian Gulf coastline around Hormuz and Başra. They were to arrive in Constantinople from St. Petersburg and anticipated traveling to Baghdad by railway.¹⁶⁰ They were to stay approximately a week in the capital before continuing on their journey via Konya, Ereğli, and Adana.¹⁶¹ The Ottomans either wanted to impress the Japanese with their particular attention to and patronage of the arriving delegation, or they did not deem it necessary to allow Hirayama and Nagase free access to the entire area, or both; they were assigned an escort.¹⁶² A related imperial decree dated December 3, 1906 clarified the Ottoman position: Sultan Abdülhamid II was not comfortable allowing territory and railways to be inspected by foreign nationals. After a concerned German ambassador had inquired about the Japanese surveyors' mission, the palace made it clear that "... since the afore-mentioned railway route is pictured in printed maps that are currently in use and known by everybody, there is no need for [this] officer (Hirayama) to go to those regions."¹⁶³ Perhaps the Japanese were able to apply diplomatic pressure on the Sublime Porte, as another edict several days later granted Hirayama official permission to carry out his inspection, under the condition that someone accompany him.¹⁶⁴ In February 1907, Minister of War Rıza Paşa wrote of



Figure 4.3 Japanese Lt. Col. Morioka of Japan, from *Resimli Kitap* 5 (January, 1909), 464. The caption underneath says he was sent to Constantinople to study Ottoman Turkish; he is pictured with Ottoman escort officer (Piyâde Kulağası) Ali Bey.

Hirayama's arrival in Başra that the purpose of the Japanese tour was "... to understand the local population's feelings toward Japan and to investigate the commercial significance of Iraq"; Rıza Paşa suggested, as per the Sixth Army commander's telegraph saying the Japanese should not be left to meet alone with foreigners for any length of time, that they be kept under close scrutiny without their knowledge of it.¹⁶⁵

The following year, the Japanese requested permission for four high-ranking army officers to visit Constantinople primarily for "touristic reasons" (see figure 4.3).¹⁶⁶ The Islamic modernist (and Kurd) Bediüzzaman Said Nûrsi said he recalled another purpose for this visit (if it was indeed the same one):

Forty years ago and the year before the proclamation of the constitution (1907) I went to Istanbul. At that time, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief (of the Army) had asked the Muslim ulema a number of questions concerning religion. The Istanbul ulema asked me about them. And they questioned me about many things in connection with Islam.¹⁶⁷

Were these Japanese military figures interested in gaining a knowledge of Islam for purposes of conversion, or were they gathering important information about the Ottoman state and Islam while conveying an image of an Eastern "brother"? In the same period (1906–1907), the Japanese ambassador to London, Omura, communicated with the Ottoman envoy there, Musurus Paşa, about establishing a formal treaty. *Bâlkân* reported on these negotiations, saying the two ambassadors were together aboard a Japanese warship from London to Constantinople to discuss the establishment of embassies.¹⁶⁸ According to *Bâlkân* and to Omura's report, the Ottoman government still insisted on a treaty based on full equality and unilaterally rejected the Japanese request for consular judiciary privileges, so the Japanese temporarily ceased their efforts.¹⁶⁹

The Ottoman state was not ignorant of Japan's expanding economic and colonial endeavors in Asia either.¹⁷⁰ The Ottoman *Vakit* pointed out that the recent increase in Indian student missions to Japan was in effect to help facilitate trade between Japan and India while European goods were simultaneously being boycotted.¹⁷¹ A conference held in The Hague in the summer of 1907 was attended by several Korean dignitaries who filed an official grievance against Japan for its violation of Korea's sovereignty and the violence used against the Korean people; the Ottoman representative's memorandum on this meeting included copies of this grievance and a lengthy summary of Korea's relationship with Japan since the Sino-Japanese War.¹⁷² The Ottoman government certainly was not surprised by Japanese actions there and in fact most likely viewed them as typical of the big players in global politics. The Ottomans were aware of Japan's rising power and they became more unwilling to yield to pressure to accept Japanese demands for Capitulatory exemptions.

Ottoman-Japanese Contacts after the 1908 Constitutional Revolution

Official and unofficial contacts between the Ottoman Empire and the Japanese continued following the Young Turk Revolution of July 1908. By this time,

the Japanese were no longer threatened by Europe or Russia. As equals, they had asserted themselves as a colonial power. Previous negotiations had taken place mainly between representatives stationed in Berlin, but now Ottoman ambassadors in Vienna, Rome, Washington, and London were trying to conclude an agreement despite continued Japanese insistence on favored-nation status.¹⁷³ In a letter to Japanese ambassador to Austria, Uchida, on March 1, 1909, Foreign Minister Omura of Japan now wrote that there was little need to establish a trade and navigation treaty due to the limited amount of commerce between the two powers, and since the Ottomans had refused to consider granting Japan judiciary Capitulations, the Japanese government desired only the exchange of embassies and consulates. He instructed Uchida to approach the Ottoman envoy in Vienna to discern the Ottoman point of view on this issue so that a joint communiqué could be agreed upon.¹⁷⁴ It was perhaps in order to facilitate such an alliance that Prince Kuni, a member of an influential Japanese house and an ex-military attaché who had been in Vienna, soon visited Constantinople. There, Prince Kuni socialized with Ottoman military officials.¹⁷⁵ Around mid-March, Ottoman chargé d'affaires in London, Cevat Bey, paid a visit to Japanese ambassador Kato in which he delivered a letter stating that negotiations between Count Omura and Musurus Paşa in 1906 had broken down over the Japanese insistence on Capitulatory privileges; since the Ottoman constitutional order had been restored in the Empire, he hoped the Japanese would relinquish their former position and open negotiations toward a diplomatic and commercial alliance.¹⁷⁶ At the end of March 1909, Omura's communications to ambassador Kato emphasized the need to exchange diplomatic facilities between the two countries and not to pursue a trade treaty; Kato was instructed to ascertain the Ottoman position in this regard and forward the information to the Japanese Foreign Ministry as soon as possible.¹⁷⁷

Despite Cevat Bey's letter, negotiations remained in a deadlock. No official agreement was ever reached between the Ottoman Empire and Japan. Individuals from each state had done what they could to promote an alliance, or at least the appearance of interest in finalizing a treaty, but both governments lacked enthusiasm and/or an enduring sense of necessity to achieve this end amid more urgent political concerns. The counterrevolution of 1909 caused domestic turbulence for the Ottoman government, and certainly Japan was aware of this unrest. The Japanese were also by this time focusing more energy on their own colonial projects in Asia. Nonetheless, the abandonment of diplomatic attempts was slow to reach the press. In 1910 the *Levant Herald* was still reporting optimistically on the progress of negotiations, saying in January:

The St. Petersburg *Retch* confirms the recent announcement that the Turkish Ambassador in London has been asked to open negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Japan.... A definite friendship is being welded between the two nations. Negotiations towards the end in question were opened some time ago, but were dropped when the appointment of several Consuls was decided upon. Now they are about to be resumed.¹⁷⁸

And in July another report surfaced:

The *Yeni Gazette* [sic] reports that the negotiations between Turkey and Japan for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries are on the eve of a satisfactory conclusion. Japan, says our contemporary, no longer insists on obtaining the same privileges as the Great Powers.¹⁷⁹

The papers were mistaken. No agreement would be reached by 1910; after the Ottoman Empire became entrenched in the Balkan Wars and the First World War, the possibility of diplomatic relations between them was permanently shelved.

Celebrated Japanese military figures still visited the Ottoman capital, however, and the excitement of the Ottoman press was mimicked by that of society at large whenever a Japanese personality graced the capital with his presence. Japanese war hero General Nogi passed through Constantinople in 1911, and *Resimli Kitap* recorded his visit through numerous photographs (see figure 4.4). He was met by Pertev Bey and Lt. Colonel Halil Bey; they and the Ottoman minister of war, Mahmut Şevket Paşa, entertained him at the



Figure 4.4 General Nogi of Japan arrives aboard a steamship at Constantinople amid much fanfare from the local Ottoman population.

Note: *Resimli Kitap* 31(June/July 1911), 564–567, 570–578, contain photographs of his entry into Constantinople, the masses awaiting his ship in the streets around Galata, the military processions he attended, and his meetings with Şevket Paşa and other officers.

Pera Palace Hotel.¹⁸⁰ He also met with Sultan Mehmet Reşâd. The Young Turk Unionist regime was eager to connect its own achievements to the nation of modern Japan: General Nogi, as the physical symbol of Japan's constitutional and military power in the world, was invited to witness the military drills conducted by Ottoman naval and army personnel in July 1911 as part of the inauguration ceremony for an Ottoman monument commemorating the 1908 Revolution and the success of the Action Army in putting down the counterrevolution in 1909 (see figure 4.5).

Another Japanese military officer, Muraoka Shotaro, traveled by train with a businessman named Komura Oshige to Ankara, Eskişehir, and back to Constantinople in early 1913.¹⁸¹ In May of 1914, a Japanese military delegation requested permission via the representatives in Vienna to visit various Ottoman army and naval institutions in Constantinople.¹⁸² Despite the failure of diplomatic negotiations to seal an agreement between the two powers, both the Ottomans and the Japanese appeared to have maintained an interest in one another, which culminated in several symbolic demonstrations of Asian solidarity between Ottoman and Japanese military figures. On the one hand, the Japanese likely engineered these visits for merely strategic military and economic purposes, as a way to investigate either the strength of the Ottoman armed forces or the viability of Ottoman Turkey as a future Asian ally. The Ottomans, on the other hand, were interested in Japanese military tactics that won wars, and the involvement of military personnel in the Japanese governing apparatus.

With the start of the First World War, the few Japanese nationals in Ottoman territory were sent home, as their country soon declared itself on the side of the Allied Powers.¹⁸³ The Ottomans had failed to secure an alliance with the Japanese after almost forty years of effort. An Ottoman Foreign Office summary report of diplomatic attempts drafted in 1915 best described the



Figure 4.5 General Nogi witnessing Ottoman military drills in honor of the Young Turk Revolution.

unwavering Ottoman skepticism toward Japanese political motives throughout these years, noting that Japan had obtained Capitulatory privileges in the Kingdom of Siam through the use of gunboat diplomacy after first establishing an ambassador in Bangkok. In order to prevent the same scenario from arising in Ottoman lands that would threaten the sovereignty of the Empire, Ottoman officials sought to conclude a treaty that would not grant Japan any special status or treatment.¹⁸⁴ The Japanese had refrained from concluding just such an agreement, illustrating their inimical intentions. They continued to lobby Ottoman embassies in Europe and Washington DC for a period, but never actually responded to Ottoman requests for an equal diplomatic treaty; they eventually stopped lobbying altogether. Following the First World War, the Japanese served as intermediaries assisting in the return of Ottoman prisoners of war from Siberia.¹⁸⁵ Japan was represented at the Lausanne Peace Conference in 1923, and diplomatic relations were finally officially established with the Turkish Republic in 1924, years after the Ottoman Empire had collapsed.

Part II

Defining “Modern” in the Ottoman Microcosm

Part II of this book centers on how modernity was abstractly defined in the local Ottoman context. The following chapters explore the Japan imagery produced by Ottoman writers and intellectuals starting in the late nineteenth century and continuing through the First World War era, and their ideological purposes in constructing this discourse. Prior to the 1908 revolution, the Young Turks and Sultan Abdülhamid II were locked in a political struggle in which both sides found the Japan model to be an expedient tool for critiquing the other, as well as a defense for their own actions. Having presided over the reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution in 1908, Young Turks in the CUP government appropriated the Japan model for themselves in a way that not only permitted them to “escape Europe” temporarily while they attempted to reestablish Ottoman power in the world, but also allowed them to justify their authoritarian reassertion of domestic political rule that alienated many who had previously supported the revolution. After suppressing the counterrevolution in 1909, the Committee of Union and Progress asserted its authority in the Empire more assiduously, and those who opposed the CUP’s actions articulated their criticisms using references to Japan, much as the Young Turks had done before them when opposing the Sultan.

Constitutional, parliamentary government and universal education were considered to be the most important institutions behind Japanese success according to some Young Turk exiles, provincial Arabs, and Egyptian nationalists in one instance; the development of infrastructure similar to that of Japan—railroads, post and telegraph services, and industry for example—were in another moment the technological means for the Ottomans to cast off their backwardness and Capitulatory arrangements with European states. With the start of the Balkan wars and the almost constant state of military mobilization in the Empire from this point onward, most Ottoman Turkish discourse mentioning Japan that appeared after roughly 1912 distinctly shifted to interest in Japanese military strategy and modernization techniques as a response to wartime considerations. In general, political criticism of the Unionist regime was silenced, and there is a dearth of sources that contain reference to a Japan model after 1916.

Images were constructed by intellectuals who were frequently involved in sociopolitical struggles within their local Ottoman environment. The Japanese historical analogy served the interests of disenfranchised members within the Ottoman social or political community, warranting in various situations cultural recognition within the larger Ottoman whole, increased political participation in the existent arrangement, and/or a complete overthrow of the Ottoman system. The following chapters, then, will not just explore the anticolonial, pan-Asian, nationalist usage of Japanese images in the Ottoman context to demonstrate a disputation of the Orientalist world framework, but it will also delve into constructions of the Japanese nation generated among the Empire's politically excluded: the Young Turks and their challenge to Sultan Abdülhamid II's absolutism in the pre-1908 constitutional revolutionary period (and the Ottoman Sultan's response, again employing a particular understanding of Japan to legitimate or defend his rule), the Ottoman Arabs and their construction of discourse on Japan in provincial areas of the Empire to express opposition to an increasingly centralized and Turkish nationalist regime in the post-revolution era, and the Egyptian nationalists in their struggle against the British occupation. In each case, an elite class hoped to provide guidance for society to attain progress by interpolating Japanese assimilation of indigenous heritage with Western science in the process of creating a modern Eastern nation.

5

Ottoman Politics and the Japanese Model

Before deconstructing the discursive imagery of modern Japan that proliferated in Ottoman Turkish and Arabic newspapers, journals, books, government documents, and other forms starting in the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman social and political milieu into which this discourse was introduced must be elucidated so that we can better understand the influence Japan's achievements had upon peoples in the Empire, how such information flowed within Ottoman society, and the role of this discourse in affecting or legitimating change in the structure of the Ottoman polity. As mentioned previously, Ottoman societal organizing principles historically had been based around the sharp distinction made between the *askeri* or ruling elite, and the *reaya*, the Ottoman masses, on the one hand, and upon the categorization of communities as Muslim or non-Muslim, on the other. The Islamic Ottoman polity ultimately centered around the Sultan as protector of his subjects, with mediation between the masses and the Ottoman authorities by the religious classes.¹ The arrival of ideas to the Empire from the European Enlightenment and the French Revolution profoundly disrupted this traditional class and communal system.

Multinational empires of the nineteenth century attempted to employ methods to hold themselves together while simultaneously being pulled apart by the centrifugal forces of the various ethno-linguistic and religious communities under their umbrellas who, tempted by nationalist ideologies, were beginning to aspire toward independent nationhood. In the Ottoman world, adhering to the fundamental principles of linear nationalist development while trying to preserve the heterogeneous character of the Empire resulted in an attempt by the Ottoman ruling elite to institute reforms and to promote a doctrine of "Ottomanism." Ottomanism is defined as the prevalent ideology of liberal reformers in the late Ottoman period who argued the Ottoman Empire was still a viable Islamic political entity provided it guaranteed the rights of its citizens irrespective of religion or ethnicity, and in turn whose loyalty to the Ottoman homeland, or *vatan*, was considered a universal, patriotic duty.² In effect, Ottomanism was a reworking of the Western nation-state conception to fit the needs of a multiethnic polity much broader and more

varied than most nations in Europe; it was an effort to make all citizens equal under the law and to satisfy those elements in its realm who were succumbing to more exclusive forms of national-communal identification (Ottoman Greeks for example).

The mid-nineteenth century *Tanzîmât* reforms, which aimed at reorganizing the Ottoman administration and military, coincided with the creation of a new bureaucratic class whose interests at times deviated from those of the rest of society.³ The new elite, state-educated bureaucrats who desired to drag the Ottoman Empire and society into the modern world through implementation of reform from above, whether Islamic-minded or not, encountered resistance at times by other elements in the Empire. For example, the Young Ottoman approach to reaching modernity was one that sought to reconcile Western constitutional thought and a patriotic love of homeland with Islamic principles; they viewed the senior bureaucrat-reformers as too arbitrary, too Westernizing in their reform policies and not truly democratic in their decrees. Nonetheless, both the *Tanzîmât* statesmen and the Young Ottomans would have a profound impact upon the ideological outlook of the Young Turk movement that eventually came to oppose Sultan Abdülhamid II during his reign (r. 1876–1909).

The European advance, physically and intellectually, into Ottoman life, hastened the emergence of a political challenge to the Hamidian status quo in the Empire in the form of the Young Turk movement. As İslamoğlu-İnan describes,

Just as the society was “traditionalizing” to protect itself from the onslaught of the “Westernizing” *Tanzîmât* state, under Abdülhamid the state structure was “traditionalizing” to preserve itself in the face of European expansion. In the process, the state was becoming increasingly more rigid and oppressive inside the Empire. One explanation for this may be that Islamic ideology could not provide the ideological unity among different classes in a society the social-political cohesion of which was undermined through the integration of its principal classes (bureaucracy and merchants) into the European world system.⁴

The Islamic-based Ottoman unity that had prevailed among the various classes, ethnicities, and religious communities within the Empire in earlier centuries had begun to erode by the late nineteenth century as a consequence of global economic peripheralization and the influx of Western intellectual and organizational patterns. These new principles either came into conflict with old ones, or they impaired the ability of Islamic institutions to mediate between state and society so that a duality emerged between the modernizing elite and those desiring to preserve a more traditional way of life in the Empire.⁵

Ottoman intellectuals from bureaucratic, religious, and other classes newly created by the socioeconomic transformation such as journalists, publishers, teachers, political activists, and military officers observed this disruption of former Ottoman political unity. Many of these individuals, keenly aware both of this breakdown and of Western interference in the Empire, searched for ways to avoid its destruction. Former Islamic-Ottoman institutions seemed unable

to reconcile the state with Ottoman society's current needs; Islamic ideology had failed to unite the Empire and protect it from European encroachment. Members of the intelligentsia inquired into alternative ideologies that would be able to rescue the Ottoman Empire from its potential dissolution, or that would at least address their immediate circumstances and interactions with other sectors of Ottoman society. An alternative ideology would have to function to intercede between Ottoman state and civil society as well as between classes within the Empire in order to generate a political unity that guaranteed the future of the Ottoman polity in the modern world.

In an Empire faced with domestic upheavals and international crises stemming in part from European involvement and the emergence of separatist movements among the Empire's minority communities, ideas of parliamentary government, of a shared national consciousness and a duty to one's homeland, and of secular rationalism all contributed to the nineteenth-century discourse on how to become "modern" in the Empire. As Selim Deringil so succinctly put it, Sultans, bureaucratic elites, Young Ottoman intelligentsia, the religious scholars (ulema class) all "began to look for a new basis for defining what was increasingly coming to be considered an 'Ottoman citizenry'" because they felt "a new social base was needed if the empire was to survive."⁶

Modern Japan came to be utilized in the Hamidian era and beyond by a multitude of Ottoman statesmen, journalists, educators, political activists, and others as a referent around which to argue for their particular conceptions of unity and identity as aspects of this future modernity. For proponents of Ottomanism concerned with salvaging the Ottoman state from destruction, Japan represented the proper methods by which to carry out technological modernization and social reform policies. For others in the Empire whose "national" sensibilities were increasingly oriented around ethnic and/or linguistic communal affiliations, sometimes at the expense of Ottomanist ideology (such as Arabists and Turkists), Meiji Japan exemplified the successful combination of particularistic identity, patriotism, and modernizing strategies. The mere fact that despite vast disparities in backgrounds, circumstances, and outlooks these individuals all shared in using Japan as an ideological referent indicates that some kind of broader unity of belief did exist, a belief in the potential of the East for attaining modernity. Ironically, this discourse on Japan on the one hand created a sense of pan-Asian or Eastern solidarity, which traversed the vertical barriers between Ottoman classes (it appealed to the Sultan, to Ottoman statesmen, middle-class journalists, and illiterate peasants alike), and on the other hand heightened the divisions between them: it supported a mentality among elites that it was they who should govern the ignorant masses and propel them into the modern world (as Meiji oligarchs had done in Japan). Similarly, while the same sense of Eastern solidarity created horizontal bonds between diverse Ottoman peoples of various ethnicities and religious sects who rejoiced over Japan's successes at the West's expense, the appeal of modern Japan's national foundations also served as a basis for distinguishing between Ottoman "national" communities: between who was or was not a member of the Turkish race, for example, or concerning what characteristics defined the Arab nation. Discourse on the modern Japanese model could divide Ottomans just as it united them.

Much of what was written about Japan that appeared in Ottoman Turkish sources emanated from Istanbul, where the main publishing houses were located. Power struggles between parties inevitably played themselves out in this locale, decisions on administration of the Empire were made in Istanbul, and here press censorship could be most severely and effectively enforced. Tight control over print had a serious effect upon the choice of words and expressions used, especially if an author's underlying message challenged the position of the ruling class. Thus questions arise as to the capacity of the Ottoman Turkish and Arabic press as vehicles disseminating ideology to actually reach the majority of Ottoman society, given the strict censorship policies enforced in the Empire under Sultan Abdülhamid II between 1876 and 1908, and under the increasingly centralized regime of the CUP following the 1908 revolution and 1909 counterrevolution. Caesar Farah pointed out in his study of freedom of expression in Ottoman Syria and Egypt that the purpose of Ottoman censorship was such that

... the Ottoman system, its custodians, *modus operandi*, and friends must not suffer insult or humiliation in whatever form and from whatever quarter. In the latter part of his reign, Abdülhamid's... prohibitions due to religious sensibilities and perennial fear of plots against his reign, not to mention radical political notions that could undermine further what semblance of unity the Ottoman Empire still retained, were the direct result of his conviction that intellectuals and publishers were the leaders of sedition. Such convictions underlie the nature and extent of censorship throughout the Ottoman provinces. The arbitrary and discriminatory application of censorship, however, had a devastating effect not only on "seditious" writings but also on all aspects of literary production.⁷

Undoubtedly, this censorship severely restricted certain political topics or views from being discussed if they were deemed unflattering or threatening to the Sultan or the Sublime Porte. The Ottoman authorities attempted (at times unsuccessfully) to squelch information on certain events, news, or information about Japan, while allowing discussion of it at other times. In a 1911 article on Japan in the Ottoman journal *Mecmua-yı Ebüzziya*, for example, the author complained that in previous years the government censors had allowed only general coverage of the Russo-Japanese War in the papers and any information pertaining to Japan's political development or national progress had been struck from the pages of the press.⁸

Despite constraints upon the subject matter, wording, language, and tone of the press in the Empire, constraints that varied from one Ottoman region to another, it was still possible to voice politically charged opinions on the Japanese nation in ways that reached Ottoman society. Some writers fled Ottoman lands to publish newspapers and other literature in Europe where they were beyond the reach of the Ottoman censor; the international postal service ensured that these papers could find their way illegally to a reading audience in the Empire. Other journalists and *littérateurs* immigrated to Cairo, which had become a center for a freer Ottoman Turkish and Arabic

press in the late nineteenth century during the British occupation of Egypt. Still others stayed in more stringently controlled Ottoman territory and risked frequent shutdowns and imprisonment by the authorities for publishing unfavorable material, editing their words when necessary to leave only implicit criticism of the Ottoman system that was more difficult for the censor to detect. At any rate, the Ottoman state, while greatly restricting freedom of expression at various times, was still unable to completely control the flow of information pertaining to issues inside and outside the Empire that the Sultan or the administration considered dangerous. Information concerning Japan printed during Sultan Abdülhamid II's reign and after, during the CUP's tenure in power, then, often had to meet wide approval—both by the Ottoman government (which required that it be politically benign or pro-Hamidian) and by its Ottoman subjects (who found ideas and images of Japan socially appealing). This Japan discourse is a filter through which to view the intersection of Ottoman state and societal concerns around the turn of the century.

A more significant impediment than censorship to the dissemination of information concerning Japanese nation-state structures, political arrangements, and social reforms was the high rate of illiteracy plaguing the Ottoman Empire, seemingly rendering print capitalism ineffective as a didactic tool of the Ottoman elite to guide the masses into modernity. Indeed, illiteracy could restrict the efficacy of the printed word in affecting the Ottoman public's knowledge and understanding of world events. Yet, such a conclusion ignores the significance of the coffeehouse culture in the Ottoman Middle East as a clearinghouse of news and information.⁹ The coffeehouse as a public space in which members of almost every social strata came to consume the beverage, socialize, and be entertained came into being in the Ottoman Empire around the sixteenth century.¹⁰ This social phenomenon quickly attracted the attention of the Ottoman authorities because

the introduction of certain other topics for discussion was inevitably to lead to direct attacks from the politically powerful. Public affairs furnished much of the fuel for comment and criticism among coffeehouse patrons. . . . A forum for the public ventilation of news, views, and grievances concerning the state possessed the potential for becoming a "clubhouse" from which concerted action might be taken by those with a common distaste for the regime. . . . More than one coup d'état has been launched from, or at least plotted in, a coffeehouse.¹¹

At the turn of the twentieth century in the Ottoman Empire, the coffeehouse provided a venue for a voluminous reading of newspapers to keep up with current events and engaging issues. Ahmed Emin's 1914 doctoral study of the Ottoman press summarized the process this way: coffeehouses would have copies of all the various newspapers on hand; customers were able to come in and pay for a cup of coffee, which would allow them access to all these papers.¹² Invariably, the content of the news publications provided one of the many topics of discussion in these establishments. Emin explained that newspapers in the Ottoman Empire published information consisting of

...translations or adaptations from foreign papers, and from the bulletins of telegraphic agencies. Every daily used to get a dozen or more French, Austrian, German, and English reviews and papers. Everything found in them on foreign politics having nothing to do with Turkey and the European situation, and concerning mostly South America, the Far East and the Scandinavian countries, was translated, as well as cultural news of a harmless character and stories on odd happenings in different countries.¹³

Literate patrons typically read aloud articles and excerpts from newspapers to those present who could not read, in order to facilitate discussion. In addition, rural and domestic venues, such as the village mukhtār's assemblies, reading salons, or individuals' homes, provided forums in which the newspaper was read aloud. In this fashion illiteracy could to an extent be circumvented in urban and rural areas as an obstacle hindering the mass consumption of printed material.¹⁴

That said, published newspaper and journalistic materials are evidence of a general trend in late Ottoman society to disseminate a discourse on Japan that underscored the desired attributes of a modern state and society. Simultaneously, this discourse was a critique of the Hamidian regime (by the Young Turks), or a justification for the demands of a sociopolitically disenfranchised party such as proto-Arab nationalists, who insisted upon more recognition within the CUP-dominated Ottoman political realm in the second constitutional period. The Japanese nation also provided the pattern for modern, Eastern nationhood.¹⁵ Both literate and illiterate sectors of the Ottoman population engaged in the production and consumption of a Japan model to assist in making sense of or justifying changes to their social and political lives.

The question frequently arises as to the origin of data on Japan. Despite the unofficial visits, private communications, and unsuccessful diplomatic negotiations conducted by Japan and the Ottoman Empire to establish an alliance, these attempts at diplomacy allowed the Japanese some latitude in cultivating a particular image of themselves in the Ottoman and Arabic press. The Japanese directly involved in diplomatic undertakings actively promoted a very positive image of Japan whenever possible as a modern, secular, independent nation, to be admired by other Eastern nations. At the same time, the Ottoman Sultan and state's distrust of Japanese intentions during the negotiation process and their fear of negative comparison with Japan actually squelched overenthusiastic displays of support for the island nation. Istanbul's proximity to Europe definitely affected the timeliness, accuracy, content of, and responses to the flow of information about Japan that was printed, sometimes in contrast to sources originating from more remote areas of the Empire (Damascus, Beirut). Much information about Japan did arrive in the Middle East from Europe, via translated books, newspaper cables, and other sources. News cables provided direct reports from Tokyo and Yokohama, Paris, London, Vienna, Berlin, and Washington DC; the Ottoman Sultan and government could gauge European opinion about certain international issues pertaining to Japan and how the Ottoman administration would be expected to respond. The Ottoman state

had direct access to European attitudes toward Japan via expatriate personnel stationed in Istanbul, which undoubtedly affected both the outcome of Ottoman-Japanese diplomatic negotiations and the views of Ottoman officials regarding Japan's reforms and modernization project. But European perceptions of Japan sometimes differed considerably from Ottoman views of that nation, even when both had access to the same information. Most significantly, the discourse on Japan was profoundly shaped by the imaginations of the Ottoman writers and journalists themselves who interpreted the information they gleaned about Japan in ways that fulfilled their own social and political aims.

The Hamidian State and Early Interest in Japan

The conviction in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire's existence that Japan had overturned the Orientalist ontology to favor the position of the East above the West was a common denominator in Ottoman lands irrespective of domestic political power. Disparities emerged, however, in peoples' interpretations of Japan in relation to the internal Ottoman power structure. The Sultan and state were powerful central authorities in the pre-1908 Empire, and the politically excluded could be said to consist of Ottoman society in general, and Young Turk activists in particular. All three, however, shared in their view of Japan as a model: representations of an idealized Japan kindled Ottoman hopes of recapturing the superiority of the East through the example of its preservation of Japanese moral character and the acquisition of modern progress. The prevailing sentiment among denizens of the Empire was typically resentment over imperialist European involvement and interference; the Sultan and his bureaucracy perceived Japan's adherence to its cultural values combined with its technical modernization as a guide for how to constrain Western intervention in the Empire and how to interact on an equal footing with Europe. Ottoman society at large was encouraged by Japanese morality and upbringing, which people believed conformed to a certain indigenous Eastern standard similar to their own Islamic (or non-Muslim) traditions. The Young Turks brandished the image of Japan to express their frustrations over Western imperialism and arrogance toward non-European peoples while at the same time demanding the West take notice of this demonstration of an Eastern nation's potential: its ability to assimilate modern science and join the ranks of the "civilized" powers.

While this shared perception of Japan created pan-Asian unity within Ottoman society, the perspectives of these three sectors could be said to diverge beyond this point. Sultan Abdülhamid II was personally quite fascinated with Japan, but he and the Hamidian state intended any message to the Ottoman populace concerning this Japan model to be politically nonthreatening to his regime. Books published by the state focused upon Japanese moral character, patriotism and self-sacrifice, education, technical modernization, trade, and reform of the military, as ways to encourage the preservation of Ottoman-Islamic morality while modernizing the Empire, in a bid to reassert Ottoman authority abroad, to resist the West, and to achieve parity with it. The Young Turk opposition, while sympathetic to these motives, used discourse on

modern Japan as a protest against the absolutist Sultan in an effort to delegitimize his authority in favor of parliamentary government. The Hamidian regime, like its opposition, clearly embraced modern technology as a means to maintain sociopolitical stability and centralized control over Ottoman lands and people. But the Sultan, in encouraging this kind of defensive modernization, did not have any drastic political change in mind for Ottoman society. The status of the Islamic Sultan-Caliph was to be preserved as a pole around which the Ottoman nation would ultimately unite. The Sultan's memoirs and other commentaries indicate his desire to use the metaphor of Japan to refute the accusations of his domestic critics. Abdülhamid II occasionally defended his rule by recognizing the innate differences between his vast, multiethnic, multireligious empire and the small, isolated country of Japan.

The Young Turks, however, were much more radical in their ideology. They sought to alter the basis of Ottoman political behavior completely. For them, the Ottoman nation-state itself was to be the new pole around which to center Ottoman citizens' loyalties, with themselves in place as its legitimate (elite) leadership. They used the Japanese model first as condemnation of the absolutist reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, and then as a political tool to demand the reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution.

The Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II was in a delicate situation as the ruling monarch of an Empire trapped geopolitically between Europe and Russia. Knowing that forging an alliance with Japan, Russia's greatest threat on its Eastern flank, could potentially anger the Czar to the point of creating an international incident, the Sultan chose to play the game of politics very cautiously with the Japanese. Additionally, the Sultan was concerned about the rising appeal of the Japanese Emperor in the Muslim East as a challenge to his own Caliphal authority. Nonetheless, Abdülhamid II was personally intrigued by Japan's accomplishments and hoped to unlock the secrets behind resisting European intervention in Ottoman affairs. His avid interest in Meiji Japan led him to commission Ottoman manuscript translations of several texts on the country. The Ottoman Ministry of Public Instruction usually handled the printing of these volumes, but given Abdülhamid II's involvement in the Ottoman education system, it was likely he who ordered the publication of these books as well. Their appearance coincided directly with international political events that brought Japan to the attention of the Empire: the first few Ottoman books about Japan were published shortly after the frigate *Ertuğrul* sank in 1891, whereas Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 spawned an array of treatises predominantly focusing on modern Japan or "the Japanese nation." Ottoman officials of the Sublime Porte contributed their own opinions to this discourse on the Japanese, whether through private government communications or through more public forums such as articles published in state-sponsored or state-controlled newspapers. Their ideas reflect the concerns Ottoman statesmen possessed regarding the survival of the Empire into the modern era.

The first example of this genre of writing on Japan appeared in 1892, immediately after the *Ertuğrul* tragedy but before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. This relatively depoliticized literature was intended to enlighten the Ottoman political center as to how an Eastern empire reached and then

defended its Great Power status. The Ministry of Public Instruction arranged the publication of a book called *Japan's Past, Present, Future* by Mehmed Zeki, a French instructor at the imperial İdâdî academy and a junior clerk in the Sublime Porte's Translation Office. Given the generosity shown to the survivors and the Ottoman Empire by the Japanese after the *Ertuğrul* incident, this essay on Japan found an eager audience in the Sultan and his statesmen. In his preface, Zeki expressed the reason for compiling it, saying

Glances have been turned to Eastern nations for a time because of an illustrious initiative to serve high hopes and aims. In the realm of the superior and the splendid success of that effort and hope...that aim is dependent upon explaining "Japan" and "Japanese," to be able to understand superior things by dissemination of the truth. For just as the Creator still honors the country of Japan with local distinguishing characteristics, so He commanded the Japanese heart, a wellspring of virtues always flowing, his intellect a storehouse of skillful aptitude, to reach and desire without envy.¹⁶

Zeki pointed out that among the obvious consequences of Japanese superiority, or their "unique Japanese nature," were their weaponry skills, political savvy, and love of country, not unlike certain French statesmen.¹⁷ The book concentrated with impressive detail on defining Japanese moral character.¹⁸ The high regard Zeki held for the Japanese stemmed from their "cultural refinement and educated upbringing, which are seen in the classes of people without exception, [and] are the distinctive traits of the Japanese which distinguish them."¹⁹

Zeki ultimately viewed Japan through the lens of an Ottoman functionary concerned with issues of governing. In discussing legal and administrative reforms Japan instituted after the 1868 Meiji Restoration, he proclaimed:

That boldness of the Japanese frightens the Europeans... The end result of the great and significant initiative that Europeans fear apparently is [Japan's] successful assimilation of "Japanese-ness" and "European-ness."²⁰

He contended that the most significant and beneficial steps taken in Japan's path to modernity were to improve the military, because "the Japanese are naturally brave and valiant people, but military organization had been lost,"²¹ and, more demonstratively for the world,

Japan confirmed the truth as it related to Eastern nations just as in the West, the premise put forth by European [political] philosophers that "the nation's progress is proportional to the ability of its legal, regulatory statutes to be amended."²²

Did Zeki mean that the true measure of a civilized nation in the modern world was a society's ability to design and promulgate a constitution, thus evolving

into a democracy that protected the rights and property of its citizens? If so, he seems to have disguised the threatening nature of this implication for the Sultan's regime by focusing the majority of the text more prominently on the Japanese challenge to European claims of superiority in the realms of morality, (military) technology, patriotism, and government administration. Zeki's expressions typified the view from Ottoman bureaucrats at this time: cryptic in their discussions of political reform under the watchful eye of the Sultan, they defined a potential new unifying ideology for the Ottoman polity as a modernized, Eastern, constitutional state. Some publications did no more than provide visions of a faraway land, their proprietors not daring to inject political meaning into the images.²³

Due to lack of information or to censorship by the Ottoman authorities of sensitive subjects, prior to the turn of the century privately published material on Japan was only sporadically available in the Ottoman capital. Early discourse that did appear in the Istanbul press tended to emphasize aspects of the Japanese nation that could be similarly applied to Ottoman state and/or society without endangering the Sultan's legitimacy. Prominent journalists and other citizens wrote articles and books on Japan that were intended to provide inspiration for the Ottoman population to modernize and reform itself, delineating the traits that made Japan a successful Eastern nation. Their idealized conceptions of Japan, whether based on fact or fiction, were clearly dependent upon the ideological orientations and the circumstances of the intellectuals propagating the images for the characteristics they chose to create or to emphasize. They also relied upon approval from the Ottoman censor for their very appearance. Although the content seems politically insignificant, its function was not: elites guided and informed Ottoman public opinion concerning a palatable form of modernity labeled "Eastern." The role of religion and patriotic education, the form of government institutions, and the position of women in society would all need to be properly incorporated into the future polity, commensurate with the Ottoman values. In effect, this comparative discourse conditioned the Ottoman public to accept Japan as a referent of successful Eastern nationhood. Yet while the Ottoman state discouraged internal politicization of these Japanese images, the Young Turks would encourage it in order to gain public momentum for their opposition movement.

One of the earliest references to Japan in the Ottoman press constructed Japan for the Ottoman reading public in 1881 in a fashion that may have tempted the wrath of the censor. An article in the Istanbul weekly *Mecmua-yı Ebüzziya* mentioned the position of the Japanese Emperor, emphasizing that "the country's constitution is complete, it is a democratic state with two houses, one a senate with elected members and the other a house of peers."²⁴ The journal's proprietor and noted littérateur Ebüzziya Tevfik associated with the failed Young Ottoman movement and activists Şinasi and Namık Kemal, and he was known to ponder solutions to the Ottoman state's difficulties, its absolutist Sultan, and a weakened empire in the modern era through subtle analyses in his paper.²⁵ Perhaps his appeal in the rest of this article for assimilating Eastern ethics and Western knowledge overrode any threatening

political content inherent in the mention of parliamentary constitutionalism: "Japan" portrayed East Asian geography and demographics, Japanese religions (Shintō, Buddhism, and Confucianism), and the status of Japanese women.²⁶ Most importantly, wrote the author, "the Japanese surpassed all of the other peoples in Asia in terms of natural intelligence, keen intellect, skill, knowledge, and especially in wealth."²⁷ Ebüzziya Tevfik admired Japan's organization, its orderliness, its art forms, and its flourishing private press²⁸; he associated a free press with democratic process and thus saw Japan as an example of successful constitutional government. A writer in the scientific magazine *Servet-i Fünûn* also argued thus:

Upon Japan's accepting Europe's civilizational principles, it traversed stages on this road to civilization in a way that will be said to be extremely quick, or even extraordinary. And when [Japan] applied these to the country by obtaining every kind of civilized European attribute, it paid attention to the press, and, heeding its importance, now Japan's presses have achieved as much progress and are as abundant as those in Europe.²⁹

The key to success was that "Japan, transforming its former self from day-to-day, endeavored to imitate European civilization and its administrative procedures, *but according to their national character* [his emphasis]."³⁰ Japan had struck a balance between Western scientific principle and Eastern morality in order to survive in the modern world.

Science, education, and technical modernization numbered among the press topics generally acceptable to the Hamidian authorities. For example, in the Ottoman-French language daily *Osmânli*, one author felt that "it is the approximately three to four hundred young Japanese who are studying the sciences in Europe that are the most helpful in [Japan's] current progress."³¹ *Servet-i Fünûn*, Ahmed İhsan's long-running weekly pictorial and literary magazine, usually covered only cultural substance up until the Sino-Japanese War because its readers wanted "...information about Japan, which has adopted European civilization and which has manifested quite a lot of technological and civilizational progress."³² General statements about Japan's "progress" (*terakkî*) as one of the "civilized countries" (*memâlik-i mütemeddine*) abounded in the scientific, literary, and political journals, as did articles on Japan's culture and people.³³

The Sino-Japanese War drew much attention in the Istanbul press. The Ottoman Navy's bi-monthly *Ceride-yi Bahriye* was interested in Japanese naval vessels and firepower, carrying frequent articles about Japanese or Chinese fleets and decisions made by their commanding officers.³⁴ The Ottoman illustrated weekly *Resimli Gazete* included maps and detailed synopses of particular clashes between Chinese and Japanese forces in a neutral tone. *Servet-i Fünûn* pictured prominent military figures and battleships and often ignored or was willing to excuse Japanese colonial actions in the Korean peninsula.³⁵ Modern progress, including Japan's modernization of its military forces, argued the paper's contributors, had allowed Japan to win the war against China.³⁶ Most

of *Servet-i Fünûn*'s articles on Japan, whether reviewing the status and duties of women in Japanese society, the growth of Japan's press, medical care in its war hospitals, the streets of Japanese cities, even the art of Japanese flower arrangement and the cultivation of bonsai trees, were introduced with a statement about Japan having obtained European civilization and an advanced level of Western progress.³⁷ The diversity of subject matter all contributed to a meta-narrative on Japan that emphasized jointly its dual successes: according to Ottoman writers, Europe was the yardstick for reaching modernity technically and intellectually, and Japan had measured up. At the same time, however, Japan had been able to preserve its indigenous cultural heritage, reflected in its arts and social customs that were unlike any other nation's. Japan had reached Chatterjee's "moment of departure," and Ottoman society was to strive for the same level of cultural preservation and progress as a new philosophy that would unite citizens in their quest to reach modernity. This narrative of Japan did not menace the power of the Ottoman authorities; it merely guided the populace in the proper direction.

The Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895 heightened interest in Japan and stimulated the production of discourse on the Eastern nation in Ottoman sources. Two Ottoman military officers composed a manuscript titled *Military Information about China, Japan, and Korea* because they wanted to provide accurate information on China and Japan to their "comrades in arms" who did not comprehend the treatises written about this war in foreign languages they could not understand.³⁸ Detailed statistical and numerical data on the Japanese military (land and sea power) were included in this text, as were short explanations of Japanese conscription procedures, the rank system, weaponry (rifle technology in the nineteenth century was said to have come from Germany, on page 2), the education levels of soldiers, and a comparison of Japanese and European army training methods. Similar sections on Korea and China followed, and the last half of the manuscript was devoted to the "Dâr ül-Harb" (the geopolitical environment of the Sino-Japanese conflict) and events of the war, recorded almost day-to-day, up to the date in which the essay was penned (pages 60–75). Information presented about specific battles seems to have been obtained via cables from Shanghai, Yokohama, Tien Tsin, or London. Sultan Abdülhamid II, impressed with previous Japanese goodwill after the *Ertuğrul* incident, observed the war and pondered solidifying the Ottoman Empire's relationship with Japan.³⁹ Despite the Sultan's inner skepticism, expressions of the desire to establish firmer trade ties with the Japanese in East Asia surfaced in the Ottoman press. In 1897 Mehmed Tahir Bey's Ottoman paper *Malûmât*, the Palace mouthpiece, aired the Sultan's opinions of Japan in its political news section. Praising how Japan had captured attention by "embracing European sciences, technologies, and numerous advancements," the island nation now desired the establishment of an embassy in the Ottoman capital; Japan had proven its sincerity in pursuing modernity "by adhering to a complete law code" and so

... the aforementioned [Japanese] government, adorned with great intelligence and ideological firmness in progress, has implemented and promoted European [methods] of commerce and industry in its own country,

and has turned the whole of Japan into a factory of progress, thanks to many [educational institutions]; it has attempted to secure and develop Japan's ability in progress by using means to serve the needs of the society such as benevolent institutions, railways, and in short, innumerable means of civilization.⁴⁰

For an Ottoman Sultan concerned with ridding his domain of foreign intrigues and elevating the status of the Empire to be included among the European Powers, Japan supplied the blueprint. *Malûmât* focused on Japan's technological achievements (predominantly in the armed forces), its relations with Western powers as an equal, and the Ottoman Empire's need to establish a firm political and economic alliance with the Japanese.⁴¹ Japan had survived and flourished by learning the art of commerce, because "they had to save their country's big industries from passing into [the hands of] foreigners."⁴² Furthermore, it was assumed that Japan maintained its "unique" culture throughout its exchanges with the West.⁴³ *Malûmât* reflected the Palace view that Japan's ability to defend its sovereignty as well as its culture in the overwhelming presence of Western attributes dominating concepts of modernization and progress meant it had acquired the respect of the European Concert and was now a player in the international arena.⁴⁴ Because of this the Sultan both admired and feared Japan.

Communications from Ottoman ambassadors abroad sometimes reflected a hopeful bias toward Japan as well.⁴⁵ As Carter Findley explains in his study of Ottoman civil officials,

What generally differentiated the Ottoman diplomats' role from that of their Western counterparts was that they represented the outside world to their compatriots, more than the other way around. Certainly through the mid-nineteenth century, the diplomats were virtually the vanguard of Westernizing cultural change, with all its mixed blessings.⁴⁶

Their orientation—as Ottoman statesmen inextricably attached to European society as well as to their own—led to a cognizance of both the need to counter Western advances with reform measures in order to protect the Empire, as well as to follow the Japanese example so as to succeed in maintaining European approval for these procedures. Aware and to an extent accepting of the paradigm subordinating their Empire and civilization to Western values, the Ottoman "second chance" with Europe, they believed, lay in choosing a path toward modern statehood that resembled that of Japan. That choice implied Western-style modernity without the loss of indigenous Eastern character.

The Ottoman Consul in New York, commenting on a newspaper report that expressed Japan's desire to establish an embassy in Istanbul, remarked in 1897 that the Japanese, "... whose political program against Russia has taken a form that draws the attention of the Imperial [Ottoman] government, also has... civilizational capacity."⁴⁷ How did Ottoman statesmen measure civilizational capacity? In a 1902 communiqué to the Ottoman foreign minister, the

Ottoman consul general in Singapore elucidated what national enlightenment meant to him:

The Japanese government has been in a progressive state of mind these last few years... Because the Japanese state works to advance [itself] from every angle, in every particular, and they strive to the utmost degree, currently they are undertaking regular service to America, Europe, China, and neighboring ports with big, beautiful steamers and postal ships... an easy and efficient transport, it almost rivals the European postal and cargo steamers... It is evident that we, the Imperial Ottoman state, and not the Japanese, will in a short time be left quite behind the most civilized nations.⁴⁸

The implementation of modern technology to advance state interests (commercial and otherwise) subsequently led to membership in the European “club of civilized nations,” and the Ottoman state now had to strive even more diligently to reach these goals, or else be left behind. Ottoman officials functioning within a restrictive political system argued that the survival of the Ottoman polity into the modern era rested upon its ability to achieve these aims.

Sultan Abdülhamid II looked to Japan as a pattern of non-Western morality and modernization schemes that could reassert Ottoman sovereignty in the face of both European encroachment and challenges to his authority from within. For him, to view Japan as “Eastern” was to retain the Japanese Emperor as the custodian of Japanese culture and organizing principles, much as the Sultan considered himself the center around which Ottoman-Islamic political loyalties were elicited. The Sultan believed in the existence of a timeless, Japanese indigenous morality embodied in the Emperor himself. This idea, promoted through publications consumed by Ottoman society at large, allowed the Sultan to ignore Japan’s recent political revolution that dissolved the Tokugawa past in favor of a reformed secular, parliamentary system and modernizing Meiji statesmen resembling their European counterparts. That reality would be too dangerous a prospect for what it could suggest in Ottoman lands. Additionally, constrained by threats emanating from close geographic proximity, the Sultan, his state, and subjects desired somehow to escape the whole scenario by “turning East,” away from Europe. Yet centuries of history deeply implicated in Europe forced the Ottoman Empire to remain connected. Unable to fully repress or sever this relationship with the West, the Ottoman solution to the dilemma was to look to the pattern of an “Eastern” Japan, refigured so as to bear signs of Western material progress while seemingly protecting Japanese heritage.

In 1901, Abdülhamid II commissioned an Ottoman translation of an essay written by a reporter named Hitomi from the Japanese newspaper *Kokumin* [The Nation]. Hitomi had been dispatched by the Japanese government in Formosa (Taiwan) to the 1900 Paris Exposition; the treatise was titled *The Example of Japan’s Morality and Institutions*.⁴⁹ The manuscript itself was separated into various sections: the first two thirds discussed Japanese institutions and cultural attributes such as history, government administration, the role of

the Emperor, party politics, religious sects, arts and architecture. The last third elucidated Japanese “*ahlâk*”: “virtues,” or “morality” that involved everything from marriage, women, raising children, funerary practices, and cleanliness, to food, clothing, and recreation. The final few pages were devoted to statistics on Japan’s schools in 1896, and Japanese naval and army forces in 1897. The subject matter pertaining to Japan’s relationship with the Western Powers inevitably attracted the attention of the Sultan and officials in the Ottoman Empire, entrenched in their own Capitulatory difficulties with Europe and anxious to find a way out of their predicament. Hitomi explained that in 1899 Japan was completely opened to foreigners, the Consular court system had been abrogated, and “Japan became the solitary nation in the Far East that presided over judicial issues of the Europeans,” so that “in this way Japan has come to occupy a rung in the ladder of the other civilized and equal nations.”⁵⁰ The Japanese declared parity with the West on the grounds of juridical practice, by annulling European extraterritorial privilege and guaranteeing the protection of rights and property on Japanese soil. In contrast to Japanese self-rule, exclaimed the Sultan in 1902, frustrated by foreign influences in his empire,

The principal factor which pushes our state into a catastrophe is the intriguing of the great powers... We cannot advance our people, again because of the great powers... We could have repeated the much-praised progress of the Japanese, if we, too, were allowed peace for only ten years, at least. They are fortunate people compared to us, for they are at a distance from the claws of the Europeans and live in security. Unfortunately, our tent is pitched at the crossroads of the European hyenas.⁵¹

Hitomi’s *The Example of Japan’s Morality and Institutions* portrayed Japan for a foreign audience, as the ruling oligarchy of Meiji statesmen preferred Japan to have been viewed.⁵² The text always presented “particular Japanese” historical development and used specific language that reminded the reader the Japanese themselves were the authors of this narrative.⁵³ The Charter Oath, promulgated by the Meiji government in 1868 to explicate the new national aims of the Japanese leadership, was reproduced in this manuscript to demonstrate the “new dynamism given to national life”⁵⁴ in Japan that resulted in, among other things, the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889. Hitomi’s manifesto struck home with the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II in his lament over dethronement and in his self-defense when blamed for mismanagement of the Empire in subsequent decades: the Sultan later complained that “I could not find the type of senior statesmen that the Mikadō had gathered around him. There was always something about both the existing statesmen and those that I trained that left every inclination to advance breathless.”⁵⁵

It is not clear who had access to Hitomi’s manuscript beyond the Sultan and his immediate circle, as the translation was never published. But Abdülhamid II certainly retained this information as a resource by which to gauge his own political problems. Japan was a reference point in discussing Ottoman politics

just after the reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution in 1908. When he met Young Turk leader Ahmed Rıza for the first time, Rıza said “Sire, there is no longer a disagreement between you and your nation. After this, Your Majesty will remain at our head and will render services to your own lands that the Mikadō carried out for Japan.”⁵⁶ The Sultan recalled this encounter, writing retrospectively in 1917 of the illogical comparison of his Ottoman Empire and the nation of Japan,

I do not know how appropriate it is to compare Ottoman lands to Japan, to expect success from this Sultan similar to that of that Emperor! Japan is a country of islands, tucked away on one side of the Pacific Ocean; it is a great society, ethnically integrated, uni-religious, uni-national. If there is any region in the world that it does not resemble, it is our wretched country. How could I have reconciled the Kurd and the Armenian, the Greek and the Turk, the Arab and the Bulgar? . . . Never at any time did Mikadō Hatsuhiro [sic] come up against such obstacles and never did Japan confront such difficulties.⁵⁷

Japan had become the trope for mapping modern progress and civilization onto a spiritual-geographical construct of East. The Sultan concurred with the Young Turks in their naive view that the Japanese had succeeded in reaching modernity without compromising their Easternness and that they had reformed and modernized domestically without painful consequences to Japanese culture and society; Japan was demonstrating this potential internationally. But he was not willing to concede that the Ottoman Empire had failed to do what Japan had accomplished because of his own shortcomings in governing. In the Sultan’s eyes, Japan was spared the indignity of foreign intrigue that was rampant in Ottoman lands because Japan was small and geographically isolated. Its people were assumed to be united in ethnicity and religion, unlike the multiethnic, multilingual, multireligious Ottoman Empire. Even the Japanese Emperor’s tools—his statesmen—were supposedly superior to those of the Sublime Porte.

The Sultan’s awareness of the collapse of Ottoman unifying ideology at the turn of the century surfaced in his tirades against European imperialism and the lack of cohesion among the various peoples he considered his subjects, many of whom he felt collaborated with the West to destroy the Empire. His solution to this modern dilemma had not involved his own removal as the central figure in the Ottoman-Islamic political structure however; instead it required a conscious effort on the part of Ottoman members of the flock to come together under his authority, to preserve their indigenous heritage while modernizing self and country, all the while resisting European interference. Many Ottoman officials were coerced into supporting his position in the pre-revolution period, emphasizing above all the need to modernize infrastructure to survive and advance. Popular literature concerning Japan suggested ways for the Ottoman masses to “modernize self” without challenging the Sultan or state. Certain implications of the Meiji Restoration, then, had to be overlooked in this narrative of achieving “Eastern” modernity. The Young Turks, however, in their representations of Japan, took precisely the

opposite view. They differed radically in defining how to provide unity for the Ottoman Empire. Their wish for a transition into a modern, secular, constitutional, and capitalist state relied upon the need for a dramatic revolution to match Japan's political upheaval. Their Social Darwinist leanings demanded they acknowledge an innate cultural character from which to proceed upon the correct path, but their notion of "Easternness" would also come to have different implications for the Empire in the second constitutional period.

Pre-1908 Ottoman Politics, the Young Turks, and the Russo-Japanese War

The victory of the Japanese over Russia in the 1904–1905 war in East Asia was a historical watershed that surprised the world. Nowhere was the impact greater than in the Eastern world itself, where "the Russo-Japanese war awakened all Muslims from Morocco to the islands of Java."⁵⁸ Japan had survived political upheaval and the Meiji Revolution of 1868, resulting in its accelerated industrialization in the following decades. In 1905 Japan was regarded as a modern, democratic constitutional monarchy, whose political system enabled it to sink the autocratic Czar's Russian fleet. Indians under British domination, Iranians unhappy with their despotic ruler, and the Young Turks demanding the reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution were not blind to this feat. Japan's victory over Russia was an inspiration for subjugated peoples to challenge the political authority of their conquerors, or it encouraged those who were dissatisfied with their present governments to attempt reform and/or to revolt based on constitutional, representative principles.

Depending upon one's relationship to the governing body of the Ottoman Empire, varying conclusions were reached as to the factors behind Japan's success. The conflict initiated an explosion of writings that celebrated Japan and its defeat of Russia. The undeniable significance of Japanese naval superiority for the Ottoman Empire rested in its own glorious past and its more recent debacles on the seas against European naval forces. Japan had a distinct symbolic meaning: for the Sultan and Ottoman officials, the message was international in nature, as Japan's victory had militarily reversed the positions of Orient and Occident. In addition, for many Ottoman observers disgruntled by the Sultan's continued absolutist rule, Japanese military success came to be viewed as the tangible result of a constitutional, parliamentary system, technological reform, and Western forms of modern knowledge. For the general population, Japan still typically represented the power of Eastern sociocultural norms.

Sultan Abdülhamid II and his governing apparatus took an active interest in the war and its political effects, both internationally and internally. Ottoman officer Pertev Bey (Demirhan) was posted in Manchuria as a military observer of the Russo-Japanese conflict and was one of the direct sources of information for the palace during the Russo-Japanese War. The contents of the Ottoman Sultan's library indicate his personal fascination: three undated manuscript translations of books from French or Russian in his private library and a vast number of military and photo albums he collected expose his avid curiosity about Japan at the time.⁵⁹ Ottoman officials communicated to the

Sublime Porte, the Grand Vezir's Office, or to the Sultan their observations about European impressions of Japan and their own perceptions of the current war in East Asia. France felt its colonies threatened by Japan.⁶⁰ Germany's military was impressed enough to imitate the siege of Port Arthur in training maneuvers.⁶¹ Some Ottoman ambassadors predicted the outcome of the war based on what they saw as Japan's successful modernization and, consequently, its naval victories over Russia.⁶² Others abroad thought that Europe attempted to stay neutral in the conflict, although this war solidified the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Ottoman officialdom was both anxious about Japanese influence and impressed with their military capabilities, particularly the naval campaigns. Japanese performance in the war and its military prowess had even impressed some dissatisfied subjects of the Ottoman Empire with nascent nationalist feeling who utilized Japanese training in their fight for independence.⁶³ At least one bureaucrat, Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil, an Ottoman Ministry of War official with sufi leanings, was known to have become so obsessed about the outcome of the war that "... he felt called to pray for the Japanese, and even came to believe he was their 'spiritual commander.'"⁶⁴

For all their interest in the geopolitical outcome of the conflict, Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Sublime Porte were concerned about the ideological messages imbedded in a Japanese victory over Russia. While obviously pleased with the rout of his Russian nemesis, the Sultan hesitated to demonstrate too much excitement over Japan's victory. His censors restricted and manipulated enthusiasm for Japan's victories in the papers in an attempt to channel potentially dangerous political energy into more general sentiments of pride over an Eastern nation's modern advances and resentment against Western injustices. The Sultan interpreted excessive praise in the press for Japan's Emperor or the Emperor's sanction of Meiji era constitutionalism as criticism of the Hamidian regime.⁶⁵ But comments on Japan's challenge to European ontological and political hegemony in remarks such as "humans' salvation and civilization that is appearing on the horizon, let us see, will it set in the East or the West?"⁶⁶ or discourse describing Japanese character as generally "refined, faithful, and humane"⁶⁷ would not be construed as slanderous against the Sultan or Ottoman authorities, and thus was permitted.

The Sultan and his censors could not completely control Ottoman public enthusiasm for Japan however, nor could they inhibit the overwhelming amount of imagery of the Russo-Japanese War spilling into everyday Ottoman life. Maps of East Asia were splashed across the front pages of daily newspapers such as *Asır* in Salonika, as were regular and at times sensationalist columns comparing military forces and leaders of the armies or navies. *Servet-i Fünûn's* pictorials included the Japanese fleet and Admiral Togo, Japanese infantry and cavalrymen, photos of cities in Manchuria such as Dalny and Port Arthur, and hospitals in Tokyo using the latest medical techniques from Germany.⁶⁸ A whole genre of writings on the Japanese nation had flourished just prior to Japan's entry into and during its war with Russia in 1904; recognizing the Porte's inability to eradicate the Japanese historical analogy from the Ottoman public realm, state-sponsored material that emphasized politically nonthreatening aspects of Japanese history, society, and culture made its way into the printing press.⁶⁹ Literature on Japan consisted of translations

of European authors, books by Ottoman officials in various ministries, articles in different newspapers or journals, and several pictorial magazines devoted exclusively to the war.⁷⁰ Frequently, there was no citation of sources, the facts were blurred, the writers unknown. The prolific amount of Japanese images that appeared, however, and the repetition of certain depoliticized themes aimed at co-opting Ottoman society into a particular path of modernity without threatening the current domestic political arrangement is what is most noticeable, whether about Japan fiercely guarding its independence against Western imperialism, or Japanese character making the difference between an enslaved nation and a liberated one.

The Ottoman Ministry of Public Instruction commissioned the publication of Birecikli Nâmık Ekrem's short essay, *The Japanese*, which concluded his translation of a book called *In Japanese Waters*.⁷¹ Ekrem's essay represented the state-sponsored view of Japan as it was produced for the Ottoman reading public, that is, the ideological framework from which the Ottoman Sultan and his officials proceeded in order to cultivate in the populace a sense of loyalty toward the state, as patriotic subjects of an "Eastern" Empire pursuing a program of modernization. Much of Ekrem's treatise was devoted to the Japanese school system, although there were other sections on Japanese manufacturing and agriculture, and several pages concerning the status of Japanese women. Ekrem linked Japanese character and the nation's progress together in a way that the Ottoman Sultan and state did not consider threatening to the political order, but beneficial to the Empire's continued economic survival.

Given the rigidity of the Hamidian regime and the possibility of a cease-production order being issued against a publisher of anything considered seditious material, little to no discussion of Japan appeared in the Levantine Arabic press immediately following Japanese war victories in 1895 and 1905. What scanty news did surface in the pages of the pre-1908 Arabic press in Syria suggests that Japan's modernization and military victories could only be proffered as politically benign investigations of Japan's origins, of its relationship with the West, and of its ability to successfully borrow and adapt knowledge to suit the country. Suggestions of how these concepts could be applied to benefit the Ottoman Empire had to be carefully worded so as to avoid rebuke by the Ottoman censor, though at times Ottoman Arab intellectuals took risks in extolling Japanese achievements that carried some politically antagonistic comments. In 1902, Jurjī Niqūlā Bāz (b. 1882–1959), a Beirutian nicknamed the "savior of the woman" ("*naṣīr al-mar'a*"),⁷² delivered a lecture called *The Progress of Japan to the Benevolent Sun Society* in Beirut, where it was then published in the newspapers *al-Maḥabba* and *al-Rā'id*.⁷³ In it Bāz traced Japan's transformation into a modern state, interjecting into his historical narrative editorial remarks on the character of the Japanese, in contrast to what he considered shortcomings "in us."⁷⁴ Bāz claimed that the government always recognized what was most beneficial, most advantageous for the people, whether it be allowing freedom of religion or building schools to teach modern sciences. The Japanese love of science and respect for the learned led to knowledge being associated with action as one of the most important and fundamental principles behind their success; Bāz claimed "the Japanese did not consider any act beneficial or useful to their country except if they

could manifest it from the realm of speculation to the realm of execution."⁷⁵ Japanese strength of character combined with good government policy was the secret behind their success.

Implicit in Bāz's discussion of Japanese political history was a subtext of anti-Hamidian thoughts that certainly would have concerned the Ottoman censor for their political content: first, the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and victory for the Mikadō meant the country would "have a respite from oppression and tyranny."⁷⁶ Japan was said to have exchanged "a tyrannical, absolutist regime" for one with "constitutional authority" and the inauguration of a parliamentary government with a House and Senate of three hundred members.⁷⁷ Considering the pressure placed on Sultan Abdülhamid II by his Young Turk critics to reinstate the 1876 constitution at the turn of the century, public statements such as this one were criticism of continuing autocracy in Ottoman lands. But Bāz also mentioned another sensitive issue that currently impeded Ottoman authority: Japan's progress, he argued, was dependent upon the establishment of true sovereignty through international treaties: "Japan entered the ranks of the Great Powers upon [signing] the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty with China in 1895. First it abrogated Consular privileges on its soil and made foreigners and [Japanese] citizens equal before the law, in consideration of national rights."⁷⁸ The Ottoman inability to nullify the Capitulations with European powers had been a frustration to the Sublime Porte for decades. Japan's success in this endeavor is argued to be the basis for its rapid progress and its political and economic development, in contrast to the Ottoman failure to protect its subjects' rights and the subsequent misfortunes of the Empire in the international arena. Bāz concluded his speech by pondering the differences between Japan and the Ottoman Empire, particularly considering Ottoman proximity to Europe and the longevity of relations between the two. "Do we not have a just government and a sovereign who loves to advance his people?" he quipped.⁷⁹ His response, quoted below, may have cleared him from censure by the Ottoman authorities, but the tone of his words nonetheless could be construed as a subtle criticism of the current political situation:

Yes, yes, we have a sovereign fervent in the welfare of his nation. Vigilant over the advancement of his people, he loves the progress of his sons. And we also are in an era of enlightenment. But it is habit and restraint. It is imitation and separatism, and a lack of patriotism, and self-love that are the issues dropping a curtain over our eyes, leaving us unchanged. Whereas our brothers, the Japanese progress day by day, year by year, we are content to observe their news. We console ourselves that they are Easterners and in the East are found states that tend to themselves, preserving their independence. . . . It is necessary to discover the arm of determination and initiative and strike out under a banner of unity. To resist the spread of evil customs. . . . To reconcile knowledge and action. And provide well for educating our youth, men of the future, and plant in our minds sound principles and love of homeland and self-reliance, like the Japanese.⁸⁰

The Beirut monthly *al-Mashriq* (*The Orient*) founded by Jesuit priest Father Luis Shaykhu in 1898 has been compared to the scientific, literary Arabic journals *al-Muqtataf* and *al-Hilāl* published by Syrian Christian émigrés in Egypt.⁸¹ Articles on Japan in this Christian Arab publication were among the few to appear at all in Greater Syria around the time of the 1905 Russo-Japanese War; given the sectarian rift in the Levant between French-supported Catholic Arabs and Greek Orthodox Christians under Russian protection, it would be no surprise that this journal subtly rejoiced at Japan's victory over Russian forces in Port Arthur.⁸² Typical of pre-1908 Revolution Beirut, the heart of Arab literary renaissance culture but under watchful Ottoman *mektûpcîs*, *al-Mashriq's* discourse on Japan did not directly challenge the authorities with politically sensitive comments, though implicit in it was an appeal for a more liberal, representative government.⁸³ According to the Jesuit fathers, ethnicity, morality, and language bound the Japanese together, as did their indigenous spirituality, which was significant insofar as it formed Japanese resolution and firm will to reform and modernize the country. Thanks to this resolve, the Japanese had abrogated their unequal privileges for foreign powers so that extraterritoriality was impossible, yet foreigners could move about the country, buy property, and engage in commerce freely under Japanese law.⁸⁴ In securing these practices, Japan had proven its civility by conforming to nineteenth-century ideas of international law, thereby gaining the West's acceptance. In addition, the Japanese were now endowed with a parliamentary government that further guaranteed civilian rights and private property, in accordance with European principles.⁸⁵ Both Bâz and Father Shaykhu ascribed the implementation of just, constitutional principles of government in Japan to the tenacity of Japanese moral character, which effected a patriotic spirit. For them, Arabo-Islamic conventions could elicit the same process in the Empire, resulting at last in an Ottoman parliament.

The Young Turk movement that came to oppose the Sultan's regime did not dispute views of Japan's "Eastern morality" and modern technological advances as the keys to reaching modernity, but they interpolated the message of Japanese modernity in ways that had more political nuance and more far-reaching consequences for the stability of the Empire: not only was their intention to disrupt the traditional political order through revolution, but their conception of moral character deviated from that which resonated with the Sultan and the Ottoman masses—that of a more traditional Islamic identity—and evolved into a proto-nationalist idea of patriotic duty to country, which would become increasingly exclusive in nature. Their form of modern progress became synonymous with rational science and secularism.

Studies of the Young Turks have revealed the diverse elements and ideology that characterized this political movement from its inception to its ultimate success in reinstating the Ottoman constitution in 1908 and deposing Abdülhamid II in 1909.⁸⁶ The expression "Young Turk" refers generally to the category of those who opposed Sultan Abdülhamid II's regime and carried out the 1908 constitutional revolution. The term "Young Turk," as Hasan Kayalı aptly noted in his monograph, is "...an unfortunate misnomer, because it implies that the group of liberal constitutionalists called Young Turks consisted exclusively of Turks, or even of Turkish nationalists. The Young Turks,

in fact, included in their ranks many Arabs, Albanians, Jews, and in the early stages of the movement, Armenians and Greeks.⁸⁷ As the successor to the Young Ottomans, this group loosely described as the Young Turk movement had a philosophy that departed in many ways from its predecessors: it was “originally ‘scientific,’ materialist, Social Darwinist, elitist, and vehemently anti-religious; it did not favor representative government.”⁸⁸ The Young Turks were profoundly influenced by the antireligious thought of Büchner’s scientific materialism and by Auguste Comte’s Positivism, including his systematic approach to societies that emphasized the relationships between people and the division of labor in hierarchically ordered levels, while simultaneously critiquing European morals and imperialist behavior. Haeckel and his Social Darwinist following in Germany, their vision of bourgeoisie social aristocracy as the “fittest” members of society best suited lead the nation,⁸⁹ and the racial theorizing of Herbert Spencer and Gustave Le Bon that ranked different peoples in a hierarchy of intelligence and civilization according to “rational” principles, all informed Young Turk views of human relations, globally and domestically.

The meaning of governance and power, political and otherwise, was recognized by the anti-Hamidian Young Turk movement to have been changing in the late nineteenth century. For them, mere access to and the ability to engage in the exploration of Western thought connoted power in and of itself—according to what was going to become in the contemporary era a universally understood principle of the structure of the modern nation-state with a patriarchal set of elites who operated as the central authorities. To be a member of their new conception of a ruling class, one had to be familiar with Western ideas of secular science and technology, conversant in the principles of constitutionalism, parliamentary democracy, and capitalist laissez-faire economics, as well as possessing dedication to the nation as a patriotic duty. The notion of nation for a powerful group within these Young Turks who emerge out of the future CUP government would also evolve with a more exclusive, racially defined meaning.

Young Turk exiles synthesized all of these ideas into a particular platform, which they propagated in the Balkans, Paris, Geneva, and Cairo in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in an effort to dislodge Sultan Abdülhamid II from power and to establish a reformed government system. The nation of Japan figured prominently in this Young Turk ideological discourse, especially once the Russo-Japanese War appeared to be demonstrating their arguments quite dramatically on the battlefield. Japan’s successful reform and modernization program based upon Western scientific methods, and its (perceived) preservation of native Eastern culture and morality, were two patterns derived in Japan from mid-nineteenth century neo-Confucian epistemology, but re-articulated into Social Darwinism. These enabled Japan to perform the ultimate task: to resist Western imperialist forces and participate in the international arena as an equal power. Pursuing these same aims in the Ottoman Empire would not directly threaten the domestic power arrangement as long as they appealed to the Sultan as supreme sovereign and guarantor of Islamic traditions. Yet, in the press of the Young Turks in exile in the last years of Abdülhamid II’s reign, Japanese achievements were used

as a political weapon to wield against the Sultan. The Young Turks compared Japan's successes internally and abroad to what they deemed the dismal failures of the Sultan and his Empire; their Social Darwinist selectivity would disavow not only a recent history of Ottoman failures vis-à-vis Europe, but also the absolute position occupied by the Sultan-Caliph in governing the Empire. In its place would form a secular, capitalist, constitutionalist, and nationalist conception of statehood they believed Japan to have pioneered, one that could finally obtain equality with Europe for them, and a modern, prosperous society that would retain a discernible Ottoman ("Eastern") essence.

While the Ottoman Sultan defended his reign by comparing Japan to his faltering empire, prior to the 1908 revolution the Young Turk movement deployed images of Japanese constitutional monarchy and independent nationhood to express their resistance to Western imperialism and to acknowledge the civilizational ascent of the Orient. The politically excluded Young Turks were equally fervent in their intention to critique the Sultan with this discourse and to advance arguments for massive reforms to be implemented in the Ottoman Empire. For them, Japan represented one possible Ottoman future, provided the tyrannical Sultan could be removed from the political equation. Supporters of the Young Turk movement had to operate clandestinely in areas firmly within the boundaries of the empire; therefore this imagery was often produced in books or newspaper articles that only very subtly conveyed a critical message. Young Turk activists further afield could be less cautious in their expressions against the Sultan and more direct in praising the ways in which Japan differed from the current state of Ottoman affairs: those resident in Cairo were beyond the reach of the Sultan, as Egypt was only nominally an Ottoman province after the issuance of an imperial decree in 1841 and less so after its occupation by the British in 1882. Their voices of dissent against the Hamidian regime resonated through the pages of an oppositional Ottoman press that clearly circulated beyond Egypt. Young Turk exiles in Europe published newspapers in which they even more fiercely criticized Abdülhamid II's autocracy and demanded a revolution, often invoking Japan's accomplishments in their reasoning.

The Young Turk platform reproduced in their press had several features in common with state-sponsored publications discussed previously, with noticeable distinctions. Young Turk propaganda addressed the specific international and domestic problems the Ottoman Empire faced; like Abdülhamid II and his officials, they felt frustration over European interference in Ottoman political affairs and the seizure of Ottoman territories. Similarly, the abstract conception of this uneven power balance between East and West translated into a conviction on the part of Young Turks of an ontological division between Orient and Occident, and their definite place within that framework as fellow Easterners with a particular indigenous heritage that could be preserved as the state modernized. While many of the Young Turks identified themselves as having been enlightened by Western civilization and thus sought inclusion into the European fold, they still recognized European resistance to seeing them as racial and intellectual equals, and the Young Turks did not believe

(especially prior to the 1908 Revolution) that the binary itself was invalid—historical and geographical closeness to Europe simply did not permit them the intellectual liberty to fully deconstruct the East-West ontology. Instead, they turned to Japan as a mediator for involvement with Europe. Japan exemplified for the Ottoman ruling elite and the Young Turk opposition alike the ability of an Eastern nation to reverse the Orientalist hierarchy, theoretically as well as physically, in the global arena.

The solution to the Ottoman dilemma of being an “inferior” on the civilizational ladder was to modernize in a scientific, progressive fashion that would place the Empire on par with Western powers as Japan had done. However, it is here that the Young Turk search for a new unifying ideology vastly differed from the conception proposed by the current Ottoman ruling class. The Sultan and the Sublime Porte used the example of Japan to appeal to the Ottoman public to preserve native character while acquiring modern science and technology, thus contributing to the continued existence of the Empire without altering the traditional Ottoman-Islamic political structure. The Young Turks, however, as a politically excluded element, sought modernization of society *and* state through the application of Western science and technology as represented by Japan. In other words, the Young Turk notion of modernity required modernization of the Ottoman political arrangement to include an overthrow of autocracy and the reinstatement of the constitution, and they deployed images of a constitutional Japan with an enlightened monarch to frame these arguments. In short, their new ideology challenging Western imperial and ontological hegemony also involved the removal of the Sultan as the political object around which to elicit loyalty and service in the name of the Empire. The modern, “Eastern,” constitutional polity itself that the Young Turks were envisioning and that Japan symbolized replaced the Ottoman Sultan as the unifying object.

The Young Turk movement drew a very important principle from Le Bon and his contemporaries from which to argue for the installation of a new regime: they desired to establish themselves as the Western-educated, elite intellectual aristocracy that would guide the Ottoman masses into modernity. Ottoman society was conceived as “...a pyramid; the base of that pyramid was made of masses called *peuple*, and the top was composed of the class of intelligentsia.”⁹⁰ Deeming the Ottoman populace too uneducated, too ignorant, and generally unready for a say in political affairs, the Young Turks considered parliamentary representative government dangerous in the hands of the masses in a diverse society such as the Ottoman Empire. Yet Sultan Abdülhamid II’s absolutism, confirmed by his suspension of the constitution in 1878, required the Young Turk opposition to demand whatever was antithetical to his regime at the time. Constitutional government was not merely a popular current that, according to Western philosophy, in part indicated the degree to which a nation was “civilized”; the Young Turks’ version of constitutionalism certainly would be capable of guaranteeing their position as the higher echelon of government while imposing limitations upon the Sultan’s autocratic rule. And for this reason the model of Japan further appealed to the Young Turks. Japan appeared to have cultivated a similar elite intelligentsia, the Meiji *genrōin*, who surrounded the

Japanese Emperor, who had conducted the successful revolution, modernized the state and nation, and established a constitutional monarchy. Japan was the apex of Young Turk philosophical, political, and national aspirations.

The Young Turk exile Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, one of the original founders of the secret CUP organized in 1889, criticized the Ottoman ruling class for not carrying out their duties as educators of the nation, stressing the drastic difference between Japanese administrators and Ottoman bureaucrats in their service to their respective homelands. Objecting to individuals surrounding the Ottoman Sultan or those in powerful government positions whose corruptive influence had weakened the Empire, he wrote enthusiastically:

Japan sent twenty thousand students all at once to Europe and America in the first stage of its awakening. It is no joke, twenty thousand I say! Upon returning to their country, these twenty thousand students brought about prosperity and organization as [though they were] miracle-workers. We want with all sincerity and humility to bring this twenty thousand number to the attention of our Ministers of Education, Public Works, Finance, Forestry, War, Navy, Agriculture, and Postal-Telegraph-Telephone, and especially to their fathers who possess wealth and zeal.⁹¹

Abdullah Cevdet reproached the endemic patronage system in the Empire that corrupted the Ottoman administration by installing incompetent people in certain government offices: “fathers who possess wealth and zeal” undoubtedly was both an insult to those officials whose well-connected fathers had obtained positions for them, and a plea for these fathers to send their sons abroad to study, as their earnest (and affordable) duty to the homeland. While channeling his criticism into an argument supporting modern education, Abdullah Cevdet implied the need to replicate the Japanese state’s actions in producing capable statesmen by sending student missions overseas to study Western science and technology. It was a choice that the Ottoman state should recognize and act upon; a new elite composed of European-educated intellectuals should form the Ottoman administrative core.

In contrast to the Hamidian state’s severe censorship of information concerning the Russo-Japanese War for fear of its potentially suggestive messages for the reading audience (especially concerning constitutionalism), the Young Turk press in the Balkans and in exile in Paris, Geneva, and Cairo persistently presented their interpretations of the Russo-Japanese conflict through the lens of the ideological perspective described above. Their sociogeographic position as Eastern exiles in Europe placed them between two worlds: they had access to Western philosophies, science and technology; those resident in Europe were keenly aware of the ontological division between East and West and were often frustrated by its implications. But, despite temptation to identify with the “superior” races because of their own elite status, having been directly subject to the West’s view of the East as inferior, they did not sympathize with the rampant paranoia of “Yellow Peril” emerging in Europe about Japan. In

fact while arguing for the preservation of Ottoman integrity amid European threats to the Empire's continued existence, the Young Turks utilized the example of the Japanese, one of Le Bon's "average races," and Japan's pursuit of rational science, to alter the conclusions within his framework about the fate of the Turkish race.⁹² As *Şûra-yı Ümmet* put it in late 1904,

Some Europeans and some Ottomans who imitate whatever they see without understanding, consider us a race in the lower part of the racial hierarchy. Let us say it in plain Turkish: they regard the Turks as second class human beings. Japanese people, being of the stock of the yellow race, are annihilating the slander against nature with the progress in their country and with their cannons and rifles in Manchuria.⁹³

The Young Turks' sincere solidarity with the Japanese nation was made clear by a communiqué from the Ottoman Consulate in Geneva reporting on the activities of Abdullah Cevdet's group there, explaining their pro-Japanese sentiments during the war in East Asia. It read as follows: "I am hurrying to submit information that I just received, that all the Young Turks here sent a telegraph out to the Japanese Emperor via the ambassador in Paris, containing congratulations for the seizure of Port Arthur by the Japanese."⁹⁴ The Young Turk paper *Bâlkân* also expressed pleasure at the Russian defeat and hoped it was a sign of change in power relations between East and West:

The Turks are quite pleased because of the Russians' war with the Japanese. After this war, the Turks' affection and good will toward the Japanese has grown immensely; for some reason the Turks are rather thrilled at Japanese advances. So much so that they hope in the future the Japanese will retaliate greatly against governments such as Russia, that have provoked Muslims.⁹⁵

The Young Turks did not reject racial theory, but instead believed the Russo-Japanese War had reordered these assumptions. In fact, Turkish nationalists' emphasis on race in subsequent years as a major determinant of identity gained its momentum during and immediately after this war, when "... the Young Turks commented upon this event as 'destroying the ideas that for centuries saw Asians as the inferior race of humans.'"⁹⁶ In Paris, the Young Turk paper *Şûra-yı Ümmet* claimed inversion of the hierarchy was at hand, since "... the Japanese have severely wounded Russia's Far East fleet..." so

the Far East, against the eyes of a bewildered [Western] world that is bent upon itself, is manifesting such fiery crimson pictures, such bloody images, representing the setting of the might and glory of a great state in the north! With strength and power, with armed resistance against the tyranny of occupation, with grandeur and intimidation, today, as if flames poured out upon the horizon from the far reaches of the East, a sun rises by the name of Japan!⁹⁷

Repeatedly, Young Turk journalists extolled Japan as it battled mammoth Russia, disproving for them the Orientalist claim of Eastern inferiority. Ahmed Rıza, the Positivist, antireligious Young Turk leader in Paris, often used Japan in his *Mechveret Supplément Français* to his Ottoman bi-monthly paper *Meşveret* to turn upside-down the racial hierarchy that placed Asians on the bottom rung:

Appetized by the potential result, Russia, “advanced sentry of Christian civilization,” wanted alone to conduct...a peaceful penetration into Manchuria. Now, it happened that the Japanese, these other barbarians, these poor primitive enlistees into the inferiority of their race, had the audacity to block the path of the monster of the North. The amazement was universal. Why! Was it not conceded that, if Japan wanted to lodge bullets in the skin, this was a new thing for it to be permitted to do, in the European mold.⁹⁸

Ahmed Rıza’s editorials revealed not only his satisfaction over the Japanese upheaval of the racial hierarchy, but also his condemnation of European imperialist actions. His scientific rationalism had no place for religion, Islam or Christianity.

Despite obstacles thrown before it, Ahmed Rıza saw Japan evolving rationally into a modern, patriotic nation, one more logical than and thus superior to any in Europe. He was in awe of Japan’s ability to dumbfound Europe and their single-minded notions of an Oriental Japan, commenting on it in “Turquie et Japon”:

What an imposing spectacle—and at the same time heartrending for our patriotism—that is what we are offered by Japan! Behold a people that, fifty years past was considered a horde of noble savages, at most exciting the literary curiosity of some eccentric writers. Europe assessed their vases, their fans and their silks in fanciful drawings. And that was rather about all. Now, silently, in the fever of a lofty national conception and nobly ambitious aspirations, a magnificent evolution is at work. Bounding ahead so to speak, this people found its way through the disdain or the simple arrogance of the Western Powers and reached the level of modern civilization. This miracle was owing to the extraordinary will of the Japanese to be counted among the Great Powers from three points of view: intellectual, commercial, and military.⁹⁹

The aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War signified the continued hypocrisy of the Western world, however, and the irrationality of a paradigm placing Europe into the category of “superior.” The emphasis Ahmed Rıza placed on race as the determining factor in characterizing peoples was distinctly pointed out in this passage expressing his disappointment in the West:

The military successes of Japan served to expose to the world not only the incapacity, the wounds, the vices, and the indignities of the Czar’s

administration, but also the state of mind of Russia in general. The famous Russian writer Tolstoy goes further: "The Japanese victory," he wrote, "showed in a most evident way, not only to Russia but to the whole Christian world, all of the worthlessness of external [appearances of] civilization of which the Christian peoples are so proud..." In the end, nothing will be changed. The politics the Western Powers will pursue, as has happened before, works for the abstraction of truth, morality, and justice. Europe was not unaware of the intellectual and moral superiority of Japan before the war. . . . What is curious and at the same time terrible in this political movement is that the "superior" race looks to be displeased when an "inferior" race marches against a monster in the way of progress. How to explain the pretension of Europe, then, of wanting to civilize Asia, since, when a people of these regions endeavors to raise itself, [Europe] condemns it immediately as a "peril" of such and such color?¹⁰⁰

Furthermore, Rıza went on, after the war the United States and the European powers collaborated with an evil intent—to hamper Japan's advance with the Treaty of Portsmouth.¹⁰¹ Not only had Japan proven its civility and progress in this conflict, it also had shown the West's true nature as an opportunistic aggressor. Closer to home, Rıza scoffed at the notion that Russia, as a member of the Christian "civilized" world, would be so arrogant as to think it could maintain this falsity and inflict its status upon an "inferior" people, because

...as Ottomans, our appreciation doubles with this valuable observation: that the Russo-Japanese campaigns have awakened us to the moral, intellectual and political disorganization of the Czar's government, this government that had presumed to come in order to civilize us.¹⁰²

How did the Japanese actively manage to turn this conception of East as inferior and West as superior upside-down? How did they achieve at least a semblance of newfound "equality" with Europe that was eventually expected to reverse the fortunes of Asians? Some exiled Young Turks attributed Japan's success to its ability to maintain its isolation.¹⁰³

Typically, the Young Turks mapped Japan's achievements onto their perceptions of what modernity implied, whether that be a racial conception of identity, or a secular, rationalist view of modern nationhood. To some exiles, Japan's Darwinist utilitarian approach to the world showed itself through the use of science and technology to oppose antiquated beliefs in empires and religions, so that "one could say without exaggeration that in the Russo-Japanese war, it was depravity, religious hatred, the holy spirits of bishops, and the arrogance of czarism that fought [and was] breached by virtue, love, scientific spirit, and constitutional organization."¹⁰⁴ In fact Ahmed Rıza, clearly influenced by Positivism and Le Bon's hypothesis of a people's energy and perseverance yielding their particular destiny, argued that Japan's scientific pragmatism was based on its people's moral character:

The so-called inferior yellow race has demonstrated its superiority and its aptitude for progress...the Japanese army, whose equipment and sanitary services were admirably organized with method and without invocations to idols, achieved victories by a series of operations scientifically conceived so as not to have anything to disentangle from celestial mediation.... It is acceptable to add that the Japanese likewise owe their glory to the passionate cult of honor and of the homeland.... The astonishing modesty that they showed in their triumph is again an indication of their moral superiority.¹⁰⁵

To Young Turk exiles increasingly enamored with ideas of nationalism and love of homeland, Japan's moral character was intimately connected to the execution of patriotic duty. For some Young Turk activists who still adhered to the notion of Ottomanism as a national ideology, such as Abdullah Cevdet (at least during the era of the Russo-Japanese War), sectarian strife that inhibited solidarity implied a failure to carry out one's service for the homeland. His journal *İctihâd* censured Ottoman society:

If the Japanese had seen in us a bit of life, a bit of self-respect, a little patriotism (*hubb-i vatan*), and an inkling of progress, they would not have delayed in inviting us into a defensive and offensive union. How could we, the Ottoman nation (*millet*) that could not unite its own races, have convoked a unity with the Japanese? The Armenian, the Kurd, the Arab, the Maronite, we are busy slaughtering each other in every corner of the empire.¹⁰⁶

Ottoman disunity led to a lack of patriotism and progress according to Abdullah Cevdet, so much so he believed that the Japanese refused to sign a pact with the Ottomans. However, other Young Turk exiles such as the contributors to the nationalist organ of the Young Turks in Cairo, *Türk*, began considering a more restricted definition of the Empire as a Turkish nation; they also idealized the Japanese nation-state,

...in all [its] natural disposition and knowledge a homogenous people that from end to end is touched by the same sentiments, pursues the same hopes. They love the homeland, with zeal fall victim for the sake of the homeland, in an instant they sacrifice lives for honor and dignity, lives that they sincerely loved and appreciated. They never fear death.¹⁰⁷

This the Japanese demonstrated in war, unlike the Russian soldier:

Compare these moral failings of the Russians with the stoic suicide of the Japanese in the presence of a duty of honor... Compare this admirable Japanese understanding for the good and the grandeur of the shared homeland with the complete absence of self-esteem and patriotism of the armed Russian!¹⁰⁸

But it is not the Russian who should take heed. In a plea to Ottoman citizens to act patriotically as Japan has, *Şûra-yı Ümmet* warned of the dangers to the Empire and its only salvation:

We should take note of Japan, this nation which has become rivals with the Great Powers in thirty to forty years. One should pay attention to that—that a nation not separating patriotic public spirit and the good of the homeland from its life is surely such that [though] sustaining wounds, setting against any type of danger that threatens its existence, it certainly preserves its national independence. The Japanese successes of Port Arthur... are a product of this patriotic zeal. Behold, the fruits of [Japanese] zeal are such that while the Russians had been third among nations in terms of navy, their defeats erased them from among the number of great naval states.¹⁰⁹

Abdullah Cevdet considered the patriotism of the Japanese a direct result of their freedom and willingness to protect it. His choice of words insinuated his desire to see government guarantee individual rights:

The Japanese are fighting for a country where they are free, where they do their part for sovereignty by means of universal suffrage. The Japanese see their national existence endangered by a Russian invasion... when the Japanese government needs a hundred men prepared to sacrifice themselves for the cause of liberating the country, it finds a million.... The Japanese have the satisfaction of having accomplished their duty and defended their legitimate and sacred rights. We send them all our sincere wishes for their success before too much blood spills on either side.¹¹⁰

The Young Turks respected constitutional government as Japan had established, whether or not they realistically intended to implement true democracy in their future Ottoman state. As mentioned earlier, constitutionalism was understood to beget civilization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In Japan's case, its elevated political position and even its victories in wartime were ascribed to their democratic process:

With a dreadful and perfect naval fleet and an army that waits and studies... They are included among the numerous advanced and civilized European states. Amazing! They understood that a nation's Parliament and Senate, which are its felicitous palace, are the ideas that make entrance into the world of perfection and progress conditional. After the establishment of these parliamentary houses, they moved forward on the path of progress with a different ardor, a new haste.¹¹¹

In this respect, Japan's conflict with Russia in 1904–1905 was viewed as the collision between Japan's rational, constitutional rule by law and the

arbitrariness of Czarist absolutism. The outcome would teach the whole world a lesson:

The Japanese victory will give the Russians a more glorious victory than theirs. Our eminent colleague of Cairo, *Arafat*, in an article entitled "Japan and Its Influence in the World," expressed the same opinion. It reasoned: "Japan rendered a service to all nations by this war, beginning with the Russian nation herself. Later, when the Muscovites see themselves auspicious and progressive they will give thanks to the Rising Sun for awakening them and for chastising them back onto the right path." We feel a deep joy in seeing our neighbors, the Russians, finally bravely crushing autocracy, in order to claim their rights of men.¹¹²

This was the most powerful and threatening point around which the exiled Young Turk political activists argued coherently for the removal of the Sultan's regime. For the Young Turks, thrilled at the prospect of Japan defeating a Western power, the most dangerous enemy for the Ottoman Empire was no longer Russia. *Şûra-yı Ümmet* warned,

Turks and all Ottomans, do not forget that the enemy of your life, the enemy of your future is that calamitous evil that destroys the homes of your *patrie*, your land, putting confidence in this deceptive duplicity and intrigue more so than in force of arms. Because like the Japanese, forced to take up arms when necessary, if we do not learn what it is to "taste of the homeland," we must know well that we will be condemned afterwards to be servants, captives, or slaves. It is by our cry of "homeland" every day that makes [patriotic] affection everlasting in our hearts, preventing this captivity. . . . Knowing well that the enemy that pretends to be one of us, that gnaws at the homeland, is inside, in the palace, more than it is abroad, let us cooperate and strive together just for the sake of our country, like the Japanese.¹¹³

The Sultan himself threatened the sanctity of the Ottoman homeland; Abdülhamid II's tyranny was to blame for the lack of patriotism in Ottoman lands. Therefore, urged Young Turk writers, to act like Japanese patriots, Ottoman citizens had to resist the temptation of trusting in his absolutist rule. It was a call for a Meiji Restoration in Ottoman lands.

Young Turk journalists wasted no time in drawing parallels between the Russian Czar and the Ottoman Sultan in the wake of the Russo-Japanese conflict. In "Leçons Japonaises," the Japanese were heralded as challengers to Western ontological hegemony, they transported modern civilization to other parts of Asia,¹¹⁴ they upheld constitutional principles; they were the standard by which the Ottomans should measure themselves. After explaining the unavoidable similarities between the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Russian Czar Nicolas II (who was then hiding in his palace from

revolutionaries), both of whom reigned with “irreducible autocracy, whimsically with morbid jumpiness, corruption, spy networks, serfdom, and massacres,” the author commended Japan for its achievements:

While the despot of Turkey and the despot of Russia tremble and hide, fearing the anger that they themselves have ignited in the hearts of their subjects, it has come to pass in the Far East among this admirable people that, like the Turks, have been treated...as barbarians...the Japanese tended to develop in all the Far East their material and moral influences, “to make themselves the guardians, otherwise the masters, of the yellow world...” And that is how one has to see this vast intellectual and moral organization, so that putting aside the theory of “yellow peril” as a brutal form of military threat against Europe, one is led to consider as a *fait accompli* that every day the hand Japan has placed on the whole of Oriental Asia becomes more worthy of attention...Behold the work of these barbarians...they whose civilization, achieved in half a century, has become superior to European civilization which has fallen into decay; they who do not have to reproach massacres, who do not have to gag any mouths out of which a liberal word came, who do not have to exile or suppress patriots, who do not have to dynamite any human beings under the pretext that their skin was dark and that it constituted a happy pastime!¹¹⁵

The author went on to praise Japan’s secular, constitutional government with one last piece of advice for “Ottoman patriots”—that they strive for the same goal and recognize “the absolute necessity for the poor Turkish people that Hamidian terrorism be plunged into the mire.”¹¹⁶ This passage represented the distinct ideological underpinnings of the Young Turk movement: utilizing the racial categorization of “yellow” to describe the Japanese and placing Turks on the same level as “barbarians,” the author then hailed Japan’s modernizing mission in East Asia (generally ignoring Japan’s imperialist actions there), reminding the readers again that the Russian Czar, who was called a “despot” like the ruler in Ottoman Turkey, had attempted to impede Japan’s progress. But the Japanese could not be stopped; their civilization in fact had now surpassed that of Europe. In an evolutionary fashion not dependent upon religious faith, Japanese modernity echoed the scientific rationalist philosophy to which the Young Turks so strongly adhered. And why had this occurred? Because constitutionalism had prevailed over Japanese society, a situation that the Empire could also secure, if only Ottoman patriots could depose Sultan Abdülhamid II. This kind of plea, built around a discussion of Japanese success, encompassing all the different aspects of Young Turk ideology, and ultimately imploring the Ottoman populace to rid itself of a despotic Sultan, appeared again and again in the pages of *Mechveret Supplément Français*, *İctihâd*, *Şûra-yı Ümmet*, and *Türk*. The oppositional Young Turk press claimed that the Sultan was so keenly aware of the dangers to himself of allowing too much exposure to events of the war that

... a decree was dictated to the newspapermen in Turkey in order that they not discuss the subject of the siege of Port Arthur by the Japanese. It is rather easy to understand what this means: Japan is a free and freedom-loving people; every free and just individual or people is the enemy of Abdülhamid II, who is freedom and justice's enemy.¹¹⁷

Şûra-yı Ümmet blamed the Sultan in a tirade against imperial mismanagement and stagnation in the face of the modern world:

It is Abdülhamid who has removed us from the English alliance. Abdülhamid is preparing us for Russian captivity. Is our ability for progress [so] worthless I wonder? Are we a human race inferior to the yellow race? Among the many various peoples in the lands that we have conquered up to now, because we stopped like a sentry whose senses are heightened by the smallest cry in reaction to enemies' attacks, we failed to progress in the sciences and industries. Additionally, at one time our great Sultans and great leaders came forth with the wisdom of administration and military sciences. Our exalted architects, our poets, and our littérateurs flourished. Today, our literature is more progressive than Japan's current literature! We would like to say that Japan exists because of our example, so that if there was a Sultan that in our minds possessed a good, firm resolve, a love of homeland, and a magnificent patriotic spirit, if there had been leadership in our administration, masters in conscience and the knowledge of spirit, then we, like the Japanese, would have advanced. We would not have despaired of our progress.¹¹⁸

The author ended the essay with the hope that the Ottoman Empire could be saved from Abdülhamid II.

The sentiments of Ahmed Rıza toward the West and its ontology, as well as toward the Ottoman Empire in its struggle against an autocratic Sultan, all melded together in "Turquie et Japon." His article demonstrated how intrinsically intertwined Japanese images were with Young Turk ideas, and how politically forceful the image of Japan could be for the disenfranchised who challenged the Sultan's legitimacy. The Japanese represented for Rıza all that the Ottomans had failed to be: he praised Japanese valor and patriotism in the face of Russian oppression, which "...found the expeditious Japanese prompted to retaliate....All sympathies go out to this people who, for their rightness and renown, drew swords against the enemy without by any means worrying about [Russia's] appellation 'the colossus of the North.'"¹¹⁹ Rıza pondered what had caused the Ottoman Turks to falter. Japan's enemy was an external one, Russia, he reasoned, whereas the Ottoman Empire was decaying from within due to the depravity of Abdülhamid II. The Sultan, autocratic and corruptive like the failing Russian Czar, had silenced patriotic spirit, while the Japanese had progressed into the modern world because of it:

As for this example of vitality and valiance, this lesson of ardent patriotism given by a nation so recently regenerated, what could be the

impression of Sultan Abdülhamid? The question appears naive on our part. But considering the men among the Japanese who lead, how not to wonder about these august Ottoman monarchs, ancestors of the spineless coward who governs us, who knew a powerful and faithful hand, castigating the insolence of those that dared to carry out an attack upon the honor of the homeland? How not to wonder that the people, that the Turkish soldiers themselves remained the same, honest, generous, and brave; that they are ready to defend their country against pirates, bandits, and excessive desire for wealth, if a strong and respected leader gave them the legitimate signal? While this [Ottoman] people, this army, has only at their head one for which unmentionable sacrificing is all for his immeasurable selfishness. While thanks to the cowardice of its ruler the Empire is torturing itself, it is in tatters; the tiniest threat of a [foreign] Power makes us turn pale; there are not worse humiliations to which we have yet to be subjected in order not to trouble the digestion of such a sovereign. One has only to want: we yield. One has only to tender the hand: we give. The awful despotism of Abdulhamid has reduced us to the state of a nation of ghosts whose sons are no longer even held by him, but by some foreign hands.¹²⁰

Japan had boldly challenged the Western penetration of Asia when it saw "... its independence and the security of its vital interests in the Far East positively threatened" due to its constitutional monarchy and capable statesmen surrounding the Emperor.¹²¹ In contrast, Abdülhamid II had exiled those Ottoman patriots who promoted a constitution so that there was no defense against Western intrusion:

And while the cannon thunders over there, the Japanese steadily torpedoing and demolishing the fleet of their enemies, here in our empire, the work of destruction continues by us and against us. The reason for this is very simple: all those that cherished their country and had demonstrated this love were eliminated, struck down by ostracism, or in part by annihilation. Indeed, the depletion of patriots—the hope and shield of the Homeland—is frightening. Those who pronounce the word Constitution—this Constitution which is precisely what made Japan what it is today—understand; some who start to voice themselves are muted and disappear. Officials, officers, and *softas* suspected of some liberalism are going to populate the fortified enclosures in faraway provinces. The hand which makes a gesture of impatience is wrenched; the voice who whispers a truth is suppressed; the head who rises up in need of independence is placed into a noose.¹²²

Not only did the Sultan squelch liberty in Ottoman lands, but he allowed himself to be manipulated by greedy palace officials, as opposed to the Meiji leadership surrounding the Japanese Emperor. Rıza tied together Japan's integrity and national prestige as demonstrated during its imbroglio in East Asia with the desolation and dishonor flourishing in Ottoman lands:

In order to continue the cruel parallel between Japan and Turkey, what do we have, as opposed to the devoted men who surround the Mikadō and work with such sincere abnegation [self-denial] to boost the country? A collection of wretched courtiers who, by their speech, their connections, their threats, terrorize the Sultan, hold him in their claws, isolate him in perpetual horror. Why? For him fly money and favors. Now the pain has become chronic, he has gangrene in all his being. Like a leper [with] his wounds, he is made to rot where he lives and outside of it he can no longer survive. And presently, that which he sees in this beautiful and unhappy capital is a deep misery, it is fear, and, upon word of an order coming out of Yıldız Palace, it is abandon, it is all treachery and all depravity. Under this cursed regime, it is the terrible recession into chaos.¹²³

Rıza finished his essay with an explanation of the mission of the Young Turks in exile and their patriotic struggle against the oppressive Sultan:

As for some of those patriots that death spared, they had to leave the native soil, and from afar, as they had done of near, they put their devotion and their tireless activity into the service of Turkey and, with the aid of pen and deed, say to Ottoman people by what means, by what efforts can they reconquer the Constitution of 1876? which is their sole salvation. At the moment, their voices may be covered by the clamors of battles and the deaf growl of the political recluse... What matters? They acted for us, upholding good, and good will be upheld. Because we do not believe in deceiving ourselves of the assurance that the Ottomans following the tragic events unwinding in the Far East with an avid interest—and it is never too late to do good—will find superiority [enough] to induce revolt in the presence of all the acts of banditry that are perpetrated in Turkey, against Turkey, permitting the suffocation of their patriotic cry! Note this happy symptom, and encourage it.¹²⁴

In the midst of what the Young Turks considered to be a threefold threat—the breakdown of Ottoman unity, foreign encroachment, and the absolutism of the Sultan's regime, the Japanese nation represented the appropriate three-sided modern response. Ottoman unity could be reestablished through a form of anticolonial, pan-Asian nationalism, or solidarity with other Eastern nations based upon an understanding of modern progress as a component of Eastern identity. This modernity incorporated the assimilation of Eastern culture and Western science through an elite-guided process, whereby the Young Turks would predominate as the Meiji oligarchy had. It also required an Ottoman society administered according to constitutional principles, like Japan. For the Young Turks who implicitly accepted the ontological division of East and West as fact, Japan altered the power balance in the hierarchy through science and war, assuming the superior position to Europe and paving the way for a possible Ottoman regeneration. Japan's force as a social, cultural, administrative, military, and intellectual model mediated between the Ottoman state,

Ottoman civil society, and the Young Turk opposition. But for the politically excluded Young Turks, the greatest obstacle to achieving rebirth as a modern, independent Ottoman polity based upon patriotism, science, and progress was the oppression of an autocratic Sultan. The Young Turk conception of a rejuvenated Ottoman nation rejected the former political system that gave the Sultan arbitrary power; Ottoman modernity was contingent upon his removal from office so that state and society could be reformed and reorganized along a constitutional basis.

Great Escape: “Sick Man of Europe” to “Japan of the Near East”

Witnessing the breakdown of Islamic unity in Ottoman lands and European occupation of Ottoman territories prior to 1908, the Young Turks intended with their revolution in July 1908 to restore the 1876 Ottoman constitution and to halt the dissolution of the empire. With the reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution and Ottoman society’s subsequent optimism about achieving a more egalitarian system, the Young Turks were now expected to put parliamentary government into practice. Shortly after the revolution, many authors and intellectuals commented upon Japan’s successes not necessarily as a critique of the regime, since Abdülhamid II had been deposed by 1909, but as a nation the Ottoman Empire could now realistically pattern itself after. The means of government were often the components of the Japanese state that most interested writers encouraging reform and modernization of the Ottoman system.

The Young Turks who launched the coup saw themselves in a new light after having successfully carried it out, as saviors of the empire, whose abilities paralleled those of Meiji statesmen propelling the Japanese people into the modern world. Aware of the Ottoman Empire’s ill-fated position as the “Sick Man of Europe,” the Young Turk leadership had to find a solution to their chronic dilemma with the West: How could they release the empire from its status as an inferior, transforming it into a powerful nation that would be accepted as equal by the Concert of Europe? In accepting the precepts of European scientific thought, the Young Turks had embraced the binary of East and West that located them conceptually outside Europe even though as Ottomans they were physically somewhat a part of it; a long though primarily antagonistic history with Europe sustained their link to it so that they were compelled to think of the empire’s survival in terms of operating within this ontological dynamic with the West. Rational, Social Darwinist evolution then dictated a synthesis of the two spheres of civilization, East and West, as the only means of escape for the Ottomans. Japan had demonstrated what was incumbent upon the Ottoman Empire (or any other “Eastern,” or “outside” nation) to reverse the order, and to reach this form of modernity. The Young Turks’ goal was to recreate Ottoman society in the same mold of a secular, independent, constitutional, and capitalist nation-state. As historian Feroz Ahmad explained, they hoped to

...rejuvenate and transform Ottoman society so as to make the Empire accepted as an equal by the Great Powers. . . . Internally, that meant converting the Empire from the status of a semi-colony controlled and exploited

by the European Powers, to a sovereign capitalist state, exploiting its own imperial resources for its own benefit.¹²⁵

This goal in part required abrogating the long-standing Capitulations that granted European powers economic concessions. The postrevolution leadership came to consist of powerful elites in the CUP whose goals included maintaining their positions as policy makers for an independent Ottoman Empire and who addressed issues of social reform, technical modernization, and capitalist development. Hanioglu labeled some of these elites the *Garbçilar*, the extreme “Westernizers” of the second Ottoman constitutional period, whose new religion was science and whose new morality was based upon Samuel Smiles’s *Self-Help* doctrine.¹²⁶ For them, Japan emerged at the turn of the century as the tangible example of what was possible; revision of Unequal Treaties (similar to the Ottoman Capitulations) and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 was their proof. While still sensing the patronizing European attitudes toward Ottomans as inferiors, the Young Turk Unionists argued that the hierarchy had been reversed by Japan. Unionist initiatives were to resemble Japan’s choices as a way for the CUP to resist Western involvement in the empire, as well as to counter criticism by the internal opposition against their leadership.

When Austria-Hungary annexed Ottoman Bosnia-Herzegovina in September 1908, the Ottomans responded with a boycott. The Unionists turned initially to Britain for support, hoping that they could play one power off against another and eventually negotiate more economic autonomy for the Ottoman Empire. With this in mind, Young Turk leaders Ahmed Rıza and Dr. Nâzım traveled to London to offer an alliance to Britain, citing the Anglo-Japanese alliance as precedent. The British politely refused, but the two CUP officials argued their position to Sir Edward Grey with an expression that injected commanding new cultural-political meaning into the Young Turk Unionist conception of the Ottoman Empire. Grey’s private letter to his colleague is where we find Rıza and Nâzım uttering their memorable metaphor comparing themselves and the Japanese. This was Grey’s response to the offer:

Our habit was to keep our hands free, though we made ententes and friendships. It was true that we had an alliance with Japan, but it was limited to certain distant questions in the Far East. They replied that *Turkey was the Japan of the Near East*, and that we already had the Cyprus Convention with Turkey which was still in force.¹²⁷ (emphasis mine)

Japan had formerly been considered the Eastern nation that had exhibited patriotic zeal, high moral character, and had thoroughly adopted Western science and technology to rapidly modernize and reform state and society. As a result, the Japanese became equals with the European powers, a status to which the Ottoman state aspired, as it was considered synonymous with reaching modernity.¹²⁸ In the eyes of Young Turks desperate to escape the stigma of the country being called “the Sick Man of Europe” and to carve out their own sovereignty, Japan had also become a direct analogy for modern Ottoman Turkey. Japan protected its economic interests and developed a capitalist state structure the Unionists desired in Ottoman lands. They believed

their empire to be well on the way, only needing European acceptance of this fact to confirm the validity of their new state enterprise. Previously, Japan had represented the abstract hope of Ottoman potential to acquire modern civilization. Japan was now symbolic of a modern and secular capitalist state whose institutions and policies could be upheld by law and by force. To be the "Japan of the Near East" meant to be an independent, militarily strong, economically viable Ottoman polity. By 1914, according to *Tercümân-ı Hakikat*, to be the "Japan of the Near East" referred to the capacity to exert Ottoman strength in the Middle East during wartime just as Japan had done when it seized the opportunity provided by the First World War to consolidate its position in East Asia. Forcing Germany to abandon its possessions in China, "who can say when Japan will do the same to France and England?" read the hopeful article "Orient for the Orientals."¹²⁹

Japan's increasing economic growth as well as its rivalries with Europe and the United States in commercial markets were observed as symbols for the Asian challenge to Western economic and political hegemony. In the midst of the Ottoman Empire's political difficulties with Europe at this time, and in light of internal tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in the empire that occasionally surfaced as economic boycotts, economic might demonstrated political sovereignty; this was duly noted by those who hoped to solve Ottoman problems with the West through learning economic lessons from Japan.¹³⁰ As Ahmed Münir (Abdürreşid İbrahim's son) wrote in *Sebîlürreşât* in 1914, "foreign trade is the means of prosperity for nations; how greatly a nation is engulfed by the desire for foreign trade is proportional to how wealthy and prosperous [its] life becomes."¹³¹ Münir then added, "Despite occupying such an important geographical position, this lowly situation in which we find ourselves is so painful, so sad and troubled a condition... we do not want to go forward. We are afraid of venturing out."¹³²

Ottoman writers in the postrevolution empire noted Japan's status as a Great Power and advised either modernizing along Western lines as Japan had done, or employing Japan directly in the Ottoman Empire in order to achieve modernity. Japan was a competing power in the world of colonial politics, and the Eastern nation who kept Russia occupied so that it was less involved in the Balkans.¹³³ Shortly after the 1908 revolution, CUP constitutionalists were hopeful and looked to Japan to lead the way in modernizing the empire:

While living under a corrupt administration like ours, embarking upon the path of modernization and reform, my eyes look around at the systems that have been favored by the nations who have accepted a constitutional administration and who have adapted all national endeavors, in short, the military, education, commerce, and industry, to conform to the requirements of modern-day civilization, and far in front I see Japan. Japan has prepared the basis of today's strength and might thanks to European instructors. Japan accepted Europe's civilizational organizations and in order to apply and enact these institutions, brought in European teachers; they strived; today they no longer have a need for instructors. Now in some matters they themselves have become the teachers. Here we have a beautiful example.¹³⁴

The Japanese themselves should be mentors for the Ottoman Empire argued some newspapers, because of their skill and experience, and their relative political neutrality in Ottoman affairs. Foreign advisors were necessary to reform the various Ottoman ministries (Finance, Public Works, Navy, and Army) to ensure survival in the modern world; reform initiatives could not merely rely upon national zeal. But British consultants had been detrimental to the Ottoman navy. Allowing Germany to advise the army could also be harmful. Foreign advisors should be selected from

...among the states in the world in which no possibility exists at all of going to war with the Ottomans, for example would it be difficult economically to attract engineers from Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, and Holland? If we were able to bring in two scientifically learned naval officers from Japan, would it not render service? They should be paid for their services.¹³⁵

Better yet, wrote Abdullah Cevdet in 1910, "let us send to Tokyo a few of the youths who were sent to Europe in order to complete their studies."¹³⁶ The Unionist *Tanin* agreed in 1911, recommending that Japan's sea trade be studied at close range in order to understand how it had succeeded in the competitive global economy. It was a crucial issue for the CUP, eager to establish an independent, capitalist state:

We want to demonstrate speed and a lofty grandeur as much as the Japanese... we have to strive to understand the facts, the reasons behind their progresses, following closely how the Japanese pursued a particular line of action. But we think that in order to be able to assure the benefits of inquiries we will carry out... it is necessary to delve deeply into truth, and, not being content with external appearances, to keep our eyes on the particular conditions of the two countries, their abilities and histories.¹³⁷

There were vast differences between Ottoman Turkey and Japan, *Tanin* reminded readers; "the Japanese were a backward nation" who until recently lived an isolated life, insulated from the rest of the world.¹³⁸ Claiming the Ottoman Empire had also been backward, the author explained the disparity:

Fearing the danger that our homeland encountered, new principles of administration were brought into existence by us. But... to hope that we would make our politics develop to the utmost in such a short period of time as the Japanese is to plunge into the imaginary a bit, because the conditions and circumstances that assured the Japanese of success do not exist in our lands.¹³⁹

The Ottomans needed to send students to study abroad in order to develop and expand modern industries such as railroads, shipyards, mining, medical instruments, and other manufacturing because,

Industry made modern civilization. Without industry neither a single human life nor a nation's life can remain. . . . Unless industry advances, people cannot be civilized. Therefore, in order for us to become more civilized, we must study industry. And we must learn the principles of manufacturing with machine technology, like the Europeans or the Americans. In the end the industry-less nation cannot become prosperous, cannot advance, cannot live.¹⁴⁰

Japan had, through its people's character, managed to gain the respect of the West, and it had equaled them industrially, guaranteeing the wealth and prosperity of the Japanese nation. Japan was now the teacher for the next student of modern civilization, the Ottoman.

What was different in Ottoman lands? In Japan the ideological, administrative, and social revolution was conducted by enlightened young modernizing leaders such as Prince Itō, but "the Emperor showed true support for them," so that they could prepare the nation for the inauguration and smooth operation of a parliamentary system:

Behold, Japan's reforms were carried out in this manner. In a country administrated with absolutism, if statesmen who are in a supreme position with the sovereign want to initiate reforms and carry out modernization, they will be able to apply these in a manner a thousand times easier in a constitutional era. If only Abdülhamid's reign had not been an era of tyranny and oppression, if it had been one of preparations for a constitution, today, three years-worth of constitutionalism would have yielded more other kinds of results.¹⁴¹

A CUP paper, *Tanin* argued that it was the previous Hamidian regime's fault for the current lack of progress in Ottoman lands. What the author perceived as the Sultan's tyrannical resistance to modern methods (as a threat to his power) contrasted with the intelligent sensitivity of Japanese Emperor Mutsuhito, who, "not deviating from paying attention to national customs, started to accept European and American civilization and advancements."¹⁴² He set the tone for the entire Japanese nation. Japan abrogated former administrative practices and then began a process of reform that included using French and German officers to retrain the army along the lines of the German military; Japan sent officers to Europe and America for training; medical technology was studied in Germany as well.¹⁴³ Shipyards, universities, and schools were established. A constitution was promulgated, parliamentary houses were opened, representatives were elected. The Japanese merely adapted modern methods to meet their nation's needs "...because they attach the most importance to practical applications of science and technology, never giving much consideration to the ideas and knowledge with which Europeans alter philosophy."¹⁴⁴ This, the author attributed to Japan's patriotic tendency throughout history to view every foreigner as the enemy, and outside influences as a possible threat to the nation's welfare.¹⁴⁵

The Unionists contemplated even more direct applications of Japanese political reforms. A confidential report from the German ambassador in

Istanbul to the German Foreign Minister in Berlin in 1910 made it clear that several Ottoman ministries of the Sublime Porte and the Grand Vezir's office concurred in their desire to staff diplomatic posts with capable, multilingual military officers, mimicking Japanese endeavors because the Ottoman statesmen recognized that

...Japan has had very good experiences with this practice....The [Ottoman] War Ministry will name capable and suitable officers for the [diplomatic] missions. If there is a vacant position in an embassy or consulate, either an officer is nominated for this position, or as it happens in Japan, the vacant position is left unfilled until the appropriate military personnel can be selected to do so.¹⁴⁶

Several months earlier, communications between the Ottoman ambassador to France and the Ottoman foreign minister, Rifaat Paşa, highlighted the same point. The ambassador requested that an Ottoman cavalry officer be nominated as a second military attaché to the legation in Paris, because "Germany, Japan, and Romania detach one or several officers for their representatives in France who collaborate with the titular military attaché and assure their service in case of absence."¹⁴⁷ Whether this policy was ever implemented in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry on a larger scale than this particular case, it is significant that Ottoman officials at high levels looked to Japan for ideas on how to staff embassies and consulates.

A financial memo signed by the Ottoman cabinet in 1912 concerning the employment of British advisors in various ministries examined Japan's rates of payment. Pondering "the manner and conditions of employment of advisors from England who have been procured by Japan's government," the Meclis-i Vükelâ reached the following decision:

Because it has been decided basically to employ some people as foreign advisors in the administration, for the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Ministry, the City Trust, the General Security and Police Directorates, and the Commerce Ministry Statistics Office, one specialist advisor for each has been requested from the British government. The annual [pay] by the Japanese government for a British advisor in the Foreign Ministry is two thousand British lira, and for a French advisor employed in the Justice Ministry is two thousand British lira.¹⁴⁸

In both cases Ottoman officials reviewed Japan's choices before embarking upon their own reform path, in order to generate the best means of government for a modernized Eastern nation that would elicit the most favor from the European Concert. The choices Japan had made were considered to be ideal for a modern (Eastern) nation like the Ottoman Empire in the second constitutional period.

6

The Young Turk Regime and the Japanese Model after 1908: “Eastern” Essence, “Western” Science, Ottoman Notions of “Terakkî” and “Medeniyet” (Progress and Civilization)

Whereas the Young Turks had been politically constrained during the Hamidian era, in the postrevolution period the domestic political atmosphere of the Ottoman Empire was charged initially with an air of optimism. Ironically, that sense of Ottoman unity and cooperation did not last for long in CUP circles or in society at large after the reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution. The Young Turks involved in the secret CUP association had, immediately after the revolution, increasingly claimed political power for themselves, to the exclusion of those whose views did not coincide with theirs.¹ The CUP, declared a political party in 1909 but able to control government appointments and policies behind the scenes, alienated many in their midst by seemingly rejecting the Ottomanist conception of empire in favor of a more narrow, secular, elitist, nation-state program of political behavior. Their actions would elicit opposition that was both political and cultural in nature, whether as objections to their monopoly over government positions or to their secularizing orientation as un-Islamic.

The Ottoman Sultan had previously embraced the dual messages of technological modernization and Eastern (Islamic-Ottoman) morality from the model of Japan in the pre-revolutionary era, and the Young Turks had wanted to replicate Japan's manipulation of science and technology that allowed it to reach a new level of national progress respected by Europe and to exert its imperial power in global affairs. Meiji Japan had embodied the essence of a new language of modernity for Sultan Abdülhamid II and his statesmen, for some Islamic modernist reformers in the Ottoman Empire, and for secular, Westernizing elites alike, a pattern that persisted into the Young Turk era. Japanese technological achievements in infrastructure (railroads, postal system, etc.) and industry became increasingly central to the thinking of the Young Turks after the revolution, as the Unionists desired to develop

a modern, capitalist state free from the exploitative Capitulations that had bankrupted the Ottoman state in the late nineteenth century. To progress and acquire modern civilization, peoples outside of Europe believed it necessary to assimilate their native “Easternness” with the most contemporary sciences of the West.

After the Young Turk seizure of power, CUP officials and the Sublime Porte assumed they were embarking upon the same path of progress as the Japanese, reversing the Ottoman place in the civilizational hierarchy, making their exclusion from Great Power status obsolete. They anticipated the empire’s transformation and active involvement in the affairs of Europe. They began to repackage the character of the Ottoman Empire as a modern state to appease European criticisms, to escape their underling class within the European Concert, while seemingly “gravitating East” in a bid to argue that they were emulating Japanese patterns. Their almost total appropriation of the Japanese analogy after 1909 assisted in legitimating their role as the governing elite.

This progression toward “Eastern-inspired Western modernity,” in and of itself, would not generally have been objectionable to the Ottoman populace. Japanese morality as it was compared to Ottoman heritage, however, was defined in disparate ways by the Young Turk Unionists who retained control over the Ottoman state, and by those excluded from power, in the aftermath of the 1909 counterrevolution. To the Unionists, Japanese patriotic spirit, self-sacrifice, and a samurai warrior ethos were what made a constitutional regime and a strong nation achievable. For others in the empire who disliked the secularizing and increasingly Turkist nature of the ruling elite, their objections were raised by using the example of Japanese morality to validate their own demands for the preservation of Islamic character and values in the Ottoman Empire in order to guarantee its survival. Despite divergent viewpoints concerning what constituted the underlying foundation of Ottoman moral and patriotic character, all concurred in the process necessary to cultivate it—the Empire must follow in Japan’s footsteps. None of these possibilities were beyond the reach of the Ottoman Empire, but Ottomans would have to very subtly “move East” to enable them to reach Western modernity. In general, whether Unionist, part of the opposition to the CUP, or somewhere in between, in the aftermath of the 1908 Young Turk revolution, the Japanese nation was the popular referent around which to argue just about any of their political strategies.

Ottoman elites with contradictory domestic political outlooks still encouraged the public to consume a certain metaphor of modern Japan constructed by them in order to elicit activities they deemed beneficial to the empire. Like the Hamidian regime before them, the Unionists sanctioned the dissemination of Japanese sociopolitical patterns as long as these did not threaten their privileged positions as the ruling class or the stability of the Ottoman state. Politically benign images in the Ottoman press and literature in this period included a collection of topics ranging from the Japanese education system to the might of the Japanese armed forces as aspects of Great Power status. Let us look first at which aspects of the Japanese model were emphasized by members of the Ottoman ruling class that could be agreed upon as worthy of emulation by a wider segment of the population, before exploring the discrepancies

manifested concerning what we will call “Ottoman morality,” and how they affected the politics of the Empire in the second constitutional period.

Constitutionalism and Compulsory Education Enable Ottoman Modernity

Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War inspired a discernible shift in the defining characteristics of “Asian” modernity among peoples in the non-West. A front-page article from the Young Turk paper *Bâlkân* published in 1908 attributed the attempted Russian revolution, the opening of Russian parliament (the Duma), and increased freedom of thought in Russia directly to Japan’s victory in the war in 1905. This new freedom was not restricted only to the Slavic Russian population, but was extended to the Muslims of Russia as well, and to Muslims in Iran, Afghanistan, Bukhara, Anatolia, and the Ottoman provinces, so that “... a day will come when not just Japan, but Asia will be the twentieth century’s means of civilization and freedom.”² This optimistic mood was already brewing before 1908 among the opposition to Sultan Abdülhamid II, and was expressed most excitedly in Abdullah Cevdet’s article “Japan Carrier of the Torch” that appeared in his Young Turk opposition journal *İctihâd* in 1905, toward the end of the war:

Japan has become more and more conscious of its high civilizing mission in Asia. Not only does it know to take some fortresses and conquer some regions, it also knows to open some new horizons, a radiant horizon for the minds of Asians bruised by infamous despots and their loathsome obscurity. We read in *The Times* newspaper an excerpt from the speech of Japanese Parliament’s ex-president Okuma. We satisfied ourselves in reproducing the following passage from it: “It is incumbent upon us that we who hold the banner of Asian civilization have the sacred duty of tendering a helping hand to China, to India, to Korea, to all the nations of Asian civilization. They wish us, as their powerful friends, to free them of the yoke that Europe imposed upon them, and to show the world that the Orient can have a confrontation with the West on the battlefields.”

Today it is precisely “measure on the battlefields” which is a measure in the fields of science, industry and in all intellectual domains. We remember a Japanese officer who said something a little like this: “The question of instruction and of education is a hair which is attached to a thousand other things; the teacher is the primary auxiliary of the conqueror, the teacher alone assures and sustains the success of the army.”³

Japan’s impressive military feat, in combination with the reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution in 1908, unleashed a discursive energy and dynamism among Young Turks and others in the empire for ideas about modernization and progress in the East. Japan’s parliamentary system, the benefits of its compulsory education system, its modern industries and infrastructure, and its military might were the primary categories of analysis for Ottoman literati

who hoped to emulate Japanese successes, though the relative importance of these aspects fluctuated over time as the Ottoman geopolitical situation transformed into one of multiple and continuous military crises in its latter years. These notable themes repeated themselves constantly in the sources and were not considered politically threatening to the CUP's control over the empire. Discourse on Japan was to encourage reform and modernization of Ottoman society as the current ruling authorities would conduct it.

For the Unionists who ultimately assumed control after the revolution and reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution, they seemed to no longer need to reiterate the importance of that parliamentary *fait accompli*. Their rhetoric instead shifted from pre-revolutionary demands for constitutional government into discussions of how the next generations need to behave patriotically in order to ensure the Ottoman state could mimic the achievements of the Japanese in the long term. Colonel Pertev Bey (Demirhan), the Ottoman officer stationed in East Asia as an observer, witnessed firsthand episodes in the Russo-Japanese War, and wrote one of the most thorough explorations of how to accomplish this. Even before his dispatch, he recalled in his later memoirs that after the death of his father, his only comfort was the ongoing discussion sessions with his students concerning the siege of Port Arthur; he developed a reputation as an expert on the subject.⁴ After returning from that posting, in 1911 he published *Material and Moral Lessons Taken from the Russo-Japanese War and the Reasons for Japan's Victory: A Nation's Good Fortune from Its Own Power!* in which he focused on material lessons from the war (military strategies, training, and technology) and commented upon the moral essence of the Japanese forces.⁵ Pertev Bey recounted in his book how "...just as Japan's victories had an extraordinary effect of incitement in China, agitation in Iran, and excitement in India and Egypt, it had the effect of freedom and [of] our Constitutional government arising..." as well as how fundamental were a constitution and moral character to creating the possibility for a nation's progress:

The Japanese today, however they choose a path worldwide with their character and moral superiority, we Ottomans, too, in time will move from victory to victory merely because of our character and our moral excellence, and we will have the whole world admiring us. If we want to progress in the field of determination and activity that is open before us because of the Constitution, and, saving our dear homeland from internal and external dangers, to find happiness, before all else we have to bestow an importance upon moral excellence; if nations whose character and morality has been corrupted appear to have the highest material progress, we must be made to see that they are always doomed to perish and become extinct.⁶

More will be said shortly about the importance Ottoman writers placed upon their various versions of "Eastern morality," but for him, the Constitution provided the indispensable political framework for progress.

The recognition of the need for a modern, scientific education program for advancing the interests of the empire was a fundamental characteristic in

common among both Hamidian officials prior to 1908 and for most Ottoman intellectuals after the revolution—though they may have disagreed about how that education platform should best be carried out to produce a generation of skilled and well-trained citizens in the future. The Ottomans already considered the West a valuable source of science, technology, and military strategy; Japan's system of instruction was said to have most successfully assimilated secular Western science. In fact, by 1905, Japan symbolized the best application of the maxim "borrow science and technology from the West in order to defeat it." Nâmik Ekrem, in his Ottoman translation of a work on Japan written around the time of the Russo-Japanese War, described the Japanese education system as having been redesigned along these European lines because "the antecedents for a state's and country's wealth and prosperity are acquired as knowledge is advanced."⁷ Japanese ethical character and morality as it was cultivated in the educational system was assumed to lead to a modernized, sovereign, "Eastern" nation whose rewards included economic growth and expansion, as Ekrem argued in 1906,

Currently the Japanese were not left behind Europeans in any industry... Because the Europeans are our neighbors, we see and hear immediately about their industries, their accomplishments, their advances. Though the Japanese recede into the world's far corner, they work continuously, they discover, they conduct experiments. They benefit themselves the most from the inventions and discoveries which they bring to light due to their determination and their zeal. And in this manner they move forward.⁸

Dialogue on Japan was still shadowed by the knowledge of Europe as neighbor and measuring rod for modernity; the Ottoman state's underlying belief was that the West was currently more technologically advanced. But Japan, representing the modernized "East," had caught up and even surpassed Europe, according to Ekrem. In every section of his text was a comparison of Japanese accomplishments to those of Europe and America, whether it was that "the enthusiasm, the desire for progress, the love of knowledge among the Japanese is not lagging behind that of the Europeans,"⁹ or that the smog of Japan's urban areas resembled that of London because of the "advances of Japanese manufacturing."¹⁰ For

...even if [Japanese] industry heads had not seen encouragement or stimulus from the government [for growth of industries], they would not have refrained from their efforts and attention, and from competing with foreigners. They never departed from earnestness and uprightness in their trades and in their duties. Because of this they continue to progress.¹¹

Japan had successfully reformed itself as a result of the modern (Western scientific) education of its youth. The Japanese government supposedly granted complete control over children's training and studies to the administrative and instructional offices of the schools themselves, and because Japanese schools

emphasized practicality over theory in education (if they did not, their teachers were considered negligent in their duties), Japan had been able to advance in the areas of medicine, agriculture, industry, and every other science.¹² The attitude toward Japanese education did not change much after the 1908 revolution; an Ottoman translation of a Japanese author's work reiterated that Japan's education had been reformed with attention to technology and manufacturing, which had in turn improved the nation's army and navy, and had caused Japan to become rivals with Europe in industry so that ultimately "the Japanese could take pride in having been the first among Eastern and non-Christian peoples to enter the ranks of the civilized powers. The Japanese proved again that Asians are not by any means inferior to Europeans."¹³

Fundamental to cultivating patriotism in Japan's youth and the modernization of its country and people was the state's implementation of a compulsory education program that could be enforced strictly, as one contributor to the Ottoman journal *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* put it:

The schools, to which Japan owes its civilizational and political strength today, are a good lesson for other peoples of Asia and the East... the East, advancing with the same ideas, treats with great respect the reputation of a Japan that inflicted a crushing defeat upon a great government of the West. Behold, Japan is the name we greatly respect; manifesting for us, its Eastern comrades, primary schools and compulsory education, it will urge us to think [to do the same].¹⁴

Japan had been able to enforce its mandatory education program, and though "Japan's law of compulsory education resembles ours... the Japanese are able to administer that law, whereas we are living incapable of its implementation."¹⁵ The Ottoman state had to take responsibility for education as a duty to society. Its subjects were required to struggle toward this end, because

We say, "the government, taking a position as the general population's father, made primary education compulsory." This is quite a truthful and correct fact. But governments must fulfill that paternal duty truthfully. Behold, it is Japan which has succeeded in this. With thirty years or so of effort it has attained many [more] years-worth of European progress, owing merely to the great consideration that would affix dedication to duty to paternalism... We, all the people of Islam, Easterners, must not at any time restrain... from paying attention to the advances that Japan owes to its efforts and resolution. If we want to be saved from ignorance and captivity, we must strive like that, with much great fortitude.¹⁶

Abdürreşid İbrahim's son Ahmed Münir, a student at Tokyo's Waseda University in 1913, illustrated for Ottoman readers the aim of Japanese educators in exerting great efforts in order to bring forth "a national spirit, a national idea," a task, he wrote, that required committed teachers as well as fiscal support from the government (which it got), even generously providing schooling for the poor.¹⁷ Quoting a speech delivered during the thirtieth-year anniversary celebration of Waseda's inauguration, Münir repeated Count

Okuma's hope to undertake "renewing the national element for the benefit of my homeland"; exhibits on Japan's history and culture presented what their educational system had been designed to deliver: "They displayed the Japanese' intellectual advances and political reforms of a half century" to representatives from universities the world over who attended the celebration to demonstrate their solidarity with Japan's educational achievements, but sadly and indicative of the Ottoman Empire's shortcomings, wrote Münir, "I heard the name of all but our university in Istanbul."¹⁸ The Ottoman government had an obligation to use every means available in order to provide a modern, compulsory education for its people as Japan had done. Japanese education provided all the means necessary to accomplish modernity: it inculcated patriotic morals and a spirit of self-sacrifice for the sake of the nation among the youth; it preserved indigenous heritage and assimilated Western science; Japanese education created the foundations for military and economic power that could combat Western aggression.

Education, Patriotism, and the Military

The grand narrative of Japanese superiority that was being constructed to define what it meant to be a worthy Eastern nation in the modern world ironically came to mean that part of being civilized at the turn of the century meant winning bloody wars, the most extreme expression of violence. Japan had succeeded in this; German military experts, whose opinions military officer Pertev Bey respected, encouraged him in his admiration by commenting on the genius of Japan and its commanders in the Russo-Japanese War. In 1906, the Ottoman War Academy press published German general staff officer Major Freiherr von Luttwitz's military history and critical commentary, *Japanese Assault Tactics in the Last East Asia Campaign*, which detailed specific battles of the war.¹⁹ An article by officer Ali Fu'ad that appeared in the Ottoman military journal, *Asker* a few years later described how

...the significance achieved from the point-of-view of service to the military in the great war in the Far East...that has caused a crescent of hope to arise among...all the peoples of Asia...is greater than [previous] influences and transformations obtained in every system, in every manner, in every science; it is greater than other benefits and results which were assured in the name of war expertise." It is a sacred duty for us in this era of bountiful freedom to secure everything beneficial for our army from among the accumulation of facts that this war drew to [our] attention. In particular, the war in the Far East possessed an exceptional value and significance for our army...Russia was one of the warring sides, the other the Japanese, who quite resemble Ottomans with regard to their un-tempered characteristics, virtues, and warlike inclinations...therefore this war was important, quite important for us, more so than for England, Germany, and France.²⁰

Ottoman military officers pointed out similarities between the Japanese and themselves; they focused on the causes of Japanese victory, translated

foreign articles and books on the subject, and came to their own conclusions about the reasons behind Japan's war success. Ottoman staff officers in the War Department translated Russian, French, and German essays concerning Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 that were published in *Asker*.²¹

Japan's success in wars stimulated Ottoman publishing of two types after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution: first, as an expression of the desire to generate an "armed nation," Ottoman writers, some of whom were military officers, discussed education and the propagation of patriotic sentiments among both the general population and among soldiers.²² Many possessed a hyperromanticized view, proposing that Japan's defeat of Russia had only to do with Japanese moral superiority. While this was a strong component of the discourse, more typically Ottoman writers recognized the role of education in providing practical military training and indoctrinating patriotism into Japanese citizens at a young age. Second, the motif of Japanese military practices and technology became the main focus of the Ottoman state's armed forces, with the peak of Ottoman interest in Japanese military strength, strategies, and tactics coinciding with the Balkan Wars and continuing through the First World War, as the empire tried to find a way to survive its many confrontations on land and sea. Let us deal with each of these trends in turn.

The image of the morally superior Japanese fighting man appeared constantly in the Ottoman press. Abdullah Cevdet, whose journal *İctihâd* frequently carried articles on Japan in the pre-revolution era, put it this way in a speech in 1909, even accusing his Muslim countrymen of behaving immorally in contrast to the honorable Japanese:

The Japanese, small-framed yet high-principled, for the sake of knowledge and virtue the Japanese thrashed Russia round for round like an ogre, as though beating a child, they drove them from Manchuria, they sunk their mountain-shaped warships, seizing more than half of them. . . The virtuous Japanese! The Japanese . . . sent back to Russia the watches, money, and valuables they found in the pockets of Russian officers killed during the war. Oh my Muslim countrymen, do you not thrust into your pockets the property of your enemy slain in battle, saying it is war booty?²³

Nonetheless, for military success, Colonel Pertev Bey recognized that both moral fortitude and actual training were necessary, since

... one should always be assured of victory if one knows how to properly use rifles, utilizes the land, and . . . acts by oneself. . . . At the same time, one should possess great heart, always maintain a trace of moderation, and should demonstrate a fearless indifference in the face of every possibility and sudden circumstance. The Japanese foot-soldier combined in himself these material and moral attributes so that he triumphed everywhere.²⁴

He and other Ottoman military personnel shaped general attitudes about Japan in their writings for consumption by both state and society, in an effort

to cultivate similar results in Ottoman lands. If the Ottoman army hoped to maintain its ability to protect the empire, reform would have to accommodate the need for a well-educated army along Japanese lines. This educational strategy had two goals: to train personnel as a skilled fighting force capable of good judgment and managing the latest technology, and to stimulate patriotic feelings among soldiers. Both Japanese commanders and conscripts, Pertev wrote, "because of the thoroughness of their military education and training, always come out of a situation with great skill, even in the most critical times," and their heroism, their self-sacrifice, their "moral upbringing" to which they so strongly adhered, made them victors over Russia.²⁵ Staff Officer Lt. Reşit Gâlip, in a military newspaper article seemingly translated from Russian, argued that by studying the circumstances and events surrounding the war in newspapers, the Japanese were better equipped to handle the duties expected of them and were more apt to follow orders accordingly.²⁶ In contrast to the Russians who were merely encouraged to serve "Czar, God, and homeland," the Japanese could all read and write and therefore learned and understood the true needs of the nation because they received superior training at a young age:

The Japanese are prepared for military service before being called to arms...they must know how to take apart and put together a rifle in middle school...all Japanese youth are raised with an intensely patriotic ideal and a deep love of homeland. In Russia there is no military education and training in the imperial schools at all; in Japan the military is trained in peacetime so as to be ready for the cost of war.²⁷

The education of future generations was the method by which to sustain the life and welfare of the nation, by teaching and training to foster an "armed nation." Pertev Bey interweaved comparisons between Japan and the Ottoman Empire in this discussion, often comparing fourteenth-century Ottoman conquests to modern Japanese victories, with hopeful advice for his compatriots:

Because of this zeal, the hearts of Japanese children are filled with feelings of love of homeland and willingness to sacrifice, and they form the basis of a terrific armed nation... We Ottomans, too, formed a true armed nation; as long as we possessed a materially and spiritually strong army, we were at the apex of conquering might and greatness. One of the most important reasons for our passing into a long era of decline afterwards was that we were deprived of a military class that would be suitable for a regular army.²⁸

For him, the status of a country's military was in direct proportion to the condition of its society; weak, unspirited, uneducated armed forces reflected a lack of patriotism in the population. He linked education to military breakdown and the fall of empires, but he discerned a way for the Ottoman Empire to recover from its dilemmas. First, instituting universal conscription in the Ottoman military had allowed Christians and Muslims alike to carry out their national duty, so that the Empire was again functioning as an "armed nation"

with a responsibility to defeat its enemies.²⁹ Second, the experience of Japan should guide the way:

Nowadays we, like the Japanese, inculcate our children in primary schools with patriotic emotion and military mentality; if we raise them in a heroic manner, ready to sacrifice their lives in the army at every moment for Sultan, homeland, and nation, the "Ottoman Army" would henceforth fear no one in the world save the Lord.³⁰

Staff Officer Lt. Reşit Gâlip explained in 1909 in *Asker* that the Japanese were supposedly consistent in tending to military personnel and equipment needs, which ensured their victory over China, and over Russia in 1905 as well. He described the disparity between Russian and Japanese fighting forces this way:

For the war in Manchuria the Russian went, saying "I am a soldier, they are conducting a war, so I will go." In other words he was not prepared with any prior ideas or aspirations. But every Japanese individual knew that to lose this war was a matter of life and death. Because the government, during a long era of peace, made ready this army's arms, munitions, and means of war materiel, just as at the same time they filled the hearts of the nation's individuals with a spiritual force of ammunition, and they armed perfectly both the army's branches and its souls, in order to utilize in a burst the product of a particular belief. Behold this state, more so in the beginning of the war, indicating a Japanese person's great superiority over that of a Russian.³¹

Japanese military figures typified the virtues necessary to win wars; words composed by a Russian officer, Sloveyev, gave the Ottoman reader a positive sense of this inherent Japanese morality:

Japanese officers without a doubt possess quite a high-minded ideological refinement, an intractable character of iron [will], in short, an ability encompassing all conditions. In reality, they are endowed with intensity, confidence, courage, a sense of discipline and unity, and most completely a feeling of self-sacrifice, so could there have been a better guarantee for victory than these?... And we must add, the desire to prevail over the enemy vehemently, with exaggerated patriotism that invigorates the entire Japanese nation.³²

Where did this Japanese morality originate? According to Colonel Pertev Bey, Japanese education generated patriots because Japanese children's "material education" included fundamental *Bushidō* [samurai] precepts for moral upbringing that brought out "... a great zeal [for] the preservation and defense of the entire homeland."³³ The popular conception that the Japanese still maintained a samurai code of ethics fueling their entire existence was described in an Ottoman newspaper article:

Individuals are educated and brought up with “Bushidō” principles. Bushidō is a code of moral conduct related to being a warrior . . . the code of ethics that Bushidō entails penetrates the depths of Japanese’ souls. As a result of this influence, they say that “in war we would see the spirits of our ancestors revolving around us. They would help us and determine our duty.”³⁴

Nitobei Inazō’s *Bushidō: The Soul of Japan*, which was published in 1905 to explicate Japanese morality to European audiences, was later translated into Middle Eastern vernaculars and likely informed Ottoman military officers’ ideas about the Japanese.³⁵ Certainly Pertev Bey’s perspective was influenced by this work, as his section on moral lessons from the Japanese reiterated the combination of Japanese Confucian ethics and the *Bushidō* samurai code of honor to generate a unique Japanese morality that involved a sense of duty toward the nation and respect for its cultural heritage, dedication to protecting the homeland, courage, heroism, and a willingness to sacrifice one’s life for the cause:

One of the moral precepts that Confucius instituted is love of family, home, and ancestral line, so that in today’s terms, it means none other than national feeling (*milliyet*) and love of homeland (*vatan*). The Japanese are one of the peoples that take the most pride in their nation. . . . After a Japanese departs from his country to travel to Europe and America in order to study science and knowledge, returning again to his homeland, he feels a more intense attachment to the nation than before, he is connected to his country with a greater affection than previously; he brings beneficial European and American things all by himself, a lot of things that we consider detrimental or unnecessary, which are in the name of civilization. Sixty million Japanese today, from youngest to eldest, love and hold their nation sacred with the same emotion, the same intensity.³⁶

In the modern era, the Emperor, the homeland, and the nation were Japanese incentives for which to demonstrate personal integrity and sacrifice one’s life, as their performance in the war had proved.³⁷ “The entire Japanese nation (including women and children) are prepared to give their lives in order not to allow a single enemy to set foot in our country”³⁸ because

one of the extraordinary traits of the Japanese nation is the sense of duty. Duty is considered more sacred than anything. It is the sense of duty that most generates the big-heartedness and willingness to sacrifice as well as the love and attachment to Emperor, homeland, and nation. Again, the sense of duty is such that in the Japanese army . . . [there] is a military brotherhood.³⁹

This samurai warrior ethic was central to his understanding of Japanese character—he fused native morality with nationalism and patriotic sensibilities,

giving new strength to the notion of being Eastern, and, in his own particular view, of being Ottoman: explaining that “the entire Japanese nation’s moral upbringing is based on *Bushidō*; *Bushidō* in turn is based on the Confucian notions of duty to elders and the Six Relationships, as well as on Buddhist spirituality that retains an indifference toward life on earth and looks to the paradise of the afterlife.” Pertev Bey noted the similarity in Muslim attitudes: “The inner motive for this indifference toward life... is not a difficult thing for us Muslims to understand. Since we believe in the Hereafter and in providence, there’s no significance to life at all in our eyes.”⁴⁰ He then carried his analogy of Japanese Confucianism and Islam to its logical conclusion: Japan’s Confucian morality dictated complete obedience toward elders as well as filial piety, thus translating in military terms into soldiers’ acceptance of their superiors’ orders, dedication to their unit when in battle, and ultimately the willing sacrifice of their own lives for the sake of the Japanese Emperor. In turn, the Islamic religion’s *jihād*, which he said consisted of the *gâzâ* (expedition or raid) and *şehâdat* (martyrdom), lent a similar spiritual content to Ottoman Muslim military personnel.

Japanese society’s tendency for everyone to rise to the level of their abilities like a well-oiled machine (due to Confucian notions of harmony) spilled over into military administration; Pertev Bey claimed he had never seen such an army as Japan’s, “an extraordinary harmony of parts blending together... a matchless unity prevails.”⁴¹ Military fraternity produced a strength and organization within the armed forces that was unbeatable in wartime.⁴² The Japanese were grave and dignified in combat, they went “one by one, like a machine, emotionless, heartless, spiritless, voiceless” to defend a battle line in the name of a “patriotic affection” that even the Russian general Kropotkin respected.⁴³ The lessons the Ottoman armed forces were to heed were that within this brotherhood, the leadership had to act in a unified manner and not for mere personal gain. Pertev Bey hoped to tap into the Ottoman military officer’s sense of pride in the Empire’s glorious gazi warrior past as well as his contemporary patriotic sentiments toward the Sublime Porte, in order to create the same momentum for an “armed nation” that had manifested in Japan and defended that nation against foreign occupation.

Beyond Pertev Bey’s extensive writings, the other observable trend in Ottoman military literature that manifested after the 1908 Revolution was that of analytical treatises designed to help the Ottoman armed forces discern better war tactics by studying the operations conducted during Japan’s war with Russia. Before the start of the Balkan Wars, some of the Ottoman military literature on the Russo-Japanese War tended to subtly combine the quantitative data with commentary concerning Japanese patriotism. But generally speaking, unlike the more sensationalized popular news coverage of this war that appeared in an earlier period, as well as books concentrating on the Japanese nation as a model for modernity mentioned previously, military conferences exploring Japan’s conflicts and various translations of European and Russian texts indicated the Ottomans were more interested in objectively examining military history in order to find practical solutions in battle. They

contemplated more direct contact with the Japanese as potential military advisers for the Ottoman land and sea forces. There was a certain gravity and deromanticized tone in their introductions; military officers carried out their duty in providing up-to-date, factual information concerning Japan's victories in war. They varied somewhat from the imagery presented on Japan that served the more fluid purposes of nation-building and social reform. There was a scientific approach to studying war, and these war treatises were a means to enhance Ottoman military administration and performance.

The Ottoman Ministry of the Navy, interested in exploring other countries' naval capabilities, held a conference to review military tactics and forces utilized during the Sino-Japanese and Spanish-American Wars, the proceedings of which were published.⁴⁴ Lieutenant Mümtaz Bey, the main lecturer, evaluated the reasons behind the respective victors' successes, explaining that the three measures of military strength were troops, equipment, and weaponry. The strength of the troops was further broken down into three measures of quality: spiritual state, or morale; skill or art of warfare; and military training/education, the second of which also depended ultimately upon education and training.⁴⁵ Mümtaz Bey could also not resist delving into morality in his exploration of these wars. He described soldiers' spiritual state, or morale, as consisting of their sense of good judgment and their actions in support of it, their comradeship, personal honor, in general their "moral virtues," coupled with courage and the ability to carry out any duty without fear; he differentiated between "common" courage, or what people were born with, "acquired" courage, a professional skill based upon self-confidence, and "accidental" courage, when one somehow inexplicably trusted the equipment, weapons, or comrades to succeed.⁴⁶ The Japanese, Mümtaz Bey claimed, possessed a high morale, whereas the Chinese did not. Given the fact that the Ottomans were at war in the Balkans at the time, they hoped to enlighten and inspire their troops with these meetings.

In 1912, Captain Mustafa Kemal translated Russian naval officer Vladimir Semenov's detailed personal account of the Russo-Japanese battle at Tsushima, *Çosima Muharebesi*, which included diagrams of battle formations, statistics on Russian and Japanese naval forces, and observations on Japanese admiral Togo's abilities at sea. Kemal remarked in his introduction that it was "the most respected documentation today" of that conflict; sections of the book had already been translated and published in the Ottoman government's navy journal, *Ceride-yi Bahriye*.⁴⁷ Another example of the effort to appropriate practical knowledge that would serve the Ottoman military was a 1914 report on the "Navies of the Great Powers" published in the Ottoman naval journal *Mecmu'a-yi Seneviye-yi Bahriye*. It summarized national expenditures on naval acquisitions in England, America, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Austria-Hungary; including Japan among the major sea powers of the world, it qualified the findings by mentioning "... the degree to which Japanese naval construction was dependent upon European example."⁴⁸ In 1917 the Ottoman Navy printed a pamphlet statistically detailing the entire Japanese fleet.⁴⁹ The Ottomans, caught up in the First World War, were still interested in the secrets behind Japan's successful military exploits.

Eastern Morality and Patriotism, Beyond the Military

Pertev Bey tirelessly argued that a nation must not be tempted by the falseness of material civilization, but should rely upon its native values to guide it along the path to modernity. Japanese morality as he defined it led to the sustained life of a nation, and not only through success in war. There were other consequences attributed to a nation's morality. Pertev Bey explained:

It is necessary for moral character to be solid and healthy in order to protect spiritual strength from being disrupted. Solidity gives strength and endurance to virtues of the heart, the spirit, and the mind. Nations always arise because of moral character; they proceed to the grave of extinction by reason of immorality. The Japanese, who are completely convinced of this, place importance more than anything else upon protecting the nation's morals against being ruined.⁵⁰

How did a nation preserve its moral character? First, Pertev Bey explained, a nation should respect its cultural heritage so that it could choose the right path for itself on the road to modernity, since "the level of (a people's) knowledge is greatly affected by its national customs and traditions."⁵¹ Japan's ability to maintain its indigenous heritage (showing "an extreme respect for the basic national customs, quite like they maintain respectfully [their] historical memories") while appropriating from abroad when necessary ("becoming civilized") allowed the Japanese to make the proper choices to advance the welfare of their nation and survive in the modern world.⁵² Quoting an article by Azeri Muslim Ahmet Ağaoğlu titled "National Upbringing" ("Terbiye-yi Milliye") that appeared in *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* several months earlier explicating the dangers involved in indiscriminate borrowing from outside one's cultural sphere, Pertev Bey reprinted the following:

A people without national upbringing sees neither felicity nor does it find perpetuity. A people like this loses the way in a desert without limits, resembling a traveler that runs directly to every mirage he sees; finally, unable to find peace and a route for himself to avoid evil, he perishes and disappears.⁵³

Ağaoğlu, he wrote, had invoked these words so that Ottomans would not forget the consequences; despite the temptation to indiscriminately adopt Western civilization, the Ottoman Empire should learn from Japan and select carefully what it needed, with cultural heritage as a basis upon which to build the modern state. These Ottoman intellectuals believed the nineteenth-century Japanese myth of Social Darwinist selectivity in borrowing, although the reality in late Meiji Japan was very much to the contrary: Japanese elites had in fact strived in earnest to cast off much of their "Japanese-ness" in favor of Western cultural attributes at this time.

Second, morality dictated a duty to serve the nation in war, in politics, and in an educational capacity. Japanese heroes such as General Nogi and Admiral Togo had fulfilled their military duties at the expense of personal losses in

the conflict. Military leadership should not be confined merely to fighting wars, however. Japanese war minister Terauchi served also as the governor of Korea, extending his knowledge and skills to manage a political enterprise for the sake of the Japanese nation. In 1910, General Nogi served in a diplomatic capacity for Japan by attending King George V's coronation. Marquis Ōyama, Marquis Itō (recently assassinated), Yamagata, and Togo all served the Emperor in Parliament or in the Cabinet because "every duty, every position is entrusted to the people" and "men of great heart always are elected for great tasks."⁵⁴ Pertev Bey viewed Japanese statesmen as men with a sense of equity, moderation, and nonpartisanship, who dutifully served their homeland and nation. He was not alone in his admiration for Japanese administrative methods that incorporated military officers. Their obligations were not limited to the political realm either; some Japanese officers participated in the education system as well.⁵⁵

Ottoman writers wrestling with this question of patriotism and morality had a keen understanding of the power of Japan's Shintō cult of the emperor that had motivated the Japanese in their devotional national identity. The Meiji Emperor was revered as the physical symbol of the new, young nation for which the Japanese were willing to sacrifice.⁵⁶ He represented a firmly preserved, traditional Japanese past that served the Japanese homeland as the backbone of moral character, giving Japan a foundation from which to advance into the world, to absorb modern science and technology, and eventually to compete with the West. On his deathbed in 1912, Japan's Emperor still objectified the determination of the Japanese people in their patriotic pursuit of modernity.⁵⁷ *İctihād* published a posthumous ode to the Emperor in 1913 that challenged Western claims of superiority by expounding upon Japan's current equality with Europe, and its inspiration of other peoples in Asia:

The land of the Rising Sun is today neck and neck with the foremost nations of the world, intellectually, technologically, scientifically, productively, commercially, agriculturally, politically, socially, militarily...yes, Japan's rise made the awakening of the East a consequence. In the liberating motion of this [Japanese] ascension are awakened the dormant passions of the Muslim, the Hindu, the Brahmin, the Confucian....The miraculous transformation Japan showed, from an oppressive feudalism into an elevated and rather progressive constitutional monarchy, is a development owing to His Excellency the late Emperor.⁵⁸

Ottomans viewed the Japanese Emperor as Meiji statesmen desired him to be perceived, and their agency in constructing an understanding of their imperial sovereign abroad is obvious. Ottoman journalistic discussions were often translations of interviews with members of the Japanese elite who would explain for example that the Japanese Emperor had granted the nation its freedom by his own hand (through ratification of a constitution and the opening of a two-house parliament) after having cultivated a national spirit suited to the needs of a modern country.⁵⁹ He made every decision with the intention

of renovating, or modernizing, the nation because the Emperor was “a sovereign, a modernizer, a statesman, a soldier, a humanist, and a literateur” for his “family,” his Japanese nation.⁶⁰ The Emperor’s authority, sanctioned by traditions of past centuries but in keeping with principles of the modern world, was legitimated through constitutional articles drafted to define power. The Japanese Imperial Rescript on Education (also quoted in this journal) linked Japanese moral education to the Emperor’s position so that Japanese tradition, morality, and modern constitutionality were inseparably connected in a form that strengthened and protected the nation, the Emperor being the physical embodiment of that connection.⁶¹

To create the same sense of duty that the Japanese had fulfilled for their Emperor, patriotism in Ottoman lands had to be tailored to the Empire’s heritage and circumstances. The Ottoman Sultan was not sufficient as an object around which to elicit such loyalty and dedication. Young Turk Unionists expected that the mere provision of a rational, constitutional, capitalist regime would be enough to draw out patriotic love of homeland and self-sacrifice for one’s nation from post-revolution Ottoman society. *Tanin*, the CUP mouthpiece, elaborated upon this new social structure that was both a prerequisite to and the result of fulfilling this sense of duty toward the Ottoman state, one which the Unionists had struggled to (re-)establish and were still striving to complete:

“Duty is heavier than a mountain; death is lighter than a feather” [Quoting Emperor’s words to his troops]. In the social life of a nation, these words are worthy of being considered normative behavior of an individual, individuals, all sectors of society. . . . This patriotic life in the Japanese gives birth to a sense of duty, a passion for duty; it urges the Japanese to sacrifice in every manner. . . . to carry it out means to know justice and to practice it. . . . If we consider ourselves for a moment, we understand how indifferent, how incapable we are in the face of truth and duty. When is it that, like the Japanese. . . we will be able to raise a future generation like this to face life anew, with this strength of a firm and prosperous upbringing? Behold, at that time we will know, saying “in this empire and nation, in this environment, in this horizon, there is a social and political order.”⁶²

The CUP authorities felt they had acted according to notions of Ottoman morality and patriotic duty to the Empire to put the nation back on its proper course. *Tanin* proffered the nation’s strength as its Ottoman youth, who would now be raised to perform their duties—not in service to the Sultan, but to the reformed Ottoman state—within the framework of a secular, orderly, modern (parliamentary) society.

The Ottoman journal *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* described Japan’s carefully engineered balance of “national education” as the foundation of its power: received and inculcated indigenous Japanese tradition, a cult of sacrifice for the Emperor, and the assimilation of Western technical and administrative methods produced a modern society of patriotic citizens in that precarious balance of “Eastern values and Western techniques.”⁶³ The Japanese had mastered the

sciences, whereas Muslims in the Ottoman system, despite having been provided all means to knowledge since the time of the Prophet, were said to have failed to strive seriously enough to advance.⁶⁴ In Japan, in addition to the established compulsory education system, there were dedicated instructors who even provided extracurricular learning sessions to generate patriotic sentiments among Japanese youth.⁶⁵ The Unionists took this to heart and followed in the footsteps of the Japanese, these “well-informed, scientifically learned men who give particular conferences. . . in a group of special salons. . .” who, “every evening in these salons, read works that were written for patriots, related wonderful stories that would cultivate feelings of love of homeland.”⁶⁶ The Young Turks undertook to provide similar conferences for their Ottoman compatriots.

Munīr Ya‘qūb, author of several articles in the Arabic paper *al-Muqtabas (al-Umma)*, leveled a subtle objection at the Ottoman ruling authorities in his description of Japan as unique among Asian nations because it had assimilated Western science with its own native culture. He discussed why Western nations were advanced and prosperous, what the Ottoman Empire needed to undertake, and what it has undertaken to reach the same level of progress:

Our government borrowed from Japan, this vigorous Eastern nation which gained in half a century what had been lost to it in twenty centuries, the matter of sending students of science to Europe in order that they learn the vital sciences such as sociology, economics, law, medicine, forestry and minerology, and the fine arts, and that they become accustomed to financial activities and become skilled in [Japan’s] military and naval affairs. This method the Mikadō nation undertook in the beginning of their awakening. Every year they send two thousand students to schools in Europe and America, returning to their country amply provided with the sciences and arts which yield benefits to their nation, restoring them to the level of the advanced nations.⁶⁷

Ya‘qūb placed the Japanese people at the forefront of recognizing the need for studying Western science in order to modernize the country and to become adept at fields of modern international competition such as financial and military procedures. He faulted indiscriminate borrowing because it undercut indigenous morality while not providing for the true benefits of Western civilization. Japan’s modern education system was argued to be the most advanced and the most beneficial to a nation, while Ottoman education stifled progress and ignored local heritages. Another author stated that

Japan did not reach high status and respected standing except thanks to sending talented sons to complete their learning in American and European schools. It did not reach its elevated status except by establishing 10,000 different schools in its country to prepare millions of the learned and talented among its sons.⁶⁸

Japan illustrated the importance of education and the absorption of the appropriate Western studies as foundations upon which to advance the

nation. The issue of educating the populace had become extremely important in the Ottoman Empire and was initially addressed by Islamic modernists who needed to find a solution to the dilemma of the West's superior technological capability. Early intellectuals reasoned that Islam in its purest form was in no way contradictory to the pursuit of knowledge; however, years of corrupt government and personal decadence had distorted the true meaning of Islam, placing Muslims in an inferior position to the West. As late as 1913, another Arabic paper, the Lebanese *al-Irfān*, published statistics concerning the growth of the Japanese school system to demonstrate to its Arab readers the importance Japan placed upon educating its youth.⁶⁹

Al-Muqtabas editor Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī often expressed his ideas about education using the historical analogy of Japan. Anxious over what he saw as fundamental problems in the Ottoman Empire, Kurd 'Alī voiced concern over the failure of Ottoman institutions of higher learning that catered only to those seeking future bureaucratic positions in the government. This, he argued, caused the citizenry to turn to foreign schools, which sufficed only for those interested in material-commercial gain, and consequently robbed the students of their patriotism (via instruction in European vernaculars). Likewise, he felt the possibility of economic decline due to European goods flooding the market, and he realized that general agricultural neglect had to be stopped through proper education. Japan had suffered a similar foreign intrusion in the decade after Commodore Perry's appearance in 1853, in which Japan was forced to sign unequal trade treaties that opened its ports and allowed foreign goods to saturate its markets. But its national education system was modern, secular, and universal, permitting Japan to maintain its economic growth, repeal the treaties, and regain its domestic wealth.

Kurd 'Alī initially accepted the Ottoman Empire as a viable political order provided it allow for diversity of language and culture within its lands. His memoirs mention the vast circle of Ottoman intellectuals with whom he associated, including not only Arab journalists of Syrian and Egyptian backgrounds, but also Ottoman Turks, Kurds, and Armenians whose Ottomanist views he shared as a national ideology in earlier years.⁷⁰ But he strongly felt the need for government provision of the most modern national system of instruction in the students' native language, in order to affirm their culture and identity. He saw the Arab community as a distinctive group deserving of an education in Arabic; in later years he would consider their potential as a future independent political unit. The CUP's maintenance of the constitutional clause delegating Ottoman Turkish as the language of instruction in the state schools until 1913 aggravated the delicate relationship between Arab and Turk and caused Arabs with Ottomanist leanings to question the logic of supporting a state that seemed to discriminate against them. Kurd 'Alī's articles on education and specifically on Japan's education system were subtle criticisms of CUP policy. This is reflected in Kurd 'Alī's introduction to a series of articles on "National Education":

The question of education is among the most important social questions in the world... National (*watani*) education is the most progressive type of education because of its preservation of races, languages, customs, and

nationalities. Because of this you find the struggle over this issue exceedingly great between the dominant nations and the defeated....The Algerians only complain about France because it intends to annihilate their race, language and religion by teaching French principles and language. The Koreans are only frustrated because the Japanese love to give Korean people the appearance of [Japanese] character and impress their character upon their colonies.⁷¹

Despite his enduring Ottomanist attitudes, Kurd 'Alī cautiously insinuated a parallel between the Arabs under the CUP regime and colonized peoples in this discussion; the implication was that Arabs' national heritage was being stifled under the present system.

Kurd 'Alī espoused views about the need for a modern, secular, scientific education system to reform the populace and make them loyal citizens, views that did not necessarily differ much from those of the CUP. Where he differed was that he emphasized the need for the curriculum to be presented in the appropriate language and to conform to Ottoman peoples' cultural sensibilities. Using the Japanese as a barometer to measure national education, he highlighted its secular nature in "Moral Instruction in Japan":

Education in Japan is purely knowledge-oriented (*'ilmī*) and religion does not have the slightest authority in the school. For France and Japan are the only two kingdoms which propagated the principles of non-religious (*lādīnī*) "secular" education in the entire world. In Japan education is separate from religion, according to the Education Law promulgated in 1872.⁷²

Japan "...did not refrain from sacrificing the most cherished of what it has for the sake of progressive development and the dissemination of education throughout the land."⁷³ Kurd 'Alī stressed the importance of indigenously developing education that did not obfuscate a people's inherent nature and morality, a lesson the CUP should take to heart:

The idea of secular education is not an invention of the new government; rather they found similar practices in the ancient history of Japan. Buddhist priests did not teach religion in their institutions...rather the schools raise them on morals and noble character traits, so education in Japan is purely secular; religion does not influence [education].⁷⁴

Education in the Islamic world had traditionally been in the hands of the religious class, a tradition he saw as outmoded. Japan's example illustrated for him the necessity to reform the system along modern lines. But crucial to his attitude was his desire to see a modern education that did not compel anyone to betray their beliefs or identity, observing that "the Japanese government...leaves to every individual the freedom of sect."⁷⁵ Kurd 'Alī was familiar with the 1890 Japanese Imperial Rescript on Education that provided a national education model for all Japanese schools to follow. He deemed it important enough to translate, although he said that "...some attribute

Japanese patriotism to what the schools inculcate in them... but they are mistaken in that because love of homeland is one of the characteristics of the Japanese man."⁷⁶ He believed Japanese patriotic sentiment was inherent in the people; moral character needed only minor reinforcement. According to his interpretation of the decree, there were two types of education: general and patriotic.⁷⁷ Patriotic education sprung from certain moral precepts that set the Japanese apart from others; these could be considered the elements of native culture that inspired patriotism.⁷⁸ They made respect for and service in the name of the Emperor a religious obligation of sorts, and one that translated into enormous national unity. The strength of Japanese patriotism was evident even in early times:

The first civilization the Japanese observed near them was the Chinese; however it did not affect patriotic spirit at all. Their foundation of education was "the Japanese spirit, then the wisdom[sagacity] of the Chinese." Buddhism entered Japan in the sixth century and had a serious consequence for the morals of the Japanese. Since the 1868 reform occurred in Japan, numerous changes have taken place due to the spread of Western civilization, but the Japanese psyche did not lose any of its essence and excellence.⁷⁹

Japanese moral education was taught in higher institutions, as was commerce, technology, medicine, and other sciences. The ultimate objective of Japan's education was to "refine the youngster's soul and instill in him upright principles to which the Japanese attach great importance," for upon this the advancement or decline of their kingdom depended.⁸⁰ Here, Kurd 'Alī denoted the key to all national success in the international political field: the successful adoption of modern Western knowledge combined with native strength of moral character. In Japan, moral behavior was rigidly defined, not in purely religious terms (as he saw it to be in the Ottoman Empire), but in an ancient code of societal conduct that had persisted in Japan to that day. This indigenous code defined the direction toward which newly acquired knowledge should be channeled; it was the moral obligation to preserve the nation.

For Kurd 'Alī, a clear parallel could be drawn between the Japanese, their moral character, their ancestral ties and devotion to the nation, and the Ottoman nation with its Arabo-Islamic heritage that served as the moral compass to reach Ottoman modernity by integrating the culture of the Ottoman Empire's various peoples with a reformed education system. It was not to be an Islamic education, but would be based on the morals and values Islam historically had nurtured in Ottoman society.

Kurd 'Alī believed that all civilizations developed based on reciprocal exchange and enrichment, and civilizations did not arise in opposition to one another.⁸¹ They merely borrowed positive aspects from one culture and refined them for their own betterment. The greatness of the Arabs in ancient times was in part due to their status as a source of knowledge from which other cultures have borrowed. Thus the current confrontation of Eastern and Western civilizations was actually an historic synthesis of cultures that would produce a higher level of civilization, or "modernity."⁸² This higher civilization would

absorb the modern science and technology of the West, while preserving the cultural superiority of the East. Kurd 'Alī believed this process was already underway in Japan.⁸³ The correct administration of government policy based on these principles of modernity yielded results to which the Ottoman Empire should aspire.

Whereas Kurd 'Alī demanded the Ottoman state correct itself and reform education in order to evolve and reach modernity, other writers used the example of Japan to insist that Ottoman subjects make more effort to serve the state. The author of a series of articles in *Resimli Kitap* in 1912–1913 called “Lessons Learned in Japan” supported ideas about the connection between the military and a nation’s greatness.⁸⁴ Süreyya derived Japan’s success in the modern world from its people’s character, firmly placing responsibility for survival in the twentieth-century world upon citizens themselves:

We feel like this, that among our people in these lands there is an extremely vast and ever-increasing tendency; and that is, to want and to await many things, and never to do anything [about it]; and at the same time, to remain a stranger to the patriotic duties expected of oneself! It must be believed conclusively that if a nation of individuals remains a stranger to patriotic duties that are incumbent upon them, or if it can be said that there is a lack of existence of those duties, there is no doubt at all that that nation’s future will be gloomy and painful.⁸⁵

Consideration for the nation’s future was foremost in the minds of Japanese citizens who knew their patriotic duties as well as their rights and privileges, so that everyone rallied for the security of the homeland. Japanese personal love for the Emperor coupled with the belief in the sanctity of the Japanese islands in which the spirits of their ancestors resided generated this patriotic behavior.⁸⁶ Their victory in 1905 and inclusion into the ranks of the European powers were examples of the potential inherent in patriotism. If the Ottomans acted in matters with unity and agreement as did the Japanese, Süreyya wrote, they would be assured of 100 percent success in their own endeavors.⁸⁷ This was obviously a significant argument in 1912, amid the Balkan crisis and increasing separatist feelings among certain groups within Ottoman lands.

Perteve Bey and Süreyya represented an Ottoman statist view that saw the potential in the Ottoman Empire to survive and regain its former social, military, and political grandeur amid threats to its existence, provided society tapped into its patriotic sensibilities and served the nation. Süreyya spoke of “organized” patriotic behavior (in contrast to “unorganized” behavior that was sure to lead to decline and destruction) as synonymous with a systematic, powerful military, and the energetic pursuit and government encouragement of trade in international markets (in Japan’s case, it was driven by the profound spiritual affection of subjects for their sovereign). The deep-seated sense of Japanese unity limited the number of political disputes among party leaders and facilitated policy decisions concerning international issues because this unity demanded that the public good override any desire for personal gain. In this the Japanese were successful and should be emulated, wrote Süreyya, because “one should strive to secure a country’s public welfare” above all else,

and “one should avoid manifesting partisanship lest the social structure be put in danger.”⁸⁸ Similarly, Pertev Bey wrote that “today we are an old nation born anew,” and preserving it would challenge the moral and material fiber of Ottoman subjects at a time when “the homeland is in danger.” He described the danger as stemming from the fact that “we are occupying ourselves, collecting ourselves anew.”⁸⁹ Was he referring to new political and/or ethno-religious, national ties being formed that were restructuring the identity of Ottoman citizens in a divisive manner, even causing strife in the Balkans that eventually led to war? Ultimately Pertev Bey’s message was that

... if we (unite with honest thoughts and intelligent hearts), we will arise shortly thereafter with the same brilliance as did the Rising Sun in the Far East a few years before. In any case, let us not forget at any time that a nation always arises from its own strength!⁹⁰

On this point, all Ottomans could agree. But a political dispute within Ottoman society was brewing over how to evoke this strength: to raise an “armed nation,” the Unionists as the ruling authorities would define the mode of modernization and the characteristics of Ottoman identity. The growing opposition to the CUP, however, was repudiating the Unionists’ legitimacy in guiding the Empire in the modern era.

The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and Opposition

With their reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution, the Unionists believed themselves to be entitled to positions of leadership in the Empire, and their policies the foundations enabling Ottoman patriotism and guaranteeing the Empire’s sovereignty. Their revived Empire would indeed be an “armed nation,” but they understood the idea of a nation as contemporary Europeans had conceived of it—certainly as militarily strong, but also as secular, scientific, technological, with themselves at the helm as the most qualified Ottoman elites who were set apart from the rest of society in their attitudes toward modernity.

For many in the empire who were hopeful and enthusiastic about the possibility of a more politically or culturally equitable Ottoman future after the constitution was reinstated, whether alienated by the CUP leadership’s centralized nature and policies, its secular orientation, or its nationalist ideology that gained ground at the expense of universalist Ottomanism, Japan ever-more frequently represented what the Ottoman Empire was not. In the post-1908 Young Turk period, Japan continued to play a dual discursive role, representative of both trends—as the trope of constitutionalism, modern institutions, and educated elites who were beacons of Western-style civility, all of which connoted modernity for the CUP on the one hand, and on the other, some of these same modern political and institutional reforms, yet fused with that essential “Easternness,” which for some in the Ottoman realm was based upon Islamic heritage, and for others was the inclusive doctrine of Ottomanism. Let us look at each of these forms of CUP opposition in turn.

Khalidi describes the tension in late Ottoman society concerning Western-style reforms and their potential contradiction with indigenous culture. When various responses to military defeats and Western encroachment in the Ottoman Empire were undertaken, "...the one most generally accepted by regional elites was the adoption of Western forms of government and military organization, and reform of education and the legal system. By contrast, others in society rejected some or all Western values. They saw the only hope for improving the situation in a return to what they believed were Islam's original values."⁹¹ Süreyya's mention of Japanese values and character, having been fostered in the school system where morality and not religious education was indoctrinated, was a subtle articulation of the Unionists' secular orientation.⁹² The CUP-opposed Society for Islamic Unity (*İttihâd-ı Muhammedi Cemiyeti*), however, highlighted a different basis for Ottoman character: Islam. Cofounder Kıbrıslı Hafız Derviş Vahdetî, a member of the Bektâşi sufi order, published the society's mouthpiece, the Ottoman daily *Volkan* (1908–1909) that Stanford Shaw described as presenting "a mixed message of mystic and popular Islam and strong opposition to the secularism of the government as well as the influence of the minorities and foreign representatives" in an attempt at counterrevolution.⁹³ In one piece *Volkan* noted the propriety of combining patriotic love of homeland with strong faith in Islam, imploring Ottoman soldiers to heed the example of Japanese troops who readily marched into the line of fire and perished before Russian forts in the name of service to the Mikadō and his nation: "Come heroes! Let us unite. Let us assume the strength of character of early Islam, let us be a noble people like the Japanese, who love their governments, their Mikadōs, who sacrifice their lives along the way.... Postponing even for a moment what I said will and does cause the homeland to break into pieces."⁹⁴ While clearly the survival of the Empire was foremost in the minds of both the CUP and Islamists, the division arising over the role Islam should play in Ottoman life and government decision making was beginning to widen. This division reflected larger political tensions.

Bediüzzaman Said Nûrsî, the Kurdish sufi and Islamic scholar from Bitlis who embraced the pan-Islamic, modernist ideas of acquaintances Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad 'Abduh in order to resist Western materialism,⁹⁵ had allied himself with the Young Turk revolutionaries after his disappointment over what he perceived as Sultan Abdülhamid II's failure to live up to his domestic and international role as caliph for Muslims.⁹⁶ In 1908, shortly after the revolution, he delivered a speech in Salonika where he was reportedly still on good terms with leading Young Turk figures.⁹⁷ This "Address to Freedom," apparently later given again in Istanbul as well, encouraged "...maintaining Islamic morality, warned against acquiring the sins and evils of civilization and abandoning its virtues. The Ottomans should imitate the Japanese in taking from Western civilization what will assist them in progress, while preserving their own national customs."⁹⁸ According to Nûrsî, whose words echoed the common perception of Japan in Ottoman eyes, Japan had not inwardly lost its cultural foundations when assimilating technology and modern forms of knowledge from the West. Nûrsî had faith in the perfect integration of Islam and modern civilization just as Japan had accomplished within its own cultural milieu.⁹⁹

Nûrsi's words did not appear to contradict the aims of the revolutionaries. Nonetheless the CUP's concern over religious currents in the post-revolution Empire that could potentially challenge their political power and centralization policies eventually seemed to sour their trust in Nûrsi, especially as he was a cofounder of the Society for Islamic Unity. Some of its members stated publicly that the CUP leadership was overstepping the limits of what were acceptable actions as an Islamic state, including Vahdetî, who "intended to replace the Constitution with the *Şeriat* and use Islam to modernize and rescue the empire."¹⁰⁰ *Volkan* promoted the resurrection of Islamic schools, the protection of Islamic law and practices (including consultation, or *meşveret*) in government and in the daily lives of Ottoman subjects to unite the community (*ümme*), and to liberate Muslims worldwide from the "tyranny of non-Muslim oppression."¹⁰¹ Public meetings conducted by this society in Istanbul led eventually to a counterrevolution that could only be reversed by a military-led intervention in April 1909, resulting in the deposition of Abdülhamid II and the destruction of the Islamic Unity group as a political party force; Derviş Vahdetî was hanged.¹⁰² Nûrsi survived the crisis by distancing himself from those who rebelled in 1909, and continued his tenuous, if dedicated affiliation with the Young Turk CUP regime throughout the First World War, but he continued to harbor the silent belief that the Unionists ultimately failed because they did not properly incorporate Islam into their ideology.¹⁰³

Before the Islamic Union Society's destruction, *Volkan* challenged state policies publicly, invoking the image of Japan in the process. A diatribe against what its publisher considered Grand Vezir Kâmil Paşa's arbitrary and impulsive decisions concerning the dismissal and appointment of a war minister (contrary to the Islamic principle of consultation) included mention of Nâzım Paşa, the officer who reorganized the Second Ottoman Army "to resemble the example of the German and Japanese armies...in the space of several months."¹⁰⁴ *Volkan* compared Japan's civilizational selectivity to the shortcomings of the Young Turk Unionists in power, noting that

...for this reason the Japanese struck a victory over Russia...one people's annihilation often results from being carried away by another people's morality and traditions.... We, we gave to the Westerners the most essential of our sciences, and we fell quite behind in terms of borrowing the sciences of their descendants.... We advanced quite a lot in taking on the really bad, really shameful practices. At a glance, offering our beautiful and sound commodities, we got an inferior value in return.¹⁰⁵

For this anti-CUP society, Japan represented the "national" solidarity derived from indigenous culture that the Ottomans had lost in betraying their Islamic heritage. Excluded from political power by the Unionists, members of this group denounced the CUP's orientation toward Europe by condemning the bankruptcy of Western civilization.

For those Young Turks who still maintained Ottomanist leanings, their interpretation of Japan became politicized not just to resist European imperialism, but also as a symbol of their growing opposition to the CUP regime and its exclusivist ideology. After 1908 many who sincerely believed in the

principles of Ottomanism became a politically excluded class in the empire, and some responded by demanding political or cultural recognition by the Unionists in power. Japan was the referent for making their case, as well as for the Unionists in their denial of wrongdoing and in their self-image as having successfully established the Ottoman state as part of the European Concert.

The memoirs of a former Unionist and the Dersim representative in Ottoman parliament, Lütfi Fikri Bey, contain an example of this Ottomanist, anti-CUP discontent, and what is more, they reflect the mood of an Ottoman elite who once shared in the Young Turk passion for a truly egalitarian, parliamentary, constitutional empire, but who became discouraged by CUP abuses and Ottoman sectarianism, both of which he ruminates over in an anecdote that further illustrated the rhetorical value of the Japanese model. A Turkified Kurd and liberal believer in multireligious, multiethnic Ottomanism who opposed the increasingly Turkist character of the CUP in later years, Fikri was an activist who, after disagreeing with CUP policies, formed an opposition party in 1910 (*Mutedil Hürriyetperver Partisi*, part of the *Entente Libérale*) and contributed to a paper called *Tanzîmât* that was frequently closed down by the authorities.¹⁰⁶ He was irritated and sarcastic when he wrote in 1913 (noting the flippancy with which the Japanese seemed to change their faith),

What a strange situation, driven by ignorance, those who are in favor of our modernization and those who are not, pointing to Japan as an example. . . . Alas, if only we had the elasticity of the Japanese, especially religious elasticity! Although my name would remain Lütfi Fikri, and no harm at all would come to my Turkishness, my Ottomanness (this latter has hence started to be understood as nonsense!), would no possibility of again becoming the Dersim representative and publishing the *Tanzîmât* newspaper arise were I to become Catholic or Protestant? From our mere answer to that question we understand the startling difference between ourselves and the Japanese. A Japanese can change religions in a manner easier than that of changing a coat!¹⁰⁷

Lütfi Fikri's words had powerful implications: he condemned as ignorant everyone who argued for or against modernization using the Japanese as a referent, because of their mistaken belief that the Ottoman Empire resembled Japan at all. Based on what we know of his character,¹⁰⁸ he likely directed these comments at both Islamic conservatives who, he believed, incited sectarian conflict and opposed a more pluralistic Ottoman identity, as well as the increasingly exclusivist CUP officials who had an authoritarian grip over government policy, and whom he described as "the Unionists (henceforth I will not say 'Unionists' because there is no meaning in this word), or more correctly, well-known personalities and their buddies, good friends and their relatives."¹⁰⁹ Though they had managed to stave off the loss of Ottoman territory (Edirne) during the Balkan crisis, he perceived these "Unionists" as a threat to constitutionalism.¹¹⁰ To him their violation of principles of democratic rule through arbitrary decisions and a Turkish nationalist disposition disguised as support for modernization projects in the Ottoman Empire were being falsely justified by touting the Japanese nation-state example.

Fikri's sarcasm concerning the term "Unionist" itself reflected the larger ideological issue at stake in the Empire: he noted the discrepancy between Japan and the Ottoman Empire in a way that mirrored his disdain for religious bigotry and his desire to see citizens united under the rubric of Ottomanism, a concept that appeared to be dying out in the twentieth century. Lütfi Fikri viewed himself as a Turk and an Ottoman, but argued, why should those characteristics be altered if he were, say, Christian as well? And why could the Ottomans not look to Japan to see that flexibility in these matters worked to the nation's benefit? Under the CUP regime, Fikri implicitly argued, one had to be Muslim to take part in social or political processes. To be Catholic or Protestant meant one was likely Greek, Armenian, or Arab, in short, not a Turk. To Fikri it also meant that one would not be re-elected to parliament nor be able to publish an opposition party newspaper. This narrow-minded inelasticity was contrary to the notions of "union" and "progress," jeopardizing the existence of Ottoman constitutional government altogether.

The "anti-Ottomanist" trend Fikri described, which encouraged the exclusion of certain communities in Ottoman society, openly revealed itself in popular political rhetoric around 1913, when a boycott against Ottoman Greek ("Rûmî) businesses during and just after the Balkan War called for Muslim solidarity against economic inequalities as a patriotic duty to the Ottoman state.¹¹¹ A pamphlet distributed to people in the streets of Istanbul, *The Path of Salvation Suitable for Muslims*, even called attention to Japanese women's service to and sacrifice for the nation during wartime.¹¹² Ottomanist solidarity had broken down by 1913 to such an extent that Muslims boycotting their Christian, Rûmî compatriots' shops were said to be serving the nation as had Japanese women in their earlier war effort.¹¹³ The CUP-led Ottoman *ümme*t had contracted into a smaller unit by 1913 that began to exclude its non-Muslim (and eventually non-Turk) population and to imagine itself as Japan had already become—as a nation-state. Japan represented proper national behavior for Ottoman Turkey; the definition of who was to be included in the community was changing.

This phenomenon would be felt by other minorities in the Empire. According to Corinne Blake's study of Syrian Arabs at the Ottoman school for civil service (*Mekteb-i Müllkiye*), graduation from this academy provided one avenue for entrance into the Ottoman elite who dominated the administrative and military spheres of government in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹¹⁴ Syrian Arab students such as Shukrî al-'Asalî, 'Abd al-Wahhâb al-İnglîzî, and Sâî' al-Ḥuşrî associated frequently with non-Arabs in the academy whose socioeconomic backgrounds resembled theirs, cultivating a sense of solidarity that would preclude ethnic differences. Nonetheless, while these Arab graduates penetrated the ranks of the culturally Ottoman upper class, for many of them, their sense of possessing an Arab identity simultaneously became more pronounced.¹¹⁵ Due to disillusionment with the lack of progress toward equality in Ottoman politics following the 1908 Revolution, al-'Asalî and al-İnglîzî joined a secret society called *al-Qahtaniyya* in 1909 that proposed an Arab kingdom be established with a separate administrative apparatus while remaining an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, presumably to be governed by educated Ottoman-Syrian Arabs such as themselves.¹¹⁶ While

the notion of Arab autonomy had seemed inimical to al-'Asalī at first because of his conviction that Turk and Arab futures were inextricably linked by the desire to rejuvenate the Ottoman Empire, a sense of discrimination against the Arabs heightened when, after 1911, Arab graduates of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* got promoted through the bureaucratic ranks more slowly.¹¹⁷

In Damascus and Beirut, cities under relatively firm central control by the Ottoman authorities, the Arabic press and other published material provided an outlet for the Ottoman Arab community in voicing their concerns about the survival of the Empire into the modern era. With the exception of Beirut, the Arabic press itself was virtually nonexistent in the Levant region of the Empire until after the 1908 revolution.¹¹⁸ Following 1908, amid the flourish of Arabic publishing enterprises, owners and editors often distributed newspapers under threat of closure by the CUP authorities if they were deemed to possess an "un-Ottoman" disposition. These Arab journalists, many of whom were younger members of the notable elite or part of a growing educated middle class, such as al-'Asalī, were sometimes Ottomanists who believed in the continued political viability of the Ottoman Empire as a multiethnic, multinational confederation until after 1909, when the CUP conducted government purges that appeared to manifest along ethnic lines. Ottoman re-centralization measures included dismissal and replacement of former officials (many of whom were Arab) with reliable new ones (often Turk), so that an appearance of ethnic discrimination by the Ottoman authorities fueled resentment among Syrian Arab political elites.¹¹⁹ At the same time, Arabs in the provinces were still expected to be instructed in Turkish in the schools, and legal affairs were conducted in Turkish until 1913. Coupled with the further loss of Ottoman territories to European expansion, Arab intellectuals became disillusioned.

Just as exiled Young Turk activists had expressed their frustrations over the Sultan's absolutism and demanded reform and revolution by drawing attention to Japan's accomplishments at home and abroad prior to 1908 through the vehicle of the newspaper, Arab discontent was often reflected in opinions expressed in the provincial press. Nonetheless, journalism in the Ottoman Empire at this time required subtle tactics. Some Arab writers compared Japanese and Arab cultural similarities as a restrained critique of the state. Others blatantly criticized Ottoman shortcomings and the empire's steady decline; Ottoman Arabs such as Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī and Shukrī al-'Asalī carefully expressed their critiques of the CUP regime in the pages of Kurd 'Alī's Damascus paper *al-Muqtabas* using images that contrasted the true constitutionalist, representative government of Japan with what were perceived as the authorities' centralizing and arbitrary Turkification policies. Kurd 'Alī knew well the caution that had to be used in critiquing the empire. His paper, confirmed to be anti-CUP from 1911 onward,¹²⁰ had articles criticizing the Ottoman polity as early as 1909. Often under threat of closure, the newspaper was shut down (and reopened under the name *al-Umma* for a short period) in that year due to government dissatisfaction. Al-'Asalī's belief around 1909 that the Arabs were an essential part of the Ottoman Empire and were not yet ready for complete independence would radically alter by 1911, and the tone of his writings would change accordingly. In either case, Ottoman authorities

were obviously concerned about the ramifications of Arab journalists' words, as Ayalon indicates:

The large proportion of journalists among the prosecuted "agitators" [most of whom Cemal Paşa, commander of the Fourth Army in Syria had tried and hanged in 1915–1916] was not coincidental, for both Arab nationalists and the CUP government were aware of the power and the danger that the press had come to represent, both potentially and in practice.¹²¹

The typically understated message in articles on Japan, then, cannot be ignored, whether they were encouragement directed at the Arab reading audience in developing a contemporary Arab national ethos through proper education, or an evaluation of unsuccessful Ottoman attempts to adopt Western institutions.

Discourse on modern Japan in the post-1908 Ottoman era, then, can be described generally as follows: either it emanated from influential members of the CUP who appropriated the Japanese model to represent themselves as the legitimate new ruling authorities after reinstating the Ottoman constitution, in which case their discourse on modern Japan was intended to defend their elitist, exclusivist policies and initiatives, or else groups opposing CUP political control similarly deployed Japanese images to illustrate Unionist shortcomings and deviations from what they argued was the correct path to Ottoman modernity. The Unionists looked to the Japan model for guidance in how to maintain power, whereas those excluded from power used Japanese images to argue for a greater share of it, or at the very least, to have more recognition within the Ottoman polity. The Japanese propensity for science and progress convinced many Ottoman writers that Japan itself, with its able statesmen, should be a direct mentor for Ottoman modernization schemes.

By 1912 there were other subtle critiques of the Unionist Ottoman government emanating from the press, which carefully used Japan to argue their positions. Writers for the *Levant Herald Eastern Express* blamed the Empire's failure to modernize on the Ottoman Empire's impractical utilization of foreign experts, its social structure, and its geographic location, in contrast to Japan.¹²² Why had Japan succeeded in its transformation? There was an inherent inclination in the Japanese toward progress, authors contributing to the *Levant Herald* and to the moderate Islamist paper *Sırât-ı Mustakim* argued, something in their character, the "great intelligence" and "firm character of the population of this country," combined with "the excellent method employed, to the profound peace which the country enjoyed during the incubation period of the new state" that allowed them to modernize so that "in short, one sees there is no reason to cry miracle. It has happened because Japan wanted it and because [Japan] knew how to make its own disposition lead to this result."¹²³ These conditions were implied to be lacking in Ottoman lands. But there were other factors, some contingent upon international circumstances, which contained critical implications for the CUP:

...because the social organization of Japan conformed marvelously to new ideas and organization.... If Japan had had the social organization of Turkey, could it have transformed so easily? Would modern civilization have been able to be transplanted with such complete success onto the minds and customs of the Far East? Certainly not. In any case, Turkey did not follow the Japanese process...since seeking to reform Turkey there has not been a single day of tranquility. How could its methods of transformation—granting that it has them—have been applied amid all sorts of difficulties that have barred the path for four years?¹²⁴

The ambiguity of the phrases “social organization” and “methods of transformation” were intentionally cautious descriptions of a multireligious, multiethnic polity whose government had been overthrown by revolution and which was now attempting to implement reforms from above. Papers such as the Islamic modernist *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* desired to remain in operation and in cooperation with the regime in power while pointing out that effective progress had been impeded. Their terminology described the Unionists as having reinstated a constitutional, parliamentary administration, but one that had become increasingly centralized amid sometimes virulent challenges to reform and to external crises. Was it the fault of the CUP regime’s methods, or of “traditional” sectors of society who resisted progress, or the ethnoreligious sectarian strife tearing at the fabric of the Ottoman nation that was an obstacle to the Empire replicating the success of Japan so readily? Readers were left to ponder.

In the aftermath of the 1908 Young Turk revolution and 1909 counterrevolution that firmly entrenched the CUP Unionists in power, the Japanese model of modernization and nationhood began to assume more particular characteristics in Ottoman discourse that would contain very pronounced meanings in political, institutional, and technological ways, as well as ultimately reflecting cultural identities and difference. The Unionists understood their government to be emulating Japanese patterns of reform and modernization that would create a secular, armed nation capable of defending itself against domestic and external threats in a form suitable for the modern, Eurocentric world. These patterns included the obvious constitutional and representative institutions, though the Ottoman Sultan could no longer serve as the pole around which to elicit national loyalty as the Japanese Emperor had been for Japan. The Sultan was now merely to be a figurehead; Ottoman patriotism would be generated from within: through a sincere love for the Ottoman homeland and respect for the modern, civilized, democratic nation-state, this patriotism would come naturally for citizens of the empire who shared in its legacy—the military history of Ottoman conquests.

Political critiques of the CUP came from former supporters of the Young Turk movement who had become disillusioned with the centralizing path of the Unionist government after 1909. Concerned about preserving true constitutionalism and a spirit of Ottomanism within a diverse ethnoreligious society, they voiced their opposition using the Japanese example to discreetly highlight Ottoman shortcomings. Other critiques were voiced by Islamists whose vision of the Ottoman polity and its patriotic citizenry was

informed by Islamic institutions, heritage, and morality, much of which was considered to have been violated by the secular, Western-oriented nature of the Unionists. For them, Japan had clung to its native, spiritual values, and the Ottomans were to be no different, with Islam as the guiding principle in reaching an appropriate form of modernity. In essence, the Japanese trope illustrated whatever political message the authors intended. As army officer Pertev Bey had insisted, Ottoman patriotism and moral character were the essential driving force behind every facet of a nation's advance, whether militarily, economically, politically, or socially. The dispute lay in defining the foundations of this Ottoman morality, a question that inevitably leads us to the issue of formulating identity in the late years of the Empire.

More will be said about the conflation of the Unionists' understanding of leadership as requiring military and racially Turkish components. From their purely political perspective, challenges to CUP rule could be deflected through drawing parallels between their policies and those of Meiji Japan. Those in power looked at issues related to maintaining power (military modernization, political centralization) while those excluded from power used the Japan model to argue for a greater share of it. The discursive image of the Japanese nation, its institutions and people, resonated throughout the Empire as the model to emulate, and this indicates that despite the opposition manifested among anti-CUP groups who also used the Japan model in their critiques, the desire to achieve some form of modernity was shared by Ottoman individuals across a very wide political spectrum.

7

Politics, Cultural Identity, and the Japanese Example

Ottoman pan-Asianist sentiments were widely shared among people in the Empire. Images of the Japanese nation supported an alternative, pan-Asian, Ottoman doctrine uniting various sectors of society in the face of Western imperialism in a more inclusive fashion that would not violate Islamic or other previous affiliations while suggesting the construction of a future nation. This ideology could be understood to incorporate all members of the Empire into a functional Ottoman political solidarity whose identity was now to be redirected and expanded into the larger entity of the "East." Solidarity with Japan and its accomplishments informed a kind of "horizontal mediation" among all Ottoman citizens regardless of religion, ethnicity, or other orientation, so that Muslims, Christians and Jews, Druzes, Kurds, Arabs and Turks, modernists, traditionalists, and secularists, statesmen, provincial notables, middle-class professionals, and even the illiterate were attracted by this rationale of "modern Easternism." In addition, pan-Asian solidarity with Japan could provide ideological support for Ottoman institutions and policies that governed relations between state and civil society in a process of "vertical mediation." Japanese imagery arbitrated between the Ottoman Sultan and his bureaucrats in conceptions of leadership, monarchical rule, and scientific advance; between the Sultan and his subjects in a merging of Abdülhamidian pan-Islam and pan-Asianism, between members of the Young Turk movement attempting to reinstate the constitution, and generally between Ottoman officialdom and its newly conceived citizenry through justification of modernizing policies, reform initiatives, and other efforts by the state to centralize and/or exert administrative control over society.

But the discursive imagery depicting modern Japan in Ottoman Turkish and Arabic press and literature could also serve to highlight the growing differences between peoples in the empire, and these divisions manifested as two types: political and cultural. Abdülhamid II and the Young Turks engaged in a political struggle in which they both deployed the trope of Japan to argue their positions. The post-revolution Unionist regime defied political opposition to its hold over the state at the same time that the opposition critiqued the CUP's policies, and both camps utilized the image of Japan in their

arguments. Either citizens' demands upon or criticism of the Ottoman Sultan or state apparatus was expressed in corresponding discursive representations of the Japanese state and its people at times.

Cultural differences emerging between groups in the Ottoman Empire occurred more gradually and were often reflected discreetly in the discussions and analyses of modern Japan, in the characteristics of the Japanese nation that particular authors chose to emphasize in their work. A careful reading of this discourse indicates much about the state of Ottoman cultural identities in the latter decades of the empire's existence. Whereas it seems as though pan-Asianism and the attitude that a reversal of fortunes was at hand for the East was widely felt in Ottoman lands with few exceptions, here the broadly shared solidarity ended. Ottomanism as a truly universally accepted ideology was beginning to wane as ethnoreligious separatist movements began to overtake the empire's unity, though a few committed ideologues continued to express their support for such inclusiveness. They used the Japanese example to underscore the possibilities inherent in Ottomanism. Religious and ethnic distinctions continued to become more pronounced—and they would, over time, eventually assume more than mere cultural difference, becoming issues of political contention as well. Whether between secularist, Islamic modernist, or conservative Muslim, or between Christian and Muslim on the religious question, the views of Japan put forth tended to mirror these disparities.

Some sectors of Ottoman society who were not immune to hopes of national recognition considered intensely patriotic Japan and its newfound modernity representative of the virtues of nation-state nationalism and self-rule. The empire had already lost several areas previously under Ottoman suzerainty to nationalist uprisings, and Japan's success as an independent and patriotic country did not go unnoticed by those still within the empire whose communal attitudes were transforming at the turn of the century. Prior to 1908, Japan's victory served to discredit the concept of transnational identity: Russia represented an antiquated, quasi-national community that was beaten by a small, independent, patriotic nation-state unified in ethnicity, language, and religion. It signified the end of an era—specifically the beginning of the end of the multinational empire—in favor of the modern nation-state. In a few short years after the 1905 war, when the Ottoman constitution had been reinstated but centralizing policies were jeopardizing the cohesiveness of the empire (and thus the effectiveness of Ottomanism as an ideology), the Japanese nation-state defined even more clearly the possibilities of an exclusivist national ideology.

Ottoman "Turkists" and "Arabists," influenced by the intellectual currents of Social Darwinism and racial hierarchies, European Romanticism, and revolutionary ideas of nationalism, awakened their own attachments to their ethnically or culturally defined pasts, and they began to set themselves apart from others within the Ottoman Empire in order to establish proto-national or even national boundaries through these "imagined pasts," as historian Benedict Anderson has described. However despite the hegemonic nature of these European ideas in the world at the time, and the seemingly subliminal yet globally widespread adoption of the concept of races as a way to categorize peoples and nations, the degree to which race became a *primary* identifier of

one's national identity varied greatly, depending upon an Ottoman individual's intellectual and physical proximity to Europe, as well as one's proximity to the corridors of Ottoman political power.

In other words, once this racialized current of thought was received and internalized by Ottoman intellectuals, it resulted in varying interpretations of what a nation meant, even within groups more aware of their ethnic origins than ever before. Discourse on modern Japan assisted in the process of articulating these new identities that would have political consequences for the empire as a whole. While most Ottoman elites were affected in some way by this new way of thinking about society, Christians and Muslims who still subscribed to the ideology of Ottomanism, saw races as distinct subgroups within a larger Ottoman *millet*. For them, the Ottoman "nation" was the more relevant source of a communal linkage, the political lifespan of which could be extended through tolerance for differences and cooperation with one another as Ottomans.¹ Islamic modernists saw the bond of religion as superceding any ethnic barriers, so that the Ottoman Empire was to be defined primarily as a Muslim nation, though non-Muslims were not necessarily excluded from their framework. These views could emanate from individuals from any one of the different ethnicities populating Ottoman lands. The Young Turk opposition movement had a plethora of such attitudes associated with it prior to the revolution.

But there was a subtle difference in the post-1908 Turkish governing elite's understanding of nationhood. Having seized firm control of the Ottoman government by 1909, influenced by pan-Turkic ideas flourishing among Central Asian, Turkic exiles from the Russian Empire who had resisted pan-Slavic policies there and countered with their own Turkist ideology, and coupled with a desire to link themselves to the Great Powers as a worthy participant in European affairs, the Unionists' affinity with Europe and their increasingly exclusive possession of Ottoman political power caused them to be profoundly attracted to racialized concepts of nationhood that would set them apart from others in the Ottoman Empire. This tendency was reflected in their particular view of the Japanese as a racially distinct and homogenous nation, and their embrace of this attitude appeared frequently in the Ottoman Turkish literature of the period.

While Ottomanist, Islamic modernist, pan-Turkist, Turkist, and Arabist were not necessarily mutually exclusive categories of identity, but overlapping layers of ethn-cultural affiliation, in times of crisis, the emphasis upon one or the other as a more significant marker of identity could become apparent. Some Ottoman intellectuals attempted to reconcile several of these identities, whereas others gravitated toward one more particular definition of nationhood. For the Ottoman Arabs, a group that could easily have been identified as ethnonational due to its racial and linguistic distinctiveness, the notion of a racialized identity seems to have been the least appealing as a defining factor in nationhood to the majority of its intellectual base. As echoed by the Arab intelligentsia's writings about the Japanese as a people defined primarily by their ancestral heritage and shared culture, Ottoman Arabs tended to define themselves similarly, as a people with a distinct ethnic background and language, but more importantly, as the founders of Islam who propagated a

faith and a civilization among other peoples in the Empire with whom they still shared an important legacy. Despite the existence of potentially divisive Muslim and Christian sects among the Arabs that one would assume would make a racial argument of nationhood a more logical argument for Arab unity and thus more appealing to Ottoman Arabs, the Arabs overwhelmingly did not emphasize race, but cultural heritage as the defining feature of their identity. These patterns, evident in the constantly reiterated discursive example of Japan, are indicative of how the intellectuals in these respective Turkish and Arab groups defined their national communities within the larger whole.

Ottoman ideas on gender roles as another aspect of national identity in a modern society were also mediated by the Japanese analogy of the nation's women in times of war and crisis. Ottoman writers at this time echoed European patterns of the cult of domesticity that relegated the woman to manager of the household and mentor to the next generation of patriots. The role of guardian in the preservation of "Eastern" identity and in the cultivation of a national consciousness was assigned to women as a patriotic duty to her homeland. This framework, while liberal for the time, ultimately maintained the subordination of women to the male patriarchy and effectively pushed them outside the political sphere.

Turkish Nationalism and Race

The historiographical usage of the term "Young Turk" tends to bring to mind a monolithic ideology of Turkish nationalism that is not an accurate portrayal of the movement's activities in the Ottoman Empire. Neither was it the sole motivation of their political organ, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Liberals in the Young Turk opposition had favored a degree of decentralization and autonomy for religious and other minorities just as many of the more nationalist Young Turks began to envision their empire as a Turkish nation and not as an Ottoman federation.² Historical evidence clearly proves that some Young Turks still loosely endorsed a philosophy of Ottomanism as a national ideology, while other prominent members of the CUP had Turkish nationalist leanings before and after the revolution.³

After successfully reinstating the Ottoman constitution in 1908, the division between these two Young Turk camps became more pronounced. In both cases, however, Young Turk Ottomanists and nationalists intertwined their conceptions of a restored empire with interpretations of the modern Japanese nation. A common thread in their divergent outlooks was the tendency to make comparisons with Japan to support ideological arguments concerning the salvation of the Ottoman polity. Proponents of Ottomanism who argued its validity as a unifying ideology for the diverse elements of Ottoman society employed Japanese images of constitutional democracy and egalitarianism to support their conception of a modern, Eastern state. They also incorporated Japan's patriotic behavior for the sake of the homeland into their philosophy through the specific example of Japan's performance in the Russo-Japanese War. As conceived by Ottomanists, their "nation" was to resemble that of Japan, yet at the same time it was to maintain the notion of the empire as a workable multiethnic, multireligious confederation whose members were

bound together by their dedication to the Ottoman homeland. For the nationalist Young Turk faction, many of whom dominated the CUP political organ in the years following the revolution, they considered themselves modern Japan's equals within a fellow nation-state. Many of these Young Turk Unionists pointed out the similarities between their empire and Japan as independent Eastern nations based on state issues—constitutional government, the provision for education, military reform, good leadership, patriotism, and at times an underlying nationalist agenda—in order to legitimate themselves as the rightful heirs who would govern the newly rejuvenated Ottoman Empire.

To better grasp the nuances of the discourse published on modern Japan that signified a Turkish nationalist orientation among ruling elites in the empire, first we must examine some of the pan-Turkist influences that pervaded Young Turk thinking prior to and after the Unionists' assumption of power. Second, in this discussion of Turkish nationalism we must distinguish between CUP members with pro-Turkish sentiments who possessed very particularistic attitudes and policy ideas about the future Ottoman state as a Turkish-dominated nation, with Turks at the helm, and the (pan-)Turkist ideologues who abstractly theorized about the character of what they called the Turkish nation in ways that may not have been meant to intentionally exclude others in the Ottoman polity from power. But Turkic immigrants and Muslim political exiles from Russia whose publications were disseminated in Ottoman lands and who themselves associated frequently with Young Turk Unionists later on laid many of the intellectual foundations for Turkish nationalist thought in the Empire's final years.⁴

Turkic Muslims from Russia who had experienced the firsthand the consequences of pan-Slavic Russification back home viewed Slavic and Turkic peoples as engaged in a civilizational, racial-national competition with one another. They often viewed Japan as a distinct Eastern race capable of challenging Russian-Slavic hegemony in Asia; the images of Japan as an advanced Asian nation produced by Turkic Muslim newspaper editors in Russian territories made their way to Ottoman readers, traversing imperial boundaries. Some Turkic Muslims sought refuge in Istanbul, bringing their ideological predispositions and their publishing ambitions with them. Many of these exiles wrote about Japan as an example to Muslim Turks of Asia to achieve the same level of progress;⁵ they attempted to draw parallels between the Japanese and "Turkic races" in Asia, or they referred to Japan in more esoteric discussions of race, culture, and/or civilization. They often compared Japanese modernity to the Turkic quest for a balance between Eastern and Western civilizations; this was a dilemma also pondered by liberal supporters of the Young Turk revolution who maintained their Ottomanist and/or Islamic modernist ideals in its aftermath and so too would have been intrigued by the Turkists' discourse on modern Japan. But Turkic Muslims from Russia, confronted with ethnoreligious pan-Slavism, possessed an ideology that was overall a secular one, linked to Western thought, and thus was underpinned by their belief in rational science as an agent in defining identity (so that race, as biology, was a scientific determinant of the nation). This ideology resonated strongly with members of the CUP who would increasingly express a Turkish nationalist orientation

after 1909—those who saw the Ottoman Empire's survival as contingent upon continued rule by Turks.

One of the infrequent, pre Russo-Japanese War references to the Japanese people as a kind of ethnic nation that appeared in Ottoman Turkish literature was undoubtedly in the writings of the influential Crimean Turk journalist İsmail Gaspıralı (1851–1914). A cultural pan-Turkist and political organizer with connections to Turkish nationalist associations such as *Türk Derneği* after the 1908 revolution, Gaspıralı frequently included editorial-style articles on Japan's achievements in his Ottoman weekly *Tercüman* that was published in Bahçeşaray in the Crimea from 1882 until 1917. True to the nature of journalism (in Gaspıralı's case as a Turk from the Russian Empire) had an effect upon the content of his paper and his impressions of Japan. Believing that "the Japanese are now Asia's example of progress and modern methods,"⁶ many of his writings emphasized Japanese "economic, political and intellectual perseverance and study" of Russian, European, and American practices by the entire Japanese nation in their "journey of national servitude for the homeland" that rapidly yielded "mature and knowing commanders and politicians, trained personnel and an organized military... presses, a system of laws, a parliament and industry managers."⁷ Much of his editorial focus early on was dedicated to describing the Japanese as "...dervishes in their zeal and love of country..." who, having "civilization and progress as their mission," studied and gained knowledge in the West that they transported home.⁸ Through the adoption of Western methods, Japan had prevailed over China in war. The Japanese "had become masters of the international laws of nations," and "had become ranked among Europe's civilized peoples," by even the Europeans themselves.⁹ Reminiscing about his experiences when a student himself in Europe, he contrasted this dedication of the Japanese students to what he considered an abysmal lack of similar character and motivation among Muslims, and particularly the Egyptians whom he encountered there, "...it being impossible to find a single Egyptian who possesses integrity and perseverance."¹⁰ Yet for a Crimean Muslim opposed to Russian rule who identified with Central Asian, Turko-Mongolian heritage, his discussions also contained an implicit message of the interconnectedness of character and race (reflected in his choice of words), a popular notion heavily absorbed into later Turkish nationalist thinking. He understood Asians as a collection of "Mongol races" in the region, whose ethnicity and physical attributes underpinned any assimilation of Western traits; "...although twenty-six years earlier there was nothing out of the ordinary about Japan's Mongols besides pride and self-confidence, as an unsystematic and disorderly [country] to the same degree as China's Mongols," he wrote around the time of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), "Japan's Mongols...generally wear European (*Frenk*) dress and uniforms, so that if it were not for their Mongol facial features and shape, it would be possible to think they are Europeans."¹¹

Tercüman, an Ottoman Turkish paper published in the Crimea, was a conduit for the flow of information and ideas across imperial boundaries that linked the pan-Asian intellectual milieu of Turkic and Tatar Muslims in Russia to Turks in Ottoman lands. Gaspıralı's ideas were the start of representations

of the Japanese nation as a new formula for consolidating Ottoman state and society into a cohesive, modern polity that could repel Western intrusion. And his Japanese trope of modernity shaped what eventually emerged as a Spencerian sense of nationhood: the racialized discourse of Turkish nationalism that surfaced more prominently after the turn of the century.

The Volga Tatar and Turkist ideologue Yusuf Akçura (b.1876–d.1935) had predicted a debate over national identity would occur in Ottoman lands when in 1904 he penned his famous and provocative “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” (Three Types of Policies) that was published in the Young Turk journal *Türk* in Cairo.¹² Believing that, though it had not appeared in Ottoman lands until very recently, “the German interpretation of nationality—one that assumed ethnicity as the basis of nationality...is closer to reality,”¹³ he envisioned Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and Turkism to be on a collision course, since “real equality does not exist” in the Ottoman nation due to the diversity of its ethnoreligious composition.¹⁴ Ottomanism, he argued, could not reconcile Christian and Muslim and thus had failed; Islamic tradition was based upon an antiquated social inequity between them. Turkism united those ethnically Turkish Muslims both within and outside the Empire, but of course excluded non-Turks. His naïve suggestion that “the other non-Turkish Muslim groups who have already been Turkified to an extent would be further assimilated” if Turkism was the ideological choice, was tempered immediately by his observation that non-Turks would likely become alienated even as a pan-Turkic unity across Asia and Eastern Europe would emerge based on shared ethnicity, language, and religion.¹⁵ Still, in Akçura’s opinion, Turkism held the most promise for the Empire, especially since the national strength derived from a Turkish Ottoman state would confirm it as “the most powerful, the most progressive, and civilized of all Turkish societies...” and thus it “could play a role similar to that which is played by Japan among the East Asian ethnicities.”¹⁶

Both the (pan-)Turkist intellectuals and many Young Turks were deeply affected by Western conceptions of nationhood and the role of certain primordial features that were believed to contribute to a people’s identity. Japanese success in achieving Western-style modernity further encouraged this ideological understanding of identity that seemed to prove inherent, racial differences among peoples, that justified categorizing peoples racially according to the prevailing “scientific” theories of the time, and, for some Young Turks whose Turkist leanings were already in existence, that allowed a more public, distinctly exclusivist nationalist agenda to be expressed that openly called for Turks to remain the dominant ruling ethnicity in the Ottoman Empire. Expressions of excitement over Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, a victory by “the yellow race,” the disproving of “the inferiority of the yellow races to the West,” and the numerous other statements by Young Turks in their publications explicitly demonstrate the Young Turks’ appropriation of European racial theorizing to condemn the West for its arrogance. It was the beginning of a more racialized Ottoman Turkish understanding of the world.

The works of Turkist intellectuals often had only implicit references to racial character within a larger framework of cultural heritage when defining a nation. Ziya Gökalp, nicknamed the “architect of Turkish nationalism” despite the ambiguity of his Kurdish origins actually attempted to explore

the meaning of nation beyond the ideas of race popular among advocates of pan-Turkism at the turn of the century and later among Young Turk Unionists (as a member of the Central Council of the CUP from 1908 to 1918). Gökalp theorized that the shared experience that forged the Turkish nation was framed by “Three Currents of Thought” intertwined—Turkism, or Ottoman Turks’ relationship to their Turkic brethren in Asia, Islamism, the notion of the *ümmet* and the Turks’ place in the Islamic community as fellow Muslims, and modernism, the acceptance of a new form of civilization enabled by modern technology that transcended culture to reach all regions of the world and unite them in what Gökalp called “internationality”:

A true internationality based on science is taking the place of internationality based on religion. The participation of Japan, on the one hand, and of Turkey, on the other, in Western civilization is giving a secular character to European internationality... thus the area of the *ümmet* is increasingly differentiating itself from the area of internationality. In short, the Turkish nation today belongs to the Ural-Altai group of peoples, to the Islamic *ümmet*, and to Western internationality.¹⁷

He often referred to the Japanese nation in his many essays on the nature of society and the assimilation of Western civilization into Turkish national culture.¹⁸ Gökalp assumed (as did other Social Darwinists) that Japan’s selectivity was the assimilative solution for the Turkish nation and its dilemma with Western forms of knowledge. For him, Japan was an alternative model for Turkish modernity, but its importance was not necessarily racial or linguistic even if the Turkish nation was differentiated by these categories. The Japanese demonstrated the possibility for entry (or in the Turks’ case, reentry) into the Western conceptual space as a full partner in modern civilization. And, interestingly, Japan represented an example of modernity for a Turkish nation-state in Gökalp’s eyes as easily as it illustrated unity in a multiethnic Ottoman community for others.

In a discussion of the origin of national sentiments, he argued that “national character” emerged as a reaction to a crisis or grave threat to a people. Gökalp cited Japan (and Germany) as examples, surmising that “Nipponism was the product of the dangerous and humiliating pressures put on the Japanese by the United States and Europe....”¹⁹ After the crisis subsided, the ideals of the nation remained behind and these ideals generated an incredible will in the nation’s subjects that manifested itself in great demonstrations of sacrifice. Again Japan (and Prussia) served to illustrate the point, this time through a somewhat fictive version of Japanese history:

Under the impact of national fervor...at the time when Japan had to decide either to live decently or to die with honor, the Shogun willingly renounced its sovereignty and the nobility its fiefs, and the Mikadō, renouncing his absolute rights, proclaimed the sovereignty of the people...the power which creates and directs the will is ideals. Men think that the inspirations of national grace are their own wills; they do not seem to realize that this will emanates from the soul of the nation.²⁰

Perhaps when Gökalp wrote these words, he had in mind the current state of affairs: the Ottoman Empire was engaged in the Balkan Wars starting in 1912 that threatened the Ottoman capital of Constantinople itself, fomenting Turkish national sentiments. This onslaught forced an expression of solidarity to defend the Ottoman Turkish homeland against attack—and very subtly created the connection between Turkish national identity and military duty, conflating them into a powerful metaphor of nationhood that would be adopted by the governing elite of the empire in the First World War, and later, in the War of Independence that ultimately resulted in the formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

Whereas Ziya Gökalp did not use the term “race” or “ethnicity” explicitly in defining a Turkish nation, there is an implicit message of race here: in the linkage to other Turks in Asia through language and origins that separated the Ottoman Turks from other groups residing in the Empire. For him, the Ottoman Empire was the Turkish nation, with its links to other Turks, to a lesser extent to other Muslims, and to modern civilization (the West). It was precisely this focus upon Turkish national culture that caused the Ottomanist Arab intellectual Sâfi’ al-Ḥuṣṣrî, whose ideas will be presented shortly, to debate Gökalp publicly on the repercussions to Ottomanism of such an exclusive nationalist ideology.

In later years Ziya Gökalp would unequivocally relinquish any support for ethnicity as a determining factor in identity altogether, writing that “...a nation is not a racial or ethnic or geographic or political or volitional group but one composed of individuals who share a common language, religion, morality, and aesthetics, that is to say, who have received the same education.”²¹ These words he expressed in the aftermath of the empire’s dissolution as a multiethnic, multireligious polity, perhaps retrospectively, after witnessing the destructiveness of such racial thinking upon groups in Ottoman lands. His influence upon the CUP in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, however, was clear: there was a distinctly Turkish nation within the empire that must dutifully struggle against Western imperialism while simultaneously absorbing the modern civilization proliferating in the world, as Japan had done.

The importance of language and word choices by contributors to Young Turk publications writing about Japan and the Japanese should not be underestimated, for they discreetly signify an ever-more racialized understanding of Turkish national identity. As Şükrü Hanioglu so definitively shows in his thorough work on the Young Turk movement,

...despite their adherence to Le Bon’s, Letourneau’s, and Haeckel’s theories, the Young Turks refrained from formulating a nationalist theory involving race during the formative years of their movement. Although in their scientific writings they frequently discussed the importance of race, they proposed no theory evaluating “the Turkish race.” There is little doubt that this was because, in the Darwinist racial hierarchy, Turks were always assigned to the lowest ranks....However, a strong focus on race did emerge immediately after Japan’s first victories over Russia in 1904.²²

A strong Turkist attitude was adopted between 1902 and 1905 in the Committee of Progress and Union and this endured through 1907, in order to establish

firmer relations with Turkic groups in and outside the Empire. Nonetheless, after 1907 and into 1908, while attempting to cultivate support for their political actions immediately preceding the revolution, the Young Turks used Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and Turkism interchangeably and opportunistically depending upon need. The core of nationalists who published in *Türk* and *Şura-yı Ümmet* still expressed ideas that echoed of Turkism, but they were cautious in their use of racial theory in order to not alienate potential supporters who were non-Turks.²³ A subtle crafting of arguments was necessary here in order not to marginalize other peoples in the empire: embracing racial theorizing generally while simultaneously discrediting the Western-inspired hierarchy of races had to be balanced with the tenuous Ottoman domestic situation in which the cooperation of non-Turkish groups like the Armenians was essential to reinstating the Ottoman constitution, because political power was not yet in the hands of the CUP. Once in power, these racial attitudes would become more blatant and more exclusionary.

In the second constitutional period, and especially after 1909, Unionists with proto-Turkish nationalist leanings absorbed the Turkists' ideas while solidifying their own political interpretations of this ideology to mean the Ottoman state must be governed by an ethnically Turkish elite, to the exclusion of others who were not racially and linguistically defined as Turks. From 1911 onward, the year in which Akçura founded the journal *Türk Yurdu* to advance Turkish cultural studies, both Yusuf Akçura's and Ziya Gökalp's ideas on Turkism were generally accepted as the trajectory for the Ottoman Turkish state to follow—Akçura's treatise was republished again in 1912—and as scholar Taner Akçam reveals in his pioneering work, by this time, there was little room left in this political conception for either non-Muslims or non-Turks.²⁴ The Unionists' motivation to preserve the Ottoman state emanated from a position of dominance and caused a dangerous conflation of certain characteristics they understood to be uniquely Turkish—an ethnolinguistic Turkish identity combined with the sense of patriotic, historic military duty to the state, which ultimately could and did turn violent during the last years of the war-torn Ottoman Empire. Let us deal with each of these newfound 'Turkish national attributes' in turn.

A study by Masami Arai on the Turkish nationalist movement in the Ottoman Empire after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and its relationship to several prominent Ottoman Turkish publications has yielded some intriguing arguments concerning the nationalist leanings of their owner-editor-contributors and the changing political tone of the articles over time. Arai's monograph relies upon the journals *Genç Kalemler*, *Türk Yurdu*, *Türk Ocağı*, and *İslâm Mecmuası* to interpret the ideological dispositions of their Ottoman writers and the increasingly Turkish nationalist rhetoric that appeared in these magazines. Arai also makes connections between the CUP governing apparatus and those involved with these publications. Articles that appeared in *Genç Kalemler* and *Türk Yurdu* highlighted Japan's achievements in the modern world as a means of supporting or enhancing aspects of Turkish nationalist identity in the pages of these presses between 1911 and 1914.

Genç Kalemler was the extension of a literary and sociological magazine launched originally in Anatolian Manastır that was published in Salonica from

1910 to 1912. Its editor-in-chief, Nesimî Sarım, was a secretary in the Central Council of the CUP.²⁵ In light of the nascent sentiment among some journalists and political figures that language formed a category of differentiation among peoples (a by-product of nineteenth-century Ottoman print-capitalism), the magazine was initially founded with the aim of overhauling Ottoman literature to be more representative of the common citizen, thus inspiring loyalty and association with the Ottoman polity. Arai claimed that the journal's stance evolved into a more particularistic Turkish nationalist one after the first several issues. Articles began to appear in support of "linguistic nationalism" that justified the simplification and purification of Ottoman Turkish to make it more accessible to and more representative of the Ottoman general populace "from the Balkans to Baghdad"; it was suggested that Arabic and Persian words, syntax, and grammatical structures be removed from Ottoman Turkish so that it would be more easily taught in schools and it would link the Ottomans to their "Turanian family expanding from the Mediterranean Sea to the Pacific Ocean."²⁶ True to its philosophy, and with CUP financial and political support for its policy and staff, *Genç Kalemler* soon began publishing its articles in modified Turkish, with the subtitle "yeni lisânla" ("with new language"),²⁷ because "now, a new and natural—and indigenous—language is needed for Turks who have entered a new life, an age of awakening."²⁸ To save the Ottoman polity from dissolution required the achievement of progress: a literate nation that could quickly absorb knowledge, science, technology and literature was the Ottoman Empire's patriotic justification for reforming and simplifying the language.

Here, the example of Japan served Turkish nationalist purposes in a literary milieu. This group of Turkish intellectuals viewed themselves as pioneers embarking on a path to a new nation much like Japan, whose choices were to be emulated and learned from. Japan had transformed itself into a modern, independent nation-state; the contributors to these publications, who increasingly defined their national community as ethnically Turkish, and who restricted its membership to those who were Turkish-literate, found justification for their movement in the character of the Japanese quest for knowledge as a foundation upon which to build a new society.

Genç Kalemler serialized an essay titled "The Japanese Empire" by a Japanese Baron in 1911. The articles were edited by Ottoman journalist Kaya Alp.²⁹ The goal of publishing this translation was as follows:

We must learn how these "English of the Far East" have advanced, who have developed to a degree that will make the West's most progressive, most civilized nations envious, and who compete with the most powerful, most formidable governments... To recognize, to learn the phases of progress of the Japanese, the great people that were the former neighbors of our grand and unequalled Turks, is one of the rather important points in adopting a scale for ourselves.³⁰

The rest of the article delved into Japan's historical relationship with the West, its isolationism, and the importance of Dutch scholarship in Nagasaki to transferring Western science and technology to Japan by showing the way

to European civilization. The second article in the series continued the historical explanation of how Japan had dispatched students to Europe and America in order to learn more about modern sciences, and in the third and final article, the Japanese Baron clarified Japan's ideological basis for doing this (the Charter Oath):

After the establishment of the empire [i.e. after the Meiji Restoration], the whole nation, materially and spiritually, despite all difficulties, began to accept European knowledge and ideas. One of the first declarations of our empire was an oath issued publicly to this effect: to search for advances and knowledge and information among every people and nation, and to abandon antiquated, nonsensical ideas.³¹

Implicit in the Turkish intellectuals' view of these Japanese achievements was the need for educated, literate citizens to carry out these tasks. Their Turkish nationalist aims, somewhat obscured by shrouding the demand for literacy and a new language in an optimism that emphasized the modernizing nature of the reform, would still ultimately exclude from the nation any Muslim who was not linguistically oriented toward the modern state's updated language of new Turkish, such as the Arab and Kurdish populations of the empire.

There was also an anticolonial, anti-Western content to these articles in *Genç Kalemler* reflecting Ottoman frustrations over European interference or behavior in Ottoman lands. The author expressed his disappointment in the European nations' responses to Japanese efforts and determination to pursue knowledge and attain progress, saying that in return, Europe viewed Japan's actions with dissatisfaction. "Is this discontent equitable?" he pondered.³² Kaya Alp then commented,

To go to Europe, to see Western progress is to look for, to find, and to adopt that which will be able to be applied to our country. But unfortunately we see that upon arriving in Europe, it is impossible for us to look for and to find things that we can apply to our country, save the opposite—that which will bring harm to the country.

That which we take as the strongest warning is the dissatisfaction which Europe shows towards the striving of new nations. We feel and see this in our own country. But if we work at it like the Japanese, if we surround ourselves with strength like the Japanese, Europe's dissatisfaction remains merely a word.³³

Kaya Alp was inspired by the Japanese rejection of European hegemonic claims as the country proceeded into modernity; he believed that Ottoman Turkey would be able to achieve the same level of civilization in spite of resistance from the West.

Meiji Japan had also inspired Ottoman ruling elites to recognize the tremendous importance of the military in facilitating the national destiny of a state: whether the military be the vehicle for reform and modernization, the armed protector of the state's territorial integrity, or the receptacle for its people's

patriotic spirit and moral essence, a polity required a modern military to guarantee its survival. Japan's victories against Russia in 1905 drove home these points, since Japan had, in a short space of time, developed a technologically modern army and navy of well-trained personnel, led by a capable and well-educated officer corps. The Japanese reverence for their ancestors, Japan's ancient samurai spirit, and its bushidō warrior ethos were considered to be the foundations upon which the Japanese built their powerful new nation; the Young Turks, passionately inspired by Japanese patriotic spirit to serve the homeland, hoped to rescue their own Empire by drawing upon a similar gazi warrior spirit believed to be the essence of Ottoman imperial strength. Japan illustrated the potential ways in which military officers and personnel could become directly involved in Ottoman political processes. Certainly Japanese imperial actions in East Asia leading up to and following the Russo-Japanese War, including the formal annexation of Korea in 1910, also justified for the Unionists the imperialist mentality that some people were meant to rule, either to expand or to preserve empire.

At this critical historical juncture, within the international climate of the turn of the twentieth century in which Eurocentric attitudes about racial hierarchies were rather universally accepted and imperial competition through wars was the normal state of affairs, the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War created an incredible moment in which racial identities became bound up in the exercise of modern military reforms and achievements. The relationship between ethnic race and military force evolved into a symbiotic, teleological one in which those peoples scientifically determined to be "superior races" became defined as those who succeeded in wars, or else success in war and military might reflected innate racial superiority. In other words, racial identity assumed a new meaning: the right to political and military power.

For the Young Turk Unionists, the message of military determinism in achieving political goals fell on receptive ears by the end of the nineteenth century. In fact, this lesson made perfect sense within the Ottoman historical narrative of conquest and the gazi state, as former Ottoman glory had been based in large part upon the ability of the empire to defeat its foes on the battlefield. Additionally, the pattern of Ottoman reform initiatives to stave off dissolution of the empire emerged first through the channel of the Ottoman military before trickling into Ottoman administrative and societal avenues. This desire for the Ottoman military to protect, reform, and save the empire was never more urgent than in the first decades of the twentieth century when, following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 and the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897, the Ottomans found themselves besieged yet again, this time by the Habsburg annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, the Italian invasion of Ottoman Tripoli (Libya) in 1911, and the Balkan Wars starting in 1912. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War reinforced for the Young Turk Unionist regime the belief in races of people as nations who could overcome adversity, become modern, and defend their lands, provided they were loyal to their character and heritage.³⁴

The coalescence of the influences on Young Turk Unionist thinking described here led in part to turbulent consequences for the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. To reiterate, the Young Turks were not immune to

the European ideas of race and racial hierarchy that proliferated in the world at this time—in fact these ideas were profoundly attractive, seen as the modern science of the day. Central Asian Turks, Muslims from Russia, and other Turkic intellectuals, building on these new notions concerning the innate character of nations, promoted the view that there was an ethnolinguistic Turkish nation stretching from the Balkans to Siberia that needed to seek its place in the world. Journalists and *littérateurs* stressed the importance of a new modern language, a “new Turkish,” in their publications as a vehicle for disseminating modern sciences while promoting the linguistic foundation of the nation as Turkish. The outcome of the Russo-Japanese War highlighted and reinforced for Young Turk Unionists who had already internalized a secular, proto-nationalistic identity the idea of the ethnic, racial nation, its military prowess being dependent upon national solidarity. Their expressions of excitement for Japan’s victory in racial terms reflected the Young Turks’ embrace of racialized thinking. Modern Japan provided the perfect pattern for independence, scientific advance, and capitalist economic development, as well as for racial identity and military might. The Unionists possessed not only a geographic and intellectual proximity to Europe in the twentieth century that helped to foment such thinking, but after 1909 they also firmly held the reins of Ottoman political power and so were in a position to rationalize governing over others according to this pattern.³⁵ For them, the synthesis of these influences resulted in their understanding of the Ottoman state as *their* nation: an ethnolinguistically Turkish nation in the European sense. The Turks, as a distinct race, as historic defenders of Islam and of empire, who liberated the empire from an autocratic Sultan, were entitled to Ottoman political power. Their military duty was to rule as an elite, to educate and promote statehood, and to protect the empire against enemies within and without. The Ottoman Empire was now a Turkish empire, the Ottoman military the custodians of this empire, and increasingly, international and domestic crises would be dealt with by the Ottoman Turks militarily (just as did every other nation, Japan the most apparent, current, and influential example of all).

The effects of this conflation of racial identity, military duty, and political power by the ruling Unionists were undeniable, motivating them to privately view non-Turks and other minorities as inferior, potentially disloyal or subversive, and in the final estimation, to be excluded from the Ottoman Turkish nation.³⁶ It enabled the possibility of ethnic and sectarian violence within society, perpetrated at times by the Ottoman central authorities in their quest to serve and save the nation. The execution of Arab journalists and political activists in 1915 and 1916 as traitors, and the Armenian genocide that began in 1915, are the foremost examples of the Unionists carrying out their perceived military duty, to defend the Turkish nation against internal attack.

The other noticeable effect of the Unionists’ sense of nationhood and political power was, as a ruling elite, to promote a sense of national solidarity among the populace. And here the attempt to forge Turkish nationhood within a larger, diverse multiethnic Ottoman Empire proved to be more ambiguous and contradictory. For the *littérateurs*, the statesmen, the writers, journalists, and activists with Turkish nationalist attitudes, language and its role in educating a modern society as patriotic citizens proved to be a complicated issue.

The CUP sponsored cultural activities and community events in an effort to promote its reform program and to gain political support at home,³⁷ and one such activity, a conference in French on “*La Renaissance du Japon*,” illustrates not only the degree to which the Japanese nation was a universal Ottoman referent for progress and modernization and an image with which the Unionists hoped to be associated (domestically and abroad), but also the extent to which the sponsors of and participants in this conference understood their Ottoman nation to be a (racially defined) Turkish one. Held in 1911 at the “*l’Amicale*” salon in Istanbul, this seminar exemplified Japanese national achievements the CUP respected and anticipated in their near future. M. Salih Gourdji, the president of the Commission for Conferences and Evening Courses, commenced the proceedings by introducing the speaker, jurist, and advisor to the Ottoman Ministry of Justice, Count Léon Ostrorog, to the audience.³⁸

Ostrorog began by dispelling the myth of “the Japanese miracle”: what he described as Japan’s adoption and total assimilation of Occidental culture after having freed itself from the strangulating noose of Unequal Treaties with the West; by explosive military exploits, Japan then forced its entry into the exclusive realm of the Great Powers.³⁹ This, Ostrorog said, was not a miracle at all, but an “admirable psychology,” a consequence of “the fundamental inclinations of the Japanese people.”⁴⁰ True to the kind of sociological and racial theories predominating at the time, Ostrorog went on to explain that Japanese language was absolutely unique, reflecting the uniqueness of the Japanese race itself.⁴¹ In addition to and because of these innate Japanese traits, Ostrorog postulated, the Japanese possessed the keen ability to recognize the potential “high value” of a foreign civilization “of another race,” and, adopt it (as with advanced Chinese culture).⁴² The end result of this process? Japan attained a higher form of civilization because it profited quickly from instruction, or from cultures that it encountered.⁴³ Ostrorog’s explanation of Japanese fundamental character intimated (ironically) that they were secure enough in this heritage not to become susceptible to “narrow nationalism”; he also pointed out Japanese “logical faculties”: they had the capacity to correctly deduce from a proposition all of the possible consequences; using Chinese science, they developed a unique governing system of “democratic imperialism.”⁴⁴ Samurai intelligence and appetite for learning, said Ostrorog, led the Japanese to the premise that knowledge and science were universal. Liberating science from culture allowed Japan to look beyond itself for information without threatening its native identity (Was he familiar with Sakuma Shozan’s philosophy?).

Delving into the historical details leading up to the Meiji Restoration, Ostrorog described how Japanese individuals such as Itō and Inoue, men of samurai origins who had studied in Europe and were “convinced of the absolute superiority of science,” had led Japan to adopt the next superior civilization because of these reasons:

They noted also that, just as a mechanical rationale existed in Europe, there existed a political rationale, grouping the component strengths of a nation in the sense of the greatest consequence of power and well-being; a centralized, hierarchical . . . administration; a supreme authority,

always unique and indivisible, without itself having any memory of a feudal scattering of strengths.⁴⁵

Whereas the Japanese ability to discern the value of a superior foreign civilization and to assimilate the desired elements of that civilization had in the past yielded Bushidō, in the modern era Japanese and Occidental civilizations together had produced young samurai” whose souls as warriors had forged Japan’s independence. As humble scholars and activists who valued science, who revered Japan’s past, who strived to achieve international equality, their passion for knowledge had raised the nation, even by accepting foreign collaboration if necessary. They ceased to view foreigners as barbarians, instead acquiring the West’s civilizational attributes, always remembering that “intelligence and character cannot be taken from others.”⁴⁶

Ostorog’s lecture was intended for those elites who governed and could actively reform the Sublime Porte and Ottoman society. He elaborated upon the nature of the Japanese state with its new modern forms: the breakup of the class system, the severance of samurai stipends and the reorganization of the Japanese economic structure, the implementation of Western institutional reforms, legal treaty revisions, the Japanese constitution, military conscription, compulsory education, and the provision for universities. Ostorog ended by saying that the Japanese had looked beyond European brutality to find the culture of science awaiting them, as if to tell his Ottoman audience of their need to do likewise.⁴⁷ His lecture was well received, at least by one Young Turk newspaper.⁴⁸

We can measure the impact of Ostorog’s conference upon Turkish nationalist ideology during the CUP regime in two ways: first, in its contributions to the meaning of race in the Empire among educated elites, and second, in encouraging an emphasis to be placed upon language as a signifier of (racial) identity. Ostorog’s discussion of the importance of language as a signifier of a race of people encouraged nationalist Turks connected to the CUP to pursue language reform designed to replace the hodge-podge Ottoman bureaucratic language, with its infusion of foreign words and syntax borrowed mainly from Persian and Arabic, with a new Turkish vernacular. Master-of-Ceremonies Gourdjı’s closing remarks at the 1911 conference iterated as a goal of the salon to “prepare our dear Turkey . . . for a more fertile, and more glorious future.”⁴⁹ Gourdjı’s comments revealed the provocative undertones of CUP ideology in the summary he provided for how the Amicale Society would facilitate development of a liberal, modern nation:

Here, gentlemen, is the goal we pursue: spreading through evening courses the teaching of the Turkish language, because the diffusion of this language will be one of the principal conduits or . . . the crucible in which national feeling will be worked out . . . in order to prepare, to form the valiant soldiers of tomorrow, to develop the taste for social studies, the social education by the institution of public conferences.⁵⁰

Gourdjı and the Amicale Society hoped to inculcate Turkish language into Ottoman subjects as an antecedent to their modernization of the Empire as a

Turkish state. In 1911 the primary aim of Amicale's gatherings was, through association and the sharing of knowledge in a public forum, to create a form of CUP-patronized unity in the Ottoman Empire that would appear to be relatively inclusive, or Ottomanist. The president of this society, with Ottoman statesmen present to legitimate its activities, made it abundantly clear, when in the next breath he maintained that "Courses and conferences shall be free-of-charge and open to everybody: Moslems, Christians or Jews, may attend them. It matters not to which religion they belong, so long as they are all stirred by a similar desire, a like feeling, an identical passion: to work for the foundation of Ottoman unity, the grandeur of the Empire."⁵¹ Ottoman unity was his phrase to elicit support from non-Turks in the audience; unity required a loyalty not to one's religious sect, but to one another as Ottomans, who for example subscribed to Japan's modernizing methods to lead to a regeneration of empire. Nonetheless, the Unionists assumed in their Ottomanist rhetoric that they would be the enlightened intellectuals who, having liberated the empire from absolutism, would guide the rest of the population into the new age according to their priorities. They were the equivalent of Meiji-era samurai statesmen, to the exclusion of other Ottoman ideological orientations.

President Gourdjı's closing remarks at this conference shed light on the disposition of the attendees and on the CUP's intended purpose for this public conference. Comparing Japanese historical experience and social progress with Ottoman derelictions, he asked his audience,

What have we done? Immobile, impassive, we attended our own decomposition, our dismemberment, our ruin, we rolled toward the abyss. And whereas by a great effort of valiance, of patriotism of course, of a whole of civic virtues, this small people of the Far East... by their means alone, exacted attention upon it, commanded the respect of the most powerful potentates on earth, and competed with another power without concern; we, the Ottomans, we routed ourselves so greatly. Whereas the Japanese revealed their intelligence, their wisdom, their maturity in endowing their country with all the liberties, the most liberal institutions, for Constantinople, "in this metropolis of the Empire of Orient which, by its position seemed it should have become the capital of the whole world," here, it has only been three years, just three years, since a similar meeting could not have taken place... the mere announcement of a conference on Japan then would have cost its organizers prison, exile, or perhaps death.⁵²

Gourdjı disparaged Abdülhamid II's regime further, blaming Ottoman society's apathy upon their enslavement to a power that kept them in a state of ignorance and isolation, precisely the conditions Japan had managed to overcome forty years earlier in order to create the present modern nation:

How, by what blind and guilty indifference had we been able to live under the most despotic regime until the last three years? By what criminal inertia, by what fatal resignation, were the Ottoman people allowed to be condemned to not being more than a vast plebeian without

existence?...What...is indispensable to deduce from this evening is that...the lack of a spirit of association has perpetuated our decadence and our servitude....Under the former regime, it would always be easy to oppress us, to reduce us so much that we lived isolated one from another...they depended at all times upon maintaining us, if violently, in ignorance and preventing us from uniting. And here is why, while the Japanese, like the rest of the great generality of peoples of the Universe, reached the apogee of glory and of civilization and appeared to the world in the apotheosis of their victory, as the great sovereign nation of human destiny in the Far East, we others, resembling a herd guided by a shepherd's iron crook, we represented up to the revolution of July 1908 the most distressing spectacle that history has ever recorded.⁵³

The CUP "emancipated" the Ottoman Empire, Gourdjı continued, providing it the opportunity to indeed become the Japan of the Near East. The Unionists created a new scenario out of which the modern Ottoman Turkish nation shall appear, if guided rightly by groups such as this one, the Amicale Society, whose priority was making knowledge and information readily available for the betterment of society.⁵⁴ He beseeched his audience to take part in "the definitive raising up of Turkey by the organization of liberty, without which men, like the most robust plants and oaks, cannot develop and grow, and which, when deprived of it, perish."⁵⁵

In the aftermath of the 1908 revolution, the Young Turk Unionists, searching for a fresh platform on which to captivate the hopeful energies of the Ottoman populace, put forth in conferences such as this one a notion of secular and scientific Ottoman unity, of liberty, and of Ottomanism that could supplant sectarian identifications. At the same time it was undoubtedly associated with Japanese national achievements as a kind of "pan-Asian" Ottoman synthesis. What made possible the unity between Muslim, Christian, and Jew within the Ottoman Empire was the same philosophy that would allow Ottoman Young Turk Unionists an affinity for a non-Muslim, pagan Japan: their shared belief in the superiority of science and knowledge in order to construct a modern, Eastern, constitutional polity. Gourdjı's last words of the evening demonstrate the relationship to Japan:

Ladies and gentlemen, I am finished, I do not have more than a word to say, a vow to formulate: set loose becoming the Japanese of the Orient: deliver the teachings contained in the brilliant conference of Mr. Ostorog. . . . Remember especially, my dear friends, that in the moral and intellectual elevation of the Ottoman nation lies the solution to the great problem posed by the advent of our constitutional and democratic regime.⁵⁶

Despite the inclusive tone of the last passage, the words more frequently used in this conference to describe the Ottoman Empire are perhaps the most telling subtext of Unionist thinking regarding the nation: repeatedly terms such as "our dear Turkey," "the raising up of Turkey," "the Turkish language,"

all insinuated an Ottoman Empire whose predominant character would be Turkish, whose leadership would remain ethnic Turks.⁵⁷ The Ottoman Empire was actively being renamed “Turkey” by 1910 for both foreign consumption and domestic use. Articles in Ottoman and European newspapers reporting on attempts to forge an alliance between the Ottoman state and Japan repeatedly used the term “Turkey” when referring to the empire, solidifying the idea that the Ottoman Empire was now a Turkish polity, with Turks in command.⁵⁸ Hüseyin Cahit Bey, journalist and editor of *Tanin* who was also a member of the association called *Türk Derneği*, was quoted as saying (in describing Japanese success in modernizing),

That which the Japanese did, could the *Turks* not do it too? ... If Japan had had the social organization of *Turkey*, could it have transformed so easily? ... Certainly not. In any case, *Turkey* did not follow the Japanese process... Besides, since seeking to reform *Turkey* there has not been a single day of tranquility. (emphasis mine)⁵⁹

Non-Turkish Ottoman elites who nonetheless had identified with the dominant culture of the ruling class in the empire such as the Ottoman Kurd Lütfi Fikri Bey even observed the change taking place, the subtle shift away from a broadly defined Ottomanism, in favor of a more Turkist line of thinking that was jeopardizing the constitutional, unionist nature of the regime.⁶⁰ Perhaps the retrospective words of the deposed Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II in his 1917 memoirs most eloquently express what had happened to the Ottoman Empire in its final years. As racialized national identities fueled irreconcilable differences between peoples in the Ottoman Empire even more fervently than religious divisions had done in the past, the former Sultan claimed there was no way he could have “reconciled the Kurd and the Armenian, the Greek and the Turk, the Arab and the Bulgar.”⁶¹

Arab Nationhood, Islamic Heritage, and the Nation of Japan

While Turkist ideologues utilized Japanese images to explicate their notion of an exclusive, ethnically Turkish nation emerging at the turn of the century and members of the CUP with Turkish nationalist leanings more boldly talked of a Turkish race that would govern the Ottoman Empire, so too did Arab intellectuals employ a trope of the Japanese nation, but interpreted for Arab needs. Initially supportive of the CUP and its promise of democratic rule following the revolution, many Arabs in the provinces with either Ottomanist or Arabist inclinations eventually became disappointed with the lack of results. They expressed this frustration carefully in the press, using Japan as the standard by which to compare with Arab heritage and to measure the Ottoman Empire’s faults. Escalating Arabist sensibilities coupled with disillusionment over post-revolution political failures and the policies of the CUP government generated a subtle but critical Arab press that often utilized Japan to argue its points of contention.⁶²

Influenced by the mid-nineteenth-century renaissance in Arabic literature, some individuals were awakening to their Arabist sentiments, that is, their

growing embrace of themselves as a people with a long and distinct heritage as Arabs: an Arabic-speaking people whose ancestors included the founder of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad, a people whose language was the very language of the Qur'an, and a people whose forefathers were the Arabs of history who established Islamic civilization as the most intellectually and technologically advanced in the world in the medieval era. For Arab intellectuals, whether secular or religious, Christian or Muslim, it was a shared heritage in which to take tremendous pride. They were not immune to the racial and Darwinian ideas currently flourishing among scholarly circles in Europe and the Ottoman Empire, but for the Arabs, Arabic language, cultural heritage, and their relationship to Islam were the more salient features of identity that bound Arabs together more so than any strictly racial ties. They had more in common with other Ottomanists and Islamic modernists than with Turkish nationalists in leadership positions in the empire whose belief in modernity required an exclusive, racialized definition of nation.

The character of the Ottoman Empire as a multinational and ultimately Islamic community resulted in a rather unusual "national" side-effect that was quite pronounced in its Arab provinces: nation-state nationalism as an accepted ideology was later in its arrival here. By the late nineteenth century, Arabs comprised the second largest demographic element of the Ottoman Empire after the Turks.⁶³ Yet in comparison to other parts of the world, or within the Ottoman Empire itself, the development of a coherent, modern nationalist doctrine among the Arabs lagged behind the emergence of other nation-state nationalisms in Ottoman territories, such as those of the Greeks, Rumanians, Bulgarians, and Serbians. This statement ignores the complex transformation the Arab world underwent, however, as its loyalty to and identification with the larger Islamic, Ottoman community were undermined by political, economic, and social events within and outside the empire. Late nineteenth-century Ottomanist ideology had found many Arab supporters; after the Arab literary-cultural awakening,⁶⁴ many Arabs found themselves supporting ideas of Islamic modernism and Arabism (defined as proto-nationalist recognition of distinct Arab identity without an accompanying separatist attitude toward the Ottoman polity),⁶⁵ while still loosely adhering to a multinational philosophy of Ottomanism.⁶⁶ Some walked the fine line between Ottomanism and non-separatist Arab nationalism while complaining of excessive Turkification policies.⁶⁷ Others voiced their hopes of Arab independence prior to this.⁶⁸ Some Arabs maintained their loyalties to the multiethnic Ottoman Empire until the end of the First World War. As recent scholarship has shown, both Ottomanism and Arabism derived from Islamic modernist notions of the compatibility between the religion of Islam and modern civilization in response to the challenge of Western imperialism, and these ideologies were not mutually exclusive.⁶⁹ However a more vocal and politicized form of Arabism surfaced among Arab journalists and activists in the Levant after 1909 when hopes were dashed for reform and equality to be extended to all Ottoman citizens. This political Arabism highlighted an implicit class struggle that at times manifested itself along ethnic lines, and the dispute was reflected in the attitudes toward the issue of education and language of instruction. The spectrum of Arabist-Arab nationalist thought was the most

varied between 1900 and 1918, when the Arabs were attempting to find a suitable self-definition by sorting through prior means of identification with the Ottoman Empire while simultaneously being pulled toward a stronger sense of Arab consciousness as a distinct people.

In the intellectual exercise of defining one's national past, the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire understood themselves to be the descendants of the founding fathers of Islam, a connection not easily relinquished or ignored. Whereas the Turks of the Ottoman Empire could look upon their Central Asian past with nostalgia and enthusiasm, encouraged by their Turkic brethren exiled from Russia (a distinguishing feature that allowed the Turks this means of racial exclusivity), the Arabs were the inheritors of a far-reaching civilization shared by many diverse peoples—that of Islam, which was the backbone of the current Ottoman state. Inevitably this was a linkage not initially lending itself to any sort of separatist movement, as the Arabs were inextricably linked to Islam, its corresponding civilization, and any dynasty sworn to uphold its precepts. The Ottoman Empire, headed by a sultan who claimed to be the Caliph of all Muslims, was understood as the contemporary custodian of Islam, the guardian of Islamic tradition, so that the Arabs could not extract themselves so easily out of this Muslim polity as a people deserving their own state.

Arab identity at the end of the Ottoman Empire owes an epistemological debt to a few of the pioneers of Islamic modernist thought whose ideas converged with Arabism in the late nineteenth century. Some of the proponents of Islamic modernism, that is, individuals in the Ottoman Empire who argued that the only feasible path to modernity for Muslims was through the reconciliation of Islamic heritage with modern science and technology—whether the voices of some Young Ottomans, the rhetoric of Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī, or others—influenced later figures in their demand for Islam to play a central role in any future Muslim society, such as the Tatar political activist Abdürreşid İbrahim, the writers of the Ottoman paper *Sırât-ı Mustakīm*, the Arab educator Muḥammad 'Abduh, and the Arab journalist Rashīd Riḍā'.⁷⁰ Their views all incorporated the notion that Arabo-Islamic heritage was to be respected and should serve as the foundation for a modern Ottoman polity: a filter through which to siphon out the unwanted cultural baggage of the West when adopting its modern knowledge and technological advances.

The Ottoman Druze amir Shakīb Arslān was one such Islamic modernist proponent of the Arab *Salafīyya* movement (the demand for the pious Arab ancestors to be revered as the founding fathers of Islam, as espoused by 'Abduh, Riḍā', and others). He vehemently opposed Western interference in the Middle East, and in penning a plea to resist losing one's Muslim identity, praised Japan's self-reliance and steadfastness. Member of a prominent Lebanese family and a deputy in Ottoman Parliament from 1913 to 1918, Arslān circulated among Syrian Arab intellectuals. He subscribed to the primacy of Islamic solidarity in the face of Western imperialism that also included belief in the viability of the Ottoman state, intense respect for Arabo-Islamic heritage, and eventually the formation of a more regional pan-Arab unity in the interwar years.⁷¹ Politically well connected and an Ottomanist almost until the end of the empire, Arslān called for the regeneration of Islamic society, blaming

current failures on both ultraconservative traditionalists who misinterpreted Islam and scorned modern science as heretical, and on secular Westernizers (in later years he engaged in polemics with Ṭaha Ḥusayn, Ḥusayn Haykal, and ‘Abd al-Rahmān Shahbandar), who he claimed blindly imitated foreign ways and rejected Islam’s inner dynamism.⁷² Arslān argued that a revival must originate in a rational application of one’s own traditions and that maintaining the distinctiveness of a particular cultural system allowed for the proper assimilation of modern civilization; as such, Islam was not a religious barrier to progress, but the foundation upon which to build it.

Arslān supported his ideas with the example of Japan, which he utilized in a provocative way despite the country’s non-Muslim character. Arslān appealed to Ottomans’ Islamic communal sensibilities over the secular politico-cultural national bonds referred to by his contemporary, the Ottoman Arab bureaucrat Sâṭi’ al-Ḥuṣrî.⁷³ Arslān concentrated upon Japanese spiritual practices as a framework from which to launch a program of selective technical borrowing in order to achieve modern civilization without compromising Muslim religious solidarity. He was convinced that Japan had not renounced its Eastern culture in joining the ranks of the Western Powers, but rather had preserved its distinct ancestral heritage, which made possible a Japanese modernity that equaled or even surpassed European achievements. In a treatise called *Why Are Muslims Backward While Others Progress?* written in response to a reader’s query in the Arabic journal *al-Manār* (published by Rashīd Riḍā’ until 1935), Arslān expressed his frustration over the fact that “the Europeans and the Japanese are not branded as tradition-ridden although they are devoted to their religions.”⁷⁴ In fact, he reminded his audience,

How many religious observances, rituals, customs, and conventions which originated among the Japanese as far back as 2000 years ago still exist among them in the same manner?... How is it then that their advancement has been so amazing and that at such a rapid pace, and why is it that they are pointed out as an example of progressiveness? No one calls them “tradition-ridden” or “conservatives” or “reactionaries” against modern civilization.⁷⁵

Arslān believed the best defense against European imperialist activities was a strong Islamic solidarity that protected Muslim morality and enabled progress. “Religion played an important part in the political renaissance of Japan,” he pointed out, because the Japanese held the conviction that

... all that their ancestors bequeathed to them was indispensable... their past still remains glorious and sacred. They value their thoughts and ideals in terms of their sacred past... They compete with others in the employment of modern methods which are indispensable to modern life. They have eschewed “Westernization” for the simple reason that they have no use for it... It is indeed their devotion to their gods and ancestors that has served them as a stronger shield and support for them even than nationalism and race-consciousness.⁷⁶

Like other Arab thinkers, Arslān viewed Japan as a tutelary, if pagan, nation from whom Muslims could learn a valuable lesson. Despite his differences with other intellectuals of his generation whose attitudes about the role of religion in identity diverged from his, whose political affiliations, and whose stances toward Europe varied greatly from his own, Arslān's interpretation of Japan as a referent for Eastern potential in the face of Western domination was shared and clearly understood by his compatriots. His sense of "Easternness" was cloaked in a more localized expression of Islamic communal solidarity, using non-Muslim Japan to argue his ideology. His pride in Arabo-Islamic heritage and his faith in its successful integration with contemporary civilization proved undeniably to Arslān that the East would shortly regain its superior position in the world; Japan had been the first to demonstrate this ability.

Imbedded within such Islamic modernism was the possibility of a proto-nationalist, or Arabist, ideal: that Arabs, as the founding fathers of Islam, deserved a certain level of cultural recognition within the larger Ottoman society. Islamic modernism came to be conflated with Arab identity by individuals like al-Kawākibī for example, with his political treatise imploring Arabs to take their rightful place as the legitimate heirs to the caliphate (and in which his "Excellences of the Arabs"⁷⁷ did make a rare racial distinction about Arabs though again not overshadowing the more important cultural heritage that made Arabs who they were). Once this form of Arabism coalesced with the more secular, literary, and linguistic sense of an Arabic awakening, the justification emerged for demanding that, as a people with a special place in the Empire, Ottoman Arabs were to be accorded an amount of cultural and eventually political status.

The Arabs who played a role in defining Arabism in the latter decades of the Ottoman Empire's existence came from a variety of backgrounds: some resided in the Arab provinces, away from the Ottoman corridors of power that would have put them in closer contact with European intellectual thought as well as provide more direct participation in political rule, as members of the CUP enjoyed. Others served in Ottoman parliament or in official government positions that did allow them a level of power and prestige, though it appears that many of these Arab political figures recognized after 1909 either the limits of their status as Arabs or felt an inclination to promote their Arab identity more strongly, or both. It is no surprise then that the majority of the discourse produced by Ottoman Arabs on Japanese modernity differed in its emphasis from that of the Turkists and Turkish nationalists: Arab writers, officials, activists, and journalists also stressed Japanese modernization of its state institutions as a model of reform, but they tended more often to highlight Japan's ancestral ties, Japanese religious devotion, and moral character as ultimately what defined the Japanese as a modern nation, in an attempt to draw parallels with similar Arab traits. Christian and Muslim Arabs both participated in constructing the Arab nation based upon a shared heritage, history, and language, and they both used Japanese imagery to illustrate their arguments; many of these Christians published newspapers and books in Egypt that found wider circulation in the Arab provinces of the empire.

In addition, Arab political disenfranchisement perpetuated by CUP policies after 1909 eventually spilled over beyond cultural attitudes to political critiques

of Ottoman moral corruption and mismanagement, and the example of Japan was used as a metaphor for proper modernity by comparison. For many critics like the Arab journalist and political activist Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī, education became the most significant issue to address in their writings because not only would national education further the Ottoman Empire's modernization process through the matriculation of future citizens conversant in the latest science and technology to serve the state, but a revamped national education system would also reach more people, and would instill the proper moral and cultural values in Ottoman students to shape them into tomorrow's patriots. Of course this, it was argued, had to be done in the local vernaculars to be effective; demands were made to implement a school system that would not only modernize the curriculum but would also take Arab needs into account through instruction in the local language, which would also impart to Arab pupils pride in their Arabness. The Arab provincial courts were to operate in the local language of the Arabs. These demands were eventually responded to by the Ottoman state in 1913,⁷⁸ as the logic used in the Arabs' arguments on this issue (often using Japanese images) resonated with those Ottoman CUP officials who understood education and language to be important components in the nation-building process (though they desired Ottoman Turkish to be the *lingua franca* of their "nation" and would revert back to the policy of instruction in Ottoman Turkish in 1916).

The press was the main forum in which Arab intellectuals manifested or crystallized their ideas about national or communal identity. The Arabic press, literature, public meetings, and the memoirs of some Arab individuals all establish the Japanese nation as a prominent referent when articulating their ideas. While in both the Ottoman Arab and Egyptian contexts, discourse on Japan was inextricably linked to the emergence of (proto-) nationalist sentiments on the part of the authors, contextual differences and variations in the character of Arab nationalism in these two regions are evident in their respective discussions of Japan. Therefore provincial Ottoman Arab intellectual trends as reflected in discourse should be treated separately from the Egyptian milieu, despite the wide circulation of Cairene publications throughout much of the Ottoman Arab world.

In the late Ottoman Empire, religion was often a hindrance to unifying the populace due to the complexities of Muslim-Christian relations. However Japanese national religion was seen as a vehicle by which to unify and mobilize the people, as well as to inspire deep feelings of patriotic love of country. It was a powerful element of Japanese national identity. The role religion would play in future Arab identity was an omnipresent question because of the inseparable association between the founding of Islam and its Golden Age under Arab rule, and the need for Arabs to assert an individual identity based on this distinct heritage. The Arabs' past could not omit the presence of Islam and therefore their ideology would have to incorporate the Islamic element into their identity in a manner functional for the modern world. The role of religion in Japan and its compatibility with modern science served as one model which could suggest to the Arabs an ideological course of action.

According to the Lebanese journal *al-'Irfān* in Sidon, the spiritual strength of the Japanese people was demonstrated by the fatherly stance of the

government toward citizens, and the familial sincerity they reciprocated, that "...yielded a firm alliance and a bond between the souls of the Japanese by connections of love and unity, giving them a taste of life's comforts and pushing them to put above everything else, in a word, the welfare of the nation and its success."⁷⁹ The power of Japan's spiritual unity had allowed them to hire foreigners to assist in modernizing the country without succumbing to the temptations of Western influence that might be detrimental to Japanese society. This strength stemmed in part from an unwillingness to tamper with the Japanese people's faith, and from maintaining a certain flexibility to regard spirituality as a product of individual hopes and beliefs.⁸⁰ Ultimately the author's words were intended to admonish Ottomans for their lack of open-mindedness: while the Ottoman Empire (and Iran, the article mentioned) had constitutional governments, he reminded readers, "do not make religion a reason for division among people, for changing their hearts. Let the Japanese spirit, their tolerance in religion, and their aspiration to continue their liberty and preserve their independence creep into you."⁸¹ Japanese ancestral solidarity coupled with religious tolerance provided the perfect foundation upon which to build a modern, patriotic nation.

An article from Kurd 'Alī's Damascus paper, *al-Muqtabas*, illustrates the Arab dilemma of separating Islam out from previous Ottoman political affiliations, as was the task of Arab nationalist thinkers in formulating a separatist ideology. "Japan and Islam" reported on a meeting the evening before in the Damascus Union and Progress club (*nādī al-Ittiḥād wa'l-Taraqqī*) between Ottoman citizens and the Japanese operative/convert to Islam, Ömer Yamaoka, who was traveling in Ottoman lands escorted by Abdürreşid İbrahim.⁸² Dr. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Shahbandar, a secular Damascus Arab and later a well-known Syrian nationalist, participated in the proceedings by introducing the visitors and translating Yamaoka's English speech into Arabic (Yüzbaşı Khālid Effendi al-Hakīm translated into Ottoman Turkish).⁸³ The gist of the speeches was that, as Japan had shown, science was the key to national advancement, but only a religion like Islam could provide the proper direction for use of this knowledge. Shahbandar's closing remarks were particularly interesting when he said (in English and Arabic):

The Ottoman Empire is an Islamic empire but that does not suggest that the Christians and Israelites and Druze are not Ottomans. On the contrary! It is similar to the official religion in the United Kingdom, which is Christianity, and it gathers under its banner the other religions. Thus it is like the Ottoman Empire. It gathers them all in a single word, and that is "Ottoman."⁸⁴

Shahbandar, while here expressing obvious Ottomanist sentiments and feelings of humanitarian pan-Asian solidarity, soon after felt alienated by what were viewed as Turkification policies of the CUP government. By 1916 he was forced to flee Damascus because of his anti-Ottoman (and pro-British) activities. But in these words appeared his earlier identification with an Islamic, multinational Ottoman Empire. The translation of Yamaoka's speech into both Turkish and Arabic at the CUP clubhouse indicated the linguistic differences

that were respected in 1910; Shahbandar felt loyalty to the Ottoman Empire but within a few short years radically altered his perception of Arab identity to mean an Arab (Syrian) nation independent of a larger whole. Despite Shahbandar's secular outlook, his ultimate rejection of the Ottoman polity was not based upon a disconnection with Islamic heritage that was part of modern Arab consciousness, but rather upon a realization that equality between members of Ottoman society regardless of religion, ethnicity, or language had not been achieved. CUP policies had demonstrated to him their failure to uphold Ottomanism.

The increasing awareness of an ethnolinguistic communal bond among the Arabs in Ottoman lands fueled a desire for a representative administration that would coincide with political recognition of Arab cultural specificity within the Islamic-Ottoman polity. Formerly, the *millet* system had managed the various religious communities in the multiethnic, multinational Ottoman Empire. The 1908 Ottoman constitutional revolution had created tremendous enthusiasm for the possibility that the state would now guarantee its citizenry individual rights by providing a constitutional arrangement that included fair representative government, an idea stemming from the French Revolution. In the twentieth century, the provision for a parliamentary government seemed even more imperative for equal treatment of individuals from different backgrounds. Yet this hope gave way to disappointment as the CUP tightened its hold on Ottoman government, which encouraged some contributors to Arabic publications to express their disillusionment in the pages of the press.⁸⁵

The dilemma for Arab intellectuals, such as Kurd 'Alī, Shukri al-'Asalī, and others in the years after 1909, was the duality of their identification with an Arabo-Islamic heritage, though understood by them in a rather secular, yet newly modern national light, and their desire to remain loyal to an Ottoman-Islamic Empire that was appearing to disregard the needs of a large portion of the population—especially the Arabs in the provinces. The choice of words to describe the Japanese nation in this context is quite telling: the Arabs tended to proclaim in their publications that Japanese nationhood and success in the world derived from their moral fortitude, their shared ancestral ties that bound them together, their Buddhist, Shinto, and Confucian traditions, devotion to their Emperor (a father figure), and their patriotic willingness to self-sacrifice that was inherent in all Japanese people. Japan's education promoted these characteristics while also providing a scientific curriculum founded on modern principles. Arab deployment of this Japanese model was a way to solidify their own sense of Arab nationhood. In contrast, the Turkish discussions of nationhood, while also reflecting upon the propagation of education, had different purposes. They tended to emphasize this morality not as a result of shared ancestral rites, but as a consequence of a Bushidō, samurai warrior ethic, and grounded in Japanese racial connections to one another. Arab writers used Japan's distinct cultural heritage to define Japanese identity, in the same way that they delineated for their readers the role of their own Arabo-Islamic ancestry and foundations in forging Arabness. Turkish writers not only emphasized a racial linkage between fellow Turks to define identity, but their discussions of Japanese education and morality subtly

reflected the position of power many of these writers occupied: interested in “arming the nation,” a rejuvenated Ottoman (Turkish) nation would identify with the militant samurai ethos as a practical and moral model for their race to emulate.

The Space between: Ottomanism and Sâti’ al-Ḥuṣrî, an Ottoman Arab

A look at the ideas of the Ottoman Arab statesman Sâti’ al-Ḥuṣrî, or Sâti’ Bey, an Ottoman Arab intellectual profoundly affected by Japan’s successes, reveals the complexities of overlapping and yet rapidly changing identities at the end of Empire. Al-Ḥuṣrî dreamt of an Ottoman nation based on a religio-historical shared past and equality among all, a dream that survived until he was left without the physical elements of empire at the end of the First World War. His views at times resembled, and at other times were in dramatic contrast to, the images of Japan that prevailed in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire after the 1908 revolution when the press flourished in cities in the Levant (notably Damascus and Beirut).

Al-Ḥuṣrî was born in Yemen to a Syrian Arab family and was educated in Istanbul. Due to his predominantly Turkish education and subsequent position within the Ottoman Ministry of Education, Ottomanism prevailed in his thinking. He was an official who meant no political affront to the Ottoman system with his encouragement of reform policies, but rather was searching for the means to “nationally” unite and strengthen the Ottoman Empire. He saw Japan’s strength as the consequence of a democratic system, the prevalence of national education, intense patriotism, and strong connections to an ancestral past (personified by the Emperor himself). None of these were considered goals unattainable in a multinational state; after all, the Ottoman constitution had already been reinstated by 1908 by Young Turk patriots whose interest was preserving the homeland. Education was even appreciated by Sultan Abdülhamid II, who had dramatically increased the number of schools within the Ottoman Empire during his reign.

Al-Ḥuṣrî was so impressed by Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 that upon his first visit to Europe in 1910, he sought an audience with the Japanese embassy in Berlin to discuss the matter.⁸⁶ Al-Ḥuṣrî’s exact words regarding his eventful journey were as follows:

During this trip, I wanted very much to learn about conditions in Japan because of that country’s rapid awakening (nahḍa). I contacted the Japanese embassy in Berlin and was given a considerable amount of information on the subject of culture. The basic ideas I acquired became the subject of a general lecture which I later published in a collection of lectures.⁸⁷

His lecture, “Japan and the Japanese,” was given in 1913 in Istanbul and was published as the Japanese section of a book entitled *The Great Japanese and German Nations*.⁸⁸ He lectured to his audience in detail on Japanese history

and culture, pointing out in his introductory remarks the seriousness with which the Ottomans should study Japan's progress:

Inside of thirty years they had acquired and assimilated all of the civilizational works; within a third of a century they had reached the status of a civilized, modern nation . . . they brought into existence a powerful and great state. . . . For nations that have remained very much behind on the road to progress, like us, and who are now obliged to advance with great rapidity, the Japanese are among the examples that must be examined with the greatest care.⁸⁹

Sâṭi' al-Ḥuṣrî was interested in Japan's accomplishments at the state level as well as their character as a nation, so that his commentary flowed back and forth between, for example, the reform of Japanese land ownership and management, and the samurai virtues of loyalty, self-sacrifice, and the practice of ritual suicide (*harakiri*). He was interested in how a nation's educational system served as the foundation for state power—in short, how it affected the strengthening of the economy, the protection of resources, and the expansion of industrial output. He noted how the promulgation of the Japanese constitution assisted in lifting the oppressive European yoke of Unequal Treaties from Japan's neck. Now, Japan's next mission was "to be an agent of civilization in Asia, especially to awaken the Chinese, to save them from Europe's yoke."⁹⁰ But Europe, threatened by Japan's reforms and by this enterprise,

...rendered a rather mistaken judgement about the Japanese: "The Japanese copy like monkeys, they possess a great capacity for imitation, but they are bereft of aptitude for assimilation and innovation" they said.⁹¹

To this al-Ḥuṣrî retorted that the Japanese understood Western civilization very well, and for this reason they were determined to improve upon it continually rather than sit idly by, so that ultimately they generated an applicable interpretation of it (one adapted to Japanese needs).⁹² Implicit in his comments was the possibility that, in doing so, the Japanese had produced an innovative, more practical, and even superior form of civilization. Sâṭi' al-Ḥuṣrî concerned himself in this lecture with how Japan's assimilation of Western civilization could teach the Ottomans a valuable lesson. His final remarks pleaded for the Ottoman Empire to accept Japan's "powerful warning through example," saying,

The Japanese . . . borrowed European and American theoretical and practical sciences and techniques, administrative and legal structures and laws; they demonstrated a great efficacy and an intense sense of perseverance in the matter of imitation and borrowing, in particular, they attributed a great significance to appropriations and modernization relating to (national) prosperity and refinement. This course of action . . . took the Japanese out of a state of being a medieval community and brought into being a completely modern nation. . . . We—like the Japanese—remained

unfamiliar with European civilization for a period of centuries. We—like the Japanese—just started, after having become distant from Europeans, to appreciate the need to borrow and imitate that civilization.⁹³

But al-Ḥuşrî faulted the Ottomans for their laxity, their ineptitude, when they had every opportunity to have advanced:

In fact we have not been living in a country far from Europe and closed to Europeans, like the Japanese; on the contrary—we have been right next to Europe; clashing with Europeans for centuries, we have seen a lot of foreigners in our commercial ports for centuries. Nevertheless, it is as though there has come to be a virtual wall of China or a great ocean between us and the Europeans who used to stand so close, among us even, so that for centuries, we passed the time unaware, without gaining a share of the intellectual, industrial, political, and social advancements and revolutions which occurred in civilized world.⁹⁴

The Ottomans should have preceded Japan in successfully completing modernizing endeavors because of the previous *Tanzîmât* efforts at reform, but “until now we have not been able to advance like the Japanese; we still have not been able to present ourselves to the civilized world as a ‘contemporary nation.’”⁹⁵ The reason was clear to al-Ḥuşrî: unlike the Japanese, whose moral character caused them to persevere, to educate themselves, and to become refined on the inside before outwardly addressing the political and administrative needs of the country, the Ottomans only superficially attempted to reform the empire as cursory reactions to immediate circumstances, rendering reforms ineffective in the long term.⁹⁶ Nonetheless, al-Ḥuşrî was hopeful about the future. Japan had proved that the Ottoman Empire could survive and progress because

... however backward a nation may remain in the matter of progress, if it shows a sufficient level of earnestness, it ... will be able to make good the time that it has lost. ... The thing that is necessary for us ... is to strive. To struggle; with determination, to endeavor in earnest, materially, spiritually, without tiring; without giving up hope, to strive ... Behold our life and salvation's only means.⁹⁷

“Japonya ve Japonlar” attempted to motivate Ottoman citizens to persevere in modernizing state and society as Japan had done, following the unavoidable tutelage of Europe when necessary, without succumbing to the notion that it was either too late for progress, or that it would somehow imply Ottoman inferiority to the West. In an additional lecture given in 1913 by Sâti' al-Ḥuşrî, he supplied another significant element in the process of rebuilding the nation, presenting his interpretation of Japanese national character as a pattern for Ottoman patriotism. As late historian William Cleveland described al-Ḥuşrî's *For the Homeland (Vatan İçin, İstanbul 1329/1913)*, an essay published after this lecture was given,

... he drew the connection between emotional loyalty and national success when he stated that the victory over Russia indicated that there was a strong feeling of patriotism in Japan. Sati' felt that Japanese patriotism was inspired by a respect for ancestors and a belief in a familial relationship between the ancestors and the living members of the state.⁹⁸

Al-Ḥuṣrî's impression of Japan was as a country which showed fierce patriotic feeling; this intense patriotism was due to the belief that the Japanese were a big family with the Mikadō as the patriarchal head. The dynasty possessed divine lineage and the spirit of these forefathers was revered. In this way the Mikadō's decrees were sacred, historical works based upon the will bequeathed by his ancestors. Al-Ḥuṣrî reproduced a version of the Japanese Imperial Rescript on Education to illustrate that in Japan the basis of patriotism (*vatan-severlik*, love of homeland) was patriarchal family ties: "If one day it is necessary," he quoted, "you will give your life to the state with courage, so you will have continued the glory of the Throne coeval with Sun and Earth."⁹⁹

Al-Ḥuṣrî's early writings reflected his sentiment that following in Japan's footsteps would not compromise the multinationality of the empire. He realized that patriotism had different qualities in different places, that the meaning of "homeland" (*vatan*) was not definite, and that patriotism was not a fixed ideal. By looking at what meaning *vatan* was assigned in only one country, and then applying it indiscriminately to another without consideration for the factors relevant to that other country, he felt a wrong understanding of homeland would be arrived at.¹⁰⁰ Al-Ḥuṣrî was aware that the ethnic, linguistic, and religious makeup of the Ottoman Empire was so varied as to make a specific patriotic summons invalid. However the Ottoman Empire could profit from accepting the appropriate ideological counterpart; it would be expanded to fit the needs of a multinational empire. Thus, Sâti' al-Ḥuṣrî transformed the Japanese idea of patriotism into the doctrine of Ottomanism: the "Ottoman spiritual bond" extending across the entire *vatan*—to all Ottoman territories, for all ethnic and religious groups. While the spiritual bond that created a sense of community unity among Japanese was an expression of their ancestral and familial relations, the Ottoman spiritual tie was more complex. It involved various communities who enjoyed a shared historical experience and patriotic loyalty to the Ottoman polity. This state should embody the will of its people, and its importance would override language affiliations, which he saw as the most significant national bond between people. Respect for the ancestral past would translate into recognition of the unique position of the Arabs within the empire as the founding fathers of Islamic civilization. While generally a secularist, al-Ḥuṣrî was aware of the importance of the Muslim religion as a sociopolitical force and included Islam as part of this unifying spiritual connection for both Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Japan was an early nation-state model for Sâti' al-Ḥuṣrî. The paradox in his thinking lay in his dual identification as an Ottomanist, which demanded political loyalty along broad lines, and as an Arabist, recognizing the increasingly powerful stature of individual nation-state nationalism in the rest of the world. His attempt to apply nation-state ideas to the Ottoman experience seemed to contradict the ultimate definition of nationalism itself. His undying

loyalty to the Ottoman Empire simply did not permit him to crystallize his Arabist tendencies until the empire's destruction in 1918. His native language was Turkish, and he did not become proficient in the Arabic vernacular until he had resigned himself to the pan-Arab cause as a member of Prince Faysal's governments in Syria and then after the First World War, in Mandate Iraq. Yet in the postwar era, his brand of pan-Arab nationalism still appeared as too broad a field for the specifics of emerging Near Eastern nation-state nationalisms. Al-Ḥuṣṣrī never relinquished the hope that the Arab region would again unite itself and erase the false borders that had been drawn up by the colonial powers after the First World War.¹⁰¹

Much of Sâṭi' al-Ḥuṣṣrī's theory on nationalism was not actually written until the 1940s-1950s, but as Albert Hourani claimed, many of al-Ḥuṣṣrī's ideas were formulated much earlier (around 1908 and after).¹⁰² His later Arabic writings emphasized the importance of a common language, history, and national religion to the feeling of national solidarity; religion was not the basis of common national feeling, but served to strengthen and reinforce it.¹⁰³ One can infer that these writings were influenced by his attention to Japan in earlier days. Al-Ḥuṣṣrī's earlier interest in the origins of national strength via ancestral connections was overshadowed by what he observed as Japan's ultimate achievement: Japanese demonstration of an Asian nation's capability to modernize equally comparable to the West. This shift in his focus could have occurred simply because he now regarded ancestral worship as anachronistic. More likely it occurred because this era was one of anti-Western, anticolonialist sentiments in the Near East, in which any non-European nation which challenged the power of the West was seen in a positive light.¹⁰⁴ In any case, al-Ḥuṣṣrī's vision of the Japanese nation supported his pleas for unity, whether in a disintegrating Ottoman Empire being pulled apart by separatism and war, or later, in the Arab world of the early twentieth century, struggling with colonial powers and the divisions of nation-state nationalisms.

In the midst of a struggle to find a unifying ideology for the Ottoman Empire in the first decades of the twentieth century, the CUP leadership and those participating in the political process, whether as members and supporters of the CUP or of the opposition, all looked to Japan's example to find a solution to their modern problems. Lütfi Fikri said it best when he claimed that everyone referred to Japan to argue for or against the renovation of the Empire; in fact, Japan defined what was meant by reform and modernization to "Eastern" peoples such as the Ottomans. To represent Japan by association was a powerful tool to propagate ideology. Until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, the debate remained whether or not the "Japan of the Near East" was to be an Ottomanist federation consisting of a variety of ethnic and religious elements, united to maintain and preserve a constitutional homeland, as Lütfi Fikri or al-Ḥuṣṣrī envisioned. Was it instead to be the CUP's now Turk-centered state, run by a powerful oligarchy that resembled the Japanese Meiji *genrōin* and that could assume unchecked power to direct Ottoman society's energies toward an independent, secular, capitalist future? Would it include only Muslims? Either way, the Japanese example emerged to lend support to politicized polemics concerning modernization and identity, indicating its overall force in the minds of Ottoman subjects as a nation

with whom there was a broader connection and a desire to emulate. Kinship with Japan expressed itself in a myriad of ways through many spokespeople. This affinity with Japan may have been utilized to argue for the expansion or contraction of the Ottoman community by various individuals depending upon their own personal and/or political constraints, and for or against certain choices in order to reform or modernize the empire. Yusuf Akçura, Ziya Gökalp, and others used the Japanese trope to discuss an exclusionary Turkish national identity based upon the incorporation of modern civilization; race became a key component in their thinking, at least initially. The purpose of much of the Turkish discourse on Japan was to encourage arming the nation in order to defend it. For the Arabs, discourse on Japan was to articulate through example a distinctive Arab consciousness that would be the foundation for an Arab national ideology. Though modernizing Arab elites often shared a kind of intellectual proximity to European thought, their lack of unhindered access to avenues of political power within the Empire was an obstacle to embracing the same level of racialized thought as Turkic writers in expressing national ideals. Sâti' al-Huṣrî, for example, an Ottoman statesman, nonetheless supported an inclusive Ottomanist doctrine of patriotism to save the Empire using the very same Japanese analogy without setting any racial parameters in his ideology. Ultimately a defining feature of the late Ottoman period, the Ottoman attraction to Japan as a national model spanned a broad spectrum of thought concerning how Ottoman individuals interpreted their cultural identities.

The Woman in Society: Japan's "Mother of the Nation"

The Japanese nation provided a pattern of cultural, social, and political advancement for many Ottoman and also Egyptian Arab elite intellectuals who applied it to the relationships between East and West, between colonizer and colonized, and between political authority and subordinate. The flourishing of the press coincided with a resurgence of interest in the societal position of women and the woman's relation to the well-being of the nation as well.¹⁰⁵ Ottoman writers influenced by Le Bon's views of a nation's character engaged in reversing the prevailing East-West Orientalist ontology by exploring "superior" Japanese morality as it was embodied in the female gender. Articles appearing in Ottoman and Egyptian journals and newspapers discussed the Japanese woman as patriot and educator of the next generation of Japanese citizens, and suggested a possible course of action for the woman in Islamic society.¹⁰⁶ Ironically, the very discourse that was generally utilized to support the claims of a subordinate group (the East, Young Turk exiles, Ottoman Arabs, or Egyptians) against control by a dominant one (Europe, Sultan Abdülhamid II, the Ottoman state, or the British), in this case was used to argue for the continued existence of an overarching patriarchy that, like in Japan, would preserve the woman's status as manager of the household and educator of children. Claiming these tasks to be her patriotic duties to the nation, the woman's societal role was thus defined as outside that of the public, political sphere. Japanese images were used by elites to maintain the subordination of women within the larger social framework of Ottoman Arab and/or Egyptian society.

Discussions of indigenous character and culture in the East inevitably led to the subject of the role of the woman in the modern nation.¹⁰⁷ Starting with the premise that “every people’s women . . . possess a group of traits and customs,”¹⁰⁸ Ekrem went on to express his admiration for Japanese women who, coming from a non-Western tradition, impressed him more. For him, the backbone of Japanese society was their women. They were the sector of society that preserved the cultural refinement and morality of the Japanese, “the decent upbringing, the artful skill, and the humane knowledge in this country’s women is amazing.”¹⁰⁹ İbnülhakkı Mehmed Tâhir’s Ottoman weekly *Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete* [Journal for Women] echoed the idea that Japan’s unique culture was preserved in the character of its women. In “The Japanese” and a three-part series titled “About the Japanese,” the author described Japanese customs and habits in detail, couched within the notion that ultimately the Japanese maintained their native character while obeying Western modes of behavior when required.¹¹⁰ The male population maintained Japan’s public realm, where the predominant premise was that Western patterns were now superior for practical aspects of modern life. The private sphere, embodied in the Japanese household, was the den of indigenous tradition. As such, it was still controlled by women, so that their education and upbringing became a significant issue for authors attempting to strike a balance between Eastern culture and Western practice.¹¹¹ For example, the Tokyo women’s university had a sole purpose:

To create mothers that would be able to raise men capable of performing well their earnest service and duty to their country, and those women, not being carried away by a world of useless pomp, to be able to manage [household financial affairs] with comfort and prosperity. . . . Knowledge will be taught that is necessary in order for a girl to become a good wife, a good mother, and a good woman.¹¹²

Another Ottoman author, conceding that Japanese women still ranked below men in society, explained, “the way Japanese women spend their lives is not much different than a day in the life of European women, but [Japanese womens’] household duties are more important.”¹¹³ These responsibilities included educating the children as young patriots. Japan’s compulsory education agenda contributed to Japanese patriotism and encouraged national ideals and morality because “immoral, naughty children, no matter how clever and diligent they are, are never seen as worthy of rewards.”¹¹⁴ But cultivating patriotic attitudes in Japanese youth started at home, argued Fatma Ünsiye, a teacher at the American Girls’ College School, because “principles begin with nations’ babies; the history of peoples ends with them”¹¹⁵ (see figure 7.1). Japanese children grew up in households with many toys that taught them to use things without breaking them, she wrote, so that they understood proper manners and the economic principles a family maintained. The Japanese succeeded in providing “elementary information about everything” to the children at a young age by surrounding them with games; by order of the Japanese Education Ministry, the primary school libraries had books for reading, arithmetic, and drawing, as well as games that showed children



Figure 7.1 Fatma Ünsiye's *Japon Çocuklar* [Japanese children] (İstanbul: Matba'a-yı Hayriye ve Şirkesi, 1912) book cover.

procedures for success, many of which required the formation of teams to develop a sense of camaraderie, following orders, and leadership.¹¹⁶ Japanese children participated in festivals with their fathers, visiting auditoriums in which they saw paintings of famous figures in Japanese history in order to cultivate in them a sense of mastery in art, in war, and in school. They toured sacred places, old palaces, and other famous buildings to gain an appreciation for Japanese life; they sculpted statues out of clay dug from the earth by their own hands, to feel the Japanese land beneath their feet.¹¹⁷ Chess had become

a popular game among Japanese children, but of course “Japanese nationality and character [was given] to the games acquired from the East and the West, Japanizing them.”¹¹⁸ Japanese childrens’ upbringing in the household and school system was designed to condition them for service to the nation because “the entire country is like a household, and its people are like individuals of a family.”¹¹⁹ Renewal and progress were carried out by everyone great and small in Japan who undertook a responsibility to each other and to their nation. Foreign language study in Japanese schools illustrated patriotic goals: they were introduced to the languages of other peoples of the world so that “... they can make available to their compatriots that language” because “the Japanese want to introduce foreign civilization to their country by means of themselves.”¹²⁰ With only superficial exposure to languages at first, the next level of education provided for the study of their East Asian neighbors’ vernaculars. At higher class levels they studied European languages, sometimes traveling to the countries of origin to carry this out:

Among the reforms the Japanese government implemented were the provision for civil and social education for women, because “With regard to schooling, the tenacity of moral character and other virtues, how great are the distinctions between the child brought up by a mother whose education and studies were completed versus a child whose mother’s studies were neglected?”¹²¹

In other words, an educated woman would, as a mother, produce a more virtuous patriot to serve the nation in the future. Education cultivated dedication to the nation and to the Emperor, Japan’s patriarch who treated his “children” with love and respect and for whom they should sacrifice, just as it provided the tools to absorb new knowledge in the classroom.¹²² The metaphor of the Japanese family-nation was echoed in Cairo, where the Egyptian nationalist paper *al-Garīda* described the “reform of nations “ needing to start with “the reform of households,” because “what is a nation but a collection of households and families.”¹²³ The Japanese woman was the sanctuary for and guardian of Japanese morality, in her familial obligations as educator of the children and the manager of the household.

While the duty of the woman was to maintain native character and raise patriots for the Japanese nation, authors conceded that educational practices and institutions were based upon those in European and American schools for girls. Professors at Japanese universities spent time in Europe and the United States to learn techniques before returning to apply them to Japanese society. The framework underlying these nativist, nationalist goals relied upon the contention that the West possessed progress and civilization, but combining them with indigenous heritage generated a superior form of Eastern modernity. This discourse explicating the assimilation of Eastern values with Western knowledge using modern Japan as an example ultimately disguised the preservation of similar Ottoman patriarchal structures within a seemingly progressive argument for increasing the availability of Western education and promoting the liberation of women. The example of Japan’s women was used to legitimate maintaining the cult of domesticity and “true womanhood” within Ottoman society.

8

Ottoman Egypt Demands Independence: Egyptian Identity, East and West, Christian and Muslim

Egypt was yet another site for the production of a discourse on Japanese modernity, though the ways in which Japan was depicted in press and literature in Egypt reflected not only a different set of social and political circumstances informing the attitudes of writers there, but the aims of such a discourse diverged at times from those of their Ottoman Turkish and Arab contemporaries as well. The number of newspapers and journals published in Cairo, the relative freedom of expression these papers enjoyed for several decades, and the availability of other forms of literary expression allow for a thorough examination of Japanese images and their particular usage in Egyptian thought. Noticeable at first is that Egyptian nationalist writers did not embrace an overtly racialized understanding of themselves in the way that some of the Turkish nationalist ideologues did, and thus their discussions of Japan did not focus upon the Japanese as a biologically defined race of people. Second, Egypt had already developed a national consciousness specific to Egyptian heritage and geography. Journalists resident in Egypt did not use the Japanese trope to formulate identity in the same way that Ottoman Arabs in the provinces tended to do, with the exception of some Syrian Arab émigrés whose writings will be considered separately from those of Egypt's nationalists. In contrast to the Ottoman Arab case, Egyptian nationalists' writings on Japan centered less around identity-building issues that included comparisons between Islam as the moral foundation for the Arabs and Shinto-style ancestral worship for the Japanese, and more upon Japan's accomplishments as a sovereign nation-state. Many nationalists either compared Egypt to Japan in an effort to illustrate Egyptian potential, or else they argued for patterning a future Egyptian state after the Japanese model. These Japanese traits included the successful assimilation of Eastern culture and Western science, patriotism and service to the nation, the education and government systems, and the role of the elite national leadership in the modernizing process.

In fact, Egypt's relatively complete sense of nationhood in terms of its people and territory caused the discursive imagery about Japan to have rather

identifiable main foci: first, the British occupation added an anticolonial dimension to Egyptian discussions of their relationship with the West, as nationalists used the Japanese trope in their demands for the British to quit Egypt so that Egypt could reach its full nation-state potential. Second, a more nuanced examination of Japanese institutions appeared in print that was to point the way toward independent Egyptian statehood, through the adoption of similar foundations. Subtle differences of opinion manifested among Egypt's nationalists as they articulated their views of Japanese achievements, reflecting the debate among themselves over how Egypt should become modern.

Egyptian nationalists and Syrian émigrés produced an exhaustive amount of composition on Japanese modernity. Because the Ottoman Sultan possessed only symbolic suzerainty over the province in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and following the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and subsequent British control over the local administration, the restrictive press law fell into disuse, allowing the newspaper industry to flourish.¹ As a distant city escaping the grip of the Sultan, Cairo played host to numerous Arabic and Ottoman newspapers critical of the Empire prior to and after the Young Turks assumed power, becoming an exception to the typical smothering of the Arabic press in the provinces by the Ottoman authorities in the Hamidian and Young Turk eras. As H. Hamilton Fyfe pointed out in his 1911 narrative of British experience in Egypt, "No city has a more active café life than Cairo. . . . Whenever you pass a café there are numbers of tarbushes to be seen outside and inside. . . . But the mass are reading newspapers and talking politics."² Syrian Christians and Muslims who fled the Ottoman Empire to pursue journalistic careers in the freer and more economically lucrative atmosphere of Cairo in the late nineteenth century spearheaded an early experiment in the Arabic press that eventually caught on among local Egyptian nationalists. According to Ayalon,

The Syrians were highly visible in the Egyptian press, where they were represented more heavily than in any other occupation. By one count, about fifteen percent of all the papers established in Egypt between 1873–1907 were founded by Syrians, although they comprised less than a third of one percent of the population in 1907.³

Some of these Syrian journalists moved their publications to Egypt while others founded new ones, but it is clear that "the Syrians promptly became a catalytic force in the press, as in many other areas of Egyptian life. Educated Egyptians, both Muslims and Copts, reacted to the challenge of the Syrian example by joining the journalistic field in growing numbers."⁴ Egyptian nationalists were deeply influenced by the ideas and actions of Syrian émigrés, many of whom published "literary and scientific journals, aimed at enlightenment" and who "played an important role in fostering reading habits among the people and training them to assimilate modern knowledge of every kind."⁵ Syrian Christian and Muslim émigré journalists acted as cultural mediators in Egypt, who, despite their disparate orientations toward the West, the British, Egypt, and Islam, were loosely linked together by certain common ideas represented in their discourse on the Japanese example.

What was published here about modern Japan was a means by which to most boldly criticize the Ottoman state, or to most vehemently condemn the British presence in Egypt and the West's intrusion into the Islamic world more generally. It was from Egypt that the loudest praise was expressed for Japanese character and the instruments of modern progress such as education and parliamentary government. Such a discourse, however, laid bare the rich complexities of Egyptian nationalists, Syrian Christian journalists, and Syrian Arab Islamic modernists, most of whom were generally critical of Western treatment of peoples in the region, and all of whom expounded upon different characteristics of Japan in order to emphasize what they considered necessary to reach modernity. Japan, a Far Eastern ally of Egypt's British occupiers, was their referent, the ideal as they interpreted it.

History and Egyptian Identity up to the Twentieth Century

Egyptian territorial nationalism and the idea that Egypt was a distinct geographical, culturally unique nation that had been heir to ancient Pharaonic and other civilizations had taken root by the nineteenth century. There was a sense among local Egyptians that Egypt had been subject to frequent waves of invasion and colonization by foreign elements throughout ancient, medieval, and modern history. Starting with Roman, Greek, and Byzantine antiquity, subsequent occupiers along the Nile Valley included the conquering Muslim armies from Arabia, the later Shi'i Fatimid dynasty, and the famous Muslim *Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn al-Ayyūbī* (Saladin, an ethnic Kurd) who settled in Egypt while continuing to battle Crusader armies in the Levant. His Ayyubid descendants maintained control in Cairo in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries until their Turkic military slave commanders assumed the throne and founded the Mamluk Sultanate around 1260; with the Ottoman conquest of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517, the Ottomans (yet another Turkish dynasty), absorbed Mamluk sovereignty along with the local Egyptian population.

The lands of the Nile had been incorporated into the Ottoman state as a province vital to the economic well-being and political stability of the Empire. In the aftermath of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, the Ottoman Albanian official Mehmet 'Alī was dispatched to Cairo to restore order. In the mid-nineteenth century, Mehmet 'Alī was able to secure political autonomy and the right to hereditary governorship of Ottoman Egypt for his descendants, the consequences of which shaped Egyptian national identity immeasurably in the twentieth century.⁶ Not only did Mehmet 'Alī's radical modernization program advance Egypt as a socioeconomic entity distinct from the Ottoman Empire, but the Ottoman ruling elite in Egypt came to consist of Turco-Circassian, Armenian, and other non-Egyptian minorities that were sufficiently alienated from the populace to cause Egyptian officer Aḥmad 'Urābī and his native Egyptian military cabal to attempt to overthrow the Khedives (the royal "Egyptian" family, Mehmet 'Alī's descendants) in 1879.⁷ British occupation ensued in 1882 after the failed coup, a measure that was initially intended as a short-term strategy to stabilize the countryside and protect the Suez Canal, but that remained the reality in Egypt until the final departure of British forces in 1956.

Consequently, Egyptians had developed a national consciousness quite specific to Egyptian heritage and geography that was unlike identity in the other Ottoman Arab provinces. Historians attribute “the separate political and advanced socioeconomic development of Egypt during the nineteenth century” and the British occupation to forming a localized Egyptian identity.⁸ European doctrines of nation-state patriotism attracted the elite sectors of Egyptian society interested in the advancement of Egypt.⁹ European intellectual influences such as Comtean Positivism (with its progressive, secular conceptions of history) and Social Darwinism spread the radical rationalist social climate of the day to Egypt.¹⁰ As was typical of most organic nationalist movements influenced by European Romanticism, a people’s “natural” bond that defined them as a nation required both a clearly delineated antiquity as well as a continuity of shared cultural experience from that ancient beginning.¹¹ The national ethos Egyptian intellectuals derived from the historical narrative of repeated alien occupations evolved into one bound up in the local peasantry: as the living testament to Egypt’s continuity through the ages, the people who had always inhabited Egypt, the tillers of Egyptian soil who came to be viewed as the repository of Egyptian national identity. The *fellaheen* had lived and worked the lands along the Nile; they became a metaphor of Egyptian authenticity, a symbol employed by political activists who demanded the immediate evacuation of British occupation forces in a bid for Egyptian self-determination.¹² True Egyptians were said to be those who spoke an indigenous Arabic dialect, not Turkish, French, or English as a native language. Most significantly, Pharaonic blood, it was claimed, ran through their veins—as the direct descendants of the greatest genius Egypt had ever known, the Pharaohs of Egypt, whose sophisticated civilization of previous millennia was physically preserved in the enduring structures of the pyramids that towered above the Cairo horizon, serving daily to remind Egyptians of their nation’s former glory as “the mother of the world” (*umm al-dunya*).¹³ For local Egyptians, whose religious affiliations were either Sunni Muslim (the majority) or Coptic Christian (a minority), the Pharaonic past provided a nonsectarian national antiquity, which, in combination with the belief in an uninterrupted Egyptian existence in the Nile Valley, reached across religious boundaries to produce relative unity in and dedication toward the newly conceived modern Egyptian nation.

Egyptian national identity at this time was internalized as being distinct from Ottoman or Arab, due to the specificity of Egyptian heritage and geographic location, as well as to the current political crises in which Egypt found itself in the late nineteenth century. The British occupation had made Ottoman political authority in Egypt obsolete, though Egypt was still considered an Ottoman province by the Porte.¹⁴ In essence, Egyptian nationalists did not face the same dilemma as Ottoman Arabs—that of an inability to completely sever the Arabs’ religio-cultural relationship to the Ottoman political center. Among Egyptians, the residue of a pan-Islamic connection to the Ottoman state remained, though it was little more than a symbolic alternative to foreign imperial control that did not contradict territorial Egyptian identity.¹⁵ Any sense of allegiance to the Ottoman Empire among Egyptians had little to do with an affinity for their Arab brethren in Ottoman lands.¹⁶ Egypt had been defined as a particular nation within the Ottoman polity but had been detached from it by historical experience.

As a response to this British colonial intrusion, some Egyptians expressed pro-Ottoman feelings toward the Islamic empire that did not preclude the existence of an Egyptian national consciousness. Egyptian nationalist thinking as to what would be Egypt's future political relationship with the Ottoman state, however, was quite varied and contestable. Nonetheless, despite disparities between Egyptian nationalists concerning Egypt's future position vis-à-vis the Ottoman state, there was no discrepancy in the nationalists' mutual recognition of Egypt as a nation with its own needs and interests.¹⁷ Most Egyptian nationalists agreed the British were a foreign occupying power that had to be dislodged from Egypt, because evacuation would then facilitate Egypt's natural political evolution into a modern nation possessing political and economic independence; the Egyptian press frequently reiterated this desire.

For *al-Mu'ayyad* editor Shaykh 'Alī Yūsuf, ridding Egypt of Lord Cromer was his primary concern. The Ottoman Empire was an Islamic pole around which to rally concerning military and diplomatic issues, but allegiance to the Khedive 'Abbās Ḥilmī II as the leader of Egypt was a more imperative cause for which to elicit support. *Al-Mu'ayyad*, which became the most widely read Cairene paper at the turn of the century, was among the earliest papers to provide a forum for Egyptian nationalists to defend Egypt and Islam against Western encroachment, gaining the support of the Khedive in the process.¹⁸ For the ardent Egyptian nationalist Muṣṭafā Kāmil and his Waṭani Party, the Ottoman Sultan and state were considered capable of liberating Egypt from its colonial shackles in a show of pan-Islamic solidarity that would ultimately result in independent nationhood. He persistently linked the party platform to the Ottoman Empire in his speeches and in *al-Liwā'* in order to crystallize anti-colonial opposition to the British in Egypt.¹⁹ Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid, publisher of the rival Umma Party's *al-Garīda* whose secular nationalist outlook eventually became the foundation for the later Egyptian Wafdists, was perhaps the lone voice of resistance to pro-Ottoman sentiments in pre-First World War-era Egypt. For the Umma Party, Egypt's interests were best served by territorially conceived secular nationalism that would include Muslims and Copts in its conception and rejected an Islamic connection to the Ottoman Empire as a basis for political action.²⁰ Al-Sayyid demanded that Egypt preserve an independent stance both in regard to the British and to the Ottoman Empire.²¹

Their Egyptian Arab identity already firmly entrenched, the Egyptian national, anticolonial struggle was meant to induce a withdrawal of British occupying forces who had suppressed Colonel 'Urābī's rebellion, exiled its leaders to Ceylon, and assumed control over the administration of Egypt. Several international and domestic events buttressed this anticolonial resistance to British presence in Egypt, as one British expatriate later recalled: Japan's dramatic victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and the Ottoman-British military confrontation over administrative control of the Sinai Peninsula in 1906 were compounded by the British-Egyptian incident at the village of Dinshaway in the same year, which resulted in the controversial execution of several Egyptian peasants.²²

Nationalists would also demonstrate Egyptian "civility" and readiness for independence by determining the state-building measures or societal organizing principles that were suitable for a new, modern Egypt. The discourse produced in their newspapers and journals aimed to dislodge the British

occupation, as well as to define the necessary elements of this future nation: in particular, a modernized education system and a democratic, constitutional governing structure, with all its institutional components—capable leaders, a parliament, political parties, a constitution.

Such anticolonial movements, a new feature of the world at the turn of the twentieth century, tended to resemble one another. Egyptian nationalists, like their anti-imperialist counterparts resisting the British in India, espoused an ideology of anti-Western, pan-Asian solidarity in an effort to realize self-determination. British occupation had unintentionally encouraged Egyptians to revere Japan's achievements in much the same way as British-controlled India had reacted to Japan's war victory in 1905.²³ Aspiring to recapture former Egyptian greatness, this time in the modern era through a new synthesis of East and West, the model for Egyptian nationalists (as it was for many Indian nationalists), was Meiji Japan.²⁴ And they anticipated even greater achievements for Egypt: geographic proximity to Europe as a North African territory on the Mediterranean linked Egypt to the trajectory of Western civilization and thought just as its historic role as a center of Islamic culture and learning since the early Arab conquests connected it to the lands and peoples of Muslim Asia. Egyptian intellectuals and activists acknowledged Egypt as a kind of "eugenic crossroads" between East and West that could reach a new level of modern civilization, if given the opportunity.

Colonial Triangle: Egyptian Nationalists, British Occupation, and Victorious Japan in 1905

The triangular relationship between Egyptian nationalists, the British occupation, and the trope of the Japanese nation (particularly after Japan's success in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905) was steeped in ironies and contradictions. When the Russo-Japanese war broke out in 1904, the Egyptian cabinet in Cairo publicized their official policy on combatants in their waters in the state newspaper.²⁵ In contrast to the discretion exhibited by the Egyptian administration, however, the nationalist press and the general Egyptian population were overtly jubilant at the prospect of a Japanese victory over the Czar's forces, what it implied for the Ottoman Empire, for the downtrodden and colonized peoples of the East, and particularly for Egypt. The Egyptian press stimulated mass enthusiasm for Japan with their regular reportage of the war. Discourse on Japan appearing in the nationalist newspapers overall had a strongly anticolonial and pan-Asian orientation, with authors highlighting Japan's potential to bring Asians together to resist Western imperialism.²⁶ Egyptian nationalist writers used the image of a modern, independent Japan to illustrate the potential inherent in Eastern nations to progress if given freedom from European colonization. The foundations of Japanese independence and patriotism coupled with British occupation of Egypt generated anti-imperialist, pan-Asian political consciousness among Egyptians everywhere in a fashion ascribed to one daily Arabic newspaper, *Ḍiyā' al-Sharq*, but typical of most Egyptian papers from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: "It published news about nations which suffered from [British occupation] like Egypt, and at the same time news of awakening nations like Japan was published to be a model (*qadwa*) for Egyptians in anticipation of their own

renewal."²⁷ The most prolific and persistent image in the Egyptian press for at least a decade after the Dinshaway Incident, modern Japan represented Eastern, anticolonial national strength, and a newfound Great Power status that Egyptians naively believed allowed Japan to "benevolently" deliver modern civilization to the less fortunate, less advanced peoples in Asia.

But the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 had bound the two island nations of Britain and Japan together militarily. While British society craved cultural "things Japanese," the British state was ambivalent about growing Japanese power in Asia, particularly after their victory over Russia in 1905 opened the path to further Japanese imperial acquisitions in Asia that might threaten British influence and outposts. The Japanese, meanwhile, newly initiated into the world of global conquest, sought utilitarian methods of managing their own colonial possessions; in 1911 they had the 1908 two-volume treatise, *Modern Egypt*, written by former British civil administrator of Egypt, Lord Cromer, translated into Japanese.²⁸ Known for his rigid, absolutist administrative style during his years as governor general of Egypt (1883–1907, when he was forced to resign over the Dinshaway affair), this manual was looked upon favorably by prominent Japanese officials such as Ōkuma Shigenobu as a guide for managing their Korean possession.²⁹ The *Japan Weekly Mail* outlined Japanese views clearly in 1907:

The leading Japanese journals speak in enthusiastic terms of Lord Cromer and the great work he has done in Egypt. They recall the immense difficulties he had to encounter at the outset of his administration and the extraordinary perseverance and patience shown by him in never flinching or allowing himself to be discouraged by the attacks directed against him and his administration at the outset. It is easy to see that these papers have Marquis Itō in their thoughts when they write thus. They appreciate that his task in Korea closely resembles that which fell to Lord Cromer in Egypt.³⁰

Even the Egyptian press was aware of Marquis Itō's publicly stated intention "to strive to make Korea a second Egypt."³¹ Yet the implications of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and Japan's actions in Asia were conveniently set aside by Egyptian nationalists who vehemently opposed the British, but who simultaneously wrote enthusiastically of Japan achieving Great Power status as represented by the very treaty itself.³² For them, it was the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904 that made Egypt's bid for independence seem impossible.³³

For average Egyptians such as the barber depicted in the following comical Arabic anecdote written by famous Egyptian littérateur Muṣṭafā Luṭfī al-Manfalūṭī (1876–1924), the Japanese victory was a newsworthy event that came up in daily conversation in Cairo:

He says some of his friends told him about a man who entered the barbershop of a barber well-known for his nonstop talking, in the days of the Russo-Japanese war. The man sat in front of the mirror while the barber cut strange shapes in his hair. After he finished, the barber turned to the others sitting in the shop and said, as if finishing an earlier conversation, 'For the sake of explanation and settling the dispute between us, I drew

for you a map of the Russo-Japanese war on the head of the customer. Here's Tokyo, and here's Port Arthur. And here Russia was defeated! And here the Japanese were victorious! And in this line the Russian fleet passed! And in this site the two fleets gathered!' At this point he started speaking zealously of the courage of Japan, and he said 'And on this site the Japanese struck Russia decisively, demolishingly!!' And he hit the center of the customer's head with his hand. The man stood up screaming and howling at his exposed head, and dashed out cursing politics and politicians, and Russia and the Japanese, and the whole of humanity.³⁴

Schoolchildren memorized and recited aloud odes written by Egypt's most famous poet of the day, Ḥāfiẓ Ibrahim, who eulogized the Japanese in works such as "Ghādat al-Yābān" [The Japanese Maiden] in which a Japanese woman is so dedicated to her nation that she decides to go to the front to battle the Russians herself, or "al-Ḥarb al-Rūsīyyā al-Yābāniyya" [The Russo-Japanese War], both of which were initially published in the local newspapers and literary journals.³⁵ Fāris al-Khūri, a Syrian Protestant lawyer and interpreter for the British Consulate in Damascus, penned a lengthy panegyric called *Waqā'ī'a al-Ḥarb* [Events of the War] in 1904 that was serialized in the pages of Rashīd Riḍā's popular Islamic modernist journal in Cairo, *al-Manār*.³⁶ The Russo-Japanese war was the frequent topic of discussion and storytelling at the local coffeehouses and reading salons; Ḥasan Efendi Riyād provided Cairo with a form of public literary entertainment with his 1903 Egyptian novel titled *al-Fatāt al-Yābāniyya* [The Japanese Girl], read out loud to benefit the illiterate in the audience.

Muṣṭafā Kāmil was among the most vocal of the Egyptian nationalist activists expressing opposition to British rule. One historian credits him with restoring to Egyptians their self-confidence after the failed 'Urābī revolt and occupation, as well as with introducing the religious element of pan-Islamism into Egyptian patriotism.³⁷ Graduating with a French law degree in 1894, Kāmil founded a private school in 1898 and publicly called for establishing an Egyptian national university in 1900, reflecting the influence of Samuel Smiles's *Self-Help* philosophy upon his own activities.³⁸ His Waṭanī Party, over which he presided until his unexpected death in 1908, officially demanded from the British government a constitution, a parliament, and a compulsory education system. The British expatriate Fyfe described his contemporary, Kāmil, as vehemently anti-British and inspired by Japan:

Mustapha Pasha Kamel founded the *Lewa* (Standard) to be the newspaper organ of his party. It was cleverly edited, and its slashing abuse of everything British soon won it circulation. Yet for a long time the Nationalist movement hung fire.... In 1906, however... events combined to carry it forward. The defeat of the Russians, a Western race, by the Japanese, an Oriental race, sent a ripple of excitement throughout the East, and certainly fanned the flicker of anti-British feeling in Egypt.³⁹

For Kāmil, Japan initially represented the ability of the East not only to withstand the European colonial onslaught, but to challenge it on its own terms and eventually to emerge victorious over Western imperialism. Newspaper

articles in *al-Liwā'* from 1903 onward frequently emphasized Japan's conflict with Russia in the Far East as part of the larger struggle between East and West: events in the Near East were unfolding in a similar manner; the outcome would determine Eastern nations' status as independent countries or as European colonies in the future.⁴⁰ Of particular concern to *al-Liwā'* were the consequences of this war for the Ottoman Empire, since Russia was their traditional enemy (could the Ottoman Empire seize this opportunity to reassert itself in the Balkans?), and for British colonial policy, especially in Egypt. Russia was viewed as the aggressor and had prepared for war far in advance; Japan, whose imperialist behavior was excused, was understood to have merely answered that challenge in an act of self-defense, all the while abiding by international law.⁴¹

Muṣṭafā Kāmil himself keenly understood the deceptive and contradictory game of international politics, but overriding those considerations was ultimately the pan-Asian recognition that Egypt and Egyptians were obligated to identify with a larger Eastern world. His newspaper rallied to the cry of "Asia for the Asians."⁴² The British, he wrote, obviously encouraged Egyptians to support their ally, Japan, in defeating Russia, Britain's colonial rival in Asia. Yet the bigger picture demanded that Egyptians show solidarity with Japan despite its relationship with Britain because "a victory for Japan is a victory for the Yellow Race," which included not only seventy million Chinese Muslims, but eventually (in pan-Islamic, pan-Asian terms), the Muslims of India, Turkestan, Afghanistan, and Persia, all of whom would embark on a path toward modern civilization that could soon challenge Western hegemony.⁴³ According to *al-Liwā'*, Japan was Europe's complete equal in strength and modern progress.⁴⁴ Japan had overcome ignorance and oppression in its own lands and was now capable of affecting this worldwide by reversing the attacks of the "White Race" upon Asians in what Kāmil called a "revolution" based upon the "solidarity of the Yellow Race."⁴⁵ Japan was Asia's teacher both in the tangible skills of successful military technology, commerce, and agriculture, and in the abstract lessons of proper education and patriotism, both of which he hoped would reach the Near East.⁴⁶ He felt Japan to be such a useful historical analogy that he published a book, *The Rising Sun*, in 1904, which one scholar describes this way:

Since Japan had been victorious over Russia in the year 1905, it was considered... a strong blow to colonialism. It gave new life to the hope of Eastern peoples to be able to achieve their independence... prompting Muṣṭafā Kāmil to write a book by the name of *Bilād al-Shams al-Mushriqa* in which he presented to his citizens a lesson of hope in breaking the furious waves of imperialism.⁴⁷

Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, Kāmil argued, was that of truth, justice, progress, and patriotism over absolutism and injustice, as well as a lesson for the East in perseverance, action, and unity, which could overcome Western colonialism,⁴⁸ since "... a European power had been defeated by an emergent Asiatic power, Japan," an event which not only "... heightened general anti-European sentiment, it also suggested to the Egyptians that their political

salvation lay in a national revival, reform and constitutional government.⁴⁹ In a speech delivered at the Zizenia Theater in Alexandria in 1904, Kāmil used the image of a patriotic and progressive Japan to encourage his audience to strive in the same manner for Egypt to reclaim its past glory.⁵⁰

Egypt the Nation, Japanese Uniqueness

Egyptians tended to agree in their representations of the Eastern country that Japanese nation-state accomplishments were illustrative tools to wrest independence from occupiers, and foremost among these was the emphasis on national strength emanating from a firm sense of identity. As early as 1899, Qāsim Amīn had noted Japan's sense of self-confidence that led it to resist colonization, to modernize fully, and to be able to compete on the world stage. He wrote in his famous 1899 treatise *Tahrīr al-Mar'a* on the liberation of women, how Japan had cast aside all its outmoded customs and rapidly risen to the level of the great powers:

We saw in the century a wondrous event which I consider unique in history. We saw a nation completely disown its customs and abolish its ceremonies and abandon its [political] organizations and its laws and cast them behind its back. It severed every connection between it and its past except what was connected with the interest of the people. Then it exerted great effort and it built new structures in place of the ancient ones, and it was not even half a century until it constructed a beautiful monument of the finest that modern civilization could offer. It was roused from sleep; it unleashed war and it felt itself gaining vitality, moving in its depths, passionate, strong and youthful blood: This is the Japanese nation which is considered today among the ranks of the civilized nations after it defeated in a number of days the vast state of China, which was only because of [China] having been enamored by its own past.⁵¹

The Arabs, he continued, must select from the customs of their ancestors (*salaf*) what was appropriate for their modernity.⁵²

Japan's national consciousness, Egyptian writers observed, was based on a distinct past as well as on the intense patriotism and dedication of its citizens to serving the nation.⁵³ Kāmil's monograph *The Rising Sun* extolled Japanese traits of noble-minded energy and self-confidence, courage, perseverance, self-sacrifice and self-dignity, virtues that foreign domination and tyrannical leadership suppressed, as he claimed had happened in Egypt. Japanese students were industrious, while Egyptians were lazy and indolent, he wrote; comparing Japan to Egypt was like comparing England's ally to the "prey between its teeth," that one was fighting Russia while the other was shackled, with its people divided among themselves. It was comparing "... the advanced to the backward; the ruling and the ruled; the hunter and the hunted... the rising sun and the sun which has set!"⁵⁴ Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid's Umma Party paper *al-Garīda* claimed Japan had "awakened from its ancient slumber" through its "people's resolute determination and zeal."⁵⁵ These traits generated patriotic behavior, created the nation-state, and sustained it through the dedication and

self-sacrifice of the individual for the greater goal: the welfare of the nation. Patriotic behavior had a variety of components that ultimately resulted in service in the nation's best interest. For Japan, knowledge, invention, ancestral reverence, loyalty to the Emperor as the personification of the homeland, and samurai morality caused Japanese soldiers to die honorably and bravely for their country in the war against Russia, using the most modern military equipment and techniques.⁵⁶

Japanese patriotic sensibilities were believed to have established two main principles as the modern foundations of the nation-state that made military victories possible in the first place: unity of the nation's will, and the duty to pursue scientific knowledge for the public good. The call for unity like that of the Japan was reiterated in Cairo, where the rift between Muslims and Copts was of concern to nationalists. The Coptic Christians in Egypt, anxious about their integration into a future Egyptian nation-state, connected themselves to the larger Muslim population through a shared sense of Eastern and Egyptian national culture and an overarching unity that disregarded religious differences.⁵⁷ *Al-Liwā'* cleverly compared Japanese homogeneity with the Ottoman Empire's problematic multiplicity of ethnicities, religions, and languages under the banner of the crescent, rather than highlighting divisions within Egyptian society so clearly.⁵⁸ Pointing to Japanese unity with one another and with the Emperor as a source of strength for the nation, Muṣṭafā Kāmil appealed to "Ottoman Christians" to unite under the Ottoman standard as a patriotic act to regain the empire's former glory.⁵⁹

The Ottoman Empire's problems seemed obvious to several journalists: first, Ottoman heterogeneity caused religious sectarianism that Japan did not experience; second, Japanese unity was oriented around the throne of the Mikadō in an exchange of trust with the nation. The Emperor, possessing love for Japan and enlightenment, did not act in his own self-interest, or in that of foreign states, so that the people dedicated themselves to his service.⁶⁰ In contrast, all reforms and resistance were directed personally at the Ottoman Sultan, causing divisiveness in Ottoman society and allowing foreign powers to intrigue at the empire's expense.⁶¹ Only the exercise of genuine patriotism, or resorting to logic and knowledge of the true welfare of the Ottoman state, could repair the trust between ruler and ruled and save the empire from destruction.⁶²

Kāmil's Waṭanī Party had construed the Egyptian nation as possessing a unique heritage, Ottoman based, yet locally Egyptian, abstract, anticolonial, and merely in need of self-reliance and determination, as had been demonstrated by Japan. Just as the Japanese fulfilled their patriotic duty to the homeland through progress, victory in war, and unity centered around the Emperor, the Egyptian nation would begin theirs by a united, unwavering struggle against the British. "To do what Japan did," Kāmil declared in a speech in 1907, "relying upon its own energy, demanding life and dominion from its efforts, striving not from support of state and sponsorship of an Islamic government," this was incumbent upon his Egyptian compatriots if they were ever to gain independence.⁶³ Kāmil found such national spirit to be inspiring, writing in a letter to Juliette Adam years earlier that "... I am infatuated with patriots and I find in this [Japanese] nation the most beautiful example of patriotism!!"⁶⁴

The ideas disseminated by al-Sayyid's *al-Garīda* reflected the more specific nation-state orientation of its party and were presented in a less provocative,

less rhetorical style. The Umma Party mouthpiece tended to concentrate its attention more strongly upon Japanese patriotism as an expression of a unified national will to absorb and adopt science, an obligation that would eventually lead Egypt to independent nationhood. Pondering why it was that “when Japan adopts Western civilization it progresses; Egypt tries and falls apart,”⁶⁵ writers linked what they called the true patriotism of the Japanese and their love of homeland that was inseparable from daily life, to the transformation of science into action.⁶⁶ Like Kāmil, *al-Garīda*'s nationalist writers alleged that patriotism was a consequence of the Japanese people's relationship to the governing house of the imperial family: the extreme unity generated by this connection and devotion to the Emperor prevailed over foreign enemies. More significant for them, however, was its egalitarian effect upon society, so that Japanese integrity, moderation, and good conduct tempered with a reverence for ancestors stimulated an equal acquisition of science and technology among all members of society and produced refined progress.⁶⁷ Individuals were incorporated into Japanese society in a way that subordinated personal interest to the welfare of the nation as a natural duty;⁶⁸ their firm resolve was applied to obtaining modern knowledge because “a nation is only that because of science,” otherwise its destiny is ignorance.⁶⁹

According to *al-Garīda*, the pursuit of universal science combined the “spirit of Japan” with the “knowledge of the West” in an assimilative process whereby Japan merely adopted what suited them from European countries and then adapted these attributes to their own deeply rooted, indigenous civilization.⁷⁰ Writers for *al-Mu'ayyad* agreed, pointing out how the Japanese intensely preserved indigenous customs while adopting European principles appropriate for the Japanese lifestyle,⁷¹ so that “...no European state was capable of setting in motion the Japanese political movement in the most perfect way like Japan's administration did for itself.” Japan had combined the best of East and West to a point that “Europe could not help this state in its war because it is such a truly great new nation.”⁷²

Nationalists argued that carefully combining Egyptian cultural character with modern Western learning as Japan had done was a national responsibility that would lead to a higher level of civilization in Egypt through assimilation.⁷³ Japan had accomplished in forty years what it took Europe four centuries to achieve, not by blind imitation of Western culture and civilization, but by a thorough understanding of reform and modern progress.⁷⁴ Consequently, Japan now represented a morally, culturally, and technologically superior Eastern nation. Egypt could follow Japan's lead in borrowing the proper knowledge from the West because Egypt was geographically close enough to Europe, its native identity had been solidly established, and some even believed that it was Mehmet 'Alī's Egypt which first inspired the Japanese to send students to Europe to learn Western methods; Egypt could surpass its East Asian “mentor” and prove its capabilities once again.⁷⁵

Egypt the State: Japanese Trope of Institutions and Elites

Despite the disparity of their parties' ideological orientations, Egyptian nationalists such as Muṣṭafā Kāmil, Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid, and others made demands of their British colonial overlords beyond mere independence. Arguing that their

own social and political nation-state development had closely followed the Japanese example, they now sought similar institutions for Egypt. They linked patriotic action to several fundamental tools of nation-state necessary for Egypt to reach modernity: a progressive, compulsory education system, representative, constitutional government, and an elite class of intellectuals and officials to implement reform from above (Syrian émigrés' views often coincided with these). Japan had cultivated the latter to develop and institutionalize the former.⁷⁶ Sending missions to Europe to study government organization and scientific advances every year had led to the establishment of schools in Japan that generated great statesmen for the future who comprehended modernization strategies as much as they understood the needs of the people.⁷⁷ Japan's Emperor and statesmen had successfully modernized country and society through the processes of education and parliamentary administration. The Japanese Emperor himself had appointed the war hero, General Nogi, as a teacher in an elementary school in order that he indoctrinate students in their duties to the nation.⁷⁸ Egypt needed only to follow suit. After casting aside impractical ancient traditions and embracing knowledge of the West, the outward signs of progress in Japan were expansion of the number of schools and colleges, a flourishing press, and technological advances like railroads and electricity in the countryside. Japanese people were very intelligent, and were inclined towards the arts of agriculture and now commerce; it was the firm resolve of the government to carry out the education of its people by founding scientific, industrial, and agricultural educational facilities.⁷⁹ Unlike Japan, argued *al-Garīda*, Egypt did not possess a patriotic, compulsory education system that was unified in purpose at the elementary, secondary, and higher levels among the many branches and teachers; its schools did not aim at cultivating an interest in arts and sciences among the students as a way to serve an Egyptian sovereign and nation.⁸⁰ Instead, Egyptians merely learned the general sciences in foreign schools without the proper sense of patriotism that would guide their use of this knowledge. To follow in Japanese footsteps, all Egyptians had to benefit where they could from European teachers while preserving a patriotic spirit of unity in action: functioning as members of a larger Egyptian body, each was to do his or her duty to help that body develop and grow through the pursuit of education.⁸¹

These concepts were not new to Egypt. Bureaucrats serving in the Egyptian Khedive's ministries prior to and during the British occupation viewed education and the discipline it spawned as the difference between European progress and Egyptian backwardness. Schooling was part of a wider political process because it prepared Egyptians to perform their civil functions with speed and precision.⁸² For those Egyptian elites influenced by Emile Durkheim, Samuel Smiles, and Gustave Le Bon, education would organize and renew the mind of the Egyptian citizen to secure the welfare of the nation just as the Egyptian countryside was being technologically modernized because where progress was concerned, the moral order was no less important than the material order.⁸³ For Egyptians adhering to Smiles's philosophy, the nation was equivalent to the aggregate character of its men; the new elite coming out of the educational system, according to Le Bon, would "constitute the true incarnation of the race," those Egyptians who would guide the nation toward progress, and of course who would initiate and manage the constitutional, parliamentary processes that guaranteed societal order and national interest.⁸⁴ The most

dangerous thing to a polity, according to proponents of this elitist attitude of national tutelage, was a disloyal or traitorous official, or a biased administration, that would lead the country down a false path toward modernity.⁸⁵ Japan epitomized the relationships between individuals' active, disciplined mentalities and the nation's strength and progress.⁸⁶

For Kāmil's Waṭanī Party, Japan's universal education system was the key to its strength because it inculcated powerful national morals resulting in an almost religious sense of unity of purpose to sacrifice in the service of the homeland and nation.⁸⁷ Kāmil reminded those who read his book *The Rising Sun* that the Japanese had long been concerned with the upbringing of their citizenry. Education in Japan now improved upon moral character, assisted the state in implementing constitutional government, and guaranteed freedom, equality, and the nation's sovereignty.⁸⁸ Through the pursuit of science as an obligation cultivated by "patriotic education," Japan had defeated tyranny at home and imperialism abroad. The comparative lack of national schools in Egypt and other Eastern, Muslim and non-Muslim countries corresponded to how inadequate Egypt was in bringing about a British evacuation.⁸⁹

Al-Garīda linked national education, moral character, ancestral heritage, and patriotism in Japan in a slightly different manner. The Japanese Ministry of Public Instruction was said to have reintroduced the teaching of moral, Confucian values and ancestral reverence (including devotion to the Emperor) after these principles had been prohibited previously; ethical upbringing had recreated a new spirit in Japan, in the mold of the old, yet modernized for today's nation-state.⁹⁰ Loyal devotion to the ancestors created a kind of foundation for Japan's modern political authority. Citizens behaved with integrity toward one another while striving for perfection in all scientific endeavors for the sake of the public interest and the nation's welfare. These citizens respected the constitution and obeyed the law.⁹¹ The Japanese Imperial Rescript on Education, propagated in all secondary schools and public events perpetuated the ancient throne, making citizens worthy of and united with their Japanese forefathers.⁹² The Japanese educational system was reformed to indoctrinate patriotic behavior so that the most modern training provided would be utilized in the nation's best interest; it was extended to women in Japanese society as well, as a contributing sector of the population.⁹³

Japan had enjoyed a constitutional monarchy and parliament since 1889 that Egyptian nationalists envied as both a tool of nation-state development and as a manifestation of freedom and modern civilization.⁹⁴ The reestablishment of a true constitutional system in Egypt that reflected the wishes of the Egyptian people was demanded by nationalists who employed the Japanese example to argue their point while they alleged that the British occupation had derailed the democratic process.⁹⁵ *Al-Liwā'* called the Russo-Japanese War the "War of the Constitution" in 1904, describing Japan as a country of freedom where no one feared government oppression or tyranny carried out by the Mikadō; progress was said to be made possible by the constitution.⁹⁶ Japan's defeat of Russia, claimed *al-Garīda*, had kindled the flames of constitutionalism first among the Russians themselves (referring to the 1905 Revolution there); Japanese success had extended this social philosophy further, to Iran, whose constitutional demands were well known, to Afghan princes, and to India.⁹⁷ The Ottoman Empire had not yet achieved true constitutional government

because it was still not completely unified, it was not free of Western interference, there were still palace intrigues, and generally freedom of ideas was only a myth in the empire due to the continually repressive mind-set of the Sultan.⁹⁸ Nonetheless, there was hope that “Japan would spread the light of freedom to Egypt.”⁹⁹

Some Egyptian nationalists pointed out that constitutional law was necessary for the East if it wanted to eradicate exploitative European Capitulatory privileges as the norm of international relations. *Al-Garīda* explained in 1907 that Japan had been able to rid itself of its unequal arrangements with European powers in the 1890s because there was no place for Capitulations in a nation with European-style laws. The paper claimed Nūbār Pasha had attempted to follow Japan’s example with his reform platform in Egypt.¹⁰⁰ The Waṭanī Party paper *al-‘Ālam* also reminded readers that Japanese private property was now protected against foreign acquisition through legal means.¹⁰¹ *Al-Balāgh al-Miṣrī* described Japan’s “constitutional revolution” as not just a blow to absolutist government, but as a concerted effort on the part of the majority of Japanese citizens to overthrow a weak Shogunate that could not oust foreigners from its borders nor preserve the integrity of the country.¹⁰²

The prevailing attitude that reform had to be initiated from above, however, and that monarchy remained an acceptable form of government, provided it was accompanied by constitutionalism, still existed in the minds of most Egyptian nationalists. Japan showed Muṣṭafā Kāmil what was possible when competent, educated people ran the government and made the correct decisions: “This progressive patriotism appeared in its most distinct and most beautiful form the day the Mikadō formed his systematic government, and the nobility, the tax-farm landlords, and the samurai saw that their country’s interest required the cessation of divisions which existed between the classes of people.”¹⁰³ A later Waṭanī Party mouthpiece, *al-Sha‘b*, also reported on the enlightened Emperor, the Mikadō, granting the Japanese people a constitution.¹⁰⁴ Kāmil was one of the first to propagate the notion that the Japanese political model was actually superior to any European one, for “... the Mikadō did not violate the wishes of his people a single time; constitutional monarchs in Europe scarcely follow the will of the nation like this.”¹⁰⁵ *Al-Balāgh al-Miṣrī* explicated Japanese political development as a cooperative effort between a just and logical Emperor and the people whom he allowed to participate in government through the elective process; the people were themselves the ones who restored the enlightened Emperor to his position.¹⁰⁶ This system was based on the German model, the newspaper argued, and created a government that served the people’s needs. It was the only means to guarantee the eradication of oppression and the facilitation of progress.¹⁰⁷

Al-Garīda provided in-depth analysis of the Japanese political system and what Egypt could learn from it. “Between Cairo and Tokyo,” a four-part series published in February 1908, connected patriotism, the emergence of political parties, constitutional monarchy, and education together in an elaborate scheme that was to instruct Egyptians in the political potential of their nation. Determined not to “publish whatever they please about Japan,” the author claimed to possess the true secrets behind Japan’s dramatic success in the world: first and foremost, “the nation’s interest above all others” dictated the actions of all individuals and parties; general education was geared toward obtaining

this objective without regard for individuals or other groups.¹⁰⁸ When Japan's political parties adopted ideas from European parties, they maintained the principle that an individual did not demand political power, but remained committed to devotion to the Emperor. Political parties addressed vital issues and abstained from the personal goals of their leaders.¹⁰⁹ Japan's political parties debated the issues to determine the nation's best interest and how to carry out procedures for this purpose; once decided, they acted in unison for the nation's well-being. All parties operated to support the government, demonstrating a true understanding of constitutionalism. By contrast, Egypt's political parties were still in a fledgling state, having been influenced by political domination, international treaties, and an occupation that created a particular foreign policy not resembling that of a country in and of itself.¹¹⁰ In addition, Egyptian political parties were only concerned with special interests and not with general welfare. As long as these parties were unwilling to sacrifice their needs for those of the nation, the homeland would be endangered. The author recommended that Egypt note the propensity of Japan's political parties to tend to the most vital issues of state: for Egypt, these consisted of support for the Khedival throne, recognition of Egypt's sovereignty, a preservation of current treaties, and the demand for administrative independence.¹¹¹

How should political parties determine vital national issues according to *al-Garīda* writer Yūsuf al-Bustānī? Education should provide Egyptians with the skills necessary to discern the most important concerns of state.¹¹² Education would fashion responsible officials from among the most capable citizens to carry out this task. In Japan the patriotic spirit of education was transferred to political party behavior; students in school first learned their rights and responsibilities and then exercised them through political parties and the parliamentary process. "Patriotic spirit" was defined as "a natural result of the relationship between ruler and ruled" in the country. The nation felt the right and the political power granted by the Mikadō (without riot or war) because of the love of the people for the Emperor. All citizens felt in their souls that sovereignty lay with the Emperor, as the embodiment of national defense and all that was possible for the nation to achieve militarily, economically, commercially, agriculturally, and diplomatically. Education and political parties were merely the outward manifestations of this sentiment.¹¹³ Japanese political parties made service in the Emperor's name their primary focus, and since the Japanese possessed a constitutional spirit, the Emperor was able to relinquish political power in favor of the exercise of rights of the nation.¹¹⁴ "What is constitutionalism except the nation enjoying its natural rights?" the author pondered before reminding his audience that there was "no political power without the nation; without the exercise of power and rights, there is no nation."¹¹⁵ Whoever demanded a constitution for the nation must teach its citizenry that this was the source of sovereignty. Egypt had not yet fully developed a constitutional spirit that permeated society, imparting a sense of the nation's rights and ultimately causing material growth and progress.¹¹⁶

Modern Japan and its progressive institutions continued to be viewed in Egypt as exemplary after 1910. In addition to the discourse on Japanese state and society that continued to manifest in the Egyptian press, various military personnel, journalists, and members of the Khedive's family personally journeyed to East Asia to decipher the "Secret of Japan's Progress" (the title

of one subsequent monograph).¹¹⁷ The start of the First World War and the British declaration of Egypt's status as a protectorate interrupted the nationalists' focus on purely nation-state issues for a time; a noticeable shift toward pro-Ottomanism coupled with hopes of the Central Powers' victory in the war to rid Egypt of British occupation became of primary concern.¹¹⁸ Nonetheless, Egypt continued to regard Japan as a nation-state to emulate throughout the 1920s, during its Easternism movement.¹¹⁹ When Egyptian nationalists needed to draw a distinction between Eastern capabilities and Western colonial dominance to plead their case for independence in the post-First World War era, Japan served as the definitive example of Asian possibility, without alienating Egyptians who despised reforms resembling Western imitation. Japan proved the non-West's ability to assimilate knowledge without losing its Eastern cultural orientation; Egypt could follow suit, reforming and modernizing education, government, industries, and the minds of its people in order to compete in the twentieth-century nation-state system.

Syrian Christian Émigrés: Refuge in Cairo

Images of the Japanese nation were generated by some Lebanese and Syrian émigrés in Cairo, many of whom (but not all) were Christian journalists who had fled intercommunal strife, economic hardship, Ottoman restrictions on freedom of expression in the Arab provinces,¹²⁰ or the hostility of the Syrian Protestant College's administration toward Darwin's ideas that were popular among its students.¹²¹ Following the 'Urābī rebellion and subsequent foreign occupation, these Syrians were at times disliked and distrusted by local Egyptians for their economic gains and participation in the state administration in Cairo. As a minority within Egyptian society under British rule, they represent another vantage point from which the Japanese example was observed and constructed in Egyptian consciousness. Syrian émigré journalists frequently employed Japan in their discussions of how to attain modernity through the proper assimilation of East and West.

Ya'qūb Ṣarrūf and Fāris Nimr, publishers of the Arabic scientific monthly *al-Muqtaṭaf* and former instructors from the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, illustrate that "the crucial role in cultural change is often played by a marginal group within the dominant community, but, of course, not alien to it."¹²² Syrian émigrés such as these served as cultural mediators in Egypt: Syrian Christians educated in missionary schools created a discursive link between Islamic and Egyptian notions of civilization, and European ones, by arguing for the synthesis of Eastern morality and culture with Western science and technology. As such, they claimed that the Japanese example demonstrated the need for secularization and scientific knowledge as the basis of a new identity to unify the populace. Syrian Christian intellectuals saw themselves as the intermediaries between East and West that would facilitate these new principles, and for many of them the distinction between Occident and Orient was less pronounced.¹²³ They understood Eastern modernity to be a cultural synthesis combining material and spiritual aspects of both civilizations rather than any kind of ontological reversal of a civilizational hierarchy.

Syrian Arab Christians' assimilationist views bridged Islamic and Egyptian heritages with European civilization, though they still assumed themselves to

be part of the Ottoman Empire and/or the Egyptian nation, both descendants of earlier Arabo-Islamic civilization. Unlike the Balkan Christians of the Ottoman Empire, they did not perceive themselves as full participants in the Western Christian tradition. What these writers described as the fundamental considerations for reaching modernity varied, but they too often shared in disseminating a form of Darwinian scientific rationalism acquired from Spencer and Le Bon's theories of social evolution and racial hierarchy to explain the rise and fall of nations. Both Christians and Muslims shared in emphasizing the past greatness of the Arabs in combination with the adoption of Western forms of knowledge; their division lay mainly in clashing viewpoints concerning the role of religion in future Arab identity. For the Christians, religion had become an obstacle to achieving Arab unity, and had to be relinquished in favor of a new, rational secularism. Islam was merely one element of an Arab past that contributed to scientific formulation of a modern Arab ethos. Syrian Christians heralded what they considered to be Japan's casting off religious tradition, replacing it with the quest for modern science. Syrian Muslims looked to Japan as the example of how to retain their native character while modernizing, citing Japan's maintenance of indigenous morality and religious practice as the foundations upon which to develop into a powerful, modern, Eastern society.

Clear divisions had become visible in the Arabic press by 1895, whether among Christians themselves, between Christians and Muslims, or between Syrians and Egyptians. The pro-British publishers of the scientific magazine *al-Muqtaṭaf*, Ya'qūb Ṣarrūf, Fāris Nimr, and Shāhin Makāryos, started publishing a controversial political daily in 1889 called *al-Muqaṭṭam* as a response to the Christian Salīm Taqlā's Francophile, pro-Khedive/pro-Ottoman Sultan *al-Ahrām*.¹²⁴ The pro-British ideas expressed in *al-Muqaṭṭam* eventually drew enough criticism to initiate publication of *al-Mu'ayyad*.¹²⁵ *Al-Mu'ayyad* persevered in its pan-Islamic, anti-British stance and engaged in fierce exchanges with *al-Muqaṭṭam*, making itself amenable to the Islamic modernist ideas of the Syrian Muslim émigré Shaykh Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā' in his *al-Manār*. The Lebanese Christian Jūrjī Zaydān encouraged a rapprochement between Muslim reformists and secular modernists in his scientific, literary journal *al-Hilāl* by celebrating Arabo-Islamic heritage as the basis for a modern Arab-Egyptian community in a way that did not alienate Muslims as Ṣarrūf and Nimr had.¹²⁶ Another Christian émigré, the Lebanese Greek Orthodox Farah Anṭūn, seemed to be at odds with both Christians and Muslims, and he propounded radical Ottoman-Socialist ideas in his *al-Jāmi'a al-'Uthmānīyya* (or *al-Jāmi'a*). Anṭūn criticized *al-Muqaṭṭaf*'s editors as enterprising Syrian Christians who merely clung to British policy in Egypt because of its profitability for them.¹²⁷ His demand for national loyalty among citizens did not center around a specific Arab identity because he viewed the military prowess of the Turks and the culture of the Persians to have been just as integral to the survival of the Islamic *umma* for centuries, thus alienating Arabist ideologues with his views.¹²⁸ Despite having come to Cairo with his Muslim friend Rashīd Riḍā', Anṭūn inflamed even the most flexible Islamic modernists: he questioned the feasibility of applying Islamic principles to the operation of a modern state, he rejected separatist (Arab) nationalism for a secular Ottomanist ideology that would be based on complete equality between religious and ethnic sects,

and he viewed representative government as the highest political authority (independent of any spiritual constraints).¹²⁹

Nonetheless, despite the vastly different viewpoints of these journalists, all utilized Japan to make their arguments for the future of Ottoman and Egyptian Arab society. The Japanese nation was an understood referent from which they could all depart into their respective discourses on what was the proper path to modernity. Implicit in their representations of Japan was the existence of an overarching identification with the East that transgressed other boundaries between communal groups, whether Syrian or Egyptian, Christian or Muslim. As one writer suggested in 1907, "the Arabs are pleased with all that has been written about Japan on account of it being an Eastern country, which entitles them to follow in its footsteps."¹³⁰

Ya'qūb Ṣarrūf and Fāris Nimr had moved to Cairo in 1884 to restart their journal *al-Muqtaṭaf*, the training ground for other intellectuals to perfect their writing skills before moving on to publish their own journals and newspapers.¹³¹ Ṣarrūf and Nimr's quest to disseminate scientific knowledge obtained the world over led them to examine Japan's achievements in technology, industry, medicine, education, and other areas.¹³² They believed that Europeans had no monopoly on civilization, but merely chose to promote rational science through education and government support for industry, thus fostering perseverance among their people. Ṣarrūf and Nimr argued that the East, and particularly the Arabs, by virtue of their past glories and sophisticated civilization, were destined to excel at science if permitted access to the same education and training as Europeans. The Arabs were perfectly suited for the same progress, provided they selectively borrowed the necessary attributes of Western civilization.¹³³ Furthermore, it was necessary not to adopt merely superficial appearances of Western civilization, but to generate new attitudes and values in Arab society, just as Japan had done.¹³⁴

Nadia Farag, in her study of the influence of Victorian philosophy on Arabic thought, describes Ṣarrūf and Nimr as having two main principles represented by Japan, one scientific, the other economic: first, scientific knowledge was to be the new unifying principle behind their conception of a national Arab identity. The secularization of Arab society and state was necessary for a progressive movement because religion was no longer a unifying force in the modern era, but an antiquated, counterproductive, and divisive agent that hindered social evolution.¹³⁵ Japan had relegated religion to its proper sphere, as philosophers such as Locke and Spencer had advocated, so that the Japanese were able to unite in purpose, assimilate Western civilization, and modernize both nation and governing apparatus accordingly.¹³⁶ The Arabs had to learn this lesson in spiritual-intellectual independence from Japan in order to succeed in the same fashion.

But the editorial opinions of Ṣarrūf and Nimr on science and secularism sometimes came under fire from their readers. In November of 1897, a reader from al-Fayyūm posited the question, "What is the reason for Japan's progress, considering that it is far from the centers of European civilization and from European countries?" to which the journalists responded,

It seems to us the greatest reason is that the religion of the Japanese does not separate them from the Europeans and does not prevent them from

acquiring Western civilization and European practices. (We say that, not viewing Western civilization as preferable to Eastern civilization nor vice versa).¹³⁷

The next issue of *al-Muqtaṭaf* carried an indictment of their ideas by a Muslim resident of Zagāzīg who challenged them to explicate what he ultimately perceived as an attack upon Islam.¹³⁸ The editors of *al-Muqtaṭaf* defended their position with a reply that very cautiously addressed their critic's allegations without ever reproaching Islam directly:

The absurdity of hiding our meaning to you, sir, was no less so than your finding our answer to the [original] question to be absurd, especially because you embraced our ideas in your response when you said "a lack of existence of anything impeding this strength." For example, China strove with all its might prior to Japan to acquire the methods of Western prosperity, but in it was something blocking this strength, thwarting its efforts. The king of Siam and his men exerted an effort...to acquire the means to Western civilization but the thing which obstructed the Chinese blocked [the Siamese] from it. The Brahmins of India...also aspired to that, but the thing which impeded the Chinese and the Siamese hinders [the Brahmins] from acquiring Western civilizational practices. And this thing is religious zeal or religious inclination or a prevailing religious ardor that separates them from the Europeans and prevents them from obtaining Western civilization and practices.¹³⁹

Al-Muqtaṭaf reminded Luṭfī and other readers that they were not censuring religious zeal, that they had explicitly stated no civilization was better than another, and that they had stipulated this precisely because of their awareness that it was a highly controversial matter. In fact, they reiterated, they did not believe Western civilization was preferable in every manner. Eastern practice was often nearer to perfection, and more suitable for present conditions. Nonetheless, *al-Muqtaṭaf*'s writers maintained the belief that "religion has the most powerful influence over the human soul, especially in the East where the sentiments of Easterners are very strong compared to those of others,"¹⁴⁰ and that ultimately religion had to be managed so that a nation could, like Japan, assimilate the proper aspects of Western civilization unhindered.¹⁴¹ While Şarrūf and Nimr argued that they were not singling out any one religion as impeding a nation's progress, they were clearly in fundamental disagreement with many of their readers over the place of religion in a modern state. Later articles in *al-Muqtaṭaf* on Japan's evolution into a modern state accommodated critics to say that Japanese religion fostered a particular morality (based upon respecting ancestors) that was conducive to progress by encouraging dedication and resoluteness while not standing in the way of association with the West.¹⁴²

Faraḥ Anṭūn espoused similar ideas about secularism and the need for tolerance in any future Arab-Ottoman society, although in discussing Japan he generally expressed more fervent concern about Western economic exploitation. For Şarrūf and Nimr, European culture and civilization was a comfortable,

familiar realm; for Anṭūn, the West was more alien and imposing and as an Eastern Christian, he attempted to distance himself from its missionaries.¹⁴³ In fact Anṭūn considered calling his magazine *The Eastern Community* rather than *The Ottoman Community*, although he quickly realized the futility of attempting to successfully unite a diverse East against Western colonial penetration.¹⁴⁴ Japan represented a challenge to European imperialism: as one of the Eastern nations (along with the Ottoman Empire and Ethiopia), Japan "...holds its head high with pride and power because it has cut the snares or evaded the danger of falling in them by its shrewdness."¹⁴⁵ A socialist who subscribed to Social Darwinism, Anṭūn praised Japan's pursuit of education because he believed it preserved Japan's economic independence and made the Eastern country a strong competitor with Europe in the world market.¹⁴⁶

Anṭūn shared this economic perspective with *al-Muqtaṭaf*'s founders. This was the second principle in their outlook demonstrated by Japanese experience, Farag explains, and a message intended for both Easterners and Westerners: to expose European economic exploitation in all its forms, illustrating the dire need for economic independence among Middle Easterners.¹⁴⁷ Japan's ability to withstand foreign domination, they wrote, had been contingent upon its national unity and intellectual independence. This led to a national self-regeneration through education, the provision for constitutional government, and a system of law that resulted in modernization, and ultimately, in a revision of unfair commercial treaties when it was powerful enough to do so, in order to protect Japan's emerging industries.¹⁴⁸ Japanese economic independence now guaranteed political sovereignty, and until Egypt could become financially autonomous, there would be no British evacuation.

Themes of Japanese unity of purpose in the pursuit of secular rationalism and economic independence appeared in *al-Muqtaṭaf* as early as the 1880s, when for example a list of books written in Japan on every subject between 1880 and 1881 was published to demonstrate Japan's scientific awakening and enlightenment,¹⁴⁹ or when, in answer to a reader's query on what were the foundations of Japan's progress and how the government facilitated it, the journal responded,

The Japanese people are immensely industrious, to the point that their fields are a parable in the mastery of agriculture. Their country is rich with mines of precious metals like gold, silver, and copper. Their government now increasingly concerns itself with spreading knowledge, so it built in its lands primary and secondary schools, it dispatched five hundred of its promising youths to Europe and America to study, it bore the cost of translating many scientific books into Japanese, and hence appears the basis of its progress.¹⁵⁰

Between 1886 and 1912, approximately twenty-two articles appeared in *al-Muqtaṭaf* that pertained to "science in Japan" or the "progress of Japan" and about twelve articles appeared that discussed education and schools in Japan. Typically, these articles pointed out how Japan had abandoned its traditional practices, embraced Western science, sent students to Europe and America to study, and upon their return, these Japanese patriot-scholars enriched

the country through their newly acquired knowledge and skills, whether in developing manufacturing and textile industries, building schools, railroads, and ships, providing electricity for the country, or making advances in the field of medicine.¹⁵¹ By 1900 Japan had replaced its foreign teachers with Japanese nationals because “Japan’s sons verge on Europeans in determination, industriousness and proficiency in the arts and sciences.”¹⁵² Japan had entered the realm of the European powers as an equal, yet Eastern nation, and it claimed parity with the West openly.¹⁵³ Unfortunately, the “Progress of the Japanese” stood in stark contrast to the backwardness of Egypt at the 1889 Paris Exhibition.¹⁵⁴

Japan’s rational application of science resulted in a modern, compulsory educational system and a constitutional, parliamentary government that permitted the functioning of political parties, objectives that represented a modernized nation for Şarrūf, Nimr, and their fellow Christian and Muslim journalists.¹⁵⁵ These elements were symbiotic in their relationship: education generated capable statesmen, stimulated the awakening of the Japanese people, and steered the nation on the path of progress.¹⁵⁶ A democratic system provided for the proper reforms (social, political, and economic) to be carried out by the Emperor, parliament, and his cabinet of dedicated ministers; in the interest of the country, the Japanese government efficiently provided schooling for its peasantry, its taxation practices were fair, and commerce expanded.¹⁵⁷ The education system intertwined Japanese ancestral reverence with practical studies to instill indigenous values in the Japanese youth. The end result of this synthesis was that Japanese schooling raised a generation of well-educated, patriotic citizens who loved their homeland, who were loyal to the Emperor and devoted to their parents, and who recognized that placing service in the nation’s interest over personal gain upheld the traditions of their ancestors.¹⁵⁸ The Japanese Emperor and the Ministry of Education paid careful attention to all the schools, universities, and curricula across the countryside;¹⁵⁹ the Japanese state, aware of the utility of the educational system, reportedly did not lessen spending on education during the Russo-Japanese War despite the massive fiscal burden.¹⁶⁰ The government’s financial participation in and protection of Japanese industries also led to further growth and security against European exploitation.¹⁶¹

Eventually political and economic independence was viewed as what had allowed Japan to develop its army and naval capacities to a degree that overwhelmed Russia in 1905. The development and execution of Japan’s superior military might became the subject of many articles in *al-Muqtaṭaf* and *al-Muqattam* written between 1903 and 1906.¹⁶² The war had come to symbolize a tangible victory for East over West and the beginning of a reversal in the fortunes of Asia: Japan was now included among the Great Powers not by virtue of its religion or race, said *al-Muqattam*, but because of its patriotism, self-reliance, and the acquisition of all things proper and beneficial to support freedom, justice, and uprightness in judgment in its lands.¹⁶³ Japan exported progress to China through visiting student missions to Tokyo.¹⁶⁴

For Fāris Nimr and Ya’qūb Şarrūf, who had personally assimilated Western learning they had acquired in missionary schools with the Arabo-Islamic heritage of their surrounding environment, neither territorial nationalism nor

religion could be the basis of society: modern, scientific progress was the only solution. Unity for them emerged in the East as a shared sense of decline and the desire to arise from it, to enter modernity, and to reclaim the glory of the past, through each individual's actions to elevate him or herself.¹⁶⁵ *Al-Muqtaṭaf* lamented the fact that past achievements of the Ottoman Empire had vastly outnumbered and surpassed those of pre-modern Japan, yet due to Japan's embrace of rational science and the support of an enlightened Emperor, "...the Japanese army, navy, the Japanese constitution and Japanese education have all become models to which Europeans look with wonder...like they used to follow in the footsteps of the Arabs when Arab lands were more advanced than Europe."¹⁶⁶ Assimilation of Eastern heritage with Western science could restore the power balance between Orient and Occident back to its original form, with the East, as represented by Japan, as superior to Europe. Even the West was now looking to Japan as the superior model of progress.¹⁶⁷ Japan had shown that it was possible to reach this exceptional level, and it was the standard to which other Easterners aspired. Unfortunately for the Middle East, argued *al-Muqtaṭaf* in 1916,

When the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress undertook the reinstatement of parliament without bloodshed, it appeared that we obtained what we had hoped for and that a state had arisen in the Near East like Japan in the Far East. This belief remained firmly affixed to our souls to the point of blotting out the deeds of this Committee, being in a perpetual state of egoism and arrogance, [believing] it did not commit any reprehensible acts.¹⁶⁸

But, he went on, "the Arabs now arose and their objective is to restore the glory of their ancestors and construct a mighty Arab state; we see that we are reinstating some of what we have mentioned previously about Japan for the purpose of guiding them in the means of establishing this state and reclaiming that glory."¹⁶⁹ Remorseful that "the Turks disappointed our faith in them although we considered them nearer than the Japanese to progressing along the lines of a constitutional state," the closing statements of this article are a nationalistic justification for the Arab Revolt in 1916: the writer ponders whether the Arabs will achieve complete independence and will establish "a mighty constitutional Arab state in the Arabian Peninsula, Syria, and Iraq," and if this state will include the lands of Egypt, for "the glory of the Arabs must be reclaimed by it; without that, there will be political and social obstacles and we will not be empowered to surmount them."¹⁷⁰ Islamic modernists could embrace *al-Muqtaṭaf's* position concerning the renovation of a mighty Arab state, particularly in remembering the contributions of the Arabs to high civilization, but they would not similarly preclude the role of Islam as a unifying, identifying force in the formation of Arab modernity.

In contrast to *al-Muqtaṭaf's* position as tacitly accepting British overlordship in their scheme for achieving Egyptian modernity, the Syrian Greek Catholic brothers Salīm and Bishāra Taqlā who published the Arabic newspaper *al-Ahrām* [The Pyramids] increasingly adopted a pro-French, anti-British stance after the 1882 occupation, despite their overall concern for delivering news rather than

political ideology.¹⁷¹ In 1880 *al-Ahrām* noted that a nation could only rid itself of oppression and adopt principles of natural law by propagating a spirit of patriotism in its people that would result in the establishment of a parliament, a process Japan had initiated.¹⁷² Its youth had studied abroad, returned to disseminate knowledge among the Japanese, and have since been able to control their relationship with Europe, although there were still difficulties with European powers over their refusal to relinquish unfair Capitulatory privileges and unwillingness to accept Japanese judiciary rulings.¹⁷³

Al-Ahrām kept the Egyptian public up-to-date on events through cabled information on the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars; news coverage of Japan allowed their political orientations to seep through in expressions of frustration over British imperialism in general and the occupation in particular that ingratiated them to Egyptian nationalists. *Al-Ahrām's* early awareness of Japanese colonial designs on Korea and the significance of Japan's war with Russia, a French ally, on international politics were overshadowed by the paper's optimism for the awakening of a powerful Eastern nation like Japan and its apparent civilizing mission in Asia.¹⁷⁴ Japanese progress defeated China's backwardness in 1894 and put fear into the states of Europe by demonstrating Eastern potential to achieve.¹⁷⁵ In addition, said *al-Ahrām*, "...we view Japan's success and its victory as a service to the East in general and to Egypt in particular because the Far East will have grave consequences for European policy, forcing states to prohibit the Suez Canal from falling into the hands of a single state."¹⁷⁶ In 1895 Japan seemed to be challenging European, and especially British hegemony despite Japan's alliance with Britain from 1902, and it did not quell their enthusiasm.¹⁷⁷

Like Şarrūf and Nimr, the Taqlā brothers reiterated the importance of Japan assimilating Western learning in order to achieve modern progress, particularly principles of liberty and the inalienable rights of man that would lead to the establishment of a constitutional regime.¹⁷⁸ Most importantly, wrote one writer,

That... which links together the Japanese nation [is] justice on its soil and the strengthening of its forces in its country. It advanced and adopted progress until in a short time it hit the apex of civilization, refinement, prosperity, might, glory and political power. It seems to me that now it has become a missionary to nations of the East and a preacher to us.¹⁷⁹

"The Backwardness of Egypt and the Progress of Japan" issued a plea for increased attention to education and schools because science was the true key to civilizational advancement, as the Japanese had proved; their government had recognized this necessity long ago.¹⁸⁰ Because Egypt had no proper rulers and no constitution, another article called "Nation with No Government" surmised, Egypt had been left behind while nations like Japan advanced.¹⁸¹

Jūrjī Zaydān, the Syrian Greek Orthodox Christian émigré to Cairo, enjoyed the tremendous success of his scientific, literary monthly review *al-Hilāl* in large part because he appealed to a broader audience than did *al-Muqtataf*. He advocated not the natural sciences, but Arabo-Islamic values as the unifying

principle behind a modern Arab identity enabling assimilation of contemporary cultural forms. Concerned with human interaction, Zaydān engaged in studies of ethics, the social sciences, and the language, literature, and heritage of the Arabs.¹⁸² Discourse on Japan propagated in *al-Hilāl* reflected his particular ideological orientation and his attempt to decipher from the Japanese experience a similar pattern for future Arab modernity. For Zaydān, Japan's experience would not support the outright demand for secularization that *al-Muqtaṭaf* expressed, but its opposite: melding Eastern morality and culture (including religious practices) with Western science and technology.

In his journal Zaydān concentrated upon Japan's indigenous cultural tradition, the evolution of that heritage in the modern era, and the results of Japan's interactions with European states as a trope of successful choices to be copied by the Arabs. His position was amenable to Islamic modernist reformers. Progress in the modern era was spiritual-cultural as well as material in his view, and the Japanese nation had remained faithful to its Eastern morality, religion, and traditions of the past.¹⁸³ According to Zaydān, indigenous Eastern values were inculcated in Japanese schoolchildren and provided the most secure foundation for a modern nation:

[The Japanese] do not learn any religious issues but the children are raised on honor, integrity, loyalty, love of homeland, respect for parents, keeping promises to friends, knowing [one's] duty, and self-reliance... virtues which raised them to the level of the Great Powers—and we need teachers to bring up our children on these virtues more than we need someone to teach them science and philosophy.¹⁸⁴

Pondering Japan's achievements, he made a comparison with Islamic civilization that surely appealed to his readers:

We do not refrain from taking the Japanese as a model and we are pleased by...their patriotism and we urge our nation to follow their example...by what they showed in the way of unity and far-reaching aims...People find the sudden appearance of these virtues strange and they start searching for a reason for that swift success, just like they looked at the speed of the Islamic conquests with the inception of Islam...As for the Japanese...the reason for their sudden awakening...appears to be what is within themselves in terms of self-respect, patriotism, and the spirit of unity; they were not concerned with what they expended or endured for the sake of their independence and the defense of their country.¹⁸⁵

Faithfulness to one's indigenous heritage while absorbing the appropriate aspects of Western society was the fundamental step to reaching modernity. The Japanese Emperor demonstrated this in his pursuit of scholarly endeavors. He was an enlightened monarch, the repository of Japanese ancestry, who had high-ranking Meiji statesmen surrounding him who understood the necessary balance between culture and modernity, such as Itō Hirobumi who,

... in terms of his character ... is an example to every Easterner—whether a man of politics or science, or for any individual... with his desire to acquire principles of modern civilization, to emulate advanced [peoples'] refinement, and to attract his fellow countrymen to its acquisition [yet] he did not accept Frankish custom or behavior... he is an example for people in our midst whom we see adopting Frankish custom and exaggerating [it] more than its masters. That is somewhat inconsistent with Eastern culture.¹⁸⁶

Another important element in Japan's progress, wrote Zaydān, was the "love of the king for his citizenry and the love of the subject for the king."¹⁸⁷ *Al-Hilāl* considered the Japanese Emperor to be an active participant in "a great revolution in their government and their country without spilling much blood" who "...formed a constitutional government, an elected Chamber of Deputies, and he appointed a Senate."¹⁸⁸ Such reciprocal loyalty enabled the nation to carry out modernization projects.

Zaydān more strongly emphasized Arabo-Islamic cultural heritage as the foundation upon which modernity should be built, but he concurred with *al-Muqtataf*'s editors in his desire for universal, compulsory education, a constitutional and parliamentary administration, and modernizing reforms as the goals of an Arab-Egyptian state.¹⁸⁹ He passionately wrote of following Japan's path and instituting a system of compulsory education, which "...increases military, administrative, political and commercial capabilities and makes it approach civilization and progress."¹⁹⁰ The results of Japanese education and constitutionalism were clearly visible, domestically and internationally, through a modern military that proved itself superior to Russian armed forces.¹⁹¹ In fact,

[The Japanese] precede the nations of Europe (except England) in educating their sons and they have more students than Germany, Austria, France, and Italy. So do you find their obtaining a constitution strange?... If you know the ranking of this nation in terms of education, you see it... did that with slow deliberateness and calmness and did not... get confused or beg for help like *we* did. Some among us... demand that we obtain a constitution like [theirs], but... [Japanese] education is seven times more progressive than ours... It is no surprise [Japan] obtained a constitution. It is no wonder that it defeated Russia in its last war; Russia is the weakest of the European nations in terms of education.¹⁹²

Egypt ought to take note of Japan's education policy regarding women too, suggested *al-Hilāl*, since no nation could truly progress without advancing the educational level of its female population.¹⁹³ Zaydān believed Japan's legacy for Egypt was to show them the way to reclaim their glorious past, through education and the achievement of modern civilization.¹⁹⁴

Syrian Muslim Émigrés: Islam and Nationalism

Syrian Muslim émigrés also reinforced the potential for reconciliation of Eastern and European civilizations by emphasizing the congruence between

Islam and Western learning. Comtean Positivism and Social Darwinism affected Islamic modernists like Muḥammad ‘Abduh, who associated with other Egyptians and Syrian émigrés and shaped their attitudes toward renewing Islam and adopting Western civilization. In essence, “... Abduh’s concern for religious reform underlined a conflict in the Egyptian mind which began in the 1870s: the response of Muslims to Western civilization, particularly European thought and culture.”¹⁹⁵

But unlike the Christians Şarrūf and Nimr and their endorsement of secularism as the basis of national renovation, and perhaps more similar to the Christian Jūrjī Zaydān’s Arabo-Islamic orientation, Syrian Muslims tended to reconcile Islam and Western science in an Islamic modernist doctrine that denied the rejection of a religious foundation upon which to build a modern community. For them, Islam was an inseparable aspect of Arab identity from which to derive a unifying ideology; it was the spiritual and moral guide to choosing the proper aspects of modern civilization without excessive Westernization. Coinciding with this, respect for the ways of the Arabs’ Islamic ancestors culminated in the *salafī* movement, which served as the basis for proto-nationalist Arabism among intellectuals. Syrian Muslim émigrés who supported Islamic modernism, Arabism, and *salafīsm* assisted in the eventual formulation of Egyptian nationalist ideology and connected themselves in this manner to the movement. They frequently sided with Egyptians in their anticolonial, pan-Islamic polemics against the British that appeared in the press.

Syrian Shaykh Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā’ could be thought of as the third link in an epistemological chain of Islamic modernists that began with al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ‘Abduh. Having become proficient in Islamic studies and Arabic language after a sojourn in a Qur’ānic school in Lebanon, Rashīd Riḍā’ was also exposed to the study of modern sciences and French while a student in an Ottoman state lycée.¹⁹⁶ Moving to Cairo in 1897, Riḍā’ developed close ties with Young Turk exiles there such as Abdullāh Cevdet, and he belonged to the Ottoman Consultative Society (*Jam’iat al-Shūrā al-Uthmāniyya*). Once he commenced publishing his monthly Islamic modernist journal *al-Manār* in 1898, the paper propagated their Ottomanist, anti-Hamidian, anti-European imperialist ideas despite supporting the concept of a caliphal state.¹⁹⁷

Riḍā’, like his predecessors, found it necessary to ponder the reasons for the current backwardness of Islamic society. Hourani summed up his ideas as follows: religious truth was related to worldly prosperity, and Muslim civilization would only flourish when genuine Islam was practiced and the Qur’ān and the traditions of the Prophet were observed; the *umma* had thrived until Muslims had lost their true religion, which was accomplished in part thanks to bad political rulers who did not respect the unity of God nor did they utilize the principle of consultation in matters of state.¹⁹⁸ A return to the ways and unchanging Islamic traditions of the Arabs’ ancestors (*salaf*) must precede the adoption of any elements of modern civilization from the West in order to rectify this situation. Riḍā’, like al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh, attempted to liberate technical knowledge and skill from culture in an attempt to universalize them.¹⁹⁹ For Riḍā’, the moral habits and intellectual principles of the society in question would determine success or failure of a people to reach

modernity, and since Islam could provide for these, there was no inherent conflict between Islam and the acquisition of modern civilization.²⁰⁰ To go one step further, Islam itself would dictate what aspects of Western civilization were necessary and appropriate for Muslim society.

For Muslims such as Riḍā', the religion of Islam was the guiding force in achieving proper progress for Arab society. The current ontological framework placing Muslims in an inferior position to Europe was due to a corrupt understanding of Islam; once Islamic spirituality was corrected, assimilation of Western science and ultimately a reversal of fortune for the Islamic world would be complete. Rashīd Riḍā' argued that Islam and modern civilization shared three fundamental characteristics that could be understood in contemporary terms. First, both required a level of activity, or positive effort (*jihād* in Islamic tradition). Europeans had abandoned their religion and replaced it with nationalism, or an intense dynamism to sacrifice for the nation.²⁰¹ Second, a sense of "nation" was common to both, although they might be based on different things. For Muslims, unity and loyalty to a nation stemmed from their single community of believers, their *umma*, that was founded upon a shared history, culture, law, rights, and responsibilities; Arabic was the primary language of this experience and would bind Muslims together. And third, Islam and modern civilization were grounded in truth, whether it be the integrity of *salafi* traditions or the precision of science and technology, neither of which were mutually exclusive. The authority of an Islamic nation emanated from God, however, and there would be no separation of religion and state. Because human relations had not been fully provided for through Islamic texts, maintained Riḍā', human reason would have to prevail in managing the affairs of the community. This meant the leader of the Muslim nation, while acting on behalf of the community's interest, would require a process of consultation from religious authorities in order to produce a body of governing law (*qānūn*) that would be appropriately subordinated to the *Sharī'a* (Islamic law). Riḍā' had in mind, wrote Hourani, a sort of *ulamā'* in a parliamentary system commensurate with modern constitutional practices.²⁰²

In other words, Rashīd Riḍā's Islamic modernist doctrine relied upon the premise that the Islamic religion would play an integral role in the execution of political authority in an Arab Muslim state, and could be successfully combined with the necessary aspects of Western science and learning to reach a higher level of civilization. His views were in complete opposition to Ṣarrūf and Nimr's demand to separate spiritual and temporal authority, to relegate religion to its proper place, and to develop a nation purely on the basis of secular, scientific rationalism. Riḍā' believed Islam inspired a state based on justice and law that could guarantee rights and equality to non-Muslims; a secular state, he countered, was founded not on morality but on a natural solidarity that had the predisposition to discriminate against those who did not belong, thus engendering division and conflict.²⁰³

Riḍā' propagated his conceptions of Islamic modernism and Arabism for readers in Egypt and beyond in *al-Manār*, frequently referring to Japan's successful assimilation of Western forms of modernity into an Eastern cultural base to underscore his arguments. Within his Islamic modernist ideological framework, Riḍā' could still concur with *al-Muqtaṭaf's* editors in advocating

the Japanese nation as an example of proper Eastern modernity. His discourse on Japan, however, posed a particular problem for him that is evident when surveying *al-Manār* from 1898 through roughly 1918. Riḍā' was, like the editors of *al-Muqtaṭaf*, concerned with Western economic exploitation. For this reason he presumed that necessity required Muslims to build their economic life upon certain Western principles in order to counter colonization.²⁰⁴ He viewed Japan as the Eastern nation that had cast off the shackles of European domination and now challenged the West at its own game.²⁰⁵ "The nation recent in its creation, judicious in its determination and consideration," Riḍā' wrote,

that liberated itself from Europe's avarice and yoke of oppression is the Japanese nation.... It drew back the veil of ignorance... and coupled knowledge and action.... It acquired from Europe its beneficial technology and refinements and rejected its filth and shameful vices.... It is called the England of the East, it is like the states of Europe, warding off harm and aspiring toward general welfare.²⁰⁶

Riḍā', like other journalists, thought the Ottoman Empire should take note of Japan's ability to withstand the Western imperialist onslaught. He praised rejection of antiquated Japanese practices and the rapid modernization of the country according to the needs of society.²⁰⁷

But the dilemma for Riḍā' arose when he tried to dissect how the Japanese, not only a non-Muslim people but a pagan one, had managed to succeed without Islam to properly guide them. Japan contradicted his Islamic modernist philosophy of statehood. Riḍā's discourse shifted from an initial neglect or dismissal of Japan's achievements as merely a material illusion in some earlier articles, to boastful pride in their undeniable yet surprising victory over Russia in 1905. Before 1900 Riḍā' danced around the issue of Japan's pagan character in *al-Manār* while refuting the notions that nations only evolved out of natural cunning and that religion concealed progress.²⁰⁸ In 1904 he claimed that while Japan was a scientifically advanced Asian nation that watched over itself and the East, its connections of patriotism were stronger than religious bonds, which the Japanese considered to be harmful in this world and useless for the Afterlife.²⁰⁹ Neglecting religious sentiment had prevented equality; social inequality was rampant in Japan, he wrote, precisely because there was no guiding religion such as Islam through which to filter civilizational importations from the outside.²¹⁰

When Japan emerged victorious over Russia in 1905 however, Riḍā' was forced to firmly recognize the Japanese as an example of an Eastern nation par excellence. He attributed their massive success to more neutral and ambiguous aspects of their cultural character such as their "strength of spirit," their intelligence, and their "lofty morality by reason of securing their independence."²¹¹ Riḍā' embraced Japan as a progressive Eastern country, representative of justice and knowledge, that was able to defeat Western tyranny and oppression as embodied in Czarist Russia.²¹² Cursing Turks and Egyptians for endorsing the blind imitation of Europe in all matters as a way to advance the nation, he reminded readers that assuming that this had been Japan's *modus operandi*

was a mistake: the Japanese had succeeded because they were acting in complete unity with one another; this unity stood in stark contrast to Egyptian chaos. "We must be a single nation, a single connection must bind us, some of us tied to others until all classes and clans among us sense it," he wrote, so that "each individual is as though a member of the greater body, having a single life."²¹³

By 1905 Riḍā' had solved the overarching dilemma contradicting his appeal for Islam as the basis of a future Muslim polity—that the Japanese lacked a religious (and particularly Islamic) foundation. He adopted the widespread, if far-fetched, proposition that the Japanese had become enlightened and at any moment were going to convert to Islam, making their superior Eastern modernity complete. The Japanese, Riḍā' wrote, had shown their progress in science and politics, they had discarded their paganism, and they searched for a new religion to guide them that had led them to contact the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II in his capacity as the leader of Muslims.²¹⁴ The Japanese were now ready to accept Islam in accordance with their knowledge, civilization, and strength, he reiterated, because in their devotion to political, financial, and social endeavors, or in consideration of their nation's welfare, they needed only a logical religious foundation from which to embark upon a path of successful competition with other nations in the field of progress.²¹⁵ Japan had concluded that Islam was a religion compatible with science and civilization, but there was no one to teach them. Riḍā' implored the pious among his readers to travel to Japan to tutor the new Asian converts properly, without sectarianism, in the tenets of Islam.²¹⁶ Pondering what this meant for Ottoman and Egyptian Muslims, Riḍā' claimed that enthusiasm for Japan's conversion to Islam demonstrated a sense of connection to a larger Muslim community that transcended linguistic and political boundaries, so that "the Islamic bond is still stronger than the patriotic (*waṭaniyya*) one to which the ignorant have been summoned to do misdeeds."²¹⁷

Riḍā' seemed to have sincerely believed the Japanese were going to convert, or at least he convinced himself of it to resolve in his mind the issue of a successful, non-Muslim, Eastern nation. The Conference of Religions held in Tokyo in 1906 encouraged his optimism for this conversion.²¹⁸ It was perhaps around 1908 that Riḍā' recognized Japanese complicity in spreading this myth, for he disenchantedly wrote in "Islam and Modern Civilization: Are They in Accord?" that "Japan is a nation that has nothing more than superficial civilization."²¹⁹ But Rashīd Riḍā' was still hopeful for Japanese conversion in 1910, thanks to the efforts of Egyptian officer Aḥmad Faḍlī and the Indian Muḥammad Barakatullah in Tokyo.²²⁰ In 1911 he repeated how splendid it would be were the Japanese to convert to Islam, as a bulwark against European colonialism.²²¹ On the eve of the First World War, Riḍā's discourse on Japan still decidedly reflected a strong pan-Asianist tendency.²²²

Whether the views of Syrian Christian and Muslim journalists in Cairo were firmly opposed to one another when defining the role of religion in future society or paralleled one another when discussing the need for education, parliamentary constitutionalism, and modern science as objectives of a new state, they all deployed the Japanese historical analogy to formulate their arguments and to legitimate them in the eyes of the Egyptian reading public. Japan

conjured a sense of affiliation, an association with a larger “Eastern” world that transcended other religious, cultural, and ideological borders. Solidarity with the East was a sensation common to reader and writer alike. Japan symbolized successful Eastern modernity even when it contradicted the ideological rhetoric of the individual writers. For *al-Muqtaṭaf*'s editors who demanded a secular political authority and resistance to economic exploitation, they portrayed Japan as a nation that had rid itself of ancient rituals even as the Shintō religion was crystallizing as the official doctrine of the Meiji state, to which all Japanese nationals were subject either in the school system or in the constitution. For Şarrūf and Nimr as well as for *al-Ahrām*'s Francophile publishers and even for the Socialist Farah Anṭūn, Japan's colonialist activities in Asia were generally conveniently overlooked (they wrote instead of Japan delivering civilization to a backward East) for the sake of argument while they pondered the assets and liabilities of the British occupation in Egypt. As Syrian Christian minorities within a larger Egyptian, Muslim society, connecting theoretical propositions to the example of Japan served to justify their place within a future Egyptian-Arab polity to those in a more secure position. They would not be viewed as Syrian and Christian émigrés in Egypt if it followed in Japan's footsteps, but as fellow citizens, modern, educated, and equal under the law.

For Syrian Muslim Rashīd Riḍā', the issue of inclusion into a future Egyptian-Arab nation was not as great a concern. He was on good terms with Egyptian founder of *al-Mu'ayyad* 'Alī Yūsuf, who he felt was of sound judgment and good character; he did not feel the same about Muṣṭafā Kāmil and his Waṭanī party associates, perhaps due to their more secular, Egyptian nationalist leanings.²²³ Riḍā's objective was to elicit support from his audience for preserving the place of Islam in political and in daily life. He initially ignored Japan's non-Muslim status before eventually putting faith in the conversion of the country when writing of Japanese achievements, in order to place the Eastern nation properly within his framework of Islamic modernism. Japan's modern awakening had widespread appeal and could not be denied by any writer; Riḍā' had to acknowledge Japan in his writings as did Christian writers. In both cases, for those caught in the power imbalance, whether as Eastern Christians or as Muslims against the politically and/or intellectually dominant Christian West, Japan challenged the current arrangement that relegated the East to an eternally inferior status. Egyptian nationalists, Syrian émigrés, Christian, or Muslim, for all of them the British occupation was the political and economic center from which they demanded recognition. Japan, in a Chatterjeean “moment of departure,” reclaimed the Orient's past and advanced boldly into a modern, Eastern future, pointing the way for Egypt and its Arabs. Japan reversed the global ontological framework, and at the same time, provided literary leverage for the anticolonial Egyptian nationalist movement opposing foreign occupation.

There was tremendous optimism expressed by journalists, political activists, and intellectuals in Egypt around the turn of the twentieth century concerning the future of the Islamic world generally and of an independent nation of Egypt in particular. These individuals interpreted Japan as a trope of non-Western modernity that could unseat Western hegemony and domestic political occupations to liberate peoples of the East everywhere and guide them in

the quest to become modern. The ideological differences in the predispositions of Egyptian, Syrian Christian, and Syrian Muslim journalists in Egypt were at times very subtle, but could be discerned more readily by looking at their attitudes toward modern Japan. It is apparent from a reading of their ideas that overall, provision for a modern, universal, compulsory education system was seen at this time as the key that could unlock a nation's inherent power, that could generate modern institutions, and could guarantee the nation's prosperity and independence. Representative government, as the highest form of political organization, would certainly ensue as a consequence of education; a constitution and parliament would be buttressed by a class of learned elites and political parties, both of which would act in accordance with the needs of the populace. But from this point, writers would differ in their views of how to attain these goals. Muṣṭafā Kāmil's Waṭanī Party, so vocal in its anti-British, anticolonial tone, desired Egyptians to rise up against their overlords and would enlist the assistance of the Ottoman state whenever it could help their cause, while seemingly believing the rest of the new Egyptian nations' needs would fall into place after ousting the British. Al-Sayyid's Umma Party wanted neither British nor Ottoman tutelage, but rather Egyptian national unity and dedication to establishing the tools of state as Japan had done. While both parties idealized Japanese strength of character and patriotism, neither group spent much time defining the details of how to assimilate Eastern culture and Western knowledge, perhaps because, as educated Egyptians themselves, the process of assimilation had already occurred in their upbringing and was not seen as a tremendously formidable obstacle to Egypt's progress, or an unfamiliar path.

As a minority in Egypt, Syrian émigrés sometimes shared a similar perspective with the nationalists about Egypt's needs and at other times, disagreed with them and with each other in ways that are reflected in the discourse on Japan. Both Syrian Christians and Muslims appear to have maintained their connections to the larger Arab whole in a way not wholly shared by Egyptians whose particularistic Egyptian national identity permeated their writings. Syrian Christians tended to be more willing to embrace the idea of the West providing the secular, scientific principles that were the only feasible foundations undergirding a modern nation; some were radical secularists who viewed religion as nothing but a hindrance, an obstacle to progress. Others like Zaydān regarded religion as the Arabo-Islamic heritage and history that could bind both Christian and Muslim Arabs together to form a nation. Syrian Muslims were more apt to understand their identity as Arabs through their deep connection to Islam, much as their Arab brethren in Ottoman provinces did. For them, Islam's role in modern society as a faith and a moral compass was imperative, in order to secure the proper form of modernity for Muslims in Egypt and elsewhere. Modern Japan was shaped and molded to fit their ideas of nation—and statehood, however they saw fit to portray their model.

9

Conclusion: Competing Narratives, Ottoman Successor States, and “Non-Western” Modernity

As the previous chapters have demonstrated, tropes of modern Japan, dissected in this study in all their variegated forms, represented a kind of “non-Western modernity” that was deeply captivating and instructive at the turn of the twentieth century. For many Eastern peoples, the Ottomans included, Japan engendered the highest state of moral evolution possible, according to a set of standards defining national behavior that were predicated upon Western intellectual thought. The Japanese, in the eyes of Asian (and non-Asian) onlookers, had seemingly preserved their samurai ethical code, the Bushidō, and their Shintō ancestral rites, transforming these into a contemporary national morality that successfully guided Japan in all its endeavors. They were believed to have retained their cultural essence as they joined the ranks of the European powers in employing the most modern technological, social, and political means to succeed as a nation-state on the world stage.

I understand the many discursive constructions of Japan’s ascent to modern nationhood and all its perceived attributes to reflect an intermediary stage in the process of Middle Easterners attempting to produce a definition of the potential to achieve a universalist form of modernity, unfettered by the Western cultural hegemony that had been imposed upon them. The late nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centuries in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa were defined by European imperial will and colonial action, which fomented resistance among many local peoples. Yet resistance to European imperial, physical, and political domination still often simultaneously engendered an attraction to Western intellectual thought and political practices, and to Western technology and science. The Japanese nation and state mediated this polarity in a way that allowed Ottomans agency—the agency to accept a Eurocentric framework and set of standards for progress while not seemingly turning their backs on their Ottoman, “Eastern” essence. This historical moment then initiated a later intellectual interrogation of modernity in the Middle East for the post-Ottoman interwar era and beyond. Not until the mid-twentieth century could we argue that an ultimately Western hegemonic

definition of what it meant to be modern was delegitimized in a way that allowed for a more culturally neutral, universal modernity to emerge, in which no civilization was believed to possess the foundations of modernity more than any other. Modernity could then “grow from the ground up.” This process is ongoing even today, with diverse viewpoints having emerged in the Middle East region concerning how to become modern without losing one’s culture and identity, some being more conciliatory toward Western influences while others more vehemently rejectionist in their attitudes.

In any case, the process of imagining the modern Japanese nation at the turn of the twentieth century was rife with contradictions, which at times served to unify ethno-religious, class, and geographic divisions in Ottoman purpose and identity, while at other times it highlighted emerging national and cultural differences among those peoples contained within Ottoman borders. We can to some extent contemplate these different interpretations of the Japanese example as reflective of certain competing national narratives that had begun to emerge among the various sectors of the Ottoman population at the end of Empire, or else perhaps as divergent attitudes toward the ruling authority under which an individual found him/herself. For example, some Arab intellectuals critical of the CUP government used Japan to suggest Ottoman shortcomings in the early twentieth century, whereas at the same time, some Ottoman Turks hoped to elicit loyalty toward the Unionist regime, believing they were patterning themselves and the Empire after modern Japan in ways that would be amenable to Ottoman “citizens.” And as another example of the different relations toward state authority, two individuals whose affinity toward the Japanese nation have been examined in previous chapters, the Ottoman Arab Sâṭî’ al-Ḥuṣṣî and the Tatar Muslim exile from Russia, Abdürreşid İbrahim, internalized and expressed their impressions of and solidarity with Japan in very different ways: Sâṭî’ Bey employed the Japanese trope to argue for unity and Ottomanism as the path forward toward modernity in the late Ottoman period, simultaneously embracing assimilation into the Ottoman Turkish state as a strategy and accepting the Turkish ruling elite as the legitimate authorities until he had no Ottoman state left to support after the First World War. İbrahim, on the other hand, found Japan and its representative Easternness to be a pole around which to rally pan-Asian, pan-Islamic, and pan-Turkic sentiments in order to combat the Russian Czar and state, as well as colonialist Europe in general. Modern Japan embodied unity and cooperation with the state for one and unity as a tool of resistance against a state for another.¹ The Japanese model came to mean whatever one wanted it to mean in a specific moment and circumstance, and this trope could, as a consequence, resonate strongly with like-minded others.

The phenomenon of imagining, of constructing Japan as a model Eastern nation, continued farther into the twentieth than merely to the First World War, carrying with it the burden of a few lingering contradictions that were not acknowledged until the end of the Second World War, if at all. Let us conclude with a commentary on a few of these issues that have perhaps only been alluded to in earlier chapters.

The political conflagration between Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Young Turks portrayed in chapter 6 was afire with imagery of modern Japan’s constitutional political system and its enlightened young Meiji Emperor as each

side in the Ottoman political struggle accused the other of unpatriotic and traitorous behavior. But the irony of Japanese patriotism was lost on both the defensive Ottoman Sultan and the impassioned Young Turk opposition. The Japanese cult of the Emperor and State Shintō doctrine that served the Japanese state and ultimately its ultranationalist militarism in Asia in later decades by motivating Japanese patriotism and self-sacrifice in service to country escaped the perception of Sultan Abdülhamid II. He was too concerned about his position as Caliph of all Muslims being challenged by the Meiji Emperor's status to have embraced the notion of promoting his own monarchical power through a symbolism similar to that of the Japanese Emperor. At the same time, the Young Turks, in emulating the Japanese oligarchs and their Emperor, misunderstood the extreme dedication of the Japanese toward a sovereign they believed was Japan's spiritual patron-ancestor. The potential concentration of that power around the imperial Japanese throne, driven forward by Shintō religious belief, deviated from the Young Turk conception of political power centered around a secular Turkish nation-state, rather than that emanating from a monarch such as the Sultan himself. While the Japanese *genrō* and the CUP inner circle had much in common in terms of seizing political authority for their own ends, the place of the royal sovereign and his stimulation of religious solidarity in each empire diverged in ways overlooked by the Young Turks overall.

The Turkist and Turkish nationalist ruling clique of the late Ottoman era Young Turk Unionist regime discussed in chapters 6–7 developed rather particular views about Meiji Japan that did not just provide models for governance. The Japanese nation also assisted them in formulating a new Turkish identity bound up in rather racialized and militarized ideas of nationhood.² Though the revitalized Ottoman state would be a constitutional, parliamentary regime, they possessed a nation-state ideal of empire placed Turks at the helm as the governing elites; the Ottoman state would be a Turkish polity at heart but could permit non-Turks who assimilated linguistically and otherwise to participate. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 inspired the Turkists and Turkish nationalists of the CUP to more openly consider their empire as a Turkish possession to be patriotically protected, using force if necessary. Arab journalists and political activists whose writings and actions were considered threatening to the unity of the Ottoman (Turkish) nation were thus executed in 1915–1916 for what the authorities considered seditious activities. In addition, while the journalists from *Genc Kalemler* actively promoted the elimination of foreign words and grammar (mainly Arabic and Persian) from the Ottoman vernacular to create a *yeni Türkçe* (“new Turkish”), not long after that, and shadowing the linguistic movement, a purge of non-Turkish ethnicities in Ottoman Anatolia to create and defend the future Turkish nation ensued, which resulted in the Armenian genocide of 1915–1920. The ideal citizen of this new Turkish nation would be modeled after the Japanese: a dedicated patriot and soldier committed to the principles of secular modern progress as well as to, in this case, “Turkishness.” As such, in the new Turkish Republic, competing narrative voices—Islamists, Kurds, et cetera—were effectively drowned out or suppressed.

The Japanese example continued to inform the discourse on modernity in Turkey in the 1920s. The Ottoman poet and littérateur Mehmet Âkif Ersoy (b.1873-d.1936), kept Japan's national awakening alive in the minds of Turks in this new Republic: his 1911 poem “Japonlar” and 1912 poem “The Secret

of Progress," both of which appeared first in Ottoman, were made available in modern Turkish via countless reprint editions of his diwan throughout the twentieth century.³ An excerpt of the latter poem is as follows

I have wandered in the East over the years, I have seen much, not just
glancing past!
I did not say, this is Arab, Persian, Tatar; I myself saw all elements of the
Muslim world.
I have peered into the souls of little men, and analyzed great men's
ideas.
Then what caused the Japanese to arise? What were the reasons for their
progress? I wanted a closer look.
This far-reaching effort, this lengthy journey, gave me but one conviction
in the world.
That conviction is this: do not look elsewhere, the secret of your progress
lies in you.
A nation's rise comes from within itself; success does not come through
imitation.
Accept the art, the science of the West, and hurry your efforts to those ends,
Because one can no longer live without them: because art and science
have no homeland;
But just keep well in mind my warning: passing through all eras of
progress,
Let your "essential spirit" be your guide.
Because it is useless, there is no hope of salvation without it.⁴

The message of selective borrowing in order not to lose one's essence is tempered by the reminder that "art and science have no native land," so that modernity is universally available to those strive in earnest to build the nation.

Ziya Gökalp, too, kept the Japanese model in the forefront of Turkish reformist thinking. Gökalp's writings after the Turkish War of Independence still wrestled with the meaning of civilization and the ability to transfer it to various cultures and religions. He often referred to Japan, noting when discussing the evolution of nations that "the Japanese, for example, abandoned the civilization of the Far East in the last century and adopted Western civilization,"⁵ and that

...just as differences in culture do not necessarily bar sharing in the same religion, so differences in culture and in religion do not prevent association within the same civilization. Thus the Jews and the Japanese share the same civilization with European nations although they differ from them both in culture and religion.⁶

Gökalp did not believe Japan had lost itself in the transition; Turkey had to follow suit and advance its sciences, industries, military, and judiciary by assimilating Western civilization. The prospect would preserve the Turkish nation, not destroy it, for

Japan is accepted as a European power, but we are still regarded as an Asiatic nation. This is due to nothing but our non-acceptance of European civilization in a true sense. The Japanese have been able to take the Western civilization without losing their religion and national identity; they have been able to reach the level of Europeans in every respect. Did they lose their religion and national culture? Not at all! Why, then, should we hesitate? Can we not accept Western civilization definitely and still be Turks and Muslims?⁷

Arab intellectuals and officials in the newly established Arab Mandate states of the post-First World War era similarly continued to rely upon the Japanese nation as a model for reform and modernization into the 1920s and 1930s. In French Mandate Lebanon in 1922, the speeches of journalist Jurjī Niqūlā Bāz printed in local Beirut papers on “The Progress of Japan” in the first decade of the twentieth century were republished in pamphlet form to reiterate the importance of applying one’s innate character and perseverance to the promotion of education and scientific study for the betterment of the nation.⁸ The pamphlet prologue contained a dedication to Muḥammad Kurd ‘Alī, “founder of *al-Muqtabas* and president of the Scientific Academy, Director of Education in Syria”⁹; Kurd ‘Alī too had devoted much time and energy in the pages of his Arabic press in the last years of the Ottoman Empire to discussing Japan’s educational system and certainly this influenced his educational activities in French Mandate Syria in the interwar period. The first page of Bāz’s pamphlet also contains several verses of the famous Egyptian poet Ḥāfiẓ Ibrāhīm’s “The Japanese Maiden,” the Arabic poem lauding the patriotic service of a Japanese woman to her country during wartime, which had been so popular during the Russo-Japanese conflict.

Next door in British Mandate Iraq, Iraqis were also still attracted to the Japanese model as a pattern to emulate. In 1925 the Iraqi and former Ottoman Army Officer Taha al-Hāshimī published *The Awakening of Japan and the Influence of the Nation’s Spirit on the Awakening* in Baghdad.¹⁰ Al-Hāshimī discussed the ideas of sociologists Edmond DeMollens and Gustave Le Bon, and the second half of the book was an Arabic translation of Ostrorog’s 1911 lecture on Japan’s renaissance discussed earlier. It is not clear whether al-Hāshimī actually attended this conference or if he merely translated the published proceedings later. It is possible however that, as an Ottoman military officer, he could have been present in Istanbul at that time. Nonetheless, the lessons Ostrorog ascribed to the “Japanese miracle,” which al-Hāshimī gleaned, are numerous: first, progress and the achievement of modernity were due to Japanese strength of character (what Ostrorog called a “fundamental inclination”). Second, their samurai origins, Ostrorog believed, were to have produced modern Meiji statesmen with leadership qualities who were capable of “emancipating” the nation from autocracy (referring to the CUP as liberating the Ottoman Empire from the despotic Sultan in 1909). Additionally, the statesmen’s tasks were also to “bestow” literacy (through promotion of national language) and education upon the rest of society (as Ostrorog had encouraged the CUP to do at the time of his original lecture). From Ottoman times to the Mandate era, the military had provided education and social mobility to those

joining the ranks, and this education not only indoctrinated patriotism but also provided access to the most modern science and technological innovations, the adoption of which was considered by Ostrorog to be crucial to a nation's survival. As a former military man turned Iraqi politician (he served as Iraqi prime minister briefly and in other Iraqi political offices during the Mandate), al-Hāshimī would have appreciated Ostrorog's line of thought and his privileging of the military class as the custodians of the nation-state.

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, Japan continued to be a model nation for many peoples in the Middle East in the face of continued European intervention. The Mandate system was merely a form of colonialism repackaged for the post-First World War era as more palatable and benign. And so the question of modernization without cultural Westernization and the loss of Arabo-Islamic identity continued to be posited, with Japan as the illustration of what was possible for non-Western nations. Again I return to Sâṭi' al-Ḥuṣrî, who, in the aftermath of the First World War, was left without an Ottoman Empire, and with an Arab nation now divided by recently drawn-up artificial Mandate state boundaries. Having served Prince Faysal in Syria until the French drove out Faysal's Arab government, Sâṭi' al-Ḥuṣrî relocated with Faysal when he was crowned King of Iraq by the British in their newly formed Mandate. As in his earlier Ottoman career, al-Ḥuṣrî served in the field of education (as director) in Iraq in the 1920s and 1930s, where he disseminated his ideas concerning Arab history and the principles of pan-Arab nationalism through textbooks and curricular development; he later developed curricula for Syria, and eventually took up a position in the Cultural Directorate in the League of Arab States in Cairo in the 1940s, where he lectured and published essays while running the Institute for Advanced Arab Studies.¹¹ A man who worked within the political system all of his life in order to promote national unity and inclusiveness, and one who viewed education as the foundation of power and independence, he lectured on Japan this way even in the 1940s when subtly expressing his aspirations for a pan-Arab nation, free of European control:

Returning...to the Europeans' allegation that the peoples of Asia and Africa are bereft of the "capacity for civilization and progress,"...that allegation started disappearing from the beginning of the present century. For the noble demonstration which nullified the Europeans' claims in this arena with decisive and factual proof is well-known, returning to the Japanese nation. That [Japan], by its swift and sudden awakening, and its reaching the level of the most advanced European nations in various fields of science and civilization, in a short few generations, proved that the non-European peoples are not bereft of the capacity for progress and civilization, just as they are not lacking in the availability of means to assist them.¹²

As Sâṭi' al-Ḥuṣrî lectured on the qualities of Japan that allowed the Japanese to achieve modernity, and Abdürreşid İbrahim, resident in Tokyo since 1938, produced war propaganda for Imperial Japan to be distributed in the Dutch East Indies, Japan was at war with the Western Allies in a conflict that only at its end caused many of these writers and thinkers in the Middle East to

distance themselves from employing modern Japan as an exemplary Eastern nation. But even so, Japan's image was only temporarily shattered after the realization of Japanese imperialism in Asia. So strong was the attraction to the modern Japan trope that it again resurfaced strongly in books and treatises in the Middle East in the 1960s and onward through the 1980s. What caused this almost incessantly powerful draw?

The most significant and undeniable element is the strong association of Europe and the West generally with colonialism in the eyes of Middle Easterners, an abhorrent sin from the nineteenth century onward, practiced mainly by the British, the French, and the Russians, which was not so easily ascribed to other peoples, particularly other "Eastern" peoples like the Japanese. The signifiers of modernity—in other words those attributes of the modern nation-state that were recognizable as the instruments of power for a particular nation, that gave it its sovereignty, its independence, its ability to defend itself forcefully or to conquer another—were still overwhelmingly understood by nationalists as a by-product of Western progress in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, having originated in and in many ways viewed as cultural possessions of the West that could be borrowed and applied accordingly. So too was imperialism and the seizure of foreign territory for the purposes of exploiting resources and labor considered the preserve of the West. This pairing of European imperialism and modernity led peoples experiencing Western colonial rule who were a certain physical distance from East Asia (far enough away to have only minimal contact with the Japanese state, i.e., the Middle East) to create a space to envision Japan in a particularly dualistic way as well: as an Eastern nation capable of modernity, yet incapable of colonialism. Let me illustrate this point further by returning for a moment to the discourse on modern Japan propagated among Egyptian nationalists.

As we explored in chapter 8, Egyptian nationalist discourse incorporating images of modern Japan revealed an ideology of anticolonial resistance, liberation, and nationhood that was relevant to Egypt's experiential understanding of modernity in the early twentieth century. In fact Egyptian conceptions of modernity in this era resembled those of other "non-Western" nations faced with the same anticolonial, nationalist dilemmas of Western imperialist domination. In other words, the West dictated the measure of modernity and Eastern nations had to conform to these standards while not losing what was considered their unique "essence," or else be denied a place in the world of modern nationhood altogether. In this early phase of Egyptian anticolonial nationalism, some of the movement's intellectual forefathers desired to link Egypt to the Japanese, the allies of their British occupiers, rather than for example to Korea, a fellow Eastern country forcefully colonized by Japan, annexed officially in 1910, and, as noted in chapter 8, in a turn of irony, governed by the Japanese using Lord Cromer's colonial pattern of Egypt. Russia had generally been seen as the imperial aggressor in the Russo-Japanese War and Japan the defender of the colonized "East," despite this being a clash over colonial possessions in East Asia. Control of Manchuria and what was labeled the "guarantee of Korea's independence" were not imperialist goals of the Japanese, argued the writers of Kāmil's *Waṭanī* Party newspaper, but a means of protecting Japan's sovereignty against foreign invasion and domination

by Russia.¹³ Only a few articles in *Abū Naẓẓāra* published by Alexandrian Jew Ya'qūb Sānū' (James Sanua) circa 1904–1905 during the Russo-Japanese War noted that this war was *not* fought in the name of defending one's *patrie*.

Egyptian nationalists, many of whom were Western-educated anti-colonialists, were receptive to the message of Japan and the potential power that emulating its pattern might generate for Egypt. Korea was a colonized loser and not worthy of much Egyptian attention or sympathy; Egyptian nationalist elites who envisioned an independent country with themselves at the helm would rather identify with modern, independent Japan and its Japanese statesmen, whom they idealized. This imagining was paradoxical and at the expense of reality, for they typically ignored Japanese imperialism in Asia altogether, or at least viewed Japan as conducting as a noble *mission civilisatrice* for Asia.¹⁴ In their eyes Korea was seen as unable to modernize by itself and in need of Japanese “assistance” to drag it into modernity. The perception thus endured that Japan was not a colonial power, but performing an honorable task in delivering modernity to China or Korea by “preserving” or “reforming” their indigenous Chinese or Korean traditions. This attitude of indifference to Chinese or Korean suffering under a Japanese colonial yoke is in marked contrast to Egyptian empathy for and cooperation with their fellow anticolonial Indian brethren under British occupation.¹⁵

Very few Egyptian voices dissented against the prevalent view of the Japanese as principled defenders of the East to point out Japan's expansionist motives in Asia. Only on rare occasion were the similarities between Egypt and Korea as fellow colonized peoples even noted in the Egyptian press.¹⁶ This resemblance was usually overshadowed by an author's apologetic tone toward Japan's imperialist actions because of its character as an awakened Eastern nation on a civilizing mission in Asia, followed immediately by more vitriolic condemnations of British and French policies in North Africa.¹⁷ It was still the assessment among many Egyptian nationalists as late as 1910, when it was argued for example that Meiji Japan was a “trusted ally of Korea,”¹⁸ or that Japan had influenced constitutional reforms in the Chinese government.¹⁹ The Syrian Arab Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī was one of few Arab writers who once mentioned Japanese oppression of Koreans through their colonial school system, which he compared to French behavior in Algeria (and which was a subtle criticism of Ottoman educational instruction in the Arab provinces).²⁰ Egyptian nationalists, seeing Egypt confidently, as ready for nationhood, would more closely identify with the victors, the empowered Eastern brother, the Japanese “civilization-bearer,” rather than the colonized losers of East Asia, the Koreans, the East Asian replica of Egypt's weaker self, whose current political circumstances more closely resembled those of Egypt under British authority. Not only did Egyptians downplay or avoid altogether acknowledging Japanese actions in Asia as imperialist, in the name of embracing what were at the time considered to be the true principles of modernity and the *only* viable path to national liberation for Eastern peoples, but Egyptian nationalist anticolonial ideology minimized the implications of Meiji Japan's formal alliance with Britain. Nationalists, in Egypt and elsewhere, had to make ideological choices that were not always consistent with the realities in order to make the point.

What is most significant in this nexus is that this phase of Egyptian nationalism reflected an historical moment in which both modernity and colonialism

were perceived as ultimately Western phenomena. Imperialism was not yet universally understood or universally resisted; a coherent and effective anticolonial solidarity across the globe among occupied peoples would take decades longer to develop. To Egyptians at this moment, around the turn of the twentieth century, therefore, Japan could only be a symbol of Oriental potential to achieve Western-style modernity and not a brutal colonizer. Egypt's nationalist assessments of modern Japan that ignored the less flattering aspects of Japanese policy in Asia make sense if we consider that the most recent Egyptian experience of colonialism (and indeed the typical experiences of many others as well at this time) was direct entanglement with a European power.

Post-First World War peace-making arrangements and Japan's role in the process further reinforced the impression that colonial activities were always undertaken only by the imperialist West and that Japan had "the East's" best interests in mind. In the aftermath of the war, those sympathetic to the Egyptian Umma Party's Western-oriented, secular ideas continued to pursue an accommodationist policy that involved forming a delegation, the Wafd, as a vehicle for officially representing and peacefully, legally achieving Egyptian national interests, the most crucial of which were to repeal Egypt's status as a British protectorate and to grant Egypt independence.²¹ In 1918 the Wafdists anticipated traveling to London to present their demands directly at the Paris Peace Conference. Britain refused to allow this, arrested prominent members of the delegation, and exiled them to Malta, an action that was immediately followed by public demonstrations, violent riots, strikes, and further arrests in Egypt in 1919 that forced the British to acquiesce. The Wafdist exiles returned and traveled to Versailles, where the Japanese sat at the table as victors with their fellow Allied Powers. Attempts by Japan to insert a Racial Equality Amendment into the League of Nations Covenant at the Paris Peace Conference perpetuated Japan's image as a crusader for non-European peoples (including African American activists) as the Japanese strived to effect on paper a recognizable change in the racial hierarchy; they were unsuccessful in this endeavor.²² Japan's true motives pertained to erasing the final obstacle obfuscating its unconditional equality with Western powers in determining global affairs. But certainly this effort by Japan had an impact upon the views of the Egyptian Wafdists present who led Egypt's Easternism movement in the 1920s.²³

The Japanese continued in their efforts to demonstrate their allegiance to nations of the colonized East during the interwar period. Playing upon pan-Asian, Eastern solidarity, Japan enticed Asians and Muslims under European rule to join in the struggle against the West.²⁴ The Japanese Emperor himself made a symbolic pilgrimage to the Ōshima memorial and cemetery in Wakayama Prefecture on June 3, 1929, in honor of the Ottoman Turkish sailors who drowned during the *Ertuğrul* shipwreck 38 years earlier. The Japanese continued to have strategic interest in the Middle East leading up to and during the Second World War, and hoped to co-opt support in the region for their anti-Westernism, which caused renewed interest in Japan at this time among many Asians and Middle Easterners as an anticolonial liberator.

Tracing the intellectual forces that shaped Egypt's understanding of colonialism and modernity in the early twentieth century through the lens of discourse on modern Japan serves to enrich our understanding of the historical backdrop for later stages in the development of Egyptian nationalism, of Egypt's particular

self-view in relation to the rest of the world, and of anticolonial nationalism more generally. It also tells us much about the changing attitudes toward modernity in the non-West. Many colonized peoples of the East were drawn to the intellectualized notions of Western progress and civility in the early twentieth century because these principles were believed to be the most fruitful of implementations for enabling power—political power to rule as entitled elites, to modernize and to reform, to steer the masses; national power to establish and preserve sovereignty, to gain international recognition as an independent country. For many “Easterners” desiring access to such power, to reject these conceptions of progress and civilization outright proved an almost insurmountable task while under the twin hegemonic pressures of Western imperial might and claims of rational scientific superiority. In turn, to then resist becoming enchanted by their Japanese manifestation, as this signified the innate potential within all Asians to become modern, would be even more improbable.

In adhering to the predominant and monolithic understanding of modern progress circulating in the world at this time as represented by Japan, Egyptian nationalists and other non-Westerners essentially precluded the articulation of a coherent ideology of international solidarity and anticolonial resistance among occupied peoples (I define a universalized anticolonialism ideally as disregarding the imperial overlord’s race, ethnicity, or religion). By this I mean the inability to formulate a universal opposition among those nations who shared in the experience of a physical occupation by an imperial power and whose political or cultural affairs were administered by this colonizer, who denied people a substantial voice in governing. This relationship between modernity and colonialism follows because peoples not yet having “become modern” according to the standards dictated by the West and rather broadly accepted by elites in both the East and the West, were deemed to be in need of assistance, thus ultimately justifying another power’s colonial intrusion. In the case of Egypt, convinced of Egypt’s fulfillment of the criteria for modernity, the nationalists engaged in anti-Western colonial resistance to eradicate the British presence from the Nile Valley in the early twentieth century. Egyptian ideology centered fervently around contesting specifically Western imperialism, rather than publicly objecting to all colonialist actions in the world without distinction; it did not extend to opposing Japanese imperial exploits for example.

In an era informed by widely accepted ideas of Social Darwinism, an ontological division in the world between “East” and “West,” and racially distinct nations whose abilities in the realm of civilization depended upon the character and morality of their respective peoples, colonialist activities were also seen and interpreted through this lens by the colonized. The brutal colonizer, in such a distillation of anticolonial attitudes, could *only* be Western, and not a fellow Easterner. This filtering of colonialism explains the lack of Egyptian solidarity with the Koreans’ plight just as it goes far in accounting for the high degree of Egyptian support for the Indian nationalists against their British overlords or for the Javanese resistance against the Dutch. In those cases, not only could the pan-Asian, anticolonial rhetoric incorporate a pan-Islamic tone, but the occupier was clearly European, and therefore the ontological opposite, the Western “Other,” behaving according to what were assumed to be its inherently negative and inhumane predispositions. The “East,” in

contrast, always preserved its superior morality. Some historians view this pattern as a pan-Asian identity, or an Easternism, that is reactive in nature, a purely fictive modality generated as a response to the West:

The widest basis of an Eastern orientation in Egypt in the 1920s was an external and largely artificial one: the difference between all the lands and peoples of the East, on the one hand, and the well-defined, apparently homogenous, and then dominant West, on the other. Easternism in this sense was derivative, a function not of intrinsic similarities or bonds among the individual units constituting the East but rather of their all being something *other* than the West.²⁵

As a derivative anticolonial discourse, and derivative in my view refers also to the way Partha Chatterjee understands it—that is, anti-Western discourse produced by the non-West but informed by European intellectual thought so that the West ultimately retained its position in setting the standards for measuring “true progress”—perhaps the Egyptian (as well as more generally the Middle Eastern) idealization of Japan as a model nation-state representative of Eastern modernity could not help but be rife with contradictions.

Views of both colonialism and modernity among non-Europeans would change and become more nuanced in later decades of the twentieth century. Imperial Japan’s violent colonial actions in Asia in the first half of the century were finally recognized as having been contrary to the very principles Japan had represented for much of the non-Western world in the prewar era, though in many regions not directly affected by Japanese occupation during the war (such as the Middle East), Japan was rather quickly forgiven for its wartime sins and again assumed the status of an Eastern role model. A more unified anticolonial solidarity did eventually materialize in the world as a response to the domination of one people over another, spearheaded by such charismatic figures as the Indian activist Gandhi, and given the most globally assertive form in the aftermath of the Second World War with the Egyptian revolutionary and self-styled leader of the non-alignment movement, Gamāl ‘Abd el-Nasser, who ascended to the forefront of Egyptian politics after the Free Officers coup in 1952 and the departure of the last British forces from Egypt four years later. His international status as the anti-imperialist “leader of the third world” highlighted an era of global decolonization in Asia and Africa in which formerly occupied peoples identified with one another and often established direct contacts. While colonialism was still generally assumed to be an aggression carried out by the West (Europe and America), a more universalized conception of colonialist behavior evolved that implicated other powers at times as well (such as China’s invasion of Tibet in 1959).

A universalist form of anticolonialism, that is, a seemingly “non-derivative” anticolonial resistance not based purely upon pan-Asian, pan-Eastern identity but upon generic resistance to any imperialist action committed by another nation, did then eventuate in the mid-twentieth century and after—in tandem with the next phase in the development of non-Western modernity, when Asians, Africans, and Middle Easterners began to more substantially question Western strategies and goals for becoming a modern society, and

their suitability altogether for “Eastern” peoples. The viability of alternative paths to modernity was fueled by this realization of decolonization in many areas of the non-Western world, ushering in a more confident attitude among many that there could be more than one legitimate path to modernity, that in fact “modern progress” did not need to be understood as a possession of the West, and that it could more successfully be achieved by genuine reliance upon indigenous cultural foundations instead (like the rise of Islamist movements, some of which violently reject Western principles). Previous attempts by mainly Western-oriented nationalist elites in non-Western societies to balance Eastern essence and Western learning were believed to have been superficial; moreover, tradition and innovation now need not be mutually exclusive, but were to be successfully reconciled as a true sign of a nation’s modernity. The notion that the foundations of modernity were merely those determined by the West had become obsolete. For Egypt this was exemplified early, by the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1920s; the Brotherhood has endured to the present day as a powerful social movement, and in 2012 became the elected authority in Egypt that embraces Islam as a social philosophy, with Western technology and forms of political organization to underpin Islamic government.

Nonetheless, despite the recognition of aggressive colonialist actions committed by imperial Japan in various parts of Asia during the Second World War, actions that definitively revealed to peoples in the Middle East that the Japanese had violated the very principles that they had come to represent previously, postwar Japan quickly recovered its image as a role model for “Eastern” modernity. In the aftermath of the Second World War, unlocking the secrets of the “Japanese economic miracle” became the desire of many leaders and citizens of the newly established states of the Middle East. An abundant number of Arabic publications in the postwar period revisited Japan, this time as a nation that rose from the ashes of war and American occupation to become a global economic power.²⁶ The Iraqi finance minister’s speculation about the future potential of Iraqis becoming “the Japan of the Middle East” as late as 2004 (mentioned in chapter 1) proves the resiliency of the “Japan message.”

Can anticolonial resistance and modernity, then, ever be fully “non-derivative” and distinguishable from anti-Western sentiments? The seeking out of a universalist modernity among non-Western nations in the latter portion of the twentieth century still easily fell back upon the nineteenth-century model of Japan, as a country that could traverse East-West boundaries by balancing Eastern essence and Western technology. Conceiving of the world in this manner in the contemporary era assumes it is a world still somewhat distinctly bifurcated between “East” and “West,” thus straying from certain historical realities as well as ultimately stopping short of discovering a true, universalist form of modernity. When the binary of “East” and “West” can be sincerely dispensed with as a division denoting differences between peoples, only then can a universalized modernity emerge, bounded by no sense of cultural possession by one civilization or another, but truly available to all through the liberation of science and knowledge from culture (as Japanese philosopher Sakuma Shōzan determined in the nineteenth century). Only then can an unfettered process of “becoming modern” finally be completed.

Notes

1 Introduction

1. Quoted from BBC News, "Iraq Prepares to Launch Bond Market," Friday July 16, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3900627.stm> accessed 11/06/2009.
2. Public Record Office, FO 800/184A and 185A, 13 November 1908 (Grey Papers), quoted by Feroz Ahmed in Marian Kent (ed.), *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 13.
3. Egyptian nationalist Muṣṭafā Kāmil's well-known Arabic book on Japan, *al-Shams al-Mushriqa* (Cairo: al-Liwā', 1904) is a direct translation of "The Rising Sun."
4. T. Sato, "al-Yābānī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam* on CD-ROM (hereafter cited as *EI*) [XI: 223a]; see also "Wāḳwāḳ" [XI: 103b].
5. When Japanese naval officers came ashore from the *Kongo* and *Hiei* warships anchored on the Bosphorus in Istanbul in 1891, rumors abounded. They drew crowds when they used the local hamāms, which made extra money for shopkeepers and bath-owners. Ziya Şakir (Soku) *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*. (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1994, 2nd edition), 86.
6. There is substantial historiography of Orientalist views of Meiji Japan. See Akane Kawakami, *Travellers' Visions: French Literary Encounters with Japan, 1881–2004* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005); Sir Hugh Cortazzi and Gordon Daniels (eds.), *Britain and Japan 1859–1991* (New York: Routledge, 1991); Olive Checkland, *Britain's Encounter with Meiji Japan, 1868–1912* (London: MacMillan Press, 1989); Toshio Yokohama, *Japan in the Victorian Mind: A Study of Stereotyped Images of a Nation 1850–80* (London: The MacMillan Press, 1987); C. Holmes and A. H. Ion, "Bushidō and the Samurai: Images in British Public Opinion, 1894–1914," *Modern Asian Studies* 14:2(1980), 309–329; Jean-Pierre Lehmann, *The Image of Japan: From Feudal Isolation to World Power, 1850–1905* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978).
7. Mikiso Hane, *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 86.
8. San-eki Nakaoka, "Japanese Research on the Mixed Courts of Egypt in the Earlier Part of the Meiji Period in Connection with the Revision of the 1858 Treaties," *The Journal of Sophia Asian Studies* 6 (1988), 11–47 for English translation.
9. San-eki Nakaoka, "The Yoshida Masaharu Mission to Persia and the Ottoman Empire during the Period 1880–1881," *Collected Papers of Oriental Studies in Celebration of Seventy Years of Age of His Imperial Highness Prince Mikasa*. Ed. by the Japan Society for Near Eastern Studies (Shogakukan, 1985), 203–235 for English translations.
10. San-eki, "The Yoshida Masaharu Mission," 21.
11. Fukuzawa Yukichi editorial, "Datsu-a-ron" [Escape from Asia], *Jiji Shinpo* (March 1885).
12. The Japanese self-view as protectors of East Asia was often published in the Arabic press. In "Ra'īs Wuzarā' al-Yābān," *al-Liwā'* (July 14, 1904), 1, Count Katsura explained Japan was not a war-monger: the war was between political states, not between religions or about domination.

13. "Mişr wa Küriyā," *Mişr al-Fatāt* (August 21, 1910), 1, describes annexation apologetically: Koreans did not care enough about their country, so Japan took matters into its own hands.
14. "Naẓra fi'l-Sharq," translated as "a glance East," was the title of an article by Shukrī al-'Asalī in the Arabic *al-Muqtabas* (July 25, 1910).
15. In *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), 15, Rashid I. Khalidi writes: "By the early twentieth century, benefiting from the spread of education and the increased mobility of people, goods, and ideas, many among the elites and the growing professional, middle, and working classes in countries like Turkey, Egypt, and Iran had become imbued with the desire to establish constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and modern governmental arrangements. They often looked to the liberal constitutional systems of Great Britain, France, and the United States as models. They also hoped that these democracies would help them to overcome both the powerful and enduring autocratic tendencies within their own governments and societies." There is a conspicuous lack of mention of Meiji Japan as another model.
16. An enormous pool of scholarship has emerged on Orientalism, the majority of which is explored in Zachary Lockman's *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 2nd edition).
17. Abdullah Cevdet, "Le Japon porteur de flambeau," *İctihat* 5 (April 1905), 77.
18. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).
19. I am indebted to Professor Harry Harootunian for the nuanced, thought-provoking insight he provided me in pondering this complex relationship between the Middle East and Japan.
20. Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (California: University of California Press, 1993).
21. Urs Matthias Zachmann, *China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period: China Policy and the Japanese Discourse on National Identity, 1852–1904* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 46.
22. See essays by Samuel C. Chu, John E. Schrecker, and Ernerst Young in Akira Iriye (ed.), *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interaction* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).
23. David G. Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885–1925* (Los Angeles: University of California Center for South & Southeast Asia Studies, 1971), Chapters 5–6, 98–155; Vinh Sinh (ed.), *Phan Bội Châu and the Đông-du Movement* (New Haven, CT: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1988).
24. Victor A. van Bijlert, "The Icon of Japan in Nationalist Revolutionary Discourse in India, 1890–1910," in Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb (eds.), *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895–1945* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 23–42; P. A. Narasimha Murthy, *India and Japan: Dimensions of Their Relations* (India: Lancers Books, 1986); Keenleyside, T. A., "Nationalist Indian Attitudes Towards Asia: A Troublesome Legacy for Post-Independence Indian Foreign Policy," *Pacific Affairs [Canada]* 55:2 (1982), 210–230; Krása, M., "The Idea of Pan-Asianism and the Nationalist Movement in India," *Archiv Orientální* 40:3 (1972), 238–260; Stephen Hay, *Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and India* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
25. R. P. Dua, *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese (1905) War on Indian Politics* (New Delhi: Chand and Co., 1966).
26. Klaus Kreiser, "Der Japanische Sieg über Russland (1905) und Sein Echo unter den Muslimen," *Die Welt des Islams* 21:1–4 (1981); Michael Laffan, "Watan and Negeri: Mustafa Kamil's 'Rising Sun' in the Malay World," *Indonesia Circle* 69 (1996), 157–175; Barbara Watson Andaya, "From Rūm to Tokyo: The Search for Anti-Colonial Allies by the Rulers of Riau, 1899–1914," *Indonesia* 24 (October 1977), 123–156;

- Akira Nagazumi, "An Indonesian's View of Japan: Wahidin and the Russo-Japanese War," in F. H. King (ed.), *The Development of Japanese Studies in Southeast Asia* (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1969), 72–84; Thijs, J. D., "The Influence on Asia of the Rise of Japan and Her Victory over Russia," *Acta Historiae Neerlandica* 2 (1967), 142–162.
27. Roxane Haag-Higuchi, "A Topos and Its Dissolution: Japan in Some 20th Century Iranian Texts," *Iranian Studies* 29:1–2 (Winter-Spring 1996), 71–83; Anja Pistor-Hatam, "Progress and Civilization in Nineteenth-Century Japan: The Far Eastern State as a Model for Modernization," *Iranian Studies* 29:1–2 (Winter-Spring 1996), 111–126.
 28. Marc Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945* (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 21–25.
 29. Tetsuo Najita and H. D. Harootunian, "Japan's Revolt against the West," in Peter Duus (ed.), *A Cambridge History of Modern Japan*, vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
 30. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1993): 22–49.
 31. To name a few, William Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati' al-Husri* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Hans Kohn, *History of Nationalism in the East* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1929); Bassam Tibī, *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971).
 32. Barbara Heldt, "Japanese in Russian Literature: Transforming Identities," in Kinya Tsuruta (ed.), *The Walls Within: Images of Westerners in Japan and Images of the Japanese Abroad* (Selected proceedings, symposium at the Institute for Asian Research, University of British Columbia, May 8–10, 1988), 247.
 33. H. S. Deighton, "The Impact of Egypt on Britain: A Study of Public Opinion," in P. M. Holt (ed.), *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 231.
 34. *Ibid.*, 232.
 35. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 36.
 36. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
 37. For example, James L. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
 38. Donald Quataert, "Ottoman History Writing at a Crossroads," in Quataert and Sabri Sayari (eds.), *Turkish Studies in the United States* (Indiana University: Institute of Turkish Studies, 2003), 15–30.
 39. Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (eds.), *Intellectuals and Articulation of the Nation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 2.
 40. *Ibid.*, 2–3. Their term "quiet politics" from Mark Beissinger, "How Nationalisms Spread: Eastern Europe Adrift the Tides and Cycles of Nationalist Contention," *Social Research* 59:1 (1996), 98.
 41. Ya'qūb Şarrūf's 1905 novel *Fatat Mişr* (1922 published ed.), which incorporates Japanese imagery, contains an intro stating "the novel *Fatat Mişr* was used for instruction in some of the schools"; his brother Işāq Efendi Şarrūf claimed an Arabic teacher in the American School in Beirut highly approved of its style (page A).
 42. Poetry concerning the victory of the Japanese over Russia in 1905 flourished, particularly in Egypt. See Ḥāfiẓ Ibrāhīm, "Fatā al-Yābāniyya" (also published in *al-Manār* [April 2, 1904], 69–70, and in *al-Mu'ayyad* [April 6, 1904], 1), and "Qaṣīda fī'l-Ḥarb" (published in *al-Manār* [November 24, 1904], 718–719), which were memorized in school. (See Hideaki Sugita, "Japan and the Japanese as Depicted in Modern Arabic

- Literature," *Studies of Comparative Culture* 27 [March 1989], 21–40]; Aḥmad Efendi al-Kāshif, "Riwāyat al-Ḥarb bayna al-Rūsiyyā wa'l-Yābān" (published on front-page of *al-Mu'ayyad* [April 4, 1904], 1–2); *Dīwān Aḥmad Nasīm* includes "al-Ḥarb al-Yābāniyya" (mentioned in *al-Garīda* (December 8, 1908), 5); Muḥammad 'Abd al-Muṭālib's *Dīwān*, Ma'rūf al-Ruṣāfi's "Ma'arikat Tsushima" in his two-volume *Diwan*; Fāris al-Khūrī's *Waqā'i'a al-Ḥarb* (Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Akhbār, 1906), published in *al-Manār* (10–56), a heroic poem about the Russo-Japanese War (68 pages).
43. "In 1905, before Ali Ayetollah could walk, the great Japanese war came, and Hassan Hikmetullah Togo, named after the great Japanese naval hero, appeared with red tufts of feathery hair." Halidé Edib Adivar, *Memoirs of Halidé Edib* (New York: Arno Press, 1972), 219.

2 Framing Power and the Need to Reverse

1. Selcuk Esenbel's "Japan's Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam," *American Historical Review* 109:4 (October 2004), 1140–1170 alludes to a relationship between Japanese pan-Asianism and the rise of political Islam as similarly resistant to Western forms of modernity (1143) in a brief reference to Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit's *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).
2. See Cemil Aydın's pioneering work deconstructing anti-Westernism, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 16.
3. The phrase "alternative universalism" was coined by Aydın in his review essay, "The Politics of Conceptualizing Islam and the West," *Ethics and International Affairs* 18:3 (2004), 93 in describing Prasenjit Duara's "The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism," *Journal of World History* 12:1 (Spring 2001), 99–130.
4. Perhaps this was the first move toward what Dipesh Chakrabarty has termed "provincializing Europe," the title of his monograph, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
5. William H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (New York: New American Library, 1965).
6. William H. McNeill, "The Rise of the West after Twenty-Five Years," *Journal of World History* 1:1 (1990), 2.
7. See Immanuel Wallerstein's three volumes of *The Modern World-System* (New York: Academic Press, Inc. 1974, 1989) and subsequent commentaries on this work for a more thorough understanding of his theoretical approach.
8. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 6–7.
9. Prasenjit Duara challenges this linearity by putting forth an alternative approach to the study of nationalism, arguing that the national space should be understood rather as an arena for competing national narratives striving to become the dominant version. His discussion of the contestation of identity in China is a useful method for deconstructing national narratives that can be applied to the Ottoman context. See Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
10. Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 3.
11. Rebecca E. Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), x.
12. Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 11.
13. Gregory Claeys, "The 'Survival of the Fittest' and the Origins of Social Darwinism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 61:2 (2000), 238. Claeys articulates the convergence

- of Darwinian biology with concurrent social philosophy and political economy in Europe.
14. *Ibid.*, 228, citing Mike Hawkins' *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860–1945: Nature as Model and Nature as Threat* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
 15. *Ibid.*, 232.
 16. *Ibid.*, 237, quoting Charles Darwin's *The Descent of Man* (1871).
 17. *Ibid.*, 236. See also Jose Harris, "Spencer, Herbert (1820–1903)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), <http://80-www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/view/article/36208>, accessed 24 Jan 2005. Some scholars argue that Spencer borrowed from Lamarck's ideas on adaptation to the environment.
 18. See J. D. Y. Peel, *Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist* (London: Heinemann, 1971), Chapters 6–8.
 19. Gustave Le Bon, *The Psychology of Peoples*. Reprint trans. (New York: G. E. Stechert and Co., 1924), 31–33.
 20. See Alice Widener (ed.), *Gustave Le Bon: The Man and His Works* (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), 40–41.
 21. Le Bon, *The Psychology of Peoples*, 26–27.
 22. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 4.
 23. Rashid Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), 10.
 24. See Huri İslamoğlu-İnan's introduction, "'Oriental Despotism' in World System Perspective," "Agenda for Ottoman History," 42–62 by İslamoğlu and Çağlar Keyder, and "The Incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the World-Economy," 88–97, by Immanuel Wallerstein, Hale Decdeli, and Reşat Kasaba, in Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
 25. See Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), Introduction, on the basic structure of the Ottoman-Islamic polity; İslamoğlu-İnan's *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, 1–24, outlines how Western organizing principles gradually displaced the Ottoman imperial system; Fatma Müge Göçek's *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) describes Ottoman capitalist development causing the emergence of a split bourgeoisie class that exacerbated the loss of state control over certain social mechanisms.
 26. In Carter V. Findley's *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 20 he explains: "European expansionism had begun to create an uneasy awareness...The gravity of the situation...seems to have penetrated Ottoman statesmen's awareness with the disastrous Russian wars of the last third of the eighteenth century."
 27. İslamoğlu-İnan, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, 10.
 28. *Ibid.*, 11, 19.
 29. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 21, goes on: "Vulnerability to the infidels' power and desire to appropriate the secrets of their strength created a love-hate relation with Europe."
 30. Selim Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23 (1991), 345.
 31. Aydın, "Politics of Conceptualizing," 90.
 32. McNeill, "The Rise of the West after Twenty-Five Years," 19.
 33. Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire*, 11–12.
 34. See Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962).

35. See Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 40–41 on the Arabic term *waṭan* (*vatan* in Turkish).
36. See Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire*, 16–25.
37. *Ibid.*, 15.
38. Harry Harootunian, *History's Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday Life* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) on the false classification of societies, as if either “East” or “West” contained complete uniformities of nations.
39. Edward Said's *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).
40. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 8.
41. See Paul Crook, *Darwinism, War and History: The Debate over the Biology of War from the “Origin of Species” to the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 44–45, and especially Chapters 1–3 (1–97).
42. *Ibid.*, 50.
43. Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics: Or Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of “Natural Selection” and “Inheritance” to Political Society* (London, 1872), reprinted in N. St John-Stevas (ed.), *The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot* (London, 1974), 45, quoted in *ibid.*, 50.
44. Aydın, “Politics of Conceptualizing,” 94.
45. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 4.
46. Al-‘Az̄m, Ṣādiq Jalāl. “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse,” *Khamsin* 8 (1981), 349–376.
47. C. Ernest Dawn, “The Origins of Arab Nationalism,” in Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva Simon (eds.), *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 5.
48. Al-‘Az̄m, “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse,” 366–367.
49. Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought*, 51.
50. *Ibid.*, 51.
51. Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*, 6.
52. Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought*, 2.
53. *Ibid.*, 2. He is quoting John Plamenatz, “Two Types of Nationalism” in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea* (London: Edward Arnold, 1976), 23–36.
54. Al-‘Az̄m, “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse,” 368–369.
55. *Ibid.*, 371.
56. See H. D. Harootunian, *Toward Restoration: The Growth of Political Consciousness in Tokugawa Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970) and Kenneth B. Pyle, *The New Generation in Meiji Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).
57. Karl, *Staging the World*, and her “Creating Asia: China in the World at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,” *American Historical Review* 103:4 (1998), 1096–1118.
58. Translated terms from Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb (eds.), *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895–1945* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 6. The Japanese slogan “Eastern ethics as base, Western science as means” was coined by late Tokugawa-era philosophers and intellectuals. In combination with Japanese scholars from the Rangaku (Dutch Studies) school who propagated *fukoku kyohei*—“enrich the country, strengthen the army,” Japan’s path to modernity led to modernization, militarization, and colonization of Asia.

3 The Ottoman Empire between Europe and Asia

1. Scholarship on this subject is vast, for example D. Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture* (London: Routledge, 1998). Many highlight Ottoman Sultans’ claims to Roman heritage and competition with the Hapsburgs over the title of Holy

- Roman Emperor. See Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 106–109; Gülrü Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry,” *Art Bulletin* 71:3 (Sept 1989), 401–427.
2. See Fatma Müge Göçek, *East Encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
 3. Yohanan Friedmann, *Tolerance and Coercion in Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.
 4. *Ibid.*, phrase contained in title of Chapter 1, 13–53.
 5. Douglas Howland, “Society Reified: Herbert Spencer and Political Theory in Early Meiji Japan,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42:1 (January 2000), 68, 71.
 6. See Peter J. Bowler, *Charles Darwin: The Man and His Influence* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1990). I am indebted to former University of Guelph student Justin Dell, whose unpublished seminar paper “Wilhelmine Germany, the Ottoman Empire and the Concept of ‘Race’ in Relationship to the Armenian Genocide of 1915” made me think further about racial thought emanating from Germany.
 7. M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 11.
 8. *Ibid.*, 13–15.
 9. *Ibid.*, introductory chapters and conclusion; see also M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) on the Young Turks.
 10. See Ulrich Trumpener, “Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire,” in Marion Kent (ed.), *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Frank Cass, 2nd ed. 1996), 111–140.
 11. Richard Weikart, “The Origins of Social Darwinism in Germany, 1859–1895,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 54:3 (July 1993), 471, 475.
 12. M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak: Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981).
 13. Weikart, “Origins of Social Darwinism in Germany,” 474–475. *Origin of Species* was translated into German in 1860, a year after original publication, and *Descent of Man* was translated shortly after its publication in English in 1871.
 14. *Ibid.*, 471: “Numerous German scholars used the Darwinian theory to defend individualist economic competition and laissez-faire, others emphasized a collectivist struggle for existence between societies.” See 476–488, for the diversity of German Social Darwinist thought.
 15. *Ibid.*, 480–481.
 16. *Ibid.*, 485, paraphrasing the works of Austrian professor Ludwig Gumplowicz and Austrian military officer Gustav Ratzenhofer.
 17. See Handan Nezir Akmeşe, *Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005).
 18. See James Allen Rogers, “Darwinism and Social Darwinism,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 33:2 (April–June 1972), 265–280, and particularly 278–280 for Herbert Spencer’s contributions to Social Darwinism.
 19. From “Réponse de H. Spencer à Berthelot,” *Mechveret Supplément Français* 153 (July 15, 1904), 7. Spencer’s letter to Baron Kaneko was dated August 26, 1892. Reprinted again in Ferit, “Japonların 1909 Senesindeki Kuvvesi,” translation from French, *Srât-ı Mustakim* 3:69 (12.1325/1910), 262. Spencer discouraged the Japanese against intermarrying with foreigners to maintain racial purity.
 20. “Spencer’in Japonlara vasiyetnamesi,” *Türk* 23 (April 7, 1904), 4.
 21. January 6, 1905 (Reports I, 21). Quoted in R.P. Dua, *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese (1905) War on Indian Politics* (New Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1966), 23.
 22. See Thomas Eich, “Pan-Islam and ‘Yellow Peril’: Geo-Strategic Concepts in Salafî Writings prior to World War I,” in my edited *The Islamic Middle East and*

- Japan: Perceptions, Aspirations, and the Birth of Intra-Asian Modernity* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007), 121–135.
23. Fāris al-Khūrī, *Awraq Fāris al-Khūrī* (Damascus: Ṭlasdār, 1989), 329. The letter was dated December 8, 1904. The poem “al-‘Ajūz al-Yabāniyya,” written by Shaykh Fu‘ād al-Khaṭīb, a teacher in the American school in Ṣayda‘, appeared in *al-Ḍiyā‘* (November 30, 1904), 112–114, the Syrian Shaykh Ibrāhīm al-Yazījī’s bi-monthly in Cairo.
 24. Ayanzāde Birecikli Nāmik Ekrem, *Japonlar* (İstanbul: Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete Matbaası, 1322/1904/06?). Translated from Kont Bvvar, *Japonya Şularında* (İstanbul: Asır Matbaası, 1321(1903?), 57–58.
 25. *Ibid.*, 57–58.
 26. Muḥammad ‘Alī, “Mustaqbal al-Sharq,” *al-‘Irfān* (October 5, 1910), 401.
 27. *Ibid.*, 401.
 28. *Ibid.*, 402, and part II of series, *al-‘Irfān* (November 3, 1910), 467–468.
 29. *al-‘Irfān*, part II, 468.
 30. *Ibid.*, 470.
 31. Samir Seikaly, “Shukrī al-‘Asalī: A Case Study of a Political Activist,” in Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva Simon (eds.), *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 81–82.
 32. *Ibid.*, 82.
 33. Shukrī al-‘Asalī, “Naẓra fī’l-Sharq,” *al-Muqtabas* (July 25, 1910).
 34. *Ibid.*
 35. From Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, “Le Japon porteur de flambeau,” *İctihād* 5 (April 1905), 77: “...far from being a ‘yellow peril’...Japan is therefore the carrier of the sword and the torch: the sword, for the oppressors, for the insolent invaders; the torch for the oppressed, for those that shine unto themselves and die for lack of light and liberty. Admirable example to follow!” And from Ahmed Rıza, “La leçon d’une guerre,” *Mechveret Supplément Français* 173 (March 1, 1906), 8: “The so-called inferior yellow race has demonstrated its superiority and its aptitude for progress... the Japanese army, whose equipment and sanitary services were admirably organized with method and without invocations to idols, achieved victories by a series of operations scientifically conceived.”
 36. “Leçons Japonaises,” *Mechveret Supplément Français* 161 (March 1, 1905), 3.
 37. Erdal Kaynar, “‘The Person Armenians Fear the Most’: Ahmed Rıza’s Thoughts about the Ottoman Empire on the Eve of the 1908 Revolution,” unpublished conference paper, WATS conference, 3 ftn 10.
 38. Ahmed Rıza, “La leçon d’une guerre,” *Mechveret Supplément Français* 169 (November 1, 1905), 2.
 39. See “Maşīr al-Tamaddūn al-Ḥadīth” (“The Fate of Modern Civilization”), in the Syrian Christian journalist Jūrjī Zaydān’s literary journal *al-Hilāl* (April 1, 1911), 420–421.
 40. In Gertrude Lowthian Bell’s travelogue, *Syria: The Desert and the Sown* (London: Darf Publishers Ltd., 1985; first published 1907), 156, she recalled a conversation with an Ottoman official named Nāzırn Pasha. She asked for his opinion on the Russo-Japanese War. “Officially I am neutral,” he replied, but “of course I am on the side of the Japanese.”
 41. *Ibid.*, 103–104. The text reads as follows: “The topic that interested them most at Ṣāleh was the Japanese War—indeed it was in that direction that conversation invariably turned in the Mountain, the reason being that the Druzes believe the Japanese belong to their own race. The line of argument which has led them to this astonishing conclusion is simple. The secret doctrines of their faith hold out hopes that some day an army of Druzes will burst out of the furthest limits of Asia and conquer the world. The Japanese had shown indomitable courage, the Druzes also are brave; the Japanese had been victorious, the Druzes of prophecy will be unconquerable: therefore the two are one in the same. The sympathy of every one,

- whether in Syria or in Asia Minor, is on the side of the Japanese, with the exception of the members of the Orthodox church, who look on Russia as their protector." In every village she entered, locals immediately asked her for tidings of the Russo-Japanese War. See also 81, 160, 182, 312.
42. Ottoman Christians were divided in their interpretation of events. Greeks and Bulgarians expressed pro-Russian sentiments concerning the war in church gatherings and in their newspapers (M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, private communication, October 2000); Arab Christians sided with their Arab Muslim brethren, applauding the Japanese.
 43. "Maslak al-Dawla al-Uthmāniyya fī al-Ḥarb al-Ḥādira," *al-Liwā'* (February 22, 1904), 1. The author reminded readers that the Japanese served humanity by demonstrating how education and training led to modern civilization.
 44. "Mişr wa'l-Islām wa'l-Yābān," *al-Liwā'* (November 6, 1904), 1. Kāmil referred also to millions of Chinese Muslims whom he hoped would follow in Japan's footsteps. He was convinced that the Japanese interests were also the interests of the Islamic world.
 45. Letter dated June 9, 1905, reprinted in *Awraq Muştafa Kāmil: al-Murāsālāt* (Cairo, 1982), 224.
 46. Gertrude Lowthian Bell, *Syria: The Desert and the Sown* (London: Darf Publishers Ltd., 1985. First published 1907), 104.
 47. Vatikiotis, P. J. *The Modern History of Egypt* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 176–177.
 48. "Naba' min al-Yābān," *al-Muqtaṭaf* 27 (August 1902), 740–741.
 49. "al-Naşr Ḥalif al-Yābān," *al-Liwā'* (December 25, 1904), 1.
 50. "al-Ḥayā al-Jadīda," *al-'Ālam al-Islāmī* (September 21, 1906), 1.
 51. Bassam Ṭibi, *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971, 2nd edition.), endnote 12, 261.
 52. For example Dr. İcikava, *Japonya Tarih-i Siyâsîsi*, trans. Mübâhât (İstanbul: Mesâ'i Matbaası, 1912), 5. Originally written in German, translator and Senate (Meclis-i A'yân) Secretary Mübâhât Bey's preface to *Japan's Political History* divided the world into two distinct categories: "Today there are two main social bodies in the field of politics. One of these is the peoples of the West, the European states, and the other is the peoples of the East." The first section summarized Japanese-Western relations from the first glimpses of the Portuguese entering Japanese waters to the Western threat leading up to the Meiji Restoration. He contrasted the "falsehood upon which Europe's politics are based" with Japanese "effort and extraordinary zeal" that allowed Japan to attain its current political status despite the Capitulatory-style treaties that were imposed upon Japan.
 53. "Never mind an erroneous political balance among the Western peoples; there's an international precept that guarantees their political existence to a certain degree. But there is nothing like this for the peoples of the East; they, in the view of the Europeans, are outside the power of international law! There is no sentiment other than the European states' sense of profiting from them. Thinking along the lines of how much profit is possible from Eastern peoples, these civilized people's primary hope and aim is to swallow them up." İcikava, *Japonya Tarih-i Siyâsîsi*, 5–6. Mübâhât Bey explained in the Postscript that he translated Ichikawa's essay to shed light on Europe's relations with other Eastern nations; Ottomans have been falsely led to believe they are part of Europe by international agreements with the West. He and the publisher intended to translate works on China, Korea, India, Siam, and Australia in the future.
 54. *Ibid.*, 22. Mübâhât Bey's reprint of a decree issued by the Japanese Shogunate in 1860 was a plea to Ottoman subjects to "to save our homeland from annihilation and extinction... we have to put an end to rebellions and riots."
 55. *Ibid.*, 31. From the second section, "Japan, the Great Power."

56. *Ibid.*, 32.
57. *Ibid.*, 22–27. The renovation included improving political knowledge and training. “Yellow Peril” expressed Europe’s inability to admit that Japan was an equal; Ichikawa argued Japan bore no grudge against the West for this, and respected the West as educators, implying Japanese moral superiority (35).
58. *Mirat Yahud Gözgü* (in Ottoman and Tatar, 1900–1902, St. Petersburg and Kazan), *Ülfet* (Ottoman, 1906, St. Petersburg), *al-Tilmidh* (Arabic, 1906–1907, St. Petersburg), *Necat* (only one issue, 1906, St. Petersburg), *Şirke* (Kazakh, only one issue), *Tearrûf-i Müslimîn* (Ottoman, 1910–1911, Istanbul), *İslâm Dünyâsı* (Ottoman, 1913–1914, Istanbul), *Cihâd-ı İslâm* (Tatar, 1915, Berlin), and other articles, pamphlets, memoirs, and translations in various languages signify İbrahim’s shift back and forth between pan-Islamism, pan-Asianism, and pan-Turkism.
59. Nadir Özbek, *Abdürreşid İbrahim (1857–1944): The Life and Thought of a Muslim Activist* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, History Dept. Unpublished MA Thesis, 1994), 47.
60. *Ibid.*, 46.
61. *Ibid.*, 50. Among the Ottoman statesmen and other important figures met were Nâmık Kemal, Ahmed Vefik Paşa, Muallim Naci, Ahmed Mithat Efendi, Minister of Education, Münif Paşa, and Jamâl ad-Dîn al-Afghânî, whose house İbrahim claimed was frequented by many, including Egyptian journalist ‘Abd Allah Nadîm. (Other memoirs indicate İbrahim met al-Afghânî initially in St. Petersburg.) İbrahim may have been in Istanbul when Sultan Abdülhamid II discussed with al-Afghânî sending Ottoman ulema to Japan to propagate Islam. See Anwâr al-Jundî, *al-Sharq fî Fajr al-Yaqza: Sûra İjtimâ’iyya lil-‘Aşr min 1871 ilâ 1939* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Anjli al-Miştirîyya, 1966), 34–35.
62. Nadir Özbek, İsmail Türkoğlu, Selçuk Esenbel, and Hayrettin Kaya. “Özel Dosya: Abdürreşid İbrahim (1),” *Toplumsal Tarih* 4:19 (1995), 6–28; Nadir Özbek, “Abdürreşid İbrahim: İslamcı bir Eylem Adamı,” 8–9.
63. Selçuk Esenbel, Nadir Özbek, İsmail Türkoğlu, François Georgeon, and Ahmet Uçar. “Özel Dosya: Abdürreşid İbrahim (2),” *Toplumsal Tarih* 4:20 (1995), 6–23; İsmail Türkoğlu, 20. “Yüzyılında bir Türk Seyyahı: Abdürreşid İbrahim,” 7. Özbek mentions in his thesis that the Orenburg Ecclesiastic Administration was established by Catherine II to “pacify Muslim resistance” (52).
64. The former direct quote comes from Dzhamaliutdin Validov, *Ocherk Istorii Obrazovannosti i Literaturny Tatar* (Moskva: 1923), 64–65. The latter quote originates in Dr. Akdeş Nimet Kurat, “Kazan Türklerinin ‘Medenî Uyanış’ Devri (1917 Yılına Kadar),” *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil Ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 24:3–4 (1966), 123–124.
65. Joseph L. Wieczynski, *The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History*, vol. 14 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1979), 112.
66. Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, *The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 236, fn 15. She refers the reader to US Office of Strategic Services Research and Analysis Branch, R. and A. 890.2, *Japanese Attempts at Infiltration among Muslims in Russia and Her Borderlands* (Washington, 1944), 9, 15–16, 25–27, 30, 32, 52, 56, 58, 79–81, 84–85.
67. *Ibid.*, August 1944, 14. According to other sources, Fukushima, who studied Ottoman military organization in 1896, made two separate and rigorous journeys, the first in 1892–1893 and the second in 1895–1897. In 1892 he had an audience with the Russian Czar; in August 1896 he was reportedly in Samarkand. The latter journey was said to have taken him through Africa, Ceylon, India, Thailand, and Vietnam, and the information he collected during these journeys proved useful during the Russo-Japanese War. For further study, see Selçuk Esenbel’s “Japan and the World of Islam,” private communication, a paper given at the 1998 Association of Asian Studies conference, 11.

68. OSS, *Japanese Infiltration among Muslims Throughout the World*, R and A 890, 15 May 1943, 7.
69. *Ibid.*, 7; OSS, *Japanese Attempts*, 14, 65.
70. OSS, *Japanese Infiltration among Muslims in China*. R and A 890.1, 15 May 1944, 88–89.
71. OSS, *Japanese Attempts at Infiltration*, 48–49.
72. See John D. Pierson's *Tokutomi Sohō, 1863–1957: A Journalist for Modern Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980) for Tokutomi's career and ideas. According to Pierson, 254–256, Tokutomi traveled to Europe and Russia in 1896. He journeyed to Istanbul and the Balkans after this before heading home. Tokutomi realized after this trip the depth of Western prejudice against Asian peoples. Tokutomi again traveled to the Ottoman Empire (Suez, Cairo, Palestine-Haifa, and Istanbul) and to Russia (Siberia) in 1906.
73. OSS, *Japanese Attempts at Infiltration*, 15.
74. *Ibid.*, 51–52.
75. *Ibid.*, 63.
76. *Ibid.*, 15–16. The report reminds the reader on 25 that "...in spite of Abdürreşid İbrahim's espionage activities on behalf of Japan during the Russo-Japanese War, so far as the Muslim world is concerned he is famous rather as an authority on Pan-Islam."
77. Esenbul, "Özel Dosya: Abdürreşid İbrahim (1)," 20. Münir Bey, İbrahim's son, graduated in 1913 and was expected to be a liaison between Japanese Black Dragon members and the Ottoman Turks; his father was assumed to be a Young Turk secret agent during the First World War because of his affiliations with Enver Paşa. Ahmed Münir was the Tokyo correspondent for the Ottoman journal *Sebilürreşat* (formerly *Sirât-ı Mustakîm*) in 1912–1914 and authored several articles espousing Japanese achievements at home and abroad, including reports on Japanese sea trade ("Japonya Ticâret-i Bahriyesi" 1–8:204–22 [7.1328/1912], 426–427), and a tribute to the late Meiji emperor Mutsuhito ("Japonya Mikado'su Mutsuhito" 2–9:213–31 [9.1328/1912], 96–98).
78. Rorlich, 113.
79. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal LeMercier-Quelquejay, *La Presse et le Mouvement National Chez les Musulmans de Russie avant 1920* (Paris: Mouton and Co., 1964), 62–63.
80. *Ibid.*, 64.
81. Of *al-Tilmîdh*'s thirty issues, numbers 15, 23, 25, and 27 were missing from the collection utilized. The absence of issue number 30 is due to supposed seizure by the Russian police. Details of İbrahim's easy traversing between ideals of pan-Asianism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turkism in this chapter come from my "The Roots of Pan-Asianism: Abdürreşid İbrahim's Early Discussions of East and West in *Al-Tilmîdh*," unpublished AHA paper, 1998.
82. "Jawla li-Tā'ir al-Fikr fī Samā' al-Siyāsa," *al-Tilmîdh* 7 (December 1, 1906).
83. "al-Ālam al-Islāmī wa'l-Umum al-Masīḥīyya fī'l-Sharq wa'l-Gharb," *al-Tilmîdh* 12 (January 16, 1907).
84. *al-Tilmîdh* 21 (April 16, 1907). İbrahim claimed 60 percent of Frenchmen were illegitimate, negating their civil rights and making them ineligible to marry, thus escalating male frequenting of brothels!
85. *al-Tilmîdh* 24 (August 8, 1907) and 28 (September 16, 1907).
86. *al-Tilmîdh* 24 (August 8, 1907).
87. *al-Tilmîdh* 28 (September 16, 1907).
88. See *al-Tilmîdh* 5 (October 15, 1906), 6 (October 23, 1906), 16 (March 3, 1907), and 20 (April 2, 1907).
89. *al-Tilmîdh* 6 (October 23, 1906).

90. Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Alem-i İslâm ve Japonya'da İntişar-ı İslamiyet*, 2 Vols. (Istanbul: Ahmed Saki Bey Matbaası, 1328/1910–1911). Mehmed Paksu edited a modern Turkish translation, *20. Asrın Başlarında İslam Dünyası ve Japonya'da İslamiyet*, 2 Vols. (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları, 1987).
91. See Cemil Aydın, "Japan as the Liberator of Asian Muslims: The Political Biography of Abdürreşid İbrahim," private communication, and other sources on Abdürreşid İbrahim's life cited earlier. Most recent is the annotated French translation, *Abdürrechid İbrahim un Tatar en Asie (1908–1910)* by François Georgeon and Işık Tamdoğan-Abel (France: Sindbad Actes Sud, 2004).
92. See Paksu, *İslâm Dünyası ve Japonya'da İslâmiyet*, Vol. 1.
93. See İbrahim, *Alem-i İslâm*, or secondary literature on İbrahim cited earlier. İbrahim presided over the opening ceremonies.
94. OSS, *Japanese Infiltration among Muslims in China*, 88. OSS report states İbrahim wrote the Arabic portion. The Japanese who signed this pact were (1) Toyama Mitsuru, (2) Inukai Tsuyoki, (3) Nakano Tsunetaro (writer of the Japanese text), (4) Aoyagi Katsutoshi, (5) Ohara Bukei, (6) Kawano Hinonaka, (7) Yamada Kinoshige, (8) Nakayama Yasuzo, 90. Photos of İbrahim with his Japanese cabal in Tokyo and of the Muslim Pact are available in Selçuk Esenbel, *Japan, Turkey and the World of Islam: The Writings of Selçuk Esenbel* (Folkestone, UK: Global Oriental, 2011).
95. Özbek, et al., "Özel Dosya: Abdürreşid İbrahim (1)," *Toplumsal Tarih* 4:19 (1995), 24, Esenbel's article.
96. "Japonya'da İslâmiyet," *Sirât-ı Mustakîm* 2:38 (5.1325/1909), 183.
97. Paksu, *İslâm Dünyası*, Vol. 2, 259–263. See also Sakamoto Tsutomu, "The First Japanese Hadji Yamaoka Kōtarō and Abdürreşid İbrahim," in Selçuk Esenbel and Inaba Chiharu (eds.), *The Rising Sun and the Turkish Crescent: New Perspectives on the History of Japanese Turkish Relations* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2003), 105–121, and Kōjirō Nakamura, "Early Japanese Pilgrims to Mecca," *Report of the Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan (Nippon Orient Gakkai)* 12 (1986), 47–57.
98. Paksu, *İslâm Dünyası*, Vol. 2, 260.
99. *Ibid.*, 260.
100. Nakamura, "Early Japanese Pilgrims to Mecca," 50. According to İbrahim, they ran into difficulties trying to find passage. Paksu, *İslâm Dünyası*, Vol. 2, 375–383.
101. Paksu, *İslâm Dünyası*, Vol. 2, 338, and İbrahim, *Alem-i İslâm*, Cilt 2, 150.
102. OSS, *Japanese Attempts at Infiltration*, 77.
103. Paksu, *İslâm Dünyası*, Vol. 2, 394.
104. *Ibid.*, 398.
105. Nakamura, "Early Japanese Pilgrims to Mecca," 50.
106. Paksu, *İslâm Dünyası*, Vol. 2, 439.
107. "al-Yābān wa'l-İslām," *al-Muqtabas (al-Umma)*, February 18, 1910.
108. *Ibid.*
109. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 304.
110. "Japonyalı Hacı Ömer Yamaoka Efendi," *Sirât-ı Mustakîm* 4:81 (3.1326/1910), 53–56.
111. *Ibid.*, 53–56.
112. *Ibid.*, 56.
113. See "Abr al-Ḥarb al-Balqāniyya wa Khaṭr al-Mas'ala al-Sharqiyya," *al-Manār* (February 6, 1913), 135. The author mentioned a scientific society formed to reconcile religion in the Ottoman Empire; it honored Yamaoka with a gathering in the famous "Ottoman Light" clubhouse in Istanbul, where Minister of Finance Mahmud Es'ad Efendi, Dr. Nâzım, and Mustafa Efendi Udamişli, adviser to the Shaykh al-İslâm, were among those in attendance.

114. See my English translation of the declaration in “Pan-Asianism in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1905–1912,” in Camron Michael Amin, Benjamin C. Fortna, and Elizabeth B. Frierson (eds.), *The Modern Middle East: A Sourcebook for History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 334–335. The article appeared as “Japonya’da ‘Daitō’ Mecellesi ve ‘Asya Gi Kai’ Cemiyetinin Beyânnamesi,” *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 6:133 (3.1327/1911), 42–44.
115. “Japonya’da ‘Daitō’” 43. The Indian activist Muhammad Barakatullah visited Istanbul on behalf of *Asya Gi Kai* in 1911 where he was to elicit amiable feelings between Ottoman Turkey, Egypt, and Japan. See “Japonya’da İslâm Nâşirleri,” *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 7:158 (9.1327/1911), 2. He was held in high regard by the Japanese members of this society, who expressed this in an essay entitled “Uhuvvet-i İslâmiyet”: “They are waiting for [people who will carry out] religious work more than financial support from the Islamic world. They want teachers who are cognizant and capable in foreign languages... (like Barakatullah).”
116. *Ibid.*, 43.
117. *Ibid.*, 44.
118. “Japonya’da Osmanlı-Hilâl Muhibleri: Ah Ertuğrul,” *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 7:162 (9.1327/1911), 86–88.
119. From “Japonya’da İhtidâ,” *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 7:174 (12.1327/1912), 290: “In a letter of the first day of Eid Azhâ that Abdürreşid Efendi’s son Ahmet Münir Efendi sent to our office from Tokyo, in Muhammad Barakatullah’s house, Baron Hiki and his son-in-law Hatano Efendi and his wife converted to Islam; it was stated that his Excellency the Baron was given the name Ali, his son-in-law the name Murşid, and the Efendi’s wife, the name Fatma.”
120. OSS, *Japanese Attempts at Infiltration*, 22.
121. See my English translation in “Hatano Uho: ‘Asia in Danger,’ 1912,” in Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (eds.), *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Volume I: 1850–1920* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), 149–160.
122. Hatano, *Asya Tehlikede*, translated by Nakawa and İbrahim (İstanbul: Sebilürreşat, 1912), 12.
123. *Ibid.*, 17. Interestingly, the Japanese were considering Iran as the “other sentinel” earlier. A letter written by an unnamed Japanese ambassador was sent to an Iranian ambassador and was published by a newspaper *al-Ḥabl al-Mâtin (Islam)*. The letter is translated into Ottoman in “Bir Japon Sefirinin Mektûbu,” *Bâlkân* 346 (January 23, 1908), 1; in it the Japanese ambassador deplored Europeans’ former views of Asians as unskilled and incapable of civilization and progress; he mentioned how European presses expressed their fears during the Sino-Japanese war and how they became even more concerned over the threat to their colonial possessions by Asian peoples after the Russo-Japanese War. He then continued, “Iran’s government is in Asia’s navel, it is in a most important and political position, in the center. If Iranians would consider their homeland’s geographic significance and embrace knowledge and learning fully, in no time they would be able to win all of Asia’s respect and affection. At that time, Japan on one side, Iran on the other would [together] serve Asia.” The letter goes on to praise Iran’s ancient achievements and to encourage its progress in the future, saying that Muslims could again become the most civilized and advanced community in the world, but that they must first reform themselves domestically, solidify their constitutional administration, grow their commerce and trade, develop a banking system independently, and send apprentices to either Japan or to America to study military technology and other sciences. Perhaps after the Ottoman Empire survived its own constitutional revolution, the Japanese began to look at it more seriously as an ally in Asia.
124. “Sibiryah” Abdürreşid İbrahim, “Japonya’da İslâmiyet,” *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 2:38 (5.1325/1909), 183.

125. Abdürreşid İbrahim, "Japonlar, Adam Yetiştirmek İçin Nasıl Çalışıyorlar!" *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 5:114 (10.1326/1910), 174. An excerpt from his *Alem-i İslâm ve Japonya'da İntişâr-i İslâmiyet*.
126. *Ibid.*, 174.
127. Veliyullah Enverî, "Japonlar ve Alem-i İslâm," *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 4:86 (4.1326/1910), 140.
128. "Tokyo'da Beynül-Millel ve Beynül-Edyân bir İctimâ," *Sebilürreşât* 11:270 (10.1329/1913), 156.
129. "Asya'da Devr-i Cedide," *Sebilürreşât* 12:295 (4.1330/1914), 165.
130. "Tokyo'da Umzî Sergi," *Sebilürreşât* 12:300 (5.1330/1914), 256.
131. "Shuyûn: Japonya," *Sebilürreşât* 12:295 (4.1330/1914), 167.
132. BBA MV, October 23, 1913.
133. Özbek, *Abdürreşid İbrahim (1857–1944): The Life and Thought of a Muslim Activist* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, History Dept. Unpublished MA Thesis, 1994), 54.
134. See Özbek thesis and Esenbel articles in bibliography on İbrahim's later life and heavy involvement with the Japanese war effort.
135. Selcuk Esenbel, private communication.

4 Asia in Danger: Ottoman-Japanese Diplomacy and Failures

1. See front-page articles by Japanese envoy Motono in Paris, "Japan and the Japanese" in Egyptian daily newspaper *al-Mu'ayyad* (May 1904) on Japanese modernization, law applied to foreigners, and dedication to military service.
2. Japanese Dr. "Lotida" (?) speech in Lahore translated into Arabic. Reprinted as "Khuṭba Ṭabīb Yābānī" in Muṣṭafā Kāmil's Egyptian weekly newspaper *al-Ālam al-Islāmī* (May 25, 1906). He said Japan's progress was due to action, true fraternity, and obedience, fundamental principles of the Islamic religion that led to prosperity and high civilization; the history of Arab Muslims proved it. The doctor was not ignorant of the strategic potential in forming a close relationship with Indian Muslims.
3. "There is no doubt that bonds of sympathy have been formed these last years between Turkey and Japan... clearly the Tokyo government pursued friendship with the Ottoman Sultan." Letter from Dost Bey in Constantinople to Ya'qūb Sānū (James Sanua), Egyptian editor of the French-Arabic satirical journal *Abū Naẓẓāra* in Paris. "La Guerre Russo-Japonais," *Abū Naẓẓāra* 28:4 (April 1904), 1.
4. From Nakaoka, "Japanese Research on the Mixed Courts of Egypt" In 1874 Fukuchi resigned from government office and became owner/editor-in-chief of a Tokyo newspaper.
5. Story, Sommerville (ed.). *The Memoirs of İsmail Kemal Bey* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1920), 143. Albanian İsmail Kemal Bey, an official and close confidant of Midhat Paşa, read him this letter: "It was advisable for the Empire to get into touch politically with the Empires of the Far East, and that he ought to send an extraordinary mission, headed by a person of importance politically... that person ought to be Ahmed Vefik Efendi (former Paris Ambassador)." See also Henry Elliot, "The Death of Abdülaziz and of Turkish Reform," *The Nineteenth Century* 23:132 (February 1888), 276–296.
6. Kaori Komatsu, *Ertuğrul Faciası: Bir Dostluğun Doğuşu* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1992), 30. From "Torukkokoku'tono Tsūkō-ni Kansuruken (Concerning the Establishment of Relations with the Turkish State)," *Nihon Gaiko Monjo (Japanese Foreign Archives)*, VIII, Subject 3, 42–44.
7. Umut Arık, *A Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations: Towards a Special Partnership* (Istanbul: Turkish-Japanese Business Council [DEIK], 1989), 19. Text used with caution; dates/names often unreliable.

8. Nakaoka, 37. The Khedive conferred an Ottoman medal upon him in 1887.
9. Tadahisa Takahashi, "Türk-Japon Münasebetlerine Kısa bir Bakış (1871-1945)," *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı Dergisi* 18 (June 1982), 128. From Chishu Naitō, *Seinan Ajia no Susei [Güney Batı Asya'nın Meyili]* (Tokyo: 1942), 269. See also BBA İrade Dâhiliye 63117, November 4, 1878. There was no treaty yet, but the Ottomans granted the *Seiki* warship special permission to enter the Dardanelles. They docked for 12 days.
10. Nakaoka, "The Yoshida Masaharu Mission to Persia and the Ottoman Empire."
11. BBA HR.MTV 494/36, January 1881. The consul general noted that the Persians had placed several officers at the delegation's disposal to keep the mission focused on trade issues.
12. BBA İrade Hâriciye 17599, March 1881.
13. The Ottoman government was aware of this. BBA YA.RES. 10/24, March 1881, Foreign Minister Âsım Paşa to the Baş Vekâlet, "Although the afore-mentioned nation [Japan] desired the founding of and support for commercial relations with the Ottoman State...not having the authority to establish a treaty, it was merely their duty to investigate whether or not the Sublime Porte would consent to this point."
14. Nakaoka, 229.
15. *Ibid.*, 231, ftn 10. *Nihon Gaikō Monjo*, Vol. 13, 520.
16. *Ibid.*, 230-231.
17. BBA HR.MTV 494/39, March 22, 1881 and April 5, 1881.
18. Ziya Şakir (Soku), *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1994, 2nd ed.), 23. This journalist wrote as though he personally witnessed at least some of these events and conversations. Text used with caution, as dates/names are often unreliable; often no sources cited. Ziya Şakir translated the French memoirs of a traveler to Japan (*Japonya Hâtıratı*), which was serialized in the *Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete* in 1908.
19. Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 30. Former Ottoman ambassador to Paris, Münir Paşa, shared with Şakir the Sultan's political thoughts: "To establish a personal and strong friendship (*dostluk*) with the Mikado from afar, but in order not to upset the Russian Czardom, to not currently enter into a political alliance with Japan, but if required, at the precise moment when it seems necessary, to suddenly transform that friendship into the form of an immediate treaty."
20. Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 24.
21. Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 21-22, contains an English translation of the questions and answers. Source unknown; may be from Chishu Naitō's work. See also HR.MTV 321/9, December 14, 1882, Şakir Paşa to Foreign Minister Ârifî Paşa.
22. Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 22.
23. BBA İrade Hâriciye 17599, March 9/10, 1881. Both ambassadors to St. Petersburg confirmed this.
24. *Ibid.*
25. BBA İrade Hâriciye 17594, March 23/24, 1881, March 27/28, 1881, and YA.RES. March 10/24, 1881.
26. See Said Paşa, *Hatırâtım* (İstanbul: Sabah Matbaası, 1328/1912), Cilt I, 36-37.
27. "En ziyâde mazhar-ı imtiyâz olan devlet."
28. In 1899, Japanese in Ottomans borders were treated under precepts of international law due to nonexistence of any treaty. Japan desired its citizens in Ottoman lands to fall under the custodianship of the British embassy. BBA YA.HUS 400/121, October 28, 1899 and YA.HUS 408/59, July 17/20, 1900.
29. See Turan Kayaoğlu, *Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) for the struggles to revise extraterritorial arrangements.

30. The Sublime Porte was aware of Japan's unequal situation with Western Powers. Abdullah Cevdet's Constantinople daily, *Osmanlı*, reported this on June 18, 1884, 2/French 3.
31. BBA YA.HUS 173/27, İrade Dâhiliye 70131, March 25, 1883. See also BBA HR.MTV 321/9, 10, 11, and 12; BBA HR.MTV 321/59, January 10, 1884; İrade Hâriciye 18717, December 1884/January 1885.
32. BBA YA.HUS 195/161, October 1886. See also BBA HR.MTV 321/60, 494/103 and 104; İrade Dâhiliye 79583, November 13, 1886; İrade Dâhiliye 83390, December 27/28, 1887.
33. BBA HR.MTV 494/103, 19 August 1886; İrade Hâriciye 19267, October 20, 1886.
34. BBA YA.HUS 197/134, December 1886; İrade Dâhiliye 80041, December 2, 1886; İrade Hâriciye 20079, March-May 1889.
35. BBA HR.MTV 491/44–48, July 1887 and HR.MTV 491/49, September 22, 1887; İrade Dâhiliye 82447, October 1, 1887.
36. The Porte tended to every detail of their lavish visit. Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 30–31; Erol Mütercimler, *Ertuğrul Faciası ve 21:Yüzyıla Doğru Türk-Japon İlişkisi* (İstanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar, 1993), 86–87; Arık, 25–26, quoting a translation from Japanese paper *Nichi-Nichi Shimbun* (November 10, 1887/Meiji 20). See DMA MEK II, D.568/S.31–1, October 7, 1887; D.526/S.103, October 7, 1887.
37. Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 32. Prince Komatsu delivered the Mikadō's personal gift of a "magic lacquer plume box," and bestowed the Emperor's "Grand Cordon of the Supreme Order of the Chrysanthemum" medal (*Kikuki Daijusho*) upon the Sultan, BBA YA.HUS 220/59, July/December 1888. More medals were exchanged. See Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 30–31; Mütercimler, *Ertuğrul Faciası ve 21*, 86–87; Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 25–26; BBA İrade Dâhiliye 82442, October 6, 1887; İrade Hâriciye 19671, January 1888.
38. BBA HR.MTV 376/67, May 5, 1888, Foreign Minister Okuma Shigenobu to Foreign Minister Said Paşa; İrade Hâriciye 19847, July 9, 1888.
39. BBA HR.MTV 376/64, Sannomiya to Said Paşa; İrade Hâriciye 19735, January 20, 1888; BBA HR.MTV 376/69, July 1889, drafts of letters from the Sultan to the Emperor.
40. İrade Hâriciye, 19735(?), April 2, 1888; BBA YA.HUS 221/14; YA RES 47/37. April-May 1889; İrade Hâriciye 20064, April 30, 1889; BBA YA.HUS 224/19, April 8, 1889; HR.MTV 321/14, October 3, 1890 and HR.MTV 321/19.
41. Komatsu, *Ertuğrul Faciası*, 32.
42. BBA İrade Dâhiliye 88816, May-June 1889; Y.MTV 38/136, May 21, 1889. DMA MEK I D.609/S.135, April 6, 1889; DMA ŞUB D.342/15-A, April 11, 1889, ŞUB D.253/S.206A, April 13, 1889, ŞUB D.339/S.147A, June 6/7, 1889; MUH D.1137/S.70, July 16, 1889; Komatsu, *Ertuğrul Faciası*, 35. English navy officer Captain Hart, chief engineer of the *Ertuğrul* before this journey, expressed concern over the aging ship. Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 28; DMA ŞUB D.341/S.1-B, May 9, 1889.
43. Naval officer Süleyman Nutkî, *Ertuğrul Firkateyni Fâciası* (The *Ertuğrul* Incident) (İstanbul: Bahriye Matbaası 1327/1911); Michael Penn, "East Meets East: An Ottoman Mission in Meiji Japan," in Worringer (ed.), *The Islamic Middle East and Japan: Perceptions, Aspirations, and the Birth of Intra-Asian Modernity* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007), 33–62.
44. BBA İrade Dâhiliye 90756, November 25, 1889.
45. Mütercimler, *Ertuğrul Faciası ve 21*, 112–115 on *Ertuğrul's* departure; also Hasan Ali Yücel, *Geçtiğim Günlerden* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1990), 52–55; BBA İrade Dâhiliye 89310, July 14, 1889.
46. Komatsu, *Ertuğrul Faciası*, 3; DMA ŞUB D.342/S.15-B, 16-A, 17-A.
47. BBA Y.MTV 39/92, July 30, 1889; DMA Umûmî Evrâk D.42/S.45, July 30, 1889.
48. Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 28 (from Naitō, 248).

49. DMA ŞUB D.331/S.2-A, November 21, 1889.
50. On local Muslim enthusiasm for pan-Islamic voyage, see Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 29; BBA YA.HUS 231/4 translation of a Bombay newspaper's October 28, 1889 article; BBA YA.HUS 232/66; BBA YA.HUS 237/30, July 3, 1890 is a report on Dutch discomfort over the *Ertuğrul's* effects on their Muslim colonial territories.
51. Many sources reconstruct the visit. BBA, HR.MTV 507/52, December 19, 1890; Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 29–33 cites detailed local Japanese newspaper coverage of the *Ertuğrul's* visit; Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 40–43; Mütercimler, *Ertuğrul Faciası ve 21*, 155–170; Süleyman Nütki, *Ertuğrul Firkateyni Faciası* (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Bahriye, 1911), 170–172 the official ceremonies held in his honor; Ottoman naval journal *Ceride-yi Bahriye* (August 5, 1890).
52. BBA, HR.MTV 507/52, December 19, 1890; Osman Paşa to *Ceride-yi Bahriye* 2:31(August 19, 1890), 90.
53. Penn, "East Meets East," 33–62 for more details, including a cholera outbreak aboard ship. See *Ceride-yi Bahriye* 2:31(August 19, 1890), 91.
54. DMA Erkân-î Harbiye D.14/S.85, June 12, 1890, ŞUB 367/147A, June 24, 1890; BBA, HR.MTV 507/42, September 24, 1890.
55. BBA, HR.MTV 507/42, September 24, 1890. İrade Dâhiliye 96163, May 31, 1891; BBA YA.HUS 240/39. The Emperor sent one of his personal doctors to the scene, and dispatched members of the Japanese Red Cross Society to Kobe to tend to the wounded. *Ceride-yi Bahriye* covered the tragedy; see 2:35 (September 30, 1890), 115–116.
56. Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 34–37, from Japanese newspapers *Nichi-nichi Shimbun* and *Ji-ji Shimbun*; Mütercimler, *Ertuğrul Faciası ve 21*, 184–185.
57. BBA, HR.MTV 507/36, September 21, 1890, BBA YA.HUS 239/39. See HR.MTV 507/30–38 and Y.MTV 45/56, September 21, 1890.
58. BBA, HR.MTV 507/52, December 19, 1890; HR.MTV 507/48; İrade Hâriciye 20562, October 1890; HR.MTV 507/61–62; HR.MTV 507/70, December 28, 1890; DMA ŞUB D.381/S.30-A, 2 March 1891, ŞUB D.408/22-A, May 15, 1892; HR.MTV 507/69, March 26, 1891; HR.MTV 507/73, June 8, 1891.
59. BBA, HR.MTV 507/50, November 1, 1890, the German Consulate in Hyogo-Osaka's report of September 23, 1890 concerning the transport of the *Ertuğrul* survivors to Kobe and their medical needs, in French translation by the German Embassy in Pera. See also HR.MTV 507/51, November 11, 1890, YA.HUS 240/91.
60. BBA, HR.MTV 507/39–40, September 21, 1890; HR.MTV 507/44, September 30, 1890, YA.HUS 239/22, 46 and 50; İrade Dâhiliye 93665, September 21, 1890; İrade Dâhiliye 93455, September 29, 1890.
61. DMA ŞUB D. 355/S.30-A, January 5, 1891; BBA HR.MTV 507/57, October 10, 1890. The Ottomans responded with a letter expressing their deep gratitude for Japanese sympathy, HR.MTV 507/58, January 21, 1891; Y.MTV 47/87, January 7, 1891; HR.MTV 507/64, June 22, 1891; HR.MTV 507/67–68; DMA ŞUB D.358/S.20-A, September 25/27, 1890, ŞUB D.371/210-A, November 4, 1890, BBA Y.MTV 48/77, February 28, 1891, Y.MTV 49/18, March 15, 1891.
62. BBA HR.MTV 507/72, October 28, 1890; YA.HUS 286/33 contains a facsimile of the text engraved on the monument and HR.MTV 507/74 included photographs. See also HR.MTV 507/54; HR.MTV 507/55; HR.MTV 507/56; HR.MTV 507/65, July 3/7, 1891; YA.HUS 251/72. On September 27, 1899; HR.MTV 507/76; HR.MTV 507/77. During the interwar period, when the Japanese were interested in co-opting support in the Middle East, the Emperor himself made symbolic pilgrimages to this memorial.
63. BBA HR.MTV 507/66, August 24, 1891; HR.MTV 321/62; İrade Hâriciye 20990, September 27, 1891; HR.MTV 376/74; İrade Dâhiliye 95017, January 21, 1891; İrade

- Dâhiliye 94936, February 7, 1891; İrade Dâhiliye 94981, February 10, 1891; İrade Dâhiliye 94537, January 7, 1891; HR.MTV 376/76; HR.MTV 376/77A and 78; BBA Y.MTV 52/26, July 12, 1891; DMA MEK II D.657/S.159, July 14, 1891; DMA MEK III D.657/S.51, undated.
64. BBA, HR.MTV 507/29, November 1890.
65. BBA, HR.MTV 507/29, November 1890.
66. BBA YA.HUS 241/25, October-November 1890; İrade Hâriciye 20584, October 27, 1890.
67. DMA ŞUB D.342/S.37-A, November 11, 1890, ŞUB D.360/S.12-A, November 22, 1890, BBA YA.HUS 240/57, October 31, 1890; YA.HUS 240/107, December 10, 1890; İrade Dâhiliye 93997, November 11, 1890; İrade Hâriciye, #13, March 17, 1895.
68. BBA İrade Hâriciye 20584, October 26 and 30, 1890.
69. BBA YA.HUS 240/57, October 31, 1890.
70. Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 57, claims Rıza Bey warned the survivors, "Until your official statement has been taken, you will say nothing to anyone about the accident." See also DMA MUH D.1277/S.115, December 8, 1891.
71. Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 58–59.
72. BBA YA.HUS 240/57, October 31, 1890.
73. Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 56–57. Captain Hakkı Paşa of the *Talia* commanded the survivors to "...pack up your belongings and...hold your tongue when you show up in Istanbul." See also BBA HR.MTV 321/17.
74. BBA İrade Dâhiliye 94561, January 11, 1891.
75. Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 63. The Japanese ships in Constantinople were public knowledge as far away as Cairo. 'Alî Yûsuf's newspaper *al-Mu'ayyad* 2:365 (February 24, 1891), mentioned in the front page article "al-Yâbân wa'l-Dawla al-'Uliyya" the friendly relations growing between the two states after the return of the survivors.
76. BBA YA.HUS 48/40, February 21, 1891.
77. Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 64–65. The newspapers involved were *Sabah*, *İkdam*, and *Tercümân-ı Hakikat*. The journalists were intrigued by Japan's traditionalism and modernity, as reflected in the decor of the ship's cabin they entered—"National (*Millî*) Japan and modern (*asrî*) Japan were blended together, showing conservatism and love of progress.... On the walls hung the swords, the weapons and the armor that showed Japan's love of nation (*milliyetperverlik*); in the middle of the salon mixed among them with a refined taste were the period's most modern types of sofas, chairs, and tables," 66.
78. BBA İrade Dâhiliye 94902, January 15, 1891; İrade Dâhiliye 95087, January 22, 1891; İrade Dâhiliye 94945, February 6, 1891; İrade Dâhiliye 95065, February 7, 1891; İrade Dâhiliye 94599 and 94598, February 9, 1891; DMA ŞUB D.403/S.21-A, December 5, 1892.
79. Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 72. See Yamada Torajirô, *Toruko Gakan [Scenes of Turkish Life]*(Tokyo: 1911), 1–5, 9. Photo of Noda, Yamada, and the five officers appears in *Deniz Mecmuası* 364 (1942). See also "Noda al-Yâbânî wa'l-Mister Gilliam," *al-Mu'ayyad* 2:450 (June 10, 1891), 1; BBA İrade Dâhiliye 95140, February 13, 1891; Y.MTV 66/61, August/September 1892; İrade Husûsî 2, November 24, 1892; İrade Maliye #10, November 29, 1892. For more on Noda, see Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 94–96, 107–111.
80. Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 67.
81. BBA Y.MTV 48/76, February 28, 1891; Y.MTV 53/72, August 23, 1891.
82. BBA Y.MTV 48/75, February 28, 1891; Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 72–73.
83. Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 74–78. Rumors flew that the Japanese were the Gog and Magog, the little people mentioned in the Qur'ân that were to appear on the Day of Judgment. When they used the local hamâms, they drew crowds which made extra money for the bathowners, 86.

84. Mütercimler, *Ertuğrul Faciası ve 21*, 230–231, excerpted from *The Japan Daily Mail* (Yokohama: October 7, 1890), quoting Noda's *Ji-Ji Shimbun*; BBA İrade Dâhiliye 94308, December 6, 1890; BBA HR.MTV 321/15, October 23, 1890, Aoki to Said Paşa; HR.MTV 321/16, December 18, 1890; HR.MTV 321/18, October 8, 1891; HR.MTV 321/63; İrade Dâhiliye 98731, January 4, 1892; İrade Dâhiliye 98755, January 7, 1892.
85. See Selçuk Esenbel's articles, "A Japanese in Istanbul: Yamada Torajiro," *Bi-Annual Istanbul* (1994–1995 selections), 30–35, and "A *Fin de Siècle* Japanese Romantic in Istanbul: The Life of Yamada Torajirō and His *Toruko Gakan*," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 59:2 (1996), 237–252 and others for a discussion of Yamada.
86. BBA HR.MTV 376/77, May 24, 1892; Y.MTV 87/19, November 13, 1893.
87. Esenbel, "A Japanese in Istanbul," 31 and 241.
88. *Ibid.*, 241.
89. BBA Y.MTV 62/19, April-May 1892, on display in the Topkapı Palace Museum; BBA İrade Dâhiliye 100452, June 19, 1892.
90. BBA HR.MTV 490/78, letter dated January 26, 1894; HR.MTV 376/79; HR.MTV 376/86.
91. BBA Y.MTV 161/199, June 30, 1897. One store was in Pera, now the Çiçek Pasajı on İstiklâl Caddesi, and the other was near the old city railway station.
92. Esenbel, "A Japanese in Istanbul," 243, 32; BBA YA.HUS 409/86, July 5, 1900.
93. BBA HR.MTV 321/20; Y.MTV 111/52, October 10, 1894.
94. Esenbel, "A Japanese in Istanbul," 242. From Yamada, *Toruko Gakan*, 12, 16. Yamada rented a house at the entrance of the Bosphorus and used binoculars daily to scan the horizon for Russian ships; he posted some twenty men on Galata Tower as lookouts for the Black Sea cruisers that would eventually join the Baltic fleet and head to Port Arthur. His report on this passage was considered a significant contribution to Japanese war strategy.
95. BBA Y.MTV 259/93, April 26, 1904.
96. 'Abd al-Qādir al-Maghribī, *Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī, Dhikrīyyāt wa Aḥādīth* (Cairo: 1967), 32.
97. Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 104–105.
98. "Japonya ve Müslümânlık," *Bâlkân* 121 (January 19, 1907), 2: "If the Japanese convert to Islam, they will be brothers to forty million Kitay [Chinese] and eighty million Indian Muslims, to Java, Afghan, Central Asia, Iran, Ottoman and Egypt's Islamic peoples. And in this manner Japan will exert political influence all over the Asian continent." See also "Muslimū al-Hind fir'l Yābān," *al-Ālam al-Islāmī*, (June 1, 1906) crediting one Ḥusayn Efendi with generating interest in Islam among the Japanese masses.
99. BBA YA.HUS 143, May 4 and 11, 1893.
100. Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 41–42.
101. BBA Y.MTV 78/60, May 23, 1893.
102. *Ibid.*
103. BBA HR.HMŞ.İŞO 48/3, October 26, 1915; HR.HMŞ.İŞO 48/8, February-December 1909; HR.HMŞ.İŞO 67/3, December 23, 1912.
104. Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 43–45.
105. BBA YA.HUS 291/3, February 22, 1894; İrade Husûsî 62, February 24, 1894. I believe this was actually Komatsu Akihito's half-brother Yorihiro, and not a son of Akihito. Yorihiro had studied in naval academies in Japan and Europe, and served in combat during both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. See also BBA YA.HUS 291/26, February 25, 1894; İrade Husûsî 95, March 4/5, 1894; YA.HUS 291/71, 93, 292/170; HR.MTV 490/77–84.
106. BBA HR.MTV 490/77, 79, and 81, February 1894.

107. BBA HR.MTV 490/84, March 15, 1894; YA.HUS 292/170, April 5/6, 1894; HR.MTV 321/21.
108. BBA İrade Husûsî 48, September 15/16, 1894.
109. BBA YA.HUS 305/3, August 1, 1894; YA.HUS 240/57, 240/107, and 241/25; İrade Husûsî 48, April 7/8, 1895.
110. BBA YA.HUS 329/1, April 29, 1895.
111. Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 44.
112. BBA HR.MTV 321/23; İrade Hâriciye January 10, 1896; Y.MTV 135/95, January 28/29, 1896. Ottoman minister of war, Rıza, permitted Fukushima access to the *Mekteb-î Fünûn-î Harbiye* (the Imperial War Academy) and one of the Imperial barracks. Y.MTV 163/73, July 20/21, 1897, from the Ottoman Foreign Ministry regarding desire of Japanese Naval attaché to Rome to meet with Ottoman officials to discuss and observe Ottoman army practices and foreign personnel serving in the Imperial Army.
113. BBA YA.HUS 376/14, July 19, 1897, NY Consul. YA.HUS 376/14, July 31, 1897, NY Consul to Foreign Minister, report on *The Japan Daily Herald Mail Summary*, a semi-official newspaper published in Tokyo. The foreign section contained a paragraph about the establishment of an embassy in Constantinople. See also Y.MTV 163/126, July 13, 1897.
114. BBA Y.MTV 163/229, July 30, 1897; Y.MTV 167/230, September 23, 1897.
115. BBA YA.HUS 376/36, NY Consul to Foreign Minister, July 5, 7, 13, 1897, include translations of articles from *The Japan Herald Mail* and *The Far East*.
116. BBA İrade Husûsî 66, May 25, 1897.
117. Tadahisa Takahashi, "Türk-Japon Münasebetlerine Kısa bir Bakış (1871–1945)," *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı Dergisi* 18 (June 1982), 134. From Naitō, 47–50.
118. Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 46.
119. BBA Y.MTV 198/122, October 8, 1899.
120. "Hâriciye Nezâreti'nden Japonya Hâriciye Nezâretine İrsâl Olunacak Tahrîrât Müsveddesinin Tercümesidir" in BBA Y.MTV 198/122, October 8, 1899.
121. DMA MEK II D.1200/S.38, December 28/29, 1899; MEK D.1182/S/20, February 12/13, 1900; BBA HR.MTV 495/119, July 25, 1899.
122. Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 48. From Ali Vehbi Bey, *prensées et souvenirs de ex-Sultan Abdülhamid* (Paris et Neuchatel, 1910), 108–109 [from Naitō].
123. BBA HR.MTV 495/119, July 25, 1899.
124. For details of Prince Kotohito Kan-en's visit, see BBA YA.HUS 405/98; HR.MTV 495/130–132; BBA HR.MTV 495/130, March 30, 1900, Aoki to Tevfik Paşa; BBA HR.MTV 495/131, May 21, 1900; HR.MTV 386/45–48.
125. BBA HR.MTV 321/28, December 19, 1902.
126. BBA YA.HUS 430/46, June 12/13, 1902.
127. Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 58 (from Naitō, 58).
128. "al-Dawla al-'Ulîyya wa'l-Yâbân" *al-Liwâ'* (September 15, 1904), 1, and "Tariq min al-Warad" *al-Liwâ'* (September 17, 1904), 1. These reports, translated from the Russian newspaper *Novya Vremia*, were said to have come from a reliable source.
129. BBA İrade Hâriciye 10, May/June 1904; İrade Husûsî 96, June 14, 1904; İrade Husûsî July 16, 20, 1904; İrade Husûsî 85, December 6, 1904; Mütercimler, *Ertuğrul Faciası ve 21*, 280–281, from Orhan Koloğlu, "Mikado'yu Bir Sünnet Edebilseydik," *Milliyet* (Kasım 4, 1990). In Gertrude Bell's travelogue, 232 she reminisced about a guide in the area of Hâmâ named Maḥmūd who had described his most memorable traveling companion as "a Japanese who had been sent by his government... to study and report on the methods of building employed in the eastern parts of the Roman empire."
130. Cezmi Eraslan, *II. Abdülhamid ve İslâm Birliği: Osmanlı Devleti'nin İslâm Siyaseti 1856–1908* (İstanbul: Ötügen, 1991), 375–376. From İlhan Süreyya Sırma, "Sultan

- II. Abdülhamid ve Çin Müslümanları," *İslâm Tedkikleri Enstitüsü Dergisi*, VII, Cüz 3-4, İstanbul 1979 and BBA.BEO 106694.1ef 3 ve aynı vesikada, 26 Aralık 1899 tarihli Meclis-i Vükelâ mazbatası.
131. A reporter for the Japanese newspaper *Nichi-Nichi Shimbun* gave two volumes of a photographic book *The Russo-Japanese War* to the Sultan; BBA YA.HUS 477/137, August 31, 1904. The Sultan's library contained a large collection of books and photo albums of the Russo-Japanese War.
 132. BBA YA.RES 124/80, March 5, 1904.
 133. Von der Goltz helped reorganize the Ottoman army (1883-1896). Pertev Bey was sent to Germany for several years as well (1894-1898). Information on Pertev Bey from *Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Yedigün Neşriyatı, Tarihsiz), Fasikül 10, 308-309.
 134. Pertev Bey Demirhan, *Rus-Japon Harbinden Alınan Mâddî ve Manevî Dersler ve Japonların Esbâb-i Muzafferiyeti: Bir Millet'in Tâli'i Kendi Kuvvetindedir!* (İstanbul: Kanâ'at Kütüphanesi ve Matbaası, 1329/1911), 8.
 135. *Ibid.*, 9.
 136. *Ibid.*, 10. Pages 8-16 detail the process by which the decision was reached. Von der Goltz reiterated in his letters his strong belief that posting an officer in the East Asian theater of war would benefit the Ottoman Empire.
 137. According to *Türk Meşhurları*, 308-309, he participated in battles at Port Arthur and Mukden and was injured. See also BBA HR.MTV 321/29 and 30, June 21, 1906; *İrade Husûsî* 116, April 18/19, 1906.
 138. BBA YA.HUS 465/84, 466/84, 467/104, 468/47, 468/51, 468/52, 468/63, 468/68, 468/101, 469/83, 470/67, 470/20, 477/131; Y.MTV 265/52, September 18, 1904.
 139. BBA Y.MTV 255/245, February 12, 1904; Y.MTV, February 19, 1904. Bell, 82 alleged the Greek Orthodox Church bishop's secretary in Homs lamented Japanese victories and penitential services were held every time there was a Russian defeat.
 140. BBA YA.HUS 486/60, February 27, 1905 and April 16, 1905, described printed proclamations hung on walls by Iranians protesting against participation in a theater performance to be given at the Armenian school (patronized by the Russian Consulate) to benefit wounded Russians from Port Arthur.
 141. In a cabinet meeting, the Egyptian government in Cairo discussed how they should deal with warring parties in their waters. The decision was made official with its publication in *al-Waqā'î al-Miṣriyya*, the state mouthpiece. Although the declaration was meant to abide by international law concerning navigation through the canal and to emphasize Khedival Egyptian neutrality during the conflict, the policy was also one which limited the Russian fleet's movements as it passed through Egyptian seas and the Suez Canal. The Japanese ships, which had no reason to pass through the Mediterranean at all during a conflict in the Japan Sea area, remained unaffected. See BBA YA.HUS 467/96, February 27, 1904. Original Egyptian cabinet memos in Arabic and French, National Egyptian Archives in Cairo: Majlis al-Wuzarā', Niẓārat al-Khārijīya: Maḥfaẓa 5, Mutafarriqa Khāṣṣa bi'l-Khārijīya, Majmū'a 15 Khārijīya, March 1904, Documents 6/1-6/6, "Bi Sha'n Mu'āmalāt al-Sufun al-Ḥarbiyya al-Rūsīyya wa'l-Yābāniyya fi'l-Miyāh al-Bahriyya al-Miṣriyya." See also the public announcement in "al-Qism al-Rasmī, Niẓārat al-Khārijīyya: Iqrār min Qomandān al-Safīna al-Ḥarbiyya al-Tābi'a li Iḥḍa al-Dawlatayn al-Mutaḥārribatayn Maṭlūb bihi Akhadh Faḥm min Thaghr min al-Thughūr al-Miṣriyya," ["Official Section. Foreign Ministry: "Acknowledgements from the Warships Subordinate to One of the Two Warring States Requesting in it Reaching an Understanding concerning Egyptian Harbors," *al-Waqā'î al-Miṣriyya* (February 10, 1904), (February 12, 1904).
 142. "Akhbār Barīd Ürübā: Rūsīyyā wa'l-Yābān," *al-Muqaṭṭam* (August 6, 1903), 1. The Sultan demanded the Russian ships be disarmed while passing, and that they go

- one by one at night, as a ruse to inadvertently delay the fleet for the benefit of the Japanese. Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 49 (from Naitō); Şakir, *Sultan Hamit ve Mikado*, 119. Julian S. Corbett explains in *Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War 1904–5*, Vol. II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 17–26 that the volunteer ships *Smolensk* and *Peterburg* were brought from Sevastopol to function as transports for the main Russian fleet. They were loaded with coal and other supplies and obtained an Ottoman firmân allowing for their passage through the Dardanelles. Guns were not mounted until after their passage through Ottoman waters and arrival in the Mediterranean. The officers aboard were then informed that they would not join Admiral Rozhstvenski's fleet in the Mediterranean, but would enter the Red Sea and cruise for vessels carrying contraband bound for Japanese ports. After stopping several British and German ships, including mail steamers, the Russians sufficiently antagonized the British for them to threaten dispatching the British Mediterranean fleet to resolve the conflict. The Russian squadron quickly turned south and sailed around Zanzibar, until eventually they were recalled home.
143. Mütercimler, *Ertuğrul Faciası ve 21*, 88. From C. Eraslan, *II. Abdülhamid ve İslam Birliği* (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 1992), 365.
 144. Takahashi, "Türk-Japon Münasebetlerine," 135. From Vehbi Ali, 151.
 145. "Japonya ve Müslümânlık," *Bâlkân* 121 (January 19, 1907), 2.
 146. Şakir, 119.
 147. *Ibid.*, 112–117. His account may have come from Abdürreşid İbrahim's *Alem-i İslam*. See also "al-İslâm wa'l-Yübân," *al-Ālam al-İslâmî* (July 6, 1906), 2.
 148. *Tercümân* article "Japonya'da Müslümânlık" reprinted in *İctihâd* 13 (July 1906), 3; Abdullah Cevdet's "Japonya Müslümânlık," *İctihâd* 11 (April 1906), 167–168 on Japanese interest in Islam.
 149. "al-İslâm wa'l-Yübân," *al-Ālam al-İslâmî* (July 6, 1906), 1–2 named Mahmut Esat Efendi (Ottoman official and school instructor), İsmâ'il Efendi Hakkı (divinity professor at Istanbul University), Ahmet Midhat Efendi (founder of the Ottoman literary paper *Tercümân-ı Hakikat* in 1878), and Râsim Bey (Ottoman ambassador to Batavia, Java). Joining them were Javan Muslim 'Abd al-Majîd Efendi, Indian Muslim Hısayn Efendi, and high-ranking Persian scholar Hâjî Mirzâ Sayyid; it was to be headed by 'Abd al-Raḥmân Efendi al-Inkilizî, who was credited with spreading Islam in India and the Far East and who delivered treatises on Islam written by other Muslims (including Khâlid Efendi, a Javan Mufti and teacher at Oxford, the Egyptian Farîd Efendi Wajadî, and Şadr al-Dîn Efendi al-Qâzânî). The Japanese were said to be ethically predisposed to convert to Islam because of its compatibility with civilization and prosperity, unlike the other religions represented at the conference (Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity). See also "al-İslâm wa'l-Yübân," *al-Ālam al-İslâmî* (July 13, 1906), 2.
 150. In "Rêve Réalisable" ("Realizable Dream: Excerpts of a letter addressed to a Japanese journalist in Tokyo") in *İctihâd* 12 (June 1906), 179–182, Abdullah Cevdet praised Japan's achievements thus far, saying the Japanese had demonstrated the evolution and the perfection that placed them above the characterization of Gustave Le Bon (as one of the "middle" races). Threatening to the Sultan was the final passage of this article. After explaining that the Japanese and the Emperor had been considering embracing Islam as their new religion, Cevdet wrote, "The Mikado would invest a strength and a very considerable prestige (to our religion). I will go farther and I will dare to say that by this fact alone the Mikado would acquire in an absolutely legitimate manner, the right to the title of 'Commander of the Faithful' with all its prerogatives.... One would not hesitate to recognize that [the Sultan] has some characteristics contrary to the qualities required in order to be Caliph. The Mikado, in whom all the indispensable conditions of the Caliphate reside except

- the one of being Muslim, would be acknowledged as the worthy *Commander of the Faithful*, that is to say as Caliph, by all true Muslims, if he came to fulfill this condition.”
151. “Japonya’da İslâmiyet,” *Bâlkân* 29 (September 2, 1906), 1 from a newspaper called *Dutch Orient Correspondence* claimed that “it is almost a reality that in Japan the government has accepted Islam as the official religion. . . . Japan, in order to possess a great strength against the competition of the Western nations, will strive to make all of Asia lend a helping hand. The most important nations in Asia are the Indians and the Chinese. All Indians are Muslim. As for China, most of its currently forty million people are Muslim. After Japan has these two nations in hand, one could say it controls all of Asia. Japan has no important political reason other than this—to get these two nations—in facilitating its acceptance of Islam; its government is so clever that . . . it convened this congress of religions investigation as a mere demonstration [of its intent to convert].” The author speculated that the Japanese would most likely not convert.
 152. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Arabic translation as “al-İslâm wa’l-Yâbân” in the Egyptian *al-‘Âlam al-İslâmî* (November 2, 1906).
 153. BBA Y.MTV 259/93, April 26, 1904.
 154. Ibid.
 155. BBA Y. Kâmil Paşa 86–22/2149, August 17, 1904. The text was *Terkîn Târîhi* [*The Cancellation of History*], the writer’s name Gastondon.
 156. BBA İrade Husûsî 21, June 12, 1905. “English Arabistân” is unclear here but probably referred to the British-controlled area around Aden, in modern Yemen.
 157. BBA İrade Hâriciye 8, October 19, 1905.
 158. “Japonlarla Türkler,” *Bâlkân* 30 (September 4, 1906), 2. This rumor was not substantiated by any archival documentation.
 159. *Al-Garîda* (May 16, 1907), 5. Similar reports appeared in Abdürreşid İbrahim’s Arabic paper *al-Tilmîdh* in St. Petersburg. *Al-‘Âlam al-İslâmî* (September 14, 1906) was more concerned with the pan-Islamic implications of the visit.
 160. BBA HR.MTV 493/1, October 10, 1906, Ottoman Ambassador to St. Petersburg Husni Paşa to Foreign Minister Tevfik Paşa; İrade Husûsî 28 and 29, November 10, 1906.
 161. BBA İrade Hâriciye 2, October 10, November 22, and November 25, 1906.
 162. Ibid.; İrade Husûsî 66, December 9, 1906; *Bâlkân* 30 (September 4, 1906), 2.
 163. BBA İrade Husûsî 33, December 3, 1906.
 164. BBA İrade Husûsî 33, December 3, 1906.
 165. BBA Y.MTV 294/148, February 13, 1907.
 166. BBA HR.MTV 493/2, June 25, 1907.
 167. Şükran Vahide, *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi: The Author of the Risale-i Nur* (Istanbul: Sözlür Publications, 1992), 40. From his *Şurular*, 300.
 168. “Japonya ve Türkiye,” *Bâlkân* 230 (August 4, 1908), 1. Article reprinted from *Şûra-yı Osmânî*, the Şûra-yı Osmânî Cemiyeti’s Arabic-Ottoman publication (1907–1908) in Cairo.
 169. Arık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 58. Omura to Uchida, 1909, and “Japonya ve Türkiye,” *Bâlkân* 230 (August 4, 1908), 1, explained that the Japanese were sent a memorandum expressing five necessary conditions for reaching an agreement, “the first condition being that Japan does not have the right to benefit from the Capitulations like the other states”; negotiations were suspended over this issue.
 170. In Abdullah Cevdet, “Japonya’da Türkiye,” *İctihâd* 30 (September 14, 1911), 833, he mentioned Baron Fieldmarshal Arisa, a Japanese commander of the Emperor’s volunteer fleet who had discussed an agreement with a Turkish company to establish a joint venture—steam service in the Mediterranean.

171. "Japonya ve Hindustân," *Bâlkân* 80 (November 2, 1906), 4. See also "Japonlar Dehşet Gidiyor," 88 (October 13, 1906), 2; "Muslimü al-Hind f'l-Yâbân," *al-'Âlam al-Islâmî* (June 1, 1906).
172. BBA Y.MTV 300/8, June 27, July 14, 1907. "Dahîyyat al-Jahal," *al-Garîda* 1:143 (August 26, 1907), 1, reported on the Korean delegation.
173. See BBA HR.HMŞ.İŞO 48/8, February-December 1909 for a summary of Ottoman-Japanese negotiations.
174. Anık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 58–59 (from Naitō, 58).
175. BBA HR.MTV 496/18, March 8, 1909, and 496/20. Photos of Prince Kuni accompanied by three other Japanese officers and Ottoman army commanders in front of a military club in Istanbul are in *Resimli Kitap* 7 (April/May 1909), 638, and at the War Academy (*Mekteb-i Harbiye*), 646. See also BBA İrade Husûsî 120, March 14, 1909; İrade Husûsî #16, March 1909.
176. Anık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 59 (from Naitō, 59). Letter dated March 16, 1909.
177. Anık, *Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 60 (from Naitō, 59). Letter dated March 31, 1909. In Cairo, "al-Dawla al-Ulîyya wa'l-Yâbân," *al-Garîda* (September 14, 1909), 5, reprinted a report from the Ottoman paper *Sabâh* that said the two nations were still debating Japan's insistence on Capitulatory privileges but that an agreement was very soon in the making.
178. "Turkey and Japan," *Levant Herald* (January 8, 1910), 10.
179. "Turkey and Japan," *Levant Herald* (July 2, 1910), 234.
180. Nogi was returning home after attending the coronation of King George V. Nogi's visit drew enormous crowds in the capital. *Resimli Kitap* 31 (June/July 1911), 564–567, 570–578, contains a series of photographs recording his entry into Istanbul, the masses awaiting his ship in the streets around Galata, the military processions he attended, and his meetings with Şevket Paşa and other officers. See also BBA HR.MTV 321/33 and 35, February 1912.
181. BBA DH.MTV 24/74, January 9, 18, and 22, 1913.
182. BBA HR.MTV 493/5, May 12, 1914; HR.MTV 493/6, May 27, 1914.
183. BBA MV 197/67, April 11, 1915.
184. See BBA HR.HMŞ.İŞO 48/3, October 26, 1915, Document 36527 of the Sublime Porte Foreign Office Legal Consultation Bureau.
185. BBA MV 220/142, October 4, 1920.

5 Ottoman Politics and the Japanese Model

1. See Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964) for an understanding of this dynamic.
2. From Bernard Lewis's *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 326. In Hasan Kayalı's *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 24, he describes the evolution of Ottomanism this way: "The Tanzîmât principle of political equality begot the concept of Ottomanism, a common allegiance of all subjects in equal status to the Ottoman dynasty...formal equality before the law, coupled with secular restructuring of social institutions and centralization, provided the framework upon which an identification with country and people...could be built by stressing the powerful symbol of the dynasty...The Young Ottomans also promoted the concepts of legal representation and popular sovereignty that would erode the intercommunal divisions within the Empire and focus the loyalty of Muslim and Christian alike on a geographical fatherland comprising Ottoman territories as well as the ruling Ottoman dynasty. Having provided an Islamic basis to their ideas, the Young Ottomans believed their vision of the Ottoman state would be readily acceptable to Turks and Arabs."

3. Carter Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 21: "Those who knew most about the West—at first scribal diplomats—became a vanguard of Westernization."
4. Huri İslamoğlu-Inan (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 22–23.
5. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 135 (quoted from James R. Bartholomew, "The 'Feudalistic' Legacy of Japanese Science," *Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization* 6[Spring 1985], 35–375; personal communications) on the expansion of Ottoman school system not bridging the gap between sectors of Ottoman society: "Such numbers [of students] mark a great change for the Ottoman Empire, but...slight, too, compared to that of the most successful Asian reformers, the Japanese, who created a national school system, from compulsory elementary schools through university, within three decades after the Meiji revolution of 1868...without having to face an acute cultural dualism, or anything like the *ulema's* vested interest in education, or the cultural aspirations of a number of discontented subject nationalities."
6. Selim Deringil, "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the late Ottoman Empire, 1808–1908," *Comparative Studies of Society and History* 35:1 (January 1993), 4.
7. Caesar Farah, "Censorship and Freedom of Expression in Ottoman Syria and Egypt," in William H. Haddad and William L. Ochsenwald (eds.), *Nationalism in Non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 183–184. The Ottoman censors rather arbitrarily found terms or news offensive, sometimes to an absurd degree. Decisions were left to the judgment of the particular censor in a geographical region of the Empire. During Abdülhamid II's reign the chief secretary to a province (the *mektûpcî*) was in charge of censoring the local press.
8. "Japonya," *Mecmua-yı Ebûzzîya* 31:115(October 6, 1911), 1166.
9. Ralph S. Hattox, *Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985), 101–102: "As was to happen later in Europe, the coffeehouse became something of a literary forum...there might be heated discussions on art, the sciences, or literature....The coffeehouse quickly became the place of exchange of information, where news of the palace or Porte was spread by word of mouth....One wishing to hear the latest news—or, more likely, the freshest rumors—needed only to station himself in the coffeehouse for a short time."
10. Hattox, *Coffee and Coffeehouses*, 77, 92–98. Egyptian Ministry of Public Education official Ḥasan Efendi Riyād frequently provided Cairo with this form of public literary entertainment. His 1903 Egyptian novel titled *al-Fatā al-Yābāniyya* [The Japanese Maiden] was described in "al-Taqrīz wa'l-Intiqād: al-Fatā al-Yābāniyya," of Farah Anṭūn's paper *al-Jāmi'a* 4:4(June 1903), 258 as "the sixteenth evening public entertainment novel (*riwāyāt musāmarāt al-sha'b*) for its author...It was authored, not translated."
11. Hattox, *Coffee and Coffeehouses*, 101–102. For a more recent study of the coffeehouse as a public political space and Ottoman state efforts to monitor or control it, see Cengiz Kırılı, "The Struggle over Space: Coffeehouses of Ottoman Istanbul, 1780–1845" (New York: SUNY Binghamton unpublished dissertation, 2000). For a cultural analysis of the coffeehouse, see Alan Mikhail, "The Heart's Desire: Gender, Urban Space and the Ottoman Coffee House," in Dana Sajdi (ed.), *Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 133–170.
12. Ahmed Emin, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its Press* (New York: Columbia University, 1914), 132–133.
13. *Ibid.*, 80.
14. "Maslak al-Dawla al-'Uthmāniyya fī al-Ḥarb al-Ḥādira," *al-Liwā'* (February 22, 1904), 1 (the Egyptian nationalist paper) described overwhelming animosity toward Russia

- and amity toward Japan felt by Ottoman peoples during this war, so that “people from every class [were] flocking to read newspapers and hear this news. Enthusiasm filled their hearts.”
15. As one example of the press as a prominent vehicle conveying a particular Japanese image to readers, note the front page of the *al-Liwā'* (October 16, 1904), which consisted of “Political View” (“Nazra Siyāsa”) by founder Muṣṭafā Kāmil (written in Berlin), including a discussion of international politics and Japan’s emergence as an Eastern challenge to Western imperialism; “The Japanese War” (“Ḥarb al-Yābān”) reports; “The Eastern Awakening” (“al-Nahḍa al-Sharqīyya”) positing the awakening of the Orient as a result of universalization of sciences and the spread of education through Japanese efforts and industriousness.
 16. Mehmed Zeki, *Japonya'nın Mâzisi, Hâli, İstakbâli* (İstanbul: Mehmed Zeki Matbaası, 1308/1892), 2–3.
 17. *Ibid.*, 2–3.
 18. *Ibid.*, 96–105, including “*harakiri*” (ritual suicide), Shintō and Buddhism in Japan, how Japanese “lack of individuality” was reflected in the absence of personal pronouns in the language, and how Western-style “material” advancement would affect Japan’s future “spiritual” progress.
 19. *Ibid.*, 92. Even lowly Japanese porters and oarsmen had civilized, harmonious dealings with one another.
 20. *Ibid.*, 71.
 21. *Ibid.*, 115.
 22. *Ibid.*, 87.
 23. M. Safvet translated *Japoneries d’automne* (1889) and the Ottoman Ministry of Public Instruction published it as *Japonya Seyâhatnâmesi* [Travelogue of Japan] in 1893. This collection of observations about Japan, written by French naval officer, novelist, and honorary member of the Japan Society Pierre Loti (Lt. Julien Viaud) recounted his memories of Kyoto, Edo (Tokyo), and the Nikko countryside. It generated a picture of Japanese life for Ottoman readers, though it lacked Zeki’s sophisticated political analysis. Loti’s 4-act *Madame Chrysanthème* (1892?) was serialized in the pages of *Servet-i Fünûn* around 1903.
 24. “Japon,” *Mecmua-yı Ebûzziya* 6 (October/November 1881), 175.
 25. Tefvik remained involved in politics during the Young Turk struggle with Abdülhamid II.
 26. “Japon,” 175, 179. Not only were Japanese women equals to European women in their education for domestic duties (they were said to be guardians of the “unique” Japanese virtue of cleanliness transcending that of European nations), but they were full participants in the workforce with Japanese men.
 27. *Ibid.*, 178. Text continues: “As for those who are poor [in Japan], they are a group whose level of poverty we would say in our country is middle class.” The author expressed envious condescension toward Japan’s affluence.
 28. *Ibid.*, 180. He attributed this to Japan’s mimicking of Europe. See also “Japonya Matbu’âtı,” (“Japan’s Presses”) *Mecmua-yı Ebûzziya* 5:50 (September 14, 1886), 1585–586.
 29. Kadri, “Japonya Matbu’âtı,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 201 (December 17, 1894), 299–301. Reprinted in *Maârif* 4:7 (February ,8 1895), 89–91.
 30. “Japon,” 181.
 31. “Paris’ta bir Japonya Gazetecisi,” *Osmânlı* 109 (June 16, 1884), 2–3. *Osmânlı* was edited by Abdullah Cevdet; its director was Tefvik İlhâmi.
 32. “Japonya Dilberleri,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 142 (November 30, 1893), 182.
 33. “Japonya’da Tezâyid-i Nüfus,” *Resimli Gazete* 105 (March 30, 1893), 758; “Japonyalılar,” *Resimli Gazete* 142 (December 14, 1893), 1204; Japonya’da Tiyatro ve Zaman İcâdi,” *Resimli Gazete* 159 (April 12, 1894), 35–36.

34. *Ceride-yi Bahriye* 5:115 (October 24, 1893), 134 on battlecruisers.
35. "Çin ve Japon Muhârebesi ve Kore Kit'asını," *Servet-i Fünûn* 179 (August 16, 1894), 354. Not only would Koreans benefit immensely from Japanese influence there (economically and otherwise), argued the journal, but it had rights to Korea, Japan "... having almost reached the level of the civilized European states because of having reorganized and restructured its land and sea forces along new principles."
36. "Japonya Manzaraları," *Servet-i Fünûn* 206 (February 21, 1895), 383; "Japonya'nın Bahriye Uniformaları," *Servet-i Fünûn* 211 (March 28, 1895), 40–41; in "Japonya Mikado'su Mutsuhito Hazretleri ve Başvekil Kont Itô," *Servet-i Fünûn* 189 (October 25, 1894), 104, the Japanese Emperor and Prime Minister Itô were pictured in Western-style military garb, pointing out that "... ever since the Japanese achieved serious progress on the road to civilization, they manifested [this progress] in the civilized outfits they wear."
37. Kadri, "Japonya Kadınlar," *Servet-i Fünûn* 196 (November 13, 1894), 215–218. Reprinted in *Maârif* 4:7 (February 8, 1895), 89–91; "Japonya Askeri Hastahaneleri," *Servet-i Fünûn* 202 (December 24, 1894), 314; "Tokyo," *Servet-i Fünûn* 228 (July 25, 1895), 312–316; "Japonların Çiçekciliği," *Servet-i Fünûn* 337 (August 26, 1897), 398–399.
38. Erkân-ı Harbiye-i Umûmiye Dairesi İkinci Şubesi Refâketine Memurlar (General Staff Office, 2nd Division Accompanying Officers Mülâzim-i Sâni [2nd Lt.] Kâzım and Binbaşı [Major] Huber. *Çin ve Japonya ve Kore Hakkında Malûmât-ı Askeriye*. (Tarihsiz [undated]), authors' preface. Some statistics are from the year 1894.
39. "Devlet-i Aliyye-yi Osmâniye ve Japonya İmparatorluğu," *Malûmât* (August 24, 1897), 1.
40. *Ibid.*, 1.
41. An article about the British in *Malûmât* (November 22, 1898), 3 explained that "... our relations and friendship with Japan are of an extremely amiable nature. There is no difference between Japan's naval forces and the navy of a European State." Other articles concentrated upon the Japanese navy, elections, treaties, cabinet formation and Japanese statesmen's abilities, factory output, capital investment, and trade revenues, etc. There was avid interest in British-Japanese treaty negotiations leading up to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902; see "Çin'de Avrupa," January 5, 1897), 1 and (January 6, 1898), 1; "İngiltere-Japonya İttifâkı" (February 15, 1902) and (February 23, 1902). Japan was praised for raising the levels of progress and education in China as well. See series of articles titled "Japonya ve Çin," *Malûmât* (January 3, 4, and 5, 1903).
42. "Japonya," *Malûmât* (March 21, 1898), 3.
43. "Japonyalıların Ta'lim ve Terbiyesi," *Malûmât* (July 12, 1900), 3. Translation of Japanese official's speech to Europeans on dealing with cultural differences between nations.
44. Japan was on the road to war with Russia, and *Malûmât* followed developments carefully with a regular front-page column "Rusya ve Japonya" from August 9, 1903, onward. Other articles discussed Japan's military strength, its alliance with England, diplomatic attempts, etc.
45. The Ottoman ambassador to London speculated on the outcome of the Sino-Japanese war to the foreign minister: "Japan's army and navy, which had been successfully reformed several years ago along the lines of European principles, and because of its superiority in battles, is thought to be assured of complete victory... on the other hand, by reason of China's vastness and the abundance of numerous people, it possesses quite the means, strength, and power." YA.HUS 306/48, Temmuz 27, 1894.
46. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 13.
47. YA.HUS 376/14, July 31, 1897, New York consul to Ottoman foreign minister, commenting on a report in *The Japan Daily Herald Mail Summary*.

48. YA.HUS 430/46, May 1902, report on Prince Komatsu's stopover in Singapore after attending British coronation ceremony in London. The Ottoman consul general was invited to the Japanese Consulate.
49. Hitomi, translated by Rıza as *Japonya Ahlâk ve Mü'essessâtına Dair Nümûne*, 1901. Manuscript 6166, Sultan's private collection, Istanbul University Manuscript Library.
50. *Ibid.*, 17–18. He refers to revision of the 1855–1858 Unequal Treaties. Japan was preoccupied with abrogating these treaties for decades after the Meiji Restoration and saw this as key to their survival. See also Hitomi, 112–117.
51. Ali Vehbi Bey, *Sultan Abdülhamid, Siyâsi Hatıratım* (İstanbul, 1974, 5inci baskı), 99. Translation from Engin Deniz Akarlı, *The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876–1909): Origins and Solutions* (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 1976), 75.
52. Meiji officials Marquis Itô, Iwakura, Itagaki, Ōkuma, and others were seen as enlightened Japanese statesmen who enabled the Meiji Emperor's benevolent rule.
53. Hitomi, *Japonya Ahlâk*, 117. Shintō, for example, was described in the section on religion as Japan's "ancient national sect" and was compared to ancient Greek and Roman belief in gods. The late Meiji era resurgence of Shintō and its use as a state religion was firmly established, as Hitomi mentioned, 127–128. The words "unique" or "sole" ("yegâne," in Ottoman) frequently appeared, as did the phrase "to ensure peace and tranquility" ("*sulh ve müsalemet temin etmek*") to depict Japan as striving to maintain peace and harmony even when it had already embarked upon imperialism in Asia. The Japanese insisted upon the very privileges they had struggled to abolish in their own country years earlier, coercing China into providing Japan "most favored nation status."
54. *Ibid.*, 83–85. The principles of the Charter Oath outline (1) deliberative assemblies and state affairs decided by public opinion; (2) all classes uniting to carry out affairs of state; (3) freedom to choose any profession; (4) evil customs of the past discarded; and (5) knowledge shall be sought throughout the world. From Mikiso Hane, *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), 86.
55. İsmet Bozdağ, *Abdülhamid'in Hatıra Defteri: Belgeler ve Resimlerle* (İstanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1975, 5inci baskı), 117. Statement dated March 31, 1917.
56. *Ibid.*, 116.
57. *Ibid.*, 116–117. I also consulted Akarlı's translations. Note the inherent difficulty in vocabulary used to discuss "nation" in 1917: "*tek din, tek millet olarak millî birliğini sağlamış büyük bir toplum.*"
58. "Japonya ve Müslümânlık," *Bâlkân* 121 (January 19, 1907), 2.
59. The manuscripts are *Japonya Payitahtına bir Seyâhat* [Journey to Japan's Capital], from Russian, *Japonya Seyâhatnamesi* [Travelogue of Japan], from French, both translated by Ahmed Neremi, and *Japonya'dan Kamçatka'ya Seyâhat* [Journey from Japan to Kamchatka], from Russian. There is one volume of an undated manuscript in the Ottoman Archives that the Sultan and palace had Ahmed Neremi translate, *Japon Muhârebesi ve Vukû'ât-ı Tarihiyesi* (volume three) [The Japan War and Historical Events], detailing battles, their political effects upon the region and on European powers. No mention is made of sources consulted or the origin of the text. Japanese reporter Teruma Tomoto from the newspaper *Nichi Nichi Shimbun* passed through Istanbul and presented several volumes of a pictorial war album, *The Russo-Japanese War*, to the Sultan. YA.HUS 477/137, August 31, 1904.
60. YA.HUS 484/55, January 14, 1905, Ottoman ambassador in Paris to the Porte, a report published in *Écoutez Paris* from Japanese Minister of War and former Formosa governor General Baron Kodama in which the Japanese explained their purpose for carrying out maneuvers in Tonkin. The article had created much excitement in Parisian political circles. The French viewed Japan as threatening the stability

- of Indochina because the Japanese stirred up feelings of “Asia for Asians” in the region, endangering French colonial possessions.
61. The Ottoman state provided travel allowances for Major General Rıza Paşa and Lt. Emin Bey to attend maneuvers carried out by the German army before the Kaiser himself. YA.MTV, July 7, 1905.
 62. See YA.HUS 466/70, 466/73, 466/84; DMA ŞUB 688/145A, August 28, 1905; ŞUB 690/18-A, October 10, 1905; ŞUB 694/16-A, October 28, 1905. YA.HUS 468/52, March 9, 1904, Ottoman ambassador in Stockholm to Foreign Minister Tevfik, wrote he did not believe the war would terminate quickly, since the Japanese “had recently seen brilliant feats with their fleets” and the Russians would rely on prolonging the war as long as possible, to dispatch more forces.
 63. YA.MTV 297/28, April 15, 1907, encoded message, Ottoman second army commander to the Porte. He worriedly reported that Bulgarians in the Karınabad region had received “Japanese training” (“*Japon Talîmî*”) the year before and were instructing guerrillas in similar techniques, like rifle handling. He claimed the army inadvertently incited attacks by treating non-Muslims with contempt, restricting their movement. Bulgaria declared independence in 1908.
 64. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 184, from Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil’s memoirs, *Risale-i Tercüme-i Ahval-i Aşçı Dede-i Nakşî-Mevlevî, Tercüme-i Hali III*. İstanbul University Library: 852 foll., Mss. TY80 (3511–2), 348, 360.
 65. From British expatriate Sir Charles Eliot, *Turkey in Europe* (London: Edward Arnold, 1908), 426: “I have heard on good authority that when the Sultan’s officers congratulated him on the defeat of his old enemy Russia, he replied that he did not by any means consider the result of the war a matter of congratulation, because he and the Czar were the only autocratic monarchs in Europe, and the defeat of the Czar meant a blow to the principle of autocracy.”
 66. “Rus-Japon İhtilâfî ve İngiltere,” *Bâlkân* 123 (January 22, 1907), 1.
 67. “Japonya ve Türkiye,” *Bâlkân* 230 (August 4, 1908), 1, on Japan’s behavior when the *Ertuğrul* sunk.
 68. “Japonya Tabâbet,” *Servet-i Fünûn* 774 (February 22, 1906), 301.
 69. Mehmet Ârif Bey, an official in the Ministry of Public Instruction well known for his involvement in the Ottoman History Society (*Tarih-i Osmânî Encümeni*) and Türk Derneği, published a four-volume, Ottoman-French magazine, *Rusya ve Japonya Muhârebesine âit Musavver Resmî Mecmuası—Album de la guerre Russo-Japonaise* in 1904 that depicted Japanese and Russian forces, military figures such as the Japanese admiral Togo and the Russian Kropotkin, illustrations of the Japanese Red Cross Society founded by Princess Komatsu, etc. In October of the same year, the Public Instruction Ministry commissioned him to publish a book (*Musavver*) *Yeni Japonya: Japonya hakkında Malûmât-ı Mükemmeleyi Hâvidir* [(The Illustrated) Modern Japan: Containing Complete Information about Japan] (İstanbul: Şirket-i Mürtebiye Matbaası, 1322/1904). His preface, 2, acknowledged the difficulties he encountered in writing an informational text on a country so far away, and also complained that there were few books on Japan in “the nation’s library.” Ârif felt it was necessary to examine “the Japanese’ current character, customs and livelihood along with their achievements which are visible in every affair.” The author broke down the contents into sections, some containing detailed growth statistics, ranging from geography, history, agriculture, transportation and communications, to public education, army and naval forces, Japanese religion, commerce and manufacturing, and, interestingly, the occupation of Formosa. He claimed all classes in Japan, every villager and city-dweller, were all able to read, write, and do basic math, and that every job in Japan required these skills. The same ministry also commissioned a five-page pamphlet by Anesti and İshâkcalzade Ali Rıza, *Japon Elifbası* (The Japanese Alphabet) (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Kütüphane-yi Cihân, 1324/1906) containing twenty-three of

- the forty-eight *hiragana* phonetic syllables of the Japanese language, as a “gift of information” to the Sultan. The Japanese pronunciation chart included Ottoman, French, Greek (“Rumca”), and Armenian phonetic spellings.
70. With the support of *Servet-i Fînî'n*'s printing press and the Ottoman War and Public Instruction Ministries, İbrahim Hilmi edited and published a series of three pictorial magazine volumes in 1904, appearing variously as *Aksa-yı Şark Tesâvîr ve Menâzırı: Rus-Japon Seferine ait Panorama-Panorama de l'extrême Orient: la guerre Russo-Japonaise*, or *Rusya ve Japonya Muhârebesine Müteallik Panorama*. They contained hand-drawn sketches of battles, military forces, and ships, advertisements for the sale of postcards to the Ottoman public that pictured maps of the war (advertised as “Aksa-yı Şark Dâr ül-Hareketi Haritası”), and an announcement regarding the forthcoming book of the five-volume series (*Illustrated*) *War History of the Russo-Japanese Campaigns* [Rus-Japon Seferinin Tarih-i Harbi (Musavverdir)] by Ministry of War officers Major Osmân Sina'î Bey and Captain Fuat Bey (these books provided exhaustive data on all aspects of the war using German, English, and French sources). The first two volumes of the five-volume book series were written by the same officers and published by the War Ministry in 1321/1905. While I cannot confirm that Pertev Bey Demirhan communicated this information to the Ottoman Ministry of War, this was the intended purpose of his travels to East Asia and it is likely that he played a role in the collection of this information. Volume three, entitled *Rus-Japon Seferi: Por Artur Hucûm ve Müdâfa'ası* credited İbrahim Hilmi as publisher.
 71. Nâmîk Ekrem, *Japonlar* (İstanbul: Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete Matbaası, 1322/1906). In his introduction Ekrem mentioned his essay being appended to *Japonya Sularında* because the translated text was written in idiomatic language that was not clearly discernible. The identity of “Kont Bvvar” remains a mystery; apparently this book first came out in 1903 but I was unable to locate a copy of it.
 72. Beth Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 77. He edited the journal *al-Hasnâ'* (1909–1912) and published articles in women's periodicals, frequently exploring the position of the Japanese woman in society.
 73. Jurjî Niqûlâ Bâz, *Taqaddum al-Yâbân: Khuṭâb Târîkhî*. Speech given on January 18 and 31, 1902 (Published in Beirut: Maṭba'at al-Qadîs Jâwurjîyûs, 1922). It is perhaps because of the potentially inflammatory nature of some of Bâz's remarks that this speech was not published as a pamphlet until 1922. Versions appearing in Lebanese papers were likely heavily edited prior to publication.
 74. “The intense attention of the [Japanese] government and its attracting the people to study the proper contemporary sciences and in-depth researches” was as important to Japanese progress as was the peoples' “possession of courage and initiative, patience, intelligence, pride in cleanliness and preservation of order, love of homeland and reverence for ancestors.” *Ibid.*, 5, 7.
 75. *Ibid.*, 15, 18.
 76. *Ibid.*, 10.
 77. *Ibid.*, 11.
 78. *Ibid.*, 21.
 79. *Ibid.*, 23.
 80. *Ibid.*, 24.
 81. Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History* (Oxford University Press, 1995), 63.
 82. See Jesuit Father Luis de Inslam, “Port Arthur,” *al-Mashriq* 8:2 (January 15, 1905), 49–57; Jesuit Father Yûsuf Khalîl, “Ahm al-Ḥawâdith fî'l-Sana al-Ghâbira,” *al-Mashriq* 8:2 (January 15, 1905), 73–82.
 83. See Jesuit Father Gibrâ'îl Lûchant, “Naẓr 'Āmm fî Aḥwâl al-Yâbân,” *al-Mashriq* 7:5 (March 1, 1904), 193–204.
 84. *Ibid.*, 202.

85. Ibid., 201.
86. See Şükrü M. Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
87. Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 4.
88. Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 32.
89. Richard Weikart, "The Origins of Social Darwinism in Germany, 1859–1895," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 54:3 (July 1993), 483.
90. Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 207. Quoted from "Küstahlık," *Şûra-yı Ümmet* 75(May 30, 1905), 1–2.
91. Abdullah Cevdet, *Yaşamak Korkusu* (İstanbul: Kütüphane-yi Cihân, 1326), 19–20. From Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak: Doktor Cevdet ve Dönemi* (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981), 189.
92. See "Yaşasın Japonya!" *Türk* 32 (June 9, 1904), 1.
93. "Me'yus Olmalı Mıyız[?]," *Şûra-yı Ümmet* 62 (October 24, 1904), 1. Quoted in Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 210.
94. Turkish transliteration of this document, dated January 7, 1905 and signed "Haydar," appears in Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak*, 187, fn 17.
95. "Japonlarla Türkler," *Bâlkân* 30 (September 4, 1906), 2. Translated from the Russian paper *Videmst* in St. Petersburg and reprinted from *Vakit*.
96. "Muhârebe ve İhtilâl," *Şûra-yı Ümmet* 72 (April 6, 1905), 1. From Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak*, 187–188.
97. "Ahvâl-i Harbiye," *Şûra-yı Ümmet* 3:54 (May 31, 1904), 2.
98. "La 'Pénétration pacifique,'" *Mechveret Supplément Français* 165 (July 1, 1905), 1.
99. "Turquie et Japon," *Mechveret Supplément Français* 149 (March 15, 1904), 1.
100. Ahmed Rıza, "La leçon d'une guerre," *Mechveret Supplément Français* 175 (May 1, 1906), 8.
101. Ibid., 1.
102. Ibid., 2.
103. "Réponse de H. Spencer à Berthelot," 7.
104. Rıza, "La leçon d'une guerre," 8.
105. Ibid., 8.
106. "Rusya Ahvâline bir Nazar," *İctihâd* 3 (February 1905), 2.
107. "Japonya," *Türk* 28 (May 21, 1904), 1. As the nationalist organ that had more interest in establishing a nation based on ethnicity, articles on Japan frequently possessed racial content, whether comparing Turks and Japanese, or utilizing the term "yellow race" to describe Japan. Yusuf Akçura's famous "Üç Tarz-ı Siyâset," from *Türk* 24–34 (1904), referred to Japan as part of the "yellow world."
108. Ahmed Rıza, "La leçon d'une guerre," 8.
109. "Hubb ül-Vatan min ül-İmân ve Japonya-Rus Seferi," *Şûra-yı Ümmet* 3:52 (March 1, 1904), 3.
110. Abdullah Cevdet, "Russie, Turquie et la paix générale," *İctihâd* 1 (September 1904), 4–5.
111. "Aksa-yı Şark," *Şûra-yı Ümmet* 2:46 (February 2, 1904), 1.
112. Abdullah Cevdet, "De la Russie," *İctihâd* 2 (January 1905), 7. *Arafat* was under the direction of Maḥmûd Salîm Bey.
113. "Hubb ül-Vatan min ül-İmân ve Japonya-Rus Seferi," 3.
114. "Leçons Japonaises," *Mechveret Supplément Français* 161 (March 1, 1905), 3.
115. Ibid., 3.
116. Ibid., 3.
117. "Rusya Ahvâline bir Nazar," *İctihâd* 3 (February 1905), 2.
118. "Aksa-yı Şark," *Şûra-yı Ümmet* 2:46 (February 2, 1904), 2.
119. "Turquie et Japon," *Mechveret Supplément Français* 149 (March 15, 1904), 1.
120. Ibid., 1–2.
121. Rıza, "La leçon d'une guerre," 2.

122. Rıza, "Turquie et Japon," 2.
123. *Ibid.*, 2. He goes on, "And so have been dispersed . . . the patriotic seed of a famous men's group who, in order to bring back life to the country, have judged that it was not too much to make a sacrifice of their own lives. It is a glory and a consolation for us to venerate the memory of these pure and noble hearts who were called Midhat, Mustafa Fazıl, Kemal, Odian, and who, at least as refugees in death, do not see a criminal monarch putting the country that they had ardently beloved into such a dishonorable situation."
124. *Ibid.*, 2–3.
125. Feroz Ahmad, "The Late Ottoman Empire," in Marian Kent (ed.), *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 12.
126. Abdullah Cevdet figured prominently in this group. From M. Şükrü Hanioglu, "A Jihad against Islam: Garbçılar, 1908–1918," a talk given at the University of Chicago's Center for Middle East Studies Friday Lecture Series, October 20, 2000. Hanioglu's depiction of their efforts to repackage science in Islamic terms so as to make it palatable to the Ottoman populace resembled other forms of cultural retooling undertaken by Ottoman intellectuals, such as the repackaging of Japan as "spiritual" ("Eastern") or "democratic" despite its massive efforts at Westernizing, its underlying secularism, and its rather elitist and oligarchical political character in the Meiji era.
127. Sir Edward Grey to Lowther, in Ahmed, 13 (Cited in Chapter 1). Ahmed, 28, fn 35 contains Dispatch 855, Lowther to Grey, FO371/546/43987 indicating Grand Vezir Kâmil Paşa had complained to Lowther that "they spoke as if they represented the Ottoman government." At the time, Rıza was an elected deputy for Istanbul and president of the Chamber; Nâzım was secretary general of the CUP.
128. See HR.MTV 121/62, February 9, 1909, in which the Ottoman ambassador to Rome, İbrahim Hakkî Paşa, wrote that Japan was part of the European Concert. He reemerged as Grand Vezir (1909–1911); his career as an Ottoman official spanned the latter decades of the nineteenth century through the First World War. Representative of Ottoman statesmen's concerns after the Revolution, Hakkî Paşa's analyses concerning international law expressed the Ottoman preoccupation with acceptance by European Powers. Findley remarks in *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 203 that in Hakkî Paşa's 1909 legal treatise, *Medhal-i Hukûk-i Duvel*, he surveyed "... international relations of Europe and the Ottoman Empire in much the way that a diplomatic historian might. Along the way, he explored such topics of interest to the Ottomans as European efforts to control the slave trade, the capitulations, and the gradual extension of the European international system, until Japan, for example, effectively became a member of it."
129. "Orient for the Orientals," *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* (August 20, 1914), quoted in Ahmad, "The Late Ottoman Empire," 16–17. Japan's economic independence had evolved into further expansion in Asia that was construed as an Eastern liberation movement against the Western colonial powers. Ottoman journalistic consensus was that this advance would be the beginning of economic and political liberation for other Eastern nations as well.
130. C. Tahsin, "Japon Sanâ'atı Avrupa'ya İstilâ Edecek Mi?" (Will Japanese Products Flood Europe?) *Resimli Kitap* 39 (April 1912), 216, writes, "After Japan entered the ranks of the Great Powers in a decisive manner following the Manchurian war, Europe's concerns over being invaded by armies of the yellow race suddenly changed in form. Since that time, Europe has been in a more frightful nightmare—that of European and American commercial markets being held captive by Japanese products."
131. "Hâricî Ticâret Vesile-i Sa'âdet-i Umûmdur," *Sebilürreşât* 12:302 (6.1330/1914), 290. Quoting a Japanese professor in the commerce department of Waseda University.

132. *Ibid.*, 291. He implored the Ottomans to get their commercial ships sailing to South Asia.
133. *Volkan* 1:54 (10 Şubat 1324/23 February 1909), 3–4; 1:59 (15 Şubat 1324/28 February 1909), 5; 1:85 (13 Mart 1325/26 March 1909), 1.
134. Hüseyin Cahit, “İslâhât Nereden Başlamalı?” *Tanin* (August 14, 1908), 1. He continued, “We do not have to go all the way to Japan to find an example; look at our own history, starting with his Excellency Sultan Selim III, look at the era of modernization that was initiated. Technological means from Europe were brought in; books were translated; instructors were summoned; students and workers were sent to Europe and even to America in order to study.”
135. “Siyâsî Fikirler,” *Yeni Gazete* (September 8, 1908). This idea was considered earlier. See “al-Dawla al-Ulîyya wa'l-Yabân” (September 15, 1904), 1; “Tariq min al-Warad” (September 17, 1904), 1, in the Egyptian paper *al-Liwâ*.
136. Abdullah Cevdet, “Bir Mektub-u Hakikatbeyân,” *Yeni Tasvir-i Efkâr* 257 (February 16, 1910), 1. From Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak*, 190. In 1913 Abdullah Cevdet’s ideas had not changed much. Ottoman industrialization and economic growth had replaced the simple plan of placing foreign advisors in ministries; the Ottoman Empire could benefit from Japanese experience. *İctihâd* published a two-part series, “Ways and Means of Progress” (“Terakkî Yolları ve Çâreleri”) in which the first article, subtitled “How Did Japan Advance?” (“Japonya Nasıl Terakkî Etti?”) *İctihâd* 71 (July 24, 1913), presented Japan’s successful modernization as the thorough assimilation of techniques and information acquired directly from Europe and America. Japan’s actions regarding emigration to America were twofold: the transfer of modern science and technology was merely a process of Japanese émigré laborers learning their trades in the factories while their children absorbed theoretical knowledge from the American school system. Repeating the words of an Englishman, he wrote that “in the heart of every Japanese burns an ambitious passion to obtain knowledge and information” (1552). Japan had been able to generate two kinds of men to serve the country and enrich the industrial sector, so that “even the Franks who were their superiors salute Japan’s progress today” (1551).
137. Hüseyin Câhit, “Japonya’nın Misâlî,” *Tanin* (September 1, 1911), 1.
138. *Ibid.*, 1: “Seeing that they were under threat of invasion by foreigners, they abandoned their old ways in order to save their homeland, they adopted European administrative practices, science and technology, and in fifty years they reached the status of a first-class state.”
139. *Ibid.*, 1.
140. Abdullah Cevdet, “Terakkî Yolları ve Çâreleri,” *İctihâd* 72 (July 31, 1913), 1573–1574. He argued the Ottoman Empire still depended upon agriculture, the first industry to be mechanized before moving on to mining, the railroads, bridge-building, and shipping. For the nation to succeed in this, everyone must apply themselves to the cause, resisting interference from the outside in order to protect the nation’s economic independence. Sons of upper-class citizens as well as the hard-working poor must be sent abroad. A society of twenty to thirty members from among the well-to-do and intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire should be founded that would be responsible for raising money in order to send students “to Europe, or America, or even to Japan in order to study industry” (1576), and to administrate all aspects of the students’ study abroad. This society, patronized and protected by the Ottoman government, should advise on how to best implement new strategies for industry development. Japan served a dual purpose: first as a standard by which to measure Ottoman potential for reaching modernity, and second, as itself a center for learning modern technology.
141. Hüseyin Câhit, “Japonya’nın Misâlî,” 1.

142. Edhem Nejat, "Japonya'da Mektepler," *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 6:137 (4.1327/1911), 107.
143. See Ferit, "Japonların 1909 Senesindeki Kuvvesi," *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 3:68 (12.1325/1910), 247, serialized translation from French in which the history of Japan's rise to power was chronicled, including detailed discussion of the Meiji Restoration.
144. *Ibid.*, 260.
145. *Ibid.*, 260.
146. Miguel to Bethmann Hollweg, April 11, 1910, Auswärtiges Amt, Papers of the Imperial German Foreign Ministry, Türkei 162, Bd. 7, No. 124. From the US National Archives, T139, roll 395. Mention is made of this idea being "taken up in Kâmil Paşa's time." Kâmil Paşa served as Grand Vezir on four occasions: (1) 1885–1891; (2) 1895; (3) 1908–1909; (4) 1912–1913. Most likely this refers to the period from 1908 to 1909. I found no Ottoman archival documentation to corroborate the German ambassador's claims.
147. HR.MTV 23/36, September 4, 1909. The officer, Adjutant-Major Süleymân Tevfik Efendi, was to continue his studies in political science and law in Europe. See September 26, 1909. On December 2, 1909, a memo sent to the Ottoman ambassador to France announced that Tevfik Paşa would be made an embassy attaché.
148. MV 169/3, September 16, 1912.

6 The Young Turk Regime and the Japanese Model after 1908: "Eastern" Essence, "Western" Science, Ottoman Notions of "Terakkî" and "Medeniyet" (Progress and Civilization)

1. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 214–215.
2. "Japonlar Yirminci Asrın Medâr-ı Hürriyetidir," *Bâlkân* 441 (May 13, 1908), 1.
3. Cevdet, "Le Japon porteur de flambeau," 77.
4. General Pertev Demirhan, *Hayatımın Hatırları: Rus-Japon Harbi 1904–1905 (Birinci Kısım): İstanbul'dan Ayrılışımdan Port Arthur Muhararasına Kadar*. (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Ebüzziya, 1943), 7.
5. In Ottoman Turkish, *Rus-Japon Harbinden Alınan Mâddî ve Manevî Dersler ve Japonların Esbâb-i Muzafferiyeti: Bir Millet'in Tâli'i Kendi Kuvvetindedir!* (İstanbul: Kanâ'at Kütüphanesi ve Matbaası, 1329/1911).
6. Pertev Bey. *Rus-Japon Harbinden*, 138–139.
7. Ayanzâde Birecikli Ekrem, *Japonlar* (İstanbul: Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete Matbaası, 1904/1906?), 8.
8. *Ibid.*, 52–53.
9. *Ibid.*, 18.
10. *Ibid.*, 21. Ironically, pollution, as the residue of industrial development, was a sign of modernity!
11. *Ibid.*, 24. The Japanese "generally are lovers of commerce," 33.
12. *Ibid.*, 59.
13. Dr. İçikava, *Japonya Tarih-i Siyâsîsi*, trans. by Mübâhât (İstanbul: Mesâ'i Matbaası, 1330 [1912]), 29.
14. Edhem Nejat, "Japonya'da Mektepler," *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 6:137 (4.1327/1911), 107.
15. *Ibid.*, 108.
16. *Ibid.*, 109.
17. Münir, "Dârül-Fünûnunun Otuzuncu Sene-yi Devriye Merâsimî," *Sebilürreşât* 11:274 (11.1329/1913), 219–220.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Major Nâci b. Halil of the Infantry translated the text [*Asya-yı Şarkî Sefer-i Ahîrinde Japonların Suret-i Ta'aruzları*]. Fifteen war maps were appended to the book.

20. Ali Fu'ad, "Aksa-yı Şark Harbinden Alınan Dersler," *Asker* 1324 (1908/9), 168, contrasting the decimation of the Russians and Japan excelling because of military German training.
21. See Ali Rıza, "Sloveveyev'in Rus-Japon Seferi Hakkındaki Mutâla'âtı," *Asker* (1325), 24–29. Sloveveyev was a Russian officer.
22. See Handan Nezir Akmeşe, "The Japanese Nation in Arms: A Role Model for Militarist Nationalism in the Ottoman Army, 1905–1914," in Worringer (ed.), *The Islamic Middle East and Japan: Perceptions, Aspirations, and the Birth of Intra-Asian Modernity*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007), 63–89 and her *The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005) for an analysis of Ottoman militarization.
23. From Abdullah Cevdet, *Bir Hutbe Hemşehrilerime* (Egypt: Matbaa-yı İçtihad, 1909), 8. From Şükrü M. Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak: Doktor Cevdet ve Dşnemi* (Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981), 189.
24. Pertev Bey. *Rus-Japon Harbinden*, 52–53. Acts "by oneself" (*kendiliğinden*) here is intended to mean the soldier's ability to think for himself and be decisive.
25. *Ibid.*, 54–55.
26. Staff Officer Lt. Reşit Gâlip, "Mançuri Harbinde Rusların Mağlûp Oluşlarının Sebeplerinden Biri ne idi?" *Asker* (1324/ January 22, 1909), 499–500. Original source unknown.
27. *Ibid.*, 501.
28. Pertev Bey. *Rus-Japon Harbinden*, 132.
29. *Ibid.*, 132–133.
30. *Ibid.*, 133.
31. Gâlip, "Mançuri Harbinde," 498.
32. Sloveveyev, "Rus-Japon Seferi Alınan Dersler: Kuvve-yi Maneviye," translated by 4th Ottoman Army Staff Officer, Major Ali Rıza, *Asker* (14 Mart 1325/March 27, 1909), 150–151. Rıza's serialized translations appeared under varied titles, but they were recognized as Sloveveyev's essay. He criticized Japanese soldiers for zealous, malicious, and bloodthirsty behavior in war, but his description of ruthless Japanese dedication to the cause during wartime, to the point of suicide, caused the opposite effect. See Sloveveyev, "Rus-Japon Seferi," *Asker* (1325/1909), 279. Pertev Bey concurred in *Rus-Japon Harbinden*, 3–4 that "preserving this patriotic hope beyond all else, of sacrificing willingly and equally, one's life for the homeland," were foundations of Japanese spirit and character.
33. Pertev Bey, *Rus-Japon Harbinden*, 130.
34. Ferî, "Japonların 1909 Senesindeki Kuvvesi," trans. from French, *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 3:69(12.1325/1910), 262.
35. Nitobei Inazō's *Bushidō: The Soul of Japan* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905).
36. Pertev Bey, *Rus-Japon Harbinden*, 93.
37. *Ibid.*, 116. He compared Japanese heroism during the siege of Port Arthur to Burak Reis's bravery in naval skirmishes during the Ottoman Sultan Bayezit II's time.
38. *Ibid.*, 95. After Kropotkin had achieved a minor victory and speculated upon the possibility of Japan retreating, this was the angry retort of his Japanese contemporary, Bombardier Captain Shimauchi.
39. *Ibid.*, 117–118.
40. *Ibid.*, 100–101. He mentioned five of the Six Confucian relationships: (1) ruler and subject; (2) father and son; (3) husband and wife; (4) two brothers; (5) two friends. The sixth, teacher and student, was omitted. The Japanese supposedly inherited the disregard for life from their samurai warriors who practiced ritual suicide (*harakiri*) to fulfill their honorable duty.
41. *Ibid.*, 82–83. The closest the modern Ottoman armies had ever come to this Japanese display of fighting spirit, he reminisced, was Gazi Osman Paşa's defense of Plevna (Bulgaria) in 1877 against invading Russian forces, 84.

42. Ibid., 135. A Japanese commander described the army as a body with soldiers for limbs, all functioning to stay alive.
43. Ibid., 88–89.
44. Mümtaz Bey, *Ba Emr-i Sâmî Bahriye Topçu Mektebinde Kaymakam Mümtaz Bey Tarafından Çin-Japon ve İspanya-Amerika Muharebesi hakkında verilen Konferans* (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Bahriye, 1327–1911/12), 2–3. The lecture, held in the Artillery Academy for cadets, began with an overview of the main sea battles between China and Japan. Members of the Erkân-ı Harbiye, including Ottoman War Office Chief-of-Staff İzzet Paşa, attended the lecture.
45. Ibid., 9. The second category, skill in war, related to understanding military sciences, technologies, and production, which the Japanese possessed, the Chinese lacked. Military training, respect for and obedience to the military chain of command, the Japanese upheld, the Chinese did not.
46. Ibid., 9.
47. Vladmir Semenov, *Çosima Muharebesi* translated by Mustafa Kemal (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Bahriye, 1328/1912), 2. M. Nâhid's *Kaptan Vladmir Semenov'in ruznamesi ve Çosima Muharebe-i bahriyesi* (published by H. Fevzi. İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Hayriye ve Şirketi, 1328/1912) is another translation of the same book by a naval engineer.
48. Ahmed İsmâil, "Düvel-i Mu'azzama Bahriyeleri," *Mecmua-yı Seneviye-yi Bahriye* 1:10 (1331/July 1915), 182.
49. *Japon kuvva-yı bahriyesi*. İstanbul: Matbaa-ı bahriye, 1333m(1917).
50. Pertev Bey, *Rus-Japon Harbinden*, 127.
51. Ibid., 96.
52. Ibid., 137.
53. Ibid., 93–94.
54. Ibid., 29.
55. General Nogi was director of a high school for girls because he recognized the importance of schooling future mothers in order that they raise their children as loyal patriots of the Japanese nation. Oyama served as the director of a school in order to cultivate a regard for the homeland among students. Ibid., 127–128.
56. Ferit, "Japonya'nın 1909'deki Kuvvesi," trans. from French, *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 3:67(12.1325/1909–1910), 198: "The feeling of love toward their Emperor with which the Japanese were raised corresponds to the sentiment of affection about parents with which children were brought up; it causes the Japanese to reach the level of worshipping their sovereign who is in a position of political power; it takes on a form of absolute monarchy, of irrevocability, for the Emperor's affairs. Not even individuals who are possessed of a share of refinement and excellence to the degree of Europeans, such as Tokyo Imperial University teachers, are permitted to acquire or divulge publicly any idea that could provide a reason to consider doubting this belief that has passed into the ranks of religious doctrine. . . . The Japanese' devotion and affection toward the Emperor is one aspect of this practice of ancestral worship. The love of homeland has the same sense of imminence. . . . Just as that sacred land has never been exposed to occupation, it probably never will be. . . . However much they obey their fathers, they respect and love in that manner their emperors, whom they look upon as the Creator's agent here on earth."
57. *Sabah* (July 27, 1912), 3; (August 1, 1912), 2.
58. "Japonya İmparatoru: Merhûm Mikado," *İctihâd* 50 (January 29, 1913), 1144, including translation of an interview with the late Marquis Itô from the *African Times and Orient Review*.
59. Ibid., 1145. This national spirit, said the Japanese statesman, was that "since the entire nation is united as a single family, the souls of the Emperors' ancestors, considered our ancestors, are always at our side, guiding us, and while bravely attacking our enemies, we feel them with us."

60. Ibid., 1148.
61. Ibid., 1148.
62. "Japonlara Dair," *Tanin* (October 4, 1910), 3–4. Author claimed Japan's morality and sense of duty stemmed from Shintōism.
63. Nejât, "Japonya'da Mektepler," 107: "When the Japanese started to take a step toward progress, they paid attention firstly to schools and to national education. They appreciated that the spirit of a nation bubbling with youth needed a good national upbringing, and so first of all compulsory studies and education attracted attention....Japan's schools give serious consideration to ethics and national morality more than anything else. In the schools, national education, adopted as a basis and mixed with the preferred practices of the West, is given with extraordinary regard to children who will take the future into their hands...they manifest a progress at the level of Europe's schools....In all the primary schools studies are extremely practical and are aimed at the elevation of the country's foundations."
64. Ibid., 108: "While the religion of Islam dictates our worldly learning, and while our master the Prophet Muḥammad condescended to offer material knowledge, spiritual knowledge, etc., we are far from [comprehending] this great truth."
65. Ferit, "Japonların 1909 Senesindeki Kuvvesi," 229.
66. Ibid., 229.
67. "Min al-Gharbiyyin," *al-Muqtabas (al-Umma)* (December 29, 1909). Ya'qūb continued: "This is like what our government did. Did the people help it? They were preceded by the Japanese, who did not deem it sufficient that the government send students to Europe and America; rather the wealthy sent their sons and those among the poor who were deserving of European training and suited to benefit their country after their return, at [the wealthy's] expense."
68. Zākī Mughāmir, "Shu'un wa Shujūn," *al-Muqtabas* (June 11, 1910).
69. See al-Madāris fi'l-Yābān," *al-'Irfān* (December 29, 1913), 49–51.
70. See Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī, *Memoirs of Muhammad Kurd 'Ali*, translated by Khalil Totah. (Washington, DC: Council of American Learned Societies, 1954), 16, 50, 90–93 for reference to his friends, Turkish journalist Celāl Nūrī Bey, Turkified Kurd Lütfi Fikrī Bey, and the Armenian editor of the Ottoman paper *Sabāh*, Diran Kelekian.
71. Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī, "Ta'līm al-Waṭanī," *al-Muqtabas* (April 13, 1910).
72. Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī, "Al-Ta'līm al-Adabī fi'l-Yābān," *Majallat al-Muqtabas* 9:6 (1911), 595–596.
73. Ibid., 596.
74. Ibid., 596.
75. Ibid., 596. He ignores Japan's state indoctrination of native Shintō belief.
76. Ibid., 596.
77. Ibid., 597. He had clearly read the Imperial Recript, which he maintained was "the true, proper education for all times and places. It includes the moral code to which the entire world should be subject." Compare to official English translation in Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 121.
78. 'Alī, "Al-Ta'līm al-Adabī fi'l-Yābān," 597: "The Japanese nation is centuries old and it believes that it is a big family from a single origin. The king rules as a father; this [Japanese belief] is the reason for Japan's great respect for the Empire, and so love of the Emperor and of the fatherland are one in the same custom. The Mikadō is a symbol of the fatherland. The Japanese go to extremes in respect and veneration of their ancestors, and they risk their lives for the homeland because it is the country of their fathers and forefathers....Twenty-six centuries ago the first Emperor founded the first kingdom. It was not spared from military conquests, although the people of the country united to defend their sacred domain and so were never

- subjugated by conquerors.” He viewed the Bushidō samurai code as the innate guide to Japanese morality. The Japanese, he wrote, were also preoccupied with knowing lineage back to ancient times, just as the Emperor traced his origins back to the first Emperor. In fact the Emperor was called the “Son of Heaven” because he was the son of Gods; the Gods were Japan’s ancestors.
79. *Ibid.*, 597.
 80. *Ibid.*, 597.
 81. For discussion of Kurd ‘Alī’s ideas, see Samir M. Seikaly, “Damascene Intellectual Life in the Opening Years of the 20th Century: Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali and *al-Muqtabas*,” in Marwan Buheiry (ed.), *Intellectual Life in the Arab East 1890–1939* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 125–153.
 82. *Ibid.*, 137.
 83. Muḥammad Kurd ‘Alī, “al-Yābān al-Ḥadītha,” *Majallat al-Muqtabas* 3:6 (1911), 226.
 84. Samizāde Süreyya, “Japonya’da Alınacak Dersler,” *Resimli Kitap* 46 (December 1912), 758–767. Süreyya selected excerpts of an article from an unnamed English journal suggesting that the British nation follow Japan’s example; he translated them and occasionally added his own commentary. There is reference to “Dr. Nitob” in a paragraph of this article that would suggest Süreyya was quoting from the Japanese intellectual Nitobei Inazō’s *Bushidō: The Soul of Japan*. Süreyya also published a book entitled *Dai-Nippon Büyüyük Japonya* in İstanbul in 1917.
 85. *Ibid.*, 758–760. The Meiji government was indebted to Japanese moral character—willingness to sacrifice oneself, intense veneration of the homeland, a close bond to one another, noble-heartedness, self-sacrifice, and far-sightedness.
 86. *Ibid.*, 760–761.
 87. *Ibid.*, 762.
 88. *Ibid.*, 765.
 89. Pertev Bey, *Rus-Japon Harbinden*, 139.
 90. *Ibid.*, 140. Later a general in the Turkish Republican forces, Pertev Demirhan published another book in 1937 echoing the views he initially put forth in 1911, called (*Commemorative Volume for Turkish Youth*) *The Origin of Japan’s Strength: Why and How Did the Japanese Arise? (Türk Gençliğine Armağan) Japonların Asıl Kuvveti: Japonlar niçin ve nasıl Yükseldi?*
 91. Rashid Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), 11.
 92. Süreyya, “Japonya’da Alınacak Dersler,” 766–767. The subheading of the text on 766 reads “Ahlāk! Ta’lim-i Dīnī Değil” [“Morality! Not Religious Education”].
 93. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 280. Sultan Abdülhamid II did not appear to support the society.
 94. *Volkan* 1:103 (31 Mart 1325/April 13, 1909), 2; Derviş Vahdeti, “Öte, beri,” *Volkan* 1:107 (4 Nisan 1325/April 17, 1909), 2. The former was an appeal in response to a letter from an officer.
 95. Şerif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nürsi* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), 74. See also 8.
 96. *Ibid.*, 78–79. In 1907 he resided at an İstanbul hotel “which catered to the Muslim intelligentsia of the capital . . .” and was “ . . . where Mehmed Âkif (*Sebilürreşât*’s editor-in-chief), the poet, who was also a theoretician of an Islamic cultural revival for the Ottoman Empire could be found, as well as a host of other eminent literateurs.”
 97. *Ibid.*, 83.
 98. Şükran Vahide, *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi: The Author of the Risale-i Nur* (İstanbul: Sözlere Publications, 1992), 58. Mardin, *Religion and Social Change* 85–86 includes excerpts also: “If a nation uses freedom as a guide, this will enable it to progress.

- Freedom also demands us to love our nation; it has opened the doors of progress and civilization. The time has come when social bonds and the need for sustenance have increased to such an extent that the nation can only be governed by a national assembly... Science should be gladly accepted from the foreigners, but this must be done in such a way as to preserve our national customs. This is what the Japanese have done, and they should be an example to the Ottomans."
99. Şükran Vahide, *Bedüzzaman Said Nursi*, 98. The words of a commander of the Japanese army reinforced his thinking when he assured Nürsi after defeating Russia in 1905 that "...in contradistinction to other religions, Islam has the capacity to progress, it contains everything necessary to achieve true civilization." The author continued, "It is significant that this acute observation was made not only by a non-Muslim, but a Japanese. For the Japanese were held up by many supporters of constitutionalism as an example to be followed in their taking only science and technology from the West in their drive for progress and civilization while retaining their own culture and morality."
100. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 280.
101. *Ibid.*, 280.
102. See Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, 84.
103. *Ibid.*, 89. He expressed this view only after 1918.
104. Derviş Vahdetî, "Şûra-yı Ümmet," *Volkan* 1:44 (31 Kanun Sani 1324/February 13, 1909), 2. In another debate shortly thereafter, *Volkan* responded to the Grand Vezir's statement that constitutions and institutions of other nations would be examined in order to borrow the appropriate aspects of them for the Ottoman Empire. Derviş Vahdetî countered with an argument that the *şeriat* was already in existence and was the tradition of law suited to an Islamic state. His use of non-Muslim Japan here was contrary to most other representations found in the Ottoman press that presented Japanese national development as appropriate for Eastern peoples to reach modernity with the usual anti-Western, anti-imperialist tone, arguing "...we respond [to the Sadrazam's statement] with the 'Society of Islamic Unity.' Because we, a community of Muslims and Ottomans, are not a lawless nation like the Japanese, so why would we require the constitutions of other nations. Our Islamic libraries were once referred to as the treasures of knowledge, having been the authoritative sources for a lot of nations; now to consider resorting to [those nations] is to say we do not know our own selves." From Derviş Vahdetî, "Şeyhülislâm Hazretlerine," *Volkan* 1:50 (6 Şubat 1324/February 19, 1909), 1. Vahdetî perceived Japan as a barbaric nation in need of a set of foreign laws and thus unworthy of imitation. Other comments printed in *Volkan* indicated that those holding the reins of power, including Ottoman military officers and even the Grand Vezir himself, disagreed.
105. Fârukî Ömer, "Hüküm Gâlibindir," *Volkan* 1:4 (1 Kanun Sani 1324/December 14, 1908), 2-3.
106. See Rashid Khalidi, "The 1912 Election Campaign in the Cities of *Bilad al-Sham*," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 16 (1984), 461-474 for Fikri's association with provincial Ottoman Arab deputies Shukrî al'Asalî, 'Abd al-Ĥamîd al-Zahrâwî, and Kâmil al-As'ad.
107. Ömer Lütfi Fikri, *Dersim Mebusu, Lütfi Fikri Bey'in Günlüğü: "Daima Muhâlefet,"* Yücel Demirel (ed.), (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1991), 38.
108. See *Türk Meşhûrları Ansiklopedisi*, Fasikül 8, 230 for biographical information. He left the CUP after a parliamentary inquiry investigated an incident of torture carried out by the authorities.
109. Fikri, *Dersim Mebusu*, 38.
110. *Ibid.*, 38: "Had they not saved Edirne...leaving the government to the constitutionalists, they should have fled the country...although it is the reverse...I fear that men such as this will come into positions to remove the constitution."

111. Ottoman Rûmî businesses were viewed as supporting Balkan and Greek actions against the Ottoman Empire.
112. *Müslümânlara Mahsus Kurtuluş Yolu*, 1329/1913, From Zafer Toprak, *Millî İktisat—Millî Burjuvazı* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995), 175.
113. *Ibid.*, 170.
114. Corinne Blake, *Training Arab-Ottoman Bureaucrats: Syrian Graduates of the Mülkiye Mektebi, 1890–1920* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Dissertation, 1991), 239–240. See also Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (California: University of California Press, 1997), 48–50. This school was the site of tensions between sons of high-level officials living in Istanbul and sons of provincial families from more humble backgrounds, as they were often treated differently. At times favoritism took on ethnic overtones as well.
115. Blake, *Training Arab-Ottoman Bureaucrats*, 166–168, 242. Seikaly, “Shukrî al-‘Asalî,” 75 summarizes al-‘Asalî’s education as having attended *Maktab ‘Anbâr*, the Damascus state secondary school, where he acquired his Ottoman Turkish language ability, entering the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* around 1896. He served in local provincial government posts (i.e., Nazareth Kâ’imakâm) in 1909, before being elected to Ottoman Parliament in 1911. Seikaly quotes Ruth Roded, “Ottoman Service as a Vehicle for the Rise of New Upstarts among Urban Elite Families of Syria in the Last Decades of Ottoman Rule,” in Gabriel R. Warburg and Gad G. Gilbar (eds.), *Studies in Islamic Society: Contributions in Memory of Gabriel Baer* (Haifa: 1984), 63–94 and “Social Patterns among the Urban Elite of Syria during the Late Ottoman Period 1876–1918,” in David Kushner (ed.), *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social, and Economic Transformation* (Jerusalem: 1986) when he says al-‘Asalî “opted to acquire a modern secular education as preliminary for government employment that would . . . enhance his socioeconomic and political status in the Syrian society.”
116. *Ibid.*, 270.
117. *Ibid.*, 194–195. It reversed earlier Hamidian attempts to draw Arabs closer through bureaucratic recruitment.
118. Prior to the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, Beirut published twenty-six papers during Abdülhamid II’s reign whereas Tripoli produced only two, Damascus three, and Aleppo three. After the revolution, in 1908 approximately thirty new papers were founded in Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, Jerusalem, Haifa, and Baghdad; another thirty-two papers were founded in 1909 in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Baghdad in Iraq. These figures are from Philippe de Tarrâzi, *Târîkh al-Şahâfah al-‘Arabîyyah*, vol. 3 (Beirut: al-Maṭba‘ah al-Adabîyyah, 1914, reprint 1933).
119. See Seikaly, “Shukrî al-‘Asalî,” 84–85 for Ottoman policies toward Arabs in the provinces. Blake, *Training Arab-Ottoman Bureaucrats*, 276, notes in 1913 the CUP repealed laws imposing Ottoman Turkish upon school and court systems, requiring officials serving in Arab provinces to know Arabic, as a way to increase Arab participation in the central government and to provide some local autonomy. See also Kayalı discussion of “Turkification,” *Arabs and Young Turks*, 82–96.
120. See Neville J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 129.
121. Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 71.
122. See “Japon et Turquie,” *The Levant Herald Eastern Express* (May 15, 1912), 1. Author unknown. He starts, “Hüseyin Câhit Bey spoke of Japan in an article in which we make the allusion between the miraculous transformation of the empire of the Rising Sun since long before, and Ottoman patriotism. This miracle, why would it not reproduce itself here? That which the Japanese did, could the Turks not do

it too?...The response is not easy. It is necessary at first to realize the manner in which the Japanese have proceeded in their renovation. Thirsting for progress and comprehending well the impossibility of getting there without specialists whose example they could heed, they placed some Europeans at the head of all their administrations: War, Marine, Justice, Public Instruction, Public Works, Naval Construction, Finance; and they left them there not a few months or a few years, but a quarter of a century. The Japanese started their schooling and profited so well from the lessons they received that they soon had nothing left to learn. The students had managed to equal the masters. But they kept from dismissing [the Europeans], and it was under their eyes that the [Japanese] men they shaped first made their way towards modernization of the empire; it was only when [the Japanese] were certain to be able to walk firmly in the footsteps they had traced, that they let the European specialists take a well-deserved rest."

123. "Japon et Turquie," 1; Veliyullah Enverî, "Japonlar ve Alem-i İslâm," *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 4:86(4.1326/1910), 140 (article from Zaysan, Siberian-Chinese border); Muhammad Barakatullah, "Japonya'da Dîn-i İslâm İntişâra Başlıyor," *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 2:50 (8.1325/1909), 384; Muhammad Barakatullah, was an Indian political activist in Tokyo.
124. "Japon et Turquie," 1. The author ended the article by writing that "...it is not necessary to ponder equaling Japan. It is impossible: 1) Because one has to disregard the initial measures, teaching by foreigners; 2) Because Turkish social organization does not resemble Japanese social organization at all; 3) Because the Ottoman Empire has not enjoyed the tranquility that is indispensable for a period of transformation. But without dreaming of attaining Japanese perfection, one can however be routed toward progress. The paths that lead there are numerous."

7 Politics, Cultural Identity, and the Japanese Example

1. See Aron Rodrigue, "Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire: Interview by Nancy Reynolds," *Stanford Humanities Review* 5:1 (1995), online at <http://www.stanford.edu/group/SHR/5-1/text/rodrigue.html>.
2. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 213.
3. M. Şükrü Hanioglu, "The Young Turks and the Arabs before the Revolution of 1908," in Khalidi, et al. (eds.), *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 31–49, and other articles in this volume.
4. Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 1–10, 30–31, differentiates between Turkish nationalism as an ideology pertaining to Ottoman Turks in the Empire, and pan-Turkism as a by-product of their interest in and contact with those Turkic peoples outside the Empire who shared a historical, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural heritage. Earlier pan-Turanism of the nineteenth century emerged outside the Ottoman Empire. It employed a much broader definition of what and who comprised "Turan"—bounded geographically by China, Tibet, India, and Iran, it included Mongols, Tatars, Üzbeks, Hungarians, Finns, and Estonians.
5. Including writers İsmail Gaspıralı, Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and Ali Hüseyinzade, as well as the Hungarian Arminius Vambery. After the revolution, Crimean and Azeri Turk émigrés often became more involved in Young Turk societies and journals that emphasized Turkish national identity, such as *Türk Yurdu*, *Türk Ocağı*, *Türk Derneği*.
6. "Yaponlar," *Tercüman* (May 26, 1896), 2. See also "Ramazan ül-Mübarek ve Terakkî-yi 'Yapon,'" *Tercüman* (February 19, 1895), 1.

7. "Ahvâl-i Yapon," *Tercümân* (April 2, 1895), 1. See also "Uzak Şarkta Terakkî," *Tercümân* (March 3, 1896), 2-3; "Dahiliye Haberleri: Odessa," *Tercümân* (October 27, 1897), 1.
8. "Ramazan ül-Mübârek ve Terakkî-yi 'Yapon,'" *Tercüman* (February 19, 1895), 1.
9. *Ibid.*, 1. See "İstanbul Havâdisleri" [Section 2], *Tercümân* (November 18, 1896), 56.
10. *Ibid.*, 1: "When I was studying in 1871...in Paris, I became acquainted with one or two Muslim students, the sons of prominent Egyptians, and five or ten Japanese students. If the Japanese happened to have a day off from studying, we would go [together] to the libraries and evenings to the theater, passing the time with investigation and critique; whenever I bumped into my Egyptian buddies, we would entertain ourselves in vulgar places such as the Café Chantan and Bar Mobile. The gates of half the world attracted the Japanese in their science and arts societies more than us...[The Japanese] are called the 'English of the East.'"
11. "Yaponlar," *Tercüman* (May 26, 1896), 2; "Ramazan ül-Mübârek ve Terakkî-yi 'Yapon,'" *Tercüman* (February 19, 1895).
12. I utilized the English translation of Akçura's "Three Types of Policies" by David S. Thomas in H. B. Paksoy (ed.), *Central Asia Reader* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), 101-116.
13. *Ibid.*, 106-107.
14. *Ibid.*, 109.
15. *Ibid.*, 113-114.
16. *Ibid.*, 113-114.
17. "Üç Cereyan," *Türk Yurdu* III:35(İstanbul 1913), from Niyazi Berkes, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp* (New York: George Allen and Unwin, 1959), 76.
18. See also Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London: Luzac and Company Ltd, 1950); Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study in Irredentism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981, 2nd ed., 1995).
19. "Mefkûre," *Türk Yurdu* 5:32 (İstanbul 1913), from Niyazi Berkes, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp* (New York: George Allen and Unwin, 1959), 67.
20. *Ibid.*, 69.
21. From Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, trans. by Robert Devereux (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 15.
22. M. Şükrü Haniöğlü, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 209-210. See also Haniöğlü, "Turkism and the Young Turks, 1889-1908," in Kieser, Hans-Lukas (ed.), *Turkey beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities* (New York : I. B. Tauris, 2006), 3-19.
23. M. Şükrü Haniöğlü, *Preparation for a Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 295-297.
24. Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 87-89. See Erik J. Zürcher, "Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics 1908-1938," in Karpas (ed.), *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 150-179, for a nuanced discussion of the linkage between "Ottoman Muslim" and "Turk" in forming identity during the Young Turk era.
25. Masami Arai, *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era* (Leiden: E. J.Brill, 1992), 24-25.
26. *Ibid.*, 24-31 for this discussion of the change in *Genç Kalemler's* perspective. Ali Canip's reforms of Ottoman Turkish to create the new language are listed on page 34, from memoirs on...mer Seyfeddin.
27. *Ibid.*, 32.

28. "Yeni Lisan," *Genç Kalemler* 2:1, 3b. From *ibid.*, 35.
29. Baron Suyamacho (?), "Japonya İmparatorluğu: Yeni Hayat," edited by Kaya Alp, *Genç Kalemler* 2:5 (July 2, 1911), 93–95; 2:7 (August 9, 1911), 123–124; 2:8 (August 23, 1911), 143.
30. *Ibid.*, 2:5 (July 2, 1911), 93.
31. *Ibid.*, 2:8 (August 23, 1911), 143. Text reprinted by *Genç Kalemler* from the *African Times and Orient Review*. Charter Oath also translated in "Japonya İmparatoru: Merhûm Mikado," *İctihâd* (January 29, 1913), 1143–1144.
32. *Ibid.*, 2:8 (August 23, 1911), 143.
33. *Ibid.*, 2:8 (August 23, 1911), 143.
34. See my "Rising Sun over Bear: The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War upon the Young Turks," in François Georgeon (ed.), *L'ivresse de la liberté : la evolution de 1908 dans l'Empire ottoman* / *The Euphoria of Liberty: The 1908 Revolution in the Ottoman Empire* (Paris: Peeters Publishers, 2012), 454–485 for more discussion of the convergence of race, political power, and military might in Young Turk thought, as symbolized by Japan.
35. See Usama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," *The American Historical Review* 107:3 (June 2002), 768–796 for application of Orientalist theory to the Ottoman political center's view of its "Arab Other."
36. See Hanioglu, "The Young Turks and the Arabs before the Revolution of 1908," 31–49 for negative views of the Arabs expressed confidentially by some CUP members.
37. Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 55. These initially independent CUP efforts in 1908–1909 increasingly became government sponsored.
38. See Comte Léon Ostrorog, *Conférence sur la Renaissance du Japon* (Istanbul: Ahmed İhsan, 1327/1911), published proceedings of the conference. Gourdjı noted in closing remarks that among those in attendance were the Ottoman Prince Abdülmeçid Efendi (to whom the published proceedings were dedicated), the minister of Foreign Affairs, and a representative from the Ministry of the Navy.
39. *Ibid.*, 1.
40. *Ibid.*, 2–3.
41. *Ibid.*, 3–4. Japan's uniqueness was attributable to four basic characteristics: language, imperial dynasty, proper public organization/administration, and ancient, divine cult of ancestors to which all Japanese adhered and sacrificed.
42. *Ibid.*, 5.
43. *Ibid.*, 5–17. He described Japan's Bushidō samurai ethics, the "soul of Japan" as it was called, as the result of combining native Japanese valor and courage with the discipline, hierarchy, and morality of Chinese Confucian learning.
44. *Ibid.*, 38–39.
45. *Ibid.*, 45–46.
46. *Ibid.*, 46–47, 82–83.
47. *Ibid.*, 84.
48. "Japonya'nın Teceddüdâtı," *Tanin* (May 28, 1911), 5, heaped praise upon Ostrorog, describing him as "not only an excellent jurisconsult, but erudite with a rare intelligence" and recommended the recently published conference volume, priced five piasters, to readers, calling it "witty and clever."
49. Ostrorog, *Conférence*, 89–90, M. Salih Gourdjı's postscript.
50. *Ibid.*, 89–90.
51. *Ibid.*, 89–90.
52. *Ibid.*, 86–87.
53. *Ibid.*, 87–88.
54. *Ibid.*, 88–89. "Since the [CUP] has restored our human dignity, an immense longing escapes all chests toward the conquest of right, liberty, and the dignity of mind . . . thanks to the laudable initiative and the impulse of citizens finally conscious of their duties,

- we see some political clubs, some study societies appear, like luminous and brilliant stars precursing beautiful daytimes, a flowering of academic and postscholarly works, associations, groupings of all sorts, that all want to strive toward a similar goal, to reach the same ideal: elevate the homeland, heal its injuries, make war on ignorance, give citizens full possession of their judgment, the full exercise of their faculties, assure forever the freedom of thought and the liberty to write; broaden, in a word, the intellectual and moral level of people and thus prepare our dear Turkey a right revenge, that is to say, open for it a greater, more fertile, and more glorious future."
55. *Ibid.*, 90–91.
 56. *Ibid.*, 90–91.
 57. As early as 1904 "Turks and all Ottomans" appeared in "Hubb ül-Vatan . . .," *Şûra-yı Ümmet* 3:52 (March 1, 1904), 3, implying a distinction.
 58. See for example, "Turkey and Japan," *Levant Herald Eastern Express* (January 8, 1910), 10, "Turkey and Japan," *Levant Herald Eastern Express* (July 2, 1910), 234, which refer to Russian and Ottoman newspaper coverage in this manner.
 59. "Japon et Turquie," *The Levant Herald Eastern Express* (May 15, 1912), 1. French author unknown.
 60. Ömer Lütfi Fikri, *Dersim Mebusu, Lütfi Fikri Bey'in Günlüğü: "Daima Muhâlefet,"* in Yücel Demirel (ed.) İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1991), 38 commenting on "Ottomaness" having become obsolete "nonsense" by 1913.
 61. İsmet Bozdağ, *Abdülhamid'in Hatıra Defteri: Belgeler ve Resimlerle* (İstanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1975), , 116–117.
 62. See my "Japan's Progress Reified: Modernity and Arab Dissent in the Ottoman Empire" in Worringer (ed.), *The Islamic Middle East and Japan*, 91–119.
 63. Akarlı, Engin Deniz, "Abdülhamid II's Attempts to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System," in David Kushner (ed.), *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), 76. From Engin Deniz Akarlı, "Abdülhamid's Islamic Policy in the Arab Provinces," Emil Doğramacı (ed.), *Türk-Arab İlişkileri: Geçmişte, Bugün, ve Gelecekte* (Ankara, 1979), 59. Akarlı puts the population figures at about 30 percent Arab and 35 percent Turk (including the Arabian Peninsula, Tripolitania, and Crete), based upon estimates by Vedat Elden, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İktisâdî Şartları Hakkında bir Tetkik* (Ankara, 1970), 52–58.
 64. The influence of the Arab literary renaissance, or *nahda* among predominantly Lebanese Christians on Arab nationalist thinking was originally highlighted by George Antonius and has since been reexamined by scholars who argue their overall contribution was negligible. However, Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East*, 36 disagrees: "By the end of the decade [the 1870s], Beirut had become the birthplace of no less than 25 newspapers and journals . . . all of these papers were established by Christians, who led the cultural awakening."
 65. See articles in Khalidi et al. (eds.), *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* concerning the debate over Ottomanism and Arabism that situates C. Ernest Dawn's monograph *From Ottomanism to Arabism* and his article in this collection with Khalidi's and others' work on the subject. In Khalidi's article, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Syria before 1914: A Reassessment," 62 he writes, "For most of its adherents before 1914, Arabism did not mean Arab separatism, nor did it conflict with loyalty to the Ottoman Empire or to its religious legitimizing principle . . . their own advocacy of reform and decentralization was motivated by their devotion to the preservation of the empire in the face of foreign ambition." Much of the conflict that arose later between Ottomanists and Arabists emerged out of the inherent class conflict pitting elites with political connections to the Ottoman administration against young, disenfranchised middle-class professionals.
 66. According to Hourani, 240, Islamic modernist Rashîd Riḍā " . . . and his friends were not then opposed to the existence of the empire, and indeed thought it necessary for the Arab and Muslim peoples."

67. In Rashid Khalidī's "Abd al-Ghānī al-'Uraisi and *al-Mufīd*: The Press and Arab Nationalism before 1914," in Buheiry (ed.), *Intellectual Life in the Arab East*, 54, he states "... al-'Uraisi and most of his fellow-nationalists do not seem to have wanted to renounce all links with... the Ottoman Empire—certainly not before 1913." In the footnote to this statement, Khalidī continues: "It would appear that until the failure of the negotiations with the CUP after the 1913 Paris Congress, most Arab nationalists refused to close the door to the possibility of reform and the recognition of their national rights within the Empire."
68. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Kawākibī voiced his strongly anti-Turk, pan-Arab views concerning the state of Islam in *Ṭabāi' al-Istibdād* (*The Characteristics of Tyranny*) and *Umm al-Qura* (*The Mother of Cities*) around 1900, before his mysterious death in 1902. Najīb 'Azurī, author of the 1905 *Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe*, endorsed Arab secession.
69. See Hourani, Dawn, Khalidī, Kayalī and other works cited above for the revisionist history of the development of Ottomanism, Arabism, and Arab nationalism in relation to this argument.
70. See Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
71. Arslān, a member of the elite, maintained strong Ottomanist attitudes. His close relationship to Arabists and to Cemal Paşa (in late 1916 Arslān was editor-in chief of *al-Sharq*, the Ottoman State's propaganda paper in Syria espousing Islamic solidarity and support for the Caliph) indicated he saw no discrepancy in supporting both the Ottoman polity and the Arabs' distinct place within the Empire until the hangings of Arab nationalists. See William Cleveland, *Islam against the West: Shakib Arslan and the Campaign for Islamic Nationalism* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 37–38.
72. *Ibid.*, 116–119 for Arslān's ideas.
73. *Ibid.*, 128–129.
74. Shakīb Arslān, *Limādha Ta'akhkhar al-Muslimūn wa Limādha Taqqadam Ghayruhum?* (1st ed., 1939 after appearing in *al-Manār*, Beirut, 1965 edition.) English transl., M.S. Shakoor, *Our Decline and Its Causes* (Lahore: 1962), 80.
75. *Ibid.*, 80–81.
76. *Ibid.*, 76–78.
77. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Kawākibī, "The Excellences of the Arabs," from *Umm al-Qura*, in Sylvia Haim's *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 78–80.
78. Kayalī, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 82–96.
79. Sharīf 'Asīrān, "Tasāhhul al-Yābāniyyīn al-Dīnī," [English translation appears in subtitle as "The Japanese Latitudinarianism"] *al-'Irfān* (May 30, 1911), 433.
80. *Ibid.*, 433. Part II of this article, in *al-'Irfān* (June 13, 1911), 461–464, describes Japanese religion as mixing Shintoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism, combining the best elements of all three, to make "latitudinarianism."
81. *Ibid.*, 464.
82. "al-Yābān wa'l-Islām," *al-Muqtabas (al-Umma)* (February 18, 1910).
83. *Ibid.* Shahbandar's introduction is as follows: "The Japanese know ways to benefit from modern civilization. Thus they grasped its truth and they disregarded corrupt characteristics, and after they studied the true essence of the sciences their attention turned to material things only, except that some among them found that [material things] alone are not sufficient to improve their affairs. They must have some religion, and thirty-five men converted to Islam. Their religion was Buddhism; among them is the former Director of Education in Japan, and they found that true religion and virtuous character raises the level of development, and that mankind must have some form of religion.... They found that [Islam] is beneficial to them."
84. *Ibid.*

85. Munîr Ya'qûb, "Mâdhâ Akhdhnâ 'an al-Gharbiyyîn," *al-Muqtabas (Al-Umma)* (December 27, 1909) wrote that whereas the Ottoman Empire had degraded itself by merely imitating Western behavior, Japan had been able to carefully select the appropriate concepts and profit immensely from them, becoming one of the Great Powers. Implicit in the article was a negative view of how the Ottomans had pursued modern progress through superficial adoption of Western institutional patterns, without the sincerity to see them through.
86. William Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati' al-Husri* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 37.
87. Sati' al-Husri, Questionnaire, 16. This is an unpublished set of responses to questions William Cleveland submitted to al-Ḥuṣrî in October 1967, prior to writing his biographical work, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist*.
88. Sâti'è al-Ḥuṣrî, "Japonya ve Japonlar" [given at the East Theater in Istanbul] in *Büyük Milletlerden Japonlar, Almanlar*. Konferans Kütüphanesi (İstanbul: "Kader" Matbaası, 1329/1913), 1–37. The correct Ottoman word for "Japanese people" should have been Japonyalılar but it was commonly misspelled in the literature of the period. My translation of this text appears in "Conceptualizing Modernity in Late Ottoman Times: Japan as a Model Nation, 1902–1913," Camron Michael Amin, Benjamin C. Fortna and Elizabeth B. Frierson (eds.), *The Modern Middle East: A Sourcebook for History* (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 2006), 438–440.
89. *Ibid.*, 4.
90. *Ibid.*, 33.
91. *Ibid.*, 33.
92. *Ibid.*, 34.
93. *Ibid.*, 34–35.
94. *Ibid.*, 35.
95. *Ibid.*, 35: "We decided thirty years before the Japanese to come out of this virtual isolation and to share Europeans' developments: we promulgated the Beneficent Tanzîmât decree thirty years before the Mikadô's auspicious Charter Oath."
96. *Ibid.*, 35–36.
97. *Ibid.*, 37.
98. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist*, 37–8. Al-Ḥuṣrî's ideas on Japan as expressed in *Vatan İçin* are summarized in Hilmi Ziya Ülken's *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Târîhi*, vol. 1 (*Contemporary Intellectual History in Turkey*), (Konya: Selcuk Yayınları, 1966), 273–275. A chapter of *Vatan İçin* was titled "Terbiye-yi Vatanîye" ("National Education," 31–56). His respect for a national education system to indoctrinate national feeling and successfully master skills and knowledge necessary for modern civilization was reinforced by Japan's example.
99. Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş*, 274.
100. *Ibid.*, 274.
101. See Bassam Tibi's analysis of al-Ḥuṣrî in *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry*, Part 4 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), 161–198.
102. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 312. See Sâti'è al-Ḥuṣrî's work in Arabic, *al-A'mâl al-Qawmîyya li Sâti' al-Ḥuṣrî*, 3 Vols. (Beirut: Markaz Dirâsât al-Waḥda al-'Arabîyya, 2nd ed., 1990).
103. *Ibid.*, 315.
104. Sâti'è al-Ḥuṣrî, *Mâ Hiya al-Qawmîyya? Abḥâth wa Dirâsât 'ala Ḍaw' al-Aḥdath wa'l-Naẓariyyât* (Beirut: 1963, 2nd ed.), 26–27, mentions Japan as an example. He stated that Eastern capacity obliged Europe and America to concede the right of nation formation (independence) to all peoples. See also Ṭibî, *Arab Nationalism*, 144.
105. See Elizabeth B. Frierson's "Unimagined Communities: State, Press and Gender in the Hamidian Era" (Princeton University Dissertation, 1996).

106. See my "Japan as Archetype: Arab Nationalist Considerations as Reflected in the Press, 1887–1920," presented at the 1995 MESA panel, "Social Change, the Press and Middle Eastern Women, 1869–1945" for an examination of the vast coverage of Japanese women in the Arabic press. *Al-Mashriq*, *Anis al-Jalis*, *Majallat al-Liwā'*, *al-Muqtaṭaf*, *al-Hilāl*, *al-Manār*, and many other prominent journals and papers compared Japanese women to women in Ottoman and Egyptian societies.
107. Ekrem, *Japonlar*, 42. "Since a short time ago, women in Europe and America have, besides housework, started to occupy themselves with external affairs as do men. Today in the city of Washington there are a lot of newspaper editors and factory managers. Women in the great capital cities of Europe like Berlin, Paris, and London are employed in medicine, engineering, farming, law, and industry. Teaching especially has become widespread in every civilized country."
108. *Ibid.*, 42.
109. *Ibid.*, 43; also 46–47. His information came from an article by Marquis Oyama's wife.
110. "Japonyalılar," *Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete* 5 (April 14, 1904), 70; "Japonyalılara dair," *Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete* 10 (May 19, 1904), 148–149; 11 (May 26, 1904), 163–164; 12 (June 2, 1904), 180–181. See also "Mikadō," *Bâlkân* 51 (September 5, 1906), 2.
111. In "Japonya'da ênâs Dâr'ül-Fünûni," *Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete* 522 (August 10, 1905), 3, the writer pointed out that Europeans assumed Japan's progress was limited to technical and military affairs alone, but the current state of women's education and training illustrated the "true progress of the Japanese people."
112. *Ibid.*, 3. This training for women consisted of everything from housework, managing finances, maintaining health and cleanliness, child-rearing techniques, and interior decorating to cooking, nutrition, and gymnastics. See also "Japonya'da Terbiye-yi Nisvân," *Servet-i Fünûn* 772 (January 8, 1905), 279.
113. See Kadri, "Japonya Kadınlar," *Servet-i Fünûn* 196 (November 13, 1894), 215–218. Same article in Ahmed Nâci's weekly *Maârif* 4:7 (January 3, 1895), 57–59.
114. Ekrem, *Japonlar*, 13; See also 11, 19.
115. Fatma Ünsiye, *Japon Çocukları* [Japanese Children] (İstanbul: Matba'a-yı Hayriye ve Şirketi, 1912), 4. Serialized in the journal *İctihād*. Latter section, subtitled *Rus Çocukları*, translated from Russian.
116. *Ibid.*, 12.
117. *Ibid.*, 14–15.
118. *Ibid.*, 20.
119. *Ibid.*, 16.
120. *Ibid.*, 49.
121. eçikava, *Japonya Tarih-i Siyâsisi*, 28–29.
122. *Ibid.*, 42–46. The "family ethic" was developed at home between members of the household as well. The military coexisted with civilization, and Japan realized the necessity of studying military training and technology in Europe in order to guarantee the country's protection.
123. "Li Ḥayā al-Ā'iliyya fi al-Yabân," *al-Garida* 1:167 (September 23, 1907), 1.

8 Ottoman Egypt Demands Independence: Egyptian Identity, East and West, Christian and Muslim

1. The regulation was modified and revived in 1909 to suppress papers amid growing public discontent and nationalist political activities that threatened the stability of the occupation. See Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 174.

2. H. Hamilton Fyfe, *The New Spirit in Egypt* (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1911), 113.
3. Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 52. From Thomas Philipp, *The Syrians in Egypt 1725–1975* (Stuttgart, 1985), 91–92, 96–100, who claims about 20 percent of all papers published in Egypt between 1800 and 1914 were founded by Syrians.
4. Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East*, 50.
5. *Ibid.*, 53.
6. See Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
7. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900–1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11.
8. *Ibid.*, 11. P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 209, writes that by 1906, administrative and legal links between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire had been severed and localized Egyptian nationalism replaced pan-Islamism.
9. Gershoni and Jankowski credit Rifā'a Rāfi' al-Tahtawī with spearheading this movement in the 1860s–1870s in the literature he composed on the Egyptian homeland.
10. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt*, 184. These currents affected Islamic modernists like Muḥammad 'Abduh, who associated with other Egyptians and Syrian émigrés and whose "...concern for religious reform underlined a conflict in the Egyptian mind which began in the 1870s: the response of Muslims to Western civilization, particularly European thought and culture," 188.
11. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).
12. Timothy Mitchell, "The Invention and Reinvention of the Egyptian Peasant," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22:2 (May 1990), 129–150; Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs*, 130–136, 205–208.
13. Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs*, 11, Egyptian intellectual Rifa'a Rafi al-Tahtawi (1801–1873) was among the earliest writers to essentialize ancient Egyptian heritage using the phrase cited above. See 164–190, for Pharaonicism in Egypt's post-1919 era; Donald M. Reid, "Nationalizing the Pharaonic Past: Egyptology, Imperialism, and Egyptian Nationalism, 1922–1952," in James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (eds.), *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 127–149; Donald Reid, *Whose Pharaohs? Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War I* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
14. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt*, 209.
15. Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs*, 5–6.
16. *Ibid.*, 15: "Educated Egyptians could not totally neglect the Arab dimensions of their culture and history, of course.... But in *national* terms—that is, with reference to Egypt defined as a distinct community and the political behavior that flowed from that self-definition—educated Egyptians overwhelmingly divorced themselves from both the neighboring Arab world and the nascent Arab nationalist movement in the years preceding World War One."
17. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt*, 204–205: "In discussing early attempts by Egyptian liberals during the period 1906–1914 to establish a secularist tradition in education and politics, one must deal with three major groups...the group of extreme nationalists led by Mustafa Kamil...the seriously liberal, rationalist and evolutionary group led by Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid. Between these two extremes stood a strange group of Muslim pseudo-liberals, first represented by Shaykh Ali Yusuf

- until 1913, and later by Shaykh Rashid Rida." 'Alī Yūsuf's short-lived Constitutional Reform Party was connected to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph, Kāmil's Waṭanī Party was influenced by French ideas of liberty and devotion to the Sultan, and Luṭfī al-Sayyid's Umma Party derived ideas from British individualism and utilitarianism; their concerns were British occupation and tutelage, waning Ottoman power and loss of territory, tensions between Islam and modernism, and Young Turk policy after 1909 (206). See also Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., "The Egyptian Nationalist Party, 1892–1919" and Mahmud Zayid, "The Origins of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party in Egypt" in P. M. Holt (ed.), *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 308–346.
18. *Al-Mu'ayyad* provided a forum for Muṣṭafā Kāmil, Muḥammad Farīd, Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid, and Sa'd Zaghālūl to express their ideas prior to their own publications. See Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East*, 57.
 19. Dennis Walker examined Muṣṭafā Kāmil's political ideology in "Mustafa Kamil's Party: Islam, Pan-Islamism and Nationalism," in *Islam and the Modern Age* (August and November 1980, February and May 1981).
 20. See Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs*, 5–6 on the two major nationalist tendencies in Egypt at the turn of the century as represented by the Waṭanī Party of Muṣṭafā Kāmil and the Umma Party of Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid. Egyptian thought and activity was "...marked by a mixture of attitudes toward the Ottoman Empire. On the intellectual level, loyalty to the Ottoman state already seems to have been overshadowed by the expression of locally oriented Egyptian territorial patriotism....The political circumstances of Egypt after the defeat of the 'Urābī movement and the British Occupation of Egypt in 1882 reinforced an Ottoman orientation for many Egyptians."
 21. *Ibid.*, 3–20, on the role of nationalists, the British, and the Ottoman Empire in generating Egyptian identity.
 22. Fyfe, *The New Spirit in Egypt*, 152. For a description of the Dinshaway incident, see Michael Laffan, "Mustafa and the Mikado: A Francophile Egyptian's Turn to Meiji Japan," *Japanese Studies* 19:3 (1999), 271.
 23. See M. Krása, "The Idea of Pan-Asianism and the Nationalist Movement in India," *Archiv Orientální* 40:3 (1972), 238–260; T. A. Keenleyside, "Nationalist Indian Attitudes Towards Asia: A Troublesome Legacy for Post-Independence Indian Foreign Policy," *Pacific Affairs* [Canada] 55:2 (1982), 210–230.
 24. See R. P. Dua, *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese (1905) War on Indian Politics* (New Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1966).
 25. See chapter 4, endnote 141, this book.
 26. Many authors in Egypt drew parallels between Japanese cultural traits and Islam: some believed the Japanese were about to convert to Islam and thus become the legitimate saviors of the Eastern world. Expressions of hope around 1906 that the Japanese would convert to Islam emanated mostly from Cairo, illustrating anti-Western attitudes of Islamic modernists and Egyptian nationalists faced directly with foreign occupation, in contrast to the relative absence of this line of discussion in the Ottoman Arab press, perhaps because Sultan Abdülhamid II and his regime censored speculation. See "al-Islām wa'l-Yābān," *al-'Ālam al-Islāmī* (July 6, 1906), 2. The author explained that if Japan became Muslim, it would help to erode barriers between Arabs, Turks, Persians, and Indians.
 27. Yuwāqīm Rizq Murqus, *Ṣiḥāfat al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī, 1907–1912* (Cairo, 1985), 80.
 28. Original text: The Earl of Cromer (Sir Evelyn Baring), *Modern Egypt*, 2 Volumes (London: MacMillan, 1908). Japanese translation: Kuroma [Cromer], *Saikin Ejiputo*, 2 Volumes (Dai-Nippon Bunmei Kyōkai, 1911).
 29. For Ōkuma's comments, see *Saikin Ejiputo*, Volume 1, 12–13 in the Preface. I am indebted to Cemil Aydın for this Japanese reference.

30. *Japan Weekly Mail* (April 20, 1907), 423. I am indebted to Michael Penn for this reference. Itō was resident-general of Korea until his assassination in Harbin by a Korean anticolonial rebel. See Hane, *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), 180.
31. "Miṣr wa Kūrīyā," *Miṣr al-Fatāt* (August 21, 1910), 1.
32. See "Miṣr wa Kūrīyā," *al-Garīda* 1:7 (June 2, 1907), 2, and other articles from May–July 1907 portraying Japan as an equal nation-state defending its political and economic interests; see also "Khulāṣa Siyāsiyya," *al-Garīda* 1:99 (July 4, 1907), 1; Sayyid 'Alī, "Quwwād al-Yābān al-Kubār," *Miṣr al-Fatāt* (January 1, 1909), 1; "Malā'ib al-Yābān," *Miṣr al-Fatāt* (May 9, 1909), 1; "al-Yābān wa'l-Ajānīb," *al-'Ālam* (May 26, 1910), ; *Abū Naẓẓāra* (Paris, 1878–1910), published by Ya'qūb Sānū' (James Sanua), expressed concern over Japan's potentially dangerous imperialist motives in Asia and addressed directly its relationship to Britain while praising Japan's modern abilities and entrance into the arena of international politics. Considered Egypt's Molière, Sānū' was a playwright who organized the first popular local theater group and perfected satire in colloquial language. See Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt* 107. He founded his paper *Abū Naẓẓāra* in 1877 in colloquial Arabic, where for two months he "focused on debunking Khedival extravagance and oppressive taxation," until he was exiled by the Khedive in 1878. In Paris he resumed publishing the paper in Arabic and French. He died in 1912. From Louis Awad, *The Literature of Ideas in Egypt, Part I* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1986), 71.
33. In a letter to Juliette Adam dated June 9, 1905, Muṣṭafā Kāmil wrote that "it is not the Anglo-Japanese Alliance that put an end to my country's independence, but rather the accord between treacherous England and France." From *Awraq Muṣṭafā Kāmil: al-Murāsālāt* (Cairo, 1982), 224. See also Jamal Mohammed Ahmed, *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 65.
34. Muṣṭafa Luṭfī al-Manfalūtī, "al-Hallāq al-Tharthār" [The Chatterbox Barber], *al-Nazarāt*, Vol. 3 (6th ed., 1932). My translation appears in Camron Michael Amin, Benjamin C. Fortna, and Elizabeth B. Frierson (eds.), *The Modern Middle East: A Sourcebook for History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 333.
35. See Hideaki Sugita, "Japan and the Japanese as Depicted in Modern Arabic Literature," *Studies of Comparative Culture* 27 (March 1989), 21–40.
36. Also published as a 68-page pamphlet (Cairo: Matba'at al-Akhbār, 1906).
37. Zakarīya Sulaymān Bayyūmī, *Al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī wa Dawruhu fi'l-Siyāsa al-Miṣriyya, 1907–1953* (Cairo, 1981), 25–28 explains that Kāmil accommodated two strains of thought: 1) European liberalism-Egyptian Arabism; and 2) Pan-Islamism-Ottoman/Egyptian solidarity.
38. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 109.
39. Fyfe, *The New Spirit in Egypt*, 152. Japan's victory was already causing political unrest in India; agitation on the part of Egyptians could endanger Britain's African occupation. See also Edward Dicey, *The Egypt of the Future* (London: William Heinemann, 1907), 140–41. A British journalist who had been in and out of Egypt since the opening of the Suez Canal, his book was meant to address British defects in Egypt's administration and to suggest policy reforms. Despite the Orientalist attitudes prevailing in his writings, he must have witnessed events or sensed the atmosphere of expectation that led him to write that there was a general mood of pan-Asian solidarity and anti-Western feeling in Egypt following the Japanese victory. He concluded that the Japanese had inadvertently inspired Africans (particularly Muslims) in both city and village alike to rebel against the English.
40. See front-page coverage of the Russo-Japanese conflict in *al-Liwā'* (daily from January 1904) in "Mushkila al-Sharq al-Aqṣā," "Ḥarb fi'l-Sharq al-Aqṣā," "Ḥarb al-Yābān," or "Rūsiyā wa'l-Yābān," etc. See also Aḥmad Ḥilmī, "Ṭhām Ūrūbā fi Nayyil Aghrāḍiḥā,"

- al-Liwā'* (January 23, 1904), 1, "Tanāffus Rūsīyā wa Inkiltarā," *al-Liwā'* (February 11, 1904), 1–2.
41. 'Uthmān Ṣabrī, "al-Ḥarb bayna Rūsīyā wa'l-Yābān," *al-Liwā'* (February 13, 1904), 1. Japan merely wanted to protect its trade interests, according to "Aghrād al-Yābān min al-Ḥarb al-Hādira," *al-Liwā'* (April 2, 1904), 1. See also "al-Yābān wa Kūrīyā," *al-Liwā'* (April 7, 1904), 1. Prime Minister Katsura of Japan issued a statement of Japan's objectives to Reuters that was subsequently reprinted in Arabic in "Taṣrīḥāt Yābāniyya," *al-Liwā'* (December 5, 1904), 1; see also "Man al-Mu'atadi?" *al-Liwā'* (March 12, 1904), 1; "Khuṭba al-Mikādō," *al-Liwā'* (March 30, 1904), 1. Control of Manchuria and the "guarantee of Korea's independence" were not so much imperialist goals of the Japanese, argued the writers of Kāmil's Waṭānī Party newspaper, but means of preserving Japan's own independence from foreign invasion and domination by Russia.
 42. See "Āsyā lil-Āsyawīyyīn," *al-Liwā'* (September 17, 1905), 1.
 43. Muṣṭafā Kāmil, "al-Ḥarb al-Hādira wa'l-Islām," *al-Liwā'* (February 18, 1904), 1. See also "Miṣr wa'l-Islām wa'l-Yābān," *al-Liwā'* (November 6, 1904), 1. Muslims in Java were reportedly inspired by Japan's success in the war to rise up against their Dutch colonial overlords. From a report in "Min Jāwā ila *al-Liwā'*," *al-Liwā'* (June 2, 1904), 1.
 44. "al-Ḥarb al-Muntaẓara," *al-Liwā'* (December 22, 1903), 1.
 45. Muṣṭafā Kāmil, "al-Ḥarb," *al-Liwā'* (January 7, 1904), 1. He naively claimed Japanese objectives in Korea and China were to generate solidarity. Conflict with Russia would distract it from making war on the Ottoman Empire, thus giving the Turks a chance to build up their resistance against future European imperialist activities. Japan's motives in China were also explained by Japanese statesmen Baron Suimatsu and Marquis Itō in a British society clubhouse; they claimed Japan's and China's interests were one and the same. See "al-Muḥālafa al-Inkilizīyya al-Yābāniyya," *al-Liwā'* (March 8, 1904), 1.
 46. "Luḥma bayna al-Sharqīyyīn," *al-Liwā'* (October 11, 1904), 1; "al-Qūwwa al-Baḥrīyya al-Uthmāniyya," *al-Liwā'* (April 18, 1904), 1; "al-Baḥrīyya al-Uthmāniyya," *al-Liwā'* (November 22, 1904), 1.
 47. 'Isām Diyā' al-Dīn al-Sayyid 'Alī Ṣaghīr, *al-Ḥizb al-Waṭānī wa'l-Niḍāl al-Sirrī, 1907–1915* (Cairo, 1987), 31.
 48. Kāmil, *Bilād al-Shams al-Mushriqa*, 117.
 49. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt*, 213. The Japanese self-view as protectors of East Asia was often published in the Arabic press. See Count Katsura's position in "Ra'īs Wuzarā' al-Yābān," *al-Liwā'* (July 14, 1904), 1. He explained the Japanese were not war-mongers; this was a conflict between political states, not a war of religion or domination.
 50. Speech delivered on June 8, 1904, reprinted in *Awraq Muṣṭafā Kāmil: al-Khuṭub* (Cairo, 1982), 267 about the rights of the nation, independence, and self-sacrifice in its defense.
 51. Qāsim Amīn, *Taḥrīr al-Mar'a* (Cairo edition, 1970), 183.
 52. *Ibid.*, 183.
 53. *Al-Liwā'* described the essence of Japanese character and morality to be the "loftiness of the individuals' souls" and a spirit of grandeur stemming from the Japanese samurai sense of perseverance and noble-mindedness; they did not need religion to guide them. See "[title illegible]," *al-Liwā'* (September 3, 1904), 1; Muṣṭafā Kāmil, "Ay al-Naṣrayn Akbar?" *al-Liwā'* (September 7, 1905), 1; "Jawla fī al-Iṣlāḥ," *al-Liwā'* (October 22, 1904), 1.
 54. Excerpt of *Bilād Shams al-Mushriqa* (Cairo: *al-Liwā'*, 1904), 8–9 reprinted in *al-Liwā'* (June 19, 1904), 1–2.
 55. Suhayl, "al-Waṭāniyya fī al-Yābān," *al-Garīda* 1:17 (March 27, 1907), 1.

56. Muṣṭafā Kāmil, "Ay al-Naṣrayn Akbar?" *al-Liwā'* (September 7, 1905), 1; "Sirr Taqaddum al-Yābān," *al-Liwā'* (August 3, 1905), 1; "Baṭl min Abṭāl al-Yābān," *al-Liwā'* (June 26, 1904), 1; Aḥmad Ḥilmī, "al-Jihād fī Sabīl al-Waṭān," *al-Liwā'* (November 17, 1903), 1; "al-Waṭāniyya wa'l-Harb," *al-Liwā'* (March 15, 1904), 1; "al-Waṭāniyya al-Yābāniyya," *al-Liwā'* (June 11, 1904), 1; "Waṭāniyya Nādira," *al-Liwā'* (August 11, 1904), 1; "al-Ḥayāt al-Qawmiyya fī al-Yābān," *al-Liwā'* (September 14, 1905), 2.
57. See Coptic Christian Tadros Bey al-Mangabadi's newspaper *Miṣr* for evidence. "Ibrat al-Sharq min al-Sharq: Mathal min al-Yābān," *Miṣr* 12: 3417 (June 28, 1907), 1, stated "Japan did not begin its new national life until after it brought together its political parties and denominations and eliminated the ethnic and religious disputes between them by means of a nation of genuine patriots and they dedicated themselves to spreading good will."
58. "al-Yābāniyyūn wa'l-Atrāk," *al-Liwā'* (October 8, 1904), 1; "Jawla fī al-Iṣlāh," *al-Liwā'* (October 22, 1904), 1.
59. "al-Iṣlāh Hunnā wa Hunnāka," *al-Liwā'* (December 20, 1904), 1; "al-Dawla al-'Uliyya wa'l-Yābān," *al-Liwā'* (December 25, 1904), 1.
60. The enlightened monarch initiated the scientific and literary awakening in Japan, giving the Japanese back their self-confidence to claim popular sovereignty and just government as well as to build factories and schools. See Ṣ., "al-Thawra al-Yābāniyya" part IV, in *al-Balaḡh al-Miṣrī (La dépêche Egyptienne)* 1:101 (October 18, 1910), 1.
61. "al-Dawla al-'Uliyya wa'l-Yābān," 1.
62. In "al-Iṣlāh Hunnā wa Hunnāka," 1, the author explained that European involvement in Ottoman reform efforts created a false illusion of progress that actually squelched independence.
63. Muṣṭafā Kāmil, speech entitled "Raghā'ib al-Ḥizb al-Waṭānī" given in Alexandria on October 22, 1907. Reprinted in *Awrāq Muṣṭafā Kāmil: al-Khuṭub* (Cairo, 1982), 28. See also letter to Juliette Adam dated June 17, 1904, in *Awrāq... Murāsālāt*, 199.
64. Letter dated June 9, 1905, in *Awrāq... Murāsālāt*, 224.
65. "Intiqād wa Iqtirāḥ," *al-Garīda* 1:5 (March 13, 1907), 1.
66. Suhayl, "al-Waṭāniyya fī al-Yābān," *al-Garīda* 1:17 (March 27, 1907), 1.
67. *Ibid.*, 1.
68. "al-Irtiqā' al-Siyāsī: Matn wa Sharḥ," *al-Garīda* 3:762 (September 9, 1909), 1.
69. Suhayl, "al-Waṭāniyya fī al-Yābān," *al-Garīda*, 1.
70. *Ibid.*, 1; Yūsuf al-Bustānī, "Bayna al-Qāhira wa Tōkiō: Ṭarīkat Ta'alīm al-'Amm" (Part II), *al-Garīda* 1:276 (February 5, 1908), 1.
71. "Ḥadīth 'an al-Sharq al-Aqsā," *al-Mu'ayyad* (February 23, 1904), 1. Discussion on wearing Western clothing outside the home, maintaining traditional fashions at home, "in the spirit of patriotism."
72. "al-Dawla al-Sharqīyya al-Jadīda," *al-Mu'ayyad* (March 27, 1904), 1.
73. "Mā Na'khudhuhu min Ūrūbā wa mā Yanfa'u Miṣr," *al-Garīda* 4: (March 1, 1910), 1.
74. "al-Iṣlāh Hunna wa Hunnāka," *al-Liwā'* (December 20, 1904), 1; "al-Sharq wa'l-Gharb," *al-Garīda* 1:4 (March 12, 1907), 1.
75. I did not find sources to support this claim. The Tokugawa government sent its first student missions overseas around 1862. In a speech by Muṣṭafā Kāmil on May 21, 1902 reprinted in *Awrāq Muṣṭafā Kāmil: al-Khuṭub*, 247, to commemorate Mehmet 'Alī's birthday, he asked his audience rhetorically when discussing the Navarino naval defeat, "Where was Japan? Where was this active country and grand state? It was—and it was as if it did not exist—in the throes of oppression and the darkness of ignorance." Aḥmad Ḥilmī, "al-Jihād fī Sabīl al-Waṭān," *al-Liwā'* (November 17, 1903), 1, also emphasized that Mehmet 'Alī's progressive vision was "that rare example of Egyptian cleverness" that surpassed even Japan. *Al-Garīda* still reminisced to this effect in 1910, when 'Abd al-Qādir Ḥamza wrote in "Ina fī dhalika li-'Ibrah: Miṣr wa al-Yābān" (August 28, 1910), 1, that "Japan was nothing when

- Egypt was the only Eastern nation with zeal and perseverance." Egypt collapsed when it allowed foreigners in, who prevailed with their Western knowledge and money, first over the government, then over the souls of Egyptians. Japan borrowed only what was necessary from Europe through students who studied there and then returned home.
76. "Ḍamīr al-Muwazzif," *al-Garīda* (February 23, 1911), 1.
 77. Indian writer Fakhr al-Dīn al-Gujarātī, "al-Umma bi'l-Rijāl," *al-Liwā'* (December 31, 1903), 1. "Easterners must make this state their model," "study its history in their schools," and "send students to Japan."
 78. Sayyid 'Alī, "Quwwād al-Yābān al-Kubār," *Miṣr al-Fatāt* (January 1, 1909), 1. Yūsuf al-Bustānī, "Bayna al-Qāhira wa Tökīo: Ṭarīqat al-Ta'ālīm al-'Āmm" Part II, *al-Garīda* 1:276 (February 5, 1908), 1, explained the Japanese had studied all types of education in "civilized" countries, then introduced the suitable principles from them into existing old Japanese ways.
 79. Tawfīq Qasīr, "Nahdat al-Yābān," *al-Mu'ayyad* (April 27, 1904), 2; Suhayl, "al-Waṭaniyya fi al-Yābān," *al-Garīda*, 1. According to Suhayl in "Dars min Ingiltarā," *al-Garīda* 1:37 (April 21, 1907), 1.
 80. al-Bustānī, "Bayna al-Qāhira wa Tökīo: Ṭarīqat al-Ta'ālīm al-'Āmm" Part II, 1.
 81. *Ibid.*, 1.
 82. These views were expounded by 'Abd al-'Azīz Jāwish, cofounder of the Waṭanī Party, later editor of *al-Liwā'* and eventually inspector-general in the Ministry of Education, in a definition of *tarbiyya* from a 1903 government textbook on education. Ḥusayn al-Marṣāfi, a senior professor at a government teacher training college, believed there were three institutions that would inculcate in the individual this new discipline: the school, the political assembly, and the press. The press, as one form of instruction, would cultivate intellectual discipline in a separate realm of truth and representation. See Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 89–90. "al-İṣlāḥ Hunnā wa Hunnāka," 1 reminds readers of the importance of self-help.
 83. See Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 108–110, 121–122. Durkheim's lectures in Paris on education as a forum in which to regenerate collective morality, Smiles's *Self-Help, with Illusions of Conduct and Perseverance* (translated by Ya'qūb Ṣarrūf) on national progress as a product of individual industriousness and energy, and LeBon's *Psychologie des Foules* (translated by Faṭḥī Zaghlūl) contributed to these views. Nūbār Pasha, prime minister of Egypt after the British occupation, viewed modernity within the distinct parameters of the moral and the material. His introducing a European legal system, says Mitchell, stemmed from the desire to guarantee the moral order through modern law that consolidated private property.
 84. Le Bon, *Psychologie des Peuples*. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 122: disciplining society through education is a way to reform and centralize it an elite who come out of the system; modern progress is ultimately a movement toward increasing social inequality.
 85. "al-İṣlāḥ Hunnā wa Hunnāka," 1.
 86. See "al-Nahḍa al-Sharqiyya," *al-Liwā'* (October 16, 1904), 1. A nation whose leaders cultivate the sciences through expansion of the education system become progressive and prosperous. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 109–110 such that "...nationalist writers in the first years of the twentieth century frequently compared the colonial occupation of their country with the situation of Japan, as the Japanese defeated first the Chinese, then the Russians at war. The major difference accounting for the success of the Japanese in defeating the largest country in Asia and the largest country in Europe was the difference between the Japanese and Egyptian mentality. The Japanese, it was explained at length, had organized education and instruction, and concentrated on 'the formation of character.' Egyptians were light-hearted, lazy, and fond of idling their time, while the Japanese were 'serious and industrious.'

- Earlier, in 1881, the journal *al-Muqtataf* had compared the industry and seriousness of the Japanese with the light-heartedness of Egyptians, mentioning among other things the industry of the Japanese in translating European books and giving a list of works they had translated, at the head of which was the book *Character*, by Samuel Smiles."
87. See "al-Ma'arif fī al-Yābān," *al-Liwā'* (August 10, 1905), 1; "Tarbiyya qabla al-'Ilm," *al-Liwā'* (September 25, 1905), 1. Japanese abilities in science and invention, particularly in the military field, were said to be due to a 72 percent literacy rate; illiterate societies permitted tyranny through ignorance and indolence.
 88. Kāmil, *Bilād al-Shams al-Mushriqa*, 117: "Concern for upbringing and education in Japan is not recent. Rather the people were interested in it before Europe by centuries and generations." Japan had successfully assimilated Chinese civilization with its indigenous culture, he went on, and was now merely doing the same with Western learning. Japan had realized that strength of self was equivalent to national power. Thus the government took an active interest in promoting domestic and overseas education to all citizens in order to strengthen Japan in the international sphere.
 89. "al-Ma'arif fī al-Yābān," 1; "Li 'Amīm al-Ma'arif," *al-Liwā'* (May 3, 1908), 1.
 90. "al-Irtiqā' al-Ṣaḥīḥ: Dars min al-Yābān," *al-Garīda* 1:38 (April 22, 1907), 1.
 91. *Ibid.*, 1.
 92. *Ibid.*, 1.
 93. See "Mahal al-Istiqlāl," *al-Garīda* 1:235 (December 15, 1907), 1 on compulsory education extended to girls.
 94. See "al-Waṭaniyya wa al-Ḥarb," *al-Liwā'* (March 15, 1904), 1. Egypt's brief encounter with parliamentary government commenced in 1866. Two decrees instituted a Chamber of Deputies; another decree in 1878 provided for a Cabinet, and although the Chamber was suspended in 1879, in late 1881 it was resuscitated as an elected legislative body, the National Constituent Assembly, and a constitutional charter was proclaimed. See J. N. D. Anderson, "Law Reform in Egypt: 1850–1950," in Holt (ed.), *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 212.
 95. See for example "Dalīl al-Mu'ayyad: Idārarat al-Yābān," *al-Mu'ayyad* (March 8, 1904), 2.
 96. "Ḥarb al-Dustūr," *al-Liwā'* (December 17, 1904), 1. Japan represented constitutionalism, true civilization, and progress of an independent Eastern nation-state.
 97. Suhayl, "al-Waṭaniyya fī al-Yābān," *al-Garīda* 1:17 (March 27, 1907), 1.
 98. "Risālat London," *al-Garīda* 2:466 (September 16, 1908), 1.
 99. "al-Shams al-Mushriqa," *Miṣr al-Fatāt* (April 24, 1909), 1–2. Information in this article was reprinted from a series of articles published under the same title in the French newspaper *ŷclair*, which described "The Rising Sun" as a progressive, constitutional monarchy whose success was due to assimilation of Western methods, preservation of indigenous civilization, and continued independence.
 100. "Majlis al-Tashrī al-Dūwwalī," *al-Garīda* 1:55 (May 14, 1907), 1.
 101. "al-Yābān wa al-Ajānib," *al-'lam* (May 26, 1910), 3.
 102. "al-Thawra al-Yābāniyya" Part II, *al-Balāgh al-Miṣrī* 1:90 (October 7, 1910), 1–2.
 103. Kāmil, *al-Shams al-Mushriqa*, 62. Students learned sciences for the benefit of the state, and in return the state guaranteed just, democratic government through the promulgation of a constitution.
 104. "Ḥawl al-Dustūr," *al-Sha'b* (March 28, 1910), 4. Kāmil had described the Japanese Emperor as one who keenly recognized that "there was no progress without justice," and that his encouragement of the people to "abandon harmful delusions and customs," and to "borrow new ideas from the entire world to increase the honor of the kingdom" triggered reforms, which led Japan to where it was today.

From *Bilād al-Shams al-Mushriqa*, 79–80, quoting what was purported to be the Mikadō's first speech.

105. Kamil, *al-Shams al-Mushriqa*, 127.
106. "al-Thawra al-Yābāniyya" Part I, *al-Balāgh al-Miṣrī* 1:86 (October 3, 1910), 1.
107. "al-Thawra al-Yābāniyya" Part II, *al-Balāgh al-Miṣrī* 1:90 (October 7, 1910), 1–2.
108. Yūsuf al-Bustānī, "Bayna al-Qāhira wa Tōkiō: al-Aḥzāb al-Miṣriyya wa al-Aḥzāb al-Yābāniyya" (Part I), *al-Garīda* 1:269 (January 28, 1908), 1.
109. *Ibid.*, 1.
110. *Ibid.*, 1.
111. *Ibid.*, 1.
112. See al-Bustānī, "Bayna al-Qāhira wa Tōkiō: Ṭarīqat al-Ta'ālīm al-'Āmm" (Part II), *al-Garīda* 1:276 (February 5, 1908), 1.
113. All of these ideas in al-Bustānī, "Bayna al-Qāhira wa Tōkiō: al-Rūḥ al-Dustūriyya Hunnā wa Hunnāka" (Part III), *al-Garīda* 1:278 (February 8, 1908), 1 were attributed originally to Alfred Stead, the British author of *Japan, Our New Ally* (1902) and *Great Japan: A Study of National Efficiency* (1906).
114. The "spirit of constitutionalism" was defined by Yūsuf al-Bustānī in "Bayna al-Qāhira wa Tōkiō: fi al-Qarya wa fi al-Sijñ" (Part IV), *al-Garīda* 1:285 (February 16, 1908), 1 as "parties in parliament" and "teachers in schools," but most importantly as the peasantry who left their land and families to fight in wars for the homeland.
115. al-Bustānī, "Bayna al-Qāhira wa Tōkiō," (Part III), 1.
116. *Ibid.*, 1.
117. Yüzbaşı Ahmad al-Fadli, *Kitāb Sirr Taqaddum al-Yābān* (Cairo: 1911). The Khedive's brother, Prince Muḥammad 'Alī went to Japan in 1908 ostensibly to improve relations with Japan. See "Ittihād al-Sharq," *Wādī al-Nīl* (June 18, 1908), 1; "Aṣr al-Dustūr fi al-Sharq," *Wādī al-Nīl* (July 27, 1908), 1. The Egyptian Prince was accompanied on his journey by Aḥmad Bey 'Abd al-Khāliq and Ismā'īl Bey Sālim. In 1912 he visited again and wrote his own travel account entitled *al-Riḥla al-Yābāniyya [The Japanese Journey]*. Other Egyptians visited Japan in an attempt to discover its secrets and transport them home. 'Alī Aḥmad al-Girgāwī, owner/editor of the Egyptian *al-Irshād*, published his own *al-Riḥla al-Yābāniyya* in Cairo in 1907/8 after a brief trip to Japan. Three Egyptian youths were reportedly sent to Japan to study and investigate the "Japanese people's noble spirit" by Prince 'Abbās Ḥalīm Paşa around 1911 according to *İctihād*, where they studied English and Japanese languages in Tokyo; one studied commerce, another electricity, and the third finance. See "Japonya'da Türkiye," *İctihād* 30 (September 14, 1911), 833.
118. See Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam and the Arabs*, 23–28 for Egyptian nationalist activities during wartime.
119. *Ibid.*, 255–269. An article on the devastating earthquake in Japan, "al-Yābān: Dawla Sharqīyya Nakbatuhā al-Ṭab'ā," *al-Hilāl* (November 1, 1923), 10–11, commented that "Japan... is the Eastern nation which lifted the head of the East and made sure that Easterners accepted modern civilization... the colonizers from England, France, and Holland, their feet firmly planted in the Eastern countries and skimping on expenditures to educate the peoples" claim "... the Easterner differs from the West in his intellectual ability and his character, and that he does not benefit from European civilization. Then came Japan's progress, disproving these allegations."
120. Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East*, 39.
121. See Shafik Jeha, *Darwin and the Crisis of 1882 in the Medical Department: And the First Student Protest in the Arab World in the Syrian Protestant College (Now the American University of Beirut)*, Trans. by Sally Kaya (Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 2005).

122. Kenny, L. M, "East Versus West in *al-Muqtaṭaf*, 1875–1900: Image and Self-Image," in Donald P. Little (ed.) *Essays on Islamic Civilization Presented to Niyazi Berkes* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), 141. From G. E. von Grunebaum's *Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity* (New York, 1932), 20; Robert M. Haddad, *Syrian Christians in Muslim Society: an Interpretation* (Princeton, 1970), 3.
123. The Syrian Christian Jūrjī Zaydān represented the view of those who did acknowledge a distinct division between Orient and Occident, describing in "Rusiyyā wa'l-Yābān: Asbāb al-Ḥarḅ wa Sabab Raghbat Inkiltarā fi Nuṣrat al-Yābān," *al-Hilāl* (March 1, 1904), 349 "... what is an... old conflict. In ancient times it was between the Persians and the Greeks, then it became between them and the Romans, then between them and the Arabs, then between the Muslims and the Franks... until now, it was between Europe and China." Within this struggle, "plenty of people talk about the political movement which has appeared in the East in recent years after the victory of Japan over Russia. Traces of this movement appeared in India and Egypt." From "Tarīkh al-Nahḍa al-Siyāsiyya al-Akhīra," *al-Hilāl* (July 1910), 571.
124. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt*, 173–175.
125. Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East*, 57.
126. *Ibid.*, 54 explains Zaydān focused less on "pure science" and more on the human condition, that is sociology, history, literature, and language, to broaden his magazine's appeal.
127. Donald Reid, *The Odyssey of Farah Antūn* (Minneapolis: Biblioteca Islamica, Inc., 1975), 110.
128. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 258.
129. See Reid, *The Odyssey of Farah Antūn*, 71–110; Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 148–149, 252–259, for Antūn's ideas.
130. "Ta'līm fi'l-Yābān," *al-Muqtaṭaf* 32 (August 1907), 609.
131. Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East*, 53. It was originally founded in 1876.
132. *Al-Muqtaṭaf* relied upon information gleaned from Alfred Stead's books on Japan. In surveying the journal from its inception to 1920, the number of articles published per year on Japan ranged between 2–6 in the 1880s to slightly more in the 1890s; during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War 1–2 articles appeared in every monthly issue, while after 1911 the number significantly tapered off.
133. See Kenny, "East Versus West," 149–153.
134. *Ibid.*, 153.
135. Nadia Farag, *al-Muqtaṭaf 1876–1900: A Study of the Influence of Victorian Thought on Modern Arab Thought* (Oxford DPhil Dissertation, 1969), 307–328.
136. "al-Yābān wa Waṣiya Spencer Lahā," *al-Muqtaṭaf* 29 (February 1904), 113–116, for Spencer's advice to Baron Kaneko.
137. "Masā'il wa Ajwibatihā," *al-Muqtaṭaf* 21 (November 1897), 869–870. They continued, "This is the preliminary reason and it is equivalent to the preparation of land for agriculture and cultivation. If the religion of the Japanese had prevented them from associating with Europeans, from studying their sciences, and from venturing along their path, and if it had convinced them that they were the greatest of God's creatures, the most knowledgeable of humans, and that contact with Europeans contaminated and ruined them, then they would have remained distant from all Western civilization, had their country been adjacent to Europe, or even had they been living in Paris or London or Berlin. This follows other major, inescapable reasons for progress among peoples, which is that Japan succeeded completely in two significant issues, one of which is that its ruler is a benevolent sovereign, concerned with the welfare of his people. He strives for their advancement. The second is that the youth whom [Japan] sent forth to Western countries [America, England, and Germany] in order to learn there and, upon returning, to teach their fellow comrades, they were initially raised in refined households to be

- resolute and virtuous. [Then] they studied under scholars passionate about scientific research, and they were a blessing to their country.”
138. ‘Abd al-Majīd Luṭfī, “al-Manāzara wa’l-Murāsala,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 21 (December 1897), 935. I will quote this reader’s entire retort, as his words echoed the views of other Muslims concerning Japan’s rise to power, and the place of Islam in future Egyptian society: “I found your response to the question . . . about the progress of Japan published in the November *al-Muqtaṭaf* absurd, as I see you ascribing the progress of this country to a religious issue without examining its modern history and what the newspapers have reported. It appears . . . that what advanced [Japan] is the love of the Mikadō for [Japan’s] progress, and his cooperation. It is his government and his nation by virtue of this noble purpose and a lack of existence of anything blocking this strength of [the nation’s] will. This is the result which it is possible to achieve, analogous to the conditions of advanced nations. As for the religious argument that you pursued, there are many examples, and the most current are the existence of pagan nations and Christian nations lagging behind, until now, materially and culturally. Because it was my understanding that *al-Muqtaṭaf* does not publish anything except what it can support with cogent arguments, I believed that in your answer was a hidden agenda and I wanted to arrive at the truth by the following inquiry. I implore you to respond to it: first, is a pagan religion closer than others to Christianity, or is it united with them in principle and objective, as per your words, so that the religion of the Japanese does not distinguish them from Europeans? Second, what are the issues from which you infer that this religious pretext is the true preparation for the progress of Japan, to the point that you commence your answer with it and you make other concerns secondary in relation to it? Third, what religion is it that you are saying prevents its people from associating with Europeans, studying their sciences, and venturing in their path, convincing them that they are the most learned of mankind?”
139. *Ibid.*, 936. Translation: religious zeal, *al-ta’aṣṣub al-dīnī*; religious inclination, *al-gharḍ al-dīnī*; a prevailing religious ardor, *al-qūwwa al-dīnīyya al-sā’ida*.
140. *Ibid.*, 937.
141. On one occasion, a reader did not believe Japan’s success was more than merely a myth perpetuated by Europeans to pacify the dangers of Easterners challenging Western political, economic, and cultural hegemony. See “Nijāh al-Yābān al-Mawhūm,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 27 (November 1902), 1115 and another reader’s opinion the following month, 1201.
142. “Naba’ min al-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 27 (August 1902), 743–744; (September 1902), 842.
143. See Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 259; Reid, *The Odyssey of*, 69–78, 100–120.
144. Reid, *The Odyssey of*, 101.
145. *al-Jāmi’ a al-’Uthmānīyya* 1:7 (June 1899), 114.
146. See “Bāb Tarbīyya wa’l-Ta’alīm: Khawf al-Gharb min al-Sharq (al-Madāris Ḥajāṭunā al-Kubra),” *al-Jāmi’ a* 2:22, 23, 24 (April 1901), 719–724.
147. See Farag, *al-Muqtaṭaf 1876–1900*, 313, 322–328.
148. *Ibid.*, 323–324. See “Kayf Qāmat al-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 49 (October 1916), 369–374 for their views on Japan’s revision of unequal trade treaties with the West; see “al-Yābān ba’d al-Ḥarb,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 55 (October 1919), 292–294 for an evaluation of Japan’s economic capacity after the First World War; “Dars min al-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 57 (November 1920), 384–389 for the translation of an economic report on Japanese imports and exports by a former British Consul to Japan.
149. “al-’Ilm fī Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 7 (1882), 184–185. Farag?, 308–309 that these lists reflected a shift in Japanese interest away from “pure sciences” such as astronomy, chemistry, and geography, toward the “human sciences” of philosophy, sociology, literature, and the arts, demonstrating to the editors that Japan had transcended the useful sciences and was now in a new realm of its own original research and discovery.

150. Response to Rashīd Efendi Ghāzī, Macedonia, in “Masā’il wa Ajwibatuhā,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 11 (1886), 570.
151. According to “Bilād Yābān wa Asbāb Irṭiqā’ihā,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 22 (February 1898), 100–106, the important factors for Japanese modernity ranged from the country’s geographical setting and political history to its religions, its language and education system, its commerce, military forces, agriculture, industry, and the role of its women.
152. “al-Ajānib fī Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 24 (January 1900), 79.
153. See Baron Iwanaki’s report on English virtues and his comparison with the Japanese in “Akhlaq al-Inkiliz,” *al-Muqattam* (March 25, 1903), 1.
154. ‘A. M., “Taqaḍḍum al-Yābānīyyīn,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 13 (1889), 760–761, quoted from Farag, *al-Muqtaṭaf* 1876–1900, 310: “Japan’s pavilion was the envy and admiration of the whole of Europe for its fine embroidery, exquisite earthenware and silk, and for the refined manners of the Japanese representatives who spoke fluent English and French, whereas the Egyptian pavilion was the scene of utter chaos with jugglers and donkey boys getting into endless brawls, sellers of sweetmeats and cakes, singers and dancers drawing large crowds of amused onlookers. There was nothing charming . . . in this picturesque and lively scene which they condemned sternly as undignified and disgraceful.” The author concluded, “If it had not been for some of the Syrian and Egyptian textiles and latticework, we would not have found anything [about this exhibit] comforting.” The Lebanese Greek Catholic Christian Shaykh Ibrāhīm al-Yazījī, who edited the Cairene journal *al-Diyā’* from 1898 to 1910, also mentioned how Europeans were impressed by Japanese manufactured goods and handicrafts at this exhibition. See “al-Yābān,” *al-Diyā’* 2 (September 30, 1901), 33–39 for his impressions of Japan and his conclusion that “. . . we are among the people furthest from accepting true civilization” as compared to the progressive Japanese. See also Farīd al-Barbārī, “Ma’arīḍ al-Yābān,” *al-Diyā’* (November 30, 1903), 107–110. Japan’s respectable traditional arts such as the tea ceremony and sword-making had been preserved and were accepted as demonstrative of a civilized, modern nation that maintained a certain cultural heritage without allowing it to control the state’s future or to ruin its image abroad. See “al-Shāy fī Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 15 (1891), 325–327; “al-Suyūf al-Yābānīyya,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 24 (June 1900), 530; “al-Ṣanā’a fī l-Ṣīn wa l-Yābān,” 25 (November 1900), 479.
155. See “Bilād Yābān wa Ḥukūmatuhā,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 18 (1894), 361–365 and 438–440; “Naba’ min al-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 27 (August 1902), 740–747; “al-’Ilm fī l-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 38 (April 1911), 414.
156. “al-’Ilm fī al-Yābān,” 371–372.
157. “Bilād Yābān wa Ḥukūmatuhā,” 438–440; “Naba’ min al-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 27 (September 1902), 842–846; “Naba’ min al-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 27 (December 1902), 1169–1171; “Naba’ min al-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 28 (January 1903), 47–49; “Imbarātūr al-Yābān wa Imbarātūratuhā,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 29 (September 1904), 748–750; “Naba’ min al-Yābān: Akhlāq Imbarātūruhā,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 30 (April 1905), 265–268; “Imbarātūr al-Yābān al-Mutawafī,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 41 (September 1912), 209–214.
158. See “Ta’līm fī l-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 32 (August 1907), 609–616 and 32 (November 1907), 889–892 for a translation of a speech by Japanese Baron Kikuchi on education in Japan.
159. “Ta’līm fī l-Yābān,” 609; “Naba’ min al-Yābān: Dars fī Tadrīs,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 40 (April 1912), 371–375.
160. “Ta’līm fī l-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 32 (October 1907), 871.
161. “Ḥadīd al-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 27 (November 1902), 1134.
162. “Naba’ min al-Yābān: Qūwwatuhā al-Ḥarbīyya al-Barrīyya wa l-Bahrīyya,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 27 (November 1902), 1062–1069. In 1904–1905, approximately

- nineteen articles appeared in *al-Muqtaṭaf* concerning the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria, including two on the meaning of the phrase “Yellow Peril” (See “al-Khaṭr al-Aṣfar,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 29 (July 1904), 599–604; “al-Khaṭr al-Abyaḍ wa’l-Khaṭr al-Aṣfar,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 30 (July 1905), 545–551). The front page of *al-Muqtaṭam* throughout most of 1905 carried the regular column “News of the War” on Japan’s military victories against Russia, as well as at least one other front-page article on Japan and Russia that was typically translated from the European press or news-wires.
163. “al-Yābāniyyūn Qudwat al-Uthmāniyyīn,” *al-Muqtaṭam* (March 10, 1905), 1. “Mā Dakhala al-Taḥrīdāt al-Dīniyya fī Masā’il al-Siyāsa wa’l-Dunyawiyya,” *al-Muqtaṭam* (May 5, 1906) made a relatively unfavorable comparison between the Russian Czar as the head of Christian communities and the Ottoman Sultan as the Muslim caliph, in contrast to the nation of Japan. Ṣarrūf supplemented *al-Muqtaṭaf* with a novel in 1905 called *Fatāt Miṣr* (Egypt: Maṭba’at al-Muqtaṭaf, 1922) that expressed his political and social ideas, including his deep admiration for Japan. J. Brugman discusses the novel briefly in his *An Introduction to the History of Modern Arabic Literature in Egypt* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), 207, 210.
 164. “Nahḍat al-Ṣīn,” *al-Muqtaṭam* (July 5, 1905), 1.
 165. Farag, *al-Muqtaṭaf 1876–1900*, 320–321.
 166. “Majlis al-A’yān al-Yābāni,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 32 (November 1907), 894.
 167. “al-’Ilm Qawām al-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 30 (January 1905), 84 is a short article that rejoiced at Dr. Henry Dyer’s appeal to the English people to “emulate Japan in disseminating arts and sciences in the country . . .,” not just in hair and clothing styles since the Russian defeat, but “they say now that the system of education in Japan is more proper than the educational system in Europe, the Japanese Senate is more suitable than the English Senate [*sic*], and the Japanese military organization is better than Europe’s.” See also “Ta’līm fī’l-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 32 (November 1907), 889. Information comes from the translations of articles in *The Nineteenth Century* by British authors, one of whom is named Captain North; “Majlis al-A’yān al-Yābāni,” 32 (November 1907), 892–894, described the structure of Japanese parliament and claimed that because of it the Japanese had been able to execute tasks efficiently whereas the British had failed. In 1916 “al-Yābān wa Majd al-Sharq,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 48 (March 1916), 209–212 reiterated the claim that wealthy Westerners were copying Japanese styles.
 168. “Kayf Qāmat al-Yābān,” *al-Muqtaṭaf* 49 (October 1916), 369.
 169. *Ibid.*, 369.
 170. *Ibid.*, 369.
 171. See Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East*, 42–44, 55–56 on *al-Ahrām*. Initially published in Alexandria in 1876, they moved *al-Ahrām* to Cairo in 1899.
 172. “al-Jābon, aw al-Yābān,” *al-Ahrām* (August 26, 1880), 4. Interest in parliamentary government was apparent in other articles such as “Bārlāmān al-Yābān,” *al-Ahrām* (January 29, 1891), 1; “Majlis Nawāb al-Yābān,” *al-Ahrām* (February 11, 1905), 1.
 173. See “al-Yābān,” *al-Ahrām* (October 11, 1890), 1.
 174. See articles typically titled “al-Ṣīn wa’l-Yābān”; “Ūrūbā wa’l-Sharq al-Aqsā” between 1894 and 1895; “Ḥarb Rūsyā al-Yābān,” “Akhbār al-Ḥarb,” or “Maydān al-Qītāl” between 1904 and 1905 when these regular columns ran every day or every couple of days on the front page of *al-Ahrām*. During the Russo-Japanese War detailed information about every battle was published from the Reuters and Havas wire services, from translations of European or Russian articles, and from Japanese press releases, all of which often interjected brief comments on Japanese morality or the adoption of modern civilization. See for example “Ḥādīth al-Yābān,” *al-Ahrām* (September 12, 1904), 1.
 175. “al-Bunduqīyya,” *al-Ahrām* (October 19, 1894), 1.

176. "al-Iskandarīyya," *al-Ahrām* (January 10, 1895), 2.
177. See Mu'āhada Inkiltarā wa'l-Yābān," *al-Ahrām* (February 19, 1902) and (February 20, 1902), 1.
178. "al-Yābān," *al-Ahrām* (January 5, 1881), 4.
179. 'Aṭā Ḥusnī, "al-Nahḍa al-Sharqīyya," *al-Ahrām* (October 5, 1904), 1.
180. "Ta'akhhur Miṣr wa Taqaddum al-Yābān," *al-Ahrām* (June 29, 1905), 1.
181. "Umma bilā Hukūma," *al-Ahrām* (August 31, 1905), 1.
182. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 246.
183. "al-Yābān wa'l-Kūriyā," *al-Hilāl* (January 15, 1904), 227–233; "Diyānat al-Yābāniyyīn," *al-Hilāl* (March 15, 1904), 369. The author was alluding to the Japanese state effort to create national unity and obedience to the Empire by endorsing the Shintō religion and its deification of the Emperor, called "mystification of state power" by Japanese historians. *Tennō-sei* is the Japanese term for the "Emperor system."
184. "al-Madāris f'l-Yābān," *al-Hilāl* (October 1, 1905), 51.
185. "Dākhilīyyat al-Yābān," *al-Hilāl* (December 1, 1907), 177–178.
186. "al-Imbarāṭūrānī al-Mutahāribānī," *al-Hilāl* (March 1, 1904), 334, 338.
187. "Maṣīr al-Tamadaddun al-Ḥadīth: Wa Kayfa Tartaqī al-Sharq," *al-Hilāl* (April 1, 1911), 420; "al-Imbarāṭūrānī al-Mutahāribānī," 337.
188. "al-Yābān wa Kūriyā," *al-Hilāl* (January 15, 1904), 228.
189. Itō was credited with not beginning "...any deed before studying it and seeking information. He traveled to Europe and America more than once for this objective. And among the most important of his actions is that he introduced the Council in the Japanese government." From "al-Imbarāṭūrānī al-Mutahāribānī," 336–337.
190. "al-Ta'alīm Dalīl al-Qūwwa," *al-Hilāl* (November 1, 1907), 91. The signs of modernity for Zaydān were summed up as follows in "al-Yābān wa Kūriyā," *al-Hilāl* (January 15, 1904), 228: "Japan expanded colleges, universities, railroads and telegraphs and it commissioned ship-building factories.... It organized the postal service and created political and scientific newspapers. Japanese youth proceeded to European and American schools and... [they became] scientists, leaders, writers, historians, doctors, surgeons, researchers, and inventors, until Japan became like one of the advanced kingdoms in Europe."
191. See other articles on Japanese education such as "al-Ta'alīm al-Ilzāmī," *al-Hilāl* (January 1, 1908), 201–207; "al-Yābān: Aḥwāl al-Duwwal al-Mu'āṣira," *al-Hilāl* (March 1, 1908), 356–362; "al-Ḥaraka al-Ilmiyya bi-Miṣr: al-Ta'alīm al-Ilzāmī wa'l-Majānī," *al-Hilāl* (April 1, 1911), 429–432; "al-Ta'alīm al-Ijbārī f'l-Ālam," *al-Hilāl* (May 1, 1911), 509–510.
192. "al-Ta'alīm Dalīl al-Qūwwa," 92. In British-occupied Egypt, where education was not yet compulsory, only the upper classes would have been able to afford a decent education. Fair class distribution in Japanese schools was an important social advance noted in *al-Hilāl*. See "al-Yābān: Aḥwāl al-Duwwal al-Mu'āṣira," *al-Hilāl* (March 1, 1908), 356–362. Egypt ought to take note of Japan's education policy regarding women too, suggested *al-Hilāl*, since no nation could truly progress without advancing the educational level of its female population. See "al-Mar'a: Bayna'l-Tabadhdhul wa'l-Hijāb," *al-Hilāl* (November 1, 1910), 106–109; "al-Mar'a al-Yābāniyya: Wa Nahḍat al-Yābān," *al-Hilāl* (April 1, 1911), 331–332.
193. "al-Mar'a: Bayna'l-Tabadhdhul wa'l-Hijāb," *al-Hilāl* (November 1, 1910), 106–109 and "al-Mar'a al-Yābāniyya: Wa Nahḍat al-Yābān," *al-Hilāl* (April 1, 1911), 331–332.
194. "al-Dustūr al-Fārisī," *al-Hilāl* (April 1, 1909), 391.
195. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt*, 188.
196. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 224.
197. Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 112–114.

198. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 228.
199. Japanese philosopher Sakuma Shōzan had succeeded in this intellectual exercise in a way that allowed Japan to borrow and adapt Western civilization without damaging Japanese self-identity.
200. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 228.
201. *Ibid.*, 228–230, 233–234.
202. *Ibid.*, 234–235.
203. *Ibid.*, 244.
204. *Ibid.*, 238.
205. See “al-Sharqayn: al-Adna wa’l-Aqṣā,” *al-Manār* 1 (March 1898–March 1899), 91–93; “Istinhād Himam,” *al-Manār* (June 10, 1899), 201.
206. “Istinhād Himam,” *al-Manār* (May 27, 1899), 167.
207. “Khātimah: Kitāb Taḥrīr al-Mar’ah,” *al-Manār* (August 26, 1899), 375.
208. “Wa Mā Kāna Rabak li Yahluku al-Qura,” *al-Manār* 1 (March 17, 1898 to March 6, 1899), 586–587.
209. “al-Ḥarb Bayna al-Yābān wa’l-Rūsīyya,” *al-Manār* 6:24 (March 3, 1904), 949–950.
210. *Ibid.*, 950.
211. “al-Ḥarb al-Muḍṭarama fi’l-Sharq,” *al-Manār* (May 6, 1904), 200; “Naḥḍat al-Ṣīn wa Sabab Irṭiqā’ al-Yābān,” *al-Manār* (February 1, 1908), 920–921.
212. “Hulāṣat Tārīkh Harb al-Yābān wa Rūsīyā,” *al-Manār* (October 25, 1904), 629; “al-Thawra fi Rūsīyā,” *al-Manār* (October 29, 1905), 677–678.
213. “al-Ḥayā al-Millīyya bi’l-Tarbiyya al-Ijtīmā’īyya,” *al-Manār* (December 27, 1905), 811–813; “Mulāḥazat al-Manār,” *al-Manār* 1 (March 17, 1898–March 6, 1899), 810; “Naḥḍat al-Ṣīn wa Sabab Irṭiqā’ al-Yābān,” *al-Manār* (February 1, 1908), 921.
214. “Da’awat al-Yābān Ila’l-Islām,” *al-Manār* (November 13, 1905), 705–706.
215. *Ibid.*, 707–708.
216. “Muslimū al-Ṣīn wa’l-Islām fi’l-Yābān,” *al-Manār* (January 11, 1906), 879–880; “Da’awat al-Yābān Ila’l-Islām,” *al-Manār* (December 13, 1905), 796; (February 24, 1906), 75–78.
217. “Da’awat al-Yābān Ila’l-Islām,” 709.
218. See “Mu’tamar al-Adyān fi’l-Yābān,” *al-Manār* (May 24, 1906), 317–319 when he says the Japanese have finally realized the goodness of Islam.
219. “al-Islām wa’l-Madaniyya al-Ḥadītha,” *al-Manār* (December 24, 1908), 819.
220. Ḥusayn Waṣfī Riḍā mentioned in “al-Ittiḥād al-Islāmī” *al-Manār* (July 7, 1910), 464 that Egyptian army officer Aḥmad Efendi Faḍlī and Muḥammad Barakatullah Efendi had taken it upon themselves to make the Japanese understand the truths of Islam and that readers could make a small financial contribution to their cause. In “Athār al-Miṣriyyīn fi al-Yābān,” *Miṣr al-Fatāt* (July 6, 1910), 1–2, the author attributed the information in Faḍlī’s lectures to books on Islam by Shaykh Ṭaṇṭāwī Gawḥarī. A Cairo-born soldier of Turkish origin and graduate of the Egyptian military academy in ‘Abbāsiyya, Yüzbaşı (Lt.) Aḥmad Faḍlī served in the recruitment office of the Egyptian forces during the Sudanese campaign, where he became disillusioned with British injustices. [The military academy in ‘Abbāsiyya still has a copy of Faḍlī’s official record, but I was unable to obtain a copy. Independent scholar Suzuki has a series of articles in ‘*Arab* (Tokyo: 1993–1995) on Aḥmad Faḍlī’s life]. Faḍlī decided to travel to Japan and spent time there between 1908 and 1911 where he traveled in elite circles that included Abdūrreṣīd İbrahim. Aḥmad Faḍlī (or Fazlı Bey in some Turkish sources) translated into Arabic a treatise entitled *The Japanese Spirit [al-Nafs al-Yābāniyya]* in 1909 by Japanese Lt. Sakurai, who served in the Russo-Japanese War at Port Arthur. Fluent in English and French, Aḥmad Faḍlī lived in the Japanese village of Nippori and married a local Japanese woman whom he brought back to Cairo. In 1911 he published his own book in Arabic called *Kitāb Sīrr Taqaddum al-Yābān [The Secret of Japan’s Progress]*. According to Abdūrreṣīd

İbrahim, in 1909 Fazlı Bey complied with statesman Count Okuma's suggestion and gave a lecture on Islam at Waseda University to some 2000 students [see Paksu (ed.), *20. Asrın Başlarında İslam Dünyası*, 357–359]. In İbrahim's description of Fazlı Bey's lectures in "Japonya'da İslâmiyet," *Sırât-ı Müstekîm* 2:38 (5.1325/1909), 183, he claimed Fazlı Bey planted the first seeds of Islam in Japan and that he was the first individual within social circles of Japan that discussed Islam truthfully. After a slanderous book about the life of the Prophet Muḥammad appeared in Japan (attributed to missionary intrigues), Aḥmad Faḍlî gave three subsequent lectures (in English) in the Kandabaş(hi?) salon; the editor of *The Japan Times* translated his lectures into Japanese and they were published in some of the Tokyo newspapers [see Paksu (ed.), 381–382]. According to Muhammad Barakatullah, the Indian activist in Japan, Ahmet Fazlı "found Japanese morality and national traditions rather close to Islam. He is convinced that Islam will be accepted in place of the current religion by the Japanese." See Muhammad Barakatullah, "Japonya'da Dîn-i İslâm İntişâra Başlıyor," *Sırât-ı Mustakîm* 2:50 (8.1325/1909), 383. This article shed light on Barakatullah's plans for the expansion of Islam in Japan and the coordination of efforts he hoped would take place between Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and the Japanese, including the building of schools and mosques, dispatching ulema, imams, and muezzins to Tokyo who knew or would learn English and Japanese languages, and publishing a weekly Islamic newspaper. He also requested permission to allow a Japanese scholar named Yasutaro Hanjyu to study in Istanbul. Fazlı eventually returned to Egypt and played no noticeable political or military role in later years.

221. "al-Radd 'ala Maqâlla al-'Ilm al-Thalâtha," *al-Manâr* (June 30, 1911), 64.
222. "Nahḍa Āsyawīyya," *al-Manâr* (August 13, 1912), 626–636. He accredited Japan's victory as the reason for this new Asian solidarity; Muslims of the Caucasus and Turkestan, as well as a Shaykh Süleymân Şükrî Efendi of Anatolia, were trying to convert the Japanese to Islam, and a camaraderie between the Ottoman Empire and the Japanese was evident in the secret talks the two countries were conducting toward an alliance. Riḍâ's discussion of Muslim marriages in 1913 suggested the Japanese be recognized as another of the "Peoples of the Book"; see "Ḥukma 'Adam Dhikr al-Brâhma wa'l-Büdhîyyîn fî'l-Qur'an," *al-Manâr* (July 4, 1913), 517.
223. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 227.

9 Conclusion: Competing Narratives, Ottoman Successor States, and "Non-Western" Modernity

1. I made these comparisons at the 2010 Tri-University History conference at the University of Guelph for a panel called Middle Eastern Minorities and Rights in a paper titled "A Tale of Two Minorities: Sati' al-Husri, an Ottoman Arab, and Abdürreşid İbrahim, Tatar Muslim from Russia."
2. My "Rising Sun over Bear" delves into the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on Young Turk thought concerning race, language, and identity.
3. Mehmet Âkif Ersoy, *Safahat: İkinci Kitap (Süleymaniye Kurşusunda)*, 23 baskı, ed. by Omer Rıza Doğrul (İstanbul: İnkilâp Kitabevi, 1991). According to this 23rd edition, after 1912 there was an undated edition, then another in 1918, and another in 1928.
4. From Ersoy, *Safahat: İkinci Kitap (Süleymaniye Kurşusunda)*, 3 baskı, (İstanbul: 1336/1918), 57–58. Poem originally published in Ottoman Turkish in 1912 as "Terakkî Sırrı." See modern Turkish text in Ersoy, *Safahat*, ed. by Doğrul, 187–188. His poem "Japonlar" is on 170–172. This excerpt was also translated in Fahir İz and Nermin Menemencioğlu (eds.), *The Penguin Book of Turkish Verse* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978), 177.
5. Originally an article titled "Medeniyetimiz," *Yeni Mecmua* 68 (İstanbul 1923), reprinted in *Türkçülüğün Esasları (The Principles of Turkism)* as "Garbe Doğru" in

1923. I utilized a modern Turkish 4th edition of this book prepared by Mahir Ünlü and Yusuf Çotuksöken (İstanbul: İnkilâp Kitabevi, 1994), 49.
6. "Medeniyetimiz," translation from Berkes, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp* (New York: George Allen and Unwin, 1959), 269–270.
 7. *Ibid.*, 277.
 8. Jurjî Niqûlâ Bâz, *Taqaddum al-Yabân: Khuḩab Târikhî* (Beirut: Maṭba'at al-Qadîs Jâwurjîyûs, 1922).
 9. *Ibid.*
 10. Ṭaha al-Hâshimî *Nahḩat al-Yabân wa Ta'thîr Ruḩ al-Umma fi'l-Nahḩa* (Baghdad: Dâr al-Salâm, 1925).
 11. See Peter Sluglett, "Colonialism, the Ottomans, the Qajars, and the Struggle for Independence: The Arab World, Turkey, and Iran," in Youssef M. Choueiri (ed.), *A Companion to the History of the Middle East* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 260.
 12. Sâṭî' al-ḩuṣrî, *Mâ Hiya al-Qawmiyya? Abḩâth wa Dirâsât 'ala ḩaw' al-Aḩdath wa'l-Naḩariyyât* (Beirut: 1963, 2nd ed.), 26–27. From lectures given at the Institute for Advanced Arab Studies at the Arab League between 1944 and 1947; first published 1959.
 13. See "Khuṭba al-Mikadô," *al-Liwâ'* (March 30, 1904), 1.
 14. This was a view shared by many in the Ottoman Empire. Ahmed Rıza wrote in "Leçons Japonaises," *Mechveret Supplément Français* 161 (March 1, 1905), 3, that "if the occupation of Korea is emphasized, it is in the form of a prodigious extension of the railway. In China, the activity of the Japanese is no less: the good offices of the viceroys are now and had already been acquired for Japanese infiltration. . . . Everywhere they have founded schools, established commercial centers, sent military instructors. Everywhere they introduce their ideas, their products and their representatives."
 15. See Noor-Aiman I. Khan, *Egyptian-Indian Nationalist Collaboration and the British Empire* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
 16. I found only two such references in the Egyptian paper *al-Garîda*: "Inkiltâra wa Miṣr wa'l-Yabân wa Kûriya," *al-Garîda* (August 27, 1910), 1 and "Li ḩafz al-Niẓâm wa'l-Amn al-'Amm," *al-Garîda* (September 10, 1910), 4.
 17. "Li ḩafz al-Niẓâm wa'l-Amn al-'Amm," 4.
 18. "Miṣr wa Kûriya," *Miṣr al-Fatât* (August 21, 1910), 1.
 19. Aḩmad Luṭfî al-Sayyid, "al-Dustûr: 'ala Abwâb al-Ṣîn," *al-Garîda* (August 4, 1910), 1.
 20. Muḩammad Kurd 'Alî, "Ta'lim al-Waṭani," *al-Muqtabas* (April 13, 1910).
 21. Vatikiotis, *Modern Egypt*, 264.
 22. Marc Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945* (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 21–22.
 23. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900–1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 255–269.
 24. For more on Japanese interest in the Islamic world in the interwar period, see Selçuk Esenbel, "Japan and Islam Policy during the 1930s" in her collection of essays titled *Japan, Turkey and the World of Islam* (Leiden: Brill—Global Oriental, 2011), 28–52. First published in Bert Edström (ed.), *Turning Points in Japanese History* (London: Japan Library and Routledge Curzon, 2002), 180–214.
 25. Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs*, 256.
 26. On the continued examination of Japan as a model in the late twentieth century, see for example these articles by Mas'ud ḩâhir, "Ṣurat al-Yabân 'ind al-'Arab," *Shu'ûn 'Arabîyya* (September 1993), 156–167; "al-'Arab wa'l-Yabân: Adwa' 'ala Tajribat al-Taḩdîth al-Yabâniyya," *al-Waḩda* 85 (October 1991), 99–107;

“al-Yābān al-Yowm: Raw’at al-Ṭabā’ wa Ibdā’ al-Sha’b,” *al-Fikra al-‘Arabī al-Mu’āsir* 80–81 (October 1990), 119–126, as well as books by ‘Abd al Ghaffār Rashād, *Al-Taqlīdiyya wa’l-Ḥadātha fī’l-Tajriba al-Yābāniyya* (Beirut: Mu’assasāt al-Abḥāth al-‘Arabī, 1984); Shākir al-Nābulī, *Al-Thaqāfa al-Thālitha, Awrāq fī’l-Tajriba al-Yābāniyya al-Mu’āsira wa Mawqif al-Mutafarraj al-Azli Minha!* (Beirut: 1988); Jacques Attali, *Lignes d’horizon* (Paris 1990) translated into Arabic by Muḥammad Zakariyā Ismā’īl as *Āfāq al-Mustaqbal* (1992).

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