British Strategy and Intelligence in the Suez Crisis

Danny Steed

British Strategy and Intelligence in the Suez Crisis

Danny Steed

British Strategy and Intelligence in the Suez Crisis

palgrave
macmillan

Danny Steed
London, UK

Acknowledgements

Contents

Introduction

For Britain, the Suez Crisis remains as divisive as it is no doubt seminal to British post-war history. The received wisdom that it took the calamity at Suez to 'shatter the illusion of Britain as a great imperial power'[1] has been countered by revisionist interpretations. Those accounts argue for the inevitability of British decline,[2] and that Suez was merely a notable yet 'dramatic hiccup'[3] in Britain coming to terms with its loss of power. Simply put, Britain would have become a middle ranking power whether or not Suez had happened. What remains in no doubt, however, is that Suez deserves its place in British political history as a key moment. The debates about the manner and timings of British decline notwithstanding, for the casual reader of history Suez provides the convenient marker point demonstrating clearly that British power was not only no longer dominant, but that it was required to bow to the wishes of larger powers, notably America. The crisis provided a genuine conspiracy to unearth, destroyed the political career of then Prime Minister Anthony Eden, and provoked a serious moment of soul-searching on the part of a Britain which, although grappling with the question of diminished status and a changed global order since 1945, realised graphically by 1957 that a serious answer was now required.

To state that at times Suez haunts British politics would be no exaggeration; Margaret Thatcher came to condemn what she termed the "Suez Syndrome", where the trauma of Suez had such an effect on the self-esteem of British foreign policy that it led to a persistent attitude of

exaggerating Britain's impotence in the world.[4] Thatcher's own foreign policy, emboldened by her success in the Falklands War of 1982, was clearly motivated in part by a desire to halt the foreign policy trend that since Suez she described as 'one long retreat'.[5] The ghost of Suez was not fully excised with Thatcher, however; its presence in contemporary political vocabulary has not ceased, and Suez was indeed cited in the run-up to the controversial Iraq War of 2003.[6] The legacy of the politically ambiguous, and no doubt costlier, interventions in the Middle East and Central Asia of the 2000s has breathed fresh life into the lessons of Suez.

Although Suez is broadly well-understood, there are avenues of research with much to contribute to established knowledge. The intention of this book is to explore the intelligence story of Britain in the Suez Crisis. Before establishing the justification for this however, it is first necessary to discuss strategy and intelligence broadly.

Strategy and Intelligence

Intelligence holds a special place in the hearts of those who both do and study strategy. Arguably the only other dimension of strategy that evokes such impassioned representation in popular culture is combat itself; intelligence over the course of the past century has inspired such fascination that some of our most cherished fictional icons are products of the intelligence world. In current times, gone are the sceptical views of the early post-Cold War years, when it was asserted that intelligence 'is a dying business'.[7] Since the events of 11 September 2001 intelligence has played an ever-increasing role, and one that has given it a level of public exposure never before seen. The decade labelled as 'the 9/11 wars'[8] has placed increasing burdens on Western intelligence services in both counter-terrorist missions and counter-insurgency missions across the world. The importance of intelligence in these missions has continually gained greater patronage, such as from the world-renowned counter-insurgency expert, David Kilcullen, who argues for its vital role in population-focussed counter-insurgency.[9] The experiences of the 9/11 wars has only underlined further the vital role that intelligence plays in developing and executing strategy.

Into the second decade of the 2000s, the world has been rocked by Edward Snowden's revelations about the method and scale of signals intelligence practices undertaken by the American National Security Agency (NSA) and Britain's Government Communications Headquarters

(GCHQ). The details of Snowden's exposures are beyond the scope of this book's focus,[10] but serve to reveal the level of public engagement with the topic now that the British Parliament, through its Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), has called for a complete overhaul of the legal architecture under which British intelligence operates.[11] Events like this, as well as the targeted killing of Osama bin Laden by US Navy SEALs in May 2011—which was labelled an 'intelligence triumph'[12]—serve to reveal that intelligence is not the dying business that it was feared to be in the early 1990s. It is very much alive and in more demand from political actors than ever.

Despite this clear requirement for, and the actual use of, intelligence in the contemporary strategic environment, 'It appears that the role of intelligence is either overlooked or is taken for granted as operating as a hidden force in the background. This is odd when one considers the significance of intelligence in the work of Sun Tzu, one of the foremost classical theorists in the subject.'[13] With these words Lonsdale establishes the central justification for this book's exploration of the relationship between strategy and intelligence: that despite intelligence very clearly holding a special place not only in strategic theory generally, but also a central place in Sun Tzu's work[14]—the oldest-known treatise on strategy at over 2,500 years old—its role therein remains formally unrecognised and certainly under-theorised.

Despite the indisputable importance of the relationship between strategy and intelligence, the respective sub-fields for their study within international relations—strategic studies and intelligence studies—have thus far carried out their intellectual endeavours without reference to one another. Strategic studies has marched to the sound of the guns, focusing its efforts on the challenges of the day, which in modern times have been overwhelmingly on the Cold War nuclear standoff and the persistent regularity of irregular warfare; in addition, the field has had its own internal debates about strategic theory. Intelligence studies, meanwhile, has always been conditioned by the secrecy of its topic as to what it can research. The focus has always fallen on those areas which have emerged into the public domain and provided publicly available evidence: warning failure, deep-penetration agents, covert operations, and oversight and accountability, before turning to the development of theory.

This lack of inter-disciplinary engagement has resulted in a gap in knowledge where the operating relationship between strategy and intelligence has been neither identified nor codified. The objective of this book

is to identify, codify and operationalise that relationship into an explanatory model that can then be used against the single case study of Britain in the 1956 Suez Crisis—using historical methodology—in order to understand the real-world operation of, and generate broader conclusions on, the relationship.

Definitions

In dealing with issues of policy, and in making a central subscription to the Clausewitzian thesis of the political nature of war,[15] it is necessary to offer definitions of politics and policy, as well as strategy and intelligence, in order to establish conceptual clarity.

Politics must be the starting point for definitions because, out of politics and policy, 'Politics is the more authoritative of the two, since it provides much of the fuel and most of the process that yields what we call policy.'[16] Minogue also highlights this idea of *process* as representing a guiding theme of Western politics since Ancient Greece, where outcomes emerge from a process of dialogue.[17] Any understanding of policy must take heed of its origins in a political process. Laswell described the study of politics as 'the study of influence and the influential.'[18] The implication of this statement is that the practice of politics is the practice of wielding influence, hence the broader title of his work, and the definition of politics subscribed to here: '*Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*'.[19]

As politics is inclusive of a process, it is clear that policy must ultimately be an expression of this process, and is consequently a *product* of the political process. Policy, therefore, is *the product of a political process, a product providing the political objectives upon which action and behaviour are both informed and conditioned towards the attainment of those objectives.*

To define strategy we subscribe immediately to Clausewitz as the necessary start point. He states that strategy is 'the use of the engagement for the purposes of the war'.[20] Clausewitz's remark may appear to hold a narrow military-centric view on strategy, but it must be considered in any attempt at a satisfactory definition for two reasons: first, no definition of strategy should ever neglect the possibility of force being used, which Clausewitz explicitly provides; secondly, Clausewitz achieves, albeit more subtly, an appreciation that the real realm of strategy lies not in the use of force itself, but in the consequences of actions taken in the achievement of sought outcomes.[21] For this book, however, the definition of strategy offered by Gray will be adopted, due to its broader political inclusivity:

'Strategy is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose; it is neither military power per se nor political purpose.'[22]

Issuing a definition of intelligence is a difficult task indeed because, as Warner argues, 'we have no accepted definition of intelligence'.[23] The sharpest point of contention in defining intelligence lies in the disagreement over whether intelligence must necessarily be a secret pursuit or whether secrecy is simply a side-effect of good intelligence work.[24] The broad outline of this disagreement can be characterised by two schools: the American school, which believes that secrecy is not the defining characteristic of intelligence work, and the British school, which believes that it is. Godson and Lockhart explored this divergence in neighbouring chapters in 1987.[25] The full definition of intelligence from Shulsky and Schmitt will follow below, but theirs represents the fundamental position of the American school in referring to intelligence as *information* that is relevant to policy. The British position, conversely, stresses secrecy as the essential defining characteristic[26]; Andrew and Dilks put it simply as 'information which policy-makers cannot acquire by more conventional methods'.[27] This is a point made explicitly by the British government's own published understanding of intelligence: it denominates intelligence as 'secret intelligence', and stipulates that 'Intelligence provides *privileged* insights not usually available openly.'[28]

It is because of such disagreements within Intelligence Studies that no singular definition will be subscribed to here; to adopt an American or British view would detract from the merits that both have to offer. A superior definition should therefore seek to incorporate the understanding of both the *relevance* to policy of intelligence, and also the *secret* nature of its pursuit. Based on this understanding, two definitions will be used—those of Shulsky and Schmitt, and Kent—in order to draw out the key points from the American school, before accepting the privileged nature of intelligence as is declared in the British Government's *National Intelligence Machinery*. Shulsky and Schmitt serve as the start point for the definition that this book will offer. To them: 'Intelligence refers to *information* relevant to a government's formulation and implementation of policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats from actual or perceived adversaries.'[29] This definition deserves its place for its reasoning that it is the relevance of information to policy that establishes its status as intelligence; mere information that holds no relevance is not intelligence at all. Secondly, we will also subscribe to Kent's view of intelligence as knowledge, organisation and activity.[30] These definitions, augmented with

the understanding and insistence from the British school that intelligence services operate in a covert fashion form the holistic understanding of intelligence on which this book's analysis is founded. Intelligence is here defined as *the knowledge, organisation and activity undertaken, in secret, to produce privileged insights of relevance to the formulation and implementation of government policy.*

At this stage the intention has been to outline the importance of intelligence, both to contemporary strategy as it is practised, and theoretically in generating a more mature understanding of its place. Having established the case, it is now time to turn to Britain and the Suez Crisis, in order to establish why this affair in particular is such a rich prospect for researching intelligence affairs.

Britain and the Suez Crisis

Anyone performing even a cursory examination of British history is sure to encounter the standard litany of phrases used to describe the 1956 Suez Crisis. It is held as the watershed moment in modern British history, Anthony Nutting declaring that it had taught Britain a salutary lesson: that 'you cannot apply any longer in the twentieth century a nineteenth century policy of Imperialism'.[31] The crisis 'marked the end of Britain and France as world powers'.[32] Indeed, it was 'the last thrash of empire'[33] as the sun set on the era of imperial colonialism and the Cold War order asserted itself beyond continental Europe. Peter Calvocoressi argues that Suez presented a 'double moment of truth', whereby not only had it become clear that the world itself was now different, but Britain was forced to confront that changed reality starkly. Those moments of truth had been forced on the British in 1956 simply because they enjoyed the luxury of victory in 1945, which had masked the realities of their changing position.[34] Nutting, who famously resigned not only his place in Anthony Eden's Cabinet over the crisis, but also his seat as a Member of Parliament, held Suez as *No End of a Lesson*.[35] On the Egyptian side, journalist Mohamed Heikal referred to the crisis as *Cutting the Lion's Tail*.[36]

The indictment of British actions did not cease with the issue of these broad platitudes; others suggest that Suez 'represents the greatest single failure of premiership in the post war period'.[37] Percy Cradock, a former chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), labels it 'a low point in the history of responsible government'.[38] The actions that Britain took in response to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company by Gamel

Abdel Nasser in 1956 are rightly remembered as notorious, highlighted nowhere more clearly than in the infamous collusion deal with France and Israel to invade Egypt, then by Britain's first use of the veto in the UN Security Council.

The historiography of the Suez Crisis, although appearing a well-trodden path of historical inquiry 60 years on, still offers plenty of scope for investigation and interpretation. W. Scott Lucas remains correct in asserting that the historiography has evolved through three distinct phases.[39] First was simply the establishment of what had transpired in 1956. This phase, of course, obsessed for many years on the issue of collusion; with Anthony Eden 'most emphatically' denying the charge of conspiracy with France and Israel in the House of Commons,[40] as well as having omitted the issue entirely in his memoirs, *Full Circle*,[41] he 'was guilty of a serious misjudgement'.[42] Beck suggests that the misjudgement harmed Eden's reputation as well as failing to satisfy those seeking to unearth the truth. In addition, Eden's failure to confront the issue shaped historical research for many years, by providing a genuine conspiracy that researchers could seek to unearth. Thus, the first phase of the Suez historiography was dominated by the search to establish collusion, a process that Eden's widow labelled as 'the collusion witch hunt'.[43] Beck further establishes that an additional reason why this first phase was so dominant was subsequent British governments, who prevented even confidential internal histories from being written on the matter, seeking 'to keep the door closed on Suez'.[44] This decision left fallow fertile ground for researchers in this first phase to exploit.

The second phase, once collusion was established, was the attribution of responsibility. The role of Anthony Eden has generally been seen as central, with a consistent flow of literature that seeks to either attribute responsibility primarily to Eden, or seeks a broader explanation. Jonathan Pearson criticises Keith Kyle and W. Scott Lucas in particular for being too quick and simplistic in their analyses of Eden's role, arguing that a broader conception of the decision-making process through the whole crisis will yield a more balanced view of events.[45] Robert Rhodes James declared in 1986 that only then, 'thirty years later, is it possible to take a *cooler* look at what actually happened, and why it happened'.[46] Indeed while cooler attitudes are needed, it must be noted that the waves of memoirs and testimony that emerged over the years all contributed to the indictment of Eden's actions. Nutting's *No End of a Lesson* was only the first: the diaries of William Clark, Eden's private Secretary, followed much later in *From*

Three Worlds,[47] continuing the drip feed of insight into the inner working of Eden's handling of the crisis. Geoffrey McDermott, deputy to Patrick Dean and Assistant Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, published *The Eden Legacy and the Decline of British Diplomacy* in 1969, showing that Eden was creating a closed architecture of decision-making *designed* to exclude the broader policy-making machine.[48] There are many more contributions to this second phase, but it must be accepted that however the historiography of Suez may evolve, Anthony Eden will always remain central to it.

The third phase seeks broader explanations for British failure, although Lucas is right to claim that numerous gaps still remain in the exploration of Suez. The first gap that he notes is the role of the intelligence services during the crisis, which is the avenue of historiography that this work seeks to contribute to. The activities of the British intelligence services always provoke interest in those seeking the full story of divisive foreign policy ventures, hoping to find the story within the story by unveiling the covert side of foreign policy and strategic affairs. This interest and motivation is not without empirical merit; Jackson issues a strong warning to intelligence researchers and historians alike when he reminds us that Britain has shown both the desire and ability to manipulate the official record in the past in order to avoid revealing the 'Ultra Secret' of the Second World War.[49] The Ultra example alone is vindication of the drive to search for stories that reveal essential truths to aid our understanding of how and why events transpired as they did.

The enduring interest in the activities of the intelligence services can also be seen in the present day in the number, scale, intensity and controversy of the public inquiries into the activities of British intelligence and the decision-making of Tony Blair's Cabinet in the lead-up to the Iraq War of 2003. The experience of these inquiries shows that the appetite for pulling back the shroud of secrecy around both Cabinet-level decision-making, and intelligence service activities, remains as keen as ever and as important as ever both to academic researchers and the British public. Much like the case of Iraq in 2003, the Suez Crisis has a rich intelligence story to tell, which has to date eluded comprehensive scholarly treatment. In examining the relationship between intelligence and strategy, it is the story of British intelligence services in the Suez Crisis that will be told here, seeking to draw together a comprehensive account of their activities in the development and execution of British strategy in 1956.

Intelligence at Suez: The Uncharted Territory of a Familiar Case

Scepticism may seem to be appropriate when pondering how much fresh insight can be unearthed by a study of the practices of British intelligence in the Suez Crisis. One can rightly note the coverage of such activities in Steven Dorrill's *MI6*,[50] Richard Aldrich's *The Hidden Hand*,[51] Percy Cradock's *Know Your Enemy*[52] and Michael Goodman's official history of the JIC[53] among others and ask, what is new? While acknowledging the broad range of literature available covering intelligence matters, Suez continues to offer new insight for two reasons. First, a comprehensive history of British intelligence activities *as a whole* at Suez has not been written. Those works that have helped to progressively lift the veil on intelligence activities must be described as representing a scattershot approach—providing pieces of the puzzle but ultimately failing to compile and analyse the complete intelligence picture. This is typically because such works have a broader focus than simply one particular episode of British policy. Aldrich was writing a larger history of intelligence practice across the Cold War period, whereas Cradock and Goodman were producing an organisational history of the JIC. Dorril wrote a similar organisational history of SIS, capturing events across the whole of the Cold War, but with a particular focus on covert operations. W. Scott Lucas's *Divided We Stand* is notable for adopting a purely Suez focus, and captures very well much of the covert activity of SIS,[54] but it does not deal with the JIC, nor was Lucas able to benefit from the declassification of significant JIC material from the early 1990s onward.

This scattershot treatment is not limited to dedicated intelligence histories; in the mainstream histories of Suez the poverty of treatment of all things intelligence is noticeable. This is best revealed in Keith Kyle's comprehensive history *Suez*: across almost 700 pages it mentions the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6[55]) on only six occasions, and the JIC not once.[56] No work tackling the Suez Crisis, whether from an intelligence perspective or from a general historical one, has sought to comprehensively trace and analyse the activities of British intelligence. This is therefore uncharted territory within a very familiar story.

The second reason for exploring the Suez Crisis lies in the poverty of analysis of intelligence activities from a strategic perspective. Strategic appraisal of intelligence activities has been lacking, generally for empirical reasons—the lack of material available to consult, which in turn is due to

the stringent statutory protections afforded to the intelligence services. The clearest and most relevant of these statutory protections in Britain are the Public Records Act 1958 and the Freedom of Information Act 2000. For the Public Records Act, the intelligence and security services hold a 'blanket exemption'; in the case of the Freedom of Information Act, the intelligence services are outside the scope of the Act.[57] The study of strategy through Strategic Studies meanwhile has failed to properly codify its relationship to intelligence, progressing little beyond the advice on the use of spies issued in Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. Taken together, these lacunae justify the exploration of intelligence and strategy during the Suez Crisis, in order to establish what the British intelligence services did during this time, but also to analyse the strategic importance of their activities and place them within the full context of British policy. This will be achieved while also drawing out the broader lessons revealed about the relationship between strategy and intelligence. So far, the treatment of intelligence activities at Suez has narrowly sought to unearth stories of special operations, not the broader analysis needed to fully understand their place in the history of the Suez Crisis and establish a strategic appraisal.

The focus of this work, therefore, is on providing the comprehensive treatment of British intelligence activities in 1956 that has so far been lacking. Primarily, the focus will be on the JIC and SIS, establishing their organisation and institutional positions, examining operational methods and respective performances, the strategic impact of their activities, and, ultimately, their adaptations following the events of 1956. Further to this, there will also be analysis of the British-led military invasion of Egypt, Operation Musketeer, analysing the role that intelligence played in supporting both planning for and conduct of military operations against Egypt. The purpose being not only to establish the history of intelligence performance at the strategic level through the intelligence services, but also to consider their activities through to the arena of military action. No strategic analysis or history can be considered complete without exploring the realm of military action as well as policy development.

While tracing in detail the development and activities of the JIC and SIS, it is also necessary to consider in depth the assumptions driving policy-making in Prime Minister Eden's government. Only by establishing the broader policy context of British thinking at the time can any effective strategic analysis of British intelligence be carried out. This approach seeks to move beyond the standard treatment of intelligence history as a form of black box activity in itself, one that is analysed with little consideration

given to the policy masters it is intended to serve. Instead, it is a core intention of this work to reveal how both the JIC and SIS were subject to the same conditioning assumptions as the Eden government in shaping the way in which Britain saw the world in 1956, and subsequently approached the crisis.

Why No GCHQ?

A notable absence from analysis must be acknowledged and explained: the role of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). GCHQ is excluded from consideration in this work for two reasons: first, the poverty of empirical evidence to inform analysis; second, despite the lack of evidence on GCHQ, the evidence that is available can be judged to show that GCHQ had little impact on the course of British policy, thereby establishing that signals intelligence added little value to British strategic activity. On the first reason there is simply not enough material publicly available on which to base adequate historical treatment or robust strategic analysis. It must be considered a brutal reality of intelligence research that significant gaps will continue to remain in place, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) remains the most formidable of those gaps in the historical record of intelligence. The best dedicated historical work on GCHQ in print, Richard Aldrich's *GCHQ*, spends just four pages on the Suez Crisis and focuses much of its attention on the often-publicised deception of Britain's American allies, rather than on what support GCHQ provided to British strategy and policy-making.[58]

The second reason will be contentious, being based on precious little evidence, but it is argued here that the evidence that is available suggests that GCHQ did not productively help the development and execution of British policy and strategy during the Suez Crisis. This argument rests first on countering the often-quoted letter from Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd to the Director of GCHQ, Eric Jones, during the crisis. In that letter, Lloyd expresses his thanks for the efforts of GCHQ in preparing the material that was consulted by the Cabinet, noting 'how valuable we have found this material'.[59] Secondly, it is necessary to temper the assertions made by Aldrich regarding GCHQ's deception of their American ally, as in reality its achievements carried less significance than Aldrich proposes.

Countering the letter from Lloyd to Jones, one can emphasise immediately the date that it was sent, 20 September 1956. Lloyd having expressed his gratitude at the end of September, one can state with certainty that

there is no evidence to suggest that GCHQ provided useful intelligence in the immediate run-up to military operations, that is, during the height of the crisis itself in late October and early-November with the intense diplomatic activity that resulted. A basic inference from the letter's date is that Lloyd was most likely thanking GCHQ for the intelligence provided during the August Suez Canal Users' Conference that was hosted in London. This inference is reinforced by Easter's recent work on GCHQ, where he establishes that Britain's best signals intelligence source came from the cracking of the diplomatic traffic of the Egyptian embassy in London.[60] Such a source would no doubt have been very valuable during London-based negotiations, but questionable in value thereafter. Any further contention is simply arguing beyond the limits of the available evidence. Presumably that intelligence was focused more on identifying the policy positions of participating countries and Egyptian activities towards the question of the Suez Canal at that conference, rather than on providing privileged insight into Egyptian affairs for Britain's own policy development.

In tempering Aldrich's assertions regarding the deception of the Americans, it is important to note three key points. Although the Americans were deceived successfully enough for military operations to begin, such achievement carries significance only insofar as the operation itself is successful, which of course it was not. In addition, whether or not any deception was successful was ultimately a redundant issue, because the British government misjudged entirely what the American reaction to those military operations would be. And thirdly, the Suez historiography has for too long assumed a totally successful British deception of the Americans; this is proved in this book's Chap. 4 not to have been the case. No matter what Britain thought at the time, she was certain to encounter active American opposition to the military actions taken against Egypt. Ultimately therefore, any deception efforts carried out by GCHQ, however tactically successful against their counterparts in the National Security Agency (NSA) they might have been, were in pursuit of what turned out to be flawed policy towards Egypt and flawed assumptions regarding the reaction of the Americans.

Instead of taking at face value the declaration of usefulness by Selwyn Lloyd, the letter he sent to the Director of GCHQ deserves more critical strategic appraisal to reveal how little in fact GCHQ actually offered. The key argument rests on basic strategic logic; no matter what intelligence material GCHQ provided through its decryption efforts that we

as researchers do not have access to—and most likely never will—it is known for certain that it did not prevent the fiasco of British policy at Suez. Easter overreaches in suggesting that signals successes provided a 'secret advantage'[61] to Britain, simply because British policy failed catastrophically. Easter also places this view in doubt by also arguing for the possibility that the USSR may have actually known about the breach in Egyptian diplomatic traffic, and actively used it to send deceiving signals to Britain.[62] Britain could not at the same time have held any secret intelligence advantage had it also been compromised and used as a tool of deception by the Soviets concurrently; such a position is simply illogical.

Furthermore, regardless of the compliment offered to GCHQ by Lloyd, signals intelligence either offered no material to avert surprise at Nasser's action, or whatever material had been gathered did not have enough impact to justify any conclusion other than one of lack of effect on the fundamental drivers of British strategy. It can be stated with confidence based on the outcome of actions at Suez that signals intelligence did not improve or change British policy in any way. Britain neither achieved its desired objectives at the Suez Canal Users' Conference in August 1956, nor were the assumptions driving British policy fundamentally altered at any stage, regardless of information obtained openly or via secret intelligence. Whatever material GCHQ did provide this author believes it is safe to reach a verdict of policy non-impact on the part of GCHQ during the Suez Crisis.

Structure
Before engaging the Suez Crisis in depth, however, it is necessary to consider in detail the relationship between strategy and intelligence as this work's start point. That relationship is impoverished in its scholarly treatment, with neither Strategic Studies nor Intelligence Studies having attempted to identify and codify it in detail. By doing so this book will provide a significant contribution to these areas of social scientific inquiry. Chapter 2 performs this through a three-tiered approach. First an inductive reasoning of the common agreements and patterns within the existing Intelligence Studies literature will be carried out in order to identify the three precepts that govern the nature of the relationship. Second, Colin Gray's Strategy Bridge will be fused to the concept of the intelligence cycle (forming Fig. 2.1) in order to both graphically illustrate the relationship as well as aid in the identification of the three functions that intelligence is argued to perform. Thirdly, there will be an identification of the

key problem that afflicts the relationship. It is argued in this thesis that the nature of the relationship can be understood through the establishment of three precepts:

1. *Intelligence is inherently political activity*
2. *Intelligence must serve strategy, not the other way around*
3. *Intelligence permeates every level of the Strategy Bridge*

Intelligence is further argued as providing three functions to the Strategy Bridge; to help inform policy development; to help operationalise policy intent into a viable plan of action; and to help ensure the provision of feedback. Chapter 2 also explores the key problem to afflict the relationship—the role of assumptions. This is a special problem to consider, one that justifies its treatment in Chap. 4, dedicated in specific regard to Suez.

The context of British intelligence structure and operational practice will be established in Chap. 3 by analysing the place that SIS and the JIC held within the governmental architecture of Britain from the end of the Second World War until 1956. This chapter will also trace the trends in SIS's operational performance during these years. What will be seen is that despite well-intentioned efforts following the end of the Second World War, the structures of British intelligence were actually in a state of disrepair; SIS could carry out special operations without the prior approval of either the Foreign Office or Cabinet Ministers (and even did so against their express prohibition), and the JIC was fundamentally restricted by its position as a Chiefs of Staff (CoS) body, thereby placing a bureaucratic block on its ability to guarantee its intelligence product's timely delivery to Cabinet level.

Chapter 4 will serve to establish the context within which British decision-making took place, by identifying and analysing the assumptions that existed in and across British strategy during the time of the Suez Crisis. Eight such assumptions are identified, the most important of which being that Britain still viewed itself as a world power. Chapter 4 argues that this dominating political assumption had conditioned British thinking and in particular the responses of Prime Minister Anthony Eden to Nasser's act of nationalising the Suez Canal Company. The additional assumptions serve to reveal that their role is pervasive; they afflict the entirety of the strategy bridge through the formation of additional assumptions across all levels of strategy, right through to tactical military action.

Chapter 5 considers the question of how British intelligence helped to inform policy development, and thereby assesses the performances of SIS and the JIC with regard to this fundamental duty. It is argued that these intelligence bodies actually contributed very little to policy development. SIS will be shown to have been more interested in the pursuit of special operations-type activities intended to proactively shape the course of events in Egypt, rather than engage in the gathering of intelligence. This operational approach, coupled with the dismantling of the SIS's Egypt-based network in August 1956 by Egyptian security services, prevented SIS from making any meaningful contribution to policy development, both before the crisis itself and most definitely at the height of events in October/November 1956. Its defeat at the hands of Egyptian counter-intelligence in August effectively created an intelligence blind spot at the political end of Britain's strategy bridge, whereby Britain could no longer access any privileged insight into Egypt's internal activities. The JIC found itself meanwhile hamstrung by its constitutional position as a CoS body, unable to respond to events quickly enough to actually inform policy development. The JIC instead found itself simply trying to keep up with the policy currents in Whitehall. As well as this, it intends to show how the infrastructure of British intelligence—through its operating mechanism of the Permanent Undersecretaries Department (PUSD) in the Foreign Office—was actively expropriated by Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick and Sir Patrick Dean and utilised contrary to its intended function in order to set up and maintain an alternative conduit of communications, designed to exclude dissent to Eden's Suez policy. It is the identification of this alternative line of communication that goes far in explaining exactly how the Eden government was successful in managing to exclude the broader machinery of government from his Suez policy.

Chapter 6 delves into the specifics of operational planning, and the way in which British intelligence helped to interpret policy intent and construct a viable plan of action in order to secure the desired political objectives. Here it will be shown that intelligence performance was ultimately good enough not to prejudice the execution of military operations. This did not occur without incident however, as British intelligence had proved unable to test the integrity of British policy, as is shown by the existence of the fundamental inconsistency in the aims of the British leadership; did they seek the overthrow of the Nasser regime, or was the objective to secure

the Suez Canal Zone for international operation? The creation of operational plans to cater for both contingencies is indicative of the fact that this inconsistency was never resolved, but simply accepted within planning. Further to this, the specific problems of where military service headquarters were located and the lack of adequate signals capacity contributed to blocks in intelligence dissemination that very nearly carried serious consequences to the planning for operations in Egypt, most particularly in the preparations of the Royal Marines to conduct their amphibious landing assault on Port Said.

Chapter 7 assesses the provision of feedback that was provided by intelligence bodies, across the tactical/operational, strategic and political levels during and after the crisis itself. The provision of this feedback will be argued as being successful at the tactical/operational level in the theatre of operations, as this was handled very competently by the military's own assets. At the strategic and political levels, however, feedback performance was poor; strategically there was no mechanism in place to monitor and report on the attainment of war objectives, and this was certainly not a task that was being performed by any British intelligence service. Politically, it will be shown that the JIC was focused on repairing the damage incurred by the loss of intelligence networks and assets across the Egypt area—following the loss of the SIS network in Egypt and the dismissal of several military attaché officers from numerous embassies in the region—and could not provide any new insight into the area to inform policy discussion for a considerable time following the events of the Suez Crisis itself.

The final chapter traces and assesses the implications of the changes that were made to SIS and the JIC following the Suez Crisis. In the case of SIS, the story of change began before the crisis itself, as a consequence of the Buster Crabb affair,[63] with the appointment of Sir Dick White as C. The experience of the Suez Crisis only confirmed to White the need for changes to be made, including a purging of staff believed to be unreliable, and an attempt to better align the service to national intelligence requirements as laid down by the JIC. The JIC, meanwhile, was to be transferred wholesale from the CoS into the Cabinet Office structure, a transfer that represents one of the biggest and most important adaptations in the history of British intelligence: the permanent centralisation of the British intelligence structure. This change will be argued to have removed the constitutional restriction that had until then prevented the JIC from guaranteeing the delivery of its intelligence product to Cabinet-level discussions, as well as serving to broadly align the efforts of all British intelligence

services through the provisions of the annual list of *Intelligence Targets*. The transfer had made both the 'pushing' and 'pulling' of Britain's intelligence capabilities considerably easier for the British government than had been the case prior to the transfer.

Arguments

This book makes numerous arguments that contribute both to historical research on the Suez Crisis itself and to social scientific inquiry relating to intelligence studies and strategic studies. First, as indicated above, is the argument that examination of the Suez Crisis offers original insight into intelligence affairs that has remained neglected in historical research thus far, despite the efforts of others; it is crucial that the historiography of the Suez Crisis benefits from a comprehensive treatment of British intelligence activities in 1956. This book provides that treatment by tracing, analysing and placing them in strategic context as well as weighing the significance of those activities.

Second, it is argued that there is indeed an identifiable relationship between intelligence and strategy. Gray argues that strategy has no less than 17 operating dimensions, of which intelligence is one.[64] Despite establishing this, however, Gray fails to explore in detail the nature and functions of the relationship between strategy and any of those dimensions. This book identifies and codifies that relationship in detail in Chap. 2. The argument is that the relationship exists, has thus far been neglected, and its elucidation is essential in establishing a more mature understanding of intelligence and what it can and cannot do for strategy.

Third, numerous contributions are made to the historical record of the Suez Crisis, from the identification of PUSD's expropriation, to establishing that the American government did indeed hold prior knowledge of British actions, through to the numerous unexplored details of military planning and operations and how intelligence helped those efforts. Analysis and interpretation of these events, among others explored, contribute to both the historiography of intelligence activities in 1956, as well as helping to place those activities in the broader context that is essential for a nuanced understanding of what took place during the Suez Crisis.

Fourth, in the final chapter on the Suez Crisis, the book, uniquely, deals with the permanent centralisation of the intelligence machinery that took place in the aftermath of the crisis throughout 1957. In that chapter full consideration is given to both the changes at SIS, and the transfer of the JIC into the Cabinet Office through the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) *Reorganisation Papers*[65] that were declassified in The National

Archives in 2006. Although many in both intelligence historiography and Intelligence Studies have made reference to the transfer, none have examined and analysed both the details of the transfer and its broader significance. This book provides that examination and argues that the changes of 1957 represent one of the most significant moments of transformation in the history of British intelligence.

Fifth and finally, the book argues for a series of conclusions that form the book's concluding chapter, intending to contribute to providing a more complete understanding of strategy and intelligence as illustrated by the empirical experience of Britain in the Suez Crisis. It is argued that these conclusions are valid not only for Britain at Suez, but should be heeded for all examinations of the role that intelligence plays in strategic pursuits. Those conclusions are as follows:

- Intelligence is not an illusion
- Intelligence performance is conditioned by the architecture of government
- Policy makers rule, and intelligence knows it
- Intelligence is not a panacea
- Intelligence is very fragile
- Intelligence can adapt

Ultimately, these conclusions, building on the codification of the relationship between strategy and intelligence, serve to establish the final conclusion of the book, that strategy and intelligence share a special, but delicate, relationship.

Notes

1. Anthony Adamthwaite, 'Suez Revisited', *International Affairs* (1988) Vol. 64, No. 3, p. 449.
2. Ibid.
3. David Carlton, *Britain and the Suez Crisis* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988), p. 97.
4. Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 18.
5. Ibid., p. 355.
6. Peter J. Beck, ' 'The Less Said about Suez the Better': British Governments and the Politics of Suez's History, 1956–67', *English Historical Review* (2009) Vol. CXXIV. 508, pp. 635–636.

7.   James Adams, *The New Spies: Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage* (London: Pimlico, 1994), p. 316.

8.   Jason Burke, *The 9/11 Wars* (London: Allen Lane, 2011).

9.   David Kilcullen, 'Intelligence', in Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (ed.), *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, operations, and challenges* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), p. 157.

10.   But *The Guardian* maintains coverage for readers to consult at http://www.theguardian.com/world/surveillance

11.   Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, *Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework* (2015), available at http://isc.independent.gov.uk/news-archive/12march2015

12.   Adam Cobb, 'Intelligence Adaptation: The Bin Laden Raid and Its Consequences for US Strategy', *RUSI Journal* (2011) Vol. 156, No. 4, p. 54.

13.   David J. Lonsdale, 'The Way Ahead: Strategic Studies in the 21st Century', in Ralph Rotte and Christoph Schwarz (ed.), *International Security and War: Politics and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2011), p. 60.

14.   There are many translations of Sun Tzu on offer, but the two that will be used throughout this work are Sun Tzu (Samuel B. Griffith trans.), *The Art of War* (Oxford: OUP, 1971), and Sun Tzu (Thomas Cleary trans.), *The Art of War: Complete Texts and Commentaries* (Boston, MA.: Shambhala Press, 2003).

15.   Carl von Clausewitz (Michael Howards, Peter Paret trans. ed.), *On War* (London: Everyman's Library, 1993), Bk. 1, Ch. 1.

16.   Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: OUP, 2010), p. 84.

17.   Kenneth Minogue, *Politics: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: OUP, 2000), p. 24.

18.   Harold D. Laswell, 'Politics: Who Gets What, When, How', in Harold D. Laswell (ed.), *The Political Writings of Harold D. Laswell* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951), p. 295.

19.   Ibid. (italics added).

20.   Clausewitz (1993), p. 146 (italics original).

21.   Gray also argues that any definition of strategy matters less in its precise wording than in understanding the essence of the subject; that essence 'lies in the realm of consequences of actions for future outcomes.' Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 18.

22.   Ibid., p. 17.

23.   Michael Warner, 'Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence', in Christopher Andrew and Richard J. Aldrich et al. (ed.), *Secret Intelligence: A Reader* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 3.

24. Sims holds this latter view to be the case, Jennifer Sims, 'Intelligence to counter terror: The importance of all-source fusion', *Intelligence and National Security* (2007) Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 41. Whereas Shulsky represents the opposing view, insisting that secrecy is one of the fundamental characteristics defining intelligence. Abram Shulsky, 'What is Intelligence? Secrets and Competitions Among States', in Rodger Godson and Ernest R. May et al. (ed.), *US Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform* (Washington D.C.: Brassy's, 1995), p. 17.

25. Roy Godson, 'Intelligence: An American View', and John Bruce Lockhart, 'Intelligence: A British View', in Kenneth G. Robertson (ed.), *British and American Approaches to Intelligence* (London: Macmillan Press, 1987).

26. Omand holds that somebody trying to prevent you from acquiring such information is an additional characteristic of intelligence. David Omand, *Securing the State* (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), p. 22.

27. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, 'Introduction', in Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (ed.), *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984), p. 5.

28. Cabinet Office, 'Annex A: UK Government Intelligence: It's Nature, Collection, Assessment and Use', in Cabinet Office (ed.), *National Intelligence Machinery* (London: Stationery Office, 2010), p. 36 (italics added).

29. Abram N. Shulsky, Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence* Third Edition (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2002), p. 1 (italics added).

30. Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1966).

31. Anthony Nutting transcribed in Anthony Moncrieff (ed.), *Suez Ten Years After* (London: BBC, 1967), p. 136.

32. Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez* (New York: Linden Press, 1981), p. 25.

33. Correlli Barnett quoted in Paul Reynolds, 'Suez: End of Empire', *BBC News* July 24th, 2006. http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5199392.stm accessed on 27/08/2014.

34. Peter Calvocoressi transcribed in Anthony Moncrieff (ed.), *Suez Ten Years After* (London: BBC, 1967), p. 138.

35. Anthony Nutting, *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez* (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1967).

36. Mohamed H. Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Though Egyptian Eyes* (London: Corgi Books, 1988).

37. Peter Hennessy, *The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders Since 1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2000), p. 246.
38. Percy Cradock, *Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World* (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 173.
39. W. Scott Lucas (ed.), *Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. 1–5.
40. Prime Minister Anthony Eden, *Israel and Egypt (Anglo-French Ultimatum)*, Hansard House of Commons Debate, 20 December 1956, Vol. 562 cc1456-63. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1956/dec/20/israel-and-egypt-anglo-french-ultimatum accessed 22/11/14.
41. Anthony Eden, *Full Circle: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden* (London: Cassell, 1960).
42. Beck (2009), p. 639.
43. Cate Haste (ed.), *Clarissa Eden, A Memoir: From Churchill to Eden* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007), p. 257.
44. Beck (2009), p. 634.
45. Jonathan Pearson, *Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Introduction.
46. Robert Rhodes James, 'Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis', *History Today* (November 1986), Vol. 36, No. 11, p. 9 (italics added). Rhodes James also provided arguably the best defence of Eden's actions with his biography. Robert Rhodes James, *Anthony Eden* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986).
47. William Clark, *From Three Worlds* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1986).
48. Geoffrey McDermott, *The Eden Legacy and the Decline of British Diplomacy* (London: Leslie Frewin, 1969), Ch. 12.
49. Peter Jackson, 'Introduction', in R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, and Len Scott (ed.), *Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), p. 8.
50. Steven Dorril, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations* (London: Fourth Estate Limited, 2000).
51. Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (New York: The Overlook Press, 2002).
52. Cradock (2002).
53. Michael S. Goodman, *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee Volume I: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).
54. W. Scott Lucas, *Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1991).

55. SIS and MI6 are synonymous terms frequently used across the literature.

56. Keith Kyle, *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Taurus & Co. Ltd., 1991; 2003).

57. As stated on the SIS website: https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-history/archive.html accessed 22/11/14.

58. Richard J. Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency* (London: Harper Press, 2010), pp. 156–160.

59. Selwyn Lloyd to Director of GCHQ, E. M. Jones (D/GCHQ), 20th September, 1956. Within AIR 20/10621, The National Archives (hereafter referred to as TNA).

60. David Easter, 'Spying on Nasser: British Signals Intelligence in Middle East Crises and Conflicts, 1956–67', *Intelligence and National Security* (2013) Vol. 28, No. 6, p. 827.

61. Ibid., p. 824.

62. Ibid., p. 830.

63. The details of which are first analysed within Chap. 4.

64. Gray (1999)), Ch. 1.

65. The JIO *Reorganisation Papers* can be found in CAB 163/9 at The National Archives, Kew (hereafter referred to as TNA).

Strategy and Intelligence: The Nature and Function of the Relationship

Before exploring the Suez Crisis, the nature of the relationship between strategy and intelligence must be clearly established. There is much in the existing literature to aid this endeavour, indeed some have already come close to penetrating that nature without intending to do so, despite the lack of direct theorisation in Intelligence Studies.[1] It is necessary, therefore, to follow some guiding precepts as to what the nature of the relationship is; three such precepts are offered here, followed by the three functions of intelligence in the relationship, before identifying the key problem that significantly affects the relationship in practice.

The three precepts are that:

1. Intelligence is an inherently political activity
2. Intelligence must serve strategy, not the other way around
3. Intelligence permeates every level of the Strategy Bridge

Intelligence has three functions in the relationship: first, to inform policy development. Secondly, to directly aid policy implementation and operationalisation into action; thirdly, to serve as an essential feedback component. These will be addressed in turn in order to draw out the functionality of the relationship, before analysing the pervasive role of assumptions in strategy. It is the role of assumptions that forms the key, and to date largely unrecognised, problem affecting that relationship.

The Three Precepts

Precept 1: **Intelligence is an Inherently Political Activity**

Politicisation is commonly held to be a Bad Thing, where political interests compromise the objectivity and integrity of both intelligence activity and product. In the preface to their *Secret Intelligence: A* Reader, Andrew, Aldrich and Wark label politicisation as one of the current problems afflicting intelligence,[2] Johnson, too, asserts that politicisation 'will always be a danger that must be guarded against'.[3] Glees and Davies spent considerable effort detailing the politicisation of intelligence in the UK with their emphasis on the Iraq example in 2003,[4] and Handel argues that politicisation represents a form of interference in what should be a pure process, untainted and 'free of political pressures'.[5]

Politicisation, according to Andrew et al., Johnson, Handel and Glees and Davies, should have no place in intelligence, but this view is an exaggeration that requires balancing, and two authors serve to establish balance. Betts insists on acknowledging the *benefits* as well as the *costs* of politicisation[6]; he calls for a wider assessment of politicisation, rather than simply assuming all its consequences are negative.[7] It is Harry Howe Ransom who best provides insight into how to balance politicisation, when he declares that policy neutrality should be called for 'in that crucial stage of the intelligence process of reporting the facts, and making judgements about the unknown'.[8] The word 'politicisation' is almost invariably applied as a negative within intelligence; Betts and Howe Ransom represent the voices attempting to redress this view. The argument here is that the literature overwhelmingly sees politicisation as undesirable, whereas the view should be that a study of the potential benefits of politicisation is required, as well as its negative effects. Nobody except Betts sees political influence as a necessary, indeed an inevitable component of the intelligence world.

Why should this be so? Why should intelligence be a political activity? The answer lies in the objective of intelligence, an objective that enjoys universal consensus within Intelligence Studies: 'to provide information to policymakers that may help illuminate their decision options'.[9] Practitioners also subscribe to this objective; Omand states that the hope is that an 'intelligence assessment will make a difference and result in improved decisions'.[10] Strong says the task of the intelligence officer is to 'form a coherent and balanced picture'[11] be it for a supreme commander, Prime Minister or whomever else. The point of Strong's statement is the

purpose behind intelligence activities: it is not the mere collection and analysis of information for its own sake.[12] He goes on to clarify his point by declaring that the purpose of intelligence is 'to make the best possible information available to those who make policy'.[13] Berkowitz echoes this view in saying that the purpose of intelligence 'is to inform officials and military commanders'.[14] Greenberg and Hass believe that 'intelligence can often be of greatest use in increasing a policymaker's understanding'[15]; Kovacs is more insistent, arguing that the sole purpose of intelligence 'is to facilitate political and military action and decision making',[16] Bennett, too, insists that 'Intelligence is *used* in a very direct way'.[17]

The logic underpinning Precept 1 is simple: that if—as is clearly agreed upon in Intelligence Studies—intelligence is fundamentally geared towards aiding and informing the policy- and decision-making processes, then it is not only 'inescapably political activity',[18] but it is *inherently* political activity. Jervis makes the interesting statement that 'Intelligence is also easier to keep pure when it is irrelevant.'[19] Jervis is quite clearly talking about purity from politicisation, his insistence on irrelevancy is telling, for what gives intelligence its status as intelligence rather than simply information is, precisely, its relevance to decision-makers. Dolman makes this clear when he argues that intelligence is only derived from information after a process of correlation giving that information meaning, with meaning referring 'to the association of information to *action* or *intent*'.[20]

It is useful at this stage to consider those who have come close to the realisation of the relationship between intelligence and strategy as a political affair. Gill and Phythian insist that the start point 'should be to recognise that intelligence is a means to an end. This end is security, and prosperity, of the entity that provides for the collection and subsequent analysis of intelligence.'[21] Recognising intelligence as a means to an end is to recognise it as a strategic tool, that it serves the purposes of a political entity in the pursuit of its interests. Gill and Phythian are, of course, correct, but they go no further than this opening observation. Kovacs goes more deeply into the matter in his illuminating article by asking the question 'Where is the user?'[22] Despite his excellent analysis on the conceptual shortcomings of the intelligence cycle, it has to be said that Kovacs goes no further than focussing on those shortcomings, where he scores he scores heavily but, like Gill and Phythian, he does not go any further. This leaves *MCDP-2: Intelligence* of the US Marine Corps as the closest that any theoretical analysis has come to the true nature of the strategy–intelligence relationship.

The US Marine Corps do this by declaring that the 'main purpose of intelligence is to support the decision making process'.[23] The US Marine Corps' understanding of intelligence derives fundamentally from its relationship to the consumers it serves, declaring that 'Intelligence is inseparable from operations.'[24] Yet this last quote reveals the limitation of the US Marine Corps' understanding, the only genuine weakness of *MCDP-2*: it is a work produced for American marines, to aid the conduct of their operations, and thus it only focuses on the operational level down to tactics. Understanding of the full nature of intelligence is consequently incomplete; ultimately it only comprehends the relationship of intelligence to the military commander, not to the political leadership as well. The US Marine Corps have come close theoretically, but it is Philip Davies who has come closest in observing the real-world operation of British intelligence. Davies's examination of the working mechanics of British intelligence machinery works on a hypothesis that grounds intelligence in the political world. That hypothesis is that the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) is characterised by a 'pull architecture' whereby 'the activities of the agency are driven by, and circumscribed by, explicit requirements for information… which originate from its "intelligence consumers" in the overt side of British Government'.[25] Although Davies does not outline a theory of the nature of the relationship between intelligence and politics, his hypothesis is clearly articulating the political nature of the intelligence world. His further works on British intelligence have only served to solidify this fundamental position in the analysis of the institutional placement and operation of British intelligence.[26]

Intelligence is therefore not only inescapably political, as Gill and Phythian have declared, it is inherently political. Intelligence exists to serve the needs of those in political power and military command, in order to inform their respective decision-making processes. By serving political entities, its status as intelligence rather than mere information conditional on its relevance to political masters, intelligence is, and will always be, political in nature. The words of former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet are probably the most appropriate and efficient to convey this understanding: 'Intelligence does not operate in a vacuum, but within a broader mandate of policies and governance.'[27]

Precept 2: Intelligence Must Serve Strategy

A clear point of structure and function must be that strategy cannot serve intelligence; rather, intelligence serves strategy. Why this is so rests on a

fundamental understanding of the central thesis of Clausewitz—war as a political instrument.[28] If war is a tool for obtaining one's desired political outcomes and strategy the bridge for translating action into political capital, then intelligence must be a tool of strategy, aiding in its own unique way the strategy function of compelling our enemy to fulfil our will.[29] Strachan and the US Marine Corps both issue worthy interpretations of Clausewitz in the understanding of what strategy should do: Strachan suggests that the two tasks of strategy are to identify the nature of the war at hand, and to manage and direct a war once started.[30] The US Marine Corps has published a flawless interpretation of Clausewitz that is worth quoting at length:

> Political objectives are the starting point for the development of a strategy. The first step in making strategy is deciding which political objectives a strategy will aim to achieve. In order to design the military action that will produce the desired result, the military strategist needs to know what the desired result is, that is, what the political objective is. From the political objectives, the military strategist can develop a set of military objectives that achieve the political objectives.[31]

The framework for Precept 2 is clear, an unreserved subscription to the central Clausewitzian thesis of the primacy of policy in war. Strategy cannot serve intelligence, not in any logical or meaningful way; intelligence instead serves strategy in the search for desired political outcomes through the provision of relevant and timely information. Lowenthal puts it best when insisting that the relationship is not symbiotic, 'the policymaker can exist without the intelligence officer but the opposite is not true'.[32] This is because of a very simple reality that is effectively conveyed by Pillar: 'It is a matter of power. Policymakers have it, and intelligence officers don't, which is why policy shapes intelligence more than the other way around.'[33] The relationship is hierarchical, with intelligence helping to inform decision-making and the development of strategy. George exemplifies this practical view, by stating that it is inherent that 'strategy must be based on good intelligence'.[34]

Although intelligence must serve strategy, this not to say that strategy owes intelligence no support, in fact strategy must still do a great deal to enable intelligence to function. Intelligence cannot operate in ignorance; after all, if the job of intelligence is to reduce ignorance for its masters than it certainly cannot be expected to work in such a condition itself. One must first be clear about the political objectives to be attained from which

strategic objectives can be designed; only then can intelligence functions usefully serve those objectives and help to attain them. The actors manning the Strategy Bridge have a duty to inform intelligence of its fundamental requirements to best enable intelligence to perform. This point is no revelation but it is important to recognise, even if Kovacs is correct in stating that such clarity is rarely achieved in practice.[35] Beyond this a deeper point must be recognised; strategy must help create the infrastructures, conditions, situations and opportunities for intelligence practices to best flourish. Not even this idea is new however; it is what Sun Tzu called for in *The Art of War*.[36] Strategy is not simply a tasking process, but a competitive pursuit for control,[37] the search for and the exploitation of the most advantageous position. Any of the tools that strategy employs cannot simply be left to their own devices, operating in isolation simply in the hope that they produce positive strategic effect. Instead, strategy has the duty to put the tools at its disposal in the best possible position to perform.

It is useful at this stage to deploy a historical example in order to illustrate the point of Precept 2: American intelligence throughout the Cold War. American policy, and thus American strategy and intelligence, was presented with a novel challenge in their strategic history. That challenge was dealing with an opponent geographically very distant, culturally different to a marked degree, but an opponent whose ideological mind-set was one of direct challenge to the American political/ideological vision. The USSR, a totalitarian system that was considered completely closed off and very difficult to penetrate,[38] represented a challenge to American intelligence. However, the policy requirements of the American state did not require the wholesale penetration of the Soviet bloc. Rather, NSC 68[39] guided American policy, and thus strategy towards firstly containment of the communist threat, and an eventual 'roll back':

> by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will.[40]

This objective did not fundamentally change throughout the duration of the Cold War. American intelligence was not required to defeat the USSR independently; rather the adaptation[41] it did take was geared

towards serving American strategy, a strategy of containing, dissuading and deterring the Soviet threat. This required American intelligence to effectively assess Soviet capabilities and watch for any signs of a potential Soviet attack on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

American strategy did not ask too much of its intelligence apparatus, instead it created the structural conditions (the establishment of NATO and other alliances, and nuclear strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), with a potent-enough conventional force based in Europe) that allowed the American strength of technological solutions to be applied to the Soviet challenge. American intelligence served strategy, and thus policy. If strategy were to have been serving intelligence what one could expect to have seen from the Cold War would have been an ever-increasing, monolithic intelligence community with the writ of law in the land, which called the shots for every move, policy decision and strategic calculation (indeed the intelligence community itself would have been making the decisions); not even the Soviet KGB reached this level of power, although it can be argued that it came to represent 'an independent power centre, uncontrolled by ministers or other elected representatives, and determin[ing] its own targets, priorities, and mandate'.[42] Intelligence is a tool of strategy, not the other way around; just as the dialogue between policy and strategy is 'unequal',[43] so too is that between strategy and intelligence.[44]

Precept 3: **Intelligence Permeates Every Level of the Strategy Bridge**

It would be an obvious first assumption to think that intelligence operates as either a 'bottom up' or 'top down' system, thus implying a linear relationship whereby intelligence is gathered just from the tactical level and fed up the chain, or that it is passed down from higher levels of collection. This is not the case, however, as intelligence, in that it effectively provides a *service*,[45] must supply that service to all actors across the Strategy Bridge. Furthermore, the fact that separate intelligence services have been created with the specific intent of providing intelligence to different consumers and across different specifications means that there must be a wider process in operation. The strategy–intelligence relationship when operating in practice resembles more a parallel diffusion of intelligence onto the Strategy Bridge at the appropriate level to the appropriate recipient. Figure 2.1 illustrates this and represents a welding of two already existing concepts in order to illustrate the relationship of intelligence and strategy

in practice. By adopting Gray's Strategy Bridge,[46] (with its breakdown of policy, operations and tactics) and merging it with the well-established intelligence cycle, one can see a broadened process.

The intelligence cycle still operates as before but its dissemination to the actors on the Strategy Bridge is easier to understand when one can observe that diffusion through Fig. 2.1. Dissemination is tailored to the intended recipient[47]; there are a great many recipients of intelligence product across the Strategy Bridge and across the different levels of strategy. Most activity is directed towards the policy end, as the British SIS, GCHQ and Security Service (MI5) operate on fulfilling the needs of departments of state. But these agencies, as well as other actors such as military intelligence branches of the three armed services, and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) housed at the Ministry of Defence (MoD), provide specific support to the operational and tactical areas of the Strategy Bridge. Each actor should, can, and does (but it must also be said sometimes forgets, and does not) issue requirements, which the intelligence bodies seek to fulfil. Thus, the ideal relationship would resemble a near-harmonious model: all the actors on the bridge issue their requirements based on a solid understanding of the policy requirement in the first place, and a suitable breakdown of objectives and tasks through all actors on the bridge. The intelligence actors then seek to fulfil these requirements, deliver the intelligence product back to the actors who utilise it accordingly. This ideal is rarely, if ever, achieved in practice.

Fig. 2.1 The merging of the Strategy Bridge to the intelligence cycle

The strategy–intelligence relationship is therefore a highly dynamic one. There is a wholesale permeation of the Strategy Bridge by intelligence product, but that permeation is not a right, it is a privilege that must be earned and very carefully maintained.[48] Intelligence is ultimately very vulnerable and fragile, most particularly during periods of hostilities.[49] The real-world intricacies of maintaining the Strategy Bridge alone are truly daunting, so for intelligence actors to be constantly supplied with the appropriate requirements to guide their actions, collect the appropriate information and successfully disseminate it in time to be relevant and useful to the pursuits of the actors, is equally daunting.

The Intelligence Functions

Function 1: Intelligence Informs Policy Development

There are two dicta within the intelligence literature that are pertinent to address. The first is that intelligence provides a service function to its consumers;[50] the second is a logical extension of the first: the service performed is that of informing actors at the level of policy development—they are the immediate and desired consumers. Johnson labels this as providing information to 'illuminate their decision options'.[51] Lowenthal asserts that intelligence officers crave access above all else, so they can discover 'what policies are being developed or pursued so they can focus their analysis on these areas and thus contribute to the policy process'.[52] The purpose remains the same, to inform policy development at any opportunity. The British Government puts it very plainly:

> The purpose of intelligence from secret sources is to support those aspects of HMG's policies by providing information on relevant activities and developments which are secret or undisclosed and which could not be adequately monitored from official or overt sources.[53]

Intelligence performs this as the first function in its relationship to strategy; it provides decision-makers with privileged information that would otherwise be unavailable in order to 'raise the general quality of discussion within the government'.[54] Strong insists than an intelligence staff must be prepared at all times to assist government 'by answering as accurately and as rapidly as possible the multitude of queries which the policy-makers conjure up each day'.[55] There are, of course, risks to performing this func-

tion, Strong argues the need for a careful balance, whereby the intelligence officer must not 'obtrude too far into the policy deliberations' but he must also be close enough to the decision makers to ensure the proper use of the intelligence product.[56] Handel notes this as maintaining the delicate balance between 'intimacy and detachment'. If the relationship is too close, objectivity can be compromised; if it is too distant however then the intelligence community loses access.[57]

The other risk to be mentioned is the fact that intelligence is not the only source of information available to government, and that a government relying solely on secret intelligence to inform its policy development is likely to make a serious error. Former DCI Tenet warns against this very mistake, calling instead for policy-makers to engage with and ask tough questions of their intelligence services.[58] This warning is reinforced by Andrew and Dilks as well as by Codevilla and Seabury, who are correct in their assertions that intelligence 'always has to be considered together with other sorts of information'.[59] This is because such intelligence is only part of the bigger picture[60]; secrets do not define reality[61] and intelligence 'is by no means the whole of governments' knowledge or information-gathering.[62]

Function 2: Intelligence Aids Policy Implementation and Operationalisation

It would be an easy presumption to make that intelligence exists *only* to provide support to decision-makers. Statements such as that of Marrin can mislead, yet usefully illustrate this point when he declares that 'Intelligence agencies exist to provide decision makers with some of this information.'[63] This view neglects the vital role it plays to those who must execute policy.[64] Marrin and others are not wrong by any means, but their failure to recognise the wider applications of intelligence results in an incomplete appreciation from the perspective of the strategist. The function of intelligence does not stop at the stage of illuminating policy options, it is also fundamental to operationalising the chosen policy course into a viable plan of action. Nowhere is this truer than at the military level of operational planning. McLachlan recognises this in his assertion that the role of intelligence is to reduce ignorance 'in the planning of any military operation, and indeed of any civil operation'.[65]

It is this stage where not only the integrity of the policy option but also the likelihood of its success can be gauged. Gray articulates this well

when he states that 'the issue is whether or not the job is feasible. Even if it would be well worth doing, if it is mission impossible or highly improbable at sustainable cost to us, then it ought not to be attempted. *This is Strategy 101.*'[66] The 'stubborn fact' that Kent suggests may be overlooked[67] must be considered at the planning stage, and it is at this stage that a truly colossal number of variables can wreak havoc on the accomplishment of any grand vision. From the quality and quantity of troops, to the weakness of an economy, faulty rifles, availability of transport, the weather, public opinion, industrial capacity, beach gradients, topographical complexities[68]; all the nuances of practical application that are not under the control of those in political power, but dominate the thinking of those who must design a plan of action with available resources. Intelligence must lend vital support to this arena of operationalising the policy vision in order to make it a practical and achievable reality.

Function 3: Intelligence Provides a Feedback Capacity

It is easy to overlook the competitive dynamic inherent in strategy, incorporating into one's analysis the role of events or the possibility of enemy action thwarting carefully laid plans. In the elucidation of Function 3 what this means is that even when all three of the functions have been suitably performed, the job may not be complete, for action is still to be taken after the completion of Functions 1 and 2. It is when action has been taken that Function 3 must play a vital role in providing feedback to the strategy process at all levels. The results of tactical action must be assessed in order to judge if they are effective, and helping to secure political ends. Fingar states that without intelligence the 'feedback needed to monitor and adjust policies would be more serendipitous'.[69] The application of intelligence services to the strategy process is not simply a one-off event, such that once possible policy options are highlighted, planned and operationalised intelligence bodies can cease their support. Intelligence provides essential feedback to decision-makers, informing them of the progress of their endeavours. It is function 3 that makes the welding of the intelligence cycle to the Strategy Bridge in Fig. 2.1 complete.

Although the above feedback function is most important in monitoring the advancement of goals, feedback also includes information on the performances of the actors within the process itself. The feedback process is as dynamic and holistic as the processes it serves; this can be seen by consulting the British *National Intelligence Machinery*, which describes

one of the functions of the Joint Intelligence Committee as 'periodically scrutinis[ing] the performance of the intelligence services in meeting the collection requirements placed upon them'.[70] Function 3 completes the elaboration of the relationship's functionality, one that begins at the stage of supporting policy, and finishes (and restarts again) at the feedback point. The pursuit of policy never ends, therefore the role of strategy in finding optimal ways of obtaining these ends never ceases, and if these two pursuits never cease then the role of intelligence in supporting these endeavours also never ceases.

The Pervasive Role of Assumptions in Strategy

The key problem afflicting the relationship between strategy and intelligence is a special one, requiring extensive analysis to be fully appreciated.[71] The problem is the role that assumptions play on the Strategy Bridge. Assumptions are a complicated issue to deal with, requiring interaction with cognitive psychological issues that are relatively intangible, and do not lend themselves well even to identification in political events, let alone causal explanation. But deal with them we must for they are pervasive because of a very simple logic:

> *Political actors exist in interaction with one another, holding imperfect knowledge of their own decision-making structures, as well as those of other actors; and assuming a similar lack of such knowledge with regards to future interactions.[72] Such actors seek to create policies with regards to the future, in order to clarify and direct efforts towards efficacious policy implementation. Any strategy[73] enacted to attempt the fulfilment of a policy is designed to exercise a degree of control over events, including the actions of other actors.[74] Strategy too must operate on the same imperfect information. The presence of incomplete and uncertain information dictates that knowledge gained from past experiences must be a factor in decision-making; prior assumptions influence decision-making processes and hence desired political outcomes; they thereby influence strategic action taken to achieve the policy vision. All of these operate with a view to 'a future that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous'.[75] That future has not happened and is not foreseeable.[76] The result of this sequence is that the policy-, strategy-, and intelligence-making processes are replete with assumptions: the Strategy Bridge is **permeated** with assumptions.*

Assumptions matter because they permeate the entire Strategy Bridge from its source, and that source is policy. The reasons for this are attributable

to matters of cognitive psychology, as well as aspects of decision-making processes. The place to start is with Rational Actor Theory, a theory drawn from economics that has also found its way into political science, wherein it is generally known as Bounded Rationality.[77] According to this, rational calculation always guides the decision-making process, following a simple cost–benefit analysis to decisions.[78] The political world, however, is not simple, filled not with cold and unbiased calculations but instead with *beliefs*.[79] Kissinger argues that a statesmen 'is confronted with an environment he did not create, and is shaped by a personal history he can no longer change… the convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they are in political office'.[80] Very simply, political leaders bring their existing belief structures and their intellectual capacities for understanding and processing information into office with them. This first reinforces the argument of Jervis, that decision-makers often lack understanding of their own belief structures construction.[81] Secondly, this also results in cognitive biases inside the decisions of government. Cognitive biases are defined as 'mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies'.[82] These biases simplify the inherently complex problems arising in the strategic world, and the simplest construct that decision-makers adopt is drawing on their own previous experience.[83] Understanding these biases is critical in the analysis of any decision-maker and even the processes under which their decisions are made, for, as Simon argues, without the 'large store of knowledge' about these actors, their minds, and how they structure the world that they see,[84] then any understanding of the assumptions underlying a decision will remain incomplete.

The above is how the assumption process begins; at the political level through a combination of the influence of political beliefs shaping the preferences of an actor, to the more subliminal creation of cognitive biases that can have their origins in any number of stimuli (but most notably those rooted in previously gained experience). Regardless of origins, the effect of the existence of assumptions matters most here. That effect is simple: assumptions not only develop at the policy stage, but they can filter down, across the rest of the Strategy Bridge, into all pursuits,[85] producing other assumptions and shaping courses of actions entirely. Jackson and Scott support this idea when they argue that few 'would deny that the process of identifying threats is inextricably bound up with political choices and assumptions'.[86] Those assumptions can create a form of conditioning effect on the thought processes of actors manning the Strategy Bridge.

Intelligence practices are also subject to the influence of assumptions. Intelligence analysts hold 'a set of assumptions and expectations about the motivations of people and the processes of government in foreign countries'.[87] Herman echoes this with his insistence that the 'mental frame of reference into which people fit the evidence is crucial, and intelligence organisations need some way of looking critically at their assumptions'.[88] Assumptions prove to be not only pervasive but also enduring. They are a permanent presence on the Strategy Bridge and, because they originate at the policy level and are not a construct originating from intelligence,[89] they can only be managed to a limited extent, they cannot be eradicated. Intelligence can play a role in managing[90] the effects that assumptions will have across the bridge, but intelligence services will always struggle in this regard. This is because more fully effective management would involve challenging fundamental presuppositions guiding policy development, a very dangerous activity for career-minded civil servants expected to serve their political masters.[91]

Ultimately what the presence of assumptions means to this argument is that there will always be an element of gambling for those seeking the advancement of political objectives. The reason is simple: we 'can never know for certain if our assumptions are insightful until they are tested against the reality they purport to understand'.[92] Any political act is therefore a gamble;[93] should an assumption prove to be correct then there is little to be concerned about,[94] but should it be proved incorrect the results are potentially disastrous. Hammes argues that they can even lead to strategic failure.[95] Schrecker is more forceful, declaring that 'strategy built on flawed assumptions is doomed to failure'.[96]

Accepting the existence and influence of assumptions is crucial, but the question remains, what can be done about them? Particularly when it has already been made clear that they cannot be eradicated from the Strategy Bridge. There are two arguments in existence, inseparable in application. The first is to simply create mechanisms for identifying what supposed assumptions actually exist in order to mitigate their effects should they be proven incorrect.[97] This is a process known as Assumption-Based Planning, which is 'predicated on identifying all an organisation's important assumptions'.[98] Hammes, too, insists on the importance of stating one's assumptions in order to be clear on the equal understanding of the situation across the Strategy Bridge.[99] Pillar highlights the fact that analysts in the American intelligence community take courses that are founded on Assumptions-Based Planning that teaches them to constantly

question assumptions and judgements.[100] Pillar stands alone, however, in recognising that it is not in the military and intelligence services where this method of challenging such assumptions and challenges are needed most, but rather it is policy-makers who would benefit most from such insights. Although Pillar is sceptical that such changes will actually take place, his insight remains correct.[101]

The second perspective is simply to prepare for uncertainty; General James Mattis argues succinctly that mavericks and risk-takers deal best with the uncertain situations that war is likely to throw at them. Because one cannot remove uncertainty, one must instead become comfortable operating within such an environment.[102] Buster Howes mirrors this view by adopting a literary phrase: *Vast Ills Follow a Belief in Certainty.* Howes' argument rests on the premise that ills result from a situation where assumptions have not been challenged at the analysis stage, and that consequently the only logical posture one can assume is to retain the most holistically capable and versatile force that one can achieve.[103] Pillar progresses the central argument of Mattis and Howes beyond the military world into that of policy while retaining the same logic, insisting that 'policy must adapt to the uncertainty'.[104] The primary thrust of Pillar's argument, and its contribution above those of Mattis and Howes, is recognising and declaring that not only will uncertainty remain a key characteristic of the political landscape, but that care needs to be taken to remember the limitations of intelligence; hence, not to expect too much from intelligence services.[105]

To conclude, the guiding precepts and functions discussed here, as well as the key problem, define the nature of the relationship between strategy and intelligence. Most important is the inherently political nature of the activity, with the additional points that the relationship is truly dynamic and subject to a myriad of real-world complexities that plague the effective execution of the function in practice. And finally this function, 'the collection of information, its collation and evaluation, and the communication of the end product to the appropriate user at the right time'[106] across the entirety of the Strategy Bridge for the purpose of obtaining political objectives, is a never-ending process. The dynamic concludes and constantly restarts in the service of its political and military masters; it is constantly adapting to shifting circumstances and objectives as well as threats. It is critical that these points, together with the guiding precepts and functions, and the role of assumptions, are taken as the foundation of the relationship. This is a dynamic that has not been codified by either

strategic studies or intelligence studies; this chapter penetrates the core of this relationship, articulates its fundamental workings and problems, and operationalises it into a tool of analysis with which to understand its real-world practice. And it is to that practice that attention will now turn, by exploring the experience of British intelligence throughout the Suez Crisis of 1956.

NOTES

1. Glees and Davies accept the 'essentially political nature' of the relationship, but they differ to this thesis by declaring that the relationship between the operating organs of government and intelligence is difficult to clarify because of the need for intelligence to serve two masters: the politicians and the truth. Anthony Glees and Philip H. J. Davies, *Spinning the Spies: Intelligence, Open Government and the Hutton Inquiry* (London: The Social Affairs Unit, 2004), p. 21.
2. Christopher Andrew Richard J. Aldrich et al., *Secret Intelligence: A Reader* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. Xv.
3. Loch K. Johnson, 'Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence', *Comparative Strategy* (2003) Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 25.
4. Glees and Davies (2004), ch. 6.
5. Michael I. Handel, *War, Strategy and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1989), p. 189.
6. Richard K. Betts, 'Politicisation of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits', in Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken (ed.), *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honour of Michael I. Handel* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003).
7. Indeed, one can observe the level of debate now within Intelligence Studies as to whether or not politicisation is inherently bad through *Intelligence and National Security's* special edition, (2013). 'Revisiting Intelligence and Policy: Problems with Politicisation and Receptivity', *Intelligence and National Security* Vol. 28, No. 1.
8. Harry Howe Ransom, 'The Politicisation of Intelligence', in Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.), *Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society* (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1987) p. 42.
9. Loch K. Johnson, 'National Security Intelligence', in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (New York: OUP, 2010), p. 5.
10. David Omand, *Securing the State* (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), p. 23.
11. Kenneth Strong, *Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer* (London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1969), p. 220.

12. Kovacs states that 'intelligence is not an independent intellectual pursuit'. Amos Kovacs, 'Using Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security* (1997) Vol. 12, No. 4, p. 145.
13. P. 244 of Strong (1969).
14. Bruce Berlowitz, 'The Big Difference Between Intelligence and Evidence', (2003)   http://www.rand.org/commentary/2003/02/02WP.html accessed 25/10/2011. P. 1.
15. Maurice R. Greenberg, Richard Haas, 'Making Intelligence Smarter', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (1996) Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 138. Fingar too reflects this by saying that 'intelligence can help by reducing uncertainty and providing insight regarding increasingly complex issues'. Thomas Fingar, 'Intelligence and Grand Strategy', *Orbis* (2012) Vol. 56, No. 1, p. 120.
16. Kovacs (1997), p. 145.
17. Edward W. Bennett, 'Intelligence and History from the Other Side of the Hill', *The Journal of Modern History* (1988) Vol. 60, No. 2, p. 313. This is reflected by Sims who states the purpose of intelligence as 'gaining competitive advantage over adversaries'. Jennifer Sims, 'Intelligence to Counter Terror: The Importance of All-Source Fusion', *Intelligence and National Security* (2007) Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 40.
18. Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 179.
19. Robert Jervis, 'What's Wrong with the Intelligence Process?' *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (1986) Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 39.
20. Everett Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 170 (italics added).
21. Gill and Phythian (2006), p. 1.
22. Kovacs (1997)), p. 145 (italics original).
23. United States Marine Corps, *MCDP-2:* Intelligence (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1997), p. 5.
24. Ibid., p. 10.
25. Philip H. J. Davies, *Organisational Development of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1979* (Doctoral thesis: Department of Sociology, University of Reading, 1997), p. i.
26. See especially Philip H. J. Davies, 'MI6's Requirement's Directorate: Integrating Intelligence into the Machinery of British Central Government', *Public Administration* (2000) Vol. 78, No.1, and Philip H. J. Davies, *MI6 and the Machinery of Spying* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004).
27. George Tenet, *At the Centre of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), p. 499.

28. Carl von Clausewitz (Michael Howard, Peter Paret trans.), *On War* (London: Everyman's Library, 1993), Bk. 1 Ch. 1.

29. Ibid., p. 83.

30. Hew Strachan, 'Strategy and the Limitation of War', *Survival* (2008) Vol. 50, No. 1, p. 50.

31. United States Marine Corps, *MCDP-1: Strategy* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1997), p. 82.

32. Mark Lowenthal, 'The Policymaker-Intelligence Relationship', in Johnson (2010), p. 439.

33. Paul R. Pillar, *Intelligence and US Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 174.

34. Roger George, 'Intelligence and Strategy', in John Baylis and James Wirtz et al. (ed.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World* Third Edition (Oxford: OUP, 2010), p. 162.

35. Kovacs (1997)

36. After issuing the somewhat pretentious statement of paying heed to the advantages of his plans, Sun Tzu insisted that 'the general *must create* the situations which will contribute to their accomplishment'. Sun Tzu (Samuel B. Griffith trans.), *The Art of War* (Oxford: OUP, 1971), p. 66 (italics added).

37. It is however also useful to note the astute observation from Shulsky and Schmitt of intelligence also comprising a competitive pursuit against a reacting opponent. Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence* Third Edition (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2002), p. 176.

38. J. M. Hanhimaki and O. A. Westad, *The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eye Witness Accounts* (Oxford: OUP, 2003), p. 445.

39. Ernest R. May (ed.), *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68* (New York: Bedford Books, 1993).

40. Ibid., pp. 80–81.

41. Steele recognises the credit US intelligence deserves not only for helping to avoid conflict, but for the technological advances pioneered by their efforts. Robert D. Steele, 'Crafting Intelligence in the Aftermath of Disaster', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (2002) Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 165.

42. Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh, *In from the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 365.

43. Elliot A. Cohen, 'The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force', in Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.), *The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy and War* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2010).

44. Handel also details the inequality in this relationship, stating that it is 'asymmetrical, as it is a meeting between an expert without authority and an authority without expertise'. Michael I. Handel, 'Leaders and Intelligence', in Michael I. Handel (ed.), *Leaders and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 1989), p. 15.

45. Aldrich notes the implication of Secret Services is that they provide a service to other departments of state, Richard J. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service* (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), p. 385. Macartney even issues as his defining purpose of intelligence the idea that it 'is basically a dedicated support service for government policymakers'. J. Macartney, 'Intelligence: A Consumers' Guide', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (1988) Vol. 2, No. 4, p. 458.

46. The bridge concept has been consistent in Gray's work for some years, but his primary works elaborating this idea are Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: OUP, 1999) and Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: OUP, 2010).

47. Omand wisely states that this is the case even for those who 'have no idea that they need to know'. Omand (2010), p. 126.

48. Macartney says that 'Intelligence is not free… The production of information is very labour intensive; it requires a great many highly skilled, and well paid, professionals.' This view should most certainly be heeded in the context of earning the privilege that an intelligence capability can deliver. Macartney (1988), p. 479.

49. Macartney further states that intelligence is vulnerable because 'it is largely designed and optimised for peacetime'. Ibid.

50. Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), Ch. 11.

51. Loch K. Johnson, 'National Security Intelligence', Johnson (2010), p. 5

52. Mark M. Lowenthal, 'The Policymaker-Intelligence Relationship', ibid., p. 440.

53. Cabinet Office, *National Intelligence Machinery* (London: TSO, 2006), p. 17.

54. Jervis (1986)), p. 40.

55. Kenneth Strong, *Men of Intelligence: A Study of the Roles and Decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence from World War I to the Present Day* (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1970), p. 154.

56. Strong (1970), p. 157.

57. Handel, 'Leaders and Intelligence', in Handel (1989c), p. 5.

58. Tenet (2007)), p. 491.

59. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, 'Introduction', in Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (ed.), *The Missing Dimension: Governments and*

Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (Basingtoke: Macmillan, 1984), p. 6.

60. Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, *War: Ends and Means* Second Edition (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006), pp. 195–196.

61. Steele (2002)), p. 166

62. Michael Herman, *Intelligence Services in the Information Age* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 29.

63. Stephen Marrin, 'Adding Value to the Intelligence Product', in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), *Handbook of Intelligence Studies* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), p. 201.

64. Fingar stands alone in recognising the role of intelligence at the stage of implementing policy. Fingar (2012), p. 122.

65. Donald McLachlan, 'Intelligence: The Common Denominator/1', in Michael Elliot-Bateman (ed.), *The Fourth Dimension of Warfare Volume I: Intelligence, Subversion, Resistance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970), p. 54.

66. Colin S. Gray, 'Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory', *Prism* (2012) Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 29 (italics added).

67. Kent (1966), p. 182.

68. The list is as potentially endless as it is variable to the context in which planners find themselves. Gray gives an account of the importance of context in Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Phoenix, 2006), Ch. 2.

69. Fingar (2012), p. 121.

70. *National Intelligence Machinery* (2006), p. 20.

71. Indeed the role of assumptions will also have an entire case study chapter dedicated entirely to its contextual application to the Suez Crisis, comprising Chap. 5 below.

72. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 410. This is a point also echoed by Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, 'Introduction: On Strategy', in Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox and Alvin Berstein (ed.), *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge: CUP, 2008).

73. Strategy must take its lead from policy, which if geared to the future must mean that strategy, too, 'is oriented towards the future'. Hew Strachan, 'Strategy and Contingency', *International Affairs* (2011) Vol. 29, No. 4, p. 1281.

74. Gray argues that strategy 'seeks control over an enemy's political behaviour'. Gray (2010), p. 7. Renshon states that because the political world is strategic in practice, 'actors must take into account how their actions will influence the actions of other actors'. Jonathan Renshon and Stanley A. Renshon, 'The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making', *Political Psychology* (2008) Vol. 29, No. 4, p. 525.

75. John Aclin, 'Intelligence as a Tool of Strategy', in John Boones Bartholomees Jr. (ed.), *US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy* (Carlisle, PA: USAWC SSI, 2010), p. 275.

76. Colin S. Gray, 'Coping with Uncertainty: Dilemmas of Defence Planning', in Cimbala (ed.) (2010), p. 2.

77. Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Ch. 5.

78. Lewis G. Irwin, *Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means: Learning from America's Struggle to Build an Afghan Nation* (Carlisle, PA: USAWC SSI, 2012), pp. 2–10.

79. Dyson argues that rationality is bounded 'by the beliefs, cognitive style, and motivated needs of the individuals, and investigating how each individual subjectively constructs and interprets the political environment is a key step in explaining political action'. Stephen Benedict Dyson, 'Text Annotation and the Cognitive Architecture of Political Leaders: British Prime Ministers from 1945–2008', *Journal of Information Technology and Politics* (2008) Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 9.

80. Henry Kissenger, *White House Years* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 54.

81. Jervis (1976), p. 410.

82. Richards J. Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1999), p. 111.

83. T. Durand, E. Mounoud et al. 'Uncovering Strategic Assumptions: Understanding Managers' Ability to Build Representations', *European Management Journal* (1996) Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 391.

84. H. A. Simon, 'Rationality in Political Behaviour', *Political Psychology* (1995) Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 60.

85. Lombardi states that assumptions affect 'all levels of strategy formulation'. Benjamin Lombardi, 'Assumptions and Grand Strategy', *Parameters* (2011, Spring), p. 30.

86. Peter Jackson and L. V. Scott (ed.), *Journeys in Shadows: Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), p. 5.

87. Heuer (1999), p. 9.

88. Michael Herman, 'What is Intelligence?' *The Naval Review* (1989) Vol. 77, No. 2, p. 112.

89. Although intelligence services suffer from their own assumptions, it is argued here that those originating from the policy world are most important and simply outrank those within intelligence; indeed, they contribute to the shaping of assumptions within intelligence.

90. Omand provides a very broad framework encouraging the management of risk for intelligence matters that is worthy of attention. Omand

(2010), Ch. 12. Although he also sagely warns against the expectation of ever being able to 'virtually eliminate risk in their policies'. Ibid., p. 48.

91. Omand warns that seeking to perform this objectively also carries the risk of being merely collusive with the political masters. Ibid., p. 7.

92. Lombardi (2011), p. 37.

93. Further reinforcing a central argument of Clausewitz, that no other 'human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance'. Clausewitz (1993), p. 96. Omand holds the element of chance as a constant throughout his analysis of intelligence matters, Omand (2010).

94. Except that an already existing unknown assumption will be reinforced and remain in place unchallenged and possibly still unknown.

95. Thomas X. Hammes, 'Assumptions: A Fatal Oversight', *Infinity Journal* (2010) Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 6.

96. M. Schrecker, 'US Strategy in Afghanistan: Flawed Assumptions Will Lead to Ultimate Failure', *JFQ* (2010) Vol. 59, p. 76.

97. Ibid.

98. J. A. Dewar, C. H. Builder et al., *Assumption-Based Planning: A Planning Tool for Very Uncertain Times* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), p. 13.

99. Hammes (2010), p. 6.

100. Pillar (2011), p. 319.

101. Ibid., pp. 320–321.

102. General James Mattis in J. Dickerson, 'A Marine General at War' (2010) http://www.slate.com/articles/life/risk/2010/04/a_marine_general_at_war.single.html accessed 18/11/2011, p. 4.

103. Buster Howes, 'Vast Ills Follow a Belief in Certainty', *RUSI Journal* (2011) Vol. 156, No. 3.

104. This phrase also forms the title of Pillar's concluding chapter. Pillar (2011), p. 332.

105. Ibid.

106. Strong (1970), p. 164.

How Was British Intelligence Structured by the Time of the Suez Crisis?

Understanding the institutional layout of British intelligence is essential not only to assess and trace its performance, but also to establish the context within which the intelligence services operated. Such an understanding demands knowledge of 'what the underlying rationales are behind its structure and how it fits within the wider governmental machinery'.[1] The two intelligence institutions to be assessed here are the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6)[2] and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). Although the Security Service (MI5) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) are also members of the British intelligence community, their activities will not be considered. In the case of MI5 this is because its operational mandate is domestic security focussing on counter-espionage, thus it played no role in the foreign policy venture that was Suez. And in the case of GCHQ there is not enough publicly available evidence of its involvement on which to base any sort of analysis. Cradock also recognises that the case of GCHQ still results in 'particular obscurity'[3] due to secrecy rulings making GCHQ activities even more difficult to trace than those of SIS.

This is an empirical problem that will not disappear soon. Indeed, it is a structural fact of conducting intelligence-related research in the United Kingdom that significant legal protection is afforded to the intelligence services. The *National Intelligence Machinery* makes this clear, stating that intelligence records 'are protected by a "blanket" exemption, in accordance with Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958, from the legal

obligation to transfer public records to The National Archives'.[4] Further to this is the declaration that the records of the intelligence agencies 'are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000'.[5] SIS and the JIC are the subjects of investigation because they are the intelligence institutions central to foreign policy and because they both had considerable involvement in the Suez Crisis. Although researching SIS suffers the same empirical problem as researching GCHQ in terms of having legally closed archives, previous researchers have uncovered sufficient ground to support a satisfactory analysis. Understanding the position of these institutions within government, their relative chains of command, mandate and operational record will show not only what organisational state they were in at the onset of the Suez Crisis, but also the value of their operational conduct. This chapter will establish the context within which SIS and the JIC operated up to 1956.

THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Founded in 1936 'to remedy the lack of co-ordination in the British intelligence community',[6] the JIC has evolved and grown in ways that are of interest to researchers on intelligence matters. Observing the deeper complexities behind these evolutions demonstrates that it was more than mere bureaucratic demand that provoked changes to the intelligence establishment. Cradock rightly notes the very modest objective of the JIC in the beginning: 'Its aim at the outset was to unify, to draw together the disparate pieces of intelligence coming into British hands and to present them as a coherent judgement on which the decision-makers, seen at that time as mainly military, could build.'[7] It was, of course, the Second World War that broadened its remit[8]; the total war footing that the British state adopted in the face of the Nazi threat resulted in the mobilisation of all national resources, including the intelligence establishment. Goodman is correct to note that 'the galvanising effect of war' did not have an immediate impact.[9] The JIC became an important component of a centralised system of intelligence adopted for the duration of the war, and under the pressure that Prime Minister Churchill placed on the Chiefs of Staff (CoS) on all matters the CoS quickly came 'to a better understanding of the virtues of a strong central intelligence organisation'.[10] Although the JIC had its weaknesses—most notably in its relations with the civilian intelligence agencies[11]—its role in the Second World War should not be underestimated. It carried a huge burden, its tasks ranging over strategic

assessment, intelligence liaison with allies, keeping overseas commands abreast of developments, as well as preparing papers on a wide manner of subject areas.[12] Without any doubt the JIC played a key role in aiding the CoS to maintain and exploit the British strategy bridge throughout the Second World War, gaining influence and respect across government, as well as immeasurable status in the eyes of the military.[13]

The intelligence establishment was already thinking ahead to the post-war world when in January 1945 a report titled *The Intelligence Machine*[14] was produced by the JIC, at the direction of its Chairman and Secretary.[15] This report observed that while the wartime adaptation of the intelligence establishment had been appropriate, the relaxation of financial constraints and the urgent imperative placed upon all resources had 'resulted in some overlapping of responsibilities and duplication of work which should not be acceptable or permissible in peace-time'.[16] The thrust of this report was looking to the future beyond the war with Nazi Germany to ensure that 'if we are to plan an organisation for peace capable of ready adaptation to the needs of a future war, something simpler and economical must be devised'.[17] Despite this relatively early recommendation to the JIC, it was some time before changes were implemented. Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Evill submitted his *Review of Intelligence Organisations, 1947*[18] in November of that year, the objectives of which were to assess:

> whether our existing organisation is such as to make the most of our available intelligence resources, or whether any adjustments are needed to enable us to meet the very exacting requirements of the present defence situation having in mind the interests of the economy as well as of efficiency.[19]

The prime imperative guiding this review was the onset of the Cold War, and the need to respond to the Soviet threat. In this regard it was noted that knowledge of the Soviet Union was 'seriously lacking or out of date'.[20] Thus the primary objective was to remedy the structural conditions that had been hindering intelligence-gathering on the Soviet Union, which were based on exploiting the position of the satellite countries to establish bases and personnel.[21] It is this adaptation that came to dominate British intelligence and explains its state of preparation at the 1956 Suez Crisis.

In 1956 the organisational structure of the JIC was very similar to that of 1948; the prime difference lay in its emphasis on the Soviet threat and the corresponding direction of resources. It was still a body serving the

CoS; its charter had evolved but not unrecognisably so—the only real change to the charter by 1956 was the inclusion of a Commonwealth Relations officer into the committee's membership.[22] The fundamental responsibilities remained:

(i)   To give higher direction to, and to keep under review, intelligence operations and defence security matters.
(ii) To assemble, appreciate and present intelligence as required by the Chiefs of Staff and to initiate such other reports as may be required or as the Committee may deem necessary.
(iii) To keep under review the organisation and working of intelligence and defence security as a whole at home and overseas so as to ensure efficiency, economy and a rapid adaptation to changing requirements, and to advise what changes are deemed necessary.
(iv) To co-ordinate the activities of Joint Intelligence Committees under United Kingdom Commands overseas and to maintain an exchange of intelligence with them.
(v)   To maintain liaison with appropriate intelligence and defence security agencies in the self-governing Commonwealth countries and the United States and other foreign countries, and with the intelligence authorities of international defence organisations of which the United Kingdom is a member.
(vi) To report progress in the spheres of its responsibilities.[23]

This charter is plain and clear, but what did it mean in terms of the practical reality of day-to-day operations?

Very simply what can be seen is that by 1956 the JIC held considerable responsibilities within the British intelligence establishment, that it had shown a capacity to adapt to the currently perceived big threat and was acting accordingly to produce intelligence product.

There were two important limitations to the JIC system however: first, the organisational position of the JIC. By 1956 it was preparing papers on an increased range of topics relating to far more than simply military matters, indeed political updates and threat assessments were effectively the trade practised by the JIC; the production of military-specific appreciations being carried out through its sub-body, the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB). This makes the position of the JIC as a CoS body quite curious, for the CoS were the only *guaranteed* recipients of all JIC papers. Although any government ministry could request, and even commission, the JIC to prepare papers, it was at the time by no means certain that

all JIC papers would be disseminated at a policy level beyond the CoS Committee. As the heads of the other intelligence services (SIS, MI5 and GCHQ) sat on the committee, one might expect there to be a flow of intelligence, which had been judged and agreed before being passed on to political masters. In reality, this is not what happened. What is seen instead is a very common problem in intelligence, the 'stove-piping' of product, and this was the second limitation of the JIC.

The stove-piping problem in intelligence is generally explained as an 'administrative process' that inhibits the export of information from the organisation in which it originates.[24] There is another view on this matter worth consideration that comes from the memoirs of Pete Blaber, an American special operations forces officer. He puts it thus:

> The currency of spies is information, and the highest-value currency is information that no one else knows about. Once a spy acquires it, he's trained to lock it up, guard it, and only to give it to others for something in return. As a result, spies tend to overcompartmentalize their most credible information, even in an atmosphere of complete cooperation[25]

This is perhaps the most acute bureaucratic problem to afflict intelligence. Some would argue—and indeed have—that politicisation is the gravest threat to intelligence. It is argued here that the wilful hoarding of this 'highest-value currency' (rather than merely accidental stove-piping), which is the more serious impediment to the intelligence process. What this meant for JIC practice at the time was that there was never a truly uninterrupted flow of intelligence product from all of the intelligence services from which to prepare assessments. Instead a selective mentality permeated the process. As intelligence services also enjoyed their own link direct to prime ministerial level—this was especially true in the case of SIS—the JIC in 1956 could not claim to be the intelligence body with the closest relationship to policy-makers. The end result of these two limitations was that the hoarding problem became acute. This was because, first, the JIC did not receive all intelligence produce from the other services, and therefore could not claim to be fully informed of all intelligence activities; and, secondly, the SIS could exploit its position of direct access to the prime minister, meaning that the JIC was not the most influential voice from intelligence in policy circles. Nor could the JIC even claim truly close proximity to the cabinet; it had limited influence over policy, although it had very intimate links to its military customers through the

Chiefs of Staff. Thus, by the onset of the Suez Crisis, although the JIC had initiated an effective, albeit developing, system of monitoring the Soviet threat and preparing policy papers, it did not enjoy a position of providing an uninterrupted flow of intelligence product to cabinet-level discussions in Whitehall. This made its voice easy to ignore, which became a serious problem throughout the Suez Crisis.

The Development of the Secret Intelligence Service: Second World War to Suez

At the end of the Second World War the strategic and intelligence instruments of state not only had to adjust to peacetime, but also re-task to deal with the emerging Soviet threat. As was the case with the JIC, SIS was thinking about post-war changes when it produced what is commonly known as the Bland Report (*Future Organisation of the SIS*). The primary thrust of the report was to ensure the continued autonomy of the service.[26] A secondary purpose was to consider how to deal with the inevitable rundown of the myriad intelligence and special operation organisations that had proliferated during the war years. The Special Operations Executive (SOE) was the best-known example,[27] although it would be more accurate to state that there were eight separate intelligence services during the war.[28]

Ensuring the continued civilian status of SIS was at the time a recurrent problem for those within the Service; a concern voiced by its first chief, Mansfield Cumming after the Armistice.[29] It maintained its independence again at the end of the Second World War despite the advances of the armed services.[30] SIS remained under Foreign Office control, notionally directed by the Permanent Under-Secretaries Department (PUSD) as of 1948. The reality was however somewhat more ambiguous: a large loophole was effectively in place whereby SIS 'could still withhold or, worse, fabricate intelligence and neglect to pass details of its operations to its Foreign Office overseers'.[31]

The second big change at the end of the Second World War was the absorption of SOE into SIS, which proved to be a time-consuming and divisive affair. Tensions existed between the two agencies, highlighted by 'the uneasy relationship between intelligence-gathering… and the organisation of "Special Operations" (SO)'.[32] Divisions and arguments raged over whether SOE should retain its status as an independent organisation. The effect on SIS was a modification of its operating doctrine to

one 'in which networks could, in principle serve double or triple duty as intelligence networks, agents of political influence, and in some cases as potential stay-behinds or resistance cells'.[33] This, coupled with the onset of the Cold War and the shift to 'roll-back' as a strategy to combat the communist threat, served to place SIS in a role of not only intelligence gathering, but also carrying out offensive action. This was to prove a volatile mixture that would have calamitous consequences for SIS in Egypt.

The third and final change to be noted here is the internal organisational restructuring of SIS at the end of the war. To act in the post-war world, SIS was reorganised into five directorates with the Requirements Directorate being further split into specific subject areas:

Finance and Admin (I)
Production (II)
Requirements (III)
   R1—Political
   R2—Air
   R3—Naval
   R4—Military
   R5—Counter-intelligence
   R6—Economic
   R7—Financial
   R8—GC&CS/GCHQ
   R9—Science
Training and Development (IV)
War Planning Directorate (V)[34]

This internal shake up was designed to place SIS in the best possible position to deal with the emerging challenges of the Cold War, with the inclusion of a counter-intelligence component as the single greatest change. SIS remained severely compromised in its counter-intelligence capability for some years, because the Soviet spy, Kim Philby, was placed in charge of this aspect of the Requirements Directorate.

These fundamental changes were the key adaptations for the post-war world that SIS faced. As to its role, little can be authoritatively stated, though there is a statement in the JIC's own 'Child's Guide' to intelligence organisation, written in 1951. SIS is described as having two functions, the second of which is still suppressed under Section 3 (4) of the Public Records Act. The first is:

to obtain, evaluate, collate (in certain subjects) and communicate to Departments of H.M.G. requiring it such intelligence as cannot be obtained by overt means regarding foreign countries, movements, etc., including the operations on foreign territory of hostile and potentially hostile subversive, sabotage and intelligence organisations.[35]

This first function of SIS is to be a pure intelligence-gatherer. The unstated secondary function is, presumably, to perform special operations. A tantalising clue lies in a letter sent by J. G. Atkinson to the JIC in 1957 regarding the production of a textbook on guerrilla warfare for reference purposes within the Service. The letter opens by saying: 'As you are aware MI6 is responsible for keeping the technique of Guerrilla Warfare alive.'[36] This would certainly go a long way to explaining the redaction of the 1951 statement under the Public Records Act and represents the surest evidence available that the second function of SIS was indeed to preserve the capacity for guerrilla warfare. This was the organisational basis of SIS in 1956.

Operational Methodology and Record

The adoption of roll-back as a strategy for the early Cold War had the political requirement of containing and proactively halting the spread of Communism. Roll-back used the infusion of a new rhetoric of freedom and deployed it to counter the Communist message,[37] the best example of which was the long-term efforts of Radio Free Europe.[38]

The implication for SIS was clear; take offensive action as well as gather intelligence. The totalitarian nature of the USSR represented a unique challenge to intelligence services, for it was extremely difficult to penetrate in every way to gather intelligence. Its vast geography ruled out all but the most cursory aerial reconnaissance on the frontiers at that time[39]; restricted access meant that it was an incredibly difficult task to infiltrate agents; and there were certainly no established networks already operating within the USSR itself. SIS had devoted all of its resources to the conflict with Nazi Germany throughout the Second World War 'to the total exclusion of intelligence-gathering on the Soviet Union'.[40] When Kim Philby informed his Soviet controllers of this important state of affairs, it cast him, ironically, in a suspicious light, for the Soviets simply could not believe that SIS was not operating against the USSR in *any* capacity.[41] Indeed Soviet suspicion went so far as to include periods of break-

ing contact with Philby during the war years.[42] The end result of this lack of attention to the USSR was made very clear in the 1947 *Review of Intelligence Organisations*, when Evill noted that:

> Our knowledge of Russia, geographical, economic, industrial and military, is seriously lacking or out of date. Our knowledge of Russian intentions, tactical and strategic doctrines, scientific and technical capacity, and the progress of their research and development in the military field appears even more seriously inadequate.[43]

The lack of information-gathering networks had two operational consequences; first, an increased reliance on technical intelligence-gathering in the form of electronic warfare intercepts and signals intercepts. The best example of such a technical fix in the early Cold War years was the joint SIS–CIA Berlin tunnel operation to tap Soviet land-lines in Berlin, known as Operation STOPWATCH to the British, GOLD to the Americans.[44] The tunnel operation is credited with revealing a great deal of information on the Soviet order of battle,[45] despite its betrayal by George Blake. And second was the pursuit of what Davies has labelled 'triple duty networks'.[46] A single network would perform three duties: serving as intelligence network providing a regular stream of intelligence material; acting as agents of political influence in order to further British interests; and representing potential resistance cells to be activated in the event of war. Such a network would cultivate all three areas at once in order to hasten progress and preparedness in all.

The concept of triple duty networks is most important in understanding the state and mentality of SIS by the time of Suez—it is important to appreciate the increased recourse to special operations (otherwise encountered in the Intelligence Studies literature as 'special political action', or 'covert action') that such an approach entails. The early stage of this intelligence offensive was centred mainly on Greece, before focussing later on an agent-infiltration programme through Albania. In Greece, efforts merely carried on from SIS wartime assistance to promoting the royalist cause,[47] demonstrating that SIS was engaging in more than simply pure intelligence gathering.

During the Greek civil war, efforts were directed towards preventing a communist takeover of the country. The idea in Albania was to be more offensive and activity was geared towards equipping exiles to secure their own liberation from the USSR— Operation VALUABLE. The hope was

that 'they would be joined by local groups, which would eventually lead to a full-scale civil war'.[48] The failure of this Albanian venture owed as much to the over-ambitious expectations of SIS as it did to Philby's betrayal of the operation. Albania shows the increased use by SIS of wartime special operations-type activities and the establishment of potential resistance networks, as opposed to its role of intelligence-gathering. It was this mentality that was fuelled with hope after the success of Operation BOOT in Iran.

Operation BOOT was launched in Iran in 1953, following the failure of operations in Eastern Europe. In contemporary parlance it was a plan for regime change to restore the Shah in place of Mussadeq, which although originating from some dubious political calculations in London—it was viewed as a matter of Empire, bound up with the fragility of the British economy, and sold to Washington in terms of preventing communist expansion[49]—was ultimately successful. SIS took credit for both the plan and the network of agents, but looked to the CIA for financial assistance. The CIA acquiesced, the opportunity to break the Anglo monopoly on the Iranian oil market not being lost on them.[50] Following the arming of some 6,000 anti-Mussadeq Iranians, demonstrations and violence broke out on the streets of Tehran. Despite complications to the original plan, Mussadeq fled Iran on 19 August with General Zahedi taking control. Zahedi welcomed the Shah on 22 August to formally take over power in Iran. Ultimately, the success of BOOT masked deeper structural problems with British foreign policy in the Middle East—'Eden failed to realise that Britain's strength in the Middle East was illusory, depending, as always, on buffer states and bribes… .'[51] The success of BOOT not only fed that illusion, it also created the impression in the minds of Anthony Eden and SIS that Britain now possessed a refined capability for regime change.

By this stage it is clear that SIS was as focussed on special operations as it was on pure intelligence-gathering, although the final operation to consider prior to the Suez crisis itself is a curious mixture of both: the infamous Buster Crabb affair at Portsmouth in April 1956. Underwater spying on Soviet naval vessels was considered a 'routine'[52] affair by 1955, part of a 'rolling programme'[53] to gain information on Soviet vessels. On previous occasions underwater acoustic equipment and frogman photographers had been employed to gather naval intelligence. In 1956 a Soviet state visit to Britain was scheduled, offering an opportunity to gather intelligence on the Soviet cruiser *Ordzhonikidze* that had carried premier Khrushchev and his foreign minister Bulganin to Portsmouth.

On this occasion, despite Eden's express prohibition[54] of intelligence operations against the Soviet visit, an operation was conducted through SIS against the *Ordzhonikidze*. Commander Lionel Crabb, a veteran diver who had previously performed numerous such operations for SIS and the Royal Navy, was enlisted. The operation went badly wrong, with Crabb losing his life somewhere in Portsmouth harbour during the dive. The failure of the operation resulted in public and diplomatic outrage, with the Soviets issuing a formal diplomatic complaint, and the British press as well as the House of Commons seeking answers to the controversial incident. Moran states that Eden's express prohibition on espionage activities during the visit was not received by SIS because the key man responsible for ensuring the message was relayed—Michael Williams—had suffered a bereavement and had left the office at the critical moment.[55] SIS did not receive the message, but neither did it utilise PUSD to inform those at ministerial level of the plan to spy on the *Ordzhonikidze*. Eden reiterated this during Prime Minister's Questions by stating 'that what was done was done without the authority or the knowledge of Her Majesty's Ministers'.[56]

Whether down to the faulty communications link via PUSD, negligence on the part of SIS, or bad luck on the part of Michael Williams's bereavement, the key fact remains that SIS undertook this special operation *without* the approval of their political masters, *within* the UK. Not only was the operation conducted without approval, it was done against the express prohibition of any such operations during the visit of the two Russian leaders to the UK. The fact that approval was not sought is important because there was an existing protocol in place for clearing proposals through the Foreign Office for sensitive intelligence-gathering missions that might have potentially serious political consequences. In 1952 it was stated that:

> it is quite impossible for us to obtain the Foreign Secretary's 'approval in principle' for dangerous operations without fairly detailed knowledge of what is involved. The reason is that we cannot form any useful judgement of the political dangers without knowing pretty accurately what is proposed.[57]

Quite obviously this operation paid no heed to the already established protocol, which is the important feature of this affair. This is the case in spite of the insistence of Admiral Sir William Wellclose Davis that perspective be retained: when 'one looks at the Crabb incident it is perhaps well to

remember the large number of successful Intelligence Operations carried out unheralded and unsung'.[58] Davis did not further justify his position by elaborating on what these successful operations were. His assertion may be viewed either positively or sceptically: positively in that it is difficult to prove intelligence success, and sceptically as a crude justification for intelligence operations carried out without oversight. The affair proved to be the final catalyst for an eventual shakeup of SIS, Sir John Sinclair leaving SIS and Sir Dick White taking up his appointment as C in July 1956.

By the time of the Suez Crisis in 1956, despite the well-intentioned and well-informed improvements of the immediate post-war years, the British intelligence establishment was actually in a state of disrepair. Being based on no statutory footing and experiencing only very tenuous Foreign Office control vis PUSD,[59] it is clear that SIS could in practice operate without Foreign Office consent. In fact, SIS's access to the prime minister enabled it to operate without Foreign Office knowledge of its activities. Sir Archibald Ross, at the time an Assistant Undersecretary in the Foreign Office as well as a former head of PUSD, declared in an interview that neither PUSD nor the Foreign Office had control of intelligence operations, even if they did have effective knowledge of them.[60] The JIC meanwhile had fallen somewhat by the wayside. Its mandate of providing intelligence guidance to the other intelligence services was unenforceable; given that the JIC was still a CoS body it had no way of knowing whether its guidance was being followed. The intelligence services could all too easily bypass, and/or selectively edit what information they passed on to the JIC. This was a situation made clear by the Buster Crabb affair, where it was clear that both the JIC and the Foreign Office had no prior knowledge of the ill-fated operation. The Buster Crabb affair is proof positive of both the ability and willingness of SIS to launch special operations without prior political consent.

The JIC was producing some fine reports by 1956 but its questionable dissemination mechanisms resulted in a disjointed approach to the provision of intelligence. Onslow described SIS as 'a rogue elephant' in 1956.[61] This was most certainly to remain the case at Suez. These failings and existing weaknesses in the bureaucracy of British intelligence contributed greatly to the failure to adequately inform British strategy at the fundamental stage of policy development.

Notes

1. Michael S. Goodman, 'The British Way in Intelligence', in Matthew Grant (ed.), *The British Way in Cold Warfare: intelligence, diplomacy, and the bomb, 1945–1975* (London: Continuum, 2009), p. 127.
2. SIS is also known commonly as MI6, throughout this thesis, however, there will be many occasions where MI6 is encountered, simply due to the proliferation of this common association throughout the literature. This author will refer to SIS, but should MI6 be encountered during quotation and referencing it is to be taken as synonymous to SIS.
3. Percy Cradock, *Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World* (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 2.
4. Cabinet Office, *National Intelligence Machinery* (London: Stationery Office, 2006), p. 33.
5. Ibid. These statutory exemptions are also stated on SIS's own website, see SIS, 'SIS archive and records policy', http://www.sis.gov.uk/our-history/archive.html accessed 20/08/2012.
6. Michael S. Goodman, *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee Volume I: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), p. 1.
7. Percy Cradock, *In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major* (London: John Murray, 1997), pp. 37–38.
8. Cradock notes that Churchill had given the JIC a directive enabling it 'to take the initiative in preparing at any hour of the day or night as a matter of urgency papers on any particular development'. Cradock (1997), p. 38.
9. Goodman (2014)), p. 63.
10. Cradock (2002)), p. 7.
11. Michael Herman, *Intelligence Services in the Information Age* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 95.
12. Ibid., pp. 17–18.
13. Goodman (2014)), p. 147.
14. *The Intelligence Machine* report can be found within CAB 21/3622, TNA.
15. Goodman (2014)), pp. 1–2.
16. Ibid., p. 3.
17. Ibid.
18. *Review of Intelligence Organisations, 1947* within CAB 163/7, TNA.
19. Ibid., p. 2.
20. Ibid., p. 7.
21. Ibid.

22. *Charter for the Joint Intelligence Committee*, 15 June 1956. Within CAB 21/3622, TNA.

23. Ibid.

24. 'Stovepipe warning' as defined in Jan Goldman, *Words of Intelligence: A Dictionary* (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006), p. 127.

25. Pete Blaber, *The Mission, the Men, and Me: Lessons from a Delta Force Commander* (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2008), p. 216.

26. Jeffery (2010), p. 599.

27. The best singular account of the exploits of SOE is M. R. D. Foot, *SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940–1946* (London: Pimlico, 1999).

28. Listed as MI5, SIS, the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS), the Radio Security Service (RSS), MI9 (responsible for escape and evasion activities), SOE, London Controlling Section (LCS), and the Political Warfare Executive (PWE). M. R. D. Foot in Christopher Andrew and Richard J. Aldrich, "The Intelligence Services in the Second World War", *Contemporary British History* (1999) Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 131–132.

29. Jeffery (2010), p. 726.

30. Ibid., pp. 744–748.

31. W. Scott Lucas and Alastair Morey, 'The Hidden Alliance: CIA and MI6 before and after Suez', *Intelligence and National Security* (2000) Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 101. Lucas also points out the 'loose' structuring of these arrangements W. Scott Lucas, *Britain and the Suez Crisis: The Lion's Last Roar* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 35.

32. Stephen Dorrill, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations* (London: Fourth Estate Limited, 2000), p. 19.

33. Philip H. J. Davies, *Organisational Development of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service* (University of Reading, UK: Doctoral Thesis, Department of Sociology, 1997), p. 284.

34. Dorril (2000)), pp. 29–30.

35. *A 'Child's Guide' to Certain Intelligence Organisations*. Within CAB 163/8, TNA, p. 5.

36. Letter from J. G. Atkinson to the JIC (italics added), 16 January 1957. Within CAB 176/60, TNA.

37. The intent behind the use of such rhetoric will be briefly encountered in Chap. 5 when the efforts of the British Information Research Department (IRD) are assessed.

38. Suitable histories of these activities include George Urban, *Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War Within the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), Richard H. Cummings, *Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950–1989* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., Inc., 2009), and Richard

H. Cummings, *Radio Free Europe's 'Crusade for Freedom': Rallying Americans Behind Cold War Broadcasting, 1950–1960* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., Inc., 2010).

39. This problem was only satisfactorily resolved through the later use of orbital satellite platforms.
40. Dorril (2000)), p. 6.
41. Ibid., p. 8.
42. Edward Harrison, *The Young Kim Philby: Soviet Spy and British Intelligence Officer* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2012), p. 177.
43. *Review of Intelligence Organisations, 1947.* Within CAB 163/7, TNA, p. 7.
44. Dorril (2000)), p. 523 and Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (New York: The Overlook Press, 2002) pp. 410–412.
45. Dorril (2000)), p. 526.
46. Davies (1997), p. 284.
47. Dorril (2000), p. 306.
48. Ibid., p. 367.
49. Aldrich (2002), p. 470.
50. Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald, *British Intelligence and Covert Action: Africa, Middle East and Europe since 1945* (London: Junction Books, Ltd.: 1983), p. 111.
51. Anthony Verrier, *Through the Looking Glass* (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1983), p. 83.
52. Michael S. Goodman, 'Covering up Spying in the "Buster" Crabb Affair: A Note', *The International History Review* (2008) Vol. 30, No. 4, p. 783.
53. Aldrich (2002)), p. 525.
54. Which was provided in the form of a written directive. James Rusbridger, *The Intelligence Game: The Illusions and Delusions of International Espionage* (London: I. B. Taurus & Co. Ltd., 1991), p. 64
55. Christopher Moran, 'Intelligence and the Media: The Press, Government Secrecy and the "Buster" Crabb Affairs', *Intelligence and National Security* (2011) Vol. 26, No. 5, p. 692.
56. Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, statement in response to question 9. *Commander Crabb (Presumed Death)* Hansard HC Deb 09 May 1956 vol. 552 cc1220-3. Available via http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1956/may/09/commander-crabb-presumed-death-1 accessed on 07/08/2014.
57. *Clearance with Foreign Office of Intelligence Operations which may have serious Political consequences.* Within CAB 163/8, TNA, para. 2.

58. Admiral Sir William Wellclose Davis, *My Life*, unpublished autobiography, WDVS 1/6, Churchill Archives Centre (hereafter referred to as CAC), Churchill College, Cambridge University, p. 753.

59. PUSD is described as from 1909 as holding the responsibility 'for liaison with the intelligence services and the administration of the secret service fund'. The National Archives, 'Intelligence Records in the National Archives', (2005) http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue.rdleaflet.asp?sLeafletID=32 (accessed 05/01/2010), P. 3 Para. 6.

60. Interview with Sir Archibald Ross, File No. 19, Suez Oral History Project. Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London (hereafter referred to as LHCMA, KCL), p. 5.

61. Sue Onslow, 'Julian Amery and the Suez Operation', in Simon C. Smith (ed), *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. 76.

What Assumptions Existed Within the British Government at the Time of the Suez Crisis?

It was established in Chap. 2 that the role of assumptions presents a special problem in investigating the relationship between strategy and intelligence. It is precisely because of the special nature of this problem that their presence must be analysed in detail. In Chap. 2 it was argued that assumptions permeate all areas of the Strategy Bridge, framing, shaping and conditioning the thought processes that leaders bring to any policy issue. Identifying and understanding these assumptions are mandatory prerequisites in carrying out any rigorous policy or strategic analysis, for they establish the context within which thinking took place, and, hence, which actions were ultimately taken.

Identifying these assumptions provides the context within which British decision-making in 1956 took place and, it is argued here, that within the British Government there existed eight assumptions (six associated with policy with two relating to the military level). These eight assumptions effectively outline the fundamental beliefs that Britain took into the crisis. It is beliefs, after all, that matter most in politics and animate behaviour most strongly. These assumptions, to offer a metaphor, created the prism through which Britain viewed the world in 1956. It is these eight assumptions that played key roles in shaping the British approach to the Suez Crisis and are ranked below in order of their importance from the policy level down to military level:

1. Britain was still a world power
2. The Suez Canal still represented a vital national interest to Britain
3. Britain's case (with its French partners) would be seen as legally defensible
4. The United States would not oppose British action
5. Britain was strong enough to enforce its will on the Nasser regime
6. The Nasser regime would fall as a consequence of British action
7. An extensive air campaign would be needed before ground operations could begin
8. Successful military operations would necessitate a prolonged occupation of Egypt

ASSUMPTION 1 *BRITAIN WAS STILL A WORLD POWER*

The assumptions of British governments from 1945 onwards was that Britain remained a great power, despite losing virtually all the attributes on which power, in international politics, depends: economic resources and military strength.[1]

This excerpt from Verrier's *Through the Looking Glass,* sums up the first assumption held by the British Government at the time of Suez: the dominant, most important, assumption to consider. This was not a recent assumption; it had been deeply embedded in the psyche of British policymakers for a great number of years, due primarily to the imperial legacy. The British Empire had been globally dominant and had been victorious in the Second World War, despite being nearly bankrupted by it. That victory reinforced or, at the very least, did not dispel the illusion of Britain's real status in 1956.

Eden, as Foreign Secretary, affirmed this view in a Cabinet memorandum of 1952 when he said that the foreign policy of the British Government is determined by certain factors. The factor at the top of Eden's list was this belief: 'The United Kingdom has world responsibilities inherited from several hundred years as a great power.'[2] Nor was this view amended even in retrospect, as can be seen by Margaret Thatcher's statement that at the time, at least within the Conservative party, the view was that 'Britain was a great power which should not be pushed around by Nasser's Egypt and that the latter should be taught a lesson, not least *pour encourager les autres.*'[3] Quite simply very little thought was given to the

realities of Britain's position; as a consequence the assumption remained not only in place, but completely unquestioned even as British commitments east of Suez became ever more undefined.

This assumption had helped to condition and shape the fundamental way in which British policy-makers viewed the world; it created the prism through which they viewed a world where Britain still played a key role in shaping the big events; using force to do so if necessary. Such a worldview informed regional views, especially in the Middle East, which Britain believed to be critically important to its status as a world power, and reinforced the belief that Britain was the predominant player in that region's affairs.[4] Kissinger even labelled Eden as a captive of his formative years because he had 'grown up in the period of British domination of the Middle East'.[5] Britain, although having an increasingly ill-defined role for its global posture, still viewed that posture as essential, for reasons that hardly went beyond sentimentality. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh perhaps expresses this reasoning best when he said that although British global positioning was not really necessary after the granting of independence to India, 'when we gave up India we'd been howled at, *it was not so easy to give up other things*'.[6]

The broad scope of Assumption 1 can be said to have created a 'cognitive reflex' on the part of British leaders.[7] It was believed that Britain was a world power and should expect to operate as such regardless of circumstances.[8] British interests and military deployments, indeed its entire strategy of global positioning, were all conditioned by this ingrained belief of the British establishment, a belief that informed instinctive reactions to any nascent crisis. Indeed, the Eden Cabinet's first agreed consensus on the Suez Crisis, was informed by Assumption 1:

> The Cabinet agreed that our essential interests in this area must, if necessary, be safeguarded by military action and that the necessary preparations to this end must be made. Failure to hold the Suez Canal would lead inevitably to the loss one by one of all our interests and assets in the Middle East and, even if we had to act alone, we could not stop short of using force to protect our position if all other means of protecting it proved unavailing.[9]

When one understands the depth to which Britain's worldview of its global importance was ingrained, it becomes difficult to conceive of Britain taking any other reaction to Nasser's move on the Suez Canal than the course of action pursued.

Assumption 2: *The Suez Canal Still Represented a Vital National Interest to Britain*

> In time of war, the Middle East will have priority second only to Western Europe. Its oil is essential to the United Kingdom in peace-time and a proportion of it might well be essential in war. But it is clearly beyond the resources of the United Kingdom to continue to assume the responsibility alone for the Middle East. Our aim should be to make the whole of this area *and in particular the Canal Zone* an international responsibility.[10]

The Suez Canal was seen as one of the key geographical linchpins of Empire as well as being symbolic of Britain's 'worldwide imperial reach'.[11] It was arguably the most important of the 'five chokepoints' of the world that the Royal Navy historically believed Britain needed to possess to control the global maritime commons.[12] Uniquely, the Canal cut communication times between Europe and Asia by several weeks and, most importantly to Britain, to the largest parts of its Commonwealth and Empire.[13] Following the end of the Second World War Britain began to recognise the relative decline in importance of the Suez Canal to British interests. India had been granted independence and Churchill recognised before his retirement that the Suez Canal Zone garrison was far too expensive to maintain[14] in relation to the economic benefits that the Canal Zone brought. This of course was made clear by the agreement with Egypt for British forces to leave the Canal Zone entirely in 1953, based on an 18-month withdrawal timetable that was to commence from 1 August 1954.[15] Eden fundamentally disagreed with Churchill over the Canal's importance following the advent of atomic weaponry. [16]

So, what had changed in British thinking? How did Britain go from recognising this relative decline of the Canal's importance to readopting the view that possession of it was in Britain's vital national interests when Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company in July 1956? The most compelling answer must lie with the personal convictions of the Prime Minister, Anthony Eden. Without doubt, Eden held a belief in Assumption 1 that Britain was and remained a world power with global responsibilities. Further, he had a strong sense of the Canal's importance, remarking in 1952 that

> A stoppage of free transit through the Canal would have a disastrous effect upon British trade with all countries east of Suez including members of the

Commonwealth. *The Canal is of more importance to the world to-day than ever before*.[17]

The nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company represented a challenge to Britain's world position as well as to the legal rights that Britain held as a partner in the company. But Eden also believed that Nasser's action threatened the very resource survival of Europe. The first Cabinet discussion on the Canal issue following nationalisation noted that of the 70 million tons of oil that passed through the Canal annually, 60 million tons of it went to Western Europe, a full two-thirds of European oil supplies.[18] By losing control of the Canal, the British Government clearly felt that Nasser, a leader whom they had never trusted, was now in a position to threaten Western Europe. Eden put this emphatically to the Cabinet on 14 August in saying 'If we lose M/E (Middle East), we are finished.'[19] The oil reserves and thus the sustainability of each state affected was under threat from a man who Eden believed increasingly to be a mere puppet of the USSR. His belief was consistently expressed throughout the time of the crisis, but its articulation is most clearly seen in his correspondence with President Eisenhower, particularly a letter of 1 October 1956 when Eden states that: 'There is no doubt in our minds that Nasser, whether he likes it or not, is now effectively in Russian hands, just as Mussolini was in Hitler's.'[20] The view of the British Government thus became very clear, in the words of the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan: 'Colonel Nasser's ambitions threatened those supplies [of oil]—directly, because they jeopardised the freedom and efficiency of the Suez Canal.'[21]

Ultimately what can be seen from Assumption 2 is that its influence on the British Government originated with Empire, began to decline in the post-war years and then returned once more following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. Britain had gone from a position of not only recognising the declining importance of the Canal and actively taking measures to end its military occupation of the Canal Zone, to believing that Nasser's actions represented a clear threat to the national interests of Britain. The weight given to this threat can be seen when the Cabinet noted that any British military action taken to secure the Canal would probably involve a run on sterling. Yet despite this concern the Cabinet considered that any run on sterling 'might have to be accepted if the alternative was slow economic strangulation as Egypt extended her control over the Arab world and the oil-producing countries'.[22]

Assumption 3: *Britain's Case (with Its French Partners) Would Be Seen as Legally Defensible*

it was a breach of international law, of an international agreement, and that if it went unchecked Colonel Nasser within a few months would have all the Arab states in the Middle East under his control.[23]

In observing the timeline of events that occurred throughout the Suez Crisis, it is noticeable that the period involving the use of force was by far the shortest. Most of the crisis was actually spent pursuing diplomatic and legal options to reverse Nasser's act of nationalisation. This was done because of a basic belief that the British and French case would be seen in the international arena to be legally justifiable. Assumption 3 is curious, however, for it was always made plain in the private circles of the Cabinet that the legal argument put forward rested on little more than protestation against Nasser's act of nationalisation. That act, because the Suez Canal Company was registered as an Egyptian company, thereby coming under the purview of Egyptian law, represented little more 'than a decision to buy out shareholders'.[24] No international court was likely to take Anglo-French claims seriously.[25] Nonetheless, as Britain viewed the act of nationalisation as a threat to the oil resources of Western Europe as well as an affront to British honour, 'the dictates of respectability required some legal cover'.[26] That cover became centred on the public argument that Egypt was in violation of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, and that the Canal represented an international waterway vital to the interests of too many members of the international community to rest in the control of a single power.

The private view that prevailed within the Cabinet, however, had become one of believing that a grave injustice had been done to Britain that needed to be corrected. And, at its worst, this act of Nasser mirrored far too closely the first moves of the totalitarian regimes of Hitler and Mussolini in the 1930s. The Lord President of the Council stated in Cabinet discussion that:

> Experience with Italy, and later with Germany, had surely shown that if the encroachments of a dictator were not checked at the outset, when comparatively little strength was needed to check them, the ultimate reckoning involved a far greater convulsion and a much greater sacrifice.[27]

Eden showed no hesitation at all in deploying the Mussolini comparison to President Eisenhower in their correspondence, before reminding the President not to forget 'the lives and treasure he cost us before he was finally dealt with'.[28]

Assumption 4: *The United States Would Not Oppose British Action*

The feeling among many of us who had been in the war, was that you didn't invade countries if you had reason to believe the Americans would disapprove![29]

The British Government went ahead with its planning for using force to settle the Suez Canal dispute in full confidence that they would encounter no opposition from the United States, or at worst that they would simply 'lament publicly and do nothing'.[30] What informed this assumption? First and obviously, the alliance that Britain shared with the United States had developed through the Second World War and continued into the Cold War and the establishment of NATO. Cradock notes that, despite the awareness of increasing European reliance on the United States, 'Wartime comradeship, a common language and memories of a common achievement *cushioned* these unpalatable facts.'[31] The personalities of those involved are critical to address; Eden and Eisenhower in particular enjoyed a personal and professional relationship dating back to the war years, indeed the personal warmth displayed in their correspondence is significant.[32]

The presence of such extensive personal relationships was instrumental in conditioning an environment of complacency. Long-standing relationships within alliances may simply be taken for granted, which introduces problems. One is that 'it may create the false impression that both allies think they know how the other operates'.[33] This can surely be made no more explicit than in Eden's friendly assertion to Eisenhower: 'You know us better than anyone.'[34] A second problem is that 'successful past co-operation may produce the incorrect expectation that both continue to have common interests. It blinds policy-makers to the possibility that interests may diverge in a new situation.'[35] Kissinger also believes in the fundamental closeness of the relationship when he asserts that 'no two countries seemed *less likely to clash* than Great Britain and the United States'.[36]

But those interests did indeed diverge over the possibility of the use of force; and Eden's inability to not only register American unease with the use of force, but also not to recognise the perception on the American side that British actions were 'reminiscent of the imperial past'[37] must, on balance, be viewed as unforgiveable. Eisenhower had consistently and, in the most cordial of manners it has to be stated, put it to Eden that 'the step you contemplate should not be undertaken until every peaceful means of protecting the rights and the livelihoods of great portions of the world have been thoroughly explored and understood'.[38] Eisenhower had further put it in plainer terms to Eden on 3 September by stating that 'I must tell you frankly that American public opinion flatly rejects the thought of using force.'[39] Eisenhower can understandably be said to have had one eye on the upcoming presidential election, a factor that Eden should have considered in his calculations. This was, however, a position from which Eisenhower did not fundamentally shift, and William Clark, Press Secretary to Eden at the time, noted in his diary how Eisenhower's reply of 27 July 'seems to have disappointed the PM'.[40] Clark further notes of Eisenhower's letter of 3 September that: 'It seems at first sight to be an absolute ban on our use of force…*It is this which has brought the PM racing back, almost in despair.*'[41]

Not only was Eisenhower clear in his correspondence, but a direct message was also displayed to the British in the Mediterranean with the deployment of the US Sixth Fleet to shadow the British naval task force *en route* to Egypt. The role of the Sixth Fleet has so far remained an untouched issue in the history of Suez, curiously eluding analysis even in those articles whose declared intent was 'to establish, in a definitive manner, what the US knew about the Suez invasion plan of 1956'.[42] Cogan does not once mention the role of the Sixth Fleet, nor does Calhoun, whose argument centres around the idea that it was British experience in strategic deception that had accounted for their ability to hide their preparations in plain sight from the Americans.[43] It is asserted here that Cogan's omission of the Sixth Fleet renders uncompleted his central desire to establish what the Americans knew of British plans,[44] and that Calhoun is incorrect in his assessment of the success of British deception of their American ally at Suez. The Sixth Fleet was in a position to keep the American Government fully informed with a very accurate account of British preparations, and dispel any doubts of the British intention to use force.

John Winton, at the time an officer serving on board the British aircraft carrier HMS *Eagle*, provides eyewitness testimony to the proximity

of the American fleet, adding flesh to the charge of 'deliberate interfering' that Rhodes James has alleged.[45] Winton asserts that two American submarines were actively shadowing the British task force and furthermore, that British Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) 'were constantly encountering American CAPs'.[46] This provoked concern that more than simply a case of 'touch and go' would soon occur, as American aircraft flown at the time closely resembled Egyptian MiGs.[47] Winton's testimony is substantiated by the MoD itself, one daily information report states: 'Their [Sixth Fleet] presence has proved embarrassing to our Carrier Force, which has flown a number of interception sorties, only to find they intercepted American planes.'[48] Indeed, the situation proved so troublesome that the matter was raised in a CoS meeting and the words of Lord Mountbatten's response to Sir William Dickson, who had pressed Mountbatten on the issue of whether or not the Sixth Fleet was in a position to interpose itself between the British Task Force and Port Said, is telling:

> At a comfortable cruising speed of 25 knots the United States 6th Fleet could reach Port Said in 6 hours from its present position. The Americans now had submarines reporting the progress of our convoys and they could estimate the day and time of our intended landing with considerable accuracy. The presence of the 6th Fleet in its present position was a continual nuisance to our naval and air operations: the United States Commander had been asked if he could move but had replied that he had taken up his position *on direct orders from his Government.*[49]

It cannot be held as at all plausible, given this evidence, that the Eisenhower Government was not fully aware of British intentions, plans and capabilities. And yet, remarkably, this view has continued to inform the historiography on the Suez Crisis. There remains one additional piece of evidence that categorically demonstrates that President Eisenhower did indeed hold prior knowledge of the British intention to use force against Egypt. This assertion is based on the record of a conversation between Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot, who was reporting to Selwyn Lloyd a conversation that had recently taken place in the British Embassy in Washington, DC. Of this conversation Selwyn Lloyd recorded that: 'The President had talked to Elliot about his foreknowledge of our plans. He told Elliot that he had known that we did intend at some time to strike Egypt. But he did not think it would be so soon. He thought it would be after the elections.'[50]

With the American position being made quite clear in personal correspondence and reinforced by the now-understood role of the Sixth Fleet, why was it that Britain retained the belief that there would not be American opposition to their actions? There are three explanations. First was the miscalculation 'that Dulles controlled American policy'.[51] Britain took much of their interpretation of the American position in their Suez policy from his remarks, despite the fact that Eden had a somewhat shaky relationship with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, attributed by Lord Sherfield to 'reasons of personality and cast of mind'.[52] For instance, Dulles is quoted in an early Cabinet meeting on the Suez Crisis as saying 'Egypt must be made to "disgorge" the Suez Canal'.[53] Not only this but a fascinating insight into this assumption comes direct from Eden's personal diary, which is generally more notable for its lack of entries (it is largely void of entries between 15 August and 7 September, and then contains no entries at all after 14 September 1956). It contains the intriguing remark that after Eden had met Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd 'F(oster) seemed not to exclude the possibility of joint use of force. I gave him certain details of our plans, in fact in order to show him where we stood.'[54] Consequently, credence is lent to the assessment of Roger Louis that the British calculated that 'by keeping the United States in the dark, they might succeed in gaining Dulles' acquiescence because of his antipathy towards Nasser'.[55]

The second reason was based on spurious readings of some of Eisenhower's letters, in which some comfort was taken in the belief that the Americans might just let Britain get away with recourse to force as a *fait accompli* if this could be delivered speedily. Where such a reading is most notable is in Eisenhower's letter of 8 September, which although reiterating the American position of not endorsing the use of force, does contain some lines that inspired hope in Downing Street. First was Eisenhower's insistence on the scale of the problem to be dealt with in regards to Nasser: 'and I do *not* differ from you in your estimate of his intentions and purposes. The place where we apparently do not agree is on the probable effects in the Arab world of the various possible reactions by the Western world.'[56] But it must be the following line that most intrigued Downing Street, when Eisenhower states that 'we do not want any capitulation to Nasser. We want to stand firmly with you to deflate the ambitious pretensions of Nasser and assure permanent free and effective use of the Suez waterway under the terms of the 1888 treaty.'[57] Clark noted in his diary that the response to this statement seemed 'a little more hopeful'.[58] It is quite clear that Downing Street was selectively examining the statements of Eisenhower for what they wanted to hear[59] and, following

the more bellicose attitude of Dulles, came to believe that a *fait accompli* could be delivered with no serious American opposition.

Reinforcing this assumption of American acquiescence was the ongoing active relationship in the arena of special operations. The case of the Anglo-American joint SIS–CIA effort to overthrow Mussadeq in Iran in 1953 is well known, but even at the time of the Suez Crisis other operations were still in the advanced planning stages. Of particular interest was Operation STRAGGLE, an Anglo-American plan to intervene in Syria and overthrow the government there. The details of the plan are not of immediate relevance here[60]; what is of relevance, however, is the fact that this remained a jointly agreed Anglo-American operation even into late October 1956, throughout the height of the Suez Crisis itself. Indeed, there was a meeting between SIS officers with officials from the State Department in October agreeing to the proposed plan and its execution that very month.[61] Harold Beeley was present at one of these meetings and insists that the British had to restrain the Americans from carrying out the operation too hastily.[62]

Operation STRAGGLE did not go ahead, not because of Anglo-American tensions over operations in Egypt but simply because the logistical arrangements were not adequately prepared in time. Douglas Dodds-Parker, a junior Foreign Office minister at the time, states that because a cargo ship carrying essential military equipment had broken down and been forced to put into port at Bahrain 'this plan for Iraq to intervene in Syria was not fully equipped'.[63] It must be held as a contributory factor that although Anglo-American relations became strained over the particular events at Suez, their general policy positions remained so aligned on balance that joint special operations were still being conceived, and very nearly launched concurrent to the Suez Crisis itself.

Assumption 5: *Britain Was Strong Enough to Enforce Its Will on the Nasser Regime*

> Above all, Eden failed to realise that Britain's strength in the Middle East was illusory, depending, as always, on buffer states and bribes, rather than military forces which could operate at will throughout the area.[64]

Assumption 5 rests on the simple idea that Britain still possessed the military power to quickly and effectively enforce its will on the Nasser regime. The very first agreement of the Eden Cabinet's Suez policy reveals

a belief in the utility of force to settle the dispute, which was 'to reverse, *by the use of force if necessary,* the reversal of the decision of the Egyptian Government to nationalise the Suez Canal Company'.[65] Such a course of action would only be considered if it was assumed that there existed adequate forces to fulfil such a policy. Clark is correct in his view that Eden's Cabinet was dominated by men who 'possessed an exaggerated view of what Britain in the mid-1950s could do on its own'.[66] The realities of Britain's lack of ability to mount both sufficient forces, and to do so quickly, became apparent to those charged with planning the operation. The Egypt Committee noted almost immediately (by 2 August) that both 16th Parachute Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade (deployed on internal security duties in Cyprus at the time) would have to be replaced in Cyprus so that they could be prepared to take part in the eventual Operation MUSKETEER.[67] The Egypt Committee went on to declare:

> 18. All that is possible to say at this stage is that:
>   (a) With or without requisitioning, personnel moves would be completed within 28 days.
>   (b) Moves of freight and vehicles could be completed in five to six weeks from the date that requisitioning is authorised.[68]

Any British action to reverse the actions of Nasser would clearly not happen at all quickly; British military forces were too dispersed for quick mobilisation, and to be prepared for immediate action. Eden did his best to mask the true intentions revealed in Cabinet by publicly stating that by 'going through every stage which the (UN) Charter lays down, we have given an example of restraint and respect for international undertaking'.[69] The realities that actually forced such prolonged measures were that the troops of 16 Independent Parachute Brigade would need refresher training for an airborne assault, as would those of 3 Commando Brigade for their amphibious duties[70]; Cyprus had no deep-water port suitable for loading the types of ships that were necessary for an amphibious landing, so Malta had to be used instead; the airfields that Cyprus did have were in a poor state of repair and the required aircraft were stationed elsewhere; and finally that there was a severe shortage of available landing craft platforms.[71]

Despite the availability of French military support these logistical factors became cumulatively critical in the ponderous planning and deployment schedules of Operation MUSKETEER. Britain could muster enough forces to mount a successful operation against Egypt, but it could not do

so in a timely manner that would prevent the build-up of international political opinion against such a course of action, 'Britain simply lacked the flexible and mobile quick-response forces, including amphibious assault shipping, to mount a *coup de main*.'[72] The Royal Navy also remarked of the Royal Marines that 'they should not be involved for long periods in such duties as internal security in Cyprus *and thus not be immediately available in emergencies*'.[73]

Ultimately, while the strength could be mustered to enforce its will, Britain was unable to do so quickly enough in a way that could have settled the affair in a timely fashion. And with this in mind the Ambassador to Egypt at the time, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, should have the final say:

> the basic cause of our failure was that what we could do in 1882, we could not do in 1956. We no longer had the same power in the world and miscalculated the forces which could be brought to bear on the situation.[74]

ASSUMPTION 6: *NASSER WOULD FALL FROM POWER AS A CONSEQUENCE OF BRITISH ACTION*

> what worries me most is that I feel that the directive on which the Chiefs of Staff have framed the plan is perhaps the wrong one. It is to occupy the Canal. *The object of the exercise, if we have to embark upon it, is surely to bring about the fall of Nasser* and create a government in Egypt which will work satisfactorily with ourselves and the other powers.[75]

The British Government not only thought it desirable to bring about the fall of Nasser from power,[76] it was considered to be an inevitable consequence of British action. Indeed, in Cabinet itself this outcome was seen as being the most likely result of successful British action to reverse the Egyptian action on the Canal.[77] Of course, as is dealt with in detail later, there emerged a fundamental contradiction between the actual British plan of action for resolving the Suez Crisis and this desire to bring about the fall of the Nasser Government. The adoption of MUSKETEER REVISE, which involved changing the amphibious landing from Alexandria to Port Said put the military action clearly in line with the objective of securing the Canal itself, but obviously not for a direct march on Cairo to depose Nasser, as the original MUSKETEER plan, with its landing at Alexandria, would have.

This assumption is explicit throughout British planning processes, as the JIC were clearly instructed to prepare reports with this desired eventuality featuring as part of their analysis. An early request highlights this well. The Chiefs of Staff invited the JIC to prepare a report on the state of affairs expected to arise in Egypt following military action, with particular attention to three issues: the establishment of a new government; the likelihood of it enjoying popular support; and the likelihood of Egyptian nationalism preventing either of the first two achievements. However, the fundamental premise of the report was to address these three concerns on the assumption that 'such armed intervention were successful in bringing about the downfall of Nasser'.[78] On 17 August the JIC explicitly accepted this assumption in their analysis when it stated:

> We assume that war against Egypt will be short and decisive. Its immediate effect will be:
> (a) the downfall of Nasser and his regime;
> (b) a period of internal disorder in Egypt which will necessitate an Allied Military Government, pending the emergence of a new regime.[79]

Although this assumption dominated British calculations regarding the expected outcomes of the Suez Crisis, it was not challenged either in policy or planning circles. Indeed, its presence was doubly asserted by Macmillan and explicitly articulated by the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) as late as 24 October. The JPS stated that one of the tasks that any occupation force should be prepared to perform would be to 'occupy Cairo in order to depose a hostile government, and to render possible the immediate installation of an acceptable successor, with the possible commitment of maintaining it in power indefinitely'.[80]

There are reasons for this lack of challenge which lie with the problem that plagued proceedings throughout the Suez Crisis: the exclusion of key participants from vital discussions and planning sessions. Julian Amery insists in his testimony that potential members of an Egyptian shadow government-in-waiting were in contact with the British Government, and that this was made known to the Foreign Office, who, indeed, had direct contact with these individuals.[81] Dodds-Parker did not consider that this was a realistic option, and further asserted that the advice of the British Ambassador to Egypt, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, could not have been sought 'because he was in the dark too'.[82]

The assumption that Nasser would fall originated with Eden, and was agreed upon by the Cabinet; this view was not challenged by the JIC, the

Egypt Committee or the British Ambassador to Egypt because very tightly controlled information, or in the case of the ambassador none at all, was given to these bodies and individuals. Dodds-Parker recounted that, years after the events of 1956, Geoffrey McDermott (deputy to Patrick Dean, the Supervising Undersecretary of the Permanent Undersecretary's Department) 'told me that he'd been told to give us as little information as possible'.[83]

Restricting the circulation of information in this way is the surest means of ensuring the security of one's intentions. Unfortunately, it is also the most effective way of ensuring that underlying assumptions are not recognised or challenged, as the people and institutional bodies best equipped to do so are starved of relevant information. Or, as Dodds-Parker himself puts it: 'If you are in a position of power as Prime Minister or even Foreign Minister, knowing your way around, [you] get hold of two or three key people and keep everyone else from finding out.'[84] Not only did Eden do this, but he also 'kept his thinking on a solution of the Suez problem to a small group of like-thinking people'.[85]

ASSUMPTION 7: An Extensive Air Campaign Was Needed Before Ground Operations Could Begin

> In formulating a concept of operations we have considered whether the aim could be achieved by unseating the Egyptian Government by bombing alone… We consider, however, that there would be a danger of not achieving the aim by bombing alone and of *a hiatus occurring* before other forces could be brought to bear against Egypt.[86]

This chief concern of the Chiefs of Staff—one that propelled thinking away from an independent bombing campaign to the inclusion of an amphibious assault—was ironic because in the end, as Rhodes James says: 'It was time that defeated Eden.'[87] Even with the eventual MUSKETEER REVISE plan that was adopted, a hiatus still developed because it was assumed that an extensive air campaign was required before any ground operations could safely commence in Egypt. This, coupled with the five days of sailing time that was needed for the naval task force to reach Egypt from Malta, provided the space in which negative international opinion grew, fed by the imagery of destruction coming out of Egypt from the aerial bombardments.

Despite the excellent performance of Anglo-French aircraft in neutralising the Egyptian Air Force inside 36 hours, with no losses to enemy

action,[88] the need for such operations to occur long before any landing by ground forces was reminiscent of 'the days of global-war thinking when it had been assumed that the international climate would be different and that political considerations would determine only the decision to act, not the methods'.[89] Keightley and Stockwell were graduates of the European school of warfare, class of 1939–1945, where overwhelming force was the key to victory, backed up by diligent planning and preparation: 'But Egypt was not Germany.'[90]

This military assumption resulted in Britain considerably overestimating the capabilities of the Egyptian military; the effect of this assumption was to create a laborious military plan designed to ensure overwhelming force. The problem with this plan was its eventual timetable; with a six-day delay between the beginning of air operations and the landing of ground forces, the political atmosphere was stoked against Britain. It allowed international opinion to coalesce and offered the opportunity for political counter-measures to be proposed at the UN. This relatively benign assumption, informed by the British experience of recent war with Germany, had masked the emerging political realities which were to constrain the ability of force to deliver strategic effect. What permissive political climate there might ever have been, disappeared.

Assumption 8: *Successful Land Operations Would Necessitate a Prolonged Occupation of Egypt*

In the worst case, assuming that Phase II has been fully implemented, we should expect that the Egyptian economy would have been seriously damaged, railways, roads and communications largely disrupted, civil administration considerably strained and disease more wide-spread than normal. Under such conditions, the restoration and maintenance of law and order would be no easy or rapid task.[91]

The British planning process effectively grasped what in today's parlance would be termed post-conflict challenges posed to a military operation. This final assumption represents arguably the most under-recognised counter-factual of the entire Suez Crisis; that on the completion of military operations to (re)secure the Canal Zone, Britain would have had to engage in a prolonged occupation of Egypt. This assumption was informed by the inherent policy contradiction at Suez that was never resolved within the

British Government—did they, or did they not seek the overthrow of the Nasser Government? Although it has been consistently shown that this was indeed a desired objective of the British, one does have to question the practicalities of this desire given the design of military operations for the MUSKETEER REVISE plan—an inconsistency which is addressed later.[92] Despite this contradiction, the overthrow of this government was indeed desired, and the British military saw itself as needing to 'overthrow such a government and create the conditions favourable to the setting up of one prepared to co-operate'.[93]

It was also recognised that British forces would have to deal with a degraded security situation in which underground movements would emerge and use guerrilla tactics against the Anglo-French occupiers. To this end a paper titled *The Security Threat* was circulated that included a detailed run-down of where hostile elements could be expected to emerge. This paper argued (in this order) that a clandestine free officers' movement, the I.E.M, communists, thugs, ordinary people, Egyptian Army personnel, the National Guard and other nationalists[94] represented the most likely candidates to organise an underground movement. There had also been an earlier warning from the British Ambassador in Cairo to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick at the Foreign Office detailing the formation of an Egyptian Home Guard-type unit. These details included the provisioning of gun licences and the training of civilians and students that served to 'indicate that the Egyptian Government are thinking of guerrilla operations in case of a British attack'.[95] Consequently, it was strongly encouraged that serious security measures should be imposed by British forces, to include the vetting and screening of all civil labour forces[96] to reduce the likelihood of attacks on British soldiers, as well as the prevention of sabotage to key facilities within the occupation zone.

Whilst the full implications of British occupation concerns were never realised due to the premature imposition of a ceasefire on 6 November, in the period following the ceasefire when British troops were awaiting the arrival of UN forces an insurgency was *beginning* to develop. Arms stores in Port Said had been opened with weapons distributed widely, resulting in several incidents when small groups of fighters attacked British forces. In a preliminary review of operations it was noted that civilians 'including very young boys were undoubtedly issued with arms; despite denials by the captured garrison commander'.[97] Keightley simply noted that 'During the whole period of occupation the Egyptians did their best to provoke incidents in Port Said.'[98]

These attacks usually took the form of hit-and-run assaults with gre-
nades, as was noted by General Stockwell in his updates to General
Keightley.[99] Orders were issued on 12 November for patrols to be vigilant
and watchful for civilians concealing weapons under their clothing, as well
as warning that Egyptian Army and Security Service personnel in plain
clothes were aiding irregulars in their attacks.[100] Roger Booth, at the time
a captain in the West Yorkshire Regiment, recounted that as the 'port's
population sensed the solidifying of our international condemnation and
thereby our incapacity for further action, so its youth became more con-
fident at night'.[101]

The security situation in Port Said alone had descended into a series of
armed attacks by irregulars on British forces. General Stockwell described
the security situation as 'awkward' because of these assaults.[102] Although
the full implications of the British assumption were not fully realised, the
British action to secure the Suez Canal Zone would have resulted in a
lengthy and difficult occupation.[103] Were further proof to highlight this
situational trend required, one need only consider the fate of Second
Lieutenant Tony Moorhouse, a young subaltern who was kidnapped by
armed Egyptians in a car[104] which was later found to have bloodstains on
the back seat along with length of rope and a gag,[105] and who died in cap-
tivity.[106] These incidents, largely unrecognised in the histories of the Suez
Crisis, suggest that 'The Canal wouldn't have been the end of it…'[107] even
if British action had been successful.

These eight assumptions on the British Strategy Bridge were critical to
British decision-making during the Suez Crisis. The understanding of these
assumptions is key to establishing and understanding the context in which
decisions were being made. They shaped and framed the world that the
Eden Government saw: the first assumption, in particular, was most impor-
tant in viewing the world of 1956 through British eyes. It characterises the
prism through which events were interpreted. Many assumptions simply
went without challenge, reflecting the extent to which they were ingrained.
Others had a more temporal element as they became invalidated in real
time due to the progression of events. And some were correct enough:

1. Britain was still a world power. *Unchallenged*
2. The Suez Canal still represented a vital national interest to Britain.
   Unchallenged
3. Britain's case (with its French partners) would be seen as legally
   defensible.

4. The United States would not oppose British action. *Unchallenged*
5. Britain was strong enough to enforce its will on the Nasser regime.
6. The Nasser regime would fall as a consequence of British action. *Unchallenged*
7. An extensive air campaign would be needed before ground operations could begin. *Unchallenged*
8. Successful military operations would necessitate a prolonged occupation of Egypt. *Subsequently proving to be true*

All of this aside, at the time when it mattered most, when the British Government was planning and conceiving its policy response (with its strategy for implementation), these assumptions played a decisive role in shaping the views of decision-makers to a degree that has so far remained largely unacknowledged in the scholarship on Suez. Nor do these assumptions end at the policy level of the Strategy Bridge; they also influenced thinking at the operational and tactical levels within the military forces themselves. Assumptions permeate the entirety of the Strategy Bridge and can carry with them significant effects upon the pursuit of the desired policy objective, even in framing what that desired policy objective is in the first place. The words of Lombardi are appropriate here, for his warnings capture very well the effects of assumptions on strategy in general, but also in how they pertain to British policy throughout the Suez Crisis:

> Erroneous assumptions are a significant impediment to the successful pursuit of strategic goals. They not only mislead decision makers as to the overall strategic context: they can also misrepresent adversaries, their political capabilities and intentions. The result is that otherwise limited resources are misapplied.[108]

Notes

1. Anthony Verrier, *Through the Looking Glass* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1983), p. 1.
2. CAB 129/53, C (52) 202, 18 June 1952, p. 5. In David Goldsworthy (ed.), *The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 1951–1957* (London: HMSO, 1994).
3. Margaret Thatcher, *The Path to Power* (London: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 88.
4. Bertjan Verbeek, *Decision-Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis: Small Groups and a Persistent Leader* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), p. 57.

5. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone, 1995), p. 530.
6. Transcript of interview of Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh by unnamed interviewer, dated 6 October 1982. In MS191/2/9, University of Birmingham Special Collections, Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham (hereafter referred to as Birmingham Special Collections), p. 1 (italics added).
7. Lieberman et al. argue that political behaviour can 'become routinized and automatic with behavioural repetition'. Matthew D. Lieberman, Darren Schreiber and Kevin N. Ochsner, 'Is Political Cognition Like Riding a Bicycle? How Cognitive Neuroscience Can Inform Research on Political Thinking', *Political Psychology* (2003) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 681–2.
8. Renshon goes as far as to argue that Eden believed that he needed to act in order to preserve Britain's great power status. Jonathan Renshon and Stanley A. Renshon, 'The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making', *Political Psychology* (2008) Vol. 29, No. 4, p. 511.
9. Cabinet Conclusions, C.M. (56), 54th Conclusions, Friday, 27 July 1956. In CAB 128/30, TNA, p. 4.
10. CAB 129/53, C (52) 202, 18 June 1952, p. 9 (italics added). In Goldsworthy (1994).
11. Peter G. Boyle, *The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955–1957* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), p. 149.
12. Dover, Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, Singapore and the Cape of Good Hope being the full list of five such chokepoints, as exclaimed by Admiral Fisher, noted by Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 206.
13. Verbeek (2003)), p. 73.
14. Brendon estimates the cost at more than £50 million per annum. Piers Brendon, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire: 1781–1997* (London: Vintage Books, 2007), p. 487.
15. Operational communiqué, 952/CCL 4 August 1954, For Chiefs of Staff from BDCC (ME). In DEFE 7/31, TNA.
16. Verbeek (2003), p. 67.
17. CAB 129/54, C (52) 267, 28 July 1952, p. 113 (italics added). In Goldsworthy (1994).
18. Cabinet Conclusions, C.M. (56), 54th Conclusions, Friday 27 July 1956. In CAB 128/30, TNA, p. 2.
19. Eden recorded in Sir Norman Brook's Notebook: Cabinet Minutes, 14 August 1956. In CAB 195/15/22, TNA, p. 100.
20. Eden to Eisenhower, 1 October 1956, Boyle (2005), p. 172.
21. Harold Macmillan, Cabinet Conclusions, C.M. (56), 62nd Conclusions, Tuesday 28 August 1956. In CAB 128/30, TNA, p. 5.

22. Cabinet Conclusions, C.M. (56), 63rd Conclusions, Thursday 6 September 1956. In CAB 128/30, TNA, p. 4, para. (c).

23. Selwyn Lloyd, transcript of *The Road to Suez*, (1965) Associated Television. In SELO 6/175, CAC, Churchill College, Cambridge University, p. 11.

24. Cabinet Conclusions, C.M. (56), 54th Conclusions, Friday 27 July 1956. In PREM 11/1098, TNA.

25. Barry Turner, *Suez: The Inside Story of the First Oil War* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2007), p. 204.

26. Keith Kyle, *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. 138.

27. Cabinet Conclusions, C.M. (56), 62nd Conclusions, Tuesday 28 August 1956. In CAB 128/30, TNA, p. 6.

28. Eden to Eisenhower, 5 August 1956, Boyle (2005), p. 158.

29. John Edmonds interview transcript. DOHP 121, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, CAC, Churchill College, Cambridge University, p. 3.

30. Robert Rhodes James, *Anthony Eden* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), p. 544.

31. Percy Cradock, *In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy Under Margaret Thatcher and John Major* (London: John Murray, 1997), p. 51 (italics added).

32. Eden would regularly address Eisenhower as 'friend', whereas Eisenhower went to lengths to express his 'earnest assurances of my continuing respect and friendship'. Eden's addressing of Eisenhower as friend can be seen consistently through his letters, Eisenhower's particular use of this phrase occurred on p. 3 of his letter of 31 July 1956. In AP20/27/57-AP20/27/85, Birmingham Special Collections.

33. Verbeek (2003), p. 9.

34. Eden to Eisenhower, 5 August 1956, Boyle (2005), p. 159.

35. Verbeek (2003)), p. 9.

36. Kissinger (1995)), p. 534 (italics added).

37. Robert R. Bowie, *Suez 1956* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 62.

38. Eisenhower to Eden, 31 July 1956, p. 3. In AP20/27/57-AP20/27/85, Birmingham Special Collections.

39. Eisenhower to Eden, 3 September 1956, p. 3. In AP20/27/57-AP20/27/85, Birmingham Special Collections.

40. Sunday 29 July, William Clark, *From Three Worlds* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1986), p. 167.

41. Ibid., Wednesday 5 September, p. 183 (italics added).

42. Charles G. Cogan, 'From the Politics of Lying to the Farce at Suez: What the US Knew', *Intelligence and National Security* (1998) Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 100.

43. Ricky-Dale Calhoun, 'The Musketeer's Cloak: Strategic Deception During the Suez Crisis 1956', *CIA Studies in Intelligence* (2007) Vol. 51, No. 2, p. 47.

44. Although his fundamental conclusion on the American disbelief at British perfidy on the matter remains correct, Cogan (1998), p. 119.

45. Rhodes James (1986), p. 568.

46. John Winton, 'Suez—Forty Years On', *The Naval Review* (1996) Vol. 84, No. 4, p. 349.

47. Ibid.

48. Ministry of Defence Information Room Record No. 1 for the 24 Hours Ending 0200 hrs 1 November 1956, p. 1 para. 1. In DSND 6/29, CAC, Churchill College, Cambridge University.

49. Lord Mountbatten (italics added), Chiefs of Staff Committee, extract from Minutes of COS (56) 111th Meeting held on Monday 5 November 1956. In AIR 8/1940, TNA.

50. Record of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot at Her Majesty's Embassy, Washington on 18 November 1956. In PREM 11/1176, TNA.

51. W. Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonisation* (London: I.B. Tauris), p. 602.

52. Lord Sherfield's (Roger Makins) interview transcript. File no. 13, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 1

53. Selwyn Lloyd quoting Foster Dulles, Cabinet Conclusions, C. M. (56), 56th Conclusions, Wednesday 1 August 1956, p. 2. In CAB 128/30, TNA.

54. Eden's discussion of such plans lends further credence to the argument that the Americans knew far more of British plans than has been accepted to date, Wednesday 15 August 1956 of Anthony Eden's diary. In AP20/1/21-32, Birmingham Special Collections.

55. Roger Louis (2006), p. 603.

56. Eisenhower to Eden (italics original), 8 September 1956, p.1. In AP20/27/57-AP20/27/85, Birmingham Special Collections.

57. Ibid., p.2.

58. Monday 10 September, Clark (1986)), p. 185.

59. Lord Sherfield postulates that Eden simply did not believe the American position and that, 'if we went ahead, they would still not react against it'. Lord Sherfield's (Roger Makins) interview transcript, File no. 13, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p.1.

60. But a detailed outline of which can be obtained from Matthew Jones, 'The "Preferred Plan": The Anglo-American Working Group Report on Covert Action in Syria, 1957', *Intelligence and National Security* (2004) Vol. 19, No. 3.

61. Anthony Gorst and W. Scott Lucas, 'The Other Collusion: Operation Straggle and Anglo-American Intervention in Syria, 1955–56', *Intelligence and National Security* (1989) Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 590.

62. Harold Beeley interview transcript. File no. 2, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 27.

63. Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker interview transcript. File no. 6, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 6.

64. Verrier (1983)), p. 83.

65. Cabinet Conclusions, C. M. (56) 54th Conclusions, Friday 27 July 1956, p. 5 (italics added). In CAB 134/4107, TNA.

66. Clark (1986)), p. 146.

67. Annex: Action Against Egypt, in Egypt Committee, E. C. (56) 5, 2 August 1956, p. 1, para. 3 (e). In CAB 134/4107, TNA.

68. Ibid., p. 5, Para 18.

69. Verbatim report of a speech by Anthony Eden at a mass meeting following the Conservative Annual Conference at Llandudno on Saturday 13 October 1956, p. 13. In AP20/36/5c-AP20/37/15b, Birmingham Special Collections.

70. The Royal Marines themselves stated that: 'Not one man had been in a landing craft for 11 months.' 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines Operation Musketeer Report, 21 December 1956, p. 3, para. 3. In ADM 202/455, TNA.

71. The points regarding ports, airfields and landing crafts were explicitly referred to as the 'main limitations' to operations by General Keightley. Despatch by General Sir Charles F. Keightley, GCB., GBE., DSO., Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces: Operations in Egypt—November to December 1956, p. 5328. In PREM 11/1130, TNA.

72. Anthony Gorst, 'A modern Major-General: General Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the Imperial General Staff", in Saul Kelly and Anthony Gorst (eds.), *Whitehall and the Suez Crisis* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 35.

73. Naval Report on Operation Musketeer, p. 4, para. 8 (italics added). In ADM 1/27373, TNA.

74. Humphrey Trevelyan, *The Middle East in Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 129.

75. Harold Macmillan, Egypt Committee: Action Against Egypt (Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer), E. C. (56) 8, 7 August 1956, p. 2, para. 7 (italics added). In CAB 134/4107, TNA.

76. Eden states to Eisenhower that this 'must therefore also rank high among our objectives'. Eden to Eisenhower, 5 August 1956, Boyle (2005), p. 159.

77. Cabinet Conclusions, C. M. (56), 56th Conclusions, Wednesday 1 August 1956, p. 3, para. (b). In CAB 128/30, TNA.

78. Note by the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Intelligence Committee, Operation Musketeer: Post Operational Problems, August 1956. In DEFE 11/134, TNA.

79. The Political and Military Effects in the Middle East of Certain Developments in the Suez Canal Situation, Annex to JIC (ME) (56) 39 (Final), 17 August 1956, p. 1, para. 3. In CO 1035/24, TNA.

80. Annex to J.P. (56) 160 (Final) Military Implications of Mounting Operation Musketeer, 24 October 1956, p. 3, para. 8 (b). In DEFE 6/37, TNA.

81. Julian Amery interview transcript. File no. 1, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, pp. 12–13.

82. Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker interview transcript. File no. 6, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 9.

83. Ibid., p. 8.

84. Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker interview transcript. File no. 6, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 9.

85. Donald Logan (1986) Narrative of Meetings at Sevres 22–25 October 1956, p. 7. In MISC 30, CAC, Churchill College, Cambridge University.

86. Chief of Staff Committee, Action Against Egypt—Outline Plan, COS (56) 293, 2 August 1956, p. 2, para. 8 (italics added). In DEFE 5/70, TNA.

87. Robert Rhodes James, 'Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis', *History Today* (1986) Vol. 36, No. 11, p. 13.

88. Report by Air Marshal D.H.F Barnett, Air Task Force Commander on Operation 'MUSKETEER', p. 9, para. 47. In ADM 116/6133, TNA.

89. Darby (1973), p. 98.

90. Turner (2007)), p. 330.

91. Annex to J. P. (56) 160 (Final), Military Implications of Mounting Operation Musketeer, p. 2, para. 5. In DEFE 11/135, TNA.

92. This inconsistency is dealt with in detail in Chap. 7.

93. Annex to J. P. (56) 160 (Final), Military Implications of Mounting Operation Musketeer, p. 3, para. 7. In DEFE 11/135, TNA.

94. The Security Threat, 1364/11/G(Int), 22 September 1956, pp. 1–2. Issued in conjunction with Allied Land Forces Operation Order No. 2. In WO 288/91, TNA.

95. Sir Humphry Trevelyan to Sir Ivone Kirpatrick, No. 1587, 15 August 1956. In PREM 11/1099, TNA.

96. The Security Threat, p. 3, para. 9 (a).

97. TAC 2 (BR) Corps, Preliminary Int Review of Ops up to 8 Nov 56, 10 November 1956, p. 1, para. 8. In WO 288/162, TNA.

98. Despatch by General Sir Charles F. Keightley, GCB., GBE., DSO., Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces: Operations in Egypt—November to December 1956, p. 5336. In PREM 11/1130, TNA.

99. Personal communiqué for General Keightley from Stockwell, 150840Z DEC. In AIR 20/10754, TNA.

100. Routine communiqué from Main HQ 2 Corps to 3 Div, 3 CMDO BDE, 40 SUBAREA, French Force 'A', 10 French Para Div, Allied Force HQ, sent 12 November 1956. In AIR 20/10752, TNA.
101. Roger Booth, Suez: A Reminiscence (unpublished memoirs, 1996), p. 11. In Ref 7628 98/3/1, IWM Special Collections.
102. Personal communiqué for General Keightley from Stockwell, 150840Z DEC. In AIR 20/10754, TNA.
103. It should also be noted that this was an assessment that was echoed by the CIA, who argued that even if 'effective security were established, the British–French occupation would almost certainly have to be prolonged'. Central Intelligence Agency, Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 30-4-56: Probable Repercussions of British–French Military Action in the Suez Crisis (Washington DC: CIA 1956), p. 2. Available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/0000252664
104. These details were communicated in KEYCOS 135 to MINDEF, KEYCOS 135, 111832Z DEC. In AIR 20/10754, TNA.
105. Single page communiqué from AFHQ to MAIN 2 CORPS, 112130Z DEC. In AIR 20/10754, TNA.
106. Booth says that Moorhouse suffocated to death, Booth (1996), p. 27.
107. Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker interview transcript. File no. 6, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 12.
108. Ben Lombardi, 'Assumptions and Grand Strategy', *Parameters* (2011: Spring), p. 38.

How Did British Intelligence Inform Policy Development During the Suez Crisis?

> The full role of the Joint Intelligence Committee and MI6 are particular gaps in current knowledge.[1]

This concluding remark by John Young from the *Contemporary British History* Special Issue on Whitehall and the Suez Crisis provides the rationale for this chapter. The role of the SIS and the JIC have still not been fully explored even within the general histories of the Suez Crisis, and certainly not in terms of their influence on policy, that is, assessed strategically. It will be seen that SIS and the JIC played a remarkably small role in the development of British policy at Suez, although SIS did much to fan the flames of prejudice towards Nasser before the crisis. What will be revealed, however, was that on the whole SIS was behaving far more in the manner of an *agent provocateur* looking for the next special operation abroad, as well as acting as a tool that Prime Minister Eden could wield independently of the wider Whitehall machinery.

The JIC meanwhile found itself hamstrung by its institutional position as a Chiefs of Staff body, and thus limited in the influence it could wield at the policy level, as it could easily be ignored. The development of British policy was instead largely a story of Eden's instant reaction to the news of nationalisation, with little challenge or input from the intelligence services except that which suited and reinforced existing assumptions.

The final area to be addressed in this chapter is the role of personalities. It is a key aspect of the Suez Crisis that personalities played a disproportionately large role, one that has been neglected to date.[2] Three in particu-

lar will be assessed: Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Permanent Secretary to the Foreign Office Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick and the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee Sir Patrick Dean, as it was these men together who circumvented the wider Whitehall machinery.

The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6): Thuggery Is on the Agenda[3]

The Appointment of Sir Dick White as C

Following the Buster Crabb affair of April 1956 Sir John Sinclair was removed as the chief of SIS, known as C, and replaced by Sir Dick White. This new management did not, however, result in an immediate change to the way that SIS conducted its operations, even though White's arrival at SIS was 'a baptism of fire'.[4] White had intended to 'whip the SIS back into shape'.[5] He became, however, a victim of events rather than their controller, for just 12 days after his appointment as C the Suez Canal Company was nationalised. In fact, 'Nasser's fate was already cast when White became chief'.[6] And, because of this, White would have little influence on SIS's conduct during the crisis itself, 'where directors were almost a law unto themselves, acting like prefects in an expensive but unruly school'.[7] White believed that SIS officers were 'steeped in self-deluding mystery, convinced that SIS operations could influence the course of history'.[8] White could never have reasonably been expected to provide the kind of change to SIS's operations and performances to the extent needed, and certainly not within 12 days. No matter what White's intentions were on becoming C, for operations in Egypt he had no choice but to accept SIS as it was.

'LUCKY BREAK'

The value of SIS to the British policy machine rests on one primary function: the provision of secret intelligence. And that is how the performance of SIS will be assessed. The SIS station in Cairo at the time of the crisis was seen as incompetent, its 'political intelligence was inadequate, while operational intelligence supplied to the Armed Forces was often inaccurate or out of date'.[9] As the number of troops stationed in Egypt decreased and military intelligence staffs redeployed, the demand for intelligence to be provided by SIS increased. Yet, SIS was poorly placed to fill this void, as

'SIS had neither the inclination nor the qualifications to investigate this society and report on its activities'.[10] Nevertheless SIS did provide one line of intelligence through an agent code-named LUCKY BREAK, who was said 'to have a direct line to Nasser and his trusted associates'.[11] SIS fanned the flames of Eden's existing prejudice against the Nasser regime when they reported that LUCKY BREAK had disclosed in early 1956 that Nasser was considering signing an agreement with the USSR to finance their Aswan Dam project.[12] Eden was reportedly already receiving the LUCKY BREAK reports from as early as November 1955,[13] further reflecting the direct access to the Prime Minister that SIS could exploit. The thrust of the LUCKY BREAK material 'was that Nasser was far more under Soviet influence than had been supposed'.[14] The effect of the SIS material based on LUKCY BREAK was to marginalise the influence of the British Embassy in Cairo,[15] a view confirmed by Ambassador Trevelyan who stated that he had not been consulted on Suez policy.[16]

LUCKY BREAK was the one publicly recorded SIS source. What is indicative of the trust placed in the material was how it was used in Downing Street. The effect of the LUCKY BREAK material should not be underestimated; Eden shared the material with Washington with great haste.[17] The sharing of this material with Eisenhower by Eden can be seen as clear evidence that the Prime Minister was persuaded by it, given the depth of the personal relationship between the two.[18] It is clear that Eden was cherry-picking the LUCKY BREAK intelligence to persuade Eisenhower, giving it much greater priority than evidence and analysis coming from elsewhere.

The material also influenced the opinion of senior civil servants in Whitehall, as the following diary entry of Evelyn Shuckburgh shows: 'It looks as if Nasser were now completely under Communist influence.'[19] Yet LUCKY BREAK may have been an agent of Egyptian deception,[20] indeed it has also been suggested that there is no evidence 'that LUCKY BREAK existed outside the creative imaginations of MI6 officers who wanted more aggressive operations against Egypt'.[21] LUCKY BREAK was the one source of intelligence that SIS had that impressed Eden, fictitious or not. But LUCKY BREAK was telling the Prime Minister exactly what he wanted to hear about Nasser, 'a diatribe about Nasser's subservience to Moscow'.[22] SIS could count on the fact this information was fundamentally 'uncheckable'.[23] SIS was therefore influencing British policy through a single source, one that reinforced the existing belief that Nasser was merely a Soviet puppet.

Thuggery Is on the Agenda

SIS had planned a series of sequential operations under the code name OMEGA, geared towards the conduct of joint SIS–CIA operations aimed at several Middle Eastern states: 'a general programme for the Middle East involving economic action, certain propaganda activities, and certain military measures'.[24] Operation STRAGGLE, the proposed regime change in Syria, was a part of this programme (and was the most advanced in terms of both planning and readiness for execution[25]) and the preferred first step prior to hastening the fall of King Saud in Saudi Arabia—the intended second phase.[26] The programme was also intended to facilitate regime change in Egypt.

Plans for Egypt were, however, infamously said to have included 'thuggery' extending all the way to proposed assassination. SIS was considering such a plan as early as February 1956. The source for this is Mohamed Heikal who describes a meeting between SIS and CIA at which George Kennedy Young of SIS outlined such plans very openly.[27] Young himself says that to encourage American support, if not involvement in British plans, he had travelled to America no less than three times in the late summer of 1956 'in the vain attempt to persuade the Dulles brothers that Nasser was not a good progressive democrat but Khrushchev's door opener to the Middle East'.[28] Peter Wright also recollects his personal involvement in the schemes, stating that SIS had asked for his consultation on some of their ideas and subsequently labelled the assassination idea as 'hopelessly unrealistic'.[29] Despite this intrigue surrounding the 'did they, or did they not, consider assassination?' question, the evidence to support such a notion remains thin. And even if SIS were at the stage of considering these operations, they certainly did not reach any advanced stage of execution and SIS instead focussed its destabilisation efforts mainly towards the realm of black propaganda, psychological operations and a coup backed by Egyptian military elements.

The Arab News Agency (ANA)

SIS had piggybacked on the operation of another small unit of the British government, the Information Research Department (IRD), which was created by Foreign Office instruction in 1948 in order to 'conduct propaganda designed to combat Communism overseas'.[30] The intention of the IRD was to draw attention towards the discrepancies between the

claims and realities of the Communist world,[31] by means of influencing the opinions of leadership circles rather than through means of mass appeal.[32] But the IRD was a secret operation of the Foreign Office, which insisted that distribution of IRD material was only to occur 'on the strict understanding that the recipient does not disclose the fact that the material was provided by HMG'.[33] By 1956 the attention of the IRD had shifted away from straightforward anti-communist activities towards a specific focus on the rise of Nasser in Egypt,[34] of which the Arab News Agency (ANA) was a component of this propaganda dissemination.

The ANA service had thus far provided a propaganda outlet for the Middle East, as well as performing as an actual news agency. The ANA was, indeed, successful as a news agency but its effectiveness at providing a cover for SIS activities was vulnerable.[35] A campaign was initiated with radio broadcasting intended to counter the output of Radio Cairo, which was seen by the British government as 'a further example of Nasser's inveterate trouble-making'.[36] These broadcasts were also supplemented with disinformation in newspapers, press associations and other news outlets in the Middle East through the ANA.[37] Even the BBC played a role in this campaign, with its own Director of External Broadcasting declaring that since the start of the crisis 'the Arabic Services has *vigorously* presented the British government's case and the reactions of British public opinion to listeners throughout the Arab world'.[38] The Director also remarked in a later report that an internal problem had developed inside the BBC regarding objective reporting, which 'came under severe governmental pressure for the first time since the war'.[39] This propaganda campaign was on going before the nationalisation of the Canal itself, and was substantially increased in volume and intensity thereafter, but it is SIS's other use of the ANA infrastructure that is of most interest here, for the simple reason that it placed SIS efforts in a vulnerable position.

SIS had not only exploited the IRD's efforts to push anti-Nasser propaganda, but they had also actively taken on the ANA as a cover for some of their intelligence officers to operate within Egypt. The 'temporary additions'[40] to the ANA staff made throughout 1956 were plainly SIS officers who tried to use the ANA building in Cairo for cover, but which provided 'hardly any cover at all'.[41] The use of such an obvious cover had placed the SIS network in Egypt into a position that was vulnerable to interdiction by Egyptian counter-intelligence, who were fully aware of what the ANA was doing and that SIS personnel were a part of it.[42]

Squadron-Leader Isameddine Mahmoud Khalil and the Restoration Plot[43]

Another avenue of covert activity that SIS had pursued was the idea of precipitating a coup from within Egypt itself, which became known as the Restoration Plot. Sir Patrick Reilly recalls that Dick White had told him personally 'that there was a body of dissidents in Cairo who were prepared to stage a revolt and upset Nasser, if allied forces approached the capital'.[44] Julian Amery substantiates the British belief of a government in waiting, saying that: 'If we had got control of the Canal Zone and begun to move towards Cairo, then he (Nasser) would have gone and they would have come forward to get the best deal that they could.'[45] Amery further established that the people involved were members of the *Wafd*, serving members of the Egyptian military, and that the British Government was most certainly informed about these developments and had even established direct contact.[46] Importantly, Amery insists that the plot to overthrow Nasser in this manner would have needed the backing of Anglo-French forces in order to succeed, because those involved were never sure 'if we meant business'.[47] Only if Anglo-French forces threatened the Nasser regime directly could the plot have had any possibility of success.

The man held as the most important recruit to this plot was Squadron-Leader Isameddine Mahmoud Khalil, the Deputy Chief of Air Force Intelligence, who was recruited in Rome by Mehmed Hussein Khairi, the grandson of Egypt's former Sultan, and introduced to SIS officer 'John Farmer' subsequently.[48] Khalil made a deal with Farmer: 'Khalil would be given valuable intelligence about Israel, which he would collect from abroad… in return for which he would establish a secret organisation of army officers in Egypt.'[49] Beyond this Khalil had further insisted on being the sole point of contact, and on being granted access to substantial funds in order to finance the operation.[50] SIS had thus concentrated their efforts into this one approach, and it would cost them dearly.

The Defeat of SIS in Egypt: Tactical Defeat, Strategic Consequences

Any hopes SIS had of (1) obtaining intelligence, (2) delivering black propaganda and (3) removing the Nasser regime by facilitating any sort of coup or special operation was dealt a fatal blow on 27 August 1956. The Egyptian security police rounded up and arrested the SIS network in

Egypt, based as it was around the ANA as a cover: James Swinburn, the business manager of the ANA, along with James Zarb, Charles Pittuck, John Stanley and 12 Egyptians were arrested.[51] The 'triple duty' network that SIS had relied upon in the form of the ANA was crushed, as the arrests totally took apart its central command in the form of Swinburn and company. The Egyptians did not get the SIS officer controlling the ANA network,[52] but this mattered little as SIS had lost its entire network in Egypt. It was thus no longer able to provide any substantial insight from secret intelligence gathered within Egypt, as was noted by Naval Intelligence, who state that the crisis in August 'coincided with a decline in the volume of intelligence from Egypt available to DNI'.[53] Nor could SIS organise any activities designed for the destabilisation of the regime from within the country; SIS 'was marooned in Cyprus broadcasting risible propaganda and providing no intelligence'.[54]

The propaganda broadcasting efforts appear to have been the only remaining function that SIS could operate following the arrest of the ANA staff, but with nobody on the ground in Egypt its effects could not be reliably monitored. By the end of August 1956, SIS had been completely defeated by Egyptian counter-intelligence; their ability to provide human intelligence to policy-makers in London had been stopped[55] and their ability to carry out any sort of special operation had been severely inhibited. The vulnerability of a triple duty network had been brutally exposed; by concentrating resources into such a network the risks associated with its compromise increased. This tactical defeat of SIS in Egypt carried considerable strategic implications, as it greatly reduced the opportunity for the collection of political-level intelligence for policy-makers from human sources in Egypt. Apart from advice from the remaining diplomatic mission in Cairo (which advice was not taken seriously in Whitehall anyway), London was starved of new and insightful political intelligence, certainly any gained by secret means from human sources.

THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (JIC): MARGINALISED AND UNHEARD[56]

The role of the JIC in its task of informing policy development is complicated, dealing as it does with the interface between intelligence and policy. The role of the JIC must be considered in three segments with guiding questions: What did the JIC actually do? What reports did the JIC write? Did they

inform policy development? The final section of this chapter seeks to provide an explanation of the bureaucratic structural reality that had restricted the JIC by considering the role of key individuals in the Suez affair: Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Permanent Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick and the Chairman of the JIC Sir Patrick Dean. It is their role in utilising the secret bureaucracy of the intelligence establishment as an alternative conduit of communications that is to be specifically addressed; that is, their 'short circuiting' of the wider Whitehall machinery.

What Did the JIC Actually Do?

The most appropriate start point for gauging what the JIC did is to address its charter:

> The Joint Intelligence Committee is given the following responsibilities under the Chiefs of Staff:-
>
> (i) To give higher direction to, and to keep under review, intelligence operations and defence security matters.
>
> (ii) To assemble, appreciate and present intelligence as required by the Chiefs of Staff and to initiate such other reports as may be required or as the Committee may deem necessary.
>
> (iii) To keep under review the organisation and working of intelligence and defence security as a whole at home and overseas so as to ensure efficiency, economy and a rapid adaptation to changing requirements, and to advise what changes are deemed necessary.
>
> (iv) To co-ordinate the activities of Joint Intelligence Committees under United Kingdom Commands overseas and to maintain an exchange of intelligence with them.
>
> (v) To maintain liaison with appropriate intelligence and defence security agencies in the self-governing Commonwealth countries and the United States and other foreign countries, and with the intelligence authorities of international defence organisations of which the United Kingdom is a member.
>
> (vi) To report progress in the spheres of its responsibility.[57]

The very first responsibility in the charter clearly assigns to the JIC the role of being the highest body for intelligence in the land; the very phrase 'To give higher direction to' asserts the prominence and importance that the JIC is to hold over the rest of the intelligence establishment in the UK. It is meant to be the central body where intelligence is co-ordinated and assessed for the ends of policy. 'The Charter of the JIC is designed to give the Committee maximum authority with sufficient powers to render them effective with-

out encroaching on Ministerial rights and responsibilities.'[58] From the start, however, the ability of the JIC to fulfil this first function must be brought into question. The reason for doubt lies with the example of the Buster Crabb affair; the JIC clearly did not know of the SIS operation to spy on the Soviet cruiser *Ordzhonikidze*, despite having permanent SIS representation on the JIC. The JIC was obviously not always made aware of all intelligence operations being conducted by the intelligence services.

The second responsibility reveals the inherent structural contradiction that impeded the JIC in the execution of its functions. Tasked with presenting intelligence 'as required by the Chiefs of Staff' reveals that the JIC was not charged with providing intelligence *directly* to the higher levels of policy-making in the British government. It was an intelligence body housed within the military command structure, and the dissemination of JIC product was guaranteed to reach only the Chiefs of Staff. There could be no guarantee of uninterrupted dissemination to the Cabinet itself, despite the intention of the British intelligence establishment as being the 'push architecture'.[59] The key JIC product that was guaranteed to enjoy constant delivery to Cabinet level was the 'Weekly Review of Current Intelligence', the Grey Book as it has since been termed.[60] The 'Weekly Review' was not a detailed analysis but instead a form of global news update, based on sources that ranged from Confidential to Secret to UK Eyes Only.[61]

Ultimately what the JIC did, and what it was capable of doing, was conditioned and influenced more by its structural position within government than by the declared intent of its charter. As it was a relatively small body within the machinery of government it could not possibly be made aware of every single operation being undertaken by the intelligence services, resulting in an immediate vulnerability in its capacity to 'give higher direction and keep under review' those operations. To make the argument here clear, if a covert service like SIS wanted to keep aspects of its operations entirely secret then it could very easily not tell the JIC, without any ability on the part of the JIC to discover this. And second, the position of the JIC as a Chiefs of Staff body created and retained an inherent limitation to the operation of the JIC; it could not provide a *guaranteed* flow of centralised intelligence assessment to Cabinet-level discussion. Although much of the material did reach higher policy levels, the flow can only be described as uneven, sporadic and subject to the wish of policy-makers as to whether it was even read and acknowledged, let alone incorporated into policy development. These were the fundamental limitations that conditioned the operation of the JIC in 1956.

What Reports Did the JIC Write?

Based on the files currently released,[62] the types of report that the JIC wrote can be categorised into three areas: political assessments, risk/capability assessments and military-specific reports. The last two categories demonstrate the structural weakness hampering the JIC in its task of informing policy development. The high proportion of reports geared largely towards military capability assessment and to support military planning show that their focus was tailored to a primarily military recipient rather than to policy-makers. Examples of these reports are easy to find in the JIC files from The National Archives; in March 1956 the 'Egyptian Effectiveness in the use of Soviet Aircraft' was distributed, concluding that the Egyptians would be able to deploy this capability by June 1956.[63] Further to this was the June production of 'The Activities of Cairo Radio and their Impact on Territories towards which they are Directed'.[64] This report provided an assessment of the propaganda utility that Egypt derived from its operations on both its technical grounds as well as its regional targeting; it labelled Israel as 'the principal objective of Egyptian propaganda'.[65]

The abundance of military-specific reports in the JIC files clearly represents the bulk of the JIC workload. This is particularly true in supporting the planning functions for Operation MUSKETEER following the nationalisation of the Canal; the 'Security of Signal Traffic'[66] was an important theme, displaying the role of the JIC (specifically functions iii and iv of the charter) for keeping operations under review as well as liaising with other intelligence services. The JIC was instrumental in establishing the procedures and protocols for the operational security of MUSKETEER, and this was a constant theme addressed by the JIC throughout the crisis, for example 'Security of Planning for Action Against Egypt', distributed on 1 August. It concluded that a security protocol should be placed to ensure that only personnel with a need to know had access to information pertinent to the operation. This became known as the TERRAPIN security procedure. It also concluded that a D-Notice should not be issued and that the government should instead choose what to officially release,[67] before recommending that this report becomes the basis 'for security planning for this operation'.[68] The JIC even dealt with the issue of the code word MUSKETEER being compromised, concluding very shrewdly that little practical benefit would result from changing the code words and instead that the grading of the code word 'should be downgraded to RESTRICTED. The grading of the meaning should remain TOP SECRET but cease to be UK EYES only.'[69]

There are of course reports pertinent to the policy development level. A pattern becomes immediately apparent, however; that there were some reports of relevance to policy development in the run-up to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company itself, but that afterwards the focus of JIC reports became dominated by supporting the military planning function, meaning that the JIC was *supporting* British policy rather than *informing* it.[70] There was little in the way of challenges to the British policy position to ensure its integrity, nor was there any great insight into possible political developments either in Britain or in Egypt. In the lead-up to the events of nationalisation the JIC was echoing the preconceived judgement of Whitehall, that Nasser was increasingly a puppet of the Soviet Union. The JIC 'immediately equated nationalist uprisings with communist-inspired insurrections: it was unthinkable to have one without the other'.[71] This despite the JIC having previously stressed in April 1956 that while Egypt was becoming increasingly dependent on Russia, this 'does not mean that Nasser has consciously resigned himself to becoming an instrument of Soviet policy'.[72]

This balanced view on the part of the JIC, backed up and explained with a detailed annex to the report, was clearly at odds with the views of Eden in particular, or at the very least ignored because of a subsequently significant event in Jordan. On 1 March 1956, King Hussein removed General Glubb as head of Jordan's Arab Legion, a considerable diplomatic embarrassment for Britain as the Arab Legion represented the 'most tangible manifestation of the confluence of British and Hashemite interests that had originally created Jordan'.[73] Eden became increasingly bellicose towards Nasser following Glubb's removal; it is described as the 'breaking point'[74] in Eden's attitude, with Eden believing Nasser to have had an influential role in this affair.[75] Shuckburgh asserts in his diary that this attitude of Eden resulted in chaos in the Foreign Office, with Eden harassing staff for endless details on the affair[76] and even calling Shuckburgh at 2 a.m. after the dismissal wanting to know: 'What the hell are you doing asleep?'[77] Shuckburgh further noted this stage as a 'turning point'[78] and that Eden 'is now violently anti-Nasser'.[79] With these events and such opinions being established, it is understandable why the notably balanced April assessment of the JIC 'went unheeded and would not be used as a basis for planning'.[80]

From the stage of nationalisation itself onwards, the JIC passed on little intelligence product of value in informing policy development towards the Middle East. Such reports that were of value were geared towards regional concerns that were anticipated to be more pressing to British policy-makers, concerns that reflected the Cold War prism through which events were increasingly being viewed. Of note in this regard was 'Probable Soviet Attitude to an

Arab/Israel War report of March 1956', which reiterated the concerns of the Soviet penetration of the region. Despite the JIC giving an overall balanced view of Nasser in their April report it does fan the flames of concern by labelling Egypt as the prime target of Soviet courtship.[81] Before the nationalisation of the Canal it is clear to see that British policy was already increasingly hostile in character towards Egypt, influenced as it was by the concerns of Communist penetration into the region and its consequences for British power. And this was a view clearly reflected within the JIC reports; policy development was less influenced by intelligence product than was intelligence assessment influenced by the prism through which the broader British government saw the world in 1956. Prior to nationalisation British intelligence offered merely qualifications, rather than robust challenges to these views, as can be seen by their continued concern over Soviet penetration of the Middle East.

The act of nationalisation itself came as a complete shock to the British, and the JIC analysis of this move had to come quickly. But production with haste did not happen, their report, 'Egyptian Nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company', was not produced until 3 August. The full consequence of this delay will be assessed in further detail below. The report itself begins with an assessment of Nasser's motives and of the effect this event would have on the region. The report started with the assumption that the British government sought to reverse the decision and assessed the situation according to solely this viewpoint. It did this by highlighting the financial measures open to London and Paris as potential leverage over the Egyptians, notably that two-thirds of the revenue from Canal transit was paid directly to London and Paris, rather than kept within Egypt.[82] It then moved on to an assessment of Western action, stating immediately that: 'We do not believe that threats of armed intervention or preliminary build up of forces would bring about the downfall of the Nasser regime or cause it to cancel the nationalisation of the canal.'[83] But the most interesting entry to the report is the calculation of the effects of Western action on other Arab states, which is worth quoting at length:

(a) If steps were taken by the West were to lead to an early change of Government in Egypt and a settlement satisfactory to the West, the other Arab States who have a natural admiration for strength, would probably swing in our favour…

(b) Should Western military action be insufficient to ensure early and decisive victory, the international consequences both in the Arab States and elsewhere *might give rise to extreme embarrassment and cannot be foreseen*.[84]

In retrospect, point (b) above was arguably the most prescient warning that the JIC could have issued, a warning that was not only fair but also was proven to be correct by the end of the crisis itself. Despite this important warning from the JIC, the significance of this report lies in a subtle detail: the date on which it was circulated. And it is here where the chronology will serve to illustrate why this warning from the JIC had no effect on policy. Although the report was produced on 3 August, it was not approved by the CoS for distribution until 10 August, a full week after its production, and no less than *14 days* after the Cabinet had already decided on their policy response. Quite simply the laborious process for obtaining CoS approval prior to circulation resulted in the JIC not being able to circulate reports in a timely manner, and in this case in particular it shows that the JIC was in no position to usefully inform British policy. This argument is based on the knowledge that the British response and policy position towards nationalisation had already been reached in Cabinet on 27 July, including the agreement that British policy was to seek the reversal of this decision, 'by force if necessary'.[85] That the JIC could not even distribute a report to inform consumers of the situation until 10 August suggests that it is not credible that the JIC had any significant influence on the development of British policy. Instead they lagged behind policy initiatives and found that they could merely support the policy position already adopted, confining their efforts to the planning stages of Operation MUSKETEER.

Following this report on the nationalisation itself, the only meaningful report of substance for policy development was that of 25 August, 'The Situation Which Might Arise in the Middle East at the Conclusion of the Suez Conference'. The report focussed on assessing the positions of other nations in the region in two separate scenarios, listed explicitly in the report as its guiding assumptions; the first was a scenario of deadlock at the negotiations, which would promote an atmosphere of growing sympathy towards Egypt. The second scenario was simply that the British government finds itself at war with Egypt.[86] For the first scenario the JIC carried out a nation-by-nation assessment of the expected positions that were to be adopted around the region. But the crux of the JIC argument was to draw attention to the differing time periods anticipated between the first and second scenario:

> Part I (deadlock) assumes a protracted period of negotiations where as in Part II the period of military operations may be very short. The Arabs are by tradition and temperament great respecters of strength and a quick success against Egypt would greatly reduce some of the unfavourable developments mentioned in Part II.[87]

In Part II of the report dealing with the scenario of war with Egypt, the JIC argued that only Syria and possibly Jordan could lend direct military assistance to Egypt, but that such assistance would be insignificant.[88] The importance of the assumptions guiding this report and the tone of the assessment indicate that the JIC advanced its endorsement for the use of force. By highlighting the protraction to be expected from a negotiation process and the likelihood of Arab opinion coalescing behind Egypt the longer the crisis continued with no reversal of nationalisation, the JIC is clearly noting this as the least desirable state of affairs for British policy. In Part II, however, arguing that Egypt would be unlikely to receive direct military assistance, as well as the insignificance of what assistance it could receive, is indicative of highlighting the assumption that Britain held the military advantage should force be used. And if any more of an indicator were needed, it only needs to be restated that the JIC believed and explicitly said that the Arabs respect strength and that quick success in any war would benefit the British while avoiding the unfavourable developments to be expected. The JIC never challenged the British policy to reverse the act of nationalisation, nor did it provide alternative policy options, instead it actively endorsed the use of force as an adequate means of achieving the Cabinet's desired objective.

The Role of Personalities

Prime Minister Anthony Eden: The Persistent Leader[89]

> He was volatile and personal. He took up things tremendously strongly and personally and without the bull-headedness that the boss needs to have. It was perfectly fine when he was the sensitive diplomat Foreign Sec, but you need other qualities to be the final man where the buck stops and I don't think he had them. I don't think he should have been PM. He wanted to be PM so badly, he'd been longing for it for years.[90]

Eden as Prime Minister comes first; understanding his activities throughout the crisis is critical to understanding the wider circumvention of governmental machinery that occurred. The quote above by Shuckburgh captures the personality that Eden brought to office. Eden is endlessly described within the literature on Suez in this vein, as highly temperamental and prone to outbursts; Eden had 'a very low boiling point… the main duty of the private secretaries was to soothe him'.[91] This was a personality trait that

was exacerbated by Eden's health problems, specifically a series of failed bile duct operations that had reduced his physical state. Doctors prescribed amphetamines, which carried the side effects of over-activity, sleeplessness and aggressive outbursts.[92] The story of Eden's ill-health is a recurring theme in the Suez literature, with Eden said to have 'resorted to a pharmacopoeia of drugs, taking morphine to calm himself down and Benzedrine to pep himself up'.[93] Nutting, too, picks up on this theme and labels Eden as 'nagged by mounting sickness'.[94] Ultimately, though, care should be taken not to place too much emphasis on Eden's health, it is better to heed the words of Sir Frederick Bishop, who served on the Prime Minister's staff. When asked for his opinion on this matter Bishop answered:

> It is true that he did occasionally have feverish attacks during 1956, but he had been warned that this would happen after the corrective operation. I don't think this affected his performance. On occasion he was short-tempered and could be irritated, *but there was nothing new about that*. That was in his nature.[95]

Eden's health problems certainly did not help his performance, but the important consideration is that Eden's personality was widely believed to have been not best suited to high command in government. He was already well known for being predisposed towards outbursts; his deteriorating health merely exacerbated this disposition to over-reaction. The 'bull-headedness' that Shuckburgh argues for as a leadership requirement was not present in Eden. Clark, press secretary to Eden during the Suez Crisis, asserted that as well as issues of health, it was also past experience that had contributed to Eden's inadequacies, specifically that he had spent his entire career in the 'number two' position in government.[96]

Further to these details about Eden's personality is his approach to decision-making over Suez. First to consider was Eden's attitude to foreign policy, which can only be described as dominant, Bishop, for instance, stating that he 'did try to keep the reins in his own hands',[97] 'Eden found it difficult to delegate.'[98] Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Secretary at the time, was 'bound to be a second-in-command. He was not subservient, but he knew that in major issues he had to carry the Prime Minister with him without any question.'[99]

From this stage on, the testimony of Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker is invaluable: he explains *how* the Whitehall machinery was circumvented throughout the Suez Crisis. The primary problem that resulted from this form of circumvention was a hoarding and stove-piping of information, and this

was a key factor in reducing the input of intelligence into decision-making. Eden had created an architecture of closed networks whereby the civil service was largely excluded, and only a select few were privy to knowing his true intentions; Kyle argues that the number of privileged few was as low as half a dozen.[100] During the crisis Dodds-Parker was the chairman of what became known as the Dodds-Parker Committee, a body set up to 'think of some ways to deal with it (the Suez Crisis) other than military operations'.[101] This was to include the areas of special operations and destabilisation, but Dodds-Parker recalls the difficulty of obtaining any information at all on which to base planning, and, as was remarked in Chap. 4, in the years following the crisis he was told by Geoffrey McDermott 'that he'd been told to give us as little information as possible'.[102] Further to this, McDermott states that he later discovered that the same order had been given with reference to him.[103] The circulation of information around the wider machinery of government, including an *ad hoc* committee designed specifically to deal with Suez, had been cut. With this in mind 'it wasn't surprising that the committee didn't produce anything because we had nothing to go on, what facilities were available, what money was to be given, anything at all'.[104]

This hoarding and stove-piping of information was not directed solely at Dodds-Parker. As Sir Frank Cooper, the head of the Air Staff Secretariat, said '[I was] increasingly aware that people had been hiding things, in particular that you could not trust a damn thing that the top politicians or those in the know at the Foreign Office said.'[105] Cooper also states that 'there were channels that were normally freely used (that) got very careful suddenly. People who had spoken freely and easily to one another got very careful.'[106] The situation around the crisis appears chaotic and almost paranoiac, yet at its heart lies simplicity: Eden had exploited his intimate background knowledge of the Whitehall establishment[107] to prevent open dissension to his Suez policy from emerging. Ross explains his actions best: 'I think the fact is that at certain points Eden simply circumvented everybody!'[108]

Decision-making on Suez was centralised into three elite groups (the full Cabinet, the Egypt Committee and the inner circle of senior ministers),[109] and this elitist centralising actively excluded the wider machinery of government: whatever was happening 'was being handled personally at the very top. The entire machinery of government, military and civil, had been bypassed.'[110] By preventing the pooling of information, including secretly gathered intelligence, any effective form of external check to the Prime Minister's decision-making had been marginalised, if not removed entirely.

In this atmosphere it is hardly surprising that the objective of intelligence in informing British policy development was unachievable. Not only were there existing structural restrictions to the intelligence establishment itself, but there was also a level of dislocation among the policy-making bodies in Whitehall that prevented policy-makers from being best informed. How was this done? Eden may have circumvented that machinery but it has not been fully explained as to exactly how this was achieved. Dodds-Parker clarifies this: 'If you are in a position of power as Prime Minister or even as Foreign Minister, knowing your way around, (you) get hold of two or three key people and keep anyone else from finding out.'[111] The two most important people in facilitating this were Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick and Sir Patrick Dean.

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick

In the case of Suez, advice went through Kirkpatrick or not at all.[112]

As Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Kirkpatrick's formal role was as the chief civil service adviser on foreign affairs to both the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister. Kirkpatrick has received considerable criticism for his dogmatic loyalty to Eden during Suez, which operated from early in the crisis because Kirkpatrick held similar views to Eden on the affair.[113] Kirkpatrick's background in propaganda efforts in the later stages of the First World War for British intelligence,[114] as well as his direct participation with the policy processes of appeasement in the 1930s,[115] resulted in him subscribing to Eden's view of the Suez affair. This included a subscription to the Munich analogies,[116] with no challenge to this position or the assumptions that underpinned them. The effect was that this 'would have established him as an ally, to be brought in when necessary to reinforce an opinion or to counter opposing viewpoints as they arose'.[117] Kirkpatrick was 'driven by his inbuilt prejudices, the goading Anthony Eden, and reporting coming from Egypt itself'.[118] Nowhere is this steadfast loyalty to Eden and his position over Suez more explicit than in his outburst to Shuckburgh, who recalled in his diary:

> Set off by some mild criticism I made of the PM's handling of the Suez Crisis, he (Kirkpatrick) said the PM was the only man in England who wanted the nation to survive; that all the rest of us have lost the will to live;

that in two years' time Nasser will have deprived us of our oil, the sterling area fallen apart, no European defence possible, unemployment and unrest in the UK and our standard of living reduced to that of the Yugoslavs or the Egyptians.[119]

But it is also how Kirkpatrick was used in his official capacities, as well as his adherence to Eden's policy, that drew severe criticism of his role over Suez. Contemporaries and historians have expressed dismay at his 'connivance at the exclusion of the Foreign Office from the decision-making process'.[120] Kirkpatrick was able to do this because his role included formal control of the Permanent Undersecretary's Department (PUSD) (although the director of PUSD at the time was Geoffrey McDermott, who was directly subordinate to Patrick Dean). This secretive link between the Foreign Office and covert activities—intended to provide a facility for communication between the Foreign Office and the intelligence services—provided the perfect instrument to effectively exclude the Foreign Office from the policy development process: 'Kirkpatrick's ability to cut the Foreign Office out of the policy-making loop was contingent upon the existence of this alternative communications network.'[121] In intelligence terms this means that the infrastructure that existed as a co-ordinating tool for intelligence operations was expropriated and used instead as a conduit for communications designed to exclude dissenters from challenging the policy position for resolving the Suez Crisis.

Through Kirkpatrick, Eden had subverted the covert infrastructure from its original purpose in order to serve his objective of ensuring that their policy was subject to minimal interference and challenge from the Foreign Office. But, there was one final link required in this chain of exclusion, provided by the chairman of the JIC no less.

Sir Patrick Dean

The only chap who knew everything was Pat Dean.[122]

Pat Dean has been intriguingly referred to as the 'missing link?' in the Suez historiography.[123] Dean 'wrote no memoirs, gave few interviews and, to my knowledge, left no private papers for others to consult'.[124] Dean makes his position clear in a letter to Selwyn Lloyd in 1976 concerning a researcher (Chester Cooper, who was a long-standing personal friend

of Dean's) visiting London seeking interviews for his subsequent book, *The Lion's Last Roar*.[125] With this in mind, Dean states that 'in spite of our close friendship, we have never discussed this in any detail and I have always taken the line with him as others that I consider myself bound by the Official Secrets Act, and that at the relevant time I was acting on instructions and have no more to say'.[126] Indeed, in his interview as part of the Suez Oral History Project Dean gives precious little away for any prospective researcher to go on. This can be seen by his stating that he held no recollection of discussions with Mollet and Pineau on the French side,[127] or of any discussions relating to the OMEGA programme.[128] When questioned about the details of Operation STRAGGLE in regards to Syria his response was simply: 'That's news to me.'[129] Dean further insisted that he held no knowledge of intelligence services' activities, and when pressed on whether or not he had noticed anything out of the ordinary in the policy-making process answered that 'we had no special knowledge about what turned out to be the events'.[130] Can this be plausible? This question must be asked because Sir Patrick Reilly, in the opening statement he gave *before* his interview had begun for the Suez Oral History Project, says:

> The second thing that I remember vividly is that Patrick Dean used to get every morning a small bunch of hyper-secret telegrams *which were kept out of the normal Foreign Office distribution*, and they continued to come to me while I was sitting in his chair. And one morning I was electrified to find on a telegram, in the unmistakable handwriting of the Prime Minister, a little note to the Foreign Secretary, which ran—I can't swear to the precise words but I remember very closely something like this—'Foreign Secretary, this may give us the pretext for which we are looking.' And I can't remember where the telegram came from or what it was about precisely, but I remember that I had no doubt at all that he meant a pretext for a military operation. Since I saw that, I've never doubted for one moment that Eden was deeply emotionally committed to having a military operation, that he wanted one. I know that's highly controversial but I have no doubt of it at all myself.[131]

Reilly eventually succeeded Dean as Superintending Undersecretary of PUSD and lends further credence to the scale of segregation within the British establishment. He does this by recalling that if 'there was a proper intelligence appreciation of a formal kind done by the JIC, the Foreign Office would have unquestionably received it, *but I don't remember one*'.[132] So how did Dean play a part in this act of circumvention? In his capacity as Superintending Undersecretary of PUSD Dean was directly subordinate

to Kirkpatrick at PUSD, and Dean states that if matters were important enough for Kirkpatrick's attention they 'would go up to him through me'.[133] Beyond this, Dean acted as an essential liaison, as the final link in the chain between Eden and the covert world outside the regular channels of communication. Dean's position was uniquely important as he was the supervising official in PUSD, and thus the link between the Foreign Office and SIS,[134] he was the final piece enabling this conduit of alternative communication in British policy-making to operate. Dean found his usual role of oversight of intelligence operations being expropriated, along with the PUSD infrastructure, to facilitate communications through the SIS medium in order to exclude the Foreign Office.

Were any further proof needed as to the esteem and trust that Dean enjoyed within Eden's circle, one need only be reminded that it was Dean who Eden instructed to accompany Donald Logan[135] to Sèvres for the infamous collusion meeting with the French and Israelis on 24 October. Goodman is right to note that Dean held no knowledge of the collusion affair until summoned to travel to France, and indeed that his role in the affair caused him considerable unease.[136] Indeed, Eden held a private meeting with Dean immediately prior to his departure to impress upon him 'his great anxiety about Nasser's policy and aims and his fear that he intended and was able to inflict great damage on British interests in the Middle East'.[137] Dean was sent because he was considered to be one of the most discreet and trustworthy persons within the British government, although he was uneasy and unhappy with the assignment.[138]

The final word on these three individuals and the role they played in policy development is that the Prime Minister alone could not have by-passed the policy-making infrastructure, he needed help to achieve this. Kirkpatrick and Dean were the people of choice to provide such assistance. Kirkpatrick, through his devotion to Eden's political message as well as his position in PUSD, was a natural choice. Dean appealed to Eden because of his discretion, the fact that he was forever 'scrupulously faithful to the Official Secrets Act'[139] and for his position in PUSD that finalised the communications link with SIS that could exclude the Foreign Office at critical moments.

That Eden could achieve this with so few individuals reveals as much about the existence of a covert infrastructure within the British government machinery as it does about the individuals using it. Because this instrument had no oversight from any external body, or even from within the Foreign Office, it was a structure open to the possibility of being expropriated for other uses. This happened in 1956: infrastructure that

was intended for liaison between the Foreign Office and SIS had instead become a conduit of alternative communication for the Prime Minister, used to exclude dissent and challenge to his policy course. The only two people who definitely knew of this situation were Kirkpatrick and Dean, although others had their suspicions; Geoffrey McDermott held more knowledge than most, before he too was excluded from being further informed. McDermott says that instructions were passed down by word of mouth from Eden directly, and that all other under-secretaries 'were to be kept in the dark as far as possible'.[140] Intelligence was not, therefore, informing British policy development; rather, intelligence structures were being used precisely because they were secret and restricted in order to prevent the broad flow of information around government and enable the development of policy that was not open to challenge.

In conclusion, the British experience at the policy level draws out many lessons in understanding the strategy–intelligence relationship. First, there are the numerous and daunting fragilities to the working of intelligence as a political pursuit. Perhaps most telling is that British intelligence, most certainly the JIC, was gradually conditioned by the operating assumptions of the Eden government that led to a behaviour of supporting rather than informing policy developments. In addition, the experience of SIS in Egypt graphically demonstrates the operational fragility faced by those who must go out and secure intelligence when faced by competent counter-intelligence services. Finally, the institutional placement of intelligence services demonstrates their vulnerabilities. This institutional position reveals the second lesson: that intelligence success is very much conditioned by the place it holds within the government architecture. The JIC was indeed marginalised throughout the crisis to a mere support function, that this was so was due as much to its constitutional placement with the CoS as it was to what the JIC actually had to say. The third and final lesson is the dominance not only of the political process, but of policy-makers themselves. Eden's actions in circumventing the broader government machinery were no doubt extreme, but his relentless actions in pursuing his policy agenda and utilising whatever means available to him, including the expropriation of PUSD, show that the policy-makers hold ultimate power, even if their policy pursuit is ultimately unsuccessful.

At Suez in particular, British intelligence proved unable to play an important role in informing policy development, they instead found themselves *supporting* policy, displaying a subscription to that policy position rather than providing any challenges and/or alternative viewpoints. This is

true even in the case of LUCKY BREAK, a source that merely reinforced the growing belief of Nasser's Soviet complicity. When one combines the operational defeat of SIS, the marginalisation of the JIC and the actions of select individuals, it becomes easy to see why British intelligence struggled to generate real and sustained impact on such a provocative policy issue, even though it is clear that they pursued their functions of supporting the development of policy with great energy. With the Cabinet having made itself clear on 27 July that it was willing to take a course of action involving the use of force, attention will now be turned towards analysing what support British intelligence provided towards operationalising the Cabinet's policy intent into a working plan of action for the military forces that would be called on to reverse Nasser's act of nationalisation.

NOTES

1. John W. Young, 'Conclusion' to Special Issue: Whitehall and the Suez Crisis, *Contemporary British History* (1999) Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 230.
2. Sue Onslow, 'Julian Amery and the Suez Operation', in Simon C. Smith (ed.), *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and Its Aftermath* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. 67.
3. This phrase is deployed by Anthony Verrier, *Through the Looking Glass* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1983), p. 158.
4. Tom Bower, *The Perfect English Spy: Sir Dick White and the Secret War 1935–90* (London: William Heinemann, 1995), p. 185.
5. Philip H. J. Davies, *MI6 and the Machinery of Spying* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 229.
6. Bower (1995), p. 185.
7. Verrier (1983), p. 152.
8. Bower (1995), p. 186.
9. Steven Dorril, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations* (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), p. 601.
10. Verrier (1980), p. 90.
11. Barry Turner, *Suez: The Inside Story of the First Oil War* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2007), p. 171.
12. Bower (1995), p. 189.
13. Dorril (2000), p. 606. Scott Lucas adds to this stating that SIS had some 25 reports of substance from this source. W. Scott Lucas, *Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1991), p. 116.
14. Keith Kyle, *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), p. 84.

15. As noted by Michael T. Thornhill, 'Alternatives to Nasser: Humphrey Trevelyan, Ambassador to Egypt', Special Issue: Whitehall and the Suez Crisis, *Contemporary British History* (1999) Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 12.

16. Humphrey Trevelyan, *Diplomatic Channels* (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 65.

17. Dorril (2000), p. 607.

18. Percy Cradock, *Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World* (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 116.

19. 20 June 1956 of Diary of 1956–57. In MS191/1/1-MS191/1/2/1-5, Birmingham Special Collections.

20. Turner (2007), pp. 171–2.

21. W. Scott Lucas, 'The Missing Link? Patrick Dean, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee', Special Issue: Whitehall and the Suez Crisis, *Contemporary British History* (1999) Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 119.

22. W. Scott Lucas, Alastair Morey, 'The Hidden "Alliance": The CIA and MI6 Before and After Suez', *Intelligence and National Security* (2000) Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 102.

23. Hill warns that intelligence services exploit the classification of their sources in order to impress political leaders and ensure they are not challenged. Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 67.

24. Sir Patrick Dean's interview transcript. File no. 5, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, pp. 3–4.

25. Beeley and Dodds-Parker both substantiate the advanced stage of STRAGGLE, and the joint nature of the operation with the CIA. Harold Beeley's interview transcript, File no. 2, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 27. And Douglas Dodds-Parker's interview transcript, File no. 6, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, pp. 6–8.

26. Kyle (2003), p. 102, Scott Lucas (1991), p. 117.

27. Mohammed H. Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes* (London: Corgi Books, 1988), pp. 117–18, and Dorril (2000), p. 610. These meetings are also detailed in Scott Lucas (1991), ch. 9.

28. George Kennedy Young, 'The Final Ttestimony of George Kennedy Young', *Lobster* (1990), p. 8.

29. Peter Wright, *Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer* (Richmond, Victoria, Australia: William Heinemann Australia, 1987), pp. 160–1.

30. Anti-Communist Propaganda Operations, 27 July 1951, p. 4, para. 1. In FO 1110/460, TNA.

31. Collation of Intelligence: Note by IRD, JIC/1146/55, 25 April 1955, para. 1. In FO 1110/716, TNA.

32. Ibid., para. 3.

33. The Use of Information Research Department Material. A Note for the Guidance of Information Officers and Chanceries, June 1955, para. 15. In FO 1110/716, TNA.

34. James Vaughan, '"Cloak Without Dagger": How the Information Research Department Fought Britain's Cold War in the Middle East, 1948–56', *Cold War History* (2004) Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 74.

35. Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (New York: The Overlook Press, 2002), p. 482. Although Aldrich does note that the ANA remained SIS's principal radio weapon against Nasser. Richard J. Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency* (London: Harper Press, 2010), p. 156.

36. Cradock (2002), p. 112.

37. Dorril (2000), pp. 624–5.

38. Report by Director of External Broadcasting: June to 18 August 1956, p. 4 (italics added). In R34/1580/1, British Broadcasting Corporation Written Archives Centre, Caversham (hereafter referred to as BBC WAC).

39. Report by Director of External Broadcasting: 1 September to 30 November 1956, p. 2. In R34/1580/2, BBC WAC.

40. Aldrich (2002) p. 482.

41. Ibid.

42. Dorril (2000), p. 631.

43. The Restoration Plot was not exposed by the Egyptians until December 1957; they very shrewdly used Khalil to con money from SIS in the hopes of launching the coup. The longevity of Khalil's operation further reveals the inability of SIS to see past this ruse, even after the Suez Crisis had passed. Dorril (2000), p. 653, and Steven Dorrill, 'Trying to Kill Nasser', *Lobster* (1985).

44. Sir Patrick Reilly's interview transcript, File no. 18, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 2.

45. Julian Amery's interview transcript, File no. 1, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 12.

46. Ibid., pp. 12–13.

47. Ibid., p. 15.

48. Dorril (2000), pp. 629–30, Aldrich (2002), p. 483 and Kyle (2003), p. 149.

49. Dorril (2000), p. 230.

50. Ibid.

51. Aldrich (2002)), p. 483, Bower (1995), p. 193, Kyle (2003), p. 218, Turner (2007), pp. 271–2, Dorril (2000), p. 631 and Laura M. James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 34.

52. Bower suggests that this man's identity was an unofficial agent, John McGlashan, who was being handled by the Cairo station chief Freddie Stockwell. Bower (1995), p. 189.
53. 'Appendix IV: Intelligence' in Naval Report on Operation Musketeer, 15 February 1957, Part II, para. 21. In ADM 1/27373, TNA.
54. Bower (1995), p. 198.
55. It must be noted, however, that this is a reflection of the publicly available evidence. The argument is that there is no available evidence to suggest successful SIS activities, and that all the available evidence suggests that SIS efforts had been comprehensively curtailed.
56. Richard J. Aldrich, Rory Cormac and Michael S. Goodman, *Spying on the World: The Declassified Documents of the Joint Intelligence Committee* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), p. 242.
57. *Charter for the Joint Intelligence Committee*, Confidential Annex, JIC/1525/56, 15 June 1956. In CAB 21/3622, TNA.
58. P. 3 of *The United Kingdom Joint Intelligence Organisation*, MoD, November 1954. In CAB 163/8, TNA.
59. This push architecture being a central argument of Davies in his doctoral thesis. Philip H. J. Davies, *Organisational Development of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, 1909–1979* (University of Reading, Department of Sociology, Doctoral Thesis, 1997).
60. Michael Herman, *Intelligence Services in the Information Age: Theory and Practice* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 115. Rory Cormac, *British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 2013), p. 85. The collection of these summaries for 1956 can be found in CAB 179/1, TNA.
61. The UK Eyes Only classification is included as the *Weekly Review* had a format delivered to relevant NATO commands as well, any bulletin coded UK Eyes Only would be removed from this version to enable its delivery outside of UK commands. 'British National Commanders who also hold NATO appointments have received special directions with regard to the extent to which they may use in their NATO capacity intelligence which they have received in their National capacity.' Peace Organisation of Intelligence, Joint Services Staff College 15th Course, November 1955, p. 7. In CAB 163/8, TNA.
62. It should be noted that even though many files are still retained under the provisions of the Public Records Act, the contents pages of reports in JIC files are available, and usefully indicative of what reports were produced even if not all of them can be consulted in detail.
63. Egyptian Effectiveness in the use of Soviet Aircraft, JIC (56) 33 (Final) (Revise), 28 February 1956. In CAB 158/24, TNA.

64. The Activities of Cairo Radio and their Impact on Territories towards which they are Directed, JIC (56) 47 (Final), 5 April 1956. In CAB 158/24, TNA.
65. Ibid., p. 2, para. 7.
66. Operation MUSKETEER—Security of Signal Traffic, JIC (56) 96 (Final), 21 September 1956. In CAB 158/25, TNA.
67. Security of Planning for Action Against Egypt, JIC (56) 82, 1 August 1956, p. 3, para. 15. In CAB 158/25, TNA
68. Ibid., p. 3.
69. Operation MUSKETEER—Codewords, JIC (56) 92, 16 August 1956, p. 2, para. 9. In CAB 158/25, TNA.
70. Omand argues that the capacity to penetrate the 'conceits and policy illusions' of the decision-maker should be in the arsenal of the intelligence analyst. David Omand, *Securing the State* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 2010), p. 7.
71. Aldrich et al. (2014), p. 240.
72. Factors Affecting Egypt's Policy in the Middle East and North Africa, JIC (56) 20 (Final), 4 April 1956, para. 3. In CAB 158/23, TNA.
73. Michael B. Oren, 'A Winter of Discontent: Britain's Crisis in Jordan, December 1955–March 1956', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (1990) Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 178.
74. Thornhill (1999), p. 13.
75. Anthony Nutting is quoted as saying that Eden felt the affair had 'to be engineered by Nasser himself'. Anthony Nutting, *The Road to Suez* (verbatim transcript) documentary programme (1965) Associated Television Limited, p. 36. In SELO 6/175, CAC, Churchill College, Cambridge University.
76. 3 March 1956 of Diary of 1956–57. In MS191/1/1-MS191/1/2/1-5, Birmingham Special Collections.
77. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh interview transcript by unnamed interviewer, 6 October 1982, p. 5. In MS191/2/9, Birmingham Special Collections.
78. Ibid.
79. 3 March 1956 of Diary of 1956–57. In MS191/1/1-MS191/1/2/1-5, Birmingham Special Collections.
80. Michael S. Goodman, *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee Volume I: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis* (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 380.
81. Probable Soviet Attitude to an Arab/Israel War, 21 March 1956, para. 4. In CAB 158/24, TNA.
82. Egyptian Nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, JIC (56) 80 (Final), 3 August 1956, p. 2, para. 5. In CAB 158/25, TNA.
83. Ibid., p. 4, para. 9.

84. Ibid. (italics added), p. 5, para. 12.
85. Cabinet Conclusions, C.M. (56) 54th Conclusions, Friday 27 July 1956, p. 5. In CAB 128/30, TNA.
86. The Situation Which Might Arise in the Middle East at the Conclusion of the Suez Conference, JIC (56) 93 (Final) (Revise), 25 August 1956, para. 2. In CAB 158/25, TNA.
87. Ibid., p. 2, para. 3.
88. Ibid., pp. 7–8, para. 44.
89. This description of Eden is a central theme of Verbeek's thesis. Bertjan Verbeek, *Decision-Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis: Small Groups and a Persistent Leader* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
90. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh interview transcript by unnamed interviewer, 6 October 1982, p. 5. In MS191/2/9, Birmingham Special Collections.
91. William Clark, *From Three Worlds* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1986), pp. 156–7.
92. Ibid., pp. 159–60.
93. Piers Brendon, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire: 1781–1997* (London: Vintage Books, 2007), p. 491.
94. Anthony Nutting, *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez* (London: Constable, 1967), p. 32.
95. Sir Frederick Bishop interview transcript. File no. 3, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 2 (italics added).
96. Clark (1986), p. 161.
97. Sir Frederick Bishop interview transcript. File no. 3, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 5.
98. Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, *The Powers Behind the Prime Minister: The Hidden Influence of Number Ten* (London: Harper Collins, 2000), p. 59.
99. Sir Frederick Bishop interview transcript. File no. 3, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 8.
100. Keith Kyle, 'Britain's Slow March to Suez', in David Tal (ed.), *The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 107.
101. Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker interview transcript. File no. 6, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 7.
102. Ibid., p. 8.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Sir Frank Cooper interview transcript. File no. 4, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 8.
106. Ibid.

107. Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker interview transcript. File no. 6, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 9.
108. Sir Archibald Ross interview transcript. File no. 19, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 3.
109. Verbeek (2003), p. 157.
110. C. C. Anderson, 'Suez—1956', *The Naval Review* (1991) Vol. 79, No. 4, p. 359.
111. Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker interview transcript. File no. 6, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 9.
112. Sir Archibald Ross interview transcript. File no. 19, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 3.
113. Ann Lane, 'The Past as Matrix: Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs', *Contemporary British History* Special Edition: Whitehall and the Suez Crisis (1999) Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 204–5.
114. Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London: Sceptre, 1986), pp. 241–3.
115. Ivone Kirkpatrick, *The Inner Circle* (London: Macmillan, 1959), Ch. 5.
116. Young (1999), p. 228.
117. Lane (1999), p. 205.
118. Goodman (2014) p. 380.
119. 24 September 1956, Diary of 1956–57. In MS191/1/2/5, Birmingham Special Collections.
120. Ann Lane, 'Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone Augustine (1897–1964)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.* http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34339 accessed 14 March 2012, p. 2.
121. Lane (1999), p. 206.
122. Sir Frank Cooper interview transcript. File no. 4, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 8. Most intriguing about this remark by Cooper was that it was a response to a question that was not actually about Pat Dean specifically, the question was referring to Richard Powell, seeking to clarify his role in the Sèvres affair. The above quote was Cooper's reply.
123. *The Missing Link?* of course forms part of Lucas's title, Lucas (1999).
124. Ibid., p. 123.
125. Chester L. Cooper, *The Lion's Last Roar: Suez 1956* (London: Harper Collins, 1978).
126. Letter from Patrick Dean to Selwyn Lloyd, 4 October 1976. In SELO 6/318, CAC, Churchill College, Cambridge University.
127. Sir Patrick Dean interview transcript. File no. 5, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 2.
128. Ibid., p. 4.
129. Ibid.

130. Ibid., p. 3.
131. Sir Patrick Reilly interview transcript. File no. 18, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p. 3 (italics added).
132. Ibid., p. 8 (italics added).
133. Sir Patrick Dean interview transcript. File no. 5, Suez Oral History Project, LHCMA, KCL, p.1.
134. Lucas (1999), p. 118.
135. Logan produced by his own recollection, Donald Logan, Suez: Meeting at Sèvres, 22–25 October 1956, 24 October 1986. In CAB 164/1359, TNA.
136. Goodman (2014), pp. 369, 401.
137. Eden's words as recollected on p. 2 of Pat Dean's untitled Sèvres narrative. In FCO 73/205, TNA. Although also undated, this source can be estimated at having an authorship date of June/July, 1978, thanks to an accompanying letter in the TNA file by John Hunt detailing the request made of Dean to transcribe his own version of the Sèvres visit. John Hunt to Sir Michael Palliser, 24 May 1978. In FCO 73/205, TNA.
138. This unease was recalled by Dean's widow, Goodman (2014), p. 400.
139. Lucas (1999), p. 120.
140. Geoffrey McDermott, *The Eden Legacy and the Decline of British Diplomacy* (London: Leslie Frewin, 1969), p. 133.

What Role Did British Intelligence Play in Operationalising British Policy on Suez into a Viable Plan of Action?

The functioning of British strategy at the policy development stage was a problematic affair; active short-circuiting of the governmental machinery, coupled with the existing inadequacies of both intelligence service performance and their bureaucratic position contributed to a policy that contained a fundamental inconsistency in its approach to the Suez Crisis. That inconsistency was whether the British government sought the overthrow of the Nasser regime and/or the securing of the Suez Canal Zone.

The operationalisation of the British policy vision into a plan of action must deal first with that inherent inconsistency. The chapter will therefore first analyse how the British military interpreted the policy. What will be revealed is that instead of resolving the inconsistency that existed within the policy, the British military instead simply tried to plan around every eventuality, attempting to satisfy all possible requests from the government. This slowed the planning process, leading not only to the creation of a secondary military plan, but also a winter contingency version of the plan as well. Furthermore, this laborious process required a large amount of intelligence material to be collected and disseminated on target areas that were ultimately never attacked. And finally, that the change from Operation MUSKETEER to MUSKETEER REVISE created a situation whereby all planning and intelligence-gathering efforts had to shift focus entirely.

The second area that this chapter will address is the specific intelligence requirements that were collected for the military units taking part in operations against Egypt. Here focus will be directed on the Royal Air Force

(RAF), 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, 16 Independent Parachute Brigade and the Joint Experimental Helicopter Unit. The intelligence requirements of these units are illuminating in revealing the variation of material that was required, as well as the complications that were encountered in the dissemination of that material.

Finally this chapter will address the weaknesses encountered in the dissemination of intelligence material to the military commands that needed it. The two weaknesses that will be highlighted are staff dislocation and restricted signals capacity. Ultimately, British intelligence was of some help in operationalising British policy into a viable plan of action, but it was help that did not come without incident.

Interpreting the Policy Message

The first and most fundamental challenge in operationalising any plan of action is to interpret the constructed policy to understand not only what it is that the political masters wish to achieve, but also plan for what actions the military can take to achieve this. Over Suez this was a complicated affair as Eden, effectively short-circuiting the wider governmental machinery by this stage, simply could not make up his mind between the desirability of removing Nasser or securing the Canal Zone. This resulted in a plan that Heikal rightly labels 'a hotchpotch of political and military contradictions'.[1] An interesting dilemma arose in British policy despite the consistency in its belief that the use of force was not only essential, but also desirable[2] and even urgent, for the Chiefs of Staff Committee were instructed as early as 30 July to 'prepare an outline plan for possible operations against Egypt'.[3] There remained an inconsistency, however, as to what the end game should be for this war: was it to be regime change, or was it simply to establish control of the Suez Canal in order to restore ownership back to the Suez Canal Company or internationalise its operation? These clearly represented the objectives of Eden and his Cabinet, but which was to take precedence?[4] It was this fundamental lack of clarity at the political level that caused planning confusion at the military level, namely the production of Operation MUSKETEER, and later the subsequent MUSKETEER REVISE.

Operation MUSKETEER in its original form was effectively a blueprint for regime change in Egypt. It proposed an amphibious landing at Alexandria before breaking out in the direction of Cairo, only then to cross the River Nile and secure the Suez Canal Zone. This initial plan formed the original Concept of Operations in the 'Combined Allied Operational

Instruction' of 16 August 1956[5] and very much reflects the position that toppling the Nasser regime took precedence. This was despite the fact that the declared aim was interpreted by the CoS as being to 'secure the Suez Canal by armed force with a view to its operation by international authority'.[6] The seriousness with which this political objective was held is shown by the action of Lord Mountbatten on 14 August, when in that day's CoS Committee meeting he raised the question of what steps were to be taken to ensure the formation of a new government 'which would not only support our policy for the operation of the Canal but would also have the support of the Egyptian people'.[7] The consequence of adopting this policy interpretation was simple: it put in motion the huge planning machinery to prepare an outline plan as well as the logistics of achieving this mission. It set mission priorities and taskings which, most pertinent here, resulted in a battery of intelligence requirements to be collected, assessed and passed on to the relevant commands. Full order sets were issued to the relevant commands including 3 Infantry Division, who received their 'Operational Order No. 1' on 5 September. These orders go into great detail not only into the concept of operations but also to the manner of execution, for example which routes different participating units were to take to Cairo, as well as informing the Division as to the planned movements of the other involved units (namely 16 Independent Parachute Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade). Details go into such depth as to the estimated water requirements per day and planned allotments of anti-tank weaponry.[8] What is also important to note is the addition of dedicated appendixes on Signals Intelligence[9] detailing the signals infrastructure most relevant to the Cairo and Alexandria areas respectively.[10] To change the plan would have far-reaching consequences to these preparations, yet change the plan the British did.

MUSKETEER REVISE was not created with the consideration of military objectives in mind; it was instead done for political imperatives. This further reflects the confusion that had plagued the entire British response to the Suez Crisis. The opinions of those who held that a landing at Port Said instead of Alexandria was militarily unsound are revealing as to this confusion. The Air Task Force Commander himself, Air Marshall Barnett, 'stresses that the original plan was considered to be the most sound military operation but was rejected for political reasons'.[11] Turner notes that General Stockwell was also not impressed with the idea of landing at Port Said,[12] whilst Lieutenant-General Cowley, then Vice Quartermaster General at the War Office further declared a Port Said landing to be 'strategically unsound'.[13] Yet the change had to happen, for two reasons according to General Darling:

First, the initial impetus for launching the operation had been lost and it was now felt politically that an Alexandria landing was too circuitous an approach to the Canal and that we would become bogged down in operations at the very heart of Egypt, namely Cairo. There was much truth in this. The other, was that such a landing *would be seen* to be directed at the Canal.[14]

The British government had in effect missed its chance at launching an early *coup d'état* in Egypt. With the August Conference then happening, as well as Britain taking a public line of seeking a political solution with international agreement, a move to regime change by attacking Cairo would simply have appeared impolitic. Any military action would have to fit with public rhetoric originating in London, that of securing the Canal for international control, rather than the private rants of Eden in declaring 'I want him (Nasser) destroyed, can't you understand? I want him murdered, and if you (Nutting) and the Foreign Office don't agree, then you'd better come to the Cabinet and explain why.'[15]

The change of plan came with MUSKETEER REVISE targeting Port Said instead of Alexandria and so, as is recorded by the Royal Marines: 'Planning therefore started from scratch.'[16] The consequence of such a change on the military machine cannot be overestimated, everything had to be redirected: the concept of operations needed to be changed, through to the target appreciations, planning cycles, intelligence requirements, right the way down to troop deployment schedules and the loading of shipping.

For intelligence in particular, the change was important, for if different targets are to be assaulted than entirely new rounds of information on those targets must be collected. In effect all military intelligence that had been collected to this point had now been made redundant.[17] The example of shipping is instructive: it was pointed out to the political masters in London that shipping could not be held ready for extended periods, nor could mobilised reservists be held indefinitely. General Darling notes that 'all we could do was to direct the various blocks of forces and shipping from the Alexandria plan to the Port Said one in roughly the same order of precedence; there was no possibility of reloading. This inevitably led to muddles.'[18] The worry about a situation whereby the operation could no longer be launched was severe enough for a Winter Plan version of Operation MUSKETEER to be drafted as a contingency, the entire purpose of which was to offset any problems of maintaining readiness over extended periods.[19]

Although the new concept of operations retained the original aim of securing 'control of the Suez Canal by armed forces with a view to its operation

by international control',[20] the switch from Alexandria to Port Said created a host of new problems. Ironically enough, however, the assertion from Cowley that the switch made the venture strategically unsound is incorrect; it instead ensured that the operation was now better aligned with the *declared* policy objective, that of securing the Canal for international operation. Had the original MUSKETEER plan been executed it would have created a strategically unsound situation, because Britain would have deposed the Nasser government and would then have needed to explain how such action equated to securing the Canal for international operation.

The new problems were those of planning and intelligence in particular, for an entirely new set of requirements had to be created; this was most important for the planning of the proposed amphibious landing.[21] Yet there was a fundamental contradiction in British policy resulting in confusion at the basic planning stage as to what exactly it was that the British government sought to achieve in Egypt. The problems that the British military therefore had simply in interpreting the communicated policy into a coherent Concept of Operations reveals this; MUSKETEER represented a blueprint for regime change with the control of the Canal representing a secondary objective. Although MUSKETEER REVISE suited more closely the objective of Canal seizure, it contained no prescription for regime change, despite the government holding regime change as a declared political objective even as late as 24 October.[22] This fundamental tension at policy level resulted in planning delays[23] that represented a causal element in the British failure at Suez. The words of Liddell Hart at the time are prescient in this regard, when he stated that having 'taken the fateful decision, on however dubious a calculation, all hope of a militarily successful result depended on *quick* success'.[24]

Intelligence Requirements

The intelligence requirements become very specific in this section, generated as they were by the needs of the military units assigned to achieve planned objectives. The best place to start is with the 'General Staff Intelligence' report of 13 September produced immediately prior to the issuing of the MUSKETEER REVISE operational plan. The report's declared aim is 'to appreciate the intelligence problem which will face the task force once organised resistance has been broken down by air action.[25] It further summarises the basic intelligence tasks according to the planned three phases of MUSKETEER REVISE:

(b) <u>During Phase II</u> Intelligence on Egyptian Armed Forces and Para-Military reactions to events and the extent to which organised resistance has been destroyed; a careful study of popular reaction with special reference to potential Resistance Groups will be needed and for all this careful Intelligence Planning will be required.

(c) <u>During Phase III</u> Intense activity on Security Intelligence especially of a counter-sabotage nature and coverage of the Egyptian Armed Forces until these have been finally liquidated or reorganised.[26]

This plan from 2 Corps serves to further validate the presence of Assumption 8 from Chap. 4, that of the 'war after the war'. 2 Corps' intelligence appreciation effectively predicts a situation whereby after British forces had secured the Canal Zone they would be confronted with hostile organisations of an irregular character, thus forcing the British to switch to what was then termed Internal Security operations. It is highly explicit within the report that violence and turmoil would follow the landing phase. This can be seen from the further prediction that plans for the handling of large numbers of PoWs would most likely not be needed, declaring instead that there will 'be a more urgent and greater requirement for interpreters and also for the interrogation and possible detention of security suspects'.[27] Had the British attempt at securing the Canal Zone been successful, these assumptions would no doubt have proved correct.

The Royal Air Force

The requirements of the RAF for the planned invasion are the best place to start for two reasons. First, the Phase I aspect of the MUSKETEER plan was the offensive air campaign against Egypt. And second, due to the lack of intelligence assets on the ground in Egypt, there was simply nobody else who could gather suitable operational intelligence. The CoS noted that:

At the present time we are not receiving adequate information for our purpose from intelligence sources and there is no prospect of this situation improving. It is becoming evident, therefore, that we must take positive steps to obtain the information which is vital to our plans.[28]

The burden fell to the Photographic Reconnaissance (PR) capability of the RAF, centred on the use of seven Canberra PR 7 aircraft based at

Nicosia airfield in Cyprus, and the assistance of six French RF 84F aircraft, based at RAF Akrotiri, also on Cyprus. The pre-D Day requirements for PR efforts as declared by the Chiefs of Staff were to enable planners to:

(a) Ascertain the disposition of the EAF (Egyptian Air Force)
    (b) Acquire target information, and
    (c) Confirm existing target information (old photo cover)
    (d) Acquire information for the actual assault
    (e) Acquire information regarding Dropping Zones and information on
Egyptian Army dispositions.[29]

This reconnaissance began eight days before the beginning of the aerial campaign against Egypt (known as D-8).[30] From that point on, reconnaissance flights occurred daily to update and satisfy the requirements as stipulated by the CoS until they were ordered to cease altogether on 8 November; the only flights which continued after this date were those carried out above an altitude of 30,000 feet.[31] The flights themselves were categorised into:

Priority 1: Port Said, Suez Canal, Kantara, Firdan, Ismailia and Moascar, Rumani, Cairo, Pyramid Area.
    Priority 2: Gebel Maryam, Serapeum, Devesoir, Fayid/Fanara, Geneifa, Shallufa, Kubri and Suez, Ismailia to Abu Ageila, Ma'adi, North West Suez Area, Alexandria.
    TAC R: Road from Ferry Point eastwards, Railway and road Kantara to El Arish, Cairo to Alexandria road, Ismailia to Cairo road.[32]

The inability to clarify whether Eden's government sought regime change or control of the Canal is further apparent from this prioritisation listing; Cairo and the Pyramid Area were still listed as Priority 1 intelligence targets even after the change to MUSKETEER REVISE. Alexandria remained listed as Priority 2. Further to this is that tactical reconnaissance (basically charting the roads which grounds forces were expected to advance on) still listed the road from Alexandria and Ismailia to Cairo as a requirement. What can be seen therefore is that the lack of a clear primary political objective filtered all the way down to intelligence procurement in the field. The RAF simply planned *around* the existing policy confusion. They achieved this by stretching the available reconnaissance assets to cover all target possibilities, including Cairo and Alexandria, into late October 1956. Clearly this does not represent the ideal of what to expect in a smooth and efficient

planning process, because moulding a plan of action around fundamental policy confusion will introduce risk and inefficiency, such as over-stretching available resources. In this case the clear inefficiency was that reconnaissance over the targets most appropriate for the MUSKETEER REVISE operation could have been degraded in quality, simply due to the need to carry out other assignments within the same time frame.

This risk for an air reconnaissance wing would manifest itself in two ways, first was to the air crew themselves; those in the reconnaissance aircraft could miss vital scenes entirely by needing to switch targets, and the risk to the crew itself is increased by flying over another target, thus increasing their vulnerability to interception. And second, by the development teams processing the film; this team may suffer from the burden of developing entirely different target sets, increasing their workload and surely increasing their turnaround times in processing the results.[33]

The distribution of air photographs was centred on a two-fold approach. First was the issuing of already existing photographs to the appropriate brigade headquarters, in this case those of 3 Commando Brigade, 16 Independent Parachute Brigade, French Force A, 3 UK Division and 2 (UK) Corps. Second, was the more challenging prospect, that of issuing up-to-date PR to the commands as they were heading into the theatre of operations, the RAF solution was simply to issue this material direct to ground forces in Cyprus through the liaison officers to 3 Commando, 16 Independent Parachute Brigade, French Force A and 10 Armoured Division. 3 Commando Brigade, 16 Independent Parachute Brigade and French Force A were the units carrying out the amphibious and parachute landings and were most in need of immediate tactical reconnaissance of their landing areas. This was supplemented by a final precaution should any of the above arrangements fail, that of printing PR in Cyprus and distributing it through the Joint Intelligence Centre in Malta to ships as they passed Malta.[34] This measure represented an emergency measure that was recognised as an unreliable alternative to the existing arrangements.

The requirement for the dispositions of both the Egyptian Air Force and Army covered both the pre-hostilities and actual hostilities phases of the Operation, since these forces definitely needed to be constantly monitored throughout. This was done by the continued use of PR assets, but the distribution was conducted in a simplified manner during hostilities. Instead of a complex chain of liaison officers, the summaries were simply collated into the daily SITREP, or situation report (otherwise titled 'Summary of Operations'), which was cabled to all relevant commands every night at 9 p.m. GMT.[35] They would detail the results of any relevant PR sorties, as

well as army, intelligence and air operations. Under those headings would be included any relevant movements of units for army operations, relocation of EAF air assets for air operations and so forth. The daily issued 'Intelligence Summary' (INTSUM) was issued supplementary to this, even though it was acknowledged that signals constraints caused delays in the dissemination of the INTSUM.[36] Having said that, the 'Naval Report on Operation Musketeer' does insist that, according to the senior Naval officers involved (the Naval Force Commander, his Chief of Staff and Staff Officer), when the INTSUM did arrive on time it was adequate for their needs.[37]

THE ROYAL MARINES

3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines had a very specific intelligence requirement, one that was of great importance to the success of the MUSKETEER venture as a whole: intelligence to support an amphibious assault. Whereas the RAF requirements centred largely on monitoring force dispositions, conducting PR and gathering intelligence for their bombing targets, the Royal Marines requirement was for what appear to be much more mundane details. There was yet another problem in the planning stages, however. In the Royal Navy's own words the problem was that the primary planners kept changing their mind, and is worth quoting at length:

> In so far as intelligence was concerned SNO was often 24 hours behind the planners. Owing to the short notice it was never possible to examine all the Egyptian beaches before the planners started to discuss them. It was more a matter of beaches being discussed, and being vetted for suitability afterwards. Information 'off the cuff' was made through JIB and the Survey Section of the JIB. Both these places found our demands exhausting the rapidity of the change of area and objective, eg they were sometimes rung up and told 'drop that now, no longer interested, have a look at so and so'.[38]

Thus, the first major problem encountered by the staffs responsible for gathering intelligence for an amphibious landing stemmed from the fundamental confusion as to whether to land at Alexandria or Port Said. This resulted in a full appreciation of the beaches at Alexandria[39] which had to be subsequently discarded when the decision to land at Port Said was adopted. This decision required yet another entirely new appreciation, which formed the basis of the Port and Beach Intelligence Annex of the 'Operation Musketeer (Revise) Naval Operation Order'.[40] Simply by observing the details collated in this appendix one can appreciate the implications of the data that were

gathered: first is port capacity, listed at 10,000 tons per day, which gave the limit of ground forces that could be supported from this beachhead.

Weather and sea data follow, important in judging the viability of airborne and sea landings and possible disruption to port operations, and thus subsequent military operations on land.[41] Later on, in the third part of the appendix are the specific beach details important to 3 Commando Brigade: exits from the beach for motor transport were assessed to be good; visible landmarks were declared to enable the fast orientation of marines once landed ashore; right down to the estimated weight of vehicles that the beach could support. In the case of Port Said only half-ton 4×4 vehicles could be supported, meaning that the standard three-ton lorries would require a beach roadway to be prepared.[42]

Despite such details, the consensus in after-action reports maintains that intelligence for the amphibious landing was meagre[43]; this was manifested in two ways, largely as the result of the same structural problem of intelligence being shared between different command headquarters. The 3 Commando Brigade after-action report noted that no source could provide a definitive statement on the depth of the fishing harbour in Port Said although details of such depth were vital to the planners considering the use of LCTs and LSTs in the assault.[44]

The second and most notable incident was the aerial photography, revealing the extent of complexity in intelligence-sharing arrangements and the difficulties that can be caused for planning cells when they find themselves without up-to-date intelligence. The Royal Marines report detailed how oblique photographic shots of the two bridges to the south of Port Said were of particular interest, but were reported to be unavailable. Fortunately for the Royal Marines one of their commanding officers managed to obtain 2 Corps' Intelligence Report on Port Said (during a liaison trip to Cyprus), containing within it exactly the photographs of those bridges required. The problem is as obvious as it is simple: 'It can only be assumed that these photographs were available through RAF channels but had not been procured *for a lack of contact* between the military and air intelligence staffs.'[45] This was quite clearly a breakdown of the intelligence cycle in practice, whereby the dissemination of intelligence material to the commands was thwarted by inefficient practices. The planning for the amphibious landing might have been badly affected were the Royal Marines not lucky enough to have found this material when they did.

Ultimately what can be said of the intelligence requirements of 3 Commando Brigade is that their requirements were met, but they were not

met without incident. Enough good luck late in the day had prevented such incidents from creating any major obstacles to carrying out the Port Said amphibious landing. The experience of 3 Commando Brigade is arguably the most telling of all units involved in MUSKETEER, and that experience reveals the two most important problems related to intelligence in terms of its military application. The first is the confusion of objective selection and its effects on intelligence requirements. The personnel of the JIB and NID were trying frantically to keep up with the demands of planners, and consequently struggled to satisfy their requirements; even though planning for MUSKETEER was carried out over a period of more than three months. And second was the issue of access to available intelligence; different command structures struggled to communicate between each other even in optimal conditions so it is easy to see that sharing small, yet still potentially vital items of intelligence also proved to be an obstacle to effective joint force planning.

16 Independent Parachute Brigade

The task of carrying out the airborne assault, known as Operation TELESCOPE, on Gamil Airfield[46] at Port Said fell to 16 Independent Parachute Brigade. Whereas the requirements from the Royal Marines centred on intelligence pertinent to an amphibious landing, the Paratroopers needed intelligence specific to conducting an airborne drop. Another important requirement was knowledge of enemy dispositions on the ground. One requirement was satisfied, while the other was not. As well as these two there is a requirement that can elude inclusion, but which has large effects on operations—meteorological intelligence. Weather is a major factor for airborne operations. Wind speeds above the operational limit would force the cancellation of the drop not least because of casualties to the Paratroopers. Visibility for aircraft is also a vital yet simple consideration for an airborne drop. Additionally, wind speed and direction have a significant effect on the flying times of aircraft involved. The particular implications are that when carrying out an airborne drop with tightly calculated drop times, any deviation in the plan caused by wind speeds can result in forces not being dropped at the right time or even in the right place. This consideration proved to cause small problems in the brigade's drop as they note themselves: 'some difficulties were encountered during the flight caused by an unexpected head wind which slowed down some of the heavily laden Hastings aircraft. Changes had to be made in the order of fly-in.'[47]

The war diary for the 3 PARA battle group within the brigade details the issues most efficiently, by declaring that while they received excellent

photography of the intended target to land on, they received little or no information about the enemy. In their own words: 'At no time did we receive information as to the exact dispositions of the enemy.'[48] The result of this was that the Paratroopers dropped in on a target zone with no prior knowledge of what they could expect to face from the enemy; needless to say, performing a drop in such conditions was a risk. The account of 16 Independent Parachute Brigade may be relatively small in intelligence terms, but it illustrates similar problems seen throughout: the lack of intelligence procured from within Egypt, owing in part to the defeat of SIS networks in August. However, the RAF's reconnaissance efforts did provide sufficient, indeed excellent, resources upon which to base an airborne drop.

The Joint Experimental Helicopter Unit

British military action at Suez is notable in another aspect; it involved the first use of helicopters in a combat role. The Joint Experimental Helicopter Unit was originally intended to perform only a combat evacuation role, but a requirement arose in the planning stages 'to lift 45 Commando whose task was to seize two bridges across a water gap which could not be outflanked by land'.[49] This tasking of bridge seizure ultimately did not occur, although the Marines were still landed during the assault. This landing did not occur without incident however. Originally the first wave of helicopters had attempted to land at the Port Said stadium but came under heavy fire from forces within the stadium itself, so landed and disembarked the Marines at the *de Lesseps* Statue instead.[50] It is actually very difficult to list intelligence requirements for this unit, due to the fact that at the time of its employment at Port Said it was still an *experimental* unit; because of this there existed no agreed principles for helicopter use on which to base specific intelligence to its needs.

Despite this, certain similarities exist which closely mirror the needs of an airborne assault like that carried out by 16 Independent Parachute Brigade. The unit was carried in by air as an assault party, thus having the same vulnerabilities as those of the parachute forces, and those flying the aircraft carrying them in also share this vulnerability. The assault party was landed in hostile, unsecured territory and, once landed, the force would be isolated until larger formations linked up with them. These similarities meant that intelligence on the suitability of landing zones and enemy dispositions were the critical requirements in the operation. In reality this

meant that the established intelligence apparatus had no harder task than that which they were already doing for the airborne drops.

The report 'Joint Experimental Helicopter Unit on Op. Musketeer' insists that when flying into landing sites that have not previously been secured great care must be taken 'to find out the exact conditions under which they will be operating'.[51] Recognising that once landed the party would be isolated meant that the planning processes needed also to factor in the need to link up with other forces, before they meet a major enemy force.

The basic difference between the helicopter assault and the airborne drop lies in the platforms transporting them in; an airborne drop requires fewer sorties to deliver troops and supplies, whereas helicopters carry fewer men, less stores, are slower and have a shorter range. Therefore there are multiple sorties to the same objective, thus placing the helicopters themselves at greater risk, as well as leaving initial waves of men landed exposed until the drop is completed. As it turned out the only damage sustained by any of the helicopters was during the first attempted landing at the stadium, where one helicopter sustained damage from small arms fire, but otherwise the mission was a success. 45 Commando were landed within 90 minutes, followed by the lifting of their stores, some 23 tons of which was delivered within a further 40 minutes.[52]

Weaknesses in Military Intelligence

The specific requirements of military units were ultimately catered for adequately, despite the arrangements for dissemination being far from optimal. Thus the conduct of military operations was not prejudiced by any intelligence oversights. Despite this there were two structural weaknesses in the establishment for the military at Suez with consequences for intelligence activities: staff dislocation, and restricted signals capacity. These two weaknesses created two fundamental problems all too familiar to intelligence practitioners: blocks to dissemination and a restriction,[53] rather than a pooling, of available intelligence products.

Staff dislocation is the place to start on these weaknesses for it most exacerbated the signals problem thereafter. The easiest way to observe this problem is to consider where each military service based their respective task force command headquarters for Operation MUSKETEER at the start of operations: the Royal Navy was based in Malta, the Army remained in London and the Royal Air Force was in Cyprus; thereafter all staffs were transferred to Cyprus.[54] The immediate and obvious consequence of this

separation was that for each staff to communicate and liaise with one another required significant signals and logistic organisation. This was true for all issues associated with Operation MUSKETEER, not just intelligence. It is even noted by the Chief Staff Officer for Intelligence in the Royal Navy's own report on MUSKETEER that the 'supply of intelligence was throughout affected both in the command structure and by the fact that various officers in Cyprus dealing with intelligence *were widely scattered*'.[55] The Naval Force Commander also noted that that the 'organisation of intelligence bodies in London is so vast that it is not at all obvious to a Force Commander just where and how he is to get what he needs'.[56] The result of such dislocation was, in effect, an *ad hoc* establishment of intelligence communications, a system that incurred obvious drawbacks. Examples such as the Royal Marine liaison officer stumbling by chance on a vital piece of intelligence to the planning of the Port Said landings were the consequence of this dislocation of service staffs into three separate locations. That dislocation meant that those who needed specific material could not easily access the intelligence they required because it was held by another staff in another country with no clear protocols to arrange access.

This was a problem that even affected single staffs, in this case the reconnaissance flights of the RAF operating from Cyprus. French reconnaissance photographs were available before British ones, why was this so? 'This was because French film could be developed and printed at Akrotiri, whereas RAF film had to be sent from Nicosia by road or helicopter to Episkopi (the army HQ) for processing.'[57] However, the best example of staff dislocation lies not within the services themselves but with the JIC (ME).

The JIC maintained specific regional bodies (sub-committees) in order to develop more region-related material. At the time of the Suez Crisis the onus fell to the Middle East body, JIC (ME), which was based in Nicosia, Cyprus. Although the central JIC body in London was well understood by the military, the Middle East section had not enjoyed close working relations with any of the military services, thus the problem of *ad hoc* arrangements became apparent once more. The Naval Force Commander notes of the JIC (ME) that it was:

> by no means certain what was required of it, and their task was made more difficult because they were not informed of the needs of the Force Commanders neither were they recalled to London to be given a background against which they could subsequently have worked.[58]

Such a situation presents enough problems in itself, but because of the subsequent time factor the JIC (ME) simply could not acquaint itself with the military staffs and become educated as to their requirements; intelligence product would therefore leave much to be desired. Indeed, the Royal Navy criticised JIC (ME) for their lack of appropriately evaluated reports, insisting that in an 'operation of this nature evaluated appreciations are essential and raw material should only be used for background knowledge'.[59] The JIC (ME) was not in the best position to provide intelligence product because it did not know which staff it was working for, nor did it enjoy a close familiarity with the MUSKETEER plans.[60] They could not therefore tailor their efforts to the required standard in such a short time to suit the military commands. In Annex II of their report on intelligence, the JIC explained this fundamental problem as a result of the political decision in London to conduct planning for the operation in London instead of by the relevant Force Commanders in theatre: 'Consequently JIC (ME) was at no time in association with the planners of Musketeer and did not know them or how they thought.'[61] The second problem was the lack of signals capacity within the Force Command structures, resulting in a situation where only 'vital intelligence' was to be sent.[62] The Force Command was based upon HMS *Tyne* through which all command information and intelligence had to be passed, but this vessel was supported by limited signals capacity. The Royal Navy notes that in terms of wireless organisation 'limited capacity' was available from both Malta and Cyprus, and in the case of Cyprus that capacity was to be used only for direct communications with HMS *Tyne*. In addition to these unencrypted, 'open' channels, there was also a dedicated Crypto secured communications channel at both Malta and Cyprus to offset the restrictions on wireless services, but the drawback of this system was that it could 'only be handled by indoctrinated officers'.[63] Further to this, the Royal Navy could not support the intelligence teams that would be required to adequately cater for the requirements of Operation MUSKETEER. Eventually, two such teams were recommended for tactical intelligence (Air Intelligence and Surface Intelligence), but it was declared that HMS *Tyne* could not support such teams 'because of her very limited accommodation and radio warfare facilities'.[64] The story of limited signals capacity is very short and easy to detail, but the significance of this limitation is profound in the Suez case.

The key issue with the first problem of staff dislocation is that it puts a heavy reliance on the available signals capacity to make up for the lack of direct liaison and communication that would be the norm with a united and co-located staff. Lacking such a capacity, the force commands had restricted

the amount of intelligence to be disseminated as evenly and broadly as possible. Even on the ground in Egypt signals capacity deployment was recognised as a problem, and referred to by the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) when speaking about the 'Y' services deployment (a signals detection capability). The DMI states that the inability to locate clandestine enemy transmitters would have been less of a problem had 128 Wireless Troop been deployed early in the operation rather than later.[65] It is clear that proper planning for the deployment of signals infrastructure was not adequately catered for in Operation MUSKETEER, from the operational command level right down to tactical field deployments.

The lack of signals capacity for Operation MUSKETEER compounded the problem of staff dislocation even further. The weakness of the military intelligence arrangements could not be improved because staff dislocation created a duplication of effort, and the lack of signals capacity prevented an effective, technological fix to communication issues. Signals were routinely overloaded on HMS *Tyne*, as well as between the RAF bases at both Nicosia and Episkopi.[66] Delays in the transmission of all messages were common, and with instructions to pass on only 'vital intelligence' it becomes obvious that only command-essential information would be communicated.

The end result of these two fundamental weaknesses in the MUSKETEER arrangements was to create blocks to intelligence dissemination. Disseminating the relevant product, to the people who need it most, in time is the vital task for intelligence staffs. At Suez, staff dislocation meant that the relevant intelligence apparatus had to serve several masters simultaneously, based in different locations, using a heavily congested signals infrastructure. Brigadier Madoc RM, in a letter to the Ground Force Commander for MUSKETEER, General Stockwell, declared 'I do not believe that there was any deliberate and conscientious effort on the part of the three Services to *coordinate* all their agencies, *pool* their intelligence and *deliver* it to the users.'[67] This statement from Madoc best sums up the performance of military intelligence at Suez.

The role that British intelligence played in operationalising British policy was one of supporting and refining the military planning processes, serving to reveal two broader lessons about the strategy and intelligence relationship with which to conclude this chapter. In the first instance the JIC, JIC (ME) and JIB all played important roles in ensuring not only the security of operations, but also in providing necessary intelligence product to the military commands that needed it. But this was not a process without incident, incidents that serve to highlight how the intelligence infrastructure is vul-

nerable to the wider planning processes of major operations. The separation of staff headquarters between London, Malta and Cyprus resulted in a dislocated approach to command and control generally that also affected the dissemination of intelligence material. The military commands struggled to 'pull' the intelligence material they required from intelligence sources when they needed it. This was made most clear by the example of 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines in preparing the amphibious landing at Port Said. This was further compounded by the lack of adequate signals capacity, which meant that intelligence bodies found themselves increasingly unable to 'push' their product to customers. What these experiences come to reveal however is that, despite the difficulties encountered and explained above, intelligence support is certainly not illusory. Unlike the struggles of the JIC and SIS at the level of policy development, at the operational level the intelligence services did indeed play a key role in helping to shape and give form to the strategic action taken against Egypt. Given the scale of difficulties that face those who must prepare strategic plans, and gather suitable intelligence, it would be understandable to characterise the attempt as a bridge too far at times. British actions in preparing operations in Egypt, however, show that just as strategy is no illusion, nor are the services provided by intelligence in supporting the achievement of strategic goals.

These issues came of course after the fundamental problem of interpreting the policy message, which presents this chapter's second core lesson as the necessary counterpoint to the first: intelligence cannot be expected to act as a panacea to the ills and flaws of poorly constructed or interpreted policy. Fundamental to the ultimate lack of success at Suez was a military plan with an interpretation of British policy that did not seek to resolve, or even challenge, the inherent inconsistency of either securing the Suez Canal Zone or overthrowing the Nasser regime as the primary objective; instead the burden was placed on military staffs to create operational plans that would cater for all contingencies. The eventual result was Operation MUSKETEER, followed by MUSKETEER REVISE and its Winter Plan contingency variant. This placed a huge burden not only on planning staffs as a whole but also on intelligence-collection efforts to gather and prepare intelligence material for plans and eventualities that never occurred. British intelligence efforts did help operationalise the Suez policy into a plan of action, but it was help that was over-worked, over-stretched and made increasingly vulnerable to the structural weaknesses in the British command and control system. Because of such over-stretch and conceptual incoherence, it becomes clear that no intelligence provision could have

acted as a panacea for the fundamental flaws that existed both in British policy as a whole, or for the failings within the military command structure to resolve those flaws before planning began. If intelligence is to flourish in its duties to strategy, then those who frame policy and strategy at the highest levels must take care to ensure that such inconsistencies are resolved before they return to plague the actual pursuit of strategy in the field. Intelligence can ultimately do precious little to rectify such problems.

NOTES

1. Mohammed H. Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes* (London: Corgi Books, 1988), p. 202.
2. Al-Solami is right to note that the reaction to adopting a military solution preceded the notion of any political settlement. D. A. Al-Solami, British Preparations for the Suez War—1956 (University of Exeter, Faculty of Arts: Doctoral Thesis, 1988), p. 44.
3. Action Against Egypt—Outline Plan, COS(56)293. In DEFE 5/70, TNA.
4. Al-Solami (1988), p. 45.
5. Combined Allied Operational Instruction, 16 August. In ADM 116/6101, TNA.
6. Ibid.
7. Lord Mountbatten as recorded in a Confidential Annex to COS(56)80. In DEFE 11/133, TNA.
8. Operation Musketeer 3 (British) Infantry Division Operation Order No 1, 5 September. In WO 288/92, TNA.
9. Ibid., Appendix A.
10. No doubt informed by the JIB report of 7 August, titled 'Principal communications targets in Alexandria, Cairo, and the Nile Delta area'. In WO 288/162, TNA.
11. Operation Musketeer G.3147/PR/2/57/20, p. 2. In AIR 19/852, TNA.
12. Barry Turner, *Suez: The Inside Story of the First Oil War* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2007), p. 203.
13. Lieutenant-General Sir John Guise Cowley, CWLY 1/3, p. 1 CAC Churchill College, Cambridge University.
14. General Sir Kenneth Darling: Papers relating to the Suez Canal Crisis, 1956–1985 Reference 4, File E, Imperial War Museum Special Collections, Imperial War Museum London (hereafter referred to as IWM Special Collections), p. 5 (italics added).
15. Anthony Nutting, *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez* (London: Constable, 1967), pp. 34–5. The word 'murdered' is included in Dorril's work, citing the later recollection from Nutting that this was what Eden had said, as opposed to 'removed' in the original quotation from *No End*

of a Lesson. Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations* (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), p. 613.

16. 42 Commando, Royal Marines: Report on Operations against Egypt, 1956, p. 2. In DEFE 2/2057, TNA.

17. A key example of which is the report on Port and Beach Intelligence for Alexandria, no longer needed, but the exact same report would now have to be carried out for Port Said. Operation Musketeer Naval Operation Order, Annex 5, Appendix C. In ADM 205/147, TNA.

18. General Darling, IWM Special Collections, p. 6.

19. As noted in the CoS memorandum of 12 October. In ADM 205/138, TNA.

20. There are a great many files with the Concept of Operations in The National Archives, but this declared aim is and remained the consistent interpretation of the policy objective by the British military. Overall Air Plan for Operation Musketeer, Appendix 'K', in AIR 20/9549, noted too as the 'overall Allied Aim' in the Overall Air Plan, AIR 20/10219, TNA.

21. The Royal Marines argue that intelligence is 'of primary importance to unit planning for an amphibious assault'. 42 Commando (1956), p. 7. In DEFE 2/2057, TNA.

22. Annex to JP(56)160 (Final) Military Implications of Mounting Operation Musketeer, 24 October. In DEFE 11/135, TNA.

23. The Musketeer Revise plan was not issued to Force Commanders until 19 September, Royal Marines, Musketeer diary of events 26 July 1956–29 October 1956. In ADM 202/457, TNA.

24. 'Operation Musketeer', B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Observer*, 24 February 1957 (italics original). In LH 10/1957, LHCMA KCL.

25. General Staff Intelligence, HQ 2 Corps, 13 September, p. 1. In WO 288/162, TNA.

26. Ibid., pp. 3–4.

27. Ibid., p. 4.

28. Minute 3 of COS(56)376, 12 October 1956. In AIR 20/10742, TNA.

29. CoS Committee, Musketeer—PR, 9 October 1956. In AIR 20/10216, TNA.

30. As is recorded by the CoS Committee CR/1117/SD12 of 2 October 1956. In AIR 20/10215, TNA.

31. General Report on Reconnaissance Operations and Organisation leading up to and during Operation Musketeer, 16 November, p. 3. In AIR 20/10199, TNA.

32. 1355/G(INT) Photo Cover Request, 10 October 1956, Annexe 1. In AIR 20/10216, TNA.

33. This was a situation noted by the RAF, although for the differing reason of staff dislocation, which will be dealt with later in this chapter. AIR 20/10199, TNA.

34. 1270/G(INT), 25 October 1956, p. 2. In AIR 20/10742, TNA.

35. These SITREPs are contained in their entirety in AIR 8/2097, and AIR 19/852, TNA.
36. The problems of lack of signals capacity will be dealt with later in this chapter, but is important to acknowledge at this point, Naval Report on Operation Musketeer, 15 February 1957, para. 35. In ADM 1/27373, TNA.
37. Ibid., para. 36.
38. Lessons Learnt and comments on the writing of Operation Musketeer, para. 4. In ADM 116/6101, TNA.
39. 'Port and Beach Intelligence' in Operation Musketeer Naval Operation Order, Annex 5, Appendix C. In ADM 205/147, TNA.
40. Operation Musketeer (Revise) Naval Operation Order, Annex 5, Appendix C. In ADM 205/148, TNA.
41. Ibid., part 1.
42. Ibid., part 3.
43. Noted in Naval Report on Operation Musketeer, 15 February 1957, para. 11. In ADM 1/27373, TNA.
44. 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines Operation Musketeer Report, 15 January 1957, para. 17. In ADM 202/455, TNA.
45. Ibid. (italics added), para. 19.
46. Operation Telescope, Overall Air Plan, p. 1. In AIR 20/9571, TNA.
47. Annex D to War Diary, November 1956, p. 5. In WO 288/74, TNA.
48. Ibid., p. 4.
49. Joint Experimental Helicopter Unit on Op. Musketeer, 14 January 1957, p. 1. In WO 288/76, TNA.
50. 'Helicopters at Port Said', Secret Intelligence Summaries, May 1957, Volume 12, Number 5, p. 11. In AIR 40/2771, TNA.
51. Joint Experimental Helicopter Unit on Op. Musketeer, 14 January 1957, p. 2. In WO 288/76, TNA.
52. 'Helicopters at Port Said', Secret Intelligence Summaries, May 1957, Volume 12, Number 5, p. 11. In AIR 40/2771, TNA.
53. Hoarding and stove-piping are related terminology associated with this problem and have already been discussed. Their use here however would imply intention to prevent dissemination. For the military side of intelligence matters blocks to dissemination were more the result of structural weakness than a desire to 'hoard' any product.
54. 24 October 1956 of Royal Marines, Musketeer diary of events 26 July 1956–29 October 1956. In ADM 202/457, this is also noted in Operation Musketeer Air Operations, 12 October, p. 9. In AIR 20/10214, TNA.
55. Naval Report on Operation Musketeer, 15 February 1957, para. 30 (italics added). In ADM 1/27373, TNA.

56. Appendix IV of Naval Report on Operation Musketeer, para. 3. In in ADM 116/6106, TNA.

57. ADM 116/6133, TNA, p. 2.

58. Appendix IV, para. 6. In ADM 116/6106, TNA.

59. Appendix 'I' to Report by the Air Task Force Commander on Operation MUSKETEER, 27 November, p. 2. In ADM 116/6133, TNA.

60. Naval Report on Operation Musketeer, 15 February 1957, para. 40. In ADM 1/27373, TNA.

61. Annex II, Intelligence Role of JIC (ME) in Operation Musketeer, 29 November, para. 10. In CO 1035/27, TNA.

62. Operation Musketeer—Special Intelligence, 17 August 1956, p. 1. In ADM 116/6099, TNA.

63. Meaning those cleared under the TERRAPIN security protocol, ibid., p. 1.

64. Operation Musketeer—Special Intelligence, 27 August 1956, p. 1. In ADM 116/6099, TNA.

65. Report on Op. Musketeer, 18 April 1957, para. 8. In WO 32/16731, TNA.

66. Appendix II, Intelligence Role of JIC (ME) in Operation Musketeer, 29 November, para. 10. In CO 1035/27, TNA.

67. Brigadier R. W. Madoc RM to General Sir Hugh Stockwell, 15 January 1957 (italics added). In ADM 202/455, TNA.

How Did British Intelligence Help the Feedback Process?

Feedback occurs across several levels because the Strategy Bridge covers the interfaces across and between the political, operational and tactical levels. Feedback will be considered across those three fundamental levels.

First to be analysed is tactical and operational feedback occurring throughout the period of military operations, second is the broader strategic feedback, before finally dealing with political level feedback. It is important to note that these processes differ in their temporal relation to one another; tactical and operational feedback occurs in near real-time in order to aid the conduct of ongoing military operations. Strategic feedback deals with the attainment of war objectives, which is generally a slower process[1] although relatively quick at Suez due to the short time within which hostilities took place. Political feedback is a predominantly post-facto occurrence, as the implications of operational results must sink in and be reflected upon.

This chapter will show that feedback becomes far more challenging as it progresses towards the level of policy; not only does feedback take longer to achieve, but it becomes unclear whether such feedback is acknowledged, and whether it even occurs, due to the complex machinery of government. At Suez the tactical and operational levels of feedback processes occurred smoothly and with little incident, for the military forces involved simply followed established procedures for handling this. At the strategic and political level of feedback, however, significant impediments were encountered. At the strategic level, British intelligence found itself

heavily restricted in its ability to provide privileged insight into Egypt itself. And at the political level this paucity of sources further restricted the inputs of SIS and the JIC, who focussed more on how to rectify the dearth of sources instead of analysing the broader implications of what Britain had just experienced. Such broader analysis was carried out, but, as will be shown, this was ultimately done without the input of SIS or the JIC.

Tactical/Operational Feedback

Tactical

Air Operations

Hostilities at Suez opened with the Anglo-French air campaign against Egypt, so this is the logical place to begin analysis of feedback provisions. First, a brief appreciation of initial reconnaissance efforts is needed to establish the context of the subsequent reconnaissance undertaken to provide feedback on the air operations. The compromise of SIS operations by Egyptian counter-intelligence placed British efforts in a position of intelligence disadvantage (see Chap. 5) because local human sources were not present to update and confirm British appreciations of the situation. The Chiefs of Staff noted the severity of this situation on 12 October, when they stated that:

> At the present time we are not receiving adequate information for our pur-pose from Intelligence sources and there is no prospect of this situation improving. It is becoming evident, therefore, that we must take positive steps to obtain the information which is vital to our plans.[2]

The result of this was the RAF aerial reconnaissance sorties, with French contribution, that were flown from Cyprus (see Chap. 6). Once hostili-ties had begun the primary function of this reconnaissance was to provide what is today termed 'Battle Damage Assessment' (BDA), in order to reliably track and monitor the progress of operations, as well as Egyptian responses to those operations. The results reflect the real-world routine[3] of monitoring progress and disseminating the results accordingly.

The results were disseminated through the daily situation reports (Sitreps), titled 'Summary of Operations' when cabled. Although deliber-ately brief to allow for fast appreciation on the part of the recipient, these summaries of operations go far in revealing the effectiveness of monitoring

air activity, both in terms of assessing the impact of British air operations and in the tracking of Egyptian responses. The basic format of the Sitreps was to include: a general overview of the situation, ground attack update, reconnaissance update, fighter/bomber operations and air intelligence. Tracking the Egyptian response was an easy task, simply because the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) never took to the skies for any counter-attack or even to engage defensively against the British assaults; the only enemy air activity that did occur was duly reported in the Sitreps.[4] Due to the non-engagement of the EAF the Sitreps largely took the task of simply monitoring the number of aircraft that the Egyptians could rely upon were they to take to the skies. By 4 November the RAF had stated that the EAF had been reduced from 500 operational aircraft to just 98,[5] before on 5 November declaring that the EAF's 'operational capability has been virtually eliminated'.[6] The reporting and relaying of this information, while not altering any components of the operational plan, still did its duty in duly informing the chain of command that the focus of air operations could now switch to ground targets in order to support the planned amphibious and airborne assaults on Egypt.

That switch occurred on 5 November 1956 to support the planned airborne drops at Port Said/El Gamil.[7] The focus then became one of assaulting ground targets to aid the amphibious assault, as well as monitoring the recovery of Egyptian air infrastructure with runway repairs reported to be in progress at Cairo West, Inchas and Almaza.[8] The final relevant Sitrep was that of 7 November, which reported the progress of Allied ground forces *en route* to Kantara prior to the imposition of the ceasefire. The only detail of this Sitrep worth noting was the observation that reconnaissance flights were also taking place over Syria to monitor whether or not Syrian forces would also be joining the hostilities, as well as the possibility that Soviet forces might operate from Syrian bases.[9] The Sitreps reporting on air activities appear on first sight to reveal little of note, but their importance lies in observing *why* this brevity exists. These reports are not designed to provide comprehensive reportage in great detail; the purpose is instead to provide high-level military commanders— both in the operational theatre and in London—with a general appraisal of current operations. While seeming possibly trivial to the casual reader viewing these reports in isolation, to those who place these reports in their appropriate context what can be seen is an essential element in keeping the chain of command appraised as comprehensively and clearly, but as briefly as possible, of the ongoing progress of operations.

Ground Operations

Ground operations at Suez were of course very brief but the feedback processes at work remain important to analyse nonetheless. This is because despite the speed with which Anglo-French forces were forced to accept a ceasefire arrangement, the speed at which events transpire at the tactical level during ground operations still provides insight into feedback processes. Unlike the air operations at Suez there is less time to process and analyse such feedback, therefore communiqués of fast updates are what characterise ground operations feedback rather than the more involved daily summaries of the RAF. The purpose of this quickened approach to updating commanders is simple: to keep the commanding staff as fully informed as possible in order for them to best direct their forces. Not only was this information quickly communicated to the commanding staff aboard HMS *Tyne*, but it was also relayed speedily to London as well.

These communiqués mostly took the form of tactical progress updates according to the MUSKETEER REVISE plan. The first most relevant of which was sent from General Stockwell to General Keightley at 0940 Zulu[10] to say that the 16 Independent Parachute Brigade drop was successful and that those forces were moving towards their next objectives.[11] Of course such reports from the field are expected to be very brief; the more detailed report was sent from Allied Headquarters, specifically by General Keightley, to London at 1640Z, reporting that British forces had secured Gamil airfield, and that French parachute forces had dropped on Port Fouad. The report gave the current number of casualties as well as asserting that 'I [Keightley] do not appreciate on present form that there will be much opposition when the main force goes in tomorrow.'[12] Until the imposition of the ceasefire upon Allied forces the feedback processes followed this same template; this is because the intent is not a careful review of all performances, rather for ground operations it is simply about communicating mission progress. Progress updates were what was required, and that meant tracking the movements of military units in relation to their planned objectives and communicating their current status, as well as monitoring any enemy movements and contact. Due to the controversy that the Anglo-French military assault had caused internationally, swiftness became the key factor in military operations with the imperative of securing as much of the Canal Zone territory as possible. There were two reasons: first, it was communicated to the Allied command staff at 0840Z that 'London has signalled that Russia announces she may take part in ME with force.'[13] And second were the communications from London of

the expectation that a ceasefire may be ordered, first communicated on 6 November at 1103Z[14] before being declared as 'likely to be ordered any time after 1700 hrs z'.[15] The operational imperative thus became to push as far south as possible before the imposition of any ceasefire.

Operational

The tactical feedback mechanisms employed by the RAF for air operations and the relevant command units for ground operations, operated according to a specific need: that of updating the immediate chain of command to best enable the continuation of operations. But for the Strategy Bridge to function there must logically be communication back to the senior military and political leadership. This was facilitated by another form of Sitrep sent at the end of each day from General Keightley to the Chiefs of Staff in London. The format of these Sitreps was to include a general overview of the day's events, with political, psychological warfare and operational aspects, before reporting on enemy operations. Sitreps 1–4[16] of this series were consistent in their feedback of the ongoing air operations to destroy the Egyptian Air Force in accordance with Phase One of the MUSKETEER REVISE plan. There is little of note to highlight in this early stage preceding the ground force landing on 6 November simply because of non-resistance on the part of the Egyptians, as their air force did not at any time try to oppose or counter Anglo-French actions in the air.

From the time of the airborne drop on the night of 5/6 November, however, the tone of reporting changed to reflect the increased intensity of operations when dealing with tactical feedback. And unlike the submissive actions of the Egyptian Air Force, the British and French ground forces met resistance. Sitrep 7 is useful in confirming one of the fundamental assumptions of British planning—that of the 'war after the war'[17]—simply by noting that not only was resistance encountered, but encountered in the form of armed children.[18] Although not of particular importance at this early stage of the ground operations, it is notable that arming of civilians, even children, had already been well prepared for the arrival of the invading forces.

Clearly what is lacking from the tactical and operational feedback is any passing on of reporting of political developments. Indeed it is to be seen in the Sitrep series just considered that on all seven of the addressed Sitreps, every one of them had N.T.R. (Nothing to Report) on their section titled 'political'. Why this was so should be briefly addressed; it is not simply reluctance on the part of the military commanders, rather it is a reflection that

when operations begin there are two disadvantages to the military providing this knowledge. First is that of perspective; those in military command are in operational theatres and are consequently dominated by their own operational concerns. It is desirable, therefore, that communication channels are not clogged up with information not deemed mission-essential. Furthermore, the theatre commanders are not the first to receive political updates. Political events do not usually transpire aboard Royal Navy command vessels nor among the armoured formations of a ground force, they develop and occur within political capitals. Simply put, knowledge of political developments is almost always going to be communicated from the political chain of command *down* to the military command, not vice versa. Second is the issue of resources; military commanders are not predisposed to devoting their finite intelligence-gathering assets towards monitoring political developments, they would not be well-suited to the task even if this were the case. Instead, military intelligence focuses on the target sets established in earlier planning, and in informing the theatre chain of command accordingly as to what the current state of operational progress is.

Strategic Feedback

The day before the operation I listened to the Prime Minister's broadcast on BBC television. He gave four reasons why military action against Egypt was essential. They were:

a) To enable sea traffic to continue to move freely through the Suez Canal which would be returned to the control of the Suez Canal Company;

b) To protect the lives and properties of the British civilians in charge of our Canal base;

c) To replace the Nasser Government with one more friendly to Great Britain;

d) To prevent the Egyptian and Israeli armies from fighting in the area of the Canal.

It was not difficult for a relatively junior officer to foresee that the result of our military operation would be the exact opposite. The Canal would be blocked by the Egyptians. The British civilians in the Canal Zones with their families would be taken into custody. Colonel Nasser would be established more firmly than before as ruler of Egypt. The Israeli Army at that time was many miles east of the Canal and completely out of touch with the Egyptian Army.[19]

Delivering strategic feedback is the observing and reporting on the delivery of war objectives,[20] notably the four publicly declared by Eden above. And it is notable that British intelligence suffered from yet another breakdown in providing this feedback. Most of the reporting that was actually provided focussed on the paucity of intelligence then available on the situation in Egypt. This is reflective of two things: first, the full extent of the SIS defeat in Egypt and its effect on available intelligence sources. Second, that the other intelligence bodies, notably the JIC and the JIB, proved unable to fill the void created by the SIS defeat. This was an issue picked up by the JIC, but not until after the crisis itself. On 28 November concern at the lack of available intelligence on the internal situation in Egypt was expressed, the JIB was noted as being constantly asked by the JIC for such intelligence, 'but they had no up-to-date intelligence on which to base their replies. As it was, their answers could only be deductions based on their knowledge of the economic situation before the present crisis arose.'[21]

This situation was exacerbated by the withdrawal of Service Attachés from Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt following the crisis,[22] as yet another source of intelligence was removed. The loss of these particular sources was to be alleviated by the use of attachés 'in adjacent friendly countries and through the attachés of such countries in London'.[23] Although the 'gaps in our intelligence coverage'[24] had to be acknowledged as a reality of Britain's intelligence position following the climax of operations at Suez, clearly the JIC, JIB and SIS had precious few sources (arguably none) with which to inform London on the state of affairs within Egypt. This situation was not quickly resolved and represents one of the most underrecognised strategic repercussions resulting from the Suez Crisis.

Not only were there few sources on which to base intelligence assessments, but the JIC also found itself constrained by its own procedures, which contributed to its inability to provide strategic-level feedback during the crisis. Within the minutes of the JIC there is an intriguing, yet overlooked, item of discussion focussing on the minutes of overseas JIC bodies. During this discussion it was noted with surprise from the chairman of an overseas JIC body (Germany) that: 'Directors of Intelligence in London were not aware of the details of their discussion in JIC (G).'[25] The most intriguing detail however, lies in the acknowledgement that although London received the minutes of JIC (Far East) and JIC (G), they did not receive those of JIC (Middle East). Those minutes were sent on an informal basis to the JIC Secretary who would use his discretion in deciding what to circulate. 'It was explained that certain JICs were sensitive about

having their minutes or extracts from them circulated in London.'[26] What this reveals is that the intelligence from JIC (ME) being communicated to the JIC in London was always subject to the selective editing of the Secretary before being circulated; consequently there is simply no way of knowing what was and was not circulated due to this informal procedure. Yet another level of bureaucratic 'hoarding' was at work, although there is no reason to believe that this level of hoarding existed for any reason other than as an informal bureaucratic protocol intended to alleviate the expressed anxieties of the overseas JIC bodies. It was nonetheless a protocol that served to add a further block to the circulation of intelligence material at precisely the time when broadened discussion was required.

A final constraint that can be observed by the keen eye scouring the papers of the JIC lies within their own 'Weekly Review of Current Intelligence'. What is of note is that in all copies of the 'Weekly Review' produced between 11 October and 15 November there are no entries at all dealing with Egypt and the Suez Crisis. This means that throughout the period when the crisis was reaching its climax the one JIC document that did enjoy reliably broad circulation and readership excluded all mention of Egypt and the crisis. There are two competing explanations for why this occurred; It could simply have been a result of the TERRAPIN security procedure instituted for accessing files related to Suez operations. This seems unlikely, however, as TERRAPIN was instituted to protect files related to operational planning in particular, which category the 'Weekly Review' would not fall under. More sinisterly, an alternative explanation is an active decision to hold back information from broad circulation. This second explanation is plausible, given the culture of restricting information flow, as was established in Chap. 5. Unfortunately, there is no further evidence to explain why this omission occurred. Either way, yet another key source of intelligence on the crisis had been denied to those using the normal channels of circulation. Not only this; the 'Weekly Review' could logically be assumed to be the one JIC document that would provide concise updates on the latest state of affairs, so the removal of entries dealing with the current crisis from its regular distribution can only be described as extremely peculiar. This is especially so given the absence of any explanation from the JIC for why this action was taken.

In terms of the provision of strategic-level feedback the performance of British intelligence leaves much to be desired. The JIC, JIB and SIS all failed to provide any reports of note, or even any indication as to the attainment of desired war objectives. What was encountered instead was a host of bureaucratic intricacies that all contributed to a stove-piped sys-

tem, whereby intelligence product was hoarded and selectively distributed. Such stove-piping is of course a constant feature of intelligence agencies to ensure the security of sources and methods,[27] but there is a real danger of a system becoming so segregated that intelligence product never reaches a legitimate user.

The defeat of SIS in Egypt, coupled with the withdrawal of Service Attachés, had the effect of closing off any privileged insight into the internal workings of Egypt itself. The JIB, not knowing that they would be needed to fill the void created by the loss of SIS sources, nor enjoying any previous relationship that would endow them with knowledge of SIS practices, was unable to fill this intelligence gap. And the JIC suffered from two problems; first was the curious exclusion of Egyptian updates in the 'Weekly Review' during the climax of the crisis. While a clear explanation for this does not present itself in the JIC files, the effects of such an omission are clear: the single most widely distributed piece of JIC intelligence had become subject to another level of restriction that prevented timely updates being known to those outside Eden's closed decision-making circle.

The second problem appears structural to the JIC; there simply appears to be no procedure whatsoever for assessing the attainment of wider war objectives. This was, after all, not contained within the JIC Terms of Reference as a requirement and thus represents a glaring omission in the task of the intelligence apparatus. If it is not the task of one's own intelligence establishment to assess and communicate the attainment of strategic objectives, then whose task is it? Nobody in Britain in 1956 can be identified as carrying out this function.

Political Feedback

The Suez Crisis became a political watershed for Britain, a failure that came as a political 'body blow'[28] that demanded a serious analysis of Britain's geo-strategic position; a reorientation for the world as it appeared after the results of the Crisis became apparent. That position was one of Britain in decline both in economic and military power, and an increasingly difficult struggle with continuing foreign commitments which Britain could not resource materially or financially.[29] The role of British intelligence in providing feedback to this process was again constrained as the big decisions on reorientation came from the policy-makers themselves rather than being informed by intelligence analysis. Despite this, we can glean from the papers of the JIC that there was input, in two parts. First was the evidence of

negative influence from the political leadership on the JIC, who were being instructed to find evidence of Soviet conspiracy *after* the Crisis. Second was JIC Sitreps on the internal situation of Egypt in early 1957, which serve to reflect the continuing paucity of available intelligence.

The political feedback has the longest life span and so a broader view must be taken over the specific feedback that the JIC provided, as well as the broad policy reorientation that Britain had engaged in, which will be addressed next.

The very first point of major political reorientation was of course the fall of the Eden premiership, hence the intriguing entry in Shuckburgh's diary on the matter: 'Pat (Dean) tells me that the Americans "have made it more or less plain that they will not have any more dealings with Eden". How can we afford to have a PM about whom that can be said?'[30] The fall of Eden and the seriousness of Shuckburgh's diary entry on the matter reveal the deeper point associated with British political thinking, which was the second point of reorientation: Britain was no longer capable of operating in a major international way independently of the United States, 'nor did the British state possess the economic or military strength to be ranked as a great power'.[31] Therefore, the state of the relationship with the United States was of great concern to London, on which subject the newly appointed ambassador to Washington, Sir Harold Caccia, wrote a timely report on the matter that was received by Selwyn Lloyd on 1 January 1957. After detailing the general disposition of the American people and their government towards the British, Caccia argues that three fundamentals had changed in the relationship:

> first, the sentimental attachment, in the Administration, created by our wartime experience as crusaders in arms; second, the innate trust in our longer experience of international affairs and our reputation for dependability; third, our largely unquestioned right to a special position.[32]

Because of these three changes, Caccia argues further that the relationship in this 'new era is one of more strictly business relationships, with much sentiment cut out and our special position temporarily, at least, impaired, but not totally dissipated'.[33] Britain from this point on would have to conduct its affairs with the United States in a more business-like manner, relying less on the use of personal familiarity, where friendships largely stemming from the shared wartime experience had counted far more than the formality of diplomatic relations. Caccia had further noted that he was 'personally quite

glad that the post-war period of "old-boyism" is at an end. It was getting phoney and maybe the end has to be sharp.'[34] Instead, Britain would be forced to recognise its position as a junior partner, and the three foundations listed by Caccia above could no longer be taken for granted in dealings with American administrations. Quite simply the dominating assumption from Chap. 4 above (that Britain remained a world power) was shattered at Suez in brutal fashion, and nowhere is this spelled out better in its ramifications than by the notes compiled by Liddell Hart for an article he published in the *Daily Mirror* in early 1957. In these notes (which were not included in the final article) held by the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, he wrote the simple question 'what went wrong?' to which his answer was:

> Politically impossible unless US support assured—and UN 'nullified'. Rash to attempt military action against Egypt without acquiescence of Eisenhower—so foolish to keep him in the dark and leave him feeling he had been tricked. His indignant reaction was very natural—what any businessman would feel if his junior partners gambled with the firm's assets behind his back.
> In sum, we are no longer fitted to play the amoral game of 'power-politics'.

- The checks inherent in our democratic system, moral scruples, and difficulty in carrying ruthlessness to an extreme form a triple handicap. This is multiplied by our slow-motion habits. On top of all is our present economic dependence on the US. So better in every sense for us to follow a moral policy—or at least a policy likely to be supported by the majority of world opinion.[35]

Liddell Hart's second point above, that British defence policy in particular was to change direction, is the final aspect of broader reorientation to consider. This is best summarised by the 1957 *Defence: Outline of Future Policy*, written by Macmillan's Defence Minister Duncan Sandys. The Sandys' White Paper is typically (albeit correctly) summarised by two main results: the decision to end conscription and thereby reduce the number of personnel in the British armed forces, and the increased role that nuclear weapons were expected to play in Britain's deterrence posture.[36] The White Paper further makes explicit the concerns of British reorientation by noting that Britain's economic position must first be nurtured in order to sustain Britain's strength, which is a constant theme of the paper.[37] That theme was the primary driver in the decision to reduce considerably numbers within the armed forces, a driver that Martin argues as being a reason for Sandys paying scant regard to dissenting voices, particularly those of the Army.[38] The second major point of the paper is not only the importance of preventing global

war, but also the noting of the belief that maintaining successful deterrence is fundamentally dependent on the nuclear capacity of the United States.[39] This is clearly reflective of the painfully accepted belief that Britain had now become reliant on the Americans and had to adjust accordingly. The final point to emphasise with regards to the 1957 review is the main position developed for the paper, which revolves around a central reorientation of British policy to the Cold War, and in particular the risk of global war that came with it. The argument put forward is worth quoting at length:

> At the time of the Korean war in 1950 we launched a rearmament pro-gramme which was intended to build up our military strength, in con-junction with our allies in NATO, to face what then appeared to be the imminent risk of world war. Thereafter, the immediate danger of major war gave place to the prospect of a *prolonged period of acute international tension*. It became clear that the conception of the "long haul" must be substi-tuted for a short intensive period of rearmament.[40]

This was the state of broad British political reorientation by early 1957. Eden's fall as a result of the crisis had brought with it questions about Britain's future role in the world. These questions were to be answered in the policy review paper *The Position of the United Kingdom in World Affairs*, published in June 1958. This report was in the form of three stages: the first would involve a definition of the United Kingdom's:

> principal aims in the world today and of their comparative importance, of the scale of resources required to achieve these aims and the resources now made available to meet them, and how this picture would be affected by the reduction in our military strength planned to take effect by 1962.[41]

The second stage was to consider the extent to which efforts could be concentrated, particularly economic,[42] before finally considering the machinery that could give effect to such policy decisions.[43] The report itself, once published, revealed that Assumption 1 from Chap. 4 had finally been dispelled from the British mind-set, and displayed a more real-istic view of Britain's place in the world. The report's words put it best:

> We can no longer operate from the position of overwhelming strength—military, political and economic—which we enjoyed in the heyday of our Imperial power. But, although we no longer have superiority in material strength, we can still exercise a substantial influence in world affairs.[44]

The report goes on to focus predominantly on Britain's economic position, noting in particular that the external monetary position had to be strengthened, through which civil expenditure at home needed to be addressed in order to reach economic targets.[45] But it is to the statement of the basic aims of overseas policy where interest here must be directed, for it is these aims that reveal the final stage of broad British policy reorientation.

(a) We must, in concert with our friends and allies—

    (i)   prevent global war and defeat the efforts of Russia and China to dominate the world;

    (ii) maintain the stability of the free world, especially Western Europe.

(b) We must ourselves—

    (i)   preserve and strengthen the cohesion of the Commonwealth;

    (ii) further our trading interests throughout the world;

    (iii) maintain the sterling area and the strength of sterling.[46]

These were the fundamental aims on which British foreign policy was to be based, they are declared as being interdependent and vitally linked to successful Anglo-American co-operation.[47] British policy had quite simply taken a complete reorientation to a Cold War focus and, coupled with the Sandys Defence Review, presented a viable economic plan with which to balance the British resources and focus on the Communist threat in concert with its alliances, while recognising that success above all else depended on the continued relationship with the United States.

Despite the reality that the large decisions associated with British foreign and defence policy had been taken with little input from their intelligence apparatus, there were two areas of political feedback that were provided by the JIC. On the first example from the JIC, the report 'Soviet Designs in the Middle East' of 11 November 1956 needs some comment. In this report, written after the ceasefire in Egypt, it is clear that not only the British government but also the JIC still believed that Nasser had become nothing more than a tool of the Soviet Union. The report begins by insisting that the 'Soviet aim in the Middle East has for some time been and still is the elimination of Western influence and the substitution for it of Soviet protection'.[48] The report then asserts that Nasser's position and ambition 'provides the Russians with an ideal instrument for the penetration of the Middle East'.[49] This point is explicitly reinforced in one of the report's conclusions, that 'Nasser will remain the principal instrument of Soviet policy in the Middle East'.[50] Several days following the publication of this

report, at the Friday 16 November special meeting of the JIC, Pat Dean is on record as saying that 'he thought it was important that every effort should be made to find evidence to give to the United States that proved that Nasser was a tool of the Soviets'.[51] The Committee agreed with Dean and 'invited Departments to see what fresh evidence they could find'.[52] The report on Soviet designs, and the subsequent statement from Dean, reveal that the JIC was still influenced by the desire of British policy to unmask a Soviet conspiracy in the Middle East, and was increasingly clutching at straws to find evidence for a position that they could scarcely continue to justify. This first example of political feedback reveals that the JIC had become improperly influenced by political pressure, and this pressure was colouring not only analysis but also the types of evidence that the JIC felt that it should be looking for. The fact that their own Chairman no less was making such a request is telling indeed of the JIC's continuing subscription to the view that Nasser was little more than a Soviet instrument.

The second area of JIC feedback came in the form of their report series 'The Situation in Egypt', written on a weekly basis throughout the early months of 1957. The format on which these reports were constructed reveals a great deal about the state of intelligence sources within Egypt at the time, as well as where the JIC stood in terms of their analyses. The reports predominantly feature a section titled 'Political' before dealing with 'Economic' issues, and then, if there were anything additional to report, a section titled 'Miscellaneous'. The first thing that these Sitreps reveal is the paucity of sources on which the JIC had come to rely, further compounded by the severance of diplomatic relations that had forced the British government as a whole to rely on other sources of intelligence. The JIC relied on reports, rumours and sources from Baghdad, Khartoum, the American Embassy in Cairo,[53] simply listening to the continued broadcasts of Cairo Radio, the Canadian Ambassador in Cairo, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, the Iraqi Ambassador to Cairo,[54] returning British subjects[55] and military attachés[56] in order to provide sources for reports. The reports for the most part reflect the implication of their titles, simply an account of the current situation mainly focussing on the stability of the Nasser regime. Despite citing the occasional rumour of dissension within the Egyptian army,[57] the reports had to regularly concede that: 'No threat to Nasser's position has yet developed.'[58]

The problem with reports of this kind was that they only provided routine updates on the situation, flavoured with a clear hope for an internal threat to Nasser's position to emerge; they did not provide any sustained

analysis for policy-makers. What they revealed instead was that neither the JIC nor SIS could provide any privileged insight into the upper ranks of the Egyptian government or military, or any reliable insight into Egypt's internal affairs beyond economic appraisals. The JIC had been reduced to cobbling together reports, rumours and second-hand recollections from sources that belonged to other governments, usually from their embassies. The political impact of these reports can therefore only be classed as minimal because they provided no new privileged insight or analytical rigour beyond their economic assessments. The JIC reports from within Egypt could do little to challenge the existing British perception of Nasser as an outright tool of the Soviet Union, nor did they try to issue such a challenge, as can be seen from the 16 November remarks of Pat Dean mentioned previously.[59] Further to this is the realisation that they could provide no details with which to illuminate decision options for the British government, and the JIC certainly provided no overall post-facto assessment of the crisis. The publicly available files show no evidence of the JIC and SIS providing any form of useful political feedback.

In conclusion, the help that British intelligence provided to the feedback process over the Suez Crisis has to be regarded as very poor. At each level however, prescient lessons about the strategy and intelligence relationship are evident once more. At the tactical and operational level all relevant feedback was handled by regular military communication channels, and by their own reconnaissance squadrons deployed in Cyprus, as the military recognised the paucity of intelligence that was then being received from other sources. The JIC, JIB and SIS did not provide any intelligence of note in the conduct of military operations, certainly none that can be identified in the large number of military papers available at The National Archives. Indeed, many reports went out of their way to argue how poor the intelligence provision actually was. Despite there being only poor intelligence on offer, though, this is not to say that there was none; the lesson of intelligence not being an illusion is present here again through the tactical and operational feedback efforts, which shows that although difficulties were encountered, operations were not prejudiced and were informed well enough, even if later in the day than would have been preferred.

At the strategic level there appears to have been not only no feedback or assessment carried out as to the attainment of war objectives, but no effort whatsoever on the part of the JIC to perform such a task. The JIC appeared further hampered by the unwillingness of the regional JIC bodies to permit the dissemination of their product to other London intelligence agencies, and

nor was the JIB tasked with performing any equivalent function. Quite simply, in 1956 there was no mechanism in place either within the British government broadly, or its intelligence establishment in particular, to monitor and communicate the progression and achievement of strategic objectives. This reveals again the lesson of intelligence performance being conditioned by its place within the architecture of government. In 1956 British intelligence was simply not institutionally designed or capable of performing such a strategic feedback role. It is also worth noting here—despite the point being beyond the scope of this work—that the broader issue of what type of mechanism the British government can and should use in the review of attaining sought strategic objectives is a topic wide open both for discussion and further research. In 1956 there was simply no type of mechanism of any kind; one would expect the intelligence services to play some kind of role, but the evidence reveals a glaring flaw in the architecture of government for which intelligence alone cannot provide a cure. How a government appraises the achievement of strategic goals is fertile ground indeed in the study of strategy.

At the political level, again the JIC provided little substantive feedback of note. The JIC in the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis was still pursuing an agenda of finding evidence to support the commonly accepted arguments of Nasser's complicity with the Soviet Union, with the intention of presenting such evidence to the Americans to justify British actions even following their failure. By this point the position of the JIC can only be described as a subscriber to Eden's Suez policy, rather than a productive informant to the development of policy.

The broader process of British policy reorientation occurred largely without any input from the intelligence services, especially the Sandys Defence Review and *The Position of the United Kingdom in World Affairs* report. This again reinforces the lesson that it is the policy-makers who rule when it comes to asking the big questions and making the big decisions facing a government. Neither the JIC nor SIS provided any broad assessment of the Suez Crisis, nor did either intelligence body provide any privileged insight into the inner workings of the Nasser regime or even into any of the internal happenings of Egypt generally. In the task of providing useful and insightful material to British policy-makers following the Suez Crisis the JIC and SIS had failed, and the British government had instigated its own process of broad policy reorientation that would place Britain on a Cold War deterrence posture in concert with its alliance commitments through NATO.

These were decisions made in part due to the failure of British policy at Suez, but they were decisions that were made without any notable input from its intelligence services. That the Suez Crisis was a defining moment in Britain's political, geopolitical and strategic history is most certainly beyond doubt. The sad truth was that Whitehall simply did not need its intelligence services to state the obvious in what this meant for Britain's future. As far as the policy-makers were concerned, the writing was on the wall following the calamity in Egypt, and they took the initiative in reorienting Britain accordingly.

Notes

1. This is an oft-overlooked observation by Clausewitz, when he states that: 'In strategy, the pace is much slower.' Carl von Clausewitz (Peter Paret, Michael Howard trans.), *On War* (London: Everyman's Library, 1993), p. 209.
2. Minute 3 of COS (56) 376. In AIR 20/10742, TNA.
3. Insisted on strongly as the reality of intelligence work in John Hughes-Wilson, *The Puppet Masters: Spies, Traitors and the Real Forces Behind World Events* (London: Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2005), p. 12.
4. Enemy air activity was reported at Port Said on 5 November, but otherwise none was recorded, Seventh Summary of Operations as at 1900 hours 5 November. In AIR 8/2097, TNA.
5. Fifth Summary of Operations 3/4 November. In ibid.
6. Sixth Summary of Operations as at 0900 5 November. In ibid.
7. Seventh Summary of Operations. In ibid.
8. Ninth Summary of Operations as at 1900 hours, 6 November. In ibid.
9. Tenth Summary of Operations as at 1000 hours, 7 November. In ibid.
10. Zulu is the standard military codeword referring to Greenwich Mean Time, hereafter referred to as Z.
11. Single page communiqué 5 November, 0940Z. In AIR 20/10750, TNA.
12. KEYCOS 32 General Keightley to Chiefs of Staff London, 5 November. In ibid.
13. Single page communiqué 6 November, 0840Z. In ibid.
14. COSKEY 42. In ibid.
15. Single page communiqué 6 November, 1450Z. In ibid.
16. KEYCOS 10, Sitrep No. 1 31 October, KEYCOS 14, Sitrep No. 2 1 November, KEYCOS 18 Sitrep No. 3 3 November and KEYCOS 23, Sitrep No. 4 3 November. In DEFE 11/122, TNA.

17. Addressed as Assumption 8 in Chap. 4.
18. KEYCOS 52, Sitrep No. 7, states that children from the age of 12 were being armed, pp. 1–2. In DEFE 11/122, TNA.
19. Lieutenant General Sir John Guise Cowley. In CWLY 1/3, CAC Cambridge, p. 3.
20. Gray refers to this as strategic effect: 'The cumulative and sequential impact of strategic performance upon the course of events.' Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 18.
21. State of Intelligence in Egypt of JIC (56) 113th Meeting, Wednesday 28 November 1956, p. 5, para. 6. In CAB 159/25, TNA.
22. As noted in Post Musketeer Intelligence, JIC/3015/56, 12 December. In CAB 176/59, TNA.
23. Ibid., para. 3.
24. Secretary Minutes, Post Musketeer Intelligence, 12 December 1956, para. 5. In ibid.
25. Minutes of Special Meeting held on Wednesday 14 November 1956, JIC (56) 106th Meeting, p. 8. In CAB 159/25, TNA.
26. Ibid.
27. This is acknowledged by the British government, in recognising the need for the intelligence services to operate in secret, as well as the commitment of SIS 'to never reveal the identities of individuals or organisation's cooperating with them'. Cabinet Office, *National Intelligence Machinery* (London: TSO, 2006), pp. 27, 33.
28. Margaret Thatcher, *The Path to Power* (London: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 89.
29. Matthew Grant, 'Introduction: The Cold War and British National Interest', in Matthew Grant (ed.), *The British Way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and the Bomb, 1945–1975* (London: Continuum, 2009), p. 1.
30. 31 December 1956 of Diary of 1956–57. In MS191/1/1-MS191/1/2/1-5, Birmingham Special Collections.
31. W. Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonisation* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), p. 696.
32. Sir Harold Caccia, The Present State of Anglo-United States Relations, 1 January 1957, p. 1, para. 7. In PREM 11/2189, TNA.
33. Ibid., p. 2, para 12.
34. Caccia quoted in Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (New York: The Overlook Press, 2002), p. 493.
35. B. H. Liddell Hart, Notes for article, *Inquest on Suez* for the *Mirror*, *Observer*, December 1956, p. 2 (emphases original). In LH 10/1957, LHCMA, KCL.

36. Wyn Rees, 'The 1957 Sandys White Paper: New Priorities in British Defence Policy?' *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (1989) Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 215.

37. First noted in Defence: Outline of Future Policy, March 1957, p. 3. In CAB 129/86, TNA.

38. Laurence W. Martin, 'The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain: The "Sandys Era"', *The American Political Science Review* (1962) Vol. 56, No. 1, p. 28.

39. Ibid., p. 5. This point is also strongly argued in Rees (1989), p. 217.

40. Defence: Outline of Future Policy, March 1957, p. 3, para. 2 (italics added). In CAB 129/86, TNA.

41. Cabinet: Future Policy, Minutes of a Meeting held on Friday 6 December 1957, p. 1, para. 1. In CAB 130/39, TNA.

42. Ibid., p. 1, para. 2.

43. Ibid., p. 1, para. 3.

44. *The Position of the United Kingdom in World Affairs*, 9 June 1958, p. 1, para. 2. In CAB 130/39, TNA.

45. Ibid., p. 7, para 23.

46. Ibid., p. 1, para. 3.

47. Ibid., p. 1, para. 4.

48. Soviet Designs in the Middle East, JIC (56) 117 (Final), 11 November 1956, p. 1, para. 2. In CAB 158/26, TNA.

49. Ibid., p. 1, para. 3.

50. Ibid., p. 4, para 17 (d).

51. Minutes of Special meeting held on Friday 16 November 1956, JIC (56) 109th meeting, p. 2, para. 4. In CAB 159/25, TNA.

52. Ibid.

53. Situation in Egypt as at 8 January 1957, JIC (57) 12/1, p. 2, para. 2. In CAB 158/27, TNA.

54. Situation in Egypt as at 24 January 1957, JIC (57) 12/3, p. 1. In ibid.

55. Situation in Egypt as at 15 January 1957, JIC (57) 12/2, para. 2. In ibid.

56. Situation in Egypt as at 28 February 1957, JIC (57) 12/8, p. 1, para. 2. In ibid.

57. Situation in Egypt as at 7 February 1957, JIC (57) 12/5, p. 1, para. 2. In ibid.

58. Situation in Egypt as at 31 January 1957, JIC (57) 12/4, p. 1, para. 1. In ibid.

59. Indeed, their continued subscription to this view is clearly made in Situation in Egypt as at 7 March 1957, JIC (57) 12/9, para. 1. In ibid.

How Was British Intelligence Changed After the Suez Crisis?

The final area to be addressed is the changes that were made to the structure of British intelligence following the Suez Crisis. In this, the intention is to reveal that British intelligence needed to be changed to better focus its efforts on the challenges confronting British policy, as well as improve the structural architecture to enable the intelligence services to operate more effectively.

Some change was already under way as SIS had begun improving its own operations following the Buster Crabb affair in April 1956. But more far-reaching and permanent changes involving the JIC were to be made throughout 1957. This chapter will consequently make three arguments:

First, that British intelligence needed some kind of change because its performance, most notably in terms of the provision of political level intelligence, had not been good enough. The efforts of SIS had been severely disrupted in Egypt, and there is no evidence to suggest that SIS provided any privileged insight into Egyptian decision-making other than the dubious material that originated from LUCKY BREAK. The JIC had failed to provide timely insights to British decision-makers when the Eden government took their key decisions; this is proven by its inability even to provide a report on the Suez situation until 14 days after the Cabinet had already decided upon the basic policy position.

Secondly, to recognise that changes to SIS were not only ongoing, but the need was further reinforced by the setback inflicted on them by the efforts of Egyptian counter-intelligence. 1956 was certainly a sobering

year for SIS; with the successive blows of the Buster Crabb affair, followed by the sacking of Sir John Sinclair as C and then the fiasco of its operations in Egypt.

And thirdly, that the relocation of the JIC into the Cabinet Office structure represents one of the most important and as yet least appreciated changes to the structure of British intelligence. That change created for the first time a truly centralised[1] intelligence machinery that, although imperfect, provided a system of developing requirements and issuing broad direction of effort that would place British intelligence on much surer footing for the challenges of the Cold War. Not only this, but the eventual intelligence target list would effectively establish the framework for the intelligence warning system that would endure for the remainder of the Cold War. It was to this Cold War front that British policy was broadly directed in the late 1950s and, following the 1956–58 changes, British intelligence could claim to be on a much more relevant footing, both structurally and objectively, for providing the British government with the intelligence service it would need.

The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6)

The story of SIS reform does not begin with the end of the Suez Crisis; change was already in motion with the appointment of Dick White as C in July 1956 (see Chap. 3). SIS was suffering a year of intolerably poor performance—Dorril quotes a former SIS officer referring to the period as 'the horrors',[2] and Davies bluntly states that 1956 'represents one of the worst single years for operational setbacks'[3] in the history of the service, although it was not *quite* as bad as 1940, when entire foreign stations across continental Europe were lost. In the same vein, Bower notes that by 1956 the CIA were 'expressing concern about the effectiveness of British intelligence'.[4]

Change had to come, and indeed did, although it is wise to heed the scepticism of Davies in this regard by labelling the popular record of White's arrival at SIS as the period of change becoming a 'truism' in the literature.[5] The changes were imperfect and White was ultimately not able to install the level of comprehensive change that he had overseen at MI5, because of the passivity inherent to his trade of being a counter-intelligence officer.[6] This passivity would result in preventing White from removing as many officers as he would have liked, leaving in place the preference among some staff, most notably George Kennedy Young, to pursue higher-risk special operations.

Despite the imperfections there was nonetheless still strong motivation for change, with many officers removed from SIS. The purpose was to put an end to the type of 'cowboy operations'[7] that had come to define SIS performance by 1956 and encourage a return to pure intelligence gathering. White's office, assisted by John Briance, drew up a substantial list of officers for dismissal and, although no specific figure for the number of dismissals is agreed upon within the literature, the size of the list provoked considerable embarrassment.[8] Clearly White was trying hard to clean the stables of SIS to allow new blood and new thinking to come in and drive the Service forward. But White was unable to remove these 'Robber Barons' who had come to represent the 'undisturbable skeleton'[9] of the Service. These personalities, John Bruce Lockhart being the only one named by Bower, could not be removed during the White reforms and remained in place challenging and resisting further changes within SIS.

White may not have been able to remove all the personalities that he wished to, but he did make a number of organisational alterations that were intended to refocus SIS activities. The first structural change was that of recruitment and staffing. After all White was appointed in part to repair the damage caused by Philby's betrayal and prevent similar damage in the future.[10] A separate recruitment section was established to curb the use of networks based on pastoral familiarity and personal referencing. Such networks had been shown to be too vulnerable when they had been so effectively penetrated by Soviet intelligence in the recruitment of the Cambridge spies. Not only did this establish the foundations of the contemporary recruitment and training system for intelligence officers, but it also introduced an administrative function for the career management of those officers.[11]

The second structural change was White's attempt to curb the more ambitious special operations by instituting more stringent checks on their authorisation,[12] and also by curtailing the training for such activities.[13] Finally, White focussed on changes to the counter-intelligence structures of SIS by putting it on an equal footing with the other service directorates.[14] The officer heading this section would now have to be a junior director, who would also sit in on the weekly directors' meeting.[15]

These internal changes brought about during White's tenure as C, although substantial in scope, nonetheless remained imperfect, and failed to curtail special operations. This was because of men like George Young, who not only remained in place, but who subsequently achieved promotion to the position of Vice-Chief of SIS[16] and was able to carry out operations according to 'The Macmillan Doctrine'.[17] Young's support for

special operations was made more influential by his original scepticism about such operations; he later became a convert to their use in the kind of proxy wars that Western governments could expect to face.[18]

What Dorril means by the 'Macmillan Doctrine' is that despite the widespread reforms to SIS headed by Dick White, special operations did indeed continue—as can be seen by the continued pursuit of the Restoration Plot in Egypt that only ended when the plot was publicly denounced by Nasser.[19] The interesting aspect of this so-called doctrine, however, lies in what Dorril had not made explicit: that the carrying out of special operations took on a new form. No longer would interventions be expected to consist of large conventional military forces like those deployed at Suez; rather, they would consist of limited numbers of Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployed covertly in order to influence events and protect British interests without provoking public interest and international outrage. The best two examples of this style of intervention both lie in the country of Oman.

The Omani intervention in 1958–59 was an early example of this type of intervention, with the Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment deployed in order to defeat a revolt against the Sultan of Oman. SIS liaison coupled with SAS action (with the occasional use of the Royal Air Force when air support was required) in the field typified this new style of intervention that, in the case of this Omani intervention, was largely decided by the securing of the *Jebel Akhdar* by the SAS. This action inflicted a decisive defeat on the rebel forces that had been making use of this fearsome natural fortress.[20] The SAS had 'become the overt/covert special operations arm'[21] of SIS by the end of the 1960s, and nowhere was this more clearly to be seen than in the second Omani deployment that began in 1970 to combat a communist insurgency in the *Dhofar* region. This intervention has traditionally been overlooked in the historiography of special operations and covert action,[22] yet it represents one of Britain's most under-recognised achievements in fighting a successful insurgency. The relevant point of the second Omani intervention was the scale, with typically an entire SAS Sabre Squadron deployed,[23] as well as considerable RAF support and the widespread secondment of British military personnel to Omani command.[24] That this scale of covert deployment could occur and generate strategic success reveals the refinement of the Macmillan Doctrine as Britain's preferred style of choice for intervention following the failure of British actions at Suez, as well as its continuing implementation as late as the mid-1970s.

The final point of SIS realignment and change, although bureaucratically quite small, was a key piece in the jigsaw of British intelligence centralisation in 1957. This was the transfer of the JIC to the Cabinet Office in October of that year, which 'formally tied the Service to the interests of foreign policy, as developed by the Cabinet Office and ministerial committees'.[25] The centralisation, of which the JIC was the key part, was intended to align the efforts of all intelligence services according to the development of broad policy directives that were intended to guide intelligence-collection efforts. This was the first 'fundamental change in tasking and analysis since the "1921 arrangement" was imposed on MI1c'.[26]

These are the changes that were made to SIS throughout and after the period of the Suez Crisis, and, imperfect as they were, when put into context with their part in the centralised change to the intelligence structure as a whole they became an important part of the intelligence effort that Britain would use for the remainder of the Cold War.

But attention must now be turned to the key change to British intelligence, one that has so far been the most neglected modification to Britain's intelligence apparatus in the historiography: the transfer of the JIC from the Chiefs of Staff to the Cabinet Office and the centralisation of British intelligence.

The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Centralisation of British Intelligence

The transfer of the JIC to the Cabinet Office, which took effect from 14 October 1957,[27] was guided by a three-step rationale. First was the acceptance that the role of intelligence itself had expanded beyond the scope of solely considering military affairs. To date the JIC had performed this predominantly military role for the CoS, but by June 1957 it had become apparent that 'intelligence had spread increasingly into the political, economic and scientific fields'.[28] This was a known trend, which can be seen by the acknowledgement that up until the First World War: 'Intelligence was sought almost entirely for the sole benefit of the military commander fighting in the field to provide him with a tactical advantage over his adversary.'[29]

The JIC was by this time producing reports on matters that were in many respects beyond the needs of the CoS and thus 'inconsistent with the broadened scope of intelligence'[30] duties, revealing the second step in the rationale. Pat Dean had said that although the CoS carried a great many

responsibilities, 'they exclude a number of increasingly important topics which call for policy decisions in spheres beyond those which directly concern the Chiefs of Staff'.[31] The JIC itself adds further that the responsibilities of the CoS 'may exclude a number of increasingly important topics covering Soviet and Communist activities and other developments which threaten our national interest and security'.[32] In a more revealing letter to Allen Dulles—the then Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)—Dean states that it is for this reason that the JIC felt its position underneath the CoS might 'unduly restrict our activities both in the reporting field and in our availability to all Departments of Government as a source of fully-collated intelligence'.[33]

The third step in the rationale was the subsequent desire to remove the restriction that Dean refers to in his correspondence with Dulles. The JIC had labelled this as a 'practical limitation'[34] because the CoS remained 'the *sole* constitutional recipient of its product'.[35]

The JIC had simply 'outgrown its old framework'[36] and it was now possible to make use of the JIC on a wider basis than it had been previously. This would also enable suitable recipients across all government departments to both commission and receive JIC product. The JIC accordingly recommended the transfer to the Cabinet Office with two objectives in mind:

(i)   to encourage Ministers and Departments, in addition to the Chiefs of Staff, singly or jointly, to ask for studies by the JIC on matters of concern to them, whether or not such studies have 'Service' implications;

(ii) to allow of the submission of JIC studies, whether requisitioned by a Department, the Chiefs of Staff, or initiated by the JIC itself, direct to the Ministers and Departments primarily concerned, as well as to other interested Departments.[37]

And in order to achieve these two objectives, the full list of recommendations was that:

(a)   the JIC should be placed within the Cabinet Committee structure;

(b)   the requirements upon the JIC should be set in part by the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff as heretofore, and in part by the Cabinet or individual Ministers;

(c)   JIC reports should be passed to the Cabinet Office except that, in order to meet the special requirements of the Chiefs of Staff, reports of a mainly military nature should be submitted, as hitherto, direct to them in the first instance;

(d)   the decision to circulate JIC reports to the Cabinet or to individual Ministers should rest with the Secretary to the Cabinet or the Chiefs of Staff, as appropriate, or, in cases where any Minister has a predominant interest in the substance of a report, with the Minister concerned.[38]

The move made the JIC 'genuinely *central* at last'.[39] Prior to the transfer the JIC could be 'pulled' to produce intelligence by many departments, but its product could only be subsequently 'pushed' to the CoS, thus encountering the constitutional restriction.[40] Following the transfer the JIC had not only made that 'pull architecture' easier to apply by having its services more 'readily available to Ministers'[41] but they had also created a stronger form of 'push architecture' whereby they were no longer restricted by their previous position under the CoS. Now their intelligence product would enjoy a wider dissemination among government departments because the JIC reports would be passed direct to the Cabinet Office.[42] Additionally the JIC could be more easily asked by such departments to perform analysis and produce material. Indeed, so important was this change that Norman Brook wrote to Pat Dean direct on the matter to see, 'as a demonstration of their new status' within the Cabinet Office, if the JIC 'could be asked fairly soon to do something directly for Ministers'.[43] Brook specified that the production of an appreciation on the strength of nationalist movements in the Middle East would be of timely benefit so that Ministers:

> could have a picture, country by country, showing what nationalist movements there are, what support they command, and what is their recent and potential future rate of growth, whether they have any prospect of gaining political control and, if so, when they are likely to achieve it.[44]

Although this example is obviously a 'pull' from Norman Brook, its context is clearly telling of the enthusiasm within the Cabinet to make the new role and position of the JIC quickly known amongst ministers, so that this new posture could be used to its full potential. It was also so that the new customers could be made quickly aware of the advantages of access to the JIC. The intention from Brook was to 'push' the services of the JIC in front of their now-broadened customer base in order to encourage those consumers to 'pull' on the services of the JIC much more in the future.

The JIC transfer also indirectly affected the role of SIS in the intelligence hierarchy. Although the central heading of the JIC Charter (renamed 'Terms of Reference under the Cabinet Office'[45]) remained that of giving 'higher direction to and to keep under review the organisation and working of intelligence as a whole',[46] the relationship of SIS to its customers had encountered an environmental *force majeure* that had altered the relationship between SIS and its customers. SIS product and input to the JIC would now receive broader dissemination (although not directly—it

would of course be subject to decisions on what SIS input was included within final JIC reports), but the demands that could be expected of them would also change. Because of this, SIS was 'forced over time to change its inner workings to conform to the changed structure and process in what was now Britain's genuinely central intelligence machinery'.[47] These changes enabled the tighter co-ordination and direction of intelligence efforts within a pull architecture that was easier to access among British government departments, with the pushing of intelligence assessment and product now disseminated more broadly than before due to the removal of old constitutional restrictions.

The final area to be addressed in the post-Suez changes to British intelligence was the annual list of intelligence targets. This is where the broad realignment of Britain's Cold War policy focus set the intelligence targets listed by the JIC to 'give higher direction' to intelligence collection efforts. In this it is noted by J. G. T. Inglis, the acting Chairman of the JIC at the time of the list's distribution, that the 1957 JIC transfer resulted in the broadening of that annual examination in order to 'embrace the enlarged field of responsibility of the JIC. This year's examination is therefore the *first* reappraisal of this broader appreciation of Intelligence Targets.'[48]

The 1958 list had aligned itself to the parameters of the 1957 Sandys Defence Review, noting that while British defence policy covers a significantly broad scope, the recognition of the lack of an effective defence against nuclear attack meant that 'the primary aim of our defence policy has become not to wage war but to prevent it'.[49] The primary aim of the 'Intelligence Targets' report therefore became one of ensuring that intelligence provided sufficient indication of any potential outbreak of war (as well as ensuring the effectiveness of any retaliatory strikes), and this can be seen in the prioritisation of targets:

(a) *Group A: Strategic Nuclear Attack: First Priority*

(i) The Soviet decision to launch a nuclear attack against the United Kingdom and her Allies including the indirect indicators of the Soviet decision having been taken.

(ii) The intelligence on the Soviet nuclear potential necessary to ensure that the Western nuclear potential remains an effective deterrent.

(iii) The intelligence necessary to ensure that the Allied nuclear retaliatory strike is launched, penetrates the defences and strikes the necessary targets.

(b) *Group B: Political, Economic and Subversives: First Priority*

The intelligence on threats, by methods short of open aggression, to British interests throughout the world necessary to ensure that our positions are not jeopardised by political or economic penetration, by subversion (including internal armed insurrection), or by nationalist and other hostile propaganda and by undeclared hostilities, especially frontier forays and the like. This category includes intelligence required to counter such activities as well as to assist in the formulation of Western policies towards the countries concerned.

(c) *Group C: Indirect Military Threats: Second Priority*

Intelligence on the development of situations short of global war, which might involve Her Majesty's Government in military action as a result of their treaty obligations and for other reasons. This group includes intelligence on the value for war of the forces with which United Kingdom forces might have to contend.

(d) *Group D: Direct Military Threats other than the Soviet Strategic Nuclear Attack: Third Priority*

Intelligence on direct military threats, other than the Soviet strategic nuclear attack, to the United Kingdom itself and United Kingdom forces in global war and to the Commonwealth, British possessions, British-protected territories and British allies by external attack in either global or local war.[50]

The grouping of targets by priority reveals not only the dominant strategic concern to British defence, but it also reflects in Group B the broadened scope of intelligence declared previously as being an accepted new reality for the JIC to embrace within its existing responsibilities. Groups A and B show the importance of this broadened scope, which are both accorded First Priority status and declared as being 'of equal importance to the survival of the country'.[51] The importance was made explicit by the report stating that a focus on purely military intelligence would be to the detriment of economic and political penetration as well as subversive activities, and there would be 'no hope of combating these activities and we could, in the long term, lose the world to Communist domination without nuclear devices being called into use at all'.[52]

The 'Intelligence Targets' report of 1958 revealed not only the effects of the JIC transfer and adoption of the broadened scope of intelligence, but also a key component in the British (and broadly NATO alliance) Cold War strategy—the policy of avoiding major war through nuclear deterrence, served by adequate early-warning capabilities. By aligning the intelligence establishment to the defence posture of preventing major war, the British government had enabled a structure to be formed based on constant monitoring of the threat through the prioritisation of necessary targets in the list above. Now not only did the JIC hold a position benefiting from greater independence and authority,[53] it had also established a framework that would become a foundation of Britain's Cold War intelligence establishment.

To conclude, British intelligence was already in a state of considerable change in the period leading up to the Suez Crisis, as seen by Sir Dick White's appointment to the position of Director of SIS immediately prior to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. But the Suez Crisis was more than just a failure of strategy and intelligence; it was 'the greatest single failure of premiership in the post-war period'.[54] The events that transpired in those few months of crisis prompted a major reorientation of British policy as a whole, which also provided the opportunity to centralise British intelligence for the first time on a permanently established basis.[55] Not only does this experience provide much material in the historiography of British intelligence, it also provides the final lesson in the relationship between strategy and intelligence: intelligence has a remarkable ability to adapt.

The 1957 transfer of the JIC was designed to be a permanent alteration to the structure of British intelligence, and its centralising effect has indeed become a permanent feature of that structure, which endures to the present. This transfer successfully broke the substantive link with the CoS and allowed the JIC to become 'more clearly linked with top government, though without other changes at that time in its membership or structure'.[56] British policy had fundamentally shifted to an overwhelming Cold War focus, based on the avoidance of major war with the Soviet Union and ensuring the credibility of Western nuclear deterrence. The Sandys Defence Review had taken major steps within the defence establishment to reorientate the British military to the Soviet threat; the JIC transfer to the Cabinet Office structure represents the major intelligence change within that broader process of reorientation. That transfer first removed the critical constitutional restriction that had prevented the JIC from guaranteeing the availability of both its product and services across the British government broadly. Secondly, the transfer was then effectively advertised not only to its broadened consumer base within the government but also to

key allies abroad, to ensure that this interpretation of the broadened scope of intelligence was widely understood. And finally, the ongoing changes overseen by Dick White at SIS were designed not only to improve SIS performance, but also to synchronise better with the new JIC approach of producing the annual list of intelligence targets.

These changes were all the more remarkable for an additional reason. The intelligence services not only responded in real time to the clear policy shifts of the moment—shifts that mandated a more tightly focussed intelligence effort with the Cold War at its heart—but they also seized the opportunity to broaden their own scope of inquiry and fundamentally alter the structures of intelligence to reflect the needs of intelligence having evolved beyond the battlefield. It was no small feat for any one organisation to achieve, making it all the more remarkable that the collection of British intelligence services as a whole was able to make these changes with such results. These changes made to British intelligence following the events of the Suez Crisis demonstrate the adaptability within intelligence.

Notes

1. Philip H. J. Davies, *MI6 and the Machinery of Spying* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 259.
2. Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations* (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), p. 660.
3. Davies (2004), p. 229.
4. Tom Bower, *The Perfect English Spy: Sir Dick White and the Secret War, 1935–90* (London: William Heinemann, 1995), p. 183.
5. Davies (2004), p. 251.
6. Bower (1995), p. 219.
7. Ibid., p. 209.
8. Ibid.
9. Bower (1995), p. 210.
10. Dorril (2000), p. 622.
11. Davies (2004), pp. 255–6.
12. The Prime Minister and Foreign Office had to give their consent in advance for such operations. Dorril (2000), p. 660.
13. Ibid., p. 661.
14. Davies (2004), p. 256.
15. Davies (2004), pp. 256–7, and Dorril (2000), p. 661.
16. Dorril (2000), p. 662.
17. 'The Macmillan Doctrine' being the title of Ch. 30 in Dorril (2000).
18. George Kennedy Young, 'The final testimony of George Kennedy Young', *Lobster* (1990), p. 10.

19. Dorril (2000), pp. 653–9, and Stephen Dorril, 'Trying to kill Nasser', *Lobster* (1985).
20. Dorril (2000), pp. 660–5, the best source of the activities of the SAS in this operation remains Peter De La Billiere, *Looking for Trouble: SAS to Gulf Command* (London: Harper Collins, 1995), ch. 9.
21. Dorril (2000), p. 729.
22. But can be adequately consulted for the purposes of this thesis through Billiere (1995), ch. 17, Dorril (2000), pp. 729–35, and Michael Asher, *The Regiment: The Real Story of the SAS* (London: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 401–20.
23. An SAS Sabre Squadron consists of roughly 50 men; SAS units are rarely deployed in such large numbers, instead traditionally opting to deploy much smaller teams.
24. For a detailed (and entertaining account) of such a secondment see Ian Gardiner, *In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2006).
25. Dorril (2000), p. 661.
26. Davies (2004), p. 254.
27. Norman Brook stated that from 'that date the JIC Secretariat will become an integral part of the Cabinet Office'. Notice to Secretaries of Committees, 1 October 1957. In CAB 163/9, TNA.
28. History of the Joint Intelligence Organisation, JIC (57) 123, 29 November 1957, p. 4, para. 22. In CAB 163/50, TNA.
29. 'Background to Intelligence: Its Aims and Functions', Secret Intelligence Summary (1955) Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 24. In AIR 40/2769, TNA.
30. Mr Benner, What Intelligence Can and Cannot Do, presentation given to SOWC Greenwich, 14 June 1976, p. 1. In CAB 163/234, TNA.
31. Letter from Pat Dean to C. A. Gault, 26 June 1957. In CAB 163/9, TNA.
32. Joint Organisation for Intelligence, JIC (57) 40, 5 April 1957, p. 1, para. 2. In CAB 158/28, TNA.
33. Letter from Pat Dean to Allen C. Dulles, 25 June 1957. In CAB 163/9, TNA.
34. Joint Organisation for Intelligence, JIC (57) 40, 5 April 1957, p. 1, para. 2. In CAB 158/28, TNA.
35. Ibid. (italics added).
36. Percy Cradock, *Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World* (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 262.
37. Joint Organisation for Intelligence, JIC (57) 40, 5 April 1957, p. 2, para. 4. In CAB 158/28, TNA.
38. Ibid.
39. Davies (2004), p. 254 (italics original).

40. The 'pull architecture' and its 'push' opposite are central themes of Davies' thesis, Davies (2004), pp. 13–16 and pp. 340–6.

41. Letter from Norman Brook to Harold Macmillan, 6 December 1957. In PREM 11/2418, TNA.

42. Joint Organisation for Intelligence, JIC (57) 40, 5 April 1957, p. 2, para. 5. In CAB 158/28, TNA.

43. Letter from Norman Brook to Pat Dean, 22 November 1957. In CAB 21/4739, TNA.

44. Ibid.

45. The change of wording was called for simply because no other Cabinet Office Committee used such a term, and it was felt that the JIC should not differentiate itself by retaining the word Charter, especially since the JIC itself held 'no sentimental attachment to the term'. Letter from J. B. H. to Norman Brook, 31 July 1957. In CAB 163/9, TNA.

46. Joint Intelligence Committee, Terms of Reference and Composition, 14 October 1957. In CAB 163/50, TNA.

47. Davies (2004), p. 260.

48. J. G. T. Inglis, Intelligence Targets, JIC (58) 72 (Final), 21 November 1958, p. 1, para. 2 (italics added). In CAB 158/33, TNA.

49. Intelligence Targets, Annex to JIC (58) 72 (Final), 21 November 1958, p. 3, para. 2. In CAB 158/33, TNA.

50. Ibid., p. 7.

51. Ibid., p. 7, para. 24.

52. Ibid., p. 6, para. 22.

53. Percy Cradock, *In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major* (London: John Murray, 1997), p. 39.

54. Peter Hennessy, *The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2000), p. 246.

55. Cormac also notes the likelihood that Eden's misuse of the JIC helped to prompt the transfer in 1957. Rory Cormac, *British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 2013), p. 199.

56. Michael Herman, *Intelligence Services in the Information Age: Theory and Practice* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 125.

Conclusions: British Strategy and Intelligence at Suez, a Special but Fragile Relationship

The Suez Crisis has entered the vault of British strategic and political history as one of the most notorious episodes of the twentieth century. Its controversy has only since been matched by the venture of Tony Blair's government into Iraq in 2003, and its parallels to Iraq have been noted in terms of political leadership,[1] as well as in the use of Suez analogies to warn against the Iraq venture.[2] And while Michael Oren was correct to label Suez as a 'crisis for all seasons',[3] the broad direction of Suez historiography has largely been conditioned towards considering only those aspects that proved most controversial—the decision to use force, and the collusion conspiracy to provide a pretext for that use of force.

Peter Beck is exactly right in his assessment of Prime Minister Eden's misjudgement over his actions to continue denying the charge of collusion:

> Seeking to keep collusion a secret rather than an issue to confront and answer in his memoirs, Eden was guilty of a serious misjudgement, which did little to help his historical reputation or to appease parliamentary campaigners. Rather than coming clean about developments, he sought to draw a thick veil over events by proving somewhat economical with the truth in his memoirs and other public pronouncements upon the issue.[4]

The consequence of this position that Eden adopted had affects not only on his own reputation but it also fundamentally shaped the direction of historical research that progressed thereafter with regards to Suez. Instead of coming clean, Eden maintained the secret of conspiracy for researchers

to continue to direct their efforts against. Much of the focus became one of simply establishing the truth of what had transpired in the British government; this theme is hugely evident throughout the testimonies of those interviewed as part of the Suez Oral History Project during the late 1980s.

This direction of effort towards collusion became the primary driver in the Suez historiography, although an equally strong direction has been the post-facto assessment of Britain's place in the world. Darby argued that Suez was the 'shock to the system'[5] that British defence policy needed and subsequently got in the Sandys Defence Review; Margaret Thatcher described Suez as a political 'body blow'[6] to Britain. Although in the case of Thatcher it is important to note her later condemnation of what she termed the 'Suez Syndrome', whereby Suez had such an impact on the British political psyche that it had led to a habit of exaggerating Britain's impotence,[7] and that British foreign policy since had largely been 'one long retreat'.[8] It is Kyle, however, with his magisterial and comprehensive history of the crisis, who provides best balance to the post-Suez dynamics that Britain faced. Although Britain was beginning to understand the erosion of its global power, it did indeed need to use force across the Middle East shortly after Suez. Although the use of super-tankers prevented the type of resource crisis envisaged in 1956, later oil crises still showed the value of keeping the Suez Canal open at all times. And, despite the general belief that Britain would not use force again unilaterally, the Falklands War disproved such a belief and put paid to the 'Suez Syndrome'.[9]

Notable efforts have of course been made to broaden the approach beyond these two primary drivers, with works such as Mahmoud Fawzi's[10] and Mohamed Heikal's[11] providing the Egyptian perspective to events, as well as more recent studies such as that of Laura James focussing on Nasser himself.[12] Other works have sought to provide inclusive analysis from all of the players in the crisis, rather than focussing solely on one actor over another.[13] These, as well as works by Chester Cooper,[14] Wilbur Eveland[15] and later W. Scott Lucas,[16] sought to pull back the veil behind the covert activities at the time. But, as argued in Chap. 1, it is contended that sustained scholarship on the totality of British intelligence activities did not take place.

Instead, a scatter-shot history of British intelligence activities emerged that has allowed a great deal of the intelligence story to be revealed, but ultimately without the comprehensive strategic assessment that the story requires. From Scott Lucas's aforementioned and revealing work on the range of Anglo-American covert operations under way, to Aldrich[17] and Dorril's capture of SIS operations against Egypt,[18] through to Cradock[19] and recently Goodman's official treatment of the JIC.[20] These mention

only the most notable works to have contributed to the British intelligence story, but all of these works had objectives other than providing a totally strategic assessment of British intelligence performance during the Suez Crisis. Aldrich was writing a history of intelligence operations in the Cold War broadly, Cradock, Goodman and Dorril were writing very specific histories carrying an organisational focus, Suez being merely one episode covered within those works.

This book has sought to fill the gaps in the scholarly treatment of British intelligence during the Suez Crisis, not only by considering its holistic range of activities, but by also seeking to identify its effects and performances across the whole range of British strategy in its attempt to reverse the Egyptian actions of 1956. By understanding the broad relationship between strategy and intelligence as established in Chap. 2, it has been possible not only to assess the performance of British intelligence across all aspects of British strategy in 1956, but also to identify conclusions that carry resonance to all episodes where intelligence is used to try to develop and execute strategic ambitions. The conclusions are as follows:

- Intelligence is not an illusion
- Intelligence performance is conditioned by the architecture of government
- Policy-makers rule, and intelligence knows it
- Intelligence is not a panacea
- Intelligence is very fragile
- Intelligence can adapt

Intelligence Is Not an Illusion

In a notable article Richard Betts once posed the critical question 'Is Strategy an Illusion?'.[21] His conclusion was that it is not. This argument has also been echoed by Colin Gray,[22] who further argued that whilst not representing an illusion, the scale of the challenge that performing strategy well poses is a 'heroic' venture.[23] Strategy, despite being a heroically difficult activity, remains possible, as is the role of intelligence in supporting and executing strategy. It has traditionally been exceptionally difficult to measure an intelligence success, whereas we can clearly identify intelligence failures. It would be reasonable to suppose, therefore, that intelligence, too, could represent an illusion, an activity that ultimately provides very little advantage to an activity, strategy, that more often than not is settled through brute violence rather than deft skill and stratagem.

Despite the not unreasonable nature of the proposition that intelligence is merely an illusion, it does indeed play a necessary and vital role in strategy, though it must be borne in mind that the quality and scope of its performance across strategy will always be in a state of fluctuation. The reasons why intelligence is not an illusion relate back to its relationship to strategy; Sun Tzu's entire opening chapter in *The Art of War* is titled 'Calculations';[24] without intelligence, how can a strategist begin to calculate his intended courses of action? Julian Lindley-French carries this basic logic further, arguing that 'sound strategic leadership must be built on knowledge'.[25] Sun Tzu's work ends with a chapter devoted to intelligence entirely, providing a strongly implied (if not necessarily explicit) logical cycle to strategy: a process that begins, continues and ends with information that is of relevance to one's strategic pursuit.

British intelligence efforts at Suez required intelligence at all levels, and it can clearly be seen that the activities of the intelligence services were not an illusion. Even in the case of GCHQ, which continues to elude in-depth scholarly treatment, enough is known to state that their activities were successful to a degree,[26] notably their breaking of Egyptian diplomatic ciphers and the deception of their American counterparts.

Prelude to Crisis

In the period covering the months leading up to the Suez Crisis, intelligence was most certainly not an illusion with regards to Egypt. The JIC, in particular, produced two reports that, while ultimately not impacting the course of British policy, were correct in their assessments. The first, 'Factors Affecting Egypt's Policy in the Middle East and North Africa', is notable in its declaration, against the tide of opinion certainly among Eden's close circle, that Nasser had not yet 'consciously resigned himself to becoming an instrument of Soviet policy'.[27] This statement was of course offered at exactly the time when disillusionment with Nasser was turning into active hostility.[28] Second, the JIC's report 'Egyptian Nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company', offered the most prescient warning on the possible use of force:

> (b) Should Western military action be insufficient to ensure early and decisive victory, the international consequences both in the Arab states and elsewhere might give rise to extreme embarrassment and cannot be foreseen.[29]

While the ultimate impact of JIC assessments did little to change the course of British strategy, its views were most certainly offered, as they should have been.

SIS meanwhile, despite its operational mentality being strongly geared towards covert operations, also provided its view through the source known as LUCKY BREAK. That source reinforced existing fears of Nasser aligning with the Soviet Union by reporting that 'Nasser was far more under Soviet influence than had been supposed'.[30] Although it has already been noted in this book that there is no definitive evidence corroborating the existence of LUCKY BREAK, what is in no doubt is the effect that the material had on Downing Street. Eden wasted no time in sharing the material directly with Eisenhower in pressing his case against Nasser.[31] Ultimately, in the case of SIS, even if the source was illusory, its impact was not.

During the Crisis

During the crisis itself, intelligence was again hard at work, with the JIC providing essential support to the planning processes that were on going for military operations, and SIS busily preparing covert operations aimed at the overthrow of Nasser's government and its replacement by members of the Free Officers' movement. This was in addition to the work that bodies such as the JIB and specific military units were undertaking, preparing intelligence requirements for units that would be deployed to Egypt for Operation MUSKETEER.

JIC support to operational planning for Operation MUSKETEER represents the bulk of the work that it performed during the Suez Crisis. This is best exemplified by the reports that considered the security of planning,[32] and the security of signals traffic[33] respectively. These reports were instrumental in establishing the points of intelligence liaison for the operation, as well as the establishment of the TERRAPIN security protocol. While these activities and products are not related to the policy level, they were instrumental to the operational security of Operation MUSKETEER, showing the place of intelligence in helping to take a strategic aspiration from concept to realistic practice.

Although SIS efforts in Egypt ultimately failed, their activities in trying to establish a shadow government in waiting are tangible proof of the leverage that intelligence services can wield prior to hostilities. Even though greater care should have been taken to learn from the experiences of 1951–54, which informed the opinion of the British Embassy in Cairo

that any stable successor government to Nasser would be very difficult to come by,[34] it is easy to understand why SIS thought such an attempt was worthwhile. The success of their joint actions in Iran with the CIA in 1953 showed that it was possible to achieve regime change with local assets, generating a greater level of policy benefit than would have been achieved through more overt means.

At the military level, much support was given to the vital planning processes that went into making Operation MUSKETEER a reality. As shown in Chap. 7, the units performing the amphibious assault landing and the parachute assault had entirely different intelligence requirements that were ultimately met through the efforts of the RAF aerial reconnaissance wings, as well as the JIB. Problems existed, particularly in the distribution of intelligence product—as seen in the case of the Royal Marines' trouble in securing essential reconnaissance photos of their landing area—but, on the whole, no intelligence oversights prejudiced the performance of military operations in any way.

Variance in Performance

There was a wide range of intelligence activities that took place before and during the crisis that were not illusory, and indeed sought to positively impact British strategy; and there is wide variance in the success that was achieved. The JIC, in particular, with its series of reports, ultimately did not impact the direction of British strategic thinking or policy decisions. Not only this, but the course of their actions changed as the crisis evolved, moving from a position of trying to inform policy development, to one of merely supporting an already-decided policy through the support of military planning processes. Nothing in the way of rigorous challenge was presented after their initial August 1956 report on the nationalisation of the canal. This position is clear simply from observing the evolution of reports that the JIC was preparing on the crisis, which clearly underwent a shift from a position of informing to supporting policy.

SIS, meanwhile, experienced a clear variance in performance based on the simple yet brutal fact that their Egypt network was dismantled by Egyptian counter-intelligence. SIS had gone from a position of providing the potential option of a special operation that might (if successful) have averted the need for overt military force, to a position of being unable to provide any unique insight into the affairs of Egypt after August 1956. This variance in performance created a blind spot in intelligence coverage

that was noted even within the military, when the Navy noted a decline in intelligence available from August onwards[35]; this fluctuation in performance had tangible effects on the information that the British government had available to it.

After the Crisis

Following the ceasefire agreement that effectively ended the crisis, the efforts of British intelligence were largely focussed on two things: first, the JIC was instructed by its Chairman, Patrick Dean, to dig up fresh evidence of Soviet conspiracy with which to impress the Americans, 'that proved that Nasser was a tool of the Soviets'.[36] This reveals that by this stage the leadership of the JIC was unquestioningly committed to supporting the policy position of the Eden government, and that intelligence efforts were being directed accordingly. Second, there was a recognition of the harm that had been done to intelligence networks in and around Egypt, and a full assessment had to be carried out to discover how bad the damage was, and to find measures to begin developing intelligence networks anew.

Particularly in the case of the recognition of the damage done to intelligence networks throughout the crisis, there is distinct proof of the variance and fluctuation within intelligence affairs. Instead of viewing this occurrence as an aberration, it should rather be recognised as the normal state in intelligence affairs. While intelligence is not an illusion, the inevitable variance in performance that will be encountered should be recognised simply as the 'cost of doing business', and anticipated accordingly.

Intelligence Performance Is Conditioned by the Architecture of Government

The position that an intelligence body occupies within the architecture of government is a crucial factor informing its performance. Position will substantially condition and shape performance by opening or restricting the scope of action for intelligence. Rory Cormac articulates this dynamic well in stating that 'JIC assessments are the product of their environment; they are shaped by the winds of Whitehall'.[37] In 1956 the position of the JIC clearly reveals this to be the case; as a CoS body the JIC had fundamental structural limitations that reduced the full scope of intelligence support that it could provide to the policy level. Simply, the JIC could not

guarantee that its intelligence product would always reach a policy level beyond CoS level. This architectural reality of the intelligence establishment's structure in 1956 was a major contributing factor to the JIC's inability to inform the development of British policy as it ought to have done.

The intelligence structures also retain two vulnerabilities arising from their covert nature and the statutory protection from public transparency that they enjoy. The first vulnerability is the potential abuse of an intelligence structure precisely because it is covert, with the aim of excluding other centres of decision-making. This happened in 1956, with Eden, Kirkpatrick and Dean exploiting the covert infrastructure of PUSD to facilitate the construction of an alternative conduit of communication outside of the regular Foreign Office channels. The position of intelligence bodies within the architecture of government is a very important consideration: if they are isolated from, or cushioned underneath, more powerful institutions, then what they have to say may never reach the decision-making table. They also carry the risk that the structures designed to ensure their ability to operate covertly are used for other designs entirely. This means, paradoxically, that intelligence services may be the most vulnerable services in all of government, by virtue of the fact that no other department will be able to see what inappropriate actions may be taking place behind the cloak used to cover their mandated activities.

The second vulnerability can be seen as a vice of intelligence services themselves, who can abuse their covert nature in order to gain prestige in the eyes of decision-makers. By making their sources 'fundamentally uncheckable'[38] the utility of their product can never be subject to the critical appraisal of other agencies and departments. Rusbridger puts it well, albeit somewhat cynically, when he says that if a source is challenged, 'you say it is so secret that it cannot be discussed'.[39] Furthermore, intelligence services can also exploit the appeal that comes with a classified source to generate greater appeal. Omand rightly warns against this, noting that classification is no guide to the end value that a source may carry.[40] SIS were guilty of indulging this vice in 1956 through the use of the LUCKY BREAK source, which was so highly regarded by Prime Minister Eden that he shared it with President Eisenhower. The integrity, even the existence, of this source has never been fully established, therefore the fact that it was shared at such high level indicates the risk that exaggerating one's sources can have. The prime risk that this vulnerability carries is damage to the value that intelligence itself can have, the best articulation

of which comes from a 1944 report on the role of special intelligence on operations. This report stated that: 'The value of intelligence is threatened whenever it is segregated into either subject or source; its value is enhanced when it is *pooled* and thereby not only *augmented* but *checked*.'[41] LUCKY BREAK clearly went through no external process of pooling, augmenting and checking.

Policy-makers Rule, and Intelligence Knows It

While intelligence can play a vital role in informing the decision-making of political leaders, it must be accepted that the biases and beliefs that policy-makers bring with them into office contribute most to shaping their decisions. Assumptions form the prism through which the world, and the events that transpire within that world, are viewed, and are the criteria that events are judged against. Policy-makers are rightly described by Pillar as 'cognitively impaired and politically possessed',[42] and while one can empathise with Gill and Phythian's warning that policy should be based on knowledge rather than conviction and ideology,[43] it must be acknowledged that policy-makers rule over intelligence for two main reasons: first, the policy-makers hold the executive power to make decisions, and those decisions are not always based purely on objective and rational processing of information, including the produce of intelligence services. Secondly, policy-makers ultimately hold considerable power over the careers of intelligence officers. Intelligence officers must tread a careful path in seeking influence but not crossing the line to political interference, thereby finding themselves marginalised at best, or excluded at worst. Intelligence, therefore, finds itself in an unequal relationship with policy-makers, because political masters hold the power to appoint and dismiss senior intelligence officials.

This was most definitely borne out in the case of the Suez Crisis: a series of significant assumptions conditioned the approach that Britain took. The most important assumption, of course, was the British belief that it was a still a world power, and could act accordingly. This dominant political assumption, informed by the weight of British imperial history, created the prism through which Britain still saw the world in 1956, a world in which Britain could not only shape world events, but could do so by force if need be. This cognitive reflex was so deeply embedded in British strategic thinking that it could not be removed by intelligence alone, and indeed nor was it during the crisis.

The balanced judgements of the JIC both on Nasser's possible alignment with the Soviets,[44] and on the possible outcomes of intervention in Egypt[45] have been praised for their accuracy on the subject. Sadly, however, these analyses did nothing to shape or even inform the decisions that the Eden government took. Indeed, one can argue that the one piece of intelligence that did carry influence on British thinking was LUCKY BREAK, and it did so precisely because what it said mirrored existing British prejudices towards Nasser and reinforced an increasingly belligerent mood. Balanced intelligence assessments during the crisis could not impact the assumptions Britain held, but some intelligence most definitely reinforced those assumptions. Nowhere was this clearer than in Pat Dean's instruction of 16 November 1956 to the JIC to 'see what fresh evidence they could find' to give to the United States 'that proved Nasser was a tool of the Soviets'.[46] By the end of the Crisis the JIC was being actively instructed to find evidence to support a case they had assessed earlier in the year in a far fairer manner.

Ultimately it is the policy-makers who hold the power, as it is they who make the decisions. It is also important to note that their assumptions shape and condition the environment of thinking that surrounds policy issues, and intelligence services are not immune to being conditioned by those assumptions. Even when intelligence services successfully resist being conditioned in such a way and provide assessment that is fairly balanced, there is no guarantee of either acceptance or use on the part of those who make the decisions.

Intelligence Is Not a Panacea

While arguing the case that intelligence is not an illusion, the logical opposite must also be discounted. Intelligence is not a panacea that can cure all the ills encountered in the development of policy and strategy. Specifically, one cannot expect intelligence to make up for the flaws and incorrect assumptions that lead to the creation of a poor policy, or indeed its actual execution. Betts is correct in his assessment that: 'The importance of successful intelligence ultimately varies with the policies it has to support.'[47] In the event of a poor, fundamentally flawed policy, no amount of intelligence product and performance can avert the disasters that lie in wait.

At Suez, it is painfully clear that nothing could have averted the policy disaster that befell the Eden government. No strategic combination or intelligence source could make up for the fact that Britain overestimated its position in world affairs, failed consequently to recognise the shifts in global

power and misunderstood Nasser—not a Cold War puppet but instead a man playing his own game of regional strategy.[48] Neither LUCKY BREAK nor any signals decrypts that GCHQ may have provided shifted any of the fundamental beliefs that the Eden government took into the crisis from the very beginning: that Britain had both global power and status, that the Suez Canal remained a vital national interest and that Nasser was not only hostile to British interests but also aligning with the Soviet Union.

A clear example of the inability of intelligence to perform such a miracle can be seen simply from the support provided to military planning processes. The intelligence support for Operation MUSKETEER was very good and, barring some small incidents by way of dissemination, did much to help the preparations for military action against Egypt. Ultimately, the fact that British and French forces encountered no operational surprise that intelligence had failed to uncover did nothing to prevent the military operation failing to deliver strategic success. The failure of the British government to anticipate the opposition that would be encountered from the Americans, and the weight of global opinion against the Anglo-French action, were the critical factors that led to the disaster that befell British policy. The only cure for these problems would have come not from intelligence but from greater, more open and inclusive, deliberation in policy circles. A rational calculation of both what British interests were, as well as the world that Britain actually found itself in, as opposed to the world it thought it was in, was required. Sadly, it was only the disaster of Suez that forced such an introspective appraisal to take place.

Intelligence Is Very Fragile

The services that intelligence provides to strategy are fragile indeed. Fragility of British intelligence at Suez can be categorised in three ways: institutionally, by process and product, and operationally.

In institutional terms, it must be recognised that the infrastructure of British intelligence was not in optimal condition at the time of the crisis, and competent performance relies on a steady institution. These institutions must be nurtured and developed over many years in order to cope with the stresses that crisis brings. Belated attempts at change are never enough to mitigate the failings that poor infrastructure will generate.

Nowhere was this clearer at Suez than in the efforts at change in SIS with the appointment of Dick White as C following the Buster Crabb affair. While White was indeed successful—in the long term—in bringing change

to SIS, the service he inherited was the one that had to be used throughout the Suez Crisis. The fragility was also readily apparent in the JIC, whose constitutional position as a CoS body greatly restricted its ability to inform policy-level decision-making. The JIC was ultimately marginalised due to its position in the structure of government rather than by virtue of what it actually had to say.

Institutional fragility greatly informs the next fragility, of the process and product that intelligence generates. Intelligence product is fragile in two primary ways: first, it is informed by sources that are actively protected from cross-checking in order to retain the confidentiality of both method of access and source of information, thereby representing an outlier among the vast stream of information that goes to decision-makers. This is most clear in the case of LUCKY BREAK, where only SIS could certify and vouch for the validity of the source; anyone with a differing opinion could not check the source, or even argue against the case it made, by virtue of its being secret and its remaining unknown to other agencies with a legitimate role in guiding policy-makers. There is certainly nothing to suggest that anybody outside SIS knew of Eden's use of the LUCKY BREAK material, so it is logical to assume that nobody in the Foreign Office knew of the source to check and counter its argument.

Secondly, once intelligence product reaches decision-makers, it is hostage to whether or not the decision-maker pays heed to what it has to say.[49] The clearest example of this at Suez was the warning issued in the JIC's report 'Egyptian Nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company', which has been acknowledged in the historiography as the most balanced argument issued on the dynamics immediately preceding the crisis. Despite this, the warning clearly did nothing to alter the thinking of the decision-making elite in the British government. Intelligence product is very fragile on reaching decision-making circles, for those who produce it have little or no control over what, if any, influence their analysis has on decisions.

Operationally, intelligence at Suez was shown to be extremely fragile, due to the fact that intelligence in the field is also subject to the dialectical relationship between opponents. There is most definitely an offence and a defence in intelligence, with an enemy that has a vote in intelligence affairs just as much as they do in warfare.[50] SIS discovered this first-hand in unforgiving fashion in 1956 with the dismantling of their intelligence network by Egyptian counter-intelligence. This defeat at the hands of the Egyptians had a decisive impact on the ability of SIS to perform any useful function for the rest of the Suez Crisis, save for the meek broadcasting of

propaganda from Cyprus. This fragility carried consequences for British intelligence efforts that went far beyond just the events of the Suez Crisis, however. The infrastructure on which intelligence is based is dependent in many ways on the normal continuation of diplomatic relationships, as well as the routine stationing of defence attaché officers within embassies. Or, as John Dickie puts it: 'Spies and diplomats operate in the same environment.'[51] Alongside the loss of the SIS network was also the loss of these attaché officers not only in Egypt, but in nations contiguous to Egypt as well. Britain lost a significant portion of its intelligence capability in and around Egypt for a lengthy period of time that extended beyond the end of the Suez Crisis.

The significance of these fragilities cannot be overstated, and a brutal fact must be borne in mind: the provision of intelligence to strategy is not a right, it is a privilege. That privilege is very fragile indeed, and the infrastructure on which intelligence is based can require many years of careful nurturing before it yields any dividend. But as was revealed at Suez, both in the field operationally and internally, such an infrastructure can be both compromised and dismantled very quickly, resulting in severe consequences not only for the pursuit of a particular policy, but also for the provision of intelligence long after the events of a particular episode.

Intelligence Can Adapt

While the conclusions thus far no doubt in the mind of the reader as to the severity of difficulties, challenges and fragilities that intelligence faces in its duties to strategy, one must also draw the conclusion that intelligence shows a remarkable resilience and ability to adapt. For any organisation to survive and remain relevant to the pursuits of strategy and policy, it must be able to adapt through both changing threats and changing contexts in order to justify its continued existence. And, despite the severe challenges that British intelligence faced throughout the Suez Crisis, it did indeed display the ability to adapt in a timely and effective manner, in ways that positioned the British intelligence services very well for the Cold War challenges that had yet to be faced.

In the case of SIS, change and adaptation was already in hand by the time of the Suez Crisis, following the notorious Buster Crabb Affair that led to the replacement of Sir John Sinclair by Sir Dick White just 12 days before the Suez Canal Company was nationalised. Adaptation could not of course happen fast enough to change the fundamental approaches that

SIS preferred—namely a proclivity for special operations—and it would be a long-term struggle to 'whip the SIS back into shape'.[52] The period was known as 'the horrors'[53]—a run of poor operational performance culminating in the compromise and dismantlement of the SIS network in Egypt at precisely the moment when it was most badly needed.

The changes imposed on SIS took three forms, two internal and one structural. First, White sought to remove many officers who were viewed as a liability due to their penchant for 'cowboy operations',[54] and align SIS back towards pure intelligence-gathering. Although White's reforms in this regard were held as imperfect,[55] and did not totally remove special operations from SIS methods, he did succeed in purging a large number of problem officers from the service. Secondly, White made a number of bureaucratic changes that placed more stringent checks on special operations, as well as shaking up the service directorates themselves.[56] Finally, as part of the broader changes imposed on British intelligence as a whole in order to centralise it, SIS efforts were more aligned with the development of intelligence collection targets issued by the JIC.

The adaptation that the JIC took after the Suez Crisis recognised that—for some years previous—the scope of intelligence had broadened beyond merely the military sphere and 'into the political, economic and scientific fields'.[57] Its transfer from the Chiefs of Staff and into the Cabinet Office structure represents a significant milestone in the demilitarisation of British intelligence, arguably the biggest single action taken to adapt to this broadened role, one that required a more inclusive approach to intelligence affairs.

The significance of the 1957 transfer should not be underestimated, notwithstanding Cormac's assertion that to present the transfer as a significant milestone would be an oversimplification.[58] Cormac is mistaken for, while correct in asserting that change in British intelligence has generally been an evolutionary affair, the 1957 transfer deserves the special attention it has not yet received because it made British intelligence 'genuinely *central*…'[59] for the first time on a permanently established basis. The confusion about the post-war role of the JIC was removed with this transfer; it placed British intelligence on a centralised footing that reoriented its services in numerous ways. First, the JIC was better placed to pursue the broadened scope of intelligence that had been evolving since the Second World War, rather than following the orthodox, military-centred view of intelligence that had prevailed when it was a CoS body. Secondly, JIC services and produce was more readily available at the policy level, with ministers being on the distribution list for the first time. This meant that

no longer would a mere bureaucratic and constitutional restriction impede the general flow of intelligence to a broadened consumer base. Finally, the change allowed a much more concerted focus on the Cold War framework that by 1957 was dominating attention more and more, a change that was very well timed to enable the British intelligence machinery to generate a stable and consistent practice for the prosecution of the Cold War. That stabilised practice is best exemplified through the intelligence targets list; from the 1957 changes onwards, was a far broader examination of annual requirements, precisely designed to 'embrace the enlarged field of responsibility of the JIC'.[60] The new annual target lists very effectively focussed and aligned intelligence efforts with the broader Cold War policy of preventing major war, and therefore are a very tangible example of how the 1957 transfer affected intelligence efforts.

The ability to adapt is critical in strategy, and the British intelligence services have time and again shown a remarkable ability to adapt to changing contexts and circumstances. Although mistakes occur, and change happens belatedly at times, happen it does. SIS reoriented itself from an agency inclined towards special operations to a serious cultivator of human sources, whereas the JIC evolved from a wartime committee that could easily have been identified as an anachronism and been dissolved, much like the Special Operations Executive (SOE) at the war's end. While the Suez Crisis demonstrates the inability of the intelligence apparatus to adapt in ways that were of immediate aid to the policy pursuit at the time, the changes that were both ongoing and that took place in the aftermath of the crisis are arguably one of, if not the most, significant changes in British intelligence history to date.

To conclude, it is necessary to return to the fundamental subject of investigation, intelligence and its relationship with strategy. Through the experience of Britain in the Suez Crisis it can be seen that the relationship is both important and complex. There is indeed an identifiable relationship between intelligence and strategy; most important is to note the inherent political nature of the relationship, whereby concerns of politicisation are not to be considered an ill to remove, but instead simply a natural tension that will always exist in the relationship. Furthermore, the dynamism of the relationship, as well as the myriad complexities that will plague its functions in real-world practice have to be considered. The nature and function of that relationship had not before been identified or codified by intelligence studies or strategic studies.

Both the theoretical understanding, and real-world application, of the relationship between intelligence and strategy is incredibly complex, reflecting in true form the scale of the challenges that face those operating in the strategic world. Intelligence, like strategy, can truly be seen as a heroic venture due to its complexity and difficulty to do well. Yet, despite the difficulties, and indeed perils, awaiting those who seek to gain the advantages that intelligence can bring, its pursuit is increasingly necessary. The final word of this book must be to declare that strategy and intelligence share a very special, but extremely fragile, relationship.

Notes

1. Dyson's work argues that Eden and Blair share strikingly similar leadership styles, Stephen Benedict Dyson, *The Blair Identity: Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), pp. 39–40.
2. Peter Beck argues for the prominence that Suez still holds in British political vocabulary, reminding readers that Robin Cook invoked Suez as a warning to Tony Blair. Peter J. Beck, '"The Less Said about Suez the Better": British Governments and the Politics of Suez's History, 1956–67', *English Historical Review* (June 2009) cxxiv. 508, pp. 635–6.
3. Michael B. Oren, 'Suez: A Crisis for All Seasons: A Review Essay', *Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies* (Winter 1994) Vol. 12, No. 2.
4. Beck (2009), pp. 638–9.
5. Phillip Darby, *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 332.
6. Margaret Thatcher, *The Path to Power* (London: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 89.
7. Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 18.
8. Ibid., p. 355.
9. Kyle (1991; 2003), pp. 583–5.
10. Mahmoud Fawzi, *Suez 1956: An Egyptian Perspective* (London: Shorouk International, 1986).
11. Mohamed Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes* (London: Corgi, 1988).
12. Laura M. James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
13. Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe Shemesh (eds.), *The Suez–Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal* (London: Frank Cass, 1990), and David Tal

(ed.), *The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East* (London: Frank Cass, 2001) are two notable, although by no means exclusive, examples of such works.

14. Chester L. Cooper, *The Lion's Last Roar: Suez 1956* (London: Harper Collins, 1978).

15. Wilbur Eveland Crane, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1980).

16. W. Scott Lucas, *Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1991).

17. Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (New York: The Overlook Press, 2002).

18. Steven Dorril, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations* (London: Fourth Estate, 2000).

19. Percy Cradock, *Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World* (London: John Murray, 2002).

20. Michael S. Goodman, *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee Volume I: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis* (London: Routledge, 2014).

21. Richard K. Betts, 'Is Strategy and Illusion?', *International Security* (2000) Vol. 25, No. 2.

22. Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 246.

23. Ibid., pp. 237–8. See also Colin S. Gray, 'The Strategist as Hero', *JFQ* (2011) 62.

24. Sun Tzu (Samuel B. Griffith trans.), *The Art of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) Ch. 1.

25. Julian Lindley-French, 'Strategic Leadership in War', in Julian Lindley-French and Yves Boyer (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 226.

26. Although these tactical successes by no means alter this author's verdict of policy non-impact, which is another level of success entirely, that was established in Chap. 1.

27. Factors Affecting Egypt's Policy in the Middle East and North Africa, JIC (56) 20 (Final), 4 April 1956, para. 3. In CAB 158/23, TNA.

28. Howard J. Dooley, 'Great Britain's "Last Battle" in the Middle East: Notes on Cabinet Planning during the Suez Crisis of 1956', *The International History Review* (1989) Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 489.

29. Egyptian Nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, JIC (56) 80 (Final), 3 August 1956, p. 5, para. 12. In CAB 158/25, TNA.

30. Keith Kyle, *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), p. 84.

31. Dorril (2000), p. 607.

32. Security of Planning for Action Against Egypt, JIC (56) 82, 1 August 1956. In CAB 158/25, TNA.

33. Operation MUSKETEER—Security of Signals Traffic, JIC (56) 96 (Final), 21 September 1956. In CAB 158/25, TNA.

34. Michael T. Thornhill, *Road to Suez: The Battle of the Canal Zone* (Stroud: Sutton, 2006), pp. 217–18.

35. 'Appendix IV: Intelligence', in Naval Report on Operation Musketeer, 15 February 1957, Part II, para. 21. In ADM 1/27373, TNA.

36. Minutes of Special meeting held on Friday 16 November 1956, JIC (56) 109th meeting, p. 2, para. 4. In CAB 159/25, TNA.

37. Rory Cormac, *Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 2013), p. 14.

38. Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 67.

39. James Rusbridger, *The Intelligence Game: The Illusions and Delusions of International Espionage* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), p. 217.

40. David Omand, *Securing the State* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 2010), p. 47.

41. The Use of Special Intelligence in Connection with Operation Neptune, January 1944–September 1944. In MISC 68, CAC, Churchill College, Cambridge University, p. 2 (italics added).

42. Paul R. Pillar, *Intelligence and US Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 319.

43. Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 175.

44. Factors Affecting Egypt's Policy in the Middle East and North Africa, JIC (56) 20 (Final), 4 April 1956, para. 3. In CAB 158/23, TNA.

45. Egyptian Nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, JIC (56) 80 (Final), 3 August 1956, p. 5, para. 12. In CAB 158/25, TNA.

46. Minutes of Special meeting held on Friday 16 November 1956, JIC (56) 109th meeting, p. 2, para. 4. In CAB 159/25, TNA.

47. Richard K. Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 192.

48. James states that Nasser's 'Anti-colonialist credentials' were secured at Suez, and that he continued to pursue his non-aligned strategy supportive of anti-colonialism. James (2006), p. 47.

49. Michael Handel and Shlomo Gazit both provide excellent analyses of this dynamic. Michael I. Handel, 'Leaders and Intelligence', and Shlomo Gazit, 'Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker', both in Michael I. Handel (ed.), *Leaders and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 1989).

50. Omand states that maintaining the concept of an opponent is ever present in intelligence affairs. Omand (2010), p. 136.
51. John Dickie, *Inside the Foreign Office* (London: Chapman Publishers, 1992), p. 202.
52. Philip H. J. Davies, *MI6 and the Machinery of Spying* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 229.
53. Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations* (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), p. 660.
54. Tom Bower, *The Perfect English Spy: Sir Dick White and the Secret War, 1935–90* (London: William Heinemann, 1995), p. 209.
55. Ibid., p. 219.
56. Davies (2004), p. 256.
57. History of the Joint Intelligence Organisation, JIC (57) 123, 29 November 1957, p. 4, para. 22. In CAB 163/50, TNA.
58. Cormac (2013), p. 197.
59. Davies (2004), p. 254 (italics original).
60. J. G. T. Inglis, Intelligence Targets, JIC (58) 72 (Final), 21 November 1958, p. 1, para. 2. In CAB 158/33, TNA.

Bibliography

Articles

Adamthwaite, Anthony, "Suez Revisited", *International Affairs* Vol. 64, No. 3 (1988): 449–464

Anderson, C. C. "Suez—1956", *The Naval Review* 79:4 (1991)

Andrew, Christopher and Aldrich, Richard J. "The Intelligence Services in the Second World War", *Contemporary British History* 13:4 (1999): 130–169

Beck, Peter J. "'The Less Said about Suez the Better': British Governments and the Politics of Suez's History, 1956-67", *English Historical Review* Vol. CXXIV. 508 (2009): 605–640

Bennett, Edward W. "Intelligence and History from the Other Side of the Hill", *The Journal of Modern History* 60:2 (1988): 312–337

Betts, Richard K. "Is Strategy and Illusion?", *International Security* Vol. 25, No. 2 (2000): 5–50

Calhoun, Ricky-Dale, "The Musketeer's Cloak: Strategic Deception During the Suez Crisis 1956", *CIA Studies in Intelligence* 51:2 (2007): 47–58

Cobb, Adam, "Intelligence Adaptation: The Bin Laden Raid and its Consequences for US Strategy", *RUSI Journal* 156:4 (2011): 54–62

Cogan, Charles G. "From the politics of lying to the farce at Suez: What the US knew", *Intelligence and National Security* 13:2 (1998): 100–122

Davies, Philip H. J. "MI6's Requirement's Directorate: Integrating Intelligence into the Machinery of British Central Government", *Public Administration* 78:1 (2000): 29–49

Dooley, Howard J. "Great Britain's "Last Battle" in the Middle East: Notes on Cabinet Planning during the Suez Crisis of 1956", *The International History Review* Vol. 11, No. 3 (1989): 486–517

Dorrill, Steven, "Trying to kill Nasser", *Lobster* (1985)

Durand, T., Mounoud, E. et al "Uncovering Strategic Assumptions: Understanding Managers' Ability to Build Representations", *European Management Journal* 14:4 (1996): 389–398

Dyson, Stephen Benedict, "Text Annotation and the Cognitive Architecture of Political Leaders: British Prime Ministers from 1945-2008", *Journal of Information Technology and Politics* 5:1 (2008): 7–18

Easter, David, "Spying on Nasser: British Signals Intelligence in Middle East Crises and Conflicts, 1956–67", *Intelligence and National Security* Vol. 28, No. 6 (2013): 824–844

Fingar, Thomas, "Intelligence and Grand Strategy", *Orbis* 56:1 (2012): 118–134

Goodman, Michael S. "Covering up Spying in the "Buster" Crabb Affair: A Note", *The International History Review* 30:4 (2008): 768–784

Gorst, Anthony and Lucas, W. Scott "The Other Collusion: Operation Straggle and Anglo-American Intervention in Syria, 1955-56", *Intelligence and National Security* 4:3 (1989): 576–595

Gray, Colin S. "The Strategist as Hero", *JFQ* 62 (2011): 37–45

Gray, Colin S. "Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory", *Prism* 3:3 (2012): 17–32

Greenberg, Maurice R., Haas, Richard, "Making Intelligence Smarter", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 9:2 (1996): 135–144

Hammes, Thomas X. "Assumptions: A Fatal Oversight", *Infinity Journal* 1:1 (2010): 4–6

Herman, Michael "What is Intelligence?" *The Naval Review* 77:2 (1989)

Howes, Buster, "Vast Ills Follow a Belief in Certainty", *RUSI Journal* 156:3 (2011): 20–25

Jervis, Robert, "What's wrong with the intelligence process?" *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 1:1 (1986): 28–41

Johnson, Loch K. "Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence", *Comparative Strategy* 22:1 (2003): 1–28

Jones, Matthew, "The 'Preferred Plan': The Anglo-American Working Group Report on Covert Action in Syria, 1957", *Intelligence and National Security* 19:3 (2004): 401–415

Kovacs, Amos, "Using Intelligence", *Intelligence and National Security* 12:4 (1997): 145–164

James, Robert Rhodes, "Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis", *History Today* 36:11 (November 1986): 8–15

Lane, Ann, "The Past as Matrix: Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs", *Contemporary British History* Special Edition: Whitehall and the Suez Crisis 13:2 (1999): 199–220

Lieberman, Matthew D., Schreiber, Darren and Ochsner, Kevin N. "Is Political Cognition like Riding a Bicycle? How Cognitive Neuroscience Can Inform Research on Political Thinking", *Political Psychology* 24:4 (2003): 681–704

Lombardi, Benjamin, "Assumptions and Grand Strategy", *Parameters* Spring (2011): 29–40

Lucas, W. Scott, "The Missing Link? Patrick Dean, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee", Special Issue: Whitehall and the Suez Crisis, *Contemporary British History* 13:2 (1999): 117–125

Lucas, W. Scott and Morey, Alastair, "The Hidden Alliance: CIA and MI6 before and after Suez", *Intelligence and National Security* 15:2 (2000): 95–120

Macartney, J., "Intelligence: A Consumers' Guide", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 2:4 (1988): 457–486

Martin, Laurence W. "The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain: The 'Sandys Era'", *The American Political Science Review* 56:1 (1962): 23–41

Moran, Christopher, "Intelligence and the Media: The Press, Government Secrecy and the "Buster" Crabb Affairs", *Intelligence and National Security* 26:5 (2011): 676–700

Oren, Michael B. "A Winter of Discontent: Britain's Crisis in Jordan, December 1955–March 1956", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22:2 (1990): 171–184

Oren, Michael B. "Suez: A Crisis for All Seasons: A Review Essay", *Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies* Vol. 12, No. 2 (Winter 1994): 104–107

Rees, Wyn, "The 1957 Sandys White Paper: New Priorities in British Defence Policy?" *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 12:2 (1989): 215–229

Renshon, Jonathan and Renshon, Stanley A. "The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making", *Political Psychology* 29:4 (2008): 509–536

Schrecker, M. "US Strategy in Afghanistan: Flawed Assumptions will lead to Ultimate Failure", *JFQ* 59 (2010): 75–82

Simon, H. A. "Rationality in Political Behaviour", *Political Psychology* 16:1 (1995): 45–62

Sims, Jennifer, "Intelligence to counter terror: The importance of all-source fusion", *Intelligence and National Security* 22:1 (2007): 38–56

Steele, Robert D. "Crafting Intelligence in the Aftermath of Disaster", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 15:2 (2002): 161–178

Strachan, Hew, "Strategy and the Limitation of War", *Survival* 50:1 (2008): 31–54

Strachan, Hew, "Strategy and Contingency", *International Affairs* 29:4 (2011): 1281–1296

Thornhill, Michael T. "Alternatives to Nasser: Humphrey Trevelyan, Ambassador to Egypt", Special Issue: Whitehall and the Suez Crisis, *Contemporary British History* 13:2 (1999): 11–28

Vaughan, James, "'Cloak Without Dagger': How the Information Research Department Fought Britain's Cold War in the Middle East, 1948–56", *Cold War History* 4:3 (2004): 56–84

Winton, John, "Suez—Forty Years On", *The Naval Review* 84:4 (1996)

Young, George Kennedy, "The final testimony of George Kennedy Young", *Lobster* (1990)

Young, John W. "Conclusion" to Special Issue: Whitehall and the Suez Crisis, *Contemporary British History* 13:2 (1999): 221–231

Books

Adams, James, *The New Spies: Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage* (London: Pimlico, 1994)

Aldrich, Richard J. *Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service* (Cambridge: CUP, 2000)

Aldrich, Richard J. *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (New York: The Overlook Press, 2002)

Aldrich, Richard J. *GCHQ: The uncensored story of Britain's most secret intelligence agency* (London: Harper Press, 2010)

Aldrich, Richard J., Cormac, Rory, Goodman, Michael S. *Spying on the World: The Declassified Documents of the Joint Intelligence Committee* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014)

Andrew, Christopher and Dilks, David, *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984)

Andrew, Christopher *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London: Sceptre, 1986)

Andrew, Christopher, Aldrich, Richard J. et al (ed.), *Secret Intelligence: A Reader* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009)

Asher, Michael, *The Regiment: The real story of the SAS* (London: Penguin Books, 2008)

Bartholomees Jr., John Boones (ed.), *US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy* (Carlisle, PA: USAWC SSI, 2010)

Baylis, John, Wirtz, James et al (ed.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World* Third Edition (Oxford: OUP, 2010)

Betts, Richard K. and Mahnken, Thomas G. (ed.), *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honour of Michael I. Handel* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003)

Betts, Richard K. *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007)

Blaber, Pete, *The Mission, the Men, and Me: Lessons from a Delta Force Commander* (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2008)

Bloch, Jonathan and Fitzgerald, Patrick, *British Intelligence and Covert Action: Africa, Middle East and Europe since 1945* (London: Junction Books, Ltd.: 1983)

Bower, Tom, *The Perfect English Spy: Sir Dick White and the Secret War 1935–90* (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1995)

Boyle, Peter G. *The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955–1957* (London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005)

Brendon, Piers, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire: 1781–1997* (London: Vintage Books, 2007)

Burke, Jason, *The 9/11 Wars* (London: Allen Lane, 2011)

Carlton, David, *Britain and the Suez Crisis* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988)

Cimbala, Stephen J. (ed.), *Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society* (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1987)

Stephen J. Cimbala, (ed.), *The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy and War* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2010)

Clark, William, *From Three Worlds* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1986)

Clausewitz, Carl von (Michael Howard, Peter Paret trans.), *On War* (London: Everyman's Library, 1993)

Codevilla, Angelo and Seabury, Paul, *War: Ends and Means* Second Edition (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006)

Cooper, Chester L. *The Lion's Last Roar: Suez 1956* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1978)

Cormac, Rory, *British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency* (London: Hurst and Company, 2013)

Cradock, Percy, *In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major* (London: John Murray, 1997)

Cradock, Percy *Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World* (London: John Murray, 2002)

Dickie, John, *Inside the Foreign Office* (London: Chapmans Publishers, 1992)

Crane, Wilbur Eveland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1980)

Cummings, Richard H. *Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950–1989* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., Inc., 2009)

Cummings, Richard H. *Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for Freedom": Rallying Americans Behind Cold War Broadcasting, 1950–1960* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., Inc., 2010)

Darby, Phillip, *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968* (London: OUP, 1973)

Davies, Philip H. J. *MI6 and the Machinery of Spying* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004)

De La Billiere, Peter, *Looking for Trouble: SAS to Gulf Command* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995)

Dewar, J. A., Builder, C. H. et al., *Assumption-Based Planning: A Planning Tool for very Uncertain Times* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993)

Dolman, Everett, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age* (London: Frank Cass, 2005)

Dorril, Steven, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations* (London: Fourth Estate Limited, 2000)

Dyson, Stephen Benedict, *The Blair Identity: Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009)

Eden, Anthony, *Full Circle: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden* (London: Cassell, 1960)

Elliot-Bateman, Michael (ed.), *The Fourth Dimension of Warfare Volume I: Intelligence, Subversion, Resistance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970)

Fawzi, Mahmoud, *Suez 1956: An Egyptian Perspective* (London: Shorouk International, 1986)

Foot, M. R. D. *SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940–1946* (London: Pimlico, 1999)

Gardiner, Ian, *In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2006)

Gill, Peter and Phythian, Mark, *Intelligence in an Insecure World* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006)

Glees, Anthony and Davies, Philip H. J. *Spinning the Spies: Intelligence, Open Government and the Hutton Inquiry* (London: The Social Affairs Unit, 2004)

Godson, Rodger and May, Ernest R. et al (ed.), *US Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform* (Washington D.C.: Brassy's, 1995)

Goldman, Jan, *Words of Intelligence: A Dictionary* (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006)

Goldsworthy, David (ed.), *The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 1951–1957* (London: HMSO, 1994)

Goodman, Michael S. *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee Volume I: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014)

Grant, Matthew (ed.), *The British Way in Cold Warfare: intelligence, diplomacy, and the bomb, 1945–1975* (London: Continuum, 2009)

Gray, Colin S. *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: OUP, 1999)

Gray, Colin S. *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Phoenix, 2006)

Gray, Colin S. *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: OUP, 2010)

Handel, Michael I. *War, Strategy and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1989)

Handel, Michael I. (ed.), *Leaders and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 1989)

Hanhimaki, J. M. and Westad, O. A. *The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eye Witness Accounts* (Oxford: OUP, 2003)

Harrison, Edward, *The Young Kim Philby: Soviet Spy and British Intelligence Officer* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2012)

Haste, Cate (ed.), *Clarissa Eden, A Memoir: From Churchill to Eden* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007)

Heikal, Mohamed H. *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Though Egyptian Eyes* (London: Corgi Books, 1988)

Hennessy, Peter, *The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2000)

Herman, Michael, *Intelligence Services in the Information Age* (London: Frank Cass, 2004)

Hill, Christopher, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)

Heuer, Richards J. *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1999)

Hughes, R. Gerald, Jackson, Peter and Scott, Len (ed.), Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008)

Hughes-Wilson, John, *The Puppet Masters: spies, traitors and the real forces behind world events* (London: Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2005)

Irwin, Lewis G. *Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means: Learning from America's Struggle to Build an Afghan Nation* (Carlisle, PA: USAWC SSI, 2012)

Jackson, Peter and Scott, L. V. (ed.), *Journeys in Shadows: Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004)

James, Laura M. *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)

Jeffery, Keith, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service (London, Bloomsbury, 2010)

Jervis, Robert, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976)

Johnson, Loch K. (ed.), *Handbook of Intelligence Studies* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007)

Johnson, Loch K. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (New York: OUP, 2010)

Kavanagh, Dennis, Seldon, Anthony, *The Powers Behind the Prime Minister: The Hidden Influence of Number Ten* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000)

Kelly, Saul and Gorst, Anthony (ed.), *Whitehall and the Suez Crisis* (London: Frank Cass, 2000)

Kennedy, Paul, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Penguin Books, 2001)

Kent, Sherman, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966)

Kirkpatrick, Ivone, *The Inner Circle* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1959)

Kissenger, Henry, *White House Years* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1979)

Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone, 1995)

Kyle, Keith, *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Taurus & Co. Ltd., 1991; 2003)

Laswell, Harold D. *The Political Writings of Harold D. Laswell* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951)

Lindley-French, Julian, Boyer, Yves (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of War* (Oxford: OUP, 2012)

Louis, W. Roger, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonisation* (London: I. B. Taurus & Co Ltd., London)

Lucas, W. Scott, *Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1991)

Lucas, W. Scott (ed.), *Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996)

Lustgarten, Laurence and Leigh, Ian, *In from the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)

May, Ernest R. (ed.), *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68* (New York: Bedford Books, 1993)

McDermott, Geoffrey, *The Eden Legacy and the Decline of British Diplomacy* (London: Leslie Frewin, 1969)

Minogue, Kenneth, *Politics: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: OUP, 2000)

Moncrieff, Anthony (ed.), *Suez ten years after* (London: BBC, 1967)

Murray, Williamson, Knox, Macgregor and Berstein, Alvin (ed.), *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge: CUP, 2008)

Neff, Donald *Warriors at Suez* (New York: Linden Press, 1981)

Nutting, Anthony, *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez* (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1967)

Omand, David, *Securing the State* (London: Hurst & Company, 2010)

Pearson, Jonathan, *Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)

Pillar, Paul R. *Intelligence and US Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011)

Rhodes James, Robert, *Anthony Eden* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986)

Rid, Thomas and Keaney, Thomas (ed.), *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, operations, and challenges* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010)

Robertson, Kenneth G. (ed.), *British and American Approaches to Intelligence* (London: Macmillan Press, 1987)

Rotte, Ralph, Schwarz, Christoph (ed.), *International Security and War: Politics and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2011)

Rusbridger, James, *The Intelligence Game: The Illusions and Delusions of International Espionage* (London: I.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd., 1991)

Shulsky, Abram N. and Schmitt, Gary J. *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence* Third Edition (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2002)

Smith, Simon C. (ed.), *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008)

Strong, Kenneth, *Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer* (London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1969)

Strong, Kenneth, *Men of Intelligence: A Study of the Roles and Decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence from World War I to the present day* (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1970)

Tal, David (ed.), *The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East* (London: Frank Cass, 2001)

Tenet, George, *At the Centre of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007)

Thatcher, Margaret, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Harper Collins, 1993)

Thatcher, Margaret, *The Path to Power* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995)

Thornhill, Michael T. *Road to Suez: The Battle of the Canal Zone* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 2006)

Trevelyan, Humphrey, *The Middle East in Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1970)

Trevelyan, Humphrey, *Diplomatic Channels* (London: Macmillan, 1973)

Troen, Selwyn Ilan, Shemesh, Moshe (ed.), *The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal* (London: Frank Cass, 1990)

Turner, Barry, *Suez: The Inside Story of the First Oil War* (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 2007)

Tzu, Sun (Samuel B. Griffith trans.), *The Art of War* (Oxford: OUP, 1971)

Tzu, Sun (Thomas Cleary trans.), *The Art of War: Complete Texts and Commentaries* (Boston, MA.: Shambhala Press, 2003)

Urban, George, *Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War Within the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997)

Verbeek, Bertjan, *Decision-Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis: Small Groups and a Persistent Leader* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003)

Verrier, Anthony, *Through the Looking Glass* (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1983)

Wright, Peter, *Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer* (Richmond, Victoria, Australia: William Heinemann Australia, 1987)

BOOK CHAPTERS

Aclin, John, 'Intelligence as a Tool of Strategy', in John Boones Bartholomees Jr. (ed.), *US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy* (Carlisle, PA: USAWC SSI, 2010)

Andrew, Christopher and Dilks, David, 'Introduction', in Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984)

Betts, Richard K. 'Politicisation of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits', in Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken (ed.), *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honour of Michael I. Handel* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003)

Cohen, Elliot A. 'The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force.' In Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.), *The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy and War* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2010)

Gazit, Shlomo, 'Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker', in Michael I. Handel (ed.), *Leaders and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 1989)

George, Roger, 'Intelligence and Strategy', in John Baylis, James Wirtz et al. (ed.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World* Third Edition (Oxford: OUP, 2010)

Godson, Roy, 'Intelligence: An American View', in Kenneth G. Robertson (ed.), *British and American Approaches to Intelligence* (London: Macmillan Press, 1987)

Goodman, Michael S. 'The British Way in Intelligence', in Matthew Grant (ed.), *The British Way in Cold Warfare: intelligence, diplomacy, and the bomb, 1945–1975* (London: Continuum, 2009)

Gorst, Anthony, 'A modern Major-General: General Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the Imperial General Staff', in Saul Kelly and Anthony Gorst (ed.), *Whitehall and the Suez Crisis* (London: Frank Cass, 2000)

Grant, Matthew, 'Introduction: The Cold War and British National Interest', in Matthew Grant (ed.), *The British Way in Cold Warfare: intelligence, diplomacy, and the bomb, 1945–1975* (London: Continuum, 2009)

Gray, Colin S. 'Coping with Uncertainty: Dilemmas of Defence Planning', in Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.), *The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy and War* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2010)

Handel, Michael I. 'Leaders and Intelligence', in Michael I. Handel (ed.), *Leaders and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 1989)

Jackson, Peter, 'Introduction', in R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, and Len Scott (ed.), *Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008)

Johnson, Loch K. 'National Security Intelligence', in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (New York: OUP, 2010)

Kilcullen, David, 'Intelligence', in Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (ed.), *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, operations, and challenges* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010)

Kyle, Keith, 'Britain's Slow March to Suez', in David Tal (ed.), *The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East* (London: Frank Cass, 2001)

Laswell, Harold D. 'Politics: Who Gets What, When, How', in Harold D. Laswell, *The Political Writings of Harold D. Laswell* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951)

Lindley-French, Julian 'Strategic Leadership in War', in Julian Lindley-French, Yves Boyer (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of War* (Oxford: OUP, 2012)

Lockhart, John Bruce, 'Intelligence: A British View', in Kenneth G. Robertson (ed.), *British and American Approaches to Intelligence* (London: Macmillan Press, 1987)

Lonsdale, David J. 'The Way Ahead: Strategic Studies in the 21st Century', in Ralph Rotte, Christoph Schwarz (ed.), *International Security and War: Politics and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2011)

Lowenthal, Mark, 'The Policymaker-Intelligence Relationship', in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (New York: OUP, 2010)

Marrin, Stephen, 'Adding value to the intelligence product', in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), *Handbook of Intelligence Studies* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007)

McLachlan, Donald, 'Intelligence: the common denominator/1', in Michael Elliot-Bateman (ed.), *The Fourth Dimension of Warfare Volume I: Intelligence, Subversion, Resistance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970)

Murray, Williamson and Grimsley, Mark, 'Introduction: On Strategy', in Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, and Alvin Berstein (ed.), *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge: CUP, 2008)

Onslow, Sue, 'Julian Amery and the Suez Operation', in Simon C. Smith (ed.), *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008)

Ransom, Harry Howe, 'The politicisation of intelligence', in Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.), *Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society* (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1987)

Shulsky, Abram, 'What is Intelligence? Secrets and Competitions Among States', in Rodger Godson and Ernest R. May et al (ed.), *US Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform* (Washington D.C.: Brassy's, 1995)

Warner, Michael, 'Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence', in Christopher Andrew and Richard J. Aldrich et al (ed.), *Secret Intelligence: A Reader* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009)

Doctoral Theses

Al-Solami, D. A. *British Preparations for the Suez War—1956* (University of Exeter, Faculty of Arts: Doctoral Thesis, 1988)

Davies, Philip H. J. *Organisational Development of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1979* (Doctoral thesis: Department of Sociology, University of Reading, 1997)

Doctrine/Official Publications

Cabinet Office, *National Intelligence Machinery* (London: TSO, 2006)

Cabinet Office, *National Intelligence Machinery* (London: Stationery Office, 2010)

Central Intelligence Agency, *Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 30-4-56: Probable Repercussions of British-French Military Action in the Suez Crisis* (Washington D.C.: CIA, 1956). Available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/0000252664

United States Marine Corps, *MCDP-1: Strategy* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1997)

United States Marine Corps, *MCDP-2:* Intelligence (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1997)

Web Pages

Berkowitz, Bruce, "The Big Difference Between Intelligence and Evidence", (2003) http://www.rand.org/commentary/2003/02/02WP.html accessed 25/10/2011

Dickerson, J. "A Marine General at War" (2010) http://www.slate.com/articles/life/risk/2010/04/a_marine_general_at_war.single.html accessed 18/11/2011

Eden, Prime Minister Sir Anthony, *Commander Crabb (Presumed Death)* Hansard HC Deb 09 May 1956 vol 552 cc1220-3. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1956/may/09/commander-crabb-presumed-death-1 accessed 07/08/2014.

Eden, Prime Minister Anthony, *Israel and Egypt (Anglo-French Ultimatum)*, Hansard House of Commons Debate, 20 December 1956, Vol. 562 cc1456-63. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1956/dec/20/israel-and-egypt-anglo-french-ultimatum accessed 22/11/14

The Guardian, "Surveillance", http://www.theguardian.com/world/surveillance

Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, *Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework* (2015), available at http://isc.independent.gov.uk/news-archive/12march2015

Lane, Ann, "Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone Augustine (1897–1964)", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.* http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34339 accessed 14/03/2012

Reynolds, Paul, "Suez: End of Empire", *BBC News* July 24th, 2006. http://news-vote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5199392.stm accessed on 27/08/2014

SIS, "SIS archive and records policy", http://www.sis.gov.uk/our-history/archive.html accessed 20/08/2012

The National Archives, "Intelligence Records in the National Archives", (2005) http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue.rdleaflet.asp?sLeafletID=32 accessed 05/01/2010

INDEX