INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT, 1945–1990

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Titles include:

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Series Editors' Preface

The chapters in this volume all stress the roles played by international organizations, both official and non-governmental, in world affairs after World War I and, more prominently, after World War II. Combined, the chapters significantly alter the usual, geopolitically oriented narrative of recent history. Those who are accustomed to viewing the 1930s as a decade that culminated in war would be surprised to read in some chapters here that those years also saw the emergence of "development discourse" at the League of Nations, whose various committees began preparing to solve global problems of poverty and hunger by making use of scientific knowledge and technical expertise. And those who habitually think of the postwar years in terms of the Cold War will be compelled by reading this book to de-centre the geopolitical drama and to pay greater attention to developments that took place outside the perimeters of great-power rivalries.

Instead of tracing changes in international affairs as a story of "the rise and fall of the great powers," this book focuses on the theme of "global governance," which is different from "international system" or "international order" – concepts that are often utilized in discussions of how nations seek some stability in their relationship with one another. Global governance, in contrast, envisages mechanisms that would reflect the interdependence of all peoples in a world buffeted by forces of globalization. Global governance, therefore, is a fit subject of study in transnational history.

The Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series has published a number of studies on social, economic, and cultural themes that cut across national boundaries. Of such themes, globalization, interdependence, and development are arguably the most significant in post-1945 history, although the meaning and impact of these themes have varied from decade to decade. As World War II came to an end, there were efforts all over the globe to create a more just and stable world order, and the idea of interdependence served as the key to action. That, in turn, led to an emphasis on development, an idea that became institutionalized in various programs devised by the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations. The stress in many chapters in this volume is on economic development, broadly conceived, including such themes as eradication of hunger, increased production of food, combating

diseases, elementary education, and, increasingly, dealing with popula-
tion pressures, all of which were directly or indirectly connected to the
concepts of social welfare and of human rights, as the chapters here
demonstrate. These ideas would in time combine to produce the idea of
"human security" in the later decades of the twentieth century.

Sovereign states (not just advanced nations but including developing
countries), intergovernmental bodies, and non-governmental organiza-
tions all became involved in devising ways of dealing with problems
of development, in the process modifying the perimeters of the tradi-
tional nation state and defining a structure of governance that would
reflect what one author calls the "new global humanitarianism" that
was emerging by the 1970s. Readers will gain fresh insight into the rela-
tionship among three categories of organizations, inquiry into which
is a key agenda in the study of transnational history. The search for
translating the widely shared sense of transnational interdependence
into a system of just and effective global governance continues today.
The chapters in this volume provide an invaluable guide to the history
of that search.

Akira Iriye
Rana Mitter

Acknowledgements

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List of Abbreviations

ACVAFS	American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service
ACVFA	Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid
AGMA	Alva and Gunnar Myrdal Archive (Sweden)
ARA	American Relief Agency
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CEPAL	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe)
CICARWS	Commission of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CMIT	Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions
CPEs	Centrally Planned Economies
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DAG	Development Assistance Group
DCs	Developed Countries
DDT	Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (insecticide)
EC	European Community
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECSE	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
EPA	European Productivity Agency
EPC WG 3	Economic Policy Committee's Working Party 3
EPTA	Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance (United Nations)
ERP	European Recovery Program
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations)
FFHC	Freedom from Hunger Campaign (FAO)
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
HYV	High Yielding Varieties
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICCH	International Commodity Clearing House
ICIDI	Independent Commission on International Development Issues
ICP	Industry Cooperative Programme
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Committee of Voluntary Agencies
IEFC	International Emergency Food Council
IGOs	Inter-Governmental Organizations
IICA	Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (prior to 1979: International Institute of Agricultural Sciences)
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCAP	The Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama (Central American Institute of Nutrition)
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IO	International Organization
IRO	International Refugee Organisation
ITO	International Trade Organization
LAC	Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa
LBLJ	The Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX
LDC	Less Developed Countries
LOC	Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
LoN	League of Nations
LTA	Long Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles
MEP	Malaria Eradication Program
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MRP	Mediterranean Regional Project
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières
NAI	National Archives of India
NAI	National Archives of Ireland
NARA	National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NMCP	National Malaria Control Program (India)
NMEP	National Malaria Eradication Program (India)
NMLI	National Medical Library of India
NYPL	New York Public Library
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OR	Official Records of the World Health Organization
OTC	Overseas Territories Committee
PASB	Pan American Sanitary Bureau
QRs	Quantitative Restrictions
RUA	Rutgers University Archives
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SCIDE	Inter-American Cooperative Education Service
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
TA	Technical Assistance
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TNA	The National Archives, London
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Emergency Children's Fund
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSF	United Nations Special Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USNA	U.S. National Archives at College Park, MD
USPH	United States Public Health Service
WCC	World Council of Churches
WFB	World Food Board
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

WHOA   World Health Organization Archives
WHOL   World Health Organization Library
WRY   United Nations World Refugee Year
WTO   World Trade Organization

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Introduction: International Organizations, Global Development, and the Making of the Contemporary World

Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel, and Corinna R. Unger

In September 2000, world leaders gathered for a historic meeting at the United Nations Headquarters in New York in order to lay out their vision of the twenty-first century's world. In a declaration that became known as the "United Nations Millennium Declaration," they outlined the following goals: By 2015, the global community was to halve "the proportion of the world's people whose income is less than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger"; it was to make sure that "children everywhere … will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling," and it would reduce "maternal mortality by three quarters." Also, it would halt the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria, promote gender equality, and improve the living conditions of slum dwellers.[1] Following up on this declaration two years later, the United Nations launched the "UN Millennium" campaign and charged an expert commission, headed by Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs, with developing a concrete action plan that would spell out how these goals could be achieved. Published in 2005, the plan announced a new "era in international development" and, with its hundreds of proposals, left no doubt that a "decade of bold ambition" had begun.[2]

The short history of the "UN Millennium" campaign illustrates that international organizations increasingly see the fight against poverty and "underdevelopment" as one of their core missions. Indeed, as United Nations General Secretary Ban Ki-moon emphasized at a meeting of the Development Cooperation Forum in July 2012, "development

cooperation lies at the heart of the United Nations." He went on to say: "We have a shared calling: to lift people from poverty and support long-term sustainable development."[3] Similar views dominate at the World Bank, where a basic strategy paper of the bank states: "[W]e have made the world's most pressing development issue – to reduce global poverty – our mission."[4]

Today, international organizations are heavily involved in shaping global development policy. Through conferences, summits, and campaigns they raise global awareness for specific problems and build moral and political pressure to promote development programs and provide financial and technical aid. Moreover, as the "UN Millennium" campaign shows, they set development targets and formulate agendas, define norms, and coordinate or try to influence other global policies. On the ground, they provide know-how and technical assistance, train officials, and invest in development projects, all of which involves substantial financial commitment. The World Bank alone, to name just one example, disbursed loans to the amount of $15.25 billion in fiscal year 2013 and funded projects in fields as diverse as transportation, public administration, energy, health and social services, water and sanitation, education, agriculture, and finance.[5]

However, international organizations have come under attack lately, attacks vividly embodied by the anti-globalization protests that frequently mar large gatherings of the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.[6] Critics charge that their structural adjustment programs have led to impoverishment around the world; they reject their loan conditions as undue meddling in internal affairs, and consider their privatization agenda as the latest cycle in the long history of Western global domination and exploitation. Others point to the disregard that development consultants of international organizations have of local needs and conditions, complain about their cultural ignorance, and criticize their obsession with comprehensive planning.[7] On the other side of the spectrum, meanwhile, there are two clusters of critics: the optimistic ones who think that international organizations should do far more in fostering global development, and the pessimistic ones who have become disillusioned by their inability to deliver on this mission.

This book seeks to put the current debate about development into historical perspective by examining the role international organizations and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) have played in the making of global development policies since 1945. Its aim is to explore and explain how their policies evolved over time, to shed light on the driving forces and dynamics that were behind them,

and to question the consequences those policies have had around the world. In doing so, this book addresses problems that are at the core of today's debate: How and why did they make development their mission in the first place? What did they promise and what were they expected to achieve? How did they conceptualize development and through what means did they promote it? What changes did they bring about in the field of global development? And, thus, what difference did they make? It is our hope that, by addressing those questions, this book will equip readers interested in the current state of global development policy with a more nuanced understanding of where international organizations have come from historically, how they have contributed to development, and which problems their actions have produced.

At the same time, this book responds to the growing interest historians take in the history of international organizations and INGOs. In line with the extensive historical research conducted in recent years, it seeks to contribute sound historical perspectives to a growing field.[8] Until international and transnational historians "discovered" international organizations, most authors in the field were former practitioners, political scientists, economists, and anthropologists – a fact well reflected by the ironic situation that even a grand-scale history such as the *United Nations Intellectual History Project* includes no trained historians.[9] As a result, while most books offer important insights, they still also typically suffer from a lack of archival research, historical contextualization, and in-depth analysis.[10] It is the intent of this book, then, to offer a historical account which is broad enough to provide a sense of the general trajectories that marked the history of international organizations after 1945, and which, at the same time, is focused enough to allow for a thorough understanding of some of the core issues that have been involved along the way.

Moreover, this book also represents an effort to sketch a vision of a transnational history which moves beyond the usual Cold War story of superpower conflict and opens up to new actors, new research designs, and new questions.[11] Also, paying attention to the forerunners of post-1945 discourses on and practises of humanitarianism and development in the context of colonialism and empire is essential if we are to understand what happened after World War I.[12] And, only if we venture beyond the Cold War narrative will we be able to grasp and explain the radically changed realities of the contemporary world, where globalization has led to a proliferation of perceived and shared global problems and to the erosion of national sovereignty. International organizations and INGOs, as we will see below, have played an important part in this

story, and the time seems ripe, therefore, to take a more systematic look at their recent history.

One possible framework for such a transnational history is the concept of "global governance", which has gained some traction among political scientists. Global governance describes "the nexus of systems of rule-making, political coordination and problem-solving which transcend states and societies."[13] It is marked by two major processes: a "reconfiguration of authority"[14] and a "shift in the principal modalities of global rule-making and implementation."[15] Both are closely interconnected: with the appearance of transnational challenges, nation states increasingly have to share their authority with trans-border players such as international organizations and INGOs which, in turn, gain governance capacity. As a result, global policies are increasingly shaped in a complex interplay between international organizations, transnational networks, nation states, knowledge producers, and national publics. This not only involves new formats of political interaction, such as global summits and conferences, but also new modes of political communication and policy coordination on the ground. Around the globe, governance is increasingly organized in overlapping "spheres of authority"[16] that rely on various "compliance generating capacities."[17]

While most political scientists see globalization as the chief force behind the emergence of global governance, we would like to take the argument one step further. As we argue, it was to some degree the evolution of global development policy (a globalization of its own) which created the system of global governance as we know it today. Indeed, as this volume is going to show, throughout the twentieth century development was a key arena for international organizations, one where they could raise their profiles as actors in their own right, build legitimacy and thereby extend their authority. In this sense, improving living conditions in the "global South" not only served ideational purposes, but was also a way of demonstrating how international organizations and INGOs could make a difference in a world that was increasingly seen as being dominated by global inequalities.

"Developing missions" and global governance, 1920s to 1990s

In order to understand the intimate relationship between global governance and development policy we have to go back to the times of the League of Nations.[18] Article 22 of the League's covenant emphasized a "sacred trust of civilization" to guide the "well-being and development"

of the former German- and Ottoman-occupied territories whose populations were allegedly "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modem world." Under the framework of the League's so-called "mandate system," those territories were divided into the more-developed "A" mandates, the less-developed "B" mandates, and the non-developed "C" mandates, and the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) based in Geneva was charged with supervising their progress.[19] In addition, a few dozen special advisory committees and other bodies were concerned with promoting social and economic welfare around the world, among them the League's Health Organization, which became an important provider of international technical assistance over the course of the 1920s and 1930s.[20] Its experts travelled around the world and assisted governments in Bolivia, China, Siam, and Liberia to reorganize their national health systems, and they staged international conferences on problems such as rural hygiene or cross-border pollution.[21]

By the mid-1930s, moreover, the League paved the way for a new global development discourse. While until then most technical-help programs had been conducted as ad hoc measures to remedy specific exigencies, various reports and inquiries on global food and nutrition questions done under the Health Organization's leadership now began to formulate a holistic understanding of "development," and a systematic, all-encompassing policy approach. As the "Mixed Committee," staffed by experts from various international organizations, observed in its final report published in 1937, global food and nutrition problems needed to be seen in relation to other social and economic aspects.[22] Solving the food and nutrition crisis around the world therefore required broad-scale measures that ranged from improving the food supply to the introduction of fixed minimum wages, family allowances, and other social security legislation that would increase the general purchasing power of populations. Such measures, the committee recommended, were to be flanked by improvements in transport systems and infrastructure, by price controls for seed and fertilizers, and by the development of agricultural credit schemes that would allow farmers to modernize their equipment. Quite clearly, the vision of development as an interventionist project of systematic socio-economic transformation was already on the horizon, and the committee was quick to point out that such problems were "particularly acute" in Africa and Asia, where they called for "urgent attention."[23] Only one year later, in 1938, another study commissioned by the League's general assembly discussed the broader problem of general standards of living and how to improve them. In

this context, the study also treated explicitly the "economic development of primitive societies" (meaning African and Asian societies). As its author, Frederick Hall, director of the London-based National Institute of Economic and Social Research, wrote, scientific advances had changed the expectations of millions of people across Asia and Africa. Now, the Western community had to accelerate "policies designed to relieve the extreme poverty of the native populations."[24]

Reports like these showed that development policy ranked high on the League's agenda. Indeed, looking back at the League's achievements and failures, a 1939 report by a special committee headed by Stanley Melbourne Bruce, *The Development of International Co-operation in Economic and Social Affairs*, noted that more than half the League's budget had been allocated to its social, economic, and humanitarian work. Although the so-called Bruce report observed that the League had accomplished a lot, it would have to do far more in the future:

> Owing to the Press, and still more, the radio and the cinema, men and women all over the world are becoming keenly aware of the wide gap between the actual and the potential conditions of their lives. They know that, by a better use of the scientific and productive resources of the world, those conditions could be improved out of all knowledge; and they are impatient to hear that some real and concerted effort is being made to raise the standard of their lives nearer to what it might become.

It was up to the League, the committee wrote, to lead the way in meeting those global challenges. As a "clearing-house of ideas and an instrument for the spread of knowledge," it would have to coordinate and orchestrate global aid transfers and policies that address the whole spectrum of social and economic problems, including "commercial, industrial and agricultural questions" as well as "financial and transport [questions], demographic and emigration questions, questions of public health and hygiene, housing and nutrition,…and other problems of social dangers and social well-being." The report underlined: "There has never been a time when international action for the promotion of economic and social welfare was more vitally necessary than it is at the present moment."[25]

In hindsight, it is surprising to see how many of the ideas that would dominate development thinking after World War II were already fleshed out in the Bruce report. This included, for instance, the notion of a "revolution of rising expectations," an idea that was later picked up by American modernization theorists such as Daniel Lerner, or the

systemic approach taken by Bruce, in which he conceptualized development policy as a transformative project that spanned all sectors of social, economic, and cultural activity. The Bruce report thus suggests that, already by the late 1930s, international bureaucrats and Western policy elites had arrived at a shared vision of development as a strategy of large-scale socio-economic intervention. Key features of this intervention were expert knowledge, technical assistance, and aid transfers.

Not surprisingly, after World War II new institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (created in 1944 and better known as the World Bank) and the United Nations (1945) with its specialized agencies – such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (1943) and the World Health Organization (1948) – often continued where the League had left off in 1939. Many of the early policies of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), for example, can be seen as an effort to implement the ideas and recommendations that the League's nutrition and food committees had pitched in the late 1930s. This was also because of direct individual connections: FAO's first director-general, John Boyd Orr, had been involved in League activities on nutrition. At another level, continuities also showed in the ringing rhetoric the new institutions used when formulating their mission. Article 55 of the UN charter, for instance, entrusted the UN with promoting "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation,"[26] in effect echoing the League's language of development. Coordination of those policies was to take place at the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), a body that, again, had already been proposed in the Bruce report.[27]

Such examples suggest that the immediate post-war years saw less a "birth of development"[28] in the realm of international organizations, as Amy Staples and other historians have claimed, but rather a re-actualization of global development policy as it had been formulated and practised in the prior decades. Still, there were important differences. For one, most of the new organizations commanded financial resources that far surpassed the League's budget. Where the League's activities had often been limited to small-scale technical assistance programs, organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) could now engage in broad global campaigns or, as with the World Bank, in large-scale infrastructure lending that financed roads, dams, and power plants around the world. Even United Nations bodies and funds, commonly ridiculed for their notoriously low aid budgets, easily outperformed the

League's accomplishments.[29] In addition, all major UN organizations set up large research centres and departments whose scale and global influence went beyond what the League had done. At the UN, this involved the creation of several regional economic commissions,[30] while the UN's Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has relied on its Development Centre since the early 1960s.[31] Thereby international organizations became not only important rallying points for "epistemic communities,"[32] but also turned into influential producers and brokers of knowledge, whose reports, statistics, and conferences led to a global circulation of development ideas and doctrines, and thereby perpetuated the very idea of development.[33]

What further distinguished the post-war years from the interwar decades was the fact that during the 1950s and 1960s decolonization turned development into *the* most important arena of North–South relations (which it has remained to this day). After all, virtually all independence movements in the colonies had built legitimacy on their promise of higher living standards were they to come into power. With independence finally in their hands, national leaders now had to make good on their promises, and were keen to do so.[34] At the United Nations, all of them could therefore easily agree with the idea of officially designating the 1960s as an international "development decade."

Both decolonization and the ensuing "development decade" transformed the global role and outlook of international organizations in a number of ways. First, the nation-building efforts then getting underway in the former colonies meant that there was a new demand for the knowledge, expertise, technical assistance, and funding that international organizations had to offer. In the case of Tanzania, to name just one example, over the course of the 1960s all major UN agencies as well as the FAO set up development programs that included direct financial assistance, fellowships for training Tanzanians abroad, seminars, and technical training. In addition, the World Bank not only helped in formulating Tanzania's first development plan but also funded a range of development projects, including the controversial "Village Settlement Scheme."[35]

Secondly, decolonization also changed the inner dynamics of international organizations. The dozens of new states now entering international institutions as members challenged former power balances and changed the face of international bureaucracies, leading at times to profound culture shocks[36] among Western representatives. More important, developing countries utilized international organizations as platforms to voice new demands, establish norms, and build moral pressure for more action

in the field of development. A good case in point here was the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), summoned for the first time in 1964, which developing countries used to push for structural changes within the world economy. Thereby, they initiated a global debate which, by the mid-1970s, would result in a North–South clash over a New International Economic Order (NIEO).[37] All the while, international organizations were also important meeting places and communication spaces for the "developing world:" by the mid-1960s, after all, a country like Tanzania had a mere 11 embassies abroad.[38]

Finally, decolonization and the new urgency that global development policy attained over the course of the 1960s also led directly to the expansion of existing development institutions and the creation of new ones. As early as 1961, Western European and North American governments transformed the Organization for European Economic Co-operation into the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an institution which was to coordinate and thereby improve Western aid flows to the "third world" in order to keep it aligned with the West. A few years later, the UN followed up by combining, to a larger degree, its fractured development activities in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), established in 1965. At the FAO, meanwhile, director B.R. Sen orchestrated a global "Freedom from Hunger" campaign that mobilized broad support from NGOs, religious institutions, the fertilizer industry, civil society, nation-states and UN specialized agencies. Within a couple of years the FAO's annual budget increased from a meager $7 million (1958) to more than $83 million (1967), allowing for an extension of rural development projects and making the FAO a major player in the world. Perhaps the most important institutional change, though, was the World Bank's conversion into the world's pre-eminent development lender, which began in the late 1960s.[39] Under Robert McNamara's stewardship (1968–1981), the World Bank increased its aid funding by a factor of ten and discarded its previous emphasis on infrastructure projects, now replaced by "basic needs" and "poverty-reduction" programs. This involved heavy investments in health care programs, water sanitation, education, nutrition, and population-control programs, often making the World Bank the biggest aid donor.[40]

It is often overlooked that, as the first development decade drew to a close, over the course of the 1970s the global revolution in mass communications and media continued to transform the posture of international organizations. With the globalizing of mass media around the world, dramatically symbolized by the new possibility of satellite

communications, major conferences and summits now turned into global media events and therefore offered international organizations new opportunities to influence the global development agenda.[41] The United Nations proved particularly adept at capitalizing on those changes as it staged global conferences on every conceivable development problem in the early to mid-1970s, including on the environment, water, food, population, women, science and technology, and housing, to name just a few.[42] As the US mission to the UN acknowledged, those conferences played a "big role in focusing attention and mobilizing the international community to action on crucial problems" and their "short and long term effects on the UN system" would "be major."[43]

While raising awareness was surely one major goal, such conferences also made the United Nations shine as a "catalytic agent"[44] that brokered agreements and global problem-solving strategies between governments, experts, and global civil society. In this sense, conferences not only lent the United Nations visibility as an important actor in the field of global development, but were at the same time also a way of establishing specific notions of world order, with the United Nations at the core. Seen this way, stirring conference announcements and declarations, reports and action programs were also a way of communicating claims about global authority and, thereby, of building that authority. With varying degrees of success, all international organizations pursued their own public diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s, and ground-breaking reports, such as the World Bank's World Development Report or the Pearson and Brandt reports (1969 and 1977, respectively) certainly have to be seen in this context.

If the new power of global communication was one important feature of the history of development in the 1970s, the amazing rise of INGOs was another. Not only did the overall number of newly created development INGOs double and triple during the decade,[45] but many also made the transition from being junior partners of their home governments to becoming global advocacy groups in their own right.[46] Again, this had much to do with the global media revolution. Images of the South's poverty, of starvation and humanitarian crises which began to circulate on a mass scale through global media, evoked empathy and compassion among Western observers and created an urge to help the suffering poor. At the same time, as Kevin O'Sullivan shows in this volume, large INGOs were quick to tap into the "charitable impulse"[47] predominant in Western societies, whereby they not only increased their visibility but also boosted their income: OXFAM, for instance, a British NGO, almost doubled its income between 1968 and 1975, from £3 million

to £5 million.[48] On the international level, meanwhile, formalized cooperation between INGOs and international organizations intensified substantially, making INGOs an integral part of the global policy-making machinery.[49]

In retrospect, it therefore seems that the system of global governance as we know it today was well in place by the 1970s. The World Bank, the biggest development player, had already appeared on the global scene, while other international organizations and INGOs, too, firmly established themselves as important development providers. This not only led to a multiplication of actors involved in global policymaking, but also to new global power constellations and, in the context of the global media revolution of the mid-1970s, to new modes of global policymaking: The goals and the means of development policy were increasingly negotiated through public communication processes among experts, nation-states, INGOs, and international organizations – a situation that, on the whole, continued to dominate the development community throughout the 1980s and 1990s, even though its specific policies changed again over time. Yet, the 1970s were also the time when recession, inflation, and unemployment hit many Western countries, which reduced the willingness on the part of nation-states to provide large sums of money to promote development abroad. As bilateral aid commitments came under fire, the role of the organizations changed, too, as did their images as representatives of specific economic schools of thought.[50]

Writing the history of international organizations and INGOs

The long history of international organizations and their "developing mission" thus opens several vistas onto the emergence and the shifting patterns of global governance. Writing that history, in turn, offers the chance to develop alternative narratives and new themes that reflect the changing global realities of our age. The chapters assembled here represent an effort to do so. Together, they introduce readers to some of the core issues that have marked the history of individual organizations. At the same time, they outline a number of broader problems and perspectives that merit further investigation by future historians.

One general concern shared by all chapters is the emphasis they put on the need to reflect critically about the particular development notions international organizations and INGOs formulated throughout the twentieth century. As Daniel Speich Chassé reminds us in his chapter about the rise of "technical internationalism" from the 1920s to the

late 1940s, such notions were always the product of specific historical circumstances which made transformative "development" promises thinkable in the first place. Specifically, he singles out three intellectual origins of the UN's early development mission: a particular colonial "spatial imagination" which distinguished between a "global North" and a "global South"; the emergence of new epistemological devices such as national income statistics which allowed for grand-scale modeling and abstraction; and interwar ideas to institutionalize technical assistance. By 1945, Speich Chassé argues, those three strands converged into a new operational vision of "development" which was technocratic to the core and made the "promise of generally improving living conditions" seem achievable. On the other hand, when it came to promoting paradigm shifts within global development thinking, international organizations were often also historical forces in their own right, as the present volume shows. By the early 1970s, for instance, as Matthias Schmelzer argues, much of the OECD's work revolved around advancing a new critique of GDP-focused development doctrines which paved the way for a new basic-needs approach.

What most chapters suggest, moreover, is that the advocacy of specific development concepts and policies on the part of international organizations and INGOs was also a form of "policy entrepreneurship" (Inge Kaul) whereby they built themselves up as important actors in the field of development. As the history of the FAO shows, for example, international organizations were constantly in search of new policy innovations that assured their institutional survival or put them in a position of moral leadership. By the 1960s, the FAO and other organizations also increasingly organized global campaigns (see Ruth Jachertz's contribution). Similar observations are shared by Heike Wieters and Kevin O'Sullivan in their chapters on the history of INGOs. While INGOs were often merely "followers rather than leaders of international debate," as Kevin O'Sullivan notes in his chapter, they were always quick to jump on opportunities once they opened up as, for instance, in the context of large global campaigns such as the UN's "World Refugee Year" (1959) or the FAO's "Freedom from Hunger" campaign. Those campaigns offered NGOs an opportunity to frame themselves as part of a global humanitarian effort and provided access to international organizations and governments alike, leading to more formalized forms of cooperation later on. At the same time, NGOs also increasingly capitalized on the media attention that marked most global humanitarian crises of the 1970s and 1980s which they used in order to demonstrate what they were capable of achieving, a strategy that won them much sympathy and civil society

support. In the case of CARE, as Heike Wieters describes, it was the close of European relief operations at the end of the 1940s which led it to re-invent itself as a global provider of humanitarian assistance. In this sense, the concept of "policy entrepreneurship" serves as a useful analytical framework which easily explains why the global development agenda has broadened so quickly from the 1950s onwards to include issues such as health, environmental policies, and population growth and why it continues to see a paradigm shift every few years. It also means, as the chapters show, that we should not take past development policies and concepts for granted, but have to question the strategic purposes that stood behind them.

Another theme that connects the chapters to each other is an emphasis on the inner life of international organizations, including institutional dynamics, power struggles, and the individuals who have shaped their course. Francine McKenzie's chapter analyses the troubled story of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) between the 1940s and the 1960s. Emphasizing that the GATT suffered from "institutional insecurity" and vulnerability throughout those years, she recounts early efforts to turn it into a fully functioning international organization after the idea of the International Trade Organization had failed, and she shows how tensions between developed and developing countries began to overshadow GATT's work in the early 1960s. In the end, as McKenzie shows, those tensions led to important institutional adjustments within GATT. Among other measures, GATT established the International Trade Center which was to provide technical exper-tise for developing countries and introduced an amendment to the general agreement (Part IV on Trade and Development) which called for a moratorium on tariffs and barriers. Procedural impediments within GATT, however, and differing ideological outlooks on the importance of trade for economic development prevented more sweeping reforms of world trade. Much in a similar way, Sönke Kunkel, in his chapter on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the New International Economic Order, casts light on another important insti-tution-building-effort of the post-war decades. Here, too, as he shows, tensions between developed and developing countries often produced deadlocks. Yet, specific individuals nonetheless were often surprisingly successful in shaping UNCTAD's and the UN's agendas.

Glenda Sluga focuses on one particularly prominent proponent of technical assistance: Alva Myrdal. As director of the United Nations Department of Social Welfare in 1949 and then director of Social Sciences at UNESCO from 1950 to 1955, Myrdal advanced a vision of

development that relied strongly on social science-based research and knowledge. Much of her work involved orchestrating expert networks, social science research, publications, and conferences, the practical results of which she was keen to see applied in the field. However, at both institutions Myrdal was also a voice of caution against linear notions of modernization. She liked to point to Margaret Mead's findings that "progress can be stifled or even turned into regression if T.A. experts [technical assistance experts] go against the culture of a people" and warned that the "world might become nothing but a nightmarish dream of press-button perfection (Huxley, Orwell) if due regard were not paid to the human factors, the receptivity, the cultural setting, the climate of inherited traditions, beliefs and values."

The obvious tension between Myrdal's belief in the universal applicability of social science and her call for cultural sensitivity remained an important feature of her thinking, Glenda Sluga shows, but she remained a tireless promoter of a social vision of development which was to include issues such as housing, the status of women, population control, and child welfare. Moreover, Sluga's chapter throws up the broader question of which role(s) did gender and class play in shaping the outlook of international organizations. Most institutions founded after 1945, after all, were staffed by males from middle- and upper-class backgrounds, and individuals from non-Western countries were a minority for at least the first years, even decades, of their existence. How did these demographic structures shape the ways in which institutions thought and acted? Which problems were claimed exclusively, which overlooked or considered irrelevant, and which delegated to other organizations? When and how did the formerly marginal groups make themselves and their perspectives heard? Questions like these will undoubtedly be important to future historians and will help to further our understanding of both the character of international institutions and the transformation of development agendas over time.

However, as much as we need to look *into* international organizations and INGOs, we also need to look *beyond* them in order to understand their histories and the evolution of global governance, as several chapters argue. Both Heike Wieters and Ruth Jachertz, for instance, stress the importance nation-states, and US governments in particular, had in shaping the agendas of CARE and the FAO, a point well underlined by the fact that more than 50 per cent of CARE's budget stemmed from US governmental sources in 1951 alone. Consequently, CARE cooperated closely with US governments, leading to a quite-profitable public–private partnership in the field of food aid (at least from CARE's perspective).

In the case of the FAO, US decisions and initiatives were vitally important at critical junctures, stretching from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations' refusal to let the agency transform into a full-fledged policy-making body to the Kennedy administration's support of a World Food Board. On the other side of the spectrum, Sönke Kunkel describes what a country like Tanzania hoped to achieve through supporting a new global institution such as UNCTAD.

In drawing our attention to the rise and fall of the WHO-led global Malaria Eradication Program (MEP), one of the largest health campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s, Thomas Zimmer provides a further example of the institutional interplay and cooperation that global campaigns required among the different actors involved. Using the MEP as a "window into the complex relationship between development discourse and politics and international public health," the chapter navigates between the different actors involved, explains their varying motives, and explores how those changed over time. Indian officials expected a number of benefits from the MEP, Zimmer writes, including general health improvements, the reclamation of sparsely populated land and, once it had been settled, a subsequent increase of food production. Most of the program funding came from the United States, which furnished motor vehicles, spraying equipment, and insecticides. Compared with US funding, the WHO's material support of the program was "rather insignificant." Yet, WHO was "crucial in demonstrating and highlighting the potentialities of malaria eradication as well as providing impartial authority, expertise, and technical guidance," as Zimmer points out.

As the history of the MEP thus illustrates, international organizations and INGOs were always part of an ensemble of institutions, from the global scene down to the local level, that interacted, cooperated, and competed with one another. Analytically, this means that we also need studies which explore the local dynamics of development policy. In this volume, Corinne Pernet offers such a local bottom-up view. Focusing on the history of the Central American Institute of Nutrition (INCAP) founded in Guatemala in 1949, she shows how global nutrition norms and development policies – as propagated by the FAO, UNICEF or the WHO – often clashed with local views of nutrition policy. One such particular conflict area was the issue of children's malnourishment, which INCAP tried to solve through local milk substitutes while UNICEF launched a program under which milk was imported from the US. While INCAP at first was unable to halt the program or introduce its own alternatives, by the late 1950s it succeeded in developing a less expensive, locally produced milk substitute called "Incaparina".

The history of INCAP points to one final theme which runs through most chapters, namely, the importance all organizations ascribed to the production and transmission of knowledge. INCAP itself is a case in point: As an institute funded by multiple development agencies, it became a training ground for nutrition experts and practitioners, not only from Latin America, but also from Kenya, Egypt, Uganda, and Indonesia, regarding this as one of its most important functions. Indeed, virtually every major international organization sent its experts and consultants around the world and maintained its own research institutes, ranging from GATT's International Trade Center to OECD's Development Centre, which became an important think-tank. Moreover, through their publications international organizations not only disseminated know-how, but also established standards and influential norms. Perhaps the "scientization" of global development policy is therefore one of the most important processes that international organizations and INGOs have set in motion over the last six to seven decades.

Seen together, then, the chapters assembled in this volume not only sketch the individual histories of particular organizations. Rather, they also attempt to introduce new perspectives, themes, and questions to a field in which former analytical categories and certainties are now in flux. Not least, they strive to explore how global development has become a key problem of the twenty-first century – and to explain why international organizations and INGOs have become so heavily involved in it.

Notes

1. United Nations (2000).
2. See Millennium Project (2005). Recently, the UN appointed a high-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda to revise the Millennium Development goals. See for more information ECOSOC (2013).
3. Ban Ki-moon (2012).
4. See World Bank (2012).
5. See World Bank (2013).
6. See, for example, Joseph Stiglitz (2002). On the anti-globalization movement, see Claus Leggewie (2003).
7. See, on the last point particularly, William Easterly (2006). See also Dambisa Moyo (2009). See, for a general and penetrating critique of development aid: Volker Seitz (2009).
8. Patricia Clavin (2013), Mark Mazower (2009), idem (2012), Madeleine Herren (2009), Helge Ø. Pharo and Monika Pohle Fraser (eds.) (2008), Daniel Maul (2012), Amy Staples (2006), Paul Kennedy (2006), Akira Iriye (2002), idem (2013), Sandrine Kott (2011), idem and Joëlle Droux (eds) (2013), Sunil Amrith

and Glenda Sluga (2008), Matthew Hilton and Rana Mitter (eds) (2013). A good contribution by a political scientist is Bob Reinalda (2009).

9. See, for an overview of all volumes and authors, United Nations (2011). See, also, Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, Dharam Ghai, and Frédéric Lapeyre (eds) (2004).

10. A good example is Routledge's series on global institutions. See Routledge (2012) http://www.routledge.com/books/series/GI/, date accessed 2 July 2012.

11. See Matthew Connelly (2000).

12. See the special issue on *Humanitarianism and Empire* (2012); Frederick Cooper (2011).

13. David Held and Anthony McGrew (2006: 8), James Rosenau (2006: 71), Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg (2006: 377–399).

14. David Held and Anthony McGrew (2006: 10).

15. David Held and Anthony McGrew (2006: 11).

16. James Rosenau (2006: 72).

17. James Rosenau (2006: 72).

18. See, on the history of the League of Nations, Eckhardt Fuchs and Matthias Schulz (2006), Patricia Clavin (2005: 421–439), idem (2013), Susan Pedersen (2007: 1091–1117).

19. See on the mandates system Michael Callahan (2004), Anthony Anghie (2006: 447–463). See also Anthony Anghie (2005). In addition, see Susan Pedersen (2006: 560–582).

20. See Iris Borowy (2009).

21. On the League's development policy, see Stefan Hell (2010), Jürgen Osterhammel (1979), Margherita Zanasi (2007) and Norbert Meienberger (1965).

22. Experts included representatives of the League's Health Organization, its financial and economic sections, the International Labour Organization, and the International Agrarian Institute Rome.

23. League of Nations (1937).

24. Noel Frederick Hall (1938).

25. L.o.N. A.23.1939, "The Development of International Co-operation in Economic and Social Affairs." Report of the Special Committee, Geneva 1939. See, also, Victor-Yves Ghébali (1970), Martin Dubin (1983: 42–72).

26. See the United Nations (2012).

27. In his report, however, Bruce had spoken of a "Central Committee for Economic and Social Questions."

28. Amy Staples (2006).

29. See Olav Stokke (2009).

30. See Yves Berthelot (2004).

31. See Matthias Schmelzer's chapter in this volume for more. For the World Bank, see Jonathan Morduch (2008) and Markus Kaiser (2003).

32. Peter Haas (1992: 1–35).

33. See, on the discursive construction of development, Arturo Escobar (1995).

34. Frederick Cooper (2010).

35. Michael Jennings (2002). See, also, Cranford Pratt (1976: 158) and Andreas Eckert (2007: 253–258).

36. Glenda Sluga (2010).

37. On UNCTAD see John Toye and Richard Toye (2004: 184–229), UNCTAD (2004).
38. See Library of the University of Dar Es Salaam, Dar Es Salaam, East Africana Collection, Ministry of External Affairs, "An Official Record of Foreign Policy of the United Republic of Tanzania," vol. 1, No. 1, April 1965: 22.
39. See, on the World Bank, Staples (2006) and Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb (1997). On the beginnings of its development mission see also Michele Alacevich (2009).
40. In a country like India, for instance, the World Bank provided 65 per cent of all foreign aid by the end of the 1980s. See Jason Kirk (2010: 22).
41. For more on the globalizing of media, see Sönke Kunkel (2011).
42. On those conferences, see Michael Schechter (2005).
43. National Archives and Record Administration, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–1976, NA II, US UN Mission NY to SecState Wash DC, 29th GA Wrap-Up: Economic Issues, 8 January 1975, accessed via "Access to Archival Databases," date accessed 14 May 2010.
44. UN Archive, S-273, Box 10, "Draft Speech by the Secretary-General on 'The World Food and Energy Crisis – The Role of International Organizations,'" New York, 9 May 1974.
45. Colette Chabbott (1999: 227).
46. To be sure, this only goes for NGOs that were grounded in civil society; other NGOs such as the Ford or Rockefeller foundations of course had a long history of global advocacy and cooperation with organizations such as the World Bank and the WHO.
47. This is the title of a fine book by Ondine Barrow and Michael Jennings (2001).
48. See Maggie Black (1992: 299).
49. See, for example, UN Archive, S-0935, Box 6, "Report on Proposed Committee on Development," attachment to Conference of Non-governmental Organizations in consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Minutes of Meeting of the New York Section of the Bureau held at United Nations headquarters, 11 October 1972.
50. On the 1970s, see Niall Ferguson et al. (eds) (2010); Daniel T. Rodgers (2012).

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2

Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System

Daniel Speich Chassé

Since 1945, a plethora of international developmental activities has evolved, which the anthropologist James Ferguson famously called an "anti-politics machine".[1] These activities structured knowledge about the North–South divide and became an instrument of donor foreign policy and a powerful element within the socio-economic realities of almost all recipient countries. Countless international organizations rose to prominence in this field. Following is a venture into the historical roots of the leading development concepts in this connection. The chapter asks: When, why and in what forms did questions of development become key topics for international organizations?

For historians, *development* is a difficult term. On the one hand it is linked to modernist notions of progress and betterment without, however, transporting specific contents. Development is a formal concept referring to change in time and can best be understood as an empty container to be filled with different meanings according to political needs. It has rightly been called an "amoeba-like concept"[2] that has no historical trajectory of its own. On the other hand, post-1945 scholars of global history are confronted with a rather clear-cut conception of development meaning political measures to level economic and social inequality across the planet. Beginning with the first "Development Decade" – heralded by the Kennedy Administration and the United Nations in the early 1960s – national development plans, international development programs, development experts and development activists started grouping around an "object of development"[3] and produced a new international social practice. In historicizing this phenomenon it

seems important to inquire into the relationship between the semiotic openness and the practical utility of development.

I assume that the perennial quest for human betterment had to be translated into a series of practical measures in order to become useful in daily politics. The central argument is that the promise of generally improving living conditions deployed a new global political potential after World War II because it was conceptualized as a technical issue and linked to academic expertise. International organizations such as the United Nations were important actors in this process. In fact, we observe a remarkable institutional dynamic on the level of international organizations during the middle decades of the twentieth century – a dynamic that seems strongly connected to the proliferation of an operational definition of development. A new kind of technical internationalism arose in the 1940s and quickly gained considerable stability. At its core lay a macroeconomic definition of development meaning the quantitative growth of national product. This specific conception of development is here presented as the effect of the contingencies of international history at the middle of the twentieth century.

I proceed in four steps. First, is a brief review of existing research. The second section looks back at the interwar period and singles out geographical, epistemological and organizational aspects of international development. These three dimensions were linked in a new development discourse and in new international developmental practices after World War II. The third section recalls specific constraints of international politics at the end of the war and asks which problems the political agents of that epoch thought possible to solve through a new conception of international cooperation. The concluding section focusses on the equation of social change and economic growth that was hammered out around 1950 and that objectified abstract developmental notions into clear-cut policies.

New histories of international organizations and development

Historiography on development follows two distinct tracks concerning the question as to when development actually began. The first refers to the long history of an enlightened discourse of betterment, which can be traced back to (at least) some leading philosophers of the eighteenth century. It conceptualizes the quest for development as a structural trait of modern European history.[4] The second track is more recent. It focusses, not on structures, but rather on political events, of which

the January 1949 inaugural speech of US president Harry Truman is often thought to have been crucial.[5] In defining foreign policy priorities Truman stated as his fourth point a clear commitment of the US government to an international development program.[6]

Both tracks are certainly close to the topic, but they both also only tell a part of the story. The first implies a *longue durée* that somewhat overshadows the marked institutional and political breaks that brought development to the fore of international diplomacy only in the second half of the twentieth century. If development is old, then why did an international development endeavour not emerge earlier? The shift in global power during the final phase of World War II and the following decline of the European colonial empires were crucial events in development history. The second track, in contrast, clearly overemphasizes the definitional authority of US foreign policy in global history. The Truman Administration was an important agent in world politics, but to credit it with the invention of development is historically misleading. We have ample evidence of the fact that the enlightened idea of betterment globally gained unprecedented political usefulness, post 1945, within the double setting of the Cold War and the emerging North–South divide. This was a truly international endeavour and by no means a singular "American Mission", as David Ekbladh has proposed.[7]

Somewhere between the perennial quest of humanity for better living conditions and the crude instrumental use of this vision at the foreign policy departments of powerful states lies the middle field of international organization.[8] Indeed, when venturing into the historical analysis of global development practices one is quickly confronted with an incomprehensible variety of international bodies which work in different thematic subfields but share organizational characteristics and regularly exchange staff members. Talking of a "United Nations System" to a certain degree helps in pegging this multitude to an organizational core for the middle decades of the twentieth century: this is because until roughly the 1970s organized political internationalism largely revolved around the United Nations General Assembly and Secretariat.[9] But there is not much work, which critical historians of the UN System can safely build upon. Too much scholarship on UN history still stands within the discursive promises of the UN founding generation, that is, the betterment of humanity through a globalized rule of law.[10] Too many books on the UN aim at defending this initial vision and, consequently, focus exclusively on the debates at the Security Council and argue that what could have worked as a global scheme of betterment failed because of the veto of some power, be it the USSR or the United States.[11] Mark

Mazower recently diagnosed a bias in UN historiography towards the safeguarding of its humanistic vision against US chauvinism. He called for a more critical stance and suggested relating the trajectory of the United Nations more strongly to the objectives of British imperial rule.[12] Mazower's analysis of the ideological roots of the United Nations shows how large a territory critical historiography still needs to survey. Scholarship on the history of human rights has started to expand in such directions,[13] and historiography on development needs to follow up.[14] New histories of the United Nations seem appropriate.[15]

While the historian's attention currently shifts from the "political" arms of the United Nations to its "technical" bodies under the umbrella of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),[16] we still lack an overall picture that convincingly reduces the complexity of the material at hand. It is not easy to see why the "birth of development" took place at FAO, WHO and the World Bank, as Amy Staples argued;[17] but not, for example, with UNESCO or ILO or the UN regional economic commission for Latin America (CEPAL), or other such regional bodies. Many more candidates could be named, such as the United Nations Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA/UNDP). Existing accounts of an allegedly comprehensive nature are not decisively more convincing. Akira Iriye, for example, claimed that these international organizations were instrumental in shaping a new kind of "global community", post 1945, but he failed to name the chief driving forces behind the process.[18] And the many volumes of the United Nations Intellectual History Project have brought a mountain of details to the fore but did not establish a convincing overall analytical framework.[19]

The image resulting from existing scholarship is that we do not know why an international technical agency deployed such overwhelming dynamics after World War II, nor is it clear why "development" subsequently became a buzzword in global politics. In the remainder of this chapter I will not set out to fill this gap. Rather, I wish to single out some conditions for the possibility of the institutional and discursive changes under scrutiny in early development history. Questions of causality that could lead to historical explanations are left aside because such claims would need to be based upon more and deeper research.

However, it seems evident that the issues at hand are related to the technical character of this field of politics. The promise of development itself is strongly linked to the technocratic belief in technical solutions. And, to a very large degree, international organizations gain their rationale from establishing transparent procedures in order to solve political problems. Our topic is, to a certain degree, the shift of this apolitical understanding

of the problem of governing from national or local levels to more global spheres and from the field of domestic policy to foreign policy. The core element in the technocratic conception of politics is the conviction that social conflict can be resolved by recourse to science and scientists.[20] Thus, our topic also touches the rise of experts and the increasing importance of scientifically grounded knowledge claims in politics.[21] After 1945 the predominant field of developmental interventions was economic life at large, and the relevant sources of procedural knowledge mainly stemmed from economics.[22] Finally, the concept of "development" refers to these issues in a specific geographical perspective that encompasses some kind of North–South relationship. International organizations engaged in development address a fundamental dichotomy between Euro–America and its global "others".[23] Identical economic policy measures, such as the building up of industrial facilities, are labelled under the heading of "growth" if the agents and the fields of implementation are located within Europe or North America; but they are "development" interventions, if a different spatial focus is in place. Thus, "development" has become a geographical category.[24]

Technical internationalism during the interwar period

Forms of economic cooperation across national borders and instances of a technical internationalism in a geographic North–South setting had emerged during the interwar period. Bodies like the International Labour Organization (ILO) or the League of Nations worked along such lines by organizing economic expert boards and international conferences.[25] Also, the Mandate Commission of the League aimed at making welfare an issue for those colonial powers that held administrative responsibility over the mandate territories.[26] At the same time, imperial governance turned towards developmental connections that went under the heading of a "mise en valeur" in French colonial policy, while the British Empire saw the advent of a new concept of "colonial development".[27] However, the manifold dimensions of what became a dominant conception of development after 1945 formed quite clearly separated strands at this early stage. Geographical, epistemological, and organizational aspects need to be analysed separately in order to clearly render the novelty of the global developmental policy outlook that emerged only after World War II. The argument here is that these three dimensions – spatial imagination, order of knowledge, and organizational innovation – followed separate historical trajectories that somewhat accidentally crossed each other's lines in the 1940s.

Geography first. The most prominent semantic root of the development concept lies in late colonialism. Frederick Cooper has argued that the postcolonial development endeavour cannot be understood without taking the colonial project of "development" fully into account.[28] Massive personal and conceptual continuities run across the institutional break of decolonization.[29] The planetary action space of European colonialism fostered a geographical imagination that encompassed a global North and a global South.[30] This was the spatial arrangement that is still in place in the global developmental context. Colonial development was probably crucial in fostering the geographical meaning of development, because in the eyes of Europeans it turned vast and practically unknown territories into potentials to be realized through capital investment.[31] These measures of real estate development gained a metaphorical strength that, step by step, replaced the older discourse of a civilizing mission as the chief mode of legitimizing colonial rule. Development became the core issue of late colonialism and anticipated the reshaping of the colonies into territories in need of development. As a matter of fact, in the dominant geographical imagination, most former colonies turned overnight into "developing countries" through the declaration of national independence at some point during the third quarter of the twentieth century. While the end of empire was a fundamental break in terms of international law, the discourse and the practice of colonial development constituted continuities that reduced the complexity of global politics and opened up new communicative alleys for all actors involved.[32]

This change in the legitimation of colonial rule directs attention to the second dimension, that is epistemological questions. Can specific disciplines be named which offered orientation in this changing environment? A look at the order of knowledge renders an unclear picture. Most strikingly, the discipline of economics seems to have contributed little to colonial development before World War II. This is a stark contrast to the role of economics as a chief source of procedural knowledge in the post-colonial development endeavour.

Colonialism was a mode of exploitation and, thus, an intrinsically economic endeavour. But there was no need for an economic theory in order to exploit the colonies economically. The British case shows quite clearly that a demand for scientific knowledge about the colonies that went beyond the fundamentals of cartographic mapping came up at a relatively late stage. Looking at the continent of Africa it seems remarkable that only around 1930 was a coordinated scientific venture began to be published as Lord Malcolm Hailey's *African Survey*

in 1938.[33] This book has been understood as the scientific research program that accompanied the colonial development project.[34] It focussed almost completely on anthropology, political science, linguistics, psychology, hygiene and agriculture. These disciplines seemed to offer secure knowledge about the structure and the developmental potential of the colonies in order to legitimize growing government expenditure in the overseas territories. But economics did not fit well into this picture. A report on capital investment that Malcolm Hailey also commissioned was published as a separate volume in 1938.[35] The author was the South African economist Sally Herbert Frankel, who in 1946 got the first Oxford professorship for Colonial Economic Affairs.[36] But Frankel was no founding father of the discipline of development economics. Rather, he dealt with the problem fully in the terms of economic anthropology and understood development as a phenomenon of cultural change that could not be reduced to mechanistic models and assumptions.[37]

Frankel built upon a discipline of economics that did not posit prescriptive knowledge and that could not inform policy decisions. Such was the state of the art during the interwar period, when economics was a rather marginal and highly contested field. Scholars debated about inductive and deductive procedures, normative values, descriptive virtues, the importance of institutions versus individual preferences and pro and contra statistical quantification and modelling.[38] Major problems of the epoch, such as the stock market crash of 1929, made economic betterment a chief public purpose in industrial societies, but the discipline had difficulties in making itself heard.[39] International economics was even less prominent and largely restricted to questions of trade, monetary policy, and labour legislation, but made no contributions to the questions of colonial development. A meeting of representatives of 66 nations in June 1933 at the London Geological Museum – one set up in order to revive international trade and to stabilize currency exchange rates – turned out a complete political and scientific failure.[40] The League of Nations reacted by intensifying transnational economic research. But these ventures focussed exclusively on industrialized countries and offered no connection to colonial economics or to the academic understanding of economic interactions overseas.[41]

The quest for a new theory opened up that could turn the discipline of economics into a prescriptive device for politics and that would render a general framework for governmental action in the economic realm. Such a theory clustered around the academic work of John Maynard Keynes.[42] It had some impact on later development thinking.

Let us now turn to the third dimension, that is, organizational innovation during the interwar period. Following the catastrophe of World War I, the League of Nations was founded as a political work of peace. But the guiding idea to civilize international conflict through the institutionalization of international law did not work out satisfactorily. Maurice Bourquin, international legal scholar and diplomat, quite bluntly stated in 1945 the failure of the League concept. But in spite of this bad record, for Bourquin, the League also incorporated success. He understood the international organization as the core of a new system of specialized bodies grouping around a new notion of technocratic politics. Looking back at the interwar period, Bourquin stated: "Step by step, under the constant pressure of daily needs and in favour of the circumstances, the bizarre edifice of what has become known as the technical organizations arose, a motley but useful collection of institutions."[43] This change went along with the arrival of new personnel. Bourquin recorded a certain tension in diplomatic practice. Traditional diplomats and heads of state, he observed, lacked the capacity to decipher the mystery of economic laws and ignored the task of global economic reconstruction. "The fact is that a new figure – the expert – has entered the international scene and has quickly gained a prominent position." [44] Scientific expertise had arrived at the level of international negotiations through the backdoor and was to be built prominently into future institutions.

The League itself registered this process of organizational change. Towards the end of the 1930s the Australian politician Stanley Bruce was commissioned to compile a report on the possibilities of institutional reform. As the report appeared only in August 1939, its recommendations could not be implemented in the League's structure, but it was of considerable importance when the United Nations Organization was invented. The Bruce Committee had suggested to clearly separate all "political" activities and organs of the League from its "technical" organizations and to institute a supervising body in order to oversee the latter. The Bruce report formulated the idea of a "technical" world organization, which was to a certain degree realized in the UN system.[45]

Foundations of the United Nations

The foundation of the United Nations during the four years between the signing of the Atlantic Charter in 1942 and the first General Assembly session in London in 1946 must be seen as a multilayered and contingent process during which the shape and the objectives of the new world organization changed. Current historiography depicts this

institutional innovation either as a great-power game; or as a historical window of opportunity in which the fundamentals of European enlightened thinking triumphed over the daily business of *realpolitik*; or as some combination of these two instances. Stephen C. Schlesinger, for example, pathetically spoke of an "Act of Creation", which he then consequently boiled down to the rather worldly interests of the superpowers.[46] In Paul Kennedy's account a transcendent moment gave rise to one of mankind's most formidable documents, that is, the UN Charter, the formulation of which he thinks to have been historically improbable and the realization of the goals of which, to his view, remained an unfulfilled promise ever after.[47] And Mark Mazower tended to understand the UN foundation as a conflicting attempt at stabilizing in one identical institutional setup old and new imperial power relations at the same time.[48]

While all these approaches are convincing, I here wish to add another observational perspective, which focusses on the emergence of a technical internationalism. I assume that on the practical level of institutional cooperation and with respect to concrete procedural questions the Kantian imperative of *enlightened reason* opened up a new political language and new action frameworks, which the great powers used as a means in their respective foreign policies. World War II was decisive in shaping this connection. The alliance against the Axis Powers started with a technical arrangement known as the Lend–Lease Act of 1941, which created financial liabilities and administrated new forms of economic cooperation in order to pay for the war.[49] The internationalization of economic policy then crucially informed the transatlantic debates about a possible postwar peace order. Drawing upon increased macroeconomic expertise, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada instituted the Combined Production and Resources Board in 1943. This body aimed at coordinating the planning procedures of the respective national war production boards in order to optimally allocate their resources internationally with respect to postwar reconstruction.[50]

In view of such initiatives, the famous reference to "freedom from want" in point six of the Atlantic Charter of 1942 must be seen not only as a philosophical postulate but also as an operational policy objective. It was causally related to the techniques of national income statistics and to the prospect of processing such data in the theoretical framework of an interventionist Keynesian macroeconomic policy. The Bretton Woods conference of 1944 that resulted in a new international monetary system was clearly based upon such a policy outlook.[51] Technical

arrangements were thought to safeguard the future welfare of all peoples subject to such protocols.

This political success of technical experts impressed some delegates at the UN founding conference in San Francisco in 1945. The Canadians, for example, took up the late League of Nations experience embodied in the Bruce Report and strongly suggested the setup of a global arena for technical negotiations, which came to be instituted as the United Nations' Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Canada highly welcomed constitutional articles of such a technical kind, which "provided for a special body to deal with economic and social questions, and hence avoided their subordination to political issues".[52] For them, technicality made it possible to check great-power politics. We can thus understand Article 55 of the United Nations' founding charter as one of the central foundations of the UN System. "With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations", this article promised promoting "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development" as well as "solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems".[53] The UN charter envisioned an assumedly apolitical level of international cooperation in order to achieve a ubiquitous rise of collective welfare.

This promise caught the imagination of many small and middle-sized industrialized states. Switzerland, for example, did not manage to join the United Nations but became an active member of all bodies related to the ECOSOC.[54] And the Belgians wished to strengthen the Economic and Social Council symbolically by changing its name to International Cooperation Council.[55] Such a name would indicate that the institution dealt not only with economic and social issues but with education, science, culture and health, too. It was responsible for all forms of civilian international cooperation, leaving only the restricted field of military cooperation to the UN Security Council. Social engineering seemed more powerful than military action. In a high mood, the chief of the Australian delegation at the UN founding conference of San Francisco 1945 later on recorded: "The long-term opportunities for the United Nations in the economic field are almost limitless. Never before has the world been so well equipped with detailed statistical and other information, nor with the means for analysis and discussion of desirable courses of international cooperation in this field."[56] The rise of the UN System was to a certain degree due to the fact that seemingly apolitical and science-based cooperation became plausible at the end of World War II.

We need, however, to keep in mind that the early UN was no truly global affair but was almost completely oriented towards the resolution of European problems. It is in this geographical connection that the Bretton Woods Conference aimed at stabilizing currency regimes.[57] Differences in economic potential and the promise of levelling economic inequality first came up on the international agenda with respect to European reconstruction. In 1947 the UN Economic and Social Council commissioned the UN Regional Economic Commission for Europe, which set a template for other regional bodies such as the Latin American CEPAL, headed by Raul Prebisch. It can be traced back to an original idea of Walt W. Rostow. During the last phase of the war, Rostow served as an intelligence officer designing targets for the allied air raids over Germany. After the war he became an advisor in the German–Austrian Economic Division of the US secretary of state, whose task was to direct the allied efforts in reconstructing the German economic potential. From this vantage point Rostow early on called for a new international organization that would coordinate all such trajectories in a supra-national planning effort.[58]

The UN reacted to his call by establishing a new international body that had two tasks. First it should introduce macroeconomic knowledge into the construction of a postwar order and, second, it should design guidelines for all European states as to how: they could cooperate economically; in which fields of economic activity such cooperation seemed most promising and efficient; and by what policy recommendations these goals could most easily be achieved. In the prose of the UN System resolutions this task read as follows: The UN Economic Commission for Europe will "initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic reconstruction of Europe, for raising the level of European economic activity, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of the European countries, both among themselves and with other countries of the world".[59] A new expert body was formed under UN auspices and headed by Gunnar Myrdal from Sweden. It came into existence before the Allied forces split along the logic of the Cold War. Accordingly, the USSR was a full member of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). And this regional body, which still exists today, always understood itself to be a combined agent of the East and the West in the greater task of economic reconstruction and development.[60]

The first product that the UNECE issued under Myrdal's lead was a scientific report on the major problems, and on the perspectives of, the combined European economies.[61] This report appeared in 1948 and

was largely written by the British economist Nicholas Kaldor. Following Charles P. Kindleberger, who was a senior economic scientist at the US state department at the time, this report was fundamental in many respects.[62] It clearly showed that the ongoing planning activities in all European countries set national priorities, which in their sum proved detrimental to general European welfare. Each nation sought to diversify its economic production without taking into consideration its comparative advantages on the European market. This resulted in an inefficient overall allocation of resources and completely disregarded the economies of scale. Economic life in the continent had, until 1939, been closely interwoven. But the market forces that had safeguarded this greater perspective had been destroyed by the war. Now it seemed compulsory to artificially re-install an international perspective in Europe by means of coordinating the national planning activities very much in line with the combined US, UK and Canadian experience mentioned above. According to the early exponents of what later became the Marshall Plan, the UN Economic Commission for Europe would have been the natural body to bring such an initiative into operation. But when Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav rejected any participation of the USSR in such a scheme, a new body had to be founded, one that consigned membership according to the cleavages of the emerging Cold War. Thus, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) came into existence, and the UNECE sank into oblivion and diplomatic irrelevance.[63]

Gunnar Myrdal has always made a strong point of the initial importance of his organization. In one of his many retrospective publications, he wrote: "As a matter of fact [the 1948] survey was taken as the scientific basis for the newly created OEEC's attempt to get into business by establishing country plans for recovery and expansion."[64] Myrdal also claimed such a primer in economic analysis for the UNECE publication on "European Steel Trends" of 1949. According to him, the knowledge and the expertise entailed in this publication defined the subsequent political negotiations towards a European Coal and Steel Community. And it was – allegedly – also one of the chief inspirations for Jean Monnet in the launching of the "Schuman Plan".[65]

Conclusion: colonial development meets economic growth

Further research must show how the new action framework of technical internationalism was stabilized during the second half of the 1940s and how this framework gained a truly global perspective. A close analysis of respective UN resolutions, reports and deliberations could clarify the

emerging links between the economics of European reconstruction and the geography of colonial development. This process was politically explosive because it aimed at objectifying the inequality in living standards between imperial centres and colonial peripheries and at pushing possible solutions to these problems out of colonial politics into a new realm of apolitical, technical cooperation. Evidence shows that, in this connection, the new category of "underdeveloped" countries was born. A report by the General Secretariat's Department of Economic Affairs of 1948, *Salient Features of the World Economic Situation*, made explicit the newness and the confusion around this term. The introductory note said: "Throughout this report frequent references have been made to 'surplus' countries, 'devastated' countries, and 'underdeveloped' countries – categories which are not mutually exclusive."[66] At this point, the destruction of economic assets through war, and structural economic weaknesses caused by colonialism, were just about to become terminologically separated issues.

The British perspective shows the following picture: As early as 1944 the biologist Julian Huxley and the economic statistician Phyllis Deane proposed the necessity of completely changing the colonial outlook. They argued that the colonies could no longer be seen as "national possessions to be used as pawns in the game of military and economic power politics, or milk cows for the enrichment of their national owners".[67] Such a direct political logic was not plausible anymore. Rather, the colonies had to be understood as social collectives entitled to a minimal standard of health, economic security, social welfare, and educational opportunity and were subject to an international organizational perspective of development. The doctrine of trusteeship for the colonial peoples seemed to be completely outdated and needed to be replaced by a new doctrine of partnership that ultimately aimed at universal equity. The authors concluded by offering a new legitimation for the British colonial presence: "The next and final phase of white expansion must express itself in assisting the development of the world's backward and undeveloped regions, of which the colonies are an important section."[68] They envisioned a highest stage of colonialism in which the colonizing mission would finally be completed by eradicating economic and social differences. These prospects led into a specific double bind because what was presented by Huxley and Deane as a rationale for colonialism ultimately blocked the legitimation of colonial rule. When colonial development was made an international organizational issue and linked to the social scientific resources of modern Western welfare states, it turned into a source of anti-colonial claims.[69]

The UN perspective shows obvious reverberations of this national outlook by a colonial power in crisis. In December 1948 the General Assembly voted on two resolutions: "Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries" and "Technical Assistance for Economic Development".[70] The General Secretariat under the lead of the Norwegian, Trygve Lie, had to take measures in this direction. They resulted in the building up of an international technical assistance program, which was initiated at a pledging conference at the temporary UN headquarters in Lake Success, NY, in 1950. Here the apolitical space of technical internationalism was filled with developmental promises that turned directly against colonial interests. Speaking to the assembled potential donors from industrialized countries, including Britons, Trygve Lie said, he wished to construct a development apparatus in which

> none of the abuses associated with past experiences of political or economic domination of one country by another are possible. Under the United Nations programme, technical assistance for economic development cannot be used for purposes of domination or imperialism.[71]

The motor behind the General Secretariat's initiative was not national interest but the enlightened use of reason. Or, to put it in other words: While there had been no demand for an economic theory in order to exploit the colonies economically, this new concept fully built upon presumably objective knowledge, disinterested expertise, and theory. Such a theory could be found in the macroeconomic modelling of national economies as mechanical devices.[72] The UN experiences in Europe, notably the work at UNECE, had shown the practical applicability of economics, but there still was much work to be done to make macroeconomic modelling helpful in view of the situation of the colonies. Some preliminary inquiries with respect to poor Eastern European countries had been conducted by Paul Rosenstein-Rodan at the London School of Economics and by Kurt Mandelbaum at Oxford.[73] But it was the Caribbean-born economist W. Arthur Lewis of Manchester University who achieved the decisive intellectual breakthrough. On behalf of the General Secretariat, in 1951 he published the report, *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries*, which offered an operational definition of development.[74] The report conceived of underdeveloped countries as collectives "in which per capita real income is low when compared with the per capita real incomes of the United States of America, Canada, Australasia and Western Europe. In this sense, an adequate synonym would be 'poor countries'".[75] Accordingly, all developmental measures that Lewis suggested focussed on raising national income through capital

investment. A quantitative notion of growth became the leading concept of development. In his 1955 textbook, *The Theory of Economic Growth*, Lewis explicitly stated the equation of growth and development. Its first sentence read: "The subject matter of this book is the growth of output per head of population."[76] And more specifically, Lewis wrote: "'Growth of output per head of the population' is rather a long phrase…Most often we shall refer only to 'growth' or to 'output', or even occasionally, for the sake of variety, to 'progress' or to 'development'."[77]

I would argue that the deeper this new notion of development as growth was rooted in macroeconomic technicality, the clearer were its contours and the more useful it became in global politics. It allowed reducing the complexities of the colonial legacy to rather simple mechanisms of economic interaction, and it rephrased the abstract notion of a civilizing mission in the operational terms of economic policy. Economists such as Sally Herbert Frankel strongly objected to this technical reductionism, but that is another story.[78]

Notes

1. James Ferguson (1990).
2. Wolfgang Sachs (1992: 4).
3. Timothy Mitchell (1995).
4. Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton (1996) and Gilbert Rist (2002). Philipp Lepenies goes even further back; see Philipp Lepenies (2008).
5. Arturo Escobar (1995: 3).
6. Dennis Merrill (1999: 4–5).
7. David Ekbladh (2010). This valuable book recounts the history of US developmental experiences prior to Truman and offers links to European imperialist and domestic governmental practices, however, without exploring them.
8. References to international relations theory are here restricted to some authors who emphasize the normative agency of international organizations. See Martha Finnemore (1996), Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2004) and Connie L. McNeely (1995).
9. Before and after the middle decades of the twentieth century the activities of nongovernmental international organizations made things more complicated. John Boli and George M. Thomas (1999) sort valuable evidence on the historical impact of NGOs into a disappointingly linear narrative of progress.
10. Martti Koskenniemi (2005).
11. Paul Kennedy (2007).
12. Mark Mazower (2008).
13. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (2010).
14. Hubertus Büschel and Daniel Speich (2009).
15. Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga (2008).

16. Daniel Maul (2007), Michele Alacevich (2009), Craig N. Murphy (2006) and Michael N. Barnett (2011).
17. Amy L. S. Staples (2006).
18. Akira Iriye (2002).
19. Of interest here are Yves Berthelot (2003), Olav Stokke (2009), John Toye and Richard Toye (2004) and Michael Ward (2004).
20. Frank Fischer (1990) and Hermann Lübbe (1998).
21. Dorothy Ross (2003), Peter Wagner (1990) and Lutz Raphael (1996).
22. Timothy Mitchell (2002).
23. Stuart Hall (1992).
24. Arndt implicitly acknowledged this parallel by writing two separate histories on growth and development. See Heinz W. Arndt (1978) and Heinz W. Arndt (1987).
25. Daniel Maul (2007), Gabriele Kohler (1998) and Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessels (2005).
26. Antony Anghie (2002) and John Kent (1992).
27. Jacques Marseille (1984) and Herward Sieberg (1985).
28. Frederick Cooper (2010).
29. Christophe Bonneuil (2000) and Joseph M. Hodge (2007).
30. Iris Schröder (2011), chapter 3 and Helen Tilley (2011).
31. Dirk van Laak (2004).
32. Daniel Speich (2011).
33. William Malcolm Hailey (1938).
34. Helen Tilley (2011).
35. Herbert S. Frankel (1938).
36. John Toye (2009: 175).
37. In 1929 Malinowski had made anthropology a practical science for use by colonial administrations. See Bronislaw Malinowski (1929). Economic considerations quickly came into view. See Richard Thurnwald (1932). This literature formed the basis for Frankel.
38. Yuval P. Yonay (1998) and Mary S. Morgan (1990).
39. Michael A. Bernstein (2001).
40. Patricia Clavin (1996) and de Neil Marchi (1991).
41. In a report by James Meade on behalf of the League of 1938, the colonies played no role. James Meade (1938), quoted in Heinz W. Arndt (1987: 33). The report dealt with the United States, Western Europe and Japan on 26 pages, while it dedicated only one single paragraph and one table to the "primary producing countries" (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia) and one sentence only to the Balkans and to the Dutch East Indies. The rest of Asia, all of Africa and the USSR went unnoticed.
42. John Maynard Keynes (1936). On the diffusion of Keynesianism see Peter A. Hall (1989) and Marion Fourcade (2009).
43. Maurice Bourquin (1945: 62). This is my rough translation of the following French quote: "Peu à peu, sous la pression des besoins, à la faveur des circonstances, s'éleva l'édifice bizarre, hétéroclite, mais utile et, en certains points, très solide de ce qu'on a appelé ses organisations techniques."
44. Maurice Bourquin (1945: 67). "Le fait est qu'un personnage nouveau – l'expert – a fait son entrée sur la scène internationale et qu'il y a rapidement conquis une place en vue."

45. Maurice Bourquin (1945: 66–68), Victor-Yves Ghébali (1970) and Norbert Meienberger (1965).
46. Stephen C. Schlesinger (2003).
47. Paul Kennedy (2007), chapter 1.
48. Mark Mazower (2008).
49. Leon Martel (1979).
50. CPRB (1945) and Gerhard Colm (1951: 79).
51. Georg Schild (1995) and Robert Clinton Hilderbrand (1990). See also Roy F. Harrod (1951), chapter 13.
52. Statement by the Canadian delegation at the fourth meeting of Commission II, Third Committee, 11 May 1945. United Nations (1945: 21).
53. United Nations (2013).
54. Daniel Speich Chassé (2012).
55. Statement by the Belgian delegation at the tenth meeting of Commission II, Third Committee, 20 May 1945. United Nations (1945: 209).
56. Herbert Vere Evatt (1948: 127).
57. To John Maynard Keynes (who was the dominant figure at the founding conference of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and a World Trade Organization) the vast majority of the 44 participating countries were simply irrelevant. Gerald M. Meier (1984: 9).
58. Charles P. Kindleberger (1987: 106), Walt W. Rostow (1981) and Michael J. Hogan (1987: 36).
59. UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 36 (IV), 28 March 1947, E/RES/36(IV), 10, http://unbisnet.un.org/, date accessed 6 March 2012.
60. Yves Berthelot and Paul Rayment (2003) and Gunnar Myrdal (1968).
61. UNECE (1948).
62. Charles P. Kindleberger (1987: 100).
63. Daniel Barbezat (1997).
64. Gunnar Myrdal (1956: 281).
65. Gunnar Myrdal (1956: 281).
66. United Nations (1948: xv).
67. Julian Huxley and Phyllis Deane (1944: 8). The publication was Number 8 in a series on major policy issues entitled "Target for Tomorrow" edited by John Huxley, Boyd Orr and William Beveridge. Huxley had been on the board of Lord Hailey's African Survey. Dean had worked on colonial social accounting under the supervision of EAG Robinson, who in his turn had also worked with Hailey. See Phyllis Deane (1948).
68. Julian Huxley and Phyllis Deane (1944: 8).
69. Frederick Cooper has highlighted the delegitimization of colonial rule through the expansion of welfare. See Frederick Cooper (1996).
70. United Nations General Assembly, Third Session, 4 December 1948, Resolution 198 (III) and Resolution 200 (III), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/3/ares3.htm, date accessed 16 January 2014.
71. Trygve Lie (1950: 311), Daniel Speich (2009) and Craig N. Murphy (2006).
72. Timothy Mitchell (2005).
73. Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Kurt Mandelbaum (1945).
74. United Nations (1951). On Lewis, see Robert L. Tignor (2006).
75. United Nations (1951: 3).
76. W. Arthur Lewis (1955: 9).

77. W. Arthur Lewis (1955: 9).
78. Herbert S. Frankel (1952) and Dieter Plehwe (2009).

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3
The Human Story of Development: Alva Myrdal at the UN, 1949–1955

Glenda Sluga

Which development story?

When the Swedish feminist and political activist Alva Myrdal arrived in New York in February of 1949 to take up her unique position as principal or "top-ranking" director of the United Nations Department of Social Welfare, the word "development" was relatively unfamiliar as a synonym for the modernizing impulse that would redefine the relationship between empires and colonies in the second half of the twentieth century. Instead, Myrdal's arrival coincided with the testing of an international mission oriented around *technical assistance* or TA, only belatedly assimilated into the larger concept of development. Against this background, her international career offers historians a critical nexus for probing "the competing visions of modernity" that shaped international development in the early years of the UN. During Myrdal's seven years as an executive in the UN and the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) bureaucracies,[1] she was intent on a technical-assistance vision of development that addressed social and economic injustice and, more particularly, the status of women. International and even intergovernmental organizations such as the UN and UNESCO, she believed, could work towards these ends by putting the "social" into the international in a way that elevated the "human".[2]

Adding Myrdal to the history of development points us towards a more complex account of the diverse and intersecting political, social and economic ambitions for modernization that informed the work of the UN and became the hallmark of latter twentieth-century internationalism. In prevalent historical narratives, the meaning and methods of development tend to be embedded in scenarios of (usually British)

colonial governance, or (usually American) modernization theory. In the latter case, for example, historians tend to be drawn to the records of American foreign policy, although they might also allow for the existence of Cold War collaborations between, on the one hand, the United States government, American social scientists, and American philanthropic organizations and, on the other, international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).[3] Then there is the gulf of research between this literature, and approaches that burrow down to the imperial roots of post-World War II development.[4] More recently, postcolonial historians have begun to examine the intersecting histories of colonial development and post-colonial state-building.[5] In these cases, a focus on individual agents has expanded our historical understanding of the extent to which a shared vision of the salience of social engineering and modernization underwrote the growing attachment of UN agencies to development as an international priority.[6]

If, in the existing historiography, Myrdal's story is exceptional because she was not only Swedish, but also a woman and a feminist, it was as atypical at the time given that there were no other women executives in the system of postwar international organizations (although there were more Scandinavians). As I will argue, Myrdal is also representative of a bureaucratic cohort that brought to mid-twentieth-century internationalism a social-scientific and social-welfare vision of international development as the path to peace.[7] In effect, Myrdal's individual life connects an international and internationalist history of development with the post-World War II influence of European social scientists and social democrats. Many of these individuals, including Myrdal, were veterans of interwar struggles for equality and rights, and proponents of scientific rationalism and social planning on an international scale. Myrdal was unique amongst the bureaucratic elite, however, for her emphasis on women as agents and subjects of development, a perspective she brought with her from her Swedish and transnational past.[8]

* * *

In her late twenties, Alva Myrdal began her national public ascendancy as "one of the most prominent political creators of public opinion in Sweden".[9] Together with her husband, celebrated economist Gunnar Myrdal, she promoted the precepts of social welfarism definitive of the iconic Swedish model and counter to the conservative tendency of the Social Democratic party that they had joined.[10] In *Crisis in the Population Question* (1934), Alva and Gunnar elaborated their aggressively modern

social democratic view of the point of politics: Social planning on a national scale was to be the basis for the improved communal lives and needs of all Swedes, moving Sweden out of the pre-industrial into the industrial age. They argued for shucking off older rural values and capitalizing on the transition to an urbanized society by taking on "a new, planned, socialist sense of community…built on a broad, democratic foundation".[11]

Crisis in the Population Question reads like a textbook case-study of the need for a social justice approach to developmentalism as it might be applied two decades later in non-European parts of the world. It exposed entrenched poverty, the destabilization of agricultural communities and workers, overcrowding, undernourishment and unemployment, as characteristic of 1930s Sweden emerging out of its rural cocoon into the urbanizing world of late industrialization. The Myrdals offered as a panacea new labour and social-welfare programs, improved education and, more controversially, the empowerment of women.[12] They argued that by improving housing and giving larger families more room, and by providing day nurseries for women who wanted or had to work, more women would have more children. Here was the case for feminist and progressive welfare placed squarely at the service of alleged national and economic modernizing imperatives, including growing a labor force.

In the 1940s, as a second world-wide war provoked reappraisals of the international and social and economic foundations of peace, the Myrdals brought this mode of modernity and progress to the problems of the wider world.[13] While Gunnar became the executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, an organization devoted to the construction of a common European economy as the foundation for peace and prosperity, Alva found herself in demand as an expert on population questions and social-welfare issues concerning families and children, and as national delegate and then civil servant to the new international intergovernmental agencies. Thirty years later, after winning the Nobel peace prize (for her intellectual contribution to nuclear disarmament), she reflected that when World War II had ended and the "positive tasks of reconstruction" had begun in Europe, she was gripped by "the great historic drama of decolonization". "So", she wrote,

> I enlisted in the struggle for development of the underprivileged parts of the world. This linked up with my work from earlier years for racial justice in my own country, for income redistribution and a better life for all weak groups, particularly children and youth. The ideal that always carried me was, and is, the one of pressing for equality.[14]

In this chapter I argue that a genealogy of development that takes into account Alva Myrdal illustrates the tensions that shadowed feminist and social scientific engagement with development thought. On the one hand, it shows that the Swedish model of development was compatible with progressive British and modernizing American trends, despite their distinctive national imperatives and methods. On the other hand, Myrdal's specific emphasis on the "human" leads us back to a lost mid-twentieth-century vision of modernity and the influence of interwar trends in political thought. It also recontextualizes the late-twentieth-century UN concepts of *human development* and *human security* and casts their underlying social justice and gender principles in a *longue durée* past.

Internationalizing the social

In January 1949 the United Nations Organization made technical assistance (TA) its flagship program in correspondence with President Truman's own announcement of a program of technical assistance led by the United States. Within the UN, there were evident tensions in conceptions of TA, its parameters, who owned it, and its implications. From the American government's perspective, TA was the "rest of the world" corollary to its Marshall Aid reconstruction program in Europe, and was proposed with an eye to gaining tactical ideological advantages in the emergent Cold War. From the perspective of members of the UN Secretariat, Truman's so-called "Four Points Program" gave the imprimatur of realpolitik to their own international TA initiatives.

As early as 1946, at the urging of disgruntled delegates from the non-European world, the UN's Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) had deliberated support for TA programs in Asia and the Americas. Brazil's ambassador, for example, complained that for two years his country had given nearly 1 per cent of its national income to the UN's refugee program "for war-ravaged Europe", while no UN attention was being paid to the desperate populations in non-European parts of the world.[15] In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly approved a major program for providing technical knowledge and aid to support specifically "economic development" in designated economically underdeveloped areas.[16] (The term *underdevelopment* had itself only recently been coined in the corridors of another international agency left over from the League of Nations' era, the International Labour Organization).[17] By this time, UNESCO's director-general, Julian Huxley, had already approved the implementation of TA-type programs premised on the view that the

dissemination of scientific knowledge would help pacify "international tensions". UNESCO's "Fundamental Education", for example, was partly about mass literacy. However, its approach was intended to be holistic, bringing experts in health, methods of agriculture, techniques of labour, and "better methods of making money" to the colonies and post-colonial societies, in the first instances to Haiti and (British) East Africa.[18] The implication was that raising the standard of living in a world economy would help guarantee peace. Importantly, these programs were conceived of not as acts of international intervention, but as international assistance on the invitation of the states involved.

In the wake of the 1948 "Four Points" speech, it was not only international organizations that reached out to their nation-state constituencies. The United States delegation to the United Nations introduced a resolution to the UN's Economic and Social Council outlining a comprehensive international TA program. When, in 1950, the UN secretary-general, Norway's Trygve Lie (pronounced "lee"), presented the Twenty Year Peace Programme, which consolidated the virtues of already-existing technical assistance as the defining UN concern, along with the principle of "human rights" enshrined in the UN's Charter. Technical assistance, Lie argued, would deliver "economic development". Economic development would be based on "large-scale capital investment". Capital would "increase production, increase purchasing power, and expand the markets of all producers of industrial and agricultural products". As importantly, TA would encourage self-help, and ultimately raise the standard of living in the states that benefited from it.[19] Eighty countries pledged $142 million to the UN over the first six years of the program, to be used to help 131 countries and territories. The UN configured two new administrative bodies for TA collaborations: the TA Committee of ECOSOC and the TA Board made up of representatives of UN agencies, including UNESCO. Between 1950 and 1956, the UN and its agencies sent out more than 5,000 experts and awarded 8,000 training fellowships as part of its contribution to TA.[20] Over the next half-century, TA manifested variegated agendas, from the "UN Development Decade" of the 1960s to the "Gender and Development" and "Human Development" norms of the 1990s. Throughout this period, the social dimensions of economic development and its "human" consequences echoed with unreliable volume in competing visions of modernity. Intergovernmental agencies in particular could not avoid the struggle over the meaning and methods of economic progress and modernity that were at the core of the emerging Cold War.

Alva Myrdal arrived at the UN while it was still based in makeshift headquarters on Long Island at Lake Success, New York. Her temporary tenure, "third person from the top", and in charge of the Department of Social Affairs, however, coincided with a crucial ideological moment in the organization's history. Her new position was also significant from a personal perspective.[21] Despite her already long public career in Sweden, it was the first time that she was actually paid for her work. She soon found herself a doll-house-like terrace apartment in Great Neck and began a personal transformation from pale *hausfrau* hostess to a determinedly thin and glamorous international civil servant.

The Department of Social Affairs that Myrdal headed was one of eight departments that made up the UN Secretariat, the public service to the UN's "parliament".[22] Each department had its own assistant secretary-general as well as director. In the case of Social Affairs, the assistant secretary-general was Henri Laugier, a French Resistance figure, founder of the International League for Human Rights, and, by profession, a physiologist. As director, Myrdal reported to Laugier, who reported to Secretary-General Lie. Social Affairs was the chief advisory body to the Economic and Social Council, advising on "its general work of coordination in the Social field, coordination between the various commissions as subsidiary organs, but coordination also between Specialized Agencies". The department's role was subject to the decisions made by the General Assembly's "Third Committee", responsible for social humanitarian and cultural programs, and often derided as "the women's committee" because of its soft power concerns and its status as the committee most suited to women's participation.[23] The controversial place of women in this international arena is an important context for understanding the relative invisibility of women in the nascent idea of development and the difficulties that Myrdal faced in her advocacy of women's rights as an integral part of the new international political agenda. In the Social Affairs department there were 107 women, but only 16 held intermediate or senior posts, including those women employed specifically in the Status of Women section.

The overwhelming masculinity of the UN and the problematic status of women within the organization did not seem to daunt Myrdal, despite evidence of hostility in the male ranks beneath her.[24] Myrdal thought her relationship with Laugier and Lie excellent and claimed for herself an easy grasp of administration; "I must say I'm a damn smart cookie, quick at evaluating, never letting a folder lie around for more than a day, good with people, and diplomatic."[25] This was no small boast

given that the one remit of Social Affairs was to report to the UN every two years on the "world social situation". Some of its social activities carried on the equally "feminized" priorities of the League of Nation's "Social Questions" bureau: traffic in narcotics; white slavery or traffic in women; refugees; the protection of women and children. UN Social Affairs also intervened in domains where the League had not dared to go, including the Human Rights Commission (although in 1947, this splintered into the separate Status of Women Commission, mirroring the gender tensions at the organization); Freedom of Information and the Press; Migration, Population, Penal Problems, Cultural Activities, Social Services and Welfare Problems. This put Myrdal in charge of an enormous portfolio, albeit with passive imperatives: to act as a "clearing house of information", "making available knowledge about conditions, improved methods, efficiency and results achieved in various part of the world".

Within a few months of arriving, in the wake of the revamped UN policy, Myrdal established TA as her *raison d'être*, and began to apply her department to the cause of knowledge-making in the interest of that program. She concentrated on research, publication, conferencing, and networks, in the clearing-house manner. She placed particular emphasis on using the resources of the institution to determine and drive the research and to imagine methods of applying it. In this way, Social Affairs, she argued, could "furnish technical assistance to fields like those of narcotics, human rights, population policies, etc".[26] In particular, it could help establish internationally agreed standards that would become the measure of development in child welfare and housing. Social Affairs could also set minimal standards of living, and provide social welfare services, share knowledge about the prevention of crime, and research the social care of immigrants and the status of women in a changing society. Myrdal's overriding ambition was to make these social welfare concerns as fundamental to the TA program as economic drivers.

On a typical day when the UN was in session, Myrdal sat in on the Economic and Social Council meetings, as she described it, "just glued to my seat in order to demonstrate the interest of the Department of Social Affairs in the development of under-developed countries".[27] Guided by Lie, TA was headed towards large-scale capital investment; Myrdal, however, steered her own small ship in the direction of social and "balanced modernization", "adjusted to the particular culture of the region" and providing "agricultural improvement, basic health measures and education about life fundamentals". One month after arriving in Lake Success, she made written notes in preparation for a speech

titled "The Welfare of People and One World", asserting that TA was "[n]ot only for technical progress":

> The world might become nothing but a nightmarish dream of press-button perfection (Huxley, Orwell) if due regard were not paid to the human factors, the receptivity, the cultured setting, the climate of inherited traditions, beliefs and values. Social Sciences. Examples from Margaret Mead of how progress can be stifled or even turned into regression if T.A. experts go against the culture of a people.[28]

Myrdal shared with many of the consultants and other professionals drawn into the web of practical internationalism in this period confidence in the relevance of the social sciences, and the social science "experts" – psychologists, anthropologists and sociologists, in the main – who could advise on cultural adaptation to the methods of modernization.[29] Social Affairs would work towards an international body of knowledge, "to guide the people we send out as consultants to governments in less developed areas" to avoid imposing "a patchwork of American ideas applied to one place, Danish another, New Zealandish in a third that these countries need [and deserve]".[30] At the same time, it would "bring in experts to advise on the limits of assuming that all problems could be standardized according to an international measure". For example, when it came to housing, as Myrdal explained, there were marked differences in standards and norms. There was the problem of housing for low-income groups, solved through the provision of houses by governments, as in Switzerland and New Zealand, which established minimum standards for lighting and sanitation and air space, but there was also the challenge of the millions of people with no housing at all.

From Myrdal's perspective, the Swedish national model provided a universal template for the specific concerns of TA-directed modernization, not only housing standards, but women's status: In her view, women as well as men had to be given a stake in development programs in economically underdeveloped societies, just as in Sweden, where providing women with the economic basis for claiming social and political rights had helped lead that country out of its feudal past into a more democratic and modern future. Significantly, Myrdal's familiarity with the Swedish model made her willing to draw on the other strands of development experience, whether, as she described, "British Colonial Development schemes [and] bilateral American projects [and] the pioneer work undertaken by the Rockefeller and Commonwealth Foundations and, perhaps, even by missionaries", for the purposes

of Social Affairs programs. For the new "Four Points Program" to be successful, she argued, "we must learn from all the experiments that have been going on for so many years, and I sincerely believe it is our historical function to digest for the use of future field experts the accumulated knowledge of these pioneers".[31]

There were also limits to the kind of approach that Myrdal would tolerate (later she would regret the extent to which her department accommodated some other approaches). Where UN agencies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) were "utilizing the purely statistical cost of living", she wanted Social Affairs "to introduce social and cultural considerations in judging so-called primitive levels of living".[32] This meant, for example, understanding the role of "local inertia" brought about by cultural traditions in the famine that was killing populations in the colonial UN Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, where a UN visiting mission report described cattle roaming over arable land, destroying vegetation, while the cows could not be eaten because of their sacred status.[33]

We find the persistent voice of Myrdal weaving its way through the processes of the United Nations, from its assemblies and council meetings to its correspondence, hammering home a vision of simultaneously universal and culturally sensitive social methods and international objectives. Stepping in for Laugier occasionally as acting assistant secretary-general, she would describe a "world sense of social justice", or the "awakening of a world social conscience…recognizing that the interests of the world are one and indivisible, that poverty in one place cannot in the long run be tolerated together with wealth in another, just as little as disease in one part of the world can be isolated to have its effects only there". In particular, "world public opinion" now supported tackling the problems of hunger, lack of housing, short lifespan, and infant mortality "typical of all the underdeveloped regions of the globe".[34] She would outline the solution to these "social problems" in economic foundations: "capital investment in new techniques, new tools, new seeds, new factories and roads"; along with "substantially increased knowledge, of realizing in concrete details what are the social conditions in different parts of the world, what are the probable consequences of the present situation, and finally what are the means at our disposal for social betterment".[35] Ultimately, Social Affairs would bring "social technology" to the same level of sophistication and understanding as economic and political knowledge, on behalf of "the underprivileged half of mankind". The point was not that the UN and its agencies would, for example, build houses. Rather, they would help "governments to strengthen their

own measures for improvements, and perhaps, to a certain extent, stimulating governments to take such measures for improvements".

Laugier would have had no argument with Myrdal's social emphasis, but it was her voice insisting on the *social* risks that might be run by exporting industrialization as the objective of technical assistance. Here, in her handwritten notes on Laugier's own correspondence to Lie on the topic of TA, Myrdal brings the point home:

> No serious consideration is given to the great risk that industrialization as such, developing certain resources, calling in labor to achieve these development projects and increasing exports and incomes on the whole, may easily ruin a people, may even turn those into slaves – as we have seen in quite a few colonizing developments. ... This approach – you may call it the sociological approach, the "community planners" approach, as used by some of the best architects, e.g. in India, the social welfare approach, e.g. as used by Greece, the democratic approach, the Scandinavian-Australasian approach – is totally absent in the presentations made by the economic people. Their approach has been far more theoretical. This has served all right to get resolutions through but it is far from enough when it comes to operating practical programs.[36]

For all her concern that the social was being neglected, Myrdal's references to the range of approaches to development are as useful a reminder of the extent of consensus around her vision. Laugier was of a similar generation of French "rights of man" adherents who, in the interwar years, had rewritten their organization's charter in order to expand those rights into social and economic, not just political and legal, domains. Laugier shared Myrdal's sense of the significance of social welfare as crucial to the cultivation of human rights in the tradition of the rights of man. The first director of UNESCO's Social Sciences department (which Myrdal herself took over in 1950), the Egyptian geographer Mahomed Bey Awad, was a graduate of London and Liverpool universities who emphasized equity issues around wages and collective bargaining.[37] Arthur Altmeyer, the economic architect of the New Deal, was the US delegate to ECOSOC.

Myrdal also shared with many of her contemporaries, albeit for different reasons, a conviction that social planning through population control was among the most important forms of TA that could improve living conditions in "underdeveloped" parts of the world. The UN Office of Population Studies, located administratively in Social Affairs, like its

predecessor departments in the League of Nations, was forged from a neo-Malthusian conception of population growth and competition for resources as the root of international tensions.[38] At the UN, the argument went something like this: Economic development will extend longevity and expand the size of populations, so research is needed on the relationship between economic and social conditions and birth rates, migration, and population growth in specific underdeveloped areas. Laugier was enthusiastic about an international push for population control as a method of meeting the challenges of so-called underdevelopment and collective security. From Myrdal's perspective, population-control methods offered married women the opportunity and right to work.[39] By the 1940s, however, she was as interested in researching the social and economic pressures on women that led to population problems in the first place.[40] In a publication contracted by UNESCO before she took her first UN job and published under UNESCO's auspices during her employment in Social Affairs, Myrdal remade her 1930s Swedish argument for intervention as a means of overcoming demographic fatalism. In the international case, of course, that fatalism was dictating overpopulation rather than underpopulation.[41] Myrdal was concerned now with coherent planning that would tackle the management of fertility in underdeveloped areas, alongside programs for the rationalization of agriculture, industrialization, and improving health.[42]

Are we too many?, co-authored with the French demographer Paul Vincent, addressed a globally conceived population problem in global social engineering terms: The rational use of the earth's resources, including the possibilities for moving people around, improving agricultural methods and limiting families through the raising of education levels. The aim was to prevent the creation of a "miserable urban proletariat" by prioritizing "rational family planning".[43] As director of Social Affairs, Myrdal negotiated with the Indian government for "a cooperative field enquiry in selected urban and rural areas of that country", which, as she maintained, could reveal "what is to be expected when new countries come in for modern technological development".[44] The collaboration led to the path-breaking 1950s Mysore survey of fertility and family planning practices in "premodern conditions".[45]

The translation of interwar social democratic principles and social welfare initiatives into the international setting was a common-enough endeavour in the early years of the UN, anticipated by colonial leaders as much as imperial actors. However, filtered through Myrdal's feminist consciousness this interwar agenda posed particular conceptual challenges: What constituted choice and freedom in a top-down international

view of rational social planning and modernization? Where did women fit into this international picture? Myrdal was able to take up these questions more fully within the educational, scientific and cultural remit of UNESCO.

The limits of international development

> This business of the T.A. philosophy or, rather, the scientific foundations of T.A. are my main professional concern, competing with my current private one, which is decorating my new Paris flat.[46]

During her tenure as director of Social Sciences at UNESCO from 1950 to 1955, Myrdal continued to pursue her social vision of TA, or as it was more simply becoming known, "development". By the time she arrived, UNESCO's Fundamental Education program had grown increasingly untenable, in part because of budget shortfalls and the lack of cross-UN institutional coordination. UNESCO's TA program was now moved into the arena of the UN's "Expanded Technical Assistance Program", a strategy that saw its funding from the UN increase from 2.5 million dollars in 1950, to 5 million in 1956.[47] With this increased funding, and the higher profile of TA, came "mounting requests" from the "countries of Asia" for the organization's assistance.[48]

From her new base, and with responsibility for establishing UNESCO's future programs in the social sciences, Myrdal pushed for a vision in terms similar to those she had propounded at the UN: an internationalism "tangible to common people" on the grounds that "[n]othing is more tangible than international *fertilization of social and economic improvements*".[49] It was UNESCO, Myrdal argued to the UN Secretary-General, that was best placed to work with the UN on methods of ascertaining the existing standards of living in underdeveloped countries.[50] And it was Myrdal herself who would connect the disparate strands of international operations, through her experience and connections in Social Affairs, and through the organization of joint planning meetings between UNESCO and the UN. She immediately set UNESCO new priorities: abandon existing plans for a terminological dictionary and "direct attention more definitely to countries where a Technical Assistance programme is in operation"; "collaborate with other UN organs, by organising a regional conference of experts from countries in various stages of industrialization" with the aim of examining the "synchronization of economic with social and cultural development, as well as with the promotion of human rights".[51] Myrdal once again added women to the

mix, to the chagrin of some of her new colleagues.[52] Previous directors had preferred to ignore or openly reject existing UN resolutions on the status of women, but under Myrdal UNESCO's Social Sciences division was now to investigate discrimination against women as the equivalent of race discrimination when it came to questions of human rights.[53]

In what was already a standard UNESCO mode, Myrdal initiated plans to set up an international centre that could help to compile information, make comparative studies on all these subjects, and "also train people from the underdeveloped countries in what we may perhaps dare to call scientific planning". Myrdal insisted TA, as the applied face of social science research on population, women, and the inevitability of industrialization, should also provide the bases for educating local experts. In 1952, she wrote to her "best friend in the realm of T.A. thinking", the UN medical director Frank Calderone, "You will know as well as I that all the technical assistance measures for rapid industrialization of underdeveloped areas are taken without recourse to any basic research at all. It also remains true that the international technical assistance agencies should not do the planning for those nations whose duty and ambition it is to do so for themselves."[54]

Out of Social Affairs and into the Social Sciences, Myrdal also set an unambiguous agenda of nation building which, she argued, was the only way of engaging the biggest peace and human rights issue of all: decolonization. She dwelt on a possible "Birth of Nations" project, which would "facilitate the access of newly created States to the international community". Decolonization was axiomatic to UNESCO's mission to build the foundations for peace, and national self-determination was a necessary dimension of decolonization:

> The next most explosive situation is geographically located in Asia, to which region special attention should be directed in 1952.…The Emphasis must be on the situations *after* emancipation and our possibilities for positive and peaceful solutions, although not disguising the craving for liberty and the need for reform.[55]

As at the UN, at UNESCO there was an explicit tension between the task of establishing universal standards on social issues, and the increasingly accepted social scientific emphasis on cultural particularism. UNESCO would "speed up exchange of knowledge", promote the "internationalization of the capital of knowledge" and learn from social scientists such as Margaret Mead about "how progress can be stifled or even turned into regression if T.A. experts go against the culture of a people". Myrdal also

continued to insist that modernization occurred "first through knowledge, later the machines; the soil must be prepared if it is to be accompanied with equality".[56] As director of Social Sciences, it was expected that she would present the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, psychology and political science as the innovative instruments of that knowledge, revealing "the laws underlying the acts which we – individuals, communities, nations, leaders – would like to think we undertake rationally and deliberately".[57] That expectation, like the existence of a Social Sciences department itself, reflected the new status of the social sciences in the mid-twentieth century, and in contrast to the end of World War I, when geographers, historians, and even classicists, were the expert advisers of choice for governments tackling international issues.[58] Myrdal's own education had been in social psychology, and her intellectual networks were predominantly with social scientists. But, it was less exposure to social science, and more her visits to the sites of UNESCO's TA work that provoked a reassessment of her international ideals, even as being in the field also reinforced her institutional expectations.

Myrdal took her first extended work trip in late 1952, travelling to the UNESCO Field Science Co-operation Offices in Cairo, New Delhi, and Havana. The role of these offices was to collect and in some cases coordinate research conducted in their regions for UNESCO or any institution or private person who might request it. They were also to encourage the organization of scientists and the exchange of information at national levels by means of meetings and seminars. Myrdal's contribution to the work of these field offices was to push them further into the realm of social as well as natural sciences, and into TA. At the outset, her visit gave her a boost, particularly when it came to her population interests. As she saw it, not only was the Mysore fertility study (that she had organized while the UN top-ranking director of Social Affairs) forging ahead under Dr. C. Chandrasekharan, she reported India was a feast of family planning experiments, some conducted through UNESCO Social Sciences Department's "Cultural Factors Influencing Fertility" research, others through WHO. She visited the Lodi Road Family planning Clinic, one of seven, "prominently advertised" in Lucknow. India, Nehru, and the Five-Year Plan, were, she claimed "[s]uch a thoroughly worked-out confirmation of everything we have always wanted. I am reading it and I cannot find a single false note".[59] The culturally sensitive sociologist in Myrdal appreciated what she saw as the native input into internationally devised programs that fitted her own priorities, whether Nehru's ideological endorsement or India's Planning Commission's enthusiastic recommendation of population policy. India's Five-Year Plan, she

concluded, had brought about "a more rapid change in public attitudes to family limitation than has to my knowledge been experienced by any other country".[60]

Myrdal's close-up observations confirmed for her the importance of social engineering and planning. Just as significant, they reaffirmed her criticisms of any international approach to TA in which local conditions and knowledge were ignored. There was in effect a greater "lack of clarity of thought" "at the international level than at the national Indian level. There, the clash continues to be", she explained, "rather between the more purely Gandhian approach of 'rural welfare' or 'village swaraj', to use a Gandhian expression, which utilizes a minimum of capital, and the often American-endowed 'Community development schemes' which carry dependence on capital outlay considerably further".[61] In other words, she was coming to suspect that under the auspices of the UN, development had become an experimental field for outsiders whose approach mired underdeveloped communities deeper in poverty, and in cultural patterns that were disruptive to their local traditions. Where external schemes were concerned, she observed, the threat was a "one way traffic off cultural influence", and economic benchmarks at the expense of communities. Myrdal now worried that the "serious" economic dimensions of the TA program were becoming "too much a matter for dogooders", and it risked "losing its reliances on indigenous forces and becomes an experimental field for outsiders". Myrdal even began to conceptualize a local Indian genealogy of modernization, running parallel with the Swedish model: Development in India, she surmised, was indigenous. It extended back to Gandhi at least, and the 1930s Congress Party plans for postcolonial industrial development in a manner that emphasized "self-sufficiency as a way of life for the villages".

Myrdal was still confident that international TA meant the advance of social science as a presence in each of these countries, studying "the human and social implications of technological change", but even UNESCO's interventions were too often based on misconceptions regarding local circumstances. In Egypt, there were "more readers and teachers than writers, [and] what they do write only fits awkwardly into our Western conceptual framework"; and as important, there was also a "training to intellectual curiosity and…willing acceptance that social relations are complicated and require objective analysis".[62] Even as UNESCO was working on an intensive study of women's access to education, on the basis that poverty and Islam acted as inhibitors, in Pakistan she was "agreeably shocked" to see women not dressed in heavy veils, but cycling in large groups to their lectures at the Women's Medical

College, or being encouraged to devote themselves to engineering. Here was a society where the status of women exhibited "remarkably progressive traits".[63] The technical assistance planned at UNESCO desks in Paris, she concluded, did not anticipate local and "indigenous" efforts. She now ordered the study groups being organized by UNESCO's New Delhi field office to focus on "the social and psychological process by which the isolation in purdah is overcome". UNESCO was to work with the local women's organizations, who were to be given their own tasks:

> Here the women's organizations should proceed to a very definite and detailed listing of the varying situations in which women wear or do not wear the veil, extending to different economic, social and geographical groups. This would constitute an interesting storehouse of information hitherto not available to sociologists and anthropologists. They should also endeavour to make socio-psychological explorations of the frustrations that women experience when kept in purdah, as well as of the protests expressed and the particular means through which they achieve liberation.[64]

From Myrdal's perspective, the shortcomings of international approaches to TA did not necessarily undermine the value of either the UN or UNESCO. As proof, she cited the fact that the Indian government was the fifth highest contributor of funds to UNESCO, and it had expressly invited the setting up of a field office in New Delhi. Indeed, there were, as Myrdal had discovered, extensive similarities in the international and national conceptualization of the benefits of development, just not always in its methods: The Indian Congress Party had, for example, since the 1930s engaged population control and population quality as nation-building policy issues. However, the limits of the UN and UNESCO's approach were as evident in the Indian government's rebellion against the new international system.[65] Myrdal would have been acutely conscious that in 1954 – the year prior to Nehru's creation of a non-aligned movement at the Asian-African "Bandung" conference in Indonesia, where he also urged a consensus on the social and economic rights of the new postcolonial nations – India held a UNESCO national commission conference in New Delhi to discuss the lack of attention paid by UN and UNESCO to the specific needs of Asia and Africa. Representatives from Afghanistan, Ceylon, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon, Nepal, Syria, and Turkey demanded the exchange of ancestral cultures from East to West, not just from the modern West to an "underdeveloped" East.[66]

Ultimately, neither Myrdal's epiphanies nor her criticisms were of broad significance to the UN development program. Internal evaluations suggested that UNESCO's efforts in all the "less economically developed countries" were "overshadowed by the larger and more generously financed activities of the US technical assistance (Point IV) programs, in lesser degree by the Colombo Plan, and in some parts of Asia by those of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China".[67] Faced with the realities of UNESCO's budget, Myrdal eventually gave up her expectation that the UN could play off the great powers" economic and strategic interests and instead encouraged them to invest in bilateral schemes for TA as "planned social development".

In 1955, Myrdal abandoned her internationalist career to move in the more traditional world of international politics, posted to New Delhi as the first-ever female Swedish ambassador. Myrdal the ambassador continued her efforts in TA by nurturing Swedish interest in family-planning initiatives. Her influence in India, Burma, and Ceylon was now felt in the agreement by Sweden to make family planning a part of its foreign aid program – a first, as the historian of the population movement Matthew Connelly notes, for any donor government.[68] The aid was delivered on the request of Ceylonese feminists, and Myrdal was the go-between.[69] In other cases, Myrdal tried to gain Swedish support for "grants in kind" that would finance small-scale development projects in areas of political tension: small woollen mills in Kashmir, reforestation in Nepal, and advisors on education reform in Burma. The Swedish experience remained her frame of reference: this time the examples of farmer, tenant and consumer cooperatives that she argued had given Swedish modernization its firm foundations. For all her activity, however, Myrdal confided to her husband that the question of influence and impact all seemed even more difficult from her base in New Delhi. And then there was the sense of déjà-vu: Had they not already travelled the journey from the hopefulness of Swedish development to the tragedy of World War II? Now, even as the East was modernizing, investment in nationalism was on the rise, and the Cold War threat of annihilation loomed. It was difficult to keep one's faith in the idea of progress, or the promise of rationality on any scale.[70]

When Myrdal returned to Sweden in 1961, the UN was continuing on its modernization and nation-building path under a new banner, "Development Decade", backed by powerful American philanthropic organizations, including the Ford Foundation, and by the Kennedy-led US government, which also orchestrated the appointment of the Burmese U Thant as director-general.[71] In the context of this expansion

in international development, Myrdal continued her own campaign for an alternative vision of modernity and of international action. She published, in Swedish, *Our Responsibility for Poor Nations*, an argument for education and reform in the interest of economically sustainable development. She recalled being ridiculed for her views in 1952, but felt vindicated in her vision of the importance of long-term planning and research over the quick-fix that she held responsible for the accumulating record of international development failure.[72]

Human development

What had Myrdal achieved during her time with the international organizations? It was a question that, as always, preoccupied Myrdal herself.[73] She would not necessarily have seen her role as passive, even though much of it, as her biographer describes, was "to a large extent about writing and presenting reports, speaking, getting people to accept joint resolutions, persuading, shifting positions, arranging concessions".[74] How can we even tell the bureaucrat from the bureaucracy? Like all members of the secretariat, Myrdal's presence was felt anonymously, a name signed to form letters, inviting individuals to participate in UN and UNESCO projects. Over the following years, she would refer to the bureaucracy-building that was her daily work, as well as the new "journals, advisory services, associations, and a documentation series" that she had been able to establish.[75] In the latter half of 1950, on the eve of her departure from Social Affairs for UNESCO, we find her writing to Laugier, reflecting frankly on her time at Lake Success, "I am deeply conscious of the fact that I have not achieved the aims I set out for myself when I joined the Department. There are still rifts and inadequacies in its organization which it has not been possible to overcome."[76] Myrdal remembered "vividly the beginning when we all had hopes for a truly creative co-operation[;] ... at least we can withdraw with the conviction that we came very near to creating something that was great".[77] She was as adamant regarding the depth of her departmental contribution, in case Laugier had not noticed:

> For the record, may I recapitulate its historical start? I know of your basic interest in paying attention to the social factors when economic development is introduced. For instance all your work with ECOSOC delegations to get the word "social" introduced in the Technical Assistance Resolutions and, what is more, to get the delegations to grasp this broader idea of the new UN nation programme. I so

perfectly shared your view that I often used to make that my theme during speeches during the UN days.[78]

In 1952, she wrote to Gunnar listing her achievements in terms of a complete staff plan, putting good people in place, and having strengthened the possibilities for research in the social sciences. What remained, she explained, was only fine tuning, and the research on democracy and the social consequences of industrialization and technology in underdeveloped countries.[79]

It is clear, too, from Alva Myrdal's office correspondence during her UNESCO period that she believed her work at the UN had helped pave the way for social welfare writ large, and the inclusion of housing and town planning, family and child welfare in the conception of development. She had, in effect, enhanced the capacity for what was slowly taking root as a social, not simply economic, conceptualization of "development".[80] Under her watch, UNESCO began to approach the status of women question in much the same way as its earlier campaign against race prejudice and discrimination: generating comparative studies, studying underlying causes and the means of eradicating traditional prejudices.[81]

In hindsight, we can see that Alva Myrdal's influence worked in other ways. As an individual able to mobilize institutional pressure, she brought to the UN her own enthusiasm for practical internationalism and a preference for applied knowledge, along with her sense that there was much to learn about progress from a society that had been stymied by its "backwardness", namely Sweden.[82] Her preferred approach – including reform in agriculture and transport, the elimination of illiteracy, the promotion of agricultural cooperatives, local self-government, a focus on women in traditional societies, social insurance for new urban dwellers – all resonated with her sense of the challenges that Sweden had faced and overcome during the previous half century. Her perspective on development as modernization also welled up out of her private struggle to escape the "backwardness" of rural Swedish life. According to Sondra Herman, both Alva and Gunnar "hoped not simply for more technologically advanced societies but for a transformation of people who might retain whatever was useful in their old ways while becoming more rational more independent, more cooperative".[83]

Despite her insistence on the similarities between herself and international colleagues such as Laugier, other UN workers did not always embrace the distinctive elements of her view of the social face of

development, including her prioritization of women. In the 1950s, UNESCO Director-General René Maheu, a philosopher by training, close to Sartre and Beauvoir, warned her against the valorization of local village cultures, perceiving it as misguided as the valorization of the modern.[84] However, on most fronts her interests were anticipated by her predecessors and her colleagues and by her successors. The most awkward elements of Myrdal's social scientific vision of world-scale planning and the capacity of the UN and UNESCO to rationalize people's lives – especially around the issue of reproduction and population – reflected the dominant mood among the early international bureaucrats.

At both the UN and UNESCO, in the midst of an inherited plethora of tasks and pet projects, it was left to Myrdal to prove that the social sciences had a role to play in this new drama of global renovation, and that women were a significant focus for the social sciences.[85] The last thing she wanted was "that the UN becomes a *world of words* only".[86] These themes began to resonate more fully in the mainstream UN conceptualization of international development only in the mid-1990s, and most notably with the appearance of a document entitled the Human Development Report, and subtitled "Gender and Human Development". The product of the UN Development Program, the report claimed a new era of "[f]ierce questioning of the dominant development paradigm and of justice, not charity", as "the goal of development".[87] "Human Development" aimed to quantify "the value of the non-monetized productivity by women (and men) in economic and household activities". Inequality was now much more focused on women and girls caught up in process of "structural adjustment". Forty years after Alva Myrdal's UN heyday, women, along with a social approach to economic development, were at the centre of the transformation of Human Development into the UN Human Security concept. Human Security's UN architects and consultants presented the new concept as the antithesis of earlier top-down UN programs such as post-war "Technical Assistance" or "Fundamental Education". Human Security would work through the encouragement of simultaneously global *and* national efforts to empower people. Empowerment was a term that returned again and again, attaching to the particular status of women as well as sex-unspecified victims of conflict and poverty.[88] For Devaki Jain, an Indian activist involved in the formulation of the Human Development idea, "Women brought into the development discourse the questioning mode."[89] Writing as the historian of women and development for the UN Intellectual History Project, Jain has also claimed that "the failure to

note, understand and respect women's ideas and intellectual skills and outputs in the area of theoretical and analytical knowledge" has contributed to the segregation of women from the mainstream of development thinking, as well as its history.

In this essay, I have argued for the significance of reaching back to Alva Myrdal in order to recover the intersecting history of her ideas and her activities and development in its international infancy. Myrdal's significance to genealogies of development lies, at the least, in the evidence that her career offers of the marginalization by international historians of women as thinkers and agents. As striking are the echoes that we can hear in contemporary versions of Human Development and Human Security of the themes she voiced, atypically, at the UN and UNESCO in the mid-twentieth century: the internationalization of the social; the status of women; the importance of the human factor. Hearing those echoes suggests the history of development is marked less by "progress" than by the ebbs and flows of its social and economic concerns, its methods, and its attention to women. In the 1940s and 1950s, Alva Myrdal understood economic parity for women as well as colonial subjects as fundamental to peace and human rights. She placed her faith in rationality and science and in programs that measured quality of life outcomes rather than GDP. Despite the differences in methodology, her views on the significance of a human approach to development, and the internationalization of social justice norms in living standards, were uncannily akin to the priorities captured in Human Security and even its language.[90] Myrdal's emphasis on putting the social into the international led, inevitably, to the question of women's place in the making of modernity and in the processes of nation-building, and to questions of social justice and equality. The questions also resonated with the ongoing ambivalences that surrounded the valorization of local culture, the politics of population control, and the application of scientific planning in the interests of a specific industrial and capitalist Western model of modernization.

The story of Alva Myrdal is, finally, a story of historically specific ways of seeing and understanding the world and the imperatives of international social welfare and justice. The extent to which Myrdal became a forgotten cog in the UN's history tells us as much about the ongoing marginalization of women in the international past, and why their addition remains critical to a historical understanding of international organizations and development and to the seductions of the siren song of modernity.

Notes

1. The research for this chapter was generously supported by the Australian Research Council. I would also like to acknowledge the extremely helpful feedback I received from various readers, including Alastair Blanshard, Barbara Caine, Marco Duranti, Andrew Fitzmaurice, John Gagné, Julia Horne, and Shane White, as well as the support of the School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry at the University of Sydney.

   AGMA [Alva and Gunnar Myrdal Archive, Labor Movement Archives and Library, Stockholm, Sweden], 3.1.3:4., notes for a speech by Alva Myrdal on "'The Welfare of People and One World,' a few suggestions to a topic," 25 March 1949.
2. AGMA, 2.1.2: 012, "The Social Sciences in UNESCO," *Educational Outlook*, 4 May 1952: 128.
3. See, for example, David Engerman (2003) and Nick Cullather (2000).
4. See Frederick Cooper (2006) and Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (1998).
5. As described by the historian Timothy Mitchell, during the 1950s technical assistance came to represent a "new politics based on technical expertise" which "would organize post-war international relations around a politics of techno-economic development." See Timothy Mitchell (2002: 41). See also Sunil Amrith (2006) and Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga (2008).
6. On the interest in social planning and engineering in the interwar, see Guy Alchon (1985) and John M. Jordan (1994).
7. For more on the history of postwar internationalism, see Glenda Sluga (2013a, chapter 3).
8. AGMA, 4.1.07:001, Myrdal to Madesin, 14 December 1948. From the beginning she also loved her job as an "international civil servant," "because it is not a woman's job," see AGMA, 2.3: 013, handwritten notes, introduction, speech material, "Alva Myrdal: Egna verk, manuskript 1947–1949": 2.
9. Ann-Katrin Hatje (2002: 4).
10. Sondra R. Herman (1992). For more on Alva Myrdal's early career, see also, Yvonne Hirdman (2006), Doris H. Linder (2001) and Renee Frangeur (2002).
11. Published as Alva Myrdal and Gunnar Myrdal (1934) *Kris i Befolkningsfragen* (Stockholm: Bonniers) [Reprint, Nya Doxa, 1997].
12. For an excellent analysis of this study, see Hedwig Ekerwald (2002).
13. Of course, by this time Gunnar Myrdal had become well-known as the author of *The American Dilemma* with its epoch-marking critique of American racism.
14. Alva Myrdal (1976: xxv).
15. Craig Murphy (2006: 53).
16. Walter H. C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson (1957: 52). For more on this history, see Murphy (2006).
17. Wilfred Benson, who had coined the term *underdevelopment*, was, like Lie and Myrdal, a committed social-democrat, albeit of the British Fabian anti-colonial kind and of an earlier interwar generation, now also employed at the UN; see Glenda Sluga (2013a, chapter 3).
18. Woodson Research Center, Fondren Library, Rice University, Julian Sorell Huxley Papers, 1899–1980, MS 50, box 66, folder 7, "Verbatim Report of Talk by Dr Huxley at the Sorbonne University, Paris, on Thursday, 26 February 1948, at 9.00 p.m.": 12.

19. Trygve Lie (1978: 370).
20. Walter H. C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson (1957: 53).
21. Myrdal was the only woman at director level, and even then, out of a total staff of 2,769 at UN headquarters 1,306 were women, most of them employed in the lower and medium grades – clerical, stenographic, junior executive and training. Most women were translators, interpreters, reporters, editors, in accounting, and technical administrative staff.
22. The other departments were Security Council Affairs, Economic Affairs, Trusteeship and Information, Legal, Public Information, Conference and General Services, and Administration and Financial Services.
23. See Glenda Sluga (2013b: 44–58).
24. Myrdal's relationship with her "patron" Henri Laugier was "double-sided". She sent him regular reports, which he responded to as her old friend and colleague, but privately with John Humphrey, the head of the Human Rights Commission, Laugier spoke of her as the "Iceberg," and plotted her removal. See A. J. Hobbins (2000: 76).
25. Quoted in Yvonne Hirdman (2006: 283).
26. AGMA, 3.1.3:4, Memorandum to Monsieur Henri Laugier, assistant secretary-general in charge of the Department of Social Affairs from Mme Alva Myrdal, top-ranking director, Department of Social Affairs, 5 April 1949.
27. AGMA, 3.1.3:4, Alva Myrdal Diary sent to Mr. Henri Laugier from Mrs. Alva Myrdal, 1 March 1950.
28. AGMA, 3.1.3:4, notes for a speech by Alva Myrdal on *The Welfare of People and One World*; "Throughout her life, when discussing women's abilities Myrdal would use Arnold Gessel and Francis Ilg's observations of child development or Margaret Mead's analysis of Samoa to indicate how parents and teachers created the traits that conservatives assumed were inherently male or female." Sondra R. Herman (1993: 328). See also Peter Mandler (2013).
29. For more on the politics of the rise of the social sciences at UNESCO and in this period, see the detailed overview provided by Teresa Tomas Rangil 2011).
30. UNESCO Archive, X07.55SS, Alva Myrdal "Remarks before the Social Commission."
31. AGMA, 3.1.3:4, letter from Alva Myrdal to Henri Laugier, 24 January 1950: "One day during the session of the Social Commission in May 1950, it so happened that Arthur Altmeyer and I spoke in the same group, both making the 'Social Impact of Economic Development' an important point, and both directing special attention to the necessity of broadening the preparation of experts who go on field missions. In the car back to Lake Success, Altmeyer asked if it would be too late to introduce into the Social Commission a definite plan to hold a conference, in order to tap the experience of those who had been consultants for the purpose of eliciting testimony as to the need of a broad, anthropological, social grasp of requirements of a technical assistant."
32. These ideas were followed up on the Joint UN–UNESCO Conference on the techniques of promoting development in underdeveloped countries, see AGMA, 3.1.3:4, Contribution by the Department of Social Sciences to the Director-General's Report to the United Nations.
33. Alva Myrdal (1950: 4).
34. She described this as "Virgin Poverty," see Alva Myrdal (1950: 2).
35. Alva Myrdal (1950: 3).

36. AGMA, 3.1.3:4, additional paragraph to Laugier's memo to Lie ending the whole memorandum, 14 November 1949.

37. Similarly, the Haitian Emmanuel Gabriel, who worked in UNESCO's Fundamental Education section, convinced the director-general to establish a program in Haiti in order to alleviate the generally "pitiful" conditions of Haiti's villagers and city slum dwellers, see Glenda Sluga (2010).

38. Claude Levi-Strauss would return to this specific theme in the 1970s, with his "shocking" neo-Malthusian conceptualization of the competition for scarce resources in a world as threatened by the population bomb as the atom bomb. See Patrick Wilcken (2010: 306).

39. Sondra R. Herman (1993: 329).

40. AGMA, 4.1.07:001, Myrdal to Bronowski, 26 October 1948.

41. Alva Myrdal and Paul Vincent (1949). See also AGMA, 4.1.07:001, "UNESCO Pamphlet on Population – Facts and Policies," sent to Dr. Bronowski by Alva Myrdal, 14th October 1948; AGMA, 27, "Carnegie Endowment Seminar on Population Problems and International Tensions." Myrdal had recommended that UNESCO "could perform a service for world mental health; the cathartic process of searching for truth and being confronted with fresh arguments is a wholesome one".

42. Alva Myrdal and Paul Vincent (1949: 39).

43. Alva Myrdal and Paul Vincent (1949: 44).

44. Alva Myrdal (1950: 9).

45. Craig Murphy (2006: 123) and Matthew Connelly (2008).

46. AGMA, 3.1.3:1, letter from Alva Myrdal to Frank Calderone, Medical Director, Health Service, United Nations, New York, 26 January 1953. Calderone was the WHO chief technical liaison officer, and by that time, medical director at the UN Secretariat.

47. The long term assessments of the Marbial project, according to Craig Murphy, were in fact the most positive of all the international interventions, at least when remembered by local populations. See Craig Murphy (2006).

48. Walter H.C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson (1957: 57).

49. Notes for a speech by Alva Myrdal on "The Welfare of People and One World."

50. UNESCO Archive, X07.55SS, Alva Myrdal, Director SS, to the Director General, "Submitting First draft of 1952 programme for the Department of Social Sciences," 19 September 1950, in "Assumptions for establishing the 1952 programme of the Social Sciences Department."

51. The emphasis was now on UNESCO's Resolution 3.24: "To bring together and to diffuse existing knowledge and to encourage studies of the methods of harmonizing the introduction of modern technology in countries in process of industrialization, with respect for their cultural values, so as to ensure the social progress of the peoples," UNESCO (2013a).

52. UNESCO Archive, X07.55SS, letter from R. Angell to A. Myrdal, 13 October 1950.

53. See Glenda Sluga (2010).

54. AGMA, 3.1.3:1, letter from Alva Myrdal to Frank Calderone, Medical Director, Health Service, United Nations, New York, 6 June 1952.

55. UNESCO Archive, X07.55SS, Alva Myrdal, Director SS, to the Director General, "Submitting First draft of 1952 programme for the Department of

Social Sciences," 19 September 1950, in "Assumptions for establishing the 1952 programme of the Social Sciences Department."

56. Yvonne Hirdman (2006: 320).
57. Myrdal was not overly utopian in her view of the social sciences. She compared her present with an earlier time when it was "not unnatural to look to the social sciences to provide the long-term searching light on international problems, revealing the manifold interdependence of cause and effect, the deep-seated interplay of external forces and internal motivations." AGMA, 2.1.2: 012, "The Social Sciences in UNESCO," *Educational Outlook*, 4, May 1952: 128–129.
58. See Glenda Sluga (2006).
59. Yvonne Hirdman (2006: 305). Hirdman also recalls that India had been Alva's dreamland since when she was a girl, "the country of her idol Tagore". See Yvonne Hirdman (2006: 311).
60. UNESCO Archives, X07.83, Missions of Myrdal, "Report on Mission to India and Egypt, 3 February 1953" from Alva Myrdal, Director Department of Social Sciences, to the Acting Director-General: 5. That policy was based on methods of birth control, especially the "rhythm method," in conformity with local cultural patterns, to accommodate social and religious (Hindu and Moslem) mores, as she wrote back to Paris: "The actual adherence to these practices is ascertained through a questionnaire to prospective clients, and care is then taken to adapt the ensuing recommendations to this pre-existing cultural pattern."
61. The kind of assistance being sought was "preserving and publicizing historical monuments and archaeological sites, fostering the cultural development of their peoples through traditional arts, setting up public libraries and museums as educational instruments, establishing publishing houses and producing good, simple, cheap books for the growing school population and for the newly literate adults, and developing national motion pictures to counteract the often lurid and violent imports from the West." UNESCO Archives, X07.83, Missions of Myrdal, "Report on Mission to India and Egypt," from Alva Myrdal, Director Department of Social Sciences to the Acting Director-General, 3 February 1953.
62. UNESCO Archives, X07.83, Missions of Myrdal, "Report on Mission to Egypt to the Acting Director-General," from Alva Myrdal, Director Department of Social Sciences to the Acting Director-General, 6 February 1953.
63. UNESCO Archives, X07.83, Missions of Myrdal, UNESCO SS/Memo.53/3600, "Mission to Pakistan, 19 April–3 May 1953," from Alva Myrdal, Director Department of Social Sciences, to the Acting Director-General, 22 May 1953: 2.
64. UNESCO Archives, X07.83, Missions of Myrdal, UNESCO SS/Memo.53/3600, "Mission to Pakistan, 19 April–3 May 1953," from Alva Myrdal, Director Department of Social Sciences, to the Acting Director-General, 22 May 1953: 3.
65. Matthew Connelly (2008: 142).
66. Walter H. C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson (1957: 58).
67. Walter H. C. Laves and Charles A. Thomson (1957: 54). By 1956 UNESCO's contribution to TA was to have sent 500 scientists and educators into the field and to have provided 600 fellowships in response to these requests.

68. In May 1958, as Matthew Connelly notes, "Sweden agreed to provide expert advice and $80,000 (about $558,000 in today's money) to distribute contraceptives and measure the results in two Ceylonese communities.…It marked the first time that any government included family planning in its foreign aid program. Sweden did not wait for the results before following up with a much larger grant to Pakistan in 1961, appropriating almost $400,000 to send three medical teams." See Matthew Connelly (2008: 185).

69. Connelly does not mention this aspect of her involvement. See Sondra R. Herman (2002).

70. Yvonne Hirdman (2006: 330).

71. Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, Louis Emmerij, and Richard Jolly (2005: 188–192).

72. Yvonne Hirdman (2006: 320).

73. The former Director of the Department of Social Sciences reflected on UNESCO and women's rights in Alva Myrdal (1955: 26).

74. Most biographers spend little time on Myrdal's development ideas, even though she has been the subject of extraordinarily insightful biographies, including most recently, Yvonne Hirdman's *Alva Myrdal* (2006).

75. Yvonne Hirdman (2006: 300).

76. AGMA 3.1.3:4, letter from Alva Myrdal to "Cher Patron," 30 October 1950, cf. Columbia University, Ms. Coll. Cordier Papers, Series I: Catalogued Correspondence, letter from Alva Myrdal to Andrew Cordier, 31 October 1950.

77. Ultimately, Myrdal was at the UN Social Affairs division for only a year and a half. Her replacement was Julia Henderson, who was promoted two ranks to the direction of Social Welfare from her existing role in budget estimation. AGMA, 3.1.3:1, letter from Alva Myrdal to Frank Calderone, New York City Cancer Committee, 17 November 1950.

78. AGMA, 3.1.3:4, letter from Alva Myrdal to Henri Laugier, 24 January 1950.

79. Other reports tell us that a regional conference on the impact of modern technology on humans was being planned in South Asia; in the Belgian Congo, UNESCO would undertake a special sociological study on the ways in which technology was affecting the lives of indigenous peoples.

80. Alva Myrdal (1955: 26).

81. She had also set UNESCO to the task of studying "the emergence of a new class of educated women and its impact on African societies, particularly in areas undergoing a process of rapid change through industrialization and urbanization." See Alva Myrdal (1955).

82. Hirdman argues that Myrdal had stopped being interested in women; Yvonne Hirdman (2006: 321–322).

83. Sondra R. Herman (1992: 86).

84. UNESCO Archives, X07.83, Missions of Myrdal, "Report on Mission to Egypt to the Acting Director-General," Maheu to "Madame Myrdal," 26 February 1953.

85. See Maurel, who states that Myrdal was crucial to the redirection of the social sciences into developmentalism in this period; Chloe Maurel (2005).

86. Notes for a Speech by Alva Myrdal on "The Welfare of People and One World." Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek [Labor Movement Archive], Stockholm. Alva Myrdals brevsammlung [Alva Myrdal's Correspondence]. Korrespondens: Alva Myrdal: FN och Unesco 1949–1955: AMb, 3.1.3:4.

87. Quoted in Devaki Jain (2005: 112).
88. Heidi Hudson (2005).
89. Jain, Devaki (2005: 12) and Louis Emmerij and Richard Jolly (2009), "Women, Development, and the UN," *United Nations Intellectual History Project Briefing note*, 12, April http://www.unhistory.org/briefing/12Women.pdf, dated accessed 29 January 2014.
90. See Glenda Sluga (2013a, chapters 3 and 4).

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4
"To Keep Food Out of Politics": The UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 1945–1965

Ruth Jachertz

"Food is now in the political arena and nothing will redress this very unfortunate development", commented the former director-general of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Binay Ranjan Sen, in the early 1970s.[1] Sen had always proudly claimed to have kept "food out of politics" and would have been very pleased with a description of FAO as an archetype of a functional organization. Yet, there has always been a political struggle over what role FAO had to play in the field of international food production and distribution.[2]

From its inception, FAO's role was highly contested among its member nations: One faction saw its tasks as the collection and dissemination of knowledge and as providing a forum for discussion; another group argued for giving the organization itself actor capability. Ironically, this conflict mirrors the debate in International Relations theory, wherein scholars argue over whether international organizations are forums through which states pursue their interests or whether they have real actor capabilities.[3] By tracing the history of FAO in its first two decades, the present chapter shows that the interests of states, and especially those of the United States, were indeed fundamental for both the shape of the organization and the work it was allowed to do. But we can also see how contacts and networks of individual scientist–lobbyists were crucial in establishing the need for a new international organization.[4] Once established, the FAO secretariat framed combating hunger as a goal and an obligation of international politics and thus assumed a position of moral leadership.[5] This moral leadership was reinforced when FAO widened its usual communication with experts and politicians and turned to the

general public in an effort to increase support for its "Freedom from Hunger Campaign".

In a mainly chronological order, this chapter traces the founding of FAO in the aftermath of World War II and analyses its ambitious plans for reorganizing international trade and the reasons for their failure. It then follows the organization's turn to non-political technical aid during the 1950s and the creation of the "Freedom from Hunger Campaign" as an overarching theme for FAO's work during the 1960s. The founding of the World Food Programme in 1963, discussed towards the end of the chapter, highlights the interplay of US agricultural interests with the aim of FAO to make constructive use of surplus production in establishing the first multilateral food-aid agency.

The founding of FAO

Plans leading to the establishment of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), one of the UN's specialized agencies, predated preparation for the United Nations itself.[6] In May 1943, the middle of World War II, the United States invited the Allies and "other friendly nations" to a conference on long-term needs in food and agriculture in Hot Springs, Virginia. The related – and for many countries more urgent – question of relief to war-devastated countries had been discussed since 1940 and would ultimately lead to the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in November 1943. In addition, the United Kingdom and the United States cooperated on several combined boards which distributed essentials needed for the war effort. A tripartite combined food board procured and distributed agricultural products.[7] Although the Food Board had no mandatory powers, its recommendations were almost automatically accepted by the governments concerned; it determined the broad pattern of food policy for four years.[8] There was, thus, war-induced cooperation in the food and commodities sectors. The invitation to the Hot Springs Conference signalled something new: an interest in long-term restructuring and regulation of agricultural production and trade worldwide.

All Allied plans for the postwar world were guided by the desire not to repeat the mistakes made after World War I.[9] For the food sector this meant concern about a buildup of unmarketable surpluses and concomitantly low market prices, as had occurred immediately after World War I. Despite British warnings to the contrary, the US War Food Administration remained preoccupied with the dangers of domestic

surpluses rather than with possible food shortages in liberated areas. Their perception changed only slowly, beginning in spring 1945.[10]

But even if one expected surpluses, this only meant that commodities could not be sold in regular markets. Looking at nutritional needs, production before the war had been inadequate. Nutrition studies in Great Britain during the 1930s had shown, for instance, that almost half of the British population was malnourished.[11] The Health Section of the League of Nations propagated the argument that, even during times of unmarketable surpluses, there was still a great and unfulfilled need for certain foodstuffs. In its publications, the League of Nations developed an approach to nutrition which was influenced and championed by progressive political movements. Combining employment, health and social justice policies, the nutrition approach regarded *underconsumption* as the cause of the global depression. Increasing consumption would stimulate both local production and trade in foodstuffs and lead to economic growth. Only full employment and insurance benefits could provide the necessary income for a healthy diet.[12]

The League of Nations studies on nutrition became the basis for calculating postwar requirements. More importantly, many of the key figures of its secretariat moved on to wartime planning boards and later to UN institutions.[13] The former Australian prime minister, (Viscount) Stanley Bruce, and his long-time advisor Frank L. McDougall had been instrumental in establishing the League of Nations special committee on nutrition in health and economics in 1935 and were aiming to bring their plans to fruition at FAO.[14] According to legend it was the economist McDougall, who persuaded American president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, to convene an international conference on long-term problems in food and agriculture.[15] Apparently, Roosevelt considered food a fitting topic for a first conference among the Allies. Invitations went out to 43 nations in late March of 1943 for a conference in Hot Springs, Virginia from 18 May to 3 June.[16]

The Hot Springs Resolution, which consisted of some 40 pages of recommendations, confidently stated that the conference, "meeting in the midst of the greatest war ever waged, and in full confidence of victory, has considered the world problems of food and agriculture and declares its belief that the goal of freedom from want of food, suitable for health and strength of all peoples, can be achieved". Underlying the resolution was an emphasis on interdependence. Food and agriculture problems transcended national boundaries so that "each nation can fully achieve its goal only if all work together".[17]

The conference established an interim commission to advise on the set-up of an eventual Food and Agriculture Organization. Reflecting the disagreement of delegates over the eventual powers of the organization, its tasks were described rather ambiguously. The new organization should conduct "promotional research, collection and dissemination of information, recommendation for action". But the interim commission should also "consider the desirability of assigning to the permanent organization functions in development of resources, agricultural commodity arrangements, cooperatives and land tenure". This struggle between whether FAO would be assigned policy-making functions in addition to the non-contested function as a knowledge provider had not been solved at Hot Springs and would come up time and again in the later years of the organization. The US and British delegations preferred a weak structure with primarily consultative and technical responsibilities. On the other side, the governments of Latin America, especially Argentina and Brazil, and other non-European countries, pleaded for a powerful organization able to realize far-reaching regulation of global food markets. They had a strong interest in restructuring international trade in order to regain their former role as food exporters for the industrialized world. Moreover, in order to secure stable food prices, issues of international trade and market organization had to be considered.[18]

Under the leadership of Lester B. Pearson, later the Canadian prime minister, the interim commission worked for almost two years on the institutional set-up and the goals of the new organization.[19] McDougall again played a prominent role as advisor and behind-the-scenes organizer. The report of the interim commission, issued in August 1945, stressed the familiar topic of the League of Nations studies that found enlarging effective demand by providing employment and income would increase production while preventing the creation of surpluses.[20]

The Food and Agriculture Organization was inaugurated as the first specialized agency of the United Nations in October 1945 at Chateau Frontenac in Quebec. Its constitution, signed by 44 states, remained rather vague on the precise functions of the organization, because delegations could not agree on the scope of its activities. The UK delegation in particular was against creating an organization with autonomous policy-making functions. At least part of that resistance stemmed from a distrust of McDougall and Bruce, who had earned the ongoing hostility of the British Foreign Office during their campaign for the League's "nutrition approach".[21] John Boyd Orr, the renowned Scottish nutritionist, was disliked for similar reasons; he had therefore not been part

of the official British delegation at either the Hot Springs or Quebec conferences. It was only at the invitation of the head of the British delegation, Philip Noel-Baker, to participate as an unofficial member of the delegation that Orr was present in Quebec at all. Prompted by other delegates, Lester Pearson asked Orr to address the delegates. Orr vented his anger that hungry people "wanted bread, but were to be given statistics". While his admonition that the organization should have real policy-making functions was not followed, his impassionate address secured Boyd Orr the nomination as first director-general of FAO.[22]

Echoing the interim commission's description of technical missions, advisory functions, member reports and publications as fitting topics for the organization, the FAO constitution described its functions as being to "analyze and gather data" and "promote and…recommend national and international action".[23]

In the beginning, FAO remained in its temporary headquarters in Washington, DC. The staff, most of whom had been brought over from the interim commission, was small enough that "the director-general could fit everyone in one room for tea",[24] yet they shared Boyd Orr's wish to turn a fact-gathering organization into an action-agency.

The postwar food crisis and FAO's plans for a long-term solution

Convinced that only an organization with policy-making functions would succeed in fighting hunger, and that the first step was to regulate agricultural markets, Orr concentrated on building up the Economics and Statistics Division to show how bad the situation really was. FAO's first World Food Survey of 1946 calculated a gap of ten million tons in wheat equivalent between imports needed and those actually available for the year 1946.[25]

Without waiting for approval from member countries, Boyd Orr took the initiative in February 1946 and informed the General Assembly of the United Nations that FAO would accept the responsibility for mobilizing world resources to meet the world food crisis.[26] A special meeting on urgent food problems under the aegis of FAO was called in May 1946. Because the representatives of 6 related international agencies and 21 nations realized that organs for inter-governmental action were inadequate to meet the crisis, they founded an International Emergency Food Council (IEFC) to replace the three nation's Allied Combined Food Board. The IEFC grew from 19 countries to 34 countries within a year. The IEFC relied on voluntary donations from member countries

and allocated these foodstuffs to individual countries and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and other international relief agencies.[27] By far the largest share of all distributed commodities originated in the United States, but there were also crucial distributions of rice from Thailand or Burma. Although the IEFC had no sanctioning authority, the United States as largest producer followed its recommendations in its export policy.[28]

At the heart of the IEFC lay the realization that agricultural production had not recovered as quickly as hoped – rice production was at 30 per cent of the pre-war average, fats and oils at 60 per cent – and that wartime cooperation had to be extended and even broadened if mass starvation and political unrest were to be avoided. It was cooperation born out of sheer necessity. In the view of the secretary of the IEFC, Dennis A. Fitzgerald, states had understood their "responsibilities of membership in an intricate and increasingly interdependent world society".[29] The IEFC, the membership of which was open to any nation represented on one of its 16 commodity committees, was served by the FAO secretariat.

Because the IEFC was only intended as an organization for dealing with the immediate crisis, the special meeting also requested the FAO director-general to develop long-term proposals for the production, distribution and consumption of food, designed to prevent both shortages and surpluses. Boyd-Orr took this as an opportunity to plead for policy-making functions. In October 1947, he presented a plan for a World Food Board (WFB) operated by FAO. This board would have taken the allocation functions of the IEFC to a world-wide level and make contributions mandatory. Orr's proposal stated that knowledge and resources existed to expand production. Increased production had to be accompanied by changing established patterns of distribution as well, otherwise some areas would overproduce, prices would be undermined and production discouraged over the long term.[30] As an incentive to maximize production, the World Food Board aimed to ensure stable prices for agricultural commodities by setting up and operating buffer stocks. Recognizing that "underdeveloped" countries lacked capital to buy fertilizer, machinery, pesticides and seeds, the WFB also envisaged a credit facility, which would provide long-term credit and gear its repayment schedule to indices of economic growth in the borrowing country. In addition to operating buffer stocks and a credit facility, the World Food Board would also use some of its reserves for famine relief and for concessionary sales to poor countries that could not otherwise meet their food needs.

The delegates at the second conference of FAO in September 1946 in Copenhagen were divided on the merits of the World Food Board. They agreed that "international machinery" was necessary to encourage worldwide production and asked a preparatory commission to discuss Boyd Orr's proposals and "other recommendations". The 18 members of the Preparatory Commission under the leadership of Viscount Bruce met for three months of intensive work.[31] Contrary to Boyd-Orr's vision, the report did not favour a policy-making function for FAO. At the same time, it urged member nations to work together to stabilize prices and increase production. The report realized that the market in agricultural products was neither free nor was it regulated in a fair way and, therefore, recommended inter-governmental commodity arrangements.

The report thus signalled a repudiation of internationally administered food policy – instead recommending the more familiar solution of inter-governmental agreements with voluntary membership.

Orr had argued that production and trade logically belonged together in *the same organization* since they interacted, but the Preparatory Commission separated them.[32] At the time, this separation made sense, because negotiations on the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO) were in full swing and an important part of the agenda dealt with commodity agreements. Members of the Preparatory Commission therefore envisioned two organizations, which would have to cooperate closely: ITO and FAO.

The idea of a World Food Board had been endorsed by France, Austria, Poland and other food importing countries, but the United States backed away from its initial support of the WFB and thus dealt the death blow to the World Food Board. The sudden change of heart in the US administration had several interconnected reasons: Beginning Cold War tensions made international cooperation on this scale seem naïve.[33] Additionally, it was uncertain whether the Soviet Union would join the WFB. Without this significant agricultural exporter and importer, a worldwide plan would have made little sense to contemporaries.[34] The Soviet Union had been a founding member of the FAO, and it participated as an observer at the conferences of 1945 and 1946. In his autobiography, Orr claimed that officials of the Politburo pledged their support for the WFB, if the British and American delegations also did so.[35] But the refusal of the Soviet Union to participate in the preparatory group made its participation in the organization highly unlikely.

The more immediate cause for the failure of the World Food Board to win approval was a policy conflict within the US administration

concerning whether agricultural products should be handled by a trade organization or within FAO. In the end, President Truman decided not to back the World Food Board. The instructions prepared by the State Department and approved by President Truman for the American delegation contained no endorsement of the World Food Board.[36]

Price stabilization, commodity agreements and the international trade organization

In an ironic twist of history, the ITO, which contained a chapter on commodity agreements, never materialized. Negotiations on the ITO charter had been successfully completed in Havana, and the Final Act signed by 54 countries on 24 March 1948. But by that time, resistance in the US Congress to the ITO had become pronounced, and the charter was not ratified. Because of the central role of the United States in pushing for the ITO, most other countries did not ratify the charter, either.[37]

Since the demise of the ITO meant that there still was no international organization responsible for the regulation of agricultural markets, the Council of FAO in June 1949 asked the new director-general of FAO, Norris E. Dodd, to study the problem of accumulation of surpluses in hard currency countries and the existence of shortages of these commodities in soft currency countries. Although the worst food shortage had passed by 1948, the world relied on the production capacities of North America, which had become the principal supplier of all deficit areas. In the words of the FAO conference report of 1948 this situation constituted "the principal international economic problem" of the time, because importing countries used their sparse dollars for commodity purchases, and the world was unduly dependent on one producer. Norris Dodd – who as US under-secretary of Agriculture and head of the US delegation to FAO had been ordered to oppose the World Food Board, although he had personally been in favour of it – was trying to salvage at least parts of Orr's plan. Under the leadership of University of California professor John B. Condliff a small group of experts developed a proposal for the International Commodity Clearing House.[38]

The International Commodity Clearing House (ICCH) would have asked for contributions based on members' gross national product toward an overall operating budget of $5 billion. This budget was to be used to purchase food surpluses in the dollar area. It would then sell these for soft currencies or trade them for strategic raw materials. The soft currencies should in the long run be used to finance a system

of buffer stocks administered by the ICCH. Any remaining foodstuffs would be channelled to needy nations at concessionary prices. The ICCH, as a public corporation, would have been operated within FAO. Although Dodd took great pains to explain that the ICCH would work through regular trading channels,[39] the delegates at the FAO conference in December 1949 were so critical of the main features of the plan that all thought of creating such an agency was immediately abandoned.[40] Some countries feared that concessionary prices might just be a hidden form of dumping. Others worried about the accumulation of soft currencies that might never be put to use and hamper a return to normal trading patterns.

Instead of creating the Commodity Clearing House, a working party suggested the formation of the Committee on Commodity Problems to perform some functions of the ICCH, but without having contractual powers. The Committee on Commodity Problems was more palatable to the delegates and was immediately set up. It was to act as a transmitter of information between deficit and surplus countries, to review possible effects of surplus operations on third countries and to initiate discussions that might lead to commodity agreements.

The FAO secretariat's ambitious plans for becoming an action agency thus were thoroughly defeated by its member nations. The report on the World Food Board led to the establishment of the FAO council as the new policy organ. Instead of a commodity clearing house, the FAO conference installed a committee to review and analyse problems in agricultural products. Aided by a new division within the secretariat, the FAO published extensively on the topic of buffer stocks and reserves but was never given actor capability.[41]

The only initiative dealing with commodities that was accepted by FAO member states was a guideline concerning the use of agricultural products that were in surplus. This guideline had been introduced as a reaction to the growing US surplus.[42] US surpluses were not only a concern of American farmers and politicians, but also of exporters, who feared that the dumping of US products would ruin their markets and depress prices. Out of these concerns a working group of FAO's Committee on Commodity Problems developed the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal in 1954. These principles became a code of international behaviour, meaning that countries dealing with surpluses formally accept compliance with these rules. The acceptance of the surplus disposal guidelines suggested the outer limits of agricultural commodity coordination that the major food-exporting countries, particularly the United States, were willing to accept.[43]

FAO and technical aid

Popular, practical and apolitical: technical aid for agricultural development

The failure of the World Food Board, on which Boyd Orr and his staff had concentrated their energies, left FAO "groping for a focus between 1947 and 1949 when it was rescued by technical assistance, which gave it a meaningful task and a raison d'etre".[44] This turn to technical aid reflected a new trend in development practice and a change in FAO's leadership. Whereas Boyd Orr had strictly refused to create jobs for the coordination of technical aid, arguing that "we can hire one man and a secretary for three months to write all that FAO will ever need on agricultural extension", under his successors technical aid became a hallmark of FAO.[45] During the 1950s and 1960s the lion's share of FAO's special budget went into technical aid, which reflected both the rise in membership from newly independent countries, who demanded technical aid and the willingness of the "developed world" to fund these projects.[46] This change in focus and membership was accompanied by a physical move of the organization. When the FAO Conference in 1951 decided in a long and contested election process to move FAO headquarters from its temporary quarters in Washington, DC, to Rome (other choices having been New York, Copenhagen or Geneva), it was argued that Rome was closest to countries in the South.[47] Rome had also been the seat of the International Institute of Agriculture since 1905 which, despite its neutral image of data collection and fact gathering, became known for its pro-fascist stance under Mussolini and was quietly dismantled when its functions were taken over by the FAO in 1945.[48] Ironically, FAO's headquarters, which are provided by the Italian government for a nominal lease of one dollar, were originally intended to house Mussolini's ministry for overseas territories.

When the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was dissolved in 1948, FAO hoped to receive its sizeable surplus of foodstuffs and finances. Most of UNRRA's surplus went to UNICEF, though, and FAO had to use a small transfer fund for its first activities in the field.[49] In these early years, most technical assistance went to European countries. The organization's commitment to assistance received a boost when the UN's Expanded Program for Technical Assistance (EPTA) began operations in June 1950 and allotted a major share of the funds to the FAO.[50] Technical aid was politically popular, because it relied on (Western) expertise, came relatively cheap and was easy to control. The objective of technical assistance was the transfer

of know-how from rich to poor countries, particularly by means of the "expert–counterpart" tandem and, to a lesser degree, by fellowships and training.

This is not to say that technical aid and Western knowledge were forced on the developing countries. Quite to the contrary, it was demanded by them. For instance, the General Assembly Resolution in December 1948 that led to the creation of EPTA, was passed at the instigation of Burma, Chile and Egypt to arrange for international teams of experts, training abroad and the building and financing of extension facilities in developing countries.[51]

In order that colonies could receive technical aid, FAO passed a constitutional change in 1955 creating the new status of associate members. Although these members could neither vote nor apply for technical help themselves, they could receive it, and their needs became more visible. When, in the course of decolonization, the FAO's membership increased enormously, the change in numbers did not cause power struggles along a North–South divide, simply because all member nations agreed that what the developing countries needed was technical aid.[52] Almost all technical aid missions now went to the developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Following the initiation of the United Nations Special Fund (UNSF) in October 1958, a further period of rapid growth occurred since, like most other organizations in the UN system, FAO was able to utilize a share of the fund for its technical assistance activities. Projects under UNSF financing were large compared with those financed under EPTA. They were designed to support the surveys, pilot projects and training facilities that were considered basic to agricultural development. EPTA finally merged with UNSF to form the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1966, but the distinctive nature of the projects financed under the two original funds was maintained for several years.[53]

In the 1956–1957 biennium, $16,643,000, or about 95 per cent of the organization's total extra-budgetary resources, came from EPTA, and in 1966–1967, $97,213,000, or over 86 per cent, came from UNDP. Although these funds greatly increased FAO's operations, they also put a strain on its budget, because they covered no overhead costs. More importantly, FAO had no real control over the scope and directions of its technical assistance program, because funds to UNDP were allocated on a voluntary basis. The matter of funding gave the United States, as the primary contributor, more control over the allocation of FAO resources.[54]

Conducting field projects certainly helped FAO's overall reputation as an organization that had first-hand experience with problems in

agriculture, forestry and fisheries. But while individual projects might have positive effects, they did not necessarily make a difference for the overall economy of a developing country.[55]

High hopes for conquering hunger: the "Freedom from Hunger Campaign"

The larger FAO grew, the harder it became to convey what FAO did. The organization had become the leading publisher of statistics on agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Its departments and divisions – around 20 at the time and 6 regional offices – all held conferences on increasingly specialized topics, and the range of activities of its field programs was even larger.[56] The fourth director-general, Binay R. Sen, in office from 1956 to 1967, gave FAO's myriad activities an overarching theme by inventing the Freedom from Hunger Campaign (FFHC). Sen, the first person from a developing country to lead a UN organization, wanted to draw attention to the continued widespread existence of hunger and to reinforce FAO's sense of mission.[57] By addressing the general public, Sen was explicitly looking for an apolitical mechanism by which to conquer hunger. His hope was that by raising awareness of hunger, public opinion would force politicians to introduce policies that would reduce hunger. But the aim of the campaign went beyond an indirect attempt at influencing politics. It wanted to use the resources and ideas of non-governmental organizations and citizens in a global fight against hunger.[58] Evoking the "spirit of human solidarity", the campaign raised voluntary contributions from religious and civic groups, foundations, local groups and even individuals, for projects aimed at rural development. This in itself was no small achievement. At the time, development doctrines and practices focussed heavily on industrialization. With the exception of plantation-style agriculture, peasants were regarded as "backward", and their proper role in emerging industrial economies was that of a large labour reservoir. To put hunger at the centre of a campaign was to acknowledge the role of small peasants and the plight of the majority of the world population, who lived in rural areas.

Preparation for the campaign went on from 1957 to 1960. Since it stressed education on the different aspects of hunger and the ways to overcome it, the campaign published 26 basic studies on issues ranging from nutrition of children to infrastructure. Working through national committees, the FFHC bureau in Rome matched projects in developing countries with privately funded groups. These national committees were often supported by governments but operated as independent entities. At its peak, the FFHC had more than a hundred national committees. Not

surprisingly, there was a wide range of projects. For example, the British National Federation of Women's Institute financed a farm institute in Karamoja, Uganda; the New Zealand Freedom from Hunger Committee sponsored a month-long seminar on modern farm broadcasting techniques in the United Arab Republic; and the Indian FFHC Foundation provided irrigation pumps to rural projects in Ceylon (Sri Lanka).[59]

Since the FFHC bureau never had more than 18 staff members, it was not able to exercise oversight over every project in detail. However, the long-term coordinator, Charles Weitz, attributed "the eclectic nature and inexperience of the campaign secretariat" as a key to its success.[60]

In June 1963, FAO convened a World Food Congress in Washington, DC, to assess the progress in the fight against hunger. To set the tone for the congress, the Special Assembly on Man's right to Freedom from Hunger that consisted of 28 Nobel Prize winners and other "persons of moral authority" issued a manifesto calling for international action to abolish hunger. As many as 1,300 invited participants attended the congress in their personal capacity. During a "World Freedom from Hunger Week" nearly 150 countries issued special FFHC stamps that raised money for the campaign. In addition to special proclamations by presidents John F. Kennedy and Charles de Gaulle, the "Freedom from Hunger Week" was endorsed by virtually all organized religious bodies.[61]

In order to enlist as much support for its program as possible, FAO in 1966 also installed the Industry Cooperative Program (ICP), which received funds from FFHC to set up an international secretariat in Rome. The aim of this cooperation was to find projects of mutual interest "where a developmental need can be translated into an industrial opportunity".[62] The "enlightened" sponsorship of the Shell company's sponsorship of a rural development project in Borgo a Mozzano in Tuscany served as an example for local levels of partnership between agriculture and private business.[63] Membership quickly rose from 18 large agribusinesses to 106 companies from 17 countries. Members mainly worked through high-level missions (manned by senior industrialists) to individual countries that had requested help in setting up factories, increasing yields for export crops or infrastructural projects. ICP officials received detailed economic reports by FAO field personnel that non-members could not obtain.

Although director-general Sen "had no illusions with regard to Transnational Corporations", recognizing their "exploitative…character, impelled by profit motive", he hoped that FAO could "try to harness the managerial ability, technical know-how, scientific experience, and

capital resources of the leading industries of Europe and North America to support our efforts to free the world from hunger".[64] The ICP was expanded several times. Especially in South Korea and Ceylon, local cooperation with big industry was the main part of the "Freedom from Hunger Campaign". Criticism of the ICP among civil society groups grew over the years. The most vocal critic, Susan George, author of the best-selling *How the Other Half Dies*, (1976), stated that ICP abused its position, furthering the interests of agribusiness corporations at the expense of Third World cultivators.[65] Under mounting public pressure and a renewed critical stance within the UN about multinational companies, the new FAO director-general Edouard Saouma (1976–1993) dismantled the ICP in 1978. However, during the 1960s the ICP was considered a success, and it is today again heralded as fostering the first public–private partnerships.[66]

The "Freedom from Hunger Campaign" itself was never officially abolished, but budget cuts led to its quiet demise in the 1980s. While 1,800 people, again in their personal capacities, attended the second congress in The Hague in June 1970, support for the campaign both inside FAO as well as among its member countries dwindled as it became clear that many participants in the campaign were in opposition to the politics of member countries and the FAO itself. Thus, the campaign that owed its success to the fact that it allowed participants a lot of leeway in what projects to choose and how to run them, became hampered by the divergent views this produced.

From an institutional point of view, the campaign was a success. It increased FAO's visibility and established its moral leadership on the issue of hunger. By the end of Sen's tenure as director-general, the FAO budget had quadrupled from $13.4 million in 1956 to $49.9 million in 1966, and the number of employees had risen to 4,000.[67] FAO also extended its legitimacy and authority in the field of agriculture vis-à-vis other UN organizations. For instance, the World Bank, while taking a more active interest in agriculture, provided considerable funding for FAO projects. In hindsight, the most innovative feature of the campaign was the extent of cooperation with non-governmental organizations. Many of the NGOs and national committees formed during the campaign continue to operate today, for instance, the German Welthungerhilfe.[68] Furthermore, it stressed the involvement of young people and initiated the policy of asking female celebrities to formally endorse the campaign.[69] Some of the events that were popularized by campaign partners remain standard procedure for raising money for development, such as sponsored walks or runs and special stamp and coin issues.

The founding of the World Food Programme

A lasting outcome of the "Freedom from Hunger Campaign" was the establishment of the UN's multilateral food aid body, the World Food Programme (WFP). The WFP owes its existence in equal measure to surplus production in the United States, the hopeful spirit of the Development Decade, and the ideas developed within the "Freedom from Hunger Campaign" on how food transfers could become an effective means of supporting development projects.

Facing mounting surpluses of grain that were stored at taxpayers' expense, the Eisenhower Administration passed the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act in 1954 at the instigation of members of Congress and the agrarian lobby. This act, P.L. 480, or more popularly, "Food for Peace," provided for the sale of surpluses to needy countries at concessional prices. Although the size of the program increased to $1,511.8 billion dollars by 1960, it only made a dent in the surplus problem.[70] The US government, especially the Department of Agriculture, was therefore looking for further ways to reduce these burdensome stocks. Officials in the department were in frequent contact with the FAO Commodities Division on how to make constructive use of these surpluses.[71] In the fall of 1960 the United States delegation to the United Nations submitted a resolution to the General Assembly requesting the FAO to consider how methods for moving surplus food could be improved, calling on the FAO to study what new techniques could be developed. Having anticipated the UN resolution, FAO immediately set up an expert group on surplus utilization, which met in Rome in January 1961. The group's five members, among them Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, propagator of the big-push theory of development, shared a Keynesian view of economics and displayed a firm belief in the possibility of progress through planning – quite in line with development thinking of the time.[72] The group's joint paper became the basis for the FAO director-general's report to the UN General Assembly.[73] Before transmitting this paper to the UN, Sen assembled an advisory meeting of major donors. George McGovern, the newly established director of the US "Food for Peace" program, quickly and decisively decided about the fate of WFP. Armed with a concrete proposal for a multilateral agency and the promise that the United States would provide half of the three years' budget of $100 million, McGovern took the other delegates by surprise and convinced them to go along with his plan.[74] The World Food Programme had two mother organizations when it was launched at the beginning of 1963 on a three-year experimental phase.[75] While

offices were set up in the FAO and most staff was transferred from FAO – the most prominent being Assistant Director Addeke Boerma, The Netherlands, who became the first director of WFP – each organization elected half of the members to WFP's governing body, the UN/FAO Intergovernmental Committee.

The FAO report on surplus utilization had favoured a program approach for most uses of food aid, meaning that food aid was to be given directly to the receiving country to use in the framework of its development program. But the WFP's assignment was to explore as widely as possible the ways in which food aid could be used in development projects.[76] This project approach was an important condition for US support for WFP, because it was the counterpart to what the Americans were doing with their much larger "Food for Peace" program.[77] WFP projects were in the field of pre-school and school feeding and food for work projects in infrastructure. At the end of WFP's experimental period on 31 December 1965, 101 countries had participated as donors or recipients. Total resources contributed reached $93.7 million, barely missing the initial target of $100 million. The United States was not only instrumental in setting up the WFP, but remained its largest donor and had influence over how its resources were deployed.

The WFP is a prime example of the US's "ambidextrous internationalism" – the United States remained on the one hand a major disburser of food aid in its bilateral "Food for Peace" program and on the other hand supported the set-up of the multilateral agency.[78]

Considering the FAO secretariat's wish for an action agency and Sen's skill at promotion of the FAO, it is quite surprising that he, apparently without qualms, accepted that the WFP as a quasi-operational arm of FAO would report to two organizations. This unusual set-up was due mainly to its character as an experiment and did not cause any significant problems for its first years of operation. There had been intense discussions in the multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the OECD on the constructive disposal of surpluses, several proposals in the UN general assembly and, most importantly, contradictory policies within the US administration – all of which made it impossible for FAO to fathom what organization, if any, would develop out of these ideas. It seems that the FAO secretariat, and especially Sen, was so delighted that a multilateral organization would be established that they did not think about the implications for FAO. After all, the WFP was housed on FAO premises and shared personnel, expertise and the same vision.[79] It was only under FAO director-general Edouard Saouma, Lebanon, and his counterpart at WFP, James Ingram, Australia,

that institutional infighting over program handling and expenditures came to a boil and, after a long-drawn, nasty and public quarrel, the two organizations were physically and formally separated in 1992.[80]

Conclusion

To achieve its ultimate goal, the conquering of hunger, FAO had to focus on raising food availability for the greatest number of people. At its most basic this meant that food production had to increase and distribution patterns had to change. Under its first two director generals, John Boyd Orr and Norris E. Dodd, FAO tried to create bodies that would have had a direct influence on agricultural trade and created a fairer system. But many FAO member countries, most prominently among them the United States and the United Kingdom, did not want to give up control over such a sensitive policy area to an outside organization. This refusal had nothing to do with FAO itself – member countries were unable to agree on rules for agricultural trade in any other body. Neither in United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) nor GATT could agreements on agriculture be reached until the Uruguay round that established the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The first 20 years of FAO's operations highlight the importance of the United States. US support was instrumental in founding FAO, just as it was in renouncing a policy-making function for the organization and installing the World Food Programme and shaping its first years. Furthermore, FAO's history shows that global governance did not increase continuously, as is the assumption underlying many contemporary debates. Cooperation between governments was most pronounced immediately after the war, when combined boards allocated foodstuffs, and relief was organized through UNRRA. Significantly, though, this cooperation worked because it was geared towards overcoming the effects of war and dealing with the threat of starvation in Europe.[81]

Having learned the hard way, FAO leadership in the coming decades would try to "stay out of politics" and gave only lukewarm support to policy fields that addressed massive inequalities, such as land reform. Instead, FAO concentrated on increasing production by sending technical aid missions to developing countries, which aimed to introduce more productive farming methods. Through the "Freedom from Hunger Campaign", FAO addressed the general public directly and involved non-governmental organizations in a common fight against hunger. As a campaign, the FFHC can be considered a success for FAO. It introduced innovations that many later campaigns would copy, such as addressing

youth, bringing in celebrities, marketing special stamps, and so forth. But there remained a fundamental problem with this non-political approach. Without a firm commitment from political leaders to tackle inequalities within their respective countries and between countries, even the most successful projects and campaigns have little impact. Local projects do not necessarily translate into change on a country level. Furthermore, if unequal systems of land tenure and unfair trading systems remain in place, productivity increases tend to cement inequalities rather than ameliorate them.

Notes

 1. Binay Ranjan Sen (1982: 249). Sen was referring to the pronounced South–North conflict within FAO in the 1970s – a topic outside the scope of this chapter.
 2. Classic functionalism considers specialized agencies such as FAO to be non-political, since they deal mainly with technical matters. But this image has shifted in recent scholarship. "Functional organizations, once perceived to be non-political, in line with functionalist theory, have become increasingly political since the issues they deal with are not merely technical, but can touch at the core of state sovereignty and deeply political concerns." Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst (2004: 72).
 3. The classic realist is Hans Morgenthau (1967); for modern realism see i.e., John J. Mearsheimer (1995: 5–49) and Loyd Gruber (2000); as introduction to the theories of global governance, see David Held and Anthony McGrew (2002), Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. (2000). A classic liberal position is taken up by Hedley Bull (1977); a neoliberal standpoint is taken by Robert O. Keohane (1984); for a functionalist study, see Ernst B. Haas (1964).
 4. For the concept of epistemic communities, see Peter M. Haas (1992).
 5. For the idea of how IOs create "social knowledge", see Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999).
 6. See Dan Plesch (2010).
 7. The Combined Food Board was at first bi-national until Canada was invited to join in October 1943; see Eric Roll (1956: 63–69, 94–97). On the 12 subcommittees dealing with individual commodities all countries who were major producers or consumers were represented.
 8. Eric Roll (1956: 303).
 9. Jessica Reinisch (2008: esp. 375–378).
10. Eric Roll (1956: 180–181); see also McKinzie (1971)
11. James Vernon (2007: 125) cites George C.M. McGonigle and John Kirby's *Poverty and Public Health* (1936). See also John Boyd Orr's *Food, Health and Income* (1936), Paul J. Weindling (1995) and Martin David Dubin (1995). On nutrition studies in Britain, see also Joshua Ruxin (2006: 27).
12. The best description of the nutrition approach is in Sean Turnell (1999, chapter 4).
13. Some examples concerned with people working on agricultural supplies/relief/health: Jean Monnet and Arthur Salter coordinated Allied shipping

during WWII as they had already done during WWI. Monnet had been deputy secretary-general of the League from its founding in 1919 until his resignation in 1923. During the war he served inter alia on the British Supply Council. Salter was head of the economic and financial section of the League of Nations Secretariat. During the war he was appointed parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Shipping in 1939 and headed the British Shipping Mission to Washington DC from 1941 to 1943. He was appointed deputy general of UNRRA in 1944. Ludwik Rajchman, who had led the League of Nations' health section from 1921 to 1939, advised UNRRA in health matters and went on to found UNICEF. One of the view few women working for the League, Mary McGeachy also became one of the six deputy directors of UNRRA. Marta Balinska (1998), Mary Kinnear (2004) and Sherrill Brown Wells (2011).

14. Clavin (2013: 165–171, 234–239, 295–296), John B. O`Brien (2000), Alfred Stirling (2012) and Heather Radi (2004).
15. John B. O'Brien (2000) and Ralph W. Phillips (1981, chapter 2). The executive secretary of the US delegation at Hot Springs, Leroy Stinebower, recalled that everyone in the State and Agriculture departments was completely surprised that the first international conference was to be on food rather than money or trade, and puts the conference's theme down to the Australian influence. Oral history interview with Leroy Stinebower, Richard D. McKinzie (1974).
16. The invitation was first discussed with the UK, the Soviet Union and China: FRUS 1943, 1, "Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom" (Matthews), Washington DC, 8 March 1943: 820. See footnote 1 for telegrams to China and Soviet Union. The conference was initially planned for 27 April, but had to be moved to a later date because of difficulties of Chinese and Soviets to form and instruct a delegation and to get to the venue in time, see FRUS, 1943, I, "Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom" (Matthews), Washington DC, 8 March 1943: 826–827.
17. United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture (1943).
18. Ruth Jachertz and Alexander Nützenadel (2011).
19. Pearson, born in 1897, had been involved with commodity policy during the interwar years. During the time of the interim commission he advanced in rank at the Canadian legation from minister to minister plenipotentiary and, in January, 1945, to ambassador.
20. United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture (1945).
21. Sean Turnell (1999: 157); see also Sean Turnell (2000).
22. H. D. Kay (1972: 65).
23. See FAO (2013). The last sentence of the preamble, "and ensuring humanity's freedom from hunger" was only added in the 1960s during the "Freedom from Hunger Campaign".
24. Staff included the influential nutritionist Wallace Aykroyd. Kenneth J. Carpenter (2007).
25. FAO (1946).
26. Anonymous (1947) "The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations", *International Organization*, 1 (1): 121–123; on the extent of hunger, Tony Judt (2005: 37–39), Lizzie Collingham (2011: 476–484).
27. FAO (1945).

28. FRUS 1947, I, "Editorial Note: United States Policies Regarding the Problem of Critical World Shortages in Food, Fuel and Industrial Items": 1039–1040.
29. International Emergency Food Council (1947).
30. FAO (1946b). Discussion of the World Food Proposal in Amy L. S. Staples (2006: 85–94) and D. John Shaw (2007: 15–31).
31. FAO (1946a). There were 16 original members: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Netherlands, Philippine Republic, Poland, UK and the United States; Argentina participated in all matters concerning wheat, Siam in rice discussions. The Soviet Union was invited but declined.
32. Shaw (2007: 29).
33. On the early Cold War, see, Melvyn Leffler (1992), David S. Painter and Melvyn Leffler (eds) (2005), esp. introduction and articles in parts I and III, John Lewis Gaddis (2005) and Walter LaFeber (2004, chapters 1–3).
34. The Soviet Union never joined the FAO. Argentina, another crucial exporting country joined in 1951.
35. Lord Boyd Orr (1966: 176).
36. Alan J. Matusow (1967: 87)
37. Helen V. Milner (1997: 139–141). Susan Ariel Aaronsen (1996, chapter 7).
38. John B. Condliff et al. (1949). For a discussion, see also Amy L. S. Staples (2006: 97–98) and John D. Shaw (2007: 32–36).
39. International Federation of Agricultural Producers (1948: 184).
40. Wilellyn Morelle (1949).
41. FAO (1953, 1956, 1958).
42. Willard W. Cochrane (1976).
43. Vernon Ruttan (1996: 395).
44. Alexander Eckstein (1955: 766).
45. Ralph W. Philipps (1981: 187).
46. FAO's regular budget is covered by member states according to an agreed scale, whereas its programme budget relies on voluntary contributions.
47. Most members favoured a European location for FAO. Ralph W. Philipps (1981, chapter 8).
48. Luciano Tosi (1989).
49. James A. Gillespie (2003: 133).
50. On EPTA, see Olav Stokke (2009, chapter 2) and David Owen (1959: 25–32). Examples of FAO's early field activities in Gove Hambidge (1955, chapters 8–11).
51. Olav Stokke (2009: 50–51).
52. Sergio Marchisio and Antonietta di Biase (1991: 41).
53. See Ralph W. Philipps (1981, chapter 10), on changes in FAO's technical aid program.
54. Amy L. S. Staples (2006: 99). On US attitude towards the FAO, see Raymond F. Hopkins (1990).
55. On the Micro-Macro Paradox, see Jörg Faust and Stefan Leiderer (2008).
56. There were five large departments, which under slightly changing names covered fisheries, forestry, agriculture, economics and publications, plus many subdivisions ranging from plant production and human nutrition to statistics. By the early 1960s there were six regional offices, for: Europe, Near

East, Asia, Latin America, Africa and North America plus liaison offices at the UN in New York and Geneva; see Ralph W. Philipps (1981).

57. Amy L. S. Staples (2006, chapter 7).
58. Matthew James Bunch (2007).
59. More examples in Amy L. S. Staples (2006, chapter 7) and Matthew James Bunch (2007).
60. Matthew James Bunch (2007: 70).
61. FAO Archives, RG 8, FFHC, Box 1363, File SP 14/6, (Religious Leaders)
62. See Walter Simons, head of ICP/FAO (1976: 173).
63. FAO Archives, RG 8 FFHC, Box 1357, SP14/12, RLO Asia, De Fonseka General, "Report on Travel in Asian Regions on FFHC Projects", 29 December 1965: 2; Shell Italiana (1961).
64. FAO Archives, Personal Collection of Walter Simons, "ICP and World Trade Unions", Memo from B. R. Sen to Edouard Saouma, 2 October 1977, cited in Bunch (2007: 164).
65. Susan George (1976, chapter 7).
66. Alexander Friedrich and Valence E. Gale (2004). Friedrich directed the ICP from to 1966 to 1979; Andrea Liese, in her search for reasons why FAO does not fit the model of increasing partnerships between UN organizations and industry, implicitly argues (without looking at its results) that the ICP was a positive experiment; Andrea Liese (2010).
67. Amy L. S. Staples (2006: 120).
68. Welthungerhilfe (2012) Profile, http://www.welthungerhilfe.de/ueber-uns.html, date accessed 12 May 2014.
69. The mix was quite odd, ranging from Sophia Loren over Margaret Mead to Mother Theresa; see Matthew James Bunch (2007).
70. See table in Peter A. Toma (1967: 52).
71. FAO Archives, RG 8, Office of Director General, Food for Peace File, "Distribution of Surplus Food Through the United Nations System", no date given (July 1960), and FAO Archives, RG 8, Office of Director General, Subject Files, Consultative Group on Surplus Utilization, II, Letter: Gerda Blau, director commodities division, to Mordechai Ezekiel, head economics department, 11 January 1961.
72. Hans W. Singer received his PhD at Cambridge as a student of Keynes. Singer worked in the UN for more than 20 years. At the time of the above meeting he was already well-known for the Prebisch–Singer thesis. His former fellow student with Keynes, Professor Vijendra Kasturi Ranga Varadaraja Rao, was a prominent Indian economist and founder-director of the Delhi School of Economics, the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi, and the Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore. In the international sphere he was one of the central forces behind the institution of the United Nations Development Program. Murray Benedict was a well-known professor of agricultural economics at the University of Berkeley in California, and José Figueres, served three times as president of Costa Rica and was the most original farmer–philosopher–socialist. See the interesting oral history interview with Ferrer from 1970, Donald R. McCoy and Richard D. McKinzie (1970). Paul Rosenstein-Rodan was a professor at MIT. He is one of the fathers of the "Big Push Model" of development theory.

73. FAO Archives, RG 12, ESC, Surplus Disposal 1960–1961, *FAO Experts Joint Report on Surplus Disposal.*
74. D. John Shaw (2011: 13–15).
75. WFP was created at the end of 1961, and official operations started at the beginning of 1963. In reality, staff had begun work immediately after the respective resolutions by ECOSOC and FAO conference which established the WFP.
76. FAO (1961: 24–27).
77. Singer et al. (1987: 28).
78. The term is taken from Mazower (2012: 294).
79. This paragraph is based on research for my dissertation: "From Crisis to Crisis. The emergence of an international food aid regime, 1945–1975", chapter 4.
80. An insider account is James Ingram (2006), *Bread and Stones: Leadership and the Struggle to Reform the United Nations World Food Program*, Charleston, SC: BookSurge Publishing.
81. Glenda Sluga (2013, chapter 4) sees another peak of internationalism in the guise of global responsibilities in the 1970s.

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5

Between Entanglements and Dependencies: Food, Nutrition, and National Development at the Central American Institute of Nutrition (INCAP)

Corinne A. Pernet

When President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed "Freedom from Want" as one of the goals of the postwar world order in his famous address to Congress of January 1941, freedom from hunger was an essential part of it. Indeed, two years later Roosevelt convened the conference at Hot Springs, Virginia, that would result in the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO. The victory over famine and malnutrition was one of the great promises of the postwar world order and was viewed as an indispensable element of economic progress and development. Yet even the scholars who, in recent years, have begun to tackle the much-neglected history of development, have almost completely ignored the field of food policy. The few existing studies focus on the major international organizations and adopt a headquarters-centred perspective.[1] Contributions to the field have also been made by scholars of US foreign policy and by historians of important private foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, so that we find solid studies of certain features such as food aid or the "green revolution".[2] Another strand of the historiography of development is modelled on Arturo Escobar's and Gustavo Esteva's incisive critiques of *development* as a Western-initiated discourse that creates tight constraints on agency in the developing world and perpetuates dependencies.[3] While these studies confirm the emergence of a "development discourse" during the 1950s, the case of food policy shows that the process was not as linear as they argue.

Adopting a constructivist notion of international organizations, my research shows that we should be weary of simply attributing decisions, priorities and norms to the power of dominant nation-states. A variety of expert bodies within international organizations were also important actors in shaping the nutrition and food policies, as recent scholarship has recognized. However, we also need to examine their complex entanglements with local development actors and assess whether and how local needs and priorities informed and shaped international agendas.

This chapter is a first foray into such an investigation, focusing on the Central American Institute of Nutrition, INCAP (Instituto de Nutrición de Centroamérica y Panamá), a small international nutrition institute in Guatemala, founded in 1949 far away from UN organization headquarters in New York, Geneva, Paris, or Rome. As a participant in the formulation and transmission of nutrition and food policies in the postwar period, the institute was one of the sites where national and regional concerns intersected with the programs of a number of international agencies, such as FAO, the United Nations International Emergency Fund (UNICEF), or the WHO. In the following pages, I will examine the first 15 years of INCAP's activities to uncover the entangled histories of international food and nutrition policies. For instance, INCAP's views on food policy and development questions differed substantially from that of FAO. In terms of nutrition work, INCAP was doubtlessly central for the creation and transmission of new types of nutritional know-how and knowledge in Central America and quickly became a hub for an international community of nutritionists with career ambitions.

To put nutritional policy and questions of development in their historical context, the chapter will first present pre-World War II international discussions and projects on nutrition and then discuss the context of INCAP's founding. These pre-war and wartime efforts are important, not only to contextualize our inquiry about INCAP, but also to show that the "age of development" did not simply materialize out of thin air with Truman's Four Point Programs in 1949, as even recent scholarship on the subject has implied.[4] Developmentalist discourses had important antecedents in the interwar period, and food policy in the Americas is one of the areas where this is evident. The chapter will then turn to INCAP, taking us from its establishment and early philosophy to the subsequent international entanglements and their effects in the 1950s and early 1960s, taking as a case study its position with regards to school feeding.

Talking about food and hunger in terms of nutrition

In the 1930s, food and nutrition had become important fields in a broad movement towards international planning that extended into many sectors, from finance and commodity trade to health.[5] A series of publications by the League of Nations on nutrition and its relation to public health as well as economic policy – among the best-selling publications of the League – suggested that malnutrition across the world (and, not quite coincidentally, the world economic crisis) could be banished by increasing local production as well as international trade. Both production and distribution should be guided rationally by the science of nutrition.[6] This "marriage of agriculture and nutrition" formed part of the basic assumptions under which the FAO, founded in 1943 as the first organization of the United Nations, operated.

In tandem with such grand schemes to globally solve the problems of (mal)nutrition and of agricultural overproduction, an apparatus of statistics increasingly molded the field of nutrition: consumption surveys, tables of nutrients in foodstuffs, minimum requirements of calories and nutrients. Consumption statistics and requirement tables, as Nick Cullather has pointed out, were "one of the lesser tools facilitating a widening of the state's supervision of the welfare and conduct of whole populations".[7] Yet, it was not only states, but also international organizations which were interested in these tools. Certainly, the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization worked hard to elaborate methods of collecting statistics in the field of nutrition. Moreover, they also endeavoured to spread these methods globally to be able to grasp the nutritional condition and requirements of the world. Early efforts in that direction still reflected a singularly European point of view,[8] and revisions in surveying and assaying methods were frequent. By the 1940s, nutritional analysis, calorie requirements and consumption statistics had become part of a scientifically legitimized discourse on the condition of the world and became prevalent at the WHO, at UNICEF and, of course, at FAO.[9]

Looking at food in those "scientific" terms deleted cultural meanings and social contexts as relevant information. In the 1940s, many laboratories across the world engaged in biochemical analyses of food, a practice that had its own subversive potential. Breaking down dishes into their nutritional contents – into carbohydrates, vitamins, and proteins – could cast doubt on the notion of the inherent superiority of (Northern) European and American diets which had long characterized the nutrition discourses.[10] As important, research into certain nutritional

deficiencies also opened the door for a re-evaluation of supposed racial differences: some characteristics that heretofore had been attributed to race were discovered to be the results of chronic undernutrition and/or malnutrition.[11] Nutrition science was unsettling. Yet its potentially liberating effects were more welcome in some quarters than in others. As Sunil Amrith has argued for the case of India, the selective appropriation of a nutritionist discourse about food did not imply the acceptance of Western food regimes, which treated food as just another commodity.[12] Gandhi, for instance, retreated from the scientific discourse about food and brought it to the foreground "as a potent symbol of the value of the particular, the local, and the individual".[13]

In Latin America, modern nutrition science had an eager reception, especially in the first decades of the twentieth century, when Latin American states deepened their engagement with *biopolitics* and started to build governmental welfare organizations. New systems of public health, improved urban infrastructure, expanded education and regulated working conditions should all contribute to much-sought-after "progress".[14] High child mortality rates had inspired inquiries on the (mal)nutrition of infants and children and, in the early twentieth century, "child protection" was discussed at a series of Inter-American Congresses. These congresses spawned transnational public health organizations that predated the League of Nations and its associated institutions.[15]

The Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB), for instance, had made reference to nutrition topics ever since the 1920s and, by 1934, asked member governments to organize institutes to study the composition and nutritional value of local food products, to elaborate statistics on nutrition and access to food, and to establish nutritional norms that could be spread through educational activities. Several governments (Brazil, Chile and Argentina) followed this demand and established nutrition institutes or commissions which attempted to fathom the nutritional values of typical diets. Evidently, the still young "nutrition science" carried much authority for the drafters of conventions of the PASB: They were planning to educate populations about the "correct diet", which would incorporate "the latest discoveries about amino-acids, minerals, and vitamins, so as to improve the popular diet".[16] By 1940, good nutrition was considered an important contribution to the "social and economic well-being" of the republics in the Americas, reflecting the association of nutrition with development that had been forged in past decades, particularly in interwar Europe.[17] Not surprisingly, colonial powers in particular had started to investigate the relation between nutrition and

economic development, focusing on African and Asian colonies.[18] When the League of Nations took up these issues in the second half of the 1930s, the link between deficient nutrition and lack of economic development became widely popularized.[19] Such concerns retreated in the background during the early 1940s, when war-time imperatives in the Western hemisphere led the United States government as well as private actors to enter into close collaboration with important Latin American allies to increase food production and ensure proper nutrition.[20] The Rockefeller Foundation, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) as well as the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) supported the establishment of institutes of nutrition in Mexico and Colombia in 1943, and immediately started research and training programs there. In the same year, President Roosevelt was host to the conference on Food and Agriculture in Hot Springs to find ways to pursue the "freedom from want" that had been declared as one of the official war aims of the Allies. The conference paved the way for the establishment of FAO two years later.

As had already been the case during the interwar period, the concern for basic nutritional needs in the postwar period was not only based on humanitarian sentiments: rather, it was part of a plan towards a general economic development. At its very first regular session, FAO staff argued that well-fed children and adults would contribute not only to political stability, but would also have a positive impact on development. Good nutrition would increase productivity and, moreover, once a people's basic nutritional needs were fulfilled, they would have resources to spend on other consumer goods and thus become "a dynamic force that makes an expanding economy possible".[21] FAO, evidently, was intent on fostering a modernization paradigm based on expanded consumerism. As the Australian, Frank McDougall, one of the leading proponents of nutrition reform put it, good nutrition was an integral part of any development plan, as it was "the essential basis for sound progress and industrial development".[22]

INCAP's establishment in the "Decade of Hope"

The establishment of INCAP was not only an expression of the new emphasis on nutrition as a component of development: it was also intimately tied to the Guatemalan political context of the late 1940s. Generally, the social reforms alluded to above arrived much later in the Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, where oligarchic elites ruled with

an iron fist), than it arrived in Mexico, the Southern Cone, and Brazil. In Guatemala, a general strike and massive protests in 1944 led to the resignation of Jorge Ubico, the last of a line of dictators who had ruled over the country since independence. By October 1944, a military junta called for Guatemala's first election that could be called democratic. The new president, teacher and reformer Juan José Arévalo, was dealing with pent-up reform demands from a small middle class and a few members of the elite, but above all with the great pressure of rural masses who chafed under extremely unequal land distribution (5 per cent of the population owned 95 per cent of the land) and the dominance of foreign companies, such as United Fruit. New labour codes and measures for social security of workers announced new beginnings, although in small steps. Nationalist sentiments of modernization pervaded this Central American republic.[23] The Arévalo Administration addressed some of the problems of the urban lower classes, but it did not touch the big question of reforms in the countryside – land distribution and the substantial improvement of the horrid conditions of the plantation labourers. Arévalo's successor, Jacobo Árbenz, elected in 1951, did implement land reforms.

Since it was one of the poorest Latin American countries, the international development community displayed some interest in Guatemala. Also the United States government included Guatemala in its postwar development programs. But the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was quietly wondering in 1950 if Guatemala was even close to a starting point for "sound economic development". In part, the scepticism of the IBRD had to do with the large proportion of indigenous people, but the state of health of Guatemalans was also considered a major problem: "The Guatemalan worker is greatly handicapped…His general level of health is poor…His nutrition often is not such as to permit him to do intensive work for long hours." Too many children were considered "too anemic, undernourished" to develop fully, also intellectually.[24] Some of the US development projects, however, were abandoned after a few years for political reasons. This was the case for an education mission of SCIDE (Inter-American Cooperative Education Service) under the leadership of rural educator Ernest Maes. Maes and his crew had to leave Guatemala in 1950 after complaints from local educators that the "gringos" were trying to dominate all education institutions, complaints bearing evidence of the nationalist impulse of the moment.[25]

Relations of the Arévalo government with the United States were already tense, as the United Fruit Company as well as the US Ambassador attempted to step up pressure on Guatemala.[26] Due to the political

discrepancies with the reformist Guatemalan government, the United States held back on economic aid, and all the more so after the Árbenz Administration took power in 1952. The ensuing land reforms greatly affected the United Fruit Company, and the United States grew increasingly impatient with the supposedly communist Árbenz government. Árbenz was overthrown in June 1954 through a US-supported military intervention. In the wake of Árbenz's ouster, the US government was under intense pressure to quickly improve Guatemalan standards of living. The United States attempted to make the country a "showcase" for liberal development.[27] US agencies embarked on a variety of ventures, so that in the mid-1950s Guatemala City was "overrun by new F[oreign] O[perations] A[dministration] workers", as a long-time expatriate observed.[28] Yet this engagement with substantial resources did not lead to noticeable improvements in the standard of living for the large majority of Guatemalans, as it mostly favoured US investments.[29] The failed experiment in "liberal developmentalism" did not prevent a slow descent into violence and civil war that cost hundreds of thousands of Guatemalan lives and ended only in 1996.

Given the widespread concern with malnutrition in Central America during the 1940s, it is not surprising that a nutrition institute was established during Guatemala's "decade of hope". In a way, INCAP was the extension of an earlier project of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which had established collaboration with the Mexican Institute of Nutrition to evaluate nutrients in Mexican diets. This venture was also supported by the Kellogg and Rockefeller Foundations.[30] These private agencies as well as the PASB wanted to foster nutrition research in other Latin American countries as well. This did not escape the attention of Julio Bianchi, who served as Guatemalan Minister of Public Health from 1945 to 1947.[31] In 1945, Bianchi invited MIT nutritionist Robert S. Harris (1904–1983) to visit Guatemala to consult on the development of nutritional activities. These two then drafted a proposal for nutrition research on Central America, a four-year project for nutrition analysis. They asked the W. K. Kellogg Foundation to sponsor lab equipment as well as fellowships for staff, so that the analyses could take place in Guatemala. The Kellogg Foundation agreed, as long as the project would serve all of Central America and would be put under the administrative and fiscal control of the PASB.[32] The Central American republics would contribute with the building as well as with annual payments. These agreements were presented as a four-year program of research to interested parties during a February 1946 nutrition conference in Guatemala City.

But FAO was also interested in Central America, dispatching two nutrition specialists on a mission in early 1947. Wallace R. Aykroyd, FAO nutritionist[33] and Arturo Vergara, the FAO regional officer, were supposed to assess the nutritional situation in the region. They visited the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences in Costa Rica (an American initiative) and informed themselves about the plans for INCAP in Guatemala. FAO encouraged the establishment of the institute, but funding was still missing to set it up. However, by 1949, the Guatemalan government was able to provide a building, and the project-based agreement was replaced by INCAP (Instituto de Nutrición de Centroamérica y Panamá), a permanent organization associated with the Pan American Sanitary Bureau. The inauguration of INCAP took place on 15 September 1949 – quite symbolically on the Independence Day of Central America.[34]

During the first years of INCAP's functioning it already became clear that the contributions of the member countries were not going to be enough to do meaningful work at the institute. The PASB only furnished the salary of the director, and the fellowships the Kellogg Foundation offered were intended to train Central American nutritionists in the United States, mostly at MIT and Harvard.[35] At first, only three countries (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) contributed regularly to INCAP. Costa Rica and Nicaragua, under the rule of the Somoza clan, did not join INCAP until 1954, and even then frequently did not pay their contributions. Soon, two thirds of INCAP's budget for project work stemmed from external sources. Apart from the above-mentioned sources, projects were financed by UNICEF and FAO and, increasingly, by diverse development agencies, foundations, and companies from abroad. Unfortunately, not even triangulating PASB, FAO, and INCAP source material on budgets allows for a year-by-year analyses of the funds and their provenance. One extant detailed budget of 1958, for instance, shows smaller projects being funded by United Fruit Company, Quaker Oats, or Miller's National Federation, presumably in the field of food processing.[36] Frequently, donations were attached to specific projects, so the dependence on external funding had a direct impact on the direction of INCAP's research and teaching.

INCAP in the network of international organizations: the projects of FAO, UNICEF, and WHO

INCAP was but a small regional actor in a field increasingly populated by other international organizations that both collaborated with and

competed with one another in their endeavours for progress and modernization in Central America. Evidently, FAO, UNICEF, and the WHO as major UN organizations played in a different league than INCAP. Among the major organizations, we find battles over fields of activities as well as instances of collaboration. Child nutrition, for instance, concerned all three organizations, while FAO and WHO had to delineate the field of nutrition in general. Acting on a global scale, FAO and UNICEF finally set up a Joint Policy Committee in 1958 to straighten out matters.[37] Frequently, discussions about Latin American nutritional requirements and food policy also took place under FAO leadership in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s. Yet, the conferences which took place in 1948 (Montevideo), 1950 (Rio de Janeiro), 1953 (Caracas), and 1957 (Guatemala) were co-hosted by or included representatives of UNICEF, the WHO and a host of organizations other than the FAO. Matters were complicated even more by inter-American Institutions set up by the US government, such as the International Institute of Agricultural Sciences, in Turrialba, Costa Rica (IICA), which also considered nutrition to be within their scope.[38]

Thus, in the fields of nutrition, nutrition education, and agricultural extension many collaborative projects took place throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In the first years of existence of INCAP, much emphasis was laid on the training of "local" professionals to do "nutrition work," such as consumption surveys, food analysis, and nutrition education or the implementation of applied nutrition programs. "Local" in that case was understood in a very broad sense, as the category seemed to include all Latin Americans. INCAP was not a pioneer in this, as the Argentine National Institute of Nutrition, led by Pedro Escudero, had already in the 1930s initiated university-level courses to train Latin American professionals. The Argentine government had sponsored four full fellowships a year.[39] By the early 1950s, there was a small but growing group of Latin American nutrition specialists – physiologists, education specialists, pediatricians, public health specialists – available to staff new positions in public-health ministries or in specialized institutions such as INCAP. This group was interested in attracting funding and giving greater importance to the field of nutrition. Frequently, they sought the collaboration of the dozens of European and US American nationals who were in Central America with project assignments, or acting as liaison officers of the various agencies, such as UNICEF or FAO. Some of them, such as UNICEF's area director, Alice Shaffer, had long-term assignments in Guatemala. Others, such as Emma Reh, an American working for FAO, went on repeated missions in Central America during the 1940s and 1950s and collaborated with INCAP as well as other institutions.

During the 1950s, INCAP significantly increased its own training functions and became a meeting point for nutrition and development specialists. In the courses on nutrition, one important goal was to capacitate nutritionists in the assessment of local diets. Not only theoretical foundations, but also fieldwork, was part of the program. In 1951, for instance, FAO's Emma Reh did a nutritional survey of Guatemalan sugar plantation workers with the help of two Peruvian women who had come to INCAP for further training. One of them was financed by FAO, the other by INCAP. Upon their return, they both took up work for the Peruvian Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance.[40] One year later, six INCAP students from Guatemala and Ecuador assisted US nutritionist Margaret Moen in a field study of the nutrition patterns of 13 working-class families in a provincial textile factory. While Moen also had been dispatched to INCAP by the FAO, three of the students held fellowships from the WHO, two held fellowships from INCAP itself, and one was paid by the W.K. Kellogg Foundation.[41] Similar missions were also led by Latin Americans, as UNICEF assigned the Panamanian, Lucila Sogandares, to work with INCAP on a study in El Salvador. Sogandares was one of the first Latin American female nutritionists (with a master's degree in public health) who attended the key 1946 meeting when the foundation of INCAP was decided. She later headed the nutrition section of Panama's Public Health Department.[42] Another Panamanian, Susana J. Icaza, headed the nutrition education section at INCAP, which in the 1960s opened its own one-year training program. Over the next 20 years, over a thousand nutrition researchers and practitioners would pass through INCAP, most financed by fellowships from international organizations or private foundations.[43]

These multiple relations and projects, with numerous partners on the one hand, enabled and enriched the work at INCAP; but on the other hand, it also posed thorny problems. FAO and WHO might have different priorities than, say, the Kellogg Foundation, or the United Nations Technical Assistance Program. There were frequent discussions as to how such collaboration should be organized and how to divide up fields of activity. Memos, reports, and confidential letters linked Guatemala City with New York, Geneva, and Rome; UNICEF with FAO, WHO, and INCAP. Sometimes, government interests also intervened in those discussions. Moreover, INCAP's status as an international organization subordinated to the Pan American Sanitary Bureau gave rise to conflicts. The PASB, for instance, assumed that all nutritional work of the member countries in Central America would go through INCAP. Both FAO and WHO headquarters, however, insisted on being able to

work directly with other partners in member countries, such as the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences in Turrialba, Costa Rica (IICA).[44] The next section will elucidate such conflicts in one particular program area, namely, child feeding.

Local solutions and long-term development? INCAP and the question of milk

The basic premise of INCAP, as stated in the late 1940s, was that "every country has the components for good nutrition within in own geographical borders and will be able to face its nutritional problems". If the Central American republics knew more about their own plants, had the possibility to do their own research, they could engage in a "correct and inexpensive nutrition program" to alleviate malnutrition where it surfaced. In so doing, they would be laying sound groundwork for further development.[45] This attitude might seem surprising, given that one of the influential nutritionists in the foundational phase of INCAP was Robert Harris from MIT. Harris at first sight seemed to embody the food regime that became dominant in the post-war period: he had helped devise a nutrient-rich soup mix during World War II for the starving populations of Europe and industrial cereal mixes for school children. It would have been easy for him to transfer the notion of wartime funnelling of surplus foods to needy populations of the postwar world, just as UNICEF had done.[46] But due to his research experience in Mexico, Harris came to recognize the nutritional value of certain local diets, especially of the indigenous populations. For this reason, he was immediately interested in extending nutritional research to Guatemala.

Like other nutritionists, Harris was weary of certain tendencies he saw in the heady discussions about global food programs after the Hot Springs conference. In 1945 he made his views public in an emphatic article, "An Approach to the Nutrition Problem of Other Nations," which appeared in the widely read journal, *Science*. He argued for examining carefully the nutritive quality of foods in the context of local food habits, citing his own surprise when he found out that the corn-based diet of indigenous populations in Mexico was more nutritious than middle class diets in Boston. He cautioned his audience not to impose foods and foods habits abroad, even if a "sense of preference and superiority and their inordinate respect for our prestige position tempts us to believe that ours is the preferred way of living". Harris asserted that good nourishment could well be achieved with local diets and warned of the consequences – foreseen and unforeseen – of dietary changes. He

suggested that the United States should help other nations through the training of specialists, supplying equipment but also "by sending field personnel abroad, first to direct and later to advise in practical nutrition research programs". They should use modern techniques to understand and, if needed, optimize local diets.[47] Nevin Scrimshaw, another MIT nutritionist, followed Harris's line when he was appointed as first director of INCAP four years later.[48] And, of course, such an approach was completely in line with the nationalist policies of Guatemala's reformist government led by Juan José Arévalo in the late 1940s.

This emphasis on utilizing local food resources to resolve nutrition problems was in principle accepted by the nutrition division of FAO. Its director, Wallace R. Aykroyd, had made similar arguments with regards to India, where he had spent many years.[49] Yet, other divisions of FAO dismissed the notion of nutritional autonomy because they saw the solution to nutritional problems in the global transfer of staples.[50] This inherent tension would come to the fore at a variety of junctures. The questions of infant and child malnutrition and of supplementary feedings for Central America provided just such a case.

From the early 1950s on, it had become clear to INCAP researchers that children were most at risk for malnutrition. This had grievous consequences, since a frighteningly high number of children died between one and four years of age, after the weaning period. Also, school children were frequently malnourished or suffered from the long-term consequences of earlier phases of inadequate food. There were several causes for this, INCAP researchers found. First, there were the serious economic constraints of the great majority of Guatemalan families, which did not allow them to buy enough food. Moreover, there were also problems with the distribution of food within the family and with the medicinal folk remedies for children with diarrhea (a frequent occurrence), which aggravated the malnutrition. Unable to do much about the poverty of the families, INCAP tried to develop solutions by first making the problem visible and public through its nutritional surveys. INCAP also engaged in nutrition education, and advised on emergency feeding programs. Another initiative was to foster local food production. In particular, INCAP attempted to develop locally available vegetable proteins:

> The purpose was to develop a food that was adaptable to the eating habits of the population, within their economic capacity, convenient for transportation, preservation, and preparation under local conditions, and nutritionally adequate to supplement the regular diet with

the needed protein, and, if possible, with the other essential nutrients in which these were also usually deficient.[51]

INCAP's general approach, as well as the research on such a local product, ran counter to initiatives pushed by UNICEF.

Since the early 1950s, UNICEF had brought thousands of tons of powdered skim milk from the United States into Guatemala to be distributed to malnourished children. Even a UNICEF-sponsored account referred to it as a "gigantic organizational udder".[52] The practice of distributing milk had started in the immediate aftermath of World War II in Europe, and once the European dairy industries had begun to recover, UNICEF did not hesitate to ship its powdered skim milk to other areas of the world, Latin America included. FAO was intimately involved in this effort as it had already played a "substantial part" in UNICEF's program in Europe. As operations were moved into Latin America, FAO wanted to continue the collaboration. The acting secretary-general thought there was "no justification for superseding FAO" through a "local organization" such as INCAP. He ordered that one might invite INCAP to "participate" in UNICEF projects, but only under FAO leadership. Perhaps INCAP could advise on the local feeding schemes – but the relations of authority were clear.[53] The close relationship between FAO and UNICEF was continued in Central America, a relationship which is also made evident by the fact that the long-term FAO consultant Emma Reh had her Guatemala offices with UNICEF rather than with INCAP.

Despite the reference to local "advising," neither the UNICEF nor the FAO leadership seemed to reflect much on the implications of such a transfer of projects and methods from the European to the Latin American arena. FAO's nutrition division did inform itself about prevalent Central American ideas regarding nutrition, but remained critical of INCAP's approach of relying on local foods. Although FAO nutritionists accepted that "many plants of high nutritional value … are already available within the region" …, … they were much less sanguine about the idea that "to produce more of the foods of vegetable origin which are at present consumed" would be sufficient for good nutrition. Admitting that there was only "scanty clinical evidence" for its claim, the nutritionists nevertheless insisted that "considerable modification [of dietary habits] may be necessary[;] … more foods of animal origin – milk, meat and fish – may be needed to provide a well-balanced diet".[54]

Interestingly, it was the WHO that weighed in on the side of INCAP in this matter. As one WHO officer pointed out, FAO and UNICEF considered the "free" handouts of skim milk to needy children to be

an "opportunity…for influencing the dietary habits of children and their families" in a supposedly positive way.[55] However, getting Central American children to drink milk was only a good idea if the supply of milk could be maintained in a long-term perspective, that is, through sustained and inexpensive local production. INCAP officers, of course, had made the same arguments all along and had repeatedly approached UNICEF with their doubts about the milk-based child-feeding programs.[56] Yet, FAO and UNICEF pushed on with the feeding programs, giving scant consideration to the eating habits of the population, since the desirability of introducing milk and thus changing local eating habits seemed to be a given.

To allay the doubts that the strategy would be sustainable over the long term, the two organizations sent a two-man team to Central America in 1951 to assess the potential of milk production. One of the consultants, Joseph Edwards from Britain's Milk Marketing Board, was of the opinion that "civilization follows cow". Central America was lucky, he thought, as he perceived quite a capacity for milk production, which would not only improve public health, but also spur rural economic development, thus "enriching the countryside".[57] To make such progress possible, FAO soon financed research into measures for "overcoming the handicaps the dairy industry meets in the tropics".[58] Progress in the matter was, however, quite limited.

Of course, the powdered milk that UNICEF introduced to Central America was the perfect example of what the Guatemalan INCAP researcher Moisés Béhar described as an inappropriate import: it did not fit into local consumption habits, and its storage and safe preparation were difficult in humid surroundings. Also, the dependency on foreign supplies was problematic, Béhar argued: if the free supply of powdered milk should cease, the nutrition programs would simply stop for lack of alternatives. Béhar, who became the second director of INCAP, was not against science and technology, but he pleaded for locally developed solutions, all the while accepting that it might be useful to test "already existing knowledge" produced in "countries with more resources" against Guatemalan realities.[59]

INCAP's director, Nevin Scrimshaw, also eyed the large-scale use of skim milk critically. He caused quite some controversy when he voiced his "serious objections" against it and attempted to convince UNICEF that it needed to change over to strategies that were valid in the long term. But according to UNICEF records, the "strong interest of the government and the support of the FAO contributed to INCAP's change in attitude".[60] Indeed, INCAP could not stem the tide of powdered milk

flooding the country, and its nutrition educator, Susana Icaza, published a brochure in INCAP's series "Nuestros alimentos" ("Our foods") which sang the praises of milk powder as an inexpensive source of valuable "animal protein" and explained how to use it correctly.[61] Unable to stop UNICEF, INCAP switched to advising it on the most useful distribution of dry milk. UNICEF, for instance, was used to working through schools with established feeding programs, yet INCAP insisted that the graver problems of malnutrition occurred at the pre-school age and suggested points of distribution for younger children. At a 1954 meeting on school feeding sponsored by FAO, this point seems to have been accepted by both FAO and UNICEF.[62]

Despite this accommodation of UNICEF, Scrimshaw's and Béhar's attitudes did not change substantially. They continued insisting that supplementary feedings with milk were "insufficient to have a long-term effect" and continued to investigate local sources of protein.[63] They tried to interest FAO and UNICEF in a project geared towards "developing indigenous food or food processing projects, possibly of a demonstration nature, in countries where child nutrition is a serious problem but where the development of indigenous milk supplies seems to be impracticable".[64] This way, INCAP's insistence on local (vegetable) sources could be maintained. The food processing aspect, however, was clearly of interest to European and North American food-processing companies that advised on the matter.[65] Scrimshaw, in particular, apparently shared an utterly modernist vision of the potential of food technology for developing countries.[66]

Indeed, from the mid-1950s on, this project picked up speed and, by the late 1950s, INCAP could present its inexpensive, locally sourced and produced milk substitute, Incaparina. Moisés Béhar took pains to present clinical trials that showed that Incaparina was as efficient as milk in providing protein to children, and at a cost that was about 25 per cent that of milk. Since Incaparina could be prepared like the traditional *atole* drink, acceptance among the population was high, and sales of Incaparina increased throughout the 1960s, as it was used by child-feeding institutions (alongside the imported powder milk). Moisés Béhar was aware that Incaparina could not "be *the* solution" to the problem of child nutrition in Central America, but insisted that "better utilization of existing [local] resources is a great help in the fight against this serious problem".[67]

Despite the increasing support INCAP gained from FAO for its initiatives, their impact remained limited. When in 1958 FAO sent John Duckworth and Elena Musmanno to Central America to examine food

policy for the governments of the Central American republics, the very first recommendation they issued was, again, to "augment the production of milk, meat, fruit and vegetables to correct the known deficiencies". The FAO report calculated "national diets" that included significant amounts of milk and meat and recommended building up production capacity. The FAO consultants were aware that their suggestions went against local food habits, but simply restated that "one has to break with them at least partially [to reach] the proportion of foods of high quality like milk, meat, and eggs that should be used". [68] It seemed as if the two FAO envoys ignored a decade worth of Central American research, which had shown the high nutritional value of many local vegetable products and the good results to be achieved with Incaparina. For FAO, "protein of high quality" still equalled animal protein, which remained the touchstone of a decent diet.

Yet INCAP's arguments and approach certainly contributed to pressure on FAO and UNICEF on certain questions. This was particularly evident at regional meetings of FAO, where the headquarters perspective was outweighed by representatives of the Latin American republics. In 1954, for instance, the regional FAO meeting had agreed that "it was necessary to investigate, in countries where meat and milk production is very expensive or difficult, the possibilities of producing and providing substitutes…".[69] Four years later, at an FAO-sponsored Latin American meeting on school feeding, some discrepancies to the official FAO position became even more obvious. Unfortunately, the conference report does not allow tracing arguments to individual participants. The report reflects a minimal consensus, which was that local foods should be used for school feedings, so as to stimulate local production and encourage economic development. Donations of powdered skim milk were not the solution, especially as some countries suffering widespread malnutrition were exporting protein-rich products like meat at the same time. If, in an emergency situation, imported food supplied by international aid should be distributed, it should be done "in ways that will not interfere with but rather promote the country's economic, agricultural and industrial development".[70] Long-standing INCAP demands, namely, that the "production of vegetable foods of high biological value" be promoted, were also included in the recommendations. Despite the fact that UNICEF and FAO were well represented at the seminar (together, they had more than a dozen delegates as opposed to the 25 national delegates), the conference invoked other arguments and it "noted with satisfaction the recent developments" that FAO and UNICEF would now support local food production programs more strongly.[71] These demands

did not mean that the participants did not value the nutritional properties of cow milk – they did – but it betrayed the long-standing concern that school feedings should be adapted to local conditions, stimulate local economies, and should not work to the detriment of economic development.

Conclusions

As a relatively small institution with limited independent funding, INCAP was not in any way powerful. Clearly, the political conditions in Central America played a role, both in the hopeful establishment of, as well as in the subsequent functioning of, INCAP. Despite the political upheaval in Guatemala, the undertones of nationalist development that characterized the founding phase of the institute never quite disappeared. During the 1960s, INCAP director Moisés Béhar still thought that INCAP would contribute to the "intellectual, economic, and political independence" of Central America – a notion that today seems highly doubtful.[72]

INCAP's activities took place not only in a national political context, but also in a dense web of development politics spun by large UN institutions (like FAO, WHO, and UNICEF), Inter-American institutions (the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, and the Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Sciences), and bilateral development and aid programs. The dependency on outside resources, exacerbated by the meager support received from local governments, made accommodation and collaboration with these institutions and private foundations a necessity. This is one reason why INCAP's own research and applied programs were not always a tight fit with its initial mission: to help Central America solve its nutritional problems with local products, triggering economic development in the process. At the same time, INCAP also served as a multiplier of knowledge and approaches to nutritional problems through its function as a training centre. By 1957, not only hundreds of Latin Americans, but also nutritionists from Mozambique, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, Angola and Egypt had attended nutrition programs in Guatemala.[73]

As the conflicts surrounding the issue of school feeding in Central America showed, divergent visions from those of the dominant UN organizations circulated in Latin America throughout the 1950s and surfaced with some regularity at conferences and meetings such as at the 1958 FAO regional meeting on school feedings. INCAP was one reservoir of alternative positions and, perhaps, also spread them through the formation of nutritionists which continued throughout the 1950s and

1960s. To which degree the dominant UN institutions were receptive to ideas, approaches, and results emanating from Central America or Latin America needs to be examined case-by-case. While UNICEF in Central America was heeding INCAP's hints that milk might save more lives if given to weaning children, it reacted only reluctantly to the critique of the use of imported dried skim milk. Even FAO, with its clear mandate to boost local food production, was slow to put school feeding on a footing that was consistent with its own tenets, instead stubbornly pursuing increased milk production in most difficult conditions rather than following up on alternative courses of action as suggested by INCAP.

Such a brief chapter is, of course, not sufficient to explore the entanglements and dependencies of INCAP fully, and many questions remain open. What kind of nutritional discourse did the INCAP trainees bring back to their home countries? Which career paths opened up to Latin American nutritionists, and what impact did this have on food policy, both in Latin America or internationally? The concept of Incaparina, for instance, was exported not only to Colombia, but also served as a model for an Indian protein supplement in the 1970s. How did the relations between the Central Americans and their European and US collaborators work? Future research will pursue these questions, but it is clear that even in the 1950s, the supposed heyday of Western models of development thinking, the field of nutrition and food policy provided plenty of fodder for discussion and for dissent.

Notes

1. Ruth Jachertz and Alexander Nützenadel (2011). See also Amy Staples (2006), D. J. Shaw (2007) and D. J. Shaw (2009). Written by an insider, the works of D. John Shaw are useful surveys, but lack a scholarly apparatus.
2. In relation to food and nutrition, see Jeffrey Taffet (2007), Paul L. Doughty (1991), Mitchel Wallerstein (1980), Lana Hall (1985), Jonathan Harwood (2009) and John H. Perkins (1990).
3. Arturo Escobar (1995) and Gustavo Esteva (1987).
4. David Ekbladh (2010).
5. Iris Borowy (2009) and Yann Decorzant (2011).
6. League of Nations (1937). See also Jo-Anne Pemberton (2006).
7. Nick Cullather (2007: 338).
8. Supposedly "useful" models of consumption surveys did not list corn or rice as a staple food, but seven different types of milk. Corinne A. Pernet (2011: 175).
9. For a thorough discussion of American nutrition science, see Harvey Levenstein (1988); for a broader view encompassing the role of the international organizations, see Paul Weindling (1995).
10. The League's publications on the subject of nutrition, for instance, had been rife with celebrations of meat, milk and butter as almost the only "protective foods" available to people.

11. Several commentators on the influence of nutrition on physical growth and cognition made sure to emphasize that race and heredity continued to be major factors in human development. In some cases, a comparative advantage of those "races" which possessed advanced nutritional knowledge was postulated as: science "promises to those races who will take advantage of the newer knowledge of nutrition a larger stature, greater vigour, increased longevity and a higher level of cultural attainment". In James S. McLester (1935: 10).
12. Sunil S. Amrith (2008: 101–105).
13. Joseph S. Alter (2000), cited in Nick Cullather (2007: 360).
14. "Ordem e Progresso" is also inscribed on the Brazilian flag, designed in 1889.
15. Donna J. Guy (1998) and Jorge Rojas Flores (2007).
16. Oficina Panamericana de Salud (1940).
17. Latin American efforts in the field were clearly stimulated by the work of the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization, which collaborated in publications on nutrition and public health. Latin American reformers availed themselves of the initiatives of the international organizations to legitimize their own endeavours and pressure their governments into action. The relation between such health officials and the Geneva institutions was complex – while they agreed on the dangers of malnutrition, the solutions that many Latin American reformers envisioned for solving nutritional problems – and with them, an obstacle to modernization – were not in tune with the liberal economic views prevailing in Geneva. See Corinne A. Pernet (2011: 175).
18. See, for instance, William Hannah McLean (1936).
19. This link was made very clear in the final report of the Mixed Committee League of Nations (1937).
20. From the early 1940s on, the question of how many countries the United States could "feed" caused considerable public controversy. The fear that Latin America might become a drain on US resources was palpable. This concern had no merit: indeed, the United States relied on food imports from Latin America during the war.
21. United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture (1945).
22. FAO Archives, RG 3.1, Series C5, Memorandum Frank Mc Dougall, 16 June 1948. This should not come as a surprise, as McDougall had been an important figure during the League of Nations debates about the "marriage of agriculture and health," where these developmentalist notions were first put forward.
23. For a critical assessment of the "Arévalo revolution," see Jim Handy (1994).
24. IBRD (1951: 75, 95).
25. Stephen M. Streeter (2000: 157–158).
26. Although the State Department did not respond to pressures from the US Ambassador and United Fruit Company to take measures against Arévalo, the US press featured a series of articles on the "threat of communism" in Guatemala. Moreover, the United States vetoed certain loans to Guatemala. See Piero Gleijeses (1991: 128–132).
27. Stephen M. Streeter (1999).
28. FAO Archive, Box 12ESN544, FAO Correspondence 1955, Reh to Autret, 22 February 1955.

29. Stephen M. Streeter (1999: 412–413).
30. The Mexican Institute had been founded in 1942. See, for instance, Richmond K. Anderson, José Calvo, William D. Robinson, Gloria Serrano, and George C. Payne (1948).
31. The nutrition project was not the only collaboration with the United States that Bianchi was involved in. He was also Minister of Health at the time of the recently publicized inoculation study by John Cutler of the US Public Health service (USPH). The study included the purposeful and undisclosed infection of prison inmates and mentally ill patients with syphilis and gonorrhoea. It is unclear if Bianchi was informed about the particulars of the research design. USPH officials knew they were operating outside their ethical guidelines, which is why they were careful in their wording, and most likely also warned their Guatemalan collaborator, Dr. Juan Funes, not to divulge details. At the very least, however, the episode shows the great eagerness with which Guatemalan public health officials initially accepted collaboration offers. Susan M. Reverby (2011).
32. Nevin S. Scrimshaw (2010). The connection with the PASB was facilitated by the fact that Robert Harris sat on the PASB's Committee on Nutrition.
33. W.R. Aykroyd was a pioneer among the nutritionists with an internationalist bent whose career started out at the Lister Institute in London and took him to the League of Nations in Geneva and to the Nutrition Research Laboratories in Conoor, South India before he joined FAO in 1946 at the invitation of John Boyd Orr. See R. Davidson Passmore (1980).
34. Nevin S. Scrimshaw (2010).
35. Apart from supporting INCAP, the PASB did not engage much in nutrition work in Central America. Instead, the organization focussed on programs that promised quick improvements, such as malaria eradication. Marcos Cueto (2007).
36. Recent accounts on the history of INCAP from within the institution do not mention this. See, for instance, Nevin S. Scrimshaw (2010).
37. David Lubin Library, FAO, Accession No. 060597, Report No: NU–, Fiche No. 60597, FAO/UNICEF Joint Policy Committee, Report of the First Session, Rome, Italy, 29 September–2 October 1958, Nutrition Division, 1958.
38. See, for instance, Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas (1955). IICA is another regional development institution that is still awaiting the attention of historians.
39. Corinna A. Pernet (2012: 255–257).
40. Emma Reh (1954).
41. Margaret L. Moen and Estudiantes del INCAP (1953).
42. *Boletín de la Oficina Sanitaria Panamericana* (OSP) 1953 35 (Suplemento No. 1): 27–37, Publicación Científica INCAP E-52. The gendering of the (applied) "nutritionists" and survey workers and the "researchers" in biochemistry seems rather obvious.
43. Susana J. Icaza (1961).
44. After sometimes tense discussions, the two organizations had agreed on a labour division in the early 1950s. FAO Archive, FAO Correspondence 1955, Box 12ESN544, Reh to van Veen, 27 January 1955. IICA was renamed in 1979 to Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture.
45. Robert S. Harris (1948: 907).

46. Juan M. Navia (1998).
47. Robert S. Harris (1945: 42–43). Harris continued this line of reasoning for many years, and insisted that Americans were the "most fed, not the best fed" people. See Alton Blakeslee (1948); *Americans are Not the Best Fed* (1951), *Use of All Available Edible Plants Termed Solution to World Hunger* (1953) *The How of a Balanced Diet* (1954).
48. Scrimshaw was the only full-time American staff for the better part of INCAP's first decade. To the astonishment of fellow nutritionists, he managed to use the appointment to Guatemala City as the stepping stone to an academic as well as an international career in food policy. He has been at the forefront of efforts to highlight the accomplishments of INCAP in 2009, when the institute celebrated its 60th anniversary. He is also the recipient of the 1991 World Food Prize. "1991 Laureate Nevin Scrimshaw" (2008).
49. Wallace R. Aykroyd (1961).
50. Amy Staples (2006).
51. Moisés Béhar (1963: 2).
52. Maggie Black (1986: 144).
53. FAO Archive, RG 2.2 Series C4, Memoranda by Sir Herbert Broadley to Nutrition Division, "FAO/Unicef Programs in Latin America," 25 October 1949.
54. FAO Archive, RG 57.0 Series G1, Reports of Tours and Missions by Nutrition Division Staff, Wallace R. Aykroyd and Arturo Vergara "Nutrition in Central America," 14 May 1947.
55. FAO Archive, FAO Correspondence 1952, Box 12ESN544, R. C. Burgess, WHO, to M. Sacks, Unicef, 31 July 1952.
56. Remarks on INCAP lobbying by Reh, Autret, Scoot.
57. Unicef Executive Board. *Milk Production in Certain Central and South American Countries,* E/ICEF/179, 21 September 1951.
58. Food and Agriculture Organization (1957: 22).
59. Moisés Béhar (1975: 3–7).
60. Kenneth Grant (1986: 22).
61. INCAP (1952).
62. FAO (1954).
63. Wilhelm Anderson, Cyrus French, Nevin S. Scrimshaw and Jean W. McNaughton (1959: 1368).
64. FAO Archive, FAO Correspondence 1952, Box 12ESN544, R. C. Burgess, WHO, to M. Sacks, Unicef, 31 July 1952.
65. At one point, Quaker Oats was considered a possible partner for the production of Incaparina.
66. It is unclear how much of this was due to opportunism, as Scrimshaw had to resituate himself in the United States in the early 1960s. FAO representatives, for instance, hinted repeatedly that Scrimshaw was less than steady in his principles. Nevin S. Scrimshaw (1961: 29–41).
67. Moisés Béhar (1963: 388).
68. John Duckworth and Elena Musmanno (1958: 5, 16). Interestingly enough, this report did not abide by the FAO emphasis on trade, as it recommended eschewing the export of protein-rich products to bolster the consumption within the countries.
69. In countries other than Guatemala, fish meal was frequently the (unsuccessful) substitute of choice. See FAO (1955: 13–14).

70. FAO (1959: 47).
71. FAO (1959: 16).
72. Moisés Béhar, "Alimentos y nutrición de los mayas en la época de la precon-quista y en la actualidad," revised version of INCAP-I 448, INCAP Archives.
73. David Lubin Library, FAO/NUT/6 (LA 57), Accession Nr. 060563, Food and Agriculture Organization, Cuarta Conferencia Sobre los Problemas de Nutrición en la América Latina, "Programa del Instituto de Nutrición de Centro América y Panamá," 23 de Septiembre–1 de Octubre 1957.

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6

In the Name of World Health and Development: The World Health Organization and Malaria Eradication in India, 1949–1970

Thomas Zimmer

Introduction

In May 1955, the Eighth World Health Assembly decided that the World Health Organization (WHO) "should take the initiative, provide technical advice, and encourage research and co-ordination of resources in the implementation of a program having as its ultimate objective the world-wide eradication of malaria".[1] In the following 14 years, WHO would "wage an all-out campaign against one of mankind's worst scourges"[2] – at a time when well over one billion people were at risk of being exposed to malaria, and an estimated 300 million cases occurred annually, resulting in roughly 3 million deaths.[3] The strategy of the global Malaria Eradication Program (MEP) was to conduct extensive sprayings of residual insecticides – especially DDT – that were to cover every single building in malarious areas, usually twice a year for a period of three to five years. Thereby, malaria transmission through mosquitoes would be interrupted. With the vector temporarily gone, all those who were already infected had to be found and treated so that transmission would not re-start with the expected return of the mosquitoes. In its scope and ambition the global MEP was unprecedented in the history of international cooperation in public health and was to remain the largest undertaking in the realm of international health politics. In 1956, WHO assisted 34 countries in their eradication efforts; in 1959, programs were in operation in 61 countries, most of which received direct assistance. In a further 24 countries pre-eradication surveys or pilot projects were

under way.[4] It is hardly surprising therefore that the MEP also dominated public perception of international public health for at least the better part of two decades.

Despite the program's initial successes, from the early 1960s onwards an increasing number of countries reported problems, and the progress of the MEP was considerably slowed down. In 1966, with international criticism mounting, WHO officially set out to re-examine the global strategy to eradicate malaria. And in fact, in July 1969, the Twenty-Second World Health Assembly concluded that malaria eradication, as a time-limited project would not be continued – thus effectively putting an end to the MEP.[5] As malaria was still one of the world's major public health issues 14 years after the initiative had been proclaimed, the global Malaria Eradication Program, it seemed, had obviously failed.

There is almost unanimous agreement in existing scholarship when it comes to the overall assessment of the program. The MEP has mostly been portrayed as a technocratic endeavour, conceived by Western elites that displayed euphoria for expert planning and too-naïve a belief in the feasibility of grand technical projects. Furthermore, it has usually been described as guided almost exclusively by US interests. This is well in line with the underlying interpretation of international health politics of this era as an undertaking dominated by Western experts and, with US help, unfurled from Geneva into all parts of the world.[6] According to this widespread depiction, the MEP was doomed to fail from the beginning because of its ignorance regarding diverse socio-economic and cultural conditions and because of MEP's sheer megalomania.[7] The dominant argument is based on unfortunately vague but certainly imposing statistics: while there were roughly 300 million malaria cases and three million deaths worldwide in 1950, there are still today somewhere between 150 and 280 million cases, and the numbers were considerably higher in the 1990s before the renewed international efforts of the past 10 to 15 years. What, other than a massive failure, could the malaria programs of the 1950s and 1960s have been?

Despite this strong consensus, the existing historical accounts leave much to be desired. The perspective of developing countries is conspicuously absent in explanations for the rise and fall of malaria eradication, as is the concrete practice and thus the effects of the projects. As a result, we know surprisingly little about the specific role of the several actors involved, such as the WHO and other international organizations, the United States, and the countries of the Global South where the vast majority of the programs were actually being implemented. Furthermore, previous scholarship has studied malaria eradication from an isolated

perspective, thus mostly neglecting the fact that international public health was always closely related to initiatives in other fields of international cooperation and politics, such as food and population.

As an exception from this isolated perspective, previous studies have rightfully identified the idea of malaria as an obstacle to economic growth as a major reason for the eagerness of both multilateral and bilateral actors to embark on an endeavour of such unprecedented scope.[8] As such, the disease owed much of its significance to the context of the Cold War. For the United States in particular, malaria eradication promised to propel societies quickly from a "traditional" state of affairs to industrial modernity. Following the assumptions of modernization theory, this would render these countries immune against communism, which was understood as a "disease" that only befell societies caught in a transitional stage between tradition and modernity.[9] While existing accounts were certainly right to examine the relationship between international health and economic development, they have done so only for a very specific moment in the mid-1950s. Meanwhile the emphasis on modernization theory's seemingly all-encompassing influence has left little room for nuanced analysis and paradoxical aspects, and the role the development discourse played in the demise of malaria eradication in the late 1960s has not been examined.

In this chapter, I will use the history of the rise and fall of the global MEP as a window into the complex relationship between development discourse and politics and international public health. Focusing on the case of India, where the world's largest and most important eradication program was initiated in 1958, this approach offers a unique opportunity to illuminate not only WHO's role in the development field but also in international public health in general, since the MEP was the organization's defining project until the late 1960s.

The resulting picture differs significantly from existing accounts of the history of global public health. It was only for a short period immediately after World War II that malaria control was primarily seen as the stepping stone on the way to collective "world health". Soon it was measured by its contribution to alleviating the alleged "world food crisis". And from the mid-1950s onwards, the disease was primarily understood as an obstacle to economic development. This perception momentarily propelled malaria control and eradication to prominence in international political discourse and enabled the World Health Organization to play a significant role. However, contemporary observers increasingly questioned the relationship between public health and economic development in the course of the 1960s. Towards

the end of the decade, the international political landscape drastically changed with the ascent of population growth to the centre of attention, the rise of environmental and health concerns regarding the large-scale use of insecticides, and the intensifying critique of some of the very pillars of development politics in general. In such a situation, proponents of malaria eradication, and WHO in particular, struggled mightily to legitimize continued support for the MEP. Equally important, malaria eradication was by no means simply a Western project doomed to fail from the beginning. It rather involved a multitude of actors that all brought their specific agendas to the table. In fact, the genesis of the MEP reveals a broad consensus and convergence of interests between the Global North and the Global South, which gradually eroded until finally evaporating at the end of the 1960s. And, while it would be foolish to present the history of the global MEP as a success story, it cannot be denied that the initiatives had some positive outcomes that included, in several countries, a significant and lasting reduction of malaria incidence and, thus, an alleviation of suffering for hundreds of millions of people. The specific challenge for contemporaries was to reconcile the apparent benefits of the program with the detrimental consequences – all against the background of highly contested and oftentimes contradictory information.

By studying the fate of the malaria program, then, this chapter pursues two broader aims. First, it suggests a new framework of analysis for the history of international health politics. I argue that the story of international cooperation in public health was more complex than simple narratives of success or failure might suggest. To do justice to the intricate dynamics involved, historians need to examine the interrelations between different fields of international cooperation, consider the variety of actors and their different motivations, and emphasize the ambivalent and often unpredictable effects of their actions. Moreover, scholars should not overlook the profound uncertainty contemporaries faced when planning, implementing, and evaluating their mostly unprecedented projects.

Secondly, by taking all these aspects into account, this chapter contributes to the historiography on international politics in a more general sense. For a very long time, historians of international relations have focused on the postwar superpower confrontation while largely neglecting topics that could not so easily be integrated into the bipolar framework of the conflict. Only recently have historians begun to explore cooperation in the fields of population, food, and health – to name but a few – as aspects of international affairs.[10] Erez

Manela, in particular, has made the case for an integrative perspective that places public health within the broader context of international politics.[11] This chapter, then, sets out to take up his plea: as the Malaria Eradication Program was one of the largest and most ambitious undertakings of international cooperation in the Cold War era, its history can undoubtedly tell us a lot about the interplay of governments, international organizations and non-state actors, different fields of international politics and, more generally speaking, the mechanisms of global cooperation and international governance in the second half of the twentieth century.

The creation of the WHO and malaria as a "top-priority" in international public health

The signing of the constitution of the World Health Organization in July 1946 by 61 countries marked the beginning of a new era in the history of international health politics. While several permanent international health organizations had been established since the early twentieth century, WHO was the first that was truly global in character – both in terms of its membership as well as, and more importantly, its designated and actual reach.[12] By 1955, 85 states had joined WHO; in 1961 the organization had 108 member states, and by the end of the 1960s, that number had risen to 131. The World Health Organization's creation has to be seen in the context of the establishment of the United Nations system, to which it belonged as a UN Specialized Agency. Guided by the idea that peace could only be secured by social and economic progress, WHO was meant, at the very least, to be an instrument to bring about such progress in the health field.[13]

Following World War II, global cooperation in public health indeed acquired a distinctly new quality. On the level of ideas and ambitions, the concept of a collective "state of world health" came to the fore in the planning of a postwar public health regime. In fact, in WHO's constitution, this decidedly visionary idea was promoted as the concrete objective of international health politics.[14] To fulfil this aim, the organization was, at least in the visions of its founders, designed to break new ground in the history of international cooperation. Its initiatives were thought to be "technical" and entirely "apolitical", crossing both geographical and cultural boundaries and transcending the borders of nation-states. Furthermore, unlike in earlier decades, global health politics was no longer meant to be primarily reactive in character, but should actively pursue its objectives around the globe.[15]

At the same time, the concrete practice of international health politics in the postwar era was marked by a hitherto unknown extent of international cooperation. WHO undoubtedly facilitated a development that resulted in programs and initiatives of unprecedented magnitude – the pre-eminent of which was the global Malaria Eradication Program.

From the beginning, WHO was designed to have an operational function as well as to be active in collecting and disseminating information, promoting research and professional training, and exerting normative influence in health regulations and classifications. Initially, the organization's top-priorities were defined as malaria, maternal and child health, tuberculosis, "venereal disease", nutrition, and environmental sanitation. Even amongst these, malaria quickly came to occupy a prominent status. To many contemporary observers of the mid-1940s, and especially amongst health experts, a vigorous international effort to fight the disease seemed to provide the ideal starting point for any attempt at realizing the overarching aim of "world health". In November 1946, the Interim Commission of the WHO agreed that the problem was "sufficiently urgent and important to warrant immediate action".[16] From the outset, however, other factors were involved in propelling malaria to the centre of international attention. As the US representative to the Interim Commission noted in January 1948, "Malaria is a direct and important contributing cause of the current world food shortage."[17] The "world food crisis" was indeed widely regarded as one of the gravest dangers and challenges in the immediate postwar period.[18] The US government focused on malaria since large parts of the affected areas were potentially fertile, and the disease was thus thought to be responsible for lowering global food production to a considerable degree. In the same letter of January 1948, the US representative urged WHO to act immediately: "The United States Delegation believes that the WHO should direct a major share of its energy and resources during its first years to the application of such measures [malaria control] to larger areas with particular attention to the major food producing areas afflicted by malaria."[19] Drawing lessons from projects that had been established during or immediately after the war, particularly in Sardinia and Greece, the idea of a concrete program of malaria control now quickly gained ground within the WHO.[20] In May 1948, the Expert Committee on Malaria agreed "that a mass attack on malaria in selected areas of food-producing countries should be carried out as soon as possible".[21] With this, India moved to the centre of international attention.

Independent India and international health politics

Historians have done a fine job in providing the reasons for India's elevated role in international affairs in the postwar era, most prominent of which being its general significance as a postcolonial state and perceived leader of the Third World, and its geo-strategic importance to both superpowers during the Cold War, which led the United States to try to stabilize the world's most populous democracy.[22] In the field of international health, the sheer scope of India's vast public health problems was a major reason why the country stood at the centre of both multilateral and bilateral initiatives. In almost every case, the largest of WHO's programs were being installed in India – be it in the fields of maternal and child health, health education or communicable diseases such as tuberculosis and, of course, malaria.

   The Indian government played an active role in this development. Immediately after independence, there was broad consensus in both the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of External Affairs that it was of crucial importance that India play a significant role in the World Health Organization.[23] There are multiple reasons for the high importance the Indian government attributed to WHO. First of all, the Ministry of Health hoped to strengthen its own position within the administration. It was assumed, for instance, that the establishment of WHO's Regional Office in Delhi would lead to more resources being devoted to health in general as opposed to other issues.[24] Secondly, it was WHO's perceived "non-political" approach that made it attractive to India. Prime Minister Nehru himself repeatedly expressed the conviction that the strictly technical nature of international health cooperation would create trust between nations and pioneer more peaceful co-existence.[25] Moreover, the Indian Government was hoping that its technical approach would prevent the organization from being dominated by the major political powers. Indian officials saw a real chance to exert considerable influence on the organization while it was still in the process of being institutionalized. Therefore, it was regarded as crucial to ascertain a place for Indian representatives in the organization's bodies such as the executive board or the various Expert Committees.[26] A third reason for the importance attached to the organization was the widespread conviction among government officials that, contrary to its predecessors such as the League of Nations Health Organization, WHO would be in a much stronger position to lend direct assistance to developing countries. As a result, whenever possible, Indian delegates pushed for a pronounced operational role

for the organization in general – and for it to focus on India in its early initiatives.[27]

The Indian government regarded malaria in particular as by far the most pressing public health issue and, indeed, one of the crucial challenges after managing its recent independence. This is hardly surprising when considering the sheer magnitude of the problem: in the late 1940s, 75 million malaria cases were thought to occur annually, with roughly one million deaths resulting directly from the disease.[28] Large-scale efforts to fight malaria had already figured prominently in the recommendations formulated by the various Indian planning committees since the late 1930s.[29] The late 1940s seemed to provide a limited window of opportunity for tackling the disease: once the logistical apparatus that had been built up during the war dissolved, and with it the mobilization of personnel the war had brought about, it would only become much more difficult to proceed with such initiatives.[30]

Apart from the direct improvements to public health, attacking malaria was expected to help in solving two other urgent tasks facing newly independent India. To begin with, large areas of sparsely populated land would become available for settlement, which would alleviate the pressure resulting from the several million refugees from Pakistan who had yet to find new homes. Furthermore, this would then significantly increase food production by giving land to refugees who mainly consisted of farmers, thereby enlarging the area under cultivation. And much like the US government or WHO in Geneva, the Indian government was generally envisaging a much more productive rural workforce once malaria had vanished.[31]

India's hopes for quick international aid in fighting malaria were fulfilled in 1949 when WHO launched four Malaria Control Demonstration Projects in different regions of the country. The aim of these projects, which affected a population of 50–100,000 each, was to test and demonstrate the procedures and possibilities of a vector-centred approach to malaria control via the large-scale use of insecticides. Therefore, WHO sent advisory teams to plan and implement the control measures and, along with UNICEF, provided most of the necessary funding.[32]

All too often, the history of international public health has been written from a West-centric perspective in which India, for instance, has only figured passively as the arena or, so to speak, the laboratory for international initiatives. However, when exploring India's role as an actor in its own right, it becomes clear that the country was anything but merely a passive recipient, and it was certainly not simply the object of international/Western projects. The genesis of the malaria control

efforts in India after World War II illustrates the broad consensus and convergence of interests between the Indian government, WHO and the United States –the three most important players – which made the rapid and massive international engagement possible.

Economic development and the rise of global malaria eradication

Impressed by WHO's demonstration projects and referring explicitly to their success, the Indian government launched a National Malaria Control Program (NMCP) in early 1953, targeting highly malarious areas and roughly one third of the Indian population.[33] Only five years later, the NMCP was transformed into the National Malaria Eradication Program (NMEP). Within seven to nine years, malaria was to be "eradicated" from the entire country, with its population then 390 million.[34]

This course of action was in line with international developments after WHO had proclaimed the global MEP in 1955. The precise moment when the eradication strategy had its global breakthrough can be explained in part by the increasing anxiety amongst experts and policy-makers after resistance to DDT in a vector species had first been reported in 1951. Though such reports were still very few, they led to a heightened fear, especially in Washington and Geneva, that the vector-centred approach to fighting malaria might be rendered ineffective in the foreseeable future. What followed can only be described as a now-or-never attitude to push forward and take the bull by the horns.[35]

This was especially true for the United States as the most important donor in international health. The Eisenhower administration had just made foreign assistance for the developing world a prominent part of US foreign policy and was looking for ways to channel resources, particularly in order to counter the Soviet proclamation to provide aid for the postcolonial world.[36] Policy planners in the State Department deemed malaria eradication attractive for several reasons. As a 1956 International Development Advisory Board report noted, the eradication via DDT spraying would result in direct contact with large populations and thus provide a means to demonstrate US goodwill and propagate democratic ideals. Furthermore, such initiatives promised immediate results and were thought to have a high propaganda value. Most importantly, though, was the prospect of accelerating economic development and thus, like in so many other initiatives of the period, the idea of rendering the developing world immune against communism.[37]

Already in the late 1940s, health experts promoted the idea that malaria impeded economic growth. Yet at the time it was clearly overshadowed by an interpretation of the disease as a factor aggravating the world food crisis since it inhibited food production. By the mid-1950s, however, the relationship between malaria control and economic development had taken centre stage. The focus was still on agricultural production, yet the prime intention was no longer to alleviate hunger. A report of the Indian Government to WHO of June 1953 unfolded the now common argumentation: of the roughly 80 million malaria cases, the vast majority – 57 million – occurred in rural areas. In each case, affected people were incapacitated for at least three days. This amounted to the "appalling loss" of 171 million workdays annually, with vast fertile areas remaining unexploited.[38] The eradication of malaria would thus lead to higher agricultural output and reduce India's reliance on imports. This, in turn, would free resources that were needed elsewhere – particularly for industrialization. In this context, the Indian population was primarily seen in terms of productivity. As the Malaria Institute of India put it in November 1956: "people afflicted chronically with malaria were not living their full lives economically and socially. Instead of being positive assets to themselves and to the nation, they were only half active and a liability to the country".[39] To what extent malaria eradication would change that situation was oftentimes illustrated in rather grandiose calculations. In April 1957, for instance, a report by the United States International Cooperation Administration's Malaria Advisory Team indicated that by 1955, the NMCP had already reduced the incidence of malaria by 19.4 million cases per year. It concluded: "On the basis of three days sickness per case and a daily wage of two rupees (42 US cents), the country saved Rs. 11.64 crores or about 24 million US dollars."[40] Even though the data basis for these calculations was mostly vague,[41] experts and policymakers in Geneva, Washington, and Delhi found them convincing all the same. So, once again, the decision to embark on a global malaria eradication program was based on a broad consensus that extended far beyond Western elites.

The practice of malaria eradication

Most, if not all eradication projects were similar in their operational features since they shared the basic procedures laid down in WHO's global program. Yet, in its sheer magnitude the Indian NMEP, inaugurated in 1958, was unique.

The program was directed and coordinated by the central government, while the execution was left to the states. Spraying and surveillance teams were organized in "standard units": each unit was supposed to be responsible for areas with a population of roughly a million. In the assigned territory, the units would proceed in mobile camps from which spraying and surveillance squads were to swarm out to all villages within a radius of three to five miles. The plan of the NMEP made high demands on its workers: two spraymen operating one pump were to spray 80 houses per day; one surveillance worker had to cover 200 houses each day. Already in 1958, roughly 90,000 people were operating under the NMEP – the vast majority of whom were spraymen and surveillance workers, with additional administrators, laboratory staff or mechanics. From the second year onwards throughout the 1960s, the number of staff engaged in the program remained constant at approximately 150,000. In the first year alone, roughly 43 million houses were sprayed twice with insecticides – and that number has to be multiplied for the early 1960s, when the program finally reached all parts of the country. As mentioned above, the spray teams were followed by malaria inspectors and surveillance workers, who searched the villages for those who were already infected and took blood samples to see if the disease was still being transmitted. In 1958, 229,000 blood samples were collected – in 1961 that number rose to 13 million samples.[42]

After a slower than expected start, it took until the early 1960s before all the units necessary to cover the whole country were fully operational. At that point, the results of the eradication efforts were impressive: while there had been 75 million cases and one million deaths in the early 1950s, by 1961, that number had fallen to less than 100,000 cases, according to the Indian Ministry of Health. And what is most astonishing: not a single death from malaria was recorded that year. In the internal reports and debates of the Central Council of Health, India's pre-eminent public health body, the achievements of the NMEP were unanimously regarded as "spectacular", and the council assumed that malaria would soon cease to be a national public health issue.[43]

The role of international aid in malaria eradication

For the entire duration of the NMEP, India provided the manpower for the program. What, then, was the role of international actors in this undertaking?

When it comes to equipment and supplies, the United States was by far the most important international source of aid throughout the

NMEP. And at least for the first five years, US support covered a significant amount of the program's costs. For instance, it was only after 1962 that vehicles for the NMEP were bought from indigenous production. Up until then, the transport fleet of roughly 2,300 jeeps and trucks had almost entirely been imported from and paid with funding provided by the United States.[44] With regards to anti-malarial drugs and spraying equipment, the situation was similar. The most crucial part of US aid was the provision of insecticides. Of the overall requirement of 28,000 tons of DDT for the 12 months starting in May 1960, for example, the United States supplied 22,182 tons.[45] Even with an increasing indigenous production of DDT and international aid decreasing after the early 1960s, the United States still provided approximately 70 per cent of the insecticides used between 1958 and 1970.[46] Thereby, over the first five years of the NMEP, US funding accounted for approximately 40 per cent of the overall expenditures of the program before American aid was drastically reduced from 1963 onwards. In 1960, for instance, the United States provided roughly $15 million in bilateral aid for malaria eradication in India.[47]

The United States was not only a crucial source of funding for the Indian malaria eradication efforts. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, its bilateral assistance for India alone surpassed the amount spent by multilateral organizations – at a time when the United States supported over 20 countries directly through bilateral aid. And even the vast majority of multilateral assistance was funded by the United States. WHO and the Pan American Health Organization (serving as WHO's Regional Office for the Americas), for instance, financed their efforts largely through special funds established in the mid-1950s to collect donations from countries and NGOs. By the end of 1963, $35 million had been received – with $31.5 million (90 per cent) coming from the United States.[48]

In material terms, WHO's role in assisting malaria eradication was rather insignificant. In 1958, the organization supplied a little over 7 per cent of the overall expenditure of the NMEP – but that amount shrank to 1 per cent or less from 1959 onwards. At the program's peak in 1961–1962, WHO contributed a paltry $210,000 to the overall cost of roughly $42 million.[49] This picture would have to be modified for some other countries that received a slightly higher amount of support from WHO. Yet the fact remains that the organization was not an important source of material supplies or financing.

Bearing all that in mind, however, the organization still had a significant influence that has to be located at a different level. WHO was crucial in demonstrating and highlighting the potentialities of malaria

eradication as well as providing impartial authority, expertise, and technical guidance. To begin with, by emphasizing malaria as the top priority in international health politics, the organization advocated and lent legitimacy to efforts to fight the disease. The role of WHO's demonstration projects of the late 1940s and early 1950s as models for the execution and possibilities of malaria control has already been mentioned. Furthermore, on the basis of the global network of demonstrations and pilot projects that were gradually evolving, information from all parts of the world was being brought together at Geneva. The organization was pivotal in condensing this information into interpretations and concrete messages – one of which was, very clearly, that malaria eradication was possible. By the mid-1950s, that message was coupled with the addendum that it had to be done quickly before mosquito resistance to insecticides could spread. After 1955, many countries explicitly referred to the proclamation of the global MEP as the reason and justification for establishing eradication projects. In the case of India, planning for eradication instead of merely control consequently began in December 1955.[50] One last area where WHO had a major influence was in implementing malaria eradication: without exception, all countries followed the methodologies formulated and consistently refined by the organization both in planning and in execution, often under the direct guidance of WHO experts. Furthermore, WHO's voice was essential in the evaluation of ongoing projects.[51] In conclusion, it seems fair to say that WHO's role and significance went well beyond its contributions in funding or manpower – and in this sense, global malaria eradication can legitimately be regarded as a project of the World Health Organization.

Demise of the MEP in the late 1960s

Seen in a global context, the success of eradication efforts in India in the early 1960s was by no means the exception. By the end of the decade, eradication had been achieved in 37 countries.[52] According to WHO, in 1970 1.8 billion people were living in formerly malarious areas; 710 million of these inhabited territories where malaria was no longer present, and for an additional 300 million, malaria incidence was reduced to an absolute minimum.[53]

Despite all that, however, after more than three years of closely re-examining the MEP, the Twenty-Second World Health Assembly abandoned the global Malaria Eradication Program in July 1969. In fact, problems had undoubtedly mounted in the years leading up to the decision. In India, the progress of the NMEP was considerably slowed down

in 1963, when "minor focal outbreaks" first occurred in areas where malaria had already been thought defeated. From 1965 onwards, areas where insecticide sprayings had been ceased needed to re-enter the "attack phase" of large-scale sprayings. In 1969, 88 million people were affected by these reverse measures.[54] Of the multitude of problems the Indian NMEP was facing, insufficient surveillance proved to be the most important obstacle. Epidemiological surveillance was never as extensive as was necessary, which meant, for instance, that focal outbreaks were detected too late and were not tackled in time. The underlying problem, of course, was the lack of adequate basic health structures in large parts of India which would have allowed for comprehensive surveillance.[55] Once again, India was not an exception, and the eradication projects in a large number of countries ran into similar difficulties during the 1960s.

What made the situation in India even worse was the overall economic and food crises that took hold of the country halfway through the decade, mainly caused by the wars with China and Pakistan and by a long-lasting drought.[56] Government resources became increasingly scarce, especially after the devaluation of the Indian rupee in 1966, and the focus generally shifted away from health programs. The national crisis caused a massive blow to the NMEP when it was already weakened because international aid had been decreasing since 1963. WHO, for instance, reduced its spending on the MEP mainly because it received no more significant donations for its special malaria fund after that year.[57] However, it was the seriously decreased US assistance that struck the Indian NMEP hardest. Compared to 1962, the United States lowered bilateral assistance by more than 50 per cent in 1963 to roughly $5 million and would no longer provide grants, but only development loans. The low point came at $1.7 million in 1967 – down from more than $15 million in 1960. From 1963–1965, India had been able to keep its commitment up and thereby compensate more or less for the decreasing international assistance. Yet, in 1966, government funding for malaria eradication was cut by over 40 per cent, and, a year later, the overall expenditure for the NMEP, borne at this point almost entirely by India, plummeted to $15.4 million, compared to $42 million at its peak in 1961–1962.[58] Furthermore, in the late 1960s, it became more and more difficult to secure from Western producers adequate supplies of insecticides so fundamentally needed for the program.

In hindsight, one of the reasons for the decreasing international support must be seen in the waning novelty effect of a program that had been under way for several years by the early to mid-1960s. For

the United States, for instance, the diminished propaganda value of the fight against malaria undoubtedly played an important role in the decision not to follow up the initial five-year commitment with assistance of similar magnitude.[59] From a historical perspective, what stands out about the situation in India as well as with the MEP is the fact that the eradication efforts had produced highly ambiguous evidence that could be, and was, used to make a case for both the success or failure of the program. As early as October 1963, for instance, a representative of the USAID mission to India warned of the "impending failure of the malaria eradication program". Yet, as late as September 1967, the US Office of International Health assured USAID in Washington of the "remarkable achievements" of the MEP and, while acknowledging "serious problems", saw no reason why it should not be possible to attain the final goal of global malaria eradication.[60] Against the background of contradictory opinions and sometimes diametrically opposed reports, it was difficult for contemporary decision makers to opt for either continuation or termination of the MEP – a situation that existing scholarship has largely failed to acknowledge.

The relationship between health and development politics stood once again at the centre of uncertainty. Public health measures had always competed with other issues in terms of their relative contribution to development efforts. During the 1960s, population growth in particular rose to prime importance as an obstacle to economic development.[61] Incidentally, in this respect, the Global North and most developing countries were still in agreement. After all, India, too, increasingly focused on population control and family planning programs.[62] However, in India and elsewhere in the Global South, malaria eradication did not come to be viewed as contradicting these initiatives but was still seen as a crucial "developmental activity".[63] Nevertheless, within the international political discourse, voices grew louder that regarded efforts to fight malaria not only of little use but even detrimental to economic development. A report on the Indian NMEP written by WHO and USAID experts in November 1970 went so far as to conclude that "the antimalaria campaign was the major factor in the acceleration of population growth after 1951. … The economic consequences of a population explosion in retarding economic development are well-known and need not be gone into here".[64] To be sure, the idea that malaria eradication was detrimental to development efforts by no means constituted the international consensus, and the relationship between public health measures and population growth remained highly contested.[65] In any case, by the end of the 1960s the former consensus that malaria eradication

would significantly contribute to economic development had undoubt-edly vanished. WHO reacted by placing all the more emphasis on the close association between efforts to fight malaria and economic devel-opment. Anxiously monitoring the decreasing amount of international assistance, the organization assumed this to be the only viable strategy to secure the continued support of the international community.

In this precarious situation, a variety of factors tipped the scales in favour of those who made an argument to end the MEP. To begin with, it is crucial to consider the pervasive sense of frustration that constituted a basic feature of international health politics in the late 1960s.[66] It resulted primarily from the fact that most contemporary observers regarded full eradication alone as the standard against which international initiatives had to be measured – and against which the very (continued) existence of malaria proved them to be a failure. Even though its influence is hard to measure, the mounting disillusionment towards the end of the decade certainly provided a fertile ground for those who claimed that the MEP needed to be abandoned altogether.

Parallel to the widespread disappointment, one specific strand of critique focused on the effects of insecticide use on human health and the environment. It was decidedly not formulated by countries in which spraying operations were actually being conducted, but originated almost exclusively in Europe and North America. The debate at the 1969 World Health Assembly over DDT use illustrates how this critique separated the Global North from the developing world. In response to the Dutch delegate's plea to discontinue the export and use of DDT, the delegate from Indonesia pointed out that "while waiting for another equally cheap and effective insecticide, whose effects were fully known, it might still be considered better in malarious countries to die of cancer in old age than of malaria in childhood".[67]

At the same time, in international health politics, as in so many other fields, the late 1960s witnessed the rise of a fundamental assault on large-scale projects undertaken in the Global South in the name of develop-ment. Once again brought forward primarily by the United States and European (as well as Eastern bloc) countries, it claimed that the strategy of malaria eradication was ill-suited to fit the diverse local conditions and did not sufficiently take into account the real social and economic needs in the developing world. The international community should, it was demanded, stop imposing malaria eradication programs on the Global South.[68] Against this background, it becomes clear why WHO's strategy to defend efforts to fight malaria could not muster much support at the end of the 1960s: emphasizing economic benefits did little to counter

the increasing unease with large-scale international health initiatives in general. This, in turn, left the MEP all the more vulnerable.

Conclusion

Existing accounts of the global Malaria Eradication Program are largely dominated by a pervasive interpretation of failure.[69] However, this narrative needs qualification: In the case of India, for instance, after the thoroughly impressive results of the early 1960s, the number of malaria cases steadily rose again. Yet, after a temporary peak at seven million cases in 1976, malaria incidence has, up until today, leveled out at approximately two million cases and 1,000 deaths annually, mostly occurring in well-confined parts of the country – a far cry from India's 75 million cases and a million deaths in the early 1950s.[70] Similar results and figures, not to mention the economic benefits, were reported from a multitude of countries engaged in malaria eradication.

Even after the intensified international control efforts since the late 1990s, malaria remains today one of the world's biggest public health problems, with an estimated 150–280 million cases and up to a million deaths annually. It should be borne in mind, however, that over 90 per cent of those deaths occur in Sub-Saharan Africa where, aside from a few pilot projects, malaria eradication programs have never been established. During the 1950s and 1960s, WHO suggested that the MEP should be extended to Sub-Saharan Africa only at some later point, when the continent would provide better infrastructural conditions. In other words, in those areas where the international community was fighting malaria in the 1950s and 1960s, lasting success was often the result.

To be clear, by no means should the history of the MEP simply be told as a success story. However, I do suggest that the story is more complex and ambiguous than previous scholarship has allowed for, as evidenced by the diversity of contemporary opinions. Contemporaries basically had to try to reconcile a variety of conflicting interests, benefits, and possible risks. When faced with the unenviable task of weighing up the significant reduction in malaria incidence – and thus the alleviation of suffering for hundreds of millions of people – against the health risks of insecticide use, detrimental population growth, and serious environmental concerns, there could hardly be any easy solution. And that does not even take into the equation the sketchiness of information and the very real difficulties into which the eradication efforts had run. While it is surprising that this delicate problem was seldom addressed explicitly in contemporary debates, it is certainly astonishing that the

complexity of this question has gone almost unnoticed in existing accounts of the MEP.

As the rise and fall of malaria eradication in the 1950s and 1960s demonstrates, international health politics of the postwar era was not simply the project of Western elites and experts – neither on the levels of planning nor implementation. Rather, it should be seen as the result of a complex and changing constellation of interests and motivations, as India's role in the genesis of the MEP illustrated. To a large degree, international cooperation in health depended on the relative importance it was being awarded for the solution of problems in other international fields – and, at worst, it could even get into opposition to the dominant political discourses. On the whole, WHO had a very limited impact on this dynamic, as evidenced by the relationship between international public health and economic development. In a very broad sense, public health was always considered a part of the development efforts of the postwar era – as much as overall social and economic development/progress was one of the main objectives of health initiatives. Unsurprisingly, therefore, WHO received substantial funding from the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance for Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries from 1950 onwards. Furthermore, since the organization had focused on "underdeveloped" countries right from its inception, it generally felt very much in tune with the goals of the proclaimed "UN Development Decade" of the 1960s. However, WHO had very little influence on the relative importance public health was being awarded in this context. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the case of the global MEP, the organization's signature project of the 1950s and 1960s. Unlike any other health issue, malaria was singled out by development experts as an obstacle to economic development – which, for a relatively short period from the mid-1950s onwards catapulted malaria eradication to a prominent place on the international political agenda. Under these circumstances, WHO undoubtedly played an important role in international politics. After all, successful or not, the global MEP was one of the largest undertakings in the history of international cooperation – and as I have detailed, it would not have been possible without the World Health Organization. At the same time, WHO was a mere bystander to the emergence of an interpretation that saw "overpopulation" as the crucial challenge and thus favoured channelling resources into population control instead of public health. Moreover, the organization struggled to mobilize continued support for the MEP in the late 1960s when it came under fire from multiple angles.

For a short period immediately after World War II, cooperation in public health was considered an important contribution to world peace since it was thought to help create socio-economic stability and foster international understanding. Not incidentally, it was logical in this period when international health experts exerted a strong influence in international politics, resulting in the establishment of an international organization with potentially far-reaching powers and unprecedented ambitions. In the decades after World War II the World Health Organization did, without a doubt, play an important role in public health cooperation – one that went well beyond its rather paltry material contributions. However, it seems equally undeniable that soon after its creation the organization was strongly depending on the ebb and flow of international political discourse, while it could do little itself to influence the tides.

Notes

1. Resolution WHA8.30, in *Official Records of the World Health Organization* (hereafter OR) No. 63, Eighth World Health Assembly 1955.
2. OR 75, *The Work of WHO 1956*, Annual Report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the United Nations (hereafter Work of WHO), p. vi.
3. For the malaria figures see: OR 90, Work of WHO (1958: 3). See also WHO (1958: 172).
4. OR 75, Work of WHO (1956: 11); OR 98, Work of WHO (1959: 3).
5. OR 176, Twenty-Second World Health Assembly 1969, Part I, Resolution WHA212.39.
6. See, for example, Randall M. Packard (2000) and the chapters in Andrew Cunningham and Bridie Andrews (1997).
7. For a condensed version of this consensus interpretation, see Randall M. Packard (2007: 150–176). See also the overall excellent accounts of Sunil S. Amrith (2006: 187) and Amy L. S. Staples (2006: 161–176). As examples of more simplistic interpretations see Yves Beigbeder (1999) or Sung Lee (1997).
8. See for instance Randall M. Packard (1997) and Randall M. Packard and Peter J. Brown (1997).
9. The Cold War context is emphasized by Randall M. Packard (1998), Marcos Cueto (2007) and Socrates Litsios (1997). For an account of modernization theory's influence on US foreign policy see Michael Latham (2011) and David Ekbladh (2010).
10. As arguably the most widely recognized example to date, see Matthew Connelly (2008). See also Nick Cullather (2010).
11. Erez Manela (2010).
12. The most useful account of the history of international cooperation in public health before World War II is still Neville M. Goodman (1971). See also Iris Borowy (2009).

13. On the establishment of the UN system see Bob Reinalda (2009).
14. See Article 1 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf, date accessed 18 January 2014.
15. See in particular the deliberations in OR 1, Minutes of the Technical Preparatory Committee for the International Health Conference. Held in Paris from 18 March to 5 April 1946.
16. OR 4, Minutes of the Second Session of the Interim Commission, 4–13 November 1946, p. 168.
17. Library of the World Health Organization (hereafter WHOL), WHO.IC/Mal/11, Fifth Session of the Interim Commission. Malaria Program. Proposal from the Representative from the United States of America, 23 January 1948.
18. Nick Cullather (2010).
19. WHO.IC/Mal/11, Fifth Session of the Interim Commission. Malaria Program. Proposal from the Representative from the United States of America, 23 January 1948.
20. For the malaria project in Sardinia see Frank M. Snowden (2006: 198–212). For Greece see Katerina Gardikas (2008).
21. OR 11, Reports of Expert Committees and other Advisory Bodies to the Interim Commission, document WHO.IC/205, p. 44.
22. For India's geostrategic significance, see Robert J. McMahon (1994: 276–299) and David C. Engerman (2013). Dennis Merrill (1990) is still very useful as an overview of US assistance to India after independence.
23. See, for instance, National Archives of India (hereafter NAI), External Affairs Department and Commonwealth Relations Department, 8(36)-UNO-I/47, A brief note concerning W.H.O., March 1948.
24. NAI, Department of Health, 9–79/47-PH II, Amrit Kaur to Shri V. Krishna Menon, 29 January 1948.
25. See for instance Nehru's remarks in WHOL, SEA/RC7/Min.1, Regional Committee SEA, Summary Minutes, 21 September 1954.
26. NAI, Department of Health, 9–42/47-PH-II, Report by Lt.-Col. C. Mani on the Fourth Session of the Interim Commission of the World Health Organization, 14 October 1947.
27. NAI, External Affairs Department and Commonwealth Relations Department, 8(31)-UNO-I/47, Instructions of the Government of India to Lt. Col. C. Mani, I.M.S., Representative of India at the Fourth Session of the Interim Commission of the World Health Organisation, 26 August 1947.
28. For a discussion of these figures, see Archives of the World Health Organization (hereafter WHOA), WHO7.0159, JKT VI, SJ2, United States of America, International Cooperation Administration, Malaria Advisory Team: Report on a Mission to India, January–April 1957: 7–8.
29. For an extensive review of these various reports, see Roger Jeffrey (1988: 105–113).
30. NAI, Finance Department, 7(3)-PII/46, 1946, Provincial Health Ministers Conference, 11–12 October 1946.
31. The Indian motives for fighting malaria are summarized in WHOL, SEA/MAL/4, WHO Malaria Conference, Report Submitted by the Government of India, New Delhi, 19 June 1953.

32. The Demonstration Projects are described in E. J. Pampana and P. F. Russell (1955).

33. For a reference to the role played by WHO demonstrations, see National Medical Library of India (hereafter NMLI), 614.0954 IND N62, Summary Proceedings of the Tenth Meeting of the Central Council of Health 1962, p. 37.

34. The plan is laid down in WHOA, WHO7.0159, JKT VI, SJ2, MHO/AS/46.57, WHO Malaria Section, Draft of a Malaria Eradication Program in India to be activated in stages, 10 April 1957.

35. See, for example, the emphasis placed on vector resistance in OR 67, Work of WHO 1955: 5.

36. For this general context see Odd Arne Westad (2005).

37. US National Archives at College Park (hereafter USNA), RG 90, A1 42, Office of International Health, Correspondence, 1949–1969, Box 2, Folder "Committees – International Development Advisory Board, 1956–1959," Malaria Eradication. Report of Special Committee of the International Development Advisory Board. Submitted 13 April 1956.

38. WHOL, Malaria Conference 1953, Report Submitted by India (see Fn. 27), p. 4.

39. "Brief Note on Malaria Eradication in India, November 1956," quoted in WHOA, US ICA Malaria Advisory Team, Report on a Mission to India 1957 (see Fn. 24), p. 134.

40. "Brief Note on Malaria Eradication in India, November 1956," p. 27.

41. This was openly reflected even by contemporaries, see "Brief Note on Malaria Eradication in India, November 1956," pp. 52–53.

42. For these figures, see WHOL, SEA/MAL/16, Report on the Third Asian Malaria Conference, 19–21 March 1959, Annex 6; NMLI, Central Council of Health 1962 (see Fn. 29), p. 39. The number of houses sprayed that is sometimes found in the literature (438 million) is certainly based on a misunderstanding.

43. NLMI, 614.0954 IND N69 P, Summary Proceedings of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Central Council of Health 1969, p. 15.

44. WHOA, WHO7.0162, JKT XIII, SJ2, Report of the Evaluation in-depth of the National Malaria Eradication Programme of India, November 1970, p. III. 3–13.

45. WHOA, WHO7.0160, JKT VIII, SJ1, US Technical Cooperation Mission to India, Health Division, A Critical Review of the National Malaria Eradication Program of India, November 1960, p. 33.

46. WHOA, Report of the Evaluation in-depth of the NMEP of India 1970 (see Fn. 39), p. III. 3–1.

47. For an overview of expenditures and sources of funding, see WHOA, Report of the Evaluation in-depth of the NMEP of India 1970, Appendix II–3.

48. OR 135, Seventeenth World Health Assembly 1964, Part I: Annex 7.

49. WHOA, Report of the Evaluation in-depth of the NMEP of India 1970 (see Fn. 39), Appendix II–3.

50. WHOA, US ICA Malaria Advisory Team, Report on a Mission to India 1957 (see Fn. 24), p. 136.

51. Even US authorities continually referred to the crucial role of WHO guidelines; see for instance WHOA, Report of the Evaluation in-depth of the NMEP of India 1970 (see Fn. 39), pp. II–2.

52. OR 180, Work of WHO 1969, p. 271.
53. OR 188, Work of WHO 1970, p. 28.
54. WHOA, WHO7.0162, JKT XIII, SJ1, National Malaria Eradication Programme. Retrospect and Prospects, by Dr. S. L. Dhir, Director NMEP, May 1970, pp. 8–10.
55. WHOA, Report of the Evaluation in-depth of the NMEP of India 1970 (see Fn. 39), pp. III.5.1–13.
56. For an excellent account of the effects the crisis had on Indian development policies, see Corinna Unger (2008).
57. See, for example, OR 139, Work of WHO 1964, p. 68.
58. For US and Indian expenditure figures, see WHOA, Report of the Evaluation in-depth of the NMEP of India 1970 (see Fn. 39), Appendix II–3.
59. Smallpox eradication, on the other hand, seemed like a new and promising field to many contemporaries. See Erez Manela (2010: 300).
60. USNA, RG 286, P 458, USAID Mission to India/Public Health Division, Subject Files, 1961–1967, Box 7, Folder "Organizations, Committees & Meetings. Meetings, National Malaria Eradication Program, New Delhi, July 1, 1963," Harald Frederiksen to Eugene P. Campbell, Chief, Health Division, "Impending failure of the malaria eradication program", 29 October 1963; RG 90, A1 42, Office of International Health, Correspondence, 1949–1969, Box 41, Folder "Diseases, Malaria Eradication, OIH/66": Richard A. Smith, Office of International Health, PHS, to Malcolm H. Merrill, Office of War on Hunger, USAID, 15 September 1967.
61. For the relationship between population growth and development, see Marc Frey (2011). For the growing importance population growth acquired in US foreign assistance in the 1960s, see Matthew Connelly (2008: 207–213).
62. For the relative amount of resources spent on malaria eradication versus family planning, see WHOA, Report of the Evaluation in-depth of the NMEP of India 1970 (see Fn. 39), pp. III.9.3–5.
63. WHOA, WHO7.0162, JKT XIII, SJ1, T. Ramchandra Rao, Comments on the report of the evaluation in-depth of the National Malaria Eradication Programme of India, no date, p. 1.
64. WHOA, Report of the Evaluation in-depth of the NMEP of India 1970 (see Fn. 39), pp. III.9.28–9.
65. See, for instance, the internal debates over the 1970 WHO/USAID evaluation report at WHO in Geneva in WHOA, WHO7.0162, JKT XIII, SJ1, Comments on the report of the evaluation in-depth of the National Malaria Eradication Programme of India, 20 November 1970. For the conflict over population growth within WHO, see also Matthew Connelly (2008: 119–130, 145–151).
66. It was near omnipresent in World Health Assembly deliberations from 1967 onwards – see, for instance, OR 161 (1967), OR 169 (1968), and OR 177 (1969).
67. OR 177, Twenty-Second World Health Assembly 1969, p. 227. For the history and impact of DDT in general, see David Kinkela (2011).
68. OR 161, Twentieth World Health Assembly 1967, pp. 223–232.
69. This is also the prevailing notion in Erez Manela (2010: 307).
70. See the figures given in the WHO World Malaria Report 2011, http://www.who.int/malaria/world_malaria_report_2011/en/, date accessed 3 January 2012.

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7

Free Trade and Freedom to Trade: The Development Challenge to GATT, 1947–1968

Francine McKenzie

The Origins of the International Trade Organization

During World War II, bureaucrats, diplomats, and politicians drew up blueprints for several international organizations to manage the postwar global community. Their work was sustained by a planning zeitgeist that reflected certainty that the international community could be made more peaceful, urgency that such a task had to be undertaken, and confidence that international institutions could restrain narrower self-interest that undermined international collaboration. Alongside the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Food and Agricultural Organization, and World Health Organization, there was a spot for the International Trade Organization (ITO). British and American wartime governments took the early lead in mapping out an organization dedicated to freeing world trade. This would be achieved through rounds of tariff negotiations in which pairs of states exchanged lower tariffs on goods relevant to their trading relationship. Once they had achieved a balanced exchange of concessions, the new tariff rates would be extended to all members of the ITO. Reciprocity, the most favoured nation principle, and non-discrimination were the operating principles of the ITO. The geopolitical purpose of the ITO was similarly steeped in liberal thinking: trade forged connections between states, maximized prosperity, and stabilized the international community. The ITO would make the world more prosperous and more peaceful.

Unlike most international organizations of the time, the ITO was not finalized during World War II. Anglo-American disagreements delayed this wartime initiative. After the war, the United States produced a draft

of the ITO charter. In 1947, delegates from 23 countries convened in Geneva for six months to review the draft charter.[1] Subjects like industrial development and economic diversification were discussed, but usually in relation to countries like Australia and New Zealand, rather than developing countries like Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, and Syria, who were also present at the meeting. While Australia and New Zealand shared some attributes with developing economies – they relied heavily on a few commodities for export, and their exports were largely agricultural (wheat, wool, lamb, and butter) – high standards of living set them apart. International trade was therefore associated with recovery from the damage of the war, the modernization of national economies, and economic growth, but not with development, meaning economic transformation to overcome poverty and stagnation.

A follow-up meeting was held in Havana from November 1947 to March 1948. Fifty-six nations sent representatives, and developing countries constituted a vocal majority. They were quick to denounce the draft charter. For example, the representative of Mexico objected to the emphasis on the removal of barriers to trade that could wipe out the rudimentary core of industrialization that developing nations had built up; he insisted that the charter should have focused on global economic inequality, and he proposed positive measures by which to promote "the economic development of all nations and the international co-operation required to expedite it".[2] Over 800 amendments were proposed, and the final purpose and scope of the ITO charter were substantially different from the earlier iteration. The Havana charter defined development as "the productive use of the world's human and material resources", with an eye to promoting "industrial and general economic development of all countries". Development was at the nexus of interlocking economic goals, including full employment, productivity of labour, rising demand, economic stability, higher income levels, and expanding international trade.[3] Economic development was positioned centrally, and world trade would be the beneficiary.

Despite a strong development impress on the final version of the ITO charter, the representatives from Chile and Colombia lamented the premise that nations at different stages of economic development should behave according to the same standards and expectations.[4] One size did not fit all, but the one-size approach had largely prevailed. Many developing countries also believed that economically advanced states bore a special responsibility to encourage economic development. As the Chilean officials put it, there was a "need for the economically

stronger countries to co-operate altruistically in the work of speedily improving the standards of living of the weak countries".[5] This was a view that reflected ideas of justice rather than efficiency, competition, and comparative advantage that had informed British and American conceptions of the postwar trade order.

Although the Havana charter was a major revision of the postwar trade order as imagined by American and British officials, developed countries also endorsed it. Nugget Coombs, the Australian representative, praised the charter for balancing two competing ideas of economic freedom: one revolved around the removal of barriers to trade, the other focused on opportunities. As he explained: "To many of us, mere absence of restraint, while an important element in freedom, is, taken by itself, a negative and empty thing....If economic freedom is to be a real and living thing, it must mean economic opportunity....[P]ositive opportunity does not automatically come to the under-developed, the under-privileged, the unemployed, and to the poverty-stricken."[6] Will Clayton, leader of the US delegation, also praised the results of their deliberations: "This may well prove to be the greatest step in history toward order and justice in economic relations among the members of the world community and toward a great expansion in the production, distribution and consumption of goods throughout the world."[7]

The governments of Australia and Liberia rushed to ratify the ITO. But most nations waited on American approval. For various reasons, the United States did not ratify the Havana charter.[8] Without American participation, the ITO lapsed. But this did not leave a complete void, because at the end of the Geneva conference in October 1947, the trade chapter of the ITO charter had been bundled with the results of over 100 bilateral tariff negotiations. As Eric Wyndham White,[9] the first executive secretary of GATT, subsequently explained, the results of the negotiations had been too important to be deferred.[10] The package was called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and it had come into effect on 1 January 1948 as an interim measure. With the failure of the ITO, GATT oversaw world trade for the next 45 years. Given that the participants from developing countries had seen the Havana version of the trade charter as only partially satisfactory, reverting to the Geneva iteration was a step backwards.

The GATT review of 1954–1955 and development economics

In the early years of GATT, one of its main activities was to admit new members, formally called contracting parties. Prospective members

were required to participate in a round of tariff negotiations in which they would open their markets by lowering tariff rates. They eased their way toward free trade because tariff rates were typically lowered by a percentage of the total (complete elimination of a tariff was infrequent) and such reductions applied to select commodities, usually manufactured goods. Tariff rounds were held in Annecy, France, in 1949 and in Torquay, UK, in 1950–1951. The net effect on lowering tariffs was less far-reaching than the original Geneva round of negotiations in 1947, but liberalization was deepened as ever more countries participated in the most favoured nation network of the GATT. By 1952 there were 26 contracting parties.

The other principal GATT preoccupation was to transform a stack of paper – the General Agreement – into a properly functioning de facto international organization. In 1946, Trygve Lie, the head of the United Nations, seconded Eric Wyndham White, a British civil servant, to chair the Geneva and Havana meetings. After the Havana conference, Wyndham Whyte stayed on as executive secretary of the Interim Commission of the International Trade Organization (it was called this because in 1948 everyone expected the ITO would be established). With a skeleton staff, a loan from the UN, and borrowed space and office equipment, GATT began to establish a more enduring administrative role and capabilities. But, as Wyndham White explained in 1949, GATT needed "a definite program" rather than "a series of tasks".[11]

Opening markets and increasing export activities were obviously relevant to the domestic economic conditions of GATT members. The assumption was that the sustained growth of global trade would benefit everyone. But there was no dedicated effort to manage trade liberalization to redress conditions of poverty or to stimulate the growth and diversification of domestic economic activities. At GATT, international trade was not situated in a North–South framework which would have reformulated the premises and goals of trade. Indeed, there were no criteria to distinguish between developed and developing members. GATT members self-selected as developing or developed, an indication that these categories were germane but not impressed upon GATT's work. However, discussions of trade-related development never entirely went away after the Havana conference. The first real opportunity to acknowledge development as a goal of the organization intersected with the attempt to turn the General Agreement into a fully constituted international organization, such as occurred during a comprehensive review session in 1954–1955.

Wyndham White took seriously the challenge of strengthening the fragile, and frequently disparaged, organization. He once referred to GATT as the Cinderella of international organizations,[12] a description that evoked its late arrival on the international scene as well as its unloved and vulnerable position amongst the better-established international organizations. As executive secretary, he worked assiduously to build support for the cause of freer trade and to deflect GATT's detractors. One of the criticisms to which GATT was chronically vulnerable was that it fell far short of universal membership. Even worse, it privileged the interests of a few members, especially countries that were already industrialized and prosperous. The moniker of GATT as a rich man's club was already beginning to stick. In advance of the 1954–1955 review session, Wyndham White knew the institutional position of GATT would be strengthened by having more, and more satisfied, members from developing countries. He therefore encouraged developing countries to push for change in a way that preserved the basic structure of GATT. As he saw it, if GATT members complied more closely with its rules, then developing countries' interests would also be better protected.

His pre-emptive diplomacy did not stifle criticism from developing members or prevent North–South tensions from arising during the review session. One area of particularly sharp disagreement arose over the use of quantitative restrictions (QRs). They had been included in the General Agreement of 1947, to be used as an emergency measure to promote recovery from the devastation of World War II or to offset a serious balance-of-payments problem. In 1954, American delegates objected to the use of quantitative restrictions except in cases of crises, and only then for a limited time and with GATT oversight.[13]

At the same time as the United States endorsed the exceptional use of quantitative restrictions, it applied for a waiver to allow it to restrict agricultural imports through quantitative restrictions. The American request strongly suggested that there was a double standard, such that the economically powerful members could ignore GATT rules with impunity. Win Brown, leader of the American delegation to the review session, noted that the waiver "strengthened the feeling of a large and important bloc of countries that the GATT is an unbalanced and inequitable agreement largely tailored to accommodate the needs of the US".[14]

Most developing country representatives opposed suggestions to restrict and control the use of quantitative restrictions. The Indonesian official insisted that it was "absolutely unacceptable" for a contracting party to have to inform GATT prior to the use of quantitative restrictions, as well

as to seek the approval of other contracting parties. He also introduced a postcolonial perspective to fortify the case for quantitative restrictions.

> I might ask with some emphasis why countries, not only having suffered from war damage in many cases, but which underwent, prior to that, all the social and economic inconveniences of being deprived for some centuries of the right to determine their own future, should not be in a position to avail themselves of the same – and exactly the same – facilities that their fellow contracting parties…were allowed to make use of for their economic restoration and expansion during these past seven years.[15]

He asked only that developing nations be allowed to use the same methods to foster economic growth that developed countries had used to recover from the war, even though the challenge confronting developing nations was compounded by a long history of economic oppression. Put this way, the continued use of quantitative restrictions did not seem to be asking for much.

Some developed countries also endorsed the general use of quantitative restrictions, but not necessarily because of a commitment to development. For instance, France linked the question of quantitative restrictions to national sovereignty. Governments should be unfettered when it came to protecting and promoting domestic economic activity.[16] American and Canadian officials suspected the French delegation was exploiting North–South tension in order to prevent the strengthening of GATT rules that would limit national sovereignty. As Brown described it, "They bid openly and in an almost humiliating manner for the support of the underdeveloped countries on anything that would weaken the provisions of the GATT."[17] Although the position of developing countries no doubt benefited from developed country support, there were ulterior motives at play.

India's representative had a leading role in resolving the standoff over quantitative restrictions. L.K. Jha warned against trying to entirely remake the GATT: such an effort was bound to fail. The purpose of the review should be to make an amended General Agreement "flexible, prompt and realistic".[18] Win Brown singled Jha out as one of the two "outstanding personalities" at the review, and paid what must have been intended as a compliment when he remarked that Jha "thought like a Westerner".[19] But Jha did not support the American position that quantitative restrictions were bad for trade. Conditions in developing countries required more nuanced thinking about their use. Without QRs, developing economies

would be susceptible to volatility and economic strain, which was also bad for international trade. The problem with quantitative restrictions was not their use to encourage industrial development but their retention once an industry was established. And this, he pointed out, was a problem in the developed world, not the developing one.[20]

The result was that the specific articles dealing with quantitative restrictions (Articles XI and XII) were preserved with minor modifications. Governments could introduce quantitative restrictions to stave off balance-of-payments problems without requiring GATT approval. There could be consultation with contracting parties being affected by such a decision, but this was not mandatory. Nor was there a specified time limit for their use, although they should be lifted as soon as possible. The regular use of quantitative restrictions to promote economic development was also entrenched in the GATT. Article XVIII was amended to justify the use of "any non-discriminatory measure" for the sake of economic development. But this was not a clear-cut triumph for development. The other contracting parties could retaliate if they did not believe the particular application of QRs was warranted.[21]

Developing country representatives also tried to revive articles from the defunct Havana charter, including those dealing with employment, investment to promote economic development, balance-of-payments crises, inflation, commodity agreements, and the general recognition of development as a priority.[22] But the United States opposed significant changes to the original General Agreement. In American eyes, what made GATT less than effective was not the substance of the agreement but faults in administering it. "It would have been better if we had made it work better." In contrast to those who held up the Havana charter as a model, the American representative referred to the Havana conference of 1947–1948 as a cautionary tale of what happened if too much were undertaken.[23] The GATT's mandate was minimalist: to liberalize trade by lowering tariffs. Adjustment was possible; transforming the GATT was not.

The Haberler Report: the importance of development through trade

The GATT could never do more than what its members wanted. Because the trading interests and policies of its members were far-ranging, competing, and sometimes in conflict, its achievements were the result of compromises and trade-offs. Concessions offered and received were weighed against one another; the goal was to receive more than one

gave. When developing countries made a case for unequal and unreciprocated concessions, they challenged standard GATT practice and collided with a zero-sum and present-minded outlook amongst developed members.

The incompatibility of developed and developing country ideas and expectations about how to open trade was underscored by the uneven distribution of the benefits of freer trade. Although the volume of developing country exports was increasing absolutely, their share of global trade was shrinking relatively (see Chart 1). The GATT secretariat called attention to the problem of unequal participation in the growth of world trade and, as a result, even more skewed distribution of the benefits. Wyndham White nudged recalcitrant developed members towards open acceptance of the fact that developing countries were losing ground in world trade. He established a committee of four economic experts in 1957 to study trends in world trade, but the terms of reference were defined to ensure that he "got the report he wanted".[24] And he did. The report concluded that developing countries were increasingly marginalized in world trade and did not participate as fully as industrial countries in economic growth.[25]

The secretariat took its cue from the report and struck a committee to find ways to promote the export growth of developing countries. But when the committee began its work in 1959, the gulf between the priorities of the secretariat and its members was exposed. No one assumed a leadership role. Representatives from Canada and the United States were "sympathetic" to the main issue, but the United States called for more research before any action could be taken. Developing countries

Chart 1[26] Percentage Share of World Trade – IMPORTS: Developed Countries (DCs), Less Developed Countries (LDCs), and Centrally Planned Economies (CPEs)

Chart 2   Percentage Share of World Trade – EXPORTS: DCs, LDCs, CPEs

believed the onus rested with developed countries to act unilaterally to open their markets to developing countries' exports. The result was that little happened.[27]

The committee finally produced a report in 1960 that examined patterns of consumption and production for 11 commodities exported by developing countries (including cocoa, coffee, tea, tobacco, jute, cotton, and lead) and showed the ways in which they were impaired in foreign markets.[28] A progress report at the end of 1960 confirmed that little had been done to redress the situation. The report described a spectrum of action that ranged from "no changes" (tea) to "little change" (raw cotton) to "very few…measures" (cotton textiles). There was a strong current of criticism directed toward the EEC, especially France, Germany, and Italy, whose use of internal charges on items like coffee sharply curtailed potential exports from developing countries.[29] One estimate was that if these three removed revenue duties on coffee, the coffee exports of developing countries would rise by $100 million per year.[30] At the next GATT meeting, many developing countries pressed for immediate action, emphasizing the urgency of open markets to their economic growth. Their comments also suggested that they were at a crossroads: unless meaningful action were taken soon, they might turn away from the liberal approach.[31] The attitude of developing countries was increasingly marked by not only disappointment, but also by frustration, impatience, and a willingness to invoke threats unless industrial countries acted soon.[32]

The export problems of the developing members of GATT took on added urgency as the winds of decolonization swept around the world. Many former colonies acceded to GATT. By 1963, 25 developing countries were full contracting parties or in the process of full accession;

another 21 newly independent countries aspired to membership. But even though there were more developing country members of GATT than ever before, GATT was not a forum that suited them. There were several reasons for this. First, GATT worked on the basis of compromise; votes were rarely held. Their numerical majority therefore did not give developing country members leverage. Second, tariff negotiations were the bread and butter of GATT activities, but developing countries typically had little to offer by way of lowering tariffs. Even if a new GATT norm were slowly emerging – that developing members could not be expected to offer equivalent concessions – developed countries still did not respond well to giving something for nothing. Moreover, many contracting parties, including the United States, continued to believe that the heart of the problem was internal to developing nations.[33] Improving market access was not the solution to underdevelopment.

At a meeting of GATT ministers in 1961, all admitted that developing countries were not participating as fully in world trade as they could and that, as a result, trade was not effectively promoting development. A ministerial declaration on the Promotion of the Trade of Less Developed Countries was issued in November: it combined good intentions and general calls for action. Pious pronouncements, however, were no substitute for concrete measures.

GATT in the shadow of UNCTAD

Before long, developing countries had somewhere else to turn. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was scheduled to meet in the spring of 1964. UNCTAD's purpose was to end the exploitative treatment and marginalized place of developing countries in the global economy. Wyndham White anticipated that GATT would come under fire.[34] But rather than cede the development agenda to UNCTAD, he tried to make GATT more relevant to developing members.

As a result, in 1963, GATT unveiled an eight-point action program to assist the exports of developing countries. This program included a "standstill provision," meaning no new barriers, either tariff or non-tariff, would be put in the way of the exports of developing countries. Developed countries should have eliminated all quantitative restrictions imposed on exports originating from developing countries within one year. Tropical products would have no tariffs imposed on them in industrialized markets. Tariffs on primary products should be eliminated and tariffs on semi-processed and processed products would be reduced by

50 per cent over the following three years. Representatives of developed countries would report to the GATT once a year on their progress. These measures were formulated as imperatives, but their implementation depended entirely on the will of its members. Without either pressure or incentives, developed contracting parties did not rush to act.

In 1962, Brazil had proposed the creation of a trade and development centre to provide technical expertise to assist developing countries to formulate trade policies, participate in trade negotiations, and pursue trade opportunities. The International Trade Centre opened its doors in May 1964, and a director and staff joined in the following months.

GATT members also considered the use of preferential tariff treatment as a way of stimulating the export trade of developing countries. American officials objected because preferences were discriminatory: they contravened the most favoured nation principle, the heart of the GATT system. They also doubted that they would work. It would be better to encourage economic growth along lines that made the most of the natural economic advantages of developing countries, such as a large and cheap labour force.[35]

Other members supported preferential tariffs in principle but disagreed about who should extend them, who should receive them, how they should be applied, and for what commodities. Britain favoured an inclusive approach so that all developing members of GATT would benefit from such a tariff. Brazil insisted that preferences should apply to all developing nations, inside and outside of GATT. Nigeria and Uganda wanted preferences to be applied only to the least-developed countries, in contrast to the better-off, less-developed countries. The Belgians and French supported individual countries extending individual preferences to specific industries. Japan, Israel, and Australia favoured preferences only to competitive industries and only for a short time.[36] Agreement eluded them on this question.

Another of Wyndham White's initiatives had more success: introducing a new chapter, Part IV on Trade and Development, to the General Agreement. Its contents reflected earlier recommendations: for instance, a standstill on barriers to the trade of developing countries. It also called on developed contracting parties to show goodwill and special consideration to the particular obstacles affecting exports from developing countries. Forty-five contracting parties, or two-thirds of all members, had to ratify the chapter to amend the General Agreement, but contracting parties from the developed and developing world held back. It was not until June 1966 that the requisite two-thirds threshold was finally met. Despite Wyndham White's efforts leading up to the first

UNCTAD meeting, Philip Tresize, US deputy assistant secretary of state for economic affairs, reported being alarmed at "how disgruntled the LDCs are with GATT", a disgruntlement that he believed had given rise to UNCTAD. He feared UNCTAD's meeting would be "one of the most unpleasant propaganda efforts of the decade".[37]

UNCTAD'S challenge to GATT

Wyndham White had been prescient to see UNCTAD as a challenge, even a threat, to the GATT. Raúl Prebisch, UNCTAD's first secretary general, did acknowledge GATT's virtues: it supported the rule of law in international trade; the secretariat was talented; and it was a useful forum for discussion – but he did not hold back his criticisms. The GATT focused almost exclusively on the removal of barriers to trade. This passive form of engagement in world trade did not promote development and was, in practice, punitive to the developing world. Prebisch did not hesitate to step on GATT's toes and specify actions that the organization should take in order to support developing countries. It must better enforce its rules, particularly with respect to curbing agricultural protectionism. GATT rules must recognize the structural differences between developed and developing countries. He endorsed the extension of preferences from developed to developing countries as well as preferences amongst developing countries. As he put it, "[W]hat harm could be done to international trade" if developing countries extended preferences on "a sizable proportion, even if it were not substantially all, of their trade?"[38] Other UNCTAD reports condemned GATT even more starkly for impeding development and for treating all states equally, which in the case of developing nations, meant treating them unfairly.[39]

Wyndham White appeared at UNCTAD to explain GATT's role in development. He insisted that the GATT could not simply waive aside all of its rules and obligations. To do so would make it less effective. He pointed out that preferences were currently under discussion, although nothing had been decided because of the complexity of the issue as well as sharp divisions of opinion. He admitted that the GATT was acting with "more prudence than heroism" but the issue remained open rather than shelved. He pointed out that developing countries made up two-thirds of the contracting parties and the onus was on them to work within GATT to better pursue their interests and needs. Hence, he boldly asserted that GATT was a "one-time rich-man's club". He deflected attention to the future, in particular the Kennedy Round – to begin in a few weeks' time – which he believed was filled with promise for the

trade of developing countries. He expressed the hope that the Kennedy Round would liberalize trade in agricultural commodities, a vast sector that had largely evaded its reach because of "acute social and political difficulties" in industrialized countries. Finally, with some audacity, he tried to exonerate the GATT on several grounds. First, making markets more accessible to the exports of developing countries would not solve the problem of underdevelopment. "The problem", he explained, "is not exclusively an external one". Moreover, fault might not reside with the institution but with the states that compose it and the absence of political will "to take the necessary political decisions".[40]

The GATT–UNCTAD rivalry subsequently evolved into a prickly collaboration. In 1966, UNCTAD contemplated the establishment of a trade centre, which would perform similar functions to the GATT trade centre. Duplication of service would likely make one or the other expendable. Wyndham White was determined that the centre would remain within GATT. As a Canadian official reported, most developing countries offered the trade centre "their warmest support…as offering an immediate, unique and concrete opportunity to help solve some of their difficulties in the export field". Rather than compete with UNCTAD, Wyndham White proposed that they share responsibility for the trade centre, with an appropriate division of labour, responsibilities, and costs. Although Wyndham White anticipated difficulty negotiating a satisfactory joint arrangement, GATT made few concessions, none of which weakened the institution.[41] As for UNCTAD, its failure to establish a centre of its own confirmed for some that it was restricted in what it could do.[42] Prebisch began to talk about GATT–UNCTAD relations in terms of "partnership not rivalry".[43]

Development and the Kennedy Round, 1964–1967

When Wyndham White had appeared before UNCTAD, he had held out the Kennedy Round as an opportunity to redress the disadvantages of developing countries in world trade. Certainly, the round began more auspiciously for developing countries than any previous round. A series of ministerial resolutions noted that "every effort" would be made to lower barriers to the exports of developing countries; the goal of the round was to lower tariffs by 50 per cent, but this threshold should be exceeded on items affecting developing country products; special attention would be paid to tropical products; and, finally, developed countries would accept asymmetrical exchanges of concessions in negotiations with developing countries.[44]

Developing countries were especially eager to liberalize trade in agricultural commodities and tropical products like coffee, tea, cocoa, bananas, oilseeds, and timber. But this was an especially difficult sector to liberalize, for several reasons. Although the original idea had been to include agriculture in the GATT, it had proved to be an exception. Moreover, tariffs were not the only way to block imports: internal charges raised prices, making these commodities uncompetitive. The GATT's reach was beginning to extend beyond tariffs, but it lacked authority to proscribe internal mechanisms to curb competition. Finally, developing countries did not constitute a bloc. According to the Yaoundé Convention, the EEC extended preferential tariffs on tropical products to developing countries in Africa. The recipients of these preferences refused to share their advantage with other developing country competitors. They went so far as to call for increased tariffs against some developing countries. The EEC therefore did not make many concessions. American concessions on tropical products were contingent on comparable EEC offers. As these were not forthcoming, the United States made few concessions.[45] Although there were a few significant reductions, they affected less than 50 per cent of the volume of trade in tropical products. Moreover, internal charges remained in place against such vital commodities as tea, coffee, cocoa, bananas, and spices.[46]

Developing countries were also eager to liberalize trade in textiles, an area in which they had achieved a globally competitive position but faced insuperable protectionist barriers. Governments like the United States, Canada, Britain, and France complained of market disruption, and they restricted the amount and type of cotton and wool textiles that could gain access to their markets. The main concern was about domestic unemployment for unskilled workers who would only with great difficulty find new jobs. Far from being weak and needy, developing countries were portrayed as aggressors. Before the round began, the Long Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) had been concluded, in effect for five years: although it ostensibly encouraged developing countries to establish efficient textile production, it really privileged domestic market stability and permitted participating governments to introduce restrictions against cotton textiles if such imports "cause or threaten to cause disruption in the market of the importing country".[47]

During the Kennedy Round, developed countries wanted to renew the LTA for five more years. Developing countries demanded more far-reaching tariff reductions and larger quotas for cotton textiles as conditions for accepting the renewal of the agreement. Duties on cotton

textiles were reduced by 21 per cent, but quotas were only slightly enlarged; the arrangement on textiles was renewed. The negotiations over textiles showed the unwillingness of industrialized countries to make concessions to developing members of GATT, despite the expectation that the Kennedy Round would be a breakthrough for trade and development. The benefits of global economic growth were set aside in favour of maintaining stable levels of employment in uncompetitive industries in developed countries.

American officials nonetheless insisted that the Kennedy Round brought real benefits and opportunities to the exports of developing countries. The average decrease of tariffs on developing country exports was 29 per cent, but this was lower than the overall average reduction of 35 per cent achieved in the negotiations.[48] Washington valued its concessions to developing countries at $900 million, although privately officials admitted that "the LDC's got less from the Kennedy Round than did the DC's" and that developing countries were "at a relatively greater disadvantage in world trade after the Kennedy Round than they were before".[49]

Developing countries concluded that they had few reasons to celebrate. Jose Encinas, the representative from Peru, speaking on behalf of an informal group of developing countries, expressed their collective disappointment. Those trade questions of greatest interest to developing countries – tropical products, commodity agreements, the removal of non-tariff barriers, and immediate implementation of concessions to developing countries – were not addressed. The result, Encinas explained, was that the developing countries "are not in a position to share, to the same extent, the satisfaction of the developed countries at the conclusion and the achievements of the Kennedy Round".[50] Eight developing countries opted out of tariff reductions and eight more did not sign the final agreement.

Conclusions

In 1953, the government of Haiti had written an optimistic memorandum about how liberalism and the GATT would benefit the least economically developed nations. It decried the clash of interests between North and South that had undermined the International Trade Organization. It upheld the fundamental premise of liberalism that all would sink or swim together: "[A]ll the nations of the world are adversely affected by a general clogging of the main channels of trade whereas they benefit by their expansion." The memorandum went on to assert that North–South

incompatibility was superficial and insisted that "there is no such thing, within the GATT, as two groups of diametrically opposed interests, let alone two contending parties".[51] Haiti's conception of international trade was appealing, but in practice the divide between North and South ran deep.

Institutional insecurity was crucial to GATT's foray into the complex world of development. In the first 20 years of its existence, GATT was regularly denounced and disparaged. There were repeated suggestions (sometimes linked to Cold War rivalry) to replace GATT with a truly universal trade organization. Institutional vulnerability fortified the position of developing countries that wanted the benefits of world trade to be shared more equally. Their economic case also had merit. Poverty was not conducive to the growth of world trade. Raising standards of living in poor countries would turn them into better consumers down the road. If the support of developing countries was crucial to GATT's institutional vitality, and the logic of development was convincing, then why was so little meaningful action taken to use international trade to stimulate the export activities of developing countries?

Part of the explanation lies in the workings of an international organization like the GATT. Although American records describe developing countries as a "real factor in world politics" by the mid-1960s, they were not a real force.[52] Wyndham White noted that "international institutions are as effective as the Governments which constitute them".[53] For the developed members of GATT, there was never enough political will or collective pressure to compel them to use trade as a tool of development, particularly if that meant their trade might be adversely affected in the short term. Nor could developing members of GATT parlay their numbers into influence within GATT, usually because they did not constitute a cohesive bloc. They competed with one another for advantages that they were reluctant to apply generally. They had different priorities and needs, which further diluted their ability to act as a unit within GATT. Furthermore, despite the one member, one vote system within GATT, all were not equal. The United States and the EEC emerged as leaders within GATT and, without their support, there could not be real progress on this question. Thus, the purpose and scope of GATT did not change to accommodate new members and new priorities. As Mohammed Ayoob observed, newly independent countries joined existing international institutions in the hope of redistributing "the world's resources and capabilities". But their participation paradoxically upheld norms, practices, and rules that had not been designed with their aims in mind.[54] This was the legacy of not being present at the creation.

The problem cannot be entirely explained in terms of the rigidity of institutional design. There was also a clash of conceptions of international trade. The advocates of freer trade believed that it produced meaningful results that would eventually generate widespread benefits. Freer trade should come first and development would follow. The universalizing and positivist outlook of modernization theory underpinned this view.[55] The champions of development disagreed because the benefits of liberal trade were not only deferred but were distributed unevenly, and the compound result was to entrench their economic marginality in the global trade system. They insisted that liberal trade did not work for them; freer trade was not fair. Systemic exploitation was central to this view and the policy implications that derived from it.[56] They argued that promoting domestic economic growth would increase the flow of globally traded goods in the long run. In reply, the supporters of liberal trade doubted that increasing their exporting opportunities would address the deeply rooted domestic causes of underdevelopment. There was a fundamental impasse, even though there was a shared belief that economic growth to overcome poverty and offset economic inequality was desirable and realizable.[57] At the heart of the impasse was the belief that trade created winners and losers. Domestic accountability informed political rhetoric in which countries positioned themselves as either winners or losers in trade negotiations and the global trade system. A presentist, politically guided, and zero-sum reckoning polarized the development and liberal conceptions of international trade. As a result, GATT was not a particularly effective agent of economic development even though the North–South cleavage was deeply impressed upon it.

Notes

1. See Francine McKenzie (2002), chapter 7 for an account of the negotiations. See also Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes (2008, chapter 1) and Thomas W. Zeiler (1999, chapters 5–8).
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3. Article 8, UN Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, 1948, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_E/legal_E/havana_E.pdf accessed 18 January 2014.
4. GATT: ITO/188: Statement by Muller, President of the Delegation of Chile, 21 March 1948; GATT: ITO/187: Speech at the 17th Plenary Meeting on Behalf of the Delegation of Colombia by H. E. Dr. Fulgencio Lequerica Veles, Minister of Colombia, 20 March 1948.

5. GATT: ITO/188: Statement by Muller, 20 March 1948.

6. GATT: ITO/212: Speech by Coombs, Head of the Australian Delegation Before Final Plenary Session, 22 March 1948.

7. GATT: ITO/194: Statement by Clayton, Chairman, Delegation of the United States of America, 23 March 1948.

8. For a discussion of why this happened, see Richard Toye (2003), Zeiler (1999, chapter 11) and Susan Ariel Aaronson (1996, chapter 8).

9. For a short but comprehensive biography of Wyndham White, see Francine McKenzie (2012), http://www.ru.nl/politicologie/koppeling/reinalda/io-bio-biographical/ accessed 18 January 2014.

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14. Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS] 1955–1957, vol. IX, (Washington, 1987) Draft Report by the Acting Chairman of the Delegation to the Ninth Session of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Brown), p. 97.

15. GATT: W.P./32: Balance of Payments Import Restrictions, Statement by the Indonesian Representative at the Meeting on Saturday, 30 November 1954.

16. GATT: W.9/115: Report of Sub-Group 1-B, (Balance of Payments Restrictions), Declaration by the French Delegation at the meeting of 17 December 1954. Historical Archives of the European Union [HAEU]: Olivier Wormser Papers from Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Français, MAEF000068 reel 158: Note pour Monsieur Clappier, object: Le nouveau GATT et l'Union française', 25 mars 1955.

17. FRUS 1955–1957, vol. IX: Draft Report by the Acting Chairman of the Delegation to the Ninth Session of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 9 March 1955, p. 100 and Michael Hoffman (1954)

18. GATT: SR.9/19: Summary Record of the 19th meeting, 17 November 1954.

19. FRUS 1955–1957, vol. IX: Draft report, 9 March 1955, p. 101.

20. GATT: SR.9/15: Summary record of the 15th Meeting, 22 November 1954.

21. "Review of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade", 8 November 1954–1947 March 1955, Australia. A copy is in National Archives Record Administration, Maryland [hereafter NARA]: RG43: General records of the Dept of State – International Trade Files, Box 278, file Australia.

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28. GATT: L/1162: Third Progress Report of Committee III on Expansion of Trade, 27 April 1960.
29. GATT: L/1321: Fourth Progress report of Committee III on Expansion of Trade, 18 October 1960.
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8

A Club of the Rich to Help the Poor? The OECD, "Development", and the Hegemony of Donor Countries

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Contrary to what a cursory review of the development literature would suggest, this chapter argues that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – often dubbed the "club of the rich" – was an important actor in the emerging international field of development aid that has unduly been neglected in scholarly research. During the 1960s in particular, the OECD was highly influential and, one could argue, at least as important as other international organizations such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). But although OECD figures such as official development assistance (ODA) are used in most studies dealing with development and its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is mentioned abundantly, the OECD's work on development cooperation has not received much attention in historical or political science literature. The literature is limited to several accounts by former OECD staff on the OECD's development work, which although an informative and essential source of information is outdated and partly apologetic;[1] and to several articles or book chapters from political science authors on aspects of OEEC development work and on the role of the DAC, focusing particularly on the period since the late 1980s.[2]

The negligence of the OECD's development work in the literature can arguably be attributed to the OECD's lack of legal power or economic sanctioning mechanisms and to its relative invisibility in current public debate on development issues. Due to the OECD's mode of governance,

relying almost exclusively on soft power mechanisms, the OECD has generally escaped the limelight of historical and political science scholars who have focused, in the realist tradition of International Relations, on traditional forms of economic and political power. This started to change only after the constructivist turn. Furthermore, the fact that, in the development field, the OECD's influence abated somewhat in the 1970s and 1980s, while other international organizations, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, becoming the targets of heated public and scholarly debate might have contributed to a distorted evaluation of the past.[3]

The so-called *rich man's club* was – with regard to "helping" the poor – significant in several ways. Firstly, the OECD was instrumental in making development aid a normal function of a modern state. Through the production and diffusion of the relevant knowledge, policy ideas, and aid standards, the OECD helped in turning its member states – who as members of the OEEC had only recently been the recipients of the first large-scale aid project, the Marshall Plan – into a community of donors, sharing a more or less coherent doctrine on aid questions. Secondly, the OECD's efforts at coordinating the aid flows of the capital-exporting countries in relation to other international capital flows and balance-of-payments questions were a vital contribution to the emergence of the aid regime. Thirdly, the OECD established some of the most influential norms, standards, and benchmarks in the development field, most importantly with regard to what counts as public aid and how much aid a modern industrialized country is supposed to give. Fourthly, the OECD produced, particularly in the 1960s, some of the best comparative data, in particular on the economies of developing countries and on flows of public and private aid. And, finally, interpreting the OECD as a central site of the global emergence of development aid does justice to the perspective of historical actors within the OECD, but also in the national administrations. Not only did some of the most highly recognized development economists work within the OECD Secretariat or at the OECD Development Centre but, more importantly, in the early 1960s it was not yet decided which international organization would emerge as the global aid institution that the World Bank would become in the course of the 1970s and 1980s. The fact that the OECD focused on the coordination of aid and the setting of aid standards and did not get involved in operational aid activities was the result of heated controversies in the early 1960s that could have turned out differently.

These aspects will be described in more detail in the following pages, focusing on the early history of the OECD's development work,

particularly the historical emergence of development-related poli-
cies within the OECD's predecessor, the Organisation for European
Economic Co-operation (OEEC), and on the role of the OECD in the
development field. The emphasis will be on the 1960s since, in the area
of development, the OECD was particularly important in the years after
its founding in 1961. From the mid-1970s onwards, the OECD lost some
of its influence and power, mostly due to the adoption of some of its
key functions by other international organizations such as the World
Bank. As Miriam Camps has noted in her review of the "'First world'
relationships" of OECD development work, by 1975 the World Bank
was providing "much of the necessary research, coordination, setting of
standards, goals etc., that came mainly from the DAC a decade ago".[4]
Furthermore, since the 1980s the importance of non-DAC donors has
increased considerably, making the rules and standards discussed within
and adopted by DAC – what has been called the "DAC-Ability" – progres-
sively less important.[5] The arguments in this chapter are not formulated
as fully advanced historical arguments backed by a sufficiently sound
source-based analysis. Rather, the aim is to open up a prolific field for
future scholarship by formulating some preliminary research hypotheses
on the role and functioning of the OECD in the field of development.

The OEEC and the emergence of development

The issue of development had been at the heart of the OEEC since its
inception. Founded in 1948 to administer the distribution of Marshall
Plan aid and promote the liberalization of payments and trade within
Western Europe, its raison d'être was the planned intervention and
provision of US capital to advance reconstruction in the war-damaged
European economies. The European Recovery Program (ERP) – despite
all the scholarly controversies on its underlying motives and actual
impact – has become the master narrative for much of the thinking about
the "development" of the postcolonial world. This connection between
the Marshall Plan and the concepts of development assistance has been
particularly close within the OEEC/OECD, where the idea of replicating
the Western Europe miracle of economic growth became central when
the organization was reorganized in 1960 and 1961. But even before,
during the 1950s, the OEEC became active in the emerging field of
development economics and in activities of financial and technical
assistance. Three areas of activity can be distinguished: First, discussions
and coordination of aid policies among the European colonial powers
within the so-called Overseas Territories Committee (OTC); second,

development initiatives aimed at the "underdeveloped" member countries of the OEEC; and, third, statistical work.

The work of the OEEC on overseas development was related to the broader issues underlying the Marshall Plan – the reconfiguration of an international order that would bind the United States, Western Europe, and the Third World together and would solve the main international economic problem of that time – the so called dollar gap. The dollar earnings in Europe had almost ceased due to a breakdown of trade with the Soviet bloc, colonial insurgency in Vietnam and Indonesia, and deteriorating terms of trade. In this context, the OEEC's and ECA's policies towards the colonized territories were geared towards providing both markets for European exports and, more importantly (through their raw material exports), a source of dollars enabling Western Europe to finance its imports from the United States.[6] The main task of the OTC was the integration of the colonies in the newly emerging growth regime of Western Europe, reinforcing the export-oriented development model so characteristic of traditional European colonization, but opening the colonies to US investment and the US market. The OTC was comprised of the colonial powers, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom, and argued that it was "as much in the interests of the peoples of the Overseas Territories as those of the peoples of Europe that the economies of the participating European countries should, within the shortest possible time, be reconstructed".[7] The core of OTC work in the early 1950s was a cooperative program to ensure the "selective expansion" of dollar-earning production in the colonies and the corresponding channelling of Marshall Plan aid to the colonies. From 1948 to 1952, almost 8 per cent of Marshall Plan funds were channelled to the overseas territories, coordinated by the OTC, whose role thereafter diminished.[8] The OTC also did some explorative work on technical aid, publishing studies on investment (1951), the organization of "indigenous agriculture" (1953), energy (1953), processing industries (1958), tax incentives for foreign private capital investments (1958), and on "the general problem of economic growth".[9] In these studies the colonies were discussed mainly in the light of the particular needs of the metropole. An internal UK report stated that it was "not until…1955 that more attention was paid to the problems peculiar to the underdeveloped areas themselves".[10] Development aid within the OEEC thus emerged – as in national administrations and at the European level – out of the colonial apparatus.[11] The degree of colonial cooperation and the impact of the OEEC studies were, however, rather limited. The emerging development field was organized primarily on a national level, the

United Nations had become an important site for the production of developmental knowledge and practices, and the importance of the OTC continuously faded as the era of colonial decline progressed.[12]

But the OEEC's development work was not just concerned with the overseas countries of the Global South conventionally associated with the development enterprise. From the beginning, the Marshall Plan – the efforts aimed at European economic integration – and in particular the initiatives of the European Productivity Agency (EPA) were aimed at the development of what were then framed as the "underdeveloped member countries", or as "member countries with underdeveloped areas". Special attention to the problems of the poor member countries of the OEEC became an important issue from the mid-1950s onwards, when decolonization started to open up a new Cold War arena, and the OEEC experienced rapidly diverging living standards in Europe. In this situation, Southern European countries – most importantly Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Spain (from 1960) – pressured the organization for special programs to benefit poor regions in Southern Europe. They were supported by the international bureaucrats within the OEEC searching for a new purpose for their organization.[13] The logic was simple. Deputy Secretary-General Guido Colonna, proposing to transform the EPA, the operational body of OEEC that comprised more than half of its budget, from an agency in which US capital and technical assistance helped Europe into one channeling Northern European aid to Southern Europe.[14] This proposal, supported by the United States and championed by Italy, which hoped to receive funding for the development of its Mezzogiorno, was adopted by the council in November 1955, and the EPA shifted its focus from introducing the newest United States' productivity-enhancing techniques and methods, to enabling poor regions to catch up. Bent Boel has described one particularly original element of this program: the setting up of pilot zones, trial and demonstration areas in Italy, Greece and Turkey, in which the OEEC tested methods for the promotion of economic growth.[15]

These development efforts were a contested issue within the OEEC, most importantly due to the ambivalent position of the poor member countries in the "club of the rich". For example, their official classification as "underdeveloped areas" was criticized as stigmatizing and so later was changed to "areas in the process of economic development", thus dividing *member* countries receiving development assistance from the *developing* countries of the Global South.[16] Furthermore, in the mid-1950s the European countries receiving aid successfully resisted attempts to turn the OEEC into a global aid agency, which would have

diverted funds they had hoped to receive through the OEEC. When the Soviet Union started its "economic offensive" in 1956, there were intense discussions, especially between the United States and the UK, about the distribution of work between NATO and the OEEC to counter the Soviet offensive.[17] In these debates, development aid was already envisaged as a possible emerging task for the OEEC, but – mainly due to Southern European opposition, especially from Greece and Turkey,– it was not until the late 1950s that this idea was again taken up.[18] In the context of the Free Trade area negotiations in 1957 and 1958, European developing countries successfully pressured for longer-term, higher financial assistance than the underdeveloped countries. They argued that they could not play a full part in any free-trade association, or in the common defence effort, unless arrangements were made that would guarantee them "a satisfactory rate of economic development" and would "reduce the growing difference…within the Western alliance".[19]

The third area of OEEC activity in the development field was comparative statistical work. On the one hand, the OEEC spearheaded early efforts in measuring the financial "contribution" of Western countries to the development of the Global South. The first review, finished in 1955, compared the amount of private and public capital transfers as a percentage of GNP at factor cost: It revealed relatively high contributions for the colonial powers and the United States (France 1.5 per cent, UK 0.8, Netherlands 0.8, Belgium 0.7, United States 0.41), and relatively low contributions for other countries (Germany 0.3, Italy 0.1, Norway 0.03, Sweden 0.01).[20] On the other hand, the OEEC statistical branch contributed to the development of national income accounting techniques, enabling international comparisons (especially the development of Purchasing Power Parity) and on national accounting techniques suited for the African context.[21]

The foundation of the OECD and its "Donor's Club"

While the development efforts described in the previous sections were only a relatively small part of OEEC work, development moved to the centre in the context of reorganizing the OEEC and the foundation of the OECD. After the OEEC's two main tasks had been successfully accomplished in the mid-1950s – European reconstruction through Marshall Plan aid and the liberalization of intra-European payments – and further progress in the field of European integration and trade liberalization was faltering due to British–French disagreements, the OEEC was in a deep crisis which fundamentally called into question its future existence. At

the same time, several initiatives were demanding closer transatlantic economic cooperation to counter the Soviet economic offensive and cope with the powerful assertion of the South as an independent bloc, one which started to use its power in the United Nations. Around the year 1960, rich countries lost their majority and thus their ability to dominate the United Nations.[22] In this context, the idea emerged to transform the OEEC into an Atlantic organization (with the United States and Canada as new members) that would focus on two crucial tasks on the economic front of the Cold War: the coordination of Western responses to the business cycle to foster economic growth, and the setting up of aid programs to meet the demands of developing countries. The idea was first formulated in June 1959 by a petition to the Atlantic Congress of 157 internationally known figures, then taken up by Jean Monnet and top commission circles, and after some negotiations was supported by the US administration. At a four-power summit in December 1959, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, French President Charles de Gaulle, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer initiated a process through which, in the following year, the OECD was founded, more or less along these lines.[23] Building on the development work of the OEEC, the OECD (established in September 1961) stated as one of its main tasks the promotion of policies "to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in the process of economic development".[24] The importance generally attached to the development function of the new organization was symbolically accentuated by the inclusion of the word "Development" in its title.

Yet, even before the OECD was formally established, the independent Development Assistance Group (DAG) was founded at a Special Economic Committee meeting in Paris in January 1960. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the UK, the United States, and the Commission of the EEC formed the DAG as a group of "capital exporting countries" to "meet together and discuss various aspects of co-operation in their efforts" and to consult with multilateral bodies such as the IBRD and the European Investment Bank (EIB).[25] Japan was immediately invited, and the Netherlands participated in the group from July 1960. At the Ministerial Conference on the Reorganisation of the OEEC in July 1960, it was decided that development would become one of the major goals of the new organization, and that the DAG would be transformed into the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), properly situated within the OECD committee structure.[26] Other countries joined DAC later: Norway (1962), Denmark (1963), Sweden (1965), Austria (1965), Australia (1966),

Switzerland (1968), Finland (1975), New Zealand (1973), Ireland (1985), Spain (1991), Greece (1991), and Luxemburg (1992).

The rationale for the OECD's development work in the DAG was summarized at its fourth meeting, in London, in March 1961 by US representative George W. Ball: "Without substantial outside help there is small chance that most less-developed countries (LDCs) will achieve rapid economic growth in freedom. Only by the hope and reality of achieving an adequate level of growth will they be able to turn their energies toward constructive purposes. If they are frustrated in this – if progress proves a delusion – then their energies will be diverted to purposes which are not only self-destructive, but destructive of our whole Free Society."[27] Alongside this attempt to tie the South to the West through a capitalist growth path financed by capital from the OECD countries, the other main rationale lay in the field of international payments imbalances. The United States, and to a lesser extent the UK, were running increasingly large balance-of-payments deficits that threatened the long-term stability of the monetary system set up at Bretton Woods. Arguing that both the military and the economic aid front of the Cold War were the collective responsibility of the OECD countries, the United States used the DAC to advance its strategy of "burden-sharing": The aim was to push up the capital exports of the surplus countries, especially Germany and Japan, by increasing their aid burden. This balance-of-payments factor – often neglected in the literature on the emergence of the global aid regime – was very successfully coordinated within DAC and the Economic Policy Committee's Working Party 3 (WP 3).[28] At its fourth meeting, the DAG also adopted "Resolution of the Common Aid Effort", which set out the basic premises and the framework within which the work of the DAC would evolve over the next decades. The two main goals set out in the resolution were that member countries should "secure an expansion of the aggregate volume of resources made available to the less-developed countries and to improve their effectiveness".[29] It implied that the aims and motives of the donors were, as Rubin has argued, "if not identical, at least compatible".[30]

However, the founding of the DAG and DAC was highly controversial from the beginning. Developing countries had pressed for the founding of a global aid agency under the democratic control of all UN member countries, and they were disenchanted by its establishment under the auspices of the exclusive OECD.[31] The poorer OECD member countries, defending their privileges, criticized the exclusion of aid recipients, with Greece and Turkey dubbing the DAG a "capitalist club".[32] Greece only conceded under extreme pressure to the formation of a "Donor's Club"[33]

and only after the "pressure group" of underdeveloped member countries had secured, with the support of the Benelux countries and the United States, special support programs within the framework of the OECD.[34] The neutral countries, especially Sweden and Switzerland, were anxious about the close association between aid and the Cold War and were thus very cautious about the inclusion of development work into the OECD. Thorkil Kristensen reassured them that the OECD would be "careful in choosing the words to avoid presenting the [development] activity as a weapon in the East/West contest for influence in the underdeveloped world".[35]

Furthermore, in the first years of DAC work there were two diverging views of its tasks. The "Little DAC doctrine", advocated by the French, Belgians and British, argued that the DAC was important as an exclusive donor's club, and that it should therefore not deal with individual country problems. The "broader DAC" approach, on the other hand, supported by the United States, Germany, Canada, the Scandinavians, the Netherlands, and Austria, pushed for more operational activities, individual developing country reviews and generally a larger role for the DAC. The small donor countries supported this view because they aimed at using the DAC as a source of information and analysis on less-developed countries which they could not provide themselves due to their limited resources and lack of expertise.[36] And the US administrations were anxious to turn DAC into an "operational" body, a real aid agency that would collectively finance developing countries "by organising syndicates of its members to make common grants or loans". However, in the face of European insistence not to duplicate the work already being performed by other international aid organizations, this "grandiose vision...proved a fantasy".[37] While the OECD was engaged in some operational aid activities, most importantly administering aid consortia for Greece and Turkey, the main tasks remained the coordination of Western aid through soft-power mechanisms. Before taking a closer look at the rather peculiar role of the OECD in the development field, the following section will sketch the institutional set-up.

Institutionalizing hegemony: The DAC and the Development Centre

The heart of OECD development work was and still is the DAC, which has been established as a rather special committee within the OECD structure. First, it is one of the three committees with restricted membership, excluding some OECD member countries. Together with the Committee

on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT) and the EPC's WP 3, DAC thus constitutes the heart of the OECD work, valued most by the larger and more powerful member countries. Secondly, it is the only committee with a full-time chair, with an office in Paris, which is not under the administrative supervision of the secretary-general, thus giving it more autonomy with regard to the OECD.[38] The chairman is further entitled to publicly present opinions of the DAC without prior approval from the OECD Council. Thirdly, the DAC is structurally dominated by the United States – the chair was paid for by the United States and was until 1999 always a US national. The first chairman, James Riddleberger, was the former director of USAID, and all the following chairs were closely connected to the US aid bureaucracy.[39] Formally, DAC operated on a unanimity rule, but the "Big Four" and most importantly the United States de facto dominated the DAC through the chairman, negotiations behind closed doors, and the establishment of a small steering group. In 1965, the US permanent representative to the DAC conceded that "any proposal which has the full support of the US, the U.K., France, and Germany will be accepted by the DAC. In practice, any proposal which has the vigorous support of the US and any two of the others will probably be accepted – though perhaps in a modified form."[40] The DAC holds several meetings a year and has traditionally organized a yearly high-level meeting attended by ministers, which at times was held in the capitals of member countries to increase the visibility of its work. It closely collaborates with other international development organizations, which regularly attend all its meetings. The raison d'etre of DAC was – and this is highlighted in many documents on its foundation – the creation of an exclusive forum for the rich Western countries, in which they could advance a common view of global development issues and could, undisturbed by nations from the Global South, coordinate their development work, also with regard to broader international forums such as the IBRD or the UN. As stated in a UK dispatch, the DAC is an "essential organ in which, untrammeled by hysterical speeches from the Afro-Asian bloc or subversive maneuvers from behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains, the Western Powers can study the real substance of aid problems in all objectivity and think out a coordinated line to take at New York and Geneva."[41] By constituting itself as a donor's club, the DAC excluded those who were most affected by what it discussed. The participation of recipients or independent experts has never been seriously considered, although such proposals were discussed when it was set up.[42] When some developing countries approached the secretary-general for aid, the UK delegation made it plain that since "the D.A.C.

is…a donor's club [i]t must be for the donors, not the potential recipients to decide whether aid to particular countries should be discussed at all and, if so, which countries should be the subject of discussion".[43] At the same time, DAC members were aware that the new forum looked "very much like a selfish club of the 'haves' from which the 'have nots' were excluded".[44]

Besides the DAC, the OECD in 1963 established the Development Centre, first proposed by the Kennedy administration in 1961, with a mandate to "bring together the knowledge and experience" on the growth process and the economic policies in "participating countries" and to "to adapt them to the needs of countries or regions in the process of economic development".[45] The mere fact that some of the most influential development economists, such as Angus Maddison, Herbert Giersch, Edmond Janssen, Göran Ohlin, Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky and Maurice Scott, worked at the Development Centre (in Paris) demonstrates the importance of this think tank.[46] The Development Centre was politically more diverse and less exclusive in relation to the Global South. Still, although economists from the Global South, such as Arthur Lewis, Jagdish Bhagwati or Padma Desai, were invited to research for a few weeks at the Centre, all the senior staff were economists from OECD countries. One of the main activities of the Centre during the first years was the deliberate attempt to transfer experiences of the OECD in the 1950s to the Global South, doing so mainly through productivity advice and through an extension of the work on educational planning by the Mediterranean Regional Project.[47] The Centre was also engaged in the systematic development, standardization and collection of national accounts for developing countries through the establishment of close contacts with and training of statistical offices in those countries.[48]

The development activities aimed at OECD member countries continued in the tradition of the OEEC and EPA, but their importance steadily decreased with the advancement of living standards in Southern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Particularly important were two aid consortia for Turkey and Greece and other programs of technical assistance to some of its less-developed members.[49] The "most successful operational activity of OECD", however, was in the early 1960s – the so-called Mediterranean Regional Project (MRP), in which the governments of Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia collaborated with the OECD on the improvement of education systems and on "human resource development".[50] This major exercise in the projection of educational needs of the growing economies, which produced a variety of influential publications on the planning of education and

economic growth, was extended in 1964–1968 to Latin America and the Middle East through a project financed by the Ford Foundation.[51]

Data, standards, and peers – OECD governance in the field of development

Drawing on constructivist and critical theories of International Relations (IR) and political science theorizing on the OECD, three mechanisms of global governance are particularly important to understand the OECD's role in development cooperation: production and standardization and diffusion of policy ideas and values; data generation; and policy evaluation.[52] All three contribute to the hegemony of donor countries in the field of "development". Firstly, through official publications, internal policy advice and "semi-academic prose",[53] the OECD presents visions and values, develops scenarios, defines guiding principles, frames topics and defines cause–effect-relationships. In this connection the OECD has been described as an ideational artist, arbitrator, and authority (Marcussen), as an "orchestrator of global knowledge networks" or as a "norm entrepreneur" (Porter/Webb).[54] The development work of the OECD helped in the diffusion of the state practice of public aid, turning it into a normal function of a developed capitalist free-market economy by defining the de facto ideal state, policies and good governance.[55] When the DAG was founded in 1960, no OEEC country had a central government department or ministry for assistance to independent countries, but most member countries established these in the early 1960s, starting in 1961 with France, the United States, Germany, Japan, and Sweden.[56] Furthermore, the OECD was – as Frank M. Coffin, US representative to the DAC explained – "attempting to arrive at a body of doctrine", which, when "the DAC nations accepted this concept as a major policy objective", would be applied to LDCs.[57] Studying this doctrine reveals the historical changes in what was the common aid philosophy from the donor perspective. For example, a summary by the secretariat of the debates of the first year of DAG's work until 1961 gives a clear account of the consensus within the rich countries club that would persist until the late 1960s. Firmly drawing on modernization theory, explicitly using language of Rostow's famous five-stage model, the report argued: "There is a general agreement that the object of financial assistance is to promote economic growth in underdeveloped countries to the point where this growth can proceed on a self-sustaining basis."[58] The universally accepted aim of donor countries' development policies, it explained, was to lift countries out of "stagnation" into "take-off" and, as fast as possible, into

"self-sustained growth". Poverty reduction was not only not the stated goal, but was explicitly sidelined in favour of a form of economic growth that would make government aid redundant and private loans profitable: "At this stage [of self-sustained growth], a country may still be underdeveloped in the sense of having a low income, but its capital needs may be fairly adequately met by stimulating a flow of lending on 'commercial' terms."[59] This consensus was diluted in the late 1960s and in the 1970s was transformed into a new doctrine. The so-called basic-needs approach advocated a critique of GDP growth as the primary goal of development policies – as the secretary general of the OECD, Emiel van Lennep, argued in early 1971, at the dawn of the second Development Decade; the realization that human welfare is not identical with economic growth was gaining in acceptance.[60] Furthermore, it was based on a critique of the trickle-down argument and put distributional questions and the employment problem at the centre of development debates. One of the first major research efforts to hollow out trickle-down confidence was a historical review of industrial and trade policies in developing countries undertaken by the Development Centre of the OECD. Observing the "evidence that standards of living in some rural areas have been declining although per capita income in the country concerned may have been increasing", they argued that under certain circumstances, "when the employment problem is already crucial, it may thus be necessary, to some extent, to be ready to sacrifice growth of output for more early employment".[61] After some years of considerable rethinking and insecurity, the DAC High Level Meeting 1977 adopted the "Statement on Development Co-operation for Economic Growth and Meeting Basic Human Needs", which countered more radical critiques of the growth focus of development aid by reframing basic needs as a productivity-oriented and growth-oriented approach.[62]

The second governance mechanism, *data generation*, describes the OECD's capacity to develop concepts and methods to assemble large sets of quantitative data that are – due to their standardization – internationally comparable and mostly available as comparable time series. OECD data – such as the ODA, the most commonly used denominator for the amount of aid given by donor states – are regarded as objective, neutral, and reliable. Mostly, they are represented as a ranking of countries, promoting a race to the top as a soft form of pressure, especially since the normative assumptions underlying the methods for data-generation and the statistical-comparative techniques are widely shared and have been developed collectively. The publication of OECD rankings are not only a test of the performance of its member states,

but often spark public debate and further a policy process of convergence towards what the ranking constructs as best practice. During the 1960s, the OECD and its Development Centre thus had, according to Angus Maddison, a better macroeconomic database on the developing world than did the World Bank.[63] But the key statistical task of DAG and DAC, especially in the beginning, was tracking the amount of development assistance. This was essential, since different definitions of aid and different methods of measuring it statistically made comparisons and any discussion about burden sharing impossible. For example, while in 1960 Germany claimed to have provided 3.4 billion DM of development aid in 1959, the US State Department calculated this to be only 500 million DM.[64] Furthermore, a lot of data was not published at all. Ball, head of the US delegation, moaned "the ex-colonial powers often kept secret the aid provided [to] their former dependencies". And, finally, a lack of adequate data about who gave what kind of aid and how much made aid coordination as well as effective Western efforts to "help [Third World countries] with their development planning" impossible.[65] The April 1961 OEEC report, *The Flow of Financial Resources to Countries in Course of Economic Development*, prepared at "breakneck speed", according to its lead author, Angus Maddison, provided the main guidelines used until the present by DAC in the collection of data from member countries.[66] But the OECD did not achieve a uniform definition of what could be declared as development assistance – merely collecting the data provided by national statistical offices, until in 1969 and 1972 the DAC adopted the concept of the ODA, which is still used today.[67] Since the definition was set by donors, its concessionality was rather limited, including as ODA all official flows with a "grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)", much less than demanded by developing countries but running counter to free-market arguments that all flows should conform to competitive market conditions.[68]

The core work of the DAC can best be described by the third governance mechanism, policy evaluation. The peer-review process, which was invented by the OECD and is now used by many other organizations, established critical auditing, detailed policy evaluation and justification of current trends among peer countries. On average, every three to four years each DAC member country is examined by a peer review process in which it must "open up" its policies to others in a rather long procedure of drafting and redrafting a jointly agreed-upon text that is then published, often accompanied by missions of secretariat staff to the capital. This highly elaborate procedure involves two other countries

being designated as "examiners", members of the OECD secretariat, the DAC chairman and the responsible authorities within the country that is examined. Over a period of more than a year the peer review runs through seven stages: (a) Preparation, (b) Visits to the Field, (c) Mission to the Capital, (d) Peer Review Meeting (e) Editorial Session, (f) Publication, and (g) Follow-up.[69] The reviews included a variety of aspects, such as the volume of aid, its geographical distribution, effectiveness and contribution to self-help, intentions for future changes in the aid flow, principal capital exporters, the internal coordination of aid within the country, and the coordination with other donors and international aid agencies. Ohlin described the aid review as the heart of DAC work and as an "exercise in shame tactics", by which aid officials show up for "the grilling".[70] Most commentators regard this form of "normative governance" through moral persuasion within a closed forum as the most effective form of OECD influence, often strengthening specific domestic factions within the executive. In the development context, Helge Pharo has shown how the pressure within the DAC was effective in strengthening Norwegian domestic actors involved in development assistance to increase aid flows in the 1960s, and similar cases can be made for Germany, Canada and Japan.[71] The review procedure was based on commonly agreed goals. One often mentioned aspect, already discussed in the DAG and later in the DAC, has been whether as a symbol of the rich countries' commitment to aid there should be targets for appropriate aid.[72] Within the DAG, discussions led to the assessment that development aid of 1 per cent of GNP was economically reasonable for the ten member countries collectively, depending on their economic strength and their magnitude of military spending.[73] In 1962, US delegation head, Ball, managed to persuade the Western governments to formally approve the goal of committing at least 1 per cent of their GNP to foreign aid.[74] Since, in these debates, the aid targets started to be expressed as a percentage of the donors' national income – first 1 per cent, later 0.7 per cent of GNP – they not only linked economic growth in the North to the "aid rush" but also made it a condition for the success of the development effort.[75]

Conclusion

Besides the functions of idea production, data generation, and peer evaluation, the basic task of DAC was to serve as a restricted forum for the donor countries, enabling them to coordinate their interests. This erupted after the first UNCTAD conference in 1964 in Geneva, which

had a major influence on the development work of the OECD. First, OECD countries were confronted with a common front of clearly artic- ulated demands for higher financial assistance, better terms of aid, access to markets, preferences, and international price manipulation for primary products. And, second, the focus on trade at UNCTAD created a sharp rift among OECD countries that were not able to find a common line.[76] In this "post-UNCTAD world", the only available body capable of developing "a positive common doctrine" of the rich Western countries to counter these demands was the OECD and its DAC.[77] Immediately, the Working Party on UNCTAD Issues was created (with Australia, New Zealand and Finland invited to participate as non-members), which examined systematically the issues raised at Geneva and worked towards harmonization.[78] Although there were rumours and fears in the Global South about "OECD countries seeming to 'gang up' on developing countries", for many years the G77 were better coordinated than OECD members.[79]

Already in the mid-1960s, criticism of DAC became paramount and many argued it was fundamentally failing its objectives. The reasons often mentioned in the ensuing debates among OECD bureaucrats, members of DAC and especially in the US administration, were that it could not legislate by majority vote and thus had to rely on the willing- ness of its member states; that it was too large for effective consensus formation; that its meetings were too numerous and not well prepared; and – most importantly – that among DAC members no agreement had been reached about the political objectives of aid. Although US aid was stagnating, the American representative to DAC complained in 1965 about the "distressing signals of reduced activity in Germany, retrench- ment in France, and glacial progress elsewhere".[80] The quantitative evolution of ODA reveals a very drastic increase of official development aid flows during the 1950s, peaking in 1961 at 0.54 per cent of GNP, then a continuous decline, especially from the mid-1960s onwards; there was a sharp drop in the early 1970s and, after some recovery, a stabilization at around 0.35 until the late 1980s, and then a further slow decrease. Although these trends have to be treated with caution, since the definitions of what is reported as ODA have changed, they reveal the general trends of development flows in the postwar period. The rela- tively high numbers for the early 1960s not only reflect the large contri- butions under the Kennedy Administration – US aid still accounting for 60 per cent of total DAC flows – but also the emergence of new donors and the accounting of British and French colonial expenditures as aid. Furthermore, the high ODA data for the 1950s and 1960s are the result

of the DAC practice of that time. Almost any flow, including commercial investments, conventional grants and purchases of multilateral bonds, were all sanctified as aid. Further qualifications were only introduced in 1969, after developing countries and economists such as Gunnar Myrdal had publicly criticized DAC.[81]

This chapter has argued that the development focus of the OECD emerged from its association with the European Recovery Program (ERP). The Marshall Plan not only became the intellectual master narrative for the global development enterprise that copied many of its institutional arrangements and guidelines, the very same organization which was founded for the self-monitoring of ERP aid, was in 1961 transformed into the world's pre-eminent donors club. However, while the OEEC received loans and grants on a highly concessional basis, and the recipients of aid monitored its distribution and use, these principles were not reproduced in the OECD. The DAC criteria for aid, set by the donors themselves, did not guarantee a flow of capital from the North to the South that was comparable in magnitude or concessionality to the Marshall Plan, but rather served as a long-term cause of the debt crisis of the Global South. Most importantly, DAC was an exclusive donors club, designed to suspend the voices of aid recipients. DAC countries thus not only captured the power to standardize the major development-related policy ideas, practices and data with all the relevant definitions and specifications, but they also monopolized the process of evaluating donor performance.

Notes

1. Seymour J. Rubin (1966), Milton J. Esman and Daniel S. Cheever (1967), Helmuth Führer (1996) and the various contributions in Jorge Braga de Macedo, Colm Foy, and Charles Oman (eds) (2002).
2. On the OEEC's Overseas Territories Committee, see Rik Schreurs (1997), on the EPA's pilot project in Sardinia, see Bent Boel (2003: 207–220). On the DAC, see Arne Ruckert (2008), Ken Masujima (2003), on the OECD, more generally see Peter Carrol and Aynsley Kellow (eds) (2011), Richard Woodward (2009) and Rianne Mahon and Stephen McBride (eds) (2008).
3. Furthermore, the OECD has not sponsored large and relatively independent research projects such as the UN Intellectual History Project or the World Bank History. Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis and Richard Webb (1997), Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij and Thomas G. Weiss (2009), John Toye and Richard Toye (2004), Shigehisa Kasahara, Charles Gore and Rubens Ricupero (2004) and Margaret G. De Vries (1976).
4. Miriam Camps (1975: 29).
5. Soyeun Kim and Simon Lightfoot (2011).

6. Robert Everett Wood (1986: 29–67).
7. OEEC, Report by the Overseas Territories Committee, part of the Interim Report on the Economic Recovery Program, 1948, esp. p. 10. Italy joined in 1950, when Somaliland was placed under its trusteeship, and Spain joined in 1959, when it became full member of OEEC. See also, Robert Everett Wood (1986: 55–60).
8. The OTC was created in 1949 "to carry out such surveys relating to the economic and social development of the Overseas Territories as may be entrusted to it by the Council, or in accordance with decisions taken by the Council". OECD Archive, C(49)37, Record of the Council Meeting, 28 March 1949. On the role of the OTC – going far beyond this official mandate – in balancing Europe's dollar-balance, see Rik Schreurs (1997).
9. OECD Archive in Paris (OECD Archive), OT/M(61)2, Overseas Territories Committee, Record of 73rd session, 4 July 1961, Annex I. Besides these, many unpublished reports were produced. On technical cooperation in Europe, see Isebill V. Gruhn (1971).
10. TNA, CAB 134/1293, M.A.C.(S.O.)(56)2, O.E.E.C. Activities in Under-developed countries, 24 April 1956. See also OECD Archive, C(56)36 and the Seventh Report. The OEEC studies, the report argued, focused exclusively on "the contribution which their [the overseas territories, MS] development makes to the maintenance of a high level of employment and production in the countries of Western Europe".
11. See, among many, Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (1997).
12. On the continuity between OTC and DAC, see the statement by Kristensen at the last OTC meeting, OECD Archive, OT/M(61)2, Overseas Territories Committee, Record of 73rd session, 4 July 1961.
13. Bent Boel (2003: 199–207). Unfortunately, these countries are neglected in Griffiths' volume on OEEC history, where only Italy is discussed, solely in relation to trade liberalization, cf. Richard T. Griffiths (1997).
14. The EPA, he argued "could now become the channel through which the knowledge gained by the more highly developed European countries would be directed towards the less advanced countries to help them in their economic and social recovery program". Colonna in December 1954, cited in Bent Boel (2003: 201).
15. Bent Boel has focused on the Sardinian Pilot Project in the late 1950s and early 1960s, cf. Bent Boel (2003: 207–220).
16. OECD Archive, OEEC C/WP26/W/21, "Activities of the EPA for Areas in the Process of Development", 1 January 1959; C(60)11, Secretary General's Report on Help for Underdeveloped Countries; C(60)123, Aid to Countries in Course of Economic Development. A Preliminary Study by the Secretariat, 23 June 1960.
17. See the files in TNA, CAB 134/1293 and CAB 134/1294. Thorp, the later chair of DAC, explained the main thrust of the counter offensive: "The most important objective for American policy must be to convince the underde-veloped countries that our interest is not in using them as pawns in the cold war, but rather in supporting their freedom and assisting in their own devel-opment." Willard L. Thorp (1956: 282).
18. In 1958, the NATO Committee of Economic Advisers discussed the possi-bility of channeling aid through the OEEC. At that time, especially Italy was advancing the idea of using the Marshall Plan repayments for multilateral

aid to the Middle East (the so-called Pella Plan), but it got little support from other countries. The OEEC Bureau discussed the situation on 12 May 1958, and confidentially decided that "the time was not ripe to launch this project into a wider forum", suspecting that "the Greeks and Turks would strenuously oppose any suggestion that funds should be utilized elsewhere than Europe". TNA, FO 371/134422, Rogers to Hudson, 4 June 1958. The UK was opposed as well, since it did not wish to "surrender any of our freedom of action to give such aid as we can give in the way we think best". TNA, FO 371/134422, Hudson to Potter, 6 June 1958.

19. TNA, FO 371/142426, M 107/2, J. A. Robinson, Assistance for the European Under-developed Countries, May 1959.
20. TNA, CAB 134/1294, M.A.C.(S.O.)(56)61, OEEC Report on contribution by Member and Associated countries to economic development in the less-developed areas of the world, 4 November 1956.
21. Peter H. Ady and Michel Courcier (1960). For the context of this debate, see Daniel Speich (2011).
22. Toye and Toye (2004).
23. See Richard Griffiths (1997). See also OEEC (1960).
24. OECD Archive, Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 14 December 1960.
25. Resolution on Development Assistance. Text adopted by the Special Economic Committee meeting in Paris on 13 January 1960, Annex I to OT/DI/225, The Development Assistance Group.
26. Annex II to OT/DI/225, Aid to Developing Countries. Resolution adopted at the Ministerial meeting on 23 July 1960, The Development Assistance Group.
27. *FRUS 1961–1963, vol. IX (Foreign Economic Policy),* Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, 17 March 1961: 214–217.
28. "We should continue to encourage further increases and reduce our aid correspondingly where this is possible. We must exert what influence we can on the distribution of aid extended by others so as to relieve or complement ours and assure maximum returns." *FRUS 1964–1968 IX,* Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk, 15 March 1963, 346–350; *FRUS 1961–1963,* vol. IX *(Foreign Economic Policy),* Memorandum for the Record, 23 February 1961: 199–200; more generally, see Irving B. Kravis and Michael W. S. Davenport (1963) and Jim Tomlinson (2003).
29. Resolution of the Common Aid Effort, adopted by DAG, 29 March 1961, London.
30. Rubin (1966: 5).
31. Ruckert (2008).
32. *FRUS 1958–1960, vol. VII (Part I, Western European Integration and Security, Canada)*, Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Burgess) and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State, 20 February 1961: 250–251.
33. TNA, FO 371/150087, Ellis-Rees to Foreign Office, 28 March 1960.
34. Greece had threatened not to sign the OECD Convention. TNA, FO 371/150525, M 5514/15, UK Delegation to OEEC to Foreign Office, 9 November 1960, Report on the meeting by Robert Hankey.

35. TNA, FO 371/150525, M 5514/17, UK Delegation to OEEC to Foreign Office, 13 November 1960. See also the material in TNA, FO 371/150525, M 5514/18.

36. *FRUS 1964–1968, IX (International Development and Economic Defense Policy; Commodities)*, Airgram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State, 6 November 1965: 339–341, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964–68v09/d113, date accessed 18 January 2014.

37. Jacob Kaplan, oral history interview, Georgetown University Library, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, 22 March 1999; George W. Ball (1982: 196).

38. The DAC depends for its work on the Development Cooperation Directorate, a rather small branch of the OECD secretariat (around 30 staff members), almost all of whom have been economists.

39. The other American chairmen were Willard L. Thorp (1963), Edwin M. Martin (1967), Maurice J. Williams (1974), John P. Lewis (1979), Rutherford M. Poats (1982), Joseph C. Wheeler (1986), Alexander R. Love (1991) and James H. Michel (1994).

40. *FRUS 1964–1968,* vol. IX, pp. 290–292, Letter From the Permanent Representative to the Development Assistance Committee (Coffin) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell), 8 January 1965; *FRUS 1964–1968,* vol. IX, Record of Executive Staff Meeting, Agency for International Development, 2 March 1965: 307–310.

41. TNA, T 312/859, Hankey, "The Future of the O.E.C.D.", 28 July 1964; see also TNA, FCO 69/227, Britten to Gallagher, Godden, Tickell and Graham, 22 January 1971.

42. See, for example, the proposal by the Belgian delegate to turn the OECD into an organization where developing countries and donor countries would meet, TNA, CO 852/1922, United Kingdom Note on the 70th Session of the OTC, 5 September 1960.

43. TNA, T 312/860, J. M. Bridgeman, "Future of D.A.C.", 21 September 1964.

44. TNA, FO 371/150075, Holliday, Memorandum: Future of O.E.E.C., 1 January 1960.

45. Cited in "The OECD Development Centre", The OECD Observer 12 (October 1963), 12. On the establishment, see OECD Archive, CES/62.19; see also C/M(62)5, 20 February 1962; C/M(62)9, 10 April 1962; C/M(62)17, 31 July 1962; C(62)144 and C(62)153; TNA, T 312/860, J. M. Bridgeman, "Future of D.A.C.", 21 September 1964 and Carl Kaysen (2002: 229–235).

46. Other famous economists who prepared studies published by the OECD or its Development Centre were Edward F. Denison, Trygve Haavelmo, Harry Johnson, Nicholas Kaldor, John Kendrick, Deepak Lal, Eric Lundberg, Amartya Sen, Jan Tinbergen, and John Vaizey. Cf., Angus Maddison (2002: 255), Deepak Lal (1972) and Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky and Maurice Scott (1970).

47. The transfer took place on different levels: For these operational activities, Buron engaged Rostislaw Donn who had worked at the EPA since 1957. Angus Maddison (2002: 239).

48. The first of dozens of volumes of this work, *National Accounts of Less Developed Countries, 1950–66*, appeared in 1968. This work involved several economists who had gained experience within the OEEC, most importantly Angus Maddison and Witold Marczewski. Maddison, for example, visited statistical

offices in Iran, Japan, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the USSR, where he explained the system and advised on necessary adjustments; see Angus Maddison (2002: 240) and see also Wilfred Beckerman (1966).

49. Thomas C. Kuchenberg (1967). These programs, a UK Treasury official commented, had "the merit of meaning that some of the smaller members receive tangible benefits from their membership of O.E.C.D. so avoiding the impression that it is run exclusively for the benefit of the richer and larger members". TNA, T 312/860, J. M. Bridgeman, "Future of D.A.C.", 21 September 1964.

50. Angus Maddison (2002: 255). See also OECD (1963: 17–28), Raymond Lyons (1964), OECD (1965) and Goran Ohlin (1968: 234).

51. Later, other development institutions were established in the framework of OECD, for example the Club du Sahel in 1976.

52. Cf., on this section: Kerstin Martens and Anja P. Jakobi (2010) and Richard Woodward (2009).

53. Martin Marcussen (2004: 105).

54. Martin Marcussen (2001), Martin Marcussen (2004) and Tony Porter and Michael Webb (2004); cf. also Rianne Mahon and Stephen McBride (2008).

55. Richard Woodward (2009: 7).

56. OECD (2006: 11–12).

57. *FRUS 1964–1968*, vol. IX: Memorandum of Conversation, 5 February 1965: 286–289. Kristensen argued in 1961 that the task of the OECD would be to develop what DAC countries lacked: "a well-defined integrated policy on the part of the Western world". OECD Archive, Thorkil Kristensen, "Work and Policies of the O.E.C.D.", Confidential Annex: Statement by Mr. Kristensen at the Council Meeting on Friday, 13 October 1961.

58. OECD Archive, DAG/WP(61)9, Relative Effectiveness and Terms and Conditions of the different types of financial assistance, 1 March 1961.

59. OECD Archive, DAG/WP(61)9, Relative Effectiveness and Terms and Conditions of the different types of financial assistance, 1 March 1961.

60. See also Paul Streeten (1979) and Norman L. Hicks (1979).

61. Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970: 6, 92). The project was conceived originally in late 1965, and the writing of the several volumes was completed at various points in time until 1969. During this period, it was the largest of the research projects undertaken by the OECD Development Centre. The main thrust of the study was to advance the free trade argument against import substitution strategies, and it can be seen as a precursor of neoliberal development strategies of the 1980s. See also the changing emphasis in Edwin M. Martin (1970: 13) and Edwin M. Martin (1971: 14).

62. OECD (2006).

63. Angus Maddison (2002: 253).

64. Douglas Dillon (1961).

65. Ball adds: "[N]or could we be sure that a recipient country was not using our aid merely to service its debts to Paris." George W. Ball (1982: 195).

66. Angus Maddison (1994).

67. OECD Archive, DAG/5, Doc 5, Fifth meeting of the DAG, Tokyo, 11–13 July 1961, Material on Economic Growth and the Impact of Foreign Capital in

Underdeveloped Countries. See also the different reports by the first DAG WP, "Working Party of the Development Assistance Group on survey of available data on financial development assistance flows to individual developing countries", especially OECD Archive, DAG/WP(61)8. See also Douglas Dillon (1961). Ball claims that the DAC never really managed to set an effective uniform definition of aid, see George W. Ball (1982: 196).

68. OECD (2006: 16). See also www.oecd.org.
69. The peer review procedure of DAC and the general characteristics of this method of policy coordination developed within the OECD is described and discussed in an internal OECD report. SG/LEG(2002)1, Fabrizio Pagani (2002) Peer Review: A tool for co-operation and change. An Analysis of an OECD Working Method, especially pp. 25–31, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/16/1955285.pdf, date accessed 18 January 2014.
70. Goran Ohlin (1968: 136–137).
71. TNA, T 317/1774, Development Assistance Committee – Background and Future, Memorandum attached to letter from Fair to Littler, 23 October 1968. Helge Pharo (2003) and Heide-Irene Schmidt (2003).
72. These discussions had started with a proposal by the World Council of Churches in 1958. But only the comparable data produced by the OEEC/OECD made real systematic efforts aimed at harmonizing the amount of aid possible. See Michael A. Clemens and Todd J. Moss (2007).
73. Douglas Dillon (1961). *FRUS 1961–1963,* vol. IX *(Foreign Economic Policy)* Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, 28 March 1961, pp. 220–224.
74. George W. Ball (1982: 486).
75. Helge Ø. Pharo and Monika Pohle Fraser (2008).
76. OECD (1965).
77. *FRUS 1964–1968,* vol. IX *(International Development and Economic Defense Policy; Commodities),* Airgram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State, 31 October 1964, pp. 256–258.
78. This WP seems to have functioned as an "antechamber" for the admission to OECD membership of Finland (1969), Australia (1971) and New Zealand (1973).
79. *FRUS 1964–1968,* vol. IX *(International Development and Economic Defense Policy; Commodities)*, Memorandum for the Files, 30 July 1964, pp. 249–252. Norway, for example, was sceptical and sometimes in opposition to the US attempts to use DAC to form a rich country front against the demands of UNCTAD. Helge Pharo (2003: 544).
80. *FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IX,* Letter from the Permanent Representative to the Development Assistance Committee (Coffin) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell), 8 January 1965, pp. 290–292.
81. For a contextualization of ODA flows, see Kunibert Raffer and Hans Wolfgang Singer (2001: 69–72).

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9

A "Global Nervous System": The Rise and Rise of European Humanitarian NGOs, 1945–1985

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Writing in 1978, *Manchester Guardian* columnist Harford Thomas described the rise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the second half of the twentieth century as an "awakening" and a significant shift in the socio-political sphere: "NGOs are evolving into a new and central organism in what is sometimes called the body politic. Together they form a network which I see as the emergence of a global nervous system."[1] At the heart of those changes lay the humanitarian aid and development sector. Going a step beyond the Amnesty International and the human rights movement guiding principle – that "individuals could change the policies of foreign governments" – humanitarian NGOs emphasized the power of "people-to-people" interaction.[2] In the process they contributed to a re-alignment of international relations towards a more globalized concept of international action. Their activities became so prominent – or at least their brands were so visible – that the 1980s earned the moniker "the NGO decade", in recognition of their lasting impact on the aid industry.[3]

But why did the 40 years after the end of World War II provide such fertile ground for the emergence of a European humanitarian NGO sector? And what role did states play in shaping non-governmental action? To answer these questions, this chapter combines an analysis of global currents of change with evidence from two national case studies: Britain and Ireland. Both states shared similar social and political structures, yet the expansion of the humanitarian sector in each case was shaped by contrasting local religious traditions, experiences of empire, and relationships with the developing world. The resultant differences

and shared experiences offer an important insight into the character and operation of European NGOs.

Their story can only be properly understood in a transnational context, as part of the international community that Mark Mazower described as "a rhetorical device, an empty box which successive generations filled with new content".[4] In the second half of the twentieth century, the principles of humanitarianism, development, aid and emergency relief were developed in, and projected into, that space. In the process these principles helped re-shape Western relationships with the outside world, from the UN to the state and civil society. This chapter describes these developments in terms of three phases of European humanitarianism. The first, postwar, phase took place against a decidedly Western backdrop. Its primary focus was on European reconstruction and the plight of European refugees; colonial concerns came second and were often the result of following the refugee trail to the Middle East and Asia. Access was plentiful – NGOs collaborated closely with, and learned from, international agencies such as the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Yet the boundaries of opportunity for the sector were still largely defined by the requirements of the Western international community. Once the immediacy of the crisis in Europe had dissipated, the NGOs' momentum proved difficult to sustain.

The second phase coincided with the emergence, at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the following decade, of a vocal, independent group of states from the Global South. Contemporary commentators and historians keen to impose unity on the "Third World" may have underplayed their heterogeneity, but the cumulative effect of their actions was to raise the profile of aid and development and to spark the beginnings of a global humanitarianism. Access was provided by a UN system keen to foster closer collaboration with private agencies. Opportunity came in the form of a renewed discussion of humanitarianism, particularly the focussed global campaigns offered by UN World Refugee Year (1959) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation's (FAO) first Freedom from Hunger Campaign (FFHC, 1960).

The third phase took those processes to another level. Between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s, NGOs benefited from the emergence of a truly global humanitarian effort – if still bearing the hallmarks of Western control. As the world's attention expanded to emphasize the problems of the Global South, NGOs adapted accordingly. The globalization of political models such as co-financing structures and an emphasis on reaching "the poorest of the poor" and of the emergency relief effort

brought NGOs access to the heart of the global humanitarian sector. A growing public and official conversation on issues such as economic interdependence and global structural reform, along with the search for appropriate forms of development, presented NGOs with the opportunities to stake a claim for a central role in this new humanitarianism. By the mid-1980s they had become fully integrated into, and displayed a brash confidence about their role in, the international system.

The importance of the state and, by extension, of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), in shaping this rapidly changing international agenda provides the core argument for this chapter. As Kim D. Reimann suggests, the explosion of NGO activity in the second half of the twentieth century owed much to greatly increased opportunities for expansion and heightened access to the levers of international action.[5] That states and IGOs were prominent in providing both implies that the emergence of the international non-governmental sector was not the simple, organic, bottom-up process that Thomas's "global nervous system" depicted. Instead, those who set the international humanitarian agenda also largely dictated its terms of engagement: from the relief and reconstruction efforts in postwar Europe to the NGO sector's response to calls for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s. The official co-option of NGOs into the aid system – through co-financing arrangements with governments and international agencies, for example – formalized that relationship still further. Yet, even where NGOs attempted to operate outside those boundaries, they constructed their identities in a framework dominated by states and IGOs. NGOs described themselves as separate from funding agencies, as an alternative, more effective form of aid and development, yet they were simultaneously conscious of their relatively minor role in the humanitarian industry. This chapter therefore ends with a simple but significant conclusion: only by appreciating the enduring importance of the state can we begin to unpack the complex relationships that emerged between actors at all levels of the international system in the second half of the twentieth century.

The origins of global NGO humanitarianism

World War II marked an important period in the transformation of non-governmental aid, development and disaster relief. There were precedents, of course: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC; founded in 1863); the philanthropic roles played by missionaries and colonial officials; the organizations such as the Save the Children Fund (SCF; 1919) and the Committee for Relief in Belgium

(1914) that emerged during and immediately after World War I. But the 1940s brought something appreciably different to the NGO sector. In simple, numerical terms the annual rate at which those organizations were founded showed a dramatic increase in the aftermath of the war and steady expansion thereafter until at least the mid-1980s.[6] A number of NGOs that later became leading players in the sector – including the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (founded in 1942 and later renamed Oxfam), Catholic Relief Services (CRS; 1943), World Relief (1944), CARE (1945), Church World Service (1946) and Lutheran World Relief (1946) – emerged in a short period during and immediately after the war. The war also provided a fillip to older organizations such as SCF, for whom it brought renewed receptiveness for what Ellen Boucher termed the "explicitly internationalist social consciousness" that had been drowned out by the state-centric ideologies of the 1930s.[7]

The growth of the NGO sector owed much to the emergence of a culture of international humanitarianism in the immediate postwar period. UNRRA, though short-lived (disbanded in 1947), instigated massive transfers of food, clothing, medicine and agricultural supplies and support for the rebuilding of infrastructure in Europe. The Marshall Plan foreshadowed the kind of co-operative effort between powerful donor and weaker recipient economies for the "development" of the latter and the economic benefit of the former. In January 1949 US President Harry Truman's inaugural address marked the formal beginning of the "Point Four" programme, a plan for massive economic and technical aid to the developing world. American efforts were matched by a growing concern with development on the part of the colonial powers. The British Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1940) and the French *Fonds d'investissement pour le développement économique et social d'outre-mer* (1946) imagined a new role for "development" in the imperial sphere. Further initiatives followed, from the Colombo Plan of aid for South Asia launched in July 1951 and sponsored by Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, to the provisions made in the 1957 Treaty of Rome for the assistance of territories "associated" with the six member states of the European Community (EC). By then, foreign aid had become an accepted currency of international relations.[8]

The impact of these state- and UN-led efforts was considerable. By making humanitarian aid and development a currency for action outside the European sphere (albeit one conducted in Western-dominated frameworks and largely on Western terms), they offered a template for policy-makers and the international community alike. The fortunes of the world's refugees were shaped by a variety of international agencies:

the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), the UNHCR, and the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). So, too, the nature and direction of the reconstruction efforts in Europe and beyond owed much to organizations like UNRRA, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the FAO. Equally important, UNRRA, its counterpart agencies and its successors introduced the concept of a "planned" humanitarian response, reliant on data collection and detailed analysis of everything from nutrition levels to access to health care and housing. Their field workers adopted an international outlook that some contemporary observers noted as "a remarkable novelty".[9] NGOs benefited accordingly. They worked with international agencies, won funding from them, learned their methods, and began to adopt their professional approach. In so doing they gained valuable experience and won increasing legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

Reflecting on these events in subsequent decades, NGOs emphasized their practical implications. The narrative was simple. Organizations initially focussed on emergency relief – Oxfam's response to the threat of famine in Greece, for example, or CRS's initial focus on aiding Polish Catholic refugees – first gained experience in Europe before turning their attentions to Africa and Asia. This experience in turn convinced them of the need for long-term assistance to tackle the underlying causes of need and to assist in the rehabilitation of affected societies. The description employed by Inter-Church Aid (the relief agency of the Protestant British Council of Churches, founded in 1945 and later renamed Christian Aid) was typical: "it was [the refugees'] plight in the postwar years which gave the system of Inter-Church Aid so much of its impetus. And as the refugee phenomenon spread beyond Europe, so did Inter-Church Aid",[10] which was not alone in framing its experience in those terms. Commenting on his organization's first 25 years of existence, Oxfam director, Leslie Kirkley, underlined its early emphasis on "the simple task of meeting the urgent needs of easily recognizable groups such as refugees and victims of natural disasters…Now, however, whilst retaining this first aid responsibility as top priority, we take a more sophisticated view of our role".[11]

There is much to be said for this narrative: the experience these organizations accumulated provided a vital grounding in the field of humanitarianism. Yet, it should not distract from the roles played by states and IGOs in shaping their fortunes. Working alongside the UN agencies gave NGOs valuable experience in the practicalities of disaster relief and of immediate post-conflict rehabilitation. The dominance of

Europe in the NGOs' geography and of Western concepts of humanitarianism also set clear boundaries to the expansion of the sector. It was true that as the West's attention moved outwards – first to refugee crises in Hong Kong and the Middle East, then to the plight of former colonies in Africa and Asia – NGOs followed, creating links with existing bodies like missionary societies and local philanthropic organizations and, in the process, greatly expanding their field of operations. But while state and IGO actions remained driven by a particularly Western agenda, the opportunities for NGO activity on a global scale remained limited.

Writing in the mid-1970s, one Christian Aid official reflected on the limits that two decades earlier had existed for his organization – and by implication the entire British NGO sector: "In the 1950s [Christian Aid's] small income and the circumstances which gave it birth also gave it a clear and limited role."[12] The implication was apparent: where the war had provided the impetus to action, that momentum proved difficult to sustain. Oxfam was only beginning to transform its public reputation into an organization of "pioneers rather than backwater philanthropists".[13] War on Want, a left-leaning NGO created in 1951 and with origins in the British labour movement, struggled to find its feet and was beset by organizational and leadership difficulties.[14] In Ireland, the situation was even less developed. Little or nothing existed in the way of a recognizable NGO sector in the late 1950s, save the actions of the country's Christian missionaries in raising money for mission stations, hospitals and schools in Africa and Asia. Church-led "penny for a black baby" campaigns and the distribution of missionary magazines like *Africa* and *The Far East* were no substitute for an organized non-governmental sector. Neither was the Irish Red Cross – created in 1939, closely linked to the Department of Defence, and coloured by the old-school nationalism of its chairwoman Leslie de Barra.

"Freedom from Hunger"

Three immediate – and linked – events at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the new decade changed the global context for humanitarian action. The first was UN World Refugee Year (WRY), launched in June 1959.[15] In 12 months the campaign's efforts to tackle World War II's residual refugee problems sparked a renewed focus on humanitarian issues among governments, IGOs and NGOs, and generated the kind of inter-agency collaboration and rivalry vital to the emergence of an international non-governmental sector. It offered opportunities for NGOs in the form of a concentrated, popular UN-led international campaign. It

provided access to UN agencies, governments and other major actors in the humanitarian sector, and it prompted the sector to mobilize, leading to the foundation of national WRY committees that brought together NGOs and other interested organizations in pursuit of the campaign's goals.

The impact of these processes was immediately evident. The Irish Red Cross's involvement in WRY prompted increased levels of public interest and carried over into the organization's participation in a number of subsequent international campaigns. In Britain, Christian Aid, under the watchful eye of Director Janet Lacey, led the way in using a national-level campaign to transform its image and to generate considerable additional income.[16] WRY also had important implications for the creation of an embryonic international NGO community. By drawing those organizations into a campaign that spanned almost a hundred countries, generated considerable financial support, and resulted in closer co-operation with the UN and UNHCR, WRY reinforced an international language of humanitarianism taking shape alongside the realm of inter-state relations.[17] Although it did not succeed in its goal of shutting all of Europe's refugee camps, the campaign explicitly aimed to draw public and government attention – as well as that of the wider humanitarian sector – away from that continent towards refugee crises in Hong Kong, the Middle East and further afield. WRY also helped to internationalize the NGO sector through the creation of the International Co-ordinating Committee for World Refugee Year, a coalition of international NGOs headed by the British Standing Committee of Voluntary Agencies Working for Refugees. That organization in turn acted as the forerunner to the International Committee of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), a loose grouping of NGOs formed in 1963 "to enable the non-governmental world to pool its experience".[18]

The launch of the FAO's "Freedom from Hunger Campaign" in 1960 took these processes a step further. Like WRY, the FFHC was built on an explicit attempt to incorporate NGOs into the global humanitarian culture. As early as January 1959 FAO director-general, B.R. Sen, publicly appealed to NGOs "to stimulate public interest" in the problems of global food production.[19] Yet the new campaign also offered something different in humanitarian terms. Where WRY focussed on an immediate problem – refugees – the FFHC's emphasis on long-term agricultural development allowed NGOs to build relationships with their constituents both in the West and in the recipient states. Initially planned as a five-year campaign and subsequently extended, the FFHC coincided with a number of important developments at the international level: growing

recognition of the interconnectedness of global food markets, concern about the disparity between Western over-production and developing world needs, and the creation of the FAO's World Food Programme (WFP; 1961).[20] The result was a strengthening of international interest in food-related issues and the extension of an emerging culture of global humanitarianism.

The manner in which the FAO linked its efforts to tackle global hunger with a broader commitment to development education proved extremely significant. In 1962 FAO officials told the Irish Red Cross (which operated the campaign at national level) that FAO was "anxious to help you make the most out of the appeal, both in terms of immediate financial gain and long term public benefit".[21] Three years later, prompted by the Irish government, a national FFHC committee was formed under the title Gorta ('famine'). Among its aims was the need to conduct educational and publicity programmes aimed at increasing public awareness.[22] In Britain, too, the campaign prompted the involvement of dozens of NGOs – humanitarian-focussed and otherwise – under the banner of a national FFHC committee. Its activities had a lasting impact. In 1961 the committee organized a countrywide educational effort to raise awareness of the campaign and of the issue of world hunger. The following year saw the foundation of the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), inspired by the campaign's success. By 1968 Christian Aid noted "a change in the climate of public opinion" on aid and development: "Due in large measure to the years of education during the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, most people now know that the answer to hunger is increased food production."[23]

At one level the FFHC's success was easy to explain. What Director Brian Walker of Oxfam later termed "people-to-people" aid created new channels through which local communities could identify directly with projects their money had helped to fund in the Global South.[24] At the end of the 1960s "War on Want," one of the NGOs involved in the national FFHC committee, described its "essential task" as "the work of enabling people in Britain and the developing countries to become allies" in the battle to end global poverty.[25] In Ireland, the campaign had a similar, if less widespread, impact, prompting schools, firms, and other small groups of individuals to become involved in a variety of activities, from walks to fund-raising collections. The novelty of these efforts lay in translating concern for the welfare of refugees in Europe into widespread sympathy for communities in the Global South – part of what Bruce Mazlish termed the creation of a global sense of "the larger 'local' above the national one".[26] The FAO certainly appreciated

its value in broadening humanitarian horizons: "A major innovation of the campaign had been this involvement of non-governmental bodies in development programs and their investment in long-term projects."[27]

But the role of states and IGOs remained prominent. What the FAO saw as "the beginnings of long-term private voluntary action to fight hunger" was in fact largely driven from above – by the FAO.[28] Its success also owed much to the context within which those developments took place, and to one issue in particular: decolonization. As the ends of empire gained in momentum, countries like Britain and France witnessed an increased interest in, and discussion about, their future relationship with the Global South. Peter Gatrell noted that "The young British Conservatives who launched WRY had a clear view of the relationship between their proposed campaign and the divisive and messy process of colonial retreat."[29] WRY's efforts to raise awareness and financial support were assisted by the visibility of a number of crises in the colonial and postcolonial world – the escalating conflict in Ruanda-Urundi, for example, or the persistent refugee problems in Hong Kong and Palestine. In Ireland, this narrative produced a different emphasis – articulated in Gorta's focus on the Irish "historical experience [that] places us in a position better than most in the modern world, to appreciate the plight and problems of the underdeveloped countries" – but with the same result: an increased interest in the issues of aid and development.[30]

Yet Michael Barnett was only partly correct to describe this process as a "shift from Imperial Humanitarianism to Neo-Humanitarianism".[31] Western concerns and a Western language of aid and development may have dominated the NGO sector, but they were not the only drivers of change. The emergence of a vocal group of newly independent states caused a significant shift in the international agenda, with knock-on effects for NGOs. It did so in two ways: by altering the dynamics of the UN and, by extension, of the international community; and by making humanitarianism, aid and development important currents of international debate. The Irish response to these changes was instructive. Wartime neutrality and the state's subsequent isolation from the international community until it joined the UN in 1955 had left an Irish populace largely unmoved by the campaign to assist Europe's refugees. Only the Irish Red Cross's limited response to postwar crises in France and India and the activities of Irish Christian missionaries drew the Irish public into a wider conversation on non-governmental humanitarianism. In those circumstances NGOs made little inroad. But as the state attempted to find an independent voice in international relations, the

UN – and with it the needs of Africa, Asia and the Global South – took on a guiding role.[32] Playing on a strong commitment (public and official) to the international organization, WRY gained the backing of the Irish government and elicited a total public contribution of IR£71,270 – the eighth-highest per capita in the world when adjusted for individual income.[33] The same was true of the FFHC, which won immediate official support and established a precedent of secular non-governmental humanitarian action.

Equally significantly, the shoots of international action began to blossom into something resembling a global humanitarian culture. WRY and the FFHC created both opportunity – in the form of concerted international action and discussion on issues of humanitarian aid and development – and access – by co-opting NGOs ever more closely into the UN system. But the growing importance of southern voices in humanitarian debates proved vital in translating these efforts into a global affair. As director general of the FAO (1956–1967), Indian diplomat B. R. Sen played a role that helped to revitalize the organization and, through the FFHC, launched "a frontal attack on the problems of widespread hunger and undernourishment".[34] The first UN Development Decade, launched in 1961, extended that conversation by focussing on the international community's responsibilities in the fields of aid and development. A number of new organizations were also created to tackle the question of underdevelopment, from the WFP and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD; 1964), to the UN Development Programme (UNDP; 1965). Their impact was significant: responding to the increasingly vocal demands of the newly independent states, the language of humanitarian aid and development became an ever more important part of the everyday workings of the international community.

Global norms and global realities

NGOs were significant beneficiaries of this global humanitarian conversation. Christian Aid director, Reverend Alan Booth, admitted in 1973 that his organization had benefited hugely from WRY and the FFHC: "We didn't invent [them], but we certainly used [them]."[35] Yet the real transformation in the sector's fortunes came later. When the FFHC's promotion of "people-to-people" action met a growing international emphasis on the concept of inter-dependence and a widening space for global civic action, the result was increased opportunities and access for NGOs. Importantly, the process of political globalization that accompanied these developments created the institutional framework within

which the non-governmental sector could flourish. In less than two decades, between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s, the playing field for NGOs was revolutionized.

The importance accorded by Western governments and IGOs to the concepts of inter-dependence and the search for appropriate forms of development was significant in that process. In 1969 the World Bank's Commission on International Development, chaired by former Canadian prime minister Lester Pearson, delivered the influential *Partners in Development* report, setting an international target of 0.7 per cent of GNP for official development assistance and in the process beginning a shift in the international approach to development.[36] The response caused an increased interest in humanitarian issues across the West. The North–South dialogue, the EC's embrace of development through the Lomé Convention (1975) and the expanded European Development Fund, and initiatives such as the meetings of "like-minded" states, led by the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, brought the search for constructive solutions to global economic reform to the forefront of international debate.[37] At the beginning of the 1980s it was the turn of former German chancellor Willy Brandt's Independent Commission on International Development Issues to lead the way, with two equally influential and revealingly titled reports: *North-South: A Programme for Survival* (1980) and *Common Crisis North-South: Co-operation for World Recovery* (1983).[38]

These debates and the global focus they brought to humanitarian issues provided the opportunity for the NGO sector to capitalize on an increased appetite for concrete action. Yet they do not tell the full story of the emergence of the humanitarian sector in this period. The growing assertiveness of the Global South and the integration of its varied demands into the international aid agenda also played an important role. The Second UN Development Decade, beginning in 1970, reinforced the international organization's commitment to supporting the Global South. Successive UNCTAD meetings at Santiago (1972), Nairobi (1976) and Manila (1979), coupled with the demands of the Group of 77 developing world states for the New International Economic Order (NIEO), focussed attention on structural change and global economic reform. Those activities – however fragmented their campaign ultimately proved to be – bequeathed a global language of development to Western NGOs of all persuasions. Trócaire (the official aid agency of the Irish Catholic hierarchy, formed in 1972) linked the 1971 document issued by the Vatican Synod of Bishops, *Justice in the World*, to "the same basic message proclaimed by the NIEO".[39] In the middle of that decade the

organization joined colleagues from Belgium, Canada, Germany, New Zealand and the United States in a "coalition for international development". In the same period Oxfam also shifted its attention to the question of global structural reform: "[T]here is a crying need not just to patch up the old system but to build a New International Economic Order."[40]

A number of parallel shifts in development thinking – again led by states and IGOs – further enhanced opportunities and access at a global level for the non-governmental sector. The role of the World Bank, under the stewardship of Robert McNamara, was significant, pioneering the concept of "basic needs" and in the process shifting that institution's priorities by linking targets for economic growth to the needs of the poorest in the developing world.[41] Though McNamara's new agenda was only part of a wider concern with bottom-up solutions – including E.F. Schumacher's and Paulo Freire's respective alternative models of development – the decision had considerable implications for the NGO sector.[42] The "basic needs" concept was, as Gilbert Rist later remarked, an idea "so simple that one wonders why it took so long to see the light of day".[43] But its focus on reaching the areas where the poorest of the poor resided and worked meant that NGOs, who already worked among these communities, stood to benefit most from any increased emphasis on bottom-up development. The sector well understood its opportunity. Commenting on draft proposals developed by the British government to set up a co-financing arrangement with the sector in December 1974, Christian Aid's Booth noted that "[i]f we are to take McNamara's analysis seriously, and facilitate the flow of aid to rural and 'grass roots' communities, then probably governments *need* the assistance of voluntary agencies".[44]

While NGOs, Christian Aid included, preferred to see their expansion as part of a linear narrative – the "move from warm, personal 'charity' to serious partnership in the transfer [of] resources" – the influence of international institutions was inescapable.[45] Matthew Hilton's analysis of the British humanitarian sector's dependence on global currents of debate to prompt their interest in and involvement with the field of human rights, for example, highlights the extent to which NGOs were often followers rather than leaders of debate on international development.[46] International conferences and summits – what Lechner and Boli termed "peak events that show concretely and dramatically how world culture gets constructed" – proved particularly influential.[47] In the early 1970s, for example, concern over the growing world food crisis, and particularly the 1974 World Food Conference, prompted an equal response on

the part of the NGO sector. In Britain in 1975 the result was Foodshare, a six-month campaign organized jointly by CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam, the World Development Movement and the Christian churches, which aimed to generate greater public and political interest in the food crisis. Oxfam ran a parallel "Feed all the Family" campaign.[48] The theme for the annual Christian Aid Week in May 1975 – "Let the Hungry Feed Themselves" – attempted to generate financial and public support for "the poorest of the poor".[49] In Ireland too the food question provided a strong impetus for action. Gorta's origins in the FFHC meant its approach retained a close association with the aims of the FAO, not least its commitment to finding "the most effective long-term way in order to help the hungry countries to produce more food".[50] Trócaire was similarly concerned with these issues. Launching the organization's 1975 Lenten campaign, Director Brian McKeown emphasized the need to "bring whatever pressure we can to bear on the Government to implement the recommendations mad[e] at the World Food Conference".[51]

This reliance on outside inspiration was underlined in the role played by the global Christian churches as catalysts for expansion in the European NGO sector. In 1958 the Protestant World Council of Churches (WCC) was the first to raise the idea of a national target for aid, suggested at 1 per cent of GNP per annum. In the following decades its influence proved extremely important for shaping a Christian response to humanitarian issues, from the 1970 Montreux Consultation's recommendation that up to 25 per cent of resources be devoted to development education, to the council's role in raising the issue of human rights in Latin America in the early 1980s. For organizations like Christian Aid, which had strong links with the council and its Commission of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service (CICARWS) in particular, a close relationship with WCC reinforced their participation in what they viewed as "a world-wide ecumenical development operation".[52]

Changes in Catholic Church teaching were of equal significance. In Ireland the church's social dominance – and a strong tradition of missionary Catholicism in particular – provided an important organizing framework for an emergent development sector. Public concern, for example, was created in 1968 as a direct response to the Biafran humanitarian crisis and had strong links with the Holy Ghost missionary order and with Viatores Christi, a group of lay Catholic volunteers. Gorta and Goal (a relief-focussed NGO founded in 1977 by the journalist John O'Shea) worked through missionary organizations. But the language of development bequeathed to the NGOs by the international Catholic Church proved most influential. Trócaire drew heavily on changes in

Vatican teaching on development, including Pope Paul VI's 1967 encyclical *Populorum Progressio* and the 1971 document *Justice in the World*. It built on the organizational structures of the Vatican's Commission for Justice and Peace and co-operated closely with Caritas Internationalis, the Church's relief agency. But its approach also owed much to voices from the Global South, particularly the liberation theology practised in Latin America and evidenced in Trócaire's commitment to the "criticism of and resistance to oppressive regimes and unjust structures and to the pursuit of justice through non-violence and of peace through development".[53]

Significantly for the NGO sector, the emergence of this new global humanitarianism was matched by new political structures that mediated between the official and non-governmental aid sectors. In June 1975 the EC organized a seminar between its staff and representatives of 40 European NGOs, the UN, the FAO and the UNDP, at which the commissioner in charge of development policy, Claude Cheysson, made clear what he expected from the collaboration: "The Community's activities could only be adapted to the realities of the new situation in the field with the help of experienced groups of organizations such as the NGO[s]."[54] Coming on the back of the 1975 Lomé Convention, a trade agreement between the Community and the developing world, the meeting had important implications for the future playing field for aid and development in Europe. NGOs were brought closer to the heart of the EC's development efforts, providing them with access to funding and a channel for information and lobbying for policy change. Practical changes quickly followed. In 1976 the EC-NGO Liaison Committee was established, and the same year the Community began a programme of financing projects through NGOs. By the end of the decade EC co-financing prioritized projects aimed at "the poorest sections of the population, and also to those in which there is a high level of local participation".[55]

The EC was not the first to introduce formal structures for the funding of development and emergency relief work through the NGO sector. The Dutch (1965) and Canadian (1968) governments began co-financing schemes in the mid-1960s, primarily, Brian Smith argued, "to complement and extend newly inaugurated bilateral assistance programmes and to gain an apolitical 'easy entry' into many new nations".[56] These concerns remained prominent in the similar schemes launched by the British (1975) and Irish (1977) governments, among others, in the following decade. But the influence of the new currents of global humanitarian discourse was also openly in evidence. The British Ministry of

Overseas Development's co-financing programme was "intended to assist voluntary organizations to extend their development work among the poorest in rural areas and in the urban slums of developing countries".[57] The Irish government framed its approach in similar terms: "to help the poorest sections of the communities of [recipient] countries to develop their own resources".[58]

Disaster or opportunity?

The growing interest shown by NGOs in bottom-up development, the expansion of their work in local communities in the Global South, their support for economic reform, and their increasingly prominent role in the official aid effort absorbed large proportions of those organizations' energies from the late 1960s onwards. Yet it was the globalization of emergency aid and the role played by NGOs in disaster relief that had the most visible impact on the sector. Just as WRY and the FFHC helped to widen the scope for humanitarian action beyond the European sphere and with it created a new playing field for NGOs, so too the emphasis on finding a global response to disaster relief created new opportunities for non-governmental actors.

   It did so in three ways. The first was a symptom of a more global age: the growth of international media and the visibility it afforded the NGO sector's efforts placed the latter at the heart of the public's under-standing of international relief. At the end of the 1960s, the humani-tarian crisis precipitated by the attempted secession of Nigeria's Eastern region – re-named Biafra by the rebels – and the civil war that followed became the first "famine-as-media-event" and the first such crisis to truly capture the imagination of Western public opinion. Missionaries and NGOs were at the forefront in publicizing the crisis in the West. The ecumenical Joint Church Aid airlift flew relief supplies into the region, where they were distributed by religious and lay organizations alike. That pattern was repeated in successive disasters in the 1970s and into the 1980s. Media coverage of crises in East Pakistan (1971), the Sahel (1973–1974), and Cambodia (1979–1980) kept the developing world in the forefront of the international agenda. NGOs benefited accordingly. Their visibility and ability to capitalize on the media attention allowed them to take centre stage in the provision of emergency relief. In the Horn of Africa (1984–1985) NGOs took that process a step further as Band Aid/Live Aid's style of celebrity humanitarianism, however prob-lematic, placed their actions at the very heart of the global campaign for disaster relief.

Yet media attention alone was not enough to explain the sector's arrival on centre stage. For NGOs to flourish, it was necessary that their visibility be matched by a global acceptance of their role in humanitarian relief, with all the access and opportunities for action that it entailed. Close collaboration with Western governments was important. But the most significant factor in integrating NGOs into the global humanitarian system was their relationship with the international relief agencies. There was little new, of course, in that process. The NGO sector's response to the refugee crisis in postwar Europe enabled what Gerard Daniel Cohen termed "the transformation of traditional charity groups into 'nongovernmental organizations'".[59] Yet the 1968–1985 period saw those relationships crystallize and NGOs take on an increasingly equal footing in the field of disaster relief. The international response to the unfolding crisis in Southeast Asia at the end of the 1970s was typical, as thousands of refugees fled Cambodia following the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime. NGOs worked closely with the UNHCR in the refugee camps that sprang up on the border with Thailand. British NGOs kept in close contact with the ICRC and UNICEF about the unfolding situation in the region throughout the summer of 1979.[60] In October UNICEF, ICRC, Oxfam and WCC representatives met in Geneva to discuss the co-ordination of relief efforts in Southeast Asia.[61] By then NGOs – and particularly larger NGOs such as Oxfam – had become part of a truly global community of organizations involved in the provision of emergency relief and long-term rehabilitation.

Experience in the field of emergency relief was important in another sense: it showed what NGOs could do, and what governments and international organizations (at least notionally) could not. A 1983 survey of public opinion in the EC found that an average of 25 per cent of respondents believed that NGOs offered the "most useful" help to the Global South. Second only to international organizations in their perceived impact, that figure was dramatically higher again in Ireland (64 per cent) and Britain (47 per cent).[62] It was a carefully constructed reputation. In Biafra, Oxfam contrasted the NGO sector's efforts with the apparent inaction of the British government: "[I]f millions of lives are to be saved, then an operation a score of times greater than the present efforts of voluntary agencies like Oxfam must be undertaken by governments at international level."[63] NGO remained intensely critical of the Irish government's perceived inaction to relieve the crisis: "[they] found us impetuous and too ready to take a risk. We would have found them totally unready to take a risk".[64] Those criticisms were not limited to governments. The UNHCR's refusal to become involved in the

crisis – attributed by Michael Barnett to "its finely tuned radar for knowing when to push beyond its mandate and when to keep its head down" – created the space for world church agencies like Caritas Internationalis and the WCC, and subsequently for NGOs, to act.[65] The ICRC drew sharp criticism for its neutrality and apparent paralysis in the face of the politicization of the humanitarian crisis by both sides.[66] Those perceived failings – repeated in its response to crisis in East Pakistan less than two years after the end of the Nigerian conflict – generated the conversations and consternation among a group of French aid workers and activists that eventually led to the creation of Médecins sans Frontières in 1971.[67] The implication was clear: NGOs could, and should, go where other agencies feared to tread.

Yet NGO criticisms of states and IGOs also made clear the latter's importance in shaping the terms of engagement in the humanitarian sector, particularly the field of disaster relief. Events in Southeast Asia in the late 1970s again provided a good example of these relationships in action. In October 1979 Oxfam director, Brian Walker, defended his organization's decision to enter into a direct agreement with the Cambodian government at a time when the ICRC and UNICEF were still attempting to do so (and on terms less favourable to the regime). Walker remarked on those organizations' "alleged collaboration with the Pol Pot forces [in the eyes of the regime]".[68] The dramatic journey of an Oxfam barge filled with food, seeds and agricultural equipment making its way into the heart of the affected areas contrasted sharply with the apparent ineffectiveness of the international organizations also operating in the region. The message was obvious: while Western agencies continued to drag their feet, Oxfam adopted the role of "saviour" of the Cambodian people.[69] Walker repeated his arguments in a meeting with Christian Aid officials in January 1980. He stated that the ICRC's failure to negotiate an agreement with the new Cambodian government, allied to UNICEF's association with ongoing debates at the UN on the question of recognition for the regime, had simply impelled Oxfam to act: "Oxfam took unilateral action after other agencies (especially ICRC) failed to negotiate a relief programme – the UN recognition of Pol Pot was clearly a factor there."[70]

One must be wary however of assuming that the NGO sector's rise marked some inexorable march of Western humanitarianism to "save" the poor of the Global South. In some cases a lack of operational staff – particularly in church-led organizations like Trócaire and Christian Aid – led NGOs to work through and with local organizations, including the semi-indigenous regional church agencies. In other cases their ability to

act was severely checked by local politics and preferences. In Nigeria/ Biafra, the determination of both sides of the conflict to use hunger as a political and diplomatic weapon placed constraints on how – through the airlifts of food from neighbouring countries – and when – by night – they could act. In July 1971 Indian authorities instructed non-indigenous NGOs to leave the camps set up for East Pakistan refugees, on the grounds that the country "already had sufficient [medical teams] of their own".[71] NGOs operating in Southeast Asia at the end of the 1970s did so according to the geographical and practical limitations imposed upon them by the governments of Cambodia and Thailand. Half a decade later, in Ethiopia, one NGO's (MSF) consistent criticism of government resettlement policy led to its expulsion while the remaining community of non-governmental organizations operated under the considerable constraints imposed by the army's priorities in the ongoing civil war.

Conclusion

The implications of this narrative for our understanding of the European NGO sector are two-fold. If it is easy to agree with Harford Thomas that "[t]he awakening to the nature of the real world has been the work of NGOs" – as their role in promoting awareness through the FFHC and subsequent development education campaigns proved – it is more difficult to assent to his argument that the NGO sector was "where the new thinking started".[72] During each of the three phases of growth presented here, states and IGOs played a prominent role in shaping the fortunes of the non-governmental humanitarian sector. In the immediate postwar period the rise of the foreign aid regime created an environment in which a new global humanitarianism began to emerge, with knock-on effects for the NGO sector. At the same time in Europe, and increasingly in Asia and the Middle East, NGOs benefited from the leadership, opportunities and experience afforded them in the field by agencies such as UNRRA and UNHCR. The UN played an important role in the second phase, by deliberately drawing NGOs further into the structures of international humanitarianism – through WRY and the FFHC. The hand of the state was equally visible in shaping the fortunes of the non-governmental sector in this period: the needs of the newly independent governments of Africa and Asia altered the international humanitarian agenda at the UN, while Western governments worked to find new ways of meeting their increasing responsibilities (and aid budgets). In the third phase, NGOs were co-opted even further into the structures of the international aid system, and in a manner that had strong echoes of

the voluntary sector's involvement in the operation of European welfare states. NGOs became a recognizable cog in the aid machine, consuming increasing proportions of budgets, while simultaneously attempting to defend their independence.

Taken together, these narratives present a simple conclusion: more often than not, NGOs were followers rather than leaders of international debate. Yet the cracks in that same narrative remind us that there is much still to learn about the role played by NGOs in shaping the agenda of international relations. In emphasizing the emergence of a global humanitarian environment in which NGOs could and did thrive, this chapter has adopted a top-down approach. But just as important to understanding the global culture of humanitarianism was the interplay between local, national, regional and international factors. The non-governmental sector operated in the space between all four. States and IGOs facilitated the emergence of those organizations, but it is too simplistic to view NGOs as passive actors in a process of political globalization; they were beneficiaries of changes in the international environment but by their actions also helped to shape the global humanitarian system in which they operated. There were also limits to the extent to which global currents of debate were adopted in a national context. The Irish government's stance at the UN World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, for example, was criticized by media commentators as "ambiguous" and "regrettable", but it was hardly surprising in a strongly Catholic country that it and the NGO sector remained largely silent on the issue.[73] Even in Britain an ostensibly secular organization like Oxfam, while arguing that it was "inescapable that the organization must increasingly concern itself with environmental and population control matters", realized that to do so necessitated "some fundamental rethinking of long-held beliefs and values".[74]

Which leads us to a final, important caveat. In explaining the rise of the NGO sector, one must be careful to avoid the suggestion that this rise represented a wholly positive, one-way process of Western humanitarianism being welcomed with open arms in the Global South. NGOs were expelled from Nigeria, India, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and elsewhere. Their actions often left them open to charges of paternalism, cultural insensitivity and neo-colonialism. They and the broader Western concepts of humanitarianism that emerged in this period were also influenced by voices from the Global South. One only has to witness the interest of many European donors and NGOs with President Julius Nyerere's *ujamaa* programme in Tanzania or the influence of the Group of 77's calls for an NIEO to understand the extent to which the language of

global humanitarianism borrowed from the communities it purported to "serve".

Notes

1. Harford Thomas (1978).
2. Michael Cotey Morgan (2010: 241).
3. Terje Tvedt (1998: 1).
4. Mark Mazower (2006: 566).
5. Kim D. Reimann (2006).
6. Colette Chabbott (1999: 227).
7. Ellen Boucher (2012: 170).
8. For a history of the foreign aid regime, see Carol Lancaster (2007) and David H. Lumsdaine (1993).
9. Gerard Daniel Cohen (2012: 62).
10. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Special Collections (SOAS) Christian Aid Papers (CAP) CA/I/14/4, "Sunday Night in Southwark: Christian Aid presentation on Sunday 28 January 1968."
11. H. Leslie Kirkley (1967).
12. SOAS CAP CA2/D/15/1, Note by Hugh Samson "A re-appraisal of Christian Aid's role," August 1974.
13. Michael Harris (1974).
14. See Mark Luetchford and Peter Burns (2003: 28–40).
15. Peter Gatrell (2011).
16. SOAS CAP CA/J/1, Janet Lacey, *Christian Aid* (London, 1961), p. 10.
17. Peter Gatrell (2011: 4).
18. SOAS CAP CA/I/11/1–2, International Committee of Voluntary Agencies internal memorandum, "ICVA Commission on Emergency Aid," 10 April 1968.
19. Amy L. S. Staples (2006: 107).
20. See Ruth Jachertz and Alexander Nützenadel (2011: 112–117).
21. National Archives of Ireland (NAI), Department of Foreign Affairs files (DFA) 2001/43/1167, Weitz to de Barra, 29 March 1962.
22. NAI DFA 2003/17/265, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries memorandum for the government, "The FAO Freedom from Hunger Campaign," 10 August 1965.
23. SOAS CAP CA/J/1, Christian Aid, *Year's Report, October 1967–September 1968* (London, n.d. [1968]), p. 8.
24. Brian Walker (1977).
25. SOAS War on Want Papers (WOW) Box 247, War on Want, *Annual Report 1969* (n.d., n.p. [1969]), p. 2.
26. Bruce Mazlish (2006: 71).
27. The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), Overseas Development Files (OD) 25/119, "Freedom from Hunger Campaign: Progress Report of the Campaign," undated extract [1968?].
28. TNA, OD 25/119, "Freedom from Hunger Campaign: Progress Report of the Campaign," undated extract [1968?].
29. Peter Gatrell, (2011: 35).

30. NAI DFA 2001/43/1156, "Address by the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries, Mr Charles J. Haughey, at the inauguration of Gorta, the Freedom from Hunger Council of Ireland, at the Shelbourne Hotel, Dublin, on Monday, 8th November, 1965."
31. Michael Barnett (2011: 104).
32. See Kevin O'Sullivan (2013).
33. NAI DFA 2002/19/298, Figure taken from a note by Con Cremin, "Assistance for newly independent African countries," 20 September 1962.
34. Quoted in Amy L.S. Staples (2006: 105).
35. SOAS CAP CA2/D/5/2, "Christian Aid Staff Planning Consultation: Bishop Otter College, Chichester, 13–17 September, 1973 – Opening Session: Rev. Alan Booth."
36. World Bank (1969).
37. See Carol Lancaster (2007: 34–44) and Gilbert Rist (2011: 140–170).
38. Independent Commission on International Development Issues (ICIDI) (1980) and ICIDI (1983).
39. "Campaigning for a better world," *One World*, Winter 1975/76.
40. "A new deal for the poor. What a new international economic order would mean for Britain and the Third World," *Oxfam News*, March–April 1976.
41. For a history of the World Bank, see Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis and Richard Webb (1997).
42. E. F. Schumacher (1974) and Paolo Freire (1970).
43. Gilbert Rist (2011: 163).
44. SOAS-A CAP CA2/D/22/4, Internal memo, Booth to Littlewood, 13 December 1974.
45. SOAS CAP CA2/D/6/2, "Consultation on 'Development and Salvation': Background paper by Alan Booth, Director of Christian Aid – Giving and Receiving with Respect," undated [February 1974?].
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47. Frank J. Lechner and John Boli (2005: 84).
48. "A call for government action on food," *Oxfam News*, March 1975.
49. SOAS CAP CA2/D/23/6, Christian Aid press release, "Politicians underestimate public mood," 7 May 1975. For details of the Foodshare campaign, see the information note to all Christian Aid staff, SOAS CAP CA2/D/23/6, "Foodshare Campaign," 16 January 1975, *Oxfam News* (1975) and TNA OD 64/73.
50. "A Message from the Chairman," *Gorta News*, 1970.
51. "Trócaire aims to raise over £250,000 in Lenten campaign," *Irish Times*, 11 February 1975.
52. SOAS CAP CA2/D/28/2, "The British Council of Churches, Christian Aid – Notes for Aid Advisory Committee by the Director," 3 January 1975.
53. "Tribute paid to Cardinal," *One World*, July 1983.
54. SOAS CAP CA2/D/21/3, "Report of a seminar on 10–12 June 1975 between Commission staff and members of non-governmental organisations (NGO) specialising in development."
55. SOAS WOW Box 142, Note by Jackie Barton, "EEC Co-Funding with special reference to Southern Africa, based on visit to Brussels, 6–8 June 1979."
56. Brian H. Smith (1990: 90).
57. TNA OD 68/43, Undated note [1977?], "Joint Funding of Development Projects by British Non-government Organisations and the Ministry of Overseas Development."

58. NAI DFA 2008/79/2840, DFA press release, "Minister allocates funds to Voluntary Aid Agencies," 8 May 1978.
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60. For Concern's co-operation with UNHCR, see Tony Farmar (2002: 167–170). For the British NGOs' conversations with ICRC and UNICEF, see SOAS CAP CA3/A/PAC 80.
61. SOAS CAP CA3/A/PAC 80, "Report of First Meeting of Consultative Committee for Coordination of Aid to Kampuchea, 23 October 1979, at the offices of International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva."
62. European Consortium for Agricultural Development (1984: 124).
63. "Nigeria/Biafra war. A statement," *Oxfam News*, May 1969.
64. Interview with John O'Loughlin Kennedy, Dublin, 16 January 2006.
65. Michael Barnett (2011: 138).
66. See David P. Forsythe (2005: 65–68).
67. For a history of MSF, see Anne Vallaeys (2004).
68. David Beresford (1979).
69. Maggie Black (1992: 221).
70. SOAS CAP CA4/C/1, Unsigned note, "Discussions with Brian Walker, at Reading University, 6 January 1980."
71. NAI DFA 2002/19/5, "Report dated 13 July 1971 from the Chargé d'Affaires at New Delhi on Visit to India of Deputies Esmond and Loughnane."
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74. Ken Bennett (1972).

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10

Of Heartfelt Charity and Billion Dollar Enterprise: From Postwar Relief to Europe to Humanitarian Relief to "Everywhere" – CARE, Inc., in Search of a New Mission

Heike Wieters

A view from the top – NGOs in international relief

Why do non-governmental organizations (NGOs) grow – single organizations as well as the whole NGO sector as such?[1] Why do all of us know names like CARE, Oxfam, World Vision, or Doctors without Borders; and why do we consider these organizations as influential, large, and powerful players in international relations when almost all of them are – historically speaking – "organizational babies" compared at least to other institutions such as the Catholic Church or certain craftsmen's guilds? When we think about NGOs today we seldom wonder what NGOs are, let alone where they came from; in the twenty first century NGOs are part of everyday life, and it has been said that the "acronym NGO has been elevated from a code word used by a sizeable but dispersed coterie of development practitioners, aid agency staff, and academics to a term of which politicians and media people around the world have become increasingly fond".[2] We read about the work of NGOs in magazines or daily papers; we know – or believe we know – what their particular missions are all about and, in many cases, we even give donations and support their work. Indeed, any civil society reaction to the 2004 Tsunami, to Hurricane Kathrina (2005), or to any of the latest Sahelian droughts would have been virtually unthinkable without humanitarian NGOs serving as proxies or liaison between governments, and – on a

more personal level – between those in need and those who are ready to lend a hand. By now, non-governmental organizations have successfully conquered a fixed spot in our perception of international relations as an integral part of a slowly evolving "global civil society" – whatever our understanding of this ambiguous term.[3]

There is, however, no scholarly agreement as to what exactly makes an NGO an NGO[4], which leads some scholars to the opinion (expressing contempt) that perhaps "more energy has gone into unrequited efforts to name and rename [NGOs] than has been invested in understanding them".[5] Hence, in order to cope with this chapter's historical perspective on growing organizations with shifting perceptions of their own status, I opt for a functional approach – defining NGOs as private (i.e., non-governmental), nonprofit (i.e., not *private*, profit seeking) agencies which have an organized structure (i.e., they are not clandestine or illegal) and are open to the public, in that they do not openly discriminate against particular societal groups but, instead, welcome outside contributions, either by integrating voluntary work, or donations, or both.[6] Together, these organizations comprise a clearly heterogeneous but nevertheless partially connected organizational universe the foundations of which are shaped – at least on the national level – by a "historical association with a particular institutional culture, a configuration of values, resources, organizational technologies, legal infrastructure, and styles of leadership".[7] This universe has always been fragmented and loosely knit, but it has been closing ranks in recent years.[8] Even apart from the specifics of "national" nonprofit sectors it seems justified to speak about a global "associational revolution"[9], meaning the "striking upsurge of organized private voluntary activity in virtually every corner of the globe", especially since the second half of the twentieth century.[10] Thanks to research conducted in political science and organizational sociology we are in the position to describe broad trends in NGO development, to keep track of the national characteristics of the so called "third sector", or to analyse the theoretical framework of "cooperation, interdependence and confrontation"[11] that mark the relationship between NGOs and governmental and intergovernmental (such as, for example, the United Nations) players in the international arena. But few of the recent studies have taken the time to really scrutinize the often-stated "rise and rise of NGOs"[12] in a detailed historical analysis. So far, there are few convincing answers to the fundamental question of why some NGOs have managed to develop into actors that, as Akira Iriye puts it, make "a significant difference in international affairs"[13] – while others have not.

Based on this general assumption, instead of focusing on macro historical trends and broad approaches to the expanding role of NGOs in international humanitarian relief, this chapter focuses on one particular player – the American NGO CARE – and traces some of the agency's steps from a temporary and loosely knit aid endeavour to becoming a permanent international relief agency. This chapter starts by arguing that there is a lot to learn from the way CARE coped with the crisis of the late 1940s – eventually making its way "to the top", to become one of the world's leading humanitarian NGOs.[14] In choosing to elevate a nonprofit organization like CARE to the status of a collective actor and in approaching it, not simply as vaguely representing "world conscience", [15] but also as an intentional agent in its own right – one with a distinct political and categorical institutional agenda – both specific and general mechanisms and reasons for NGO development and growth are revealed. NGOs are not disinterested when it comes to their survival as organizations; they have institutional goals which go along with their publicly declared missions to save the environment, tackle world hunger, or advocate gender equality. Hence, in addition to altruistic missions put forward publicly, non-governmental organizations strive for organizational stability and continuity – developing a kind of life of their own that may at times be in conflict with their altruistic agenda.[16] Part of the reason for the "success" of private humanitarian organizations can be found in a certain entrepreneurial culture that regards improvement of organizational performance and competition with other agencies as a motivation in itself. Furthermore, nonprofit activities cannot be excluded from general tendencies of economization nor from being subject to certain market pressures. In fact, many nonprofit enterprises – and CARE is no exception – consistently show annual accounting surpluses. While these surpluses cannot be distributed to owners, trustees or members of the organization, these agencies reinvest their profits into the enterprise, new projects, geographic expansion, technological innovation, or even strategic partnerships. Although it may be difficult to determine "how fully the culture of the market has been integrated into the operations, as opposed to the rhetoric of the non-profit sector"[17] there are no doubts that "US-nonprofits…do not operate outside the overall economy".[18] Accordingly, this chapter takes a look at NGO growth from the perspective that "nonprofits are really not that different from all other organizations"[19] – meaning that the structure and impact of these players can be analysed using tools from general organizational theory and business history – thereby broadening the perspective on NGOs as being increasingly influential actors in international relations.

CARE was founded in 1945 and – as did many other private relief agencies – entered the field of postwar relief and rehabilitation to assist the war-struck peoples of Europe following the Allies' defeat of Nazi Germany. One central feature that distinguished CARE from other (mainly religious) American agencies was its cooperative nature. CARE was founded as a non-sectarian organization by more than 20 established nonprofit welfare agencies, all of which were represented on its board of directors. In a cooperative effort that was heavily supported by US government officials, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) representatives and the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service (ACVAFS)[20], a charitable and tax-exempt nonprofit enterprise was established that implemented a special relief concept: CARE began distributing food packages in a "person-to-person approach" while other American agencies relied on bulk shipments and "general relief".[21] Individual as well as corporate American donors would pay for a CARE package and designate it for a certain recipient – who would in turn sign a postcard to be sent back to the United States, thanking the benefactor. This interactive approach – "overwhelmingly Smith to Schmidt" as a State Department representative put it[22] – singled the agency out and allowed it to stand amongst the many religious agencies that relied on donations from their members.

However, as the European recovery progressed, public support and donations to CARE dropped sharply. Most Americans thought that Europe was over the worst, and they stopped giving for postwar relief altogether. Even though the CARE package drew much attention and served as a central signature badge, by the late 1940s the organization was facing a major crisis. To an agency such as CARE – initially not set up to be a lasting organization, but as a limited endeavour intended to go out of business after having fulfilled its task in Europe – this should have meant "closing shop". But instead of terminating the enterprise, dismissing its employees and ending an operation that was internally and externally perceived as a tremendous success, CARE adopted a strategic and expansive position and began the search for a new and broader organizational mission, for other means of survival and enhanced areas of intervention in order to secure organizational continuity.

Inventing new markets with government funds?

The end of the immediate postwar period did not only affect CARE: due to falling private contributions many American agencies engaged in postwar relief were going out of business by the late 1940s. The number

of agencies registered with the government Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) fell from more than 100 in 1946 to about 60 in 1949.[23] The agencies that terminated their enterprise overwhelmingly were lacking in size and had not been delivering "general relief", but had served only a single European country or a particular region.[24] CARE had been delivering packages to all of Europe – but, foreseeing an end of operations in Europe early on, the agency had started sending personnel to China, Japan and Korea as early as 1947 in order to broaden its operations and meet the persistent needs in Asia.

This idea of mobilizing donor support for the needy beyond Europe – and of course the motivation and resources for setting up the logistical requirements abroad – did not emerge out of the blue. On a more general level this entrepreneurial ambition has to be linked to broader historical trends and discursive patterns that opened a door for CARE and other agencies.

A lot of research has focused on the emergence of the development discourse, which is commonly traced back to President Harry Truman's inaugural address of 1949 in which he declared that "improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas" was one of the most distinguished obligations of the American people and the rest of the "free world".[25] While this may be a simplistic, or at least monocausal interpretation,[26] in the long run, the introduction of a "development/underdevelopment couplet...justified the possibility – or necessity – of intervention on the grounds that one cannot stay passive when one is confronted with extreme need".[27] This pattern was fortified by the deepening Cold War and the "free world's" fundamental systemic rivalry with the Soviet Union, which made practical solidarity with nations that were either threatened by the communist opponent or tended to flirt with Soviet offers, a question of political acumen and the strategic instrument of choice for the United States. Apart from bilateral governmental aid, of which a huge portion was military,[28] there were also civil programs which were meant to support "developing nations" on their way to industrialization and "modern" outlooks.

CARE embraced these new developments, possibilities and – what is more important – the public funding that suddenly became available. Promoting American good will abroad was a task that was openly acclaimed by the CARE board and executive management. It was also seen as a possible source of income that could supplement falling private donations. As early as 27 January 1947, CARE's executive director, Paul C. French, contacted a State Department liaison officer inquiring "whether CARE could do a more constructive job...and whether food could be

used as evidence of good will rather than to implement power politics". He therefore asked for an appointment with Secretary of State George C. Marshall and President Truman in order to discuss his concrete proposals.[29]

This feeling of being at the heart of world politics, in line (or literally *on* the line) with political leaders, and somehow changing the world was felt by most agency representatives. Cold War anxiety and the prospect of Truman's "bold" new development program created a thrilling background noise for many American NGOs – especially those engaged with the American Council for Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service (ACVAFS). This body was an umbrella organization, founded in 1942/43, which tried to coordinate organized voluntary relief efforts, framed decision processes and spurred interaction – in a cooperative as well as competitive outlook. It took the ACVAFS some time to organize a joint approach to promoting the role of voluntary agencies in technical assistance and development aid, but the task was taken seriously and seen as an investment in the future of private overseas relief as a whole.[30]

In addition to the joint ACVAFS action plan, however, CARE embarked on its own strategies: Staffers were relieved from other duties in order to prepare reports on CARE's opportunities for acquiring public funds. Agency representatives overseas even reported back to headquarters whenever other agencies acquired money for Point Four programs.[31] CARE management pressed very hard in Washington, using every backchannel possible to secure funds for development purposes. In the winter of 1950–1951, Executive Director French even tried to get from the State Department the enormous sum of $35 million (approximately $294 million in 2011, approximately $330 million in 2013 using CPI).[32] French's proposal, which projected enormous quantities of food, blankets and books for virtually every country from Algeria to Yugoslavia, was discussed internally at the State Department, but without ever securing any actual approval. The officials felt "thoroughly alive to the good that might be done by such a … program [but had] great doubts as to how on earth [they] would get the funds to do it".[33] Accordingly, CARE's initiative was declined[34] – inciting CARE's executive director even further to "continue to press different proposals".[35] French's aggressive style at one point led a White House official to claim that CARE was not reacting to real need anymore but "pumping it along for reasons best known to themselves".[36]

What is true for most of the American nonprofit sector – that it runs on fairly large amounts of government money – is certainly true for CARE (See Table 10.1)

Table 10.1 Income for foreign relief – CARE 1946– 1951[37]

Year	Income for foreign relief; in $US	Private US sources	Gov. sources	UN or or other international sources
1946	10,275,980	10,275,980	–	–
1947	29,083,343	28,495,819	587,524	–
1948	29,485,779	28,695,489	790,290	–
1949	15,981,158	15,110,608	870,550	–
1950	9,093.533	8,069,631	1,029,902	–
1951	25,461,101	8,183,673	17,270,072	7,356

To some extent there even seems to have been an inverse development of private funding and government support. The downward trend of private donations to relief agencies after 1948 can of course be explained by growing public awareness of progress in the European recovery – while relief programs for non-European nations were not as easily communicated to the public as the agencies would have hoped. In 1958 CARE commissioned a market research study which revealed that 43 per cent of the Americans interviewed still wanted American aid to go to Europe, while only 6 per cent wanted it to go to "everywhere".[38]

But, on a general level, the trend towards growing government funding and a relative decrease in private contributions was mirrored throughout the whole nonprofit sector. By the mid-1960s, private contributions to US nonprofits constituted still more than 52 per cent, but this ratio had fallen to roughly 33 per cent a decade later.[39]

This downward tendency in private contributions hints at the fact that the nonprofit sector was not as "private" as it sometimes appeared. "Contrary to the common view, nonprofits are far from independent of private enterprise and government"[40] and although much of the "postwar rhetoric about nonprofits suggests that they grew as a counterpoint to the expanding scale and scope of the federal government, there is persuasive evidence that government policies played a major role in fueling the explosive growth in the number of charitable tax-exempt organizations".[41] The US government certainly had an interest in a private relief sector, from the outbreak of World War II to the inception of the Point Four programs and on to the issuing of "new directions" in US foreign aid by way of PL 93–189 in 1973 – which explicitly urged that US assistance "be carried out to the maximum extent possible through the private sector".[42] Every administration, from Roosevelt to Ford, saw to the establishment of at least some kind of liaison between government agencies and private overseas relief providers and tried to include

private giving in its foreign assistance strategies.[43] However, these kinds of strategic considerations should not conceal NGO agency and the active role private organizations played in shaping and designing their relations with government agencies. Attracting possibly large amounts of public funding while at the same time retaining the greatest possible independence from governmental interference was a major topic for any nonprofit agency in the United States.[44] But, from the perspective of CARE, it was a certain necessity, too: by mid-1949 CARE had managed to set up a large enterprise with more than 500 employees. By mid-August 1950 it had been necessary to reduce personnel numbers to a meager 339,[45] leading to manifest deterioration in in-house accounting and general performance – as an independent audit report revealed.[46]

   It was foreseeable that declining private contributions would entail further cuts and a weakening in performance unless new sources of funding were considered. These considerations were not taken lightly, and they proved to be a matter of internal organizational conflict. While the CARE representative in Washington, D.C., Olive Clapper, on behalf of the New York-based executive management, met with President Eisenhower in 1954 to discuss a "proposal for the expanded use of CARE to augment the Foreign Policy of the United States,"[47] others – especially some CARE board members – saw the acceptance of public money as a tightrope walk, posing a real danger of political entanglement and even dependency. In 1955, Wallace Campbell, CARE board member and one of the agency's founding fathers, believed it was necessary therefore to formulate a statement for the record, underlining that "CARE must always retain its independence, not only of governments overseas, but of our own government as well, because the voluntary character is a fundamental part for its reason of existence".[48] The fact that such a statement for the record proved necessary hints at the fact that interests of board members and management did not always coincide. The line between "loss of independence" and "doing a more constructive job" with a little help from government funds was definitely very thin.

A challenging public private partnership – Food Aid

It is instructive to take a look at the field of food aid, which is a central factor when it comes to assessing reasons for the initial growth and expansion of the American NGO sector of overseas relief in general – and CARE in particular.[49] From the late 1940s on it became obvious that the United States would again be facing huge agricultural surpluses. Wheat, corn, rice and other commodities, produced in a protectionist environment, which guaranteed fixed prices to American farmers,

proved exceedingly unsellable on the world market.[50] The 2008 statement by Anthony Faiola observing that "globalization did not really work for food" [51] was certainly already true in the late 1940s. In an attempt to dispose of excess foodstuffs while alleviating hunger and possibly opening future markets overseas,[52] the US government increasingly included surplus commodities into US foreign aid strategies: excess foodstuffs were given away – on a concessionary basis, by barter, or as loans.[53]

It was precisely this field in which the American agencies decided to intervene. The agencies had acquired considerable expertise in handling food-based relief during and after World War II and were willing to put these skills to further use in a broader setting. More importantly, however, food was seen as a central prerequisite for the development for the so called "underdeveloped" countries. In the hands of private agencies, it was argued, American abundance would "nurture not only the free individual, free from all tyrannies, including the tyranny of hunger, but also the free society".[54] Even though there was as yet no such thing as a spelled-out strategy regarding the role of food within the development process – the related debates basically developing during the 1960s[55] – surplus food distribution was still perceived of as an essential remedy to both the world food problem and the menace of world poverty.[56]

While most of the agencies organized in the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service (ACVAFS) decided on a cooperative effort in securing food aid, Executive Director French determined that CARE could shoulder the task just as well on its own. In early May 1950 he testified before the House Agricultural Committee on Disposition of Agricultural Surpluses, expressing CARE's strong support for an amendment to the Agricultural Act of 1949 (HR 7137) that would have made surpluses available primarily for CARE; he also lobbied for widened private involvement.[57] French failed and, even worse, caused major resentment among the other agencies which were not amused by CARE's hit-and-run attitude.[58] But food aid was perceived of as a central pillar in CARE's transformation from an organization focused on European recovery to an agency operating internationally. Securing relevant amounts of government-donated commodities meant the difference between liquidation and organizational continuity – at least for CARE, which could not count on a grassroots donations system as could the faith-based and church-related agencies. Accordingly, CARE's management tried very consciously to carve out a profitable new branch of the enterprise based on commodities. With the passing by Congress of Public Law 480 in 1954, Richard Reuter, assistant executive director

with CARE, underscored that "the time [was] right for CARE to go after a million dollar fund to expand American influence around the world through the increased utilization by CARE of farm surplus supplies". He hoped for "a much more legitimate stake in this whole program [and] the cash to allow us to compete with other agencies and negotiate with US and foreign governments".[59] Reuter understood that an aggressive attitude was a necessary step towards recapitalization of the organization and, since management was successful in presenting CAREs work as "efficiently and properly…carried out with professional ability",[60] they were able to secure quite remarkable amounts of the commodities available for private distribution. As a matter of fact, in 1955 government-donated foods amounted to almost 20 per cent of all CARE relief. (See Table 10.2)

This heavy involvement in government-funded activities even grew in scale after American food aid was institutionalized and remodelled within the "Food for Peace" program in 1961. In that year the PL 480 ratio of all CARE income was at approximately 63 per cent. By 1969 it already had grown to over 70 per cent.[62] From an operational perspective this provided for a very successful business model: Donors would buy CARE packages comprised largely of (free) surplus commodities, while CARE organized the shipping and handling of the surpluses and catered the recipients overseas. In effect, CARE charged the donors a certain fee per package, so that overhead costs and administration in New York and overseas could be sustained and even expanded. The income derived from the sale of packages provided the necessary cash basis for the expansion of the overseas operation system into a truly multi-divisional enterprise. It also allowed for technological innovation, new programming routines and special development programs. When CARE employees overseas started voicing criticism that "CARE was not expanding self-help projects sufficiently and that there was great danger of it becoming exclusively a food relief agency" Executive Director French stressed that these innovative self-help programs could only be conducted through government surplus commodities which allowed CARE "to maintain adequate overseas administration".[63]

Table 10.2   Relief by type (in per cent), 1953–1955[61]

Relief by type	1953	1954	1955
Regular package	97.3 %	88.4 %	72.6 %
Self help	2.5 %	4.9 %	8.1 %
Surplus commodities	0.2 %	6.7 %	19.3 %

Inter-agency competition and cooperation

While cooperation with governmental agencies proved – if not easy – at least profitable for CARE, inter-agency coordination amongst the private players caused bigger difficulties.

All evidence suggests that the first steps voluntary agencies took beyond Europe were very challenging, marked by a genuine lack of local routines and tremendous bureaucratic hurdles, to say the least. This was a problem in most countries the agencies served and was especially grave in the field of food aid. Accordingly, in 1954 the ACVAFS tried to establish committees "in each country to review the amount of surpluses each agency plans to use". This cooperative approach was meant as a means of standardization procedure aimed at eliminating disarray and coordinating efforts confronting authorities.[64] But the idea was not greeted with too much enthusiasm by the CARE management at that point. Executive Director French reported to the board of directors that the executive staff had "come to the conclusion that this procedure would simply delay the use of surpluses in areas of need and that there are adequate facilities of cooperation with the local governments of the countries involved as well as through the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid in Washington and the Department of Agriculture. We have felt that it would not serve any useful purpose for *CARE* to participate in this approach".[65]

It seems that it was Paul French, in particular, who was not too fond of non-competitive co-existence with other agencies. His frank statements caused resentment among colleagues, as they did more than once. In a luncheon meeting with a staffer from another agency, he even declared that "there were only two agencies doing a decent job…, CARE and the Quakers" – whereas the agency his luncheon partner was working with "stinks".[66] French's non-cooperative strategy even led to CARE's temporary withdrawal from the ACVAFS in 1954. But absence from this body eventually led to heavy competitive disadvantages and a lack of information to such an extent that CARE suppliantly applied for re-entry one year later – after Paul French had been discharged as executive director.[67]

It would be erroneous, though, to place the entire blame for crossing the line on a single person. This air of rather ambitious attitudes was definitely not an isolated phenomenon. The agencies, all of which were nonprofit and not allowed to keep any surplus or gain, were nevertheless harsh competitors when it came to reaching their goals. What has been called "aid rush"[68] on a global scale was clearly mirrored in the institutional behaviour of private American relief agencies abroad.

This is reflected in a seemingly minor incident. In 1952, in the midst of the Korean War, CARE's executive management intervened with the aforementioned Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, the State Department body that licensed new relief agencies, and questioned the license for the American-Korean Foundation. Executive director French complained: "[I] am frankly [at] a loss to understand the need for another agency in the field ….It would seem to me that this simply adds another complication to the Korean situation and leads to more competitive campaigns than can possibly succeed in the present situation.…I think that it is a major mistake for the Committee to register this agency until there is some clear understanding…whether they will cross into the fields of already interested groups".[69] CARE's executive director was not successful in preventing the admission of the new competitor, a fact he soon came to regret even more, since shortly after its registration the American Korean Foundation ruined his long-nourished plans for a CARE publicity trip with a Korean children's choir touring the United States.[70] The American Korean Foundation pulled the necessary strings at the Korean embassy in the US, "hijacked" the publicity tour, and hosted the choir themselves.[71] Obviously the agencies did not regard amicability, cooperation and "good manners" as indispensable values. There are countless other examples which underline that agency personnel perceived their respective organizations as contestants in a race for public resources, donor money, new ideas or even international standing. This even included purely reputational issues: When one CARE worker in Egypt read about a new World Food Program project for refugees from the Aswan Dam area, he immediately complained to a USAID staffer: "This is almost precisely the same project which I submitted to USAID some time ago (attached copy of my letter No 5041) and which was disapproved. It would have entailed distribution control by the American CARE staff. The credit for the gift would have gone to the United States. The great majority of the food distributed in Nubia by the World Food Program will be a gift of the United States. The credit for the distribution will go to the United Nations."[72] From a practical perspective it might have been irrelevant who finally administered the program – as long as it got done. But the CARE staffers pursued their organizational goals with great entrepreneurial ambition and held strong aspirations not only to do good, but to do better – compared to other players in the field. This does not imply, in turn, that there was no cooperation. The agencies – including CARE – increasingly recognized the advantages of an umbrella organization like the ACVAFS, which provided legal protection and slowly but surely developed into an arena for the discussion and establishment of

best practices and new ideas and concepts. After its re-entry in 1955 CARE subjected itself to ACVAFS standards and, in 1966, for the first time a CARE representative became chairman of the ACVAFS.[73] CARE agreed to invest resources into the ACVAFS since it served as an increasingly stable bulwark against outside interference and promised enhanced stability for the whole sector of overseas relief.

From the mid-1960s on there were also cases of intense cooperation with non-ACVAFS members like Oxfam or even International Organizations such as the World Food Program or UNICEF. But the simple fact that the agencies were cross-linked institutionally did not mean peaceful cooperation. The ACVAFS and its local bodies overseas were not perceived of as an "independent entity, but an association of independent agencies, all with specific objectives for which funds are raised".[74] Hence, cooperation was sought as long as it helped to foster organizational performance and motivation. But CARE always kept a focus on the fact that "selling big charity" was the organization's task and that therefore even other regional CARE offices had to be treated as "friendly rivals, competitors for donor dollar and the bottom line"[75]. CARE personnel saw the organization as a valuable player with a mission important enough to take things seriously. Doing the job efficiently and possibly better than others was a major organizational credo. The fact that securing organizational stability and continuity did of course save jobs for American CARE staffers, while at the same time enabling further support for the needy overseas, was not considered a dilemma, but rather a logically consistent correlation. Doing "hard-nosed" charity, "squeezing each buck, making most of each penny"[76] was perceived as a commendation, not as an accusation and proved to be a central motivation flanking CARE's transformation from a postwar relief endeavour into a growing humanitarian NGO.

Conclusion

Approaching the scene from the perspective of one particular NGO does of course mean leaving out another part of the story. The picture might look different from the perspective of administrative government professionals, political leaders, or individual recipients overseas. But to a certain extent this is an inevitable side effect of any case study and comes with undeniable advantages, too: It allows for a much more detailed perspective on micro historical and "endogenous" organizational developments[77] explaining the rising stake of private American relief organizations within the humanitarian universe.

There is certainly more than one answer to this chapter's initial question about the reasons for accelerated NGO growth during the second half of the twentieth century: General democratization processes, the development of accelerated transport and communication channels, global media broadcasting resulting in growing public awareness of humanitarian crises, or even a certain progressing weakness to the nation state – these are just some randomly picked buzzwords that are often raised when it comes to the growing role of humanitarian NGOs on a global scale. But a glimpse at some milestones in CARE's early organizational development reveals that it is indeed also justified to focus on the diverse organizational "survival tactics" as a contributing factor to NGO development. It is a rewarding perspective to focus on particular NGOs as actors *in* and amplifiers *of* global historical developments.

Today, large international humanitarian NGOs are certainly in the vanguard of exercising global accountability – working for those who cannot speak for themselves, delivering relief to the hungry, and lobbying for human compassion and munificence. Their image as "world conscience" may therefore be absolutely justified. But modern NGOs are at the same time business enterprises (structurally speaking, especially). As such they are subject to intra-organizational dynamics and tensions and have to react to pressures from without and from within. It may sound impious to address humanitarian NGO work in terms of resources, outputs and new markets, but to some extent this approach helps explain and analyse the attitude CARE as well as some other NGOs developed towards their fields and new areas of intervention. CARE has never behaved like a ship lost in the currents of historical events but has, on the contrary, actively and at times even aggressively searched for ways to manoeuvres the enterprise. Identifying and making the most of new opportunities – as well as outplaying competitors for ideas and resources – were seen as major management tasks. Accordingly, there is added scientific value in taking a closer look at the ways NGO managers and board members sought organizational stability and continuity for "their" organizations. CARE's management was ready to invest in new partnerships – most prominently into the public–private partnership with the US government concerning food aid. This partnership proved to be a cornerstone for CARE's geographical as well as corporate expansion and provided the essential cash basis for innovation and general institutional diversification. It did of course also mean that CARE had to compromise – there are consequences to such a venture, especially in the United States where many observers greeted all-too-obvious proximity to the state with growing suspicion. But CARE decided to go for a

partnership – for the sake of the "good cause" as well as in an attempt to save the enterprise. These motives were not necessarily contradictory as the phrase "selling big charity" indicates: entrepreneurial ambition and moral vision gravitated towards one another and proved to be a central motivation for the expansion of the enterprise and the search for a new organizational mission in development aid and hunger relief overseas.

Notes

1. Burton Allen Weisbrod (1998).
2. Adil Najam (2000: 376).
3. For a history of ideas approach to the debate about "global civil society" see, for example, John Keane (2003); see also Jürgen Kocka (2005).
4. The Union of International Associations, which is often cited as a reference, collects its data concerning NGOs, registered in the International Yearbook, using more than a dozen different typological criteria; see, for example, 2004 report: http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/types-2004.pdf, date accessed 19 January 2014.
5. Ian Smillie (1995: 22).
6. See Klaus J. Hopt and Thomas von Hippel (2005: 12).
7. Peter D. Hall (1992: 2).
8. Peter D. Hall (1992: 10) and Norman Isaac Silber (2001, chapter 4).
9. Lester M. Salamon (1994).
10. Helmut K. Anheier and Jeremy Kendall et al. (2001: 17).
11. Janina Curbach (2003: 15).
12. Mark Turner and David Hulme (1997: 202).
13. Akira Iriye (2004: 4).
14. CARE International turned more than $800 million for relief in 2010 alone, see CARE International annual report 2009/2010, pp. 26–27. Available online: http://www.care-international.org/Annual-Report, date accessed 19 January.
15. Bruce Mazlish and Akira Iriye (2005: 4).
16. See Brian H. Smith (1990: 37–44) and Kathleen D. McCarthy (2003).
17. Lester M. Salamon (2003: 63).
18. Burton Allen Weisbrod (1998: 4).
19. Peter Frumkin and Jonathan B. Imber (eds) (2004: vii).
20. Rutgers University Archives (RUA), records of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies (ACVAFS), Box 7, Minutes of Committee on Cooperatives Meeting, 6 September 1945; Minutes of meeting on CARE on subcommittee meeting on cooperatives, November 1945. The meeting reports underline ACVAFS support as well as government support by Arthur Ringland (State Department) and Donald Nelson, who had been serving at the United States Office of Production Management (1941–1942) and War Production Board (1942–1944). From November to December 1945 Nelson was CARE's first director. See also Wallace J. Campbell (1990: 5–17).
21. This concept was not unprecedented since the American Relief Agency (ARA) headed by future president Herbert Hoover had undertaken a similar

endeavour after World War I. See Bertrand M. Patenaude (2002: 5–26, 178–179); see also: Benjamin M. Weissman (1974).

22. CARE records. Manuscripts and Archives Division. The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations, (NYPL, CARE [MssColl 470]), Box 26, Letter Arthur Ringland to Paul Comly French, 10 February 1949.

23. Rachel M. McCleary (2009: 63, see also figure 3.1).

24. Rachel M. McCleary (2009: 61–62).

25. Harry S. Truman, "Inaugural Speech", 20 January 1949. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1945–1953 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1966). http://trumanlibrary. org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=1030, date accessed June 2011.

26. As David Ekbladh has argued most convincingly. See David Ekbladh (2010: 3–4, 78–79).

27. Gilbert Rist (2006: 76).

28. Odd Arne Westad (2009: 26).

29. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 26, letter French (CARE) to Ringland (ACVFA), 27 January 1947.

30. NARA, RG 469, UD 679-A, Box 5, Report, The Role of Voluntary Agencies in Technical Assistance, 16 October 1952.

31. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 26, Memorandum Charles Bloomstein to Paul C. French (Executive Director CARE), 27 July 1950; Memorandum Paul Gordon to French, 31 July 1951 reporting successful acquisition of Point Four funds for an Indian program by the Friends Service Committee.

32. NARA RG59, A1–1526, Box 1, Memo Howland H. Sargeant (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State) for George Perkins (Department of State – EUR), Subject: Proposal by CARE, 11 January 1951; CPI= Consumer Price Index, Relative Value Estimate based on data provided by Measuring Worth, http://www. measuringworth.com/uscompare/, date accessed 19 January 2014.

33. NARA, RG 59, A1–1526, Box 1, Confidential Perkins (DoS-EUR) to Sargeant (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State), 16 January 1951.

34. NARA RG59, A1–1526, Box 1, letter Sargeant to Alexander Hawes (CARE counsel), 29 January 1951.

35. NARA RG59, A1–1526, Box 1, letter Sargeant to Arthur Gardiner (DoS-NEA), 6 February 1951.

36. NARA RG59, A1–1526, Box 1, Memorandum of conversation, Charles Jackson (White House) and Howland H. Sargeant (DoS), 29 April 1952, indirect quote on CARE by Jackson.

37. NARA, RG 469, DU 658-A, Box 1, CARE Schedule ICR (compiled for ACVFA) resources received for Foreign Operations 1946–1952, 18 May 1953.

38. CARE even paid for a market research study conducted by Bennet & Chaikin, Inc. in 1958. The poll unveiled that in 1958, 43 per cent of the Americans polled wanted aid to go mainly to the needy in Europe, whereas only 6 per cent considered aid to the needy everywhere the best option. NYPL CARE (MssColl 470), Box 6, Copy of Bennett-Chaikin, Special Analysis of Atlanta, July 1958. For a general account on management consulting and their proactive role within the nonprofit sector see the excellent study by Christopher D. McKenna (2010: 111–144).

39. Stats compiled based on: Virginia Ann Hodgkinson et al. (1996, figure 2.1).

40. Burton Allen Weisbrod (1998: 4).

41. Peter D. Hall (1992: 62).
42. Brian H. Smith (1990: 5).
43. Dennis R. Young (2006: 61–62); for Latin America and the Alliance for Progress see, for example, Jeffrey F. Taffet (2007: 48–50).
44. Beth Gazley and Jeffrey L. Brudney (2007).
45. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 3, Paul C. French, Executive Director's report, Board of Directors Meeting, 13 September 1950.
46. The External Audit Report for Fiscal year 1951 (1 July 1950–30 June 1951) by Price Waterhouse & Co mentioned genuine "need for improvement of the accounting supervision and internal control" due to internal shifting or termination of skilled personnel, see: NARA, RG 469, UD 659, Box 7, Report and Accounts for CARE, 30 June 1951, Study conducted by Price Waterhouse & Co, pp. 1–24, here p. 22.
47. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 30, letter Olive Clapper to President Eisenhower, 15 December 1954.
48. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 1170, Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 16 February 1955.
49. Beth Osborne Daponte and Shannon Bade (2006: 669–675).
50. John Shaw (2007) and Giovanni Federico (2005: 196–205).
51. Anthony Faiola (2008).
52. President Eisenhower hoped that the Agricultural Act of 1954 would "lay the basis for a permanent expansion of our exports of agricultural products, with lasting benefits to ourselves and peoples in other lands". Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 10 July 1954, in: *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Washington, DC, 1954, vol. X, p. 121.
53. Christopher B. Barrett and Daniel G. Maxwell (2005: 13–16).
54. RUA, ACVAFS records, Box 8, ACVAFS Statement (draft) "The continuing Challenge of American Abundance", 13 November 1956; see also ACVAFS Statement "The Moral Challenge of American Abundance"; ACVAFS Statement before the "Agricultural House Appropriation Committee", 30 April 1954.
55. See, for example, Kristin L. Ahlberg (2008).
56. See Nick Cullather (2010: 75).
57. RUA, ACVAFS records, Box 29, Copy of testimony before "House agricultural committee on disposition of agricultural surpluses", 3 May 1950.
58. RUA, ACVAFS records, Box 29, Letter Charlotte Owen (ACVAFS) to Paul C. French (CARE), 5 May 1950.
59. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 26, Memo Reuter to French, 17 April 1954.
60. NARA, RG469, Entry 1186, Box 1, Confidential report on "Mission to Egypt Social Welfare and Community Development Division", 25 March 1955.
61. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 1171, Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 23 March 1956.
62. Data from Annual Reports of the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (Dept of State/USAID, Washington, DC) "Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs".
63. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 1171, Minutes of Board of Directors Meeting, 18 April 1956.
64. For an account on standardization processes among International NGOs see, for example, Thomas A. Loya and John Boli (1999).

65. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 7, Report Executive Director to Executive Committee, 18 August 1954.
66. RUA, ACVAFS, Box 29, Copy of Eldon Burke (Cralog) to Cralog Headquarter, 6 August 1948, partially circulated within the ACVAFS.
67. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 1170, MECM, 13 July 1955.
68. Helge Ø. Pharo and Monika Pohle Fraser (2008).
69. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 33, letter Paul French to Arthur Ringland (ACVFA), 23 May 1952.
70. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 26, letter French to Ringland, 9 October 1952; Box 26, letter Ringland to French, 14 October 1952.
71. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 26, letter French to Ringland, 30 January 1953; Box 26, letter Ringland to French, 13 February 1953; Box 26, letter French to Ringland, 17 February 1953.
72. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 130, letter Mathues (CARE) to Constantin Cabooris (USAID), 19 December 1964 (CC to Edwin Moline and Alan Strachan (USAID).
73. NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 1172, Minutes of Board of Directors Meeting, 26 January 1966.
74. NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964–1966, Box 3228, Airgram American Embassy in Seoul, Korea (Benjamin Fleck, Secretary to Ambassador) to Department of State, Subject: Conference of KAVA 1964, 4 July 1964.
75. Harold Gauer (1990: 46).
76. See Phil Santora (1973). The article was reprinted by permission of the *New York Daily News* and handed out as promotional reproduction by the CARE publicity department; see: NYPL, CARE (MssColl 470), Box 1007.
77. Gary Herrigel (2008: 479).

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11
Contesting Globalization: The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Transnationalization of Sovereignty

Sönke Kunkel

In 1976, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger embarked on an unusual journey. A frequent traveller to Western Europe and the Middle East, the diplomatic trouble-shooter this time made his way to East Africa in order to address the fourth meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Nairobi, Kenya. Coming in the midst of a serious crisis in North–South relations, Kissinger's speech responded to calls for a New International Economic Order which developing countries had sounded for almost two years. Observers were stunned, because they saw the appearance of what seemed to be a new Kissinger – a well-versed economist who delved into complex economic details and emphasized multilateral solutions for global economic problems, including a joint and permanent effort to control commodity prices in the world market. "I chose to speak", Kissinger later remembered, "in order to symbolize the political importance we attached to the need for new cooperative economic arrangements".[1]

Kissinger's address also symbolized something else – the new status that international organizations had acquired within the international system. By the mid-1970s, international organizations had become important players which shaped global discourse and established authoritative norms. In addition, they also coordinated and conducted global policies, often by drawing together action coalitions of experts, non-governmental organizations, and governments. As a result, by the time Kissinger made his address in Nairobi, international organizations operated in virtually all major fields of global action. They were involved in

global development policy and human rights debates, in environmental matters and population policies.[2]

This chapter examines how and why international organizations also became major sites for the contestation of globalization during the 1960s and 1970s. Using this particular problem as a window into the broader shifts in the role of international organizations and into the dynamics of global governance, the chapter shows how postcolonial, underdeveloped countries increasingly turned to international organizations in order to regulate flows of goods, capital, and commodities that easily transcended their boundaries yet had significant impact on their development efforts.[3] While focusing in this context on Tanzania – a leading international advocate for new economic arrangements – the chapter devotes its major part to the history of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and of the United Nations in a larger sense. It examines which norms were propaged for the global economy, how UNCTAD worked to influence within the international system, and how it forged closer relationships with international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).[4]

Based on multiarchival and multinational research in US governmental archives, the United Nations archive, Tanzanian archives, and the British Library, I argue that international organizations attained a new importance in the postwar decades because of a global transformation of sovereignty. With the onset of what Charles Maier has called the "waning of territoriality",[5] brought about by the intensification of globalization, nation-states increasingly faced transnational challenges they could no longer muster against or control alone. Their "decision space"[6] – their capacity effectively to control social, economic, and political change within set boundaries –only partially corresponded with the post-territorial dynamics of a globalizing world. Eager to either retain their national sovereignty (as in the case of postcolonial countries) or to limit their loss of control, nation-states increasingly turned to international organizations in order to coordinate concerted international action. Thereby, they gradually transnationalized their national sovereignty. At the same time, international organizations began to function more and more as important nodal points of global governance.

In assessing these changes, the chapter also explores the dynamics of global governance during the 1960s and 1970s. A concept which to date has mainly been employed by political scientists, global governance, in short, describes "the nexus of systems of rule-making, political coordination and problem-solving which transcend states and societies".[7]

This type of networked action leads to multilayered (globally as much as locally produced) "spheres of authority"[8] that exercise their power through various "compliance generating capacities".[9] Put differently, the international decision space becomes an open space where compliance is produced and negotiated through varying means that encompass not only financial or military resources, but also moral pressure, discourse power, knowledge, or the mobilization of public outrage.

Nation-building, globalization and sovereignty: the view from Tanzania

"The reality of Neo-Colonialism", President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania observed before an audience in Nigeria in 1976, "quickly becomes obvious to a new African government which tries to act on economic matters in the interests of national development". While the new government, according to Nyerere, had "the power to make laws" or "to direct the Civil Service", it would soon discover "that it did not inherit effective power over Economic Developments ….Indeed, it often discovers that there is no such thing as a National Economy at all".[10]

Sixteen years after a wave of decolonization had brought independence to dozens of African societies, including Tanzania in 1961, Nyerere's radical rhetoric struck a familiar tone among Third World audiences because it identified the core challenge that underdeveloped countries faced, namely the loss of sovereignty that globalization entailed for them.[11] Driven by technological changes, globalization had indeed accelerated and intensified again since World War II. In African economies, many of them focused on agricultural exports, the 1950s and 1960s often brought dramatic increases in exports, as Frederick Cooper has observed.[12] As a result, between just 1961 and 1963 the relative portion of trade between developed and underdeveloped countries took up a considerable 44 per cent share of total world trade.[13] Overall, world trade grew by roughly 6.6 per cent per year between 1958 and 1970.[14]

Tanzania, too, experienced an intensification of globalization. Traditionally a producer of agricultural products such as coffee, cotton and sisal since colonial times, the Tanzanian export economy witnessed a significant growth in production output between 1960 and 1972, according to statistics assembled by the "Tanzania Society". Cotton, coffee, cashew nuts, and tobacco production, almost all of it going into exports, increased: cotton, 113.9 per cent; coffee, 100.8 per cent; cashew nuts, 165.6 per cent; and tobacco, 463.6 per cent.[15] At the same time, many foreign firms, such as "British American Tobacco Ltd.", the

"Bata Shoe Company" or "Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd", operated in Tanzania, a development that the Tanzanian parliament further encouraged in 1963 by passing the Foreign Investment Protection Act.[16] Extensive advertisements in Tanzanian newspapers for West German or Japanese cars (Volkswagen and Toyota), for fashion, foreign films and global airline networks such as Air India, Alitalia and the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC), reflected quite vividly globalization's advance through Tanzania (and indicated the existence of at least a partial Tanzanian consumer economy).[17] Frequently, such advertisements visualized the state of Tanzania's global involvement, either by showing Tanzania's worldwide cotton exports or, as in the case of a BOAC advertisement, by showing a world map with broad arrows that connected Tanzania with the other continents, announcing: "BOAC serves Africa – Spreading Its Influence World-Wide."[18] President Nyerere, for his part, observed throughout the 1960s "that the world gets smaller every day.…[T]he ramifications of international trade mean that goods produced in London, New York, or Tokyo have affected the lives of people in the bush hinterland of Tanganyika; and truly too the same company names are to be seen operating in Germany, America, India and Africa".[19] The same tendencies were also reflected in the growth of Tanzania's tourism sector. Fuelled by Hollywood films such as the John Wayne movie *Hatari* (1962), which introduced Tanzanian safari wildlife to Western audiences, and by official advertising campaigns abroad, tourism grew from 12,218 visitors in 1961 to 85,000 in 1971, also becoming manifest in the opening of Kilimanjaro Airport in 1971.[20]

Yet such global integration also had its dangers for the Tanzanian economy. Export crop orientation meant not only dependence on global demand, but also on volatile world market prices, meaning an equally volatile export income. Particularly developments in the sisal market made the consequences of dependence painfully clear for Tanzanians when sisal prices dropped sharply around the mid-1960s due to the global breakthrough of synthetic fibres. As Nyerere bemoaned in a speech, "the total amount of external capital aid was less than the amount by which our sisal earnings went down because of the fall in international prices". In turn, he concluded, it "would have been far better if we had received no aid at all, but the prices of our commodities had not fallen".[21]

Globalization, as Nyerere believed, therefore put not only Tanzania's developmental nation-building efforts under extreme stress, but also threatened its sovereignty. After all, foreign companies operating in Tanzania, as Nyerere and the more radical blocs within TANU frequently charged, made their decisions based not on Tanzanian developmental

desires, but on profit calculations.[22] At the same time, price swings in the world market could easily undermine carefully planned development policies and, in the long run, thereby not only subverted Tanzania's nation-building efforts, but also threatened its national sovereignty.

Two interrelated conclusions flowed from this particular postcolonial sensitivity regarding sovereignty: in order to protect its freedom of action, Tanzania had to loosen foreign influence on its domestic politics and economy. And, second, the global economy had to be regulated so as to be beneficial to Tanzania's development as a sovereign nation. Indeed, from the mid-1960s onwards Tanzania's governing party TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) and Nyerere set to work to nationalize dozens of foreign firms in order to build what he called self-reliant "African socialism".[23] Put down as official party policy in the "Arusha Declaration" of 1967, African socialism emphasized rural development over industrial development, stressed the goal of self-reliance, and proclaimed the principle of public ownership.[24] Particularly in the weeks after the "Arusha Declaration" of 1967, foreign firms and banks faced the closing down of their activities, or nationalization. The vernacular press, in the meantime, did its share in praising the *Reconquista* of national sovereignty by vilifying foreign companies and foreigners in general. One typical cartoon of the time, for instance, depicted an African whose blood was being sucked through straws by a European, Arab, Indian, and African. His pain, however, turned to joy as black hands cut off the straws. Another cartoon showed how the exploiters were being burned together with a sack called "*ubepari*" (capitalism) with wood called "*taifa*" (nation).[25]

While such cartoons built support for the policies laid down in the Arusha Declaration, they also indicated a Tanzanian tendency to withdraw from the world market for the sake of its sovereignty. Yet, Nyerere also realized that self-reliance had its limits. After all, Tanzania still remained dependent on export earnings in order to fuel its development. As Nyerere explained in an authoritative guidance essay for his principal secretaries and officials of Tanzanian ministries, *inter*dependence was a fact of the times which Tanzania could not ignore completely: "[M]odern technology and international trade", after all, were "pulling together all the parts of the world, and all the peoples in the world". Even for post-Arusha Tanzania, this still meant that if the American people decided to build up "their stocks of sisal or coffee or cotton, then we can get good prices for the goods we sell on the world market. Equally, if they decide to reduce their stocks, the prices we obtain will drop. … These things", as Nyerere summed up, "are the result of the technology and trade patterns

of the century in which we live".[26] At the same time, the title of the essay, "Argue Don't Shout", indicated that for all the ideological fervor associated with the post-Arusha era, Tanzanian foreign policy still strove for rational pragmatism.[27]

A complete withdrawal from the world market not being a serious option, the only response left open to Tanzania thus was to push for a comprehensive regulatory framework that organized globalization along lines beneficial to the country. As Nyerere decried continuously, the primary structural cause of Tanzania's underdevelopment was not the lack of aid, but the chaos of the "free, unregulated" world market with its daily price fluctuations and inequalities in production capacities which allowed industrialized countries to produce more cheaply or to force down prices through buffer stocks. As Nyerere pointed out: "Our development plans can be reduced to absurdity by market changes…which are beyond our control and which we cannot even anticipate." Market volatilities as well as underdevelopment, Nyerere was convinced, could only be brought under control through a "world economic development plan": just as nation-states governed trade within their national units, they had to organize "planned trade" globally through new international trade arrangements and institutions.[28]

At this point, international organizations entered the equation, even though Nyerere believed that they had to reshape their mission in order to make a difference for Tanzania. In their present state, Nyerere lamented time and again, international organizations such as the FAO were mere "charity organization[s]" that were "not able to deal with the basic problem of international poverty", since their work could have "only the most marginal effect on the problems" and could be "wiped out at any time by the 'forces of the market'."[29] Rather than just being aid providers, Nyerere believed, international organizations had to transform into engines of global regulation that brokered new global trade arrangements.

Tanzania, therefore, hailed and actively supported the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development which assembled for the first time in Geneva in 1964 (UNCTAD I), with further conferences following in New Delhi (UNCTAD II; 1968), Santiago de Chile (UNCTAD III; 1972), Nairobi (UNCTAD IV; 1976), and Manila (UNCTAD V; 1979). UNCTAD offered a country like Tanzania several practical advantages. For one, in contrast to the World Bank or the IMF, its voting procedures and the composition of its bodies assured a Tanzanian role in global decision-making. Second, UNCTAD's global approach not only opened the prospect for truly multilateral and worldwide binding arrangements,

but also provided a corrective of power asymmetries. Indeed, aware that Tanzania's negotiation leverage itself was highly limited, Tanzania joined in forming the group of 77 during UNCTAD I – a "trade union of the poor"[30] as Nyerere liked to call it – whose stirring founding declaration pledged to work towards new economic agreements on a global scale. Still existing today, the group of 77 became an important forum through which Third World countries prepared for the UNCTAD conferences and pooled their negotiating power, if seldom effectively. Third, Nyerere saw UNCTAD as a vital means to correct what he perceived as the principal flaw of GATT, namely the most-favoured nation clause which prevented Tanzania from gaining trade advantages over other and often stronger export economies. Finally, for a country with a small foreign ministry such as Tanzania, UNCTAD conferences also were an indispensable opportunity to meet with other leaders or officials in order to coordinate positions. After all, in the mid-1960s, Tanzania had only 11 embassies worldwide.[31]

Tanzania's high expectations regarding UNCTAD reflected its concern both with the shape of globalization as well as with its perceived threat to Tanzanian sovereignty. From the point of view of the Tanzanian government, UNCTAD offered solutions for both: it promised to change the structure of the global economy and it left the Nyerere government in control of social and economic changes within Tanzanian society, one of the principal elements of sovereignty as Nyerere saw it. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Nyerere therefore became one of the most vocal spokesman for UNCTAD's vision of a regulated global economy, someone who educated Western and Third World audiences in countless speeches and articles about the flaws of present global trade patterns and their impact on Tanzania's development efforts.[32]

Clearing house of global governance? The United Nations and the global economic order

In contrast to institutions such as the FAO, the World Bank or the GATT – created by Western governments around 1945 – UNCTAD was one of the first major institutions set up at the initiative of developing countries during the early 1960s.[33] This situation had two important implications: for one, it was clear from the beginning that it was an institution of the developing world and would act accordingly. And, secondly, it was equally clear that it could only accomplish its mission if it managed to build up its own actor capabilities.

Indeed, in retrospect, it is surprising to see how quickly the UNCTAD secretariat managed to do just that – to build an institution that stood on its own feet, yet argued for the interests of the developing world. Much of this was the merit of its first secretary general, Raùl Prebisch, the energetic former chairman of the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America. Already months in advance of the first UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, Prebisch began to travel around the world and circulate a conceptual paper to participating governments. Entitled "Towards a new trade policy for development", the so-called *Prebisch Report* soon proved extremely influential since it framed not only the questions to be addressed at the conference but, in the long run, also defined the issues of the global development agenda of the late 1960s and 1970s.[34] National development, Prebisch argued in the report, was deeply intertwined with world trade which, on the one hand, was problematic, but also opened opportunities for developing countries. It was problematic, Prebisch pointed out, because globalization led to a widening trade gap in developing countries which exported less low-price primary commodities than they imported high-cost manufactured products and investments (this was a line of thought that dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein would pursue further in subsequent years). At the same time, though, globalization offered the solution for developing countries, because it could "induce export-mindedness", would lead to the development of efficient production capacities, and thereby would close the trade gap.

Yet, as Prebisch underlined in his report, world trade had to be regulated in order to yield benefits for developing countries. To this end, he advanced a comprehensive set of measures intended to govern globalization, of which three were especially important: compensatory financing, steps in commodity trade, and actions in manufactured exports. Compensatory financing, Prebisch emphasized, was necessary in order to compensate for deteriorating terms of trade and to balance the flow of resources. With regard to trade in primary commodities, Prebisch advocated price-stabilization schemes through the regulation of supply, export quotas, and import quotas and appealed for greater access of developing countries to Western markets by setting import targets and reducing trade barriers such as taxes and tariffs. In addition, Prebisch appealed for new international commodity agreements which should be "more comprehensive and cover the various aspects of international trade". On industrial exports from developing countries, Prebisch opined that two broad initiatives would be required. First,

obstacles to exports should be eliminated in all "great industrial centers". Second, the "active promotion of exports should be undertaken both in the developing countries themselves and on the international plane". Going one step further, Prebisch also introduced the idea of a "system of preferences" which would "help the industries of developing countries to overcome the difficulties that they encounter in export markets because of their initial high costs" and would protect "infant industries". The optimum solution, Prebisch stressed, would of course be a "free entry" formula for imports from developing countries. Thus being a far-reaching and ambitious effort to create a regulative framework for globalization, the report closed with a rough sketch of an alternative institutional machinery that would guide the implementation of those rules. Here, Prebisch openly rejected the GATT as a possible institutional focal point and recommended the establishment of a secretariat and of a standing committee under the auspices of a United Nations conference, such as the UNCTAD. Those bodies would fulfil the task of international supervision and should, as he demanded, take a global and integrated approach to development problems.

The *Prebisch Report* had a considerable impact around the world, not least within the US administration. As a strategy paper prepared in advance of the first conference summed up American concerns, UNCTAD's major proposal constituted "an overall attack on the most-favoured nation principle and on basing trade on comparative efficiencies". The report also cautioned that the so-called less-developed countries "also envisage a drastic transformation of the institutional structure for handling trade and development matters".[35] Indeed, the course of the conference itself did not ease such concerns. Particularly George Ball, undersecretary of state, came away from the meeting in Geneva with the impression that "the Conference has become an organized pressure campaign designed to force a massive transfer of resources from the industrialized countries to the less-developed countries by pegging prices and manipulating world trading patterns". Noting that "Dr. Prebisch … has managed to whip up a high degree of enthusiasm among his clients",[36] Ball warned: "We should also recognize that this is not a one-shot affair. We are participating in the formation of a mechanism in the UN that will exert continuing pressure on the policies of governments."[37]

Those warnings were indeed quite prescient, and UNCTAD soon set to work to establish variations of such permanent pressure mechanisms, as Prebisch sought to transform UNCTAD into a dynamic international actor in its own right. UNCTAD, as Prebisch liked to put it, was to become

an "action agency"[38] that acted on all levels and fostered compliance to its regulatory norms through different means. One of those means was the production of knowledge. As James Scott has shown, expert knowledge was the key resource of "high modernism" – a "particularly sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied" to plan, design, and command social and economic progress.[39] In line with such thinking, which postulated a new role for experts and was marked by the can-do-belief in comprehensive planning and the manageability of change, Prebisch and his successors worked hard to make UNCTAD a leading transmitter and producer of knowledge about globalization. The underlying assumption here was that objective knowledge would create compulsory pressure for global action or would at least provide an objective rationale for the norms UNCTAD advocated. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s numerous studies commissioned by UNCTAD therefore underlined and validated its case by either showing how trading patterns and price hikes were prolonging underdevelopment or by calling for action to correct the asymmetries of globalization.[40] Many of those studies became important reference works for economists and accelerated the rise of the dependency theory, as thinkers such as Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, Walther Rodney or Dieter Senghaas picked up on UNCTAD's ideas and expanded on them in many ways.

In addition, Prebisch sought to improve UNCTAD's institutional effectiveness and to coordinate actions with other international organizations. Within UNCTAD, for instance, he attempted for some time to centralize intergovernmental coordination within the secretariat in order to foster consensus and to avoid the emergence of wearying stalemates within UNCTAD's commissions.[41] At the same time, he reached out to other international organizations and entered into negotiations with the World Bank about a supplementary financing facility that compensated underdeveloped countries for export losses and supplemented the short-term grants of the IMF's "Compensatory Financing Facility".[42] Moreover, in conjunction with the FAO, Prebisch also explored possibilities to establish mechanisms that stabilized raw material prices.[43]

Yet UNCTAD's most efficient instrument in building itself up as a new institution was doubtless its public diplomacy, all the more so as the global revolution in mass communications increasingly led to the emergence of a global public. All UNCTAD conferences were therefore prepared and launched as major newsworthy events. As a result, they were broadcast and observed around the world and thereby raised global awareness for the problems UNCTAD discussed.[44] In this sense, UNCTAD

could command a tremendous "discourse power" with conferences and resolutions that shaped the course of global debates about globalization. Accordingly, all UNCTAD conference meetings were global publicity events during which different state, non-state, and international actors sought to tap into UNCTAD's discourse power by issuing ringing declarations, challenging speeches, or generous promises: INGOs, for example, often disseminated pamphlets during conferences with titles such as "UNCTAD 3: Make-Or-Break for Development"[45] in order to call attention to globalization's problems.

One should not belittle such efforts as irrelevant rhetoric. In fact UNCTAD's public role reflected important shifts within the international system where transnational communication became more and more important for global action, as it identified problems, raised awareness, and established norms.[46] Because of their public diplomacy value, the major UNCTAD conferences often spawned significant achievements or put new issues on the global agenda. UNCTAD II, for example, which took place in 1968, marked the breakthrough of a generalized system of preferences, precisely because the Lyndon Johnson Administration saw it as "the subject on which the US will gain its greatest psychological advantage".[47] Accordingly, developed countries conformed to the "early establishment of a mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences",[48] as the unanimously adopted Resolution 21 stated.[49] A few years later, in 1971, both GATT and the European Economic Community formally adopted the generalized system of preferences by deferring the most-favoured nation clause when it came to underdeveloped countries, and the United States later followed suit – a major UNCTAD achievement.

By that time Prebisch had already departed UNCTAD, yet he had left behind an institution that was well positioned to make an impact, as UNCTAD III demonstrated in 1972: characterized by a heated atmosphere and bitter clashes between developed and underdeveloped countries, UNCTAD III moved the issue of multinational corporations into the global spotlight and called for the regulation of their activities. Another major issue was a Mexican proposal for a global "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties" that defined norms and obligations for economic activities. The conference made such an impression on President of the European Commission Sicco Mansholt, that he soon began to lecture US officials about the need for quick action along UNCTAD's lines. As Peter Flanigan, Nixon's assistant for international economic affairs, reported from a meeting with the Europeans: "Mansholt responded with a long speech which began by noting what

he believed was a growing sentiment in European public opinion and parliaments about the future of relations between the developed and developing countries. He said that, in comparison with the 'minor' economic problems among developed countries, those between developed and developing economies were much more serious." Highly concerned with European public opinion, Mansholt pleaded for radical action: "[H]e said, the real issue is that income from future growth needs to be distributed more extensively to the LDC's to close the gap. This should be done by heavy new taxation in developed countries…, and by trading arrangements to organize markets in favour of LDC exports."[50] In the following years, the European Commission indeed drew its conclusions from UNCTAD III and signed the Lomé Convention with several African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries in 1975. The convention set up a fund for stabilizing export gains that encompassed 29 export products. Another one of UNCTAD's defining norms thus had been put into practice, even if this only pertained to a section of the world economy.[51]

The Lomé Convention was passed against the background of two landmark UN declarations which had further escalated North–South clashes on a rhetorical level since UNCTAD III, namely the "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" and a "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States".[52] Passed a few months after the oil-price shock, the declaration on the NIEO and its accompanying Action Programme created a new sense of urgency, even though most of the measures they demanded had already been formulated within UNCTAD, among them, for example, non-reciprocal trade preferences for developing countries, more balanced prices between exports and imports, and the regulation of multinational corporations. As the declaration noted on the last point, each state had the "full permanent sovereignty…over its natural resources and all economic activities" and "the right to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the State". In December 1974, the UN General Assembly followed up on these declarations by passing the "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States", which once again explicitly stressed "the urgency to establish generally accepted norms to govern international economic relations systematically".[53]

Although all of these regulatory items, to be sure, had been discussed in UNCTAD before, a shared sense of urgency, Third World empowerment and the prospect of a short-term implementation of these propositions within a United Nations context contributed to a widely shared

perception that North–South relations had reached a turning point. More important, all three resolutions suddenly propelled the United Nations itself to the centre of the conflict about globalization. This, in turn, opened up new institutional opportunities to re-position the United Nations as a "catalytic agent",[54] as UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim called it, that brought together governments, experts, and leaders from all fields of society in order to coordinate global problem-solving strategies. "[G]lobal problems", Waldheim liked to say, required "global solutions", and the United Nations were "the only organization with the membership and the machinery to make such a response".[55] As a result, under Waldheim's leadership not only did global UN conferences and summits flourish, but United Nations relations with NGOs also improved considerably. Waldheim himself had frequent correspondence with key NGOs, such as the Club of Rome,[56] and UN agencies in the field began to deepen technical cooperation, coordination of material assistance and consultation on projects with NGOs. In addition, the United Nations' Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) commissioned several studies in the early 1970s in order to seek ways of improvement in UN–NGO relations.[57] This was an important departure from former practice, for at the beginning of the 1970s, there still existed surprisingly little cooperation between NGOs and UN agencies.[58]

Those developments were important, because they assured that UNCTAD's agenda and calls for a NIEO voiced at the United Nations had considerable impact on the thinking of development NGOs whose numbers soared during the 1970s.[59] As a result, NGOs were not only present at UNCTAD conferences but actively contributed in contesting globalization. OXFAM, for example, is one of the bigger NGOs engaged in public campaigns in Western European countries in order to educate publics about the ostensible fallacies of the world economy.[60] Likewise, West German NGOs such as "Aktion 3. Welt" and "GEPA" began to set up a system of fair trade during the 1970s under which they sold Third World products at higher prices in special stores – today being a significant business. Both NGOs also engaged in public advocacy for a reform of world trade.[61] The Club of Rome, too, picked up on the NIEO, hosting a number of conferences on "The North–South Crisis of Human Society" (1974) as well as on "The New International Order", in 1976 publishing the RIO report, which translated the broad principles of the NIEO into concrete realizable measures.[62] Overall, a study commissioned by the OECD found that many Western NGOs put their programmatic emphasis on structural problems of the world economy during the 1970s.[63]

International organizations in a transnational age

Reflecting on the "present state of North–South negotiations" in early 1977, one of Waldheim's aides noted: "[T]he developing countries expressed profound concern and frustration about the very limited progress achieved – both within UN bodies, such as UNCTAD, and at the Paris conference – in the implementation of the decisions made at the Seventh Special Session."[64] Indeed, by the end of the 1970s the feeling was widespread that the era of global reform within a United Nations framework had come to an end, visibly symbolized by the World Bank's "Brandt Commission", which signalled that now the World Bank was becoming the major problem-solving forum for conflicting North–South issues. This had two main reasons. For one, UNCTAD's claim to regulate detailed aspects of globalization simply proved overambitious in practice and often caused bitter nit-picking in UNCTAD's bodies. Secondly, conflicting interests between industrialized nations and underdeveloped nations as well as within the bloc of underdeveloped countries often made the building of consensus a troublesome process.

Still, as this chapter has shown from different angles, UNCTAD was nonetheless a major player within the international system during the 1960s and 1970s since it responded to, as much as reflected, the end of territorial sovereignty. Seen from Tanzania, UNCTAD offered a promising vehicle to contest globalization and to push for comprehensive global reform. UNCTAD itself, in the meantime, not only defined norms and produced important expertise, but also inspired global discourse that often led to coordinated transnational action on all different layers, ranging from codes of conduct to NGO-organized fair-trade arrangements. Along the way, UNCTAD could also score a few successes, such as the realization of a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 1968–1971, the new trade arrangements set forth in the Lomé Agreement, or the three commodity agreements (on sugar, rubber, and cocoa), UNCTAD brokered until the end of the 1970s.

In terms of global governance, however, the broader contribution of UNCTAD and of the UN points in two further directions. In contesting globalization, UNCTAD worked as a catalyst for other international organizations such as the OECD, GATT, and the World Bank, which either took up UNCTAD positions or were used as a counterforce by Western nation-states. This not only gave international organizations a new voice in world politics, but also made them a new "sphere of authority". Moreover, through launching global discourses that mobilized civil

society actors, UNCTAD also paved the way for what today has become a lively anti-globalization movement around the world.

Notes

1. Henry Kissinger (1999: 953).
2. The term "International Organizations" is used here in a broad sense, meaning formalized border-crossing structures that are generally seen as actors by states and civil society. See Madeleine Herren (2009: 6).
3. For lack of better alternatives, I use interchangeably the terms "Third World", "underdeveloped country", etc., while yet being aware of their highly problematic nature.
4. See, on the history of UNCTAD, Ian Taylor and Karen Smith (2007), UNCTAD (2004) and John Toye and Richard Toye (2004).
5. Charles Maier (2000). Maier observes: "The capacity of traditional territorial units, nation-states, ... to keep their peoples from being buffeted by globalization has drastically diminished."
6. Charles Maier (2000).
7. David Held and Anthony McGrew (2006: 8), James Rosenau (2006: 71) and Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg (2006).
8. James Rosenau (2006: 72).
9. James Rosenau (2006: 72).
10. Julius Nyerere, "The Process of Liberation", Speech at Ibadan University, Nigeria, 17 November 1976, Nyerere Foundation, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania.
11. From 1962 to 1964, when it entered a Union with Zanzibar, Tanzania was called Tanganyika, but for the sake of clarity I will use Tanzania throughout the article.
12. Frederick Cooper (2002: 86).
13. On these numbers, see also Ankie Hoogvelt (1997: 72–74). For another introduction to the history of globalization, see Harold James (1997). Since the mid-1960s, however, economic nationalism often led to a decrease in trade between First and Third World countries.
14. See Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson (2004: 93).
15. See T.J. Aldington (1975: especially 59–60). Accessed at the National Museum of Tanzania, Dar Es Salaam. For similar numbers see Cranford Pratt (1976: 175).
16. See Juergen Herzog (1986: 202–201).
17. See especially the pages of the *Sunday News* published in Dar Es Salaam.
18. *Sunday News*, 23 December 1962.
19. Julius Nyerere (1963: 231–251, 232–233).
20. G. M. S. Mawalla (1975). See, for an example of advertising efforts in Canada: "Tanzania: At African Place", published by the Ministry of Information and Tourism, Dar Es Salaam, undated, Box "Tanzania – General", African History Reading Room, Library of Congress, Washington DC.
21. Julius Nyerere (1966: 157–174, 166).
22. See Julius Nyerere, "The Process of Liberation", Speech at Ibadan University, Nigeria, 17 November 1976, Nyerere Foundation, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania.
23. See Julius Nyerere (1966: 162–171).

24. "The Arusha Declaration", 29 January 1967, in *Freedom and Socialism*, 231–250.

25. See James Brennan (2002: 330–331).

26. RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967–1969, Box 2512, NA II. Nyerere, Argue Don't Shout. An Official Guide on Foreign Policy by the President, undated, but likely 1969. See also AmEmbassy Dar Es Salaam to Secstate WashDC, "Argue Don't Shout", 1 August 1969, ibid.

27. See also "The President Explains the Arusha Declaration", undated, but very likely 1967, Box "Tanzania – Speeches", African History Reading Room, LOC. Here, Nyerere stresses again the necessity of remaining involved in international trade.

28. Julius Nyerere (1963: 244–246).

29. Julius Nyerere (1963: 249–250).

30. Folder: Nyerere Documents, No. 3, National Central Library, Dar Es Salaam: Julius Nyerere, Unity for a New Order, Address to the Ministerial Conference of the Group of 77, 12 February 1979.

31. See Ministry of External Affairs, An Official Record of Foreign Policy of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1, 1 (April 1965), 22, East African Collection, Library of the University of Dar Es Salaam, Dar Es Salaam.

32. See for example, Julius Nyerere, "The Third World and the International Economic Structure", Address given in the Federal Republic of Germany, 4 May 1976, Box "Tanzania – Speeches", African History Reading Room, Library of Congress, Washington DC Nyerere enjoyed enormous personal prestige abroad, especially among Western intellectuals who, as Kenyan political scientist Ali Mazrui commented jokingly, suffered from "Tanzaphilia". Quoted in Andreas Eckert (2007: 218).

33. UN Resolution 1707 (XVI), 19.12.1961: International Trade as the Primary Instrument for Economic Development.

34. For the *Prebisch Report*, see the accompanying CD attached to UNCTAD, Beyond Conventional Wisdom. Report accessible at http://unctad.org/en/docs/edm20044_En.pdf, date accessed 20 January 2014.

35. George Ball, UNCTAD Strategy Paper, 24 February 1964, NSF, Country File, Box 293, LBJL.

36. FRUS XXXIII: Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, 1964–68, doc. 292, Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson, 30 March 1964.

37. National Security File, Country File, Box 293, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. George Ball to McGeorge Bundy, UNCTAD, 3 March 1964.

38. NSF, Box 294, LBJL. US UN New York to State Department, UNCTAD-First TDB Meeting, 25 May 1965.

39. See James Scott (1998: 4, 89).

40. NSF, Box 293, LBJL. US Mission Geneva and State Department, Round-Up Third Week, UNCTAD-TDB II, 19 September 1965.

41. NSF, Box 293, LBJL. US UN and State Department, UNCTAD-Preferences, 11 June 1965.

42. See Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis and Richard Webb (1997: 190).

43. See John Toye and Richard Toye (2004: 219).

44. See for example "UNCTAD – Intenciones para 2070" *Confirmado*, 15 February 1968 (Biblioteca Nacional, Buenos Aires, Argentina); "UNCTAD II at New

Delhi – A Supplement" *Times of India* 1 February 1968 (Widener Library, Harvard University); "Das Tribunal der Armen" *Die Zeit* 5 May 1972; "Square-Off in Nairobi", *Time* 10 May 1976. Examples could be multiplied easily.

45. S-0988, Box 3, UN Archive, NY. "UNCTAD 3. Make-Or-Break for Development. A Special World Development Movement Report", London 1972.
46. See, for example, Ann Marie Clark (2001).
47. NSF, Files of Edward R. Fried, Box 1, LBJL. USIA, News Policy Note, Unctad II, 24 January 1968.
48. See UNCTAD resolution 21 (II).
49. On US preparations for UNCTAD II see: NSF, Files of Edward R. Fried, Box 1, LBJL. Department of State to all diplomatic and consular posts, UNCTAD II, 27 December 1967.
50. FRUS, 1969–1972, vol. III: Foreign Economic Policy, Document no. 91: Report by the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) Washington, 20 June 1972, Attachment 2: Brussels, 1 June 1972. Conversation with EC Commission President Sicco Mansholt.
51. See, on these issues, Urban Vahsen (2009: 241–274). The fund was called STABEX Fonds zur Stabilisierung der Exportgewinne (STABEX).
52. UN General Assembly Resolutions 3202 (S-VI) and 3201 (S-VI). Accessible at http://www.un-documents.net, date accessed 20 January 2014.
53. UN Resolution 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted 12 December 1974. Accessible at http://www.un-documents.net, date accessed 20 January 2014.
54. S-273, Box 10, UN Archive. "Draft Speech by the Secretary-General on 'The World Food and Energy Crisis – The Role of International Organizations'", New York, 9 May 1974.
55. Box S-0273, Executive Office of the Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, Speeches and Addresses, UN Archive, NY. Draft Speech by the Secretary-General on "The World Food and Energy Crisis – The Role of International Organizations", New York, 9 May 1974.
56. See Box S-0974–0003, UN Archive, NY. Waldheim's correspondence with the Club of Rome.
57. See, for example, ECOSOC Resolution 1580 (L). One study determined the contribution of NGOs to the International Development Strategy by sending out a detailed questionnaire to NGOs.
58. See S-0935, Box 6, UN Archive. Statement by Mr. Bradford Morse to the Bureau of Conference of Non-governmental Organizations in consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council, 13 September 1972.
59. See Colette Chabbott (1999: 222–248, 227).
60. See for example "OXFAM rethinks", *New Society*, 30 May 1974, pp. 497–498 and Robin Sharp (1976), both accessed at the British Library, London. On OXFAM, see Maggie Black (1992).
61. See Claudia Oleginiczak (1999: 120–124). See also Bastian Hein (2006: 129–135) (on UNCTAD).
62. Box S-0974–0003, UN Archive, New York.
63. OECD (1988).
64. S-0911, Box 1, UN Archive. Notes on Present State of North–South negotiations, 22 February 1977.

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