CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

Challenges and Opportunities

Edited by
Toyin Falola & Emmanuel M. Mbah

Contemporary Africa

African Histories and Modernities

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By Munyaradzi B. Munochiveyi

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*To Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, for his struggle
and vision for a free Africa.*

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Acknowledgments

Figure 0.1 Map of Modern Africa

Introduction: Change and Continuity in Contemporary Africa

Toyin Falola and Emmanuel M. Mbah

INTRODUCTION

The optimism that characterized the African struggle for independence between 1945 and 1960 quickly dissipated once the statesmen of the continent's respective nations realized how many unsettling issues and challenges created during the period of European colonial rule needed to be addressed. Fifty years after independence, African nations still find it difficult to establish meaningful, democratic governing institutions that could permanently eradicate graft, unwarranted patronage, and corruption; to configure self-reliant economies capable of redressing the poverty gap and cater to the developmental needs of the people of the continent; and to establish concrete social structures centered on the advancement of gender equality, protection of women's rights, and promotion of education and health care. Because colonial authorities only paid lip service to these and other socioeconomic issues, African statesmen inherited a continent marred by a litany of almost unmanageable challenges. Their inability to deal with so many problems at once is symptomatic of the dysfunction that continues to afflict these new nations to this day. The challenges are even tougher because personal differences and ethnic cleavages created during colonial rule have produced many disputes and stifled inter- and intrastate dialogue. Thus, the numerous promises made during the struggle for independence—such as eradication of hunger and poverty; better health-care and educational facilities and services; modernization through expansions in infrastructure, job creation,

and many others that were supposed to improve the standards of living on the continent—never materialized.

While scholars are not definitive about the extent to which the European intrusion during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries exacerbated Africa's problems, it is an incontrovertible axiom that the colonial legacy remains one of the continent's major obstacles. Of course, some improvements have taken place in industry, infrastructure, travel, education, and internally developed projects as well as in the expansion of democratic institutions, particularly the increasing role of civil society in social and economic development. But the colonial legacy remains a problem, especially because African economies are still dependent on the West and China, which too often dictate what to produce, production quotas, and prices. African economies are also overly dependent on the developed world for technology, skill, and expertise. As a result, the resources of the continent continue, as during the colonial days, to be "transferred abroad in various forms: sales of its raw materials; high prices for imports; and a never-ending servicing of loans."[1]

The Challenges

At the 2000 United Nations (UN) Millennium Summit, durable peace, security, protection of human rights, and sustainable development were recognized among a list of eight goals, known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),[2] which are to be attained worldwide by 2015. MDGs are considered prescriptions for socioeconomic innovations, progress and growth, and advancements to make people's lives better. However, thus far, the realization of these goals has been largely absent in contemporary Africa. For Africa, development involves harnessing state resources to sustain its citizens and to provide avenues for raising standards of living while reducing unemployment, poverty, and inequality. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the attainment of desirable levels of development has been a tall order; societies in this broad region have been influenced considerably by Western culture, mainly through global economic, political, and social networks that date back to the colonial period. Thus, Sub-Saharan African economies, from the late nineteenth century until today, continue to mirror economic patterns that have been progressively implanted by mostly Western nations and, more recently, China.

Mineral extraction and the agricultural sector comprise Africa's primary commodities in Western and Chinese markets, for which it

receives manufactured goods, near-obsolete technology, insufficient financial capital, and ill-adapted cultural practices in return. Over the years, low levels of manufacturing and industrial production have resulted in Africa's dependence on overseas markets, the results of which have been aptly described by April and Donald Gordon:

> So far, the "integration" of Africa into the global economy has largely gone badly for most countries on the continent as the cost of foreign imports compared to the prices of African exports has often been unfavorable to Africa, leaving almost all countries, most of their people in poverty, and living standards among the lowest in the world. Only a minority of African countries are prospering and relatively few Africans have been able to acquire more than a few tokens of the promised life the developed world symbolizes.[3]

The absence of development in Africa is characterized by the inability of many of its nations to address a multitude of socioeconomic challenges—many of which are reflected in the eight MDGs, such as too much debt, poverty, inequality, hunger, gender issues, lack of adequate health care, and environmental challenges. In this introductory chapter, we examine, albeit briefly, some of these challenges, beginning with Africa's huge debt.

The Debt Problem

The debt problem is a major challenge and a principal inhibitor to development in contemporary Africa. Africa has the highest foreign debt "when measured in relation to economic output."[4] Repayment rates are very high such that many debtor nations have not been able to service their massive obligations. Economic policies designed to address the African debt problem and foster development, such as market capitalism, centralized social systems, and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, have been attempted. Many such policies have, however, failed miserably because they have been designed from the outside by bureaucrats who are not in touch with the experiences of everyday Africans.[5] SAPs, for example, did very little to reduce African debt; the program only further destroyed the African socioeconomic fabric. Too much debt with little development can only translate to economic standstill and/or regression, and that characterized African economies in the decades since the attainment of independence.

Unemployment, Poverty, and Hunger

The absence of development and long-term failure of economic policies, including those related to debt management, means that many more people are unemployed and go hungry on the continent today than before. Poverty is rampant. Limited access to food and its impact on African societies are major challenges that can, in part, be traced as a result of the introduction of the plantation economy for the production of cash crops such as cotton, coffee, cocoa, peanuts, and rubber. These export crops were designed to fulfill the needs of foreign markets during the period of colonial rule. Food production has also been affected by environmental issues and disasters, such as the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s that led to a famine affecting roughly 70 percent of Africa's population. Population increases, rural-urban migrations, inadequate transportation, and storage systems, insecurity resulting from conflict, terrorism, and dictatorship, and unsound government policies represent other serious problems.[6]

Rapid population growth and urbanization in countries such as Nigeria often translated into fewer job opportunities and social services and hence slow rate of economic growth, especially when policies to enhance growth and create employment are bureaucratized or not taken seriously. Agriculture in rural communities has been neglected due to the absence of technology and financial capital. Lack of technology and resources means that people have to cultivate or graze cattle on deteriorating lands. The result is poor yields, more structural unemployment, rural-urban migration in search of jobs (complicating the socioeconomic and political problems of urban centers), and rural decay or the development of ghost villages in many areas. These problems crystallize into intolerance, conflict, and insecurity, as is happening in many Sub-Saharan African countries like Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Central African Republic, the Sudans, Somalia, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In the past, the large and extended African families and similar sociocultural institutions have served as safety nets for many Africans during hard times; however, the current trend is for well-to-do Africans to adopt the "Western nuclear-family model," leaving millions of poor people to deal with their individual hardships.[7] In a continent where the gap between the rich and the poor is increasing at an alarming rate and where there are fewer economic opportunities for the poor, elevating the living conditions for the poorest through job-creating investments will remain the soundest solution in the fight against hunger and poverty.

Women, Poverty, and Inequality

If there is one group that is afflicted inordinately by hunger and poverty in Africa, it is women. Their perceived unequal status in many areas only complicates the challenges they encounter on a daily basis. Raising the economic status of women and increasing their role in development in Africa is, therefore, an imperative challenge for a number of reasons. First, more African women than men live below the poverty line, usually on less than US $1.25 per day. Because more women on the continent are uneducated, their access to economic resources is minimal, and poverty runs amok among their ranks, especially those living in rural areas.[8]

Second, in many parts of the continent, traditional cultural practices, such as those regulating land tenure and ownership, do not favor women. These practices place a major constraint on the socioeconomic empowerment of women in Africa. Discriminatory land tenure arrangements have made it that close to 80 percent of rural women in Africa perform agricultural work that benefits men. It is true that legal reforms are being enacted and implemented in some countries to address issues of discrimination and marginalization of women, but in many rural agrarian localities women are yet to take advantage of these new policies because they lack education. Therefore, education is very important for the empowerment of rural African women; with education, they will be able to understand and mitigate legal nuances that would place them in a better position to protect and further their rights.[9]

Third, the issue of climate change impacts women's agricultural productivity and access to water in Africa, which needs urgent attention. Because rural African women depend heavily on farming for food and income, climate change, with its unpredictable weather patterns, is having a negative effect on soil quality, leading to reduced levels of food production. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) predicts that access to water will also pose grave challenges to women in the future, "an extra two million people in sub-Saharan Africa are going to be affected by water shortages and the majority of these are women," especially because "water collection, a task that typically falls on women and children in developing countries, could become increasingly burdensome."[10]

Innovations in renewable energy, such as solar energy, are one way of improving the livelihoods of rural African women in the most environmentally unfriendly parts of the continent, and doing so will create "opportunities for skills building, diversified livelihoods, and

leadership development" for these women.[11] "Achieving rapid poverty reduction and sustainable human development in Africa," the UNDP asserts, "depends essentially on how fast the well-being of women is enhanced through socio-economic empowerment and sustained livelihoods."[12]

Health Care

Health care remains a major obstacle on the path to development and social progress for many African nations, both in terms of the resources spent to treat diseases and the diseases' debilitating effects on health and productivity in the continent. But despite the almost insurmountable health-care challenge the continent faces, health infrastructures remain inadequate and outmoded and delivery systems are inefficient. The patient-to-medical practitioner ratios are unacceptable in most parts of the continent at a time when much attention is needed to address diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria. The challenge of HIV/AIDS and its effects on development and society in contemporary Africa requires particular attention.

HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS remains one of the greatest health-care challenges facing many African countries in terms of cost of health-care facilities and infrastructures, medicine, death rates, burden on family members, and governmental expenditure. While some progress in the provision of drugs to patients and a reduction in the number of new infections have been registered, the spread of the pandemic has not been contained in the continent.[13] There are more HIV/AIDS patients in Africa than in any other continent. With barely 11 percent of the world's population, 67 percent of people living with HIV/AIDS in the world belong to this continent. In 2008, there were an estimated 22.4 million HIV/AIDS patients in the continent, 1.9 million of which were considered new infections. The pandemic has also resulted in 14 million orphaned children in Africa.[14] What these numbers suggest is that policies to halt the pandemic have been elusive.

In a 2006 publication, Amy Patterson examines three principal issues that impact the politics of AIDS in Africa. These include "the magnitude of the disease, the inequalities that surround the pandemic, and the role of formal and informal institutions in shaping AIDS policies."[15] As to the first issue, the magnitude of the disease, Patterson notes that life expectancy in Africa has plummeted to below 50 years and that the pandemic has resulted in an overall reduction

in the African labor force by as much as 35 percent in some countries. The labor reductions are manifested through the deaths of civil servants, professionals, and agricultural workers. Too many AIDS patients mean a reduction not only in government employees but also in the governments' capacity to provide services, including those who deal with the prevention and treatment of the disease.

As to the second issue, namely the inequalities that surround the pandemic, Patterson argues that more African women than men are infected with HIV/AIDS because of issues such as sexual violence, the compulsion to bear children despite the risk of infection, and entrapment in polygamous marriages and relationships. These issues have been premised by women's lack of economic power. Because more African women than men are illiterate, they have been politically and economically marginalized. As a result, Patterson argues,

> women's limited economic power shapes the life choices they make—marriage, formal or informal employment, commercial sex work, or relationships with male sponsors. A woman's economic dependence on her husband or boyfriend often makes it impossible to refuse sex or negotiate for condom use even if she knows her partner has had other sexual relationships.[16]

Finally, as to the role of formal and informal institutions in shaping AIDS policies, Patterson points out, AIDS must receive adequate consideration in African politics. AIDS organizations, civil society, and the donor community need to develop sustained interest and commitment as well as devote considerable resources in the struggle.[17]

Considering the statistics cited, it appears that little has changed in how the HIV/AIDS pandemic has been addressed on the continent in the more than six years after the publication of Patterson's book. Indeed, the pandemic is holding hostage the continent's development and social progress. Education remains one of the best weapons in the fight against HIV/AIDS in the continent. While education should be pursued through forms of training that eliminate misconceptions associated with the disease, it should also aim at the forms of empowerment that enable people, especially women, to make good health decisions.[18]

Child Mortality and Maternal Health

While child mortality rates in Africa have improved, more African children still suffer from disease, hunger, and malnutrition compared to children in other parts of the world. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for

example, children have a higher rate of HIV/AIDS infection, passed mainly through mother-to-child transmission or through breastfeeding. Poverty rates are higher among Sub-Saharan African children who, like women, lack political and economic power and representation in many of these countries. As a result, children have been abducted and exploited for labor, sex, and exploitation in warfare. These factors expose children to sexual exploitation and abuse at tender ages and increase their vulnerability to HIV/AIDS infection and early death.[19]

Environmental Sustainability

The African continent is rich in natural resources, but its resources are being depleted at an alarming rate. Heightened deforestation in many countries in West and Central Africa are a result, in part, of logging activities by local and foreign companies, but also from indigenous need for firewood due to the absence of alternative sources of fuel. Deforestation has resulted in the destruction of the top soil leading to soil erosion. Oil exploitation has decimated many hitherto sustainable lands in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Overexploitation of resources is a serious impediment to registering any progress in poverty reduction and economic development, and it may result in an even greater challenge of scarcity for future generations. The consequence of unsustainable exploitation is "global climate change, from which Africa is expected to experience growing and disproportionate negative impacts."[20]

Sustainable development needs to be pursued such that the environment is also protected. It is in this regard that Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, the President of the General Assembly of the UN, declared in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in January 2011:

> Poverty reduction and sustainable development are crucial themes not only for the future of Africa, but also for the whole world. Our common welfare is at stake. In the globalized world of the twenty-first century, problems no longer have a passport and we can no longer ignore what is happening elsewhere, be it pandemics, migration or international terrorism. Global strategies are required to meet these new challenges. This calls for a system of global governance that is effective, inclusive and representative.[21]

Many of the developmental and social challenges Africa faces today can be given some measure of resolution if the system of global

governance emphasizes Africa's role and responsibilities in a world where communication, consultation, and cooperation between all other partners, including civil society, nongovernmental organizations, and academia, is imperative.[22] But, for this concept to succeed, Africans need to redress the most potent obstacles to development and social growth on the continent. We address these obstacles in the next section of this introduction.

Obstacles to Addressing the Challenges of Development and Social Growth

There are three major obstacles that stand in the path of solutions to the challenges that contemporary Africa faces. These include ethnic politics, absence of good governance, and conflict, rebellions, and terrorism.

Ethnic Politics

Ethnic conflict stimulated during and after the colonial period has not boded well for contemporary Africa, where ethnic discord and its potential for violence are recurrent themes. Peter Schraeder defines ethnicity as

> a sense of collective identity in which a people [the ethnic group] perceives itself as sharing a common historical past and a variety of social norms and customs, including the roles of elders and other age groups within society, relationships between males and females, rites and practices of marriage and divorce, legitimate forms of governance, and the proper means of resolving conflict.[23]

Because Africa has more than 1000 ethnic groups, ethnicity, according to Toyin Falola, has been transformed into "a source of identity affirmation (a cultural unit) and an agency of power (economic and political power)."[24] It is a potent element in the African society responsible for shaping allegiances, alliances, and conflict. Thus, ethnic-related conflict and its potential for deadly violence and destruction of property in Africa are the new normal, as examples in Cameroon,[25] Côte d'Ivoire,[26] and the Rwandan genocide of 1994 seem to suggest.

In recent years, a new form of ethnic conflict, autochthonism, has developed in many parts of the continent, particularly in Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, South Africa, and Libya. Autochthonism, or a

kind of ethnic nationalism wherein particular ethnic groups claim to be more indigenous than others, has grown as a result of ethnic competition over scarce resources, social status, and political appointments. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, the concept of *Ivoirité* has been used to label northerners as outsiders and southerners as true Ivoirian citizens.[27] While ethnicity is a major deterrent to development and economic growth in Africa, it is a very difficult problem to address satisfactorily. The idea of ethnic balance advanced by scholars such as Schraeder could work but only where functional, multiparty democracies based on constitutionalism and good governance are put in place.

Democracy, Governance, and Accountability

Undemocratic regimes lack transparency and accountability, and these are challenges that further impede socioeconomic and political growth in Africa. The demands for multiparty democracy, more freedom, and meaningful elections that intensified in the 1990s were initially resisted in many Sub-Saharan African states. Peter Schwab aptly uses the term "cling abstraction" to characterize the resistance:

> In a region in which a middle-class bourgeoisie hardly exists, and where few countervailing institutional structures endure to provide wealth and opportunity on a scale provided by government or the military, securing and holding on to the sole venues of power engenders what I would term the "cling abstraction."[28]

However, domestic pressure from politicians, the unemployed, and other disenfranchised groups disappointed at the magnitude of socioeconomic challenges facing their respective states, as well as foreign pressure from international financial institutions, forced African dictators to give ground.[29] As African leaders caved in to the demands for political change, single parties and military dictatorships were gradually disassembled throughout the continent as dictators grudgingly introduced multiparty politics. New parties came on the scene, determined to canvas and win votes in elections even as some dictators also contrived to thwart the democratic process. Many dictators had "discovered the limits to which external agencies were prepared to go to support internal democratic movements and the leverage they still had."[30] Elections that culminated in peaceful transfer of political power have taken place in South Africa, Benin, Cape Verde, Mali, Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya.

Militarily repressive regimes that resisted the democratic push were taken down in Malawi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo. For others, including Cameroon, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, and Côte d'Ivoire, some changes were introduced at a very slow pace, but a democratic process that assures free and fair elections that do not brook intimidation is still elusive. Irregularities and violence continue to characterize elections. Thus, while democratic transitions are underway in many countries of the continent, including Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the need to craft reasonable constitutions and to adhere to the letter of those laws remains the only viable path for the success of democracy and good governance. Good governance is a prerequisite for development and social progress anywhere, but most especially for Africa.

Terrorism and Other Forms of Rebellious Activity

Finally, postcolonial Africa has experienced a great share of terrorism and other forms of rebellious activity. Africa is home to many Muslims. Wahhabism—a form of Islamic radicalism—is on the rise, and it has resulted in insecurity and instability in many parts of the continent, most especially in the "Sahel corridor" from Somalia in the east to Mali in the west.[31] Governments committed to addressing the plight of the people is an important way to mitigate the problem of rebellions and terrorism in Africa. Poverty and underdevelopment in Africa is partly responsible for why some have sought solace in radicalism. Al-Qaeda–sponsored terrorism has spread from the Middle East to Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Algeria, Eritrea, Nigeria, and Sudan, and the presence of its networks in these countries has been growing steadily. In West Africa, in addition to Nigeria and Niger Republic, Al-Qaeda has financial networks in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In Central Africa, international terrorism has profited from the diamond trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo to finance terrorist activities worldwide. Al-Qaeda's presence in the African Sahel has resulted recently in spectacular outbursts of terrorist and rebellious activities in Sudan, Central African Republic, Niger, Nigeria, and Mali, which prompted Western (United States, France, and UN) and African (Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS) intervention. The most recent intervention in Mali sought to combat not only Al-Qaeda–sponsored terrorism but also entrenched internal rebellion.

Different forms of terrorism stifle development within African states, affecting international security and business. As a result, much

of the US and Western efforts on the global war on terror are centered on the Sahel region of Africa, which arguably has become the most unstable region on the continent. Instability, state collapse, and conflict in the Sahel corridor and surrounding areas are the result of the acute absence of the rule of law. The state is not able to control borders or to protect local and foreign interests.[32] If the increasing presence of Al-Qaeda and other forms of rebellious activity in Africa is left unchecked, the continent will remain a significant battleground for the war on terror. The vicious cycle of terrorist attacks and Western responses will continue, deterring meaningful socioeconomic development.[33]

Organization of this Book

The introduction of this book frames the concept of change and continuity in contemporary Africa in the context of its challenges and opportunities. Nine chapters are divided into two major sections: Part I—Colonial and Neocolonial Legacies, and Part II—Transformational Moments in Economies and Cultures. The conclusion in Chapter 11 sums up the contributors' discussions.

The chapters in each section elaborate on the ideas identified in the introduction. Part I examines colonial and neocolonial legacies and is composed of four chapters. Chapter 2, "Mau Mau Inventions and Reinventions," by Mickie Mwanzia Koster explores the entanglements of literature on Mau Mau over the last 50 years. She argues that the texts surrounding Mau Mau in the colonial archives serve as clear evidence of the uses and abuses of history and history making. This is so because the war was fought both in the forest and in print, thereby shaping the images, imaginations, and narratives that surround the topic. Koster's chapter provides a focused treatment of the complex and contradictory nature of Mau Mau historiography by examining how it was "adapted" over time by various groups. Embedded in this account is a discourse about power and the ability to create historical narratives to fit political interest and agendas of the time. Interestingly, Koster notes, Mau Mau narratives are still being created and used in political and social spaces in Kenya and beyond. As a result, she argues, there is no single version of the Mau Mau narrative; there is only a past with multiple and changing windows. Thus, instead of looking for a one-dimensional approach to representing Mau Mau history, the historian will have to search for more creative and multidimensional methodologies to explain its complexity.

In Chapter 3, "The Development of the Civil Service in Africa," Julius O. Adekunle argues that the African civil service system pre-dated colonial rule and that it existed in the pre-colonial times. Over several years of its existence as an organ of the government, the civil service has gone through changes, improvements, and reforms. The first major change occurred with the coming of the Europeans, who introduced the Western civil service system. That change led to the process of adaptation on the part of the Africans. The requirements for positions in the civil service changed since Western education was needed to be able to perform the multi-dimensional functions in the civil service. As new departments were created, the civil service became wider, and the number of civil servants increased. Hence, the government became a major employer and expenses of maintaining the administration became higher. Admittedly, the modern civil service system is a legacy of the colonial government.

Chapter 4 by Tokunbo A. Ayoola, "The Second World War and Africa's Socioeconomic Infrastructures: A Case Study of the Nigerian Railroad System," examines the impact of the Second World War on Africa's socioeconomic infrastructures. Using the Nigerian Railway as a case study, Ayoola discusses that the negative impact of the War on the system far outweighs the benefits derived from the temporary economic boom brought about by the conflict. Ayoola argues that some of the blame for the poor state of Africa's postcolonial infra-structures could be traced back to their virtual stagnation during the war years.

The fifth and final chapter in Part I, "The Cold War and the Emergence of Economic Divergences: Africa and Asia Compared" by S. U. Fwatshak, focuses on the economic impact of the Cold War on Africa and Asia. Though both regions were not principal actors in the Cold War, they did participate and, thus, were impacted by the war. On the one hand, Asia came out of the war economically improved; the opposite was true of Africa. To Fwatshak, therefore, the divergences of outcomes of the war in the two regions naturally provoke different questions, such as what accounts for the economic divergences in the outcome of the Cold War in the two regions? For example, can the story of the Asian Tigers and the Asian miracle or of Africa's under-development be complete without the Cold War? Fwatshak attempts answers to these and other questions in the chapter.

The second part of the book addresses transformational moments in African economies and cultures and is composed of five chapters. Chapter 6, "Africa's Debt Burden and HIPC Initiative: Cameroon, from Challenges to Opportunity" by Augustine Ayuk, examines

some of the problems that plagued the African continent in the postindependence/postcolonial period including, but not limited to, famine, drought, ethnic and regional conflicts, authoritarian rule, mismanagement, embezzlement of government funds, and corruption. He believes that these problems have been exacerbated by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, which has ravaged many of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. He also points out that the debt crisis has had perhaps the greatest impact on the political, economic, developmental, and social psyche of Africa today. Furthermore, the external debt burden could prevent many countries in the continent from achieving or reaching their MDGs by 2015. The severity of debt crisis convinced multilateral and bilateral creditors (international financial institutions) and governments in industrialized countries to propose and implement measures to ameliorate the continent's crumbling economies and debt problems. Ayuk's chapter is dedicated almost entirely to examining and explaining the genesis and dimensions of Africa's external debt problems as well as discussing the various mechanisms proposed by multilateral and bilateral creditors to deal with the debt overhang. Using Cameroon as a case study, the chapter presents an assessment of its performance under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (EHIPC) Initiative.

In Chapter 7, "The Impact of Family Planning Programs on Poverty Alleviation in Cameroon," Consoler T. Teboh examines the demographic attributes that affect family sizes in a bid to ascertain whether socioeconomic indicators improve the quality of life for women in Cameroon. Data for the chapter are culled from the 2004 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS-III). The DHS-III was carried out from February to August 2004 and covered 10,462 households, or 10,656 women aged 15–49 years. Univariate analysis and Chi-squared tests were used to determine the results. Teboh found that unlike in the United Kingdom, Yemen, and Nigeria, age at marriage did not affect family size in Cameroon, but all other indicators did. The chapter also identified that the select socioeconomic indicators did not improve quality of life among Cameroonian women.

Austin C. Okigbo in Chapter 8, "Music and the Politics of Culture in a South African Zulu HIV/AIDS Experience: Implications for 'Post-Apartheid' Discourse," examines a drum controversy he witnessed at the McCord Mission Hospital in Durban, South Africa. The controversy arose from the hospital's white management's refusal to the use of Zulu drums by the Siphithemba Choir (an HIV/AIDS support group–turned choral ensemble). The drum controversy, however, brought other issues to light. Rifts indeed arose between

the choir and the hospital management; the contestation over the Zulu drum was the first instance. Okigbo argues that the controversy marked evidence of a continuing politics of culture and identity, which was integral to the apartheid system and was reproduced and replayed within the context of the current experience of HIV/AIDS. What does it mean then when the musical performance of HIV/AIDS becomes a space where the once opposing bodies in the system of apartheid engage in cultural contestation? Using this singular musical event, Okigbo analyzes the dynamics of interracial cultural relations in South Africa as well as interrogates the notion of "post-apartheid" as a discourse.

In Chapter 9, "Land and Conflict in Kenya's Rift Valley: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives," Martin Shanguhyia and Mickie Mwanzia Koster examine land conflict in theThe "Rift Valley" region of Kenya. This region denotes an imposing geographical landscape that slices the country from north to the south and is also the largest Provincial administrative unit. It is home to many communities that make a living from land cultivation and pastoralism. The central parts of the Rift Valley in particular are known for their extensive fertile lands and lush pastures. But it is its agricultural capacity that has defined its status as the granary of Kenya since the colonial times. This economic value of the region that led to extensive land alienation schemes for European settlement by the British colonial state at the turn of the twentieth century turning the central Rift Valley Highlands into part of the "White Highlands". Following the decolonization of the White Highlands in the 1960s, the central Rift Valley has remained a terrain for contesting land rights, ethnic identity, and accessibility to national politics. Land has occupied a central place in the Rift Valley so much that it has remained the most "politicized" region in Kenya, as attested to by cycles of political violence that have mired the Province every election cycle since the late 1980s, and particularly following the bungled 2007 General elections. Based on these complex developments, this work examines the symbolism of "Rifted" land, ethnicity, and politics as it relates to the formation of Mungiki, a religious and political movement. Using a combination of archived data, media reports, survey reports, and interviews, this study traces land ownership, politics, and origins of Mungiki. The study contributes to Kenya's land historiography by elongating the treatment of Kenya' as an "Unhappy Valley" while using a historically important geographical region— the Rift Valley—to understand trends in political and social history of modern Kenya.

Finally, Chapter 10, "The Migration of Professionals from Africa: Assessing the Impact of 'Brain Drain' from the Continent," by J. K. Mapulanga-Hulston interrogates the impact of the ongoing rise in the migration of highly qualified professionals from Africa, also known as the "brain drain." Mapulanga-Hulston notes that such migration continues to slow down economic development in the continent. The chapter also examines the economic, social, political, and/or personal reasons behind this brain drain. In particular, the author argues that the brain drain of health professionals is a major problem with devastating consequences for the continent. The chapter concludes with some policy options and recommendations aimed at redressing the current trend.

Chapter 11, the concluding chapter by Falola and Mbah, argues that despite a new optimism in economic growth and social improvements, the continent still faces numerous challenges in economic growth, poverty, health care, climate change, gender issues, political transparency, accountability, and inclusion of citizens in decision making.

Notes

1. Toyin Falola, "Introduction," in *Africa, Volume 5: Contemporary Africa*, edited by Toyin Falola (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2003), xxviii.
2. Virginia Delancey, "The Economies of Africa," in *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, edited by April A. Gordon and Donald L. Gordon, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 128–29.
3. April A. Gordon and Donald L. Gordon, "Introduction," *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, 3–4.
4. Falola, "Introduction," xxxi. See Chapter 6 for more on the African debt crisis.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. See Gordon and Gordon, "Introduction," 4–5.
8. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), "Women's Access to Justice in Rural Africa," Opening Remarks by Mr. Tegegnework Gettu, Regional Director, UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa and Assistant Secretary General, during the Side Event on "Increasing Rural Women's Access to Justice and Productive Resources in Africa" as part of the activities marking the 56th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women, March 6, 2012. http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2012/march/womens-access-to-justice-in-rural-africa. Accessed on July 17, 2012.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. See Gordon and Gordon, "Introduction," 6.

14. DevelopAfrica, "Africa's Struggle with HIV/AIDS." http://www.developafrica.org/hiv-aids-Africa. Accessed on November 5, 2012.

15. Amy S. Patterson, *The Politics of AIDS in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 1.

16. Ibid., 5–10.

17. Ibid., 1–2.

18. See DevelopAfrica, "Africa's Struggle with HIV/AIDS."

19. Patterson, *The Politics of AIDS in Africa*, 11.

20. See Gordon and Gordon, "Introduction," 5.

21. See General Assembly of the United Nations, Statement of the President of the 65th Session of the General Assembly, "Africa: An Essential Partner in a Global World," Speech Delivered at the Institut des Relations Internationales du Cameroon (IRIC), Yaoundé, Cameroon, January 28, 2011. http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/65/statements/iric280111.shtml. Accessed on July 31, 2012.

22. See General Assembly of the United Nations, "Africa: An Essential Partner in a Global World."

23. Peter J. Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation* (Boston; New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000), 138.

24. Toyin Falola, *The Power of African Cultures* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2003), 9.

25. See Emmanuel M. Mbah, *Land/Boundary Conflict in Africa: The Case of Former British Colonial Bamenda, Present-Day North-West Province of the Republic of Cameroon, 1916–1996* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2008), 92–93.

26. See Gilbert Gonnin, "Ethnicity, Politics and National Awareness in Côte d'Ivoire," in *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa*, edited by Okwudiba Nnoli (Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA Book Series, 1998), 163–64.

27. See the study by Armando Cutolo, "Modernity, Autochthony and the Ivorian Nation: the End of a Century in Côte d'Ivoire," *Africa* 80, no. 4 (2010): 527–52.

28. Peter Schwab, *Africa: A Continent Self-Destructs* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 30.

29. See Bolande M. Eyinla, "Democratisation and Governance in Africa," in *Shaping a New Africa*, edited by Abdullah A. Mohamoud (Amsterdam: KIT Publishers, 2007), 61–62.

30. Joseph Richard, "Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives," in *Comparative Politics*, Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow 29, no. 3 (April 1997): 370.

31. See Judy Duncker, "Globalization and Its Impact on the War on Terror," in *Africa and the War on Terrorism*, edited by John Davis (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), 66.
32. Ibid., 63–64.
33. Ali A. Mazrui, "Between Global Governance and Global War: Africa before and after September 11," in *The Politics of War and the Culture of Violence: North-South-Essays by Ali A. Mazrui*, edited by Seifudein Adem and Abdul S. Bemath (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2008), 269–70.

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Colonial and Neocolonial Legacies

Mau Mau Inventions and Reinventions

Mickie Mwanzia Koster

Introduction

On June 23, 2009, five elderly Mau Mau exsoldiers filed into a London courtroom seeking justice and openly stated their case:[1] They wanted retribution for atrocities committed against them by the British government during the struggle. Their testimonies and remembrances show that it is impossible to erase the lingering Mau Mau war emotions, destruction, hardship, turmoil, and memories associated with violence of that magnitude. In addition, the claimants' statements point to a past that is still being shaped. The Mau Mau revolution remains a point of fascination, myth, and controversy. It serves as an excellent model to discern ways in which historical adaptations are functions of political, social, and cultural moments. Although the Mau Mau war, fought from 1952 to 1960, ended British hegemony in Kenya, it remains an unresolved aspect of the country's history and serves as an excellent example of the uses and abuses of history making. Presently, this past is still being played out in the minds of Kenyans who are trying to understand the war's impact on Kenya's present and future.[2] From the very beginning of the war, in October 1952, written details on the topic have been blurred, misrepresented, and polarized. The literature on the topic reflects a wide range of perspectives, interpretations, meanings, and political objectives, which have made the study interesting but challenging. While British colonialists claimed that Mau Mau was shaped in the shadows of savagery and barbarism, Mau Mau fighters viewed the war as a rational

response to African grievances and a means for African liberation, land restoration, and freedom.

This chapter explores the entanglements of literature on Mau Mau in a bid to understand the narratives of inventions and reinventions of the tragedy from the perspectives of different interpreters over the last 50 years, many of whom support various political, social, and economic interests. The texts surrounding Mau Mau in the colonial archives serve as clear traces of the uses and abuses of history and history making. The war was fought both in the forest and in print, thereby shaping the images, imaginations, and narratives that surround the topic.

Discussions and information on Mau Mau were silenced for years following the war, leaving very little room for contestations. In 2003, the Kibaki government finally lifted the ban on Mau Mau allowing, for the first time in over 50 years, a new dialogue on the topic—this time from silenced Mau Mau veterans.[3] These elderly participants were able to finally present their version of the Mau Mau story. In addition, thousands of published, but suppressed, Mau Mau files have been released, removing another layer of Mau Mau silencing. On April 6, 2011, *BBC News* reported that thousands of Mau Mau–related files, previously unavailable to the public, had been released by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the British government as a result of the case investigations surrounding the ex-Mau Mau fighters.[4] These two examples point to why Mau Mau continues to find its way into the present and why it remains a point of invention and reinvention.

This chapter provides a focused treatment of the complexity and contradictory nature of Mau Mau historiography by examining how this was "adapted" over time by various groups. Embedded in this account is a discourse about power and the ability to create historical narratives to fit political interest and agendas of the time. Interestingly, Mau Mau narratives are still being created and used in political and social spaces in Kenya and beyond. I argue that there is no single version of the Mau Mau narrative; there is only a past with multiple and changing windows. Thus, instead of looking for a one-dimensional approach to representing Mau Mau history, the historian will have to search for more creative and multidimensional methodologies to explain its complexity.

Overview of Mau Mau Historiography

The Mau Mau struggle was a historical moment in which many Kenyans ceremonially united through sacred oaths to fight for their

"land and freedom"; it was an insurgency that lasted eight years. In many ways, those eight years of the war (from 1952 to 1960) represented a period in which Kenyans became Kenyans.[5] The movement crossed boundaries of ethnicity, gender, class, education, religion, and geographic location. Though mostly Kikuyu, Mau Mau represented a collective action against the increasingly problematic situation whereby grievances were not being addressed by British colonial administrators. It was a secret group with operations mostly in the forest of Central Kenya; recruits pledged their commitment to fight and remove the British from Kenya. The war was brutal.[6]

Jeffrey Fadiman's statement from his Kenyan oral history study, *When We Began, There Were Witchmen*, captures key and relevant issues related to Kenyan history making. His words reveal the limitations, divisions, inventions, and categorizations that often shape and restrict what we know about Kenyan history. Although there has been a great deal of literature on oral history and oral traditions, obstacles remain. Scholars studying Africa have used oral tradition in historical analysis; archived and printed data are superior evidence that confirm and support positions and oral testimonies. Archival preference is, however, problematic because of its biases and especially because archival data were usually written, as Fadiman points out, "by the various whites imposing colonial rule." Although oral tradition may be limited to the memory and transmission techniques of individuals, recorded texts fail to show the continuity of the narrative and are often controlled by the perceptions of others. This is not to suggest that the archives and newspaper reports do not have a place. They do, but indeed, "records say too little."[7] The opportunity is in using the right combination of oral and written sources and providing a mix of perspectives and interpretations related to a topic.

The complex historiography of Kenya has been illuminated to a great extent by discussions of the Mau Mau struggle. But despite the abundance of scholarship and discourse, Mau Mau is still elusive, as various stories, voices, accounts, and political perspectives are clouded in the past, thereby rendering the subject obscure but relevant. Commenting about its relevance, Frederick Cooper observed thus:

> Mau Mau has become a politically charged topic, and discussing it has become a way—in some cases a risky way—of saying something about the present. The voices of the past and the present mix with each other, but perhaps this angry disharmony, this clash of voices, itself reveals the most.[8]

Suppression has led to a wide range of issues in the rational treatment of this history.[9] The discussion in this chapter provides a small window to some of the conversations, issues, and contestations between different groups to show the varied perspectives that have gone into the making and remaking of Mau Mau historiography. These contestations are examples of the layers of opinions, meanings, and problems with understanding Mau Mau. Consequently, Mau Mau historiography has, since its inception, been a space for historical invention and reinvention in order to support varied political, social, and economic interests. Therefore, this chapter will serve as a necessary foundation for understanding Mau Mau and its discursive challenges; it also reveals how the production of knowledge on the topic has been shaped by the entanglements of political power, ethnicity, and memory in Kenya. Mau Mau continues to perplex because the narratives are still evolving—constantly being invented and reinvented by various Mau Mau interpreters.

What Is Mau Mau?

One of the biggest challenges within the historiography of Mau Mau is defining it. Was it an honorable movement leading to Kenyan nationalism by freedom fighters? Or was it a rebellious group of thugs, criminals, and savages maddened by modernity? The categorization depends on the perspective. For example, the colonial government created and crafted the image of Mau Mau as barbaric. John Lonsdale states that Mau Mau was often written to support political agendas: "Mau Mau was the best possible argument for the full restoration of white supremacy. The official interpretation reassured settlers only to the extent of agreeing Mau Mau to be savagely tribal rather than justifiably national."[10] It is, therefore, impossible to define Mau Mau in the absence of historiographical issues attached to it. However, defining Mau Mau is perhaps the first challenge of its historiography. Can we put Mau Mau in a category or attach a label to it that is appropriate? Are we losing or gaining meaning by associating Mau Mau to a particular classification? Does a label really allow us to appropriately define Mau Mau? The shortest answer to the "What is Mau Mau?" question is, "it depends," because the term Mau Mau is elusive. There are multiple versions and definitions of Mau Mau that often change over time, and this is further complicated by the fact that different parties use the term to satisfy varying interests; the above notwithstanding, there are some general attributes that can render the definition meaningful.

For many who joined the movement, their aim was to restore Kenyan "land and freedom." But different points of view and subjective meanings make the definition of Mau Mau fluid and difficult for historians to agree. Marshall Clough, examining this fluidity in *Mau Mau Memoirs*, notes thus, "The Mau Mau has been described as a nationalist revolt, an anti-colonial war, a resistance movement, a class struggle, a peasant uprising, a movement of cultural renewal, an ethnic revolt, and a civil war. The memoirs indicate that it was all of these."[11] In many ways, Clough's premise speaks to the problems with locking the Mau Mau into one particular term since it oversimplifies a complex phenomenon. On his part, Atieno Odhiambo questions the production and owners of Mau Mau history:[12]

> Mau Mau: war/rebellion/civil war/revolution? Each choice of epithet both absolves and accuses the users irrespective of whether they claim expertise of professional or guild historians or partake in the popular debate of the various interested parties. The point is that there are layers of spoken knowledge, but also of critical silences, that inform one's choice of each word both within the academy and in the larger society. This is because there are, in fact, various Mau Mau pasts calling for their own historians.[13]

Therefore, it is important to understand Mau Mau as it relates to specific writers at specific moments, because, like many contested histories, the storyline changes. Therefore, to understand Mau Mau, it is necessary to turn to the varied writings on the topic.

Different Mau Mau Versions, Perspectives, and Interpretations

Most scholars have accepted that "there never was a single Mau Mau movement."[14] The meaning and purpose of Mau Mau was played out in the individual minds of those involved. The perspectives associated with Mau Mau were not haphazard but very calculated attempts by some to control, shape, and define the movement according to their own political aims. Although it is impossible to cover all versions, voices, perspectives, and opinions, this study explores the interpretations of Mau Mau that influenced the highly interpretative nature of its historiography. Additionally, therefore, it examines the invention and reinvention dance that occurred between those who took an oath to join Mau Mau versus the notions of others such as colonial administrators. I begin with initial colonial accounts of the Mau Mau

discourse, much of which was invented and lingered unchallenged for years.

Colonial Perspectives

In the 1950s and 1960s, British accounts of Mau Mau supposed atrocities dominated discussions and communications, and the British became the major international disseminators of messages about the revolt. David Anderson, for example, posits thus:

> Mau Mau . . . The very words conjure up memories of something evil lurking in history's dark shadows. Mau Mau was the great horror story of Britain's empire in the 1950s. The battle to suppress the revolt in Kenya was presented as a war between savagery and civilization, a rebellion made by men who could not cope with modernity, who reached back into a depraved, tribal past in an effort to stop the wheel of progress from turning.[15]

This quote is representative of many British views on Mau Mau. The intentional disclosure of violence from only one side distorts the true story. Evidently, those with political power had the ability to create Mau Mau discourse to serve their needs. The British narrative ultimately became a European discourse that controlled Mau Mau images around the world. On October 27, 1952, *Time* magazine of the United States described Mau Mau as:

> an African secret society whose savage warriors have pledged themselves in blood to drive the white man out of Africa . . . Mau Mau terrorists, striking from their bush hideouts, had murdered and mutilated scores, burned the homes of 24 tribesmen who went to work for the whites, maimed hundreds of animals by chopping the hooves of cattle, slashing sheep's noses . . . [16]

In this example, the magazine had labeled the Mau Mau participants as savages, terrorists, and ruthless, siding with British propaganda to label the Mau Mau as monsters. That image would justify the murders, executions, and detentions of thousands of Africans by the British during and after the struggle.[17] A week later on November 3, 1952, *Time* carried another article on Mau Mau with the following interpretation: "Part land hunger, part savage revolution against the domineering white man . . . the Mau Mau have already mutilated scores of whites and 'loyal' blacks, with their favorite weapon the panga-a long, machete-like knife."[18]

Narratives of this nature, which provided chilling descriptions that often portrayed only the side of the insane Mau Mau rebel, with no objective analysis, were common in Western media discourses at the time. Such accounts and many similar ones inside and outside Kenya minimized African grievances, issues, and sensibilities and reduced Mau Mau initiatives, characterizing them as tribal, savage, irrational, and blind. Negative Mau Mau images, narratives, and accounts were also reinforced and played out on screens. In films such as *Simba*, released in 1955, black Mau Mau participants were depicted as murderers who kill white masters, friends, and children in their beds (i.e., the Lari Massacre). In many ways, films that propagandized the image of the Mau Mau as a savage had much in common with those that derogated blacks in the United States, such as *Birth of a Nation*, set on the premise that without slavery African descendants would naturally sink into a state of barbaric behavior, attacking whites and threatening society. The British created and shaped what most non-Mau Mau participants viewed as a true account of the struggle, and by so doing, they introduced multiple meanings of the movement, as historian Dave Kennedy succinctly observes:

> For white farmers in the Rift Valley, for businessmen in Nairobi, for agricultural development officers on the reserves, for the Special Branch in its secret meetings, Mau Mau meant such things as gangster assaults on persons and property, trade unionism in disguise, peasants' retrogressive resistance to progress, and a communist conspiracy…Mau Mau was seen among other things as the dreaded rise of West African-styled nationalism.[19]

I examine the varying perspectives of British society on the Mau Mau struggle in the following subsections.

A Conservative Perspective: Frank Derek Corfield

A classic European perspective on Mau Mau comes from the official report created by Frank Derek Corfield that was presented to the British Parliament in 1960.[20] In this report, the author, writing on behalf of the Kenyan administration, provided the following definition and description of Mau Mau:

> Mau Mau in its shortest terms was the violent manifestation of a limited nationalistic revolutionary movement…it was not sudden

uprising; it was the culmination of a long period of political unrest among the Kikuyu people of Kenya…The seeds of potential unrest are sown whenever any primitive society is brought in close contact with a more highly civilized society…this is a common experience throughout Africa.[21]

One obvious point from the quotation above is the idea that Mau Mau was a savage, violent, and unjustifiable response to the transition from a primitive state to modernity. In the full report, Corfield explains in greater detail why there was no justification for the evils of Mau Mau. In his account, it was "wholly evil in its conception and based on the exploitation of grievances by its organizers."[22] In addition, Corfield distinguishes Mau Mau from other revolutionary movements in Africa based on three characteristics: it was considered tribal in nature; it was based on primitive superstition that was practiced primarily through oath taking; and it was anti-Christian.[23]

The Corfield report clearly outlined Mau Mau atrocities, including the Lari Massacre, binding and dropping of bodies into wells, torturing victims before killing them, exhuming bodies, drinking human blood, hanging victims, splitting open pregnant women, maiming cattle by hamstringing, sawing off victims' heads, and cutting the ears of individuals who did not take the oath.[24] The Corfield report includes statements recorded by those involved in Mau Mau. The following is a statement from an African prisoner in 1952 submitted to the Commissioner of Police: "Mau Mau terrorism has almost completely shattered the average African's spiritual equilibrium to such an unbelievable extent that a new extremism, a new barbarism and, as such, a new type of African fanatic, are atomically being created."[25] Corfield also reports the voices and opinions of other Europeans. For example, in 1952, Father Trevor Huddleston provided his interpretation of Mau Mau: "Mau Mau is a movement which in its origins and in its development is wholly evil. It is the worst enemy of African progress in Kenya. It has about it all the horror of the powers of darkness: of spiritual wickedness in high places."[26] These descriptions are important because they represent the violent, savage, evil, and apparently irrational acts associated with Mau Mau. The language used would be forever engraved into the Mau Mau discourse. In the media and in daily conversations on Mau Mau, these words and descriptions served as the primary images etched into the minds of most Europeans, some Africans, and the world.

A Liberal Perspective: Louis Leakey

Another key European interpretation of Mau Mau was from Louis Leakey, who was born in Kikuyuland in 1903. He grew up practicing limited Kikuyu rituals and was a part of the Mukanda age set. Based on his upbringing in Kikuyuland and his knowledge of the Kikuyu language and culture, Leakey positioned himself as an authority on the Kikuyu. The Mau Mau interpretations by Leakey in his two works, *Mau Mau and the Kikuyu* in 1952 and *Defeating Mau Mau* in 1954, were held in high regard by the British and the international community because of Leakey's apparent intimate knowledge of the Kikuyu people, culture, and language. Leakey argued that "Mau Mau was not an expression of tribal tradition but rather a subversion of it resulting from the consequences of rapid colonial social change and the unattended grievances of the Kikuyu people."[27]

Leakey contradicted Corfield's report by stating that the Kikuyu actually had justifications for the revolt based on the loss of land, horrible laboring conditions on white farms, overcrowded housing, and racial discrimination.[28] Unlike the beliefs of many Europeans based on the propaganda being distributed, Leakey did not feel that Mau Mau was an "atavistic reversion to traditional savagery, but rather a perversion of civilized Kikuyu tradition."[29] Leakey defined Mau Mau as a "violent anti-White and anti-Christian conspiracy to expel Europeans from Kenya by a group that played upon Kikuyu frustrations and exploited the vulnerability of people disoriented by social order from British rule and white settlement."[30] He characterized Mau Mau as a perverse religion based on its rituals and oaths that were transformed into a new faith gaining support of the masses. The message was that they could kill for righteous reasons.[31] Leakey echoed familiar words about the Mau Mau being a mission to "recover stolen lands, obtain self-government, destroy Christianity, restore ancient customs, and drive out foreigners."[32] He claimed that Mau Mau leaders "were semi-educated gangster politicians who exaggerated legitimate grievances, distorted traditional customs, undermined colonial improvement schemes, manipulated the beliefs of a religious people, and intimidated the people of the little community into going along with them."[33]

Both of Leakey's works were well received, largely by whites attempting to understand the mindset of the Kikuyu as portrayed through the activities of Mau Mau. Leakey offered rational explanations to the violence of those Africans who were not too long ago docile and peaceful. However, he was praised by few Kikuyus and was

not viewed as a representative or authority on Kikuyu culture, even though he positioned himself as a friend of the Kikuyu. Nevertheless, Leakey's contribution to the discourse on Mau Mau was based on his position as a British man with intimate connections to the Kikuyu. He translated his African knowledge (including his knowledge of the Kikuyu language) in ways that could be understood by Europeans.

The Conservative versus Liberal Perspectives

As we can see from the diverse statements of Corfield and Leakey, even amongst the European constituents there were disagreements and inconsistent accounts of what Mau Mau was about, whether or not it was justifiable, and how it manifested. Some historians have even classified European thinking on the Mau Mau topic into conservative and liberal paternalists.[34] At a basic level, the distinction between the two is that conservatives saw Mau Mau as evidence that Africans were swayed by primitive aggression and savagery, compared to the liberal paternalistic view of a need to explain the African reaction.[35] Both European ideologies presented a level of strain on the British government in Kenya and Britain. Despite the differences in opinion, the conservative and liberal paternalists viewed Mau Mau with "fear and revulsion and had a desire to crush it"[36]; they combined forces to fight the violence of Mau Mau and eventually succeeded in defeating the movement militarily. Differences in how these Europeans interpreted Mau Mau were equally important because the liberal perspective put some of the blame of the revolt on adverse colonial conditions in Kenya and sought to understand a method of better transforming Kenya.[37] In this regard, Kennedy, in his essay "Constructing the Colonial Myth of Mau Mau," argues that it was the liberal position that helped shape the actual course that Kenya followed in the 1950s and 1960s.

The Perspectives of the Colonized

Similar to the various European ideologies, Africans in Kenya also had different interpretations of Mau Mau that fell under different categories of thought. There were probably even more splinters in the ideologies because of the wide range of experiences and diversity of the African population. The following statement attempts to touch on the wide-ranging African perspectives:

> Mau Mau did not mean the same thing for the Gikuyu and the other peoples who populated Kenya, nor even for various elements within

the Gikuyu population. Gikuyu Christians and Gikuyu traditionalists, Gikuyu landowners and Gikuyu tenants, Gikuyu squatters in the white highlands and Gikuyu taxi drivers in Nairobi, and Gikuyus otherwise placed within the colonial order had varying views of the crisis.[38]

During the period up to 1960, Mau Mau participants were considered to be those who took the oath, and "any Kikuyu (or Kenyan African) who took even the slightest interest in politics was a dangerous agitator and hence Mau Mau."[39] Yet, these different members had different levels of participation, desires, and experiences. There were multiple Mau Maus within the mind of Africans because there were different agendas and beliefs.

Before 1963, European images of the Mau Mau movement dominated published works on the topic. However, during the 1960s, several key works challenging the existing historiography appeared. These classic African perspectives were voices from actual Mau Mau participants: they came from the works of Josiah Kariuki, Karari Njama, and Waruhiu Itote. Their works do not necessarily represent the wide range of African thoughts during Mau Mau. And they often discuss these differing positions from an "insider" or "within" state. Their documents provide firsthand accounts of Mau Mau from their perspective, contesting and contradicting many European presentations of the movement.

Josiah Kariuki's Version

Josiah Kariuki provided his personal memoir of the Mau Mau meaning and significance in his 1963 book, *Mau Mau Detainee*. In this work, the author argued that there was another side of the Mau Mau story that needed to be revealed, one through the perspective of the detention camps. Kariuki's aim was to restore the voices of those who were detained in the prisons and/or detention camps so that their struggles were not forgotten. In his view, the public needed to know the truth about the horrible treatment that Africans experienced in the camps. Kariuki believed that Mau Mau was a "movement of unity and that the (members of Mau Mau) were not terrorists, murderers, but the noblest fighters for freedom."[40] Kariuki sought to change the language associated with the Mau Mau participants from "thugs," "gangsters," and "terrorists" to "freedom fighters."[41]

Kariuki revealed the magnitude of the movement as one that consisted of 10,000 Africans being killed and 90,000 Africans being detained. The key problem that led to the movement was the inability

of Africans to participate politically in their own country, where Europeans consisted of no more than 60,000 people, compared to an African population of 7 million.[42] But the ultimate issue was economic in nature in that all wealth was stripped from the Africans who no longer had land and livestock. One of the most effective aspects of understanding Mau Mau is found in the actual oaths that portray the unity and commitment of the movement. This raises questions concerning the rationality and thoughtfulness of the rebellion. Kariuki's book was indeed effective in shaping the historiography of Mau Mau. In order to understand the contribution of this book, it helps to consider how others viewed it around the time of the war. In the journal *African Affairs*, Ian Gunn wrote about *Mau Mau Detainee* in 1964.[43] Based on the language of the review, Gunn falls into the European conservative camp prevalent during the 1960s. His review minimized the violence by declaring Mau Mau as freedom fighters. Gunn also viewed the collision represented in the book as simply the outcome of "Old Africa meeting with 20th century Europe with all of its competence."[44]

Karari Njama's Version

Similar to Kariuki, Karari Njama provided his personal account as a forest fighter in his memoir, *Mau Mau from Within* published in 1966, co-authored with Donald Barnett. This book is also an intervention in the standing historiography about Mau Mau that counters the belief that the movement was irrational and based on savagery. It revealed the rationality, commitment, sacrifice, and creativity in the establishment of a unified military and political structure with the objective to regain stolen land, drive out Europeans, and restore the dignity of African people. Njama's narrative provided readers with eye-witness accounts of Mau Mau struggles as well as the peaks and valleys of the movement. We now know from his accounts that there were several moments in the movement where Mau Mau members felt that their freedom was just around the corner and that the servants would become the masters.[45]

Njama's parents were squatters in the White Highlands on a European farm. Thus, his perspective exposed the injustices and issues that Africans experienced as squatters as the white settler population increased. Njama used his family experiences to show that the laws passed, such as the 1936 law preventing Africans from owning more than 15 cattle in the White Highlands, were all strategically designed to remove any form of African economic independence and wealth.

The 600 cattle owned by his father had to be sold immediately at very low prices, which stripped the wealth and autonomy of his family.[46]

The personal background of Njama and his family provides an excellent setting to understand Njama's Mau Mau. Njama's father was from the warrior clan and his mother from a clan that practiced witchcraft; these details are important in seeing his ability to embrace the practices of the Mau Mau movement. Njama's book also uncovers important aspects of those who did not join Mau Mau or abandoned the movement because they feared that Mau Mau would never win and they needed to find a way out by disassociating with Mau Mau activities.[47] From a historiograghical perspective, Njama's work is significant because it provides his version of Mau Mau as a participant and provides details of use to future scholars, particularly historians, to better understand what took place during the time of Mau Mau— again from an insider perspective. As the historiography has shifted to a desire to understand the lost voices of those who fought, Njama's memoir serves as key documentation.

Waruhiu Itote's (General China's) Version

Waruhiu Itote clearly noted in his 1967 book that he and other freedom fighters felt they were the ones who brought freedom to Kenya by going into the forest and fighting.[48] The above notwithstanding, he also noted that other groups claimed to have brought freedom to Kenya, like the Kenya African Union (KAU), Kikuyu Central Association, and other African tribes. In another book, Itote stated that the varying voices that claim to have brought freedom to Kenya "speak the truth...the struggle for freedom was like a vehicle and a vehicle cannot go without a body, an engine and a driver."[49] In many ways, this statement is a true reflection of the interdependent components of Mau Mau, even though they have often been treated as separate and distinct parts. They were all responses directed toward the same goal—to restore freedom to Kenya.

Itote traced the beginning of social unrest in Kenya to 1919, when the Kenyan colonial government passed an ordinance stating that Africans had to be forced to work on European farms and pay tax per household. Itote showed that after the First World War, social and economic frustrations grew, and Africans began to form political associations as an outlet for these concerns. Naturally, the colonial government made several attempts to suppress the activities of these associations by putting leaders in jail and monitoring their movements. After the Second World War, economic pressures

from Britain translated into increased demand for African labor while African socioeconomic conditions worsened. Jomo Kenyatta, whose leadership grew from his involvement in the KAU, became the link between the different African associations. Itote pointed out that Kenyatta was the inspiration behind the fight for freedom. However, political activism in the 1950s, the result of the injustices suffered by ordinary Kenyans, fell on deaf ears as the Kenyan government made no attempt to address the issues. According to Itote, it was at this moment that the "fight was then carried into the forest."[50]

Itote's book contributes immensely to Mau Mau discourse; it is viewed by many as a classic work that outlines the fight and events in the forest from an insider perspective. Similar to Kariuki's and Njama's works, Itote's narrative is a recollection of the contributions of all those involved in the freedom fight. He argued that the strength of Mau Mau was an added impetus to the conviction that "whatever will be the outcome, or whatever will happen, the African people of Kenya would eventually be independent."[51] Countering the false statements recorded about Mau Mau, he remarked, "a number of books have been written about Mau Mau: some of them contain stories which are not true but they are believed by many people just because they were written by whites."[52] This statement speaks to the problems associated with the discourse on Mau Mau: the knowledge produced on the subject often came from outside influences that shaped the literature and narrative of the movement.

Reflections on the Various Colonized Perspectives

What is revealing about the stories outlined above is that they all carry a consistent message of dismantling British distortions of Mau Mau while creating a new positive image. Kariuki, Njama, and Itote refuted the myths about Mau Mau; their works commonly examined how they militarily fought racial oppression, their desire for national liberation, and the goal to unite all Africans under the movement.[53] These early narratives from leaders of the movement also embraced the power of literacy by taking detailed accounts and notes of fighting activities so that they would be in a position to discuss "their" Mau Mau. They utilized writing to create their own discourse while refuting the propaganda employed by many Europeans. These leaders saw a difference between "violence to oppress (which was used by the Europeans) and violence to liberate."[54] They led the way for the second wave of writings, such as this one, that challenge European accounts and provide different insights into the movement.

During the 1970s, the literature on Mau Mau continued to grow with the addition of more African interpretations, showing the internal fragmentations of the movement. These voices included Joram Wamweya (1971), Kiboi Murilithi (1971), Karigo Muchai (1973), Ngugi Kabiro (1973), Mohammed Mathu (1974), Kahing Wachanga (1975), Paul Maina (1976), and Gucu Gikoyo (1979).[55] These later narratives present Mau Mau as a rational response to social, economic, and political agitations caused by the British colonial occupation, including confused traditional African social responsibilities, racial discrimination, exploitation, removal from land, and lack of political representation. From the point of view of the 1970s' Kenyan authors, the members who stood up to fight against those injustices were heroes because they were brave enough to stand up for their rights. Although these later writers were not Mau Mau leaders, they do offer insights on the internal dynamics of the movement as well as their national desires. To be honest, there are still many more perspectives that have not been analyzed in this chapter; the chapter is dedicated more to the insider perspectives on the movement that shaped and challenged the historiography of Mau Mau the most.

Mau Mau Writings: 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s

In the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, writers on Mau Mau would provide a new set of interpretations. By the 1980s and 1990s, the discourse shifted from overarching concerns for the relationship between European colonizers and African subjects to specific themes and groups of people. David Throup, in *Economics and Social Origins of Mau Mau 1945–1953*, approaches the study of Mau Mau from the perspectives of the colonial office policy makers by focusing on the period before the outbreak of Mau Mau. The study is an economic and social treatment of Mau Mau. Similarly, in *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau*, Tabitha Kanogo addresses the tensions between Europeans and Kikuyu, showing how the grievances of squatters strengthened the rise of Mau Mau.[56] Unlike Kanogo, Frank Furedi, in *The Mau Mau War in Perspective*, attributes the evolution of Mau Mau to the activities of the squatter elite and traders. Such focused trends of Mau Mau studies continued in the 1990s. In 1993, Wunyabari Maloba, in *Mau Mau and Kenya*, wrote about the economic factors associated with Mau Mau through the perspective of peasant-based revolts. Another valuable, yet narrow, study during this period is the work of Greet Kershaw in *Mau Mau from Below*. This book was based almost entirely on interviews aimed at shedding light on the motivations of those who joined Mau Mau. In short, Mau Mau was being reevaluated

in the 1980s and 1990s by scholars who produced focused writings on different groups such as policy makers, squatters, peasants, and freedom fighters as well as situating the struggle within a historical and social framework.

Contemporary writings show that Mau Mau is still an important topic of research. However, the trend for analysis around specialized Mau Mau histories has continued to shape the direction of the writings. The period from 2000 saw two new additions to the Mau Mau narratives: Caroline Elkin's *Imperial Reckoning* and David Anderson's *Histories of the Hanged* (both 2005). Anderson and Elkins address the entanglements of imperialism, detention, and atrocities of Mau Mau. They interrogate the overall Mau Mau conversation by revealing the British role in the war that has often been overlooked by scholars. They offer insights that have shifted the analysis to British atrocities during the war. Anderson uniquely contributes to Mau Mau by providing useful statistical data on the criminalization of Mau Mau participants and by showing how colonial laws against Mau Mau impacted the number of cases taken to court. Additionally, his work charts Mau Mau offenses and convictions, useful in understanding colonial policing strategies against the movement.

David Smith's book *Kenya, The Kikuyu, and Mau Mau*,[57] published in 2005, is a monograph based on his personal experiences in Kenya while serving as a field intelligence officer in the Kenya Regiment during the Mau Mau insurgency.[58] In 2009, Daniel Branch's book *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya* analyzes the Mau Mau war from the perspective of the loyalists with a goal to increase understanding of the counterinsurgency nature of warfare.[59] Branch offers a new way of conceptualizing Mau Mau through the lens of the loyalists while also addressing the legacies of Mau Mau. Thus, all current writings on Mau Mau offer a revision to our previous knowledge on the topic; the ultimate goal is to increase the understanding of the "true" Mau Mau past.[60] But what these narratives portray is that Mau Mau history making is riddled with political and social entanglements; through Mau Mau literature, we can see how history can be used and abused over time to invent a past to support varied needs.

Conclusion

The Mau Mau story is far from ending; there will be many more inventions and reinventions of this history. It is an unresolved history, and the truth of this history has not surfaced completely. This is especially so because of deliberate suppressions of the literature; in

the aftermath of the struggle, Mau Mau fighters were not allowed to congregate. The recent release of thousands of Mau Mau–related files has opened a floodgate of new narratives. Then, after years of legal investigations, ex-Mau Mau veterans returned to the London courts, this time seeking out-of-court settlement for British atrocities against them in the 1950s.[61] To begin with, many ex-Mau Mau victims are now in their seventies and eighties and realize that time is not on their side. Some claimants have passed away, such as one ex-Mau Mau claimant, Susan Ciongombe, who died recently.[62] The ex-Mau Mau fighters want some gesture of retribution for their years of suffering. The British government fears that other countries under British colonial rule may be encouraged to sue if awards are made to Mau Mau victims. The British position further exemplifies how the Mau Mau is still being used to serve the interest of the British government.

It is evident that although there are many writings on Mau Mau, the understanding of the topic is still ambiguous, rendering it open for multiple narratives. The stories of once-silenced Mau Mau veterans and the recent release of Mau Mau files have, created new versions of this intriguing subject. Mau Mau has a historiography loaded with high political stakes, agendas, and varied meanings. The mystery and complexity around Mau Mau explains why it is associated with words like "myth" and "imagination."

The Mau Mau discourse is shifting again, but this time it is being reinvented mostly from the perspective of troubled Kenyan youth and artists who are frustrated with the current socioeconomic injustices in Kenya. Through plays, music, media, and new social movements, Mau Mau lives on as a legacy deeply embedded in modern Kenyan politics. These artistic endeavors point to the unfinished work of Mau Mau. In the minds of some artists, Mau Mau is no longer a physical war in Kenya, but a mental one.[63] The invention-to-reinvention processes will continue as long as Mau Mau emotions linger, and Kenyans feel that the work of Mau Mau is incomplete. In short, the Mau Mau story is not over.

Notes

1. Carina Ray, "The Empire's Ghost Returns," *New African* (August/ September 2009): 18–22.
2. For example, the play "*Are We Here Yet*" in Nairobi, Kenya (July 2011), directed by Keith Pearson addresses the legacies, memory, and present-day Kenyan struggles associated with Mau Mau through a dramatization of two Mau Mau fighters still fighting in the forest 60 years later.

3. Ray, "The Empire's Ghost Returns," 18–22.

4. BBC, "Kenyan Mau Mau Uprising Documents Released," April 6, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12983289. Accessed November 9, 2011.

5. This is based on the fact that the Mau Mau movement was a nationalist struggle, a precursor to Kenyan independence achieved through a common struggle to overthrow British domination in Kenya and a move to restore Kenyan "land and freedom."

6. There is existing controversy on the exact number of casualties. Carolyn Elkins, in *Imperial Reckoning*, questions if there were hundreds of thousands of Africans murdered in the war. Also see David Anderson's *Histories of the Hanged*. It is difficult to accurately determine this number because of distortions and silencing on the topic.

7. Fadiman, *When We Began*, 5.

8. Frederick Cooper, "Mau Mau and the Discourses of Decolonization Review Article." *Journal of African History* 29 (1988): 313.

9. For example, this suppression often provides a lopsided historical treatment of the war, relying on colonial archived perspectives; other issues are associated with a need and passion to provide a corrective history.

10. Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa, Books One and Two* (Oxford: James Currey, 1992), 285.

11. Marshall S. Clough, *Mau Mau Memoirs: History, Memory and Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 241.

12. Atieno Odhiambo, "The Production of History in Kenya: The Mau Mau Debate." *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 25, no. 2 (1991): 300–07.

13. Ibid.

14. Greet Kershaw, *Mau Mau from Below* (Athens: Ohio University Press 1997), xix.

15. David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (London: Weidenfeld and Nelson, 2005).

16. "Kenya: SOS," *Time*, October 27, 1952. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,890400,00.html.

17. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, appendix charts.

18. *Time*, "Kenya: The Meow-Meows," November 3, 1952. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,806523–1,00.html. Accessed April 2, 2013. According to the article, Mau Mau had the habit of "nailing headless cats to their victims' doors," which is why they were being called the "terrorist Meow-Meows."

19. Dane Kennedy, "Constructing the Colonial Myth of Mau Mau." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 25, no. 2 (1992): 244.

20. Frank Derek Corfield, *Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau* (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1960).

21. Ibid., 7.
22. Ibid., 7–8.
23. Ibid., 162.
24. Ibid., 168.
25. Ibid., 167.
26. Quote from Father Trevor Huddleston in December 1952. Corfield, *Historical Survey*, 284.
27. Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, "Louis Leakey's Mau Mau: A Study in the Politics of Knowledge." *History and Anthropology* 5 (1991): 145.
28. Ibid., 145.
29. Ibid., 146.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 147.
32. Ibid.
33. Carolyn Clark, "Louis Leakey as Ethnographer: On the Southern Kikuyu before 1903." *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 23, no. 3 (1989): 385.
34. Kennedy, "Constructing the Colonial Myth," 251.
35. Ibid.
36. Kennedy, "Constructing the Colonial Myth," 250.
37. Ibid., 243.
38. Ibid., 244.
39. Rob Buijtenhuijs, *Essays on Mau Mau: Contributions to Mau Mau History* (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 1982).
40. J. M. Kariuki, *Mau Mau Detainee* (Nairobi and London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 215.
41. Clough, *Mau Mau Memiors*, 3.
42. Kariuki, *Mau Mau Detainee*, 42.
43. Ian Gunn, "Review of Mau Mau Detainee." *African Affairs* 63 (1964): 240–41.
44. Ibid.
45. Donald L. Barnett and Karari Njama, *Mau Mau from Within: Autobiography and Analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt* (Dublin: MacGibbon and Kee), 421.
46. Ibid., 84–85.
47. Ibid., 422.
48. Waruhiu Itote, *Mau Mau General* (Nairobi: East African Pub. House, 1967).
49. Waruhiu Itote, *Mau Mau in Action* (London: General Printers Ltd, 1979), 1.
50. Ibid., 5.
51. Ibid., 7.
52. Ibid., 193.
53. Clough, *Mau Mau Memoirs*, 241.
54. Ibid., 78.

55. Atieno Odhiambo, "Review of Mau Mau Memoirs: History, Memory, and Politics." *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 4 (October, 2000): 1430–31.
56. Tabitha Kanogo, *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1987), 116–17.
57. David Lovatt Smith, *Kenya, The Kikuyu, and Mau Mau* (Herstmonceux: Mawenzi Books, 2005).
58. Pascal James Imperato, "Differing Perspectives on Mau Mau." *African Studies Review* 48, no. 3 (December 2005): 147–54.
59. Daniel Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), opening book page.
60. "True" suggests understanding what could have happened, which we know is difficult and problematic, since the past is gone.
61. Wambui Ndonga, "Mau Mau Want Out-of-court Award in UK case." *Capital FM News* (September 2011). http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2011/09/02/mau-mau-want-out-of-court-award-in-uk-case/. Accessed September 9, 2011.
62. Ibid.
63. Interview notes and personal communication, Nairobi, Kenya, July 2011.

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The Development of the Civil Service in Africa

Julius O. Adekunle

INTRODUCTION

All over the world, the civil service has evolved as the stronghold of the government. While the concept of the civil service is a global phenomenon, its evolution in Africa predated the colonial period. African kingdoms and empires operated on monarchical systems and there were political institutions as well as a ring of officials who provided a variety of governmental services on behalf of the ruler. African rulers surrounded themselves with capable people who formed the core of the precolonial civil service. This chapter examines the emergence and growth of the civil service in Africa. It will discuss how the centralized political system favored the argument that Africans had the concept of the civil service before the Europeans imposed a Western form of governmental system. Even where centralized systems did not exist, Africans evolved institutions that served in place of the civil service. In examining the globalization of the civil service, this chapter will explain how Africans adapted to political changes and positioned themselves in the civil service system introduced by the Europeans. It will also analyze the status of the civil service in contemporary Africa.

GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SERVICE IN PRECOLONIAL CENTRALIZED STATES

The political structures in precolonial Africa were referred to variously as "chiefdoms," "empires," "kingdoms," or "states."[1] They were

centralized and possessed all apparatuses of the modern state political system. In the Mediterranean civilizations and in sub-Saharan Africa, kings had full control of their domains and governments assumed certain responsibilities such as maintaining law and order, securing frontiers, promoting sociocultural values, preserving economic resources, and providing economic opportunities for the people. One such empire was Kanem-Bornu in present-day West Africa, where there was a long list of dynastic rulers (Mais). Under powerful rulers such as Dunama I (1097–1150), the empire achieved remarkable territorial expansion through control of both cavalry and infantry soldiers. There was also the great period of Ali Ghaji (1472–1504), during which the king reformed the government, established a new capital (Birni N'garzargamu), strengthened the royal forces, adopted Islam, and promoted trade. Ali Ghaji's reign was relatively peaceful because of the effective use of government officials in both the metropolis and subordinate regions. C. C. Ifemesia points out that the Kanem-Bornu was

> administered by a hereditary sovereign, the Mai, who was prohibited from showing himself in public except for two grand annual religious festivals, and remained hidden behind a curtain while receiving strangers. He was attended by a governing state council of twelve who in theory controlled almost all his decisions. In practice, however, the innate ability, force of character and political acumen of the reigning Mai in large measure determined the extent of his control.[2]

Among the Yoruba of the southwestern part of Nigeria where the Oyo Empire once existed, there was a layer of officials performing multidimensional functions for smooth administration. At the head of the political hierarchy was the king, who theoretically exercised absolute powers. His position was hereditary along the male line. Below the king were the town or village chiefs followed by the ward and compound heads. The governing state council, which assisted the king, represented the civil service of the time. The chiefs and government officeholders, such the king's servants, palace guards (police), court historians, priests and priestesses, and market supervisors, pledged loyalty to the king. Any act of rebellion or insubordination was often viewed as an attack on the king or state system, and was hence punishable either by revocation of position or death. The officials were not given regular wages, but were compensated according to the king's discretion. However, they were expected to be effective and efficient in carrying out their responsibilities or the king's orders.

The officials served as the ears and eyes of the king over all the territory. They had to report every event to him. Based upon his absolute power, the king had the authority to discipline or remove any recalcitrant chief or state official with little or no notice. His decision was often declared "final and irrevocable." Some of the officials "carried diplomatic messages between kingdoms and acted as royal escorts for important visitors. In course of their duties, they were highly respected and as emissaries of their sovereign to other kingdoms they enjoyed a measure of diplomatic immunity especially when their sovereign enjoyed cordial relations with such other kingdoms."[3]

There were two parts of the Asante Empire—the metropolis and the provincial. While the Asantehene headed the metropolitan administration, the Omanhene was in charge of the provincial government. In each province, the Omanhene had a state council while in the central administration, which the Asantehene headed, there was a confederate council consisting all of the provincial kings. The state and confederate councils were advisory to the Omanhene and Asantehene respectively.[4] A European observed in the early nineteenth century that "the king rule[d] with unrivalled sway; every king, chief, viceroy or caboceer, being his absolute and unconditional vassal as tributaries or not and most of them holding their governments by virtue of an appointment from the Court."[5] Like other political settings in Africa, the state officials in the Asante Empire were assigned specific duties and were expected to perform their functions effectively since the administrative class (the civil servants) depended on "talent and ability rather than on birth."[6]

Similarly, in the interlacustrine region (East and Central Africa), the Bunyoro Kingdom emerged as a large and well-structured political system "until the development of a more centralized and bureaucratic state in Buganda."[7] Bunyoro evolved after the unification of the small principalities in the interlacustrine region. Beattie described the political structure and institutions thus:

> In Bunyoro, the great territorial chiefs, of whom in historical times there were a dozen or more, enjoyed a good deal of autonomy, governing their areas rather like private estates. Their rights over these territories and their inhabitants, which they held from the king as his subordinates and on condition of tribute payment and homage to him, were subject to restrictions, but within their areas these chiefs were accorded high prestige, and received homage and tribute similar to, but on a much smaller scale than, that paid to the king, whose representatives they were.[8]

Beattie discussed the feudal system as it operated in Bunyoro. Feudalism was a common political system in precolonial Africa. In the above quote, Beattie indicates that the king as well as the subordinate chiefs did not live on regular wages, but on tribute. However, the king was wealthy because he controlled the state economy. The Buganda Kingdom supplanted Bunyoro, also evolving an elaborate court system. Robert July points out that Buganda was "governed by royal administrators, bureaucratic appointees who held office at the [K]abaka's pleasure. "[9] All state appointees (the civil service) were directly responsible to the king.

It is clear that in the governmental arrangement throughout the centralized states in Africa, the king worked in consonance with the council of chiefs and other state appointees. Disobedience or insubordination was dealt with promptly and attempts were made to prevent rebellions. Without the cooperation and efficiency of the core of "civil servants," the king could not maintain law and order and rule peacefully.

Generally, African societies were male-dominated, but both men and women participated in politics and held political positions. Women, however, played different and complementary roles.[10] The Ashanti people of modern Ghana were a matriarchal society where the queen mother (*ohemmaa*—the senior female in the royal family) wielded enormous political influence. She was surrounded by a cohort of counselors, who constituted her civil servants. She reserved the prerogative of choosing the king after due consultation with members of the royal family. As Tarikhu Farrar asserts, the queen mother could "assume full control of central authority; she could become the 'king,' the *omanhene*"[11] and could operate her own court. In other African political systems, some queen mothers became provincial governors.[12] Queen mothers often had their own core of officials who oversaw female affairs. Like their male counterparts, the female officials (civil servants) were not on regular wages and they held their positions as long as it pleased the queen. Although few and far between, there were female rulers such as Queen Amina of Zaria and Alaafin Orompoto in the Old Oyo Empire. Both rulers were successful politically and militarily.[13] In Yorubaland, "the *iyalode* had jurisdiction over all Yoruba women and defended their concerns in the male king's council."[14] Women also held powerful socioeconomic positions such as the *mudjadji* (the Rain Queen) among the Lovedu people of South Africa, and the *omu* in charge of marketplaces among the Igbo. Bothe women used spiritual power to carry out their responsibilities.[15]

African political philosophy was wrapped in religious belief systems. Africans believed that political authority was divinely vested in a person with the right to promulgate laws and administer justice. Rulers were seen as semi-gods and they assumed extensive political powers. Thus, religion was a source of empowerment to kings because it gave them the authority to rule and legitimized their reign. In the Rwandan society, the *mwami* (sacred king) surrounded himself with the *ubwiru* (a council of royal ritualists) who were political advisors and performed rituals for the king. Since the *ubwiru* performed specialized politico-religious functions, their positions were hereditary.[16]

African political systems made provisions for justice. There were family, lineage, and village heads who were in charge of judging minor cases while the king judged serious cases.

The Civil Service in Precolonial "Stateless Societies"

Unlike the centralized states, stateless societies did not operate on elaborate political system, but had the functionaries of government, based mainly on kinship and gerontocracy. Instead of a king, numerous clan or lineage heads provided leadership, although not with institutionalized political authority. The absence of sovereign rulers invested with hereditary political powers and state officeholders did not indicate the presence of chaos and anarchy. Indeed, there was law and order and justice. There was no specific group of civil servants, but certain members of the societies performed specific duties for the smooth and peaceful administration of the communities. As pointed out elsewhere, "there were representatives of the different segments or villages that composed the political community, usually, adult male members. All adult men possessed the right to speak on political matters of the community and to belong to councils that had specific assignments."[17]

Examples of stateless societies include the Igbo and Tiv in Nigeria, Dinka and Nuer in Sudan, the Maasai in Kenya, and the Tallensi in modern Ghana.[18] In these societies, the prevailing sociopolitical concept was egalitarianism. In the Igbo political system, village councils, elders, and lineage heads performed political roles. Giving the example of the Tiv, July indicates that their "devotion to statelessness has brought forth a truly egalitarian society with legal and economic rights based primarily upon kinship."[19] The pastoral Somali in Somalia, according to I. M. Lewis, did not have "any administrative

hierarchy of officials and no institutionalized positions of leadership to direct their affairs."[20] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, a renowned anthropologist, pointed out that political institutions were closely related to environmental conditions because of the livelihood of the people. With specific reference to the Nuer, he asserts that the largest political segment was the ethnic group. The people were segmentary and the political system was egalitarian.[21] Similarly, "leadership within the Pygmy [of north-eastern Zaire] bands is diffuse and co-operative with no single person being responsible for all decision making for the group."[22]

The above examples indicate that an egalitarian approach to governance in stateless societies suggests that power did not flow from top to bottom and the civil service concept did not clearly apply, although all administrative aspects existed and were carried out. The lineage heads employed the services of age-grade sets to carry out public works such as constructing and maintaining roads and bridges as well as marketplaces. In other words, age-grade sets were sociopolitical agents and enforcers of public safety.

All aspects of the political system were in place by the end of the nineteenth century when the Europeans penetrated the interior of Africa. Their objective was to abolish the slave trade from its roots in Africa and introduce legitimate trade. Given the growth and spread of the Industrial Revolution and the economic and technological competition in Europe, there was a quest for raw materials and markets for their manufactured goods in Africa. The influx of European merchants and companies led to intense economic rivalry, competition for land acquisition, and creation of spheres of influence. The initial economic relations between Africans and Europeans later turned into political control, which eventually changed the preexisting political systems in Africa. With the Europeans holding political powers, new political institutions were introduced. Thus, Africans changed from their monarchical system to a European parliamentary system with the introduction of the civil service.

COLONIALISM AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN CIVIL SERVICE

Arriving in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the Europeans (either by treaty signing or wars of conquest) occupied most of Africa and aimed to have political control. By 1914, when World War I began, only two places—Ethiopia in the east and Liberia in the west—were not colonized by the Europeans. This does not

mean that the two places were also completely devoid of European influence. All the European powers[23] used African soldiers to fight against their fellow Africans in order to cement and legitimize their domination as well as pursue their economic, political, and social interests. The colonial political system was very bureaucratic. The military officers and civil servants were appointees of the administration and they were expected to be loyal in performing their various functions. Thus, the establishment of the military became an important and integral machinery of the colonial civil service. Since Africa is a pluralist society, the European powers adopted the "divide and rule" policy by favoring particular ethnic groups and promoting them in the military. The imbalance in the military eventually created ethnic problems in the post-independence era.

The colonial powers used various approaches of administering their subjects, but a common feature was working through traditional African rulers.[24] The objective was partly to have a peaceful administration with little or no resistance from the people. The main functions of the traditional rulers were to maintain law and order, ensure that their domains were peaceful, judge minor cases, and collect taxes for the colonial administration. In performing these functions, the traditional rulers employed a group of workers who served as the local civil servants. However, ruling through African kings created some problems in the sense that it pitched the traditional rulers against the educated people, who were more relevant to the civil service system. It seems the colonial authorities did not have clearly defined political roles for the rulers. They could not use their own initiative in certain matters.

With particular reference to Nigeria, the British, at the beginning of their colonial rule in the late nineteenth century, established government agencies such as the colonial secretary's office, a registrar of births and death, the post office, law courts, a jail system, and the printing office. Since these offices were alien and required education and tr-ining, not many Africans could immediately perform the jobs. Hence, a few colonial officials held the high-ranking positions in the civil service while the African civil servants were disrespected and had no voice in policy-making decisions, presumably because they did not possess the education and experience for governance. For example, the African educated elite in West Africa called on the colonial governments to make civil service reforms after World War I. In Nigeria, the National Congress of British West Africa (a political pressure group) sent resolutions to the British government in London, demanding political reforms, employment opportunities, and better

treatment for Nigerians in the civil service. Although the resolutions were rejected, the demand for civil service reform continued.

It was clear that the Europeans swept aside the monarchical system and used a group of African literate or semiliterate personnel as the pioneers of the civil service. For expediency and economic prudence, and because they did not have enough personnel, European administrative officers appointed and trained Africans to perform some official duties. Thus, Africans served at the lowest sector of the emerging civil service. The adjustment to a new political system was slow and gradual, but successful. While the concept of the civil service was not completely new to African politics and governance, the colonial system became attractive because of the wages attached to it. The civil service provided an alternative to farming, which involved intensive labor. Therefore, Africans flocked to government jobs in spite of the ridiculously low wages. The civil service transformed the labor market and created a new work ethic and decorum for Africans. Just as being employed in the services of the king was empowering in the precolonial times, working for the colonial government became a mark of identity, accompanied by dignity and integrity. The civil service was not only attractive, but it was also prestigious because civil servants were given loans to purchase cars.

All over Africa, civil servants formed labor movements to fight against low wages and for better working conditions. Strikes were organized and labor union leaders became agents of opposition to colonial economic oppression. The colonial economic policy to minimize cost and maximize profit prompted unacceptable wages for the civil servants. A particular example of a strong trade union leader in the 1940s was Michael Imoudu of the Nigeria Railway Workers Union. Imoudu led the railway workers to march to the governor's residence to demand the Cost of Living Allowance for workers in 1942.[25] Imoudu's actions yielded positive results as the colonial government "increased the wages of temporary and daily laborers."[26] Many workers were promoted, moving from day wages to permanent pay and from daily rates to monthly salaries.[27] Protests, strikes, and unrest became more frequent after World War II because of economic ramifications of the war and its impact on colonial administration. Inflation was high and working conditions were poor. The more stringent the colonial government became, the more active and vociferous the trade unions became. Imoudu organized the first general strike of the railway workers in 1945. His ingenious leadership and commitment earned him recognition as "Nigeria's Labour Leader No. 1."[28]

After World War II, the process of decolonization began throughout Africa. Africans wanted the termination of colonial rule so they would have full control of their own affairs. All avenues for independence were explored—political parties were formed, delegates were sent to Europe, anticolonial articles were written, and nationalist movements took place. Educated Africans provided leadership for decolonization. The first major step forward came in the Gold Coast (Ghana) when the charismatic and radical nationalist Dr. Kwame Nkrumah was chosen as the Leader of Government Business. Nkrumah used the position to not only garner support for himself, but also provide amenities for his people to prove that Africans were capable of managing their own affairs. He employed fellow Africans in his administration. Similarly, with the evolution of regionalization in Nigeria in 1946,[29] premiers were appointed, each of them adopting policies that favored their people. One prominent development, especially in the Western Region, was the promotion of education under the leadership of Obafemi Awolowo. Known for his welfare programs, Awolowo embarked on free Universal Primary Education in 1955. This radical and revolutionary program produced educated people qualified to serve as indigenous civil servants in the years following independence.

Simeon Adebo, one of the foremost civil servants in Nigeria, wrote a book, *Our Unforgettable Years*, chronicling his contributions, the activities, and developments of the civil service in the Western Region. He indicated that British colonial officials praised the performance of the civil servants. According to Adebo, Sir John Rankine, British governor in Nigeria, once wrote to him that

> he [Sir John Rankine] thought he should let me know that some of the very distinguished visitors from the United Kingdom and elsewhere who had recently called upon him had told him that they considered our Civil Service one of the best, if not the best, in Black Africa and that it compared more favorably with the Civil Service in even more developed lands.[30]

Adebo was a civil servant in the years immediately following independence, when there was a conscious effort to Nigerialize the civil service. Then, civil servants were not yet fraught with serious challenges. As in other African states, dedication, diligence, efficiency, and transparency were the key words. High work ethics and moral values were required of civil servants. With time, however, the African civil service faced some challenges.

The Civil Service and Reforms

The civil service, as the main machinery of the government, has several departments working together to achieve a common goal: good governance. The inefficiency of the civil service or poor political leadership could lead to bad governance. Hence, reforms were required to shape or sharpen the output of the civil servants. In precolonial times, rulers had the prerogative of reforming their administration and removing poorly performing officials from their assignments. Like in the African indigenous political system, civil servants in contemporary times do not hold hereditary positions. Hence, there is a need for reforms to enhance political performance. An unusual reform took place in the Asante Empire in the late nineteenth century when Mensa Bonsu, the *Asantehene*, instituted "democratic reforms to bring Asante more in line with the British way of doing things. He even went so far as to replace some Asante civil servants with Europeans ... These radical changes threatened the traditional power structure of the councils and civil servants, and there were calls for the destoolment of Mensa Bonsu."[31] Colonial officials were sometimes changed or removed if they did not perform. Policies were abrogated or revised to suit the needs of the governed. For example, on several occasions, the colonial authorities revised tax laws in the wake of protests and resistances. The concept of reforms survived the colonial period and persists universally in governmental systems.

The Africanization of the civil service was a major political issue during the period of decolonization. To prove that Africans were competent to run their own affairs, emerging political leaders embarked on the process of indigenizing the civil service by calling for the replacement of the colonial officials with African educated people who could perform administrative duties. Ernest Ikoli, a journalist and politician, was the president of the Nigerian Youth Movement in 1941 and ran for an elective post in the Legislative Council. In his manifesto, Ikoli promised to pursue, among other things, "complete Africanisation of the Civil Service."[32] According to another nationalist:

> There is no reason why equal attention should not be paid to the African Civil Servant's demands as that which is paid to the European Civil Servants ... Give the African Civil Servant a fair treatment for he is the back-bone of the Government. There must be equal pay for equal work.[33]

The argument was raised that the problem of jobs would be solved if Africans, especially the ex-servicemen, were absorbed into the civil service. Africans in general, and Nigerians in particular, urged the colonial authorities to stop job and wage discrimination and recognize the administrative ability and skills of the indigenous people. Sir Arthur Richards, the governor of Nigeria in 1946, appealed to the people for patience because it was not an easy process to indigenize the civil service. This was partly because of the level of education and little administrative exposure of Nigerians. Richards emphasized:

> No serious African Civil Servant subscribes to the assertion that there exists today among them a crop of men from whom can be selected successive Governors, Directors of Marine or such Heads of Department. The average African Official is annoyed and rightly too that because he is not made a Governor or the Chief of Secretary but that he is not given opportunities to show in other posts what he can do and that if he has been given the opportunity and has made good, some change or the other is brought in to incapacitate him from occupying the post.[34]

With independence coming to African states, especially by the mid- and second half of the twentieth century, one of the immediate and main reforms was the Africanization of the civil service system, which was inherited from the Europeans. However, then and now, the civil service continues to perform the functions of "designing, formulating and implementing public policy." It also "discharge[s] government functions and development programmes in an effective and efficient way."[35] Like others sectors of government, the civil service makes reforms from time to time in order to improve its performance and make its policies relevant to the needs of the people.

Civil service reform may be intractable and pose serious challenges for governments. Nevertheless, it is carried out for various reasons. Civil service reform is sometimes motivated by the government's desire to promote loyalty, transparency, and performance. It may be a result of party politics. The change in leadership automatically leads to a reshuffling of the government. Loyalists of the former political leaders or government are removed and replaced with supporters of the new administration in order to promote new goals or programs. In the early years of independence in Ghana, President Nkrumah issued *A New Charter for the Civil Service*, which brought the civil service under his direct control. It was partly to make the civil servants nonpartisan, but also to promote his one-party agenda.[36]

The Civil Service and Challenges

The civil service in Africa has been facing many challenges. First, shortly after securing independence, many Africans were recruited into the civil service because of the Africanization policy. Most college and university graduates joined the civil service because of the seemingly attractive working conditions. They became the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie,"[37] and because the government is the largest employer, the civil service became remarkably enlarged. During the 1960s, "the civil service in Africa grew on an average of 7 percent. By 1970, 60 percent wage earners were government employees. A decade later, at least 50 percent of government expenditures were allocated to salaries."[38] Thus, training and maintaining a huge civil service brought about economic burdens on many governments.

Second, given their access to public funds, many civil servants have become corrupt. Contractors are willing to bribe their way through the civil servants in order to receive contracts, and business owners are determined to offer bribes to minimize their costs of operation. While corruption is a means of sustaining an economy, it remains a global phenomenon, and it is rampant in many underdeveloped economies, including African countries. Owing to their privileged position, many public officers transfer public funds into their own private accounts. Salaries and remuneration of public officers are being increased unnecessarily. While many African countries are ravaged by poverty and underdevelopment, public officials flaunt their ill-gotten wealth at the expense of the poor taxpayers. In Nigeria, the anticorruption agency the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, was established to check corruption. The commission has convicted only a few corrupt public officers. In Kenya, where a similar anticorruption agency has been established—the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission—the head is "reportedly expected to have a monthly compensation package exceeding 2.5 million Kenyan shillings ($32,000)."[39] Corruption has been institutionalized and closely linked to civil servants. As John Mbaku suggests, "Unless the state's regulatory system is reformed, civil servants are likely to institutionalize … bottlenecks and transform them into a permanent source of extra-legal compensation for themselves."[40] To curb corruption, Mbaku recommends that governments should establish "structures that adequately constrain the state and minimize the ability of civil servants to engage in opportunism."[41]

Third, patronage has largely permeated the civil service. Ethnic identities rather than ability or skills to perform become a major part of the consideration for holding public offices. It seems political

leaders relish the idea of surrounding themselves with members of their ethnic groups to maintain political power and control economic resources. Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg describe this as clientism, which "refers to a personalized and reciprocal relationship between an inferior [client] and a superior [patron] commanding unequal resources."[42] Carlene Edie also points out that "Civil servants benefit from clientelist rule in that many of them acquired their jobs as a result of political patronage."[43]

Conclusion

The chapter has discussed the evolution and development of the civil service system in Africa. It has argued that the civil service system predated colonial rule and that it existed in the precolonial times. Over several years of its existence as an organ of the government, the civil service has gone through changes, improvements, and reforms. The first major change occurred with the coming of the Europeans, who introduced the Western civil service system. That change led to the process of adaptation on the part of the Africans. The requirements for positions in the civil service changed since Western education was needed to be able to perform the multidimensional functions in the civil service. As new departments were created, the civil service became wider, and the number of civil servants increased. Hence, the government became a major employer and the expenses of maintaining the administration became higher. Admittedly, the modern civil service system is a legacy of the colonial government. However, it has connected African governments to the global system of governance. All over the world, the civil service is always undergoing changes and reform, which is an indication that the system is not static—it changes according to the needs of the people. Also, the challenges that African civil servants face, especially corruption and patronage, are not peculiar; they are global. Even in the developed economies and political systems, public servants have been accused and indicted for corruption. Since the civil service is an essential and integral part of government, African states should make necessary reforms to sanitize the civil service and make it more effective for good governance and relevant to peoples' needs.

Notes

1. The basic elements of a state include: a territory (sometimes not well-defined in a precolonial African context), population, a system of

government, an economic base, and a system of transportation and communication. See E. A. Boateng, *A Political Geography of Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 10.

2. C. C. Ifemesia, "The Peoples of West Africa around A.D. 1000," in *A Thousand Years of West African History: A Handbook for Teachers and Students*, ed. J. F. Ade. Ajayi and Ian Espie (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1965), 84.`

3. Toyin Falola and Dare Oguntomisin, *The Military in Nineteenth Century Yoruba Politics* (Ile-Ife, Nigeria: University of Ife Press, 1984) 18–19.

4. J. B. Webster and A. A. Boahen, *The Revolutionary Years: West Africa since 1800* (London: Longman, 1967), 122.

5. Ibid., 126.

6. Ibid.

7. John H. M. Beattie, "Bunyoro: An African Feudality?" in *Perspectives on the African Past*, ed Martin A. Klein and G. Wesley Johnson (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1972), 81.

8. Ibid., 84.

9. Robert W. July, *A History of the African People*, 5th ed. (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1998), 144.

10. Audrey Chapman Smock, *Women: Roles and Status in Eight Countries* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1977), 180.

11. Tarikhu Farrar, "The Queenmother, Matriarchy, and the Question of Female Political Authority in Precolonial West Africa Monarchy," *Journal of Black Studies* 27, no. 5 (May 1997): 579–97.

12. July, 154.

13. At Igboho, Orompoto is remembered as a female Alaafin who used her womanhood to have a long, peaceful, and prosperous reign. She won many wars, especially against Borgu. According to Robert Smith, "Orompoto was a woman ruler (*oba obinrin*), but who in any case is remembered as having formed a large army whose rearguard alone consisted of 1,000 horsemen and 1,000 foot soldiers." See Robert S. Smith, *Kingdoms of the Yoruba*, 3rd ed. (London: James Currey, 1988), 32.

14. Jean O'Barr and Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, "African Women in Politics," in *African Women South of the Sahara*, ed. Margaret Jean Hay and Sharon Stichter, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman Scientific Technical, 1995). For more information on the Iyalode, see Bolanle Awe, "The Iyalode in the Traditional Yoruba Political System," in *Sexual Stratification: A Cross-Cultural View*, ed. Alice Schlegel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 144–195, 193.

15. In the precolonial times, the *obi* (male ruler) and the *omu* (female ruler) collaborated in their political roles to rule their people. In empowering the men, the colonial authorities eliminated the *omu* position.

16. Julius O. Adekunle, *Culture and Customs of Rwanda* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007), 7.

17. Julius O. Adekunle, "Democracy and Political Change in Pre-colonial Africa," in *Democracy in Africa: Political Changes and Challenges*, ed. Saliba Sarsar and Julius O. Adekunle (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 3–18.

18. M. Fortes, *The Political System of the Tallensi of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast* (London: Oxford University Press, 1955).

19. Ibid., 108.

20. I. M. Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961, reprinted International Institute, James Curry, 1999), 1.

21. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), 4–5. Anthropologists refer to the stateless societies as acephalous or segmentary because of their numerous clan and lineages with no strong political ties, but with close kinship relations.

22. Jolayemi Solanke, "Traditional Social and Political Institutions," in *African History and Culture*, ed. Richard Olaniyan (Lagos, Nigeria: Longman, 1982), 33.

23. The seven European powers in Africa were Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

24. The British used the Indirect Rule, the French used Assimilation and Association, the Portuguese used *Assimilado,* and the Belgians used Paternalism.

25. Robin Cohen, "Nigeria's Labour Leader No. 1: Notes for a Biographical Study of M. A. O. Imoudu." *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 5, no. 2 (June 1970): 303–08.

26. Toyin Falola, *Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 156.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 160. Until his death in 2005, Imoudu remained a power to reckon with among Nigeria's labor unions.

29. In the 1946 Richards's Constitution, Nigeria was divided into three regions–Eastern Region, Northern Region, and Western Region, with Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and Chief Obafemi Awolowo as premiers respectively.

30. Chief Simeon O. Adebo, *Our Unforgettable Years* (Lagos, Nigeria: Macmillan, 1983), 302.

31. See Eugene L. Mendonsa, *West Africa: An Introduction to Its History, Civilization and Contemporary Situation* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 318.

32. "Mr. Ernest Ikoli's Message to Electors of Lagos," *The Nigerian Daily Times*, March 9, 1946, 175.

33. "Mr. Adedoyin's Manifesto to Electors of Lagos," *The Nigerian Daily Times*, March 13, 1946, 1 and 3. Adedoyin was declared the

winner of the election with 904 votes to Ikoli's 160. Ikoli challenged the results of the election. The court eventually nullified Adedoyin's election because he "had not fulfilled the conditions required by law of an elector in connection with residential qualifications." See "Judgment Delivered in Election Petition," *The Nigerian Daily Times*, March 29, 1946, 1 and 5. With the nullification, Ikoli was declared the winner.

34. O. A. Omololu, "Africanisation of the Civil Service," *The Nigerian Daily Times*, March 30, 1946, 1 and 4. Omololu was the editor of the *Nigerian Civil Servant* of the Nigerian Civil Service Union.

35. Ogunrotifa Ayodeji Bayo, "Federal Civil Service Reform in Nigeria: The Case of Democratic Centralism," *Journal of Radix International Educational and Research Consortium*, 1, no. 10 (October 2012): 1–42.

36. William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Africa*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 131.

37. Naomi Chazen, Peter Lewis, Robert A. Mortimer, Donald Rothchild, and Stenpen John Stedman, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 55–56.

38. Ibid., 55–56.

39. Dagi Kimani, "Kenya's Filthy Rich Civil Servants." *World Press Review* 51, no. 1 (January 2004), http://www.worldpress.org/Africa/1701.cfm. Accessed October 1, 2013.

40. John Mukum Mbaku, "Corruption." **in** *Africa: Contemporary Africa* 5, ed. Toyin Falola (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2003), 145.

41. John Mukum Mbaku, "Property Rights and Sustainable Environmental Management," in *Africa: Contemporary Africa* 5, ed. Toyin Falola (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2003)., 61.

42. Quoted from Chazen et al., 112.

43. Carlene J. Edie, *Politics in Africa: A New Beginning?* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003), 78.

The Second World War and Africa's Socioeconomic Infrastructures: A Case Study of the Nigerian Railroad System

Tokunbo A. Ayoola

INTRODUCTION

At the start of the Second World War, most parts of Africa were under the control of European colonial powers. Africa and Africans were thus drawn into the conflict by their colonizers, as the continent's resources and infrastructures were mobilized for the war. The Allied Powers—in control of the continent throughout the period of the war—made extensive use of Africa's transportation infrastructures to transport troops, supplies, and machinery to parts of Africa and beyond.[1] After the loss of British colonies in Southeast Asia to the Japanese in the early 1940s, Africa suddenly became very strategic to the Allied Powers, particularly for the supply of essential raw materials (peanuts, palm oil, cocoa, rubber, and cotton) and mineral resources (tin and columbite) that were used to feed their troops and to produce war materials, respectively.[2] As a result of the increased demand for these commodities, Africans came under great pressure to produce more agricultural products and minerals for export. The war thus stimulated more production and brought about economic boom.[3] These developments were, however, at the expense of the continent's transportation infrastructure, which was used intensely and without proper maintenance and renewal. During the war, it

became impossible to import essential capital goods such as spare parts and machinery with which to repair and modernize existing physical infrastructures.[4] This was due to contradictory colonial economic and industrial policies formulated and implemented between 1938 and 1946.[5]

As Africa's military involvement and contributions to the outcome of the Second World War are a very important part of the continent's modern history, many scholars have written about these and the political, economic, social, psychological, and cultural consequences of the war on Africa and its peoples.[6] But conspicuously missing in the existing literature is any study on the specific impact of the war on Africa's socioeconomic infrastructures: railroads, ports, airports, roads, and inland waterways. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to fill the gap in the existing literature. Using the Nigerian Railway (NR) as a case study, this chapter discusses the impact of the war and argues that the negative impact of the war on Nigeria's railroad system far outweighs the benefits derived from the temporary economic boom made possible by the war. The best assistance rendered to the NR after the war was staggered rehabilitation of its equipment and infrastructure, rather than complete rebuilding or modernization. It further argues that some of the blame for the poor state of Africa's postcolonial social and economic infrastructures can be traced to their virtual stagnation during the war years, 1939–1945.

The Nigerian Railroad Industry in the Time of the Second World War

The construction and development of what eventually became the NR began in the late nineteenth century, with the construction of the Lagos-Ibadan Railway, which was opened in March 1901.[7] In 1905, the line was extended further north by 62 miles, to Oshogbo.[8] From Oshogbo it was extended northward again to Ilorin and then Jebba, a town on the bank of River Niger, in 1909.[9] The Lagos railroad remained in this state until 1915 when the Jebba Bridge was opened, a development that eventually made it possible for the line to be extended into Northern Nigeria.[10] Meanwhile, in the latter, construction and development of an entirely different railroad had started at the beginning of the twentieth century, and its first phase, the 34-mile Kano-Baro line, was declared open in 1911.[11] The "Northern" line served as the link not only between major towns such as Kano, Kaduna, Zaria, Minna, and Baro, but also Southern Nigeria and the rest of the world.[12]

In 1912, both the Lagos and the Kano-Baro, or the Northern Nigeria railroads, were amalgamated to form the NR.[13] Further development to the NR's infrastructure was made in 1914 with the construction of a 140-mile Bauchi Light Railway from the tin-mining area of Bukuru, near Jos, to Zaria. It was specifically meant to transport tin from Central Nigeria to the southern ports of Lagos and Port Harcourt.[14] In the east, the Port Harcourt line, whose construction was started in 1913, was extended northward to reach Enugu in 1916.[15] When it opened, it started transporting agricultural produce from the eastern region and coal from the mines around Udi Hills, near Enugu, to the southern ports. Subsequently, from Enugu, the eastern line extended northward, reaching Makurdi, on the banks of Nigeria's second major river, the River Benue, in 1924.[16] With the construction of the Benue Bridge after the First World War, the development of the eastern line continued further north and reached Kaduna in 1932 (see Figure 4.1).[17] Thus, by the late 1930s the basic outline of the NR's network had emerged.[18] Throughout the colonial period, the NR

Figure 4.1 Map of the Nigerian Railway Network until 1964

was the backbone of Nigeria's export and import economy. The development and integration of 1,265 miles of railroads by the 1930s greatly increased the production and exportation of the colony's agricultural and mineral resources.[19]

After the amalgamation of the two main railroads, the new NR did not initially find its financial bearing as it incurred deficits in its financial accounts in 1912, 1915, 1916, and 1921.[20] From 1922 to 1929, its operations were profitable.[21] However, between 1930 and 1935, the NR experienced serious economic crisis,[22] which was an integral part of the much larger Great Depression of the 1930s that severely affected Great Britain (Nigeria's colonial power and chief trading partner), Nigeria itself, and the rest of the world. In the particular case of Nigeria, between 1929 and 1931, the value of export commodities dropped precipitously from £17.8 million to £8.8 million.[23] On the other hand, the value of her imports fell from £13.2 million to £6.5 million.[24] As a result of this gloomy economic situation in Nigeria, farmers produced much lesser for export because of the much reduced prices being offered for export crops. With reduced purchasing power, farmers could not buy imported goods and local foodstuffs, which had become more expensive. Also, as a result of the Great Depression, demand from abroad for Nigerian exports shrunk.[25] Thus, the NR, the carrier of these goods to and from the Nigerian ports, had loss of revenue as the volume of freight traffic carried by it fell.[26]

Second, in the 1930s, the NR started experiencing greater competition from road transport, which it ironically pioneered and developed from 1907 to the mid-1920s, and had complemented its services through feeding it with freight traffic from the hinterland to the railroad stations and carrying imported goods and local foodstuffs from the stations to the hinterland.[27] But from the mid-1920s and especially in the 1930s, individuals and companies, taking advantage of the rapidly changing economic situation in the colony and the world, increased their participation in the road and motor transportation business.[28] According to G. Walker, whereas in 1934, 1,400 hundredweight vehicles were registered, in 1939 this had jumped to 3,500.[29] Of these two numbers, half were registered in Lagos, the capital of the colony, and from where private road transporters operated regular and lucrative service to and from Ibadan, a route that ran parallel to the western railroad (the Lagos-Ibadan-Ilorin-Jebba-Kano route).[30] In the 1930s, these transporters competed fiercely against the NR for the transportation of cocoa, palm kernels, and palm oil from the western parts of the colony to the Lagos port.[31] Furthermore, the

stiff competition among the road transporters themselves resulted in a dramatic fall in the roadway charges between Lagos and Western Nigeria. This development greatly undermined the NR.[32]

Another of the NR's competitors at the time was the inland waterway system. In the new economic climate of the 1930s, freight traffic, which had hitherto used the NR, was being diverted to Lagos lagoons and then shipped inland. Similarly, in Northern Nigeria, freight traffic between Kano and Lagos that used the railroad was also being diverted to Baro on the bank of River Niger and shipped to the Delta ports and Port Harcourt (see Table 4.1).[33]

In order to counter this strong competition, the NR's management decided to reduce the rates for transporting freight and passengers and granted other concessions to customers and traders. However, all these attempts at attracting back customers failed.[34] Instead, the number of lorries on roads paralleling the NR's first 240 miles (i.e., the western rail line between Lagos and Ilorin)[35] increased rapidly, just as freight traffic going by the NR continued to decline.[36] By

Table 4.1 Nigerian Railway: Financial results, 1930–1951 (in £ Sterling)

Year	Gross Receipts	Total Working Expenditure	Operating Surplus	Interest on Capital	Renewals	Surplus
1930–31	2,154,731	1,313,208	841,523	987,220	–	–134,405
1931–32	1,837,977	1,164,720	673,257	1,000,022	–	–321,949
1932–33	1,870,426	1,087,502	782,924	1,041,825	–	–253,901
1933–34	1,868,172	1,072,823	795,349	1,046,202	–	–246,668
1934–35	2,007,674	1,040,805	966,869	1,047,173	–	–74,314
1935–36	1,945,109	1,032,582	912,527	1,048,729	–	–421,014
1936–37	2,666,958	1,159,720	1,507,238	783,396	662,025	+72,612
1937–38	2,834,967	1,326,955	1,508,012	764,691	428,000	+231,286
1938–39	2,076,168	1,320,282	756,914	755,314	430,000	–473,875
1939–40	2,024,741	1,221,967	806,572	766,275	430,000	–326,471
1940–41	2,409,976	1,183,689	1,234,613	721,273	300,000	+223,230
1941–42	3,145,915	1,368,796	1,775,853	919,396	300,000	+774,750
1942–43	3,583,118	1,627,394	1,960,183	945,520	430,000	+869,412
1943–44	4,091,818	1,889,550	2,212,324	949,520	430,000	+147,650
1944–45	3,961,405	2,042,422	1,919,670	949,547	430,000	+661,716
1945–46	3,022,838	2,110,103	1,511,937	949,547	430,000	+409,973
1946–47	4,630980	2,652,124	1,967,303	947,215	430,000	+812,039
1947–48	4,740,395	3,023,449	1,709,163	900,762	430,000	–22,481
1948–49	5,715,611	3,703180	1,998,168	900,774	830,000	+181,439
1949–50	6,098,256	4,099,668	1,985,685	900,768	830,000	–283,480
1950–51	6,340,508	4,834,005	1,521,445	754,210	830,000	–327,214

Source: Nigeria Railway Annual Reports 1930–1951.

1937, the NR had lost not less than £150,000 gross receipts from freight and passenger traffic to road transporters. On the other hand, due to the NR's deliberate policy of reducing rates to attract traffic already lost to road transporters, it recorded an annual loss of £36,000 during the Great Depression.[37]

   In view of the NR's financial crisis, its management requested the colonial government to restrict and control road transporters. Attempts made by the government in 1933 and 1936 to solve the problem through critical studies and recommendations by the Rail-Road Committee were not successful. In its endeavor to protect the overall British imperial economic interest, the colonial authorities found it hard to restrict or completely ban road transport services, which by the 1930s had become very important for quickly transporting export commodities to the ports and imported goods to the interior. Instead, the government imposed taxes by way of high motor licence fees on lorries and vehicles running parallel to NR lines.[38] The NR's dire financial position was not to last too long, as it started improving in the 1936/1937 financial year. One of the factors responsible for this positive development was the deliberate actions taken by the government: first, to relieve the NR of its crushing financial burden by taking over the high interest rates on the loans secured for the construction of the unprofitable eastern line[39]; and second, to transform the NR into a fully commercial organization and therefore now primarily responsible for meeting its operational costs, pension obligations, other interest payments on loans, contributions to the renewal funds, and settlements of all deficits.[40] This was the situation of the NR in the time of the Second World War.

Impact of the War on the Nigerian Railroad

From the start of the Great Depression in the late 1920s up to 1938, when the NR again entered profitable ways, only about £450,000 was spent as capital expenditure on its physical infrastructure.[41] In 1938, its management and the government drew up a renewal and development plan, which was to cost £10,078,082 for repair of its infrastructures that had been neglected for upward of ten years. Of the budgeted amount, £3.4 million, or 33 percent, was earmarked for spending in the first five years of the program. The remainder £5.6 million, or 56 percent, was for the second five years. Also, of the total amount, £5.7 million was to be spent on major civil works, while £4,026,327 million would be utilized for purchasing locomotives, rolling stocks, and other engineering equipment. Finally, of

the original amount, 50 percent was to be raised as external loan.[42] However, this well-planned program was jettisoned as soon as it was put together. But why was this?

In July 1939, in anticipation of the outbreak of the Second World War, the British imperial government secretly started implementing a policy of import and export restrictions in the British Empire. This was aimed at conserving foreign exchange and to ensure the survival of the empire's economy, particularly during the war, which then seemed inevitable.[43] Consequent upon this new policy, therefore, the NR had to abandon its renewal program.[44] Second, perhaps taking a cue from her experience during the Great War, the Nigerian colonial government decided to implement some austerity measures. First among these was the retrenchment of some of its workers. In early 1938, NR had a total of 19,153 workers on its open lines operation, but by mid-1939 the workforce had been reduced to 18,052. Again by March 1940, the number had shrunk to 17,658, and a year later, the number fell further down to 16,452.[45] Third, throughout the 1939–1945 war, only £400,000 was spent on the repairs and maintenance of existing infrastructure, and no finance was provided for capital projects.[46] The implication of these developments was that both immediately before and during the war, the NR's infrastructure was in a state of disrepair. The first 18 months of the Second World War were very challenging for the NR. By 1940, the NR was already in serious economic crisis. But surprisingly a year later its financial fortunes changed for the better, once again. From 1941 to 1946, the NR achieved working surpluses of £223,230, £774,750, £869,412, £147,650, £661,716, and £409,973, respectively (Table 4.1). Additionally, whereas the total net tonnage transported by the NR in 1938/1939 was 955,000 tons, this rose to 1,600,000 tons in 1943/1944 and to 2,298,000 tons in 1953/1954.[47] But what factors could have been responsible for these dramatic changes? First was the unexpected demand for railroad transport services to carry increased volumes of freights and increasing number of passengers throughout the war period.

There was a sudden increase in demand in Britain for agricultural and mineral resources like peanuts, palm oil, palm kernels, cocoa, cassava (starch), cotton, rubber, hides and skins, tin, and *columbite* from Nigeria—just as it was for the rest of Africa.[48] Before the war, Asian colonies were the main sources of such export commodities for European nations. Second, the NR was used intensely during and after the war to transport contingents of British troops from Nigeria's interior to the southern ports of Lagos and Port Harcourt and from these ports to the hinterland, as well as for the carriage of British

Army, Royal Air Force, and US air force equipment and personnel around the colony at a special rate of 1s. 6d. per wagon-mile (freight) and per coach-mile (passengers). This specific military-related traffic carried between April 1941 and March 1945 were 340,300 tons of freight and 645,700 passengers.[49]

The war no doubt brought unexpected prosperity to the NR, but this was at the expense of a poorly maintained and ill-equipped railroad infrastructure. Many of its locomotives ran a million miles over the standard 5¾ million miles before maintenance was carried out.[50] Prior to the war, the NR's locomotive engines and rolling stock were operated for some eight months during the dry season, during the harvest time when agricultural commodities were harvested, packed together, and transported across the colony to the ports, and during the transportation of imported goods from the southern ports to the hinterland.[51] On the other hand, during the following rainy season, when railroad traffic were considerably reduced, the locomotives and rolling stock were sent to workshops for maintenance, repairs, and refitting.[52] But during the war, most of the railroad equipment had no such rest.[53] Thus, there were many engine failures, which increased the prewar average of each engine failing after traveling 24,000 miles to just 17,707 miles in the time of the war.[54] At the peak of the war, the situation worsened even further,[55] as some locomotives had to be completely withdrawn from service so that major disasters such as derailments or accidents could be averted. By the end of the war, the percentage of locomotive engines awaiting repairs in the NR's workshop was about 30 percent of its holding stock.[56]

However, not only the railroad equipment suffered serious strain, the staff of the NR also experienced it. In order to cope with the increase in traffic during the war, regular hours of work had to be extended, and many workers, especially those working in the workshops and the traffic department, were forced to work overtime. This state of affairs is partially explained by the fact that at the start of the war, the NR panicked and retrenched about 2,000 workers. Notwithstanding the extension of workers' hours, however, the NR had to recruit more staff, as the NR's General Manager, D. C. Woodward, rationalized the situation in his report of 1941–1942:

> In the latter part of the year the strain upon the resources of the Railway and upon all its personnel became so great that it became necessary to seek a considerable increase in staff both African and European. Great credit is due to all grades of personnel for the manner in which they stood up to the strain put upon them. One instance

will suffice to illustrate-Shift Staff, European and African worked an average 11.2 hour day for 28 days in a month of 28 days, and had maintained an effort nearly as high for some 5 months. This standard has been maintained throughout the line.[57]

The strain on the workers adversely affected their health.[58] While some recovered fully, others carried the scars and pain for the rest of their lives.[59] This human cost was one of the many problems the NR's workers faced, which made them anxious and agitated. Their agitations, however, went beyond their work situation and also included social and economic problems brought about by the war. These included shortages of consumer goods, food shortages due to the fact that Nigerians were forced to cultivate cash or export crops at the expense of food crops, high economic inflation, high cost of living, ineffective government-managed price control mechanisms, relatively high taxation, general poverty, stagnant wages, high unemployment, housing shortages especially in the urban areas, uncontrolled rural to urban migration, and urbanization and its attendant social problems.[60]

After the war, the NR's workers looked forward to the amelioration of these problems. But when the colonial authorities procrastinated, labor agitations began across the colony that eventually culminated in the General Strike that lasted from June to August 1945.[61] Indeed the strike could well be described as the "Nigerian Railway Strike" due to the prominent role played by the NR, both at management and workers' level. This was consequent upon the significance of the NR in the Nigerian economy during the colonial period. The strike was led and sustained by trade union leaders from the NR at both national and provisional levels.[62] In the first week of the general strike, the NR's services were completely paralyzed, and for the rest of the strike, the organization could only run skeletal services.[63] Furthermore, normal maintenance and repair of locomotives and rolling stock in the workshops were severely affected. As a result of this, the number of locomotive engines available for both freight and passenger services was curtailed. On the other hand, passenger traffic had to be reduced by as much as 30 percent.[64] The NR had respite from the impact of the general strike only when the colonial government reached some agreement with the representatives of the generality of Nigerian workers.[65]

What all of the above indicate is that during and immediately after the war, while the NR was achieving working surpluses in its operations, it was not carrying out the necessary maintenance of its

equipment, machineries, and infrastructure. One can, therefore, easily argue that while the war was still on, the NR's management must have reasoned that as soon as the conflict was over it would immediately start to repair/modernize its infrastructures and purchase new equipment. Such a program of renewal of assets would have, for instance, put the NR in a more secure position from which it would have been able to compete more efficiently and effectively against other modes of transport. It is in the light of this one should view the NR's sustained pressure on the colonial office, through the Nigerian government, for assisting it in the procurement of railroad equipment from Great Britain. In July 1945, the Nigerian government at the behest of Woodward submitted a memorandum to Britain's Ministry of Supply and the Locomotive Manufacturers Meeting (United Kingdom). The document contained a long list of equipment the NR sought approval to be purchased under the 1946 production and supply programs. Second, the list was also a reminder to the Crown Agents—the British agency responsible for the procurement of goods and equipment for the colonies—and railroad equipment manufacturers that they should make the delivery of orders submitted to London for locomotives and rolling stock well before the end of the war.[66] An important item on the list was the request to deliver new locomotives, rolling stock, and steel worth about £5 million.[67] Another was for immediate supply of materials for the repairs of the railroad network and 60 lb rails for the reconstruction, realignment, and relaying of the Minna-Jebba section of the western line (see Figure 4.1).[68] This renewal of infrastructure was very crucial for the NR, so as to arrest its rapidly shrinking share in the profitable transportation of peanuts and other oil seeds from Northern Nigeria to the coast. Even then, while the NR anxiously awaited the supply of all the ordered equipment, primarily from Britain, it still continued to transport a record volume of freight. For instance, in the 1946/1947 financial year, it carried 1,300,000 tons of freight, which brought in a record revenue of about £4.7 million.[69] However, as a result of the deterioration in its infrastructures, its operating cost continued to rise, and it was unable to transport all available freight.[70]

It was not only Nigeria's economy, however, that was adversely affected by the NR's inadequacies. The supply of vegetable oil and groundnuts from Nigeria to Britain was also adversely affected. As a result, in May 1946, Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, suggested that a fact-finding mission be sent to West Africa to investigate the possible problems militating against increased production and exportation of vegetable oils and oilseeds from the

region.[71] The mission was eventually sent, and during its visit, it identified some operational and managerial problems in the NR, which it attributed to the impact of the war. Some of these included inadequate supply of locomotives and wagons, inadequate number of European supervisory staff, reduced repair output, increased man-hours per unit repair, and the manufacturing of many spare parts locally and in ill-equipped workshops.[72] Lending credence to the report of the mission, the Crown Agents argued that some of the problems identified above came about because "the supply of spare parts is difficult and will continue for some years, as in certain lines … there is not the capacity [of British manufacturers] available for the demand [i.e. orders for railway equipment from home, colonies, and Britain's trading partners]."[73] These procurement problems were further complicated by Whitehall's reformulation of the economic relationship between Britain and her colonies, which was aimed at limiting economic and financial initiatives on the part of the colonies; the build-up of the empire's dollar reserves in London; and shoring up the declining value of the sterling.[74]

Under this new policy direction, the British imperial government concluded that "improvement of the colonies had to be an integral part of her recovery efforts."[75] Although Britain would still remain the chief trading partner to her colonies, the latter were now required to export more of their agricultural produce and mineral resources to the United States and other dollar-earning areas.[76] This was because, in the postwar era, the US dollar became the strongest currency in the world. As a result, dollars from trade with the United States would shore up Britain's postwar balance of payment deficits.[77] Second, Britain was to continue to supply manufactured goods to her colonies. However, in order to conserve dollars earned from colonial exports from outside the British Empire within it, the colonies were to limit their dollar expenditures outside the British Empire to the barest minimum. Even then, imports from the sterling area were also to be drastically reduced.[78] Hence, to have a large reserve of dollars in London, greater percentages of all exports from the colonies had to go to the United States and other "dollar countries." Additionally, the colonies were discouraged from withdrawing from these huge reserves to finance "unnecessary imports."[79]

The new postwar economic relationship between Britain and her colonies also affected the method by which steel was allocated by the British government to British manufacturers of railroad equipment. The allocation of steel was determined first and foremost by the overall imperial needs of Britain: by the value of the mineral resources

and agricultural products exported into Britain from a particular colony and by imports from Britain to dollar-earning markets like Argentina and Brazil. In essence, allocation was not made on the basis of first come first serve, but rather on the strategic economic interests of imperial Britain. As a result, Nigeria, whose railroad system was in urgent need of new equipment in the 1940s and 1950s, did not always get her orders as quickly as they were required.[80] This point needs further explication. In the first half of 1948, the NR wanted to rebuild the 90-mile rail line from Kano to Zaria, which ran right through the heartland of the peanut-producing areas of Northern Nigeria. The project involved the total replacement of the light 45-lb rails, laid way back in 1912, with the much heavier 60-lb rails.[81] Without this renewal, locomotive engines with an axle load of more than 9.5 tons and traveling at more than 25 miles per hour would not be able to move well on the railroad. Consequently, as a result of the continued use of 45-lb rails, several months after the war it became virtually impossible for the NR's locomotives to transport increasingly larger volumes of peanuts produced in and on offer from Northern Nigeria to be transported to the coast.[82] To execute the project, the Crown Agents applied on behalf of the NR to the Board of Trade in London for steel to cover 9,225 tons for rails, 9,312 tons for railway sleepers, 53 tons for fish bolts, 632 tons for rail clips, and 223 tons for fishplates.[83] However, due to the preferential manner that steel was being allocated in Britain, which privileged the nonempire overseas trade clients of Britain over her colonies, Nigerian orders for steel were not adequately met until the early 1950s.[84]

Apart from the supply of steel for railroad tracks, there was also the need for new rolling stock and locomotives. In 1946, the NR started complaining about its nonreceipt of locomotives and rolling stock that had been ordered in 1944 from British manufacturers.[85] The new locomotives were to replace 14 old ones in the NR's stock and added an additional set of 11 2-8-2 locomotives that would increase the overall number of locomotive engines in her stock.[86] According to the schedule of delivery sent to Nigeria by the Crown Agents from the manufacturers, Robert Stevenson and Hawthorns Company, one locomotive was to be delivered to Nigeria in September 1945 and six more in December. The remaining 19 locomotives were to be delivered by December 1946. However, on July 12, 1945, the Crown Agents informed the NR that the locomotives would no longer be delivered in that year because the £20,000 per locomotive being quoted by the manufacturers was too expensive, and second

the existing export restrictions would not allow them to deliver the locomotives as originally scheduled.[87]

Another reason given for the delay was the shortage of technical staff in the manufacturing company to design the particular locomotive model the NR wanted. For these reasons, the period of design had to be extended by 15 months. Consequently, the Crown Agents suggested to the Nigerian government and the NR that the contract for the manufacture and supply of locomotives be withdrawn from the Robert Stevenson and Hawthorns Company and be rewarded to Messrs. Vulcan Foundry Limited. The government accepted this suggestion and approved the change of manufacturers. But almost immediately after the change, the new company warned that it too was experiencing some operational problems in designing, on time, the specific locomotive models the NR wanted, and the manufacturers would not be able to deliver any locomotive to Nigeria before 1947.[88] None of these promised locomotives were delivered to Nigeria before 1949.[89]

Another piece of important railroad equipment, albeit with a more direct impact on the lives of Nigerian workers, travelers, and traders, was the passenger coach. As a result of inadequate numbers of coaches, by 1948 there was serious overcrowding in coaches.[90] The first order for coaches after the war was placed for 32 third-class and 10 staff coaches in September 1945.[91] In 1946, both the Crown Agents and the NR agreed to the specific design and seating layouts of the coaches. However, three months later, confirmation of schedule of delivery was yet to be given. In September 1946, the Crown Agents confirmed that the price for the coaches had been fixed and delivery would begin in late 1947.[92] Expectation, however, turned into despair when the NR was informed later that the bogies for the coaches had not been designed, even after it had been agreed that riveted bogies could be used on the coaches in replacement of the yet-to-be-designed bogies. Notwithstanding the agreement, by the end of 1948 the new coaches were yet to be delivered to Nigeria.

The postwar delay in the delivery of locomotives and rolling stocks and the progressive decrease—through engine failures and an increasingly high number of engines, wagons, and coaches being sent into the workshops for repairs—had the effect of severely undermining the organization's integrity and ability to offer effective, efficient, and economical services.[93] Consequently, export commodities that should be regularly transported from the hinterland to the ports were accumulating at buying centres, warehouses, and railroad stations in Northern Nigeria. At the end of the 1945/1946 agricultural season,

a total of 10,000 tons of peanuts could not be transported to Lagos port due to the nonavailability of locomotives and wagons.[94] In the following season, 1946/1947, an additional 230,000 tons were ready for carriage to the southern ports.[95] But hard at work as the NR was, it was not able to transport all the two seasons' accumulated peanuts. The NR was, therefore, forced to delay, or carry over, the transportation of 92,000 tons of peanuts to the 1947/1948 season.[96] The pyramids of "unrailed" peanuts continued to grow in 1947/1948, when 422,000 tons, including the 92,000 tons carried over from the previous year, were available for transportation to Lagos. At the beginning of the 1948/1949 season, the NR could only transport 170,000 tons to the Apapa port in Lagos. In the following year, the problems seem to have worsened: with a bumper harvest of 390,000 tons in 1949, the NR was saddled with a staggering 560,000 tons of peanuts for carriage to the southern ports.[97]

These yearly accumulations of unrailed freight had serious consequences on the NR. First, all available spaces for storage for each new season were virtually taken up by the previous year's commodities. Second, contrary to the normal practice of cleaning storage spaces at the end of each farming season after all the commodities stored in them must be transported, from 1945 to 1951 this was impossible. The consequence of this was that crops that could not be transported in any particular season were left out in the open—covered with tarpaulin—where they were infested by insects and diseases. Third, as a result of lack of capacity for the transportation of peanuts from the north, the NR decided to stop carrying its share of cocoa, palm oil, and palm kernels from Western Nigeria. It thus completely lost the revenue and the narrow market share that had been forced on it from the early 1930s onwards by her competitors: road and water transportation.[98] Fourth, because of the congestion on its network, the NR was forced to reduce, by as much as 33 percent, its lucrative passenger traffic.[99] In addition, as a result of the inadequate supply of steel, the main ingredient for the production of railroad equipment, the NR was requested by British imperial officials in London to manufacture some of the spare parts it needed locally. However, the NR's workshops, which were built in the second decade of the twentieth century to handle 4 million miles per annum repairs, could not cope in the 1940s when they were handling between 6.5 and 7 million miles per annum repairs.[100] Therefore, the request that the NR should begin manufacturing its spare parts, especially the building of new wagons and the rebuilding of what was left of the 370 lend-lease wagons brought into Nigeria during the war—at the height of the

shortage of railroad equipment, amounted to asking too much from an already overstretched organization. In fact, to take on these new additional responsibilities, the NR's workshops would require considerable physical expansion, refitting, and rehabilitation.[101] In turn, all of these projects would have required considerable financial capital outlay for the organization, which it could ill-afford at the time.

Coupled with this were inadequate machines and machine tools in the workshops, and there was an urgent need to acquire new ones, which although the NR could afford could not be delivered before the late 1950s.[102] In addition, there were shortages of senior, qualified, experienced, technical, and supervisory staff to manage and lead key work areas in the workshops. By the late 1940s, there were acute shortages of personnel for such positions as Assistant Chief Mechanical Engineers, Draughtsmen, Senior Assistant Works Managers, Electrical Engineers, Carriage and Wagons Superintendents, and Locomotives Superintendents.[103] Although these shortages predated the Second World War, the conflict complicated the existing situation. As a result of the war, there was a general shortage of skilled European railroad personnel within the Empire as many railroad staff from both Britain and the colonies were drafted to fight in the theatres of the war. After the war, there was very stiff competition between the metropole and the colonies for the few available skilled railroad personnel.[104]

As a result of the crises of supply of railroad equipment, which continued well after the war, the NR's officials and those of the colonial and imperial governments met in London in 1948 to work out quick solutions for the deepening crises confronting the transportation of mineral resources and agricultural produce, especially peanuts,[105] and to consider alternative transportation proposals such as the use of roads, rivers, and the more expensive air transport. However, in view of the high costs and logistics that would have been involved in such a multiple-mode approach, and the long gestation period for its full realization, the idea of utilizing it for the immediate transportation of peanuts was abandoned. The only feasible course of action left for the NR, therefore, was to assist the organization in increasing its carrying capacities and rehabilitating its infrastructures.[106] But even then, the NR was still unable to take delivery of adequate numbers of locomotives and right quantities of rolling stock until the late 1950s. In the meantime, in the wider Nigerian transportation sector, the intense competition between road and railroad transport continued.[107] Two years after the end of the war, the colonial government tried to continue with the regulation of road transport, which it had imposed under the war emergency regulations.[108] But the implementation of a

new regime of regulations became a herculean task. This was because of the new and larger postwar British imperial economic interests. As stated above, after the war, the British economy was virtually in ruins, and to rebuild it, Britain required all the agricultural and mineral resources it could get from her colonies as fast as possible. To achieve these goals, the commodities must first be quickly transported to the Nigerian ports. Yet, the chief carrier of this freight within Nigeria, the NR, was not up to the task.[109] Thus, the continuous "paternal" shielding of the NR from the very stiff competition of road transporters after the war became rather superfluous and counterproductive. Set against this background, the colonial government went all out to develop road transportation.

Thus, from 1945 onward there was massive development of road transportation across Nigeria, which was an important part of the postwar colonial development and welfare scheme. The British also encouraged African and foreign private road transporters, who would in turn assist greatly in the transportation of export commodities to the ports and import commodities into the hinterland.[110] By the late 1950s, the latter had lost passenger revenue, more percentages of its share of the freight traffic, and commercial initiatives to road transportation. The Nigerian railroad industry never recovered and eventually collapsed in the 1990s. Certainly overwhelmed by the onerous task of completely rebuilding the NR industry, the postcolonial Nigerian state and political class shifted policy focus and capital away from railroad transport, and to the road transportation sector. Not only was the latter sector easier to develop, but it was also a very good source—through the award of multimillion dollar contracts—from which members of the Nigerian ruling elite indulged in the primitive accumulation of capital.[111]

Conclusion

This chapter examined the impact of the Second World War on the NR. It showed that the war had both a negative and positive impact on the organization. In the "boom years," 1941–1946, the NR achieved consistently positive operational surpluses. These were, however, at great expense to the organization's workers, equipment, and physical infrastructure, which received no renewal, adequate maintenance, or new equipment during and immediately after the war. As a result of the import and export restrictions placed on goods to and from certain countries and regions, which were imposed by

the colonial Nigerian and British imperial governments, the NR could not purchase or receive delivery of locomotives and rolling stock from abroad as and when required. This economic and trade policy was brought about by the war contingency, shortages of steel in Britain, and the manifest inefficiency of Britain's manufacturing industry. In fact, the British railroad equipment manufacturers were in turn the victims of their government's muddled-up economic priorities, which privileged domestic and dollar-earning markets (overseas, especially the Americas) over the requirements of the British colonial territories.

The inability of the NR to get the equipment needed at the crucial time resulted in its inability to carry all the traffic on offer after the war. For instance, it was forced in the 1950s to cut its passenger services by as much as 33 percent and to abandon to road transport the profitable carriage of cocoa, palm kernels, palm oil, and rubber from the Southwestern Nigeria to the coast. In the case of peanuts from Northern Nigeria, on which the NR became heavily dependent for its freight revenues after the war, it was unable to transport all the tons offered for railing. Peanuts that could not be transported on time had to be stored in warehouses or in the open, and this led to the legendary, but certainly embarrassing, "groundnuts pyramids" in Northern Nigeria.

Finally, the cumulative effects of the war on the NR forced it to yield ground and lose revenues to road transport from the late 1950s onwards. In addition, the NR accumulated operational deficits and was saddled with an increasing debt burden. It did not recover from these challenges in the postcolonial era, when the government, conscious of the NR's multidimensional problems, the capital-intensive nature of its operations, the organization's inability to rise up to the postwar and postindependence transportation requirements of the country, and the government's mad rush to develop the NR at a much faster pace than Nigerian railroad "locational rigidity"[112] was allowing, decided to refocus its transportation developmental efforts on road transportation. Thus, the existing railroad system was not modernized, and no new railroads were built. This open bias can easily be understood in the way capital funds were overwhelmingly allocated in favor of road transportation under the national development plans of 1962–1968, 1970–1974, and 1975–1980.[113] Cumulatively, therefore, the operations of the NR suffered terrible decline, and by the early 1990s, the Nigerian railroad industry had virtually collapsed.

Notes

1. Peter B. Clarke, *West Africans at War 1914–18, 1939–45* (London: Ethnographica, 1968), 19; Toyin Falola, *Key Events in African History* (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 2002), 208.

2. Ibid.; David Killingray and Richard Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (New York: St. Martins, 1986), 5.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 8.

5. Ibid.

6. Gilbert A. Sekgoma, "The Second World War and the Sierra Leone Economy: Labor Employment and Utilization, 1939–45," in *Africa and the Second World War*, edited by David Killingray and Richard Rathbone (New York: St. Martins, 1986); John Lonsdale, "The Depression and the Second World War in the Transformation of Kenya," in *Africa and the Second World War*, edited by David Killingray and Richard Rathbone (New York: St Martins, 1986); Timothy Oberst, "Transport Workers, Strikes and the 'Imperial Response'": Africa and the Post World War II Conjecture." *African Studies Review* 31 (1988): 117–33; R. T. Kerslake, *Time and the Hour: Nigeria, East Africa, and the Second World War* (London; New York: Radcliff, 1997); Kwabena O. Akurang-Parry, "Africa and the Second World War," in *Africa Volume 4. The End of Colonial Rule: Nationalism and Decolonization*, edited by Toyin Falola (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 49–62; Wendell P. Holbrook, "British Propaganda and the Mobilization of Gold Coast War Efforts, 1939–45." *Journal of African History* 26 (1985): 347–61; G. O. Olusanya, *The Second World War and Politics in Nigeria, 1939–1953* (Lagos: University of Lagos/Evans Brothers, 1973); Axel Harneit-Sievers, "The Second World War and Nigeria's Political Economy," in *Modern Nigeria: A Tribute to G. O. Olusanya*, edited by Toyin Falola (Lagos: Modelor, 1990), 31–61.

7. John Stocker, *Nigerian Railway Jubilee, 1901–1951* (Ebute-Metta, Nigeria: Nigerian Railway Printer, 1955).

8. Ibid., 3.

9. Ibid., 3–5.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 5.

12. Ibid., 6.

13. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria: A Documentary Record* (London: HMSO, 1968), 59–60. In May 1912, Fredrick Lugard in his capacity as the Governor of Nigeria sent a proposal to the Colonial Office in which he proposed the amalgamation of not only the railways of the two territories, but also their Marine and Customs Departments. See National Archives, Kew, England (hereafter NA) C.O.583/1 Confidential dispatch Lugard to C.O. 21/9/12.

14. Stocker, *Nigeria Railway Jubilee*, 8.
15. Ibid., 9.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Olasiji Oshin, "Nigerian Railways under Stress 1912–45: A Study in Colonial Transport Planning and Management." *Odu: A Journal of West Africa Studies* (1990): 37, 61.
19. Ibid.
20. G. Walker, *Traffic and Transportation in Nigeria* (London: H.M. Stat. Off, 1959), 67.
21. Ibid., 68.
22. Ibid.
23. Gerald Helleiner, *Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria* (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1966) cited in Wale Oyemakinde, "The Impact of the Great Depression on the Nigerian Railway and Its Workers." *Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria* 7, no. 4 (June 1977): 144.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Olasiji Oshin, "Road Transport and the Declining Fortunes of the Nigerian Railway, 1901–1950." *The Journal of Transport History* 12, no. 1 (March 1991): 23–24.
28. Ibid., 24.
29. Walker, *Traffic and Transportation*, 72.
30. Ibid.
31. G. O. Ogunremi, "The Nigeria Motor Transport Union Strike of 1937." *Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria* 9, no. 2 (June 1978): 129.
32. Ibid., 129–30.
33. Walker, *Traffic and Transportation*, 73.
34. Ibid.
35. Nigerian Government, *Nigerian Railway Annual Report, 1936–1937* (Lagos: Government Printer, 1937), 9.
36. Walker, *Traffic and Transportation*, 72.
37. Ibid., 73.
38. Ogunremi, "The Nigeria Motor Transport Union Strike," 135–37.
39. Wale Oyemakinde, "The Impact of the Great Depression on the Nigerian Railway and its Workers." *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 8, no. 4 (June 1977): 152.
40. Ibid.
41. Nigerian Government, *Nigerian Railway Annual Report 1948–1949* (Lagos: Government Printer, 1949), 4.
42. Nigerian Government, *Nigeria Railway and Colliery Report, 1937–38.*
43. National Archives of Nigeria, Ibadan (hereafter, NAI), Chief Secretary's Office (CSO) 18/19 "Import and Export Restrictions, 1939": Secret Import Restrictions in Emergency, July 27, 1939.

44. Nigerian Government, *Nigeria Railway and Colliery Report, 1937–38*, 5.
45. These figures have been computed from the *Nigerian Railway Annual Reports*, 1938–1941.
46. Ibid.
47. Nigerian Government, *Nigerian Trade Journal* 3, no. 3 (July/September 1955): 105.
48. Stocker, *Nigeria Railway Jubilee*, 24.
49. Ibid., 23.
50. Nigerian Government, *Nigerian Railway Annual Report 1945–1946*, 7–8.
51. Walker, *Traffic and Transportation*, 74–75; Oshin, "Nigerian Railways under Stress," 63.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Nigerian Government, *Nigerian Railway Annual Report 1945–1946*, 7–8.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Nigerian Government, *Nigerian Railway Report, 1941–42*, 3, cited in Wale Oyemakinde, "Michael Imoudu and the Emergence of Militant Trade Unionism in Nigeria, 1940–1942." *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 7, no. 3 (1974): 544.
58. Stocker, *Nigeria Railway Jubilee*, 27–28.
59. Ibid.
60. Lisa A. Lindsay, *Working with Gender Wage Labor and Social Change in Southern Nigeria* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003), 53–70; Wale Oyemakinde, "The Nigerian General Strike of 1945," 693–710.
61. Ibid.
62. W. Tudor-Davies, *Enquiry into the Cost of Living and the Control of Cost of Living in the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria* (London: HMSO, 1946), 25.
63. Ibid.
64. Nigerian Government, *Nigerian Railway Annual Report 1945/46.*
65. Oyemakinde, "The Nigerian General Strike of 1945," 693–710.
66. Some of the equipment, such as locomotives, passenger coaches, goods wagons, and manufactured spare parts, were on order from 1943. See FCO Library, *Colonial Reports. Nigeria, 1946* (London: HMSO, 1947), 77. Viscount Swinton of the House of Lords in London confirmed this fact: "Is it not a fact that the Nigerian Government, even before the end of the war, had warned His Majesty's Government of the urgent need for replenishing the rolling stock, wagons and engines on that railway if this great groundnut crop was to be shifted and were

not all the plans and needs before His Majesty's Government right back in 1945?" Lord Listowel's reply on behalf of the government did not disprove this point. See British Parliament's *Hansard* of 12 May 1948 and NA CO 852/791/1 "Colonial Railways. Nigeria."

67. FCO Library, *Colonial Report. Nigeria, 1946* (London: HMSO, 1947), 77.

68. *NR Annual Report, 1946*; NA CO 852/791/4 Crown Agents to D. Kelvin-Stark (CO), January 2, 1947.

69. FCO Library, *Colonial Report. Nigeria, 1946* (London: HMSO, 1947), 77.

70. Ibid.

71. NA CO852/601—E. Melville to D. R. Serpell, February 21, 1947.

72. *Report of the Mission appointed to enquire into the production and transport of Vegetable Oils and Oil seeds in the West African Colonies*, 33–45, enclosed in NA CO 852/ 601/9.

73. Ibid., 3.

74. This restriction was not a new phenomenon as we saw earlier. In the midst of the war, import control was imposed on the colonies. This was relaxed immediately after the war, but with the value of the British Pound in free fall in August 1947, the control was reimposed. For the latter restriction, see NA, T 236/693: Circular telegram to the colonies, August 6, 1947. Furthermore, colonial officials were directed not to approve import licenses for goods that would not in turn produce commodities capable of earning dollars or imports involving unnecessary spending of dollars, see NA T236/688: Circular telegram, "Import licensing policy," September 5, 1947.

75. Jeremiah I. Dibua, "The Political Economy of Colonial Planning in Nigeria." *Oye: Ogun Journal of Arts* 2 (June 1989), 62. Many imperial government officials believed strongly in this policy, for instance, the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. See his letters to Prime Minister Attlee of September 13, 1947 and September 16, 1947 in NA CO537/3047. In the letters, he argued that this was the best policy of pulling Britain out of her economic and financial miseries. Other supporters of the policy included the Deputy Prime Minister and the Lord President of the Council, Herbert Morrison. See NA CAB 124/1079, "Planning for Expansion," May 31, 1947.

76. M. Havinden and D. Meredith, *Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850–1960* (London: Routledge, 1993), 228.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., 227–28.

79. Ibid.

80. As far as the imperial government was concerned, this was the best position for the colonies. As the Colonial Development Working Party argued, "The small orders placed by Colonial railways put them at a disadvantage, particularly as regards speedy delivery." See NA CO852/790/6, CDWP (48) 11th Meeting, September 15, 1948.
81. NA CO852/792/2, B. Percival (CA) to Willis (CO), October 22, 1948.
82. NA T229/394, Nigerian Groundnuts Transport," H. G. Savage (CA) to G. H. C. Amos (Ministry of Food), April 9, 1948.
83. NA CO 852/792/2 Letter from B. Percival (CA) to M.A.WiIllis (CO) October 22, 1948. This was in reply to CO to CA Ref. No. 17025/112/48 of October 7, 1948. It was on the issue of supply of track and bridging materials for the relaying of the Zaria-Kano section.
84. Ibid.
85. NA CO 852/791/1, D. C. Woodward, General Manager Nigerian Railway to H. M. Foot, Chief Secretary, Nigerian Secretariat, February 11, 1948, attached to Minute from V. E. Robinson to P. Maynard (CO), February 12, 1948.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. NA CO852/790/5, A. Campbell to T.W. Davies (CO) September 5, 1947.
90. NA CO 852/791/1, "Memorandum for the Sub-Committee of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Finance," by D. C. Woodward, General Manager Nigerian Railway.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. NA CO 852/792/1, G. H. C Amos, Ministry of Food, to J. Gordon, Board of Trade, April 14, 1948.
94. NA CO852/791, A. Strachey, Minister of Food, to Right Honourable A. Creech-Jones, Secretary of State for Colonies, April 27, 1948.
95. Ibid.
96. NA CO 852/791/1, Telegram No. 552, Sir Macpherson, Governor of Nigeria to Secretary of State for Colonies, April 30, 1948.
97. This of course included the 21,000 tons of peanuts from the French Niger, which the railway was assisting the French colonial authorities to transport to the coast.
98. NA CO 852/792/2, Part 2 Inward Telegram from Sir J. Macpherson, the Governor of Nigeria to the Secretary of State for Colonies No. 1547, November 3, 1948. See also FCO Library, *Colonial Office Annual Report on Nigeria* for the year 1949, 91. Practically, palm oil and kernels were transported from different parts of Eastern Nigeria by road to Port Harcourt. In other instances, they were transported by road and water to other ports.

99. NA CO 852/791/1, Immediate Inward Telegram No. 704 from Sir J. Macpherson, Governor of Nigeria to the Secretary of State for Colonies, April 7, 1948. The remaining passenger service was reduced to short-distance traffic powered by tank locomotives that were not important in the evacuation of goods. See the note of a meeting held in the Colonial Office on 2 June 1948, NA CO852/791/1, "Colonial Railways Nigeria."

100. NA CO852/792/1, Note of internal meeting held at the Colonial Office on the June 2, 1948.

101. NA CO852/792/1, Extract from the letter from the General Manager, NR, D. C. Woodward to A. J. Bunning, Adviser on Inland Transport, Colonial Office, May 19, 1948 in J. Macpherson, Governor of Nigeria to the Secretary of State for Colonies, May 30, 1948. For example, the extensions at the Ebute-Metta workshops were to be carried out in five different sections, viz. "A" Priority—Carriage and Wagon shop; Timber Storage Shed Timber Stores; "B" Priority—Erecting Shop; Train Lighting Shop. See NA CO852/792/2, B. Percival (Crown Agents) to M. A. Willis (CO), October 22, 1948.

102. NA CO 852/791/1, "Memorandum for the Sub-Committee of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Finance," by D. C. Woodward, General Manager Nigerian Railway.

103. NA CO852/792/1, Inward Telegram No. 903 from Sir J. Macpherson, the Governor of Nigeria to the Secretary of State for Colonies, July 15, 1948. This was a reply to the Secretary of State's telegram No 737 of July 1, 1948 in which the latter wanted to know the current position of NR's equipment needs.

104. Ibid.

105. NA CO852/792/2, Part 2, Nigerian Railways. Note of a meeting at the Colonial Office, October 22, 1948.

106. Ibid.

107. Walker, *Traffic and Transport*, 148–49.

108. Ibid.

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The Cold War and the Emergence of Economic Divergences: Africa and Asia Compared

S. U. Fwatshak

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the Cold War,[1] the economies of Africa[2] and Asia[3] were remarkably different. Africa was still a poor, backward, failing, and nonperforming continent. Eight countries in Asia had earned international reputation as "Tigers" or High Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs), being richer, progressive, and developing. This was, indeed, a kind of puzzle for some reasons. First, at independence in the 1960s, Afro-optimists, including Western powers, believed that, with its vast natural resources, Africa would develop faster than Asia. Africa's growth potential was predicted to reach 7 percent annually. Optimists argued that Africa was not a part of the poor world described by the economists of the 1950s as one ravaged by the "vicious cycle of poverty" and the "ever-widening gap" between poor nations and the rich industrial world.[4] None of these was realized. Second, historically, Africa and Asia shared the common fate of enslavement, colonial exploitation, and underdevelopment by foreign powers.[5] Only one country in each of the two regions, Ethiopia and Thailand, respectively, escaped formal colonization; their freedom from colonial rule was a post-Second World War phenomenon.[6] This suggested a common destiny. However, that was not to be. Third, up to the 1960s and 1970s, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and many

countries in Asia were at about the same economic level. They were natural resource– and aid-dependent countries; were mainly agrarian and not industrial—as exemplified by SSA, South Asia, South Korea (of the 1960s), and Malaysia (of the 1970s). Many were among the least developed, heavily indebted, and poor countries of the world. The main agricultural sector performed poorly; GDP growth per capita was below 1 percent for many of them; and population growth was above 2 percent—as exemplified by SSA (in the 1980s), Indonesia (in 1965), and South Korea (in the 1960s). Illiteracy was prevalent, as was the case with SSA and Thailand. Thus, they were regions of political and social instability.[7] Even Japan, which temporarily colonized Taiwan and Korea during the Second World War, and which developed earlier than the others, was before 1960 so poor that it did not qualify for a World Bank loan.[8]

Characterized by hostile competition for global hegemony in economic and political philosophy and practice of state management, the principal parties to the Cold War were capitalist United States and its Western European allies, on the one hand, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, on the other.[9] Two major principles defined USSR's foreign and Cold War policy in general: internationalization of proletarianism and peaceful coexistence with nonsocialist countries. Cooperation within and among socialist states was promoted through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).[10] The United States' major Cold War policy for Africa was to prevent the USSR from gaining important ground outside Eastern Europe. Thus, the penetration of Angola and Ethiopia by the USSR and Cuba in the 1970s forced the United States to focus on Africa; this intensified rivalry between the two superpowers.[11] This was because many in the United States believed that the Soviet Union and its communist system were evils that must be eliminated.[12] Asia sided with the United States; Africa chose neutrality called Non-Alignment, which was a general approach by the less developed world to avoid direct participation in the Cold War on either side, in hopes of promoting world peace.[13]

The contest for global hegemony by the superpowers led the United States to develop and implement policies and practices that were beneficial to Asia, as Asia did not pretend to be neutral, but on the United States' side. However, the United States' and USSR's policies and practices for Africa, as well as Africa's so-called Non-Alignment, did not produce the same result; thus, divergences emerged.

COLD WAR ECONOMIES OF AFRICA AND ASIA: PROFILE OF DIVERGENCES

By the 1950s, when many African states were still under the colonial yoke, Asia's growth had been initiated. The 1960s to 1980s were, however, the periods of vigorous industrialization in Asia—for example, in the 1960s in South Korea, in the 1970s in Malaysia and Indonesia, and in the 1980s in Thailand and the Philippines. By the 1970s, divergence began to manifest: while African economies continue to sink, as they never recovered, those of Asia started to show signs of growth when Japan became economically strong. In the 1980s, African economies continued to slumber and were overtaken by those of Asia. By the early 1990s, while African economies remained backward and poor, those of Asia had broken the development jinx: the World Bank announced that East Asia had performed a miracle. The data below speaks to the divergences.

In respect of the African lag, evidences of nonperformance include low growth, high rates of inflation, indebtedness, and poverty. In the period 1965 to 1985, among the developing nations of the world, SSA had the weakest growth profile, with annual GDP per capita income growth at below 1 percent. In the period 1965 to 1974, the regions' dependence on natural resources for export growth yielded annual growth rates of only 2.6 percent[14] while yielding negative growth rates between 1981 and 1986.[15] Except for the oil sector, poor performance characterized different sectors of the economies including manufacturing and agriculture, which grew at less than 5 percent in the 1980s.[16] In the agricultural sector, exports declined to 0.6 percent between 1981 and 1985.[17] By contrast, industrial and agricultural performance of other regions of the world between 1970 and 1986 grew; for example, Asia's newly industrializing countries (NICs), 13 times; the Middle East and North Africa, 6 times; and Latin America, 5 times. In the agricultural sector, where SSA performed poorly between 1981 and 1985, for the same period Asia and Latin America experienced growth: South Asia by 2.5 percent, East Asia by 3.2 percent, and Latin America by 3.1 percent.[18] Africa had many failed projects, was experiencing collapse of infrastructure, and lower health and education performances. The 1980s to the 1990s were decades of greater divestment by foreign firms in Africa.[19] Consequently, the World Bank prescribed for Africa the adoption of the market approach called Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Indeed, Southeast Asian economies, with lower potentials in the 1960s, had grown far beyond those of Africa by the 1980s.[20]

Inflation, indebtedness, and poverty, as indicators of Africa's poor performance, became manifest from the 1970s and elaborated in the coming decades. The global inflation that followed the 1970s' oil price increase hit many countries between 1973 and 1982 at an average of 25 percent; for the less developed countries (LDCs), the average was 30 percent.[21] During the 1970s and 1980s, the indebtedness of many African countries became intensified due to a number of factors. First, they borrowed heavily from international creditors to finance their development projects. Second, from 1970s and especially the 1980s, the prices of primary produce including oil, on which most African countries depended for revenues, fell in the international market due to global economic recessions. Compounded by donor aid fatigue, in the 1980s, their inabilities to repay loans had become glaring and were thus in embarrassing financial positions.[22] SSA from the 1980s witnessed increasing poverty due to falling GNP per capita. Robert Solomon has argued that SSA's poor GDP per capita was due to astronomical population growth, very harsh droughts, rising incidence of HIV/AIDS, other environmental challenges, and civil war leading to state failure in some countries. Other factors for the poor economic performance of SSA included natural resource dependence, fluctuating and declining prices of primary products, and low domestic investment. Botswana was an exception. That country used its oil resources to achieve growth, which averaged 11 percent annually in the 1980s.[23] I agree with Solomon except to add that the civil wars in Africa at that time were partly the result of divisions caused by the Cold War.

While Africa sunk, Asia's HPEAs and NICs rose and were characterized by rapid and shared growth. Asia's growth started in the mid-1950s. By 1955, the growth of East Asia became noticeable, signified by rising trends in per capita income and manufacturing production, while SSA continued to experience downward growth spirals.[24] Asia's growth continued in the 1960s, became intensive in the 1970s and 1980s through to the 1990s. Thus, although much of the world experienced growth downturns in the 1970s, countries that adopted export growth orientation, for example, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore (the Asian Tigers), Brazil, Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Israel, Spain, and Portugal, experienced growth from the 1960s through to the early 1990s.[25] In the 1970s, the Tigers grew at an annual average of 8–10 percent.[26] Indeed, in the period between 1973 and 1995, the East Asian countries—Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia—significantly improved their cumulative "share of total manufactured exports"

from 3.9 percent in 1973 to 6.7 percent in 1995.[27] The NICs Hong
Kong, Taiwan, Israel, Korea, and Singapore experienced export and
economic growth. Indeed, countries like China, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, and Vietnam achieved 8 percent growth before the Asian
crisis of 1997.[28] Starting from the 1970s and the 1980s, Asian econ-
omies were becoming industrialized. Thus, the HPAEs, especially
the Asian Tigers, moved from mainly agrarian and raw materials
producing and exporting economyto an industrializing economy in
the 1980s. Their economies were characterized by more output in
higher technology than in the labor-intensive sectors; manufacturing
became competitive, as they were producing manufactured goods
for exports.[29] The East Asian economies experienced fast growth
but with lower inflation rates than Canada and the United States.[30]
For 25 years, between 1965 and 1990, growth in 23 East Asian
economies was more rapid than in other parts of the globe. Eight
East Asian economies, called the HPAEs or NICs, accounted for the
Asian miracle or spectacular growth. They included Japan; China,
also called the large dragon; the Asian Tigers, namely Hong Kong,
Korea Republic, Singapore, and Taiwan; and the newly industrial-
izing economies of Southeast Asia, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand.[31] Thus, although in the 1960s Indonesia's and Thailand's
GDPs were lower than that of Nigeria and Ghana, respectively,
though Nigeria and Indonesia were oil-dependent while Ghana and
Thailand depended on agricultural resources, by the 1990s, the
two Asian countries had better economic performances than their
two African counterparts.[32] Generally, growth in the HPAEs in the
25-year period was twice that of the rest of Asia, thrice that of Latin
America and Southeast Asia, and 25 times faster than SSA. They
also grew faster than the oil-endowed sheikdoms of the Middle East
and North Africa between 1960 and 1985. Their per capita income
was four times greater than Japan's and twice higher than that of
Southeast Asia.[33] The Asian region, including Japan and China, rap-
idly integrated economically leading to increased interregional trade.
Growth was translated into improvements in citizen's welfare. Thus,
in the 1980s, all the NIEs significantly reduced the incidence of
absolute poverty and gross inequality in their nations, as life expec-
tancy took a rising trend. Indeed, absolute poverty rate fell to 17 per-
cent down from 58 percent in Indonesia and from 37 percent to
less than 5 percent in Malaysia. Absolute poverty also declined from
54 percent to 43 percent in India and from 50 percent to 21 percent
in Brazil. Life expectancy rose to 71 years in 1990, up from 56 years;
from 39 and 49 years in 1960 in some of the low- and mid-income

HPAEs to 62 and 66 years, respectively, in 1990.[34] Thus, the World Bank described Asia's growth a miracle.

Explaining the Divergence

What caused the divergence? I argue that the different Cold War experiences of the two regions were significant contributors and not just policy choices as argued by the Washington institutions—the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to them, wrong economic policy choices and practices were at the root of Africa's failure. These included poor macro- and sectoral economic policies, due to state-led development; weak macroeconomic stability occasioned by large and long-term budget deficits; uncompetitive markets due to state protection and government monopolies, for example, price controls of trade and of allocation of foreign exchange; the establishment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs); the use of policies that discourage exports like heavy taxation for agricultural exports; the absence of local capital and of entrepreneurs, and the state's refusal to promote and use foreign capital and to rely on market forces; overvalued foreign exchange evidenced by the existence of parallel markets for foreign exchange; heavy spending evidenced by high budget deficits and high government expenditure on consumables (consumption took an increasing trend in the 1960s and reached its peak at about 17 percent, as against 5–6 percent of the GDP in other regions in the 1980s); inward-looking trade policies in which the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model was relied upon while also protecting the ISI with tariffs; and political instability occasioned by conflicts: civil wars and rebel movements and natural disasters collapsed the GDP to 0.5 percent between 1965 and 1985. The World Bank also identified and blamed external factors for the subregion's poor performance between 1970s and 1980s. The external factors included falling revenues due to declining terms of trade for nonoil exports and poor human capital profile. In respect of human capital, the World Bank noted that, although there were improvements in primary and secondary school enrolments between 1965 and 1985 from 41 percent to 69 percent and from 2 percent to 14 percent, respectively, the number of medical personnel, doctors and nurses, increased as was life expectancy, which rose by 8 years, and child mortality declined. SSA still lagged behind other regions in the above social sectors.[35] Negative terms of trade averaged 1 percent of GDP annually, which led to an annual growth by only 0.8 percent.[36] However, the World Bank concluded that of the two factors,

domestic and external, the former centering on poor policies was most implicated for SSA's poor performance. The state straddled the economy like a colossus and marginalized market forces; the quality of governance deteriorated between the 1970s and 1980s, as many states were ruled by authoritarian, centrist regimes.[37]

In respect of Asia's "miracle," the World Bank and its supporters claimed it was due to fervent operation of the market principle in many directions, with the state playing key roles in directing markets through policy formulation, making and implementing investment-friendly laws, and direct participation in the economy. Asia's growth, therefore, according to the Washington institutions and their supporters, could specifically be attributed to best practices in the accumulation of human and physical capital, in which the right basics were applied, namely the promotion of local and foreign investments, savings, and development of infrastructure, the adoption of effective macroeconomic policies by way of provision to investors of greater credit access, investments in education leading to the development of skilled manpower through focusing on primary and secondary education, reduction of taxes on agriculture, and adoption of foreign technology. Other policy options included focus on export-led growth through selective industrial promotion aimed at catching up with the industrialized countries. In this case, the state selected and promoted some industries by giving them priority access to subsidized credit through banks established for that purpose, mild financial repression or keeping interest rates on loans low, protecting young industries, and investing in applied research for use by export-oriented firms and industries. In the case of access to credit, the state guided the allocation of resources to the private sector as was the case in China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The industries that were given these privileges were not arbitrarily selected but based on their performances. Thus selected industries were given specific export targets. The state also developed marketing institutions.[38] Thus, the growth of Asia was not based purely on market forces, but also on some form of economic dictatorship. Accordingly, unlike the Washington consensus, which emphasized on privatization and a minimal role for the state, the governments of China, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan were actively involved and directed the markets; they created efficient firms or SOEs and adopted gradual trade liberalization while also encouraging information sharing between private and public enterprises.[39]

The World Bank's claim that the free market was Asia's strength was, however, not correct. Rather, the US incentives they enjoyed

following their Cold War arrangements were growth propellers. Indeed, all the East Asian countries that made agreements with the United States, for example, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and most ASEAN members, did not adopt free trade policies; rather, following the example of Japan, they adopted mercantilist policies in which governments were used to stimulate and protect select industries.[40] Foreigners were denied access to the "ideas and technology" being developed by Japan, as its economy, like that of the other Asian countries including China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea, fought foreigners trying to sell their own high-technology products in Japan and other Asian countries. Indeed, many non-Asians did not know the fact that East Asian economies did not usually differentiate between private and state-owned investments as is the case in the United States and Western Europe. For example, Japan indigenized foreign military and civilian designs of technologies and diffused them widely within its domestic economy.[41] Japan spent more money in upgrading and diffusing technology within its economy than on key issues of research and development. The best example is the "semiconductor industry" in the 1980s.[42] Although much of the research was done in the United States, Japan licensed the technology and favored local producers. Gradually, Japan achieved a lead status in quality, equipment fabrication, and cost reduction for end items.[43]

Again, the World Bank's claim that state-led growth was Africa's malaise did not apply to Asia, where the state was an agent of development. It is true that firms in Asia took large responsibilities for the social welfare of their workers; however, governments also played key roles in promoting heavy savings and investment culture.[44] Korea was a good example of these policy combinations to the extent that after the Korean War, South Korea adopted a growth strategy that in 30 years increased its per capita income eight-fold, drastically reduced poverty, improved literacy, and significantly reduced the technology gap between that country and the more developed countries. Its automobile products and electrical appliances from Daewoo, Hyundai, and Samsung were competitive and successfully sold worldwide. Thus, although Korea before the war was poorer than India, its development strategy enabled it to grow significantly to join the OECD.[45] The country was, however, not dogmatic in its intervention. Thus, minimal intervention was used, as the country reverted to "prudent macroeconomic management" where intervention threatened the stability of the macroeconomy.[46] The country also controlled population growth by encouraging family planning, and controlled inflation. The emphasis on industrialization did not lead to the complete

neglect of agriculture. But the agricultural sector emphasized productivity and change, as land reforms also characterized that sector.[47] Although these policies worked for Northeast Asia, other regions that attempted to make it on similar paths failed due to the rigors of the East Asian policy model.[48] Asia's story is thus a successful combination of market and state-led growth, or what G. K. Meier and Rauch E. James call Asia's "pragmatic flexibility—the capacity and willingness to change policies—is as much as the hallmark of the HPAEs as any single policy instrument."[49]

Though not as critical and successful as market orientation,[50] geographical and cultural factors were also parts of the Asian success story. Geographically, the HPAEs are contiguous, had easier access to the sea, and these were important for the development of regional trade and capital flows in a liberal regime. They share common historical and cultural heritage as ethnic Chinese spread in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China. They were inspired by the success story of Japan in building large trading companies, in foreign trade, and in heavy industry.[51] Herein lies the role of cultural capital in Asia's regional development. Africa also practiced state-led development, based on "African socialism," but never developed. Did the problem lie with statism or with the socialist brand of statism?

A. G. Kenwood and A. L. Loughead attributed the success story of the Asian Tigers and the NICs, and the fast pace at which globalization moved from the 1980s leading to trade expansion, to "the rapid liberalization of the financial markets … and the acceleration of capital flows to the NICs." This trend, according to the authors, resulted in the speedy movements of some Asian countries into a higher group, while others such as Malaysia, Thailand, and China succeeded by following the "Asian export-oriented path to their industrialization."[52] This globalization explanation is a part of the dominant market theory. In any case, the development of the Asian countries did not begin in the 1980s; the blossoming of Asia in that decade was the culmination of about two or more previous decades of gradual but steady economic progress based on external incentives provided by the United States during the Cold War.

Amartya Sen argues that central to the success of all these policies and processes in Asia was the creation of the enabling social and economic environment. He defines the social environment as "social opportunities," that is, investment in people's health and education. Thus, though India and China adopted the market economy in 1979 and 1991, respectively, China succeeded while India did not because China was more economically and socially prepared for the market

economy. China laid the economic conditions for its growth from 1966. China, between 1966 and 1972, after its cultural revolution focused on economic development and achieved GNP growth of 8 percent on average. Thus, China's Guandong and Fujian provinces in the south experienced about 10 percent annual growth rate.[53] In terms of social preparation, China before 1979 had invested in education and health care so that by 1979 it had more literate people; on the other hand, India's education focused on the tertiary level, which benefitted the elite most, while China, like other NICs, focused on primary and secondary education.[54] Southeast and East Asia also developed quickly due to their focus on improving health care and intensification of economic participation, unlike India, Pakistan, and Brazil where "social opportunities" did not expand well and so they did not grow well.[55] Japan (beginning with the Meiji restoration), South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China, and other countries in East and South Asia did very well to increase "economic opportunities" by providing enabling environments: education, health care, and land reforms.[56] I agree with Sen since development is about improvements in people's well-being through a human agency; a society with more skills and healthy people is likely to develop faster than one lacking in these factors. However, the "social opportunities" identified by Sen were provided by Asian governments due to an external advantage. This will be elaborated shortly.

Although the market theory is valid, being a product of specific empirical research, it does not give a total picture of the cause of the divergence. For example, it does not explain why some African countries that treaded the path of market orientation failed. For example, African countries such as Kenya, the Côte d'Ivoire, and, to some extent, Nigeria have traditions of market orientation, but the miracle never occurred in those countries. Indeed, during the Cold War, Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire resisted the temptation of being drawn into the communist fold.[57] Nigeria also resisted being drawn into the communist fold and maintained a mixed economy principle, in which private enterprises and SOEs lawfully coexisted.[58] Thus, Asia's policy combination of private investments coexisting with SOEs was also the policy option of these African countries, especially Nigeria. Nigeria's indigenization laws of the 1970s did not eclipse private investments but was meant to shore up local capital in small- and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs), but Nigeria did not develop. The lacuna lies, in my opinion, in the divergent environments created by the Cold War in the two regions. I now elaborate on the environmental differences created by the Cold War in the two regions.

The Role of the Cold War in the Economic Divergences

The Cold War was largely responsible for the divergences by creating an environment favorable for Asia's development and one unfavorable for Africa. The environmental factor has several dimensions, mainly the Cold War policies and practices of the two superpowers in the two regions, which I elaborate below.

Asia's Prodevelopment Cold War Environment: The United States and Western Europe at the Background

The Cold War established a favorable economic environment in a number of ways: from the United States, guaranteed security, market and technological access; from Western Europe, aid and development. During the Cold War, the United States did countries in the Pacific Basin, including the Asian countries I chose to discuss, lots of favors, which made the region's economic environment favorable for development. Following mutual agreements with these countries, the United States developed and implemented pro-growth policies for them. David B. H. Denoon outlines four components of the policy, two of which are relevant to this discourse:

1. to guarantee the security of countries in the Pacific Basin by maintaining US "nuclear and conventional forces" in the region; and
2. to grant the countries in the Pacific Basin "economic and military tariff preferences" as well as access to US markets in order to extend their cooperation with the West, especially the United States.[59]

For the purposes of elaboration, I subdivide the economic policy into two, market access and technology access, but maintain the security policy as a single item. I start with the security policy. The United States guaranteed the security of Asia under a special arrangement. Africa did not have such a privilege. During the Cold War, the United States and several regions in the Pacific Basin, including Australia, New Zealand, North and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands, entered a mutually beneficial cooperation. The terms of the cooperation were that the countries in the Pacific Basin would resist communism in exchange for military/security and economic assistance—market and

technological access. Security assistance was in the form of "nuclear deterrence" and conventional defense. This arrangement, according to Denoon, was generally successful, in spite of some hitches.[60] The military/security protection granted by the United States—which also picked up their military expenditures—enabled the countries in the Northeast and Southeast Asia to reduce national spending on military between 1978 and 1989, except for Latin America.[61] Japan was a good example where the United States picked up her military expenditures until the 1970s, when she become stronger economically and the United States asked Japan to step up her military/security spending. Japan obliged and since then has increasingly picked up large parts of its defense budget.[62]

The beneficiary countries, therefore, channeled their reserve funds and energies into economically productive sectors. The security provided by the United States helped the region to focus on economic performance, while gaining from American "dual use" technology, that is technology that was used in both the civilian and military sectors. It was thus within this condition of peace and tranquility that many of the beneficiary Asian countries began the leap forward in economic growth and development. Examples abound in South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. South Korea, famous for high-tech automobiles like Hyundai and Daewoo, electronics like Samsung and Luck Gold Star, and computers and semiconductors, started its industrialization in the 1960s during the military regime of General Park. In the 1970s, it focused on heavy industries especially machinery, construction tools, and petrochemicals. Although the conglomerates, called Chaebols, were based on the Japanese Zaibatsu industrialization model, quotas were placed on Japanese goods. Though Korea was one of the 20 heavily indebted countries in the 1980s on account of heavy borrowing by SMEs, its annual GDP between 1981 and 1996 was 8 percent.[63] Malaysia's foreign direct investment (FDI)-based industrialization started in the 1970s by shifting away from its predominantly primary product-based economy. Its manufacturing industries, located at export processing zones, produced clothes, shoes, and apparel. In 1990s, major manufacturing activities were the production of computer disk drives, semiconductors, and automobiles. Its locally manufactured brands of cars satisfied the domestic market by two-thirds; hence Malaysia began to export cars in the 1990s. Indonesia's industrialization, which has been labeled "crony capitalism," began in the 1980s, when income from oil and gas industries was used to improve national health and education and for industrialization. SOEs) were a part of

the industrialization process, as the private sector was also promoted. For example, President Sahurto's family business was granted special privileges. The period 1986 to 1997 was one of good annual growth at 6.8 percent.[64] Thailand's industrialization occurred in the 1980s as was the case with Indonesia, as production shifted from primary products to manufacturing focusing on exports from the 1980s. In that decade, import tariffs were lowered, and Japan increased its FDI in Thailand. By the 1990s, three-fifths of exports were made up of manufactured goods. Thus, between 1987 and 1995, exports rose four-fold. The Thai Baht was tied to the US dollar,[65] which was evidence of crony capitalism. The Philippines was also another US crony in Asia. It aligned with the United States and was completely opposed to communism; hence, the Huk movement, which opposed Japanese occupation but came under communist influence and rebelled, was suppressed with the assistance of the United States.[66] Thailand, like the Philippines, aligned with the West and vehemently opposed communism.[67]

In the economic sphere, Asian countries covered by the special arrangement enjoyed access to US technology and markets during the Cold War. Africa did not have such opportunities, and where they did, as was the case with the European Economic Community (EEC), only limited market access was granted. Beneficiaries of the US largesse, for example, Japan, enjoyed regular supply of various resources and human capital. Outside Asia, Western Germany in Europe also benefitted, In return, the United States gained access to these countries' markets and military bases.[68] In case of Asia, economic assistance was in the form of "open access" to US markets for their exports.[69] The United States traded extensively with Asia by buying more of their goods and incurring trade deficits in the process. For example, between 1982 and 1987, the United States incurred four-fold deficits in its trade with the East Asian economies. With Japan, the United States between 1960 and 1991 incurred trade deficit to the tune of $40 billion (and more since 1985 except for the two years, 1987 and 1990, when it was below $40 billion). Conversely, Japan's investments in the United States between 1985 and 1990 were worth $59 billion.[70] The success in the economic spheres manifested in the stimulation of a vibrant economy in the Pacific Basin.[71] Thus, countries like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, among others, used the US FDI and the security arrangement to achieve economic development.[72]

The Asia allies also benefitted from US technical assistance or technological access. Indeed, between the 1950s and 1970s, "the US provided thousands of technical data packages" and large amounts

of industry-based technology to the largesse beneficiaries. With a secured economy and open access to US markets and technology, inter- and intraregional trade in the Pacific Basin experienced rapid growth, as trade and capital flow within the region rose sharply in the 1980s. Direct investments in the region tripled between 1985 and 1989. The main beneficiaries of the low-cost technology transfer were Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which expanded their industrial bases. Japan, for example, put most of its complex industrial technology in the civilian and dual-use category in the private sector.[73] For Japan, the bilateral agreement was struck in the 1950s, in which the United States on its side granted Japan access to its markets; Japan on its part agreed that its ruling Labor Democratic Party would contain left opposition and assist the United States in its war with Korea. There was a strong anti-US sentiment in Japan in the 1960s, as the Labor Party organized demonstrations against the military agreement with the United States, forcing the Prime Minister to resign and weakening US-Japan relations; the 1970s opened a new vista in US-Japan relations. In the 1970s, the Labor Party in Japan had become weak; the defense treaty remained unchanged, while Japan's access to the US markets was revived, except for US placement of quotas on Japanese textiles.[74] Between 1988 and 1992, the United States' high-technology sector sold more than 5 percent shares in 608 companies to outsiders; Japanese companies bought 399; those from the United Kingdom, France, and South Korea bought only 110.[75] In effect, Asia's economic performance was enhanced by the economic arrangements with the United States. The whole arrangement tantamount to the United States making sacrifices for Asia, though Asian governments "have never accepted the principles of free trade."[76] The nonpractice of free trade created an asymmetrical economic relationship between the Asian countries and the United States, which favored the Asian countries, while the United States suffered trade imbalances and loss of jobs and industrial competitiveness in key industries.[77]

During the Cold War, Asia received more economic aid and assistance than Africa from the West, and these yielded more positive results. For example, the Development Assistance Countries between 1945 and 1960 gave out large sums of monies to Asia, especially India. Asia received about $14 billion of the over $20 billion Official Development Assistance (ODA) of that period.[78] Since the 1970s, Japan's investments have focused on Asia (China, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Thailand), which received 25 percent, followed by Europe, which received 17 percent.[79]

Africa's Antidevelopment Cold War Environment: The Cold War Environment and Europe at the Background

The Cold War established an unfavorable economic environment in Africa. African countries did not make a similar agreement with any of the two Cold War principals. They did not, therefore, enjoy any benefits. Instead, they were engulfed by various problems that impeded economic growth and development. Three broad areas epitomize these problems: insecurity due to internal wars, lack of economic opportunities, and politics. Each of these problems has several dimensions, as discussed below.

While Asia had a favorable atmosphere for economic production following their protection by the United States under the agreement, African countries were left with serious security problems. Although Asian countries like Vietnam experienced security problems, these were outside the Cold War arrangement with the United States. The security challenges in Cold War Africa had many dimensions. First, Africa was a theater of war, being used to fight proxy wars. Thus, Africa was embroiled in internal conflicts involving supporters of one side or the other of the principal Cold War actors during their independence struggle and after. In colonies where armed struggle was resorted to as was in the case of Angola, Algeria, Kenya, Mozambique, and South Africa, nationalists in different countries looked to one side or the other of the superpowers. While some looked to the United States for "protection as proxy guardians of mineral resources and transportation routes deemed necessary for the cold War,"[80] others looked to the USSR for military assistance in their guerilla wars against white minorities and local opponents. The superpowers encouraged the wars by supplying arms and sometimes troops to local African cronies. Examples are in ample supply. The USSR and the Warsaw Pact, in collaboration with Cuba or China, supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the Ethiopian national army in its war against Ogaden rebels and Eritrean independence seekers, and the Somali national army against internal dissenters. The USSR also armed liberation movements and communist parties in Egypt and Algeria. Cuba contributed up to 15,000 troops to Ethiopia and 50,000 troops for Angola. In the 10-year period between 1977 and 1987, the USSR gave financial aid/loan for the military in the three countries: $8.38 billion (Ethiopia), $9.23 billion (Angola, for arms importation), and $2.03 billion (Mozambique).[81] The USSR also supported nationalists

in Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, Comoros, Seychelles; South Africa (African National Congress, ANC), and Namibia (South West Africa People's Organization, SWAPO).[82] For example, the Party for the Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) led by Amilcar Cabral was supported by the USSR and China in collaboration with independent countries in West Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the UN.[83] The USSR also gave military assistance including arms supplies through the Warsaw Pact in support of local clients fighting their US-backed counterparts in the Democratic Republic of Korea and Laos; in Latin American countries like Nicaragua, El-Salvador, Paraguay, and Guatemala; and in the Middle East states like Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria.[84] All these were outside the US-protected partners.

On its part, the United States and its CIA sponsored antigovernment rebel movements in Africa's Angola and Chad, as it did in Latin America's El-Salvador and Nicaragua, and Asia's Afghanistan and Cambodia during the Reagan administration, as several US security agencies intervened in many countries of the world[85] that were outside the security arrangements. For example, the United States and South Africa supported the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA); the United States supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) through Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC); and the United States and NATO backed Portugal's support for the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) in Mozambique.[86] West Germany supplied arms to South Africa and supported the National Resistance Movement in Mozambique as well as UNITA.[87] The United States also assisted the Ian Smith Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in 1965, as the UDI condemnation by the British was not backed by further action. The UN imposed sanctions at the instance of independent African states, but South Africa as well as the United States helped maintain the Smith regime. The United States, for example, continued to buy Chrome from Rhodesia in spite of the sanctions during the Cold War.[88] The United States and her Western allies to different degrees supported the apartheid regime in South Africa, which condemned the ANC as communist while presenting itself as "the last bastion of Christian civilization" in Africa and needing to be defended against communist expansion into the continent. However, the United States did not maintain a consistent policy toward apartheid. While democrats like Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter sympathized with the oppressed blacks and tried to apply sanctions, their republican counterparts like Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan,

and Bush Snr kept faith with the apartheid regime.[89] Other European powers also contributed to the insecurity in Cold War Africa. For example, France had about 8,000 troops in Central African Republic (CAR), Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon, and Senegal; more than 12,000 military advisers in 26 African countries; a 47,000-strong, combat-ready standing army to intervene in Africa; had defense agreements with Cameroon, CAR, Commoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal, Togo; and military agreement assistance with "Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, and Zaire." French troops have been deployed to many of these African countries during times of internal conflicts in support of regimes that were often corrupt and oppressive. French personnel controlled the national armies of some African countries.[90] The French military engagements in Africa were typical of France's neocolonialism on the continent.

Another dimension of the externally inspired insecurity problem in Cold War Africa relates to leadership vulnerability, as was the case in other regions where the US security arrangements were lacking. Some radical or socialist-oriented Third World leaders like Patrice Lumumba of Zaire and Rafael Trujillo of Dominican Republic were killed by suspected CIA agents. Stooges of the United States became leaders of their countries, but those who deviated from the US instructions, like Manuel Noriega of Panama, were humiliated. Another aspect of the Cold War Africa security challenge was in the area of direct external attacks. SSA lacks a good example, but North Africa provides one. For example, in 1956, France, Britain, and Israel jointly invaded the Suez Canal zone. Although the attack received worldwide condemnation and forced the invaders to withdraw, some damage had been done. The attack was the result of the nationalization of the Suez Canal following the withdrawal of the United States' and Britain's pledged support for building the Aswan Dam. Nasser was forced to turn to the USSR, where he got the needed support. The Britian and the West were angered by Nasser's action and attempted to eliminate him regarding him as procommunist.[91]

The military intervention of the USSR and the United States and her European allies in Africa aided and abetted wars in Africa, leading to a loss of revenues in arms transfer, general insecurity, destruction to life and property, food shortages, as well as general underdevelopment of the continent. Robert O'Brien and Marc Williams capture the negative—conflict—impact of the Cold War on Africa. According to them, the opposite of what some Asian countries gained from the United States was true of some other regions. For example,

in Southern Africa, Central America, and Asia's Indochina, the Cold War "fed the flames of local conflicts, contributing to escalating violence and increasing poverty."[92] It was Gorbachev's political and economic reforms that led to the abandonment of orthodox Marxism-Leninism both in the USSR and some African countries and thereby reduced the externally fueled Cold War security challenges.[93] It was only toward the end of the Cold War the principal actors began to build consensus that mitigated the externally inspired or supported conflicts. For example, the two superpowers supported a peace deal (the New York Agreement) for Angola between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa initiated by the United States in 1988. The deal provided for Cuban withdrawal from Angola and for Namibian independence. Cuba also withdrew from Ethiopia, as the USSR withdrew from Mozambique, which was receiving more Western aid and also arms supplies from the United States.[94] Ironically, the two superpowers continued to support their clients in Angola—MPLA (USSR) and UNITA (United States)—as the USSR opposed the racist regime in South Africa but argued that compromise, rather than black violence or revolution, was the solution.[95] The United States also continued to maintain military interests in Chad, Kenya, and Zaire (DRC).[96]

Lack of economic opportunities had several manifestations, including lack of guaranteed, broad-based, market, and technological access; inadequacy and defectiveness of financial assistance; and the second scramble for Africa. Of course, trade relations between former British, French, and Portuguese colonies remained strong in a general sense, while Africa also had wide trade relations with the United States.[97] The extent of such trade relations remained below those between Asia and the United States. Thus, while Asia basked in the US economic opportunities, Africa got only limited access to EEC markets from the 1960s, even then not on a very sound footing. Though Britain joined the EEC in 1973 along with its former Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific colonies followed by Ethiopia and Liberia, which joined in 1975, as other African countries joined following their independence, no significant advantages were obtained by non-European entrants due to French neocolonialism. Hence, while Britain's relations with her former colonies started to decline in the 1980s, relations between France and her former colonies have remained strong.[98] Thus, although from the independence decade of the 1960s Europe remained Africa's largest market, the African continent increasingly became a less important market for Europe. For example, in spite of the Preferential Treatment to goods from Africa provided for in various international treaties like the Treaty of Rome and the Yaoundé

and Lome Conventions, the EEC's share of African markets fell from a high of 63 percent between 1958 and 1963 to 45 percent between 1974 and 1986; the UK share of African exports fell to 7 percent between 1974 and 1986, from 22 percent between 1958 and 1963. For the former French colonies, France's share of their trade fell to 25 percent between 1974 and 1986 from 56 percent between 1958 and 1963. Conversely, France extended her trade exports to former British colonies from 2 percent to 9 percent in the corresponding period (1974–1986). John Ravenhill argued that the decline in Britain's share of African exports was due to that country's adoption of the policy of self-sufficiency for colonies, and that the decline in Europe's interest on the continent has been due to Africa's increasing economic problems since the 1960s.[99] However, the British policy of self-sufficiency for colonies was not a postcolonial one, but an early and enduring colonial policy, and could not have affected postcolonial trade relations between Britain and her former colonies. The US market also shrank for Africa, as trade between Africa and the United States from the 1980s took a declining trend. One example was in 1988 when US exports to and imports from Africa declined from its 1983 levels at 2.2 percent and 4.2 percent, respectively, to 1.2 percent and 2.0 percent, respectively. Jeffrey Herbst attributed this decline to the decline in oil prices, general economic downturn in Africa, and imposition of sanctions against South Africa.[100] However, those may not be all of it; the Gorbachev reforms that began to turn the attention of the West to Eastern Europe may also be another cause. The opening years of the twenty-first century, however, saw the United States and Europe creating market access package for Africa. The United States enacted the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000; Europe enacted the Everything But Arms policy in 2001. However, these policies provided only limited market access, and in all cases, technological access was left out. In my study of the first five years of the AGOA respecting US-Nigeria trade, I found that the oil exports—and not the AGOA textile items—still dominated Nigeria-US trade in the AGOA era. Although countries like Ghana and South Africa improved their fabric and agricultural products exports, respectively, the big push expected from the AGOA was still a matter for the future.[101]

Cold War Africa was also disadvantaged in the area of economic aid compared to Asia. Aid and other forms of financial assistance to Africa from both sides of the Cold War divide were insufficient and defective. Africa received less of USSR's aid to cronies, as those in Asia (though not in an agreement with the United States) got more.

For example, the socialist countries—USSR, China, and Eastern Europe—by 1960 had raised $3.6 billion for the LDCs, of which about half went to South Asia, one-third to the Middle East, India, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. In the 1970s and 1980s, socialist countries' aid reached $5 billion yearly, but the major beneficiaries were Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia (which received more than 70%), followed by other socialist countries that received 12 percent while the remaining Third World countries received just 7 percent.[102] With respect to aid from the West, the Development Assistance Countries between 1945 and 1960 gave out a large part of the monies to Asia, as noted earlier.[103] It was only in the 1990s after the Cold War had ended that Africa, especially SSA, received a larger chunk of aid, 40 percent of the $40 billion total aid to the LDCs.[104] Britain's direct investment focus shifted from the Commonwealth in the 1950s to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s; to the United States (33%) and EEC (20%) in the 1980s; to the EU, the United States, and Commonwealth in the 1980s and 1990s.[105]

In aid-dependent Africa, there was a severe but skillfully manipulated competition for foreign aid, as captured by Bill Freund: "The cold war made the aid game a rat race: …African could up the ante in aid by skillfully playing different countries and the two sides of Iron Curtin against each other."[106] Aid was not only smaller compared to Asia's, it dwindled in the postcolonial era. Thus, although the USSR increased its aid to Third World countries generally between 1965 and 1974, SSA's and North Africa's shares fell from 13 percent to 4 percent and from 34 percent to 9 percent, respectively.[107] Soviet loan, which included technical assistance, was payable either in the recipient's currency or major trade products from the sector for which the loan was received. China's aid to socialist states in SSA was for the development of agriculture, transportation, and health sectors. But while China's aid in the region was 4.0 percent between 1930 and 1973, it declined to 0.8 percent between 1973 and 1992.[108] In the area of trade, many African countries were not happy with the terms offered by the USSR; they believed that the USSR was a part of the global north's conspiracy against Africa and, therefore, blamed it for their slow pace of development.[109] In 1985, US aid to Africa was $1.25 billion, but the figure dropped in the subsequent years to below $1 billion anually. For 1990, the figure was $905 million. Conversely, UNITA retorting the Cold War logic received $50 million, which was more than what the United States gave any individual African country.[110] Europe's aid to Africa has also been in the decline. Germany was an exception. From the

1970s, Europe increased the aid, largely in grants, from 20 percent to more than 30 percent of its annual aid budget to Africa, making Germany the third largest EEC aid giver to Africa. Countries in the SSA, especially Cameroon, DRC, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Tanzania, and Togo, were the major beneficiaries. From 1978, much of the aid was cancelled for 19 poorest African countries. But like Britain, West Germany opposed giving aid to Africa unconditionally as it also opposed sanctions against South Africa because of its investments in that country.[111]

Aid to Africa had a number of defects. First, aids from the capitalist bloc were mainly international capital market loans of the World Bank and IMF and tied to strings—SAPs, which many African countries adopted in the 1980s.[112] Only two African countries had one kind of agreement or the other with IMF in 1978. Ten years later, the situation had changed, with more than 50 percent of African countries already implementing one or more of the IMF and World Bank SAPs, including the supervision by the IMF of their key economic organs like the Central Banks and Ministries of Finance, Trade, and Budget departments.[113] It was only after the end of the Cold War that the United States was willing to grant debt relief for countries owing up to $600 million and only for those that adopted economic reforms.[114] In the same manner, due to pressure from Britain's Development Assistance Group on the Thatcher regime, the country migrated all aid to 13 poorest African countries to grants.[115] Another problem was that aid to Africa from both sides was the destructive type, mainly in military arms and supplies.

Another defect with aid to Africa was its neocolonial features. For example, France, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal, among other former colonial powers on the continent, focused their aid destinations to their former colonies, while using aid to open up vistas in other African countries. France was Africa's largest aid donor contributing $2 billion in 1987, while the International Development Assistance, an agency of the World Bank, contributed just $1.4 billion.[116] France used aid to Africa to advance her economic interest on the continent. For example, many African countries held their foreign reserves in France, which gained priority access to recipients' essential raw materials. Portugal extended aid to Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) due to its large Boer population in South Africa.[117] The advancement of donor economic interest using aid contradicts Ravenhill's claim with respect to France that the goal of France's Africa policy was enhancement of its prestige and honor, as French Africa was regarded as part of France.[118]

Another problem with aid was that most of it was loans, which could not be repaid because of high indebtedness and revenue losses. For example, Ghana permitted a multinational corporation, Kaiser and Reynolds, to establish the Volta Aluminum Company in Terna, close to the Akosombo dam—itself built with World Bank loan. But while the Volta project accrued profits for its MNC owners, Ghana lost revenue in underpriced electricity.[119]

Another issue that relates to the lack of economic opportunities was the second scramble for Africa. Africa's resources were scrambled for among the Western and Russian powers. The Cold War was used by the rivals to pursue their economic and strategic interests in Africa. While the promotion of ideology dominated their interests in Asia, economic exploitation and strategic advantages were their major considerations in Africa, especially on the side of the United States and Western Europe. Both the United States and USSR had economic and strategic interests in Africa, especially to exploit the continent's resources while competing with former colonial powers. Evidences abound. With respect to the USSR, it had an interest in having access to Somalia's coastline. Access to Somalia's coastline was a means to an end—to achieve USSR's interests in the Middle East, in Egypt (the Suez Canal), and also to operate in the Indian Ocean in order to expand her naval base and power and also to access fishing opportunities therein. On its part, Somalia wanted military support from the USSR.[120] Access to countries with coastlines also defined in part Soviet interest in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. All have long coastlines, access to which the USSR has sought to enhance its naval opportunities. The USSR thus benefitted from Africa's naval facilities. It established naval facilities off Eritrea's Massawa port on the Dahlak Islands; Angola gave USSR access to its airport, which enhanced USSR's surveillance in the South Atlantic; Mozambique gave the USSR access to its airports. However, USSR gained less economically from these African countries; Angola's oil trade, for example, was more West-bound. Worse still, Angola and Mozambique joined the World Bank in 1983 and 1984, respectively, and were more economically inclined to the West and its market economy.[121] During the Second World War, the United States obtained a large economic interest in Africa, which it sought to protect due to the weakness and vulnerability of capitalism there. The USSR's attempt to extend its influence into Africa confirmed United States' fears.[122] The United States imported several solid and energy minerals from Africa. US imports from Africa averaged 23 percent in the ten-year period between 1974 and 1986.[123] The interest of Europe in

Africa was largely on the continent's natural resources. As noted earlier, many former French African countries granted France priority access to their raw materials and held their foreign reserves in France. Spanish interest in Africa was largely in the oil sector (where Nigeria and Gabon were primary areas of focus) and fishing. Spain also maintained some economic interest in South Africa (though it supported sanctions against the apartheid regime) and gave aid to Morocco.[124] The consequences of the scramble are known: exploitation rather than the development of Africa.

The third broad category of antidevelopment issues in Cold War Africa was politics, which had various dimensions. Although economic determinism states that the economic structure determines the other structures of the society, Cold War politics in postcolonial Africa proved otherwise. Political power determined which economic structure to adopt. Personal rule produced inconsistent economic policies, where military coups were prevalent. Politics affected African economies negatively in three major ways: brutal dictatorships, ideological division/confusion and USSR's policy inconsistencies, and the failure of Non-Alignment. I elaborate on these below.

Generally, the Cold War in Africa and Asia strangled the growth of democracy as it propped up undemocratic, military, or one-party dictatorships detrimental to the progress of the state.[125] Both the United States and the USSR propped up dictators in Africa and Asia. In order to prevent the spread of communism to Asia, the United States, according to Noam Chomsky, established "military dictatorships in the countries susceptible to infection." In Indonesia, for example, in 1965 the Communist Party, though mass-based, was abolished while landless peasants were killed.[126] Soviet-backed African dictators included Ethiopias's Mengistu Haille Mariam, Somalia's Siad Barre, and Angola's Augustine Neto, who practiced Marxist-Leninist statism. However, the types of dictators propped by the two blocs were of different qualities. While the United States propped up benign and nationalist dictators in Asia, the two superpowers propped up brutal dictators, looters, and incorrigible spend-drifts in Africa. While those in Asia engaged in what has been called positive corruption, those in Africa engaged in negative corruption. For example, unlike their counterparts in Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan who stole national wealth and invested it at home, African leaders stashed their stolen wealth outside.[127]

The Cold War also caused bitter ideological divisions on the African continent. This manifested in the confusion among African leaders, workers, youth, and students' organizations as to which

ideology to adopt in the political and economic management of states and unions.

While a few African states—Kenya, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Liberia—resisted communism, others went for socialism. The United States did not control the nonsocialist states as it did in Asia under the agreement. The USSR however, exerted a strong influence on the political and economic policies of all African clients. Between 1969 and 1976, Soviet-type political institutions were built in Somalia. This culminated in the establishment of the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party. Despite all pretentions, the party was a reincarnation of the Military Council established by Siad Barre in 1969. Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique followed the Somalia trend in the 1970s on Soviet Union and East Germany advise.[128] As Soviet influence expanded on the continent, more confusion manifested in the following ways. First, African socialist leaders debated whether capitalism must precede socialism on the continent. This debate created an ideological quagmire, as the USSR labeled them "countries on the non-capitalist road." But African leaders considered the label derogatory and denying the possibility of African socialism. This forced the USSR to relabel them "countries of socialist orientation." The Soviet model did not satisfy their ego; African leaders then began to look up to China as their model—adding to their confusion—as socialism had variants. The Chinese model opened a floodgate of competing socialist ideologies; some African leaders domesticated socialism as "African socialism" with different names;[129] others kept faith with the traditional Marxist-Leninist model. Those who adopted "African socialism" included Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Modibo Keita of Mali, and Nyerere of Tanzania, who preferred to identify their political philosophies in African contexts, cultures, and traditions rather than on purely foreign ideas. But some countries like Angola, Benin Republic, and Mozambique stuck with Marxism-Leninism until the Gorbachev reforms in the 1980s, which led to collapse of the USSR.[130] The adoption of different versions or names for socialism on the continent was evidence of confusion, as it suggests different interpretations of socialism in Africa.

The ideological confusion also extended to trade unionism, youth, and students' organizations in Africa. For example, the United States sponsored the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) formed in 1949; the USSR sponsored communist internal organizations like the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in 1945. Though rivaled by ICFTU of the United States, the WFTU by 1950 had 5 percent of its membership from Africa, including

South Africa, the Sudan, and French colonies. At the level of youth, the United States established the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), while at the student's level, the USSR established the International Students' Union. Apart from dividing students in Africa, those in Europe and the United States were also divided as both sides had international student's scholarship programs for tertiary institution studies. The United States used foundations like Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller to give grants for research and sponsored African scholars to the United States as well as projects and university programs, such as the Fulbright Scholar Program of the Council of International Exchange of Scholars. The USSR also offered scholarships to African students while also creating the Soviet Association for Friendship. The purpose of such scholarships was to produce future leaders properly indoctrinated in one or the other of the two rival ideologies. The USSR, for instance, granted scholarships to African students hoping that on return after the completion of their courses they would be the agents of socialist change in Africa.[131] The aim of penetrating trade unions by both sides was to influence the political process in Africa during the nationalist struggles and after independence.

Apart from competing socialist ideologies, African socialist states experienced policy inconsistencies in their relationship with the USSR. These manifested in policy changes initiated by each Soviet leader. In the early 1960s, the USSR under Nikita Kruschev supported African radicals who called themselves "Revolutionary Democrats," in the hope of achieving socialist change on the continent. However, in the latter part of that decade, USSR's interest in Africa declined due to the removal from power of many radical African leaders through coups. Instead of active support, USSR's role became advisory: African leaders were advised to adopt socialist development strategies. Active interest in Africa was renewed under Leonid Brezhnev in the 1970s due to the adoption of Marxist-Leninist traditions by some African leaders, starting with Mengistu in Ethiopia followed by leaders in Angola and Mozambique. In the 1980s, USSR's support for Africa declined again in the Gorbachev era, as Soviet Africa policy emphasized reconciliation and moderation to reduce the conflicts on the continent. Reconciliation was recommended for war-torn Angola and Ethiopia. Mengistu was threatened with stoppage of assistance if he failed to reconcile with Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia.[132] African leaders were also advised to manage the state not along lines of organized political parties but on wide coalitions of progressive forces including the military. With respect to economic moderation, African countries

were advised to adopt mixed economy principles, not to rush into full collectivization or full state control (nationalization) of their economies, and to maintain SMEs. In addition, they were advised to permit Western private FDI as engines of economic growth.[133] Conversely, the USSR supported the establishment of large-scale enterprises at the level of industry and agriculture.[134] Some African leaders were frustrated by these policy changes to the extent that they considered the USSR and the United States to be neocolonial masters whom they cannot trust since they tied their aid strings.[135]

According to Marina Ottaway, the Gorbachev Africa policy of reconciliation was a manifestation of USSR's frustration with Africa's failure to achieve peace in spite of the billions of dollars in financial and military aid to the countries concerned in the 1970s, and that it was also a cost-saving devise for the USSR and finally that it was meant to shore up the USSR's struggle to improve East-West relations.[136] Ottaway may score a point here, as Gorbachev met a declining USSR, which was not strong enough to continue supporting clients. However, the inconsistencies that characterized its Africa interests were lacking in other regions. For instance, though Asia was also plagued by coups in the 1960s, for example, in Indonesia and Thailand,[137] these did not lead to policy inconsistencies. Even if the USSR did not have a strong presence in these countries, it was not because of their political situations but because of their attachment to the United States. Be that as it may, Africa could not achieve development in the context of confused ideologies, divided loyalties, and policy inconsistencies.

The last political point I raise is that of the failure of Non-Alignment. Non-Alignment was a general continental international relations policy, which the United States and the USSR—under Kruschev—recognized in the 1950s and 1960s. Non-Alignment, however, was not a developmental philosophy; indeed, it did not prevent individual country choices of a development path. Besides, it was plagued not only by differences in individual state's political philosophies but also by several problems including internal divisions due to conflicting economic interests and border conflicts.[138] Internal divisions within the organization occurred a number of times. At its 1961 meeting in Belgrade, divisions became manifest. While India's Nehru wanted it to be a loose and open concept, Yugoslavia's Tito and Egypt's Nasser wanted it to be more strict and closed. The India-China conflict of 1962 and the India-Pakistan conflict were other causes of division. They weakened India's

influence on the movement. Egypt then became prominent. A further problem emerged in the 1970s—divergent national interests—which were difficult to synthesize. The issue was how Africans would successfully realize their goal of liberation using communist support and make capitalist societies sensitive to the continent's problems.[139] The admission of Saudi Arabia and Cuba in the 1970s also caused problems because it made the movement rather fluid, thereby weakening it. Although it gave member states "a sense of association and solidarity,"[140] the expectation that interests would converge in the areas of "freedom, equality, and human rights"[141]never crystallized. Instead, membership expansion reduced the movement's vitality. Worse still, in the 1980s, the UN became less capable of controlling global events and thereby diminished the significance of Non-Alignment.[142] Another problem with Non-Alignment was that African leaders only wanted to exploit the principle to their advantage by flirting with both sides. Thus, the argument of Lance Van Sittert on the Cold War aid regime is noteworthy. According to Sittert, the Cold War gave African states clientele status[143] in their relationship with the two superpowers, because the boom in primary produce prices after the Second World War, instead of making African states richer, rather encouraged them to receive aid from both sides of the Cold War divide.[144] One example of dealing with the two was Nkrumah of Ghana who received aid from both sides.[145] Thus, African states had modeled their development on modernization and industrialization along either the capitalist or socialist path and based on funds generated from the export of primary produce and incomes from former colonial masters as well as "Cold War patrons."[146] Africa was not alone in the Cold War policy nonadherence. Asian countries were also guilty. For example, while some countries like India and Burma favored socialist planning, others like Thailand relied on the Western models in which the World Bank sent experts to help with their planning.[147] Although in both cases planning in the region "precedes attempts at its realization,"[148] while individual country's preferences were helpful to Asian countries that aligned with the Unitd States, such an alliance did not help African countries. Nonadherence led to Non-Alignment politically and economically, and the divisions within the organization took its toll on African economic development.

As the Cold War took its toll on the principal rivals in the 1980s, African states were the losers in the circumstance. African states lost their bargaining power in their relationship with the West and East,

both of which advised African states to adjust in the direction of market orientation by adopting SAPs.[149]

Conclusion

Up to the early 1960s, Africa and Asia had comparatively similar economic profiles as poor, illiterate, agrarian, and underdeveloped regions. But by time of the collapse of the USSR, Asia was better than Africa. The World Bank and its neoliberal supporters explained the divergences mainly from the point of view of adoption or otherwise of market policy options. Strong as this explanation is, it fails in a fundamental way to look at divergences in the environment and opportunities for development created by the Cold War. Admittedly, the Cold War was not the principal cause of the divergence, but it did in a fundamental way by creating two different environments: one for the progress of Asia, the other for the backwardness of Africa. The zero-sum game (loss of one is the gain of the other) Cold War policies of the two superpowers were risky to Africa's development.[150] During the Cold War, the United States created a favorable environment for the growth and prosperity of Asian countries that cooperated with it. Asian countries that cooperated with the United States enjoyed free security, enabling them to focus on economic development, and free access to the US technology and markets, which enabled them to industrialize and produce competitive trade goods while also adopting mercantilist economic systems. Indeed, the United States made huge economic sacrifices for beneficiary Asian countries. Also, Asian countries enjoyed greater aid and favor from the United States and Western Europe in the distribution of FDIs. Africa, on the other hand, suffered a debilitating sociopolitical and economic environment. The African policies of the superpowers were inconsistent; Africa was engulfed in deep ideological confusion, crises/conflicts perpetrated and supported by the principal actors and their allies; Africa suffered declining aid/FDI and indebtedness, limited access to foreign markets and none at all to Western technology. By the time the OAU (now African Union, AU) was formed, Africa had been divided up between the two superpowers.[151] African countries also became subjected to economic exploitation as economic and strategic interests of the rivals and their allies also defined the Cold War. While the US/Europe/USSR relations with Africa was that of client and patron, Asia-US relations were cooperative and more beneficial. Most Asian countries that did not benefit from the US largesse remain as poor and backward as their counterparts in Africa.

Notes

1. Although it is common knowledge that Cold War ended with the dis-integration of the USSR in 1991, scholars are divided as to the date it began. Some argue that it began after the Second World War, due to the superpowers' struggles to control the small states of Europe, the building of military alliances and of nuclear weapons. For details on this view, see for example Robert O'Brien and Marc Williams, *Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 113; http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cold_war.htm. Accessed October 8, 2010); and http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/westn/outlinecoldwar.htm. Accessed October 8, 2010). Others argue that it was a post-pre-Second World War phenomenon, rooted in the success of the Bolshevik revolution and the failed Western intervention, as well as the formation of the Soviet Union in 1922, whose ideology was at variance with that of the West. For details on this view, see M. S. Pletushkov et al., *The Soviet Union* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 34–39. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cold_war.htm. Accessed October 8, 2010.

2. Africa here is defined as Sub-Saharan Africa, plagued by failure, poverty, disease, hunger, and conflicts.

3. Asia here is defined as seven of the eight Asian countries that were responsible for the Asian "miracle." They included Japan, Hong Kong, Korea Republic, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Though China was a part of the Asian miracle, I excluded it for the following reasons: China was not a typical ally to any of the superpowers; China was not a part of the security arrangements between the United States and countries in the Pacific Basin.

4. Fwatshak, "The Incredibly Diminishing Giant: Growth of Afro-Pessimism," in *African Journal of Economy and Society* 4, no. 1 and 2 (2002): 31–37.

5. For literature on African slavery and colonial exploitation, see *Forced Migration: The Impact of the Export Slave Trade on African Societies* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1982); A. G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (London: Longman, 1973), 200; 254–67; Claude Ake, *A Political Economy of Africa* (London: Longman, 1981); Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1981); Bade Onimode, *A Political Economy of the African Crisis* (London: Zed Books, 1988); For literature on Asian slavery and colonial exploitation, see, Kenwood and Loughead, *The Growth of the International Economy*, 57–59; 41; Maria Serena I. Diokno, "Southeast Asia Imperial Possession and Dispossession in the Long Twentieth Century," in *The Great Divergence, Hegemony, Underdevelopment, and Global Inequality*, edited by K. S. Jomo (New Delhi: Oxford, 2006), 171–72; 180–190; A. G. Kenwood and A. L. Loughead, *The*

Growth of the International Economy, 1820–2000: An Introductory Text, 4th edn (Routledge: London and New York, 2001 [1999]), 34, 41: Gunnar Myrdal, *The Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, Vol. 1 (New York: Pantheon, 1968), 146–47

6. Gunnar Myrdal, *The Asian Drama*, 131, 132
7. For aid dependence of the regions, see Kenwood and Loughead, *The Growth of the International Economy*, 218, 320–21, which provides data on both regions; Dambisa Moyo's *Dead Aid, Why Aid is not Working and How there is Another Way for Africa* (London: Penguin Books, 2009), which provides a detailed analysis of aid to Africa. On structure of the economies and poor economic performance, see Onimode, *A Political Economy of the African Crisis*, 5–7; Thomas M. Callaghy, "Africa and the World Economy: Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place," in *Africa in World Politics*, edited by Harbeson, John W. and Rothschild, Donald (Oxford: Boulder, San Francisco, 1993), 40; The World Bank, *Adjustments in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 17; Gunnar Myrdal, *The Asian Drama*, 415–688; Robert Solomon, *The Transformation of the World Economy*, 2nd edn (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999), 144. On population growth see: Kenwood and Loughead, *The Growth of the International Economy*, 252. On indebtedness, see: James A. Paul, "The Emerging Maghreb: North Africa and the New World Order," in *Altered States: A Reader in the New World Order*, 333; Myrdal, *The Asian Drama,* 376–79. The African debt profile is documented by Onimode in *A Political Economy of the African Crisis*, 194–99; on the regions' poverty, see: Solomon, *The Transformation of the World Economy*, 141; David B. H. Denoon, *Real Reciprocity: Balancing US Economic and Security Policy in the Pacific Basin* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 33; James A. Paul, "The Emerging Maghreb: North Africa and the New World Order," in *Altered States: A Reader in the New World Order*, 333.
8. Denoon, *Real Reciprocity*, 33
9. http://www.ibiblio.org/expo/soviet.exhibit/coldwar.html. Accessed October 8, 2010)
10. Pletushkov et al., *The Soviet Union*, 221–30.
11. Jeffrey Herbst, "The United States and Africa: The Issues for the Future," in *Africa in World Politics*, edited by John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), 163.
12. Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy* (New Haven and London: University of Yale Press, 2006), 50.
13. Clovis Maksound, "Redefining Non-Alignment: The Global South in the New Global Equation," in *Altered States*, edited by Bennis and Moushabeck, 31.

14. World Bank, *Adjustments in Africa*, 17; Fwatshak, "The Incredibly Diminishing Giant," 31–32.
15. Onimode, *A Political Economy*, 5–7; Callaghy, "Africa and the World Economy," 40–42; World Bank, *Adjustments in Africa*, 17–19; World Bank, *The East Asian Economic Miracle: Growth and Public Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 19.
16. World Bank, *Adjustments in Africa*, 17.
17. Fwatshak, "The Incredibly Diminishing Giant," 31–32.
18. Onimode, *A Political Economy*, 5–7; Callaghy, "Africa and the World Economy," 40–42; World Bank, *Adjustments in Africa*, 17–19; World Bank, *The East Asian Economic Miracle*, 19.
19. The World Bank, *Adjustments in Africa*, 18–19.
20. Onimode, *A Political Economy*, 5–7; Callaghy, "Africa and the World Economy," 40–42; World Bank, *Adjustments in Africa*, 17–19; World Bank, *The East Asian Economic Miracle*, 19.
21. Kenwood and Loughead, *The Growth of the International Economy*, 318.
22. Paul, "The Emerging Maghreb," 333; Bill Freund, "Africa in the Long Twentieth Century," in *The Great Divergence*, 109.
23. Solomon, *The Transformation of the World Economy*, 163.
24. Kenwood and Loughead, *The Growth of the International Economy*, 317.
25. Ibid., 337; Solomon, *The Transformation of the World Economy*, 139–40.
26. Solomon, *The Transformation of the World Economy*, 139–40.
27. Kenwood and Loughead, *The Growth of the International Economy*, 301.
28. Ibid., 318.
29. Solomon, *The Transformation of the World Economy*, 139–40; Kenwood and Loughead, *The Growth of the International Economy*, 338.
30. Denoon, *Real Reciprocity: Balancing US Economic and Security Policy in the Pacific Basin* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 45.
31. World Bank, *The East Asian Economic Miracle*, 1.
32. World Bank, *Adjustments in Africa*, 17.
33. World Bank, *The East Asian Economic Miracle*, 2–5.
34. Solomon, *The Transformation of the World Economy*, 139; World Bank, *The East Asian Economic Miracle*, 2–5.
35. World Bank, *Adjustments in Africa*, 20–25.
36. Ibid., 21, 26.
37. Ibid., 31–34.
38. The World Bank, *The East Asian Economic Miracle*, 5–12; Gerald M. Meier and James E. Rauch, *Leading Issues in Economic Development,* 7th edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 37–40; Sen,

Development as Freedom, 150; Solomon, *The Transformation of the World Economy*, 139–40.

39. World Bank, *The East Asian Economic Miracle*, 5–6, 9; Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 4, 92.
40. Denoon, *Real Reciprocity*, 58.
41. Ibid., 60.
42. Ibid., 61–62.
43. Ibid., 63.
44. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents,* 10.
45. Ibid., 94.
46. World Bank, *The East Asian Economic Miracle*, 6–7.
47. Meier and Rauch, *Leading Issues in Economic Development*, 37; Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 150 .
48. Meier and Rauch, *Leading Issues in Economic Development.*, 37.
49. Ibid., 41.
50. World Bank, *The East Asian Economic Miracle*, 9; Meier and Rauch, *Leading Issues in Economic Development*, 38–39. Both the World Bank and Meier and Rauch argue that geographical and historical/cultural factors are only aspects of the story. For example, North Korea and the Philippines followed different policies and failed to grow like the HPAEs.
51. Meier and Rauch, *Leading Issues in Economic Development*, 38–39.
52. Kenwood and Loughead, *The Growth of the International Economy*, 338.
53. Denoon, *Real Reciprocity*, 23–24.
54. Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 42.
55. Ibid., 45.
56. Ibid., 91.
57. Freund, "Africa in the Long Twentieth Century," 106.
58. Fwatshak, *African Entrepreneurship in Jos, Central Nigeria, 1902–1985* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2011), chapters five to seven.
59. Denoon, *Real Reciprocity*, 10.
60. Ibid., 1.
61. Ibid., 13.
62. Ibid., 35–36.
63. Solomon, *The Transformation of the World Economy*, 141–43.
64. Ibid., 144.
65. Ibid., 146.
66. Myrdal, *The Asian Drama*, 387–88.
67. Ibid., 391.
68. Arjun Makhijani, "Economic Apartheid in the New World Order," in *Altered States*, 108.
69. Denoon, *Real Reciprocity*, 1.

70. Ibid., 50–51.
71. Ibid., 10.
72. O'Brien and Williams, *Global Political Economy*, 115.
73. Denoon, *Real Reciprocity*, 43–46, 64.
74. Ibid., 33–34.
75. Ibid., 64.
76. Ibid., 4.
77. Ibid., 6–8.
78. Ibid., 259.
79. Ibid., 257.
80. Lance Van Sittert, "Imperialism in Africa," in *The Great Divergence*, 125–26.
81. Adebayo Oyebade, "Radical Nationalism and Wars of Liberation," in *Africa Vol. 4; The End of Colonial Rule: Nationalism and Decolonization*, edited by Toyin Falola (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 77–79; Ottaway, "The Soviet Union and Africa," 229–31, 234–35; Edmund Abaka, "Portuguese Africa," in *Africa Vol. 4; The End of Colonial Rule*, 379, 393–94.
82. Pletushkov et al., 233.
83. Akanmu G. Adebayo, "West Africa," in *Africa Vol. 4; The End of Colonial Rule*, 357.
84. Pletushkov et al., *The Soviet Union*, 228–33.
85. Marcus Raskin, "Coming in from the Cold? The CIA after the Collapse of the Soviet Union," in *Altered States: A Reader in the New World Order* (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1993), 76–77.
86. Ottaway, "The Soviet Union and Africa," 234; Abaka, "Portuguese Africa," 379, 393–94.
87. John Ravenhill, "Africa and Europe: The Dilution of a Special Relationship," in *Africa in World Politics*, 190.
88. Funso Afolayan, "Southern African States, 1939 to Independence," in *Africa Vol. 4; The End of Colonial Rule*, edited by Falola, 423.
89. Afolayan, "South Africa," 455.
90. Ravenhill, "Africa and Europe," 191–93.
91. Abaka, "North Africa," 335–36; Ottaway, "The Soviet Union and Africa," 230–31.
92. O'Brien and Williams, *Global Political Economy*, 115.
93. Herbst, "The United States and Africa," 163.
94. Ottaway, "The Soviet Union and Africa," 236–38; Jeffrey Herbst, "The United States and Africa," 163.
95. Ottaway, "The Soviet Union and Africa," 238–39.
96. Afolayan, "Southern Africa States," 421–22; Jeffrey Herbst, "The United States and Africa," 163.
97. Ravenhill, "Africa and Europe," 182, 187–90.
98. Ravenhill, "Africa and Europe," 196–99.
99. Herbst, "The United States and Africa," 179–81, 186.

100. Ibid., 165.
101. Fwatshak, "The AGOA and Nigeria's Non-Oil Exports." *The Nigerian Journal of Economic History*, nos 7&8 (June 2005): 135–53; also in the *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 17 (2007/2008): 151–68
102. Kenwood and Loughead, *The Growth of the International Economy*, 329–30.
103. Ibid., 259.
104. Ibid., 261.
105. Ibid., 257.
106. Freund, "Africa in the Long Twentieth Century," 106.
107. Ottaway, "The Soviet Union and Africa," 233.
108. Kenwood and Loughead, *The Growth of the International Economy*, 329–30.
109. Ottaway, "The Soviet Union and Africa," 233–34.
110. Herbst, "The United States and Africa," 164.
111. Ravenhill, "Africa and Europe," 182, 187–90.
112. Ibid., 182, 187.
113. Callaghy, "Africa in the World Economy," 44; Onimode, *A Political Economy,* 288.
114. Herbst, "The United States and Africa," 164.
115. Ravenhill, "Africa and Europe," 182, 187–90.
116. Ibid., 183.
117. Ibid., 191–96.
118. Ibid., 190.
119. Makhijani, "Economic Apartheid in the New World Order," 110–11.
120. Ottaway, "The Soviet Union and Africa," 233, 229.
121. Ibid., 234–35.
122. Sittert, "Imperialism in Africa," 122.
123. Ravenhill, "Africa and Europe," 181.
124. Ibid., 181, 191–96.
125. O'Brien and Williams, *Global Political Economy*, 115.
126. Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 119.
127. http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/spiegel/0,1518, druck-363663,00.html. Accessed February 19, 2010.
128. Ottaway, "The Soviet Union and Africa," 233.
129. Clovis Maksound, "Redefining Non-Alignment," 32.
130. Ibid., 231; Saheed A. Adejumobi, "Neocolonialism," in *Africa Vol. 4; The End of Colonial Rule*, 491–92; Herbst, "The United States and Africa," 163.
131. Ottaway, "The Soviet Union and Africa," 231.
132. Ottaway, "The Soviet Union and Africa," 228, 234–39.
133. Herbst, "The United States and Africa," 232.
134. Ibid., 232; 236–37.

135. Adejumobi, "Neocolonialism," 491–92.
136. Ibid., 237.
137. Myrdal, *The Asian Drama*, 376–79; 391–95.
138. Ottaway, "The Soviet Union and Africa," 230.
139. Ibid., 32–33.
140. Maksound, "Redefining Non-Alignment," 31.
141. Ibid., 33.
142. Ibid., 33.
143. Sittert, "Imperialism in Africa," 116.
144. Ibid., 125.
145. Adejumobi, "Neocolonialism," 491–92.
146. Sittert, "Imperialism in Africa," 129.
147. Myrdal, *The Asian Drama*, 726–28.
148. Ibid., 739.
149. Freund, "Africa in the Long Twentieth Century," 109.
150. Harbeson and Rothchild, "Africa in Post-Cold War International Politics: Changing Agendas," in *Africa in World Politics*, 5.
151. Ottaway, "The Soviet Union and Africa," 230.

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Transformational Moments in Economies and Cultures

Africa's Debt Burden and the HIPC Initiative: Cameroon, from Challenges to Opportunity

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INTRODUCTION

Famine, drought, ethnic and regional conflicts, authoritarian rule, mismanagement, embezzlement of government funds, and corruption are just a few of the problems that plagued the continent of Africa in the postindependence/postcolonial period. These problems have been exacerbated by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, which has ravaged many countries in the continent, particularly in the Sub-Saharan region. Along with AIDS, Africa's excessive debt crisis has perhaps had the greatest impact on the political, economic, developmental, and social psyche of Africa today.[1] The causes of Africa's debt crisis are numerous, complex, and profound. The burden of debt has had deleterious effects in most countries, including a decline in the quality of life, a negative impact on investments by governments in physical and social infrastructure, an unintentional outcome of capital flight, and subordination of the interest and well-being of Africans to those of wealthy countries and institutions, as well as limits on private investments. Furthermore, the external debt burden has prevented many countries on the continent from achieving or reaching their Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. The severity of Africa's debt crisis convinced multilateral and bilateral creditors (international financial institutions) and governments in industrialized countries to propose and implement economic recovery measures

designed to ameliorate the continent's crumbling economies and debt problems.

This chapter will examine and explain the genesis, dimensions, and countenance of Africa's external debt problems, as well as discuss the various mechanisms proposed by multilateral and bilateral creditors to deal with the continent's debt overhang dilemma. Similarly, the chapter will examine arguments in support of and in opposition to debt cancellation for African and other developing countries. Particular focus will be on Cameroon, its struggles with an external debt burden, and steps taken to wane the country from the debt trap. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of Cameroon's performance under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (EHIPC) initiative.

Background

The 1960s and early 1970s, according to most scholars, observers, and practitioners of African politics, were the continent's "best period." Not only did most countries gain their independence from colonial rule, but many experienced robust economic growth, spurred by high demand for commodities by industrialized countries after Second World War. Africa's economic "honeymoon" was unfortunately shortlived as many factors worked to undermine continued growth and prosperity. In the middle of the 1970s, many African governments started experiencing economic distress resulting from the quadrupling of oil prices by the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Faced with looming current account deficits, many African governments resorted to import controls, which further exacerbated the problem, creating shortages in consumer goods as well as intermediate capital goods, and this encouraged inflation while slowing down economic activity.[2] A number of factors, both domestic and international, contributed to Africa's massive debt in the 1980s and beyond, including misaligned exchange rates (overvaluation), excessive budget deficits, economic mismanagement, deteriorating terms of trade, rising interest rates, global oil shocks, and liberal lending policies of international commercial banks.[3] Cognizant of the magnitude and impact of Africa's debts on growth and development, some initial debt relief mechanisms were proposed by multilateral and bilateral institutions to deal with this crisis. Unfortunately, these "quick fix" solutions were inadequate and too simplistic to address Africa's complex debt problem.

Causes of Africa's Debt

The literature on the causes of Africa's debt crisis has been documented extensively elsewhere and need not be repeated here. However, two contrasting perspectives will highlight the causes of the debt crisis to give us context. The first perspective focuses on internal or endogenous factors, and the second on external or exogenous factors. Western regimes and creditors blame Africa's excessive debt to internal forces, including poor governance, gluttonous and corrupt political leaders, long-drawn-out civil conflicts, the absence of democratic checks and balances on government borrowing and spending, uncontrolled population growth, and the pursuit of economic policies aimed at enriching the elites to the disadvantage of the masses. While acknowledging that these factors have irrefutably contributed to Africa's economic malaise and the debt problems, the Forum on Debt and Development (FONDAD) argues that Africa's debt problems have been impaired by several other reasons, including external circumstances. The Dutch organization has identified some external factors that contributed to Africa's debt difficulties as follows: (1) The thoughtless and irresponsible over-lending by private and official creditors during the commodity boom period in the 1970s, without which irresponsible over-borrowing by African governments would not have occurred. (2) Second, the persistence of negative real interest rates during most of the 1970s in global financial markets which caused lenient monetary and fiscal policies in the industrialized countries which made it economically rational for developing and African countries to borrow externally (rather than save or attract equity investment) for development and consumption. (3) The emergence of high, positive real interest rates throughout the 1980s compounded Africa's debt servicing and debt accumulation burdens. (4) Over-reliance on external savings by African governments (1979–83), and defiance by African leaders to increase domestic savings and cut domestic consumption added to the continent's debt load. (5) Africa's debt also ballooned in the 1980s as a result of unpredictable exchange rates. During this period, the U.S. dollar depreciated between 1985 and 1990 resulting in increase in dollar value of Africa's outstanding debts, over a half of which were denominated in currencies or composites which appreciated against the U.S. dollar. (6) Recurrent official and private rescheduling of Africa's debt by Western creditors, including international financial institutions. These debt rescheduling were often on punitive terms in the early years of the debt crisis. This resulted in an increase in the outstanding level of debt while providing temporary, but totally insufficient cash-flow relief. (7) Poor and impractical advice provided by experts from International Financial Institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, African Development Bank) and official creditors on the extent of debt relief African governments needed

to negotiate and how they might adjust. (8) Buildup of arrears which creditors have tolerated to a point of doing more damage to restoring disciplined debtor-creditor relationships than if more sensible action to reduce debt and debt service burdens had been taken by them in the first place. (9) Protectionist policies in the industrialized market for agricultural products and low technology manufactures made it difficult for African countries to diversify and increase exports to hard currency markets, hence making it especially difficult for African countries to earn their way out of the debt trap. (10) Finally, a prolonged and devastating drought between 1984–88, severely impaired Africa's agricultural and cash crop production and resulted in extensive damage to output and to the financial structure of Africa's fragile economies.[4]

With excessive cash from sales of oil ("petrodollars"), many Western commercial banks were ready to issue loans to African and other developing countries without scrutinizing loan requests or querying borrower countries how the loans were to be utilized. These banks lavishly lent their windfall capital to African governments on the assumption that governments would not default on the loans.[5]

The first and second oil price hikes, in 1973 and 1979, respectively, sparked off global inflation in America and other industrialized economies. A major corollary of this global nuisance was that it forced policy makers in the United States to embrace unyielding monetary policies to curb inflation at home. Unfortunately, this strategy had a boomerang effect, contributing to both domestic (US) and global recession. For African governments, however, it meant significant declines in export volumes and prices/revenue for key commodities. Furthermore, African countries had to contend with discriminatory trade practices in the industrialized world, especially in Europe, which imposed barriers to African products entering into their markets.[6] Faced with these insurmountable challenges, most governments in Africa sought alternative ways to supplement their depleting revenue reserves. Their preferred choice was to borrow from multilateral and bilateral institutions, as well as from governments in industrialized countries, whose lending terms were satisfactory to African leaders. These institutions and governments allowed African governments to borrow at market interest rates and concessional terms with longer maturities.[7] African leaders were further lured to borrow money to meet the economic development needs of their citizens as well as overcome the escalating costs of fuel. As Michael Todaro suggests, some of these loans were not wisely spent on implementing specific development projects or even on expanding imports of capital

goods.[8] Although spike in oil prices was the catalyst behind Africa's debt problems, other pertinent factors included higher interest rates in 1980–1982, declining export prices and volumes associated with the global recession in 1981–1982, problems with domestic economic management, and adverse psychological shifts in the credit markets.[9] The relative ease with which African leaders obtained loans from Western financial institutions (with no conditions or guideline for use or its ability to repay the debt) encouraged financial irresponsibility on the part of both creditors and debtors.[10]

In the 1970s, most of Africa's external debt (76%) was owed to multilateral official creditors such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the African Development Bank. These loans were issued to African and other developing countries at below the prevailing market rate and with longer repayment periods. By 1987, however, the portion of Africa's debt held by official creditors fell to 56.7 percent. The implication of this drop was significant for two reasons: (1) interest rates for official and private lenders leapfrogged from 3.7 percent to 10 percent, a net increase of 172 percent, and (2) the period of maturity for these loans was reduced from 6.7 years in 1970 to 4 years in 1987, representing a net loss of 35 percent.[11]

Between 1970 and 2003, African governments received a total of US $540 billion in loans from multilateral and bilateral sources as well as from private sources and paid back a total of US $580 billion in debt servicing. Despite efforts by African governments to service their debt, the continent's external debt burden still remained at US $330 billion.[12] A perfunctory glimpse at Sub-Saharan Africa's debt situation reveals similar trends. Between 1970 and 2002, Sub-Saharan Africa received US $294 billion in loan payout and made $268 billion in debt service. The region is still saddled with a debt stock of US $210 billion.[13] In the 1980s, the ratio of foreign debt to Africa's GNP jumped from 51 percent in 1982 to 100 percent in 1992.[14] In the 1990s, Africa's debt increased to four times relative to its export income,[15] and most countries were not able to generate the requisite resources to meet their repayment obligations. Africa contributes only 5 percent to the world's income, but its debt burden is twice that of any other country in the world, accounting for over 11 percent of the debt owed by developing countries.[16]

Arguments for and against Debt Repayment

The debate about repaying loans owed by African governments to their creditors has been intense and forceful. Opponents of debt

forgiveness or cancellation, especially commercial banks, argue that debt cancellation or reduction "for Africa on the scale necessary—no matter how justified it might be—would serve as a precedent for similar actions taken else and thus weaken the bargaining position of banks exerting pressure to maintain debt service flows from the developing world at unrealistically high levels."[17] Creditor governments and members of the international financial institutions (IFIs) also argue that debt reduction would further exacerbate "moral hazard" by rewarding bad policies and behavior on the part of debtors.[18] Other arguments made against debt reduction or cancellation is that it would take off the pressure necessary for African leaders and their governments to follow a disciplined approach to governance and resource management. Critics of debt cancellation also maintain that debt cancellation would benefit not the citizens who desperately need help but rather fill the pockets of corrupt African leaders and their cronies in the civil service.

Ann-Louise Colgan of Africa Action argues that Africa's debt should be considered "illegitimate debt" in light of how these debts were incurred by African leaders.[19] The illegitimacy of Africa's debt, according to Colgan, is based on the following tenets: (1) debts contracted by dictatorships or repressive regimes, and used to strengthen the hold of these regimes, are illegitimate; (2) debts contracted by formally democratic but corrupt governments, which were stolen by leaders or other senior officials of the government—"stolen wealth"—are illegitimate; (3) debts contracted and used for improperly designed projects and programs, particularly those commissioned by the World Bank and the IMF, are illegitimate; (4) debts that bloated as a result of high interest rates and other conditions imposed by lenders/creditor governments and banking institutions are illegitimate; (5) debts that cannot be serviced without depriving a country's people of basic necessities of life are illegitimate.[20]

Initial Efforts to Deal with Africa's Debt Problems

Recognizing the adverse impact of the debt burden on Africa's growth and capacity to develop in the future, the international community and bilateral and multilateral creditors proposed various initiatives aimed at alleviating the debt burden of the most vulnerable countries on the continent. The first step toward this goal was debt forgiveness. Between 1987 and 1989, the total debt forgiven or transfigured for 32 low-income Sub-Saharan African countries was US $1.6 billion

and US $206 million for 12 middle-income countries.[21] This modest initiative was followed by an announcement by some creditor countries of their intent to cancel Official Development Assistance (ODA) debts owed by low-income countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1985, the Paris Club slackened the terms governing debt rescheduling for acutely indebted countries of Africa. Similarly, during the Group of Seven (G-7) annual summit in Toronto, Canada, in 1988, creditor countries were given the latitude to partially write off debts, lengthen repayment periods, and also consideration of concessional interest rates on low-income countries. Although Toronto was hailed as a major breakthrough in the debt relief initiative, critics argue that it did not go far enough in solving the debt morass of vulnerable Sub-Saharan African countries. Mindful of the deficiency of the Toronto initiative, the World Bank and some creditor nations proposed even bolder strategies to combat the debt overhang of Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank called on "creditor nations to either cancel one-third of the principal payments or reduce the interest rates by one third, rather than opting for the extension of maturities."[22] In September 1990, during the Second United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the Dutch government appealed to other creditor countries for the cancellation of all official bilateral debts owed by LDCs, including low-income countries overstretched by debt. In return for debt cancellation, debt-strapped countries would implement sturdy economic reforms proposed by the IMF.

Similarly, during the Commonwealth Finance Ministers' meeting in Trinidad in 1990, the United Kingdom offered a new proposal aimed at addressing the debt situation of LDCs. The British proposal was designed to modify the terms of the Toronto agreement of debt rescheduling by the Paris Club creditors. The proposal contained four key targets. First, it called for a two-thirds increase in the amount written off, instead of the one-third proposed by the Toronto terms. Second, it called for lengthening the period of repayment of loans from 14 years to 24 years. Third, it proposed "that the total debt stock should be dealt with as a single long-term operation; the Paris Club should not just reschedule one year's worth of maturities at a time." Fourth, it stated that interest payments in the first five years should be capitalized and payments made in stages, with increased payments of principal and interest as export capacity of debtor country's economy grew.[23]

In 1990, United Nations Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar's personal representative on debt called on creditor nations to cancel

90 percent of the bilateral debt service of poor countries and further convert the remainder to highly concessional long-term loans.[24] The acuteness of Africa's debt crisis forced African leaders to convene an Extraordinary Summit in 1987 to discuss the continent's external debt crisis. At this Summit, leaders "adopted a Declaration outlining comprehensive proposals to deal with the debt situation."[25] Among other things, leaders proposed holding an international conference on Africa's external debt. Not surprising, this proposal was strongly dismissed by Africa's creditors. In 1988, the African Development Bank called for refinancing of Africa's debt and the conversion of the continent's outstanding stock of debt, excluding concessional and multilateral debt, into a long-term security of at least 20 years' maturity, with a fixed interest rate set below the prevailing market levels.[26] Another major proposal aimed at dealing with Africa's debt problem was the Brady Initiative. Proposed in 1988, the Initiative focused on debt and debt service reduction. The Brady Initiative was designed to deal with debts owed to commercial banks. However, commercial bank debts constitute only a small percentage (10%) of the total debt stocks owed by African countries to creditors. Furthermore, this initiative only affected a small number of middle-income countries in Africa.[27] In addition to the above measures, multilateral financial institutions proposed other strategies designed to alleviate the debt servicing load of poor African countries. One such strategy was to avoid arrears on multilateral debts. The World Bank, for instance, set aside 10 percent of repayments to International Development Association (IDA) to assist qualified debtor countries pay the interest on debts owed to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). On its part, IMF marshaled additional resources from creditor countries through support groups to assist African countries that owe arrears to the IMF, which are willing to adopt corrective measures.[28]

The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative

Recognizing that past attempts at restructuring or rescheduling Africa's debt had been unsuccessful in resolving the continent's debt overhang, multilateral, bilateral, and other creditors sought new alternatives to the continent's debt dilemma. In 1996, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative was launched by the Bretton Woods Institutions to alleviate the external debt situation of neediest/poorest countries of the world. This initiative was an assurance by "the international financial community to act together

to alleviate the external debt situation of the neediest countries."[29] HIPC was the first far-reaching debt relief initiative launched by creditors in the West, bringing together multilateral, bilateral, and private creditors under the same umbrella to tackle developing country's debt problems. The goal of "the HIPC Initiative was to reduce to 'sustainable levels,' the debt burden of poor countries that demonstrate sound economic and social policy reforms, and thereby provide lasting solution to the debt crisis."[30] At inception, the Bretton Woods Institutions selected 41 countries as potentially eligible for HIPC debt relief assistance. Of the 41 countries chosen, 33 were from Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the World Bank, the total debt stock of these highly indebted impoverished countries amounted to approximately US $200 billion in 1997.[31] It should be pointed out that 85 percent of HIPC long-term debt is owed to public lenders such as multilateral and bilateral creditors, and a tiny fraction (just 3.7%) is owed to rich Western creditors such as the United States.[32] To qualify for debt restructuring under the HIPC initiative, countries had to satisfy three conditions: (1) a country had to be eligible for concessional loans from the IDA of the World Bank and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF, renamed Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility) of the IMF; (2) a country's debt burden had to be unsustainable to meet the threshold for qualification; and (3) the debtor country must seek bilateral forgiveness of ODA.

Dissatisfied with the pace of progress made by debt-stricken countries under the original HIPC initiative, leaders of the G-8 at a meeting in Cologne, Germany, in September 1999 discussed new ways of dealing with the excessive external debt burden of poor countries. This meeting resulted in the modification of the original HIPC debt relief initiative. The revision resulted in the creation of the EHIPC, also known as HIPC II. G-8 leaders hoped that HIPC II would benefit close to 40 debt-stricken low-income countries in the world, including Sub-Saharan African countries. Supporters of HIPC II believe the initiative will ascertain a greater link between debt relief and the MDGs. A major component of HIPC II was conjoining debt relief with poverty reduction. This initiative required debtor governments to construct a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper as a condition to their being eligible for HIPC II relief.[33] By early 2001, a total of 22 LDCs had reached their decision points, including 18 in Sub-Saharan Africa—Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Cameroon, Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Benin, Zambia, Niger, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Guinea, Madagascar, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe.

In July 2005, G-8 leaders met in Gleneagles, Scotland, and launched the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). This initiative is viewed by many as a major breakthrough in debt relief efforts. Under this arrangement, countries that had reached or would ultimately reach the completion point under the EHIPCor HIPC II would receive a total debt write-off (100% debt cancellation) from three key creditors: the IMF, the IDA, and the African Development Bank Fund, an arm of the African Development Bank. In 2006, executive board members of these three multilateral institutions approved 17 countries that had reached the postcompletion point with MDRI.[34]

Cost of the Debt Crisis

The upsurge of the debt crisis has had colossal consequences for Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the World Bank, the most devastating effect of the debt crisis was, and continues to be, the significant outflow of capital to finance the debt. The World Bank notes that since 1982 the highly indebted countries received about 2 percent of their GNP per year in resources from industrialized countries, and since then, African governments have transferred double this percentage to Western institutions and governments.[35] This capital hemorrhage has severely limited prospects for economic growth in the developing world and seriously skewed the patterns of economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa.[36] Populations in Sub-Saharan Africa are worse off economically as a result of the debt crisis as governments have to export more of their products (commodities) in order to maintain current levels of imports. The debt burden has no doubt affected the quality of life in Africa, as summarized by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development:

> Per capita consumption in the highly-indebted countries in 1987, as measured by national accounts statistics, was no longer higher than in the late 1970s; if terms of trade losses are taken into account, there was a decline. Per capita investment has also fallen drastically, by about 40 percent between 1980 and 1987. It declined steeply during 1982–83, but far from recovering subsequently, it has continued to fall.[37]

The predicament is made even stacker by Jeffrey Sachs in his assessment of Latin America:

> As for the debtor countries, many have fallen into the deepest economic crisis in their histories. Between 1981 and 1988, real per capita

income declined in absolute terms in almost every country in South America and the developing world. Many countries' living standards have fallen to levels of the 1950s and 1960s—A decade of development has been wiped out throughout the debtor world.[38]

The debt crisis and subsequent burden on Africa also has a self-buttressing force. Resources that could have been used to build schools and hospitals and construct farm-to-market roads are now being diverted to service debts owed to industrialized countries. As a consequence, fewer children will survive to their first birthdays, and the ones that survive will have fewer opportunities and challenging circumstances ahead of them. Another major cost of the debt crisis, which is directly tied to the decline in living standards in Africa, is the increased incidence of political violence. The imposition of austerity measures by the IMF and other developing countries contributed to violent political protests and demonstrations in Africa, which resulted in the killing of thousands in the continent. Political instability may make it more difficult for emerging democratic regimes to thrive, and popular pressure may lead to regimes, hostile to market economies, thus setting the stage for dramatic confrontation between debtor countries and external agencies that set the terms for debt rescheduling or alleviation.

Another major political consequence of the debt crisis is that political violence may affect national security issues in the region. It may provoke violence and subsequent instability in neighboring states. The debt crisis also resulted in massive exodus of skilled Africans in key fields such as health, engineering, management, and education to seek greater opportunities in the West, particularly in the United States and Europe. Besides the migration of talented Africans from the continent, the debt crisis also contributed to capital flight in many countries. Billions of dollars have been siphoned from Africa to financial institutions in developed countries, creating liquidity problems. A final cost of the debt crisis in Africa and other developing countries is its impact on developed countries, particularly the United States. As James Robinson observes, "increasing poverty in the developing countries leads to a reduction of economic growth in the developed countries." Robinson argues that as debtor countries have been forced to undergo dramatic cuts in imports in order to increase the foreign exchange earnings needed to pay pack their debts, it has affected the developed countries measurably,[39] since they are importing less from the developed countries.

Cameroon: From Challenges to Opportunity

Following nearly two decades of robust and sustained economic growth, the economy of Cameroon was showcased as a model to be emulated by other countries in Africa.

Although Cameroon's impact on the world economy is miniscule regionally, the country is regarded as an economic powerhouse in the Central African Economic and Monetary Zone (CEMAC). As a regional economic hegemonic power, Cameroon accounts for more than half the GDP of CEMAC countries and serves as a major market and gateway for landlocked countries such as Chad and the Central African Republic. After independence, Cameroon adopted protectionist trade policies designed to protect infant industries and encourage industrial development. To accomplish these goals, the country utilized various mechanisms/tools, including selective taxes, tax exemptions, price controls, tariff barriers, and import restrictions.[40] Between 1984 and 1988, the terms of trade for Cameroon fell sharply, from 14 percent of GDP in 1984/1985 to about 6 percent of GDP in 1987/1988. In addition, prices for the country's major exports dropped significantly—oil by 65 percent, cocoa by 25 percent, coffee by 11 percent, and rubber by 20 percent.[41] These economic devastations resulted in a 47 percent drop in the country's global terms of trade, correspondingly affecting the country's balance of payments. As Dorothy Agbor notes, Cameroon's economic problems were a major cause of its deficit, which stood at 9 percent of GDP in 1986/1987. From independence until 1975, when oil was discovered, Cameroon's economy was dominated by agriculture. Indeed, 70 percent of the country's export earnings came from the agricultural sector. Cameroon's economic success was due to two factors: political stability and an interventionist economic policy. From 1963 to 1977, Cameroon experienced phenomenal economic growth, with real GDP growth averaging about 6 percent per year. This growth was spurred by a high demand for commodities, especially the country's two major export crops, cocoa and coffee, and favorable terms of trade.

In 1978, however, when oil production began, the president of the Republic, Ahmadou Ahidjo, warned that despite discovery of oil, Cameroonians should not neglect agriculture, which has served as a fortress of prosperity in the country. He echoed his concern thus: "before oil there was agriculture and after oil, there will be agriculture." In essence, agriculture would remain the mainstay of Cameroon's economy. The country's economy shifted in full gear

toward oil production as commodity prices declined further, prodded, by the recession in the industrialized countries. In 1982, the economy was buttressed by the oil boom, which increased export earnings for the country. During this period, the growth rate of the economy averaged approximately 8.8 percent, with a per capita income of US $880, one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1978 and 1986, government revenues increased to 21 percent, compared to 17 percent between 1965 and 1977. With increase in revenue, government expenditures in public works projects accelerated. The government created parastatals organizations, such as the National Produce Marketing Board (NPMB), National Fund for Rural Development (FONADER), Cameroon Airlines, National Railways, etc., using government subsidies.

Genesis of Cameroon's External Debt

Between 1975 and 1995, the structure of Cameroon's external debt varied significantly. Initially, the country's debt was owed to multilateral institutions and private sector creditors with a longer maturity period. However, this arrangement was altered, shifting the debt to bilateral creditors and shortened maturity period. The debt owed to bilateral and multilateral institutions in 1975 was slightly under 40 percent of total public and publicly guaranteed debt.[42] Private creditors during the same period were responsible for just 22 percent of the country's debt. By 1995, however, the portion of Cameroon's bilateral debt had leapfrogged to 60 percent, with slightly more than one-third of this owed to France, while multilateral debt had dropped to 20 percent.[43] From 1984 to1995, Cameroon witnessed many daunting challenges, which stifled further growth in the economy. These challenges included (1) a continued decline in commodity prices caused by new entrants into the market place (Southeast Asian suppliers). The new competitors used more advanced technology compared with farmers in Cameroon. The initial response by government officials was to leave producer prices unchanged while the government absorbed losses incurred by the marketing board through the budget; (2) reduction in oil production; (3) rise in the real exchange rate; (4) an overvalued currency; (5) a failed military coup; (6) policy slippages; (7) rapid population growth (at a rate of 3% per year); (8) devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994; (9) rent seeking; and (10) deterioration of the terms of trade. It should be pointed out that as these factors caused growth in debt and exports to digress, Cameroon's debt stocks swelled measurably, while the nominal value

of her exports tumbled. The country's debt-to-export ratio[44] soared from 120 percent in 1985 to 340 percent in 1995, while its debt-to service ratio grew from 20 percent in 1985 to 75 percent in 1995, then slipped back to 60 percent in 1994.

In 1988, Cameroon's economic woes continued with deteriorating macroeconomic imbalances caused by worsening terms of trade, loss of external competitiveness, and gross mismanagement from public officials, as well as rapid depreciation of the dollar vis-à-vis the French franc, resulting in 45 percent deterioration in the country's terms of trade in 1987/1988. Furthermore, the squabble between the former president, Ahidjo, and his predecessor, Paul Biya, (1982–1984) contributed immensely to the country's economic despair.[45] In April 1984, members of the Republican Guard staged a military coup against President Biya. Although the coup attempt was unsuccessful, its impact on the economy was far-reaching. Cameroon's economy faced another major setback following the hotly disputed October 1992 presidential election. The postelection struggle between the incumbent and the challenger led to widespread disruption, including strikes, demonstrations, and work stoppages in the public and private sectors. Furthermore, the opposition's call for citizens to cease from paying taxes added a crippling blow on an already distressed economy. These two incidences—the failed coup and the contested election and its aftermath—caused investors to be apprehensive of investing in Cameroon and frightened local business people who withdrew their capital from the banking system, leaving the banks with little liquidity. These problems, without doubt, impeded the government from fulfilling its financial obligations to its creditors. Indeed, figures show that investment in Cameroon plummeted by more than 70 percent between 1985/1986 and 1992/1993 when these two major crises occurred.[46]

Faced with these insurmountable financial difficulties, the Bretton Woods Institutions prescribed the "dreadful" Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) for Cameroon. "Adjustment," in macroeconomics, refers to the adoption of fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies to accomplish external stability.[47] From the point of view of Alejandro Diaz, macroeconomic instability in Cameroon was caused by an increase in foreign indebtedness, bank jitters, and failures.[48] The key features of IMF-sponsored SAP include:

1. Demand restraint, which includes reduction in government expenditure, a ceiling on credit expansion, increased taxation, and wage restraint.

2. Switching of resources to tradables by using policy instruments like devaluation.
3. Policies emphasizing improvements of the medium- and long-term efficiency of the economy, which includes measures like financial reform and import liberalization.[49]

P. Streeten offers three reasons why Cameroon and other developing countries had to implement SAP:

1. Reduction or elimination of balance-of-payment deficit
2. Resumption of higher rates of economic growth
3. Achievement of structural changes that would prevent future payments and stabilization problems[50]

In accord with IMF conditionalities, the government of Cameroon slashed salaries of civil servants by 15 percent in January 1993, and in November of same year, salaries were further reduced by 32 percent. In January 1994, a 50 percent downward realignment of the parity of the CFA franc was in effect. This action by the government resulted in a 17 percent rise in inflation, and the cost of living rose by 60 percent.[51] Cameroon abandoned the first three adjustment programs from 1988 through 1995 due to domestic pressures and serious policy slippages.[52]

In 1994, the CFA franc was devalued, and CEMAC countries agreed to new trade and fiscal codes. The government further embarked on austerity measures, including privatization of state-owned enterprises, reorganizing the financial and banking systems, and liberalization of domestic prices and interest rate. Painful as these policies were, they have contributed immensely to stabilizing the economy of the country. Cameroon's output increased steadily and its external competitiveness re-established.

Structure of Cameroon's External Debt

Three major elements constitute Cameroon's external debt and include:

Bilateral Loans

Cameroon's bilateral debt surged from the 1980s. According to the World Bank, the country's debt increased from US$759 million in 1980 to US$5,644 million in 1997. The ratio of bilateral debt

burden to debt burden increased from 30 percent in 1980 to more than 60 percent in 1997.[53]

Multilateral Loans

Contracted from various international organizations such as IBRD, IMF, Asian Development Bank, and IDA, these loans have also experienced a steady increase in absolute terms. However, the ratio of multilateral loans to total loans experienced an unsteady trend during the period 1980–1997.

Commercial Private Bank Loans

Private banks used to constitute an important source of funding for Cameroons' development projects. During 1980–1990, in absolute terms, private debt increased from US\$1,273 million to US\$2,112 million. But between 1993 and 1997, there was a decline in private debt from US\$2,017 million to US\$777 million. This decline came about as a result of the dire financial crisis private commercial banks in Cameroon were facing during this period.

Early Attempts at Containing Cameroon's Public Debt

To deal with Cameroon's spiraling debt problem, the government established an autonomous agency, the *Caisse Autonome d' Amortissement* (CAA), to manage the country's public debt. This agency was charged with the following responsibilities: managing the public and publicly guaranteed external debt and public domestic debt; safekeeping all loan agreements and related documents; ensuring timely disbursements of negotiated loans and making regular debt service payments; participating in the renegotiation of debt agreements with official and commercial creditors; and providing regular statistics on the external and domestic debt for official publications. This agency participates in defining medium-term macroeconomic policy with other governmental agencies. However, the agency lacks adequate internal and external control mechanisms to verify debt aggregates with creditors' statements on a regular basis. To exert its influence even more, it has been suggested that the agency maintain frequent contacts with all creditors. Disbursement of funds or cancellations should be properly recorded; debt reports and repayments should be made through self-directed bank accounts; and the agency should maintain regular audits.

Cameroon and the HIPC Initiative

On October 16, 2000, the executive directors of the IDA and the IMF concurred that Cameroon had met all the benchmarks for the decision point under HIPC II. Cameroon subsequently received a total of "US$1.26 billion of total debt relief assistance in end-1999 net present value (NPV) terms. The debt relief was calculated to bring the NPV of debt to the equivalent of 150 percent of exports based on prices at the end of June 1999."[54] Similarly, the boards of directors of the IDA and the IMF granted Cameroon interim debt relief until it reached the floating completion point. Other multilateral institutions such as the African Development Bank, the European Union, and the Paris Club group of creditors followed suit (through flow rescheduling on Cologne terms).[55] This debt relief translates to 25 percent in the nominal value of the debt service over time.[56] Cameroon became the fifteenth regional member country to reach the completion point under HIPC II. As such, the boards of directors of the IMF and the World Bank approved approximately US $1.27 billion[57] of debt relief in the end-1999 NPV terms, equivalent to 27 percent reduction of Cameroon's debt relief (in NPV terms) after traditional debt relief.[58] In accordance with the requirements under the enhanced HIPC framework, Cameroon had to satisfy six fundamental stipulations, including:

> (i) preparation of a full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and satisfactory implementation for least one year, (ii) maintain a stable macroeconomic environment, (iii) adequately use budgetary savings from the interim debt service relief, (iv) satisfactorily implement structural reforms supported by the Third Structural Adjustment Credit (SACIII), (v) successfully implement governance and anticorruption instruments, including in the areas of judicial and procurement reforms, budget execution, and the creation of regulatory agencies and (vi) satisfactory implementation of key social reforms, including combating HIV/AIDS.[59]

Outlook for Cameroon's External Debt after Debt Relief

Cameroon's nominal stock of external debt, according to the African Development Bank/African Development Fund, reached US $6.2 billion at the end of 2005, compared with US $7.8 billion at end of 1999. The NPV of Cameroon's external debt at the end of 2005 stood at US $5.7 billion, compared to US $4.7 at the end of June 1999.[60] With full implementation of debt relief from various financial

institutions and creditors under HIPC II, at decision point, the NPV of Cameroon's external debt dropped to US $2.2 billion, corresponding to 61 percent debt-to-export ratio, compared with a decision point projection of 109 percent.[61] It is also speculated that when bilateral debt relief beyond the HIPC initiative is taken into consideration, the NPV of Cameroon's external debt would be US$1.2 billion, representing 31 percent of exports. There is no denying that debt relief provided by multilateral, bilateral, and other creditors will have significant impact on Cameroon's economy and society for years to come. Similarly, as a result of HIPCII, Cameroon's interest payments will drop significantly. According to the World Bank, Cameroon's interest payment in 2011 was US $59,801,000, compared to US $234,307,000 in 1996.[62]

Conclusion

The debt crisis has paralyzed most developing countries in the world, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa. The crisis has extended beyond political boundaries, and its impact has been far-reaching. The debt crisis has not only caused Africa to lag behind other regions in the world in economic growth and human development but also contributed to inequality within countries. The debt crisis should not been seen as the responsibility of borrower countries alone, but rather as a joint effort between borrowers and creditors. Cameroon's debt burden, like in many other African and developing countries, has been a major roadblock to economic growth and the country's capacity to save, invest, or reduce poverty. Similarly, the country's debt overhang has hampered public sector investment and compromised the health-care and human resource development of Cameroonians. Furthermore, the debt crisis has indirectly encouraged brain drain and capital flight, leaving the banking system with less liquidity. Since the implementation of macroeconomic measures under HIPC I and HIPC II, Cameroon's external debt has reduced measurably. The country's external debt service declined from 8.8 percent in 2004 to 6.8 percent in 2005 and dropped to 3.6 percent in 2006. It is projected that the debt service will further decrease to 2.1 percent in 2015.[63] Cameroon has made significant progress on several fronts since reaching the decision point under HIPC II. The IMF and the IDA concluded that significant progress has been made by the government of Cameroon in improving public finance management, strengthening the judicial sector, meeting the triggers for education and health care, and maintaining macroeconomic stability. Cameroon has enjoyed robust

growth in nonoil real GDP and decelerating inflation. Sustainability of Cameroon's long-term debt hinges on continuingly strong macro-economic performance and sound policies. To wane the country from foreign debt, the government needs to maintain a growth average of 5.5 percent, keep inflation low, restrain spending, improve on governance, diversify exports, and adopt prudent borrowing policies.[64] Finally, while acknowledging all the efforts by multilateral, bilateral, and other creditors to assist Africa and Cameroon out of the debt morass, the fact remains that debt cancellation, debt forgiveness, and the extension of maturity period are not a remedy for the continent's debt overhang. Long-term solutions to Africa and Cameroon's debt difficulties should focus on structural impediments such as trade, misguided policies, and good governance.

Notes

1. Virginia Delancey, "The Economies of Africa," in Understanding Contemporary Africa, edited by April A. Gordon and Donald L. Gordon (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 127.
2. Saleh M. Nsouli and Justin B. Zulu, "Adjustment Programs in Africa: The Recent Experience," Occasional Paper No. 34, (Washington, DC: IMF, 1985).
3. S. I. Ajayi, Macroeconomic Approach to External Debt: The Case of Nigeria" Nairobi, African Economics Research Consortium (AERC),
4. Forum on Debt and Development (FONDAD), "From African Debt Revisited: Procrastination or Progress?" The Hague: FONDAD, 1992.
5. Jeffrey Sachs cites Citicorp chairman, Walter Wriston, as justifying the heavy bank activity with the observation that "countries never go bankrupt." "Introduction," in *Developing Country Debt and the World Economy*, edited by Jeffrey D. Sachs, a National Bureau of Economic Research Project Report (Chicago: The Chicago Press, 1989), 8. Sachs also points out Wristons's self-interest in this belief, as international operations accounted for 72 percent of Citicorp's overall earnings in 1976.
6. Naomi Charzan, Peter Lewis, Robert Mortimer, Donald Rothchild, and Stephan John Stedman, *Politics and Societyin Contemporary Africa*, 3rd edn (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 332.
7. Caritas International and CIDSE. "How Did the Debt Crisis come about? What was its Impact on Poor Countries?" http://www.word-hunger.org/global.htm. Accessed March 6, 2007.
8. Michael Todaro, *Economic Development* (London: Longman Publishers, 1997).

9. William R. Cline, *International Debt and the Stability of the World Economy, Policy Analyses, in International Economics*, no. 4 (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1983), 31.

10. Karamo N. M. Sonko, *Debt, Development and Equity in Africa* (New York: University Press of America, 1993), 6.

11. Eboh C. Ezaeni, "An Appraisal of the African Debt Burden." *Africa and the World* 1, no. 2 (1988), 27.

12. Africa Action, "Africa Action Statement on 100% Debt Cancellation for Africa," 2005.

13. United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, "Debt Sustainability: Oasis or Mirage?" (New York: United Nations, 2004), 9.

14. Alternative Information and Development Center, Briefing for the Archbishop of Cape town WHN Ndungane. http://www.aidc.org.za.

15. Jonathan E. Sanford, "Africa's Debt Burden: Proposal for Further Forgiveness," CSIS Africa Notes, October 1996 (in) "Promoting U.S. Relations with Africa," Task Force Report sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, 1998.

16. Jubilee 2000 Africa Campaign. Conference Report, 2001.

17. This type of murky concern about potential portfolio blemishes goes against the bankers' own insistence that each debtor case be treated on its own merits (case-by-case approach). In Africa, the case can clearly be made for most low-income countries that debt reduction on a large scale, with the burden of such reduction being shared by both official as well as commercial creditors, is absolutely necessary. The case has been made in all too many instances not by the governments themselves but by agencies like the World Bank and the IMF.

18. A corollary of this belief (and one which is unproven in reality) is that a tight, short-leash approach to debt relief, doled out grudgingly year by year in the elaborate, expensive, and tediously repetitive Paris Club rescheduling, provides greater leverage to creditors and IFIs in getting African governments to change the course of their economic policies and endure the consequences of such change.

19. Ann-Louise Colgan, "Africa's Debt-Africa Action Position Paper," July 2001.

20. Ibid.

21. United Nations, "Economic Crisis in Africa: Final Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the United Nations Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986–1990," report of the UN Secretary General prepared for the session of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the UN General Assembly, September 3–13, 1991, 20.

22. Ibid., 21.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 22.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Anthony R. Boote and Kamau Thugge, "Debt Relief for Low Income Countries and the HIPC Initiative," *Pamphlet* no. 51 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1999).
30. Colgan, "Africa's Debt," 5.
31. See the World Bank website, http://www.worldbank.org.
32. Congressional Research Service Report, Debt Reduction: Initiatives for the Most Heavily Indebted Poor Countries." Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 2000.
33. Colgan, "Africa's Debt," 5.
34. See the www.worldbank.org/hipc/ for key features of the HIPC Initiative.
35. World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, DC: 1998), 17.
36. Vincent Fararro and Melissa Rosser, "Global Debt and Third World Development," in *World Security: Challenges for a New Century*, edited by Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas (New York: St. Martin Press, 1994), 332–55.
37. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report, 1988, UNTACD/FDR/8 (New York: United Nations, 1988), 101.
38. Jeffrey Sachs, "Making the Brady Plan Work." *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 3 (1989), 91.
39. James D. Robinson III, "It's Time to Plan a Third World Revival." *New York Times*, August 28, 1988, F3.
40. Dorothy Agbor Nkogho, "The Main Characteristics of Cameroon's Economic Situation." *African Economic Research Consortium (AERC)*. Niarobi, Kenya: 2001: 109–113.
41. Ibid.
42. IMF, "External Debt Histories of Ten Low Income Developing Countries: Lessons from Their Experiences." (Washington, DC, 1998), 28–39.
43. Ibid.
44. The Debt-t-Export Ratio is defined as total external debt (including short- ,medium-, and long term debt and non-publicly guaranteed debt)in nominal US dollar terms relative to exports of goods and services in US dollars.
45. For a full description, see Jean-François Bayart, "La Société politique Camerounaise, 1982–1986." *Politique Africaine* 22 (1986): 5–36; Victor T. Levine, "Leadership and Regime Change in Perspective," in The Political Economy of Cameroon, edited by Michael G. Schatzberg and William I. Zartman (New York: Praeger, 1986); and J. P. Biyiti Bi Essam, *Cameroun:Complots et Bruits de bottes: Quelque Donnée pour ébrouiller l'écheveaur* (Paris: Harmattan, 1985).

46. Agbor, *The Main Characteristics of Cameroon's Economic Situation*, 110.

47. For theoretical debates on the "why" and "how" of adjustment within the context of the "assigned problem," the reader may refer to R.A. Mundell, "The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policies for Internal and External Stability." IMF Staff Papers, IX, no 1 (1962): 70–79; J. Marcus Fleming, "Domestic Financial Policies in Fixed and Floating Exchange Rates." IMF Staff Papers, 9, no. 2 (1962): 369–80; J. Niehans, "Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Open Economies under Fixed Exchange Rates: An Optimizing Approach." *Journal of Political Economy*, LXXIV, pt. II (1968): 893–920; M. C. Kemp, "Monetary and Fiscal Policies under Alternative Assumptions about International Capital Mobility." *The Economic Record* (December 1966): 598–605; and J. H. Levin, "International Capital Mobility and the Assignment Problem." Oxford Economic Papers (March 1962): 54–67.

48. Alejandro, C. Diaz, " Good-Bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash." *Journal of Development Economics* no 2 (1986): 19.

49. F. Stewart, *The IMF and World Bank in Africa: Conditionality, Impact and Alternatives*, edited by K. J. Havnevik (Uppsalla: Swedish Institute of Advanced Studies, 1987), 31.

50. P. Streeten, "A Survey of the Issues and Options," in *Structural Adjustment and Agriculture: Theory and Practice in Africa and Latin America*, edited by S. Commander (London: ODI and James Curry, 1989), 4.

51. Agbor, *The Main Characteristics of Cameroon's Economic Situation*, 108.

52. International Monetary Fund, "External Debt Histories of Ten Low Income Developing Countries: Lessons from Their Experience." Washington, DC: IMF, 1998.

53. World Bank, World Debt Tables. Washington, DC: 1997.

54. Cameroon-HIPC Approval Document: Decision Point under the enhanced framework. Ref.:ADB/BD/WP/2000/149, dated 20 November, 2000.

55. In addition, some commercial creditors delivered their full share of HIPC assistance through participation in the IDA-supported buy-back operation. The OPEC Fund also provided some assistance during the interim period, although this was not explicitly framed in the context of the HIPC initiative.

56. International Development Association and the International Monetary Fund, "Cameroon: Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative Completion Point Document and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)." (Cameroon: IDA and IMF, 2006), 5.

57. Revisions to debt and export data result in an increase in HIPC assistance at decision point from US$1.260 billion in NPV terms to US$1.267 billion.

58. Traditional debt relief mechanisms refer to the successive Paris Club agreements on the level of debt cancellation for the poorest and most indebted countries since 1988. The Toronto (1988), London (1991), Naples (1994), (Lyon (1996), and Cologne (1999) terms agreed to implement 33 percent, 50 percent, 67 percent, 80 percent, and 90 percent reduction, respectively, in the NPV of debt for eligible countries.
59. African Development Bank, African Development Fund." Cameroon: HIPC Approval Document Completion Point under the Enhanced Framework," 2011.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. World Bank, Global Development Finance (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011).
63. International Development Association and the International Monetary Fund, "Cameroon: Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative Completion Point Document and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)." (Cameroon: IDA and IMF), 67.
64. Ibid.

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The Effects of Family Size on Socioeconomic Status in Cameroon: A Critical Analysis

Consoler Teboh

INTRODUCTION

Much attention has been paid to the number, variety, and strength of the socioeconomic factors that influence women to deliberately inhibit their fertility and thereby limit the size of their families.[1] This has been the trend in most Western countries, and research shows that some African and Middle Eastern countries are also beginning to witness small decreases in population growth.[2] Cameroon is among those Sub-Saharan African countries that have witnessed a gradual decline in fertility rate. Specifically, in the past couple of decades, there has been a 2.71 percent decline in the fertility rate in the country. In 1991, the fertility rate was 6.8 percent,[3] and currently it is 4.09 percent.[4] The decline can be attributed to trends known as demographic innovators,[5] which influence family size.

One such demographic innovators is women's decision-making power. Greenhalgh[6] argues that as a woman's bargaining power in making decisions increases, family size decreases. In addition to the decision-making perspective, Pillai and Sunil suggest that there are several demographic innovators that influence women to "make rational decisions with respect to starting, spacing and stopping of births involving the use of contraception."[7] Other demographic innovators taken into consideration include education, work, and political participation, or, as coined by the Population Reference Bureau (PRB),[8] biological, cultural, and socioeconomic factors.

Family size–related determinants have implications in social work practice, research, and policy in that service providers use family size and income to determine client program eligibilities. Becker[9] posits that the cultural demand for children predicts the number of children in a family and that the cost of children (food, clothing, and health-care expenses) also affects family size. Declining fertility rates and demographic innovators have been associated with "improved standards of living, such as increased per capita income, increased life expectancy, lowered infant mortality, increased adult literacy and higher rates of female education and employment."[10] This chapter evaluates the effects of demographic innovators on improved standards of living among Cameroonian families. It thus attempts to answer two questions:

1. Do selected demographic indicators reduce family size in Cameroon?
2. Does smaller family size increase the quality of life in Cameroon?

Literature Review

The premise of this review follows the PRB[11] model that examines a combination of the biological (age at marriage), cultural (use of family planning methods), and socioeconomic (education, urbanization) conditions affecting family size. Although these conditions influence women's exposure to intercourse and their ability to conceive a child, as well as the number of children they may wish to have, it is difficult to determine direct causation, and care must be taken not to confuse causation with correlation.[12] For example, some factors may be linked to fertility rates, while others may be the real cause of differences in levels of fertility among different women in different societies.[13]

Age at Marriage

In spite of the importance of marriage in population studies, not much attention has been paid to age at marriage in relation to family size.[14] The few studies that directly address age at marriage usually relate it with other constructs like the median age of marriage, age at first birth, and birth spacing.[15] The few studies that have examined age at marriage in relation to family size in less developed countries include those by Sunil and Pillai[16] and Akmam.[17] Unlike in the United States, which in the second half of the twentieth century experienced an

increase in the age at marriage, the age at marriage in most developing countries still remains low.[18] In 2004, 22 percent of women in Cameroon between the ages of 25 and 49 were already married by the time they turned 15, and by the age of 18, 50 percent of this group were in marital relationships.[19]

When compared with unmarried couples, those who were married showed evidence of greater "physical, emotional, and economic well-being, although the association may vary by outcome, sex, and other factors,"[20] such as family support. This may not be the case with married couples in developing countries, since Umemoto[21] suggests that girls enter into marriage early because they are either forced into it or are poor and/or illiterate. Akmam[22] posits that women who are more educated tend to have a 2- to 5-year increase in their age at first marriage. Sunil and Pillai[23] and Umemoto[24] suggest that women who postpone marriage tend to have fewer children. Akmam[25] also confirms that those who engage in the use of contraceptives delay giving birth in order to further their education and quality of life.

Family Planning Methods

Family planning is another recurring topic in the reviewed literature. Becker[26] suggests that couples in developing countries like Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal are more open in talking about sex-related issues such as family planning, abortion-related services, and breastfeeding and tend to have fewer children. Isiugo-Abanihe[27] suggests that factors that affect family size in Nigeria are men's education, monogamy, intention not to rely on children for old-age support, age at marriage, interspousal communication, and family planning. Wang and Pillai[28] also suggest that women's reproductive rights have a statistically significant effect on family planning, and that family planning is very instrumental in fertility decline.

According to Einterz,[29] the most disturbing factor hindering family planning in parts of Cameroon is ignorance. Since the illiteracy rate is as high as 90 percent in some regions of the country, most women are still "ignorant, submissive and bound by superstition while girls grow to be women, and know nothing about the biology of their own bodies or the world around them."[30] Although Babalola, Vondrasek, Brown, and Traoré[31] found that information about family planning is on the rise, Einterz states that women in Kolofata, Mora, in the extreme north region of Cameroon do not recognize "overpopulation as a problem or a threat"[32] and, therefore, still have large families.

EDUCATION

Education is a socioeconomic issue that influences family size. In South Africa, Kauffman and Stavrou[33] posit that the level of education of a family affects the time at which women engage in sexual activity. The time invested in education can affect people differently. Pillai and Wang[34] and Derose and Kravdal[35] suggest that educated women delay childbearing plans as their aspirations for a better life come into play. Contrary to this view, Johnson-Hanks,[36] Eloundou-Enyegue and Williams,[37] and Leke[38] argue that the desire to bear children in Cameroon outweighs academic achievements.

Sabia[39] stipulates that no single approach to sex education is entirely correct. Her findings indicate that "while sex education is associated with adverse health outcomes, there is little evidence of a causal link after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity via fixed effects and instrumental variables."[40] The findings suggest that those on each side of the ideological debate on sex education are, in a sense, both correct and mistaken.[41] Opponents are correct in seeing sex education as associated with adverse health outcomes, but are generally incorrect in interpreting this relationship causally.[42] Proponents are generally correct in claiming that "sex education does not encourage risky sexual activity, but are incorrect in asserting that investments in typical school-based sex education programs produce measurable health benefits."[43] A Ugandan research study determined that the use of condoms was significantly higher among in-school than out-of-school girls.[44] In Cameroon, Meeker and Klein[45] found that when parental support for children's education was high, condom use among sexually active women increased.

In a South African study, Dickson-Tetteh, Pettifor, and Moleko[46] reveal that only 44 percent of 796 girls talked about contraception with their partners, and 36 percent actually used some method of contraception during their first sexual encounter. Manzini proposes that "if sexuality education were to begin before puberty, at age 9–10 and in primary schools, then many more women would be in a better position to make informed choices about their sexual activities by the time they reach menarche."[47] In spite of the educational factor, when there is a propensity to accept childbearing at an early age and sexual activities are not frowned upon,[48] women place themselves not only at a high risk of HIV infections but also tend to have large families. Again, as advanced by Johnson-Hanks,[49] Eloundou-Enyegue and Williams,[50] and Leke,[51] the pressure to have children in Cameroon sometimes outweighs the need to use modern contraceptives in spite of higher levels of education.

Place of Residence

The place of residence can be important in the lives of women; for instance, Kongnyuy et al.[52] argue that geographical differences can affect contraceptive outcomes like family size. Benefo[53] concludes that community characteristics such as heterogeneity and urbanization increase the likelihood of contraceptive use in developing countries. This is also the case in Cameroon and Nigeria where increases in the use of contraceptives have been noticed in urban areas.[54] Traditional methods of contraception like birth spacing and douching are usually found in rural areas,[55] while in the urban areas where the cost of raising children is high,[56] more modern forms of contraceptives are in use.[57]

Leke[58] posits that 90 percent of women in rural areas of Cameroon abstain from sexual activities during extended breastfeeding periods. Over the years, rural dwellers in Cameroon have depended on this natural child spacing method. Kongnyuy et al.[59] argue that distinctions in outcomes of contraceptive use and pregnancies are not only because of socioeconomic differences but also because of the geographic dissimilarities between the regions. Tsafack and Kengne[60] also confirm that rural inhabitants in Cameroon are less likely to be exposed to modern contraceptives and, therefore, had more children.

Socioeconomic Status

The quality of life and socioeconomic status (SES) of a person can be crucial in deciding family size. According to Dickson-Tetteh et al.,[61] if the quality of life for women in South Africa is to be enhanced, their reproductive health problems need to be tackled. This observation resonates with Cameroon, where low quality of life and SES affect family planning decisions.[62] Studies of how socioeconomic factors influence family size are common. Wealthier girls in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi,[63] and Cameroon[64] had a later sexual debut compared with their poorer counterparts. Interestingly, this was not the case with the Madise et al.[65] study in Uganda. In Cameroon, Kongnyuy et al.[66] confirm that there are numerous geographical dissimilarities in outcomes of modern contraceptive use and pregnancy because of the socioeconomic differences between regions. In the same context, Khumba, Pillai, and Pillai[67] also identify an association between sexual debut and SES among young people in Cameroon; however, their findings are not statistically significant.

Poverty apparently affects entire families and communities. Clements and Madisse[68] suggest that women who are poor are least likely to use contraceptives because they direct their meager earnings toward the upkeep of the family. It is no surprise, therefore, that poverty in families and communities has forced many young women into prostitution in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia where economic hardship and living in rural areas affects family size.[69] Even though Pettifor et al.[70] conclude that lack of awareness causes a rise in the sex trade in Johannesburg, the number of sex workers is increasing because of economic hardships. In the Central African Republic, Khlat et al.[71] suggest that poor living conditions and infrastructure in the communities push women into unprotected sex, which leads to pregnancy, HIV/AIDS, and other sexually transmitted diseases. As Rahman and Pine[72] argue, age at childbirth below 14 years, which is rampant in some parts like northern Nigeria and Malawi, has also been linked to poverty. In Cameroon, Eloundou-Enyegue[73] and Mosima[74] also demonstrate that women engage in unprotected sex because of poverty and economic hardship.

Contextual and Theoretical Frameworks

There is ample evidence showing that the success of the efforts to lower birth rates will depend on improving the status of women.[75] The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo ensured universal access to education and employment opportunities for women, as well as an end to discrimination against women.[76] In some countries, fertility patterns change in as little as a decade,[77] and voluntary policies and programs can be highly effective in encouraging the change. But, measuring the actual effects of family size and economic well-being has been inadequate in Cameroon. Only when there is research-backed evidence of economic benefits to small family sizes can the government sell its population reduction policies and programs with impunity.

Modernization theory is often used to explain almost all aspects of human socioeconomic behaviors.[78] The theory generally offers a method to sort changes in populations in various stages of becoming modern. This study explains how a number of variables that are affected by demographic innovators are driven by the forces of modernization. In assessing the effects of family size on socioeconomic well-being, this study hypothesizes that when there is a decrease in family size, there is an inverse proportional increase in that family's SES.

Method and Materials

The 2004 Cameroon Demographic Health Survey CDHS-III covers the entire country of Cameroon and provides information on many aspects of fertility, such as sexual knowledge and sexual activity, use of family planning methods, and knowledge, attitudes, and behavior regarding HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. The data collected in the CDHS-III update the demographic and health indicators derived from the 1991 and 1998 CDHS surveys. The CDHS-III was carried out from February to August 2004 and covered 10,462 households, including 10,656 women aged 15–49 years.

Variables

The dependent variable for the study was family size as measured by the number of children. Respondents with 0–5 children were coded 0 and made the control group, those with 6 or more children were made the reference group and coded 1. Family planning, education, urbanization, age at marriage, and income were independent variables used to determine the effects of demographic innovators on family size.

Family planning: Those who ever used any form of family planning methods, such as the pill, injections, condoms, sterilization, and intrauterine devices, are coded 1, and those who never used any are in the reference group and coded 0.

Education: Those with primary or secondary education are coded 1, while those with no education are coded 0 (reference group).

Place of residence: An urban place of residence is coded 1, whereas a rural place of residence is coded 0 (reference group).

Age at marriage: The study classified women into three age groups: 15–20 years (coded 0, reference group) as young women, 21–25 years (coded 1) as old women, and 26–49 years (coded 1) as older women.

Income: Those who earn are coded 1 and those who do not are considered the reference group and coded 0.

The next process was to measure the effects of SES on family size. The dependent variable for measuring the quality of life was family size. In measuring the quality of life or SES, cooking fuel, drinking water, electricity, flooring, radio, refrigerator, telephone, television, and toilet (independent variables) were taken into consideration.

These variables were coded as follows: cooking fuel—no cooking fuel is coded 0, cooking fuel is coded 1; flooring—no flooring is coded 0, flooring is coded 1; toilet—no toilet is coded 0, toilet is coded 1; electricity—no electricity is coded 0, electricity is coded 1; radio—no radio is coded 0, radio is coded 1; refrigerator—no refrigerator is coded 0, refrigerator is coded 1; telephone—no telephone is coded 0, telephone is coded 1; and television—no television is coded 0, television is coded 1. The results of the data analysis are presented under hypothesis 6.

Data Analysis

In order to better understand the dependent variable—family size, it is necessary to present a description of the respondents in terms of the number of children each family has. Here, 81.5 percent of the respondents reported having a small family (0–5 children), whereas 18.5 percent indicated they had a large family (6–18 children). Two separate Chi-squared tests were run in PASW to determine an association between family size and demographic innovators, and between family size and SES. The results are presented below.

Hypothesis 1

The hypothesis "The likelihood of having a smaller family compared with a larger family is higher among women who got married later in life than those who go married earlier" in this study is not supported. More respondents who got married young (81.7%) had a small family than those who married late (18.3%). The Chi-squared test results confirm that there is no association between family size and age at marriage: $\chi^2_{(1, N = 10,656)} = 5.095$; $p = .024$.

Hypothesis 2

The study hypothesized that "The likelihood of having a smaller family compared with a larger family is higher among women who have an education than those who do not have an education." Statistical results support this hypothesis. More respondents who had an education (79.9%) had a small family than those who did not have an education (20.1%). As predicted by the hypothesis, increases in education decreased the number of children a family had. The Chi-squared test results confirm that there is an association between family size and education: $\chi^2_{(3, N = 10656)} = 675.092$; $p < .05$.

Hypothesis 3

The hypothesis "The likelihood of having a smaller family compared with a larger family is higher among women who make use of family planning methods than those who do not make use of family planning methods" was supported in the study. More respondents who used family planning methods (57.5%) had a small family than those who did not use family planning methods (42.5%). The Chi-squared test results confirm that there is an association between family size and family planning methods: $\chi^2_{(1, N = 10656)} = 19.762$; $p < .05$.

Hypothesis 4

The study also predicted that "The likelihood of having a smaller family compared to a larger family is higher among women who earn an income than those who do not earn an income." Based on the statistical results, the hypothesis was supported. More respondents who earned an income (53.1%) had a small family than those who did not earn an income (49.9%). The Chi-squared test results confirm that there is an association between family size and income: $\chi^2_{(1, N = 10656)} = 241.817$; $p < .05$.

Hypothesis 5

The next hypothesis states: "The likelihood of having a smaller family compared with a larger family is higher among women who live in the urban areas than those who live in the rural areas." The statistical analysis confirmed this prediction. More respondents who lived in the urban areas (50.5%) had a small family than those who lived in the rural areas (49.5%). The Chi-squared test results (table 7.1) confirm

Table 7.1 Chi-squared test results of select demographic innovators on family size

Independent variables	χ^2	df	P-Value
Age at marriage	5.095	1	0.24
Education	675.092	3	0.00
Family Planning Methods	–	–	–
Income	19.762	1	0.00
Income	241.817	1	0.00
Residence	185.610	4	0.00

Note that N = 10,656 and that the level of significance is at 0.05.

that there is an association between family size and place of residence: $\chi^2_{(4, N = 2138)} = 185.610; p < .05.$

Hypothesis 6

A Chi-squared test was run between family size and SES variables. Results showed that there is no statistical significant relationship between family size and SES. Based on these results, it was concluded that hypothesis 6, "The likelihood of having a higher quality of life compared to a lower quality of life is higher among women who have a smaller family," is not supported. The results are presented in table 7.2.

Discussion and Conclusion

The fertility rate in Cameroon is gradually declining, as confirmed by the Institute Nationale des Statistiques (INS) (2005) at 6.8 percent in 1991 and by the Central Intelligence Agency (2012) at 4.09 percent in 2012. Several factors have been linked to this decline in other countries such as the United Kingdom,[79] Yemen,[80] and Nigeria.[81] This study found that in Cameroon, unlike in Yemen and Nigeria, the age at marriage did not influence family size. It is worthy of note that Cameroonians for many years have been taught the importance of spacing children and having only as many children they could take care of. Thus, many Cameroonian families tend to have five or fewer children, as suggested by the 2004 CDHS dataset. This may be the reason why those who reported to have got married young still maintained smaller families. Education, family planning methods, income,

Table 7.2 Chi-squared test results of select SES indicators on family size

Independent variables	χ^2	df	P-Value
Cooking fuel	15.963	5	.310
Drinking water	16.120	11	.255
Electricity	.376	2	.713
Flooring	5.688	8	.778
Radio	3.274	2	.763
Refrigerator	.396	2	.670
Telephone	.754	2	.528
Television	.304	2	.602
Toileting	9.513	5	.333

Note that N = 10,656 and that the level of significance is at 0.05.

and place of residence inversely affect family size, as predicted by the hypotheses.

The SES defined as having cooking fuel, drinking water, electricity, flooring, radio, refrigerator, telephone, television, and toilet did not affect family size, as suggested by hypothesis 6. Since Johnson-Hanks[82] and Leke[83] identified a strong affinity among Cameroonian women toward children, there is a tendency for them to have children in spite of low SES. Pillai and Wang[84] also argue that the desire to have children in general and the societal burden to have male children in particular puts severe pressure on families; such pressure, however, compels families including those that already have several female children to continue procreating in a bid to acquire 'prized' male children.

It is possible that the results of the study were affected by the selection of variables to define SES and the fact that the data are eight years old. These limitations notwithstanding, the study offers data that inform policymakers of the importance of determining the factors that affect the fertility rates. Social workers and demographers can also benefit from the study by using it in practice with family planning programs as well as shaping demographic policies. Further research needs to be conducted with new data in order to find out what has changed over time; for instance, it would be interesting to study the effects of cellular phones and the Internet on family size.

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Music and the Politics of Culture in a South African Zulu HIV/AIDS Experience: Implications for "Post-Apartheid" Discourse

Austin C. Okigbo

INTRODUCTION: WHAT ABOUT THEIR DRUM?

It was a windy morning on Tuesday, August 7, 2007, when I drove into the premises of the Sinikithemba AIDS clinic at McCord Hospital in Durban to meet with Dr. Helga Holst, the medical superintendent at the hospital. I had worked for several months with the Siphithemba Choir, an HIV/AIDS support group and choral ensemble that functions as part of the McCord Hospital, but I only met Dr. Holst for the first time on the night of July 29, during a cocktail party at the Zimbali Lodge in Overport City. The party was organized for Professor Bruce Walker of Harvard Medical School and director of the Center for AIDS Research at the Massachusetts General Hospital, who was visiting with his research team. A middle-aged white woman, Dr. Holst, has presided over what is reckoned as one of the best "holistic HIV [and AIDS] care" in Africa[1] under which program the Siphithemba Choir was born.

Our meeting lasted nearly an hour, during which the superintendent recounted the history of the choir, placing it in the context of the history of the hospital as a church institution. She also showed me her personal archival collections on the choir, including pictures and newspaper articles on their overseas tours. I was getting ready to

leave her office when she suddenly asked me about my faith and what I thought about mixing elements and symbols of indigenous African traditions with Christianity. I responded that, as a Catholic priest who is trained in theology, I am a strong believer in enculturation theology and have no problems with letting African peoples (or any ethnic groups at all) worship God in ways that are relevant to their own unique experiences. Following my response she said, "Then ask them about their drums." "What about their drum?" I asked. "There was a controversy about it some time ago in this place. Ask them about it. If they trust you they will tell you something about it; then you should let me know," she responded (Durban, 2007).

The few minutes of conversation with the superintendent caused me to think hard about what she was trying to get at. At the event at the Zimbali Lodge, the choir performed several gospel tunes, including the choir's adaptation of Enoch Sontonga's "Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika" and some of their own compositions, plus two traditional Zulu folk songs, "Isiyalo" (advice) and "Ikhalaphi" (from whence the cry). The choir usually performed "Isiyalo" with a modern choreographed dance that incorporated elements of the *ukusina*, the traditional Zulu foot-stamping, performed to a soundtrack accompaniment, but "Ikhalaphi" was performed purely as traditional folk song paired with *ukusina* dance. In a rehearsal during the day at Umlazi, the choir had made the decision not to use the soundtrack so they could make a smooth transition from "Isiyalo" to the last section of "Ikhalaphi." In previous performances, the song had been open to all choir members to demonstrate their facility with the dance: they all took turns coming to the front of the ensemble to demonstrate a solo dance. Sometimes, when performed exclusively to a Zulu audience, individual members of the audience would follow the trail of the choir to also demonstrate their facility with the dance.

Something dramatic happened that night as soon as the choir made the transition from "Isiyalo" to "Ikhalaphi." Some members of the choir rushed to the empty table that was by the wall in front of the audience and began pounding away rhythmic beats to accompany the foot- stamping of the *ukusina* dance. The pounding of the beats on the table added vigor to the dance. I thought, however, that the dance would have been more graceful if it had been accompanied with their Zulu drum, the *idlamu*. They had used the drum for their rehearsal during the day at Umlazi before the night's performance at the Zimbali Lodge. I wondered why they chose to play the dance beat on an empty table, when they could have brought their drum to the event.

In a later conversation, Phumulani Kunene, the choir director, explained that the superintendent once objected to their traveling with the drum on grounds that McCord is a Christian hospital and could not be associated with the use of the drum. Apparently, she linked the drum with the ritual practices of Zulu traditional diviners (*izangoma*) and traditional healers (*izinyanga*), who used drums to invoke spirits or even to heighten their own spirit during ritual ceremonies of healing. But Phumulani explained that the drum was also used traditionally to signal the coming out of the king from the royal kraal, as well as to send messages to the infantry regiments about an impending war. Its use in traditional Zulu dance was mainly to accompany and accentuate the rhythm of the *ukusina* dance. According to him—and his explanation reflected the opinion of other members of the choir, the superintendent was wrong in her interpretation of the spiritual significance of the drum. Some members believed that the superintendent's action amounted to an attack on their culture and identity as Zulu and Africans. But the choir respected her decision not to use the drum, although they attempted to travel with it at other times when she was not with the group.

The drum controversy, however, brought other issues to light. Rifts indeed arose between the choir and the hospital management, and the contestation over the Zulu drum was the first instance. In this chapter, therefore, I make the case that the controversy marked an evidence of a continuing politics of culture and identity, which was integral to the apartheid system, and that is being reproduced and replayed within the context of the current experience of HIV/AIDS. Using this singular musical event then, I seek to analyze the dynamics of interracial cultural relations in South Africa and to interrogate the notion of "post-apartheid" as a discourse. What does it mean when the musical performance of a HIV/AIDS support group becomes a space where the once opposing bodies in the system of apartheid engage in cultural contestation? Before proceeding, however, it is important to place in context the Siphithemba Choir's history and their decision to incorporate traditional music and dance and by extension the *idlamu*.

The Siphithemba Choir, Choral Singing, and Dance

The Siphithemba Choir[2] came out of the HIV/AIDS support group that was founded in 1997 at the McCord Mission Hospital in Durban, thanks to the efforts of Nohlanhla Mhlongo, a social worker who was

charged with the duty of providing pre- and postdiagnostic counseling to people infected and affected by HIV and AIDS. The founding of the support group was part of the hospital management's effort to provide comprehensive care to HIV and AIDS patients, especially at the time when, due to the slow dissemination of the antiretroviral therapy, doctors and caregivers could only render little medical help to patients. Thus, the support group functioned as a source of alternative care in the form of spiritual counseling, prayers, and a social support network for HIV-positive individuals, in order to help them cope with the emotional and material burden associated with being HIV-positive (Okigbo, 2011).

To alleviate the poverty conditions of individual members who faced the risk of opportunistic infections due to poor nutritional habits, the management created a self-help project for the support group. According to Nohlanhla Mhlongo, the social worker who coordinated the support group, "we've got people who are HIV-positive, and who have no income ... What we are trying to inculcate to [in] people is that they have to work and not beg. Because of their status they shouldn't go around begging" (Durban, 2007). The initial self-help project consisted of beadworks. Later on, several other skills acquisition projects, such as knitting, woodworks, mosaics, and computer programming, were added. The project generated money that provided income to members as well as savings in a fund that supported treatment for sick members.

The members of the support group hummed and sang hymn tunes and gospel choruses while they worked at their projects, an example of African context of music making that has been well documented by ethnomusicologists and Africanist scholars (Bebey, 1975, 11; Biko, 2004, 46; Nketia, 1974, 28–29; Weman,1960, 80–82). Xolani Zulu, one of the choir members, described the context thus:

> People were doing different things for income generation[s], like beadworks, craftwork, any handwork you can think of, in order to raise funds for their circumstances. So what happened, they started to sing when they are in groups, as mostly we Africans we used to do. When we are sad, we sing; when we are happy, we sing. Whenever we gather, we sing, you see. (Durban, 2007)

Mhlongo remarked that "the group sang so well, and sometimes we even shed tears" (Durban, October 2007). According to Nomusa Mpanza, one day in 1998 the group sang and danced for a long time after the day's work: "It was like we all went crazy that day,

and everybody was watching us. So Nonhlanhla [Mhlongo] suggested maybe we should form a choir" (KwaMakutha, 2007). Thus, at Mhlongo's suggestion, more than 40 individuals in the support group constituted the first choir, which began to perform at hospital events. The formation of the choir thus transformed the initial support group into a trifunctional entity as HIV/AIDS support group, microeconomic project, and choral ensemble.

Siphithemba's repertoire is largely gospel music, including pre-existing songs they adopted or adapted and their own compositions. The preponderance of gospel music in their repertory is in keeping with their association with McCord Hospital, which is a missionary hospital.[3] But in addition, the choir sees itself as engaged in the mission of preaching the gospel through their music, which encapsulates the spirituality of hope and faith in God in the presence of HIV and AIDS. In fact, choir members made me understand that they preferred to be designated as a gospel choir, rather than as an HIV/AIDS choir.

Their preference for gospel music notwithstanding, the choir conductor Phumulani and other members who I interviewed revealed that they also incorporate traditional Zulu songs because of their amenability to integration with dance. The dance rationale has several implications as it pertains to the experience of Siphithemba members. According to Phumulani (Xolani Zulu also provided similar explanation), "these traditional songs have a way of making people want to dance. So we really wanted to sing something that they understand, because they already know the meaning and what we are singing" (Durban, July 2007). In other words, the choir was concerned about getting their message across to their local audience, and so the best medium to that effect is a musical idiom that is recognizable to their local audiences. In addition, both Phumulani and Nomusa Mpanza explained that the choir's decision to perform traditional songs was to provide them more opportunities for dance as a form of exercise. Exercise has been recognized as a key component of "positive living," an expression that conveys the idea of having a positive physical, emotional, and spiritual attitude toward and about the reality of the disease (O'Loughlin, 2008).

While attending several HIV/AIDS support group meetings and workshops, I saw constant reminders to people living with AIDS to keep fit and strengthen their immune system through regular exercise. When I asked how they do this, Phumulani quickly responded, "by dancing" (Durban, July 2007). According to him, Zulu traditional songs, with their accompanying vigorous dance movements

Figure 8.1 Ncamisile demonstrates the *ukusina* dance with vigor in a concert at the Zimbali Lodge in Overport City, Durban. Photo by Austin C. Okigbo, 2007

and heavy foot-stamping, provide weekly exercise for members who would not otherwise have an opportunity to exercise because of their schedules and environments. Thus, music making plays several roles for the choir members in their struggle with HIV/AIDS: as income-generating enterprise, talent expression, social network, and outlet for physical exercise.

Dance is also the choir's way of projecting their distinctive African identity in the context of performance, especially in the presence of foreign audiences.[4]

It is noteworthy that the Siphithemba Choir does not see any inherent contradictions with the African cultural idioms that they appropriate in their performance and the Christian faith and gospel message. Xolani Zulu made the point that "we preach the gospel and give hope through our music" (Durban, July 25, 2007). Asked how he sees the consistency of incorporating traditional songs with "preaching the gospel," he responded, "Because they are part of who we are as African people. I think it is okay, we can still praise God

with traditional music, because we are doing good work with it" (Durban, July 25, 2007).

The *Idlamu* in Traditional Music and Dance

It is not clear how and when the *idlamu*, a double-headed cylindrical drum, entered into and became a permanent feature of Zulu dance. Further investigation that I made into the history and meaning of the instrument revealed that *idlamu* is actually not originally a Zulu instrument. In fact, *idlamu* is a corruption of the English word *drum*, whereby the */i/* in *idlamu* is the subject prefix of class-three nouns singular.[5] Since the phoneme /r/ does not exist in IsiZulu, the Zulu tend to replace the /r/ sound in loanwords with /l/.[6] Furthermore, Zulu words, like those in most languages of Sub-Saharan Africa, do not end with consonants. Thus, the "shadow vowels" that are heard in the final consonants of English words are usually exaggerated to full vowel sounds; hence the /u/ in *idlamu* as a final vowel.

In addition to the linguistic evidence, the shape of the drum resembles in every respect the bass drum of the Western military regimental bands. The instrument probably entered Zulu musical culture by way of their encounters with the British, perhaps from the earliest days of British soldiers' encampment at the port of Durban, or during the Anglo-Boer Wars in the late nineteenth century, or even as late as the period of the First World War (see also Kaemmer, 2008, 403). Thus, the superintendent's attempt to proscribe the use of the drum was simply informed by erroneous assumptions about the drum and its presence in Zulu culture.

Even if the *idlamu* were not to have Western origins, the superintendent's action—notwithstanding any clear Christian intentions—could be construed as reminiscent of the colonial distortion of African cultural practices and condemnation of African values and worldviews to mere superstitions and savage idiosyncrasies (Etherington, 2002). Missionary efforts to suppress the music of African peoples, particularly those in Southern Africa among whom they worked, have been well documented (Axelsson, 1974, 91; Kaemmer, 1967, 57; Keteyi, 1998, 23; Parrinder, 1946, 190; Shaffer, 1954, 39). The colonial and missionary attitudes prompted Philip Ghebo (1954), the Ghanaian school music teacher, to challenge the missionaries against propagating "the idea that our music is primitive, fit only for the devil. I warn the missionaries to stop preaching that gospel, else there will be conflict between us and they will regret it in the end. They have done

Figure 8.2 A Zulu woman plays *idlamu* in an entrance procession during a cultural mass at Emmanuel Catholic Cathedral, Durban. Photo by Austin C. Okigbo, August 2007.

a lot to prohibit the music that is the center of our culture" (82). Ghebo's prediction of conflict between the missionaries and Africans on account of their attempt to prohibit African music came true in the case of the choir and McCord Hospital.

HIV/AIDS and Cultural Politics

One must wonder how the context of HIV/AIDS became the sphere of contestation over cultural symbol and meaning. To make sense of that, however, I suggest we keep in mind one reality about HIV/AIDS as a public health situation. That is, that HIV/AIDS is the most politicized public health situation of our time, with social and cultural implications. Just as the virus has the tendency to mutate and thus produce its varied strains across racial and national boundaries, it also has the capacity to generate varied levels of sociocultural productions and local policy debates. The reason is that the antecedent conditions that exacerbate the spread of the virus, though globally similar in some instances, vary across national and regional boundaries and in accordance to specific social, cultural, economic, and political climates. Similarly, local communities tend to forge solutions to the HIV/AIDS problem in accordance with their own unique experiences.

In South Africa, the history of apartheid and its lingering effects has been recognized by scholars of public health and social medicine

to have a serious impact on the current experience of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the country (see Brummer, 2002, 1–26; Coovadia et al., 2009, 817–34; Fassin, 2007, 72; Jochelsonet al., 1991, 157–73; Karim et al., 2009, 921; and Seftel, 1988, 17–22). I have also argued elsewhere[7] that this history has also shaped the AIDS discourse in South Africa and how the problem is viewed through the lens of race and ethnicity, thereby fueling a process of cultural politics reminiscent of, and similar to, that which formed the bedrock of the politics of apartheid and its resistance from different fronts such as the Steve Biko–led Black Consciousness and Black Liberation Theology (de Gruchy and de Gruchy, 2005; Magaziner, 2010).

The Drum, the Musical Performance of AIDS, and the Politics of Culture in "Post-Apartheid" Discourse

To fit the contestation over the use of the drum as cultural politics into "post-apartheid" as a discourse, I draw upon Didier Fassin's suggestion that in South Africa the story of HIV/AIDS cannot be told, and the full picture cannot be grasped, except that the story of apartheid forms part of the backdrop against which the narrative is outlined (2007). Fassin's suggestion also means that understanding apartheid must be the starting point of any "post-apartheid" discourse. In that light, we must bear in mind that apartheid was an ideology that had political, economic, and sociocultural ramifications. For the purpose of this chapter, I address the question of apartheid as cultural policy.

Fundamental to the European colonial and missionary engagement of African cultures, religions, and worldviews is the belief that they are primitive and evil (Etherington, 2002, 422–439; Sindima, 1992, 73–74; Turnbull, 1962). Hence, for most European missionaries, the civilization of Africans, and ultimately their spiritual salvation, lies in being wrested from their past and its "heathen" environment. In South Africa, especially in Natal, this amounted to the establishment of the mission stations, including the Adams Mission in Amanzintoti by the American Congregationalists and the Marianhill Mission by the Roman Catholics, where the *amakohlwa* "believers" were made to live apart from their original homesteads and kinsfolk. At these missions, Africans were taught about an idealized European lifestyle (Etherington, 2002), which was equated with Christian way of life; their civilization was measured according

to the degree to which they adopted the European lifestyle, even if superficially (Turnbull, 1962, 21).

Apartheid was thus shaped by the colonial missionary projects, which denigrated African cultures and in many instances proscribed many African cultural idioms, particularly music. Once these missionary ideas about African and Zulu culture became entrenched, they became the bases for the formulation of the cultural components of the racial politics of the Union from the 1800s and culminating in the institutionalizing of apartheid as state policy from 1948 and 1990. Eminent South African theologians John de Gruchy and Steve de Gruchy lend credence to this historiography in their observation that apartheid, as it was practiced by the Afrikanner-led Nationalist Government, was first theologically conceived, before they were given circular interpretation and political enactment. The proscriptive precedence that was set by the missionaries continued to influence the development of music in the mainstream mission churches. In the Roman Catholic Church (as well as in the Anglican and Wesleyan churches), the 1955 papal encyclical *Musicae Sacrae* and the Second Vatican Council constitution on the liturgy, all of which encouraged missionaries to promote local music for use in worship (Dargie, 1997, 321), yielded little result. From late 1970s and early 1980s, however, following the efforts at the Lumko Missiological Institute in the Eastern Cape, the marimba xylophones, which were inspired by the Zimbabwean marimba that was developed at KwaNongoma, began to be accepted as part of church music across Southern Africa (Dargie, 1997, 322). In an interview with the choirmaster during a research trip to South Africa, at the Martyrs of Uganda Catholic Church at Umlazi, he lamented the fact that the incorporation of dance music and the amakorasi[8] only began to gain entrance into mainstream churches in the 1980s. According to him, "they were banned by the missionaries, and we are still suffering it today" (Umlazi Townwship, July 2005). David Dargie (1997) suggests that Africans' own non-readiness to embrace the use of local Zulu musical idiom as it was being pushed for by the Lutheran missionary and musicologist Henry Weman, for instance (321), and their utter rejection of the drum and drumming by their "educated elite" (323), constituted a stumbling block to African musical idioms and instruments gaining a pride of place in the mainstream churches. I, however, add that African elites' attitude was a result of the long-term cultural "brainwashing" that was perpetuated by the first generation of European missionaries beginning in the 1800s. It would take the wave of political independence of several African states in the 1960s, which coincided with

the Second Vatican Council, and the emergence of African voices in the disciplines of philosophy and theology, especially the Kenyan Anglican priest John S. Mbiti (1969), for Africans to become open to indigenous African musical idioms. In South Africa, this new openness coincided with the birth of the Black Consciousness and the emergence of Black Theology.

Yet the call by Steve Biko, Barney Pityana, and some pioneer exponents of South African Black Theology—such as Bonganjalo Goba (1974) and Gabriel Setiloane (1973, 36–41), who, like Mbiti, looked back to "precolonial" African cosmologies and rituals as a basis for the Africanization of the Church (see Magaziner, 2010, 84–99)—was overshadowed by the immediacy of the quest for political freedom. Moreover, their ideas became suspect in the eyes of the apartheid state authorities, but also in the eyes of the still white-dominated hierarchy.

Since 1990, however, the move to acculturate the Christian worship and music in mainstream churches has gained traction.[9] But this is happening amidst what are still clearly and largely segregated churches in South Africa. The implication is that white South Africans still have not enough interaction with their surrounding African cultures in a religious space, except as entertainments in the tourism sector and through the media. Every now and then, one experiences heated debates over the radio in which white South Africans, in particular, continue to criticize elements of African cultural practices—sometimes rightly so—but with an apparent lack of insight into the meanings and origins of such practices. It is this persisting attitude toward African cultural practices, including music, that informed the superintendent's effort to ban the use of the *idlamu* by the choir.

By seeking to prohibit the use of the drum, the superintendent, therefore, triggered the memories of apartheid under which system the politics of culture, and the cultural domination of Africans by the Europeans, comprised an ideological bedrock. According to the South African Jesuit theologian, Xolile Keteyi, "Black people have used music. . . . to tell the story of their trauma and pain; to proclaim their aspirations and affirm their humanity" (1998, 28). Some choir members whom I interviewed construed the superintendent's action as an attack on their culture and identity as Africans and Zulu. From my conversations with them, and in the light of Keteyi's words, one could argue that, as a group of young men and women whose lives have been severely impacted by the burden of the virus, social stigma, and rejection by family and friends, the superintendent's actions amount to a double attack on their aspirations and the affirmation of

their humanity. According to Phumulani, events similar to this forced them to shift their perspective about their struggle with HIV and AIDS. Born out of a consciousness of their mutual struggle with the HIV/AIDS, a disease that has been so politicized, they now construe themselves as engaged in the struggle, first as individuals, second as a group with shared experiences, and third as African people who must raise their voices for the African cause in the context of the HIV/AIDS (Okigbo, 2011). For the Siphithemba Choir, the complex issues of race, culture, and identity embedded in the HIV/AIDS discourse are now expressed in music. Hence, according to Phumulani, "we are aware of these issues, and so whenever we are singing, even when we travel to America, or to anywhere, we believe that we are talking not just about ourselves, but for Africa and for Black people everywhere" (Durban, July, 2007).

Conclusion: Evaluating "Post-Apartheid" as a Cultural Discourse

In light of the foregone discourse, I must ask then what is "post" in "post-apartheid." In other words, what does it mean to speak about "post-apartheid"? Since the democratic transition in 1994, "post-apartheid" as a theoretical discourse has preoccupied scholars (see, for example, Freund and Padayachee, 1998, 16–22; Greenstein, 2009, 69–84; Ramphele, 2001; Wilson, 2000, 1173–1180), who analyze the prospects for future development against the background of the legacies of apartheid. While the discourse has focused largely on issues related to politics and economic development, the cultural conditions of apartheid are yet to be undone and have scarcely been addressed as relevant panacea for sustainable human and socioeconomic development.

First of all, as a "post" discourse, "post-apartheid" presupposes the cessation of the conditions that defined apartheid. It is a forward-looking analysis of the legacies of apartheid, in which scholars tend to make projections about the prospects for future development as those conditions and legacies recede into memory. In this regard, post-apartheid as a discourse has largely focused on issues of political and economic development and human rights in South Africa. The discourse has seldom paid attention to religion and culture, which were the major cornerstones of the initial formulation of the apartheid policy. Even the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) failed to address the issue of cultural violations that were visited upon

Africans—on their psyche and on sacred places—by the apartheid state and the mission churches. The implication is that not only are the cultural legacies but also the cultural conditions of apartheid are still strong in many places, such as the instance of the *idlamu* controversy at the McCord Hospital.

Interestingly enough, in 1996, former President Nelson Mandela declared HIV/AIDS "the next struggle," an expression that is reminiscent of the idea of the "anti-apartheid struggle." By so doing, he triggered a symbolic linking of apartheid with the current experience of HIV/AIDS. However, while Mandela's idea of "the next struggle" may be about public health situation, a decade after that declaration, the "struggle" against HIV/AIDS has become the context where the once opposing bodies in the system of apartheid are engaging in cultural contestation, and music is still at the center of that struggle.

Notes

1. www.inmed.us/training_sites/mccord_hospital_south_africa.asp. Accessed March 1, 2011.
2. For more details on the history of the Siphithemba Choir and the Sinikithemba support group at the McCord Hospital, see Austin C. Okigbo, "Performing Blackness in a South African HIV/AIDS Choir." *Du Bois Review* 8, no. 1 (2011).
3. Dr. James McCord, a medical missionary of the American Congregational Church in Durban, founded McCord Hospital in 1909. See McCord and Douglass, 1946, for more on the missionary history of the hospital.
4. In addition to dance, the choir's use of traditional Zulu dresses as part of their concert regalia is also a way to project an African and Zulu identity. See Okigbo, "Performing Blackness," for more on this.
5. Nouns in IsiZulu, like in most Bantu languages are characterized into noun classes marked by specific subject and object prefixes. IsiZulu has seven noun classes. In this case, idlamu falls in the class three noun category, the "i" being the singular subject prefix of class three nouns.
6. Because of the absence of /r/ in isiZulu, many Zulu who lack a Western education would pronounce the *Rand*, the South African currency, as "ilandi," replacing the /r/ with /l/, while adding /i/ at the beginning as part of noun class three subject prefix and a final /i/ as an exaggerated shadow vowel.
7. See Okigbo, "Performing Blackness." In this article, I argue that the Siphithemba Choir's performance of "Blackness" is shaped by a combination of several related factors, namely the nature of the virus's genome and its racial and geographical distribution, the history of apartheid and its lingering effects, the interracial acrimony in the

post-apartheid society, and other sociocultural and global politics of HIV and AIDS. These factors account for the choir members' perception that Africans and people of African descent comprise the majority of the victims of the disease, thus prompting them to use their music as a tool to perform their individual and collective experience of HIV, but also to raise their voices on behalf of Africans and black people everywhere.

8. *Amakorasi*, or choruses, are short texts that are sung repeatedly, which resemble the cyclic African folk singing style and are often accompanied with handclapping and dance.

9. Between 2006 and 2007, I documented a series of experimentations in this direction at the Emmanuel Catholic Cathedral in Durban in the form of the cultural mass and in the Methodist Church in Durban. A yet unpublished paper based on this documentation was presented at the 2010 Society for Ethnomusicology Annual Meeting in Los Angeles, CA.

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Land and Conflict in Kenya's Rift Valley: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives

Martin Shanguhyia and Mickie Mwanzia Koster

Introduction

Conflict in Kenya's Rift Valley has been common from the early colonial period to the present. Such conflict, while frequent across Kenya, has tended to be concentrated in the Rift Valley Province. In this region, more than other parts of the country, colonial land policies created a default mode of land relations that marginalized local African communities and their modes of production by restricting their access to the most important resource in these processes—land. While emphasizing exclusion, this colonial mode generated contradictions in the economic, political, and social spheres that in turn bred conflict and bloody encounters over land between the government and the local communities, as well as between communities. This process has persisted into the postcolonial times, sometimes aided by the independent government that has presided over a troubled land reform program since 1963. Following the decolonization of the former White Highlands in the 1960s, the agriculturally productive parts of Kenya's Rift Valley has remained a terrain for contesting land rights, ethnic identity, and accessibility to national politics. Land has occupied a central place in this area so much so that it has remained the most "politicized" region in Kenya, as attested to by cycles of political violence that have mired the province every election cycle since the late 1980s, and particularly following the bungled 2007 general elections.

The chapter therefore complements the existing studies that have analyzed the central role of land in the trajectory of Kenya's history, and the role of this resource in configuring relations between the state and its inhabitants, and between ethnic communities. Most specifically, the study adds to our understanding of the historical evolution of the default nature of land policies and relations from the colonial through the postcolonial periods, the contradictions inherent in those policies and relations, and the extent to which they have elicited tensions and conflicts over land since the late nineteenth century. We concentrate not only on the causes of these conflicts, but also on how the state and various communities have used land to safeguard their interests at the local, regional, and national levels. We argue that since the onset of colonialism, various communities and movements have sought to access land in the Rift Valley by positing several racial, economic, political, ethnic, and spiritual meanings and arguments, in ways that have bred discontentment, tensions, and outright conflicts between communities in the province. We also make clear that conflict leading to fear, bloodshed, and loss of life has been the result of the commitment by certain communities and movements to redress the inadequacies in Kenya's land relations. Such communities and movements have thus targeted the state and its allies perceived to reinforce a controverted agenda in land relations that has undermined the cultural, economic, and social welfare of the majority rural populations depending on this resource.

A review of these processes adds to our understanding of the complicated nature of Kenya's history in land relations dating back to the early colonial period. It also gives insight into factors that have helped to occasionally stall Kenya's progress toward a successful land reform program. Continued tensions, violence, and bloody conflicts over land, especially in the Rift Valley, remains the most distinct reminder of the evasive nature of land reform agenda. This scenario, if it persists, only helps to confirm an uncertain future for a country whose economy has profoundly been embedded in land-based modes of production, yet its historical record in the pursuit of a successful land reform program has not matched the positive gains made in the liberalization of the national and local political institutions since the early 1990s. However, while conflict has characterized the land question in Kenya for decades, we also show that some social movements such as *Mungiki* that have recently emerged in the country, have tended to posit an alternative dimension to this question by advocating for a return to traditional practices and new forms of spiritualism. Finally, there is the often-overlooked peace model that

can help resolve the vexing question on land that has eluded several government regimes in the country. In a general sense, the study contributes to the country's land historiography by extending the its treatment as an "Unhappy Valley"[1] while using a historically important geographical region—the Rift Valley—to understand trends in the political and social history of modern Kenya.

The Area

The Rift Valley comprises an imposing geographical landscape that slices Kenya from the Ethiopian border in the north to the Tanzanian border in the south. This vast depression dominates the central and western portions of the country. It is home to many communities that make a living from land cultivation and pastoralism.[2] Most of it constitutes the Rift Valley Province, thus making it the largest of Kenya's eight provincial administrative units (see map below). It spans an area of about 183,383.2 sq. km/113,954.3 sq. m., while the high agricultural potential land constitutes about 18,791 sq. km/11,680 sq. m. The rest is of either medium or low potential.[3] The central parts of the Rift Valley in particular are known for their extensive fertile lands and lush pastures. But it is its agricultural capacity that has defined its status as the granary of Kenya since the colonial times. This economic value of the region led to extensive land alienation schemes for European settlement by the British colonial state at the turn of the twentieth century, converting the central Rift Valley Highlands into part of the "White Highlands."

Intrigue and Conflict in Early Colonial Times

During the course of early European contact with the interior of today's Kenya in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the imposing presence of the Great Rift Valley was difficult to ignore. The valley drew the attention of imperial scholars who were increasingly building a repertoire of studies on the natural history and scientific investigation of the expanding European empires, particularly Britain's. Consequently, the documentation of the historical geography of this region by J. W. Gregory in 1892 constituted a precursor to increased British interest here for reasons other than intellectual.[4] More often than not, in terms of its importance to potential European economic enterprise, the Rift Valley was usually contrasted with other parts of East Africa, such as the Lake

Victoria Basin that was considered as the "gateway" to Uganda, a common destination for early European travellers before the turn of the century. Sir Charles Eliot, a pioneer British colonial official in the territory that evolved into the Kenya Colony, acknowledged the fertility of the Lake Victoria Basin and its immediate highlands, and the industrious disposition of the local Bantu and Nilotic communities in agricultural production. But Eliot was keen to note the seemingly "unhealthy" environment of the hot lowlands of the Lake region with its prevalence of tsetse and mosquitoes, itself an indication of incidences of sleeping sickness and malaria that were likely to impinge on any long-term European enterprise in the Lake Victoria Basin. Consequently, Eliot's attention turned to the adjacent Rift Valley whose climate and vegetation, particularly on the escarpments and elevated plateau lands, he considered as ideal for European settlement. Laikipia and Uasin Gishu plateaus, as well as the lowlands of Naivasha and Nakuru, were considered suitable agricultural farmlands for cultivating wheat, maize, and potatoes, and as offering "the best grazing land" on a large-scale enterprise.[5]

This view of the Rift Valley and its value to Britain's imperial possessions was amplified by Sir Winston Churchill while on a tour of the East Africa Protectorate (later Kenya Colony) and Uganda in 1907 as he noted:

> The strongest feeling that I experience is of admiration &wonder at the beauty &worth of these noble & spacious possessions [which] have been so lately Protectorate [which] in fertility, in verdure, in the coolness of the air, in their streams of running water & their rich red soil, are far superior to anything I have ever seen in India or S.A & really bear & even challenge comparison with England and Italy. I allude particularly to the Rift valley & to the elevated plateau, nearly 9000ft high, of the Mau Escarpment.[6]

Such covetous convictions were strong motivations that drove British colonial expansion and acquisition of this expansive and productive part of Kenya that in turn set in motion tensions and bloody conflicts over land that have continued to characterize the Rift Valley into the twenty-first century. In fact, such tensions and conflicts did not have to wait until the actual process of colonial conquest and the establishment of the colonial state. Before 1900, the Maasai but particularly the Nandi, engaged in bloody confrontations with European-led exploration and trading parties traversing the Rift Valley that were sometimes focused on extracting economic resources from these communities.[7]

Aside from the peaceful rapprochements between the Maasai and the British that facilitated the latter's expansion into the central Rift Valley after 1890,[8] such expansion was largely accomplished at the cost of bloody colonial wars of pacification particularly against the Turkana and Kalenjin communities such as the Nandi, Tugen, and the Ilchamus.[9] Colonial conquest was driven by the need to meet British capitalist expansion in this part of Eastern Africa. Access to productive land, particularly in the Rift Valley, held the potential to ensure successful economic investment of imperial capital.[10] The initial development that shaped official policy toward this process was the construction of the Kenya-Uganda Railway which was intended to open up the interior of East Africa as far as Uganda. With its escarpments, ridges, and lowlands, the Rift Valley presented engineering challenges to the development of this transportation feat, but the economic gains to be made overshadowed such challenges. The massive investment by the London Government in this railway that cut through the heart of the Kenya highlands attested to the strategic and capitalist pursuits of the British Empire in the hinterlands of Eastern Africa.[11]

The construction of the railroad through the Rift Valley provided one of several reasons for the conflict between the British and the Nandi. The proximity of Maasai and Nandi land to the railway was particularly seen as pertinent to the proposed European settlement scheme. It was here that British colonial land alienation schemes were commenced in earnest from about 1902 to allow for a European-based colonial economy in the productive areas of the Rift Valley, thereby setting in motion a long history of tensions and conflicts over land and related resources—such as labor—with the local African communities.

As far as Britain was concerned, administrative and economic difficulties of sustaining the emerging colony demanded a stable economy that could generate revenue to cover the costs of administering the new territory and help London recover the costs of building this commercial line. Furthermore, the fertile soils and "European-like" temperate climate of the central highlands and parts of the Rift Valley of Kenya and its potential for European settlement and commercial farming remained strong reasons to want to control this area. Almost immediately, Sir Charles Elliot, the protectorate's high commissioner (1900–1904), floated schemes for encouraging European settlement that formed the bastion for an agricultural export economy aimed at raising freight revenues to enable the economical operation of the railway while sustaining the economy of the nascent colony.[12]

An effort to comprehend the capitalist basis upon which European settlement in Kenya was premised serves to help shape our understanding of how strained relations over land developed between the colonial state and African communities in the Rift Valley and surrounding areas. The agricultural economy envisioned by early colonial officials was based on the assumption that large-scale agricultural estates managed by an "advanced" European farming was the most effective way of integrating the conquered state into the global economy. African agricultural and pastoralist modes of production were considered inadequate for the needs of the envisioned "modern economy" of the global system into which Kenya and its African communities were being introduced. Commissioner Elliot dismissed the pastoralist Maasai as a "non-productive" lot who should be pushed off their "native" grazing fields that they were unable to cultivate, while he characterized the agricultural Bantu communities such as the Kikuyu and Luyia in the neighboring highlands of the Rift Valley as lacking in "civilization" with no impetus for business or work of any kind.[13] Elliot was offering a competing vision to utilizing land in the Rift Valley in Western terms that was dissonant to traditional uses of land among African farming and pastoralist communities.

This thinking became the basis for targeting African land for alienation so as to build a European settlerdom in Kenya at the turn of the twentieth century. Lands identified for alienation were the uncultivated "open" or "empty" sections of the Kenya Highlands patched next to the railway lines, then inhabited by the Maasai, Kikuyu, and Nandi communities, and wrongly thought by colonial officials to be uninhabited. This underlines the colonial misinterpretation of pre-colonial African ecological occupational and utilization patterns. L. S. B. Leaky captured this official gross delusion about uninhabited African fallow areas when he stated later in 1935:

> To the white man, as distinct from cultivated land and grasslands, [*sic*] appeared to be unutilized land and many a settler who took up areas in Kikuyu country in the early days holds firmly to the view that the land which he took over was unoccupied and unused because it was virgin bush. But to the African virgin bush is the ideal pasturage for goats and sheep, and Kikuyuland bush was as much in use and occupation as are the great grassland farms of the European stock owners of today.[14]

The alienation process that commenced shortly after 1900 was aided by British imperial statutes that were invoked to regulate land allocation. While the sovereignty of the British Crown was declared over

the entire territory, the need to regulate land led to the enactment of Crown Lands Ordinances by the protectorate government between 1900 and 1920 that ended ownership rights by Africans of their land anywhere in Kenya and ceded those rights to the British Crown. Under these legal provisions, large portions of land belonging to the Kalenjin, Maasai, and Kikuyu communities were alienated by the colonial government for European settlement in the Rift Valley and parts of Kenya's central highlands.[15] Usually, the forced nature of colonial alienation of these lands was not uncontested by the affected communities. The Nandi were forcefully evicted from land adjoining the railway line after a confrontation that led to the burning of 917 houses and 239 grain stores, and the loss of about 450 livestock to British colonial forces.[16] A section of the Maasai who had been pushed north of the railway in Laikipia frequently conflicted with European livestock keepers over "tresspassing" and straying of Maasai stock on alienated land. It was not uncommon for European livestock barons in the central rift valley area to shoot African pastoralists found trespassing on their vast ranches, which, as in the Galbraith Cole incident, led to court cases that failed to yield justice to the African victims.[17] To prevent this, and fearing the spread of cattle disease on their farms, the European settlers put pressure on the government to relocate this group of Maasai south of the railway, which was accomplished through forced eviction by 1913. This eviction elicited the most notable of Maasai protestations against the loss of their land, and contested the eviction in a colonial court that only endorsed the transfer of that land to the British Crown.[18] The legacy boded ill for the long-term relations between this community and the government as noted by McGregor Ross, a colonial civil engineer who was well acquainted with Maasai social and economic plight under British colonial rule. He noted that the "Maasai did not, on the whole, settle down contentedly in their new locations" and that the eviction created "a perplexed and sullen tribesmen that proved to be the most difficult posts in the public service."[19] Indeed, for most of the colonial period, the administration in the newly created Maasai reserve south of the railway frequently contended with raids by Maasai *morans* against government stations and neighboring African communities.

THE SQUATTER SYSTEM AND ITS INHERENT TENSIONS

Land alienation led to the creation of African reserves into which many communities that lost their lands were confined and eked a

living from shrinking land for cultivation and grazing. Boundaries were demarcated to separate these reserves from land alienated for European settlement, and to separate the different ethnic communities that were assigned to their reserves. The establishment of reserves was intended to insulate alienated land from infiltration by dispossessed African communities and act as labor reservoirs for European enterprises. Yet disputes and conflicts arose between the various communities over reserve boundaries in the Rift Valley. As early as the 1920s, such disputes were common between the Pokot and Marakwet, the dominant Kalenjin communities in northwest Rift Valley. Both sought to access grazing and crop cultivation in the Chesogon River Valley. Further north, the Samburu and the neighboring Borana, both livestock-keeping communities, conflicted over communal lands designated for them by the colonial government.[20]

A significant development that emerged in the wake of alienation of African land was the squatter system in the Rift Valley. This system required the accommodation of thousands of landless African households on European farms. The Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities formed the majority of squatter communities throughout the Rift Valley, especially in central and southern Rift Valley in Nakuru, Naivasha, Laikipia, Narok, and Uasin Gishu.[21] They were also joined by mainly the Luyia from Western Kenya who, while spared large-scale land alienation for European settlement, flocked into Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia parts of the Rift Valley as farm laborers and squatters. Most came from the North Kavirondo District where population pressure on land created landlessness and became a strong motivation for out-migration from the late 1920s.[22] The squatter system was a vivid manifestation of the consequences of land alienation that was allowed into natural progression by the colonial government since it helped to provision African labor on European and government endeavors. Thus the settler economy was bound to succeed only by precluding the emergence of an independent African peasant producer. This, according to E. A. Brett, could only be achieved by "snatching from the African producer the reins of social and economic control" and "by alienating his land and marginalizing him into the labor reservoir."[23] The squatter system eliminated the possibility that Africans in and outside of the European settled areas, if allowed considerable access to land and labor, could undermine settler economy.

As long as squatters posed minimal threat to this arrangement during the "legal" hiatus period from 1903 to about 1930, their tenure in the White Highlands was tolerated. Soon, the squatters became

innovative, utilizing their labor, livestock, and limited access to land on European farms to sustain their livelihoods and even dispose some produce to the colonial markets. The colonial administration in the Rift Valley frequently lamented the lack of progress in settler agriculture as compared to the thriving production from squatter-held areas on settler farms. This could have been the case since production by independent squatters in the Highlands surpassed that of European landlords in the period of the two depressions before 1940. This development, according to Bruce Berman, "was a real threat, insofar as many settlers had difficulty making productive use of their estates."[24] Furthermore, outside of the squatter economy, it has been established that the costs of maintaining the railway were borne by African peasant production from Nyanza Province and not by European settlers, at least before 1920.[25] Indeed, within the larger White Highlands, of the 6,847,000 acres of land alienated for European settlement, about 1,850,000 acres was under squatter crops or livestock, with much more being trespassed by land-starved communities such as the Maasai, Nandi, and Tugen in Mau, Uasin Gishu, and Baringo areas of the Rift Valley.[26] However, it is true that certain cash crops grown by European farmers in the Rift Valley were bringing in high earnings to the colonial government and the farmers. For example, by 1935, as Kenya started to gradually recover from the Great Depression, the economic prosperity in Nakuru and Naivasha areas was attributed to the production of sisal, coffee, and dairy, while high maize outputs were registered in Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia districts by European farmers.[27]

Generally, however, when the European settlers were unable to increase their financial security as was the case after 1930, they blamed this on squatter prosperity that was thought to thrive on squatter access to more labor, and increasing acreages of crops and livestock in squatter-occupied areas. European settlers soon put pressure on the colonial government to review the squatter "institution" to favor them. But in ways that initiated a path toward serious conflict between the two groups, the European settlers devised strategies to strangle the squatter economy by reducing the land available to African squatters in the Rift Valley for farming and grazing. They demanded more labor hours from their squatter laborers and a reduction in squatter livestock on European farms. Extreme controls over squatter economy included seizure of stock by European farmers, which forced Africans to retaliate by maiming livestock and burning crops that belonged to settlers.[28] They eventually resorted to forced eviction of the squatters from the late 1930s into much of the 1940s,

later contributing to the Mau Mau rebellion, the most notable bloody conflict that has left an indelible mark on land relations in the Rift Valley in particular and Kenya in general. Squatters and settlers thus offered competing economic visions on utilizing land in the Rift Valley, with the former seeking to monopolize all the land at their disposal, even when the entire land under their title was not fully being cultivated. Their intention was to stifle the productive potential of the squatters, who, in spite of their agricultural entrepreneurship on the limited land resource, found their paths to adequate land blocked by the settlers supported by the colonial governments. The outbreak of the Mau Mau, and its related violence and bloody conflict, indicated the tenuous nature of these mutually opposed visions of land-based mode of production in the Rift Valley.

Mau Mau and the Struggle over Land

The Mau Mau uprising shows how relations over land in Kenya have been played out in a conflict-ridden arena. The violence and concomitant murders and destruction that characterized both sides of the conflict underline the means by which each of those sides sought to define their interests. The colonial government looked beyond its land and other policies that drove the Kikuyu and other Africans onto the margins of destituteness and despair, and delegitimized the uprising by unleashing the heavy weaponry of imperial forces with heavy human casualties then unknown in Kenya's history.[29] Originating in the central Rift Valley in Naivasha and Olenguruone areas in the late 1940s, this dominantly Kikuyu movement was aimed at expelling all Europeans from Kenya and installing Africans as "rulers of the land."[30] The fact that lopsided colonial land policies were important in the uprising is evident from the tensions that continued to characterize the settler squeeze of African squatters' economic activities on one hand, and government failure to facilitate the settlement of those squatters in the Rift Valley's open spaces on the other.

One such area was Olenguruone where the intended settlement of landless Kikuyu families was botched as the 4,000 peasant families that accessed the settlement resisted the imposition of land use restrictions that undermined their freedom to utilize the new environment in ways they deemed economically viable to their livelihoods. The government dubbed these families as "illegal residents" and between 1946 and 1950 forceful measures were implemented to evict them. Homes and crops belonging to these families were razed to the ground by colonial police, followed by mass evacuations

and enforcement of prosecutions for those who disobeyed orders to evacuate from the scheme. Those who resisted evacuation hastily constructed temporary shelters or retreated to nearby caves hoping that the government would relent on the evacuation orders.[31] By 1950, discontentment with government land policies soon spread to other Kikuyu communities in the Rift Valley areas, particularly Njoro, Elburgon, and Timboroa.

About the same time, Dini Ya Musambwa (DYM), a millenarian spiritual movement with strong roots and following among the Bukusu of North Kavirondo District of Nyanza Province, spread and engulfed Luyia and Kalenjin—mainly Nandi and Pokot—communities in Trans Nzoia and parts of Uasin Gishu. Founded and led by Elijah Masinde, DYM sprang from perceived colonial excesses against the Bukusu members of the Luyia community, but was motivated by unpopular colonial agricultural demands such as soil conservation, and a local reaction against alienation of land for European settlement in the borders areas of North Kavirondo and Trans Nzoia.[32] By the beginning of the 1950s, Trans Nzoia in the north Rift had become a "hot bed" of the DYM since its message resonated closely with Luyia and Kalenjin farm laborers and squatters on European farms. DYM adherents deliberately set grazing lands on fire to protest grazing controls by the local administration. Luka, a DYM leader of the Pokot community, mobilized local opposition to the government's "planned development" program aimed at promoting agricultural development partly as a means to stamping out the DYM. Lukas promoted a millenarian vision among his followers by forecasting a new era in which "healing" of the land and abundance in crop and livestock production, as well as good health of the African population that would follow European departure from the area. The resulting confrontation in this part of the Rift Valley, referred to as the Kolloa incident of 1950, led to the death of three European officials, an African policeman, Lukas, and a number of DYM faithfuls.[33]

But the Kolloa incident was overshadowed by the Mau Mau, not so much in the way both were motivated by the unpopular colonial land and agricultural policies of the government that impinged on African land rights, but by the extent in which the latter became widespread and unleashed a sustained bloody conflict within the Rift Valley and Central Provinces. As pressure from European settlers mounted on squatters to vacate farms across the settled areas of the Rift Valley in 1950, Mau Mau peasants relocated to the forestlands of the Rift Valley and Central Provinces and launched systematic attacks on European farms. In 1953, a planned Mau Mau attack on a police

station in Naivasha yielded a consignment of arms and ammunitions to the militants, and led to major conflicts and murders directed at settlers as well as African sympathizers of the colonial government, as illustrated by the Lari massacre. These two developments led to a government decision to evict thousands of Kikuyu families in central and lower Rift, about 30,000 from Laikipia alone.[34] The bloody attack on Lari was a symbolic culmination of not only decades of Kikuyu disapproval of government disregard for the landlessness of the squatters, but also a simmering dispute between the "rebellious" and privileged loyal sections of that community. Bruce Berman's emphasis on these developments is even clearer when he asserts the Naivasha raid and the Lari Massacre marked the explosive culmination of a long-simmering land dispute between the Mau Mau Kikuyu loyalists on the acceptance of compensation of land alienated to white farmers and symbolized the class element in this anticolonial struggle.[35] Between 1954 and 1956, Mau Mau fighters continued to wreck havoc against European farmers in Naivasha, Nakuru, and Laikipia, leading to killings on both sides of the conflict.[36]

While the end of the state of emergency in 1959 attested to the complete end to the Mau Mau, the legacy of the conflict over land relations in the Rift Valley provided even more challenges to the colonial government. The developments that came at the conclusion of the bloody phase of the conflict after 1956 created tensions over land between African communities living in the province and those aspiring to access land in the area, particularly Kikuyu returnee squatters who had been expelled in the years leading to Mau Mau. The returnees had failed to gain access to land in Central Province and hoped to reverse their landlessness by returning to the Rift Valley. Their decision to return was economic, most hoping to be reabsorbed as farm laborers by European settlers. Their return, however, was also fuelled by the impending decolonization of Kenya, a reality that prevented most settlers from either investing in their farms, or abandoning those farms, in an environment that was generating "gloom and despondency" among this section of Kenya's community.[37] On the other hand, by 1960, these developments enabled the Kikuyu returnees to seize on the opportunity to reassert themselves in the emerging political economy of land relations in a rapidly changing Kenya.

However, the influx of non-Kalenjin and non-Maasai communities into the Rift Valley in the post–Mau Mau period but before independence was not welcomed by communities that felt they were "indigenous" to the province, and who, also conscious of the impending decolonization, were keen to reclaim all land formerly alienated by the

British. These tensions were largely amplified and played out within Kenya's largest nationalist parties—the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KADU mobilized support from Kenya's minority ethnic communities such as the Kalenjin, Maasai, Mijikenda, and Luyia to press for a *Majimbo* (federal/regional) government for an independent Kenya during the Lancaster constitutional deliberations. *Majimbo* was perceived as the ultimate solution to defending the political and economic opportunities of these minority groups against the larger dominant ethnic communities, particularly the Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba.[38] Consequently, KADU and KANU—the latter dominated by the majority ethnic communities such as the Kikuyu and the Luo—largely influenced the emergence of opposing ethnic alliances within the Rift Valley, so much so that political loyalty became more synonymous with tribal loyalty, thereby increasing tensions in the province. These political developments had implications on land relations as well. The Kalenjin feared that the increasing influx of the Kikuyu in the Central and Upper Rift Valleys—Nakuru, Naivasha, Uasin Gishu, and Trans Nzoia—could dispossess them of land soon to be vacated by European farmers.[39]

Kikuyu-Kalenjin tensions often reached fever pitch leading to creation of armed groups to be used as a means to claiming the right to land in the Rift Valley. In 1962 the Kikuyu-dominated Kenya Land Freedom Army sought to use armed force against other African groups in the Rift Valley so as to aid Kikuyu claims to European-owned land, a development that elicited "military" mobilization within the Kalenjin community keen on preventing such an occurrence. The Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner reported thus of the Kalenjin response to Kikuyu threats: "African smiths were inundated with orders for spears. Bows and arrows were manufactured and stock-piled; poison was traded for goats and grain; and on a number of occasions the war alarm was shouted from hill to hill, leading to the rapid mobilization of hundreds or even thousands of excited warriors."[40]

None of these African ethnic tensions in the Rift Valley led to an all-out conflagration as feared by the government. Nonetheless, thousands of Kikuyu and other communities outside of province gained access to land within the Rift Valley mainly through government-assisted settlement programs between 1961 and 1964. Many more others purchased farms on an individual or cooperative basis particularly in the early decade of independence.[41] These settlement schemes and land purchases reinforced the cosmopolitan nature of

the agriculturally productive rural areas of the province that now became a permanent home not only to the "indigenous" Kalenjin and Maasai communities, but also to the Luyia, Luo, Kisii, and Kamba communities who found themselves there because of the need for land. More significant, however, is the fact that those developments sowed the seeds for future tensions and conflicts, which became more prominent following the ethnic, regional, and national politics that characterized the reemergence of political pluralism in Kenya after 1990. Land proved central to the outcome of these later politics.

National Politics and Conflict over Land in the Multiparty Era

Probably no period in postcolonial Kenya has revealed the explosive nature of land relations at the national and regional levels than the period following political liberalization after 1990. This has been a transformative era for Kenya as it accelerated the pace toward a multiparty system but in a way that enhanced the structural dominance of land issues in national politics. The Rift Valley in particular has provided a "battleground" for defining political and ethnic alliances in national politics in which access to land in the province has played a critical role. Local animosity by ethnic communities in the Rift Valley such as the Kalenjin and the Maasai against "none-native" groups such as the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luyia that have legally acquired land and made the province their home has undermined any pretentions that the unitary status of Kenya's political structure can hold the country's diverse populations together without using land as a "weapon" to perpetuate national integration and promote meaningful development. Thus since 1988, the political elite in the Rift Valley seized on the opportunities offered by political pluralism to exact political loyalty from migrant communities settled in the province. Intimidation, bloody conflicts, and murders have therefore marked the relations between "natives" and "nonnatives" in the Rift Valley, with the latter being forced to give up their claims to land in the province. These tensions and conflicts have been marked particularly during every election cycle since the 1992 multiparty elections.

In the buildup toward the 1992 multiparty elections, the first in Kenya since 1966, the local Kalenjin and Maasai political elite aligned with the incumbent KANU party that was battling a strong wave of opposition movement and assumed a surrogate role of helping the party stave off the multiparty onslaught by using land and ethnicity to exact support in the Rift Valley. Sometimes, such "tribal" animosities meted out by the native communities had no ultimate political

motives; however, political pluralism provided these communities with an opportunity to revisit and settle years of land-related tensions. For example, in early 1989, a section of the Kuria community residing in the Maasai-dominated Transmara District in the southern part of the Rift Valley Province were forcefully evicted by the provincial administration on the account that they were squatters from across Tanzania. The forceful eviction was justified by the local administration as a preemptive measure of precluding the Maasai from using spears to drive out the Kuria. About the same time, but for political motives, Luo-speaking "squatters" on Thessalia Farm in Kericho District were violently driven out of the area by the local administration that was sympathetic to claims to land of the local Kalenjin-speaking Kipsigis community.[42]

The Kuria and Thessalia episodes marked the beginning of a series of "ethnic" cleansing evictions in the productive and ethnically diverse districts in the Rift Valley that dominated the 1990s and demonstrated a tendency to reoccur in a politically charged environment in Kenya. "Settler" or "alien" communities in the province—usually the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luyia—who were construed to support the opposition movement against KANU were largely considered as government critics and asked to leave their farms. A member of the local political elite allied to KANU in the province publicly supported this move by stating:

> Let them [migrants] keep quiet or else we [Kalenjin] are ready for reintroduction of Majiboism where every person will be required to go back to his motherland. Once we introduce Majimbo in the Rift Valley, all outsiders who acquired our land will need to move and then leave the same land to our children.[43]

By invoking *Majimbo* in the early 1990s, politicians in the Rift Valley were rekindling the history of nationalism of the late colonial period in Kenya so as to shape the trajectory of national politics in a postindependent Kenya in their favor; while using land resources to achieve that aim, they ruptured Kenya's unitary structure for political expediency. *Majimbo* had been the political ideology central to KADU's nationalist politics of decolonization in the early 1960s. Between 1963 and 1969, the KANU-led government had undermined KADU's national influence, changed the constitution to abolish the regional government that helped birth Kenya as an independent state, and proscribed opposition parties in the country's national politics.[44] Thus, a return to multiparty politics after 1990 marked a considerable

gain against political repression that had been the outstanding feature of Kenya's politics since 1969.

But this political development was not without contradictions that helped to crystallize conflicts and tensions over land in the Rift Valley. That is, there were political leaders from communities such as the Kalenjin and Maasai, previously considered as minorities in the era of decolonization, who, feeling threatened by political liberalization in the 1990s, sought to return to the ideologies of the pre-independence era so as to ensure their ascendancy in national politics. Hence, their appeal to *Majimbo* as a means of evicting from the Rift Valley those communities from larger ethnic groups that did not agree with their political agenda. Consequently, such a strategy has been interpreted by some as lacking any legitimacy, and therefore, a means of refurbishing "regionalism" into a political ideology of ethnic cleansing for political gains at the national and regional levels in Kenya. It was particularly seen as a means of altering the demographic structure of the Rift Valley to the advantage of the incumbent party in the impending 1992 elections.[45] Land issues in the Rift Valley have played a central role in this metamorphosis of national politics in Kenya. In fact, the use of the *Majimbo* mantra by local leaders on behalf of the Kalenjin and Maasai communities to lay exclusive claim to land in the Rift Valley was also seen as a means of stifling the wave of political liberalization in Kenya. The need to use violence against "alien" communities in the Rift Valley to undermine the multiparty movement in the early 1990s was made clear in public political rhetoric at the time.[46]

Such was the environment that characterized the politics regarding land and the resulting conflict at the national and regional levels in Kenya at the beginning of the 1990s, and which were largely responsible for tensions, bloody confrontations, and destruction of property that marked the Rift Valley in particular. This was common in the build-up to the 1992 elections and after. In October 1991 in the Tinderet Division of Nandi District, a confrontation over the Miteitei farm took place between a Kikuyu women's group and a local Kalenjin faction that was opposed to this property being owned by a non-Kalenjin enterprise. To prevent this possibility, the local Kalenjin faction, aided by KANU political operatives in the region, forced the eviction of the Kikuyu from the farm by burning their houses and grain stores. The purchase of land and investments made on it by this women's group were subsequently lost.[47] In November of the same year, a group of Luo that had jointly raised funds to purchase a piece of land from a European plantation owner in Songor, Nandi, were subjected to violent attacks, resulting in deaths and eviction,

by the local Kalenjin community. These conflicts were attributed to the influence of calls for *Majimbo* by local politicians in the affected areas.[48]

Following independence in 1963, Uasin Gishu District in the north Rift Valley retained a larger population of former squatters and workers on farms previously owned by European settlers. These included the Luyia, Kalenjin, and Kikuyu communities. While inter-ethnic clashes over land in the 1990s were isolated in that district, such clashes were, however, concentrated in Ainabkoi Division, particularly in the Burnt Forest area that was heavily settled by Kikuyu migrants. Conflicts here pitted the local Kelenjin youths against these Kikuyu migrants, and involved the use of firearms, hand grenades, bows, and arrows. Though local complaints pointed at livestock thefts, it is clear that these conflicts were politically motivated as they coincided with campaigns for the general elections in 1992, occurring in the few months before and after the elections. The conflicts, which led to several deaths, were linked to the development of a political movement sympathetic to the opposition against KANU in this area. The Kikuyu-Kalenjin conflicts in this part of the Rift Valley were so sustained that they led to a government declaration of this area as a security operation zone in September 1993.[49]

In Trans Nzoia further north, the Sabaot, a Kalenjin community that lost thousands of acres to European settlement during the colonial period, have, since independence, demonstrated a tendency to reclaim these lands at the expense of non-Kalenjin communities that moved into Trans Nzoia in large numbers. The largest non-Kalenjin community that has acquired land in this area is the Luyia (especially the Bukusu) from the neighboring Western Province, as well as the Kikuyu from Central Province. The Sabaot, acting in consonance with fellow Kalenjin communities, opposed the introduction of opposition parties and easily tapped into old grievances of land loss to express a dislike of the Luyia and Kikuyu in Trans Nzoia who supported opposition leaders against KANU. The resulting conflicts were concentrated in Kwanza, Endebess, Cherangani, and Saboti divisions. Given the spread and predominance of the Sabaot in Western Province, particularly in the greater Mt. Elgon area, ethnic tensions motivated by national politics but made to thrive on decades of land-related grievances, ensured that the conflicts in Trans Nzoia were replicated in this northern portion of the Western Province that is dominated by the Luyia people.[50]

The central Rift Valley, particularly Nakuru, Molo, Olenguruone, and Naivasha areas, were most affected by clashes over land in the

early 1990s involving the various ethnic groups living in the area. As already noted, these areas were centers of the Mau Mau movement within the province in the 1950s, and became points of destination for Kikuyu migration from Central Province in the post–Mau Mau period. Nakuru is also one of the most multiethnic parts of the Rift Valley given its status as the headquarters of the expansive province. Most migrants—outside of the government and economic elite— who have legally acquired land in this area have found themselves living side by side with the Kalenjin and Maasai communities that consider these areas as their "ancestral" lands. While tensions over land in these areas cannot be discounted, conflict between migrants and the "local" communities were mainly invoked by the differences in affiliation to different political parties. For example, the Kikuyu population that dominates the Nakuru-Molo-Naivasha zone tended to identify themselves with the opposition parties that were anti-KANU, a party that enjoyed the support of the Kalenjin and Maasai communities in this area.[51]

But it was in Narok, in the southern portions of the Rift Valley, between June and September 1993, that Maasai residents constantly put pressure on the Kikuyu families in the district to leave the area. They seem to have been motivated by the local Maasai political elite who, in the guise of reclaiming Maasai land rights that had been appropriated by British colonial policies in the colonial era, demanded that the Kikuyu peasants who had bought land and settled in the area in the 1960s and 1970s be evicted.[52] A confrontation in the Enoosupukia part of Narok in mid-October of 1993 left about 20 members of Kikuyu families dead and almost 30,000 displaced.[53]

"Ethnicizing" the Rift Valley and politicizing the land for gain continued into the second half of the 1990s as long as the KANU leadership of the Kalenjin and Maasai communities felt the threat of being supplanted by opposition parties that appealed to communities settled in the Rift Valley but who originated from outside the province. The survival of traditional pastoralist grazing patterns amongst the Maasai became a factor in the ensuing clashes over land. For example, in Narok and Laikipia, the Maasai insisted on a nomadic pastoralism that required them to herd their livestock on lands used for crop cultivation by the farming communities such as the Kisii that had settled in these respective areas. Although not legally owning the cultivated farms, the Maasai herders have always felt that they have grazing rights to these farms given that this area historically belongs to the community. The political positioning by both these pastoralists and the migrant agricultural communities by rendering their support

to opposing political parties before and after the 1997 general elections was a recipe for conflict. Consequently, the Ol Moran area of Laikipia was marked with arson, murder, and decapitation of livestock by opposing groups in January 1998.[54] The presence of European private investments in capital-intensive ranches in Laikipia has intensified Maasai claims to land in the area to the extent that landlessness among some African communities in the region is contrasted with the enormous profits made by these large-scale capital investments. This has turned the question of land grievances in the Rift Valley, particularly with regard to the Maasai, into a human rights issue by both civil organizations and the local Maasai elite.[55]

Multiparty politics and its attendant conflicts were not limited to the Rift Valley alone but were widespread in the other provinces particularly Coast, Central, and Nyanza. Such a national trend reflected the search for grand coalitions between Kenya's myriad ethnic groups so as to protect parochial interests by using politics to achieve this. Consequently, major urban areas in most provinces, aside from small trading centers in rural areas in the Rift Valley, became focal points for contesting national politics. This widespread nature of tensions and conflicts in Kenya as channeled through national politics, but which reflected entrenched economic interests embedded in land and other income-generating institutions, was quite evident in the mayhem that followed the bungled 2007 general election. While land grievances were not the cause of the postelection violence in late 2007 and early 2008, generations of failed land reforms and tensions over land since the colonial times provided fertile ground on which the outcome of that election was contested. Thus the postelection violence clearly followed interethnic cleavages that were evident in the violence and murders in urban areas such as Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru, and Eldoret.[56]

However, given its status as a historically contested geographical region in Kenya, the Rift Valley became a major flash point in the bloody conflicts that marked the 2008 postelection violence. Rift Valley areas such as Nakuru, Naivasha, Molo, Uasin Gishu, and Narok that had been zones of decades of tensions over land between various ethnic communities bore the brunt of the conflict in terms of murders, arson, and destruction of property. Furthermore, the 2008 postelection violence highlighted two major developments that relate to the extent of tense land relations in the Rift Valley. The first of these was that this province, particularly in areas prone to land-related tensions, accounted for over a half of the internally displaced persons throughout the country (see table 9.1).

Table 9.1 Population of internally-displaced persons (IDPs) at the height of the 2008 postelection violence

Region/Province	No. of IDPs
North Rift	88, 524
South Rift	87, 119
Nyanza	3, 866
Western	15, 502
Central	5, 000
Nairobi	2, 459

Source: Kenya Human Rights Commission, *Human Rights Report: Special Edition on Post Election Violence*, 10, no. 1 (January–June 2008), 45, quoting the Kenya Red Cross. The same source estimates the total for the IDPs in Coast Province at 75,000.

Second, the role of the local militias in politically motivated conflicts, while not new in the multiparty era in Kenya, became a marked phenomenon in the postelection violence following the role of *Mungiki,* particularly in its base in Nakuru and the central Rift Valley region.[57] This social movement had its origins in the early 1990s, and its emergence and role in Kenya's national politics at critical times has evoked memories of Mau Mau with regard to land and other issues. However, *Mungiki* has also elicited new meanings attached to land in ways that espouse the core values and uniqueness of the faithfuls of this movement.

Mungiki and the Search for a Peace Land Model

The religio-political *Mungiki* movement connects to the history of resistance stemming from the unresolved ethnic clashes in Rift Valley's land tensions and political frustrations. The largely Kikuyu *Mungiki* group is highly organized, active, and radical in their recruitment, activities, and operations, receiving support from thousands of marginalized Kenyans.[58] Years of untreated and disputed land problems and inequality that stretches back to colonial rule have provided the reasons for *Mungiki* efforts in recruiting many landless, displaced, poor, and disgruntled peasants who wanted solutions to their problems. The resistance of this group should not be undermined and has often been compared in ideology and militancy to Mau Mau,

which ultimately led to Kenyan independence.[59] In the process of an interview, one Nairobi informant offered the following explanation of *Mungiki*:

> Mungiki is the voice of the voiceless. The government outlawed it not because it was a terrorist organization, but because they feared criticism. This was political repression like that which was meted against organizations like the Mau Mau and the Kenya African Union (KAU) during colonial times.[60]

This notion of *Mungiki* as a "voice of the voiceless" is reminiscent of Mau Mau activism. However, *Mungiki* aims to complete the incomplete "land and freedom" struggle of Mau Mau.[61] There are other complementary ways to understand the movement. In *Peasant Intellectuals*, Steven Feierman states, "When peasants organize political movements, or when they reflect on collective experience, they speak about how politics can be ordered to bring life rather than death, to bring prosperity rather than hunger, and to bring justice rather than inequity."[62] Feierman continues that it is the peasant who determines the means to achieve results.[63] In this regard, *Mungiki* unites those who contest and challenge the Kenyan government and its failure to address the land issues in the Rift Valley and economic inequality in general.

Mungiki history has been written largely by scholars who present development as it relates to Kenyan land politics. After independence, the government failed to present a clear National Land Policy to address land management and administration, opening an opportunity for *Mungiki* to create their own solutions. The organization serves as a reminder that in the absence of clear leadership, direction, and resolution, matters will be addressed in creative and varied ways. Contestation of the Rift Valley cannot be ignored as it helps explicate the call to action, timing, and conviction of *Mungiki* members. The group has been in the making for years, which has given them time to refine their protesting messages. *Mungiki* continues to be challenged in defining the movement and determining the ultimate solution for peace and healing in the Rift Valley.

Mungiki has been successful over the years in mobilizing "masses" of Kikuyu youth in response to economic and social difficulties.[64] According to Rasmussen, *Mungiki* appeals to different people for different reasons; his study explores *Mungiki* in light of the history of youth movements in Kenya, the use of snuff tobacco, and Kikuyu cultural practices for connecting with ancestral elders.[65] Aside from this

generational and youth dimension, *Mungiki* also has an important ethnic factor.[66] Its members are mostly Kikuyu, products of ethnic land clashes in the Rift Valley. On this topic, a Luhya interviewee responded, "[*Mungiki*] is a Kikuyu affair. This is why the group is mainly rooted in Central Kenya and some parts of Nairobi. I believe if all tribes were represented, then it would not be a terrorist gang. It would have been a platform for political and economic agitation."[67] This respondent communicates the perceived exclusive *Mungiki* membership and the missed opportunity of a collective cross-ethnic resistance movement. Peter Kagwanja views the dynamics as even more complex, actually arguing that "the instrumentalization of ethnicity in African politics has its corollary in the concomitant instrumentalization of other identities—race, class, gender, clan, age, and religion."[68] Regardless of the identity factors, the group has been effective in numbers as a movement with nearly 7 million self-proclaimed *Mungiki* members.[69] By the 1990s, the movement quickly spread, encompassing the Central Province and Nairobi. Many persons displaced from Rift Valley land moved to Nairobi such that *Mungiki* has become identified more as an urban group in Nairobi slums.[70]

However, it is important to place the activities of *Mungiki* in a larger perspective, raising questions on why and how victims—*Mungiki* faithful—are actually portrayed as killers. This analysis requires a return to the land conflict and issues that still linger in the Rift Valley, conditions in the Nairobi slums, as well as government-mediated land deals, all against which the *Mungiki* has been vocal. The Mungiki blames these malpractices for the economic and social deprivation that ordinary Kenyans face, exacerbated by unequal access to land. While the movement's political leanings are undeniable, it is its socioreligious ideology, independent of the much-entrenched government partisanship in land relations, that holds the potential for addressing the continued tensions and conflicts over land in Kenya.[71] For *Mungiki* faithful, a solution for land conflict means upholding the indigenous rituals and beliefs that relate to the health of the "earth" and which can produce peace over land relations in Kenya. "Land peace" rituals are a means to stabilize and unify different ethnic groups in the Rift Valley and Kenya in general. This spiritual blueprint is clearly influenced by Jomo Kenyatta's treatment of these spiritual aspects in *Facing Mount Kenya,* in which he outlines the vital relationship between Africans and land that has been relived to some degree by *Mungiki*.[72] Kenyatta states that "the earth is the most sacred thing above all that dwell in or on it."[73] Land was essential for agriculture and thus life. Activities relating to land were serious

business of usually elderly men who had traditional systems in place to resolve land conflict and strife. The *muuma* ritual, an important component of *Mungiki* spiritualism, was a tradition used prior to the arrival of Europeans to resolve land disputes and issues within the Kikuyu community. It is a ritual that was subsequently used to contest Rift Valley lands appropriated by the British during the Mau Mau uprising.[74] The ritual process included tying the chest bone of a goat, passing seven sticks around each participant in the process, eating goat meat, drinking the blood of the goat, piercing its eyes, breaking its chest bone, piercing its stomach with seven sticks, and removing its chest bone.[75] Other practices included licking a mixture of a lamb's stomach in sacred herbs while taking oath (swearing) in the hope that the guilty party would be revealed by the ritual.[76] The legacy of these ritual practices resonate with *Mungiki* followers who continue to view *muuma* as relevant in the fight for land but which can also help achieve the broader goal "to make people have togetherness."[77]

These cultural ideals, particularly their spiritual nuances, provide a "bottom-up" approach to the problems of the land question in Kenya. The ideals aim to open up a new conversation and approach to addressing the arduous land issues, especially in the Rift Valley where *Mungiki* was initially founded in the early 1990s. They point to the fact that more energy needs to be focused on the strategies for peace and against emphasizing land violence and conflict. If viewed positively, this perspective and dimension will provide the government and the larger society a better position to build sustainable and acceptable land policies rooted in traditional and cultural beliefs of the different ethnic communities. The success of this approach in resolving conflicts and tensions over land, however, will rest on the extent to which all parties involved are able to "harmonize" a truly "national" or non-partisan traditional land ritual peace model that embraces the various ethnic communities involved in the struggle over land in the Rift Valley. Furthermore, such a traditional model for peace, if deemed viable, should be accommodated with the state legal framework so as to redeem some aspects of *Mungiki* traditional practices from being demonized by Kenya's mainstream society.

Conclusion

The Rift Valley Province in Kenya is the agricultural core of the country. Land-based modes of production remain essential to the national economy and to the livelihoods of millions of families that inhabit the province. Communities there continue to navigate a much-contested

land framework that colonialism helped to create, and which has been left intact by the postcolonial state. The capacity of both the colonial and postcolonial governments to preside over such a land framework has been challenged by ethnic communities in the Rift Valley since the late nineteenth century. Tensions, fear, and bloody conflicts have marked the relations between the government and local communities over access and right to land. Conflict has also been evident between the various communities that live in, or have sought to migrate to the Rift Valley. The need to survive by accessing the most essential resource across Africa has been the motivation for these conflicts, yet the importance of political advantages to be gained in regulating such access has also been evident. Consequently, the Rift Valley has been at the center stage of Kenya's national politics since the foundation of this territory at the turn of the twentieth century. Movements such as Mau Mau and *Mungiki* that have been at the center of Kenya's land politics may be construed negatively for their violent orientations toward searching for a consensus in Kenya's troubled history of land relations. For some, however, the spiritual appeals of these movements partly speak to alternative pathways to be sought in efforts for minimizing conflict over land in the country.

Notes

1. This being a term used for an incisive study by Lonsdale and Berman on intrigues that bred a history of violence in colonial Kenya. See Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa* (London: James Currey, 1992).

2. The dominant ethnic communities that regard the Rift Valley as their "native" area fall within a linguistic cluster known as "Kalenjin." They include Dorobo, Elgeyo, Kipsigis, Keiyo, Marakwet, Nandi, Pokot (or Suk), Sabaot, Terik, and Tugen. The non-Kalenjin communities include the Maasai, Samburu, and Turkana. As a "cosmopolitan province," the Rift Valley also plays host to migrant communities such as the Kikuyu, the Luyia, Luo, Kuria, and Gusii. John O. Oucho, *Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflict in Kenya* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 50. An insignificant European farming community is also present.

3. For comprehensive statistics on these geographical aspects, see the *Kenya National Bureau of Statistics* (Nairobi: Government Printers, 2011).

4. J. W. Gregory, *The Great Rift Valley: Being the Narrative of a Journey to Mount Kenya and Lake Baringo* (London: Frank Cass, 1968).

5. Sir Charles Eliot, *The East African Protectorate* (London: Frank Cass, 1966), 63, 171–72.

6. The Churchill Archive, CHAR/10/27/66–69. Churchill also noted the scourge of the tsetse fly in the Lake Victoria region that was not conducive to European settlement.

7. On the hostility of the Maasai to Joseph Thompson's party traversing through Maasailand in 1883, see Joseph Thompson, *Through Masai Land: A Journey of Exploration Among the Snowclad Volcanic Mountains and Strange Tribes of Eastern Equatorial Africa, Being the Narrative of the Royal Geographical Society's Expedition to Mount Kenia and Lake Victoria Nyanza, 1883–1884* (London: Cass, 1968). As regards the Nandi massacre in 1896 of Peter West, a member of a trading party led by another European named "Dick", himself murdered in the same year by the Maasai on the Kedong Escarpment in the western Rift Valley, see C. W. Hobley, *From Chartered Company to Crown Colony*, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1970), 88–89; Also Gregory, *The Great Rift Valley*, 147. These massacres were precipitated, among other motives, by controversy over livestock resources between the parties involved.

8. The Maasai were so much afflicted by internecine civil strife and natural crises that they were weakened enough to resist British colonial expansion into the Rift Valley areas under their habitation. Richard D. Waller, "The Maasai and the British, 1895–1905: The Origins of an Alliance." *Journal of African History* 17 (1976): 529–53; Richard D. Waller, "Emutai: Crisis and Response in Maasailand 1883–1902," in *Ecology of Survival: Case Studies from Northeast African History*, ed. Douglas H. Johnson and David M. Anderson (London and Boulder, 1988.), 73–112.

9. A. T. Matson, *Nandi Resistance to the British: A Volcano Erupts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); A. T. Matson, *The Nandi Campaign against the British, 1895–1906* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1974); Paul Lamphear, *The Scattering Time: Turkana Responses to Colonial Rule* (Oxford: Oxford Studies in African Affairs); David Anderson, *Eroding the Commons: The Politics of Ecology in Baringo, Kenya 1890–1963* (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), 41–47.

10. E. A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change 1919–1939* (London: Heineman, 1973); R. D. Wolff, *The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya 1870–1930* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974).

11. Britain invested approximately £5.5 million in the construction of the railway line. J. Lonsdale and B. Berman, "Coping with the Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895–1914." *Journal of African History* 20 (1979): 495. About imperial interests in the rail venture, see G. N. Uzoigwe, "The Mombasa Victoria Railway, 1890–1902: Imperial Necessity, Humanitarian Venture, or Economic Imperialism?" *Kenya Historical Review* 5

(1976): 11–34 and G. N. Uzoigwe, *Britain and the Conquest of Africa* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), 196–97.

12. Wolff, *The Economics of Colonialism*, chapter 3.

13. Ibid., 47–48. L. Hughes, *Moving the Maasai: A Colonial Misadventure* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 24. As for the Maasai, such characterization of their livelihoods may have been due to the frustration on the part of the colonial administration to bring the "wandering tribe" under effective control.

14. L. S. B.Leaky, quoted in N. Best, *Happy Valley: The Story of the English in Kenya* (London, 1979), 41.

15. M. P. K. Sorreson, Origins *of European Settlement in Kenya* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); G. H. Mungeam, *British Rule in Kenya, 1895–1912* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).

16. R. Meinertzhagen, *Kenya Diary 1902–1906* (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1957), 282–83.

17. Galbraith Cole owned almost 30,000 acres of land in Gilgil near Naivasha, and shot Kikuyu intruders on his farm leading to a court case that led to his expulsion from Kenya but was allowed to return in unclear circumstances. See Elspeth Huxley, *Out in the Midday Sun: My Kenya* (New York: Viking, 1985), 95–97.

18. Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement*, 190–225; Hughes, *Moving the Maasai*, 67–100.

19. McGregor Ross, *Kenya from Within: A Short Political History* (London: Frank Cass, 1968), 138–39.

20. Rift Valley Province (hereafter, RVP) Annual Report 1938, Kenya National Archives (hereafter KNA)/PC/RVP/2/3/1. Some Kenya National Archives references used in this chapter follow the numbering at the Bird Library of Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York.

21. A vivid account of the squatter history in the Rift Valley can be found in Tabitha Kanogo *The Squatters and Roots of Mau Mau* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1987).

22. On population pressure as a motivation for out-migration in areas such as Vihiga, see Martin S. Shanguhyia, "The State, Ecology, and Society in Western Kenya: Politics of Soil Conservation and Land Management in Vihiga, 1930–1950" (PhD Dissertation, West Virginia University, 2007), 384–400. Also Robert Maxon, *Going Their Separate Ways: Agrarian Transformation in Kenya, 1930–1950* (London: Associated University Presses, 2003), 131–35, 178–83.

23. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, 169.

24. John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, "Coping with the Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895–1914," *Journal of African History* 20 (1979): 149, 498. Also P. M. Mbithi and C. Barnes, *The Spontaneous Settlement Problem in Kenya* (Kampala: East African Literature Bureau, 1975), 46–47. As for the economic under-performance of settler faming before 1940, see P. Van Zwanenberg, "Kenya's Primitive Colonial Capitalism: The

Economic Weakness of Kenyan Settlers up to 1940." *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 9 (1975): 277–92.

25. Lonsdale and Berman, "Coping with the Contradictions," 498.
26. David Throup, *Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau* (London: James Currey, 1988), 93. Anderson, *Eroding the Commons*, 102–25.
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28. Throup, *Economic and Social Origins*, 92–93.
29. Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005); David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005); Daniel Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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33. RVP Annual Report 1950, KNA/PC/RVP/2/3/6; For details see Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Affray at Kolloa, Baringo* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1951).
34. RVP Annual Report 1953, KNA/PC/RVP/2/3/6.
35. Bruce Berman, *Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya* (London: James Currey, 1990), 348.
36. RVP Annual Reports for 1954–1955, KNA/PC/RVP/2/3/6; RVP Annual Report, 1956, KNA/AA/13/1/8/3 Vol. X.
37. RVP Annual Report 1960, KNA: AA/13/1/8/3.
38. For a more recent analysis of this aspect of decolonization in Kenya in the late 1950s and early 1960s, see Robert Maxon, *Kenya's Independence Constitution: Constitution-Making and End of Empire* (Lanham, MD: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2011).
39. RVP Annual Report 1960, KNA: AA/13/1/8/3.
40. RVP Annual Report 1962, KNA: AA/13/1/8/3 Vol. XI.
41. On the details of Kenya's land resettlement schemes shortly before and after independence, see Christopher Leo, *Land and Class in Kenya* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984); John Harbeson, *Nation-Building in Kenya; The Role of Land Reform* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
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46. *Daily Nation*, September 29, 1991.

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48. Ibid., 76–78.

49. Ibid, 111–15.

50. Ibid., 191–223. See also Clare Medard, "Indigenous Land Claims in Kenya: A Case Study of Chebuyuk, Mount Elgon District," in *The Struggle Over Land in Africa: Conflicts, Politics and Change*, ed. Ward Anseeuw and Chris Alden (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2010).

51. Ibid., 119.

52. *Daily Nation*, September 13, 1993; *Weekly Review*, October 29, 1993, 8–9; *The East African Standard*, August 21, 1993.

53. *Sunday Nation*, October 17, 1993; *Daily Nation*, October 18, 1993.

54. Republic of Kenya, *Report of the Judicial Commission*, 140–46.

55. *East African Standard*, August 25, 2004; *East African Standard*, August 27, 2004; *East African Standard*, September 12, 2004.

56. A comprehensive report by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) gives a detailed regional spread of the 2008 postelection violence across rural and urban areas in Kenya. See *On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya's Post-2007 Election Violence* (Nairobi: KNCHR, August 15, 2008).

57. Mungiki is regarded to have its largest base in Nakuru. KNCHR, *On the Brink of the Precipice*, 85. Also, the *East African Standard*, June 27, 2004.

58. Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, "Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca? The Mungiki, Ethnic Violence and the Politics of the Moi Succession in Kenya, 1987–2002."*African Affairs* 102, no. 406 (2003), 102.

59. David Anderson, "Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya," *African Affairs* 101, no. 405 (October 2002), 535. Also see Kagwanja, "Facing Mount Kenya," 102, 30. Kagwanja states that "Mungiki leaders also lay claim to the Mau Mau mantle."

60. Interview, E. N. N, July 2011, Nairobi, Kenya.

61. Kagwanja, "Facing Mount Kenya," 102, 30.

62. Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 3.

63. Ibid.

64. The name "Mungiki" translates into "masses." Aarhus, Paige. The Mungiki, the Taliban, and Me. *VICE.* http://www.vice.com/read/

the-mungiki-the-taliban-and-me-0000107-v19n1,2. Accessed February 2012.

65. J. Rasmussen, "Mungiki as Youth Movement Revolution, Gender and Generational Politics in Nairobi, Kenya." *Young* 18, no. 3 (2010): 301.

66. Most instances of land violence are between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic communities and started after independence. During this initial period, *Mungiki* assisted Kikuyu farmers against the Kalenjin-dominated government. However, the Kalenjin viewed the Kikuyu differently. Over the years, there has also been reported *Mungiki* and Luo strifes, again raising questions about the potential for multiethnic resistance. See Scott Baldauf, "Why the Infamous Mungiki Are Gearing up for Reprisal Killings." *Christian Science Monitor* 100, no. 44 (January 2008): 12.

67. Interview, L. D., July 2011, Nairobi.

68. Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, "'Power to Uhuru': Youth Identity and Generational Politics in Kenya's 2002 Election." *African Affairs* 105, no. 418 (January 2006), 51.

69. Erik Henningsen and Peris Jones, "Crisis and Regeneration of the Self: The Mungiki Movement's Power of Mobilsation," Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, Working paper

70. Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, "'Power to Uhuru,'" 51.

71. Indeed, politics has been a part of *Mungiki*'s activities as has been its spiritual agenda. Grace Nyatugah Wamue, "Revisiting Our Indigenous Shrines through Mungiki." *African Affairs* 100 (2001): 458.

72. Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu* (London: Secker and Warburton 1938), xxi.

73. Ibid., 22.

74. Kenya National Archives, "Kikuyu Muuma Oath Cermony," March 27, 1952, KNA: DC/KBU/7/1.

75. Ibid.

76. John Middleton and Greet Kershaw, *The Kikuyu and Kamba of Kenya* (London: Sydney Press, 1965), 45.

77. Interview, J. Mbogo Ngondu, June 2012.

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The Migration of Professionals from Africa: Assessing the Impact of the "Brain Drain" from the Continent

J. K. Mapulanga-Hulston

INTRODUCTION

According to the United Nations, an estimated over 214 million people reside outside the country of their birth. The international migration of people, in particular those moving from developing countries to developed ones, has become an important and critical aspect of the global economic order. With the rapid population growth in developing countries and controlled growth in developed countries, international migration is likely to play a prominent role in the global economy (Beine et al., 2009). There is ample literature on diaspora externalities and international migration, which shows that there is a rise in the migration of highly qualified professionals, also known as "brain drain" or "globalization of human capital." According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), brain drain statistics for the world's 48 least developed countries (LDCs)[1] are quite stark. For example, about one in five university-level educated professionals leave for employment elsewhere, and the brain drain rate is estimated at a high of 18.4 percent for LDCs (UNCTAD, 2012).

For Africa, the "brain drain" continues to have a significant impact on the challenges the continent has been experiencing for decades, particularly in relation to economic development and growth. With an estimated 16 million African professionals currently working and

living in other, mainly developed, countries, the most commonly identified causes of migration are disparity in the levels of income, rise in unemployment, and lack of adequate social welfare. While globalization, trade liberalization, and the working of global economy have led to an increase in the effective supply of skilled workers across international borders, the exodus of skilled African professionals to the West, specifically to Europe and North America, has potentially devastating effects. This makes the topic of international migration a major policy and research issue at both the national and regional levels. This chapter provides an overview of the impact of Africa's brain drain by addressing its causes and its implications for the continent. In particular, it focuses on the brain drain of health professionals,[2] which could have devastating consequences for the continent. The chapter also addresses some policy options and recommendations.

Understanding the "Brain Drain": Implications of the Migration of Professionals

International migration refers to human movements across national borders. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), there are various categories of international migration.

> Much international migration is known as economic or labour migration and occurs as people move from countries with lower wage levels to countries with higher wage levels in search of work. Some international migration is known as family reunification and happens as members of a family move to join members of their families who have already settled elsewhere. Some international migration, known as refugee movements, occurs as people move to escape wars and political or religious persecution. (2000, 9)

There is a differentiation between voluntary migration and forced migration. Voluntary migration usually refers to displacements or movements in search of economic opportunities. Forced migration, on the other hand, is associated with some type of threat or concern that results in people moving from their homes for reasons of security, safety, or livelihood (Castles and Miller, 2009).[3]

International migration goes beyond the mere movement of people. It also "represents a powerful mechanism to transmit ideas across borders" (Bertoli and Marchetta, 2012, 4). Such transmissions are

not only restricted to ideas. According to Okeke (2008), brain drain is synonymous with knowledge loss. Lowell and Findlay maintain that brain drain occurs

> if emigration of tertiary educated persons for permanent or long stays abroad reaches significant levels and is not offset by the feedback effects of remittances, technology transfer, investments, or trade. Brain drain reduces economic growth through loss return on investment in education and depletion of the source country's human capital assets. (2001, 7)

The major reasons for the mass exodus from Africa are mainly financial or economic in nature, but may also be for social or political reasons. Crush and Pendleton (2010) maintain that the deteriorating politicosocial environment in the home or source countries is an important variable in migration. To this effect, one study found that South African health professionals who migrated had extraordinarily high levels of dissatisfaction with working and living conditions in their own country. Another study examined the negative aspects of forced population displacement on democratization and sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa and found that forced migration negatively affects the sociocultural cohesion as well as the economic and political systems of a large number of African societies (Rwamatwara, 2005).

Social and political reasons for migration can be categorized as either internal or external. Economic mismanagement, political instability, and civil strife are some of the internal issues that spurred international migration.[4] External issues are mainly economic forces, such as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), debt repayment, and global trade imbalances,[5] resulting in the rise in unemployment and deterioration of working and living conditions, thereby plunging many economies further into crisis (Crush, 2005). As the African Union succinctly states,

> The root causes of migration are numerous and complex. The push-pull[6] framework gives insight into the different forces at work to explain migration. In Africa, poor socioeconomic conditions, such as low wages, high levels of unemployment, rural underdevelopment, poverty and lack of opportunity fuel out-migration. These factors are usually brought about by a mismatch between the rapid population growth and the available resources, low level of requisite technology to exploit the available natural resources and capacity to create employment and jobs at the countries of origin. (2006, 1)

Economic Implications

The economic impact of international migration brought about by the various consequences or implications of human movement and migration is quite significant. Studies on various aspects of the impact of brain drain are wide-ranging. Some studies have analyzed the impact of globalization on domestic labor markets and found that migration has resulted in increased trade between receiving/destination countries and source/home countries (Blanes, 2005; Gould, 1994; Rauch and Trindade, 2002; White, 2007). Other studies have found that migration results in increased investment between the countries involved (Javorcik et al., 2011; Kugler and Rapoport, 2011; Nijkamp et al., 2011). Clemens and Pritchett (2008) found that the income of migrants was 50 percent higher than it was for residents in home/ source countries, and that migration was a way to poverty reduction and, therefore, constitutes economic development. Steineck (1996) addresses the economic impact of migration on welfare, while Borjas (1995) coined the term "immigration surplus," which refers to the increase in income of the indigenous population of the host country following immigration.

While economic migration plays a role in reducing skill shortages in receiving countries and thereby influencing their budgetary positions (Coppel et al., 2001), the African region is losing out on growth and development through the mass loss of the knowledge base of multitudes of emigrants. A study by Rasool and Botha (2011) found that South Africa is experiencing a serious shortage of skilled workers, which has had a negative effect on the country's economic prospects and socioeconomic growth and development. Another economic effect is in relation to the lost investment in terms of skills creation, which African countries made following independence from colonial rule. African governments invested heavily in providing universal access to primary and secondary education and setting up and establishing universities and training colleges, as well as offering generous financial support in the form of grants and bursaries to students to go overseas for further education and advanced training (Crush, 2005). For instance, an investment equivalent to US$48,169 is required for the medical training of one physician in Kenya (Kirigia et al., 2006). A recent study has found that most institutions in African countries lack the capacity or resources to train sufficient numbers of doctors (Mullan et al., 2011).

Hence, the migration of skilled professionals amounts to huge economic consequences in terms of losses of public finance in the

source/home countries. There appears to be lesser return on the investments African governments have made.[7] Further, the high levels of skilled migration have slowed down economic growth, and as a result, there is a perpetuation of poverty and inequality (Lowell and Findlay, 2001, 6). Sankore (2006) claims that developed countries like the United States have recruited over 130,000 foreign physicians and by so doing saved an estimated US$26 billion in training costs. In addition, although Africa only has meager resources to train its medical personnel, it incurs a loss of US$184,000 for each emigrating doctor or nurse (Sankore, 2006).

A study by Mills et al. (2011) on the lost investment of domestically educated doctors migrating from nine Sub-Saharan African countries[8] to Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States found that the estimated government subsidised cost of a doctor's education ranged from US$21,000 in Uganda to US$58,700 in South Africa. The study also found that the overall estimated loss of returns from investment for all doctors working in the destination countries was US$2.17 billion, with costs for each country ranging from $2.16 million for Malawi to $1.41 billion for South Africa.

Social and Political Implications

Migration also has important social effects in both receiving and source countries, because it is part of a process of social change. This process not only involves leaving social networks behind, but may also include experiences of a sense of loss, dislocation, alienation, and isolation, which are part of the process of acculturation, that is, when two cultures come into contact and changes occur (Androff et al., 2011; Bhugra, 2004; Creese, 2011; Groenewold, 2012; Kamya and White, 2011).[9] Migration is, therefore, a process that has multidimensional aspects to it. Julca (2011) states that migration primarily involves a family mechanism intended to reduce vulnerabilities associated with underlying inequalities but also involves the break-up of physical contact with family members, which results in "an enduring feature of vulnerability in their communication with origins" (e30).

Migration, therefore, has a huge impact on cultures and societies. Epstein and Gang (2010) found that culture manifests itself in the migration process for migrants, those remaining in the sending areas, and those already living in the receiving countries. They found inter alia that characteristics of international migration include the clustering of immigrants in ethnic communities, initial disadvantage of migrant workers in accessing the labor market in the receiving

countries, limited interaction of local and foreign workers, and assimilation struggles faced by some migrants.

The sociopolitical effects of migration are varied and include the way in which migration affects the fertility patterns of migrants in receiving countries (Beine et al., 2009; Kulu, 2005), or the promotion of democracy in home countries by foreign-trained individuals, that is, when such training was acquired in a democratic country (Spilimbergo, 2009). The latter study also found that students migrated more to democratic countries. Ohndorf (1998) found that migration has the potential to impact social structures, such as the improvement of the housing situation for foreigners and the improvement of educational and vocational qualifications of second-generation migrants. Studies have also examined the formation of social networks (Mercer et al., 2009), while other studies have interrogated various medical-related aspects of migration (Gagnon et al., 2011; Polonsky et al., 2011). The role of remittances is one aspect of the social implications of migration, which has been widely studied from various aspects (Johnson and Stoll, 2008; Lartey, 2011; Sirkeci et al., 2012; Vacaflores, 2012; Ziesemer, 2012).[10] For example, a study by Appiah-Yeboah et al. (2012) found that remittances by skilled Ghanaian migrants increased as the migrant's household income increased, but that remittances decreased as the time spent abroad by the skilled migrants increased. The study also found that as the level of educational attainment of the skilled migrant increased, the level of remittances decreased. Mills et al. (2011), however, point out that while studies show migrant remittances to home or source countries, such remittances are sent to family members rather than the state, and as such, it is impossible to quantify the impact of remittances on the local economy.

The Brain Drain: Implications for the Health Sector

To demonstrate the extent of the impact of Africa's brain drain, this chapter will now examine its implications on the health sector due to the ongoing and unprecedented exodus of health professionals. According to Kalipeni et al. (2012), the main reason for health professionals migrating from the developing to the developed world is the high pay and good working conditions. Making an assessment of the implications of brain drain, however, is not an easy task. There is usually inadequate information/data coupled with the difficulties of extracting empirical data from countries in Africa. While this is

the case, there is nonetheless enough research that shows the serious shortage of health professionals due to migration and the repercussions on the health sector in African countries.

While studies like those of Seymour (2011) and Clemens (2011) maintain that brain drain has positive aspects and also that the benefits of migration may actually outweigh the losses, which at times tend to be exaggerated,[11] other studies state the contrary. Although there are obvious benefits and advantages to the emigrants and also to the source/recipient countries, it is debatable whether for the African continent one can describe migration as a form of economic development. This is because many areas have been and continue to be devastated by the exodus of skilled health professionals.

Much of Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing underdevelopment, inadequate use of resources, and poor economies. The health-care systems in the region have inadequate infrastructure and resources and struggle to provide adequate health care for all. The drastic fall in health professionals arising from the brain drain has resulted in the inadequate supply of human resources in the health sector, which has further constrained the ability of the sector to provide the necessary health care. This has resulted in severe health-care consequences for the continent. Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly affected by the exodus:

> The global shortage of health workers is estimated at 4.2 million by the World Health Organization (WHO), but the migration of doctors, nurses, midwives and pharmacists from poor to rich countries means the shortfall is not evenly distributed—of the 57 nations identified as having reached a crisis point, 36 are in sub-Saharan Africa. (IRIN, 2011)

Numerous studies demonstrate the brain drain of health professionals and its impact on the health sector, such as the critical shortage of health professionals, in Sub-Saharan Africa.[12] A study found that of the 771,491 physicians in the United States, about 64 percent were trained outside the country, mostly in low-income or lower-middle-income countries, and that a total of 5,334 of those physicians were from Sub-Saharan Africa (Hagopian, 2004). Studies also show that barely a quarter of Zimbabwe's physicians trained in the 1990s still practice domestically (Schrecker and Labonte, 2004), and that physician densities in African countries are about 17 per 100,000 population as compared to densities of 300 per 100,000 population in the receiving countries (Dovlo, 2005).[13]

The brain drain of health professionals has serious consequences for the African continent because of the few doctors catering to the large numbers of people, especially in the rural areas. With about 11 percent of the world's population, Sub-Saharan Africa bears over 24 percent of the global disease burden. However, it only has 3 percent of the global health workforce and spends less than 1 percent of the world's financial resources on health (Anyangwe and Mtonga, 2007). The WHO in its 2006 *World Health Report* states that while Sub-Saharan Africa has 24 percent of the global burden of disease, it only has 3 percent of the world's healthcare workers (2006). It is quite evident that health policies and regulations that aim to mitigate, control, and eliminate diseases cannot effectively achieve their purpose due to the drastic shortage of health professionals and the associated challenges of the brain drain. For instance, although WHO has a recommended standard of one doctor per 5,000 people, there are only approximately 750,000 health workers serving a continent with about 1 billion people. This is partly because about 65,000 (one-fifth) of African-born physicians and 70,000 (one-tenth) of African-born professional nurses worked overseas by 2000 (Clemens and Pettersson, 2008).

Mitigating the Negative Effects of Brain Drain on Health Care: Is There a Way Forward?

The migration of health workers from developing to developed countries is a major contributor to weaker health systems in low-income countries, and according to Scheffler et al. (2008), this is a primary threat to achieving the health-related millennium development goals. The rate at which health professionals have been migrating from Africa has resulted in the global medical community raising concern about current and projected shortages of health professionals. At a 2003 meeting of health ministers from Commonwealth countries, it is recorded that

> international migration, fuelled by many factors, has grown to such proportions that it is affecting the sustainability of health systems in some countries. While both developed and developing countries are experiencing the negative impact of loss of skills, such loss is more keenly felt in developing countries, which are finding it increasingly difficult to compete for skilled human resources in the existing global market. (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2003a, 1)

Others have criticised, terming it a social injustice, wealthy countries "poaching" health professionals from developing countries. Health worker migration from poor source countries to wealthy destination countries has been condemned as a misallocation of resources, a "reverse foreign aid" in which the poor subsidize the rich (Bomba, 2009; Buchan and Dovlo, 2004). There have been calls for the recruiting states to adopt some form of restriction or control. Kalipeni et al. (2012) suggest that the recruiting states "could be pressured to either restrict the flows of African health care personnel or at least pay some reparation for the poaching of skilled personnel from African countries which could then be invested in the fledgling medical schools on the continent" (160). However, such "draconian" appeals have been doomed for being simplistic and ineffective (Lucas, 2006, 382). Certainly such proposals would be quite difficult and almost impossible to enforce. This is due to the fact that the exodus of health professionals from Sub-Saharan Africa is not so much a case of recruitment by the developed countries or overseas recruitment agencies. Notably, these professionals are migrating due to the prevalent social, political, and economic situations in their home countries.

A number of policy options have been proposed by African governments and other interest groups. The options include the development of national codes of conduct for ethical recruitment, restricting approaches to the recruitment of staff from developing countries, enforcement of visa restrictions by recruiting countries, and payment of compensation to source countries (Scott et al., 2004). When African health ministers pushed through resolutions at a meeting of the World Health Assembly calling for urgent action to curtail the unplanned and disastrous emigration of health-care workers,[14] Commonwealth states proceeded to enact a code of conduct to curtail "unethical recruitment."[15]

The WHO further set up the Global Health Workforce Alliance (GHWA)[16] in a bid to curb the problem of health worker shortage. Other measures include those of the World Health Assembly, which also unanimously adopted the first Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel in 2012. The main objective of the Code was to discourage member states from actively recruiting health workers in developing countries facing critical health personnel shortages. It also called for all member countries to mitigate the negative effects of the migration of health workers, which has led to serious shortages of heath personnel.

Morgan et al. (2005) examined the role of the Commonwealth as an international organization of sovereign states to manage such

recruitment through agreed protocols. The study found that the situation was a complex one, which was fraught with various political considerations. According to de Haas, dominant discourses on policy options fail to note that migration from Africa is also fuelled by a structural demand for cheap migrant labor in informal sectors in the receiving countries and further that, as a result, the proposed restrictive immigration policies have invariably failed to stop migration. de Haas also maintains that despite lip service being paid to combating illegal migration, neither European nor African states have much genuine interest in actually stopping it (2008).

Another policy option to curb the ongoing migration of Africans is to promote and boost economic development in the source countries, as that would reduce migration to the West. Castles (2009) argues that although this gives the impression that migration is not good and that people should stay put, in actual terms, migration or human mobility is regarded a normal part of the social transformation processes that allow people to exercise their choice of improving their livelihoods. de Haas (2008) also maintains that this idea of boosting economic development in Africa would in fact only enable and inspire more people to migrate.

It remains to be seen whether these measures will have any effect of mitigating the critical shortage of health professionals in Africa. This is so because migration is part of the process of an integrated global labor market in which individuals are free to pursue employment opportunities locally in their own countries or overseas.[17] As Ansah (2002) states,

> Internationalists perceive the brain drain as a mutually beneficial exchange of human and fiscal capital in a contemporary global labor market. Proponents of this perspective believe that human beings voluntarily seek the highest reward commensurate with their education and training, and the trend reflects voluntary choices made by migrants. (21)

While African leaders have stated that there is a need "for a comprehensive, integrated, concerted and balanced solution, whose objectives, policies and measures will be long-lasting" (African Union, 2006, 9), there is no longer any room for rhetoric. African leaders must look at practical ways in which they can retain and recruit health professionals. This would require examining and addressing systemic weaknesses such as inadequate funds and resources and inefficient health sector management practices. Such a move may help promote

and provide suitable and appropriate working environments. The continent may need to "embark on an urgent massive educational and recruitment campaign in the health sector" (Mapulanga-Hulston, 2009, 108).

Most importantly, there needs to be commitment from African leaders to invest in the health sector and embark on viable health reform. Such a commitment needs to be followed up with a reorganization or reprioritization of government budgets. In April 2001, the heads of states of the African Union met in Abuja, Nigeria, and pledged to allocate at least 15 percent of their annual budget to improve the health sector. However, according to WHO, this has not been the case as many African nations tended to give health a relatively low priority when allocating their budgets, with some countries allocating lesser than what they did in previous years. It has been suggested that these countries should be able to raise additional funds for health from domestic sources by increasing health's share of total government spending to 15 percent (WHO, 2012).

As mentioned earlier, international migration is a social process that cannot be stopped—particularly since the world is now a "global village" and one that is progressively adopting neoliberal labor market policies in which people are taking advantage of their ability to sell their skills and labor in the international market. That being the case, Africa must nevertheless ensure, more than ever, that it contributes positively and proactively to the development of tangible and updated human resource policies that are specifically aimed at enhancing and strengthening the ability of the health sector to provide an effective and efficient health system. Such a move would require a consideration of the push factors to be addressed in order to counter the reasons why professionals have been migrating to the West in the first place. Any attempts to reorganize the health sector and build on the human resources for the sector must take into consideration the role and importance of other health professionals such as community health workers in the health sector. Health reform and the adoption of innovative approaches is, therefore, imperative for Africa.

Conclusion

The ongoing "brain drain" from Africa does not appear to be abating any time soon. With both positive and negative effects, the brain drain is affecting Africa's development at the individual, national, and regional levels. African leaders face a number of challenges in promoting and enhancing development in their countries. In relation to the

health sector, while it is acknowledged that international migration is not the only cause of the problems being confronted, the contention is that it is a major if not the most aggravating factor—one that is serious enough to require urgent practical solutions.

Notes

1. LDCs are a group of countries classified by the United Nations as least developed in terms of their low GDP per capita, weak human assets, and high degree of economic vulnerability. The 48 African countries currently designated by the United Nations as LDCs are Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia.

2. For the purposes of this study, this term is not restricted to only doctors and nurses but will also include dentists, pharmacists, midwives, clinical officers, etc.

3. Refer also Will H. Moore and Stephen M. Shellman, "Fear of Persecution Forced Migration, 1952–1995."*Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 5 (2004): 723–74; Abbey Steele, "Electing Displacement: Political Cleansing in Apartado, Colombia."*Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 3 (2011): 423–45.

4. For example, Onwuekwe maintains that the political leaders are the core problem of this economic mismanagement in the region. See Chika B. Onwuekwe, "African Political Instability and the Search for an Inclusive Society," in *Trans-Atlantic Migration: The Paradoxes of Exile*, edited by Toyin Falola and Niyi Afolabi, 243–60 (New York: Routledge, 2008); and F. S. Wouterse, "Migration, Poverty, and Inequality: Evidence from Burkina Faso." IFPRI Discussion Paper 00786 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2008).

5. See, for example, Khoudour-Castéras, who maintains that trade liberalization in Latin America has come with an increase in emigration. David Khoudour-Castéras, "Unexpected Effects of the Washington Consensus: Trade Liberalization and Migration Flows in Latin America." *The International Trade Journal* 24, no. 4 (2010): 440–76.

6. The "push–pull" theory is the common reason given for migration and was initially coined by Ravenstein in 1889 and later elaborated upon by E. Lee ("A Theory of Migration," *Demography* 3, no. 1 (1966): 47–57). Mahroum points out various push and pull factors that lead to migration, such as taxation, studying abroad, quality of

work, openness in communication, business expansion overseas, and labor market supply and demand signals, and that these play an important role in the choice of highly skilled migrants to relocate overseas. Sami Mahroum, "Highly Skilled Globetrotters: Mapping the International Migration of Human Capital." *R and D Management* 30, no. 1 (2000): 23–32.

7. In Zimbabwe, it is stated that the training of new health workers has not kept pace with the exodus of qualified and experienced professionals. See A. Chikanda, "Medical Migration from Zimbabwe: Magnitude, Causes and Impact on the Poor." *Development Southern Africa* 24, no. 1 (2007): 47–60.

8. Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

9. Alex Julca, "Multidimensional Re-creation of Vulnerabilities and Potential for Resilience in International Migration." *International Migration* 49, Issue Supplement s1 (2011): e30–e49. Bhugra further states that migrants' cultural identity is likely to change when they settle in receiving states as they try to foster a degree of belonging and assimilation. Dinesh Bhugra, "Migration, Distress and Cultural Identity." *British Medical Bulletin* 69, no. 1 (2004): 129–41. See also, Dinesh Bhugra and Matthew A. Becker, "Migration, Cultural Bereavement and Cultural Identity." *World Psychiatry* 4, no. 1 (2005): 18–24.

10. Kwame Appiah-Yeboah, Asamoah Bosomtwi, and Muriel A. Yeboah, "Factors Impacting Remittances by Skilled Ghanaians Abroad." *International Migration* 50 (2012): 1–15.

11. Seymour maintains that the skilled workers themselves benefit from the migration in that they are able to sell their skills for "far higher wages" to countries that value those skills and that the economies of the home countries are improved due to the remittances being sent back to Africa. Richard Seymour, "Brain Drain or Brain Gain?" *African Business* (January 2011): 50–52. Clemens actually argues that the actual costs of health professionals' emigration are difficult to quantify and often tend to be exaggerated. M. Clemens, "The Financial Consequences of High-skill Emigration: Lessons from African Doctors Abroad," in *Diaspora for Development in Africa*, edited by S. Plaza and D. Ratha, 165–82 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011).

12. In 2007, Kumar found that, with the exception of South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Gabon, all other Sub-Saharan countries suffer from critical shortages of health-care workers. See P. Kumar, "Perspective Providing the Providers: Remedying Africa's Shortage of Healthcare Workers." *New England Journal of Medicine* 356 (2007): 2564–67. According to Shinn (quoted in Kalipeni et al.), there is an estimated one neurosurgeon per three

million people in Kenya, and it is reported that Tanzania, Uganda, and Ethiopia have two each for the entire nation. Refer Ezekiel Kalipeni, Linda L. Semu, and Margaret. A. Mbilizi. "The Brain Drain of Health Care Professionals From Sub-Saharan Africa: A Geographic Perspective." *Progress in Development Studies* 12, nos 2–3 (2012): 153–71 at 163.

13. In Kenya, for example, an estimated 600 doctors worked in public hospitals, out of more than 5,000 registered, as the rest had moved abroad or were working in the private sector. See, Samuel Siringi, "Kenya Government Promises to Increase Doctors' Salaries to Curb Brain Drain." *The Lancet* no. 358 (2001): 306. See also, Lincoln Chen and Jo Ivey Boufford, "Fatal Flows—Doctors on the Move." *The New England Journal of Medicine* 353 (2005): 1850–52.

14. World Health Organization, *International Migration of Health Personnel: A Challenge for Health Systems in Developing Countries*, 58th World Health Assembly (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2005).

15. Commonwealth, *Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health Workers* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2003a).

16. The Alliance is a partnership consisting of national governments, civil society, international agencies, finance institutions, researchers, educators, and professional associations who are dedicated to identifying, implementing, and advocating appropriate solutions to the problem of health professional migration and has been described as "one of the most fundamental constraints to achieving progress on health and reaching health and development goals." Refer, Global Health Workforce Alliance. http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/about/en/. Accessed May 16, 2013.

17. For instance, the Democratic Nurses Organisation of South Africa strongly voiced their position on their members' constitutional right to emigrate. See, James Buchan, Tina Parkin, and Julie Sochalski, "International Nurse Mobility: Trends and Policy Implications." WHO/EIP/OSD/2003.3 (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2003).

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Conclusion: Africa that Works

Toyin Falola and Emmanuel M. Mbah

Balance Sheet

A June 6, 2011, report in the *African Economic Outlook* observed that "Africa's economies have weathered the global crisis relatively [well] and have rebounded in 2010."[1] This came as welcoming news to Afro-optimists, who predicted for quite some time now that the continent is in rebound mode. To be fair to the optimists, there is more good news coming out of Africa today than ever before—the story about Africa is not all gloomy. To begin with, the continent has begun making progress toward meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), although much still needs to be accomplished. Thus, while Africa still has higher poverty rates compared to other regions of the world, the rates dropped significantly between 1990 and 2008, interrupted only by the global economic crisis and the resulting food shortages that hit the continent. Therefore, the period between 1990 and 2008 witnessed relative social and economic gains as recorded by the 2009 UN MDG report:

> In 1990, the baseline year for the MDGs, 57% of the population of Africa was living in extreme poverty, earning less than $ 1.25 a day in purchasing power parities and 2005 prices. By 2005, the poverty rate had dropped to 51 percent …[P]rojections suggest that the extreme poverty rate in Africa has continued to drop to about 46 percent in 2008.[2]

Some countries such as Kenya and Nigeria have made significant progress in poverty reduction in the world. Such progress is in part

the result of successful health-care, water, and sanitation programs that have improved living standards. Kenya, for example, "has successfully combined creative financing methods and public subsidies to provide piped water to poor households."[3] Africa has also continued to make significant progress in addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic, chaperoning efforts for the research and development of an HIV vaccine for Africa.[4] Additionally, many more HIV/AIDS patients on the continent now have access to antiretroviral therapy, and new HIV infections have dropped by 17.4 percent in the seven years between 2001 and 2008.[5]

Participation in local and national politics in Sub-Saharan Africa is on a steady climb. There have also been significant improvements in women's rights and empowerment and overall gender equality in many African countries, where "gender parity" in primary education is now an achievable goal. This notwithstanding, there still exists inequality in enrollment and attendance in secondary and higher education, where women are still behind. In politics, more women in Sub-Saharan Africa have been elected to national parliaments from 1990 to 2009, giving it a regional average of 19.8 percent, well above the global average of 17.7 percent.[6] Thus, based on recent improvements in human development trends (including income, health, and education), especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, which "has had the highest average [Human Development Index] improvement over the past decade of any region in the world," the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) projects the region's human development index (HDI) to rise to 44 percent by 2050. The rise in HDI will give Sub-Saharan Africa "the biggest increase in any region of the world—and one which will propel much of the continent into what are now classified as medium or high levels of human development achievement."[7]

An Africa that Works: The Way Forward

Despite the new optimism in economic growth and social improvements, the continent still faces numerous challenges. For example, much of the success in Africa has still not been reflected in the area of health care, where "there has been little advancement in improving maternal mortality" and where "maternal deaths (per 100,000 live births) stood at 920 in 1990, dropping only slightly to 900 in 2005."[8] Efforts to reduce hunger have also fallen below expectations, with the undernourished proportion reducing only minimally from 32 percent in the 1990s to 29 percent of the population in 2008.[9]

Economic growth should benefit all, but, more especially, it should harness the potential of the ever-growing youth population. Thus, while growth is important for human development, it can only lead to progress if it is broad-based and if it reduces the levels of inequality. African governments need to be particularly serious about investing in job creation and social services, as well as promoting gender equality and the rights of women. The Chief Economist at UNDP's Regional Bureau for Africa, Pedro Conceição, could not have said it any better when he noted that "prioritizing health, education and basic services is key to ensuring that the most vulnerable are not left behind."[10]

An Africa that works has to ensure that growth and prosperity reaches the most vulnerable in society. Thus, political and economic leaders need to address the issue of globalization and global transactions to minimize the negative effects on the poor. While it is true that individual nation-states in Africa lack the economic and political capital or leverage to influence global transactions, they can make gains by bargaining "collectively to shape global trading and investment regimes that respond to their own needs," especially because collective bargaining through regional integration "can open up additional opportunities in trade and investment, boosting inclusive growth and human development."[11] To this regard, the UNDP and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) have partnered to assist African nations in reinforcing regional trade and integration by identifying and eliminating domestic, regional, and international obstacles to raising the level of foreign direct investment (FDI). The partnership also provides finance and development advice to low- and middle-income countries to "expand their provision of and access to financial and credit services, which are essential for development."[12]

Addressing environmental challenges, particularly climate change, remains a serious problem for the continent. Deforestation is one major hurdle, as 4.1 percent of Africa's forest was lost between 2000 and 2005 alone. Guaranteeing safe drinking water and acceptable sanitation also remain challenges to Sub-Saharan Africa that are inextricably linked to the issue of climate change. According to a UN report on climate change, "sub-Saharan Africa may be the lowest emitter of carbon dioxide, but it stands to be the region most affected by climate change, which will compound the environment and energy challenges that the region faces."[13] In fact, another UNDP report of November 2, 2011, cautioned that "steady advancement in human development in sub-Saharan Africa could stall and even reverse unless

bold steps are taken to reduce environmental risks and inequalities in the region and around the world," reiterating that inequality and environmental decimation could coalesce to obliterate future progress in Africa and the world at large.[14] Thus, the projected 2050 increase in HDI may be accompanied (if not carefully managed) with severe environmental problems, including water and air pollution and other extreme weather conditions that "could reduce the regional HDI growth by 12 percent by mid-century," after which period the region could start witnessing a decline.[15] Sub-Saharan Africa will be affected greatly because of its high HDI inequalities, and the most affected groups would be the poor and women, who depend heavily on natural resources for their sustenance.[16]

Climate change also negatively affects agriculture in Africa, and this notwithstanding, the fact is that the continent is already experiencing food shortages. If climate change is not seriously addressed, it is projected that by 2030 the production of maize and wheat in Southern Africa would drop significantly. Thus, the issue of sustainability for present and future generations has become a major social justice concern for Africa.[17] The good news is that African political and business leaders are aware of how climate change can impact the continent, and this has led to numerous consultations and workshops—such as those that took place in Durban-South Africa throughout 2011 between senior delegates of UNDP, UNITAR, and African negotiators—aimed at addressing the issue.[18]

UNDP has been working in ten African countries in developing plans, labeled as "Gleneagles Scenarios," that would facilitate practical and more rapid socioeconomic growth at country levels. This derived from a commitment made by the G8 in 2005 "to double aid to Africa" and includes the following:

Support in planning poverty reduction strategies and budgets around the MDGs

Monitoring and reporting on progress toward achievement of the MDGs

Help in building the capacities of African countries to scale up implementation of the MDGs

Policy support for the Millennium Villages initiative, including the dissemination of lessons learned

Preparation for the United Nations' 2010 MDG Review Summit via the preparation of an Africa MDG Report

Implementation of the recommendation of the MDG Steering Committee in collaboration with UN agencies, the World Bank, the

African Development Bank, the African Union, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the International Monetary Fund

Advocacy for the MDGs at the regional and global levels[19]

An Africa that works would entail nurturing the new partnerships that have been developed with emerging economies, many of which have recently experienced the arduous process of navigating economic growth and development, and that can provide Africa with the right technology and skills needed to improve the lives of millions of people. These partnerships have and will continue to be instrumental in the promotion of growth rates in the continent through new national development opportunities in trade, aid, and investment. Current economic growth has been the result of the fact that Africa has diversified its partners and consequently has become more integrated in the new-world economy. For example,

In 2009, China surpassed the U.S. and became Africa's main trading, while the share of trade conducted by Africa with emerging partners has grown from approximately 23 percent to 39 percent in the last ten years. Africa's top five emerging trade partners are now China (38 percent), India (14 percent), Korea (7.2 percent), Brazil (7.1 percent), and Turkey (6.5 percent).[20]

Finally, political transparency, accountability, and the inclusion of citizens in decision making need to be prioritized. A functional political atmosphere is good for local, national, regional, and international business and a deterrent to conflict, instability, and the type of insecurity that currently characterizes the "Sahel Corridor" from Somalia to Mali. Thus, political transparency and accountability have to be vigorously pursued if African leaders truly care about the people they govern. "Putting people first must go hand in gloves with efforts to accelerate regional coordination and integration. Trade agreements that benefit the continent as a whole, unleash the full potential of the private sector, and develop regional investment opportunities are the way forward."[21]

Notes

1. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), "Africa Should Embrace New Economic Giants and Boost Social Inclusion," June 2011. http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2011/june/africa-should-embrace-new-economic-gia. Accessed on July 17, 2012.

2. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), "Africa: Poverty Reduction and the MDGs." http://web.undp.org/africa/poverty.shtml. Accessed on July 17, 2012.

3. Sub-Saharan African countries with the highest HDI's include Mauritius (number 77), Gabon (number 106), Botswana (number 118), Namibia (number 120), and South Africa (number 123). Sub-Saharan Africa still remains the region with the 10 lowest 2011 HDI levels out of 187 nations. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), "Fighting Climate Change and Inequalities Key to Progress in Africa," November 2, 2011. http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2011/november/fighting-climate-change-and-inequal. Accessed on July 17, 2012.

4. During a roundtable luncheon on research and development for an HIV vaccine for Africa, which was held on June 11, 2008, as part of a High Level Meeting on AIDS at the UN headquarters in New York, the African AIDS Vaccine Program (AAVP) High Representative, Jeanette Kagamé (First Lady of Rwanda) "reiterated the commitment of African leaders in support of HIV Vaccine R&D efforts, the vital role that AAVP is playing to facilitate HIV Vaccine work in Africa and finally called upon the donor community to increase their support and commitment." World Health Organization (WHO), "Initiative for Vaccine Research (IVR): The African AIDS Vaccine Programme (AAVP)." http://www.who.int/vaccine_research/diseases/hiv/aavp/en. Accessed on November 5, 2012. Also see DevelopAfrica, "Africa's Struggle with HIV/AIDS." http://www.developafrica.org/hiv-aids-Africa. Accessed on November 5, 2012.

5. UNDP, "Africa: Poverty Reduction and the MDGs."

6. See UNDP, "Africa: Poverty Reduction and the MDGs"; UNDP, "Fighting Climate Change and Inequalities Key to Progress in Africa."

7. UNDP, "Fighting Climate Change and Inequalities Key to Progress in Africa." "Between 1970 and 2010, countries in the lowest 25 percent of countries ranked—the majority of them African—improved their overall HDI achievement by 82 percent, twice the global average."

8. UNDP, "Africa: Poverty Reduction and the MDGs."

9. Ibid.

10. UNDP, "Africa Should Embrace New Economic Giants."

11. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), "Building the Capacities of African Negotiators." http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2011/december/developing-the-capacities-of-african. Accessed on July 17, 2012.

12. UNDP, "Building the Capacities of African Negotiators."

13. UNDP, "Africa: Poverty Reduction and the MDGs."

14. UNDP, "Fighting Climate Change and Inequalities Key to Progress in Africa."

15. Ibid.
16. Current statistics show that approximately 90 percent of this group (the poor and women) in Africa do not have access to modern cooking fuel, 85 percent still live under insanitary conditions, and 60 percent cannot either afford or have access to electricity and/or other alternative power sources. Ibid.
17. See UNDP, "Fighting Climate Change and Inequalities Key to Progress in Africa."
18. UNDP, "Building the Capacities of African Negotiators."
19. UNDP, "Africa: Poverty Reduction and the MDGs."
20. UNDP, "Africa Should Embrace New Economic Giants."
21. Ibid.

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