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

THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF AFRICAN COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL HISTORY

Edited by Martin S. Shanguhyia and Toyin Falola

The Palgrave Handbook of African Colonial and Postcolonial History

Martin S. Shanguhyia · Toyin Falola
Editors

The Palgrave Handbook of African Colonial and Postcolonial History

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

Map 1 Africa on the eve of European scramble and partition, circa 1880



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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Martin S. Shanguhyia and Toyin Falola

This Handbook was conceived out of the necessity to demonstrate the extent to which African history has expanded in scope, themes, and interpretations since the early 1980s. It focuses on African colonial and postcolonial history, the two eras of the continent's history that seem inseparable, though the extent to which they are similar or different has pervaded scholarly debates for decades and is an aspect that some of the chapters in this volume explore. The book benefits from contributions from established and up-and-coming scholars in African studies, each using the vantage point of their study of Africa and Africans to reveal how we have come to understand the continent's historical trajectory since the professionalization of African history in the 1950s.

The majority of the contributors are historians, while the rest are drawn from diverse fields in African studies, particularly political science, anthropology, art, music, literature, religious studies, education, and international relations. Part of the initiative here is to demonstrate that African history has not evolved in isolation from other disciplines that focus on Africa; rather, in researching and interpreting what they study, historians of Africa have directly and indirectly benefited immensely from other disciplines. One can also argue contrariwise that scholars of African studies have tapped into African history

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to shed light on various aspects of their respective fields. It is fair to argue as well that the production of African history has been, to a certain extent, the result of an interdisciplinary effort.

Work of the nature attempted in this Handbook has been preceded by past initiatives to appraise the state of African historiography, and these fine, early efforts must be applauded. The *Cambridge History of Africa* remains an important starting point for works of this kind. The UNESCO *General History of Africa* volumes published in the early 1980s remain indispensable as they immortalize initiatives of eminent pioneer scholars who virtually laid the foundations of African history as a legitimate professional pursuit. Even before the UNESCO effort, very engaging works reflecting on trends in African history were rolled out in the 1960s and 1970s, a little more than a decade following the historical revisionism that had been launched in the 1950s. Some of these works were concerned with general, broader trends of historical studies that covered Sub-Saharan Africa.[1] Of these, A.D. Roberts's work that focused on colonial Africa is quite relevant to the kind of work partly covered in this volume. Even so, Roberts was mainly concerned with the *earlier* historiography of colonial Africa.[2] Other studies tended toward regional analyses, particularly on East and West Africa.[3]

Later studies on African historiography from the 1980s through the first decade of the twenty-first century build on these earlier efforts, if only to reflect ongoing debates on what direction the interpretation, methods, and scope African history in particular was to take, either as an individual discipline or within the family of African studies. They depict a polarization among historians of the day on interpretation, themes, and value to Africa of African history.[4] We briefly outline this subject below, as various debates contributed to the evolution of the discipline into its present state. The place of Africa in European imperial historiography, particularly that of Britain, has also garnered attention, though many will argue about its validity to a 'true' African history, if such history ever exists, given its strong imperial focus.[5,6]

Since the publication of these earlier works, African colonial and postcolonial histories have experienced expansion in interpretation and thematic focus, the entire breadth of which has not been completely captured in a single volume. Perhaps a more recent effort in this direction is the *Oxford Handbook of Modern African History*, edited by John Parker and Richard Reid. That volume is an excellent analysis of some of the finest works that reflect recent trends in modern African history. Our endeavor in this volume is to present an expanded scope of themes that have formed the cache of African colonial and postcolonial history over the last three or so decades, and to show how those themes, both old and new, have been engaged by various scholars. The themes in the volume illustrate the depth of African modern history, the innovativeness and range of paradigms of its analysis, and the multidisciplinary lens for understanding Africa's past.

Evolution of Colonial and Postcolonial African Historiography

The development of African historiography on the colonial and postcolonial periods has received excellent, detailed attention by several scholars since the 1960s. To avoid redundancy, we have opted only for the key strands of its evolution, but in ways that we hope will help illustrate developments in the discipline in recent decades. The emergence of that historiography has been a product of decades of enriching debates on the nature of the discipline, its methodology, interpretation, ownership of production of historical knowledge, and more importantly, the uses, functions, or value of African history to Africa and Africans. The historiography has also been shaped by debates on the practices and uses of African history in Africa and the West.

In 1965, while reflecting on the importance of periodization of African history, Basil Davidson predicted that 'the larger wisdom of the future' would profit the discipline by engaging, without fear, the interpretation of African history by taking advantage of the increasing 'mass of material'.[7] Certainly, ever since, the growth of African precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial histories has benefited from scholars' access to immense sources of various domains, especially archaeological, linguistic, paleontological, botanical, written and oral sources, among others.[8] Davidson, Terrence O. Ranger, J.D. Fage, Jan Vansina, Anthony G. Hopkins, and an array of indigenous historians of Africa (most notably E.A. Ayandele, Adu Boahen, Jacob Ade Ajayi, Bethwell A. Ogot, Joseph Ki-Zerbo and many others) worked hard to transform the field in its early years of development. They were the pioneer revisionists of African history and had the unenviable task of erasing entrenched, Western, colonial assumptions that Africa and its peoples were devoid of history, and that Africans' historical experience commenced only after intense Western interaction with the continent beginning from the fifteenth century. In other words, African history was an account of European presence in Africa. A proliferation of historical writings about Africa emerged before and during the colonial interface, but most of the analysis lacked objectivity as it served to promote the European intellectual tradition and objectives of the imperial mission. These annals, particularly those produced by colonial states and their agents, became the 'official history' rather than an authentic African history. Its analysis or assessment of Africa and Africans was apologetic to the colonial mission, and rooted in the Enlightenment persuasions of civilizing the non-European world, hence its undisguised emphasis on the administrative practices of colonial states and their benevolence to Africans.[9] This, then, was the background upon which the new generation of scholars of African history at the dawn of independence sought to recover African history. The need to offer a counter-narrative to the colonial presentation of Africa and Africans seemed an urgent mission for those scholars.

Subsequently, historical revisionism in the 1950s and 1960s assumed a nationalist tone, partly acting in tandem with the strong anti-colonial sentiments by Africans that helped bring colonial domination to a close. Above all else, the new nationalist historiography seemed to mellow with the aura of freedom, a feeling of independence and renewal that imbued the new African states and their citizens with a vision to use scholarship to criticize and radically change colonial historiography. There was a need to furnish Africa and Africans with a historiography that gave purpose and meaning to former colonial subjects and their newfound sense of belonging. Freedom, pride, hope, and expectations of visionary leadership inaugurated new 'aggressive self-assertive' political agendas of the decolonized states.[10] The new history was expected to energize and legitimize the status quo.

Therefore, some of the works of history that emerged pointed to Africa's golden past (states, empires, and African economies prior to colonization) to delegitimize the colonial phase and give inspiration to the new Africa. West African indigenous historians of the Ibadan school unearthed the African historical initiative in the years preceding colonial domination, much of it focusing on Nigeria.[11] In East Africa, T.O. Ranger and a vibrant community of historians of the Dar es Salaam school led efforts to recover the African agency in the continent's history. For the Dar es Salaam revisionists, to focus on Africans during the colonial period was to clarify the role of the African not as a victim but as a hero whose achievement lay in fending off colonial invasion and subordination. This nationalist history therefore drew our attention to African resistances against colonialism and colonial oppression across East and Central Africa, themes that lasted into the 1980s.[12] In East and West Africa, the nation-state became hallowed as well by the nationalist historians, whose new studies bore titles after the names of the new states. The contents of the publications reflected aspects of the new ideologies pertaining to nation building.[13]

Pioneer institutions of higher education that had colonial origins, staffed by 'nationalist' African academic scholars with help from Western historians of the liberal persuasion, fronted these recovery efforts. The institutionalization of the discipline was rapid, if not vibrant, in Anglophone Africa. It was also evident, but not as rapid, in other African territories. In Francophone Africa, Senegal seemed to take the lead where the establishment of the Institut Français de l'Afrique Noire (IFAN) in Dakar back in 1937 provided an institutional basis for disseminating African studies in other parts of French-speaking Africa. By 1950, IFAN had branches across many of the French West Africa territories, while the establishment of the University of Dakar in 1957 lent the Institut a permanent intuitional base to promote African studies in Francophone Africa. This revolution also became the cause for liberal scholars of African studies based in a few Western institutions in the USA, France, and especially Britain.[14] Following independence, Senegalese historiography was slow in its growth due to the pedagogical approaches and structures of the university system that had strong French underpinnings—hence a slow pace

of Africanization of history. But when Senegalese history took shape by the 1980s, local and foreign scholars were attracted to pre-colonial and early colonial themes, particularly cultural developments, slavery, and Islam.[15] Except for studies that focused on pre-colonial state building and transatlantic connections, works on the colonial (and later, the postcolonial) experience of Lusophone Africa were clearly absent in early revisionist works, both general and specific. These lacunae have been addressed by some of the finest studies that have since been done on Lusophone Africa.[16] Philip Havik's contribution to this book is therefore an excellent effort.

Scholars' quest to tie African authenticity and relevance to nationalism and the new state proved challenging as disappointments of independence crept into the public and political elite. Political practice alienated some, as the moral obligation and levels of tolerance of the nationalist leaders who had ushered their citizens from colonial subjectivity to freedom came under scrutiny. Some critics perceived ironies and distortions in looking to the past, beyond colonialism, to present an authentic African history. Writing in the 1980s, Caroline Neale was lucid on these perceptions:

> That African nationalism has been for many a moving and courageous struggle is in no way disputed; what is of interest … is the reason for situating its origins far back into the past as possible … and the distorting effect this had on the representation of African history. As a political movement, nationalism took its force from the colonial situation; but as an idea, it derived its mysterious domination over centuries of African history from the evolutionism which placed Europeans and their political works at the pinnacle of man's development.[17]

Thus, according to Neal's critique, nationalist historians might as well have considered the nationalist triumph of the 1950s and 1960s as the peak of Africa's socio-political progress, victory over an intervening era of history (the colonial period) that had impeded or arrested that progress. Yet aside from the political disappointments of the early years of independence, realities of poverty, inequalities, and other forms of economic and social dilemmas led to the questioning of the nationalist approach to understanding the challenges that faced postcolonial Africa, and how the past was helpful in analyzing and overcoming those challenges. To others, the postcolonial state might as well have been a reincarnation of its colonial counterpart, as they pointed to the nipped public expectations as evidence of their conclusion. Political independence might have effaced Western colonial powers from Africa, and with them 'the illusion of a civilizing Mission and the obvious racial factor'.[18] But antecedents of 'colonial mentality' were perceived to exist in political elites' management of free African states, while their intellectual counterparts (products of the colonial states) slid into social and spatial isolation from the rest of the decolonized society from where they objectified their knowledge. This transformation helped these intellectuals to advance their analysis of Africa from a Western perspective.[19]

Critics also asserted that nationalist scholars overlooked the rupturing effects of colonialism, and treated with hindsight colonial production of social differences in the form of class and gender, or even misconstrued the African peasant, as much as those scholars also ignored the long-standing imperial and global contexts that shaped the continent's historical agency. The emergence in the 1970s of the radical Marxist scholars (the New Dar School) was in direct response to the shortcomings of nationalist scholarship. Poverty and Africa's economic dilemmas, the Marxist scholars argued, were the result of the incorporation of Africa into global capitalism with its domineering tendencies sustained by certain political power structures within and outside Africa, operating in tandem. African economic or developmental history, analyzed within development or underdevelopment theories, was the hallmark of the new scholarship.[20] It epitomized a shift from the optimism of the nationalists to the pessimism of the realities of Africa's stagnation that was measured in terms of economic development and progress.

In fact, for some of these Marxists, the African political elite and members of the African 'petite bourgeoisie' were culpable of the exploitation, oppression, and predicament that African peoples found themselves in at the dawn of independence.[21] The 'bourgeois nationalist' historiography, the label that nationalist, historical analysis had derived,[22] had failed to see through these experiences of the African masses. In Kenya, the national challenges of implementing a sustainable land reform program invited political scientists to provide a critique against the nationalist ideology of independence and socio-economic development. Those challenges also pushed radical nationalists to question whether 'true' independence had been achieved.[23] Perhaps, as Ali Mazrui reminds us, Africa's founding fathers were culpable of promoting postcolonial relations which, dubbed as neo-colonialism, contributed to Africa's persistent dilemmas. Such relations entrenched a 'neo-dependency' status for the continent, with leaders of independent African states cultivating a new role for themselves as 'Client Chief[s]' who, although sovereign, were manipulated by former colonial powers in ways that failed to benefit the Client's peoples.[24] For others, internal social cleavages and tensions within African societies that were driven by materialism (to which nationalists cast a blind eye) could rationally be disentangled and understood through a Marxist lens.[25] Thus, there was a gradual realization that the African historical experience and initiative operated in complex, broader, interconnected relationships with a long history that had to be recognized.

Not every revisionist history within the framework of economic or development history (and its social ramifications) viewed the African as an actor who was completely disadvantaged by the inequalities of the colonial and global orders of the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. A liberal approach to this revisionism in the 1970s revealed Africans as rational and innovative actors who, even before formal colonization commenced, were able to navigate the constraints of the global capitalist economy

oftentimes to their advantage. It was an initiative that many Africans, particularly in West Africa, continued to sustain through the better part of the colonial period.[26]

During the early years of asserting African historical agency, scholarship by Vansina and Ogot to reclaim African oral traditions as valid sources for writing African history aided in the reconstruction of precolonial histories of Africa. Later on, consultation of the knowledge of the so-called African 'organic intellectuals' or 'encylopaedic informants' helped some historians recover precolonial and colonial historical experiences of such ethnic communities as the Baganda, Yoruba, Kuba, and Luo.[27] The utilization of oral and written sources has since become the custom of the historian of the colonial (and postcolonial) era, and has yielded numerous, interesting works that define the essence of 'local histories', especially within the broader field of social history.[28] Production of biographical histories of African individuals has also immensely benefited from these oral sources.

By the 1960s, South Africa experienced a more divergent historiography; its most dominant aspect emphasized an orthodox orientation produced by white scholars and one that reflected on the developments that stretched back into the nineteenth century. The position of black South Africans was framed within their role as objects of the policies and practices of white South Africans.[29] Though a more liberal scholarship emerged in the 1920s and lasted through the 1950s (in spite of the ascendance of apartheid in 1948), it was trapped into a paradigm of analysis that revolved around the state and its segregated demographic components based on race. For instance, while the *Oxford History of South Africa* captured elements of the African contribution to the making of modern South Africa (more or less in response to the growing interest in African history at Western universities), it left unresolved the roles of structure and power in the configuration of the country's history. It portrayed the African in static and ahistorical terms, and African societies as unchanging and isolated.[30]

South African revisionists of the 1970s, largely of the Marxist school, were enthralled with race, class, development, and materialist accumulation, indicating possible external influence from Africanists and international scholars of the underdevelopment school. They perceived a close connection between the apartheid state and capitalism in the mining and industrial sectors, and with other critical components of that state, most notably migrant labor, the native reserve system, and the aggregated nature of South Africa's rural communities. From the 1980s, the History Workshop Movement inaugurated the focus on popular history of ordinary South Africans, probably the result of wider disaffection across Sub-Saharan Africa with the failure of the political elite to expand avenues of freedom for their citizens. In this tradition, the focus of studies included local protests, social justice movements, and class histories.[31] The transition of South Africa from apartheid to majority rule in 1994 was in itself an historic moment, but has elicited debates on the value

of understanding past experiences as a basis for ordering the post-apartheid state. Some scholars have posed the legitimate question of whether South African history has ever been postcolonial despite the end of apartheid.[32]

As regards modern Ethiopia, the typical historiography thrived within the context of Africa's contact with European imperialism. Its key focus was on the intersection between state building, external forces, and indigenous responses to those forces, with the Ethiopian imperial institution providing the framework of analysis. The overthrow of that institution by the 1974 Revolution, while retaining the state as a unit of historical analysis, saw a shift toward a Marxist interpretation of the past, with scholars narrowing down their analysis to structures and processes of the Ethiopian society: social/class relations and social conflict. Periodic episodes of drought and famine in the 1970s and 1980s, and peasant responses to them, hoisted ecology as an important component in the emerging Ethiopian historiography. This prompted scholars to pay attention to questions surrounding the agrarian sector, land relations, and administrative institutions. Conflict with Somalia, the Eritrean movement and foundation of the Eritrean state, and Oromo dissent to the national project led to calls in the 1990s for historians of Ethiopia to rethink the relevance and scope of the existing historiography. Revisionists pointed to the importance of ethnicity and nationalism as the loci for enriching the historical analysis of the modern Ethiopian state.[33] Despite these new developments, ramifications of Adowa have continued to provide some historians with an analytical framework for understanding Ethiopia's influence on historical developments within and outside Africa. Fikru Negash Gebrekidan's chapter in this volume demonstrates this.

Evolution of 'New Histories'

Most of what emerged as 'new histories,' particularly from the 1980s, was the result of criticism against dependency scholarship of the 1970s. Critics faulted dependency scholars for their reliance on Western models of analyzing African experiences, an illustration of just how far the debate had proceeded regarding interpretation and authenticity of methods of analyzing the past. They were also faulted for totalizing the past as a collective, not individual, experience, thereby overlooking the importance of certain sub-categories of Africans whose interaction with the colonial and postcolonial states might have yielded unique experiences. This criticism, common among political economists, was responsible for inaugurating historical analyses that disaggregated African states, communities, and institutions into categories that, though parts of the whole system, could be isolated and analyzed with sufficient depth as to unearth unique historical processes that shaped or were shaped by them. Revisionists of the 1970s saw particular opportunities for growth of social history, as they called for scholars to explore such themes as modes of production and techniques of production, social differentiation

and the shifting role of the sexes, relationships between societies and their environment, the experiences of the migrant laborer and urban worker, and creation of popular cultures.[34]

Since the late 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the historical analysis that subscribed to this genre of interpretation yielded a wide range of useful histories which have since endured into the early years of the twenty-first century. Histories focusing on African women and gender and class relations assumed an unparalleled importance.[35] Also important was the paradigm shift from women's to gender history. The latter has allowed historians and other scholars to foreground gender as a set of social and symbolic relations.[36] More broadly, African women histories have largely evolved as part of African social and cultural histories that initially rested on the premise floated by anti-Marxist revisionists that African pre-colonial traditions and institutions would offer a medium for understanding African colonial and postcolonial experiences. In this shift, scholars sought to understand African history from 'below' by making the ordinary man and woman the primary focus of analysis. Consequently, historians, aided by anthropologists, brought to the fore of the discipline aspects of study such as ethnicity, marriage, law, and initiation rites.[37]

This social and cultural orientation of African history also helped scholars reify such concepts as 'masculinity,' 'sexuality', and 'youth' among other things, that continue to be important subjects of study. Some of the chapters in this volume, particularly those by Mamadou Diouf and Xavier Livermon, engage the themes of youth and sexuality, respectively. By extension, works focusing on African social identities in the colonial state have also benefited from this later historiographical revolution.[38] Structures and categories as domains, sites and agents of making African history have thus been helpful in expanding the thematic and analytical scope of the discipline. Several chapters in this book refresh our understanding of these aspects in African history. Given the paucity of works reflecting on the role of women in shaping national politics in postcolonial Africa (from an African historian's perspective), Alicia Decker's contribution to this volume reinforces the importance of gender in crafting modern African history.

Generally, categories such as gender, modernity, coloniality, postcoloniality, and even consumption of material and popular culture have helped enrich African cultural history.[39] These categories have provided scholars of critical African studies with a framework to reassess Africa's position in the current world order. They have also provided a critique of notions of decolonization, subjectivity, and postcolonialism.[40] In fact, though it is yet to have a major impact in African history, postmodernism has provided a few historians and anthropologists focusing on Africa with the methods to unpack political and cultural crises produced in Africa's postcolonial states. Applying this to their social and cultural analysis of national crises in Kenya in the late 1980s and early 1990s, David William Cohen and E.S. Atieno Odhiambo have revealed that local and public discourses at the national and local levels have the

propensity to produce knowledge that can be useful to historians of Africa regarding current politics and culture. They argue that the sociologies and politics of knowledge production on 'present concerns and interests' relating to such issues as disease epidemics, refugee crises, civil wars, and environmental dilemmas can yield very authentic histories, if focus is directed on the ordinary African individual and his or her everyday experience.[41]

The quest by a few scholars to construct relations in colonial and postcolonial Africa at global, state, and community levels has prompted the creation of frameworks that apply concepts such as power, hegemony, and resistance to convey the nature and degree of African initiative. Discourses based on these concepts have aided the revision of our earlier understanding of such processes as resistance and production of knowledge and commodities in Africa. Studies focusing on environment, agricultural production, and anti-colonial protests have resulted from this development.[42] Currents of African intellectual history also seem to have tapped into this approach. Long considered the avowed mission of the educated African elite, articulation of anti-colonial protest could equally have been entertained by the African peasant. Steven Feierman's *Peasant Intellectuals* is a masterful revelation of how this category of African society could effectively articulate anti-colonial political discourses and action as did the African educated elite. Peasants did so by harnessing the power that was inherent in the indigenous institutions that governed their moral, productive economy. Aside from being conceived within the broader political economy of colonialism, African medical histories have similarly thrived on discourse analyses, revealing the creation of subjectivity and the category of 'the other'.[43]

The scholarly and public debate on Mau Mau has been more polarizing but enriching than any other theme in postcolonial Kenya, and has spawned studies that fit the description of 'new histories.' In the 1960s and 1970s, this debate provided nationalist radicals who were dissatisfied with the socio-economic and political progress of the new government with an alternative (often a populist) ideology that resonated with a disaffected public.[44] In the years that followed, the debate forced some historians to refocus their energy on depicting the Mau Mau struggle as a 'people's' history: an experience of ordinary men and women, delving deeper into African (rather than imperial) action in the uprising.[45] More recently, the most dominant scholarly threads in this debate have shifted attention to the validity or meaning of freedom for the ordinary citizen, memory, and nationalism, ownership of the struggle for freedom, as well as ethnicity and nation building.[46] These threads have also reminded us of the stigma of colonial repression that postcolonial states inherited at independence. This has in turn inspired studies that urge the need to rethink the legitimacy of imperial trusteeship and responsibility to the former colonial subjects of empire who are now free citizens of postcolonial African states.[47]

The emergence of histories of local, national, and transnational African visual and performance cultures (particularly art, dance, and music) have

further defined the varied interests of scholars of Africa's past. Some of these predate the recovery initiatives of the 1960s. For instance, in art history, the African imagination of the West and its colonial modernity was produced by Africans in the Belgian Congo as far back as the 1920s.[48] Current efforts, particularly by a new generation of African scholars, have catapulted African visual arts into African studies. Informed by the historical bearing of African art, works by Aderonke Adesanya among others help us discern gender, leisure, politics, and identity.[49] Overall, such works have promoted an ingenuity that has been at the core of Africa's contribution to civilization, but one that the colonial interlude served to deny. Indeed, Toyin Falola's reflections on the role of works on African art in rehabilitating Africa's past and in restoring the African's innate creative power and dignity, are ideal. He has noted that, in themselves, African artistic expressions are a form of self-definition that enables the rejection of imposed (external) ones, and helps to change the paradigm of negativity to the positive. Above all, works focusing on African art enable us to comprehend how visual and even performance art create a counter-discourse to the hegemonic representations of blackness, thereby allowing blacks to fight back with disdain, anger, and rationalization. More importantly, they provide evidence of civilization in Africa's past, a confirmation of the mission that pioneering works by Du bois and Cheikh Anta Diop sought to promote.[50]

Generally, African history's evolution in scope and analysis, especially since 1980, has expanded in ways that this Introduction cannot capture entirely. Yet, as a new generation of scholars emerges in the field and continues to build on past and recent efforts, and as new paradigms of analysis emerge, the discipline is bound to continue to grow.

A Synthesis

The foregoing analysis reveals that since the 1950s African historiography has been shaped by academic institutions (universities and their intellectual or political ideologies) as well as economic, social, and more recently cultural perspectives that have yielded the existing interpretations of the field. The historiography has also thrived from a multidisciplinary appeal, inviting analyses from history, politics, anthropology, literary studies, visual and performance arts, and even from ecological studies. Generally speaking, debates that have yielded what so far can be credited as African historiography reflect two key components.

The first relates to contested interpretation, which has left scholars divided over the nature of the relationship between Africans and colonialism.[51] Historical analysis of the African past has generally progressed along this divided interpretation, a fact that chapters in this volume reveal. Historians, anthropologists, and literary critics, among others, have contributed to the discourse that makes up the two varied interpretations. There are scholars who view

colonialism as a juxtaposition to the 'Other', the African experience, and not a process that produced a hegemonic colonial state that blurred the African place in it. For instance, Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff maintain that colonialism was not a simple exercise in domination and resistance, but was everywhere marked by various forms of complex dialectics, including that which was mediated by social differences and cultural distinctions, yielding 'new frontiers, new signs, and styles', and transformed everyone and everything that came it into contact with.[52] This body of scholarship explores the contradictions that colonialism generated in Africa, and points to the many contestations in the colonial state between Africans, and between colonial officials and Africans over colonial structures, policies, and practices. Therefore, for one to grasp the historical proceedings within the colonial state (and one can make a similar argument for the postcolonial state), this interpretation urges scholars to look beyond the assumed power of such states, and instead peer into the multiple layers of political and social relations and the conflicts and struggles that those relations produced. African cultural and social histories have borrowed from this thread. For instance, using reflections from African gender history, Nancy Hunt contends that:

> colonialism can no longer be viewed as a process of imposition from a European metropole but must be seen as tangled layers of political relations and lines of conflicting projections and domestications that converged in specific local misunderstandings, struggles and misrepresentations … Social action in colonial and postcolonial Africa cannot be reduced to such polarities as metropole/colony or colonizer/colonized.[53]

Then there are works whose interpretation assumes or perceives an imposing, hegemonic presence of colonialism, which broadly argues that the African historical agency was recognizably directed or influenced by colonial superstructures, however superficial these structures might have been. For instance, African resistance against colonialism was real, directed at certain oppressive state structures that must be accounted for. Teresa A. Barnes is specific on this thinking, and sees colonialism as a period marked by violence, exploitation, deconstruction, improvement, and the tendency to reconsolidate economic, political, and social identities and power. For this reason, to overlook the broader picture in which such dynamism operated while pursuing local structures likely effaces an enriching historical analysis. Where one attempts to understand the dynamic colonial period in a 'deconstructionist mode,' Barnes therefore contends, 'the creative examination of matters ever more local can lead scholars to miss the forest for the trees. Historians may abandon complex narration out of postmodernist scruple, but if narration loses its critical edge, history becomes indistinguishable from soap opera'.[54]

Frederick Cooper has recognized the difficulty that exists in exploring colonial binarism since any attempts to do so unintentionally reproduces

'new variations of the dichotomy' along the lines of modern versus traditional or by a transposition of 'the destructive imperialist versus the sustaining community of the victims'. He particularly notes the difficulty of the African historian in confronting the power that propelled European expansion 'without assuming it was all-determining' of the outcome of the social clashes it unleashed. Cooper seems to proffer a middle-ground approach between the preceding two extremes by urging that historians of Africa consider using binaries of colonizer/colonized, Western/non-Western, or domination/resistance as initial, useful devices for investigating the complex nature of colonialism, particularly questions relating to power. However, as they do so, scholars should not be constrained to search 'for precise ways in which power is deployed and the ways in which power is engaged, contested, deflected, and appropriated'.[55] By using the instance of the connections between the resistance and colonialism, Cooper urges the need to move past superficial, if not simple, analyses that explain that connection in terms of the oppressor/oppressed model. 'Politics in a colony', he argues, 'should not be reduced to anticolonial politics or to nationalism: the "imagined communities" Africans saw were both smaller and larger than the nation, sometimes in creative tension with each other, sometimes in repressive antagonism'.[56]

Aside from producing a divide in interpretation, debates that have produced African historiography over the decades have also rendered the question of epistemological and utilitarian uses of African historical knowledge relevant. To the revisionists of the 1960s, restoring the authenticity of African history implied not only decolonizing its methodology and substance, but also ensuring that the reclaimed historical knowledge, or at least the past, would help reconstruct the African identity and confront postcolonial challenges to African nationhood. The signature of the debate's relevance was the conspicuous adoption of the phrase 'Usable Past'.[57] The crux of the argument in the "usable past" scholarship has been that past knowledge is helpful for the epistemological approach of Africanist scholars to narrow the gap between the paradigm logic applied and the needs and perceptions of the people—and the state. It is a line of argument that was recognizable in the critique against nationalist scholarship in the 1970s. Critics advanced that pride and cultural nationalism that were the core of nationalist scholarship lacked tangible value for the ordinary citizens.

In the mid-1970s, proponents of applying the 'useable past' to achieve meaningful outcomes in the present argued that 'the poor and hungry cannot eat past cultural achievements', and that contemporary African regimes merely manipulated versions of the past and pursued modernist transformations that disregarded African realities.[58] Still dominant at the beginning of the following decade, at which time African scholars of literary criticism plied their professional trade by scrutinizing political malpractices of African governance, the perception that scholarship should inform Africa's plight and its solutions appealed to many African scholars. For Ngugi Wa Thiog'o,

neo-colonialism as embraced by African leaders remained a major obstacle to the elimination of economic mismanagement, corruption, political and cultural repression, and the degradation of African culture. In essence, it was a betrayal of the struggle for freedom in Africa.[59] In the mid-1980s, historians of Africa and other Africanists still regarded this question as worth pursuing. In a comprehensive reflection on the debate, Bogumil Jewsiewicki emphasized that the 'Usable Past' ceased to be just 'a matter exclusive academic debate', but a useful lens for reflecting and resolving the paradoxes of postcolonial African states.[60] In this book, a number of scholars revisit these paradoxes as far as postcolonial Africa is concerned.

The 'Usable Past' was thus partly cultivated into existence by a recognition by scholars that Africa faced real political and socioeconomic challenges that academic scholarship was to address. The close of the 1980s witnessed an Africa whose public memory was still ingrained in the uncertainties of the 1960s. Few governments had done much to ignite hope for their citizens, as many political systems exercised repression rather than fostered freedom within the civil society. Many Africans, according to John Lonsdale, saw their governments 'as evils to be evaded rather than as potential instruments of the public good'.[61] Therefore, some historians reasserted the importance of using Africa's past as a way of understanding not only these challenges, but also in projecting the future of Africa. It was important for the historian of Africa to study the past to help them and other political actors (leaders) imagine Africa's future. Lonsdale was lucid on this role while reflecting on the developments of the late 1980s:

> The future is treacherous territory for historians. It is also their continually imagined ideal … historians cannot help but judge the human successes and failures which they find in their recreation of the past than by the light of their own hopes and fears for the future. Effective political actors in the everyday world of the present require a complimentary feat of the imagination. They can most easily recognize and work for a desired future when they have imagined it, and they are able to portray it to a wider public as a project which builds on the triumphs or avenges the defeats of the living past.[62]

Thus, Africans' acquaintance with their history was supposed to serve the urgent need of promoting free political argument that would in turn aid and formulate alternative societal futures. The past would also inspire African governments to mobilize the public in the pursuit of core values that would help provision a meaningful future.[63]

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the past has continued to provide historians with a reference framework for social, economic, and political trends in Africa. The aspirations, failures, and fears of early years of independence may be in the distant past, but as Stephen Ellis reminds us, they are still within living memory—so much so that many within and outside Africa have not ceased from making allusions to notions of nation building, liberation,

economic development, Pan-Africanism, and freedom from dependency. All these, Ellis contends, are reminiscent of 'the great themes of the independence generation'.[64] Most of these remain only figments of the imagination in Africa because they have not been fully realized. There has been the feeling that historians of Africa have uncritically related the shortcomings of the 1960s to Africa's present experiences, and therefore are to blame for reproducing the status quo, a fact that Ellis makes clear: 'Historians [of Africa] have made their own modest contribution to this unsatisfactory state of affairs by their reluctance to reconsider Africa's contemporary history in terms appropriate to the present state of affairs'.[65]

The 'Usable Past' has also found relevance in efforts to re-image or 're-package' Africa in ways that differ from how the continent and its citizens have been cast by the West in the postcolonial period. Lonsdale juxtaposes the West's optimism for Africa shortly before and after independence with the current, external pessimism and the role to be played by the historian of Africa. African nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s, and the energetic search for the nation by Africans, seem to have cultivated a sympathy, and even an admiration, within the Western public and academic institutions. In those years, as Lonsdale illustrates, 'Press cartoons portrayed Africans, not as starving children or emaciated victims of HIV-AIDS, but as virile nationalist giants, overshadowing puny British politicians'.[66] During those years, African leaders displayed an uncanny energy to take on challenges and opportunities that came with the end of colonialism. But over the years, and particularly by the beginning of the twenty-first century, all this has changed. Ever-increasing global economic and social inequalities, and persistence in political and social dilemmas internal to African states, have complicated any ambitions of positive progress for the continent and its peoples. As a result, Western hopes and optimism for Africa and Africans that was evident in the 1960s have vanished, and has been replaced with perceptions of 'hopelessness'. The West's casting of such perceptions upon postcolonial Africa has in turn cultivated the irony of the 'civilizing mission', whose populist version presents Africans as unable to fend for themselves. The African scholar has therefore been urged to address the arduous task of offering a counter-enlightenment narrative that demonstrates that the realities of the African situation are the result of continued production of Africa as nature and the West as culture.[67]

Thus, Africa as packaged and presented by the West has outlived the end of formal empire. Undeniably, this construction of Africa is still viewed by critics as a cultural construct of imperialism and colonialism, one that, as Achille Mbembe notes, presents Africa as the 'Other'. He presses this interpretation as a reminder that the view that Africa lacks value attributable to human nature, and that the continent excels in elementary and primitive aspects of life that bar its forward progress (relative to the West), have a long history. According to Mbembe, the continued application of this construct

long after Africa's independence has allowed the notion of Africa's difference to be stretched to a new level, and served 'the West's desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world'. In this sense, Mbembe, echoing V.Y. Mudimbe, furthers the argument, 'Africa still constitutes one of the metaphors through which the West represents the origin of its own norms and identity'.[68] The enduring role of the West in its definition and casting of Africa, despite the latter's independence, has undoubtedly continued to enrich debates and analysis about Africa's past, present, and future. Questions regarding knowledge production about Africa, producers of that knowledge (scholars of Africa based in or outside the continent), and the authenticity of that knowledge in genuinely confronting challenges unique to Africa, continue to assume importance in scholarship pertaining to Africa. Part of the search for this authenticity in production of knowledge about and for Africa is behind the establishment of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). The Council has provided a platform for the research and publication of some of the most engaging African issues by Africa's finest scholars in history, politics, economics, and other fields. Indeed revision of Africa's past and an engaging analysis of Africa's recent and current experiences from CORDESRIAS's works must be applauded.[69]

The 'Usable Past' has also brought the aspect of audience into the debate. To whom should historians of Africa direct their scholarship? Should historical research address larger, global issues that resonate with the global audience or should those historians narrow down to Africans and localized issues within the continent? Given the everyday life challenges that Africa has continued to experience, some have recently argued that historical focus that deconstructs colonial and postcolonial superstructures is less suited to the audience (ordinary Africans) and historians based in Africa. This is because, critics argue, deconstructionism is an analytical tool rooted in North American rather than African realities. This argument is situated in the current global order in which the marginalization of Africa by global capitalism has tended to sway some analysts to find an explanation within universal models, instead of shifting the focus to localized problems and challenges faced by specific African countries and communities.[70]

Thus far, the foregoing perspectives only proceed to confirm that African historiography is a product of past and ongoing debates and conversations regarding paradigms of analyzing African history and of uses of knowledge that is produced. The diverse debates and their consequences have informed the richness of the field. Development of the discipline has benefited the most from the evolutionary trends in African studies since the 1950s. In his reflection on the prospects of African studies in the twenty-first century, Colin Bundy has concluded: 'Take African history [for instance] … this is a field whose fruits—its scope of enquiry, topics, themes, methodologies, theoretical

tools, and links with other disciplines—have for forty years yielded rich harvests. It is a body of work which has increasingly informed debates well beyond Africa; and it has challenged versions of world history that misconstrue or silence African perspectives'.[71]

This volume bears testimony to Bundy's conclusion. While it focuses more on themes and their interpretations, other aspects of African history are also implied, particularly the interdisciplinary approach to production of knowledge in the field. Thematic growth of the discipline over the decades has been tremendous, an indication that there remains a lot to be uncovered. Therefore, not every theme has been captured by the volume, and neither can we argue that the volume is complete and thorough. For instance, themes not accommodated in the volume but which have been important to the field include customary and colonial laws as they related to the African, African technologies, as well as Islam during the colonial era, among others.

The case for a postcolonial African history, reflected in the themes that form the second part of this volume, is validated by major transformations that African countries, generally speaking, have experienced within the last three decades. The ensuing internal changes have occurred not in isolation but partly consonant with Africa's never-ending struggle to adjust to the postcolonial regional and global orders. That struggle has revealed some persistent, old, systemic challenges, but one cannot fail to recognize some positive developments that have occurred during this period. The development challenge continues to ensure that the questions about national debts and foreign aid remain important. Resource-endowment remains Africa's strongest advantage in a world where resource-extraction is critical for development. The extent to which the continent has failed to harness its natural wealth to realize development remains an irony and a vexing question to many Africanists. The education sector has become a point of focus for many African countries and its relevance to modern African needs has led to certain definite developments in that sector. Quality and delivery of knowledge, especially at the tertiary levels, continue to pose challenges.

As regards Africa's postcolonial politics, while some may see secessionism in the emergence of new countries such as Eritrea (1991) and South Sudan (2011), others see nationalism and freedom at work in these political developments. The Rwandan Genocide (1994) still defines how some view Africa's colonial and postcolonial experiences. Mahmood Mamdani's reflections on the latter yield a very engaging perspective as far as comprehending Africa's postcolonial, political challenges: that African nationalists of the conservative order have been part of the problem given their failure to decolonize what he refers to as the native prerogative with regard to the indigenous populations resident in their territories. The political consequences of such colonial legacy proved serious for countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, and Zanzibar, where 'race' (or even ethnicity) became the ultimate standard for

defining citizenship, and a major determinant of violence during the political upheavals that rocked these states after independence.[72] It is also undeniable that reflections on ethnicity, identity, and past experiences have provided Rwandans, for example, with a formula for engaging with nation building and dealing with 'Usable Past'. The Biafra War may similarly have defined how modern Nigeria has evolved since the 1960s, at least politically.

On another dimension, the Pan-Africanist project as represented by the African Union has persisted and been reformed to identify itself more with Africa's challenges beyond politics, in spite of external and internal challenges that the project has experienced since its inception. Regional blocs on the continent reflect a new sense of purpose in dealing with systemic political and economic challenges, and an urgency to remedy the divisiveness that hindered meaningful cooperation between African countries in past decades. The African renaissance that some thought was resurging in the 1990s has been evident in these developments, though its intensity remained questionable. Despite the numerous socio-economic challenges, the brightest spot for Africa has been the liberalization of politics in many countries during the 1990s. Civic problems and the slow pace of political accountability may still be evident, but it is gratifying that a few scholars have seized on these developments to revisit constitutional histories of African countries. Accountability and transparency have in turn catapulted into importance the role in public governance of the African media and civil and non-government institutions.

On a macro-scale, decolonization has led to 'reverse migration' whereby postcolonial migrations by Africans into Western countries has become an important 'transnational' challenge for destination countries. Such outmigrations, evident at intra and extra-continental levels, offer development challenges to Africa in the form of brain drains to countries that have historically thrived on Africa's human and natural resources. Some would argue positively about the monetary remittances back to Africa by the continent's intellectual and economic diaspora; but the socio-economic implications of their absence from the continent, and the cultural dislocation they encounter away from home, have had consequences for the individual, country, and continent.[73]

Former colonial powers, notably France, have gradually redefined their relationship with their former colonial territories. The end of the Cold War has inaugurated an era where, strictly speaking, the West has no political stranglehold over the continent. By extension, China's presence in Africa has assumed a degree that is difficult to ignore. Globalization has been responsible for exchange of cultures between Africa and the world, and these have produced categories of identities for Africans in Africa and in the diaspora. All these are developments that chapters focusing on postcolonial Africa consider, reflecting an attempt to embrace the call to scholars of Africa, and of African history in particular, to relate their production of knowledge to Africa's real changes, whether political, social, cultural, or international.

Organization of the Handbook

This volume is divided into two general parts. Part I is concerned with colonial Africa, while Part II focuses on postcolonial Africa. This division is adopted only for purposes of chronology and flow of themes, and is not an absolute delineation of Africa's historical experience. In fact, as some of the chapters demonstrate, there are certain overlaps and continuities in historical action across the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras. The thematic approach is deliberate, as we endeavored to reflect on the depth of African history by having various scholars engage various themes that have defined the field. We also hope that while doing so, the chapters reveal the paradigms of interpretation that have been used to analyze those themes.

Part I focuses on the African experience in colonial Africa. Martin Shanguhyia contends that Africa's physical environment provided a medium for historical action during the colonial era. This is in no way to state that its environment has determined Africa's history. Rather, by using multiple studies of African environmental history in the colonial period, he attempts to show that the environment offered both colonial states and Africans a platform to express, forge, and preserve their perceptions, notions, meanings, and uses of nature in ways that produced different outcomes and responses. In the next chapter, Toyin Falola and Chukwuemeka Agbo examine relations between Britain and France (the two major European colonial powers in Africa) and their African colonial subjects, as shaped by new administrative structures. The structures are in turn examined within economic, social, and political changes and African response to them. In his chapter, Paul Lovejoy perceives a persistence of slavery during the colonial period in Africa. Instead of disappearing completely (as some have assumed), slavery underwent extensive transformations. For instance, Lovejoy demonstrates, acts of enslavement were undertaken surreptitiously rather than through capture in warfare, judiciously sanctioned punishment, or slave raiding, although kidnapping continued in some places. Although colonial rule was justified as a civilizing mission and slavery was considered an anathema that had to be eliminated, its persistence was a feature of colonial rule, despite policies and development schemes that attempted to redefine social relationships through taxation, migrant labor deployment, Christian practices, redefinition of kinship, and other 'civilizing' mechanisms.

On the colonial economy, Moses E. Ochonu maps the general economic policy trajectories of colonial regimes as well as the active agency of Africans in engaging with these policies, and shows how, in an economy calibrated to serve metropolitan interests, Africans as individuals and groups engaged with the closures and openings presented by colonial land, labor, and agricultural regimes. Women also played fundamental roles in defining and redefining colonial economies, and their place in it. This is the subject of Judith Byfield's chapter. She attempts to move us away from a historiography that privileges

men's roles in colonial economies (particularly cash crop production) to strike a consonant with scholars of African women who have identified the numerous direct and indirect ways in which women engaged the colonial economy. She contends that as the scholarship on women continues to expand and explore topics such as artisan production, marriage, and childhood, we have a fuller understanding of the dynamic ways in which women in Africa shaped and were shaped by colonial economies.

More often than not, colonialism brokered into existence ambivalence in pre-existing African indigenous structures and values in ways that redefined the roles of African women and expectations about them by the colonial society. In her chapter, Gloria Chuku reflects on this development by exploring how European colonialism attempted to alter African womanhood (a signifier of responsibility, social etiquette, versatility, independence, hard work and resilience) and expectations of an adult African female in indigenous African societies. Challenges and barriers created by colonialism enhanced, diminished, or placed African women in ambiguous situations as they physically and culturally negotiated the transition from old ways of life to new ones.

Historical works on Anglophone and Francophone Africa often overshadow studies on the colonial experience of Lusophone Africa. Therefore, Philip J. Havick's chapter on the administration, economy, and society in the Portuguese African Empire is a much welcome contribution to this volume. His chapter offers a comparative overview of the Third Portuguese Empire, particularly its economic, political, social, and cultural ramifications and the impact of Portuguese administration upon African societies between 1900 and 1975.

Andrew Barnes revisits the role of Christianity in Africa in an innovative way. In his chapter he shows how the importance of creating and maintaining social welfare institutions (schools, hospitals, and poor houses) for the expansion of Christianity in Europe in turn influenced Christians in Africa to build similar institutions with similar goals. Some European Christian missions in Africa perceived this as a challenge and therefore teamed up with colonial governments to ensure missionary control over evangelization through poor relief. In response, African Christians developed similar but different strategies for evangelizing other Africans. Kelly Duke Bryant offers an overview of the history of colonial education in Africa, particularly the involvement of missionaries and the colonial state, tracing these developments from the early years of colonial rule through the interwar period to the expansion and reform of the postwar era, as well as offering some postcolonial legacies of these developments. She focuses in particular on African responses to and experiences of colonial education, relying on her original research on Senegal. She views this history through the lens of African agency and ambivalence, arguing that although Africans shaped colonial education and the uses to which it could be put, its complicated legacies led colonial education to occupy an ambivalent position in African history.

Health and medicine in colonial Africa have been a growing area of scholarship. Matthew M. Heaton examines health and health care in Africa in the colonial period by analyzing the health consequences of colonial occupation and colonial economies on Africans. He argues that issues of health and medicine should not only be treated in terms of the spread of germs and the provision of health care, but also in terms of the limitations of medical science and the broader social dynamics that affected how both Africans and Europeans thought about the role of health and medicine in colonial Africa. As regards the African experience during the colonial period, Uyilawa Usuanlele and Oluwatoyin B. Oduntan argue that colonial urbanization aimed at achieving financial self-sufficiency of colonies and ensuring the good social (cultural) well-being of European populations. These ideas justified colonial neglect of rural communities and Africans in urban environments. Africans who were affected by these developments resisted, reimagined, and reshaped colonial purposes and designs, and thereby established themselves as co-makers of colonial towns and cities.

Meshack Owino reflects on the African experiences in the First and Second World Wars, each war treated in separate chapters. During the first global war, Africans' contribution was noticeably through provision of supplies and as porters (carriers), but they were also victims of the mayhem that characterized the conflict. Africans' participation in the Second World War was even more remarkable by serving overseas in the main theatres of the conflict. Overall, the wars' specific impact on African soldiers, civilian populations, and the continent is analyzed.

African migration within and out of Africa predates colonialism. However, the inauguration of colonial rule in Africa highly regulated this process, mainly to serve the needs of the various administrations. Kwabena Akurang-Parry and Isaac Indome's chapter demonstrates the extent to which the attritions of colonial rule (wars of conquest and African resistance, conscription of forced labor, taxation, and brutalization of Africans) triggered migrations throughout the colonial period. During the late colonial era, the unintended benefits of colonial rule (such as education, expanding colonial economy, urbanization, and social change) also became inexorable forces of African migrations.

For their part, Benjamin Lawrance, Temilola Alanamu, and Benedict Carton attempt to broach a new ground for agents that have long been neglected in African history. They try to claim the agency of children in African history. They make the pertinent argument that children in Africa have often been marginal to those in power, a fact that, together with the absence of adequate sources, has led to this category of African society being neglected by historians beyond narratives on childhood socialization, labor, education, and play. Their chapter examines how colonialism simplified the complexities of African childhood by having children become workers crucial to capitalist accumulation, perceiving them as malleable minds to be shaped through formal

Western education, and by institutionalizing boys' and girls' expectations in the broader society.

On the subject of literature in colonial Africa, Tanure Ojaide establishes the relationship between African people's culture and literature, and between their history and politics. He maps out the many kinds of literature in colonial Africa which portray history in a non-conventional way as regards social, cultural, economic, political, and psychological consequences of colonialism on Africans. Colonial African literature provides evidence for the suffering, struggle, and resilience of African peoples under colonial rule. On his part, Sylvester Okwunodu Ogbechie reviews the impact of colonialism on African art and identity, especially in the emergent modernity of African artists. He shows how colonial rule impacted the development of new visual languages for modern African art. By examining African artists from different regions of Africa, he maps regional differences in these artists' approach to their practices and their engagement with questions of modernist identity. He reveals that an investigation of discourses of modern art and identity in the colonial era helps us search out points of convergence in how these discourses unfolded in their national spaces and transnational engagements. Augustine Agwuele counters the often presumed view that colonialism radically altered alien cultures. Focusing on Yoruba culture, he argues that colonialism rapidly and radically intensified or attenuated existing practices rather than upended or even radically changed or transformed them. With regard to youth and popular culture in colonial Africa, Jamaine Abidogun's chapter describes how African youths lived through changing times and how they defined popular culture through lived experiences. That culture was the product of negotiated experiences within the realities of European colonization.

Fikru Negash Gebrekidan's chapter reminds us that the practical and symbolic implications of the Battle of Adowa retain value in enriching Ethiopian historiography in ways not captured in previous literature. Gebrekidan explores how Ethiopian victory at Adwa in 1896 helped promote a more far-reaching Pan-African discourse, one in which Ethiopia itself played an important role as a poignant symbol of anti-colonial resistance during the first half of the twentieth century. The chapter is an example of trends in transnational history that have defined African historiography.

Understanding colonial Africa within the 'global' is also evident in Enocent Msindo's analysis of colonial Africa and the West. Msindo views colonialism as an extractive system which legitimized the looting of Africa by Western corporations, safeguarded new markets for Europe's Industrial Revolution, and created Africa's dependency by delegitimizing African indigenous innovations and knowledge systems through incorporation of Africans into Western education and cheap labor regimes. Herein are to be found the roots of poverty on the continent. Western politics and economic power were instrumental in legitimizing this system. Ibrahim J. Gassama critically examines the role of international law and all its manifestations in the lives of Africans during

the colonial era and extends the analysis into the present day. He argues that this received law facilitated imperialism and colonialism, and that it remains a manifestation of colonial legacy in modern-day Africa given that few Africans can fully escape its tragic hold on their lives. Aside from implying it in existing historical literature, few historians have explored the deeper connections between colonialism and development in Africa. Ruth Rempel goes into the subterranean connections of colonialism and development in refreshing ways by tracing development as practiced in colonial Africa to its Western roots and other global developments in the first half of the twentieth century. She uses imperial development history in British and French colonies to show how colonial regimes initially used ad hoc development measures in their African colonies before they were pushed to systematize and change them by global war and economic depression, and by persistent African agency. She also examines US involvement in development in Liberia and Ethiopia, and the adoption of a countervailing development project by African nationalists and the United Nations in the 1950s which shared with its imperial rival assumptions about economic growth, planning, and the primary role of the state.

Toyin Falola and Chukwuemeka Agbo offer an engaging analysis of African nationalism since the nineteenth century. They examine the intersection between nationalism and African intellectuals, particularly the quest by African elites to address issues of tradition, change, politics, and power, and to reconstruct a new image for Africa. They are also concerned with the way nationalism shaped the production of knowledge and influenced colonial politics in Africa, leading to the formation of the modern African states. Robert M. Maxon engages African 'Decolonization Histories'. He argues that decolonization was a lengthy process, one that occurred over several decades in the second half of the twentieth century. The lengthy period and varied contexts that marked the change from colonial territories to nation-states as well as differing paths followed means that one narrative does not fit the experience of all. Therefore, Maxon urges that decolonization accounts have to pay attention to the varied forces and factors, paths and actors, timing, and the experiences of former British, French, Belgian, and Portuguese African territories. He particularly demonstrates that African factors were the most significant variable in the continent's decolonization histories.

Chapters in Part II mainly focus on themes in postcolonial Africa. Readers are encouraged to consider the content of this section as overlapping with the previous one, given that topics found in the former have roots in the years preceding independence after 1960. Clear examples include the Cold War, creation of African diasporas, Pan-Africanism, and apartheid. The Cold War emerged as an important external influence on the political trajectories of African states shortly before and after independence. It is one of those themes that transcends any presumed 'boundaries' between colonial and postcolonial Africa. Kenneth Kalu argues that the intrigues of the Cold War shaped Africa's decolonization process in very significant ways, and led to the

evolution of extractive and utterly predatory political and economic institutions in postcolonial Africa. Drawing from several cases of foreign interventions in Africa during the Cold War, he demonstrates that the activities of the USA and its allies were not always focused on advancing the interests of Africans, but were more concerned about ensuring that African countries did not imbibe communist ideas. On the other hand, Ademola Araoye navigates post-independence African politics, especially the struggle for partisan and absolute appropriations of state spaces. He notes that different colonial experiences of each individual state, variations in patterns that yielded statehood, the neo-colonial traditions and institutions bequeathed to them by departing powers, and their heterogeneous internal constructions have all influenced African postcolonial politics.

Immediately after independence, African states were often weak and under-representative of their respective ethnic communities, thereby marginalizing significant portions of their population. This contributed to violent struggles by excluded communities for political and economic autonomy from the state. Charles Thomas's chapter charts these developments, and focuses on political dissention that resulted in separatist conflicts, especially civil and secessionist wars. He clearly observes that such conflicts have not occurred without external, usually global, political influences.

Africa's relations with the West following decolonization have been a subject of fruitful debate in African studies literature. Enocent Msindo argues that Africa's postcolonial economic and political transitions have been mainly due to the structural conditions of the new states and the nature of Africa's relationship with the West. Post-independent Africa remained captured by Western capitalist and political enterprises that have dictated Africa's economic and political developments.

For much of the history of the USA's foreign relations, Africa has been a somewhat overlooked entity and sometimes entirely ignored. In his chapter, Adebayo Oyebade provides a lucid analysis of the historic connections and interactions between the USA and Africa. He traces the US-African relationships from the fifteenth century to the postcolonial period and demonstrates the existence of a long-standing connection through which Africa has contributed to the definition of US foreign policy. Franco-African relations after independence in particular have provided interesting scholarly perspectives. In his chapter, Tony Chafer argues that the 'exceptional' nature of these relations span the entire colonial period as successive governments have sought to decolonize, not by preparing the colonies for independence, but by integrating them more closely with France. This aspect of envisioning an African future as part of a Franco-African bloc was challenged during the 1950s, forcing Charles de Gaulle to improvise an 'exit strategy' which involved transferring power to African political leaders while signing an array of cooperation agreements with the newly independent states that tied their futures closely to France. The postcolonial Franco-African special relationship (Françafrique)

was born, further perpetuating the notion of French exceptionalism. Franco-Algerian relations have been equally intriguing to scholars. In her analysis, Natalya Vince also challenges the oft-repeated idea that Franco-Algerian relations were 'exceptional' both during the colonial period and into the post-independence era. Although Algeria held a distinct place within the French empire, there were many connections and parallels between Algeria and other parts of the French empire—in terms of people, colonial ideas and policies, the experiences and activism of colonized peoples, and intertwined chains of events. In the post-independence period, a confrontational rhetoric between the two countries has masked pragmatic collaboration. Franco-Algerian 'memory wars' are often more Franco-French and Algero-Algerian than they initially seem. Moreover, rather than being locked in a suffocating embrace, Franco-Algerian relations have always existed and functioned in broader global contexts.

One of the stand-out consequences of the decline of the Cold War has been China's increasing expansion into Africa, to a degree that has forced scholars of Africa to reconsider the importance of the continent to global powers. Consequently, the chapter by Joshua Eisenman and David Shinn is very enlightening. The two scholars explore how China's increasingly proactive foreign policymakers have taken advantage of a void left by an indifferent Russia, a preoccupied USA, and a divided Europe to create fresh opportunities and pursue new bilateral and multilateral dialogues with African countries. In doing so, China has evolved a foreign policy toward Africa designed to secure natural resources, markets, opportunities for its construction firms, and to consolidate its position as leader of the developing world. Beijing has been adept at employing approaches that address African nations' economic, diplomatic, and security needs, while ensuring China's continued ability to influence the political and commercial landscape of the continent.

John Mukum Mbaku provides a critical and rigorous analysis of the often troubled relationship between Africa and global financial institutions. He shows that while African policymakers have looked to these institutions as sources of funds for industrial projects in their respective countries, these institutions' activities in Africa have also imposed significant social, economic, political, and environmental costs on the African peoples. As well as examining the ways in which conditionalities imposed on the African countries by global financial institutions have interfered with public policy in these countries, Mbaku also explores the extent to which these global financial institutions have also impacted political and economic development in the African countries. Ruth Rempel continues with her analysis of Africa and the development experience, but this time focuses on the postcolonial period. She describes African development after independence as a mix of colonial policies and institutions with approaches created in United Nations forums. From advancing national development agendas in the late 1960s, African development aspirations were also guided by the Lagos Plan, a continental

development blueprint, during the 1970s. Global economic volatility and the unraveling of nationalist coalitions during that decade undermined earlier state-led development approaches, and opened up avenues for structural adjustment policies in the following decade. She outlines African responses to adjustment and governance reform. She ends by analyzing varied efforts to relaunch a development project in the new millennium, which, like its predecessors, involves the roles of both external and African agencies.

In recent decades, research on a narrowly constituted 'African diaspora' has given way to an increasingly expanded focus on multifarious diasporic communities in Africa, Eurasia, and the Americas. In his chapter, Kwasi Konadu argues that such communities must be understood within the historiography of African diasporas and within the specific contexts that help explain departures and arrivals, sources and destinations. By focusing on two of the most significant trends in diasporic approaches to African history ('Atlantic creoles' and 'Black Atlantic' frameworks), Konadu makes the case for addressing methodological and other shortcomings inherent in those trends, in terms of approaches in the field of African history that can promote an African world perspective and practice in African diaspora studies.

Sub-Saharan Africa is frequently seen as the periphery of the Muslim world, in terms of both geography and religious influence. In her chapter, Marloes Janson demonstrates that Islam has had a presence in Sub-Saharan Africa since the earliest days of its history. She moves away from conventional scholarship that emphasizes 'African Islam' to an approach that helps to capture the fluidity of the different ways of 'being Muslim' in everyday living, thereby challenging ingrained analytical concepts such as an 'African Islam' versus 'Arab Islam,' and an accommodating Sufi Islam versus an orthodox reformist Islam. Christianity and religious philosophy in particular have also shaped postcolonial African politics, social moral fiber, and a platform from which to reflect on postcolonial mentalities and thought processes. This is a subject that Elias Kifon Bongmba engages in his chapter. He unpacks postcolonialism as unfinished business through African theological perspectives.

Reflecting on apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa, Nancy L. Clark offers a comprehensive overview of the incremental elaboration of racial segregation in South Africa, and demonstrates the continuing impact of the past on post-apartheid South Africa. Clark draws attention to the crucial role played by Africans outside the political process in bringing about the end of apartheid through protests, boycotts, and strikes, as well as the growing disenchantment with the African National Congress Government in the post-apartheid period. Using evidence from newly accessed sources, Clark provides a broad picture of how apartheid worked and was defeated, and the current problems facing South Africa.

In what is an in-depth analysis of Pan-Africanism and its connection with the history of the African Union, Horace Campbell explores the ideas and skills of Africans in and outside Africa and their influence on Africa's history

of emancipation. Campbell deftly traces the evolution of the global idea of Pan-Africanism and its political and ideological manifestations over the historic period since the transatlantic slave trade. He concludes by calling on scholars and students of Pan-Africanism to break from the traditional and worn-out assumptions of African Reconstruction and embrace the spirit of Ubuntu, which is the new paradigm for Pan-Africanism emanating from victories of a revitalized African people.

In a chapter focusing on human rights in modern Africa, Edward Kissi examines debates over the universal or cultural definitions of human rights, and reveals how human rights have been viewed, used as ideological instruments for contesting and reinforcing oppression, and memorialized in the history of Africa. He concludes that the pursuit of human rights as social policy in Africa has exposed the contradictory embrace of human rights as an organizing principle in African history.

Peter Otiato Ojiambo traces the development of education in postcolonial Africa as part of efforts by governments to address social, political, and economic needs. Many of these reforms have been shaped by varied historical happenings within the African continent. Drawing from his research on development of education in postcolonial Kenya, Ojiambo examines how historical experiences have influenced educational reforms, progress, challenges, and future trends. African women's relationship with the postcolonial state has often been as complex as it had been with the colonial state. Consequently, Alicia C. Decker explores the ways in which African statecraft has created opportunities and challenges for African women. She reveals how state policies and practices have influenced women's lives by examining the political trajectories of several women who got involved in politics and thus became part of the state. Decker considers the role of activism as a tool for engaging the state from the outside, and concludes by returning to the gendering of African statecraft, theorizing how and to what extent African women can make the postcolonial state less patriarchal. As alluded to earlier, this chapter refreshes the gender dimension in African modern history by locating women at the center of modern state politics in Africa.

In his reflection on youth and public space in Africa, Mamadou Diouf reveals how young people are triply positioned in environments of crisis with multiple causes, forms, and consequences. He argues that young people have come to constitute significant actors and resources, as well as the central concern, within the continent that has been shaken by eruptions of violence, social and political movements, and cultural and democratic projects. Young men and women have been both the principal perpetrators and the principal victims of these happenings. Xavier Livermon writes on African sexualities and makes the argument that there is no one 'African sexuality'; instead, African sexualities emerge as discursive and as political formations shaped by Africans themselves as much as by colonial formations. Importantly, the chapter charts new developments in the ways that African sexualities have

been reimagined with a particular focus on how scholars and activists have attempted to decolonize this field. Livermon argues that African feminism and African queer studies are sites of contestation toward the production of new directions and alternative histories of African sexualities.

During the colonial period, certain objects from African material cultures were reinvented as art within the context of Western colonial knowledge about cultures and regimes of value. In her chapter, Sarah Van Beurden considers the impact of such reinvention on the development of museum and heritage cultures in postcolonial Africa. For instance, in postcolonial Africa, museums are seen both as subjects of, and tools for, cultural decolonization. Inversely, large collections of what is now considered national heritage in Africa were or are located in the West. Beurden addresses the rising importance of international heritage and conservation regimes supported by organizations such as UNESCO, and their role in the negotiation of restitution claims.

The importance of Mukoma Wa Ngugi's chapter goes beyond the ideal study on Africa's postcolonial literature. Rather, Ngugi provides a novel way in which historians and other scholars of Africa can use literary works to raise and answer questions on decolonization, African languages, 'transnationality', identity, and ownership. He does so by reflecting on early South African Literature (late1800s–early1940s) alongside the literature of decolonization (1950s–1980s) and contemporary transnational literature (1990s–present). He makes a cogent argument: that modern African literary criticism (itself an enriching source of understanding Africa's past and present) can hardly ignore its literary history. This chapter is an excellent complement of Ojaide's contribution in the colonial section of the volume.

In a related thread, Eric Charry outlines how an extraordinary number and diversity of distinct music cultures in Africa is at the root of postcolonial efforts to establish national identities with music and dance ensembles, and forging new multi-ethnic mixes for presentation on the world stage. Charry explores these initiatives within a wide range of issues such as: the influence of colonial education, the role of colonial imports (brass bands and Christian music), regional musical instruments, the stories they tell, and their global reach, Pan-African arts festivals, government audio and video archiving to preserve and stimulate the cultural heritage, the Internet and intellectual property issues, and the rise of independent artists. For their part, Hikabwa D. Chipande and Davies Banda explore the interplay of the complex relationships between sport and postcolonial politics in Africa. They discuss the instrumental role that sport played in nation building and projecting a positive image of the African continent. Since colonial times, communication media have been a vital component of state and society in Africa.

Sharon Omotoso examines this aspect for postcolonial Africa and sees a vertical communication structure of the colonial era as being gradually replaced with a horizontal structure, as new media breeds an enlightened

society thereby challenging both conventional media and governance. Within the context of this transformation, Omotoso vouches for an African philosophy of communication, scrutinizes the impacts of media policies on relationships between elites and the grass roots, and, more importantly, examines how media policies in postcolonial Africa have helped bridge communication gaps.

The last chapter, by Michael West, offers incisive perspectives on a theme in African historiography that is increasingly being advocated for: transregional or transnational historical approaches. He rationalizes why African and African diaspora studies in the USA can be enriched by such approaches. West argues that although the end of the Cold War may have resulted in a decline of area studies, it has led to an increased interest in diaspora studies. For him, the defining contribution of the western African diaspora is a worldview that conceives of peoples of African descent not in ethnic, national, imperial, regional, or even continental terms, but in global ones. Consequently, the study of peoples of African descent globally should build on this tradition and eschew particularism, exceptionalism, and national historiography in favor of a transnational, transcontinental, and transoceanic approach.

Notes

1. For instance, T.O. Ranger, ed., *Emerging Themes in African History* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968); Christopher Fyfe, *African Studies Since 1945* (London: Longman, 1976).
2. A.D. Roberts, "The Earlier Historiography of Colonial Africa," *History in Africa* 5 (1978): 153–67.
3. Examples include Lidwien Kapteijns, *African Historiography Written by Africans, 1955–1973* (Leiden: Afrika-Studiecentrum, 1977); Bethwel Ogot, "Three Decades of Historical Studies in Eastern Africa, 1949–1977," *Kenya Historical Review* 6, nos. 1&2 (1978): 493–510.
4. These works are many, but for key ones, see Arnold Temu and Bonaventure Swai, *Historians and Africanist History: A Critique* (London: Zed Press, 1981); Caroline Neale, *Writing "Independent History": African Historiography 1960–1980* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985); Bogumil Jewsiewiscki and David Newbury, eds., *African Historiographies: What History for Which Africa?* (Beverley Hills: Sage Publication, 1986); Toyin Falola, ed., *African Historiography* (Harlow: Longman, 1993); and E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo, "From African Historiographies to an African Philosophy of History," in *Africanizing Knowledge: African Studies Across the Disciplines*, ed. Toyin Falola and Christian Jennings (New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 13–63.
5. See, for instance, the chapters by John E. Flint, A.D. Roberts, Toyin Falola, Charles Ambler, and William H. Worger in Robin W. Winks, eds., *The Oxford History of the British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
6. For reasons of concision and common usage, authors throughout have used the terms 'Britain' and 'British' rather than the technically correct 'United Kingdom' and 'UK'.
7. Basil Davidson, *Can We Write African History?* (African Studies Center, Los Angeles: University of California, November, 1965), 6.

8. For a more recent analysis of these sources, see John Edward Philips, *Writing African History* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006).
9. Though this may be argued across the board for most European empires in Africa, this was undeniably the case with Britain's engagement with the continent as there is enough historical documentation for this assertion. See examples of early colonial literature in British Africa in W.M. Roger Louis, "Introduction," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*: *Historiography*, ed. Robin Winks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 20–22.
10. Kapteijns, *African Historiography*, 2.
11. These were numerous, and were preceded by K.O. Dike's *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956); later works included, among many others, Jacob Ade Ajayi's "Nineteenth Century of Nigerian Nationalism," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 11, no. 2 (Dec. 1961): 96–105, and *Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841–1891: The Making of a New Elite* (Evanston, IL: Northeastern University Press, 1965), and many other works by E.A. Ayandele, J.C. Anene, A.E. Afigbo, to mention but a few.
12. Terence O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896–7: A Study in African Resistance* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1967); Terence O. Ranger, *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898–1930* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970); and Gilbert Gwassa and John Iliffe, eds., *Records of the Maji Maji Uprising* (Dar es salaam: East African Publishing House, 1967).
13. Isaria N. Kimambo and Arnold J. Temu, eds., *A History of Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969).
14. Kapteijns, *African Historiography*, 17–19. For a brief but informative account of the development of African historiography in France and Belgium, see Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "Africanist Historiography in France and Belgium: Traditions and Trends," in *African Historiographies*, ed. Jewsiewicki and Newbury, 39–164.
15. Mohamed Mbodj and Mamadou Diouf, "Senegalese Historiography: Present Practices and Future Perspectives," in ibid., 207–14; Martin A. Klein, "The Development of Senegalese Historiography," in ibid., 215–23.
16. Allen Isaacman's several works on Mozambique must be recognized in this effort. Linda Heywood's contributions have also been critical, especially *Contested Power in Angola, 1840s to the Present* (Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press, 2000); As regards postcolonial history, see, for instance, Patrick Chabal et al., *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002).
17. Neale, *Writing "Independent History,"* 10.
18. Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "African Historical Studies Academic Knowledge as 'Usable Past' and Radical Scholarship," *African Studies Review* 32, no. 3 (December 1989), 4, 16.
19. Ibid., 16.
20. The signature publication of the Marxist school was that by Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1974). Also Edward A. Alpers, "Rethinking African Economic History: A Contribution to the Discussion of the Roots of Underdevelopment," *Ufahamu* III, no. 3 (1973): 97–129; Edward A. Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves: Changing Pattern of International Trade in East Central Africa to the Later Nineteenth Century* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1975).

21. Neal, *Writing "Independent History,"* 18. "Petite bourgeoisie" or "straddlers" is used here after Gavin Kitching and a few other scholars to refer to African material accumulators who also had access to certain social and economic opportunities that a majority of the African population did not during the colonial period. This placed them on a plane higher in the local social hierarchy. Gavin Kitching, *Class and Economic Change in Kenya* (London: Yale University Press, 1980), 193.
22. Henry Slater, "Dar es Salaam and Postnationalist Historiography in Africa," in *African Historiographies*, ed. Jewsiewicki and Newbury, 254.
23. Oginga Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru* (London: Heinemann, 1967).
24. Ali Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), 77.
25. This was the emphasis in Temu and Swai, *Historians and Africanist History.*
26. Anthony G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1973).
27. Atieno-Odhiambo, "From African Historiographies," 34.
28. For instance, Derek R. Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, c. 1935–1972* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
29. Shula Marks, "South African Studies Since World War Two," in *African Studies Since 1945: A Tribute to Basil Davidson*, ed. Christopher Fyfe (London: Longman Group Limited, 1976), 188.
30. Ibid.
31. For an excellent summary on these developments of South African historiography see Atieno-Odhiambo, "From African Historiographies," 28–32.
32. Premesh Lalu, "When was South African History Ever Postcolonial," *Kronos* 34 (November 2008): 267–81.
33. For an overview of these and other issues, as well as key studies in Ethiopian historiography, see Donald Crummey, "State, Society, and Nationalist in the recent Historiography of Ethiopia," *The Journal of African History* 31, no. 1 (1990): 103–19; Bahru Zewde, "A Century of Ethiopian Historiography," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 33, no. 2 (November 2000): 1–126; and Donald Crummey, "Ethiopian Historiography in the Latter Half of the Twentieth Century: A North American Perspective," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 34, no. 1 (June 2001): 7–24.
34. For instance, T.O. Ranger, "Toward a Usable African Past," in *African Studies Since 1945: A Tribute to Basil Davidson*, ed. Christopher H. Fyfe (London: Longman, 1967), 26–27.
35. These works are many; for examples, see Claire Robertson, *Sharing the Same Bowl: A Socioeconomic History of Women and Class in Accra, Ghana* (University of Michigan Press, 1990); Claire Robertson, *Trouble Showed the Way: Women, Men, and Trade in the Nairobi Area, 1890–1990* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); Rose Nancy Hunt, "Domesticity and Colonialism in Belgian Africa: Usumbura's Foyer Social, 1946–1960," *Signs* 15, no. 3 (Spring, 1990): 447–74; See also Nancy Rose Hunt, Tessie P. Liu, and Jean Quataert, eds., *Gendered Colonialisms in African History* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1997); Luise White, *Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Jean Allman, "Adultery

and the State in Asante: Reflections on Gender, Class, and Power from 1800 to 1950," in *The Cloth of Many Colored Silks: Papers on History and Society, Ghanaian and Islamic in Honor of Ivor Wilks*, ed. John Hunwick and Nancy Lawler (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996); Jean Allman and Victoria Tashjian, *I Will Not Eat Stone: A Women's History of Colonial Asante* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2000); Jean Allman, Susan Geiger, and Nakanyike Musisi, eds., *Women in African Colonial Histories* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002). See also Nancy Rose Hunt, Tessie P. Liu, and Jean Quataert, eds., *Gendered Colonialisms in African History* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1997); Tabitha Kanogo, *African Womanhood in Colonial Kenya 1900–1950* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005); and Iris Berger, *Women in Twentieth Century Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

36. Nancy Rose Hunt, "Introduction," in "Gendered Colonialisms in African History," special issue, *Gender and History* 8, no. 3 (1996): 326; Atieno-Odhiambo, "From African Historiographies," 21.
37. Early works in this category include Margaret Jean Hay and Marcia Wright, *African Women & the Law: Historical Perspectives* (Boston: Boston University, African Studies Center, 1982); Martin Chanock, *Law, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Sally Falk Moore, *Social Facts and Fabrications: "Customary" Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880–1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts, eds., *Law in Colonial Africa* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Educational Books, 1991).
38. For instance, Tim Burke, *Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and Cleanliness in Colonial Zimbabwe* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996).
39. Atieno-Odhiambo, "From African Historiographies," 21; Hunt, "Introduction," 325. Hunt lists examples of studies that fall in this "lexicon of cultural history" on page 335.
40. For example, Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa: Myths of Decolonization* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2013); Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Empire, Global Coloniality, and African Subjectivity* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2013).
41. David William Cohen and E.S. Atieno Odhiambo, *The Risks of Knowledge: Investigations into the Death of the Hon. Minister John Robert Ouko in Kenya, 1990* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2004), 22–23, 27; see also David William Cohen and E.S. Atieno Odhiambo, *Burying "SM": The Politics of Knowledge and the Sociology of Power* (James Currey: London, 1992).
42. Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990); Fiona D. Mackenzie, *Land, Ecology and Resistance in Kenya, 1880–1952* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1998); and Jamie Monson, "Relocating Maji Maji: The Politics of Alliance and Authority in the Eastern Highlands of Tanzania, 1870–1918," *Journal of African History* 39 (1998): 95–120.
43. For earlier trends in this historiography, see Maynard W. Swanson, "The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the Cape Colony, 1900–09," *Journal of African History* 18 (1977): 387–410; for later studies, see Maryinez Lyons, *The Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping Sickness*

in Northern Zaire, 1900–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Nancy Rose Hunt, *A Colonial Lexicon: of Birth Ritual, Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Megan Vaughan, *Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). Recent studies also reflect on a few aspects of this interpretation and extend it to the postcolonial period: Emmanuel Akyeampong, Allan G. Hill, and Arthur Kleinman, eds., *The Culture of Mental Illness and Psychiatric Practice in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014).

44. Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru*; on the political polarization of the Mau Mau debate in the 1960s and 1970s, see Daniel Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
45. The literature that is represented under this category is immense and only a few examples can be provided here: Tabitha Kanogo, *Squatters and Roots of Mau Mau* (London: James Currey, 1987); Wunyabari O. Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt* (Oxford: James Currey, 1993); and Greet Kershaw, *Mau Mau from Below* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1997).
46. E.S. Atieno Odhiambo and John Lonsdale, eds., *Mau Mau & Nationhood: Arms, Authority & Narration* (London: James Currey, 2003).
47. Carol Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Owls Book, 2005); David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005).
48. Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "Painting in Zaire: From the Invention of the West to the Representation of Social Self," in *Africa Explores*, ed. Susan Vogel (New York: The Center for African Art, 1991), 130–75.
49. Aderonke A. Adesanya, *Carving Wood, Making History: The Fakeye Family, Modernity and Yoruba Woodcarvin*g (Africa Research and Publications, 2011).
50. Toyin Falola, *The African Diaspora*: *Slavery, Modernity, and Globalization* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2013), 310.
51. For a summary of how historical scholarship on Africa has split historians over the degree of colonial impact or influence on Africans, and one from which the following summary benefits, see Harvey Amani Whitfield and Bonny Ibhawoh, "Problems, Perspectives, and Paradigms: Colonial Africanist Historiography and the Question of Audience," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 39, no. 3 (2005): 582–600.
52. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier*, Vol. 2 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997), 28.
53. Hunt, "Introduction," 326. John Lonsdale's analysis of structures and action as essential components of understanding African states also falls into this category of interpretation. John Lonsdale, "States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey," *African Studies Review* 24, nos. 2/3 (June–September 1981): 139–225.
54. Teresa Barnes, *"We Women Worked So Hard": Gender, Urbanization and Social Reproduction in Colonial Harare, Zimbabwe, 1930–1956* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999), xx–xxi.

55. Frederick Cooper, "Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History," *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (1994): 1517.
56. Ibid., 1519.
57. For instance, Ranger, "Toward a Usable African Past," 17–30; Jewsiewicki, "African Historical Studies," 3.
58. Ranger, "Toward a Usable African Past," 22.
59. Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, *Barrel of a Pen: Resistance to Repression in Neo-Colonial Kenya* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1983), 1, 3.
60. Jewsiewicki specifically mentions the confrontations in the 1960s between Cheikh Anta Diop and Leopold Sedar Senghor in Senegal to demonstrate how intellectualism and national politics generated confrontation between scholars who appropriated history as a battlefield to confront the shortcomings of the political practice in Senegal. Jewsiewicki, "African Historical Studies," 3.
61. John Lonsdale, "African Pasts in Africa's Future," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 23, no. 1 (1989): 127.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Stephen Ellis, "Writing Histories of Contemporary Africa," *The Journal of African History* 43, no. 1 (2002): 6.
65. Ibid., 7.
66. John Lonsdale, "African Studies, Europe & Africa," *Afrika Spectrum* 40 (2005): 378.
67. Ibid., 381–82.
68. Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 1–2. This theme is treated in detail by V.Y. Mudimbe, *The Idea of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) and V.Y. Mudimbe, *Invention of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
69. One of CODESRIA's many works that focuses on African history that stands out is Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, *A Modern Economic History of Africa (Vol. I): The Nineteenth-Century* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1993).
70. This is the fundamental argument by Whitfield and Ibhawoh, "Problems, Perspectives, and Paradigms," 584–85.
71. Colin Bundy, "Continuing a Conversation: Prospects for African Studies in the 21st Century," *African Affairs* 101, no. 402 (January 2002): 72.
72. Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
73. For varied perspectives on the importance of migration and its diasporic implications in and outside Africa, see, for example, Falola, Toyin, *The African Diaspora*: *Slavery, Modernity, and Globalization* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2013) and Toyin Falola and Adebayo Oyebade, eds., *The New African Diaspora in the United States* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017).

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PART I

Colonial Africa

CHAPTER 2

Colonialism and the African Environment

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African activities and Africa's contacts with foreigners over the centuries have been powerful agents in shaping the continent's history. The African environment in particular provided the medium in which these activities and interactions played out, leaving an indelible mark on Africa's history. The physical environment has been a canvas on which the continent's history has been studied, debated, and written. The nature of that history is evident in the way the environment has impacted on African societies, and the way geographical landscapes and other natural phenomena have been shaped by human and state agencies, or even by forces of nature. This is in no way to state that the environment has determined Africa's history; rather, the environment has played a significant role in the way that history has developed over the centuries. Therefore, any efforts at writing African history at any scale or period with the environment as a major theme is to delve into a complex arena given that such a history not only spans centuries, but also transcends diverse regions and communities, and has to include external (global) elements.

European colonialism was a major external force that has shaped our understanding of African history in general and its environmental dimensions in particular. This chapter provides an overview of the extent to which Africa's encounter with colonialism shaped notions about the African environment and, by extension, how those notions influenced human relations and human–environment relations. It goes further to highlight the way these developments have been perceived or interpreted by scholars whose studies

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have focused on that period and how these interpretations have aided our understanding of modern African history. Environmental relations in colonial Africa has enabled scholars to critically examine questions about the nature of colonialism, race, justice, moral economy, culture, identity, power, resistance, social status, belonging, and development, among others. The scope and contents of this chapter are by no means complete, or even comprehensive, given that the environmental theme in African history has been widely captured by many scholars focusing on Africa and the European empires. Neither is this chapter the first to address the meaning, nature, and outcomes of the intersection between European colonialism and the African environments. Prior efforts by a few scholars to highlight this historiography must be applauded.[1] Those efforts provide the starting point for understanding this important aspect of African history.

Historians of Africa and other Africanists have revealed how the 'environmental question' in colonial Africa permeated the politics of the colonial state and defined and was defined by the colonial project. This was true in the colonial pursuit for social control, economic production, demography and settlement patterns, reordering landscapes, confronting human health challenges, regulating built environments, and promoting development, among other aspects. Conflicts of interest emerged on these issues, so much so that ideological and moral arguments characterized conversations about human interactions with the natural environment, the nature of the outcome of those interactions, and about access to, use, and management of natural resources. An analysis of colonial environmental relations precludes any attempts to characterize the colonial experience in Africa as a uniform one. Questions and ideas about the environment were numerous and diverse, reflecting divergent worlds of all those who constituted colonial African states—so much so that, as Jane Carruthers correctly points out, that experience defies mere labeling of 'colonizers' and 'colonized', which is not to say that one should overlook the extent to which colonialism transformed power relations over people and resources with the environment acting as a site of contestation.[2] This then forms the justification for this chapter, which highlights how the colonial phase was significant in shaping these relations in fundamental ways that have helped historians and other scholars understand and write about the African experience under colonialism.

Thus, the roles of colonial states and their African agents in shaping environmental relations have widely informed scholarly analyses. By extension, this scholarship has largely constituted what has emerged as African environmental history, a major sub-field that has served to enrich African historiography, and which has expanded the scope of African history since colonial times. Recently published general academic works by some of the outstanding historians on African environmental history as an emerging sub-field validate this development.[3]

While the introduction of colonialism vastly altered Africa's environment and redefined how Africans interacted with it, some scholars have focused their research on aspects that remind us of the dynamism of the African encounter with nature before the colonial era. Intense human activities and natural forces in precolonial Africa were at play in altering the environment, though the pristine nature of that environment was still evident in many areas.[4] This counters the notions of 'Merrie Africa' or a tropical 'Eden' that were highly held by European colonizers of the twentieth century, whose perceptions of 'Primitive Africa' also served to reinforce scenes of 'uncorrupted' Africans and their environments in the old days.[5] As will be demonstrated later in the chapter, such thinking justified colonial intervention in African modes of production, most notably in sectors such as farming, forestry, and hunting. This intervention was extended into African residential environments, both new and old, that authorities thought were threatened by dangerous insects and infectious diseases. However, colonialism should not be seen as the genesis of transformation of African environments, but rather as a powerful contributing variable to the rhythms that were already shaping their nature, and with it, African inhabitants. It speeded up the process of transformation and left a legacy that continues to elicit historical inquiry and analysis.

African Environment and European Imperialism

Impulses that inaugurated and drove Western imperialism in Africa were to a greater extent shaped by European imagination of the continent's environment. Some scholars of European empires have drawn the link between imperial interests of those powers and geographical knowledge of the colonial world including Africa. For instance, Dane Kennedy observes that European explorers, who were adept at cataloguing their explorations of African (and other) lands and peoples were the vanguard of imperial expansion. Just as Alexander von Humboldt used geographical sceneries of the tropical world in such areas as the West Indies, South America, and the Pacific to construct landscapes (and their inhabitants) that projected notions of difference between these regions and the temperate world, European explorers used the African environment to transpose similar notions. So much so that Kennedy rightly notes, 'By the late nineteenth century, the connection between exploration and empire was often direct and institutionalized'.[6] Even before Victorian and other European explorers' encounters integrated Africa's environments into the imperial quest in the period after 1850, the tropical ecology of some areas of Africa was already under some form of European control. The pristine nature of those environments amazed early Europeans who encountered them. These early colonial encounters were characterized by assumptions that an 'Eden' existed, assumptions that were pronounced by processes that seemed to indicate exhaustion or degradation of some of the continent's natural resources. Cases of environmental dislocation threatened

the commercial and therapeutic value of tropical environments to Europeans, a concern that reoccurred with vigor during the colonialism of the twentieth century, a theme that is examined elsewhere in this chapter.

Dreams of an 'Eden' led to scientific experiments to preserve or recreate 'wild' African landscapes by setting up botanical gardens by the British and French in the Cape Colony and Mauritius, respectively. Botanical gardens were miniature versions of grandiose plans that were subsequently implemented to ensure large-scale preservation of the environments in these and other early British, French, as well as Portuguese and Spanish territories in isolated parts of Africa before colonialism expanded to engulf the entire continent during the twentieth century. These developments have been treated within the scholarship that examines global dimensions of the role of the environment in the expansion of mercantile European empires, and especially those focusing on the origin of modern global environmentalism.[7]

Imperial explorers and other European travellers of the nineteenth century expanded the purview within which the West appropriated African environments in the bid to 'recreate' Africa and redefine its people. Even so, it must be emphasized in advance that many of these adventurers may have set upon 'discovery' journeys into Africa not in the service of their European empires; rather, they sought to satisfy their curiosity about the unknown, undertaking adventure for its own sake, or even entertained the humanitarian mission of purging Africa of the carnage of the slave trade and other perceived social evils. Served well by improved channels of communication (especially popular media) and sponsorship from scientific agencies such as the geographical societies, many brought to Europe's knowledge the breathtaking geographical sceneries of Africa, as well as its varieties of plant, animal wildlife, and human communities.

The role of geographical societies in popularizing the use of geography to spur imperialism in Africa is particularly captured in analyses of European empires' origins and expansion. Drawing from a rich source of studies on the historical geography of France, Robin A. Butlin reveals the direct and indirect links, and probable influence, of the Société de Géographie de Paris on the *parti colonial* of French colonial expansion during the nineteenth century. The Société also had connections with numerous other French geographical societies, which for either commercial or cultural reasons may have influenced French colonial acquisition of Tunisia, French West Africa, and Madagascar in the later part of that century. In Portugal, the Africa Committee of the Lisbon Geographical Society, founded in 1875, was tasked with convincing the Portuguese government to consolidate and expand its imperial presence in West Central Africa for economic and cultural reasons. Similar societies in Spain, Belgium, Germany, and Italy had connections to these countries' imperial designs in Africa at the close of the nineteenth century.[8]

The oldest of these, the Royal Geographical Society of London, harnessed scientific and geographical tools and expertise (pertaining to exploration and

mapping) to make sense of travellers' accounts and to support geographical expeditions into lesser known parts of Africa. David Livingstone, whose humanitarian journeys across East and South Central Africa were responsible for opening this region to British colonization, and who was the reason for a relief expedition sponsored by the Royal Geographical Society in 1872 to search for him in the deeper parts of the African interior, acknowledged the Society's imperialistic project of using Victorian geography to advance Britain's overseas expansion.[9] Joseph Thompson's memorable expedition across Maasailand in East Africa, too, was a project that the Society embraced and supported.

The economic potential of Africa's resources informed the writings of the likes of Livingstone, Thompson, Henry Morton Stanley, and other explorers who ventured into the continent during the second half of the nineteenth century. Their writings also depicted Africans as 'uncivilized' and in need of the benevolence that flowed forth from European Enlightenment virtues. The two missions to harness the continent's resources and to 'civilize' its inhabitants were hardly inseparable. Later, colonial states strived to accomplish them simultaneously. This external view of the African environment and its inhabitants partly provided the impetus for the 'New Imperialism', creating a foundation upon which European colonial expansion in Africa was justified.

Some historians of Africa have clearly acknowledged this connection in their analyses of these nineteenth-century proceedings. For instance, commenting on Joseph Thompson's writings about his encounters with the Maasai and the East African landscapes in the 1880s, William Beinart and Lotte Hughes emphasize aspects of consumption and expropriation of these landscapes that likely appealed to British power that later dominated this region.[10] This natural and material appeal of African environments in the tales of European explorers resonated with politicians and the general public in Europe. The explorers' links to nineteenth-century imperialism have been aptly summarized by Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns: 'Their tales of adventure and exploration, which emphasized the economic value of Africa's interior and the desperate needs of its peoples, were powerful instruments in the education of the reading public and profoundly shaped its later approval and support for imperialism'.[11]

Aside from the intellectual, cultural, and economic value that African environments offered the West, those environments also presented inherent dangers to imperial expansion. Scholars of empire and of African history have demonstrated how aspects of Africa's natural environment slowed, but did not deter European conquest of the continent. They have focused attention on the African disease ecologies. The African disease ecology is perhaps the most dominant theme in the historiography on this subject. European concerns about Africa's disease and health challenges predate the imperialism of the late nineteenth century. West Africa's coastal areas had posed health problems to

European traders, early adventurers, and troops during the transatlantic slave trade. Reflecting on these processes, historians of African demography (most notably Philip Curtin) and of empire (such as Alfred Crosby, who emphasizes the 'Columbian Exchange' of the transatlantic interactions) have noted the high mortality rates among early Europeans who ventured into the West African coastlands in the days of the slave trade. They attribute this to mosquito-infested environments that bred malaria and yellow fever, a reflection of the dangers for Europeans of being exposed to an unforgiving tropical environment.[12] Africans also suffered high mortality rates but these were much lower than those of Europeans. Africans had coexisted with mosquito ecologies and had developed immunity or a form of tolerance to malaria.

In spite of these health risks, the European push into the continent was relentless, a fact that Curtin attributes to European ignorance of Africa's deadly disease ecologies, at least before 1800. They were also motivated by economic transformation in West Africa following the decline of the slave trade as European profiteers, both in government and private enterprise, began searching for and expanding new avenues in their commercial relations with Africa. This led them to push into Africa's interior, beyond the coastal confines to which they had been condemned for centuries. Imbued with a sense of optimism, Europeans launched a series of explorations into the interior of Africa. Geographical societies and European commercial companies became the handmaidens of these explorations.[13] Thus, the economic imperative remained a powerful lure for European expansion in Africa, even as the disease ecology remained a barrier but not a permanent hindrance to that expansion.

The discovery and use of quinine offered promise against malaria, perhaps the most dangerous of Africa's tropical diseases at the time. It helped Europeans expand their frontiers beyond the coastal areas. From the mid-nineteenth century, traders, missionaries, explorers, and imperial armies moved into deeper parts of the continent equipped with the anti-malarial drug. Malaria remained a threat but could now be checked. Typhoid, cholera, dysentery, and bubonic plague became the major concerns in the West's March to conquer Africa. They resulted from increased global commerce along international sea lanes that connected Africa with other continents.[14] Subsequent medical advances in confronting these diseases also minimized mortality rates among European troops and their African and Indian conscripts.

The historiography on disease ecology in the age of imperial conquest of Africa goes beyond mere improvement in tropical medicine and its role in aiding Western military advances into the continent. Historians of empire have demonstrated that other 'tools of empire' such as steamboats and railroads were important in compressing distances between Africa and the rest of the world, as well as between regions and within the continent. These technologies helped overcome environmental barriers to imperial advances and aided the movement of resources and people.[15] But interconnectedness and

closer contact between populations and diverse regions also implied a high incidence of infectious diseases. Compression of time and space ensured that both new and old diseases spread into many parts of Africa in the last decades of the nineteenth century, particularly in West Africa.[16] Thus, while Western technologies helped check Africa's tropical diseases, some of those technologies also served as pathways along which diseases spread in the continent.

Critical historical studies have analyzed how, in the few decades leading to colonization, African communities in Tanzania actively engaged with their production and exchange networks, and interacted with their environments while mastering and shaping (not being constrained by) those environments. This included navigating debilitating human and livestock disease epidemics. Some of these, like rinderpest and the sand flea plague, were linked to global contacts.[17] During this time, local communities in Kenya, Sudan, and Ethiopia devised survival techniques to navigate disease, drought, famine, and other ecological disasters.[18] These examples illustrate the resilience and innovation of African communities in bad times, and seek to depart from narratives that have depicted precolonial Africa as tranquil, undisturbed by the rhythms of nature. Colonial expansion in some of these regions furthered environmental disruptions, rendering weak the coping mechanism that local communities had developed.

The Pursuit of 'Healthy' Environments and Spaces

Following the pacification of Africa and the establishment of colonial rule, environment-related parasites and diseases remained dangerous to the colonial project. Aside from mosquitoes and malaria, the tsetse fly and trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness, the disease caused by the fly) proved important. The latter had existed in Africa for centuries, before colonial times. It afflicted Mali, the famed empire of the West African savannahs in the medieval period. During the transatlantic slave trade, European medical observers noted a 'Sleepy Distemper' among African slaves aboard slave ships in the 1700s. By 1850, European hunters and Christian missionaries increasingly encountered the fly in Southern Africa where the Tswana name 'tsetse' was used to refer to the fly.[19] By the end of the nineteenth century, much of Sub-Saharan Africa from Portuguese West Africa (especially in Principe) to the Belgian Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, through Southern Africa, the dangers of the tsetse fly and trypanosomiasis to both humans and animals were real.

Colonial initiatives to confront these two problems and their impact on local communities and the natural environment have attracted considerable scholarly attention.[20] Campaigns to combat tsetse and sleeping sickness inaugurated the careers of Western scientific and medical experts in Africa, among them entomologists, parasitologists, medical doctors, and ecologists. Their mission, backed by metropolitan governments and research institutions, was to utilize advances in Western science and technology to study Africa's

insects, their ecologies and African relations to them, as an initial step towards understanding causes and solutions to insect-borne diseases. These developments illustrate instances where campaigns against Africa's disease and insect ecologies expanded the scope of Western science in colonizing Africa. Furthermore, knowledge produced from studies carried out by British, German, Swedish, French, and other European scientists working in Africa sharpened the pseudo-scientific notions about Africans and their natural environments. These aspects were the two key subjects of study in natural and medical sciences at the time.[21] Efforts to use Western science to understand Africa's disease environments expanded the cultural lens through which colonizers viewed Africans. Also, since untamed disease ecologies were likely to pose political, economic, and social challenges to colonial states, thereby undermining the position of colonial powers in Africa, official intervention was justified as part of the 'civilizing mission'. Western medical science and technology provided the necessary tools to be used to overcome a problem that 'primitive' communities were unable to eliminate.[22] Such views fit the social analyses of colonial campaigns' search for disease-free environments in Africa.

The social analyses of those campaigns have been inspired by the demographic impact on Africans of those colonial initiatives at eliminating tsetse flies and sleeping sickness. Of interest to historians are the high rates of African mortality resulting from the disease and from some colonial measures to eradicate the flies. For instance, about 300,000 Africans may have perished from the disease in colonial Uganda between 1900 and 1910, without counting hundreds of others who died within the Lake Victoria regions of Tanzania and Kenya.[23] Administrative approaches to the campaigns required relocation of African communities to concentrated settlements that were deemed 'safer' zones, which made it easier for British and German administrations to enforce quarantine measures, administer medical treatments, ensure uninterrupted provision of education, water, agricultural development, and regulate the mobility of African labor.[24]

Belgian anti-tsetse and trypanosomiasis campaigns in the Congo were no different from those enforced in the British and German territories in Eastern Africa. They involved *medicamenteuse* and *biologique* approaches. The former involved medical components such as increasing the number of trained medical staff and establishment of medical clinics and hospitals, all aimed at curing the victims of sleeping sickness. *Biologique* contained a slew of approaches that were pushed by administration and public-health departments, and aimed at preventing the spread of the disease. This involved creating *cordons sanitaires* that separated healthy populations from infected ones, a form of 'social-engineering'.[25] This approach complemented the scientific (biological and chemical) approaches that were directed at the flies and their natural habitats.

All these approaches directly or indirectly disrupted the demographic patterns of African communities by altering preexisting African settlement and

migration trends. For instance, in Bunyoro, Uganda, sites to which the Banyoro were relocated were hardly developed to provide for their economic and social needs. Formerly evacuated zones were allowed to revert to bush, which in turn became sanctuary for wildlife and tsetse. This, among other factors related to British colonial conquest, resulted in population decline in Bunyoro.[26] Some scholars have argued that colonial campaigns against tsetse flies in other parts of East Africa may have been ineffective, and could have instead expanded tsetse ecologies. By using evidence from colonial mapping of tsetse-infested areas of colonial Tanzania, Helje Kjekshus has revealed that those areas expanded between 1913 and 1937, in spite of intensive German and British initiatives to control the flies. Kjekshus attributes this to colonial officials' failure to consider African initiatives that had effectively utilized indigenous ecological control measures before colonialism. It would take time, and studies by a few Western experts such as John Ford, to get colonial regimes to integrate African solutions to anti-tsetse fly campaigns and other related environmental problems.[27]

Besides natural environments, urbanization in colonial Africa has offered scholars a window through which to analyze colonial authorities' pursuit of 'healthy environments' and communities. Colonialism led to the emergence of new cities and alteration of old ones. Rapid urbanization attracted many Africans (as well as Asians in East and Southern Africa) into many of these cities. Urban areas offered the migrants economic opportunities but also became sites of contestation between migrant communities and colonial authorities over issues related to environmental health. In the bid to manage urban populations through 'planning', city authorities had to make critical decisions that altered urban relations in the face of emergencies created by disease outbreaks. Plague, cholera, and other epidemics that spread into urban areas at the turn of the nineteenth and early twentieth century led colonial administrations to enforce racial segregation in the affected cities.

As a result, Asians and Africans became targets of strict hygiene measures as part of the health campaign measures to check the outbreak of these diseases. City authorities in Nairobi incinerated Asian buildings on grounds of being a potential source of public-health risk. In Kisumu, western Kenya, the Indian Bazaar was quarantined and merchandise disinfected. In these two urban areas, official British policy insisted on residential zoning along racial lines for public-health reasons.[28] In the South African cities of Cape Town, Durban, and Port Elizabeth, Asians and Africans were also on the receiving end of anti-plague measures in the 1890s and early 1900s. In Durban, Asian living quarters were tagged as 'breeding haunts and nursery grounds for disease' and therefore a source of social discomfort for the European population. Asians were forcefully relocated to zones sited away from European quarters, a move that municipal authorities imagined would help 'cure this our social leprosy'.[29] In Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, Africans and Coloreds were unfairly blamed for infectious disease outbreaks, and just like Asians, they

were subjected to racial segregation measures construed by urban authorities as the solution to curbing those epidemics. Labels such as 'undesirable elements' and 'Kafir' gained currency in reference to Africans in their 'filthy' living environments. Consequently, what Maynard Swanson has referred to as the 'sanitation syndrome' came to dominate the minds and actions of administration and health officials in their efforts to confront infectious diseases in Cape Town. They did so by positing infectious disease as a societal metaphor that was used to racialize urban relations, and by promoting discourses on cleanliness, filthiness, overcrowding, slums, and public health that were in turn used to reinforce racial, class, and cultural differences between urban dwellers.[30]

Asians and Africans were not merely passive in these invasive public-health control measures. Concerned that plague control measures would 'fill the "cup of woe"' for Asians as evidenced by vexatious quarantine measures, Mahatma Gandhi passionately engaged colonial authorities in South Africa in defense of the Asian community.[31] In Port Elizabeth, both Asians and Africans did not wait to be relocated into officially designated zones, but on their own accord moved to areas on the city's outskirts that were out of government control. A few Africans purchased plots of land on which they erected their own dwellings. When officials attempted to regulate these new settlements to prevent further disease outbreaks, some refused to relocate without adequate compensation from the government in the form of property.[32] Uitvlugt (Ndabeni), the largest of the relocation sites outside Cape Town, witnessed organized Africans' resistance against the administration for failure to provide basic amenities and assurance of guarantee to permanent property for those settled there by authorities. Their leaders organized train boycotts, petitions, and legal proceedings, forcing authorities to legalize Ndabeni as a permanent African settlement.[33]

These cases of contestations on health and urban environments reveal incidences of race, ethnicity, and class relations regulated by colonial power but contested by the 'victims' (Africans, Asians, and Coloreds) who refused to be labeled as such. They also demonstrate how colonial campaigns for healthy spaces reinforced social identities by creating social constructs such as 'healthy', 'unhealthy', and 'filthy', and applied these to categories of colonial populations in unequal ways. Furthermore, those cases show that economic motives underpinned official involvement in public-health campaigns. Blaming Asians for plague and cholera outbreaks was related to the obvious economic threat that Indians posed to European communities in East and Southern Africa. Those campaigns were also intended to regulate African movements so as to secure rural areas from being afflicted by urban disease epidemics and to ensure healthy reservoirs of African labor.

Generally, scholars of historical epidemiology have linked the emergence of modern disease environments in Africa to rapid urbanization during the colonial period. Gerald Hartwig and K. David Patterson have pointed out

that colonialism induced dynamic urbanization developments in Africa that unleashed serious epidemics in cities. The resulting transformation was rapid, as hundreds of migrants flocked to urban areas, leading to overcrowding and poor housing. City authorities were caught unprepared to deal with urban health problems that resulted from inability to cope with sewerage and refuse disposal and the provision of clean water supplies to migrants and other city residents.[34] When these arguments are considered, the 'blame the victim' rationale that colonial authorities adopted when enforcing public-health campaigns in the face of disease epidemics in urban areas begs for a legitimate critique.

Colonial Economies and the African Environment

Our knowledge of the relationship between colonialism and the African environment also comes from studies focusing on Africa's economic history. Those studies draw a close connection between colonial economies and the African environment. Some of them extrapolate this connection from economic motives of European imperialism, colonial extraction of African resources, and African initiatives in colonial economies. As noted earlier, economic motives were implied in the writings and images about Africa by European explorers and missionaries, and in the annals of European geographical societies that helped drive nineteenth-century imperialism. Following the establishment of colonial rule, colonial powers viewed Africans and Africa's natural resources as playing a vital role in the extractive economies, and in securing the fiscal base, of their respective colonies.

Starting from the early period of formal colonization of the continent, colonial administrators confirmed the wealth of African environments—its dangers notwithstanding. The impact of European settler communities on local African communities is what has garnered the most attention both in general historical works and more specialized studies. The alienation of Africans' land and seizure of their livestock, for which colonial administrations and the settlers offered an economic justification, led to ecological, economic, and social disruption of African systems. French colonization of Algeria after 1830 led to a series of government legislations that resulted in alienation of land from Algerians that was in turn handed over to French *colons*. More land that formerly belonged to the *beylik* and which was inhabited by Arabs and Berbers was forcibly inherited by the French conquest state.[35] Systematic expropriation of rural peasants and nomadic pastoralists by the French led to massive restructuring of traditional society. Many Arabs and Berbers were reduced to supplying hard labor both in towns and rural economies.[36] Earlier colonial pioneers (such as the Dutch, who were propelled by the mercantile imperialism of the sixteenth century) realized how critical African resources were for their survival in what became the Cape Colony in South Africa. These pioneers built their initial colonial fortunes on fertile lands, livestock,

and labor, oftentimes forcibly acquired from local African communities in the Cape and beyond. They expanded their settlements by displacing first the Khoikhoi community, and later the Xhosa pastoralists and other local peoples beyond the Cape. British annexation of the Cape Colony after 1806 and their occupation of Natal, and their subsequent expansion from these bases deeper into Southern Africa, led to the loss of land by Africans.[37]

Aside from leading to loss of African land and livestock, Dutch expansion into the Cape Colony and its hinterlands also expanded the human disease ecology, most notably the introduction and spread of smallpox, which ravaged through Khoikhoi society and facilitated the decimation of their culture.[38] Farther north in Kuruman, Nancy Jacobs has illustrated how communities and individuals with power (invested by culture, tradition, or colonialism) manipulated those without it to access and monopolize land and water resources. By using power and racial inclinations, European settlers as well as the twentieth-century South African state and its segregation policies were able to displace Africans from the fertile Kuruman River Valley into the Kalahari. For their part, traditional chiefs seized on these transformations to use their positions to monopolize cattle ownership, thereby creating a mode of dependency that made them patrons to clients without livestock of their own. Thus, in Kuruman, communities and individuals with power used the environment to forge relations that benefited their access to, and use of, resources. The dispossessed negotiated the system by devising certain ways of farming and developing new social relations.[39]

Central and East Africa experienced similar disruptive patterns. In Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), the way the British reorganized settlement patterns so as to access land and African labor for European settlers aided the expansion in tsetse ecology in eastern parts of that colony. Part of this reorganization was to discourage African hunting and emphasize close settlement of African communities, which led to an expansion of bush lands and an increase in wild animals. This in turn led to high incidences of tsetse flies and with them sleeping sickness and *nagana*.[40]

In 1903, Sir Charles Elliot, Kenya's High Commissioner (1900–1904), regarded British acquisition of this territory as 'the greatest philanthropic achievement of the later nineteenth century' partly because of the opportunity this offered Britain to advance its 'civilizing' mission, but most important because 'Europeans can live and thrive not merely in patches of territory here and there, but practically anywhere in the highlands'.[41] Elliot facilitated the origins of the White Highlands that were created from vast stretches of fertile lands and watering areas that were alienated from African communities, most notably the Maasai, Kikuyu, and Kalenjin.[42]

The enforced relocation of the Maasai into the less hospitable Narok Reserve was not without negative ecological impacts on the area, the community, and their livestock. Once resettled in Narok, they no longer had

access to their traditional dry weather grazing grounds in Laikipia. Aridity, decline in quality pastures, population pressure, and droughts led to increased ecological deterioration in Narok. East Coast Fever and sleeping sickness took a heavy toll of both the Maasai and their livestock. Whereas colonial officials explained Narok's ecological woes from a Malthusian perspective that reinforced the 'blame-the-victim' narrative, the Maasai, who had all along resisted their relocation into this southern reserve, attributed the area's problems to colonial ignorance of the ecological challenges that existed there. Thus, to the Maasai, the reserve was an unhealthy environment, far from more conducive Laikipia where they had been forced out.[43] If indeed for some historians of Africa an 'Eden' never existed prior to the disruption that colonialism introduced in rural Africa, then the Maasai experience is instructive. In interviews with Maasai elders with knowledge of this colonial debacle, Lotte Hughes has revealed that the Maasai were able to contrast their bitter experiences in Narok with the 'sweetness' (plenty of pasture, water, and disease-free environment), a kind of 'Eden', that was associated with Laikipia.[44]

Some historians of East Africa have revealed how the creation of settler communities closed off frontiers of African access to ecologies that served as 'havens' for survival in times of natural disasters. In this way, settler agricultural economies undermined African environment-based livelihoods. David Anderson has revealed that the Tugen and Ill Chamus of Baringo in Kenya's Rift Valley were precluded from accessing the wetter highlands that were alienated for European settlement. This starved the pastoralists of access to traditional watering and pasture areas. Their attempts to breach physical boundaries that encased those farms to enable them to graze their livestock were criminalized as 'trespassing', leading to imposition of fines and other forms of retribution. Anderson uses the 'Range War' that ensued between colonial administrators and settlers on one hand, and the Tugen and Ill Chamus on the other, to contrast two contested views of land tenure and land use in a settler colonial state. The former viewed land ownership from a Western model—as belonging to the individual, who had sole rights over it. For their part, Africans in Baringo saw land as strictly communal, use of which was open to every member of the community.[45] Excision of indigenous forests in Baringo as Crown or government property, and for private commercial use, had similar effects of undermining local livelihoods. By insulating forests from access by African communities, colonial regimes in Africa dislodged local usage of forest resources. Some communities were unable to acquire wood for fuel and building materials, and were prevented from hunting and gathering food in those forests.[46]

These disruptive trends of colonial expansion into Africa were also evident in territories that did not have European settlers to influence policies on land and other resources. In such territories, colonial administrations and international commercial companies, acting as allies, had particularly strong interests

in land resources and collaborated in dispossessing local communities. In the Congo Free State, African lands that were deemed *terres vacantes* (vacant territories) were appropriated by the administration for individual and corporate gain.[47] One of the most extreme, disruptive natures of colonial restructuring and extraction of land-based resources occurred in this territory. The vacant territories were not actually vacant as officials had initially thought; rather; this was land which indigenous Congolese communities used for shifting cultivation, hunting, and gathering. This land was appropriated and divided into Domaines and handed over to international monopolies, and the rest retained by the state. The Domainal system thrived on the extraction of rubber (then in high demand in global markets), ivory, and minerals. This exploitation was aided by forced Congolese labor, with many Africans maimed or killed, leading to human suffering, depopulation, and famine.[48]

Some scholars have opted to direct attention to the ecological transformation of colonial, commercial, agricultural plantations and its impact on Africans. Some cash-crop plantations created regional microclimates that dramatically altered local environments, which in turn affected the health of African migrant farm laborers who worked on those plantations. In German Cameroon, plantations were set up in lowland swampy coastal regions that were hotter, wetter, and vulnerable to malaria and filariasis. African laborers who journeyed seasonally to these plantations from inland savannah areas of Yaounde, Bali, and Fumban suffered high mortality rates from these diseases. Thus, economic developments resulting from changes in man–habitat relationships, coupled with high population mobility and interactions, created 'microenvironmental conditions' that posed health challenges to communities.[49] Elsewhere along the Nile in Egypt, irrigated cotton fields led not only to waterlogging and salinity, but also induced an unhealthy environment that affected peasant communities living there. Malaria, bilharzia, and cholera outbreaks on irrigated farms were frequent occurrences, leading to numerous deaths.[50]

Economic developments in Africa did not always lead to depressing human health conditions and colonial exploitation. Rather, those developments presented some African communities and individuals with opportunities to distinguish themselves as innovative entrepreneurs and important role players in facilitating Africa's integration into the global economy. Their access to land and other natural resources was key to their entrepreneurship. Africans produced and supplied land-based products to regional and global markets even before the commencement of formal colonization, a role that persisted into the colonial period both in non-settler and settler territories. Absence of European settler economies in West African colonies allowed Africans to play a prominent role in resource extraction in those territories. Generally, though, the development of the cash-crop economy in many parts of tropical Africa increased due to the 'second industrial revolution' in Western

countries, which stimulated production and export of products such as rubber, palm oil, and groundnuts.[51] The expansion of that economy benefited greatly from legitimate nineteenth-century commerce, which allowed African communities to be innovative in the production of tropical crops as substitutes for slave export.

In West Africa, the active role of African producers was enhanced by the lackluster outcome of early British and French experiments in commercial production of cash crops (cotton, coffee, and groundnuts) in their colonial enclaves here before the 1890s. In West Africa's hinterlands and areas abutting the Atlantic coast, in the area stretching from Senegal, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, through Gold Coast, the Niger Delta, to the Cameroons in the East, enterprising Africans moved into fill the void in supply of products that were required to jumpstart legitimate commerce. They produced and supplied palm oil, palm kernels, cotton, groundnuts, cocoa, timber, rubber, and gold to regional and international markets. Local agricultural and forest products thus largely propelled West Africa's export economy during this period. Reflecting on these developments, economic historian Anthony G. Hopkins sees this role by Africans as evidence of their ability to adjust to global production and market networks by masterfully using natural resources at their disposal. These initiatives led some of them to alter landscapes and settlement patterns by migrating into previously unused lands which they turned into rich productive zones that helped meet the ever increasing demands for tropical products in global markets.[52]

Elements of state coercion in this West African entrepreneurial spirit were rare. But elsewhere in colonial Africa, the pressure of global, capitalist demands fostered by colonialism bore down on African, peasant producers. Cases of colonial regimes enforcing the cultivation of cash crops, particularly cotton, upon African farmers have received scrutiny from historians and other scholars of Africa. In South Sudan during the 1920s and 1930s, the British administration's enforcement of cotton cultivation amongst the Dinka and Shilluk farmers as part of the effort to introduce a cash economy was met with considerable resistance from those communities. Drought and damage from cotton boll weevil did not help local acquiescence with cotton production. The British were interested in 'modernizing' South Sudan's economy through peasant cash-crop production. The Shilluk opposed cotton production as a non-edible crop: for them, planting food crops was the rational insurance against famine which commercial production of cotton did not guarantee.[53] Thus, moral arguments on both sides regarding functional utility of material production from the land ran counter to each other, creating tension in colonial relations.

In German East Africa, African opposition to cotton production that spawned the 1905–1907 Maji Maji Uprising is well documented. Tensions generated by colonial authoritarianism were important causes of the uprising,

but the environmental conditions in which communities in Southeastern Tanganyika were forced to produce cotton were equally important. Generally, this opposition was the result of instability, if not uncertainty, caused by forced incorporation of local producers into a rapidly changing global economy. John Iliffe lucidly places the rebellion into these broader developments: 'It took place at the moment of transition from the nineteenth-century economy to the colonial order and it began as a movement of highlanders and frontiersmen resisting incorporation into the colonial economy and reduction to peasant status'.[54]

In colonial Mozambique, peasants weighed returns on their labor expended for cotton cultivation (as demanded by the Portuguese administration) against tending to their own food crops.[55] Food security was imperative to them, a need that was not guaranteed by cultivation of cotton, a non-food crop. Beyond focusing on state authoritarianism and food-security concerns as causes of these African resistances to cash-crop production, Allen Isaacman has stressed the need to consider other factors that shaped this African response. These include the tensions between African peasants and colonial states over rural, labor regimes and differential access to market opportunities and agricultural technologies as determinants of the outcome of relations surrounding cotton economies in colonial Africa.[56]

These cases of community responses to colonial cash-crop economies in rural Africa have been examined as part of African peasant studies that emphasize the principle of rationality as a determining behavior and actions of the peasant producer in a highly state-regulated economy. This view emphasizes the ability of African peasant households to make rational choices in the production process that guarantee the survival and welfare of their members. Rural households that became successful at subsistence and market production during the colonial period did so because they were able to take advantage of market incentives, predict and adapt to market trends, navigate certain strict, state-regulation mechanisms, and innovate ways of overcoming limits imposed on land by population growth and environmental challenges such as soil erosion. Consequently, such households experienced prosperity, and not poverty that resulted from colonial dislocation. Where obstacles to peasant production were overcome, both the colonial state and the farming communities benefited from land-based extractive economies.[57] We have to be cautious about generalizing such stories of success; rural prosperity may also have caused internal social differentiation in farming communities due to differential access to factors of production, most notably land, labor, and technology.

Prosperity for the rural African sometimes brought him into direct conflict with colonial authorities, usually over the question of managing land and other reproductive resources so as to preserve them from physical degradation. Consequently, colonial states enforced resource-conservation programs for much of the colonial period, a subject that has received considerable attention from historians and other scholars of Africa.

Environmental Conservation in Colonial Africa

Conservation (the protection of physical landscapes and natural resources) emerged as an important issue in African colonies following intensified integration of African economies into the global system at the beginning of the twentieth century. Internal developments such as an increase in Africa's rural populations, as well as local and foreign demand for agricultural and other products extracted from the land, facilitated the drive for conservation. From the beginning, colonial conservation efforts were fraught with contradictions because they were marked by the imperative of economic production while requiring that extractive resources be preserved. Achieving such balance proved elusive for colonial regimes, resulting in a tenuous relationship with African communities.

One aspect of the African environment that received early attention in colonial conservation efforts was wildlife. This involved protecting wild animals and their habitats, except where some animals that were regarded as predators to livestock and destructive to crops were methodically eliminated. Hunting became an important aspect of focus for colonial administrations seeking to protect wildlife. Precolonial and colonial hunting practices have provided historians with a lens for analyzing how indigenous communities, European settlers, and colonial regimes perceived or understood wild animals, their social and economic importance, and their habitats. From their studies, we have come to appreciate that before colonial rule, hunting served as an essential source of economic survival for many African communities, as well as possessing political and cultural value beyond the economic imperative. John M. Mackenzie has pointed out that an examination of African hunting has to consider the 'function, technique, the role of animal products in subsistence, crafts and trade, as well as the complex relations associated with the chase'.[58]

The advent of colonialism undermined or redefined the meaning and importance of hunting. Colonial states and settlers commoditized it and used it to draw lines of social distinctions between themselves and Africans, based on new skills and tools of hunting that were very exclusionary, if not discriminatory. In South Africa, the introduction and use of firearms in hunting led to a gradual decline in these resources. Dutch and British expansion from the coastal locations into the interior, the establishment of settlers' agricultural farms, and the resulting upset in African settlement patterns consumed natural habitats for game and altered preexisting African hunting patterns. Colonization of South Africa ensured that more animals were hunted for scientific and commercial purposes.[59]

In East Africa, the global demand for ivory had a long-standing tradition that predated colonialism. This region's early colonial encounters in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries increased the economic demand for ivory and other game products, even as hunting transitioned from a fundamental source of African survival to an elite European sport. This transition, and the need to protect certain animal species perceived to be threatened

through indiscriminate hunting, marked the development of colonial preservation and conservation in East Africa.[60]

These developments in East and Southern Africa led to decline in certain animals, particularly the hippopotamus, rhinoceros, giraffe, elephant, and springbok. From 1880 onwards, this created urgency within colonial administrations to protect these animals. Besides the fear that indiscriminate hunting led to decline of certain animals, the drive for conservation was also motivated by other factors. Economic motives provided the basis for creating national parks and game reserves as wild-animal sanctuaries for tourism purposes. In these protected areas, licensed hunting for game trophies (that were then sold) was allowed but restricted to Europeans only. Exclusion of Africans from these areas by legislation was deemed necessary on the basis that indigenous hunting techniques were inconsistent with the new conservation ethic. Those who breached such laws were tagged 'poachers', thereby criminalizing African hunting. The emergence of game departments and game warders proceeded out of the need to effect new boundaries that were drawn between Man and wildlife. These restrictions, and the imposition of a British aristocratic hunting ethos, diminished African wildlife knowledge and uses to a state of inferiority which in turn inspired resistances from local communities against exclusionary conservation measures.[61]

In trying to understand the consequences of these developments, historians of Africa have benefited from critical analyses of wildlife conservation from human geographers. By using the case of Mount Meru in Tanzania, Roderick P. Neumann has revealed the limits of state enforcement of wildlife conservation through the creation of animal sanctuaries. By using the case of Mount Meru National Park in Tanzania, Neumann shows how this wildlife sanctuary produced terrains of resistance from local communities opposed to the 'ordering' of nature that resulted in their exclusion from access to and use of enclosed resources.[62]

Sometimes, professionalization of wildlife knowledge through Western sciences was used to exclude or undermine African wildlife knowledge and practices, even when these had the potential to contribute to conservation efforts. This was evident not only in hunting, but also in knowledge regimes pertaining to some types of animals, such as birds. Most recently, Nancy A. Jacobs's seminal study *Birders of Africa* confirms how Africans have managed to fashion a close relationship with their natural environments and wildlife. Focusing on birds and 'birders' (Africans who were knowledgeable about birds), the study reveals that the ability to 'find one's "way to nature" through birds' was not only a preserve of a few European scientists who were categorized as 'ornithologists', but also of 'vernacular birders' of Africa. Because of their vast knowledge about birds, these individuals had an unparalleled ability to 'create productive, healthy, and happy lives' for those who interacted with birds in fields and forests. Such knowledge helped vernacular birders to navigate the hierarchies that European birders (ornithologists) constructed to distinguish

both groups along racial lines. Colonial ornithologists in Southern-Central Africa came to depend on local birders such as Jali Makawa (in Nyasaland) to study birds, while the latter used the opportunity to 'mitigate his experience of exclusion'.[63] Here is a classic way in which African local knowledge about nature aided in advancing colonial scientific study of the African environment and animals in ways that helped overcome cultural biases against Africans based on racial stereotypes of the colonial world.

Besides wildlife, other scholars have directed their focus onto colonial conservation of Africa's agrarian landscapes, particularly those that authorities thought were being ruined by African farmers and herders. Farmers and herders relied primarily on land-based resources. In many colonial states, these resources were a major source of the administration's income. Colonial regimes increasingly reached the conclusion that colonial capitalism in the form of crop production for the market could be both a bane and a boon for rural households. This conclusion was aided by trends in African agricultural prosperity in the post-Depression years of the 1930s and in the period following the First World War. This led to increased crop production, made possible by appreciating prices on the market. Colonial administrations in Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa were drawn to serious cases of soil erosion and land degradation in rural areas, which they blamed on African 'overproduction' and inefficient herding practices.

Colonial soil conservation and other land reconditioning measures in colonial Africa have featured prominently in numerous studies. Some of these have focused on colonial arguments on the causes of land degradation. Colonial arguments that African cultivation practices and herding methods were 'wasteful' or 'inefficient', and therefore environmentally unsound as major causes of land degradation, is central to those studies. Others highlight the contradictions that colonial capitalism promoted in rural Africa through agricultural commercialization which led to a strain in household labor as farmers struggled to balance between producing their subsistence and market needs, and satisfying the rigors of conservation demanded by the state. In such cases, rural protests against the colonial state's authoritarianism in conservation were the likely response.[64] These views underpin the economic interpretations of these conservation programs, which argue that colonial administrations unfairly raised the specter of soil erosion and degradation as a reason to undercut Africans' desire to reap the benefits of crop and livestock production.[65] Official claims of African land degradation in settler colonies were also a means to legitimizing settler capitalism in the agricultural sector that thrived on land dispossessed from African communities who were pushed into reserves.[66] Based on this understanding, it is therefore possible to trace the role of colonial capitalism in firstly reorganizing production spaces that differentiated settler farms from African reserves, and, secondly, in using conservation to ensure the permanence of this differentiation. Yet overcrowding in African reserves due to natural increase in population resulted from this

territorial reorganization, itself the product of colonial land dispossession and strict regulation of access to public land and forests. This, and the enclosure of alienated farms from encroachment by dispossessed communities, all proved a recipe for environmental degradation.[67]

On the other hand, social interpretations of soil conservation have zeroed in on the opposing ideas, practices, values, and traditions about land use and management held by colonial administrators and experts on one hand, and Africans on the other. This argument has been extended to the argument that African resistances to conservation drew from African spiritual tradition.[68] Others have traced the influence of the gendered structure of social relations of production in precolonial Africa as a factor in rural opposition to colonial enforcement of land reconditioning programs. Focus on gendered aspects has in turn promoted ecofeminist interpretations that acknowledge the value of women's indigenous understanding of nature and resource reproduction. By opposing subjective forms of colonial conservation, African women sought to reassert their environmental and agricultural knowledge in managing their farms.[69]

All these interpretations have directly or indirectly been linked to the anti-colonial sentiments that fuelled African nationalism in the 1950s. They represent an effort to study colonial conservation 'from below', and social interpretations have dominated that approach, and constitute the political interpretations that perceive a close connection between rural resistance and colonial authoritarianism in soil conservation programs with the rise of African nationalism in East Africa in the 1950s.[70]

Scholarly focus on causation and solutions in colonial conservation has exposed a prevailing contrast between Western and indigenous knowledge systems. If colonial castigation of African indigenous cultivation repertoires helped draw that contrast, then the search for solutions to land degradation in general and soil erosion in particular confirmed that contrast. Consequently, colonial imposition of Western environmental solutions to degradation of Africa's rural landscapes has attracted considerable attention from historians and other scholars of Africa. This was true for British colonies in South Africa and East Africa.[71] Those methods proved incompatible with the ecological, economic, and social realities of rural Africa. In South Africa, conservation was devised to cover a broad range of activities beyond soil conservation on African and settler farms. Conservation involved regulation of grass fires, grazing patterns, water and irrigation, an attack on pests and livestock predators, and uprooting of obnoxious weeds.[72] The importance of weeds and management of pastures further raised concerns about 'plant invasions' and their ecological and economic importance in the political economy of rural environments. In these discussions, obnoxious weeds and the Prickly Pear were important.[73]

Colonial emphasis on external ecological solutions reinforced the role of Western experts and science in Africa. Agricultural and livestock experts

found place of pride in concerted colonial policies to protect farms from degradation or domesticated animals from being decimated by pests and diseases. The basic motive was to protect and increase the reproductive resources of the agricultural sector.[74] As Diana K. Davies has noted with regard to French colonial territories in North Africa, defining and advancing local environmental crises within Western scientific thinking (such as the declensionist narrative) justified colonial degradation of local preexisting farming knowledge, sanctioned French appropriation of land and social control of the conquered communities, and forcefully articulated local subsistence production into a market-oriented one.[75] Institutionalization of Western knowledge was partly the reason why African knowledge systems and technologies were treated with colonial hindsight. Colonial subjugation of African knowledge and technology systems relating to the use and management of land was evident. This has been analyzed within the poststructuralist paradigm of knowledge–power relations of the colonial state.[76]

Recent revisionist studies have argued that colonial science was not wholly a problematic enterprise that promoted authoritarianism in African colonial states and the privileging of Western knowledge. This view insists that presenting colonial science and technology practices as they relate to the environment as highly subversive renders those components 'as static social artefacts, trapped in the context in which they were generated'.[77] Rather than focus on their coercive elements, revisionists urge us to consider cases where colonial experts and scientific enterprises consciously incorporated African knowledge in dealing with environmental challenges. Helen Tilley has produced perhaps the most convincing study that underscores this interpretation. Citing British development efforts in colonial Africa, Tilley argues that experts in the Africa Research Survey charged with exploring development initiatives hardly ignored local conditions, environmental set-ups, and African needs and knowledge.[78] This approach to colonial initiatives has been cited as the reason for successful rural programs in some colonial states. Indeed, in Uganda, soil conservation measures in Kigezi proceeded unimpeded by the local community because officials integrated land-management techniques that mirrored the traditional *Bakiga* system.[79] Colonial experts and science may thus have allowed for interpenetration of Western and African knowledge systems in ways that earlier studies have overlooked.

Related to this revisionism are recent studies on narratives that are concerned with 'blame-the- victim' in colonial-degradation narratives. They seek to rectify the long-held view of Africans as despoilers of their environments and therefore responsible for deforestation and degradation of landscapes. These studies have instead confirmed cases of African-environment interaction practices that aided the preservation of natural environments. Those practices, often overlooked in official colonial discourses, led to regeneration of vegetation and soils. This perspective was pioneered by Paul Richard's study on West Africa's farming activities that allowed him to conclude

African farmers possessed the ability to utilize their 'ecological knowledge' or 'people's science' to cultivate food crops in ways that promoted environmental sustainability.[80]

Colonial neo-Malthusian arguments of population increase as the cause of degradation have also been overturned by recent research that confirms increases in rural populations in areas such as Machakos and Kenya have actually led to innovation by farmers, which, together with less intrusive state policies and favorable agricultural markets, has led to vegetation regeneration and preservation of the soil since the 1930s.[81] This revelation contradicts colonial narratives that blamed the agricultural and livestock activities of the Kamba community for environmental degradation.

Of all recent 'corrective narratives' on degradation and environmental decline in colonial Africa, the study by Melissa Leach and James Fairhead on colonial forestry in Kissidougou in Guinea, West Africa, has proved the most influential in presenting a shift in paradigms for studying Africa's environmental history. It has also had an influence on modern environmental intervention policies. French colonial experts pointed to open areas in Guinea's savannah grasslands as evidence of human interference that resulted in decline of what they premised as a luxuriant humid forest that existed in the past. Instead, Leach and Fairhead established that traditional settlement patterns in Kissidougou actually led to filling of landscapes with trees, itself evidence that French colonial experts read forest history backwards. Coming from non-historians, these findings have nonetheless provided an analytical framework for some social environmental historians of Africa. Emanuel Kreike's study in southern Angola and northern Namibia is important. Here, Ovambo-speakers experienced decades of resource-based violence, environmental challenges such as famine and rinderpest, followed by colonial displacement. Subsequently displaced as refugees in wilderness spaces, they eventually domesticated their new locations by revegetating the landscape, creating a 'water infrastructure', and keeping livestock. Some of them regenerated fruit trees, thereby creating a sort of 'Eden' in the Ovambo Flood Plain.[82] Ovamboland's case is a classic illustration of the ability of African communities to rehabilitate, use, and preserve environments; one that departs from colonial criticisms of these communities' activities as a major cause of environmental dislocations.

Environment, Colonialism, and Development

Irrespective of the motives and justification that colonial administrations presented for their intervening in Africa's natural resource management and in human relations with the environment, there was always an element of 'development' that was implied. Colonial officials were always convinced that their intervention would help transform every aspect of life in positive ways. The pursuit of 'healthy environments', introduction of cash crops in rural areas,

and conservation of wildlife, agricultural, and pastoralist environments were all regarded as development initiatives. This colonial perception began earlier, but became directly implied during the postwar reconstruction agenda after 1945. It has largely been analyzed within the lens of 'colonial developmentalism' initiated during the 'second colonial occupation' after the Second World War.[83] A wide range of European experts and other trained personnel of empire answered a call of duty to help British, Belgian, Portuguese, and French colonies boost their economic potential, and in the process help shore up postwar recovery at home and abroad. In French colonies, these development efforts were implemented through the FIDES and the FERDES.[84] In British colonies, rural development plans were packaged as 'Betterment' programs. They largely targeted the agrarian sector, which was the core of colonial economies, but was perceived as threatened by increased incidences of land degradation after the war. Funded by Colonial Development Corporation and the Overseas Food Corporation, Betterment programs in British colonies sought to improve both the economic and social welfare of rural communities.[85] During the 1940s and 1950s, soil conservation measures may have been the centerpiece of these British programs, but food production, conservation of water, improvement of methods of cultivation and pasturelands, livestock management, afforestation, land resettlement programmed, and large-scale cash-crop initiatives were as important. In French and Portuguese colonies, the mining sector increased in importance.

In many parts of Africa, colonial regimes engaged soil conservation as 'development' which could only be accomplished by recourse to scientific and technological solutions from the USA. This approach was appealing in Southern Africa from the 1920s.[86] It was widely embraced in East Africa, particularly Kenya, from the 1930s through the 1950s. Here, colonial land reconditioning programs in Baringo, Machakos, and Vihiga were patterned after technological solutions imported from the USA and South Africa.[87] Recent studies have revisited these colonial initiatives with the aim of evaluating their success or failure, and as models for configuring policy regarding modern development. For instance, British soil conservation in colonial Kigezi succeeded due to integration of indigenous knowledge and institutions, and has reinforced the calls for modern rural development efforts to consider local conditions in drawing and implementation of policy.[88]

Attempts to define colonial environmental projects as 'development' has also directed some historians' attention to large-scale colonial statist projects. Colonial visions of prosperity and progress in Africa inspired the massive investments of finance and expertise that went into these projects. Such investments were also predicated on the envisioned economic benefits of those projects to the metropolitan powers in terms of export of agricultural products for industrial development back in Europe. Most of these projects failed to take off as planned, or failed to yield the desired economic and social benefits to African communities. This failure illustrated the shortcomings

of colonial development plans in Africa in the 1950s. Historians have been interested in the reasons for their failure and lessons that subsequent development can draw from this experience.

Perhaps the most scrutinized of those projects is the East African Groundnut (Peanut) Scheme implemented in central Tanganyika by the British colonial administration in the late 1940s. It proved unsuccessful. This failure has been attributed to poor planning and ignorance of local ecological conditions, these despite the massive financial investments and technical skills that British planners committed to the project.[89] In the French Sudan, the signature project of French colonial developmentalism was the Office du Niger irrigation scheme. The scheme unsuccessfully attempted to transform the Upper Niger delta into a commercial cotton-growing enterprise. French officials were forced by local communities and local geographical conditions to change their development objectives from cotton to rice, a food crop.[90] This outcome points to the possible importance that African communities gave to food security in environments that were considered fragile. But it also confirms the failure of colonial development 'experts' to pay attention to physical environments in which large-scale agricultural projects were sited.

Colonial mega-projects such as damming of water along major rivers for purposes of bringing development to the regions and communities living in riverine locations have also provided opportunities for historical analysis. In Mozambique, the Cahora Bassa Dam involved sophisticated forms of scientific planning by the Portuguese administration aimed at agricultural transformation through irrigation, improvement of transportation in the Zambezi River Valley, flooding control, and electricity supply. For the local African communities, the economic benefits envisioned by the Portuguese colonial (and later, the African) government were outweighed by the social dislocation and absence of services that resulted from the completion of the dam. There was massive population dislocation, exploitation of African labor, violence, and environmental decline, illustrating the contradictions of planned development by modern states.[91] These projects have been subjected to a scholarly framework inspired by James Scott's 'high modernism', a form of modern development pursued by modern states in which scientific planning and the colonial expert and administrator monopolized the vision of development outside the realm of the ideal world of the rural peasant.[92] In northwest Zimbabwe, among the Tonga, the construction of the Kariba Dam in the 1950s ended what Joann McGregor terms as a 'river-focused way of life' that had given cultural and economic sustenance to that community. Damming of water led to their displacement, loss, impoverishment, and exposure to a tsetse environment.[93] Colonial developmentalist projects relating to damming water yielded legacies that have continued to shape not only community–state relations, but also contested access to land in the affected riverine areas. Joost Fontein's recent study on the damming of the Mutirikwi River in Masvingo, southern Zimbabwe, offers an excellent analysis of the impact of

external intervention into riverine ecologies with intentions of superimposing elements of modernization by the state. That intervention not only alters community livelihoods, but also, in the long term, reinforces politics of environmental identities and contestations over land in a bid to reassert lineage claims to land.[94]

Conclusion

The outcome of Africa's interaction with colonialism created dynamic environmental relations between colonial states and Africans that have provided scholars of Africa with a rich terrain for studying and writing about Africa's colonial experience. Among the forces that propelled European colonial interests in Africa, the lure of the African natural environment was important. The economic importance of tropical environmental resources to Europe was confirmed following the establishment of colonial rule. Socially, though, nature in Africa afforded colonial interlopers the opportunity to reconstruct images and perceptions about the continent and its peoples, to justify economic imperialism, and to consolidate the politics of the colonial state. The insistence of colonial administrations and their agents on certain environmental ideas, norms, and practices led to two mutually opposed outcomes.

On one hand, it attempted to promote a world of unequal power relations aimed at promoting the notion of 'difference': the difference between the European colonizer and the African subject, one that was partly played out in environmental relations. In doing so, colonizers were aided by advantages offered by 'tools of empire', of which Western science and technology were powerful; so much that the application of new ideas to challenges posed by the African environment (disease, for instance) or to the use and management of natural resources opened avenues for the colonial states to elevate imported knowledge to the service of colonial power. While this subjective role of Western scientific and technical knowledge has dominated studies focusing on colonialism and the environment in Africa, a few scholars have reminded us of the positive value of that knowledge in minimizing, even eliminating, dangers of the environment to human health. No doubt, then, precolonial and colonial efforts to eliminate such diseases as malaria have persisted into the postcolonial era, thereby drawing further interest from some historians.[95]

On the other hand, colonial insistence on an environmental orthodox drew revulsion from Africans who resisted the subjective and marginalizing tendencies of colonial environmental ideas. Sometimes Africans sought to reassert their knowledge in colony–environment relations. Historical analyses of this African response, mostly by peasant communities, have promoted our understanding of Africa's 'subaltern histories' that seek to give agency to these communities in colonial histories. To an extent, the influence of works

by subaltern scholars of India has been invaluable in recovering these African histories.[96]

Overall, Africa's encounter with colonialism generated complex environmental issues that have enabled historians to critically evaluate and reexamine diverse themes that emerged from that encounter. The themes include, but are not limited to, imperialism, colonial conquest, health, economy, urbanization, preservation, and management of natural resources. More important, some structural, even abstract, themes have provided an interesting setting for academic study. They include race, ethnicity, identity, power, knowledge, class, gender, language, and culture, among others.

Furthermore, the complexity of the 'environmental question' in colonial Africa has attracted the interest of scholars from multiple disciplines so much that examination of that question has not been limited to the historian. Instead, the historian of Africa has immensely benefited from approaches and findings of multiple disciplines whose scholars have studied Africa's colonial environmental experience. Geography, anthropology, ecology, political science, economics, and development studies have been of particular importance. This has enriched both Africa's environmental history and African historiography. One can conclude emphatically that African environmental history is a blended, interdisciplinary effort. Some of these disciplines (particularly ecology, geography, anthropology, and development studies) have used historical knowledge to shed light on current environmental issues in Africa that are of both local and global significance. These issues (for instance, climate, health, and conservation) are not new to Africa and Africans.

Notes

1. Such key works include William Beinart and JoAnn McGregor, eds., *Social History and African Environments* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003); William Beinart and Lotte Hughes, *Environment and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Gregory Maddox, James Giblin, and Isaria N. Kimambo, *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1996).
2. Jane Carruthers, "Tracking in Game Trails: Looking Afresh at the Politics of Environmental History in South Africa," *Environmental History* 11, no. 4 (2006): 811.
3. For instance, James McCann, *Green Land, Brown Land, Black Land: An Environmental History of Africa, 1800–1990* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999); Gregory Maddox, *Sub-Saharan Africa: An Environmental History* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006). More critical studies on African Environmental History include Beinart and McGregor, eds., *Social History*. Other critical works on the relationship between African environmental history and African history, with a larger focus on colonial Africa, include Gregory H. Maddox, "Africa and Environmental History," *Environmental History* 4, no. 2 (1999): 162–67; William Beinart, "African History and Environmental History," in "Centenary Issue: A Hundred Years of Africa," special issue, *African*

Affairs 99, no. 35 (2000): 269–302; and Jane Carruthers, "Africa: Histories, Ecologies and Societies," *Environment and History* 10, no. 4 (2004): 804–29.

4. Among works that give considerable treatment to precolonial African environmental history and the central role of African agency are James C. McCann, *Green Land, Brown London*; James Webb Jr., *Desert Frontier: Ecological and Economic Change Along the Western Sahel, 1600–1850* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994); David Schoenburn, *A Green Place, a Good Place: Agrarian Change and Social Identity in the Great Lakes Region to the 15th Century* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1998); and Jan Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforest: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).
5. See a discussion on these perspectives of African historiography in Maddox, Giblin and Kimambo, *Custodians of the Land*, 7–8.
6. Dane Kennedy, "British Exploration in the Nineteenth Century: A Historiographic Survey," *History Compass* 5, no. 6 (2007): 1890.
7. These issues are extensively dealt with in Richard H. Grove, *Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600–1860* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Alfred W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
8. A well-outlined historical role of these societies in Africa is provided by Robin A. Butlin, *Geographies of Empire: European Empires and Colonies c. 1880–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 275–314.
9. David Livingstone, *The Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a Contested Enterprise* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 167.
10. Beinart and Hughes, *Environment and Empire*, 91–92.
11. Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, *A History of Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 253.
12. Philip Curtin, *Death by Migration: Europe's Encounter with the Tropical World in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Crosby, Ecological Imperialism.
13. Philip Curtin, *Disease and Empire: The Health of European Troops in the Conquest of Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 11–15.
14. Ibid. Curtin details the interface between imperial British and French military campaigns in various parts of Africa during the nineteenth century, and advances in tropical medicine and hygiene by Western countries.
15. On detailed studies on these aspects of technological advances and their relations to imperialism and colonialism, see Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); and Michael Adas, *Machines as Measures of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
16. For instance, James Brown, "Increased Inter-communication and Epidemic Disease in Early Colonial Ashanti" in *Disease in African History: An Introductory Survey and Case Studies*, ed. Gerald W. Hartwig and K. David Patterson, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1978), 181–206. Also, Myron Echenberg, *Plague Ports* (New York: New York University Press, 2007).

17. Helge Kjekshus, *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1977). For other relevant work on economic production and environment in precolonial and early colonial Tanzania, see James Giblin, *The Politics of Environmental Control in Northeastern Tanzania, 1840–1940* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1993). Some contributions in *Custodians of the Land*, ed. Maddox, Giblin, and Kimambo also reflect some of these trends.
18. For details, see Douglas Johnson and David Anderson, eds., *The Ecology of Survival: Case Studies from Northeast African History* (London: Croom Helm, 1988).
19. For an excellent outline of the early history of the tsetse fly and its health implications in Africa, see John J. McKelvey Jr., *Man against Tsetse: Struggle for Africa* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1973), chap. 1.
20. The most incisive of these include Helge Kjekshus, *Ecology Control*; John Ford, *The Role of the Trypanosomiases in African Ecology: A Study of the Tsetse Fly Problem* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); James Giblin, "Trypanosomiasis Control in African History: An Evaded Issue," *Journal of African History* 31 (1990): 59–80; Kirk Hope, *Lords of the Fly: Sleeping Sickness Control in British East Africa, 1900–1960* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); and Maryinez Lyons, *The Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire, 1900–1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
21. McKelvey Jr., *Man against Tsetse* documents these scientific studies and their colonial and intellectual impact in greater detail.
22. Lyons, *The Colonial Disease*, 103.
23. Kjekshus, *Ecology Control*, 165–66; For detailed quantification of these mortality rates, see Hoppe, *Lords of the Fly*. Regarding anti-tsetse fly campaigns in Kenya's Lake Victoria Basin, see George Oduor Ndege, *Health, State, and Society in Kenya* (Rochester: Rochester University Press, 2001), 18–33.
24. Kjekshus, *Ecology Control*, 166, 168–73.
25. Lyons, *The Colonial Disease*, 102–3.
26. Shane Doyle, *Population and Environment in Western Uganda 1860–1955: Crisis and Decline in Bunyoro* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2006), 146–50.
27. John Ford, *The Role of Trypanosomiases in African Ecology: A Study of the Tsetse Fly Problem* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
28. Beinart and Hughes, *Environment and Empire*, 177; and Ndege, *Health, State, and Society*, 34–40.
29. Maynard W. Swanson, "The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the Cape Colony, 1900–1909," *Journal of African History* 18 (1977): 390.
30. Swanson, "The Sanitation Syndrome," 387, 394–95, 397; Myron Echenberg, *Plague Ports*, 274–76. For an apt summary of these developments in South Africa, see Beinart and Hughes, *Environment and Empire*, 174–77.
31. Francis Dube, "Public Health and Racial Segregation in South Africa: Mahatma (M.K.) Gandhi Debates Colonial Authorities on Public Health Measures, 1896–1904," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 21 (2012): 26–27.
32. Swanson, "The Sanitation Syndrome," 402.
33. Myron Echenberg, *Plague Ports*, 294–97.

34. Gerald Hartwick and K. David Patterson, eds., *Disease in African History: An Introductory Survey and Case Studie*s (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1978), 15.
35. John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 70–72; and For more details on French colonial land policies in Algeria, see John Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: Origins of the Rural Public Domain* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967).
36. John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 70–72.
37. For an outline of African loss of land and related resources to Dutch (later Afrikaner) and British settlers in South Africa, see Rodney Davenport and Christopher Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History* (London: Macmillan, 2000), 21–54, 77–125, 129–93.
38. Richard Elphick, *Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa* (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1985), 234–38.
39. Nancy Jacobs, *Environment, Power, and Injustice: A South African History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
40. Leroy Vail, "Ecology and History: The Example of Eastern Zambia," *Journal of South African Studies* 3, no. 2 (1977): 129–55.
41. Report of the H.M. Commissioner on the East Africa Protectorate (1903, cd. 1626), 29–30, as quoted in G.H. Mungeam, *Kenya: Select Historical Documents 1884–1923* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1978), 93.
42. Settler history in Kenya had received much attention with regard to land alienation. For a detailed study on the role of British colonial officials on this development, see G.H. Mungeam, *British Rule in Kenya, 1895–1912* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); and Lotte Hughes, *Moving the Maasai: A Colonial Misadventure* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
43. For details on these varied views between colonial officials and the Maasai, see Hughes, *Moving the Maasai*, chap. 5, 105–32.
44. Ibid., 105.
45. David M. Anderson, *Eroding the Commons: The Politics of Ecology in Baringo, Kenya* 1890–1963 (Oxford: James Currey, 2002).
46. Ibid., 232–66; Jamie Monson, "Canoe-Building Under Colonialism: Forestry and Food Policies in the Inner Kilombero Valley, 1920–1940," in *Custodians of the Land*, ed. Maddox, Giblin, and Kimambo, 200–12; Christopher A. Conte, *Highland Sanctuary: Environmental History in Tanzania's Usambara Mountains* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2004); and Christopher Conte, "Nature Re-organized: Ecological History in the Plateau Forests of the West Usambara Mountains 1850–1935," in *Custodians of the Land*, ed. Maddox, Giblin, and Kimambo, 96–121.
47. Martin Ewans, *European Atrocity, African Catastrophe: Leopold II, the Congo Free State, and Its Aftermath* (London: Routledge Curtzon, 2002), 157–72.
48. Ibid., 157–65.
49. Mark W. DeLancey, "Health and Disease on the Plantations of Cameroon, 1884–1939," in *Disease in African History*, ed. Hartwick and Patterson, 153–79.

50. Nancy E. Gallagher, *Egypt's Other Wars: Epidemics and the Politics of Public Health* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990).
51. Gareth Austin, "Explaining and Evaluating the Cash Crop Revolution in the 'Peasant' Colonies of Tropical Africa, ca. 1890–ca. 1930: Beyond 'Vent for Surplus'," in *Africa's Development in Historical Perspective*, ed. Emmanuel Akyeampong et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 315.
52. A.G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 124–66. For details on the role of Africans in the production and supply of tropical products to regional and global markets in Gold Coast during this period see Raymond E. Dumett, *Imperialism, Economic Development and Social Change in West Africa* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2013).
53. Robert O. Collins, *Shadow in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), 306–7. For varied responses by African farmers to colonial cotton production, see Allen Isaacman, *Cotton, Colonialism, and Social History in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995).
54. John Illife, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 168.
55. Allen Isaacman, "Chiefs, Rural Differentiation and Peasant Protest: The Mozambican Forced Cotton Regime 1938–1961," *African Economic History* 14 (1985): 15–56.
56. Allen Isaacman, "Peasants, Work and the Labor Process: Forced Cotton Cultivation in Colonial Mozambique 1938–1961," *Journal of Social History* 25, no. 4 (1992): 815–55; and Allen Isaacman, *Cotton Is the Mother of Poverty: Peasants, Work, and Rural Struggle in Colonial Mozambique, 1938–1961* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995).
57. For instance, Elias Mandala, *Work and Control in a Peasant Economy: A History of the Lower Tchiri Valley in Malawi, 1859–1960* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990); Robert Maxon, *Going Their Separate Ways: Agrarian Transformation in Kenya, 1930–1950* (London: Associated University Presses, 2003); Stephen G. Bunker, *Peasants against the State: The Politics of Market Control in Bugisu, Uganda, 1900–1983* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); and Gavin Kitching, *Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African Petite-Bourgeoisie* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980).
58. Mackenzie, *The Empire of Nature*, 56. For an elaborate discussion on the overall importance of hunting and game products in African communities across Central, East, and Southern Africa, see ibid., 54–84. Though a thin line separates "preservation" from "conservation," the former aims at preventing frequent interference, while the latter is more interventionist, aiming at "sustainable" management for the long term. Ibid., 289–90.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 85–165. On details regarding game preservation policies in colonial Kenya, see Thomas P. Ofcansky, *Paradise Lost: A History of Game Preservation in British East Africa, 1895–1963* (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2002).

61. For details on game preservation and conservation in South Africa, see Jane Carruthers, *The Kruger National Park: A Social and Political History* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1995). As regards Kenya, see Edward I. Steinhart, *Black Poachers, White Hunters: A Social History of Hunting in Kenya* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2006).
62. Roderick P. Neumann, *Imposing Wilderness: Struggles Over Livelihood and Nature Preservation in Africa* (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1998).
63. Nancy J. Jacobs, *Birders of Africa: History of a Network* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 14, 17, 148–79.
64. Maxon, *Going Their Separate Ways*; Mandala, *Work and Control.*
65. Anderson, *Eroding the Commons*; Martin S. Shanguhyia, *Population, Tradition, and Environmental Control in Colonial Kenya* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2015).
66. Anderson, *Eroding the Commons*; Tabitha Kanogo, *Squatters & the Roots of Mau Mau* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1987).
67. Shanguhyia, *Population, Tradition*; David Anderson, "Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought: The Colonial State and Soil Conservation in East Africa during the 1930s," *African Affairs* 83, no. 332 (1984): 321–43.
68. Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).
69. Fiona D. Mackenzie, *Land, Ecology, and Resistance in Kenya, 1880–1952* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1998).
70. These studies are many; but for examples, see R.A. Young and H.A. Foosbrooke, *Smoke in the Hills: Political Tension in the Morogoro District of Tanganyika* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969); Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*; David Throup, *Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1987); Mackenzie, *Land, Ecology and Resistance*; Mandala, *Work and Control*; John McCracken, "Conservation and Resistance in Colonial Malawi: The 'Dead North' Revisited," in *Social History*, ed. Beinart and McGregor, 155–74; and Pamela A. Maack, "'We Don't Want Terraces': Protest and Identity Under the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme," in *Custodians of the Land*, ed. Maddox, Giblin, and Kimambo, 152–74.
71. William Beinart, *The Rise of Conservation in South Africa: Settlers, Livestock, and the Environment 1770–1950* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); and Kate Showers, *Imperial Gullies: Soil Erosion and Conservation in Lesotho* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005).
72. Beinart, *The Rise of Conservation*; Lance Van Sittert, "'The Seed Blows About in Every Breeze': Noxious Weed Eradication in the Cape Colony, 1860–1909," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26, no. 4 (2000): 655–74.
73. Sittert, "The Seed Blows". Regarding the prickly pear, see Karen Middleton, "The Ironies of Plant Transfer: The Case of Prickly Pear in Madagascar," in *Social History*, ed. Beinart and McGregor, 43–59.
74. Karen Brown, "Political Entomology: The Insectile Challenge to Agricultural Development in the Cape Colony, 1895–1910," *Journal of South African Studies* 29, no. 2 (2003): 529–49.

75. Diana K. Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007), xii.
76. Mackenzie, *Land, Ecology, and Resistance*. See Henrietta Moore and Meghan Vaughan, *Cutting Down Trees: Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890–1990* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1993) regarding colonial notions on Bemba land use in colonial Zambia.
77. William Beinart, Karen Brown, and Daniel Gilfoyle, "Experts and Expertise in Colonial Africa Reconsidered: Science and the Interpenetration of Knowledge," *African Affairs* 108, no. 432 (2009): 413–33.
78. Helen Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire,Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
79. Grace Carswell, *Cultivating Success in Uganda: Kigezi Farmers and Colonial Policies* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007).
80. Paul Richards, *Indigenous Agricultural Revolution: Ecology and Food Production in West Africa* (London: Hutchinson Education, 1985).
81. Mary Tiffen, Michael Motimore, and Francis Gichuki, *More People, Less Erosion: Environmental Recovery* (Chichester: John Wiley, 1994).
82. Emmanuel Kreike, *Re-Creating Eden: Land Use, Environment, and Society in Southern Angola and Northern Namibia* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2004); and Emmanuel Kreike, "Hidden Fruits: A Social Ecology of Fruit Trees in Namibia and Angola, 1880s–1990s," in *Social History*, ed. Beinart and McGregor, 27–42.
83. The terms "Colonial Developmentalism" and "Second Colonial Occupation" are used here after Frederick Cooper and D.A. Low and Lonsdale, respectively. See Fredrick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 36–37, 59; and D.A. Low and John Lonsdale, "Introduction: Towards the New Order 1945–1963," in *Oxford History of East Africa*, ed. D.A. Low and Alison Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 12–16.
84. Maddox, Sub-Saharan Africa, 155.
85. Joseph M. Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007), especially chap. 7.
86. Soil Erosion, "Conservationism and Ideas about Development: A Southern African Exploration, 1900–1960," *Journal of South African Studies* 11, no. 1 (1984): 52–83.
87. Anderson, *Eroding the Commons*; Shanguhyia, *Population, Tradition, and Environmental Control.*
88. Carswell, *Cultivating Success in Uganda*.
89. The scheme has attracted considerable attention, mostly from scholars of economics and development in the 1950s and in the postcolonial period. For the latter, see, for instance, J.S. Hogendorn and K.M. Scott, "The East African Groundnut Scheme: Lessons of a Large-Scale Agricultural Failure," *African Economic History* 10 (1981): 81–115; and Matteo Rizzo, "What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme? Development Disaster and Labour Market

in Southern Tanganyika 1946–1952," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 6, no. 2, (2006): 205–38.

90. Monica van Beusekom, *Negotiating Development: African Farmers and Colonial Experts at the Office Du Niger, 1920–1960* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002).
91. Allen Isaacman, *Dams, Displacement, and the Delusion of Development: Cahora Bassa and Its Legacies in Mozambique, 1965–2007* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2013).
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94. Joost Fontein, *Remaking Mutirikwi: Landscape, Water, and Belonging in Southern Zimbabwe* (London: James Currey, 2015).
95. For instance, James L.A. Webb Jr., *The Long Struggle against Malaria in Tropical Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); and James McCann, *The Historical Ecology of Malaria in Ethiopia: Deposing the Spirits* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2014).
96. For example, Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); and James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987). However, as Feierman's *Peasant Intellectuals* reveals, frameworks for analyzing the colonial history of African peasants can be centered within local or indigenous experiences.

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CHAPTER 3

Colonial Administrations and the Africans

Toyin Falola and Chukwuemeka Agbo

International relations between Africa and Africans and the outside world, especially Europe, before 1900 were basically trade-related. By the dawn of the twentieth century, however, the interaction had shifted from trade/exchange relations to control and subordination. Conflicts of interests in Europe over African territories and the resultant clashes among European powers led to the convening of the Berlin Conference towards the end of the nineteenth century (1884/1885). The conference, on which sat no African delegation, saw the splitting of Africa among European powers in the pursuit of expansionist and economic advantages in territories outside Europe.

Between 1885 and 1900, most of Africa was taken over as colonies of Europe, a major event that has shaped the course of African history ever since. The long era of free trade and reasonably peaceful relations gave way to one of economic exploitation and political domination. Before the 1880s, very little of Africa was under colonial rule: less than ten percent consisting of small areas along the coast where trade was carried out. The greater part of the African interior was even unknown to Europeans. The few colonies of the British included areas around Freetown in Sierra Leone, forts in the Gambia, Lagos, a protectorate in the southern Gold Coast (now Ghana), and some areas in Southern Africa. The French had control in St Louis and Dakar in

Toyin Falola, in his *Key Events in* African history: *A Reference Guide*, has dealt in great detail with this topic. Significant aspects of this chapter are drawn from that study.

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Senegal, Grand Bassam and Assini in Ivory Coast, and a small coastal area in Dahomey (now the Republic of Benin). The Portuguese were established in Mozambique and Angola.

By the 1880s, the long-established Afro-European relations based on trade changed to those of colonial domination. By 1900, with the exception of only Liberia and Ethiopia, imperial administration had been established in Africa. Africa experienced colonial rule during the first half of the twentieth century. By 1914, Europeans had consolidated their hold on the continent. Between then and 1939, they implemented various policies that defined the colonial era. After 1939, a number of reforms were undertaken to respond to African demands for independence.

The colonial era had economic, social, and political impacts. The changes were not only numerous, they were also rapid, and Africans had to learn to deal with them in creative ways. What were the reasons for this change, and what was the process, and how did Africans respond? This chapter answers these three important questions.

European Politics in the Nineteenth Century: Background to the Partition of Africa

We have established that trade relations between Africa and Europe predate the nineteenth century. The Atlantic trade, for instance, as far back as the fifteenth century. With time, the trade expanded to include the Americas and the Caribbean. It was pioneered by Portuguese voyagers who were searching for a sea route to India. By the seventeenth century, slaves had become one of Africa's major exports. African laborers were in high demand in North and South America and in the Caribbean Islands, where they were made to work the sugar, cotton, and tobacco plantations and in mining, too.[1] With the industrialization of Europe, particularly in Britain during the last decades of the eighteenth century, the value of slaves as well as demands for them began to dwindle. After enriching her Treasury with profits from the human traffic, Britain was the first among European states to abolish the slave trade. The slave trade and its abolition prepared the way for the colonization of Africa.

Different arguments have been put forward by scholars for the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. Our aim is not to dwell on this, but to highlight the key issues raised so as to enhance our understanding of the argument that follows. In 1933, Sir Reginald Coupland published his *British Anti-Slavery Movement* in which he argued that slavery and the slave trade in British dominions were abolished on humanitarian grounds rather than for selfish purposes.[2] The dust raised by Coupland's argument prompted scholars like Eric Williams to respond with a counter-argument. Williams opines that economic self-interest was at the root of the abolition of the slave trade. At the

dawn of the nineteenth century, Williams asserts, Britain was already moving from mercantile capitalism to industrial capitalism. The gains of the Industrial Revolution had rendered the slave trade unattractive.[3] As pointed out earlier, it is not our intention to go into any form of detailed analysis of this subject. But, as Njoku and other scholars have asserted, there is no doubt that the abolition movement had a multi-purpose agenda in which could be discerned economic, humanitarian, religious, nationalist, and geo-strategic calculations. The balance of current opinion, however, supports Williams as being nearer to the truth than Coupland. This is to say that without the economic argument, the British government would not have expended so much its public resources in bringing the trade in slaves to an end.[4]

Like the abolition of the slave trade, scholars have proven time and again that the colonization of Africa was primarily an economic project.[5] Njoku, for instance, has observed that the European colonization of Africa was not an end in itself but a means to an end.[6] In pursuit of the objectives of colonization, Njoku further observes that the ultimate economic motive of colonization of Africa would not have been achieved through mechanistic econometrics calculations alone; rather, a combination of other factors needed to be taken into account as vital accessories. For instance, some measures of Western education had to be introduced to enable colonized territories to speak the language of their masters and imbibe their cultural values. Modern means of transportation, a modern portable and standardized currency, and imposition and maintenance of the British system of law and order (the so-called Pax Britannica) were also some preconditions for achieving the colonial project.[7]

From the foregoing, it has been established that African colonies offered great economic opportunities to Europe. The expansion of capitalism and the desire for profits were the principal motives behind the conquest of Africa. Falola summarizes European interest in Africa as follows:

> The contact between Nigeria and Britain predated colonial conquest. From the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries, Nigeria was involved in both the transatlantic slave trade and the so-called legitimate trade in raw materials. During the late nineteenth century, trade relations gave way to colonial domination. Among the primary objectives of imposing colonial rule were the need to obtain a cheap and constant supply of raw materials for European industries, secure a market for the products of these expanding industries, and create new outlets for investments. The purpose of British rule was thus to initiate a transformation of Nigerian society and its economy in order to meet these objectives.[8]

That the exploitation of Africa by Europe was the principal focus of colonial rule is best exemplified by the statements of two important colonial officials. Emphasizing the principal responsibility of the colonial government in Africa

to Britain, Bernard Bourdillon, who served as British colonial governor in Uganda and Nigeria, declared: 'our duty to the British tax payers is to extend the supply of raw materials and the market for the British manufactured goods'.[9] Fredrick Lugard, governor general of Nigeria, expressed a similar opinion. He wrote: 'let it be admitted at the onset that European brains, capital, and energy, have not been and never will they be expended on developing the resources of Africa from the motive of philanthropy; that Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes and of the native races'.[10]

The European merchants who made profits in their business relations with Africa believed that they could make even more profits by pressuring their governments to involve themselves directly in the management of Africa. Profits could be made in two ways: by obtaining cheap raw materials which would be exported to Europe to manufacture various products, and by turning Africa into a huge market to consume imported goods from Europe. As other countries such as Germany, France, and Portugal were catching up with Britain in industrialization, the need for raw materials and markets grew greater than ever before. Excess capital was generated by many industries and merchants, and they wanted to spend their money in making more profits. When gold was discovered in South Africa in the 1880s, Africa was seen as offering great promise as a continent in which to invest for quick rewards. The traders already based in Africa began to pressure their home countries to establish economic monopolies in African countries so that they would gain greater access to raw materials and markets.[11]

The fight for Africa was an extension of the intense competition among the European nations. Various elements in this competition can be seen as the 'political motives' responsible for Africa's partition. The unification of Germany created a major third power in Europe, as well as France and Britain. The three were active in maintaining a balance of power, and were eager to prevent any one of them from gaining too much power. Colonial acquisition was interpreted as evidence of a threat to the balance of power. In 1870, France was defeated by Germany, losing two provinces as a result. One way to overcome the humiliation and gain more territories was to seek them in Africa. By the 1880s, ambitious European nations had no territories left to acquire within Europe, thus forcing them to look elsewhere. Early in the 1880s, Britain established control of Egypt, thereby also controlling the Suez route to the east. The French and the Germans believed that they too had to take parts of Africa in order to minimize the advantages that would accrue to Britain. Nationalism was at stake: the extreme passion of the period supported the possession of a large empire, if only to show other nations that one was a great country and a great power.

Each European country wanted to claim overseas territories to exhibit its military and political strength. The acquisition of a large colony was regarded as evidence of imperial power. Each power wanted to prevent any rival European power from taking an area it was interested in. For instance, the British

signed a number of treaties with the chiefs of the Niger Delta in Nigeria in the 1880s, just to prevent the French from encroaching on the area.[12] The European countries believed that they could use acquired territories to build nationalism and prestige. For instance, when Britain acquired the Suez Canal in Egypt in 1882, the French and Germans went elsewhere in Africa to assert themselves, partly to build prestige: the French established claims over the north bank of the River Congo, and Germany established claims over four areas along the African coast, in Togo, Cameroon, Tanganyika (now Tanzania), and South West Africa (now Namibia). King Leopold of Belgium decided to annex territory in Central Africa and created the Congo Free State as his personal estate. The French were interested in possession of the Western Sudan (modern Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) partly to counteract their humiliation by Germany in the war of 1870–1871. Individual European soldiers and officials in Africa regarded territorial possession as a way to gain glory, attention, and promotion.

Evidence of cultural arrogance can be found in the statements of those who participated in the conquest. A belief that Europeans were superior gave rise to the claim that they had a right to conquer Africa. The belief in white superiority was also used to describe the partition as a 'civilizing mission'– the idea that a superior race had the right to improve the lives of an inferior one, if necessary through force and colonization.[13] The conquest of 'backward races' was even interpreted as a legitimate use of force, as many cited the principle of 'Social Darwinism' (only the most able and superior can survive) based on the idea espoused by Charles Darwin in his 1859 book *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*.[14] When this idea was expressed in religious terms, aggressive missionaries claimed that evangelization was a way of uplifting the 'inferior' people.[15] The partition of Africa was seen as an opportunity to do the same.[16]

The Process

The principal European countries involved in the partition were Britain, Portugal, France, and Germany. The greatest rewards went to Britain and France. The British and the French participated in trade and the spread of Christianity, and maintained control in a few areas before the 1880s. Holland and Denmark withdrew from West Africa and sold their bases to the British. The Germans did not become involved until 1884, but they later annexed the coast of Togoland and the Cameroons. The European countries regarded themselves as competitors and viewed one another with suspicion. In 1876, King Leopold I of Belgium indicated a strong interest in Africa by convening a conference and creating an association to sponsor expeditions to the Congo area. In the same year, Portugal began to send its own expeditions to Africa. France too entered an expansionist phase by exploring some areas in the Congo, participating in a dual control of Egypt with the British, and

indicating that it would use force in the Western Sudan. The tensions of the late 1870s and early 1880s, all strongly showing that the European countries were now interested in colonial expansion, led to a major conference to consider the urgency of their aggression and the fate of Africa.

Now known as the Berlin Conference, it was held from 15 November 1884 to 26 February 1885, with Germany as the host. It was agreed that all the European countries were free to participate in the takeover of Africa, that the navigation of the Congo and Niger Rivers was free to all, and that for any country to declare a protectorate over any part of Africa 'effective occupation' of the area was required. When a protectorate was declared by one European country, it must notify the others that it had acquired 'spheres of influence'. The country involved must also give evidence that it would protect certain rights and ensure freedom of trade. The Berlin decisions laid down the rules for partitioning Africa.[17]

After the Berlin Conference, activities aimed at 'possessing' Africa became intense. The leading participants wanted to establish 'effective occupation' in as many areas as possible. As Berlin was unclear whether presence at the coast meant control of the adjoining hinterland, the Europeans challenged one another in areas away from the coastlines. At another conference in 1890 at Brussels, they agreed that the principle of effective occupation also applied to the hinterland. Among the evidence that they used to claim an area as belonging to one of them were the settlement of people or traders from the country, exploration of the area, treaties signed with local chiefs, activities of traders and missionaries, and physical occupation.

After 1885, two strategies were used to acquire colonies. The first was the signing of treaties[18] and the second was direct military attack.[19] Treaties were signed between the representatives of a European power and African chiefs or between one European power and another. In the Euro-African treaties, African leaders signed documents to show that they surrendered their power, and agreed to promote trade and accept other conditions. There is no evidence that many African chiefs understood the contents of the treaties. Treaties among the European powers demarcated boundaries and defined spheres of influence.

Military attacks involved the deliberate use of armies to subdue areas or at least frighten them into surrender. For instance, the French used their army against groups in the Western Sudan, Gabon, and Madagascar. The British attacked many places and peoples as well, including the Yoruba town of Ijebu Ode and the Asante of Ghana. Germany, Italy, and Portugal also used warfare to acquire their colonies.

The Europeans engaged in various disputes, but did not fight many wars among themselves. Their energies were concentrated on sharing Africa among themselves. The British extended their possessions in West Africa and claimed the lucrative and well-populated countries of Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia. In South Africa, Cecil Rhodes, a private entrepreneur, gained valuable areas for the British. With a fanatical desire to impose

British control from the 'Cape to Cairo', he was ruthless in attacking African nations in areas that later became Botswana and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The British consolidated their hold during the Boer War (1899–1902), which ended in the unification of the Boer republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal into the Union of South Africa.[20] British companies in East and Central Africa (the Imperial British East Africa Company and the British South Africa Company) also paved the way to the acquisition of Kenya.

The French invaded the Western Sudan in 1879. Using their existing control of coastal areas, they moved to the hinterland, gaining larger territories and hoping to outflank the British. They moved south from Algeria, northeast from Gabon, and north from Dahomey and Ivory Coast. They also annexed Madagascar and a host of small islands off the coast of East Africa.

With brutal methods, the Congo Free State was expanded. King Leopold treated it as a personal property until 1914 when it was acquired by the Belgian government. The Portuguese and Germans extended their possessions from the coastal areas they controlled prior to 1885. The Italians failed to conquer Ethiopia in 1896, but were able to establish themselves in Eritrea and Somaliland. The Spanish acquired an area on the Guinea Coast (the modern Equatorial Guinea). By the early 1900s, the definitive map of colonial Africa had emerged. Only a few changes followed. Germany lost its colonies at the end of the First World War, as they were transferred to Belgium, France, South Africa, and Britain to manage on behalf of the League of Nations.

African Response

Many African states and leaders were shocked by the European ambition to colonize them. Many struggled to retain their sovereignty and protect their land, their institutions, and their cultures. While many states wanted to maintain friendship with European traders and missionaries, they rejected the attempts to invade and rule them. Indeed, many refused to compromise, preferring even to die in battle. In a mood typical of many leaders, the king of the Mossi in West Africa told a French leader in 1895 that:

> I know the whites wish to kill me in order to take my country, and yet you claim that they will help me to organize my country. But I find my country good just as it is. I have no need of them. I know what is necessary for me and what I want: I have my own merchants: also, consider yourself fortunate that I do not order your head to be cut off. Go away now, and above all, never come back.[21]

Resistance to European conquest was not isolated or restricted to large kingdoms. Eager to portray their conquest in a glowing light, early European accounts exaggerated their welcome by the Africans and criticized their opponents as bloodthirsty tyrants. However, what the African rulers were struggling to retain was their sovereignty. They resorted to various strategies.

In many areas, response took military forms. A state might use its army to fight the European forces, as in the case of the Asante in West Africa or the Zulu in South Africa. Armed resistance could even be prolonged, as in such cases as western Uganda and northern Niger where Africans continued to resist until the 1920s. Samori Touré, the leader of the Mandinka in West Africa, modernized his army and resisted the French for almost seven years.[22]

Resistant Africans were confident of their ability to succeed, trusting their military experience, spiritual forces, and sheer determination to survive. The appeal to religious and magical forces was one way to win the wars, but also a way to seek help from the spiritual realm against the European enemy. Many people and leaders called on ancestors, gods, and spirits for help. Sacrifices were made, in addition to prayers and the use of charms to ward off the 'evil forces' represented by European encroachment.

Diplomacy was yet another option, pursued by forming an alliance or promising to cooperate with the Europeans.[23] Where a group felt threatened by violence, it sought the means to minimize the possibilities of European violence. In situations where a people believed that they could benefit from the European presence, they accepted foreign rule. Among the expected benefits were the introduction of Western education, the spread of Christianity, and expanded opportunities for trade. In expecting positive changes to come with European rule, the Africans misunderstood the objectives of the colonial enterprise.

Religion played an important role. To win wars and build morale, leaders and soldiers used charms. Religious leaders also emerged to lead opposition to Europeans. Religious power could come from indigenous religions, Islam, or Christianity. Religion was used to build unity among people, and to mobilize them for war or disobedience. When the conquest became a reality, religion provided one of the sources of nationalism but also enabled Africans to reconcile themselves to the new situation. Finally, other options were pursued in meeting the challenges of European invasion. Some groups or people took to migration.

Why Europeans Were Successful

In spite of vigorous resistance by a number of African nations and leaders, only Liberia and Ethiopia escaped the imposition of colonial rule. There were a number of reasons for this. To start with, it is misleading to see all of Africa as a single bloc resisting external invasion. Were this the case, it would have been difficult for the European powers to easily take over this huge continent. Not only did the Europeans take on one African nation after another, but there were cases where some African leaders allied with an invading European power against another African people.[24] The European armies included hundreds of Africans, recruited from one group to fight another group.

Other reasons why the Europeans succeeded in imposing colonial rule relate to the power of technology and the availability of resources. Compared

to the African nations, the European powers had more resources to use. They had the money to buy arms and pay troops. If they lost a battle, they could regroup, benefiting from the knowledge gained and the resources available. Their armies were professional, devoted to full-time warfare. African nations too had armies, but in many places they were composed of volunteers who had to abandon their farms and other occupations, without the resources to engage in prolonged warfare.

Due to the records supplied by explorers, missionaries, traders, and representatives of governments, the European invaders possessed valuable information about Africa. More Europeans could also go to Africa to serve in the armies and administration. The use of quinine had made it possible to minimize the danger of malaria fever, thus removing the fear of the deadly disease that had frightened off many Europeans in previous years.

The Europeans relied on improved firearms. Africans relied on bows, arrows, and muzzle-loading guns (such as Dane guns) which were slow to load. The European armies in the era of the partition relied on breech loaders, which could fire almost a dozen bullets in a second. Whereas the European armies had adequate modern guns (the Maxim and Gatling), their African rivals lacked access to them. A few nations, such as the Baule of Ivory Coast, had stockpiled large quantities of arms and ammunition, but they were mainly old muskets which were no match for Maxim guns. Where Africans had modern weapons, they did not have access to large quantities of them. The armies of even such large states as the Sokoto Caliphate lacked the tactics to deal with an invading army using machine guns. The tactics of the African armies (cavalry charges, the defense of walled cities, the use of large armies carrying bows and arrows) were ineffective in facing an army equipped with machine guns.

The guns were used to subdue many groups. However, others were forced to surrender because of the threat of violence. When some groups saw the fate of their more powerful neighbors, they chose to give up. In some cases, it could well be that the rulers saw the futility of resistance and wanted to avoid bloodshed. In the end, only Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia was victorious against the mighty European powers. By 1902, the conquest of Africa was almost completed. A new map was created: instead of hundreds of precolonial nations, there were now about forty political units.

Politics and Administration

New countries with new boundaries were created. These boundaries were artificial. Preexisting political units and ethnic groups might be divided into two or more countries. For instance, the empire of Kanem-Borno in the Lake Chad area was divided between Nigeria (a British colony), Cameroon (German), and Niger and Chad (French). In spite of the problems associated with them, the boundaries have since been maintained with only minor changes. The colonial experience also aided the formation of an African identity, with

a commitment to national boundaries, a sense of unity based on a common experience of colonial domination, and a desire to liberate the continent from oppression and poverty.

The major colonial policies were determined abroad. Colonies were extensions of Europe, and must reflect changes in Europe rather than the concerns of the African subjects. The officers in Africa regarded themselves as under the control of their governments in Europe. They were expected to carry out the instructions given to them, making them applicable to their local situations. The number of officers (administrators and soldiers) was low, to keep down the cost. Their duties were simple and clearly defined: they must pursue the colonial economic objectives, and they must maintain law and order. What Africans wanted was different: development, so that they could not be exploited; and power, which would threaten the colonial state.

Africans were involved in the administration. The armies and the police were manned by Africans, and many came to believe that they owed their survival and prestige to the colonial state. Educated Africans served in the civil service, mainly in the lower levels of administration. As many of them enjoyed privileges, they began to imitate European ways of life.

African countries were not all governed in the same way, although the broad patterns were clear. After early efforts to administer areas unknown to them, the colonialists evolved administrative systems suited to their objectives and adaptable to the circumstances of conquest. To take just two examples, the British tried a system of indirect rule, and the French a system of assimilation.

The British and Indirect Rule

In British colonies, a policy of indirect rule (a method of administering local government) was adopted in many colonies. Indirect rule rested on the assumption that European and African cultures were different, and the best way to govern local communities was through the political system that they had evolved on their own. Above the local government was a central government. Each colony was administered as an autonomous unit, divided into a number of provinces. The governor headed the central administration, aided by executive and legislative councils. The executive councils included only British officers. The legislative councils contained a few Africans, but the power of each council was limited to the colony. The governor was powerful within the colony, but he still obeyed instructions from London. A province was divided into districts, where the system of indirect rule operated.[25]

The British administrator most famous for implementing this idea (in the Sudan and Nigeria) and developing the best manual on it was Lord Lugard, author of *The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa*.[26] Early in the twentieth century, Lugard faced the task of administering the huge area of Northern Nigeria, formerly part of the extensive Sokoto Caliphate, which had a highly developed political system under a sultan and emirs. The British would have

required a large number of people and extensive resources to govern such a huge area. What they chose to do was to control the sultan and emirs, who would in turn control their own people. Indirect rule in Northern Nigeria became a model for other places. The system was later extended to other areas in Nigeria and other colonies such as Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia.

Under indirect rule, existing traditional institutions were modified to meet the needs of the colonial administration. Chiefs, kings, and their officials were used for local administration, to carry out the policies of the colonial government.[27] Indirect rule reduced cost and numbers of foreign personnel, by using Africans to administer themselves. However, many of the Africans involved owed their appointments to the British officers who could also remove them. They were expected to carry out instructions, performing the unpopular duties of collecting taxes and recruiting labor for the government. To return to the example of Northern Nigeria, the British officer, a resident or district officer, supervised and advised the local emir, instructed on how to reform and modernize local institutions, and ensured the collection of taxes. The emir was the head of the Native Administration and appointed district heads, village heads, and tax collectors.

Indirect rule experienced a number of problems and can be criticized on several grounds. Chiefs and kings in many areas actually had more power than before, thus creating tension between them and their people. Indirect rule proved unsuitable to areas that were previously used to powerful kings and their officials. In areas without established centralized institutions or strong kings, as among the Igbo of Nigeria or the Swahili of Tanganyika, powerful chiefs were created for them. Known as 'Warrant Chiefs' among the Igbo, they were given wide powers, they carried out unpopular decisions, and they could be individuals of low social status without much respect in the community.

In the attempt to protect traditional chiefs and institutions, as in Northern Nigeria, the British gave little encouragement to the spread of Christianity and Western education. In some cases, European officers would blame African chiefs for lack of progress, wrongly accusing them of not initiating modernization. In the quest to preserve existing institutions, some officers actually prevented rapid changes, arguing that traditions needed to be preserved at all costs. Finally, where a new African, educated elite emerged, indirect rule excluded them from power. The exclusion of the educated Africans from power created a lingering hostility between them and the Europeans.

The French System

Proud of their culture, and with a strong belief that they could spread it, the French opted for a policy of assimilation. Their African subjects were expected to become French in culture, and if possible, in citizenship, and the colonies would be run as provinces of France. Not only did the French think

that they had attained the highest possible culture, they believed that Africans could acquire the essence of their civilization, as long as the necessary institutions were put in place. Their African subjects should imitate them, and their colonies should become an extension of France.

Senegal in West Africa was the place to experiment with this grandiose project of culture transfer, in the areas known as the 'Four Communes': St Louis, Dakar, Rufisque, and Goree. A French system of local government and schooling was introduced, and the African residents were regarded as French citizens, with the right to elect a representative to the Chamber of Deputies in Paris.[28]

Outside these four areas, the French did not fully assimilate their African subjects. Thus, the colony was divided between the French citizens and 'other Africans'. The French citizens enjoyed wide privileges. Unlike the British colonies, where the Christian missionaries developed the education system, the French government took control of the school system in its colonies. Only a small percentage of Africans had the benefit of Western education, and those who did enjoyed the privileges of citizenship. The non-French did not enjoy freedom of speech, movement, and the press; they could be forced to work to build roads and railways, and they paid direct tax which compelled many of them to take to the production of cash crops in order to raise wages. In a notorious system known as the *indigénat*, a French officer had the power to arrest and jail any non-French African without trial.

Extending the policy of personal assimilation proved difficult, partly because it was difficult to enforce a uniform culture. Cultures and customs varied, and it was hard for the French to impose theirs on all Africans, certainly not on adults who were already set in their ways. There were profound differences between the cultures of the French and the Africans. Aspects of traditional life such as the lineage system, religion (both indigenous and Islamic) and many others were hard to give up. Great differences also existed in terms of laws, rights, and duties which were hard for Africans to abandon. For instance, an African Muslim married to two wives could not become a French citizen since this would violate the law on monogamy. By implication, assimilation would destroy or undermine many aspects of African culture and traditional authorities.

The French side, very early in the twentieth century, began to question the need to extend wide privileges to Africans and make them citizens. There was a fear that over time, the number of Africans who were French citizens would outnumber the European French citizens and could even possibly take over power. Also, the attainment of colonial objectives meant that the French needed millions of Africans to contribute to the colonial economy.[29]

The French, like the British, set up central and local governments. The Ministry of the Colonies in Paris controlled the colonies, preferring to treat many of them as a federation rather than as separate, autonomous countries. For instance, all the French colonies in West Africa (Senegal, Mali, Guinea,

Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Niger, Dahomey, and Mauretania) were administered as a single federation under a governor-general based in Dakar.

Power revolved around the governor-general. He represented France in Africa, taking instructions and implementing them. Only the governor-general could transact official business with the ministry in France. He had a large budget, and was financially independent of the separate territories. He controlled appointments to the civil service, while the security forces of the army and police were treated as federal matters. Below him were the governors who headed the component territories. The governors executed the orders sent from Paris through the governor-general.

With respect to the local government, the colonies were divided into *cercles*, units that ignored traditional boundaries and were artificially drawn so as to be similar in size and population. Each cercle was headed by a *commandant de cercle*. A cercle was divided into more manageable units, each administered by the *chef de subdivision* who administered the subdivision. The French used more of their own personnel, who enjoyed a more direct exercise of power. The African chiefs were undermined, left with little or no power, denied judicial power, and reduced to a low status. Many chiefs were removed, and the others became subordinate to French political officers. They were given the most degrading tasks of raising forced labor and collecting tax, two tasks they must carry out to avoid being disgraced or even removed.[30]

If the idea of personal assimilation could not be implemented, it was easier to implement administrative and economic assimilation. In the long run, this had a number of negative consequences: in the case of Algeria, the close links with France made the struggle for independence difficult and violent.

The Economy

The aim of the European powers was to exploit the resources of Africa in various ways: as a supplier of minerals and cash crops, consumer of finished imported products, and provider of revenues to make the colonies financially self-sufficient. Even when important changes were made, they were connected to the colonial economic objectives of generating a massive transfer of wealth from Africa to Europe. The economy rested narrowly on a few products, and was heavily dependent on external demands. New currencies were introduced to replace indigenous ones. Until the dying years of colonial rule, industrialization and economic planning were ignored.

As was the case in British colonies in Africa, the need to attain the colonial objectives meant that new infrastructure had to be built. Roads and railways appeared in areas with exportable resources, in order to facilitate the movement of goods from production centers to port cities, to be transported by ships to Europe. The building of the new roads and railways brought hardships to the Africans who were compelled to perform construction work.

New and efficient for their goal, the communication facilities contributed to the massive expansion of the export economy, the penetration of imported items into cities and villages, the mobility of people, urbanization, and the spread of ideas and religions.

Africans participated in the colonial economy in various ways. The majority were producers, working on their farms. Many others were forced to work for the government or for European ventures. Taxes were imposed, and the need to raise cash in order to pay compelled many people to seek wage incomes, even as laborers.[31] Agriculture was the most important sector of the colonial economy. Among the key products developed and exported were peanuts, cocoa, rubber, coffee, palm oil, and timber. Except in the areas with large numbers of European settlers, agricultural production was mainly in the hands of Africans. Several measures were put in place to ensure production. A common one was the payment of tax in cash which forced millions of people to produce and sell in order to obtain money. In some colonies, people were compelled to work. The perceived benefits of obtaining money to buy luxury items, pay for the education of children, and build houses also served to encourage production.

Foreign firms made considerable profits from the export of agricultural products. In areas and periods when governments became involved in buying crops or regulating prices, they were able to accumulate huge surpluses by underpaying the farmers. Export crops were favored, as the best land was devoted to them. The cultivation of cotton damaged land by reducing its nutrients. The overall consequence of the emphasis on cash crops was to reduce the quantity of food crops available. Mining was developed in areas with gold, tin, coal, diamonds, copper, bauxite, and manganese. The sector was totally dominated by a few foreign companies who made huge profits and paid limited taxes. Africans worked mainly as laborers. Wages were low, and the formation of trade unions was disallowed for a long time.[32]

Direct European involvement in the economy occurred in a few sectors and areas. Where there were large numbers of European settlers, they established plantations, such as the sisal farms in Tanganyika and the large farms of the fertile 'White Highlands' in Kenya. Mining in South Africa, the Belgian Congo, and Northern Rhodesia also witnessed heavy European investments. In Kenya and Rhodesia, where there was a substantial number of European settlers, the foreigners exercised more power than the Africans. They were thus able to award themselves with a number of privileges, including control of trade, access to fertile land, and the use of Africans as domestic and farm workers. This became a source of great tension.

European involvement forced many Africans off their land to work as laborers for European large-scale farmers. Many also migrated to the cities to obtain other kinds of jobs. In some countries, reserves were created to keep the dispossessed Africans in areas where they could be policed. Some Africans were forced to work in European ventures and remunerated with low wages.

African economies were incorporated into the world economic system, with Africans working as producers to supply raw materials to external industries. So important was this role that African areas without raw materials needed for export were regarded as backward, and many of their people could be found as migrant workers elsewhere. To the colonizers, the ability to produce was evidence of progress. This 'progress' became uneven between regions—areas which exported raw materials had better infrastructural provisions and social services. Areas without minerals or exportable raw materials were forced to supply their labor to distant areas, in a 'contribution' which destroyed many rural areas as farmlands and families were abandoned. Countries such as Mali, Basutoland (now Lesotho), Niger, and Chad were regarded as labor reserve areas. When the people were unwilling to work, they could be forced to do so. The requirement that they must pay tax also ensured that they had to seek wage employment in distant areas.

The control of the lucrative export-import trade was in the hands of non-African businesses. European firms enjoyed great advantages, being able to mobilize the capital to control shipping and make huge bulk purchases. Next came the Indian and Lebanese traders who were able to buy raw materials in bulk, sell imported items in retail stores, and advance credit to small producers. African entrepreneurs were pushed to the margins, surviving mainly as small-scale traders in local markets.

Socio-Cultural Changes

There was an increase in the continent's population of about 37.5%. The pace of urbanization increased. New cities were created (e.g. Enugu and Port Harcourt in Nigeria, Abidjan in Ivory Coast and Takoradi in Ghana) and some older ones rapidly expanded, because they served as centers of commerce and administration. Although services tended to be inadequate, the cities enjoyed far better facilities than the rural areas in terms of medical services, leisure facilities, and schools.

Western education spread in many areas, as colonial governments and foreign firms needed clerks and other literate people to work for them. Interest was concentrated on elementary education. Where missionaries were allowed to operate, as in British colonies, they established elementary schools and a few grammar schools. Governments saw the participation of missionaries as saving them money. The missionaries were able to use the school system to convert many Africans to Christianity. The size of the educated elite increased, and they increasingly dominated the economy and politics of the continent. European languages spread among the elite.

Christianity and Islam spread, as missionaries took advantage of the railways and roads to travel to many areas. They were able to reach millions of people in the cities, where new mosques and churches were built. Their spread pushed indigenous religions to the background. Western education,

Christianity, and urbanization had a combined impact on social structure. The traditional elite (chiefs, kings, warriors, blacksmiths, and diviners) lost power and prestige to a new educated class.[33] Africans also became divided along spatial lines between those who lived in cities and those who lived in villages. The cities represented 'civilization' and the villages represented 'backwardness'. Migrations to cities became fairly common, especially among the youth who wanted to learn about new cultures and seek wage employment.

Both the cities and villages were stratified. In the cities, at least three major classes could be found. At the bottom were the 'urban proletariat' comprising artisans and low-income earners. Because of the scarcity of affordable houses and the limited social services, many had to live in shanty areas. Among the poor, prostitution, unemployment, crime, and juvenile delinquency were more common. Above them were the 'sub-elite' comprising primary school teachers, clerks, nurses, and others who had higher incomes than the low-income earners, but lacked power and connections. At the top were the members of the elite (lawyers, politicians, doctors, senior civil servants) who had the resources to enjoy the facilities of the city and participate in politics as leaders. In the villages, there were landowners and landless. In precolonial Africa, everybody had access to land. In colonial Africa, especially in areas with large numbers of European settlers, many were denied land. In Southern and East Africa, large numbers of landless people moved about as migrant workers.

Conclusion

Colonial Administrations in Africa: Positive or Negative Changes?

The evaluation of the comprehensive changes of this period has given rise to three major opinions. First, there are those who see everything as positive. Many missionaries, European officials, and scholars of moderate persuasion regard colonial rule as having been beneficial for the following reasons: peace replaced wars in many areas; Western education and medicine spread; roads and railways were constructed; Africans sold their products abroad for money, and so on. In short, to them, the colonial era brought 'civilization' to a 'dark continent'.[34]

Second, there are those who regard the changes as negative.[35] Rather than development, they see the exploitation and retardation of the continent. Such changes as the building of roads and railways simply provided the infrastructure needed by the colonial powers to take away resources from Africa to Europe. Thus, colonial infrastructures in Africa have best been described as infrastructures of exploitation.[36] To scholars of the 'Dependency School', colonialism destroyed indigenous economies, removed wealth from Africa to Europe, and created the basis for underdevelopment. In the words of Walter Rodney, a famous critic, 'Colonialism had only one hand—it was a one-armed

bandit'.[37] Other critics of colonial rule do not deny that the era brought positive changes, but they assert that indigenous cultures and environments were damaged in various ways, that women were marginalized in a colonial society dominated by men, that the exploitation of the continent was far greater than the benefits it received, that social services were provided primarily to meet the needs of Europeans and a small number of privileged Africans who lived in the cities, and that racial dominance by Europeans undermined the worth of Africans as a people.

Finally, there are those who see both positive and negative aspects in colonial rule. They agree that some changes had beneficial impacts, such as political stability, the creation of a smaller number of countries with fixed boundaries to replace hundreds of previous states, the creation of a judiciary and civil service, and the creation of conditions that led to African nationalism. On the negative side, they mention, among other things: the end of the sovereignty of African states, the weakening of the traditional basis of power, the creation of small, and land-locked countries, and the rise of ethnicity. With respect to the economy, they praise the creation of new roads and railways and the development of the mineral and agricultural potential of the continent in such a way that wealth was generated by many people whose purchasing power was enhanced. On the negative side, they point to the inadequacies of the communication system, the commercialization of land, the use of forced labor, the acquisition of fertile land by European settlers, the control of lucrative trade by European firms and Lebanese and Indian traders, and other forms of exploitation.

Irrespective of the conclusions of the various analysts, there is no doubt that the colonial era was one of the most significant events in African history. It brought many changes, such as new countries, the spread of European languages and institutions, and the introduction of Western education and health services. Many of these changes have had a lasting impact on the continent.

Notes

1. See for instance, Onwuka N. Njoku, *Economic History of Nigeria, 19th–21st Centuries* (Nsukka: Great AP Express Publishers, 2014), 163.
2. See Reginald Coupland, *The British Anti-Slavery Movement* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933).
3. See Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (The University of North Carolina Press, 1994 ed).
4. Njoku, *Economic History of Nigeria*, 164. See also, David L. Imbua et al., *History, Culture, Diaspora, and Nation Building: The Collected Works of Okon Edet Uya* (Bethesdan: Arbi Press, 2012); David L. Imbua, *Intercourse and Cross-currents in the Atlantic World: Calabar-British Experience, 17th–20th Centuries* (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2012).

5. The following example will suffice, Eric Willaims, *Capitalism and Slavery*; Chinweizu, *The West and the Rest of Us* (New York: Random House, 1975); Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1974); Toyin Falola, *Britain and Nigeria: Exploitation or Development* (London: Zed, 1987); and Walter Ofonagoro, *Trade and Imperialism in Southern Nigeria, 1881–1916* (Nok Publishers, 1979).
6. Njoku, *Economic History of Nigeria*, 189.
7. Ibid.
8. Toyin Falola, *Development Planning and Decolonization in Nigeria* (Florida: University of Florida Press, 1996), 2.
9. Bernard Bourdillon, cited in Kehinde Faluyi, "The Response of the People of Oyo Division of Western Nigeria to Cash Crop Development, 1935–1960," *The Nigerian Journal of Economic History* 1: 41.
10. See, Z.A. Konnczacki and J.M. Konczacki, eds., *An Economic History of Tropical Africa*, Vol. II (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 18–19.
11. For more on the economic situation in Europe and the consequent expansionist drive into Africa and ultimately its colonization, see P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism, 1688–2000* (Essex: Longman, 2002); and A. Boahen, ed., *UNESCO General History of Africa, VII, Africa Under Colonial Domination, 1880–1935*, Abridged ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
12. For details on these treaties, see K.O. Dike, *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830–1885: An Introduction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria* (London: Clarendon Press, 1956).
13. Similar argument to justify the economic explanations for colonizing Africa had been put forward by J.A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1902); and V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (New York: International Publishers, 1917).
14. Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* (John Murray, 1859).
15. See for instance E.A. Ayandele, *The Missionary Impact on Modern, 1842–1914: A Political and Social Analysis* (London: Longman, 1966).
16. On the partition of Africa see Richard Reid, *A History of Modern Africa, 1800 to the Present* (Hoboken: John Wiley and Son, 2011); and Deryck Schreuder, *The Scramble for Southern Africa: The Politics of Partition Reappraised* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
17. See for example Roland Anthony Oliver and Neville Sanderson, *The Cambridge History of Africa*, *Vol. 6, 1870–1905* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
18. K.O. Dike, *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta*.
19. See for example, Toyin Falola, *Nigerian History, Politics, and Affairs: The Collected Essays of Adiele Afigbo* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), chap. 7.
20. Deryck Schreuder, *The Scramble for Southern Africa*.
21. See Toyin Falola, *Key Events in African History*.
22. For armed reistance against the Europeans, see for example Randy Sparks, *The Two Princes of Calabar* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004).
23. Toyin Falola, *Nigerian History, Politics, and Affairs*, chap. 4.
24. Sparks' *The Two Princes of Calabar* serves as one example.

25. For indirect rule in British Africa see Obaro Ikime and Segun Osoba, *Indirect Rule in British Africa* (London: Longman, 1970).
26. Frederick Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922).
27. For indirect rule in Eastern Nigeria see Adiele Afigbo, *The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria, 1891–1929* (London: Longman, 1972).
28. A.I. Asiwaju, *West African Transformations: A Comparative Impact of French and British Colonialism* (Ikeja: Malthouse Press, 2001).
29. James Eskridge Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence, Cultural Authenticity, and the Limitations of Mimicry in French-Ruled West Africa, 1914–1956* (New York: Peter Lang, 2004).
30. Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975). For forced labor in colonial French West Africa see Babacar Fall, *Social History in French West Africa: Forced Labor, Labor Market, Women, and Politics* (Amsterdam: SEPHIS, 2002).
31. Ibid.
32. A similar case obtained in British West Africa and the colonialists exploited their colonies as best they could. O.N. Njoku has given considerable attention to the situation in Nigeria in his *Economic History of Nigeria*.
33. Toyin Falola in his *Nationalism and African Intellectuals* (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2001) has dealt with this issue. Also, see Chap. 25 by Toyin Falola and Chukwuemeka Agbo, "Nationalism and African Intellectuals," in this volume.
34. See for instance, J.A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*.
35. The examples of Rodney, Chinweizu, and Ofonagoro, among others, have already been cited earlier.
36. S.A. Olanrewaju, "The Infrastructure of Exploitation: Transport, Monetary Changes, Banking, etc" in Toyin Falola, ed., *Britain and Nigeria: Exploitation or Development*. See also, Njoku, *Economic History of Nigeria*, 213.
37. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.

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CHAPTER 4

Slavery in the Colonial State and After

Paul E. Lovejoy

By the time that colonialism ended in Africa, slavery was hardly something of the past, although its shapes and forms had undergone extensive transformations. It was no longer legal to buy and sell people as slaves, and acts of enslavement were undertaken surreptitiously rather than through capture in warfare, judiciously sanctioned punishment or slave raiding, although kidnapping continued in some places. Slavery had been widespread almost everywhere at the time of the European conquest as an accepted part of the social order. Colonial policies altered official attitudes to slavery primarily because colonial rule was justified as a civilizing mission and slavery was considered an anathema that had been eliminated in European colonies in the Americas and Asia, and indeed in Southern Africa, Sierra Leone, and the French enclaves in West Africa and North Africa. The persistence of slavery nonetheless was a feature of colonial rule, despite a wave of policies and development schemes that attempted to redefine social relationships through taxation, migrant labor deployment, Christian marriage, the invention of 'tribalism' as a method of indirect rule, the redefinition of kinship, and other 'civilizing' mechanisms. Repeatedly, however, slavery surfaced as a reality that dragged the precolonial era into the present. Slavery emerged in court cases, labor unrest, politically inspired disputes over appointments to colonial-sanctioned public office, friction between Christians and Muslims, and even in education. Slavery during the colonial era led some to question whether or not slavery was really an issue any longer, since it became illegal to enslave people let alone buy and sell individuals. Older, preconquest relationships that clearly involved enslavement might be thought to have dissipated, lingering on as

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vestiges of the past that eventually would disappear with the passing of time, constituting what some officials predicted was the 'slow death of slavery' that would take at least a generation, and in less sanguine predictions, two generations to finish. Despite problems of definition of what constituted slavery, the status of 'slave' clearly continued through the colonial period and resurfaced under the modern conditions of contemporary slavery.

This chapter analyzes slavery during the twentieth century and the implications for understanding why it has continued into the present. In order to do so, several important distinctions are made. First, slavery is understood to mean the status of an individual who was considered to be property, that is someone who could be bought and sold as a person and therefore had a monetary value that was clearly established in local custom and law and was distinct from other forms of servile relationships and methods of exploitation.[1] Moreover, slavery was an inherited status that could not be altered unless individuals or their offspring were emancipated, usually through purchase, death-bed acts of charity, or actions derived from legal proceedings but sometimes through flight, executive order, and in Muslim societies through birth if the father was free. Slavery should therefore be considered to be distinct from forced labor, conscription, debt bondage, pawnship in which individuals were held as collateral for debts, or marriage in which women had no choice. Sometimes, slavery has been confused with other exploitive relationships, which is not to underestimate the degree of coercion during colonial rule but to provide an important analytical distinction that helps to understand the transition that was involved for the institution of slavery as a result of European conquest. As is widely recognized, slavery was extensive in virtually all parts of Africa before the colonial conquest, although the conditions of enslavement, the mechanisms of enslavement, and the extent of the trade in slaves and other means of distribution of those who were enslaved varied considerably across the continent. In most parts of Africa in the period of final European occupation from *c.*1885 to 1900, the proportion of those who were enslaved constituted a substantial population, amounting to more than half the population in many places. Hence the destiny of this considerable population deserves close analysis, regardless of how slavery related to other forms of servility that already existed or that were introduced under colonialism.

Strictly speaking, the nature of slavery became ambiguous under colonial rule. All European powers justified conquest in part on the prevalence of slavery and at least a nominal commitment to its eradication through the self-proclaimed civilizing mission of colonialism.[2] In claiming a moral stance that opposed slavery, European governments made no basic distinction between areas that were Muslim and areas that were not. In reality, however, French and British policies towards slavery reflected extensive and long-standing knowledge of slavery under Islamic rule, the French because they had occupied first Algeria in the 1830s and then subsequently moved inland from the

Senegambian coast by the middle of the nineteenth century, while the British had confronted slavery in Muslim parts of South Asia throughout the nineteenth century. German, Belgian, and Portuguese policies towards slavery readily echoed the common anti-slavery rhetoric but willingly obfuscated distinctions between slavery and other forms of coerced labor that blurred the transition in the conditions of many people who were actually enslaved as opposed to those who were now subjected to colonial dictatorship. In one way or another all colonial regimes instituted laws that prohibited the actual enslavement of individuals through kidnapping, war, and other means for purposes of sale into slavery. They made the trade in human beings illegal, which now became a criminal offence subject to imprisonment, fine or both, and the liberation of the individuals who had been enslaved or were being sold. Nonetheless, no colonial regime actually emancipated the enslaved population at the time of conquest, although provisions for redemption from slavery were often encouraged and strengthened, even when those in slavery faced the same coercive measures of forced labor that all colonial subjects, except the elites, had to endure.

Even the exceptions to where slavery was prevalent are instructive. In British South Africa and Sierra Leone, slavery was formally abolished in 1834 with British emancipation throughout its colonial domains, although the distinction between colonies and protectorates meant that slavery did not end everywhere in the British empire. In British colonies, after a period of apprenticeship that lasted until 1838, the enslaved population was legally free, but in protectorates, which included much of South Asia and also areas of Africa that were conquered at the turn of the twentieth century, the enslaved population was not emancipated, although the legal status of slavery was no longer recognized in British courts, and enslavement and slave trading were legally proscribed and made criminal offences.[3] This fine distinction between emancipation of people who were held as slaves and the change in the legal status of the enslaved population could be confusing, even for colonial administrators who were attempting to understand the difference and act accordingly. For public consumption in Europe, there were supposedly no more slaves with the imposition of the colonial state, but missionaries, some newspaper reporters, and early anthropological inquiry reported otherwise. Moreover, the colonial state allowed coercive measures of labor recruitment that confused the situation over the continuation of slavery even more. Hence it can be argued that the colonial period hardly resolved the issue of slavery in Africa but rather resulted in its obfuscation.

The analysis of slavery during the European colonial occupation of Africa has suffered not only because of confusion over what is meant by slavery but also because of the rhetoric of the era that often failed to make distinctions among the legalisms that were used to describe European occupation and dictatorship. The term 'colonial', for example, once referred to formal settlement of territories by immigrants from the homeland of colonial rule, as in

North America; as distinct from 'empire', which did not necessarily involve European migration and settlement, as in most of Asia. In the twentieth century, Europeans did migrate to some parts of Southern Africa and East Africa where settler regimes eventually emerged that more or less helped shape the policies of European occupation, most especially in South Africa, Kenya, and in Portuguese enclaves in Angola and Mozambique, which complicate the analysis.[4] Forced labor, abusive concessions to European-controlled cartels, and terror allowed the perpetration of measures that allowed the continuation of slavery under terminologies that disguised the abrupt shift from situations in which there was an enslaved population to conditions of colonial servitude. Some of these abuses were exposed, as in André Gide's documentation of the horrors of the Congo Free State (*Voyage au Congo*, 1927). Others were justified on the basis of racist pronouncements of the primitive mentalities of Africans, as described in Dominique-Octave Mannoni's *Prospero and Caliban* (1956). A clear difference marked the continuation and transformation of slavery in areas of European immigration from most of the rest of Africa where European settlement was marginal or non-existent. In all areas, nonetheless, European 'colonial' rule had to allow for existing authority whether through the incorporation of officials of previously independent political states or the cooption of the leadership of acephalous societies and fragmented social structures. In many places, colonial regimes imposed newly created titled officials to facilitate labor recruitment, taxation, and political control who inevitably affected how slavery was perceived and how those who were enslaved were treated.[5] The conquest and the process of stabilization in combination also introduced conditions in which many of those who were enslaved were able to run away, but often to marginal areas to escape detection; and for those who did not flee, there were successful efforts to renegotiate their status and their obligations to their masters.

The division of Africa into European-controlled territories that were called 'colonies' and 'protectorates' changed the context for those who were enslaved and led to dramatic transformations, but not the end of slavery. In the Muslim states of West Africa that were defeated and incorporated into European territories at the end of the nineteenth century, there were more people enslaved than in all of the Americas combined at any time during the era of slavery there.[6] There were also many enslaved people in areas that were not under Muslim governments, such as Asante, the Yoruba states, the interior of the Bight of Biafra and elsewhere, even in stateless societies. In Muslim-controlled areas of East Africa and Christian Ethiopia, slavery continued despite European, particularly British, efforts to end the slave trade in the Indian Ocean and across the Red Sea. Slavery and debt bondage that was often converted into enslavement was common throughout the Bantu-speaking societies and states from the Congo River basin southward to the Zambezi and the Kalahari Desert. The prevalence of slavery was so pervasive

in its multifarious forms that some scholars have insisted that there were many types of 'slaveries' that characterized African societies at the beginning of the twentieth century. This situation characterized virtually the whole continent that had been conquered, and even Ethiopia and Liberia that remained independent were no different; it seems that slavery was as widespread as elsewhere.

Even missionary critics of colonial exploitation subscribed to aspects of the ideologies of colonialism, abhorring the supposed backwardness of African populations although insisting that Christian conversion offered the road to civilization and enlightenment. Missionaries were particularly confused on the issue of slavery. On the one hand, the Catholic White Fathers of Cardinal Charles Lavigerie purchased slaves outright, especially children and women, under the pretence that they were freeing them, provided they actually converted to Christianity. This policy was first instituted in Algeria, but was developed to its fullest in the interior regions of East Africa and the Congo River basin.[7] The missionary initiatives that derived from Sierra Leone, including the Church Missionary Society of the Anglican Church and the Methodists, relied on formerly enslaved converts to spread the Gospel and founded enclaves of Christianity on the basis of escaping from slavery, particularly in Yoruba and Igbo regions and in the hinterland of Freetown in Sierra Leone. For many missionaries, including those Africans who had been liberated and now recognized themselves as the vanguard of a new, Pan-African movement of reform and conversion, slavery was only one element of 'heathenism' and was placed alongside such abhorrent practices as the killing of twins, alleged savagery associated with ritualized masquerades, artistic representations in wooden carvings, body scarification, poison ordeals, and other supposedly barbaric practices including nakedness. Human sacrifices at funerals and during public ceremonies were indeed challenging cultural, social, and political obstacles to conversion, not only to Christianity but also to Islam, especially when victims were often those who were enslaved, often acquired specifically for the event. The impact of missionaries extended across Angola through the Belgian Congo to the Great Lakes.[8]

Because slavery was widespread and the ideology of conquest, ironically, was often based in part on opposition to slavery, the military consolidation of European control itself enabled many of the enslaved population to run away during military encounters and the uncertain climate after initial occupation. The slave-holding elites were temporarily without power and therefore could not keep those who wanted to flee from doing so. Hundreds of thousands of the enslaved population in West Africa deserted in the last few years of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth. The new colonial regimes, therefore, had to deal with the issue of slavery, not so much because they used slavery and the slave trade as part of the justification for colonial rule, but because the slave population could seize the opportunity

and threaten the establishment of stable colonial regimes. As a result, the colonial governments attempted to make sure that slaves were not immediately emancipated and that slavery was not directly eliminated. The two major colonial regimes that had to confront slavery were British and French; German encounters with slavery ended abruptly with the First World War, while Portuguese and Belgian measures require a separate analysis because the coercive measures that they imposed introduced atrocities that targeted the whole population, not only those who were technically enslaved.

An examination of slavery in the states that had been founded in jihad in West Africa between the late eighteenth century and the nineteenth century demonstrates the scale of the transformation in social relationships that came about as a result of the colonial approach to the slavery issue. These Muslim states stretched from Fuuta Jalon and Fuuta Toro in the Senegambia region through the Umarian empire of al-Hajj 'Umar and the Sokoto caliphate, and indeed dominated the sahel and savannah as far as the Mahdist state in the upper Nile River Valley, reaching the Red Sea by the end of the nineteenth century. Together, these states had a slave population that numbered in the millions. The Sokoto caliphate alone had an enslaved population that surpassed the number of the enslaved in Brazil and Cuba combined. Inevitably, therefore, slavery was a major issue that affected how the British and French brought these Islamic governments under imperial control. How to deal with this situation was a major concern of both British and French officials. In British territories in West Africa, the status of slavery had been ambiguous since the middle of the nineteenth century. Officials debated whether or not they were allowed to provide sanctuary for fugitive slaves, and in an effort to contain the flight of slaves from areas beyond their control, they drafted young males into the evolving forces of the Hausa Constabulary and then the West African Frontier Force, which became the conquering armies of the British advance. Under Frederick Lugard, the newly appointed High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, British policy was consolidated under the rubric of 'legal status abolition', following the slavery policy that had been adopted in India and elsewhere.[9] As the leading ideologue and political theorist in British Africa, Lugard had experience in the consolidation of British rule in Uganda and subsequently served in Hong Kong, although his major impact was in Nigeria, first in the region dominated by the Sokoto caliphate and then subsequently after 1913 in all of Nigeria. Lugard was considered the father of 'Indirect Rule' and implemented what was known as the Indian model of slavery policy, which did not emancipate slaves but rather altered the legal status of slavery in the courts. Lugard came to believe that he abolished slavery, or at least his public image required such an interpretation. He played a major role as an anti-slavery expert at the League of Nations in the 1920s and even wrote the entry on slavery in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* in 1929. The evolution of his impact on slavery policy is best revealed in a remarkable report on the evolution of slavery policies in Northern Nigeria

from 1897 through the 1920s that Gordon Lethem, Lieutenant-Governor of Northern Nigeria, assembled, at Lugard's request, in 1931.[10]

In the French sphere, Governor-General E. Roume proclaimed a new judicial system in November 1903 that effectively abolished the legal status of slavery throughout French-controlled territory, a policy which proved to be remarkably similar to the one adopted in British territories. By the terms of administrative decree, both French and indigenous courts and judicial tribunals were no longer permitted to acknowledge the status of slavery in their proceedings and were prohibited from issuing certificates of freedom for those who were seeking emancipation. Because slavery was widespread, several administrators undertook to study the problem, resulting in the official reports of Georges Poulet, Ernest Roume and Georges Dehereme in 1905–1906.[11] Like the British, the French employed fugitive slaves in the military, the *tirailleurs sénégalais*, and placed many fugitives in *villages de liberté* that were stationed along trade routes and the newly constructed railroad into the interior as a dependable labor force.[12] French policy did not prevent the massive desertion of slaves, who left their masters during these years, but it did enable the renegotiation of relationships between the enslaved population which did not flee with their former masters. In the Sahara and the sahel especially, servile and formerly servile people continued to be enmeshed in pseudo and sometimes coercive relationships of dependency for many decades, and in some places lasting until the present.[13]

A major exposé of the enslaved population was undertaken in the 1920s. Initially the concern was the nature of newly imposed policies in the former German territories that the League of Nations placed under mandate to the French and British. It was not clear if policies in adjacent colonies should apply to the mandated territories, and to deflect attention from the problem, the League undertook to investigate the prevalence of slavery and the policies of various governments in its suppression. The League specifically initiated an investigation into the persistence of slavery in Ethiopia in 1922 but soon broadened its mandate. As Suzanne Miers has demonstrated, the League's involvement in the suppression of slavery had rather dubious origins, and in the fifteen years during which the League was concerned with the slavery issue, more was done to protect the interests of colonial governments than to eradicate slavery.[14] Nonetheless, the inquiries of the League indirectly affected colonial policy towards the slavery issue. For public consumption, at least, colonial regimes had to appear to have the slavery situation under control, not only in the mandated territories but throughout their colonial empires.

Lugard surfaced as one of the leading spokesmen in the slavery debate. At the time, he was Britain's appointee to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League. He was also Vice President of the Abyssinian Corporation, which promoted British commercial interests in Ethiopia. On November 10, 1922, Lord Arthur Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, transmitted a

memorandum to the League through Lugard recommending an investigation of slavery in Ethiopia. Lugard assumed the appearance of one who was not directly interested in Ethiopia, despite his connection with the Abyssinian Corporation, but as William Rappard, Director of the Mandates Section of the League, noted at the time, 'the British Government or certain colonial circles were considering the possibility of using the League and Sir Frederick Lugard as a means of intervention in Abyssinia'.[15] Conflict of interest aside, the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, especially through the tireless activities of J.S. Harris, quickly entered the debate over slavery in Ethiopia. The inquiry expanded into an investigation of former German colonies. As Britain's representative on the Mandates Commission, Lugard was well placed to play a role here, too. The Mandates Commission issued reports in 1922, 1923, and 1924, which were forwarded to the International Labour Office. Slavery was visible to anyone who wanted to notice. In December 1923, the Fourth Assembly of the Council of the League adopted a resolution to continue the inquiry into the question of slavery. A Temporary Commission on Slavery was established, with Lugard as Britain's representative. The Commission was instructed to gather information on what legislative and other means were being taken to secure the suppression of slavery. Further, it was to report on the results of the efforts at suppression and whether slavery was completely suppressed or was still dying out. Finally, the Commission was to examine the economic and social impact of anti-slavery measures on former masters, slaves, governments, and the development of territories where slavery was or had been important. The Council wanted replies from the different governments by June 1, 1924.

Lugard drafted the questionnaire to be addressed to governments throughout the world. As might be expected, considering his experience in East Africa, Nigeria, and Hong Kong, the questionnaire was written in terms that were compatible with his commitment to the abolition of the legal status of slavery. The questions addressed slave raiding, slave dealing, domestic or 'praedial' slavery, concubinage and payment for females disguised as dowry, adoption of children through pawnage, and compulsory labor. Lugard convinced the Commission to take a broad perspective 'to enquire into the question of slavery from every point or view', whether or not particular governments wanted to minimize the extent of' slavery in their domains or anti-slavery groups tried to exaggerate the extent of slavery in particular countries. The volume of data that came before the Temporary Commission simply could not be ignored. So much material was submitted that the French delegate, Maurice Delafosse, former official of French West Africa and prominent ethnographer, agreed to summarize the documentation for purposes of discussion.

In preparation for the League's inquiry, the colonial government in Nigeria reviewed existing legislation, only to discover that the Mandated Territories were not fully covered. A circular on November 10, 1922 extended

Northern Nigerian laws to Northern Cameroon, but this circular had questionable legality. Particularly difficult to explain was the practice whereby Islamic courts issued certificates of freedom in situations where individuals had been born free, which was innocently admitted in the report to the Mandates Commission in 1923. In order to repair the damage, the legal status of slavery was formally abolished in the Mandated Territories on February 1, 1924. Confusion continued, nonetheless, because the situation in the Cameroons was similar to that in Northern Nigeria and indeed elsewhere, but it was embarrassing to admit as much. Furthermore, government efforts compounded the problem because the laws of Southern Nigeria were applied to the Mandated Territories, but those laws were based on the Native House Rule Ordinance (1901), which defined all persons living in a single housing compound as members of a 'family,' whether or not they were connected by kinship and in fact might very likely be either pawns or slaves.[16] Unlike the laws of Northern Nigeria, there was no role for the Islamic courts in the Southern Nigeria code, and there was no reference to the freeing of slaves after March 31, 1901, as there was in Northern Nigeria. The Mandates Commission wanted an explanation. The new measures did not actually resolve the sensitive questions being asked at the League, therefore, but confirmed the abolition of the legal status of slavery, declaring that 'all persons heretofore or hereafter born in or brought within the area were free.'[17] This provision made it clear that all children were born free, although it was noted that 'non-recognition by the Administration of the legal status does not imply equal non-recognition in native public opinion'. Hence the pressures brought to bear on Northern Nigeria by the League of Nations resulted in tighter restrictions on slave trading and slavery in the late 1920s.

Lugard introduced a lengthy report on forced labor in July 1925 that led to considerable discussion and deflected attention from Nigeria. In Delafosse's summary of the many reports that had been submitted, he presented his own interpretation of slavery that in turn led to lengthy review. In 1925, Lugard asked officials in Northern Nigeria for comments on Delafosse's memorandum, which allowed the colonial regime to stay abreast of League discussions without drawing attention to Northern Nigeria itself. Lugard made it clear that he disagreed with Delafosse on the approach that should be adopted in dealing with 'slavery in all its forms'. The result of the activities of the Temporary Commission on Slavery was the Slavery Convention, adopted by the League on September 25, 1926, which included twelve articles outlawing slavery and slave trading. As Marjorie Perham, Lugard's biographer, has noted, the Convention was largely based on Lugard's draft. The Slavery Convention recommended the abolition of the legal status of slavery following 'the Indian model'. According to Miers, slavery that no longer had legal status "was now euphemistically called 'permissive' or 'voluntary' slavery since slaves might remain in servitude if they wished'. The similarity to Lugard's policy in Northern Nigeria is obvious. The Temporary Commission

was subsequently terminated, its assignment considered to be complete. Thereafter, the League contented itself merely with receiving reports from various governments and made no effort to enforce or otherwise expose slavery practices.

The League, dormant in its campaign to undermine slavery for five years after 1926, once again directed its attention to the slavery issue in 1931. A new Committee of Experts on Slavery was instructed to examine the material that had been submitted by various governments since 1916 and to report on the extent to which slavery was being suppressed throughout the world. Lugard was not only Britain's representative again, but he also served as the Vice Chairman of the Committee. In its report of September 1931, the Committee recommended that a bureau be established to process documentary material and that a permanent commission be appointed 'because the mere existence of such a Commission could enlighten world public opinion in regard to slavery in the world'. The pressure on officials in Northern Nigeria, as elsewhere, was renewed. By this time, Lugard's credentials as an authority on slavery were unsurpassed. It must have come as quite a surprise, therefore, when he was inexplicably not appointed as the British representative to the Advisory Committee of Experts on Slavery, which met from 1934 to 1936. He had to content himself with writing letters to the British newspapers. The Committee of Experts was 'circumscribed' in its duties: because it could only collect information from governments and not from individuals and private organizations. As a result, the Colonial Office apparently wanted someone who had not been connected with the slavery issue, and Lugard's history in Nigeria did not allow him to fill that role. Britain's new champion in the fight against slavery was George Maxwell, who had formerly served as a colonial official in Malaya. Perhaps to everyone's surprise, as Miers has observed, Maxwell turned out to be 'the only truly independent member of the committee'.[18] He raised issues such as why ex-slaves did not leave their masters, and he put a large amount of pressure on the British in particular.

The renewed interest of the League of Nations was anticipated with caution in Northern Nigeria. The establishment of the Permanent Commission of Experts, with Maxwell as the British representative, was not welcomed. The Northern Provinces Advisory Council was already investigating the continuation of concubinage when Lugard requested Lethem to review slavery policy in 1931. Subsequently, lengthy files were compiled, as colonial officials gathered information for its reports to the League, but the purpose was clearly to deflect criticism. In the summer of 1935, Maxwell warned Nigerian officials that the League inquiry into the suppression of slavery was serious. The Slavery Committee would give 'special attention' to the whole issue of 'voluntary slavery' in British and other colonies as well as in the Mandated Territories. Furthermore, the Committee would 'raise the question of the approximate numbers of persons involved,' and hence he requested a census of 'ex-slaves.' The Slavery Committee, in its next report, aimed to show, not

merely that slavery was not disappearing, but instead wanted to reveal the manner in which the ex-slaves were being, or had been, absorbed into the normal life of the free population. The League rejected bald statements such as 'slavery has been abolished' or 'slavery is unlawful,' which clearly 'carried little weight' even when supported by circumstantial evidence.

In Northern Nigeria, a census was duly manufactured and forwarded to Maxwell. The census officially reported a population of slaves and ex-slaves and the children of slaves who were still 'living in their previous mode' at 121,005 in 1935–1936.[19] It is amazing that the government of Northern Nigeria was willing to admit publicly to a slave population of this scale. Moreover, problems with the methods that were used to estimate the number of slaves and unaccountable variations in the figures for the provinces raise serious questions as to the accuracy of the census, perhaps not surprisingly. The census deserves closer analysis because it does provide valuable information that suggests that there were something approaching 390,000 or 400,000 slaves, former slaves, and descendants of slaves, rather than the 121,000 who were reported, and these were only the slaves, former slaves, and slave descendants that authorities in Northern Nigeria were willing to confirm.

All the figures are highly suspect. The figure for Sokoto (40,000) was rounded off to the nearest ten thousand, which confirms that no census was actually attempted, or if it was superficially. Officials merely guessed at what they thought would be acceptable to recognize the large slave population that still existed. The figure for Adamawa (11,900) can be compared with an estimate made fourteen years earlier, when the District Officer at the time thought that the number of slaves in *murgu*, that is, who were being allowed to earn wages and otherwise work on their own account in return for cash payments to their masters, was 10% of the total population of Yola, or about 20,000 people. By 1936, presumably, some of the people who had been working under *murgu* arrangements had either died or achieved self-redemption, but others were still under legal restrictions that related to enslavement. In any event, the 1936 estimate was low. The Bauchi figure (14,245) is of the same order but suggests some attempt at actually counting those who were enslaved. Similarly, the figure for Katsina (8430), while low, suggests the existence of a visible slave population, but the estimate is very low, since Katsina certainly had a much larger enslaved population than either Bauchi or Yola. The estimates for Kano (950) and Zaria (650) are so small as to be ridiculous, however. The Emir of Kano alone still had thousands of slaves on his estates, while other officials all had substantial numbers of slaves on the estates that they were still allowed to control. Still, this 'census', despite its clear under-representation and outright fabrication, is an interesting commentary on colonial perceptions of what must have been considered 'acceptable' levels of slavery that they thought could be presented publically to the League. The inquiry clearly made colonial officials nervous, and they had to admit to the presence of slavery on an enormous scale.[20]

When some of the unaccountable differences between provinces and categories are eliminated, the report to the League suggests that perhaps as many as 400,000 people fell into the categories of slavery that had been defined by the League. British officials claimed that only 70,883 slaves had failed to take advantage of the opportunity to ransom themselves before slavery was finally abolished in 1936. Since anyone born after March 1901 was legally free, all these slaves had to be over thirty five years old, moreover. Although the figures for Kano and Zaria are suspiciously low and should be dismissed, the estimates for Bauchi, Adamawa, Niger, Sokoto, and Katsina can be taken more seriously, although still admittedly low. In all cases, there was good reason to underestimate the slave population, and the figures for all provinces are conservative. If adjustments are made to allow for the relative proportions of slaves that were reported in 1916–1919, when 85% of court cases were in the central Hausa emirates, then the total number of slaves aged over thirty five who had not purchased their freedom may well have been as high as 220,000 in those provinces, not 70,883. Similar distortions can be detected in the estimates for the number of slaves who had been ransomed but continued 'in their previous mode of living' and the children of slaves who continued under conditions approximating slavery. Even the more modest estimates of the number of individuals who were still slaves or who were living under modified conditions of slavery were an embarrassment to the British government in London and officials in Nigeria.

The examination undertaken by the League was more detailed than any previous inquiry, and when compared with other information from Nigeria led to the final abolition of slavery in Northern Nigeria through Ordinance No. 19 of 1936. Documentation that was provided to the League revealed that the Yoruba system of pawnship had been abolished, that the Native House Rule Ordinance of Southern Nigeria, which had allowed slavery to continue, had been repealed, and that slavery had been abolished in the Mandated Territories. The question was raised: Why was there still a law in Northern Nigeria that only allowed for the freedom of persons born after March 30, 1901 and if so, why was freedom not conferred on the whole population? In 1936, the Advisory Committee of Experts, with Maxwell in the chair, made it clear that 'voluntary slavery' would not be tolerated as 'a cover for the fact that individuals fear persecution or oppression if they avail themselves of the law'. Governments were instructed to investigate whether or not slaves could gain access to land and 'thereby earn their own living'. The Committee also wanted to know if there were any signs of 'the mental helplessness of a depressed class, especially in Muslim countries, where every attempt should be made to emphasize the liberal attitude of the Koran and tradition (Sunnah) to slavery'. Hence the Slavery Ordinance of 1936 that finally legally abolished slavery was a significant watershed in the history of slavery. Thereafter, slavery truly had no legal status, and all slaves at least in theory were thereby emancipated without further compensation to their masters. While

the League continued to focus on Ethiopia and other parts of Africa, particularly Liberia and Bechuanaland (Botswana), the colonial government in Nigeria had to confront a serious critique that undermined its efforts to maintain a low profile on the slavery issue.

The Northern Nigeria case is an important example of the transition in slavery that affected the enslaved population under colonial rule because of the large scale of slavery that had prevailed in the Sokoto caliphate, Borno and indeed throughout the region. The example is also instructive because conditions there were more or less the same as in areas under French control in what became Niger and in the German enclaves in northern Kamerun that had been part of Adamawa. Elsewhere in the Muslim-dominated areas of the western Sudan that were under French rule, in the region of Tchad as well, and in British-controlled Nilotic Sudan the conditions were also the same, which included massive slave desertion for those who were able to leave and decided to do so and the large enslaved population which chose to stay put but somehow renegotiated terms of servitude that resulted in modified forms of slavery. In the Senegal province of French West Africa, for example, the Mourides emerged as the dominant Muslim brotherhood that owed its following to the many former slaves who left their masters and sought sanctuary in the villages where groundnuts became the principal crop grown for export overseas.

This analysis has concentrated on the changes that occurred in those areas that were dominated by Muslim regimes that were formed in the context of jihad. What happened in areas that were not under Muslim control at the time of European conquest? It can be demonstrated that changes were equally profound, although for different reasons, often associated with the presence of Christian missionaries. Colonial strategies towards slavery were complicated for a variety of reasons. First, colonial occupation was often associated with anti-slavery rhetoric, although this does not mean that those who were condemning slavery had anything against exploitative relationships of production. Sometimes, the oppressive relationships of colonialism were worse than the stereotypes of slavery but it is important not to confuse slavery and colonial exploitation. Were individuals being bought and sold? Under forced labor, this was not the operative formulation. Brute force under the guise of supposedly enlightened colonial rule and racist perceptions of African inferiority were analogous to slavery in some ways because of the degree of dehumanization.

The issue of women and slavery is also one that the colonial occupation complicated. Not surprisingly, women were not perceived as anything of importance. They were part of kinship networks, which was a sort of recognition. The civilizing mission abhorred the idea of multiple wives, but in terms of labor, forced or waged, women were usually not conceptualized. When targeted production was enforced, as in rubber extraction, women were implicitly included in the demand for output, but in considering issues of slavery,

women were not of particular concern. Migrant labor policy focused on men, not women, who (if they were thought about at all) were generally expected to remain at home, do the child rearing, and farm the land. Men formed the labor force, whether coerced or not. Christian missions enforced monogamy, which undermined existing gerontocracy whereby mature males controlled access to women through polygamy; that is, having more than one spouse at a time, which in fact was polygyny, or males having more than one wife, since it was only males who could have more than one spouse. The practice was gender-specific. Christianity imposed monogamy, if not always fidelity. Nonetheless, the imposed reform limited relationships between genders, since before the insistence on Christian marriage, multiple spouses often meant that second and subsequent wives were not always from respectable families that required negotiated bride prices but could be females being held in pawn or who were slaves. Monogamy inevitably undermined these more complicated and abusive marital relationships.

In Islamic contexts, the continuation of multiple marriages continued, but men could only marry free women, which meant that relationships with the families of wives continued to be important in stabilizing marital relationships. The exception was the legality of concubinage, since Muslim males could legally cohabit with women other than their wife or wives through the practice of concubinage. The problem was that concubines, unlike wives, were supposed to be of slave status. The practice of pressing freeborn girls into concubinage was well established, so much so that British officials were candid in response to an inquiry from the League of Nations, claiming that many women 'prefer to continue in the category of slaves rather than of free persons', particularly 'the daughters of domestic and other slaves [who] frequently prefer to be concubines'. It was admitted that 'many thousands or girls have been … ransomed who were in fact born free under the Nigerian Ordinance', which was blamed on 'the connivance of their parents'. Concubinage was still common over two decades after the imposition of colonial rule, although British officials predicted its eventual demise. Yet concubinage could be expected to 'operate for a certain limited number of years',[21] in fact, continuing throughout the colonial period to the present.

The issue of pawnship also related to the associated problem of how women were treated under colonialism as a population that was not important and hence classified as dependents and subordinates of men. Individuals who were held as security against debts, that is, pawns, were often female, usually girls. They were not enslaved, and indeed their legal status as pawns usually prevented their enslavement because families were committed to their protection and creditors who held the pawns were bound to uphold both local legal customs and abide by public acknowledgement of personal relationships and guarantees of the safety of those held as pawns. In the colonial mentality, however, pawnship and slavery were linked, both effectively establishing the lack of freedom and hence antithetical to the freedom and

civilizing ideology of colonialism, even though the reality of colonial rule was anything but devoted to human rights. The preoccupation of the League of Nations and the colonial regimes was to equate pawnship with slavery, despite the clear distinctions between the two. Pawnship, unpaid dependent labor of kin, and marital relationships converged in social structures and economies that were tied to slavery and hierarchy. As the unpublished reports of the colonial era attest, many officials were acutely aware of the complexities. Nonetheless, the colonial state and the missionary adventure stumbled through policies and actions that confused customary practice and Western interpretations in ways that confused the continuation of slavery with the civilizing mission.

How slavery is remembered and how its legacy and the identification of people with that legacy have prevailed are subjects of considerable reflection. The voices that have emerged in an effort to understand the persistence of slavery as an issue in modern society speak to the contemporary problem. The legacy of slavery affects many people and is reflected in daily experience and social encounters.[22] Moreover, it is claimed that there are more slaves today than ever before.[23] Understanding how the continuation of forms of bondage in which individuals are bought and sold requires careful analysis because there is an important distinction to be made between a time when slavery was legal and clearly defined, and today when it is illegal and not clearly defined. Oppression today does not excuse its existence, but considering contemporary forms of oppression and exploitation 'slavery' does blur the present with history.

Maybe, as has been postulated, it is best to problematize different 'slaveries.' There is the slavery before abolition and emancipation became ideological constructs, and there are contemporary forms of exploitation that are analogous but are not necessarily the same. Even understanding slavery in the past has often been blurred. The initial debate between Marxist-oriented scholars who examined the materialist basis of slavery disagreed with anthropologists and historians who thought about slavery as institutional marginality. Both positions, and the relationship to contemporary discourse, have to be deconstructed. When focusing on former French and British territories and the policies that were adopted in West Africa, it can be seen that the resulting impact on African societies was formative. Despite the legal ending of slavery and the various subterfuges to disguise its continuation, the lives of many individuals, such as those in the sahel and southern Sahara, changed only gradually. When the League of Nations first began its inquiries into the 'question of slavery', it was well understood that there was an enormous problem. Years later UNESCO would undertake its exposé of the 'Slave Route' and the United Nations would declare slavery a 'crime against humanity'. Even after the legal emancipation of slaves and the criminalization of slavery, enslavement has continued, as it has in many parts of the world outside Africa. The links between historic slavery and contemporary forms of

human trafficking explain why slavery has persisted as a means of exploitation and human domination.

The distinction between forced labor and bondage in the present is different from historic slavery in the accepted legality of the slavery in the past and the subterfuges to disguise its continuation in various forms. A frequent approach of colonial regimes was to confuse cultural differences for the benefit of exploitation. This conscious manipulation has led some scholars to refer to slavery in a plural form—slaveries. But a plural approach to understanding slavery confuses the issues more. Those who have been forced into labor but who are not actually bought and sold are not slaves, even though they are captives and have virtually no choice in what they do. Forced labor is not a form of slavery, except in a metaphorical sense. Slavery is when individuals are treated as property, not when people can be made to work, although coerced labor might well involve slaves and indeed wage labor might result in the employment of slaves whose wages were confiscated in whole or in part by their masters. Slavery certainly did involve oppressive conditions of labor, but not always. Sometimes, members of the enslaved population, especially males, were allowed to work on their own account in return for specified payments to their masters. Occasionally, individuals were placed in positions of responsibility and rewarded for their loyalty. Forced labor did indeed impose harsh conditions of existence on individuals, but unless people are being bought and sold, or it is possible to do so, it is not slavery. It is forced labor which violates legal proscriptions.

Notes

1. For a definition of slavery, see Paul E. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1–8.
2. Suzanne Miers, *Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade* (London: Longman, 1975).
3. For a discussion of "legal status abolition," see Paul E. Lovejoy and Jan Hogendorn, *Slow Death for Slavery: The Course of Abolition in Northern Nigeria, 1897–1936* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
4. Glyn Stone, "The Foreign Office and Slavery and Forced Labour in Portuguese West Africa, 1894–1914," in *Slavery, Diplomacy, and Empire: Britain and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1807–1975*, ed. Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 165–95.
5. Frederick Cooper, "Conditions Analogous to Slavery: Imperialism and Free Labor Ideology in Africa," in *Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor, and Citizenship in Postemancipation Societies*, ed. Frederick Cooper, Thomas C. Holt, and Rebecca J. Scott (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 107–50.
6. Paul E. Lovejoy, *Jihad in West Africa during the Age of Revolutions* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2016).

7. Francois Renault, *Lavigerie, l'esclavage Africain et l'Europe* (Paris: E. De Boccard, 1971), 2 vols.
8. David Maxwell, "Freed Slaves, Missionaries, and Respectability: The Expansion of the Christian Frontier from Angola to Belgian Congo," *Journal of African History* 54 (2013): 79–102.
9. Lovejoy and Hogendorn, *Slow Death for Slavery*, 64–65.
10. Lugard asked Lethem to assemble the documents, which became "Early History of Anti-Slavery Legislation," so that Lugard could maintain his stature as anti-slavery crusader. See the discussion in Lovejoy and Hogendorn, *Slow Death for Slavery*, 95.
11. Sydney Kanya-Forstner and Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery and its Abolition in French West Africa: The Official Reports of G. Poulet, E. Roume, and G. Deherme* (Madison, WI: African Studies Program, 1994), 7–10.
12. Myron Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts. The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960* (London: Heinemann, 1991), 8–18. For the background to slavery policy in French West Africa, see Martin A. Klein, *Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
13. E. Ann MacDougall, "Living the Legacy of Slavery," *Cahiers d études africaines* 45 (2005): 957–86; Marie Rodet, "Escaping Slavery and Building Diasporic Communities in French Soudan and Senegal, ca. 1880–1940," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 48, no. 2 (2015): 363–86; Bruce S. Hall, "Bellah Histories of Decolonization, Iklan Paths to Freedom: The Meanings of Race and Slavery in the Late-Colonial Niger Bend (Mali), 1944–1960," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 48, no. 2 (2011): 61–87; and Benedetta Rossi, *From Slavery to Aid: Politics, Labour, and Ecology in the Nigerien Sahel, 1800–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
14. Suzanne Miers, "Slavery and the Slave Trade as International Issues 1890–1939," *Slavery and Abolition* 19, no. 2 (1998): 16–37; and Miers, "Britain and the Suppression of Slavery in Ethiopia," *Slavery and Abolition* 18, no. 3 (1997): 257–88.
15. As cited in Dogbo Daniel Atchebro, *La Société des Nations et la lute contre l'esclavage, 1922–1938* (Geneva: Institut universitaire de hautes etudes internationals, 1990), 40. Also see Miers, "Britain and the Suppression of Slavery in Ethiopia," 257–88.
16. "The Southern Nigeria Native House Rule Ordinance (1901)," *African Economic History* 40 (2012): 129–36.
17. Summary of Reports to the League of Nations for 1922, 1923, and 1924, submitted to the International Labour Office, October 14, 1925, Nigerian National Archives Ibadan, CSO 26 1/799, Vol. 1. Also see Lovejoy and Hogendorn, *Slow Death for Slavery*, 273.
18. Miers, "Slavery and the Slave Trade," 32–33.
19. The following discussion is based on Lovejoy and Hogendorn, *Slow Death for Slavery*, 278–80. See especially Table 9.3, *Slaves Reported to the League of Nations, 1936.*
20. As discussed in Lovejoy and Hogendorn, *Slow Death for Slavery*, 102–5.

21. Edward J. Arnett's Memorandum to Maurice Delafosse, August 9, 1925, Arnett Papers, Mss. Afr. S.952/2-3, Rhodes and discussion in Lovejoy and Hogendorn, *Slow Death for Slavery*, 251–59.
22. Alice Bellagamba, Sandra E. Greene, and Martin A. Klein, eds., *The Bitter Legacy: African Slavery Past and Present* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2013); Bellagamba, Greene, and Klein, eds., *African Voices on Slavery and the Slave Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Bellagamba, Greene, and Klein, eds., *African Slaves, African Masters: Politics, Memories, Social Life* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2017).
23. Kevin Bales, *Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy*, rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); and Joel Quirk, *Unfinished Business: A Comparative Study of Historical and Contemporary Slavery* (Paris: UNESCO, 2008).

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CHAPTER 5

Africans and the Colonial Economy

Moses E. Ochonu

In this chapter, I outline the various ways in which Africans of different vocational inclinations engaged with the colonial economy and with the economic policies and expectations of colonial regimes. How did Africans, as individuals and groups, react to the strictures and opportunities of colonial economics? How did African peasant farmers (producers of export raw materials and consumers of European finished goods) react to colonial schemes to boost agricultural exports? How did African laborers, women, urban traders, and service providers fare in the colonial economy? What specific niches and strictures did colonial agricultural, urbanization, and labor policies wittingly and unwittingly present to Africans? The following analysis answers these questions by surveying the roles and fates of Africans in the colonial economy.

An African colonial proletariat emerged through colonial coercive and appropriative policies and through strategic economic self-repositioning on the part of African workers. African laborers struggled to define and pursue their interests in relation to colonial efforts to maximize labor output while minimizing its cost. Squeezed by colonial pricing, taxation, land, and protectionist policies, African farmers similarly sought to engage with the colonial export economy on their own terms. How do we write the initiatives and self-interested creativity of these Africans into our evaluation of African colonial economies? I provide below some empirical and conceptual roadmaps for understanding the struggles of a wide range of Africans in the expansive orbit of the colonial economy.

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Peasantization and African Initiative

Across Africa's multiple colonial landscapes, a primary goal of colonial economic policy was to encourage export-oriented agricultural production where none had existed and to expand it where it existed prior to colonial conquest. Expanding export production in areas with a tradition of export agriculture was a dicey proposition since it threatened to jeopardize the existing ecological, economic, and social balance of such communities while exposing them to the risk of sacrificing food crops for increased export crop production. Turning African subsistent and semi-subsistent farmers into export-oriented peasants ('peasantization' in the jargon of African economic history) was a difficult, complex, and drawn-out process, requiring multiple mechanisms, some coercive, others persuasive. I begin with a survey of the unfolding of this process, its problems, and the ways in which African initiative and resistance complicated it.

The peasant question (the debate on the extent to which African 'subsistence' producers were turned into peasants and the extent to which they adopted the new export crops preferred by colonial states) has probably loomed larger in colonial African economic history than any other. For dependency theorists, African peasants were sucked into the cash nexus of colonial capitalism and subjected completely to the vagaries of the international market. This perspective has been as controversial as it has been a radical departure from the vent-for-surplus theory of colonial development theorists.[1] Generally, scholars who credit colonial policies with opening up the world economy to African peasants also tend to see precolonial African economies as closed, subsistent or, at best, semi-subsistent agricultural systems. Scholars who view African agriculture at the dawn of colonial conquest as subsistence-based systems of production fall into two categories. Some scholars see 'traditional' or even 'primitive' economies hampered by their mode of production and structure of labor mobilization. Others see subsistence as a pragmatic African response to the absence of markets (or 'vent') for surplus production.[2] Both groups agree that 'subsistent Africans' became peasants through the instrumentality of colonial economic policy.

One question has sustained the debate on African colonial peasantry; that of who, in the context of African colonial economies, is a peasant. Colonial anthropological reports and writings largely cast African producers as crude, subsistence actors in need of market incentives and outlets. This sharp distinction between 'traditional' subsistent production and peasantry (the latter understood as sustained, market-oriented production) reflected colonial understandings of 'backward' African economic practices even though it also sometimes critiqued colonial interventions designed to erase subsistence and semi-subsistence and replace it with market-oriented smallholder production.

This dichotomous perspective was ahistorical. It took hold in spite of evidence from coastal East Africa, Ethiopia, and the Sokoto caliphate of the

precolonial existence of agricultural arrangements in which large-scale landholding, rent payment, and market-oriented and surplus production characterized the agricultural system.[3] In Northern Nigeria, the *gandu* system of plantation agriculture provided the basis for transitioning into colonial groundnut export production.[4] In coastal East Africa, especially the Swahili Coast, the messy transformation of a precolonial, export-focused plantation and sharecrop agricultural system into a less successful colonial agricultural system of export cultivation has been documented by Frederick Cooper.[5]

Studies of precolonial, export-oriented agricultural systems in Africa forced a rethink of the reductively simplistic subsistence/peasantry paradigm. Not only were precolonial African peasantries accorded their rightful status; colonial-era African producers, even those who did not explicitly produce for the market, or who only engaged in need-based surplus production, gradually came to be seen as peasant producers. In 1987, when Ralph Austen published his *African Economic Hist*ory, his definition of an African peasant clearly reflected this conceptual refinement. African peasants, Austen posited, are 'small-scale agriculture producers occupying their own land'.[6] This conceptual clarification did not answer the question of why some African groups resisted export production because of its risks and uncertainties and remained in subsistent or semi-subsistent production while others embraced export-oriented production with all its instabilities. Different groups of African farmers made different choices in response to colonial export-boosting projects.

African colonial economic history is replete with instances where African producers rejected the strictures and demands (declared and undeclared) of the colonial economy, remained within modes of production that encouraged little if any surplus production, and persisted in smallholder, semi-subsistent cultivation as a matter of strategic choice. This group of African communities became the target of colonial interventions designed to incorporate so-called subsistence producers into the colonial export economy. It is noteworthy that colonial economic policies also sought to expand market production in societies that had traditions of producing for the market or that had willingly embraced the opportunities of the colonial export economy. In other words, colonizers also sought to deepen the integration of societies already connected to the world commodities market.

Mechanisms of Peasantization

Colonial authorities, whether as the political arm of company rule or later as a generic colonial bureaucracy, utilized several mechanisms for expanding African export agriculture production. The provision of transport infrastructure was one incentive of which Africans who wanted to participate in the export economy could take advantage. But this, by itself, proved inadequate for attracting a critical mass of African producers into the colonial export economy. To draw African producers away from semi-subsistence production and

to compel market-oriented producers to increase their acreage, colonial economic policymakers deployed multiple tools.

One such measure was the imposition of crop quotas on communities. Quotas were designed in such a way as to hold chiefs and community leaders responsible for achieving them. The incentive for chiefs to compel their subjects to produce the assigned crop quotas was the retention of their positions of privilege in colonial society. The punishment for failure to meet the quota was often dismissal from the position of colonial chief. Another strategy was the seemingly benign distribution of free crop seedlings and the provision of free agricultural extension services. Colonial authorities sometimes adopted this strategy by itself. At other times, they adopted it alternately or simultaneously to crop quota or other coercive measures.

In many colonies, the strategy was to close off alternatives to Africans and compel them to continue their participation in the colonial export economy. Taxation and its strict enforcement made export crop cultivation hard to avoid for many African producers who might have otherwise restricted themselves to the familiar, secure zone of food crop production. In many colonies like Northern Nigeria, European produce buyers and their Levantine, Asian, and African mercantile allies devised a system of advance payment and crop mortgage that kept farmers perpetually indebted to the buyers and ensured that farmers continued to participate in the export economy. Under this system, produce buyers advanced money to farmers to pay their taxes in the dry season before harvest. The farmers in turn mortgaged their harvest against this advance. At harvest, they paid back the 'loan' with all or most of their harvest. They were then forced to obtain yet another advance during the dry season and in the months preceding harvest.[7] The cycle continued, trapping farmers in a conundrum of impoverishment.

In some colonies, authorities adopted forced cultivation, corralling large groups of Africans into plantation-type work gangs on large-scale farms. The Portuguese perfected this brutally coercive method of colonial agricultural production in Angola and Mozambique. In both colonies, they built state-directed colonial economies that came to rest on the forced, large-scale cultivation of cotton and sugarcane for export.[8] Forced cultivation was one extreme in a spectrum of colonial strategies for deepening the participation of African peasants in the colonial export economy. It is worth noting that state-owned agricultural plantations of the Portuguese type were an exception. The British, French, and to a smaller extent the Germans before the First World War tried to establish plantations and to encourage their citizens to set up plantations and settler agricultural communities in several West African colonies with little success. The failure of these early plantation experiments in West Africa reauthorized the strategy of turning African producers into export-oriented peasants and of increasing the production capacity of those Africans who had already embraced export agriculture.[9]

In settler colonies, the strategy of export expansion targeted white farmers, who, by deliberate colonial policy, constituted the basis of colonial export agriculture. In these colonies, colonial authorities sought to ensure the supply of African labor to farms and, more crucially, to prevent Africans who still had access to smallholder plots from competing with settler farmers. Several colonial laws in Kenya prevented African landholders from cultivating coffee, tea, and other crops that the white settler population grew for export.[10] Colonial authorities took similar measures in other East African and Southern African settler colonies. This scenario stands in sharp contrast to the policy adopted in non-settler colonies, where there were no white settler farmers whose interest might provide the overriding impetus for colonial economic management, and where colonial authorities focused, as a result of this absence, on encouraging African producers to restructure their production methods and choices to produce a wide variety of export crops—cocoa, peanut, palm oil, cotton, sesame, and other.

Regardless of whether they were in a settler or non-settler colony, African peasants' economic lots fluctuated wildly during the colonial period. The major catalyst for this economic instability was the fact that the levers of the colonial economy were not in the hands of African producers but in the manipulative grip of colonial authorities as well as in the dynamics of the world economy. African peasants' loss of control over their own economic destinies meant that famines, food shortages, and devastating swings in income levels were common during the colonial period. In many colonies, the biographies of peasants bore out the colonial distortion of rural agricultural life and the cycle of poverty and misery that came to define African peasantry in many colonial territories. In settler colonies, the African peasant was a particular figure of colonial devastation, a stand-in for the instabilities of colonial economic life. Charles van Onselen's biography of Kas Maine, a South African sharecropper, is synecdochical of the colonial transformation of peasantry in Africa.[11]

Strategies of Economic Control

The supreme object of colonial economic management was to maintain and reinforce the connection between the economy of the colony and that of the metropolitan country. Keeping the colony's economy dependent on and organically tied to the metropolitan economy entailed strengthening the institutions and practices that increased the demand for and consumption of European manufactured goods and increased the production of exportable crops. Colonial authorities used multiple practices and policy instruments to achieve this goal of tying periphery to metropole economically.

One mechanism was monetization, the introduction of colonial measures of value, mainly currency, and the outlawing of precolonial standards of value

and currencies such as manilla, cowrie shells, metal bars, cloth, and others. The introduction of government-issued colonial currencies served several ends. Colonial authorities used it to enforce the payment of taxes in early colonial days when many conquered African groups were struggling to adjust to the unfamiliar routine of taxation. Because tax payment was a compulsory obligation to the colonial government and evasion attracted severe punishment, and because taxes could only be paid in the colonial currency, Africans had no choice but to enter into one or multiple sectors of the colonial economy as a way to earn the colonial currency. The introduction of colonial currencies thus not only minimized the problem of tax evasion; it was also a mechanism for compelling Africans to become laborers on European-owned colonial enterprises, or market-oriented peasant producers.

In addition to monetary connections, African colonial economies had structural ties to the economies of their colonizing countries. The bulk of their exports went to so-called empire markets, markets within the imperial countries' global empire. The bulk of imports also came from within the empire—mostly from metropolitan manufacturers. This reality curtailed the bargaining power of African peasant farmers, reducing the prices of their goods and their income. It also restricted the consumption choices and the range of imported goods available to Africans, compelling them to purchase such goods at uncompetitive high prices. During moments of economic upheaval, colonial authorities escalated this mechanism of protectionist control and regulation, enforcing a policy widely known as Imperial Preference. This was a system of trade tariffs imposed by colonial countries on imports into the colony from countries outside the empire and on exports from the colony to countries outside the empire.

This policy effectively banned the export of African raw materials from British colonies to countries outside the British empire and banned the import of manufactured goods from outside the British empire. Portugal and France used the same instrument to effectively close their African empires to the patronage of countries outside their empires, which were willing to pay more for African exports and sell their imported goods for less. Imperial Preference was used extensively as a system of retaliatory preferential tariffs during the Great Depression and in the brief depression of the 1920s.[12] Preferential imperial tariffs caused the colonies to become cushions for the metropolitan countries in their time of economic distress—at the expense of Africans and their economic aspirations. But even in difficult economic periods, Africans embarked upon ambitious gestures of self-preservation. Many simply exited the formal nodes of the colonial economy; they refused to produce or they reduced their production of colonial cash crops that rendered them vulnerable to colonially mediated vagaries of the world commodities market.

Colonial Urbanization and African Economic Creativity

The emergence of colonial towns and cities was a catalyst for an unintended and largely unwelcomed African, urban economy that would become discernibly gendered. Africans made the urban, colonial space the informal entrepreneurial hotbed it became. Colonial towns and cities provided opportunities that Africans seized. Ports, mines, railway stations, and produce-buying stations dotted colonial urban centers, and an urban colonial bureaucratic sprawl, which relied on African low and mid-level labor, served as a magnet for African migration. Urbanization attracted Africans from nearby rural areas and distant hinterlands, but urban opportunities and amenities hardly kept pace with population growth. As a result, urban unemployment rose steadily throughout the colonial period, marked most starkly by the proliferation of urban slums and the ubiquity of economically marginal populations of Africans.

Urbanization also led to the growth of vibrant, informal economies where ingenuity, creativity, and enterprise thrived as unemployed urban dwellers struggled to earn a living on their wits and through petty trading, service provision, and by taking advantage of new niches opened up by the demographic and socioeconomic pressures of colonial urban life. One such niche was sex work. Many single African women, migrants from rural areas who found themselves without formal work in urban centers, and who found few other opportunities in a colonial economy that privileged the labor of men, took to sex work to support themselves.[13] The colonial attitude towards the urban informal economy was ambivalent. On the one hand, colonial authorities feared that unregulated and unbridled urbanization would produce crime and urban squalor, highlight colonial economic problems more sharply, and put pressure on colonial amenities. On the other hand, they recognized that the urban service sector and the services that urban slum dwellers provided were important for replenishing the energy and morale of Africans employed in colonial enterprises. This attitude marked their reaction to sex work, which they condemned in sensational, hyperbolic vocabularies but which they recognized as important to the physical and emotional stability of miners, haulers, railway men, and other African workers in the colonial economy.[14]

African Women in the Colonial Economy

Sex work was not the only arena in which women functioned in the colonial economy. In her book, *African Women: A Modern History*, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch documents the numerous ways that African women contributed to the colonial economy and helped sustain their male partners' contributions as laborers or peasant farmers. The Victorian gender ethos of colonial administrators led them to formulate economic policies that

marginalized women. Despite the active economic roles that women had played in precolonial societies, colonial authorities saw them only as useful in the domestic realm. Cash crop cultivation, colonial employment, whether in the bureaucracy or in factories, were reserved exclusively for men. The few women who ventured out into the formal workplace were employed only as nannies, wet nurses, and domestic servants for Europeans and, much later, in secretarial jobs considered feminine vocations.[15]

In spite of these strictures, women gradually established themselves as the pivots around which several components of the colonial economy revolved. Women continued to play central roles in the cultivation of cash crops even though colonial authorities took away from them control over the incomes from these crops. In the absence of migrant laborer husbands, women held the family together, cultivating the food crops that their families needed. Given their marginality and unprecedented economic burden during the colonial period, it is a testament to the resilience of African women that they continued to ensure the reproduction of African labor for colonial enterprises.

In the urban sector, women's roles and self-created niches proved particularly important for holding families together and for performing the auxiliary services necessary for urban living.[16] Their petty trading, commercial culinary skills as restaurant owners, their hawking, and their control of the urban leisure and recreation industries gave them a central, indispensable position in the economies of major industrial and urban centers.[17] Thus, despite the marginal roles and positions that colonial economic policymakers imagined for them, African women excelled on many economic fronts, and the actual position of women in the colonial economy was larger and more central than their official status permitted. Some women moved into roles initially reserved for men. Others rebelled against the colonial patriarchal order to create productive economic niches. Yet others thrived in colonial commerce, becoming wealthy and employing many Africans.

The entrepreneurial undertakings of African women in the orbit of colonization, coupled with the vibrant associational platforms that they created for purposes of self-help and economic solidarity, thrust them into prominent economic positions that belied their statutory position in colonial society.[18] Colonial restrictions did not hold back African women. In several respects they regained much of the economic clout they had possessed in many African societies prior to colonization. In some instances, their conditions even bettered their precolonial economic positions, as certain sectors they occupied proved particularly lucrative. The legend of the Nana Benzes, wealthy female traders in colonial and postcolonial West Africa,[19] reflects this paradoxical female economic empowerment in the crevices of the Victorian colonial economy.

Colonial Land Policies and African Livelihoods

In many colonies, settler and non-settler, the land question was the most consequential economic issue. As a result, colonial authorities across the continent often intervened early in the politics of land. Soon after conquest, they acted to regulate and codify land tenure practices and precedents considered favorable to export-oriented agriculture and colonial mining interests. Where land tenure procedures were perceived to be in conflict with colonial agricultural and mining interests, intense interventions in land ensued, unleashing disputes between colonizers and the colonized and among Africans on the maintenance of viable household production and African participation in the colonial export economy.

Several scholars have argued that private property in land was the exception rather than the rule in precolonial Africa and that the codification of land laws by colonial authorities merely legalized a prevailing trend of non-private ownership of land. One of the clearest articulations of this argument comes from political scientist Mahmood Mamdani.[20] Mamdani is correct in calling attention to the prevalence of land tenure practices that depended more on communal control than on individual ownership. He is equally right to assert that colonial 'customary' laws invested indigenous political authorities with despotic powers to regulate access to and transaction in land. But he is only half-right to extrapolate that these 'despotic powers' were actually exercised or that they were always successful in determining land tenure practices on the ground at the colonial grass roots. First, there is now a scholarly consensus on one foundational fact: that with the exception of South Africa, the Rhodesias, and perhaps Kenya (after the colonial conquest), Africa was a 'land-surplus economy', and that the landscape itself was either 'sparsely populated [or] underpopulated'.[21] As a result, there was hardly a struggle over land on a scale that might have necessitated the consistent exercise of juridical powers by local rulers in that respect.

Second, the codification of land tenure by colonial regimes did not preclude the existence of a variety of practices and transactions in land. These land tenure practices evolved in response to colonial realities whose contours were shaped by grass-roots agricultural dynamics rather than colonial logics. Perhaps colonial land policy even led to a proliferation of diverse transactions in land. With regard to Northern Nigeria, for instance, Robert Shenton has shown that a considerable degree of ambivalence characterized British intervention in land matters. It oscillated between attempts by Frederick Lugard, the first governor, to create an indigenous land-owning class and the attempt by his successor, Percy Girouard, to make land a communal possession.[22] Historian Steven Pierce demonstrates that the eventual consensus favoring customary ownership and the symbolic superintendence of chiefs over land foundered because land tenure did not have the valence that the British

thought it did, and also because revenue extraction, which was the object of British intervention in land, did not depend on land tenure practices, since the generally high land to labor ratio made land tenure marginal to agriculture.[23] In other words, African peasant farmers often simply ignored colonial land edicts and continued to cultivate agricultural plots over which they had already claimed usage rights. Colonial aims in this domain were therefore doomed to failure.

Land tenure was so porous and was of so little consequence to agricultural production that the British had to move away from land and instead reformed the extant tax system and enacted new tax laws in order to generate much-needed revenue. Adamu Fika notes that the local rulers who, under the land laws of colonial Northern Nigeria, were charged with regulating land tenure, actually resided in provincial capitals, far removed from the centers of production, content with the collection of taxes on grains. This divergence from British teleology attracted reforms aimed at domiciling these local agents of colonialism within the loci of production, but this, too, had little or no impact on land practices.[24]

This trend (the indeterminacy and plurality of rights in land) was more common than outright land ownership systems, in which rights were rigidly defined and understood. These ambivalent regimes of land usage persisted because Africans preferred them to rigid colonial land policies. Sara Berry's findings show that in Southern Ghana and Western Nigeria access to land was controlled by chiefs and lineage groups respectively. But even here, she argues that the increased commercialization of agricultural production of the colonial era brought about a proliferation of rights and claims in land.[25] Similarly, migrant farmers benefited from the delimitation of chiefly territorial jurisdiction in Ghana, as chiefs sought to boost their prestige and revenue base by attracting strangers and granting them favorable sharecropping and land tenure agreements. A similar pattern of increased and liberalized access to land was found in Western Nigeria in the colonial period.[26] African cultivators compelled colonial authorities to come to terms with age-old land usage norms.

In settler colonies, the land question presented a set of new problems for African peasants and settlers alike. Land confiscation to satiate settler hunger for agriculturally viable land produced African victims in the millions. In settler colonies from Kenya to Zimbabwe, land ordinances were the foundations of a racially constituted colonial economy. Like land laws in other settler colonies, South Africa's 1913 land law squeezed out black land-holding farmers from all but a tiny sliver of arable land. In all cases, the colonial politics of land rested on a belief that the economic interests of white settler populations trumped those of blacks and that black land ownership presented a threat to white agricultural profitability and to labor availability. Specifically, colonial authorities, beholden as they were to settler economic interests, feared that black land ownership would produce and nurture a vibrant black peasantry,

which in turn would compete with white farmers. Another fear was that black landholding would hurt farm-labor recruitment and jeopardize white settler agriculture.

There was thus an economic logic to land confiscation in settler colonies, a logic that cannot simply be explained by a simplistic invocation of colonial racist ideology. The presence of white settlers determined to use the apparatuses of colonialism to their economic advantage at the expense of the black population predetermined the economic fates of many African groups in settler colonies. This settler economic aggression compounded the economic predicament of many African communities already burdened by the economic obligations of colonial rule. Land was a site to demonstrate white settler privilege, land confiscation a tactic to protect the exclusivity of white export agricultural production. Control over land gave white farmers virtual monopoly over cash crops, and ensured successful labor recruitment from the ranks of displaced and dispossessed African farmers. In Kenya, land confiscation and the conflicts that it triggered between the Kikuyu and the settlers and within Kikuyu society itself produced the Mau Mau anti-colonial uprising.[27]

The contrast between settler and non-settler colonies in the realm of land policy was sharp. In non-settler colonies, African access to land was a crucial plank of colonial economic policy. Here, colonial interventions ranged from attempts to engineer big landholding agriculture to efforts to preserve communal control over land to attempts to encourage secured individual landholding. The goal, however, remained broadly the same: to ensure that Africans had access to cultivable land so they could produce the agricultural raw materials that colonial authorities hungered for. In the settler colonies, by contrast, Africans' continued access to land outside the restrictive purview of state policy stood in the way of colonial economic priorities, and so the goal was to restrict it. In mineral-producing settler colonies like South Africa and Zimbabwe, the hunger for cheap African labor intensified the imperative for restricting African land access.

Forced Labor, Labor Migration, and 'Stabilized' Labor

Another arena in which the colonial economic project is often located, and where it is said to have demonstrated its efficacy, is the use of forced labor and the imposition of other labor regimes on African communities. This happened extensively in different colonial territories in Africa. British colonial authorities used forced labor extensively in railway and road construction.[28] So did the French. The British colonialists used forced labor on a massive scale in South Africa to solve the acute labor problem that developed with the boom in gold and diamond mining.[29]

British colonizers claimed that they did not indulge in forced labor practices after the international labor conference of 1930 banned the practice, and contrasted their labor policies to French labor recruitment methods.[30] But

Frederick Cooper argues that the British, much like the French, who were less pretentious in their reliance on forced labor, continued to rely on coerced labor in periods of economic and political emergencies. A significant period of economic emergency that saw the British plucking African labor by force was the Second World War.[31] Francois Manchuelle has argued that the first wave of migration among the Soninkes of modern Senegal and Gambia in the colonial period took the migrants to the French navy, where they served mostly as sailors but sometimes as ship hands. Known in local parlance as *laptots*, the rank of these migrants had swollen in the 1890s as the French recruited manumitted slaves, and later during the world wars.[32] Later, the *laptot* system birthed a culture of labor migration to French colonial enterprises.

It is important to note, however, that this trend of young Africans taking advantage of participation in colonial enterprises to enhance their personal social and economic worth was greater in some areas than others. For instance, the Southern African colonies, South Africa in particular, provided young African men with few choices to participate in the colonial economy in a transactional framework. In Zambia and Mozambique, where the policy of forced labor, known as *chibaro*, was pursued with a ferocious fervor comparable to that of the French *corvée* system in West Africa, Africans had little space to maneuver.[33] Furthermore, the on-the-job maneuverability of Southern African workers in the South African mines and, to a lesser degree, the Rhodesian gold mines, was curtailed by racist legislation and policies. In South Africa this took the form of pass laws, vagrancy laws, influx control laws, the compound system, and other race-based restrictive legal instruments.

In spite of these stringent conditions, however, Black miners used the practice of flight and mobility to occasionally defeat the restrictive control mechanisms of mines management and colonial authorities. Patrick Harries's work shows how some Mozambican migrants to the South African mines used migration to acquire resources that enabled them to become retailers of consumer goods at home, while others were able to acquire formal Western education and set themselves up in mission and educational work.[34] In Northern Nigeria, labor migration from cash-crop-poor regions to the tin mines on the Jos Plateau became the lifeline for many young men from those regions, enabling them to build modest lives for themselves.[35] These kinds of unforeseen economic consequences should mitigate any reification of colonial hegemonic claims and shift the analysis from colonial intentions and calculations to Africans' strategic use of colonial institutions and policies for their own ends.

As widespread as coerced labor was in colonial Africa, it was never considered an ideal form of labor recruitment, only a crude, desperate method to get colonial work done. In British Africa, forced labor was gradually rolled back. In French and Portuguese colonies, forced labor persisted for a longer period until at least 1930, when the international labor organization took an interest in the matter and banned it. After that, the use of forced labor, even in the French and Portuguese colonial empires, became sporadic. Corvée,

the French system of forced labor, persisted in scattered, diminished forms. In much of colonial Africa, a system of migrant labor evolved and replaced forced labor or gradually came to coexist with it. Africans in rural areas were given incentives and compelled by colonial obligations to migrate from rural homelands to mining centers, port cities, and other centers of colonial work. Colonial firms gave the laborers short-term contracts, housed them in hostels, and expected them to return to their rural ancestral homes at the end of their contracts. Colonial authorities supported migrant labor because it was cheap and was technically unforced, saving money and reputation.

Like forced labor, migrant labor had its drawbacks for the colonial economy, which complicated its theoretical advantages. Migrant laborers quickly evolved into a sort of 'floating population'. Migrants, in theory and according to the desire of colonial authorities, should return to their ancestral homelands when their labor contracts ran out. But many did not. The philosophy of mandatory return, as colonial thinkers understood it, was anchored on several problematic assumptions. Many studies conducted by colonial ethnographers and semi-independent anthropologists concluded that young African men (laborers and migrant workers) were tied to their rural homelands by 'tribal' cultural obligations, that the social cohesion of these rural enclaves was worth preserving, and that their return to these rural sites of origin would not only ensure the preservation of rural communities but also enable rural peasant agriculture, the mainstay of many colonial economies, to thrive undisturbed. To these early colonial ethnologists, excessive immersion in colonial institutions and cultures, such as the colonial culture of permanent, disciplined work, would damage 'tribal' African societies.[36]

Colonial policymakers and their anthropological allies counseled that migrant workers from rural hinterlands were not suited to urban life and should not be given permanent employment in urban centers of mining, mechanized agriculture, or seaports. This logic sustained a colonial obsession with migrant labor. Early colonial anthropological studies posited the influential 'target worker' thesis, which held that Africans, unlike European workers, only worked as long as it took them to earn enough to meet a target or need.[37] Once the need was met, it was argued, Africans no longer wanted to work but craved a return to the stability and certainty of their rural homelands. This thesis provided the anthropological and philosophical underpinning for colonial migrant labor practices. It justified short-term contracts as being in line with Africans' cultural predilections. It also justified paying African workers poor wages because of the assumption that, if paid fair wages, African workers would meet their so-called targets quickly, abandon their contracts, and return home to their families. The added advantage of labor migrancy, from the colonial perspective, was that it foreclosed the expenses that come with permanent employment.

Although colonizers swore by its efficacy as a labor recruitment mechanism, migrant labor proved burdensome and became a public relations

disaster once the conditions of hostel-housed workers were known to the wider world. The migrant labor system had other problems, too. As determined as they were to maintain migrant labor flows and to control the back and forth movement of workers from rural areas to colonial workplaces, colonial authorities lacked the legal and logistical tools to remove migrant workers who would not return to their ancestral homelands at the end of their contracts. The number of these self-asserting urban laborers and out-of-work young men was increasing. As early as the 1920s, migrant squatter camps and shantytowns began to proliferate around mining, railway, and seaport towns. Along with the development of this unwanted effect of urbanization came crime, prostitution, drunkenness, drug abuse, and other social vices associated with undisciplined urbanization and unbridled rural-urban migration. By the late 1930s, labor migration as a template of colonial labor recruitment was a failure. It began to cost colonial authorities more to remove shantytowns, to fight the crimes that festered in them, and to provide urban amenities than it would cost them to offer permanent labor contracts to African workers.

There was another rather obvious disadvantage to migrant labor: male African migrant workers were not as productive and 'settled' as they could be because they lacked stability, family support, and spousal services that would make them more productive and committed to their work. They were required to leave their wives and children in their rural homelands and were thus deprived of the emotional stability necessary for a productive work life. This disadvantage made a strong economic case for moving away from migrant labor. Together with the other stated unforeseen consequences of rural-urban labor migration, this economic pitfall of labor migration convinced colonial capitalists and colonial administrators that migrant labor was anachronistic and did more socio-economic harm than good. Starting in the late 1930s, colonial authorities embraced the policy of labor stabilization, under which African laborers were given permanent labor contract and encouraged to settle, along with their families, in the urban vicinity of their workplaces—mostly in accommodations provided by their employers.[38]

The transition from migrant labor to stabilized labor also entailed a 'shift from large-scale unskilled labour to a smaller and better-paid skilled force'.[39] Colonial mining companies and other employers saw the potential for training African laborers to become more effective workers, for professionalizing the workforce and thus increasing its productivity. Pioneered by the Union Minière copper mines of Katanga in the Belgian Congo, labor stabilization spread gradually to several other colonies in both British and French Africa. Even the Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) copper mines, which had considered but rejected full labor stabilization, gradually came to treat its migrant laborers as though they were stabilized labor and came to tolerate and recognize the reality that the migrants were no longer guests but settled residents of mine towns.[40]

Labor stabilization solved the problem of labor recruitment and high labor turnover for many colonial employers, but it created new problems. Like migrant laborers, stabilized African workers asserted themselves in ways that challenged colonial expectations. Stabilized labor cost more to maintain and retain. And even though the stabilized laborers were not allowed to organize themselves into unions and were under company control, they had rights and began to act on them. They increasingly became aware of their poor conditions vis-à-vis their rights. This awareness transformed into catalytic labor awakening and activism. From 1939 to 1948, labor agitation spiked across Africa, and paralyzing general strikes rocked Senegal and Nigeria.[41] African workers, stabilized to varying degrees, began to make demands and to picket their workplaces. Some constituted informal unions. Some unions (like those in South Africa and in the colliery of Enugu, Nigeria) became so powerful that mines management had no choice but to recognize and seek dialogue with them.[42]

Frederick Cooper contends persuasively that the labor activism of African workers, especially after the legalization of unions in postwar French and British Africa, snowballed into a full-fledged demand for equal compensation between equivalent white and black workers. This in turn morphed into agitations for decolonization, as labor leaders transformed into nationalist figures and as the labor question was reframed as a nationalist question with expanded demands for autonomy, self-rule, and independence.[43]

Conclusion

The results of colonial economic schemes and policies were mixed, complicated by African maneuverings, resistance, and actions, which were motivated by self-interest and self-preservation. In the four key domains of land tenure, agriculture, urbanization, and labor mobilization, this was particularly true. For the most part, Africans were pushed to the margins of colonial economies, taking their place as producers of agricultural raw materials, laborers, trade middlemen, and operatives in the informal service sector. But Africans, often as a result of their own strategic maneuvering, transcended the roles carved out for them in the colonial economy. They forged new economic paths as innovative urban women, as creative, strategic peasants, and as assertive laborers.

Africans, men and women, rebelled against the strictures of the colonial economy and took advantage of new, mostly unintended opportunities to better themselves to the extent allowed by colonial racism. Some African peasants avoided the colonial export markets altogether, or withheld their crops when prices were low. For their part, African custodians of land subtly resisted colonial tinkering with land usage norms, and those who desired access to land as a way of participating in the colonial export economy insisted on securing access through time-honored and flexible mechanisms,

not through rigid, colonially legislated land rights that were frozen in law or in the hands of newly appointed chiefs. African laborers, for their part, resisted colonial attempts to order their existence and work life according to colonial interests or understandings, and when they acquiesced to the work regimes of colonial authorities, they pushed for rights and protections that transgressed the overarching climate of colonial racism.

In settler colonies, the politics of land and labor were particularly charged and intertwined. The two sites were platforms for demonstrating white-settler economic privilege and for displacing Africans from the lucrative loci of the economy. Africans were forcefully removed from their lands in order to turn them into colonial laborers; confiscated land needed to be worked by African laborers in order to generate agricultural profits for settlers and revenues for colonial governments. Often, the success of colonial economic measures, even in settler colonies, depended on the coerced or strategic cooperation of African workers and superintendents of communal land. Africans' cooperation depended on the extent to which they hoped to benefit from the measures and on clear indications that colonial schemes would not adversely affect their economic interests.

African groups had an infinite capacity to render colonial economic policies ineffectual on the ground, regardless of official rhetoric. Colonial archives are full of self-congratulatory claims about European efforts to turn African workers into time-disciplined work machines, and African farmers into agents of export-oriented agricultural raw material production. But the same colonial archives are also full of official frustrations and disappointment at the refusal of Africans to go along with aspects of colonial economic policies and colonial demands that they considered too economically risky or exploitative.

Notes

1. Dependency theory was partly a reaction to the arguments of colonial development theorists. The principal proponent of the vent-for-surplus theory of African colonial economic change is A.G. Hopkins. His book, *Economic History of West Africa* (London: Longman, 1973), argues that colonial authorities provided a vent, a profitable outlet for Africans' latent and idle productive capacity by, among other things, building roads, establishing market relations, and introducing currency.
2. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa*.
3. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, *A Modern Economic History of Africa*, *volume 1, the Nineteenth Century* (Dakar: Codesria Book Series, 1993), 8–9.
4. Mohammed Bashir Salau, *The West African Slave Plantation: A Case Study* (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
5. Frederick Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890–1925* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).
6. Ralph Austen, *African Economic History* (London and Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1987), 122.

7. See Robert Shenton, *The Development of Capitalism* (London: James Curry, 1986); Michael Watts, *Silent Violence: Food, Famine, and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Moses Ochonu, *Colonial Meltdown: Northern Nigeria in the Great Depression* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), chap. 2.
8. Allen Isaacman, *Cotton Is the Mother of Poverty: Peasants, Work, and Rural Struggle in Mozambique 1938–1961* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995); Gervase William Clarence-Smith, *Slaves, Peasants, and Capitalists in Southern Angola, 1840–1926* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
9. Marion Johnson, "Cotton Imperialism in West Africa," *African Affairs* 73, no. 291 (1974): 178–87; Richard Roberts, *Two Worlds of Cotton: Colonialism and the Economy in French Sudan, 1800–1946* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Richard Roberts and Allen Isaacman eds., *Cotton, Colonialism, and Social History in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995).
10. Tabitha Kanogo, *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau, 1905–63* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1987).
11. Charles van Onselen, *The Seed Is Mine: The Life of Kas Maine, a South African Sharecropper, 1894–1985* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996).
12. Ibid., chap. 1.
13. See Luise White, *The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990); Lynn Thomas, *Politics of the Womb: Women Reproduction, and the State in Kenya* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Moses Ochonu, "Masculine Anxieties, Cultural Politics, and Debates over Independent Womanhood Among Idoma Male Migrants in Late Colonial Northern Nigeria," *Interventions* 13, no. 2 (2011): 278–98; Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, *African Women: A Modern History* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
14. Moses Ochonu, "Masculine Anxieties;" Luise White, *The Comforts of Home*.
15. Jeane Penvenne, *African Workers and Colonial Racism: Mozambican Strategies & Struggles in Lourenco Marques, 1977–1962* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1994); Coquery-Vidrovitch, *African Women*.
16. "Women in the Changing African Family," in *African Women South of the Sahara*, ed. Margaret Jean Hay and Sharon Stichter (London and New York: Longman, 1984), 64–67.
17. See Emily Osborne, *Making States: Power, Gender, and Colonial Rule in Kankan-Baté, West Africa, 1650–1920* (Athens: The Ohio University Press, 2011); Coquery-Vidrovitch, *African Women*.
18. Audrey Wipper, "Women's Voluntary Associations," in *African Women South of the Sahara*, ed. Margaret Jean Hay and Sharon Stichter, 69–86.
19. John Heilbrunn, "Commerce, Politics, and Business Associations in Benin and Togo," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 4 (1997): 473–92.
20. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacies of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 138–40.
21. See Anthony Hopkins, "The World Bank in Africa: Historical Reflections on the African Present," *World Development* 14, no. 2 (1986): 1479.
22. Robert Shenton, *The Development of Capitalism in Northern Nigeria*, 33–46.
23. Steven Pierce, Looking for the Legal: Land, Law, and Colonialism in Kano Emirate, Nigeria (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2000).

24. Adamu Fika, *Kano Civil War and British Over-Rule, 1882–1940* (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1978).
25. Sara Berry, *No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 104–8.
26. Ibid., 107–8.
27. Kanogo, *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau.*
28. See, for instance, Michael Mason's discussion of extensive use of forced labor in the construction of a railway network in Nigeria. Michael Mason, "Working on the Railway: Forced Labor in Northern Nigeria 1907–1912," in *African Labor History*, ed. Peter Gutkind, Cohen Robin, and Jean Copans (New York: Sage Publications, 1978), 56–79.
29. See Moitsadi Moeti, "The Origins of Forced Labor in the Witwatersrand," *Phylon* 47, no. 4 (1986): 276–84.
30. Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 28.
31. David Killingray, "Labor Mobilization in British Colonial Africa for the War Effort, 1939–46," in *Africa and the Second World War*, ed. Killingray and Richard (New York: Saint Martin Press, 1986), 68–96, 77.
32. Francois Manchuelle, *Willing Migrants: Soninke Labor Diasporas 1848–1960* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997), 130–31.
33. See Charles Van Onselen, *Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia 1900–1933* (London: Pluto Press, 1976); Patrick Harries, *Work, Culture, and Identity: Migrant Laborers in Mozambique and South Africa, c.1860–1910* (Portsmouth, London, and Johannesburg: Heinemann, James Curry Ltd., and Witwatersrand University Press, 1994); and Manchuelle, *Willing Migrants.*
34. Harries, *Work, Culture, and Identity*, 83–108.
35. W.M. Freund, "Labour Migration to the Northern Nigerian Tin Mines 1903–1945," *Journal of African History* 22, no. 1 (1981): 73–84.
36. See, for instance, David M. Goodfellow, *Principles of Economic Sociology: The Economics of Primitive Life as Illustrated by the Bantu Peoples of South and East Africa* (London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1939); Max Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict in Africa* (London: The Free Press, 1955); J. Clyde Mitchell, Elizabeth Colson, and Max Gluckman, eds., *Human Problems in British Central Africa: The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal* XIX (1955). The studies conducted by the anthropologists hired and funded by the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI), which began operations in 1937, proved particularly useful for British colonial authorities in South-Central and Southern Africa. For a critical review of the connections between colonial policies and the works of the Institute, and of how the anthropological studies produced by it shaped colonial economic policies regarding labor and urbanization, see Lynette Schumaker, ""A Tent with a View": Colonial Officers, Anthropologists, and the Making of the Field in Northern Rhodesia, 1937–1960," *Osiris*, 2nd ser., 11 (1996): 237–58. Max Gluckman, who was a director of the Institute, and other anthropologists viewed African cultures and peoples as repositories of "tribal" customs and of functional "tribal" dynamics that excessive colonial intrusions and the inordinate penetration of colonial cultures of work and production into

Africans' lives would destroy. The following passage from the second page of Schumaker's article illustrates the colonial purpose of these early anthropological studies on African peoples, cultures, customs, and needs: "In the 1930s the governor of Northern Rhodesia, keen on the potential uses of anthropology for solving problems of social change in the colony, pushed for the founding of an anthropological institute and garnered support for it from local sources such as the mining companies. After World War II, this institute became part of the British government's postwar colonial development effort and was lavishly funded by the Colonial Social Science Research Council (CSSRC). This enabled the RLI to recruit a team of talented young anthropologists, most of whom were working for their doctorates. The RLI's first directors set out to create a coordinated program of applied anthropology useful for colonial development."

37. David M. Goodfellow, *Principles of Economic Sociology*, 242.
38. Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society.*
39. Ralph Austen, *African Economic History* (London and Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1987), 166.
40. Ibid., 167.
41. Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society.*
42. Keletso Atkins, *The Moon Is Dead! Give Us Our Money! The Cultural Origins of an African Work Ethic, Natal, South Africa, 1843–1900* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1993); Caroline Brown, *"We Are All Slaves": African Miners, Culture, and Resistance at the Enugu Government Colliery, Nigeria* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002); Edward Roux, *Time Longer than Rope: A History of the Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa 2nd edition* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967).
43. This is the central thesis of Frederick Cooper's *Decolonization and African Society.*

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CHAPTER 6

African Women in Colonial Economies

Judith A. Byfield

African women, as Iris Berger notes, were fully engaged in the economic life of their communities. Whether traders, farmers or craft-makers, women contributed to the production and distribution of goods that sustained village life and urban spaces, local markets, and regional hubs. However, colonial officials were often blind to women's economic contributions and the consequences of their policies on African women.[1] Since the pioneering work of Ester Boserup, Margaret Jean Hay and Claire Robertson, women have been better represented in African economic history and we have a much fuller picture of how colonial economic policies transformed their household responsibilities, workload, and economic opportunities.

Our understanding of African colonial economies is being further enhanced by the recent renaissance in African economic history.[2] The resurgence of interest in African economic history is welcome because scholars are using new technologies to digitize and transcribe vast amounts of data such as the British colonial *Blue Books*, tax censuses, and marriage registers that facilitate research on education, public finance, and population shifts during the colonial period.[3] The new African economic history does not have to reproduce the silences in colonial archives for it is unfolding at an auspicious time in the study of African women and gender. As social historians pay greater attention to topics such as marriage, children, and urbanization they shine a

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brighter light on women's economic activities within and beyond the household as well as the ways in which colonial policies shaped these activities.[4] Together, the renewed attention to African economic history and studies on African women and gender refine our understanding of how women contributed to and supported, and in some instances subsidized, the colonial economy even if colonial officials did not always see them.

The Colonial State and Economy

This chapter's main concern is the colonial period; therefore, it is important to begin with some consideration of the colonial state and its policies. Crawford Young argues that all colonial states faced similar imperatives even though the outcomes varied tremendously over time and space. African colonial states at the end of the nineteenth century had to create administrative structures and establish economies that produced revenue for the colonial state as well as resources that integrated these regions into larger imperial networks.[5] Scholars dispute the extent of the reach and administrative capacity of colonial states to control their subjects, with some, like Young, insisting that the colonial state was hegemonic while others argue, like Jeffrey Herbst, that it was weak and unable to broadcast its power.[6] The opposing reflections on the African colonial state do not represent different types of states; rather, Bruce Berman suggests, both qualities existed within the same state. Though the relative strength or weakness of the colonial state varied within each territory and over time, African colonial states straddled two levels of articulation, 'between the metropole and the colony, and, within the latter between introduced forms of capitalist production and the various indigenous modes'.[7] Colonial officials had to help create and protect opportunities for capital accumulation among competing European interests, maintain social and political control over African populations often disrupted by the methods of accumulation, and ensure that the entire enterprise unfolded with little cost to European treasuries. Colonies had to produce revenue quickly to essentially pay for themselves.[8]

In order to better integrate African colonies into their imperial networks that supplied resources or markets to metropolitan industries, colonial officials had to create the infrastructure to facilitate the movement of goods out of and into the colonies. However, just as the reach of colonial power was uneven, so was colonialism's economic geography. Colonies sometimes held multiple forms of economic enterprises: plantations, extractive mining industries, coerced cash-crop production, and dynamic peasant production.[9] Where and how women would be integrated into these enterprises depended on a number of variables including the preexisting economic structures, cultural prescriptions and expectations, and colonial state formation. Periodization was equally important. The early colonial period in many cases opened new opportunities for some women, but many enterprises contracted in the face of the interwar economic depression and the Second World War. The

Depression and the war threatened the colonial economic foundation as income plummeted, leading officials to apply increased pressure on African populations to pay taxes and to increase production of commodities deemed essential to the war effort. In the postwar period, colonial states, partly in response to African political demands, invested in development strategies and increased spending on education. A number of women benefited from this social spending, but it did not radically alter the unequal economic structures created during the early decades of colonial rule.

Constructing the Colonial Economy

Commodities had to be collected and moved toward ports or vice versa; therefore, infrastructure dominated the minds of colonial officials. Large-scale infrastructure projects such as roads and railways dotted the continent. Colonial records often made note of the thousands of men who participated in these projects. In the Congo Free State, the government imported construction workers from British and French territories in West Africa, Hong Kong, Macao, and British Caribbean colonies to begin work on the railway in 1892.[10] In French West Africa, railway construction began in the 1880s and by the first decade of the twentieth century, thousands of miles of railway lines connected Senegal, the Soudan (Mali), French Guinée, Ivory Coast, and Dahomey to ports along the Atlantic Ocean.[11] By the 1890s, Britain also invested in railways connecting the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria in West Africa and in its East African colonies of Kenya and Uganda. Nonetheless, the density of the railways in Africa never matched that of Europe, since they were created for extracting products rather than integrating regions.[12] While railways were vital to the consolidation of the colonial state and economy, the significance of roadways to the colonial project cannot be underestimated, for as Herbst suggests, 'roads … more than railroads or waterways, brought the most profound changes to African society'.[13] The expanding network of railways and roads, 'reinforce[d] ties with the metropole, [bound] disparate territories together and integrated colonial economies into the world market'.[14] These infrastructure projects also helped determine how state formation would affect different societies and different social groups. Men dominated the work sites of the colonial state. Some were brought in under coercive labor regimes while others were hired as skilled and unskilled labor. In some instances, women were part of forced labor crews even though few traces exist of them in the records.[15] Women's labor became invisible while road construction, railways, and ports became unquestioned male occupational preserves.

Colonial states also required a fiscal infrastructure to bring revenue into their treasuries. In some colonies the bulk of the state's revenue derived from import and export taxes. Colonial governments taxed the main exports: cocoa, cotton, peanuts, palm oil, and rubber. They also taxed items imported for an expanding African consumer base. Leigh Gardner argues that the

'desperate need for revenue along with some colonial officials' desire to bring Africans into the market economy, led most colonial administrations … to impose direct taxation on Africans from the first years of colonial rule'.[16] Officials created either a flat-rate 'hut tax' on African dwellings or a poll tax paid by African men. These tax systems reflected the idea that the man was the head of the household and responsible for women's head tax, thus reinforcing an idealized notion of women's dependent status. In South Africa, in particular, officials hoped to force men to do 'monetarily productive labor while women concentrated on domestic duties'.[17] Nonetheless, there were exceptions and in Western Nigeria women in several Yoruba communities were taxed independently of men.[18] In some instances, taxes could be paid in kind. In French Guinée in 1896, for example, the military required that districts in the Southern Soudan make tax payments in rubber as part of their effort to dissuade traders from taking their rubber to Sierra Leone.[19] By the end of the First World War, taxes were largely paid in currency, thus accelerating the monetization of colonial economies and forcing tax payers into wage labor, cash-crop production, or other sectors mediated by European currencies.

Women, Cash Crops, and the Colonial Economy

Agricultural production dominated most colonial economies. Although food production for the domestic market remained critical, colonial officials were most concerned with the production of export crops for these were major revenue earners. The main exports included: cocoa, peanuts, cotton, rubber, and palm oil. Production practices varied and created different outcomes for women.

The history of cocoa production in West Africa is a remarkable story of African-led agricultural innovation, but it also illuminates the ways in which women remained largely invisible in the history of this commodity. In 1892, Ghana did not export any cocoa beans, yet by 1911 it had become the world's largest producer of cocoa, exporting 40,000 tons annually. By 1936, Ghana's output surpassed 300,000 tons.[20] The rapid expansion of cocoa production here, and in other parts of West Africa including Nigeria and Ivory Coast, was in part due to technological as well as cultural transformations unfolding in Europe and North America. Cory Ross argues that the real breakthrough began in the 1880s when 'global transport and rising purchasing power in Europe converted cocoa from a luxury article into an item of mass consumption'.[21] Small-holder farmers led the development and rapid expansion of cocoa production in Ghana and other parts of West Africa in the face of colonial doubts about their ability to respond to market demands.

Scholars sought to explain how 'countries like Ghana could very rapidly increase their export production without apparently reducing their existing economic activities, nor benefiting … from massive immigration'.[22] Building on Hla Myint's vent-for-surplus theory, some scholars argued that these

communities had idle hands and idle land and farmers abandoned leisure pursuits in order to invest in cocoa production; or it occurred in local circumstances that had unusually dense populations and less intense labor demands for crops produced for domestic use.[23] However, Gareth Austen demonstrates that these assumptions were faulty and argues instead that cocoa took off because farmers redeployed labor away from less profitable export lines, such as palm products, artisanal gold mining, or the production of inexpensive textiles, and toward cocoa production.[24] Women contributed to the establishment of early cocoa farms. They planted food crops, such as plantain and cocoyams, that provided the shade essential to the growth and protection of young cocoa plants. Moreover, a small group of women featured among the early cocoa entrepreneurs. They tended to be elderly and single, and independent of obligations to lineage elders and husbands.[25]

Asante women's involvement in cocoa production increased; however, for many of them their greater investment in cocoa corresponded to a loss in status. Jean Allman and Victoria Tashjian demonstrate that as new areas were colonized for cocoa farms and households lost access to dependent forms of labor such as pawns after 1908, husbands drew increasingly on the labor of their wives. In addition, families often pawned dependent girls in order to raise capital for cocoa farms. As a result, an increasing number of women entered marriage as pawn-wives in the early twentieth century, and the cultural distinction between free-wife and pawn-wife collapsed.[26]

Women's unremunerated labor was matched by their invisibility in the economic histories of cocoa production in other parts of West Africa as well. In Nigeria, Yoruba women also contributed to cocoa production, especially during the harvest. They spent as much as eight hours daily fetching water, carrying the crops and cooking for all those engaged in farm work, but they did not self-identify as farmers or receive remuneration.[27] It has taken the work of scholars of gender to illuminate women's critical role in the adoption and expansion of cocoa production as well as its social consequences.

The early colonial period also coincided with the tremendous demand for rubber. Rubber played a central role in the engines that supported the Industrial Revolution, the beginning of the automobile industry as well as telecommunications and electrical expansion, for it provided insulation for telegraph, telephone, and electrical wiring.[28] Moreover, rubber products proved vital to leisure culture for it was used in sporting devices, especially bicycles, and shoes. Before the development of synthetic rubber, manufacturers of rubber implements relied on natural rubber derived from trees and vines. Brazil dominated the rubber market. The commercial sale of African rubber only began in the 1850s; however, by the end of the nineteenth century King Leopold's Congo Free State became the second largest rubber exporter after Brazil. Other parts of West Africa and Central Africa (Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Gabon, Nigeria, Liberia, French Guinée, and Northern Rhodesia) also exported rubber to the international market.[29]

In Africa rubber grew wild and men performed the tasks of locating and tapping rubber vines. In many places individual male entrepreneurs took advantage of the worldwide demand for rubber. In Southern Nigeria, Saros, African returnees from Sierra Leone invested initially in rubber production around Lagos while Christian converts were among those who first participated in rubber extraction as it moved inland.[30] In Benin Province, the Nigerian colonial government established communal plantations to help stem the destructive tapping carried out by tappers from other regions, and both Europeans and Africans established rubber plantations using local and imported plants.[31] In French Guinée men gathered the rubber sap and also dominated the sale and distribution networks that conveyed rubber to Freetown and later Conakry.[32]

Women's role in the rubber economy varied considerably. In French Equatorial Africa, women carried and sold rubber in the markets. Germaine Krull, an avant-garde photographer, captured scenes of African women in markets outside of Brazzaville during the Second World War.[33] In the Congo Free State, where rubber lay at the center of an extraordinarily brutal colonial regime, women played critical though indirect roles in the rubber economy. The concession companies that received control over significant portions of the colony set rubber collection quotas that kept men away for weeks at a time. On average, villages in areas controlled by the Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company (ABIR) were assigned 'three to four kilos of dried rubber per adult male per fortnight'. This translated into full-time work for the men in those villages, while men in the areas controlled by the Société Anversoise du Commerce au Congo spent about 24 days a month in the forest.[34] Rural women assumed more work in order to try to maintain food production for their households and to meet the company's demands for food. For example, villagers near the ABIR concession had to provide food to feed the soldiers. They were expected to deliver 15 kilos of yams, five pigs, or fifty chickens. While men were away searching for rubber and unable to clear new garden plots, women often replanted crops on nutritionally exhausted fields. As a result, yields declined and famine increased.[35] The agricultural work women performed in maintaining households, farms and villages while men left in search of rubber vines ultimately disappear in narratives constructed primarily around the volume of rubber production or the brutality embedded in the system. In the process, women's contribution to the maintenance of the colonial economy also disappears from the record.

Cotton was an important export crop from many colonies. While rubber and cocoa production developed with colonialism, cotton production had been a long-standing activity and formed the base upon which thriving textile industries existed in different parts of the continent. Scholars believe that cotton was grown, spun, and woven in the region of Nubia between the third century BCE and fourth century CE.[36] Cotton grew wild in the hinterland around Luanda in Angola. Peasants did not cultivate it: however, they

collected the wild cotton, spun it into thread, and wove it into cloth for personal use and trade.[37] In West Africa farmers cultivated cotton as early as the tenth century CE. Colleen Kriger notes that West Africans grew cotton from the coast to the Sahel, a substantial region that crossed and connected numerous trade routes and production zones.[38] US and European abolitionists in the nineteenth century became interested in the commercial potential of African cotton for they imagined that it could address several social and economic issues. Thomas Bowen, a US missionary who worked in Yorubaland from 1849 to 1856, argued that commerce and cotton production could end the slave trade as well as revolutionize African households by ending polygyny and domesticating wives.[39]

In the western region of Nigeria, small and large farmers took advantage of missionary efforts to promote cotton production and export to Britain, though it did not lead to the full social transformation missionaries anticipated. Cotton production relied heavily on slave labor locally and did not transform Yoruba women into dependent partners within African households.[40] European industry's continued demand for cheap cotton ensured colonial interest in the commercial potential of African cotton and encouraged what Marion Johnson called cotton imperialism: crush the local weaving industry, export the raw cotton that would have been woven locally, and transform redundant weavers into cotton producers.[41]

The nature of cotton production varied. Among the Baule in Ivory Coast, cotton was a women's crop. After men (husbands, sons) cleared the field, women planted yams and intercropped corn, cassava, and cotton among the yam mounds. Women owned the products of these fields and could dispose of surplus as they saw fit once they had met the family's subsistence needs. In the case of cotton, women carded it and spun it into thread before giving it to male weavers.[42] In Hausa communities in Niger, on the other hand, men controlled the production of cotton; nonetheless, men had an obligation to provide cotton for their wives and other female dependants. Thus, very different social practices gave women control over cotton.[43]

During the colonial period many colonial states invested in efforts to increase the production of cotton for metropolitan factories. In Togo, German officials hired four African Americans from Tuskegee University to train the Togolese to produce cotton for export.[44] In the French Soudan and Egyptian Sudan, officials created large-scale irrigation schemes, the Office du Niger and Gezira, respectively. Both projects relied on forced settlement for their workforce.[45] In the Belgian Congo, colonial officials relied on compulsory production, and rural women in polygynous households shouldered most of the burden of cotton production. Women were heavily involved as well in transporting cotton to trading stations and roads.[46] In Malawi's Tchiri valley, however, the colonial state did not have to resort to compulsory labor. Both men and women in different household formations (monogamous, polygynous, female-headed) integrated cotton production into the existing

system of food production. Cotton provided an important avenue of income generation in order to pay taxes. Equally important, Elias Mandala notes that cotton's significance grew because the consolidation of the colonial state and economy narrowed other opportunities to generate cash. The creation of forest reserves, for example, closed opportunities for hunting while the importation of pots and salt contributed to the decline in manufacturing of these items.[47]

Despite women's multifaceted roles in the production of cotton, they are not very visible in colonial narratives of its production. In many societies women derived their access to land through marriage, therefore their hold on land was tenuous especially as land became commoditized. Equally important, colonial officials directed their promotion of cotton production toward men. In the case of the Baule, the French used forced production as well as taxation. Men's need to pay taxes helped to make women's continued role in cotton production invisible.[48] Tax payer, Osumaka Likaka argues, was an administrative category that imposed a colonial, patriarchal worldview. In 1914, Belgian officials passed a decree making the 'healthy adult male' a unit of labor for all industry, labor, and taxation. The category hid women's central role, as well as that of children, in cotton cultivation by suggesting that only the male head of the household grew cotton. This administrative category made husbands and fathers the interface between the colonial state and the household while enhancing male power within the household and over the distribution of cotton money.[49]

While colonial officials did little to note women's contribution to cocoa, rubber, and cotton, women's contribution to palm-oil production was conspicuous, for women processed the palm fruit into palm oil and the inner seed into palm kernel oil. Missionary accounts and later colonial reports acknowledged women's important role in processing the palm fruit. Palm-oil production was usually done within the household and the bulk of the oil produced belonged either to the man who owned the tree or the man who picked the fruit. Women kept what they needed for household use, but they owned the kernels.[50] Men picked the palm fruit; however, 'women carried it to the processing centers, picked the palm seeds from the thorny fruits, fetched water and firewood, boiled and pounded the seeds, extracted oil from the fiber and nuts, separated the fiber from the nuts, and cracked the nuts to produce the palm kernels'.[51] Both items were staples during the era of legitimate trade and remained important commodities into the colonial period. However, as the commercial value of palm products grew, men assumed greater control of palm fruits. Gloria Chuku argues that Igbo men assumed ownership of oil palms, control of palm produce, and new technology, such as palm oil presses and nut-cracking machines, introduced during the colonial era. Women's right to palm kernels remained protected as did their ability to earn cash from the export of palm kernel oil until the expansion of oil mills in the post-Second World War period.[52]

Cash crops did not lead to one outcome for all African women. Some women who were landholders, such as Cãndida da Silva Senna (Dona Cãndida) in Guinea Bissau, took advantage of expanding trade opportunities. Da Silva exercised a monopoly over the trade in rubber, beeswax, and rice in the borderland region between Cacheu and southern Casamance.[53] In Buganda, some women benefited from cotton production and became independent (albeit short-lived) landholders and cotton farmers.[54] Nonetheless, for the great majority of women, cash-crop production relied increasingly on women's uncompensated labor.

Women, Wage Labor, and the Colonial Economy

Taxation played a critical role in expanding African investments in cash crops; it also proved essential to the creation of wage labor. Throughout the colonial period, men dominated wage labor in all sectors: education, trading companies, mines, railways, agriculture, skilled and unskilled government positions. The wages men received were not family wages; they were designed to cover the worker's day-to-day reproduction.[55] As a result, women played a significant role in subsidizing the expansion of wage labor across the continent.

Men dominated mine jobs in the Copperbelt, which extends from the northern part of Northern Rhodesia into the Belgian Congo,[56] the diamond and gold mines in South Africa and the coalmines of Nigeria. In Belgian Congo women were not employed in the mines, but the state relied on women to produce food for mine workers. Women's agricultural labor directly subsidized the cost of social reproduction on the mines. Rural communities, including regions already part of the cotton scheme, were forced to produce food for the mines. Communities were assigned quotas to fulfill and women transported the food to the mines, thus compounding the invisible work they did in support of the mining industry.[57]

Women who lived on the mining compounds as wives of miners also subsidized the mining industry in part by providing a stable home life for their husbands. Although most mining companies resisted the additional costs of providing housing for wives and children, the Copperbelt mines such as Roan Antelope Copper Mine were forced to allow dependants to accompany their husbands, for they were competing for labor with Union Minière in Katanga and Broken Hill Mine in Northern Rhodesia, which allowed miners to bring their families. They also faced competition from the mines in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa that paid higher wages, though they did not allow dependants.[58]

In addition to creating an environment that enabled men to be more productive, married women also supplemented men's salaries through the sale of home-brewed beer. Although the Northern Rhodesian government encouraged mining officials to limit beer brewing so that beer halls could benefit from men's leisure activity, women continued to brew beer.

Mining companies also tried to increase income-generating activities for women. They invited missionary groups into the mine compounds to work with women by teaching them cooking, hygiene, baby care, laundry, as well as handicraft skills that enabled them to stretch their husbands' salaries.[59] Women on the Copperbelt mining compounds helped foster and create the conditions that enhanced productivity and therefore profits.

In Southern Rhodesia wives were not welcome in the mining compounds. Nonetheless, Schmidt revealed the complex ways in which women in Goromonzi District near Salisbury helped build and subsidize the colonial economy. Goromonzi District was distinctive because it was adjacent to a major urban center as well as many mines. The increasing demand for food in the city and at the mines, as well as the outbreak of the South African War which cut off food supplies, helped a thriving African peasantry to develop. As a result, between 1890 and 1912, the bulk of the fresh produce and grain came from African peasants in Southern Rhodesia. Women's customary crops (including green vegetables, potatoes, and groundnuts) added to the miners' diets.[60] African peasants increased the acreage under cultivation and the production of surplus in spite of the migration of men. Schmidt showed that women were largely responsible for the increasing surplus since this was accomplished without the introduction of new technology. Women's customary activities such as beer brewing also became income-generating as women now sold their beer to mine workers. In some instances, women withdrew from agricultural work and hired men to work in their place for beer brewing proved so profitable.

However, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, this window of profitable peasant production closed considerably. Colonial officials moved decidedly against African peasant producers in order to bolster settler production. The state took away the most fertile and well-watered land and successive beer laws outlawed the sale of beer in the urban center and on the mine compounds. Miners also expressed a greater desire for ground maize instead of millet, and in order to compete with settler-produced maize, peasants introduced plows which substantially increased women's work. Plows increased the area under cultivation as well as the tasks women and children performed: planting, hoeing, weeding, harvesting, and grinding. Moreover, the peasant economy was greatly affected by the increase in hut taxes, rents, grazing, and dipping fees. By the 1930s, even though peasant production remained high, the value of their crops had declined and male wages became the mainstay of peasant households.[61] The depression also brought about a decline in wages as mines and factories closed. In the face of increasing impoverishment, women entered the workforce as agricultural labor. Some were hired as seasonal workers, but others were hired to perform piecework. Women and children in agricultural work received less payment than men involved in the same tasks. Wage labor in these instances did not replace the unremunerated work women performed on household fields.

Thus, women subsidized the extremely low wages offered to men on multiple fronts simultaneously.[62]

Kikuyu women in Kenya also joined the agricultural wage workforce. Kenya did not have mines; nonetheless, the expansion of settler farms created a significant demand for labor. Some of that demand was satisfied with the creation of the hut tax and through tenant or 'squatter' farmers. The First World War increased labor scarcity as African men were conscripted into the army as porters. In order to fill this vacuum, settlers successfully convinced colonial officials to 'encourage' African women and children to work on coffee plantations. Kikuyu women and children were forced to work on plantations where they often suffered physical and sexual assault. Most of the women and children who worked on the coffee plantations lived in the nearby African reserves to which they returned at night. Working on the coffee plantations did not relieve them of their responsibilities in subsistence farming on the reserves, especially since the coffee harvest coincided with the peak season in peasant agriculture.[63] Overall, our knowledge of women wage earners in the rural workforce awaits greater investigation. John Sender, Carlos Oya, and Christopher Cramer, who examined female wage earners in rural Mozambique in the first decade of the twenty-first century, noted that most scholars still assume rural wage earners are male, even though women (especially single women due to divorce, widowhood, or separation) comprise a significant sector of the workforce. Life histories collected from survey participants reveal that several generations of women had been engaged as casual wage laborers.[64] In addition to working on the farms, some women obtained domestic jobs. In Southern Rhodesia, a small number of African women were employed within settler households as domestic servants. Some remained in Southern Rhodesia, but some ventured into South Africa where they worked on white farms in rural Transvaal close to the Rhodesian border.[65]

Women had few opportunities in the wage labor sectors largely due to European gender prescriptions. Industrial positions in the mines were all male, and very few manufacturing opportunities existed on the continent outside of South Africa. Although women in South Africa participated in industrial work, they were concentrated in certain sectors. Most of them were employed in the textile and garment factories and food-processing industries. Companies initially hired Afrikaner women; however, as they expanded in the 1920s and 1930s, they brought in Colored women. African women would be hired following the postwar expansion of manufacturing.[66] The Second World War proved critical to women's expanding role in manufacturing. During the war new industrial sectors including engineering firms and munitions plants brought in women as emergency workers. Initially restricted to semi-skilled jobs, women eventually moved into skilled jobs especially after 1942. However, because they were female their wages were reduced. In 1941, the government went a step further and instituted the practice of paying a lower rate to all women regardless of their job on the basis of their sex: 75% of that

of men. South African women in the industrial workforce faced a wage structure that was structured by both race and gender. This wartime contingency had lasting consequences for jobs were reclassified in ways that reflected a deskilling and devaluation of these positions.[67]

The Second World War and postwar development plans stimulated the development of manufacturing in certain colonies. In Ivory Coast, the Gonfreville textile factory actually began production in 1923; however, it was not until 1950 that it began to hire women workers. Entrance into wage labor reflected a radical shift for Baule women who were once producers and owners of cotton and thread. Under colonialism, women became involved in the production of cotton as a cash crop that supplied Gonfreville and ultimately workers in the factory that supplied the cloth they purchased.[68]

A small number of African women held professional positions. African women began to be trained as nurses in Southern Rhodesia in the late 1920s.[69] Those aspiring to professional training did not have to travel to Britain for they could receive it in South Africa.[70] In Nigeria and Ghana, elite African families began sending daughters to London for education in the nineteenth century. Though a small but influential group of women emerged in these colonies and began to organize socially for improved educational opportunities for women, very few were employed either by the state or private firms. In Nigeria, teaching opportunities for women opened slowly in the second decade of the twentieth century. There were 17 female teachers in primary schools in 1912 and by the late 1940s Lagos boasted a total of 260 female primary school teachers in mission-led schools.[71] By the 1920s, Nigerian women began to receive training in Western midwifery and nursing; while many trained in Lagos, some completed British diplomas. These Western-trained nurses could expect to be hired by local authorities, private clinics, or the government hospitals. By the 1930s, women had branched into social work and journalism, but their movement into the civil service and professions like law did not happen until the postwar period.[72]

Limited educational opportunities for girls were essentially repeated across the continent, though the periodization differed. In Uganda, all the schools run by missionary societies as well as the school for the daughters of paramount chiefs stressed domesticity; in other words, preparing girls to be good wives. They were encouraged to be 'diligent mistresses of efficient households … keep their homes and children clean … feed their families in nutritious [ways] … sew and do handicrafts'. In 1928 there were only 26 female elementary school teachers in the country, though the figure would rise to 90 by 1933.[73] In French West Africa, women's access to medical training, specifically midwifery, began relatively early. Blaise Diagne, the first African representative to the French Chamber of Deputies, spearheaded the establishment of the first school of midwifery in Africa in 1918: L'Ecole des sages-femmes.[74] The vast majority of women, however, did not receive Western education and were not literate in the language of the colonial state.

Moreover, the number of educated African women and those engaged in professions deemed appropriate for elite women remained very low throughout the colonial period.

Women Entrepreneurs, Urban Space, and the Colonial Economy

The colonial economy relied on women's labor in agriculture to subsidize cash-crop production and male wage labor. Therefore, policymakers (often at the behest of male authorities) tried to restrict women's movements as well as their ability to live beyond male authority. In Southern Rhodesia, women in Goromonzi District left the rural areas in response to the growing impoverishment of the interwar depression and the intensified demands on their labor. Some fled to towns, mines, and European farms.[75] Framing the young women, often single or in a temporary relationship, as promiscuous and vectors of venereal diseases, the colonial state used public-health policies to try to control their influx. The Public Health Act of 1925, for example, made medical examinations compulsory for African women who were seeking employment, or were already employed or living, in certain areas.[76]

Despite the efforts to contain them in the countryside, women took advantage of migration as economic and social agents, for migration offered more opportunities to earn cash incomes that could help support their families in economically depressed rural areas. Migration also enabled these women to pursue their own strategies for marriage, becoming social adults and creating their own households. Thus, as Karen Jochelson reminds us, women were not passive participants in this exodus from rural locations.[77]

In cities, women found work in the interstices of urban economy: processing and selling food, brewing beer, providing accommodation, and sex services. Most were individual entrepreneurs, though significant economic divisions existed. Some women traders were merchants. They obtained credit from European trading firms, rented stores in the markets, and they hired others to assist them in their business. At the other extreme you had women who barely eked out an existence from their trade. Very often, food sellers were at the bottom of the hierarchy of trade. These women did not have access to credit, relied on assistance from their children or other dependants, and sold on the street because they could not afford the fees to trade in the established markets. Abosede George, Claire Robertson, and Gracia Clarke show that whether we examine the colonial or postcolonial era, for these women, trade was much more about survival than accumulation.[78]

Cultural expectations also shaped the nature of the activities women performed in urban centers. In Uganda, women began to move into cities in the 1920s. They could not get hired for jobs involving manual labor since both British and African men considered these jobs inappropriate for women; in addition, opportunities to sell food and beer were restricted as many migrant

women did not have the capital to get started and both British and African men concluded that women should not be involved in the sale of alcohol. Therefore, men were the primary beer brewers in Uganda.[79]

In Nairobi, women had a wider range of opportunities that collectively supported the social reproduction of male workers while providing incomes. Women brewed beer, cooked food, and provided accommodation, for a number of them had invested in property. Many female landlords had been involved in sex work and practiced *malaya*: indoor sex work that often involved domestic services such as meals and laundry.[80] In West Africa, where urbanization had a much longer history, the number of women involved in sex work increased as colonial rule consolidated. In Lagos, a significant number of sex workers migrated to the capital from the immediate hinterland and from parts of Eastern Nigeria like the Cross River Basin. Benedict Naanen attributes the migration of women from Cross River to Lagos and further afield (Cameroon, Gold Coast, Fernando Po) to a number of factors. Though marginal to the colonial economy, this region primarily produced palm oil and women's agricultural burden increased with the imposition of taxes. Migrating for sex work allowed capital accumulation and enabled women to build homes and acquire rents which they used to maintain their dependants. It was not unusual for sex workers to provide the financing to establish their brothers in petty trading. In addition, not all communities saw prostitution as an offence.[81]

A different set of opportunity structures existed for many Yoruba women in Lagos and in the hinterland. In Yoruba society, women as a matter of course were engaged in trade or manufacturing. Yoruba culture required husbands to provide start-up capital for their wives; in addition, since women often pursued the same trade as their mothers, senior women helped them to become established. The introduction of cocoa proved significant to the expansion of trade and manufacturing in some Yoruba towns. In Abeokuta, for example, wealth from cocoa increased the level of consumption, especially of imported items like cloth. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the indigo-dyeing industry flourished as dyers purchased imported cloth and dyed it in highly desired indigo patterns.[82]

Women traders played a significant role in creating colonial cities and expanding the reach of European commodities into African interiors. Robertson notes that women traders and farmers 'were … key actors in the development of the trading and market gardening system' that fed Nairobi.[83] Women sold dry staples such as maize and beans, vegetables as well as milk, and English potatoes. Some were involved in long-distance trade and others traded daily and returned to their homes at night. Women also traded in imported items such as cloth and soap. The structure of trade was not static, and by the 1930s women became increasingly confined to local trade in the markets, while better-capitalized men traveled around as wholesalers and sold from shops or tea stands.[84]

In many West African societies, women have historically dominated (and still do) the internal markets selling agricultural items, cooked food, as well

as a range of imported items from soaps to beauty products to cloth. The textile trade best illustrates the critical role women played in expanding the market for and consumption of European products. Abeokuta's indigo dyers indigenized inexpensive cotton cloth when they created resist-dyed patterns on them. Europeans also had to learn what factors African consumers valued most, such as quality, durability, and price. Moreover, they had to develop an appreciation of African aesthetic values. They introduced patterns drawn from other world regions, as in the case of the Dutch wax prints,[85] they copied the visual effects of African indigo dyeing techniques as well as the geometric patterns on woven raffia.[86] Wax prints, as Paulette Young argues, 'became one of the most lucrative commercial exchanges of the Dutch-Gold Coast'.[87] Women proved central to this commercial relationship because many Dutch merchants married African women, thus benefiting from their social and economic networks. Equally importantly, women named these cloths, thus transposing a foreign import into a product with local meaning and cultural value.[88] Seamstresses further transformed these textiles into clothing that communicated age, status and aspiration within rapidly evolving colonial societies.[89]

The large pool of self-employed women who fall into what scholars call the informal economy played a vital part in the colonial economy. They linked colonial markets and imperial commodities. They were central conduits between rural producers and urban consumers. As significantly, women's agricultural and commercial work subsidized low wages that could not sustain households and dependants. Those subsidies translated into profits for mine owners, settler farmers, European trading companies, as well as tax revenue for the colonial state.

Conclusion

Women played critical roles in colonial economies whether or not they were visible to colonial officials or in colonial records. As this chapter has demonstrated, their contributions were both direct and indirect. West African women traders expanded the markets for European consumer items and processed cash crops for export. In some areas women paid taxes, but where women did not pay taxes directly, they contributed through cash or labor to men's tax payments. Women's greatest contributions to colonial economies may have been in the indirect ways in which they provided maintenance to critical economic sectors. In East and Southern Africa, many women maintained rural economies that prepared new generations of young men for migrant labor systems, and received those too old or infirm to toil in the mines or on the farms. This maintenance, Margaret Jean Hay argues, reflected one way in which women subsidized the colonial economy. In meeting rural food requirements and helping to supply food to labor migrants in town, while colonial officials extracted capital and labor from the rural economy, women in western Kenya subsidized the settler economy.[90] Similarly,

women who provided food to miners and soldiers in the Belgian Congo directly subsidized the mining sector.

The nature of the colonial economy as well as European and African gender expectations significantly shaped women's economic activities and their control over resources. In many communities, gender ideals sanctioned men's access to women's labor and the products of that labor. Moreover, the colonial state often intervened to uphold male and generational privileges. However, women were not passive participants. Some women challenged new labor regimes that demanded more of their time or efforts to restrict their mobility. Some pushed back on men's attempts to move into sectors once considered women's spaces, while others created new economic opportunities. In the process, women helped to define and shape colonial economies.

Despite the richer picture we have of African women in colonial economies, many areas require further research. Coumba Mar Gadio and Cathy Rakowski argue, for example, that most scholarship on cash crops focuses on those produced by men for export; few examine cash crops produced for local markets by women.[91] Even where technology is providing new data, gender still shapes the information. Using data culled from *Blue Books*, Ewout Frankema and Marlous van Waijenburg suggest that real wages increased during the colonial period for urban, unskilled African men in many of Britain's African colonies. Moreover, workers would have been able to sustain a nuclear household of five people above subsistence levels. While tantalizing, the authors acknowledge that their assumptions are arbitrary and their comprehension of the purchasing power of African households lacks crucial information, such as the earnings from female and child labor.[92] The lack of data on earnings by women and children also impairs the new studies on taxes. Gardner's study of taxation in the British empire, for example, is insightful on many levels; yet it fails to grapple with the fact that the tax structure was predicated on an assumed male dominance over household resources and dependent labor.[93] Thus, theorizing taxation as an individual male obligation rather than a household obligation involving husbands, wives, and children provides an imperfect understanding of the full consequences of colonial tax policies. In 2009, when Anthony Hopkins drew attention to the renaissance in African economic history, he argued that the turn toward gender and race had been a distraction to scholarship on economic history.[94] While studies on gender and race were not the most compelling reasons for the decline, it is clear that gender as well as race are vital to the work of economic historians if they aspire to document economic history as experienced by historical actors.

Notes

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Change During the Colonial Period," in *Women in Africa: Studies in Social and Economic Change*, ed. Nancy Hafkin and Edna Bay (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 87–110; Claire Robertson, *Sharing the Same Bowl: A Socioeconomic History of Women and Class in Accra, Ghana* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). For more on the renaissance in African economic history see: A.G. Hopkins, "The New Economic History of Africa," *Journal of African History* 50, no. 2 (2009); Gareth Austin and Stephen Broadberry, "Introduction: The Renaissance of African Economic History," *Economic History Review* 67, no. 4 (2014): 893–906; James Fenske, "The Causal History of Africa: A Response to Hopkins," *Economic History of Developing Regions* 25, no. 2 (2010): 177–212; A.G. Hopkins, "Causes and Confusions in African History," *Economic History of Developing Regions* 26, no. 2 (2011): 107–10; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Economic Development: An Empirical Investigation," *The American Economic Review* 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369–401; and Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117, no. 4 (2002): 1231–94. For important critiques see Gareth Austin, "The 'Reversal of Fortune' Thesis and the Compression of History: Perspectives from African and Comparative Economic History," *Journal of International Development* 20, no. 8 (2008): 996–1027; and Hopkins, "New Economic History," 162–70.

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CHAPTER 7

Colonialism and African Womanhood

Gloria Chuku

In indigenous African society, the concept of 'woman' or 'womanhood' signified: a high level of responsibility; an embodiment of social etiquette; and familial and community expectations of an adult female as a wife, mother, and responsible member of the society. African womanhood embodied versatility, independence, hard work, and resilience of adult females contributing to the socio-economic well-being of their households and communities. However, the presence of European colonial powers (Britain, Belgium, France, Italy, Germany and Portugal) which pursued different but similar political, social, and economic policies in Africa, altered African womanhood by massively transforming African indigenous institutions, worldviews, and livelihoods. The colonial era, for the most part, the period between the 1880s and 1960s, was marked by tumultuous social change and upheaval which had far-reaching ambivalent impact on African women and their societies. The argument here is that colonialism created opportunities, challenges, and barriers as African women physically and culturally negotiated the migration from old ways of life to new ones; and as they carved out new spaces for themselves. Furthermore, through the actions of the colonizers and the colonized, African womanhood was enhanced, diminished, or placed in ambiguous situations. As existing studies have shown, while colonial rule reduced African women's status and leadership positions, decreased their earning power, and increased their workloads, it also offered women opportunities to improve their lives through a number of innovative forces.[1]

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African women's colonial historiography has shown not only a historical experience that was marked by both opportunities and limitations, but also women's agency as they negotiated and challenged the normative gender relations engendered by colonialism. Women in both urban and rural areas who conformed to these normative gender relations, and those who acted against the normative ideas of proper female behaviors by challenging African and European male authorities, were all at the forefront of historical change and transformation throughout colonial Africa.[2] This chapter explores the political and socio-cultural structures, institutions, and practices that shaped women's lives in colonial Africa and how African women responded to them. It also examines women's diverse experiences and their heterogeneous modes of resistance, adjustment, and negotiation in defense of African womanhood and agency. These issues are discussed below under the following subheadings: African women's political power and institutions under colonial rule; formal education, transformation, and African women's agency; ambiguities of the colonial legal system and African womanhood; and migration and criminalization of African womanhood.

African Women's Political Power and Institutions Under Colonial Rule

African women have enjoyed a long history of active political engagements in their respective communities, states, and kingdoms. In Asante, Buganda, Lagos, Dahomey, Benin, Swazi, and many other African imperial systems and polities, there were notable female political figures such as regents and queen mothers who not only advised, defended, nurtured, and protected the kings, but also punished and dethroned them. These women built political and military coalitions that brought their sons or relatives to power. Women's age-grade associations, secret societies, and councils in different parts of Africa were involved in governance and maintenance of law and order. Certain women with spiritual powers had led in battles or prepared soldiers for wars, and were also part of the kings' courts, advising and interceding on their behalf and for the good of their polities. With European colonialism, African female political and spiritual figures lost their powers to enthrone or depose kings and to restrain their excesses and actions as new governmental and legal structures and hierarchies were imposed on Africans. The gendered checks and balances of the Buganda political structure as in many other African polities were undermined as the colonial officials dealt directly with Ganda chiefs and male authority figures. In the Dahomey kingdom, where female dependants of the royal court served as soldiers and commanders, ministers of state and counselors, provincial governors, and trade agents, the French colonial rule closed these avenues of power and authority for women. In some wars of resistance against European colonial conquests, some of these women came into direct confrontation with the colonizers. While a number of them

were exiled, others were criminalized; and those who remained witnessed a diminished role, power, and influence.[3]

African colonial historiography has shown that colonialism and its variegated effects created new avenues of power and authority as it foreclosed others. Many of the elite women's precolonial pathways to power (kinship, high spirituality, aptitude in indigenous medicine, military prowess, leadership in women's organizations and secret societies, the marketplace, and the household) were neglected under the masculine terrain of colonial statecraft. As demonstrated by Emily Osborn's study of Kankan (the capital and trading center of the Baté empire in the Milo River Valley of Guinea-Conakry), the Baté state grew out of its households as women went to great lengths to ensure the success of their male relatives. Women used their domestic roles as savvy mothers, respectful wives, and wise and generous sisters to influence social and political processes of Baté. But French colonialism separated the household from the state and depoliticized women's domestic roles as colonial officials treated men as active agents and women as domesticated dependants.[4] The structures and processes of the colonial state made it impermeable to women's interventions. This explains why African women featured frequently in the precolonial political narratives but less so after colonization. African women's power diminished as colonial officials ignored women and precolonial indigenous institutions that guaranteed their authority and influence. In both the French policy of direct rule and British indirect rule, women had no place in the official corridors of colonial power; but African men served in colonial bureaucracies as chiefs, scribes, tax collectors, policemen, judicial officers and enforcers, interpreters, and other local administrative agents, some of whom often had little or no legitimacy among the people they were to oversee.

An important question here is how African women, especially women political and religious leaders as colonial subjects exercised political authority and how they adjusted and manipulated vectors of power to ensure their continued access to power and resources within the confines of the colonial state. Different processes of unanticipated and uncontrollable interpretations, manipulations and transformations emerged as African male colonial employees attempted to pursue the policies of their employers and also advance their own interests and protect their privileged positions. Among such unanticipated outcomes was the creation of a window of opportunity for a few women to serve in colonial government, a colonial reality that was made apparent by the agency of African womanhood. Examples can be drawn from the Igbo of southeastern Nigeria. The first known example of an Igbo woman serving in the colonial government was that of Madam Okwei (1872–1943), who was appointed a member of the Onitsha Native Court in 1912 in recognition of her political clout, leadership skills, and wealth. The second Igbo woman to occupy important political office during this period was Ahebi Ugbabe, who was appointed the Warrant Chief of Enugu-Ezike Native Court

in 1918 and shortly after became the monarch (*eze*) of Ogrute, a position she held until her death in 1948. The appointment was a reward to Ugbabe for assisting the British with vital information that contributed to the conquest of Enugu-Ezike. A few other Igbo women who served as local council members were appointed in 1930 after they demonstrated their leadership during the violent Women's War of 1929: one in the Nguru Mbaise Native Court, another in the Okpuala Native Court, and three out of 30 members of the Umuakpo Native Court.[5]

Other rare exceptions were in such colonies as Sierra Leone, Basutoland, and Dahomey with a history of powerful female political figures in the precolonial period but where the colonial state redefined local governance and provided new avenues for women to maintain and even expand their political authority.[6] While maintaining their traditional roles as queens, wives, and sisters Yoruba-speaking women of Ketu in French Dahomey also served as advisers, treasurers, ritual specialists, and colonial agents.[7] Among the Mende and Sherbro of Sierra Leone, women's political power and prerogatives as paramount chiefs were sustained and even expanded just like their male counterparts by the colonial state. The British indirect rule model left many indigenous political institutions and structures relatively intact. Colonial paramount women chiefs such as Madam Yoko of Kpa Mende, Humonya of Kenema, Maajo of Limeh, and Yaewa of Sendume exercised female agency to maintain their power. Their membership and support by the Poro (male) and Sande (female) societies which maintained social guidelines that empowered both men and women helped these women chiefs transpose their socio-religious powers into political powers. Engagement in military expansion and control of resources (land and labor), serving as mediators in wars and political conflicts, as well as being mothers with many children, senior wives, and female heads of household and female lineage heads were avenues through which Mende and Sherbro women became chiefs and protected their positions under colonialism.[8] In fact, a combination of wealth, military prowess, family ties, and leadership skills guaranteed women political power and authority within the colonial state.

In British Basutoland, women gained more political positions as regents and high chiefs even though the colonial government preferred masculinization of the chieftaincy to its feminization. British officials recommended paying female chiefs two-thirds the salary of their male counterparts. In 1903, the Resident Commissioner chastised the Basutoland National Council for voting to allow women to succeed as chiefs in their own right instead of as regents, even though some British officials admitted that female chiefs often 'ruled with distinction and integrity'.[9] Although the institution of Basotho chieftaincy was predominantly and customarily male, it did open up avenues for women to enter public politics as regents and chiefs. For instance, in 1911, female regents constituted 2% of the total chiefs and 'headmen' but their number increased to 12.5% in 1955. In 1941, Mantsebo Seeiso was

elected 'paramount chieftainess' and by 1955, four of the twenty two most senior chiefs (the 'sons' of Moshesh) were women.[10]

The increased visibility of Basotho women in public politics during the colonial period could partly be attributed to colonial conditions in Southern Africa. Migrant male labor created a vacuum and a de facto population that was increasingly female. In order to enhance the 'efficient' flow of Basotho male migrant labor to the mines of South Africa, British officials accommodated the chieftaincy institution where men and women political officeholders cooperated to achieve that goal. But more importantly, it was the support of male chiefs and women's agency that led to the increasing participation of women in government and politics. Male chiefs protected women's political officeholders on the grounds that their positions were 'traditional' even though the British argued for an all-male administration which they saw as being more 'modern'. Women protected their political ambitions through the support of male advisors and relatives, as well as by resorting to the courts and use of violence or its threat. An example was in 1926 when Maletapata of Quthing was accused of inciting a small-scale war in order to seize new lands and expand her political domain. In another example, the widow of Chief Jonathan of Leribe, in her resistance against an unfavorable choice of succession, threatened the Resident Commissioner with a bloodbath in 1929. In the 1940s and 1950s, many women chiefs were accused of and executed for allegedly using 'sorcery' to advance their interests. Another significant point to note is that female chiefs were widely respected by the Basotho people because they were less likely than men to succumb to the temptations of office. Women chiefs advocated women's autonomy and rights. They radically opposed colonial policies that restricted or undermined women's spatial, social, and economic mobility, and their self-worth. These female political officeholders were seen as 'honorary men' by the Basotho people. The women chiefs preferred to be addressed as *Ntate* (Sir).[11]

The above examples of exceptions to the norm notwithstanding, African women generally lost their political powers under European colonialism. However, they were active during the decolonization politics when women collectively and individually struggled to regain their power and authority, an effort they have intensified since independence. A number of studies have been devoted to the role of women in advancing decolonization and claims to independence in the 1950s and 1960s in different parts of Africa.[12] A few examples drawn from French and British colonies are discussed below to illustrate African women's agency and their strategies for meaningful political participation during the decolonization movements.

The French gender ideology was informed by the Napoleonic Code that established the legal framework of women's subordination to their husbands in France. This ideology, that undermined women's status, was exported to the French colonies in Africa under assimilation policy of direct rule. As a result, the French colonial officers ignored African female leaders.

Subsequently, women's right to vote and to political participation and representation in colonial Senegal depended on their status as citizens or subjects. Citizens were Africans who had passed through the French colonial educational system and were literate in French. Africans who became citizens, a tiny minority of the total population of Senegal, came from the Four Communes of Saint Louis, Gorée, Dakar, and Rufisque. A few women from the four communes who went to French schools were considered 'assimilated' but without full citizenship rights. The majority of Senegalese women, particularly those in the countryside, were considered illiterate and colonial subjects. Consequently, while African men obtained the right to vote in 1848, it took their female counterparts a century, with full suffrage in 1946, two years after the same right was granted to French women in metropolitan France. Once the right to vote was granted to French women, Senegalese men campaigned that such right be extended to Senegalese women 'like all women'.[13]

Senegalese men's strong support for women's suffrage in Senegal was not based on their commitment to gender equality but to the electoral threats posed by white and *metis* (mulatto) politicians and the potential power of a politically active female population to neutralize such threats. Subsequently, Senegalese women began playing an active role in urban politics of the 1940s, mobilizing electoral support for men through political rallies where they sang and danced to the praise of their party and its male leadership. As political party auxiliaries, women's massive votes in the 1945 municipal elections (with 21% of the electoral votes in Dakar) ended white political dominance and gave Senegalese men victories and the control of the four communes.[14] Women's huge involvement in the decolonization politics contributed to the election of Senegalese nationalist leaders and the end of colonial rule in 1960.

In French Mali, the political activities of Aoua Keita of Bamako stood out. She was a pioneer product of the School of Midwifery in Dakar (1928–1931) and with strong support from her medical doctor husband M. Diawara, she became politically active. Keita was a trade unionist and a militant member of the Soudanese branch of the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (USRDA) which she joined in 1946. When Malian women became enfranchised in 1956, Keita and Aissata Sow (president of the Soudanese Teachers' Union) became two of the seventeen elected members of the Central Committee of the RDA in 1957. In 1958, Keita organized the women's wing of the USRDA in Bamako, and in December of the same year was appointed to the Constitution Drafting Committee for the proposed Mali Federation. Keita was elected deputy to the Mali Federation in April 1959, and with independence in 1960 she became the first female deputy to the Republic of Mali's national assembly.[15]

By 1946, Africans were regarded as French citizens in Overseas France and had the right to vote for African delegates to the Territorial Assemblies. The period after the Second World War also witnessed an explosion of political parties and mass political mobilization for full self-governance in French

Africa and across the continent. But in Gabon, political activities for independence were muted due largely to the weak political and middle classes and poverty. Only a few educated Gabonese, the 'notable' men (civil servants, ex-soldiers, and assessors in native courts), who constituted 6% of the population could vote in 1946. It was not until 1952 that a restricted group of Gabonese women were allowed to vote, with full suffrage granted in 1956.[16] Muslim women of colonial Algeria were completely disenfranchised. In the two nationalist parties (the Algerian People's Party and Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties [PPA-MTLD] and the Algerian Communist Party [PCA]), women's significant presence was as auxiliaries mobilizing others. Yet when the 1954–1962 war of independence broke out, about 11,000 women joined as fighters, which was 3.1% of all those in active combat; and over 2000 became militants (16% of all militants), dealing with lives of deprivation, hunger, harsh weather, imprisonment, torture, and death. No Algerian woman was a member of the National Liberation Front (FLN) party. They only belonged to the National Union of Algerian Women (UNFA) as auxiliaries of the FLN. Ironically, when independence was achieved, women seemed to have disappeared from the political scene. But with their enfranchisement in 1962, they gained ten seats in the first National Assembly out of 194 members.[17]

Basotho women played active roles in the decolonization politics of the 1950s and 1960s. An important study on the subject has highlighted Basotho women's agency and political activism, including roles as chiefs, politicians, nuns, homemakers, prostitutes, and runaways in the last four decades prior to Lesotho's independence in 1966.[18] In 1960, the British restricted franchise to tax-payers resulted in only 56 women being eligible to vote in the entire Basutoland. The male-dominated Basutoland Congress Party (BCP, former Basutoland African Congress) encouraged women's participation in nationalist politics and also created a platform which fostered the emergence of the first woman leader, Ellen'Maposholi Molapo, in the 1950s. Molapo was a dynamic African National Congress (ANC) activist who organized for the BCP in the Transvaal and was involved in the bitter struggles between the Pan-Africanist Congress and the ANC prior to her expulsion from South Africa. The BCP Women's League played an important role in mobilizing villages and towns in support of the party, and contributed to the party's triumph in 1960. But the party's opposition to the enfranchisement of women and its urban-focused electoral campaigns among other factors led to its narrow defeat in 1965 by Leabua Jonathan's Basotho National Party (BNP).[19] BCP members who testified to the Basutoland Constitutional Commission in 1962 opposed women's enfranchisement on the basis that Basotho women were 'not matured in politics [and] knew nothing about independence'.[20] They also attacked the Catholic Church and the nuns. But Jonathan's BNP campaigned for the protection and emancipation of women, and on a pro-women agenda, including girls' education, health-care centers for women,

equal wages for men and women, and guarantee of women's rights. Jonathan praised Basotho nuns and laywomen, referring to the latter as 'bulldozers with breasts'.[21]

Nigerian women participated in the decolonization politics of the 1940s and 1950s with a long history of struggle for political relevance. They were not included in the executive committees or policy-making positions of the early protonationalist parties. They did not enjoy the limited franchise extended to men of the colony. It was out of frustration at being marginalized and excluded in the political process by male nationalists that Oyikan Abayomi founded the Nigerian Women's Party (NWP) in 1944. The NWP was established to demand women's rights: the right to vote and be represented on the Lagos Town Council (LTC) and the Legislative Council for the colony. With limited woman suffrage in 1950, the NWP fielded the first women political candidates of colonial Nigeria. Although the party failed to win the two seats to the LTC that it had contested, its establishment and activities were major achievements in the political history of Nigerian women. Subsequently, more southern women began to play active roles in Nigerian politics. While southern Nigerian women were enfranchised from 1950, their northern Islamic counterparts remained politically powerless and disenfranchised throughout the colonial period. Ironically, as the Islamic emirate governments of the North were suppressing independent women as 'immoral', the same group of women was increasingly vital in political organization and the women's wings of the two major political parties there: the Northern People's Congress (NPC) and the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). The leader of the NPC Women's Wing was a well-known personality in *karuwanci* (courtesanship). The male leadership of the political parties assumed a paternalistic relationship with the women's wings, with the NPC vehemently opposing women's enfranchisement. But the NEPU under Aminu Kano's leadership advocated female franchise and women's formal education.[22]

Formal Education, Transformation, and African Women's Agency

The ramifications of differential gender-based colonial education (which though transformative and offering African women opportunities for upward social and economic mobility, while at the same time domesticated them) is explored below.[23] Formal education, which was pioneered by the Christian missions, had the greatest transformative impact on young women and girls, offering them opportunities to traverse geographical, cultural, ideological, and social boundaries. Mission and colonial education was a vehicle for vocational training, job acquisition, upward social mobility, and acculturation. Various colonial powers implemented different but similar educational policies in their respective colonies. In all the colonies, both the mission and the

government pursued gender-based education that favored men and boys with serious implications for African women and girls. The discussion below draws examples mainly from Belgian, Portuguese, German, British, and French colonial and mission educational policies to demonstrate their differential impacts on African women and girls.

In the early colonial French Africa, Catholic priests and nuns monopolized the education of African children. The first school in Senegal was opened by a Catholic priest in 1816 in Saint Louis. By the 1840s there were four primary schools there: two in Saint Louis and the other two in Goree, with a total enrollment that was under 600. The first schools for girls in Senegal were established in Goree and Saint Louis in the first half of the nineteenth century after colonial officials encouraged the Sisters of Saint Joseph de Cluny to provide instruction to *signares* (mulatto Franco-African women) and their *metis* daughters. With instruction focusing primarily on history, grammar, and geography, the schools witnessed poor attendance by *metis* and African children. But attendance improved after 1852 as the schools started training girls for adult female roles (such as sewing and other housecraft skills) that were socially approved of for African women in the emergent colonial society. For instance, Saint Louis enrollment increased from a couple of dozen girls between 1822 and 1852 to 150 during the 1852–1854 school years, and the Goree school witnessed an enrollment increase in 1853 from 60 to 178 students. In 1873, there were 300 students in both schools, although most of them were Catholic *metisses*. For the first time, a significant minority of Senegalese girls, including a few Muslims, enrolled in the two schools.[24] In 1856, Louis Faidherbe built a school in Saint Louis for the sons of chiefs to train them as intermediaries of the French colonial administration, but there was no similar school for girls.

Following the organization of the colonial administration of French West Africa (AOF) from 1902 to 1904, the government took over the direction of all schools in Senegal, the Soudan, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Dahomey, and later those in Mauritania, Niger, and Upper Volta. The colonial government stopped funding mission schools and even closed some. Those that remained open called themselves 'workshops', offering students practical skill training. Subsequently, the William Ponty School was established in Saint Louis in 1903 to train the first African primary-school teachers, interpreters, medical personnel, and veterinarians, the products of which became the nucleus of a pioneer African male elite, the so-called Black French. The first *lycée* in AOF was established in 1919 at Saint Louis; it remained the only secondary school serving the whole federation until 1936 when a private school in Dakar began offering secondary courses.[25] In 1938, less than 3% of school-age children in AOF were in full-time education. There were between 56,135 and 68,416 pupils in primary schools, the majority of whom were attending rudimentary semi-schooling, and 717 in *écoles primaires supérieures* (EPSs: higher primary schools after six years of primary education, the equivalent of

an American junior high school). The EPSs trained primary-school teachers, low-level clerks, and other local employees of the administration and commerce. In the 1937–1938 academic year, girls comprised only 5892 of the total school enrollments. In French Equatorial Africa (AEF: Chad, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, and Ubangi-Shari, later Central African Republic), the poorest and least developed of the colonial federations, there were 9038 African children in 78 primary schools in 1938. Less than 1% of the annual budget was invested in education specifically for the training of a small group of male auxiliaries. There were no public schools or classes for girls; only a tiny number attended the boys' schools. Secondary education was unavailable for African children with the first black African trainee teachers graduating from Ecole Edouard Renard, Brazzaville in early 1939.[26]

Comparatively, the French invested less in the education of Africans compared to the Germans. For instance, the whole Federation of AOF had only 400 primary schools with 22,000 pupils in 1920 compared to 14,000 pupils in German Togo in 1913, and 41,000 in Kamerun, which also had a teacher-training institution, three senior primary schools, and a professional school.[27] Female education in French colonies remained very limited and was worse in Muslim communities. In French North Africa, if male education was limited, girls and women were grossly underrepresented. In Algeria, there were 42,904 Muslim children in primary schools compared to 112,223 European children (with the European population being 20% of the whole) in 1920–1921. Secondary-school bursaries were offered for sons of *qadis* (judges) and junior Muslim functionaries in 1886. In 1914, there were 386 Muslims in lycées, and in 1930 the number increased to 776 (7.7% of the total *lycée* students in Algeria). At the same period in Morocco, restrictions were imposed on African children's access to secondary education; there were no instructions on modern sciences and the humanities.[28] Muslim girls and women were shielded from public spaces such as schools. Only very few of them were enrolled in schools. For example, Senegalese girls' enrollment in public primary schools fluctuated between 200 and 500 in the first three decades of the twentieth century compared to 2500–5000 for boys.[29] Since the French and Islamic ideologies on women were embedded on familial and patriarchal expectations, female education was tailored to reinforce these ideologies and not to alter the fundamental bases of the Muslim family and gender roles. Female education therefore focused on practical training in cooking, childcare, sewing, and other domestic arts.

In both British and French colonies, medicine (training as midwives, nurses, and nursing aids) was one of the first fields that opened for African women an opportunity for post-primary education. But while in British, Belgian Congo and other colonies, these pioneer African midwives were trained in mission institutions,[30] the colonial state took direct responsibility in French West Africa by promoting public health education for African women through the establishment of a school of midwifery in the medical center

founded in Dakar, Senegal, in 1918. By 1957, this school had produced over 500 midwives. Before 1938, when teachers' training schools for women were opened in Rufisque, Senegal, and Katibougou in Ivory Coast, colonial midwives were the most highly educated African women in AOF.[31] The *École normale de jeunes filles* (ENJF) for a four-year teacher-training course, and the Dakar School of Medicine and Midwifery (two years of midwifery training) were the only avenues for post-primary advancement for AOF girls and young women. The goal of the ENJF was to produce good housewives and auxiliaries for girls' education. The first class of this elite federal teacher-training college for young women in Rufisque in 1938–1939 comprised seventeen girls from Senegal (mostly from Dakar), nine from Dahomey, eight from Togo, seven from Guinea, four from Ivory Coast, and one from the Soudan. Some 24 of them came from families of government functionaries, eleven from commercial families, seven were daughters of public-work artisans and one was the daughter of a navigator. None of them was the daughter of a traditional elite (chiefs, Islamic clerics, *qadis*, and other leaders). Not only were these girls the daughters of the newly educated African elite, but their fathers provided the strongest encouragement and support for their pursuit of education.[32]

Prior to 1938, women teachers were recruited from those who completed higher primary school in French colonies. At the teacher-training college, their morning classes included French, writing, arithmetic, and the basic sciences, and in the afternoons hygiene, childcare, cooking, sewing, and drawing. Many pioneer graduates of the ENJF later occupied important positions in education, government, and the private sector in Senegal and throughout the AOF where they served as role models especially in the spread of female education. Formal schooling produced African female homemakers, teachers, and professionals. However, both mission and colonial education were lopsided in favor of men and boys. In many colonies, it domesticated African women and girls in ways compatible to European values, gender ideology, and the needs of the colonial state. Formal education, which often was not more than elementary training, was to mold African women and girls into suitable housewives for modern elite men, and ideal mothers and teachers for young children. While boys were trained in literary education (reading, writing, and arithmetic) and to acquire skills and knowledge in literacy, communication, leadership, and other highly skilled artisanal work such as carpentry, building, plumbing, horticulture, and animal husbandry, young women and girls were trained in rudimentary reading, writing, arithmetic, child care and domestic skills. Generally, French education for boys was to train them to perform lower-level bureaucratic services, but female education was to serve as a springboard for the civilizing mission. The expectation was that educated African girls as culturally assimilated young women would foster the reproduction of French colonial society in Africa by becoming pious Catholic wives and mothers instilling French values in future generations of Africans.

Just as in Gabon where 60% of Gabonese pupils and students attended Catholic schools,[33] in the Belgian Congo education in general was entrusted to the Catholic Church.[34] Female education, in particular, which was managed by nuns, was offered to African girls and women with a more conservative gender-based tradition. Boys and men were the first to receive formal education and instruction was in French. Prior to the 1948 educational reform, female education in the Belgian Congo was offered in local languages and it was based on domestic science and home management skills as well as feminine characteristics that were defined by Christian values and convictions. In the first phase of a two-stage primary education, instruction was in local languages. Certain pupils were selected for the second-stage where they were prepared for secondary school and instructed in French. At the secondary level, boys were prepared for careers in public service, private enterprise, and post-secondary education. In the new system, Congolese girls received additional training in household management (cooking, ironing, washing, gardening, home furnishing and decoration, cleanliness and orderliness) and in sewing, arithmetic, religion, French, one's local language, geography, music, singing, drawing, gymnastics, and agriculture. They could pursue a three-year middle school in homemaking, or a four-year teacher training program, or a two-year nursing and midwifery instruction course for nurses, nursing assistants, and midwives, followed by practical training. Much emphasis was placed on practice.

The goal of mission and colonial education in Belgian Congo was to produce male assistant clerks, artisans, and medium-level professionals as female education was oriented toward making perfect wives for the male elite (*les évoluees*), informed mothers of families, household managers, and auxiliary teachers, nurses, and midwives. In 1955, there were twenty three girls' schools for apprenticeship and twenty two teacher-training schools for girls with a combined enrollment of 1600 students compared to 7750 boys enrolled in the same type of institutions. There were only six schools for girls, categorized as 'select' upper primary sections with thirty classes that prepared them for post-primary education. In addition, girls and young women had two professional schools for clothing design and sewing, and seven middle schools for household management. The conservative Christian patriarchal norms of mission education backed by colonial legislation exacerbated the educational disparity between boys and girls, and resulted in a dismal record in female education on the eve of Congo's independence in 1960. For example, in 1960, there were 350,000 girls in primary school out of 1.6 million primary pupils, 10,000 girls were attending post-primary and secondary schools with fewer than 1000 in secondary schools out of 29,000 students; there were no females among several hundred Congolese students in the two universities or in the six post-secondary institutions there. There were no females among the 800 secondary-school graduates. The most educationally advanced Congolese woman was a senior in high school.[35] The result of the

educational disparity between boys and girls, men and women was that while the mission and colonial system of education distanced women from salaried work and confined them to 'feminine' work, it prepared men for leadership, technical and professional jobs, and reinforced their patriarchal control. A few women who ventured outside the home were limited to the elementary school, the convent, and hospitals as midwives and nurses' aides; but men were employed in the military, the colonial administration, medical service, trading firms, craft industries, agriculture, construction (such as the railway and buildings), teaching, and mission enterprise.

The British differential application of the indirect rule system in Nigeria, as well as different religious ideologies, and the often antagonistic relationship between the missionaries and colonial officers contributed to the educational imbalance between the Northern and Southern Provinces. Southern Provinces and Lagos had enormous educational advantage over the Northern Provinces because the people embraced the missionaries and formal education earlier and with more enthusiasm than the Muslims in the North. For instance, in the South, between 1846 and 1899, different missions had established over a dozen primary schools, five secondary schools for boys and one post-primary school for girls that started in 1895. The first government primary school was established in Lagos in 1899 for the education of Muslim boys. In 1928 there were 49 government primary schools in the South with 8440 boys and 703 girls. Schools for boys had been established in Northern Nigeria since 1910, but the first two girls' schools here were established in Kano and Katsina in 1930 with 15 and 40 pupils respectively. Until 1933, the two girls' schools were called 'centers' and they primarily taught sewing. But within a few years, the curriculum expanded to include reading and writing, the main purpose being to train urban women to be better, healthier wives and mothers. By 1937, primary-school enrollment in the North was merely 10% and secondary school less than 2% that of the South.[36] Out of a school population of 7,750,000 (under 16 years old) in the mid-1940s, 400,000 were at school, with only 30,000 from the whole of the Northern Provinces.[37]

The gendered educational disparity between the North and South was even worse in secondary and higher education. King's College, Lagos (1909) was the first government secondary school, and Queen's College, Lagos (1927) the first government secondary school for girls. In 1928, there were 16 boys' secondary schools with 612 enrollments, and three girls' secondary schools with 53 students in the South. A Women's Training Center (later in 1942, Women's Training College) was established in Sokoto in 1939 to train Muslim women teachers. It started with 24 students who were daughters of northern Muslim aristocrats, many of whom married soon after graduation and were confined to purdah.[38] Female education in the 1940s revealed 'a very backward situation', with 150 girls at the Queen's College, and 2 domestic centers in the South; and for Moslems in the North there were 4 schools at the junior primary level, 'small in size and mediocre in standard',

a good training center in Sokoto, and 4 domestic science centers. It would require up to two decades of serious investment in teacher education alone and commitment by all parties involved to bridge the educational disparity between women in the South and their Muslim counterparts in the North.[39] In 1951, out of 16 million northerners, only one had a full university degree, and a couple of teachers had two-year post-teaching college university training in the United Kingdom. They were all males. In 1952, Aminu Kano, a northern progressive politician, established a school for women in Kano where courses were offered in machine sewing, handicrafts, basic Hausa, and English literacy.

The gendered nature of mission and colonial education in Nigeria privileged boys over girls in terms of access to formal schooling, the breadth of its curriculum, and employment opportunities. In 1955, 70% of males were enrolled in primary school compared to 30% of females.[40] Data on secondary school and post-secondary enrollments were worse than primary-school enrollments for girls. For example, Yaba Higher College, the first post-secondary educational institution established in Nigeria in 1932, had 83 female students out of a total enrollment of 1150 by 1961. The University of Ibadan, a premier institution of higher education established in Nigeria in 1948, had 79 female students out of a total student enrollment of 1116 (excluding non-Nigerians).[41]

Furthermore, in British Kenya, there were no high schools for girls until 1950 when the first high school for African girls (the African Girls High School, later the Alliance Girls High School) was established in Kikuyu territory. The only three girls in high school prior to the opening of the girls' high school were admitted in a boys' school (Alliance Boys' High School) in 1950. Among the three girls was Margaret Kenyatta, the daughter of Kenya's first president who later became the first mayor of Nairobi, the capital city, after independence. In 1950, 61 boys had sat for the school certificate examination (high-school diploma) but no girl had done so; however, in 1963, 1292 boys and 199 girls took the examination. Similarly, Nairobi University College had 40 men and a woman in 1965.[42]

In addition to limited access to formal schooling, colonial education offered boys and young men opportunities to train for leadership and other positions in society while domesticating girls and young women through a curriculum that emphasized wifehood, motherhood, home economics and management, hygiene, needlework, and other related activities. Girls and young women were not taught skills useful for wage employment at the primary schools; they also had limited access to secondary education: two factors that enormously impeded their ability to compete favorably with their male counterparts in the labor market. Only very few Nigerian women, for instance, had the opportunity to pursue and acquire higher education and professional certificates and degrees in the above post-secondary institutions and overseas prior to independence in 1960.[43]

Generally, mission and colonial female education in Africa was domestic-oriented because many missionaries did not see wage work as a desirable career for African women and girls. For example, in 1920s–1930s Southern Rhodesia, girls' and women's education was aimed at producing: farmwomen to take care of rural African communities; wives for African teachers, evangelists, builders, clerks, and interpreters; and mothers to raise elite African children. Part of the expectations was that as literate wives and mothers, African women could help to tie African men and their households to African community without threatening European control of Southern Rhodesia through integration. And by working in European households as servants and retainers, mission-educated African women could help safeguard European women and girls from the constant presence of African male domestic servants, and by so doing secure European families. It is therefore not surprising that female education in this colony focused on agriculture, child care, morality, and domestic service and avoided individualism and careerism.[44]

Similarly, mission education for girls and women in South Africa prior to the 1920s pursued the same ideology of domesticity, focusing on housewifery which included cleaning, cooking, sewing, and how to be 'useful' wives, mothers, and women. Some of the female graduates became nurses, teachers, and church workers.[45] In Zanzibar, where the first government girls' school was established in 1927, the curriculum emphasized marriage and motherhood with instructions on modern hygiene, religion, writing, reading, and arithmetic.[46] This type of education offered girls and women limited opportunities to gain qualifications sufficient for careers in teaching, nursing, midwifery, and secretarial services. For the most part, their education was not for employment but implied domesticity; that is, creation of hardworking virtuous Christian wives for emerging male elite Africans, and caring mothers.

In colonial Mozambique, for example, where few children had access to formal schooling, girls had far fewer opportunities than boys to attend school with a course of study that was oriented toward domestic science skills. While the first schools were established for boys by the Christian missions in the 1850s, a girls' school was opened in the 1890s by Catholic nuns. African parents preferred nuns to teach their daughters for some reason, a practice that impeded the education of girls and young women in Mozambique due to a number of factors, including the scarcity of female teachers which continued into the 1950s. At the rudimentary level, boys and young men were instructed in reading and writing in Portuguese and local languages, basic mathematics, history, science, singing, and drawing. Successful ones were eligible to attend trade schools where they learned moral and civic education, as well as manual skills in agriculture, machinery, carpentry and furniture-making, iron work, tailoring, shoe making, and pottery making (a traditional domain of women). The skills and experiences prepared men for leadership roles and integration into the colonial economy. Girls and young women were taught how to read and write, sing and play piano, draw and paint, cut

and sew, crochet, bake, wash and iron clothes, and make better homes for themselves as housewives and mothers. Advanced courses included child care, cooking, literacy, embroidery, household maintenance and budgeting, nursing, and teaching. Yet, as in other colonies in Africa, boys' enrollment outpaced that of girls. For instance, in 1920, there were only 632 girls compared to 5995 boys enrolled in Catholic schools in Mozambique; and in 1940, there were 16,573 (30%) girls out of the total of 56,011 student enrollments throughout the colony.[47]

Low enrollments of girls and young women across colonial Africa was a result of various factors, including cultural inhibitions, household labor needs, early marriage, financial constraints, and parental opposition or lack of support for the education of their daughters. Part of the cultural inhibitions involved the interference of formal schooling in female initiation rites, early marriage, and motherhood. Parental opposition was driven by patriarchal sensibilities, economic factors and religious ideologies. For instance, while African parents saw the education of their sons as an investment, they reasoned that the education of their daughters was a waste of resources since they would be married away and take with them any income they would have earned for their natal families. Yet daughters tended to have more domestic obligations than their brothers, and therefore less time to devote to their studies. They were more likely to be withdrawn from school than their brothers for a number of reasons, including death or sickness or any misfortune in the family. Early and teenage pregnancy also contributed to high dropout rates for girls. Moreover, girls usually started schooling at a later age than their brothers and also spent fewer years in school than boys. As a result, fewer numbers of girls than boys attended school. They were under-represented in school enrollments, particularly in the higher standards or classes. Similarly, their graduation rate was minimally low. For example, in German Duala and Victoria (Kamerun/Cameroon) only three of the twenty five primary graduates in 1900 were girls. All the male graduates were employed as court clerks, sales clerks, teaching aides, customs inspectors or were offered scholarships to study carpentry and teaching.[48]

Gender-based educational imbalance was compounded by the intersection of class and gender. In colonial Africa, particularly in the countryside where the mass of peasants lived, girls and women served as the backbone of subsistence agriculture and rural economies. Here, girls' and women's labor value without formal education was higher than in the cities because they were more active economically in agriculture and trade, two areas vital to their household survival and the sustenance of rural economies. Thus, women's labor value, both in their households and communities, superseded their desire to attend formal schooling. Cost of education, lower quality of girls' schools, long distances to rural schools without adequate and affordable means of transport, and seclusion of Muslim girls at puberty were contributory factors to the low female enrollments in schools and their high dropout

rates. Other inhibitive factors were lack of or discrimination in employment opportunities in the public and private sectors for female products of formal education; and the general belief by African parents that the education of their daughters had no benefits to their families since they would be married away.

Often, class played a significant role in determining girls' and young women's access to formal education as children of Western-educated parents and those whose parents were affiliated with the mission or colonial administration or foreign trading companies were more likely than children of rural peasants and pastoralists to attend and graduate from formal schooling. In different parts of colonial Africa, there were many instances of Western-educated fathers demanding that their daughters' education should equip them to become suitably socialized wives for the emergent male elite and future mothers.[49] For example, the education of Senegalese girls only became a major policy discussion after the emergence of a new social class of educated elite males who supported the education of their sons and daughters but with different foci: sons for future leaders and daughters as wives of leaders and future mothers skilled in Western feminine norms, sociability, and accomplishments.

Similarly, in Mozambique, children of the African middle class benefited from the elite status of their parents in many ways. Following the passage of the Missionary Accord in 1940 that transferred the education of African children to the Catholic Church, and the imposition of Portuguese as the language of instruction, many Mozambican children faced restricted access to formal schooling. The Catholic Church imposed school fees, age restrictions, and conversion to Catholicism and baptism of Catholics as conditions for enrollment and promotion to another level. African children were taught in overcrowded classrooms based on rote learning with lack of teaching materials, and were subjected to all kinds of physical violence in the name of discipline for speaking their local languages, engaging in disruptive behaviors, or failing to demonstrate the ability to learn fast. Children of the tiny African middle class, who were fluent in Portuguese because Portuguese was spoken in their homes, had an advantage when entering the colonial education system. Their parents could also afford to pay their school fees. Generally, in their cultural elitism, the Portuguese colonizers who designated African languages as dialects, considered Africans with literacy in African languages as illiterate, and only accepted fluency and literacy in Portuguese as true markers of an educated African eligible for social mobility.[50]

When it came to the decision of whom to send to formal school, African parents for the most part chose their sons over their daughters. Under the colonial system that denied women access to employment opportunities, African parents saw no benefits in girls' education because they were expected to be married away with whatever skills and resources they had acquired. Many parents would argue that a girl did not live by books but in caring for the

home and the farm and in engaging in village markets. In many colonies such as the Congo-Brazzaville, daughters were withdrawn from school during peak farming seasons for farm work.[51] In colonial Kenya, formal education was seen as 'a pollutant [that would] affect a wide range of cultural practices and beliefs'; educated females were regarded as 'prostitutes' and 'badly behaved'.[52] Even as late as the 1950s and 1960s, many African men preferred to marry women with little or no literacy skills for fear of their being 'too wise and wayward'. Marrying Western-educated and professional women, referred to as *acada* women by the Igbo of Nigeria (*acada*: a corruption of the English word *academic*), was often considered as taking a bad risk, for such women had passed the age considered normal for marriage and reproduction, and could also be headstrong.[53]

In many parts of colonial Africa, young women and girls generally withdrew from school or abandoned their wage employment, especially when male authority was threatened. In my study of Igbo women of southeastern Nigeria, I documented cases where girls and young women were withdrawn from school and female teachers were forced to abandon their teaching careers for petty trade when they got married because trading offered them the flexibility to carry out their familial responsibilities and expectations.[54] In Southern Rhodesia, the first class of educated African women were hired in the 1920s as infant class teachers or junior teachers until they were married.[55] The resistance against girls' and women's education and wage employment was worse in Muslim communities, where Islam posed a formidable barrier to the expansion of formal education. In Algeria, in 1954, only 4.5% of women could read and write and they had no access to employment except in jobs not demanding professional qualifications. On the eve of independence in 1962, there were no more than six female doctors, 25 secondary-school teachers and no women in higher education. Out of the 500 students at the University of Algiers, only 50 were female.[56] In northern Nigeria there were fewer educated women than among their southern counterparts due to opposition from Muslim men. For example, a 1940 report noted the dearth of women teachers in Nigeria as so worrisome, with only one African graduate in the entire colony, that although European teachers were expensive, it would require 10 more years before an African cadre would be built up in the South, and 25 years in the North.[57]

In Muslim societies such as Zanzibar, parents used puberty as a reason to withdraw their daughters from school, primarily for marriage. To track Zanzibari schoolgirls' physical development and determine their puberty age, medical inspections were introduced in schools in 1913. When medical inspection intensified in the 1930s and 1940s, it became a reason for parents to withdraw their daughters from school. Muslim parents saw marriage as an institution where female sexuality had to be contained, and thus the 'longer a girl spent at school after puberty, the more her respectability came into question'.[58] Breaking the rules of respectability was also why unwed pregnant

schoolgirls were expelled from school. Zanzibari schoolgirls were believed to have posed a high risk of disgracing their families and therefore being unmarriageable if they chose academic advancement before marriage.

Generally, in colonial Africa, only a tiny minority of African girls and women, boys and men acquired an education beyond the primary-school grades. For instance, according to a UNESCO publication, 88.5% of African women and 73.4% of men were reported to be illiterate in 1960, and in 1970 the figures were 82.4% for women and 58.3% for men.[59] Some colonies were worse than others, especially Belgian Congo and Portuguese colonies. For example, in 1970 (five years before independence), only 6% of Mozambican women and girls and 12% of boys and men completed primary-school education; and 93% of Mozambican women and 86% of men were considered illiterate in Portuguese.[60] The gender disparity in access to formal education as well as the quality of the content and methods of instruction undercut African women and girls in the labor market. While boys and men were better prepared than women and girls for salaried work, ideologically, they were the ones found ideal to be hired by the government, the military, the mission, and the private sector. The cumulative impact was that fewer African women and girls were gainfully employed in jobs only available to Africans. For example, in Mozambique in 1960, there were 31 female nurses out of 191 African nurses; out of 115 African primary-school teachers, only 4 were women; and there were 14 African women out of a total of 234 African high-school teachers.[61]

Furthermore, the way mission and colonial education domesticated African women and girls distanced them from the labor market, and reinforced male dominance over them. However, female education at all levels was transformative and offered a tiny fraction of African women opportunities for spatial, social, and economic mobility. In spite of the barriers and challenges, African women and girls were able to acquire formal education that prepared them for opportunities outside the household. With their formal education, women and girls in colonial Africa became seamstresses, teachers, secretaries, nurses, midwives, and other professionals, as well as nannies, servants, proprietors of small-scale domestic training centers, catering centers, and businesses, activities which helped them to build independent economic bases. But they were a tiny minority compared to their male counterparts. This group of women became pioneers of a modern, African, female middle class, acquiring new identities and enhanced status in their own right and often refusing to abandon their professions upon marriage, although some succumbed to patriarchal, cultural, and religious pressures. The women successfully negotiated a balance between their family lives, employment, and professional growth. Some of them further enhanced their status through their marriages to members of the new African elite. In addition, many African women and girls took their formal education as a springboard for resistance against patriarchal authorities, including colonial and indigenous ones. Formal education

was transformative to this group of women because it equipped them with knowledge of alternative skills, values, and lifestyles to forge new alliances and networks for individual identity and self-esteem as well as for group solidarity and community.

Ambiguities of the Colonial Legal System and African Womanhood

The ambiguities of European colonialism and the nature and range of women's strategic engagements with it were also demonstrated in the legal system. The key question here is: How did women employ colonial legal instruments and strategies to deal with multiple and diverse circumstances, institutions, and authority figures? The colonial dual legal structures of customary/Islamic codes and statutory and common laws ambivalently reinforced patriarchy while at the same time opening new avenues for African women's mobility and self-assertion. They gave African women, individually and collectively, opportunities to challenge with varying degrees of success indigenous social-control institutions, inhibitive practices, and authority figures. The colonial courts were thus battlegrounds where husbands and wives, men and women, fathers and daughters, widows and their in-laws, old and new elites, elders and youths, relatives, neighbors, slaves, and masters, as well as the subordinated and their superiors contested power relations. Sometimes, they presented women with avenues and new opportunities to negotiate autonomy. Studies on the codification of African marriages, bridewealth transfers, divorce proceedings, inheritance, and child custody in public records have demonstrated the ambivalence of such laws in subjecting women to a new dual patriarchy (what Schmidt, in reference to Shona women of Southern Rhodesia, described as being 'beholden to two patriarchies' of African men backed by colonial officials), as well as creating new opportunities for them but within the context of a paternalistic and restrictive colonial state.[62]

The codification and modification of customary marriage laws became imperative in the face of instability in African marriages caused by high divorce rates, exorbitant bridewealth, adultery, and civil and violent conflict between men and women with its negative impact on socio-economic development and population growth. While colonial officials consulted African men and used them to enforce the laws, nobody sought the opinions of African women and girls in the legal matters that affected them, simply because they were seen as minors and dependants of men. In some colonies, the colonial government in collaboration with elite African men reinforced patriarchy by codifying marriage and family laws to enforce senior men's control over women and junior men. The courts had punished adulterous wives and their lovers by imposing fines on them. Runaway wives were also prosecuted and fined. The courts had denied divorces to women on the grounds that their reasons for desiring to end their marriages were insufficient. The

male-controlled local courts usually ordered women to return to their husbands or be liable to contempt of court and fined.[63] In this way, they curtailed women's efforts to maintain autonomy over their marital status.

However, African women demonstrated their agency in various ways, including circumventing the laws, or selecting aspects that protected their interests, or negotiating with male authorities to minimize their negative impact. Some of them resorted to divorce, desertion of their husbands, and elopement. Just as in the cases of the Gusii of Kenya and the Yoruba of colonial Lagos, most women stayed in their homes and argued their cases in local African courts presided over by elderly men, or sought justice in colonial courts dominated by Europeans.[64] Yet Zulu women of Natal (now KwaZulu Natal) were active agents in challenging the patriarchal nature and meaning of custom and customary law that attempted to control their bodies and spatial mobility by appearing in colonial courts as litigants and witnesses.[65] The law courts enabled women to strategically negotiate and manipulate the law in their favor and reshape women's expectations in marriage.

African women and girls used the courts to neutralize men's hegemony as they sought for divorce or justified their escape from unsatisfactory marital situations. Women gained some rights, such as those to divorce and certain inheritance. Divorce was always granted to women as long as they transferred back the bridewealth to their husbands and paid for any damages.[66] In Northern Ghana, for example, the colonial courts awarded husbands monetary compensation when their wives abandoned their conjugal homes. The courts granted husbands the right to divorce their wives and claim damages for adultery alone, but wives could divorce their husbands only if the adultery involved crimes such as desertion, incest, rape, cruelty, bestiality, or sodomy. For five decades, women litigated their domestic disputes before the courts, a mark of protracted resistance. But while the courts allowed husbands to assert ownership over their wives, the latter exercised more control outside the courts.[67]

Women contested for inheritance rights and were successful to varying degrees. Widows and heirs of their deceased husbands also contested boundaries of levirate marriage, with the courts granting women the right to make the determination on their marital status. In AOF, Muslim wives of African soldiers turned to French officers for the adjudication of their divorce and inheritance rather than to the Islamic courts, even though the latter allowed the women's families to keep the bridewealth which they had to return in French courts.[68] The French courts as in other colonial legal systems granted legal custody of children to their fathers who had paid bridewealth but maternal care and physical custody for under-aged children. Widows were however granted full custody of their children instead of heirs of the deceased husbands. Moreover, women used both the civil and military courts to sue their husbands for family support or damages from domestic violence.

It is important to note that what the colonial officers codified as customary laws or Islamic laws (sharia) were the males' interpretations, which always protected their status and undermined women's. For example, in the northern Nigerian Kano emirate, women lost their inheritance rights over houses and farms for more than 30 years (1923–1954) as a result of the emirs' interpretation of the sharia on the subject. The British accepted Emir Usman's deliberate misinterpretation of the sharia that women never inherited houses and farms. But the Islamic law guarantees daughters one-half of their brothers' shares of inheritance. Usman used the Islamic law to protect male authority when it was threatened by women's property ownership, capitalizing on women's political powerlessness and the concern that women's property ownership would turn them into prostitutes. However, in 1954, Emir Muhammadu Sanusi restored women's right to inheritance as an ameliorative measure to poverty and destitution of elderly women, citing that the sharia had never prohibited women from inheriting houses and farms.[69]

In spite of gains made in terms of rights to divorce, inheritance, and physical custody of minor children, African women remained undermined by the colonial legal pluralism of common and statutory laws, religious and customary laws which complicated the administration of justice in different colonies. Matters relating to death, divorce, child custody, and inheritance remained under customary law prescribed and enforced by men. With little oversight by European officers, African male elders prescribed and proscribed judgments according to local logic which was guided by discriminatory patriarchal sensibilities and notions of women's appropriate role in social and familial relations. Among all the colonial and customary laws, it was those over land ownership that had the most profound impact on African women because they touched on women's livelihood and economic independence. African women had to learn how to negotiate all the legislative and regulatory measures and prohibitive social conventions imposed on them by colonial officials, the missions, and African men. These new impositions limited African women's choices, their rights, and mobility.

Migration and Criminalization of African Womanhood

Migration of men (especially in East, Central, and Southern Africa to the cities, mines and other sites of employment) and the restriction of women's movement from the countryside to those new sites created by colonialism were other examples of colonial gender discrimination against women. Studies of different colonial settings in Africa have shown how women negotiated their restrictions to migrate to urban areas, where the intersection of African ideologies with European values has been most dramatic and contentious; as well as their criminalization as prostitutes and 'health hazards' for venturing to these centers of employment; and how such discriminatory regulations and invasive medicalization of their bodies circumscribed African women's

opportunities, upward mobility, and autonomy.[70] In many colonies, African women used spatial mobility to new centers (towns, missions, schools, mines, markets, and farms) created by colonialism as a means of neutralizing rural patriarchal control over them and their daughters.

In Basutoland, for example, the British issued the Basutoland Native Women's Restriction Proclamation of 1915, a law which imposed three months' imprisonment on any offender, to institutionalize the control of rural women's spatial mobility. Colonial officials saw urbanized women as fosterers of 'disease, alcoholism and insubordination in naïve young' male miners. But from the 1930s interwar years, Basotho women ignored the law and migrated to towns, mines and to South Africa where they set up shops as brewers and sellers of illicit liquor and sex.[71] In colonial Swaziland, the number of Swazi women engaging in transborder migration to South Africa was curtailed due to the stringent measures, including a pass system, taken by the state, the Church, and local patriarchies to control female spatial mobility.[72] However, even though old rules and constraints were curtailed in these new centers, African women confronted and devised strategies to deal with new forms of patriarchy with their accompanying challenges and obstacles.

Often the efforts of the colonial state and African local authorities to prevent the urban migration of women which capital and industry had encouraged revealed the complexity and subtlety of a system of alliances and contradictions between the state and capital, women and men, town and countryside, and subsistence and capitalist modes of production, as Chauncey's study of the Zambian Copperbelt and Barnes's account of Southern Rhodesia have demonstrated.[73] In both colonies, the state and African local authorities discouraged and worked against the migration of women to mining towns and cities because women were needed for the sustenance of the rural economies. The state, through legislative apparatuses, acknowledged and reinforced African men's claims over women: claims of fathers and husbands over their daughters and wives respectively. In Southern Rhodesia, single women and unemployed men were required to carry passes that authorized them to enter towns, but married women were allowed without passes to join their husbands who were employed. However, the mining companies encouraged the presence of women and families in their compounds and mining towns because women's unpaid labor (all the myriad domestic tasks they performed, including cooking, cleaning, sewing, child rearing, as well as supplementing males' incomes and providing sexual services) were vital for the reproduction of migrant male labor, increased productivity, and the development of colonial capitalism. In spite of the ban, married and single African women managed to migrate to the towns and cities. For example, in Salisbury (Southern Rhodesia) in 1936, there were 150 wives, 150 'respectable' single women, 50 prostitutes, and 450 concubines; and in Bulawayo, there were 200 married women, 300 prostitutes, and 725 concubines.[74] Many female urban migrants entered into different kinds of relationships

with men, including temporary marriages. Such marriages and female entrepreneurship demonstrated the resourcefulness of African women in achieving economic and social independence. Women's independence and the recognition of urban marriages undermined the structural basis upon which elder men controlled the labor of African women and young men in the countryside.

Studies of colonial Africa have shown that African and foreign workingmen in military garrisons, towns, mines, and farms sought 'the comforts of home' exemplified in African female companionship, prepared meals, clean clothing, shelter, and often stable households (where marriage and children were involved).[75] Significantly, even when the power relations between the different actors were largely unequal, agency was not one-sided or limited to one gender. Thus, African women's participation in those relationships was not necessarily as victims but also as actors. African women strategically employed their sexuality for security and mobility. Yet their sexuality was often exploited and criminalized by European colonial officers and their African agents; and demonized by European women. It is not surprising that the control of African women's mobility and sexuality united African men and European men and women in a patriarchal alliance. European women joined the campaign for increased patriarchal control over African women because they wanted to keep African women out of their homes and away from their husbands. They vilified African women and publicized the so-called yellow peril: the miscegenation caused by sexual relations between European men and African women as was the case in Southern Rhodesia.[76]

Furthermore, while the official position of the British Parliament and the colonial authorities was total disapproval of any sexual liaisons between European men and African women, the French pursued an ambivalent policy on the issue. At a certain point, the French government encouraged their officers to take African women as mistresses but at another such practice was discouraged. Although there is evidence that many white men had African mistresses in colonial Nigeria and other British colonies, with some children born out of such liaisons, what guided 'officers' sexual relations across racial boundaries' were discretion and reticence.[77] On the contrary, before racial prejudice overtook French policy in Africa, their officers were allowed and encouraged to take local mistresses. But from the 1880s, African women were banned from military garrisons for allegedly causing the underperformance of French officers, the same period the French encouraged their African soldiers to use kidnapping or raiding of their villages and towns as a means of acquiring 'wives'. In Senegal, French officers blamed African women for all forms of undisciplined behavior by the soldiers, accusing them of having deleterious influence on military conduct and bearing. They called the women 'prostitutes', 'scavengers' and 'parasites', who not only transmitted diseases to the soldiers, but also consumed their earnings and bonuses.[78] The blaming of African women for the transmission and spread of all kinds of diseases, particularly

those associated with sexuality, in cities, towns, and around mining centers and military bases led to the invasive medicalization of their bodies across the continent.[79]

Yet despite efforts by the French officers to discourage African soldiers from going after their women, they sought lovers and wives from surrounding villages and vicinities for companionship, food, sexual gratification, and a better shelter the women provided to the soldiers, which was more attractive than the 'stuffy rooms of the barracks or brothels'.[80] Recognizing these important services provided by African women, especially in creating stable family life to the soldiers which helped to increase their morale and reduce desertions, as well as costs of lodging and maintenance, the French colonial military institutionalized the domesticity of their African troops in Senegal from 1880 by encouraging the establishment of families or households in villages near military posts and garrisons. In Congo Brazzaville, the French colonial government established official brothels during the Second World War to cater for the sexual needs of soldiers.[81]

Western Sudan was a region already ravaged by warfare in the 1880s, where most recruits and their women were prisoners-of-war of Al-Hajj Umar and Samori Touré. Recognizing the invaluable services of African women to the colonial military, the French allowed African soldiers (*tirailleurs)* to capture women for marriage. There was, for example, the case of the infamous Voulet-Chanoine expedition of 1898–1899, which adjusted its original plan of occupying Chad to capturing and enslaving more than 600 women from the Bambara and Segun areas. French officers gave these women captives to their African soldiers for marriage as an incentive to gain their loyalty and commitment to service. Within the French colonial circle, these marriages were 'a welcomed liberation from slavery' for the women and the soldiers as well as a great opportunity to establish families and households.[82] But the policy broke marriages in rural villages when some married women abandoned their impoverished husbands for African soldiers who enjoyed economic and social mobility. In Equatorial Africa, while some African soldiers used their allowances for bridewealth, others took in female slaves who had escaped from captivity and sought their protection as wives.

Women in both Western Sudan and Equatorial Africa served as porters and cooks for the military, often following their husbands' or lovers' military columns and pitching their own camps as bands of women and children, cooking and cleaning for their men. On rare occasions, such as at Adrar in Western Sudan in 1905, women fought alongside their husbands who had been ambushed by the Tuareg cavalry.[83] In these areas, wives and female companions served as a bridge between the military and the civilian populations and fostered the colonial government's efforts to harness the resources of the local economy and also save the government money for housing and feeding the African servicemen. Ironically, in spite of the valuable services that African women had rendered to the colonial military, widows were denied

their husbands' pensions or any benefits because the French colonial government did not recognize customary marriages. And even though the women served as porters, cooks and servants, they never enjoyed any benefits as their husbands or common-law husbands who were enlisted in the army. In spite of African women's resourcefulness, they were still shortchanged by the colonial state and military through their gender-based policies that were dictated by patriarchal sensibilities and norms.

Conclusion

This chapter has addressed how African women: navigated the many twists and turns of the complex and highly gendered colonial terrains; variously dealt with the tensions and conflicts created as a result of the juxtaposition of indigenous cultural sensibilities and colonial transformative forces and situations; were affected by the encounter with European colonialism and how they responded to colonial conditions in their respective communities. I have argued that African women's diverse experiences and their heterogeneous modes of resistance, adjustment, and negotiation to the changing colonial times and the massively transformed indigenous institutions, worldviews, and livelihoods were in defense of their womanhood and agency, and their households and communities. African women's response to mission and colonial domination and intrusiveness came in various forms, including acceptance, cooperation, compliance, circumvention, migration, outright rejection, violation, boycotts, strikes, sit-ins, protest demonstrations, waging wars, nudity, and the establishment of African independent churches and community schools. They demonstrated their agency by deploying complex and diverse initiatives that questioned conventional norms, and by strategically negotiating with colonial and indigenous authority figures who defined and regulated them. African women's colonial historiography has shown a historical experience that was marked by both opportunities and limitations; as well as the diverse ways they engaged different authorities and power brokers around them and the myriad contradictory policies imposed on them. It is not surprising that 'colonizing [African] women', as Kanogo aptly states, 'drew together the largest number of relentless power brokers' across the continent.[84]

The ambivalent impact of mission and colonial education on African women has also been analyzed. The gender-based formal education domesticated African women and girls and placed them at a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis their male counterparts in the competitive labor market. It also reinforced African male dominance over women and girls. But in its transformative mode, formal education offered women and girls opportunities to navigate geographical, cultural, ideological, and social boundaries which resulted in their acculturation and socio-economic mobility. It transformed African women's identities by creating the pioneer working-class women and

professional elite in the continent who were equipped with knowledge of alternative skills, values, and lifestyles to form new alliances and networks for their individual self-esteem and group solidarity. Remarkably, these women successfully negotiated a balance between their family life, employment, and professional growth. Many of them became leaders in their respective communities, professions, organizations, and countries. They also served as role models to subsequent generations of African girls and young women.

With its variegated outcomes, colonialism created new avenues of power and authority as it foreclosed others. Generally, colonialism undermined African women's political power and authority just as it created new avenues and power structures that enabled a tiny minority to serve in the colonial bureaucracies as chiefs, advisers, treasurers, ritual specialists, informants, and agents. It showcased the collective power of African women just as it sharpened their individualism. In numerous instances, African women used the provisions of the customary and colonial laws as interpreted in colonial courts to assert their agency on their own terms, for example over divorce, inheritance, custody rights, choice of liaisons and marriages. African women as historical actors questioned and complicated the colonial and missionary fixed boundaries of male and female spaces, gender roles, public and domestic, morality and immorality, and legality and illegality.

Colonialism created spaces that congregated various kinds of people and conditions that forced them to define and redefine the meanings and boundaries of African cultural norms and practices, customary and European laws, indigenous and formal education, and gender roles and expectations. Attempts to mold an African womanhood in an acceptable fashion (or what were considered to be appropriate gender roles, spaces and identities through mission and colonial education, codified family and marriage laws, the courts, restricted spatial mobility, and limited employment opportunities, as well as alliances between European and indigenous authorities) were met with mixed reactions from both the colonized and the colonizers. They also produced unintended and uncontrollable outcomes that paradoxically enhanced women's upward mobility and undermined it, too. The history of colonialism and African womanhood is characterized by protracted negotiations, reformulations, and contestations of strategies by African women as they dealt with diverse constituencies and conditions that mediated their lives, their households, and their communities. It was a history of African women's versatility, assertiveness, resourcefulness, survival and resilience, resistance and cooperation, collectivism and individualism, hopefulness and disappointments, and of successes and failures.

Notes

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11. Epprecht, "*This Matter of Women Is Getting Very Bad*;" Epprecht, "Women's 'Conservatism' and the Politics of Gender," 35, 37–39.
12. See Elizabeth Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939–1958* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2005); Tanya Lyons, *Guns and Guerilla Girls: Women in the Zimbabwean Liberation Struggle* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2004); Susan Geiger, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955–1965* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1997); Cora Ann Presley, *Kikuyu Women, the Mau Mau Rebellion, and Social Change in Kenya* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); Amrit Wilson, *The Challenge Road: Women and the Eritrean Revolution* (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1991); Cherryl Walker, *Women and Resistance in South Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982); and Stephanie Urdang, *Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women in Guinea-Bissau* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979).
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20. Epprecht, "Women's 'Conservatism' and the Politics of Gender," 49.
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31. See Jane Turrittin, "Colonial Midwives and Modernizing Childbirth in French West Africa," in *Women in African Colonial Histories*, ed. Allman, Geiger, and Musisi, 71–91; LaRay Denzer, *Women in Government Service in Colonial Nigeria, 1862–1945*, African Studies Center Working Papers in African Studies no. 136 (Boston, MA: Boston University, 1989), 6.

32. Barthel, "Women's Educational Experience," 146–47.
33. Jean-Baptiste, *Conjugal Rights*, 86. In Libreville, the focus of this book, girls accounted for 32% of primary-school enrollments and 19% of junior-high students; figures said to have represented an elevated number of African girls attending school in the whole colony.
34. Out of a total of 1.6 million Congolese school pupils in 1960, 77% and 19% attended Catholic and Protestant institutions, respectively. See Barbara A. Yates, "Church, State and Education in Belgian Africa: Implications for Contemporary Third World Women," in *Women's Education in the Third World: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Gail P. Kelly and Carolyn M. Elliott (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), 127.
35. See Gertrude Mianda, "Colonialism, Education, and Gender Relations in the Belgian Congo: The *Évolué* Case," in *Women in African Colonial Histories*, ed. Allman, Geiger and Musisi, 144–63; Yates, "Church, State and Education in Belgian Africa," 135–45. Mlle. Sophie Kanza, the daughter of the then mayor of Leopoldville, was the first Congolese woman to receive a high-school diploma in 1961 (Yates, p. 127).
36. See Peter K. Tibenderana, "The Beginnings of Girls' Education in the Native Administration Schools in Northern Nigeria, 1930–1945," *Journal of African History* 26, no. 1 (1985): 93–109; Peter K. Tibenderana, "The Emirs and the Spread of Western Education in Northern Nigeria, 1900–1946," *Journal of African History* 24, no. 4 (1983): 519–20, 523–24; Albert Ozigi and Lawrence Ocho, *Education in Northern Nigeria* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 40–1; C.N. Ubah, "Problems of Christian Missionaries in the Muslim Emirates of Nigeria, 1900–1928," *Journal of African Studies* 3, no. 3 (1976): 362–65; A. Barbs Fafunwa, *History of Education in Nigeria* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974); E.A. Ayandele, *The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, 1842–1914* (London: Longman, 1966), 139–52; Sonia F. Graham, *Government and Mission Education in Northern Nigeria, 1900–1919* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1966), 32–97; L.J. Lewis, *Society, Schools and Progress in Nigeria* (Oxford: Pregamon Press, 1965); S. Phillipson, *Grant-in-aid of Education in Nigeria: A Review with Recommendations* (Lagos, Nigeria: Government Printers, 1948), 6–12; Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna (NNAK), Kadmineduc 4/12/DDN 883/1, A. Booker to Education Officers, Sokoto, 15 April 1940; NNAK, Kadmineduc 4/12/DDN 883/1, A. Booker to Assistant Director of Education, Sokoto, 21 September 1936; NNAK, SOKPROF 3/2/4388, G.J. Lethem to E.J. Hussey, Kaduna, 30 May 1933; NNAK, SNP 17/2/11133/1, SNP to Chief Secretary to the Government, Kaduna 27 July 1933; NNAK, SOKPROF, 3/2/574/1, "Extract from an Account of a Visit to Lagos by the Sultan of Sokoto and the Emir of Gwandu," June 1933; Public Record Office, CO 583/173/3, "Education Policy of Nigeria, 1930"; and Fredrick D. Lugard, *Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, and Administration, 1912–1919* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery, 1920), 63–64.
37. Nigeria, "Nigerian Educational Policy," Being a Summary of *the Memorandum on Educational Policy in Nigeria. Sessional No. 20 of 1947* [Lagos, Nigeria: Government Printer], published in *African Affairs* 47, no. 186 (1948): 52.

38. Tibenderana, "The Beginnings of Girls' Education in the Native Administration Schools," 104–5.
39. Nigeria, "Nigerian Educational Policy," 53.
40. Nigeria, *Annual Digest of Educational Statistics* 2, no. 1 (Lagos, Nigeria: Federal Ministry of Education, 1962), 17.
41. J.F. Ade Ajayi and Tekena N. Tamuno, eds., *The University of Ibadan, 1948–1973: A History of the First Twenty-five Years* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1973); A. Babs Fafunwa, *A History of Nigerian Higher Education* (Lagos, Nigeria: Macmillan, 1971); and Nigeria, *Annual Digest of Educational Statistics*, 15 and 17.
42. Kanogo, *African Womanhood*, 229–33.
43. The women included Charlotte O. Obasa, Oyinkan Abayomi, Kofoworola Ademola, Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti, Margaret Ekpo, and others. This group of women established women's associations such as Lagos Ladies League, later, the Lagos Women's League, through which they mobilized other women and resources; campaigned for women's issues and concerns such as education, increasing the number of women in the colonial service, equal pay for men and women; and also influenced policies. See Gloria Chuku, "European Victorian Ethos, Igbo Women, and Gender (Re)Construction: An Examination of Policy Implication in Colonial Southeastern Nigeria," in *Negotiating the Public Space: Activism and Domestic Politics*, ed. Sarah Ssali and A. Madanda (Kampala, Uganda: Makerere University, 2006), 120–49; Bolanle Awe, ed., *Nigerian Women in Historical Perspective* (Lagos, Nigeria: Sankore Publishers, 1992); Denzer, *Women in Government Service in Colonial Nigeria*; Kristin Mann, *Marrying Well: Marriage, Status and Social Change among the Educated Elite in Colonial Lagos* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Fafunwa, *History of Education in Nigeria*; Ayandele, *The Missionary Impact*; Nigerian National Archives, Ibadan (NNAI), COMCOL 1, 498, "Olajumoke Obasa to the Resident of the Colony," August 6, 1926; NNAI, COMCOL 1, 498, "Mrs. Obasa to the Honourable Chief Secretary to Government," February 26, 1924; and NNAI, COMCOL 1, 498, "Lagos Women's League to Hugh Clifford," October 24, 1923.
44. Carole Summers, "'If You Can Educate the Native Women …': Debates over the Schooling and Education of Girls and Women in Southern Rhodesia, 1900–1934," *History of Education Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (1996): 449–71.
45. Deborah Gaitskell, "Housewives, Maids or Mothers: Some Contradictions of Domesticity for Christian Women in Johannesburg, 1903–1939," *Journal of African History* 24, no. 2 (1983): 241–56.
46. See Corrie Decker, "The Elusive Power of Colonial Prey: Sexualizing the Schoolgirl in the Zanzibar Protectorate," *Africa Today* 61, no. 4 (2015): 43–60; Decker, *Mobilizing Zanzibari Women*.
47. Kathleen E. Sheldon, *Pounders of Grain: A History of Women, Work, and Politics in Mozambique* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002), 84 and 89.
48. See, for example, Elizabeth Schmidt, *Peasants, Traders and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 1870–1939* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1992), 143; Arie J. van der Ploeg, "Education in Colonial Africa: The German Experience," *Comparative Education Review* 21, no. 1 (1977): 99.

49. See Mianda, "Colonialism, Education, and Gender Relations in the Belgian Congo," 148–58; Audrey C. Smock, *Women's Education in Developing Countries: Opportunities and Outcomes* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981); Remi Clignet, "Social Change and Sexual Differentiation in the Cameroon and Ivory Coast," *Signs* 3, no. 1 (1977): 244–60; and Remi Clignet and P.J. Foster, *The Fortunate Few: A Study of Secondary Schools and Students in the Ivory Coast* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966)
50. See Judith Marshall, *Literacy, Power and Democracy in Mozambique: The Governance of Learning from Colonization to the Present* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 72–75; Michael Cross, "The Political Economy of Colonial Education: Mozambique, 1930–1975," *Comparative Education Review* 31, no. 4 (1987): 550–69.
51. See Martin, *Catholic Women of Congo-Brazzaville*, 86.
52. Kanogo, *African Womanhood*, 209–10.
53. See Chuku, *Igbo Women and Economic Transformation*, 83–84; Sheldon, *Pounders of Grain*, 97; Philomena E. Okeke-Ihejirika, *Negotiating Power and Privilege: Igbo Career Women in Contemporary Nigeria* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 79–102; and Summers, "If You Can Educate the Native Women," 468.
54. Chuku, *Igbo Women and Economic Transformation*, 192–96.
55. Summers, "If You Can Educate the Native Women," 456.
56. Amrane-Minne and Abu-Haidar, "Women and Politics in Algeria," 62.
57. Nigeria, "Nigerian Educational Policy," 53.
58. Decker, "The Elusive Power of Colonial Prey," 48 and 52.
59. Daniel Haag, *The Right to Education: What Kind of Management?* (Paris, France: UNESCO, 1982), 128.
60. Anton Johnston, *Education in Moçambique, 1975–1984* (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Authority, 1984), 21.
61. Sheldon, *Pounders of Grain*, 103.
62. See Emily S. Burrill, *States of Marriage: Gender, Justice, and Rights in Colonial Mali* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2015); Jean-Baptiste, *Conjugal Rights*; Shadle, "*Girl Cases*;" Schmidt, *Peasants, Traders and Wives*, Chap. 1; Mann, *Marrying Well*.
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64. Shadle, "*Girl Cases*;" Kristin Mann, "Women's Rights in Law and Practice: Marriage and Dispute Settlement in Colonial Lagos," in *African Women and the Law: Historical Perspectives*, ed. Margaret Jean Hay and Marcia Wright (Boston, MA: Boston University, 1982), 151–62.
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67. Sean Hawkins, "'The Woman in Question': Marriage and Identity in the Colonial Courts of Northern Ghana, 1907–1954," in *Women in African Colonial Histories*, ed. Allman, Geiger and Musisi, 116–43.
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82. Thompson, Ibid., 439.
83. Ibid., 446.
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CHAPTER 8

Administration, Economy, and Society in the Portuguese African Empire (1900–1975)

Philip J. Havik

Portugal's Third Empire was governed by three different regimes from the early 1900s to 1974: a monarchy, the First Republic, and the New State (Estado Novo). For most of the modern colonial period until the end of empire (1926–1974), the empire was governed by the New State dictatorship, which emphasized political transitions and ideological rationales for colonial rule. The antecedents of its Third Empire are particularly important for the shaping of myths and mystifications regarding imperial history that have persisted in the postcolonial context.[1] The wake-up call provoked by the British Ultimatum of 1891, when Portugal was in the midst of a deep economic crisis, has figured ever since as a historical marker for the country's colonial renaissance.[2] Following the independence of Brazil in 1822 (at a time when most Latin American territories had shed their colonial ties) and the protracted civil war in Portugal (1822–1833), attentions shifted towards Africa.[3]

However, given that the dream of a 'new Brazil' in Africa would only come to partial fruition after the Second World War, it long remained

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confined to the realm of fiction and fantasy.[4] The 'turning point' of the British Ultimatum was thus largely a political event which propelled Portuguese authorities into action, obliging them to extend Portugal's claim to sovereignty over African territories by military means. Portugal's protracted campaigns to break the resistance of African populations, which preceded and coincided with the First World War in which it participated, set the tone for the country's affirmation of its modern imperial role.[5] The emergence largely unscathed of a neutral Portugal from the Second World War without, however, having made significant investments towards colonial development as Great Britain and France had done (from 1929/1940 and 1946 respectively), also points towards a particular trajectory. The fact that until the 1930s Portugal largely depended on re-exporting (processed) colonial raw materials to wealthier European countries such as Great Britain and France shaped subaltern inter-imperial relations.[6] Finally, Portugal's refusal to decolonize at the time most other European nations were doing so, while linking the destiny of the nation to retaining its control of its African territories, forms another key indicator of Portuguese specificity in empire.[7] The armed struggles which marked the end of empire and its collapse coincided with a change of regime, denoting a distinct historiographical perspective on modern Portuguese colonialism. Thus, the 'shuffling of papers', which in the Portuguese case was to continue for a decade-and-a-half after most African territories had achieved independence, placed the process of decolonization in markedly different international contexts than its European counterparts.

The historiography of Portugal's modern imperial enterprise has largely emphasized four contentious issues[8]: the racial categories guiding colonial administration, forced labor practices, economic (under) development, and armed conflict. In geographical terms, publications have mainly centered on Portugal's continental African colonies such as Angola and Mozambique, owing to their sheer size and economic relevance, relegating other territories such as Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, and the Cape Verde Islands to a marginal role. Therefore, the principal emphasis will be put here on the main theatres of empire, without however neglecting the periphery. The geography of empire is significant here, given its dispersal across the continent and insular locations: the lack of territorial unity mirrors the centrifugal nature of imperial rule. The notable lack of territorial cohesion, or imperial dislocation, which contrasts with French and Belgian imperial clusters and the British 'corridor' would however strengthen the need for stressing imperial unity across countless continental and maritime boundaries. At the same time, its global reach would engender narratives on the 'integralist' nature of the Portuguese empire 'from Cabo Verde to Timor'.[9]

In the following sections, the four principal strands identified above will be addressed in three separate sections, which cast a broad perspective upon the historiography of Portugal's Third (African) empire during the period under consideration. Besides including data culled from published sources, this

chapter is also based upon archival research and includes data from hitherto unpublished documents.

The Racial Dimensions of Colonial Rule

Portuguese administration in Africa generally adhered to the practice of 'direct rule', borrowing from centralized metropolitan traditions as well as bearing similarities with the French example. Despite formal appearances, in practice colonial rule was characterized by a heterogeneous administrative culture: while direct rule was the custom in rural areas where the bulk of *indígenas* or native African populations lived, in urban centers indirect forms prevailed, with selective forms of representation limited to *civilizados*, i.e. those with Portuguese civil status. In some areas, public administration actually 'shared' control with private concessionaires, whether companies or individual planters. In a highly dispersed and centrifugal empire, forms of governance in continental and insular territories differed: whereas the latter had been settled from the 1500s under a feudal regime, the former emerged under the nation-state erected upon the foundations of the constitutional monarchy in 1833. The slave trade, which provided the bulk of insular populations, enabled *latifúndio* type property (based on slave labor) to dominate in Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, where it was well entrenched in the 1870s when trafficking was abolished. The de facto *mise en valeur* of continental areas beyond coastal regions only began in earnest during the end of the monarchy (1910) and the early years of the First Republic. Laws on land concessions severely limited the access of 'natives' to land concessions,[10] while labor and fiscal legislation imposed special regimes for indigenous Africans.[11]

From the 1850s, colonial affairs fell under the auspices of the Ministério da Marinha e Ultramar, transformed into the Ministério das Colónias (Colonial Office) following the proclamation of the Republic in 1911.[12] The establishment of a colonial administration in the continental territories claimed by Portugal at the Berlin Conference followed protracted 'wars of "pacification"' in continental colonies until the early 1920s.[13] From 1914 onwards, a unitary imperial blueprint for colonial administration based on the *indigenato* system (similar to the French *indigénat*) was passed by republican lawmakers. Subsequently, statutes were introduced regulating 'native' civil and penal rights and labor, which further refined already existing racial definitions of colonial populations. These criteria would remain in place until 1961 when, under international pressure, racial *indigenato* laws were abolished. Given that these laws referred to Portugal's continental colonies, insular possessions with a particular emphasis on Cabo Verde, a Creole society, remained largely peripheral to these policy shifts.[14] Owing to their 'civilized' status, Cape Verdeans were to become important subaltern administrators of empire in Portugal's continental African colonies.[15]

Nevertheless, the legal imposition of racial criteria[16] permeated all aspects of colonial rule, i.e. administrative hierarchy and culture, the rights and obligations of settlers and 'natives', and their access to services. However, variations were common, owing to differences in: population density; African political, ethnic and religious institutions; local economic conditions; and the presence of colonial 'elites'. Also, processes of inter-ethnic mixing, miscegenation, and creolization had resulted in hybrid social formations, especially in urban areas.[17] Members of these groups were to give voice to a budding African civil society, publicizing their views in pamphlets and journals while forming local associations, above all following the republican turn in Portugal in 1910.[18]

The question of miscegenation led some foreign observers to hold that 'racial mixing' was actually condoned, and much more common in Portuguese than in British or French colonies.[19] Seasonal, tropical cycles (i.e. the rainy and dry seasons) also created annual disparities in terms of production, consumption, mobility, and revenue generation between *indígena* and *civilizado* populations. Distinctions were also felt between urban and rural areas, where the bulk of African populations resided. In the latter, administration was organized in *circunscrições* (administrative districts) and *postos* (administrative posts), whereas municipalities and districts (*câmaras municipais* and *concelhos*) exercised authority in urban environments. A two-tier system operated with segregated courts, labor relations, educational and health services. African communities were divided into *regedorias* where local ethnic chiefs (*sobas* in Angola and *régulos* in Mozambique and Guinea) appointed by district administrators exercised delegated authority under the *chefes de posto*. Nevertheless, chiefly authority was, with few exceptions, systematically undermined by administrative officials in Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique.[20] Land concession policies allowed considerable scope for individual settler-planters to freely manage their estates, which often included entire 'native' villages. Large company concessions controlling vast estates in the Centre and North of Mozambique and Angola exercised extensive leverage over indigenous communities in terms of labor recruitment and work contracts, mobility, taxation, trade, health, education, and socialization. Reports show that administrative officials often failed to verify the tax levies and labor contracts in these concessions.[21] Similarly, the owners of cocoa plantations, or *roças*, on the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe also formed a small but powerful *latifúndio* elite who, counting on a subservient administration, exercised a notable hegemony over many aspects of insular life.[22]

The transformation of 'natives' into workers, tax payers, and producers relied on the native identification (ID) system, labor 'contracts', hut and poll taxes, and the imposition of export crops. The local bureaucratic apparatus for the registration of tax payers, laborers, and crop producers was generally understaffed and underfunded. As a result, the circulation rate of officials was relatively high compared to British and French regimes. Owing to an inefficient administration and large-scale evasion, the civil register and the emission

of ID cards was faulty and full of lacunae, allowing Africans to 'slip through the net'.[23] The emergence of 'bureaucratized' officialdom and its tendency to cut corners was the result of the broad brief of district administrators, acting simultaneously as lawmakers, judges, tax collectors, labor agents, and employers, whilst also appointing ethnic chiefs and being responsible for the maintenance of public order and security in their respective districts.[24]

The reforms introduced with the Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina in 1933 attempted to redeem this situation by depicting them as 'men of action' rather than armchair bureaucrats. Thus, administrators were expected to regularly visit their districts and interact with chiefs they appointed, reorganized in *regedorias*, and above all with local village heads.[25] However, in practice they delegated these tasks to 'their' subaltern *chefes de posto* and locally recruited administrative guards or *cipaios*. The latter served as a key pillar of civil authority in terms of the extraction of labor, taxes, and crops, and the gathering of information.[26] The exercise of administrative authority over natives (*indígenas*) was expressed in terms of twin complementary tasks, i.e. law and order on the one hand and 'protection' and the 'civilizing mission' on the other. The latter function was generally relegated to religious (Catholic) missions charged with proselytization and 'rudimentary' primary education, especially in rural areas, whilst Protestant missions were tolerated.[27]

Besides local administrators, fiscal departments (*Fazenda*) and those responsible for native affairs (*Negócios Indígenas*) exercised their own autonomous authority over African populations. In insular colonies, these responsibilities pertained to the *Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas*, above all with regard to plantation labor. Special central and urban administrative bodies were responsible for relations with settler communities, which were particularly relevant in the case of Angola and Mozambique. The Colonial Act of 1930 consolidated the legal framework based on the distinction between *civilizados*, whose status was similar to that of Portuguese citizens, and *indígenas*.[28] A novel intermediate but unstable category, the *assimilados*, or assimilated Africans, originally proposed by French colonial specialists such as Girault in the late 1800s, had already been introduced in 1926 for Angola and Mozambique, followed by Guinea the year after. Despite claims regarding the progressive transformation of customs and integration of Africans into colonial society, the criteria were applied with great caution while the status initially granted was reversible, thus restricting the potential number of assimilated citizens.[29] By 1950, there were 30,089 (0.08%) assimilated citizens in Mozambique, 4.349 (0.75%) in Angola and 1478 (0.29%) in Guinea.[30] In insular colonies such as Cape Verde and São Tomé, legal distinctions differed: the indigenous statute did not apply to the Creole population of the former (given civilizado status in 1947), while the latter was only extended to the population of São Tomé and Príncipe in 1953.[31]

Subsequent constitutional and legislative reforms in the 1950s (which incorporated the *indigenato* status in the Portuguese constitution of 1954)

maintained discriminatory norms based on more subtle distinctions between 'primitive natives' and 'evolving natives' having absorbed some European influences, and 'detribalized natives', i.e. those who assumed a Europeanized lifestyle whilst maintaining some traces of native culture.[32] The latter were viewed with concern, given their unstable social status, thus necessitating their progressive integration into the assimilado category.[33] Nevertheless, these belated attempts at retaining colonies while 'refining' racial distinctions and the criteria for the 'civilizing mission', which were subject to growing criticism from international and anti-colonial quarters, had little impact. Although the *indigenato* laws were formally abolished in 1961 they remained deeply ingrained in colonial culture. The reforms coincided with the beginning of the colonial wars, when nationalist movements took up arms against colonial rule, first in Angola in 1961, and thereafter extending their struggle to Guinea in 1963 and Mozambique in 1964.

Labor, Production, and Taxation

Metropolitan and colonial legislation were to establish the parameters for the recruitment and contracting of 'native' labor from 1878 onwards.[34] Hence the term '*contrato*' (contract) which, while underlining the seemingly voluntary nature of these agreements, was associated with abusive practices, which found expression in the local vernacular.[35] Legal regimes varied between forced, penal, and contract labor, as did the methods of public and private recruitment. Following the introduction of the Native Labor Code in 1899, successive alterations were to refine criteria and alter procedures in 1899, 1914, 1928, and 1954, without however altering its basic racial precepts until 1961. Establishing the 'moral obligation for natives to work', labor legislation effectively imposed formal remunerated employment, created a pliable workforce, and monetized the economy in a modernizing effort based upon the notion of social engineering.[36] The latter also included the introduction of the hut tax in the late 1800s and early 1900s, in Mozambique (1880s), Guinea (1903) and Angola (1906); distinct fiscal systems operated in insular colonies, strongly centered on municipal authorities. Direct native taxes were imposed in continental colonies by means of military 'pacification' campaigns and subsequently transformed into poll and personal tax regimes.[37] Owing to ever changing fiscal criteria, their arbitrary application, the lack of means-testing, the abundant use of fiscal surcharges as stop-gap measures, extraction and evasion became a cat-and-mouse game in which guards and traders doubled as tax collectors.[38] In order to circumvent legislative norms regarding compulsory labor (which in essence was a variable direct tax paid in kind) new direct taxes were introduced from the 1930s.[39] Large-scale ethnic migrations took place in Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique, settling hitherto uncultivated areas while working on short contracts to supplement income. Many sought refuge across the border.[40] Road construction for military and

civil purposes, which enabled the penetration of hitherto untapped resources, was largely achieved through coercive schemes.[41] The introduction of cash crops such as cotton, coffee, cocoa, sisal, sugar and peanuts (which also involved compulsory measures in the case of cotton and rice in Mozambique, cotton and coffee in Angola, cocoa in São Tomé and Príncipe and peanuts in Guinea) was meant to provide colonial export-based revenue while being re-exported via the metropole to other European countries.[42]

The extraction of 'native' labor power, taxation and export crops (the pillars of colonial rule) became an integral part of the *esprit de corps* of colonial officialdom. Portuguese labor codes created conditions for a large-scale migrant labor system focused on public works. Private contractors benefited from the cooperation and complacency of administrative authorities. In this respect, they did not essentially differ from similar legislation in other colonial territories.[43] However, the perception of Portugal's weakness as an imperial power was to fuel international pressures following the foundation of the League of Nations in 1919. Previously, abusive labor regimes had been denounced from the late 1800s onwards, for São Tomé and Angola.[44] Large-scale labor migration from Mozambique to the Southern African mines, facilitated by the Natal railway built in the late 1800s, gave rise to the first labor conventions with South Africa and agreements with miners' associations.[45]

Spearheaded by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and missionary societies, international campaigns against compulsory labor in colonial Africa focused above all on the humanitarian dimensions of 'contract' labor and debt bondage.[46] The *Curadoria dos Negócios Indígenas* in continental colonies (called *Curadoria dos Serviçais e Indígenas* in São Tomé and Príncipe) exercised the trusteeship with regard to 'native' employees.[47] However, reports showed that central and district services were not verifying the situation in rural areas with regard to labor recruitment and contracts.[48] Acting as the sole executors of native policies and supervisors of their implementation in rural areas, administrators acting as trustees often rubber stamped 'contract' labor. The penalties imposed on local populations could range from fines to correctional penal labor.[49]

The idea that the Portuguese were 'colonizers by vocation' was severely tested in 1925 with the publication of the caustic report by Edward Ross on labor conditions in Angola, based upon interviews with '*contratados*'.[50] Putting Portuguese governing circles on the defensive, such denunciations were to play a key role in shaping legislation, propaganda, and the 'civilizing mission' in Portuguese colonies.[51] The revised labor code of 1928 and the 1926 and 1929 laws on native rights for Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea incorporated a number of international legal formulae following Portugal's ratification of the League's 1926 convention on slavery. However, by rejecting the convention on forced labor in 1930 (together with France [ratified 1937] and Belgium [ratified 1944]), based on the principle of foreign non-intervention in Portuguese colonial affairs, practices on the ground remained

unaltered.[52] Although subsequent reforms essentially perpetuated the legal and political framework, the colonial inspection service would provide an alternative perspective from the mid-1930s onwards, based upon visits and enquiries conducted in loco, which could result in disciplinary action. Inspection reports were to document administrative practice, compliance with legal and procedural standards, and identify problems and correct them whenever possible. Strong criticism of labor conditions in Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique (including forced labor by women and children) and their impact on African populations were expressed with some regularity in inspection reports.[53] As public health became an increasing concern in the 1940s and broad reforms were introduced for the empire as a whole, reports began to emphasize the need for stricter rules for the recruitment, transport, and treatment of laborers in accordance with procedures adopted in other African colonies.[54]

Based upon his experience as a provincial governor and as a probing inspector in Angola and in the 1940s in Mozambique, Henrique Galvão became one of the major critics of Portuguese colonial administration. Galvão's 1947 report before the Committee of Colonial Affairs of the Portuguese National Assembly amounts to a strong indictment of Portuguese rule, above all in Angola, the 'jewel in the Crown' of empire.[55] The report highlighted the administrative incapacity to implement 'native affairs' policies with regard to African labor, taxation, and production, which had in turn provoked a veritable demographic exodus to neighboring colonies while destroying the foundations of the African family.[56] By laying bare the difference between propaganda and practice, it revealed serious contradictions with regard to the implementation of labor, tax, and production policies. It also highlighted the serious lack of human and material resources, of competent officials, and of an effective organization on the ground capable of relating to African populations' conditions and needs.[57] The wide-ranging nature of his statement, and the fact that it was made by a high-ranking figure and MP, enhanced its political significance, which was immediately grasped by the British embassy in Lisbon.[58] Nevertheless, in international forums, some inspector colleagues vehemently denied the 'existence of a generalized system of compulsory labor' in Angola, Mozambique and São Tomé, and Príncipe.[59]

Despite submitting another report commissioned by the then Minister of Colonial Affairs on Mozambique, which arrived at similar conclusions, Galvão's warnings remained unheeded and he became a persona non grata and one of the regime's major critics in exile.[60] Although highly critical of the ad hoc nature of governance, the lack of de facto territorial administrative control, and of reforms in terms of 'native affairs', the supporter-turned-opponent of the New State's methods did reserve praise for a private labor regime. DIAMANG, a private diamond-mining company with mixed Portuguese, Belgian, French, and US capital, operated a large concession in the North East of Angola.[61] Heralded by its administrators and authorities as a

showcase of colonial modernity, the inhuman conditions to which workers in the DIAMANG mines in the Lunda region of Angola were subjected were denounced by Gilberto Freyre, the Brazilian proponent of 'lusotropicalism', which was adopted as the New State's official ideology in the 1950s (see below).[62] Simultaneously, other reports by foreign scholars also strongly criticized labor conditions in Southern Mozambique and the absence of the 'racial harmony' that 'lusotropicalism' preached.[63] By the time the complaint by newly independent Ghana was submitted to the ILO in 1961 on Portugal's non-compliance with the Forced Labor Convention (which Portugal had ratified in 1956), nationalist movements in Angola had already taken up arms against Portuguese rule.[64] The Batepá massacre of workers by plantation owners in Saõ Tomé in February 1953, the Pindjiguiti uprising of stevedores in the port of Bissau (Guinea) in August 1959, the Mueda massacre in June 1960 in Mozambique, and the popular revolt in the COTONANG-controlled Cassange area in Northern Angola in January 1961 (generally regarded as the spark that ignited anti-colonial resistance) revealed the increasingly tense labor relations, heavy-handed colonial repression, and authorities' political ineptitude.[65]

Economic Modernization and Armed Conflict

Soon after civil administrations were established in recently occupied African territories in the 1920s, the 1926 military coup in Portugal and the 1929 world crisis served to temper ambitious development plans. The New State regime curbed public investment, the colonial civil service was subjected to rigorous cuts and controls, and new taxes and surcharges were meant to balance the budget as revenues from export crops sharply decreased because of lower world market prices.[66] The reversal of the devolution of colonial autonomy under the first Republic was reinforced by the fiercely nationalist regime's attempt to put in place autarchic economic policies that largely depended on 'closed' circuits between colonies and metropole. In the meantime, new strata of (mostly Portuguese) landed property holders affirmed themselves, whilst large private companies with Portuguese and foreign capital (such as the Sena Sugar Estates, the Companhia de Mozambique, DIAMANG and COTONANG) emerged as important economic actors, producing sugar, coffee, cotton, sisal, cacao, peanuts, rice, maize, rubber, and diamonds. Railway corridors were built linking coastal ports in Mozambique (Beira, Lourenço Marques) and Angola (Lobito, Benguela) to their respective (British and Belgian) hinterlands. At the same time, the economies in insular territories tended to lag behind, owing to the small scale transactions in the trade of raw materials (coal, salt) or processed food (canned fish) in the case of Cape Verde, or cocoa, copra, coconuts, and coffee in São Tomé and Príncipe.[67]

Although metropolitan authorities encouraged European settlement, Portuguese emigration to continental colonies proceeded in a controlled fashion

Table 8.1 Population of Portugal's former African colonies (1926–1970). *Source* Boletim Geral das Colonias, 3, 21, 1927; Celia Reis, 2000; Censo Populacao de, 1950; Provincia Guine, 1959; Anuario Estatistico de Angola, 1933; Anuario Estatistico Mozambique, 1960; AEU (Anuario estatistico Ultramar), 1943, 1954, 1965, 1972

	Population								
	Guinea		*Angola*		*Mozambique*		*Cabo Verde*	*S. Tomé*	
	Indigenous	*Total*	*Indigenous*	*Total*	*Indigenous*	*Total*	*Total*	*Indigenous*[a]	*Total*
1926								20,301	58,907
1927							150,160		
1928	384,394	386,425			3,814,407	3,849,977			
1933			2,972,587	3,098,281					
1940	345,267	351,089	3,646,399	3,738,010	5,030,179	5,085,630	181,286	28,456	60,490
1950	502,457	510,777	4,009,911	4,145,266	5,640,363	5,732,317	148,331	16,768	60,159
1960		519,229		4,830,449		6,578,604	201,549		63,485
1970		487,448		5,673,046		8,233,834	272,072		73,631

Note
[a]Figures for indigenous populations do not include '*servicais*' or contract laborers

until 1945. From then on it was encouraged by the New State regime, albeit in a highly selective fashion, leading to a significant growth of colonial ranks and urban populations through migration from Portugal to Angola and Mozambique.[68] Europeanized African 'elites' emerged in continental cities in Angola (Luanda, Huambo, Benguela, Malanje, Uíge), Mozambique (Lourenço Marques, Beira, Chimoio, Tete), and Guinea (Bissau and Bafatá).[69] Urban development projects also flourished from the late 1940s in a coordinated effort toward infrastructural, architectural, and sanitary modernization.[70] At the same time, the influx of Europeans caused indigenous Africans (whose numbers grew significantly from the 1930s) to be relegated to the urban periphery in terms of housing, jobs, and services.[71] The end of empire between 1950 and 1970 was to witness a large population increase (32% overall) in Portugal's African colonies, signaling a notable African demographic momentum (see Table 8.1).[72]

Tax regimes, land concession policies, agricultural extension, and health services were expected to facilitate European settlement in order to promote exports of cash crops and raw materials to the metropole.[73] At the same time, reformist tendencies became apparent in administrative circles, as some officials adopted paternalist attitudes towards African populations, highlighting discrimination, and advocating reforms.[74] This coincided with a shift in terms of tax revenue from African towards European strata in (growing) settler colonies such as Angola and Mozambique, contrasting with greater burdens being put on the shoulders of Guinean populations.[75] With the aim of 'nationalizing' colonial economies and societies, Portuguese investment in trade, industry, and agriculture was officially promoted. Portuguese conglomerates such as the CUF (Companhia União Fabril) and the 'imperial bank', the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, which issued currency and supervised financial transactions, exercised effective control over colonial economies and imperial trade flows.

A two-pronged policy served to strengthen economic ties between Portugal and Europe, as well as with its empire. This was symbolized by Portugal joining the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1959 and the establishment in 1962 of the Portuguese Economic Space (*Espaço Económico Português* [EEP]), which was meant to further economic integration in the empire. This process of economic internationalization relied on the influx of Europeans, which, although most returned to Europe, succeeded in attracting a significant number of settlers. By 1960, the European presence in Angola and Mozambique had reached over 170,000 and 97,000 respectively, quadrupling compared to 1940, further rising between 60 and 70% until 1970 (see Table 8.1).[76] European settlement coincided with a considerable increase in the prices of export commodities on world markets after 1945, leading to a coffee, peanut, and cotton boom in Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique respectively.[77]

The 1950s were to witness a concerted effort to infuse colonial economies with much needed capital investment in order to modernize their rudimentary infrastructures whilst enhancing Portugal's reputation abroad. The *Planos de Fomento* (Development Plans) introduced from 1953 onwards in metropolitan Portugal and its colonies (I: 1953–1958; II: 1959–1964; *Plano Intercalar*, 1965–1968; III: 1969–1973) signified a change of course towards state-led modernization and private investment[78] but falling short of 'welfare colonialism'. Although partially inspired by broad investment programs introduced in the British and French empires to modernize their economies and increase self-sufficiency,[79] Portuguese programs started out by centering on infrastructural investment rather than promoting social and economic welfare. Social dimensions were only addressed from the mid-1960s as a result of pressures from the international organizations and nationalist liberation movements,[80] with the additional caveat that colonies were expected to fund a large part of the costs with self-generated revenue.[81] Despite the fact that in absolute terms Angola and Mozambique were by far the main beneficiaries of the Plans' investment programs, relatively speaking, Cape Verde (which had just emerged from a severe and deadly famine in 1947[82]) would champion the financial assistance provided between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s. São Tomé and Príncipe would be second to Cape Verde in relative terms, as its cocoa export economy steadily declined (from the 1920s onwards). Prospecting for natural resources in the 1950s was to result in the finding of oil deposits in Angola, while iron ore, manganese, and copper were also mined there, as were bauxite and coal in Mozambique (Fig. 8.1).



Sources: AIC (Anuário Estatístico Império Colonial), 1949; AEU (Anuário Estatístico do Ultramar), 1951, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1960, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972.

Fig. 8.1 Total Revenue (*c.*1949–1972)

Portugal's membership of the United Nations in 1955 coincided with the birth of nationalist movements in its colonies. The UPA/FNLA, MPLA and UNITA in Angola, PAIGC in Guinea and Cape Verde, MLSTP in São Tomé and Príncipe, and FRELIMO in Mozambique shared a common goal but differed in terms of political programs, ideologies, mobilization strategies, and guerilla tactics.[83] A significant number of future nationalist leaders, such as Agostinho Neto, Mário Pinto de Andrade, Holden Roberto, Jonas Savimbi, Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel, and Uria Simango had been trained in (Protestant and Catholic) mission schools which often operated with foreign (non-Portuguese) personnel and funding. The armed struggle waged by these movements in Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique against Portuguese rule (1961–1974) led to the stationing of large numbers of Portuguese troops and military personnel and the rapid growth of a security apparatus.[84] In the face of the 'nationalist threat', 'white elites' in the colonies also called for greater autonomy from Lisbon, which initially reacted sympathetically while promoting a program of public investment to allay the concerns of local economic interests.[85] Securitarian considerations and social engineering went hand in hand with the regrouping of Africans in *aldeamentos* or model villages located close to roads, bringing them under military control whilst providing access to basic infrastructures and services. In the 1950s, significant inputs were also directed towards agricultural settlement schemes (*colonatos*) for rural Portuguese families introduced in Angola and Mozambique, providing them with land, tools, seeds, housing, livestock, extension, and health services.[86] Thus, the idealized notion of a rural way of life deeply rooted in the New State's make-up was combined with a push towards implementing economic development, repressive counter-insurgency methods and intensifying Portugal's 'civilizing mission'. Its 'lusotropicalist' ideology, which professed the competence and adaptability of Portuguese colonizers in the tropics, and expounded the virtues of a 'harmonious, multiracial, pluri-continental nation' which included the metropole and 'overseas provinces' was under threat.[87]

Although nationalist movements rapidly debunked this myth and countered colonial rule with armed resistance, the programs of both colonizer and contestants had certain aspects in common, such as a strong emphasis on nation, modernization, and the state's role in it.[88] Whereas Portuguese armed forces took their cue from counter-insurgency strategies developed by the British in Kenya,[89] nationalist forces adopted guerilla tactics and mobilization drives first tested in Asia and Latin America, reinventing them in Africa in territories with a complex ethnic mosaic.[90] Crucially, the wars of liberation illustrated the large-scale mobilization of Africans by both anti-colonial and colonial sides, thus deeply affecting African societies.[91] Owing to overlapping and competing responsibilities, administrative officials (many of whom felt increasingly sidetracked by their military counterparts) protested at the lack of knowledge and incompetence of the Armed Forces in terms of comprehending local traditions.[92] Although the Portuguese economy experienced significant economic growth as a result of industrialization during the 1960s and early 1970s, as

would Angola,[93] the lack of monetization, credit facilities, and capital, red tape, and above all armed conflict, were to hamper economic and social development in the colonies. From the mid-1960s onwards, the financial contributions of the colonies to the metropolitan economy were to decrease significantly, being overshadowed by remittances from Portuguese emigrants in Europe.[94]

The pressure from nationalist movements, above all in Guinea and Mozambique, was to provoke an acceleration of reforms in the late 1960s towards developmental programs which included social welfare, for example in terms of health and education.[95] Public health and social services were expanded for African populations, while secondary schools were introduced from the 1950s as well as institutions for higher education in Angola and Mozambique in the 1960s. At the same time, nationalist movements erected new, rudimentary forms of government in their own liberated areas, above all in Guinea and Mozambique, while offering social support and educational and health services to mobilized rural communities. However, as social-engineering efforts intensified, repressive interventions such as the aforementioned *aldeamento* policy would be forcibly applied on a large scale by the Portuguese Armed Forces during the colonial wars in order to exercise control over indigenous populations.[96] The heightened social, political, economic, and racial tensions resulting from armed conflict were to uproot hundreds of thousands of Africans. As they fled to neighboring countries where nationalist movements kept their bases, the regionalization of armed conflict directly involved independent states such as Senegal, Guinea-Conakry, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo/Zaire, Zambia, Rhodesia, Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania. In the course of the war, Portugal also established strategic military alliances with neighboring countries such as South Africa and Rhodesia in the Alcora Treaty of 1970.[97]

The nationalist diplomatic offensive, internal political tensions, and the broad international condemnation of Portugal's colonial wars were to culminate in the Carnation Revolution in April 1974 which overthrew the New State dictatorship. The subsequent decolonization process would result in the independence of Guinea-Bissau (1974), followed by Mozambique, Cabo Verde, São Tomé, and Príncipe and Angola in 1975.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a broad view of the policies and practice of administration and its impact upon the economy and society in Portugal's former African colonies over a period of 75 years. The contradictions and discontinuities between policy and practice in empire, and the reactions of African populations to colonial rule have been highlighted, with regard to racial precepts, labor relations, economic development, and violent conflict. It revealed three principal strands for an analysis of the former Portuguese empire in Africa: the (aspiring) imperial nation in overreach, the lack of imperial unity, and the

ad hoc nature of colonial rule on the ground. Dominated for the most part by the New State dictatorship, the deep-seated concern with the identification of the Portuguese nation with empire was to increasingly insulate the regime from political change in Africa and beyond. The belated attempt to develop its colonies coincided not only with late industrialization in Portugal and its turn towards Europe, but also with the nationalist challenge in Africa. The sudden but inevitable collapse of empire in the mid-1970s, which was associated with the regime's wars in Africa, set in motion processes of decolonization, long after other colonial nations had shed their respective possessions in Africa. The regime's refusal to negotiate with nationalist movements and embrace the idea of decolonization, and the mounting momentum of nationalist movements' campaigns served to regionalize and internationalize these conflicts during the Cold War. These struggles and the delayed end of empire were to leave a legacy fraught with long-term implications for its deeply divided former colonies, above all in the case of Angola and Mozambique.

Notes

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2. Richard J. Hammond, *Portugal and Africa, 1815–1910: A Study in Uneconomic Imperialism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966).
3. Valentim Alexandre, "O Império Português (1825–1890): ideologia e economia," *Análise Social* XXXVIII, no. 169 (2005): 959–79.
4. Valentim Alexandre, *Origens do Colonialismo Português Moderno* (Lisbon: Sá da Costa, 1979); and by the same author, "Ideologia, Economia e Política: a questão colonial naimplantação do Estado Novo," *Análise Social* XXVIII, no. 123–24 (1993); and also *Velho Brasil, Novas Áfricas: Portugal e o Império (1808–1975)* (Oporto: Afrontamento, 2000).
5. René Pélissier, *Les Campagnes Coloniales du Portugal, 1841–1941* (Paris: Flammarion, 2004).
6. William Gervase Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire (1825–1975): A Study in Economic Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983); and Pedro Lains, "An Account of the Portuguese African Empire, 1885–1975," *Revista de História Económica* 16, no. 1 (1998): 235–63.
7. Omar Ribeiro Thomaz, *Ecos do Atlântico Sul* (Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ/Faperj, 2002); Cláudia Castelo, *"O Modo Português de estar no Mundo": o Luso-tropicalismo e a Ideologia Colonial Portuguesa (1933–1961)* (Oporto, Portugal: Edicões Afrontamento, 1998).
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10. SEMU, Concessões de Terrenos nas Províncias Ultramarinas. Carta de Lei de 9 de Maio 1901 (Lisbon: Secretária de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar,1901).
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13. Réné Pélissier, *Les Campagnes Coloniales du Portugal.*
14. Sergio Neto, *Colónia Martir, Colónia Modelo: Cabo Verde no pensamento ultramarino português, 1925–1965* (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2009).
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18. See for exemple the pamphlet *Voz d'Angola Clamando no Deserto* (1901) in Angola, the journals *O Africano* (1906–1918), *O Comércio da Guiné* (1930–1931) in Guinea, *O Brado Africano* (1918–1974) in Mozambique, *Claridade* (1936–1960) in Cape Verde and *A Liberdade* (1919–1923) in São Tomé. After 1926, press freedom was suppressed, only to be challenged from the 1950s by nationalist movements and cultural associations.
19. Visit by French Diplomatic Adviser of the AOF to Portuguese Guinea, *Voyage en Guinée Portugaise*, August 1959; Ministére des Affaires Étrangers (MAE), Paris, Direction Afrique-Levant, Série: GP, Sous Serie: I, Dossier III: Guinée Portugaise, 1953–1959; Report HM Consul Luanda, A.J.S. Pullan, on a tour of southern Angola, 18–28 July 1955; and National Archives, London, FO 371/113878.
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22. Augusto Nascimento, *Poderes e Quotidiano nas Roças de São Tomé e Príncipe* (Lousã: Tipografia Lousanense, 2002), op cit. 108.

23. Alexander Keese, "Taxation, Evasion and Compulsory Measures in Angola," in *Administration and Taxation in Former Portuguese Africa, 1900–1945*, ed. Philip J. Havik, Alexander Keese, and Maciel Santos (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), 98–137.
24. Philip J. Havik, "Tchon I Renansa: Colonial Governance, Appointed Chiefs and Political Change in 'Portuguese' Guinea," in *Ethnicity and the Long-Term Experience*, ed. Alexander Keese (Berne: Peter Lang, 2010), 155–90.
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26. Maria Conceição Neto, "In Town and Out of Town: A Social History of Huambo (Angola), 1902–1961" (PhD diss., School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), UCL/London, 2012), 265–78; and Philip J. Havik, "Direct or Indirect Rule? Reconsidering the Roles of Appointed Chiefs and Native Employees in Portuguese West Africa," *Africana Studia* 15 (2010): 29–56.
27. Susana Goulart Costa, "Portugal and the Building of an Imaginary Empire," in *Religion and Politics in a Global Society: Comparative Perspectives from the Portuguese Speaking World*, ed. Paul C. Manuel, Alynna Lyon, and Clyde Wilcox (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013), 33–46. In 1940, Portugal and the Vatican signed a concordat and missionary convention, formally recognizing and regulating the key role of Catholic missions in empire.
28. Acto Colonial, D-L 22.465, *Diário do Governo*, 83, 11-4-1930, Carta Orgânica do Imperio Colonial Português, D-L 23.228, *Diário do Governo*, 261, 15-11-1933. The latter was subject to alterations in 1946 (Portaria 11: 380, 11-6-1946).
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33. José Carlos Ney Ferreira and Vasco Soares da Veiga, *Estatuto dos Indígenas das Províncias da Angola, Guiné e Moçambique* (Lisbon: Authors' Edition, 1957).
34. Regulamento para os Contratos de Serviçais e Colonos nas Províncias de África Portuguesa, *Diário do Governo*, 237, 18-11-1878; Regulamento Geral do Trabalho dos Indígenas, *Diário do Governo*, 262, 25-11-1899; Regulamento Geral do Trabalho dos Indígenas nas Colónias Portuguesas, *Diário do Governo*, 1ª série, 187, 14-10-1914; *Código do Trabalho dos Indígenas nas Colónias Portuguesas de África* (Luanda: Colónia de Angola, 1928); and D-L 3966, Estatuto dos Indígenas Portugueses das Províncias da Guine, Angola e Moçambique, *Diário do Governo*, 110, 20-5-1954.
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36. Art. 1, Regulamento Geral do Trabalho dos Indígenas, *Diário do Governo*, 262, 25-11-1899.
37. Philip J. Havik, "Colonial Administration, Public Accounts and Fiscal Extraction: Policies and Revenues in Former Portuguese Africa (1900–1960)," *African Economic History* 41 (2013): 162–226; op. cit. 174.
38. Neto, In and Out of Town, 288: "In the search for a way out of *indigenato* constraints, 'natives' used migration, deception, tax evasion and every possibility offered by the system".
39. The *contribuição braçal* (Port: Manual Contribution), a compulsory labor tax, was introduced in Guinea in 1935 and in Mozambique in 1942.
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49. Arts. 12 & 13, Estatuto Político, Civil, Criminal dos Indígenas, 1929.
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56. Exposição do deputado Henrique Galvão, 10.
57. Ibid., 50–54.
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"A Baixa de Cassanje: algodão e revolta," *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos*, 18–22 (1995–1999): 245–83; Leopoldo Amado, Simbólica de Pindjiguití na cultura libertária da Guiné, *Guineidade*, 21-2-2006, http://guineidade.blogs.sapo.pt/15548.html; Michel Cahen, "The Mueda Case and Maconde Political Etnicity: Some Notes on Work in Progress," *Africana Studia* 2 (1999): 29–46; and Diogo Ramada Curto, Bernardo Pinto da Cruz and Teresa Furtado, *Políticas Coloniais em Tempo de Revoltas—Angola circa 1961* (Oporto: Afrontamento, 2016).

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81. Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire*, 167.

82. António Carreira, *Cabo Verde: aspectos sociais, secas e fomes do século XX* (Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 1984).
83. On the history of these nationalist movements, see Didier Péclard, *Les Incertitudes de la Nation en Angola: aux racines sociales de l'Unita* (Paris: Karthala, 2015); Christian Gefrray, *La Cause des Armes au Mozambique: anthropologie d'une guerre civile* (Paris: Karthala, 1990); José Vicente Lopes, *Cabo Verde: os bastidores da independência* (Praia: Spleen, 2002); Leopoldo Amado, *Guerra Colonial e Guerra de Libertação Nacional, 1950–1974: o caso da Guiné Bissau* (Lisbon: IPAD, 2011); Christine Messiant, *1961: L'Angola colonial, histoire et société. Les prémisses du mouvement nationaliste* (Paris: Karthala, 2006); and Gerhard Seibert, *Comrades, Clients and Cousins. Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in São Tomé and Príncipe* (Leiden: Brill, 2006).
84. Dalila Mateus, *A PIDE-DGS na Guerra Colonial, 1961–1974* (Lisbon: Terramar, 2004); Sayaka Funada-Classen, *The Origins of War in Mozambique: A History of Unity and Division* (Somerset West: Africans Minds, 2012).
85. Fernando T. Pimenta, *Angola: os Brancos e a Independência* (Oporto: Afrontamento, 2008).
86. The *colonatos* and *aldeamentos*, first proposed in the 1930s, also served to introduce cash crops such as cashew trees, which would become important export crops in a postcolonial context, above all in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.
87. With the constitutional reforms of 1951, Lusotropicalist notions were enshrined in the constitution, as well as the Colonial Act, *Diário do Governo*, 117, 11-6-1951; the new Organic Law of Portuguese Overseas Territories was passed in 1953.
88. Rosemary E. Galli, "Amílcar Cabral and Rural Transformation in Guinea Bissau: A Preliminary Critique," *Rural Africana* 25, no. 6 (1986): 55–73.
89. John P. Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War 1961–74* (Solihull: Helion, 2012).
90. See Patrick Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War* (London: Hurst, 2002), 67–77; and Mustafah Dada, *Warriors at Work: How Guinea Was Really Set Free* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1993).
91. Carlos Matos Gomes, "A africanização na Guerra Colonial e as suas sequelas. Tropas locais—Os vilões nos ventos da História," in *As Guerras de Libertação e os Sonhos Coloniais: alianças secretas, mapas imaginados*, ed. Maria Paula Meneses and Bruno Sena Martins (Coimbra: CES/Almedina, 2013), 123–41.
92. Inquêrito Funcionários Administrativos, Guiné e Moçambique, 1972; AHU, MU, ISAU.
93. Nuno Valério and Maria Paula Fontoura, "A evolução económica de Angola durante o segundo período colonial—uma tentativa de síntese," *Análise Social* XXIX, no. 129 (1994): 1193–208.
94. Lains, An Account of the Portuguese African Empire, 255/6. Between 1961 and 1970, an average of 26% of the Portuguese government budget (8% of GNP) went towards military expenditure; 242, 251. In 1970, more than 120,000 Portuguese troops were stationed in Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique. Although metropolitan emigration to the colonies was strongly promoted by the regime in the 1960s, by then the major migratory flux was directed towards Northern Europe.

95. Bandeira Jerónimo and Costa Pinto, "A Modernizing Empire."
96. João Borges Coelho, "Da violência colonial ordenada à ordem pós-colonial violenta Sobre um legado das guerras coloniais nas ex-colónias portuguesas," *Lusotopie* (2003): 175–93.
97. Amélia Neves de Souto, Relações entre Portugal, África do Sul e Rodésia do Sul e o Exercício Alcora: elementos fundamentais na estratégia da condução da guerra—1960–1974, in *As Guerras de Libertação e os sonhos coloniais*, ed. Meneses and Martins, 143–69.

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CHAPTER 9

Christian Evangelization and Its Legacy

Andrew E. Barnes

This chapter outlines the evolution of Christian social-welfare practices as first developed in Europe and then pursued in Africa. It has three objectives. The first is to provide some background to the provisioning of European-style social-welfare institutions, such as schools, hospitals, orphanages, etc., during the colonial era in Africa. The chapter will explain how and why Christian missions constructed their strategies for Christianizing Africa based upon the establishment and maintenance of such institutions. Social-welfare institutions were an attribute of a strategy of proselytization which may be labeled evangelization through poor relief. The strategy played a crucial role in the Christianization of Europe, which is why there was so much interest in pursuing it in Africa. The strategy built upon the presentation of Christianity to the 'poor' (that is, individuals and groups viewed by evangelizing Christians as on the margins of society) as a means towards self-improvement and collective empowerment. Christianity was portrayed as having the capacity to make the sick healthy, the poor prosperous, the weak strong, to make all those who embraced its tenets better individuals, better community members, better persons in general. Following the strategy, evangelizing Christians preached conversion as the most important step an individual could take towards solving the problems of the world.

European missionaries were not the only group of Christians who sought to save Africa by means of evangelization through poor relief. They had competition from African Christians with Ethiopianist sympathies. African

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Christians took a number of ideas from across the Atlantic, from people they considered as 'Africans in America'.[1] It was African Americans who first drew attention to the proclamation in the Hebrew Bible that, 'Princes shall come out of Egypt and Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands unto God' (Psalms 68:31). As Christians of African descent on both sides of the Atlantic understood the passage, it was a prophecy that one day Africans would be the agents of Africa's Christianization. Christians of African descent who accepted the truth of the passage embraced the name Ethiopianists.

A second objective of the chapter is to focus some attention on Ethiopianist movements among African Christians, and the importance of these movements as a first articulation of African-Christian sensibilities. Ethiopianism is a word that, historically, has held a number of different meanings for a number of different groups of people. As used by Christians of African descent in the New World from the 1840s, and Christians of African descent in Africa from the 1880s, Ethiopianism had to do with any notion, any agenda, that promoted African racial uplift through black Christian agency.[2]

More than disagreements over such things as polygamy, bride price, or the worship of traditional deities, the initiatives that African Ethiopianists took to evangelize other Africans, through the use of social-welfare institutions, served as a source of contention between African and European Christians. Before modern secular debates about the economic or social development of Africa began to take place, Christians framed discussions of the 'civilizing' or social transformation of African peoples by reference to ideas of the Christian 'regeneration' of Africa. Christian regeneration in these conversations involved the creation of societies with economies led by Christianized entrepreneurial classes, much in the image of similar classes in European Protestant societies.[3] Both European and African Christians took for granted the fact that this type of society was the outcome of the cultural and social processes that occurred in Christian social-welfare institutions, most importantly schools. For this reason both European and African Christians anticipated leading the Christianization of Africa using such institutions as instruments. Ethiopianists explained their determination to replicate the efforts of missions as justified by European racism, which they felt so permeated missionary thinking that it compromised the integrity of whatever social transformation Europeans hoped to effect via missionary social-welfare institutions. The alternative institutions Ethiopianists hoped to establish would educate fellow Africans in the right ways, towards a commitment to ending European domination of Africa and Africans. Ethiopianist movements failed, in part because they could never find funding to pay for the cost of building and maintaining social-welfare institutions, as well as due to the coming together of colonial governments and European missions to assert European hegemony over all European-styled charity. Still, Ethiopianist movements were among the first fruits of the planting of Christianity in Africa. They represent the first efforts on the part of African believers to reconstruct Christianity as an indigenous

faith. They deserve greater recognition for their role in shaping the larger contours of the evolution of Christianity on the continent.[4]

The third and broadest objective of the chapter is to use the discussion of Ethiopianism to prompt a redirection in scholarly research concerned with the history of Christianity in Africa. To employ a dichotomy first formulated by the German sociologist Max Weber, recent studies have contrasted the success of new *charismatic* African-Christian Churches introduced by African prophets and healers with the failure of old *bureaucratic* Churches introduced by European and American missions. Such scholarship has overdrawn the opposition between African and European notions of Christianity to the detriment of the historical understanding of how Africans have experienced Christianity as a lived religion and of how Christianity has grown over time in Africa.

Recent scholarly presentations of the Christianity that missionaries brought with them to Africa have persisted in the modernist/postmodernist debates of the last decades of the twentieth century. The presentations still challenge narratives of the Christianization of Africa that originated in the nineteenth century.[5] In these older narratives, missionaries, as heroic white saviors, brought 'light' to indigenous peoples lost in the cultural darkness outside the pale of European Christian civilization. With due acknowledgement of the missionary literature that popularized such narratives in Europe and America, it is doubtful even the most chauvinistic missionaries, once they were on the ground, long maintained such illusions of who they were and what they were doing. Recent scholarly studies, however, remain committed to demonstrating the falsity of these older narratives, mostly by contrasting the character and nature of Christianity as practiced in Africa today with some construct of the Christianity that arrived with missionaries in the past, the point to these counter-narratives being that whatever light Christianity brought to Africa, Africans discovered themselves.[6]

The problem with these demonstrations is that they beg the question of the institutional legacy of mission Christianity. The counter-narratives support a telling of the story of Christianity in Africa as discontinuous, as illustrating the failure of something European, something extraneous before the triumph of something African, something indigenous. However, there are a number of gaps in the resulting histories. Two are of concern here. First is the gap in the story of African-Christian agency. In the counter-narratives about the new African Christendom, almost all based upon developments in the years since the end of the colonial era, African Christians are depicted as protagonists, capable of and in fact initiating religious and historical change. These same capabilities are not granted to earlier groups of African Christians, those who had to contend with Europeans during precolonial and colonial times. In narratives about Christianity in Africa during these ages, African Christians are usually pictured as victims of racial domination, men and women manipulated into passive subjectivity, sometimes by missionary duplicity, other times by

government deceit. In these narratives Ethiopianism is sometimes identified as a symptom of racial domination, yet Ethiopianism is rarely discussed as a solution aimed at addressing racial imbalance.

Materials written by Ethiopianists suggest a different narrative, however, one of racial visionaries convinced that Christianity could serve as a weapon to battle colonial conquest. An adversarial dialectic between African Christians and European Christians emerged during the later decades of the nineteenth century, when the earliest groups of Africans born and raised Christians first began to challenge the ways Europeans preached Christianity. The African side to this adversarial dialectic encompassed a number of initiatives, almost all involving Africans appropriating some attribute of the institutional edifice of European Christianity and attempting to build an African Church based upon it. On the European side, missions endeavored to blunt these initiatives, ultimately cooperating with colonial governments in the characterization and then suppression of Ethiopianism as seditious.

In the histories of Christianity in Africa now being written, scholars rush through the story of Ethiopianism to get to what for them are the more edifying stories of the rise of African Independent Churches (AICs) and Pentecostalism. Yet AICs and Pentecostalist Churches did not come into existence *ex nihilo*. There is a need for more investigation of Ethiopianism as a phenomenon distinct and independent of mission Christianity. Such investigations should make clear both the debt more recent forms of African Christianity owe to Ethiopianism and the critical importance of Ethiopianism as an initial stage in the indigenization of Christianity in Africa.

A point to appreciate is that, when mission Christianity is viewed from the perspective of Ethiopianism, it is possible to see what excited Africans about Christianity in the first place. The second gap in the historical understanding of the evolution of Christianity in Africa is the blank space in the scholarly picture of how African Christianity, as a church experience, relates back to European Christianity. Whatever the cultural baggage the missionaries brought with them, there were some things about Christianity as instituted in churches and congregations that African Christians chose to keep, not discard. Further, whatever these things were, they have remained sufficiently influential that as African-Christian movements have coalesced into Churches, and Churches into denominations, these movements have continued to follow in the footsteps (that is, the same patterns of ecclesiastical growth) as did their Western European predecessors.

The argument below is that evangelization through poor relief provides the link connecting the historical development of Christianity in Africa back to that of Christianity in Europe. Over the centuries, as it evolved in Europe, evangelization through poor relief came to consist of some combination of four elements. The first was a demonstration of Christian charity, from actions as simple as an offer of a free meal to more complex gifts such as the performance of free medical procedures. The second involved an enactment

of the religious theater associated with the proffering of Christian salvation to non-believers. The third was the presentation of a program of personal transformation that could supply converts with the self-discipline that could make conversion a life-changing act. The fourth element was the creation of opportunities where new Christians could demonstrate their faith through their actions. In the evangelical strategies they pursued, missionaries introduced various combinations of these elements in Africa, with competing missions fairly guaranteeing that potential converts in any given location would be exposed to all the four elements. Some of the Africans who did convert appropriated these strategies, and reworked and recombined the elements to fit their own capacities and ambitions.

Current scholarship is fixated with the extraordinary ways in which African Christians have taken the message communicated by European missionaries and reconceptualized it in indigenous idioms. But if the question of message is put to the side and focus is trained instead of the question of method, it is possible to see that evangelizing Christians first in Europe, and then in Africa, have followed the same formula in essaying through the social services they provide to demonstrate the capacity of their faith to improve and empower. European missionaries once appeared before African village leaders offering to build medical dispensaries. African prophets still appear before village headmen offering to staff deliverance ministry chapels. Both acts reflect the same approach to evangelization. Missionaries and prophets have staked their promises to make life better on different bodies of knowledge. In their proposals, missionaries place at the disposal of leaders the accumulated expertise of European civilization on dealing with the biology of health and sicknesses. In their proposals, prophets place at the disposal of leaders their own personal knowledge of Christ's capacity to help individuals get to the spiritual malaise at the heart of many physical problems. However, both missionaries and prophets pledge the same social outcome of tighter-knit, more harmonious communities. And the yardstick of success missionaries established centuries ago remains the metric used by present-day prophets. Neither group has assessed its ministry in patients served or healed, or any such secular statistic. Rather, proof that they are doing the Lord's work they have measured in the extent to which they can see themselves as having replicated the efforts of the Apostle Paul in founding new churches, in establishing new congregations of believers.

In sum, evangelizing Christians, from missionaries to Ethiopianists to the leaders of contemporary AICs, all have aspired to spread Christianity by improving the lives of those Africans who embrace the faith. They have attempted this not just through their preaching, but through the social-welfare institutions they have put in place to apply the teachings of the Gospels to everyday life. The discussion below will first survey the development of evangelization through poor relief in medieval and early modern Europe to provide a sense of the Christian world that evolved based upon the approach.

The second topic discussed will be the introduction of the evangelical strategy in Africa by European missionaries. The third topic will actually draw the most attention. The introduction of the strategy in Africa was so successful that groups of African Christians challenged the hegemony missionaries presumed over its use. Ethiopianists may have failed to appropriate evangelization through poor relief from missions, but their efforts need to be viewed as the first in a succession of African attempts aimed at indigenizing the strategy. As suggested in the chapter's conclusion, later forms of African Christianity took their departure from the path Ethiopianists forged. The 'Africanization' of evangelization through poor relief that followed upon the Ethiopianists' defeat is an ongoing process that anthropologists and scholars of religion are still mapping. The chapter's ambition is to illustrate how the pathways being discovered can be traced back through Ethiopianism to European Christianity.

Evangelization Through Poor Relief in Europe

The greatest expression of Christian piety is evangelism, the sharing of the Christian message with those who do not know it. The men who knew Christ, his Apostles, did this. They traveled the ancient Mediterranean world as itinerant preachers, spreading the news about Christ. The stories of their ministries form part of the Christian Bible. Following in the footsteps of the Apostles, living what the European Christian tradition identified as the *vita apostolica*, has remained the ultimate expression of Christian faith. Over time, however, Christian evangelism has taken forms other than itinerant preaching as different peoples have applied the ideal to their contemporary times and contemporary needs.[7]

In the Roman Empire and its successor states, Christianity was first most successfully evangelized through the establishment of monastic communities where believers could go to escape the impurities of the mundane world and ideally, through their devotions, generate sufficient spiritual grace to compensate for the sins of those outside the monastery's walls.[8] Eventually, other forms of evangelism emerged to compete with monasticism. Of these, the one with the greatest historical import was evangelism through poor relief.

Poor relief needs explanation. The term 'the poor' was open-ended; it was used by Christian elites (that is, people with power) to categorize the multiple, typically overlapping, groups of people whom they considered poor (that is, powerless). Poor relief comprised acts of charity, acts out of the 'love' of God, performed by people with power for people without it. These acts might have had ulterior social and political motives, but they were performed in the ritualized, protocol-driven ways of Christian devotion. Thanks to rulers like Constantine, Clovis, and Charlemagne, who declared themselves and all who lived in their territories to be subject to Christ, and, equally importantly, who employed Christian churchmen as state officials, the presumption at the

top of European societies was that all the people below were Christians. From the perspective of Christian elites (that is, the churchmen and laymen who exercised some authority in their own right), however, just as Christians were not all equal in power and status, they were also not all equal in faith.[9]

From the Christian elite's point of view, powerless people were deficient not just in political and/or social terms, but also in matters of faith. In addition, the poor's deficiencies deprived the latter of the capacity to save their own souls. The language of Christian faith used in antique and medieval European Christian devotional discourse constructed spirituality on a scale of greater and lesser spiritual perfection. The term meant different things in different ages.[10] However, whatever its meaning, spiritual perfection was something humans strove to attain. Christian elites equated power with volition, and volition with the capacity to strive. A Christian needed power in order to channel the use of power towards spiritual perfection. The poor lacked volition, therefore they had nothing to channel, therefore they lacked the capacity to strive towards spiritual perfection.

In ministering to the needs of the poor, European Christian elites understood themselves to be giving the poor the capacity to strive. Christian elites perceived themselves as standing closer to God, the poor as standing further from God in perfection. They understood poor relief as a challenge to help the poor get closer, if not to God, than at least closer to themselves in spiritual perfection. Their evangelism aimed at disciplining away the deficiencies that made the poor less capable than themselves. In turn, they read the poor's acceptance of the proffered relief as a first act of volition, as a first indication of a poor person's willingness to accept the needed discipline.

The Christian elite's concern to help the Christian poor strive provided the impetus behind the evolution both of social-welfare institutions and the programmatic strategies of social transformation followed in these institutions. To progress towards spiritual perfection, poor souls needed not just to be physically fed and healed, but spiritually mended and fortified. Programs of psychological counseling, social rehabilitation, and the like are not inventions of modern secular society. Their roots go far back into the evangelical strategies pursued in medieval social-welfare institutions. Evangelizing is an act of communication, and communication is a function of using available media to convey ideas. Medieval Christian efforts at social amelioration were not articulated in 12-step programs (that is, systematized curricula presented over some time period, but through the creation and exploitation of visual media and public ritual. The art carved on the outside or painted on the inside of walls of a social-welfare institution, the processions and other rites performed by the clergy who maintained a social-welfare institution, these were the tools of teaching and training. The liturgy (that is, the annual schedule of devotions celebrated by a social-welfare institution) gave this teaching and training whatever programmatic structure it was perceived to have.[11]

The material culture and physical rituals associated with social welfare emphasized how in giving to the poor, elites were demonstrating Christian charity. This much is widely recognized. In focusing on poor relief as it was practiced in Europe as a source of data for the resolution of theoretical debates about the nature of European society, scholars have given insufficient attention to how poor relief also provided medieval European Christians with space and time to act out their own understandings of the stories in the Christian Gospels. It is important to appreciate, however, that in the latters' minds they were successors to the Apostles, aspiring in their turn to achieve the goal of Christian regeneration, the rekindling of the faith that poor Christians were presumed, through their lack of volition, to have lost. Looked at from a religious viewpoint, what stands out about medieval social-welfare institutions is the extent to which they provided venues for the performance of Christian conversion stories, for naïve, but still self-consciously mimetic reenactments of the most inspiring stories of evangelism depicted in the Christian Bible. Christian social-welfare institutions were places where Christians with power displayed their religious convictions by passing on to the powerless the discipline needed to begin the mental and behavioral transformations that stood as thresholds to the pursuit of spiritual perfection.

The would-be evangelists who funded and staffed social-welfare institutions discovered though, probably to their chagrin, that there is no necessary causality between conversion and Christian life. The third element of evangelization through poor relief was the most difficult to realize. Conversion could be a life changing event, but only if in fact a convert changed, and began living life as a Christian. Very often, however, converts fell back into pre-conversion patterns of thought and behavior. The term Christians use for this phenomenon is 'backsliding'. Over the centuries, in response to the failure of poor people to stay true to the promises they made at the moment of conversion, the Christians who ran social-welfare institutions began to think in progressively more programmatic fashion about ways to correct (and, even better, to avert) backsliding. These discussions may be considered the first discourses on the subject of what will be discussed below as the Christian social ethos.[12]

The individuals who converted were known as *conversi* or *donati*.[13] Finding social niches and public opportunities for them to display evangelical volition became problems of success. Social-welfare institutions tended to absorb the most enthusiastic of their converts as lay workers and helpers. Nevertheless, there was not space within the institutions for all who converted. Directing and controlling the enthusiasm of converts outside institutional walls were issues of concern for both clerical and temporal authorities. Worth suggesting is that these concerns were not effectively addressed until the thirteenth century when the Franciscans and Dominicans innovated through the creation of third orders, or tertiaries, which were associations of lay people committed to lives of evangelism but who remained outside the monasteries

in secular society. Through these tertiary groups and the devotional associations for which they pioneered a path, it became possible for lay people under clerical supervision to display proof of evangelical volition in public space outside institutional walls.

During the later centuries of the European Middle Ages, what had been originally elite ideas about evangelism through poor relief were popularized across Christian society. Poor relief was organized on a progressively more elaborate institutional basis. Helping the poor was centralized in stone and mortar edifices; that is, almshouses and hospitals. The institutions had what can be recognized as proto-professional staffs, primarily monks and nuns who discovered vocations in helping the poor and developed some expertise in counseling them. These staffs had helpers, typically former participants in the institution's programs.[14]

Opportunities for lay Christians below elite status to demonstrate volition via participation in poor relief also grew through the foundation of devotional associations known as confraternities. Devotional associations augmented social-welfare networks through the creation of new types of institutions such as hostels for poor travelers, and new types of agencies such as collection societies for funds to provide dowries for poor girls. When devotional associations first became common, their memberships were drawn from the upper and middle classes. Towards the end of the Middle Ages, many of these associations opened their doors to Christians from the lower classes. Evangelization through poor relief in many instances became an in-house activity, richer members focusing their proselytizing on poorer members of the association. By the end of the Middle Ages, evangelism through poor relief was a devotional pathway open to Christians of all social ranks. Rich and powerful believers with the wherewithal to establish or fund social-welfare institutions still had many more opportunities to don the persona of an Apostle. Christians of more modest stature could also assume the mantle of an evangelist, if only before the poorer members of the association.[15]

Social-welfare institutions and the evangelical strategies deployed through them were essential attributes of the lived Christian experience that evolved in Europe in the wake of the decline of the monastic ideal. Modern scholars, however, have dismissed medieval social-welfare institutions as having had limited social impact, and lacking this, little historical import. For the most part scholars treat the institutions only as an aspect of a religious sensibility made obsolete by the Protestant and Catholic reform movements of the sixteenth century. Thomas Max Safley traces this reading back to Max Weber's assessment that medieval social-welfare institutions were too preoccupied with irrational sensibilities to be of much use in resolving the problems associated with poor relief. As Weber saw it, the challenge poor relief placed before elites in Europe was how to put the poor to work. The mystical notions of 'brotherly love' that infused Christian social-welfare institutions got in the way of the discovery of systematic processes for turning the poor's potential

into productive labor. After centuries of desultory results with allowing Christians to train the poor, the 'loveless realities' of the marketplace finally forced the rationalization and bureaucratization of poor relief that Weber approvingly noted as taking place during his own times. Safley argues that in making this case, Weber performed a neat trick of othering; not really investigating medieval social-welfare institutions but projecting back onto them all the opposite qualities to those he ascribed to modern social welfare.[16] Weber sent scholars off in the wrong direction. Generations of historians, no matter what aspect of poor relief they have investigated, have fallen prey to the 'Weberian trope', as Safely labeled it, of repeating the storyline that from the medieval to the modern centuries, something warm and empathetic but also ineffective gradually wore away to be replaced by something cold and rational but also efficient.

The price tag for the ongoing validation of Weber's characterization of poor relief, Safley suggests, has been a lack of theoretical appreciation of the extent to which something warm and full of pathos (that is, the ideas animating medieval ideas of poor relief) could be and in fact were progressively updated to address the expectations and demands of economic and political elites. To build upon Safley's point, medieval Christians did look at poor relief from the perspective of economic outcomes, but only secondarily, and then from the point of view of how the outcomes validated Christian conversion. Christians never aspired to the transformation of all the poor who came through the doors of their welfare institutions. Rather, their goal was the harvest of those poor souls who, through their actions, gave evidence of God's favor. In their own assessments of the impact of their initiatives, Christians always had in mind some gradient derived from the teachings of Saint Augustine of Hippo. Augustine taught that God chooses only a portion of human souls, an elect, for salvation, leaving the rest, the reprobate, for damnation. Based upon this understanding, in the programs and routines implemented in their social-welfare institutions, Christians sought: firstly to identify the elect among the poor people they served; secondly to help this elect attain self-consciousness of its chosen status. Christians took for granted that 'by their fruits you shall know them', meaning that the onus was on the poor elect to make themselves known through their positive response to the training being offered. Christians invested in the economic success only of the poor who emerged from their institutions. For Christians, the limited social impact of Christian social-welfare institutions condemned by theorists and scholars was actually a measure of success. It demonstrated that Christians had indeed found a way to separate the wheat from the chaff, the elect from the reprobate, the potentially powerful from those eternally damned to poverty.[17]

The practice of evangelization through relief to the poor, the social-welfare institutions it inspired, and the social ethic these institutions sought to inculcate all developed during the European Middle Ages as features of Roman Christianity. All three took an evolutionary step forward as a consequence of

the state takeover of Churches during the early modern European centuries. By the seventeenth century, states oversaw and regulated Church life everywhere in Europe, in lands both officially Protestant and officially Catholic. Relief for the poor during the Middle Ages typically had the support of the state, but it did not fall under government oversight. The situation changed during the early modern era when political regimes took control of churches and, through them, of poor relief.[18]

States justified their nationalization of the practice of Christianity by reference to national security. To explain the relationship between state and Church that became the ideal during the era, contemporaries used the expression, '*cuis regio, euis religio*', 'the religion of the ruler is the religion of those under the ruler's rule'. The term communicated a truth recognized by all with some sort of political authority during the time, that faith either supported the political status quo or faith undercut it. 'No bishop, no king', was another contemporary expression that circulated in England after the restoration of the monarchy in 1660. In the previous two decades, civil war, the dissolution of the Church of England, and the execution of a reigning monarch had validated the conventional wisdom that, from the state's perspective, the primary task of religious institutions, the goal towards which they necessarily needed to be dedicated, was maintenance of the political order.[19]

In line with this goal, Churches became departments of the state. Rulers took over all Churches in territories under their sovereignty, and appointed Churchmen committed to advancing the policies of the state Church. Among the responsibilities of these Churchmen was oversight of poor relief. The institutional face of poor relief did not change much over the early modern European centuries. Charity continued to be dispensed from centrally located stone and mortar edifices. The social function of welfare institutions changed, however. The older characterizations of the poor as powerless did not disappear, but these definitions were overlaid with new stereotypes reflecting economic deprivation and displacement. The religious wars, the rise and decline of states, the economic cycles of the period created hundreds of thousands of uprooted people who registered in the minds of the government authorities through whose territories they wandered only as beggars and vagrants; in other words, as at best social nuisances, at worst political threats.[20]

The potential of displaced populations for civil unrest and social rebellion made surveillance and containment primary concerns governments expected social-welfare institutions to address. The state Church, through the social-welfare institutions it maintained, became the triage point for assessing the poor: the threats they posed; the relief they required. The problem of displaced populations, which only increased in magnitude across the early modern European centuries, pushed governments towards policies of incarceration as strategies for containment. Social-welfare institutions became the forerunners of modern prisons. In exchange for the succor they offered, social-welfare institutions required that the poor accept being locked away, if

only at night, when they were assumed to pose the greatest threat to law and order. The stone and mortar buildings where charity was dispensed came to be encircled with high stone walls. The walls were for keeping people in.[21]

There was not much space in this world for the idea of evangelization through poor relief that developed during the Middle Ages. But the idea evolved with the times and flourished again. Though states took control of social-welfare institutions, the staffs at these institutions continued to be Church people, for whom helping the poor and saving the latter's souls remained synonymous expressions. Since loyalty to the state was measured by loyalty to the state Church, the Church people running social-welfare institutions drew only praise from governments for developing programs designed to convert the poor simultaneously into good Christians as well as loyal subjects.

The Christians who maintained early modern European social-welfare institutions evolved as intermediaries who used their knowledge and authority to shape the nature of the encounter between Europe's ruling and subject classes. They successfully played both sides against the middle, in this instance convincing both sides that the Christianization going on in Christian-run social-welfare institutions was social progress. Early modern Christians could make such claims because, in contrast to what Weber argued, the educational and behavioral reform programs offered in social-welfare institutions did help equip poor people to fulfill the economic demands of their times. Early modern economies needed proto-industrial laborers, workers ideally with some technological competence trained to toil according to some regimen. Social-welfare institutions, in particular the new charity schools that were founded to educate the children of the poor, endeavored to supply the desired workforce. The institutions passed on to the poor who slept inside their walls life skills that included some basic literacy and numeracy coupled with a rudimentary introduction to the use of selected tools. These were all embedded in a social routine aimed at instilling a disciplined work ethic. The poor who stayed at a social-welfare institution long enough acquired the skills to catch on somewhere in the technology-driven economic world coming into existence as a consequence of transoceanic trade. From the point of view of governments, these people had ceased to be part of the problem and had become instead proof that there existed a solution.[22]

Christians were similarly satisfied with the people leaving their institutions. Conversion is a moment that can take a lifetime and a number of false starts to occur. The Christians who staffed social-welfare centers certainly wanted (but realistically did not expect) most of the individuals passing through their institutions to convert. A far more persistent hope was that poor individuals would come to recognize that whatever other identities they claimed, they were first and foremost sinners. For Christians, conversion, as a spectacle observed was ideally the happy denouement to a personal spiritual drama that

could have many acts. However, for this conclusion to be reached, the drama had to begin with some self-consciousness of the sin that permeates every human's life. The clergy and laypeople who ran early modern social-welfare institutions hoped at the least to get the poor to this level of awareness.

The poor who went beyond this level, to actually enquire about how they could be freed from sin, were the prize. For this audience, early modern Christians, much like their medieval predecessors, turned their institutions into theaters where they, as aspiring spiritual directors, staged their own reenactments of conversion stories from the Bible. The performances were open-ended. The early modern centuries were a great age, perhaps the last great age of Augustinianism. Saint Augustine taught that every event is providential. Early modern Christians could proselytize with the confidence that whether or not a conversion drama had a happy ending was up to God, not to them. And one evangelist's failure to help a sinner shed his or her burden might be God's way of giving another evangelist a chance.

From the beginning, European social-welfare institutions were enormously expensive to build and maintain. They were an expression of the faith of the rich and powerful. They only grew to the extent that they did by the end of the Middle Ages through the lavish granting of indulgences by the Roman Church hierarchy, which channeled the pious offerings of prosperous townspeople and well-off peasants into charitable projects. Once the state took over the Church, the state and local governments stepped into supply a good deal of the maintenance cost of social-welfare institutions. Founding and building such institutions, however, involved a separate set of funding issues. Here is where Christians, wealthy individuals acting on their own and Christian communities and associations acting collectively, dictated the contours of the growth of poor relief. Hospitals, schools, and poorhouses came into existence through Christian initiative. In early modern Europe, what was from the Christian perspective a wonderful cycle of development evolved. Church people would find the funding for founding a social-welfare institution, get the institution up and running, and then governments would step in and offer to subsidize operational costs. With the monies they received from government subsidies, Church people would save up and set their sights on the founding of another social-welfare institution.[23] Later in colonial Africa, both governments and missions had this cycle in mind when they negotiated plans for the development of social-welfare institutions.

To use (once again) Weber's terminology, evangelization through poor relief was routinized into the character of European Christianity. It became the process Europeans most readily thought of when they thought of Christian evangelization. By the end of the eighteenth century, the moment when Christian mission expansion to Africa began in earnest, evangelization through poor relief and the institutions through which it was effected had become defining characteristics of European Christianity.

Evangelization Through Poor Relief in Africa

The focus below will be on Protestant missions to Africa.[24] By way of background, is may be noted that the first Christian missions from Europe to Africa began at the end of the fifteenth century. Catholic missionaries under the patronage of the Portuguese monarch set up mission stations, staffed with monks committed to using medieval notions of evangelization through poor relief, in the Kongo kingdom in Central Africa and explored doing something similar in the lands of the emperor of Ethiopia. Catholic mission stations in Central Africa continued to be occupied through the end of the seventeenth century. How much impact the missions had on African religious sensibilities is the subject of ongoing historical investigation. Catholic missions to the continent, albeit to a completely different region, began anew at the end of the eighteenth century, this time under the aegis of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. The mission stations established as part of this push were built along the West African coast. Over the nineteenth century, Catholic missions expanded significantly, several new religious orders emerging with a specific vocation to evangelize people of African descent.[25]

Missions under Protestant sponsorship did not begin until the last years of the eighteenth century. Missionaries from a number of denominations then founded mission stations along the West African coast, most notably in Sierra Leone, where the 'black poor' of England were resettled.[26] Christian conversions in Sierra Leone grew in part through the proselytization of local populations, but in part also through the repatriation to Africa of Africans freed from captivity by the British Naval Squadron. The number of missionaries, the number of mission stations, the number of confessions and denominations represented on Africa's West coast all climbed across the nineteenth century, as did the numbers of African-Christian believers. A second set of mostly Protestant missions began the evangelization of Africa from the southern end of the continent, using European settler towns and communities as their starting points. These missions, led by the great explorer missionary David Livingstone, expanded into the interior of the continent, setting up stations for Africans in proximity to European settlements. In this area as well there came to be a wide range of denominational and confessional mission stations, and a large number of prosperous African-Christian communities came to be associated with these stations.[27]

Christian missionary enterprise in Africa was based upon the strategy of evangelization through poor relief, though this point is hard to discern in the literature produced by missionaries. Missionaries loved the idea of wandering the roadways of Africa, proselytizing in the manner of the original Apostles, and highlighted the moments when they actually did these things in the stories and books they published about their time in Africa. Most missionaries, however, spent the majority of their time tied to mission stations, occupied with the social-welfare institutions they maintained on those stations.

Accepting as accurate the generalization that most missionaries appeared on the scene in African villages and communities as a protected group of outsiders with elite privileges, then it can be said that, initially, Christianity was proselytized in Africa in much the same way it had come to be preached in Europe; that is, from the top down through social-welfare institutions. It can also be argued that Christianity took root in Africa the same way it had in Europe, through the recruitment and empowerment of people with little to no power and authority in existing societies. Lastly, one can postulate that the social dynamics that pushed the Christianization process in European social-welfare institutions were reproduced on mission stations in Africa. Like European customs and practices not sanctioned by state Churches, African customs and practices not sanctioned by missions were condemned as the lures of Satan. Contention over continued performance of such customs and practices was a common occurrence between missionaries and African converts. The disputes that could not be resolved to a convert's satisfaction saw the convert walk away, perhaps to another mission, as the poor in Europe once moved on from one almshouse to another. As for those disputes that could be resolved, these missionaries acknowledged post facto in their writings under the rubric of backsliding. For missionaries, the practice of characterizing negotiations concerning discipline in this manner allowed them to claim the spiritual high ground over the polygamists, beer drinkers and clandestine participants in traditional rites with whom they had been arguing. The reward for the disputants was that they could now rejoin the mission station community.[28]

The strategy worked. Mission stations gave rise to communities of African Christians. Successful stations became hubs for expansion, making use of Christians from these communities as examples of the power of Christian conversion. Looking at evangelization through poor relief from the African perspective, it can be taken as a given that the message the white men were preaching, often half incomprehensibly through translation, did not resonate with every African who heard it. What appealed to the Africans for whom the message did resonate, though, was the Christian social ethos. As introduced by missionaries, this was composed of a number of things, one of the most prominent being a sensibility that viewed social change both as possible and, if the change were in the direction of broader communal engagement in projects aimed at social amelioration, as advancement. Many African peoples shared this sensibility. For a significant number of them Christianity came to be associated with improvement, both on the individual level (the acquisition of intellectual skills and behavioral self-discipline) and on the collective level (the evolution of self-conscious, self-improving communities).

Behind the sensibility were several commonly held assumptions that focused the pursuit of progress on the establishment of Christian social-welfare institutions. One assumption was that an individual assimilated the Christian social ethos through a process distinct from the processes associated with

Christian conversion and/or Christian witness. Christians, both African and European, assumed, based upon the biblical admonition that 'By their fruits you shall know them', that the measure of the assimilation of the Christian social ethos was observable behavioral and attitudinal change. Practicing Christians were expected to behave in certain ways, to think in certain ways. Orthopraxis, that is, acting and thinking according to some established norms of faith, stood as separate from and for the most part posterior to the more dramatic events associated with conversion and witness. Individuals could go through the rituals associated with Christian conversion (that is, baptism and communion), but later 'backslide' in their actions, in this way invalidating for practicing Christians any claim those individuals made of conversion. Similarly, individuals could undergo trials for their faith, enduring ridicule, condemnation and even violent assault, yet later be dismissed by the faithful for leading dissolute lives.

As these qualifications suggest, the Christian social ethos was understood to reflect a state of consciousness achieved only through a continuous disciplining of mental and physical habits. The ethos demanded that individuals learn how to control themselves. African Christians were in broad agreement with European Christians that the best place to learn the desired self-control was a mission school. 'School' is actually a problematic term because it characterized any venue where learning to read the Bible was taught, or where Christian life was talked about in some systematic fashion. As such, schools were everywhere and anywhere missionaries set up shop in Africa. Missions introduced a number of different types of social-welfare institutions to Africa. In the nineteenth century, among others, there were freed slave homes, freed slave villages, and orphanages. All of these types of institutions typically came to maintain some form of school for potential converts.

Beyond these informal, ad hoc introductory programs to Christianity and its tenets, many missions also established formal education institutions where European styled curricula were taught up to the secondary level. At the least, these schools were day schools, where students attended classes five to six days a week. Ideally they were boarding academies, where the students practiced living Christian lives under adult Christian supervision. The intellectual skills to be obtained in such schools were highly prized. The skills were understood to guarantee future employment in some connection with the transoceanic world expanding inward into Africa from the coastal regions. The allure of the skills can be overemphasized, however. For Christians, equally important was the religious persona the schools were understood to inculcate. Mission schools were seen as immersion experiences in Christian identity. It was taken for granted that without some internalization of the Christian social ethos, students would find it impossible to survive at the schools. Students who made it through the course of study at mission schools were thought to have mastered living, thinking, and behaving as Christians. If there was one proof they were asked to give regarding the benefits of

Christianity to Africa, that proof for most African Christians would be the mission school.[29]

To the extent to which there was any collective opposition to mission education in the decades leading up to the colonial era, it came from Europeans living on the continent. For them the issue was race. Mission schools were very good at turning out Christians. Yet, over the course of the nineteenth century, as Europeans came to claim the civilization that evolved in Europe as an expression not of Christian good works but of European racial genius, this outcome came under increasing dispute. For some Europeans, Christian became a synonym for 'civilized', which in turn became a synonym for European. In European discourse all these terms came to be reserved as markers that conveyed racial whiteness. From the perspective of Europeans who thought this way, mission schools were not turning out civilized people; the schools were turning out phony Europeans with pretensions of whiteness. As European states began to conquer African territories this mindset achieved some hegemony among Europeans with power and authority. It also established itself firmly in the heads of the thousands of Europeans who in the last half of the nineteenth century began to take ship from Europe to Africa to seek their fortunes. The latter insisted upon the establishment of social hierarchies in African colonies, with full civil rights and privileges reserved for white people.[30]

Even before the onset of colonialism, African Christians challenged the privileges Europeans sought to reserve for themselves based upon race. African Christians insisted that a positive equation existed between Christianity and civilization, that as Christians they were civilized, therefore they as Christians had a claim to all the rights and privileges from which Europeans were seeking to exclude them. In response to such arguments, European thinkers tied culture more exclusively to race, and insisted that African conversion to Christianity was a form of 'race suicide'.[31] Mission schools came under pressure from Europeans to stop 'denationalizing' Africans, meaning educating Africans to have aspirations beyond the latter's 'nation' or status in a world controlled by Europe. The Christian social ethos measured God's favor by individual initiative and self-improvement, by communities formed and social institutions founded, in sum by aspirations striven for and attained. From the perspective of the thinkers who shaped the colonial European mindset, the Christian social ethos was denationalizing Africans by teaching them to strive for a self-sufficiency that Africans as a race could not be allowed to possess.[32]

African Christians would come to criticize mission schools in one regard. After the reported success of industrial education schools for training freed African peoples in the USA, African Christians petitioned missions to diversify school curricula by augmenting the clerical training that shaped the common offerings in mission schools with more explicitly scientific and technical instruction. Missions rebuffed these entreaties, mostly by dismissing the

Africans who made the entreaties as unrepresentative of African-Christian desires.[33]

The missions' response to the criticisms of mission education leveled by Europeans was more complicated. Missions came to pursue some mixture of two different strategies. Many missions adopted a 'do no evil, see no evil' stance. As the declaration of European suzerainty over African territories picked up steam in the last decades of the nineteenth century, missions tried to distance themselves from any charge of complicity in the emergence of African Christians as the most vocal opponents of the imposition of European rule. The rejection of African requests for curricular diversification in mission schools was one way missions sought to assure imperial governments of their loyalties. Of greater historical consequence, missions began the erection of what would eventually be a two-tiered system of Christian evangelization, where missionaries exercised a fairly exclusive control over all mission social-welfare institutions. This system is discussed in more detail below. In the period under consideration it was anticipated primarily through missions reversing a course of development, most clearly spelled out in the writings of Henry Venn of the Church Missionary Society and most clearly articulated in the career of the African Anglican bishop Samuel Ajayi Crowther, that had advocated placing African Christians in roles of authority over mission churches and mission social-welfare institutions.[34]

With Africans nowhere in sight in the upper echelons of leadership in mission churches, missions could feel justified when, in response to European criticisms, they protested that all they were doing in their schools was training Africans to assist, not lead, in Christian evangelization. Missions could be accused of a bit of disingenuity here. There was an ever expanding market outside churches for the intellectual skills to be gained inside mission schools. More and more missions complained about the allure of Mammon for their students and former students, an acknowledgement of their awareness of that market, and that, with the Church itself no longer viable as a career option, the majority of their students intended to enter it, not the ranks of evangelists. Missions knew that they were not just training Church people. They were also aware that the people they were training were the people leading the charge against colonization. Yet in assuming the stance that they did, missions could treat all such developments as something outside their control and thus not their concern.

Missions tempered this stance of what might be labeled diffidence, or even resistance, with one of cooperation with other Europeans. Missions tried to develop curricula in their schools that kept the striving associated with the Christian social ethic, but limited the goals to which Africans could rightly strive. 'Industrial education' is another term that had multiple meanings to multiple groups of people. The term was used by missionaries to characterize mission school curricula in the late nineteenth century, especially in the parts of Africa settled by the British. It signified an ambition to train Africans to

desire a 'square house', instead of a 'round hut', and to seek a job working for Europeans instead of maintaining a farm with 'a few goats and cattle'. 'Industrial' in this context was the adjectival form of 'industriousness', the notion being that mission schools could convince Africans that hard work in subservience to white domination was a Christian way forward.[35]

A counterfactual historical question worth pondering is: What would the Christian evangelization of Africa have looked like if it had not taken place at the same time as the European conquest of the continent? African Christians remembered the earliest generations of missionaries, the ones who came to Africa up through the time of Livingstone, with a good deal of fondness as father figures. Not quite so for the generations of missionaries who came later. From the last decades of the nineteenth century to the end of the colonial era, there was as much suspicion as trust in African characterizations of missionaries and the latter's intentions. There was European racism and African indifference to Christianity long before the closing years of the nineteenth century, yet the coming together at that historical juncture of the modern missionary movement and European imperialism seems to have created critical mass for the synthesis of a set of associations between Christianity and European racism with which Christians, and the historians who write about Christianity in Africa, still struggle.

As the 'Scramble for Africa' took place there was cognitive dissonance if not outright contradiction in the ways that missions sought to reconcile their presence in Africa with the concerns other Europeans had about African Christians. Social-welfare institutions were generating the same social products in Africa as they had in Europe. They were sending out crop after crop of strivers, Christians who wanted to demonstrate their convictions through the transformation of the world around them. Missions wanted this to continue. Yet, to placate white anxieties, missionaries endeavored to temper and/or redirect the enthusiasm that made African Christians want to save Africa for Christ. Their rationalizations here certainly reflected European scientific racism. The Christian social ethos trained Christians to aspire to the role of protagonist in dramas about evangelization. Missionaries convinced themselves, and perhaps some other Europeans that, given the intellectual limitations of the race, Africans could be limited to playing foils to European leads in such dramas.

The 'colonial moment' in Africa, as it has been called, lasted for approximately eighty years, from 1880 to 1960.[36] During this period, European states progressively built up political and economic infrastructures in colonized African territories with the goal of making Africa profitable for Europeans. Governmental institutions that Europeans set up ensured that every African paid his dues to the colonial regime. Railways, motor roads, cities and harbors were constructed, all geared towards the extraction of wealth from Africa and its transport to Europe. African peoples were forced to leave other pursuits to labor in service to the needs of capitalistic development. The

pernicious impact of state-supported capitalism on African societies was most obvious in the mining industries that grew up in Southern and Central Africa and then in West Africa, which pulled millions of Africans from their homes to pay taxes to cover the cost of construction of economic infrastructure.

From the 1880s to around 1920, the interactions of three sets of actors shaped the direction in which social-welfare institutions evolved: Christian missionaries, colonial governments, and African Christians. During the period, missionary efforts to Christianize Africa reached their high point. The imposition of colonial rule gave European peoples from across the globe confidence that law and order would prevail sufficiently along the many frontiers in Africa to allow mission stations to be established. The missionaries who set sail for Africa reflected the broad array of understandings of Christianity not just among Protestants, but Catholics as well. There was also, for the first time, a significant number of women missionaries. They came with an explicit dedication to create social-welfare institutions for African women and girls.[37]

The social welfare of Africans was not a primary preoccupation of colonial governments. Certain emerging conditions pushed governments' involvement in social services. First was the needs of African communities and individuals displaced by the various transformations taking place as part of the establishment of colonial rule. Second was the perceived threat of sedition from within the ranks of African Christians. When governments did act, it was mostly to manipulate in desired directions the competition between the ever growing number of missions. Missions that provided what governments deemed as valuable social services got permission to establish stations in choice spots among African peoples identified as open to evangelization. Missions that declined to cooperate with government dictates, or whose African adherents caused concerns, were punished with access to fewer sites typically among African peoples with no displayed interest in Christianity.

Neither missions not governments were looking to alter evangelization through poor relief as the strategy was pursued in Africa at the start of the colonial era. The measures missionaries introduced to tone down the challenges African Christians posed to European domination to some extent did mollify Europeans. And the plenitude of missions, eager for stations, supplied colonial governments with a convenient way to both control missions and to address the social-welfare needs of Africans. Site license for mission stations were granted to missions with the understanding that whatever the status of the evangelical work going on at a station, if the social services being provided at that station did not measure up to government expectations, another mission could be offered a site license in close proximity. Europeans probably would have been content to play this game among themselves ad infinitum had it not been for the intervention of African Christians, who put pressure on both missions and governments to take a very different approach to social welfare.

By the 1880s, the second generations of Christians (individuals who had been born and raised in the faith) were maturing in many places in Africa. These individuals were ready to take leading roles as missionaries and evangelists. Typically, these individuals were literate. They were the producers as well as the consumers of the African newspapers that began to flourish. Through these newspapers, African Christians were exposed to ideas coming from Europe and the New World. African Christians were very conscious of the emerging science of race in Europe and the arguments this science produced justifying the subjugation, perhaps even eradication, of the African race. African Christians perceived the influence of these arguments in the actions of all Europeans, but especially missionaries. In the decades under discussion, there were a number of developments that African Christians could and did read as signs of a missionary willingness to use Christianity to help other Europeans overpower the African race.[38]

Reacting to these perceptions, African Christians with Ethiopianist leanings began to talk among themselves about taking the lead in the regeneration of Africa. Ethiopianists were conscious of Christianity as something over and above the racialized version of the faith then current among Europeans. The challenge for Ethiopianists was to find a way to save the baby while discarding the bathwater, the baby in this context being the ameliorative capacities of the Christian social ethos; the bathwater, missionary racism.

Initially, African Christians turned towards colonial governments. They read in newspapers that in Europe itself, governments were building state school systems, and more broadly state social-welfare systems, with the conscious goal of removing these things from Church control. To Africans reading about such developments, it seemed fair to conclude that governments would want to do the same in the colonies. Such thinking was behind the petitions advanced by Ethiopianists in the 1890s, in Sierra Leone and Nigeria in West Africa, and in Cape Province in South Africa, for European governments to build schools. The schools proposed would be central secondary institutions, set over and above mission-maintained primary-school networks. African Christians envisioned the schools not as replacements for mission schools and the inculcation of the Christian social ethos that took place at mission schools, but as training centers in the higher forms of especially technical knowledge that missionaries refused to share.[39]

Governments turned a cold shoulder to all Ethiopianist petitions for schools. So Ethiopianists looked for ways to sponsor the construction of the schools themselves. Europeans, missionaries as well as others, took for granted that Europe provided the only viable examples of civilized societies. But African Christians looked across the Atlantic to the example of African-American freed people in the USA, and drew inspiration. In the second half of the nineteenth century, African Americans were characterized in the world press as an outstanding illustration of a people who had pulled themselves up by the bootstraps. Freed from slavery but left in poverty in the 1860s, by the

1880s they were presented in newspapers as an emerging capitalist class of landowners and agricultural entrepreneurs. The key to their social transformation was Christianity, to which they had been exposed in what was seen as a definitive demonstration of the effectiveness of evangelism through poor relief. There were a number of successful schools established by missionaries for freed people in the USA. Yet African newspapers focused on two of them. In the decades before 1895, Hampton Institute in Virginia gained its own set of admirers among African Ethiopianists. But after 1895, Tuskegee Institute in Alabama (led its charismatic principal, Booker T. Washington, an alumnus of Hampton) became the model of the kind of social-welfare institution Ethiopianists wanted to copy across Africa.[40]

'Industrial education' as taught at Hampton and Tuskegee today draws mostly condemnation from scholars for its lack of academic rigor and emphasis on manual training, 'working with the hands', as Washington popularized the expression. Yet, in Africa, at the turn of the twentieth century, industrial education as Washington developed it at Tuskegee was viewed with much racial pride. Tuskegee was more than a school; it was the Christian social-welfare institution updated and perfected to the needs of the African race. It was a place where poor black people could not only be mended physically and spiritually, could not only discover the empowering discipline of the Christian social ethos, but also acquire economic skills to make them competitive with whites.[41]

Edward W. Blyden, the most influential Ethiopianist thinker in West Africa, was among Tuskegee's greatest supporters. He praised Washington for discovering a Christian way forward towards an African industrial civilization. He endeavored to build his own version of Tuskegee in Lagos.[42] In South Africa, John Tengo Jabavu, editor of *Imvo Zabantsundu*, the largest and most influential African newspaper, mentioned the school regularly in his newspaper, and conceived a grand plan to build a version of Tuskegee, an Inter-State Native College, in Cape Province.[43]

Both Blyden's and Jabavu's plans for schools like Tuskegee were undermined by funding challenges. All schools are expensive to build and maintain, but perhaps none more that industrial education institutes. Further, once such schools were up and running, they required round after round of what General Armstrong, founder of Hampton, called begging: the constant search for money to support the costs associated with technical training through trial and error learning. Blyden put forward his proposal for a Lagos Literary College and Industrial Training Institute in 1896. The colonial governor of Lagos at that time, Sir Gilbert Carter, offered £2000 to get the school started, with the stipulation that his offer be matched with local contributions. To the chagrin of the proposal's supporters, local contributions were not forthcoming. There were several other initiatives to build an industrial education institute in West Africa, the last of which was a proposal put forward in Ghana in 1918 by a group led by the writer, lawyer and

Pan-Africanist J.E. Casely-Hayford. The group, calling itself the 'Founders of Gold Coast National Schools', solicited contributions of £50 each from 200 'patriotic, educated, well-to-do and influential sons of the soil', in order to build, among other things, industrial education institutes. The group never got the capitalization that it requested.[44]

Ethiopianists elsewhere in Africa had more success in soliciting funding for the establishment of schools on the Tuskegee model, though with tragic outcomes. John Chilembwe was a Malawian who came to the USA in 1897. He spent several years studying at the Virginia Theological College before returning to Malawi in 1900 to found the Providence Industrial Mission (PIM). Chilembwe had the backing of the National Baptist Convention, an African-American Baptist denomination, which helped fund his school and sent two African-American missionaries to help establish it. At its height, about a decade after its foundation, the PIM had approximately 1000 adolescent and 600 adult students. Finding money to maintain his school was a problem for Chilembwe, however. He petitioned the colonial government of Malawi for a visa to return to the USA in pursuit of further funding, but the administration declined his request. In January 1915, Chilembwe led what is considered the first organized rebellion against British colonial rule in Africa. He and his followers were all killed.[45]

John L. Dube was an individual who sometimes shared a stage with Chilembwe in the last years of the nineteenth century when the two young Africans were working the church circuit in the USA, seeking funding to build versions of Tuskegee in their homelands.[46] Dube was the scion of a distinguished African Christian family and one of the first Africans to be ordained in a US seminary. Dube received backing from a number of affluent white American congregations and opened his school, the Zulu Christian Industrial School, better known as Ohlange Industrial Institute, in 1900. Dube initially fared better than Chilembwe. Journalism provided the key. Dube published and edited his own newspaper, *Ilanga lase Natal*, where he regularly made a pitch for funds for his school. Perhaps more important, Dube wrote a number of articles about his school and its needs that appeared in US missionary periodicals. The articles were often rewarded with gifts of money and equipment. Things became more difficult for Dube after he accepted the presidency of the South African Native National Congress, the forerunner to the African National Congress, and focused his energies on the repeal of the South African Native Land Act of 1913. Funds for Ohlange were not forthcoming, no matter how hard he begged. In 1922, Ohlange was taken over by the Natal provincial government with the stipulation that Dube move his newspaper and his family off the premises.[47]

As for Jabavu, his dream of a native college did come true, but his dream of a school like Tuskegee did not. The South African government took over plans for a school for African students and reconceived the plan to fit government and mission needs. The Native College at Fort Hare (later Fort Hare

College) came into existence in 1916. It did not pursue Tuskegee's emphasis on technology and agricultural development. Rather, the college concentrated on clerical training and teacher preparation.[48]

The term 'Ethiopianism' held negative connotations among whites in the regions of Africa where Europeans settled. The term was perceived as representing an ideology of black power derived from the misguided teachings of African Americans. In the mid-1890s, Ethiopianism was identified by whites as the prompt behind the decision of a number of African congregations of denominational mission churches to break away to form their own black denominations. Ethiopianism was brought home to white South Africans as a political threat in 1898 when an American bishop, Henry M. Turner, of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, toured South Africa, preaching about the return of African Americans to Africa. Ethiopianism was presumed to be the motivation behind the Bambatha Rebellion in Natal in 1906– during the course of which Dube was detained and interrogated by the police about his Ethiopianist leanings. Ethiopianism was explicitly indicted by the settler parliament in Malawi as the ideology behind John Chilembwe's failed revolt in 1915.[49]

Chilembwe's Rebellion was perhaps the tipping point in the progression towards colonial states treating Ethiopianism as a form of sedition. Beginning during the First World War, governments began to search for ways to control African vocalizations of opposition to colonialism, in particular Ethiopianism. The search expanded and intensified after the war when newspapers such as *The Crisis*, which communicated the ideas of W.E.B. Du Bois, and *The Negro World*, which conveyed the ideas of Marcus Garvey, began circulating in Africa.[50]

Governments blamed missions for the time and attention administrations wasted in surveilling Christian Africans. Missions made quite obvious their lack of sympathy for all ideas that empowered African Christians to challenge European authority. Colonial governments, however, still traced back to mission school teaching the mistaken impression educated Africans had that they possessed the same rights as British citizens. Once colonial governments had the opportunity after the end of the First World War, they moved to establish control over all missionary activities in their territories. Governments asserted their prerogative to inspect all Christian social-welfare institutions and shut down the ones that, in the opinion of government inspectors, were not adequately provisioned or sufficiently staffed. These actions were deemed necessary in the interest of suppressing political subversion.[51]

Missions protested vehemently against the actions before metropolitan governments. Something of an impasse had developed when Thomas Jesse Jones, education director for the Phelps-Stokes Fund, a US charity, appeared with a compromise solution. Jones volunteered to assemble a team of experts to travel through Africa and assess mission schools from the perspective of how the schools could be reformed to serve the interests of colonial states.

A first tour of schools along the western littoral of Africa from Sierra Leone down to Cape Town was conducted in 1920. Jones wrote the first report of what was called the Phelps-Stokes Education Commission, published in 1921. The Report was considered such a success that funds were found for a second tour of assessment, this time from South Africa up the east coast to Ethiopia. The tour was made in 1924. The second Phelps-Stokes Education Commission Report was published in 1925.[52]

The primary recommendations of both reports emphasized the need of governments and missions to collaborate to provide Africans with high-caliber social-welfare services. Jones lectured missions on the need to suppress the evangelical character of their endeavors, which distracted them from the more important tasks associated with making life better for Africans in Africa. Jones enjoined colonial governments to render every assistance possible to missions that focused their energies explicitly on the development of social-welfare institutions.[53]

Jones's writings on education in Africa, which included but were not limited to the two Phelps-Stokes Education Commission reports, presented a powerful case for the social utility of evangelization through poor relief once the strategy had been stripped of any explicitly Christian agenda. Jones argued that all civilizations were constructed upon four 'simples', by which he meant learned sets of behaviors and attitudes that have to do with health and hygiene; work discipline; family life; and cultural expression. If missionaries in Africa concentrated their energies on the inculcation of the four simples as these things had evolved among Anglo Saxons (the most advanced race on Earth), then Jones predicted that missionaries would truly help save Africa; that is, move Africa from the benighted primitivism in which it found itself towards some future state of civilization.[54]

The above discussion makes it clear that, stripped of the social-scientific dressing and racial posturing, Jones was offering old wine in new bottles. Jones was proposing that missions repeat in Africa what Churches had done in Europe during the early modern European centuries. Jones was convinced and was convincing that Christian social-welfare institutions could work their magic once again and turn Africa's agrarian and pastoral peoples into the kinds of proto-industrial workforces who had made the Industrial Revolution possible in Europe. As for Christian proselytization, Jones argued that Christian missions should admit that they had made a mistake in preaching Christianity to Africans. Christianity as missionaries taught it was an articulation of an evolved European consciousness. Africans, were on the whole a primitive race: Christianity had only confused the few who had ever even grasped it. Jones agreed with other Europeans that African Ethiopianists were the source of much confusion in African colonies, and that missions were impeding the civilizing of Africa through their insistence on creating more and more mission boys. Jones was convinced, however, that missions had a positive, indeed crucial role to play in the development of Africa through the propagation of

the four simples in mission social-welfare institutions. So Jones invited missions to stop arguing with African Ethiopianists and start over again. He recommended that missions head as far out into the countryside as possible to establish new mission stations. Here, missionaries should strive to reach Africans uncorrupted by the old evangelism. As for the pursuit of converts which Jones's proposal would take missionaries away from doing, he counseled patience. In the fullness of time, African collective consciousness would evolve to the point where Africans as a group could grasp Christianity. At that point, all the hard work over the generations by missionaries would be rewarded with a harvest.

Across the 1920s, not only did the British Colonial Office get on board with the program that Jones laid out, but the International Missionary Council (IMC), the lobbying agency that came into existence to represent missionary interests before colonial governments, took his proposals as a starting point for future negotiations with governments. A number of US philanthropies also committed to help with funding for promising experiments in new forms of social welfare. The one group of Europeans lukewarm about Jones's ideas were rank-and-file missionaries. The idea that they were supposed to deny their calling and put their lives and health on the line in Africa not to preach, but to provide some social service, did not sit well with many of them. Neither did they buy the idea that they were supposed to just abandon the African Christian communities they and their missionary predecessors had sacrificed so much to help build.

Yet rank-and-file missionaries were attracted to Jones's take on how to deal with African Christians with Ethiopianist proclivities. Based upon his previous experience of dealing with African-American Christians with similar instincts, Jones argued that the best strategy was to marginalize and then ignore them. This approach was illustrated in the solution adopted by colonial governments and missions to what was for them the vexing problem of African-American missionaries in Africa. Both governments and missions were more than willing to trace the source of African Christian restiveness with white authority back to the influence of African Americans and the latter's pernicious ideas. In 1927, at an IMC conference in La Zoute, Belgium, colonial officials and representatives of missions agreed to a set of regulations that effectively denied access to stations in Africa to African-American missions. Individual African-American missionaries could apply to one of the white missionary organizations to serve as missionaries in Africa under that organization's agency. African-American missionaries would need to be vetted first, however. Jones, who helped arrange the conference, offered the Phelps-Stokes Fund as a vetting agency. African-American missionaries did apply to white missionary organizations to go on mission to Africa in the years between the two world wars. Very few were accepted.[55]

In Africa itself, colonial governments eradicated African-Christian social-welfare institutions with at least the missions' passive consent. Starting in the

1920s, governments began to shut down 'bush schools', as village schools maintained by African teacher evangelists were labeled. In those days, the promise of learning to read was a hook that brought people to listen to whatever else an aspiring evangelist had to say. 'Bush school' was a blanket designation that could cover any type of social-welfare institution maintained by an African with the goal of furthering Christian evangelization. Government education ordinances presumed all such institutions to be at best fraudulent operations, at worst nurseries for sedition. Education inspectors closed them all, except those with an explicit affiliation with a mission. Eventually, missions began to protest that governments were applying education ordinances aimed at regulating bush schools too rigorously, at the expense of stifling the evangelical initiatives of missions themselves. But in the beginning the ordinances did the job they were intended to do, which was to asphyxiate any grass-roots efforts on the part of African Christians to assert direction of the Christianization process through copying European strategies of evangelization.[56]

Beyond the suppression of black challenges to the hegemony missions asserted over the provision of Christian charity in Africa, however, there was much in Jones's proposals with which missionaries took exception. Women missionaries, for example, were upset with his ideas on the education of girls, which went against many of the things women missionaries were attempting in the social-welfare institutions they had set up for African women.[57] Initially, missionaries did not see themselves as having many alternatives to going along with government policies derived from Jones's recommendations. Though there were no state Churches in Africa, governments clearly had early modern European precedents in mind in asserting their rights to regulate all activities that might be construed as religious, again with the rationale of maintaining political order. All missions were welcomed, but only to the extent to which they were deemed by government officers as offering to provide some service of value to the state. The filters through which government officers viewed mission petitions for residency permits and site licenses came to be shaped by the recommendations Jones provided in the Phelps-Stokes Education Commission Reports. As such, the petitions had to address in some way one of Jones's four simples. It was during this time that missions became heavily involved in building schools according to yet a third notion of industrial education, this one derived from Jones's understanding of the educational experience offered at Hampton and Tuskegee Institutes in the USA. As Jones depicted them, these schools had perfected a method of teaching African Americans to be technically competent, disciplined in behavior, yet politically subservient. It was also during this time that missions began to invest significant amounts of time, money, and personnel in the development of medical and health services, sending missionaries to be trained as nurses and dispensers, building and staffing hospitals, opening and maintaining leper stations.[58]

Eventually, missions grasped that colonial governments did not have the funds or personnel to do what they threatened to do immediately after the First World War One, which was to build and maintain in African colonies networks of government-maintained social-welfare institutions such as existed in metropolitan countries. The world economic crash of 1929 made the hollowness of the threat even more evident. Growing progressively more aware of their essential role in colonial social welfare, missionaries began to flout government injunctions against using social-welfare institutions as platforms for proselytization. The clandestine nature of much of the proselytization that took place at colonial social-welfare institutions demands acknowledgement. During the period between the two world wars, mission evangelism developed an edge both as a form of resistance and as a form of empowerment. Missionaries traveled to places officially off limits to them to preach, missionaries incorporated Christian devotions into the delivery of nominally secular social services, missionaries cultivated as potential converts patients under their professional care. Missionaries replicated in Africa an evangelical experience that went back to the first decades of Christianity. In medieval and early modern Europe, the Christians running social-welfare institutions essayed to recreate, through stories and play acting, the experiences of the early evangelists who during the Roman era had won converts and built Christian communities in the face of an adversarial political regime. Missionaries in Africa pictured themselves doing something even more dramatic. Out on the frontiers of faith, they were living the same sorts of lives, experiencing the same sorts of dangers and rewards as the first Apostles once did under the Roman empire.[59]

Missionaries broke government rules, but breaking the rules remained a European prerogative. Missionaries, operating out of the social-welfare institutions they established and maintained, remained the protagonists in the stories written about the Christianization of Africa. Colonial government continued to monitor the activities of African Christians, closing down any initiative that appeared too close to what missionaries were doing or too far removed from missionary oversight. As mentioned above, a two-tier system of Christian evangelization came into existence. Control and direction of social-welfare institutions were reserved for European missionaries. African evangelists were tasked with spreading out into the villages, there to identify and recruit potential converts. The most promising of these recruits were sent to social-welfare institutions to learn how to be Christians under European supervision.

Beginning in the 1930s, the discourse among Europeans about colonial development in Africa moved on past Jones's program to a succession of new approaches. The transformations in the delivery of social services prompted by the determination of colonial governments to make Jones's recommendations work, however, remained in place. Jones's appearance on the scene inaugurated the reign of the 'experts'—scholars and scientists with ideas

about how to make colonial development profitable for the colonizers that would continue for the rest of the colonial era.[60] Gradually, the new government emphasis had an impact on the nature and character of Christian missions. Progressively, the missionaries who stayed in Africa any significant time possessed some certified expertise, be it in education, medicine or technology. More and more, these people were also preoccupied with providing services based upon their expertise. Missionaries had to accept other new roles as well. Most routinely they became the managerial staff of non-government organizations, 'voluntary agencies', to use the terminology of the colonial era, tasked by governments to maintain the paperwork associated with the supply of some contracted social service. On occasion they also did double duty as local staff for some scholar/researcher sent in by government to test some big new theory about how to make life better for Africans. Proselytizing in the manner of the first Apostles became something missionaries did less and less, and then only in their spare time.

Space developed, both in missionary thought, and the lived Christian experience in Africa, for Africans to take the lead in the spiritual dramas associated with Christian evangelization. In the dramas staged in colonial social-welfare centers from the 1930s onward, however, African Christians continued to play at best, the role of missionary's assistant. These roles did grow, though, both in competence and stature. In the networks of outstations that expanded like spider webs outward from central locations where missionaries resided, African Christians did most of the day-to-day proselytizing. Teacher-training programs and dispensary-training programs granted African evangelists skills they too could brandish to attract potential converts to their stations. Over time, missions were dealing with second and third-generation African-Christian congregations. Many senior evangelists received pastoral training and took upon themselves the ministry of such congregations. Mission Churches in Africa began to look like African Churches run by African peoples for African people. Missionaries continued to reserve the right, however, to admit new members.

In the years leading up to the Second World War, observing the rise of fascism and communism in their home countries, many European Christians became convinced that the Christian age in Europe was over, and that their primary religious obligation was to preserve Christianity by passing it on to non-European peoples. Discussions began about passing the torch from 'older churches' to 'younger churches'.[61] Mission Churches were the younger Churches in these conversations. After the Second World War, European Christians began to pass most of the institutions and activities associated with Church life over to African Christians. Social-welfare institutions, however, because of their various contracts with governments, and because of the absence of Africans trained in the necessary technical competencies, remained under European control.

Conclusion

From one perspective it is possible to say that during the colonial era evangelization through poor relief ceased to operate in Africa for missions as it once had in Europe for Churches. In Europe itself, class had always been the greatest hurdle over which Christian evangelism had had to leap in order to create *communitas*; that is, a sense of shared community. Churches in Europe found ways to use social welfare to transcend class, if only during liminal moments in the private space of devotional chapels. Race was the equivalent obstacle in Africa. But during the era under consideration, due in part to their relationship with the colonial state, missions never discovered ways to use social welfare to transcend race. Social welfare remained something that Europeans did for Africans, not something that Christians did for other Christians. As a result, missionaries did not pass on the torch of evangelizing through European-style social-welfare institutions to African successors in their Churches.

Evangelization through relief to the poor *was* passed on to Africans, however. During the middle of the colonial era, African Christians enthused by the evangelical strategy, but alienated from or suspicious of all things European, began to rethink the use of indigenous practices and rituals for purposes of social amelioration. These Christians did not reject that European knowledge could help to make some aspects of life better. They just insisted that African knowledge could help deal with things European knowledge could not comprehend. New African Churches were founded upon the mandate to apply the power and glory of the Christian god to the everyday struggles of African peoples. The new Churches eschewed the institutional settings used by mission Christians to improve and empower, in part out of choice, in part out of a desire to keep their distance from the colonial state. Rather, in syncretized rituals that appropriated as needed from mission Christian culture as well as indigenous traditions, they introduced new practices aimed at the same ends of individual spiritual renewal and collective social amelioration. These Churches were the seeds of the new African Christendom now flourishing.

Notes

1. For examples of African uses of the construction, see, for West Africa, *Sierra Leone Weekly News*, July 15, 1899; for South Africa, *Imvo Zambantsundu*, January 21, 1887.
2. See Andrew E. Barnes, *Global Christianity and the Black Atlantic: Tuskegee, Colonialism and the Shaping of African Industrial Education* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2017), 7–31.
3. See Lamin O. Sanneh, *Abolitionists Abroad, American Blacks and the Making of Modern West Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 66–138; Andrew Porter, "'Commerce and Christianity': The Rise and Fall of a Nineteenth-Century Missionary Slogan," *The Historical Journal* 28, no. 3 (September, 1985): 597–621 and *Religion Versus Empire? British Protestant*

Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 1700–1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); and Brian Stanley, *The Bible and the Flag: Protestant Missions and British Imperialism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century* (Leicester: Apollos, 1990).

4. For a discussion of Ethiopianism as a theological/intellectual concept in the New World, see the two books by Wilson Jeremiah Moses, *The Golden Age of Black Nationalism, 1850–1925* (1978); *Afrotopia: The Roots of African American Popular History* (1998). Also worth viewing is James Quirin, "W.E.B. Du Bois, Ethiopianism and Ethiopia, 1890–1955," in *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 5, no. 2 (Fall/Winter, 2010–2011). On Ethiopianism in West Africa, see: J. Ayondele Langley, *Pan Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900–1945: A Study in Ideology and Social Class* (1973); Ogbu U. Kalu, "Ethiopianism and the Roots of Modern African Christianity," in *The Cambridge History of Christianity*, Vol. 8, ed. Sheridan Gilley and Brian Stanley. On Ethiopianism in Southern Africa, see: J. Mutero Chirenje, *Ethiopianism and Afro-Americans in Southern Africa, 1883–1916* (1987); and Badra Lahouel, "Ethiopianism and African Nationalism in South Africa before 1937," *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 26, Cahier 104 (1986): 681–88.
5. These debates crystalized around the work of John and Jean Comoroff. See John and Jean Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) v. 1. "Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa" (1991); v. 2. "Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier" (1997). Of the many, many reviews of the Comaroffs' work, most helpful for providing an orientation to their ideas and arguments are: Paul S. Landau, "Review: Hegemony and History in Jean and John L. Comaroff's 'Of Revelation and Revolution,'" *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 70, no. 3 (2000): 501–19; Les Switzer, "Review: Christianity, Colonialism and the Postmodern Project in South Africa: The Comaroffs Revisited" *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 32, no. 1 (1998): 181–96; and Andrew Porter, "'Cultural Imperialism' and the Protestant Missionary Enterprise, 1780–1914" *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 25, no. 3 (1997): 367–91. Of value as an assessment of the impact of the Comoroffs's ideas on the historiography on African Christianity is David Maxwell's, "Writing the History of African Christianity: Reflections of an Editor," *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 36, nos. 3–4 (2006): 379–99.
6. For a sense of the spectrum of discussion of the new African Christianity, see: Allan H. Anderson, *African Reformation: African Initiated Christianity in the 20th Century* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001); Ogbu Kalu, ed., *African Christianity: An African Story* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2007); and Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming Age of Global Christianity* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). For a review of the subject from the anthropological perspective, see Birgit Meyer, "Christianity in Africa: From African Independent to Pentecostal-Charismatic Churches," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 33 (2004): 447–74. For a sense of the historical investigation of the subject, see Joel E. Tishken, "A Brief History and Typology of the African Reformation," *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 13, no. 1 (August 2009): 4–10.

7. The best guides to the spread of Christianity from the Roman world to Western Europe remain the various works of Peter Brown. See his *The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity, A.D. 200–1000* (New York: Wiley–Blackwell, 2013). See also Richard A. Fletcher, *The Conversion of Europe: From Paganism to Christianity 371–1386 A.D.* (London: Harper Collins, 1977). Older works to consider include Christopher Dawson, *The Formation of Christendom* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967).
8. On monasticism in Western Europe, a good starting point is Anne-Marie Halvetius and Michel Kaplan, "Asceticism and Its Institutions," in *The Cambridge History of Christianity*, *Vol. 3: Early Medieval Christianities, c.600–c.1100*, ed. Thomas F.X. Noble and Julia M.H. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 275–98. An older, but still useful work is David Knowles, *Christian Monasticism* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969). Also of value is Jean Leclercq, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982). For the evolution of European Christian sensibilities beyond the monastic paradigm, there remains no better guide than Marie-Dominique Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspective in the Latin West* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). A more recent survey with an up-to-date bibliography is provided in G.R. Evans, *The I.B. Tauris History of Monasticism: The Western Tradition* (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2016).
9. This definition of the poor is derived from the works of Louis Chatellier, which are focused on a later period, but still have relevance for this discussion. See: Louis Chatellier, *The Europe of the Devout: The Catholic Reformation and the Formation of a New Society* (Cambridge, England, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); *The Religion of the Poor: Rural Missions in Europe and the Formation of Modern Catholicism c.1500–c.1800* (Cambridge: New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997). For a discussion from a different perspective that arrives at a similar characterization, see Peter Brown, *Poverty and Leadership in the Later Roman Empire* (The Menahem Stern Jerusalem Lectures) (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2002). See also: Michel Mollat, *The Poor in the Middle Ages: An Essay in Social History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); James William Brodman, *Charity and Religion in Medieval Europe* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006); and Adam J. Davis, "The Social and Religious Meanings of Charity in Medieval Europe," *History Compass* 12, no. 12 (2014): 935–50.
10. On notions of spiritual perfection in medieval Europe, see Chenu, 202–69. See also: Herbert Grundmann, *Religious Movements in the Middle Ages: The Historical Links between Heresy, The Mendicant Orders, and The Women's Religious Movement in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Century, with the Historical Foundations of German Mysticism* (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Lester K. Little, *Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978); and Andre Vauchez, *Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
11. See: John Henderson, *The Renaissance Hospital: Healing the Body and Healing the Soul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), especially 113–85; Federico Botana, *The Works of Mercy in Italian Medieval Art* (c.1050–c.1400)

(Turnhout, Belguim: Brepols Publisher, 2011). See also, Brodman, *Charity and Religion*, 245–66.

12. See Lindberg's discussion of medieval charity from the perspective of the Protestant Reformation in Carter Lindberg, *Beyond Charity: Reformation Initiatives for the Poor* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 17–66.
13. See: Henderson, *The Renaissance Hospital*, 186–224; and Brodman, *Charity and Religion*, 178–244.
14. Ibid.
15. See Davis, "Social and Religious Meanings of Charity," 941–44; and Brian S. Pullan, *Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice: The Social Institutions of a Catholic State to 1620* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), 63–98.
16. See Thomas Max Safley's "Introduction," in *The Reformation of Charity: The Secular and the Religious in Early Modern Poor Relief*, ed. Thomas Max Safley (Boston: Leiden, Brill Academic Publishers, Inc, 2003). See also Thomas Max Safley, "Charity and Poor Relief," in *Europe, 1450 to 1789: Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World*, ed. Jonathan Dewald (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2004) Vol. 1, 452–58.
17. See: Brodman, *Charity and Religion*; A.D. Wright, *The Counter-Reformation: Catholic Europe and the Non-Christian World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), especially 1–39.
18. See: Ute Lotz-Heumann, "Imposing Church Discipline," in *Cambridge History of Christianity Vol. 6: Reform and Expansion 1500–1660*, ed. Ronald Po-chia Hsia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 244–60; and Catherina Lis and Hugo Soly, "Policing the Early Modern Proletariat 1450–1850," in *Proletarianization and Family History*, ed. David Levine (Orlando: Academic Press, 1984), 163–228.
19. The classic work by Theodore Rabb, and the discussion it provoked, remains the best guide to this point. See Theodore K. Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). See also J.H. Elliott, "The General Crisis in Retrospect: A Debate Without End," in *The Pattern of the Early Modern Past: From the General Crisis to the Struggle for Stability*, ed. Myron Guttman and Philip Benedict (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005), 31–51.
20. In addition to the works of Lindberg and Safley mentioned above, see: Robert Jutte, *Poverty and Deviance in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and Marco H.D. van Leeuwen, "Logic of Charity: Poor Relief in Preindustrial Europe," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 24, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 589–613.
21. See the various essays published in the edited volume by Safley mentioned above. In addition, see the essays collected and published in: Ole Peter Grell and Andrew Cunningham, eds., *Health Care and Poor Relief in Protestant Europe* (London, New York: Routledge, 1997); Ole Peter Grell and Andrew Cunningham, eds., *Health Care and Poor Relief in Counter-Reformation Europe* (London, New York: Routledge, 1999). See also: Mollat, *The Poor in the Middle Ages*, 251–93; and Brian Pullan, "Catholics, Protestants and the Poor in Early Modern Europe," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 35, no. 3 (Winter 2005): 441–56.

22. See: Jean Pierre Gutton, "Enfermement et Charité dans la France de l'Ancien Régime," *Histoire, Economie et Société* 10, no. 3 (1991): 353–58; van Leeuwen, "Logic of Charity," especially 609–13; and Lis and Soly, "Policing the Early Modern Proletariat," 185–213.
23. The best discussion of the costs associated with building and maintaining a social-welfare institution is provided in Henderson, *The Medieval Hospital*, 147–83. On this point, see also Lingberg, *Beyond Charity*, 128–60. On the funding of social-welfare institutions, in addition to the essays collected in Safley, ed., *The Reformation of Charity*, see those collected in: Ole Peter Grell, Andrew Cunningham and Robert Jutte, eds., *Health Care and Poor Relief in 18th and 19th Century Northern Europe* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002); and Renate Wilson, "Pietist Universal Reform and Care of the Sick and Poor: The Medical Institutions of the Francke Foundations and Their Social Context," in *Institutions of Confinement: Hospitals, Prisons and Asylums in Western Europe and North America, 1500–1950*, ed. Norbert Finzsch and Robert Jutte (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, Cambridge University Press, 1996), 133–52.
24. While this chapter focuses only on Protestant missions to Africa, for a discussion of Catholic practices from a similar viewpoint, see Andrew E. Barnes, "'On the Necessity of Shaping Men Before Forming Christians': The Institutionalization of Catholicism in Early Modem Europe and Modern Africa," *Historical Reflections/Reflexions Historiques* 16, nos. 2/3 (1989): 217–49. See also Andrew E. Barnes, "Catholic Evangelizing in One Colonial Mission: The Institutional Evolution of Jos Prefecture, Nigeria 1907–1954," *The Catholic Historical Review* LXXXIV, no. 2 (1998): 240–62.
25. On Catholic missions in Africa before the year 1800, see: Bengt Sundkler and Christopher Steed, *A History of the Church in Africa* (New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 42–79; Adrian Hastings, *The Church in Africa 1450–1950* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 71–129; Irma Taddia, ed., *The Diplomacy of Religion in Africa: The Last Manuscripts of Richard Gray* (Rome: Aracne editrice, 2014); and John K. Thornton, *The Kongolese Saint Anthony: Dona Beatriz Kimpa Vita and the Antonian movement, 1684–1706* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
26. See: Sanneh, *Abolitionists Abroad*, 22–138; and Stephen J. Braidwood, *Black Poor and White Philanthropists: London's Blacks and the Foundation of the Sierra Leone Settlement 1786–1791* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1994).
27. For an overview see Sundkler and Steed, *A History of the Church in Africa*, 81–560; and Hastings, *The Church in Africa*, 173–393. See also Elizabeth Isichei, *A History of Christianity in Africa* (London: Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1995), 74–208.
28. For discussions of mission education before the advent of European colonial rule, see: Christopher Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); J.F. Ade Ajayi, *Christian Missions in Nigeria, 1841–1891: The Making of a New élite* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, c.1965), 90–165; E.A. Ayandele, *The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, 1842–1914: A Political and Social Analysis* (London: Longmans, 1966); Norman Etherington, *Preachers, Peasants, and Politics in Southeast Africa, 1835–1880:*

African Christian Communities in Natal, Pondoland, and Zululand (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), 47–134; Robert W. Strayer, *The Making of Mission Communities in East Africa: Anglicans and Africans in Colonial Kenya, 1875–1935* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1978); John P. Ragsdale, *Protestant Mission Education in Zambia, 1880–1954* (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, London: Associated University Presses, c.1986), 17–55; and J.D.Y. Peel, *Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 123–51.

29. See Andrew E. Barnes, *Making Headway: The Introduction of Western Civilization in Colonial Northern Nigeria* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2009).
30. See: George M. Fredrickson, *White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 136–282; and Saul Dubow, *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919–1936* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 1–50.
31. See E.D. Morel, *Nigeria, Its Peoples, Its Problems* (London: Frank Cass reprints, 1968), 216.
32. See Barnes, *Making Headway*, 114–22.
33. See Barnes, *Global Christianity*, 98–106, 114–22.
34. The outstanding example here was the Anglican bishop Samuel Ajayi Crowther. See: Ajayi, *Christian Missions in Nigeria*, 206–73; Sanneh, 139–81; and Andrew F. Walls, "The Legacy of Samuel Ajayi Crowther," *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 16, no. 1 (January 1992): 15–21.
35. James Stewart, "'The Educated Kaffir': Industrial Education: A Sequel," *The Christian Express* (1, September 1880): 3–4, 13–14.
36. The expression comes from the title of a collection of articles reprinted from volume 7 of the *Cambridge History of Africa*. See Andrew. D. Roberts, *The Colonial Moment in Africa: Essays on the Movement of Minds and Materials, 1900–1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
37. See in particular: Jeffrey Cox. *The British Missionary Enterprise since 1700* (New York: Routledge, 2010); Fiona Bowie, Deborah Kirkwood and Shirley Ardener, eds., *Women and Missions: Past and Present. Anthropological and Historical Perceptions* (Providence: Oxford: Berg, 1993).
38. On the development and articulation of European scientific racism, in addition to Fredrickson, *White Supremacy*, see: V.G. Keirnan, *The Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes to Other Cultures in the Imperial Age* (revised edition) (London: Zed Books, 2015); Douglas Lorimer, *Colour, Class and the Victorians: English Attitudes Toward the Negro in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978); Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Man: Science, Technologies and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Stephan Jay Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man* (New York: Norton, 1996); and Saul Dubow, *A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Science, Sensibility and White South Africa 1820–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
39. See Barnes, *Global Christianity*, 7–28.
40. Ibid., 55–80.
41. Ibid., 55–132.

42. Ibid., 88–90.
43. Ibid., 114–22.
44. Ibid., 103.
45. See: George Simeon Mwase, *Strike a Blow and Die; The Classic Story of the Chilembwe Rising* (London: Heinemann, 1975); George Shepperson and Thomas Price, *Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, Setting and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969); and Patrick Makondesa, *The Church History of Providence Industrial Mission* (Kachere: Kachere Series Publications, 2000).
46. See: Manning Marable, "South African Nationalism in Brooklyn: John L. Dube's Activities in New York State 1887–1899," *Afro-Americans in New York Life and History* 3, no. 1 (1979): 23–30.
47. See Barnes, *Global Christianity*, 130–31.
48. Ibid., 118–20.
49. See the report of the "Nyasaland Native Rising Commission," published in *The Nyasaland Times*, February 10, 1916, 6.
50. Kenneth King, *Pan Africanism and Education: A Study of Race Philanthropy and Education in the Southern States of America and East Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 79–94.
51. See: Clive Whitehead, "The Historiography of British Imperial Education Policy, Part II: Africa and the Rest of the Colonial Empire," *History of Education* 34, no. 4 (2005): 441–54; Peter Kallaway, "Education, Health and Social Welfare in the Late Colonial Context: The International Missionary Council and Educational Transition in the Interwar Years with Special Reference to Colonial Africa," *History of Education* 38, no. 2 (2009): 217–46; and Aaron Windel, "British Colonial Education in Africa: Policy and Practice in the Era of Trusteeship," *History Compass* 7, no. 1 (2009): 1–21.
52. African Education Committee, *Education in Africa; A Study of West, South, and Equatorial Africa by the African EducationCommission, Under the Auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and Foreign Mission Societies of North America and Europe; Report Prepared by Thomas Jesse Jones, Chairman of the Commission* (New York: Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1922); African Education Committee, *Education in East Africa; A study of East, Central and South Africa by the Second African Education Commission Under the Auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, In Cooperation with the International Education Board. Report prepared by Thomas Jesse Jones* (New York: Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1925). For the history of the Phelps-Stokes Education Commissions, see King, *Pan-Africanism and Education*; and Edward H. Berman, "Education in Africa and America: A History of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1911–1945" (Ed. D. Columbia University, 1970), 89–99.
53. See African Education Committee, *Education in Africa*, 86; and African Education Committee, *Education in East Africa*, 87–88. See also Thomas Jesse Jones, "A Good Word for Missionaries," *Current History* (July 1, 1926): 539–44.
54. See Thomas Jesse Jones, *Four Essentials of Education* (New York: Scribners and Sons, 1926), especially pages, 31–37. See also Stephen Taylor Correia, "'For Their Own Good': An Historical Analysis of the Educational Thought of Thomas Jesse Jones" (PhD diss., Pennsylvania State University, 1993).

55. King, *Pan Africanism and Education*, 91–94.
56. See Barnes, *Making Headway*, 177–89.
57. See Andrew E. Barnes, "'Making Good Wives and Mothers': The African Education Group and Missionary Reactions to the Phelps-Stokes Reports" *Studies in World Christianity* 21, no. 1 (April 2015): 66–85.
58. See Megan Vaughan, *Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
59. See for example Shobona Shankar, *Who Shall Enter Paradise: Christian Origins in Muslim Northern Nigeria, ca 1890–1975* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014), 47–115.
60. See: Douglas Rimmer and Anthony Kirk Greene, eds., *The British Intellectual Engagement with Africa in the Twentieth Century* (Houndmills: Macmillan Press, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Joseph M. Hodge, *Triumph of the Experts: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007); Helen Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); and Patrick Harries and David Maxwell, eds., *The Spiritual in the Secular: Missionaries and Knowledge About Africa* (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2012).
61. See Godfrey E. Philips, "The Younger Churches Help the Older," *International Review of Missions* 30 (1941): 539–45.

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CHAPTER 10

Colonial Education

Kelly Duke Bryant

In an essay entitled 'The Education of a British-Protected Child', celebrated writer Chinua Achebe reflected on his experiences as a schoolboy in colonial Nigeria, recounting pleasant memories of his earliest efforts to learn the English language, of his participation in Empire Day festivities in the 1930s, and of reading classics of English literature while a student at Government College Umuahia in the 1940s. Yet, despite his focus on happy stories, Achebe periodically referred to the violence of colonialism, hinted at tensions that emerged between university educators and students, and characterized the education system as flawed due to its association with colonial rule.[1] In his essay, then, Achebe came across as ambivalent about the role played by colonial education in his own life. Such ambivalence is characteristic of the history and legacy of colonial schooling throughout Africa.

The officials and missionaries who operated colonial schools did so with their own goals in mind and offered curricula and experiences that often alienated students or caused them to question their cultures. Once they had become aware of the advantages schools could provide, however, many Africans not only worked to ensure access for themselves or their children, but also attempted to shape the approach, content, and conditions of the

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education offered. Yet ultimately, although many Africans actively sought to enroll, engaged in school-related political activity, or derived certain advantages from attendance, some (former) students and scholars came to view colonial education as a mostly negative force. Thus, while African agency played a crucial role in defining colonial education and determining the uses to which it could be put, colonial education left a complicated legacy and occupies an ambivalent position in African history.

This chapter provides an overview of colonial education in Africa, focusing most particularly on the issues of agency and ambivalence and the tensions surrounding them. Though it is grounded in a thorough reading of the secondary literature, this chapter also relies on a variety of primary sources including documents from the colonial archives in Senegal, oral interviews with Senegalese retirees, and, most importantly, a variety of published first-person accounts written by Africans from across the continent who had at least some experience with colonial schooling. Nearly all of these sources represent elite perspectives. Some were written long after their authors completed their schooling and are thus affected by the whims of human memory. Despite the limitations of perspective and memory, however, I think these sources are useful in that they feature Africans speaking for themselves about their experiences with education. These experiences were diverse, and authors' reactions to colonial schools varied widely. So although I cannot make a case that the issues discussed here applied to *all* Africans, I can use these sources to give readers a sense of the range of possibilities. After a brief historiographical section, the chapter provides an overview of the history of colonial schooling, and then examines three issues in some detail: the decision to go (or not to go) to school, politics and protest, and the legacy of colonial schooling. It makes the case that agency and ambivalence were central to all of these processes.

Historical Scholarship and Colonial Schooling

Historians have long shown keen interest in colonial schooling as a way of understanding the techniques of empire, the emergence of new African elites, the impacts of school attendance and literacy, and a whole host of other processes. In the mid-twentieth century, historians tended to focus on educational institutions and policies, tracing the emergence and growth of individual schools or school systems and assessing their impact on African societies. Writing around the time of decolonization or in the decades that followed, many of these scholars made the case that as a tool of missionaries and colonialists, colonial education was essentially disruptive, inadequate, and totally unsuited for African needs. In his study of the history of underdevelopment in Africa, for example, Walter Rodney criticized colonial schools for their limited resources and distribution, their poor quality instruction, and their Eurocentric content. For these reasons and others, Rodney

argued, 'colonial schooling was education for subordination, exploitation, the creation of mental confusion, and the development of underdevelopment'.[2] Although she did not condemn colonial education in French West Africa in her encyclopedic study of its history, Denise Bouche made clear that French economic and political interests drove education policy.[3] These and other works effectively established chronologies and evaluated the implications of colonial education policy, but they often paid little attention to African responses or initiatives.[4]

More recent scholarship has built on and added nuance to this earlier work. Some historians have continued in the tradition of institutional histories, but have responded to trends in the historiography of colonial Africa that have privileged African agency and have envisioned colonial institutions as sites of negotiation. For example, in her rich study of the Inanda Seminary, a high school for black South African girls founded in 1869, Meghan Healy-Clancy shows how the school intersected with and contributed to a changing politics of gender in the wider society both before and during apartheid.[5] Others have focused on debates surrounding the classroom learning environment, or have examined its effects on students. Exploring such sources as textbooks, curricula, student writing, and correspondence, scholars have sought to understand how colonialists and Africans alike envisioned colonial education.[6] And still others have traced Africans' active participation in (and influence over) the project of colonial education, or have examined Africans' attempts to take up schooling for their own purposes.[7] In her study of colonial Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), for example, Carol Summers shows how some Africans used colonial education as a way to work out 'dreams, ideals, and creative responses to state power', and she demonstrates that African actions and demands shaped the implementation of colonial education policies on the ground.[8] My own book, which places colonial schooling at the center of local politics in Senegal in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, also fits into this trend.[9] This more recent scholarship recognizes that colonial officials planned to use schools to engender loyalty, reshape African cultures, and train better workers, but it emphasizes the ways that Africans operated creatively within this system as active participants and strategists. Focusing on agency and ambivalence, the present chapter applies many of these insights across empires and regions.

Historical Overview

Most of the first sustained efforts at providing Western-style schooling in Africa date to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and were concentrated in places like Cape Coast (Gold Coast/Ghana), Freetown (Sierra Leone), and Saint-Louis (Senegal); schools arrived even earlier in Cape Town (South Africa). As coastal settlements with long histories of European contact, these towns were focal points for Catholic and Protestant

missions, and these organizations played crucial roles in education. In Saint-Louis, for example, the Brothers of Christian Instruction took over struggling secular schools in 1841, at the government's request, and the Sisters of Saint-Joseph of Cluny operated public schools for girls beginning in 1826. Senegal's budget covered at least some of the costs of these schools and its officials had some influence over the education offered. Beginning in 1855, the French administration worked to create a parallel system of secular public schools in Saint-Louis and, later, in other parts of Senegal. In Freetown, the Church Missionary Society (CMS) opened its first schools as the British Crown prepared to take over the colony in 1808, and other mission organizations soon followed suit. Operating with considerable autonomy and some government support, the CMS established Fourah Bay College (West Africa's first university) in 1827, secondary schools for boys and for girls in 1845 and 1849, and a variety of primary schools.[10]

Over the ensuing decades, Western-style schooling expanded in these areas and took root in others, most often through the work of Christian mission societies and, eventually, educated Africans who served as teachers, catechists, and auxiliaries. By the late nineteenth century, mission schools were scattered across the continent, though distribution was uneven since establishing a school often depended on missionaries' ability to obtain land from African rulers and communities, to staff and fund mission stations and schools, and to recruit students. In British colonies and zones of influence, missionaries sometimes looked to British officials for logistical support, but they retained control over their schools. From its base in Saint-Louis, Senegal, the French administration continued to subsidize the Catholic mission organizations that provided public schooling in their expanding West African territory, even as it created secular public schools and allowed independent Protestant and Catholic missions to found private schools. In Central Africa, the French relied even more heavily on the mission organizations that had begun operating schools in the 1840s. Mission societies of a wide variety of denominations and nationalities opened schools in the final decades of the nineteenth century in the Congo, which King Leopold II of Belgium controlled beginning in the 1880s. Similarly, by the late nineteenth century, Protestant and Catholic mission societies based in several countries established schools in both Portuguese and German zones of influence.[11]

As they focused on their expanding African empires in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, colonial governments began to organize and regulate the patchwork of mission and secular schools that had emerged. The government of the Congo Free State, for example, issued Educational Acts in 1890 and 1892, which regulated primary schooling, created the first government-run schools, and provided subsidies to officially recognized Catholic schools. In 1903, the governor-general of French West Africa issued two education reforms designed to reorganize and centralize public schooling across the federation. Most importantly, the decrees

established a single hierarchy with uniform curricula, stated that schooling would be offered for free, and mandated that instruction be secular and given in French. Secularization resulted in the closure of some schools, mostly in Senegal, and in the reduction or elimination of financial support for mission schools everywhere.[12] Significant education reform did not come until the interwar period in most British colonies, where missions continued to operate the large majority of schools. Here, education reform formalized and revised the existing practice of giving grants-in-aid to the missions that ran schools. Now, however, in order to continue receiving aid, mission schools had to acquiesce to state oversight and curricular initiatives. The British also created a small number of state-run schools in various colonies.[13]

In the postwar period, the British and French invested in education as part of their new commitment to economic development and in an effort to placate African nationalists. To an extent, government officials also realized that they needed to prepare African leaders for increasing political autonomy (and perhaps even independence) in the not so distant future. These colonial governments sought to expand schooling at all levels, and many of Africa's oldest universities date from this era. Reforms enacted in 1946 and 1948 adopted metropolitan curricula in the schools of the French colonies, planned for the expansion of schooling from primary through post-secondary grades, and allowed for students to transfer more easily to metropolitan institutions. The British focused especially on literacy campaigns and primary schooling, with varying degrees of success. In the Belgian and Portuguese cases, the state continued to depend heavily on Catholic missions and to focus on primary schooling. Although two universities opened in the Belgian Congo in the 1950s, very few Africans had access to secondary and post-secondary education in this period. Meanwhile, in South Africa, the apartheid state implemented the Bantu Education Act in 1953, which pushed Christian missions out of the business of operating schools for Africans and used schools to promote the ideas of African inferiority and separate development.[14]

Though the focus and intent of education policy varied across time and from place to place, governments and missionaries always intended colonial education to serve their own interests. Yet success in this initiative depended on the active participation of Africans; Africans had to attend in order for schools to have an impact. By showing up or staying home, petitioning, and protesting, Africans had some ability to influence colonial education.

Going to School

Africans' decisions about whether or not, and where, to enroll their children or themselves in school played a significant role in the history of colonial education. Initially, colonial schools faced numerous obstacles in recruiting students, since they seemed to have limited relevance and utility, and since children had other demands on their time. African families generally

remained committed to socializing and training children within the family and community, an approach that allowed children to learn by doing and their families to benefit from their labor. In Islamic areas, many children also attended Qur'an schools. However, as the first generations of school leavers were able to obtain new kinds of jobs within the colonial economy, demand for colonial schooling increased. Africans' decisions about school were thus characterized by both ambivalence and agency, and the individual and family strategies that shaped these decisions changed over time.

A large majority of families kept their children away from colonial schools early on, especially in Islamic areas. Despite their best efforts to recruit students, teachers often echoed the frustrations of Isaac Konaré, who worked in a primary school in Kaolack, Senegal, in the 1890s. 'I still have the same number of students', Konaré wrote after months of working to increase enrollment. 'I await the arrival of the Administrator to convince people to send their children to school; they always promise to send their children to classes, but they never keep their word'.[15] The reluctance of African families to send their children (especially their daughters) to school was one reason for low enrollment, which concerned teachers, mission organizations, and colonial officials in this period. And the numbers are striking. In Senegal, a 1910 government report indicated that only 3637 boys and 435 girls attended the colony's schools, many of which had been open for over a decade. This was a small percentage of school-aged children, as evidenced by the government's 1912 estimate that 11,451 children were attending Qur'an schools.[16] Recruitment was thus an important priority in these early years.

Even so, a significant number of Africans ultimately decided to enroll, and they did so for many different reasons. Some, like Susiwe Bengu, a daughter of a Zulu chief, saw the colonial school as a resource they could use in local or familial power struggles. Bengu came to Inanda Seminary in South Africa in August 1892 in an effort to avoid an arranged marriage to a considerably older man. In her testimony to the missionaries who ran the seminary, Bengu explained that she had continually refused to engage with the marriage process, and that she finally 'watched for a chance to get away, and came here to you'.[17] Others, like Samuel Ajayi Crowther, who went on to become an important Anglican missionary and bishop in Nigeria, sought refuge from slavery or other forms of oppression at a mission station and began to attend school. Still others saw the school as an appealing economic pathway in a new colonial world. Amadou Cissé, a twelve-year-old schoolboy from Senegal, for example, noted in a 1906 scholarship request that he had 'a very strong penchant for study, and my biggest dream is to become a teacher'.[18] For many (probably most) Africans, the decision to attend a colonial school was a family matter. Senior relatives decided whether or not to send a child and strategized about whom to send. Sometimes such family decisions happened under pressure from colonial officials, who attempted to use their influence (especially with chiefly families) to help populate colonial schools.[19]

By the 1920s and 1930s, colonial education had become clearly linked to white-collar employment, social mobility, and political or nationalist ambition in much of colonial Africa. As interest in colonial schooling grew among Africans as a result, demand soon outstripped the supply of seats in primary schools. Budgetary and other constraints prevented governments from offering truly mass primary schooling, and they had no interest in making higher levels of education widely available since they feared that this could create an intellectual class, which could challenge the colonial system. Thus, only a tiny minority of students progressed to higher primary or secondary school, while standardized examinations ended the school careers of most. In addition, continued parental opposition kept some children out of school, while others could not attend because their families could not afford the fees that British colonial schools required. Through at least the late 1940s, therefore, colonial schools reached only a small percentage of school-aged children. In Nyasaland in 1935, for example, annual reports estimated that out of a total population of 1,608,023, only 170,617 children attended school, and that all but approximately 30,000 of these went to so-called 'bush schools', in which educated Africans taught others in their community outside the purview of the government.[20] Such statistics notwithstanding, colonial schooling had become a compelling dream, a mark of status, and an important economic resource for some parents and young people.

Memoirs and other sources reveal the excitement and longing with which some African children regarded the colonial school by the 1930s, if not before. Nigerian Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka, for example, wrote about his early fascination with the mission school where his father was headmaster. Before his third birthday, and long before he was officially old enough to register for school, he snuck into a classroom and sat next to his older sister. The teacher indulged him, saying he could come to class when he liked, but that he might not always want to do so. But Soyinka was undeterred. For him, the classroom was an 'inviting playroom', and he told the teacher, '"I shall come everyday"'. Similarly, in a memoir of his early life, renowned Kenyan novelist Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o suggested that he had so wanted to go to school that he was left speechless when his mother raised the possibility. 'One evening', he wrote, 'my mother asked me: Would you like to go to school? It was in 1947. I can't recall the day or the month. I remember being wordless at first. But the question and the scene were forever engraved in my mind'.[21]

The appeal (indeed, the magic) of colonial education grew out of its clear connection to new economic opportunities, social mobility, and literacy. School leavers, especially those who had earned at least their primary-school certificates, were well placed to obtain low-level employment within the colonial economy, either in private industry or for the colonial administration. A 1924 annual report from a Church Missionary Society school in Kisimu, Kenya, is suggestive of the range of opportunities available to primary-school leavers. Describing the first gathering of the school's 'Old Boys" club, the

school principal observed that some alumni had stayed on at the school to teach, while the 'majority scatter seeking jobs as carpenters, clerks, builders and so forth'. Others had become chiefs.[22] Higher primary-school or secondary-school attendance opened doors to even more desirable jobs. Literate Africans derived regular salaries and, at least sometimes, a sense of importance from such positions, and they could use them to benefit their families and communities as well.[23]

Thus, Africans began to incorporate colonial education into their economic strategies. Sometimes, parents chose a variety of paths for their children in an attempt to ensure future economic stability for the family. Perhaps they sent one child to a colonial school, arranged an apprenticeship for another, and kept another at home. Gender and birth order often influenced such decisions, privileging the education of elder sons. The father of Tom Mboya, for example, strategized about education in this way. In his memoir, Mboya, who in the 1950s became an anti-colonial activist and political figure in Kenya, wrote that his father 'was determined to give me, and as many as possible of his other children, a good education; this was not only because he wanted us to have a better standard of life, but also because education constituted a safe investment against old age'. However, as a laborer on a sisal estate, Mboya's father could not afford equal education for all eight of his children. With support from their father and from scholarships, Tom and at least two of his brothers were able to attend university abroad, while their eldest sister went to school just long enough to achieve literacy.[24]

Colonial schooling itself could bestow prestige on families, especially if their children excelled. Children's conduct, successes, and failures had long reflected back on the families that raised them, and this idea seems to have transferred onto the colonial school. Additionally, families had to have resources to enroll their children in school (to cover the costs of school fees and supplies when necessary, clothing, transport, and the loss of their children's labor) and this too could elevate their status. This dynamic seems to be at work in Camara Laye's remembrances of his childhood in Guinea in the 1930s and early 1940s. Laye, who became a significant Guinean author and politician in his adulthood, suggested that pride in his educational accomplishments had changed the way a family member celebrated him during the public ceremonies leading up to his circumcision. His mother's co-wife joined the dancing while holding 'an exercise-book and a fountain-pen' above her head, instead of the customary hoe. Though uncomfortable with her action, Laye understood that his 'second mother was merely observing an old custom, and doing so with the best will in the world, since the exercise-book and the fountain-pen were the symbols of a profession which, in her eyes, was superior to that of a farmer or a mechanic'.[25]

Although most Africans initially rejected colonial schools and some continued to do so, these examples suggest that by the 1930s, at least some Africans from across the continent had come to value the education they provided.

Attending school became a dream of many young children, a motivation to make financial sacrifice, and a part of the economic strategy of many individuals and families. African parents and children *chose* whether or not to accept colonial education and, despite the ambivalence that still surrounded these decisions, they exercised agency in making them.

Politics and Protest

Once they began to accept the idea of colonial education, Africans also sought to increase access to schooling and to influence both the kind of education they received and the conditions under which they received it. As colonial governments moved toward policies designed to educate Africans in ways deemed most appropriate for their culture, lifestyle, and station in life, Africans called for more schools, and they pushed for a metropolitan-style curriculum. Boarding-school students demanded better food and living conditions at school. As nationalism became more important in the 1940s and 1950s, school strikes and protests reflected tensions in the larger society. By engaging in a politics of petition and protest, young people and their families shaped the process and experience of colonial education in Africa.

By the first decades of the twentieth century, colonial officials and educationists across the continent shared a commitment to so-called 'adapted' education. Adapted education emphasized vocational training and offered only a rudimentary academic one, an approach thought to match the future economic roles Africans would hold and aimed at keeping them grounded in their agricultural societies. For girls, this meant that schooling focused on domestic tasks (cooking, sewing, child-rearing, housework) with the idea that they would become educated wives and mothers and help introduce gradual, appropriate changes to their families and communities. Only a tiny minority of Africans, most believed, should have access to literary education and anything past the primary grades. French officials had begun to lay the groundwork for this approach by privileging agricultural and vocational training in rural schools beginning in the 1890s, and formalizing the practice in the 1903 education reforms for West Africa. Through the first few decades of the twentieth century, officials across French Africa continued to push for vocational and agricultural emphasis in colonial schools. In British colonies, officials embraced this approach following the tours of the Phelps-Stokes Commission in the 1920s, whose reports recommended the US-style industrial education model. These tours also resulted in the creation of Jeanes Schools, which paired agricultural education with community-development projects.[26]

While colonial governments touted adapted education as most useful and relevant to their colonial subjects, many Africans had other ideas. Viewing education as a pathway to white-collar employment and, at least sometimes, as a means of striving for equality with Europeans, they typically valued European-style literary education most highly. Adapted education thus became

a flashpoint for debate and negotiation surrounding colonial schooling. In Senegal in 1919, for example, literate elites used the local press to lambast Inspector of Education Georges Hardy, who had worked to channel African students out of the small number of metropolitan-style schools and into schools offering adapted education. One editorial called upon Hardy to leave his post, threatening that if he did not, '"the voice of the people will purely and simply throw you out from French West Africa"'.[27] This campaign prompted the Ministry of the Colonies to recall Hardy to France on administrative leave. In this colony, with a long history of French education and where some Africans could exercise citizenship rights, adapted education had little chance of garnering public support.

In British colonies, where primary schools used local vernaculars as languages of instruction and often did not teach English as an academic subject right away, the aversion to adapted education intersected with concerns about language. Realizing that they needed to learn English in order to maximize social mobility and employment opportunities, Africans strongly preferred literary education, and they sometimes made these preferences known. Residents of the village of Umchingwe, Southern Rhodesia, did so in the early 1930s when elders petitioned the government to establish a school and pledged annual financial support. Yet these men could not convince their junior relatives to contribute labor to the school's construction or to attend classes. Hoping to learn English as a pathway to new kinds of jobs, young men were not interested in the industrial education that the government had decided to offer, and the government ultimately withdrew support for the school. In certain areas of Kenya, on the other hand, opposition to colonial education models led Gikuyu people to create their own independent schools, which flourished until the British government banned them in 1952 due to the activities of the Land and Freedom Army.[28] In each of these cases, Africans acted in ways that truly impacted education in the colony.

In addition to demanding schools and seeking specific types of schooling, Africans also shaped colonial education by engaging in student protest. Such protests often aimed at improving living conditions (especially the quantity and quality of food) at boarding schools, and they sometimes took on a distinctly anti-colonial tone. Indeed, Michael O. West characterizes a 1947 strike among students at Dadaya mission school as an important turning point in Southern Rhodesian nationalism. Poor treatment of female students was the immediate catalyst for this strike, which formed part of the political training of strike participant and future nationalist leader Ndabaningi Sithole.[29] Similarly, Carol Summers shows that violence and scandal at King's College in Budo, Uganda in 1942 derived from increasing friction between educated elites, Ganda aristocrats, and colonial officials, and she makes the case that the fallout from this incident had a lingering impact on politics in the colony.[30]

African memoirists sometimes mentioned student protests at the institutions they attended. Ghanaian politician Joseph Appiah, for example, wrote

about a days-long student protest that he helped organize in 1936, when he was prefect at Mfantsipim, an elite secondary school outside Cape Coast. Frustrated by a lack of variety in the food and by the patronizing attitude and 'veiled racism' of the principal's wife, who served as school nurse and presided over the dining hall, students threw food, refused to attend class, and marched through the streets of Cape Coast. Negotiations led to an agreement under which the school and its Methodist mission leadership pledged to address these issues, in part through the creation of 'a food committee of students' that would have some influence over the meals served.[31] Appiah also wrote about student reactions to a guest lecture delivered by 'a distinguished representative of the colonial power' who attempted to make the case that colonialism had been beneficial. This did not go over well, and students quickly began shouting so that the speaker could not be heard and left. Appiah viewed this as a successful act of protest that clearly communicated students' nationalism and 'hatred of colonialism'.[32]

The most vociferous resistance took place in South Africa, with the most famous incident being the Soweto uprising of 1976, in which thousands of black students protested against a law that required the use of Afrikaans as a language of instruction. In her memoir of her adult life, Sindiwe Magona, a South African educator and activist, described her experiences with the system of education available to blacks and her reactions to the uprising. Having 'experienced Bantu Education – as a student, as a teacher, as a parent', Magona felt that it was totally inadequate and was an ardent supporter of the students who fought to overturn the system in 1976. She explained their motivations this way: 'Young school-going Africans had had enough of the education given them. Desirous of change, they decided to take to the streets, to let the government know that they were ready for change'.[33]

These examples illustrate some of the ways that Africans engaged with the politics of colonial education. Since colonial schooling succeeded only insofar as children enrolled, attended regularly, and seemed receptive to at least some of what was on offer, this engagement had the potential to profoundly shape education. Indeed, by making demands of the colonial state, Africans affected day-to-day operations, openings and closures of school facilities, the philosophical approach to education, and education policy itself. Though their efforts often did not succeed in producing all desired reforms, they are important in that they demonstrate African choice and strategic action in response to an institution designed to facilitate colonial oppression.

Reflections on Colonial Schooling: Opportunity and Alienation

One of the most resounding critiques of colonial education, lodged in different ways by people ranging from colonial officials to African nationalists, to scholars, was that its content was disconnected from African experiences, and

that its methods produced school leavers who felt alienated, uprooted, and distanced from their own culture. Undoubtedly, colonial schooling brought about cultural change in its students, created social distance within families, and allowed school leavers to circumvent existing structures of authority. Yet disruption could produce creative responses, and cultural change did not always lead to alienation. Indeed, as they reflected on the impact of colonial schooling, Africans came to many different conclusions. Taken together, the written and oral sources consulted for this chapter are suggestive of the complicated and ambivalent legacy of colonial education in Africa.

For some Africans who experienced colonial schools, an emphasis on the presumed superiority of European languages and cultures became the defining feature. Indeed, despite his excitement about beginning school as a young boy, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o ultimately viewed it much more unfavorably. As a novelist and theorist, Ngũgĩ became a well-known critic of the lingering cultural and linguistic influence of colonialism, and called on African writers to write in their own mother tongues. In an essay on this subject in his 1981 book, *Decolonising the Mind,* Ngũgĩ wrote evocatively of the Gikuyu language world in which he had played, listened to and told stories, worked, and learned as a young boy. After going to a colonial school, he wrote, 'this harmony was broken. The language of my education was no longer the language of my culture'. At school, teachers punished students for speaking Gikuyu, while English 'became the main determinant of a child's progress up the ladder of formal education'.[34] Thus, while he benefited from colonial schools and from his mastery of English in some very clear ways, his overwhelming sentiment was one of loss.[35]

Like Ngũgĩ, Senegalese writer Mariètou Mbaye Biléoma excelled in school but also found it profoundly alienating. As the only girl in her large family to attend the French school, which arrived in her remote village of Gouye only in the final years of colonial rule, her status as a schoolgirl complicated her struggle to feel loved and accepted by her family. The school and the language it taught, Biléoma wrote, 'upset a thousand worlds and a thousand beliefs hidden behind the baobab trees'.[36] Since there was no secondary school in her village, she had to live with relatives and friends in town in order to attend, experiences that further distanced her from her community and that ultimately made her feel her identity was 'torn in two'.[37] Thus, for Biléoma, colonial schooling became an insurmountable divide between herself and her family and community. Though she fully understood Western culture and the French language, ultimately living in Belgium, she felt that she never truly belonged anywhere.

Others focused on the lasting benefits they had received from attending school. For example, Fatima Massaquoi, a Vai aristocrat who attended a US mission school for girls outside Monrovia, Liberia, in the early 1920s, summed up her experiences in this way: 'Well, whatever was the cause of my pleasant stay in Bromley, I am deeply grateful for having been there, and I

often find myself observing the moments fleeing away from me, pleading with them to linger, because of their beauty'.[38] Tom Mboya was critical of the patronizing and often racist attitudes of some of the missionaries and teachers he encountered in the schools he attended, but he also recognized that schooling had given him important opportunities and experiences that he used in his later work with trade unions and in politics. School had encouraged him to travel, had allowed him to become a leader of the student body, and had helped him 'become determined to work for my people'.[39] And Joseph Appiah remarked that, decades later, he remained happy with the education he had received at Mfantsipim. The school, he wrote, 'had filled me with some knowledge and therefore some amount of power; it had taught me to stand up nobly for the truth and for what I believed to be right; but above all, Mfantsipim had taught me that the fear of God was, and still is, the beginning of all wisdom'.[40]

Similarly, several retired teachers whom I interviewed in Senegal in 2007 stressed the benefits of the colonial education they had received, and spoke with pride of their work as teachers for the colonial system. Madiké Wade, for example, reflected on the importance of colonial education in preparing him for his roles as a schoolteacher and as an activist in the Rassemblement Démocratique Africaine (RDA) political party in the 1940s. By spending vacation time helping people learn to read and write, he was able to combine teaching with his work for the RDA youth wing. This was significant because, as he put it, literacy was 'one of the factors in liberation'.[41] Wade thus suggested that colonial schooling connected him to his community, which he felt called to serve. Ousman Camara, who completed his training at Senegal's Ecole Normale William Ponty in the 1930s, also characterized his education and teaching job as sources of connection to people. Once he and his peers had obtained jobs from the French administration, Camara said, 'we began to work, to earn a living, to establish a household, to help our parents, to help our brothers'. Their relatives were proud of their successes, he continued, and would tell them 'that truly we had honored them'.[42] Both Wade and Camara seemed to see colonial education as a means of working for other people, and not as a source of alienation.

These examples show that colonial schooling prompted a wide range of responses from Africans. In attempting to convince Africans of the superiority of a foreign culture, language, and history, colonial education had the potential to make them more critical of their own society. In encouraging them to dress, eat, measure time, and behave differently, schools often created cultural differences between students and their families. And in giving them access to new kinds of credentials, opportunities, and networks, colonial education sometimes encouraged young school leavers to challenge social hierarchies that placed elders at the top. On the other hand, schooling prepared Africans to participate in the colonial economy in ways that could benefit their families, their communities, and themselves. It gave them tools with which

to criticize colonialism and to push for change. And it trained many of the leaders of anti-colonial movements across the continent. In itself, therefore, colonial education was an ambivalent cultural and political force, and African actors shaped its impacts in important ways.

Conclusion

In the end, educated Africans turned the intent of colonial education (to train loyal subjects and efficient workers for the colonial state) on its head, using the literacy, language, skills, and status they had gained in colonial schools for their own ends. Crucially, educated Africans were well equipped to question, petition, and criticize the colonial state. Able, like Madiké Wade, to use their literacy for the benefit of their people, many became involved with anti-colonial politics, and most of Africa's nationalist leaders were products of colonial schools, as were many in the first generation of public and private leaders in independent Africa. African actors were able to leverage their education against the colonial system that had provided it. At the same time, although it never became mass education, colonial education left behind numerous more troubling legacies, such as uneven infrastructure, Eurocentric curricula, pedagogies that stressed rote learning, and a public perception that literary education was the best route to social mobility.[43] The process of decolonizing this ambivalent educational system would extend well beyond political independence.

Notes

1. Chinua Achebe, "The Education of a British-Protected Child," in *The Education of a British-Protected Child: Essays* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2009), 3–24, especially 4, 7, 21. Achebe gave an earlier version of this essay as a lecture at Cambridge University in 1993.
2. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1982), 238–61, quotation on 241. See also Jean Suret-Canale, *French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, 1900–1945*, trans. Till Gottheiner (London: C. Hurst, 1971), 371–91; B. Olatunji Oloruntimehin, "Education for Colonial Dominance in French West Africa from 1900 to the Second World War," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 7, no. 2 (1974): 347–56; and A. Adu Boahen, "Colonialism in Africa: Its Impact and Significance," in *General History of Africa*, Vol. 7, *Africa under Colonial Domination 1880–1935*, ed. A. Adu Boahen (Paris: UNESCO/London: Heinemann/Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 801–2.
3. Denise Bouche, "L'Enseignement dans les territoires français de l'afrique occidentale de 1817 à 1920," (PhD diss., Université de Paris I, 1974). For overviews of the historiography, see Marie-France Lange, "Vers de nouvelles recherches en éducation," *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 43, no. 169/170 (2003): 7–17; Clive Whitehead, "The Historiography of British Imperial

Education Policy, Part II: Africa and the Rest of the Colonial Empire," *History of Education* 34, no. 4 (2005): 441–54.

4. There are certainly exceptions to this trend. In a 1963 article, for example, J.F. Ade Ajayi explored how Africans helped ensure the literary quality of secondary schooling in colonial Nigeria. See J.F. Ade Ajayi, "The Development of Secondary Grammar School Education in Nigeria," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 2, no. 4 (1963): 517–35.
5. Meghan Healy-Clancy, *A World of Their Own: A History of South African Women's Education* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014). See also: Kathleen Sheldon, "'I Studied with the Nuns, Learning to Make Blouses': Gender Ideology and Colonial Education in Mozambique," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 31, no. 3 (1998): 595–625; Daniel J. Paracka Jr., *The Athens of West Africa: A History of International Education at Fourah Bay College, Freetown, Sierra Leone* (New York: Routledge, 2003); and Terri Ochiagha, *Achebe and Friends at Umuahia: The Making of a Literary Elite* (Suffolk: James Currey, 2015). Narrative histories of schools and education systems have also continued to appear. See, for example: R.J. Zvobgo, *Colonialism and Education in Zimbabwe* (Harare, Zimbabwe: Sapes Books, 1994); Simphiwe A. Hlatshwayo, *Education and Independence*: *Education in South Africa, 1658–1988* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000); and J.C. Ssekamwa and S.M.E. Lugumba, *A History of Education in East Africa*, 2nd ed. (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001).
6. P.S. Zachernuk, "African History and Imperial Culture in Colonial Nigerian Schools," *Africa* 68, no. 4 (1998): 484–505; Gail P. Kelly, "Colonialism, Indigenous Society, and School Practices: French West Africa and Indochina, 1918–1938," in *Education and the Colonial Experience*, ed. Philip G. Altbach and Gail P. Kelly, 2nd rev ed. (New York: Advent Books, Inc., 1991), 9–32; and Gail Paradise Kelly, "Learning to Be Marginal: Schooling in Interwar French West Africa," in *French Colonial Education: Essays on Vietnam and West Africa*, ed. David H. Kelly (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 2000), 189–208.
7. Michael O. West, "Ndabaningi Sithole, Garfield Todd and the Dadaya School Strike of 1947," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 2 (1992): 297–316; Carol Summers, "'Subterranean Evil' and 'Tumultuous Riot' in Buganda: Authority and Alienation at King's College, Budo, 1942," *Journal of African History* 47 (2006): 93–113; Sybille Küster, "'Book Learning' versus 'Adapted Education': The Impact of Phelps-Stokesism on Colonial Education Systems in Central Africa in the Interwar Period," *Paedagogica Historica* 43, no. 1 (2007): 79–97; and Mark Hunter, "The Bond of Education: Gender, the Value of Children, and the Making of Umlazi Township in 1960s South Africa," *Journal of African History* 55 (2014): 467–90. For analysis of Muslim efforts to protect their own religious education, see: Louis Brenner, *Controlling Knowledge: Religion, Power, and Schooling in a West African Muslim Society* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), chaps. 2–3; Cheikh Anta Babou, *Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853–1913* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), chap. 7; and Rudolph T. Ware III, *The Walking Qur'an: Islamic Education, Embodied Knowledge, and History in West Africa* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), chap. 4. For an overview of recent research on

colonial education in Africa, see Carol Summers, "Education and Literacy," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History*, ed. John Parker and Richard Reid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 319–37.

8. Carol Summers, *Colonial Lessons: Africans' Education in Southern Rhodesia, 1918–1940* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002), 200–1.
9. Kelly M. Duke Bryant, *Education as Politics: Colonial Schooling and Political Debate in Senegal, 1850s–1914* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015).
10. Helen Kitchen, ed., *The Educated African: A Country-by-Country Survey of Educational Development in Africa*, compiled by Ruth Sloan Associates (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), 326, 387–88; Gladys Harding, "Education in Freetown," in *Freetown: A Symposium,* ed. Christopher Fyfe and Eldred Jones (Freetown: Sierra Leone University Press, 1968), 143–46; Prosser Gifford and Timothy C. Weiskel, "African Education in a Colonial Context: French and British Styles," in *France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, ed. Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), 669–73, 678–82; David E. Gardinier, "Schooling in the States of Equatorial Africa," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 8, no. 3 (1974): 518; C. Magbaily Fyle, *Historical Dictionary of Sierra Leone* (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006), xviii–xix; and Duke Bryant, *Education as Politics*, 14–17.
11. Hanns Vischer, "Native Education in German Africa," *Journal of the Royal African Society* 14, no. 54 (1915): 123–42; Gifford and Weiskell, "African Education in a Colonial Context," 673–74; Oloruntimehin, "Education for Colonial Dominance in French West Africa from 1900 to the Second World War," 350; David E. Gardinier, "The Impact of French Education on Africa, 1817–1960," *Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society* 5 (1980): 72; Ungina Ndoma, "Belgian Politics and Linguistic Policy in Congolese Schools, 1885–1914," *Transafrican Journal of History* 13 (1984): 147–48; Bob W. White, "Talk about School: Education and the Colonial Project in French and British Africa (1860–1960)," *Comparative Education* 32, no. 1 (1996): 9–25; and Sheldon, "I Studied with the Nuns, Learning to Make Blouses," 596–98.
12. Gifford and Weiskell, "African Education in a Colonial Context," 674–75; Gardinier, "Impact," 73; Ndoma, "Belgian Politics and Linguistic Policy in Congolese Schools, 1885–1914," 149.
13. Gifford and Weiskell, "African Education in a Colonial Context," 701–3; Andrew E. Barnes, "Western Education in Colonial Africa," in *Africa*, Vol. 3, *Colonial Africa, 1885–1939*, ed. Toyin Falola (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 145–47.
14. Kitchen, ed., *The Educated African: A Country-by-Country Survey of Educational Development in Africa*, 131–32, 148–49, 164, 192–201, 236–37, 267–70; Gardinier, "The Impact of French Education on Africa, 1817–1960," 75–76; Boahen, "Colonialism in Africa," 800; Barnes, "Western Education in Colonial Africa," 153–54; Whitehead, "The Historiography of British Imperial Education Policy, Part II," 445–46; Michael Omolewa, "Programmed for Failure?: The Colonial Factor in the Mass Literacy Campaign in Nigeria,

1946–1956," *Paedagogica Historica* 44, no. 1–2 (2008): 107–21; and Summers, "Education and Literacy," 326.

15. I. Konaré to Directeur des Affaires Politiques, December 10, 1893, J30, Archives Nationales du Sénégal (ANS, Dakar, Senegal).
16. Colonie du Sénégal, Statistiques de l'instruction publique, 1910, AOF/X/1, Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer (ANOM, Aix-en-Provence, France); Tableau général par cercles des écoles maraboutiques du Sénégal, 1912, AOF/X/6, ANOM. The Qur'an school figure likely vastly underestimates actual attendance, since officials had a notoriously difficult time collecting data on these schools that they did not control.
17. Susiwe Bengu, "Testimony of a School Girl," in *Women Writing Africa: The Southern Region*, ed. M.J. Daymond et al. (New York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2003), 134–35.
18. James Frederick Schön and Samuel Crowther, *The Journals of the Rev. James Frederick Schön and Mr. Samuel Crowther* (London: Hatchard and Son, 1842), 384; Cissé Amadou to Gouverneur, August 24, 1906, 1G28, ANS.
19. See, for example, Yves Hazemann, "Un Outil de la conquête coloniale: l'école des Otages de Saint-Louis (1855–1871; 1892–1903)," *Cahiers du C.R.A.* 5 (1987): 135–60.
20. W. Bryant Mumford and B.N. Parker, "Education in British African Dependencies: A Review of the 1935 Annual Reports on Native Education in Nyasaland, N. Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda, Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone," *Journal of the Royal African Society* 36, no. 142 (1937): 22.
21. Wole Soyinka, *Aké: The Years of Childhood* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 24–25; Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, *Dreams in a Time of War: A Childhood Memoir* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010), 59. For other examples, see: J. Mutuku Nzioki, "Thorns in the Grass: The Story of a Kamba Boy," in *East African Childhood: Three Versions*, ed. Lorene K. Fox (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967), 106; and Lily P. Moya to The Organizer, Non-European Section [Mabel Palmer], February 20, 1949, in *Not Either an Experimental Doll: The Separate Worlds of Three South African Women*, ed. Shula Marks (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 60.
22. CMS Kavirondo Annual Report and Maseno Central School Report, 1924. Available through: Adam Matthew, Marlborough, *Empire Online*, accessed June 6, 2016 http://www.empire.amdigital.co.uk.ezproxy.rowan.edu/Documents/Details/CMS Kavirondo Annual Report Masuo Central School.
23. Summers, *Colonial Lessons*, chaps. 3 and 6; Derek R. Peterson, *Creative Writing: Translation, Bookkeeping, and the Work of Imagination in Colonial Kenya* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2004); Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn, and Richard Roberts, eds., *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); and Karin Barber, ed., *Africa's Hidden Histories: Everyday Literacy and Making the Self* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
24. Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 6–7, 16–18.
25. Camara Laye, *The African Child*, trans. James Kirkup (Glasgow: Fontana Books, 1954), 97–98. On Laye, see also Eloise A. Brière, "*L'Enfant noir* by

Camara Laye: Strategies in Teaching an African Text," *French Review* 55, no. 6 (1982): 804–10. For additional examples, see: Nafissatou Diallo, *De Tilène au Plateau: une enfance dakaroise* (Dakar: Les Nouvelles Éditions Africaines du Sénégal, 2007), 34–50, 57; and Joseph Appiah, *Joe Appiah: The Autobiography of an African Patriot* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 78.

26. Gifford and Weiskell, "African Education in a Colonial Context," 687–94, 699–703; Oloruntimehin, "Education for Colonial Dominance in French West Africa from 1900 to the Second World War," 349–50, 354–55; Sheldon, "I Studied with the Nuns, Learning to Make Blouses," 614; Tony Chafer, "Teaching Africans to Be French?: France's 'Civilising Mission' and the Establishment of a Public Education System in French West Africa, 1903–1930," *Africa* 56, no. 2 (2001): 190–209; Barnes, "Western Education in Colonial Africa," 147–49; Küster, 79–88; Shoko Yamada, "Educational Borrowing as Negotiation: Re-examining the Influence of the American Black Industrial Education Model on British Colonial Education in Africa," *Comparative Education* 44, no. 1 (2008): 21–37; and Summers, "Education and Literacy," 322–25.
27. *La Démocratie*, February 9, 1919, quoted in Gifford and Weiskell, 692–93.
28. A.E. Afigbo, "The Social Repercussions of Colonial Rule: The New Social Structures," in *General History of Africa*, Vol. 7, *Africa under Colonial Domination 1880–1935*, ed. A. Adu Boahen (Paris: UNESCO/London: Heinemann/Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 491; Barnes, "Western Education in Colonial Africa," 147–48; and Summers, *Colonial Lessons*, chap. 2.
29. West, "Ndabaningi Sithole, Garfield Todd and the Dadaya School Strike of 1947".
30. Summers, "'Subterranean Evil'".
31. Appiah, *Joe Appiah: The Autobiography of an African Patriot*, 88–96.
32. Ibid., 40–42.
33. Sindiwe Magona, *Forced to Grow* (New York: Interlink Books, 1998), 149, 158.
34. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, "The Language of African Literature," in *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, ed. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin (London: Routledge, 1995), 287–88.
35. Ngũgĩ's ambivalence toward colonial schooling is also apparent in his fiction. Despite the sense of promise in *Weep Not, Child* and *The River Between*, for example, in neither novel does education save the protagonist from tragic downfall or fully heal rifts in the society. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, *Weep Not, Child* (New York: Penguin Books, 2012); and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, *The River Between* (Johannesburg: Heinemann, 1965).
36. Ken Bugul [Mariètou Mbaye Biléoma], *The Abandoned Baobab: The Autobiography of a Senegalese Woman*, trans. Marjolijn de Jager (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991), 98. See also Marilyn Slutzky Zucker, "On Teaching 'The Abandoned Baobab: A Senegalese Woman's Autobiography,'" *Women's Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 3/4 (1997): 127–34. Ken Bugul is a penname, which translates from the Wolof as "the person no one wants." Her experiences in Belgium were even more alienating and destructive, and she ultimately became involved in drugs and prostitution before returning to Senegal. For another

example of alienation, also by a Senegalese woman, see Mariama Bâ, 1943, "My Little Country," in *Women Writing Africa*: *West Africa and the Sahel,* ed. Esi Sutherland-Addy and Aminata Diaw (New York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2005), 186–88.

37. Bugul, *The Abandoned Baobab*, 123.
38. Fatima Massaquoi, *The Autobiography of an African Princess,* ed. Vivian Seton, Konrad Tuchscherer, and Arthur Abraham (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 104.
39. Mboya, *Freedom and After*, 16, 18–20.
40. Appiah, *Joe Appiah: The Autobiography of an African Patriot*, 99.
41. Madiké Wade (retired teacher), interview by Kelly Duke Bryant, Saint-Louis, Senegal, November 28, 2007.
42. Ousman Camara (retired teacher), interview by Kelly Duke Bryant, Saint-Louis, Senegal, November 27, 2007.
43. For analysis of the legacies of colonial schooling in the period immediately following independence, see: Philip Foster, *Education and Social Change in Ghana* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965); and David B. Abernethy, *The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: An African Case* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969).

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CHAPTER 11

Health and Medicine in Colonial Society

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This chapter examines the effects of European colonialism in Africa on the health of Africans and the development of medical frameworks for promoting health and combating illness. We will focus on four main themes within the history of health and medicine in colonial Africa. First, we will look at the health consequences of colonial occupation and colonial economies on African subjects. The second section will examine the ways that colonial administrative priorities and racism affected how European medicine was introduced and practiced in African colonies. Following this, we will look at African responses to colonial health policies and medical practices, emphasizing the wide variety of responses overall as well as the ways that issues of health and medicine became key features of anti-colonial resistance in particular. The final section will explain major developments in the expansion of Western biomedical facilities in the post-Second World War era, as nationalist movements pushed for greater autonomy and European administrations began to prepare African colonies for independence.

Through these themes, this chapter will explore specifically the ways that colonialism affected the health of African peoples as well as the ways that European medicine became intertwined with the colonial experience for both colonizer and colonized. This chapter therefore allows us to see issues of health and medicine not just in terms of the spread of germs and the scientific development of medical treatments, but, just as importantly, the limitations of medical science in colonial Africa and the broader dynamics of colonial

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society that affected the ways that people (African and European) thought about the role of health and medicine.

Health Consequences of Colonial Occupation

A variety of health-related factors contributed significantly to European powers' ability to colonize most of Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Innovations in European medical technology combined with advances in military technology to give Europeans the 'tools' needed to conquer African territories. At the same time, many parts of the African continent were experiencing medical and environmental catastrophes that made them vulnerable to European conquest at exactly the time that the Scramble took place. The European conquest of Africa was itself an extremely violent process which killed large numbers of Africans and displaced many more.

Before the mid-1800s, Europeans had referred to tropical Africa as the 'white man's grave' because the likelihood of surviving an extended stay in the region was quite low. For example, 48% of the European soldiers who served between 1819 and 1836 in Sierra Leone lost their lives. Two-thirds of the soldiers in Gold Coast died between 1823 and 1827. Overall, in the early nineteenth century, '77 percent of the white soldiers sent to West Africa perished, 21 percent became invalids, and only 2 percent were ultimately found fit for future service'.[1] The main reason was the lack of immunity that Europeans had to a variety of tropical diseases and the lack of medical knowledge of how to prevent or treat these diseases effectively.

While infectious diseases such as typhoid, yellow fever, and dengue fever contributed to the high death rates of Europeans in tropical Africa, the biggest killer by far was malaria. Efforts to treat malaria medically had existed for a long time. Jesuit missionaries in the 1600s had noticed that peoples of South America staved off malaria with the bark of cinchona trees, and it had been used by Europeans ever since. But several factors prevented its overall effectiveness. Cinchona trees grew only in the Andes, so supply was low, costs high, and the product had often been adulterated or deteriorated by the time it reached European consumers. Its efficacy was also somewhat suspect because it was used for a wide variety of 'fevers', as diagnostic distinctions between malaria, yellow fever, and others were not well known at the time. Finally, the concentrations of the active ingredient in cinchona bark (quinine) were low. It was not until 1820 that two French chemists effectively isolated the quinine alkaloid and began producing it in higher concentrations. Even then, it was another 20 years before Europeans realized that quinine best prevented malaria if it was taken as a preventative *before* exposure rather than as a treatment once fever had set in. Even with all of this knowledge about quinine by the 1840s, Europeans did not understand the cause of malaria. It was not until 1880 that the *plasmodium falciparum* was identified as the agent of malaria in tropical Africa, and it took until 1897 for Ronald Ross to confirm

that the anopheles mosquito was the primary vector for the transmission of *falciparum*.[2]

The understanding of how to use quinine effectively to prevent malaria was a game changer for Europeans in tropical Africa. Overall first-year death rates for European soldiers stationed in tropical Africa dropped from 250 to 750 per 1000 before widespread use of quinine to 50 to 100 per 1000 afterwards. This death rate was still relatively high, but made a huge difference in terms of the types of activities that Europeans could undertake in Africa. Whereas Europeans had formerly been confined almost entirely to the African coastline, in the second half of the nineteenth century European exploration into the interior of Africa expanded significantly. And the ability to protect soldiers from malaria meant that military conquest became a much more feasible prospect for European powers that increasingly coveted the resources, markets, and strategic advantages that imperial expansion would bring. Malaria prophylaxis made it possible for Europeans to conquer African territories militarily and, once conquered, inhabit and govern those territories.

At the same time that malaria prophylaxis was contributing to the colonization of Africa by improving European health, the indigenous populations of many parts of the continent were experiencing severe ecological catastrophes. Societies throughout East and Southern Africa experienced a variety of major disruptions to their health and livelihoods in the 1880s and 1890s. Ethiopia experienced drought between 1888 and 1892. The Maasai went through an epidemic of bovine pleuropneumonia in the early 1880s. Shortly thereafter a catastrophic wave of another cattle disease (rinderpest) tore through communities from Somalia to South Africa and then west to Namibia, killing most of the cattle upon which pastoralist peoples relied. It has been estimated that rinderpest killed as much as 95% of all the cattle in East Africa in the 1890s. As if this weren't bad enough, in the 1890s epidemics of smallpox decimated the Maasai and Kikuyu in Kenya and spread throughout much of East and Southern African over the course of several years. Natural disasters and epidemics caused not only significant death and destruction, but also had social consequences as they dislocated people, creating large numbers of environmental refugees seeking means of reconstituting themselves at exactly the time they needed to defend against European invasion.

The European colonization of Africa was a violent process in itself. Conquest frequently involved direct military engagement, often with catastrophic results for Africans. Advances in weaponry in the nineteenth century made Europeans extremely efficient dispensers of death and destruction. Breech-loader rifles and machine guns gave Europeans major advantages in pitched battles, and Europeans were not afraid to use force to subdue resistance. Thus, at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898, British forces were able to kill over 11,000 Sudanese soldiers in the Mahdi's army while losing only 40 of their own men. It is estimated that as much as one third of the population perished in the Maji Maji uprising in Tanzania in 1905–1906, and 75–80% of

all Herero of what is now Namibia were killed by German colonizing forces. In the Herero case, not all were killed in battle: to quash all resistance, German forces frequently followed up a battle by poisoning wells in this desert region, inflicting untold suffering that has been classified as genocide. The violence, disruption, and fear that accompanied colonial occupation also convinced many Africans to flee, uprooting people all over the continent and exposing them to inopportune environments, scarcity of food and water, and contributing to the spread of diseases.

The widespread devastation that took place in Africa in the years leading up to and during the Scramble for Africa were therefore highly volatile and dangerous for Africans. Indeed, many historians have concluded that in the wake of European conquest of the continent, it is no exaggeration to say that African peoples were unhealthier than they had ever been. Yet, the onset of colonial rule did not bring about immediate improvements to the health prospects of colonized peoples. Colonial governments employed large numbers of forced laborers, who were often underpaid if they were paid at all, often doing dangerous work such as building railroads. Other forms of wage labor were encouraged through high taxation, which required colonial subjects to work for the government to make money to pay their taxes. Often wage labor was very dangerous as well, as in mining operations in the South African diamond and Nigerian tin industries. Forced and wage labor took workers, mostly men, away from agricultural pursuits, foisting ever more domestic work onto women and children. Cash-cropping initiatives privileged using land and resources to grow inedible or non-nutritious products such as cotton, tobacco, and coffee at the expense of subsistence crops, which were increasingly imported in many rural African settings. The result was that when ecological or economic catastrophes occurred, their impacts were significantly more severe than they would have otherwise been.

Conscription into military duty frequently put African colonial subjects at risk. It is estimated that over 150,000 African soldiers died in the First World War defending the interests of Europeans. Colonial labor patterns also resulted in massive increases in migrant labor, as people had to move from their homes to wherever it was that Europeans wanted them to work, whether it was in wage labor, forced labor, or military service. The massive increases in mobility actually made Africans more susceptible to acquiring and spreading infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, smallpox, sleeping sickness, and influenza. The conditions of migrant and military labor (far from home and lacking familial comforts) also contributed to the increased concentration and spread of venereal diseases in some places.

The most extreme example of the health implications of colonial labor policies might be the outcomes of the infamous 'red rubber' scandal in the Congo Free State, where the government under the rule of Leopold II of Belgium undertook a massive reorientation of the local economy towards the harvesting of wild rubber. People were required to acquire and turn over to

authorities large amounts of rubber, the collection of which took up most of their labor time. Those who did not acquire enough rubber or otherwise resisted the appropriation of their labor might be killed, have their families taken hostage, their homes and villages burned, etc. Collecting rubber exposed people to harsh environmental conditions and decreased their nutritional intake, as they had little time to cultivate, tend livestock, or hunt on their own account. Birth rates in the Congo fell dramatically during the horrific reign of terror unleashed in the Congo Free State. An official Belgian commission reported that between the founding of the Congo Free State in 1885 and the end of the First World War in 1918 the population of the Congo had 'been reduced by half'.[3] Although no official census existed at the time, best estimates suggest this means a population decline of between 5 and 10 million.

Colonial Health Care in Practice

Colonial governments recognized the poor health circumstances of their subjects, but mostly chalked them up to the 'primitive' cultures of presumably inferior African peoples. While there were many dissenters who blamed colonial rule for destabilizing African societies, the general narrative of colonial regimes particularly early on in the colonial encounter was that Africans were naturally diseased, unsanitary people ignorant of basic hygiene and medical practices. This is, of course, not true, but the image of a decrepit African population in need of salvation from moral, humane, knowledgeable Europeans became a basic feature of the 'civilizing mission' of European colonialism. Europeans believed that they were in Africa to save Africans from themselves in many ways, including superior medicine and health care.

However, this paternalistic image of colonial medicine rarely lived up to its own hype. Ultimately colonial government policies regarding health care tended to revolve around three main principles: (1) the prioritization of the health of Europeans over Africans; (2) maintenance of the labor force for purposes of sustaining colonial economies; and (3) reduction of government expenditure on social services such as health care, leaving the bulk of the medical work in colonies to private enterprises, particularly Christian missionaries.

Protection of Europeans from disease, and malaria in particular, was a major concern of colonial administrations in tropical Africa. In the early 1900s, European colonial governments feared that both African tropical environments and African people were major threats to the spreading of tropical diseases. To protect against this problem, many of the colonial urban centers were built on high ground, away from African towns, and strictly segregated. Hill Town, a European enclave in Sierra Leone, for example, was built in the first decade of the twentieth century at 750 feet above sea level, roughly four miles away from the nearby major city of Freetown. Only Europeans were

allowed to live there, and Africans were allowed to work there during the day, but had to leave before night. The justification for this state of affairs was partly medical (Europeans believed, however erroneously, that this protected them from dangerous African diseases) but it was also clearly a means of reinforcing notions of racial difference and the power dynamics of colonial society, a reality that was ever more clear as it became apparent that Europeans who lived at Hill Town continued to contract malaria at roughly the same rates as people who lived elsewhere. Many other colonial cities had segregated European quarters, such as French-controlled Algiers and Dakar and Dar es Salaam in German East Africa, for example.[4]

The second major threat to colonial order from the European standpoint was the extent to which infectious diseases threatened African populations and, by extension, the colonial economies that depended upon African labor. Efforts to prevent the spread of infectious diseases often involved isolating infected individuals, curtailing the mobility of people, and sometimes destroying their property. Such measures frequently did little to bring these diseases under control but the social disruption associated with them often did a great deal to incite African opinion against the colonial government and its medical policies. For example, when a plague epidemic hit Senegal in 1914, French authorities instituted a quarantine to protect the European district at Dakar. However, the city so relied on African labor that many thousands of exceptions had to be made to allow Africans to cross the cordon sanitaire for purposes of working in the European district. The French also established isolation camps to contain plague victims. At these camps, plague sufferers, who had been forcibly removed from their homes in central Dakar, were given compulsory vaccinations while their clothes and portable possessions were disinfected. Their homes were usually burned to the ground. After being held in quarantine for ten days, people were then sent to live in new villages on the outskirts of town. Africans were supposed to be compensated for the destruction of their property, but often were not.

Europeans in Senegal, of course, had no restrictions on their own mobility, and their own homes and property were not destroyed to combat plague. While vaccinations were mandatory for Africans, they remained optional for Europeans. The French colonial system in Senegal effectively established plague as an African problem, used it as a justification for further segregation of the colony, and extended a very heavy-handed response that alienated large numbers of African subjects against the colonial regime. In fact, Africans in Dakar vociferously protested against the plague measures of 1914, instituting the colony's first general strike over the government's harsh measures.[5]

The unhealthy conditions that Africans faced in the early years of European occupation had resulted in massive depopulation in many places by the second decade of the twentieth century. By the 1920s, colonial governments recognized that their subject populations were too small to support the labor needs of the colonial economy, and began to develop policies designed

to increase birth rates and decrease infant mortality figures. In the Belgian Congo, the colonial government began to subsidize a charitable organization known as *gouttes de lait* (drops of milk) that supplied formula and food for mothers and infants, while simultaneously attempting to persuade Congolese couples to have more children. The milk plan was supposed to help with this process because the Congolese had a cultural belief that couples should abstain from sexual relations during the breastfeeding period, which could last up to three years in Congolese culture. By providing formula and persuading women to wean their children earlier, the spacing of births could be shortened and population increased. The Belgian government and the European women who ran the program placed all the blame for underpopulation on the superstitions of the Congolese rather than on any of the consequences of the rubber economy described above, further reinforcing the paternalist notion of the 'civilizing mission' by emphasizing the 'good' that Europeans were doing and ignoring the negative consequences of the colonial experience.[6] Similar efforts to reform motherhood and child care were undertaken in British East Africa, where colonial authorities were also highly concerned about underpopulation in the interwar years.[7]

Colonial governments did not want to expend the resources necessary to provide health care in African settings along European lines, and, as such, their interventions, while sometimes heavy-handed, were rarely comprehensive or sustained. In British territories, the administrative policy of indirect rule became a justification for not creating and sustaining massive public institutions, including state-funded education, social welfare, and health care. As a result, in Nigeria there were only about 50 doctors in a colony with an estimated population of 16.5 million people in 1920.[8] In many colonies there were small numbers of doctors in private practice, although there were often racialized restrictions on African doctors' ability to practice privately.

Christian missionaries picked up some of the slack in the provision of European-style medicine. Christian missionaries had been active in many parts of Africa since before the Scramble. Indeed, David Livingstone, the famous Scottish explorer of the nineteenth century, was himself a missionary doctor. Medical missions throughout colonial Africa provided much of the European-styled primary care that Africans could access. They also ran vaccination campaigns and leprosaria, providing long-term treatment for people with severe chronic illnesses. However, unlike the colonial state, which frequently claimed to stay out of the business of changing African cultures, missions were very much interested in converting Africans to Christianity, and, in so doing, changing their beliefs and lifestyles significantly. Christian missionaries tended to see the health problems of Africans in terms of their lack of Christian morals, in which physical illness was a representation of African moral failing, very much in keeping with images of Africa as a 'Dark Continent' of 'backward' and child-like people in need of education and salvation.

Mission clinics offered an opportunity not only to heal the body but also to save the soul.

Many Africans healed by missionaries did go on to embrace Christianity, but not all did. Even for those who did not, however, the relationship between medical and spiritual treatment was clear. Historian Megan Vaughan recounted the specific case of a Muslim patient in Uganda in 1902. Despite the fact that he had undergone an operation and was cured in a mission hospital, he was not allowed to go home. The missionaries declared, 'We are keeping him in hospital as we are very anxious to win his soul'. The patient did not agree, however, arguing that he had come 'to the hospital for healing, and didn't see why he should change his religion'.[9] The different goals and ideologies of colonial governments and missionary hospitals meant that European medicine in the colonial context was not by any means homogenous. African responses to European health care were also quite diverse.

African Responses

The majority of Africans living under colonial rule had no access to or experience of either colonial or missionary medicine, and continued to rely on indigenous health practitioners for all of their health needs, as they had always done. Even in settings where missionary medicine or state-run public health measures were instituted, Africans continued to seek medical treatment from indigenous healers for a wide variety of reasons. First, and most significantly, indigenous healers had deep roots in local communities and long track records of providing successful health care in ways that were culturally meaningful to community members. European-styled medical care was new on the scene, did not have the long track record of indigenous healers, and frequently did not have particularly better answers for how to handle local health problems than indigenous healers did. Furthermore, as noted in the examples above, sometimes colonial and missionary health practices were very disruptive to African social structures and often caused problems that were potentially as undesirable as those they professed to be fixing.

This is not to say that Africans rejected colonial and missionary medicine outright, however. Both had positive connotations for many Africans, who appreciated the exotic powers of the outsiders while simultaneously recognizing that that power could have positive or negative impacts. Therefore, in places where African colonial subjects had interactions with state-run health programs or missionary clinics, they were able to incorporate these systems into medical marketplaces that were already pluralistic.

There were sometimes tensions between colonial and missionary medicine on the one hand, and indigenous health systems on the other. Europeans usually saw their own health systems as superior to those of Africans and often intervened to try to marginalize the activities of indigenous healers whom they saw as a threat to their own power or, potentially, to the health of their

patients. For example, in South Africa, the European-controlled government passed many laws circumscribing the ways that indigenous healers could legally practice medicine. Indigenous healers were not allowed to sell or dispense any products that were deemed useful in 'European' medicine, even if they were products that indigenous healers had used for a long time. At the same time, indigenous healers who engaged in any form of supernatural processes, particularly witchcraft or anti-witchcraft measures, saw their practices outlawed by colonial authorities in many African colonies. In Nigeria, colonial authorities outlawed the practices of the so-called Soponno cult, which sought to appease the god of smallpox, on the unfounded notion that the cult's activities actually spread smallpox. None of these legal measures ever eliminated the cultural value of indigenous healers to their clienteles, but they did sometimes change the context within which indigenous healers could work and forced some of their activities underground.

The hard line that colonial authorities tried to draw between 'traditional' African practices and 'modern' European ones also fundamentally misunderstood the nature of indigenous African health systems, which had been historically dynamic and incorporative of a wide variety of ideas about how best to promote the health and well-being of individuals and communities. In fact, in many settings even in colonial times, African patients sought out European medicine, seeing it as potentially powerful, but often reinterpreted the meaning of that medicine in local cultural terms that left Europeans flabbergasted. As Luise White has shown:

> Africans chose treatments, tablets and the placement of telescopes because of their own etiologies of disease. Illnesses that were believed to be caused by excessive cold might best be treated by pills that were hot in color, like red or pink. These reinterpretations were debates about the nature of curing itself and reflected divergent ideas about sickness, health, and healing that did not readily conform to the dichotomies between Western and African medicine, both of which changed rapidly in the twentieth century.[10]

Such interconnectedness between medical systems further illustrates the diversity and pluralistic nature of health-care beliefs and practices in colonial Africa: the story is not so much one of the spread of European medicine as the ways that European medicine interacted with preexisting health systems to create new sets of meanings and practices for African patients and healers.

Many Africans also argued that colonial governments had a greater responsibility to provide more and better health care. The colonial system relied heavily on Africans for labor, local 'traditional' administration, and, increasingly, to fill lower-level positions within the colonial administrations and businesses that formed the backbone of the colonial venture. This latter group became known as the 'African middle class' because in order to work within the colonial structures they needed some level of education and enculturation into European languages, beliefs, and preferred skill sets. This African

middle class tended to benefit materially more from the colonial system than lower classes, and their lifestyles and beliefs came to incorporate many of the values of the European middle class. Middle-class Africans, who tended to be located in urban areas, near centers of colonial governance and business, became among the harshest critics of colonial administrations, demanding that the government do more to extend to Africans the benefits of 'civilization' that were supposedly a part of the colonial mission. Health care and expansion of medical facilities became one of the realms within which the middle class accused colonial governments of failing their subjects.

Included within this African middle class pushing for greater access to Western medicine and health care were black doctors and other medical professionals whose qualifications made them well suited to make the case that colonial governments could be doing much better. They had undertaken significant education in order to garner the qualifications necessary to participate in the delivery of European-style medicine. As a result, they usually believed very strongly in the value of European-styled medicine (although not necessarily exclusively). Many worked directly for the colonial government, in government hospitals or dispensaries. Others were involved with missionary clinics. They often bought into the rhetoric of the colonial 'civilizing mission', seeing their own professions as examples of the potential for positive development in their home countries and themselves as representatives of the essential capacity of Africans for 'civilization' on European terms. They were therefore in a very good position both to point out the poor quality and quantity of the colonial health-care system and to argue for its expansion and improvement.

African protests against the colonial medical system frequently saw the explicit racism embedded in alien European rule as one of the key causes of the underdevelopment of health care that characterized colonial policy. On the one hand, the minimal resources devoted to expanding health-care services were an indication that African lives were not worth as much to Europeans as their own, despite the fact that colonial government claimed responsibility for African peoples. At the same time, one of the main reasons that there were so few doctors in colonial environments for most of the colonial period was that so little was done to train Africans to provide high-quality medical care. In fact, in many cases, the professional status of medical doctor was jealously guarded as the preserve of the European. The West African Medical Services (WAMS), founded in 1902 to recruit European doctors for service in British West African colonies, did not allow black doctors to become members, thereby leaving them outside professional ranks throughout much of the colonial period.[11] African colonial subjects could become medical doctors in some colonies by overcoming extremely high barriers to entry, but African doctors were usually paid less and had greater restrictions on rights to private practice than Europeans. Many middle-class Africans saw the unwillingness of colonial governments to encourage the growth of a professional class of African medical personnel as one of the key

factors perpetuating the underdevelopment of biomedical services in African colonies. It is therefore not surprising that doctors and other medical-service providers were often very active within nationalist movements. Perhaps most famously, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, who became the first president of independent Ivory Coast in 1960, had begun his career as a doctor, only later becoming a politician. The first president of independent Malawi, Hastings Banda, had also been trained as a doctor.

Nationalism, Decolonization, and Health Care

Colonial health-care systems limped along as underdeveloped, low-priority institutions throughout the interwar years. In the context of the global depression of the 1930s, resources for major development projects were even less forthcoming than they had been previously. However, the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 created a new context for the invigoration of colonial health services in Africa. The need for healthy colonial fighting forces resulted in a major influx of military spending on medical care, as well as the training of medical personnel to administer to troops. Many thousands of African colonial subjects fought on behalf of the Allied cause in the Second World War. Much of the fighting took place in the North and East African campaigns, but West African soldiers fought for the British in Burma, and French Equatorial African forces contributed to the Free French cause. Enlisting healthy soldiers and keeping them as healthy as possible during the war therefore required some significant improvement in health-care services in underdeveloped African colonies. Nigeria, for example, served as an important base for airlift operations throughout the war; however, it became clear that troops stationed there were experiencing poor health from a variety of illnesses, malaria most significantly. Over the course of the war, new military hospitals were built at Lagos and Kaduna, with a variety of reception stations around the country. Disinfection of planes became common practice, and by the end of the war Allied forces were using DDT to control mosquitoes. When troops were demobilized in 1945, ex-servicemen's wards were built around Nigeria, with the largest one at Yaba, near Lagos, being converted into an orthopedic hospital.[12] A military psychiatric facility was opened at Lantoro to handle the psychological problems of demobilized Nigerian soldiers on returning home, which became the jumping-off point for the nearby development of Aro Mental Hospital, the first modern psychiatric hospital in Nigeria, in 1954.[13]

After the war ended with Allied victory in 1945, the progressive trajectory of health-care provision in the colonies continued as nationalist movements, noting their own loyalty to the Allied fight for freedom, democracy, and equality, demanded ever more concessions from weakened colonial governments. Improvement in social services, most notably health care and education, both appeased anti-colonial sentiment and helped pave the way for

national independence through the Africanization of public-service positions and improvements to human capital necessary for self government. Improvement in health care in the postwar era was therefore not strictly a humanitarian issue; it was also a political one.

The nationalist push for more health care and for a more equitable place for Africans within the health-care system helped to influence the active modernization of health facilities in many African colonies in the 1950s and 1960s. Postwar development plans throughout the British empire provided significant funding for increased medical infrastructure after 1945. In Nigeria, for example, the colonial government instituted a Ten Year Plan in 1945 that allocated £10.4 million for medical and health services. The total number of hospitals operating in Nigeria grew from about 100 in 1945 to over 300 by 1960. About half of this growth was in the realm of government hospitals. Treatment facilities for leprosy and malaria were also created, vaccination campaigns against smallpox were undertaken, and treatment for such epidemic and endemic diseases as yaws, scabies, and trypanosomiasis was expanded. The plan also allocated £8 million to improve water supplies for Nigerian communities, a preventive measure against water-borne diseases and an effort to expand access to a major life necessity.

New hospitals and dispensaries needed to be staffed by qualified doctors, nurses, and attendants. Medical education grew apace with facilities in the postwar years. Again taking Nigeria as an example, as of 1945 there existed only one training hospital in the colony, at Yaba outside Lagos. In 1948, however, the University of Ibadan became the first university in Nigeria and began work on a medical program and the building of a university hospital, which was completed in 1957. Originally, the medical school trained only nurses and aides, with doctors needing to go abroad to complete their medical degrees. However, by the early 1960s, the University of Ibadan had initiated postgraduate studies in medicine, and over the course of the 1960s and 1970s more universities developed medical programs and teaching hospitals. Even for those who did not go to the University of Ibadan, opportunities to study abroad grew in the 1950s, with increasing numbers of Nigerians (and other Africans) matriculating to universities in the United Kingdom, France, the USA, and USSR, among other places. The result was a major increase in the number of doctors practicing in Nigeria in the 1950s. Whereas there had been only about 150 doctors practicing here in 1945, that number had grown to well over 1000 by 1955, most of the increase coming from the entrance of young Nigerians into medical degree programs in the postwar years.[14] A similar story can be told in East Africa, where Makerere University in Uganda had been providing medical training to Africans since the 1920s, but which saw an increase in the size and professionalization of its student body from the 1940s onwards.[15]

International organizations like the newly formed World Health Organization (WHO) also got involved in major projects to eradicate infectious

diseases in Africa in the 1950s. From 1955, the WHO was conducting an ambitious, although largely unsuccessful, campaign against malaria in many African countries, and was in the beginning stages of a smallpox eradication program that unfolded in the 1960s and 1970s. The WHO also oversaw a more successful treatment campaign against yaws, and supported a large number of initiatives in African countries against other infectious diseases, as well as in areas such as pediatrics, maternal and child health, mental health, and public-health administration. Bilateral funding for health-care initiatives also came from the USA and grants-in-aid from European countries.

Through these investments and transformations in health-care practices in the postwar context, overall health indicators and medical infrastructure were better for most African countries at the time of independence than they had been at any point during the colonial encounter. According to United Nations data, the median life expectancy for the African continent was 36.2 years between 1950 and 1955, but had risen to 43.0 by 1965. Similar trends occurred in many individual countries. Burkina Faso's average life expectancy rose from 30 to 37 in the same time period, and Cameroon's from 37 to 41, for example.[16] These data are aggregate, however, and it must be recognized that some countries experienced higher growth than others, and some regions and demographics benefited more than others. Improvement in health indicators tended to rise faster in urban areas and among wealthier people than among the poor and rural, who may have seen little improvement over this period. And many of these health indicators have, in fact, slowed or reversed in the period since about 1980, when most African economies collapsed, ushering in a new period of decline.

Conclusion

This examination of health and medicine in colonial society has sought to illustrate the strong connections between health beliefs, medical practice, and the political, economic, and social realities of colonialism in Africa. Colonialism had significant health impacts for African subjects: colonial occupation and colonial economies brought about significantly negative health outcomes for many Africans. European medicine offered some answers to health problems facing Africans, but its relationship with colonial ideologies meant that European medicine, which itself often did not have particularly good solutions to African health problems at the time, remained unavailable to most Africans throughout the colonial period. That medicine which was available was often tailored to meet the goals of European colonial administrations as much as, if not more than, African subjects. The result was that indigenous health systems continued to compete effectively with biomedicine for the trust and care of African patients.

African responses to European medicine varied depending on context: some embraced European medicine where they could get it, if it were seen

to offer positive outcomes that could not be achieved through other means. Others resisted European medicine when its proposed procedures or treatments seemed counter-productive to the needs of African patients and/or communities. Still others found great value in the precepts of European medicine but argued that the colonial system did not do enough to extend the benefits to African populations. This response became a key feature of anti-colonial activism that pushed for greater equality between Europeans and Africans in colonial society, ultimately resulting in independence for African countries in the decades after the Second World War. As African colonies moved toward independence, biomedical facilities expanded significantly, but have never achieved the level of saturation in African societies that they have in OECD countries. The colonial legacy in the realm of health and medicine is one of ambivalence and incompletion in which Africans continue to have a variety of options for health care, all of which have benefits and drawbacks, and within which Western biomedicine is frequently seen as only one of many options.

Notes

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2. Ibid., 64–65.
3. Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 233.
4. Philip Curtin, "Medical Knowledge and Urban Planning in Tropical Africa," *American Historical Review* 90, no. 3 (1985): 594–613.
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6. Nancy Rose Hunt, "'Le Bébé en Brousse': European Women African Birth Spacing and Colonial Intervention in Breast Feeding in the Belgian Congo," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 21, no. 3 (1988): 401–32.
7. Lynn Thomas, *Politics of the Womb: Women, Reproduction, and the State in Kenya* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
8. Ralph Schram, *A History of the Nigerian Health Services* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1971), 298, 342.
9. Ibid., 62.
10. Luise White, *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 99.
11. Ryan Johnson, "The West African Medical Staff and the Administration of Imperial Tropical Medicine, 1902–14," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 38, no. 3 (2010): 419–39.
12. Schram, *History of Nigerian Health Services*, 261.
13. Matthew M. Heaton, *Black Skin, White Coats: Nigerian Psychiatrists, Decolonization, and the Globalization of Psychiatry* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2013).
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CHAPTER 12

African Colonial Urban Experience

Uyilawa Usuanlele and Oluwatoyin B. Oduntan

Locating the African Experience in Historical Scholarship

The changing shifts and emphases in how scholars narrate the history of urbanization in Africa reflects milieus, historiographical traditions, and methodological tools as they evolve. The earliest accounts equated urbanization in Africa with European presence, and tended to reduce the experience of Africans to their appropriation by and exclusion from colonial cities and modern facilities. Triumphalist accounts in literature, movies, and anthropology promoted the view that European power and ingenuity transformed Africa's massive landscapes into modern cities. That such faulted Eurocentric views continue to dominate the public (and some scholarly) views of urban Africa is well demonstrated by Francis Jaekel's *History of the Nigerian Railway* (1997), in which he declares that Nigeria owes a 'debt of gratitude' to Britain not just for the railways, but for the urbanization it engendered. Similar studies as this racialize urbanization and modern facilities as European natural capacities and, in contrast, promote the image of Africa as tribal and rural.[1]

The UNESCO General History of Africa aimed at combating such racialist prejudices to recover a history that depicts the lived realities and

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experiences of Africans from ancient times to the present. This massive project has received commendations for how it overcame its institutional challenges to produce eight volumes of history written by scholars from around the world; and for its emphasis on an African perspective that highlights African knowledge and agency.[2] In this mold, authors on the *General History* challenged Eurocentric narratives of urbanization by shifting attention away from empire builders and highlighting instead the contributions of African labor in the development of mining cities in South Africa, of merchants on and around the West Atlantic, and Africans who made the Swahili port cities. In Volumes V and VI devoted to precolonial Africa, authors successfully challenge the conceptualization of urbanization that privileged European urbanity as the normative and African urbanization as a preexistent 'Other'.[3] This has promoted recognition for and renewed scholarship in recovering the spatial and cultural geographies of indigenous towns, architectures, palaces, trade routes, markets, cities, etc. across Africa. However, the nationalist framework of the UNESCO model has proved grossly inadequate to overcome the conceptual and methodological claims of colonialism and its epistemological entrenchment of the perspective that modern African cities are new, colonial, 'little Europes'. The idea that African cities are new and different from traditional African forms dominates the chapters even as authors try to push the case that Africans participated in the making of colonial urbanization. It does not help that those Africans mentioned (manual labor recruits, mine workers, harbor hands, *Shabeen queens*) served in subaltern positions. Unwittingly, many accounts reproduce and legitimize Eurocentric notions that modern cities, railways, roads, and urban management are European ways in contrast to African ways. Africans remain cast as interlopers and adopters of European ways in many accounts of colonial urbanization.

The theoretical tools to effectively challenge Eurocentrism and thereby recover the African experience of urbanization during colonial rule began to be available from the 1980s onwards. These tools evolved from the flood of studies that followed Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) and later *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), which demonstrated that European knowledge of Africa, as of many parts of the colonized world, and by implication the archive upon which historians rely to recover the African past, was 'invented' to serve imperial purposes. The cultural strategy of imperialism, Said highlights, was to establish difference through premises of posed-opposites between European ways and the ways of the colonized.[4] By appropriating the modern and its claims of science, rationality, etc. as European natural endowments, colonialism rendered African ways as traditional and different from the modern. Thus, African urbanization may only be rendered as a different, inadequate form of the European modern city. By advancing African authenticity, the nationalist school failed to overcome the claims of difference upon which colonial ideology is grounded.

Many historians have adopted new critical tools to attempt the recovery of African urban history. This purpose has been pursued firstly by reevaluating colonial narratives of urbanization in Africa with a recognition of their faults, including their narrowness, propaganda, and as ideological claims to establish and secure colonial power and European dominance. Secondly, several studies delimit the timelines of African urbanization, finding continuities in the histories of cities such as Lagos, Benin, Abeokuta, Kumasi, Timbuktu, Mombasa, Durban, etc., and thereby overcoming the assumption of newness or displacement.[5] They underscore how other processes such as Islamization, Creolization, and hybridization were also at play in the making of modern African urbanization. Furthermore, de-essentializing cities as centers of civilization has led to recognition of varied layers of the urban experience, and for the critical nexuses and influences of comparative rurality (metropolises, small towns, markets, urban, margins, etc.) in the making and sustenance of urban culture.[6] The collection of articles from the 2003 University of Texas Conference on African Urban Studies experiment with these varied strategies with varying degrees of effectiveness. They provide new tools for interrogating old axioms about colonial urbanization and the African experience.[7]

Yet, problems persist, not least in the configuration of the existing library on African urbanization and the knowledge system it has created. Scholars still have a lot to do to push back against *images of Africa*, including in college curriculums, pedagogy, and as projected in the media. The ideas that modern cities were built by Europeans in Africa, that Africans lived in tribal landscapes and were incapable of modern technology and space management continue to dominate some scholarly and media depictions of Africa. The more enduring challenge however remains how to overcoming the stranglehold of European universalizing concepts and imposed categories to fully achieve the production of historical accounts untainted by Eurocentrism. Indeed, despite the strides made to recover African agency, we continue to struggle with the inferiority imposed by marginalization, which automatically renders African roles as poor copies of, and aspirations to, a European referent.

A long chronology of authors has struggled with this dilemma of moving past recognizing alterity, and the 'common cries of anger and anguish among activist African historians and intellectuals sick and tired of being marginalized in the production of scholarly knowledge on and about Africa',[8] to developing frameworks which render more credible histories. As the eminent philosopher Abiodun Jeyifo observes, de-centering is inadequate for Africa if scholars do not go further to 're-center'. He further asserts that, 'there is an absence, a vacuum left from deconstructing or de-territorializing colonization which has not been filled, and without the filling of which old colonial narratives are reinforced as the *only*, even if intensely challenged historical explanation'.[9] The African experience of urbanization during the colonial era still requires a re-centering, a narrative of African agency, of innovation and

adaptation, of impositions as well as impacts. Despite many promising discursive experiments, there is yet no consensus on how this might be achieved. Paul Zeleza has suggested a 'double intellectual maneuver' as a strategy for recovering the African past. His preference for a dualistic approach proceeds from a recognition of the promises and limitations of Dipesh Chakrabarty's *Provincializing Europe*, which advances a pluralistic approach to the past; one which reduces European ideas as provincial (and not universal) and narrates how it engages with other 'provinces'. Recognizing the practical inadequacies of *Provincialism* (not least that our scholarly enterprise, including its language, valuation, conceptualization, and chronology all remain tied to the scholarly ethics and standards of the European Enlightenment), Zeleza suggests that Africa should also be conceived of as global to countermand Western universal claims. Other frameworks, including 'multiple modernities', transnationalism, etc. which seek to create space for the histories of colonized peoples also confront the overwhelming universalism of the dominant narrative.[10]

More particularly than the broad issues of African historiography, the main step to recovering the African experience of urbanization must recover the conceptualization of urbanization from its Western universalistic claims. Where Zeleza suggests an excision from the European episteme, and Jeyifo a re-centering of Africa as global, we propose a more reductionist strategy as the way forward for the history of urbanization in Africa. This includes recognizing as a first premise that the grand underpinning of power and dominance is *difference*. It is well recognized that the strength of colonialism was not only its coercive power, but also the legitimization it derived from posing and establishing difference. If difference is the conceptual authority of European universalistic claims, it can be effectively challenged at that crux of its authority. In other words, attempts at rarefying some authentic 'African' forms as a counter-discourse to domination can only reinforce European difference. Africanists need to redefine European claims as human characteristics and not racial ones. This framework does not preclude recognition for the celebrated achievements of the Enlightenment or the Industrial Revolution, or even of colonial conquest and rule; rather they become part of what human beings do. We can thereafter materially explain why Europeans acted in certain ways and how different layers of peoples chose other forms. The history of marginalized peoples, their dynamic science, technology, laws, labor, social order, and in our case urbanization, can be recovered alongside an explanation of the choices they made, and of their marginalization.

The broad outline that follows contextualizes the African urban experience during colonial rule by overcoming difference. It recognizes the multiplicity of African habitations prior to colonial rule. It further reduces colonial rule from its claims of being superhuman to its contextual realities of empire building—a common occurrence in Africa, (and indeed all human history).

Urbanization comes across as how metropolises, cities, towns, and sub-urbans evolved, grew, or modified during an era. In so doing we unlock Africa from alterity to render an account of the lived experience of African peoples.

Colonizing the African Urban: The Construction of Difference

Properly defined, urbanization is a global phenomenon rather than a race-specific or region-configured experience. Scholarly attraction to and concentration on Greek and Roman cities, much of it conducted to find roots that justify *The Rise of the West*, may make the ancient cities of Europe the classical normative. However, recent researches reveal impressive urbanization in virtually all regions of the world.[11] Contrary to the old model which credits the making of cities to the capacity of individual empire builders like Alexander the Great, there is consensus among scholars that urbanization is an ecological and demographic process in which growing populations respond to environmental change to become sedentary in areas where regular supply of food and social needs can be assured.[12] Towns and cities across Africa conform to global patterns of urbanization (growth in population, rise of social classes, centralization of power, mobilization of labor, trans and extra-kinship relationships, etc.) and urban culture.[13]

The earliest European encounters with Africans were stimulated by the reputation African urbanization had acquired in Portugal and across Europe. Embassies exchanged between Portugal and Ethiopia were thought to be correspondences with 'Prester John', the mythical king of a sprawling metropolis popular in medieval Europe,[14] just as the reputation of Mali's Mansa Musa as the richest human in the world was well known. The Portuguese invasion of Ceuta in 1415 required 225 ships, an affirmation that Africa was not lacking in urban centers and complex societies.[15]

Drawn to the attractions of African commerce, Europeans did not settle in wildernesses but near the supply of existing desired markets. Mercantile cities in Europe, on the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic, and across the world were similar in terms of their openness, fluid political systems, and close global interactions and communication to facilitate and sustain production, travel, and commerce. These cities existed on the margins of more rural production centers, usually hidden by middlemen from prying merchants. However, as industrialization induced a favorable shift in European comparative advantage in global trade, it produced a shift in conceptions of urbanization. In Europe, the movement from biological and artisanal modes of production drew a greater percentage of the population to factories in cities, thereby reordering marginality. The ideology of modernity and civilization that followed rendered rural settings, previously the centers of production, as margins of cities—now defined as centers of civilization. Industrialization further consummated growing European conceptions of racial superiority over others

and of the superiority of the European city over its rural margins, and over the non-European world. Racial ideology enabled European conquest and colonization, and along with this, the conception of Europe as the normative civilized and modern form of urbanization, and of the colonized world as rural, countryside, 'bush', or aspiring locales.

It is important to note, however, that the rise of European power did not thereby obliterate preexisting social realities. Existing towns and cities continued to thrive, not in any ossified traditional form, but alongside existing patterns of social formation, which were always dynamic, appropriating and localizing new ideas. The needs and outputs of industrial capital energized urbanization globally through increased volume of trade and the fast pace of innovation, new products, and ideas. The social conditions which followed urbanization in Europe, including the rise of a bourgeois class, the influence of labor unions, social and political revolutions, the growth of social leisure (theater, music, and sports), republicanism and suffrages, were not restricted to Europe but were shared variously. Neither did rurality, nobility, and old biological regimes disappear in either Europe or elsewhere. Rather, these ways of life were posed as discursive ideologies in the social and political struggle to define the most acceptable form of society and how it is governed. As Fred Cooper has emphasized severally, historians grant Europeans much more power and capacity than was real when we assume a coherent European identity and power to impose European ways on the colonized world.

The African experience of urbanization during the colonial period did not begin with a jolt or a total newness. As one author has noted, the sun did not fail to rise the day after European conquest. Spatial transformation was slow at best in a few places, and non-existent in many others. Nevertheless, old dynamic forms of urbanization remained, appropriating new ideas and resources (including European ones) and retaining old forms that were sustainable. In all cases, however, the main strategy of colonization was to establish and affirm difference. Accordingly, from the onset of colonial administrations, Europeans set out to define European ways, and to construct and impose opposites as the ways of Africans. They tried to secure European settlements as special and different from Africans settlements. The *colonization* of African urbanity further complicated the experiences of Africans as colonial cities grew.

This is not to deny the profound pace of urbanization that occurred during colonial rule, or to deny its impacts on human settlements and the demography of Africa. As colonial rule became entrenched, complete with functioning secretariats and offices, parastatals and bureaucracy, there occurred a simultaneous decline in the pedigree of existing urban centers in favor of colonial locations. In West Africa, the main driver for the growth of colonial cities was the opportunity they opened to enslaved persons to escape from indigenous slave-holding societies. Thus, Lagos witnessed an ever

increasing inflow of escapees, slaves, youths, and women as colonial power began to reach the Yoruba hinterland and fueled political and social instability. Colonial infrastructures such as the railways created employment opportunities that attracted the colonized population to seek their fortunes in colonial cities. Bill Freund reports that one estimate showed that the number of Africans living in urban centers rose from 4.8% in the 1920s (after over two decades of colonial rule) to 14.2% in 1960 at the end of colonial rule in most African countries.[16] Another means by which Africans were attracted to colonial cities and commercial centers was the introduction of colonial regulations and taxes. Forced recruitment of Africans into colonial projects and the imposition of taxes and regulations weakened local economies and forced men into port cities and mining service in East Africa and Southern Africa respectively. This increasing urbanization was propelled largely by diminishing opportunities and the exacerbation of poverty in the rural areas, a condition attested to by John Iliffe's words that urban poverty was the face of rural poverty.[17] By this, Illife meant how the attraction of labor to the mining and agricultural complexes in East and Southern Africa depopulated rural ones. The colonial strategy of defining urbanization as 'unAfrican' was used to justify policies to restrict permanent African residence in colonial cities, and ultimately created conditions of poverty in the rural areas as well as on the margins of colonial cities.

Several shared principles among colonial states guided their policies on urbanization and defined how Africans experienced colonial urbanization. These included the affirmation of racial superiority, financial sufficiency, and economic exploitation, achieving governance at minimal costs, and the protection of European colonial personnel. These principles variously affected the development of urbanization and life and experiences of Africans who inhabited the urban centers. We have established how difference was the main underpinning of colonial rule. To effectively rule, colonial states had to pose European cities as the modern form, distinct from African urbanization. Colonial policies were therefore targeted at clearly mapping European settlements away from natives. Policies in Segregation-Era South Africa denied African residency in Cape colony, first through restrictive legislations and later by denying land ownership for Africans. Before and under apartheid, laws were created to require passes, and at its height to push blacks into homelands. Where European populations were not large enough to sustain a settler colony, and where Europeans settled in preexisting African towns and cities, colonial authorities designated white-only residential areas.

Colonial policies also aimed at the effective exploitation of labor and colonial resources. Colonial states expected their colonies to be at least self-sufficient, capable of supporting colonial administration and serving the needs of the metropolitan economy. The French financial law of 1900, according to Teresa Hayter, 'suppressed subsidies to the colonies and obliged them to

subsist on their own budget resources'.[18] The British had a similar policy and the Colonial Office insisted on a policy of adherence to strict financial self-sufficiency without dependence on British taxpayers.[19] The policy of financial self-sufficiency also required the colonies to generate surpluses to invest in the metropole with the colonial power.

Shoestring budgeting influenced urbanization policies in the colonies. The main concern of the financial approving authorities in the colonial administration was a balanced budget with the expenditure on European personnel and welfare prioritized, followed by surpluses for overseas investment. A paltry expenditure was grudgingly approved for the local African personnel and critical infrastructure that could contribute to revenue generation. Expenditure that neither promoted European survival and welfare nor generated revenue was rarely prioritized. The ideology of difference justified the non-provision of public infrastructures and social services to Africans. As such, roads, electricity, postal services, etc. were defined as modern facilities and non-African ways. Public-health facilities were provided only to mitigate the spread of disease to European neighborhoods, because diseases were racialized as African.

Though racial and cultural superiority and difference are rarely stated in colonial policy documents (except the Italian Fascist *Laggi Razziali* of 1938), they are implied in some policy mission statements such as the French *Mission Civilisatrice* (in the colonies) and the unwritten ethos of European racial discrimination and segregation against the colonized. Racial bias was also a major plank in colonial policy that influenced colonial attitudes in their relations with Africans, and manifested too in urban management and development; except that it was masked by other factors such as health concerns and financial incapacity of most Africans to afford some specified building materials in housing codes. The masked racist and cultural superiority claims for segregation similarly morphed with financial self-sufficiency policy to deny Africans access to equal social services and amenities in the urban centers as well as residence.

Colonial administrations aimed to prevent African societies from disintegration through propping up some preexisting African cultural institutions and practices with indirect rule. The system containerized the people in tribes and communal lands, ruled by chiefs (turned autocrats) and armed with customary laws to preserve and guide the communities 'along native lines'.[20] Administering the colonized 'along native lines' was a euphemism for treating Africans differently by denying them services and amenities that could enhance African welfare in their settlements. Though this policy of development 'along native lines' started to be abandoned in British Colonies after the adoption of Colonial Development and Welfare policies of the 1940s, the neglect of African welfare in the urban centers had already prompted the formation of African organizations that not only catered for such welfare but also championed agitation for the dismantling of colonial rule and management of African welfare by Africans.

Organic Cities: Colonial Urbanization and the Limits of Difference

The colonization of Africa was immediately followed by the establishment of administrative centers and development of efficient transport systems that facilitated colonial exploitation of the newly created territories. Though some preexisting urban centers were turned into administrative centers, other factors were at play in the choice of location; natural resource endowment (mines/forest), new transport infrastructural facilities such as roads, railways and harbor/port facilities, as well as health of the Europeans (influenced by limitations of medical knowledge) were particularly important. Apart from the limited number of personnel because of financial policies, only administrative centers could be created, and so not all precolonial urban centers were appropriate. Even some which thrived as administrative/commercial centers in the early colonial period lost their status to nearby, better endowed/resourced or more strategically placed towns. This loss of status was usually followed by neglect. Such was the fate that befell Kilwa Kivinje in Tanzania, a mainland entrepôt town (that succeeded the ancient Island of Kilwa Kisiwani). When a deep harbor was built some 15 miles away during the colonial period, a new town, Kilwa Masoko, was born and made an administrative headquarters, which overshadowed and killed precolonial Kilwa Kivinje.[21] Likewise in Nigeria, Bonny which served as an administrative, commercial, and port town from the precolonial period until the late 1910s was abandoned when a better harbor facility nearby influenced the building of the new town of Port Harcourt, which became the new administrative and commercial center.[22] Similar developments were recorded for Kenya and, according to Otiso, 'Although the arrival of the British initially benefited precolonial or traditional centers it soon destroyed them. After consolidating political power, the colonial administration undermined precolonial centers by developing new centers more suitable to European needs'.[23]

The abandonment and consequent decline of preexisting towns was largely helped by denial of funds to build the necessary infrastructure and amenities needed to grow them. Lacking the new colonial incentives such as infrastructure and social amenities with their multiplier effects of employment and profit-making opportunities, some of the inhabitants relocated in search of better opportunities.

Such precolonial old towns that did not become administrative centers were neglected without the benefit of European planning and services. It was only when European interest got involved that the financial self-sufficiency policy was relaxed. For instance, Siluko in Benin Province (Nigeria) was neither an administrative center nor categorized even as a township (towns were graded in Nigeria under colonial rule), but because it had some resident European traders, it enjoyed government sanitary inspection services in 1922.[24] On the other hand, many similar towns in Benin Province that

lacked significant European populations, including some administrative divisional headquarters like Ubiaja (with one or two Europeans) and Auchi, were denied sanitation services until 1938 (and they concentrated on leprosy control work).[25] Even in both old (indigenous) and new (colonial) urban centers, financial parsimony prevailed in areas inhabited by Africans, while no expense was spared in letting the Europeans enjoy particularly good health and comfort where they settled in large numbers. For instance, electric light was introduced to Lagos in 1897, but a survey conducted in 1909 showed that two-thirds of the city did not benefit and streetlights were only available in areas inhabited by Europeans, while Africans bore the brunt of paying for the lights.[26] In Benin City (Nigeria), piped water introduced in 1910 was pumped to individual European homes, while a few public fountains were provided in strategic places for the teaming African residents. When the waterworks malfunctioned in the 1920s, the administration used tanks to ensure steady supply to the European quarters only until completion of a new waterworks in the late 1930s. The administration's attempts to transfer the cost of paying for the waterworks to African residents resulted in the Benin City water rate agitation of 1937–1938.[27] A similar policy was implemented in Dar es Salaam (Tanganyika) with water piped to individual homes of the Europeans and shared public water kiosks provided for non-European residents. The nature of water supply to non-European residents was in accordance with the parsimonious financial policy. This is further attested to by Hilary Hungerford and Sarah Smiley, who have shown that in Dar es Salaam, 'the government chose to instead use cheaper public water points' for African residents because 'British colonial discourse on water supply in Dar es Salaam questioned … whether the expenses of supplying such water access were justified'.[28] The financial self-sufficiency policy was usually enforced when it concerned catering to the infrastructural and social amenity needs and welfare of African urban dwellers.

European Commercial Interests and the Building and Segregation of New and Old Towns

Even when precolonial towns were made administrative and commercial centers, the colonial administrations were quick to build segregated and cordoned areas as residential quarters for Europeans (officials and non-officials). Various excuses were employed to dislodge the African residents in the areas chosen for European habitation. Home has argued that racism was not absent from pre-nineteenth-century colonial segregation.[29] But the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the heyday of social Darwinism and concomitant racism, and their convergence with the exacerbation of segregation of racial residential quarters in the colonies makes it difficult to completely exonerate a racist motive from segregation policy and practice. Similarly, new colonial towns were easily segregated at the point of planning and building. Luanda

(Angola) had from its beginnings in the sixteenth century restricted non-slave Africans' residence, and those Africans who sought to live around the city established themselves in the Musseques (a slum-like conglomeration of huts around the European suburbs.[30] Portuguese prohibition of African residence and consequent segregation was not based on health, but racial and cultural superiority claims which were reinforced with the later fascist policy of 1933. A*ssimilado* (assmimilated Africans) and Portuguese were reserved the best areas, and indigenato (unassimilated Africans) received the worst. What other European colonial powers did later with segregation was not different except that the policies were rationalized citing health/sanitation problems, security, affordability of building materials, and cultural differences.[31] Nevertheless, for the segregated European quarters or town to function, it required the labor and residence of Africans who ministered to the European needs. As a result, such Africans could not be completely eliminated even in apartheid South Africa, where provision was made for the African nanny in the planning of homes in the segregated European towns.[32]

Forging Difference: Patterns of Labor Appropriation in Colonial Urbanization

European colonizers in Africa depended on non-European labor (including unskilled labor), even though they were seemingly reluctant to include it as part and parcel of their lives. As a result, they even imported labor from Asia, partly to meet the shortfall in skilled labor particularly in Eastern and South Africa. The imported Asian laborers joined the preexisting Indian merchants to swell the population of Asian settlers. A few schools were established to train Africans as auxiliary personnel to supplement the Creoles (in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Kenya) who serviced the colonial administration. In the precolonial cities, these skilled auxiliary personnel were either allowed to settle among the colonized natives or sometimes separate quarters were built for them, known as clerks or native quarters. These served as buffers (in addition to the racetracks and golf courses) between the European quarters and the indigenous towns.

Similar African auxiliary personnel quarters were part of the planning of the new towns established by the colonial governments. Such quarters for African workers were not established in every town as Africans were expected to be housed by their employers. However, both the government and many employers did not provide housing for all of their workers.[33] Apart from financial policy (as stated by the Nigerian government committee on housing in 1923, which reported that housing for African staff should not be 'constructed by government out of public funds'[34]), the African laborer was viewed as a 'target worker' and not expected to live permanently in the urban center.[35] The French had established L'office de l' habitat économique (OHE) in 1926 to 'defray the cost of low income housing for qualified families in West Africa'.[36] According to Betts:

> the most spectacular construction activity at this time (before end of WWII) was the creation of another African residential quarter, this time at Fann, North of Medina [Senegal], in which 14 buildings were constructed in 1935–1936. In another effort, this to improve Medina, two *cités ourvrières* were erected in 1937–38, one with 47 rooms and the other with 32.[37]

These were for an African population of over 100,000 and so could provide only a few houses to a very insignificant percentage of the African urban residents. Consequently, the worker and his family were not entitled to permanent accommodation and were left to fend for themselves in terms of accommodation. Like the Angolan Africans of old who were excluded from building in Luanda, the Africans had to make do with housing built with materials within their means, without regard for European standards and building codes.

Challenging Difference: The Realities of African Urbanization

Both the old and new urban centers that were turned into administrative, commercial, and transport hubs in the early stages of colonialism attracted Africans in search of opportunities for trade, employment, education, and services. Various factors compelled African migration at the beginning of colonialism, namely the emancipation of slaves, forced labor, environmental crisis, land shortages and congestion of African reservations, low crop prices, and increasingly high taxes that singly and/or combined to orchestrate poverty. In some cases, the colonial governments used propaganda to attract people. In addition to those forced to migrate by changing circumstances, the government also encouraged and persuaded people to migrate to new towns which they were creating. Such persuasion surrounded the building of Port Harcourt (Nigeria), where the government flooded Lagos with posters inviting people to migrate and settle there.[38] In many cases, European colonial officials wanted Africans out of the urban areas as they saw the latter as rural and communitarian. Authorities feared that urbanization would destroy African moral fabric and rural character. As a result, efforts were also made to police and control rural urban migration. Young men were also targeted in crime-control measures to tackle juvenile delinquency and the so-called 'Black Peril' in settler colonies of both East and Southern Africa.[39] Initially, women were the main target of policing and control. Policing women's migrations to towns has been blamed on the patriarchs in the rural areas, who complained about runaway wives and young women's engagement in prostitution and requested their return to their rural homes. The fear of spread of venereal disease by women among workers was another excuse for policing them, which in some cases led to the practice of Bheura. This was the inspection of female genitals before women were allowed entry into some housing facilities in Southern Rhodesia.[40] In addition, Hungwe noted that the women in

Southern African urban centers brewed beer, which competed with the beer halls established by the administration, thereby threatening generation of revenue by the state.

The women who moved to the towns were taking advantage of increased trading opportunities there, especially in foodstuff, educational training, skill acquisition (particularly tailoring), and other services such as hospitality. Colonial governments had no place for African women in their functional operations (except for midwives during the interwar years and secretaries after 1945), and made no provision for their urban needs such as maternity hospitals and family homes. Despite governments' antipathy to women residing in urban settlements, women created a burgeoning informal sector there. They put to good use their trading skills, especially in West Africa, where they formed formidable market-women organizations. Similarly, Asians created bazaars in Central, East, and Southern Africa, while Levantines injected themselves into retail trade in West Africa.[41] These trading opportunities and a booming informal sector created employment in the urban centers and attracted Africans and particularly Asian settlers and a few Levantines. However, the economic slump and later depression of the 1920s brought massive unemployment which continued long into the postwar period. Increasing unemployment created destitution and the associated problems of juvenile delinquency and crime, which became rampant in many urban centers. The unemployment problem was made worse by housing problems and the cost of living.

The colonial government policy towards African housing was virtually laissez faire until the end of the Second World War. In addition, some towns (including a few new ones like Nairobi) were not planned from the beginning before they were built.[42] As a result, land allocation was left to the whims of early administrators and the indigenous African land tenure system. The Africans and Asians capitalized on this laissez-faire policy to put up different kinds of housing in areas assigned to them (called locations and townships in settler colonies) without adhering to any building codes, which was common in French colonies. The housing types ranged from European styles through hybrid ones to African indigenous designs, shacks and huts comingling. In addition, indigenous housing in old towns and huts and houses in neighboring villages near new towns catered for African housing. These African sections of new urban centers and central districts of old towns were either inadequately provided for or lacked basic social amenities, motor vehicle access, and other communication facilities. Some of these places soon degenerated into the sprawling slums which proliferated in many African towns. Even after the war, when the colonial governments started to provide a modicum of housing for some categories of workers, the scarcity of the houses soon resulted in overcrowding. For instance, in the 1930s, 492 people were found to be living in 11 houses constructed for a population of 163, and in spite of seeming improvement it was estimated that 82,000

Africans were living in housing designed for 50,000 in 1947 in Nairobi (Kenya).[43] Population growth quickly outpaced house building, to the extent that accommodation provision in Nairobi for 30,000 people was completed between 1946 and 1957 at a time when the city's population had risen to 52,000.[44]

The consequences of inadequate housing induced overcrowding coupled with chronic shortage of social amenities and communication networks turned the African sections of the urban areas into cesspools of vermin and diseases such as tuberculosis. The episodic plague outbreaks in some African and Asian sections of African towns provided the pretext for (at least attempted) destruction of properties and forced relocations of the inhabitants to new areas. This simultaneously helped to achieve the goal of racial segregation in the towns.[45] Such acts of destruction aimed at redesigning the towns, and high charges for social amenities and welfare singly and or in combination usually galvanized the African inhabitants (locals and/or immigrants) into forming civic associations to protest and agitate for better treatment from the colonial administration. This was usually the only option left to Africans since they were most often excluded from the administration and decision making regarding planning and allocation of funds for the local communities. Even in indigenous urban centers under indirect rule, the European administrative officers maintained monopoly over allocation of resources for development. It was worse in the settler colonies where the European settlers ensured the exclusion of Africans from the administration. Murunga has demonstrated this in the case of Nairobi, where the initial Asian and European participation in the administration was changed with the gradual easing out of the Asians as European settler emigration to the city increased from 1907. There was only perfunctory recognition of an African Advisory Council (window dressing to satisfy the Colonial Office) in 1926.[46] In the non-settler but segregated new town of Port Harcourt,, the cosmopolitan nature not withstanding, ethnic associations soon formed and in 1944 coalesced into the African Community League to wrest the administration of the town from the autocracy of the European Resident before the Local Government Reforms of 1948 assisted leagues gradually to take over administration of the town.[47]

The inadequacy and shortages induced competition in the urban settlements, necessitating the formation of ethnically based associations to assist individuals and communities gain access to resources and opportunities. These ethnic associations adopted self-help in providing some of the amenities the communities lacked, such as schools, dispensaries, town halls, scholarships for children etc. as well as employment and accommodation for new members of the communities and arranging for the repatriation of the destitute and bodies of dead members. Some associations built meeting and club halls, which assisted their recreation activities in addition to organizing indigenous dances, masquerades, and festivals, which further added African flavor, particularly in the new colonial towns. It was only with the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (CDWA) and its community development component

in the period after the Second World War that the colonial administrations started providing basic social amenities such as reading rooms, dance halls/clubs, and encouragement of the formation of clubs for boys and girls to depoliticize and engage youth in socially desirable leisure activities such as sport, drama, Art, and so on.

The ethnic associations' agitations provided training grounds for politics and formed the basis of nationalist politics in the urban areas. Some of the ethnic associations transformed into nationalist parties, while some of the earliest political organizations such as the Peoples Union of Lagos emerged from the water-rate agitation, which was an early urban conflict between African residents and the colonial administration. The ethnic associations joined with other civic organizations that emerged from the neglect of the welfare and interests of African residents of urban areas to create the basis of nationalist parties. It was in these colonial urban centers that the independence of African colonies was wrested from the European colonial administrations, which tried to create European islands of urbanization, while Africans in the face of neglect and poverty molded them into their own living spaces.

Conclusion

Urbanization has been a universal development and Africans made their own contributions to the process by building numerous ancient urban centers which dotted various parts of Africa from Jenno-Jenne in the West African interior to the Swahili coastal cities of East Africa and agro-towns of the Tswana in Southern Africa. This chapter has shown that African urbanization predated Arab and European contacts and European colonization, the latter of which resulted in the grafting of European planning on African urbanization which was receptive to new ideas and infrastructure. The European colonial administration in Africa was predicated on financial self-sufficiency and promotion of European health and welfare at the expense of the colonized Africans, who suffered discrimination and neglect in precolonial African urban centers. Though the colonial administrations established some new urban centers that facilitated exploitation and extraction, unofficial African inputs went into creating the sprawling African sections of the towns and even the European sections. This was the case in spite of the European colonial official objective of establishing difference through segregation and neglect. The European sections/quarters remained only negligible islands of European architecture without obliterating the African character of the urban centers. The African urban experience was one of racial discrimination and neglect. It was this negative experience of Africans under colonial administration in the urban centers that orchestrated the formation of the African ethnic associations and nationalist movements that would wrested independence from the colonizers and return urban administration and development to African people.

Notes

1. Francis Jaekel, *The History of the Nigerian Railway*, Vol. 1 (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1997).
2. Muryatan Barbosa, "The Construction of the African Perspective: A History of the General History of Africa (UNESCO)," *Revista Brasileira de História*. 32, no. 64 (2012): 14. The General History remains the single, most detailed compendium of African history. See also Paul Zeleza, "The Pasts and Futures of African History: A Generational Inventory," *African History Review* 39, no. 1 (2007): 1–24.
3. See for instance, Jan Vansina, "The Kongo Kingdom and Its Neighbours," 546–83; and B.M. Barkindo, "Kanem Borno: Its Relations with the Mediterranean Sea, Bagirmi and Other States in the Chad Basin," 492–512.
4. For applications of Saidian deconstruction to African history, see V.Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Achille Mbembe, "The Intimacy of Tyranny," in Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001); and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, ed., "Introduction," in *The Study of Africa: Global and Transcontinental Engagements*, Vol. 2, (African Book Collective, 2006), 1–26.
5. Catherine Coquer-Vidrovitch, "The Process of Urbanization in Africa: From the Origins to the Beginning of Independence; An Overview Paper," *African Studies Review* 31, no. 1 (1990): 1–98.
6. See, for instance, David Bell and Mark Jayne, *Small Cities: Urban Experience Beyond the Metropolis* (Abingdon, Oxon: Taylor and Francis, 2006).
7. Steven J. Salm and Toyin Falola, eds., *African Urban Spaces in Historical Perspective* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2005).
8. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, "The Troubled Encounter between Postcolonialism and African History," *Journal of Canadian Historical Association* 17, no. 2 (2006): 89–129.
9. Transcribed from "Harvard African Studies Workshop Featuring Biodun Jeyifo," accessed November 12, 2015, https://vimeo.com/56034878.
10. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, "The Troubled Encounter between Postcolonialism and African History," *Journal of Canadian Historical Association* 17, no. 2 (2006): 89–129.
11. Barbara Price, "Cause, Effect and the Anthropological Study of Urbanism," in *Urbanization in the Americas from Its Beginning to the Present*, ed. Richard Schaedel, J. Hardoy, and N. Scott-Kinzer (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978), 52–53.
12. Ancient cities developed around main rivers and ocean coastlines: Euphrates, Yellow River, Niger, Indian Ocean, etc.
13. The Sudanese empires thrived around the Niger, Great Zimbabwe and the Congo on their respective rivers, Egypt, Axum, etc. along the Nile Valley.
14. Andrew Kurt, "The Search for Prester John, a Projected Crusade and the Eroding Prestige of Ethiopian Kings, *c.*1200–*c.*1540," *Journal of Medieval History* 39, no. 3 (2013): 297–320.
15. Urban centers speckled the Western Sudan, the East African Swahili region, the Zimbabwe complex, the Nile Valley, etc.
16. Bill Freund, *The African City: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 65.

17. John Iliffe, *The African Poor: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 164.
18. Theresa Hayter, *French Aid* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1966), 23.
19. John M. Carland, *The Colonial Office and Nigeria, 1898–1914* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 103–4.
20. Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizens and Subjects: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies (Ibadan: University of Ibadan, 2002), 50–52.
21. M.G. Vassanji, *And Home was Kariakoo: A Memoir of East Africa* (Penguin Random House, 2015), 75.
22. W. Ogionwo, *The City of Port Harcourt: A Symposium on Its Growth and Development* (Heinemann Educational Books (Nig.) Ltd, 1979), 21.
23. Kefa M. Otiso, "Colonial Urbanization and Urban Management in Kenya," in *African Urban Spaces in Historical Perspective*, ed. Steven J. Salm and Toyin Falola (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2005), 78.
24. N.A.I. BP 238/21 D.O. (B.D.) to Resident (B.P.) 1/2/1922.
25. S.A. Shokpeka, "Local Government and Development in Benin Province 1938–1960" (PhD thesis, University of Benin, Benin City, 1990), 191–193.
26. Rina Okonkwo, *Protest Movements in Lagos, 1908–1930* (Enugu: ABIK Publishers, 1998), 13.
27. Phillip Igbafe, *Benin Under British Administration: The Impact of Colonialism on African Kingdom, 1897–1938* (Longman, 1979).
28. Hilary Hungerford and Sarah L. Smiley, "Comparing Colonial Water Supply in British and French Africa," *Journal of Historical Geography* 52 (2016): 77.
29. Robert Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2013), 125.
30. Michael P. Bulfin, "Bursting at the Seams: Water Access and Housing in Luanda," *Ufamahu: A Journal of African Studies* 3, no. 1 (2009): 4–5.
31. Raymond Betts, "The Establishment of Medina in Dakar, Senegal, 1914," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 4, no. 2 (April 1971): 143–144; Maynard Swanson, "The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the Cape Colony, 1900–1909," *Journal of African History* 18, no. 3 (1977); Giulia Barera, "Mussolini's Colonial Race Laws and State Settler Relations in Africa Orientale Italiana (1935–1941)," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 8, no. 3 (2003): 427–428; Allison Hay and Richard Harris, "Shauri ya Sera Kali: The Colonial Regime of Urban Housing in Kenya to 1939," *Urban History* 34, no. 3 (2007): 510; and Sarah Smiley, "The City of Three Colors: Segregation in Colonial Dar es Salaam, 1891–1961," *Historical Geography* 37 (2009): 179.
32. Rebecca Ginsburg, "The View from the Back Step: White Children Learn About Race in Johannesburg Suburban Homes," in *Designing Modern Childhoods: History Space and Material Culture of Children*, ed. Marta Gutman and Nind de Coninck-Smith (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008).
33. Allison Hay and Richard Harris, "'Shauri ya Sera Kali': The Colonial Regime of Urban Housing in Kenya to 1939," *Urban History* 34, no. 3 (2007): 512–516.

34. Quoted in Idyorough "The Development of Formal Social Services Under the Colonial State in Northern Nigeria (1900–1960)" (PhD thesis, University of Jos, Jos), 228.
35. National Archives of Nigeria, Ibadan File CSO 26/1/03571 Vol. II, Information relating to Conditions of Industrial Life and Labour; F.H. Ruxton, Lieutenant General, Southern Nigeria to Mr. H.A. Grimshaw, International Labour Office, Geneva, 25/06/1928, 199–200.
36. Ambe Njoh, "Urban Planning as a Tool of Power and Social Control in Africa," *Planning Perspectives* 24, no. 3 (2009): 305.
37. Raymond F. Betts, "Dakar: Ville IMPERIALE (1857–1960)," in *Colonial Cities: Essays on Urbanism in a Colonial Context*, ed. Robert Ross and Gerard J. Telkamp (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 204.
38. C.N. Anyanwu, "The Growth of Port Harcourt, 1912–1960," in *The City of Port Harcourt: A Symposium on Its Growth and Development*, ed. W. Ogionwo (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nig) Ltd, 1979), 20.
39. Andrew Burton, *African Underclass: Urbanization, Crime and Colonial Order in Dar es Salaam* (London: The British Institute in East Africa, 2005).
40. Chipo Hungwe, "Putting Them in Their Place: "Respectable" and "Unrespectable" Women in Zimbabwe Gender Struggles," *Feminist Africa* 6 (2006): 37.
41. Kalpana Hilaral, "Gujarati Dukawallas in the Indian Ocean Region: A Case Study of Natal (1880–1910)," *Man in India* 94, no. 3 (2014).
42. Godwin R. Murunga, "'Inherently Unhygienic Races': Plague and the Origin of Settler Dominance in Nairobi, 1899–1907," in *African Urban Spaces in Historical Perspective*, ed. Steven J. Salm and Toyin Falola, 106.
43. Iliffe, *The African Poor: A History*, 168.
44. Burton, *African Underclass*, 29–30.
45. Murunga, "'Inherently Unhygienic Races': Plague and the Origin of Settler Dominance in Nairobi, 1899–1907," in *African Urban Spaces in Historical Perspective*, ed. Salm and Falola, 116.
46. Ibid., 112.
47. Anyanwu, "The Growth of Port Harcourt, 1912–1960," in *The City of Port Harcourt: A Symposium on Its Growth and Development*, ed. W. Ogionwo, 32–33.

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CHAPTER 13

Africa and the First World War

Meshack Owino

The First World War is remembered almost throughout the African continent with resentment. Indeed, many African soldiers and their families remember the war bitterly, with negative terms and adjectives peppering their conversations about it. In Senegal, veterans of the war and their families often refer to it as '"a very, very bad thing"' or as '"the worst thing I ever saw"'.[1] The main reason for this is that many African soldiers were conscripted to serve in the conflict, and many of these conscripts suffered or lost their lives as a result.[2] The families of these men resented the war because it caused them to lose their loved ones. In fact, many African soldiers and their families equated the war with suffering, toil, and death. Africans in Malawi (Nyasaland) associated the war with *tengatenga*—military labor.[3] Those in East Africa associated it with military-labor units such as the Carrier Corps (Kariokor), and with death.[4] It has been estimated that nearly two million Africans served in the First World War[5] and that almost 200,000 of them perished in it.[6] The death of such a large number of men during and after the war undeniably left many African families grieving and mourning. It has been estimated that, in East Africa alone, nearly one million African servicemen were involved in the war in one way or another, and that about 10% of them lost their lives during it. According to Geoffrey Hodge, 'the total mortality rate' among the men in East Africa 'was well over 100,000'.[7] The overwhelming unpopularity of the First World War in Africa can be discerned from the reaction and behavior of Africans after the outbreak of the Second World War. When the

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latter broke out and colonial authorities started canvasing for recruits to serve in it, many Africans immediately became apprehensive because they and their family members still remembered how the previous conflict had created many problems such as illness, death, and general suffering among Africans. One colonial official in Kenya reminisced that any time the war was mentioned, people remembered the 'ill-fated Carrier Corps of the First World War and everything connected with it'.[8] When government recruiting agencies in Tanganyika started looking for new recruits to serve in the Second World War, they were shocked to find that memories of illness, injuries, mourning, bereavements, and death during the previous war were still so strong among African families that they 'left a general distrust of military service'.[9] The war was associated with suffering, injuries, and death. Fathers and mothers remembered it for the death of their sons; wives of their husbands; children of their fathers; and communities of their lost future. Many African wars of resistance were in fact organized against conscription into this war. When and how did the First World War begin and spread into Africa? How did Africans get entangled in it? What was the nature of their experience?

The Beginning of the First World War and Its Expansion into the African Continent

While a full, detailed chronicle of the origin of the First World War is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is necessary to mention the one major factor that contributed to the acceleration of the events that led to the war, and to its expansion into Africa: the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, in Sarajevo, Serbia, on June 28, 1914. Angered by the death of the heir to the throne, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and at the same time started seeking diplomatic and military support from Germany in the event that Russia, the traditional ally of Serbia, came to the aide of Serbia during the quarrel. The dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia quickly expanded: Russia came to the aid of Serbia and declared war on Austria-Hungary; and Germany, in retaliation for the Russian declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, in turn declared war on Russia. The war further expanded when Germany declared war on Luxembourg, France, and Belgium. The conflagration soon consumed nearly all of the most powerful nations in Europe at the time that Britain declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914.

Within a short time, the flames of war started flickering over the African continent. The major reason for this was that the nations declaring war and fighting with each other in Europe happened not only to be the most powerful on on earth at the time, but also the most important colonial powers controlling a vast swathe of land in Africa. The British, the French, the Belgians, and the Germans controlled, between them, perhaps more than three-quarters of the colonies in Africa, and certainly the largest and most populous territories.

Thus, when the British, the Germans, the French, and the Belgians and, later on, the Portuguese, declared war on each other in Europe, their conflict quickly expanded into Africa as they rushed to their colonies to draft support.

Thus, following their declaration of the war on the Germans, the British and the French quickly mobilized Africans in their colonies to help them out.[10] The French sent most of their African troops to fight in the trenches overseas in Europe. The British, on the other hand—and to some extent a few French forces in West Africa—decided to mobilize their African troops against the German colonies in Africa, hoping for a quick campaign before focusing their full attention on the campaign in Europe. For a time, everything went according to plan. The fighting in Togo lasted less than one month, coming to an end with the German surrender to the Allied troops on August 25, 1914. The fighting in Namibia lasted a little longer, with the Germans not surrendering until July 1915. The British plans for a quick war in Africa started unraveling in Cameroon, where fighting did not come to an end until April 1916, and completely collapsed in East Africa, where fighting dragged on until the end of the war in 1918. Ultimately, the French deployed 'upwards of 160,000 West African soldiers', known as *tirailleurs*, in the trenches of the European campaign during the war[11] and the British, with the support of their African troops known as *askaris*, fought the longest campaign of the entire war in East Africa.[12]

The campaign in East Africa lasted longer than the British had wanted because, while the plan had been for a short, quick campaign before focusing attention on the European campaign, the Germans, led by General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, planned to keep them bogged down in Africa. Thus, when the war broke out, von Lettow-Vorbeck's strategy was to lure the British troops into a long guerrilla campaign that covered many parts of Tanganyika, Mozambique, and Zambia. Indeed, it has been observed by many scholars of the First World War in Africa that the East African Campaign did not come to an end until General Lettow-Vorbeck surrendered to the Allies at Abercon, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia)[13] on November 25, 1918, 'two weeks after the signature of the armistice in Europe'.[14] The war had lasted longer in East Africa than anywhere else on the continent or in any other part of the world, and, consequently, the African participation in it was probably also the longest.

With the exception of a few colonies in Africa belonging to the Portuguese, the Italians, and the Spaniards, Africans in many parts of the continent participated in the war both directly and indirectly from its very outbreak. They participated intensively and extensively in the war. There were many Africans in Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Niger, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Togo, Cameroon, Namibia, Tanganyika, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi who participated in the war as infantrymen on the fronts in Europe and Africa.

There were others who provided manpower and material goods to the European colonial powers involved in the war. Indeed, it has been estimated that nearly 2 million Africans served in the First World War.[15] While some Africans provided food and other material services to the European powers during the war, others provided direct military service as combatants and support troops.

Yet, what is very ironic about the African military service in the First World War in Europe and Africa is that they were actually not supposed to serve. The Europeans, particularly the European colonial powers in Africa, did not want Africans involved for several reasons. First, the Europeans, according to Reigel, believed that the war would be a short one. No one '… expected a long war … all experts predicted a short conflict, a few months or perhaps a year or so, and of course expected their side to win'.[16] It was consequently felt that there was no need to recruit Africans. The second reason was that European experts believed that the war 'would largely be fought in Europe rather than Africa',[17] making it even more imperative to keep Africans out of it. Otherwise, they might end up travelling to, fighting in, and even living in Europe after the war. The third reason why the Europeans did not want Africans fighting in the war was that it could reduce the status of whites in the eyes of Africans in the African continent. In the words of Stratchan, 'the spectacle of white fighting white would reduce the status of the European' among Africans.[18] 'Blacks would kill whites, and the forfeiture would be white racial supremacy.'[19] According to Reigel, the Europeans perceived the conflict as a 'white man's war'.[20]

The fourth reason why the Europeans did not want Africans fighting in the war was that it would rekindle African military traditions,[21] which, in the end, might jeopardize the very existence of the colonial system in Africa.[22] If Africans were enlisted into the war, it was claimed, their warrior traditions might be 'reawakened' and their knowledge of how to use the new weapons might grow to the detriment of whites and the colonial system in Africa. In the words of Reigel, the Europeans wanted to keep Africans out of the war for 'fear of losing control of their African subjects'.[23] In short, Africans were not supposed to be involved in the First World War.

It was therefore quite ironic that, in spite of the pervasive fear of African participation in the conflict, the European colonial powers began recruiting Africans into their armies almost as soon as it broke out. Immediately the war started and its realities began sinking in, the Europeans abandoned their 'short-lived' plans for keeping Africans out of it.[24] They began recruiting and preparing Africans to fight. Strachan argues that it was the Entente powers that, in spite of their own propaganda warning the Germans against enlisting Africans to fight, started the policy of 'arming the African"[25] for the war. Indeed, once the conflict began in earnest, almost all the European powers, including the Germans, started recruiting a large number of Africans into their armies and deploying them into the war. The French, for example, sent large numbers of West Africans into *tirailleurs Senegalais*, employing

well-known and well-connected African leaders such as Blaise Diagne to recruit for them. It is estimated that well over '140,000 West Africans were recruited into the French army and served as combatants on the western front between 1914–1918'.[26] Some scholars believe that the number of Africans who served in the French army during the war was even higher. Nancy Lawler believes that 'upwards of 160,000 West African soldiers, virtually all of them conscripts, fought in the trenches during World War I'.[27] 'The number of African soldiers recruited by the French in French West Africa during the war', according to Strachan 'was something like 200,000 soldiers'.[28] Joe Lunn contends that probably as many as "180,000 Africans [from West Africa] were transported overseas by the French between 1914–1918.[29] Other scholars believe that the French probably sent over 450,000 African soldiers to fight.[30]

The number of African soldiers from West Africa recruited by the British to help them in the war was also not small. According to Stratchan, 'something like 25,000 soldiers' were recruited by the British to serve in the British West African Frontier Force.[31] African soldiers from East and Central Africa were also enlisted by the British to serve in the King's African Rifles (KAR) and their numbers grew from 2319 at the beginning of the war to about 8000 men during the war, and to 35,000 men by the end.[32] Africans in Southern Rhodesia were enlisted into the Rhodesia Native Regiment in 1916 for service in the war. By 1918, the number of Africans in it was '2360 men … less than 1% of the total African male population, and 75% of them originated from outside the colony'.[33] African soldiers were also enlisted by the Germans into the Schuzetruppe for military service in Togo, the Cameroons, Namibia (German South-West Africa), and East Africa during the war. African soldiers also served in the Force Publique of the Belgians in the Congo and in other European armies during the war, notably in that of the Portuguese in East and Central Africa.[34]

There is one important distinction that must be made when discussing the African experience in the First World War. The African servicemen were not homogeneous. While many of them served as infantrymen wielding rifles and fighting on the frontlines (notably deployed by the French in Europe and the British in East Africa), the majority were ordinary military laborers or porters—the African carriers. The African carriers came from all over the continent. Stratchan observes that they originated in 'Eastern Belgian Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, German East Africa, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and the northern areas of Mozambique'.[35] They also came from British West Africa. 'There were 57,500 carriers, twice as many as the number of soldiers, in British West Africa'.[36] A total of 25,000 black South Africans enlisted as laborers in the South African Native Labor Contingent to support British troops in France between September 1916 and January 1918.[37] There were about 260,000 porters serving Belgium's domestic and external needs during the war.[38] There were 30,000 porters recruited by the Portuguese to

serve the British needs, and 90,000 to serve their own.[39] The highest number of African carriers serving in the war came from East Africa, because the war lasted longest in that theater, requiring more manpower serving for a longer period than anywhere else. Consequently, many African carriers were variously recruited by the British and the Germans to help them in the war in East Africa. Geoffrey Hodges notes that the number of African carriers from East Africa serving in the war was well over a million.[40]

These carriers constituted the majority of the African men serving in the European armies during the war, and their role in prosecuting the conflict was especially important when one considers that a transport system based on motor vehicles and trains in Africa during the period was almost non-existent.[41] Where motor vehicles and trains were available, their use by the military often turned out to be limited because, according to Reigel, 'trucks, cars, and motorcycles' often got 'stuck in the mud … often teams of draft animals were required to pull trucks out of mud pits'.[42] Where 'draught or pack animals [could be] usable', observes Stratchan, the animals often 'fell prey to the tsetse fly'.[43] The Second Division of the British army in East Africa, was, for example, prevented from moving beyond areas it had conquered by this pest.[44] Moreover, 'tens of thousands of horses, mules, and oxen'[45] were killed by 'animal epidemics spreading out throughout the region'.[46] Worsening the shortage of animals that could be deployed to provide transport to the military were other problems such as 'wild animals … attacking lines of animals harnessed together, such as horse artillery teams'.[47] Faced by all these transport problems and challenges, European powers turned to Africans to serve as porters and laborers in the war, a solution to military transport problems that ultimately became devastating to the health and lives of African carriers. The European powers recruited and relied on large numbers of 'African carriers' to carry supplies to the front, and to evacuate the injured and the dead back to the camps. In all, 'somewhere over 2 million Africans served in the First World War as soldiers and laborers'.[48]

The African soldiers and carriers served in the war with "distinction, dedication, and commitment."[49] They participated in it closely, intimately, and professionally. They were integral to its prosecution in Africa. Indeed, when one thinks about the serious transport problems bedeviling the colonial armies in Africa at this time, it is difficult to imagine how the war would have continued without them. The African carriers were literally the 'feet and hands of the colonial armies'.[50] They were like a 'human chain linking troops to their bases, and without it, they could not move, feed, or fight'.[51] Reigel contends that the carriers were 'the primary method of transport in the military logistics' during the last two years of the war in East Africa.[52] The carriers (those 'beasts of burden' in the African campaigns) literally carried Europeans and their fellow Africans forward and in retreat.[53]

The primary responsibility of the carriers was carrying provisions such as ammunition, food, and other military supplies to the fighting troops on the front lines, and evacuating the injured and the dead. The carriers also carried out many other responsibilities. Reigel provides a very detailed list of the carriers' responsibilities, including: 'armed scouts, headmen, interpreters, guides, cooks, bakers, mounted gun carriers, machine gun carriers, mortar carriers, signal porters, stretcher bearers, stevedores, canoe men (aka boatmen, paddle men), truck drivers, steamer crewmen, road/bridge builders, drain/latrine/trench diggers, hut builders, wood choppers, rail-road gangs, dockworkers, tailors, cobblers, blacksmiths, grooms, sweeps, carpenters, carrier police, and personal servants'.[54] The African carriers also served as personal aides to European soldiers during the war. Stratchan states that 'seven to nine porters' were routinely attached as aides to 'each British officer' in East Africa.[55] Eight porters were attached to each Belgian officer. Four to six porters served as servants and cooks to each German officer in West Africa. When the European soldiers in the German army marched through Portuguese East Africa during the last years of the war, "they were each allowed to have three porters at their disposal."[56] About "two or three porters were attached to British and German officers" in the Cameroons.[57] These African personal aides to European soldiers were among the many African soldiers and carriers who served in the various European armies during the First World War.

The African carriers and soldiers served with courage, élan, dedication, distinction, and professionalism during the war. They readily sacrificed their comfort and lives for the causes for which they were enlisted. Indeed, many of them gave up their lives during military service. They were, in the words of Reigel, 'dedicated and professional'[58] men who ended up paying with their lives for their dedication and professionalism.

The Experience of African Soldiers and Carriers in the First World War

The First World War left a devastating impact on the African landscape. Many African soldiers and carriers lost their lives during the war. As already mentioned, over 2 million Africans served, and, out of that number, more than 200,000 died or were killed in action.[59] There were many factors for this. The first obvious cause was participation in the war itself. Exposure to a war environment brimming with bullets and bombs on the front lines, for four years, could not have ended without African soldiers losing their lives. Many African soldiers died in combat during campaigns in Africa, and, even more were killed on the Western Front in Europe. The number of African soldiers killed during combat grew as the campaigns progressed steadily through Europe and Africa. Analysis reveals that the most African soldiers were killed in Europe. The French army, for example, 'listed almost 30,000 deaths among the 135,000 African troops serving in Europe'.[60] Unfortunately, we

will never know the exact number of African carriers killed in the French army because the French, like the Germans, did not leave clear records on the death of their African carriers.[61] Many African soldiers also lost their lives during the campaign in Togo, Namibia (German South-West Africa), Cameroon, and East Africa. It seems that more African soldiers were killed in Cameroon and East Africa than in Togo and Namibia (German South-West Africa) because the war went on for a much longer period in the former territories than in the latter territories. It has been noted that von Lettow-Vorbeck, commander of German forces in East Africa, tried to reduce casualties among his troops by avoiding pitched battles against British troops during the campaign in East Africa;[62] but, still, a considerable number of African soldiers in his army got killed during fighting here. About 1800 African soldiers were killed while serving in the German Schuzetruppe in East Africa during the war,[63] and about 1377 African soldiers were killed on the British side of the campaign during that campaign.[64]

There are scholars who believe that many African soldiers lost their lives on the front lines during the war because of a deliberate policy of the Europeans, especially the French, of using African soldiers as cannon-fodder exposed to greater danger than European soldiers.[65] Admittedly, this view is controversial, but there are scholars who believe that such a policy existed; that African soldiers such as the Senegalese troops in the French army were treated 'as no more than cannon fodder',[66] and were 'systematically employed … as assault troops with the deliberate intention of sacrificing their lives in order to spare French ones'.[67] If such a policy truly existed, then there is no doubt that it contributed to the death of some of the estimated 30,000 French African troops on the Western Front in Europe during the war.[68]

Nevertheless, although many African servicemen died during combat in the war, an analysis of the military casualties reveals that many of them occurred due to non-combat factors. The most serious of these non-combat factors were health problems brought about by exhaustion, exposure to the elements, and diseases. According to Reigel, many 'insects, microorganisms, and the diseases' in the environment caused illness, diseases, and death amongst African soldiers and carriers[69] during the war in East Africa. Reigel estimates that, 'for every combat casualty, there were thirty more due to illness'.[70] Among the most serious of these diseases were malaria and dysentery. Malaria, according to Stratchan, 'was the principal cause of sickness' among soldiers and carriers during the war.[71] Apart from malaria, African soldiers and carriers were also vulnerable to 'cholera, typhoid, dysentery, typhus, guinea worms, and chiggers'.[72] Indeed, Stratchan and Hodges argue that malaria and dysentery were the two most serious problems causing major illnesses and deaths among the African soldiers and carriers in East Africa.[73]

Diseases and other health problems ran riot among African soldiers and carriers for several reasons. To begin with, the recruitment quota system imposed on headmen and chiefs, and the conscription policy that came into

effect with it, made many of them so desperate for recruits that they often recruited soldiers and carriers who were not physically fit for military service.[74] Such soldiers and carriers were often very vulnerable to diseases such as malaria and dysentery. The army policy of deploying African carriers and soldiers far away from their homes to reduce desertion from military service during the war also exposed soldiers and carriers to diseases and ill-health. In the words of Stratchan, 'the migration of so many Africans out of their native localities exposed them to fresh infections, and the physical and psychological demands [of the war] lowered their resistance to disease'.[75] Africans from malaria-free regions, for example, became very vulnerable to malaria while serving in areas 'infested with malaria-causing mosquitoes'.[76] The biggest challenge to the African soldiers and carriers in East Africa during the war was, according to Reigel: the environment.[77]

Another reason for the vulnerability of African soldiers and carriers to ill-health was their unfamiliarity with the army food that was often badly cooked. Serving in a new environment far away from home, African soldiers and carriers were often served with new types of food to which they were not accustomed and did not like. To make matters worse, the food was often badly cooked because the cooks did not know how to cook well, did not have enough time to prepare the food adequately, and did not maintain proper sanitary conditions while cooking. The unfamiliar, badly cooked food was also not nutritious enough to keep the soldiers and the carriers healthy. Instead of nourishing the African soldiers and carriers and protecting them from diseases, the often "bland and badly cooked food" left the them suffering from diseases such as "dysentery and beriberi." Soldiers and carriers from Uganda who normally 'subsisted on bananas, sweet potatoes, and beans"[78] at home, for example, 'developed intestinal diseases' when they were made to start eating badly cooked maize meals that they were not used to.[79]

Exhaustion, hunger, and dehydration also contributed to health problems among African soldiers and carriers during the war. Indeed, many African servicemen lost their lives due to dehydration and exhaustion during military service. Reigel observes that large numbers of them often suffered from exhaustion because of fighting and marching over long distances during military service. Many collapsed and died from exhaustion after walking almost non-stop between base camps and the front lines. Others incurred the wrath of the jigger menace after walking bare-footed over long distances in unfamiliar territories.[80] Stratchan observes that as much as '40% of the West African Frontier Force was lame by the end of the Cameroons campaign'.[81] But jiggers were not the only problems causing ailments and deaths among the soldiers and carriers. There were also 'the lions, hippos, and venomous snakes' that were 'frightening enough' but also 'responsible for a few casualties".[82]

Exposure to the elements also contributed to illness, injury, and death among African soldiers and carriers during the war. Poorly built and badly maintained camps left them unprotected from the hot sun, and, sometimes,

the unrelenting rainfall, and the cold air, especially at night. In 1915, for example, poorly built, overcrowded, and badly maintained tents serving as barracks led to the creation of 'disease-ridden environments in which mortality rates were often exceptionally high'[83] in Senegal. This problem did not end even after the tents were brought down and permanent barracks constructed in their place. The barracks were often badly maintained and unsanitary. Many soldiers thus continued to lose their lives.

Many African soldiers and carriers who contracted diseases during the war died because of an inadequate supply of proper medicine and lack of trained medical personnel. After contracting diseases or getting injured during military service, many African soldiers and carriers found to their dismay that there was a shortage of medicine and trained health-care personnel to attend to their medical needs, even if they were lucky enough to get to a hospital. Without proper medicine and adequate attention from properly trained health-care personnel, many injured and ill soldiers and carriers needlessly lost their lives to easily curable medical problems.[84] The shortage of medicine and medical personnel was often worsened by overcrowding in hospitals, leading to more people contracting chest problems and other diseases, and dying. All these problems (deployment to unfamiliar territories, bad food, exhaustion, dehydration, exposure to the elements, shortage of medicine, lack of properly trained medical personnel, congestion, among others) contributed to the vulnerability of African troops, especially the carriers, to diseases during the First World War. Most of them lost their lives to diseases during the war. 'Disease, not battle, disabled armies in Africa.'[85]

Thus, although many African soldiers and carriers lost their lives during fighting on the front lines, even more lost their lives to non-combat factors such as diseases malaria, dysentery, beriberi, typhoid, bilharzia, and cholera. For example, while 1377 African soldiers in British service in East Africa were killed in combat, 2923 (more than double that number) died from disease.[86] Similarly, the Allied forces in West Africa 'lost a total of 4600 men through death or wounding in action or through death by disease', in contrast to over 35,000 cases 'admitted to hospital'.[87] Indeed, Stratchan contends that the death rate among the African carriers in East and West Africa was 'about 20%' during the war, which, he observes, was 'similar to that of an army on a so-called major front'.[88] In view of the high casualty rate among African soldiers during the First World War, it should therefore not be very surprising that many Africans viewed the conflict as a 'very bad thing', as 'the worst thing that ever happened'.

The Impact of the First World War on Africa

The First World War had major implications for the African continent. Apart from the large number of Africans who died, the war devastated the economies of many parts of Africa. Young, strong, and energetic men were taken

away from their homes to serve, and their farms suffered from a shortage of manpower. Agricultural production in many parts of Africa declined. The combatants' scorched-earth policy (aimed at denying each other provisions) led to the destruction of many African villages and harvests that could not be requisitioned.[89] All these led to cases of famine in many parts of Africa, and the shortage of food was exacerbated by the outbreak of human and livestock diseases leading to even more suffering and death during and after the war. French Equatorial Africa, for example, experienced the worst famine in its history from 1918–1926.[90] East Africa was not spared these calamities either. For example, the 'worst drought and disease epidemic to affect Kenya in the twentieth century'[91] broke out shortly after the end of the war in 1918. The war and the outbreak of these calamities contributed together to the death of many people and their livestock. The population of Belgian Congo 'fell by one-third or one-half'[92] during this period. The colonial state in Kenya 'was forced to import food to meet the distress'[93] following the outbreak of food shortage and famine in Kenya during the same period. Many people therefore suffered during and after the First World War. The conflict also changed the political map of Africa as the German colonies of Togo, Cameroon, Namibia, and Tanganyika changed hands and were governed by other colonial powers. The newly formed League of Nations handed over Togo and Cameroons to the French, Namibia to the Union of South Africa, and Tanganyika to the British. These colonies were supposed to be governed on behalf of the League of Nations. Entrusted with the task of taking care of the former German colonies on behalf of the League of Nation, the British and the French not only consolidated their hold on their African colonies, but also increased their power and influence over many parts of Africa. The war also raised the political consciousness of many Africans. Many Africans started trying to change the political dynamics of their colonies by engaging in politics in their colonies. These Africans formed political associations, trade unions, newspapers, and literary clubs to articulate their grievances against the colonial system and demand redress. Their growing political consciousness forced many colonial powers to recognize the need to implement reforms. The biggest impact of the war, however, was in the experience of African soldiers and carriers. For many of them, it was unforgettably a 'very bad thing', 'the worst thing that ever happened'.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how the First World War broke out and expanded into Africa. It has focused on the conflict's key campaigns, and the experience of African soldiers and carriers, particularly their suffering and death. The majority of African people remembered the terrible suffering they had endured either on the front lines during the fighting or from related injuries and diseases.

Notes

1. Joe Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom: A Senegalese Oral History of the First World War* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, Oxford: James Currey, Cape Town: David Philip, 1999), 215.
2. Geoffrey Hodges, *Kariakor: The Carrier Corps: The Story of the Military Labour Forces in the Conquest of German East Africa, 1914–1918* (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 1997), 19, 150–85.
3. Melvin Page, "The War of Thangata: Nyasaland and The East African Campaign, 1914–1918," in David Birmingham, A.G. Hopkins, R.C.C. Law, and A.D. Roberts, World War I and Africa, *The Journal of African History* 19, no. 1 (1978), 90–97. See also: Melvin E. Page, "Introduction: Black Men in a White Man's War," in *Africa and the First World War* ed. Melvin E. Page (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1987), 8–13.
4. The misery of African veterans of the Carrier Corps was starkly captured by Geoffrey Hodges in his book, *Kariokor: The Carrier Corps*. According to Hodges, African service in the Carrier Corps during the First World War was characterized by suffering and death from negligence, starvation, exhaustion, and diseases.
5. Hew Strachan, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3.
6. Melvin Page, "The War of Thangata".
7. Geoffrey Hodges, *Kariakor*, 21.
8. S.H. Fazan, "The Pioneers: A Memorandum on Certain Points Outstanding 25 September, 1939" (KNA/PC/NZA/2/3/21, The Pioneers, 1939–1942).
9. Timothy Parsons, *The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902–1964* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, Oxford: James Currey, Cape Town: David Philip, Nairobi: EAEP, Kampala: Fountain, 1999), 74.
10. Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, 1.
11. Nancy Lawler, *Soldiers of Misfortune: Ivoirien Tirailleurs of World War II* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1992), 2.
12. Byron Farwell, *The Great War in Africa: 1914–1918* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, July 17, 1989; Charles Miller, *Battle for the Bundu: The First World War i East Africa* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974); and Edward Paice, *World War I: The African Front: An Imperial War on the African Continent* (London: Pegasus, 2008).
13. See note 10 above.
14. Ibid.
15. Hew Strachan, The First World War, 3.
16. Corey W. Reigel, *The Last Great Safari: East Africa in World War I* (Lanham, Maryland, Boulder, New York, and London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), 18.
17. Hew Stratchan, *The First World War*, 2.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Corey W. Reigel, *The Last Great Safari*, 101.
21. See note 17 above.
22. Ibid.; Corey W. Reigel, *The Last Great Safari*, 102.

23. Corey W. Reigel, *The Last Great Safari*, 102.
24. Ibid., 83–114.
25. Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, 3.
26. Joe Lunn, *Memoirs of a Maelstrom*, 1, 120.
27. Nancy Lawler, *Soldiers of Misfortune*, 2.
28. Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, 4.
29. Joe Lunn, *Memoirs of Maelstrom*, p. 100.
30. C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, "France, Africa, and the First World War," in David Birmingham, A.G. Hopkins, R.C.C. Law, and A.D. Roberts, World War I and Africa, *Journal of African History* 19, no. 1 (1978): 16.
31. See note 28 above.
32. Corey W. Reigel, *The Last Great Safari*, 48.
33. See note 28 above.
34. For a general overview of African military experience in the colonial army, see: Timothy Parsons, *The African Rank-and-File*. See also: Michelle Moyd, *Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2014).
35. Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, 5.
36. Ibid.
37. B.P. Willan, "The South African Native Labor Contingent, 1916–1918," in David Birmingham, A.G. Hopkins, R.C.C. Law, and A.D. Roberts, World War I and Africa, *Journal of African History* 19, no. 1 (1978): 61.
38. Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, 6.
39. Ibid.
40. Geoffrey Hodges, *Kariokor*, 15–16.
41. See note 34 above.
42. Corey W. Reigel, *The Last Great Safari*, 28.
43. See note 34 above.
44. See note 41 above.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. See note 25 above.
49. The best analysis of the dedication, elan, and professionalism of African soldiers and carriers in the war can be gleaned from Melvin E. Page, "Introduction: Black Men in a White Man's War," 9–14.
50. Geoffrey Hodges, *Kariakor*, 3.
51. See note 34 above.
52. Corey W. Reigel, *The Last Great Safari*, ix.
53. Melvin E. Page, "Introduction: Black Men in a White Man's War," 8.
54. Corey W. Reigel, *The Last Great Safari*, 54–55.
55. Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, 8.
56. Ibid.
57. Hew Strachan, The First World War, 5.
58. Corey W. Reigel, *The Last Great Safari*, 50.
59. See note 25 above.
60. Melvin E. Page, "Introduction: Black Men in a White Man's War," 14.
61. Ibid.

62. Corey W. Reigel, *The Last Great Safari*, 26.
63. See note 59 above.
64. Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, 9.
65. Henri Barbusse, "Introduction: Black Men in a White Man's War," quoted in Melvin E. Page, 9.
66. Joe Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom*, 120.
67. Ibid.
68. Joe Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 121.
69. Corey W. Reigel, *The Last Great Safari*, 31.
70. Ibid.
71. See note 63 above.
72. See note 68 above.
73. Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, 7; Hodges, *Kariokor*, 119–30.
74. See note 37 above.
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76. Ibid.
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80. See note 68 above.
81. See note 63 above.
82. See note 68 above.
83. Joe Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom*, 93.
84. Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, 10.
85. Ibid., 8.
86. E. Howard Gorges, *Great War in West Africa* (East Sussex, UK: Naval and Military Press, 2009), 261–62.
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CHAPTER 14

Africa and the Second World War

Meshack Owino

As political and military disputes escalated between various European powers in 1939, the colonial government in Kenya began military preparations for the outbreak of full-scale war. A colonial military unit was, for example, dispatched to the Kenya border with Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. Circulars were sent to government functionaries in various parts of Kenya to begin identifying potentially hostile German and Italian citizens living in the colony, with the intention of interning them in case war broke out between European powers. Grounds were laid down for the recruitment of African soldiers to participate in the war and for the mobilization of colonial resources to support the government war-effort. As a result of these preparations, close to 100,000 African soldiers from Kenya were recruited and deployed to serve in the war. Such men included Johannes Ochanda Ameny, who abandoned school at Grade 6 and joined the Pioneer Corps on September 2, 1939.[1] They included men like Alfred Juma Bunde, who reportedly tried several times to join the military in Kisumu, Kenya, during the war and was turned away each time because he was too young. Bunde finally succeeded in joining the military when he tried his luck at another recruitment center at Onjiko, a few miles from Kisumu, on November 20, 1939.[2] There were such men all over the African continent who joined the military and served during the Second World War. Such men came from West Africa, North Africa, Southern Africa, East Africa, and Equatorial Africa, and went on to serve not only in their home continent but also in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far

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East. When, how, and why did the war break out, and how did it spread into the African continent? How and why did men like Alfred Juma Bunde and Johannes Ochanda Ameny join the army and serve in the war? What were their experiences of military service? How did the rest of the African population participate in the war? How did the war affect the African continent and its people?

The Outbreak of the Second World War and its Expansion into the African Continent

Officially, the Second World War began with the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. Britain, France, and their allies then issued an ultimatum to Germany to withdraw from Poland or face war. When Germany refused to heed the ultimatum, the British and French declared war on September 3, 1939. Yet, in spite of this war officially breaking out on September 3, 1939, many Africanists and African scholars believe that the war and the events leading to it did not really start on September 1, 1939 but, rather, on October 3, 1935.[3] This was four years before 1939, the official date of the outbreak of the war. It was the day that the Italians under Benito Mussolini unilaterally invaded Ethiopia, got away with it, and created a precedent that eventually emboldened Hitler to lead Germany in its aggressions against its neighbors, beginning with Austria in March 1938, then Czechoslovakia in September 1938 and ultimately Poland in September 1939, sparking off the Second World War.

Africanists and African historians argue that Italy, smarting from many military setbacks suffered at the hands of the Ethiopians during the nineteenth century (that is, during the colonial wars of conquest in Africa), vowed to make amends by one day invading and ruling Ethiopia. The Italian military reverses in Ethiopia included the Battle of Dogali in 1887, which ended with the death of many Italian soldiers at the hands of the Ethiopian army. After this humiliating debacle, the Italians began planning another war against Ethiopia. The opportunity came at the Battle of Amba Alaga in December 1895, which ended without an outright victory for either side. The Italians were therefore still not satisfied and continued looking for that elusive victory against the Ethiopians. In March 1896, they once again went to war with the Ethiopians; a conflict which ended with their rout and utter humiliation at the Battle of Adowa on March 1, 1896. Vandervort estimates that, 'out of the 10,000 Italian men who participated in the war, 289 officers and 4600 soldiers lost their lives'.[4] He observes further that were also '500 … wounded, and 1500 taken prisoner'[5] during the encounter. The defeated Italians were forced to sign a treaty recognizing Ethiopia as an independent nation, Ethiopia thus carving a proud place for itself in the pages of African history as an independent, powerful nation that was never conquered and colonized by the Europeans. The Italians, on the other hand, felt very humiliated by the Battle of Adowa. They had suffered '50% casualties, far higher than those suffered in any other major battle of the nineteenth century',[6] and vowed to avenge their defeat. Benito Mussolini, who was thirteen years old at the time, swore that

'his 'whole imagination was engaged' by the tragedy of the Adowa so that his 'being labored' for revenge and the restoration of Italian honor'.[7]

After becoming Prime Minister of Italy, and later assuming absolute power in Italy, Benito Mussolini quickly moved to avenge the humiliating military disasters that the Italians had suffered at the hands of the Ethiopians during the nineteenth century. Putting his plans into action, Mussolini sent a strong army of 120,000 to invade Ethiopia on October 3, 1935.[8] The Italians defeated the Ethiopians this time, and they forced Emperor Haile Selassie to flee the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on May 2, 1936. The Italians occupied Addis Ababa on May 5, 1936, and officially annexed it to Italy on May 9, 1936.[9] Although the Italians succeeded in ousting the Emperor and were able to occupy and annex Ethiopia to Italy, they never succeeded in forcing Selassie to officially surrender to them. Instead, Selassie went into exile where he embarked on an international diplomatic campaign against the Italian invasion of his country, visiting various nations to raise awareness about Ethiopia's predicament, mobilizing international opinion against the injustice of the unilateral Italian occupation. Three years after the Italian invasion, Germany invaded and annexed Austria to Germany in March 1938 before going on to invade Czechoslovakia in September 1938, and Poland in September 1939. The Italian aggression against the Ethiopians in 1935 cannot be seperated from the German invasion of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The road to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, did not end there. It continued to Warsaw, Poland. It marked the beginning of the Second World War.

Many Africanists and African scholars believe that the Italian invasion of Ethiopia marked the beginning of the Second World War for one major reason. It laid the ground for the subsequent German invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Simply put, it emboldened Germany. When Britain and France and other members of the League of Nations failed to respond robustly to the Italians' unilateral invasion of a country which was not just a sovereign state but also a member of the League of Nations, they created a precedent that ambitious, ruthless world leaders like Hitler could emulate. In the words of Mazrui and Tidy, 'Hitler took heart from the failure of the Western powers to stop Italy's aggression by embarking on a programme of aggression of his own that led inexorably to a new World War'.[10] On September 1, 1939, Hitler ordered the German invasion of Poland. The British and the French finally woke up to the dangers of countries unilaterally invading other countries. Giving the Germans an ultimatum to withdraw from Czechoslovakia and Poland without success, the British and the French subsequently declared war on September 3, 1939.

After the war broke out, it quickly spread into the African continent. The British and French immediately started mobilizing their Africans troops and preparing for war. They feared that the Germans would try to reclaim their former colonies in Africa,[11] and started preparations to stop them. They also feared that, since Italy possessed colonies in Africa, the Italians could use their colonies to jeopardize British and French interests in the continent. Thus, they began preparing their colonies for war against the anticipated German and Italian aggressions. They put the colonies that shared boundaries with

the Italian colonies in Africa on a high alert. They arrested German and Italian citizens in their colonies, interviewed them, and interned those deemed a danger. They mobilized British and French citizens in readiness for the war. They also started stationing troops along the border areas with Italian colonies such as Libya, Italian Somaliland, and Ethiopia.

Unlike during the First World War when the colonial powers were not willing or ready to mobilize Africans to fight for them against other colonial powers, this time many of them were ready and prepared to mobilize and deploy African soldiers. When the war broke out, the French, for example, had no hesitation in enlisting African soldiers. 'While the British government entertained doubts about the wisdom of arming large numbers of Africans, the French … had long ago resolved this issue ….'[12] The French did not dither or debate whether Africans should participate in the war. They began mobilizing African troops as soon as it became apparent to them that war was going to break out in Europe. The British followed suit in mobilizing African soldiers in their African colonies. Only Portugal and Spain did not mobilize African soldiers, and this was largely because they chose to remain neutral (at least at the beginning of the war). The rest began active war preparations and mobilization of African soldiers.

The war came to the notice of the African people when the Allied Powers began appealing for help and started mobilizing African soldiers for military service in 1939. Although many Africans fled their homes to avoid military service once they heard that their colonial governments were looking for recruits, many others expressed what the colonial authorities in Kenya referred to as 'their unanimous and enthusiastic' support for the war by enlisting for military service. Many African men in Ivory Coast enlisted for military service voluntarily while others enlisted under duress.[13] There was no shortage of volunteers in Kenya during the first years of the war.[14]

The men who volunteered did so for different reasons. There were those who enlisted because they truly believed that Hitler was a danger to the world and because they wanted to protect their colonies, themselves, and humanity from him. There were those who perceived themselves as loyal and patriotic to the colonial system.[15] There were those who were motivated by material and financial needs and hoped to earn money to buy livestock for bride price, clothes, blankets, and shoes, or simply wanted to accumulate money to start a business or build a house.[16] Such men saw the war simply as a job, as an opportunity (a hazardous one, admittedly) to make money. There were those who wanted to be employed as village elders and chiefs after the war, like the veterans who had found such employment after the First World War. There were those who joined the war because they thought that it would be thrilling, that the war would give them an opportunity to travel and visit new places, see people, and tour the world. There were those who thought that military service would give them exposure, make them famous, and perhaps even rich. There were those who volunteered because a European man or woman they knew, perhaps a European missionary, a school teacher, or

doctor who was friendly to Africans, had told them that their country was under attack from Hitler and that their country needed help. They joined the war to help that European to protect his homeland from Hitler.[17]

There were those who joined military service because that is what 'real men' did. Such men included Alfred Juma Bunde who, for example, tried to join the military several times and was always turned away because he was too young, and only finally succeeded in doing so when he went to a different recruitment center at Onjiko, far away from his home in Kisumu, Kenya. His goal was to prove that he was a man.[18] Another was Johannes Ochanda Ameny, who abandoned school at Grade 6 and joined the army because 'my father told me that that is what real men are doing. I was not scared when I enlisted for military service. My father told me that I would come back from the war alive … so I was happy when I joined the military'.[19] There were also those who joined military service because they did not want their womenfolk to call them cowards. There were those who joined the army because the government told them that they would be given first preference when looking for jobs after the war. There were those who enlisted for military service after they were promised money and land after the war. There were those who joined military service 'voluntarily' because they were told that if they volunteered they would be allowed to choose the unit they would serve in, such as the King's African Rifles and that, if they did not enlist willingly, they would be conscripted and forced to serve in dangerous labor-intensive units such as the Pioneer Corps, which, they were told, would just be like the Carrier Corps of the First World War. There were those who enlisted because they were promised 'voting rights and, after discharge, entitlement to use the French rather than the 'native' legal system (the *indigénat*)'.[20]

There were those who, technically, can be called 'volunteers', but, in reality, joined the military under pressure when the chiefs in their villages advised that 'each family was required to volunteer a family member to serve in the war'.[21] There were those who were at a marketplace when the chiefs brought in trucks, ordered them to climb aboard, and took them to a recruitment station where they felt they had no choice but to join the army for military service.[22] Thus, many African men enlisted and served in the war for various reasons. As the war escalated and expanded deeper into Africa and the rest of the world during the mid-1940s, many African men were increasingly forced to serve through conscription policies and other unscrupulous methods. From around 1942 to the end of the war, colonial powers largely relied on conscription methods to get Africans to serve in the war.

The African recruits at the beginning of the war were mostly from the French and British colonies in North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa. The French had the largest number of African soldiers in their service at the beginning of the war. The number of African soldiers in the French *tirailleurs Sénégalais* in West Africa at the beginning of the war was 80,000. The number of West African troops in the French

army increased as the French entered deeper into the war. It is estimated that there were about 150,000 West African soldiers in the tirailleurs Sénégalais at the time of the French collapse in 1940.[23] Some scholars believe that as many as 200,000 black African soldiers served in the French army. Many of the French soldiers came from West Africa and Equatorial Africa, while others came from North Africa. By the end of the war, Africans made up almost one-third of the French army.

The British also had a large number of African soldiers in their service during the war. For example, it has been estimated that there were something like 100,000 African soldiers from Kenya serving the British,[24] and 200,000 soldiers from South Africa. Nearly one-third of the soldiers in the South African contingent during the Second World War were black South Africans. It has been estimated that perhaps as many as 320,000 African soldiers from East and Central Africa served the British,[25] and many African soldiers coming from Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone served in the British West African Frontier Force during the war. Some scholars believe that as many as 370,000 African soldiers served in the British army,[26] while others put the number as high as 700,000.[27] African soldiers also came from Belgian-Congo and participated intensively in the war. Whether they volunteered for it or not, African soldiers saw military service as the war expanded into Africa and beyond.[28]

There were several key moments in the war that had major implications for the African continent and the African soldiers serving. As the war continued, Germany invaded and defeated France in June 1940. Germany's victory split up the French and their government into two camps. One camp was led by the collaborating Vichy Government of Marshall Petain, and another camp, the Free French camp, was led by General Charles de Gaulle. The division in France radiated throughout the French colonies in Africa, reflecting divisions in France itself. Some French colonies in North Africa, West Africa, Eritrea, and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa and Madagascar in the Indian Ocean decided to side with the Vichy Government; but others mostly in Equatorial Africa (notably Chad under the Governor Felix Eboue) decided to throw in their lot with the Free French Government-in-Exile.[29] There was therefore fighting between the French colonies in Africa collaborating with the Vichy administration and those opposed to them. Thus, from June 1940, African soldiers from French Africa served on both sides of the French political and military divide, a situation that no doubt confused many of them.

The most serious moments of the war in Africa began when Italy, after dithering for a while over which side to support, threw its weight behind the Germans and declared war on the British in June 1940. This Italian move expanded the war deeper into the African continent. From August 1940, Italian forces in Africa invaded Egypt, British Somaliland, and northern parts of Kenya. There was fierce fighting between the Italian and British forces in North Africa and the Horn of Africa. War also erupted between the Free French forces and the Vichy-supporting regime in Eritrea. After several

months of fighting, the Free French forces conquered Eritrea in March 1941. The British and their allies also defeated the Italian forces in Italian Somaliland, and managed to throw the Italians out of Addis Ababa in May 1941.[30] The Allied victory over the Italians in Ethiopia was significant because it led to Ethiopia reclaiming its independence. After spending almost six years in exile, Haile Selassie came back to his throne as Emperor.

The most intense phase of the war in Africa took place in North Africa. After several months of vicious, back-to-back, inconclusive fighting between the Italian and Allied forces in North Africa, a German military unit known as the Afrika Korps, under the command of General Erwin Rommel, the 'Desert Fox', arrived in North Africa in March 1941 and went on the attack. Fierce fighting broke out in North Africa between the Italian and German forces on the one hand, and the British and French forces, on the other hand. Very many people died during the North African campaign. The West African tirailleurs who fought in North Africa remember the Battle of Bir Hakeim in Libya as 'one of their finest hours'.[31] Kenya African soldiers who participated in the North African Campaign have never forgotten how brutal the campaign in North Africa was. The soldiers especially remember the Battle of Abu Haggag in June 1942, and the Kenyan soldiers involved say that many people perished during it, 'as many as sand'.[32] Other African soldiers remember the fierce fighting that took place between the Allies and the Axis Powers at Tobruk. Fighting in North Africa lasted from 1940 to 1943. African soldiers were also involved in the Allied invasion against the Vichy-collaborating administration in Madagascar in May 1942. After several months of fighting, the Allies took over the island in September, 1942.

The most decisive moment of the North African campaign came at the Battle of El Alamein in October 1942. After many months under sustained fierce attack from the German and Italian forces, the British and their Allies finally managed to repulse the enemy forces and drive them out of Egypt. The momentum decisively swung to the British and French side during the Operation Torch landing, when US forces arrived in North Africa in November 1942 to bolster the British and Free French forces.[33] The Allies were also boosted by the defection of many former Vichy-leaning African colonies to their side. This eclectic Allied force, supported by African soldiers, started scoring victories in battles against the Axis Powers in North Africa. The Allies thus drove the Axis powers from Egypt, Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia by the middle of 1943. They subsequently forced the German and Italian forces to surrender to them on May 13, 1943.

By the middle of 1943, the phase of the war in Africa had largely come to an end. This however did not mean that the African participation in the war also came to an end. Instead, the Allies decided to deploy African troops in campaigns overseas. African soldiers from West Africa were already fighting in the Levant, France, and Italy, and with the end of the North African campaign, many more were sent abroad for service. African troops from British

colonies went to fight in the Middle East, Sri Lanka and Burma (Myanmar). They also travelled to Britain. A large number of African soldiers saw service in the Free French army in France until the war came to an end in 1945. In fact, scholars have pointed out that the African troops from West Africa and North Africa participated in the liberation of France itself.[34] These troops fought at St. Elba, Toulon, Marseille among other places, and they were also there on the day Paris was liberated from the Germans and their allies.

The African soldiers' roles and experiences in the Second World War were more varied and complicated than those in the First World War, when they had served as infantry soldiers or as carriers. In the Second World War their roles were more diverse, elaborate, and complicated. They fought not only as infantrymen during the war but also as support troops: drivers, signalers, medics and stretcher-bearers, guides, engineers, chaplains, clerks, teachers, cooks, porters, and entertainers. Their roles in the war were more eclectic and wide-ranging.[35] Their level of training for the war was also more comprehensive and intensive than it had been during the First World War. Many African soldiers remember their military service during the war with something akin to pride. They believed that they served bravely and courageously.[36] Even those who joined as conscripts ended up embracing their roles and regularly boasted about their professionalism. The African soldiers showed off their war medals and military documents attesting to their courage. They proudly talked about fighting in Ethiopia and Somaliland, about how they threw Mussolini out of Ethiopia. They boasted about fighting in Diego Suarez in Madagascar. They proudly recounted their experiences of serving in the East, in the Holy Land, and in Italy, France, and Britain. Many of the African soldiers believed that they were perhaps even more courageous than white soldiers during the war. They asserted that they used to be deployed at the front 'where fighting was fiercest because of our bravery'.[37] The soldiers asserted that war is for 'real men', and that their service during the war proved that they were 'real men'.[38] Those who served in the East, in places such as Burma and Sri Lanka, even claimed that white soldiers used to paint their faces 'black' in order to look like black Africans because the Japanese soldiers were scared of black African soldiers.[39]

While boasting about their bravery and professionalism during the war, the African soldiers were not oblivious to problems in the military. Many believed that these problems were deliberate and caused them unnecessary anguish. The most serious problem concerned racism,[40] which they asserted was a common occurrence.[41] Bildad Kaggia, a veteran of the war who went on to become an influential politician in Kenya, observed that white soldiers were frequently treated as superior to African ones, and that African soldiers often had to demand equality.[42] The soldiers often complained about low pay and the lack of opportunities for promotion. Others complained about bad army rations that often tasted like 'prison food', while others complained about lack of arms during military service. Black South African soldiers, for example,

complained about the military policy of denying them the right to bear arms during military service in the war. Kenyan African soldiers in the Pioneer Corps agitated for the right to be issued with arms like other African soldiers. Although some African soldiers did not like army food, others believed that it was good and spoke highly of it. In fact, African soldiers serving in South-east Asia Command spoke 'very highly of the food … and mention[ed] especially the meat, rice, wheat flour and sweet potatoes'.[43] A Kenyan newspaper observed that African soldiers were given a good army diet consisting of ugali (cooked maize/sorghum meal), vegetables, beef, mixed maize and beans, and sweet potatoes. The newspaper also reported that African troops used to drink tea during the war, which the soldier enjoyed just 'as much as his English brother-in-arms'.[44] The physique of African soldiers also started changing noticeably after getting used to the army diet. In the words of the East African Standard:

> When an East African native comes into the army, he experiences for the first time a scientifically balanced diet … the newly recruited native, rather a fat young man, when he first experiences army food, loses weight for a short while. Then, as he gets used to his new foods, starts to gain weight and eventually over a period of a few weeks becomes more healthy and vigorous than he has been before.[45]

In spite of the fact that many African soldiers such as those from Kenya believed that army diet was 'better than home food', they did not fail to notice that their meals were different and inferior to meals offered to white soldiers during the war. West African soldiers, for example, resented the fact that white soldiers were given wine with their meals, and they were not.[46]

The African soldiers were also aware that they often took their meals in separate mess halls from white soldiers. Many frequently complained about segregation in the military during the war. While acknowledging that medical care during military service was very high, African soldiers were not unaware of the fact that they received treatment at different facilities from white soldiers. Although African soldiers expressed gratitude for the very high medical care they received whenever they fell sick or got injured during the war, they felt that white soldiers got even better medical care than they did during military service. Many also complained about racist white officers who often hurled insults at them, punished them for no reason, or gave them heavy punishments for simple infractions during military service.[47]

African soldiers who were taken prisoner during the war also believed that they were treated badly, especially by the German and Italian prison officers, because of their race. There were also African soldiers who believed that, just as during the First World War, African soldiers were often chosen and deployed to undertake high-risk military operations and participate in fierce, difficult battles because of their race. Their lives were expendable. Indeed, after fighting for so long and putting their lives at risk for the sake of France, West

African soldiers were shocked when they were moved from the front to the back of the French army as it marched into Paris to liberate it from the Axis Powers.[48] After putting their lives on the line for France, they were denied honors and recognition simply because, they believed, they were black.[49]

Many African soldiers also complained about the large number of their compatriots who died during the war. Tens of thousands of African soldiers laid down their lives for the Allied Powers during the war, some in combat, others from disease. Although African soldiers believed that whenever a soldier fell sick or got injured in the course of his duty, he was 'immediately taken to the best army hospital and given the best care by the best doctors',[50] very many of them died. There are no firm figures on the number of African military fatalities, but some scholars believe that the number who died during the fall of France in 1940, for example, was around 24,000 while others put it at around 35,000.[51] There are scholars who believe that the number of East and Central African soldiers who were wounded or killed during the war was probably around 50,000.[52] Scholars estimate that the number of South Africans who perished was 6496, those who were wounded 14,078, and those taken prisoner or missing 14,583.[53] Nevertheless, whether African soldiers experienced problems or not during the war, they almost unanimously remembered their time in it with pride. They regularly talked about their courage, bravery, and professionalism. They always boasted about their loyalty and gallantry, and they talked about how they readily put their lives on the line for their governments.

The African soldiers would not have actively participated in the Second World War without the support of African civilians. Indeed, when examining the experience of the African continent in the Second World War, one must not forget the role of the general African population. While African soldiers enlisted and fought far away from home, African civilians who remained at home participated by producing food and other goods. The African people supported the war in many different ways. One colonial official in Kenya observed that when the war broke out, many Africans in the colony responded to the British call for help by providing monetary contributions 'unanimously and with expressions of very loyal sentiments'.[54] The African civilians also grew food and donated money for various war causes.[55] These Africans supported the war materially. They grew tobacco, cotton, rubber, sisal, cocoa, tea, peanuts, and other cash crops to help raise revenue for the colonial government. They also helped to mine gold, diamonds, copper, tin, and other minerals to boost the economies of their colonies. Furthermore, they remained largely 'peaceful' and tried to avoid agitations during the war, believing that peace, law, and order were necessary to keep their governments focused on the conflict. Thus, Africans contributed to the war both indirectly and directly.

Many scholars have observed and written extensively about the anger and bitterness of the African veterans of the Second World War. They are right.

The anger and disgruntlement of African soldiers who served largely started as the war drew to an end. Although African soldiers had had problems during military service and had even agitated against such problems, their anger, bitterness, and disillusionment grew as the war came to an end. It started as the African soldiers began trooping back home at the end of the war, as they started noticing that their treatment was changing. They began observing that, as the war was coming to an end, their problems were no longer a priority for the colonial governments. The process of demobilization, for example, was often frustratingly slow. Some mutinied and went on the rampage after spending too long in demobilization camps.[56] When they arrived home from overseas, Ivorian soldiers observed that 'no one came to welcome us when we got to Abidjan'.[57] The African soldiers also complained about money. They claimed that they were not given as much money as they expected when they retired from the military after the war.[58] They complained about lack of medical care for the veterans who fell sick as a result of health problems incurred during the war. They complained about the lack of gratuity and pension. As they retired from military service, the African veterans of the war started complaining about abandonment. They started pointing out that they were treated well during military service, when their service was needed, and very badly after the war ended, when their service was no longer needed. Indeed, the biggest complaint by African soldiers who served in the Second World War is that they were forgotten by their governments afterwards.

The Impact of the Second World War on Africa

The Second World War marked the beginning of major social, economic, and political changes for the African people and their continent. Many scholars believe that the war led to the beginning of the decolonization of the African continent, to the end of empire.[59] The war dealt a death knell to colonialism in Africa.[60] In the first place, as early as 1941, it led to the liberation of Ethiopia from Italian occupation and the ascension of Emperor Haile Selassie to power again. As a result of the war, the Italian colonies in Africa were placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations and began their march to independence. The war led to the signing of the Atlantic Charter in 1942, which committed the colonial powers to the ideals of freedom, self-determination, and human rights. These ideas resonated very well with Africans who were suffering under the colonial system.

The colonial powers led by the British and the French suffered politically, economically, and militarily during the war. Their people were exhausted emotionally, mentally, and psychologically. Their economies were devastated. The British owed the US $3 billion after the war. These colonial powers were no longer in a position to continue maintaining their colonies by force. They started becoming aware that they could not maintain their colonies the way they used to do. With the emergence of the USA and the Soviet Union

as world powers fighting for world influence and domination, and with the beginning of the Cold War, the colonial powers realized that they needed to placate their colonies with progressive reforms or lose them to the Soviet Union and its communist allies.

The colonial powers also increasingly became aware of their gratitude to Africans for supporting them during the war. Consequently, the colonial powers, the British and the French, in particular, started (admittedly grudgingly) to introduce reforms in their colonies in Africa. The French, led by Charles de Gaulle, promised Africans a 'New Deal' in appreciation for the help they had received from them during the war. Under the terms of the 'New Deal' (signed in Brazzaville, Congo, in 1944), the French started the process of dismantling the hated *corvée* labor system and the indigénat. The French also began granting citizenship rights to Africans, and appointing them to higher political positions in their colonies.[61]

The British started introducing reforms in their colonies even before the end of the war.[62] They set up the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund (CDWF) in 1940 to support development projects in Africa. When the Labor Government of Clement Attlee came to power in Britain after the end of the war, the British committed themselves to even more changes in Africa. They increased funding to the CDWF[63] and started allowing Africans to join the legislative councils in their colonies first as members in the legislative councils and later as ministers in the executive councils. They allowed Africans to form mass political parties to help them channel their grievances and advise their leaders. They introduced agricultural, land, and labor reforms in African colonies. The war changed the attitudes of black Africans and whites to each other. Many whites developed a lot of respect for black Africans as a result of observing and interacting with them during the war. Similarly, black Africans, after interacting with whites at close range for many years during the war, realized that whites were human like them.[64] They realized that whites were not invincible.[65] They started questioning why whites were ruling them, and they started agitating against colonial rule. Their views about the world and the order of things changed. The war expanded their mental horizon. The Allied and Axis propaganda about fighting for human rights and ideals such as freedom and democracy left a 'lasting impression'[66] on the minds of the African people. The Africans started yearning for such ideals.

Many of them were actually bitter with the leaders of their colonies for creating social, economic, and political problems in the colonies. Trade unionists complained about socio-economic problems brought about by the war. Journalists highlighted these problems in the newspapers. African veterans complained that the colonial powers had used them to fight for them during the war and abandoned them afterwards. They complained about money owed to them. They complained about joblessness and the lack of rewards and recognition after the war. They chafed over health problems associated with the war. Many African civilians also complained about suffering during the war.

They said that they had been forced to grow crops, provide food and donate money to support the war effort. Their sons had been taken away from them to serve in the war. The bitterness and anger of African soldiers and civilians led many Africans into movements fighting for the reform of the colonial system. Many African veterans started participating or playing bigger roles in the politics of their colonies before and after independence. They started agitating for change. They started forming movements fighting for economic and political rights in their colonies. Eventually, some of these movements evolved into mass political parties fighting for independence of the African continent.

Indeed, many veterans of the war went on to lead their countries to independence. A good example is Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal. The war facilitated the rise of new identities among Africans, based on the colonial states. Instead of defining themselves by ethnic groups, as was common in the past, Africans started defining themselves as, for example, Kenyans, Ugandans, Nigerians, Ghanaians, Sierra Leoneans, etc. In fact, many educated Africans started perceiving themselves as Pan-Africanists, as part of something bigger, larger, and broader, encompassing the whole black race. A new class of Africans started emerging after the war: confident, educated, exposed to the world. The Africans began forming mass political parties and agitating for independence. The Africans started reaching out to Africans in other parts of the African continent and abroad. In 1945, these educated Pan-Africanists organized the 5th Pan Africanist Congress in Manchester. The agenda of the meeting was freedom for the African people.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the outbreak of the Second World War and how it spread into the African continent. While some scholars contend that the war began with the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, many African specialists believe that the war really began with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia four years earlier, in 1935. The chapter looked at the major campaigns that took place in Africa and outside of Africa where African soldiers were involved during the war. It examined how Africans participated in the war, and how they were in turn affected by their participation. Africans participated actively, intimately, and intensively in the conflict, both directly and indirectly. Although service in the war was very demanding, many African soldiers remember it with pride. In spite of the rigors of the war, African soldiers believe that they served with dignity, honor, and courage. They believe that they suffered greatly during the war, and that many of them sacrificed their lives for their beliefs and their colonies. The chapter has also contended that, although many veterans are proud of their service during the war, the majority of them tend to complain about how they were abandoned by the colonial governments afterwards. They assert that they served loyally and gallantly during the war. They fought on the frontlines. They served both in Africa

and abroad. They helped to drive Mussolini out of Ethiopia. They served in Madagascar, North Africa, the Middle East, Burma, Sri Lanka, France, Belgium, and some of them even travelled to Britain. They are very proud of their military service during the war. They blame the colonial government for not attending to their welfare after the war. Feeling betrayed by the governments they loyally served during the war, many African soldiers started agitating against the colonial system and ended up playing a major role in the struggle for independence of their respective colonies.

Notes

1. Johannes Ochanda Ameny joined the Pioneer Corps on September 2, 1939. After the disbandment of the Pioneer Corps, he was transferred to the East African Engineers Corps where he served until August 31, 1945. I interviewed him at Usere Village, Karapul Sub-location, Siaya District, on November 29, 2000.
2. Alfred Juma Bunde, Oral Interview at Kowet Chief's Camp, Nyalgunga Village, Nyalgunga Sub-location, Siaya District, on December 18, 2000.
3. Timothy Parsons, "The Experiences of Ordinary Africans in World War II," in *Africa and World War II*, ed. Judith Byfield, Carolyn Brown, Timothy Parsons, and Ahmad Sikainga (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 3–23.
4. Bruce Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830–1914* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 163.
5. Ibid., 164.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 165.
8. Ali A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa: From About 1935 to the Present* (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1984), 4.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 7.
11. Richard Osbourne, *World War II in Colonial Africa: The Death Knell of Colonialism* (Indianapolis: Riebel-Roque, 2001), 39, 45.
12. Nancy Lawler, *Soldiers Of Misfortune: Ivoirien Tirailleurs of WW II* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1992), 19.
13. Ibid., 24–26.
14. Timothy Parsons, *The Rank-and-File: Social Implications of African Military Service in the Kings African Rifles, 1902–1964* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, Oxford: James Currey, Cape Town: David Philip, Nairobi: EAEP, Kampala: Fountain, 1999), 75.
15. O.J.E. Shiroya, *Kenya and World War II* (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1985), 10.
16. Timothy Parsons, *The African Rank-and-File*.
17. R.H. Kakembo, *An African Soldier Speaks* (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1946), 7.
18. Alfred Juma Bunde, Oral Interview, December 18, 2000.
19. Johannes Ochanda Ameny, Oral Interview, November 29, 2000.

20. Nancy Lawler, *Soldiers of Misfortune*, 54.
21. Johannes Ochanda Ameny, interviewed 29th November, 2000.
22. O.J.E. Shiroya, *Kenya and World War II*, 1.
23. Nancy Lawler, *Soldiers of Misfortune*, 29.
24. David E.L. Easterbrook, "Askaris in World War II and their Demobilization with a Special Reference to Machakos District," in *Three Aspects of Crisis in Colonial Kenya*, ed. Myrick Bismarck, David L. Easterbrook, and Jack R. Roelker (Syracuse, NY: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1975), 27–60.
25. Timothy Parsons, *The African Rank-and-File*, 2.
26. Richard J. Reid, *A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 237.
27. Vincent B. Khapoya, *The African Experience: An Introduction* (New York: Longman, 2010), 161.
28. Moyse-Bartlett, Lt. Col. H., *The Kings' African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890–1945* (Aldershot, UK: Gale and Polden Ltd., 1956).
29. Ali A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa*.
30. Ibid.
31. Nancy Lawler, *Soldiers of Misfortune*, 155.
32. In a letter, Nuera Omeda, who survived the fighting, wrote that about "40 people died in the same moment … but dead bodies were many as much [sic] as sand" (see: Nyanza Provincial Commissioner to Major ALB. Perkins, Directorate of Pioneers and Labor, letter dated 11th November, 1944, War Casualties, PC/NZA/2/3/97).
33. Ali A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa*.
34. Nancy Lawler, *Soldiers of Misfortune*.
35. Timothy H. Parsons, "'Wakamba Warriors were Soldiers of the Queen:' The Evolution of the Kamba as a Martial Race, 1890–1970," *Ethnohisory* 46, no. 4 (1999): 671–701; Timothy H. Parsons, "'Kibra is our Blood:' The Sudanese Military Legacy in Nairobi's Kibera Location, 1902–1968," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 30, no. 1 (1997): 87–122; and Timothy H. Parsons, "'Dangerous Education?' The Army as School in Colonial East Africa," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 28, no. 1 (January, 2000): 112–34.
36. O.J.E. Shiroya, *Kenya and World War II*, 27.
37. Nancy Lawler, *Soldiers of Misfortune*, 88.
38. Cpl. Thomas Alfred Oluoch Odawa, Oral Interview on 12 January 2001.
39. Ibid.
40. Ali A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa*, 20. See also: Eric T. Jennings, *Free French Africa in World War II: The African Resistance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 150–54.
41. O.J.E. Shiroya, *Kenya and World War II*, 31.
42. Ali A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa*, 20.
43. "Confidential Extracts from African Mail, May 1945," (African Mail, 1945, KNA, PC/NZA/2/2/89).
44. *East African Standard*, January 19, 1945.
45. Ibid.
46. Nancy Lawler, *Soldiers of Misfortune*, 72.

47. David Killingray, "'The Rod of the Empire:' The Debate over Corporal Punishment in the British African Colonial Forces, 1888–1946," *The Journal of African History* 35, no. 2 (1994): 201–16.
48. Nancy Lawler, *Soldiers of Misfortune*, 180.
49. Eric T. Jennings, *Free French Africa in World War II*, 260–65.
50. Zacharia Ochieng' Adiwa, Oral Interview, Siaya District, 3rd January, 2001.
51. Nancy Lawler, *Soldiers of Misfortune*, 87.
52. Richard Osbourne, *World War II in Colonial Africa*, 395.
53. Ibid., 380.
54. Letter by G.H.C. Boulderson, P.C., Coast Province, to the Information Officer, Nairobi, dated September 16, 1940, quoting Tana River LNC verbatim as providing (Native Authority, 1939–1945, KNA, PC/COAST/2/3/113).
55. David Killingray, "Labour Exploitation for Military Campaigns in British Colonial Africa, 1870–1945," *The Journal of Contemporary History* 24, no. 3 (July, 1989): 483–501; David Johnson, *World War II and the Scramble for Labor in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1939–1948* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2000); David Anderson and David Throup, "Africans and Agricultural Production in Colonial Kenya: The Myth of the War as a Watershed," *The Journal of African History* 26, no. 4 (1985): 327–45; Lonsdale John, "The Depression and the Second World War in the Transformation of Kenya," in *Africa and the Second World War*, ed. David Killingray and Richard Rathbone (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), 97–142; Ian Spencer, "Settler Dominance, Agricultural Production and the Second World War in Kenya," *The Journal of African History* 21, no. 4 (1980): 497–514; and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, "Kenya and the Second World War," in *A Modern History of Kenya, 1895–1980*, ed. W.R. Ochieng' (London: Evans Brothers Ltd, 1989), 144–72.
56. Myron Echenberg, "'Morts Pour la France:' The African Soldier in France During the Second World War," in World War II and Africa, *The Journal of African History* 26, no. 4 (1985): 363–80; and Myron J. Echenberg, "Tragedy at Thiaroye: The Senegalese Soldier's Uprising of 1944," in *African Labor History*, ed. Peter C.W. Gutkind, Robin Cohen, and Jean Copans (London: Sage, 1978), 109–28.
57. Nancy Lawler, *Soldiers of Misfortune*, 199.
58. Ibid., 195.
59. Michael Crowder, "The Second World War: Prelude to Decolonization in Africa," in *The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 8, From c.1940 to c.1975*, ed. Michael Crowder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 8–51.
60. Richard Osbourne, *World War II in Colonial Africa*, 368.
61. Ibid., 315–16, 329–30.
62. Joanna Lewis, *Empire and State-Building: War and Welfare in Kenya, 1925–1952* (Oxford: James Currey, 2000).
63. Richard J. Reid, *A History of Modern Africa*.
64. Frank Furedi, "The Demobilized African Soldier and the Blow to White Prestige," in *Guardians of the Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, c. 1700–1964*, ed. David Killingray and David Omissi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 179–97.
65. Vincent B. Khapoya, *The African Experience*, 162.

66. Michael Crowder, "The Second World War: Prelude to Decolonization in Africa."

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CHAPTER 15

Colonialism and African Migrations

Kwabena O. Akurang-Parry and Isaac Indome

Each historical period in world history has experienced human migrations. During the era of European colonialism in Africa, migrations of all types occurred as African initiatives and responses to the colonial conquest itself and the exigencies of the political economy of colonial rule. Some of the major themes slabs that define African migrations in the colonial era are amorphous and complicated colonial policies. These include taxes, military recruitment, and forced labor; economic change characterized by rural-urban migrations; and education, social change, acculturation, and social formations; and abolition of unfree labor and the quest of former slaves and pawns to seek autonomy. In short, the causes of such migrations were often determined by political, economic, social, environmental, and cultural motives. Such motives are conditioned by push or pull factors. The pull factors served as centripetal, indeed, magnetic forces that lured Africans into comparatively comfortable thresholds of the colonial situation. In this regard, in the early colonial period, migration was the result of the movement away from the colonial conquest, while in the late colonial period, voluntary migration was the pull of social change and urbanization. For its part, the push factors were centrifugal dynamisms that sent Africans away from hopeless and bleak vicinities in the early colonial period due to the acidic effects of the colonial conquest and administrative processes. Additionally, the push factors entailed free choices made by Africans to migrate into more furnished urban centers, especially in the post-Second World War epoch.

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This chapter examines the general causes of African migrations during the colonial era, roughly put, between *c.*1870 and the 1960s. Colonial rule itself, to be sure, was a system of domination and violence that forced Africans to migrate from active centers of colonial oppression: according to Michael Crowder, 'Colonial rule created a new geo-political framework within which Africans had to re-orient their lives'.[1] The differences in the degrees of implementation and enforcement of some colonial policies by the European imperialists and their African political surrogates determined the forms and timing of African migrations. In such situations, African responses and initiatives in resisting colonial policies presented opportunities for migration. Our operational definition of migration in Africa in the colonial period is not necessarily about the conventional designation of movements of large numbers of people from one location to settle down elsewhere. We contextualize migration here to refer to movements of Africans within colonial states and across colonial territories, whether transient or permanent, caused by the colonial conquest, colonial policies, and African responses. Our operational definition covers organized movements of African professionals, such as anti-colonial armies and canoe men, who had to move into specific regions in order to do their work within the colonial situation. It also includes people such as former slaves in flight whose main motivations were determined by migrating from sites of bondage and oppression to coterminous enclaves where freedom could be guaranteed. Also, we theorize the movements of a few political elites, such as journalists, who crossed borders to engage in political actions, even if temporary or episodic, as migrants. In sum, we use migration(s) to mean movements, travels, journeys, exile, mobility, etc. However, our operational definition does not consider the size of the migrating population, or the distance covered in the course of migrating, or the effects of migration.

The period covered in this chapter has been divided into three phases. The first phase is from *c.*1870 to 1918; that is, the time of the colonial conquest, African responses, the consolidation of colonial rule, and the First World War. The second period from 1919 to 1945 witnessed new forms of cooperative African nationalism from reformism to revolution. The African intelligentsia championed this at a time when local and global forces were melding to shape African responses to colonial rule. The final phase encompasses the epoch-making decolonization between 1945 and the 1960s, indeed, the era of African radical nationalism and the watershed of postcolonial nation building when urban centers became the irresistible theaters of osmotic change and renewal. It should be stressed that these congregated time periods do not mean that particular forms of African migrations had ceased by certain periods. In many cases, causes and forms of migrations intersected periods and either abated or intensified due to colonial policy and consequent African responses. We note that this chapter minimally examines the effects of African migrants on their host societies as well as the ways that such migrations (re) configured colonial rule.

In many ways, human migrations in Africa belong to prehistory and were first undertaken by our ancestors, especially Homo erectus and more ardently Homo sapiens sapiens. Prior to the imposition of European colonial rule, Africans had experienced internal migrations on the continent as well as intercontinental migrations. Overall, human migrations in precolonial Africa, for example, the Bantu Migrations, as well as the peaking phases of migrations that characterized the Atlantic Slave Trade, were far larger and sustained than the scale of migrations in colonial Africa. In the precolonial period, Africans migrated, either voluntarily or forced, into the islands flanking the continent: the Mediterranean, Middle East, the India Ocean, and the Atlantic basin of Europe and the Americas. Thus, during the precolonial epoch, voluntary and forced migrations dispersed Africans across the continent and beyond.[2]

Informal European colonization of Africa started at a slow pace from the late eighteenth century. For its part, the insidious processes of formal colonization materialized in full scale by the early twentieth century. The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 gave a formal recognition to the ongoing scramble for and partition of Africa among European imperialists. More importantly, the Berlin Act of 1885 offered a macabre bouquet of total colonization of Africa to the European imperialists who effectively occupied their spheres of influence. Thus, the application of the principle of effective occupation, whose pace was accelerated by the Berlin Conference, snuffed out the sovereign existence of Africans.

The Watershed of Migrations in Colonial Africa (*C.*1870–1918)

This period marked the invasion of Africa by the European imperialists hungry for colonies. For this reason, fierce contestations for power ensued between Africans and the European imperialists. One result was forced migration of Africans under the auspices of their indigenous rulers. In sum, some Africans took to flight as a way of escaping or ingeniously engaging the European invaders. One common form of resistance was migration embarked upon through the initiatives of individuals and groups. For example, from 1882 to 1889, the Fulbe population in the periphery of Saint-Louis dropped from 30,000 to only 10,000. And from 1916 and 1917, the heyday of arbitrary military recruitment and pernicious taxation, more than 12,000 people left the Ivory Coast for the Gold Coast. Also a huge number of migrants migrated from Senegal into the Gambia, Upper Volta into the Gold Coast, and Dahomey into Nigeria. In Southern Africa, more than 50,000 Africans living in the Zambezi Valley migrated into Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland between 1895 and 1907.[3] Some of these migrants took refuge in inaccessible areas. For example, Bemba dissidents migrated into the interior. In southern Angola, the Gambo rebels took to the rugged Gaerezi Mountains between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia.[4]

Apart from the flights of individuals and groups, other forms of migrations occurred under the leadership of indigenous African rulers. There are many varying examples. One example is Samori Ture's grand episode of resistance to the French. From 1891 to 1898, Ture the ruler of the Madinka empire fought an epic war, punctuated by skirmishes and scorched-earth battles, against the French. This involved systematic patterns of migrating out of reach in the eastern peripheral sweeps of his empire. In this regard, he expanded the reaches of his empire even as he migrated from the relentless French pursuit. Finally, he reached the frontiers of the British colony of the Gold Coast where the French captured him. As a result, he was sent into exile.[5] Another example is the Oba of Benin, who with some of his subchiefs and subjects bravely resisted the British colonial conquest and took to migrations to escape capture from the early 1890s onward. However, the Oba and his subjects were eventually captured and deported to Calabar in 1897.[6] Equally, some East African indigenous rulers and their subjects experienced the same fate of forced migration when they confronted the armies of imperial Europe. For example, The Kabarega of Bunyoro and Mwanga of Buganda, all in Uganda, who tried to defend their independence, were forced to use migrations as instruments of policy.[7] Yet another example is Nana Agyeman Prempeh I, King of Asante, who, together with his family and many other key Asante chiefs and their retinues were all arrested and deported from the Gold Coast in 1896 to Freetown in Sierra Leone and finally to Seychelles Island in 1900.[8] Not to forget that earlier on in the same Gold Coast, the British had deported King Amoako Atta of Akyem Abuakwa and members of the royal family to Lagos between 1880 and 1885 for alleged slave dealing.[9] It is obvious from the above examples that European imperialists adopted a policy of forced migration for Africans they considered 'undesirable elements' during the violent conquering phases of imperialism. In such cases, the mode of migration was indubitably a forced one. It was not as if African rulers and their subjects decided to flee. Rather they were captured and sent into exile. And for the most part, such forced migrations lasted longer than could have been wished by the exile. The push factors involved Africans whose resistances were seen as an affront to the imposition of colonial rule by the imperialists, while the pull factor of migration involved the search for suitable sites in which to confine those who resisted colonial rule.

The migrations of Africans became integral outcomes of the colonial wars and conquest. And here we use the Anglo-Asante War of 1874–1875 as a case study. The war was one of the British efforts to bring the Asante Kingdom under its imperial sway in the nineteenth century. Massive social crises and postwar political anarchy set off migrations from the center of the Asante kingdom to its periphery.[10] In sum, in the aftermath of the war, the weakened Asante kingdom was beset with civil wars, secessionist movements, population displacements, and refugee crises that spilled into the

frontier boundary of Asante and the Gold Coast.[11] Additionally, postwar internecine civil wars occurred in Asante, the result of the 1873–1874 war, and involved, for example, Kumasi and Dwaben, Bekwai and Adanse, and Mampong and Nsuta. Such conflagrations spread into the frontiers of Asante and the Gold Coast, consequently, intensified population displacement and generated migrations. For example, the war between Adanse and Bekwai, on June 13, 1886, led to the displacement of '725 Adansi men, women, and children [who] entered … Akim [Akyem] villages' and on June 16, [1886], 3450 Adansis crossed into Assin.[12] The colonial state put the total number of refugee-migrants who entered parts of the Protectorate in June 1886, at 12,411. The population displacement and refugee crisis affected women and children the most. There is no doubt, as the colonial government suggested, that faced with want and penury, some of the refugees in all probability found themselves in a state of slavery and other forms of dependency.[13]

The process of carving out Africa into colonies by the European imperialists ended up creating artificial boundaries. In some cases, the new boundaries divided preexisting African states and societies into separated colonial enclaves. Such disunions usually stimulated migration, as groups were desirous of uniting with their kin along colonial frontiers. This may be due to the proximate opportunities for economic partnership, for example, usufruct use of land. Also reunion with indigenous authorities that were the custodians of ancestral reverence and rituals caused migrations, even if seasonal ones. Additionally, such separated frontier groups reconnected with their kinsfolk for ritual performance associated with rites of passage and quotidian struggles. For instance, the Sanwi of Ivory Coast were the kin of the Aowi of the Gold Coast, but the French and British imperialisms split them into two in their demarcation of spheres of influence.[14] As a result, there were encompassing waves of Sanwi migrants into the Gold Coast hoping to join their Aowi kin.[15] Similarly, the Ovambo and the Bakongo from Angola as well as the Shona and Chewa from Mozambique migrated across colonial borders to Nyasaland to join their kinsfolk.[16] What the above means is that precolonial migrations that had come to an end by the early nineteenth century leading to the creation of stable sedentary communities were given jolts of instability in the colonial period. This was when boundaries demarcated not only spatiality of existence, but, perhaps more significantly, the hitherto undefined social and cultural boundaries of kinship.

One colonial policy that triggered African migrations which, for the most part, coincided with formal imposition of colonial rule, was abolition ordinances that sought to free domestic slaves and pawns. Absolutely, in the precolonial period, slaves had sought freedom on their own volition by fleeing from their holders. But once abolition was formally put in place by the colonial state, larger numbers of slaves took to flight to secure their freedoms. Such were not forced migrations, but voluntary ones defined by ubiquitous

struggles for freedom. While fleeing slaves lacked exact choices of destination. In some cases, they sought refuge in the precincts of Christian mission quarters where efforts were made to convert them to Christianity. Others settled down in freed-slave communities created either by former slaves or established by the colonial state. Yet others found their way to their original homes: this raises questions about the outsider status that has become central to the conceptualization of slaves in precolonial Africa. It is very likely that the majority of former slaves went to communities where the stigma of their former slave status could be concealed and negotiated.[17]

Although, we may never know the exact number of slaves who took advantage of the freedom offered by the colonial abolition ordinances to migrate, it is very likely that the number was huge. This is because servile labor in Africa had considerably expanded in the second half of the nineteenth century due to the growing need for cheap labor to sustain the burgeoning colonial economy. One may hazard that in most cases, such former-slave migrations were not organized. Rather, they were spontaneous and involved groups of slaves or individuals. Also, in a great number of cases, such abolition ordinance-induced slave migrations were episodic and ephemeral, sustained by the vigor or otherwise of colonial policies. Indeed, whether considered from individual or group standpoints, ex-slaves' migrations were revolutionary in the sense that they undermined slave systems in Africa. On the other hand, the processes of their adjustments to freedom in the continuum of autonomy, whether assisted by the colonial state or not, tended to be reformist and hence restorationist. That is to say, a considerable number of them could not effectively adjust to freedom brought about by migrations, but rather found themselves in new forms of bondage and dependency.[18]

The colonial state at times became instrumental in what may be called the controlled migration of former slaves. We know that the British colonial authorities moved former slaves from the Gold Coast to Nigeria and vice versa. Such former slaves were placed in the care of colonial and Christian missionary operatives, both African and European. What is problematic is that we do not know the size of the former slave populations that found themselves in these migratory arrangements. In sum, slave flights and other attendant migratory patterns did not only occur in the late nineteenth century, but also in the early twentieth century. What is obvious is that it was more prevalent in the nineteenth century than during the early twentieth century.[19]

Another push factor of migration in the formative era of colonial rule was the combined colonial policies of taxation, harsh forced-labor regimes, compulsory cultivation of crops, and conscription. These served as the triggering moments of African migrations and cut across all periods. Droves of men, forced by the relentless demands to pay taxes, left their communities to work for low wages in faraway lands to pay colonial taxes at home. As Adu Boahen rightly put it:

> This strategy (Africans migrating across colonial boundaries) was particularly popular among the Africans in the French, Belgian, German, and Portuguese colonies, mainly because of rampant forced labor, oppressive direct taxation, compulsory cultivation of crops, and in the case of the French colonies, the *indigent* … and the use of corporal punishment.[20]

The point here is that the French, Belgians, Germans, and Portuguese were perceived as being extremely harsh in their colonial policies. As a result, a considerable number of Africans under colonial rule migrated into neighboring British colonies, where the demands of colonial rule were seen as better, whether this was real or imagined. In 1910, as many as 14,000 migrated from the district of Misahohe in Togoland to the Gold Coast; and in 1916 and 1917 alone, more than 2000 people migrated from Ivory Coast to Ghana.[21]

Migration for work accounted for a considerable movement of people on the continent in the colonial period. This entailed a number of factors. In many ways people migrated in search of jobs across colonial borders or across economic regions within colonies. Examples are the 'movements of Yoruba traders into the markets of Togo, Gold Coast and Upper Volta, the spread of the Ibo from impoverished or over-populated land to the North of Nigeria as traders and clerks'.[22] Indeed, one official source stipulated that 50,000 Africans living in the Zambezi valley migrated to Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland between 1895 and 1907.[23] Also, cotton and coffee farmers in Buganda employed migrant workers from northwestern Uganda, Ruanda, and Burundi.[24] African migrants engaged in seasonal work in the cash crop economy. For example, a number of people from Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso worked on cocoa farms in Gold Coast. This was because of the cocoa boom and the need for additional farmhands to meet the supply-and-demand curve.[25]

Again, there was the deliberate colonial practice of population transfer with the objective of securing adequate forced labor to work on projects, be it on cash-crop farming or public infrastructure. This also allowed the colonial state to have more effective ways of controlling the displaced population. Among such was the forced migration or relocation of the Idoo people from their communities along Nzo River to precincts of the new Guiglo-Tai road: this was done to facilitate the forced cultivation of coffee and other cash crops in Ivory Coast.[26] Equally, a variation of forced migration occurred in East Africa where Britain, Italy, and Germany resorted to deliberate policies of destroying normative practices of some pastoral African groups in order to trigger forced migrant labor among them. However couched, it may be that the introduction of the rinderpest disease in East Africa was consciously done, as was suspected by Africans, to wean them off their pastoral economy to take up migrant labor.[27] Whether the conclusions of Africans were true of false,

many Basotho people had no option than to migrate to work in the mines of South Africa.[28]

Between 1880 and 1918 saw a wave of African migrations and the First World War. Africans were dragged into the 1914–1918 conflict because the belligerent European imperialists had colonized them. Thus, African states became irrevocably tied to the Europe-driven war. The First World War, dramatized in Africa, compelled a considerable number of Africans to enlist to serve in the imperial forces.[29] It has been estimated that about 211,000 troops were recruited in Francophone Africa and out of this number 163,952 were sent to fight in Europe.[30] In the British territories, things were the same: in Kenya alone, 163,000 Africans left their home to serve the British in the war.[31] Regarding the Allied struggle against the Germans, men from British West Africa fought in East Africa against the Germans. Also Africans from French North Africa and West Africa as well as the South African Native Labor Contingent (SANLC) served in the European theater of the war.[32] But more significantly for our purposes here, the recruitment process itself caused panic and forced migrations from home even if for the short term. For example, compulsory military service had been introduced in French colonies in 1912. As a result, Africans showed their discontent and engaged in overt revolts to the extent that whole communities migrated into inaccessible areas to avoid conscription. For example, from 1915 forward, resistance to military service intensified because Africans realized that no adequate provision had been made for the families of soldiers on the front. As a result, for example, there was a major uprising in the Soudan which spread to Upper Volta, and some areas of Dahomey rose up against the French authorities.[33]

By the outbreak of the First World War, education, diffusion of innovation, and economic change had produced a class of skilled workers who migrated in search of jobs. For example, as massive economic change occurred in West Africa in the early twentieth century, a high demand was placed on Gold Coast laborers in the West African region. As a result, some of them sought employment in other colonial enclaves in the region. One such group was the Gold Coast canoe men who migrated to work on the coast of Dahomey, southern Nigeria, Fernando-Po, and the Congo. It is common knowledge that the colonial state exploited African labor within specific colonies they controlled. But contrary examples abound: in the case of the Gold Coast canoe men, the Gold Coast colonial government assisted them by championing their causes by, for example, ensuring that they had good working conditions overseas. Apart from the colonial state, other formal and bureaucratic institutions supported the overseas employment of the Gold Coast canoe men. These bureaucratic recruiting structures, included contractors or recruiting agents, lawyers, foreign agents, chiefs, Asafo [lineage] groups, and colonial officials. Through the migration of the canoe men, we gain insights into their level of consciousness about and responses to working conditions overseas.[34]

The Confluence of Migrations in Colonial Africa (1918–1939)

This period marked the end of the First World War and presaged the Second World War. Colonial policies that caused African migrations at this time were distinguishable from the previous decades, but worsened in the interwar years and became intense. This was due to the immediate depleting effects of the war on the European imperialists as well as the corrosive outcomes of the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s. The Great Depression forced the European imperialists to make more demands on colonized Africans. For instance, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the French embarked upon a policy of compulsory cultivation of cotton in Upper Volta, Mali, and Niger. This led to the forced migration of about 80,000 French colonial subjects, mostly the Mossi and the Dagari in the Upper Volta districts, to Gold Coast.[35] In Kenya in East Africa, the Resident Natives Ordinance of 1918, the Labor Circular of 1919, and the Native Registration Ordinance of 1920, all aimed at making African laborers work on European farms and plantations, caused massive migrations within Kenya.[36] Additionally, in the Belgian Congo, it is on record that by 1935 more than 900,000 peasants were involved in the compulsory production of cotton. In Tanganyika, the British colonial government took over the administration with a mandate by the League of Nations, and passed new labor ordinances that triggered migrations.[37]

Harsh taxation contributed to African migrations in the colonial period. During the interwar years, the inability of the French colonial state to implement the 1935 proposed tax modification policy that would have given Africans comfortable tax relief rates caused migrations from the eastern frontier zone of Ivory Coast into Gold Coast.[38] In many ways, the push factor of migration determined the destination of African migrants who wanted to abandon one sphere of colonial oppression for another perceived as more accommodating. In this regard, the differences in the degree of the implementation of colonial tax policies made some colonies more attractive than others.

In our operational definition of migration, we made mention of ephemeral migrations of African political elites. In fact, between 1918 and 1945 the rise and growth of national consciousness among African social classes caused migrations. Such national consciousness was championed by African educated elites whose activities were not restricted to their own regions or colonial enclaves, but encompassed other areas. Thus, in the 1920s, there emerged in Africa various forms of political organization like the Destour in Tunisia, the White Flag League of the Sudan, the National Congress of British West Africa (Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Gambia, and Nigeria), the Kikuyu Central Association in Kenya, the Tanganyika African Association, and the African National Congress in South Africa. These interregional associations provided

clear evidence of an inexorable political consciousness among groups if not classes of the colonized subject populations and also paved the way for migrations in colonial Africa.[39]

The African educated elites who formed these organizations were obviously frustrated and disappointed by the colonial order. Their ability to mobilize themselves into unions, among other things, resulted from the process of migration and urbanization that gathered momentum in the colonial period as more people migrated into urban centers for employment. Indeed, one colonial labor official remarked in 1933 that 'the degree to which the African is not only travelling, but also observing, is probably not generally recognized; it is, however, easy to hear a camp-fire conversation in the Congo during which conditions in the union, Rhodesia, Tanganyika and Angola are all discussed and commented upon.'[40] In sum, the interregional associations stimulated both labor and politically driven migrations. The activities of the National Congress of British West Africa caused a few of its members to engage in migration even if only temporarily.[41] Through pan-African zeal, some Western-educated Africans crossed colonial borders to practice their anti-colonial sentiments. This happened in Gold Coast where Wallace Johnson and Nnamdi Azikiwe, Sierra Leonean and Nigerian emigrants respectively, openly demanded the overthrow of colonial rule in Gold Coast.[42]

The European imperialists did not stay aloof as the African became politically conscious. In many cases, African leaders were arrested and forced to migrate from their centers of political or religious activities. The arrest on charges of sedition and forced migration to Kismayu of Harry Thuku (leader of Young Kikuyu Association) and of some of his supporters is an example. Again, leaders or founders of politico-religious movements and their followers faced forced migration. Followers of the Kimbanguist and Kitawala Churches, founded by Simon Kimbangu and Tomo Nyirenda respectively in Belgian Congo were exiled into Katanga.[43]

This period also witnessed the outbreak of the Second World War, triggering African migrations. Larger numbers of Africans left their homes to serve in the Second World War than in the First World War. As in the First World War, Britain and France (that had the largest portions of Africa as their spheres of influence) recruited Africans to serve in combatant and non-combatant roles in various theaters of the conflict. For example, African troops fought alongside other troops against Italians in Ethiopia and also against the Japanese in Burma.[44] It is on record, for instance, that no fewer than 87,000 Africans were sent from Tanganyika to serve the British in the Second World War.[45] The magnitude of the war posed threats to Africans, especially during vigorous phases of recruitment that caused them to migrate to inaccessible regions to avoid conscription, its effects, and the camping of troops in newly built barracks.

Crowder wrote that the 'impact of European administration led to change in all spheres of African life … Colonial occupation grouped peoples into

new political units, and facilitated their movement within them, especially towards the new urban centers which were the focus of colonial commerce and administration'.[46] There is no doubt that by the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, various urban centers had emerged in different parts of the continent. The expansion of urban centers (such as Lagos, Dakar, Nairobi, Kampala, Cairo, Algiers and many others) in the late colonial period was due to a number of factors. First, preexisting urban centers (like Accra and Dakar) that had existed for decades as colonial capitals attracted migrants. This was because both had witnessed rapid infrastructural inputs, such as pipe-borne water, electricity, housing, road networks, and railway terminals.[47] Urban centers serving as administrative and commercial hubs also became the go-to areas because those were where basic services were provided. This resulted in the growth of population and expansion of urban centers. For example, by 1920, almost 200,000 migrants per year migrated from the savanna regions into urban centers of Gold Coast and Nigeria. By 1931, Dakar's population was 54,000; that of Freetown shot up to 44,000, Dar es Salaam rose to 25,000 and Nairobi's hit 48,000.[48] Besides infrastructure and jobs, the colonial urban centers served as cosmopolitan vessels and melting pots that made migrants feel more at home than provincial enclaves where the limitations placed on the individual by family and community were stronger and more constraining.

Additionally, urban centers along the coastal areas and their immediate interior witnessed rapid expansion in Christian missionary and educational activities. The case of Gold Coast is a good example. The area between the Cape Coast in the West and Accra in the East as well as the coterminous regions of Akuapem and Akyem brimmed with many Christian missions and schools. Thus, these regions attracted a large number of people who wanted to soak up Christianity and Western education. Furthermore, urban centers in this period served as pull factors of migration because they were commercial centers of the import-export trade. Traders and merchants were attracted to the urban centers because their professions were given major boosts by urbanization.[49]

Conclusion: The Floodplain of Migrations in Colonial Africa (1945–1960s)

The period between 1945 and the 1960s presaged, but also in many ways birthed, decolonization and also contributed to African migrations. Increasing rural poverty and centralization of facilities in the burgeoning urban centers continued to push the youths in rural areas into the urban centers to look for better opportunities. A considerable number of such rural-urban migrants belonged to those who had completed basic education and needed work. The contradiction between colonial education and consequent social mobility was due to the consideration that farming was not as attractive as the civil

or public service. Thus, clerical and other jobs in the urban centers lured the educated youth. In some places such unorganized, but massive migrations of young people in search of jobs led to the creation of slums and an impoverished underclass. More significantly, the youthful migrants in the towns formed literary clubs and ethnic associations that ferried some cosmopolitan zeal to emergent nationalist movements that would have been provincial had they been located in rural enclaves.

The pre-1945 period of harsh taxation regimes and the general need for cash for consumerism called for migrant jobs. This persisted and expanded in the era of decolonization we are looking at here. It has been estimated that there were many migratory workers who crossed colonial frontiers. For example, about 330, 000 from the French territories arrived in Gold Coast and the Gambia; 420,000 temporary immigrants from adjacent colonies found their way into the Union of South Africa; and 440,000 immigrant workers were recorded in the 1948 census of Buganda.[50] Indeed, before 1945, Gold Coast, for example, had already assumed the status of a catchment area for immigrants from Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. This was especially true during the rapidly transformative postwar period.[51]

One unique cause of African migration during this period was the movements of anti-colonial armies in Africa and their consequent population displacement and involuntary migrations. From 1945 to the 1960s was the watershed of decolonization. Africans formed real political parties aimed at regaining their power from the European imperialists. The activities of the various associations, clubs, and political parties among others cut across ethnic lines. For this reason, there were widespread migrations of all forms that contributed to the negotiations for independence. The decolonization of Africa was not always on a silver platter as some of the European colonial oppressors were by no means ready to grant independence. As a result, many colonies in Africa, for example, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, Algeria, and Kenya had to settle their demands for independence through militancy that led to wars and population displacements and migrations.[52]

It is well to note that migrations in colonial Africa became a somewhat mixed blessing, and were in fact one of the unintended effects of colonial rule in Africa. For instance, migrations led to population increase of host regions. And absolutely, while the host-regions benefited from the immigrants, the places of origin of the immigrants sustained losses in human capital:

> … losses which the French suffered were gains for the British territories where, as in the case of the Dagari, the refugee communities constituted a labor reservoir … contributing especially to the agricultural and mining industry of Gold Coast. A parallel exodus from Senegal and French Guinea into Gambia contributed to the promotion of groundnut cultivation … [and] cotton production in the Egbado Division of Abeokuta Province were Yoruba emigrants from Dahomey into Nigeria …[53]

Thus, as a result of emigration of Africans, the host community, for instance, enjoyed cheap labor. On the contrary, there were other worse effects on the host community: for example, Ngambo, in Zanzibar in East Africa, contained some of the worse features of slums, serious congestion, and inadequate sewage, drainage, and ventilation.[54]

There is no doubt that the colonial period in Africa triggered migrations as the result of colonial policies and African responses. Certainly, the violence of the colonial conquest displaced many who moved away from the localities of instability. But it was the political economy of colonial rule from about 1945 to 1960 that led to more migrations. This is not only because of the exigencies it brought about, but also the incidental or unintended effects of social change, social mobility, and urbanization. These involved making choices to better one's lot by moving away from the constrictions of provincial rural life to cosmopolitan experiences in the melting pot of the urban centers. It is important to note that as colonial rule was consolidated, African responses were tamed. As a result, there was a shift from forced and unplanned migration that had characterized the era of the colonial conquest to one of voluntary migration planned to harvest some of the incidental effects of colonial rule, such as the good and alluring fruits of urbanization. Thus, in the postwar period, due to the expansion of education, urban facilities, and jobs, rural-urban migration took a more forceful shape, and by the time of decolonization and in its aftermath, had become a major design in the political-economy fabric of emergent African states.

Notes

1. Michael Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule* (London: Hutchinson, 1976), 356.
2. A. Adu Boahen, *African Perspective on Colonialism* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987), 5.
3. A. Adu Boahen, ed., *Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880–1935, General History of Africa*, VII Abridged Edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 69–70 and 89.
4. Ibid., 89.
5. Elizabeth Isichei, *History of West Africa Since 1880* (London: Macmillan Publishing Ltd., 1977), 165.
6. Uyilawa Usuanlele and Victor Osaro Edo, "Migrating Out of Reach: Fugitive Benin Communities in Colonial Nigeria, 1897–1934," in *African Agency and European Colonialism: Latitudes of Negotiation and Containment*, ed. Femi Kolapo and Kwabena Akurang-Parry (Lanham: University Press of America, 2007), 72–74.
7. Boahen, *African Perspective on Colonialism*, 47.
8. Ibid., 46.
9. A. Adu Boahen, *Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1975), 62.

10. See, for example, Kwabena Akurang-Parry, "Colonial Wars and Local Internecine Wars: Social Crisis and Migrations in the Asante Frontier, 1873–1886," unpublished paper.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. A.I. Asiwaju, "Migrations as Revolt: The Example of the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta Before 1945," *Journal of African History* 17 (1976): 582.
15. Ibid.
16. Boahen, *African Perspective on Colonialism*, 66.
17. See, for example, Kwabena Akurang-Parry, "The Administration of Abolition Laws, African Responses, and Post-Proclamation Slavery in Colonial Southern Ghana, 1874–1940," *Slavery and Abolition* 19, 2 (1998): 149–66.
18. See, for example, Kwabena Akurang-Parry, "'I Often Shed My Tears About This:' Freed Slave Children, Apprenticeship Policy, and Africa Responses in the Gold Coast (Colonial Ghana), ca.1890–ca.1930," in *Power of Doubt: Essays in Honor of David Henige*, ed. Paul Landau (Madison: Parallel Press, 2011), 147–69.
19. Ibid.
20. See note 16 above.
21. Ibid.
22. Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule*, 336.
23. See note 16 above.
24. A.D. Roberts, *The Colonial Movement in Africa* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990), 225.
25. Ibid.
26. Asiwaju, "Migrations as Revolt," 588.
27. Pule Phoofolo, "Ambiguous Interactions: Basotho-Colonial Relations on the Eve of the Rinderpest Outbreak, 1896," in *African Agency and European Colonialism*, ed. Kolapo and Akurang-Parry, 87–90.
28. Ibid.
29. W.E.F. Ward and W.L. White, *East Africa: A Century of Change 1870–1970* (London: George Allen Unwin Ltd., 1971), 80.
30. Ibid., 259.
31. Ibid., 82–83.
32. Roberts, *The Colonial Movement*, 226.
33. Isichei, *History of West Africa*, 259.
34. See, for example, Robin Law, "Between the Sea and the Lagoons: The Interaction of Maritime and Inland Navigation on the Precolonial Slave Coast," *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines*, 114 (1989): 209; Peter C.W. Gutkind, "The Canoemen of the Gold Coast (Ghana): A Survey and an Exploration in Precolonial African Labor History," *Cahiers d'Edtudes Africaines* 29: 339–76; and Kwabena Akurang-Parry, "'When I Saw Them I Badly Cried What a Bad Treatment': The Employment of Gold Coast Canoemen in West Africa, 1900–1935," unpublished paper.
35. Asiwaju, "Migrations as Revolt," 590.

36. Ward and White, *East Africa*, 112–20. Based on these ordinances, where the distance from African communities to the European farms was not too far, women and children also were encouraged to go to work.
37. Ibid., 163. The 1926 ordinance also affirmed the 1923 one by even extending the period of migration to the working site to twelve months.
38. Asiwaju, "Migrations as Revolt," 585.
39. Robin, Hallett, *Africa Since 1875* (East Lansing: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), 61–62.
40. Roberts, *The Colonial Movement*, 225.
41. Boahen, *Ghana*, 127.
42. Ibid., 143–45. Wallace Johnson had earlier migrated to Lagos in Nigeria where he formed the African Workers' Union of Nigeria in 1931. He later migrated to Gold Coast in 1933 to form the vibrant West African Youth League that used Nnamdi Azikiwe's newspaper, *African Morning Post*, to attack colonial rule.
43. Boahen, *African Perspective on Colonialism*, 88–89. Like other religious movements, the Kimbanguist and the Kitawala Churches were very radical and anti-colonial in character.
44. Ward and White, *East Africa*, 69; and Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule*, 336–37.
45. Ward and White, *East Africa*, 69.
46. Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule*, 335.
47. Ibid., 340–42.
48. Boahen, *Africa Under Colonial Domination*, 205.
49. Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule*, 273–320.
50. D. Houghton Hobart, "Migrant Labor," in *Africa in Transition*, ed. Prudence Smith (London: Max Reinhardt Ltd., 1958), 42.
51. Asiwaju, "Migrations as Revolt," 585–86. The tax reduction policies adopted by the French colonial government from 1945 reduced the African migrations from the Ivory Coast into Gold Coast.
52. Ward and White, *East Africa*, 203.
53. Asiwaju, "Migrations as Revolt," 591.
54. Clayton Anthony, "The General Strike in Zanzibar, 1948," *Journal of African History* 17 (1976): 422.

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CHAPTER 16

Colonialism and African Childhood

Temilola Alanamu, Benedict Carton and Benjamin N. Lawrance

During the period of European colonial rule over Africa, from the mid-eighteenth until the mid-to-late twentieth centuries, children were central to African social, productive, and cultural life, but often marginal to colonial power. What we know about children's experiences and societal attitudes to and conceptualizations of children is very limited because sources are sparse and children, until very recently, have been relatively ignored by historians. There is still no single history of childhood in colonial Africa, and few readily available sources. In this chapter we discuss shifting ideas and definitions of childhood through the eyes of historical observers and historians, the stages of childhood, and children's activities such as labor, education, pastimes and play.

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Shifting Understandings of Childhood

What constituted a child in the eighteenth century versus mid-nineteenth century versus twentieth century? Words and their meanings have differed greatly and changed over time and space. No unified definition may be applied for the entirety of the continent or over multiple centuries. The definition of childhood in Africa is a subject of intense scholarly debate, and ideas about it were linked to evolving conceptions of childhood, particularly in Europe and North America, as much as they were to changing attitudes to families, labor, and political power in Africa and beyond.

Although early colonial records are sparse, during the formative stages of European colonization, in places such as the Kongo Kingdom or early South Africa, children were routinely described as dependants, marginal acolytes, property, and subordinates.[1] Erik Hofstee observed that 'any attempt to establish a fixed definition of child or childhood during the … trans-Atlantic slave trade may well be a "fruitless" task'.[2] The most comprehensive resource for studying the early colonial period, the web database *Voyages*, offers 'a cautionary note' with respect to reading much into age definitions.[3] Definitions changed over time and among colonial powers, and colonial officials and Africans employed a host of names and terms to disaggregate children based on perceived age and capacity, many of which filtered into vernacular use. By the time of mature colonial rule in the 1920s and 1930s, European conceptualizations of childhood had begun to filter into colonies in the form of academic and applied schooling, religious indoctrination, the Europeanization of family structure and domestic space, and the widespread use of children as domestic servants.

During the slave trades, across the Sahara and from the West and East coasts of Africa, children were a 'deliberate target' of slave traders. Children were viewed as possessing skills and competencies less accessible to adult slaves, including the powerful dependencies that quickly emerge from the emotional vulnerabilities of childhood. Slave traders realized that children craved security and protection. Slave traders preyed on children's emotional insecurities to entrench the master–slave relationship and refashion it with the paternal dimensions of a pseudo-family. The 'spiriting away' of Ukawsaw Gronniosaw from his Bornu homeland illustrates the naïveté of children; the benefits of vulnerability and malleability convinced a Dutch slave trader to purchase the child.[4] Slave children were highly prized, specifically targeted, and exceptionally valuable investments, at particular moments in time and in discrete geographical and economic contexts.

Ideas about what constituted a child, physically, are tied deeply to European concepts. Children in slave trade records were often identified by height, and four feet four inches was often a standard marker for adolescence or early adulthood. The Royal Africa Company defined children as those who physically appeared to be under 14 years of age according to unstated Eurocentric concepts. Outward signs of puberty or sexual maturity were important. But

various standards changed over time. Ships designed specific areas for boys and girls, and with what were considered appropriate measurements: 'five feet by one foot two' for boys, and 'four feet six by one foot' for girls. Children are indicated in records by the lower taxes paid on particular imports and also by the value of insurance paid for cargos. In terms of insuring cargo, three children were occasionally valued as two adults. In Dutch, French, Portuguese, Spanish, German, and English records, different words are used to describe many various types of children, ranging from breast-feeding infants, to infants able to stand by themselves freely, to prepubescent girls, or boys with first whiskers, or children with first adult teeth.[5]

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries children become more visible in historical records, such as court records of recaptured slaves "rescued" by the anti-slavery patrols, where they were often identified by an estimated age and height and by physical marks, such as branding. Estimations of age during the illegal phase concentrated on 'sexual maturity as assessed by physical appearance' as the central measure, which for most during this epoch would have 'probably occur[red] in the mid-teens' but may have varied 'according to the diet prevalent in the areas from which Africans were drawn' and 'according to the eye' of the beholder. The bounties paid to officers in the Royal Navy distinguished between adults and children. Slavers and liberators of slaves had conflicting incentives to identify children clearly.[6] Evidence from colonial archives demonstrates how Europeans struggled with how to pay for their colonies, and also sheds light on how children were counted. The clumsiness of British and French colonial legal systems reveals how it became almost impossible to apply laws that specified age as a criterion. Some matters, such as minimum working age, child delinquency, and criminality and legal responsibility, shifted dramatically from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. But perhaps nothing was as complex as how to apply direct taxation in the French, Belgian, and Portuguese colonies. A child head tax was applied at various ages—in some colonies at the age of eight, and in others at the age of ten or 16. Students enrolled in schools were often released from taxation.[7]

European colonial powers used the language of childhood to obfuscate. William Cohen noted that French colonizers commonly described Africans as '*peuples enfants*' (infant peoples).[8] In settler colonies it was particularly difficult to discern African children and childhood. In the early 1900s, white supremacists justified their colonial mandate by asserting that they ruled over children. Eugenicists, such as Dudley Kidd, depicted Africans as happy primitives whose development peaked at 'the dawn of puberty … [when] a degenerative process seems to set in, and the previous efflorescence … leads to no adequate fruitage later in life'.[9] Such ideas underpinned European rule in Africa. For their part, British authorities in South Africa elaborated why: 'Natives are, in a sense, but children, and should … be protected from the inherent weaknesses of undeveloped humanity'.[10]

Colonial rule streamlined, simplified, and erased the nuance and complexity of African childhood. Children were captured by the colonial state as laborers, and children became instrumental to the process of capitalist accumulation, particularly in white settler states, such as Kenya, the Rhodesias, and South Africa. Beverly Grier demonstrated how children in colonial Zimbabwe 'struggled to shape the circumstances of their own lives' as they shaped the history of the colony.[11] In Zimbabwe, Kenya, South Africa, and urban settings of other colonies with large European populations, such as Accra, Dakar, Libreville, and Lagos, children grew up in a highly racialized environment and distinctly from European children. The relatively rare memoires of African childhood, such as Thomas Kyei's diaries or Camara Laye's novel, provide important real or fictionalized insight, but few documents exist written by children while they were children.[12] The birth of ever greater numbers of mixed-race children created new 'problems' in the eyes of Europeans, and *métissage* in Francophone territories versus mixed or 'half-cast' identification in Anglophone countries created additional cleavages among children of all ages.[13] The meaning of childhood during the mature colonial period is indeed inseparable from the various forms of colonial power established over the continent. And with its emphasis on cash-crop production, colonization changed labor patterns, agricultural methods, and with it notions of childhood.

Stages of Childhood

Throughout continental Africa during colonial rule, what constituted a child could be indicated by a specific appellation or nomenclature, membership of a social group, such as an age set or age grade, and also various initiation, scarification, and puberty rituals, including male and female genital cutting. Amadé Badini noted that among the Mossi a baby is only consider a child after weaning; prior to weaning it is as if the child is a 'stranger' who might leave at any time.[14] Alma Gottlieb reminds us that the precarious nature of infancy is central to distinctions between infancy and childhood, which speak to the fear that infants may at any time choose to reenter the spirit world.[15] Jacques Sanou's definition of childhood in Burkina Faso expands on this by highlighting ceremonies that usher a child into fully human status and community membership.[16] Indeed, drawing on these and other scholars, Lisa McNee notes, children may be said to constitute a group of people who have been weaned but not yet initiated.[17]

In many African cultures, age was calculated against events rather than by years. Just as slave traders distinguished between suckling infants, crawling children, and toddlers, so African communities too had distinct terminologies reflecting the incremental changes of social, psychological, and physiological growth. But these, and many other culturally specific connotations of children and childhood, may have been lost or abandoned throughout the

processes and experiences associated with colonialism; they are certainly difficult to recover today. Practices in the African continent often, however, indicate attitudes to childhood. Child slaves, for example, were often not enchained in compounds, and they performed labor appropriate to their age. To be sure, childhood in Africa did not cease suddenly, but rather it constituted an incremental process whereby one transitioned into youth and then adolescence and then early adulthood, both privately and publicly.

Gerontocracy persisted in many African cultures throughout the colonial period, and it deeply informed conceptions of children and childhood. A patriarch, or 'Big Man', such as the protagonist in John Iliffe's biography of Africa, controlled his wives, children, siblings, and other 'dependents' related by blood and obligation.[18] The 'Big Man' household emerged in equatorial societies, moving westward, eastward, and southward at the start of the first millennium. Big Men and their families used sharp-edged iron tools to clear vegetation for subsistence farming and livestock husbandry; polygyny produced the laboring generations that peopled chiefdoms and, later, states. By the early centuries of the second millennium, this pattern of social reproduction had extended across the continent: in East Africa among Somali and Kikuyu families; in West Africa among Ibo and Yoruba groups; in Central Africa among Gisu and Kongo polities; and in Southern African Bosutswe, Mopedi, and BaSotho settlements.[19]

Understanding children's experiences in colonialism requires attention to the evolving structures of domestic power during the longue durée of European presence. The Big Man's kin depended on unbalanced reciprocity and the work of juniors, particularly children who fulfilled their duties according to senior privilege and gender division. A patriarch drew on the labor of his wives and offspring. Senior wives had rights to the labor of younger wives and their daughters. While this social hierarchy elevated married adults to positions of authority, only certain ranking men and women could earn reverence for directing rituals, negotiating nuptials, and distributing land and livestock. Daughters and sons were socialized to respect elders in return for resources (such as garden plots and cattle bridewealth) to create their own families. Children could gain in status after they met their responsibilities to elders. Individual accumulation fulfilled ambition, but kinship belonging brought security.

Not all children were destined to become powerful patriarchs and senior wives—a situation that triggered different tensions. When disasters such as drought and invasion diminished the birthright of youths, hierarchical respect could be frayed or breached. Generational struggles were exacerbated in the colonial era, as Jean Allman demonstrated in West African Ashanti society.[20] And in late nineteenth-century South Africa, shortly after the rinderpest epizootic killed upwards of 90% of the region's cattle (thus obliterating bridewealth), and colonial rulers imposed a poll tax on single males, Zulu youths rose up against their homestead heads for failing to forestall the ensuing hardship.[21]

Children's lives were deeply shaped by their enrollment in age sets or age grades, which established long-term, peer-based bonds. Initiation ceremonies may be interpreted by focusing on several critical themes. Societal gender division and the gendered realms of power are one important aspect. A second component concerns the transmission of knowledge, cultural practice, and spiritual belief as preparation for marriage, authority, and parenthood. A third aspect is the value of secrecy, consisting of the known, unknown, and rumored or imagined. These are not exclusive themes but rather overlapping and mutually informing. As members of a specially recognized group, some youngsters also taught one another about gender and generational expectations. In Ibo villages, boys of the same age trained together to be married men, and in colonial Kenya mission schools instructed Kikuyu pupils in single-sex grades to model themselves on monogamous Christian husbands and wives.

Rites of passage, honored enactments that brought childhood to a close, took place in the teenage years. During white rule, as it was in the precolonial period, ceremonies required initiates to seek temporary seclusion from the community, where a specialist etched tattoos, removed their teeth and hair, or made body incisions. Male cohorts united in the exuberance of puberty were taught law, war strategy, political tactics, and other masculine realms of knowledge. Initiation was often accompanied by the assigning of a secret name, one known only to the age set. This moniker not only sealed the sacred relationship between the youths, but also established a stealth connection that they carried throughout their adulthood. Some rites of passage for boys (that persist today) focused on the cutting of genitalia, which communicated a message of pain: becoming a man necessitated a sharp, shocking separation from childhood heightening one's awareness of the resilience involved in marriage, procreation, and parenting. Poro ceremonies in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, and Ivory Coast are routinely referred to as 'bush schools', and in this way they operated as the primary educational institutions for the transmission of male cultural knowledge.[22] Anthropologists have identified circumcision as one of the three most momentous events in male life, along with birth and death. In some cultures, men with intact foreskin may face obstacles to marrying.[23] At times, initiation practices atrophied, as when: British authorities in Kenya outlawed customary incisions of genitalia; Xhosa migrants in squatter settlements outside Cape Town had little space to undergo their coming-of-age operation; precolonial monarchs such as the Zulu founder Shaka replaced boys' circumcision with military service to his royal house.

Girls also underwent genital cutting (often referred to as circumcision), which was performed by senior mothers or lineage heads with designated titles such as *sowei* among the Mende of Sierra Leone. The extent of this observance is unclear but was first noted in the seventeenth century along the Guinea coast, and then in other parts of Africa as colonial rulers fanned

out. In some areas, missionaries, colonialists, and modernizing African leaders urged its banning and it declined in the twentieth century. In other parts of Africa, it expanded during colonial rule as gender roles and marital expectations solidified. It is difficult to grasp the emotional life of girls facing the prospect of being forcibly taken into a compound, enclosure, or bush, and mutilated as a necessity for achieving true womanhood, but the pressure to conform is often high. Carol Hoffer MacCormack suggested that the idea that girls are transformed into women through the intervention of secret societies and initiation, rather than leaving matters to nature, provides a rationale for genital operations. Mende women related how the ritual 'made them clean'.[24] Chuck Jedrej interprets an initiate's 'moral transformation' from girl child to woman adult as occurring via three phases (from novice, to virgin, to bride) each marked by public appearances.[25]

Other rites of passage involved less invasive procedures, such as washing limbs with sacred liquid (i.e. the gall of livestock) and coming out ceremonies that signaled, according to Thenjiwe Magwaza, a girl's 'ripeness' for marriage.[26] After initiation, boys and girls maneuvered in a society governed by elder authority that opened to their membership. As children in Africa approached puberty, sexual interest spiked. Various conventions regulated romantic interactions, and while courting could lead to intercourse, this act drew severe reprimand, with fines imposed on the male suitor if premarital pregnancy was the outcome. In societies as diverse as Yoruba, Kongo, Xhosa, and Zulu, if unmarried sexual transgressions occurred (including sexual assault and rape) the girl accused could be harshly ostracized, while her male companion might get a scolding.[27] Patriarchal prerogatives dictated this gender discrimination. In polygynous families, a male elder's vow that a first-time bride retained her virginity often paved the way for her eventual wedding.[28]

Children's Play, Leisure, and Pastimes

Colonialism changed the face of childhood leisure and play and the structure of children's daily routines. With the introduction of colonial mass education in the early twentieth century, the time that many children spent in labor progressively reduced. Tighter labor laws, which sought to exclude children under the age of 16 from economic activities, in an effort to increase school enrollment and enforce European ideals of child rights, also lessened children's work. As children's labor declined, emphasis was placed on filling the void with leisure. Modern emphasis on childhood leisure, play, and pastimes in Africa is largely a product of colonialism. This is not to imply that play was absent from precolonial childhood experiences, and when children did play, usually after they had completed household and economic tasks, their leisurely activities were often left to childhood whims. Play largely took the form of public physical activities such as swimming, wrestling, jumping, and running or more intellectually tasking pastimes involving telling jokes and

Fig. 16.1 Staged stick fight, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa (*c*.1900). Photo courtesy of Benedict Carton

riddles or listening to adults tell stories and folktales, which often had moral lessons for both children and adults.[29]

Unfettered play affirmed family security. Recreation with peers celebrated the nurturer-mother and warrior-father. Pondo girls, for example, transformed corncobs into dolls, which they toted on their backs, while boys practiced defensive combat skills by tossing sticks at a branch set upright in the ground. In a more elaborate form of recreation, Zulu boys, like their counterparts in neighboring Sotho and Xhosa communities, reinforced peer rankings through stick fighting (Fig. 16.1). In this sport, competitors aspired to be the top warrior-hero (*iqhawe* or *ingqwele*). Losers could face contempt, and to the extent injurious outcomes defined the sport, so too did the imperative of exerting self-discipline (*inkuliso*) during clashes. Winners were praised, not because they inflicted harm, but because they won a bout that heeded the referee's call to cease combat before an opponent suffered damage.[30]

Children, including girls, learned the basics of stick fighting in pastures by fencing with switches employed to guard livestock, a source of tribute. Sifiso

Fig. 16.2 Xhosa women practice their martial arts, Eastern Cape, South Africa (1981). Photo courtesy of Rachel Jewkes

Ndlovu shows that herding, long thought to be a male domain, required female effort. This may be due, Ndlovu argues, to the legacy of 'women's power' and participation in expansionist Zulu campaigns where military service was rewarded with cattle. Indeed, the founder-king Shaka kaSenzangakhona enlisted girls in regiments that raided rivals with vast herds.[31] More generally, colonial and postcolonial ethnographies show that Nguni teenagers, as they aged in chiefdoms from the Cape to Zululand, retained martial traditions associated with stick fighting. Figure 16.2 illustrates this point. It depicts Xhosa women competing in the Transkei south of Shaka's historic territory.

During colonialism, childhood play was crucial to childhood development, and children's time ideally was to be split between schooling and leisure rather than spent exclusively on labor. However, such changes were not experienced by all children and these new ideologies were often the preserve of the indigenous urban middle classes in Africa, themselves products of Western education. Speaking about Egypt and South Africa respectively, Heidi Morrison and Sarah E. Duff argue that children of the poor and working classes did not benefit from extended leisure time because their labor was crucial to the economy of their household and, in Egypt's case, the very survival of the nation.[32] In Egypt, for children of the urban middle class known as *effendiya*, indigenous childrearing methods characterized by work were substituted

with education and play. However, children of the peasant class known as the *falaheen*, on whose labor the country depended for its agricultural sustenance, would not benefit from these new pedagogies; instead they would "work and toil".[33]

In the Cape Colony of South Africa, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Duff states that religious organizations, but mostly the government, emphasized the crucial need to educate all white children. As racial categories hardened, the government considered universal white education and the continued relegation of black children to manual labor as central to maintaining white supremacy.[34] Nevertheless, many efforts to extend schooling to the white poor, especially the rural white poor, failed because of a combination of a lack of rural infrastructure and the unwillingness of poor families to send their children to school and consequently lose the vital economic contributions children made to the household. It is interesting to note that while the Cape Colony government continued to emphasize universal education for all white children, 'leisure time of children who were black and who were poor was seen as potentially dangerous'.[35] Idleness in poor children, often performed publicly, was considered 'loafing' and 'represent[ed] a threat to the social order'. The absence of productive activity among children of the poor was considered inimical to the colonial state and was thought to ultimately lead to vagrancy and crime. Poor, 'idle' girls were also at risk of falling into prostitution.[36] For the poor, free time was to be spent in organized industrial, manual, and household labor for white boys, black boys, and girls, respectively.

For the children of the middle classes across Africa, leisurely pastimes and play were deemed crucial to childhood development and encouraged. Play was no longer left to the whims of children but was often carefully guided by adults and experts.[37] Organized team sports were introduced to schools and children were recruited into organizations like the Girls Guide and Boys Scouts in the colonies. When established, the Boy Scouts, for example, was initially embraced by the African elites because many of its features incorporated indigenous aspects of childhood socialization such as age grades and practical skills acquisition. Furthermore, Scout leaders made a concerted effort to include African cultural practices such as cultural dances and the use of the indigenous local language in Scouting activities.[38] Writing about the Boy Scouts organization in Nigeria, established in 1915, Adam Paddock states that while colonial education tended to isolate children, the Scouts 'encouraged cultural socialization and … more closely resembled cultural expectations'. He argues, however, that Scouting never gained any real popularity among average and low-income households due to the high cost of membership and uniforms. As a result, Scouting and similar childhood extracurricular organizations became a preserve of the privileged.

The Scouts' affiliation with the African middle class declined during the nationalist struggles of the 1940s and 1950s when the organization's

association with the colonial government made it less attractive to locals who sought self-determination.[39] Around this time another trend unfolded in South Africa: the organization was embraced by black elites. As Timothy Parsons shows, Baden-Powell's idea of Scouting 'as an instrument of social discipline to smooth over … [social] tensions' appealed to disenfranchised communities seeking opportunity for their children. When educated Zulu boys were considered for separate membership in the Pathfinders based on 'tribal' affiliation, a Natal educationalist named Daniel McKenzie Malcolm endorsed their inclusion because it reinforced the aim of divide-and-rule colonialism, which segregated each 'native' in his own reserve. Malcolm hailed his Zulu Scouts for 'understanding the power of tradition … [and] what it means when a person says this is not done (*akwenziwa lokhu*). There is no law or written rule so strong as this simple phrase and you are going to build this up … "A Pathfinder is loyal"'.[40]

In settler colonies, such as those in Southern Africa, leisurely pastimes for the white middle classes took on different connotations. In the Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century, leisure time, which was time not spent in education or at church, was crucial for both boys and girls. For girls, activities such as diary keeping were encouraged as they provided opportunities for self-reflection and self-development. Girls were also encouraged to use idle time for self-improvement by attending social events and participating in activities such as 'charity work, piano playing and drawing and exercise, chiefly walking'. These activities served the dual purposes of broadening girls' social circles and providing opportunities to meet future husbands. In essence, it socialized girls from girlhood into respectable middle-class womanhood.[41] Such activities were not encouraged for the white, female, working-class and black contemporaries for whom selfhood was understood differently, being characterized by productive labor which contributed tangibly to the national development.

Middle-class white males also had a substantial amount of free time, which was also used in the development of middle-class masculinity through the pursuit of hobbies like swimming, tennis, and attending concerts and events. Boys were also to widen their social circles by attending tea parties, writing letters to, and going on long walks with, young women. Middle-class boys were often under no obligation to work and only did so when adults were unavailable to perform tasks or to earn extra income in pursuit of hobbies.[42] Therefore, new ideas about childhood in South Africa, which incorporated leisure as a crucial aspect, were the preserve of the middle classes who did not require the financial contribution of their children. Childhood engagement in leisurely pursuits, especially social activities which involved interactions with the opposite sex, was considered a rehearsal of the crucial 'rituals and practices of middle-class adults' which was, in its own way, considered 'productive' and essential to adult middle-class masculinity and femininity.[43]

In Egypt, where the practice of Islam did not encourage extensive interactions between children of the opposite sexes, childhood play among middle-class boys and girls was characterized differently and was aimed at promoting independent thought and action among children. Children's public play was to be discouraged and restricted to allocated rooms and areas where children could play after they had received permission from adults.[44] As local elites were committed to displacing the British notion of the effeminate and backward Egyptian, print culture assumed a prominent role in middle-class children's pastimes. The introduction of children's magazines played a key role in childhood leisure and reading and creative writing was advocated for children of the upper classes. Children were encouraged to send letters, written submissions, and photographs to magazines to express their wants, concerns, and aspirations and to 'assert their unique identity'.[45] Stories in children's magazines were also used to convey messages concerning children's gender roles in societies. Morrison states that in over 200 stories written by the acclaimed early twentieth-century Egyptian children's storywriter Kamil Kilani, 'women were usually portrayed in domestic roles and men as warriors and leaders. There [were] no female heroines and women [were] rarely the main character'.[46]

Through play, middle-class children learned their place in society. Although reading was a new privilege for middle-class females, playtime literature was geared towards teaching girls to perform traditional patriarchal roles and producing home managers and domestic caregivers, while that of boys prepared them for public life. This was also evidenced in the role of Western technology as boys were encouraged to play with the most up-to-date Western gadgets including cameras, clocks, and typewriters, while girls were not.[47] As eloquently put by Morrison, 'learning the home economics of frugality and resourcefulness [was] important for girls; learning how to use a telescope [was] not'.[48]

Children's leisurely pastimes evolved in dynamic ways in colonial Africa. Childhood in precolonial Africa, which was characterized by labor, was to be replaced with education and leisure, two elements considered crucial to proper childhood development. However, these new ideologies of childhood were the preserve of the indigenous middle classes who, unlike their peasant and working-class counterparts, did not require the income from the labor of their children for the survival of the household. Among the middle classes, pastimes developed in disparate ways across Africa. While areas such as Nigeria embraced the hybridity of organizations such as the Boy Scouts that incorporated both Western and indigenous ideas of childhood, childhood among the white middle class in South Africa focused on self-development through social interaction between boys and girls and the pursuit of hobbies. On the contrary, Childhood play in Egypt discouraged interaction between the sexes and was instead characterized by an emphasis on development using print media where ideas of appropriate gender roles were conveyed. Leisure and

play, although varied across the continent, were nevertheless crucial to class identity and differentiation in colonial Africa.

Child Labor and Education

Children have always been a fundamental component of coerced labor and non-coercive labor systems in continental Africa, but over time, from the slave trade into formal colonial rule, children's roles become more streamlined and their labor specifically targeted. Children's education also transformed rapidly under colonial influence, shifting away from informal or traditional and familial education patterns and Islamic education, toward more European education systems that emphasized religious morality and Eurocentric normative paradigms, such as gendered labor practices, nuclear monogamous families, and patriarchal and hierarchical divisions of responsibility and power.

In precolonial Africa, much of childhood was spent performing some form of work. Childhood labor was near universal and most children were taught work, both household and economic labor, from a very young age. In many cultures, young boys often resided with their mothers until at least the age of seven or eight, and would likely have had to fetch and carry water and assist with home chores, such as keeping the hearth alight, gathering firewood and thatching materials, and tending to chickens, ducks, and goats. Labor, however, often took on gendered dimensions as household labor was often emphasized for girls rather than boys. Morrison writes that girls across Egypt spent much of their childhood doing chores and learning homemaking skills.[49] Caroline Bledsoe also records how Mende girls were drafted into household work (like sweeping) or child-care duties as soon as they were physically capable. Girls learned cooking by observation at home, and instructed their younger sisters in female duties, such as fetching wood and water, making fires, preparing food, thatching huts, making pots, and cultivating crops. Even in areas such as Southern Nigeria, where women have historically participated in rigorous economic activities, girls' labor from an early age involved more household chores than boys' as such tasks were considered to prepare them for marriage, home making, and child rearing.[50]

Labor for both boys and girls nevertheless also involved economic production as soon as children were considered old enough to undertake such tasks. Amongst the Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria, for example, children began to participate in commercial ventures around the age of four when they started to show a measure of independence.[51] Children in precolonial Africa were considered vital to the financial survival of the household. They hawked goods, sold in marketplaces, and participated in marketable craft activities.[52] Children also performed a variety of tasks on family farmsteads and also on farms of extended lineage kinsmen to whom parents may have owed labor. Regardless of the tasks performed (farming, hunting, fishing, salt

making, domestic chores, or small-scale trading), young children occupied a tenuous position in a lineage, rivaled in vulnerability only by the most elderly. Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, boys carrying out collective male tasks took their little brothers along to learn how to build huts and fences, forge metals, carve wood, weave fishing nets, hunt game, drill for battle, and tend livestock. In addition, some African states utilized children to fulfill national obligations. Regents in the nineteenth-century Zulu kingdom enlisted regiments of boys to lug provisions during military campaigns, and recruited girls to weed the gardens of the royal family.

From the early to mid-nineteenth century, children became increasingly vulnerable to enslavement as slavery and labor coercion expanded across the continent with the rise of plantation economies tied to colonial and imperial expansion. Consistent with the widespread socio-economic system in operation, as very junior members of lineages, children were highly susceptible to the operationalization of rights-in-persons, wherein claims on their labor, their future labor capacity, or other valuations made them expendable. As from the trans-Saharan and transoceanic trades, there were highly buoyant shorter and longer-distance trade routes throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, wherein children were increasingly desirable mechanisms facilitating exchange, credit accumulation, or debt obligation. As smaller, lighter, weaker individuals, children were more susceptible to violent seizure, kidnapping, capture in conflict, and subsequent transportation. The paths to enslavement were somewhat narrower for children than for adults. Along with adults, children were captured in warfare and targeted in raids. Children could be separated from kin and family very easily in the context of conflict. Children were enslaved as punishment for witchcraft or as part of a broader 'catastrophe' inflicted against a family group as the result of trial by ordeal. Children were also given as settlements after the conclusion of a palaver, and they could operate as proxies for adult crimes, as Sigismund Koelle's description of his travels among the Vai demonstrates.[53]

Although African children were enslaved by many of the same tactics as adults, various forms of pawnship targeted them. Pawning operated in different ways and was not always directly tied to enslavement. Pawning operated as a 'crucial … way of securing credit' in slave-vending communities and thus functioned as a primary means for enslaving children.[54] Paul Lovejoy and David Richardson argued that 'the use of human pawns to secure goods advanced against the delivery of slaves represented' an 'extension of local credit arrangements to British ship captains enabling them to enforce repayment of debts in compliance with customary law'.[55,56] It may be that the very mechanics of the slave trade rested upon securities afforded by pawns. Elsewhere, however, pawning morphed from being largely a security to a 'vehicle to generate slaves'.[57] Roquinaldo Ferreira notes certain indigenous groups in Portuguese Angola targeted 'disgraced pawns'. Indeed, the habit of converting collateral into slaves was so widespread that the Portuguese introduced additional penalties and punishments.

Formal education for boys, and occasionally for girls, consisted of reading and writing a European language, basic arithmetic, and geography and history, all within the context of a formal program of various branches of (predominantly Christian) teaching. Some schools provided instructional aids and books, and others relied more heavily on teachers to innovate a curriculum. Many European-style schools blended formal education with practical, applied, and 'trade' education. In Christian Missionary Society Service schools throughout Africa, boys and girls swept and scrubbed schoolrooms and dormitories, cleaned tables and cookware, washed clothes, and cleaned shoes. They cleared schoolyards, worked on school farms, and sometimes prepared their own food. Girls learned to weave and spin, and boys to cultivate cash crops, such as tea, coffee, arrowroot, and ginger, teaching what the Protestant Reverend Charles Haensel referred to as 'habits of industry and usefulness'.[58] Many religious schools became pipelines for colonial police, militias, and armies, particularly in Belgian Congo. Secular schooling emerged later in colonial Africa and was more common in Francophone colonies. But regardless of the basis of school, and whereas spelling and reading were important, the moral elevation went hand-in-hand with social indoctrination and the gendered contours of a European education. A universal objective of formal child education across the continent was to create malleable and resilient vessels who could operate and work effectively at the frontier of the colonial enterprise.

Wage work transformed children's lives. Zulu boyhood in South Africa was irrevocably changed by salaried, hourly labor. For most of the nineteenth century, male adolescents enrolled in regiments (*amabutho*) of the Zulu monarchy, which socialized cadets to embrace ideals of patriarchal dignity, *indoda enesithunzi*. In 1879, British imperial invaders destroyed the Zulu kingdom and its military. For the first time, familial homesteads had to meet financial burdens imposed by white rule. As a consequence, they released their boys into colonial service where money could be earned to pay for taxes and provisions. These young jobseekers streamed into cities burgeoning around lucrative mines, where prosperous white employers clamored for household help. Answering the call, migrant Zulu boys worked alongside immigrant European maids. They were known to engage in sexual intimacy, which led to colonial regulations prohibiting contact between white and black servants, Mxolisi Mchunu explains. The *Imperial Colonist*, a lifestyle magazine of settler elites, publicized the racial etiquette for European maids who 'should never … touch their [black male servants'] hands, or sit in a room where there are [African] boys, or do anything whereby an insolent native may take liberties'.[59] Milestones of Zulu masculinity, once celebrated in regimental anthems (*amahubo*), were now expressed in ambivalent idioms justifying domestic labor: '"*Ngibheke nje, ngizoyindoda ngoba ngangisebenza ezingadini*" (Just look at me, I will be a man because I was once a gardener)'. It was also the norm for male retainers, young and old, to don their 'kitchen suit[s]' (Fig. 16.3). Mchunu describes how they struggled to stomach this tunic

Fig. 16.3 Madam and children: Young Zulu servant in his kitchen suit, Natal, South Africa (*c.*1900). Illustration courtesy of Benedict Carton

while observing white children in the same outfit playing with the madam. If the Zulu 'house boy' objected to wearing his uniform, he could be fired, 'a choice that would relinquish income to pay taxes, buy food and increase savings for *ilobolo*, (bridewealth, usually in cattle)'.[60]

As plantation economies expanded throughout colonial Africa, more children were drawn into European capitalist economies and away from traditional, childhood laboring experiences. Wiseman Chirwa demonstrated that the employment of children, youth, and women in casual wage labor stemmed from a wider problem of mobilization, compounded by seasonal variability in adult male labor. From the 1930s to the 1950s, colonial planters in Nyasaland (Malawi) could not afford a large and regular wage-labor force, so they therefore relied on cheap categories of casual labor, predominantly that of children and immigrants from Mozambique. Children were easily accessible during the colonial period and the majority of them working on European plantations were drawn from resident tenants and surrounding villages. Labor migration

emboldened boys and girls, acquainting them with new cultural possibilities and an economic conduit through which to accumulate their own resources and accelerate their own ascent to seniority. And as Polly Hill, Sara Berry, and others have shown, younger, working sons who bought their own bridewealth did not have to rely on their father's contribution, eroding the generational constraints that prolonged their junior subordination.[61]

Conclusion

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, intriguing issues are being explored by scholars of African childhood. Does girlhood or boyhood end with initiation, or does it linger into late adolescence and a younger adulthood? Is there a liminal stage before marriage and parenthood? Does childhood begin at birth, weaning, or some other phase before pivotal rites of passage? And what role should contemporary law—such as changes to the age of consent, laws on coerced child marriage, or the domestic mandates of the 1989 International Convention of the Rights of the Child—play in these debates? On a continent so vast, one with great diversity and remarkable continuities across time and space, the main intellectual concern is to devise a flexible framework through which to examine variations in children's roles and social development.

Notes

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2. Erik J.W. Hoftsee, "The Great Divide: The Social History of the Middle Passage in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade" (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2001.
3. http://www.slavevoyages.org/voyage/understanding-db/methodology-6.
4. Ukasaw Gronniosaw, *A Narrative of the Most Remarkable Particulars in the Life of James Albert Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, an African Prince, as Related by Himself* (Bath, England, 1792).
5. Benjamin N. Lawrance, *Amistad's Orphans: An Atlantic Story of Children, Slavery, and Smuggling* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 29.
6. Ibid., 30.
7. Lisa McNee, "The Languages of Childhood: The Discursive Construction of Childhood and Colonial Policy in French West Africa," *African Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (2004): 24.
8. Quotation from François Piétri (1937) in William Cohen, "The Colonized as Child: British and French Colonial Rule," *African Historical Studies* 3, no. 2 (1970): 427.
9. Dudley Kidd, *Savage Childhood: A Study of Kaffir Children* (London: Adam and Charles, Black, 1906), viii.

10. *Colony of Natal Report Native Affairs Commission 1906–7* (Pietermaritzburg, Natal: P. Davis and Sons, 1907), 12.
11. Beverly Grier, *Invisible Hands: Child Labor and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2006).
12. Thomas E. Kyei, *Our Days Dwindle: Memories of My Childhood Days in Asante* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2001); Camara Laye, *L'Enfant Noir* (Paris: Éditions Plon, 1954).
13. Owen White, *Children of the French Empire: Miscegenation and Colonial Society in French West Africa, 1895–1960* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1999); Christopher J. Lee, *Unreasonable Histories: Nativism, Multiracial Lives, and the Genealogical Imagination in British Africa* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014).
14. Amadé Badini, *Naître et grandir chez les Moosé traditionnels, Découvertes du Burkina* (Paris: Sépia-ADDB, 1994).
15. Alma Gottlieb, "Where Have All the Babies Gone? Toward an Anthropology of Infants (and their Caretakers)," *Anthropological Quarterly* 73, no. 3 (2000): 121–32.
16. Jacques Sanou, "Importance des pratiques traditionnelles de socialisation et d'enculturation de la jeunesse rurale en Haute-Volta. Exemple des jeunes Bobo-fing dans le département des Hauts-Bassins, 1960–1982." Mémoire de Diplôme des Hautes Études Pratiques Sociales, Lyon, 1983.
17. McNee, "*The Languages of Childhood*."
18. John Iliffe, *Africans: The History of a Continent* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
19. Paul Landau, *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400–1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Jan Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforest: Towards a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990); and Christopher Ehret, *An African Classical Age: Eastern and Southern Africa in World History, 1000 BC to AD 400* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998).
20. Jean Allman, *Quills of the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).
21. Benedict Carton, *Blood from Your Children: The Colonial Origins of Generational Conflict in South Africa* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 79–86, 91–113.
22. Mark Hanna Watkins, "The West African 'Bush' School," *American Journal of Sociology* 48, no. 6 (1943): 666–75.
23. Marc A. Chevrier, "Note relative aux coutumes des adeptes de la société secrète des Scymos: indigènes fétichistes du littoral de la Guinée," *L'Anthropologie* 27 (1906): 359–76.
24. Carol Hoffer P. MacCormack, "Bundu: Political Implications of Female Solidarity in a Secret Society," in *Being Female: Reproduction, Power, and Change*, ed. Dana Raphael (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), 157.
25. Charles Jedrej, "Cosmology and Symbolism on the Central Guinea Coast," *Anthropos* 81, no. 4/6 (1986): 497–515.
26. Thenjiwe Magwaza, "'So That I Will Be a Marriageable Girl': *Umemulo* in Contemporary Zulu Society," in *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu Past and Present*, ed. Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 482, 484–85.

27. See Elizabeth Thornberry, "*Ukuthwala*, Forced Marriage, and the Idea of Custom in South Africa's Eastern Cape," in *Marriage by Force? Contestation over Consent and Coercion in Africa*, ed. Annie Bunting, Benjamin N. Lawrance, and Richard L. Roberts (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016), 137–59.
28. Carton, *Blood from Your Children*, 66–71.
29. Heidi Morrison, *Childhood and Colonial Modernity in Egypt* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 65.
30. Benedict Carton and Robert Morrell, "Competitive Combat, Warrior Bodies and Zulu Sport: The Gender Relations of Stick Fighting in South Africa, 1800–1930," in *Beyond C.L.R. James: Shifting Boundaries of Race and Ethnicity in Sport*, ed. John Nauright, Alan Cobley, and David Wiggins (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2014), 125–43.
31. Sifiso Ndlovu, "A Reassessment of Women's Power in the Zulu Kingdom," in *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present*, ed. Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 112–13.
32. Morrison, *Childhood*, 53.
33. Ibid., 81–83.
34. Sarah E. Duff, *Changing Childhoods in the Cape Colony: Dutch Reformed Church Evangelicalism and Colonial Childhood, 1860–1895* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 123.
35. Ibid., 75.
36. Ibid., 122.
37. Morrison, *Childhood*, 44.
38. Adam Paddock, "'A World of Good for Our Boys': Boy Scouts in Southern Nigeria, 1934–1951," in *Children and Childhood in Colonial Nigerian Histories*, ed. Saheed Aderinto (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 126, 127.
39. Ibid., 135–40.
40. Timothy Parsons, "Undivided Loyalties: Inkatha and the Boy Scout Movement," in *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 345.
41. Duff, *Changing Childhoods*, 61.
42. Ibid., 81–84.
43. Ibid., 81–83.
44. Morrison, *Childhood*, 78.
45. Ibid., 76–77.
46. Ibid., 92.
47. Ibid., 72.
48. Children's camps and camping activities were also incorporated into middle-class playtime activities. Morrison, *Childhood*, 86.
49. Ibid., 2.
50. For more on girlhood and women's labor in Southern Nigeria, see Abosede George, *Making Modern Girls: A History of Girlhood, Labour, and Social Development in Colonial Lagos* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014); Niara Sudarkasa, *Where Women Work: A Study of Yoruba Women in the Marketplace and in the Home* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1973); and Misty L. Bastian, "Dancing Women and Colonial Men: The Nwaobiala of 1925," in *'Wicked' Women and the Reconfiguration of Gender in Africa*,

ed. Dorothy L. Hodgson and Sheryl A. McCurdy (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2000), 109–29.

51. There was an identical practice in Egypt where children were introduced to work from a very early age when it was believed they had developed *aql* (reason). Morrison, *Childhood*, 68.
52. Duff, *Changing Childhoods*, 94–96; Bolanle Awe, "Iyalode Efunsetan Aniwura (Owner of Gold)," in *Nigerian Women in Historical Perspective*, ed. Bolanle Awe (Ibadan: Bookcraft, 1992), 55–71; Judith A. Byfield, *The Bluest Hands: A Social and Economic History of Women Dyers in Abeokuta (Nigeria), 1890–1940* (Oxford, UK: James Currey, 2002), 1–42.
53. Sigismund Koelle, *Narrative of an Expedition in the Vy Country of West Africa* (London: Seeleys, 1849).
54. Lovejoy and Richardson, "Trust, Pawnship," 335–36.
55. Lovejoy and Richardson, "Business of Slaving," 67–89.
56. Lovejoy and Falola, *Pawnship in Africa*.
57. Ferreira, *Cross-Cultural*, 79–80.
58. Lawrance, *Amistad's Orphans*, 175.
59. Mxolisi Mchunu, "A Modern Coming of Age: Zulu Manhood, Domestic Work, and the 'Kitchen Suit'," in *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present*, ed. Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 573–82; Keletso Atkins, "Origins of the AmaWasha: The Zulu Washerman's Guild in Natal, 1850–1910," *The Journal of African History* 27, no. 1 (1986): 41–57; and Luli Callinicos, *Working Life in 1886–1940: Factories, Townships and Popular Culture on the Rand* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), 56.
60. Mchunu, "A Modern Coming of Age," 575.
61. Polly Hill, *The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963); Sara Berry, *Fathers Work for Their Sons: Accumulation, Mobility, and Class Formation in an Extended Yoruba Community* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

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CHAPTER 17

Literature in Colonial Africa

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Literature is a cultural production that often reflects a people's history, experience, sensibility, ontology, belief systems, and realities, among others. In the African tradition, literature and history tend to be closely related with history also associated with politics; hence full knowledge of Africa's history of the colonial period would be incomplete without a comprehensive view of the literature. One can therefore venture to say that history drives the direction of literature in Africa and this is apparently true whether in precolonial, colonial, or postcolonial times. History in its macro state thus incorporates the progress of a people's culture and society, which form the backdrop of African literature. Literature in Africa predates the continent's colonization by the European powers because Africans have always had a literature whether in the form of orality or scripts such as the Egyptian hieroglyphs, the Liberian Vai scripts, and the Nsibidi pictographs of the Ejagham (also called Ekoi) and Efik ethnic groups of southeastern Nigeria and northern Cameroon. The European conquest and subsequent colonization of Africa would add another dimension to the people's literature, which had been mainly oral before, introducing a written component as the products of European schools and administrations.

Before delving into the nature, types, and functions of literature in colonial Africa, it is imperative to explain European justification for the colonization of Africa and the nature of the colonial system as it affected Africans. As Chinua Achebe has described it in *The Education of a British-Protected*

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Child, colonialism involved the total takeover of a people by a small but armed group to dominate their economic and political lives for their own (foreign) benefit. Hegelian and European racist ideas of Africa as 'the other' that was not civilized, not Christian, and a tabula rasa that needed to be civilized fueled the colonial enterprise in Europe. Historians such as Hugh Trevor-Roper and Arnold J. Toynbee saw Africa as consisting of barbarism. The Europeans who needed raw materials from Africa for their industries converged their economic exploitation with philanthropic reasoning of bringing civilization to a part of the world that lacked it in their opinion. The Berlin Conference from November 1894 to February 1895 gave the European imperialists the imprimatur they needed to share Africa among themselves so as to have the legitimacy to loot the continent of its human and natural resources. It is in the context of an armed foreign group taking over other peoples and their lands and running the place for their economic and political benefit that colonialism should be seen. The literature in colonial Africa would inevitably reflect the condition of the colonized people in their 'new' dispensation. The colonial administration affected the state and subjects in social, cultural, psychological, and political ways. Literature, according to Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffins, and Helen Tiffin, 'offers one of the most important ways in which these new perceptions are expressed and it is in their writing, and through other arts such as painting, sculpture, music, and dance that the day-to-day realities experienced by colonized people have been most powerfully encoded …'.[1]

Postcolonial Literature

Literature in colonial Africa involves, but is not limited to, 'postcolonial literature', which is 'writing that has been affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization to the present day. This is because there is a continuity of preoccupations throughout the historical process initiated by European imperial aggression'.[2] Literature in colonial Africa is synonymous with writing about life shaped by the colonial experience of direct rule and domination by imperialist powers. From most definitions of 'postcolonial literature', literature in colonial Africa is postcolonial. Frantz Fanon (1925–1961), the Martinique-born revolutionary psychiatrist and philosopher, occupies a central place in the discourse of literature in colonial (and postcolonial) Africa. He had personal experience as a psychiatrist treating victims of racism and colonial oppression in Algeria, and he later joined the nationalist Algerian struggle against France.

Fanon maps out three different stages of literature of a colonized people in a paper he presented at the Second Congress of Black Writers and Artists in Rome in 1959. The paper became a chapter, 'On National Culture' in his *The Wretched of the Earth*. Literature in colonial Africa seems to affirm his conceptualization. While I hope to elaborate on this at specific points while

discussing aspects of literature in colonial Africa, it is important to note the stages as: first, 'unqualified assimilation', by imitating literary trends of the metropolis; second, the stage of dialectical antithesis to the first stage; and third, a stage of national consciousness of native resistance against colonial domination when the writer becomes 'the mouthpiece of a new reality in action'.[3] Fanon's colonial experience and conceptualization of literature and culture in the colony expose not just the historical dimension of colonialism but also the psychological impact of colonial socio-cultural, economic, and political measures.

Africa in colonial times had many literatures, which included the indigenous oral literatures, Arab literature, Swahili literature influenced by Islam brought by Arab merchants to East Africa, and the 'new' literature that was a byproduct of European takeover of Africa. The objective of European colonization of Africa through its colonial laws and its accompanying missionary proselytizing was to erase African culture, languages, folklore, and art that were denigrated to affirm European superiority over an uncivilized race. However, following Fanon's conceptualization, the literature in colonial Africa would at first imitate European models before trying to affirm itself, and even before independence attempting to decolonize itself. What follows is a summary of the different trends of literature in Africa in colonial times that the context of colonialism made possible. I will also attempt to discuss the function and contribution of the literature to the culture itself, to the effort of dealing with the psychological aspects of colonialism, response to the European encroachment into Africa, and as a tool in the nationalist struggle to gain independence from the colonizers.

Oral Literature

Literature could be oral or written. Western critics, who once questioned the oral as literature, bearing in mind its connotation of what is written, seemed to have forgotten that early Western literature, such as Homer's *Odyssey* and *Iliad*, was oral before it came to be written down. African oral literature is as old as the African people and still thrives today alongside the 'new' or modern written literature that came with colonization and resulted from the colonialists training Africans in literacy so as to help them in communication and administration. Traditional Africa had no schools as modern Africa has (after interaction with the West). However, there were avenues for teaching young ones about life, society, the environment, and language and literary skills, which the oral tradition brought about. Usually at the end of the day's work, parents and elders gathered their young ones by the fireside to tell them stories. Such sessions were a part of the growing process of young boys and girls, who looked forward to these informal fireside 'schools' with enthusiasm. They not only listened but learnt to tell such stories and sing the songs themselves. The traditional literature was very much integrated into the daily lives

of the people as well at different stages of an individual's life. It functioned in the communal society in maintaining a healthy social ethos that bound the people together. It also served moral and ethical purposes and gave the people a sense of belonging to their community. It was (and is) a literature that has its own aesthetics and forms. As would be seen later, oral literature reinforces the written literature and, to some extent, vice versa.

There were different forms of oral literature in precolonial through colonial Africa. They included, but were not limited to, the narrative types of folk tales, epics, myths, legends, and the poetic songs, chants, riddles, and tongue-twisters. Much as there are narratives and songs, there is no clear-cut division of genres of fiction, poetry, and drama as in the Western-derived written/modern literature. Oral literature in colonial Africa, as in precolonial and postcolonial Africa, was very integrative in the sense that a good narrative incorporated poetic songs, chants, and when performed became a dramatic experience. Thus, one can say that the literature that the colonialists met in Africa was a multi-media event in the sense that a performance of a folk tale or any other type of traditional narrative (including epics) incorporated songs, the minstrel wearing a mask and/or a special costume and performing to the accompaniment of music. Since this literature was passed down from one generation to another by word of mouth, it relied on memory, which was not always accurate; hence there are many variants of many tales (such as *Sundiata*, the epic of Mali), and many folk tales across sub-Saharan Africa. I have observed many variants of the story of the fastidious girl who wants to marry a complete gentleman or spotless man and, after marrying a stranger who dons such a habit, is rescued to marry someone from her own locality. It is significant to note that there is a close relationship between traditional literature and history in Africa. As the culture is dynamic, so also is the literature that changes according to the prevailing experiences of the people. Proverbs and folk tales adapt to the times in which they are coined or told. Fashion, neologism, modernism, new technology, and other factors affect folk tales, proverbs, and other artistic traditional verbal forms to renew themselves. New variants of folk tales and new proverbs are constantly being born out of contemporary experience. Of great significance is that the oral tradition has become a tool for modern African writers to establish their cultural identity.

Let me mention some specific oral literature traditions that were fully developed and vibrant before and during the European colonization of Africa. There were great epics such as *Sundiata*, *Ozidi*, and *Mwindo*, among many. At the same time, there were oral poetic performance traditions such as the Yoruba *ijala*, the Zulu and Tswana *izibongo*, the Urhobo *udje*, the Ewe *halo*, and a multiplicity of other forms of panegyrics and abuse songs and chants and narratives that reflected the realities, aspirations, and the drama of existence of different groups of people and individuals among them.

The colonial system in its capitalist pursuit of forcing the men to pay so-called 'head tax' and promulgating laws of slander helped to cause the decline of the *udje* oral poetic performance tradition. Christianity also contributed to the demise of *udje* as the sanctity of the god of songs (Uhaghwa), for whom it was performed was vilified as fetish or Satanic. Thus, while there was a vibrant traditional literature before colonialism arrived, the colonial system and its objectives of erasing African culture through its laws and the evangelizing of the accompanying Christian missionaries worked against the thriving of indigenous African literatures in colonial Africa.

Arab/Islamic, Swahili, and Hausa Literatures in Colonial Africa

Before the colonization of Africa towards the end of the nineteenth century, another form of literature, derived from Africa's interaction with the Arab and Muslim world, was flourishing in parts of Africa, especially North Africa, parts of West Africa (particularly the Sokoto caliphate), and the coastal part of East Africa (including Mombasa). Let me begin with the literature of the Swahili coastal people of East Africa. The Indian Ocean trade brought Arabs and Islam to the area especially to Mombasa and Zanzibar. According to Ibrahim Shariff in 'The Function of Dialogue Poetry', 'Poetry is composed more for the ear and not for the eye, for immediate dialogic encounters rather than for solitary reflections, and it is simply the highest art form of a society that attaches exceptional value to refined speech'.[4] This value of speech is comparable to what Chinua Achebe says of the place of the spoken word in Igbo traditional society. There was an increase in the publication of Swahili poetry from the end of the nineteenth century which coincided with the period of colonization of present-day Kenya and Tanzania.

Similarly, in much of Northern Nigeria, especially in the Sokoto caliphate, two types of literature thrived during the British colonial era: Islam-inspired and indigenous Hausa poetic forms and narratives. In the Islamic court of Sokoto, Usman Dan Fodio promoted Islamic literature. His own daughter Nana Asma'u Bint Usman Dan Fodio (1793–1864) is credited with writing many poems in the Islamic and Arab poetic traditions with socio-political themes. This female jihadist had written literature of scholarly and religious depth before the colonial period. Therefore, one can make the point that before European colonization of Africa, indigenous and Arab/Islamic forms of literature thrived and would continue during the colonial period. It is significant that the premium placed on writing in the colonial period would accelerate the growth and spread of Arabic/Muslim and Swahili literatures in Africa. On the other hand, the more indigenous literature in Muslim parts of Africa, as among the Hausa people, was discouraged at the expense of the Islamic one.

The Early Wave of Written or Modern Literature in Africa

History, no doubt, greatly influenced literature in Africa in a more compelling manner from colonial times. Modernity, itself a product of history, would diversify literature in Africa by adding new forms of literature, written in European languages, to be a counterpoint to the indigenous oral literature that already existed. The new literature began in an imitative manner as African writers modeled their works on already existing European literary genres.

In order to achieve the colonial mission efficiently, it was necessary for the colonialists (British, French, and Portuguese) to build schools for domestic assistants, interpreters, and junior-cadre administrators in their respective colonial governments, since they could not bring their European kinsfolk for everything. Literacy in the colonial European languages became an enabling factor for the African in getting a job. It was graduates of the different Western schools who had become literate and so knowledgeable of European literature and the Bible who would eventually become writers of the new African literature. Those who graduated from elementary schools had to go to many government colleges and missionary-run secondary schools. At the top were tertiary schools that were linked to metropolitan colonial institutions. For instance, in the Anglophone colonies, many university colleges were established and attached to specific English universities with which they shared the same syllabi and other forms of curricular affiliations. Such colleges include Fourah Bay College in Freetown (Sierra Leone); Legon (Ghana); Ibadan (Nigeria); Makerere (Uganda); and Nairobi (Kenya). Coincidentally, these educational institutions became major centers of literary creativity in colonial and modern Africa. It is noteworthy, for instance, that Chinua Achebe, Christopher Okigbo, Wole Soyinka, J.P. Clark, M.C. Echeruo, and some other writers attended the University College, Ibadan, and Okot p'Bitek attended Makerere. Benedict Wallet Vilakazi attended the University of Witwaterstrand and was the first black man to receive a Ph.D. degree from that university. His doctoral thesis was titled 'Oral and Written Literature in Nguni'.

Most of the instructors were European. It is not surprising therefore to have a strong modernist influence in the Anglophone universities and surrealist and existentialist influence in Francophone institutions bearing in mind the literary trends in Britain and France during the period. The African writers in their writings responded to existing European literatures they were taught in schools, and the Bible. However, before discussing these African writers' works in colonial Africa, it is important also to introduce some European writers, especially on Africa, who foisted on them a responsibility to react to put things right. It was a kind of anxiety of influence.

Europeans Writing on Africa: Conrad, Graham Greene, and Joyce Cary

One cannot have a holistic view of literature in colonial Africa without mentioning some European or Western writers who have created literary works set in Africa or with African characters. Those whose novels have had a lasting impression are Joseph Conrad with his *Heart of Darkness*, Graham Greene with his *The Heart of the Matter*, and Joyce Cary's *Mister Johnson*. In these works, British novelists portray African characters in their narratives from the way they understood Africans during their contact with Africa. Chinua Achebe wrote a lot on Conrad's racist portrayal of Africans in the Congo. The characters are one-dimensional and are not rounded. The same portrayal appears in Cary's *Mister Johnson*. Graham Greene was a British colonial officer in Freetown, Sierra Leone. It is generally believed that his Sierra Leonean experience informed the novel even though his novel was set in South Africa.

Heart of Darkness, a Western classic, was taught in African institutions to Africans who saw its lack of realism and racism and would set out, as Achebe does in *Things Fall Apart*, to give a realistic portrayal of the Africans they lived with and knew very well. Thus, an aspect of the literature in colonial Africa deals with the biased and racist portrayal of Africans by Europeans who visited Africa in colonial times and later used their experiences to write fictional narratives. In fact, Joyce Cary was a colonial administrator in Northern Nigeria and his short story 'Umaru' and novels *Aissa Saved* (1932), *The African Witch* (1936), and *Mister Johnson* (1939) were all informed by his Nigerian experience. Many of the African writers who started to write in colonial times saw it as their responsibility to correct the wrong portrayal of African characters by colonial writers.

Pioneer Poets

All the poets who are described as 'pioneer poets' had their education and their writing careers entirely in colonial times. They came mainly from South Africa, Nigeria, and Ghana. Of the South Africans, D.I.E. Dhlomo, Benedict Wallet Vilikazi, and Mazisi Kunene are the most prominent. It is interesting to note that even in early colonial times before apartheid was formalized in South Africa, there were authors already writing in indigenous languages and calling for African literature to be written in African languages. Benedict W. Vilakazi, in 1939, lamented the fact that South African writers were writing in English and not in African indigenous languages:

> By Bantu drama, I mean a drama written by a Bantu, for the Bantu, in a Bantu language. I do not class English or Afrikaans dramas on Bantu themes, whether these are written by Black people, I do not call them contributions to Bantu

> Literature. It is the same with poetry … I have an unshaken belief in the possibilities of Bantu languages and their literature, provided the Bantu writers themselves can learn to love their languages and use them as vehicles for thought, feeling and will. After all, the belief, resulting in literature, is a demonstration of people's 'self' where they cry: '*Ego sum quod sum*' [I am what I am].[5]

Vilakazi also sees Bantu sensibility as different from what he describes as the Romantic sensibility of South Africans of European stock.[6] Both Vilakazi and Mazisi Kunene wrote in isiZulu. As Dike Okoro wrote of the two Zulu poets:

> Vilakazi's poetry shares with readers his love for the natural world of his South African homeland, his closeness to his family, and the deep views he held concerning the role of blacks in South Africa. Conversely, Kunene's poems separate him from Vilakazi in many ways … His poems in this book share with readers his view of history as a foundational basis for comprehending the history of the black family in the West, and his acknowledgment of pan-Africanism as a vehicle for African diasporic solidarity.[7]

Writing came early, too, to West Africa, and among the 'Pioneer Poets' were Dennis Chukude Osadebay of Nigeria and Kwame Kyeretwie Boakye Danquah, Michael Dei Anang, Gladys Casely-Hayford, and R.E.G. Armattoe of Ghana. Unlike the poets in South Africa, who wrote in isiZulu, the West African pioneer poets wrote in English. They were highly imitative of Victorian poetry and Christian hymns, and their major themes centered on race and Christian virtues. Their poetry generally lacked craft.

One of Dennis Osadebay's major poems was 'Young Africa's Plea', in which the poet demands:

> Don't preserve my customs
> As some fine curios
> To suit some white historian's tastes.
> There's nothing artificial
> That beats the natural way
> In culture and ideals of life.

The speaker of the poem goes on to say that he will 'play with the whiteman's ways' and 'work with the blackman's brains'. There is openness to other ways of life to strengthen his African ways but not to abandon his own. This readiness to combine what is needed in other ways with indigenous ways, the poet believes, will result in a 'sweet rebirth' that should make him a 'better man'. The poet shows courage in trying new ways brought by the European to Africa. There is expression of confidence in the ability to blend the African and European ways that colonialism has brought about. The poet further addresses the colonizing Westerners about the disrespect shown to

him and his culture and appeals for them to 'bury their prejudice'. The poem does not make use of imagery to show the poet's displeasure but only ordinary prose. One has to acknowledge, though, the occasional use of rhymes. At the same time, Osadebay thanks 'Sons and daughters of Britannia' for having given Africans hospitals, schools, communications, and Western civilization in another poem titled 'Young Africa's Thanks'. It is for this flirtation with colonial modernity that Tijan M. Sallah and I condemn the pioneer poets:

> Lost to the uncritical voice of the typical pioneer poet were the negative aspects of colonialism, such as the wholesale obliteration of indigenous cultures, the forced labor of 'natives', the siphoning of huge stocks of natural resources, the levying of unfair taxes, and the repression of local freedom.[8]

Négritude

A significant portion of literature in colonial Africa is made up of Négritude poetry which derived from the Pan-Africanist aspirations of Caribbean and African students in France who used their journal, *Presence Africaine*, to affirm their Africanity. Led by Aimé Césaire (Martinique), Léon Damas (Guadeloupe), and Leopold Sedar Senghor (Senegal), these black writers conceived negritude as a form of resistance to European racism and a counter to Western hegemony. They used their writings to invoke their African heritage so as to affirm their humanity. While the three major figures express their 'negritude' differently, Senghor's poetry is important in the discussion of literature in colonial Africa. Despite snide remarks by Wole Soyinka that 'a tiger does not proclaim its tigritude', Senghor's negritude is a crucial response to colonialism in mainly Francophone Africa and the Caribbean, and his poetry influenced such writers as Birago Diop and Bernard Dadie.

In Senghor's poetry there is often a romanticizing of the African past that evokes an Edenic state, which some literary scholars have criticized as too idealized. Poems such as 'Femme Noire' ('Black Woman') and 'In Memoriam' respectively portray the African woman as nurturing and the ancestors as not dead but guiding and protecting the living. His 'New York' sees Black Harlem as sensuous and natural in the music and life that come from it, and different from the artificial and steel-like Manhattan. To the poet, the artificial West needs sensuous Africa to complement it for a fuller life.

It suffices in this discourse on literature in colonial Africa to acknowledge the importance of Négritude poetry during the period as a counterpoint to European claims of cultural superiority. Négritude is to some extent the second stage in Fanon's conceptualization of the literature of colonized peoples, when the writer is free to be the opposite of the trends in the colonial metropolis.

Early Fiction

While poetry occupied a preeminent place in both Anglophone and Francophone colonies, especially from the discussion of 'pioneer poets' and 'Négritude poets', there were writers of fiction in colonial Africa. I will use only three examples here: Guinea's Camara Laye and Nigeria's Amos Tutuola and Cyprian Ekwensi.

Camara Laye's *L'enfant noir* (translated as *The African Child* and *The Dark Child*) was published in 1954 and is seen generally as an autobiographical novel that chronicles the real life of the author from his birthplace of Kouroussa, education in Conakry, to his subsequent departure to France. Though the book won the Prix Charles Veillon, its reception was controversial. Mongo Beti's review finds it pandering to the Western image of Africa. In any case, it presents African culture in its natural setting to the outside world. In 1955, Laye published *Le Regard du Roi (The Radiance of the King)*, which has been described by Kwame Anthony Appiah as 'one of the greatest of the African novels of the colonial period'.[9] Laye would write more after Guinea's independence on October 2, 1958, but these two major novels made a splash in the literature of Africa during the colonial period.

Tutuola was not highly educated and was a clerk whose interest in writing impelled him to tell Yoruba stories in English. *The Palm-wine Drinkard* received good reviews from outside Africa as soon as Faber & Faber brought it out in 1952. While the likes of Dylan Thomas praised the book for its quaintness, African writers and scholars saw the work of an uneducated African and as something Western scholars admired for its 'otherness'. Tutuola tells the story of a palm-wine drinker who goes to the land of the dead to look for his palm-wine tapper, goes through fantastic episodes, and does not succeed in bringing him back. Following the fantasy (magical realism) of *The Palm-wine Drinkard*, Tutuola later wrote *My Life in the Bush of Ghosts* (1954), *Simbi and the Satyr of the Dark Jungle* (1955), and *The Brave African Huntress* (1958) before Nigeria's independence on October 1, 1960.

Another writer of fiction in colonial times was Cyprian Ekwensi, whose pre-independence fictional narratives include *Burning Grass, The Passport of Malam Ilia*, and *Jagua Nana*. He moved from narratives set in Northern Nigeria to those set in the city. His novels presented characters in a rather superficial manner in episodic sequences that the public enjoyed. While literary scholars (until Ernest Emenyonu) did not seem to have taken his work seriously, his novels blazed a trail in fictional writing in Nigeria and other parts of Africa.

Early Plays and Theatre

Plays, like poetry and fiction, were being published in colonial Africa. Those of Nigeria's James Ene Henshaw were examples of dramatic writings produced in the later colonial period. *This Is Our Chance: Three Plays* (1956) is

perhaps Henshaw's best-known collection of plays. In *The Jewels of the Shrine*, the dramatist presents the young as seeing the old as backward and for that reason tending to ignore their invaluable experience. *A Man of Character* has a protagonist who fights against corruption. *This Is Our Chance* focuses on the conflict between traditional mores and modernity. The simple plot and style of opposing characters standing for indigenous African tradition on the one hand and accepting of the new ways brought by colonialism on the other make his plays popular with audiences. Critics have written about the influence of Bernard Shaw on Henshaw because of his long Introductions. This is not unexpected as his studies in Ireland might have exposed him to the Irish playwright and his propensity towards drama would have drawn him to popular drama of the colonial time.

It is important to mention the 'Traveling Theatre' in parts of Western Nigeria during the colonial period. The major figures of this popular traveling theatre were Hubert Ogunde and Duro Ladipo, who produced plays in Yoruba that reflected the realities of the common people. The 'traveling theatre' would open the way for theatre for mass mobilization for mostly health and political issues during colonial and post-independence periods in Nigeria.

Onitsha Market Literature

Onitsha Market Literature was an integral part of literature in colonial Africa. Flourishing in the large market city of Onitsha in eastern Nigeria, the pamphlets and novellas concerned themselves with a myriad of popular issues of the middle of the twentieth century. The term has become generic for popular writings made up of fictional narratives, plays, tracts on current events, advice, and moral tracts. Many of them also related to city life but with romantic, often sentimental, and often admonitory moralistic tones. In such works, there was glamorization of Western life in the city and the warning against being lost in the city life, which was presented as seductively corrupt. Since common people with little education wrote the works, their readers also had minimal education. The narratives often placed a premium on entertainment; hence the popular appeal to common readers. The plots of narratives were predictable but captivating in the tantalizing stories. In addition to warning against city girls and love, other narratives dealt with guides to making girls fall in love with one and how to become prosperous. Many of the best known of the producers of Onitsha Market Literature are said to have been students, journalists, and even taxi drivers who were not very literate but had a passion for telling their stories and giving advice or teaching how to do things. Some of the writers and their works include Thomas Iguh's *Agnes in the Game of Love* and *Alice in the Romance of Love*; J.O. Nnadozie's *Beware of Harlots and Many Friends, the World is Hard*; and Raja Raphael's *The Right Way to Approach Ladies and Get Them in Love*. Other popular writers include Ogali A. Ogali, O. Olisa, and Felix N. Stephen.

Onitsha Market Literature may not be significant in the growth of African literature as an intellectual discipline, but it occupies an important place in literature in colonial Africa. It generated much interest in reading and provided a medium of entertainment not only in Onitsha but also across much of Nigeria at the time. It also brought a measure of social egalitarianism between the writer and the reader of the same low-education social class. Onitsha Market Literature stands out as different from the later literature in Nigeria and the rest of Africa that became a product of the ivory tower for members of the same position in the universities.

Nationalist Struggle and Literature

Frantz Fanon's third stage of literature in the colonized state appeared during the era of nationalist struggle towards the end of the colonial period. It was more revolutionary than the earlier stage and entailed not only criticizing colonialism but also inspiring Africans and highlighting their culture, history, and personality. I will use two writers and their works before their respective countries' independence as examples of this literature: Cameroon's Mongo Beti and Nigeria's Chinua Achebe.

Mongo Beti (born Alexandre Biyidi Awala and writing under the name Eza Boto) was a major figure in African literature in colonial times. After criticizing Camara Laye's *African Child* in his *Presence Africaine* review, he published a short story titled '*Sans haine sans amour'* ('Without hatred or love') in 1953. Beti published his first novel *Ville cruelle* (*Cruel city*) under the pseudonym of Eza Boto in 1954. He later published the popular *Le pauvre Christ de Bomba* (*The poor Christ of Bomba*) in 1956 and exposed the collaboration between the missionaries and colonial administrators working in Africa. The book was banned in Cameroon because of its biting satire of the foreigners and the manner in which the Cameroonians resisted them. Beti published *Mission Termine* in 1957 and the novel won the Prix Sainte Beuve in 1958. In 1958, he published *Le Roi Miracule*. From Beti's novels written and set in colonial Cameroon, one gets an insight into the impact of colonialism on the colonial subjects. The people's lives were affected culturally, socially, economically, politically, and psychologically. The novelist uses satire as a weapon of native resistance to combat the problems associated with colonialism.

While Beti has a body of work in the colonial period, Nigeria's Chinua Achebe published his classic novel *Things Fall Apart* in 1958. Much has been written about this novel but it suffices in this chapter to make some comments on the inspiration of the book, its purpose, portrayal of colonial Nigeria, and its contribution to African literature. Chinua Achebe in his essay 'The Writer as Teacher' conceives of the author as an educator, and he seems to have set out in *Things Fall Apart* with the purpose of uplifting the self-esteem of Africans whose culture and humanity had been denigrated by

colonial policies. At the same time, he wanted to show the foreigners, the colonialists, and the West that Africans had a culture before the European invasion of their land and that Africans through their practices were better organized in many ways than the Europeans who claimed to be superior to them. In other essays, Achebe emphasized that Africans are people and that they are neither angels nor devils; in other words, they have their strengths and weaknesses. Achebe spent much of his writing career responding to the likes of racist Joseph Conrad, Hugh Trevor-Roper, and Hegelian followers who deny Africans their humanity. To Achebe, such racists were wrong in their views of Africa and Africans.

Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* portrayed the insensitivity of the European colonialists who, for one white man killed, wiped out the entire village of Abame. The duplicity of the District Officer who sought dialogue with Okonkwo and his clansmen only to put them in handcuffs and jail tells the sort of people the colonialists were. After Okonkwo hangs himself, the District Officer in his insensitivity only thinks of the book he wants to write and using this tragic event as a part of it. Obierika, who draws his attention to the gravity of what has happened, reprimands him, saying that Okonkwo is one of the greatest men in the clan and that the 'white man' has driven him to take his own life and he would be buried like a dog! Like Mongo Beti, Achebe in his only pre-independence novel gives a graphic portrayal of the socio-cultural, economic, political, and psychological disruption and damage brought by colonialism to Africans.

Later Colonial Literature from Zimbabwe, South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique

The colonial period in Africa varied in length. While the partition of Africa took place in Berlin in 1884/1885, African countries gained independence at different times. Some struggled like Algeria and Kenya to gain independence, while others like Nigeria and Cameroon had independence handed over to them. In any case, after the independence of Ghana and Guinea in 1957 and 1958 respectively, most other African countries became independent between 1960 and 1963. However, peculiarities in Southern Rhodesia and the Lusophone countries of Angola and Mozambique in particular resulted in a longer struggle for independence in a prolonged colonial state. Admitting differences and peculiarities in their respective countries, I will use the example of literature about the struggle against colonialism in Southern Rhodesia.

The liberation struggles created a literature of their own, which can be seen as part of literature in a colonial African state at the late stage of its foreign tutelage. It was a revolutionary literature intended to inspire nationalism in the people and give them the courage to bear the sacrifices that their struggle entailed. While historians speak of three different *chimurengas*, I refer here to the literature, including songs and music, of what has been referred

to as the Rhodesian Bush War of 1966–1979—the guerrilla war for black independence of Zimbabwe.

Newspapers, Literary Magazines and Journals in Colonial Africa

One cannot avoid mentioning the role of many newspapers, magazines, and journals in promoting literature in colonial times. Many newspapers in South Africa, Nigeria, and Gold Coast, among others, had newspapers and magazines used as avenues for promoting poetry, short stories, and literary discussions in colonial times. In Nigeria, Chief Ernest Ikoli (1893–1960) started his newspaper career in the early 1920s with the *Lagos Weekly Record* and became the first editor of the *Daily Times* of Nigeria which was launched in June 1926 under the chairmanship of Adeyemo Alakija. Ikoli promoted the publication of creative writing in the paper. *The West African Pilot*, a nationalistic newspaper associated with Nnamdi Azikiwe, also created space for some creative works in colonial times. At the same time there were discussions of literary creations in the same newspapers.

In South Africa, Sol Plaatje was an intellectual and journalist and became the first black South African to write a novel in English. Also in South Africa, the *Drum* magazine was a vehicle for creative works at the time. Many of the journalists working with *Drum* were also writers. It is significant to note that Es'kia Mphalele was the fiction editor from 1955 to 1957 and encouraged the publication of dozens of short stories. Among *Drum* writers who went on to publish their works are: Can Themba, Lewis Nkosi, William 'Bloke' Modisane, Bessie Head, and Richard Rive. *Drum* gave inspiration to much writing about urban life in South Africa in the 1950s.

Of great significance in colonial times in the Francophone areas of Africa is the literary magazine, *Presence Africaine*, based in Paris and edited for a long time by Alioune Diop. It was the medium for the propagation of Négritude, publication of creative works such as short stories and reviews of works of Francophone Africans and those in the diaspora. Newspapers and literary magazines thus played a major part in the dissemination of literary works in colonial Africa.

Conclusion

Literature and history have a symbiotic relationship, especially in colonial Africa. Literature is fueled by historical experiences that it reflects in its peculiar artistic way. To a large extent literature portrays history in a non-conventional way by its portrayal of the implications of social, cultural, economic, political, and psychological consequences of colonialism. It is not surprising that teachers of African colonial history have to use texts such as Mongo Beti's *Poor Christ of Bomba* and Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* in their

courses in African history because of the graphic way that literature projects the details of lives and states that history documents. Literature enhances both the macro and micro modes of history in presenting the colonial state and the characters whose daily life experiences tell the overall consequences of the colonial period.

This chapter has thus given the different but related aspects of the colonial period that political independence has ended in Africa. Literature was active and contributed immensely in exposing the nature of the colonial state and the human beings who were affected by that historical phenomenon. While oral literature existed before the appearance of the modern written literature, the two modes outlived colonialism and thrive side by side today. For better or for worse, the imperial conquest of Africa and its partition to colonies have left indelible marks on the psyche of the people, and the literature of the time gives adequate testimony to the suffering, struggle, and resilience of the African.

Notes

1. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffins, and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Postcolonial Literatures*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 1.
2. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 2007), 176–79.
3. Swahili dialogue poetry was popular during the colonial period in Kenya.
4. Ntongela Masilela, *The Cultural Modernity of H.I.E. Dhlomo* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2007). 76.
5. Vilakazi saw the Bantu sensibility as different from the European one. Benedict Wallet Vilakazi, "Oral and Written Literature in Nguni." (PhD thesis, University of Witwaterstrand, South Africa, 1946), quoted in Masilela, *The Cultural Modernity*, 75.
6. Dike Okoro compares and contrasts Vilakazi's and Kunene's poetry in *Two Zulu Poets: Mazisi Kunene and Benedict Wallet Villakazi* (Milwaukee, WI: Cissus World Press, 2015), xiv.
7. The Pioneer Poets were not seen as critical of the colonial enterprise as Tanure Ojaide and Tijan M. Sallah observe in their introduction to *The New African Poetry: An Anthology* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 2.
8. https://web.archive.org/web/20070421144243/http://www.nybooks.com/shop/product?usca_p=t&product_id=78. Archived from the original on April 21, 2007. Retrieved Feb 8, 2010.
9. Kwame Anthony Appiah, review of *The Radiance of the King* in the *New York Times Review of Books*, July 15, 2001.

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CHAPTER 18

Art, African Identities, and Colonialism

Sylvester Okwunodu Ogbechie

This chapter reviews the impact of colonialism on African art and identities, especially in the emergent modernity of African artists such as Gerard Sekoto (1913–1993), Ben Enwonwu (1917–1994), Gazbia Sirry (b.1925), Afewerk Tekle (1932–2012), Irma Stern (South Africa 1894–1966), and Iba Ndiaye (1928–2008). The unfolding of colonial rule differed in various regions of Africa and impacted the development of new visual languages for modern African art in these contexts. The artists selected represent these regional differences in their approach to artistic practice and questions of modernist identity. I use their careers to investigate discourses of modern art in the colonial era, and to search out points of convergence in how these discourses unfolded in their national spaces and transnational engagements.

African art has always been modern, and it is now necessary to invent new terminologies and frameworks of interpretation that foreground its responses to changing social conditions. The rigid classification of African art into 'traditional' and modern types has created a schism in the field, which is exacerbated by outdated ideas of indigenous cultural production. Also, analysis of twentieth-century African art marginalizes the impact of pioneer African artists who worked in the colonial period and mainly focuses on postcolonial artists. To understand the role of art in African nationalism and the development of modern and contemporary African identities, we need to pay more attention to how pioneer modern African artists engaged questions of modernity

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which, in many instances, shaped the visual languages of postcolonial African art.

The five pioneer artists I discuss developed new visual languages for modern art in various African contexts. I do not intend to write comprehensive biographical histories of these artists; rather I use their careers as reference points to discuss changing forms and discourses of African art under colonialism and the search for unique African identities for the artists involved. Ben Enwonwu was the first modern African artist to gain global fame and he enjoyed immense critical acclaim in Africa, Europe, and the USA. In the colonial culture in which his career originated, and the postcolonial context in which it ended, his affirmation of multiple identities (Igbo, African, Nigerian, Biafran, modern artist, etc.) inserted him into the fractious politics of African nationalism and the continued struggle of African societies against different forms of European imperialism.[1] Afewerk Tekle grew up in Ethiopia during the Italian occupation and initially set out to study engineering in England. He turned instead to fine arts and became celebrated for his paintings on African and Christian themes, and more importantly, his stained-glass artworks. Gazbia Sirry is a notable Egyptian female artist whose works contributed to a feminist consciousness and discussions of 'what it meant to be a modern Egyptian in a world of conflicting and complimentary political, cultural and artistic ideologies'.[2] Iba Ndiaye was a notable pioneer modernist in Senegal, where he co-founded training programs that contributed to one of Africa's most exiting contexts of modern art practice. The South African artist Gerard Sekoto is considered one of the earliest South African modernists and social realists. His work chronicled the traumatic changes imposed on black South Africans by an emergent apartheid system during the 1940s.[3] Sekoto left South African before apartheid was formally introduced, and he lived out his life in exile in France where his resolute identification as an African sustained him. Irma Stern, a white South African complicates our narrative by introducing the divergent history of colonialism in South Africa, which resulted in parallel developments for black and white artists.

These pioneer artists struggled with the meaning of their modern art in the context of colonialism and efforts to define nationalist identities as modern Africans. The analysis that follows evaluates how the colonial context framed their unique responses to modernity, indigenous art traditions, and the global horizons of black cultural subjectivity.

Colonialism and the Politics of Representation

Colonialism defines the imposition of European rule on Africa starting from the late nineteenth century onwards. It is a subset of an ongoing imperialism that asserts Western (white) power and control over African bodies and resources. The colonial period is a key political/social/cultural moment in

the history of modern Africa that saw major transformations in all aspects of life. Colonization of Africa also raised for the first time a global consciousness of African identity as being distinctive from, despite being subjugated to, Western imperialism. The effort to define African subjectivity within the confines of colonial rule ultimately led to various forms of anti-colonial and nationalist struggles, which were central to the emergence of new African identities and efforts to define a modern African art in the global context.

European colonization of Africa dates to the Berlin conference of 1884–1885, which oversaw the scramble for and partition of Africa. The push to formally claim colonial spaces assigned to various European powers resulted in wars of colonization which roiled Africa from 1890 to 1910, with Western armies fighting and subjugating many indigenous African kingdoms.[4] Subsequently, European colonizers created new political boundaries that ultimately defined the outlines of modern African nations.

Africa's history predates its colonization by significant margins. In the case of Nigeria, for example, Falola and Heaton note that although 'the borders of modern-day Nigeria were established … by British colonizers … the histories of the peoples that make up the polity go back many centuries'.[5] Colonialism in Africa sidelined this history as well as previous engagements with modernity in parts of Africa such as Lagos, Cairo, Freetown, Liberia, Ethiopia and Cape Town during the long nineteenth century. We may thus argue that colonialism produced regressive ideas about African identity that became the focus of nationalist and anti-colonial struggles.[6] Olufemi Taiwo suggests that colonialism preempted an emergent modernity in Africa and it is important to disentangle the supposed links between colonialism and modernism, since many of the central concepts we associate with African modernity either predate or postdate colonialism.[7]

Colonialism reshaped African societies. However, Africans' resistance to colonialism led to nationalist movements through which many African countries achieved independence from 1958 onwards. It is important to stress the global nature of the African resistance to colonization, mainly because the diasporization of Africans due to the transatlantic slave trade and similar practices such as the Indian Ocean and Arabic slave trades had already resulted in the forcible transplantation of millions of Africans from the continent to all parts of the world. Continental and diaspora Africans thus participated in the emergence of the modern world from its inception and contributed in no small measure to the formal and conceptual frameworks of modernity in diverse contexts.

Formal colonial rule in Africa lasted until the 1960s, when many African countries secured political independence, although this happened much later in countries such as Mozambique and Angola (both liberated from Portugal in 1975), Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1985) and the Republic of South Africa, which emerged from under apartheid rule in 1994 with

its first multiparty elections.[8] It is notable that European colonial culture in Africa initially intended to produce white settler colonies of the sort found in the Americas, Canada, and Australia, where immigrant whites decimated and largely replaced indigenous populations. Except for the Southern African regions such as South Africa, Namibia, and to a large extent Kenya, where a postcolonial apparatus of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) resulted in a large white population, the attempt failed in most parts of Africa. The transition from colonial rule for many African countries resulted from nationalist anti-colonial struggles which in some cases flared into outright conflict, as in Algeria's bitter war of independence against France. Similar conflicts in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Angola also presaged the end of colonial rule.

The definition and parameters of African identity was central to most nationalist movements. In many colonized African countries, indigenous Africans were excluded from the concept of national citizenship, and in South Africa this hardened into apartheid: a formal system of segregation that rendered black Africans estranged in their own country. The question of modern African identity therefore emerges during the colonial period as part of a broad anti-colonial and nationalist movement. Similar struggles occurred among African diaspora blacks who saw their lives reflected in the colonized conditions of blacks in Africa, leading to the development of global strategies to combat colonization. Pan-Africanism was one such platform, in its articulation by W.E.B. Du Bois and political activist Marcus Mosiah Garvey.[9] The Pan-African Congress Movement was the most notable result of this ideology, starting with the one Du Bois organized in Paris in 1919. This movement built on the momentum generated by the Harlem Renaissance, which offered 'a view of blackness (Africanness …) that found value and beauty in African culture and history as subjects of art, much in the same way African sculpture and religious rituals had penetrated Cubism and Surrealism'.[10]

The ideology of Négritude, conceptualized by Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, Aimé Cesaire of Martinique, and Leon Damas of French Guiana, was arguably the most influential ideology of black subjectivity during the colonial period, and it shaped the works of influential modern African artists such as Ben Enwonwu.[11] Négritude can be used as a generic term to describe the various impulses of black consciousness, and the various movements for rehabilitating black African culture in the wake of colonialism. These include: Aimé Cesaire's militant Caribbean variant and Nnamdi Azikiwe's African Renaissance movement (1930–1940s); Kwame Nkrumah's African Personality Campaign (1950–1960s); Amilcar Cabral's Re-Africanization program in Guinea-Bisssau (1960s); and Steve Biko's Black Consciousness movement in South Africa (1970s).[12] All these movements resisted European cultural domination and sought to rediscover and regenerate black African culture. We may add these to appropriations of international cultural styles and movements (such as Surrealism) also adopted by African artists and nationalists in their struggle against Western cultural domination.

Inventing African Traditional Art in Colonial Culture

Colonial culture wrought great transformations in African art, especially in the forms and contents of indigenous artworks. Studies by various Africanists have documented these changes in detail even if their implications are not always thought out. A bias towards identifying all indigenous artworks that emerged from the colonial era as enduring and timeless examples of African culture has led to major errors in identification and classification. This includes the persistent idea that artworks in indigenous cultures emerge from an enduring and timeless past, based on theories couched in functionalist assumptions about the internal coherence of traditional African communities and their symbolic practices. However, the changing aesthetics and iconography of indigenous art resulting from the colonial encounter suggest African art has always been a dynamic context that constantly adapted to new social, political, and environmental conditions.

It is important to stress that most of the African artworks classified in museums as 'precolonial' or 'traditional' art were actually created during the colonial period and were considered examples of an emergent modernity captured in indigenous idioms and visual languages. As John Picton observed, 'most traditional African art in museums today was made, and subsequently taken abroad, during the height of the colonial period – from roughly 1880 to 1960'.[13] In spite of this fact, they are wrongly described in the literature as evidence of pre-colonial African creativity. Alongside this misidentification, the artists who created these works are often seen as exemplars of indigenous creativity. Take, for example, the great Yoruba sculptor Olowe of Ise (1875–1938), who produced many sculptures under royal patronage at the turn of the twentieth century. Roslyn Walker's influential biography of the artist shows Olowe worked almost exclusively for various Yoruba royalty and aristocrats within a sixty-mile radius of his hometown of Ise.[14] However, he came to global attention when a set of his doors for the palace of the Ogoga of Ikere was exhibited at the 1924 British Empire Exhibition in London and was thereafter acquired for the British Museum's collection in 1925. Olowe is credited with creating several important innovations in Yoruba sculpture. He imparted a suggestion of movement to his figures, thus deviating considerably from the hierarchical rigid frontality of classical Yoruba sculpture. He also developed a technique of carving the surface of his doors in very high relief with the figures protruding almost six inches from the surface and considerably animated by the shadows they threw. Based on the evidence of his surviving sculptures, Olowe painted some of his major artworks with an expanded palette of commercial colors and may have helped popularized polychrome sculptures in Yoruba art beyond the traditional practice of coloring sculptures with subdued earth-toned pigments.

Suzanne Blier notes that changing contexts of power, reflected in the subordination of African royal authority to British colonial rule, led local rulers to use visual arts to compensate for their diminished authority.[15] Olowe's

artworks contained witty references to the emergent colonial order in the furniture and entourage of the Yoruba kings he depicted. Olowe has been praised for his mastery of classical Yoruba sculptural forms, but there is less commentary on his clear experiments with modernist techniques of representation, including his use of commercial pigments and the high relief his sculptures are known for. For example, an Olowe door from the palace at Ilawe-Ekiti shows a king on a ceremonial outing accompanied by an entourage including porters and his wives (Fig. 18.1). The door is divided into several registers and the figures are carved in high relief, with many of them almost three-dimensional, a technique notable in Olowe's doors but largely absent from comparable Yoruba carvings of that era. Olowe shows the king sitting in an imported folding chair, which was a common item used by colonial officers of that era as they traveled around the country on administrative duties. Also, one register of the door shows the king mounted on a horse whose halter is decorated with beadwork. The complex beadwork found in Yoruba art today includes historical examples that used indigenously produced beads (the city of Ile-Ife was a notable bead-producing center in the first millennium, centuries before the arrival of Europeans in West Africa) but

Fig. 18.1 Olowe of Ise, *Palace Door*. Wood and pigment, 20th Century (copyright Femi Akinsanya African Art Collection)

also modern industrial beads. The adoption of imported industrial beads of uniform sizes significantly expanded bead working in Yoruba culture (and South African Zulu culture, and Native American Navajo and Hopi cultures for that matter). Representations of beadwork in Olowe's art thus speak to the wealth of imagery and technique made possible by the availability of industrially produced beads, which in turn speaks to the impact of an emergent colonial economy.[16]

Olowe's imagery therefore documented both African kings and their European colonizers as they jostled for power and authority within the colonial order. His famous doors (carved *c.*1910–1914) that were exhibited in London showed the colonial government's subversion of indigenous authority through its representation of porters carrying a European visitor in a palanquin. Olowe's sculptures were brightly painted with imported commercially produced paint, which showed his awareness of new materials and methods and can thus be classed as a response to modernity in Nigerian art. The significant increase in patronage and commissions that Olowe and other Yoruba sculptors of this era enjoyed was in part due to colonial economics and the new forms of wealth it made available to enable innovative practices that the artists themselves considered modern approaches to representation. These artists engaged the emergent modernity of their societies and cast a keen eye on local and foreign elements that impacted their modes of visual representation. They also incorporated representations of European colonizers into their visual landscape to indicate colonial transformations of the social order.[17]

Theorizing African cultural production of the colonial era as evidence of modernity impacts interpretations of modern African art but it does not imply that precolonial Africa lacked indigenous and unique forms of art. It merely recognizes that from 1500 onwards, Africa was embroiled in changes that inextricably linked it to a global context in which mass movements of peoples and ideas, flora and fauna, caused massive changes in all forms of life and visual culture. Colonialism in Africa came at the tail end of five centuries of change, and its impact should be evaluated accordingly. More importantly, colonialism cemented ethnic identities, which in precolonial Africa were often fluid. As Richard Thompson noted, ethnic processes:

> have been relatively recent historical creations of colonialism and imperialism and the subsequent post-colonial period in which primordial communities have become integrated into new and often unstable state structures. Thus, there is little that is 'traditional' or pre-modern about ethnic differences in Africa … they are part and parcel of a contemporary world and perform critical functions for the combined evolution of that world.[18]

Ethnic identities were not absent in precolonial African culture, but that which we now define as canonical African ethnic identities (such as Amazigh, Yoruba, Omoro, Maasai, Zulu, or Afrikaner for that matter) were concretized during the colonial period.[19]

The encounter between Africa and Europe is documented in the changing forms of African artworks over the centuries, but the transformations caused by colonialism accelerated the pace of change considerably. Thus, while Benin bronze plaques, for example, document the presence and activities of Europeans at the Benin court from 1500 onwards, Benin cultural practices adapted the encounter with Europe into a distinctive Edo cultural matrix that continued to uphold 'traditional' values. We can track such changes in Benin brass casting, which from its inception continually adapted its forms to changing political, social, and symbolic mores. During the colonial period however, changing modes of education and art practice accelerated changes in Edo-Benin art, which now began to show an expanded range of subjects. Benin brasscasters also began to sign their works and individuate themselves from their general identification with the Igun guild that has been responsible for Edo-Benin brass casting for the past seven centuries.

Transformations such as those that occurred in Benin art are relevant to analysis of the changing identities of indigenous African artworks that are often discussed as representative of singular ethnic groups.[20] This is because, to date, studies of indigenous African art have used the idea of ethnic uniqueness to frame questions about the identities of the artists who made these works. For example, the above identification of Olowe of Ise as a 'Yoruba' artist is an overly determined focus on ethnic identity that prevents us from equally seeing him as a modern artist exploring the contours of an emergent global modernity. Ideally, Olowe's encounters with colonial culture and his experiments with modern forms mean we should reclassify him as a modern African artist.

Colonial Culture and Modern African Art

Colonialism contributed to the contested modernity of indigenous African art whose forms and meanings were significantly impacted by new techniques and modes of representation. Modern African art was similarly impacted by these changes because it originates in cultural interactions engendered by modernization processes during the colonial period. It consists of those structures of art production and patronage that emerged in Africa with the introduction of European systems of representation, and its implantation was facilitated by colonial encounter.

Many issues complicate any effort to write an overview history of modern art in Africa. Most analysis omits North African countries and South Africa from consideration and locates the emergence of modern African art/identity within the practice of painting linked to the career of Nigerian artist Aina Onabolu (1882–1963). These include publications by Marshall Ward Mount, Jean Kennedy, Kojo Fosu, Ulli Beier, the anthology produced by N'Goné Fall and Jean Loup Pivin, and the influential catalogue produced by Susan Vogel for the *Africa Explores* exhibition.[21] Most of these books aim for comprehensive analysis of modern art in Africa, and analyze the national and cultural identity of African artists through artworks that reflect the complex interactions between local and global notions of modernist aesthetics. However,

they neither incorporate the history and impact of photography, despite the fact that it predates all other forms of modern art in Africa, nor seriously engage the divergent development of modern art in North Africa (Egypt especially) and South Africa.

A true history of modern art in Africa should aspire to a multiracial analysis that recognizes that modern art in Egypt predates Onabolu. Tolerant attitudes towards figurative art engendered by new development in publishing and photography meant that questions about modernism were already central to Egyptian art by the turn of the twentieth century, as they were to artists in Nigeria and South Africa, as were questions about the relationship between indigenous cultures (which, in addition to African traditions, included Islam) to modern art and identity. White artists in South Africa were equally engaged with similar questions, as we can see from the work of artists such as Irma Stern (1894–1966).[22] Modern African art therefore signified more than the adoption of different modes of practice; rather it signified a reconfiguration of indigenous systems of symbolic communication. In comparison with extant modes of artistic practice in indigenous African cultural systems (such as in the sculptures of Olowe discussed above), it represented not only a difference in degree but also a difference in kind.

A difference in degree implies contiguous ideas and conceptual structures identified as, for example, 'Impressionism' or 'Classical African art' (Impressionist paintings often look alike, and masks predominate in museum displays of African art). Although regional variations exist in individual types such art, their overall conceptual structures and conventions of representation are usually comparable. A difference in kind however denotes practices whose visual and conceptual structures operate along divergent trajectories. That doesn't mean that the different kinds of objects or concepts in question are mutually exclusive but that they diverge enough that we can ascribe unique characteristics to them.[23] For example, concepts of art and visual representation differed in Portuguese and Edo-Benin cultures but both societies evolved notions of value that invested artworks with unique ritual, aesthetic, political, and other forms of meaning. What differs in each society is how underlying values shape the visual forms and makes their art different. Such differences do not preclude changes in cultural notions of value or the possibility that existing forms can be reconfigured. We may thus juxtapose pre-twentieth-century European art's orientation to Greek ideals of form and representation with other examples such as Islamic art with its non-representational visual structure, or African art with its conceptual paradigms of representation. The visual and architectonic logic of each culture's artworks speak to different modes of cognition and articulation of forms. It is therefore important not to describe them as degenerate imitations of, or regression from, occidental perfection. Instead, we can define their differences as a result of variant approaches to realism, divergences in modes of symbolic communication or differences in the articulation of form.[24]

Mary Nooter contends that the structural form of African artworks lies not only in their materiality as images endowed with physical form; conceptual form is equally important and significant 'absences' comprise an important aspect

of African notions of form.[25] Indigenous African societies deployed visual and conceptual forms that were radically different from those in European art. In instances where artistic forms share an affinity in the two cultures (sculpture, for example), visual intent and modes of representation differ greatly. In this sense, although modern African artists appropriate indigenous traditions of visual culture, the conceptual focus of their art differs from those found in indigenous art. Because of this, the practice of contemporary African artists cannot be reduced to a continuation or reconfiguration of indigenous traditions. Even when recognizable continuities exist in both practices, there are major differences in the forms and functions of the objects produced, the methods of art training utilized, notions of art and cultural representation deployed, and structures of production and patronage. Indigenous structures of representation in African art survive in the contemporary era where they engage changing social and cultural conditions by a process of continuous reinvention. The interaction between these extant contexts of indigenous representation and those of modern/contemporary African art provides an interesting analytical problematic.

Modern African art was impacted by the global cultural experience of colonialism which engendered a distinct space of practice and a distinctive cadre of practitioners. Pioneer artists in all contexts faced the task of defining new modes of visual representation and notions of artistic identity and subjectivity. Easel painting was the major signifier of this emergent visual tradition, and like many aspects of modernity in Africa it took root mainly among the African intellectual elite. In European art, the development of easel painting as a favored medium of expression was related to the rise of capitalism in a cultural matrix that privileged individual ownership, private property, and inscription of individual identity for both artist and patron. The development of perspective, and the structured visual and conceptual spaces it made possible suggests that the emergence of easel painting in its European and African contexts was not a neutral indicator of simple changes in artistic practice. Rather, it signaled shifts in modes of visual representation expressed by the articulation of new social, cultural, and contextual spaces through images.[26] These notable changes apply equally to the emergence of easel painting in African art during the era of colonialism.

As previously stated, European colonialism was a major factor in the constitution of modern Africa. It introduced a new order of governance and new notions of individual and cultural identity. It also brought about new forms of cultural practices in art, music, literature, and modes of social organization. The projection of European modes of visual and conceptual representation onto African colonies, signified by the implantation of modern African art at the turn of the century, did not proceed in a cultural vacuum. Many pioneer modern African artists operated in societies with defined ideas about art and visual culture. During the colonial period, these artists appropriated and reconfigured European aesthetic concepts for use within emergent African contexts of practice. In this sense, modern African art spoke not only to the emergence of new cultural patterns, but also to the critical foundation provided by indigenous aesthetic traditions and modes of (self-) representation.

The principal characteristics of modern African art emerged from the tension between its imported European forms and African concepts of art, which played out against a background of colonialism. Emergent identities therefore often reflected individual struggles against Eurocentric rhetoric and the racial tensions of colonial culture. Pioneer modern African artists were shaped by this struggle; their art and emergent identities were therefore political in the most fundamental sense of the word.

The Pathfinder Protocol: Making Modern African Artists

The pursuit of modernism was also a search for a new African identity in the urban context. The pioneer modern African artists discussed here all operated in cities. The concentration of modern art practices in African cities provides a technique for distinguishing between 'traditional' and modern African arts by associating the former with rural, community-based practices. This created what Sidney Kasfir describes as a distinction between 'the subjectivity of the artist living in the multilayered African city versus one whose world is a rural community somewhere in the African hinterland'.[27]

African cities provided new interactions with global commodities and structures of colonial art education that produced important pioneer artists. However, colonial education by itself did not guarantee new forms of modern art, especially since the objectives of colonial educators did not align with the nationalist orientation of modern African artists. Colonial prescriptions for 'native' education ran counter to the globalizing aspiration of the emergent African intellectual elite, which created an antagonistic relationship between the colonial regimes and African intellectual elites that hastened the rise of a radical politics of emancipation.[28] This idea of radical social change that framed liberation and nationalist movements resulted in calls for political independence. In many parts of Africa, it brought a commensurate interrogation of cultural practices in an effort to reconstitute a sense of indigenous identity disrupted by colonization. The aesthetics of radical politics defines a specific focus on material culture within this process of political transformation. In brief, 'radical politics historically covers individual or collective activities for implementing an ideology challenging the fundamentals of the existing system of politics and governance. Generally, it advocates fundamental changes in the political, legal, and economic structure of the existing authority or state, often, but not necessarily, by extreme means'.[29] In the context of modern African art of the pre-independence period, such calls represented a demand for a new visual language that embodied postcolonial aspirations in different African countries.

Let us be clear, none of these pioneer artists was a flag-waving radical: a true radical politics emerged with the nationalist struggle and continued into the postcolonial era (Frantz Fanon is the most notable purveyor of radical politics in the period of nationalism and liberation movements in Africa). Pioneer modern African artists were acutely aware of the contradictions of their lives as they navigated a colonial culture that often supported their careers

while simultaneously marginalizing them. There is also an element of irony in the fact that European languages reign unchallenged in African discourses of cultural identity. The attempt to develop an African literature in African languages, mounted by radical theorists like the Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong'o, was largely unsuccessful. Similarly, modern Africa artists were dependent on European patronage in the colonial context and many of them were trained in some of the best art schools in Europe, often supported by scholarships provided by colonial governments. Ben Enwonwu studied at the Slade School of Art in London, as did Gazbia Sirry and Afewerk Tekle. Iba Ndiaye studied in Paris at the Ecole des Beaux Arts and eventually returned to live out his life there after becoming disillusioned with independent Senegal. Escaping the emergent apartheid regime, Gerard Sekoto left South Africa in 1947, first for London (where he spent three weeks with Enwonwu) but ultimately settling in Paris. Irma Stern studied art in Germany at the Weimar Academy and had her first exhibition in Berlin.

The privileged position of these pioneer modernists in the colonial order and among African intellectual elites constrained the radical potential of their work. Despite these constraints, they invented new visual languages and engaged international discourses of modernity in art. They worried about the meanings of African cultural representation within the matrix of modern art, and their own location within discourses of nationalism and internationalism, achievements now routinely ascribed to postcolonial African artists.[30] In addition, the arbitrary demarcation of modern African art into the colonial and postcolonial periods is often misleading. All the pioneer artists discussed here were also active in the postcolonial period and some lived into the twenty-first century.

Liliane Karnouk, writing about the emergence of modern art in Egypt, points out that:

> The Egyptian artist had to resolve a double dilemma. The first is whether to become an artist in the European, individualistic sense and thus risk losing a connection to the native soil and its traditions, or whether to revive the traditional ethnic arts and risk remaining marginal to the world of international high art.[31]

Other pioneer modern African artists faced a similar dilemma and struggled to escape the limitations of colonially assigned roles in order to define culturally relevant modes of modernist representation. The particulars of their struggle show that regional differences impacted how modern art developed in different colonial contexts.

Differences in the regional characteristics of colonialism in Africa make it difficult to write a comprehensive history of modern art in Africa. The British sphere of colonial control (affecting Enwonwu and Sirry) differed from that of the French (Ndiaye), Italians (Tekle), or Afrikaners (Stern, Sekoto). Iba Ndiaye grew up in the French colony of Senegal, center of France's colonial empire in Africa. For African intellectuals under colonialism, French colonial

policy of assimilation provided an impossible ideal since acculturated Black French intellectuals were confronted with their dark skins as a marker of their essential difference.[32] Britain's policy of indirect rule provided enough space for the continued flourishing of a Nigerian intellectual elite with deep transnational links who became active in the anti-colonial struggle. Nigeria also enjoyed a deep history of divergent and important culture, which Ben Enwonwu referenced through his choice of masquerades as a central motif in his art. In Egypt, modern African art developed through a 'deep and complex cultural revolution' that confronted the dilemma of how to 'articulate the existence of several value-systems historically coexisting within this nation on two levels: the Islamic and the Egyptian'.[33] According to Karnouk, modernism in Egypt 'expressed itself in artists' efforts to transform an Egypto-Islamic style into the new "universal" language of international art, while at the same time express[ing] the new self image of Egyptian political reform'.[34]

Afewerk Tekle contended with a similar issue in Ethiopia, whose long and illustrious history (dating to biblical times) includes the honor of being the only African country to defeat its colonial invaders, in 1896 when Emperor Menelik II beat the Italian army at the Battle of Adwa.[35] Ethiopia's important heritage of Coptic Christian art is reflected in a liturgical mode of representation that constitutes a respected canon. It also has an indigenous script which plays a large role in its monastic scriptorium. Tekle, as an Ethiopian modern artist, carved out a career against these important cultural influences and this placed major constraints on his art.

The lives and careers of South African artists Irma Stern and Gerard Sekoto show how white-settler colonialism complicates analysis of the development of modern African art. The history of South Africa dates back to 1910, when the British colonies in the Cape of Good Hope and Natal united with the Boer republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State to form the Union of South Africa.[36] The resulting state initially comprised Dutch and British settlers and was bolstered by immigration of large numbers of Europeans in the decades after the Second World War, essentially aspiring to build a white homeland for Europeans in South Africa. Despite the obvious problems of amalgamating two groups of whites (British and Dutch settlers, each with their own national agendas), the ensuing Union of South Africa nevertheless inherited an idea of its existence as a nation of white people whose heritage traces back directly to a European ancestry.[37] The assumption that this nation was European rather than African produced a national narrative based on racial exclusivity, which in 1948 evolved into an apartheid regime that marginalized black South Africans and dispossessed them of their lands and resources.[38] The nation constructed around this idea of white supremacy narrated South African history before the coming of the white settlers as *terra nullius* and excluded Africans from citizenship. Isolated by the international community for its apartheid policies, South African art and discourses turned inwards and 'increasingly cut off from major international

art events and movements … remained relatively parochial, conservative and overwhelmingly white'.[39] Additionally, engagement with Western strategies of artistic expression by South African artists were read as derivative by art historians.[40] South Africa's history between 1948 and 1994 is mainly a history of increasingly militant black resistance to the apartheid regime (including an armed struggle), which culminated in a transition to majority rule in 1994. This date, marked by the election of Nelson Mandela (1918–2013) as the first black president of South Africa (he served as president from 1994 to 1999) in the country's first multiracial election, is the true beginning of South Africa's postcolonial era.[41]

The history of South Africa meant that Irma Stern's life and career as a white South African artist unfolded in a context radically different to that of Sekoto. Stern was born in 1894 in the Transvaal to German-Jewish parents. She spent much of her life traveling between Europe and Africa, although more in Africa in her later years. However, she studied in Germany (Weimar Academy, 1913; Levin-Funcke studio, 1914), became associated with German Expressionist painters, and held her first exhibition in Berlin in 1919. She returned to Cape Town and by the 1940s had become an established artist. Irma Stern is considered South Africa's foremost artist in terms of public recognition, and her modernist-style artworks fetch record prices at auction.[42] Her career path shows the intricate links between white South Africans and Europe, and also the complications in defining (white) South African art of this era, which was variously seen as a form of European regional practice.

Gerard Sekoto was also born in the Transvaal in 1913 at Botshabelo, a German Lutheran Mission. According to Chloë Reid, that year was:

> marked by the introduction of the 'Natives Land Act' – the first of the segregation legislations to be passed by the Parliament of South Africa. The series of measures taken by the government to exploit, alienate and degrade non-white South Africans that followed the Land Act drove Gerard Sekoto … into self-imposed exile [in] Paris where he stayed until his death in 1993.[43]

Sekoto's career was on an upswing before his exile. He won second prize for painting in a competition organized by Fort Hare University College in 1938. Encouraged by this achievement, he moved to Sophiatown to pursue a career as a full-time artist. In 1942, he relocated to Cape Town where he interacted with many white contemporary South African artists. Sekoto's art mostly documented black life at the fringes of the urban metropolis. He exhibited his works in a number of galleries in Cape Town and achieved significant recognition but concerns about achieving his full potential under South Africa's marginalization of blacks ultimately caused him to leave the country.

The racial politics of South Africa illustrate the vast differences in the careers of Stern and Sekoto. Stern trained with modernist artists in Germany and had close links with German Expressionists at a time when European

modernists were using African cultural influences to reconfigure all aspects of their art. When she returned to South Africa, her highly individual and modernist style initially proved shocking to Cape Town's conservative public of the 1930s. Stern compounded this shock by her strong interest in portraying black South African peoples. However, her portrayal of black people reads today as rather generic, especially since her interest, like that of her Expressionist antecedents, lay in a fascination with the exotic other. As she once stated:

> it is only through personal contact that one can get a few glimpses into the hidden depths of the primitive and childlike yet rich soul of the native and this soul is what I try to reflect in my pictures of South Africa.[44]

Her statement is deeply invested in the European concept of primitivism and positions her art within a global context of modernist appropriations founded on the unequal power relations of the colonialism that brought African art to the attention of European modern artists.

As a black artist, Sekoto faced a very limited horizon of opportunity, which makes his overall experience, including his exile to Paris, remarkable. As a Christian and the son of a priest/teacher, Sekoto belonged to a new South African black elite.[45] His work reflects what John Peffer defined as a 'struggle for a nonracial aesthetic practice in South Africa within overlapping contexts of the modernist reception of indigenous approaches to art [and] the draconian racial policies' of the emergent apartheid state.[46] Peffer, exploring Seketo's role in the development of 'black modernism', argues that his art presaged the emergence of a non-racial South Africa and depicted his personal exploration of the novelty of urban life. They were also experiments with modernist styles. His audience and principal collectors were white middle-class patrons, critics and artists. Sekoto also interacted with members of the 'New Group', a collective of progressive young South African artists who studied in Europe and in the 1930s opposed the conservative values championed by the institutional South African Society of Artists.[47] According to Peffer, Sekoto 'met with Judith Gluckman and Alexis Preller … painted alongside Preller … and learned the rudiments of working in oil in Gluckman's studio'.[48] These interactions were part of what Peffer defined as 'gray areas', sites and locations where black and white South African artists and culture workers mingled.

The New Group artists initiated an engagement with indigenous South African culture in their works, in an effort to get away from an institutional context that promoted academic art based on European classical forms. Peffer notes that 'it is not unusual in the history of modern art for urban artists to search for some (perceived to be) primitive source material to rejuvenate contemporary cosmopolitan culture' as a cursory analysis of the works of European modernists shows. 'But when the sources were actually part of the

local culture, in the context of settler colonialism, the stakes for cross cultural inspiration or exchange were that much more profound.'[49]

The appropriation of black art by white artists in mid-twentieth-century South Africa was much criticized since its celebration of indigenous African culture coincided with dispossession of black South Africans who were being forcibly evicted from their lands. Peffer carries out substantive analysis of the implications of this appropriation for efforts to produce a non-racial, inclusive art in South Africa. However, he fails to link his analysis to similar developments in other parts of Africa, where modern African artists challenging colonial prescriptions for cultural production often settled on what Peffer defines as 'two sided-appropriation: of modernist technique from Europe and of indigenous [African] aesthetic forms'. Such comparison allows us to link the experiments of the New Group to those of the famed Zaria Art Group, formed in Nigeria in 1958, and Gazbia Sirry's Group of Modern Art (GMA), formed in Egypt in 1948, through which she 'identified with the intersection of artistic ideology and nationalist political concerns'.[50] Okeke-Agulu notes that Sirry and the GMA 'participated in the discourse of Egyptianness, or what it meant to be modern Egyptian in a world of conflicting political, cultural, and artistic ideologies'.[51] But in another context, he does not link this search for Egyptianness to a comparable project of postcolonial emancipation of the Zaria Art Society, choosing to define the latter's program of Natural Synthesis as a unique and sui generis invention.

Conclusion

According to Stuart Hall, identity is subject to a radical historicization and is constantly in the process of change and transformation.[52] The preceding analysis of the impact of colonialism on African art has shown that the search for a modernist identity is tied to the anti-colonial struggle that ultimately codified into broad independence and liberation movements. It also challenges colonialism's efforts to locate Africa's indigenous art in the pre-colonial period. Olufemi Taiwo suggests colonialism, far from being the source of modernity in Africa, has actually been the main obstacle to its implantation because colonial policy aimed at what he calls 'sociocryonics', or the preservation of archaic social forms, through which it undermined Africans' efforts to fully participate in a global modernism.[53] The usual art historical practice of tracing this search mainly through the works of black artists in Africa undermines its validity. A more inclusive narrative encompassing South Africa and Egypt (among other North African contexts) reveals important points of convergence and establishes a common context of anti-colonial struggle for new nationalist and modernist identities in Africa. Comparative analysis is therefore needed for a complete and more inclusive analysis of modern African art and this should now become the focus of our discourse.

Notes

1. For a comprehensive analysis of Enwonwu's career, see Sylvester Okwunodu Ogbechie, *Ben Enwonwu: The Making of an African Modernist* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008).
2. Chika Okeke-Agulu, "Politics by Other Means: Two Egyptian Artist, Gazbia Sirry and Ghada Amer," *Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism* 6, no. 2 (2006): 122.
3. Sekoto's art is chronicled in N.C. Manganyi, *Sekoto: I am an African: A Biography* (Witwatersrand: Wits University Press, 2004).
4. See Bruce Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998).
5. Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1.
6. For analysis of African artists' engagements with modernist discourse, see Elizabeth Harney, *In Senghor's Shadow: Art, Politics and the Avant Garde in Senegal 1960–1995* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). Ogbechie, *Ben Enwonwu*; Chika Okeke-Agulu, *Postcolonial Modernism: Art and Decolonization in Twentieth Century Nigeria* (Durham: Duke University Press); John Peffer, *Art and the End of Apartheid* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); and Liliane Karnouk, *Modern Egyptian Art 1910–2003* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2005).
7. Olufemi Taiwo, *How Colonialism Preeempted Modernity in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).
8. South Africa became independent from British rule in 1910 and instituted apartheid in 1948; its transition to a multiracial democracy is considered more relevant to the discourse of colonialism in Africa.
9. For a general definition of Pan-Africanism, see (https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pan-Africanism). Du Bois's assimilationist approach contrasted with Garvey's vision of independence for Africans through a return to Africa. Both views shaped subsequent notions of African identity.
10. Okwui Enwezor, *The Short Century: Independence and Liberation Movements in Africa 1945–1994* (New York: Prestel, 2001), 12.
11. Négritude became a contentious ideology in the postcolonial era. See Sylvester Okwunodu Ogbechie, "Comrades at Arms: The African Avant-Garde at the First World Festival of Negro Arts (Dakar 1966)," in *One Million and Forty-Four Years (and Sixty-Three Days)*, ed. Kathryn Smith (Stellenbosch, SA: SMAC, 2007), 88–103.
12. Gregson Davis, *Aimé Césaire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 136–57; Patrick Chabal, *Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Shannen L. Hill, *Biko's Ghost: The Iconography of Black Consciousness* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).
13. John Picton, "Art, Identity, and Identification: A Commentary on Yoruba Art Historical Studies," in *The Yoruba Artist: New Historical Perspectives*, ed. Rowland Abiodun et al. (Washington, DC.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994), 1–34.

14. Rosslyn Walker, *Olowe of Ise: A Yoruba Sculptor to Kings* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998).
15. Blier, *Royal Arts of Africa: The Majesty of Form* (London: Laurence King, 1998), 39–40.
16. For analysis of colonial economies in Africa, see Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann, eds., *Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960 (Volume 4: The Economics of Colonialism)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
17. For a comprehensive overview of representations of Europeans in African art, see Nii Quarcopoome, *Through African Eyes: The European in African Art 1500 to Present* (Detroit: Detroit Institute of Art, 2010).
18. Richard H. Thompson, *Theories of Ethnicity: A Critical Appraisal* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 100.
19. Amazigh peoples of Libya; Yoruba peoples of Nigeria, Republic of Benin, and Brazil; Omoro of Ethiopia; Maasai of Kenya; Zulu and Afrikaners of South Africa.
20. For a critique of how individual artworks stand in for whole ethnic groups in the discourse of African art, see Sidney Kasfir, "One Tribe, One Style? Paradigms in the Historiography of African Art," *History in Africa* 11 (1984): 163–93.
21. Marshall Ward Mount, *African Art: The Years since 1920* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); Jean Kennedy, *New Currents, Ancient Rivers: Contemporary African Artists in a Generation of Change* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992); Kojo Fosu, *20th Century Art of Africa* (Zaria: Gaskiya, 1986); Uli Beier, *Contemporary Art in Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1968); N'Goné Fall and Jean Loup Pivin, eds. *An Anthology of African Art: The Twentieth Century* (Paris: Revue Noire, 2002); and Susan Vogel, *Africa Explores: 20th Century African Art* (New York: Center for African Art, 1991).
22. For a comprehensive and multiracial history of South African art, see Mario Pissarra et al., eds., *Visual Century: South African Art in Context* (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 2011).
23. Divergence of this kind is also a characteristic of African art where regional or internal representations of an object, such as a Bamana Chiwara mask superstructure, can result in different visual forms.
24. Margaret Hagen, *Varieties of Realism: Geometries of Representational Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) investigates different interpretations of perspective in European, Asian and African art.
25. Mary Nooter, ed. *Secrecy: African Art That Conceals and Reveals* (New York: Museum for African Art, 1993).
26. These issues are discussed at length in Bram Kempers, *Painting, Power and Patronage: The Rise of the Professional Artist in the Italian Renaissance* (London: Penguin Books, 1994).
27. Sidney Kasfir, "First Word," *African Arts* 46, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 1.
28. For divergent analysis of the conflicts of colonial education in Nigeria, see Ogbechie, *Ben Enwonwu* (Chap. 1) and Okeke-Agulu, *Postcolonial Modernism* (Chap. 1).
29. "Radical Politics." http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/R_0007.htm.
30. See for example, Enwezor, *The Short Century*, and Chika Okeke-Agulu, *Postcolonial Modernism*.

31. Karnouk, *Modern Egyptian Art*.
32. For the impact of the ideology of assimilation on black intellectuals in the global context of colonialism, see Lilyan Kesteloot, *Black Writers in French: A Literary History of Negritude* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1974).
33. Karnouk, *Modern Egyptian Art*.
34. Ibid.
35. Raymond Jonas, *The Battle of Adwa: African Victory in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).
36. Peffer, *Art and the End of Apartheid*, xv–xvi.
37. The brief history of South Africa summarized here inevitably glosses over complicated political and social issues, including the presence of immigrants from Asia whose story is an integral aspect of the evolving political landscape of that period. For details of important political and cultural events of this era, see "Timeline" in Pissarra et al., *Visual Century*, Vol. 1, 198–210.
38. For a comprehensive history of apartheid, see David Welsh, *The Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009).
39. Lize van Robbroeck, "Art in White and Black" in *Visual Century*, Vol. 2 and 3.
40. Partha Mitter, "Interventions: Decentering Modernism: Art History and Avant-Garde Art from the Periphery," *Art Bulletin* 90, no. 4 (2008): 37. Mitter was referring to the history of South Asian artists' adoption of Western strategies of artistic expression, but the statement equally applies to the general reception of modern African art in art history.
41. Sylvester Okwunodu Ogbechie, "Art, Nationalism and Modernist Histories: Writing Art History in Nigeria and South Africa," in *Art/Histories in Cultural Dynamics*, ed. Pauline Bachman et al. (Paderbom: Wilhelm Fink, 2015).
42. *Irma Stern*. South African History Online (accessed October 10, 2016, http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/irma-stern). The biography on this website is taken from Proud, H., ed., *Revisions: Expanding the Narrative of South African Art* (Cape Town: South African History Online and UNISA Press, 2006).
43. Chloë Reid, "The Artist/Sekoto's Life." The Gerard Sekoto Foundation, accessed October 21, 2016, http://www.gerardsekotofoundation.com/artist-overview.htm.
44. Marion Arnold, *Irma Stern: A Feast for the Eyes* (Cape Town: Fernwood Press, 1995).
45. This black middle class was documented in photographs and can be seen in Santu Mofokeng's *Black Photo Album/Look at Me: 1890–1950*, comprising his reworking of nineteenth-century colonial portraits of urban working, middle-class black families.
46. Peffer, *Art and the End of Apartheid*, x.
47. The New Group included Louis Marice, Gregoire Boonzaier, Judith Gluckman, Alexis Preller, Solly Disner, and Walter Batiss.
48. Peffer, *Art and the End of Apartheid*, 3.
49. Ibid.
50. Okeke-Agulu, "Politics by Other Means," 122.
51. Ibid.

52. Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Who Needs Identity," in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London: Sage, 1996).
53. Olufemi Taiwo, *How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

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CHAPTER 19

Intensification and Attenuation: Colonial Influences on an African Culture

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The study of Africa and its development often engenders two opposing camps: the colonialist\neo-colonialists and the colonialists\misdirected leadership. Nonetheless, the external culture and civilization that were poorly grafted upon Yoruba civilization and customary practices influenced several existing institutions; for example, mode of transport, communications, manufacturing practices, credit institution, development of luxury items, and the modification of paid labor. Colonization either intensified or attenuated the normal (perhaps, natural) course of cultural development in the Yoruba nation. In some instances, existing ideas and tendencies that are more compatible with the introduced colonial systems were rapidly promoted as a result of support; those that were not of immediate concern were arrested in their trajectory. The type of support system that enhanced certain practices and discouraged others was not organic to the Yoruba culture and did not develop in its rightful time. This support system, (e.g. tarred roads, motorized vehicles, formal educational system etc., seen as the benefits of colonialism, but in reality, were structural instruments necessary for colonization) produced a false sense of Europeanization or, if you will, of modernization. In reality, this support system or artifacts of colonialism was without its 'European' socio-cultural bases, and hence a complete misfit.

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A significant number of African scholars, especially those of African descent, often observe, suggest, and forcefully lament the destruction of 'African cultures' by the incursion of Western rule, education, and influence. Modern Africa, contemporary Africa, developing Africa, and different qualifiers to Africa evoked in the discursive context of the contact situation, especially contact due to colonialism, suggest a transformation of the existing order. Germane to the works of many scholars in the humanities and social sciences (especially those with an applied outlook and those who consider political, economic, and social transformation as necessary conditions for achieving a more responsive form of governance, as well as improved quality of life and life chances) is the quest to make sense of the continent with its many complexities. One consideration within this view is the exploration of the probable trajectory of the past relative to the present, a second is the effort to recover the usable values presumed to have been upended by the 400 years of exploitative intrusion, especially from the West. Thus, it is not uncommon for these scholars to cast in oppositional terms the discussions surrounding 'African cultures'.

There is no doubt that colonization, neo-colonization, and imperialism involve a conscious disparagement, denigration, and devaluation of the other; these not only make subjugation conscionable, they elevate it to an ideal, a worthy and benevolent cause in which 'civilized' people were bringing 'light' into the 'heart of darkness'. For example, the so-called white man's burden was an urgent call for redemptive intervention. So were some of the ideals of Levy-Bruhl's work that charged traditional Africa as primitive, preoccupied with supernatural forces, superstition and myth, and incapable of abstract and creative thought.[1] The incursion occasioned, in the case of Africa, the arbitrary partitioning of the landscape and grouping of the effaced people into arbitrary administrative and exploitative units, and, eventually, the interruption to a presumed linearity in the developmental trajectory of the people's history. Observers and scholars alike, all describable as products of the colonial milieu, even when they differ in their level of consciousness and dispositions, are equally divided in the way they view this history of interaction with Westernization. More pertinently, they differ in how they examine different African cultures and evaluate their usefulness. These scholars explore African cultures from opposing sides of the historical divide that now sorts this significant event into precolonial (i.e. traditional culture/society) and postcolonial (modern or Westernized) cultures. From the critical inquirers' camp, there are 'cultural revivalists' championed in part by Gyekye.[2] These scholars are favorably and reverentially disposed towards 'traditional' African cultural institutions, which they presume to have not only been denigrated and suppressed, but forcefully disrupted and upended by the colonialists, who imposed their own values through various socio-cultural and political means. Consequently, holders of this view would like to revive, reclaim, and implement 'traditional' African values, especially in solving perennial problems,

most of which are the products of colonialism. This idealization is problematic, as 'traditional' African values remain nebulous, and without a doubt, call up the imagery of exotic practices. I will be arguing, using popular resources, that the deeds and practices of Africans, regardless of the time of existence of the people to whom we attribute them, remain in consonance with universal desires of mankind, especially in the pursuit of life, happiness, and liberty. African peoples employ in these pursuits every available means, without allowing a radical alteration to those cores (values, beliefs, quests, and explanations) indigenous to their formation as peoples, for example Yoruba, Sidama, or Luyia.

Viewing the revivalists as a group of nostalgists are the modernists, among whom a foremost thinker is Paulin Houtoundji. This group advocates a focus on contemporary problems and seeking solutions to them using science and technology. Furthermore, they view as anachronistic the previous political and socio-cultural institutions; this group is affiliated with Western cultural institutions, ideals, and outlooks. They address their concerns to immediate activities of contemporary players and repudiate any presumption to a solidarity[3] of view, or 'the myth of primitive unanimity'.[4]

The discourse around institutions on the continent, including its cultures, remains primarily binary in nature, pitching pre-African (often described as traditional Africa), against contact induced dispositions; that is, modern Africa. Observers are led to either see a truncation to the way of life of the continent, or hegemonic domination of the previously existing (however they may be selectively defined) aspects of the life of the people. Consequently, the emergence of 'new', ways of being, 'strange' ideas, and disciplines that are deployed to engender new power constellations, as well as the different principle in the organization of the society (including the integration through force of Africa into the international market economy), offer an apparent indication of disruption to the ways that such issues were conducted. Furthermore, it suggests not only a severance to the patterns, principles, and philosophies which guided the society at large, but also raises the notion that there were no previously existing ties to international affairs and economy, and where there was some impetus toward the same, it was curtailed. Despite this assumption, wherever one looks, there remain observances, ideologies, and expectations common to the group that challenge the idea of cultural eruption. The challenge to those who not only see the end of 'African traditional cultures' (whatever that means) in the imposition of Western values via colonialism, missionary proselytization, and monetary integration into the Western economy, but also consider it anachronistic and without relevance to the contemporary situation, is to substantiate such claims. In this chapter, I will substantiate the opposing view.

As revealed by the title of this chapter, 'Attenuation and Intensification', my goal is to suggest that there is fundamentally nothing new occasioned into the culture of Yoruba people via European civilization; rather, the new milieu

mainly provided another outlet for already existing tendencies. Some of the existing inclinations were formalized and enhanced while others were attenuated. I will buttress this point by drawing from popular resources as well as 'trivial' and 'circumstantial' events. 'When properly articulated, the use of trivialities to study a society avoids the position of arrogance, especially, the estrangement of the isolated thinker who occupies that world of ideals and perfection and is unencumbered by the vicissitudes of ordinary existence.'[5]

In place of the normative historiography that focuses on the study of different past events such as political, economic, social, and intellectual history, it might be informative to evaluate the idea of rupture and continuity by exploring the activities of ordinary Yoruba people and their outlooks from popular sources to see if the propounded discontinuities could be substantiated or if there is only an intensification of existing tendencies as they pursued life in their own particular ways. The social and moral provisions adopted by a society align with, and insure, not only the evolution but the social transformation of its ideas; they assure its economic viability, sustenance, and social provision in terms of justice and protection.

I will explore, in the fashion of Roland Barthes,[6] the denotations in popular accounts or significations of Yoruba culture to extrapolate possible connotations that point to the intensification and in some cases attenuation of existing tendencies. In adopting this approach, I am very conscious of the danger in pursuing a 'single story' or event. Anti-revivalist scholars would no doubt criticize such homogenization of the Yoruba people as part of the myth of an assumed 'primitive unanimity'. At any rate, the approach that I am adopting involves the referencing of singular instances of events and based on such single exemplars I will build a larger case for the pervasiveness of analogous practices. I will suggest that institutions exist primarily to meet individual and group needs and to the extent that those needs are felt met, the institution will continue. Culture fundamentally involves the organization of a people's world, essentially the subjective component in which is expressed the definer of the self, feelings, and, most significantly, the fulcrum of their actions; that is the ideological concept of culture. Seen in this way, culture comes out in language, spirituality, and other observances.

Statehood and Loyalty

According to the universal criteria of cultures proposed by Murdock, 'the community and the nuclear family are the social groups that are genuinely universal. They occur in every known human society'.[7] The partitioning of Africa culminated in colonization through which Nigeria became a country that is composed of many states in a federation. Western Nigeria, home to the Yoruba people, consists of six states. Now with statehood (the transition from the existing communal formations), individuals, ranging from government

functionaries to citizens are expected to become patriots, whose allegiance is to the state, while maintaining their social and communal ties through which their identities are primarily formed. Loyalty therefore is foremost to the state to which allegiance is pledged. Since at least independence in 1960, every pupil in every school across the nation has pledged allegiance to Nigeria by singing the national anthem every single school day. This daily regimen is designed to foster the spirit of unity and to inculcate in them faithfulness, loyalty, and honesty towards the country, the component states, and the various local government and parastatals that represent the state, and that the people own collectively. A pertinent question however is: Has there been a shift of loyalty to the state?

A casual observation restricted to the Yoruba people, but generalizable across Nigeria (if not the whole continent), indicates that citizenship is local, it is patrilineal, and it cannot be rescinded. The position of every government functionary remains only an outlet to obtain a piece of the national or state resources for his or her own use. The idea for the Yoruba is rooted in the concept of bringing home the fruits (profits) from the farm (*ko ere oko dele*). Traditionally, one goes to farm, and the main farm is always at a distance from the homestead. One therefore sojourns in the farm. This concept of sojourning in the farm is not restricted to actual farming; whatever one's profession, land for the Yoruba is, metaphorically speaking, whatever an individual tills for yield (profession). The gains from such endeavors are expected to be repatriated home, that is back into one's community of birth, homestead, and family. To accumulate wealth abroad is great, but of less significance to the extent that those at home are not beneficiaries of it, or could not vouch that an individual returned with booty from his or her expeditions, because home is our refuge, our resort, and place of succor from sojourn/farmland. (*Ile ni abo simi oko*). This internalized perspective explains why every Yoruba transmigrant has to have a physical presence in their hometown. To appropriate state resources for personal use is not allegiance to the state, nepotism is not allegiance to the state, to offer differential services to clients as a function of their names does not show a transfer of allegiance to the state. Consider the deplorable states of many public infrastructures across Yorubaland, ranging from schools, universities, shopping complexes, roads, and hospitals to name a few. Many citizens comment on their continuous decay and neglect, and no one feels particularly committed to maintain and improve them. Instead, these infrastructures provide continuous opportunities for corruption and theft of public funds. This use of public infrastructures as means of enriching the self or family show that the state remains a foreign concept, poorly grafted onto existing ethnic formations that are more meaningful to the people. Consider a letter to the editor that appears in the *Lagos Times* of 1879. In it, the author decried the waste of public funds when he wrote concerning a public clock that had been erected in the tower of Christ Church, Lagos:

> [A]s a matter of favour, an incompetent man, a carpenter, was appointed to attend to the valuable clock for 30s. per month. A Clock, for which the Government has expended an exorbitant amount, to be spoilt by incompetence. This is a sad defect. It is a crying shame that instead of employing a proper man to do the work, it should be left to a novice, who being ignorant and bashful to express his incapacity, keeps it always out of order ….[8]

Writing and Literacy

The disposition of many scholars (such as Appiah, Wiredu and, Hountondji) is that 'literacy' is inevitable to civilization. Thus, where there is apparent lack of a form of writing system recognizable and decipherable by the West or a Western system of writing, their expeditors, missionaries, thinkers, and colonialist affirm for such places and people the absence of civilization and modernization. This devaluation is of course necessary in order to make savages out of a people, thereby justifying the violence on them and the eventual need for redemptive and civilizing missions. The Western-style literacy instituted into the socio-cultural system of the Yoruba people was embraced; there was no way around it, and it was appropriated and put to work in service of an existing outlook. Unlike the case of the Kaluli people,[9] where the introduction of missionary works and Western-type literacy (including a system of writing) has radically altered their culture, ushering in new communicative practices and social stratification, the Yoruba people retained existing stratification, which indeed is fundamental to their societal organization and they have continued to apportion worth and reverence along the lines previously laid down by their worldview. One achieves the good life, however one can, as long as one does not neglect the *Ori* (the spiritual head). As is often the case with imposition, the introduced system is frequently appended poorly to existing institutions and rarely erodes 'traditional' knowledge. As a new means of achieving the good life, there is overt acceptance and immediate implementation of the new system. The consequence is that the existing knowledge (*awo*) regresses in its secrecy and consequently increases in its relevance as it becomes more difficult to access. It also assumes greater mythic status in its efficacy, since the new model fails to address existing problems; rather, it (the new model) expends whatever capital it has at resolving its inherent and created problematics.

The Yoruba society remains largely oral in character (see below Tidbits). People rely more on verbally conveyed information than on written ones and, indeed, there is an absence of a reading culture. Literacy is pervasive; indeed, 60% of Yoruba people are literate. Reading occurs mainly to the extent that it is related to a profession. A lesser form of reading occurs in the consumption of religious materials from one's denomination. Reading for pleasure or for the sake of knowledge is less common. Now, this is not to discountenance the significant amount of reading going on online, especially, social media. Yoruba people, especially the youth, consume an enormous amount

of information from diverse social media, including Facebook, Twitter, blogs, Badoo, Meetup, Mylife, and Youtube, Whatsapp, and tabloid sites among many others, using mostly handheld Android-enabled devices. The art and nature of the writings of these sources are akin to the oral mode of dissemination of information that the people are already familiar with. It is fair to suggest that such kinds of reading do not deviate significantly from gossip, jokes, comedic illustrations, and grapevine-type information consumption. Since these electronic resources are easily relatable to the existing style of information sharing, these sites attract heavy, voluntary traffic as opposed to the style of information presentations found in scholarly books.

It might very well be that the village square has given way to the Internet community, that Facebook provides more social information than the town crier, that Yahoo! appears to hold a key to 'making it', and formal classroom instruction has replaced certain intergenerational transfer of information. This creative expressiveness of a common past and shared outlook now remains fossilized in the myths and folklores that appear in books that are cited. It nevertheless remains to be shown that this apparent subsuming of the people's 'existing' mode of disseminating and accessing information into new and citable forms equals an obliteration of them.

Since, I am focusing on popular outlets, especially newspapers that were published shortly before and immediately after the pacification of Yorubaland and the formation of Nigeria, it is important to show how writing in newspapers intensified the existing need to narrate. For instance, *sagesm*, a fundamental means of socializing Yoruba children, continued uninterrupted. Rather than being offered as moonlight tales, as was the case prior to European intrusion, it found an outlet through the written word. On April 20, 1927 there appeared an article in the *Yoruba News Ibadan* that introduced a new column called *Awon Akewi* (Yoruba philosophy). The article, which also praised Mr. Denrele Adetimikan Obasa for his innovativeness and foresight in creating the column, noted in its preamble the absence of a culture of reading when it claimed that many indigenes did not as of then value reading and publishing, but certainly would do so later: '*bi o ti le je pe opolopo ninu awon enia wa ko mo riri iwe-kika ati iwe tite, sibesibe akoko mbo* …'.[10] Featured also in this newspaper was Mr. Afolabi Johnson, who had a regular column where he waxed didactic in Yoruba, dispensing indigenous wisdom and modes of admonition. His topics ranged from health to social issues such as 'pick pockets', ethics, and morality. Essentially, what we find in the *Yoruba News Ibadan* is a gradual appropriation of the print media for the continuation of existing oratory.

Another example that illustrates the exploitation of this Western mode of documentation (print media), is its use for the dissemination of existing oral historical accounts. For instance, Mr. E.A. Akintan wrote down one of the existing oral narratives on Yoruba history. This was published on June 28, 1947 in the *Lagos Times* under the title 'ITAN YORUBA' (Yoruba History). In it, Mr. Akintan described the origin of Yoruba people as follows:

> Nimrod in Mecca – a guard/hunter had 3 children – Oduduwa, Gogobiri (founder of Hausa), King of Kukuwa. There was a religious conflict between Muslims and traditionalists. Nimrod was a traditionalist. Islamists won, and Nimrod fled Mecca; the 2 children went East (iwo-orun) and Oduduwa went west (ila-orun). He settled in a city called Yariba – now Yoruba. After many years he reached ile ife after traveling for adorun ojo. There he met agbonmiregun or Orunmila who taught him divination. Oduduwa and his two sons brought two deities to Ife. This created an abundance of deities in Ife similar to the ones in Egypt. E.g. Opa oranyan. Odududwa's first child is Okonbi, who replaced his father; he had 7 children: Iya oba olowu Abeokuta, Iya Oba Alaketu, Oba bini, Rangun of Ila, Olupopo of popo, Onisabe of Sabe, Oranyan-Alaafin. For this reason, we know that all Yoruba people are descendants of Oduduwa.

Essentially, the tendency to narrate their lives and transfer their wealth of knowledge across generations was enhanced by the use of print media, a Western art. The only difference was that once any version of the stories, that were freely told, appeared in print, it not only had to be cited and attributed to an author, but also became standardized.

In his works, Mudimbe explored the dichotomy between the past, that is the traditional, and the modern, focusing on how African intellectuals could make use of the past to make better the future. In this process of extracting the Usable Past to reconstruct the present and perhaps, create the future, he recognized the existence of experts (that is, intellectual African) who were in a position to perhaps extricate the self from the so-called past in the reconstruction of the moment. As noted by Masolo,[11] this recognition of the intellectual as (a) an individual, (b) an individual who is able to operate cognitively and outside of his own preexisting socialization, and (c) as an individual who would discern, using undefined standards to extract the Usable Past, is quite problematic, Furthermore, Masolo's argument against Mudimbe's estrangement of intellectuals as people who rise above their own traditions by their cognitive practice places him at the center of another Western value; that is, the view that experts are isolated producers and owners of the knowledge which their consumers consume. Western literature, which constructs the other, identifies individuality as a major characteristic of the definition of Western rationality, in contrast to the anonymity and collectiveness which are reputed to be the distinctive characteristics of the other. It might very well be that individuals now take ownership of work by authoring them, yet, when it comes to cultural, indeed, life issues, Africans, in this case, Yoruba, continue to draw from the well of their collective knowledge even when such are printed in books under the name of an individual. Rarely is there a Yoruba person who, despite operating cognitively, functions outside their preexisting socialization.

Traditional and Modern

The various elements invaluable in the social organization and administration of the traditional Yoruba society were so codified as to be easily transmitted, retained, and retold using oral modes of reinforcement in the form of dances, dirges, and ceremonies of sacred nature. All these various means of communicating social values, that were cloaked in memorable and enjoyable celebrations, have now given way to an individuated, in a lot of ways, narcissistic perspective of a single thinker found in a self-contained, nucleated form of transmission that is ill adapted to the socio-cultural and environmental base of Yoruba polity. Much as every Yoruba person seeks to harness the advantage of a nuclear family (which is presumed to save them time and money, grants them some privacy, and absolves them from the various obligations entailed in a communal existence as instituted by the Yoruba nation), it is often the case that the nuclear family lifestyle is impracticable in a lot of ways. For those in Yorubaland, one needs the extended family to accompany one to seek the hand of a woman in marriage. No Yoruba woman would be married off without the involvement of the family. One needs the assistance of one's neighbor in running certain errands, even mundane ones such as charging a phone, grinding pepper, child care, support during times of emergency, a naming ceremony, and many others that modernization has generated but has been unable to resolve. For those in the diaspora, who hover in foreign lands where they are mostly tolerated but rarely accepted, kin, even at large, are the reliable source of information on all things and are resource persons in good and bad times. Imagine giving one's child in marriage in the USA, Germany, Canada, or Great Britain and being the only one wearing *agbada* (flowing gown), or being surrounded exclusively by people of different ethnicities. Imagine losing a loved one and there being no-one to commiserate with one. I will never forget when a prominent Yoruba scholar died in the USA and his European wife decided to cremate his remains and refused to hold a funeral ceremony commensurate to his age and achievement as an illustrious Yoruba son. One of his Yoruba colleagues, and perhaps the foremost historian from Africa, wailed and said with unconstrained surprise, '*o ma sun ni na, mi o mo enikankan ti won sun ni na ri*' (She simply burnt him. I have never known anyone who was burnt.) That the deceased man had ended up in a non-Yoruba way (not interred or entombed) remained not only calamitous, but was an abomination. The inappropriateness of 'two-aloneness' (as a couple or nucleated family is seen) as a way of life for Yoruba people, regardless of times and place and the necessity of the community, has given rise to various ethnic-based associations in the diaspora developing to meet their psychological needs.[12]

What is found intensified in the above narrative is the belief system surrounding the burial rites of a Yoruba man who has accomplished his earthly

purpose. According to their ontology and worldview, the Yoruba person is on earth to obtain wealth, have children, and lead a long life.[13] The elderly man who gains all these blessings and dies peacefully is returned to the ancestors through elaborate burial ceremonies that assure his reincarnation. The cremated Yoruba man would have been provided with some elaborate tombstone, possibly with his grave right in from of his homestead. There would have been sculptures describing his life, and perhaps effigies of moments in it. His name and accomplishment would have been inserted in the praise narrative of his lineage (*oriki-ile*). At the very least, he would have had a full-page obituary in one of the national and local newspapers which have now emerged as outlets for the intensification of the flamboyant life and death of a Yoruba icon; and annually, he would be remembered. The following is a remembrance announcement of a Yoruba death in a newspaper in 1920.

> In Affectionate remembrance of Madam LOUISA GABBIDON (the beloved mother of Mr. J. Omosalewa Thomas, Mrs. Comfort Bailey, and Sarah Salako), who departed this life on the 9th of April, 1915.
> **L**ong we will mourn your loss
> **O**h! What a loving mother thou art!
> **U**pon earth thine equal is rare
> **I**s this the end of so noble a life?
> **S**hall thy children without a comforter be?
> **A**las mother! alas! alas!!
>
> **G**ood were thy days on earth
> **A**nd in heaven the reward is sure
> **B**eloved thou art among thy children,
> **B**lessed and beloved also in the Realm above,
> **I**ncessant in well doing she has succeeded
> **D**oing all she could to improve the world
> **O**f her body could be said as of old
> **N**ever shall see corruption'[14]

That this Yoruba man was neither entombed nor accorded these rightful rites, as bemoaned by the scholar friend, shows the persistence and continuity of those significant values ordering the life of the people.

Yoruba Films

Eegungun is a term used for popular performance, the word employed to describe anything from the décor to their name, to their character and their enactment. For instance, there is Eegun Alarinjo (dancer and entertainer), *Eegun Oje* (performing masquerade), *Eegun Agbeji* (itinerant performer). Each masquerade plays a unique role; the various roles include magical

performances, theatrical displays, and political performances. All of these were accepted as legitimate outlets for commentaries and social critique on the king and his chiefs. In addition, there were reverential, commemorative masquerades performed in honor of the ancestors and women. For each *eegungun* performance, there is not only a purpose but also an accompanying storyline. The storyline comes with a complete package, such as a certain pomp and pageantry, a unique character, and exclusive expressions. Included in the popular performance is the mystique which spreads among the people as popular myth. This mysteriousness in theatre is thus sustained and perpetuated and therefore never ceases to dazzle. One popular perception that was spread, and continues, involves the illusion created by the mysterious transformation of an *eegungun* into a lion. The *eegungun* will regain his original nature as long as it did not rain during the performance, otherwise his new form will remain forever unalterable. It is not uncommon to hear even today the murmur within the crowd that the *eegungun* should hurry up before it begins to rain, even if there is no sign of rain. Out of the *eegungun* performances evolved the itinerant performers and entertainers, which morphed into stage plays. When TV stations started in 1960 in Ibadan, the stage theatres turned into sitcoms and, led by Duro Ladipo,[15] the artists began to create films. Sophisticated Yoruba films form a major aspect of the popular Nigerian film industry, Nollywood, and they could be argued to be a continuation of the oral tradition.[16] Significant in the Yoruba films is that their major thematic has not deviated from the preoccupations of the different *eegungun* and traditional itinerant performers. Just as in the olden days, when the performers educated, admonished, and instructed on the various values vital to the Yoruba nation, the Yoruba film industry mainly provides a contemporary illustration to these preexisting tropes. Thus, the Yoruba film industry, in a sense, revolves around the three themes that derived from the Yoruba cosmology and defined the purpose of the earthly journey. These are, riches, longevity, and children. In order to achieve these goals or to assure their continuity when they are attained, the cosmology asks that we reverence the spiritual head (Ori) by keeping watch over it.

Just as in the olden days, when the *eegungun* and their guides received their sustenance and livelihood from the public, contemporary film and TV performers are paid by the consuming public. They are revered as idols and celebrities, just as the *eegungun* and the admiration for them grants them certain recognition which translates into privileges. Essentially, the market square finds an outlet in TV sets, laptops, and various handheld devices. The griot-like nature of instruction finds an outlet in scripts, and rather than it being practiced by a family and transmitted as a family inheritance, there is a democratization of the cast and script writers. The electronic media intensify existing institutions and have not introduced anything new, except for their ability to widely spread the performances (Fig. 19.1).

Fig. 19.1 Masqueraders' family house in Aperin, Ibadan. *Source* The author
Note A banner announces the 2016 festival. Such announcements would have been made by the town-crier. Announcements are not new, the mode is. Having a seal of one's profession is an old practice of the Yoruba people.

Money

For the French philosopher Marcel Mauss,[17] exchange is at the heart of society. While Mauss looked at kinship and solidarity from this perspective, especially the exchange involving individuals in a marital situation, he noted that through gift-giving we understand the many networks that compose the social fabric, including the economic, moral, and religious contexts. My intent here is to note some of the Yoruba's form of exchanges and to point to the underlying self-interest and the interdependence[18] among them. More importantly, I aim to show from citizens' comments that monetary exchange did not come with the Europeans; rather, there were already established systems for the exchange of goods and services based on a local currency. This traditional Yoruba means of exchange was in place when the colonialists came. They also used cowries until the pacification of the Yoruba, when British currency was formally introduced, thereby supplanting the cowries. For instance, according to the *Lagos Times* of October 1878, cowries were still in use in the Yoruba country for stipends and for the passage to and from Ibadan. For

instance, Mr. Ambekemo wrote a rejoinder on November 11, 1878; it pertained to a previous letter to the Editor about the so-called 'Christian Parakoyis of Abeokuta', defined as self-constituted, because 'in this our country, by paying large sums of cowries in shape of bribes, one can do what you good people in England would consider almost impossible'. Those expeditors, travelers and merchants who for instance, needed people to move their goods from one city to another (for example, a heavy load transported from Abeokuta to Ibadan) would pay contractors to undertake the journey with them, carrying their luggage. The trip to Ibadan from Abeokuta attracts up to five strings of cowries, the equivalent of £1.5/- (one pound and five shillings). Colonialism did not abrogate monetary exchange, neither did it introduce it; rather, it only introduced a different form of currency and exchange rate. International trade was not new: Yoruba people traded across the border, they were involved in the trans-Sahara trade to the Middle East. Without a doubt, they were integrated into European trade through colonialism, and the values of their commodities were pegged to a different culture and values. Nevertheless, such integration could possibly have evolved organically had there not been any external interventions. What do Yoruba people exchange and how do they make use of exchange? When examined critically, the impetus for their engagement in exchanges has remained unaltered. There were exchanges with the gods, there were exchanges involving pawnship, and there were exchanges in their quest to achieve the good life.

Human Sacrifice

In 1882, the *Lagos Times* reported on human sacrifice in Yorubaland. The story ran as follows:

> Rev. C. Phillips, native missionary at Ode Ondo, in Ijesha Country, in a sermon spoke to two main concessions exacted from the people: 1. To end human immolation at the death of an influential or consequential persons. (standing in the way of this is the profit to the king to whom a slave is given for each sacrifice that is made). 2. They consented, quite reluctantly, but with conviction based on Christianity to end two main public immolation of human beings that are made periodically between July and August each year to Esu, in order conciliate his much-dreaded anger and cruelty. The second one is to Oramafe, the diviner at Ife, 'who gives to the earth its fatness'. Since yam is the staple food of the people and at the root of their economy, the chief babalawo remains steadfast in arguing against their abolition, against the counsel of some chiefs. According to the report, 'The power of the priesthood in the heathendom here is by no means to be despised. The people are certainly priest-ridden.[19]

While the exchange of currency for food and services is a normal daily and temporal necessity, the most significant form of exchange occurs between humans and the various deities. Born out of their cosmology, which institutes

theocratic rulership of their lives, every Yoruba curries the favor of the different deities charged with the delivery of different services to ensure they lead a good life and completely realize their apportioned lots on Earth and that those apportioned goods are secured. These various gods must be palliated through obedience to their wishes, not only so that they continue to perform their duties to the people, but also to avoid their wrath that is bound to be incurred should they consider that there has been a breach in the covenant with the people.[20] This, despite the obvious advantage to the king and to the Babalawo (as suggested in the news report quoted above), is the subtext of the sacrifices made to them on a regular basis. The highest form of reverence that could be shown to the gods included the offering of a human life. Nowadays, there are no overt human sacrifices made to the gods as was the case in the olden days. However, animal sacrifices continue for Muslims, while the traditionalists and the Christians have outsourced this practice, accepting, for instance, the sacrifice of Jesus Christ as adequate. Regardless of the confession, the efficacy of the blood in the social institution is inviolable. At every situation, the Christians plead the blood of Jesus. In this regard, it is particularly important to underscore the persistent worldview guiding physical exertion on earth. According to a slightly deterministic view, the Yoruba people claim that to work while others are playing and to fast while others are feasting would not make one rich or prevent one from becoming fat. (*Kaa sise nijoti gbogbo aye nsere o pe a lowo lowo, ka gbaawe nijo gbogbo aye njeun o nii a ma san ra, ori ni yo ni.)* The spiritual head (Ori) is the provider. Despite this, the Yoruba insist that humans are given legs so that they can work out their own accomplishment. Consequently, to actively supplement belief, through magic, medicine, and sacrifices, does not contravene faith. To not do so would be negligent. This firm understanding, of 'belief and supporting work', informs the various observances infused into whatever received confession the people exhibit. So, Yoruba people engage in extraneous sacrifices to the gods in order to activate all blessings.

In today's world, it is not uncommon to hear complaints against human smuggling, identity theft or impersonation to gain entry to those choice destinations where we presume life would be better for us. Whatever the reason, this practice is not new either. Human cunning and the quest for self-interest remain effective in engineering sources for gain. In the same report of March 1, 1882 was the news from 'Ondo country' about the execution of criminals in place of the existing practice of using them for immolation sacrifices at funerals or selling them off as slaves. Arguably, immolation sacrifices have been attenuated if not abolished due to colonization. This is about the only definite change in the habitual practices of Yoruba people. This, however, does not mean that using humans for ritual purposes has been completely eradicated, despite the capital punishment attached to it. Enslavement continues surreptitiously. Essentially, capitalism is not new to the Yoruba people; neither is circumvention of laws or treaties for gain.

Slavery and Pawnship

According to a letter to the Editor of the *Lagos Times* published February 6, 1882, Libertas, perhaps the penname of the author, decried ongoing slavery in the form of pawnship when he wrote:

> No money interest is paid upon the loan contracted, but the personal labour of the unfortunate pawn till the time the loan is repaid; which is always left open … The pawn receives not a fraction of payment for his toils. Should he die before payment of the loan is made, or should he desert his master, a substitute is to be provided. This wicked slavery is practised under the eye of British law, and that sometimes by persons calling themselves Christians.

Further, the author noted:

> It is sometimes the case that unwary people are decoyed from this place to be sold into slavery in the neighbouring [sic] non-British countries … Slaves bought in and brought from countries beyond British borders and registered as aliens have sometimes been decoyed out of Lagos by those who have registered them as their distant relatives and connections or other friends, and sold off again as the case may be, and there are never wanting those who would help such persons in their wicked transactions.[21]

The author identified as culprits 'young people of intelligence, jurors, as among important owners of slaves'.[22]

There were responses to this assertion. One was a rejoinder written by J. Marshall, the Chief Justice of the Gold Coast Colony. He wrote that 'formerly domestic slavery on the Gold coast was recognized and supported by the Government; but owning, or debt slavery, never was'.[23] It is of no consequence to this discussion whether *de jure* or de facto slavery (either properly or vicariously as pawnship or debt services) was practiced; historians have produced significant works in this area to show the presence of commercial transactions based on the use of pawns.[24] Of importance to me in my pursuit of the trivial and supposedly inconsequential but life-defining practices is the uncovering of a state of mind that informs habitual behaviors. The Yoruba say: *o ni aburo, o so pe o leru, ise wo lo ran eru, t'aburo o je*? (You have younger siblings and you claim that you have no slaves/servants, what services do slaves render that your younger sibling are unable to perform?) The use of relatives in a pseudo-slave position continues despite political speeches and judicial injunctions. Nearly all upper-middle-class and elite Yoruba people, especially (as noted in the 1882 letter) learned individuals, people of consequence, and jurors, are intensifying this practice with increasingly sophisticated and nuanced perspectives that obfuscate the inherent exploitation. The owners of these enslaved or pawned individuals consider themselves to be benevolent, offering socio-economic and academic support

for the advancement of the beneficiaries in exchange for minimal domestic services. With a hierarchical and pyramidal spiritual model, which is made up of a retinue of gods and subordinate gods in declining order of power and influence, a hierarchical political order consisting of a king and ranked subordinate chiefs, and a hierarchical family structure with the father at the top and members of the agnatic descent ranked in order of influence based on age and sex, the Yoruba social structure is dominated by the concept of the big man. This spiritual and temporal pyramidal structure that produced the principle for the organization of the Yoruba nation generates the mindset or worldview that culminates in the practice of 'bigmanism',[25] which makes a mockery of philanthropy.

Often the corruption in the government is rooted in the use of state funds to secure the loyalty of a vast number of followers in a patron–client relationship. At each ladder in the hierarchical set-up, the 'big man' employs carrots and sticks and is without sanction except by a higher influence. In 1882, the *Daily News* carried the following news:

> [R]eport concerning the cruelty of Ogundipe, a powerful Abeokuta chief, known to have within the past 12 months preceding the report murdered at least 40 of his slave wives. He is said to take pleasure in compelling his wives to drown their offspring in a river, delights in human sacrifices, and frequently, after decapitating his victims, he has been known to drink their blood as personal offering to his sanguinary deities, he has been known to starve his slaves to death just for personal amusement …,[26]

While these gory acts have now become attenuated, it is fair to ask if there is law and order in the contemporary Yoruba nation. Presumably, there is no more now than there was when Ibadan was emerging as a military state, nor any more than when Abeokuta was warring against all sides for survival, nor any more than when Kosoko and Dopemu feuded for Lagos, and certainly no more than when Basorun Gaa held sway in Oyo, or the mercilessness of Dahomey when they invaded and destroyed Imeko. Power, position, and influence ruled and continue to do so. As long as you have the means to coerce obedience, your wishes become the standard of etiquette and you remain unassailable. Actually, you are considered valorous. Yoruba people value valor, and modernity has only intensified this social value.

Class and Gerontocracy

Class is endemic in Yoruba social interactions due to a built-in stratification across several social strata. People are primarily stratified by age. More than a week into my research at the National Archive at the University of Ibadan, one of the supervisors suddenly decided to implement a rule that I had never

before encountered. It included me providing my name, my address, email and phone number. I complied, but since my Nigerian number was new, I did not have it memorized and could not supply it. He decided that I would not be allowed to use the facility until I had supplied the phone number. According to him, 'we need to know you'. I asked him to produce the written policy that he was now implementing. He said, it is known and he does not need to produce it. I asked for his name. He said, he was Alabi, J.B. I said, 'Alabi, I do not have the phone number and I will take this up above your level'. He was so infuriated, he almost spat fire. He became belligerent, rude, and disruptive, just because I had called him by his name. According to him, 'I am more than you'. It took a while for me to understand the meaning of the utterance and to correlate it with the behavior he exhibited. Just on his conviction that he was older than me, he did not expect me to question him or call him by his name.

Exploring the interaction of Yoruba people on the Internet list-serve USA/African Dialogue, Agwuele[27] in 2012 showed how the ire of participants would be incurred should someone they presume younger than them did not adhere to the traditionally sanctioned mode of address reserved for an elder. Agwuele[28] also documented the manner in which such English terms of address as '*sista, broda, onkul,* and *senior*' are deployed to maintain stratification by age. As a result, someone older is called '*broda* or *sista*' depending on their sex, not because they are related to the younger person who addresses them so, but because social distance has to be maintained at all times. In exchange for this accordance of deference that comes with privileges, the 'senior or older' person is empowered to intervene in the affairs of the younger person and use them as their butler. The younger receives gifts and gets the benefit of the knowledge and experience of the seniors as well as their goodwill. The traditional hierarchy remains pervasive. Individuals are expected to know their position and to keep within their status. Each is expected to offer deference to those above them and trample forcefully on those beneath. The only time that gerontocracy is displaced is when an individual by sheer force of character achieves acclaim in the form of exceptional notoriety, wealth, or success. This form of reciprocal relationship is strongly upheld within the patron–client relationship.

Tidbits

African Time

At the Society of Arts in 1882, Captain Cameron read out a paper on 'The Gold Fields of West Africa'. He reported concerning his journey: 'As soon as possible we started. The ordinary African delays, of course, occurred'.[29] The said African time is not new, it would seem from this report, and had already become so well known as to merit no definition or explanation. The Captain

stated it as a matter of fact. Has anything changed? Watches, to some extent, remain just pieces of jewelry to complement appearance and accentuate attire. The joke is that if you invited a Yoruba to dinner at 6 pm, s/he starts to shower at 6 pm. Although trivial, this stereotypical behavior emerged out of a worldview and frame of mind claiming that *kitakita o dola, ori lo ngbe ni* (regardless of its extent, exertion does not equate success/wealth, only the head grants success[30]). So, time for the Yoruba is a phenomenon. While the West mainly keeps and marks time, the Yoruba person owns time and is not constrained by it. Were Ali Mazrui[31] to offer an opinion on time, he might have said that Africans became complacent about time because they reside in the midst of natural abundance and therefore were not in any way compelled to invent or exert themselves unnecessarily, unlike the Europeans, who are at the mercy of harsh weather and climatic conditions. African time is also intensified by the material consequences of modernity: African infrastructures are inimical to the running of a system, ill grafted to a radically different socio-cultural condition. They have, over time, become so dilapidate, due to lack of maintenance (that is the result of a different consciousness, in addition to other factors already discussed), that even with the best of intentions, time and appointments cannot be kept. A road trip of a hundred kilometers is fraught with so many uncertainties and there are no provisions for emergencies, or even alternate routes. People therefore resort to prayer to accomplish even the most mundane things. This by itself is not new; uncertainties have accompanied Yoruba existence since Oduduwa climbed down an iron chain to found the nation, starting from Ile-Ife.

Fraud

Avarice and greed have always triggered fraud, regardless of the introduction of exact quantification by numbers and measurements. For instance, the January 1, 1878 edition of *African Times* wrote to denounce the practice, which did not fool any one. According to the report, natives were buying 30 yards of fabrics and 2 gallons of oil but were actually receiving 26 yards and 1.5 gallons of spirits due to dubious measuring devices. The Ibadan were particularly concerned about the Egbas and Ijebus, who sold them alcohol containing scarcely 12% spirit (i.e. pretended spirits, of which seven-eighths is water), and they were also keen to get 30 yards of cloth instead of 25 yards. Go through any gas station in Yorubaland: no-one really believes that they are obtaining the same quantity of liters that the pump indicates, despite the fact that the customers added extra tips to the salespeople pumping the gas in order to obtain the advertised price. The women at Gbagi, Dugbe, and Bodija markets have the underside of their pans beaten in just to reduce the volume. Such a pan, known as a *kongo*, is the standard unit of measurements for selling staple foods such as rice, garri, and beans in smaller quantities rather than in bags. Short measures and adulteration continues

and intensifies. The government, you ask? They are too busy tinkering with the budget and individual allocations to be bothered with such mundane matters as the worth of 'peanuts'.[32] Remember, statehood has not attenuated filial feelings and loyalty to ethnic origins; hence government is only one of the sources for unlimited funds to maintain the patron-client system.

Gambling: Rondo Rondo

On August 6, 1861, King Dosunmu ceded Lagos to Britain. In 1914, Nigeria was born. By 1921, there were already letters to the Editor of *Lagos Weekly* complaining about the gambling on the streets of Lagos. On April 10, 1920, the writer Veritas described them as itinerant bands, noting the large scale of this business that preyed on people's avarice. Every adult in Ibadan will recollect seeing at one time or another the itinerant magicians and tricksters known as Rondo Rondo. They turn tricks with cards, with a stone or marble hidden under one of their three cups which they shuffle around for unsuspecting clients to choose. Whoever chooses the cup with the stone under it wins double or triple the amount betted. No one ever wins.

The Goal of Earthly Existence

The quest to obtain and secure the good life as instituted by the Yoruba cosmology has always preoccupied the people. It ranges from the time of ascertaining one's destiny immediately after birth to the use of divination to resolve life's problems, and the transposition of such to those received confessions Christianity and Islam. It used to be that through word of mouth the reputations of powerful diviners, healers, and medicine men were broadcast. Making known one's profession not only intensified with the advent of written words; newspaper advertisements are made less transient. Readers can retrieve them and uncover their content in the same way that historians research the documented deeds and quests of the peoples. Being vested in knowing what the future holds for them, it is customary to inquire the content of a new year towards the end of a year. Eight years after the birth of Nigeria, Adam I. Animashaun, an Arabian astrologer, wrote his predictions for the year 1922. According to him:

> Various kinds of winds and sickness will exist in this year.
> Death of kings, chiefs and influential men will be prevalent
> The epidemic of small pox will break out,
> Deaths of children will occur frequently as well as those of old men and women …
> There will be very good crops and plenty of rain
> Cattle sheep and all sorts of Quadrupeds will breed well.
> Pregnant women will experience difficulty before and during child birth ….[33]

Following his predictions for the year, which he claimed would come to pass between January 22 and April, he took out a personal ad touting his qualification as 'Author of Arabic Nigerian Almanack and Proprietor of the Times of Nigeria', reaching out to one of the most fundamental needs of the people:

> If you want to know about your future or that of your relatives what profession suites you what country our fortune lies in whether your [sic] have a long life or not, what day is your lucky day, what wife will best suit you, cause of your ailments and its remedy what is condition of your relatives or friends however far away they may be from you whether pregnant women will easily and safely brin [sic] forth or not and whether the offspring will be male or female whether you will recover from your sickness or not and whether trade commercial partner will be successful or not and a full reading of your life apply to the named astrologer free of charge at his office ….[34]

We merely have the intensification of existing inclinations; nothing is new in all of these developments. While the astrologer appeals to those worldviews of his people pertaining to their earthly goals, pitching his offerings around wealth, procreation, and longevity, the European merchants and their marketers did not fail to exploit the same motif in targeting the Yoruba people with goods by the Europeans in the same newspaper and in the *Yoruba Newspaper*. In both we find ads selling health-related drugs and tonics, for example the Lake Breeze Motor fan that was propelled by burning kerosene was being sold to the elites as a cure for certain ills. Or the blood tonic from Dr. Cassell, who had a remedy for every single ailment. They ranged from tablets which he claimed 'make you strong and healthy, cure all the troubles of weak mean' and also prevented 'malaria fever and dysentery, vital exhaustion, nerve weakness, etc'. There was Phospherine, advertised as the best tonic medicine; Winox wine food, described as 'A delicious wine without drugs and the only tonic giving analyses of content on every bottle; it prevents influenza, fevers, malaria … nervous weaknesses'. And Hall's Wine which 'banishes weakness and depression', 'makes you strong and always vigorous'. There was Sloan's liniment that kills pain, rheumatism, sciatica neuritis, backache; Veno's lightning cough cure which also cured influenza and catarrh. Dewitt's Pills were billed as 'the world's greatest remedy for rheumatism and backache and disorders of the kidneys and bladder'. Similarly, in the Yoruba newspaper *Eleti-Ofe*, advertisements were made in English and Yoruba. For instance, 'White's Radial Gonkiller', captioned in Yoruba as 'Egbogi Alawotan Atosi' was billed as the cure for Gonorrhoea (sic); Mentholatum was captioned as 'Ipara Awo'gba Arun', and to the Yoruba hunters were marketed American cartridges for 'a no disappointment, western clean kill at any distance' by Nigerian Sporting Goods Depot[35]. Even Christians were not left out: the International Bible Student Association marketed their own literature as follows: 'The outworking of

the Divine Plan made more interesting than the best novel ever read. God's beneficent designs for all the human family – the overthrow of the Devil and his earthly organization – the deliverance of oppressed mankind into peace, happiness, liberty and life …'.[36] For those who now reside in the city and perhaps are no longer satisfied with moonlight tales and Elaloro, the traditional mode of entertainment and teasing the brain,[37] the *Lagos Weekly Record*, starting from July 5, 1930, began to include crossword puzzles in their publications.

As trivial, mundane, familiar, or perhaps strange as these stories gleaned from newspapers may seem, especially with respect to the forms of things and manner of events that form the content of the people's existence, when viewed through the prism of culture (that is, an aggregate of learned patterned knowledge that informs attitude towards material and non-material entities as well as conducts), then they begin to take a decidedly remarkable, realistic quality that one can easily relate to but immediately requires theoretical explication. After many years of obtaining other perspectives, interacting with and experiencing the ways of life of the other, I cannot but agree with Hall (1959) that the highly personal things are the most pertinent cultural data. These things are indicators of an emergent frame of mind. Bit by bit, through one seemingly minor and inconsequential act, thought, dos and don'ts that follow one after the other, we build up those categories of importance that we have assigned to set until it is a governing system, carefully fitted to administer the society and guard our ways of life. Thus, the main template in organizing and maintaining Yoruba existence appears to remain intensified even when the people assume differing European garb. Such fundamentals, that is culture, 'a mode in which we are all cast, and [that] controls our daily lives in many unsuspecting ways'[38] is rarely destructible, save for the total annihilation of its owners.

Back in the rusty city of Ibadan, the town of warriors, home to the restless traders, there are many things that are quite obvious: hotels of different sizes, club houses, pipe-borne water, paved roads, taxis, buses, okadas (motorbikes), cocoa house, the tallest building in the city with its elevators, cinemas, swimming pools, and neon lights etc.; all marks of modernity and Westernization. Nevertheless, anyone of experience would immediately see the huge contrast to the Western world in the organization of these things as well as the difference in attitudes that they elicit from the people. Of course, any casual observer will quickly point to those techniques of transport, health, education, certification and accumulation. Is there really anything that is bold, new, defining, and radically transformative in the contacts of cultures of Yoruba and Great Britain? It would seem to me that there remains nothing but the intensification of those positive concerns and the attenuation of those with obvious negative consequences.

These newly introduced cultural artifacts (or elements of modernization), as mentioned above for the city of Ibadan, are mainly other means through

which existing tendencies have adapted to newly introduced realities. Since learning, for instance, replaced biological adaptation in humans, the role of instinct has become replaced by culture. Cultural reactions for humans have become as trusted as is the blinking of the eyes for preventive and lubricative purposes. Society has also become so dependent on cultural reaction to existent that its constancies are adjudged inviolable. To illustrate the preceding view, consider Yoruba people's internalized worldview concerning appearance. A certain ill-will is stimulated, that ultimately provokes violence, when an adult Yoruba male wears his hair in an unkempt fashion, that is to say, in dreadlocks.[39] That hairstyle is judged to be a sign of non-conformity to the carefully crafted societal segregation between the forest world, presumed to be infested by nefarious spirits (*igbe*) and the cultivated, orderliness of the city (*ilu*). The city, it is believed, is a place of light and transparency; as such, there is no danger of evil lurking around. Thus, whoever comes across such a dreadlocked person, who personifies the evil from the dark forest world, is duty-bound to exterminate such evil and save their fellow citizens. The violence that is visited upon such a person occurs instinctively, is a cultural instinct. Culture in a lot of ways is indeed the assignment of sets to categories, which once determined mainly unfold in the manner in which the assigned category is treated.[40]

Conclusion

Business attire, that is, a buttoned-up shirt, sport coat, and tie worn with a pair of slacks and black shoes whose heels produce a stepping noise of importance as one approaches an office, did not displace the more regal and respectful flowing gown *(agbada*); rather, business clothes accentuated class (e.g. the class of *akowe*, secretary, that has now morphed into personal assistant). The *akowe* forms the retinue of personnel attending to the personal needs of the rich, who announces their importance by the number of such minions that enhance his/her cult of personality (bigmanism). The business attire, with its brusque salutation, defines the working class, while the chiefs and the *nouveau riche* with their time-consuming gowns continue their ritual of affluence, reflective of certain class, attainment, and position. Elaborate prefatory greetings attend even the briefest casual encounter.

Recycling? We came from nature and to nature we shall return. Out of respect for nature, the Yoruba seek only their place. They carve out of nature a place of abode and places for cultivation, they seem to maintain a careful pact or bargain struck with other earthly inhabitants. Yoruba people do not venture into the forest, and the forest dwellers stay in their territory. To cross the divide between the city and the forest requires strength. A fortified hunter goes into the forest to overcome game for food; if, in the process, he/she falls prey to a stronger creature, that person is mourned but no blame is ever attached to the animal.

A careful balance is maintained at all times. Things obtained from nature are returned to nature. When at dawn you walk through the alleys between the houses, stepping over gutters, or open sewers in Ibadan, you are very mindful, watchful, and attentive. You are mindful not to step into things that will glue to your shoes with smells that trail after you. You are watchful to immediately avert your gaze, especially from crouching figures beneath whom streaks a watery substance. You are attentive and watchful for the creaking noise of windows or gates opening so that you duck quickly; because the later apology, *e maa binu, ito o omo yin ni* (Please pardon, it was only the urine of your children) which is meant as a palliative cannot undo the damage. You are lucky if it fell on your shoes or splashed your trousers. These different examples illustrate the Yoruba simply putting 'out' of the abode those things that they do not need in hope that the wind will blow them back into nature. Other examples include sweeping the front of the compound further away from the main house in hope that the debris will return to earth. This is no different from letting anything out of our hands wherever we may be as a form of recycling. Since (we) Yoruba did not modify anything so radically that we are not decomposable, we rarely pay attention to the lifespan of those things that are now chemically altered, including plastic bags and dead vehicles. The constructed drainage systems are additional spaces for getting rid of refuse and rubbish. To the Yoruba, all these consist of *eyinkunle* (backyard, actually, behind the residence). *Ehikunle* is '*akitan*' (refuse dump), *ehinkunle* is '*igbe*' (forest), ehinkunle is '*ibi igbonse*' (toilet). Coming to our aid in the recycling of waste is a web of animals such as: dogs, cats, rats, and rabbits. Their efforts are augmented by incineration. Finally, whatever is left within the immediate environment/abode, '*iwaju ile*' (front of the compound), is removed by torrential rainfalls.

There appears to be a resurgence of the old ways in popular culture; perhaps we willingly chose to ignore their existence until providence forced their acknowledgment upon us in all we do. The belief in the supernatural is organic and the socialization within them remains uninterrupted. While most households in Ibadan with young children foster Nigerian English upon their school children, and while some pretend to find the Yoruba language limiting, presuming greater opportunity in some creolized foreign tongues, at the most unexpected moments Yoruba sayings, aphorisms, and proverbs spring up, reaching the heart of the Yoruba person. Fresh, as if newly minted, they broadcast the life that has always been there, the life that we have always led, the beliefs that have always guided actions, informed decisions, and given words to prayers that have been uttered ever so silently. They remind us of the taboos that we have observed without acknowledging their source and importance in our interactions, they rekindle those values that have always defined us as Yoruba. At that instance, it becomes clear that we have never departed and our core has remained undiminished. The very self, including culture and ideals, is like treasures of eternal value that are secured in their

hiding place while we seek to add to them. The corporate nature of the Yoruba people makes hoarding a lifestyle: we keep what we have, we obtain from others what is of value and we increase, rarely giving up that which we possess.

Notes

1. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality* [*La mentalité primitive*] (New York, NY: AMS Press, [1922] 1978); Lucien Levy-Bruhl, "How Natives Think," in *African Philosophy: Selected Readings*, ed. Albert Mosley (New York: Prentice Hall, 1995).
2. Gyekye Kwame, *Tradition and Modernity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
3. Anthony Appiah, *In My Father's House: African in the Philosophy of Culture* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1992), 26.
4. Hountondji Paulin J., *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), 60.
5. Augustine Agwuele, *The Symbolism and Communicative Contents of Dreadlocks in Yorubaland* (NY: Palgrave 2016), 23.
6. Roland Bathes, *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers (London: Vintage Press, 1996).
7. George Murdock, *Social Structure* (New York: MacMillan, 1949), 79.
8. Letter to the Editor, *Lagos Times* of April 20, 1879. (Author not named.)
9. Bambi B. Schieffelin, Introducing Kaluli Literacy, in *Regimes of Value*, ed. Paul Kroskrity (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research, 2000), 293–327.
10. The Yoruba New Ibadan, April 20, 1927 (p. 6).
11. D.A. Masolo, "An Archaeology of African Knowledge: A Discussion of V.Y. Mudimble," *Callaloo* 14, no. 4 (1991): 998–1011.
12. See, for example: Charles Adeyanju, "Yoruba-Nigerians in Toronto: Transnantional Practices and Experiences," in *Yoruba Identity and Power Politics*, ed. Toyin Falola and Ann Genova (Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press, 2006); Akintunde, Oyetade, "The Yoruba Community in London," *African Languages and Cultures* 6, no. 1 (1993): 69–92.
13. For a full discussion see, Ayo Opefeyitimi, "Iwure: Medium of Communicating the Desires of Men to the Gods in Yoruba Land," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 18, no. 17 (1988): 27–41.
14. Published by J.O.T. in the *Lagos Weekly Record* (April 4th, 1920): 8.
15. See Ebun Clark, *Hubert Ogunde: The Making of Nigerian Theatre* (Oxford University Press, 1979).
16. Joel A. Adedeji, "Oral Tradition and the Contemporary Theater in Nigeria," *Research in African Literatures* 1971: 134–49. See also Hutchison, Y. "The Seductive Dance between History and Literature: The Moremi Legend by Historian Samuel Johnson and Playwrights Duro Ladipo and Femi Osofisan," *South African Theatre Journal* 13, no. 1 (1999): 31–47.
17. Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies* (London: Cohen and West, 1925 [1954]).
18. See, Edward J. Lawler and Shane R. Thye, "Bringing Emotions into Social Exchange Theory," *Annual Review of Sociology* 25 1999: 217–44.

19. The story, on page 31, was published in the March 1, 1882 issue of the *Lagos Times*.
20. Now classic, Karin Barber's, "How Man Makes God in West Africa: Yoruba Attitude Towards the Orisha," *Afric*a 51, no. 3 (1981): 724–45, provides an insightful discussion on the relationship between Yoruba people and their gods.
21. A letter written by Libertas to the Editor, the *Lagos Times*, it was published on February 6, 1882.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. See for instance: Paul E. Lovejoy and Toyin Falola eds. *Pawnship, Slavery and Colonialism in Africa*. J. Africa World Press, 2003; and Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson. "The Business of Slaving: Pawnship in Western Africa," c. 1600–1810. *Journal of African History* 42 (2001): 67–89.
25. This term derives from Marshall Sahlins. "Poor Man, Rich Man, Chief: Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5, no. 3 (1963): 285–303.
26. *Daily News*, July 1, 1882.
27. Using the exchanges between Yoruba Nigerians on the listserve, the article documents how the traditional mode of interaction that is based on gerontocracy, position, and title, among others has migrated to the virtual space. For a full discussion, see Augustine Agwuele. "From Village Square to Internet Square: Language and Culture at the USA–Africa Dialogue Series," in *Development, Modernism and Modernity in Africa*, ed. Agwuele Augustine (NY: Routledge, 2012), 78–108.
28. Augustine Agwuele, "Popular Culture of Yoruba Kinship Practices," in *Africans and the Politics of Popular Culture*, ed. Toyin Falola and Augustine Agwuele (NY: University of Rochester Press, 2009), 41–63.
29. Captain Cameron, in the *Lagos Times*, August 1, 1882.
30. For a fuller discussion of the concept of *Ori* (head) and earthly success, see Kola Abimbola. *Yoruba Culture: A Philosophical Account* (Birmingham, UK: Iroko Academic Publishers 2005).
31. See for instance Ali Mazrui, *The Africans: A Triple Heritage* (MA: Little Brown & Co, 1986).
32. This word was used by the former director of the Deutsche Bank, Juergen Schneider, to describe the insignificance of the loss of over DM50 million by the bank. It was voted the "Un-wort des Jahres" (non-word of the year) and it is referenced here to illustrate the dissonance between ordinary and rich people in their perceptions.
33. This was republished on page 4 of the Monday edition of the *Times of Nigeria*, May 22, 1922.
34. Ibid.
35. Eleti Ofe, January 12, 1927, p. 10.
36. Ibid., 11.
37. For the explication of *eleloro*, the Yoruba traditional method of instruction, see Michael O. Afolayan, 2012. "*Elaloro*: A Didactic Approach to Yoruba Education," in *Development, Modernism and Modernity in Africa*, ed. Augustine Agwuele (NY: Routledge), 108–20.

38. Edward T. Hall, 1959. *The Silent Language* (Greenwich: Conn. Fawcett Premier Book), 38.
39. See Agwuele, 2016 for a full discussion of treatment of people based on appearance.
40. Hall, *The Silent Language*.

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CHAPTER 20

Youth and Popular Culture in Colonial Africa

Jamaine M. Abidogun

Youth hold the future for every society. But what informs this future? What do youth see as the trends, issues, and cultural contexts that matter, shape, and form their present and our future? In traditional history, we may look to the major events and standard cultural expectations of the time to find these answers. Yet, in the past 30 years, many historians have moved away from this traditional analysis to embrace new historiographies that share interpretations from other social sciences and humanities. Africa's colonial history is no exception, with newer historiographies assisting in the telling of colonial youth's popular culture. Africa's colonial youth encompasses a daunting range of societies and varied historical contexts. Defining popular culture requires identifying what youth perceived as influential. These influences are described and analyzed from a range of disciplines, including but not limited to cultural studies, anthropology, art, education, and media. Popular culture then and now reflects the changing modes of culture and society, resulting in individual and ultimately institutional changes. This chapter provides some evidence of colonial youth's experiences and their perspectives on changing times.

Identifying colonial youth is the first challenge. What constituted 'youth' in African societies? How did African social constructs intersect or disconnect with European constructs to define colonial youth? Historian Thomas Burgess commented on the problem of how to define African youth:

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> Often invisible to censuses and maps, youth consists of a constantly shifting population moving in and out of locally determined notions of youthfulness. Nor has *generation* in Africa been codified; the absence of any canonized script or normative theoretical guidelines to which scholars may refer has, until now, discouraged both research and debate, particularly among historians.[1]

In the process of defining African youth within African societies and the colonial context, a Pan-African framework was applied to this chapter to track African social structures during the colonial period and to also consider the impact and interaction of Westernized colonial constructs within African youth cultures. It is important when considering the extent of colonial influences to keep in mind that most African colonial youth experienced little to no direct contact with European colonials. Their interaction was most often indirect via the resulting institutional changes. For example, changes due to colonial administration and colonial education more often impacted how these societies defined youth and influences on popular culture. African societies, to provide a very generalized anthropological or sociological construct, often ascribed age grades or age sets that labeled each group, male and female, from birth to adulthood. Age grades remain common reference points today even though the paths that individuals may now follow include many more options in comparison to precolonial or colonial periods. The age grade marked each member within a specific historical period based on their birth era and simultaneously provided a support group that followed the individual from birth to death within the wider society. Prior to colonization, youth were those who were not yet initiated into adulthood. Most societies had initiation rites or transitional time periods for females and males that ushered them into adulthood. These rites or periods might be marked by ceremony and/or physical indicators and involved periods of instruction on the responsibilities of adulthood, marriage, and wider responsibilities to the society. These systems, with all their variations across African civilizations, ensured a division between youth and adult. Bernardo Bernardi's term 'age class systems' indicated these age grade systems also served in part as demarcations of political and labor or class constructions.[2] Often this meant youth's mentoring and training in the societal vocations or responsibilities identified with their specific lineage, gender, and political status. The colonial period introduced European societal structures with new variables that served to complicate who was and was not considered African youth.

Colonial administration complicated these defining markers in at least two ways that cut across all colonial areas with varying degrees of impact. They established and imposed political administrations on top of or in place of African political and state structures. They also imposed formal European education systems that were separate from African social institutions and, as such, effectively separated increasing numbers of youth from indigenous education. Colonial administration created 'heads of households', defined as the oldest male of the household in most cases. Within many African compound

systems this meant that unmarried men and women were often labeled as 'dependants', so even if married they might be considered 'dependants' based on lack of individual property. Imposed Western education systems served to lengthen the period one was identified as 'youth', especially as these schools expanded from primary and vocational to secondary and tertiary education over the colonial period. For most of the colonial period, Western education engaged the elite or less than 10% of any colonized population. After the First World War, especially in urban areas and locations with settler communities, youth increasingly were defined by their educational status; that is, those in colonial schools were more readily identified as youth regardless of their age grade, while those who remained within African constructs followed their society's transition process from youth to adult. Thus, colonial administrative organization coupled with the imposition of Western education systems worked to complicate who was considered youth across African societies.

The term 'colonial youth' as applied in this study refers to a cross-section of groups; each group may be cast as youth based solely on African conventional social structures or as historically identified based on colonial identification. It is reasonable to assume that most 'youth' experienced some extent of duality as they shifted back and forth between African-specific and colonial contexts. In reality, many young people often navigated between labels of youth and adult as applied to their day-to-day experiences. These intersections provided evidence of popular culture in transition between and in contrast to Afrocentric and Eurocentric constructs. Their voices ultimately defined popular culture by how they defined themselves, saw their roles, and what trends, issues, and material culture best represented them and their shared experiences.

Presented here are a handful of societies with the goal of extrapolating general trends and differences across the colonial period. By exploring the specifics of each group's popular experience, the chapter provides evidence of how colonial youths viewed their present and impacted Africa's future. Colonial youth groups were selected from a range of colonial contexts to highlight varied experiences based on which African society(ies) and European power(s) engaged as colonized and colonizer across geographical regions. Secondary considerations in selection of youth groups included socio-political and economic dominance of the African society, differences between nominally occupied colonies and European settlements, urban versus rural, and the extent of indigenous versus Western education experience within each group.

Youth groups described in this chapter come from several regions and include many Sub-Saharan African civilizations. Pulling examples from Southern, East, East-Central, and West Africa, it was readily apparent that there were significant differences in experiences based on each society's culture and the extent of interaction with colonial cultures and their social constructs. Southern Africa, cases include the 'Copperbelt Cowboys' of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), apartheid South African migrant youth and culture formation, and South Africa's Natal Hindu and Muslim Indian youth cultures. East and

East-Central examples come from Tanganyikan and Kenyan youth's use of urban dress and space, and youth differences in urban popular culture based on religion, urban versus rural, and socio-economic contexts. In the West, Gold Coast (Ghana) and colonial Nigerian youth interactions with Western education provided insight into transformations in colonial youth's popular culture that later identified many as part of the national elite. While the examples are predominantly Anglophone, the intersections of multiple African ethno-national groups are significant in looking at these examples. As such, African experience is central. Most ethno-national groups included in this chapter resided within and outside British colonial or settler boundaries; this effectively expanded African influences on youth beyond Anglophone borders. In addition, competing European, Asian, and Middle Eastern influences also informed and further complicated youth perspectives on popular culture.

For the purposes of this chapter, 'colonial' is constructed to include European domination in Africa via political administration of 'effectively occupied' colonies as defined during the Berlin Conference (1884–1885) and European settler areas.[3] The period under consideration covers approximately the 1890s to the 1960s. Each case discussed falls within this colonial timeline. Some settler areas, like Kenya, were clearly colonially administered from Europe as colonial holdings, while Southern Africa settler groups, such as the Afrikaners of Dutch descent and Rhodesian Anglo settlers, remained largely self-governed even while under British political administration. What is common across all cases when looking at colonial youth and popular culture is the imposition of historically European institutions onto or in place of African institutions that positioned them as colonial holdings. For this reason, the political status and extent of colonial presence for each civilization or set of civilizations is described in each case to assess the extent of colonial presence that contributed to the formation of popular culture.

What is popular culture and what aspects of popular culture were considered in this study? While historically the term is first attributed to Johann Gottfried (1784), who simply used it as a marker to delineate the masses or 'popular culture' from 'the culture of the learned',[4] its application in the past thirty years was widely limited to Marxist classist analysis that identified elite control of production as limiting popular culture to mindless consumption to distract the masses from true revolution within a capitalist society. The Weberian view of social status and what Pierre Bourdieu defines as 'cultural capital' are used to distinguish common, 'low' or popular culture from elite or 'high' culture. In the Weberian framework one may belong to one or the other regardless of economic or political class.[5] A Weberian working definition of 'popular culture' provides a broader view that encompasses more than class. In the African colonial context, it more often indicated independence from or appropriation of Western culture. In these cases, colonial youth's expression of popular culture is not solely dependent on class consciousness, although it is likely that youth made connections with these expressions that varied from

identification with African political and economic statuses to colonial power alignments or resistance, as well as including fashionable adoption of the foreign as novel.

Bourdieu reinforces the Weberian framework within the colonial construct through what he terms 'cultural capital', defined as cultural aspects that provide access to power and prestige within the dominant society.[6] Youth awareness of Western values as cultural capital is demonstrated as some follow and master Western cultural aspects while others actively resist appropriating colonial European culture. These cultural assets most often included language, religion, Western education, music, and clothing, among other expressive cultural forms. Many youth groups produced and/or endorsed popular culture that rejected all Western cultural forms through exclusive use of indigenous expressive forms. Some others appropriated certain Western aspects and infused them in ways that worked to keep their African culture front and center, while still other youth groups wholeheartedly embraced Western culture as manifested in their popular culture. In comparison, Marxist class analysis proved too narrow a lens for colonial analysis, since it does not take into consideration the imposition of foreign cultural forms or idioms that youth groups engaged in across a continuum that ranged from fully independent of Western influence to complete appropriation of Western culture in the production and promotion of popular culture. For these reasons, the Weberian model provides effective parameters for describing popular culture across Africa's colonial youth.

Neo-colonial, Pan-African, and critical theories frame and inform this chapter. Neo-colonial theory offers a way to historically situate the research. While neo-colonial most often references the postcolonial period, it is important to realize that the process of neo- or internal colonialism begins during the colonial period. Especially as applied to changing youth culture, understanding the imposition of Western administration, education, aesthetic styles, and media allows for a starting point that underlines the forced historical nature of changes in their worldview. Through this framework, the nature of internalization of Western concepts as they replaced indigenous forms of knowing and doing helps identify how youth were impacted to a greater or lesser extent based on the degree of their direct involvement with these institutions. In this way, neo-colonial theory takes into consideration how historically many African youths shifted between Afrocentric and Eurocentric perspectives in their expressions of popular culture.

Pan-African theory positions the historical experience through the eyes of African youth and their cultural perspectives.[7] It supports evaluation based on African ethno-national cultural norms and indigenous knowledge and philosophies, making it possible to track cultural change. As an African counterpoint to Western or European historiographies, it challenges the writer to maintain an African-centered narrative as it seeks to reclaim African youth history by setting it in African contexts and from there describing cultural

transformations demonstrated via popular culture. Critical theory works with Pan-African perspectives by emphasizing the necessity to center the subject, colonial youth, as the research focus. This ensures their voices validate the research conclusions. Critical theory assists in identification of Western constructs that the colonized African elite often promoted as status symbols. This critical analysis may be applied directly to Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital. For example, youth's gravitation to Western material forms reflected the development of individualist philosophies that culturally demonstrated their position as caught between African and Western cultures. Critical theory then calls for positioning Africans as agents in their negotiation of what they maintain from their cultures versus what they adopt, reject, or transform from European and other colonial cultures.[8] The following examples of colonial youth and popular culture described within this framework create a picture of cultural transformation as African-centered as each society adopted, rejected, and transformed Western cultural aspects within a continual push-pull interaction that ultimately informed their cultural expressions.

Southern Africa

Southern Africa youth experienced European invasion and advancement as early as 1510 when Francis de Almeida, Viceroy of Portuguese Indies, landed at Table Bay to collect fresh water. While docked there, some of his crew attempted to kidnap two Khoi children and cattle. The Khoikhoi successfully drove the sailors back to their ships, but this only delayed European invasion. First Portuguese then increasingly Dutch and British ships landed at Cape of Good Hope or Table Bay to restock water and meat. Finally, in December 1651, Jan van Riebeeck, an agent for the Dutch East India Company of the Netherlands, established a permanent outpost at the Cape of Good Hope. From that moment forward European advancement into the area dramatically altered the course of African history.[9] By the 1800s most of this area, including South Africa and North and South Rhodesia were European- or European descendent-controlled. Although Europeans were never and are still not the majority, they used European military and economic supports to dominate the region. The examples of colonial youth popular culture reflect both African based experiences and immigrant based experiences within Dutch and British European dominated colonial states. Southern stories of colonial youth popular culture describe at once the triangulation of African civilizations' negotiation of European political and economic domination and long-term cultural interactions and impositions. The final example layers these experiences further with experiences from immigrant Indian cultures and how missionary encounters influenced South African popular culture. The 'Copperbelt Cowboys' of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) reviews Western cinema's influence on youth culture in the 1940s and 1950s under British colonial rule. The second example highlights cultural, anthropological studies during

the 1950s to the end of Apartheid South Africa to examine how popular youth culture was defined and delineated. This piece takes a deconstructive perspective moving these studies by centering their analysis on African experience rather than a Euro- or Western-based colonial analysis. The final Southern Africa example describes Natal Hindu and Muslim Indian youth cultures from the late 1800s to the 1930s through the lens of Indian migration to South Africa and Hindu youth's experience with Muslim missionaries. While all three studies are placed within the context of British-controlled Southern Africa, their experiences vary greatly as each youth group's ethno-national and specific historical positions delineate their unique popular culture.

Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) set in the 1940s and 1950s was nominally under British colonial rule with a significant white colonial settler population in control of administration, education, and labor. Historian Charles Ambler describes the Northern Rhodesian 'Copperbelt Cowboys' colonial context as 'linked with Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi) in a Central African Federation dominated by white settler interests'.[10] Africans were viewed as a colonized labor source and were coerced through colonial taxation and other means to work in British-controlled copper mines. Labor compounds and townships were established to support the mining industry. In the larger townships, local open-air cinemas or 'bioscopes' sprang up beginning in the 1930s and expanded throughout this period. Bioscopes brought in Hollywood films that included westerns, gangster, or private-eye genres, and the occasional Superman film. Under the British and white Rhodesian control, these films were censored, primarily on race-based lines geared to omit sexualized images of white women and to prohibit scenes of organized resistance, such as the oppressed (that is Native American, African, Indian) challenging European or white authority. Rhodesian film venues were segregated spaces throughout the 1960s with white authorities or their colonial African appointees to oversee the African-attended bioscopes. Northern Rhodesian African youth were regularly exposed to disconnected images of cowboys with their gunfights, train robberies, and banditry as well as slick gangsters making wisecracks against local police and political organizations. As Ambler documents, 'it was the working-class male youth with relatively little education who made up the core of film audiences'.[11] While Ambler's only documentation of their African civilization is that they were for the most part Chibemba speakers, he does describe the impact of these Western expressions of popular culture.[12] For these youth, even the most disjointed of storylines due to censorship could not negate the image of men standing up against men.

These youths' adoption of Western aesthetic style demonstrated the impact of Western cinema, while their specific adoption of 'wild west' and 'gangster' themes from these films served as symbolic protest against colonial subjugation. As demonstrated through their popularization of 'posturing' or as a concerned white Rhodesian reported to the Rhodesian Department

of Information, 'the idea that to stand and speak to anyone with hands in pockets, lounging, and possibly giving the hat—firmly on the head—an insolent backward tilt is to show a high degree of sophistication'.[13] Youth continued to popularize these cowboy and gangster images through dress, posture, and an internalization of their demonstrated bravado against unfair and seemingly lawless situations that were reflected in these youths' lived realities. Youth, who popularized Western and gangster dress and took on names like 'Jeke' or Jack to represent cowboys or even 'Popeye' to reflect the power and agency of the spinach-eating cartoon sailor, created popular culture that informed their understanding that these movie features embodied both modernity and fashion, but also the call for agency and empowerment in the face of colonial and racial oppression. This popularization of struggle by youth in art and media was replicated throughout Southern Africa.

In another example, anthropologist Heike Becker examined how anthropologists studied popular culture in Southern Africa from the 1950s to the end of apartheid. Becker applied Johannes Fabian's definition of popular culture, a variation on the Weberian definition, as 'contemporary cultural expressions carried by the masses in contrast to both modern elitist and traditional "tribal" culture'.[14] Its archaic minimalist and static idiom of 'traditional "tribal" culture' as opposed to 'social culture' that reflects active and agent-bearing African social cultures draws attention to the often unrecognized and unstudied aspects of the African society(ies) within the colonial context. The previous example demonstrates the danger in this as its author never offered any Chibemba-specific societal structures to contextualize the youth's home culture(s). Becker's analysis compares cultural anthropology and cultural studies as applying seemingly parallel yet divergent roles to popular culture studies. He posits two primary reasons for these societal structures and notes cultural studies' frequent omission of active participants reflected in studies from the 1970s to the 1990s. First, he identifies a focus on neo-Marxist analysis which emphasized the political economy over and above local interpretation or action along with a shift in methodology that distanced the scholar from the field as cultural studies became an academic discipline. The distancing of these new experts, many trained in literary critique, resulted in a focus on analysis and evaluation of social texts presented in various mediums and less on deep or field participant-observer ethnographic methods.[15] Becker sought to correct these participant omissions through a deconstructive perspective that required a shift from primarily Euro-South African focus to an African South African focus to present African colonial youth's home culture as the center of their colonial experience in defining popular culture.

One such African-centered anthropologist and ethnomusicologist was David B. Coplan, who described his work in music and theater as 'Weighed against *apartheid* … [as] both a record of and a small contribution to the efforts of black South Africans to gain control of their national culture and to use it to regain control of their individual and national lives'.[16] Coplan's study

on Lesotho migrant workers' songs in South Africa includes Basotho youth's role in how this 'process of transformation from peasant agro-pastoralism to rural/industrial migrant worker has been accompanied by a dynamic enrichment of existing genres of performance'.[17] The specific oral poetic genre he explored was 'migrant mineworkers' and women's sung poetry, known generically as *difela* (*sefela* singular) *tsa ditsamaya-naha*, "songs of the inveterate travellers".[18] These poetic songs reflect generational changes dating from the 1860s when the first diamond mines at Kimberly were opened to present day Basotho migrant laborers' experiences that stretch across South Africa. These groups were primarily young men and some young women, the majority were unmarried, unlanded, and without cattle, so historically they were viewed as dependants or youth in their natal homes. Wealth of some sort, such as cattle, land, money, is a social expectation for Basotho males to enter full adulthood. Prior to European settlement, cattle were the measure of that wealth. British and Afrikaner colonial presence forced the introduction of a cash economy and politically required the Lesotho kingdom to negotiate with the British to retain its sovereignty. As part of these negotiations the British left Lesotho to administer itself if Lesotho's young men came regularly to work the mines. Some young women also came as cooks, maids, and prostitutes.[19] Their poetic songs documented their changing circumstances and what they held valuable as part of their popular culture.

As these first migrant laborers walked the 200 miles to Kimberly they created *difela tsa ditsamaya-naha* to distract them from the rough conditions. Their words reflected the need to earn cash for cattle to offer as brideprice to enter marriage (manhood), as Lethetsa Malimatle's poem sings in part:

> They want cattle for your brideprice.
> I left home at night …
> 'Go and drive them at the mines yonder.'[20]

Other poetic verses reflect youths' conversion of Lesotho manhood rites from battle with invaders of Lesotho to battles with the mine bosses or 'cannibals of war' and with the mines or 'the earth' themselves.

> They answered mercifully, the cannibals of war:
> 'This day is your last.'
> I heard, remembering evil times, …
> It was right out in the unknown wilderness.[21]

Over time, as the train replaced foot and horse, it too became part of these young migrant workers' popularized experience, as in this excerpt by Ngoana Mokhalo:

> The train is a taker and a returner,
> Ours, that of the young men,

> It came running from Rouxville, the white-faced carriage …
> It galloped like a white-spotted hare.[22]

Coplan explained that Basotho male youth, like the poet above from Mamokhesuoe's village, 'sing of love affairs and faithlessness, not marriage; doubt and danger, not certainty; wage labour, not agriculture; trains and trails, not home and family'.[23] For female youth in the mine compounds or nearby townships, they were often referred to as *matekatse* (literally translated as 'to wander about to odd jobs'). Often viewed as prostitutes by the larger society, these young women in practice were single, working girls who were not married, and as such were not viewed as equal to adult women. Their *sefela* reflected a gendered style. Coplan described its difference from male *difela*: 'women's difela are organised both rhythmically and tonally by the instrumental accompaniment of accordion and drum, and female performers universally decline to sing without such accompaniment'.[24] Many considered these performers of lower social status and some did not equate them to male *difela*. Still their songs, like Nthabiseng Nthako's, a female *sefela* performer, reframed Basotho life to reflect migrant female youths' realities:

> I am a polygamist [I have many men] …
> I look at them; they look away, yonder ….
> Here they are at Hlotse camp, girls,
> In whose trust do I leave them? … pray for me.[25]

For South African youth, whether from Lesotho or other Southern African locations, their migrant experiences disconnected and reconnected them to their home lives in new forms and fashions. For male youth, this involved the reimagining of battle as part of male initiation and as cash economy as currency for family life. For female youth, their experience at once reflected new forms of freedom and old forms of potential social retribution on their return home. Basotho migrant youth effectively articulated the colonial experience of exploited labor through their reinvention of Lesotho oral traditions as part of their popular culture.

The final South African example located in Natal colony during the late 1800s highlights immigrant indentured Indians from Calcutta and Madras. Like the Basotho youth, immigrant Indian colonial youth were mostly male and were laborers for British and Euro-settler-controlled ports, fields, and mines. Their experiences were complicated by competing Christian, Hindu, and Muslim missionaries who vied for their conversion.[26] Historian Nile Green's documentation of Natal missionaries included the establishment of Christian missions as early as 1867, and more importantly described the competition of Hindu and Muslim missions which sought to convert Natal's poor young Indian immigrants.[27] One Muslim mission, due to its charismatic leader Ghulam Muhammad, stands out as a cultural shaper of Indian

youth culture. While Hindu and Muslim missions were slower to establish themselves in Natal, by the end of the 1800s their presence was a vital part of Natal's religious community. As with many missionary societies, Ghulam Muhammad 'Sufi Sahib' used local language and access to education to entice its followers. For Natal Indians Urdu quickly became the language of Muslim instruction; this served to build bridges across castes, whose divisions certainly worked as a barrier to growing the mission.[28] The adoption of Urdu impacted youth both as a source of religious instruction, but also to build a common community. While Ghulam Muhammad utilized his Arab lineage traced from the Konkani Muslim community on the west coast of India to establish his religious credentials, his origins also provided him support from middle-class Indian merchants who regularly traded at Natal's ports with many Konkani labor and merchant classes also immigrating to Natal. His mission, initially established at Umgeni in Natal's Riverside area, included a mosque, khanaqah, and madrasa, reflecting the Indian diaspora in Southern Africa.

Through the mission's identification markers, which included Urdu as a common language to fashionable Muslim Indian dress, Natal's Indian Muslim youth quickly developed a recognizable popular culture. A popular culture that defined the modern Islam world, as Mahatma Gandhi, himself a recent immigrant to Natal, recorded in the *Indian Opinion* newspaper: '"The progress of Mahomedans" which among its list of ten proposals recommended the same blend of education, independent labour and physical health that also underwrote the ethics of the intellectuals' farmstead at [Gandhi's] Phoenix [Settlement]'.[29] Through the establishments of orphanages and madrasa or schools, Ghulam Muhammad effectively institutionalized generational change for hundreds of Indian Muslim youths as they were provided access to religious and secular instruction and protection from falling through the cracks in South Africa's labor class. Their popular culture reflected these protective strategies as they adopted Bombay clothing styles designed to signify their status as proper Muslims and were provided instruction that cautioned against the use of ganja as an escape from the trials of labor. His mission attracted Hindu and Muslim youths as he incorporated older Indian traditions including the maintenance of *urs* or celebrations of the shrines of blessed or holy men and the celebration of *Muharram* processions in honor of the martyred Husayn. Ghulam Muhammad expanded his brand of modern Muslim Indian culture across South Africa that reflected a unification of South Africa's Indian youth culture.

A clear pattern of marginalizing African culture in Southern African colonial history via youth experience runs through the above described examples. The wide extent and long length of European settlement and the significant immigration of Indian and Arab societies that systematically worked toward the economic and social domination of African cultures is clearly apparent. The cases of Central and West Africa, with comparatively shorter colonial

histories, better demonstrated African societies' influence on their colonial youth.

East and East-Central Africa

For the East and East-Central Africa, examples come from colonial policing of Kenyan youth via corporal punishment and the ways that the popular press vied for influence on Kenyan and Tanganyikan youth to shape their religious and social contexts. Paul Ocobock's extensive work on colonial administration's role in policing Kenyan youth provides a broad look at colonial influence on youth as well as specific cases that give insight into youth images of how they defined their roles in colonial society. Kenyan and Tanganyikan youth colonial culture and its shaping are documented via the use of the popular press. Nathaniel Mathews's study described the use of Kenyan Swahili-Arab Muslim newspapers as a venue of modern Islamic reform for youth like that of Natal's Indian youth experience. Maria Suriano's review of a popular monthly press provided details of youth's popular culture expressed through fashion.

As colonial administration of urban space developed, questions about youths and their roles presented themselves. In Kenya's context, colonial administration viewed youth as potential labor and idle youth as a threat to colonial and urban peace. Ocobock's work examined corporal punishment's role as a common demarcation of the generational divide between adults and youth. The colonial experience complicated these experiences for youth as he explained: 'The right to beat a boy, once the exclusive right of African parents and elder kin, increasingly included [colonial] missionaries, schoolteachers, employers, chiefs, and the colonial state. Each of these disciplinarians considered physical violence an appropriate form of punishment for young males'.[30] While his work focused on Kenya, this colonial redistribution of the right to corporal punishment's use to control youth was evident across colonial holdings, as witnessed in schools, churches, and other social contexts. For example, in colonial Nigeria, Toyin Falola recounts his early school experiences, 'Late arrival was punished. 'Kneel down on that hard surface,' … Even the senior students carried a cane',[31] demonstrating how colonial use of corporal punishment became internalized by African youth. The response of youth formed their popular culture as they negotiated what they viewed as legitimate. As Falola continued, 'The other students were not impressed, and no one vowed to use the humiliation of the latecomers as a valuable lesson'.[32] Like Nigerian youth, Kenyan youth also negotiated its response to colonial authority with some groups adopting its use to identify themselves with power while others actively resisted acknowledging this authority.

In Babcock's case of juvenile vagrants and their dealings with colonial authority, youth popular culture's agency is demonstrated as it negotiated with colonial authority. As early as 1901 in Nairobi, Sub-Commissioner

J.D. Ainsworth arrested twenty male youths for vagrancy and established this practice as policy in 1902 as the Vagrancy Act to continue through to the 1950s. This act along with others was a way to control rural to urban migration and labor supplies for settler farms. Kikuyu male youths were impacted by increased white settlement that took away from their family-based agriculture and left many to look to urban areas for lucrative opportunities. While white settlers vied for their labor, most Kikuyu youths were not inclined to work the fields they saw as rightfully theirs for the profit of these white settlers. Yet these same youths still needed to prepare for their initiation into adulthood that included demonstrating their ability to provide a stable home suitable for marriage and to raise their family. In this way, they found themselves in the city looking for business or employment opportunities.[33] Youths sought to define their life conditions as they swelled the streets of Nairobi.

Looking for autonomy and opportunity, Kikuyu and Kamba male youth, and to a lesser extent female youth, trekked to Nairobi in increasing numbers. They sought Western education in a bid for government jobs or to hire themselves as house helps for the colonial and Kenyan elite; in these pursuits they effectively broadened their choices beyond rural labor. In response, the colonial administration sought to control rural and urban labor by using vagrancy laws that imposed corporal punishment and relocation to rural areas to deter youth from venturing to the city. Although most of these youths set out of their own volition to Nairobi, Kenyan colonial law did not recognize their independence. Obocock documented colonial understanding as, 'the Indian Penal Code, Section 361, boys under the age of fourteen and girls under the age of sixteen enticed away from their families and homes without the consent of their parents and guardians were considered kidnapped'.[34] Vagrancy laws supported this assumption in law as they routinely repatriated Kikuyu and Kamba youth without family ties in Nairobi back to their natal rural villages. By the 1920s. caning and repatriation were routinely enforced for returning vagrant youth. This was in response to what colonial officials viewed as youths' increased ties to organized crime. The combined punishment was an effort to deter youths from continued reentry to the urban area and to reduce crime. Youths' response was consistent from 1902 through to the beginning of the Depression in the 1930s where a slight decrease was noted, but then it steadily rose again from the 1940s forward. They routinely returned to the city despite the calculated risks of short-term imprisonment, caning, and repatriation. Ocobock noted this combined punishment for recidivism increased from approximately 125 cases in 1925 to well over 600 by 1951.[35] Kikuyu's popular youth culture reflected a trend toward urbanization in direct response to the loss of family land. For Kikuyu, this youth culture established a major urbanization trend that is reflected in Kikuyu's dominant numbers in Nairobi society today.[36]

From East African urban centers like Mombasa in Kenya and Dar es Salam in Tanganyika, colonial youth cultural trends developed across East Africa as

competing interests weighed into shape them. From popular Muslim reform movements to urban fashions, the press became a vehicle to shape and to reflect youth's popular culture. The Swahili press was a perfect medium for Muslim and Western-educated urban populations to explore new ideas expressed as cultural trends. Mombasa's *al-Islah* (Reform) Swahili Arab newspaper and Tanganyika's *Mambo Leo* (Current Events), a monthly government Swahili magazine, were two examples of media influence on Eastern Africa colonial youth culture.

Similar to Indian youths' experiences in Southern Africa, East Africa's Muslim leaders actively reached out to youth to reinforce Muslim Arabic cultural and religious identities as they faced increasing competition from colonial Christian missions and Western education. One example, reviewed by historian Nathaniel Mathews, was Sheikh al-Amin Mazrui's *al-Islah* newspaper established in 1932, printed in Swahili and Arabic.[37] Its goal was to advocate for cultural and religious change to strengthen the modern image of Muslim identity among East Africans. Since young males were the most likely to attend schools, they made up a significant proportion of *al-Islah*'s readership. The colonial administration supported Muslim and Christian schools and mandated teaching Swahili and English literacy in the schools, so they indirectly contributed to the paper's readership. *Al-Islah*'s articles focused on the return to *shari'a* not just as a legal system, but to include its social aspects.

It was these social aspects that were most likely to catch the imaginations of young people; for example, the popular trend to reinforce Arab origins as a demarcation of social and economic elite status. *Al-Islah* highlighted these Arab Islamic knowledge systems and commercial or economic prominence within the Indian Ocean trade networks that developed over several centuries prior to British colonialism into a uniquely Swahili-Arab culture along the East African coast.[38] Swahili Muslim male youth were most inspired by this rhetoric to refashion their ancestry to match their newfound access to colonial education. This refashioning worked to improve their social status that often translated into economic connections in and outside of Mombasa.

Sheikh al-Amin encouraged these youths to practice their Arabic as a sign of Muslim knowledge by regularly providing Arabic texts in *al-Islah*. In this way, a new generation of up and coming Swahili Arab youth elite could readily demonstrate their reimagined transnational identities.[39] This education via the popular press also served to reinforce Arab-Swahili identities at a time when the British administration had systematically reduced them to 'natives' under British native court structures even as they maintained their status as 'non-natives' for taxation purposes. As Mathews noted, many readers signed their contributions as '"*Mzalia wa Africa*" (native of Africa) or "*Mzalia wa Unguja*" (native of Zanzibar)'.[40] This new generation of Arab-Swahili educated youth transformed into an adult elite who simultaneously claimed African and Arab origins as the true East African leaders despite colonial dictates.

Al-Islah's articles influenced its youthful readers to reinvent and reestablish a transnational Arab-Swahili identity through their popular culture.

In the case of *Mambo Leo*, its pages reached beyond the East Coast to influence East and East-Central African youth. This Swahili language monthly magazine was published under the auspices of the British Tanganyika Department of Social Development. Historian Maria Suriano described its purpose as:

> an educational monthly magazine that began in January 1923 … to describe British Government efforts: for instance … Despite its pro-Government orientation, readers throughout the country made use of *Mambo Leo* to voice their complaints and express their opinions on various issues. … It became a sort of 'forum' of discussion on cultural and social matters … about the wider Tanganyikan society.[41]

Colonial administrators and Tanganyikan elders alike commented routinely on what youth should aspire to as well as what they observed as the realities of youth culture. Comments ranged from observations about appropriation of Western dress to identify as 'cultured' to concerns about the increase in beer and dance hall goers. For example, a *Mambo Leo* reader, Rashidi Ali Meli, criticized the fad of male youth wearing glasses, even if not needed for sight, as part of Western attire as, 'nowadays I see many youths who love wearing glasses … for the price of twenty cents without any reason, and if you ask them what does this mean, they would reply that [they] are part of the 'Culture'. But, fellows, is this Culture or ruin? And what is the sense of the word Culture?'.[42] Ali Meli tied these fake glasses to youth adoption of Western slacks, shirt, and tie as a further corruption of Swahili *utamaduni* (culture) and as such identified it as *upotevu* (immoral life, vandalism).

In a similar vein, a concerned reader commented in poetry on female youth dress and connected it to youth participation at beer and dance halls, Chande Ally wrote:

> *Kinamama kwa yakini, Fedhea mwaithamini,*
> *Mwaingia dansini, Kigauni mapajani,*
> *Mtindi Beer kichwani, Mwajiona mpeponi,*
> *Dansi ni ngoma duni, Wajuao kufikiri.*
> For women [dansi] is surely, a valued shame,
> You enter the dancehall, showing-off thigh,
> With alcohol and beer in your head, you feel in paradise,
> Dansi is a worthless music, for those who can think.[43]

The *dansi* style of Western knee-length dresses was equated with the beer and dance halls that youth frequented. Interestingly, Suriano notes that women, especially Muslim women, often shifted between Swahili and Western dress to fit the occasion. A Mrs. R.M. Ngoda 'affirmed in 1950 in a poem against

"*nguo gotini* knee-length dresses … *ni wakati wajioni, zageuza mtu sura* it is nighttime that changes a person's appearance"'.[44] As youth males and females adopted Western dress as part of their popular culture, they also adopted new forms of popular entertainment in beer parlors, dance halls, and cinema. By the 1950s, just like the Rhodesian 'Copperbelt Cowboys' of Southern Africa, some Swahili youth adopted the cinema cowboy dress and style, as the '*uchinjo* or bottle-mouth trousers and the *kilipa* [heavy shoe]' that Suriano noted were accompanied with cowboy-style speech, slouch, and walk. While she disagreed with John Leslie's interpretation of this dress and style as "the revolt of the adolescent, in age and in culture, against the authority of the elders, of the established, of the superior and supercilious' and as 'the safety-valve of the dangerous mob element',[45] the influence of Western cinema clearly shaped youth fashion in their expression of popular culture that transcended African ethnic and colonial boundaries.

Most of youths' Westernized expressions of popular culture were not looked on favorably by older generations. Suriano summarized through cross-validation of mission papers and Swahili readers' contributions to *Mambo Leo* that these elder authorities 'agreed in condemning beer halls and vilabu (African clubs) where people, especially youths, "wasted" time drinking pombe (local beer), while dressed in "indecent' ways"'.[46]

East African colonial youth developed unique and often dual expressions of popular culture that reflected new colonial identities, while refashioning older identities. Whether in negotiating the colonial administration's attempts at controlling their labor or in refashioning older identities of Arab origin, youths demonstrated a tenacity to transform often competing influences into unique expressions of popular culture. In their experiences, the trends of colonial influence are documented. At the same time, they transformed these Western and older Eastern influences to meet their specific cultural contexts.

West Africa

In West Africa, examples of Gold Coast (Ghana) and colonial Nigerian youth interaction with Western education as a vehicle for identity change reimaged youth popular culture. Trade schools and European mission schools in West Africa often worked as business partners and were clearly established by the nineteenth century across Anglophone African colonies. Nkrumah noted that the first successful mission school in Gold Coast was established by the Basel Missionary Society in 1828 outside Accra and in Nigeria; the United Presbyterian Synod of Scotland established a school by 1846 at the Old Calabar River off the Gulf of Benin (present-day Calabar, Nigeria).[47] Interestingly, Eastern schools like Kenya's mission schools were established somewhat later, as George Urch explained: '… it was not until the last quarter of the century that mission work began in earnest. The Berlin Treaty of 1885 provided both

freedom to operate and some degree of protection; missionaries soon set up stations in the interior of East Africa'.[48] These Euro-Christian missions effectively established Western education structures that eventually developed into the current national education systems. Mission schools provided the bulk of Western education as late as the 1950s. Edward Berman documented Nigerian and Gold Coast/Ghana mission schools as, 'In 1942, 97% of Nigeria's student population was enrolled in missionary schools … As recently as 1950, missionary schools accounted for 97% of the total enrollment in Ghanaian schools'.[49] In comparison, Berman described an early appropriation of mission education by the Kikuyu in the Kenyan experience, as he explained:

> In Kenya during the 1920s and 1930s the schools were run almost exclusively by missionaries. The reaction to the demand by the Church of Scotland (CSM) missionaries that all Kikuyu church elders renounce the practice of female circumcision … [was] Independent schools controlled by the Kikuyu were organized. In 1933 there were 34 schools enrolling 2,518 students; by 1936 these figures had increased to some 50 schools with 5,111 students.[50]

The Kikuyu were unique in their establishment of 'independent' schools to retain the right to ethno-national cultural practices. This shift in control underscored the Africanization of Christianity for youth within these schools. As Berman noted, 'Kikuyu church elders' led the change to Kikuyu-controlled schools, but did not question Christian doctrine. Rather, they made a distinction between Christianity and retention of ethno-national cultural practices.

Effectively, the Christianized curriculum kept the majority of African Muslim ethno-national groups, whether in Ghana, Nigeria, or Kenya, marginalized within the colonial Western education system.[51] The British policy of Indirect Rule sought control over capital in the form of land, labor, and natural resources and claimed minimal interest in forcing religious or cultural change. Education served the Colonial Office's purpose of training colonial labor. It was a marriage of convenience that Christian missions were willing and able to provide this needed education. These missions were a cost saver for the colonial administration; so long as Africans were trained for the colonial labor market, inclusion of Christian coursework was incidental at worst and advantageous at best to assist in assimilating Africans to Western norms.

As the colonial presence grew the Christian missions and the few colonial trade schools could not keep up with the labor needs of the British Colonial Office. Over time, the mission schools were often at odds with the Colonial Office regarding the ideal curriculum (religion-focused versus workforce preparation). In the face of increased business and government offices within the colonies, there was an increased need for English literate white-collar workers. After the First World War, the British Colonial Office took a more direct interest in Anglophone African education policy. This took the form in 1925 of the Advisory Committee on Native Education in the British Tropical

African Dependencies (Advisory Committee). The Advisory Committee's official report back to the Colonial Office resulted in part in the following official policy:

1. The British government reserved the right to direct educational policy and to supervise all educational institutions.
2. Voluntary missionary efforts in the field of education were to be welcomed and encouraged with a program of grants-in-aid.
3. Technical and vocational training should be carried out with the help of government departments.
4. Education should be adapted to local conditions in such a manner as would enable it to conserve all sound elements in local tradition and social organization, while functioning as an instrument of progress and evolution.
5. Religious training and moral instruction should be regarded as fundamental to the development of a sound education.[52]

The policy maintained 'missionary efforts in the field of education' and 'religious training and moral instruction as fundamental' that in turn ensured generations of youth culture that centered itself in Christianity. At the same time, it provided guidelines on including '"sound" elements in local tradition and social organization, while functioning as an instrument of progress and evolution'. This policy point had mixed responses as mission and colonial schools alike were divided on the idea of maintaining African social norms and practices.

They all agreed on the inclusion of a curriculum that 'function[ed] as an instrument of progress and evolution' as this was the 'civilizing mission' writ large in the curriculum. This policy did result in two changes: (a) the addition of African geography and/or history to social studies curriculums; and (b) the establishment of English as the language of education. These provisions created a duality within youth popular culture. This new social studies curriculum downplayed the depth and complexity of their historical, political, and economic heritages and instead focused on African music and the arts to create social cohesion. Sociologist Cati Coe described this cultural display of the African curriculum at Achimota school in Gold Coast:

> Drumming and dancing were the strongest part of its teaching of 'African culture', … relegated to an extracurricular, albeit compulsory, activity. Most of the senior teachers in the school were European, with little … knowledge of Gold Coast culture; outside experts had to be brought into teach 'African culture' … [with more of] a focus on students' appreciation of 'African culture' than on actual competence or knowledge, both in the founding philosophy and the curriculum: the students were expected to respect the traditions of a reified 'ancient' past, but not necessarily participate fully in that realm as competent adults. Ultimately, to incorporate 'African culture' into an anglicized elite

> school, the founders and teachers of Achimota had to define 'culture' quite narrowly.[53]

In this manner, youths who were physically separated from access to indigenous education via Western boarding schools began to express their 'African' culture as elements of popular culture in retention of drums in high life music or shifting between Western and African dress with Western dress identified with the 'educated' class.

Regarding language policies, prior to 1925, many Christian mission schools used indigenous languages ('vernaculars') as the language of instruction, especially in learning scripture to help converts better relate to them and therefore more readily embrace Christianity. After 1925 in Gold Coast and Nigeria, African languages of instruction were completely replaced with English. To maintain their effort to enforce 'native education', African language instruction was maintained, but as secondary languages that was dependent on each local area identification of the dominant mother tongues. Interestingly, the emphasis on teaching African language was more prominent in the development of secondary schools, as Michael Omolewa noted: 'October 1922, London University adopted Hausa and Yoruba as "optional special languages" for its university entrance qualifying examinations … the London University Faculty Senate approved the recommendation of the senate-appointed "Board of Studies in Oriental Languages and Literature" that these two languages be adopted as suitable examination subjects'.[54] Such a language policy reinforced the cultural role assigned to African languages while maintaining adherence to English as the language of instruction. Many Western-educated youths defaulted to internalizing Western identities expressed in popular culture to align with their colonial overlords. Others shined in this colonial era and overcame the reductionist view of African language and culture in their work to become Pan-African leaders.

These important curricular changes taught students that their ethnonational knowledge, cultures, and languages were to be marginalized and replaced by Western knowledge, culture, and language. The schools' informal curricula reinforced this formal curriculum as students were indoctrinated in proper Euro-Christian norms and practices; that is. appropriate dress, food and table etiquette, courting, Western medicine, vocational skills, recognition of British and Christian holidays, and of course loyalty to the Crown. In comparison, due to Arab-Swahili and Kikuyu efforts, Kenya's schools established English as the language of instruction, but Swahili was retained as a secondary language of instruction. In Northern Nigeria, as on the East Coast, Islam was retained for religious instruction in Muslim-dominant areas. This aligned with British Indirect Rule and ensured youth and adult cooperation within the colonial administration from African Muslim societies.

The impact of Western education combined with non-indigenous religious instruction on youth culture cannot be overstated. It resulted in what Falola described as 'a mess'. He demonstrated youths' awareness of religious

and political influences and their results during his educational experience in Ibadan, Nigeria in the 1950s, writing:

> Before the mess, there was a clean body, not pure but clean. In my day, the anthem of cults that circulated in schools, one that we all sang, was about the retention of the cultures of old.
>
> We shall perform our rites
> We will obey our customs
> No religion can forbid us
> Not at all
> From performing our rites.[55]

His experience as a secondary student in Yorubaland during the last years of British rule in Nigeria references youths' awareness of the new political and religious structure that was imposed upon the old political and religious structure. He explained that 'the mess' developed later, 'As they strengthened their faith, Christians and Muslims slowly but surely eroded the cultural foundations of the city, creating a mess that the visitor can see today'.[56] Through this experience, youth gradually adopted Christianity or Islam and English to identify as a new elite. While initially Western-educated youth continued to combine ethno-national cultural practices with Christian or Muslim practice, later generations, especially youths who were second or third-generation Western-educated, steadily shift away from involvement with ethno-national cultural practices and adopted an increased use of English or Swahili language in social venues. The song above indicates this initial duality reflected in early Western-educated youth culture simultaneously acknowledging African culture while promoting Westernized cultural expectations. Youth selectively adopted, rejected, or transformed Western cultural expectations that ultimately became foundational elements in the establishment and maintenance of West African nation-states.

Conclusion

While the examples are at first glance predominantly Anglophone, the intersections of multiple African ethno-national groups are significant in looking at these examples. In Southern Africa, the early existence of Indian Ocean trade from the East and comparatively early Euro-settler groups of Dutch/Afrikaner and later French and British set in motion complex cultural, political, and economic relations across Southern African ethno-nations. During the more traditional colonial era of the 1800s to mid-1900s, many Southern African ethno-nations once again reorganized these relationships in partial response to the *Mfecane* (Zulu, 'crushing') or *Difaqane* (Basotho, 'forced migration') from the early 1800s to 1820–1830s followed by the Boer

(Dutch/Afrikaner) Great Trek or migration into these same areas in response to British control. This forced geographical disbursement of ethno-nations due initially to Kwa-Zulu invasions and later Afrikaner advancements into ethno-national territories triggered colonial involvement across the region to better regulate colonial investments and control labor. By the close of the 1800s, the colonial presence stretched across Southern Africa. This colonial presence, whether internal from Euro-settler classes or external from British, Dutch, Portuguese, or German administrations, interacted with every African ethno-nation to consolidate power and profit. In East and East Central Africa these colonial administrations and newer Euro-settler groups competed with older Arab-Swahili and Indian connections and cultural constructs that served to further complicate youth experience and perspectives on popular culture. In West Africa, as a result of the centuries-old trans-Saharan trade, Africanized Muslim Hausa and Fulani ethno-nations dominated the northern corridor, while African Traditional empires, such as the Ashanti and the Yoruba, controlled the core West and maintained much of their cultural influence across colonial holdings. These varied colonial contexts surprisingly presented a fairly globalized colonial youth experience.

The two most prominent trends in colonial youth popular culture appeared to be in adoption of Western clothing and in endorsement of Western education as an expression of elite identity. Whether Euro-settlers were present in large numbers or not did not seem to change youths' adoption of Western clothing or wanting to be identified as Western-educated. The examples provided above are only complicated to the extent that the Muslim or Koranic education was already available in these areas. As evidence indicated in Arab-Swahili and Hausa Fulani communities, the colonial administrations were successful in combining Muslim instruction with Western education. Colonial youth, Muslim, Christian, or Traditional, embraced the new Western dress and, as Bourdieu explains, used this newfound 'educated' status as cultural capital.

The most readily evident difference was in relation to access to Western influences. Rural African youth groups tended not to follow Westernized dress trends. This difference set these youths up as 'bush' or 'uneducated' in the view of urban, more Westernized youth. As Suriano explained in the Tanganyikan case:

> Clothes worn by … urban residents, who called themselves … *waungwana* (gentlemen), and those worn by newcomers from rural areas, scornfully referred to as *washenzi* (barbarians, savages). Although the identities of most of the urban dwellers were inextricably woven together with the rural ones, in the 1920s and 1930s many urban Africans (both Christian and Muslim) increasingly expressed their conscious sense of belonging to the cities.[57]

This difference played out across African regions, colonial administrations, and ethno-nations as Western culture increasingly became cultural capital

that could be negotiated into opportunity. Whether that opportunity was a colonial job or social status, youth routinely expressed popular culture through Westernized dress, incorporation of Western instruments in their music, and Westernized dance. It was not surprising that this rural-urban split sharpened over time as urban, Western-educated youth became the Western-educated adult elite and new generations of youth took on increasingly dual senses of African-Western popular culture.

Further Research

One glaring absence in most of the work presented in this chapter is the lack of representation of individual African ethno-nations' or societies' cultural contexts within the historical or anthropological work of the authors. There appears almost a universal assumption that colonialism somehow came with a homogenizing impact on African civilizations—at once making them a bland mix vested in different colored robes and accompanying drums. There is much more work to do to document how and in what ways individual ethno-national youths lived these colonial experiences.

Much of what is documented in these pages comes from the popular press and colonial archives. Too little of it comes from the inner workings and negotiations of these youths. Many questions are left unanswered. What were their mindsets, their attitudes toward this Westernization? How did they view the trans-national Muslim image of the day? How did they negotiate between ethno-national-specific cultural custom and process and Western-imposed practices? Most importantly, to what extent did they internalize Westernized popular culture versus using it as negotiable currency within the colonial context?

Colonial youth included a wide range of voices and contexts. Burgess summarized the historical context of colonial youth as:

> Colonial rule, Christianity, capitalism, urbanization, nationalism, and independence infinitely complicated relations between youth and elders. If gerontocratic discourse affirmed that youth was a liminal stage between childhood and adulthood, and between dependence and autonomy, the category came in the colonial period to exist in a very general sense somewhere between village and town, 'tradition' and modernity.[58]

While Suriano provided a summary of the significance of material culture as expressed in popular culture:

> By arguing that material culture is intertwined with processes of social change, and that people in Africa have been imagining alternatives in their own lives in spite of colonial domination, … [by exploring] the relationship between popular culture and the changing identities of Tanganyikan urban youths by focusing on

> fashion. The meaning of clothing has implications for our understanding of the relationship between 'tradition' and 'modernity' … as well as for our knowledge of rural-urban, generational and gender relations. Moreover, the focus on clothing can contribute to grasp local strategies of resiliency and broader processes by which African actors forged translocal connections and created 'translocalities' that increasingly sustained new ways of 'being-in-the-world'.[59]

As the definition of African youth became more Westernized and its length expanded under colonialism as it gradually included the rubric of Western education through to secondary school, colonial youths sought to make sense of their experience. Popular culture, whether expressed via dress, as in Suriano's example, or through music, popular press, language use, or new entertainment venues, demonstrated colonial youths' incorporation of colonial, Western culture to negotiate their newfound status as colonial laborers to Western-educated colonial elite.

These cultural expressions did not negate African ethno-national cultures, but served to negotiate the colonial realities of their period. With more research on the retentions of Afrocentric popular culture on the continent, the ethno-national specificity of these cultural negotiations may be documented. While many diasporic academics document Afrocentric or Pan-African cultural 'retentions' or 'survivals', especially in Atlantic or American studies, not enough of this work is readily available within the African continent. African youth culture, in particular, is a newer field that has much left to explore within the colonial period. While the examples provided in this chapter only document the surface, they do provide the preliminary groundwork to go further and seek the necessary historical, personal sources to complete the historical description of ethno-national differences and changes in expressions of youth popular cultures that emerged during this period.

Notes

1. Emphasis is mine. Thomas Burgess, "Introduction to Youth and Citizenship in East Africa," *Africa Today* 51, no. 3 (Spring 2005): viii.
2. For a full discussion on African age grades, implications of class, and political hierarchy, see Bernando Bernardi, *Age Class Systems: Social Institutions and Politics Based on Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
3. See Berlin Conference (1884–1884) overview in Kevin Shillington, History of Africa, 3rd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 313–34.
4. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophic der Geschichte der Menschheit* (Riga and Leipzig: Hartknoch, 1784), as cited in Holt N. Parker, "Toward a Definition of Popular Culture," *History and Theory* 50, no. 2 (May 2011): 148.
5. For a full and insightful discussion on the history and defining of popular culture, see Holt N. Parker, "Toward a definition of Popular Culture," *History and Theory* 50, no. 2 (May 2011): 147–70.

6. For a full discussion of cultural capital, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gina Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
7. See: Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonisation and Development with Particular Reference to the African Revolution* (London: Heinemann, 1964); Imanuel Geiss, *The Pan-African Movement: A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe, and Africa* (New York: Africana Pub. Co., 1974); Peter O. Esedebe, *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1982); and Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora Since 1787* (New York: Routledge, 2003).
8. Critical theory also Critical Radical theory as described in Henry Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education* (London: Bergin & Garvey, 2001).
9. "Colonial History of Cape Town: The Dutch Settlement" from South African History Online, www.sahistory.org.za, accessed November 10, 2016, http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/dutch-settlement.
10. Charles Ambler, "Popular Films and Colonial Audiences: The Movies in Northern Rhodesia," *The American Historical Review* 106, no. 1 (Febuary 2001): 82.
11. Ibid., 95. For a detailed account of Rhodesian mining town life during the 1930–1950s period, see Hortense Powdermaker, *Copper Town: Changing Africa: The Human Situation on the Rhodesian Copperbelt* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).
12. This part of Ambler's study is problematic as he never states whether Chibembe is their ethno-national language or whether it is the lingua franca of the mining compound or townships with multiple ethno-nations engaged in these experiences. For this reason, the study may overgeneralize African viewpoints in the interviews and reports as no African societal structural information is provided other than a generalized expectation of respect for elders and a conservative view of male and female public image and interactions.
13. R.J. Allanson to Director, Department of Information, Lusaka, North Rhodesia, January 27, 1956, NAZ, Sec. 2/1125, no. 19, as cited in Ambler, 93.
14. Johannes Fabian, "Popular Culture in Africa: Findings and Conjectures," *Africa* 48, no. 4 (1978): 315.
15. Heike Becker, "Anthropology and the Study of Popular Culture: A Perspective from the Southern Tip of Africa," *Research in African Literatures* 43, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 19.
16. David B. Coplan, *In Township Tonight! Three Centuries of South African Black City Music and Theatre*, 2nd ed. (Johannesburg and Chicago: Jacana Media and University of Chicago Press, 2007), 1, as cited in Becker, 25.
17. David B. Coplan, "'I've Worked Longer Than I've Lived': Lesotho Migrants' Songs as Maps of Experience," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32, no. 2 (March 2006): 224.
18. Ibid., 225.
19. For a fuller discussion on Lesotho and South Africa migrant labor history see: Tshidiso Maloka, "Khomo Lia Oela: Canteens, Brothels and Labour Migrancy in Colonial Lesotho, 1900–40," *The Journal of African History* 38, no. 1 (1997): 101–22; and Samuel N.A. Mensah and Vannie Naidoo, "Migration

Shocks: Integrating Lesotho's Retrenched Migrant Miners," *International Migration Review* 45, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 1017–42.

20. Coplan, "'I've Worked Longer Than I've Lived': Lesotho Migrants' Songs as Maps of Experience," 227.
21. Ibid., 231.
22. Ibid., 228.
23. Ibid.
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CHAPTER 21

The Horn of Africa and the Black Anticolonial Imaginary (1896–1915)

Fikru Negash Gebrekidan

In 2002, historian Gebru Tareke wrote a laudatory review of the second edition of Bahru Zewde's *History of Modern Ethiopia*, describing it as 'the best introduction to contemporary Ethiopian history'. One of the main points upon which Tareke begged to differ, however, was Zewde's treatment of the Battle of Adwa as a Pan-African watershed. 'The legacy of the Battle of Adwa is overdone', he rebutted. 'There is little evidence, if any, to show that it had any direct and immediate bearing on the rest of Africa or on the Africans of the diaspora unless history is read backwards'.[1]

Tareke's statement is reminiscent of Africanists who came of age at the height of area studies, when the nation-state was still the primary unit of historical analysis. Augmenting the mainstream literature on the first Italo-Ethiopian war with African American and Caribbean contemporary accounts, this chapter affirms the global significance of the Battle of Adwa. In the process, it raises critical questions that historians have so far ignored. Why was Adwa not little more than a fleeting moment in history? What distinguished it from the few other anticolonial victories before it: the 1879 Battle of Isandlwana, or the 1885 Mahdist triumph over Charles Gordon of Khartoum? The chapter locates the answer in the Pan-African career of Benito Sylvain, the Haitian national whose preoccupation with Ethiopia is discussed in great detail for the first time. Sylvain's travel to the Horn of Africa in 1897, the

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first of its kind by a diaspora black, transformed the global extent of Ethiopia's military exploits. It not only popularized Ethiopia's image abroad as a symbol of anticolonial resistance, it added a new ingredient to the Black Atlantic discourse on hybridity and modernism. By the early twentieth century, the Horn of Africa had moved into the center stage of black history, its past mythologized and celebrated in W.E.B. Du Bois's Afrocentric classic *The Negro*.

Adwa and the International Media

Unlike the highly sensational antifascist protests of 1935 and 1936, the media coverage of Adwa did not spark instant mass reactions. Still, Adwa was a milestone in the history of black nationalism. In fact, long before modern-day historians, it was Du Bois who, in 1915, referred to the event of 1896 'as one of the most decisive battles in world history'.[2] His assessment was not exaggerated. The war and its aftermath were extensively reported in leading US and European newspapers, including those catering to African American readers. Among the latter, in particular, such reports were of double significance. First was the psychological role of Adwa to arguments of racial vindication. Second was the geohistorical awareness of the Horn of Africa that the coverage of Adwa promoted: the transnational convergence of the Black Atlantic with the Red Sea-Indian Ocean littoral.

Since the late eighteenth century, diaspora Africans had identified with ancient Ethiopia, whose exaltations were to be found scattered in scriptural verses and the Western classics. Yet, the Horn of Africa remained the least familiar region of Africa in black diaspora thought. Few knew that the name Abyssinia, the toponym outsiders had adopted since the seventeenth century, referred to the Nile Valley state that was once part of greater Ethiopia. Physical distance and absence of direct contact accounted for much of the mystification. Eastern Africa did not produce the likes of Martin Delany and Robert Campbell, Pan-Africanists who spearheaded the famous Niger Valley expedition of 1859. It lacked the evangelical appeal of Western and Southern Africa, where most of the nineteenth century missionary work in Africa was concentrated. Nor did it measure up to the unique history of Liberia and Sierra Leone, home to thousands of ex-slave repatriates, that made West Africa an intimate partner of the Atlantic world.[3]

It is against this backdrop that the 1896 Italo-Ethiopian War became a turning point in global African consciousness. What characterized the relationship between Italy and Ethiopia in the early 1890s was the steady erosion of mutual trust. This was after Italy had declared Ethiopia a colonial protectorate, a fact that Emperor Menelik II was to learn by accident, by manipulating the phrasing of a diplomatic document that the two countries had signed in 1889: the Wichale Treaty of Friendship and Commerce.[4] The tension escalated into a diplomatic imbroglio, and from then into open military

preparations. Armed confrontations that began in December 1895, with Menelik having declared a national mobilization in September, would conclude on March 1, 1896, following a day-long battle near the market town of Adwa. Defying every prediction, Ethiopians would emerge decisively victorious, safeguarding their national independence and puncturing the myth of European racial superiority.[5]

For Italy, Adwa was a historic rout, a national blemish that Benito Mussolini would try to expunge in the 1930s. Italy's casualties of 70%, against Ethiopia's 20%, were unprecedented in the annals of modern colonial warfare. They consisted of 15,000 dead, 1400 wounded, and 1900 captured. Of the five generals, two died in action, one was wounded and captured, and only two managed to straggle back to Eritrea.[6] In Rome, spontaneous mass protests would force Prime Minister Francesco Crispi and his cabinet to resign, the first time an African event was directly responsible for regime change in Europe.[7]

Ethiopia found itself catapulted into the outside world by the international media. On March 4, for example, the *New York Times* published two lengthy features on different aspects of the Italo-Ethiopian War. In the first, a dispatch from Rome offered a detailed account of the actual battle. It put the number of Italian deaths at 3000, a very conservative estimate. Oreste Baratieri, the top commander who was rumored to have committed suicide, was said to have been found alive, while two other generals were reported wounded and another one was missing.[8] The second article traced causes of the war to Italy's growing colonial ambitions in the Horn of Africa, which was obstructed by the politics of inter-European rivalry that made it possible for France to arm the Ethiopian side. It also listed the names of Ethiopian commanders, or *Rases*, together with the size and strength of their fighting units, including Empress Taytu's force of 15,000.[9]

In all, the name Abyssinia appeared in several dozen stories in the *New York Times* in the month of March alone. They included headings such as 'Italy is Awe Struck' (March 5), 'Abyssinian Reverses Provoke Paroxysms of Rage in Rome' (March 6), 'Women Against Expeditions' (March 8), 'Kassala is Evacuated' (March 10), 'Magnanimity of King Menelik' (March 14), 'Russia and Abyssinia' (March 17), 'Partition of Africa' (March 22), and 'A Personal View of Menelik' (March 22). The last was a tongue-in-cheek piece about a French commercial explorer fresh from Africa, who was joined for dinner by some 40 New York socialites, so as 'to hear him say how Menelik looked and Menelik talked'.[10]

Even as knowledge about East Africa improved with fresh insights of history and geography, most of that went hand-in-hand with the prevailing order of white supremacy. According to historian Raymond Jonas, the North American media simply evaded the paradox of Adwa by adopting the myth of Ethiopian racial exceptionalism. The *Atlanta Constitution* reported news of the Italo-Ethiopian war with a few factual errors, including the placement

of Ethiopia in South Africa. The conservative Southern paper understood, as a matter of fact, that it owed its readers some explanation for the unusual turn of events. Under the heading of 'The Abyssinian Race Question', its physiognomic analysis established that Ethiopians were 'of Phoenician origin', a conclusion supported by drawn images of Menelik with the likeness of Tsar Nicholas II. Editorials of similar content appeared in several papers, among them the *Chicago Tribune* and the *New York World*, in which Abyssinians were identified as dark-skinned Caucasians. The message was clear. Since Abyssinians belonged to a more intelligent, civilized, non-African pedigree, the threat of an actual African military specter was no more real after the war than it was before it.[11]

The whitening of Horn of Africans, which initially began as a tactic of accommodation by social Darwinists and colonial apologists, would periodically spill over to the black press. In the 1930s, in the years leading up to the second Italo-Ethiopian war, it would revive the volatile question of 'blood kinship', on which many African Americans wanted to predicate their stands with the beleaguered country.[12] What the racial controversy confirmed to most black readers was, however, the arbitrariness of modern race science, a hypocrisy made all the more obvious by the fact that racial boundaries shifted back and forth in accordance with European dictates. The one-drop rule, on which basis Americans of mixed backgrounds were denied citizenship rights, was now used to confer the status of fictive whitehood to the militarily victorious swarthy Ethiopians. Part of the African American struggle for equality and justice was to expose and challenge this self-serving notion of whiteness, and it was in this context that the news from Adwa was seen through the prism of racial vindication. [13]

According to James Quirin, who sampled African American newspaper coverage of the first Italo-Ethiopian war in a brief but illuminating essay, in the scattered references to Adwa was the universal picture of race pride. This was not surprising. In May 1896, only two months after the Battle of Adwa, the US Supreme Court had issued its verdict on *Plessy v. Ferguson*, recognizing as constitutional the 'separate but equal' racial doctrine. On the rise in the 1890s was also the physical persecution of African Americans, with about a hundred lynchings reported every year.[14] Against this background of despair, many detected a providential sign in the extraordinary news from Africa. They saw in it the negation of Darwinian logic, or so-called scientific racism, on which ground American racial totalitarianism had been justified.[15]

The vindicationist tone ranged from reflective to celebratory. 'They hit 'em hard in Abyssinia' and 'The partitioning of Africa will soon cease to be a midsummer's night dream', declared the *Indianapolis Freeman* on March 14.[16] 'Who said an African would not or could not fight', rejoined the *Cleveland Gazette* on the same day, adding: 'King Menelek is proving himself more than a match for civilization's trained and skilled warriors, with all their improved machinery of war. More power to him!'[17]

In its issue of March 28, the *Cleveland Gazette* published the most detailed account of the war so far. Contributed by a certain G. Weippiert, the 1500-word essay provided an encyclopedic outline of Ethiopian history: Axum's embrace of Christianity in the fourth century, the religious wars of the sixteenth century, and the recent military engagements with Italy and Mahdist Sudan. Having described Adwa as the 'Italian Waterloo', the column concluded with a cautionary note on domestic politics: 'One lesson which the American people can learn from the present crisis is that the colonizing and annexation fever is not only a source of danger, but a menace to the stability of home government'.[18]

Similar articles appeared in Georgia's *Savannah Tribune*, another black weekly. 'The Abyssinians have shown themselves equal to any emergency', its editorial of March 21 read. 'They have given the Italians a severe flogging and if England persists in interfering she will be taught a serious lesson'. At stake was more than a military honor, moreover. Italian defeat epitomized the bankruptcy of the 'civilizing mission' along with its self-serving, lofty moral claims. 'The Abyssinians are defending their homes and native land; they are perfectly right in expelling foreign aggressions', the weekly further sympathized. 'This overbearing spirit exercised by European nations over African nations should be stopped. It is cruel, unworthy of Christian nations and unjust'.[19]

Not all commentaries were as favorable. Without international correspondents of their own, fledgling black newspapers covered Africa using syndicated columns and dispatches. The practice, among other things, posed the risk of recycling mainstream media prejudices. At least in two instances, according to Quirin, images of Ethiopian savagery were invoked. In one paper, Taytu was singled out and blamed for influencing her husband into waging a bloody and atavistic type of warfare.[20] In another paper, Ethiopians were relegated into a racial no-man's land that defied classification. 'The Copts, who are the ruling race of the country, are descendants of the ancient Egyptians, their blood being mingled with that of the Greeks, Arabs, and Nubians', was the take by G. Weippiert, the contributor of the lengthy essay in the *Cleveland Gazette*. Taken as a whole, however, the black media adopted a strongly partisan position.[21] The majority of the newspaper articles celebrated Adwa as a genuinely African military victory. In Ethiopia's continued independence they saw a beacon of hope and freedom, a reminder that racial domination was neither divinely sanctioned nor scientifically defendable.

Finally, in the new geohistorical knowledge about the Horn of Africa, made possible by media's extensive coverage of the Battle of Adwa, was the disruption of the historic Black Atlantic. The insular flow of ideas and cultural innovations between West Africa, North America, the Caribbean, and the European metropoles was flung open for possibilities from the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean world. Evidence of this new transnational interaction at the global level was the Pan-African career of Benito Sylvain of Haiti.

Reminiscent of the pioneering work by Martin Delany and Robert Campbell in West Africa, Sylvain would spend many years of his life trying to build a diplomatic bridge between Ethiopia and Haiti. Charismatic and dashing, he would serve as Ethiopia's de facto roving ambassador internationally, keeping the Battle of Adwa fresh in public memory and reinforcing the image of Menelik as an icon of anticolonial resistance.

Black Atlantic Meets Horn of Africa

Marie-Joseph Benoit Dartagnan Sylvain was born in Port-de-Paix, Haiti, on March 21, 1868.[22]

His father, Michel Sylvain, belonged to the urban establishment, best remembered as the first person to run a theatre in Port-au-Prince.[23] His older brother, Georges, who went on to serve as Haitian ambassador to France in the 1910s, was a leading literary figure and an outspoken patriot. Benito (Benoit was dropped at infancy) grew up sharing similar academic aspirations, at least until his idealistic visions got the better of him in the aftermath of the Italo-Ethiopian war. Establishment of bilateral ties between the independent countries of Haiti and Ethiopia would become the raison d'être of the adult Benito Sylvain, making him the first Occidental black to travel to East Africa. As it turned out, it would take another half century for the diplomatic relations to become real. What Sylvain's historic visit to East Africa accomplished was, instead, a new chapter in the transoceanic narrative: the immersion of Ethiopia in the global Pan-African discourse.[24]

For over a millennium, East African seafarers had tapped into the Monsoon winds, while the importance of the West African seaports had surpassed the inland caravan trade by the sixteenth century. Because the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean systems were oriented in opposite directions, divergence characterized the experience of the vast African world in the East and that of its counterpart in the West. The former stood outside the cultural and intellectual dialectics taking place between West Africa, the Americas, and Western Europe, for which Paul Gilroy coined the phrase 'Black Atlantic'. It is against this background that Sylvain's arrival in East Africa was to become transformational. African transnationalism would henceforth take on a truly global dimension, thanks to the representation of East Africa in the Afro-Atlantic fusion.

Having studied in a Port-au-Prince Catholic seminary since 1874, or the age of six, in 1887 Sylvain qualified for an advanced high-school diploma from the Stanislas College of Paris. Two years later materialized Sylvain's first real job as a secretary in the Haitian legation in London, a post he soon abandoned in pursuit of a journalistic career. For representing Haiti at the 1890 antislavery conference in Brussels and for his journalistic work in general, in 1893 the Haitian government conferred on Sylvain an honorary naval title: ensign of the vessel. Here was indeed a renaissance man on the rise. In 1894

alone, the year Sylvain completed his law degree, he founded and headed two associations: Circle of Fraternal Union (a Haitian student organization), and the Committee of Oriental and African Society of Ethnologists of Paris.[25]

Eclectic as these interests seemed, Sylvain's true sentiment lay in his role as editor of *La Fraternité*. This was the journal he introduced in 1889, its mission boldly announced in its provocative subtitle: Organ for the Defense of Haitian Interest and the Black Race. The paper, which he directed for the next seven years, with subventions from the Haitian government and the abolitionist Victor Schoelcher, would remain an important platform for the discussion of contemporary race and race-related issues. In conjunction with the 1896 Italo-Ethiopian war, *Fraternité* was the main factor behind Sylvain's initiation into the politics of Pan-Africanism.

Sylvain did not fight in Ethiopia, as claimed in the obituary of his famous niece: the folklorist Suzanne Comhaire Sylvain.[26] To the contrary, Benito Sylvain learned about the 1896 Ethiopian victory at Adwa from the European papers. The last time European soldiers had suffered a serious defeat in Africa was in January 1885, when Sudanese nationalists, or Mahdists, overran General Charles Gordon's Anglo-Egyptian garrison in Khartoum. The year 1896 was, therefore, the first time in recent memory that an African nation and its fighting prowess made news in Europe. *La Liberté*, for example, extolled that 'all European countries will be obliged to make a place for this new brother who steps forth ready to play, in the Dark Continent, the role of Japan in the Far East'.[27] Across the channel, likewise, the *Times* of London adopted a favorable tone, reversing earlier portraits of Ethiopians as a 'barbarous foe'.[28] Among educated Haitians in Europe, the news must have struck an even more poignant tone: it was reminiscent of the laurels of Haiti's own victory over the invading forces of Napoleon almost a hundred years prior. For Sylvain, in particular, homage to the court of Menelik, the Toussaint Louverture of Africa, would become a life-defining moment. He would spend the next several years traveling back and forth between Ethiopia, Europe, and the Americas promoting his brand of Pan-Africanism, or what may be characterized as a one-man's South–South diplomacy.

Despite the construction of the Suez Canal decades earlier, in 1897 Ethiopia was still an expensive and difficult country to reach. The 500 miles from the Djibouti coast to its capital, Addis Ababa, passed through an inhospitable desert landscape and mountainous terrains, and could be traversed only on foot or animal back. According to biographer Antoine Bervin, Sylvain's critical question of how to pay for his ambitious scheme was resolved by a certain Amir Johannes Salim, an acquaintance he struck in the Latin quarter of Marseille. The Amir, the son of an Ethiopian mother and an Arab father, and who apparently grew up in Ethiopia, agreed to finance the journalist's prohibitive undertaking. Besides money, he furnished Sylvain with three Amharic letters of introduction, which he was to present to the Ethiopian sovereign and other officials along the way. 'What interests does he have in the success of

my voyage?' Sylvain was to wonder by the seemingly providential encounter. Artifacts such as the Ethiopian national costume, palace curios, and a richly bound Book of Psalms was what Salim asked in exchange, which is to say his largesse was not as altruistic as Sylvain had assumed.[29]

Sylvain disembarked at the port of Djibouti sometime in the month of February of 1897. For a first-time arrival on the extremely hot and arid East African coast, his observations were relatively impersonal and scientific. There was no port facility in Djibouti, so passengers had to be rowed ashore by Somali fishermen. The town, whose major buildings were the governor's residence, the jail, and the post office, was home to about 1500 locals, 20 French servicemen, and just as many Greek merchants, plus countless goats, camels, and donkeys. Somalis and Dankalis made up the local inhabitants, but Ethiopian interpreters and caravan escorts also came and went freely. Because of its heat, Djibouti earned the reputation as 'the antechamber to hell'; but Sylvain, anticipating the cooler climes of the highlands, thought of it as 'the antechamber to purgatory'.[30]

It took six days for Sylvain's small caravan of eleven men, four mules, and two camels to reach the walled city of Harar, better known in France for its association with the romantic poet Arthur Rimbaud. In Harar, a 20-day wait followed before Ras Makonnen, the 45-year-old governor, returned home from an official trip to Addis Ababa. Sylvain's subsequent interview with the statesman, Menelik's younger cousin, could not have gone more smoothly. 'The great Ethiopian chief fixed on me his expressive eyes and looked at me attentively … and said, in a grave voice, these unforgettable words, which my interpreter translated with a visible emotion', Sylvain recorded in his diary: "Since your first visit, you have inspired my sympathy. I trust you. It is God that sent you to us for the good of this country and all the men of our race. You may leave for Addis Ababa; I will make the necessary arrangements for you to receive the hospitality of the Emperor and the Empress."[31]

Sylvain left for the capital two days after the audience with the Ras, grateful for his generous provisions of fresh escorts and pack animals. Covering as many as 30 miles a day, his men would reach the outskirts of Addis Ababa on April 8, ten days after they had left Harar. The next day they entered the city, with food rations doubled for men and beasts to lift their spirits, and egged on by the sound of a trumpet. 'Where is he rushing to? Asked the populace, alerted by the call of the bugle', Bervin wrote, summarizing Sylvain's diary and his upbeat mood. 'And his men replied: "He goes to Addis Ababa; he comes from afar, from very far off beyond the seas, to see our Emperor Menelik!" And all these brave people, who are so proud of their beloved sovereign, from whom we can obtain everything by invoking his venerated name, were well pleased by this story and implored the blessings of Heaven on his travels, and offered him advice and gifts.'[32]

Until Bervin's work, the only source of information about Sylvain's historic meeting with Menelik had come from the controversial passage in

Robert P. Skinner's book of 1906. Since the late 1890s, Skinner had been serving as the US consul-general in the Mediterranean city of Marseille, and it was his lobbying that had convinced President Theodore Roosevelt of the value of establishing political and commercial presence in the Red Sea hinterlands. In 1903, Skinner himself would head the historic diplomatic mission to Ethiopia, and three years later he would publish his travel accounts as *Abyssinia of To-Day*. The passage in question, which some scholars have cited as proof of Ethiopian xenophobia, or even racism, was based on hearsay Skinner picked up while in Addis Ababa, more likely from the foreign legations. According to the story, Sylvain had taken all the trouble to come to Ethiopia with an ambitious program of race amelioration, only to discover that the Ethiopians saw themselves differently. "The negro should be uplifted," Menelik was said to have responded firmly. "But in coming to me to take the leadership, you are knocking at the wrong door, so to speak. You know, I am not a negro at all: I am a Caucasian."[33]

In fairness to the US emissary, the passage had positive things to say of the West Indian. Just a few lines below was the portrait of Sylvain as well-educated and socially refined. Skinner's agenda was more complex, however. His insistence on an Ethiopian phenotype, as in the chapter entitled 'The Caucasians of Cush', aimed at defending Roosevelt's decision of sending a costly diplomatic mission to the Horn of Africa, a region of which US Americans knew very little.[34] By reenacting the fictive whitehood of post-Adwa Ethiopia, the consul-general thus hoped to assuage post-bellum racial concerns. After all, as one historian commented, the racial jargons in which Menelik seemed to feel so much at home sounded more American than Ethiopian.[35]

Sylvain Meets Menelik

To the Ethiopian court chronicler, used to the coming and going of career diplomats and eccentric men of means, Sylvain's humble private mission no doubt aroused little interest. Still, in the palace calendar for April 10, 1897, the name of the West Indian was entered next to the names of other foreign visitors received by the emperor that day: Count Le Gonidec, Prince de Lucinge, and Ensign Benito Sylvain of the Haitian Navy.[36]

Against such dearth of sources on the Ethiopian side, Sylvain's diary notes need to be understood in their intellectual and psychological context. The writings constitute a travel genre, of course, but not of the classic Euro-American type. Sylvain, who sees himself as civilized by virtue of a French education, has his Haitian background to fall back on during the rough and tumble of his African sojourns. His travel observations, therefore, comprise the dualistic perspective of an outside insider. In some pages, he deprecates the lifestyle of the lowland pastoralists as savage and primitive. In others, he eagerly and uncritically embraces the high culture of the Christian highlands, which he believes is at the same level of sophistication as that of diaspora

blacks and can serve as an agent of social transformation. As shown in the paragraphs below, what Sylvain's notes about his meeting with Menelik reveal is a conflicted Pan-African worldview, a tension reminiscent of the Du Boisian notion of double consciousness.

On the morning of April 10, at eleven o'clock, the Haitian presented himself at the Ethiopian palace, attired in a sharp navy uniform with white gloves and carrying a sword. The sight of an overseas black person in a European military uniform must have been startling. For Taytu, indifferent to protocol, impetuously stepped closer, studied the stranger critically, and exclaimed to the nearby interpreter: 'He is definitely a man of our race!'[37] For his part, Sylvain saw in the queen's body language natural intelligence, shrewdness of character and dominance, traits that made her the most uncompromising patriot in the eyes of Europeans. Her opulent physique spoke of her untoiling life as a noble woman. And her light complexion, at least by local standards, must have reminded Sylvain that in Ethiopia, as in Haiti and the rest of the Caribbean, society paid attention to shades of pigmentation, light skin commanding more social value than dark skin. Taytu was regal but not attractive, however. Sylvain found her natural beauty compromised by hydropsy, better known as edema, a potentially debilitating medical condition characterized by a swelling of the skin tissues due to excessive water retention.[38]

Menelik, Taytu's third husband according to Sylvain, exuded a more affable personality. In his mid-50s, the king remained physically active, starting his day at five in the morning with a stroll in the palace garden, and spending much of the day consulting with local and foreign dignitaries. He was an iconoclast in his own ways, but with the virtues and vitality of a great monarch. Sylvain described him in superlatives as one of the greatest men alive, in league with the Pope, the German Kaiser, and the Russian Tsar. Having grown up since the age of six in a strictly disciplinarian boarding seminary, it was as if Sylvain had finally discovered the paternal figure he had longed for as a child. In one passage, Sylvain wrote how he was welcomed with spontaneous cordiality by the great African sovereign. In another, he felt a dream-come-true in seeing with his own eyes the illustrious *Negus*, the moral exemplar of all humanity.[39]

Indeed, the exchange between Menelik and Sylvain could not have been more different from what was imagined by Skinner. Notorious for asking practical questions, Menelik used occasions like this to gauge the world's opinion about himself and his empire. On the issue of territorial integrity, he elicited Sylvain's consent that Ethiopia's encirclement by the colonial powers of Italy, Britain, and France posed the country's most serious existential threat. On his part, responding to a question about the slave trade, Menelik reminded his guest that he had already promulgated two imperial edicts banning the practice, and that he hoped that domestic slavery would die as a consequence. Sylvain remarked that ending slavery would not only deprive Europeans of the pretext for their anti-Ethiopian propaganda, but it would

also transform the mixed feelings that blacks in the Americas had for their ancestral land.[40]

Then the discussion drifted to Sylvain's vision of 'African regeneration'. Even countries like Egypt and Ethiopia, with a long history of 'civilization', were often disparaged in popular opinion because of unfavorable European coverage, Sylvain explained. The solution, as the West Indian saw it, was for blacks in Africa and the Americas to set aside petty differences and unite in a common cause of racial solidarity. This was not about a racial backlash. Rather, it was about uplifting oneself to the level of Europeans, with Western blacks playing the 'civilizing' role. More specifically, it was up to the elites of Haiti, Ethiopia, and North American blacks to join hands in working for collective social transformation. The concept was elitist, even avidly Eurocentric, by present-day standards. However, it was also prescient in its own right, as it foreshadowed the South–South dialogues of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The palace audience ended with Menelik having decorated Sylvain with the Cross of Solomon and appointed him an aide-de-camp, his liaison to the Pan-African world at large.[41]

Thus opened the first chapter of Ethiopian-American relations, whose rise and fall over a century has since fascinated many a historian. Sylvain would visit Ethiopia a few more times. Menelik would hire as his personal physician a French-speaking West Indian doctor, Joseph Vitalien of Guadeloupe. He would personally welcome a certain Daniel R. Alexander, the ex-slave Missourian who married and settled in the outskirts of Addis Ababa. In the mid-1930s, just before the threat of Italian invasion forced foreigners like Alexander out of Ethiopia, the number of black repatriates in the country would number close to a hundred, most of them colonial nationals from the English-speaking Caribbean islands.[42]

Second Visit

Sylvain's documented second voyage to Ethiopia took place in 1903.[43] This was the year that the Western hemisphere was represented in the court of Menelik by two other guests. African American William Henry Ellis, a wealthy New York stockbroker, made his call in November, presenting himself as a savvy business prospector.[44] In his footsteps followed the aforementioned Skinner, the US consul-general in Marseille, to whose memoir has already been traced the distorted interpretation of the 1897 event. Having concluded with Menelik the draft of the first diplomatic treaty between Ethiopia and USA, Skinner and his entourage left for the coast shortly after celebrating Christmas with the European legations, just days before the arrival of the Haitian mission in the capital.[45]

By 1901, a railway service between Djibouti and Ethiopia's eastern town of Diredawa, about 30 miles northwest of Harar, had shortened by half the several-week journey into the Ethiopian heartlands. Still, it was not unusual

for travelers to run into one another during the latter half of the leg, and that was how Skinner and Sylvain met. Rumors in the capital, to which Skinner himself had fallen prey, were that Sylvain had come and gone several years ago feeling misunderstood, told in no uncertain terms that Ethiopia was the wrong place for his political cause. Fortunately, Skinner's description of the 1903 Haitian mission relied on his own observation. The somber image the consul-general drew of the West Indian envoy, following their brief encounter in person, belied the caricaturist portrait of the legations. If anything, it showed a man conscious of protocol, purpose-driven, and proudly wearing the badge of honor placed on him by host Menelik more than six years earlier.

According to Skinner's account, his escort of two dozen marine guards and sailors had barely left the highlands when it crossed paths with that of Sylvain's much smaller group, moving in the opposite direction. The meeting took place serendipitously at a resting stop where both parties had pitched their camps. Only by chance did the Americans take notice of the white tent with a foreign flag, out of which came a messenger who produced a card bearing the name of Sylvain and his personal credentials. 'Within a few moments Commandant Benito Sylvain arrived in person, in full uniform, varnished Wellington boots, spurs, white breeches, sword, and the Order of the Cross of Solomon upon his breast', Skinner wrote. 'Mr. Sylvain said that he was going to Addis-Ababa to present a letter from his Government to the Emperor. He intimated that he might remain there, to establish a permanent Legation', Skinner added. 'He was a most polite young man, speaking French that was a pleasure to hear, and I have no doubt whatever that he is persona grata at the capital quite as much as he was in the American camp'.[46]

Indeed, the Sylvain of 1903 was a worldly figure, well connected to a burgeoning group of Pan-African activists on both sides of the Atlantic. At the 1900 race conference in London, Sylvain had skillfully exploited his aide-de-camp soubriquet, giving the impression that he was either from Ethiopia or had direct access to its government. The completion of his doctor of law degree the next year, based on research he undertook on the plight of indigenes in the French colonies, further enhanced his intellectual standing. At home, it was time that the Haitian elite took notice of one of its own. In April 1903, President Pierre Nord Alexis finally recognized Sylvain's achievements by elevating him to the rank of commandant. It was at the peak of this social and intellectual potential, when opportunities were there for the picking, that the 35-year-old pioneer chose to return to East Africa.[47]

This time, Sylvain arrived in Ethiopia bearing a message of friendship and goodwill from the Haitian president. The timing was deliberate, as it coincided with the celebration of Haitian independence from France exactly a hundred years before. On the morning of December 31, 1903, fifteen soldiers, with what must have been a crash course on Haitian history by their drill master, climbed the highest summit of Addis Ababa where they raised

the Haitian flag. Firing volleys, they shouted 'long live Haiti, long live the American Ethiopia' and gave salutes to the Caribbean bicolor. The group then proceeded to the imperial palace expecting a reception, only to learn that the emperor had left the previous night for his estate in the countryside. Thus was the token commemoration in Ethiopia on the eve of the centennial anniversary of Haitian independence day. It did not have the spectacular ending that Sylvain had hoped. But the commotion on the summit was dramatic enough to have attracted the attention of the locals, some of whom joined in the merrymaking by firing their guns into the air.[48]

Sylvain's 1903 mission focused on establishing formal bilateral ties between the two independent countries. This was an important distinction, as African American and West Indian travelers in West and Central Africa were mostly interested in business ventures, religious work, or migration. Thanks to that effort, Haiti became the first country to exchange diplomatic overtures with Ethiopia outside the governments of Europe and the USA. 'We congratulate Your Excellency on your election to the presidency of the Republic of Haiti, the independence of which has been dear to us, ever since we came to know of its history', read Ethiopia's reply to Nord Alexis. Although it bore Sylvain's editorial fingerprints, the letter was dictated to an interpreter by Ras Makonnen, Menelik's de facto foreign minister. The text mentioned the need for Haiti and Ethiopia to 'establish good rapports', as well as to work together for mutual benefits and for the benefit of the African race. 'If men are separated by great maritime and terrestrial distances, common aspirations towards the Good can and do bring them closer', it concluded.[49]

The letter, dated May 23, 1904, stayed undelivered for several years, a delay Bervin attributed to indifference, even jealousy, within the Haitian bureaucracy. Sylvain's own speech as he finally deposited the document on March 21, 1907, gave credit to that sentiment. 'The reward from the physical and mental exertions that I have had, that nobody here has yet heard', it said, 'is the patriotic satisfaction of putting in your hands the reply of His Majesty Menelik II to the letter Your Excellency addressed to him on the occasion of the centennial anniversary'. The series of obstacles leading to the exchange of diplomatic messages between the two governments were unprecedented in ordinary international relations, Sylvain continued. But so was the historic significance of that exchange, in which the two standard-bearers of the 'black race' felt united by a common sense of duty for the first time. As he finished the speech, Sylvain handed to President Alexis the grand cross he was given by Menelik exactly ten years earlier. It was a symbolic gesture in which the vision of a man and his years of relentless toil were being entrusted to the government, although the latter would have neither the resources nor the passion to pursue them.[50]

According to Bervin, Sylvain made his fourth and final voyage to Ethiopia in 1906, although nothing is said of its significance or what it sought

to achieve. News worthy of international coverage that year was the passing away of Ras Makonnen, Menelik's right-hand man and potential successor. The 54-year-old governor died of a sudden illness, probably of typhus, on March 21, 1906, leaving behind two sons: the 14-year-old Tefari (future Emperor Haile Selassie) and his much older half-brother Yilma. A seasoned statesman at home and abroad, Makonnen's death was a major blow to the government, and it is possible that Sylvain's last trip to Ethiopia was motivated by the desire to express his condolences in person.[51]

At any rate, by now Ethiopia had lost much of its allure for the Haitian ideologue. Since his audience with Pope Pius X in Rome in June 1905, Sylvain had gravitated toward a sympathetic understanding of the Church as the handmaiden of African colonialism.[52] His new organization, Work for the Social Rehabilitation of Blacks (WSRB) hoped to thrive financially as a proponent of the civilizing mission. Unfortunately, the decision to move WSRB to French-speaking Catholic Canada, where untapped resources were anticipated, would turn out to be a great miscalculation. In fact, it would mark the anticlimactic end of a long and colorful Pan-African career. The extent of racism in Montreal was such that, after a year of struggle, Sylvain was forced to close WSRB and move back to Haiti to try his luck in mainstream politics.[53]

In Port-au-Prince, Sylvain was quickly promoted to the rank of adjutant general in the navy and then to the chamber of deputies, making him head of the senate committee overseeing the work of the army. His success was short-lived. Caught between the interests of US banks and land concessionaires on the one hand, and that of the rural insurgents on the other, Haiti would revert to another round of civil war, ousting no fewer than five presidents between 1911 and 1915. In November 1914, after Sylvain wrote to the press denouncing the landing of US and German forces on the island to protect European interests, the government downgraded him as head of a non-existent department of agriculture. A broken man, the Pan-Africanist died on January 3, 1915, a few months short of his 47th birthday.[54] His only son, René, a soldier in the French army, fell in the line of duty in February 1916 during an infantry charge against German forces. A newspaper obituary described him as being 20 years old.[55]

Ethiopia in Haiti

One of the earlier, possibly the earliest, references to Sylvain's trip to Africa in the Haitian newspapers was the brief article in *Le Nouvelliste* in its issue of July 31, 1900. The article announced Sylvain's return to France after nine months of absence in Abyssinia. Other than the mention of the meeting between Sylvain and Menelik, the article provided no additional factual information. Sylvain's historic sojourn in the Horn of Africa, which took place in 1897, did not become public knowledge until three years later. The reasons were not difficult to fathom. First, *Nouvelliste*, the oldest Haitian newspaper,

did not start publishing until 1898. Second, typical media coverage of Africa did not go past the Atlantic shores, and even then a vast gap of information existed.[56]

Ironically, it was an unlikely event in 1902 that resulted in a lengthier piece about Ethiopia by the Haitian newspaper. In July of that year, Ethiopia was among the world governments that the British foreign office had invited to the coronation of Edward VII. Because of his relative familiarity with Europe from his visit to Italy in 1890, Ras Makonnen represented his country at the royal pomp and ceremony. Accompanied by his mission-educated translator, Gebru Desta (later Kentiba Gebru), Makonnen used the occasion to travel through France, Germany, and Turkey. While in London he made the acquaintance of William Henry Ellis, the New York stockbroker who would visit his country the next year as a business prospector. In France, he used his old contact Sylvain, to recruit Joseph Vitalien, a medical doctor from the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe, to help him start the first modern hospital in Harar.[57]

Because of the special attention Makonnen drew as the only black guest at the Court of St. James, the Haitian newspaper not only came to know of the African representation but seemed to be critical of it. On August 22, *Nouvelliste* published a rather facetious piece on the Ras, a commentary about the Ethiopian's supposed lack of 'etiquette'. Indifferent to protocol, Makonnen was said to have been seen greedily perusing the collection of Ethiopian manuscripts at the national library of France, which the paper interpreted as proof of the man's lack of social refinement. How a casual incident became newsworthy, in which Makonnen's behavior was dubbed as 'vulgar' by the Editor, was not clear, although sentiments of national rivalry could not be ruled out. In fact, it was not until the arrival of *Le Matin* in 1907, as the commercial competitor to *Nouvelliste*, that Ethiopia began to appear favorably to Haitian readers.[58]

In *Matin*, Menelik was addressed more formally, and the words emperor and its Amharic equivalent *negus* were often used interchangeably, as were the names Abyssinia and Ethiopia. Most of all, the king's ever deteriorating health condition remained of particular interest. On October 19, 1908, *Matin* included a short dispatch from Paris, which announced that the rumors about Menelik's demise were unsubstantiated. The story was repeated on January 30 based on the latest dispatch from London, only to be modified a few days later, with reports indicating that the king was seriously ill but not dead. Implicated was Taytu, who supposedly poisoned her husband out of sheer lust for power, an allegation that brought Sylvain into the fray. On April 13, 1910, Sylvain, now a deputy in the senate, wrote to *Matin* denouncing the negative media coverage. Taytu, even more than Menelik, he argued, was the one who had spared her country from the fate of colonialism, hence why she was a target of retaliation by the pro-European press, including *Nouvelliste*. To give the op-ed more weight, Sylvain signed the letter with his

military title as Colonel Benito Sylvain, honorary aide-de-camp to Emperor Menelik.[59]

In 1913, *Matin* published two detailed articles on Ethiopia. The first was the June 26 summary of the previous day's senate debate, in which the paper paid particular attention to exchanges between Deputy Sylvain and Foreign Minister Morel Bonamy. During the question-and-answer session, Sylvain had asked the minister if the government of Ethiopia was informed of the election of Michel Oreste as the new president of Haiti. On learning that nothing of that nature had been tried, Sylvain reminded his colleague that he, Bonamy, and President Alexis were among those who had supported the 1903 historic mission to East Africa. Since the governments of Ethiopia and Haiti had since been in de facto recognition of each other, a fact made evident by the correspondence between Menelik and Alexis, it was only proper that Bonamy and his Ethiopian counterparts kept each other abreast of contemporary developments; so advised Sylvain.[60]

The second editorial, 'Emperor Menelik: Is He Dead or Alive?', appeared on November 26, coincidentally just weeks before the actual demise of the monarch. Digressing from the original question for lack of evidence, the article directed its attention to the topic of the press in Ethiopia. *Le Courrier D'Ethiopie* had just found a niche in the expatriate community of Addis Ababa as the city's only foreign-language weekly. *Matin* introduced the serial as the first newspaper in the whole country, unaware of the Amharic *Aimro* that had preceded it by more than a decade. To support its claim, *Matin* reproduced the promotional section that had appeared in the August issue of *Courrier*. To business competitors, accessing a copy of the overseas African paper no doubt demonstrated *Matin's* growing international network. To casual readers, the story of *Courrier D'Ethiopie* must have served an equally compelling lesson. Haiti had at least two well-established daily papers, *Matin* and *Nouvelliste*; while Ethiopia, with many times the size of Haiti's population, could count on just an expatriate-driven weekly publication.[61]

Sylvain and Ethiopia in North America

A reference to Sylvain's African odyssey appeared in the North American media as early as October 1898.[62] By 1899, Sylvain's name had made it into the correspondence between Booker T. Washington and Henry Sylvester Williams, a British-trained Trinidadian barrister. As founder and president of the African Association in Britain, Williams was in communication with the prominent US educator on the upcoming Pan-African conference that his organization was to host in London. 'Our plans (sic) for the Pan African Conference is maturing gradually. Have had a very favorable response from Mr. Benito Sylvain', he wrote to Washington.[63] 'You will be pleased to learn that M. Benito Sylvain of Abyssinia will be present', he added in a follow-up letter.[64]

Sylvain and Washington were not strangers to one another. A detailed account of the Pan-African conference, which took place at the Westminster Town Hall from July 23 to July 25, 1900, was published in Sylvain's 1901 doctoral dissertation: *Du Sort des Indigènes dans les Colonies d'Exploitation*. According to that account, translated into English by the historian Tony Martin, Sylvain and Washington had crossed paths as early as 1897. 'In the month of December 1897, returning from Haiti after our first voyage to Abyssinia, we came in contact with Professor Booker T. Washington', Sylvain was to remember. Washington put Sylvain in touch with Williams and other kindred spirits in Britain, a day's trip from Paris by land and sea: 'and we decided to join an African Association which had just been formed in London through the zealous efforts of a clergyman, the Rev. Joseph Mason, and a young student, Henry Sylvester Williams, originally from Trinidad'.[65]

Despite having been consulted at the preparatory stage, Washington did not attend the Westminster gathering, typical of someone known for his aversion to protest politics. Among the 33 delegates who participated, in addition to Williams, were W.E.B. Du Bois, Anna Julia Cooper, and Bishop Alexander Walters, all from the USA. F.R. Johnson, an ex-attorney general, attended on behalf of the Republic of Liberia, while the governments of Haiti and Ethiopia were represented by Sylvain. Colonial delegates came from Gold Coast, Lagos, Sierra Leone, Canada, Jamaica, and some of the smaller Caribbean islands, as well as from Cuba. Influential Britons, including Members of Parliament and the Bishop of London, joined, and the *Times* of London gave the event positive coverage.[66]

The conference concluded with what few then suspected would be the occasion's most remarkable oration: Du Bois's 'Address to the Nations of the World'. In a passage wrongly traced to his 1903 masterpiece *Souls of Black Folk*, the 32-year-old scholar made the century's most prophetic observation on North–South relations: 'The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line'. The most critical question of the new era, he continued, was 'the question as to how far differences of race (which show themselves chiefly in the color of the skin and the texture of the hair) will hereafter be made the basis of denying to over half the world the right of sharing to their utmost ability the opportunities and privileges of modern civilization'.[67] The Atlanta University professor pointed out the pervasive nature of racial exploitation internationally, against which a collective and conscientious struggle had to be waged. 'Let the nations of the World respect the integrity and independence of the free Negro States of Abyssinia, Liberia, Haiti, and the rest', Du Bois pleaded, 'and let the inhabitants of these States, the independent tribes of Africa, the Negroes of the West Indies and America, and the Black subjects of all nations take courage, strive ceaselessly, and fight bravely, that they may prove to the world their incontestable right to be counted among the great brotherhood of mankind'.[68]

In its deliberation, the conference recommended the establishment of a Pan-African Association under which the various international activities were to be centrally coordinated. The Association would meet every two years: in a city in the USA by 1902, and in Haiti by 1904, so as to coincide with the country's centennial commemoration of its national independence. Finally, 'a memorial would be addressed to the Emperor Menelik and to the Presidents of the Republics of Haiti and Liberia, proclaiming them Grand Protectors of the Pan-African Association'. With whatever diplomatic resources the three governments had in their reach, the message envisaged, they would intervene 'against the policy of extermination and degradation which prevails in Europe in regard to Black and colored people'.[69]

Constraining factors faced by the Pan-African Association, as it tried to live up to its ambitious mandates, are outside the scope of this chapter. In the immediate aftermath, North American newspapers praised the Westminster conference as an important milestone. On August 18, the *Appeal* of St. Paul, Minnesota, described the three-day event as the first time that international black activists had been able to come together and speak with one voice about their aspirations for equality and freedom.[70] A few days later, the *Colored American* of Washington, D.C., applauded the conference as 'a great success'. The latter's detailed account contained, among other things, a comprehensive list of personalities involved, daily activities, and receptions. Bishop Walters, pastor of the African Methodist Episcopal Church of New York, merited a particular acknowledgement for his presiding role, as did his assistant Sylvain, identified by his Ethiopian military title.[71]

The New York Times, North America's leading daily, said nothing about the historic meeting. In an unrelated incident, however, it too was to draw attention to the man who was now Menelik's de facto roving ambassador. On his way to Haiti in December 1901, Sylvain had disembarked at the New York port for a four-day stay in the city. His arrival on the French liner *La Gascogne*, bedecked colorfully, caught the attention of custom officials, resulting in an extended interrogation. 'A picturesque young officer, in a profusely gold-braided military suit, wearing two swords at his side and carrying another in his hand, was down on the passenger list as M. Benito Sylvain', the article read. 'When asked the reason for all of the gold lace and swords, he, with a decided French accent, told his questioner that he was a naval officer in the navy of Abyssinia, and also an aide de camp to King Menelek of that country'. In exaggeratedly poor English, the article reconstructed the dialogue between the 'Abyssinian' passenger and the custom inspector, with the former insisting that he be shown respect as a subject of King Menelik, and the latter retorting rudely: 'Who's Menelek? He don't count over here'.[72]

There was no mention of what Sylvain planned to do during his four-day layover in New York, although it would have been uncharacteristic of him if his schedule had not included a call on acquaintances, even a confab with the very Bishop Walters himself. That would not have been the first time

the West Indian had tried to insert himself in the African American political landscape. As mentioned, he and Washington had crossed paths in 1897. In fact, just two months prior to his last transit through New York, Sylvain had cabled the Tuskegee Wizard, congratulating him on his dinner invitation from the White House, the first time a black leader had been accorded that honor.[73] If Washington, a practical man, thought of Sylvain as little more than a peripatetic ideologue, he at least appreciated his broader transoceanic perspective. In April 1904, as Congress discussed the ratification of Skinner's diplomatic treaty with Ethiopia, Washington would try to have an African American official fill the new position that might open within the State Department's overseas desk. 'I have talked with the President several times with a view of getting him to send a colored man to represent this country since Abyssinia is practically a Negro nation', he wrote to one Mr. Anderson.[74] The lobby did not succeed. In the same year, however, Washington was able to send three Tuskegee graduates to nearby eastern Sudan, then under British administration, to serve as technical advisors in a cotton-growing agricultural scheme.[75]

The last time Sylvain was in touch with the African American community was in 1908. During his short domicile in Montreal, Canada, he was able to appear at several US venues, including at New York City's Bethel Church on West 25th Street.[76] An individual Sylvain sought to meet in person during the lecture tours, but was able only to write to, was his old London acquaintance: Du Bois. 'I am very glad to have gotten the little note from you and to know that you are well', the New Englander scribbled back in January 1908, adding: 'I should like very much to hear of your work in Ethiopia and to see if there is a chance for our co-operation'.[77] In the follow-up letter, Sylvain explained briefly about his book project on 'Abyssinia, which will surely have some echo everywhere', before apologizing for his poor English and moving on to a topic of mutual interest. 'I received and read with the greatest satisfaction the litterature (sic) concerning the Niagara Movement that you have sent me', he continued. 'Our aim is the same: the complete emancipation of our Race, by exercising with dignity all the rights and prerogatives granted and warranted to white people'.[78]

The correspondence seems to have progressed no further. Du Bois was perhaps put off by a sentence in Sylvain's last missive about his hope for an African American college graduate wife, a subject the professor deemed rather too personal and inappropriate. Or, perhaps, instinct told him, and rightly so, that Sylvain was also in touch with his ideological archrival Washington.[79] Decades later, however, Du Bois would credit the West Indian for his ambassadorial role in introducing Ethiopia to the outside world. 'I remember the stiff, young officer who came with credentials from Menelik of Abyssinia', Du Bois wrote in *Darkwater*, his first autobiographical work, in 1920.[80] 'As early as 1900', he later added in a correspondence with an Ethiopian official, 'a Pan-African Conference met in London, and there was present a young

Haitian who had been in Abyssinia and brought us some information concerning the country'.[81]

Whether at the London conference, in the newspaper articles, or in the personal communications sampled above, there was a common thread. The insertion of Sylvain into the Ethiopian body politic helped write a new counter-discourse. The deracination of Ethiopia, a byproduct of post-Adwa racial anthropology, was subtly reversed. Thus began the incorporation of Ethiopian symbolism into the anticolonial imaginary. Because of his extensive network and wide travels, Sylvain epitomized the era's consummate global activist, becoming the true progenitor of modern Pan-Africanism in the eyes of some. And Menelik, whom Sylvain continued to represent abroad, grew into a larger-than-life figure, an anticolonial icon that a generation of black internationalists revered and looked up to.

Laudatory praises about Ethiopian war heroes in the black press long after the Battle of Adwa were, indeed, a testament to the country's evolving folkloric stature. In its issue of December 1900, the *Colored American Magazine* published a five-page biographical profile of Menelik. 'And to-day, his empire is recognized as a first-class power all over the world', was its compliment to the African sovereign.[82] In 1909, Ras Makonnen was called the 'Napoleon of Africa' by the *New York Age*, as well as being compared with Toussaint Louverture of Haiti. 'It was through his strategy and valor that the Italians were routed, and Abyssinia, that great Negro African kingdom, has remained free and independent', read the paper's overdue tributes to deceased Makonnen.[83]

Menelik's death in December 1913 was seen as the closing of an era by the *Chicago Defender*, prompting another flattering eulogy. 'King Menelik of Abyssinia, who recently died, was indeed a great man. Even though the country over which he ruled was comparatively small, his fame was worldwide.' The paper described Menelik as 'primitive in his own ways' for turning his back to modernity, but still concluded that he was a just and brave leader. 'His army of wild tribesmen have defeated some of the best disciplined and equipped soldiers of the old world … Although he ruled with an iron will, he ruled Justly; and many of the more civilized countries might well pattern after Abyssinia.'[84]

Finally, as Robert Hill has argued, the black anticolonial imaginary appropriated a more subtle trope in the tradition of *Ethiopis vagantes.* In the USA, Europe, the West Indies, and even among Africans had emerged a group of 'wandering Ethiopians', who either identified themselves as Ethiopians or claimed ancestral roots in Ethiopia.[85] Some of them were impostors of royalty, with copycat stories of a stranded traveler desirous of help. One of them was so credible that his story appeared in the *New York Times* of December 22, 1907. That was the story of Prince Ludwig Menelik, globe-trotting nephew of the African emperor, who became the unfortunate victim of theft while traveling through Europe.[86] Little did the paper suspect foul play. In 1904, Prince Thomas Mackarooroo had his cover of Zulu nobility blown by

London police and was deported back to Jamaica as a certain Charles Isaac Brown, only to reappear a few years later as Prince Ludwig Menelik of Abyssinia. In explaining Brown's new avatar, Menelik, Hill writes: 'Emperor Menelik II's status as the culture hero of the black world, following the stunning military victory of Ethiopia at the Battle of Adwa in 1896, had grown by leaps and bounds in the preceding years'.[87] Hill could have added that Sylvain was the catalyst behind that transformation. After all, no one performed the role of 'wandering Ethiopians' better than Sylvain of Haiti, Menelik's legendary ambassador to the Pan-African communities abroad.

Conclusion

Once distant and obscure to blacks in the Western hemisphere, by the early twentieth century the Horn of Africa had become an important trope in the modern anticolonial imaginary. The catalyst was the 1896 Ethiopian victory over Italy at the Battle of Adwa. Contemporary social Darwinists reinvented the post-Adwa state as a non-African sociopolitical entity. Diaspora blacks, by contrast, read in the Ethiopian victory the very theme of racial vindication that their newspapers and religious institutions had relentlessly promoted. Thanks to the role of Benito Sylvain, Ethiopia and Emperor Menelik had become household names in Pan-African circles, and bilateral diplomatic ties between Addis Ababa and Port-au-Prince even seemed a possibility.

Whatever ambivalence lingered on the 'Abyssinian race question', Du Bois tried addressing it in his 1915 Afrocentric classic *The Negro*. Du Bois described Menelik as 'a shrewd man of predominantly Negro blood' and his wife Taytu as 'a full-blooded Negress'. However crude the professor's language, his logic was clear. The Red Sea and the Nile Valley lay at the crossroads of cultures where populations from Africa and Asia met and mixed. According to the conventional definition of blackness, therefore, the people of the Horn of Africa were as Negroid as diaspora blacks.[88]

This extended into the classical past as well. Ancient Egypt, one of the earliest complex societies and home to many impressive innovations, was not African just by geography, but its progenitors were Ethiopians native to the vast region of the upper Nile. 'Pre-dynastic Egypt was settled by Negroes from Ethiopia', Du Bois posited. 'They were of varied type: the broad-nose, wooly-haired type, to which the word "Negro" is sometimes confined; the black curly-haired, sharper feature type, which must be considered an equally Negroid variation'.[89]

Du Bois himself treated race as a social construct, or 'a philosophic speculation', as he dubbed it. 'It is of no more importance now to know how many human races there are than to know how many angels can dance on the point of a needle', was his witty comment on the subject.[90] Yet, this was the era of scientific racism, and some level of race thinking was necessary to prove that the black past was no less impressive than the past of other peoples. Du Bois's

Nilocentric outline of history, from Ethiopia's ancient conquest of Egypt to its recent defeat of Italy at the Battle of Adwa, was meant to do that. It was a timely perspective that transcended the spatial and temporal constraints of the Black Atlantic. From the back-to-Africa homilies of Marcus Garvey to the prose and poetry of the Harlem artists, henceforth the Horn of Africa would play a critical role in popularizing the theme of resurgent Africa. Thus was the long-term significance of Emperor Menelik's defiant spirit at Adwa, which the Haitian Sylvain promoted internationally, and which was to inform profoundly the early history of the modern Pan-African movement.

Notes

1. Gebru Tareke, review of *History of Modern Ethiopia 1855–1991*, 2nd ed., by Bahru Zewde, *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 35, no. 2/3 (2002): 587–90.
2. W.E.B. Du Bois, *The Negro* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 26.
3. For a discussion of classical Ethiopia and its place in black thought, or what Scott calls the "Ethiopian Tradition," see William R. Scott's *Sons of Sheba's Race: African–Americans and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–1941* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), chap. 1. For a comprehensive account of the history of African American sojourn in Africa, including missionary travels and repatriations, see James Campbell's *Middle Passages: African American Journeys to Africa, 1787–2005* (New York: Penguin, 2006).
4. The most controversial clause of the Wichale Treaty, also spelt as Wuchale or Ucciali, was Article 17. The Amharic version, which was the original draft, gave the Ethiopian government the option to negotiate with other sovereign powers through the Italian government: "His Majesty, the King of Kings of Ethiopia, *may, if he so desires*, avail himself of the Italian government for any negotiations he may enter into with other Powers and Governments." The Italian translation, which was distributed to the various European governments and which implied Ethiopia's protectorate status, stated that Ethiopia's diplomatic dealings with foreign powers were to be conducted through the Italian government: "His Majesty, the King of Kings of Ethiopia, *consents to avail himself* of the government of his Majesty the King of Italy *for all negotiations* in affairs which he may have with other Powers or Governments." (Italics added by the author for emphasis). For a comparative analysis of the Amharic and Italian versions of the treaty, see Paulos Milkias's "Battle of Adwa: Historic Victory of Ethiopia over European Colonialism," in *Battle of Adwa: Reflection on Ethiopian Victory Against European Colonialism*, ed. Paulos Milkias and Getachew Metaferia (New York: Algora, 2005), 43–50.
5. For a detailed account of the battle, see Raymond Jonas's *Battle of Adwa: African Victory in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), chaps. 9–13.
6. Milkias and Metaferia, *Battle of Adwa*, 71, 128.
7. "Italy Like Pandemonium: Abyssinian Reverses Provoke Paroxysms of Rage in Rome," *New York Times*, March 6, 1896.

8. "Italy's Terrible Defeat," *New York Times*, March 4, 1896.
9. Article 2: no title. *New York Times*, March 4, 1896.
10. "A Personal View of Menelek: Impressions of Commercial Traveler Who Talked with Him in His Imperial Camp Last Month," *New York Times*, March 22, 1896.
11. Jonas, *Adwa*, 269.
12. For an insightful discussion on the Ethiopian race debate in the 1930s, a carry-over from the 1890s, see the chapter entitled "Black or White: The Hamitic Controversy," in Scott's *Sons of Sheba's Race*, 191–207.
13. Scott, *Sons of Sheba's Race*, 21 and 32.
14. Darlene Clark Hine, *African–American Odyssey*, combined volumes (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2003), 320.
15. James Quirin, "African–American Perceptions of the Battle of Adwa, 1896–1914," in *Proceedings of the XVth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, ed. Siegbert Uhlig (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006), 344–48.
16. Quoted in Quirin, "African–American Perceptions," 346.
17. *Cleveland Gazette*, March 14, 1896.
18. Ibid., March 28, 1896.
19. Quoted in Quirin, "African–American Perceptions," 345.
20. Quirin, "African–American Perceptions," 346.
21. *Cleveland Gazette*, March 28, 1896.
22. Key texts in constructing this section have been travel diaries and other primary sources found in Antoine Bervin's biography of Benito Sylvain. Although a treasure trove to Horn of Africa specialists, the documents have been inaccessible to non-French readers and therefore hardly explored. For those who might be interested in these sources but may not have the language skill, effort has been made to integrate a few copious excerpts without altering the flow or the pace of the narrative. The author would like to thank his erudite bilingual student assistant, Denis Boulet of St. Thomas University, for translating into English relevant sections from Bervin's biography as well as the various articles from *Le Matin* and *Le Nouvelliste*. This chapter would have taken a totally different course without his help.
23. Emmanuelle Sibeud, "Comment Peut-on être Noir? Le Parcours d'un Intellectual Haïtien à la Fin du XIXe Siècle," *Cromohs* 10 (2005): 2.
24. Antoine Bervin, *Benito Sylvain: Apôtre du Relèvement Social des Noirs* (Port-au-Prince: La Phalange, 1969), 25. Also Sibeud, "Comment Peut-on être Noir?" 1–2.
25. Sibeud, "Comment Peut-on être Noir?" 2.
26. Daniel J. Crowley, "Suzanne Comhaire Sylvain: 1898–1975," *Obituaries* (1978): 700–1.
27. David Levering Lewis, *The Race to Fashoda: European Colonialism and African Resistance in the Scramble for Africa* (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 121.
28. Richard Pankhurst, "British Reactions to the Battle of Adwa: As Illustrated in the *Times of London* for 1896," in Milkias and Metaferia *Battle of Adwa*, 218.
29. Bervin, *Benito Sylvain*, 27.
30. Ibid., 32–34.
31. Ibid., 42–43.

32. Ibid., 45–46.
33. Robert P. Skinner, *Abyssinia of To-Day: An Account of the First Mission Sent by the American Government to the Court of the King of Kings, 1903–1904* (New York: Longman, 1906), 131.
34. Skinner, *Abyssinia*, 178–84.
35. Jonas, *Adwa*, 283.
36. Chris Prouty, *Empress Taytu and Emperor Menelik II: Ethiopia 1883–1910* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1986), 192.
37. Bervin, *Benito Sylvain*, 46.
38. Bervin, *Benito Sylvain*, 49–50. According to Chris Prouty, Taytu's biographer, the medical condition got more serious as the queen grew older, and surgery was discussed as a solution at some point. See Prouty, *Empress Taytu*, 277.
39. Bervin, *Benito Sylvain*, 47.
40. Ibid., 54–55.
41. Ibid., 55–56.
42. Jerrold Robins, "The Americans in Ethiopia," *Mercury* 29 (May–August 1933): 63–69. On Daniel Alexander, see "Rogers Found Four Americans in Abyssinia," *Afro-American* December 20, 1930; "Former Missourian Describes Menelik," *Pittsburgh Courier* February 8, 1936; and "Abroad for Thirty Years, Speaks Eleven Languages," *Afro-American* December 30, 1939.
43. According to Bervin, Sylvain made his second trip to Ethiopia in December 1903. However, in a letter to the Provisionary Government of Haiti, in October 1902, Sylvain writes about having returned from his third voyage to Ethiopia in July 1902 (87). Similarly, during his audience with Menelik in December 1903, Sylvain reminds the emperor that the last time they saw each other was two years earlier (68). Chances are Sylvain made more than the four trips (possibly six) acknowledged in the biography. In a couple of instances, Sylvain might not have proceeded farther than Harar, the abode of Ras Makonnen, just a day's train ride from Djibouti after 1901. Yet, Bervin seems to have counted only those involving a visit to Menelik's palace in the capital, hence the discrepancy.
44. The Texan William Henry Ellis, also known as Guillaume Enriques Ellesio, claimed a dual identity both as an African American and a Mexican national. Having risen to a great financial success in New York City as a business associate of Henry Hotchkiss, the famous gun manufacturer, Ellis was perhaps the richest black American of his time. On January 1, 1904, the *New York Times* published an article by Ellis about his Ethiopian expedition, "Tales of King Menelik," which was mostly a make-believe story of primal Africa. For a comprehensive biography on Ellis, see Karl Jacoby's, *The Strange Career of William Henry Ellis: The Texas Slave Who Became a Millionaire* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2016).
45. Skinner, *Abyssinia*, 73–82.
46. Ibid., 131–32.
47. Sylvain's role at the London conference, sometimes referred to as the First Pan-African Congress, is best captured in Tony Martin's, *Pan-African Connection: From Slavery to Marcus Garvey and Beyond* (Dover, MA: Majority Press, 1984), chap. 13. Scattered references to Sylvain's participation are also found in Marika Sherwood's *Origins of Pan-Africanism: Henry Sylvester Williams*

and the African Diaspora (New York: Routledge, 2010). For Sylvain's promotion to the rank of commandant in 1903, see the chronological timetable in Bervin's, *Benito Sylvain*, 156.

48. Bervin, *Benito Sylvain*, 69–71.
49. Ibid., 144–45.
50. Ibid., 145–46.
51. For obituary, see "Makonnen Dead," *New York Times*, March 24, 1906.
52. Bervin, *Benito Sylvain*, 100–3.
53. For Sylvain in Canada, see Bervin's *Benito Sylvain*, 127–40.
54. Bervin, *Benito Sylvain*, 148–49.
55. "Décoré et Porté à l'Ordre du Jour," *Le Matin*, February 15, 1916.
56. "Benito Sylvain," *Le Nouvelliste*, July 31, 1900.
57. For Makonnen's 1902 trip to Europe, where he was to meet with the African American Ellis, see Dawit Gebru Desta, *Kentiba Gebru Desta Ye Ethiopia Kiris* (Addis Ababa: self-published, 1993), 199–200. Also see Karl Jacoby's *Strange Career of William Ellis*, 146–47. Makonnen's recruitment of Dr. Joseph Vitalien, in 1902, is mentioned in Chris Prouty's *Empress Taytu*, 283. More likely, the contact between Makonnen and Vitalien was initiated by Sylvain. In one of his letters to the Haitian government, Sylvain mentions having met with Makonnen in Paris and of having run a special errand on his behalf. See Bervin's *Benito Sylvain*, 87.
58. "Le Ras Makonen," *Le Nouvelliste*, August 22, 1902.
59. Benito Sylvain, "Respect à la Femme! l'Impératrice d'Ethiopie et la Presse Européenne," *Le Matin*, April 13, 1910.
60. "La Chambre," *Le Matin*, June 26, 1913.
61. "L'Empereur Ménélik: Est-Il Mort ou Vivant?" *Le Matin*, November 26, 1913.
62. On October 2, 1898, a Californian newspaper included a dispatch from Paris about a social event at which Sylvain was a guest speaker. The occasion was inspired by the hundredth birthday of the now-deceased Jules Michelet, the celebrated French historian. Madam Michelet's father had served as the personal secretary of Toussaint Louverture in the 1790s, and Sylvain's presence was meant to symbolize that connection. Sylvain spoke representing his newly established organization: The Black Youth of Paris. The newspaper described him as "a Negro naval officer and aide-de-camp to the Abyssinian Emperor Menelik." See *Sacramento Record-Union*, October 2, 1898.
63. Louis R. Harlan, ed., *Booker T. Washington Papers* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), Vol. 5, 158.
64. Harlan, *BTW Papers*, Vol. 5, 569.
65. Quoted in Tony Martin, *Pan-African Connection*, 207.
66. Martin, *Pan-African Connection*, 207.
67. W.E.B. Du Bois, *ABC of Color* (New York: International Publishers, 1969), 20.
68. Du Bois, *ABC of Color*, 23.
69. Martin, *Pan-African Connection*, 207–8.
70. "Pan-African Conference," *Appeal*, August 18, 1900.
71. "Pan-African Conference," *Colored American*, August 25, 1900.

72. "King Menelek's Agent Was Forced to Wait," *New York Times*, December 2, 1901.
73. Harlan, *BTW Papers*, Vol. 6, 261.
74. Harlan, *BTW Papers*, Vol. 7, 486.
75. Harlan, *BTW Papers*, Vol. 7, 403–4, 520; and Vol. 8, 153–54, 288–89.
76. Letter from Benito Sylvain to W.E.B. Du Bois: May 23, 1908. W.E.B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312). Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries.
77. Letter from Du Bois to Sylvain: January 24, 1907 (more likely 1908). Du Bois Papers (MS 312). Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries.
78. Letter from Sylvain to Du Bois: June 24, 1908. Du Bois Papers (MS 312). Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries.
79. In May 1908, the same month Sylvain was in communication with Du Bois, he wrote to Washington inquiring about a teaching post at Tuskegee University, to which Washington responded negatively. See W. Manning Marable, "Booker T. Washington and African Nationalism," *Phylon* 35, no. 4 (1974): 399–400.
80. W.E.B. Du Bois, *Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil* (New York: Harcourt, 1920), 193.
81. Memorandum to His Excellency Kentiba Gebrou and Mr. Malaku E. Bayen, Representing His Majesty Ras Tafari, King of Ethiopia: August 14, 1930. Du Bois Papers (MS 312). Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries.
82. S.E.F.C.C. Hamedoe, "Menelik, Emperor of Abyssinia: A Direct Descendant of Solomon the Great and the Queen of Sheba," *Colored American Magazine* 2, no. 2 (December 1900): 149–54.
83. Quoted in Quirin, "African–American Perceptions," 346–47.
84. "King Menelik," *Chicago Defender*, January 3, 1914.
85. Robert A. Hill, "King Menelik's Nephew: Prince Thomas Mackarooroo, aka Prince Ludwig Menelek of Abyssinia," *Small Axe* 26 (June 2008): 16.
86. "African Prince on Hunt for Capital: Nephew of Menelek Has 150,000 Abyssinian Acres He Wishes to Sell," *New York Times*, December 22, 1907.
87. Hill, "King Menelik's Nephew," 28.
88. Du Bois, *Negro*, 26.
89. Du Bois, *Negro*, 18.
90. Du Bois, *Negro*, 16.

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CHAPTER 22

Colonial Africa and the West

Enocent Msindo

To understand Africa's postcolonial condition and its relationship with the West we need to first appreciate historical linkages between the two.[1] Africa's relationship with Western countries, particularly European countries, emerged mainly as a result of colonization and the systems that colonizers established. Colonization happened at a specific era in Western history. By 1800, mercantile capitalism had firmly established itself in Europe and had extended its tentacles across the globe. Mercantile capitalism was strengthened by the profits of the slave trade and aggressive industrialization, leading to social and political changes in Europe. The evolution of efficient shipping technology and the invention of lethal military technology were also important factors. The rapid expansion of mercantile commerce, post-slave trade, which period is glibly referred to as the era of legitimate commerce (which it was not); the rise of new Western forms of aggressive nationalisms spurring and themselves further spurred by aggressive unifications (for instance Germany, Italy, France, and others), and the birth of certain philosophies, especially social Darwinism, all heightened appetites for adventure, impelled notions of Western grandeur and also dictated changing ideas towards modes of business between Europe and the rest of the world.

Colonization became one preferred approach to create and safeguard new markets for the industrial revolution in Europe, to accelerate the extraction of cheap raw materials, and to reproduce cultures of perpetual dependency by delegitimizing African indigenous innovation and knowledge systems

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through incorporating Africans into a lasting regime of cheap labor.[2] This helps us to understand why colonialism became primarily an extractive enterprise which depended on the establishment of certain political and economic systems which continued to shape and further undermine African economies after Independence, exacerbating Africa's dependency on former colonizers. Even in this era of Chinese economic dominance, African countries' links with former colonizers have remained strong. In this chapter, we examine how the colonial system worked and how it was closely tied to Western politics, how it fed into the Western economic system and how it created conditions that dictated Africa's future. Without radical economic decolonization, the African story remains one of abject misery.

Legacies of the Colonial Economy

Colonialism was a complete package that thrived by integrating Africa to the Western economic system on unequal terms. This happened through a combination of processes. First, African judicial and political structures were destroyed and replaced by European structures that facilitated the extraction of resources through monopoly capitalist entities. In settler colonies, colonial officials undermined preexisting African political and economic systems. They also passed a raft of laws that impacted on Africans' productive capacity. These included discriminatory land laws; laws controlling the prices of agricultural goods such as the 1934 Maize Control Act in colonial Zimbabwe, and laws controlling labor mobilization in the colonies.

In protectorates and indirect rule colonies, colonial power was exercised through salaried despotic monarchies (mainly kings and chiefs) and through a few African educated elites who served in the civil service. Where centralized polities did not exist, such as in Eastern Nigeria, new warrant chiefs were invented to make the system work.[3] In the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, where there were established monarchies, divide and rule was used to facilitate colonial resource extraction. The institution of kingship was transformed as kings became key in mobilizing forced labor from weaker ethnic groups for colonial projects such as railway and road construction and cash-crop agriculture. In Rwanda and Burundi, Tutsi kings and chiefs, who were 'Nilotes', were given unwieldy powers over the mainly Hutu 'Bantu' subjects. This cemented the Hamitic myth. In Uganda, the Baganda monarchy, headed by the *kabaka* (king) was retained, this time under a new colonial mandate. Unsurprisingly, when the nationalist movement rose in the late 1950s in the Great Lakes region, it was strongly anti-monarchy as the latter was associated with the evils of indirect-rule colonialism. In Uganda, the king's residence was attacked in 1966, the king forced into exile in Britain, and his residency turned into one of President Milton Obote's military barracks. The institution of kingship was legally abolished in 1967.

In Rwanda and Burundi, Tutsi regimes that had been in power during Belgian colonial rule were violently overthrown between 1959 and 1962 and replaced by majoritarian Hutu leaders. Consequently, huge Tutsi populations trekked into parts of Central and Eastern Africa such as Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), Uganda, Tanzania, and elsewhere. In many ways, this refugee crisis situation explains many challenges that we have in Central Africa today such as: the perpetual refugee crisis in the region; the 1994 Rwanda genocide; the crisis in Zaire that ended Mobutu's reign, himself a Western Cold War ally; the perpetuation of ethnic politics in the region; the rise of new political heavyweights in the region, namely Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame (both key Western allies in the region)[4] at a time when Nyerere's influence was in decline following his retirement from politics in 1985; the failure of democratic transitions in the entire Great Lakes region; the rise of insurgencies and the collapse of traditional social structures. Scholarship has demonstrated that the West has been the key beneficiary of the disorder in the Great Lakes region. Since the short-lived reign of Patrice Lumumba, Western multinational corporations, allied with local and international criminal networks, have continued to foment disorder and loot the economy during times of civil war in the Congo.[5] In addition to Mobutu's use of mainly Hutu refugees against his fellow citizens since the Rwanda genocide, Western food, financial aid, and other interventions have continued to fuel the refugee crisis and violence in the region as perpetrators use human hostages as shields.[6]

The second point is that under colonial rule, industrial production in Africa focused on extracting raw materials mainly through mining and (cash-crop) agriculture, both of which produced raw materials for the colonizers' countries from where they were processed into finished goods.[7] These finished products were then imported from the metropolitan countries into Africa and elsewhere, usually by companies wholly owned by citizens of those colonizing countries. Invariably, these firms repatriated most of their profits to their parent countries. The capitalist system was an organized cyclical system. Consequently, there was no deliberate attempt to invest in the manufacturing sector as doing so would severely compromise the colonial project by creating possibilities for colonies to become more competitive and self-sufficient, which would make them more difficult to govern and possibly become more self-reliant, should they gain political independence.

Moreover, any attempt to develop processing industries in colonies required either a massive immigration of skilled white personnel to the colonies or heavy financial investment in setting up tertiary education institutions for Africans so that they would get the skills required to run new industries. Neither of these possibilities was inherently desirable to the colonizers as this would directly undermine the colonial project for no apparent gain. In settler colonies such as Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), massive immigration campaigns were started to attract new white settlers between the 1950s and 1970s,

but such campaigns were not successful as this did not bring in the much needed capital investment and the skilled persons envisaged by the Rhodesian government.[8] The few immigrants who came into Africa after 1945 did not set up new competitive manufacturing industries but served mainly in the agricultural and mining sectors. Elsewhere, in the 1950s, white settlers were already leaving Africa mainly due to the end of colonial rule in different African countries. Some were leaving their colonies for other African settler colonies which still appeared to be intact. For instance, some left the Belgian Congo for Southern Rhodesia following the collapse of Belgian rule; the same applied to whites from Kenya after the Mau-Mau insurgency.

The cyclical nature of the capitalist system that we described above is a very pertinent factor in understanding African economic history. It helps us to understand why Africa is still dominated by huge multinational corporations, which are listed on stock exchanges of their parent countries, such as Anglo-American, BHP Billiton, Shell and others. None of these corporations focused on manufacturing in Africa as their model was and is still based on extracting it raw, shipping it out, processing it abroad, then selling it worldwide, including to the original source. This was Africa's first impediment. When African countries received their independence, the new states had to maintain close ties with established Western corporations and Western governments because these were the only known and available economic avenues for Africa to access the outside world with its raw materials. Any diplomatic relationships were handled with care as feared to upset this status quo. Those who tried to delink from the West by adopting socialist principles immediately faced thAfricae wrath of the West; Congo, Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, and a few others are examples. Those who became pro-capitalist, like Ivory Coast, yet with an Afro-centric economic model were not spared either. They held on for a few years, but by the mid-1970s they were also in trouble and highly indebted.

The third challenge for Africa was that at independence, most Africans were not yet trained and skilled enough to initiate and run their own industries. At independence, in Congo only a handful had a university degree, and these were mainly African priests. This was the situation in many other African countries at independence, except in parts of West Africa, where missionary education predated colonialism and an educated elite class emerged much earlier. Moreover, the education system that was established in many post-colonial African countries did little to solve Africa's economic conundrum as the education system reproduced the colonial education model of producing workers to serve in established entities as opposed to training entrepreneurs.

In Africa, the relationship between capitalism and colonialism dictated that capital be invested in those colonies where there was more likelihood of extracting more raw materials, particularly in mineral-rich areas. By 1938, more than half of Britain's £1222 million investment to Africa went to South Africa (£555 million) and Southern Rhodesia (£102 million) as colonial

Zimbabwe was then known. These two were the mineral-rich settler colonies of Southern Africa. This made South Africa and Zimbabwe economically stronger than their regional neighbors, and they were used as springboards by the British to control neighboring colonies which were under indirect rule.[9] The story was the same for other settler colonies that were strategically scattered in different African regions. Before the Mau Mau insurgency and its ultimate independence, Kenya dominated Tanzania, Uganda, and the Island of Zanzibar. This history of strong colonial investment and the corresponding huge white-settler populations in these colonies increased these colonies' dependence on Western economic models and heightened their vulnerability to Western corporations' disinvestment. Zimbabwe is currently struggling to revive its economy following the closure of mainly foreign-owned firms, most of which were owned by the descendants of British settlers. South Africa is also beginning to experience an economic downturn following similar Western capital flight and the speculative tendencies of its international investors.

We alluded above to the relationship between colonialism and resource extraction. Each African colony was a specialized economic unit that produced a narrow range of products, particularly certain minerals or cash crops that were required in metropolitan countries for their industrial, military, and food necessities. By creasing a situation in which Africans produced what they could not consume (raw materials) and consumed what they did not produce (finished products), colonial economies entrenched Africa's cycles of dependency which had started during the slave trade era.[10] This narrow economic structure had serious ramifications for Africa's food security after independence, particularly in the light of Africa's postwar population boom, and also for Africa's overall balance of trade. For instance, in South Africa (where the major economic venture was mining), huge urban centers emerged with the Africans evicted from certain areas into reserves. Consequently, by the 1930s, their food security situation and their tradable products had drastically declined to almost 50% below their 1885 levels because of declining production in the dry areas into which they had been driven. Inhabitants of South Africa's Ciskei and Transkei regions were so impoverished that they became nothing more than reservoirs of cheap colonial labor for the mines.[11] The historical connection between these poor areas and mine labor has continued to this day as the majority of miners working in the platinum mines of the North West province come from these areas. Post-apartheid South Africa currently contends with this huge and vulnerable rural populace whose plight will not change because they have been submersed into a permanent social and economic crisis.

Furthermore, the narrowness of the colonial economy, which remained so after independence, meant that in the event of a fall in prices of certain products, many African countries had no fall-back plan. This happened to Ivory Coast of Houphouet-Boigny in 1988, then a producer of about 40% of world cocoa. When the price of cocoa declined by 50%, the Ivorian economy

collapsed, also worsening the Ivorian food security situation as the country did not have sufficient foreign currency to import food.[12] Zambia, which relied on copper, also suffered when copper prices fell drastically in the 1970s.

Colonial cash-crop specialization was a deliberate economic choice to turn colonies into specialized economic zones so as to connect Africa to the global capitalist economy. Certain African colonies were better known for growing certain cash crops. Cotton was mainly produced in Mozambique and Uganda, rubber in Liberia and Belgian Congo, coffee in Kenya and Uganda, cocoa in Ivory Coast and Ghana, palm oil in Nigeria, groundnuts in Senegal and Gambia, and many others. Between a quarter and a third of all cultivated land in Africa was dedicated to cash-crop agriculture.[13] Before the rise of African nationalism in Africa, mainly after 1945, African peasants who were drawn into this parasitic colonial economy could not successfully challenge the system because of increasing colonial violence. Colonial cash-crop cultivation during the colonial era thrived because of the use of violence including physical force, the rejection of African indigenous agrarian knowledge systems, the evictions of villagers from their land, price-fixing by the state-controlled marketing boards, and an introduction of a dual-tiered pricing model whereby products from European farmers fetched higher prices than from those of Africans.[14] In the 1940s, efforts by African peasants to create alternative markets for their products were thwarted by colonial regimes which tightly controlled the marketing boards so as to undermine peasants' economic competitiveness.[15]

Post-independence African governments inherited the above parasitic character of the colonial state. They did not perform well as they either failed or were unwilling to move beyond the limits of the colonial economy as moving away entailed creating a completely new and different relationship with the West. Peasants remained at the center of the state's developmental goals, perhaps because the peasants were viewed as softer targets to manipulate than the burgeoning urban populace which was politically virulent because of their trade union movements, their access to information, and their being politically outside 'tribal' structures where they had been controlled through despotic chiefs and headmen. In post-independent Africa, peasants had the dual role of producing food for the rapidly expanding urban population and at the same time producing cash crops that helped boost the export sector.

In Tanzania and Ethiopia, peasants were moved from their original villages into resettlements where they were forced to farm under close supervision from government development agents. This undermined their own agency. The same socialist experiment was adopted in Mozambique. In other countries, peasants were forced to work on chiefs' farms at the expense of their own farms; were forced to pay back government loans by being beaten up or sprayed with fertilizer or insecticides (Senegal); or were threatened that their farms would be seized if they disobeyed (Ghana) or were not productive enough (Ivory Coast).[16] Post-independence peasants never got to control

the marketing of their produce as this role continued to be managed by state-controlled marketing boards, which fixed producer prices of their cash and food crops so as to compete on international markets. Declining profits, coupled with the rise in input costs, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, drove many African peasants out of business, leading to what Brycesson termed the problem of Africa's 'vanishing peasantry'.[17] The ultimate result of the collapse of the peasant agricultural sector is the food crisis which drives Western non-governmental organizations into Africa with their associated hidden agendas.

And finally, colonies were sustained through a system of gate keeping, which thrived on the capacity of the colonial officials to force colonial subjects to pay taxes that sustained administrative costs. A raft of taxes such as hut tax, poll tax, cattle tax and many others were introduced. The introduction of taxes was multipronged. First, to meet the tax obligations, Africans had to participate in the colonial cash economy by accepting cheap labor. Cheap labor was necessary for company profit maximization. Second, taxes were symbolic, a kind of vulgarization of the precolonial tribute system, to make a political statement. The third and most important factor is that colonial taxes played a huge part in sustaining the small colonial economies. Metropolitan countries wanted to spend as little as possible on service delivery in the colonies, particularly on African education and health, and also on their increasing administrative costs. By 1934, a sizeable amount of revenue in most African colonies came from taxes from Africans which exceeded taxes from non-Africans. Table 22.1, which demonstrates the tax revenues in 1934, is instructive.

Historian Basil Davidson argued that, in general, taxes that were levied from Africans increased during the Great Depression of the 1930s when living conditions were harder than before.[18] Reliance on taxes to pay most of the administrative costs was due to the fact that colonial economies were not diversified enough. To prevent a total collapse of such colonies, colonial officials instituted a gate-keeping system, which relied on levying taxes and charges on certain services provided to its citizens.[19] This system was also followed by the post-independent state, except that the latter abolished some of the repugnant taxes, like hut-tax. The gate-keeper system impedes innovation and popular participation in the state's economic development. This is

Table 22.1 Tax revenues in 1934. *Source* B. Davidson, *Modern Africa*, p. 55

Country	*Currency*	*Tax from Africans*	*Tax from non-Africans*	*% of annual budget revenue*
Nyasaland	£ Sterling	129,562	18,970	43.0
Kenya	£ Sterling	544,480	116,495	32.5
Nigeria	£ Sterling	775,010	32,633	18.5
French Equatorial Africa	French francs	37,298,300	1,185,000	57.0
Belgian Congo	Belgian francs	80,709,434	19,764,683	28.8

so because gate keeping thrives primarily on coercion and patronage whereby the big men (usually senior politicians) have a chain of small men (their lower-level administrators, governors, and others) who pay homage to them and do the errands for the big men to stay in power and also to get richer. These small men are in turn rewarded for their services in some way, either by promotion or by being given certain powers to abuse state resources knowing full well that they have protection from above. We will finish this discussion by briefly analyzing the impact of the post-1945 developments on post-independent Africa.

Postwar Transitions

The situation facing colonies after 1945 varied. Some colonies suffered economic stagnation as a result of the economic slowdown after the war. In some parts of Africa, however, particularly in some British and French colonies, the period saw a measure of economic development triggered by attempts by British and French governments to promote colonial capital projects and limited infrastructural development in colonies under the assumption that this investment would boost chances of the metropolitan countries' recovery from their postwar recession.[20] New capital projects such as hydroelectric power generation, mechanization of agriculture, capacitation and development of some industries were undertaken in a few colonies. However, it is a gross exaggeration to assume, as Fieldhouse does, that these initiatives '… stimulated an unprecedented expansion of African economies which was still under way when the colonies received their independence' and that '… the African economies, far from being "underdeveloped", were well equipped for sustained development, provided that they maintained the sensible policies previously imposed on them by the colonial authorities'.[21] The allocated funds for most of these projects were insufficient to meet the overall developmental needs. Marxist theorists, whom Fieldhouse is critical of, help us to understand why this investment was minimal. A key argument by Giovanni Arrighi (quoting Oskar Lange) in his discussion of the duality of the center (Western countries) and the periphery (African countries) is useful, notwithstanding its flaws. He rightly argues that there was no interest in making African economies competitive as this threatened Western economic monopoly. With the development of large capitalist monopolies in the leading capitalist countries, the capitalists of those countries lost interest in developmental investment in the less developed countries because such investment threatened their established monopolistic positions.[22]

In British colonial Africa, settler colonies also engaged immigration experts to help them attract new, white, skilled immigrants to bring in human and financial capital to boost industry. This effort reaped very limited results because Africa competed with the new world (New Zealand and Australia, for example) for immigrants.[23] Moreover, the waves of protests that led to

the first phases of decolonization in the 1950s scared away prospective immigrants and new investors, who preferred safer investment havens elsewhere. Protests and anticolonial movements also added to the financial, military, and administrative costs of sustaining colonies. For these reasons, the envisioned grand projects of the period (which are usually termed 'the second colonial occupation' in Africa) were unsuccessful.[24] These initiatives did not provide foundations for a dynamic, sustainable and strong African economy. As Frederick Cooper argued, African '… economies remained externally oriented and the state's economic power remained concentrated at the gate between inside and outside'.[25] Undiversified and unindustrialized economies remained, and these were entrenched by the entrance, after 1945, of bigger multinational corporations, mainly backed by the USA, whose economy was strengthening relative to other Western countries that had been severely battered by the war.[26] These new corporations added to already existing European capitalist monopolies, some of which were established in the nineteenth century, years before the Scramble for Africa. The US corporations were however more technologically advanced and engaged in some basic, low-cost, integrated manufacturing industries (such as Unilever's turn into soap making and cooking oils in West Africa), which did not require highly skilled labor. They also injected high-capital investments, mainly in perceived stable African states such as South Africa (and Brazil) where settler colonialism was still entrenched.[27] American multinational corporations grew mainly due to their government's expenditure in research and development, which multiplied fivefold between 1948 and 1966, further strengthening the relationship between technology, state policy, and resource extraction. By the 1960s, their market share in Africa had overtaken most British and French corporations'.[28]

Also relevant to the developmental colonial states' initiatives after the war were the colonial officials' attempts to control agriculture in African communities. In Kenya and in colonial Zimbabwe, new land laws were passed to deal with soil erosion and to enforce new farming practices. Technical experts were deployed to rural areas to teach Africans 'modern' ways of farming, usually by using force, such as the violence meted out to Africans when the 1951 Native Land Husbandry Act was implemented in Zimbabwe. These top-down approaches, emerging from Western notions about land use and the Green revolution, ignored indigenous knowledge systems in Africa. This led to peasant discontent and the eventual rise of African nationalism in rural areas. Europe was not prepared for this political ferment in Africa, which happened when the West was financially stretched due to the Second World War.

Another notable development in the colonies was the postwar advances in medicine, especially the availability of anti-malarial drugs. This made it possible for new areas to be developed for human settlement. In apartheid South Africa, this accelerated the movement of African people into Bantustans, which were usually dry, inhospitable, and far from major transport networks. Colonial Zimbabwe also experienced new waves of evictions to

previously uninhabited areas as colonial officials alienated land in anticipation of the arrival of many white immigrants. Medical advance also led to a general reduction in population mortality rates, which led to rapid population growth. Attempts to open up new districts for human settlement and to increase agricultural production proved costly as investment in social services and public infrastructure was required. Invariably, many new resettlements remained inaccessible from major road and railway networks. Rising population also called for increasing the economic and human capital costs of 'native' administration. The rising cost of colonial administration and infrastructure meant that new models of running the colonies should have been imagined. There was a need for the colonizers to plough back some of their profits into colonial development, which they were not prepared to do. Evidently, traditional colonial rule was facing a crisis. In the absence of meaningful, direct financial support from the metropoles, settler colonies were no longer going concerns. There was also a brewing political crisis.

In African communities, the rise of politically active, educated elites sharpened critiques of colonial power, especially through their writings and broadcasts. Educated Africans were not many, but were usually resolute and were generally respected by their African compatriots. Intellectuals like Jomo Kenyatta, Tom Mboya, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Leopold Senghor, Ndabaningi Sithole and others were using their connections to global emancipatory and socialist movements to influence and radicalize political thought in Africa. It is not a coincidence that most African protest movements of the late 1940s and 1950s happened at a time similar movements were happening globally: the August Revolution of 1945 that created the Republic of Vietnam; the Workers Party of Korea's revolution that led to the birth of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1948; the Chinese Communist peasant victory of 1949; and the Cuban revolution (1953–1959).[29]

African nationalism grew partly as a result of local conditions within African states that were further radicalized by the philosophies and revolutionary ideas of African intellectuals of the time, one of which was Pan-Africanism, championed in Africa by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Nkrumah's radical writings were inciting Africans to unite and overthrow colonialism as a precondition for economic change. He stressed:

> … the only solution to the colonial problem is the complete eradication of the entire economic system of colonialism, by colonial peoples, through their gaining political independence. Political freedom will open the way for the attainment of economic and social improvement and advancement.[30]

True to Nkrumah's thoughts, Sudan gained independence in 1956 and Ghana in 1957 after Nkrumah raised radical youths and women protesters. Many other colonies followed suit until the last African state (South Africa)

was liberated in 1994. By the 1970s, more than three-quarters of Africa had become politically independent.

A number of factors led to decolonization. One was the change in official thinking about the economics and politics of empire, especially in postwar Britain which was now under the Labour Party. Another was the heavy cost of suppressing political movements in Africa, as Britain realized in Kenya. A third crucial factor was the anti-colonialism pressure from the US government, which was a rising global economic giant after 1945. The USA preferred a new economic model in the former colonies whereby multinational corporations would take advantage of the structural economic setting provided by the colonial governments to create a new neo-colonial relationship between Africa and the West. For it to thrive, neo-colonialism did not require formal political empires, but only a manipulative and exploitative economic and political relationship with African governments. A fourth factor was crisis in certain European countries that led them to decolonize. For instance, Portugal (which was poor and badly governed) ousted its dictator Salazar. He was replaced by a new government which feared the embarrassment of continuing to fight a losing battle against African nationalist movements. This led to abrupt decolonization in Portuguese Africa. As for France, French colonies collapsed following the embarrassing defeat in Algeria, which happened after protracted efforts by the French to repress anticolonial demonstrations in their West African colonies after 1945.

Conclusion

In conclusion, a few key points stand out clearly in this chapter. First, since the colonial era, the relationship between Africa and the West has been unequal, as it had been characterized by systematic extraction of African resources by Western corporations without corresponding development of local manufacturing industry. The colonial economy was what economic historian A.G. Hopkins, influenced by Dudley Seers's writings, termed an open economy.[31] It exhibited the following characteristics that we identified above. First, it exported a very limited range of primary products and imported a wide range of largely consumer goods in return. Second, foreign interests dominated the major sectors of that economy. Third, corporations exercised strong influence on its economic policies, which were consequently developed in their favor. In other words, the colonial state acted as a legitimizing instrument for corporate looting by international corporations. Trade restrictions, for instance, were kept at a bare minimum for the benefit of the corporations. Fifth, metropolitan powers expected the colonies to be self-sustaining financially, and put in as little money as possible for the running of the colonies. This was why the biggest share of the budgets of most of the colonies was covered by taxes from the colonized and peasant mono-cropping agriculture. This also explains Africa's weak public infrastructure at independence.

And lastly, in an open economy, the monetary system is an appendage of the colonizing country, as the system was designed to increase ties with the West. Monetary policy was controlled from abroad, with exchange controls manipulated to stem capital leakage from the colonizing country.[32] For the colonies, this situation created an environment of dependency which post-independence Africa is still struggling to deal with. In essence, dependency theorists like André Gunder Frank and others were correct as their argument is backed by overwhelming evidence from every African country that experienced colonialism. The legacy of colonialism on African economies, which in turn dictated Africa's relationship with the West, must not be underestimated, neither should other factors that we will explore below.

The postwar European economic situation paved the way for the entrance into the African economy and dominance of US multinational corporations (oligopolies). This was backed by the USA's increased public spending on research and development and technology as well as its aggressive economic policies. The USA's domination started when Europe's major colonialists were weighed down, not only by the postwar economic downturn but also by the rising economic costs of sustaining formal empires. The US neo-colonial approach later became an important vector in Africa's postcolonial politics as African leaders tried to renegotiate their positions after independence. At the time of dependence, many African states experienced a generally similar trend; namely, the immediate capital flight of many small-scale but skilled enterprises and an inflow of big conglomerates that specialized in raw material extraction and agro-based industries. This trend meant that the colonial pattern of capital investment for export purposes never changed after independence, but was further entrenched. Other than mining, multinational corporations also focused on processing primary products for export purposes, or on import substitution by developing light industries that processed soap, cooking oil, textiles, beverages, footwear, and others. These products were profitable because they were daily human necessities with high turnovers. But, heavy manufacturing industries remained either non-existent or were export-oriented, and this continued to stall Africa's industrialization.[33]

Finally, at the time of independence, Africa inherited a number of impediments. The majority of its African citizens were uneducated. Tertiary education was rare and the few universities that were there were still very new. Africans with degrees constituted a very tiny minority. In 1960, only 16% of adult Africans were literate. In British settler colonies, a racialized dual education system existed, with Africans exposed to a system that did not help them to develop into highly skilled workers. In colonies under indirect rule, some Africans never got any access to education. In Portuguese Africa, the education situation was a lot worse than in other colonies. In French colonial Africa, the assimilationist education system sought to integrate Africans to French culture so that the most educated Africans became (in theory) the most brainwashed supporters of the French Union. In practice, reactions to

French assimilation produced militant anti-colonialists like Leopold Senghor. At independence, the same, semi-literate Africans were expected to take over political power, serve in the public service, create policies to run the economy, and at the same time negotiate the murky waters of the Cold War era which complicated Africa's international relations. In terms of infrastructure, most areas were inaccessible because of poor road networks, most of which were gravel roads. Electricity generation was below the required capacity to industrialize Africa. The agricultural sector had been compromised by the colonial regimes which had focused on cash crops. Moreover, land redistribution was a burden that African countries faced after independence, with no clear clue on how this could be done without upsetting the inflow of foreign direct investments.

Economically, African families were generally poor as their earnings during colonialism were not competitive enough to encourage meaningful investment which would have created a basis for Afro-capitalism. There was severe racial economic inequality that makes it futile to argue about the economic performance of colonial Africa versus postcolonial Africa in the manner that Fieldhouse (cited above) tried to do. Because of Africans' widespread poverty (not to say that no Africans could empower themselves), most initiatives to empower black Africans would require efforts from the African governments themselves. This did not happen in most cases, and where it did, it was usually marred by systemic challenges such as the politics of citizenship, as was the case with the Ivorian cocoa agriculture which triggered the politics of autochthony versus foreigners, and also instances of corruption and nepotism elsewhere.[34]

Efforts to ensure broad-based economic empowerment were also hampered by financial sustainability challenges. As we stated in this chapter, manufacturing was weak as companies continued extracting, also threatening to pull out whenever governments tried to do anything that was not in their favor. Consequently, the tax that was levied from the big corporations remained relatively low, to the extent that most of their profits did not help develop the former colonies. Meanwhile, the new African governments faced a bloated civil service that increased public debt. They had to relapse into the colonial mode characterized by gate keeping and living off rural peasants' agricultural production. These were some of the economic constraints facing Africa at independence. Independent African governments tried to deal with these in various ways.

Notes

1. This work is based on the research supported in part by the National Research Foundation of South Africa (Grant Number 90985). Any errors or omissions, however unintended, are entirely mine.
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18. B. Davidson, *Modern Africa*, 55.
19. Cooper, *Africa Since 1940*, 5.
20. Fieldhouse, *Black Africa*, 6–13, 33.
21. Ibid., 30.
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23. Msindo, "Winning Hearts and Minds," 663–81.

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32. Hopkins, *An Economic History*, 168–70.
33. Arrighi, *Essays on the Political Economy*, 109–12.
34. See generally: S. Dorman, D. Harmett and P. Nugent, *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Bayart, *The State in Africa*, chap. 2.

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CHAPTER 23

International Law, Colonialism, and the African

Ibrahim J. Gassama

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the enduring and evolving role of received law and all its manifestations in the lives of Africans during both the colonial era and the present day. I argue that international law not only facilitated imperialism and colonialism, it remains at the core of what Africans received from imperialism and colonial rule. Africans are still subjects of this alien species of law, introduced by Western conquerors and colonizers, and they remain in many ways unable to fully escape its tragic hold on their lives. In short, international law occupies a predominant role today in organizing African realities and in justifying the complex web of persistent and violent exploitative relationships that order the place of ordinary Africans within the present even more alienating globalized world order.

Law played an essential role in the European conquest and exploitation of Africa. The most important characteristic of any legal system is sanctioned regularity.[1] It is in this sense that law defined, elaborated, and sanctified the common interests of the antagonistic European sovereignties that preyed upon Africa economically, socially, culturally, and otherwise over the course of

I dedicate this chapter to the memory of my dearest friend and longtime collaborator, Professor Louise Hope Lewis (1962–2016). I am grateful for the insights and comments of colleagues Professors Antony Anghie, A. B. Assensoh, Michael Fakhri, and Michelle McKlinley. I am also grateful for the research assistance provided by Marissa Martinez and Colin R. Saint-Evens.

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several centuries. Law therefore emerged in concert with violence to develop efficient colonial systems for the subjugation and exploitation of Africa, a process which began in earnest during the Scramble for Africa in the late 1880s.[2] Law was an integral part of the systems before, during, and after the initial incursions, just as it was during the transatlantic slave trade. Specifically, law allowed European powers, great and small, to eventually establish jurisdiction over specific portions of African territory and its people, and it legitimized their exercise of power within such domains

This perspective is consistent with the following observation by Walter Benjamin about the relationship between law and violence:

> All violence as a means is either lawmaking or law preserving. If it lays claim to neither of these predicates, it forfeits all validity. It follows, however, that all violence as a means, even in the most favorable case, is implicated in the problematic nature of law itself … When the consciousness of the latent presence of violence in a legal institution disappears, the institution falls into decay.[3]

The Europeans needed law to validate both the violence they unleashed on the unsuspecting people and the ideology behind the violence, even as the law itself needed the violence (or the consciousness of its latent presence) to sustain its efficacy and legitimacy. In this way, international law was both the child and the nurturer of European colonial violence. As will be shown shortly, this intimate relationship between international law and violence has continued well into the postcolonial era.

Joseph Conrad (1857–1924) noted that:

> The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only … and an unselfish belief in the idea-something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to ….[4]

Conrad was a percipient witness to events in Africa during the period when fully fledged imperialism transitioned into bureaucratic colonialism. He understood well that ideas were important to create the foundations for violence and rapacity as well as to facilitate enduring systems of domination. Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* captured the particular sensibilities of the Christian/capitalist civilizing missions undergirding imperialism and colonialism in Africa. As he elaborated, even ideas as high-minded or 'unselfish' as those of bringing Christ or civilization to 'savages' needed discipline and an operational system. This is where law, specifically international law, came into service for Europeans; to flesh out the ideas and bridge the gap between a legitimacy that had once been conferred solely by divine grace and that which would subsequently emanate from secular sovereign commands.

Law in general protects and enhances the utility of violence, insofar as it sanctions and regularizes it. So it did during the colonial era.

International law thus sanctioned colonialism, the extension of European sovereign jurisdiction to Africa. Colonialism was the direct outgrowth of the processes of sanctioning and regularizing the subjugation and plunder of the continent or, as Conrad termed it, the 'taking it away'. Colonialism became the end game that resolved various conflicting efforts by private parties to gain commercial advantages throughout Africa. The processes of colonialism were sustained and elevated by law, at least in their most enduring and efficient manifestations. Without international law, a law accepted by diverse European parties, investment in colonialism would not have been as valuable, and imperialism would have remained locked and hobbled by its rougher unsophisticated edges. In turn, by extending European sovereign jurisdiction over particular portions of the continent, colonial rule was able to deploy international law internally to facilitate a more efficient subjugation of the population, the erasure of their organized communal identities, and the extraction of wealth from subject entities to the benefit of interests sanctioned by occupying powers. Colonial rule as such was sustained by a mutual acceptance among imperial powers that the rules and processes of the law that they were evolving benefited them more in the long run than unbridled competition or violent conflicts. In this sense, law was indelibly superior to the alternative of conquest purely by force of arms. Law did not completely replace the latter of course, since law, like force, was fundamentally an instrument of the conquest. However, law provided an organized system to better ensure that the fruits of conquests were recognized by others similarly situated.

Law made European violence more acceptable and efficient in Africa, reducing the number of occasions that would give rise to intractable inter-European conflicts. This was also the essential aim of the Berlin Conference, and this heritage persists today. It is critical to emphasize here that law in Africa during the partitioning era spoke primarily to the mutuality of interests among competing European powers. It was only much later that the law came to play a dominant role in prescribing the relationship between the European subjugators, be they public or private, and the local African authorities and subjects. When it did, it was largely to confirm the subjugation of the latter, and to inscribe the terms of European dominion in perpetuity.

It is also important to acknowledge at this juncture that the political independence that African states have attained in the postcolonial era has not fundamentally changed the fact that these countries emerged from colonial domination essentially as creatures of international law, with their agencies and capacities for self-determination severely constrained in both the domestic and international spheres. The postcolonial reality of the African state today is that while formal imperialism and direct colonial rule have ended, the imperial project accomplished two important objectives that have endured: (1) It buried its core principles deep within the institutional structures and

processes of each emerging African state; (2) It developed new systems that are just as exploitative and efficient at privileging the interests of the former colonial powers as the explicitly imperial systems that preceded them.[5]

The passionate embrace by postcolonial African leaders of this received law and its embedded legal principles (principles such as national sovereignty, self-determination, or *uti possidetis juris*) testify to the success of the first objective. In support of the second objective, note how the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions have consolidated and managed the postcolonial world order in much the same manner as those efforts that were initiated by the Berlin Conference. The ideas, principles, structures, and aims of these post-Second World War institutions are fundamentally indistinct from those of the earlier colonial era.

In the next section, I examine the foundational role that international law played in the acquisition and control of African territory, the destruction of African political communities, and the cultivated dissonance that permeates the politics of the continent to this day. The main point here is that international law greatly facilitated the European 'idea' or enterprise in Africa. This idea first manifested itself as a civilizing mission but it quickly morphed into something 'not pretty': wholesale plunder. Force of arms and the codification of the law of conquests were essential means in operationalizing the idea.

In the third section, I examine how international law dictated both the course of the struggle for African independence and the present course of the emerging nations of Africa. In addition, I illustrate how contemporary African societies are managed by domestic and international elites who quite comfortably embrace the contours established by this alien legal order, as well as the nature and methods of violence it justifies. As a result, Africans remain unable to conceive of or reconstruct an alternative and authentically African worldview. The war on memory that international law has in effect facilitated has thus achieved considerable success. As time passes, Africans find it increasingly difficult to disentangle the forces that continue to oppress them or to remember a time when subjugation and dependency were not the essence of their reality.

International Law and the Conquest of African Territories and People

Joseph Conrad was unequivocal about the ulterior motives of Western European seizure of territory in Africa at the end of the nineteenth century. 'They grabbed what they could get for the sake of what was to be got', he asserted, and concluded that 'It was just robbery with violence, aggravated murder on a great scale, and men going at it blind – as it is very proper for those who tackle a darkness'.[6] Scholars of international law have noticed the legacy of this imperialism on international law. For instance, some of them have perceived 'the construction and universalization of international law' as having

been pertinent to the imperial expansion that led to subordination of non-European peoples and societies to European domination.[7]

The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is often crudely anointed as the starting point of international law. This is wildly inaccurate. Actually, that particular moment marked a series of agreements among various European powers that ended decades of brutal warfare among them. The main outcome of Westphalia was a degree of communal recognition of the sovereign independence of fragments of the Holy Roman Empire that had successfully resisted efforts at imperial reconsolidation. The acceptance of this primitive concept of national sovereign independence in Western Europe would of course face numerous tests over the coming centuries, but it could be claimed that, from this point forward, the basic idea of sovereign independence was accepted as legitimate and supported by law, as opposed to being mere diktat. Yet, this story of the origin of international law does not properly incorporate the essential roles played by the processes of European migration and conquests of territories and peoples outside the European continent, especially in Africa and what would later become the Americas. Seen through that lens, the Westphalian accomplishment was to broaden the embrace of secular or positivist principles that justified and sanctioned the right of European powers to conquer and exploit diverse native peoples in Africa and the Americas. Those principles had actually been in operation for more than a century before the Peace of Westphalia.

The narrow Westphalian account of the origins of international law also presents the discipline as a progressive advance over a more barbarous period of European history. As such, international law is extolled as the source of a new era of peace and progress, the enduring solution to conflicts amongst Europeans with different political, cultural, social, or economic interests and perspectives. In this vein, the scholarship of the Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius (generally regarded as the 'father' of international law) has been front and center.[8] It is important to note that Grotius made significant contributions towards the subjugation and exploitation of non-European peoples by developing modern rationales for just wars and freedom of navigation and trade.[9] It is more accurate to understand that international law developed and expanded during this period to serve as a vehicle for a more legitimate and enduring resolution of conflicts between the burgeoning numbers of fundamentally equal European sovereign states. In this sense, international law differed from *Jus Gentium*.

It is also more accurate to recognize that long before the supposed Westphalian founding of international law in 1648, European powers were actually deploying international law of a sort to defend their titles to 'discovered' territories in Africa and the 'New World'. How else should we interpret the various papal bulls that purported to grant and defend titles to new territories claimed by the Portuguese and the Spanish?[10] True, papal bulls were not international law documents of the positivist variety, but they were essential

precursors in terms of doctrine and processes. These documents granted title and established jurisdiction, albeit subject to the authority of the Pope. As Grovogui has argued:

> [M]edieval Christianity and papal interpretations of the Scriptures have defined the modern international order, including its hierarchical systems and various forms of unequal subjectivities (or sovereignties). These hierarchies and subjectivities in turn have delineated the realm of international law from the Renaissance, through the Enlightenment, and to the present.[11]

The earliest papal bull, for example, *Romanus Pontifex*, issued by Pope Nicholas V in 1455, purported to give Portugal, under King Afonso V, title to its discoveries in Africa.[12] However, Spain convinced Pope Alexander VI to issue a series of bulls in 1493, titled *Inter Caetera Divinae*, which sought to resolve disputes between Spain and Portugal over the new territories they had invaded and wished to exploit without interference from other European powers.[13]

These papal bulls were legal documents of an international character that sanctioned wars of conquests as just, granted titles to European sovereigns, and established jurisdiction over foreign territories and peoples. Among other principles and rules created by these papal dispensations was an imaginary line (established by *Inter Caetera)* that divided Portuguese and Spanish possessions and jurisdictions. It is in this sense that international law was itself a product of conflicts within and outside Europe; and importantly, also a product of European imperialism and colonialism. Indeed, Portugal and Spain successfully negotiated an amendment to the papal orders that moved the line of demarcation issued by Pope Alexander 270 leagues to the West of the Cape Verde Islands.[14] This very early form of international dispute resolution, employing a third party mediator or arbiter (albeit one still deeply attached to divine grace and natural law perspectives) also established the overarching justification for international law's legitimacy: the civilizing mission. For the Pope and European despots of that age, the civilizing mission was centered on the spread of Christianity among 'non-rational infidels,'[15] the supposedly barbarous peoples in the new lands outside Europe. The freedom and right to navigate and trade came as important justifications shortly after the religious imperative, to further mask naked desire and greed.

Over time, the rationales for intervention in the lives of non-European peoples have been presented under various guises, but they remain fundamentally inseparable from these early justifications. In a sense, the primary contribution of the Peace of Westphalia was to free even more Europeans to participate in the pillage of non-European territories and the subjugation of their inhabitants. The competition and conflicts among many European powers henceforth would be mediated to significant degrees by international law. The possibilities of plunder in Africa and the Americas increased, with international law becoming an essential and dynamic participant.

Not only does international law's development as an essential vehicle for interstate relations owe a lot to European imperialism in Africa and the Americas (initiated more than a century before the treaties of Westphalia), but it was also aided by the subsequent commercial and colonial policies and practices that would mature a few centuries later. As Anghie has asserted, 'colonialism was central to the constitution of international law in that many of its basic doctrines of international law – including, most importantly, sovereignty doctrine – were forged out of the attempt to create a legal system that could account for relations between the Europeans and non-European worlds in the colonial confrontation'.[16] The widespread acceptance of international law was thus aided greatly by its value as a vehicle for conquest, domination, and rapacious exploitation of weaker peoples before and during the colonial era.

International law played a critical role in the consolidation of European interests in Africa. Pakenham has noted that:

> [I]n 1880 most of the continent was still ruled by its inhabitants and was barely explored. Yet by 1902, five European powers (Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Italy) had grabbed almost all of its ten million square miles, awarding themselves thirty new colonies and protectorates ….[17]

International law worked intimately alongside brute force to ensure the success of this crude epochal process of continental consolidation and partitioning. Conrad noted about the European conquerors that their mission was actually 'aggravated murder on a great scale', and that 'they grabbed what they could get for the sake of what was to be got'. Hence, the value of the idea and methods of civilization. The justificatory mechanism of the civilizing mission and the methods of international law allowed for the Europeans to see themselves as purveyors of light who found darkness only in the continent and amongst their victims.

Of course, Pakenham's notion of rule by inhabitants prior to the institution of direct colonial rule was substantially inaccurate. Well before the Scramble for Africa, the authority and processes of indigenous rule or self-determination had been systematically undermined by European interests, whether private, public, or some combination of the two. It was not a huge leap from the seemingly benign interests of anti-slavery crusaders, Christian missionaries, adventurers, investors, and traders, to an open embrace of empire. The thinly obscured arrogance of missionaries like David Livingstone, who pleaded for Africa to be saved from the evils of the slave trade, easily gave way to the rapacity of conquerors like Belgium's Leopold II and England's Cecil Rhodes.[18] These robber barons, arriving in the wake of the missionaries, understood the value of the sanctioning mechanism of law as creator of enduring wealth. Treaties and other forms of legally binding agreements gave them concessions they could exploit in due course and sanctioned their right to subjugate and exploit, and even destroy, native inhabitants to the exclusion of others. When their assorted ventures, aimed at securing

long-term access and profits, came under unmanageable threat, primarily from other Europeans, they demanded the full imprimatur of state support. Some have disputed the eagerness of European powers to take on this burden in defense of private or quasi-private interests, but the facts are that once it became clear that the pre-Scramble period of imperial exploitation was no longer tenable, the race was on, and European powers stepped in swiftly and greedily to expand and defend their respective spheres of influence.

This essential point was captured succinctly by Chapter VI of the General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa. That article demanded that any European power that took 'possession of a tract of land on the coasts of the African continent outside of its present possessions' including those that established a protectorate on the continent, should notify other powers of such moves, so as to enable them to 'make good any claims of their own'. The signatory powers to the Berlin Act were also encouraged to establish an authority in their newly acquired regions to protect their existing rights to those regions, but allow freedom of international trade and transit through those regions.[19]

International law occupied a central place in this process right from the start. The fact that Europeans were deploying a legal system that had developed organically out of centuries of European struggles, and that the system was foreign to the indigenous inhabitants of these conquered territories, was of no consequence to the alien invaders. Indeed, the law was not actually speaking to the indigenous inhabitants. They were not its subjects, for they were 'savages' or, at best, abject wards at the mercy of international sensibilities. Again, Conrad captured the spirit of this naked enterprise in all its suffocating racist splendor when he noted '… and of course, as long as there was a piece of paper written over in accordance with some farcical law or other made down the river, it didn't enter anybody's head to trouble how they [the subjugated people] would live'.[20]

The law was effectively directed at creating a scheme by which Europeans could communicate with each other about the division of spoils, in a language more efficient than naked force alone.[21] This was clearly one of Bismarck's goals as he convened the conference in 1884, and it was broadly accepted by all the participants in the adoption of this 'constitution of dispossession'. It of course did not trouble these plenipotentiaries to consider the perspectives of the land's inhabitants. After Berlin, Africans again found themselves completely shut out of global processes mediated by law. They were (and remain) bound to a scheme of ordered subjugation and exploitation that they had no role in developing and that has offered them no possibilities of escape. Their options were to submit or die. Even today, one must appreciate the audacity and hubris of Europeans racing to extract these concessions from diverse African communities or convening international gatherings like the Berlin Conference to discuss the fate of the African continent without any hint of their absurd nature. Then again, not much has changed

since then. The essential lesson from the confirmation of colonial rule in Africa, which the Berlin Conference signified, is that desires or interests developed entirely within the European psyche dictated the future of Africans. It matters little whether these circumstances came about because of the inevitable progression of imperialism, a desire to protect European bondholders and other investors, a need to access raw materials in Africa, the necessity to develop new markets for the products of the European working class, an extension of European nationalism or politics, or simply by casual accident. Whatever the governing factors, the end result was that Africans found themselves swiftly imported into a European world order in which law worked assiduously to consolidate and secure gains achieved by deceit or the force of arms. The Maxim machine gun could not have achieved by itself what it did in concert with the law. This lesson has been learned only too well by African leaders. As such, Africans remain fully conscious of 'the latent presence of violence' in law and institutions.[22]

International Law and the Struggle to End Colonialism

Some have posed the old question of whether the postcolonial world can deploy for its own purposes the law which had enabled its suppression in the first place?[23] Once transported into the realm of European colonial rule, Africans found themselves unable to achieve any measure of extrication without recourse to the tools laid out by colonial masters. This was true to some degree even regarding armed liberation struggles, but it was even more so in the case of the political mass-mobilization struggles of a less convulsive nature. These efforts at liberation effectively proceeded within confines defined or permitted by international law. The language, the means, and the processes of change were all supplied by international law. Undoubtedly, international law was not static, and it was itself challenged and influenced by the anti-colonial struggles of subjugated peoples. Still, efforts against colonialism generally succeeded only when they came to embrace foundational aspects of the global order mediated by international law. In sum, newly independent African states were not allowed into the global order until they made substantial and lasting compromises with the scheme developed by the masters in the course of their subjugation.

The employment of international law to manage Africa's place in the developing global order expanded and deepened after the Berlin Conference. Again, it was events, practices, and policies emanating from Europe that drove the process and, again, Africans were not consulted. The First and Second World Wars were seminal events. The defeat of Germany during the First World War removed it as a major player in Africa and, more importantly, introduced the Western world's newest empire, the USA, into the old politics of Europe. US involvement in Europe helped to transform Manifest Destiny into the American Century. President Woodrow Wilson projected and

promoted a nuanced belief in world peace through law, and saw, in the plight of some oppressed people, fertile ground for the spread of the US democratic vision.[24] Wilson had the great gift of not being burdened too much by irony. At home, he was an unadorned racist who promoted policies that pulled back the meager human-rights gains African Americans had made over the decades after the American Civil War. He was also ideologically and morally unconstrained by lessons from the US' own record of violence and rapacity against weaker peoples as well as its burgeoning empire in the Americas and Asia.

With soaring language and unyielding commitment, Wilson promoted a vision of international law in the service of world peace through legal order. He spoke in opposition to the growth of European empires and in defense of the rights to self-governance of certain oppressed minorities. He sponsored the League of Nations and a Permanent Court of International Justice. Neither institution lasted long, but both served to sow the ground for the global embrace of a sanitized version of international law as the proper vehicle for resolving international disputes. The principle of self-determination of peoples also gained ground as the preeminent normative yardstick for the legitimate exercise of governmental power. Wilson supported the League of Nations' Mandate System that offered opportunities for former colonies of Germany and the Ottoman Empire to gain some measure of self-determination, even though he did not challenge the legitimacy of other instances of ongoing European colonial rule in Africa.[25] Regardless, Wilson's profession of faith in international law helped to infect much of the world with an idealism that worked over time to erode the legitimacy of colonial power exercised without the support of an international law that had come to accept self-determination as a core principle.

Wilsonian idealism floundered in the face of post-First World War skepticism and a general turn to realism. The failure of the US Congress to go along with Wilson's internationalist plans doomed the institutions and processes he championed. It took another global conflagration, the Second World War, emanating from Europe, to revive these ideas and give impetus to the African struggle for independence from direct colonial rule. At the conclusion of the war, the victors, under US leadership, doubled down on Wilson's ideas and promoted a revitalized and totally ahistorical rendition of international law as an almost secular religion and the primary vehicle to unite humanity. Arguably, this approach functioned substantially to consolidate and extend their dominance, albeit under changing circumstances. African anti-colonial activists, like others around the world, took advantage of what they perceived as openings and pressed their case for freedom from European colonial rule. When political rhetoric and non-violent mass mobilization failed to achieve their aims, some turned to armed struggle.

Two consequences of the Second World War aided the efforts of the independence movements. First, while Germany and its allies were again the major losers of this conflict, the victorious nations in Europe were also

devastated and even more dependent on the USA. Second, the Soviet Union with its socialist and internationalist ideology also emerged as a serious competitor to Western interests on a global scale. In short, European colonial powers became trapped between the soaring rhetoric of US idealism, now reconstituted with even more vigor by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the threats posed by an evangelical strain of socialism coming from the Soviet Union, soon to be joined by China under communist rule. However, it is crucial in appreciating the anti-colonialist struggles of that era to recognize that their leaders were operating largely on the reconstructed terrain of colonial masters. The openings they saw were actually invitations of a sort. Thus, even when they achieved victory they found that they had largely negotiated terms of their surrender within the broader dynamically reconstituting global architecture.

Post-Second World War international law developments supplied national independence movements with principles and guidelines to support and constrain their struggles. Three developments in particular came to define the contours of African anti-colonial liberation struggles and the paths to admission of new states into the postwar global order: the centrality of the concept of self-determination; the promotion of sovereign equality of nation-states with defined and inherited territorial boundaries; and subordination to the supervisory authority of postwar international political and economic security institutions. In this manner, international law became, in essence, the constitutional law for newly independent states of Africa. Further, the embrace of these ideas and principles by independence movements also served to coopt their struggles and trap them even more securely within the world order that had been created in the process of subjugating and exploiting them.

The principle of the self-determination of peoples became a central tenet of African independence struggles. It had gained prominence after the First World War and became sanctified in the major international agreements of the post-Second World War period. The United Nations Charter affirms it as one of the organization's foundational principles. The first article of the two principal binding human rights agreements states that, 'All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development'.[26] The right to self-determination is considered by many today to be the foundation of all human rights. However, as Grovogui has argued, this right, 'like other rights claimed by the colonized, derives from particular conceptions of community and politics that are specific to western culture'.[27] He further notes the 'endless quest for material well-being and a reliance on violence to achieve political ends' that are characteristic of this culture.[28] In embracing this particular organizing principle of freedom, African leaders in essence endorsed both the violent alchemy that created the entities of colonialism they were seeking to liberate and also a future that would put them on an endless path of violence as they sought material well-being within

these entities. Self-determination applied in the context of sovereign equality of states isolated, indeed imprisoned, the various African communities that had been violently forged by alien interests. Crucially, veneration of this ideal denied Africans other possibilities.

Of course there was opposition to this ideal, such as was seen in places like Katanga, Biafra, Eritrea, or South Sudan; and not all of it operating from principled grounds. Still, such dissenting voices found very little legal or material support that could have enabled a more critical understanding of the consequences of an uncritical embrace of self-determination along the lines defined by international law. It is instructive that no independent African regime has hesitated to defend its colonial inheritance by resorting to the domestic and international privileges and powers derived from international law and the monopoly on violence it conferred on the state. Indeed, without a hint of irony, African rulers have not only insisted upon a limited and self-serving understanding of the principle of self-determination, they have often advocated an unconstrained right to the monopoly of force within their inherited boundaries. They have also sought to exclude external criticism or concern about treatment of their fellow citizens by citing international law's claimed protection of matters within their internal jurisdiction. This has been the case even when such expressions of concern or criticism have emanated from other Africans.

When European powers had carved out their territories in Africa, they had given little weight to historical or existing relationships while squeezing together diverse nationalities within newly created borders. These borders were essentially crudely drawn lines on maps that essentially defined domains of convenience. In almost every instance when political independence was achieved, national liberation movements embraced these externally constructed entities as legitimate and enduring sovereign political subdivisions. Ethiopia's struggle against Italian aggression and colonialism was a case in point. When the post-First World War Wilsonian renovation of international law failed and Italy decided to revive its imperial legacy in Africa, a deposed Emperor Haile Selassie escaped to Britain to continue Ethiopian nationalist resistance from the soil of a nation that Italy was merely trying to imitate in Africa. The Emperor's well-received plea on behalf of the right to self-determination of all small nations obscured the reality of European colonialism in Africa and the foundational illegitimacy of all colonial boundaries, including his own. Ironically, his claims were received positively not only by European audiences who identified in his stance a defense of progressive aspects of colonialism, but also by Pan-African activists worldwide who uncritically adopted him as a symbol of African resistance to imperial rule. In effect, activists and even revolutionaries committed themselves to going forward with a reality that had been created through violent subjugation, instead of challenging the past. They embraced the legitimacy and privileges that had been conferred by conquest.

The Emperor and ruling elites in Ethiopia and elsewhere in Africa benefited from an international law that offered the right to self-determination and governance to those who accepted uncritically the territorial boundaries and other obligations inherited from an imperial era. This bargain has held in general over time. In exchange for gaining international legitimacy for their postcolonial regimes, Africa's postcolonial rulers (the elites who have mastered the rules and processes of international affairs) have essentially confirmed the logic of imperial and colonial domination. They sustain the processes that led to the creation of their territories and boundaries and the global order that was created to sustain neo-colonial privileges. The long suppressed interests and concerns of unprivileged or minority communities locked within these exalted boundaries have not found favor in a world constructed out of the imperialist imagination. Tragically, nationalist rulers continue to suppress challenges from within their countries to the boundaries of their artificial entities by employing ideas and means developed and perfected in the course of the imperial processes. After a while, and unsurprisingly, ordinary Africans could hardly perceive a substantive difference in the course of their lives.

In his study of the Mandate System, Anghie argued that 'the transfer of sovereignty to non-European peoples … was simultaneous with, and indeed inseparable from, the creation of new systems of subordination and control administered by international institutions'.[29] The same holds true with even greater force for the newly independent African states of the post-Second World War era. Even as Africans were extracting their freedoms from old colonialism, newly created multilateral institutions were being perfected to maintain the status quo.

At the end of the Second World War, victorious nations under the leadership of the USA became even more committed to developing international institutions to supervise the new world order. The institutions were permeated with law and legalisms, with built-in escape hatches such as weighted voting and veto rights only for the most powerful, as well as alluring traps such as state and government recognition, economic and security assistance, and educational and technological exchanges, for all those that accepted the rules of the new order. Three principal institutions were created in 1945 during the first wave of institution building: the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. A global trade organization was delayed until the 1990s, although the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) essentially carried out that function in the interim years.

The United Nations was created, 'determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind'.[30] Its most powerful organ was its Security Council, with veto powers granted to a select group of influential states over the most crucial aspects of UN work. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were established to supervise the global economy, but they were

operated through a system of unequal voting powers that essentially preserved the status quo. Over time, even more institutions were created with varying degrees of supervisory powers over global affairs.

Embrace of international institutions by leaders of newly independent African states was effectively a prerequisite to admission to the club of nations. These new leaders perhaps saw membership in the postwar institutions as either unavoidable or necessary to bring about change. With membership came incentives, mostly in terms of access to capital, technology, and trade. As is now well documented, the terms of these incentives and assistance quickly proved onerous. African and other Third-World leaders would of course denounce, ad nauseam, their subordinate status within the postwar order, but most were merely calling for a rearrangement of the deckchairs of this *Titanic*. The web of multilateral arrangements proved too complex and manipulation or extrication quickly became impractical. Acquiescence proved the easier course. The effective result, even to the present day, is that the interests of African and other weaker states remain generally subordinate to the interests of those who had invaded, subjugated, and exploited them in the colonial era.[31]

Thus, the end of the Second World War helped to spur the struggle for national liberation in Africa as Wilson's heirs in the USA moved to more aggressively and comprehensively center international law as the legitimate medium of interstate relations. One result was that the nation-state emerged as the hegemonic vehicle for capturing and advancing popular aspirations. The principle of self-determination emerged as the organizing principle of national liberation, even as it confirmed the logic and end-products of colonialism. Another result was the development of a network of international political and economic institutions with extraordinary powers over weaker nation-states. Leaders of African liberation from colonial rule embraced all of these results even as they challenged marginal aspects. Africa is still plagued by these foundational legacies.

Conclusion

International law was essential to the success of colonialism in Africa. It legitimized the use of enormous and often unconstrained violence in the service of rapacity and subjugation. It provided a roadmap for successful colonization and made the process far more efficient by creating and affirming the rules that diverse competing European interests could use to protect their African interests. International law became an important companion to the civilizing mission by filling in the details for what could otherwise have been an unorganized and uncivilized plunder. In essence, international law helped to operationalize, systematize, and legitimize the idea of civilizing 'savage' people with violence and linked the idea to the subjugation of these people and the extraction of their labor and wealth for the benefit of the civilizers. Moreover, by supplying

the principles, rules, and processes of decolonization, international law helped to ensure that even the end of colonialism would not result in a meaningful challenge to Western hegemony. African liberation leaders came to embrace these principles, rules, and processes. They became invested in them as they later gained control of the signal creation of international law, the nation-state, and have subsequently defended them, thus tragically reaffirming the logic and consequences of colonialism and international law.

Notes

1. As Joyner puts it, "Generally speaking, international legal rules function to preserve order. That is, international law embodies a system of sanctioned regularity, a certain order in itself, which conveys expectations to the members of international society. International legal rules provide for the regularity of activities that can be discerned, forecast, and anticipated within the international community. Through international law, the attempt is made to regulate behavior to ensure harmony and to maintain international society's values and institutions." Christopher C. Joyner, *International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global Governance* (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 2005), 293.
2. The "Scramble for Africa," also known as the "Partition of Africa," was the term that the European Powers used at their meeting in Berlin, Germany, where spheres of colonial influence were determined at the 1884 conference. It marked the carving and annexation of African countries according to colonial interests. See: Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa* (New York: Random House, 1991); M.E. Chamberlain, *The Scramble for Africa* (London: Longmans, 1974); and S.E. Crowe, *The Berlin West African Conference 1884–1885* (New York: Longmans, 1942). See also Siba Grovogui, *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minn. Press, 1996).
3. Walter Benjamin, *Reflections* (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), 287.
4. Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness and Selections from the Congo Diary* (New York: The Modern Library, 1999).
5. See: René Dumont, *False Start in Africa* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1966); Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, DC: Howard U. Press, 1974).
6. Conrad, *Heart of Darkness.*
7. Makau Mutua, "What Is TWAIL?," *American Society of International Law Proceedings* 94 (2000): 49.
8. For an excellent evaluation of Grotius's contributions, see Henry Richardson III, *The Origins of African-American Interests in International Law* (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2008), 87–101.
9. Grotius published two seminal international law texts: *Mare Liberum ("The Freedom of the Seas")*, first published in 1609 and *De Jure Belli ac Pacis ("On the Law of War and Peace")*, published in 1625.
10. Grovogui, *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans*, 19–20.
11. Ibid., 16.
12. See Robin Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern 1492–1800* (London: Verso, 1997).

13. Grovogui, *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans*, 19–20.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), 3.
17. Pakenham, inside cover.
18. Ibid., generally.
19. General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa, 26 Feb. 1885, Chapter VI, Articles 35 and 36.
20. Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*, 42.
21. For example, the conference unanimously approved a resolution that required "that each nation should notify the other of its plans for colonization, and at the same time outline the territories within which it proposed to operate." Maurice N. Hennessy, *Congo* (London: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1961).
22. See John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, eds. *Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: An Introduction,* in *Law and Disorder in the Postcolony* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2006).
23. Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, 8.
24. See generally Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: OUP, 2007).
25. Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, 136–44.
26. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 1966 U.N.J.Y.B. 170, and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 1966 U.N.J.Y.B. 193.
27. Grovogui, *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans*, 4.
28. Ibid.
29. Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, 179.
30. See Preamble, Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043.
31. As Grovogui puts it, "only the rights sanctioned by the former colonialists were accorded to the colonized, regardless of the needs and demands of the latter. That the will of the colonial powers was so central to the implementation of self-determination was not considered an aberration in international law." Grovogui, *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans*, 6.

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CHAPTER 24

Colonialism and Development in Africa

Ruth Rempel

'Development' is a term with many meanings. Positive change is one of its non-biological ones. While this can be an evolutionary process, development history focuses on intentional change.[1] Jan Nederveen Pieterse defines development as 'organized intervention in collective affairs according to a standard of improvement'.[2] As Kenneth Dadzie put it: 'Development is the unfolding of people's individual and social imagination in defining goals and inventing ways to approach them'.[3] Development history involves following what social actors say about their goals for collective improvement, as well as the means they use to achieve it.[4] Looking at how resources are allocated is an important way to identify actors' means as well as their development goals, both overt and latent.

Some scholars argue that development was invented in 1949, pointing to US President Truman's second inaugural address as its birth announcement.[5] The Point Four Program (1950–1954), which Truman's speech initiated, was the practical embodiment of this new idea. However, this interpretation is undercut by both contemporary and recent analyses.[6] More importantly for African development history, the continent received only six percent of the Point Four funds; the bulk of the money went to Asia. Roughly, half the Africa funds went to one country, Egypt, and the next largest amount was transferred to Britain, France and Portugal for use in their 'Dependent Territories'.[7] This followed a pattern already established with the Marshall Plan (1948–1952), in which US allies were allowed to finance development

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in their empires with transferred funds.[8] As this suggests, European imperial governments were a crucial external source of development ideas and practices in the continent. As the experiences of Liberia and Ethiopia will show, the US approach to development in independent African countries was not a coherent 'project'. In addition, an exclusive focus on these external actors obscures the development initiatives undertaken by African actors in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as the crucial role of African agency in reshaping European and US development initiatives. This chapter can only sketch a part of this rich, emerging field of history.

Modernization and Development in Nineteenth-Century Africa

Modernization interested historians and political scientists who studied precolonial African states in the 1960s and 1970s. They looked at African empires as well as states like Buganda and Asante.[9] Some took up the argument that modernization—by which they meant the adoption of European technology and institutions as part of a conscious program of social change—was widespread in nineteenth-century Africa, and that this process was frustrated rather than accelerated by European imperialism.[10] Nineteenth-century Africans did not necessarily use terms like 'modernization' and 'development', but Pieterse's definition suggests that the initiatives of various African states and non-state actors could be reexamined with development in mind.[11] Some of their 'organized intervention' was an explicit response to or tool of imperialism; all of it was part of the social landscape that empire-builders had to take into account by the end of the nineteenth century.

Some African developmental interventions have been researched, though few have so far been interpreted as development history. A notable exception was Bahru Zewde's collective biography of two generations of Ethiopian intellectuals who called for developmental changes in conjunction with, and occasionally at odds with the Ethiopian emperors of their day.[12] Education was a central part of their initiatives, together with administrative modernization. These changes would give substance to the political independence defended at the Battle of Adowa (1896), and encourage social justice, especially improvements for peasants and slaves. To the extent these intellectuals considered the condition of conquered peoples like the Oromo, they expressed sentiments and suggested solutions similar to those of contemporary Europeans writing about European empires.[13] Zewde's study built on national histories, which described initiatives by Emperor Menelik II (ruled 1889–1913) and several of his predecessors to change as well as expand the Abyssinian empire. They sought to centralize the state, build enabling infrastructure and institutions, acquire key European technologies, promote crafts and manufactures, and expand agricultural production.[14] This has been analyzed as defensive modernization, a response to European imperialism,

though defense of the empire against European encroachment was only one reason for change.[15] Programs of change like these were also not the reflexive response of isolated peoples to an external threat. Nineteenth-century African reformers looked to and learned from the Meiji regime's transformation of Japan, for example, and the Nizam-ı Cedid (new order) in Ottoman Turkey.[16]

Another developmental intervention that interested both historians and development scholars was that of Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman viceroy in Egypt (ruled 1805–1848). A regime-commissioned account of his initiatives placed them in—and against—the convention of *islah* (reform), a guiding concept for intentional change.[17] Creation of an effective military was at the heart of Muhammad Ali's program, but he believed this required social transformation. He initiated improvements in education, changes to government structure, new irrigation and transport infrastructure, state monopolies in crop marketing, a land survey, and redistribution of land in aid of increased commodity production and taxation.[18] Rapid industrialization was another element in his program. It included agricultural processing, production of textiles and consumer goods, and weapons manufacturing. State-owned factories, manipulation of internal markets for labor and raw materials, and protectionist trade policies were all used to support these industries.[19] Effective autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, even independence from it, was the ultimate goal. In this context, imperialism was an important way to express Egypt's power and status.[20] Muhammad Ali's 1820 invasion of Sudan provided resources, as well as conscripts for Egypt's reformed army. Improving the welfare of Sudan's peoples by opening up the region and administering it in a mutually beneficial way were among the justifications for the conquest.[21] Among Muhammed Ali's successors, Ismail Pasha (ruled 1863–1879) was also known for his modernization efforts, which focused on civilian rather than military institutions.[22]

The Eastern Congo settlements established by traders from the Sultanate of Zanzibar were another kind of developmental intervention.[23] Traders like Hamed bin Muhammed el Murjebi, better known as Tippu Tip, were consciously transforming the places in which they operated. Tippu Tip and his competitors initiated three linked changes. First, through training and example, the region's people were to be weaned away from their alleged 'barbarous' practices—paganism, cannibalism, and nakedness—and introduced to *ustaarabu* (civilization), as this was understood along the Swahili-speaking coast. The aim was 'conversion' in the broad sense used by Valentin Mudimbe to describe European imperial intentions in Africa.[24] Second, peace and order were to be imposed in the region. Tippu Tip said of Maniema: 'In this country there are no hereditary chiefs'; rather, outsiders came and offered goods to those who 'own the land' and the people accepted these new leaders.[25] This legitimized control by Zanzibari traders who—despite their own escalating violence—presented themselves as an improvement on the conflict-ridden rule of existing leaders. Third, agriculture in the

region was reoriented. In major settlements like Nyangwe and Kassongo, it increasingly involved plantations and enslaved labor.[26] New crops like rice, maize, and citrus fruits were also introduced. In villages along emerging caravan routes, production was regularized so villagers could provision passing traders. As inhabitants often responded by withdrawing from areas through which the Zanzibaris were advancing, they had to be forcibly returned to their villages and made to resume cultivation.

Modernity, reform, and civilization were not static; neither were the 'traditional' institutions they sought to supplant. All were tools for a variety of individuals and groups seeking betterment, or at least security, whether in empires or other kinds of state.[27] As the three examples above suggest, developmental initiatives were not desired by all involved in them. Sanction and violence were needed to ensure the participation of the unwilling, often people with less power. This was true to an even greater extent for the developmental initiatives of European imperialists, on which the remainder of this chapter will focus.

European 'High' Imperialism and Development

The decades between 1870 and 1914 were an era of 'high' or 'new' imperialism.[28] Africa was a focal point for this, with several European states making claims in the continent. Non-state actors, such as chartered companies and Christian missions, expanded in counterpoint.

Gareth Austin argued that the relation between land and indigenous labor envisioned by the imperialists was a determining factor in development history.[29] He distinguished three main types of colony: settler-elite, concession, and peasant colonies.[30] In the first, European settlers were present in larger numbers, though always still a minority. Crucially, they were given rights to the best land, and the colony's indigenes were forced to work for them. Africa had a few settler-elite colonies—Algeria, Kenya, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South Africa, and South West Africa (Namibia)—created by France, Britain, and Germany. Italians also settled in numbers in Libya and Eritrea.

In concession colonies, European companies were granted rights to tracts of land in which they could extract resources, typically rubber, ivory, timber, or minerals; concessions were also the contractual basis for plantations and some infrastructure projects. This delegated the cost of developing a colony to private investors. Concession companies were granted special privileges, some involving control of inhabitants' labor, and they were ill regulated, with violence and extreme exploitation the tragically common result.[31] Concessions were granted in many parts of the continent, but colonies dominated by them were concentrated in equatorial Africa, with King Leopold II's Congo Free State the infamous exemplar. By the 1920s, many of the concessions had been wound down, and after 1930, the remainder were subject to the Forced

Labour Convention of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Portugal's African colonies were a hybrid of the settler-elite and concession types, and endured to the early 1970s.

This chapter focuses on what Austin called peasant colonies, which were home to more than half of Africans. In them, most of the land remained in indigenous hands, and indigenous authorities were important adjuncts to colonial administration. Agriculture was taxed, and colonial officials sought to change crops and farming methods.[32] Most of the agriculturalists were peasants (or smallholders), but there were usually a few settlers and indigenous farmers operating on a larger scale as well. The chapter also focuses on British and French colonies since they covered almost three-quarters of the continent by 1920, the height of these two empires. While the French ruled a somewhat larger area, at nearly 12 million square kilometers, the British ruled about 60 million Africans, almost twice as many as the French.[33] British and French development policies also served as a model for those of other European imperial powers.

Development was one of the justifications offered for the Scramble for Africa. This social interventionism was a distinguishing mark of 'high' imperialism.[34] However, European colonial claims had to be realized on the ground before the changes Europeans envisioned could be initiated. Conquests and treaties were followed by ad hoc initiatives that brought as much inadvertent as intentional change. As Frederick Cooper commented, European rule was distinguished by trespass more than transformation in the decades following the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference.[35]

Civilization and Development in French West Africa

The extension of French control in West Africa between the 1850s and 1900 occurred largely by military conquest. By 1895, *mission civilisatrice* (civilizing mission) had become the official ideology of the Third Republic's empire. As Alice Conklin documented, its initial emphases were transformative. African societies, once conquered, would undergo 'constructive exploitation' directed by the French state. Slavery would be replaced by free labor, the oppressive feudal rule of kings and chiefs by rational administration, while French education and medicine, together with railroads and printing presses would end African isolation and ignorance. This revolutionary and racist program was widely accepted in French policy circles, as was the assumption that it would benefit both Africans and the French.[36] Funds for this transformation were limited, though, and the new colonies were expected to be self-financing.[37] Railways were a priority, as the French believed the changes they desired would follow from increased trade and communication. They were financed by head (poll) taxes, compulsory labor, and loans contracted in France. Health was another early policy focus, though it received much less funding.[38]

Colonial administration was established gradually after conquest brought more peoples under French rule. As Emily Osborn shows, in the early years of French rule, African soldiers, translators, and clerks were the face of the colonial state in West Africa, and they reinterpreted French demands and initiatives. This accentuated local variation in the implementation of colonial policy, as did the manipulation, inertia, and withdrawal with which elites and commoners responded to the new French administration.[39] The African interpreters Osborn discusses appropriated some of the spoils of French occupation, and encouraged a partial reshuffling of social and political hierarchies, but did not advance an alternative to either precolonial or French development programs.

Indirect Rule and Development in British Uganda

Uganda was declared a British protectorate in 1894. Since 1886, it had been part of a British sphere in East Africa, negotiated with the Germans and the Sultan of Zanzibar. Mimicking the trade-based sultanate, both European powers used chartered companies to establish themselves in the region. The inability of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) to administer effectively the area assigned to it led the British government to step into prevent loss of territory to regional rivals.[40]

Like many parts of the African interior, Uganda posed a challenge for its new rulers. The nearest port was 1200 kilometers away and the British did not consider mainstays of regional trade—salt, bark cloth, fish, and slaves—tradable. The minerals, ivory and rubber they did value were not abundant in Uganda.[41] Generating revenue to recover the costs of pacification and of building a railway to the coast became a British preoccupation. They instituted taxes in the early 1900s, with a head tax and import duties generating most of the protectorate's revenue.[42] They also sought to increase the protectorate's profitability through cash-crop production. Officials believed that if they provided security and infrastructure, then British businesses would invest and economic advancement would follow. However, tropical development proved more complex, and British investors narrowly interested in mining and commerce.[43] Consequently, after 1900, colonial administrators played an active role in supporting and enforcing cotton cultivation.[44] It spread rapidly among peasants in the protectorate's East and South as the least disruptive way of satisfying British demands.[45] However, as Grace Carswell's research on Kigezi showed, where farmers had other ways to earn money for taxes they resisted growing designated cash crops.[46] The administration quickly became dependent on taxing cotton, which supplied 90% of its revenue by 1920.[47]

In the protectorate's early years, the chiefs and generals of existing states, especially Buganda, were essential to the expansion and administration of the minimally resourced British administration. The practices of the Buganda kingdom consequently influenced the creation of what was effectively an

'indigenous civil service'. This was an early version of Indirect Rule, the policy that Frederick Lugard, the IBEAC's Ugandan administrator, was later to articulate. In it the legitimacy and capacity of 'native authorities'—stereotypically a chief and his advisory council—were harnessed by the new British administration. These authorities were expected to maintain order among their traditional subjects, communicate British requirements to them, and enforce these when necessary.[48]

While Uganda was not envisioned as a settler colony like neighboring Kenya, the establishment of plantations by a few European settlers and by resident Indians after 1911 was a welcome development in the eyes of many British officials. Some Baganda, Basoga and Bagisu chiefs also used their control over land and labor to establish large personal cash-crop farms.[49] However, all these producers needed labor and land, which interfered with peasant agriculture. Labor shortages were especially severe because of the pacification wars, famine, and epidemics in the preceding decades. When these shortages were compounded by falling export prices after 1920, most of the European-owned plantations went out of business. Peasant production was more resilient because African farmers could fall back on subsistence crops, and because most had to continue to grow some cash crops to pay their taxes.[50]

Institutions for Development: Education and Missions

Economists became increasingly interested in the role of institutions in development after the mid-1980s.[51] Many concluded that British colonial institutions were more beneficial for development than those of other European powers. As Ewout Frankema observes, education lies at the heart of this supposed difference, but the economic literature examines neither the context for education in Britain's African colonies nor the significant differences between them. Frankema also argues that the uneven distribution of schools in British-ruled Africa—and the subsequent large variation in literacy rates—was more strongly influenced by African agency than by imperial policy.[52]

In the early years of British rule, education and health care were left to private actors, primarily Christian missions, who supplemented indigenous services. Teaching and medicine were aids to the missions' goals of religious conversion and social progress; the degree to which they intended their work to be a contribution to or a corrective for colonialism varied. Even when colonial administrations became more actively interested in education after the mid-1920s, missions still played an important role. In Uganda, the Church Missionary Society, the Church of England's mission organization, provided about half of the roughly 100,000 primary-school spaces in the late 1920s. Three Catholic missions—only one of them British—provided the remainder. Mission schools ranged from village ones with a single teacher and large multi-grade classes to King's College Budo, Gayaza High School and St Mary's College Kisubi, the boarding schools that educated the elite

of Uganda's kingdoms. The vast majority of teachers in mission schools were regional converts, not Europeans, as was also the case for service providers in clinics and churches. Indeed, the Africanization of missions was essential to their expansion, even after medical advances improved the tropical life expectancy of Europeans. Further, the money and in-kind resources used to build and run schools came mostly from converts and from colonial taxpayers, not from the metropole. This varied by colony, though. In Uganda, the colonial administration covered 20–30% of the cost of mission schools; in the wealthier Gold Coast, it was about two thirds of the cost, while in impoverished Nyasaland it was less than eight percent.[53]

The British were more open to the operation of missions than were other imperial powers. The French tolerated Catholic mission schools in prescribed roles and locations. Generally, they were more active in French Equatorial Africa than in the West African colonies, and more active in the early nineteenth century—and thus in coastal regions—than at the end of the century. Legislation passed between 1902 and 1905 directed the secularization of church-run schools, forcing administrators in France's colonies to involve themselves with education. However, state investment in education was low.[54]

The Emergence of Developmental Imperialism in French Sudan and British Uganda

The economic crisis between the two World Wars was a significant period in African development history. Although generally treated as a single event—a Great Depression lasting for a decade after 1929—there were in fact three interwar economic contractions: a short recession in the early 1920s, a more severe one from 1929 through the mid-1930s, and then a faltering of the economic recovery in 1937.[55] Trade transmitted the global recession to Africa, since the continent was not deeply integrated into international financial markets.[56] Production for trade and taxation of trade thus became central issues for Africans and their European administrators. War and recession caused the European colonial powers to rethink their position in Africa. They systematized the ad hoc development measures they had previously relied on, and introduced new ones.

French rule underwent important changes earlier, during the First World War. Shortages of money and personnel prompted significant colonial public-service cuts, affecting health and education more than general administration.[57] Wartime desperation also prompted the imposition of conscription in France's African colonies, and greater use of forced labor. These became flashpoints for opposition to French rule; they also drew French attention to the problem of labor scarcity, and to the deplorable condition of their West African subjects.[58] A new policy of association emerged in response. Traditional elites and institutions were reinterpreted: they were now useful, not inherently oppressive. Under French tutelage, chiefs and other elites would

help govern and civilize their peoples. Marital Merlin, the Governor General of French West Africa, argued that this differed from Britain's policy of Indirect Rule because it better protected the rights of the African masses vis-à-vis their indigenous leaders. However, the bigger difference lay in the concessions eventually made to French-educated Africans, who demanded a political role and rights.[59]

These policies were accompanied by a shift in thinking about imperial trade. A strategy of systematic economic development known as *mise en valeur* (literally, value creation) received new attention after 1919.[60] The term had been used since the early 1890s, but interest in it intensified among officials and politicians who saw that the empire had not provided resources France needed during or after the war. Minister of Colonies Albert Sarraut formalized the strategy in *La mise en valeur des colonies françaises* (1923).[61] It involved comprehensive modernization based on state investment in colonial infrastructure and commerce. This would increase trade within the empire and better the condition of France's African subjects, since economic improvement would bring social progress in its train.[62] This was linked to a race-based regeneration policy known as *faire du noir* (literally making black), to increase the African birth rate while reducing illness and hunger.[63] However, state capacity in both Dakar and Paris was limited and, since the latter was not willing to give up the principle of self-financing colonies, the strategy was only partially implemented.[64]

An irrigation scheme in French Sudan (Mali) was a *mise en valeur* project that did proceed. The colony was envisioned from the first as a supplier of cotton to France, though peasants who already grew cotton would need to increase production and grow varieties preferred by French manufacturers. However, even after a rail link to Senegal and ginning equipment were in place, French merchants were reluctant to involve themselves and French manufacturers were unwilling to compete with the higher prices offered by the region's artisanal weavers.[65] Large-scale, irrigated cotton production would sidestep the perennial problem of peasant colonies—managing peasants. A private consortium proposed a system of dams and canals in 1918, promising investors it would create an El Dorado on the Niger River.[66] Two years later, engineer Émile Bélime carried out a state-sponsored survey, proposing a grand irrigation project that was incorporated into Sarraut's plans. However, the limited public funding this project initially received came from West African taxpayers rather than France. The forced labor of civilians and military conscripts was another essential contribution.[67] While its size was distinctive, the project's focus and methods were consistent with those of other agricultural development projects in the continent, both British and French.[68]

Cotton production was the project's primary goal. It would make the empire self-sufficient in this increasingly expensive commodity; it would also rescue land from the encroaching Sahara. The proposal was modified in 1924 to include rice production, which would end famine in the region and

support *faire du noir*.[69] Work began in 1925; it accelerated in 1931 when a scaled-down version of the project was approved for a French colonial loan. The *Office du Niger* was created to administer the project, an agency with powers so vast that it was effectively a state within the state of French West Africa.[70] The project was also an exemplar of France's *colonisation indigène* (native colonization) policy, which sought to address labor and African welfare problems identified after the First World War. It involved resettling African farmers in areas that the French considered best suited for agriculture. European agricultural methods, such as ox ploughs and new crop rotations, would also help these farmers become more productive.[71]

While the project experienced technical challenges, its persistent failure to meet its goals stemmed from labor scarcity.[72] There were few volunteers so 'settlers' were recruited by force, some from neighboring districts and some from Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). French officials described the *Office* as a project of 'independent peasant production under European supervision', but the agricultural regimen was strict enough to suggest plantation life. It illustrated the increasingly illiberal orientation of French policy in the 1930s.[73] Many of the project's involuntary participants, nicknamed *tubabu jonw* (slaves of the white man), fled. Those who stayed cultivated additional land outside the *Office* and sold their crops in local markets rather than through its official marketing channel, actions that undermined the project. French administrators who believed that indigenous 'settlers' would change their farming methods and undergo a social transformation—accepting private property in land and living in nuclear families—were frustrated.[74]

Global recession prompted additional changes in French policy. France's trade policies in Africa had been more protectionist than British ones from the outset, relying on tariffs and preferential treatment to structure trade within the empire.[75] This protectionism intensified during the 1930s, and by mid-decade France's African colonies were an important market for its most recession-affected industries.[76] However, dependence on trade taxes in France's West African colonies meant that their revenues fell significantly during the interwar recessions.[77] The higher taxes imposed as a result impoverished those who remained on the land and tried to increase their cashcrop production. It also drove many off the land, pushing them to seek urban employment, though opportunities were limited.[78] Although the West African administration received larger transfers from France to counter-balance tax shortfalls, this aid did little to improve well-being in the colonies.[79]

The postwar recessions' effects were also a rude shock to the British colonial establishment, which assumed that imperialism brought different, but mutual benefits to the metropole and its subjects. The decline in African well-being triggered by the trade crisis was revealed in a series of reports. As in French-ruled Africa, it was magnified by colonial budget cuts, which affected health, education, and agricultural services.[80] For peasants under British rule, particularly the indebted, this was a time of great difficulty.[81] Landless people, such as migrant agricultural workers, faced a sharp drop

in wages or lay-offs.[82] While negative effects dominated, some producers evaded new exactions and pressures to increase export production, or even found opportunities in the misfortunes of their region.[83]

Prior to the recessions, British policy had been reactive, rather than a tool for a deliberate, consistent development vision.[84] In 1918, Uganda's governor Robert Coryndon complained of the lack of a long-range plan for the protectorate. As was the case in France, war and recession heightened consciousness of Britain's dependence on raw materials and prompted efforts to create supplies of them within the empire.[85] In response, British officials systematized their strategy for agricultural development: indigenous farmers would grow the cash crops most needed by British industry, and their earnings would allow them to purchase its products. The British favored a diversity of crops, though, fearing the consequences of over-reliance on one commodity.[86]

The interwar years were pivotal ones in Uganda. Cash-crop production increased, though it was coffee rather than cotton production that grew most rapidly, both arabica in Bugisu and robusta in Buganda.[87] While the British promoted arabica production, the expansion of robusta was the result of farmer initiative. It was in part a rural protest against low cotton prices, and in part a recognition by Baganda peasants and chiefs that once the bushes were established, coffee gave a higher return with less labor than other cash crops. Land and tribute laws passed by Buganda's *Lukiiko* (legislature) in 1928 provided peasants with security of tenure that made a perennial crop like coffee attractive.[88] Nevertheless, the incomes of Ugandans grew more slowly than did their export crop production, and income was not equitably distributed. Reported one observer: 'A few wealthy chiefs and landowners could now live in brick houses, wear smart European suits and ride in motor-cars, but as far as the mass of the people were concerned the improvement in the standards of living had not been particularly impressive'.[89]

Coffee production had other, unanticipated effects. It tied peasants into broader markets, whose functioning affected their livelihoods. As Stephen Bunker found, increased coffee production in Bugisu during the 1930s made peasants there more sensitive to prices, but also 'to questions of taxes, the condition of warehouses, roads, and bridges, and the procedures followed at the buying stations. They were also increasingly concerned with the availability of education and medical attention in the rural areas'.[90] Both indigenous leaders and British administrators had to consider these concerns.

Cashcrop production also created tension along other lines. Although coffee required less labor than cotton, hulling the beans made a significant demand on women's time, one that was resisted since decisions about coffee and the income from it were generally the province of men.[91] In Buganda, this tension was relieved by hiring migrant workers from the North and East of the protectorate, as well as neighboring Ruanda-Urundi.[92] This fueled a growing differential between the wealth and influence of coffee-growing regions and other parts of the protectorate.[93]

Already during the First World War, cashcrop production allowed Uganda's administration to be self-financing.[94] Export taxes were raised further in 1919, with the justification that this would generate funds for development. However, the per capita revenue raised was relatively low and, before the demise of the European plantation sector, it received a disproportionate benefit from the resultant development spending.[95] This included transport and communication infrastructure, though the salaries and pensions of British officials and security also consumed significant amounts. Spending on health and education for Ugandans increased too, but less than the increases in other sectors.[96]

In 1932, Britain abandoned decades of relatively free trade for protectionism. The Uganda protectorate's administration also started to intervene in the purchase of cash crops during the 1930s. Its initial concern was to stave off farmer protest over their treatment by traders, most of them resident Asians. It also wanted to ensure coffee quality, and find a price that incentivized growers but did not upset the European-run export firms. While focused on domestic issues, this action was consistent with the colonial powers' broader concern during the interwar recessions—stabilizing international commodity markets.[97]

The League of Nations and Development

The interwar years were also important ones in the emerging intergovernmental sphere. The League of Nations and the ILO, both created in 1919, were important elements. As Rachel Crowdy of the League's Secretariat commented, peace was the organization's primary task but it would be achieved 'by working for social welfare', not only by negotiating treaties. The League addressed social problems like working conditions, human trafficking, and disease.[98] Collecting information was an important part of this, both via investigative reporting and improving data collection by states.[99] The 1930 Commission of Inquiry into forced labor in Liberia was an example of the former.[100] Work like this built on an existing tradition of international humanitarian involvement in Africa, particularly for the abolition of slavery. Some of the work was novel, though, like the decade-long study of nutrition jointly undertaken by the League's Health Organization, the International Institute of Agriculture, and the ILO. It created international nutrition standards, sponsored nutrition surveys in selected countries, and collected information about member countries' nutrition policies. All this information was assembled, analyzed, and disseminated in conferences and publications. This initiative had a galvanizing effect on British colonial policy.[101] As Christopher Wrigley said with respect to Uganda:

> during the 1930s a silent revolution, discernible both in London and in Entebbe, in intellectual as well as in political and administrative circles, was taking place in the values of Colonial Government. The intellectual revolution

> can perhaps be pin-pointed to 1936, when the International African Institute turned aside from the study of tribal institutions and how to preserve them and devoted a whole issue of its journal to the problem of nutrition.[102]

Susan Pedersen argues that the League's work on issues like labor and nutrition had lasting effects on development ideas and institutions, though her primary focus is the impact of the mandate system.[103] The colonies seized from the Germans and Ottomans during the First World War became Mandated Territories to be administered in trust, not additions to the empires of the victors. Half of the League Mandates were in Africa.[104] The League of Nations Covenant instituted the Mandates and also required its signatories to 'secure the just treatment of the native inhabitants' elsewhere in their empires, setting norms for imperial rule that included the welfare of subject peoples.[105] The Permanent Mandates Commission and the League's Mandates Section were tools (novel ones) for trying to hold imperial governments accountable. The norms they used were based on British policies and practices, particularly in Egypt, or at least Britain's 'best intentions'.[106] The philosophy behind this was Indirect Rule, and Pedersen documents the role that Frederick Lugard's *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922) played in articulating global norms of welfare and development under colonial rule, reinforced by his membership in the Mandates Commission between 1922 and 1936.[107]

All this did not mean that Mandate Territories were better governed in practice. Rather, Pedersen argues that the mandate system's impact lay in 'internationalization', the process by which an issue was transposed from a national (and imperial) political sphere into an international one. The creation of an intergovernmental civil service was part of this. The League's staff were not simply tools of the imperial powers who dominated the organization. Some sought a degree of autonomy from their home governments and a progressive interpretation of their mandate.[108] A network of lobbyists, philanthropists, and experts grew around the League, which both shaped and amplified its actions. The League's internationalization built the skills and credibility of people who petitioned for their rights under Mandates as well. Metropolitan policymakers and politicians were changed too, as they had to incorporate extranational interests into their work.[109] They were also forced to acknowledge—though not necessarily to change—the racism inherent in trusteeship, the idea that underpinned developmental imperialism.[110]

Liberia: Interwar Development via Corporate Altruism

Entrepreneurs were also among the agents of colonialism, though as of the First World War Africa hosted only six percent of global investment. During the interwar years, foreign direct investment in the continent grew and, more importantly, its focus shifted. Prior to 1914, only South Africa and Egypt attracted much investment; after 1919, investment in other African countries

grew more rapidly.[111] These investments were small by global standards, but investors like Lever Brothers in the Belgian Congo, Imperial Tobacco in Nyasaland (Malawi), Schneider et Cie in Morocco, or Firestone in Liberia had significant development impacts.[112]

US investment in Africa increased during the interwar years, though it remained much less significant than British investment.[113] The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company's concession in Liberia was a prominent example, one that paved the way for subsequent US investments.[114] Liberia in the early 1920s was in desperate financial straits. Its leaders, descendants of the black Americans who founded the republic of Liberia, maintained economic ties with the USA, but US isolationist policies meant this relationship generated little aid.[115] The traditional fix, international borrowing, was not an option since Liberia's finances were already under creditor supervision.[116] The need of the Liberian government coincided with the interests of US tire companies, the world's largest users of rubber. They wanted affordable supplies because after 1910 the Brazilian government and the British, acting for several South-East Asian colonies, raised the international price of rubber by controlling exports.[117]

Between 1924 and 1926, Firestone representatives signed a set of agreements with the Liberian government. The Firestone Plantation Company, a wholly owned subsidiary, received a 99-year lease to a million acres of Liberian land.[118] The agreements included a clause that bound the Liberian government to take a substantial loan from Firestone. Harvey Firestone insisted on this to give his company leverage over the government.[119] The five million dollar loan was opposed by many Liberians, but its defenders believed the loss of sovereignty it represented was the lesser of two evils; the greater evil being a lack of engagement by the USA at a time when Liberia needed protection from British and French encroachment.[120] They also hoped that the infrastructure Firestone agreed to build would stimulate the country's stagnant economy.[121]

Firestone did not use all its leased land, but even so it established the world's largest rubber plantation, with a second smaller plantation nearby. Daily production decisions were made in Ohio and communicated by radio.[122] The plantations were largely self-sufficient, having built roads, hydroelectric stations, latex processing factories, and an airfield. Labor was covered in Firestone's agreement with Liberia's government, which used the annual hut tax that inhabitants of the interior had been compelled to pay since 1910, and force, to supply thousands of plantation workers.[123] As the country's only large employer, Firestone was an important means by which cash for taxes could be earned. By the early 1930s, the Company switched to dealing directly with chiefs, paying them a stipend for each worker they supplied.[124]

Firestone's involvement in Liberia was intentionally developmental. As with nineteenth-century model industrial projects, the paternalistic vision of

the company's head was crucial. For Harvey Firestone, the Liberian plantations were more than a business investment. He was, as a former State Department official observed, also 'very interested in the idea of establishing schools, hospitals, agricultural training schools, and so forth for the development of the aborigines'. Firestone was attracted by the idea of 'doing welfare work' on a grand scale. Where peers like Henry Ford were building model towns, he would be 'developing a model nation'.[125] This was little compensation, though, for those displaced by the government's appropriation of land for the Firestone concession or forced to work for Firestone.

As with the plantation, the development Firestone initiated was considerably less grandiose than his initial plans. He had two hospitals built, funded medical, ethnographic, and linguistic research, and made some investment in schools and agricultural training.[126] The scope for development spending by external actors was great, since the Liberian government focused its development spending on infrastructure, mostly in the coastal region. By comparison, the government of British-ruled Sierra Leone, with a similar population, spent twenty times as much on education, health, and agriculture.[127] In this context, Nigerian nationalist Nnamdi Azikiwe called Firestone's efforts 'unavoidable expedient altruism'.[128]

Firestone's involvement in Liberia preceded the idea of a business-led 'American Century' of global development—and President Truman's speech—by several decades.[129] Firestone's development activities in Liberia, like those in interwar British and French African colonies, were ad hoc and limited. US officials assisted the negotiations between Firestone and Liberia, but the concession-based development that followed was not a 'project' of the US government. Its involvement in Liberia was sporadic, frustrating both Firestone and members of the Americo-Liberian ruling elite.[130]

The Second World War and Imperial Development Policy

Second World War battles were fought in East and North Africa, but the war effort affected the entire continent.[131] African soldiers and laborers, both conscripts and volunteers, played important roles. So did farmers: the demand for food and industrial crops intensified, as did the demand for rubber and timber. The mining sector was also deeply affected, as African miners and mines were crucial to meeting the wartime demand for coal, iron, and copper, as well as specialty metals like molybdenum.[132] Given existing labor shortages, quotas and compulsion often substituted for higher prices and wages as Vichy, Free French, and British administrators sought to meet the high expectations of their metropolitan leaders and those of regional military commanders. Privation, discrimination, and abuse met with predictable reactions from the Africans subjected to them: protest, mutiny, desertion, smuggling, and migration.

After the war, veterans were among those making new demands, which African nationalists sought to harness.[133] British and French colonial administrations tried to manage specific demands as well as broader pressures for political, economic, and social change, though in different ways. The French admitted qualified Africans to citizenship and a reimagined metropolitan political process; the British made openings in local government and cooperatives.[134] The war brought less obvious changes as well. It accelerated urbanization, and young women and men in cities experienced new freedoms. African traders lost ground to the European firms favored in managed wartime trade, and European settlers took advantage of discriminatory wartime incentives to advance their interests at the expense of indigenous farmers and laborers.[135] Multinational corporations were more involved in Africa at the war's end, having played an important role in meeting resource demands. They benefited from wartime technological developments as well, and a congenial postwar policy climate.[136] African economies were, overall, more monetized and more strongly oriented toward commodity exports by the war's end, though peasant agriculture and pastoralism were still the basis for most Africans' livelihoods. Last, but far from least, state intervention in the economy was normalized in both the metropole and colonies, and new tools created to facilitate it.

There were also important development policy changes during the war. Britain's parliament passed a Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940. It was a product of events and ideas from the preceding few years, but was overtaken by the outbreak of war in 1939. The senior Colonial Office officials pushing this policy change argued, successfully, that attention to the welfare of colonial subjects was more necessary than ever to prevent the war effort from being undermined by unrest and low productivity.[137] While the war limited the Act's implementation, its principles informed the 1945 and 1950 Acts of the same name. These included the transfer of metropolitan resources to the colonies through a Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, and their use to promote social development, not just economic growth. Allocations were made on advice from a committee of experts, who also vetted the ten-year development plans each colony was required to submit under the Act. Disputes within the Colonial Economic Advisory Committee revealed the conflicting impulses behind the new policy, with progressives like the St Lucian economist W. Arthur Lewis arguing for rapid economic growth based on agricultural change and industry, substantial investment in a few designated colonies, and a central role for the colonial state in economic development. Colonial officials on the Committee wanted less disruptive change. They feared that deliberately uneven allocation of development funds would cause an uproar in the colonial service, while encouraging large-scale farming would provoke unrest among rural peasants. More fundamentally, they believed the state should leave plenty of room for private actors in planning and implementing development projects.[138]

In the late 1930s, political instability precluded a parallel process of policy reform for French colonial development. The Brazzaville Conference of 1944, attended by Free French officials and senior French administrators in Africa, was a point where principles for long-term policy could again be articulated. These included support for planning and a strong state role in the economy. The welfare of the indigenous population was identified as a policy priority.[139] As Frederick Cooper argued, the Second World War created an opening for change in the French empire, one that Africans seized.[140] For example, in 1946, striking workers in Dakar rallied for coverage under the metropolitan labor code with the slogan '*à travail égal, salaire égal*' (equal work, equal salary).[141] Reforms initiated in 1946 also included the abolition of forced labor, which inspired peasants. As Monica van Beusekom documented, this change meant the French managers of the *Office du Niger* had to take indigenous farmers' views into much greater account.[142]

French reformist thinking was reflected in the 1946 *Plan de modernisation et d'équipement* which guided postwar reconstruction. It included a ten-year plan with a wide remit for the French African territories, one modeled on the 1940 British Act. While this differed from the ad hoc and short-term policy processes of the preceding years, the *Plan's* greater novelty was the significant growth in publicly funded transfers, both grants and loans that were to finance change in every aspect of life in French-ruled Africa.[143] The *Fonds d'investissement pour le développement économique et social* (FIDES), established in 1938, would channel annual allocations from the metropolitan budget for a range of development initiatives in French colonies. The Fund was managed by the *Caisse centrale de* la France *d'outre-mer* (CCOM), which was also empowered to make concessional loans for modernizing projects.[144] Although these were the main channels for aid to the colonies, they were not the only ones. This complexity is an ongoing characteristic of the French development aid system.[145] The changes laid the foundation for a dramatic expansion of development aid transfers within the French empire.[146] However, Patrick Manning has calculated that the metropolitan government continued to receive more in taxes from its African colonies than it spent in them.[147]

Postwar Trade Policy: Entrenching Commodity Specialization

African development was also fundamentally affected by the substantial debts that Allied European governments owed to the USA by 1945. Dollars to repay those debts and to finance reconstruction were desperately scarce. This not only jeopardized Europe's postwar recovery, it caused US officials to fear another recession if their country's wartime levels of production and export fell. Trade was consequently key to postwar planning. Europe's colonies were expected to contribute in two ways. First, they would provide a market for

metropolitan products, substituting for markets in Eastern Europe lost in the intensifying Cold War. This meant that the colonies' purchasing power had to be increased via economic development. The colonies' second role was to earn dollars for the metropole by exporting raw materials to the USA, or save dollars by producing substitutes for US goods the empire would otherwise have imported.[148] The main dollar-saving goods produced in Africa were sugar, tobacco, coffee, cotton, and copper, entrenching African colonies as the source of these commodities for France, Britain, and Portugal.[149] A new version of the Atlantic triangular trade was institutionalized: European countries traded manufactures to their African colonies and purchased their raw materials, and the colonies traded their raw materials to the USA. The dollars earned returned to Europe to sustain a flow of debt repayment to the USA and the import of essential US goods by Europe.

Britain used two mechanisms created before the war to structure this trade. One was dollar pooling, whereby colonies deposited the dollars their exports earned in a central account in London from which the British government could borrow. South Africa and several West African colonies were net contributors in the postwar years, but the main depositors were Asian.[150] Marketing boards were the other mechanism. They came to play so crucial a role in subsequent African development that a colonial official called their introduction a 'silent revolution'.[151]

Marketing boards had their genesis when the British government made cocoa purchasing in West Africa a state monopoly in 1939. This was in response to a strike by growers in the Gold Coast (Ghana), protesting against their treatment by European trading companies. When war broke out the monopoly also helped officials match exports with available shipping.[152] An expanded West African Produce Control Board was made responsible for marketing palm oil and oilseeds in 1941. In Uganda, a temporary state marketing structure for coffee and cotton were set up at the beginning of the war; they were made permanent after the war's end.[153] At that point, territorial marketing boards for specific cash crops also replaced the central one in West Africa. By the early 1950s, these boards had been set up throughout Britain's African colonies.[154] They ended up controlling between 66 and 100% of the colonies' main exports. After the war, they were ostensibly a mechanism for price stabilization and forced savings for colonial investment. However, in the eyes of officials their main purpose was solving Britain's postwar financial problems, since the boards paid growers less than the world price for their crops.[155]

After the war, France, like Britain, saw trade with its colonies as essential to its recovery. As in Britain, the institutions that structured France's postwar trade were established in the 1930s.[156] To reinvigorate trade with its African colonies France intensified its menu of quotas and duties, and added price-support funds to compensate for some of the trade deficit its colonies were forced to run. This *surprix* (surcharge) system kept the prices of

African exports artificially high in the French market to enable its colonies to purchase even more overpriced French manufactures. France also invested substantial public funds in colonial export production and infrastructure to increase imperial trade.[157] Like marketing boards, the *surprix* system was precedent setting, as elements of it were subsequently adopted by the European Economic Community.[158]

Uganda's Post-Second World War Development

The disarray of international markets in aftermath of the Second World War, which prompted fears of economic crisis like the one that had followed the peace of 1919, convinced colonial officials—and African nationalists—that continuing state management of the economy was a necessity. The corollary of the state's dominant role in economic development was the need for it to direct the voluntary organizations that grew in number and prominence after the war. These included faith-based self-help and charity organizations, trade unions and occupational associations, cooperatives, secular service organizations, recreational-interest clubs, ethnic and hometown associations, as well as international non-governmental organizations.[159]

Spending under the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act had been limited by wartime shortages of cash and staff. After the war, the Colonial Office was anxious that the Act be seen as more than just an empty gesture, so its Development Fund was increased and officials were urged to disburse more of it.[160] Colonies were required to submit a multi-year development plan to access the Fund but, as had been the case since the start of British rule, most of the resources invested in development came from taxation—particularly via the marketing boards—rather than British aid or loans. Uganda made only modest requests for money under the Act, and used them to finance roads, hospitals, and a radio broadcast network.[161]

Official development intervention intensified in Uganda with the 1945 iteration of the Act, guided by a ten-year development plan. Nevertheless, the ideas on which the Worthington Plan was based remained largely those of the 1930s. Cash-crop exports were still the mainspring of development, and state-directed modernization would improve agricultural production. Substantial investment in education and health waited on the increased revenue that achievement of agricultural goals would bring.[162] Faith-based and other volunteer organizations continued to be an important supplement to the administration's social development efforts, and they were growing in number and membership. The National Council of Social Service was established in 1954 to coordinate the work of the relevant government ministries and the protectorate's main private welfare organizations.[163] As agriculture could not provide an adequate living for the growing rural population, an expansion of mining and industry was also called for, and the Uganda Development Corporation was established in 1952 to support this diversification.[164]

Light industry supplying consumer goods was encouraged, as such goods might otherwise be imported from non-British sources and require scarce dollars.[165]

Coffee production expanded significantly after the war, and it outstripped cotton as the protectorate's main export. The British government's financial needs were one reason for this, but not the main one; international coffee price increases in the early 1950s were more important.[166] Ugandan peasants responded to them by planting more coffee. Production of robusta rose fourfold between 1946 and independence in 1962, while production of arabica rose almost threefold.[167] Cooperatives were an additional factor. Ugandan farmers saw them as a way to increase their power vis-à-vis crop buyers, and to improve the price they received by ensuring better initial processing of their crops. After significant rural protest, cooperatives were legalized in 1946.[168] Grudging acceptance turned to official encouragement after 1952, when it was hoped cooperatives would channel rural political energies. Rapid growth in cooperative membership followed this policy change.[169] In the final decade of British rule, cooperatives became powerful institutions. Beyond their economic roles, they gave leadership experience to many who became politicians and civil servants at independence.[170]

Ugandan growers also used cooperatives to help pressure the Coffee Board to pass on a greater share of the high world price. Even though the full increase was not transferred to them, it did put more cash in the hands of many peasants. The resulting wealth was concentrated in Buganda, providing an average per capita income almost twice the national level. This exacerbated regional inequality and added to tension around the special status of the kingdom within the protectorate.[171] The coffee price boom was also associated with rapid growth in government spending, from £8 to £22 million between 1950 and 1955. The spending was concentrated in the south-central districts of the country, though, reinforcing the inequality of cash-crop wealth and continuing a pattern of uneven access to public services dating back to the early years of the protectorate.[172] Some of the administration's new income was invested in infrastructure—the hydroelectric dam at Jinja and expansion of the railway network, for example—as well as in schools, clinics, and roads.[173] This led to rapid increases in school enrollment and an estimated literacy rate of 40% in 1961, though with significant regional differences as well as much higher rates for boys.[174]

Government spending continued to grow even after the price boom ended in the mid-1950s, though at a slower rate. By the early 1960s, falling coffee prices and potential budget deficits, together with political tensions, were casting a shadow over the prospect of independence.[175] Added to concerns about the ability of coffee exports to finance Uganda's independent development were commitments made as part of the new International Coffee Agreement. France, Portugal, and Britain joined it on behalf of their African colonies, agreeing to export quotas to raise and stabilize the world price for coffee.[176]

The Transition from Colonial to Post-Colonial Development

Colonial development policy changes in the 1940s were not intended as preparation for decolonization, though some who advocated for them hoped for this. The reforms were intended to revitalize the British and French empires. Wartime promises of change were remembered by Africans, though, and became part of the demand for improvements made by many, including nationalist leaders. Although nationalists began calling for more change than colonial officials were willing to grant, the two groups found common ground in some elements of postwar development policy.

Economic planning was one such area. It emerged as a policy tool in the interwar recessions. Worldwide fascination with it grew in the 1930s, spurred by the Soviet Union's rapid industrialization and the Tennessee Valley Authority's modernization project.[177] Planning became an essential state function during the Second World War as governments sought to maximize production, minimize civilian consumption, and manage military supply. This required systematic economic measurement and forecasting, as well as the capacity to coordinate activity in multiple sectors. After the war, planning addressed two important problems: states' international status, and their citizens' expectation of employment and improved welfare.[178] The route to both was economic growth, which planning promised to deliver. Planning also encouraged unity, by drawing private firms and trade unions into state-led action to achieve economic growth.[179] In France, elements of the Catholic Church were also advocates of planning, and of specific types of development as a moral project as well as a progressive economic one.[180]

Early development economists, notably W. Arthur Lewis and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, argued strongly for planning in colonial economies too. They saw planning as the best way to address the particular problems of poor countries. African nationalists embraced these ideas, as evidenced by their response to Lewis's 1949 study for the Fabian Society, *The Principles of Economic Planning*.[181] Planning for state-led economic growth appealed to them for some of the same reasons it attracted metropolitan politicians and bureaucrats. To begin with, it guaranteed them significant roles.[182] More importantly, they believed rapid and effective modernization required action on a scale that only states could achieve.[183]

The British Colonial Office, where Lewis was a consultant during and after the war, embraced planning though not some of Lewis's other ideas. Planning would allow development interventions 'on a scale quite unknown in the past', in the words of one secretary of state for the colonies.[184] The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), where Rosenstein-Rodan worked, also adopted planning as the basis for more effective postwar reconstruction lending. The IBRD initially showed little interest in colonial economies, but by the late 1950s, planning had become the prerequisite for development lending to newly independent countries.[185]

It was routine for colonial administrations in Africa to issue a territorial development plan after 1945, as did countries that had already gained independence.[186] However, as Lewis observed, these varied in content and format.[187] Toyin Falola's book on planning in colonial Nigeria remains the only in-depth study of this crucial element of African development history. As he documented, the plans that guided Nigeria's imperial development were aggregations of projects chosen from the wish lists submitted by provincial and district officials, with some commercial initiatives thrown in. It was not specified how these would combine to generate economic growth and improved welfare.[188] By the 1940s, Nigeria's colonial administration had come to see aid from Britain as a means of balancing its budget while still undertaking some public works. Planning was a means of accessing that aid, not a tool for directing economic change. The plethora of planning committees it created encouraged competition for funds between regions, rather than prioritization of projects within them. The capacity to implement projects, or to find the local resources required to match metropolitan grants were not considered when these committees drafted proposals. Development success was measured by the amount of funding obtained more than by change in the welfare of Nigerians.[189] These were unfortunate precedents for development planning after independence.

Official development assistance was another area of emerging consensus. In 1955, the World Council of Churches sought expert advice on their efforts to assist people in newly independent and soon-to-be independent countries. They received the wisdom of the day: development required resources that were far beyond the means of charities. Big transfers of money, expertise, and technology from governments were needed. The idea of an aid target for already industrialized countries emerged from the Council's discussion of this advice, and was forwarded to the offices of all representatives to the United Nations in 1958.[190] This target—one percent of the national income of industrialized countries to be transferred annually to developing countries in the form of aid and investment—was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1960, and a version of it was included in the first Development Decade document.[191] Many African nationalists agreed that large-scale transfers were needed for development; they also supported the implicit assumption of moral obligation for them on part of countries that had already industrialized, especially those which had used African labor and resources to do so. Some, however, cautioned that relying on external aid would foster dependence on its donors.[192]

France was the only donor that met the UN aid target.[193] Its aid institutions were those established after the war, such as FIDES, as were the objects of its aid. The West African Federation received the largest share of FIDES funds, and almost two-thirds of that was spent on transport infrastructure in the first five years of the 1946 *Plan*, with production and social development receiving equal shares of the remainder.[194] This spending disproportionately

benefited urban areas, though. Adjustments were made in 1952 for the second half of the *Plan*. Production was emphasized, a response to both French opponents of aid and a deteriorating international economic climate. This shifted development spending toward mining, export processing, and economic infrastructure. Unfortunately, the neglect of rural areas and agriculture continued. French contributions to the *Plan* were also cut, with private investors and West African taxpayers expected to fill the gap. As falling commodity prices made public funds even scarcer in West Africa than in the metropole and French investors did not follow the lead of public money, much of the Federation's postwar development spending was financed with CCOM loans.[195]

The West African colonies faced a growing financial crisis in the 1950s. Many, especially inland colonies like French Sudan were running substantial deficits. The rapidly rising cost of French personnel and imported goods under the *surprix* system consumed the lion's share of public funds. It was a financial strain simply to operate and maintain the infrastructure built with FIDES money and to repay the CCOM loans.[196] Another dynamic that the 1952 reforms did not address was the unevenness of development spending within the colonies. While the French colonial administration was centralized, in practice it gave individual administrators, both governors and district administrators, substantial power. This resulted in considerable variation in development spending between districts.[197]

If the primary goal of postwar French aid was maximizing dollar-saving imperial trade, the advent of decolonization brought other issues to the fore. The spread of communism and of US influence were concerns that predated the war, but intensified after it.[198] So did the desire to demonstrate France was a world power, and to display the value of its culture. A sphere of influence in Africa was essential to achieve these goals, and aid an important tool for maintaining it.[199] Francophone African nationalists were also united in stressing the need for ongoing aid from France.[200] Unsurprisingly, the volume of French aid rose after the late 1950s. It took the form of technical assistance—especially teachers, support for investment, and coverage for the budget deficits of former colonies. Cooperation became the catchword for French aid, and its colonial-era channels were renamed, but French aid institutions remained largely intact; so did their focus on Africa.[201]

Increases in aid required initiatives in which it could be deployed. Grand projects intended to reengineer entire social and physical environments excited both late colonial development planners and their nationalist successors.[202] They sent concrete messages to a range of audiences about the state's power. Ideally, these projects flowed from a coherent national plan; in practice, a collection of projects was often the core around which development plans were crafted.[203] Practically, big projects were seen as the best way to allocate scarce funds in vast regions with immense needs; they also lowered administrative costs.[204] Theoretically, it was suggested that certain industries

or initiatives stood out for their dynamism, and concentrating resources on them would create a *pôle de croissance* (growth pole) that would spark broader change.[205]

In Africa's dry regions, many of these grand projects involved water.[206] The *Office du Niger* remained an exemplar and, as French involvement in postwar African development intensified, it remained a centerpiece project despite its critics. Between 1945 and 1959, it received 30% of the aid given to French Sudan.[207] At independence, Mali's government adopted the *Office du Niger* with relatively few changes, despite its desire to establish a more autonomous development policy. Ownership of the *Office* was formally transferred from France in 1962, two years after independence. The Malian government reorganized and reduced the *Office's* staff, and curtailed a few of its quasi-sovereign powers, but they also increased the scale of its irrigation works and retained its comprehensive mandate and top-down approach.[208] Rice rather than cotton had already become the project's focus under French administration. After independence, the *Office's* goal was reformulated: it would ensure national food security, particularly the urban food supply. Although less than one percent of Mali's population farmed under the project, it received one-third of the government's rural development budget in the years after independence.[209]

In sum, the duration of European imperial rule in Africa varied from centuries in some coastal entrepôts to decades in remote inland areas. The era of effective rule throughout the continent was between sixty and seventy years. This was short in comparison to European rule in the Americas and Asia, but sharp nonetheless. In calling it a trespass, Frederick Cooper characterized it well.[210] Shoe-string administrations, desperation triggered by global war and recession, and the depth of European racism vis-à-vis Africans all played a role in this. Despite the rhetoric of imperialists, there were few resources and little time for transformation. The institutions they bequeathed were more effective at extraction and coercion than the promotion of well-being. Nevertheless, development became one of the catchwords of the twentieth century in Africa. It was far more than a neo-colonial ploy. It was a core demand of peoples seeking independence from empire and from an international system conditioned by empire; it was indeed a right.[211] It was both a reason for independence (genuine development could only occur with an indigenized state and economy) and a reason for continued sacrifices afterward. A slogan of the Tanganyika African National Union, *uhuru na kazi* (freedom and work), captured this perfectly.[212]

The Early Cold War and US Aid to Africa

The emerging discipline of development economics prescribed aid when 'there is reasonable assurance that it will be effectively used' to support investment for self-sustaining economic growth.[213] However, the distribution

of aid was governed by multiple and sometimes conflicting rationales in the 1950s, and economic theory was often an after-the-fact justification. One rationale for aid was the purchase of political influence and economic access, making it a tool for the exercise of neo-imperial power. This element of aid was heightened when an intensification of the Cold War coincided with a growing interest in development in the late 1950s.[214] A modest but well-publicized Soviet diplomatic and aid offensive to win hearts and minds in the developing world and the end of the Korean War commodity boom, which renewed doubts about trade-financed development, spurred a new interest in development aid among US officials. As one explained, the main 'appeal of Soviet communism to underdeveloped areas is to hold out promises of better food and rising living standards for the common masses'. Aid-funded development programs, 'which visibly produce higher living standards' would 'build confidence in the possibilities [of life] under free institutions'.[215]

Events in the Middle East—such as Egypt's 1952 change of government—led US officials to reevaluate their country's position in this crucial region.[216] Military bases were central to US security in the 1950s, and Ethiopia's province of Eritrea contained a prize: the Italian-built Qaqnaw (or Kagnew) base.[217] Aid was understood by the Americans to be the price for its use. The Department of Defense would have given the emperor rent for it in 'solid gold Cadillacs' if that was what he wanted.[218] For the emperor, aid was an important resource for maintaining his and Ethiopia's position.

Haile Selassie's wartime diplomatic overtures to the United States had already yielded a lend-lease agreement in 1943 and a US technical assistance mission in 1944. Ethiopia joined the Point Four Program late, in 1952.[219] Ethiopia's Point Four agreement emphasized agriculture, but included education, health, and administrative capacity building.[220] These projects, like the entire program, were the product of conflicting development ideas. Some were ideas that had circulated among Ethiopian intellectuals for decades already. Education and technology were central to their hopes for an indigenous modernity, and the emperor supported education as well.[221] This was a point of overlap with Point Four. However, Haile Selassie also had a long-standing preoccupation with security. As journalist James Morris observed, to provide security for the throne 'schools have actually been closed down to save money for guns'.[222]

The ideas put forward by the Emperor and his ministers, refracted through the 1944 US mission's report, were not adopted wholesale for the Point Four Program. The USA was an interventionist donor, insisting that it identify aid priorities and oversee use of its aid. It also required institutional changes to support its aid projects, such as reform of the tax system, and of trade and investment regulations.[223] However, US officials did not have as unified an approach to development as this suggests. Many in the Technical Cooperation Administration that ran the Point Four Program favored a small-scale, bottom-up approach to development.[224] Together with key officials at the

new State Department Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, they saw land reform as a foundation for agricultural modernization and the rural republicanism they believed was responsible for US democracy.[225] Others in these departments thought rural productivity more important. The Point Four Program's first administrator, for example, dreamed that Ethiopia would become a breadbasket for the Middle East through mechanized farming.[226] Productivity's supporters preferred large-scale development initiatives, since they doubted the productive capacity of smallholders and they feared the destabilizing effects of substantial land reform. In the end, they hoped successful elite-driven modernization in agriculture would be crowned by democracy, but did not think political change should be a short-term goal of US aid.[227] As this suggests, development was a negotiation between the interests of diverse internal and external actors. Neither in Ethiopia nor in the USA was there a single development 'project'.

The Other Twentieth-Century Development 'Project'

When Asian and African countries started to become independent after the Second World War their leaders and those of already independent Latin American countries shared a sense of urgency about the problems they faced.[228] During the United Nations' first session in 1946, Lebanon proposed that the UN provide expert advice on development to member countries. In presenting this resolution Lebanon's ambassador, Charles Habib Malik, noted the grossly unequal development of the UN's member countries and classified them into four groups: 'developed, non-self governing, trusteeship territories, and sovereign but underdeveloped countries'.[229] This preceded President Truman's Point Four speech, with its supposed invention of development, by more than two years. Malik, like Truman after him, assumed that development could be used to classify countries, but the vision of change associated with Malik's speech was different. As Thandika Mkandawire argues, there were two strands to the postwar development 'project'. The first, which has received relatively little scholarly attention, was an emancipatory one that involved 'catching up' by underdeveloped and not yet independent countries.[230] It was articulated in the United Nations, and in regional gatherings such as the 1955 Bandung conference.

In 1946, the Americans and victorious European powers were preoccupied with employment, international economic stability, and reconstruction. The new UN, for them, was a forum for these issues. UN member countries that identified with what Alfred Sauvy called the *Tiers Monde* (Third World) saw things differently. They repeatedly and forcefully directed attention to their concerns: anti-imperialism and development.[231] They pressured the Secretary General to appoint experts to study the latter problem. Trygve Lie appointed a five-person expert panel with, remarkably for the times, only one member from an industrialized country.[232] Their 1951 report, *Measures for the*

Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries, became the UN's template for development. W. Arthur Lewis was its lead author.[233]

The 1951 report's model remained the dominant one at the start of the first UN Development Decade in 1961, accepted by most economists and national leaders. Poverty was a trap, they believed, and countries could escape it into self-sustaining economic growth with a 'big push'. Planning and a massive increase in investment were the essential tools for this.[234] Since capital was scarce in poor countries, investment by government would be crucial. External aid could amplify the 'push' and initiate it more quickly. Development was understood to be economic growth; other desired changes would follow automatically from it. Growth required structural transformation of the economy, especially industrialization, though not all development enthusiasts put the same degree of emphasis on industry.[235] The Third Worldist and Trumanesque strands of development intersected in African countries when an emerging cadre of international development workers, both official and volunteer, facilitated changes called for in the 1951 model.[236]

Additional elements of the Third Worldist development 'project' were articulated at the 1955 Bandung conference, attended by delegates from 29 Asian and African countries.[237] These included non-interference, peaceful co-existence, and mutual benefit. They were drawn from the five principles (*panchsheel*) in a 1954 treaty between India and China.[238] These principles situated development in a different kind of international relations than those underlying the Trumanesque strand. Over the next two decades, plans for a New International Economic Order built on and reinforced this difference.

What were the African contributions to Third Worldist development? Individually, Algeria's government provided leadership in organizations like the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77.[239] Collectively, African governments contributed through the weight of their vote in the General Assembly. The UN was a critical arena in which newly independent African countries exercised their sovereignty, and the UN Africa Group was a large and effective voting bloc on issues of continental consensus: decolonization and anti-racism, development, and strengthening the role of the UN.[240]

African countries also brought development ideas to the UN system. An early example was the interdependence of economic and social development, which was first enshrined in the 1958 mandate of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).[241] Later that year, five of the African countries that had fought for the UNECA and its distinctive mandate proposed the linkage be incorporated into the UN's model of development. They called for the addition of social development measures that would increase productivity, 'minimize social disorganization resulting from economic and technological change as well as from rapid urbanization', and 'promote equitable distribution of national incomes'.[242] Florence Wilson Addison, a member of the Ghanaian delegation who spoke to this proposal, identified education as an essential part of these social development measures. This was a consistent

priority for African countries, and their growing vote in the UN drew institutional resources for education and training to the continent.[243] The proposal also embodied other recurring themes in African development: the beliefs that technology and policies for economic growth could be adopted without jeopardizing social stability, and that inequality threatened social harmony. While none of these ideas was uniquely African, this combination was an African emphasis within the Third Worldist 'project'.

The UNECA was also a pioneer in the area of women and development. Starting in the early 1960s, some of the Commission's workshops, conferences, and publications identified women's roles in and concerns about national development. This effort paralleled those of African women's organizations that held national, regional, and continental meetings in the early 1960s. They articulated a desire for involvement in national development that grew out of the active role women played in the independence struggles of many African countries. At the 1975 UN conference on women in Mexico City, these initiatives were identified as a model for other regions. Margaret Snyder and Mary Tadesse argue that historians of the women's movement have ignored these African initiatives.[244] Newly independent African governments, though, showed they were in no hurry to embrace these pioneering ideas.

Notes

1. Robert Chambers, *Ideas for Development* (London: Earthscan, 2005), 184–86; and Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, "The Invention of Development," in *Power of Development*, ed. Jonathan Crush (London: Routledge, 1995), 28.
2. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *Development Theory: Deconstructions/Reconstructions* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2001), 3.
3. K.K.S. Dadzie, "Economic Development," *Scientific American*, 243, no. 3 (1980): 64. Amartya Sen and others subsequently built on this kind of agency-focused definition of development. See: Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999); Martha Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); and Khadija Haq and Richard Ponzio, eds., *Pioneering the Human Development Revolution: An Intellectual Biography of Mahbub ul Haq* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
4. Denis Goulet, *Development Ethics: A Guide to Theory and Practice* (New York: Apex Press & Zed Books, 1995), 38–40; and Chambers, *Ideas for Development*, 184–86.
5. For example, Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith*, trans. Patrick Camiller, 2nd ed. (London: Zed Books, 2006); and Philip McMichael, *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2004).
6. For example, Jahangir Amuzegar, "Point Four: Performance and Prospect," *Political Science Quarterly* 73, no. 4 (1958): 530–46; Tarun Bose, "The

Point Four Programme: A Critical Study," *International Studies* 7, no. 1 (1965): 66–97; and Stephen Macekura, "The Point Four Program and U.S. International Development Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 128, no. 1 (2013): 127–60.

7. Jonathan Bingham, *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy: Point 4 in Action* (1953; reprint, Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 245, 255–56. Egypt was one of four African countries that received Point Four aid directly; the others were Ethiopia, Liberia, and Libya.
8. Robert Wood, *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 43, 55–56.
9. These included studies like David Apter's "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda," *World Politics* 13, no. 1 (1960): 45–46; and *The Political Kingdom in Buganda: A Study of Bureaucratic Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). They also included analyses of prominent individuals like Emmanuel Akyeampong's "Christianity, Modernity and the Weight of Tradition in the Life of *Asantehene* Agyeman Prempeh I, c. 1888–1931," *Africa* 69, no. 2 (1999): 279–311.
10. For example, Agneta Pallinder-Law, "Aborted Modernization in West Africa? The Case of Abeokuta," *Journal of African History* 15, no. 1 (1974): 65–82.
11. See, for example, J.D.Y. Peel, "*Olaju*: A Yoruba Concept of Development," *Journal of Development Studies* 14, no. 2 (1978): 139–65; and Philip Zachernuk, "The Lagos Intelligentsia and the Idea of Progress, ca. 1860–1960," in *Yoruba Historiography*, ed. Toyin Falola (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1991), 147–65.
12. Bahru Zewde, *Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia: The Reformist Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth Century* (Oxford: James Currey et al., 2002).
13. Zewde, *Pioneers of Change*, 130–35.
14. Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1974* (London: James Currey et al., 1991); and Richard Pankhurst, *The Ethiopians: A History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).
15. For a general discussion of this phenomenon see Philip Curtin, *The World and the West: The European Challenge and the Overseas Response in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 128–55.
16. See, for example, Christopher Clapham, "Ethiopian Development: The Politics of Emulation," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 44, no. 1 (2006): 137–50; and Bettina Dennerlein, "South-South Linkages and Social Change: Moroccan Perspectives on Army Reform in the Muslim Mediterranean in the Nineteenth Century," *Comparative Studies in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 1 (2007): 52–61.
17. Dyala Hamzah, "Nineteenth-Century Egypt as Dynastic Locus of Universality: The History of Muhammad 'Ali by Khalil Ibn Ahmad Al-Rajabi," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 1 (2007): 62–82. There has been much recent research on Islamic reform movements in the continent; see, for example, Sean Hanretta, *Islam and Social Change in French West Africa: History of an Emanicpatory Community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

18. P.J. Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*, 4th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 49–69; and Anouar Abdel-Malek, "The Renaissance of Egypt, 1805–81," in *General History of Africa*, Vol. VI *Africa in the Nineteenth Century Until the 1880s*, ed. J.F. Ade Ajayi (Paris: UNESCO et al., 1989), 325–55.
19. Laura Panza and Jeffrey Williamson, "Did Muhammad Ali Foster Industrialization in Early Nineteenth-Century Egypt?," *Economic History Review* 68, no. 1 (2015): 81–83.
20. G.N. Sanderson, "The European Partition of Africa: Origins and Dynamics," *Cambridge History of Africa*, Vol. 6 *c. 1870–c. 1905*, ed. R. Oliver and G.N. Sanderson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 107.
21. Hassan Ibrahim and Bethwell Ogot, "The Sudan in the Nineteenth Century," in *General History of Africa*, Vol. VI *Africa in the Nineteenth Century*, 358.
22. For an overview see P.J. Vatikiotis, *History of Modern Egypt*, 70–89.
23. This late nineteenth century process is described in greater detail in Ruth Rempel, "Trade and Transformation: Participation in the Ivory Trade in Late 19th-Century East and Central Africa," *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 19, no. 3 (1998): 537–42.
24. Melvin Page, "The Manyema Hordes of Tippu Tip: A Case Study in Social Stratification and the Slave Trade in Eastern Africa," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 7, no. 1 (1974): 76; Melvin Page, "Tippu Tip and the Arab 'Defense' of the East African Slave Trade," *Etudes d'Histoire africaine* (Lubumbashi) 4 (1974): 105–17; and V.Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press et al., 1988), 44–64. See also Jonathon Glassman, "Slower Than a Massacre: The Multiple Sources of Racial Thought in Colonial Africa," *American Historical Review* 109, no. 3 (2004): 720–54.
25. Hamed bin Muhammed el Murjebi, *Maisha ya Hamed bin Muhammed el Murjebi yaani Tippu Tip*, trans. and ed. W.H. Whitely (Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau, 1974), Sect. 87.
26. François Renault, "The Structures of the Slave Trade in Central Africa in the 19th Century," in *The Economics of the Indian Ocean Slave Trade*, ed. W.G. Clarence-Smith (London: Frank Cass, 1989), 153.
27. Frederick Cooper, "Modernity," in *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 146–47. Sara Berry made a similar argument in *No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 13–35.
28. For an overview see Michael Adas, "'High' Imperialism and the 'New' History," in *Islamic and European Expansion: The Forging of a Global Order*, ed. Michael Adas (Philadelphia: Temple University Press), 311–44.
29. Gareth Austin, "The Economics of Colonialism in Africa," in *The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics*, Vol. 1 *Context and Concepts*, ed. Célestin Monga and Justin Yifu Lin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 525.
30. Colonial is used here as a synonym for imperial. The formal relation of European imperial powers to African polities varied, however. At the height of empire in the early 1920s this included a distinction between colonies and protectorates, and the situation was further complicated by the

Condominium Agreement through which Britain jointly ruled Egypt's Sudanese empire and the creation of Trust Territories after the First World War.

31. See Cyrus Veeser, "A Forgotten Instrument of Global Capitalism? International Concessions, 1870–1930," *International History Review* 35, no. 5 (2013): 1136–55.
32. On the creation of these colonies and of peasantization in them see Moses Ochonu, "African Colonial Economies: State Control, Peasant Maneuvers, and Unintended Outcomes," *History Compass* 11, no. 1 (2013): 1–13.
33. S. Herbert Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa: Its Course and Effects* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), 334, 349; William Hailey, *An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), 108; Edgar Sydenstricker, "Population Statistics of Foreign Countries," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 20, no. 149 (1925): 87; and Melvin McKnight, "Water and the Course of Empire in North Africa," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 43, no. 1 (1928): 44–93. The population figures referred to are for 1923–1925.
34. For example, Henry Stanley, "The Story of the Development of Africa," *Century Illustrated Magazine* N.S. 29, no. 4 (1896): 500–9; and Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, "Introduction: Tensions of Empire: Colonial Control and Visions of Rule," *American Ethnologist* 16, no. 4 (1989): 617. For a comparative view see Kenneth Pomeranz, "Empire and 'Civilizing' Missions, Past & Present," *Daedalus* 134, no. 2 (2005): 34–45.
35. Frederick Cooper, "Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History," *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (1994): 1529.
36. Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 8, 11, 13, 18.
37. For example, Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *French West Africa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), 269.
38. Conklin, *Mission to Civilize*, 39, 43–45.
39. Emily Lynn Osborn, "'Circle of Iron': African Colonial Employees and the Interpretation of Colonial Rule in French West Africa," *Journal of African History* 44, no. 1 (2003): 29–50.
40. See P.L. McDermott, *British East Africa, or I.B.E.A.: A History of the Formation and Work of the Imperial British East Africa Company* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1895); and John Galbraith, *Mackinnon and East Africa, 1878–1895: A Study in the 'New' Imperialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
41. Christopher Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda* (Kampala: East African Institute of Social Research, 1959), 13; and Richard Reid, *Political Power in Pre-Colonial Buganda: Economy, Society and Warfare in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: James Currey et al., 2002), 136–41.
42. Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, 71; and Christopher Youé, "Peasants, Planters and Cotton Capitalists: The 'Dual Economy' in Colonial Uganda," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 12, no. 2 (1978): 182.
43. Michael Havinden and David Meredith, *Colonialism and Development: Britain and Its Tropical Colonies, 1850–1960* (London: Routledge, 1993), 91.

44. Crawford Young, Neal Sherman and Tim Rose, *Cooperatives and Development: Agricultural Politics in Ghana and Uganda* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), 34.
45. Thomas Taylor, "The Establishment of a European Plantation Sector Within the Emerging Colonial Economy of Uganda, 1902–1919," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 19, no. 1 (1986): 51; and Holly Hanson, *Landed Obligation: The Practice of Power in Buganda* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003), 169–70.
46. Grace Carswell, "Food Crops as Cash Crops: The Case of Colonial Kigezi, Uganda," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 3, no. 4 (2003): 521–51.
47. Thomas Taylor, "The Struggle for Economic Control of Uganda, 1919–1922: Formulation of an Economic Policy," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 11, no. 1 (1978): 7.
48. William Hailey, "Some Problems Dealt with in the 'African Survey'," *International Affairs* 18, no. 2 (1939): 195–97; and William Hailey, "A Turning Point in Colonial Rule," *International Affairs* 28, no. 2 (1952): 178.
49. Taylor, "*Establishment of a European Plantation Sector*," 35, 46–47; and Stephen Bunker, *Peasants Against the State: The Politics of Market Control in Bugisu, Uganda, 1900–1983* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 20.
50. Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, 37–39, 44; Youé, "Peasants, Planters and Cotton Capitalists," 174–75; and Peter Robertshaw et al., "Famine, Climate and Crisis in Western Uganda," *Developments in Paleoenvironmental Research* 6 (2004): 543–44.
51. For a survey see Oliver Williamson, "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," *Journal of Economic Literature* 38, no. 3 (2000): 595–613.
52. Ewout Frankema, "The Origins of Formal Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Was British Rule More Benign?" *European Review of Economic History* 16, no. 4 (2012): 335–55. One exception noted by Frankema was the restricted access of Christian missions to areas where administrators feared they would cause costly destabilization of existing Islamic institutions.
53. Frankema, "Origins of Formal Education," 340–43.
54. Frankema, "Origins of Formal Education," 338, 347; Elise Huillery, "History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 1, no. 2 (2009): 185–88; and Ana Isabel Madeira, "Portuguese, French and British Discourses on Colonial Education: Church–State Relations, School Expansion and Missionary Competition in Africa, 1890–1930," *Paedagogica Historica* 41, nos. 1–2 (2005): 31–60.
55. Ian Brown, "Introduction," in *The Economies of Africa and Asia in the Inter-War Depression*, ed. Ian Brown (London: Routledge, 1989), 2–3.
56. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Economic Changes in Africa in the World Context," in *General History of Africa*, Vol. VIII *Africa Since 1935*, ed. Ali A. Mazrui (Paris: UNESCO et al., 1993), 286.
57. Conklin, *Mission to Civilize*, 147.
58. Ibid., 66–67, 142–47.
59. Conklin, *Mission to Civilize*, 174–75, 187–95. See also Cooper, "Conflict and Connection," 1531.

60. C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, "France, Africa, and the First World War," *Journal of African History* 19, no. 1 (1978): 17–20.
61. Conklin, *Mission to Civilize*, 41.
62. Martin Thomas, "Albert Sarraut, French Colonial Development, and the Communist Threat, 1919–1930," *Journal of Modern History* 77, no. 4 (2005): 923.
63. See Alice Conklin, "Faire Naître *v.* Faire du Noir: Race Regeneration in France and French West Africa, 1895–1940," in *Promoting the Colonial Idea: Propaganda and Visions of Empire in France*, ed. Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 143–55.
64. Frederick Cooper, "Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept," in *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 65.
65. Richard Roberts, *Two Worlds of Cotton: Colonialism and the Regional Economy in the French Soudan, 1800–1946* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 76, 80–98.
66. Conklin, *Mission to Civilize*, 224; and François Molle and Philippe Floch, "The 'Desert Bloom' Syndrome: Irrigation Development, Politics, and Ideology in the Northeast of Thailand" (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Institut de Recherche pour le Développement and the International Water Management Institute, 2008), 4.
67. Jean Filipovich, "Destined to Fail: Forced Settlement at the *Office Du Niger*, 1926–45," *Journal of African History* 42, no. 2 (2001): 239; and Myron Echenberg and Jean Filipovich, "African Military Labour and the Building of the *Office Du Niger* Installations, 1925–50," *Journal of African History* 27, no. 3 (1986): 537.
68. Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, 269; and Monica van Beusekom, "*Colonisation Indigène*: French Rural Development Ideology at the *Office Du Niger*, 1920–1940," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 30, no. 2 (1997): 299–323.
69. Conklin, *Mission to Civilize*, 224–25; Monica van Beusekom, "Disjunctures in Theory and Practice: Making Sense of Change in Agricultural Development at the *Office du Niger*, 1920–60," *Journal of African History* 41, no. 1 (2000): 81; and Monica van Beusekom, *Negotiating Development: African Farmers and Colonial Experts at the Office Du Niger, 1920–1960* (Portsmouth: Heinemann et al., 2002), 2–3, 7.
70. Jon Moris, "Irrigation as a Privileged Solution in African Development," *Development Policy Review* 5, no. 2 (1987): 108; van Beusekom, "*Colonisation Indigène*," 317; and van Beusekom, "Disjunctures in Theory and Practice," 81–82.
71. van Beusekom, "*Colonisation Indigène*," 302–3. As Maurits Ertsen observed, colonial irrigation schemes in Africa tried to control and change farmers to a much greater extent than comparable projects in Asian colonies; see "Controlling the Farmer: Colonial and Post-Colonial Irrigation Interventions in Africa," *Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa* 4, no. 1 (2008): 212.

72. John de Wilde, *Experiences with Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa*, Vol. 2: *The Case Studies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for the IBRD, 1967), 287–88; and Filipovich, "Destined to Fail," 240.
73. Conklin, *Mission to Civilize*, 250.
74. van Beusekom, "*Colonisation Indigène*," 318–19; and van Beusekom, "Disjunctures in Theory," 83–84.
75. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, "French Economic Policy in Tropical Africa," in *Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960*, ed. Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 144.
76. Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Economic Changes in Africa," 286.
77. Dependence on trade taxes grew after a spate of administrative reforms in 1904. The repayment of loans for West African infrastructure and development projects was an additional draw on tax revenue. See Conklin, *Mission to Civilize*, 47; and Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, 269.
78. Susan Martin, "The Long Depression: West African Export Producers and the World Economy, 1914–45," in *Economies of Africa and Asia in the Inter-War Depression*, 81.
79. Thompson and Adloff, "French Economic Policy in Tropical Africa," 135.
80. Stephen Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914–1940* (London: Frank Cass, 1984), 228–31.
81. Martin, "The Long Depression," 85.
82. Michael Crowder, "Africa Under British and Belgian Domination, 1935–45," in *General History of Africa*, Vol. VIII Africa *since 1935*, 89.
83. See, for example, Moses Ochonu, *Colonial Meltdown: Northern Nigeria in the Great Depression* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2009); together with David Anderson and David Throup, "The Agrarian Economy of Central Province, Kenya, 1918 to 1939," and Wolfgang Döpcke, "'Magomo's Maize': State and Peasants During the Depression in Colonial Zimbabwe," both in *Economies of Africa and Asia in the Inter-War Depression*, 8–28, 29–58, respectively.
84. Taylor, "Establishment of a European Plantation Sector," 37; and Havinden and Meredith, *Colonialism and Development*, 148–49.
85. Youé, "Peasants, Planters and Cotton Capitalists," 169, 177.
86. Youé, "Peasants, Planters and Cotton Capitalists," 182; and Benoit Daviron, "Mobilizing Labour in African Agriculture: The Role of the International Colonial Institute in the Elaboration of a Standard of Colonial Administration, 1895–1930," *Journal of Global History* 5, no. 3 (2010): 492.
87. Asiimwe Godfrey, *The Impact of Post-Colonial Policy Shifts in Coffee Marketing at the Local Level in Uganda: A Case Study of Mukono District, 1962–1998* (Maastricht: Shaker Publishing, 2002), 31–32.
88. Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, 60–61; B.D. Bowles, "Economic Anti-Colonialism and British Reaction in Uganda, 1936–1955," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 9, no. 1 (1975): 53; Young et al., *Cooperatives and Development*, 38; and Hanson, *Landed Obligation*, 237–38.
89. Christopher Wrigley, "Buganda: An Outline Economic History," *Economic History Review* N.S. 10, no. 1 (1957): 57.
90. Bunker, *Peasants against the State*, 46.
91. Carswell, "Food Crops as Cash Crops," 534.

92. Nakanyiki Musisi, "The Environment, Gender, and the Development of Unequal Relations in Buganda: A Historical Perspective," *Canadian Woman Studies* 13, no. 3 (1993): 57–58.
93. For example Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, 58.
94. Young et al., *Cooperatives and Development*, 35.
95. Taylor, "The Struggle for Economic Control of Uganda," 7–8; and Ewout Frankema, "Raising Revenue in the British Empire, 1870–1940: How 'Extractive' Were Colonial Taxes?" *Journal of Global History* 5, no. 3 (2010): 453–54.
96. Ewout Frankema, "Colonial Taxation and Government Spending in British Africa, 1880–1940: Maximizing Revenue or Minimizing Effort?" *Explorations in Economic History* 48, no. 1 (2011): 139, 147–48.
97. Young et al., *Cooperatives and Development*, 39; Bunker, *Peasants Against the State*, 42; and Godfrey, *Impact of Post-Colonial Policy*, 38. On market stabilization see Gerald Meier, "The Formative Period," in *Pioneers in Development*, ed. Gerald Meier and Dudley Seers (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1984), 6.
98. Rachel Crowdy, "The League of Nations: Its Social and Humanitarian Work," *American Journal of Nursing* 28, no. 4 (1928): 350.
99. See, for example, Lucien March, "International Statistics and the League of Nations," *Quarterly Publications of the American Statistical Association* 17, no. 133 (1921): 629–35.
100. A contemporary account can be found in W.E. Du Bois, "Liberia, the League and the United States," *Foreign Affairs* 11, no. 4 (1933): 682–95.
101. John Boyd Orr, "Foreword," *Africa* 9, no. 2 (1936): 146. This introduced a special issue of the International African Institute journal titled "Problems of the African Native Diet."
102. Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, 63.
103. Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 9.
104. Pedersen, *The Guardians*, xviii. The African territories also contained about 60% of the people governed under the mandate system.
105. Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 23.
106. Michael Callahan, "'Mandated Territories Are Not Colonies': Britain, France, and Africa in the 1930s," in *Imperialism on Trial: International Oversight of Colonial Rule in Historical Perspective*, ed. R.M. Douglas et al. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 6; and Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 34.
107. Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 107–11, 131–34.
108. Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 46–48. For a similar dynamic at the ILO see Daniel Roger Maul, "The International Labour Organization and the Struggle against Forced Labour from 1919 to the Present," *Labor History* 48, no. 4 (2007): 478.
109. Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 4–5, 7, 11, 93–94. For examples of impact on policy-makers and politicians see Constantine, *Making of British Colonial Development Policy*, 229–33; and Conklin, *Mission to Civilize*, 228, 235.
110. Callahan, "'Mandated Territories Are Not Colonies'," 5–6. On trusteeship as a central theme in development see Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, *Doctrines of Development* (London: Routledge, 1996).

111. Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa*, 151; Charles Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 73; Mira Wilkins, "Comparative Hosts," *Business History* 36, no. 1 (1994): 20–21; and John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan, *Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy*, 2nd ed. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 175.
112. For example, see Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa*, 299, 301; K. Dike Nworah, "The Politics of Lever's West African Concessions, 1907–1913," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 5, no. 2 (1972): 248–64; Mira Wilkins, "European and North American Multinationals, 1970–1914: Comparisons and Contrasts," in *Transnational Corporations: A Historical Perspective*, ed. Geoffrey Jones (London: Routledge for the United Nations, 1993), 41; and Tony Woods, "'Why Not Persuade Them to Grow Tobacco?': Planters, Tenants, and the Political Economy of Central Malawi, 1920–1940," *African Economic History*, no. 21 (1993): 131–50.
113. Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa*, 151; and Michael Twomey, *A Century of Foreign Investment in the Third World* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2000), 44, 47–48. British firms accounted for most of the foreign investment stock in the continent both before and after the First World War.
114. See, for example, Rudolph Grimes, "Liberia and Foreign Investments," *Columbia Journal of International Affairs* 4, no. 2 (1950): 65–67.
115. Robert Miller and Peter Carter, "The Modern Dual Economy—A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Liberia," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 10, no. 1 (1972): 114.
116. Cuthbert Christy, "Liberia in 1930," *Geographical Journal* 77, no. 6 (1931): 526; and Jacob Pereira-Lunghu, "Trends in Deficits in the Liberian Economy from 1912 to 1990: Implications for Fiscal Policy in Post-Civil War Liberia," *Liberian Studies Journal* 20, no. 2 (1995): 209.
117. Fiona Gordon-Ashworth, *International Commodity Control: A Contemporary History and Appraisal* (London: Croon Helm, 1984), 192–94.
118. Christy, "Liberia in 1930," 526–27; and J.H. Mower, "The Republic of Liberia," *Journal of Negro History* 32, no. 3 (1947): 279.
119. Frank Chalk, "The Anatomy of an Investment: Firestone's 1927 Loan to Liberia," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 1, no. 1 (1967): 22.
120. Baron De Lynden, "The Liberian Centenary," *African Affairs* 46, no. 185 (1947): 210; and Chalk, "Anatomy of an Investment," 25.
121. R.J. Harrison Church, "The Firestone Rubber Plantation in Liberia," *Geography* 54 (1969): 431.
122. Louis Wells, "The Multinational Business Enterprise: What Kind of International Organization?" *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (1971): 457.
123. Mower, "Republic of Liberia," 290–91; and Augustine Konneh, "The Hut Tax in Liberia: The High Costs of Integration," *Journal of the Georgia Association of Historians* 17 (December 1996): 41–42.
124. Christy, "Liberia in 1930," 527.
125. Sidney De La Rue (1924) as quoted in Chalk, "Anatomy of an Investment," 21.
126. Mower, "Republic of Liberia," 296–97; Adell Patton, "Liberia and Containment Policy Against Colonial Take-Over: Public Health and Sanitation

Reform, 1912–1953," *Liberian Studies Journal* 30, no. 2 (2005): 42; and Twomey, *A Century of Foreign Investment*, 84. Firestone's initial investment in Liberia was around US$3 million, and it spent at least US$360,000 on development projects and research.

127. De Lynden, "Liberian Centenary," 210; and Mower, "Republic of Liberia," 300.
128. B. Nnamdi Azikiwe, "In Defense of Liberia," *Journal of Negro History* 17, no. 1 (1932): 31.
129. Rodney Carlisle, "The 'American Century' Implemented: Stettinius and the Liberian Flag of Convenience," *Business History Review* 54, no. 2 (1980): 175–91.
130. For the role of American officials see Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 98, 104–5.
131. See Judith Byfield et al., eds., *Africa and World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) for a recent overview.
132. Raymond Dumett, "Africa's Strategic Minerals During World War II," in *Imperialism, Economic Development and Social Change in West Africa* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2013), 493–521. Although oil and natural gas had been found at a few sites in Africa, the big discoveries that led to commercial exploitation did not occur until the 1950s; see Jonathan Baker, "Oil and African Development," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 15, no. 2 (1977): 175.
133. Judith Byfield, "Producing for the War," in *Africa and World War II*, 40–41.
134. Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, "Conclusion: Consequences of the War," in *Africa in World War II*, 507.
135. Byfield, "Producing for the War," 35–39.
136. For example, Dumett, "Africa's Strategic Minerals," 514. It is worth noting that Africa still hosted a relatively small share of global multinational activity. For an overview of multinational enterprises in this period see Dunning and Lundan, *Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy*, 172–89.
137. Constantine, *Making of British Colonial Development Policy*, 227–66 offers a detailed account of the policy process.
138. Robert Tignor, *W. Arthur Lewis and the Birth of Development Economics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 56–65.
139. Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, 251; Hubert Deschamps, "France in Black Africa and Madagascar Between 1920 and 1945," in *Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960*, 233–35.
140. Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship Between Empire and Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 7–8; see also Conklin, *Mission to Civilize*, 254–55.
141. Frederick Cooper, "From Free Labor to Family Allowances: Labor and African Society in Colonial Discourse," *American Ethnologist* 16, no. 4 (1989): 753–54.
142. Monica van Beusekom and Dorothy Hodgson, "Lessons Learned? Development Experiences in the Late Colonial Period," *Journal of African History* 41, no. 1 (2000): 29–33; and van Beusekom, *Negotiating Development*, 118–46.

143. Edgar Beigel, "France Moves Toward National Planning," *Political Science Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (1947): 381–97; Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, 252–53, 270; and Deschamps, "France in Black Africa," 231–32.
144. Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, 253, 270; and David Fieldhouse, *The West and the Third World* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 84, 88.
145. See, for example, Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 143.
146. Twomey, *Century of Foreign Investment*, 48; and Gérard Bossuat, "French Development Aid and Co-Operation under De Gaulle," *Contemporary European History* 12, no. 4 (2003): 441.
147. Patrick Manning, *Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2nd ed. (1998) as cited in Gareth Austin, "African Economic Development and Colonial Legacies," *International Development Policy/Revue Internationale de Politique de Développement* 1 (2010): para. 17, doi:10.4000/poldev.78.
148. Wood, *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis*, 40–41.
149. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Review of Economic Activity in Africa, 1950–1954* (New York: United Nations, 1955), 73.
150. Wood, *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis*, 54.
151. C.Y. Carstairs (1943) as quoted in David Meredith, "State Controlled Marketing and Economic 'Development': The Case of West African Produce During the Second World War," *Economic History Review* 39, no. 1 (1986): 77. While the French government allowed private firms to conduct the empire's commodity trade during and after the war, the governments of newly independent French colonies chose to establish national marketing boards; see Fieldhouse, *Black Africa*, 19.
152. Peter Bauer, "Origins of the Statutory Export Monopolies of British West Africa," *Business History Review* 28, no. 3 (1954): 199–200; and Fieldhouse, *The West and the Third World*, 95.
153. Godfrey, *Impact of Post-Colonial Policy Shifts*, 43–44; and J.J. Oloya, "Marketing Boards and Post-War Economic Development Policy in Uganda, 1945–1962," *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics* 23 (1968): 51.
154. Bauer, "Origins of the Statutory Export Monopolies," 197; Meredith, "State Controlled Marketing," 84, 88–89; and Gavin Williams, "Marketing Without and With Marketing Boards: The Origins of State Marketing Boards in Nigeria," *Review of African Political Economy* 12, no. 34 (1985): 5.
155. Woods, *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis*, 54; and Meredith, "State Controlled Marketing," 78.
156. Fieldhouse, *The West and the Third World*, 99.
157. Thompson and Adloff, "French Economic Policy," 144–45; and Fieldhouse, *Black Africa*, 13, 15–16.
158. See Louis Sicking, "A Colonial Echo: France and the Colonial Dimension of the European Economic Community," *French Colonial History* 5 (2004): 207–28.
159. Most of the research on this subject is national in scope, or focused on a single organization like Timothy Parsons, *Race, Resistance and the Boy Scout Movement in British Colonial Africa* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2004). Continental surveys like Wogu Ananaba, *The Trade Union Movement*

in Africa: Promise and Performance (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979) and Aili Mari Tripp et al., *African Women's Movements: Transforming Political Landscapes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) do not give much space to the colonial period. For an overview of postwar growth see Kjell Skjelsbaek, "The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century," *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (1971): 420–42.

160. Havinden and Meredith, *Colonialism and Development*, 223–27.
161. Ralph Clark with Tom Soper and Peter Williams, *Aid in Uganda: Programmes and Policies* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1966), 26–29; and Havinden and Meredith, *Colonialism and Development*, 254–55.
162. Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, 63, 68; Clark et al., *Aid in Uganda*, 24–25; and Havinden and Meredith, *Colonialism and Development*, 223.
163. Kathleen Heasman, "Women and Community Development in Kenya and Uganda," *Community Development Journal* 1, no. 4 (1966): 16; see also Hilda Mary Tadria, "Uganda Women's Organizations: Their Contribution Towards Raising Uganda's Standard of Living," *Africa Spectrum* 8, no. 2 (1973): 217–26.
164. Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, 68; A.B. Adimola, "Uganda: The Newest 'Independent'," *African Affairs* 62, no. 249 (1963): 327; and Garth Glentworth and Mulozi Wozei, "The Role of Public Corporations in National Development: Case Studies of the Uganda Development Corporation and the Uganda Electricity Board," *African Review* 1, no. 3 (1972): 54–90.
165. Keith Ede, "An Analysis of Regional Inequality in Uganda," *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie* 72, no. 5 (1981): 300; and Young et al., *Cooperatives and Development*, 44–45.
166. Richard Bilder, "The International Coffee Agreement: A Case History in Negotiation," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 28, no. 2 (1963): 334; and Gordon-Ashworth, *International Commodity Control*, 210–12.
167. Young et al., *Cooperatives and Development*, 46; and Bunker, *Peasants Against the State*, 44, 259.
168. Young et al., *Cooperatives and Development*, 48, 58; Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, 80; and Bunker, *Peasants Against the State*, 53.
169. Young et al., *Cooperatives and Development*, 57, 59–60.
170. Oloya, "Marketing Boards," 51; and Young et al., *Cooperatives and Development*, 60–61.
171. Edward Manson et al., *The Economic Development of Uganda* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for the IBRD, 1962), 442; Wrigley, "Buganda," 75, 79; and Joseph Mubiru, "Uganda: Nationalism Unresolved," *Africa Today* 8, no. 7 (1961): 8.
172. Young et al., *Cooperatives and Development*, 44–45; and Ede, "Analysis of Regional Inequality in Uganda," 301.
173. Joseph Haring et al., "Marketing Boards and Price Funds in Uganda, 1950–1960," *Journal of Agricultural Economics* 20, no. 3 (1969): 351; and Adimola, "Uganda," 328.
174. UN Economic Commission for Africa, *A Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, 1960–1964* (New York: United Nations, 1968), 171; Manson et al., *Economic Development of Uganda*, 346; and Robert Byrd, "Characteristics of

Candidates for Election in a Country Approaching Independence: The Case of Uganda," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 7, no. 1 (1963): 10.

175. Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, 73; Patrick Wall and Brian Macdona, "News Out of Africa," *African Affairs* 59, no. 236 (1960): 222; and Adimola, "Uganda," 332.
176. Bart Fisher, *The International Coffee Agreement: A Study in Coffee Diplomacy* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 23, 25; and Gordon-Ashworth, *International Commodity Control*, 212.
177. For example Tignor, *W. Arthur Lewis*, 58–59. The global impact of the TVA is explored in David Ekbladh, "Meeting the Challenge from Totalitarianism: The Tennessee Valley Authority as a Global Model for Liberal Development, 1933–1945," *International History Review* 32, no. 1 (2010): 47–67.
178. Postwar planning by the French government, especially the 1946 Monnet Plan, was particularly influential. See Irwin Wall, "Jean Monnet, the United States and the French Economic Plan," in *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity*, ed. Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 86–87; and Astrid Ringe, "Background to Neddy: Economic Planning in the 1960s," *Contemporary British History* 12, no. 1 (1998): 82–83.
179. See Frances Lynch, "Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan: National and International Planning in French Reconstruction," *Economic History Review* 37, no. 2 (1984): 229–43; and Jim Tomlinson, "Managing the Economy, Managing the People, Britain c. 1931–70," *Economic History Review* 58, no. 3 (2005): 555–85.
180. French Catholic thought on planning is discussed in Giuliana Chamedes, "The Catholic Origins of Economic Development After World War II," *French Politics, Culture and Society* 33, no. 2 (2015): 55–75.
181. Tignor, *W. Arthur Lewis*, 28–29.
182. This parallels the argument Benedict Anderson made with respect to education, print, and nationalists in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991). See also Immanuel Wallerstein, "Elites in French-Speaking West Africa: The Social Basis of Ideas," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 3, no. 1 (1965): 1–33; and Toyin Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2001), 107–8.
183. Cooper, "Modernity," 146.
184. Oliver Stanley (1943) as quoted in Tignor, *W. Arthur Lewis*, 59.
185. Olav Stokke, *The UN and Development: From Aid to Cooperation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 93; and Henry Bloch, "Regional Development Financing," *International Organization* 22, no. 1 (1968): 185. See also Transcript of interview with Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, 14 August 1961, Oral History Program, World Bank Group Archives, http://oralhistory.worldbank.org/person/rosenstein-rodan-paul-n.
186. The work of India's national Planning Commission, set up in 1950, was particularly influential; see Jagdish Bhagwati, "Comment," in *Pioneers in Development*, 199–200.
187. W. Arthur Lewis, *Development Planning: The Essentials of Economic Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966; reprint, Routledge, 2003), 1.

188. Toyin Falola, *Development Planning and Decolonization in Nigeria* (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 1996), 27, 31, 65; and Charlotte Neisser, "Community Development and Mass Education in British Nigeria," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 3, no. 4 (1955): 358.
189. Falola, *Development Planning and Decolonization*, 66, 68, 120, 159.
190. David Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949–1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 247; Michael Clemens and Todd Moss, "Ghost of 0.7%: Origins and Relevance of the International Aid Target" (Working Paper 68 Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2005), 4; and Stokke, *The UN and Development*, 643. The World Council of Churches was an umbrella body that spoke for mainline churches in 44 countries.
191. Helmut Führer, "The Story of Official Development Assistance: A History of the Development Assistance Committee and the Development Co-Operation Directorate in Dates, Names and Figures," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 1994, pp. 7 and 13, OCDE/GD(94)67, http://www.oecd.org/dac/1896816.pdf.
192. See for example, Wallerstein, "Elites in French-Speaking West Africa," 27.
193. The complexity of France's development aid system results in differing estimates of French Official Development Assistance (ODA) in relation to national income. Bossuat estimates French ODA/GNP at 2.03% in 1956 and 2.15% in 1960. The OECD provides standardized figures for 1960 onward, at which point it calculates French ODA/GNI at 1.35%. In both datasets, French development aid was double the level suggested by the World Council of Churches and, despite a steady decline in this ratio, continued to exceed that target until the mid- or late 1960s. See Bossuat, "French Development Aid," 440; and OECD Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/.
194. Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, 255, 270; Fieldhouse, *The West and the Third World*, 88.
195. Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, 255, 257–59, 272, 287.
196. Ibid., 259–60, 286–87.
197. Deschamps, "France in Black Africa," 235, 237; and Huillery, "History Matters."
198. Fieldhouse, *Black Africa*, 13; and Thomas, "Albert Sarraut."
199. John James Quinn and David Simon, "*Plus ça change* …: The Allocation of French ODA to Africa During and after the Cold War," *International Interactions* 32, no. 3 (2006): 299–301; and Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, 146.
200. Thomas Hodgkin, "Pressure for Self-Rule in French Black Africa," *Africa Report*, Special Report 2 (January 1957): 4–5. Hodgkin was reporting on the Bamako conference of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* in September 1956.
201. Anton Andereggen, *France's Relationship with Subsaharan Africa* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 122; and Bossuat, "French Development Aid," 431, 433, 444–45, 448–89.
202. Fieldhouse, *Black Africa*, 13.
203. Transcript of interview with Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, 6–8.

204. Tignor, *W. Arthur Lewis*, 63–64; and Anne Krueger, Constantine Michalopoulos, Vernon Ruttan et al., *Aid and Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 127–28.
205. Mamadou Dia, *The African Nations and World Solidarity*, trans. Mercer Cook (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 96–97, 110, 125. See also José Lasuen, "On Growth Poles," *Urban Studies* 6, no. 2 (1969): 137–61. The influence of French economists like François Perroux and Gérard Destanne de Bernis on African development policy before and after independence needs further research.
206. Moris, "Irrigation as a Privileged Solution;" and Ertsen, "Controlling the Farmer."
207. Thompson and Adloff, *French West Africa*, 370; and van Beusekom, "*Colonisation Indigène*," 320–21.
208. de Wilde, *Experiences with Agricultural Development*, 249, 251.
209. Djibril Aw and Geert Diemer, *Making a Large Irrigation Scheme Work: A Case Study from Mali* (Washington, DC: IBRD, 2005), 6, 12; and Sander Zwart and Lucie Leclert, "A Remote Sensing-Based Irrigation Performance Assessment: A Case Study of the *Office Du Niger* in Mali," *Irrigation Science* 28, no. 5 (2010): 373.
210. Cooper, "Conflict and Connection," 1529.
211. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, "The Struggle for Human Rights in Africa," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 41, no. 3 (2007): 487–88. As Zeleza notes, the concept of a right to development originated with Senegalese jurist Kéba Mbaye.
212. See, for example, William Edgett Smith, *We Must Run While They Walk: A Portrait of Africa's Julius Nyerere* (New York: Random House, 1971), 5, 100–1, 284.
213. Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 43, no. 2 (1961): 107.
214. Nick Cullather, "The Third Race," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 3 (2009): 507–12.
215. Omar Pancoast, "The 'Point Four' Policy," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 10, no. 3 (1954): 87.
216. Sidney Warren, "The Background of Our Aid Program," *Current History* 33, no. 193 (1957): 136; and McVety, "Pursuing Progress," 395–98.
217. Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia*, 183. Eritrea was a former Italian colony that federated with Ethiopia in 1952.
218. Jeffrey Lefebvre, "Donor Dependency and American Arms Transfers to the Horn of Africa: The F-5 Legacy," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 25, no. 3 (1987): 471.
219. Bingham, *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy*, 245; Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia*, 184; and Amanda McVety, "Pursuing Progress: Point Four in Ethiopia," *Diplomatic History* 32, no. 3 (2008): 371, 383, 401.
220. On the Point Four Program generally see Rollin Atwood, "The United States Point Four Program – a Bilateral Approach," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 323 (1959): 35. On Ethiopia's program see Bingham, *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy*, 252; and McVety, "Pursuing Progress," 383, 389–90.

221. Zewde, *Pioneers of Change*, 27–34, 138.
222. Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia*, 129–37, 208; and James Morris, *The Road to Huddersfield: A Journey to Five Continents* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1963), 106.
223. Atwood, "The United States Point Four Program;" and Paul Streeten, *Aid to Africa: A Policy Outline for the 1970s* (New York: Praeger Publishers for the United Nations, 1972), 28.
224. McVety, "Pursuing Progress," 385.
225. Nathan Citino, "The Ottoman Legacy in Cold War Modernization," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40, no. 4 (2008): 583.
226. Bingham, *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy*, 80.
227. Citino, "The Ottoman Legacy," 579–80, 584–85.
228. Gerald Meier, "The Formative Period," 5.
229. Charles Malik (1946), as quoted in Digambar Bhouraskar, *United Nations Development Aid: A Study in History and Politics* (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), 24. The resolution, 52(I), was passed by the General Assembly on December 14, 1946.
230. Thandika Mkandawire, "Running While Others Walk: Knowledge and the Challenge of Africa's Development," *Africa Development* 36, no. 2 (2011): 6–7.
231. Nassau Adams, *Worlds Apart: The North-South Divide and the International System* (London: Zed Books, 1993), 51–53. For a discussion of the Third World's changing meanings see Marcin Wojciech Solarz, "'Third World': The 60th Anniversary of a Concept that Changed History," *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 9 (2012): 1561–73. For an example of action against imperialism, see Ernest Gross, "The South West Africa Case: What Happened?" *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 1 (1966): 36–48.
232. John Toye and Richard Toye, "Arthur Lewis and the United Nations," Paper presented at "The Lewis Model After Fifty Years" conference, Manchester University, 6–7 July 2004, https://johntoyedotnet.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/arthur-lewis2004.pdf. As Amy Staples documents, the UN's international civil service played an important role in institutionalizing development; see *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006).
233. For example, John Toye and Richard Toye, *The UN and Global Political Economy: Trade, Finance, and Development* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 102–6. See also W. Arthur Lewis, "United Nations Primer for Development: Comment," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 67, no. 2 (1953): 267–75.
234. Tony Killick, "Trends in Development Economics and Their Relevance to Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1980): 368; and Richard Jolly et al., *UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice* (Blooomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 50–54.
235. See, for example, Tignor, *W. Arthur Lewis*, 176–77 on differences between Lewis and Kwame Nkrumah, whose government he was advising.

236. The term Third Worldist is borrowed from Robert Malley, "The Third Worldist Moment," *Current History* 98, no. 631 (1999): 359–69.
237. See, for example, Christopher Lee, ed., *Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010).
238. Craig Murphy, *The Emergence of the NIEO Ideology* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 37, 46, 95.
239. Carol Geldart and Peter Lyon, "The Group of 77: A Perspective View," *International Affairs* 57, no. 1 (1980/1981): 94; Robert Mortimer, "Global Economy and African Foreign Policy: The Algerian Model," *African Studies Review* 27, no. 1 (1984): 6; and Robert Mortimer, *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 49.
240. Hayward Alker, "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," *American Political Science Review* 58, no. 3 (1964): 650; plus Adekeye Adebajo, "Ending Global Apartheid: Africa and the United Nations," and James Jonah, "The Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Secretariat," both in *From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations*, ed. Adekeye Adebajo (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009), 3–4, 72–73, respectively.
241. Adebayo Adedeji, "The ECA: Forging a Future for Africa," in *Unity and Diversity in Development Ideas: Perspectives from the UN Regional Commissions*, ed. Yves Berthelot (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 235–36. See also Frederick Arkhurst, *African Diplomacy: The UN Experience* (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2010), Chap. 2.
242. United Nations General Assembly, Third Committee, Thirteenth Session, Agenda Item 12, "Report of the Economic and Social Council: Formulation of Social Policies Related to Economic Development," A/C.3/L.666, 3 October 1954. The five countries were Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic; they were joined by Indonesia. Subsequent revisions of this motion had additional sponsors.
243. H.E. Caustin, "United Nations Technical Assistance in an African Setting," *African Affairs* 66, no. 263 (1967): 113–26; and Stokke, *The UN and Development*, 138. The comments of Ms. Addison can be found in the official record of the UN General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Third Committee, 6 October 1958, Agenda Item 12. I am indebted to the staff of the UN's Dag Hammarskjöld Library for copies of this and the drafts of the A/C.3/L.666 resolution discussed at this meeting.
244. Margaret Snyder and Mary Tadesse, *African Women and Development: A History* (London: Zed Books, 1995), 32–33.

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CHAPTER 25

Nationalism and African Intellectuals

Toyin Falola and Chukwuemeka Agbo

Thomas Hodgkin has identified three distinct themes that illustrate the trajectory of scholarship on Africa's interaction with the West.[1] The first of these themes, which characterized the first phase of the intercontinental relation, focused on 'the competition for colonial possession as a factor tending to promote, or intensify, conflict between the major European Powers. The practical question which absorbed them was how to limit or remove the rivalries between imperial and would be imperial Powers, as an evident contributory cause of international wars'.[2] The second theme was developed during the interwar years. Scholars at this time were concerned with 'the problem of the social ends to be sought, and the administrative methods to be used, by the colonial powers in the territories which they controlled'.[3] The third theme shifts attention from an exclusive discussion of the superpowers to a shared attention involving them (European overlords) on the one hand and their African subjects on the other hand. In our generation, Hodgkin writes:

> the colonial problem means, principally, the problem of the relationship between Europe and its outpost communities in Africa, on the one hand, and the indigenous African societies on the other. Put crudely, it means what adjustments, compromises, surrenders, must the European colonial Powers (and their settlers) make in the face of the claims of African nationalism?[4]

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It is on the individuals who pushed for these drastic changes in Africa's relations with Europeans, their efforts, and activities towards securing greater freedom and eventually independence for Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that this chapter reflects.

This chapter is about nationalism (the 'consciousness on the part of individuals or groups, of membership in a nation, or of a desire to forward the strength, liberty, or prosperity of a nation'[5]), a persistent theme in African history since the nineteenth century. According to Hodgkin, historiography on nationalism in Africa falls into three categories or eras: the era of political explosions, the emergence of new sovereign states, and the era of interdependence among African states.[6] The question that has dominated intellectual thinking in Africa in the last 200 years has been constant: against the background of Western incursion, how can Africa uplift itself? This is an intellectual confrontation with a modern world where continuity and change go hand in hand, compete and clash, reinforce and complement one another. Change, continuity with the past, and adaptation to new circumstances have all been part of the challenges that intellectuals have confronted as they make sense of modernity and reflect on what they perceive as their alienation in a world increasingly dominated by European values. As with the intelligentsia in other lands, Africans are not merely trying to understand the process of change and continuity, but they also have to experience the reality and insert themselves into the very process and society that they are analyzing.

This chapter examines the intersection between nationalism and African intellectuals in the quest by African elites to address issues of tradition, change, politics, and ultimately power. It discusses efforts by African elites to reshape or reconstruct a new image for Africa. Although it focuses on one class of elites, this chapter does not suggest that Africa has always had only one class of elites. In fact, if the Europeans obtained power from a traditional elite during the nineteenth century, they handed it over to a new educated elite in the twentieth century. Modern elites proved to be interested also in power by challenging traditional authority at virtually all levels of government. They successfully positioned themselves as the only ones who could reflect effectively on the profound changes that characterized the various periods and who had the means to bring them about.

This chapter, however, is not about power politics, but how nationalism has shaped the production of knowledge and influenced politics in Africa since the nineteenth century. It is about the relationship between African intelligentsia and the Europeans (missionaries and colonial apparatus) and subsequent state formations; the contradictions manifested within Pan-Africanism and nationalism; and the relation of academic institutions and intellectual production to the state during the nationalist period and beyond.

Africa has always had its intellectuals. This chapter focuses on those who emerged during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The representatives of the previous intellectual traditions also remain, but they are often

marginalized by the modern educated elite that control power. In this chapter, this earlier class of intellectuals is referred to as traditional elites. They consist of priests, kings, chiefs, and merchants who generated knowledge and exercised considerable power and authority. Their knowledge was usually oral and constituted the foundation of politics, it could be esoteric, and there were specialists who handled the interpretation of complex religious ideas. An indigenous education system, informal and varied, existed partly to reproduce the traditional intellectuals and socialize everybody into the community. Diviners, griots, and priest contributed to the development of society by using their specialized knowledge to interpret reality, produce relevant histories for leaders, mediate in conflicts, and even predict the future.

Another important class of intellectuals that has developed in Africa is the Islamic intelligentsia. This school of thought was based on Islam and a formal Islamic education system. Prior to the founding of Islam by Mohammed in the seventh century, writing had, of course, been invented, and schools had been in existence in various parts of the world. For example, the monasteries, the Alexandria museum and library in Egypt had existed since the third century BCE. This early intellectual tradition continued to develop and be built upon in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and North Africa. The spread of Islam into Africa meant the introduction of a formal Islamic educational system in North, West, and East Africa. Islamic education was quickly developed at various levels of education—elementary, secondary, and university. The first Islamic university in Africa was located at Karawiyyin, founded in 859 CE in the old city of Fez. From here, Islamic professors spread the Maliki code of law, religious brotherhoods, and other cultural ideas to the Maghreb and West Africa. Al-Azhar University in Cairo became prominent in the tenth century CE.

The spread of Islam went hand in hand with the spread of the Arabic language, thereby creating an intelligentsia who relied on writing. Like the traditional intelligentsia, Islam was oral, thus retaining an aspect of culture well established in the African continent. For instance, Swahili poetry reveals an oral tradition rich in history and culture. Similarly, the Fulani and Hausa of West Africa established a rich Islamic-cum-oral tradition. A literate intelligentsia relied on the radicalism supplied by Islam to develop a vision of society in different parts of Africa. For instance, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Islam became a tool to fight imperialism by resorting to radicalism and tradition, both already tested in previous years in reforming society.

The Rise of Modern Elites

As important as the above intellectual traditions were, they did not create the modern intellectual tradition. A number of factors were responsible for the rise of modern elites in Africa. Modern intellectuals owe their origins to the spread of Western formal education, which began in some parts of Africa

in the sixteenth century. European contact with Africa was first initiated by the Portuguese. The British, Danes, French, Dutch, and Germans joined later. As the slave trade became more lucrative, more and more Europeans went to Africa. They established trading stations along the coast in St. Louis and Goree in Senegal, Elmina, Accra, and Cape Coast in Gold Coast, Benin in the area of modern Nigeria, and the Kingdom of the Congo. In these places, rudimentary elementary schools sprang up. They were meant to introduce a handful of Africans to basic accounting as well as reading and writing European languages. A small scheme to produce teachers was also started by sending Africans to Europe for further education.

Writing about the Yoruba of Western Nigeria, Falola observes that:

> changes in the nineteenth century were rapid, chaotic, and reformist … Also during the nineteenth century, the circumstances that produced the new intelligentsia began to unfold with the abolition of the slave trade, the return of liberated slaves to the Yoruba homeland, evangelization by foreign missions, the British annexation of Lagos, and the subsequent imposition of colonial rule … The acceptance of Christianity and Western education since the mid-nineteenth century rapidly transformed the Yoruba and created an educated elite that has played a leadership role in tropical Africa.[7]

Members of this class of Yoruba modern elite were quick to employ nationalism in their relations with the Europeans.

Falola further observes:

> Chronicles began in the nineteenth century, as a cultural project by a new intelligentsia interested in presenting to the European world a rich and different heritage. This intelligentsia was connected with the church. It believed in 'legitimate' commerce and the recently inaugurated process of Westernization, as long as it did not rob Africans of political and economic power. The defining characteristics of this elite were Western education and claims to the knowledge of (and connection with) Western culture. The elite constituted the labor pool for the emerging government sector, the consumers for imported items, readers of available books, and the chroniclers of the age … In a country where the majority were unable to read and write, literacy especially in English, was a source of power. They could communicate with foreign merchants and officers and at the same time serve as the representatives of the extra-literate traditional elite.[8]

The production of a Western educated elite in Africa was a slow process, but the pace accelerated in the twentieth century as Africans insisted on change. A second important factor in the rise of modern elites in Africa was the activities of Christian missionaries. In establishing elementary schools, the missionaries offered the basis for producing literate people. Euro-African relations in the nineteenth century called for the use of more literate Africans in commercial houses, churches, and government establishments. The African elite had to

respond to the changing nature of Euro-African relations. The abolition of slavery led to trade in raw materials and later colonial conquest. The 'success' of Western education can be dated to the nineteenth century, when missionaries started arriving in large numbers. More and more Africans were receptive to conversion and secular education. Some governments, such as those of Egypt, and many individuals, notably liberated slaves, demanded education for Africans. The provision of Western education enabled the missionaries to propagate Christianity, campaign against the slave trade, and create a new, Western-oriented African intelligentsia. They used education to convert Africans to Christianity and assimilate them to a new way of thinking. The missionaries and colonial powers both understood the relevance of Western education, and they tried to balance its provision with perceived need and the awareness of its power as a social agency. Higher education was completely neglected, as there was no need to produce education at that level. Only a few secondary schools were provided, and by and large, the education of Africans was restricted to the elementary level. The self-interest of the missionaries made them front runners in the provision of education. As long as education was the handmaid of evangelization, they were ready to work for it.

Both for Africans and the colonizers, education was necessary for survival. For the colonizers, the system could not function without an elite, or at the very minimum, a group of people who could read or write. While a number of European administrators learned and used African languages, many others had to depend on interpreters to serve as intermediaries. Thus, the first major job of educated Africans was to mediate in all sorts of relations: to present the Bible on behalf of the white missionaries, to relay instructions on behalf of European administrators, and to negotiate trade deals. As important as these roles were, the elites extended this to become also the mediators of history and culture. They presented European value to Africans, either as critics or as modernizers. Yet on the other hand, they presented Africa to the Europeans. Intellectual works by Edward Wilmot Blyden and others show that these elites regarded this mediation as important to themselves and to the continent.

The colonizers and representatives of European firms also needed educated Africans as workers. The missionaries required native agents, mainly schoolteachers and priests. The firms needed clerks, cashiers, and others to facilitate the import–export trade. The government required clerks, tax collectors, police, soldiers, and many others to serve in different agencies. Where the colonial officers depended on local chiefs, as in the case of the British system of 'indirect rule', the number of educated Africans required was small indeed. In other colonial systems, a selfish calculation was made that training Africans for positions that Europeans could occupy was in effect creating a revolution that would destroy the system. The number of Africans required was dependent on the nature of the colonial economy and politics, the extent to which a colonial government was willing to depend on European migrants

and settlers, and the extent of exploitation or modernization underway. As new occupations became necessary, including nursing, teaching, law, and medicine, the system also needed qualified Africans to fill them. Nevertheless, the colonial government deliberately created an educational system that would make Africans subordinate to Europeans.[9]

For Africans, Western education was also necessary. We have made mention of the mediation role of the elite, which was an exercise of power. Indeed, the voice of mediation was a source of great power for the court interpreters who profited from closeness to the judiciary, for the officers in the police and army who served as agents of coercion, and for the highly educated who were negotiating old and new cultures. Education was an agency of social change, indeed the most potent agency of change. Africans who wanted to join in the new sectors needed the knowledge of a European language and education.

Piecemeal measures never satisfied Africans, who understood the game the missionaries and colonial governments were playing with them. Having realized that education brought many advantages, notably mobility and social status, the African beneficiaries of Western education in the nineteenth century wanted to retain their privileges, to consolidate their power, to educate their offspring, and to use education to transform the continent. Wherever a mission had established a school, the community ensured that education survived and expanded.

Africans also exerted pressure on the missionaries and government to create secondary schools and universities. If education was confined to the elementary level, Africans could only work as subordinates to white superiors in all establishments. Creating an alliance with a Christian missionary turned out to be the easiest way for Africans to ensure the creation of new secondary schools, as in the case of Southern Nigeria where the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and the Baptist and the Roman Catholic Churches established secondary schools.[10] Those Africans who received higher education and held positions of power (for example, as school principals) used their influence to persuade communities and congregations to contribute money to start new schools, which a mission or government could then acquire or subsidize. This was the case in a number of southwestern Nigerian towns in the first two decades of the twentieth century, when six new secondary schools were created. In Ghana, the elite raised money from traditional leaders and businessmen to start new schools in Accra and Cape Coast.[11]

In order to obtain schoolteachers, pressure was also directed at creating teacher-training colleges. While a number were established in different parts of the continent, so acute was the shortage of teachers that this became a factor in the expansion and creation of secondary schools. In South Africa, the Churches began to make an important impact from the 1840s onward; following the London Missionary Society's leadership, the Methodists and the Paris Evangelical Mission took an interest in teacher-training colleges,

secondary schools, and agricultural and industrial schools. As Fourah Bay College acquired fame in West Africa, so did the Lovedale Institution, established in 1841 by the Scottish Presbyterian Mission in South Africa. The objective of Lovedale was to train students in a variety of occupations (industrial, evangelical, teaching, and so on). It offered courses in carpentry, masonry, printing, and bookbinding.[12] Its academic offerings were equally diverse and rigorous. Lovedale provided the model and inspiration for the establishment of other secondary schools in South and East Africa after 1870.

The next phase in the pursuit of Western education by Africans came in the form of study abroad. Those who had enjoyed the opportunity of a secondary-school education or who had such a school in their area sought to establish an institution of higher education or travel abroad for further education. In British West Africa, a few students went to Fourah Bay College, which was upgraded to a university in 1876. However, as theology dominated the training there, those seeking education in law, medicine, accountancy, and other fields had to seek opportunities in Europe. Others went to the USA; these included such men as Kwame Nkrumah of Gold Coast (later Ghana) and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria. Slow to be accepted as possessing the same credentials as those trained in Europe, the graduates of US universities became strong advocates of the American system of higher education. The combination of academic, vocational, and technical training, as in Tuskegee Institute, was highly recommended for producing a new elite that would be able to think and invent.[13]

The extent of opportunities for higher education turned it into a desirable aim for many Africans. Those who managed to obtain college diplomas were able to obtain good jobs. Among them were the évolués, who were committed to French culture and were encouraged to travel to France for more education. A number of Africans (notably from Togo, Cameroon, and Dahomey) traveled on their own to France for secondary and higher education, and many of them developed anticolonial ideas and supported the emerging idea of Pan-Africanism. A number of others resisted what they perceived as the imposition of French culture, and they began to call for the study of African culture and customs.

For most of the period under consideration, the number of these elites was small, thereby constituting them as a minority. But this elite had always been a powerful minority, so successful that it inherited power from the Europeans and has continued to generate ideas, in spite of the domination of politics by the military. The intellectuals have always invested in the notion of progress—the genuine hope that Africa would develop and that they would be the agency of the transformation. The notion of progress has intermeshed with that of nationalism: most demands in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been couched in the language of nationalism. The intellectuals have constructed or accepted not only the ideas of the nation-state, but also those of ethnicity, and even the larger project of continental identity for

Africa. They participate in local and global cultures; their perspectives are drawn from local, national, continental, and international issues; they were originally resented by the Europeans but later acquired power from them; they constitute essentially a public-sector elite, that is, they are not primarily 'an economic bourgeoisie', which means that they have had to seek relevance and power in government and the apparatus of state.

The third agent in the rise of modern elites in Africa was improvement in communication. The development of printing presses, newspaper houses, and broadcasting revolutionized communication systems in Africa. Hodgkin has shown that communication increased interdependence which enabled Africans to:

> [s]peak and listen to one another and to the outside world in a way that has never previously been possible. The development of a nationalist Press, which seeks to stimulate political awareness and activity among the literate and barely literate mass rather than to inform a small elite, has been of special importance. African controlled journals like the *West African Pilot* in Nigeria and *Afrique Noire* in French West Africa, have been powerful instruments for the diffusion of the new outlook. Mass education projects, particularly in British Africa, have widened the circle of the literate. Through broadcasting and films, as well as through newspapers, Africans even in the remoter small towns and villages, are able to learn about Apartheid in the Union of South Africa, Indian independence, the conflict in Korea and Viet-Nam [sic], the hydrogen bomb. In Nigeria especially there has been a post-war spate of pamphlet literature, comparable with English pamphleteering in the 1640s, dealing with every kind of current topic, from polygamy to educational reform. Anti-colonial ideas imported, partly through returning students, from a variety of sources—the American gospel of free enterprise, the Marxist theory of the self-destructive character of imperialism, the Moslem Brotherhood's rejection of Western culture, the Gandhist concept of passive resistance—circulate widely in contemporary Africa.[14]

Highlighting the importance of communication to West African nationalism, Falola writes as follows:

> the educated elites in their respective countries had conceived the value of networks that used education as a cement. Books circulated, ideas traveled within the region, and newspapers carried information far and wide. Key figures also moved around to give lectures and for purposes of business and political dialogue.[15]

Lastly, the rise of new 'African political leadership' was also instrumental to the emergence of modern elites in Africa. Many countries in all regions of Africa witnessed this revolution. Writing about this political phenomenon in Africa in 1957 (a period in African history that witnessed the emergence of many of these leaders), Hodgkin notes that such men as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria, Leopold

Sedar-Senghor of Senegal, Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, to mention but a few, emerged with a new kind of power. Hodgkin further notes of these individuals:

> They differ profoundly both from the traditional chiefly leadership and from the past generation of lawyer-politicians. They combine, perhaps, some of the qualities of both, in that they enjoy the kind of reverence which the chief, as the intermediary between God and man, and symbol of his people's unity and continuity through time, enjoys in traditional African society; but also the new kind of authority attaching to those who have mastered the European's political techniques, and know how to use them to press African claims. These leaders have the advantage of being at home in both worlds—the world of the ancestors, the dance and the market, and the world of parliamentary debate and the struggle for state power. Thus they can command popular loyalties and win votes at elections no less effectively than party leaders in Western Europe … Judged simply on their political ability, these men do not compare unfavorably with Western European statesmen. A few of them—M. Senghor, for example—are intellectually well above the normal British or French Cabinet Minister Standard. It is not unreasonable that they should expect to be treated—as indeed they are beginning to be treated—on terms of equality by the political leaders of Europe, Asia, and America.[16]

The above factors empowered Africa's modern elites to confront their European visitors and demand freedom, equality, and respect for Africa, its political, economic, social, and cultural institutions and infrastructure.

Modern Elites and African Nationalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

African nationalism developed in three different ways, from cultural nationalism to political nationalism and finally territorial nationalism. A foremost figure in African nationalism is Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832–1912), a notable thinker. Blyden's front-line activism earned him recognition as *The Father of Cultural Nationalism*.[17] His great ideas and numerous opportunities to deliver speeches in different countries and to diverse audiences would pave the way for him to become more famous than his contemporaries. He was a strong advocate of self-pride and self-assertion for Africans. His antecedents lay in slavery, as his ancestors were taken from West Africa, but he himself was born in the West Indies (St Thomas). Denied the opportunity to study in the USA because of racism, he migrated to Liberia in 1851 where he went to school. His skills were reflected in his leadership of the *Liberia Herald* in the 1850s. He became a teacher in his alma mater and its principal in 1858. In the same year, he became an ordained minister of the Presbytery of West Africa. In 1861, he traveled to the USA to seek African Americans who would return to Liberia. A year later, he became a professor of Latin and Greek in the new Liberia College. He was teacher, preacher, scholar, and diplomat. He

held ambassadorial appointments (1877–1878, 1892), was the president of the Liberia College (1880–1884), failed in his bid for the presidency of Liberia in 1885, and relocated to Freetown where he became interested in Islam and lived until his death.

He condemned racism and asked Africans to be proud of their race. 'I would rather be a member of this race', he maintained, 'than a Greek in the time of Alexander, a Roman in the Augustus period, or an Anglo-Saxon in the nineteenth century'.[18] He was of the opinion that Africa did not need to seek universalism but an African identity. 'An African nationality is the great desire of my soul. I believe nationality to be an ordinance of nature and no people can rise to an influential position among nations without a distinct and efficient nationality. Cosmopolitanism never effected anything and never will.'[19] He advocated Pan-Africanism, the concept of the 'African personality', and a slogan, 'Africa for Africans'. He observed:

> It is sad to think that there are some Africans, especially among those who have enjoyed the advantages of foreign training, who are so blind to the radical facts of humanity as to say, 'Let us do away with the sentiment of Race. Let us do away with our African personality and be if possible in another Race' … Preach this doctrine as much as you like, no one will do it, for no one can do it, for when you have done away with your personality, you have done away with yourself … the duty of every man, of every race, is to contend for its individuality—to keep and develop it … Therefore, honour and love your Race … If you are not yourself, if you surrender your personality, you have nothing left to give the world.[20]

Blyden's activism was not limited to theories; he reduced his intellectual liberation agenda to practice. His first step in this direction was the study of local history and cultures, from the 'uncontaminated Africans' who knew the songs, traditions, and history of 'the wonderful and mysterious events of their tribal and national life'.[21] He was of the opinion that only Africans can uplift their race in Africa, thus he encouraged educated African elites to return to Africa. He rejected the prevailing European notion that races could be organized in a pyramid on the basis of achievement, ability, and civilization, with the white man at the top. If the white man had constructed this pyramid and placed himself on top, another race could do the same, using a different set of criteria. For Blyden, each race excelled in certain things and lagged behind in others. Rather than regard races as competitive, he saw them as complementary, equal but different. If Africans were looking for a race to emulate, Blyden warned them against the white race.

Another notable figure of Blyden's time was Surgeon-Major James Africanus Beale Horton (1835–1883), the first black to be commissioned into the British army, a prolific author, and radical intellectual.[22] Horton was the son of a liberated slave. He had the vision of a free, united Africa. As early as 1859, he remarked in his doctoral thesis that the Krumen, Yoruba, and Igbo

would, through intermarriage, produce the leading race for Africa. He saw theories of racial inferiority as misleading. While not denying differences in stage of civilization between blacks and whites, he attributed this not to race but to 'external circumstances'. He dismissed negative views that found Africa incapable and argued that the black race would take its place in the history of the civilized world. He compared African history with that of Europe and saw hope on the horizon:

> 'Rome was not built in a day'; the proudest kingdom in Europe was once in a state of barbarism perhaps worse than now exists among the people inhabiting the West Coast of Africa; and it is an incontrovertible axiom that what has been done can again be done. If Europe, therefore, has been raised to her present pitch of civilization by progressive advancement, Africa too, with a guarantee of the civilization of the north, will rise into equal importance.[23]

He advocated policies for change: Africans must liberate themselves from the notion of inferiority; they must seek political independence, self-government that would enable them to govern themselves in a more orderly and progressive manner; they must all unite. He was of the view that whatever inadequacies were to be found in Africa would be corrected by education.[24]

An elite network emerged during the nineteenth century, one that was sustained for over a hundred years, until it was redefined by 'territorial nationalism', which privileged the emerging nation-state. In West Africa, Freetown was the leading center of intellectual production for a while. The Krio of Sierra Leone essentially comprised liberated African slaves from West Africa, primarily Yoruba, Nova Scotians from Canada, and Maroons from Jamaica. They were predisposed to new thinking about the Self and Africa as a result of the conditions of slavery, their loss of connection to their original homeland, their contact with other cultures, their suffering, and their weak linkages with other African groups in Sierra Leone. Their intellectualism appears to have been primarily focused on how to combine European and African cultures. In this activity the Krio were defining themselves as a new ethnic and cultural group, in the process becoming maligned by other groups as neither African nor European.[25] The Krio contributed to the spread of Western education and culture in West Africa and acted as agents of modernization and instigators of nationalism. From 1839 onward, the Krio began to disperse to other parts of West Africa, notably Southern Nigeria.

In Nigeria, the Krio and other liberated slaves who returned to Nigeria from Sierra Leone and elsewhere after 1840 were known as the Saro.[26] They cherished education, and many served as native agents of missionaries in converting fellow Africans. Based mainly in Abeokuta and Lagos, the most successful among them took to the new occupations of medicine, law, trade, and the clergy, and many distinguished themselves as missionaries and traders. Many regarded themselves as mediators between the indigenous population and Europeans. Ethiopianism took deep root among a number of them; they

established independent Churches and demanded a number of reforms. Of the prominent intellectuals who emerged, J.A. Otonba Payne was a pioneer historian, writing short accounts of the Yoruba and attempting to provide chronicles of annual events.[27] There was also J.O. George, another famous antiquarian.[28]

In Gold Coast (Ghana), the elite behaved more like its Nigerian counterpart rather than like the Krio of Sierra Leone. John Mensah Sarbah (1864–1910) founded the first cultural organization, the Mfatsi Amanbuhu Feku (Fanti National Society), which was interested in the collection and compilation of indigenous history and culture. While this intention was initially shared by a few of Sarbah's colleagues, the emphasis was not sustained,[29] although Sarbah himself wrote two important books.[30] The organization was subsequently transformed into the country's first political party, the Gold Coast ARPS, which established a newsletter and encouraged its members to take an interest in indigenous laws and customs. The members of the ARPS sought Western education, but not at the expense of their cultures, and they were part of a new vanguard telling the world that Africans were great achievers. Some of the members also adopted African names, wore African clothing, and encouraged the use of the Fante language. As with their Yoruba counterparts, significant authors emerged among them, including Sarbah, J.E. Casley Hayford, and S.R.B. Attoh Ahuma.[31] These authors and others also worked within the ARPS to criticize British policies.

In French West Africa, Senegal took the lead in receiving ideas from France, generating fresh ones in the communes with their assimilated elite, and transmitting many of these ideas to other French colonies. The Senegal Socialist Party was established in the 1920s and participated in the French Popular Front, a regime that promoted the formation of trade unions in Africa. A few Africans succeeded in becoming prominent in French politics, and a number of French socialists also went to Africa, spreading the ideas of Jaures and Lenin. Arguably, the most sustained idea was that of Négritude, in part an outcome of the French policy of assimilation. In the hands of Senghor, a learned man, poet, and politician, Négritude reached a level of great refinement and profound romanticism. Senghor did not object to Western education or the understanding of other cultures, but the essence of black spirituality was to be maintained. Africa's contribution to civilization was profound, argued Senghor, and aspects of its civilization survived until the present, in intuitive reason and passion.[32] Négritude accused imperialism of attempting to destroy African values and culture.

The sites of intellectual production have been diverse and the genres multiple. If the intellectuals presented so far in this chapter became prominent through their connections with state power or as university academics, there have been many others whose career paths and ambitions have been different. One path has been the writing of town histories in the fashion of chronicles. The transition from oral histories to written histories can be seen as

one of the major intellectual achievements of the last one hundred years or so. If academic historians were later to work for the integration and acceptance of oral traditions into history writing, their predecessors successfully turned the tradition into their major source of writing outstanding town and national histories. The writers were many, but among the famous were Sir Apollo Kagwa of Uganda, Carl Reindorf of Ghana, Samuel Johnson, Jacob Ehgharevba, and Akiga Sai of Nigeria, Hampate Ba of Mali, and Boubou Hama of Niger.[33] These writers resorted to oral testimonies, mainly transmitted spoken words and eyewitness accounts. The testimonies were transmitted from one generation to another in the context of the culture of each society. The majority of African societies preserved their historical traditions and customs in this manner.

By writing historical texts, the authors were making a profound contribution to knowledge; they were converting oral traditions to written forms, a process that preserved the traditions and made them available to a wider audience. Writing at a time when the impact of colonialism was still minimal, they were able to observe the producers and cultures of the events they were describing and the traditions they were using. They contributed to the creation of written sources that a later generation has relied upon for the construction of historical knowledge. If the bulk of the writings on Africa by Africans have concentrated on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, one reason is the abundance of written materials. Writers like Samuel Johnson and Carl Reindorf provided the materials that have made possible subsequent historical reconstruction by academic historians. As Africans, they provided an alternative way of looking at a variety of institutions and events in contrast to the way in which European sources had presented them. Thus, in a way, the writings are insiders' accounts. To take one example, if European writers had presented missionary enterprises and imperialism in a glorious light, some African writers offered a contrary opinion or emphasized the African side of the encounter. Indeed, some of the works of this era have become the 'authentic voices' of Africans.[34]

The years before the Second World War witnessed a consolidation of the intellectual movement started by Blyden. African elites of this generation were more activists than intellectuals, thus pushing the frontier of nationalism to a higher level. Their intellectual focus was no different from Blyden's: how to retain African culture, how to borrow from Western civilization without destroying African culture, and how to blend imported with local cultures. To use the dictum of Senghor, Africans should assimilate, but not be assimilated. They theorized about cultural reforms. Not all the writers sought a distinction between politics and knowledge, as they combined to defend their continent and its people, to reveal the heritage of Africa, and to demonstrate their own ability to think. This class of elites refocused nationalism to a set of ideas and power. There must be educational opportunities and jobs for all qualified members of the educated elite. Some among them, including J.G. Campbell,

regarded the nineteenth-century abolitionist phase as the ideal, the time when educated Africans such as Bishop Crowther occupied leading positions in the ministry. Africans must be invested with power, sharing it with Europeans. They were the leaders of their people, not followers to be treated like political inferiors. The Europeans must include them in the administration, not all Africans, to be sure, but the best minds among them. If a bridge were to be built to reach the masses, the elites must be the architects, as they understood Africans in a way Europeans could not. Beside J.G. Campbell, Mojola Agbebi and Kobina Sekyi were also outstanding.

During the later years of the twentieth century a group of African elites who eventually entered the nationalist movements as territorial advocates emerged. These men led their different countries to independence starting from the end of the first half of the twentieth century, and to a greater extent during the 1960s. As the system became more repressive and antagonistic toward the elite, the intelligentsia became more critical of the system, rejecting the moderate ideas propounded by people like Casely Hayford. In the 1930s, men such as J.B. Danquah of Gold Coast and Herbert Macaulay of Nigeria were asking for more. From the late 1930s onward, a radical moment descended on the continent, with unanimity that freedom meant the transfer of power and the dismantling of the empire. Shouts of 'immediate self-government' by men such as Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana filled the air.

Kwame Nkrumah was born on September 18, 1909, in the Western Region of Gold Coast. He attended a Catholic elementary school and later the Government Teachers Training College in Gold Coast. From 1931 to 1934, he served as a schoolteacher, and became exposed to the Pan-Africanist ideas of Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Du Bois. In 1935, he traveled to the USA for higher education, attending Lincoln University, a black college. While a college student, he was a member of the African Students Association, took a keen interest in black culture, and studied some of the papers in the Schomburg Collection of the African Diaspora in 1936. His advanced degree focused on the 'Philosophy of Imperialism' and the indigenous philosophy of the Akan people of Ghana. By the time Nkrumah returned from his study abroad, he had developed anti-racist ideas. Like his contemporaries, he began to write, work within associations, join protest movements, and develop long-lasting and productive associations with such notable Pan-Africanists as W.E.B. Du Bois and George Padmore.[35] He developed a keen interest in African cultures, partly in order to demonstrate that there was nothing inferior about them. He lambasted the colonialist debasement of African culture:

> [Africans] were trained to be inferior copies of Englishmen, caricatures to be laughed at with our pretensions to British gentility, our grammatical faultiness and distorted standards betraying us at every turn. We were denied the knowledge of our African past and informed that we had no present. What future

> could there be for us? We were taught to regard our culture and traditions as barbarous and primitive. Our text-books were English text-books, telling us about English history, English geography, English customs, English ideas, English weather.[36]

His style was radical, combative, and often polemical. He declared in 1945 that:

> [o]nly the united movement of the colonial people, determined to assert its right to independence, can impel any colonial power to lay down its 'white-man's burden', which rests heavily on the shoulders of the so-called 'backward' peoples, who have been subjected, humiliated, robbed, and degraded to the level of cattle.[37]

Nkrumah's strategy was to mobilize peasants and workers to capture power in order to create a better society. The people could take to non-violent protest, as advocated by Mahatma Gandhi, and African intellectuals must support all anti-colonial struggles. His theories were tested in Gold Coast where he led the nationalist movement to independence.[38] He was originally invited in 1947 to join the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), led by J.B. Danquah, with key members drawn from the professional middle class. By 1948, it was clear that Nkrumah's strategy did not conform to that of the party. In November of the same year, he founded the Convention People's Party (CPP). The CPP used the media to radicalize anti-colonial nationalism. In 1951, CPP won the majority of seats in the new assembly, and Nkrumah became the first prime minister. Further agitation for independence led to a new constitution in 1954, internal self-government, and the transfer of ministerial responsibility to Africans. In 1956, the CPP won the elections yet again, and Ghana became independent a year later.

In Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe was equally prominent, with a remarkable political career and prolific writing talents.[39] Born in 1904, he had direct exposure to the colonial bureaucracy and to colonial changes. His father worked as a clerk for the government and lived with his son in an emerging, heterogeneous Nigerian city. Azikiwe himself worked for the government, complained about the slowness of career mobility, and, in 1925, traveled to the USA for further education. He was influenced by the Pan-Africanist ideas of Marcus Garvey and George Padmore. From the 1930s onward, he became a radical anti-colonial fighter. His philosophy and works incorporate virtually all the major strands in African political thought: Pan-Africanism, nationalism, the nation-state, ethnicity, democracy, development, and military rule. He was a learned man as well as a notable activist. Like his contemporaries, he called for colonial disengagement and blamed many of Africa's woes on the Europeans.

He was persuaded by the ideas of leading African–American thinkers such as W.E.B. Du Bois and Leo Hansberry. He returned to West Africa in 1934,

where he emerged as a leading nationalist. He established his newspaper in Nigeria, the *West African Pilot*, in 1937. In a politically astute manner, he turned his media into an extension of his personal politics and a vehicle to express anti-British propaganda, beginning to mobilize the people. At the same time, he was enunciating a political philosophy: that Africans must wrest control from Europeans, unite, overcome all divisive politics, and solve the problem of the 'colonial mentality', that is, the feeling that everything European was superior.[40] Azikiwe was not just a writer but a front-line activist. When he joined the Nigerian Youth Movement in 1938, he invigorated it with his zeal and energy. Not long afterward, Nigerian politics abandoned Pan-Africanism and also moved away from the nationalist vision of a united Nigeria in favor of regionalism. Azikiwe had to fight with an emerging member of the Yoruba elite, Obafemi Awolowo (1909–1987), who was equally interested in power. Awolowo chose the path of federalism and nationalism, and his strategy of building an ethnic-based political party may be interpreted as undercutting Pan-Africanism. Also a prolific writer, journalist, and businessman, Awolowo's own strategy was that the regions of Nigeria should develop in a federal system.[41]

In 1942, Azikiwe, teamed with others to establish the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), which later became the National Council of Nigerian Citizens. For a while, the NCNC still projected a national image, but the pressure of regionalism eventually turned it into an Eastern regional party. While consolidating his power in the East, Azikiwe continued to work with others to press for European disengagement. He never achieved what he wanted the most, the leadership of Nigeria, but he was abundantly rewarded as the first indigenous premier of Eastern Nigeria and later the governor-general (and later ceremonial president) of independent Nigeria.[42]

Conclusion

Although this chapter focuses on modern elites, pre-nineteenth century African societies had each had their own elites, classified here as traditional elites. These had been equally important in the production of knowledge in the continent. The major strengths of their works include: their ability to study Africans from the African point of view, thereby challenging the biased nature of early European records on the continent, the documentation of Africa's oral tradition, thus setting the stage for academic historians to reconstruct town and national histories by relying on these records as their primary sources. Also important is the fact that traditional elites provided alternative ways of studying Africa.

As was the case with the infrastructures instituted by Europeans to exploit Africa, the same exploitative measures were extended by the Europeans in the development of Western education in Africa. Africans were considered

important only for positions that would keep them in perpetual subordination to the Europeans. But with the gains of Western education, modern African elites, beginning from the nineteenth century, continuously challenged European dominance in their own land. With the nationalist ideas gained through their studies at home and abroad, African elites engaged in continuous activism, demanding greater freedom for Africa. They employed their educated minds and used various media in their push for African freedom: the mass media, propaganda, demonstrations/mass action, formation of pressure groups, some of which were later transformed into political parties, and, very importantly, writing. With these weapons, nationalist activities in Africa touched on the cultural, political, and territorial integrity of Africa.

The fact that the elites were small in number constituted them into subaltern groups. Yet, they were able to break through this limitation and speak up. Contrary to the logic that subaltern groups cannot speak for themselves, the success of these elites thus questions the idea that defines subalternity in terms of numbers. Their success show that armed with necessary weapons and ideas, any group, no matter how small, can confront its challenges, overcome its limitations, overthrow its task masters, and establish its freedom.

Notes

1. In 2001, Toyin Falola published a detailed analysis of this topic. Certain aspects of this chapter emanate from that study. See Toyin Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals* (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2001).
2. Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (New York University Press, 1957), 9. Also refer to J.A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (London: G. Allen Unwin Ltd. 1938); and Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion* (London: Heinemann, 1935).
3. Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, 9; Frederick Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1922); and Margery Perham, *Native Administration in Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937).
4. Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, 10; Paul Henry, "The European Heritage," in *Africa Today*, ed. Grove Haines (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1955).
5. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism: A Report by a Study Group of Members of the* Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1939).
6. Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, 10–13.
7. Toyin Falola, *Yoruba Gurus: Indigenous Production of Knowledge in Africa* (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1999), 2.
8. Ibid., 3–4.
9. See for instance, Okechukwu Ikejiani, ed., *Nigerian Education* (Lagos: Longman, 1964).
10. J.F. Ade Ajayi, *Christian Missions in Nigeria, 1841–1891: The Making of a New Elite* (London: Longman, 1965).

11. David Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850–1928* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 84–87.
12. C.P. Groves, *The Planting of Christianity in Africa*, *Vol. 2.* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1955), 136.
13. See for instance, J.F. Ade Ajayi, "The American Factor in the Development of Higher Education in Africa," *James Coleman Memorial Paper Series*, no. 1 (Los Angeles: 1988).
14. Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, 13. See also, The United Nations, Special Study on Educational Conditions in Non-Self-Governing Territories (1954), Chap. 6.
15. Toyin Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals*, 64.
16. Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, 14–15. For more insights on the emergence of new political leadership in Africa see; Philip Garigue, "Changing Political Leadership in West Africa," *Africa*: *Journal of the International African Institute* XXXIV, no. 3 (1954): 220–32.
17. The book, which was completed in 1889, appeared in book format in 1895, without a major publisher; perhaps the publication was paid for by the author after the Basel Mission had shown little or no interest. A second edition was later published by the Basel Mission in Switzerland. A reprint was undertaken by Ghana Universities Press in 1966. Ray Jenkins has observed that the second edition contains a number of additions not found in the first, although he does not dismiss the value of either edition. Jenkins, "Impeachable Source? On the Use of the Second Edition of Reindorf's History as a Primary Source for the Study of Ghanaian History," Part I, *History in Africa*, 4 (1977): 123–47; Part II, 5 (1978): 81–100.
18. *West Africa*, March 8, 1930. Cited in Kimble, *Political History*, 521.
19. See for instance, Carl Reindorf, ed., *Remembering the Rev. Carl Reindorf* (Accra: self-published, n.d.).
20. C.C. Reindorf, *History of the Gold Coast and Asante* (Basel: Basel Mission, 1895), 4–5.
21. Ibid., x.
22. An important study on this figure has been carried out by Toyin Falola, *Pioneer, Patriot, and Patriarch: Samuel Johnson and the Yoruba People* (Madison: African Studies program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1993).
23. Samuel Johnson, *The History of the Yoruba from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate*, ed. O. Johnson (Lagos: CMS, 1921), vii.
24. Ibid., 642.
25. Akintola Wyse and C. Magbaily Fyle, "Kriodom: A Maligned Club," *Journal of the Historical Society of Sierra Leone* 3, nos. 1 and 2 (1969), 37–44; Akintola Wyse, *The Krio of Sierra Leone: An Interpretive History* (London: C. Hurst, 1989).
26. See: Jean Herskovits Kopytoff, *A Preface to Modern Nigeria: The "Sierra Leonaians" in Yoruba, 1830–1890* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1965); Kristin Mann, *Marrying Well: Marriage, Status, and Social Change among the Educated Elite in Colonial Lagos* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Mac Dixon-Flye, *A Saro Community in the Niger Delta, 1912–1984: The Potts Johnson of Port Harcourt and Their Heirs* (Rochester, New York: University of Rochester Press, 1999).

27. See J.A. Otonba Payne, *Historical Notices of the Yoruba People, Table of Principal Events in Yoruba History* (Lagos: self, 1893).
28. *Historical Notes on the Yoruba Country and Its Tribes* (Lagos: self, 1895).
29. David Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850–1928* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 517–20.
30. Johnson Mensah Sarbah, *Fanti Customary Laws* (1897; reprint ed., London: Frank Cass, 1968); and *Fanti National Constituion…* (1906; reprint ed., London: Frank Cass, 1968).
31. Attoh Ahuma, *Memoirs of West African Celebrities* (Liverpool: D. Marples, 1905).
32. Leopold Senghor, "What is Negritude?" *West Africa*, no. 4 (1961): 1211.
33. See, for instance, Akiga Sai, *Akiga's Story: The Tiv Tribe as Seen by One of Its Members* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939); Jacob Egharevba, *A Short History of Benin* (Lagos: CMS Bookshop, 1963). A number of interpretive essays have been written on these chronicles, especially in the journal *History in Africa*.
34. See, for example, Samuel Johnson, *The History of the Yoruba*. Details on Samuel Johnson could also be found in Michel R. Doortmont, "Recapturing the Past: Samuel Johnson and the Construction of Yoruba History" (Ph.D. thesis, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, 1994). Also important is, Carl Reindorf, *History of the Gold Coast and Asante*.
35. For more details on Nkrumah's life and activism, see Kwame Nkrumah, *The Auto-Biography of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York: International Publishers, 1971); and Kwame Arhin, ed., *The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1993).
36. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (London: Heinemann, 1963, reprint, New York: International Publishers, 1973), 49.
37. Kwame Nkrumah, *Towards Colonial Freedom* (London: Panaf Books, 1962).
38. See, for instance, David Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Father of African Nationalism* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1990); and Arhin, ed., *The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah*.
39. Examples include: Nnamdi Azikiwe, *Zik: A Selection from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1961). His career has generated a great deal of literature, usually adulatory by his followers and admirers. See, for instance, Agbafor Igwe, *Zik: The Philosopher of Our Time* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1992); M.S.O. Olisa and O.M. Ikejiani-Clark, eds., *Azikiwe and the African Revolution* (Onitsha: Africana FEP Publishers, 1989).
40. Nnmadi Azikiwe, *Renascent Africa* (New York: Negro University Press, 1937; reprint ed., London: Frank Cass, 1966). See also his essay, "In Defense of Liberia," *Journal of Negro History*, no. 17 (1952): 30–50.
41. On Awolowo, see, for instance, *Awo: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); and Francis Ishola, Ogunmodede, *Chief Obafemi Awolowo's Socio-Political Philosophy: A Critical Interpretation* (Rome: Pontifica Universitas, 1986).
42. For Nnamdi Azikiwe's political career, see, K.A.B. Jones-Quartey, *A Life of Azikiwe* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965).

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CHAPTER 26

Decolonization Histories

Robert M. Maxon

'Decolonization' is a term used to denote the process by which colonial territories became independent states. In Africa it was a historical course that stretched over several decades in the twentieth century and involved multiple actors and factors.[1] The different time frames as well as the varied factors involved in decolonization mean that while there were similarities that marked the path to independent status for African states, many differences characterized this transition. These reflected regional variations and differing policies and approaches of the colonial powers. Even neighboring colonies controlled by the same European ruler experienced the decolonization process at varied speeds that were the result of different sets of variables. One narrative or interpretation does not fit all cases. Thus, the term 'decolonization histories' is appropriate for this discussion.

In general, scholars recognize three sets of factors or forces at work that influenced the process of African decolonization and produced varying decolonization histories. These were African, metropolitan, and international.[2] All were significant in varying degrees, and they often influenced each other. Of these, the African factors will be most closely examined in this chapter, as what happened in Africa, as well as the colonial rulers' perception of why, proved most influential.

Also important to consider are the varied paths to the creation of independent states that characterized decolonization histories. One was a handover of power to an elite within the African dependency that was unrepresentative of the populace at large with the transition characterized by the absence of democratic elections and universal human rights. A second path

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was the emergence of an independent state based upon a negotiated settlement between the colonial power and African leaders validated by universal-suffrage elections and democratic constitutions. The third path involved wars of liberation where independence was wrung from the colonial power or unrepresentative minority by guerilla conflicts lasting longer than a decade followed by the dominance of a single political movement or party usually associated with the victorious insurgent force.

Overall, decolonization histories were marked by similarities though the outcome for each colony was unique, reflecting local realities. There thus has been, and continues to be, a division of opinion among scholars in the assessment of African decolonization. The relative weights to be given to African, metropolitan, and international factors remain open to differing views. The brief summary that follows seeks to illustrate this through a regional and chronological account.

Forces/Factors

Despite disagreement on the relative significance of the three sets of forces, there is a good deal of agreement as to what they actually were. Among the metropolitan are normally counted the weakened military and economic status of the European colonial powers that were the result of the Second World War. These made it hard for them to hold on to African colonies after 1945. Wartime propaganda which had focused on opposition to authoritarian rule and racism had an impact on the populace in the metropoles and colonies in undermining support for colonial rule. Also influential on the people, particularly in Britain and France, was the need to rebuild shattered economies as well as increase spending in support of improvements in welfare (e.g. education, health care, and housing). The means of financing these postwar economic and social necessities came to constitute a significant reason for the European colonial powers to adopt a strategy of 'developmentalist empire' after the war that had such a huge impact in speeding the end of empire in Africa itself.[3]

Among international forces, on the other hand, scholars have counted the changing international balance of power after the Second World War. Britain and France (to say nothing of Belgium and Portugal) were no longer great powers. The superpowers after the war, the USA and the Soviet Union, were both, at least in theory, anti-imperialist. The independence of Asian colonies of European powers, such as India, Pakistan, and Indonesia in the 1940s, proved important international examples for the African colonies. The newly formed United Nations also provided an international focus for pressure for decolonization, particularly from the newly independent countries mentioned above, and through the actions of that body's Trusteeship Council.

Examined more broadly, a critical international factor was the changed process of globalization after the war. As A.G. Hopkins noted, changes in the

world economy reduced the value of colonial forms of integration. A changed economic environment now favored an Africa consisting of independent states rather than a continent of dependent territories.[4] Britain, France, Belgium, and even Portugal actually speeded up African decolonization in their attempts to exploit this postwar globalization.

The most important set of forces/factors, however, were African. The opposition to colonial rule within the various colonial territories (including technically independent South Africa) was clearly most critical. This was provoked by varied reasons and took different forms, but the emergence of discontent with colonial rule and its eventual rejection by large segments of the population brought an end to European colonial rule in Africa.[5] Among the most fundamental causes for this situation was the rebounding of the Second World War and Cold War propaganda that emphasized democracy and human rights. In Africa, as in Britain and France, 'the propagation and implementation of principles of human and civil rights undercut systems of domination' based on racial and cultural superiority.[6] Increasing numbers of Africans, starting with the educated elite, questioned why such ideals were not applied in the colonies. This was most obvious to the many African men who had fought in the armies of the imperial power during the war. They had fought side by side with European soldiers, but returned to Africa as second-class citizens. Moreover, opposition to colonial policies emerged in Africa from the earliest days of colonial control, and continued into the era of decolonization. These included opposition to the brutality and discrimination practiced by most colonial states, economic exploitation, taxation without representation, and lack of economic opportunity. Such causes of anti-colonial activities continued into the period of decolonization, and they were enhanced by the post-Second World War policies of the colonial powers framed to promote economic and social development in their African colonies.

This initiative, often termed the 'second colonial occupation of Africa', reflected the ideal of developmentalist empire. The European powers had done relatively little to develop their colonies economically and socially (e.g. schools, hospitals, health clinics, urban housing) prior to 1945, but thereafter development was to be spurred for the metropolitan reasons noted above as well as to exploit African resources more efficiently. The economic expansion that characterized most African colonies during the war demonstrated potential opportunities for further growth, especially in the areas of agricultural and mineral exports. The fact that colonial rule was under attack in Africa and other parts of the world was another reason for pushing the strategy of developmentalist empire. A particularly important reason was one often overlooked in accounts of decolonization that emphasize metropolitan and international factors: this was the growing demand among Africans for an expansion of formal education, greater influence within an expanding economy, and an increased voice in the administration of the political entity within which they lived. There can

be little doubt that it was the political, economic, and social changes in Africa before, during, and after the war that had 'the greatest impact on the process that led to the end of colonial rule in Africa'.[7]

As the process worked itself out, what was involved was nothing less than the failure of the colonial state all over Africa. The irony here was that these colonial states sought ambitiously to intrude much more extensively than ever before in the lives of Africa's peoples.[8] The attempts to enhance economic and social change led to pressure on peasants, traders, and workers that hit women disproportionately and provoked massive resistance. Likewise, the expansion of formal education so as to facilitate economic expansion produced an ever greater desire among the African population for such education which colonial states found it impossible to meet. The developmentalist push brought forth another fundamental contradiction in putting less emphasis on political change. This led to even greater pressure for expanding African political and administrative participation within the colonial state. In the end, the inability of the colonial states to meet the economic, social, and political demands of their populations led to political independence as the outcome.

Timing

Decolonization in Africa was a twentieth-century phenomenon, and whereas the majority of independent states achieved that status after the Second World War, some colonies gained political independence earlier. The Union of South Africa moved from British colony to self-rule in 1910 with full independence the result of the 1931 Statute of Westminster. Egypt, while not officially a colony, became independent of British rule in 1922. Libya gained independence from Italy in 1951 under the auspices of the United Nations, with a monarchy in control. These early examples of decolonization fit the first path to independence noted above in that they gained political independence without full participation of the majority of the population in the political process.

The independence of most African colonies, on the other hand, fell within the period 1955–1968. Most gained political independence as a result of a negotiated settlement with the colonial power. Nevertheless, exceptions to this path may be noted in the experience of Morocco (handover to an unrepresentative elite), and Sudan (government not representative of the population).

The final period of African decolonization stretched from 1974 to 1994. The time frame included the independence of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Eritrea, and Portugal's colonies in Africa. Very significant in this period was transformation of South Africa from a republic ruled by the white minority to a democratic state. This period is notable in that all these states moved to independence as a result, at least in part, of wars of liberation.

Sources of Discontent in Africa

For the period of decolonization after the Second World War, experience in Africa was characterized by opportunities and obstacles. The opportunities mainly resulted from the globalization that impacted Africa during this time. The war had brought some prosperity after a decade of depression marked by a lack of export markets and unemployment. The opportunities to build on this after 1945 reflected a favorable market for African produce and minerals. This was the case for agricultural producers in Africa as well as those seeking employment in industries (such as railways and docks) that depended on agricultural and mineral exports. Employment opportunities expanded for those with professional training, notably teachers. This era also witnessed a substantial upsurge in commerce within the colonies that attracted ever greater African interest. The postwar emphasis on human rights seemed to open the way for greater African participation within the government of the colonial states. The developmentalist approach was an important means that the colonial rulers utilized to take advantage of these opportunities.

As the first two postwar decades unfolded, however, far too many obstacles emerged to restrict and block the opportunities that Africans and their colonial rulers sought to exploit.

Peasants who wished to expand production and sale for market met many problems. These included new priorities and regulations as to which crops to grow and how. The agents of the colonial states, whether expatriate officers or chiefs, met growing opposition to, among other things, crop preferences, cultivation techniques, and soil conservation measures. African workers also encountered numerous obstacles. They were faced by poor working and living conditions and low wages. These had produced labor unrest and strikes before and after the war as in Gold Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanganyika, and in French West Africa where in 1947–1948 the railway system was shut down for months.[9] The system of migrant labor, so common over many parts of colonial Africa, came under stress nearing breakdown. Developmentalist colonialism sought to meet these difficulties in the path of development by coercion, encouraging trade unionism that focused on welfare of workers, and what was termed 'labor stabilization' through the emergence of an urban working class not migrant workers.[10] These measures proved far from effective in both the eyes of colonial officials and subjects. In addition, African traders struggled during the war and its aftermath, for example with the absence of consumer goods. They likewise found obstacles in a developmentalism that placed limits on competition in terms of trading licenses and assistance to aspiring traders.[11]

Perhaps the most important obstacle of all was the 'colonial mentality' that characterized so many of the European civil servants, both administrative and technical, who made up the leadership of the colonial states. Despite the influence of war and postwar ideology, they viewed Africans as 'different' from Europeans in terms of intelligence and culture. Although the prevailing

postwar ideology held that difference would, with time, be overcome, leaders of the colonial states and the colonial ministries in Europe believed that this would take many decades. In the meantime, paternalistic thinking held sway that since Africans were not 'ready' to be scientific farmers, productive workers, profitable traders, responsible civil servants, and political leaders, the colonial rulers must call the shots.[12] Such views were enhanced in those colonies where there were numbers of European farmers and wage workers as these groups demanded that the postwar period should mean continued precedence for their interests.

As can be deduced from the above, the key groups in Africa that were impacted by the opportunities and obstacles described were peasants, wage laborers, traders, and the educated elite. These groups often faced different sets of circumstances or challenges, but a majority within each came ultimately to the same conclusion: colonial rule must end.

Peasants all over colonial Africa faced the obstacles noted above and more. Peasant households sought to maximize production of food crops and commodities, but they were faced with widening state restrictions. This situation produced growing discontent that led to significant rural unrest as peasants balked at following the dictates of developmentalism. Wage laborers likewise found obstacles in their way. The attempt to stabilize African workers and create an urban working class encountered many difficulties. Wages continued to be low and did not keep pace with the cost of living in most African cities. Most cities grew rapidly after the war, and the market and the colonial state could not keep pace with the demand for housing, transport, and access to utilities such as water and electricity. Another discontented and influential group in African colonies after the war was traders. This definition included individuals and households ranging from itinerant traders, retail merchants, artisans, produce buyers, wholesalers, to those involved in transport.

The reasons for each group's discontent with the colonial state were varied. African traders in West and East Africa were unhappy with the competition they faced from so called 'foreign' merchants (Syrian and Lebanese in West Africa, and Asian in East Africa). They claimed the colonial state did little to improve opportunities for entering varied forms of commerce and placed other obstacles in the path of African traders such as lack of access to credit, state control of the market, and overregulation. Just as with peasants, the second colonial occupation served to heighten unhappiness among traders.

The last of the groups discontented with state obstacles was the educated elite. These individuals were distinguished by their formal schooling, including university and professional education. Members of this group were initially fewer in number than those described above due to the lack of educational facilities at the high-school level and above in most African colonies. After the war, numbers of schools expanded, but the elite found obstacles in the way of their gaining greater access to education, to civil service jobs, and

participation in governance. The group was also greatly impacted by the pervasive racial segregation that characterized most African colonies. The usual answer to demands for greater participation in governance, for example, was that the elite were too small in numbers to be important and that the real representatives of the African population in the colonies were the state-appointed chiefs.

Discontent with the obstacles placed in each group's way found many voices and forms. Those voicing displeasure included local political organizations, trade unions, elite political parties, reform movements focusing on a single issue (e.g. forced soil conservation), and religious movements. As to forms of protest, these included worker stoppages and strikes, protest marches, letters and petitions addressing specific grievances, agitation using African-owned newspapers, and passive resistance (e.g. organized refusal to pay taxes or obey regulations). These escalated further to involve violence in the form of urban or rural riots and armed insurgencies (e.g. the Mau Mau revolt/war in Kenya). The latter produced colonial state violence that further inflamed discontent.

Experience

The different forms of discontent involving the varied groups combined with the colonial powers' perceptions of it to shape the trajectory of Africa's decolonization histories. This produced a changing environment in which neither the colonizer nor the colonized succeeded in calling all the shots or determining the outcome. Protests of varied sorts burst forth in many parts of Africa in the 1940s. Initially, not all sought the creation of an independent state as one of the desired changes. This was true for the leaders of the political parties that emerged in the postwar period, including those that came to adopt a nationalist focus in appealing to varied groups within the colony to support the goal of ending colonial rule. It was also true for the rulers of Britain and France, who recognized the need for political change after the war but thought they could move such changes along lines they thought beneficial. For the rulers of Belgium and Portugal, on the other hand, there was no thought of independence for the African territories they controlled in 1945. These points will be illustrated by the following summary.

The start of what proved to be a relatively rapid process of change from colony to nation-state emerged first in West Africa within the British and French colonies there. Most colonies in this region attained independence between 1957 and 1960. In this transformation, Gold Coast led the way. Here a combination of urban protest and rural unrest led to the emergence of mass nationalism that caused the scuttling of British plans for gradual economic and political development. The years 1947 to 1951 were crucial. Rapid urban growth, including the return of former soldiers. heightened problems with employment, a lack of consumer goods, and housing as the

cost of living soared causing urban unrest and strikes; all contributed. In rural areas, a huge wave of discontent resulted from the colonial state's attempts to cope with swollen-shoot disease in cocoa trees. The discontent led to boycotts supported by farmers, workers, traders, and members of the elite, and to the Accra riots of February 1948 that spread to other towns. Eventually, the Convention People's Party (CPP) led by Kwame Nkrumah took the lead in welding together support from the four groups for Nkrumah's goals of self-government now and 'seek ye first the political kingdom'. According to this formula, political independence would be the way to effectively deal with the issues that caused discontent among all groups. The educated elite were to lead the people of the colony to a promised land where Africans, not the colonial rulers, would make the political, economic, and social policy decisions. By 1951, the majority of the voting public backed the CPP; self-government was granted by Britain.

This pattern of political independence, achieved in 1957 as the new state of Ghana, characterized other British colonies in Africa. Faced with a nationalist movement backed by a majority in elections, the British rulers opted to negotiate with, and cede power to, the elite leadership of a nationalist party rather than continue repressive policies, such as those used against the CPP (e.g. arrest of leaders and banning newspapers). From the start of the 1940s, if not earlier, British goals for decolonization in Africa included: insuring the loyalty of the new ruling class to Britain, protecting British material interests in the colony (trade, investment, and access to natural resources), supporting Britain's strategic interests, and standing with Britain internationally in a divided postwar world.[13] Whereas British leaders claimed that their goals had been met in Ghana and elsewhere in British-ruled Africa, in reality the imperial power accommodated itself to African conditions. Decisions were based on the philosophy that it was better to move too fast rather than too slowly so as to sustain satisfactory relations with successor states.

While British rule in other colonies gave way before movements reflecting support for nationalist parties. Ghana's experience illustrated another issue that marked Africa's decolonization histories. This was that the process of protest was characterized by rival nationalisms that reflected regional, religious, and ethnic differences in competing political parties. This was an era, for example, of 'ethnic patriotism' in many colonies.[14] A division of the nationalist movement emerged in Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, and Angola, to note just a few.

The decolonization experience of the French colonies, on the other hand, witnessed many of the same forces at work in producing discontent, protest, and eventual independence. Here the key period was similarly the postwar years down to 1960. Like the British, the French colonial rulers sought economic development after the war through improved productive techniques, infrastructure, and the conditions of labor. Like the experience in British colonies also, the best laid plans were not fulfilled as the colonial rulers

had hoped. Trade-union resistance marked by strikes during the 1946–1948 period pushed the reform movement in new directions, and the agricultural improvement sought through the second colonial occupation did not succeed as hoped, producing new forms of resistance.[15]

Nevertheless, major difference marked the political arena where, unlike in the British experience, politicians participated in metropolitan politics as well as West African ones. A voice in the French legislature was important for events in the 1950s, but African factors turned French colonies away from continued association with France. Politicians aspiring to influence had to build a support base in Africa. For example, Leopold Senghor in Senegal and Felix Houphouët-Boigny in Ivory Coast formed political parties that gained support in urban and rural areas as they took advantage of discontent among farmers, workers, traders, and the elite.

Events in French-ruled Africa thus helped lead to the decolonization of French West and Equatorial Africa by 1960, but here, too, the process proved different to that envisioned by colonial rulers and the ruled. In 1950, it was unclear whether these territories would emerge from the decolonization process as nation-states or as a self-governing units within a federation that was part of a wider French union of territories. The latter seemed to have won out as the French instituted a new policy through the *loi-cadre* (foundation law) of 1956 with gave each territory in French Africa its own government to control a budget and internal administration while France was responsible for defense and foreign affairs.

The final push for decolonization came about because of these forces as well as changes in France. The establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958, the result of African factors in the form of the Algerian war of liberation, proved influential. French president Charles de Gaulle offered a new relationship with France's territories in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the 1958 referendum, all dependencies but one chose autonomy within the French Union. Only Guinea, led by Sékou Touré, rejected that option and chose immediate independence from France. Within two years, however, the other territories in West and Equatorial Africa became separate nation-states following relatively brief negotiations with the French government. Numerous factors were responsible for this outcome, but African experiences and decisions were decisive.

Another decolonization history of this era associated with a negotiated independence was that of the Belgian Congo. Here the experience deviated from that of British or French West Africa. Dissent and discontent with European domination in the Congo took a variety of forms during the prewar and postwar periods in a dependency characterized by paternalistic colonialism. This had emphasized economic progress and social welfare over politics, and unlike other European colonial territories, the educated elite was extremely small in numbers. This, combined with Belgian policy that only allowed local political organizations in 1954, meant that national political

parties did not emerge in the Congo. Not surprisingly, the local associations reflected regional and ethnic differences that later characterized decolonization politics. As the 1950s came to an end, moreover, religious, ethnic, and economic grievances surged and tension heightened, particularly among the urban population of the capital Leopoldville, and in the copper-mining region of Katanga (later Shaba) province. These African factors produced a crucial response from Belgium. Faced in 1959 by riots in the capital, the Belgian government quickly conceded independence to the Congo with minimal preparation for a smooth transfer of power. This decolonization initiative produced. weak government, division, and civil war.

A second stage in African decolonization marked the period 1961–1968. The focus during this period was largely on the eastern and central portions of the continent. The British territories of Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, Zanzibar, Nyasaland, and Northern Rhodesia achieved independence during 1961–1964. These territories were viewed by British policymakers as being distinctly different from the West African empire. British rule had begun later in East and Central Africa, and there were significant racial minorities resident there. The latter comprised European farmers in Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, and Tanganyika, Arabs as the ruling minority and plantation owners on Zanzibar, and Asian (people who had come from British India) traders in the East African dependencies. These proved particularly significant so far as British calculations of the future were concerned. These groups wielded economic influence out of proportion to their population size. After the Second World War, Britain applied a policy that became known as multiracialism. It was to provide a means for sharing political power among members of racially defined groups.

This multiracialism implied that independence could be granted when there was 'proper provision' for all 'the main communities' that had made their homes in British East and Central Africa. The policy also meant that Britain had a responsibility to move the African populations more rapidly along 'on the path of political, social and economic progress'.[16] These goals and the policy itself proved impossible to achieve as multiracialism was rejected by the African majority as well as the Europeans. The policy was meant, for example, to protect the economic and political dominance as well as social influence of Kenya's and Southern Rhodesia's European settler community, but it never drew enthusiastic support from the latter.

Opposition to the official policy was one constant reason for the rise of anti-colonial movements and the eventual emergence of mass nationalism, but it was far from the only factor. The legacy of earlier discontent continued to be felt after the Second World War in terms of labor unrest, peasant opposition to the state's market and agricultural policies, religious dissidence, and opposition to colonial land and labor policies that disadvantaged Africans. Just as in other parts of British-ruled Africa, peasants, workers, traders, and

the educated elite were increasingly discontented with postwar conditions, including the developmentalist initiatives, in the rural and urban areas.

The most important manifestation of this unhappiness took the form of the Mau Mau revolt/war in Kenya between 1952 and 1956. The British suppressed the armed resistance, but metropolitan policymakers realized that reforms were needed to sustain colonial rule in Kenya and the other East and Central African colonies. While those fighting the British forces for land and freedom were largely drawn from among the landless, poor, and modestly educated people of central Kenya, the discontent underlying the revolt/war exemplified African unhappiness with their lack of voice in politics and administration, little chance for education, the absence of economic and social equality, and the difficulties African farmers and traders faced in gaining access to high-value cash crops, markets, and credit.

In seeking to address the discontent associated with Mau Mau, the British rulers' reform agenda actually speeded the end of colonial rule in Kenya and other East African territories, especially Tanganyika. The rural and urban reforms pushed so vigorously by the colonial state in Tanganyika provoked resistance leading to massive support for the nationalist political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Such was the level of support for TANU, that by mid-1959 Tanganyika's last governor, Sir Richard Turnbull, admitted that he was not confident his administration could for much longer rule the colony without facing another major rebellion in East Africa. Faced with this assessment of an important African factor, the British government decided to accede to TANU's demands, agreeing to independence in December 1961.

With this decision, the independence of Uganda (1962), Kenya (1963), and Zanzibar (1963) could not be far behind. In Kenya, for example, attempts by the colonial state to control nationalist dissent (banning nationwide African political parties and manipulating elections) failed in that by the early 1960s resistance to colonial rule had escalated to such an extent in western Kenya as to threaten British control itself. Unlike in Tanganyika's decolonization, divisive forces marked that of Uganda (ethnic, regional, and religious), Kenya (ethnic), and Zanzibar (racial), and presented problems for negotiators. Nevertheless, this final process was characterized by the haste with which British rule was formally ended with no solution to problems that British rule had created (e.g. the Lost Counties in Uganda).

The British Central Africa decolonization experience, on the other hand, was in some ways similar to that of East Africa. Just as there, the multiracial policy faced huge difficulties as a result of opposition from those who were meant to benefit from it. Europeans in Southern Rhodesia had enjoyed internal self-government since 1923 with an all-white legislature and cabinet. They refused to share power with the African majority after the war. In addition, the centerpiece for Britain's implementing the multiracial ideal, the

Central African Federation (officially Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland) spurred nationalist opposition.

The federation was established in 1953 linking the three territories (which retained their own territorial administrations) in a federal government (led by a prime minister) and close economic collaboration, but it was imposed in the face of African opposition. The existence of the federation, and African dislike of it, became the most critical factor which drove resistance in the form of mass nationalism. Most of the promised economic benefits of federation went to Southern Rhodesia. However, federation was not the only significant African factor as rural and urban discontent surged to the surface in all three territories as a result of issues such as land shortage, wages and working conditions, discrimination in employment and marketing, and a demand for greater education.

By the end of the 1950s, nationalist political parties had emerged in all three territories with an end of the federation topping the list of demands. In Nyasaland the opposition reached such proportions as to convince the governor to declare a state of emergency in 1959. This involved attempts to suppress the nationalist party by banning it and arresting its leaders, and the Northern Rhodesia administration also banned the largest nationalist party and arrested the party leader. The year 1959 also witnessed similar action by the minority government in Southern Rhodesia. The state actions did not have the desired effect of slowing discontent. The conduct of the Nyasaland emergency drew criticism in Britain and, according to many students of British decolonization, caused the government of Harold Macmillan to move quickly to decolonize in East as well as Central Africa.[17] An important element of the latter was the agreement to dissolve the federation in 1963. Nyasaland reached independence as Malawi and Northern Rhodesia as Zambia in 1964. Decolonization at this time was not the fate of Southern Rhodesia, however; the unwillingness of the ruling white minority meant that a negotiated settlement was not possible.

Instead, decolonization in Southern Rhodesia came about as a result of a war of liberation. This experience placed the British dependency in a category of decolonization histories similar to the Portuguese African territories, Algeria, Eritrea, Namibia, and South Africa. With the exception of Algeria, the histories of the wars of liberation fell in the post-1965 period.

A popular, but simplistic, explanation for this decolonization scenario recognized the strength of many of the forces and factors that produced hostility to colonial rule in those parts of Africa that experienced the rise of nationalism. In the end, however, no agreement on such a transfer proved possible as the colonial powers, such as Portugal, or the minority rulers, such as in Southern Rhodesia (Rhodesia after 1965), refused to give way and grant independence to a successor state in which the majority of the population would have the most powerful voice. The failure to achieve a negotiated decolonization, therefore, led to a war of liberation as the only means to alter

a situation marked by growing frustration among the majority of the territory's population.

Wars of liberation reflected this pattern, but they also involved other factors. For example, most, starting with the Algerian conflict, involved Cold War rivalry and shifting support by the Western and Eastern blocs. In most cases, moreover, wars of liberation were not confined territorially to the colonial entity itself, but spilled over into neighboring states. Metropolitan factors were influential here as changes in the system of governance in France and Portugal proved significant in ending the wars in Africa with decolonization.

Yet with wars of liberation also we may see the critical importance of African factors in the decolonization histories. An important one was the division among the liberation forces that grew out of competing political movements seeking an end to foreign or minority domination. This division had important ramifications as far as the wars in Rhodesia (independent as Zimbabwe) and Angola were concerned. Rival armies sought to liberate those territories and establish majority rule.

As in any war, victory in a military sense is important, but these were guerilla conflicts. Victory for the liberation forces often constituted maintaining a presence in the territory and inflicting damage on the enemy. Even more important, it meant winning support of the hearts and minds of the territorial population and maintaining it as the conflict dragged on for years. This African factor was critical for the ultimate success of most wars of liberation. Also significant was the takeover of a portion of the disputed territory by the liberation forces so as to initiate an alternative government that could provide security and services for the people under their rule, as in Mozambique. Weariness with the conflict and its impact among the population backing the rebels as well as the government in each territory was a local force that played a part in ending wars of liberation with decolonization.

South Africa's democratic transformation illustrates these factors and more. It is generally agreed that armed struggle was not, by itself, the key factor. Rather, a combination of changing international pressures together with internal discontent and hostility to the apartheid system, particularly in urban areas, forced the ruling whites to negotiate a transfer of power. Growing trade-union influence and youth discontent with educational and economic opportunities meant that the government was ultimately unable to paper over the contradictions emerging in the system constructed to protect and maintain white supremacy.

One other point may be made with regard to wars of liberation. This was their association with large movements of people. The process of decolonization in any historical era, of course, involved the departure or 'going home' of the colonial rulers.[18] In the twentieth-century African cases, however, movement of peoples constituted more than this. The wars themselves caused movements of refugees. The aftermath of wars provoked an exodus not just of colonial rulers, but of people from the metropole who had come to settle

and work in the dependent territory. This was most obvious in the departure of thousands of French from Algeria and Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique that accompanied the transfer of power to a successor regime.[19] This chapter raises this issue as one of many where research will likely provide new insights as to Africa's decolonization histories that occurred over differing time periods and involved regional and other differences. It offers several examples to illustrate the importance of African factors in the process. Though one narrative will not be likely to suffice, decolonization histories offer continued opportunities for significant research contributions to modern African history.

Notes

1. For an overview, see Toyin Falola, *Africa Volume 4: The End of Colonial Rule: Nationalism and Decolonization* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002).
2. Robert Tignor, *Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 5.
3. Frederick Cooper, *Africa Since 1940* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 74.
4. A.G. Hopkins, "Rethinking Decolonization," *Past and Present* 200 (2008): 215–16.
5. Eritrea gained independence from another African country, Ethiopia.
6. Hopkins, "Rethinking Decolonization," 216.
7. Cheikh Anta Babou, "Decolonization of National Liberation: Debating the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 642 (2010): 44.
8. Cooper, *Africa Since 1940*, 4.
9. Ibid., 30–32.
10. Ibid., 34.
11. Robert Maxon, *Going Their Separate Ways: Agrarian Transformation in Kenya, 1930–1950* (London: Associated University Presses, 2003), 115–16.
12. Cooper, *Africa Since 1940*, 37.
13. Robert Maxon, *Britain and Kenya's Constitutions, 1950–1960* (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2011), 22–23.
14. Derek Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, c. 1935–1972* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012), 23–25.
15. Cooper, *Africa Since 1940*, 41–44.
16. Maxon, *Britain and Kenya's Constitutions*, 34–35.
17. Wm. Roger Louis, "The Dissolution of the British Empire," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume IV The Twentieth Century*, ed. Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 353.
18. Anthony Kirk-Greene, "Decolonization: The Ultimate Diaspora," *Journal of Contemporary History* 36 (2001): 133–35.
19. Pamila Gupta, "Decolonization and (Dis)possession in Lusophone Africa," in *Mobility Makes States: Migration and Power in Africa*, ed. Darshan Vigneswaran and Joel Quirk (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 169–70.

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PART II

Postcolonial Africa

CHAPTER 27

Africa and the Cold War

Kenneth Kalu

'When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.'—*An African proverb.*

The Atlantic slave trade and colonialism have been the two major historical events often seen as the principal forces that shaped and continue to shape Africa's political economy and its relationship with the rest of the world. For sure, the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism were unique in their crass exploitation and harsh cruelty towards Africa's peoples and natural resources. The literature on the Atlantic slave trade is unambiguous on the devastating impacts of slave trade on Africa's culture, sociology, and political economy.[1] Slavery thrived on the use of extreme force, raids, kidnapping, and acts of inhumanity to Africans. Likewise, the European colonial experiment in Africa has been described as the foundation of Africa's inefficient and extractive institutions that have contributed to keeping Africa in its present state of underdevelopment.[2] These historical epochs had devastating impacts on the continent. European colonial administration set up institutions primarily designed to facilitate the extraction and transfer of Africa's natural resources to Europe. These extractive institutions and predatory state structures, which have persisted, have been the major cause of Africa's poor economic performance.[3]

Having suffered under colonial domination for decades, African countries began to gain political independence during the late 1950s. This period also coincided with the time of the Cold War. The Cold War can be seen as the

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period, from 1945 to 1991, of intense struggle for ideological supremacy between capitalist forces led by the USA and the forces of communism spearheaded by the USSR.[4] The Cold War shaped Africa's decolonization process and transition to nationhood in very significant ways. According to Jeremi Suri,[5] there are two distinguishable genres of literature on the place of the Cold War in shaping international relations and the global political economy after the Second World War. The first school of thought posits that the Cold War had a tremendous impact on the global political economy. Along this line, US foreign policy during the Cold War, however nuanced, is seen as some form of continuation of imperialism in all material respects.[6] According to this view, the major Cold War actors (the free market ideologues led by the USA, and the Soviet Union with its allies who were inspired by communism) played the most important roles in defining the direction of international relations and the global political economy at the end of the Second World War. The second school of thought argues that the whole narrative about the Cold War and its significance in the world system gives undue primacy to the USA and Europe and undermines the critical contributions of local actors in the peripheries, including Africa, Asia, and Latin America.[7] This school of thought argues, for example, that instead of framing decolonization around the actions and inactions of the USA, Europe, or the USSR, analysis should focus on the nationalist movements, on local struggles, and on domestic forces of change and liberation whose actions and sometimes ultimate sacrifices had significant impacts on the changes that took place, especially in developing countries. These actors may or may not have had any connections whatsoever with either the West or the East but were wrongly labeled to be sympathetic to either the Right or the Left. The latter argument seeks to bring to the fore the often neglected actors whose contributions shaped the socio-political trajectories of the time. This second strand of literature questions the seeming conventional wisdom that the principal Cold War rivalries shaped the nature of international relations after the Second World War.

The two distinct analytical frames summarized above have their arguments anchored on some premises: while one gives primacy to the activities of the superpowers in the postwar period, the other privileges local actors and domestic struggles as the most appropriate narrative for global dynamics, especially relating to the changes in Africa and the rest of the Third World. In aligning with one strand or the other, it is important to emphasize the economic strength and political clout of the actors and the role these variables play in shaping international relations. For sure, local nationalist movements are about the only legitimate vehicles to push for independence and self-government for their respective countries, but local actors needed the right resources to be able to organize a formidable pressure group to push forward their demands. Domestic pressure groups needed the international media, financial resources, and sometimes materials to stage a credible opposition.

Across the developing world, domestic actors received support from external forces, but such support or interventions were never without strings attached. Take the case of Guinea, which voted to exit the French Union in 1957. It is

reported that French President de Gaulle was so irked by Guinea's decision that he chose to make an example of the West African country by withdrawing all forms of assistance, including taking away hospital beds, school tables, and French personnel in order to make life unbearable for its citizens.[8] For sure, domestic actors voted for Guinea to leave the French Union, but the country would have been crippled without the timely intervention of the USSR. The intervention of the USSR set Guinea on the path to communism, which may not have been the original idea or intention of the domestic actors who voted for Guinea to severe ties with France. The case of Guinea and other such countries show that a more nuanced narrative that recognizes the critical roles of each actor (domestic and foreign) is perhaps a more appropriate frame. This chapter argues that the Cold War had important implications for Africa's decolonization process. In addition, the Cold War shaped the form of institutions and political culture that evolved in Africa in the post-independence period. This by no means undermines the important contributions of domestic actors whose struggles also shaped the independence movement in significant ways and whose actions have continued to define Africa's development trajectory up to the present.

The Cold War and Africa's Decolonization

The Second World War and its aftermath heralded a new vista in the global system. Besides its huge cost in human and material resources, the War led to the formation of new global alliances, altered existing relationships, created new superpowers, and demystified empires that had hitherto commanded respect, especially in the colonies. It was during the War that Africans finally realized that the European military wasn't invincible. Africans who were drafted to fight in the war alongside their imperial masters saw, perhaps for the first time, that the European military which had conquered and colonized Africa could be vulnerable. Having participated in the War alongside the Europeans, Africans came back more emboldened to confront their European colonizers. As Crawford Young noted, the War created a 'rupture in expectations', as colonial subjects pressed for enhanced political and economic stature for Africans.[9] During the War, European colonists had been concerned that the US military forces that fought were a multiracial contingent which included African Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and other 'non-European Americans'. The concern of the European colonists was that dealing with the 'black Americans would explode some of the racial stereotypes they had consciously cultivated in their colonies'.[10] In effect, because the colonial policy directly denigrated Africans as being inferior to the white man, the colonists were concerned about how to relate with African Americans without contradicting the stereotype they had institutionalized in the African colonies. As Westad noted, this apparent contradiction came to a head when an adviser to the Belgian Government in the Congo, Felix de Muelenaere, tried to explain this contradiction to the African American diplomat Ralph Bunche in 1942. Felix de Muelenaere noted that black American

soldiers 'would have a bad effect on the Congo natives, especially on the detribalized native clerks … The Congo native would begin to think that he should have the same privileges as the highly developed American blacks who are college graduates, doctors, and professors'.[11]

After first-hand experience of the devastation which Europe suffered, Africans began to question the toga of invincibility which was associated with the European military. The new realization that the colonial army was not infallible helped to strengthen the resolve of African freedom fighters to intensify the struggles for independence. In addition, the exposure of Africans from the colonies to black Americans during the War helped colonial subjects to begin to question some of the racial prejudices that the European colonists had consciously laid in the minds of Africans. Although the black Americans were still facing a series of racial challenges in the USA, at least the native African believed that the black American prospects were much better than those of Africans in the hands of the colonial masters. The first decade of the postwar period therefore witnessed intensified pressures for changes to colonial policies. However, the initial response of the French and the British imperial powers to Africa's demands was violent resistance and suppression as witnessed in Algeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar and Tunisia, where local uprisings were brutally crushed by the French military. The British colonial government equally used violent forces to suppress the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya, and this led to the death of many civilians in the area where the Mau Mau group held sway.[12]

Nationalist movements and the struggle for independence in the African colonies had been in process to varying degrees for as long as colonialism had lasted, and the struggle had understandably focused on internal issues relevant to the local population. However, following the end of the War, external interests began to alter the dynamics of independence struggles in significant ways. In a bid to promote their economic interests or to push forward one ideology or the other, external forces besides Africa's colonial masters began to take a more than passive interest in the geopolitical dynamics in the continent. Consequently, local independence struggles in the African colonies began to take on new forms. The two Cold War rivalries (the USA-led Western forces and the Soviet Union with its allies) began to play active roles in the political economy of African colonies. These foreign interventions meant that some conflicts that should otherwise have been on a small scale and prosecuted by contending domestic forces escalated and took on larger dimensions. The external interventions usually resulted in more destruction, exacerbated instability, and produced more permanent devastation in the region.[13] In effect, one of the legacies of the Cold War on the continent is a higher degree of violence in the region during independence struggles and up to the period immediately following political independence. Take the case of Angola, where the struggle took on a different dimension, so much so that about 30,000 Cuban troops had to be deployed to the fight alongside revolutionaries. The Cuban troops were deployed because Cuba felt that Angola

was towing the communist line and thus qualified as an ally. Although the USSR had no direct interest in Angola, Moscow had to lend its support to the revolutionaries there because of their communist leanings. As expected, the USA also intervened in the Angolan crisis, using the South African army to quell opposition from forces that were believed to be pro-communist.[14] One can only imagine the consequence of such multilateral interventions in Angola, as in other equally struggling African countries at that time.

The USA and its allies were always willing to show sympathy to movements that supported (or were seen to lean towards) capitalism as opposed to communism. Interestingly, all the major colonial powers in Africa (Belgium, Britain, France, and Portugal) were US allies. An easy option for the USA would have been to offer unconditional support for the continuation of these allies' empires, but this option was not a feasible one for the USA for several reasons. First, the USA had no colonies in Africa but was desirous of promoting both its influence and economic interests in the region. Therefore, allowing Western European colonists to continue with their empires would not have given the USA the opportunity to enter the lucrative African market for raw materials. Second, at the end of the War, the notion of self-determination was creeping into global political ideology. With the emergence of the United Nations, that had been set up to promote world peace and to emphasize the human rights of all peoples irrespective of race or creed, colonialism had become a sort of contradiction to the dictates of self-determination. Colonial subjects had their human rights largely denied by the colonial masters, and colonial subjects had no say on how they were governed. Colonialism thus became an anachronism in the emerging world order. Third, there was the palpable fear in the minds of US policymakers that the Soviet Union would find ready and available converts to communism among the oppressed peoples of the colonies. These factors put the USA in a rather difficult position with respect to its appropriate role in Africa's decolonization struggles. The USA therefore supported decolonization, in part to dilute the influence of Europe over African countries. However, the US government was careful not to allow the independence struggles to be hijacked by socialist elements or for the independent states to move towards communism.[15]

By the late 1940s, the economic challenges faced by Europe following the War had become clearer, and the cost of maintaining the colonies was becoming a major issue for the colonial governments. In Europe, questions were being raised about the reasonableness of maintaining the African colonies. It would be recalled that the colonies were mainly a source of raw materials for European industries, but the War had devastated the European economy, destroyed infrastructure, and led to general decline in industrial production and capacity. This meant that the demand for African raw materials had also declined since the industries that needed them were not functioning at the scale of the prewar period. The effects of the War on Europe thus gave rise to questions about the appropriate place of the African colonies. However, because the colonies were still largely considered assets for the metropolitan

governments, the resolve of Europe was to maintain them and suppress the rising agitations.

After the initial violent suppression of internal agitations by the colonial governments in the immediate postwar period, especially in the French colonies, it became clear to imperial Europe that changes were inevitable. By the 1950s, the British colonial government had given more representations to Africans, and more responsibilities were accorded to domestic political actors. However, Britain adopted a strategy to mentor a crop of new African elites that would protect British interests when power was eventually handed over to them. It was only in Kenya that the Mau Mau uprising posed a difficult challenge to the British colonial administration, leading to the use of British military to crush the uprising. The rather brutal reaction to the Mau Mau insurgency had severe consequences for the civilian population, where an estimated 200,000 Africans became victims.[16] The British hoped that setting up the Commonwealth of former colonies would help safeguard British interests whenever the countries eventually gained independence. This strategy meant that the British colonial governments were not deeply bothered by the increasing wave of independence struggles. However, for the African population, it meant that politically independent status would actually mean little in substance as the imperial power would remain largely in control of the economy and continue to have significant influence on political developments in the independent states. This strategy of planning for the protection of European interests, as against preparing the colonies for balanced and sustainable growth and development after colonial rule, set the stage for neo-colonialism in the postcolonial period.

In the French colonies the situation differed considerably from the fairly straightforward post-empire strategy of Britain. France felt that it would lose its place in the global political and economic equation if it lost its African colonies. Consequently, the French government fought devastating wars to suppress nationalist agitations, leading to the vicious conflict in Algeria and the use of military forces against independent struggles in the West African colonies. However, the global environment in the postwar period was generally not conducive to the maintenance of empires. The US government was concerned that revolutionaries in the colonies could be easy prey for communist infiltration, and France could not get the support from the US government to maintain the status quo in the French African colonies. As nationalist struggles continued, the French government had no option but to concede more grounds to African nationalists. The French first created more seats in the French Parliament for French Africans. With less than 3% of the seats reserved for Africans, the gesture was aimed at appeasing the natives and creating a more conducive environment for the continuation of French colonial rule. However, by 1960, most of the French African colonies had gained independence, although France negotiated a range of military, political, and economic partnership agreements that would protect the country's interests in the post-independence period.[17]

France was reluctant to grant independence to its African colonies, but Belgium and Portugal were even less willing to do so. The violent dictatorship of King Leopold II in Congo and the subsequent transfer of the colony's administration to Belgium had done little to prepare Africans for self-government. In the Congo, education was not readily available to Africans, as the colonial government was reluctant to bring Western education for fear that it would enhance the exposure of the natives and lead to more potent agitations, thereby creating problems for the colonial government. In 1960, when Congo gained political independence, there were only 20 Congolese who had obtained a university degree.[18] As such there were not many Western-educated Africans to assume positions of leadership in the new country. This meant that Belgium maintained a significant presence in independent Congo, controlling the large mining corporations and running the country's military. Like Belgium, Portugal was unwilling to embrace self-government for its African colonies. Not being as powerful as Britain or France, Portugal felt that it would lose whatever strength it had if it lost its African colonies. In Angola and Mozambique, the Portuguese fought a protracted war against African independence movements, but again the balance of global power was tilted against colonialism, and Portugal had to reluctantly grant self-government to its African colonies.

During the decolonization process, the two major Cold War actors had begun to take on major roles in the African colonies beyond those they had played before the War. The USA generally supported decolonization but wanted independent African states to embrace free-market principles instead of falling into the hands of the communist USSR. The USA wanted access to raw materials from African colonies. The European imperialists had hitherto maintained exclusive control over African trade. While the USA supported self-government and independence for the colonies, it frowned at violent revolutionaries who were often accused of receiving support from the communist USSR. The USA therefore encouraged the colonial governments to embrace changes that would leave no room for violent agitations. On the other hand, the USSR, China, and Cuba provided assistance to nationalist movements that were seen to be sympathetic to socialist principles, or, at least, that were not aligned with US capitalism. Along these lines, the USSR at one time or another extended assistance to nationalist movements in Algeria, Angola, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, and Mozambique, among others.[19]

In general, while one may not conclude that the Cold War led to decolonization in Africa, the Cold War significantly altered the dynamics of independence struggles. The pursuit of economic and ideological domination by the superpowers turned Africa into a center for a proxy war. African nationalists took advantage of the interest shown by the USA, the USSR, Cuba, and China in the political and economic development of the region. Financial and material support became more readily available to independence movements and revolutionaries that were seen to be sympathetic to the ideology of

the donor nation. Although this increased support helped the independence movements in different countries, it also led to the influx and proliferation of arms in African countries, leading to more violent struggles and a spike in the number of crises, wars, and associated fatalities. As Schmidt observed, 'from Kennedy through the Nixon administrations, American weapons, tanks, planes, ships, helicopters, napalm, and chemical defoliants were used against Africans in the Portuguese colonies …'.[20] This was the case across the continent wherever the US government and its European allies felt that domestic revolutionaries were receiving support from the USSR or any other country on the communist side. The unfortunate end product of the military interventions by the USA and the USSR and their allies was the increased militarization of African societies, because once arms are in the hands of agitators or revolutionaries, it is difficult to retrieve them even after the object of the initial struggle has been won or lost. The infiltration of external powers through the provision of financial and military support during the Cold War contributed significantly to the proliferation of arms in the region. The consequence was continued conflict, unnecessary militarization, and civil wars in the post-independence period.

While the Cold War may have helped to quicken the decolonization process, it had deeper negative consequences in fueling violent conflicts, arming state and non-state actors, and heightening social and political instability in the region. The result of arms proliferation was more wars, increased guerilla warfare, armed robbery, and general crisis in the region even after independence. Within the first decade of independence (1960–1970), Africa had experienced 27 military coups d'état that led to change of government, and 12 failed coup attempts, making a total of 37 military coups in the continent.[21] Although one may not conclude that external interventions during the Cold War were the only causes of the crises, the activities of the main Cold War actors had significant impacts on all the major political and economic events in the region. The ease with which the Cold War superpowers supplied arms and other forms of military assistance to African countries helped to militarize the region and turned many countries into a keg of gunpowder waiting to explode. As Europeans departed at the dawn of independence, the seed of instability that was being sown from the period of colonial rule to the Cold War era germinated and produced military coups, communal conflicts, and civil wars. The Cold War superpowers were adept at identifying local champions, who were then supported to promote the ideology of the particular superpower. In many African countries, one would see the USA providing resources to one group and the USSR supporting a different factional leader. The propping-up of puppets (a major foreign policy strategy of the USA during the Cold War era) was a precursor to political crises, wars, and the destruction that characterized the African continent up to the 1970s and 1990s.

The Cold War and Political Institutions in Independent Africa

It is well established that colonialism left a legacy of extractive institutions and predatory states that was not conducive to real economic growth and development.[22] As African countries began to gain political independence in the 1960s, there was growing optimism that with the United Nations in place, the world would make an effort to ameliorate some of the problems that had hindered Africa's social, political, and economic development. However, as Christopher O'Sullivan noted, the world missed that opportunity to address the myriad of challenges facing Africa largely due to the bitter rivalry between the two factions of the Cold War era.[23] The USA and the USSR failed to forge the global cooperation and partnerships necessary for Africa and the international community to work together towards correcting the evils that European colonial exploitation had unleashed on Africa and its people. As the superpowers struggled for supremacy, the developing nations, including some of the newly independent African countries, formed the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which was a coalition of nations that were not aligned to the Right as dictated by the USA nor to the Left under the leadership of the USSR at that time. For sure, members of the NAM had neither the economic capacity nor the political clout to effect the kind of changes that would fundamentally alter the trajectories of failure and despondency laid for Africa by European imperialists.

The world superpowers in the immediate postwar period were interested in spreading their influence and parallel ideologies across the globe. Engrossed in ideological warfare, the superpowers and the rest of the world paid no attention to the deficient foundations laid in Africa by European imperialists: the arbitrary borders created by colonial Europe, the destructive exploitation of Africa's natural resources, the conscious establishment of extractive institutions that were not amenable to development, the creation of a perverse economic structure dependent only on the export of a few cash crops to European firms, and the colonial masters' strategy to retain a firm grip over the region even after the end of formal colonialism. The period of independence would have been a great time for the world to review the conditions and prospects of the emerging African states. But instead of setting Africa on a developmental trajectory, the politics of the Cold War turned the continent into a site for proxy wars between the two superpowers and their allies. As the African saying quoted at the beginning of this chapter aptly states, Africa again suffered as the two big elephants (the USA and the USSR) fought for ideological supremacy.

As colonialism was fading away, the USA became increasingly concerned about the direction that independent African states could take. The fear expressed within the US government was that the USSR might infiltrate the newly independent states, and entice African leaders to embrace communism. The thinking was that the exit of European colonists could exacerbate this

problem. It was against this background that President J.F. Kennedy made the following statements in 1961:

> We live in a world which has changed tremendously in our lifetime—history only will secure a full perspective on that change. But there is Africa, which was held by Western European powers for several centuries, now independent—which holds within its countries masses of people, many of them illiterate, who live on average incomes of 50 or 60 or 75 dollars a year, who want a change, who now are the masters of their own house but who lack the means of building a viable economy, who are impressed by the example of the Soviet Union and the Chinese, who—not knowing the meaning of freedom in their lives—wonder whether the Communist system holds the secrets of organizing the resources of the state in order to bring them a better life.[24]

The US government therefore focused on counter-strategies. African leaders who appeared to have sympathy for socialist ideas were rebuffed and isolated by the USA, regardless of whether they were loved by their people. For example, Ghana's President, Kwame Nkrumah, although very popular amongst the people of Ghana, was seen by the USA as being too radical and almost pandering towards communist ideas. Consequently, the US government thought he was becoming a threat that must be isolated in order to ensure he did not drag his country to communism. In a memo to President Kennedy, Chester Bowles (the President's special envoy), stated as follows, after a visit to Africa in 1962:

> Nkrumah is continuing to lose ground as a political force and is likely to become increasingly isolated from the mainstream of African politics … Our policy in Ghana should therefore be one of restraint. By denying Nkrumah a demagogic issue … we will help to assure his increasing isolation.[25]

The Cold War era somehow made it impossible for the USA to consider other factors (such as domestic preferences or the long-term interest of African countries) in its policies towards Africa. African leaders increasingly realized that US foreign policy during the Cold War was not necessarily premised on promoting Africa's long-term interest despite the grants and aid provided by the US government. Consequently, the atmosphere of distrust which defined the relationships between the West and African countries after the period of colonialism persisted despite the independent status of most African countries. Besides protecting capitalist ideas and ensuring that the USSR did not infiltrate African countries with communism, the USA sought to expand its economic interests into the African region. In the same vein, the major imperial powers of Britain and France were not in a hurry to relinquish their hold on the colonies.

Even as many African countries gained independence in the 1960s, the colonists were not willing to give up control of the region's economy. At the time of independence, the colonial forces took proactive steps to safeguard

their economic interests and investments in the colonies. The determination to maintain control over African countries and to avoid the intrusion of communism into Africa led Europe, with its US ally, to play principal roles in deciding who would succeed the colonial government. The result was selective support for political leaders who were expected to safeguard the economic interests of the departing colonists and embrace capitalism over communism. In supporting one African politician over another, the external interventionist paid little or no attention to what would advance the interests of the African population but focused only on protecting the selfish interests of the external forces. Beginning in the late 1950s, external interventions in Africa's politics were widespread, and the primary mission of such interventionists was to raise and foist on African countries new sets of leaders who would entrench the ideology of the benefactor. Perhaps the situation in the former Belgium colony of Congo best illustrates the callousness of foreign actors who cared less about the welfare of Africans. Even by colonial standards, Congo (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) suffered terrible exploitation under King Leopold II, who ruled the Central African country with an iron hand and perpetrated some of the worst forms of abuses in colonial Africa. For Congo, independence should have marked a breath of fresh air and the discontinuation of the exploitation and expropriation that occurred on a grand scale during colonial rule. Instead, the intrigues of the Cold War brought devastation to the region, such that Congo has never seen stability since gaining independence in 1960. At independence, the people of Congo elected Patrice Lumumba as the country's first prime minister. Lumumba was a Pan-Africanist who believed in the emancipation and unification of Africa. He opposed the brutal exploitation of colonialism in all its ramifications and he was not afraid to show his disdain for the colonial forces. His tough stance on reclaiming Congo and its resources from Belgian imperialists did not go down well with Belgium and the USA. Lumumba faced strong opposition from external forces who feared that this new leader would embark on reforms that would dilute Belgium's control over the country.

Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was not afraid to tell the truth to the colonists. It was reported that in his speech on the day of Congo's independence, he reminded the audience, including the departing colonial officials, as follows: 'We are proud of this struggle, of tears, of fire, and of blood, to the depths of our being, for it was a noble and just struggle, and indispensable to put an end to the humiliating slavery which was imposed upon us by force'.[26] These words, spoken by the new Prime Minister in the presence of Belgian officials, foreign press and King Baudouin of Belgium at Congo's independence celebration in 1960, irked the latter, who had earlier counseled the new Prime Minister to retain the 'structures' that Belgium was handing over to him at independence. From the beginning of Patrice Lumumba's administration, he did not have the support of Belgium and the USA. He was seen as a radical nationalist, concerned about Africa's liberation and unity, and who would not protect European interests in Congo. Within the first days

of his government, a factional force declared independence for the province of Katanga from Congo on July 11, 1960. The secessionist forces were supported wholly by Belgium, thus plunging the nascent nation into avoidable crisis.

Lumumba sought the support of the United Nations to quell the secessionist forces and restore peace to the new nation,[27] but help was not forthcoming as the USA supported Belgium. Lumumba then sought the support of the USSR to maintain peace in the Congo. This action was the straw that broke the camel's back, as it was viewed as a declaration for communism by Lumumba. The crisis took on an international dimension and the battle was fought not just in Congo but also on the floor of the United Nations. The USSR demanded that the United Nations secure the immediate release of Lumumba who had, at that time, been arrested by the military forces led by General Mobutu. The USSR also asked the then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold to order Belgian officials to leave Congo for the Congolese.[28] These demands were not met because the USA had thought that Congo, which had uranium deposits, would fall into the hands of the Soviets if Belgium left. The US's interest was not about the welfare of Africans in Congo; neither was it concerned about restoring stability in the country according to the wishes of Congolese. Rather, the USA's preoccupation was on how to ensure that Congo did not enter into any relationship with the USSR or allow the latter access to its uranium deposits. The crisis escalated, culminating in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and the eventual emergence of the Western-backed Joseph Mobutu.

The assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba was greeted with protests across the world, and not a few believed there was Western complicity in his death. Patrice Lumumba had been very determined to turn the fortunes of Congo around for the good of the Congolese. In his often celebrated independence speech, he had reminded the world that the wounds inflicted on Africa and Africans were:

> too fresh and too smarting for us to be able to have known ironies, insults, and blows which we had to undergo morning, noon and night because we were Negroes. We have seen our lands spoiled in the name of laws which only recognized the right of the strongest. We have known laws which differed according to whether it dealt with a black man or a white.[29]

The USA thought he was too radical and as such susceptible to communist ideas. Congo represents a classic example of the devastating impacts of the Cold War on Africa. From the time of independence, Congo has not known peace and the exploitative structures that began under King Leopold II have largely persisted. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba might not have achieved complete transformation of the Congo if he had been allowed to lead his people, but he was clear about his detestation for colonialism and the slavery that was the hallmark of Congo's colonial experience. The Congo crisis in the 1960s devastated not only Congo, but also affected other countries in the region.

Sometimes, events like the Congo crisis are analyzed on the surface, perhaps in terms of the destruction of lives and properties only. While the loss of life and property are indeed some of the negatives of the crisis, a major effect of such development is the institutional legacy it created in the country and the region at large. The Cold War and the crisis it generated created institutions that reinforce exploitation and are continuously prone to crisis. It also liberalized the culture of violence with the influx of arms from external forces to support one group or another. Despite Congo's enormous resources, poverty has persisted and the country has rarely enjoyed peace and stability since its independence. The form of institutions that promote a culture of violence and inhibit inclusive productive engagements by all are not conducive to growth and development, irrespective of the policy adopted, and irrespective of the volume of foreign aid extended to the country.

As his Western supporters expected, Mobutu did not dismantle the exploitative structures that had been set up by the colonial government. Rather, Mobutu continued with the crass exploitation of Congo's resources even to a scale that was as much as, or even more devastating, than had been the case during the rule of King Leopold II.[30] The USA and Belgium supported the rise of Mobutu in Congo and provided him cover, just as he protected the interest of Belgium, shunned the overtures of the USSR, and pursued the free market ideas of the West. For his loyalty to the West, President Mobutu at first received the foreign support he needed to continue to exploit his people. Congo's experience shows that international interventions in the continent during the Cold War period were not always for the overall long-term interest of Africans.

While decolonization and the principles of self-determination are good ideas on their own, the process of decolonization and the emergence of independent African countries could have taken a different form. The colonial government was predatory, and all political and economic institutions during colonial rule were extractive, designed to exploit and expropriate Africa's resources. In effect, the colonial state and its structures were not anchored on any social contract between the state and its citizens. The government belonged to the colonial masters and their respective home governments. Africans were alienated from the government and state–society relations were defined by exploitation in all material respects. Given the structure of colonial rule, one would have expected that at the end of colonialism, Africa's development partners would work with the incoming African leaders to dismantle those colonial institutions that fostered exploitation and expropriation. An African-centered process of decolonization should have included the restructuring of all institutions of the state from the civil service to the military, and from the electoral process to the judiciary, and property rights should have been properly defined to reduce the risk of expropriation. Independent African states needed to launch into statehood with inclusive institutions that would redefine the essence of the state and create mutually beneficial relationships between the state and its citizens.

The Cold War focused the attention of the world on the distinction between capitalism and communism and on the superiority of one over the other. International politics revolved around these two models, and the search for recruits for either of these ideas became the major concern of the world superpowers of that era. Africa and other developing countries across the world became the center of contestation, as the USA sought to enmesh the newly independent nations within the free market, while the USSR and China were busy seeking new converts to communism. As Schmidt noted, many African leaders took advantage of the rush for new converts. These countries courted different parties to the ideological divide, and often simultaneously received support from opposing forces.[31] While this contestation lasted, the superpowers that should have invested in recreating the new nations just emerging from many decades of exploitation and devastation abandoned this role and concentrated on hawking ideas. Africa needed a fundamental restructuring in the 1960s to have a real chance of achieving meaningful development after decades of colonial exploitation.

The arbitrary division of the continent into incoherent and unworkable units for the convenience of the colonial masters, the brutal exploitation of the region's resources, and the establishment of political and economic structures that were by all accounts exploitative are good reasons for believing that African countries needed restructuring at the end of colonial rule. Instead, the Cold War diverted the attention of the world from the precarious state of the continent to vain pursuit of ideological supremacy between the West and the East. While new dictators emerged following the withdrawal of old ones, the world looked the other way for as long as the dictator conformed to the 'free market ideas' and allowed the West access to natural resources in the region. It is not likely that the devastation suffered by Europe during the Second World War was anything close to the institutionalized looting and massive destruction that took place in Africa during several decades of colonial rule. Yet while the USA was quick to put in place the Marshall Plan designed to rebuild Europe after the War, no such plan was designed to rebuild Africa after the devastation of colonialism and its aftermath. The Cold War diverted the world's attention to the propagation of ideologies that served the interest of the First World, and restricted the choices available to the periphery. Even the setting up of the Non-Aligned Movement by some countries in Africa and parts of Asia could not help these countries to fend off the powerful influence of the USA and Western Europe.

One must note that Africans are also culpable for their complicity in carrying on with the exploitative structures set up by colonial Europe even after colonialism had ended. Regional bodies like the then Organization of African Unity, now the African Union (AU), could have taken a hard look at the continent immediately after political independence. But the AU failed to initiate the critical restructuring that was needed to change the independent states. This failure on the part of the regional body should be expected because of the global dynamics of that time. Radical movements were promptly crushed

by the US government and its allies, as such movements were dubbed communist insurgencies that must be curbed in order to give the world the free market that the USA and its allies believed would enhance society's welfare. One can excuse African leaders in the first decade of independence for following the European colonial exploiters and prioritizing America's free market over restructuring of their countries. Perhaps many of the African leaders were rather too naïve to embark on such a fundamental project. The support of the superpowers was what Africa needed to restructure its societies out of the perverse anti-development structures that colonialism bequeathed on the continent.

Although the Cold War is over, Africa continues to bear the real cost of the ideological battle that occurred at a time when the continent was just emerging from colonialism. Africa's political space of today remains dominated by a few 'big men'. Just like in the era of colonialism, most African governments are detached from the people and state–society relations are largely defined by exploitation and predation on citizens. In most of Africa, economic institutions are not inclusive and do not support productive engagements by every citizen. The restructuring of institutions and state-society relations that needed to happen at the end of colonialism did not take place because the key actors that should have championed this critical restructuring were engaged in a needless Cold War. Consequently, the colonial institutions that served mainly the interests of the colonial government persisted, and African governments now only seem to exist to serve a privileged few. Instead of restructuring the governance arrangements, the emerging African leaders, supported by the West, maintained the colonial structures that paid little attention to serving the general population. Continuation of the colonial institutions helped to safeguard the interests of the former colonists at the expense of the African population. Real development has therefore been difficult to achieve because the extant political and economic institutions were never designed to produce broad-based growth and development. One should note that it is actually disingenuous to expect the colonial institutions that once treated Africans as objects of exploitation to turn and serve the same population as citizens. The overall effects of these perverse institutions is scandalous levels of inequality between a privileged few and the masses, with abject poverty and misery being the norm for the general population. There is no attempt here to suggest that the Cold War is to blame for all of Africa's developmental challenges. The argument is that the Cold War helped to shift the attention of the world from appraising the devastation of colonialism in Africa and coming up with an Africa-type Marshall Plan to restructure the continent.

The Cold War also facilitated the emergence of a new set of dictators who took over the reins of leadership at the twilight of colonialism. Once these dictators appeared to protect the interest of the departing colonial masters or were in tune with the free-market ideology that was spearheaded by the USA at that time, the world overlooked the atrocities of the dictator and actively supported his reign over Africans. In many respects, the Cold War

facilitated the transfer of African countries from European colonial masters to African dictators. The implication is that no real change took place following the end of colonialism. What happened was the transfer of the colonies from European taskmasters to African dictators and emperors, while the fate of the ordinary citizen remained largely the same. The departing colonial powers consciously transferred power to Africans who would maintain the status quo and not implement fundamental restructuring to alter the colonial order and produce real benefits for Africans. Cold War actors were more interested in the pursuit of parochial interests than the interests of African countries.

Conclusion

At the end of the Second World War, the USA was determined to spread free-market ideas to Africa and the rest of world. It was also an opportunity for America to gain access to Africa's markets, which had hitherto been dominated exclusively by European imperialists. On the other hand, the USSR and its allies were hawking communist ideas and found the emerging African nations a fertile ground for the spread of communism. The USSR believed that the struggles of Africans and other Third World populations against colonialism and other forms of domination and exploitation were natural tenets of communism. Therefore, the communist countries could identify with Africans in the struggle for freedom. The two superpowers (the USA and USSR) were both interested in the fate of the Third World. However, this interest was not necessarily out of love for the oppressed people of the developing world but was based on the self-interest of the superpowers and the pursuit of ideological supremacy. Perhaps the USSR genuinely supported the liberation movement in Africa out of principle, but such cannot be said of the USA. The USA supported decolonization, in part to dilute the economic influence of Europe over African countries and to make an inroad into the African market. While the USA supported decolonization, it was conscious not to allow the independence struggles by African nationalists to be hijacked by communist elements. It was based on this paradigm that President Eisenhower wrote to Prime Minister Winston Churchill on the need for an end to colonialism as follows:

> [T]here is abroad in the world a fierce and growing spirit of nationalism. Should we try to dam it up completely, it would, like a mighty river, burst through the barriers and could create havoc. But again, like a river, if we are intelligent enough to make constructive use of this force, then the result, far from being disastrous, could rebound greatly to our advantage, particularly in our struggle against the Kremlin's power.[32]

In effect, the US government felt the appropriate strategy was to 'moderate' Africa's independence so as to avoid the 'infiltration' of communist elements in the struggle for independence.

International relations during the Cold War were dominated by the selfish interests of the superpowers. Although the Cold War afforded African countries access to finance and the military support of one or other Cold War superpower, it created a permanent stain on the political culture and development trajectory of these countries. Because financial and military support were readily available to domestic forces (from either side of the divide), these forms of support helped to escalate and broaden conflicts that would otherwise have had far less disastrous effects on the people. The protracted wars in Algeria between 1954 and 1962, and the conflict in Congo in the 1960s that ousted Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and installed one of Africa's worst dictators, are major examples of the negative influence of the Cold War in African countries. Instead of serving to liberate African countries, Cold War rivalries fostered the continuation of imperialism in a different form. Africans were not allowed to pursue development and statehood in ways that worked for African societies. Rather, the USA had its own definition of modernism which had to be followed by the nascent countries, otherwise they were accused of following the communist agenda. Instead of enjoying true independence, African countries did not have the freedom to pursue their own ideas of modernity. Their near pathological attachment to opposing ideologies developed into feelings of insecurity in the minds of the two superpowers, such that US foreign policy became one based on the belief that 'my enemy's enemy is my friend' and vice versa.[33] In effect, if a country was not following communist ideas, such a country or its leader was considered a US ally.

While political independence should have been a great opportunity for African countries to evolve institutions and a development paradigm that worked for African communities, the Cold War politics blocked such opportunities for the nascent nations and led to the confusion that has characterized Africa's political economy ever since. Again, the intrigues in Congo at the time of independence readily come to mind. The people of Congo overwhelmingly voted for Patrice Lumumba to direct the affairs of independent Congo, but the US government was not comfortable with Lumumba's ideas and rhetoric. In pursuit of its Cold War objectives, the USA and its Belgian ally helped to thwart the wishes of the people of Congo. Patrice Lumumba was removed from office and the more US-friendly General Mobutu was helped onto the throne. The fate of Congo under Mobutu is well known. While we may not know whether Congo would have fared better under Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, the brazen manner in which the wishes of the Congolese were truncated left a permanent scar in the minds of Africans and helped to entrench a political culture defined by violence and brute force.

The process of decolonization presented an opportunity for the world to assist Africa in dismantling the extractive political and economic institutions established in the continent by European colonial powers. However, the intrigues of the Cold War deviated the attention of the world to the real problems facing Africa and the rest of the Third World. Instead of targeting the utterly destructive legacies of colonialism, US foreign policy towards

Africa focused on dictating the type of modernity that independent African states must pursue. The battle for supremacy between the US-led forces of capitalism and the apostles of communism anchored by the USSR and China often resulted in violent conflicts. The destructive forces of political brigandage, frequent military overthrow of popular government, and civil wars in African countries after political independence are direct consequences of the Cold War.

Notes

1. See Paul E. Lovejoy, *Transformation in Slavery: A History in Slavery in Africa*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Patrick Manning, *Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental and African Slave Trades* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
2. Daron Acemoglu, Simeon Johnson, and James Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *The American Economic Review* 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369–401.
3. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, "Why is Africa Poor?" *Economic History of Developing Regions* 25, no. 1 (2010): 21–50.
4. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3.
5. Jeremi Suri, "The Cold War, Decolonization, and Global Social Awakenings: Historical Intersections," *Cold War History* 6, no. 3 (2006): 353–63.
6. See for example the important contributions by: Thomas McCormick, *America's Half Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1995); Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004); among others.
7. See for example the work of: Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincialising Europe*: *Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Matthew Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict During the Algerian War for Independence," *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000), 739–69; among others.
8. Richard J. Reid, *A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present* (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2012), 278.
9. Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994): 184–85.
10. Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 132.
11. Conversation between Bauche and de Muelenaere, November 16, 1942, quoted in Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 132.
12. Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Interventions in Africa: from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
13. Schmidt, *Foreign Interventions in Africa*, 23.
14. Jeremi Suri, "The Cold War, Decolonization, and Global Social Awakenings: Historical Intersections."
15. Schmidt, *Foreign Interventions in Africa*, 23.
16. Frantz Fanon (English translation by Richard Philcox), *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2004), 38.

17. Richard Reid, *A History of Modern Africa*, 277–78.
18. David Wallechinsky, *Tyrants, the World's 20 Worst Living Dictators* (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006).
19. Schmidt, *Foreign Interventions in Africa*, 25.
20. Ibid., 82.
21. Habiba Ben Barka and Mthuli Ncube, "Political Fragility in Africa: Are Military Coups d'état a Never Ending Phenomena?," *AfDB Chief Economist Complex*, September 2012.
22. See the seminal work by Acemoglu et al., *The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development*; and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, "Why is Africa Poor," *Economic History of Developing Regions*, 25, no. 1 (2010), 21–50; among others.
23. Christopher O'Sullivan, "The United Nations, Decolonization, and Self-Determination in Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960–1994," *Journal of Third World Studies* 12, no. 2 (2005): 103–20.
24. "Special Message to Congress on Foreign Aid," March 22, 1961, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy*, Vol. 1, 340–43 (quoted in Wested, 134–35).
25. Chester Bowles to President J.F. Kennedy, "Report on a Mission to Africa," October 17–November 9, 1962, DDRS (Quoted in Westad, 135).
26. Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Africa 1960–1970: Chronicle and Analysis* (Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press, 2009), 20.
27. Christopher O'Sullivan, "The United Nations, Decolonization, and Self-Determination in Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960–1994."
28. United Nation, *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960* (New York: United Nations, 1961), 52–129.
29. "Marred: M. Lumumba's Offensive Speech in King's presence." London: *The Guardian*, July 1, 1960. https://www.theguardian.com/world/1960/jul/01/congo.
30. Reid, *Modern Africa*, 288.
31. Schmidt, *Foreign Interventions*, 27–28.
32. Quoted in Gregory A. Olson, "Eisenhower and the Indochina Problem," in *Eisenhower's War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 98.
33. Westad, *Global Cold War*, 399.

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CHAPTER 28

African Politics Since Independence

Ademola Araoye

Engaging the complexities of politics in Africa since independence poses the challenge of distilling commonalities across a wide universe of 56 African postcolonial political entities and their equally vast panoply of governance paradigms. African states and political entities are diverse, significantly differentiated in their antecedents, including in the different trajectories to their emergence as states in the global system, their colonial experiences and traditions bequeathed to them, the varying strength and salience of impositions of neo-colonial affinities, and their heterogeneous internal constructions that together impact the variegated internal processes and dynamics of each state. Patrick Chabal, for instance, notes that although the five Lusophone countries in Africa (which gained independence in 1974/1975 mainly through military defeats of the Portuguese colonial administrations) share a common colonial heritage, a heritage that is quite distinct from that of the other two main colonial powers, Britain and France. However, they are also diverse and complex in many other ways. This diversity and complexity consists of their sociological constructions, size, and geo-physical structure that impact their politics. For example, Cape Verde is an archipelago of ten islands and constituted by a creole society more akin to the Caribbean than the African; whereas Mozambique, also multiracial in its composition and based on a community of established Indian Portuguese 'Goans' and a more recent Indian trading population, is much less multiracial in its outlook. Mozambique was also far less successfully integrated than Angola.[1]

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African states have different internal constructions. Nigeria, with a land area of 910,770 square kilometers and an estimated population of 184,932,822 as of Thursday, January 28, 2016[2] and composed of over 250 ethnic groups is divided into 36 states in a quasi-federal arrangement that is broadly demarcated along ethnic boundaries. The Nigerian society and state have managed, in recent times, to render more complex their ethno-regional mosaic and tensions by exacerbating a major line of cleavage in the thinly veiled struggle for ascendancy between Christianity and Islam in national life. Liberia's internal cleavages are along the lines of a hegemonic Americo-Liberian elite society constituted by descendants of returnee free slaves on the one hand and an indigenous population of 15 major ethnic groups that, on the other hand, challenge the legitimacy of the Liberianess of the identities of some of the indigenous groups. Superimposed on these divisions in post-conflict Liberia is a clamor for the declaration of Liberia as founded on Christian foundations, even while some want the state to be directed by Only Indigenous Liberians (OIL). In the same vein, the central theme of the politics of Guinea Bissau has traditionally been how to manage the vaunted political aspirations of the Ballanta, the single largest ethnic group and, paradoxically, the widely perceived ambivalence of the status of the Mettise community that produced Amilcar Cabral, the founding father of the nation. In Ivory Coast, long dominated by Houphouët-Boigny working in close collaboration with the French establishment, the Ivorianness of the Mossi and Foula are often questioned. The Republic of South Sudan, the world's latest independent country, gained independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011 as the outcome of a 2005 agreement that ended Africa's longest-running civil war. Its population of ten million people is made up of the 10 southernmost states of Sudan. South Sudan is one of the most diverse countries in Africa. It is home to over 60 different major ethnic groups, and the majority of its people follow traditional religions.[3] The diversity of South Sudan, as in most of Africa, has proven to be a challenge for national cohesion.

Senegal's estimated population of 15,684,159 is comprised of over ten main ethnic groups, though five account for the majority of the country's people. The largest group is the Wolof in the northwest and central regions, who make up nearly half of the population. The Wolof language has become a national lingua franca of sorts. In the North are the Fula/Peul/Fulbe/Fulani, one of West Africa's largest and most diverse ethnic groups, speaking two distinct languages and accounting for around a quarter of the population. Religion plays a significant role in Senegal, where 92% of the population is Muslim, mainly Sunni of Maliki school of jurisprudence intermingled with Sufi influences. Christians, mostly found in the Casamance region, represent 7% of the population. Traditional beliefs are officially practiced by 1% of the population, but a significant proportion of the population partake in traditional practices. The Diola, who straddle the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, predominate in the region of Casamance. The Casamance was ceded by Portugal to French control following negotiations between the two in 1888, in

which Portugal lost possession of Casamance, then the commercial hub of its colony Portuguese Guinea, which later became Guinea Bissau. A local variant of Kriol known as Ziguinchor Creole has been retained in the region, and the members of the deep-rooted Creole community carry Portuguese surnames like Da Silva, Carvalho and Fonseca. Interest in Portuguese colonial heritage has been revived in order to exert a distinct identity, particularly in Baixa (Lower) Casamançe.

The Islamic Republic of Mauretania further sharpens the cultural complexity, the contrasts, and the tensions in the historicity and sociological constructions of African states and societies. In bridging the Arab Maghreb and western Sub-Saharan Africa, Mauretania has retained the tensions in Afro-Arab relations in officially sustaining the slavery of its black population until 1981. This largely desert country presents a cultural contrast, with an Arab-Berber population to the North and black Africans to the South. Many of its people are nomads. For a while controlling the Islamic part of Spain, Mauritania in the Middle ages was the cradle of the Almoravid movement, which spread Islam throughout the region. Slavery is deeply rooted in the structure of Mauritanian society and closely tied to the ethnic composition of the country.[4] Mauritania was the last country in the world to formally abolish slavery; the continued vibrancy of the centuries-old practice is a fossilized residue of the trans-Sahara slave trade when Arabic-speaking Moors raided African villages. Society is organized around a rigid caste system that favors mainly Moorish noble-borns, who are uncompromising about their country as an Arab republic. Power and wealth is concentrated among majority lighter-skinned Moors. The descendants of slaves and darker-skinned Moors, as well as black Africans, live on the margins of society. It is estimated that up to 800,000 people in a nation of 3.5 million remain chattels.[5]

The implications of the internal constructions of postcolonial African states acquire greater salience for the nature of the governance that emerged in the post-liberation era in states that emerged through armed liberation struggles. This is pronounced in cases where white settler minorities had made Africa their homes and had entrenched minority rule. Nationalist liberation movements, confronted by a refusal of the incumbent, internal, minority colonial regimes to relinquish power, had been forced to take up arms to dislodge settler colonialism. Roger Southall advances that the ensuing armed struggle required the transformation of nationalist movements into what have become known as National Liberation Movements (NLMs).[6] In dealing with what he terms the ambiguous heritage of settler colonialism in the post-liberation state (exemplified in South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe), the centralized and hierarchical protocols as well as the organizing principles of the NLMs gave birth to vastly different organizational forms, strategies, and tactics of struggle. These attributes significantly impacted the governance practices of the post-liberation state as the armed movements became the ruling parties. The structure of society and the history of minority rule

threw up profound multiple challenges regarding identity legitimation and the skewed political economy in the new states. These multidimensional challenges included the fundamental characteristic that the pivots of the economy remained white-dominated; the hitherto subordinated racial populations lacked the necessary skills required to be meaningfully integrated into the political economy. These challenges also reflected the ambiguity around the concepts of race and citizenship in the post liberated state. Southall observes of this connection that:

> It was easy enough to depict 'white settlers' as the principal beneficiaries of 'white domination'. Yet what constituted a 'settler'? Was it someone who themselves had just recently settled upon Africa as their home? If so, what about those whites whose forebears had settled in their countries of residence two, three, or even more generations ago, and who had known no other home but Africa? … Suffice it to say that NLM found themselves awkwardly situated with regard to the status of whites who viewed themselves as living at 'home' while at the same time they identified white settlers whose power was embodied in racially exclusionary regimes, as manifestly 'the enemy' of political liberation. … Even so, questions around whether the 'white citizen' could also claim to be authentically 'African' were to linger on well into post liberation era and were to retain political volatility.[7]

Navigating these complexities of the continental landscape, some have concluded that there is not one, but many Africas.[8] In this diversified universe, the specific contexts and make-up of each African state drive its politics.

Meanwhile, the extant construction of Africa is an important context and a crucial pointer to the evolution of politics in and of African states since independence. This problematic construction reflects the inability of the leaders of Africa in the immediate post-independence era to surmount the fundamental historic challenge. This challenge was expressed in fractious structures and institutions of a fragile states system that was bequeathed as a legacy of colonialism. The main existential dilemma before the continent in 1963, as new states emerged (often variously directed and controlled by the colonial powers), was clearly defined. The question was whether in forging ahead in the post-independence era, Africa would maintain the fractious and divisive structure of the evolving continental states system that was based on the outcome of the Berlin Conference of 1884, at which the colonial powers partitioned the continent according to their national interests, or whether it would mobilize the will to transcend these contrived divisions and build a strong and viable continental state. The failure of an ideo-philosophically divided leadership of the continent to consolidate the colonially designed states system into a single strong and viable continental federation (thereby radically realigning the continental political geography) has haunted the evolution of Africa since independence. Two camps emerged in the struggle: the Casablanca group, whose integrationist

vision was encapsulated in the struggles of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and a conservative Monrovia group led by the likes of Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast (officially the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire), Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, and William Tubman in Liberia, whose insistence on a gradualist approach to substantive African unity merely reflected the interests of their neo-colonial controllers and their personal predilections, which were informed by personal political interests to maintain the status quo. Before then, the French idea of a united Francophone West African colonial state, for example, crumbled over the personal rivalry of Boigny and Senghor, who both sought to maintain a postcolonial fiefdom under their respective control. On the other side, Kwame Nkrumah, the preeminent articulator of the integrationist perspective, canvassed total political integration in the form of a continental union. The Union was to have three main objectives: overall continental planning on a continental scale; a unified land, sea, air, military, and defense strategy; and a common foreign policy. Nkrumah emphasized that the interests of neo-colonialism and the objectives of African governments are directly opposed, for whereas the strength of African countries lies in their unity, the strength of neo-colonialism lies in their disunity.[9] The subversion of the integrationist project of the visionaries also reflected the lack of will of most of the leaders of early post-independence Africa to rise above parochial and personal interests in resolving the first and defining political challenge that faced the continent. This failure presaged the transformation of independent African states into mere personal fiefdoms of these early leaders through their complete appropriation of the socio-political and economic spaces of post-independence African states. The personal appropriations of state spaces by early political leaders were convenient for the sustenance of external and neo-colonial control and fed well into the calculus of the Cold War that prevailed as African states emerged as proxy entities into the global system of states.

Meanwhile, Adebayo Olukoshi observes that the last decade-and-a-half in Africa's recent history has been marked by some dramatic and significant developments on the continent's political terrain. These developments have been as varied as they have been contradictory. This evolution, he concludes, has also constituted a major source of challenge to political theory as different schools of thought have grappled with them in terms of their weight and meaning.[10] Despite the continuing evolution, complexity, and diversity across the African continent, it is safe to hazard that the politics of postcolonial Africa has been shaped by the interplay of a myriad of factors and especially by the expansive activities and interactions of an unholy trinity of associated forces. Among these may be cited the ideological bifurcation of the global system at the emergence of African statehoods in that system that impacted the internal dynamics and governance arrangements in the new states. Western powers viewed African independence through the lens of the Cold War,[11] and the determination to coopt them as instruments or proxies of their

ideological camps directed their interaction with the new states. Ultimately, culturally and politically, and in the face of the rejection by African leaders of constructive realignment and consolidation of the political geography of the continent to enhance the capacity of a united Africa to resist foreign domination in the 1960s, the legacy of European dominance remained evident in the national borders, political infrastructures, education systems, national languages, economies, and trade networks of each of the newly emerged nations.[12] The location of the new states as weak postcolonial entities that largely served as proxies of the major protagonists in the Cold War ensured the projection of strategic interests of neo-colonial powers during the Cold War at the expense of the continent. In relation to these factors, with the outbreak of the Cold War after the Second World War, the USA and its Western allies were prepared to let emerging new states in Africa enjoy neither political autonomy nor effective control over strategic raw materials in their territories. That was in order to avoid these strategic minerals falling under the control of their enemies in the USSR.

In the post-Cold War period, the resurgence of the Berlin 1884 syndrome has been notable, even as the liberating consequences of the end of the Cold War instigated social forces, however feeble, for the liberation of Africa's political spaces from entrenched maximum rulers in a raft of sovereign national conferences. The sovereign national conferences sought to renegotiate the normative political settlements and impositions that had evolved and seemingly been validated in the context and by the externally derived logic of the Cold War. The post-Cold War redemocratization impulse fizzled out as democratic practice was again instrumentalized to revalidate neo-patrimonialism as the normative governance paradigm. In state after state in the post-Cold War era, constitutionalism was assaulted with varying results and consequences. It has eventually paved the way for a post-Cold War club of sit-tight presidents and national leaders with varying legitimacy depending on the specific national contexts. Many of these leaders have their antecedence in military interventions in the political process in the Cold War era. The challenging situations in Pierre Nkurunziza's Burundi are as different from the situation of Paul Kagame as those in Rwanda are from Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, which in turn is very different from Dos Santos in Angola. The consolidated, permanent, personal appropriation of the state spaces in scenarios (such as in Paul Biya's Cameroon, Sassou Nguesso's Congo Brazzaville, the now dethroned Yahya Jammeh in the Gambia, Joseph Kabilla in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe) reflects problematic continuities that have defied the feeble redemocratization wave of the post-Cold War. In some of these instances, the residual logics of neo-colonial control have been at play despite the political rhetoric of neo-colonial forces, such as France, to the contrary. Even then, some consolidated personal appropriations of the totality of the public spaces (by leaders such Yoweri Museveni and Robert Mugabe) are paradoxically validated by perceived threats of

neo-colonial interventions to reverse the radical gains made. Yet the strength of political institutions that have prevailed in a country like Nigeria, where the spirited efforts of a claimed born-again democrat in Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military dictator, to change the constitution to facilitate his term elongation; the smooth transitions of power and substantive democratic consolidation in Ghana; and the dramatic turnaround and democratic consolidation in the former quasi Marxist-Republic of Benin offer some hope for the future.

Finally, the third of the unholy trinity is the internal security dilemmas associated with the structural heterogeneity of the postcolonial African state and the pathologies of postcoloniality. In newly independent states cobbled together by external forces and structured to advance the interests of their creators, social and constituent groups who perceive themselves as trapped in the newly demarcated political spaces and entities have to determine whether their new compatriots pose a threat to them. This is especially so as the colonial creators of the postcolonial state manipulated the various groups to attain their strategic objective of continued and long term control. Consequently, Ademola Araoye notes that in the postcolonial environment each group must look out on its own for its own to protect its integrity and autonomy. Thus, the state, once appropriated by one dominant group through the political settlement that emerges or through control of the coercive machinery of the state, potentially poses a mortal threat to the continued integrity and autonomy of the other constituent communities or groups. Each group must ensure that it has enough coercive instruments to protect itself.[13] Invariably, perceptions of security dilemmas have been in the affirmative, as the Rwandan genocide, the case of Nigeria and Biafra or in Guinea Bissau, or even challenges to the legitimacy of certain identities in countries such as Liberia have shown. The pervasive contest for ascendancy between Christianity and Islam has added a new dimension to perceptions of threat to deeply held values by religious minorities as in the Gambia, Angola, Liberia, Nigeria, among others. The security dilemma has been exacerbated by the manipulations of the colonial powers, expressed in the role of France in the conflict in Ivory Coast and in the Central African Republic (CAR). Also, the existence of transnational and extraterritorial stakeholders who perceive legitimate interests to protect in the outcomes of the strategic interactions in the environment of the postcolonial African state has critical implications. The internal construction and the processes of the postcolonial state impact the nature of relationships generated with the immediate 'external' environment of the postcolonial state. The immediate environment of the postcolonial state has an intermestic attribute.[14]

Africa is geophysically the center of the universe. It is also acknowledged as the cradle of humankind. Africa is the second-largest and second-most populous continent on earth. It is the most endowed of all continents. It has the largest deposition of natural wealth on the surface of planet Earth. Africa has 25% of the world's arable land. About 65% of the uncultivated arable land needed to feed 9 billion people globally by 2050 is in Africa. Africa has an

abundance of human resources. The UN Population Fund stated in 2009 that the population of Africa had hit the one billion mark and had therefore doubled in size over the course of 27 years. As of 2015, the population estimates are around 1.166 billion.[15] With these endowments, Africa is of immense strategic interest to humanity. These factors have impacted the fortunes of the continent, from the social through the economic to the political evolution of the continent. Developments in Africa, including political, social, and economic, since its contact with the world (mainly the Arab world and Islam as well with Europe and Christianity) have significantly been impacted or even directed by powerful external forces mobilized around the control of the immense strategic values, material, spiritual, and the commodified black humanity, of the continent. External forces have also influenced the character of the political landscape, the structure of political, social, and economic entities, as well as the overall dynamics that have shaped the evolution of the African colonized spaces that began to be transformed into sovereign states in the 1950s.

Postcolonial African states[16] began to emerge from the 1950s when six African nations, notably Ghana in 1957, gained independence from colonial Britain. In the 1960s, 11 other independent African states emerged. In 2016, Africa is home to 54 recognized sovereign states and countries, 9 territories, and 2 de facto independent states with very little recognition. Africa thus groups together 56 of over 193 entities that constitute a complex universe of hierarchically arranged state actors in the global order. These factors constitute a context that has crucially defined Africa's locus in the global system and its relationship with the world that have all affected, and in instances directed, the internal dynamics of its diverse states. The multiplicity of Africa's relationships with the world have been skewed, reflecting Africa's subordinate status in a highly hierarchical global system. These relationships have impacted the socio-cultural and political development and evolution of the continent, spanning formal debilitating enslavement of Africans to the neo-colonial status of Africa in contemporary times. Still directed and pummeled by the same global forces that created the African state in their own images and interests, the neo-colonial state that emerged and its internal dynamics were a continuity of sorts of the historic complexities and travails of Africa and of black humanity given its locus in global affairs.

Against this general background, African politics (the ways in which political protocols, rules, norms, methods, and modes of interaction are established, maintained and change) in the postcolonial era has been marred by authoritarianism, corruption, military intervention, and leadership failures amidst a broader socio-economic crisis characterized by poverty.[17] In the pervading climate of poverty, African politics in the first five decades of independence witnessed an era of exuberant expressions, on the part of both civil and military interventionists in the political sphere. The exuberance exhibited in the ideo-philosophical engagements of the dominant and often hegemonic

political forces that emerged in early decades of post-independence entailed deleterious consequences for state and nation building as well as for peace, stability and development; political and socio-economic development in the postcolonial state. The situation was the same whether the main actors were nationalists and revolutionaries as in most of Lusophone Africa or in post-liberated states in Southern Africa; nationalists as in most of Anglophone Africa; or plain conservatives as in most of Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa. This was a natural consequence of the mass mobilization required to overthrow the *ancien* colonial administration in most of Africa, including internal minority colonial regimes that instigated revolutionary responses in Southern Africa. African politics since independence has generally been turbulent and characterized by violence. The culture of political violence associated with African statecraft carried forward an experience that was integral to colonial control of subordinated territories by the creators of the neo-colonial African state. Specifically, colonial administrative systems were not based on democratic foundations. Governance followed the top-down approach that was largely arbitrary and not geared toward the well-being of the governed.[18] Since the purpose of colonial government was to control the population and ensure the continuous exploitation of natural resources for the benefit of the European colonizing powers, the objective was met through authoritarian rule that was bolstered by strong police and military forces. In this context, political legitimacy was attached to the unequivocal control of force. Colonialism thus implanted the notion that authoritarianism is an appropriate mode of political rule and that force is an acceptable instrument of that rule.[19] Democratic practice in the post-independence era, often alternating with military regimes and revolutions of various hues, competed with and or often complemented political violence in postcolonial Africa. The military emerged in post-independent Africa as the most critical segment of all in the struggle for power.[20]

However, both political violence (Including civil wars and armed liberation struggles) and Africa's myriad versions of democracy have been instruments in the service of exclusive parochial objectives, in contradistinction to national consensus and the overall public good. Democratic practice, thus also instrumentalized, acquired a unique flavor that subverted substantive democratic values and ethics as well as procedures. It was used to advance the parochially exclusive acquisition of loot instead of instilling the intrinsic value of democracy to attain the publicly inclusive good in the post-independence era. Given the structural heterogeneity and the internal polarities of society in postcolonial political entities struggling to be nations, the search for parochial loot by powerful constituents, often seeking hegemonic status in the political space, is a pivotal motive driving the political process. In the postcolonial state, the search for loot by agencies associated with and loyal to identifiable and specific competing constituents undermines the policy of advancing the inclusive and positively non-exclusive public good. Accordingly, in the postcolonial state setting, the search for parochial loot by the dominant political

force, in contradistinction to the non-exclusive national public good, is facilitated through the struggle for the absolute appropriation of the public space by the dominant parochial force. This national process, driven by parochial objectives of the dominant competing forces, sets apart the internal political process of the postcolonial state from the internal politics and policy processes of modern and postmodern states. The latter operates on the basis of the constant search for compromises among competing forces. Public policy formulation equates the search for the non-exclusive public good. Southall observes the same tendency for exclusive public policy in post-liberated states. He highlights that in the post-liberation era, the capturing of the state and its transformation are major policy objectives of the different liberation movements. This is illustrated in the commitment to transformation agendas that is a feature common to all post-liberated states that emerged from settler colonial regimes. In the transformation was implied the need for a revolutionary state capable of overcoming all obstacles.[21] Given their backgrounds and the challenges emanating from the struggle and the ambiguity of their heritage, it is scarcely surprising that liberation movements in their transformed role as ruling parties regarded the state as requiring not merely Africanization (as in Zimbabwe) or affirmative action to ensure 'representivity' (as in Namibia and South Africa), but its becoming the key instrument of transformation.[22] The policy to deploy party personnel to all key institutions of the state, which is a central tenet of the process of state transformation, is to enable the liberation movement to control the levers of power. In the final analysis, though, the implementation of the transformation policy, especially its deployment strategy, became an instrument of patronage, material accumulation, and upward mobility. It acquired the character of a neo-patrimonial system associated with the classic postcolonial African state.

The struggle for the partisan absolute appropriation of the totality of the state space has been the driving motif of politics in Africa since independence. The search for the parochial good as against the public or national good threw up creative structures such as the one-party states that effectively were one-man states, as well as political parties or military formations structured largely as the vessels for the articulation of the parochial and partisan interests of local dominant forces and their external allies and sponsors. The outcome of the struggle has been a pervasive deployment of violence and manipulation of democratic practice by powerful forces to retain absolute control of the state space against all other contestants. It is in this context that some have argued that multiparty politics have made things worse, not because of the theoretically admirable principles of political competition but because of the dirty and messy business which such competition can mean in practice.[23]

At the domestic level, partisan absolute appropriation of the socio-economic and political spaces by contesting stake holders and constituent units of the postcolonial state has been the central motif of African politics since independence. At a second level, external forces are heavily implicated in the internal politics to consolidate control over what they perceive as their

neo-colonial possessions. Indeed, the process of independence often laid the foundations for neo-colonial control of the emerging state. These are exemplified in manipulating key internal facts such as demography (as in Anglophone Nigeria and Kenya), or in the institution of mechanisms to effect direct placement of stooges as leaders of new states (as throughout Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, including Ivory Coast, Gabon, Democratic Republic of Congo, or Congo [Brazzaville] and lately in Guinea). In Lusophone Africa, where revolutionary forces forced out the Portuguese, the decay of these revolutions compromised the integrity of the movement towards nationhood as they over time slid into big-power manipulations, as in Guinea Bissau and ultimately in Angola. In this climate, the dominant political settlements were largely impositions of the interests of the most powerfully placed interest group, mainly ethno-regional or ethno-religious groups, or a coalition of interest groups against all other stakeholders. The prevailing political settlements were thus fragile and they unraveled as the internal configuration of domestic forces changed or when the external guarantor of the prevailing settlements switched loyalty. In these situations, armed conflict became the currency to resolve the stalemate that often led to the implosion of the state. Nigeria, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, Liberia, Angola, Chad, Ivory Coast, CAR, Somalia, Burundi, and Mobutu's Zaire present classic examples of this.

The pervasive search for partisan absolute control of the state space by contesting political forces within the postcolonial African state ensures instability in the political process. Political conflict is perennially generated over control of the state, where conflict is about who governs and does not envisage the creation of a new state. The unity of the state is tacitly accepted by competing elites, and conflict centers on control of the state and state resources.[24] However, this is conditioned on the expectation that the competing constituent units will be able to outsmart the extant dominant power over time. The political process is an attempt to capture the state through the use of political or military power by one group at the expense of another, but ultimately it is a process of the search for absolute partisan appropriation of the state space by anyone of the competing constituent groups by outmaneuvering the others. The process elicits conflict. As expressed in Nigeria, Liberia, and Angola, the most difficult conflict is that around the control of the state and its resources. This control is often attained by one of the groups of contesting forces institutionalized in the dominant neo-patrimonial system of governance. The political process in Africa since independence has thus been characterized by crisis and ultimately war to attain absolute partisan appropriation of the state space. In the unending struggle for absolute control of the political space, succession struggles in the postcolonial African state focus upon the presidency and the institutions in which competition for national leadership takes place.[25] Also, dynastic succession has posed a challenge to democratic transitions in the post-Cold War era. Accordingly, although power transfers and transitions are effected by four means in the politics of Africa,[26] irregular power transfers remain the norm.

In the second half-century of post-independence that has been characterized by strong international sentiments for the entrenchment of democracy, the vogue has been for African leaders to abridge democratic practice through the unconstitutional renewal of executive tenure and controversial adjustments of executive mandates that also represent avenues of open subversion of the Constitution. Mwaura identifies the four means of power transfers in Africa as:

1. 'Regular executive transfer', which occurs according to the relevance of the established rules, constitution, laws, customs, etc. which regulate succession and facilitate a peaceful and orderly transition. Power transition from one ruling party or elite to another competing party or group of power aspirants remains an aberration.
2. 'Renewal of executive tenure' or 'self-succession', which involves the search for regime legitimacy in elections, 'constitutional' amendments, and centralized control of political-party and state-administrative structures.
3. 'Executive adjustments' involving succession of political and economic elites, through cabinet shuffles, party (re)alignments and alliance shifts, and the ethnic equation of governmental positions.
4. 'Irregular power transfer', according to the key event which leads to succession, such as assassinations and political murder, deposition, resignation and coups d'état as the instruments for succession.

The implications of executive adjustments are aptly demonstrated in the case of Kenya by Lakidi and Mazrui. Affirming the 'the East African Experience' as a 'third model' of power transfer, they note that initially the Kenyan constitution was based on the Westminster experience. In that model, the prime minister derived his legitimacy from parliament. When the East African countries went 'presidential', it was not in the direction of the US system. The relationship between the president and parliament changed; it was no longer a system in which the president derived legitimacy from parliament, nor one in which the president was constitutionally separate from the legislature, but one in which the parliament in reality came to derive its legitimacy from the president (Lakidi and Mazrui 1973: 3). As Lakidi and Mazrui further elaborate, the presidency in East Africa became the primary source of legitimization for proposed political policies and social values. While in Britain the prime minister cannot afford to lose the confidence of parliament, in East Africa, parliament cannot afford to lose the confidence of the president. Constitutional amendments and changes in Kenya have over the years consolidated presidential power against parliamentary initiatives. Political expediency and prudence determine political survival or the ability of a political leader to retain political office or political efficacy. Political recruitment is the other side of the coin of political survival; those who fail to survive are by definition out

of the center of politics; those who are recruited come either to replace the losers or to supplement the survivors. Political survival therefore dictates that political recruitment be regulated and controlled so as to limit leadership succession at all levels of the political ladder. Kenyatta attempted to reduce competition for political recruitment through, firstly, an internal purge in KANU, and, secondly, control of the electoral process. The roots of conflict in independent Kenya revolved around ideology and policies of the new state.[27]

With the scant prospect of a constitutional transfer of power, the outcome of the political processes since independence has been the entrenchment of violence to achieve political goals. This is often expressed in coups d'états, revolutions, conflict, wars, and associated humanitarian disasters that are prominent features of African politics. The challenge therefore has been how to reinvent political processes to address the multidimensional deficits of democratic practice. It is against this background that John W. Harbeson[28] advances that postcolonial politics in Africa since independence has been, and continues to be, very much work in progress. It is surmised that the originally prevailing designs for building prosperous, viable, stable states have changed markedly over Sub-Saharan Africa's first half-century of independence through reliance upon various hypothesized keys to overcoming fundamental and endemic manifestations of political and economic underdevelopment. Harbeson concludes that the assumed first vision of nationalist leaders of the mass-based parties who brought their countries to independence, centering upon rapid, egalitarian, state-led political development, dissolved amid political disarray with their objectives largely unrealized.[29] Many of the nationalist leaders became victims of the strategic interferences of elite states determined to keep Africa within their spheres of influence during the Cold War. Many of the leaders in Africa were and are still directly imposed or manipulated into office by elite states to consolidate their control over what many analysts still refer to as neo-colonial states, rather than postcolonial states. The controversial emergence of Alhassan Ouattara as president in Ivory Coast following the removal of nationalist Laurent Gbagbo, the entrenchment of Sassou Nguesso as quasi-permanent president of Congo (Brazzaville), Ali Bongo, son of Omar Bongo, as successor to his father, or the continuing rule of Paul Biya, among many others, all reflect the continued leverage of France to determine who rules and on what terms in Francophone Africa.

A good appreciation of the antecedence and structure of the state are critical elements in understanding the internal dynamics (whether political, social, and/or economic) of African states since independence. Some analysts advance that because of its antecedence as a mechanical creation and it being an unintended derivative of early globalization driven by elite state actors, the postcolonial African state has been unable to keep pace with the evolutionary advance of the cluster of modern states that emerged from the impulses of the mid-seventeenth century to a postmodern phase. Because of its sluggish adaptive capacity, the African postcolonial state is characterized

by institutional lags that have militated against its evolution. Consequently, it has remained a marginalized member of the global interstates system. The postcolonial African state also grapples with the tensions and struggles that characterized if not the formative stages of Westphalia then at least its phase of state consolidation that gave birth to the nation by 1781. Nation building has remained a formidable challenge to the consolidation of the postcolonial state. Its fragmented and unpacified society is the biggest threat to its continued existence as a member of the global states system. Conventional wisdom perceives the interstate system as one of anarchy in which those states which fail to help themselves, or which do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper. In this self-help system, units worry about their survival due to the danger posed by the external environment. The weak postcolonial African state paradoxically deviates from the general principles that govern the states system. The double paradox is that the threat to the perpetuation of the postcolonial state is largely internal, as the state is permanently in danger of imploding or disintegrating in the context of the pervasive struggle for absolute partisan appropriation of the state space by its constituent units. The evidence illustrates that many postcolonial African states have lived with powerful proto states[30] within their territory as rival claimants to the sovereignty of that state. A second paradox is that the postcolonial state owes its continued existence to the protocols and myths of the global interstate system and often to direct patronage of elite state actors in this system. These caveats reflect the complexities of the underpinnings of politics in the postcolonial African state.[31] Independence would seem to have complicated the conditions of Africa's engagement with its self and the world around it.

The intermestic character of the immediate environment in which the postcolonial African state is located is therefore conceptually distinct from the conventional environment of the interstate system. Although the immediate intermestic environment is integral to the structure of the overall external environment, the character of the immediate environment is principally defined by the potential presence of proto-states whose existence are facilitated by the cross-border flow of transnational interest groups perceiving legitimate stakes in the affairs of the postcolonial state. These distinctions have radical implications for the political process and have been manifest in politics since independence. The formal postcolonial state may seek the perpetuation of the structure of the state as presently constituted, while the goal of the proto-state or disaffected communities is either to transform the structure of the state to its partisan advantage or to carve out a new autonomous political space from the formal state. In instances, the proto-state (exemplified by Greater Liberia with its capital in Gbarnga under Charles Taylor, greater Ivory Coast with its capital in Bouake of the Forces Nouvelle, the SPLA in South Sudan with its Juba capital) have sometimes demonstrated more coercive capabilities than the opposing postcolonial state. In other instances (such as the wide enclave in Angola of the Jonas Savimbi-led UNITA, which lasted

for over three decades), they fizzle out as anachronistic elements in an evolved global strategic landscape that is inimical to their survival. Their objectives are mostly achieved through war that has become a feature of political bargaining since independence. The constraints posed by the intermestic immediate environment of the postcolonial state are therefore different from those posed to the modern state by the structure of the interstate system.

A configuration of power may emerge that advances the vested partisan interests of the key actors in the international community in controlling the internal political forces in the postcolonial state and dominating the immediate and larger environment. The nature of relationships elicited by the structure of the external environment, including the state system, also impacts the internal characteristic of the postcolonial state. The politics of the postcolonial state may thus be impacted or exacerbated by the confrontation between strategic interests between blocs of transnational forces supporting or challenging the civil order of the postcolonial state. Harbeson observes that the outcome of the intertwining of the rapidly and profoundly changing contours of late twentieth and early twenty-first century world politics and the global economy with predominant weakness and political decay in African politics, as well as endemic economic underdevelopment, have had deleterious consequences for the continent. These pathologies are intrinsic to the incongruous internal structure of the African state. In terms of their attributes, especially their domestic and Westphalian sovereignties, as well as the multiple loci of power, many of the political entities in Africa barely qualify as states, except in the convenient recognition afforded them as such by other states expressed in pragmatic respect for their international legal sovereignties. The interactions of external forces and associated factors and domestic forces and factors have shaped the dominant governance patrimonial paradigm in Africa since independence.

The distinctive institutional hallmark of African regimes is neo-patrimonialism.[32] This dominant governance paradigm is variously expressed in a statism that paradoxically consolidates power outside the public realm in the private hands of a patriarchal figure operating in the context of patrimonial, neo-patrimonial, civilian and military autocratic structures and institutions of governance of African states since independence. In its classic expression, patrimonialism is a social system in which a royal elite rules through personal and arbitrary control over a bureaucracy and over slaves, mercenaries, and conscripts who have no power themselves and serve only to enforce the monarch's rule. It was most often associated with Asia, and China in particular. Patrimonial systems, representing tenuous political settlements, are known to be far less stable (and have attracted coups d'état and revolutions) than other types of systems. Proponents of the concept of neo-patrimonialism assert that distinct features distinguish governance in the African state from its counterparts in other world regions. It is highlighted that this particular attribute of the African state is characterized by the lack of separation between the public

and the private spheres.[33] This is consistent with the experience in Africa where patrimonial systems with respectable economic successes have resulted in social and political instability and ultimately violent transitions as exemplified in Ivory Coast since Houphouët-Boigny, the revolution against Moussa Traore in Mali, and the overthrow of Siad Barre in Somalia. Bratton and Van de Walle highlight that although neo-patrimonial rule may outwardly resemble a democratic society, the underlying system has more in common with a patrimonial system, in which society is governed by a powerful leader for whom personal ties are central. In this system, an individual rules by dint of personal prestige and power. Authority is entirely personalized, shaped by a ruler's preference rather than any codified system of laws. The neo-patrimonial system modifies this structure while maintaining the basic relationships; while laws and bureaucracies do exist, the underlying system is little different from patrimonialism. Neo-patrimonialism merely incorporates patrimonial logic into bureaucratic institutions.[34] Finally, neo-patrimonial systems, with their emphasis on the individual prestige of the leader, are inherently undemocratic, despite the fact that democratic elections take place. Though ostensibly governed by rules and bureaucracy, they in fact employ these means in order to be instilled in society. Democratic institutions are subverted in order to fit within this power structure.[35]

In its workings, patrimonialism is based on a patron–client relationship where a president first occupies the political space by entrenching substantial centralized control over social and economic affairs in the state. With the power of patronage concentrated in one hand, as a patron the president deploys state resources to court the loyalty of cronies who serve as clients within his primary constituency, as well as others coopted from opposing constituencies or interest groups. Bratton and van de Walle delineate the three features of neo-patrimonialism as: a systematic concentration of power: a penchant of the patron for awarding personal favors to cronies; and the use of state resources for political legitimation. Patrimonialism connotes that a patron in a certain social and political order bestows gifts from their own resources upon followers in order to secure loyalty and support (Weber 1980 [1922]: 133–134, 136). Clients, in turn, obtain material benefits and protection.[36] To achieve this end, constitutionalism is abrogated to create what some have described as authoritarian statism that entails the management of the concept of life presidency intrinsic to patrimonialism. Patrimonialism is thus the principle or policy of concentrating extensive economic, political, and related controls in the hands of an individual. With the immense power of the state to intrude into society, the real cost of patrimonial regimes is the loss of individual liberty. It is intended to concentrate power in the hands of one man, thus making it easier for the consolidation of political power as well as accentuating the consolidation security and of all levels of influence in the state mechanism. Power is concentrated in one man or one party in what may be referred to as a 'one-man state' or (OMS) or 'one-party state'

or (OPS). Neo-patrimonialism undermines the constitutional process through the destruction of the constitution. Patrimonial arrangements survive by oiling political clientelism that is operated as an extant political settlement among the elite. This political arrangement involves 'give-and-take' relationships between actors controlling political, economic, and social resources. Meanwhile, a fourth attribute of neo-patrimonialism is that opposition figures are assassinated or hunted out of the state. It is thus observed that in conflicts emerging from 'new independent consolidation' or attempts by postcolonial regimes to achieve consolidation and control of national political space ('an attempt to subdue regional, ethnic, ideological and personal ambitions which resisted state authority') the loser often has to flee into exile as a survival option.[37]

The character and operations of neo-patrimonial systems have been well codified in the case of Zambia by Christian von Soest.[38] Soest observes that the first President Kaunda served for 27 years in office and entrenched his power with a corps of personal advisors which in turn reduced the influence of the cabinet and other units of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). He not only gained from particular legitimacy as Zambia's founding President who had led the struggle for independence but also augmented his control of the political process by promulgating the one-party state in December 1972.

The neo-patrimonial centralization of power in Zambia also finds expression in the frequent change of ministers. The average tenure of key ministers from independence until today stands at only 2.4 years. Consequently, the most important cabinet members have exercised their functions for only half of a legislative period, on average. Christian von Soest cites Burnell as noting that this pattern of 'elite circulation' has shown a high degree of consistency and has endured during Zambia's one-party Second Republic (from the end of 1972 to 1991) and during the multiparty Third Republic (since November 1991).

It is also noted Kaunda's successor, President Frederick Chiluba, adopted the same technique. According to Erdmann and Simutanyi,[39] in a major cabinet reshuffle in April 1993 for instance, President Chiluba removed from office those reform-minded ministers he perceived to be a threat to his rule. Others were frustrated to the extent that they resigned from government. With an average tenure of less than two years, the 'ministerial game of musical chairs' in the key departments did not slow down under President Mwanawasa, who was reelected on 28 September 2006 (Electoral Commission of Zambia, 2006). In sum, the neo-patrimonial concentration of political power has been a feature consistently applied in Zambian politics.[40]

Politics since independence has been within the context of a febrile democratic environment across the continent, characterized by the subversion of constitutions and the erosion of constitutionalism. Attempts at entrenching the practice of democracy in Africa since independence, including in the post-Cold War era, have thus been largely only convenient as an instrument in advancing the parochial interests of internal forces and advancing strategic

objectives of elite external forces. These forces and factors now include the emerging struggle of powerful main systemic hegemonic faiths, fundamentalist Christian sects, and radical and militant Islamic institutions for ascendance in Africa's polluted spiritual spaces. This accounts for the continued assault on the legitimacy of the secularity of African political spaces by faith-mobilized civil society. Its impact has been the increasing lack of salience of the ideational and the degradation of the role of conventional civil society in giving direction to the evolution of political processes in Africa.

Accordingly, the undercurrents of politics since independence in Africa include the fact that black Africa has also presented a particularly inviting arena to be conveniently coopted to serve extra-African interests by willing African proxies. The interests represented are not just political in the conventional understanding. In more recent times, the polarization of society mobilized on fundamentalist religious credos that seem to assault the integrity of all other faiths and belief systems (including demonization of traditional systems of worship, explicit in particular in the growing rift and deep antagonism between fundamentalist Islam and Pentecostal Christian evangelicalism) has evolved as a major line of cleavage across the continent. This cleavage is discernible in Nigeria, where the fierce contest for ascendance between Islam and Christianity has incrementally intruded into public life and politics and has now has been institutionalized, reflecting the increasing danger in the long term de-secularization of the public sphere in Africa. In Nigeria, balancing religious faiths in presidential and gubernatorial tickets is the conventional wisdom. There is also a palpable contest in Nigeria between Christianity and Islam in all spheres off human endeavor, from education to careers in government,. In Liberia, the intense clamor to declare the state as founded on Christian foundations is the biggest political challenge facing the country. This division reverberated during the country's long civil war. Angola has informally banned Islam, and in the Gambia, President Yahya Jammeh has declared the state an Islamic Republic. East Africa is caught in the throes of Al Shabab's agenda to Islamize the region. Boko Haram has acquired the same ideology to turn West Africa into a caliphate. In January 2016, in Central Africa, the Seleka, a largely Muslim militia, has been fighting to stave off a counter-coup by forces of the Christian majority in this 'state' in the capital Bangui and the northern city of Bossangoa.[41] Mozambique is also caught in the throes of the expansion of hegemonic faiths. Religious animosities continue to surface from time to time. Although the Mozambican government has historically been secular and has refused to recognize the traditional Christian holidays as religious, the declaration of two Muslim festivals as public holidays has created some furor among Catholics. Renamo promptly seized the opportunity to condemn the move, in the process alienating Muslims who had supported its campaign in 1994. The situation reignited the controversy surrounding Mozambique's joining the Organization of Islamic Conference a few years ago. The growing influence of Iran and the ease with which Islam is taking hold in the traditional African milieu has irked Catholics.[42]

The deployment of religion to serve political ends and vice versa has led to the exacerbation of religious elements and symbols. This has been glaring in Nigeria, where it is fast becoming a political convention to balance presidential and gubernatorial tickets on religious lines. The volatility of ethno-religious passions has become one of the most combustible factors of African politics. These developments are consistent with Alain Rouvez's[43] assertion that sub-Saharan Africa has proven to be particularly vulnerable to external influence. Independence made little difference to the exploitation of Africa's wealth by European colonial powers. Indeed, this remains at the core of France's agenda in its neo-colonial relations with black Africa. Power and politics in Africa remain servants to the economic strength of the West, and now possibly of Arab oil-producing countries such as Iran, which is fanning the embers of Shiite expansionism in Nigeria and in the Gambia. China too is expanding its economic zone of influence throughout Africa. As poor countries, independence created a power vacuum to be exploited by those who care enough to graft Africa into their orbits of influence. Rouvez attests that the ex-colonizers learned to convert remnants of their imperial liabilities into postcolonial assets. In the same manner, hegemonic faiths have sought to appropriate the totality of spiritual spaces on the continent. Religion has become a core political factor in Africa, especially in the twenty-first century. The virulence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al Shabab in Somalia, and the Séléka movement in the CAR are sharp pointers to this challenge.

The situation in the CAR manifests the complexities of African politics since independence, as all the deleterious factors converge. Observers believe that at Séléka's core is a very diverse cast of characters. The Séléka rebel movement has no concept or structure of a political program, no clear or coherent ideology, and no precise demands.[44] Government officials from Bangui accused Séléka of harboring 'foreign provocateurs' greedy for the country's vast mineral wealth. Suspicions are cast that mainly Muslim elements from Chad, Nigeria, and Sudan make up Séléka's ranks. Others have noted that rather than being a simple revolt by the CAR's civil society, money to pay Séléka's soldiers may originate from the same sources that funded the Malian, Libyan, and Tunisian revolts: amongst others, this would imply Chad and possibly al Qaeda.[45] According to other reliable sources, the numbers of the Seleka coalition rebels were swollen by soldiers coming from Darfur (or even mercenaries from other countries such as Mali or even Northern Nigeria) where Boko Haram Islamists are based, while noting that the Seleka coalition is made up of rebel groups from the North of the CAR (who are all Muslims), or even from the Darfur region. Darfur is where Rwanda and Uganda have deployed hundreds of troops, paid for by the USA, to stop what they call mass killing by the Sudanese government against the Darfurians.[46]

Other observers, however, interpret the Séléka phenomenon as a northern resistance to the continuing struggle of the central government in the CAR to fully appropriate the totality of the economic space, in particular those formerly under the control of northern (mostly Muslim) merchants. It

is highlighted that it is impossible to say which of the numerous grievances and motivations were dominant in the uprising of the Séléka against the central government of Francois Bozizé. The North is seen as economically poor and politically marginalized, a zone mostly out of the control of the state, where its people make their living in a variety of ways, including artisanal diamond mining and trading, forestry, wildlife conservation and poaching, and smuggling along ancient Sahelian trade routes. From 2003 to 2013, President Bozizé attempted to centralize control of diamond extraction and trade by cutting out of the market many northern diamond traders. Bozizé also attempted to gain greater control over the smuggling and trade routes throughout the country, threatening the little access to trade and revenue many in the North had remaining to them. Accordingly, reports indicate that many of the original commanders of the Séléka coalition were 'Big Men' of the northern economy who fought to grow their control of the country's resources and to keep Bangui out of their existing networks. Some of François Bozizé's ministers even claimed that the Séléka takeover of the country was 'a "coup" by the diamond merchants'.[47] The perceived coup was led by the Séléka from the northeastern CAR, a predominantly Muslim region. It bears highlighting that President Bozizé is Christian, as is 71% of the Central African population.[48]

In the varying appreciations of the Séléka phenomenon emerge the following expressions of African politics: an ethno-religiously and ethno-regionally mobilized struggle for control of the economic space, contention around the attempt of the state to penetrate its society fully, and the intermestic role of communities across the national frontiers of the CAR with defined stakes in the internal processes of the country. Yet other analysts have advanced crucial geo-strategic imperatives that link both the USA and France to the situation in the CAR. According to these analysts, controversies around the non-intervention posture of France and the USA in the overthrow of Francois Bozizé abound. They highlight that Bozizé had urged the USA and France to intervene against the rebel forces, but his call fell on deaf ears. Demonstrators reportedly accused Paris of supporting the rebels. In response to the claims of French President François Hollande to neutrality in the internal affairs of the country, the question was raised of why France intervened in the internal affairs of Ivory Coast then, literally kidnapping Laurent Gbagbo, who had really won the elections and putting Alassane Ouattara into power? Also, in its report of January 2, 2013, GlobalResearch.ca concluded that behind this bogus 'non-intervention' posture, the French government was undoubtedly working hand in hand with the Obama Administration to determine the outcome of the crisis in the CAR because France has been intimately involved in every change of government in its former colony since 1960. It was observed that after declaring himself president, Djotodia, who briefly was in power, through the Séléka said that he would invite France, the CAR's former colonial power, along with the European Union and the USA, to retrain the country's army.[49]

The response to the encroachment of these destructive external forces in post-independence Africa has also been the emergence of strong nationalist leaders determined to ward off all manner of extraneous forces, from the neo-colonial political and economic to the extra-African religious forces seeking the appropriation or consolidation of their hold on local and even the continental social, economic, and political spaces. This has bred new forms of nationalist insurgencies which have radically repudiated the extant political dispensations. The drawback is that these nationalist leaders have also demonstrated a penchant for validating their endless tenures through controversial constitutional amendments that abrogate term limits. Accordingly, this has perpetuated the OPS/OMS state syndrome in a new strain of neo-patrimonial dispensation dominated by the singular vision of the progressive nationalist leader on the way forward for state and society. Yoweri Museveni in Uganda and Paul Kagame in Rwanda or even Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe are classic examples of this form of governance arrangement. Patrimonial arrangements have thus become a challenge to the deepening of democratic culture in Africa.

Museveni is a product of a revolutionary rejection of a dangerous national circumstance as the Idi Amin regime exploited ethno-religious sentiment to entrench a brutal dictatorship. Idi Amin's coup in the 1970s launched Yoweri Museveni's political career. By October 1978, when Amin ordered the invasion of Tanzania in order to claim the Kagera province for Uganda, Museveni had already trained a significant number of fighters in his Front for National Salvation (FRONASA). This fed into a people's protracted war that he had waged for many years, because Museveni perceived that it was the only way to cement the involvement of the population.[50] The FRONASA collaborated with the Tanzanian forces deployed by President Julius Nyerere, who was irritated and tired of the embarrassment Ugandan dictator Amin had become and sought to oust him from power. Yoweri Museveni relaunched a guerrilla war on February 6, 1981 against the Ugandan government in which he had served as a minister, arguing that that the 1980 elections were rigged. His National Resistance Army eventually took power in January 1986 and introduced the Movement system of politics; described as a broad-based, alternate system of democracy in which people compete for political office on individual merit. Mr. Museveni argued that political-party activity split underdeveloped countries like Uganda along ethnic and religious lines.[51] Promising not a mere change of guard, but a fundamental change, Museveni was sworn in as president of Uganda on January 29, 1986. On inauguration, he affirmed that the people of Africa and the people of Uganda were entitled to a democratic government and that he did not consider a favor from any regime. He declared that the sovereign people must be the public, not the government. 'The main problem in Africa is of leaders who do not want to leave power', he asserted. By 2015, when he sought constitutional change to remain president, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni had been in power for 29 years. Meanwhile, Mr. Museveni's government accuses Dr. Besigye, a former comrade and now

a prominent opposition figure who has stood against the President, of trying to organize an Egypt-style uprising.[52]

Paul Kagame is in this same genre of neo-patrimonial OMS mode. In the 1980s, Paul Kagame came into the limelight fighting in Yoweri Museveni's army (FRONASA) that had launched him to power as Ugandan president. He later joined the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which invaded Rwanda in 1990 and assumed control of it following the death of leader Fred Rwigyema. He played a prominent role in the civil war that was reignited as a result of the assassination of Rwanda's President Juvénal Habyarimana and ended the genocide in that country with a military victory. He became vice president and was in charge of operations to neutralize Hutu insurgents who were destabilizing the country from hideouts in neighboring Zaire. As part of the counter-insurgency operations, Kagame sponsored two controversial rebel wars in Zaire. The Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebels' Armed Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire (AFLCZ) won the first war (1996–1997) that removed French-backed dictator Sese Sesko Mobutu from office and installed Laurent-Désiré Kabila as president in his place. Kagame later turned against his ally.

Paul Kagame became president in 2000. His tenure has been marked by stability and relative prosperity. As president, he has focused on a national development plan to transform Rwanda into a middle-income country by 2020. By 2013, Rwanda had demonstrated strong performances on key indicators, such as health care and education. Annual growth between 2004 and 2010 averaged 8% per year. With impressive indicators of progress in Rwanda, Kagame has strong support among the population, although human-rights groups note political repression. He won an election in 2003 under a new constitution adopted that year, and was elected for a second term in 2010. In a referendum to amend the constitution to end term limits on December 18, 2015, more than 90% of Rwandan voters said yes to the proposed changes. That cleared the way for Kagame to run for office again—and again and again. With the outcome of the referendum, Kagame, in theory, could remain in power for another 17 years.[53]

The dominant governance paradigm on the African continent, arising from the interplay of the unholy trinity of factors and associated forces, has been expressed in normative statist autocracies, civilian and military dictatorships alike, and orchestrated through strategic patron–client relationships. This patrimonial and, more contemporaneously, neo-patrimonial paradigm of governance and a snapshot of the conundrum of African governance are illustrated in the trajectory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which since independence in 1960 has not recovered from the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, its first nationalist national leader. Between 1961 and 1973, it is reckoned that six African independence leaders have been assassinated by their ex-colonial rulers, including Patrice Lumumba of Congo.[54] Accordingly, the problem of governance since independence in Africa is epitomized by the career of Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga

and the travails of the Congo that are still raging to this day. Joseph Desire Mobutu was implicated in what Ludo De Witte has qualified as 'the most important assassination of the 20th century'.[55] Patrice Lumumba, the democratically elected prime minister of the DRC, was assassinated on January 17, 1961, barely a year into the country's independence. His assassination by a Belgian execution squad working in collaboration with Congolese accomplices was a culmination of two interrelated assassination plots by US and Belgian governments.[56] Also, according to remarks attributed to Baroness Park of Monmouth, who was head of the MI6 station in the central African country at the time, the Congo's first democratically elected prime minister was abducted and killed in a Cold War operation run by British intelligence. The contention was that it was the fear of the Western allies that Lumumba would have handed over the high-value Katangese uranium deposits as well as the diamonds and other important minerals largely located in the secessionist eastern state of Katanga to the Soviets.[57] Colonel Mobutu was thus propelled into office in 1965 as a direct beneficiary of an international conspiracy involving the USA, Belgium and Britain. With the support of the USA and its Western allies, he was through dubious democratic maneuvers transformed into a life president of the DRC.

Mobutu Sese Seko ruled the Republic of Zaire with an iron hand from 1965 to 1997, when he was overthrown by a coalition of forces organized under the umbrella of the Armed Forces for the Liberation of the Democratic Republic of Congo/Zaire (AFLDC/Z). These anti-Mobutu forces comprised both state and non-state actors, including the national armies of Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Angola fighting alongside the Laurent Kabila-led AFLDC/Z. In the changing calculus of elite forces in the post-Cold War period, the regional coalition of forces, the AFLDC/Z and its regional allies that were paradoxically supported by the USA, were arrayed against an opposing alliance of regional, mainly Francophone, countries including Morocco, status quo forces and non-state actors such as the UNITA from Angola, mobilized by France. In 1967–1968, Mobutu Sese Seko served as chairperson of the Organization of African Unity.

Lumumba's assassination had significant historical import because of a multitude of factors. It starkly demonstrated the deleterious pertinence of the global context, its impact, specifically in this instance on Congolese politics and, generally, on the evolution of African politics since independence. It was also a reflection of Lumumba's overall fate and the legacy of Africa's nationalist leaders at independence. The powerful forces arrayed against African states at their emergence as states onto the world stage have remained. The continued salience of elite forces of the global states system, although modified in the transformed geo-strategic landscape of Africa characterized in the post-Cold War era by behavioral transformations of African states, is again illustrated in the fate of Laurent Kabila, also of the Congo. Laurent Kabila, the hero of the liberation from the rule of Mobutu Sese Seko, was assassinated in

what remain mysterious circumstances in 2001. Kagame sent Rwandan troops into Zaire in late 1996 to battle the Hutu forces. While there, the troops also intervened in the rebellion taking place, supporting Laurent Kabila in his successful quest to depose Zairean president Mobutu Sese Seko. Kagame was one of several African leaders operating military forces in Congo during that country's civil war, dubbed Africa's 'first world war'.[58]

In 1998, after Laurent Kabila had been in power for a little more than a year, his former allies, Museveni and Kagame, shifted support to rebels who sought to oust Kabila. They mounted a campaign that reached the suburbs of the capital, Kinshasa. Kabila was only saved by the intervention of other neighbors (Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe) to protect their strategic interests in the region. Notwithstanding a peace agreement, Uganda and Rwanda, with the support of several Congolese rebel groups, controlled half of the territory of the country for a long time.[59] Incursions from these Congolese rebels are rampant and uncontrolled despite the deployment of the largest United Nations peacekeeping force in the country. Under its Chap. 7 mandate, the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces have engaged in direct combat to address catastrophic humanitarian consequences of rebel forces suspected of being proxies of neighboring states. Given the humanitarian challenges in the Congo, UN forces continue to provide support to a Congolese army that is reputed for its indiscipline.

The assassination of Patrice Lumumba was the second in the killing of five leaders of independence movements in African in the 1960s orchestrated by Africa's former colonial masters, or their agents. Amilcar Cabral, leader of the West African liberation movement against Portugal of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde or PAIGC) in Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, was assassinated in Conakry in 1973 by Portuguese agents. Before Lumumba's death in 1961, Felix Moumie, the Cameroonian opposition leader, had been poisoned in 1960. Meanwhile, Sylvanus Olympio, leader of Togo, was killed in 1963. Mehdi Ben Barka, leader of the Moroccan opposition movement, disappeared in France in 1965. Finally, Eduardo Mondlane, leader of Mozambique's Frelimo, fighting for independence from the Portuguese, died from a parcel bomb in 1969.[60] Also, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was ousted in a Western-backed coup in 1966. He died in exile in Guinea.

A second archetype of patrimonial governance, with the strong connivance of metropolitan controllers of puppet African leaders and neo-colonial forces, is the life presidency of civilian and civilianized military dictatorships. These regimes, mainly expressed in the OPS/OMS, are often rationalized in many (frequently contradictory) terms, as there are autocratic patriarchal figures heading patrimonial arrangements. The political evolution of Ivory Coast, under its OPS the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (PDCI), and doubling as an OMS under the life presidency of Felix Houphouët-Boigny, a trained medical assistant, who has led the country since 1945 or even in Sassou Nguesso's

Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) or Mobutu's Sese Seko in Zaire or now Democratic Republic of Congo, are classic exemplars. Other more contemporaneous variants of the OMS with some controversial historic validation are in Paul Kagame's Rwanda or Museveni's Uganda or even Zimbabwe's 92-year-old President Robert Mugabe.

In all these cases, constitutional term limits are abrogated through constitutional referenda almost always to the benefit of the incumbents. In Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza forced his way, through a muscled Supreme Court ruling, to rig to enthrone an unconstitutional third term. In a few cases, with strongly entrenched institutions such as Nigeria, the institutions have proven to be resilient enough to thwart attempts at undermining the integrity of the constitutional process. The strenuous effort of Olusegun Obasanjo to manipulate the constitution for an elongated tenure was robustly defeated. In Sierra Leone, the ambition of President Kabbah to secure a third term has led to serious schisms within the ruling party. As for Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, his unending validation is the leadership of the 1970s guerrilla war where he made his name. At the time, he was seen as a revolutionary hero, fighting white minority rule for the freedom of his people; this is why many African leaders remain reluctant to criticize him.[61]

As with most African states, the trajectory of Houphouët-Boigny's politics in Ivory Coast essentially reflected the political history of the country. With antecedence as a local tax collector for the French colonial administration, he appreciated the prejudices against indigenous farmers, leading him in 1933 to organize the first African planters' association Syndicate Agricole Africain (SAA) in Ivory Coast. With over 20,000 members, the SAA became one of the first anti-colonial movements in the country. Houphouet-Boigny entered the *Assemblée Constituante* (French National Assembly) in 1945, occupying the seat reserved for the indigenous constituency. In 1946, he collaborated with the French Communist Party to found the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (PDCI) that allied itself with the African Democratic Rally, a transterritorial movement across French West Africa. Given that the climate in the Cold War presented risks to associations with communism in Africa, including French West Africa, and specifically in Ivory Coast, the RDA and its Ivorian expression in the PDCI abandoned their ideological leaning and association with the French communists.

These developments paved the way to his recognition as a moderate in the French Assembly. It earned him the acquaintanceship of General Charles de Gaulle. Houphouët-Boigny effectively became an ally of the French establishment. His whole political career thereafter was dedicated to the protection of French interests in Ivory Coast and Africa. Félix Houphouët-Boigny is associated with the drafting and ultimate adoption of the *loi-cadre*, passed by the French National Assembly in 1956, authorizing the right to vote for all African subjects in French colonies. The law also presaged the autonomy of French colonies in Africa.[62] His life and times as a benign civilian dictator

represented one polar end of the OPS/OMS syndrome, while Mobutu Sese Seko represented the military end of the continuum. Invariably, all Africa's major political actors fall within this continuum.

Military interventions in the political processes of African states that were initially perceived as political aberrations became instrumental to the consolidation of the extant political settlements under threat or to institute new settlements that were driven by the partisan agenda of the triumphant interventionists or a coalition of partisan stakeholders determined to overthrow the old regime. Political settlements describe the types of informal as well as formal political bargains that can end conflict and bring sustainable peace, promote reform, development, and reduce poverty; or fail to achieve any such progress.[63] It is argued that political settlement is central to all development and one that does not exclude powerful players is more likely to prevent conflict.[64] The reality, however, is that political settlements in post-independence Africa have not been achieved through consensual engagement. They have been a product of impositions through various means, including Africa's distorted brand of democracy, or purely forceful interventions in the political process.

Forceful changes of political settlements through military interventions such as coups d'état, rebellions, and revolutions of various hues have been a prominent part of the politics of post-independence Africa. The period between 1960 and 1970 and slightly beyond has generally been called the decades of coups.[65] Military intervention entails the conscious act of displacing and supplanting an existing political order, a government, by soldiers with the objective of either governing or influencing the political affairs of the country in a particular direction determined largely by the interventionists themselves.[66] Military interventions in the form of a coup or military regimes are the most extreme forms of the military impacting the policy process. These interventions effect an irregular transfer of the state's executive power by the regular armed forces or internal security forces through the threat or actual use of force. They usurp the legislative or executive power or in some cases the judicial powers.[67]

During the decade of coups the scoreboard read something like this:

1. Congo-Kinshasa, 1960. Colonel Mobutu seizes power temporarily.
2. Togo, January 1963. Coup deposes President Olympio who gets killed in the process.
3. Congo-Brazzaville, August 1963. Government of Abbe Youlou overthrown by Marien Ngouabi.
4. Dahomey, December 1963. Colonel Sogho overthrows President Albert Magai.
5. Gabon, February 1964. Coup d'état occurs but is reversed by French forces.
6. Algeria, June 1965. Colonel Boumedienne overthrows President Ben Bella.

7. Dahomey, December 1965. A second coup is staged.
8. Burundi, October 1965. The monarchy is overthrown by Army officers.
9. Central African Republic, January 1966. President David Dacko is ousted by Colonel Jean Bokassa.
10. Upper Volta, January 1966. Colonel Lamizana deposes President Yameogo.
11. Nigeria, January 1966. General Ironsi is installed after a coup led by young majors.
12. Ghana, February 1966. President Kwame Nkrumah is overthrown by the military led by General Ankrah.
13. Nigeria, July 1966. General Gowon overthrows General Ironsi.
14. Burundi, November 1966. Captain Micombero takes over in another coup.
15. Sierra Leone, March 1967. President Margai deposed by Lieutenant Colonel Juxon-Smith.
16. Algeria, December 1967. A second coup attempt is made.
17. Sierra Leone, April 1968. A coup from the ranks overthrows Lieutenant Colonel Juxon-Smith. Civilian government reinstalled under President Siaka Stevens.
18. Mali, November 1968. Young officers led by Lieutenant Moussa Traore depose the government of President Modibo Keita.
19. Sudan, May 1969. Free Officers' Movement seizes power.
20. Libya, September 1969. The monarchy is deposed.
21. Somalia, October 1969. A revolutionary Council led by the military overthrows the government.

Among the prominent military takeovers in the 1960s were those in: Congo (Kinshasa) in November 1965 by Colonial Joseph Desire Mobutu, and in the same year in Algeria by Colonel Houari Boummedienne; Nigeria in January 1966, by Major Nzeogwu followed later by a counter-coup by Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi; a month later in Ghana, by Colonel Akwasi Amankwaah Afrifa; Togo in January 1967, by Lieutenant Colonel Etienne Gnassingbe Eyadema; Mali in 1968, by Lieutenant Moussa Traore; and Libya in September 1969, by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Prominent among the military coups in the 1970s were those in: Uganda in 1971 by Idi Amin Dada; Ethiopia in 1974 by Colonial Mengistu Haile Mariam; Nigeria in July 1975 by General Muhammad Murtala; and Ghana in 1979 by Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings.

After 1970, numerous other governments were overturned. The progressive government of Dr. Milton Obote in Uganda was deposed by General Idi Amin in January 1971. Uganda, under General Amin, went through one of the most tragic experiences in recent African history. The feudal monarchy of Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia was deposed by the military in

September 1974. By 1975, approximately half of the continent's states were led by military or civil-military governments. Other states also had records of predatory attacks by their military forces. In the 1980s, changes of government through the coup d'état have occurred in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Congo (Brazzaville) and Nigeria, among others. No doubt, the coup d'état and the military regime had become the most prevalent political phenomena in Africa.

The era of military interventions in post-independence Africa seriously impacted the overall direction of the politics here up to contemporary times. For one reason, many of the usurpers of power validated themselves through patrimonial arrangement or legitimized their order through external recognition and validation by powerful external forces that exploited them to advance their strategic ideological or material interests. In this class are the interventions that brought the likes of Congo's (later Zaire's) Sese Seko Mobutu to power through the removal of Patrice Lumumba or, more lately, the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya or even the assassination of Africa's 'Che' Thomas Sankara by Blaise Compaore in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. These interventions were often underwritten by external forces advancing their global strategic objectives. This was mostly the case in Francophone Africa, from Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, the CAR etc. Military intervention has not always been conducted to 'rescue' the nation from political ills. Coups have been linked directly or indirectly with personal ambitions and the craving for power by some specific key players. This was in fact the case in Dahomey in 1965. In other instances, officers have led coups to regain lost prestige or to preempt an impending purge. Coupled with this, interpersonal clashes have occurred between the civilian and military elites and thereby provoked takeovers. Cases in point have been Uganda in 1971, Togo in 1963, Congo in 1968, Dahomey in 1967, and several others.

In that connection, Murat Önder notes that:

> For the centrality of the military approach, the greater the resources and the cohesion of the military, the greater the likelihood of interventions are (Mayer and Burnett, 1977). One view emphasize the sectoral interests of the military, treating the military as a potentially parasitic institution which, given its centrality to the state's claim on legitimate violence, is prone to use this to dominate politically, and especially if civilian institutions are weak (Jenkins and Kposowa, 1992). The stronger the military's resources, either as a percent of state resource or relative to the national economy, the weaker the institution of civil society and thereby the greater the probability of military interventions. Several studies have found that larger armies and those with greater claims to the government revenues have been more coups prone. A second view argues that a centralized chain of command, military discipline, and extensive communication make military officers a cohesive group, capable of organizing effective seizure.[68]

The distinctive characteristic of military bureaucracy from civilian bureaucracy is that they are more hierarchical, authoritative, and their attribute

as a legitimate source of coercion make it easy for them to influence political institutions.[69] The deployment of coercive instruments of the state and, at the same time, the use of force by competing unpacified domestic forces to advance partisan political objectives, partly accounts for many coups and generally the turbulence of the internal processes of postcolonial states in Africa. The outcomes of the interactions of these factors, feeding into the pervasive struggle of all forces, both domestic and external, to appropriate the totality of the social, political, and economic space, were expressed in the prevalence of classical patrimonial structures of governance in the first decades of independence. With political development processes of African states based largely on coercion, the nodal state has in the long term been weak and susceptible to unraveling. In this environment, African politics in the postcolonial era has been marred by authoritarianism, corruption, military interventions, and leadership failures amidst a broader socio-economic crisis characterized by poverty.[70]

Benjamin Talton observes that although by 1990 formal European political control had given way to African self-rule (except in South Africa), the legacy of European dominance remained evident in the national borders, political institutions and infrastructures, education systems, national languages, economies, and trade networks of each nation. Accordingly, in the post-Cold War period coinciding with the post-Mandela world order, the accent on democratic practice as the validating principle of governance imposed by Western European masters turned out to be subverted by the continued unrestrained interest articulation of the same neo-colonial forces (especially France) as the leading force for the sustenance of the status quo on the continent. Decolonization failed to transform the political structures to bring about true autonomy.[71] Democracy in Africa in the post-Cold War period has therefore been doubly instrumentalized. First, it is to project the strategic interests of neo-colonial forces, which connive in institutionalizing neo-patrimonial structures and institutions that advance their strategic interests. African leaders, often in collusion with neo-colonial handlers, have also instrumentalized democracy to consolidate illegitimate political settlements negotiated often after protracted electoral controversies. The consolidation of the status quo that absolutely appropriates the state space for a particular ethnic constituency is attained through one-man life rule as reflected in Houphouët-Boigny in Ivory Coast, Omar Bongo in Gabon (who became the longest ruling head of state before he passed away), Gnasingbe Eyadema in Togo, and Paul Biya in Cameroon, among others.

A second route to the consolidation of the neo-patrimonial status quo is via dynastic succession, as in the Eyadema clan in Togo, the Omar Bongo dynasty in Gabon, the Kabila family in Democratic Republic of Congo, and an attempt by President Wade in Senegal to invest control of Senegal in his son Karim Wade. The idea of father-to-son inheritance of state power in Senegal began to emerge after President Abdoulaye Wade's first presidential victory as Karim Wade, who was in his 40s, like Ali Bongo in Gabon before him, was placed in a post in the presidential office. He was soon appointed to the

strategic position of president of the Agence Nationale de l'Organization de la Conference Islamic in charge of preparing a summit of the Islamic Conference Organization.[72] President Abdoulaye Wade's father-to-son power-transfer plan was foiled through mass protests. Houphouët-Boigny manipulated the political process to ensure the seeming constitutional takeover of the state by his Baoule ethnic heir and godson Bedie. He ensured the rise of Bedie as the president of the legislature in line for the presidency in the event of the incapacitation of the president. The project failed. As earlier noted, abrogation of constitutionally sanctioned term limits has become the norm to subvert the will of the people. This has been the case with Pierre Nkuruzuza in Burundi, Sassou Nguesso in Congo (Brazzaville), Bai Koroma in Sierra Leone, Paul Kagame in Rwanda, Kabila in Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), Dos Santos in Angola, and Yoweri Museveni in Uganda. Olusegun Obasanjo's attempt to elongate his rule in Nigeria was robustly confronted and defeated. All such cases of confrontations with assaults on constitutional term limits have been costly in term of human lives and financial losses.

The consequence is that politics in the African state environment involves a struggle for the appropriation of the totality of the social-economic and political spaces by all against all others. Force is more likely to be deployed from within, in collaboration with transnational interests groups in the immediate intermestic environment, to unravel perceived illegitimate political institutions, processes, and imposed settlements of the OMS/OPS structure across the continent. This significantly explains the rise of many proto-states with the support of such neo-colonial forces as France's instigation and support for the rebellion of the Forces Nouvelles in Ivory Coast against a nationalist Laurent Gbagbo administration and the support of the USA, France, Belgium, Morocco, and apartheid South Africa for Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko, who came to power in 1965 in the Congo (later Democratic Republic of Congo) and was overthrown in May 1997 by the Laurent Desire Kabila led coalition of African forces including Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and Angola, supported by post-apartheid South Africa in what is popular dubbed as Africa's first world war. In Liberia, Charles Taylor was ousted by a coalition of rebellious forces mobilized in Sierra Leone and Guinea with the active support of Houphouët-Boigny in Ivory Coast, acting to execute the interests of France in derailing the attempt to transcend colonial divisions of the subregion through the Economic Community of West African States. This coincided with the withdrawal of US support for Liberian President and warlord Charles Taylor due to arguments around concessions in respect of oil finds in commercial quantities in the country.

Overall, military interventions have been instituted for three and a quasi-fourth reasons. These interventions may be inspired by revolutionary objectives, to advance nationalist goals, or to consolidate a failing partisan status quo and, finally, merely to advance the personal ambitions of military officers. Revolutionary interventions are exemplified by Muammar Gaddafi's overthrow of King Idris in September 1969. Idris's government was increasingly

unpopular by the later 1960s; it had exacerbated Libya's traditional regional and tribal divisions by centralizing the country's federal system in order to take advantage of the Libya's oil wealth. Corruption was entrenched by widespread patronage throughout the oil industry. Muammar Gaddafi effectively overcame these challenges while binding all Libya's fractious elements into a nation or at least a working state. Thomas Sankara's coup in Burkina Faso in 1983 was founded on Marxist revolutionary, pan-Africanist theories. He was a charismatic and iconic figure of revolution, commonly referred to as 'Africa's Che Guevara'. His coup was undertaken with the goal of eliminating corruption and the dominance of the former French colonial power. He mobilized the population at the grassroots level across the country and launched one of the most ambitious programs for social and economic change ever attempted on the African continent. He was assassinated by forces loyal to his deputy Blaise Compaore, who was supported by France and the regional overseer of French interests in the region, Ivorian president Houphouët-Boigny. General Murtala Mohammed in Nigeria attempted to radically alter the moral foundations of the Nigerian state and society and institute transformative policies. He was assassinated by status quo forces determined to halt programs of change. In general, conservative military regimes have greater longevity in Africa: Nigeria, Congo Brazzaville, Zaire, and Mali are some of the examples. Whether in the case of Muammar Gaddafi, Thomas Sankara, or Murtala Mohammed, external forces with strategic interests to protect were implicated in the ultimate neutralization of revolutionary regimes in Africa.

The decisive involvement of neo-colonial external forces in the internal affairs of the African state locates the African state within the workings of a world system. Accordingly, in the manner predicted by Immanuel Wallenstein,[73] the life of the African state, a unit of the larger world system, and its internal processes are made up of tensions of rival conflicting forces, contending for supremacy in the polity. The state is held together by tension and torn apart as each contending constituent unit seeking to transform the system to its absolute advantage in conjunction with its conniving external metropoles. The transition of power from one dominant group to another emergent force, either through demographic transitions or the introduction of new factors that change the internal balance of power, or even the reversal of sympathy or loyalty of the metropolitan force, is marked by extreme violence. In this climate, the military institution plays a prominent and decisive role, and control of the military is a prime political objectives of major contending forces in the African state. Some analysts emphasize the centrality of the military institution in the politics of Africans states.

Postcolonial and post-independence Africa has witnessed a few revolutions. A revolution is a process that seeks to violently overthrow an established socio-political order with a view to creating a new and better one founded on radically different visions of society and fresh new principles and ideas. Ademola Araoye advances that revolutions are motivated by the uncompromising

rejection of the foundational values and fundamental principles that underpin the subsisting social order and system. Frantz Fanon argues that the end of a revolution is to bring into being an entirely new world that must be absolutely free of the past. A revolutionary process would aim to achieve 'a total, complete, and absolute substitution' of certain specie of men by another specie without any period of transition. It is an abrupt transformation of society. Given the 'willed' abruptness and the absolute substitution it seeks to attain, the desired transformation requires the application of absolute violence.[74] It may be surmised that revolutions seek seismic systemic transformations that are based on a total rejection of the foundational premises and value systems on which the rejected system is constructed. These thoughts were shared by Amilcar Cabral. Seen from this light, only in a few cases in post-independence Africa have military interventions attained revolutionary proportions.

Military interventions in African politics may be broadly delineated into four classes. These are the interventions of revolutionary 'madmen' and nonconformists to fundamentally reorder the national value system and realign relations with dominant external forces and neo-colonial forces intruding or outrightly directing the internal affairs of the state. In the vision of Thomas Sankara, one of those revolutionary madmen, he

> would like to leave behind me the conviction that if we maintain a certain amount of caution and organization we deserve victory … You cannot carry out fundamental change without a certain amount of madness. In this case, it comes from nonconformity, the courage to turn your back on the old formulas, the courage to invent the future. It took the madmen of yesterday for us to be able to act with extreme clarity today. I want to be one of those madmen. We must dare to invent the future. https://answersafrica.com/by-these-quotes-you-know-thomas-sankara.html.

This genre of intervention would include Thomas Isidore Noel Sankara's revolution in Upper Volta and its transformation to Burkina Faso (meaning land of people of integrity) or Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's revolutionary Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or the ill-fated Derg-led Ethiopian revolution that in September 1974 brought the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie to an end.

A second genre of military interventions is the nationalist coup d'état that may be motivated by grand or limited objectives to sanitize the internal processes and introduce some order to national affairs. The case of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings in Ghana comes to mind. Often the perpetrators of this kind of intervention begin with revolutionary rhetoric reflecting a reading of the national mood for drastic action to contain a slide to national trauma. In Ghana, Jerry Rawlings executed key members of the ousted regime for economic sabotage. At the same time, his revolution coincided with mysterious assassination of many prominent members of the judiciary.

The two classes of military intervention often begin with the proclamation of a revolution but become more clearly delineated with the passage of time

and the articulation of policy. The modalities of engagement, in particular the acceptance of revolutionary means (political executions) as state policy to advance radical political ideology, often separate revolutions from nationalist military interventions in the political process. A third kind of military intervention, often in the form of counter-coups, is driven by the need to reverse the movement or a gathering momentum toward radical transformations of the system. Such counter-coups may be reactionary and may be motivated by the perceived need to consolidate the status quo, whatever the character of that status quo. In Ghana, the 1966 coup of the National Liberation Council appears to have been a reactionary response to Kwame Nkrumah's radical political visions. Also, with the imminent threat to partisan interest represented by a particular regime, civilian or military, to its partisan constituency, a coup may be staged to forestall another coup that could effect a power transition from one partisan constituent unit to another contesting constituent of the state. Most of the military interventions in Nigeria's public life have been staged by Northern officers fearful of a forced change of Northern-dominated governments that are often in power. When the Northern-dominated Nigerian military struck in 1983, it was to preempt a coup from outside their military circuit to remove the widely condemned Northern-aligned and performance-challenged Shehu Shagari regime from office. The reactionary military regime of General Ibrahim Babaginda that overthrew the draconian regime of General Muhammadu Buhari and his right-hand man, the Northern Yoruba Muslim General Tune Idiagbon instituted a hegemonic regime. General Ibrahim Babaginda's self-styled military presidency was not only anti-South, but is reputed to have systematically begun the destruction of the country's morality and value system. It formally entrenched corruption as quasi-state policy and institutionalized the physical elimination of political opponents by the administration. Strategic neutralization of opponents became a part of the political culture of the country that spilled over into the democratic era. Also, at the height of General Ibrahim Babaginda's administration, all members of the Supreme Military Council, with the exception of two, were Northerners. When a Yoruba politician finally won what is generally acclaimed as the freest and most democratic presidential election ever held in the country after a tortuous transition program, Moshood Abiola's mandate was annulled because the top brass of the Northern-dominated military would not hand over power to a non-Hausa-Fulani. The Nigerian military acquired the reputation of being the most potent political instrument of the Hausa-Fulani North.

Also, many coups are undertaken by partisan forces seeking to reverse radical changes to the status quo by a revolutionary regime. This would include the September 2002 attempted coup staged by the France and Burkina Faso-backed Forces Nouvelles to remove the nationalist and Pan-Africanist government of Laurent Gbagbo from office in Ivory Coast. The coup was manipulated by French authorities to become a full-blown war in order to consolidate its continued hold over the country. That objective was finally

secured in the controversial kidnapping of the Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo, who was handed over to the Hague-based International Criminal Court which is perceived in most of Africa to be a political hatchet institution to advance the strategic interests of neo-colonial powers. The quasi-fourth motivation is the coup for personal aggrandizement of military officers. Moussa Traoré's coup in Mali on 19 November 1968 exemplifies this. Lieutenant Moussa Traoré led a coup d'état against Mali's one-party government, personally arresting the president, Modibo Keïta, a Pan-Africanist. In March 1971, Traoré arrested his co-conspirators and main rivals, including his deputy Captain Yoro Diakité, for plotting to overthrow his government. In 1972, they were convicted to life imprisonment in the Taoudem Salt Mines, where Diakité died a year later. On May 18, 1977, ex-president Modibo Keïta died in prison.

The driving motif of African politics in post-independence Africa, including military engagement in the political domain, may be the search for absolute appropriation of the totality of the socio-political and economic space of the African state by internal forces, in connivance with external vested interests. This situation has engendered the challenge of resolving a pervasive security dilemma that has afflicted the African state process since independence. Gerard Hagg (2008) highlights that in postcolonial African countries, political power struggles generally take two forms: the state is in conflict with identity groups (state-identity conflict), and identity groups compete for 'ownership' or dominance of the state (inter-identity conflict).[75] The two levels of conflict seldom occur or remain in isolation but are interactive and can develop in two directions: from the state to society and from society to the state. The state may actively support one identity in inter-identity conflict if this identity occupies powerful positions within the state. In reality, such states often encourage dominant identities to use state resources and institutions to suppress other identities. Therefore, strategic interaction among groups is characterized by competition for control of the state as the dominant group in the state sets the terms of competition between its rivals. Accordingly, Lake and Rothchild (1996) assert that the pursuit of particularistic objectives often becomes embodied in competing visions of just, legitimate, and appropriate political orders.[76] Interpreting interaction between political forces, the dominant patrimonial and neo-patrimonial governance paradigm may be better understood as part of a mechanism to consolidate the absolute partisan appropriation of the African state space.

Perhaps these have influenced the failures of sovereign national conferences (SNCs), mainly in Francophone Africa, to change the dominant governance paradigm in the post-Cold War era. Participants in SNCs have often comprised prominent intellectuals, including a few from the diaspora, representatives of political parties and of civil-society groups, notably labour unions, media and youths. In practice, participation has been manipulated and skewed to ensure that the outcome of the conference is consistent with views and interests of the administration. This has been a major drawback of SNCs

organized by the various administrations in Nigeria. The phenomenon of the SNC was employed by the Republic of Benin as the long-entrenched degenerate Marxist OMS of Mathew Kerekou was forced to acknowledge the bankruptcy of his regime and apologise to the population. The two-week frank and critical deliberation led to a broad national consensus on the adoption of principles of liberal democracy, respect of fundamental human liberties, rule of law, separation of power with checks and balances, multiparty system, competitive choice of political leaders through free and fair elections, good governance, etc. It was this broad national consensus that was later enshrined in the constitution that was adopted through a referendum on December 11, 1990.[77] The crucial and unusual success factor in Benin Republic was a collapsed state and economy and a leader who admitted failure. The experience in the Republic of Benin is seen as the only success of the wave of SNCs that took place in several Francophone African countries in the early 1990s. Without exception, incumbent leaders in the other countries who considered themselves in effective control engineered the failure of the conferences in their respective countries. Two notable examples were Bongo of Gabon and Eyadema of Togo. SNCs failed in the other countries. In Zaire, where the longest conference lasted over seven years, the dinosaur state of Mubutu ensured that the proceedings were consistently interrupted, even while Étienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, a convenient on-and-off ally of Mobutu, led opposition Sacred Union and its coalition partners battled the state to no avail. It is paradoxical that it was the decision of the conference to formally denaturalize all Zairean Tutsis of Zairean nationality that provided the rationale for Rwanda and others to raise Laurent Kabilla's rebellion that finally overthrew Mobutu from office. The rebellion succeeded largely because of the liberating implications of the end of the Cold War for Africa as the USA teamed up with Nelson Mandela's South Africa to negotiate an end to the Mobutu regime against the stout opposition of France that had mobilized neighboring Francophone proxy states to put up a last battle in Kinshasa.

In Congo Brazzaville, the elected sovereign post-conference president Pascal Lissouba was removed from office by the old dictator Sassou Nguesso, who with the financial support of ELF Acquitaine, launched a war to remove President Lissouba, who had opened up the hitherto French-controlled oil sector in that country to US interests. In December 2015, President Denis Sassou Nguesso, 71, after a new constitution removed age and term limits obstructing his bid to extend his rule, announced that a presidential election would be held several months early. Under the controversial new charter adopted after a referendum in the preceding October, an election was due to be held in the Republic of Congo in July 2016, but he said he wanted to bring it forward to the first quarter of 2016 to usher in a 'new dynamic' following the referendum.

Meanwhile, the relationship between France and its African proxies can often take on the character of a roadshow or circus, especially when the occasional simmering disagreements between them blow into the open or

when domestic pressure forces the government to distance itself momentarily from its protégés. It is in this context that, in September 2015, French judges ordered the seizure of properties tied to Sassou Nguesso's family in an investigation over suspected ill-gotten wealth.[78] He is among a number of African leaders targeted by a long-running French investigation into suspected ill-gotten wealth in France.[79] About the same time, French authorities began investigating Gabon president Ali Bongo's chief of staff on suspicion of having taken a bribe to help secure a contract for a French company. Under Omar Bongo, put in office by the French, Gabon had excellent relations with France for decades under a system known as 'la Françafrique'. The Paris establishment granted political and military support to long-serving presidents in its former African colonies in exchange for commercial favors. But the skewed and exploitative relationship has cooled since Ali Bongo, who was supported by France to succeed his father as president in a disputed election in 2009, sought to distance himself from France's exploitative relations sustained by his father. His chief of staff, Maixent Accrombessi, under investigation by the French authorities, had asserted that Gabon had been like a drinking trough for the biggest French companies, which, under Omar Bongo, had been behind unprecedented crimes, illicit agreements, abuse of public goods, and abuse of their dominant position. While the scandal unfolded, past presidents, including Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy, denied allegations of having benefited from millions of dollars in illegal campaign funds from figures like Omar and Ali Bongo. Also, France's top multinationals are overrepresented in the former colonial nations. Home to one of four French military bases in Africa, Gabon remains the 'epicenter of Françafrique' and the sphere of influence *par excellence*, where French businesses control more than 30% of some market sectors.[80] Observers note that the revelations are an indictment of a corrupt regime that reflects shamefully on both the former colonial master France and the unabashedly high-living governing family that has treated the national treasury like its own private bank account.[81] Before relations with France went awry, Francois Stifani, the grand master of the National Grand Lodge of France (GLNF), one of the largest Masonic orders with 38,000 members, was in Libreville in May of 2010 to ordain Ali Bongo as the grand master of Gabonese Freemasons. Until then, Ali Bongo had occupied the rank of Assistant Grand Master, i.e., at least three levels below the peak of the hierarchy. At age 53, Ali Bongo was catapulted to be the grand master of the Grand Lodge of Gabon (GLB) and the Grand Equatorial Rite, the two predominant Freemason orders in Gabon.

These problematic relationships have fed into the internal dynamics of governance in post-independence Africa and have been sustained in the post-Cold War era. Gary K. Busch explains that Freemason lodges maintain a formidable, covert influence within the French judicial and police structures. Their tentacles spread all over Francophone Africa and are a potent instrument to keep control over political developments across the African

continent, in particular in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa. All three Freemason lodges in France have gained reputations in recent years for being caught out peddling political influence and pursuing false invoicing on state contracts, particularly in companies controlled by the state. It is the responsibility of the Freemasons in the judiciary to hamper any investigations through bureaucratic measures designed to torpedo any serious attempt at reform. One of the topmost grievances raised by the muzzled press is the National Grand Lodge of France (GLNF) open-armed embrace of brutal or corrupt African dictators who are Masons. The other two Grand Lodges are no different. Just as in France, Freemasonry is ubiquitous at the very top in many African states. Denis Sassou Nguesso, the Congolese president, is Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Congo (Brazzaville), which was linked to the GLNF; President Mamadou Tanja of Niger, and Chad's Idriss Deby and Francoisois Bozize of the Central African Republic are among at least 12 African presidents linked to the Masons. In November 2009, Ali Bongo, the new Gabonese president, was ordained as the Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Gabon (GLB) and the Grand Equatorial Rite, the two predominant Freemason orders in Gabon.

In Congo-Brazzaville, both the current president, Denis Sassou Nguesso, and the former president, Pascal Lissouba, are freemasons, although they belong to different chapters of the order. Lissouba is an initiate of the Grand Orient of France, while Sassou Nguesso belongs to a Senegalese lodge affiliated to the GLNF. Most of these African presidents, but not exclusively, are Francophone: Paul Biya, president of Cameroon; Blaise Campaore, president of Burkina Faso; Robert Guei, former head of Ivory Coast; John Kuffuor, former president of Ghana, to name but a few. There are scores more at cabinet level and among those staffing African regional organizations and banks.[82]

In effect, governance and governmental institutions in Francophone Africa are caught in formidable unofficial strictures and neo-colonial institutions that constitute the real informal platforms that in fact govern the Francophone African state. Significantly, this critical factor has remained constant since the independence of the Francophone Sub-Saharan African state. The end of the Cold War paradoxically merely liberated neo-colonial forces to pursue their national interests with extra vigor at the expense of the peoples of those states. Gary Busch, citing the work of Francois Xavier Verschave, extensively codified the depth and reach of these affairs.

Francois Xavier Verschave in 1994 coined the concept of 'Françafrique' to describe a conspiracy between African proxies and stooges and the French establishment as the tip of the iceberg that is Franco-African relations. He said the term refers to the secret criminality in the upper echelons of French politics and economy, where a kind of underground Republic is hidden from view. Putting it in historical context, he observes that in 1960, events forced De Gaulle to grant independence to the French colonies of black Africa. He described the newly proclaimed international legality as the unsullied tip of

the iceberg as France insinuated the idea of being the best friend of Africa, development, and democracy. Meanwhile, Jacques Foccart, 'the man in the shadows', was given the task of enforcing African states' dependence, using inevitably illegal, secret, and shameful methods. Focart, also known as Monsieur Afrique, selected African heads of state who were 'friends of France'. Verschave documents that through war more than 100,000 civilians have been massacred in Cameroon since 1956; the Madagascan resistance was broken in 1947 by carnage of a similar magnitude, assassination, or electoral fraud. Verschave highlights that to these African guardians of the neo-colonial order, Paris offered a share of the income from raw materials and development aid. Military bases, the CFA franc which could be exchanged in Switzerland, the secret services and the outwardly-innocent businesses acting on their behalf (Elf and numerous supply or 'security' companies) completed the system.[83]

Verschave observes that a lot of this ability to hide what it happening from the public derives from two interlinked processes. The first is the absence of any democratic procedures in the French political system for debating African policy, and the second is the role of French Masons (and their African presidential lodge brothers) in enforcing the narrow interests of French business throughout Africa by using the institutions of the French state. In return, the African presidents pay a tithe to the French politicians which funds French political parties and enriches others on a personal basis.

He exemplifies the workings of the system with Gabon's late president Omar Bongo, who allegedly pocketed millions in embezzled funds from the Central African state, channeling some of it to French political parties in support of Nicolas Sarkozy. Verschave alludes to a US embassy cable referencing a senior official at the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) who gave information to a US diplomat in Cameroon. This information comprised Bongo's 'brazen' defrauding of the BEAC, which holds the pooled reserves of six Central African countries, including Gabon, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Shortly after Bongo's death in 2009, the US embassy in Yaounde said the bank source told them: 'Gabonese officials used the proceeds for their own enrichment and, at Bongo's direction, funneled funds to French political parties, including in support of French President Nicolas Sarkozy'. The cable, released by WikiLeaks, continued: 'Asked what the officials did with the stolen funds, the BEAC official responded, 'sometimes they kept it for themselves, sometimes they funneled it to French political parties'. Asked who received the funds, the official responded, 'both sides, but mostly the right; especially Chirac and including Sarkozy'. The BEAC official said 'Bongo was France's favourite president in Africa', and 'this is classic FrancAfrique'.[84] Gary Busch cites Francois Xavier Verschave's revelations that the Ivorian crisis was the war of the French against Ivory Coast instigated by Jacques Chirac. It was his fit of pique which ordered the French peacekeepers to attack and destroy the Ivorian air force. It was his order to send over a hundred tanks to surround the Hotel Ivoire and President Gbagbo's house. It was his decision to allow his soldiers to open fire on a crowd of singing

youths, totally unarmed and non-threatening, seeking only to stop the French from carrying out a coup or killing President Gbagbo. It was his African advisor Michel Bonnecorse, Defense Minister Aliot-Marie, and Pierre Brochand, chief of the General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) who made and controlled French policy and programs in Africa under Chirac. They were aided by a web of French agents assigned to work undercover in French companies like Bouygues, Delmas, Total, and other multinationals; pretending to be expatriate employees.[85]

In this climate, the SNCs that took place in the wake of the end of the Cold War, with the singular exception of the Republic of Benin, failed in Chad, Comoros, Gabon, Mali, Niger, and Togo. They made no dent on the prevailing governance paradigm. In post-conference Togo, under the reign of Gnasingbe Eyadema, who was president from 1967 until his death, aged 69, in 2005, family dynastic rule has been entrenched for 38 years. He took power definitively in January 1967, but was already notorious for having, as a 28-year-old sergeant in 1963, assassinated the first president of Togo, Sylvanus Olympio, in West Africa's first post-independence coup.[86] With Benin under him, such was his inexperience and incompetence that President Charles de Gaulle's African adviser, Jacques Foccart, was said to rule Togo by telephone.[87] Significantly, the country is now ruled by his son Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé. In like manner, Omar Bongo in Gabon, who ruled from December 1967 to June 2009, became the world's longest-serving non-monarch ruler. He was one of the longest serving rulers in history. Bongo was criticized for in effect having worked for himself, his family, and local elites and not for Gabon and its people. For instance, French Green politician Eva Joly noted that during Bongo's long reign, despite an oil-led GDP per capita growth to one of the highest levels in Africa, Gabon built only 5 kilometers of freeway a year and still had one of the world's highest infant mortality rates by the time of his death in June 2009. After Bongo's death, his son Ali Bongo (who, as part of preparations to assume office after his father, had been assigned key ministerial responsibilities by the latter) was elected to succeed him in a controversial election that was marred by violence in August 2009.[88] In Lusophone Africa, violence continues to play a significant role in the resolution of political contentions. Guinea Bissau, where virtually a whole generation of mainly old cadres of the African Party of Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) militocrats has been wiped out in political violence (from President Bernandino Viera through General Ansumane Mane, the former head of the military junta, to his chief of staff General Verissimo Seabra) in internecine quasi-ideological struggles, it may be said that violence is the principal mode of political engagement. Mozambique remains mired in intermittent political flashes while Angola would seem to have overcome the challenge of violence in its national life. Hopefully, for good.

In Anglophone Africa in the post-Cold War era, constitutional conferences, convened in particular in Kenya and Nigeria, often became mere talking shops as their recommendations were never implemented. Nigeria's

tortuous experience of formulating a balanced constitution presents a unique case of the problem of constitution making in Africa. In Nigeria, one channel through which the NGN 550 billion appropriated to fund the National Assembly has been drained in the last 17 years is the Constitution Review project. Though only one of the three attempts at amending the constitution has succeeded, at least NGN 9 Billion has gone into what has become a very expensive ritual.[89] Since the end of the civil war, several constitutional conferences have been held, from the Murtala/Obasanjo Constitutional Drafting Committee headed by Chief F.R.A. Williams, through the era of states creation by General Ibrahim Babaginda, the General Sani Abacha Constituent Assembly, the General Abdul Salami Abubakar 1999 Constitution, the President Olusegun Obasanjo National Political Reform Conference of 2005, to President Jonathan's Constitutional Conference on 2014. In all these attempts at constitution making, the trend has always been for Nigerians to demand the creation of more federating units.[90] The constitutional and political reform initiatives embarked upon by the various executive and legislative arms of the government since 1999 (at least two by each arm) have had no impact on the constitution that the Sani Abacha military regime foisted on the country. The Ibrahim Mantu-led attempt to amend the constitution in 2006 was entangled in the manipulation of the process by President Olusegun Obasanjo to advance his project of unconstitutionally extending his tenure in office.[91] The review was thus thrown out with Olusegun Obasanjo's third-term project by the Legislature. The successor Goodluck Jonathan administration also hosted what observers thought was a jamboree designed to woo mostly old political horses who were offered seats by the administration in the conference and who dominated its proceedings to support the controversial second-term bid of President Goodluck Jonathan. Accordingly, the clamor for authentic and politically unencumbered constitutional reform has remained a permanent issue that all administrations, including the Mohammadu Buhari administration, have had to confront. The Eighth National Assembly has decided to resume the attempt to review and amend the country's extant constitution as there is universal recognition that Nigeria's existing constitution is neither one that derived legitimacy from 'we the people of Nigeria' nor one that provides an adequate basis for tackling the country's two major challenges: socio-economic development and enduring political stability. In Kenya, constitutional review efforts undertaken over two decades prior to the governance crisis of 2008 were only partially implemented by successive governments that conveniently picked from the reforms proposed by the review. The main objective of the administrations was to avoid any threats to their continued power and interests. Not even the catastrophic events of 2008 around its elections led to any comprehensive changes in the constitution. The subsequent constitutional reform exercise was a root-and-branch affair: all political, economic, and social issues that were dodged or skirted in the past were addressed and the national consensus that emerged was incorporated into a new constitution.[92]

Post-conflict Liberia has not been immune to the rigmaroles of constitution making. The more attempts that have been made to overcome institutional prejudices in its founding 1847 constitution, the more newer challenges have emerged on the nationality clause that proscribes people of non-negro descent from acquiring citizenship. There have even been attempts to bar the poor from electoral competition by demands for unaffordable registration fees to contest elections. Attempts to review the 1986 constitution since 2014 have run up against the reluctance of establishment Liberia to accept changes that would completely equilibrate the rights of all citizens by eliminating the special privileges of Americo-Liberians. Also, a new reactionary movement to declare Liberia as founded on Christian foundations has gained a degree of momentum that may ultimately drive the country back to sectarian hostilities. Across the continent, as earlier noted, in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo Brazzaville, and Senegal among others, constitution making and review have been manipulated to consolidate or entrench personal and partisan interests, including absolute appropriation of the totality of the state space by these sectarian interests.

The outcome is that today only a handful of African countries (including Kenya, Benin, Senegal, Ghana, Cape Verde, and South Africa) have constitutions that may be said to reflect the wishes of the population and are owned by the citizens. The Republic of Benin, Ghana, Cape Verde, and South Africa would arguably remain the reference for democratic consolidation in Africa given their strings of successive regime transitions through the ballot box devoid of violence. Besides the experience of the transition from apartheid to black majority rule in South Africa, the Republic of Benin probably signposts one potential future trajectory of democracy in Africa. Against the backdrop of overcoming coups d'état, overthrowing an OPS/OMS through a popular SNC, the removal in 1990 of General Mathieu Kerekou, whose OPS/OMS was anchored in a convenient Marxism/Leninism and his acceptance of the first democratic presidential elections in 1991 that he lost to Nicephore Soglo, the Republic of Benin has survived all the pathologies of post-independence Africa.

Conclusion

These morbid pathologies have remained a common challenge of most African states since independence. Paradoxically, in the evolved new syndrome of sit-tight presidencies and dynastic succession among African leaders of all hues in the post-Cold War era (ranging from the failed attempt by Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo, through Sassou Nguesso in Congo Brazzaville, Pierre Nkunrunziza in Burundi, or the Eyademas in Togo among many others), some cite the demonstrably reformed dictator Mathieu Kerekou as the preeminent change driver in Africa in his role in building a stable democracy by calling and accepting the resolutions of the SNC which put an end to his quasi-Marxist Leninist regime.[93] His return to a constitutional two-term

tenure in office as president in the post-SNC period and voluntary transfer of power thereafter revalidated his general vision of a constitutional order and specifically a democratic Republic of Benin as the exemplar of the assured future of Africa in the post-Cold War era. The future of Africa two decades into its second half-century of independence would probably lie in repudiating the pervasive normative struggles for the appropriation of the totality of the political spaces through the realignment of the vision of its diverse leaderships to advance the distilled corporate will and collective interests of its peoples. Hopefully the dysfunctional and hazardous exuberance of politicians and the military that characterized the first half-century of independence of African states will give way to more rational, reasoned, structured, institutional, transparent, and ordered paradigms of inclusive governance based on the imperative to project the common will and collective interests of the peoples of the continent as the very raison d'être of the African state.

Notes

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14. Ademola Araoye and Hegemonic Agendas, "Intermesticity and Conflicts in the Post-colonial State," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 12, no. 1 (2012).
15. Source: http://worldpopulationreview.com/continents/africa-population/.

16. The reference to African states in the context of postcoloniality raises issues around the perpetuation of externally and colonially derived structures and institutions that are founded around the logic of the continued subordination and appropriation of African spaces by neo-colonial forces that remain actively engaged in the internal processes of the Africa state. Postcoloniality may then be defined as the complete and absolute retrenchment in actuality of all structures and protocols that perpetuate the subordinate status of Africa in its interaction with the global system of states. The term neo-colonial state would seem to convey the true character of the African state as it currently is.
17. Donald L. Gordon, "Overview of Politics in the Postcolonial Era 'African Politics'," in *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, ed. April A. Gordon, and Donald L. Gordon (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007).
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21. Roger Southall, ibid., 137.
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25. Ibid.
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CHAPTER 29

Secession and Separatism in Modern Africa

Charles G. Thomas

The states of Africa have been objects of contention among their citizens since the emergence of the modern independent polities of the continent. The boundaries of Africa's modern countries were delineated along the lines of the European colonies that had been established following the 1885 Berlin Conference. However, there were no African powers present at this conference, only the representatives of the European states interested in the continent. The borders the representatives drew were based upon the negotiations of these powers as they expressed their political and economic desires in their newly claimed continent. These negotiations were not informed by the populations living upon the land they were discussing, but instead upon the balance of power in Europe, the treaties powers could already claim, and the rights of conquest and occupation. As such, these boundaries cut across social, cultural, political, and even economic linkages as they already existed on the continent.

This social fracturing was carried forward following independence, with each new state lacking historical or cultural connections to bind the state together. Even worse, each of these states also lacked the capacity to forge such connections within its newly independent populace.[1] With unrelated groups now sharing political and economic boundaries, often with their traditional connections severed by the new political order, significant discontent developed amongst those populations who felt marginalized within these new borders. This discontent found an outlet in non-violent and eventually violent attempts to revise the local political order. Especially as strong ethnic

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or linguistic groups attempted to revise their local order, the ideas of local national identity groups governing them instead of a distant and unrepresentative state carried a strong appeal. As these groups fought for governance and in some cases direct sovereignty, postcolonial Africa grappled for the first time with secession and separatist conflicts. These conflicts have become ubiquitous since the first shots were fired in Sudan's 1956 civil war, and there has not been a single year without a secessionist or separatist conflict since then. This chapter will discuss the political aims of secessionism and separatism, what drives them, the evolution of secessionist and separatist conflicts in Africa, and why these have evolved as they have during the past 60 years.

What are Secession and Separatism?

In the modern postcolonial era, the Westphalian nation-state is considered the most desirable and representative political unit across the globe. This state carries with it many specific characteristics, including the maintenance of a bureaucracy to administer its functions, the policing of criminal behavior, the existence of an armed force to defend its borders, the provision of services to its citizens, the raising of revenue to pay for its servants and services, and the acquisition of political legitimacy to ease the creation of the foregoing.[2] While most states of the developed world are able to affirmatively pursue all of these characteristics, in many African states there are significant challenges to achieving these solely through the state. These developing states maintain their legitimacy through the recognition of the international community, but will often afford fewer services, less political representation, and fewer legal protections to marginalized groups within their borders. These groups might be an ethno-linguistic group, a political party, or even a local geographic socio-political subdivision, but the marginalization in the services and protection by the state leaves the targeted group with second-class citizenship in the state and most often drives a desire to revise the political order. However, given that the state itself has little incentive to voluntarily let this revision occur, these groups will often have to turn to violent means to compel this revision. If the desired revision is to devolve the political governance of the marginalized group to the group itself, essentially granting autonomy, then the conflict is a separatist conflict. In these cases, the local political actors will take over the internal aspects of their own governance, creating and enforcing their own laws, often collecting their own taxes, and providing their own services to their populations. However, in such cases these local autonomous groups are still understood to be part of the same larger state structure by the international community and any formal international exchange will pass through the formal state structures.

For some marginalized African groups, local autonomy isn't enough. Due to the weakness of the state in Africa and the centrality of international connections for political legitimacy and economic aid, separatism is sometimes

not enough to fully address the grievances of marginalized groups. Since the sovereign state is the only authority recognized by the international community, the state retains extraordinary control over social, economic, and even political development within its borders.[3] This means that if an autonomous region wishes to access these networks of international capital and development aid, it needs to negotiate access to them with the existing state. These negotiations can sometimes be accomplished, but far more often the marginalized group either cannot reach an acceptable agreement with their host state or more often refuses to negotiate such access. In this case, the marginalized groups will enter into an armed struggle for not only their local autonomy but their internationally recognized sovereignty in the form of their own state. These struggles for an independent state are secessionist struggles, and what marks their difference is exactly this fight to attain and maintain independent, internationally recognized sovereignty over the territory the group governs.

Given this, all of these struggles are ultimately ones for control over the functions of the state (that is, the application and enforcement of laws, the taxing of the populace, and the provision of services), but secession also involves the creation of an entirely separate and recognized political body. As such, all secessions are ultimately part of separatism, but not all separatist conflicts necessarily involve secession. These lines will often become even more blurred over the course of a conflict, when a secessionist movement may instead settle for local autonomy, such as has been seen in the Malian conflicts in the 1990s. Conversely, the struggles of separatists and their subsequent relations with their host state might convince them that a settlement cannot be reached and instead secession must be adopted as a conflict goal. This pattern was seen through the long wars in South Sudan, where initial struggles for local autonomy eventually led to such a fractious relationship with the North that secession was seen as the only remedy. As such, it must always be understood that these related but distinct concepts are rarely cleanly declared or pursued, and it is only in the wake of conflicts that the final determination of separatism and secession is understood.

Separatism and Secession in Colonial Africa

Separatism and secession in Africa is a difficult subject to effectively approach. The concepts of secession and separatism rely strongly on the concepts of the Westphalian nation-state, the creation of which was a liminal moment in the emergence of European modernity. Given that the processes of European modernity only began being impressed on Africa during the decades of colonial rule, and even then only piecemeal, it is hard to say whether secession or separatism is an idea that can be applied to any study of Africa prior to independence. This isn't to say that there weren't efforts by marginalized groups to exercise their own local control, but often this was a local control that was

not as developed in terms of participation, function, or capacity as those of the later nation-state. However, it is useful to look at some occurrences of political fracturing and local autonomy in these periods to understand how and why these historical attempts both resembled and were foreign to the modern African secessionist and separatist conflicts.

Following the 'Scramble for Africa' in the nineteenth century, the vast majority of the continent was colonized by European powers. Aside from Liberia and Ethiopia, the continent was divided into colonial administrations where the political, economic, and military control was exercised by the colonial power. The colonial systems that these powers put in place were state-like, but not states. Whereas states exist explicitly to protect and provide for their citizens, these colonies had the provision of services and the protections of their subjects as generally a secondary objective. Instead, control was exercised in such a way as to maintain order for the economic exploitation of the regions. The local laws, taxes, and administrative structures were rarely designed by the locals, instead being alien systems put in place to compel the obedience of the ruled. While there were regions where the original indigenous political systems continued to exist, such as the Sokoto caliphate, they did so as sub-imperial agents of the colonizing power. As such, these local political organizations, while maintaining their own state-like attributes, could only exercise their own sovereign power under the auspices and direction of their colonial masters.

Within the colonial context there certainly were violent conflicts waged by Africans to throw off the control of the colonial powers. There are literally hundreds of histories of local resistance to the European empires in Africa. The Germans fought against the Maji-Maji revolt in East Africa[4] while the British faced a Zulu revolt in 1906,[5] to name but two of the indigenous uprisings against the established colonial control of their colonial conquerors. However, in these cases they were not done with the explicit intent to split from an existent local state authority and then join Ethiopia and Liberia in independence. Instead, these were violent rebellions against local authorities without a greater goal of state creation. As such, they are commonly viewed as either resistance or liberation struggles, conflicts that are similar to the later secessionist and separatist wars, but ones which, instead of overthrowing the authority of a local state or state structures, were instead throwing off the colonial structures of distant European states.[6] It would not be until local independent state structures existed that secession and separatism could be exercised on the continent.

The Independence Era

Following the Second World War the colonial powers that ruled the majority of the continent found themselves either severely weakened in victory or crushed in defeat. This weakness, combined with local unrest and

international opposition, saw the first major cracks in the colonial system. By the late 1940s it had become apparent that colonial Africa was firmly on the track to independence, and by the late 1950s it was plain this independence would be happening sooner rather than later. While Sudan, Tunisia, and Morocco each gained their independence in 1956, the full torrent in Sub-Saharan Africa began with Ghana in 1957 and over the next decade the vast majority of African countries gained their own self-rule. However, independence had come quickly and even those colonial powers which felt some responsibility for the development of governing institutions were caught flat-footed. As such, very little progress had been made in creating robust, local, and modern governing institutions; effective bureaucracies; African leaders for the military and police services; or even general educated civil societies. The states that emerged had in many cases not completed the transition from sites of colonial extraction and thus had incomplete capacities to effectively provide the services and protections that state legitimacy is founded upon.

These weak states in turn often found that in the absence of the unifying nationalist cause of independence there was little holding the various political and cultural groups together within their borders. Those groups which were poor and marginalized called upon the state to provide for their uplift, a task often well beyond the capacity of the state. Those groups which had resources within their purview such as copper, gold, iron, diamonds, or oil often found the state wished to redistribute this wealth to a greater degree than those groups hoped. Those groups which were a minority found themselves without much political power and felt unrepresented within their new government, while their ethnic group might have considerably more representation on the other side of a state border. These subnational groups, whether political or social, proved to be potent rivals to the state, especially as they often had far more cohesion than the state itself. These groups then often found themselves even more aggrieved as the states of Africa began to take the initiative in nation building, frequently asking for labor and funds from the peoples who felt little loyalty or care towards their independent regimes.

It is within this context of independent states that the initial conflicts demanding autonomy or secession began in Africa. These secessionist and separatist groups had several arguments in their favor. The first was that the new wave of decolonization had been supported by the United Nations (UN), which enshrined a people's right to self-determination.[7] While this had often been deferred in the past, such as with the League of Nations and later UN Trustee territories,[8] the cornerstone of the dismantling of the European empires was the concept that the postwar moment was when the promises would be made good for all of the colonized peoples of the world. However, while self-determination was a right, there had been no pronouncement on the limitations of self-determination. To those aggrieved, marginalized populations in Africa, this offered the legal possibility of their own state under the current international order. The second argument in their favor was that

these groups often had an arguable precedent for independence. While the colonial boundaries had been set as the initial new state borders, the colonies themselves had been subdivided within their own borders many times over; different administrative areas might be ruled under completely different legal codes, marking an existent and arguably legitimate boundary. For example, South Sudan had been administered under an entirely different Anglo-Egyptian administration than the North since 1930,[9] with each having its own legal code and philosophical basis. With these two ideas taken hand-in-hand, secessionist groups felt they had a strong and legitimate argument for their secession from the sovereign states that the former colonies had become. It would not take long for some of these aggrieved groups to test these arguments in the wider world.

The Civil Secessions

The first and most notable secessionist attempts are what might be termed the 'civil secessions'. In both cases, the secessionist territories (in the Republic of the Congo and Nigeria) had been administered separately to the rest of the colony into which they had been amalgamated. Due to the resources at hand and their relations with the colonial powers, both had managed to become well-developed colonial territories. They featured developed infrastructure, good public services, a strong bureaucracy, and a firm identity as a people. As such, when both found themselves at odds with their new state, they found themselves in much stronger positions than might be expected; both might be able to form its own state directly from the regional structures it had already developed. Given this, when secession came, it came as a whole, multi-ethnic civil political unit; thus a civil secession.[10]

The strategy of both of these secessions would prove to be the same. Given their political and economic development and precedent for independence, the secessionist powers simply declared their secession and went about administering their territories as a state. Taxes were collected, services procured, legal codes revised and enforced, and defense forces organized to defend the borders of their new states. These efforts were intended to underscore the true independence of these territories, building their internal legitimacy while at the same time hopefully gaining them the international recognition that would see them join the great community of nations.

However, in both cases, this declaration of independence was seen as a crisis of sovereignty by their host nations. In both instances, attempted negotiations failed, leading inevitably to military confrontations. Given that the secessionist states were just subdivisions of their host nations, they invariably lacked the military strength to effectively fight a decisive war against them. Instead these secessionist states attempted to fight a defensive conflict while waiting for international actors to recognize their independence and step in to negotiate an end to the conflict. However, in both cases their assumptions

about the strength of their home states, the reaction of the international community, and the viability of civil secession as a whole would prove to be wrong. The precedents thus set within the family of African states and the global communities would shape all future secessionist and separatist conflicts on the continent.

The first of these civil secessions was Katanga in the newly independent Republic of the Congo. The former Belgian colony had had a precipitous dive into independence, with the Belgians doing little to develop their massive colony aside from its mineral-rich southeastern province. When elections were held in May of 1960, the populist leader Patrice Lumumba led his Mouvement National Congolais party to victory but managed to do little to bring together the fractious political factions within his nation. One of those members left out in the cold was the Katangan political leader Moise Tshombe, who saw little reason to compromise with the new government. His province of Katanga had always been administered separately from the rest of the Congo under the auspices of the Comité Spéciale du Katanga.[11] This separate administration had been due to the mineral riches of Katanga itself, with the province holding deposits of copper, cobalt, silver, platinum, uranium, and zinc. Given Tshombe's antipathy to the new Congolese government, the precedent of separate administration, and the tacit support of the Belgian government (which wished for continued access to the riches of Katanga), it was hardly surprising that Katanga would look for any opportunity for secession.

Such an opportunity presented itself less than a week after independence, when the Congolese army mutinied on July 4, 1960.[12] In the confusion of the mutiny and Lumumba's attempts to reimpose order, Tshombe declared Katanga an independent state on July 11. Tshombe assumed the presidency of the new state with the support of the Union Minière du Haute Katanga, the largest of the mining companies in the region. Tshombe quickly established a small state with vast mineral wealth and excellent relations with their former colonial power. With the aid of Belgian expatriates and technical advisors, Katanga quickly established a central bureaucracy and resumed its extractive industries. Just as importantly, with the aid of Belgian troops and the recruitment of mercenaries, the new state quickly established a potent defensive force to guard its borders until such time as Katanga might be recognized by the international community.

In the meantime, Lumumba's situation had become critical, with much of his political base fracturing and Katanga's secession creating an internal crisis that sparked other possible secessionist fronts. The Prime Minister appealed for support to the United Nations. Under the direction of Secretary General Dag Hjammarskold, the UN deployed a strong contingent of international peacekeepers with the intent of ending the bloodshed in the Congo and stabilizing its increasingly threatened government.[13] However, while the UN was willing to keep the peace, it initially was unwilling to take any action

against Katanga despite Lumumba entreating it to do so. The increasing instability of the central government and the UN's unwillingness to do anything more than demand the removal of Belgians from Katanga eventually doomed Lumumba, whose appeal for additional aid to the Soviet Union led to his arrest by the commander of his army, Joseph Mobutu. Following an escape attempt, Lumumba was again captured, but this time flown to Katanga where he was tortured and murdered on Tshombe's orders.

However, it was this act that likely doomed Katanga. While there had been some attempts to bring Katanga back under the auspices of the Congolese government in a loose federal structure, this killing turned international opinion decisively against the Katangans. The United Nations' forces began a series of offensive actions against Katanga on the premise that the foreign mercenaries within its borders were in violation of international law and must be ejected. Katanga saw these actions as inimical to its sovereignty and resisted, leading to several sharp clashes between mercenaries and the UN.[14] In the midst of these confrontations, Dag Hammarskjöld's plane was shot down near the Katangan border and his death forced the UN's hand. The peacekeepers finally undertook decisive offensive operations and despite their involvement with Katanga the Belgians could no longer offer aid following such a heinous act. The final Katangan stronghold of Kolwezi was occupied on January 21, 1963 and Moise Tshombe fled the country. Following this action, Katangan secession was finally finished and the province was returned to the central control of the Congolese government.

The second and final civil secessionist attempt would occur a mere four years later. The Federal Republic of Nigeria had entered into independence better equipped than most of the former colonial possessions when it gained independence on October 1, 1960. Britain had established a well-staffed professional civil service and a military with a well-deserved reputation for professionalism. The country itself had a strong economy with oil reserves in the southeast and a historically flourishing coastal trade. The Federal Republic had even seen all three of its major ethnic groups join together to push for national independence despite the historic cleavages between the Northern Hausa, the Western Yoruba, and the Eastern Igbo.[15] However, within the first few years of independence, splits had begun opening within the nationalist coalition. The Hausa of the North were more populous but hewed towards traditional Islamic values whereas the Igbo were the smaller part but had far more modern Western ideas. The Yoruba and Igbo quickly became concerned that the Hausa would electorally dominate the new Federation, locking them out of the governance of the state. Conversely, these Hausa were concerned that the bureaucracy of the country, where much of the power lay, was dominated by their coalition partners. Their fears were particularly focused on the Igbo, who not only made up a large amount of the state administration but also made up a significant amount of the mercantile sector within the country.

Electoral dysfunction plagued the country during its first few years of independence, with each of the three major ethnic groups attempting to game the federal system to retain power. Violence finally erupted in 1966 when back-to-back coups rocked the young republic in January and July. The first was primarily driven by young officers in the Army, the majority of whom were Igbo.[16] The second was a counter-coup by Northern officers that brought Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon to power.[17] Both coups saw targeted violence, with the plotters of the first murdering prominent Northern and Western politicians and the plotters of the second killing many of the Igbo officers involved in the first.[18] In addition, the second coup triggered a series of pogroms in the North against the Igbo communities that had settled there, leading many to flee back to the East.

Following the second coup there was a brief period of uncertainty. The new Northern military ruler, General Yakubu Gowon, placed officers in charge of each of Nigeria's four major regions and made gestures towards unifying the reeling country. However, these gestures would not be enough and in May of 1967 the military ruler of the Eastern Region, Lieutenant Colonel Emeka Ojukwu, declared the Eastern Region the independent state of Biafra. Ojukwu and the other Biafrans' argument was simple: the Federal Republic of Nigeria was now under illegitimate governance and the Eastern Province had a historical precedent to independent administration. The first half of the argument was premised on the idea that Gowon's government was not an elected government as provided for within the Federal Constitution but had instead come to power in a coup. In addition, it had offered scant representation or protection to the Eastern region and thus had lost any legitimacy it might claim. The latter half originated in the British colonial governance of Nigeria, which had seen the North and South governed separately until 1914, when the two had been unified under an umbrella administration. However, the South and particularly the East had been developed and administered very differently to the North even following this union and as such there was a legal argument for this separation.

The new state of Biafra then continued down the path of statehood, providing services to its people, promulgating its new codes of law, developing its own military to defend its borders, and reaching out the rest of the international community for recognition and aid. Much like Katanga before it, Biafra placed its hopes in declaring itself a state and then defending that state long enough for the international community to force Nigeria to recognize it. This plan started out well when Biafra repelled the initial Nigerian invasion in July 1967. However, in a perhaps misguided strategy to force a reckoning with the Federal system, the Biafrans launched a strike westward in the hopes of driving the Yoruba-dominated Western Region into rebellion against the North as well. This strategy backfired when the lightning offensive failed and the Western Region then reaffirmed its allegiance to the Federal structure.[19] Now isolated, Biafra settled into the military defensive

while the North and West mobilized their own armed forces to bring the secessionist state to heel.

Even before the failure of Biafra's westward offensive in September, the Nigerians had begun to drive inroads into Biafran territory. Beginning in July, the Federal forces captured Enugu and by October were threatening Onitsha and Calabar. The Biafrans mobilized what manpower they could and created massive workshops to produce the materials of war that they could not import. However, with the Federal capture of Port Harcourt in May 1968, Biafra was entirely surrounded and could only be resupplied by airlift.[20] At this point, the war was militarily unwinnable and the only remaining hope that the Biafrans had was for the intervention of the international community.

Unfortunately for Biafra, the international community did not respond as they had hoped. Britain and the United States wished to stay out of the conflict and quietly backed the Federal Government, strengthening their support once the oil-producing regions of the Niger Delta were captured.[21] France saw an opportunity to intervene in an oil-rich region and supplied arms, medical supplies, and food, but did not recognize Biafra.[22] Russia immediately backed the Federal Government. Within Africa, the only countries that recognized Biafra were Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, and Ivory Coast. The latter two largely did so in support of French policies and the former two for humanitarian reasons.[23] However, with this meager international support it quickly became evident that external enforcement of independence would not be forthcoming.

Despite this denial of recognition, Biafra struggled on. International humanitarian aid was still delivered via airlift, and arms and war materials were smuggled into the embattled enclave. However, food was quickly depleted for the population left inside and the remaining Biafrans adopted a siege mentality. Their print media declared now that Biafra was an Igbo nation and that the Federal Army was intending to commit genocide. The struggle became desperate throughout 1969, but the Biafrans simply did not have the power to push the Nigerians away with the limited foreign aid they were receiving. Finally, in December 1969, the reorganized and rearmed Nigerians pressed through the thin Biafran perimeter and split the tiny enclave in two. The next month Ojukwu fled his declared country and the remaining Biafrans surrendered. The second and final civil secession in Africa came to an end in 1970.

However, while the civil secessions had been finally brought to a close, they set several precedents that would continue to resonate through the coming decades. The central concept behind both had been secession, an end goal that could only be accomplished politically and militarily with the support and recognition of the international community. However, whether from individual actors, regional organizations, or even the UN, this support and recognition were denied as a matter of policy. Both secessionist actors had largely assumed that the United Nations' guarantees of

self-determination would support their claims. However, as the Congo crisis unfolded, the UN eventually set the precedent that secession was not a recognized political end goal. Instead, the UN enforced the practice that in such situations the recognized government must remain unitary. The UN would enshrine the right of territorial and political integrity for the existing, recognized government versus secession attempts within its Resolution 161.[24]

This same resolution also reinforced the UN's earlier call for the removal of all external military forces that were present without the consent of the recognized nation, which had begun with Resolutions 143 and 145. This combination of resolutions led to the removal of Belgian technical and military personnel from the Congo, effectively creating the precedent that foreign personnel supporting an unrecognized secessionist conflict, whether at the behest of another state or not, was not accepted. This precedent then broadly became part of the international consensus with the general understanding that states that were part of the UN would not create relations with these unrecognized armed political actors.

Finally, in terms of the continent of Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in the very year that Katanga was toppled. The OAU was intended to bring together all the states of Africa and establish the aspirations, rules, and norms involved in the Pan-African community. While the charter called for African unity, the push for the liberation of the remaining colonial states, and beneficial trade relations, Article III spoke directly to the issues that the Congo was facing. Article III promised both 'non-interference in the internal affairs of states' and 'Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State'.[25] With this signing of the charter by every independent African state, there was now a continent-wide consensus against the recognition of secession or the support of secessionist actors.

While each of these precedents was set during or in the aftermath of the Congo Crisis, and thus might be attributed to Katanga's attempted secession, it was the Biafra conflict that saw them put into effect. When Biafra declared independence there was not a single country that rushed to recognize its sovereignty. The UN did not intervene as they had in Katanga because the recognized government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria did not request their aid, but without United Nations recognition Biafra could not even begin to ask for their help. In terms of independent states, as noted, only the French intervened to aid Biafra, but this was at the margins and without official recognition. All the other world powers, no matter their alignment in the Cold War, refused to recognize or offer aid to the state of Biafra outside of providing humanitarian assistance to its starving populace. Finally, in terms of African states, only four offered recognition and all largely bore the enmity of their fellow OAU member states for their recognition.[26]

In the end, these precedents set in the wake of the two civil secessions would essentially end the possibility of civil secessions in Africa. For this model of secession to succeed it required the intervention of the international

community which would open the possibility either of military aid or diplomatic negotiations. However, this necessity for foreign intervention proved to be disastrous for the would-be secessionist states, as the international community not only refused to intervene in such conflicts but actively shaped international norms to prevent any future intervention. This closed the most obvious path towards secession, but as the next few decades would come to show, those dedicated to secession and separatism would prove resourceful in the pursuit of their goals.

The Long Wars

At the same time that Katanga was busy fighting pitched battles to defend what it claimed were its independent borders, there were other conflicts ongoing that would bloom into secessionism and separatism. These conflicts tended not to draw the attention that the civil secessionists had done due to their method of pursuing their political separation. Where the civil secessionists had proclaimed their independence and fought to maintain the territorial integrity of the state they had declared, these parallel efforts were more flexible. Over the next several decades these wars would be waged not for territory but for social and political legitimacy, and took the approach not of declaring a state and fighting to maintain it, but of fighting a war to gain a state. These would be what might be characterized as the long wars, as they took decades of slow-burning conflict to build parallel capacity and eventually force the recognition of their host.

These long wars took the longer struggles of global liberation as their model for the structure and pursuit of independence. Prior to the 1960s, the decolonization struggles of Vietnam and Algeria and the political struggle of the Chinese Civil War had offered a pathway forward with minimal formal state organization and even less outside support. What these models instead showed was the path of using a protracted struggle to raise political awareness and legitimacy, which would help form a mass movement for the political purpose of liberation or secession.[27] In turn, these mass movements would translate not only into military capacity, but also allow the creation of an administrative organization and a political framework. In the end, these political, military, and administrative structures would allow for the creation of what would essentially be a ready-made state if victory were achieved.

It was of course through this process of creating a state that the mass movements would also pursue their ultimate goal of secession. While the civil secessionists had looked beyond their borders for international recognition of their independence, those behind the long wars instead took the view that the only possibility of recognition was through their host state. This daunting task was undertaken with the understanding that no African state would willingly allow a subnational group to separate from its sovereign territory. This meant that the host state would need to be compelled to do so. However,

the host state had direct advantages that the secessionist and separatist movements could never hope to match. The host state had access to the vast resources of a formal state, could trade on the international markets for arms and war material, and could negotiate with its neighbors to cut off any succor for its secessionist foe. To nullify these, the secessionist movements took on a long-term strategy, one that could weather the strengths of the host state while building their own capacity to resist.

The model of these long wars was also the first of them to be successful: Eritrea. While initially an Italian colony dating to the 1889 Treaty of Uccialli, in the wake of the Second World War the UN was uncertain what to do with the small territory on the shore of the Red Sea. While it was adjacent to the Empire of Ethiopia, its citizens argued that they had never been formally part of that state. Conversely, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia argued that historically Eritrea had been claimed by his state and that in the postwar settlement that territory should properly revert to the Crown. The UN eventually split the difference, declaring Eritrea a separate republic under the federal control of the Ethiopian Crown in 1950.[28] However, federation under an absolute monarchy proved to be an unstable system, and over the next decade Ethiopia dismantled most of the governmental structures of Eritrea and placed it under the direct control of the Ethiopian government.[29]

Ethiopian rule was not necessarily pleasant for much of the Eritrean population and by 1961 the first shots had been fired in what would be the long war for Eritrean secession from Ethiopia.[30] Initially disjointed, much of the resistance to Ethiopian rule found its way under the flag of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) by 1965, and the new politico-military group was waging an effective guerrilla campaign against the Ethiopian forces. The ELF formed five regional commands to coordinate its struggle against the Ethiopians over the next five years, but found itself largely at a stalemate due to factional infighting and political divisions between the regional commands.[31] Already at the brink of suppression, the ELF splintered in 1970 into the ELF and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). While the ELF retained its identity as a nationalist guerrilla force, the EPLF took on a more revolutionary cast, looking to transform the economic, social, and political underpinnings of Eritrea. While the two Fronts remained largely hostile to one another, both carried on their struggle against Haile Selassie's forces. With the war now entering its second decade, the Ethiopian forces had weakened and turned to harsher measures, drawing more support to the two guerrillas.

The weakness of the Ethiopian state finally caused a crisis and in 1974 Selassie was overthrown by Marxist revolutionaries calling themselves the Derg.[32] During the confusion of this overthrow, the two liberation Fronts declared a ceasefire and began to recruit and implement their plans within the regions of Eritrean they controlled. The ELF proposed modest reforms, drawing mild support, while the EPLF offered land redistribution, education, health care, and even an expansion of women's rights.[33] Over the next four

years both fronts made advances, with the Ethiopians being largely pushed out of Eritrean territory aside from scattered garrisons in Asmara, Massawa, and Barentu. However, during this period, the transformative programs of the EPLF gained them significantly more legitimacy and popular support than their rivals the ELF. This would stand them in good stead during the hard years beginning in 1978.

Starting in 1977 the shifting Cold War dynamics in the Horn saw Ethiopia become the recipient of massive Soviet military aid. This infusion of weaponry and expertise allowed Ethiopia to rebuild massive forces to both drive away their Somali adversaries in the Ogaden and direct powerful operations against the Eritreans in 1978. The offensives that followed, involving over 100,000 Ethiopian troops equipped with armor and artillery, swept the ELF forces away while forcing the more flexible EPLF to retreat to more defensible positions.[34] While the veteran EPLF guerrillas bloodied the Ethiopians, over the next two years they were driven back to their mountainous bastion of Nacfa, where they continued fighting an irregular struggle against the Derg's forces. However, despite being bowed, the EPLF was unbroken and it continued to carry out and support the social and political programs within Eritrea despite the Ethiopian occupation. Over the next several years the EPLF forces in Nacfa fought off several powerful offensives while guerrillas in the countryside bled the Ethiopians dry, even through the terrible famines that struck the Horn in 1984–1985.[35]

By 1987 the EPLF had regained enough strength to launch several counter-offensives against the weakened Derg forces, eventually inflicting a crushing defeat on the Ethiopians at the 1988 Battle of Afabet.[36] As the Eritrean soldiers advanced, they were welcomed by the social and political organizations that EPLF had continued to foster within their state. In addition, these structures had allowed for the fostering of other domestic liberation fronts within Ethiopian, such as the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF). In the late 1980s, the TPLF and other domestic armed groups formed an alliance called the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPDRF). Although the EPLF had a fractious relationship with the TPLF and other members of the EPDRF, they joined forces in a final offensive against the Derg forces. By 1991, the EPLF had liberated Asmara and Massawa and aided in the capture of Addis Ababa, which placed the EPDRF in control of Ethiopia.[37] In return for the aid of the EPLF, the EPDRF offered a plebiscite to the Eritrean populace, a UN-overseen popular referendum that in 1993 decisively chose secession and independence. The now independent country of Eritrea was governed by the very social structures that had sustained the EPLF's long war; the political structures, the provision of health care, the land-tenure regime, and the educational administration. The Eritreans had built their state in the process of winning its freedom.

The other major example of the long wars comes from Sudan, which saw similar dynamics to those in Eritrea. The South had been administered

separately under the Anglo-Egyptian government since the late nineteenth century, eventually having its own legal regime, military forces, and bureaucracy.[38] With the beginning of decolonization in 1955, the North of the country quickly set about politically dominating the South, replacing the British officials with heavy-handed Northern administrators. The South had little representation in the government of Sudan and all senior ranks of the now-unified military went to Northern officers.[39] This state of affairs proved untenable for the South, and within months the Southern military had mutinied against Northern control. While the mutiny was put down, many of the soldiers fled into the bush to continue the struggle. By 1963, these soldiers had named themselves the Land and Freedom Army, although they would more commonly be called the Anya-nya.[40] The Anya-nya carried out guerrilla raids against the Northerners garrisoning the South and quickly the conflict turned into a pattern of raid and reprisal within the fractious South.

This military resistance was paralleled by political resistance, as a series of Southern political groups rose to challenge Northern rule. First the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) and later the Sudan African National Union (SANU) rose to try and create a unified political front, but dealt with constant splintering. The North fared little better as the initial independence government of Premier Abdullah Khalil was swept away in a military coup led by Brigadier Abboud in 1958, and then Abboud himself was toppled in 1964 and replaced by Premier al-Khatim al-Khalifa who in turn lost his base and was replace in 1965 by Mohammed Ahmed Maghoub. With both sides dealing with political turmoil, there was little chance for the advancement of the conflict on either side. The South continued its decentralized raids while the North attempted to tamp down the political and military chaos in the South. It was not until 1969–1970 that the civil war would enter a new phase.

In 1969, the Northern government of Maghoub was overthrown in a bloodless coup by Colonel Gaafar Mohammed al-Numeiry, who wished to compel the South to come to the bargaining table. The following year, the splintered Southern opposition was finally welded together by a fighter named Joseph Lagu, who had gained a monopoly on the flow of Israeli arms and ammunition into the South.[41] Using this monopoly, he managed to coerce many of the armed fronts to join his faction, which eventually unified the South under the banner of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). With this unified command and a steady flow of war material, Lagu carried the struggle forward and inflicted significant damage on the Northern forces in a series of raids throughout 1971. This unitary control also allowed Lagu to finally form a central administration for the resistance movements, allowing for a degree of political, social, and economic cohesion amongst the armed groups of the South.[42] This project was just coming to fruition in 1972 when al-Numeiry's offer of a ceasefire reached his headquarters.

The ceasefire led to negotiations in Addis Ababa between the still fragile SSLM and a Northern government tired of war. While the Anya-nya and members of the SSLM had wanted secession from the North, the Northern government was categorically against the splitting of the nation. The SSLM would settle for the next best thing, separatism under the control of the local administration which had been being developed. The South would have regional autonomy but in return remained limited in the central government in Khartoum. In addition, the armed forces would be steadily integrated, with the unified army, absorbing elements of the South's armed forces but with the central government largely retaining control of these forces. However, despite the obvious flaws of this agreement, at this point both sides were willing to sign to end the conflict and in 1972 the First Sudan Civil War ended.

The Addis Ababa agreement would buy 11 years of peace, but in that time the weakness of the agreement would become manifest. The South, already feeling marginalized, found its lack of control in Khartoum left it out of the country's major decisions. While the North increasingly expanded its irrigation capacity and mechanized its agriculture, the South remained moribund and economically backward. Beyond this, the integration of the military had still left many of the Southern soldiers marginalized and the Southern officers who had been accepted into the new armed forces found themselves distrusted.[43] Fights often broke out between the Northern and Southern units, leading to armed tension throughout the country. While autonomy and accommodation had brought the South peace, it had brought them little else that they had wanted when they initially went to war.

Beginning in 1983, Southern military units began deserting, beginning renewed resistance to the Sudanese government. The Commandant of the Sudanese military academy, a Southerner named John Garang, travelled to one of the troubled military units, claiming he would calm the difficult soldiers. Instead he led the unit and its sister unit into a mutiny, beginning the larger conflict that would engulf the South for the next three decades.[44] Garang, using the troops under his control and connections with the Derg's Ethiopia, managed to weld together the disparate armed groups in the South. While these forces had been fighting under the general sobriquet of Anya-nya II, Garang's new unified command was now called the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) with its armed wing called the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Having been part of the original Anya-nya, Garang was determined to avoid the loose structure and constant divisions that had marked that organization. Instead, the SPLM was quickly structured as a disciplined and harsh centralized organization, with Garang using his access to military materials as the carrot to his armed forces' stick.[45] This unity of command allowed Garang to quickly establish results far in excess of those of his predecessors.

Under the SPLM, numerous administrative centers were created in the South, restarting the social and political transformation that had only partially occurred over the previous decade. In addition, the SPLA reached out to the West and East of Sudan, attempting to spark more regional resistance to the Northern government. While Numeiry's government increased its counter-insurgency operations to try and tamp down this resistance, the brutality of his soldiers and their related militias just caused a more general conflagration. By 1986, the harsh measures of the central government saw Numeiry overthrown and replaced by Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the Islamist Umma Party. Unfortunately, even this did not halt the spread of resistance to the Khartoum government and by 1989 the central government was willing to negotiate with the increasingly powerful SPLM government and its various regional allies. However, while victory appeared in their grasp, two separate occurrences would again shift the strategic balance.

The first was that in 1989 Sadiq al-Mahdi was overthrown in a coup led by Omar al-Bashir. This coup halted the peace process and caused general chaos within the North. Without a partner to offer terms, the SPLM and its increasingly independent allies found themselves at a halt. Additional offensive military action seemed counter-productive, but the unity of purpose of the allies was unraveling during this period of inaction. The second was the ongoing collapse of the Derg regime in Ethiopia. The Derg had been the central supplier of arms and war materiel to Garang, and in turn these arms and materiel had been what allowed him to keep control of the more far-flung or fractious factions under his direction. However, by 1990, the pipeline of Derg weapons was closing off as that government faced several decisive defeats at the hands of the EPLF and the EPRDF. Without these arms at his command, Garang lost unified control of his forces. Beginning in 1991, several splinter factions emerged, many of them taking more effort to try and overthrown Garang than fight the North.[46] These internecine conflicts would continue throughout the early 1990s, and the North often found itself supporting several of these splinter factions as spoilers towards Garang's forces.

Despite these setbacks, Garang's faction, called SPLM-Torit and later SPLM-Mainstream, managed to weather the storm largely thanks to its established administrative zones in the South. While the SPLM-Nasir (later SPLM-United) eventually began running out of steam and relying more on Northern support, Garang's forces rallied within their home territories, where the social and economic transformation had made several safe zones. By 1996 the SPLM-United had failed in a rebranding and then splintered further, with most of the splinters finding their way back to the SPLM-Mainstream camp. By 2000, the Southern forces had largely reconstituted themselves under the stable banner of Garang's SPLM.

This would prove to be excellent timing, as al-Bashir's government had found itself increasing isolated since 1991. With the collapse of the Soviet

Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War, the USA had seen little gain in continuing to support the Islamic government in Sudan.[47] Instead, the USA had seen it as far more preferable to see peace in the Sudan and they began to exert firm pressure on al-Bashir to draw this long-running conflict to an end. Although the conflict continued for some time, usually through the North supporting Southern splinter groups, by 1994 the Khartoum government had largely accepted the principles of Southern self-determination and by 2000 it had begun drafting the documents necessary for the plebiscite in the South. Finally, on January 9, 2005 an agreement was signed, one that demarcated the spheres of the North and South and set the date for a plebiscite on secession in 2011. Six years later, that plebiscite was carried out under the auspices of the UN, and the South formally seceded from the North.

Both of these examples of long wars are exceptional for a singular reason—they succeeded. Both Eritrea and South Sudan managed to achieve their political goal of a separate, recognized sovereignty from their host country. This stands out in stark contrast to the cases of the civil secessions, both of which not only failed but seemed to close the doors of secession behind them. As such, it is important to discuss how these succeeded despite the barriers put in place following the failures of the civil secessions.

In terms of the lack of recognition or support from individual states, the precedent essentially held. Neither South Sudan nor Eritrea was recognized by an outside power. While the Eritrean Liberation Front would receive some help attaining arms and supplies from Islamic countries early on, and arms from Israel and Ethiopia would be decisive for the South Sudanese groups, this was not that different to what had been seen before. Katanga had received arms and aid from Belgium during its secessionist attempt and Biafra was sustained in large part due to smuggled French arms.

Furthermore, the precedents binding the OAU saw less disruption than during the Biafran conflict. While Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, and Ivory Coast had recognized the breakaway Eastern Region of Nigeria, no African state recognized or offered open aid to these participants in the long wars. In fact, aside from the illicit arms that Ethiopia was providing to the South Sudanese, there was remarkably little relation between any African states and the long-wars secessionist movements.

This leaves the United Nations, which played a unique role in both of these conflicts. In both cases it was the UN that oversaw the plebiscites that conferred secession and then welcomed these new sovereign states into the international community. As such, the UN was the key player in the formal attainment of the secessionist goal. It is, however, the nature of this intervention that is the crux of the different outcomes between the long wars and the civil secessions. In both long-wars cases, the UN intervened decisively for the secession because the host state invited them to do so; in turn, this invitation was the result of the military victory of the secessionist groups.

Ultimately, then, the question concerns how the long-wars secessionist states achieved victory where the civil secessions did not. The answer is rather simple: the strategy adopted by Eritrea and South Sudan could prevail despite the crippling lack of international recognition or large-scale foreign aid, whereas that of Katanga and Biafra could not. Given the advantages in manpower, materiel, organization, and resources, the host state invariably could marshal almost overwhelming strength against a secessionist enclave. As such, once recognition and therefore aid was denied to Katanga and Biafra, their conventional approach to guarding territory was doomed to failure. However, the EPLF and SPLM both took an approach reminiscent of liberation fronts. Instead of facing the forces of their host state directly, they fought a guerrilla campaign to weaken them while building their own administrative and logistics hubs to sustain the fight, even in the absence of outside aid. This allowed them to carry on the fight until such time as the balance of power tipped in their favor and they could carry our more decisive actions. Even when the balance tipped back in favor of the host, as seen in Eritrea in 1978, the EPLF could retreat back to its safe, organized strongholds to continue the struggle. Given the weakness of the postcolonial African state and the potent organizing done by the secessionist Fronts, eventually both forced a tipping point and seized victory from their state-based opponents.

The New Wave

With the end of the Cold War following the 1989 revolutions and the 1991 break-up of the USSR, there was a dramatic revision of the global order that would have wide-ranging implications for phenomena of secession in Africa. Before the end of the Cold War, secession in Africa had largely been seen as an impossibility. The UN and the OAU had both set their firm precedents against such activity, and while at the time the Eritreans, South Sudanese, and many others were in the midst of their struggles, there was no perceivable positive ending for these combatants. However, the fall of the Soviet Union and the reordering of the global community triggered a series of alterations that would change the strategic calculus for would-be separatists in Africa and set off a new wave of conflict.

The first of these alterations was the fracturing of many of the Eastern Bloc states in the wake of the Cold War and the welcoming of their successors into the global community. While several of the post-communist states such as Poland and Bulgaria were brought into the new capitalist world order without territorial alteration, other states underwent massive transformations. Czechoslovakia was split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992, and Yugoslavia broke into seven successor states in 1990. With the maps being redrawn in Europe following the dissolution of the USSR and the broader communist bloc, this offered marginalized groups in Africa the hope that their borders might prove mutable as well.

The second major alteration involved the fracturing of the USSR proper, which began during the same period. The USSR had encompassed the territories of the former Russian Empire, which had expanded to include a multitude of ethnicities during the nineteenth century. During the break-up of the USSR, these populations were encouraged to reclaim their states from Russian control. This was an explicit call to reform what were termed nation-states, those states that were built to specifically offer services and protection to a particular nation or ethnicity. In the USSR this process achieved the creation of an Uzbekistan for the Uzbeks, Kazakhstan for the Kazakhs, and several other nation-states for the former Soviet minority groups. However, this fostering of nation-states was a departure from the Cold War era, where the excesses of nationalism before and during the Second World War had been perceived as the driver of the worst of the atrocities committed and perhaps even as the main cause of the war. As such, in the decades following that conflict there had been a conscious decision within the international community to deny the formation of specifically ethnically derived states and instead foster ethnically diverse ones.

However, within the African context, the 'nation', that is informal associations of ethno-linguistic groups, had generally always existed in competition with the state. These groups had often been able to form their own legitimate authority within the state, providing a degree of services or protection, but had never been able to take on the functional recognition as a state. The fear of ethnically based states had essentially allowed for the suppression of any state ambitions that these groups might have held. However, with the acceptance of ethnically based states in the wake of the collapse of the USSR, these groups now felt there was a precedent being set. Ethno-nation states were now no longer a taboo within the global context and as such the nationalist ambitions of several sub-national groups were reignited.

Finally, and perhaps most critically, the end of the Cold War directly disrupted the governing capacity of the majority of states in Africa. As noted earlier, most states in Africa had not emerged from colonialism fully developed, with many lacking effective administrative apparatuses or large and professional security services. This administrative underdevelopment was exacerbated due to economic underdevelopment, with the extractive economies of these states being both relatively poor and subject to severe global shocks. However, due to the fierce rivalries of the Cold War, many African states gained significant support from either the First or Second World, thus allowing a degree of technical assistance, material support, and economic buttressing to be applied to their weak state structures. This meant that while the states themselves remained relatively weak, they were able to maintain their core functions with the assistance of their international patrons.

With the end of the Cold War, the support from either pole effectively ended. For those powers that had largely aligned themselves with the communist bloc, there simply were no patrons left to offer assistance. Countries

like Ethiopia that had relied heavily on Soviet aid found their state functions failing and their governments crumbling. Even those states like Angola that were Marxist in alignment but had significant resources found themselves diminished in their capacity. For those countries that were aligned with the USA and other capitalist powers, the aid did not necessarily end but it did change form. While the capitalist powers were willing to support illegitimate regimes like Mobutu's in Zaire during their proxy struggle with the USSR, now they wished to see democratic reform and a more free market system. These states, so long dependent on more direct aid, found themselves caught in the lurch, with diminished capacity right at the moment when questions about the future of sovereignty were being opened.

These factors combined to help drive a wave of new insurgencies against the states of Africa. The weak states of Africa combined with strong sub-national groups and the possibility of revising the political order of Africa created a new dynamic context that saw the rise of new armed groups devoted to taking over the government of their state, seizing local power, or even forming their own new state. Especially with the states being weakened in the wake of the Cold War, smaller and less organized groups could still manage to sustain a longer and more effective conflict than they might previously have been able to.

Admittedly, with the questions of the new political order and the diminished capacity of many states, there was one alteration in the end goals of many conflicts. While during the previous decades it was far more common for armed groups to push for a secessionist outcome, with the new armed groups it was just as common to see armed force as a negotiation for local autonomy, which might have been unthinkable previously. Simply put, the post-Cold War African states did not necessarily have the capacity to effectively put down their local aggressors and so found themselves negotiating local solutions more than previously. While many of these conflicts are still underway in places such as the Casamance in Senegal and Cabinda in Angola,[48] there are several other regions that have seen secessionist conflicts begin and end—notably Mali and Somaliland.

The conflict in Mali was waged between the nomadic Kel Tamasheq of northern Mali and the state government, which was largely based in the South near the Niger bend. The Kel Tamasheq, commonly called the Tuareg, had always had difficulties with the central government.[49] They had been administered by the French separately from the African populations and felt culturally superior to the Bambara and Mande populations whom they had enslaved for centuries.[50] With the end of colonialism the Kel Tamasheq had suddenly found themselves suborned to the Malian government despite assurances by the French that there would be a separate Saharan zone for them and the Bidan populations.[51] The central government tried to conscript their young men into development projects and to tax their trade across the Sahara. A brief nationalist guerrilla struggle broke out in 1962, but there were never many fighters and by 1964 the resistance had generally been

suppressed.[52] While many of the Kel Tamasheq population fled across the desert to Algeria and Libya, there remained a considerable number of them in Mali and over the next two decades many drifted back as conditions allowed. However, the Malian government never managed to effectively integrate members of the Kel Tamasheq and they suffered terribly in several droughts and famines that occurred in 1972–1974 and 1984–1985.

This marginalization was not forgotten and in 1990 a civil war began with the Kel Tamasheq in the North attacking the city of Gao.[53] This began a series of hit-and-run attacks where the Kel Tamasheq would raid the cities bordering the North and the Malian army would attempt to send columns to pacify them. Reprisals were taken on both sides and despite initial efforts at a ceasefire in 1992, the conflict carried on. Interestingly, the 1992 ceasefire included the creation of the Kidal Region in Mali, which would be self-governing and largely inhabited by the Kel Tamasheq. Despite another devastating raid on the city of Gao in 1994, the Kel Tamasheq were unable to decisively defeat the Malian armed forces nor were the Malians able to effectively stop the Kel Tamasheq. Finally, in 1995, moderates on both sides negotiated a peace and the Kel Tamasheq was largely given autonomy in the North and offered additional connections to the resources of the state. While some groups still wished for their own Kel Tamasheq state in relation to a parallel revolt that was occurring in Niger, the peace deal was signed in 1996 and this separatism was largely accepted for the moment.[54]

As for Somaliland, it retains a very unusual pedigree. While born in conflict, its secession occurred almost by default and, even more strangely, its secession was from Africa's first nation-state. The territory now known as Somaliland was a strip of the Red Sea coast that was inhabited predominantly by the Isaaq clan family of the Somalis. During the Scramble for Africa it was conquered by the British, who let the Isaaq traditional leaders administer most of the interior while they retained the coast for control of the Red Sea traffic. With the end of the Second World War, the UN combined this British Somaliland with the larger Italian Somaliland to create Somalia, the first nation-state of Africa in 1960. General Mohamed Siad Barre seized control of this unified state in 1969 in a coup, quickly establishing fervent pan-Somalism as his central binding ideology.[55] While historically the seven major clan families of Somalia had had a fractious and sometimes violent relationship, Barre's regime attempted to keep these groups together by focusing on their unified Somali identity and the Somali territories that still lay outside their state. The prime example of these territories was the Ogaden in Ethiopia, which had been conquered by the Ethiopian empire in the nineteenth century. To maintain his control in the state, Siad Barre launched a war to retake the Ogaden from Ethiopia in 1977.[56]

Due to the currents of the Cold War, the Ogaden War would prove to be a disaster for Barre's Somalia. Although the major military operations were completed in 1978 following the USSR's abandonment of its client state

Somalia in favor of the Derg regime in Ethiopia, Barre kept up desultory operations until 1988.[57] At this point, his army largely depleted, his overseas support gone, and with increasing opposition by the clans within Somalia, Siad Barre attempted to end the war and maintain control of his country. However, at this point the clan-driven opposition to his rule had become too organized and too coordinated and in 1991 he was overthrown by a coalition of clan-affiliated armed fronts. For those clans of the southern regions, such as the Hawiye and the Darod, the power vacuum led to an armed struggle that eventually caused the southern region to collapse into a vicious civil war and humanitarian disaster.

For the Isaaq the results were quite different. At the outset of the armed struggle against Siad Barre, their armed forces from the Somali National Movement swept into their territories in former British Somaliland and quickly took control of the major city of Hargeisa and the port at Berbera.[58] Although the late 1980s had seen fierce struggles against the forces of Siad Barre, this new offensive met little organized resistance. By May, the country was mostly under the control of the SNM and the Isaaq clan. With the rest of the state of Somalia falling rapidly into a civil war, the Isaaq declared their territory the new state of Somaliland during a grand conference of the clan leaders in mid-May of 1991.[59] While Somaliland would continue to face internal challenges from some of the marginal clan group militias, by the middle of 1993 there had already been a transition in their government from President Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur to Muhammed Haji Ibrahim Egal, and the security of the state had been improved through negotiations between various militias.

Interestingly, while the rest of Somalia has still struggled to create a unified government, Somaliland has remained generally pacific and stable and remains autonomous to this day. In 2003 they held their first full election for president and continue to use a bicameral parliament to decide most legislative questions.[60] In addition, they have used their access to the strategic port of Berbera to forge economic ties with the other Red Sea nations and also serve as an exit port for Ethiopian goods. However, despite all of this, Somaliland remains an unrecognized state and to the present day much of the global community insists on maintaining the federal government in Mogadishu as the only legitimate government for all of Somalia.

In both these cases, the dynamics of the post-Cold War wave of secessions can be examined. For both cases it was the weakness of the host state that allowed the secessionist/separatist struggles to gain a foothold and even succeed despite small numbers of combatants and relatively short conflicts. In Somaliland's case it was not just the weakness of Somalia, but that state's collapse following the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime. In addition, in the case of Mali, it can be seen that a secessionist group can find it far more useful to negotiate separatism with its weak host state. For this, the armed groups

can gain autonomy and oftentimes additional concessions, such as additional government employment or aid like that the Kel Tamasheq were offered.

However, there is also one more as yet undiscussed characteristic of these conflicts: their uncertain ends. While Somaliland currently has its unrecognized secession, without that recognition it has only a small amount of international legitimacy. Indeed, as Somalia's Federal Government continues to gain capacity, there will likely be calls for Somaliland to rejoin the nation of Somalia. Under such circumstances they might maintain significant autonomy, but there would still be less local control than they currently have. Even more uncertain is Mali. While the moderates in the Kel Tamasheq community accepted autonomy and aid in 1996, many in the Kel Tamasheq community did not. Newer splinter groups emerged such as the May 23, 2006 Democratic Alliance for Change, which was formed of former combatants of the 1990 war who were unsatisfied with its outcome. Beginning in 2007, a new conflict erupted in Mali and Niger as Kel Tamasheq in both states fought for more representation within their states and more recognition of their traditional rights. While these conflicts both continued at best sporadically, beginning in 2012 a new wave of combatants, armed with weapons drawn from Libyan stockpiles, reignited the general conflict in northern Mali, this time calling for the direct creation of a Kel Tamasheq state in the Sahara called Azawad.[61] Like these conflicts, many of the other ethnically based secessions of the new wave have uncertain ends, as the states of Africa are still attempting to build capacity and the political order on the continent is by no means concrete.

Conclusion

Secession and separatism in postcolonial Africa have not been especially common occurrences. Although the first decade of independence saw several secession attempts begin, these were seemingly suppressed very quickly and international precedent apparently made them impossible. For most African states, the idea of a Katanga or Biafra was a nightmare, yet one that passed quickly as the international community refused to recognize these attempts and the OAU enshrined territorial integrity within its charter. However, despite the concept of secession seeming to be dead, after thirty years of conflict combatants in Eritrea managed to seize their own sovereignty and those in South Sudan soon followed. What had seemed an impossibility had now been achieved and with the post-Cold War world being reordered, new struggles for secession, autonomy, and irredentism are again in progress on the continent. While no other new state has yet been recognized, in this brave new world it seems only a matter of time before one is.

Notes

1. Much of this discussion is covered in Basil Davidson's excellent *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State*. See Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1997).
2. These attributes are discussed at length in Ricardo Rene Laremont, "Borders, States, and Nationalism," in *Borders, Nationalism, and the African State*, ed. Ricardo Rene Laremont (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 5.
3. This is most often discussed as the Gatekeeper State, as noted in Frederick Cooper's *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present*. See Frederick Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 141.
4. For a broader perspective on the Maji Maji Revolt, see James Giblin, and Jamie Monson, eds., *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War* (Leiden: Brill Academic Press, 2010).
5. For a broader perspective on the 1906 Zulu Revolt, see Thompson Paul S., "The Zulu Rebellion of 1906: The Collusion of Bambatha and Dinuzulu," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 36, no. 3 (2003): 533–57.
6. This also tracks with the analytic framework used on African insurgencies by Christopher Clapham. See Christopher Clapham, "Introduction: Analyzing African Insurgencies," in *African Guerrillas*, ed. Christopher Clapham (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 6.
7. The right of self-determination is specifically noted in Article I, Chapter I of the United Nations Charter. See "Chapter I, Charter of the United Nations," accessed March 9, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/.
8. For example Tanganyika, a League of Nations Trustee Territory was denied self-determination until the era of decolonization.
9. Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 10–11.
10. The idea of a civil state is expounded on at length in Philip White, "Globalization and the Mythology of the 'Nation State'," in *Global History: Interactions Between the Universal and the Local*, ed. A.G. Hopkins (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 257–84.
11. Jules Gérard-Libois, *Katanga Secession*, trans. Rebecca Young (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 316
12. Ernest Lefever and Wynfred Joshua, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo, 1960–1964, Volume 2: Full Text* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1966), 14.
13. Georges Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960–1964* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 14. The particular resolution deploying UN forces was Resolution 143.
14. Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History* (London: Hutchinson, 1962), 252–88.
15. For an accessible source on the formation of colonial and postcolonial Nigeria, see Sir Rex Niven, *The War of Nigerian Unity, 1967–1970* (Ibadan: Evans Brothers, 1971).

16. John de St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972), 31.
17. Ibid., 69.
18. Ibid., 60 and 69.
19. Zdenek Cervenka, *The Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970* (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard and Grafe, 1971), 57.
20. Ibid., 63.
21. de St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 181–84.
22. Ibid., 210.
23. Ibid., 193–96.
24. Resolution 161 effectively outlawed secession and also authorized extremely aggressive action on the part of the UN to enforce integrity.
25. "OAU Charter, article III, Sects. 2 and 3," accessed March 9, 2017, https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf.
26. For example, Tanzania's later appeals for OAU support against Idi Amin's Uganda were generally rejected by the Nigerians, who still held the recognition against Biafra against Julius Nyerere's government.
27. This was most effectively discussed in Mao Tse-Tung's classic "On Protracted War." See Mao Tse-Tung, "On Protracted War" in *Mao Tse-Tung on Revolution and War*, ed. M. Rejai (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1970), 271–79.
28. Richard Sherman, *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution* (New York, NY: Praeger Publishing, 1980), 23.
29. Ibid., 29.
30. Dan Connell, *Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1993), 58.
31. Sherman, *Eritrea*, 74.
32. *Derg* is the Amharic word for "Committee," reflecting the initial character of the regime, although it was swiftly dominated by Colonel Mengistu Haile Miriam who purged most dissent.
33. Connell, *Against All Odds*, 38–39 and 109–26.
34. Ibid., 160–61.
35. The best discussion of the famines and their effects are in Alex DeWaal, *Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia*. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991).
36. Connell, *Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution*, 228.
37. DeWaal, *Evil Days*, 272–73.
38. Douglas H Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (Bloomington; Kampala: Indiana University Press; Fountain Publishers, 2003), 10–11.
39. Scopas Sekwat Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan, 1955–1972* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 37; and Dunstan M. Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan* (New York: Africana Pub. Co., 1981), 74.
40. Ibid., 92.
41. Robert O Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008), 103.
42. Ibid., 106.
43. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 41.

44. Philippa Scott, "The Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Liberation Army (SPLA)," *Review of African Political Economy* no. 33 (August 1, 1985): 70.
45. Douglas H. Johnson, "The Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism," in *African Guerrillas*, ed. Christopher Clapham (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), 61.
46. Ibid., 63.
47. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 102.
48. However, both of these conflicts have been intermittently fought by their populations since independence.
49. The name Kel Tamasheq means "The people who speak Tamasheq" and is generally accepted as the most inclusive and accurate name for this group. See Jean Sebastian Lecocq, *Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 2.
50. See Priscilla Ellen Starratt, "Tuareg Slavery and Slave Trade," *Slavery & Abolition* 2, no. 2 (1981): 88; and Baz Lecocq, "The Bellah Question: Slave Emancipation, Race, and Social Categories in Late Twentieth-Century Northern Mali," *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 39, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 52.
51. This was called the Organisation Commune des Regions Sahariennes (OCRS), a French project that would have seen a communal organization of the Saharan territories, which held much more promise for them. However, this was abandoned in the face of decolonization. LeCocq, *Disputed Desert*, 41.
52. This conflict was called the Alfellagha. Ibid., 186.
53. Baz Lecocq and Georg Klute, "Tuareg Separatism in Mali," *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 68, no. 3 (September 1, 2013), 426.
54. LoCocq, *Disputed Desert*, 307.
55. I.M. Lewis, *Making and Breaking States in Africa: The Somali Experience* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2010), 65.
56. Lewis, *Making and Breaking States in Africa*, 119; Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 187.
57. Compagnon Daniel, "Somali Armed Movements," in *African Guerrillas*, ed. Christopher Clapham (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), 80.
58. Mark Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland* (Oxford: James Currey, 2008), 62.
59. Ibid., 82.
60. This legislature features a lower house of elected representatives and an upper house of clan elders, making the structure somewhat analogous to the House of Commons and the House of Lords.
61. The state of Azawad had been part of the initial goals of the Alfellagha and the 1990–1996 insurgency, but the specific demands for an irredentist Kel Tamasheq state have been more strident in the 2007 and 2012 insurgencies.

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CHAPTER 30

Postcolonial Africa and the West

Enocent Msindo

When he pronounced his famous saying, 'Seek Ye First The Political Kingdom …', Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of independent Ghana, a leading African philosopher and proponent of Pan-Africanism, unwittingly set the tone for what became the preoccupation of African political leaders after independence—the pursuit of political power. In the last 60 years, Africa has experienced genocides, rebel movements, coups, xenophobia, economic crises and much else. Associated with these has been the slowness of economic, political, and institutional change as venal leaders have cloven to power. This was not in line with Nkrumah's vision for Africa. For Nkrumah, political power was not an end in itself, but a prerequisite if Africans were to jettison global capitalism and establish a just society in which national goods and endowments would be fairly distributed under a socialist dispensation. African socialism was envisaged as a complete package to drive Africa's political, economic, and social agendas.

However, the African socialist experiment failed for a number of reasons, including: the structural conditions of the inherited states; the nature of African politics since independence; and, chiefly, the nature of Africa's relationship with the West after independence. As in the years of Western colonial control, post-independence Africa remained tied to Western capitalist systems that dictated Africa's pace and nature of economic (under)development. In many parts of Africa, Western corporations did not withdraw following the demise of formal empires, but continued to extract resources for their mother countries. Coupled with this was the rise of US economic imperialism, whose

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multinational corporations (MNCs) also prowled in Africa looking for primary goods. This situation meant that Africa's efforts to transform its economy were doomed to fail. Neither capitalist-oriented African leaders, like Félix Houphouët Boigny of Ivory Coast (aka Côte d'Ivoire) and Mobutu of Zaire (Congo), who increased their economic ties to the West, nor the avowed socialists like Nkrumah, Nyerere of Tanzania and Machel of Mozambique who had radical, Pan-Africanist ideas ultimately transformed the African economy. Afro-pessimists and some scholars tend to blame Africa's poor economic performance on Africa's bad policy choices and bad African leadership. There is some truth in this critique, but these scholars do not sufficiently examine Africa's economic and political relationship with the West and how this perpetuates Africa's problems. The West's parasitic economic agenda, we argue, has been and still is the major contributory factor not only to the failure of Africa's economic performance, but also to the rise of toxic forms of political expression such as coups, military rule, and other forms of instability in post-independence Africa. To demonstrate this point, we will take a number of examples from Sub-Saharan Africa since independence.

Africa (1956–1973)

Between 1956 and 1973, about three-quarters of African countries attained political independence, with Ghana leading the way in Sub-Saharan Africa. In North Africa, Egypt had already become independent in 1922, followed by Sudan in 1956. The exceptions were Southern Africa colonies which were under repressive white-settler regimes. Whereas decolonization was relatively peaceful in British West Africa, where the British had exercised indirect rule, this was not the case in settler colonies of East and Central Africa. In Kenya, the struggle for independence was as violent as it was in French controlled Algeria. In this section, we examine how Africa's attempt to negotiate its transition was affected not only by its bad political leadership and the colonial legacy on African institutions, but also by the overall international political environment, especially the politics of the Cold War. We also examine Western responses to certain African challenges and the efficacy of such responses. Additionally, we examine the challenges faced by African countries that tried to replace capitalism with socialism as an ideology and economic principle, and how this brought those states onto a collision course with Western powers. Finally, we will briefly analyze Africa's economic performance and dealings with Western MNCs.

Independent Africa inherited weak and anachronistic social, political, and economic institutions, yet at the same time they weren't easy to change as changing them would lead to instability. In the Great Lakes region, for instance, colonial politics of divide and rule created tensions between ethnic groups. Here, the Belgians and British practiced forms of indirect rule that solidified ethnic animosity between the ruling classes (usually the *nilotes*

and mainly Tutsi), who served in administrative and political positions, and the majority (usually *bantu*) who endured various abuses from the colonial agents. Following the rapid withdrawal of the British and Belgians there was chaos in Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda after 1959 as majority governments replaced colonial regimes.

In Rwanda, a predominantly Hutu government came to power, resulting in many Tutsi, who feared retribution, leaving for exile mainly to eastern Congo and Uganda. In Uganda, Tutsi refugees became involved in local politics, ultimately forming in exile a Tutsi militia called the Rwanda Patriotic Front, which helped Yoweri Museveni to ascend to power after he ousted Milton Obote. With the support of Museveni, the Rwanda Patriotic Front invaded Rwanda in 1990, eventually leading to the 1994 genocide in which close to a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed. In Burundi, a Tutsi monarchy was retained under Michel Micombero, resulting in the formation of all-Hutu political organizations in 1972 that attacked Tutsi people. This gave the Tutsi military regime the excuse to attack Hutu people in revenge. The result was a loss of more than 100,000 Hutu lives and massive numbers of refugees outside the country, mainly in Tanzania and Rwanda, where the new governments were pro-Hutu. The crisis in Burundi eventually led to further coups in 1987 and later. Contemporary Burundi is still struggling to move beyond this identity-based politics which have their origins in the colonial era. Attempts to resolve conflicts by way of unity governments, power-sharing arrangements, and peace accords reaped short-term benefits between the years 1960 and 2000.

In Kenya, the new government of Jomo Kenyatta inherited in 1964 a weak constitution that limited the powers of the central government by promoting an ethnic based quasi-federal system. However, as a Unitarian nationalist and Pan-Africanist, Kenyatta used his ingenuity (a mixture of paternalism and good statesmanship) to create a unitary government and to run the economy by combining strong capitalist ideas and very mild socialist ideas. Although Kenyatta's interventions ensured peace and economic development in Kenya during his rule, the unity between powerful ethnic groups (especially Kikuyu and Luo) was fragile. This became evident even in Kenyatta's own political party where members of his own party aligned themselves to ethnic-based factions which made it difficult for them to agree on national priorities.[1] His successor, Daniel Arap Moi, failed to reconcile these factions, resulting in him having to use violence against opponents and cronyism to stay in power.[2] Many aspiring Luo politicians went into exile for fear of Arap Moi.

The challenges of regionalism, political tribalism, and even xenophobia are common problems in Africa. However, these emerged primarily within the colonial politics of divide and rule. Africa's fundamental challenge was its failure to reform the social and political architecture of the states they inherited. In this regard, Crawford Young is correct when he says, 'New political superstructure directed by the triumphant nationalist leaders was bolted onto the

sturdy frame of colonial autocracy … In many silent ways, the mentalities and routines of the colonial state were absorbed into the quotidian action of its postcolonial successor'.[3]

By the mid-1970s, many African countries had experienced political instability of one form or another. More than thirty military coups had occurred in Africa, with at least nine countries experiencing coups two or more times. Benin alone (formerly Dahomey) experienced six coups between 1963 and 1972.[4] Although bad African leadership is often blamed for instability in Africa (and some of the African leaders are indeed culpable), the role of Western powers in political processes in Africa also requires closer scrutiny. In some African states, political instability happened as a result of either direct or indirect Western political interference. Africa gained independence amidst the international political divide created by the Cold War rivalries between the Eastern and Western blocs. African countries that took the socialist path were subjected to various forms of political and economic sabotage, with some Western countries sponsoring rebel movements, secessions, and coups, especially in the first two decades of independence. Instability became the order of the day because of a combination of the internal weakness of African social and political institutions and the political and economic agenda of the intervening Western powers. Pro-Western independent African countries were not spared as, because of economic and political dependency, they too were turned into quasi-states that relied on Western patronage.[5] During the Cold War, the USA sought strategic international allies to form a bulwark against the spread of Soviet communism. A number of African countries were seen as strategically important in their regions. Zaire (Congo), Morocco, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya were identified as allies, and had diplomatic support and foreign aid provided to them for their support of the USA and other Western countries.[6]

In some cases, Western governments intervened directly in the internal affairs of African countries, such as the USA's involvement in the Angolan civil war in support of UNITA, a Cold War ally. In the Central African Republic, the French government helped Jean-Bedel Bokassa, a military ruler, into power through a 1966 coup, only to depose him through another army coup that they sponsored in 1979 when Bokassa no longer served their economic and political interests.[7] In Chad, the French supported Christian southerners in seizing power from Muslim northerners in exchange for continued French economic control over Chad. French troops were stationed in most parts of Chad. This cemented regional animosities in Chad which eventually led to a civil war in 1968 as rebel movements from the North tried to seize power in 1968. The incumbent, Tombalbaye, who was supported by the French, failed to control this civil war and was eventually ousted from power in 1975. In a typical Cold War scenario, the northerners were supported by Libya's Muammar Gaddafi in their fight against the French-supported southerners.[8] This chaos continued into the 1980s and beyond.

It is because of the traditional rivalry between the French and Libya that French troops directly intervened in Libya in 2011, leading to the killing of Muammar Gaddafi.

In Congo, Belgian and US governments interfered in the country by supporting Moise Tshombe, a secessionist who wanted to control Katanga, a rich copper-mining region, and use proceeds from corporate taxes to advance his agenda. Lumumba was murdered within a year of assuming office because he was an avowed communist ally. Since Lumumba's death, Congo has never known peace, beginning with the thirty-two year dictatorship of Mobutu.[9] For this reason, his human rights abuses on the Banyamulenge of eastern Zaire, his killing of opposition politicians, his kleptocracy, his patronage system, and other forms of misrule were never questioned, but rather abetted by the US and Belgian authorities who had close corporate and political interests in Zaire. During this time, Congo, renamed Zaire, received massive financial aid from Western multilateral institutions, which Mobutu diverted to sustain his dictatorship by paying his patronage networks.[10] It only became prudent for the West to criticize Mobutu's excesses in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War.

Western governments dumped Mobutu and began supporting his rivals. His successor Laurent Kabila was also a dictator, so is the incumbent Joseph Kabila, who, like his predecessors, has failed to deal with the multiple crises facing the country. Perpetual instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo has created an ideal environment for MNCs to loot the Congolese economy as they have done since the colonial era. So, overwhelming evidence demonstrates the relationship between political instability in Africa and bad Western interference. Another challenge for some African countries was their adoption of socialism, which strained their relationship with the predominantly capitalist West. We will briefly examine that below.

Liberation movements came into power by winning the hearts and minds of the poor African populace who had been victims of capitalism in many ways. They did so by promising to replace the capitalist state with a new socialist one that would curtail inequality and capitalist accumulation. Socialism was seen as an alternative model for Africa due to the frustrations with failure to develop Africa using Western economic models. The third reason for preferring socialism was the mistaken belief that it would stem rampant corruption and misappropriation of funds by political leaders. It was believed that capitalism was inherently corrupt. The fourth reason for wanting to adopt socialism was the assumption that African societies had traditionally been collectivist, and were therefore closer to socialism than capitalism.[11]

But socialism, as espoused by the new African governments, was not along the lines of 'primitive' communalism where societies operated on the basis of consensus, with multiple centers of power in the form of ethnic groups, clans, and kingdoms. The socialism of the post-1960s was based on centralized political control, with one-party governments dictating the socialist

agenda, as was the case in Asia and Russia. This undermined participatory development in Africa, eventually leading to popular discontent. Moreover, broadly based collectivist understandings of socialism were imposed on African societies which had been fragmented into rival ethnic groups and economic classes, which made state development projects difficult to implement on a one-size-fits-all basis. Additionally, African political elites never fully agreed on how to implement socialism in their countries, often clashing on state policy matters.

Finally, socialism on the continent was doomed to fail because it was being adopted without adaptation to economies here which had long been tightly linked to global capitalism but had no control over it. As Ali Mazrui correctly said:

> If the genius of capitalism is production, the genius of socialism is distribution. And yet one cannot distribute poverty or socialize the means of *non*-production. Africa will need to develop a productive capacity before it can meaningfully implement a programme of distribution. At least to some extent Africa has to become capitalist before it can genuinely become socialist.[12]

Africa's socialist countries were well meaning in their attempt to champion an alternative to capitalism. However, such efforts were not successful because of certain systemic flaws in the inherited economy and also because any move towards socialism was a total affront to the Western powers, whose corporations chose to withdraw their capital from such socialist countries. We will take a few examples below to illustrate the fate of African countries that took the socialist route.

In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah believed that socialism should be the central political philosophy, the unifying social ideology, and the driving force behind Africa's economic development. He was too radical and did not understand how intricately linked to the West and how small and fragile the Ghanaian economy was. Nkrumah's immediate goal of industrializing Ghana through state-controlled enterprises was very noble when he came to power in 1957. He was attempting to move Ghana beyond the limited, colonial, cocoa cash-crop economy. A key project was the Upper Volta hydro-electric project, from which Ghana would tap electricity required for major industrial projects. However, this project was too expensive and drained most of the loans that Ghana had borrowed from the Americans, deepening Ghana's debt crisis. Ghana tried to service this loan by overtaxing the already underpaid cocoa-farming peasants.[13] The Upper Volta dam was completed in 1966, the very year Nkrumah was ousted through a coup. Nkrumah also had great difficulties convincing his opponents in government about economic strategy as they were divided between those who wanted private enterprise against his faction, which preferred public enterprise. A key limitation was that Nkrumah's Ghana did not have sufficient capital to develop import substitution

industries. The mechanized farms and other state-run businesses and those which had been developed realized massive losses because of mismanagement and possibly corruption.[14]

To deal with Ghana's financial crisis, Nkrumah tried to nationalize some gold mines, but for fear of immediate Western criticism, he targeted smaller ones instead of the Ashanti mines which were the largest and most profitable. As the urban population grew, Ghana faced an urban food crisis, which further alienated Nkrumah from the very young people who had voted him into power. Soon he requested food aid from the USA, which was not approved because of his radical ideas against neo-colonialism.[15] In rural areas, the plight of the peasants did not improve from what it had been during colonialism because the state's parasitic relationship with them continued. The indigenous business sector was unhappy with the tight controls on exchange rates, business permits, and other impediments. The army, whose older leaders were quickly removed and sometimes overlooked in promotion in favor of younger and inexperienced ones, became divided and disloyal. Nkrumah no longer had guaranteed military support. Some of his ministers felt sidelined as Nkrumah arrogantly pursued his socialism. Neighboring countries did not help Nkrumah's fate as capitalist-oriented ones such as Ivory Coast were thriving economically in the first decade up to the early 1970s. As internal opposition grew, Nkrumah became dictatorial, regularly using the colonial preventive detention law to detain critics without trial. He was eventually ousted in absentia through a bloodless coup and exiled.[16]

Although Nkrumah's socialism was driven by the noble aim to indigenize the economy, it failed because the Ghanaian economy remained in the hands of Western corporations. Nkrumah's governance was a kind of charismatic leadership that depended on inspiring awe and fear and had almost built a personality cult around his figure. He did not do enough to ensure that his ideas were well understood at grassroots level and in his party leadership. He also failed because of the influence of the West. Since his disagreement with the USA in the 1960 Congo crisis, when he advocated for non-Western intervention, his relations with the USA and other Western countries had been severely tainted. Western governments used pro-capitalist African states such as Ivory Coast, Malawi, Zaire, Kenya, and Nigeria to thwart Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist ideas. These African countries had no option as they risked losing financial aid and loans should they not be acquiescent. In Ghana itself, Nkrumah came under increasing US pressure, with CIA spies secretly meeting some of his unhappy government ministers and inciting them to rebel against Nkrumah for his alleged Soviet leanings and alleged authoritarianism.[17] Evidence from CIA files and other sources suggests that the CIA actively aided the coup plotters.[18]

Nkrumah was replaced by a military regime which ruled and handed over power to a civilian government following the 1969 elections; but in 1981, Flight Lieutenant Gerry Rawlings took over power in a military coup once

again. He engaged in pro-International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank structural adjustment policies in an attempt to gain access to Western loans. He is credited with the good use of IMF money, but he did not deal with the fundamental problems of creating economic self-sufficiency and alleviating poverty.[19] Rawlings also failed to democratize Ghana and entrenched repression, yet he continued to receive financial support from Western multilateral institutions.[20]

In Tanzania between 1967 and 1980, socialism as epitomized in the Ujamaa village system did not take into account various preexisting community economies, such as those of people who had survived on cattle ranching since the pre-colonial era. When they were forced into villages, the evictees had to start to learn a new farming-based economy, which drove them into abject poverty. Traditional local authorities, mainly chiefs, were undermined and slowly became redundant because of the ruling party's inordinate political interference in directing rural agricultural production. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) organized people into cells, with cell leaders systematically replacing those who had previously been called headmen during the colonial era. TANU leaders became the new elites in rural areas, perpetuating inequality.[21] The limited successes of the Ujamaa villages program was undermined in the mid-1970s by the drought of 1974 and the oil price hikes of the same decade, which made Tanzania a net food importer.[22] The economy slowed down, the Tanzanian currency devalued significantly, debts continued to mount, and inflation rose sharply. This led to the decline in public support for Ujamaa.[23]

The Tanzanian story is not so different from that of the socialist government of Haile Mengistu in Ethiopia, which moved huge populations into resettlements after the 1973 droughts. These movements are largely blamed for the devastating famine of 1983 to 1985. Western attempts to pour in aid and loans did not help the country to emerge from its economic and social crisis. Instead, this increased Ethiopia's dependence on the West for its survival.[24] In Mozambique, in the late 1970s and 1980s, Samora Machel's socialist government compelled peasants to work on village cooperatives, in almost the same way they had been exploited under the Portuguese regime.[25] Like Nkrumah, Machel did not live to see the end of his vision as he was killed by agents of the South African apartheid state. Elsewhere in Africa, many grand projects failed not merely because of corruption, bloated expenditures, mismanagement, and the general inefficiency of the African state in conducting business, but also because of declining terms of trade with the West. Having said this, we will briefly examine below other facets of Africa's economic condition since independence.

Many African states attained independence partly because of the ideological and military support of the socialist countries. At the time of independence, their diplomatic and military ties with these socialist countries

remained. However, Africa's economic and cultural ties with the Western capitalist bloc remained in place after independence, even in those states that were supposedly socialist. African education continued to be offered in the languages of the former colonizers, with very little effort to intellectualize African languages for broader adaptation to the curricula. This had implications for indigenous knowledge systems, as this was also not intellectualized, sufficiently embraced, and legitimized for economic development.

In general, the African economy continued to be run on Western models that privileged foreign capitalist extraction and accumulation with no critical thinking about alternatives to empower the locality. Even socialist countries were not free from the trappings of accumulation as the state itself became a capitalist entity of sorts by controlling and directing production using state-controlled businesses, by nationalizing some businesses, and also by forcing peasants to work for the state agricultural projects, supposedly to attain the goals of socialism. These failed dismally. African countries like Ivory Coast that took the capitalist route endured for just over a decade after independence before their economies collapsed in the late 1970s, consequently relapsing into dependency on Western patronage. At the time Ivory Coast was being hailed as the African miracle, its leader Houphouët Boigny, a conservative French *assimilado*, was busy using the profits of the land to extend his personal rule, thwarting opposition and trade unions, and also to engage in the grand project of turning his village home of Yamoussoukro into the state capital of Ivory Coast.[26]

But how is it that neither the capitalist nor socialist model worked for Africa? The answer lies in the fact that neither socialism nor capitalism were fundamentally African ideologies, but were convenient models borrowed from elsewhere. Moreover, Africa's ties to the West and the role of Western MNCs in African politics and economy were also limiting factors. Moreover, during the struggle for independence, there had been no careful thinking about how the African economies would be sustained after independence. The assumption had been that by attaining political independence, the new leaders would use state power to control and dictate economic policy. African nationalists were wrong in underestimating the power of international corporations and their links to global politics and multilateral institutions. They also did not realize that Western governments were planning carefully on how to dictate terms of engagement with Africa after the 1960s.

Relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the African, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) countries were dictated by the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which set in place the broader neo-colonial frameworks for multilateral relations that would saddle Africa in the long run. This led to further conventions, generally known as the Lome Conventions, which built upon this Treaty and further refined the original thoughts in the Rome Treaty.[27] The 1957 Rome Treaty hinged on three critical points, which were:

- the gradual opening of markets of associated African countries to the exports of the EEC member states without discrimination
- the opening of EEC markets to the produce of associated African countries under preferential arrangements
- the inauguration of social and economic investment programs in these overseas countries, financed by the European Development Fund.[28]

Africa played no part in determining terms of trade with the West under this Treaty or even in deciding on the nature of development finance that would be loaned to her. The first two points of the Treaty illustrate the West's intention to continue with the colonial system of extracting raw material from Africa and trading of finished goods to Africa. There was no intention by the Western powers to encourage Africa to fully industrialize. The 'bail-out' strategy in the Rome Treaty was a bait to pull Africa into the vortex of economic dependency. Former colonial powers knew exactly the fragility of the economies they left in African states, and how Africans would soon come for various forms of aid and loans.

With the economic crisis of the 1970s that was mainly caused by the oil price hikes of 1973 and 1979, Africa's fragile economies were severely affected as governments had no financial reserves and the necessary foreign currency to buy capital goods and food to feed the starving population. Africa consequently turned to Western loans and aid. This paved the way for them to come under the neo-liberal regime of controls, with the IMF and World Bank imposing new, restrictive conditions under its structural adjustments programs. Since then, Africa has never recovered from the huge debts incurred from these loans, which kept being rescheduled as African governments failed to service them.

The ballooning debts and the associated badly performing economies had serious political ramifications for ruling regimes, as they had to deal with widespread political opposition including Western-sponsored rebel movements at a time when Africa's (economically effective) population was being decimated by the HIV-AIDS virus. African dictatorships went a step further to contain this rising discontent. In Malawi, the Banda regime became more repressive; so did the Kaunda regime in Zambia, which had also been struggling since the 1970s because of falling copper prices. In Zimbabwe, the economy struggled to weather the challenge of restructuring, leading to the radicalization of the trade union movement, which eventually became a political party in the late 1990s. In Somalia, Siad Barre's regime became more repressive, leading to clans revolting, and to the eventual collapse of his regime in 1991. This marked the beginning of the Somalian crisis. In the same year, Haile Mengistu's regime collapsed in Ethiopia. Barre and Mengistu were 'collateral damage' of the end of the Cold War, they having been strong socialists. But a salient issue that also requires some analysis is the role of MNCs that we alluded to above.

In postcolonial Africa, MNCs continued to maintain the old exploitative relationship with Africa, with the continued support of their mother countries, which were supposedly democratic yet financially propping up dictatorial African regimes. In nine Francophone West African states (Benin, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, and Niger), French MNCs invested considerably more money between 1960 and 1970 than they had invested during the colonial era. Their investment by far exceeded that which the African governments themselves invested in those states for industrial development during the same period. Consequently, any assumed economic growth in these states was basically capital growth of the MNCs themselves, not real sustainable growth of the African countries' economies.[29] As Samir Amin argues, the distribution of this foreign investment to the different sectors has continued to follow the colonial pattern of investing in agriculture, mining, energy, and fishing. However, the total investment in these sectors was only a third of the total investment, with the rest going into infrastructure, housing, social services, and transport that were not directly linked to the productive sector. For this reason, only two countries (Ivory Coast and Mauritania) out of all the former French West African states realized reasonable economic growth between 1960 and 1970.[30]

The US corporations also invested in Africa, especially in apartheid South Africa in the 1970s. Ironically this was the time South Africa was under economic sanctions for its gross human rights violations against the black populace, as evident in the Sharpeville massacres and other cases of violence. We do not know exactly how much was invested by the USA into Africa between the 1960s and 1970. Suggested figures range from about $500 million to $755 million, with US exports to settler-ruled South Africa and Namibia alone totaling $563 million and their imports totaling only $208 million, epitomizing a negative balance of trade scenario for Africa.[31] The story of negative balance of trade is pervasive all over Africa because of low industrialization levels and declining terms of trade.

Multinational companies continued to siphon investable surpluses from Africa in almost the same way other corporations did during the colonial era. Seidman and Makgetla argue that between 1965 and 1975, US firms alone directly sent home more than $601 million, which was twenty five percent more than their original investments.[32] This figure does not include other unreported capital leakages and income from their shady business deals in war-torn countries. Having recouped their investments, MNCs are under no pressure to stay in some African countries, especially when there is a drastic change in the investment climate in that country. They can leave at will or siphon money from one part of Africa to invest in another continent. Moreover, the fact that some of these companies are in a stronger position financially than the state in Africa encourages them to defy government orders and threaten to disinvest should African governments pass laws that seek to demand them to invest a larger portion of the profits locally or to sell shares

to indigenous populations. Facing demands to sell some of its shares to Nigerian indigenous businesspeople in the mid-1970s, US-owned Citibank chose to leave Nigeria instead.

In many cases, Western countries directly intervened to contain the threats of nationalization of some MNCs by signing investor protection agreements to protect their companies in Africa.[33] This protection is always necessary because MNCs are the chief agents of Western neo-colonialism. As Markovitz argued, the power of the MNCs lies in the fact that they 'represent the forces that have created the world market system', the Western countries. In this regard, one may note the address of US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger to the United Nations General Assembly in 1975. In this he declared that transnational enterprises were the 'engine of development', warning that the host governments must treat these enterprises 'equitably without discrimination … [and] not as objects of economic warfare'.[34] Kissinger had to defend the MNCs because they are the mainstay of the US economy. In the mid-1970s, US MNCs accounted for 62% of US exports, 35% of US imports of manufactured goods, and about a third of the USA's domestic economic activity. In the early 1970s, their largest MNC, General Motors, was bigger than the Gross National Product of most of the countries internationally, including some European countries, having a turnover of more than $36 billion.[35]

MNCs also thrived in Africa, as they did elsewhere, because of their patronage networks with corruptible African politicians and rebel movements. In the Congo, Belgian and US MNCs supported and even paid 'taxes' to Moise Tshombe so as to thwart communist supporter Lumumba whom they feared would nationalize the economy. During the reign of Mobutu, MNCs promoted his kleptocracy and dictatorship in exchange for favorable business deals and limited scrutiny. During Kabila's era, they helped foment political chaos that helped them to continue extracting mineral resources during the conflict. In Nigeria, soon after the discovery of oil and the beginning of oil-drilling operations, a coup took place resulting in military rule. This was followed by a second crisis, the Biafra civil war (1967–1970), with the Igbo-dominated Biafra region, the source of most of the oil, turning to French support to secede from the Nigerian state even as the British and the Soviet Union supported the unitary Nigerian government. Whereas the French hoped to enter the Nigerian oil market by supporting a secessionist movement, the British government supported the central government under which its oil corporations Shell-BP were already operating, having long secured oil prospecting licenses during the colonial era.

Concluding his analysis of the role of MNCs in Africa, Markovitz had no kind words:

> The MNCs pour asbestos into drinking water, Sulphur dioxide into the air, hormones into cattle, mercury into fish. The MNCs pollute, they corrupt. They

> buy prime ministers and pay the 10 percent to administrative officials. The willingness of indigenous nationalists to accept bribes should not divert attention from the bribers. If the MNCs can, as alleged, bribe the Dutch royal family and arrange payoffs to Japanese prime ministers, they can do it to anybody … the multinational corporation represents the latest chapter in the long history of the continued expansion of national capitalism.[36]

Markovitz's criticism was not off the mark. By the mid-1970s, Africa had been driven by the same corporations into bankruptcy, with negative balance of trade and very limited foreign currency reserves. Africa had become more indebted and her economy was in dire straits.

'The Lost Years' (1973–1990)

Between 1973 and 1990, Africa's economic performance was generally disappointing, especially due to the fall in oil prices and declining terms of trade. In this misery, Africa turned to the World Bank and the IMF for help. However, assessing the economic environment, the IMF and the World Bank took on more interventionist approaches guided by the new neo-colonial world order supported by strong neo-liberalist thinking. Politically, Africa witnessed a rise in the number of military dictatorships which stifled political change. Because of a combination of lack of political change and the economic crisis, this period is characterized as Africa's lost years.

Earlier, we examined how post-colonial Africa inherited narrow, unindustrialized economies. In the 1960s and 1970s, African governments tried different economic development initiatives, most of which failed because of inordinate political interference, lack of sufficient skills, and Africa's weak finance capital base. In Ivory Coast, the government continued profiteering from cocoa monoculture, but did not diversify the economy early enough to hedge against falling cocoa prices. In Nigeria, the discovery of oil resulted in a switch from a predominantly agrarian economy that produced cocoa, palm oil, palm kernel, and groundnuts to a spigot economy. With her farmers driven out of business because of the rising costs of farming, Nigeria became one of Africa's biggest net food importers.[37] In Ghana, Nkrumah tried to industrialize by first investing in hydro-electricity generation, but this noble investment drained most of the country's financial reserves. We have also noted how governments of Mozambique, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and elsewhere engaged in ambitious state-controlled agricultural ventures, which led to opposition from below and to serious food shortages.

Many African governments tried to deal with the problem of dependency, especially the skewed balance of trade by establishing small manufacturing industries which produced certain goods locally so as to substitute the huge import costs. Import substitution would have been a noble strategy had there been sufficient capital, managerial, and political capacity to deal with the

growing international economic competition of the 1970s and 1980s. Under the import substitution strategy, governments incentivized industry through access to cheap credit, protected markets, favorable exchange rates, and state subsidies. The assumption was that such industries would eventually grow and generate surpluses to make them self-sustaining and competitive in the international markets.[38]

Unfortunately, these industries failed to compete with bigger international corporations which had better technology and had already established themselves in Africa at independence. Consequently, these industries experienced retarded growth, became moribund, and those that survived continued to require financial bailout from the state.[39] The urban development bias and the inefficiency of state controls were also partly to blame for the failure of these industries. Whereas state-controlled economies worked during the colonial era because the colonies were themselves controlled by the Western governments that in turn controlled international economic processes, state control of the local African economies after independence did not work because Africa was not a key global economic player. Increased *statism* led to disinvestment and capital flight, which made Africa more vulnerable economically. To stem capital flight, desperate African governments had to acquiesce to the demands of belligerent Western corporations even where these corporations competed with new African industries.

There were other efforts to grow the African economies which also failed. Attempts to modernize agriculture and encourage peasant production failed because they were premised on the colonial parasitic model of exploiting peasants. Other efforts, such as encouraging economic growth via regional integration initiatives, also failed because of lack of political will to unite and also because of the lack of agreement between regional states on the overall economic strategy.[40] Today, some parts of African countries are still not linked to other countries as the existing road networks have not yet been developed beyond the old colonial trade routes.[41]

Although Africa's economic challenges predate the 1970s, African economies became more precarious in that decade than they had been in the 1960s. This was mainly due to the global recession hitting Sub-Saharan Africa, whose economies were based on exporting raw materials. Between 1970 and 1975, Africa's growth rates were lower than other least-developed countries. This was mainly due to the global hike in oil prices of 1973, which affected agricultural and industrial development, and the drought of 1974 which increased Africa's food import costs. As African economies tried to recover, they were further constrained by the oil-price shocks of 1979. Concurrently, international financial institutions drastically hiked their lending rates, supposedly to curtail reckless spending, at a time when African governments expected to borrow more to revive their economies.

In addition, Africa also experienced serious droughts between 1983 and 1984. Consequently, Africa's economic growth rate was as low as one and

half to two percent in the mid-1980s, the lowest since 1960.[42] Economies that had thrived in the 1960s began to collapse, and Ivory Coast, which had been hailed as the African miracle, suffered severe economic decline as all its financial reserves dried up. Zambia's once a successful copper industry also collapsed due to declining terms of trade. In Zaire (Congo), Mobutu's patronage was tested as he no longer had enough wealth to distribute to his loyalists due to the falling copper prices. In the 1980s, pictures of famished Ethiopian people began to appear on British televisions, all heralding the sorry state of Africa. The widespread economic crisis made it difficult for Africa to service her earlier debts to international, multilateral financial institutions.

By 1987, Sub-Saharan Africa's external debt stood at US$129 billion, which was roughly about 47% of the continent's Gross Domestic Product.[43] This indebtedness was worsened by the fact that in the 1960s and 1970s, dictatorial regimes had accessed cheap credit from Western funders because of their Cold War loyalty. They used most of the monies to defend themselves from coups and rebel movements instead of developing their countries. The economic crisis made it difficult for African countries to import capital goods to revive the collapsing import substitution industries. To recover the monies owed by African governments to them, the IMF and World Bank, starting in the late 1970s, began to tighten their funding criteria in a manner that fundamentally deepened Africa's economic crisis. They forced Africa into what was called structural adjustment programs (SAPs).

The basic assumption of the World Bank, as evident in their ideologue Berg in his 1981 report, was that Africa's economic crisis was a product of it local economic distortions that he blamed on inappropriate government policy interventions and lack of institutional reform. Berg cited, among other factors: overprotection of industry hampering external competition; exchange-rate controls that made African currencies stay overvalued and discouraged international trade; a raft of state subsidies which were increasing public debt; the bloated civil service; and the agriculture development bias. Except for Ghana, where food production temporarily increased in the mid-1980s, SAPs severely affected African cash crop and food-based agriculture. The removal of state subsidies led to high input costs which increased producer prices, yet without a corresponding increase of the price of the final product on the international market. This worsened rural poverty levels and further slowed down Africa's economic growth.[44] Education and health-care services became more expensive, and job losses increased as companies downsized by retrenching workers.[45]

SAPs did not deal with the problem they proposed to address, but drove Africa into acute economic and political crisis. This increased Africa's dependency on the West. As Loxley and Campbell argued:

> Never before have the international financial institutions wielded such pervasive influence on policy formulation in Africa: not since the days of colonialism have

> external forces been so powerfully focused to shape Africa's economic structure and nature of its participation in the world system.[46]

SAPs reduced African governments' capacity to industrialize as their emerging industries came under severe competition from international suppliers from more industrialized countries under the market deregulation regime. The export bias of the SAPs also meant continued focus on cash crops, which compromised Africa's food security. Additionally, the SAPs did not lay out any clear strategy to take Africa out of debt.

What was clear was the intention to increase lending to Africa, even to highly indebted countries. This increased Africa's economic dependency on the West, with more money transferred to the West than was initially loaned. Between 1984 and 1990, there was a net transfer of $156 billion from Sub-Saharan Africa to Western countries, with $4.7 billion being repaid to the IMF and the World Bank alone between 1986 and 1990; this, incidentally, at a time when Africa was struggling economically.[47] This compromised Africa's ability to develop alternative economic models beyond IMF and World Bank patronage. However, what are not usually mentioned are the political repercussions of the SAPs on Africa.

Evidence suggests a corresponding relationship between SAPs-oriented economic change and the entrenchment of one-party dictatorships in Africa as governments tried to contain popular discontent from every direction. As Legum correctly observed, 'By the beginning of the 1990s, forty-two [African] states were under either military or single party rule, and only five still maintained multiparty systems'.[48] Legum, however, did not see the SAPs and politics nexus. In Morocco, the mere announcement by government in 1984 that subsidies would be cut led to countrywide street protests which prompted extreme police and military brutality as government sought to contain its restless population, arresting over 9000 protesters and killing about 400 people in the process.[49] In Zimbabwe, the implementation of SAPs radicalized the trade union movement and the student organizations, with the result that government also used police force to control protests in 1989 and in the early 1990s. In Ivory Coast, economic hardships brought about increasing xenophobia as the politics of citizenship were evoked in claims to land. Boigny's pro-IMF regime used brute force to suppress protesting students, teachers, and workers in 1990, arresting more than 100 people. His regime eventually collapsed in 1993. In Zambia in 1985, rioting against the state happened following almost a decade of government implementation of the SAPs. This forced Kaunda to temporarily break from the IMF and World Bank reforms, before reintroducing them in 1986. The Zambian riots led to the death of 15 people as government sought to contain discontent. Citizens soon started mass gatherings demanding political change.[50] In Zaire, the state collapsed as civil servants could no longer financially afford to travel to work. Soldiers abandoned Mobutu as he could no longer financially sustain his patronage networks in the country. The list is endless. However, all

this points to the fact that in the 1980s, dictatorial tendencies had their origins deeply rooted in economic crises facing neo-liberal Africa. Therefore, we rightly argue that dictatorship was not *causa sui* and that it was not always to be blamed on the characteristics of individual African politicians.

When it became evident that Africa's economies were not improving and that there was a rise in African political turmoil, the West changed its political game in the late 1980s. For the first time, Africa's poor economic performance was blamed on her bad politics and fragile institutions. Democracy and economic development began to be seen as Siamese twins. This became an important facet of Africa's engagement with the West in the post-Cold War era, following the weakening and collapse of communist regimes.

From the 1990s Onward

The collapse of international communist regimes in the late 1980s had serious repercussions for Africa. African countries that had benefitted militarily, diplomatically, and financially from communist countries were in a crisis. Revolts in communist-controlled Ethiopia, Somalia, and Liberia, for instance, resulted in chaotic second transitions in these countries, the first transitions being the transition from colonialism. Countries that had sided with neither the capitalist nor the communist blocs, in what was called the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), did not perform better as they were also beset by increasing poverty. African leaders who had benefited from Western support during the Cold War were also uncertain about the future. Some of their governments collapsed as a result of declining Western financial support in the 1990s.

Although most African countries crafted investor-friendly laws in the late 1980s and 1990s with a view to attracting foreign capital, Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s experienced low levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) when compared to Latin America and Asia. Ghana, which had a sound economic development package in 1985, had secured a total FDI of only one billion (US$) by 1991, which was insufficient to meet its development needs. Uganda, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and many other countries had similar experiences. Although this poor FDI situation is easily blamed on the grounds that many African governments were still under coups and military rule, therefore not investor friendly, it is also true that the West has generally been unwilling to promote industrialization projects in Africa that would have resulted in Africa becoming economically self-sufficient. In this section, we examine the changes in the West's terms of engagement with Africa, especially the rise of the language of democracy and human rights which had not been important to them before 1989.

Backed by their governments, that drew up country 'fact files', Western financiers came up with one alibi: that African dictatorships were the major cause of their countries' poor economic performances. With this, Africa had

entered a new phase in which economic men (the IMF and World Bank) ruled African politics with the political backing of the West in a neo-liberal era. There were increased calls by Western countries for Africa to twin good governance and democratization to the broader issues of economic reform and public accountability.[51] Consequently, Western-sponsored civil society organizations emerged as whistleblowers and watchdogs to safeguard human rights and the rule of law. But whose whistleblowers were they? When the IMF and World Bank started their SAPs in Africa, they never concerned themselves with Africa's political questions. This concern started in 1989 with the World Bank mentioning the term 'governance' in its discussion of Africa's developmental issues, blaming Africa's internal political conditions and weak commitment to policy and political reform for the failures of their SAPs.[52]

Given its global reach, especially in the West, the World Bank set the pace for other international investors and donors to Africa, who immediately joined the governance bandwagon. The World Bank led attacks on Africa, arguing that the continent had severely declining quality of governance, creeping bureaucracies, weak judiciary, inadequate rule of law, corruption and rent-seeking tendencies, and a 'deep political malaise' which were making it impossible for the continent to cope with 'rapid modernization'.[53] Following this negative slant, many Afro-pessimists rose in the academy pandering to the same World Bank whim. Thus, Africa began to be described by scholars of the post-1990s as having parasitic or vampire states, rogue regimes, failed states, and so on. Such depictions usually sought to diminish the interface between Africa's bad governance and bad Western economic interventions that we have explained above.

In its attempts to operationalize reforms in Africa, the World Bank had, by 1994 initiated civil-service reforms in 29 countries to contain bloated costs and to privatize state enterprises. The bank also enforced legal reforms in Uganda, Angola, Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali, and Guinea to promote human rights and enforce contracts relating to private-sector loans and credits. It also sponsored projects that focused on legal training and legal awareness such as the ones offered by the Legal Resources Foundation in Zimbabwe and many others in Tanzania, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Zambia. The Bank also sponsored female-gender activist movements in Africa, assuming that this would ultimately empower them economically. Considerable efforts were made to support grass-roots non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to empower people to counter the neo-patrimonial state. Some of the NGOs were given much money to undertake development work and were trained on capacity building. In schools, curricula were subjected to scrutiny for their overall economic value, so were funds made available to laboratories and libraries within the overall rationalization schema.[54] All this was not helpful for many reasons.

First, the World Bank systematically distorted Africa's postcolonial developmental experience and did not appreciate a myriad of reasons why certain

development initiatives had failed. The World Bank did not appreciate Africa's global constraints and its very own role in deepening Africa's debt crisis. Moreover, there was no proven link between economic development and democracy, and as the Asian economies demonstrated, their economies grew the most under dictatorial regimes that enforced and directed economic programs in almost the same way pre-1970s Ivory Coast had developed under the dictatorship of Boigny.

African countries accepted the World Bank's political demands so as to meet the lending criteria. According to Crawford Young, by 1991, more than forty states had either undertaken political liberalization or had promised to implement such reforms. By the same year, a number of old African regimes had been voted out of office, in addition to those who that were ousted through military coups. Curiously, even as the IMF and World Bank spoke strongly about democracy and good governance, these institutions were still keen to work with amenable dictatorial regimes such as those of Senegal, Gambia, and Zimbabwe in the 1990s. The dictatorial Yoweri Museveni of Uganda received much foreign aid in the 1990s, being well liked by the West, especially after the demise of Mobutu. In Rwanda, Paul Kagame continued to gain Western support by playing the victim card after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, even when evidence of extra-judicial killings of political and ethnic enemies in the country continued to surface.[55] The West itself watched the genocidal horror of Rwanda that claimed almost 1 million lives.

Another point is that where communist regimes collapsed lase in Somalia, the West watched the country degenerate into chaos, perhaps because there was relatively little wealth for its corporations to tap from the country. In Ethiopia, the fall of Mengistu's socialist regime did not lead to democratization, but to protracted ethnic fights particularly over state resource allocation. In the 1990s, both countries continued to rely heavily on donor aid as they had been doing since the late 1970s. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Western donors have persistently supplied food and military aid for decades, without corresponding action on how to deal with the civil conflict in the country. Throughout the Congo crisis, some Western companies were involved in mining and mineral smuggling.

An important development in the post-1990 era was the proliferation of NGOs in Africa such as Oxfam, Care International, World Vision, Action Aid, Catholic Relief Services, and many others promoting peace, security, and development. By the mid-1990s, many locally based NGOs had also emerged, usually with links to international NGOs and funding agents. This rise of NGOs happened against the backdrop of Africa's economic decline, which weakened governments' capacity to provide basic services.[56] It also coincided with increasing cases of HIV and AIDS-related illnesses in Africa and also with efforts by some African countries to reconstruct, following protracted civil wars, military rule, and other forms of instability from the 1970s to the 1980s. In Tanzania, NGOs grew from numbering seventeen in the

early 1980s to about 1000 in the late 1990s. Tanzania's neighbor Uganda had 2,655 registered NGOs in 2000 and 5200 in 2004.[57]

Most importantly, the growth in the number and prominence of NGOs was also triggered by the rise of Western liberal internationalism that sought to re-educate former communist countries and the so-called 'Third World' countries supposedly to curtail human rights abuses as a precondition for economic development. In this regard, NGOs were meant to drive the agenda of international capital that financed them and the politics of their sending countries.[58] Unlike the earlier period when funds had been recklessly advanced to some unaccountable, usually authoritarian, political regimes in Africa, substantial amounts of funds were now being channeled to Africa through NGOs. In eastern Zaire, NGOs became the major employers after 1994. They offered better salaries when compared to those in the public service. This NGO factor contributed to the collapse of the country's public service and by extension, poor service delivery, leading to protests. International NGOs and the local ones took over the conventional functions of the state, setting themselves on a collision course with African leaders who perceived NGO activities to be an affront to state sovereignty. In Somalia, where most of the people survived on food aid from NGOs, this food aid was a disincentive to Somalian peasant production as food became freely available.

Although international NGOs are often mistaken for disinterested altruistic organizations, evidence of their operations in Africa suggests that they are not completely divorced from the covert agenda of their sending countries. As we alluded to above, some NGOs played a critical part in enforcing compliance to the World Bank's problematic 'good governance' and 'democratization' program.[59] By their aid programs and activities, some became complicit in sustaining dictatorships.[60] In the eastern provinces of Zaire, NGOs continued to support Hutu refugees even when these refugees formed a militia that raided and attacked the local Banyamulenge who were Mobutu's enemies. Their food aid distribution was biased against the Banyamulenge who were not in the refugee camps, yet the same Banyamulenge could not produce food because of persistent attacks from the Hutu militia and Mobutu's army.

Furthermore, in areas where NGOs have been involved in community development, their interventions have usually been one-offs and have not offered long-lasting solutions. As soon as the NGOs leave, villagers relapse into their old circumstances. For this reason, we believe that Africa's future will depend on collective efforts by Africans to develop the necessary skills to expropriate and properly use Africa's own resources, not her reliance on NGOs. Although civil societies and NGOs have helped to raise important questions about democratization, Africa must still strengthen its institutions and develop political and economic models that are best suited to its own contexts.

Conclusion: Whither Africa?

In concluding this chapter, we must emphasize a few key observations that are important to our understanding of post-colonial African economies, politics, and relationship with the West. First, colonial economic structures were replicated in the postcolonial era, and where there were attempts to modify them, there were more often than not uprisings in African states. In Congo, this happened with Belgian and US companies and intelligence forces supporting the secessionist Moise Tshombe against the nationalist Patrice Lumumba. Second, African leaders who took over power had no political model to learn from. Colonialism had not showcased good governance, but had thrived on divide-and-rule, racist, capitalist dictatorship, and forms of patronage. Thus, the politics of patronage in Africa were mainly an extension of bad leadership that was inherited from the colonial era, and of course perfected after independence as the new leaders tried to sustain the ungovernable states marred by rebellions, banditry, political tribalism, calls for secession, and other forms of political expression. Third, Kwame Nkrumah's vision of seeking first the political kingdom as a pathway to gaining economic freedom was noble, but it was not fulfilled. The trap of state sovereignty deprived the African leaders of the opportunity to work closely with their neighbors to rethink better models of economic integration and development, and to smoothe over the challenges of regional economic communities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Communities (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and others. Thus, African countries continued to sustain their traditional parasitic links with Western African countries in ways that consolidated the Western economic stranglehold over Africa. Very little was done to invest in processing industries, and where this happened, ambitious projects met the challenges of narrow revenue bases, which made it difficult to complete such projects. The debt crisis which encumbered Africa as a result of the IMF and World Bank's neo-liberal regime intensified the economic crisis.

Except for a few African countries where political leaders had clear plans of action (such as Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, and others), some new African leaders had not necessarily prepared themselves for leadership over the new states, with many lingering questions about the future having never been considered. In contrast, the West had planned more carefully about it engagement with post-independence Africa. Where their planning was not so good, Western countries took advantage of opportunities that presented themselves in Africa (particularly political and economic instability, ideological confusion, and the lack of unity between African states) to reassert their new forms of control in the different African countries. Following the collapse of communism, Africa became a site for both political and economic control as the financiers imposed conditions that had political repercussions across the continent. Monitoring Africa's good governance and

democratization levels were important for the World Bank after 1990. But as we have argued, this has not made Africa a better place economically and politically.

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CHAPTER 31

The USA and Africa

Adebayo Oyebade

For much of the history of US foreign relations, Africa has been a somewhat overlooked entity and sometimes entirely ignored. The primary interests of the postcolonial USA, for 150 years, resided chiefly in the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In Europe, for example, during the Second World War, bilateral cooperation with Britain elevated Anglo-US ties to a pedestal described by wartime British prime minister Winston Churchill as a 'special relationship'. In Latin America, the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 declared the region out of bounds to European colonization and, by the early twentieth century, American hegemony in the region was fully at play. In Asia, the threat to the USA's economic interests compelled a demand for free trade in China in 1899 through the Open Door policy. The promotion of free trade would become the centerpiece of the USA's foreign policy in Southeast Asia for much of the twentieth century.

In sharp contrast, before the Second World War Africa was virtually invisible in the USA's external relations and dealings. The USA had no foreign-policy doctrine that defined distinctive interest in Africa, nor did it establish significant treaties and alliances with the continent. Indeed, for the most part, the USA considered colonial Africa as the purview of European imperialist states, not a part of its own sphere of influence.

Yet deep-rooted connections between the USA and Africa had always existed. Interactions between North America and West Africa could possibly have begun in pre-Columbian America, as expressed in some Afrocentric

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literature. Taking this hypothesis as a point of departure, this chapter will discuss the major historical and contemporary themes that have defined relationships between the USA and Africa.

'A Dark Continent:' The US Perception of Africa

The lack of US interest in Africa, particularly before the Second World War, was a reflection of many Americans' historical perception of the continent as 'dark'. This Eurocentric perception of Africa as a 'dark continent' was, in one sense, an expression of the inherent ignorance of the land and its people by the Euro-American public. In another sense, 'dark Africa' was essentially a perception of the continent as lacking in human advancement, cultural sophistication, and a history worthy of note. This idea was rooted in the Eurocentric historical tradition vividly represented in the early nineteenth-century Hegelian theorization of ahistorical and inconsequential Africa.[1] This Eurocentric conceptualization of Africa found further expression in racist Euro-American scholarship and popular culture and literature from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The British-born US journalist-turned-explorer Henry Morton Stanley, perhaps more than any other single individual, propagated the idea of Africa as a 'dark continent'.[2]

Africa and Pre-Columbian America

The earliest period of interaction between North America and Africa could possibility have been in the pre-Columbian era. This idea has been expressed in some Afrocentric literature, although without wide scholarly acceptance. Afrocentricity (or Afrocentrism) itself is an intellectual movement which gained some prominence, particularly in the 1990s, among black scholars in the USA. Its fundamental principle is its insistence on a paradigm shift in which the elements of African culture (religion, philosophy, history, and sociology) form the core of any scholarly discourse about Africa.

One of the basic claims of Afrocentric scholarship is Pre-Columbian contacts between North America and West Africa. The pioneering proponent of this hypothesis was the one-time Rutgers University scholar Ivan Van Sertima, whose controversial book *They Came Before Columbus* postulated the presence of Africans in the New World, particularly South America, before the arrival of Christopher Columbus.[3] Since the publication of Van Sertima's book, Molefi Kete Asante, often credited with propounding Afrocentric theory, and a number of African American scholars, have argued that there were transatlantic crossings that brought voyagers from West Africa to the Americas before Columbus's arrival in the New World in 1492.

Yet the notion of a pre-Colombian black presence in the Americas has not been embraced by mainstream US scholarship. In particular, there is strong reservation about the Afrocentric claim of significant African contribution

to Mesoamerican culture.[4] In essence, as the idea of a pre-Columbian black presence in America has not met with definitive validity, it remains at best a hypothesis, despite the work of a handful of Afrocentric apologists.

The Early US Republic and Africa

With the Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the conclusion of the American Revolution in 1783, the American Republic was effectively established, and the new nation entered the fray of foreign relations. Even though Africa had no place in the external relations of the early American Republic, one of the first countries to formally recognize its independence was the North African state of Morocco. This occurred on June 23, 1786, when it signed a treaty of peace and friendship with the USA. What followed was a period of American consular presence in Morocco, with the establishment of a consulate in Tangiers in March 1791, which was elevated to a legation in March 1905. Following the first consulate in Tangiers, in the next hundred years the USA opened other ones in Moroccan cities, including Casablanca and Rabat.[5] The USA also had official representation in another North African state, Tunisia, dating to 1795 when the state recognized the American republic. A treaty of friendship and trade was concluded with Tunisia in 1799, and an American consulate was established in Tunis in 1800.[6]

Although US foreign policy in its first century was not globally focused, the North African region was certainly of considerable importance to it. In the early nineteenth century, a number of states in the region known as the Barbary States were involved in international piracy that impacted US shipping on the Mediterranean. The states, namely present-day Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, were sponsors of pirates who seized Western and US sailors and extorted ransom from their countries. The US attempt to stamp out the activities of the pirates prompted the Barbary Wars of 1801–1805 and 1815–1816 against Tripoli and Algiers respectively.[7]

Interactions in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade

An epochal period in the early history of US interaction with Africa was the era of the Atlantic slave trade. The rise of the USA's plantation system in the South needed a massive infusion of labor for success. However, poor and indentured whites and Native Americans were unable to meet the requirement. Beginning in the early sixteenth century, Africans had begun to be transported by Euro-American slave merchants to the New World, many of them enslaved on southern plantations.

Enslaved Africans were brought from the entire stretch of the west coast of Africa and the West-Central region as far as Angola. Most came from the region known in the parlance of slave merchants as the 'slave coast'; that is, the Bight of Benin, an area coterminous with the coastline of present-day

Republic of Benin and Nigeria up to the Niger Delta. However, there were other major slave-exporting regions, namely Senegambia in the upper Guinea coast, the 'Gold Coast', and the Bight of Biafra. Dotting this coastal landscape were trading posts such as Goree, Cape Coast, Elmina, Porto Novo, Whydah, Badagry, Lagos, Bonny, and Luanda, where European slave merchants and their African collaborators conducted the business of buying and selling slaves.

In the USA, the agrarian southern economy became exclusively dependent on slave labor. Enslaved Africans, put to work on the plantations to cultivate cotton, tobacco, sugar cane, corn, rice, indigo, and other crops, constituted an instrument of wealth creation and accumulation for the southern, white, slave-owning class that dominated the society. With time, the black population began to exceed that of whites in some southern counties. In South Carolina, for example, by the 1790s the black population had surpassed that of whites, and, indeed, more than doubled it by 1860. The growing population of enslaved Africans through the Atlantic trade became a major problem to the privileged white society. The belief that this increased number of blacks accentuated the possibility of slave revolts led some states, by the end of the American Revolution, to pass legislation restricting the importation of slaves. Between 1776 and 1787, ten states banned the importation of slaves. In any case, the slavery system was now self-perpetuating and the need hardly existed to import more Africans. Congress itself outlawed the Atlantic trade in 1808. By this time, according to estimates, between 10 and 12 million transplanted Africans had been enslaved in the Americas, mostly in the cotton states of the US South.[8]

The transatlantic slave trade lasted for almost 400 years. Its most profound legacy was the establishment of the African diaspora in the Americas, a community of the descendants of enslaved Africans. As of 2015, people of African descent, now known as African Americans, numbered 46.3 million, representing 14.4% of the entire population of the USA, but contemporary United States has also seen the emergence of a new black diaspora that is fast expanding. While the old black diaspora was shaped by the Atlantic slave trade that, from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, brought enslaved Africans to the New World, the new black diaspora is being created by the massive influx of African-born immigrants into the USA, particularly since the closing decades of the twentieth century. Consequently, the US black community has expanded to include new social, cultural, and religious identities.[9]

Liberia: The USA's Stepchild

The African diaspora in the USA notwithstanding, the antebellum USA had no dynamic relationship with Africa beyond Liberia. An independent republic located on the West Coast of Africa, Liberia was a US creation which existed in its early decades as a virtual colony of the latter.

As a colony, Liberia was founded in 1821 by the American Society for Colonizing the Free People of Color in the United States (otherwise known as the American Colonization Society, ACS) as a haven for emancipated American slaves. Its foundation was a direct product of a combination of factors in the USA: the abolitionist movement, the South's race dilemma occasioned by an increased free black population, and the emancipation and colonization project that had become very prominent by the early nineteenth century.

As far back as the 1790s, there had been a number of groups, mostly in the North, dedicated to the emancipation of the slaves and the ending of chattel slavery in the USA. This campaign was driven not only by white Christian liberals, but also by other groups not necessarily motivated by altruism. In the South, some in the slave-holding class had grudgingly accepted the inevitability of the end of slavery and were troubled by the prospect of the significant expansion of blacks that emancipation would bring about. Thus, while subscribing to abolitionism, they tied it to the colonization of free blacks outside the USA. In essence, the early nineteenth-century politics of abolitionism was interwoven with the twin concept of emancipation and colonization.

Many blacks in the South were convinced that they would never be truly free citizens in the racist US society and thus welcomed relocation outside the South, though not necessarily outside North America. Colonization in Africa never appealed to the vast majority of free blacks, who saw the Liberian project as a ploy by whites to rid the USA of blacks. In any case, by the early nineteenth century, many of the free blacks were US-born with no connection to Africa whatsoever. Indeed, one the most prominent black abolitionists, Fredrick Douglass, opposed the colonization scheme.

The ACS, under whose auspices Liberia was founded, only managed to ship a small number of freed slaves to the colony. Some other colonization societies also established colonies in the same locality and sent free blacks there. By 1824, the different colonies had consolidated to be officially known as 'Liberia', and Monrovia became its capital, named after James Monroe, the fifth US president who had supported the colonization enterprise. However, the Liberian colonization scheme was never a huge phenomenon as a mass exodus of US blacks to the colony did not materialize.[10]

In its early years under the governing authority of the ACS, Liberia struggled to survive amidst numerous arduous challenges, including financial difficulties, hostility from indigenous communities, and encroachment on its territory by European colonizing powers, notably Britain and France. The ACS eventually went bankrupt, which largely led to the colonists' demand for independence, granted in 1847.

Post-independence Liberia maintained close ties with the USA, especially after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1862. However, prior to the Second World War, US interest in Liberia was largely economic, primarily an investment in rubber production. This venture was largely the work of

Harvey Firestone, owner of the US-based Firestone Rubber Company, who established extensive rubber plantations at Harbel on the Farmington River in 1926. The rubber company came to exert a great deal of influence over the Liberian economy. A year after its establishment, the company secured a concession agreement with the Liberian government which granted it one million acres of land for a period of ninety nine years. Also, Liberia was required to accept a $5 million loan from the company, an arrangement that put the African nation in a long-term debt.

The Second World War: Changing Dynamics of US-African Relations

The advent of the Second World War significantly altered USA's interest in Africa. The continent formally entered the US war effort on November 8, 1942, when Anglo-US forces invaded North Africa in a military operation called Torch. This operation was a campaign directed at wresting French North Africa from the control of the Germans, which would deliver to the Allies a platform from which to halt the Axis gains in Europe.

US wartime interest in Africa manifested in two major arenas: economic and strategic. The war demand on the US economy, even before the nation's entry into the war in December 1941, required stepping up its external trade. The dramatic increase in the volume of US import/exports trade reflected on Africa, catapulting the continent into an important portion of the USA's economic warfare. The fall of Southeast Asia to Japanese forces by early 1942 had significant repercussions for the US economic war effort. This region had been an important source of raw materials for the USA. The consequent loss of the traditional markets of British Malaya, French Indochina, and Burma spelled the denial of vital strategic raw materials to the USA. In this precarious situation, the USA turned to other regions, including Africa, for the supply of vital commodities to meet domestic industrial need and the war effort. West Africa, for example, became an important supplier of strategic mineral raw materials including Liberian iron ore, Nigerian tin ore, Gold Coast's manganese ore, Sierra Leone's diamonds. The USA also obtained vital minerals from other parts of the continent such as South Africa and the Belgian Congo. Besides strategic mineral resources, the USA also obtained critical agricultural products such as palm oil and cocoa from Nigeria, Gold Coast, and Sierra Leone and rubber from Liberia.[11]

The Second World War also brought Africa into the USA's strategic plan in the Mediterranean where the Germans and the Italians had established control over the coastal stretch from Egypt to Tunisia. In May 1943, the USA provided much needed military assistance to the Allied powers in order to defeat the Axis in North Africa and end the campaign in that sector that had begun in 1940. Although North Africa was a major theatre of war in Africa, West Africa was also brought into the US war strategy in the Southern

Atlantic. The region not only played an important role in Allied victory in the Mediterranean; US war planners saw it as vital to the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, the USA established military bases in strategic locations, from the western tip of Africa through Central Africa to North Africa and onward to the Middle East. Points on this line included: Dakar, Bathurst, Freetown, Monrovia, Takoradi, Lagos, Kano, Maiduguri in West Africa; Fort Lamy in Central Africa; Khartoum in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan; and Cairo in North Africa. These bases served as terminal points on a trans-Africa air-ferry service across West and Central Africa to the Middle East. This was a pre-war route which the USA took over in 1941, expanded, and operated through Pan American Airways (Pan Am), a leading aviation company that had been operational in South America since the 1930s. Through this ferry service, British desert forces received critical military supplies and hardware including US-manufactured combat aircraft.

The USA greatly expanded its strategic interest in Liberia during the Second World War, as was evident by its conclusion of a defense pact with Monrovia in 1942. A major airbase, Roberts Field, was constructed by Pan Am and financed by the USA. The USA maintained a military presence in Liberia by stationing military units there made up of predominantly African Americans troops and other servicemen. Liberia eventually formally joined the Allied powers in 1944 when it declared war on Germany and Japan. The strategic importance of wartime Liberia was underscored by President Franklin D. Roosevelt's visit to the country in January 1943, where he held war-related talks with the Liberian president, Edwin James Barclay, and met the 2000-plus American troops stationed in the country.

The USA and Cold War Dynamics in Africa

After the Second World War, Africa witnessed the advent of the era of decolonization, as European colonies in Africa began to attain political independence. This period coincided with the shaping of the Cold War, the ideological tension between the two global powers, the USA and the USSR. US foreign policy in Africa during this period was necessarily affected by the prevailing Cold War dynamics. The USA began to view Africa almost exclusively from the logic of the Cold War. The overriding US foreign policy goal in Africa was to prevent newly independent states from joining the Eastern bloc and to see them adopt Western-oriented economic principles and democratic governments.

The independence of Ghana (formerly Gold Coast) in 1957, the first state to be free of colonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa, posed a challenge to the US vision of a democratic Africa secured within the Western capitalist bloc. Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's foremost nationalist leader, who led his country to independence from Britain and became its prime minister, was known for promoting a radical form of Pan-Africanism which called for the political

union of African states. Although not overtly anti-West and espousing non-alignment, he vehemently opposed European imperialism, subscribed to Leninist-Marxist principles, and flirted with communism. Ghana under Nkrumah's dictatorship and one-party rule was hardly a model for Western democratic tradition.

The late 1950s and early 1960s saw the intensification of the Cold War and consequent US anti-communist covert interventions overseas. In Africa, an important example of the USA's Cold War meddling was the Congo Crisis of the early 1960s. Western and US interest in the former Belgian colony rested on its vast mineral resources, the access to which could be jeopardized by the budding Soviet influence in the state. The new Congolese prime minster, Patrice Lumumba, had sought Soviet assistance as the newly independent nation's crisis deepened. President Dwight Eisenhower's administration regarded Lumumba as a stooge of the Kremlin who must not be allowed to aid the expansion of Soviet influence in Africa. The Congo Crisis culminated in the unceremonious murder of Lumumba in January 1961, in which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was implicated. The USA also facilitated the enthronement of Mobutu Sese Sekou, a staunch ally of the West, as the new Congolese leader. Indeed, the West, particularly the USA, helped to sustain Mobutu's corrupt and autocratic rule till the end of the Cold War. As elsewhere during the Cold War, the USA had subordinated its much touted principles of human rights and democracy to an anti-communism foreign policy that tolerated contrary authoritarian ideals.

Following the Congo Crisis that ushered in the Cold War to Africa, other parts of the continent emerged as proxies in the Soviet-US ideological confrontation. In Southern Africa, the USA sought to undermine the increasing Soviet presence in the region. In the 1970s, the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique had turned to Warsaw Pact states and the USSR for military and economic assistance in their anti-colonial struggle. The post-independence civil wars in both countries threatened a continued Soviet presence which the USA wished to end. At independence in 1975, Angola declared itself a Marxist state as the People's Republic of Angola, under its pro-Soviet leader Agostinho Neto. In the immediate post-independence Angola civil war, the USA supported the pro-Western rebel organization the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, UNITA), which was fighting the ruling Marxist, Cuban and Soviet-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, MPLA).[12]

The same Cold War pattern of overt and covert superpower intervention occurred elsewhere in Southern Africa. During Mozambique's post-independence civil war, the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO), professedly Marxist, enjoyed extensive military aid from the Soviet Union and some East European states in its war against the rebel forces of the Mozambican National Resistance

(Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, RENAMO), which was covertly supported by the USA through its proxy, apartheid South Africa. In Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) and Namibia (formerly South West Africa), their respective liberation organizations, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), received Soviet military and technical aid and other forms of support from East European communist states in their guerrilla wars against racist white minority rule. The African National Congress (ANC), in a similar struggle in South Africa against apartheid, was viewed with distrust by Washington, which erroneously assumed it was a communist organization with direct Soviet influence.

The US reluctance to support the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa amounted to a tacit approval of apartheid. But this was primarily dictated by Cold War dynamics, although it also had to do with the USA's extensive economic investment in the country. In the early 1980s, international condemnation of the apartheid regime was rife, but Cold War considerations continued to prevent the USA from making a meaningful change in its policy toward South Africa. President Reagan's administration opposed demands, especially from the black congressional leadership, for sanctions against South Africa. Instead, the administration pursued a reactionary policy called 'constructive engagement', by which Washington expected to encourage the apartheid regime to gradually end its racist policies. Not unexpectedly, this policy failed to bring about change in South Africa; rather, it sanctioned the apartheid state's repression of the black struggle.[13]

US Post-Cold War Interest in Africa

The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s freed the USA from the anti-communist foreign-policy straitjacket it had been constrained by for almost half a century. In Africa, Cold War concerns that had restricted US opposition to apartheid were removed, and US engagement with Africa was now defined by a new interests-based partnership. One key area of partnership on which the USA placed a premium was African democratization. The US policy was to promote in Africa the building of viable democratic institutions, respect for human rights, elimination of corruption, and the fostering of transparency in governance. Sustainable economic growth and development was another component of partnership. To assist in achieving this, in 2000 the US Congress passed into law the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which offered eligible sub-Saharan African states tangible trade incentives and preference to tap into the US market. This initiative was intended to promote economic expansion and free markets in Africa.[14]

Strengthening African democratic institutions and promoting US-African trade has continued to be a critical element of contemporary US policy. The administration of President Barak Obama repeatedly underscored these core values in US foreign policy in Africa. However, there are other arenas of US

partnership with Africa. One important dimension has been promoting health care on the continent. The administration of President George W. Bush, in particular, pursed an active agenda in this area. As part of the US Global Health Initiative (GHI), the US government expended significant material and financial resources on combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa. This effort was largely pursued through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) which was launched in 2003. The US health-care initiative in Africa also included the fight against other debilitating diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis.[15]

Alternative Approach to Conflict Prevention in Africa

Post-Cold War Africa continued to witness intractable conflicts, some of which attracted international attention because of their destructive intensity and extended duration.[16] One of the legacies of the Cold War was a massive infusion of arms into African conflicts by both superpowers, which undoubtedly exacerbated the conflicts. The US arms transfers to many African states continued even after the Cold War had ended. For example, the conflicts in the Great Lakes region in Central Africa, that began in the mid-1990s, were fueled by the US supply of arms to the warring parties, worth $125 million by the end of the decade.[17]

However, in the post-Cold War period, the USA exercised restraint in direct humanitarian intervention in Africa. This was evident in Rwanda, where the Clinton Administration refused to intervene in the country's brewing crisis in a way that some observers believed could have prevented the 1994 genocide in the country. The US reluctance to intervene in African conflicts where its vital interests were not at stake had a direct relation to the lesson of the failed US-led humanitarian intervention in Somalia in December 1992, codenamed Operation Restore Hope. During the course of this, some 18 US soldiers were killed in a most dastardly manner by Somali militiamen at the so-called Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993. Eschewing interventionist policy, US strategy toward African conflicts was to help African states build up viable mechanisms to address continental crises. This peace-building strategy involved US assistance in creating an all-Africa rapid response force that could be deployed to hotspots on the continent.

The immediate result of this strategy was the launching of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in October 1996 by the State Department, supported by the Department of Defense. This was an initiative that aimed at enhancing the capability of the militaries of designated African states to respond efficiently in a peacekeeping capacity to crisis situations on the continent.[18] ACRI immediately began training programs for the military in these states. However, some African countries, including Nigeria, were unreceptive, at least initially, to the idea of US military training for their militaries, which they considered condescending. Nevertheless, in 2004, ACRI was

restructured as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) and continued to provide military training and technical and logistical support to more African militaries.[19]

Combating Terrorism and the Militarization of Africa

With the emergence of Africa as a front in the US-led global anti-terrorist project in the late 1980s, the level of US military partnership with the continent increased dramatically. The perceived terrorist threat to Western and US interests from Africa dates to at least 1986, when President Reagan accused Muammar Gaddafi's Libya of fomenting terrorism worldwide, supporting terrorist organizations that killed US diplomats and tourists, and allegedly setting up camps in the country to train terrorists. Viewing the Libyan regime as hostile to the USA, Reagan ordered US strategic bombing of alleged terrorist installations in Libya.[20] However, it was the coordinated bombing of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), and Nairobi (Kenya), on August 7, 1998, with heavy casualties, that crystallized the reality of terrorist threat to American interests in Africa. Henceforth, Africa became a part of the broader war on terrorism which would necessitate a US military presence on the continent.

Islamist terrorism has been rife, principally in the Horn of Africa, North Africa, East Africa, and West Africa. The USA's counterterrorism campaign on the continent has thus been focused on key terrorist organizations based in these regions, such as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); al-Shabaab, active in Somalia; Ansar Dine, operational in Mali; and the Nigerian-based Boko Haram. These groups not only pose a threat to American and Western interests in Africa; they also have a history of destabilizing their regions of operation.

The US approach to countering terrorism in Africa has been to forge counter-terrorism partnerships with some African states with the aim of equipping them with the necessary tools to enhance their capacity to effectively combat terrorism. In order to degrade terrorist cells and deny them a platform from which to operate, the US partnership has focused on providing support to its African partners in a number of areas. One critical area is bolstering the capacity of state militaries and law-enforcement agencies to conduct counter-terrorism operations. Another important area is working with partners to eliminate sources of funding for terrorist groups and at the same time helping governments to institute poverty-alleviating strategies that would benefit impoverished youths and discourage them from gravitating towards extremist groups.

To manage the US counter-terrorism collaboration with North and West African states, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), an initiative of the Bureau of Counterterrorism (BCT), was established by the State Department in 2005. An equivalent agency, the Partnership for

Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), was created in 2009 for the East African partner states. These initiatives have provided support for partner states as well as regional organizations at the forefront of the war against terrorism. For example, PREACT has provided military and financial support for the governments of Somalia and Kenya and for the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) against al-Shabaab.[21] A repercussion of the broader war on terrorism is a major US military presence in Africa. An indication of the prevailing militarization of the continent was the establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007, as one of the six Department of Defense's regional combatant commands. AFRICOM uses the major US military base, Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti, as operational ground for its military activities and counter-terrorism crusade in Africa. The military command has been roundly criticized for the alleged militarization of the continent. This opinion was aptly expressed by political scientist Olayiwola Abegunrin, when he stated:

> AFRICOM is an example of U.S. expansion in the name of the war on terrorism. … It represents a policy of U.S. military-driven expansionism that will only enhance political instability, conflict, and the deterioration of state security in Africa.[22]

Conclusion

The history of interactions and relations between the USA and Africa is a long one, although too often episodic. Nevertheless, it has been an enduring one that promises to continue to expand. This chapter has attempted to interrogate the major themes that have defined this history, from pre-Colombian America to the contemporary age of Islamist terrorism and its destabilization of states and entire regions. The latter period has given birth to significant US military presence on the continent. Perhaps justifiably, US strategic and security concerns will be the yardstick for delineating contemporary relations with Africa for some time to come. This has overshadowed other forms of US engagement with the continent such as partnership with African states and development assistance to promote trade and investment, political transparency and democratic institutions, health-care needs, and educational development.

Notes

1. For critique of Hegel's African thesis, see the following: Teshale Tibebu, *Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2011); Babacar Camara, "The Falsity of Hegel's Theses on Africa," *Journal of Black Studies* 36, no. 1 (2005): 82–96; and Ronald Kuykendall, "Hegel and Africa: An Evaluation of the Treatment of Africa

in The Philosophy of History," *Journal of Black Studies* 23, no. 4 (1993): 571–81.

2. Among Stanley's works are, *Through the Dark Continent*, *Vol. 1 and II*, (1878); *In Darkest Africa: Or the Quest, Rescue, and Retreat of Emin Governor of Equatoria* (1890); and *My Dark Companions and Their Strange Stories* (1893). Note the reference to "dark" and "darkness" in the titles of the works.
3. Ivan Van Sertima, *They Came Before Columbus: The African Presence in Ancient America* (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 1976).
4. An example of a critique of this notion is provided in Gabriel Haslip-Viera, Bernard Ortiz de Montellano, and Warren Barbour, "Robbing Native Cultures: Van Sertima's Afrocentricity and the Olmecs," *Current Anthropology* 38, no. 3 (1997): 419–41.
5. US Department of State, Office of the Historian, "A Guide to the United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, Since 1776: Morocco." Retrieved Feb. 28, 2016 at https://history.state.gov/countries/morocco.
6. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "FACT SHEET: Enduring U.S.-Tunisian Relations," May 21, 2015. Retrieved Sept. 13, 2016 at [https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/21/fact-sheet-enduring-us-tunisian-relations]; and U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "A Guide to the United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Tunisia." Retrieved Feb. 26, 2016 at https://history.state.gov/countries/tunisia.
7. On this subject, see Frank Lambert, *The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005); and Ray W. Irwin, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers 1776–1816* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1931).
8. The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database provides a figure of 12.5 million. See the website at http://slavevoyages.org/.
9. For more on this subject, see Toyin Falola, and Adebayo Oyebade, eds., *The New African Diaspora in the United States* (New York: Routledge, 2017).
10. For more on this subject, see the following: John David Smith, ed., *The American Colonization Society and Emigration: Solutions to "The Negro Problem"* (New York: Garland Publishers, 1993); James Wesley Smith, *Sojourners in Search of Freedom: The Settlement of Liberia of Black Americans* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987); and Tom Shick, *Behold the Promised land: A History of Afro American Settler Society in Nineteenth-century Liberia* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University press, 1984).
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CHAPTER 32

Franco-African Relations: Still Exceptional?

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The notion of exceptionalism in Franco-African relations has a long pedigree.[1] It can be traced back to the colonial period and the idea that French colonial policy was fundamentally different from, and indeed superior to, British policy. In contrast to the British approach of indirect rule, which did not seek to 'remake' the colonized in the image of the colonizer and which allowed the indigenous population to retain certain administrative, legal, and other powers, the French republican colonial project, rooted in direct rule and assimilation, was presented as progressive and modernizing. Many commentators have pointed to the 'myth of the contrast'[2]: yet the 'thin white line' of colonial administrators was just as much of a reality in French as it was in British Africa, with the result that colonial rule in practice, on the ground, was 'the art of the possible', involving improvisation and 'making do'. Many other factors (lack of resources, both financial and human, the underlying racism and assumption of superiority, and the overriding concern among colonial administrators to maintain stability) militated in favor of such convergence of practice between the colonial powers. However, French claims to exceptionalism were not entirely without substance. France was different from the other European colonizing powers, which were essentially conservative monarchies. To be sure, there was never any systematic attempt to transpose French republican traditions south of the Sahara but, unlike under British colonial rule, there was an underlying assumption that colonial administrators, through the system of direct rule, would seek to rid the

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colonies of their 'feudal' aristocracies by undermining hereditary chiefs and promoting Francophile, French-speaking elites to positions of limited power.[3] The influence of this conception of French colonial rule was far from uniform across the period: during the interwar years the policy of association cut in the opposite direction, with its stress on rural society and 'traditional' authority rather than urban educated elites. Nonetheless, the Republican modernising instinct continued to underpin French policy and this difference in approach came to the fore after the Second World War.

Both France and Britain emerged from the war much weakened. Not only were they confronted by the emergence of two new global superpowers (the USA and the USSR) but their relation to their colonial empires fundamentally changed as a result of the war. The notion of white superiority was undermined in the eyes of many Africans by the sight of whites, for the second time in less than thirty years, fighting each other in a global conflict. Moreover, the war was fought in the name of freedom and the Atlantic Charter of 1941 asserted the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they are governed. Although the colonial powers were quick to assert that this did not apply to their colonized territories as they were not yet ready to exercise such freedoms themselves, this was not a view that the majority of the colonized could be expected to share. Other factors, specific to France, undermined the notion of French superiority. The colonial empire in Africa divided in 1940, with French North and West Africa declaring for Vichy and French Equatorial Africa declaring for de Gaulle and Free France. Further underlining French weakness, liberation from Vichy rule came with the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1941 and was the result of Allied, not French, action. African troops subsequently played a significant role in the liberation of metropolitan France[4] and in some cases even found themselves, in Syria for example, fighting each other for two 'different Frances': Vichy France and Free France.

Thus, the maintenance of empire became even more important to France's continuing claim to world power status than it was before the war. However, de Gaulle's Free French government was acutely aware that for this to be possible, profound reforms would be needed in the colonial relationship. He therefore decided to convene a conference (to be held in the capital of French Equatorial Africa in January–February 1944 and called the Brazzaville African Conference) with the dual aim of making clear France's intention to hold onto its colonial empire after the war and promising wide-reaching reform to the colonized peoples of Africa who had remained loyal to France during the war. Although the conference had no legislative power and could only make recommendations, a significant number of its recommendations were subsequently enacted, including the abolition of forced labor and the *indigénat*,[5] the establishment of a fund for economic and social development in the colonies, and the plan for African deputies to be elected to the future National Assembly in Paris.

This laid the basis for a distinctive French approach to decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Whereas British Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald

had expressed the view before the war that Britain's ultimate aim was to bring its colonies to self-government,[6] any form of self-government for France's colonial empire was explicitly ruled out at the Brazzaville Conference.[7] In keeping with this, France's Fourth Republic (1946–1958) embarked on a project to bring about decolonization through closer integration with the Republic and the full application of its core values of liberty, equality, and fraternity, rather than through secession from it.[8] This was enshrined in the constitution of the Fourth Republic by the declaration that France forms with the peoples of overseas France (as the colonized were now called) 'a Union based on the equality of rights and duties, without distinction of race or religion'. Indeed, each of the major colonial reform projects after 1944 (reconfiguring the empire and renaming it the French Union [Union Française] in 1945; the *loi-cadre* [framework law] of 1956, which devolved certain powers over internal affairs to the government councils that were established in the individual colonial territories; the creation of the Community [La Communauté] in 1958) was seen at the time not as a series of stages on the road to self-government and eventual independence but rather as a means of reconfiguring the French presence in order to maintain influence. To be sure, France was not alone among the colonial powers in seeking to ensure that decolonization did not mean complete withdrawal and in searching for ways to continue to exercise influence, albeit more cheaply; what was distinctive in the French case was that decolonization was taken to mean closer integration with metropolitan France. Decolonization was equated with the modernizing of Africa through economic and social development, while political independence was ruled out. In Indochina and Algeria, this policy would lead France into two highly destructive wars of decolonization[9]; in Sub-Saharan Africa it laid the basis for the Franco-African special relationship that would subsequently come to be characterized as the 'Franco-African state'[10] or *Françafrique*.[11]

The foundations for this special relationship were, first, the decision to provide for direct political representation of France's Sub-Saharan African colonies in the National Assembly in Paris. In some cases this even led to African politicians being appointed government ministers, such as, for example, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who was a minister in the Mollet Government from 1956 to 1957. The consequence of this was to establish Paris as a key focus for the political activity of African political leaders under the Fourth Republic. Many of them affiliated to metropolitan political parties (Houphouët-Boigny, for example, having initially affiliated to the Communist Party in 1946, subsequently joined François Mitterrand's center-left Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance in 1950). They became thoroughly socialized into the French political system and culture[12] and formed close alliances (and often friendships) with leading French politicians. These political associations, which endured in many cases for up to thirty years beyond political independence in 1960, formed the bedrock of the post-colonial Franco-African special relationship.

Second, the creation of the Economic and Social Development Fund (FIDES) for overseas territories in 1946 played an important role. For the first time it channeled significant sums of money from the metropole to France's colonial territories in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet FIDES could never hope to provide sufficient funds to meet the vast development needs of France's Sub-Saharan African empire. African political leaders thus inevitably competed with each other, lobbying the government for investment in major infrastructural projects such as roads, ports, hospitals, and schools since their legitimacy as political leaders depended, to a significant degree, on their success in obtaining these funds for their territories. This had two consequences. It reinforced the relationship of economic dependency between France and its African colonies, and laid the basis for a patron–client relationship in which the patron (France) and its African clients (its colonial territories, soon to become independent states) were locked into a relationship of mutual obligation, from which both parties expected to derive benefits. Finally, and just as importantly, it gave a number of large French companies, which benefited from these large infrastructure projects within what was a de facto protected market, a stake in the Franco-African special relationship.

Belated Moves Towards Granting Political Independence

This vision of an African future as part of a Franco-African, or 'Eurafrican', bloc with France at its head, came under growing challenge from within Africa, notably after the Bandung Conference of 1955.[13] The twenty-nine countries, most of them newly independent, that participated in the conference aimed to promote 'South–South' economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Following Bandung, African intellectuals and social movements increasingly saw themselves as part of a wider 'Third World' grouping, embracing North and Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time as their political horizons were shifting, the military situation in Algeria was deteriorating and the Fourth Republic fell in 1958. The new French government under de Gaulle, who had left power in 1946 but was now recalled to restore order in Algeria and save France from a possible military coup d'état, was forced rapidly to improvise an 'exit strategy' that would both avert the danger of another colonial crisis developing in Sub-Saharan Africa and enable France to maintain its position and influence in the region. Initially, in the 1958 referendum on the new constitution that established the Fifth Republic, he offered the colonial territories in Sub-Saharan Africa the option of joining a renovated French Union, to be renamed the Community, or immediate independence. Only Sékou Touré's Guinea chose the latter course, while all the other territories voted 'yes' to de Gaulle's offer. However, the Community was to prove short-lived and, in the presence of General de Gaulle, on December 13, 1959, the president of

the Mali Federation[14] and future president of Senegal Léopold Sédar Senghor announced that he was requesting the right to independence. Expressing his gratitude to, and confidence in, 'the man of the 18th of June' ('l'homme du 18 juin'), who had launched the struggle for the liberation of France in 1940, he declared:

> You are, Mr President, the inheritor of the French Revolution, which for the first time in the world dared to proclaim the rights of man and of the citizen … We trust in you to 'do the rest' with us … You have understood us: you have understood the History of this Century.

Significantly, he concluded:

> [W]e aim to achieve our national independence, not against France, but with France, in a great Franco-African grouping, by friendly and constitutional means … Beyond constitutional independence, we aim to achieve 'real independence and guaranteed cooperation,' which is what you are offering.

De Gaulle's response was similarly gracious and eloquent. He pointed to France and Africa's shared language and ideas and acknowledged the legitimacy of their claim to 'international sovereignty', recognizing that without a state, you 'do not exist in the international order'. He stated his preference for the term 'international sovereignty' rather than 'independence', as it accorded better with the spirit of the age, and he went on:

> No one in truth enjoys total independence … But international sovereignty means … a lot. It means that a people takes responsibility for managing its affairs itself … There is no international existence that is not first of all a national reality.

He finished by saying that the Mali Federation and its member states would achieve this objective 'with the agreement, the support, the help of France'.[15] Thus, only in 1959 did the French government finally abandon its efforts to hold back the rising tide of anti-colonialism and announce that it would grant independence to any colonial territories that requested it. Within little more than twelve months, the process was complete, and all the territories of former French West and French Equatorial Africa had achieved political independence.

The strategy for granting independence was called the 'transfer of competences'.[16] It involved transferring power to African political leaders who were for the most part friendly towards France, while at the same time putting in place an array of official agreements and other links which ensured that the future of France and its newly independent former colonies remained closely tied.

The Establishment of the French *Pré Carré* in Africa

Having accepted the inevitability of political independence, the priority was to ensure that decolonization did not mark an end, but rather a restructuring, of the imperial relationship in Sub-Saharan Africa. This was to be achieved in a number of different ways. Crucially, under the Fifth Republic, decision making on Africa policy largely bypassed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; key decisions were instead made by the president in close consultation with his 'Africa cell' of special advisors at the presidential palace, and were not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Indeed, Africa policy was for many years the 'reserved domain' of the president. This personalization of policy making was an important vehicle for the cultivation of regional friends among Africa's political leaders, a practice that was facilitated by the fact that many of the leaders of the newly independent states of Francophone Africa had, as we have seen, been *députés* in the National Assembly in Paris under the Fourth Republic. France's privileged sphere of influence in Africa was known as the *pré carré*.

Crucially, also, France signed cultural, technical and military cooperation accords with most of its ex-colonies at independence. The sending of large numbers of *coopérants*, often as teachers or government advisors to former French Africa served to maintain, and indeed reinforce, the French presence. In some cases the latter were sent to Africa to assist the newly independent governments, while in others former colonial officials simply exchanged their previous post as employee of the colonial government for a new one as advisor to the president or to an African minister in the government of the newly independent state.[17] A Ministry of Cooperation, successor to the colonial Ministry for Overseas France, was created. Its role was to oversee the cooperation agreements and it became in effect a ministry for Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa.

The policy of cooperation, which was at the heart of the Franco-African special relationship, rested on three pillars: the economic, the cultural, and the military.

The Economic Pillar

Central to the economic pillar was the Franc zone. Maintained by most of the former French colonies at independence, it tied their currency, the CFA franc, to the French franc at a fixed rate and obliged the countries using the CFA franc to deposit 65% of their foreign currency reserves with the Trésor in Paris. No decision concerning the Franc zone could be taken without the approval of the Bank of France.

We have seen that, thanks to FIDES, a number of large French companies were already involved in Africa in the late colonial period. Thanks to the retention of the Franc zone, these economic links intensified after political independence. FIDES was abolished in 1959 and replaced by the Fonds

d'Aide à la Coopération (FAC) with a brief to oversee the *coopération* agreements (economic, cultural, technical, military, and defense) with the newly independent Francophone African states. Two-thirds of French development aid went to France's former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa, and a government agency, the Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique, was created to provide development loans.[18] The contracts to carry out projects funded by these bodies went to French companies, some of them state-controlled or with strong links to the state, such as the Compagnie Générale des Eaux, Bouygues, Bolloré, Eiffage, and France Télécom.

The French oil company Elf-Aquitaine, which was established in 1966 under de Gaulle as a state-run company with a brief to secure French access to oil, also played a key part in Franco-African relations during the post-independence years. A key area of operation for the company was West and Central Africa, where it operated effectively as a state within a state.[19] It had its own security and intelligence services and was headed for many years by a former Gaullist intelligence officer, Pierre Guillaumat. Its role was in effect to act as the 'oil arm' of the French state, to ensure its energy independence and challenge the dominance of the big Anglo-American companies in this crucially important sector.[20] Before its merger with Total-Fina, it was accused of interference in African politics, contributing to military conflicts and corruption, which culminated in legal proceedings and a crisis in relations with the ruling regime in Congo-Brazzaville in 2003.

Economic relations between France and Francophone Africa have benefited from several special conditions. In particular, economic and financial ties were reinforced through the maintenance of the Franc zone and the policy of coopération which, while making a contribution to the development of the newly independent countries, maintained the relationship of dependency between France and Francophone Africa.

The Cultural Pillar and Francophonie

The projection of French power overseas (the so-called *besoin de rayonnement*) is integral to France's image of itself on the international stage and often seen as independent from its material power.[21] In keeping with this, the second pillar of the Franco-African special relationship was the maintenance of the French language and promotion of French culture. This meant that central importance was attached to sustaining the position of French within the education systems of the newly independent states. This is reflected in the large sums disbursed through the *coopération* budget to secondary and higher education, which were seen as the most strategically important. Thus, from 1959 to 1967, the FAC devoted more than 38% of its budget to higher education and 27% to secondary education, with just 13% going to primary education and only 7.4% to the technical and vocational sector.[22] The sending of large numbers of *coopérants* as teachers, university lecturers,

and educational advisors to former French Africa thus served to maintain, and indeed reinforce, the French cultural presence.[23]

This 'soft power' dimension of French power in Africa should not be underestimated and derives from the prestige attached to France as a beacon of humanist republicanism, promoting liberty, equality, fraternity, and universal human rights. Its role as perceived champion of the 'Third World' and its position at the forefront of promoting universal values not designed solely for the French people of France but for enlightened citizens throughout the world remains an important vector of French influence in Africa. This is despite the uses and abuses of these ideas during the colonial period, when supporters of empire sought to justify France's imperial enterprise through various forms of the civilizing mission (*mission civilisatrice*), which aimed to bring progressive enlightenment to the backward populations of Africa through exposure to the values, traditions, and culture of France.[24]

The Francophonie movement has also played a key role in maintaining the position of the French language in Africa. Its origins date back to a special issue of the review *Esprit* (1962), to which a group of intellectuals and politicians, including Senghor, contributed. The movement was supported through the Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique (ACCT), which was created in 1970 at the instigation of, among others, Senghor of Senegal and Diori of Niger. The movement only became formalized, however, when François Mitterrand hosted the first Francophonie Summit in Versailles in 1986. Since then, the summits have taken place biannually, usually outside France. The movement also underwent various changes, including the election of a secretary-general from 1998, before becoming the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) with a permanent secretariat in 2005. Despite these changes, the idealistic discourse portraying France and French culture to the world as a beacon of progressive values remains largely intact and Africa continues to play a key role within Francophonie; nearly half the organization's member states are in Africa, which is also the continent with the largest number of countries whose official language is French. With over 96 million French-speakers, the future of French as a global language is inescapably bound up with its development in Africa.

The Military Pillar

Arguably the most important pillar of the Franco-African special relationship is the military one. At one level, the significance of the military dimension actually predates the colonial period, since African soldiers (the so-called *tirailleurs sénégalais*[25]) played a key role in the French conquest of Africa. In the twentieth century, hundreds of thousands of Africans served under the French flag in metropolitan France and other theaters in both world wars and in the two major wars against French colonial rule in Indochina and in

Algeria. Indeed, alongside African students who went to France in increasing numbers from 1945 onwards, they represent the largest social group that traveled to the metropole.[26] At independence these veterans also expected their role to continue to be recognized and took their demands directly to de Gaulle and Jacques Foccart. However, in 1960, in what appears to have been a unique legislative act, the French Parliament froze the military pensions of all veterans who were not French citizens, thus leading to discriminatory treatment of these veterans compared to their army colleagues who held a French passport.[27] Moreover, at independence, a parallel 'transfer of competences' played out in the military sphere, notably in former colonial territories such as Mauritania and Cameroon, where the French army remained on the ground after 1960 to assist the new governments of these countries in the fight against 'insurgents'. It is also worth noting that many of the coups d'état staged against post-colonial governments from the early 1960s were carried out by African military officers who had been educated in the French service. When deciding for or against intervention in a putsch situation, France's African affairs specialists often had to take account of the fact that these leaders had an older, military-related connection with France.[28]

At another level, the Ministry of Defense has been a key actor in French Africa policy since 1960. France maintained military bases in several countries, including the Central African Republic (CAR), Ivory Coast, Gabon, Senegal, and Djibouti and a large presence of permanently stationed troops, which numbered 58,500 in 1962, dropping to 21,300 in 1964 and 6700 in 1981,[29] before rising again thereafter. In line with the bilateral defense agreements signed at or shortly after independence, France intervened militarily in Africa more than thirty times between 1960 and the early 1990s, an average of one intervention a year and a record that led France to be dubbed the 'gendarme of Africa'.[30] It also had large numbers of military advisors working in the defense ministries of African governments and military officers embedded within African armies. In addition, France remains a major supplier of military equipment, including aircraft and armaments, to African countries. Moreover, in geopolitical terms, the Cold War afforded France a 'space' on the international stage in which it was able to present itself as the guarantor of Western interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, in a part of the world that the USA did not know well and which it did not see as central to its own security. The USA was therefore happy to delegate to France the task of ensuring that the region did not fall into the clutches of Moscow. These factors taken together have combined to ensure that the Ministry of Defense, together with the 'Africa cell' at the presidential palace, have played a pivotal role in determining and implementing Africa policy in the post-independence period, not least because the former has direct access to the Africa cell through the president's military chief of staff stationed within the palace.

France's African Networks

Alongside these official policy instruments there existed a complex range of unofficial, family-like, and often covert relationships.[31] For much of the thirty years after political independence these networks (*réseaux*), as they were called, were associated with Jacques Foccart, de Gaulle's 'man in the shadows' and special advisor on African affairs, to whom he had entrusted the task of maintaining France's position in Africa after independence.[32] Foccart subsequently also acted as advisor to President Pompidou and to Jacques Chirac, both when he was prime minister and president. There were also the Franco-African summits, instituted at the instigation of President Hamani Diori of Niger in 1973, which brought the French president and key ministers together with African political leaders in an annual celebration of their special relationship. These meetings were traditionally more like a family gathering than an official summit meeting, as there was no published agenda and no final communiqué afterwards. Finally, regular French presidential visits to Africa and visits by African presidents to Paris further helped to maintain the special relationship. The close interlinking of these official, semi-official, and unofficial dimensions of the relationship, together with support for them at the summit of the French state, were the key to France's success in establishing its African *pré carré* that was at the heart of its special relationship with Africa after political independence. Thus was the post-colonial Franco-African special relationship born, giving credence to, and further perpetuating, the notion of French exceptionalism.

The Watershed of the Early 1990s

With the end of the Cold War in 1990, the Cold War rationale for France maintaining its African *pré carré* disappeared. Acknowledging this new context, President Mitterrand's announcement to African leaders at the 1990 La Baule Franco-African summit that France intended in future to reward those regimes which undertook political reform signaled a significant break with past French practice, as political conditionality in this form had never been part of French African policy. His speech was clearly intended to send a message to African political leaders that they needed to initiate a process of political reform if they wished to continue to receive French support.[33] Although the new policy was actually implemented very unevenly across Francophone Africa, it nonetheless set in motion a profound process of political change, which started with the holding in Benin in 1990 of the first of a series of national conferences to reform the political systems of Francophone African countries.[34]

In the economic sphere, the introduction of economic conditionality, the so-called 'Balladur doctrine', or 'Abidjan doctrine' (because the new policy was unveiled in the Ivoirian capital) was a further sign of profound change. Concerned about the rising cost to France of its African relationship, Prime Minister Balladur announced in September 1993 that the granting of French

public development aid would henceforth be conditional upon the prior signature of an accord with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. This was followed in January 1994 by the devaluation of the CFA franc by 50%.[35] Taken together, these two measures aimed to promote economic reform in France's former colonies, thereby reducing the cost to France of its African policy and making it more financially sustainable. A major reconfiguration of the Franco-African special relationship was underway.

The pressure for change increased further as a result of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Following the shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane in April 1994, his supporters were responsible for the killing of some 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the space of two months.[36] Having been the main external backer from 1990 to 1994 of the Habyarimana regime that prepared the genocide,[37] France was widely criticized for its failure both to see what was happening in the country and take measures to prevent it. France's response, in the aftermath of the genocide in June, was to seek United Nations support for a humanitarian mission to the country to protect refugees and establish, where possible, safe humanitarian areas. Operation Turquoise, as it was called, drew further criticism for two reasons. First, it was seen as an attempt to prop up the genocidal Hutu regime by providing many of the perpetrators of the genocide with a safe escape route into neighboring Zaire (now called the Democratic Republic of the Congo: DRC). Secondly, by deploying a second UN mission, Operation Turquoise, the French government was accused of undermining the mandate of the existing UN mission (UNAMIR) in the country.[38]

The Rwanda genocide and its aftermath marked a major turning point in French military policy in Africa. Since then, successive French governments have been careful to seek United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval for military operations on the continent. It was also following the Rwanda debacle that the idea of creating an African peacekeeping force emerged, driven on the one hand by the need to gain increased international acceptance and consolidate domestic support for France's military effort on the continent, and on the other by the desire to share the burden, both militarily and politically, of this effort. Moreover, after the much criticized Operation Turquoise, France initially showed far less willingness to intervene militarily on the continent and substantial reductions were made in the number of French troops stationed in Africa, with two bases in the CAR being closed in 1999. Thus, under pressure from external forces which it could not control, France was forced to undertake major changes in its Africa policy.

From Bilateralism to Multilateralism

In the immediate aftermath of decolonization, bilateral ties with the newly independent African countries of France's African *pré carré* were preferred. From the late 1990s, a multilateral approach was increasingly adopted and

France sought to engage with African countries outside the *pré carré*. Various initiatives were launched with this in mind. The so-called 'P3' initiative began in 1997. This was an informal grouping that brought the USA, Britain, and France together at the level of the UNSC to coordinate their positions and harmonize their peacekeeping capacity-building programs in Africa. In the following year, at the Anglo-French summit in Saint-Malo, the British and French governments announced their intention to set aside a century of rivalry and cooperate more closely on African issues.[39] Also in 1998, in an effort to reduce its deployment of troops in Africa, France introduced its Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) program to build African peacekeeping capacity. This represented a watershed in French policy, as it marked a move away from its traditional approach of direct, unilateral military intervention towards a policy of training and supporting Africans to peacekeep themselves. At the same time, there was a recognition that France needed to engage beyond its traditional *pré carré* if it were to address security concerns effectively on the continent: Liberia, where ongoing instability threatened to affect neighboring countries that were part of France's *pré carré*, was an important object lesson in this respect. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001 further reinforced the converging focus on security issues between France, Britain, and the USA, as Africa now emerged as a key arena of the 'war on terror'.

Two key principles underpinned France's Africa policy from the late 1990s: 'Africanization' and 'Europeanization'. Africanization was supposed to mean ensuring that any military intervention has been requested by the government of the country, that it had the prior approval of the relevant African regional body, and involved African forces taking the lead role. The Europeanization of Africa policy was defined in various ways. It could mean, for example, European Union (EU) member states, through the European External Action Service, sharing responsibility for the protection (and eventual evacuation) of EU citizens in Africa; it could mean Europeanizing the French military presence on the continent, thereby freeing up more French troops and resources for operations in Africa led by NATO or the UN[40]; or, less ambitiously, Europeanization was a means of avoiding the charge of neo-colonialism, insofar as an EU military operation would not have the same direct association with France and would thus be seen as more politically 'neutral'. Above all, from a French point of view, 'Europeanization', like 'Africanization', is about burden sharing: sharing the risks and costs, of military operations in Africa with other actors.

In addition to the factors already mentioned, another key driver of this change was pressure on public finances. Lacking the resources to continue to do everything it wanted to do in Africa, French governments sought to make alliances, to be integrated into UN or EU actions and to build coalitions in which France would play a lead role, so as to benefit from the 'multiplier of influence' effect.[41] Under Presidents Chirac (2002–2007) and

Sarkozy (2007–2012) there was an effort to Europeanize French military interventions in Africa. There were three French-inspired European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) military missions on African soil between 2003 and 2009: Operation Artemis in the DRC from June to September 2003; EUFOR, also in the DRC, from July to November 2006; and EUFOR Chad/CAR from January 2008 to March 2009. Also, President Sarkozy oversaw the Europeanization of the RECAMP program, which was renamed EURORECAMP in 2008.[42]

Within Africa, the move towards multilateralism has meant working increasingly with African regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). Thus, after the 2003 Marcoussis agreement was signed between the political forces involved in the Ivoirian conflict, a largely Francophone force was deployed under the auspices of ECOWAS in 2003–2004.[43] Meanwhile, the French intervention force (Licorne) remained under French command, with ECOWAS's blessing but without its formal approval, and played a key role in supporting the ECOWAS (subsequently UN) peacekeeping force in Ivory Coast.[44] This trend towards increased engagement with multilateral organizations continued under President Sarkozy. Thus, French intervention to support Ivoirian troops in arresting President Gbagbo, after he refused to step down following his defeat in the 2010 presidential election, was carried out with the blessing of ECOWAS and the AU.[45] There were, however, limits to this cooperation, as was seen when, under the auspices of NATO, the French and UK governments launched air strikes on Libya in 2011 despite the opposition of the AU to any form of military intervention.[46]

A New Partnership with Africa?

A recurring theme in French policy discourse on Africa in recent years has been the idea of partnership. Before his election as president, in a speech in Benin in 2006, Nicolas Sarkozy called for a new partnership with Africa, saying that Franco-African ties should 'not merely depend on the quality of the personal relations between heads of state' but should engage Africans 'as equal, responsible partners', supporting their efforts to build democracy and respect individual freedoms.[47] Similarly, prior to the 2012 presidential election, the Socialist Party's Africa specialist, Thomas Mélonio, published a pamphlet promising a 'modern' partnership with Africa, based on transparency and greater involvement of civil society and with a renewed emphasis on human rights and democracy.[48] The theme of partnership was taken up by Hollande after his election and placed at the center of his Africa policy. In a speech before the Senegalese National Assembly in Dakar in October 2012 he said: 'The time of *Françafrique* has passed. There is France and there is Africa. There is the partnership with relations based on respect, clarity and solidarity'.[49]

France has sought to portray itself, in particular, as a partner for peace and security in Africa. President Hollande announced in January 2013 that he was launching Operation Serval at the request of the Malian president to assist the country in fighting 'terrorist elements coming from the north,' to protect Malian sovereignty and 'the right of a population … to live in freedom and democracy'.[50] Serval finished in July 2014 and was followed by a new operation, Barkhane, launched in August 2014, whose theater of operations stretches across the whole of the Francophone Sahel/Sahara region, spanning five countries (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad; referred to on the French Ministry of Defense website as the 'G5 Sahel'). It comprised, in 2015, 3000 men, 200 supply vehicles, 200 armored carriers, 6 fighter planes, 20 helicopters, 7 transport planes, and 4 drones. The operation is similarly justified by reference to the need to support the armed forces of the participating countries in their interventions against armed terrorist groups and to help prevent the reestablishment of terrorist sanctuaries in the region.[51] However, while the policy discourse regarding Barkhane is very much one of partnership with, and support for, African forces, the reality is that the capacity of the armed forces of these countries (with the exception of Chad) to intervene outside their national territory is limited and the operation is very much dependent on French troops, materiel, logistics, and intelligence.

It should be noted that this discourse of partnership is not motivated only by security concerns. France has seen its share of the African market reduced by 50% in the last ten years. A priority for the Hollande Government was to reverse this downward trend and double French trade with Africa, creating over 200,000 jobs in France.[52] President Macron has also placed emphasis on improving economic links with Africa. However, if this is to be achieved, France will have to continue the major reorientation of its trade links away from its Francophone *pré carré* towards the big economic powers in Africa, such as Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola.

Conclusion

France's special relationship with Africa needs to be understood, first and foremost, in the context of the continuing importance attached to Africa in French foreign policy. Since the colonial period, Africa has been, and remains to this day, the foundation stone of France's ambition to remain a global power; outside Europe, it is *the* privileged arena for the projection of French power overseas. The various changes in French Africa policy, and the efforts to reconfigure Franco-African relations since the Second World War, need to be seen in this light.

The move away from exclusive, bilateral relations with (mainly Francophone) African states towards a multilateral approach was important, both in terms of reducing the cost of the French presence in Africa and addressing the accusation that France was behaving as a neo-colonial actor on the

continent. The 'Europeanization' and 'Africanization' of policy were the twin pillars of a new African policy that was supposed to provide the means to avoid such criticisms in future. They were also seen as a way of relegitimizing France's military role in Africa. Following widespread domestic and international criticism of its role in Rwanda, in the late 1990s French governments initially abandoned unilateral military actions that had earned France the reputation of being the 'gendarme' of Africa. However, in recent years, the fight against terrorism has provided a new legitimacy for French military actions on the continent. The French military's traditional focus on territorial defense has been redirected to meet new global challenges, in particular the 'war on terror'[53] and the promotion of peace and security in Africa. Under the Hollande Presidency. France apparently became less afraid of criticism of its role as a 'neo-colonial' actor in Africa, which in turn facilitated the move back to more unilateral interventions, as we saw in 2013 with the interventions in Mali and CAR. The discourse of partnership with Africa remains, but the reality is that the EU and African actors were reduced to essentially supporting roles under President Hollande. France's relations with Africa thus remain in many respects 'exceptional'.

Notes

1. "Africa" in this article refers to Sub-Saharan Africa. French relations with Algeria are the subject of a separate chapter in this volume by Natalya Vince.
2. M. Semakula Kiwanuka, "Colonial Policies and Administrations in Africa: The Myths of the Contrasts," *African Historical Studies* 3, no. 2 (1970): 295–315.
3. Gordon D. Cumming, "Transposing the 'Republican' Model? A Critical Appraisal of France's Historic Mission in Africa," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 23, no. 2 (2005): 233–52.
4. African troops subsequently played a significant role in the liberation of metropolitan France; see Tony Chafer, "Forgotten Soldiers," *History Today* 58, no. 11 (2008): 35–37.
5. The *indigénat* was the native civil code that, according to Gregory Mann, defined "the very status of 'native' on which colonial rule relied" and listed offenses that "by definition only 'natives' could commit." Gregory Mann, *From Empires to NGOs in the West African Sahel: The Road to Nongovernmentality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 44.
6. John D. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa*, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1996), 50.
7. Jacques Dalloz, *Textes sur la Décolonisation* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), 21.
8. Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa*: *France's Successful Decolonization?* (Oxford: Berg, 2002).
9. Anthony Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization* (London: Longman, 1994).
10. Jean-Pierre Dozon, *Frères et Sujets: la France et l'Afrique en Perspective* (Paris: Flammarion, 2003).

11. François-Xavier Verschave, *La Françafrique: le Plus Long Scandale de la République* (Paris: Stock, 1998).
12. Tony Chafer, "Education and Political Socialisation of a National-colonial Political Elite in French West Africa, 1936–47," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 35, no. 3 (2007): 437–58.
13. Chafer, *The End of Empire*, 145–46.
14. The Mali Federation comprised Senegal, and French Soudan. It was dissolved in August 1960.
15. Charles de Gaulle, "Senghor Speech," Federal Assembly of Mali, December 13, 1959, Archives de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, Dakar, Series Fédération du Mali, File No. FM00018.
16. Article 78, Constitution of the Fifth Republic, in Dalloz, *Textes*, 77–78. See also Tony Chafer, "Senegal," in *Exit Strategies and State Building*, ed. Richard Caplan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 48–51.
17. There were many examples of this throughout former French West and Equatorial Africa. One of the best known was former French colonial administrator Jean Collin, who became a government advisor in Senegal after independence and occupied the posts of finance and later interior minister. Yves Gounin, *La France en Afrique* (Brussels: Editions De Boeck, 2009), 24.
18. Gordon D. Cumming, *Aid to Africa* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 60.
19. Jean-Pierre Bat, *Le Syndrome Foccart* (Paris: Gallimard, 2012), 425–42.
20. Jacques Amalric, "Une création de De Gaulle pour contrer l'Amérique," *Libération* (2003, 13 January), 3.
21. John Keiger, *France and the World since 1870* (London: Arnold, 2001), 18.
22. Samy Mesli, "French *Coopération* in the Field of Education (1960–1980): A Story of Disillusionment," in *Francophone Africa at Fifty*, ed. Tony Chafer, and Alexander Keese (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 124.
23. Gérard Bossuat, "French Development Aid, and Co-operation under De Gaulle," *Contemporary European History* 12, no. 4 (2003): 447.
24. Margaret A. Majumdar, "France in the World," in *The Routledge Handbook of French Politics and Culture*, ed. Aurélien Mondon, Marion Demossier, Nina Parish, and David Lees.
25. Despite their name, the *tirailleurs sénégalais* actually came from across French Sub-Saharan Africa, not just from Senegal.
26. Myron Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts. The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1991); and Marc Michel, *Les Africains et la Grande Guerre: l'appel à l'Afrique (1914–1918)* (Paris: Karthala, 2003).
27. "Une dette de sang", *Le Monde*, January 5, 2002.
28. Alain Rouvez, *Disconsolate Empires: French, British, and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), 18; and Camille Evrard, "Transfer of Military Power in Mauritania: from Ecouvillon to Lamantin (1958–1978)," in *Francophone Africa at Fifty*, ed. Tony Chafer, and Alexander Keese (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 100.
29. Robin Luckham, "French Militarism in Africa," *Review of African Political Economy* 9, no. 24 (1982): 55–84.

30. Tony Chafer, "Hollande and Africa Policy," *Modern and Contemporary France* 22, no. 4 (2014): 517; and Victor-Manuel Vallin, "France as the Gendarme of Africa, 1960–2014," *Political Science Quarterly* 130, no. 1 (2015): 79–101.
31. Jean-François Médard, "France-Africa: Within the Family," in *Democracy and Corruption in Europe*, ed. Donatella Della Porta, and Yves Mény (London: Pinter, 1997), 22–24.
32. Bat, *Le Syndrome Foccart.*
33. Tony Chafer, "Chirac and '*la Françafrique*': No Longer a Family Affair," *Modern and Contemporary France* 13, no. 1 (2005): 14–15; and Gounin, *La France en Afrique*, 41.
34. Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, *Les Conférences Nationales en Afrique Noire - une Affaire à Suivre* (Paris: Karthala, 2009).
35. Chafer, "Chirac and '*la Françafrique*,'" 14–15; Gounin, *La France en Afrique*, 44.
36. Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide* (London: Verso, 2006).
37. Daniela Kroslak, *The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide* (London: Hurst, 2007).
38. Bruno Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 140–41.
39. Tony Chafer, "Beyond Fashoda: Anglo-French Security Cooperation in Africa since St-Malo," *International Affairs* 86, no. 5 (2010): 1129–47.
40. Thomas Mélonio, *Quelle Politique Africaine pour la France en 2012?* (Paris: Fondation Jean Jaurès), 33–34.
41. Daniel Bourmaud, "From Unilateralism to Multilateralism: The Decline of French Power in Africa," in *From Rivalry to Partnership?: New Approaches to the Challenges of Africa*, ed. Tony Chafer, and Gordon Cumming (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 52.
42. Tony Chafer, "The AU: A New Arena for Anglo-French Cooperation in Africa?" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 1 (2010): 64.
43. Douglas A. Yates, "France, the EU, and Africa," in *The EU and Africa: from Eurafrique to Afro-Europa*, ed. Adekeye Adebajo, and Kaye Whiteman (London: Hurst, 2012), 336–37.
44. Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 165–66.
45. Tony Chafer, "The UK and France in West Africa: Towards Convergence?" *African Security* 6, no. 3–4 (2013): 246.
46. Thomas Alberts, "The African Union and Libya, on the Horns of a Dilemma," *African Arguments* (blog), November 2, 2011, http://africanarguments.org/2011/11/02/the-african-union-and-libya-on-the-horns-of-a-dilemma-by-thomas-alberts/.
47. Gounin, *La France en Afrique*, 70–72.
48. Mélonio, *Quelle Politique Africaine pour la France?*
49. Christophe Chatelot, "M. Hollande veut un 'partenariat' avec l'Afrique," *Le Monde*, October 14, 2012.
50. Stephen W. Smith, "In Search of Monsters," *London Review of Books* 35, no. 3 (2013): 3.

51. Ministry of Defense, *Opération Barkhane* (French Government, 2015) http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/sahel/dossier-de-presentation-de-l-operation-barkhane/operation-barkhane.
52. Marie Bezou, "La France appelle l'Afrique à prendre en charge sa sécurité," *Bulletin Quotidien*, December 8, 2013: 6; and Pierre Moscovici, "Mon objectif: doubler les flux commerciaux entre la France et l'Afrique," *Jeune Afrique*, no. 2760, 1–7 (2013): 82.
53. Yates, "France, the EU and Africa," 329–30.

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CHAPTER 33

Algeria and France: Beyond the Franco-Algerian Lens

Natalya Vince

The dominant metaphor used to describe relations between Algeria and France is that of a forced marriage which ended in a bitter separation, fraught with recrimination on both sides. Writing in 1991, Benjamin Stora, one of the leading historians of France and Algeria, argued:

> Franco-Algerian relations were forged in violence, by the imposition of the colonial system and by a seven-year war which enabled Algeria to acquire independence. This is why, thirty years later, time has not appeased passions … From 1962 onwards, the Mediterranean, whose name in Arabic, *al-bahr al-abyad al-mutawassat* means 'the white sea in the middle,' became a fracture line, an imaginary blue 'wall.' The violent divorce has unceasingly fed tensions, obsessions and fantasies from one shore to the other.[1]

This language of intimate enemies captures what is often depicted as the exceptionality of the Franco-Algerian relationship. In the context of France's African empire and subsequent Franco-African relations, this relationship is characterized on both sides of the Mediterranean and in much academic literature as both exceptionally close and exceptionally bad.

Yet while there were many distinctive features to the French colonial presence in Algeria (the form which decolonization took and post-independence relations), the case for exceptionalism has been overstated. This has resulted from the tendency to study Algeria solely through a French lens.

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For the colonial period, relatively little attention has been paid to Algeria's connections to other parts of the French empire in terms of people, policy, and intertwined chains of events. For the post-independence period, Algeria has continued to be predominantly viewed through the perspective of its relationship to France, and rarely located in broader African, Middle Eastern, or Third Worldist contexts.

Colonial Algeria: Three Departments of France, a Large Settler Population, Multiple Forms of French Citizenship

The 1830 invasion of Algiers, at the time under Ottoman rule, marked the beginning of three decades of military conquest. Algeria was thus neither part of France's 'first wave' of empire in the Americas from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, nor was it part of the 'second wave' of empire acquired by the French Third Republic (1870–1940) in West and Equatorial Africa, and in Tunisia and Morocco, during the late nineteenth-century 'Scramble'. Moreover, Algeria was neither a colony (as French possessions were in Sub-Saharan Africa) nor a protectorate (like Tunisia and Morocco). Instead, from 1848 onwards, Algeria was three departments of France: Oran, Algiers, and Constantine. The Sahara would remain under direct military control until it was turned into departments in 1957.

Algeria was also distinctive in the French empire because it had a large settler population. These settlers came not only from France, but also from Spain, Italy, Malta, Germany, and Switzerland. They were a heterogeneous group of political exiles, landless farmers, urban laborers, and large farming and business interests. In 1889, in a bid to shore up the Frenchness of 'French Algeria', all children of European settlers were automatically given French citizenship. This contrasted sharply with the citizenship status of the autochthonous population. A decree passed in 1865 declared that all 'Muslim natives' were French nationals, but barred them from benefiting from full French citizenship unless they renounced their Muslim personal status; that is to say, those aspects of Muslim family law which were considered at odds with the French civil code, such as polygamy, repudiation, and the right of parents to choose their child's spouse. Renouncing their personal status was considered an act of apostasy by most Muslims, and for the few thousand who did seek naturalization the colonial legal system put significant obstacles in their way. Thus, under the cloak of 'respect for tradition' and the supposed lack of Muslims' cultural readiness to embrace full French citizenship, the French state had found the means for a numerical minority to politically dominate the majority of the population. The 1865 law also applied to Algeria's autochthonous Jewish minority for five years (with their personal status being Jewish Mosaic Law). In 1870, the Crémieux Decree collectively accorded full citizenship to around 30,000 Jews in the three departments of Algeria. The

1891 census counted 530,924 'Europeans' (a category which now included the Jews of Algeria) for 3,577,000 'Muslims', a ratio of 1: 6.7. By 1954, however, the European presence of 984,000 could not keep pace with the Muslim population of 8,675,000 and this ratio was 1: 8.8.[2]

Connections and Parallels Across Empires: Settler Myths, Under-Administration, the *Indigénat*, Colonial Troops, and Anti-Colonial Campaigns

Settlers in Algeria sustained many of the same myths to justify their presence that white settlers did in other parts of Africa. Europeans credited themselves with having 'made the desert bloom' after centuries of supposed environmental mismanagement by the 'natives'.[3] The Tamazight-speaking (Berber) peoples of the region of Kabylia were depicted as a lost European Christian tribe, 'noble savages' more susceptible to being assimilated into French culture and becoming loyal colonial administrators than the Arabic-speaking majority.[4] Many settlers appropriated the label 'Algerian' (*Algérien*) for themselves, seeing their identity and culture as distinct from both that of metropolitan France and the autochthonous majority who were attributed a variety of labels, including 'natives' (*indigènes*), 'Muslims', and later 'French Muslims'.

For the colonized population of Algeria, the experience of colonialism had many similarities to that of peoples living under French rule south of the Sahara. Although the European presence in Algeria was far greater than in other parts of the empire, this presence was largely concentrated in Algeria's coastal cities. Vast swathes of Algerian territory had very little contact with the colonial administration or indeed anyone of European origin. In 1948, less than one in ten Muslim children aged between six and fourteen were in primary school (this increased to just under 17% by 1954) while all European children had access to education.[5] In 1954, there were only 1900 doctors in Algeria, equating to 5300 patients per doctor, most of whom were based in the major cities where the settlers lived.[6] As French nationals, not full citizens, Muslims were also subject to the *indigénat*: a series of laws and rules which applied only to the 'native' population. Codified in 1881, it proscribed a whole range of activities, such as organizing a meeting without a permit, leaving the territory without permission, and disrespecting figures of authority. First trialed in Algeria, versions of the *indigénat* were subsequently applied all over the French empire, before being repealed after the Second World War.

As ideas about how to 'run' empire circulated, so did the men used to conquer territory and enforce colonial rule. Louis Faidherbe is best known as the general and colonial administrator who vastly increased France's West African empire, but he had received his military training in Algeria, under the ruthless Marshall Thomas Robert Bugeaud. Regiments of colonized men also

moved across the empire. *Tirailleurs sénégalais* (literally, Senegalese riflemen, but including troops from across France's Sub-Saharan empire) participated in brutal massacres of local populations in Sétif, Guelma, and Kherrata (eastern Algeria) in the wake of anti-colonial demonstrations on May 8, 1945. Algerian 'French Muslims' went to fight in the French army in Indochina between 1946 and 1954. Tirailleurs sénégalais fought against the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN) during the War of Independence, as did some Algerian men, today commonly referred to as *harkis*.

In the first political movements to emerge in the interwar period to challenge colonial domination and discrimination, there were also connections across different parts of the French empire. When the French army conscripted colonized men during the First World War, politicians in Algeria and in Senegal's Four Communes seized on the occasion to demand, in return for the 'blood tax', citizenship rights for a much wider segment of the population. In 1916, Deputy Blaise Diagne successfully secured full citizenship for the black residents of Saint-Louis, Dakar, Gorée, and Rufisque, in return for his participation in the French army's recruitment campaigns. In Algeria, the Emir Khaled, a captain in the French army as well as being the grandson of the Emir Abdelkader who had led resistance against the French invasion in the 1830s and 1840s, also sought to link citizenship to conscription and lobby for an extension of full citizenship to more 'Muslims', but with less success.[7]

Migration to the metropole from across North Africa, Indochina, and Sub-Saharan Africa, of both intellectual elites and factory workers, meant that mainland France, and particularly Paris, became a hub for the emergence of critiques of colonial rule in the interwar years.[8] There was a greater degree of political freedom compared to the colonies, and the first nationalist movements found an early, although not sustained, source of support from the French Communist Party. In 1926, Messali Hadj created the first overtly nationalist organization, the Etoile Nord-Africaine (North African Star, ENA) in Paris. In 1927, Messali and other ENA members attended the conference of the League Against Imperialism in Brussels, alongside representatives from Senegal, Tunisia, Indonesia, the African National Congress (ANC), and the Syria-Palestinian Congress. Although the massacres of Sétif are described by some historians as the beginning of the War of Independence,[9] in post-Second World War Algeria, Algerian politicians such as Messali and Ferhat Abbas sought to participate in the political process like their counterparts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Abbas was a deputy in the First Constituent Assembly, which played a major role in shaping the French Union of the 1946 constitution, alongside Lamine Guèye, Léopold Sédar Senghor, and Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Members of both Messali and Abbas's post-Second World War political parties (respectively, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques [Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties, MTLD] and the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien

[Demoratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto, UDMA]) stood as candidates in local elections, although the blatant ballot rigging by colonial authorities left a bitter taste.

The Violent Algerian War vs Peaceful Decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa?

The main claim to difference between Algeria and France's Sub-Saharan African colonies (and indeed the protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco) is based on contrasting Algeria's anti-colonial war, in which independence was wrenched from a recalcitrant France, with the peaceful 'transfer of power' in the rest of France's African empire; although as Tony Chafer has highlighted, this 'successful decolonization' was less the result of careful planning on the part of the French and much more accidental and ad hoc.[10] Just months after the French government had extricated itself from Indochina after the army's humiliating defeat at Dien Bien Phu, on November 1, 1954, a newly formed organization called the FLN, frustrated with what it saw as the failings of previous anti-colonial movements to make progress, carried out a series of explosions, assassinations, and acts of sabotage across Algeria. The attacks were accompanied by a statement calling for 'The restoration of the sovereign, democratic, and social Algerian state, within the framework of Islamic Principles'.[11] The response of the French government was unequivocal; Algeria, senior politicians repeated, was France.

The conflict would drag on for another seven-and-a-half years. Some 1,400,000 French soldiers, the vast majority conscripts, were sent to Algeria. Around 25,000 of these men were killed, as were 4000–5000 European settlers and an estimated 15,000–30,000 *harkis*. Hundreds of thousands of Algerian combatants and civilians were killed; the official figure in Algeria is one and a half million martyrs; historians are more cautious in their estimations of between 350,000 and 400,000 Algerians killed.[12] The conflict wreaked economic devastation and brought about major social upheaval. Vast areas of the Algerian countryside were declared no-go zones and populations forcibly displaced. Bombing campaigns by the French army destroyed land and livelihoods. The 'Battle of Algiers' between autumn 1956 and autumn 1957 pitched the FLN's clandestine urban networks, which carried out bomb attacks and assassinations against military and civilian targets in the capital, against the might of the French army. Within a year, the army had largely dismantled the FLN's Algiers network. However, the methods which they had used to do so (systematic use of torture, assassination, forced 'disappearances') both reinforced divisions between 'Europeans' and 'Muslims' and undermined the Republic's claim to its 'civilizing mission'.

The ongoing conflict would bring down the Fourth Republic, as settlers and army generals in Algiers, unconvinced of the center-left government's resolve to hold on to Algeria, staged the beginnings of a coup in May 1958.

The Algerian crisis provided the conditions for the political comeback of General Charles de Gaulle, posited as the savior (once again) of France, and the creation of the Fifth Republic.

This was a war very much fought on the world stage with both sides producing extensive propaganda for global consumption and seeking to win supporters and international legitimacy through formal and informal diplomacy. The FLN sent delegates to the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in April 1955, which in turn issued a declaration of support for the rights of the peoples of North Africa to self-determination and independence. The FLN scored a major political victory in December 1960, when the United Nations General Assembly recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence.

The war was not a straightforward confrontation between the 'French' and the 'Algerians'. While the majority of the Algerian population had rallied to the FLN by 1956–1957, internecine conflict continued between supporters of the FLN and supporters of the rival Mouvement National Algérien (Algerian National Movement, MNA), created by Messali at the end of 1954. In addition, 200,000–400,000 Algerians (through ideological conviction, coercion, or economic necessity) served in the French army.[13] They would come to be known as *harkis*. In early 1961, the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (Secret Armed Organisation, OAS) was created, composed of hardline settlers and disillusioned members of the French army, to wage war against the French army, the FLN, and the wider Algerian civilian population.

A peace treaty, the Evian Accords, was finally signed between France and the FLN in March 1962. An immediate ceasefire was announced, political prisoners released, and a referendum planned on self-determination. The violence however, did not end. The OAS accelerated its assassinations and participated in a 'scorched earth' campaign to leave no functioning infrastructure behind. The European population of Algeria, fearing that their only choice in independent Algeria was 'the coffin or the suitcase' fled between spring and summer 1962, becoming 'repatriates' in a country most had never seen. Many *harkis* and their families also sought to escape, but the French state was much more reluctant to accommodate their arrival. Thousands were parked in camps in France; many others were left behind and became victims of reprisals, although others integrated back into their local communities. In summer 1962, the FLN imploded into its competing factions, with the army generals who had spent much of the war based in Tunisia and Morocco gaining the upper hand over both the combatants fighting on Algerian territory and the politicians who had participated in much of the FLN's peace negotiations and international diplomacy. By the start of autumn 1962, a single party state (under the banner of the party of the FLN) had taken shape.

The distinctiveness of Algeria in the context of the decolonization of France's African empire seems clear in a number of ways. First, the scale of the violence and the tortuous length of the conflict compared to other

colonies are undeniable. Second, the way in which FLN politicians appealed to and used the international context to press home their demands for total independence was, for Matthew Connelly, a 'diplomatic revolution', an example which would go on to inspire the African National Congress and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.[14] In this perspective, Algeria broke with the pattern of French decolonization in the rest of Africa and established a new road map. Less attention, however, has been paid to how decolonization in Algeria was, in other ways, similar in pattern and also intertwined in process to decolonization in the rest of the French empire.

The French response to nationalist demands and anti-colonial critiques across its African empire held a number of similarities. In Algeria, there was military repression on a massive scale, but this always went hand in hand with major reform programs. The logic driving this reform was much the same as in Sub-Saharan Africa ('decolonization through integration' [Chafer, this volume]), that is to say, applying the oft-proclaimed but rarely practiced Republican values of liberty, equality, and fraternity through according equal political rights and investing in economic and social development.[15] Between 1955 and 1958, Jacques Soustelle, as Governor General of Algeria, pushed forward with his idea of 'integration' and the creation of what he saw as a modern, inclusive Franco-Algerian nation. (Bitterly disappointed at the failure of this to come to fruition, he went on to join the OAS.) Extensive efforts were made to win over Muslim women, notably between 1957 and 1959, through a program of increasing access to schooling and health care, implementing voting rights and replacing the 'Muslim personal status' with the French civil code in matters of family law.[16] The Constantine Plan, launched by de Gaulle in October 1958, was an ambitious series of economic and social reforms, with the indisputably political aim of reducing the stark inequalities between the 'European' and 'Muslim' populations.

As in Sub-Saharan Africa, voters in Algeria were called to the polls in September 1958 to vote on the new Fifth Republic constitution and the creation of the 'French Community', with greater devolved powers passed over to the colonies. The population of Algeria voted for the constitution and for the Community by a large majority and with a fairly high turnout. Indeed, de Gaulle's ideal solution to the Algerian crisis at this point in the war would have been for Algeria to remain within the Community, alongside Senegal, Ivory Coast, Chad, and so forth. In a televised speech in September 1959, de Gaulle laid out three options for Algeria: total integration (which, unlike Soustelle, he viewed as neither feasible nor desirable), total independence (as Guinea had chosen in 1958, which in de Gaulle's view presented a grave danger for Algeria politically and economically), or (his preferred option) a federal relationship between a French-backed Algerian government, with interdependency in key areas such as the economy, education, defense, and foreign policy. The FLN was not prepared to accept interdependency, but this should not distract us from the fact that this was de Gaulle's preferred option,

which would have made France's 'decolonized' relations with Algeria closely resemble those which France established with its former Sub-Saharan African colonies. By 1960, as a 'Community' solution in Algeria came to be understood as politically impossible by senior French politicians, the all-consuming nature of the Algerian crisis sped up decolonization elsewhere, and all of France's Sub-Saharan African colonies became formally independent.

The Basis of Post-Independence Franco-Algerian Relations: Confrontation in Rhetoric, Cooperation in Practice, and a World of Connections

If the way in which decolonization took place shaped the basis of post-independence French-Sub-Saharan African relations (see Chafer, this volume), this was also true in the Algerian case. In the Sub-Saharan African case, French politicians and civil servants in the post-independence period engaged with interlocutors with whom they had long relationships and mutual understanding of their shared interests. In Algeria in the 1960s and 1970s, key politicians and foreign policy actors were not career diplomats or civil servants but war veterans with 'revolutionary experience'.[17] Algerian statesmen unequivocally positioned their newly independent country as part of the Arab and Muslim world, while at the same time building relations with the Eastern Bloc. Algeria also saw itself as a leader of the wider Third Worldist movement, pioneering a 'third way' between capitalist exploitation and the more oppressive aspects of communism. Algeria proudly hosted the 1969 Pan-African Festival in Algiers, as well as providing a haven and training ground for anti-colonial activists and revolutionaries from around the world.[18] While nourishing these transnational connections, Algeria maintained a principle of neither allowing other countries to meddle in its affairs, nor meddling in the affairs of other countries, and a marked preference for bilateral, as opposed to multilateral, relations.

France, meanwhile, its colonies gone, threw itself into achieving that Gaullist buzzword 'greatness' through other means. The commonly held idea that France 'replaced' empire with a leading role in European construction requires nuance, however; the two were not mutually exclusive. As an integral part of French territory, Algeria was part of France's European Economic Community (EEC) negotiations, and indeed part of the EEC between 1957 and 1962. After independences, de Gaulle sought to reinvent himself as a decolonizer and France as a friend (and leader) of the 'Third World', not least to counteract the negative impact of the Algerian War on France's international standing, notably in the eyes of newly independent countries. This meant that *coopération* (technical and educational cooperation) was not only more necessary than ever, it also needed to be exemplary.[19] In short, how France and Algeria positioned themselves in relation to each other was important in constructing their future away from each other.

The Evian Accords of March 1962 put in place a road map for future relations in key areas such as nationality and citizenship, property ownership, *coopération*, financial investment, shared control of petrol exploitation, nuclear testing, and military bases. Apart from nuclear testing (which continued in the Sahara until 1967, with devastating results for the health and livelihoods of local populations) and the French military bases (which remained until the end of their rental periods), many of the agreements contained in the Evian Accords were rapidly rendered a dead letter by both events and subsequent political decisions. The guarantee of property rights for Europeans became obsolete in spring and summer 1962 as the majority of Europeans left and their vacant homes and properties were spontaneously occupied by Algerian families, many of whom were rural to urban migrants who had been made homeless by the war. In the following years, land and industry would be nationalized. The Evian Accords had allowed for European settlers to choose Algerian nationality within three years, as long as they fulfilled certain residence clauses. However, in March 1963, the Nationality Code stated that only those whose father and grandfather had been born in Algeria under the (colonial) 'Muslim personal status' were automatically Algerian.

While the French state and French economic interests were desperate to maintain a major stake in petrol exploitation in the Sahara (and saw this as their 'right' as a result of their initial financial outlay in discovering petrol), the Algerian political discourse was one of economic, as well as political, independence. The Algerian state rapidly sought to bring the technical knowledge associated with petrol discovery and extraction and the wealth it generated under greater Algerian control. In 1971, President Houari Boumediène (who had seized power in a coup in June 1965) unilaterally nationalized Algerian petrol. 'If we were to analyze Algerian petrol', he declared in one speech, 'We would discover that the blood of our martyrs makes up one of its components because the possession of this wealth was paid for in our blood'.[20] This emotive political discourse (and sincere desire to bring Algerian resources under Algerian control) found an echo in popular culture. While the French singer Michel Sardou penned 'Ils ont le pétrole, mais c'est tout' (They've got petrol, but that's it), vaunting France's 'Latin paradise' in retaliation against Algerian nationalization, Algerian singer Rabah Driassa sang his own hit 'Petrol' in which nationalization was depicted as the continuation of the liberation struggle. Nevertheless, economic relations were maintained. Thousands of *coopérants* traveled to Algeria, including as government advisors whose technical expertise shaped Algeria's nominally socialist economy. Until 2014, when it was overtaken by China, France was Algeria's main trading partner.

Much of the political rhetoric of independent Algeria was about cultural decolonization. Algeria, successive presidents of Algeria repeated, was Arab, Muslim, and Arabic-speaking. Unlike in Sub-Saharan Africa, where French was maintained as the official language, Arabic was immediately made Algeria's sole official language. In the course of the next decades, Arabicization

laws were steadily introduced across education, the judiciary, and other state institutions. While Léopold Sedar Senghor, first president of Senegal, and Habib Bourguiba, first president of Tunisia, among others, embraced ideas about 'Francophonie' (a community of French speakers with shared humanist values), Algeria kept its distance. Algeria refused to become a member of the Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique (Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation, ACCT) established in 1970, and its successor, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (International Organisation of Francophonie, OIF), despite having one of the largest French-speaking populations in the world. Indeed, Algerian authors writing in French have made a major contribution to Francophone literature, with writer Kateb Yacine famously describing the French language as a 'war booty' ('*butin de guerre*').

Up until the 1980s, the Algerian government was considered by the French government to be the main actor in the organization and control of the large numbers of Algerians who migrated to France after 1962, seeking to escape economic misery which was not quickly resolved by independence. Both states viewed migration as a temporary phenomenon. The Friendly Society for Algerians in Europe (Amicale des Algériens en Europe, AAE) took the form of 'a true ministry for emigration' ('*un veritable ministère de l'émigration*'),[21] collecting subscriptions from Algerians for repatriation insurance in case of death on French soil, bringing imams to France, organizing Arabic lessons and concerts, and training youth workers. The Amicale represented the interests of the FLN and sought to extend their control over Algerian immigrants, conscious that France, both during and after the war, was a space for Algerian political movements challenging the hegemony of the FLN. Indeed, in 1965, the French authorities connived in suppressing Amicale dissent in France in the wake of Boumediène's coup.[22]

By the early 1980s, the Algerian state was in a far weaker position to negotiate its place in the world. In the context of falling oil prices, and in need of financial assistance, under President Chadli Benjedid (1979–1992), Algeria moved away from its state-led socialist economy towards economic liberalization, and Algerian debt was rescheduled within the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) structural readjustment program. The crisis of the 1980s in Algeria was political as well as economic. As elsewhere in North Africa and the Middle East, Islamism was rapidly gaining ground in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Large sections of a new, post-independence generation had a burning sense of injustice at being excluded from the political system and the employment market. In October 1988, youth riots took place across Algeria. In February 1989, the introduction of political pluralism brought to an end twenty-seven years of single-party rule. The political party which gained the most from this was the Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, FIS). In December 1991, the FIS scored a landslide victory in the first round of legislative elections. In January 1992, the Algerian army

stepped into prevent a second-round victory for the FIS. Chadli resigned, the National Assembly was dissolved and a state of emergency declared. A decade of violence pitching the forces of the Algerian state against armed Islamists ensued, during which many civilians found themselves caught in the crossfire. An estimated 200,000 Algerians were killed.[23] The conflict also 'spilled over' into France, for example, in the Saint Michel metro bombing in 1995.

During this period, Franco-Algerian relations underwent a significant shift. No longer primarily state-to-state and predicated on competing claims to be leaders on the world stage, the fight to crush what was perceived to be a shared threat (Islamist terrorism) led to an opaque imbrication of Algerian and French secret services and senior politicians, with France becoming the privileged interpreter of what was going on in Algeria for the rest of the world. For Hugh Roberts, 'Paris's relations with Algiers degenerated into the French government's involvement with the *personnel* of the Algerian regime', which in turn generated a 'complex and unsavory system of patronage, reciprocal back-scratching and corruption'.[24] The system of elite imbrication and dodgy deals across the Mediterranean at the expense of the 'ordinary' people is sometimes referred to using the pejorative term Françalgérie, an adaptation of Françafrique.[25]

The Impact of the 1990s: A Franco-Algerian Lens Locked in Place by Transnational Memory Frames and Political Expediency

In the 1990s, the way in which Franco-Algerian relations came to be understood was shaped by the coalescence of the civil violence raging in Algeria, developments in the academic field of memory studies, and the turn to legalistic strategies to seek historical redress by memory activists. The language used to talk about how states, societies, and individuals have addressed (or not) the Holocaust (terms and concepts such as amnesia, repressed memory, trauma, unhealed wounds, recognition, and repentance) began to be applied to colonial contexts. Stora's evocatively titled *La Gangrène et l'oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991) established the framework for much future work on France and Algeria. In 1997–1998, Maurice Papon was found guilty of crimes against humanity for his role in the deportation of Jews between 1942 and 1944. The Papon trial also flagged up to the French public his role as Paris chief of police in the deadly repression of Algerians participating in a peaceful demonstration in the French capital on October 17, 1961, protesting against the wartime curfew imposed on them.

In part because of the wide-ranging amnesties put in place at the end of the War of Independence to protect civilian and military personnel from being prosecuted for illegal acts committed during the conflict, memory activists on both sides of the Mediterranean and from a wide range of political positions during the war (from OAS to FLN) have sought to bring court

cases for crimes which are not covered by the amnesties, albeit with little success. Associations of former settlers have demanded that the French state recognize its responsibility for having 'abandoned' French civilians to their fate in the months between the Evian Accords and formal independence in July 1962, while harki memory activists use the language of 'crimes against humanity' to frame their experiences. In 2002, General Paul Aussaresses and the publishers of his 2001 memoirs were found guilty of 'apology for war crimes', for stating that he had used torture during the war, and would do so again. In 2003, Louisette Ighilahriz, a former member of the FLN bomb network who was brutally tortured and raped during the war, took French army General Maurice Schmitt to court for libel when he accused her of fabricating her account.

The law of February 23, 2005, whose Article four declared that the French school curriculum should recognize 'the positive role of the French overseas presence, notably in North Africa', prompted a sustained campaign by French and Algerian historians against state interference in the writing of history. It also led to a brief attempt in 2010 by a group of Algerian deputies to pass a law declaring colonialism a crime against humanity; the Algerian government had little appetite for this and the idea was quietly dropped. Indeed, senior politicians in Algeria and France studiously shied away from taking a position on the February 23, 2005 law, although it is widely seen as having dashed a planned 'Friendship Treaty' between Algeria and France. Article four was revoked by President Jacques Chirac (1995–2007) in January 2006, when he described it as a text that 'divides the French'.

Indeed, these debates (often referred to as 'Franco-Algerian memory wars') are in many cases less Franco-Algerian than they initially seem. First, both in the political language used and the legal strategies employed, they are part of transnational debates which go far beyond the Franco-Algerian relationship. The February 23, 2005 law, for example, is part of a wider pattern of memorial laws in France, including the Taubira Law, which recognized slavery as a crime against humanity, and the law criminalizing Armenian genocide denial, both passed in 2001.

Second, these 'memory wars' are often closely tied to Algero-Algerian or Franco-French national, local, and regional politics, and the ensuing debates do not always find an echo on the other side of the Mediterranean. The February 23, 2005 law initially attracted very little media attention. Few deputies and senators participated in its various readings as it made its way through the French legislature, and those who supported it were, broadly speaking, a cross-party group from the South of France, where the former settler or *harki* voters are based. At the same time, at the national level, taking a particular view on France's colonial legacies has become a means for French politicians to position themselves. On the far right, nostalgia for the colonial period is a common theme, flying in the face of the far right's simultaneous insistence on the 'inassimilable' nature of immigrants and its hatred of multi-ethnic,

multicultural contemporary France. On the right, President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012) has been a loud supporter of the 'refusal of repentance' ('*refus de la repentance*'), that is to say, the claim that reexamining the colonial past equates to national self-hatred and the decline of Frenchness. On the left (despite the fact that the Republican center-left historically constituted the most enthusiastic supporters of the 'civilizing mission' and that it was a center-left government that escalated the war in Algeria in 1956), confronting the colonial past and making carefully worded apologies is a way of demonstrating a vision of France as open, diverse, and united. François Hollande's first official engagement as the Socialist Party's (PS) presidential candidate on October 17, 2011 was to throw a rose (the symbol of the PS) into the Seine, in memory of the Algerians who died there on October 17, 1961.

In Algeria, meanwhile, borrowing from the language of the anti-colonial struggle has become a means to contest the political system in place. Since 1962, the war has been both the foundational block of Algerian national identity and the key source of legitimacy for the political establishment ('the system'). In his 1999 election campaign and subsequently, Abdelaziz Bouteflika (president 1999–present) played on his veteran status. Critics of 'the system' also use the language of the war to claim that those who took power in 1962 were not 'true' veterans. Some liberal, secular critics argue that the post-1962 insistence by the state and the party of the FLN on Islam and Arabic effaced a much longer nationalist tradition of political and cultural plurality. Other critics, more sympathetic to Islamist ideas, argue that the process of cultural decolonization begun during the war has not yet been completed, and that Algerian identity needs to become more Muslim and Arabophone. In both the French and Algerian cases, 'memory wars' are moving farther and farther away from the colonial past. Instead, this past has been boiled down to a series of key words, increasingly emptied of the historical substance linking back to a shared Franco-Algerian past, which provide instantly accessible political languages to debate the French *or* Algerian presents.

Conclusion: Changing the Lens

Franco-Algerian state-to-state relations today may best be characterized as noisy, sometimes confrontational rhetoric accompanied by quiet, pragmatic collaboration. The idea that Franco-Algerian relations are 'exceptional' is a mythologized, if not entirely mythological, claim. The mythologizing contrast between, on the one hand, Franco-Algerian relations, and on the other hand, relations between other former colonial powers and their former colonies, is sustained by two states both with very strong national myths. In France, the idea that Algeria was the exception which proved the rule of France's 'successful' decolonization, chosen and driven by France, with France always the center and the principal actor, persists. In Algeria, the idea that the Algerian people led a unique struggle to overthrow colonial

oppression, at the cost of the lives of 1.5 million martyrs is sacrosanct. Both countries see themselves as bearers of a distinct model with a special place in the world. The frame of national exceptionalism, and its corollary, exceptional Franco-Algerian relations, provides a potent political language which has permeated wider culture. Yet rather than being locked in a suffocating embrace, Franco-Algerian relations have always existed and functioned in wider contexts. For the colonial period, a number of academics have now produced work which steps beyond the Franco-Algerian binary. The work on post-independence Algerian history which goes beyond Algeria's relationship with France is only just beginning to be done.[26] This work is nevertheless essential in order to avoid what Frederick Cooper has termed the fallacy of 'leap-frogging legacies',[27] whereby postcolonial states and societies are reduced to being permanently viewed through the lens of the former colonial power.

Notes

1. Benjamin Stora, *La Gangrène et l'oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991), 317. "Les rapports franco-algériens se sont noués dans la violence, par l'imposition du système colonial, et par une guerre de sept ans qui a permis l'accession de l'Algérie à l'indépendance. Voilà pourquoi, trente ans après, le temps n'a pas pu apaiser les passions … Dès 1962, la Méditerranée, dont le nom arabe, *[A]l [b]ahr [al-abyad] al moutawassat*, signifie 'la mer blanche du milieu,' est devenue ligne de fracture, 'mur' bleu imaginaire. Le divorce, violent, n'a cessé de nourrir tensions, obsessions, fantasmes d'une rive à l'autre."
2. Dominique Maison, "La Population de l'Algérie," *Population* 28, no. 6 (1973): 1080–82.
3. Diana Davis, "Desert 'Wastes' of the Maghreb: Desertification Narratives in French Colonial Environmental History of North Africa," *Cultural Geographies* 11, no. 4 (2004): 359–87.
4. Patricia Lorcin, *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995).
5. Kamel Kateb, *Ecole, population et société en Algérie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005), 27–28.
6. Jennifer Johnson, *The Battle for Algeria: Sovereignty, Healthcare, and Humanitarianism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 66.
7. Saliha Belmessous, *Assimilation and Empire: Uniformity in French and British Colonies, 1541–1954* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 161–64.
8. Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
9. For example, the former member of the FLN and leading Algerian historian Mohamed Harbi, "La guerre d'Algérie a commencé à Sétif," *Le Monde diplomatique*, May 2005.
10. Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa*: *France's Successful Decolonization?* (Oxford: Berg, 2002).
11. Todd Shepard, *Voices of Decolonization: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston: Bedford/St Martin's, 2015), 96–100.

12. Benjamin Stora, *Les mots de la guerre d'Algérie* (Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 2005), 23–25.
13. François-Xavier Hautreux, "Quelques pistes pour une meilleure compréhension de l'engagement des harkis (1954–1962)," *Les Temps Modernes* 666 (2011): 44–52.
14. Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 5.
15. Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
16. Neil Macmaster, *Burning the Veil: The Algerian War and the "Emancipation" Of Muslim Women, 1954–62* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).
17. Amine Ait Chaalal, "La politique étrangère de l'Algérie: entre héritage et originalité," in *La politique étrangère: le modèle classique à l'épreuve*, ed. Claude Roosens, and Valérie Rosoux (Belgium: PIE-Peter Lang, 2004), 206.
18. Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization and the Third World Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
19. Jean-François Daguzan, "Les Relations franco-algériennes ou la poursuite des amicales incompréhensions," *Annuaire français des relations internationales* 2 (2000): 438–50.
20. Nicole Grimaud, "Le Conflit pétrolier franco-algérien," *Revue française de science politique* 22, no. 6 (1972): 1276–307. "S'il nous était donné d'analyser le pétrole algérien, nous découvririons que le sang de nos martyrs constitue l'une de ses composantes car la possession de cette richesse a été payée du prix de notre sang." Boumediène speaking in Skikda on July 16, 1970.
21. Jean-Charles Scagnetti, "Pays d'origine et encadrement des pratiques religieuses: l'Algérie et ses émigrés (1962–1988)," *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 78 (2009): 177–202.
22. Ed Naylor, "The Politics of a Presence: Algerians in Marseille from Independence to 'immigration sauvage' (1962–1974)" (PhD diss., University of London, 2011), 190–93.
23. Martin Evans, and John Phillips, *Algeria: The Anger of the Dispossessed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), xiv. Like the statistic of "one and a half million martyrs" killed during the War of Independence, the figure of 200,000 killed during the "black decade" is increasingly challenged by academics and civil society activists. Nazim Mekbel, founder of the association Ajouad Algérie Mémoires, which campaigns for the recognition of victims of terrorism, and author of an MA dissertation on the subject, puts forward the figure of 40,000–70,000 killed, drawing on a wide variety of sources and a decade-long study. Ameyar Hafida, "La Société ne peut pas se contenter de lois d'amnésie et d'amnistie," *Liberté*, October 18, 2016.
24. Hugh Roberts, *The Battlefield Algeria 1988–2002: Studies in a Broken Polity* (London: Verso, 2003), 307.
25. Lounis Aggoun, and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire, *Françalgérie: Crimes et mensonges d'Etat* (Paris: La Découverte, 2004).
26. As Malika Rahal underlines, "in contemporary Algeria, it seems no history is possible after the War of Independence." Malika Rahal, "Comment faire l'histoire de l'Algérie indépendante?," *La vie des idées*, March 13, 2012. See

her trilingual blog http://texturesdutemps.hypotheses.org as a starting point for collaboratively writing the post-1962 history of Algeria.

27. Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 17–18.

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CHAPTER 34

China and Africa

Joshua Eisenman and David H. Shinn

Historical Overview

In the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing's primary motivation in Africa was the affirmation of its own brand of communism and support for revolutionary movements. In the 1970s, following the most tumultuous period of Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution and the deepening of the Sino-Soviet split, an increasingly pragmatic leadership sought to secure China's borders by keeping Soviet resources bogged down in distant conflicts. In the 1980s and 1990s, China's attention to Africa receded as the country turned inward and devoted more attention to relations with the West. Since the turn of the millennium, however, to support China's growing economy, China has developed extensive commercial, diplomatic, and political ties with Africa.

The 1955 Asian–African conference at Bandung, Indonesia, marked an important watershed in China's relations with Africa.[1] Premier Zhou Enlai, who led the Chinese delegation, interacted for the first time with delegations from six African countries: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, and soon-to-be independent Sudan and Ghana.[2] The Bandung Conference marked a change in China's relations with Africa. The Chinese developed a good relationship with the Egyptians and met with representatives of several African liberation movements. Bandung provided a forum for China to condemn colonialism

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and imperialism in Africa, and to support independence movements in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and Egypt's claim to the Suez Canal.[3]

Building on its success at Bandung, China expanded its engagement with the Afro-Asian world in an effort to mold its thinking and actions in accordance with Chinese ideology. The USSR, which had not been invited to the conference, and its supporters resisted this effort. China sent a delegation to the first Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization Conference in Cairo, which began in late 1957, and took note of Africans' growing role in the movement. Before the conference opened, Beijing held a rally to support several African national liberation movements and afterward acknowledged the growing importance of Africa in world politics.[4]

During this period China portrayed itself as shepherding a flock of African nations moving toward a 'new democratic revolution'. At the Moscow Summit of Communist Parties in November 1960, China's state-run press reported that African revolutionaries were 'studying Mao's works and using Chinese guerilla methods'.[5] Premier Zhou Enlai nurtured the idea that Africa was engulfed in revolutionary zeal and that Soviet revisionists had betrayed the ideals of revolutionary communism. Some African leaders had indeed become steeped in Maoist revolutionary thought and liberation ideology.[6]

Zhou's historic ten-country visit to Africa at the end of 1963 and beginning of 1964 began China's emphasis on the importance of regular, senior, face-to-face contact with African leaders—a practice that continues today.[7] In Africa, Zhou unveiled five principles to guide China–Africa relations: opposition to imperialism and colonialism, non-alignment, African-Arab unity, peaceful resolution of disputes, and national sovereignty. These principles are sufficiently general that they have withstood the test of time, yet China has not always adhered to them. Chinese support in the 1960s for several African revolutionary movements committed to the overthrow of independent governments violated them.[8] Nevertheless, the principles continue to be quoted by Chinese officials and scholars, and were updated and expanded in China's 2006 African policy statement.[9]

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969), the Communist Party of China (CPC) brought African policy to the Chinese people via the state-run press. To reinforce domestic support and publicize its conviction, CPC propaganda promoted what Mao called 'righteous struggle' in Africa. This meant supporting Mao-style revolutionary mass movements as an extension of China's own unfinished revolution.[10] By citing Africa as proof of the widespread appeal of Mao Zedong's thinking, China aimed to highlight Maoist ideology's broad appeal and establish its position as the vanguard of global proletarian revolutionary orthodoxy.

Beijing aided many African revolutionary forces fighting a guerrilla war by hastening 'the development of [African] political opposition groups and guiding them towards conceptions of action closely akin to her own'.[11] Speeches, editorials, and publications condemned vestiges of Western

colonialism and stressed the role of Maoist ideology and the scope of armed struggles.[12] By asserting that conflicts in Algeria, Cameroon, the Congo, Uganda, and elsewhere were proletarian revolutions, China showcased its influence. Calls for armed struggle and the export of small arms cost little, so Beijing supported revolutionary groups with zealous rhetoric and modest materiel support.[13]

China's willingness to place geopolitical objectives before ideological consistency grew apace with the Soviet threat. In 1969, roughly 400,000 Soviet troops equipped with battlefield nuclear weapons appeared on China's border. While the Soviets never attacked, the threat prompted Beijing to devise a strategy to cope with the threat. Although Beijing advocated a dual-adversary approach directed against both the USA and USSR, in practice the latter was prioritized.[14] China sought to preoccupy Soviet forces in far-off conflicts, particularly in Africa.[15] The CPC supported revolutionary movements that fought against 'imperialist forces', a term synonymous with groups supported by Moscow. This shift from dogmatism to pragmatism was catalyzed by widespread cynicism as the Cultural Revolution's worst days subsided. This less radical approach succeeded in 1971 when twenty six African countries supported Beijing's successful effort to replace Taipei on the UN Security Council. In the 1970s, China initiated a strategy that prioritized national-security interests and was predicated on state-to-state relations, themes that continue today.[16]

Throughout the 1970s, the CPC's pragmatists gradually gained power. Although Mao had already been enshrined as 'the great leader of the international proletariat and the oppressed nations and the oppressed people', his followers had suffered a crisis of conscience.[17] Maoism had failed to fulfill its promise as a panacea for society's ills. Free from the need to insist all rebel movements were Maoist, and desperately poor, China began promoting African self-reliance. Beijing became willing 'to grant ideological autonomy, and when African countries seemed to embark on a policy closely akin to Chinese thinking, Peking refrained from claiming that the Africans were following a Maoist path'.[18] China increased state-to-state relations and put most leftist radicals on notice that they could not expect much support.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, changes in China's domestic landscape diverted attention from Africa. By the time the pragmatists had wrested power from the residual Maoists, widespread rural poverty and urban disenchantment required a reorientation of priorities. Led by Deng Xiaoping, China's leadership focused on expanding market forces in the economy. Chinese people were told to get rich, leading many to turn to trade with the West to make their fortunes. Economic reforms, a receding Soviet threat, and the waning role of revolutionary ideology diverted Chinese attention from Africa. It was not until the nation's need for raw materials and support on diplomatic issues (e.g. repeated Western attempts to condemn China's human-rights abuses in the UN in the 1990s) that Beijing turned back to Africa via

the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) framework initiated by President Jiang Zemin in 2000.[19] Throughout the twenty-first century, China has emphasized its economic ties with Africa but never lost sight of its political and security interests.

China's Interests in Africa

China has become, in the words of Zimbabwe's strongman Robert Mugabe, 'an alternative global power point' in Africa.[20] Beijing has designed a strategy in Africa to ensure access to energy and other natural resources, open new export markets, safeguard its interests in international institutions, and gain external validation for its socialist political ideology. In pursuit of these objectives, Beijing has shown little regard for the financial or humanitarian constraints that give pause to leaders in liberal democratic societies.

China has five primary interests on the continent, the first of which is access to raw materials. In 2009, China became Africa's largest trading partner, surpassing the USA. About 85% of China's imports from Africa are raw materials, mainly oil, minerals, and hardwood timber. Five oil/mineral exporting nations (South Africa, Angola, DRC, South Sudan, and Zambia) account for most of Africa's exports to China. While China's imported oil from Africa as a percentage of global oil imports fell from 28% in 2008 to 22% in 2014, the total volume imported from Africa has remained about the same. China also imports large quantities of minerals such as cobalt, copper, manganese, and tantalum to supply China's robust manufacturing and construction sectors. Beginning in mid-2014, the fall in oil and commodity prices resulted in a sharp reduction by dollar value of China's imports from Africa, declining from $115 billion in 2014 to $55 billion in 2015. Previous dollar values are likely to return if the global economy improves and prices recover.

Second, China wants to increase its exports to Africa, which has more than 1 billion people and a growing middle class with increasing expendable income. Most Chinese exports to Africa are consumer products or high-value manufactured goods such as transport equipment, machinery, and electronic products. From 2014 to 2015, even as the value of China's imports from Africa dropped sharply, the value of China's exports to Africa increased slightly. China's most important African markets are South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, and Angola. Still, Africa accounts for only about 5% of China's global exports; China, by contrast, supplies about 19% of all African imports.[21]

Third, China seeks African support in international forums on various global issues ranging from climate change to trade disputes in the World Trade Organization. African countries constitute more than one quarter of the members of the UN General Assembly and hold thirteen of the forty-seven seats on the UN Human Rights Council.[22] Beijing uses its seat on the

Security Council to support the positions of African countries, and they, in return, support China when it faces Western criticisms for its human-rights practices. China seeks African support on three additional internal issues: first, backing for China's position on Tibet, which has attracted little interest in Africa, except when the South African government turned down the Dalai Lama's visa request; second, rhetorical opposition to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a Muslim separatist group of militant Uighurs in Xinjiang Province; third, and most recent, China has solicited African leaders' support for its territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. Although this issue is geographically far from Africa, African leaders have provided substantial support for China's position.[23]

Fourth, China is committed to ending Taiwan's diplomatic presence in Africa. From the late 1950s until 2008 there was intense competition between Beijing and Taipei for recognition by African countries. In the early years, Taipei maintained diplomatic relations with numerous African countries but over time Beijing has successfully pushed Taipei's diplomats out of all but Burkina Faso and Swaziland. Following the election in 2008 of the more Beijing-friendly Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's president, the two sides agreed upon an unofficial diplomatic truce that temporarily stopped their rivalry for recognition. Taiwan's election of the more independence-minded Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 ended the truce and China quickly established diplomatic relations with The Gambia, which had broken ties with Taiwan in 2013.[24] São Tomé and Principe switched from Taipei to Beijing late in 2016. Although the competition for diplomatic recognition is largely over in Africa, Taiwan's status remains among China's core interests.

Fifth, China wants to minimize illicit activities including terrorism, international crime, narcotics trafficking, and piracy so they do not harm Chinese in Africa or the homeland. Chinese nationals, who number between one and two million in Africa, are increasingly subject to attacks. More than twenty Chinese nationals have been kidnapped in Nigeria by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. Rebel groups in Sudan have attacked Chinese oilfields and kidnapped Chinese personnel near Darfur, resulting in several deaths. Nine Chinese employees of a Sinopec subsidiary died in Ethiopia's Ogaden region when they were caught in the crossfire between Ethiopian security personnel and a rebel group. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, citing China's crackdown on Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang, attacked Chinese highway construction workers in Algeria. Boko Haram kidnapped ten Chinese construction workers in northern Cameroon and three Chinese nationals were among eighteen killed when Muslim militants stormed a hotel in Bamako, Mali. During the height of Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden, Chinese crews and vessels came under attack, prompting China to join the international anti-piracy operation. The overthrow in 2011 of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya resulted in the evacuation of almost 36,000 Chinese working on contracts valued at $20 billion. Dozens of Chinese were injured when Libyans

looted their work sites. China has also arrested a number of Africans in China for engaging in narcotics trafficking, and had Chinese deported for engaging in fraudulent online activities.

China's Engagement with Africa

China prioritizes its engagement with African states, and its high-level leaders make frequent visits. Beijing has diplomatic relations with fifty-two African countries and maintains an embassy in all of them; all but The Gambia and São Tomé and Principe have an embassy in Beijing. Former President Hu Jintao visited Africa four times, and President Xi Jinping made his first overseas visit to Russia followed immediately by a trip to Africa. Xi returned in 2015 to attend the Sixth FOCAC summit in Johannesburg. Every year since 1991, China's foreign minister has made his first overseas visit to Africa, usually in January. Senior CPC and People's Liberation Army (PLA) personnel also make regular visits to Africa. The CPC has developed strong ties with African ruling political parties in countries such as Ethiopia, Angola, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. China annually hosts hundreds of senior African government, party, and military officials.

China created FOCAC in 2000 to coordinate its interaction with individual African countries. FOCAC was designed to help Beijing regularize its diplomatic initiatives, technical training, infrastructure financing and construction, and aid and trade policies. FOCAC institutionalizes China's outreach to African governments and advances Sino-African solidarity. It meets at the ministerial or summit level every three years, alternating between Beijing and an African capital. At its last meeting in 2015, Xi announced $60 billion in new financing for ten major initiatives, including: $10 billion for an industrial cooperation fund to invest in manufacturing, hi-tech, agriculture, energy, and infrastructure; $5 billion for aid and interest-free loans; $35 billion for preferential loans and export credits; and $10 billion for the expansion of the China Africa Development Fund.[25]

Since the Mao era, China has trained cadres from African political parties and organizations. The primary vehicle for foreign political party outreach and training is the Central Committee of the CPC International Department (ID). CPC training is based on sharing its own experiences with African counterparts. In recent years, the CPC's cadre training efforts in Africa have expanded their focus to include younger political leaders. African political delegations visiting China as guests of the ID receive lectures at China's educational and training institutions, attend cultural programs, visit state-owned and private businesses, and meet a variety of officials.[26] The countries with the largest number of exchanges since 2006 are Sudan, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Morocco, Algeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Mauritius. Since 2012, more African party delegations have visited China each year than CPC delegations have visited Africa.

Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa began growing rapidly after 2000 and reached $32 billion at the end of 2014. Although fast growing, Chinese investment represents less than 5% of the global FDI stock in Africa.[27] As of 2011, 31% of Chinese FDI in Africa was in oil and mining, 20% in banking and finance, 16% in construction, 15% in manufacturing, and the remainder in services, technology, wholesale and retail, agriculture, and real estate.[28] At the end of 2012, South Africa, Zambia, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, and Sudan accounted for 58% of China's FDI in Africa.[29]

From 2010 through 2012, almost 52% of China's $14.41 billion in overseas development assistance (ODA) (about $2.5 billion per year) went to African countries. The aid was in the form of grants, both cash and in-kind, interest-free loans, and concessional loans. Most of China's aid consists of concessional loans managed by the Export-Import Bank.[30] Between 2000 and 2014, the Chinese government, banks, and contractors extended $86.3 billion worth of loans to African governments and state-owned enterprises primarily in Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Most of these loans financed infrastructure projects and did not qualify as ODA.[31] China has a good record of providing debt relief to heavily indebted poor countries. Beijing prides itself on attaching no political strings to its ODA other than the 'One China' principle, but requires nearly all recipients to hire Chinese companies and use a determined amount of Chinese materials and labor.

To improve its image, China has an extensive public-relations operation in Africa. The official news services Xinhua, China Central Television, and China Radio International have branches in Africa and reach millions of Africans. China promotes a positive image of itself and works to counter the negative coverage in the Western media. One of China's oldest programs in Africa is the sending of some 18,000 medical personnel to forty-six countries since 1963. China offers 5500 university scholarships annually, although many of them are not being utilized. It has provided technical training for 30,000 Africans. In 2016, there were forty-five Confucius Institutes in African universities and twenty-three Confucius Classrooms in secondary schools in thirty-five African countries.[32] In 2009, FOCAC announced the twenty plus twenty program whereby twenty Chinese universities established formal ties with African counterparts.[33]

China has long been a major supplier of military equipment to African countries. From 2011 to 2014, China provided about 24% of the conventional arms entering Sub-Saharan Africa.[34] China also transfers the single largest quantity of small arms and light weapons to Africa.[35] Countries, especially those facing Western sanctions such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, welcome low-cost and good-quality Chinese weapons, which are increasingly appearing in conflict zones. On the positive side, China is active in UN peacekeeping operations. In 2016, some 2200 Chinese peacekeepers were serving in seven of the nine UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, including combat units in

South Sudan and Mali.[36] Since its engagement in the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, China has expanded its bilateral security relationships with African countries and the size and role of the PLA Navy (PLAN). Since 2010, there have been more than thirty PLAN port calls in about a dozen African countries.[37] China is also constructing a permanent military facility in Djibouti to support its growing naval presence in the region and secure its interests in Africa.[38]

Over the last decade, China has expanded its security presence in Africa and along African coasts. The CPC and Xinhua are extending their outreach to African political parties and press outlets, hosting more visitors than ever before and training the next generation of African party cadres and media, respectfully. Chinese investment and trade have helped many African countries develop their industries and unearth their resources. Yet Chinese economic, diplomatic, and security policies have faced criticism for facilitating corruption and poor governance. These approaches have also had unintended consequences for China: its state-run firms lost billions in Libya after Gaddafi fell, and despite its contribution to UN peacekeeping in South Sudan, Chinese oil investments have been undermined by civil war. In Zimbabwe, a looming political transition threatens to bring similar economic losses.

African Perceptions of China's Africa Strategy

Perceptions of China are generally positive in Africa. A 2014 Pew survey conducted through interviews with 7062 individuals in Tanzania, Kenya, Senegal, Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, and South Africa found that in all countries (except South Africa) over half of those surveyed hold favorable views of China, perceive China's economic growth as beneficial for their country's economy, and believe that the Chinese government respects personal freedoms.[39] In a subsequent 2015 Pew survey, which looked at favorable/unfavorable views of China in nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, China's favorable rating was about 70%.[40]

Many Africans appear to welcome the benefits of newly constructed roads, schools, communication facilities, and factories, as well as rising energy and commodity prices driven by China's growing demand. It remains to be seen, however, whether a fall in oil and other commodity prices in 2014 and China's diversification of petroleum imports towards non-African suppliers will alter these positive perceptions.[41] Summarizing China's economic engagement in Africa, the governor of the Bank of Botswana, Linah Mohohlo, generally praised China's efforts in promoting development throughout the Continent. At the same time, he expressed concern that there may be a second Scramble for Africa that results in the plundering of Africa's resources. Mohohlo concluded that 'Africa should be careful not to rely too much on China and its development model as the panacea for its economic ills'.[42]

China has cordial, and in some cases warm, relationships with all fifty-two African governments that recognize Beijing. Autocratic African governments, like Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and Sudan, have been particularly attracted to China's political and economic systems. These close relations also extend to the North African countries of Algeria and Morocco. Like many countries, China was forced to adjust its policies in North Africa in the aftermath of the Arab spring. Relations with Tunisia have returned to normal and ties with Egypt are particularly strong, although Libya remains a challenge. Beijing has cordial relations with the Sahel countries except for Burkina Faso, which recognizes Taipei. China's economic ties are strong throughout the region, including trade with Burkina Faso.

China has good relations with leading countries in West Africa: Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Liberia. The autocratic governments of Central Africa have warm relations with China, largely because Beijing does not hector their leaders over their poor human rights practices and reluctance to democratize. China has good relations with central Africa's most important country, the DRC. China is a major trade partner for the DRC, which has received billions in Chinese loans.

The six countries in the Horn of Africa present challenges for China because of internal conflict and problems with neighbors. China has strong economic and political ties with most of them, particularly Ethiopia and Sudan. At the same time, it has struggled to preserve its oil interests in South Sudan, where it contributes more than 1000 troops to the UN peacekeeping operation. China has developed close ties in East Africa with Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, and has good relations with the four Indian Ocean Island governments. Beijing's economic and political relations with the governments of Southern African countries are uniformly strong except for Swaziland, which recognizes Taipei. Angola and South Africa are China's major African trade partners, and a high percentage of China's FDI has gone to Southern Africa.

While China generally has close relations with African governments, elite African perceptions of China are not uniformly positive. The bluntest criticisms of Chinese business practices liken them to European colonialism. 'The potential danger, in terms of the relationship that could be constructed between China and the African continent, would indeed be a replication of that colonial relationship', former South African president Thabo Mbeki said in 2006. 'It is possible to build an unequal relationship, the kind of relationship that has developed between African countries as colonies. The African continent exports raw material and imports manufactured goods, condemning [it] to underdevelopment'.[43] In 2013, Nigeria's Central Bank governor, Lamido Sanusi, observed that:

> China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the essence of colonialism. The British went to Africa and India to secure raw

> materials and markets. Africa is now willingly opening itself up to a new form of imperialism.[44]

In 2016, despite winning numerous government contracts, several Chinese multinationals, including the massive telecoms giant ZTE, were placed under investigation by the Kenya Revenue Authority for using accounts in Hong Kong to facilitate tens of millions dollars in tax evasion.[45] Some members of African elites, like John Mangudya, the governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), have refused to publicly criticize the Chinese even as they are transporting hundreds of millions in hard currency out of the country in 'suitcases and depositing cash with a Chinese bank in Johannesburg'. In 2015, Mangudya acknowledged that $684 million was illicitly externalized by individuals 'under the auspices of free funds for various dubious and unwarranted purposes'. That year, in a case bankers called 'just the tip of an iceberg', the Chinese diamond mining firm, Jinan Mining, was investigated for externalizing $546 million. 'It's not just the currency; it's also ivory and precious stones. A few of them have been arrested but the fines have not been deterrent', an anonymous RBZ official said. An anonymous source within the ruling ZANU-PF party said the capital flight had 'disturbed the political system'.[46]

Other elements of African societies that have responded less favorably to China's increasing presence on the continent include civil-society organizations, opposition political parties, independent labor unions, and the non-government media sector. They periodically express concerns about existing China–Africa trade patterns and the treatment of African workers. Mixed perceptions of China among Africans have had some negative social and political externalities. One young Chinese woman in Kenya explained how 'traditional' Chinese attitudes damaged African perceptions:

> Traditional Chinese businessmen came to Africa simply to pursue fortune. They usually ignore labor complaints, environmental pollution, wildlife conservation and relationship with local residents. Besides, when meeting problems, especially facing government officials, they tend to solve problems by corrupting them. All of these leave a bad impression of Chinese to African people.[47]

Tensions have precipitated urban protests in a number of African countries. Zambia and Zimbabwe, for instance, have seen riots against Chinese merchants and products, and the exclusion of Chinese from business and other communities.[48] In 2015, in Kinshasa, DRC, local protesters attacked and looted about fifty Chinese-owned shops in working-class neighborhoods. Demonstrators shattered windows, broke down doors, and picked shelves clean. 'Nothing was touched besides the Chinese stores', said one Congolese who owns dozens of businesses in the area. Thousands of Chinese laborers in the DRC work on Chinese-financed infrastructure projects or run businesses that serve their compatriots. 'They sell everything, [and] we're no longer

doing any business because of them', complained one local vendor, who said he hoped the looting would be a 'lesson' to his Chinese rivals.[49]

If China-Africa trade continues in accordance with existing patterns, China's interests will be increasingly pitted against emerging African resistance narratives at both the grass-roots and elite levels. Generally, positive perceptions of China as an African development partner seem to turn negative when large numbers of Chinese enter African communities, usually as traders and entrepreneurs in the local market. In Kampala, Uganda, for instance, local merchants held a two-day strike in 2011 against the 'influx of Chinese traders associated with Chinese investments'. Issa Sekito of the Kampala City Traders Association explained: 'Over the years, we have been complaining to government over the aliens doing petty trade, especially the Chinese—who come in as investors'.[50] In a move aimed at Chinese, the Ugandan Parliament in 2016 gave foreigners engaged in retail business three months to either make larger investments or leave the country.[51] Similarly, in 2014, Tanzania's labor unions publicly criticized the government for letting in small Chinese traders.[52]

'China inadvertently follows the same pattern of other preceding great powers, spreading the seeds of discontent in a continent with diversified ethnicities and cultures', Eric Kiss and Kate Zhou observe.[53] China's indifference to, or active aid of, autocratic regimes in countries like Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Sudan, and Ethiopia risks partnering with repressive political elites against local people. By selling African governments weapons, censorship technology, and monitoring equipment to maintain social order, Chinese firms are unwittingly tapping into a reservoir of historic anti-foreign resistance narratives that remain widespread among some communities. Grass-roots anti-Chinese critiques frequently veer into charges against African governments; many Africans are aware that their political leaders sanction or turn a blind eye toward adverse Chinese business practices.

At the heart of such criticism is a perception that has become increasingly widespread within African civil society: China's predilection for autocratic regimes determines its choice of African trade partners and is thus exploitative.[54] To examine how widely held this perception is, in 2014 the Ethics Institute of South Africa conducted an online survey of 1056 African civil society representatives from fifteen countries.[55] The study found that African perceptions of Chinese businesses are indeed overwhelmingly negative. Africans are skeptical about the quality of Chinese goods, Chinese enterprises' environmental and economic practices, and Chinese businesses' employment policies toward their African workers. 'There is a perception that Chinese companies do not treat their African staff with respect, do not provide decent working conditions, have little regard for health and safety conditions of their employees and have little regard for basic workers' rights', the study noted.[56] It seems likely that the study's small sample size, focus on urban civil-society representatives, and reliance on an online questionnaire (rather than face-to-face interviews like the Pew survey) led to a selection bias.

African resistance to Chinese firms takes many forms, but is often organized via social media and led by an emergent African civil society that demands more opportunities for locals, ethical business practices, and worker-friendly policies. Mark Kaigwa and Yu-Shan Wu argue that as the number of social-media communication platforms expands in Africa, so too do outlets for anti-Chinese sentiment.[57] In Zimbabwe, there has been a government crackdown on Chinese business activity and a wave of popular anti-Chinese journalism. In Kenya and Uganda, there is resistance among some communities to Chinese railway construction practices. Soon after construction on the East Africa railway began, protestors blocked highway traffic, burned tires and accused the project contractor, China Road and Bridge Construction Company, of denying them jobs in favor of Chinese workers. 'Contracts for the projects are shrouded in secrecy, this cannot be good for us as well as future generations', said Ugandan parliamentarian Geoffrey Ekanya. 'The Chinese are giving us cheap loans, but this should also translate into good jobs for our people'.[58]

Notes

1. For a detailed description of this period see David H. Shinn, and Joshua Eisenman, *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 31–38.
2. Shinn, and Eisenman, China, and Africa, 33.
3. Mon'im Nasser-Eddine, 60–104, has a detailed account of Chinese–Egyptian contacts leading up to diplomatic recognition in 1956 in *Arab-Chinese Relations 1950–1971* (Beirut: The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 1972); see also Bruce D. Larkin, *China in Africa 1949–1970: The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971), 16–20. For an account of the Bandung Conference, see Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference* (Jackson, MS: Banner Books, 1956).
4. Larkin, China, and Africa 1949–1970, 20, 32–36.
5. W.A.C. Adie, "Chinese Policy Towards Africa," in *The Soviet Bloc, China and Africa*, ed. Sven Hamrell and Carl Gosta Widstrand (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1964), 53.
6. Patrick Tyler, *A Great Wall* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 204.
7. Julia C. Strauss, "The Past in the Present: Historical and Rhetorical Lineages in China's Relations with Africa," *China Quarterly* 199 (2009): 781–82.
8. CIA, "What the Chinese Communists are Up to in Black Africa," declassified secret report, March 23, 1971, 7.
9. For a discussion of the principles, see Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa 1958–71* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 120.
10. Adie, "Chinese Policy Towards Africa," 44.
11. Larkin, China, and Africa 1949–1970, 157.
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CHAPTER 35

Africa and Global Financial Institutions

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Since independence, African countries have had an uneasy and somewhat ambivalent relationship with international financial institutions (IFIs). On the one hand, African countries have looked to IFIs, such as the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD] and the International Development Association [ADA]) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for access to international capital markets so that they can secure the resources that they need to finance national development projects. Specifically, many African countries have looked to the World Bank for access to credit to finance important capital projects and to the IMF for help with balance-of-payments problems. On the other hand, they have resented these international institutions' interference in the domestic policy process in the continent. Many African countries give as an example of the interference of IFIs in political economy in the continent the IMF and World Bank-mandated structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which were imposed on many African economies as a condition for, inter alia, further access to international financial markets.[1]

Developing countries, including those in Africa, have looked to the World Bank and the IMF (the so-called 'Bretton Woods institutions') to help them improve their ability to participate fully and gainfully in the global economy and, at the same time, deal more effectively with domestic economic problems, including especially the eradication of poverty. The Bretton Woods institutions, which form the heart of the international financial architecture, were founded after the Second World War and were expected to serve as a conduit or mechanism through which the rich industrial countries of the

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economic North could participate fully and effectively in the elimination of global poverty and material deprivation and help the poor countries of the economic South significantly improve their national standards of living.

Critics of the World Bank and the IMF have argued that despite the fact that, at their founding, these global financial institutions were given clear mandates, they have proceeded to pursue other goals, including an effort to 'integrate countries into the capitalist world economy'.[2] Although the Bretton Woods institutions came to view themselves as agents of social and economic transformation in the developing countries of the economic South, and of the eradication of mass poverty and deprivation, their critics claim that these institutions have, during the last six or so decades, been interested primarily in integrating the elites and governments of the poor and relatively weak states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America into a global economy that is dominated and controlled by large and highly powerful transnational companies headquartered in the industrial market economies of the economic North.[3]

During the last six decades, both the World Bank and the IMF have gained significant political and economic power, as well as influence. Today, these global financial institutions have emerged as very important (and, to a certain extent, dominant) players in the global lending and donor communities. In fact, the World Bank and the IMF have become so powerful economically and politically that they now control much of the lending to developing countries, including those in Africa. First, these institutions are themselves major lenders to African countries, a significant number of which are not able or lack the capacity to source funds directly from private lenders in international financial markets.[4] Second, many international lenders (both private and public) now require IMF/World Bank clearance before credit is extended to the governments of developing countries, including those in Africa.

Thus, while many African countries see the Bretton Woods institutions as effective conduits to the international financial market, they also resent the power that these institutions can exercise over them. The African countries resent the gatekeeper role played by the World Bank and the IMF and consider programs such as the SAPs as interference with national sovereignty and the ability of each African country to carry out macroeconomic policy. In fact, some African countries have argued that World Bank and IMF involvement in domestic policy has been extremely harmful and has retarded inclusive growth and development. The World Bank and IMF conditionalities in Mozambique are usually offered as an example of these institutions' overreach. With reference to its activities in Mozambique, the World Bank is said to have stated that, 'partly by design, partly by default, the Bank [i.e., World Bank] today has a near-monopoly on development strategy dialogue with the [Mozambican] Government'.[5] In the process, African governments have been forced to the sidelines (i.e. the periphery of the international economy), with the multilateral agencies having a significant impact on the policy agenda in these countries.

This chapter will rigorously examine the relationship between Africa and the international financial system with specific emphasis on the impact of the

activities of the IFIs on public-policy design and implementation in the continent, as well as on the continent's ability to source funds from the international market.

International Financial Institutions: What Are They?

IFIs, together with the United Nations system, are responsible for most of today's global governance. The IFIs function specifically to enhance economic and financial cooperation among countries, including especially the transfer of financial resources.[6] Thus, mobilization of financial resources at the global level is a key function of the IFIs. Specifically, IFIs provide: (a) financial assistance to countries; and (b) technical and professional advice, primarily for the purpose of advancing economic growth and human development. In the process, the IFIs also promote international economic cooperation, including trade.

The expression 'international financial institutions' is usually used in the literature to refer to the IMF and the five multilateral development banks. The latter consist of: (a) the World Bank Group; (b) the African Development Bank; (c) the Asian Development Bank; (d) the Inter-American Development Bank; and (e) the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The last four financial institutions are regional banks and focus their activities on specific regions of the world. The activities of the World Bank Group and the IMF are global in perspective and scope.

Membership of the IFIs is limited to sovereign countries only, which are referred to as 'owner-members'; both developed and developing countries are eligible for membership in the IFIs. Historically, the developed countries have been *donors* to the IFIs, while the developing countries have been *borrowers*. Membership in the regional development banks is open to all countries, including those which do not belong to the region in question. For example, membership of the African Development Bank includes not only African countries but also many countries from outside the region, including Britain, the USA, Canada, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, The Netherlands, the People's Republic of China (PRC), South Korea, Germany, and Argentina, to name just a few. Although each IFI has its own 'independent legal and operational status',[7] there is a significant level of cooperation among all these IFIs because of the structure of their memberships.

While the IMF offers temporary financial assistance to member countries to help them deal with balance-of-payments problems, the regional development banks provide resources for member countries to invest in national development projects. Three types of financial instruments dominate the relationship between the regional development banks and their members: (a) long-term loans (with maturities of up to twenty years); (b) very long-term loans (with maturities of thirty to forty years); and (c) grants, specifically for 'technical assistance, advisory services, or project preparation'.[8]

Within the global financial system, there are other 'publicly owned international banks and funds', which also extend credit to developing countries. However, these institutions are usually classified as 'other multilateral financial institutions' (OMFIs) as opposed to IFIs.[9] These OMFIs (such as the European Investment Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Islamic Development Bank, and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Fund for International Development) usually focus on specific and much narrower economic sectors or have extremely narrow membership structures.[10]

The IMF was established in 1945 as the primary regulator of the international monetary system. In performing its functions, the IMF was expected to 'prevent crises in the [international monetary] system by encouraging countries to adopt sound economic policies'.[11] In addition to monitoring countries to make sure that they were adhering to the principle of sound economic policy making, the IMF also stood ready to provide these countries with financial assistance to meet balance-of-payments problems.

The IMF, since its founding, has engaged in three important types of activities: (a) it monitors financial and economic developments, globally and at the country level, and offers advice to countries; (b) it provides loans to member countries, which are having balance-of-payments problems; and (c) it provides technical assistance and training to the governments (usually finance ministries) and central banks of member countries.

The IMF is headquartered in Washington, DC and is accountable to its 188 member governments. In recent years, the IMF has emerged as a global forum for examining issues of importance to the stability of the international economy; for example, the design and implementation of standards and codes of conduct in such areas as data management, fiscal transparency, and financial and monetary policy transparency.

The World Bank was founded in 1945 and was initially geared toward financing the reconstruction of countries that had been destroyed by the Second World War. Nevertheless, as war-torn European economies slowly and steadily recovered, the Bank began to turn its attention to the other task that had been envisioned for it at its founding; that is, to assist in and, to a certain extent, oversee the economic development of what came to be referred to as developing and non-industrialized countries.

The World Bank Group's shareholders are the same countries which make up the membership of the IMF. The Bank is governed by a Board of Governors, which is made up of the representatives of ministers of finance/development of the member countries. However, since the Board of Governors meets only annually, the power to make decisions for the Bank on a daily basis is delegated to twenty four executive directors who are located and work at the Bank's location in Washington, DC.

The World Bank Group consists of five institutions, namely: (a) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, usually referred

to as the World Bank); (b) the International Development Association (IDA); (c) the International Finance Corporation (IFC); (d) the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and (e) the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). All five institutions have different roles to play in fulfilling the World Bank Group's corporate mission, which is to fight poverty and improve the living conditions of people throughout the world. As a group, they 'provide low-interest loans, interest-free credits, and grants to governments and the private sector in developing countries for investments in education, health, infrastructure, communications, and many other purposes, as well as services in support of those investments'.[12]

The African Development Bank (AfDB), whose headquarters are located in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, is engaged principally in the development of its African member countries. The AfDB is owned by fifty three African countries and twenty four others from the Americas, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. According to the Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank,[13] the latter's main purpose is to 'contribute to the sustainable economic development and social progress of its regional members individually and jointly' (Article 1).[14] The AfDB's functions include:

- To use the resources at its disposal for the financing of investment projects and programs relating to the economic and social development of its regional members
- To undertake, or participate in, the selection, study and preparation of projects, enterprises and activities contributing to such development
- To mobilize and increase in Africa, and outside Africa, resources for the financing of such investment projects and programs
- Generally, to promote investment in Africa of public and private capital in projects or programs designed to contribute to the economic development or social progress of its regional members
- To provide such technical assistance as may be needed in Africa for the study, preparation, financing and execution of development projects or programs; and
- To undertake such other activities and provide such other services as may advance its purpose (Article 2 (1) (a–f)).[15]

In carrying out its functions, the AfDB is instructed by its enabling law to 'seek to co-operate with national, regional and sub-regional development institutions in Africa' (Article 2[2]).[16] Additionally, the AfDB is instructed to cooperate with 'other international organizations [which are] pursuing a similar purpose and with other institutions concerned with the development of Africa' (Article 2[3]).[17]

The AfDB's financial base is made up of subscribed capital, reserves, and funds that the Bank sources through loans, and its accumulated net income.

In terms of the AfDB's subscribed capital, two-thirds is held by its regional member countries and one-third by member countries outside the continent. In terms of governance, the AfDB's highest policy-making body is the Board of Governors, each member country being assigned one governor. In terms of actual governance, however, the Board of Governors delegates some of its powers to the Board of Directors, which consists of 18 executive directors, 12 of whom represent the regional members, and 6 of whom represent the outside or non-regional members. Its founding law, however, mandates that the president of the AfDB must be a national of one of the regional member countries.[18]

Africa and the International Financial System

Before we take a look at Africa's post-independence experience with the international financial system, it is instructive to see how the IFIs view their role in Africa and other developing regions of the world. Regardless of the dictates of their mandates, many IFIs purport to provide certain specific services to countries in Africa and other poor regions of the world in an effort to enhance economic growth and human development.[19]

First, IFIs provide *financing*, usually loans and grants, to African countries to undertake various development projects. Although such financing may support projects in infrastructure and other areas critical to the development of each country's productive capacity, all projects financed are based on national priorities designed in consultation with the IFIs. In certain cases, the financial assistance offered the African country is directed at projects associated with structural adjustment programs (SAPs).[20]

Second, staff members from the IFIs enhance the capacity of African countries to design and implement public policies, especially those dealing with economic growth and development. In addition to providing dedicated staff who consult extensively with elites from both the public and private sectors of the African countries, the IFIs (e.g. World Bank and IMF) may actually send staff members to work with central banks and finance ministries in the African countries. The two parties (technocrats from the IFIs and Africa's private and public sectors) ideally are expected to produce policy packages which are informed by recommendations of the IFIs and the African countries. These policies, of course, are expected to reflect the poverty and development needs of the respective African countries.

Third, IFIs help African countries develop and adopt internationally accepted codes of good practices; for example, the IMF's *Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency* and *Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies*.[21] The development and adoption of these internationally recognized or accepted codes of conduct for use in both the public and private sectors is supposed to generally improve both economic and political governance and enhance economic growth and development.

In addition to promoting improvements in domestic economic performance, adoption of codes of good practices is expected to enhance the ability of the African economies to integrate into and participate gainfully in the global economy.

Fourth, the IFIs provide various sectors of the African economies with opportunities for human capital development. Training can be undertaken within the framework of specific development projects undertaken by the African countries with the support and guidance of the IFIs or as stand-alone training programs designed to build capacity in the African countries. For example, the training arm of the World Bank or IMF may bring staff from both private and public sectors in the African countries to Washington, DC to attend short courses or workshops that help these individuals acquire new competences and return home to improve the capacities of their work units.

Finally, IFIs offer financial and other assistance to capacity-building institutions (e.g., the African Capacity Building Foundation and the African Economic Research Consortium) to train researchers, improve and enhance knowledge transfer, support economic and financial research, provide continuing education courses for staff in both private and public sectors, and generally assist the continent in capacity-building projects.

While, in theory, the IFIs can provide many services to the African economies (e.g. help them build capacity and develop and implement monetary policies that enhance financial and economic stability), it is important to point out that these external institutions, including even the African Development Bank, must play only an advisory and subordinate role. Each African country must not allow these institutions to dominate and control domestic public policy. Economic policy in each country must be the purview and responsibility of the country's policymakers.

Africa's Post-Independence Experience with the International Financial Community

In the mid-1970s, many countries in Africa suffered from significantly high levels of external debts and, by the mid-1980s, the failure of these countries to effectively manage their debts had evolved into a major constraint on economic growth and development.[22] In order to deal effectively and fully with these debts and provide the wherewithal for economic growth and development, many of these African countries appealed to the international financial community for assistance. Most of the effort was directed at two of the most important IFIs—the World Bank and the IMF. Eventually these so-called Bretton Woods institutions became involved in what came to be referred to as 'conditional lending'. Under the latter regime, African countries which sought loans or loan-extensions from the international financial system (primarily from the Bretton Woods institutions and/or the developed market economies) were required to implement a basket of institutional reforms,

which included, inter alia: (a) reductions in the public sector; (b) devaluation of the national currency; (c) deregulation of the foreign trade sector; and (d) greater reliance on markets for the allocation of resources.[23]

As a result of the fact that the World Bank and the IMF had essentially become gatekeepers for certain types of financial flows (primarily debt and development assistance) to the African countries, these institutions played a significant role in the transition to democratic governance that started in the continent in the mid-1980s.[24]

But how did the Bretton Woods institutions become so intimately linked to structural or institutional adjustments in the African countries? As argued by Baylies, the involvement of these multilateral financial organizations in Africa's reform efforts can be traced to 'a broader discourse promoted by the World Bank from the mid-eighties which expressed the need for an enabling environment to facilitate prescribed economic reforms'.[25] At the time, the World Bank felt that many of its development projects in Africa were not functioning efficiently because recipient countries were pervaded by extremely inefficient and dysfunctional bureaucratic structures and governance systems that were actually constraints on entrepreneurial activities and the creation of wealth.[26] In other words, the World Bank argued that the governance architectures of many African countries were actually a hindrance to wealth creation, economic growth, and development. The World Bank subsequently engaged in a concerted effort to coerce African countries into undertaking institutional reforms, which were expected to improve economic performance and significantly increase the efficiency and performance of the multilateral organization's projects in these countries. Thus, since the mid-1980s, the World Bank and the IMF have become very critical participants in the transition to more effective governance systems in the African countries.

The involvement of both the World Bank and the IMF in the African economies beginning in the mid-1980s was supposed to assist these countries resolve an economic crisis that was threatening to wipe out most of the improvements in human development that had been achieved in the continent since the 1950s and 1960s. By the early 1980s, many countries in Africa suffered from significant balance-of-payments deficits and their development efforts were threatened by rising external debts. The Bretton Woods institutions' structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were supposedly designed to help the African countries improve macroeconomic performance and create the environment for rapid economic growth. The latter would then provide each African government with the resources that it needed to fight poverty and material deprivation and improve the quality of life for all citizens. By 1994, the World Bank[27] was still quite optimistic regarding the positive role that the SAPs could play in economic transformation in the African countries. However, many scholars criticized the World Bank's assessment of the SAPs and argued that although African countries were in need of institutional reforms and structural adjustment, the top-down and elite-driven approach

adopted by the World Bank and other IFIs would not produce outcomes that were beneficial to the African countries. In order for institutional reforms to significantly improve governance, and hence, entrepreneurship and economic growth in the African countries, the reforms had to be undertaken through a bottom-up, inclusive, and people-driven process; that is, the African people had to initiate and own the reforms, and implement them without the active involvement of the IFIs.[28]

The IMF and the World Bank are the cornerstone of the international financial system. The IMF, for example, is expected to help minimize interruptions in global trade and assist countries in meeting any temporary shortfalls in their balance-of-payments. The financial assistance to be provided by the IMF was supposed to ensure that 'these countries continued to participate in the international economy without any interruptions'.[29]

The World Bank's raison d'être was to promote and enhance rapid economic growth and development in the post-Second World War period, not just in war-torn Europe but also in the developing countries, most of which were former colonies of the European countries. As part of the duty to assist developing countries fight poverty, the Bank was expected to lend these countries money so that they could invest in social overhead capital, which included 'roads, railways and other communication infrastructures, utilities, dams, irrigation facilities, schools, health care centers, including hospitals, and other structures that were expected to enhance the rapid creation of the wealth that these countries needed to deal with poverty'.[30] An important argument at the time was that in the newly independent countries in Africa, Asia, and the Americas, the private sector was either unwilling or incapable of providing the necessary economic infrastructures. It was, therefore, critical that the government intervene and provide the necessary social overhead capital, which was a *sine qua non* for postwar economic transformation in the continent. In addition, the World Bank was also expected to encourage and facilitate the flow of foreign private investment into the African countries through loan guarantees or the direct participation of the Bank with private entrepreneurs in development projects.

Policymakers in the African countries came to view the Bretton Woods institutions as financial organizations that could help them secure the necessary resources they needed to invest in poverty eradication programs. Specifically, these multilateral organizations were expected to function as a conduit through which the rich industrial countries of the economic North could contribute to job creation and poverty eradication in the economic South. Critics of the World Bank and the IMF, however, have argued that although these IFIs were granted clear mandates, they nevertheless have pursued other objectives, the most important of which is to 'integrate countries into the capitalist world economy'.[31]

Although the Bretton Woods institutions came to view themselves as 'agents of social and economic transformation in the Third World, and of

the elimination of global poverty, their critics claim that the primary function of these institutions during the last fifty years has been the integration of the elites and governments of the poor and relatively weak states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America into an international economy that is dominated and controlled by large transnational firms located in the industrial market economies'.[32]

During more than fifty years of operations, both the World Bank and the IMF have gained a lot of political and economic influence; in fact, today, they are considered the global economy's most important financial institutions. The IMF has expanded its duties from ensuring an effective international payments system to performing other functions associated with general global financial health, international trade, job creation and economic growth, and poverty alleviation. In fact, during the financial crisis of 2008, the IMF restructured its policies toward poor countries and introduced a more flexible regime of conditionality, making it easier for these countries to access resources for poverty alleviation. In addition, the IMF reformed its lending framework and adopted a system that allowed it to tailor 'loan terms to countries' varying strengths and circumstances'.[33]

The control of lending to the African countries by the World Bank and the IMF has been undertaken in the following ways. First, both organizations have emerged as the most important lenders to developing countries, including those in Africa. Most of these countries are not in a position to independently access resources directly from international private lenders.[34] Second, since the early 1990s, so-called 'conditional lending' has become an important part of the flow of resources from the developed countries to the African economies. It was at this time that many donor countries implemented policies that linked 'official development aid to political and economic liberalization as recommended under the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programs'.[35]

Of course, the developed countries that extend financial assistance to the African countries do not actively engage in monitoring the recipient countries to make certain that they engage in the necessary institutional reforms. That job is left to the IMF and the World Bank. As a consequence, the recommendations of the IMF and the World Bank now constitute an important aspect of the approval of development aid to developing countries, including those in Africa.[36] In the African countries, many policymakers believe that the IMF and the World Bank are now important gatekeepers in the flow of financial resources from the developed countries to the continent.

The enormous economic power that the Bretton Woods institutions have amassed since their founding in the 1940s has allowed them to exercise significant influence on macroeconomic policies in the developing countries, including those in Africa. One can use the involvement of these IFIs in the economy of Mozambique to illustrate the extent to which these organizations have usurped public policy in many countries in Africa. After Mozambique's

civil war ended, the World Bank and the IMF became de facto governors of Mozambique's political and economic systems. As stated by Dunn, '[a]s the World Bank and IMF have enlarged the scope of conditionalities beyond economic policies, the Mozambican state now exists to the extent that the Western lending agencies allow it to exist'.[37] According to David Plank, 'public officials [in Mozambique] now have little choice but to do whatever the aid agencies demand of them'.[38]

As argued by Young, 'despite equipping Mozambique with all the trappings of a democratic state, the sheer leverage of outside powers, and in particular the coordinating role of the IMF/World Bank, have subjected Mozambique to an extraordinary degree of foreign tutelage. Indeed, Mozambique has been made into a virtual laboratory for new forms of Western domination'.[39] In fact, the World Bank eventually admitted its culpability in Mozambique's disastrous macroeconomic performance when it stated that, 'partly by design, partly by default, the Bank today has a near-monopoly on development strategy dialogue with the [Mozambican] Government'.[40]

As a consequence of these developments, many scholars came to view the Mozambican state as merely an extension of international donor and aid agencies instead of a servant of the citizens (i.e., the domestic electorate). As accurately summed up by Dunn,[41] the Mozambican state has become 'largely an interlocutor for international agents and domestic interests, and distinguishing between the two has become increasingly difficult'.[42]

Beginning in the mid-1980s in Africa, many countries were literally forced to 'adopt and implement programs designed in Washington, DC by the World Bank and the IMF in order to qualify for additional loans from the international lending community'.[43] During the negotiations that produced these programs, individual African countries were usually represented by 'urban-based elites who lack both time-and-place information about economic and social conditions in the rural areas of their respective countries'.[44] In addition, these elites were not likely to bear a significant portion of the costs of implementing these programs. For example, in a study of SAPs in Nigeria, Julius O. Ihonvbere[45] determined that most of the costs of these programs were borne primarily by rural peasants, the urban poor, and historically marginalized individuals and groups (e.g. women and minority ethnic and religious groups).[46]

One important aspect of the SAPs was for each African government to get rid of price controls on the marketing of foodstuffs in urban markets in an effort to improve the prices received by rural farmers for their produce. Unfortunately, the implementation of price deregulation in the African countries was undertaken capriciously by governments that were eager to maintain the 'goodwill of the politically volatile urban sectors' and, as a consequence, many rural farmers rarely benefited from the implementation of the SAPs.[47]

In fact, the decision by the IMF and policymakers in the African countries to emphasize the production of cash crops (e.g. coffee, cocoa, rubber,

palm kernels, and bananas) at the expense of foodstuffs was made without widespread consultation; it was a top-down, elite-driven and non-participatory policy that came to be an important cause of food shortages in many of these countries. While the policy significantly improved the capacity of many African countries to secure the foreign exchange (through the export of cash crops) to service their external debts, it crippled economic activities in many rural areas and 'dealt a severe blow to foodstuff production and consequently, food security'.[48]

In Cameroon, for example, the government designed an incentive system that encouraged and enhanced the production of coffee, a policy which, in the country's grasslands, 'worked directly against the production of food staples such as cocoyams, several varieties of yams, plantains, and other crops essential for the maintenance of a healthy and productive population'.[49] The outcome was major food shortages that forced many people to depend on imported foods. Unfortunately, dependence on imported foods created many nutritional and health problems, particularly in children. Many families were forced to change their diets, including those of infants and young children, creating such dietary problems as tooth decay and diabetes that the country's health-care system was not equipped to fully and effectively handle.

Although the World Bank and the IMF intended their adjustment programs to enhance the ability of African countries to promote and enhance human development through strengthening markets and greatly enhancing rapid economic growth and the creation of wealth, many researchers now argue that, with respect to the African countries, the Bretton Woods institutions have evolved into 'vehicles through which the income and wealth of the poor countries is redistributed in favor of the rich developed countries'.[50] For example, in its 1992 annual report, the World Bank[51] reported that it and the International Development Agency had remitted $16.441 billion to its borrowers in developing countries. In terms of net disbursements (gross disbursements minus payments on outstanding loans and credits), the amount was $6.258 billion. In the same year, developing countries, which were debtors to the World Bank, collectively sent $6.547 billion to private business enterprises in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries as payments for goods and services on the Bank's outstanding loans. From the point of view of net transfers, the poor countries paid $198 million more to the developed industrial countries for World Bank-associated purchases than the developing countries had received from the Bank.[52]

During the last several decades, the World Bank and the IMF have made great efforts to help the African countries service their debts. Many critics, however, have argued that the reality is that the programs promoted by these institutions have resulted in the continuous bleeding of the African economies; there has been a net transfer of resources from the continent to the industrial market economies. It is argued, however, that the more important

issue is that at the same time as the multilateral financial institutions have been helping the African countries to remain viable borrowers, levels of poverty and material deprivation have continued to rise in these countries. Improved access to international financial markets has allowed many of these countries to increase their debt levels but most of the resources secured through this process have not been invested in productive capacity or in providing welfare-enhancing services to the populations. Instead, a lot of the borrowed resources have been used by unscrupulous civil servants and political elites to minimize the impact on themselves of the austerity measures that are part of the IMF and World Bank imposed conditionalities.[53] In addition, spending on health care, education (especially at the primary and secondary levels) housing, HIV/AIDS education, and other areas that are critical to human development, have been neglected in favor of debt service. As a consequence, many researchers have come to see both the IMF and the World Bank programs (e.g. the SAPs) as mechanisms designed to exploit and plunder the African economies for the benefit of national elites (civil servants and politicians) and their foreign-based benefactors. The bulk of the citizens in these countries, especially those who historically have been marginalized and pushed to the political and economic periphery (e.g. women, rural inhabitants, the urban poor, and ethnic and religious minorities) have received virtually no benefits from these adjustment programs. Instead, they have been forced to bear most of the costs of the SAPs and other austerity programs.[54]

The origins of IMF and World Bank involvement in African political economy, argue some economists,[55] can be traced to the desire by the World Bank to improve the institutional environment in economies in which it had development projects. The World Bank is said to have indicated that many of its development projects in several countries, including those in Africa, were not performing effectively and efficiently because of the presence of several institutional impediments; specifically, severely weak, inefficient, and parasitic bureaucracies, and governments that were either not willing or did not have the capacity to design and implement policies that support markets and enhance entrepreneurial activities. The Bank sought to have recipients of its financial assistance programs implement a basket of policy reforms designed to significantly improve their governance architectures.[56]

Specifically, the World Bank desired that countries participating in its development programs should undertake specific adjustments to the structure of their governance institutions—here, 'adjustment' refers to 'changes made in the economy (as well as in the institutional environment) to enhance the latter's (i.e., the economy's) ability to cope with external shocks'.[57] The Bank argued that if the reforms were fully and effectively implemented, the domestic economy would be more able to properly respond to both negative and positive external shocks such as, for example, trade deficits, changes in global commodity prices, and inflows of foreign resources (e.g. official development aid, private investment, and loans).

The structural adjustment programs, as promoted by the World Bank and the IMF in Africa, can be seen as consisting of two separate but connected elements: (a) changes in public policy whose main objective is to enhance the ability of the domestic economy to achieve both internal and external balances and which are considered to be within the purview of the IMF and policymakers in the adjusting African country; and (b) institutional reforms that force each African economy to rely more on markets and prices for the allocation of resources. The latter reforms, those designed to enhance and improve the functioning of markets, are considered the purview of the World Bank.[58] As implemented in the African countries during the last several decades, SAPs have essentially involved efforts to, inter alia[59]:

- significantly reduce state ownership and management of productive resources through the privatization of state-owned enterprises
- abolish the regime of price controls, including especially price ceilings on agricultural produce in an effort to improve incentives for farmers and enhance productivity in this critical sector
- devalue the domestic currency in order to improve the country's ability to compete globally
- remove most government subsidies on goods sold and consumed domestically
- reduce state regulation of private exchange and rely more on markets for the allocation of goods and services
- upgrade the national investment code and create an enabling environment for the inflow of foreign investment
- significantly enhance free trade by eliminating protectionist laws and statutes.

Africa's post-independence experience with the international financial community has been dominated by its involvement with the IMF and the World Bank. In addition, the relationship between Africa and the Bretton Woods institutions has been overshadowed by the latter's preoccupation with the SAPs. The argument given by economists at the World Bank and the IMF at the time was that full and effective implementation of the SAPs would: (a) significantly decrease national debt levels and free up revenues for investment in critical sectors, such as education and training, health, and agriculture; (b) improve macroeconomic performance and enhance the creation of wealth; and (c) generally strengthen economic and political governance. Although many of the African countries that implemented the SAPs continued to suffer deterioration in their economies, the World Bank and the IMF continued to argue that the SAPs would eventually improve political economy in many of these countries and bring about inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development.[60]

By the 1990s, many Sub-Saharan African countries were no longer able to service their national debts, and this was partly responsible for their decision to seek assistance from the IMF and the World Bank. Despite the assistance provided by the Bretton Woods institutions, many of these countries continued to struggle with a debt burden that threatened to destroy prospects for economic growth and effective elimination of poverty. While several reasons were offered by researchers to explain why the implementation of the SAPs had not had a major positive impact on macroeconomic performance, the most important of them was the fact that the SAPs were seen by most Africans as external impositions; these reform programs were 'designed abroad without effective participation by [each country's] relevant stakeholders'[61] and were implemented arbitrarily and capriciously.

Of course, African countries were duly represented at the negotiations that produced these structural adjustment schemes. Nevertheless, the truth of the matter is that representation was limited to urban-based elites, who worked closely with economists at the IMF and the World Bank. Important stakeholders (notably inhabitants of the rural sectors, the urban poor, and women) who ultimately were forced to bear most of the costs of the adjustments were not provided the facilities to participate fully and effectively in the design and implementation of the adjustment programs. The urban-based elites lacked the time-and-place information, especially information about social and economic conditions in the rural areas of many of the African countries that were subjected to the SAPs and, without such information, they could not design programs that were capable of dealing effectively with the problems these communities suffered from. Additionally, the fact that many of these countries had governing processes that were not truly representative meant that the elites at the center (i.e. the individuals who were in charge of public-policy design and implementation) were not in a position to maximize *national* objectives.

Even after the many institutional transformations that have taken place in the continent since the pro-democracy movements of the early 1990s (including the recent Arab Spring events), many African countries still have institutional arrangements or governance systems that: (a) do not adequately constrain the state, allowing civil servants and political elites to act with impunity and engage in growth-inhibiting behaviors such as corruption and rent seeking; (b) constrain entrepreneurial activities and the creation of wealth; (c) fail to enhance the effective management of diversity (especially ethnic and religious diversity); and (d) do not provide effective participation of all relevant stakeholders in policy design and implementation.

Although many African governments still optimistically believe that the involvement of the Bretton Woods institutions in their economies will significantly improve their capacity to manage their debts fully and effectively, the citizens of these countries continue to see the SAPs and other impositions of the international financial system as new forms of colonialism and

exploitation. There is a belief in the African countries that both the World Bank and the IMF are part of an effort by external actors, based primarily in the developed Western economies, to recolonize the continent and exploit the latter's resources for the benefit of the metropolitan economies and collaborating urban-based elites in the African countries. Nevertheless, the implementation of the programs demanded by the IFIs as conditions for African countries to continue to participate in and access global financial markets has imposed significant costs on the poor and historically marginalized and deprived groups and communities such as ethnic and religious minorities, women, rural inhabitants, and the urban poor.[62]

Virtually all the research carried out on the effects of SAPs on African economies has contradicted the excessive optimism expressed by the World Bank and the IMF.[63] As argued by Lall, for example, SAPs have provided virtually no benefits to industry in Africa and have, in addition, not helped in the diversification of industry in the continent.[64] While many countries continue to adhere to the demands of the international financial system, including those of the IMF and the World Bank, the benefits to these economies are, at best, dubious, and at worst, injurious. Throughout the continent, the SAPs and other foreign-imposed institutional reforms have been politicized and have emerged as instruments for the enrichment of domestic political elites.[65] As a consequence, many citizens do not consider these structural adjustment programs as genuine tools for effective transformation of their economic and political governance systems. The view among many Africans is not just that the SAPs should be abandoned, but that all foreign or externally imposed reforms should be avoided in favor of bottom-up, locally focused, inclusive, and people-driven institutional reform programs, which are most likely to reflect local values, interests, and problems, and hence allow the Africans to own their transformation processes.

While some policymakers argue that the Bretton Woods institutions still have a role to play in Africa's struggle to develop, others argue that both institutions are actually obstacles to the continent's effective economic transformation. Those policymakers who oppose the intervention of the Bretton Woods institutions in African political economy argue that these organizations' obsession with institutional reforms (that many African countries do not consider as priorities) is interfering with the ability of policymakers in the continent to engage in the promotion of policies that are relevant to and informed by the multifarious problems that plague their economies.

The World Bank and the IMF offer the African countries a basket of 'services' including:

- granting a 'seal of approval' for commercial lending
- providing coordination of donors in-country
- participating in the Paris Club consultations, which determine aid and credit to developing countries, including those in Africa (but some

critics argued that both the IMF and the World Bank attend these consultations to bully participants into adopting these institutions' views on the transfer of resources to developing countries)[66]
- conditionalities on structural adjustment loans and debt relief (most of which conditionalities have remained the same despite changes in the political economy of many of these countries)
- significant power to interfere in domestic monetary policy, including sending individuals to oversee activities at central banks and finance ministries
- balance-of-payments support in cases of emergency
- loans for countries to undertake major infrastructure projects such as dams, roads and transport, mineral extraction, energy projects, and other economic infrastructures.

While these services may appear as benefits to the African economy, critics argue that the financial reforms (e.g. exchange rate liberalization) imposed on these economies by the World Bank and the IMF usually induce capital flight, with the latter wiping out any gains from any inflow of financial resources into the continent induced by the Bretton Woods institutions. Research by James Boyce and Léonce Ndikumana has shown that Africa is a net exporter of financial resources and that, by 2004, more than 30% of African citizens' investments (cash and assets) were held offshore.[67] As argued by other researchers, Africans do not benefit from the loans accumulated by their governments; most of these resources are siphoned off by corrupt civil servants and politicians and then 'invested' in offshore accounts in the same banks that extended the credit to the African governments, with benefits accruing to the corrupt elites and their benefactors and not to the people.

Over the years, researchers have uncovered evidence to support the position that World Bank projects in Africa have been mired in corruption and have produced virtually no benefits for the people. Africans argue that there is a total disconnect between their aspirations and the values promoted by their leaders, the latter being the ones who deal with the IFIs; these individuals are primarily interested in maximizing their personal interests and usually engage in activities and behaviors that enrich them but do not promote national development. For example, in the World Bank-funded Chad–Cameroon oil pipeline, while the multinational companies exploiting Chad's oilfields were making record profits, communities around the oilfields and along the pipeline were left to swelter in poverty and high levels of material deprivation, thanks to corruption at the highest levels of the Bank and in the African capitals.[68]

The AfDB began effective operations on July 1, 1966, and until 1973 it struggled to meet its many functions, including especially the promotion of economic growth and development in African countries. The main issue for the Bank at this time in its existence was an inadequate capital stock.

The latter was supposed to come from subscriptions by its member countries. Unfortunately, most of these countries were poor and highly underdeveloped, and hence were not able to pay the money that they had pledged as part of their membership in the AfDB. During the period 1967–1974, the Bank financed its investments in the African economies primarily through funds received as paid-in capital by member countries.[69]

Beginning in 1974, the AfDB began to support its work through the borrowing of resources from the central banks of member countries. Nevertheless, it still continued to operate with a very limited resource base, investing only US $119,500,000 during its first six years of operations in projects in the African countries.[70] At this time, however, the AfDB did not have the necessary creditworthiness to access resources from international markets. The main source of the AfDB's financial problems can be traced to the fact that its membership was essentially made up of severely underdeveloped and extremely poor economies, each of which individually had very poor credit. However, that creditworthiness did not improve after they consolidated their resources and formed the AfDB. Of course, there were a few economies within the continent (Algeria, Nigeria, and Libya) that were relatively large and provided the Bank with significant capital. Nevertheless, the Bank was still unable to secure enough resources to provide the type of capital base that would have significantly enhanced its ability to access international financial markets. In addition to the fact that this state of affairs limited the Bank's investment portfolio, it also discouraged external lenders from extending credit to the Bank. A further exacerbating factor was the failure of many member countries to make good on their financial commitments to the Bank.[71]

In 1975, the AfDB was able to secure funds worth US $65,000,000 from a syndicate of commercial banks in the USA.[72] Finally, with access to funds in the international financial markets, the AfDB was able to safeguard its paid-in capital, as well as expand its investment programs in the African economies. Slowly, the AfDB began to gain the confidence of external lenders, specifically those in the Western industrial economies, such as the USA and other OECD countries.

Over the years, the AfDB's ability to access funds from external sources (i.e. sources outside Africa) continued to increase. This was due partly to the fact that the Bank significantly improved its internal efficiency, especially in the management of its loan portfolio. With an increased ability to source loans from international financial markets, the AfDB was now in a position to engage in multinational projects throughout the continent.[73]

The AfDB's main objective is to promote sustainable economic growth and development in Africa. A fundamental issue that the Bank has tackled in recent years is poverty alleviation, and in doing so, it has spearheaded the African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Within the framework of the NEPAD, the Bank has had to deal with

additional issues besides poverty alleviation, including, especially, climate change and the environment, health (especially in view of the HIV/AIDS pandemic), gender equality, and the reconstruction of post-conflict societies. Over the years, the AfDB has taken an active role in infrastructure development throughout the continent, including the building of roads and highways, railway and port facilities, and other structures designed to significantly increase the productive capacity of many countries. In keeping with changes in technology, the Bank has gradually increased its investment in clean energy projects. In fact, the Bank now manages a Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa, the latter supported by donations from the governments of the USA and Denmark and designed to support the development of clean, affordable, and renewable energy for commercial and household use in the African countries, as well as the creation of jobs in this fast-emerging economic sector.

Conclusion

During the last several decades, African countries have had a rather ambivalent relationship with the IFIs. The ruling elites of many countries on the continent have looked to the IFIs (notably the IMF and the World Bank) to provide funds for and facilitate the implementation of major industrial projects (e.g. the Chad–Cameroon pipeline project). However, many civil-society organizations in Africa (e.g. community, human-rights, and environmental activists and their organizations) have argued that a lot of projects funded by the IFIs have generated benefits almost exclusively for national elites and their foreign benefactors. At the same time, these projects have imposed significant social, economic, political, and environmental costs on the general population. For example, civil-society groups in Chad have argued that the US $4.8 billion Chad–Cameroon pipeline, cofunded by the World Bank, provided many benefits for the multinational companies (including especially ExxonMobil, the consortium leader) involved in the project, as well as for Chadian political elites. But, as argued by many of the country's civil society groups, the additional revenues flowing to the government were used to fund the military and significantly increase the state's capacity to oppress and exploit citizens. In addition, the project created many environmental problems for the villages located along the pipeline's route but provided them with virtually no benefits.

Critics have also argued that flows of financial resources to the continent facilitated by IFIs have usually been accompanied by pressure from multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF for the African countries to undertake certain prescribed institutional reforms, most of which are not designed with the full participation of each country's relevant stakeholders. As a consequence, many of these reforms, such as the SAPs, do not reflect the values and priorities that are most important to the mass of the African peoples. For example, emphasis of the SAPs on debt service skewed agricultural

production in many African countries in favor of cash or export crops (e.g. coffee, palm kernel, cocoa, and bananas) and neglected foodstuff production, a process that led to severe food shortages and threatened food security in many communities throughout the continent.

The way forward, as argued by a host of civil-society organizations and community activists across Africa, is a total reconstruction of global finance so that the IFIs do not remain, as they have been in the last several decades, instruments for the economic, political, and social exploitation of the African peoples. While the reform of international finance is a desirable goal, it is important that Africans provide themselves with governance systems that cannot be easily turned into instruments of plunder by national elites for their own benefit and that of their foreign benefactors. For one thing, the IFIs cannot fund exploitative projects in the continent without the cooperation and acquiescence of each African country's civil servants and political elites. Hence, it is important that each country provide itself with institutional arrangements that adequately constrain the state and hence prevent its custodians (i.e. civil servants and political elites) from acting with impunity. Perhaps, more important, is the fact that significantly improved and more democratic governance systems would greatly enhance the ability of civil society to serve as an effective check on the exercise of government power and hence prevent the engagement of ruling elites in IFI-funded projects that undermine the protection of human rights, gender equality, environmental and ecosystem preservation, peaceful coexistence, poverty eradication, and national development.

Notes

1. See e.g. Carolyn Baylies, "'Political Conditionality' and Democratization," in *The Review of African Political Economy* 22, no. 65 (1995): 321–37; and World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1981).
2. Kevin Danaher, "Introduction," in *50 Years Is Enough: The Case against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund*, ed. Kevin Danaher (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1994), 2.
3. For more on this subject, see the following: Kevin Danaher ed., *50 Years Is Enough: The Case against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1994); and Boris Bernstein and James M. Boughton, "Adjusting to Development: The IMF and the Poor," Finance and *Development* 31 (1995): 42–45.
4. See e.g. *World Bank*, *African Development Indicators, 1998/1999* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1998), 177.
5. Quoted in Tom Young, "'A Project to Be Realized': Global Liberalism and Contemporary Africa," *Millennium* 24, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 538–39.
6. Vinay K. Bhargava, "The Role of the International Financial Institutions in Addressing Global Issues," in *Global Issues for Global Citizens: An Introduction*

to Key Development Challenges, ed. Vinay K. Bhargava (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2006), 393.

7. Ibid., 394.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Vinay K. Bhargava, "The Role of the International Financial Institutions in Addressing Global Issues," 394–95.
11. Ibid., 395.
12. Ibid., 396.
13. African Development Bank, "Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank," last visited on December 31, 2016. Available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal-Documents/Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20ADB%20final%202011.pdf.
14. Ibid., Article 1.
15. Ibid., Article 2.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., "Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank."
19. See e.g. Saleh M. Nsouli, "Capacity Building in Africa: The Role of International Financial Institutions," *Finance and Development* 37, no. 4 (2000): 34–37; and Michael A. Dessart, and Roland E. Ubogu eds., *Capacity Building, Governance, and Economic Reform in Africa* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2001).
20. See "Capacity Building in Africa."
21. See John Mukum Mbaku, *Institutions and Development in Africa* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2004), 247, 261.
22. See e.g. Simeon Ibidayo Ajayi, and Mohsin S. Khan eds., *External Debt and Capital Flight in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: IMF, 2000); and Richard E. Mshomba, *Africa in the Global Economy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000).
23. See e.g. Mbaku, *Institutions and Development in Africa*, 141.
24. See e.g. Fantu Cheru, *The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy* (London, UK: Zed Books, 1989); Timothy M. Shaw, "Reformism, Revisionism, and Radicalism in African Political Economy during the 1990s," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 29, no. 2 (1991): 191–212; Stephen R. Weissman, "Structural Adjustment in Africa: Insights from the Experiences of Ghana and Senegal," *World Development* 18, no. 12 (1990): 1621–34; Julius O. Ihonvbere, *Nigeria: The Politics of Adjustment & Democracy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994); and George W. Shepherd, "The African Right to Development: World Policy and the Debt Crisis," *Africa Today* 37, no. 4 (1990): 5–14.
25. Baylies, "Political Conditionality," 322.
26. Mbaku, *Institutions and Development*, 142.
27. See e.g. World Bank, *Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
28. See generally Sanjaya Lall, "Structural Adjustment and African Industry," *World Development* 23, no. 12 (1995): 2019–31; Ihonvbere, *Nigeria: The Politics of Adjustment*; Kempe R. Hope Sr., ed., *Structural Adjustment, Reconstruction and Development* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1997); and Fantu Cheru,

The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy (London, UK: Zed Books, 1989).

29. Mbaku, *Institutions and Development in Africa*, 145.
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CHAPTER 36

Development History and Postcolonial African Experience

Ruth Rempel

Poet Okot p'Bitek asked his readers: 'Do you remember/The night of *uhuru*' (freedom, independence), when 'men and women wept with joy/As they danced,/Hands raised in salute/To the national flag?' He continued, giving voice to the hopes of Uganda's rural majority, by asking:

> Did someone tell you
> That on the morning of *uhuru*
> The dew on the grass
> Along the village pathways
> Would turn into gold?[1]

Nationalist historians, like p'Bitek's villagers, saw political independence as a historical watershed. However, if we use development as a lens, political independence appears as the redirection of a watercourse, rather than a watershed. p'Bitek was one of many who went on to identify painful continuities between development in the colonial and postcolonial eras.

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Development in New African States

Nationalists promised that if they held the levers of power they would provide good jobs and markets, as well as modern education, health care and other services Africans were coming to expect, like roads and mail.[2] The word 'development' carried all these and other desired changes. But how was it to be accomplished?

Governments of newly independent African countries generally maintained the development approach established under imperial rule. In part, this was because imperial officials continued to occupy senior positions due to the scarcity of educated nationals.[3] Another factor was the attractiveness of some inherited policies, exemplified by the 1951 UN report's influence in African countries.[4] Even where a reversal of approach might be expected, there were continuities. For example, the 1962 Evian Accords that ended Algeria's bitter war for independence used the 1958 Constantine Plan to structure postwar development and French aid for it.[5]

Development continuity was also the product of the constrained choices African countries faced.[6] Most were small. The median population size in 1960 was three million, and 15 countries were under one million. Despite this, imperial boundaries made for diverse populations, so national unity was a challenge.[7] On average, 15% of African countries' land was arable, giving reasonable agricultural prospects. A handful of countries had known mineral deposits, but few were thought to have oil.[8] Most lacked the capacity to extract sub-surface resources, or to compete with established processors and manufacturers. They depended heavily on trade, but were disadvantaged by small market share, distance from global markets, and ties to a single trade partner. Their influence with investors, lenders, or donors outside their imperial metropole was limited. This was a hindsight view, however. At the time of independence, development experts believed African countries' prospects for economic growth were fairly good; African leaders believed they were excellent.[9]

'Political independence, in itself, does not satisfy anything', Senegalese politician Mamadou Dia remarked. 'But it is necessary, and without it, nothing is possible'.[10] What independence chiefly made possible was a new pace of development, often through intensification of existing approaches.[11] Uganda's economy, for example, remained overwhelmingly agricultural after independence in 1962, its subsistence sector largely outside the purview of government policy and its main export crops subject to policies established around the Second World War. Coffee and cotton marketing boards continued to accumulate surpluses through indirect taxation. Trade-based taxes generated much of government revenue, as had been the case since 1920.[12] Cash-crop growers continued to exercise economic and political agency in cooperatives, legalized in 1946.[13] Public investment followed patterns established in the early 1950s. Experts noted that the years of high investment and growth before independence were also years of booming exports and high

world prices. Spending restraint would be needed in non-essential areas to meet the robust, but status quo economic growth targets of the 1961–1966 Five-Year Plan—four to five percent per year—or the more ambitious seven to eight percent target of the subsequent plan. Alternatively, higher taxes, 'semi-voluntary' savings schemes, and stronger incentives for private investment would be required.[14] The new government preferred to rely on external aid and borrowing, though it attracted less of these than neighboring Kenya.[15] Likewise, community development and women's development followed already established patterns, with existing volunteer organizations complemented by formal structures set up in the early 1950s.[16] Staples of nationalist policy like diversification of agricultural exports, promotion of light industry focused on the domestic market, and participating in an International Coffee Agreement to manage the market for the country's main export all predated Uganda's independence, and were continued afterwards.[17] Regional integration, a signature policy of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was built on East African institutions created between 1917 and 1961. The pace of practical integration did not increase after independence, despite the creation of the East African Community in 1967.[18] It is worth remembering, though, that Uganda's early five-year plans differed from those of its regional partners, with whom it shared history and geography as well as institutional ties. That diversification accelerated after independence, within both East Africa and the continent.

Emerging African Approaches

Despite the constraints and challenges they faced, African governments viewed the creation of national development plans as an exercise of sovereignty.[19] However, a study of plans from 22 Sub-Saharan countries found that it was the second post-independence plan—generally drafted in the mid- to late 1960s—in which a national development model of some sort was advanced.[20] This effort was tempered, though, by the political structures emerging in a number of African countries. As Claude Ake observed, once in power, nationalist leaders tended to use their position for accumulation since they had been unable to build up economic strength under imperial rule. These leaders sought to contain social and economic divisions, both to build national unity and to protect their own positions. They deliberately narrowed the political system, creating effective, if not formal, one-party states, and enhanced the power of the executive within the state. They also limited the space in which non-state actors—whether private businesses, unions, non-profit organizations or popular movements—could operate. 'Besieged by a multitude of hostile forces that their authoritarianism and exploitative practices had engendered', Ake went on, 'those in power were so involved in the struggle for survival that they could not address the problem of development'. They also could not abandon it, since development was an important

rationale for their rule. Leaders 'responded to this dilemma by making token gestures to development while trying to pass the responsibility for [it] to foreign patrons'.[21] Poet p'Bitek was blunter. He railed against the leaders who rejected the works of Europeans, 'the famine relief granaries/And the forced-labour system', even as they invited 'Foreign "experts" and peace corps [to] swarm the country like white ants'. They proclaimed the need for 'all the tribes' to 'become one people' while sowing fierce new political divisions. They talked endlessly about how 'They fight with diseases/Poverty and ignorance', while they ate 'thick honey/and ghee and butter'. They opened a gulf between the rural poor and urban '"big car" tribesmen'.[22] These leaders, p'Bitek charged:

> Throw themselves into soft beds,
> But the hip bones of the voters
> Grow painful
> Sleeping on the same earth
> They slept
> Before Uhuru![23]

Whether token or not, national development models and their underlying ideologies can be categorized by their emphases: African socialism and African pragmatism were initially popular; Afro-Marxism and populism made an appearance toward the end of the 1960s.[24] Despite their diversity of name and focus, these models shared the idea of state-led development, then a globally accepted element of development.[25] It was particularly powerful in Africa because recent independence had made the state a collective and an individual prize. The desirability of modernity was a second shared assumption. It was not understood as openness to ongoing change, which could be destabilizing; a fear nationalist leaders shared with their imperial predecessors. The appeal of modernization was increased productivity and capacity through adoption of new technology and techniques.[26] Nationalists believed these could be blended with valued elements of tradition. The third assumption was the need for indigenization, protectionism, nationalization, and often also nativism. The territorial nation and the continent were the units to which this assumption was generally applied, but at both these levels, the indigenous had to be adapted or (re)constructed. An example of this was consensus seeking—what Ali Mazrui and others called the palaver tradition—which became a rationale for 'one-party democracies' in a number of countries after independence.[27] The development goal that flowed from all these assumptions was an internationally respected, unified country governed by a state with agency. It should have a revitalized, harmonious social order linked to a national identity, and a self-reliant economy that financed modernization.[28]

Nationalist models proved difficult to translate into specific development policies, even where governments were genuinely interested in doing so. The Tanzania African National Union (TANU) government under Julius Nyerere

was one that made the effort.[29] Tanzania's new development principles were set out in the 1967 Arusha Declaration.[30] The country's second five-year plan (1969–1974) called for full mobilization behind the core principle of *ujamaa* (familyhood). *Ujamaa* bundled together values abstracted from familial relations, which Nyerere and TANU saw as the heart of traditional African societies, and extended them to the nation. *Ujamaa* was also linked to villagization. It would create rural communities that farmed more productively through collective work and improved methods. The villages would also be vehicles for more effective service delivery, for national planning and defense, plus incubators for appropriate norms and roles. Women as mothers should improve food security and familial well-being, for example, while young men were to guard the nation, though both groups' energies were channeled rather than genuinely mobilized.[31] After 1973, the creation of *ujamaa* villages was enforced, since voluntary participation was not achieving official targets. Industrial workers and students were also subordinated to the government. As this suggests, the direction and pace of change did not please all Tanzanians, and the government's increasingly authoritarian posture grieved and angered many. The impacts of villagization and other initiatives linked to *ujamaa* varied.[32] Improved access to health and education services helped increase average life expectancy from 42 to 52 years between 1960 and 1980, while literacy increased from 10 to 66%.[33] Production of food crops also grew over these two decades, but at a slower rate between 1967 and 1973 than in the immediately preceding or following years.[34] After leaving office, Nyerere said the Arusha Declaration had not banished poverty, but claimed that it had not promised to do so; rather, its purpose had been to offer hope for a future of justice and peace.[35]

Rural development received more attention in Tanzania than was common in African countries at that time, but structural change based on industrialization was still TANU's long-term goal.[36] Neglect of the rural, especially smallholders (or peasant farmers), was an emerging concern about the 1951 development model. It was an acute omission in African countries, which had overwhelmingly rural populations. African women played important agricultural roles, but women were another of the model's blind spots. By the late 1960s, both critics and supporters of development were also questioning the assumed connection between international aid, state-led economic growth, and bettered lives. Addressing these problems created opportunities for non-profit actors, ranging from foundations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating at a global scale, to associations and organizations that worked at very local ones. More of these were active in African countries by the 1970s, though the non-profit sector varied considerably by country.[37]

Fears of a global food crisis intensified development experts' interest in agriculture toward the end of the 1960s. To the extent that African governments delegated national development to external actors, they followed this trend, though their most acute concern was usually to keep food affordable

and prevent unrest. Mali's government, for example, retooled the *Office du Niger* after independence, with the goal of ensuring national food security. The area under irrigation increased, and the government endorsed the preindependence switch from cotton to rice production; the project's top-down approach was also retained.[38] As the *Office* had never been profitable, foreign aid was needed to support it and thus subsidize the rice it produced, mostly for urban consumers.[39] Food imports were another tactic some African governments used, though in doing so they sacrificed national self-reliance and rural prosperity for stability.

From Challenge to Crisis

The mid-1970s was a watershed for African development because global economic changes that significantly affected the resources available for development interacted with changes underway within African countries. The most visible global change was the oil price increase of 1973, which occurred after members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cut production to enforce their demand for better prices. A simultaneous embargo by Arab oil exporters against Israel's allies in the Yom Kippur war magnified the cut's impact. Real international oil prices doubled. Observers believed that 'the energy crisis has deprived the less developed countries of any chance of further development'. A second large price increase occurred in 1979, triggered by fears of shortages after an oil-worker strike in revolutionary Iran and the Iran-Iraq war.[40]

Another change whose effects were becoming clearer by the mid-1970s was the American government's 1971 decision to end the convertibility of its dollar to gold. Rapid fluctuations in the value of major currencies followed, and by early 1973 the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-supervised system of exchange rates negotiated after the Second World War was effectively dead.[41] Banks seeking to protect themselves from these fluctuations and from rising inflation switched from lending with fixed interest rates to variable ones. Added to this, monetary policy changes in countries that housed international banks, especially the USA and Britain, provoked substantial increases in real interest rates at the start of the 1980s. As Susan Strange observed, the decade-and-a-half following 1973 was characterized by significant economic instability as the prices of commodities, of currencies, and of credit all became more volatile.[42] This severe turbulence was even more striking by contrast with the stability of the preceding decade. In retrospect, the 1960s and the 1950s before them looked like a golden age for development.

Commodity-price fluctuations interacted with exchange-rate volatility to increase the risk and cost of trading. Businesses and governments both faced greater challenges in planning economic activity and managing their finances. Powerful economic actors, whether industrialized countries or multinational corporations, were able to cope with or deflect these problems. Their

negative effects fell most heavily on weaker actors, including low-income, trade-dependent countries.[43] Where these countries had only been independent for a short time and had relatively inexperienced governments—as was the case in Africa—the harm was amplified. In addition, international economic volatility had a more damaging effect on countries experiencing internal conflicts.[44] Between 1970 and 1985, armed conflict affected roughly half of Africa's countries.[45]

As this suggests, global changes interacted negatively with socio-political processes in African countries. When commodity prices fell, national income contracted as did state revenue, since African governments still relied heavily on taxation of trade. Reduced revenue affected the state's ability to provide public services and jobs, to subsidize essential goods, to invest, or to provide the counterpart funds required for many aid projects. Windfalls, like the dramatic coffee-price spike of the mid-1970s, could be equally destabilizing.[46] African governments, both those committed to development and those not, interpreted dramatic price increases as signs of an upward trend. The pressure to spend rather than save the increased income was powerful, and once spending commitments were made it was hard to counter the expectation they would continue. In Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda—all heavily dependent on coffee exports—management of the price spike was fumbled by military governments.[47] Even where either government or the private sector invested the windfall, limited capacity to absorb a sudden burst of spending undermined the investments' effectiveness and caused inflation. All these problems were compounded by poor advice from external development experts whose commodity-price forecasts tended to be optimistic, and whose understanding of the causes of price volatility was limited.[48]

The national development models advanced in the late 1960s could not reach healthy maturity in such an environment, no matter what their content. International turbulence strained the compact nationalists made with citizens at independence: loyalty to the state and contributions to its development agenda in exchange for prosperity and social harmony. It also exacerbated tensions between ethnic groups and classes. Not surprisingly, 30 African countries experienced coups between 1973 and 1985, and 13 of them multiple coups, a greater concentration than during any other period between 1950 and the present.[49] About half of these coups were successful, and the names of the regimes they engendered implied renewed promises: Democracy, Progress, Unity, and Redemption.[50] But a reported exchange between Liberia's military ruler and future president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf summed up what most offered in practice: '"General Doe, you promised the people so many things, and you are not keeping those promises." Doe just looked straight at me and said, "I didn't promise them shit"'.[51]

Different, but equally difficult conflicts consumed Southern Africa as the struggle for liberation from white minority rule intensified, together with destabilization of frontline states by embattled settler regimes.

The Portuguese colonies' independence struggles ended abruptly after a 1974 coup in Portugal, but were followed by destructive civil wars in Angola and Mozambique.

Post-independence crises like the Suez (1956) and Congo (1960) ones had drawn an international response from governments and the UN. The Nigeria-Biafra war (1967–1970) was different. The official response was limited, but non-profit actors like the Red Cross, together with European and North American church organizations, played a significant role. They provided both relief aid and Track Two (or citizen) diplomacy. Their public appeals, together with international media coverage, prompted an outpouring of donations.[52] The war was another turning point in development history. Biafra shaped a new generation of humanitarian workers and NGOs, successors to those who assisted postwar Europe. By 1970, a recognizable international humanitarian system that paralleled and overlapped with that of development assistance was emerging.[53]

Meanwhile, another crisis was unfolding close by. Drought started in the Sahel in 1968, and the hunger it caused intensified into famine over the next few years. Several million people in six countries required food aid and an estimated 100,000 died.[54] Sahelian governments did not declare a state of emergency until early 1973, though, the point when the disaster also started to receive international media coverage.[55] In its aftermath, many questions were raised about the humanitarian response. Nonetheless, aid to the continent increased substantially, both for relief and for development. Drought-stricken Sahelian countries almost doubled their per capita aid receipts between 1975 and 1980.[56] Unfortunately, this caused them to suffer aid indigestion, as they had a limited ability to absorb the sudden influx of resources or deal effectively with a mass of donors.[57]

A decade later, famine in the Horn of Africa drew unprecedented international attention. In development circles it was clear that the mid-1980s drought and food shortages were not confined to the Horn; they affected 22 countries spanning West, East, and Southern Africa.[58] This humanitarian emergency fed a sense that the continent was suffering a development crisis. The appeals for extraordinary aid by African governments and intergovernmental organizations helped to distinguish the continent's needs from those of other regions.

The number of aid-dependent African countries almost tripled between 1975 and 1979. Two types of countries were added to the existing list: drought-affected Sahelian countries and small countries like Gambia, Lesotho, and the Seychelles that were particularly vulnerable to economic turmoil. By the end of the 1980s, almost half of the continent's countries were aid-dependent.[59] This reflected both the success of pleas for aid made with increasing intensity in the 1980s, and the dramatic reduction in incoming foreign investment that distinguished Africa from other developing continents during the 1980s.[60]

The UN Development Decades in Africa—Were They a Disaster?

Crises, which entrenched the image of the entire continent as a disaster zone, suggest the need for a review of Africa's development performance during the UN Development Decades, roughly also the first two decades after independence. The most common metric for development during this period was economic growth, and by this standard African countries' performance was, on average, respectable. Tanzania's economy, for example, grew by an annual average rate of six percent in the 1960s and five percent in the following decade.[61] Most countries, though, did not reach the very ambitious growth targets prescribed in their national plans. These echoed or exceeded the targets of the UN Development Decades, on which African governments had been an important influence.[62] Economic growth was not only jeopardized by global turmoil after 1973, it was undercut by rapid population growth. The average per capita income growth in the continent was a limited, though still positive, 0.9% over the two UN Development Decades.[63]

With respect to structural change, commodities continued to make up the vast majority of African exports, though some countries were able to diversify into non-traditional commodities whose prices were better. However, outside of export enclaves, production techniques and productivity did not improve much.[64] The share of manufactures in African exports rose, indicating that the goal of industrial development was being met, albeit modestly. Although trade with former imperial powers remained important, most African countries were able to diversify their trade relationships.[65] More importantly, as Table 36.1 shows, life expectancy and literacy both improved, though slowly, and levels of social development in many Sub-Saharan countries remained very low. As with income, these averages concealed significant variation between countries, and growing inequality within them.

Developing countries were responsible for the proclamation of a second UN Development Decade in 1970. Its agenda was more substantial than that of the first, though mostly still through intensification of the 1951 model.[66] An important difference, though, was the collective action taken

Table 36.1 Trends in social development

	Life expectancy (years)				*Literacy rate (percent)*			
	1950	*1960*	*1970*	*1979*	*1950*	*1960*	*1970*	*1979*
Low-income Sub-Saharan countries	35	39	43	46	–	17	17	29
Middle-income Sub-Saharan countries	37	41	46	50	16	22	37	–
North African countries	42[a]	47	52	57	19[a]	19	24	40
All developing countries	43	48	54	58	33	38	46	56

Source World Bank, *World Development Report 1982* (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1982), 24

[a]The 1950 data for North Africa include the Middle East

by governments in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. They sought to change the global context in which their national development occurred, and the New International Economic Order they desired became a defining development initiative of the 1970s.[67] The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), created in 1964, was a vehicle for it. African countries, working in concert, provided crucial support for this in the UN and ensured that the problems of commodity-exporting countries were prominent on UNCTAD's agenda.[68] African governments hedged their trade-and-development bets, though, by negotiating special market access to the European Economic Community (EEC) on terms similar to those they had from their former imperial rulers.[69]

Templates for African Development

At the national level, African states were also adjusting their development agendas. As Claude Ake noted, external actors played an increasing role in this. The space ceded by African leaders, whose governing capacity did not keep pace with the growth of their populations or with the challenges of the 1970s, was one reason for this. The engagement of a larger and more diverse group of external actors, who had more encompassing ideas about development, was another. The Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP) was emblematic of both trends, as John Cohen's work on the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit in Ethiopia illustrates.[70] Donor pressure had given agriculture a new prominence in Ethiopia's third five-year plan (1968–1973). Both donors and the government agreed that a few well-resourced interventions would be the most effective way to spark change, given the depth of Ethiopia's rural poverty and the government's limited capacity. Chilalo, started in 1967 by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), was the first of three IRDPs. It demonstrated that an integrated set of measures—improved rural markets, infrastructure and services, together with the Green Revolution inputs of high-yielding seed and fertilizer—could increase agricultural production in Ethiopia. However, the benefits were unevenly distributed, and they were not accompanied by either popular participation or progressive social change.

The Chilalo project represented a negotiation of interests among the participants. SIDA chose to believe Emperor Haile Selassie's promise that land-reform legislation, something the Swedes thought essential to rural transformation, was imminent. In turn, the emperor approved the Chilalo project—and its inflow of resources—as proposed, and allowed it to be administered autonomously by SIDA. At the project level, tenants who increased production faced demands for higher rent from feudal landowners. Some even evicted their tenants and used the project's inputs and subsidized farm machinery for themselves.

The Swedish evaluation of Chilalo concluded that a few inputs had been crucial to the productivity gain, so SIDA said it would help provide these in more locations via a less complex and much less expensive Minimum Package Program starting in 1971. This program continued after the military coup in 1974, as did the Chilalo project though it was renamed and extended throughout the Arsi region.[71] Ethiopia's new revolutionary government initiated one of the more substantial applications of the Soviet agricultural model to an African country. It nationalized land and distributed user-rights to small farmers. It required the formation of peasant associations and cooperatives, started resettlement and villagization programs, and created some state farms, though subsistence farming was for the first time a national priority. Nonetheless, the new government continued to receive rural development aid from SIDA and other prerevolutionary donors. This enabled a sharp increase in government spending on agriculture. Though it insisted on greater national control over planning and implementation, the government still needed aid and multilateral loans to finance development. Another important continuity with the prerevolutionary era was use of national marketing bodies to tax farmers.[72]

The sense of development crisis was far from universal in the continent after 1973. The oil-price increases gave Africa's oil exporters an unprecedented opportunity to fund national development. Though Algeria's model of oil-financed development had its problems, the price windfall of the 1970s was invested to a greater extent than in other African countries.[73] Nigeria's experience, by contrast, gave development analysts grounds for talking about a resource curse.[74] Botswana and Mauritius offered national models for prospering, and not just surviving the economic turmoil. Mauritius used income from sugar exports to the EEC, earned with a large Lomé agreement quota, to diversify its economy and industrialize. However, its distinctive socio-political and geographic conditions led observers to question whether other African countries could repeat its experience.[75] Botswana parlayed its diamond wealth into economic growth, improved social development and political stability, though diamond processing was as far as its economic transformation proceeded.[76] Both have been tagged as African developmental states, though the debate about the character and desirability of such states continues.[77]

The UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) was the scene of another kind of positive work: drafting a continental blueprint for development. It started in 1975, the year in which a driven new executive secretary, Adebayo Adedeji, was appointed. The ECA undertook an audit of development trends in the continent from 1960 to 1975 and found that, despite an average economic growth rate of 4.8%, there was an increasing gap between nationalist promises and African performance, as well as between Africa and other developing regions.[78] Adedeji was convinced that blind acceptance of Western development models was behind this, and set the ECA to create an African one. The result was a set of connected documents, including the

Monrovia Strategy (1979) and the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), that were adopted by the OAU. These documents showed that the 1950s development consensus continued to exercise a strong hold on African intellectuals and leaders, though they adapted it to the continent's particular needs.[79] The Lagos Plan assumed the modernization of society as a goal, to be achieved through import-substituting industrialization, with the state playing a central role in development. African unity was a means of accomplishing development objectives through collective self-reliance via an African Economic Community.[80] The Plan's drafters were conscious of the changing global context, though. Rising international food prices and falling African production moved neglected agriculture into the Plan's first chapter, with the goal of food self-sufficiency via an agricultural revolution.[81] Urgent action was also prescribed in the Plan's energy section, since shortages were identified as an existential threat to non-oil-exporting African countries.[82] Despite evident worry over worsening development prospects, the Lagos Plan displayed a mid-1970s optimism that collective Third World action could change an unjust international system. Adedeji, the Plan's sponsor, argued though that global change must flow from national and continental transformation; only then would commodity-dependent African countries experience economic decolonization.[83]

The Lagos Plan's existence was more distinctively African than its content. No other region of the world felt the need for a continental model of development, let alone put significant effort into creating one. The Plan embodied a confidence that elements of disparate development approaches could be successfully harmonized, a trait evident in other individual and national African development prescriptions. Unfortunately, the Lagos Plan fell into an established pattern for continental pronouncements: leaders assented, but did not follow through with national public engagement or sufficient resources. The Lagos Plan quickly became the first in a series of what Adedeji called 'Battles for the African Mind'.[84] Its opponent was the World Bank's *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa* (1981), which set out a very different agenda for change. As African governments had few resources they were able, or willing, to devote to the Lagos Plan, and external donors and creditors preferred to support its opponent, the battle was short.[85] The African Development Bank was the one organization that did adopt the Lagos Plan, as a response to critics who said it lacked a clear development strategy for its lending.[86]

Despite successes in a few countries, the decade after 1974 was one of uncertainty and confusion about the direction of development in Africa. By the time the Lagos Plan was formally adopted the conditions in which and for which it had been created were gone. The OAU's next major statement about continental development, Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER, 1985), referenced the Lagos Plan but was effectively an elegy for it. Though stating that the Lagos principles were 'more valid today

than ever', APPER concerned itself with crisis recovery and called for a new relationship with aid donors.[87]

Economic Shocks and National Survival Programs

Between 1980 and 1986, the global context for African development changed further. International commodity prices, including that of oil, fell sharply. In 1986, real commodity prices stood at levels below those of the 1920s and 1930s. Price volatility, though less severe than during the 1970s, continued.[88] The resulting terms of trade losses were worse in Africa than the average for developing countries. While Africa's oil exporters suffered the most dramatic losses, between 1981 and 1986 the non-oil-exporting countries of Sub-Saharan Africa collectively earned an estimated US$1.6 billion a year less than they would have done if commodity prices had stayed at 1980 levels. This was in spite of generally increasing export volumes.[89] Indeed, the greater export effort made the problem worse, as oversupply further lowered prices.

Ghana's situation illustrates the ongoing interaction between external and internal pressures. A series of venal military regimes gave way to a weak civilian government at the end of the 1970s, but none of them offered policies that engaged much public support or responded effectively to the turmoil Ghana experienced. When Flight Lieutenant Rawlings seized power for a second time in 1981, his military government inherited an economy close to collapse. Unlike some other African governments, it did not have an immediate debt problem because of rescheduling carried out in the early 1970s.[90] However, cocoa production, which accounted for more than 70% of the country's exports, had been falling steadily for a decade. Worse, cocoa's international price dropped in 1980.[91] Ghana was also experiencing a severe drought, which caused food shortages, destructive fires, and a drastic cut in hydroelectric generation that limited national economic activity and power exports. Nigeria caused additional problems when it expelled foreigners, including between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Ghanaians, who had to be reabsorbed.[92]

Import strangulation was the first and most visible symptom of crisis in Ghana and elsewhere. By the mid-1980s, African countries had a sharply reduced capacity to pay for crucial imports of productive goods, consumer items and, in some cases, even food.[93] Many African governments borrowed to cover the resulting trade deficits, but rising real interest rates and a scarcity of credit after the international debt crisis broke in mid-1982 made this a problematic strategy.

The governments of several countries—Algeria, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania among them—responded by creating national survival programs in the early 1980s. These were country-specific programs used to solicit support from bilateral creditors and aid donors. They generally

included measures to bridge the gap between imports and exports, and to deal with food deficits; some also dealt with budget deficits and allowed private businesses more of a role in the economy.[94] Burkina Faso's program, for example, responded to a worsening deficit and debt situation that, while modest in comparison with other African countries, were significant given the country's small income and cautious financial policies. The revolutionary military government installed in 1983 quickly introduced a self-designed policy package to address the economic shocks and, more unusually, to promote social equity and structural change in the economy. This included cuts to civil-service wages and perks, new taxes and fees, an end to the fertilizer subsidy, as well as measures to increase agricultural production and mining. There were also primary-education, health, and housing initiatives. This echoed parts of the Lagos Plan, but the Burkinabe program was formulated independently of it. Although the program had positive effects, the country's debt-service burden worsened.[95] The program was also not successful in attracting international aid: while the USA increased its assistance to Burkina Faso, this was outweighed by French aid cuts.

Other countries with national survival programs were similarly unable to attract funding from either socialist donors or Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ones. They were consequently forced to turn to the IMF and World Bank.[96] The survival programs were also swamped by the severity of the crisis, especially where new shocks were piled onto serious existing problems, as was the case in Mozambique.[97] While these programs had mixed policy effects, one thing they consistently failed to do was reduce the debt of the countries concerned. Indeed, in most cases the debt increased. Over the next several years, these survival programs evolved into narrower economic stabilization packages, usually financed by the IMF. Initially, this was short-term credit from the IMF's Stand-By Facility, whose conditions were not quite as onerous as those of the Fund's Extended Facility. When drawing on the latter, countries were forced to adopt stabilization policies that were controversial both because their effect on the least developed countries was debated, and because their sharp impact on the public made them politically unpopular.[98]

Adjustment vs Development

Jacques de Larosière, the IMF's managing director, could report in 1984 that adjustment was 'now virtually universal' and the debt crisis was being successfully managed.[99] However, in 1986, the Fund had to create a Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), followed a year later by an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) as it became increasingly clear that standard stabilization packages were not addressing the economic problems of African countries.[100] In hindsight, the early 1980s were the high-water mark of direct IMF involvement with indebted countries, as new forms of World Bank

lending allowed it to play an increasing role.[101] The World Bank's Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) and smaller-scale Sectoral Adjustment Loans (SECALs), created in 1980 and 1982 respectively, had two conflicting purposes: to promote policy dialogue with borrowing countries and to provide money to countries in economic crisis, money that was available quickly and was not tied to a particular project.[102] The policy dialogue occurred when the loans were negotiated, but given the financial desperation and limited capacity of African governments, together with the superficial deference many paid to donors and creditors, lenders dominated the dialogue. Adjustment loans consequently had a consistent core of policy conditions.[103] This included a substantial dose of stabilization, followed by policy changes to reorient the economy and promote economic growth. A switch from state-led to market-led development, involving liberalization and privatization, was central to the reorientation. While adjusting countries were encouraged to diversify their exports, in practice, adjustment programs emphasized producing more of what was already being exported. Indeed some of the policy tools needed for diversification, especially a shift toward commodity processing and manufacturing, were put out of bounds by adjustment conditionality.[104] All this was an axe to the root of the nationalists' program of development, which neo-liberal advocates dismissed as a set of growth-killing policies that primarily benefited corrupt African politicians and bureaucrats.[105]

Behind stabilization and adjustment was an increasingly powerful monetarist view of the economic problems of industrialized countries. It made the leap to development policy in the late 1970s with the assertion that the problems of poor people and poor countries were not distinctively different from those of others.[106] The weakness of existing development models, under attack from both the right and the left, facilitated this leap. Supporters proclaimed the end of development and a new era of reform with the conviction of military spokespersons announcing a redemptive new regime. Simultaneously, a New Political Economy that used neo-classical economic tools to generate a radically negative view of the state was gaining influence, fueling a preference for small, authoritarian, and technocratic states.[107]

The reform process, which IMF and World Bank experts initially expected to last two to three years, would need more time, maybe a decade or more.[108] As the period for neo-liberal policy intervention lengthened, its scope also broadened, giving structural adjustment the characteristics of a development model despite the neo-liberal rejection of development. By the end of the 1990s, the rationale for adjustment had become retroactively and openly developmental: 'to prevent or reverse unsustainable economic conditions that hurt the poor and to establish or restore the conditions for sustainable development'.[109]

The election of governments espousing these ideas in influential creditor and aid donor countries meant they were communicated to bilateral aid agencies and to institutions like the IMF and World Bank. In turn, these were the

channels through which these ideas were transmitted to African countries and became powerful there.[110] Structural adjustment lending played a key role in this process, but it is worth noting that these World Bank loans were not created as an evangelical tool for neo-liberal views.[111] However, in giving policy space and influence to monetarism and the New Political Economy, adjustment lending helped to establish these views in the development mainstream and to keep them there during the 1980s and much of the 1990s.[112]

While structural adjustment lending was generally no more than a quarter of the World Bank's and IMF's total lending, it became a crucial means of engagement with African countries for both organizations.[113] Having an IMF agreement is a good indicator of the intensity of a country's adjustment experience, since the World Bank together with other lenders and aid donors required the IMF's 'seal of approval' before they would provide funds.[114] Between 1980 and 1999, indebted non-African countries with IMF stabilization programs spent an average of nine of those years under the discipline of these programs, while indebted African countries spent an average of eleven years, and among the ten most adjusted African countries, it was almost 18 years. The ten most adjusted non-African countries spent an average of only ten years under IMF discipline. Nine out of ten African countries had an IMF program at some point during the 1980s and 1990s. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the next most adjusted region of the world, this was true for just over three-quarters of the countries.[115]

African governments responded to neo-liberal reform ideas and to conditionality on much needed funding in a variety of ways. Some rejected specific conditions, as when Ghana's government refused to privatize its cocoa marketing board, Cocobod, choosing to reform it instead.[116] Rejection of an entire adjustment program was relatively rare, though Zambia was one country that did so. Its 1985 Economic Recovery Program (ERP), supported with World Bank and IMF loans, was a program whose conditions frustrated even those members of the government who favored reform. When riots provoked by removal of the maize subsidy spread from Copperbelt towns to the capital in 1987, the government changed course. President Kaunda announced the ERP's replacement with a nationally designed reform program that was to be financed by diverting foreign exchange from unproductive uses like luxury imports and foreign debt payments. Debt service was unilaterally limited to ten percent of net export earnings. Like the national salvation plans, this reform program had mixed results. The least ambiguous one was the withholding of funds by donors and lenders who disapproved of Zambia's action. Under growing financial pressure, the government returned to an orthodox adjustment program one year later, and maintained it despite renewed rioting and a coup attempt.[117]

A much more common response to structural adjustment programs was to agree to what external funders proposed and then delay, or fail to implement reforms, or undermine them with countervailing measures. Independent

studies suggest that about half of the conditions were implemented, but only a quarter of them on the timetable set by the Fund or the Bank.[118] Since multilateral lenders were under pressure to keep loans flowing, and bilateral donors wanted to support client countries, non-cooperation was an effective way for some African governments to avoid unwanted change. It did not, however, amount to an alternate strategy for addressing national crises. Regimes and leaders often embraced those reforms that fitted with their interests, rather than national ones. In Tunisia, for example, the 1986 *infitah* (opening) of the economy intensified a process of liberalization already underway, adding in resources and policy advice from the IMF and World Bank. The government of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, installed in a bloodless 1987 coup, maintained a close relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions, especially the IMF. Ben Ali's government was quite willing to remove currency controls and restrictions on foreign investment and profit repatriation to liberalize the crucial tourism sector, among others. Nonetheless, it insisted on a more gradual pace of reform than its Bretton Woods advisors wanted. Significantly, the government also did not remove itself from the tourist industry. A number of the state-owned hotels that were privatized were in fact purchased by state-owned banks and refurbished; the banks then sold off some shares in the hotels. This was part of a pattern of liberalization in which new channels of patronage were created for a small number of well-connected and wealthy Tunisians.[119]

The human costs of stabilization and adjustment were also significant. In Ivory Coast, one of the continent's ten most adjusted countries, poverty was a long-standing problem. It worsened significantly, though, after the government started to draw extensively on the IMF in 1989. An IMF-supported study found that between 1988 and 1995 the incidence and the intensity of poverty in the country doubled, and poverty affected a wider range of social groups.[120] The share of the population earning less than US$1 per day rose from 18 to 37%, and the incidence of stunting (low height-for-age among young children) rose from 20 to 35% over the same period. Despite efforts to protect social expenditure, stabilization measures resulted in small per capita decreases in real health spending and dramatic cuts in real education spending. As primary school enrollment was increasing, the quality of education deteriorated as student–teacher ratios increased and teacher salaries fell. In the health sector, user fees introduced in 1991 did not reduce visits by the poorest Ivorians. However, their health suffered because they were no longer able to supplement low-quality public health services with formal private-sector care, and instead had to fall back on traditional medicine. A program to mitigate the short-term effects of adjustment on the urban poor—the rural poor were expected to benefit from adjustment—was only partly implemented and it failed to prevent a worsening of urban poverty. Ivory Coast's reforms were initiated by the autocratic regime of Félix Houphouët-Boigny. With no prior opportunity for public input, it was no surprise that the public

expressed opposition to the reforms when political liberalization started in the early 1990s.

As in Zambia, public protest was one, though not a universal part of the popular response to structural adjustment. Campaigning by African NGOs, national church bodies and trade unions was another, some of it directed at national decisionmakers and some at external targets, like the World Bank. Involvement in international campaigns in turn helped create space for African NGOs in some countries to participate in national dialogue on adjustment issues through the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRIN) and subsequent Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) consultations. This advocacy and policy work was only one part of the response of non-profit organizations, though. NGOs, both national and international ones, were also under pressure to return to the fields of health, education, and income generation as government budget cuts left substantial gaps in their provision of basic services and community development.

Circumvention of stabilization and adjustment's effects was a common response at the level of households and individuals. Migration was an option for some, as was movement, not always voluntary, into the informal sector. In many African countries, the informal sector grew substantially. It and subsistence agriculture were the means by which many Africans, especially women and the poor, supported themselves during the years of crisis. The informal sector helped insulate its participants from economic contraction, but it also meant they were excluded from new economic opportunities in the reformed formal sector.[121]

An African Synthesis?

In the 1980s, most African intellectuals were, if not completely opposed to structural adjustment, then critical pragmatists, though there were also some African enthusiasts for structural adjustment. The critics denounced adjustment as a set of policies that opened African economies to external exploiters, impoverishing both citizens and states, as well as stereotyping Africans as corrupt and incompetent. In other words, it was a thinly disguised recolonization of the continent. The critical pragmatists acknowledged that some adjustments were necessary to deal with external shocks and poor policy choices, but they were adamant that many parts of the standard structural adjustment package were unsuited to African conditions and inconsistent with any idea of long-term development.

Under Adebayo Adedeji's leadership, the ECA became a center of high-level African opposition to structural adjustment. Adedeji was also conscious of the need for 'an alternate paradigm' that donors and the Bretton Woods institutions would fund.[122] In 1988 and 1989, the ECA sponsored assessments of existing adjustment programs and consultation on alternatives. The outcome was the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment

Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP), a document without counterparts in Latin America or Asia, though there was no shortage of opposition to adjustment in those continents. This document echoed the views of the critical pragmatists in several respects: adjustments were needed, but should be done in a way that addressed long-standing development problems and were appropriate to the circumstances of the adjusting country. While it looked back to the Lagos Plan for its development content, in some areas the AAF-SAP went further than the reforms envisioned by the Bretton Woods institutions. For example, it added unsustainable, import-dependent Western lifestyles to the list of economic imbalances where transformation was needed.[123]

However, the 'war of visions' that had developed between the UNECA and the World Bank ensured that the AAF-SAP was seen as a riposte, not a basis for negotiating change in the practice of adjustment.[124] It was also not well received by bilateral aid donors, and lacked champions among Africa's national leaders.[125] Although adopted by the OAU in 1989, member support was perfunctory. Some NGOs and trade unions picked up the Framework as a campaigning and popular education tool, but no African government implemented it.[126] Although a few of the earlier national survival programs, particularly that of Burkina Faso, bore some resemblance to the AAF-SAP, these programs were, like Zambia's self-designed adjustment program, generated through national processes and had no explicit links to the AAF-SAP.

By the mid-1990s, views had shifted. While radical critiques were still being penned, blanket opposition to adjustment had diminished in many circles. This was the result of tiredness, a shift in focus to the impact of post-Cold War conflicts, and new development possibilities emerging in the last half of the 1990s. Neo-liberal ideas were also evolving: becoming more nuanced and pragmatic in the eyes of some; in the eyes of others, becoming so well entrenched that harsh dogmatism and external enforcement were no longer necessary. On the part of donor countries and a range of multilateral lenders, politicians, and economic officials across various African governments, there was agreement that it was time to move beyond structural adjustment.[127]

The resulting, rough Africa policy consensus recognized the need to maintain financial and trade balances, but in a way that incorporated a long-term plan for development and investment in key sectors.[128] It agreed on the need to reduce the debt overhang, and that generating government revenue through a better tax system would reduce dependence on external funds. It accepted the need for policies to reduce poverty, recognizing that economic growth alone would not do so. It also recognized that agriculture, especially smallholder agriculture, needed more attention. It saw that trade liberalization had benefits, but acknowledged that African countries had been required to liberalize heavily and unilaterally. Likewise, continuing commodity dependence was not desirable, though there was less agreement on

how to change that. A series of financial crises starting in 1994 undermined arguments for full financial liberalization, but debate about the appropriate degree of liberalization continued. Overall, both states and markets were seen to have important roles to play, and to be in need of improvement in African countries. The rough consensus also recognized that, in Africa, regional cooperation and the institutions to foster it were important, though admitting that there were lessons to be learned from past failures. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD, 2001) was a later expression of this synthesis.

A Long Lost 'Decade'—the Impacts of Adjustment

Within the continent, the years of stabilization and adjustment are widely seen as lost ones for African development. Conventionally, the lost years are the decade of the 1980s, but as intensive reform did not start until the end of the decade in many countries and was preceded by years of turmoil that also hindered development, the 'decade' was a long one, lasting from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s. It is not a stretch to argue, as some have done, that this long decade's impacts on African countries have been as great as the decades of direct imperial rule.[129]

While post-independence governments had their faults, African countries together with other debtor countries running financial and trade deficits were made to do most of the adjusting to the changes engineered in the global economy in the 1970s. Countries that accumulated trade and financial surpluses at their expense did little adjusting. The costs of that adjustment were high: a worsened international trade position and, more seriously, substantial foregone investment in education, health, and infrastructure. As with the promises of the nationalists, the rapid economic growth that was supposed to follow structural adjustment was in short supply. Wealthy and well-connected Africans were able to insulate themselves to some degree from the shortages and problems that stabilization and adjustment caused, but most citizens were not. Improvement in mortality, literacy, and other indicators of well-being slowed dramatically, and were reversed in some cases. Girls and women were usually the most affected. Gaps of income and opportunity widened within countries. Alterations to adjustment packages that were supposed to address poverty provided some belated relief, but critics argued that in the poorest and least developed countries, adjustment needed a human body, not just a human face.

Another significant impact of the lost 'decade' was the changes it wrought in the balance of development actors. The dramatic decrease in the size of the state, together with a change in its character, was foremost among them. If the face of the state in the 1970s was a mass of clerks, industrial workers, teachers, doctors, nurses, and soldiers with status jobs but falling real wages, the face of the state in the 1990s was a few powerful, but overworked senior

officials in the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank. This shrinking and distracted state became the focus of popular movements for political renewal in many African countries, as well as external donors newly interested in good governance and democratization. These changes created openings for a wide range of non-state actors: businesses, as well as non-profit actors like NGOs and community-based organizations. Growth of the informal sector removed large swathes of the economy from state purview, while new decentralization initiatives called out, but did not resource other levels of government and 'traditional' authorities. This posed new challenges for leaders who subsequently tried to muster the resources and support for a revival of development linked to the nation-state.

Reformed African states required a rewrite of their post-independence public narratives as well. The technocratic elite who occupied, or sought powerful positions within them understood themselves to be fulfilling the promise of independence. The source of the continent's development problems, they believed, had been its postcolonial states and their policies. By dismantling and reversing these, they would end poverty, create both opportunity and stability, and restore the international credibility of African countries. Neo-nationalist reformers—and the external experts they worked with—paid less attention to the regional and ethnic balances that postcolonial states had achieved, however rough and unsatisfactory, even as new disparities grew under stabilization and adjustment. Subsequent identity- and resource-based conflicts were intensified by the liberal distribution of weapons from national armories and transnational smuggling networks.

The power conferred by holding debt triggered another change in the balance of development actors in the continent: it gave external donors and international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank, a new prominence in most African countries. There were more foreign advisors in the continent than at the height of imperial rule, with fewer lines of accountability and less public acknowledgement.[130] Expatriates were also maneuvered into senior government positions, as with the Canadian who was appointed governor of Zambia's central bank in 1990.[131] Related to this, another legacy of the lost decade has been a narrowed range of national economic-development policies. For some this represented a hard-won, though still partial, consensus; for others, the hegemonic power of approaches introduced in the 1980s. These policies featured many points raised by the critical pragmatists in response to adjustment and stabilization, but also contained more neo-classicism than would have been the case in a consensus built prior to the mid-1980s. Elements of the New Political Economy also continued to shape the intellectual landscape, with the concept of the neo-patrimonial African state a widely assumed backdrop to discussions of both economic policy and democratization.[132] Neo-liberal ideas also trickled down to influence the practice of development by NGOs, contributing to the emergence of new tools like micro-loans, fair-trade certification, and cash transfers.

Conditionality was the final legacy of the lost decade. It would be inaccurate to say that every policy condition was forced on an unwilling African government, but even where support for economic reform existed, the intensity, scope, and speed of the changes external actors demanded far exceeded it. Many Africans felt their countries had become laboratories for a massive policy experiment, one that their poverty left them no option to refuse.[133] Unfortunately, poverty also meant that the conditions needed to support positive results from the experimental economic 'medicine' were scarce. Worse yet, international lenders and donors rarely provided enough funding to help their 'patients' implement multiple reforms in a harsh global economic environment.[134] Poor results did not cause the experimenters to doubt their assumptions or question their prescriptions; it caused them to look for new variables to control with more conditionality, or to chide their 'patients' for their failure to follow instructions. Some World Bank and IMF officials were openly patronizing; others occasionally gave incomplete or misleading information to adjusting-country governments, apparently believing they had the right to decide what it was proper for debtor country officials to know.[135] All this left a bitter taste.

Relaunching Development

The new millennium is associated with new energy for international development, embodied in such things as the Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History campaigns, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).[136] These international initiatives garnered attention, but more complex things were happening within the continent under many names. 'Restoration' was one of them, a term that started to appear with regularity in the literature on African development in the late 1990s. It was applied to post-conflict settings and to situations that followed the removal of authoritarian governments, among others. Restoration had parallels in the call that people like Abiola Irele made for a return to the 'modernity project'.[137] The 'African Renaissance', floated by Thabo Mbeki, was another term for change in the new millennium. It meant different things to different people, but often included the revival—in modified form—of Pan-Africanism and of development-minded nation-states. There were many sources of inspiration for this relaunch on the part of African leaders, intellectuals, and activists. Some looked to the South, as mutual development cooperation with other Southern countries grew in importance again; some looked East to the developmental states of East Asia, while others sought in reinvigorated tradition—whether ethnic, national, or African—a model for change. The idea of a new, more effective partnership with OECD donors also returned to prominence with NEPAD. It did not explicitly reference the 1969 new aid partnership of the Commission on International Development, but it included development ideas from that era, like investment in infrastructure and regional economic cooperation. It also included

novel tools, like the African Peer Review Mechanism. Gender was briefly mentioned in NEPAD, and in other relaunching development discussions, but did not play a clear or significant role in them.[138]

These initiatives paralleled and intersected with the rediscovery of poverty by external actors at the end of the 1980s, followed by their discovery that the character of institutions, whether public or private, mattered. At the World Bank, the bellwether for a flock of donors and the IMF, programs to mitigate the social costs of adjustment were an early step in this process. The understanding of poverty and the tools needed to deal with it harked back in several ways to *Redistribution with Growth*, which had expressed the World Bank's general position on poverty in the early 1970s.[139] A more substantial and innovative step was the joint introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) by the World Bank and IMF in 1999. These were comprehensive blueprints for medium-term poverty-focused development and they were supposed to be created through participatory national processes. Preparing a satisfactory PRSP became a requirement for countries needing either policy-based loans or debt relief, as did conditionality that mandated certain political and legal reforms. The Bank's engagement with African countries was the driver of this 'governance' conditionality, and African countries were disproportionately subject to these kinds of conditions. Africa was the continent with the highest concentration of programs to reduce the social costs of adjustment, also known as social funds; in addition, it was the continent in which the PRSP approach was the most thoroughgoing.[140]

The pattern was similar in global initiatives like the MDGs, where Africa was consistently singled out as a region of focus because special effort would be needed to achieve the goals there. Bilateral donors, most explicitly in the British Labour Government's Commission for Africa (2004), echoed this focus on Africa.[141] However, Africans played a relatively small role in formulating these initiatives. With the MDGs, for instance, African governments and African NGOs participated in the UN conferences and meetings that provided input for the goals. However, the role of African actors, other than UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in drafting the goals and targets was much more limited.[142] Situations like this were the basis for the belief that non-African actors were responsible for the revival of development, even as the continent became the focus of the international development and humanitarian systems. However, below the surface things were less clear-cut. African governments were involved in multiple processes for setting development goals. For most, the national goals set out in their PRSP were more compelling than the universal MDGs, since aid and debt relief depended directly on them.

A closer look at PRSPs reveals examples of more African agency, in a context where the meaning and funding of development remained a negotiation between internal and external actors. PRSPs were explicitly modeled on the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) Uganda's government had put forward in 1997.[143] The PEAP built on Ugandan initiatives from earlier in

the 1990s, including a national seminar on poverty, as well as a standard program to mitigate adjustment's social costs. However, it received new energy and direction from the interaction between voters, President Museveni, and opposition candidates during the 1996 national elections. Subsequent consultation created a new consensus on poverty within government, and between government, civil-society organizations, and external donors. Economic growth was seen as the foundation for poverty eradication, but the PEAP also offered both a comprehensive strategy and plans for poverty-focused policy and spending in each sector. It required that government spending be evaluated in terms of its effect on poverty, and protected spending in priority areas from cuts.[144] The Ugandan government proposed its revised second PEAP (2000) as its PRSP for purposes of the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Country debt relief initiative. However, the World Bank and IMF were surprisingly reluctant. In the end, they agreed that a summary of the lengthy document would qualify, but the summary underwent translation into language acceptable to the Bank and Fund. Ugandan civil-society organizations were excluded from this translation process, though they had been substantially involved in revisions to the full PEAP.[145]

The first two PEAPs resulted in increased funding for designated Ugandan poverty initiatives. Some of this was money no longer needed for debt payment, which was channeled through a Poverty Action Fund. However, bilateral aid was crucial to implementation of PEAP, though use of budget support by donors reduced their control over the money somewhat. There was a similar mixture of internal and external resources in the Uganda Debt Network (1996), which became an institutionalized channel for civil-society participation in and monitoring of subsequent PEAPs, among other things. It received funding from INGOs and some bilateral aid agencies, but also relied on volunteer input at the community level and membership contributions from individuals and national NGOs.[146]

Uganda's PRSP experience was distinctive. In other African countries, bilateral donors and the World Bank played a substantial role in the PRSP process and the PRSPs, despite their supposed national character, had many common elements.[147] Nevertheless, Uganda displayed other trends with broader relevance. In its ongoing political restructuring, elements of a one-party state mingled with an array of private-sector actors and the military; elements of a 'developmental state' and a neo-patrimonial one were also comingled. Some, though not all of the conflicts that had catastrophically undermined Uganda's national and East African regional development were ended. External actors—bilateral donors, multilateral lenders, INGOs, and foreign firms—were more involved than ever before, but the Ugandan state and, to a lesser degree, other internal actors showed an ability to manipulate and manage them. Development continued to be important to the legitimacy of the ruling party, and of the state, and ideas from the era of state-led development and African Socialism continued to echo. Development tools such as national

plans and budget support from the 1950s were revived and used side-by-side with new ones, like the Poverty Action Fund.

Underlying this were important development finance trends. Bilateral aid, which had dried up and narrowed to a core of OECD donors during the 1990s, was more readily available and from a competing array of donors in the new millennium. There was more investment money as well, though much of it was concentrated in resource extraction. Remittances to African countries quadrupled in the twenty years after 1990; reported amounts stood at almost US$40 billion in 2010, slightly exceeding the official aid coming into the continent.[148] Most importantly, commodity prices, still central to African economies and to government revenue, rose again in the late 1990s. African actors who had access to these unevenly distributed resources had options that had not been available for decades. What use they made of them and what impact it is having on the well-being of Africans are not yet easy to judge, especially since these financial flows have shrunk again in recent years.

Assumpta Acam-Oturu, another poet from Uganda, lamented what post-independence generations like hers experienced: 'this land has waited/Under the perennial sun in those twenty years/The dawns of those years were a prayer, a rise in hope' even as 'her ravaged arteries bled to waste'. Writing as a 'gory sunset' ended the century and the millennium, she voiced a widespread, though cautious optimism, looking for 'A transition that may one day draw/ From its unknown source, a resurrection, a new spirit?'[149]

Notes

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5. Phillip Naylor, *France and Algeria: A History of Decolonization and Transformation* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 19–21, 36–37, 60.
6. Dudley Seers, *The Political Economy of Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 91.

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11. David Fieldhouse, *Black Africa, 1945–1980: Economic Decolonization and Arrested Development* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 42.
12. Thomas Taylor, "The Struggle for Economic Control of Uganda, 1919–1922: Formulation of an Economic Policy," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 11, no. 1 (1978): 7; Paul Clark, "Development Strategy in an Early-Stage Economy: Uganda," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 4, no. 1 (1966): 48–49; and Michael Schultheis, "The Ugandan Economy and General Amin, 1971–1974," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 10, no. 3 (1975): 6, 8. See also J.J. Oloya, "Marketing Boards and Post-War Economic Development Policy in Uganda, 1945–1962," *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics* 23 (1968): 50–58.
13. Crawford Young, Neal Sherman, and Tim Rose, *Cooperatives and Development: Agricultural Politics in Ghana and Uganda* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), 42–44, 61.
14. A. B. Adimola, "Uganda: The Newest 'Independent'," *African Affairs* 62, no. 249 (1963): 326–32; Clark, "Development Strategy in an Early-Stage Economy," 49–51, 56; and Reginald Green, "Uganda's Plan for Growth and Development: An Analysis of and Preliminary Reflections on Work for Progress," ERRP No. 103 (Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex, 1966), 3, http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/1511/EDRP103-329701.pdf?sequence=1. See also C.C. Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, East African Studies No. 12 (Kampala: East African Institute of Social Research, 1959).
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CHAPTER 37

African Diasporas and Postcolonial Africa

Kwasi Konadu

In recent decades, research on a narrowly constituted 'African diaspora' has given way to an increasingly expanded focus on multifarious diasporic communities in Africa, Eurasia, and the Americas.[1] State and economic crises, military rule, civil war, natural disasters, violence and oppression, desires for belonging and home(land), and potential economic opportunities (for both incoming and outgoing migrants) have all shaped African diasporas spawned in the 'postcolonial' moment. In light of the circuits of movement and reconstitution, the forms of violence (economic, political, and 'ethnic') that animated the colonial state and that underpin ongoing diasporas have stubbornly endured in the present, making the 'postcolonial' moment a meaningless marker indexing how Africans moved through historical time. Those circuits, instead, belong to an elongated historical process rather than a 'postcolonial'

[1] On the definition of the "African diaspora," see: Brent H. Edwards, "The Uses of Diaspora," *Social Text* 19, no. 1 (2001), 45–73; Colin A. Palmer, "Defining and Studying the Modern African Diaspora," *Journal of African American History* 85, no. 1–2 (2000), 27–32; Joseph E. Harris, ed., *Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1993); Kim Butler, "Defining Diaspora, Refining a Discourse," *Diaspora* 10, no. 2 (2002): 189–219. For a standard, narrative account (in all its bewildering details), see Patrick Manning, *The African Diaspora: A History through Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). On the African diaspora contextualized as a "migration," see Tiffany R. Patterson and Robin D. G. Kelley, "Unfinished Migrations: Reflections on the African Diaspora and the Making of the Modern World," *African Studies Review* 43, no. 1 (2000): 11–45.

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moment, where intra-African movement remains just as dynamic as that of those who move and resettle beyond the borders of continental Africa and its offshore island-states. To be sure, the influx and outflow of individuals to, from, and within Africa have multiple geneses, but these movements must be understood within the historiography of African diasporas and within the specific contexts that help explain departures and arrivals, sources and destinations. This chapter discusses two of the more recent and significant trends in diasporic approaches to African history, and makes a case for addressing methodological and other shortcomings inherent in those trends, in terms of approaches in the field of African history that might engender an African world perspective and practice.

Conventional accounts of the 'African diaspora' in African historiography view Africa as bounded unto itself and as an imaginary source for its diasporic folk to draw upon in their (re)imagined selves and communities.[2] According to this view, there is only Africa *and* the diaspora. The conjunction 'and' envisages diasporic movement and community formation as something that has (and continues) to occur *outside* of continental Africa. Rarely do such accounts consider diasporic movement and community making *within* Africa writ large. It is precisely out of this framework that we have been held captive to binary debates about the continuity or creolization of African cultures, about imagined communities and invented identities, about diaspora as principally a return or reconnection to Africa, and about the relationship between Africa and African America, docked in their impervious hemispheres. Within this framework, a fashionable lexicon populates its universe: hybridity, creolization, cosmopolitanism, (re)invention, imagination, and (Black) Atlantic. Unsurprisingly, there exists a clear asymmetry in knowledge production (where Atlantic diasporas have received far more scholarly attention than Indian Ocean or Mediterranean or Eurasian varieties) in addition to the global and chronological breadth of African diasporas reduced to a singularly constituted 'African diaspora', itself a shorthand for the fashionable but defective 'Atlantic creole' and 'black' Atlantic conceptualizations of diaspora.

[2] Giles Mohan and A. B. Zack-Williams have rightfully lamented, "African Studies has retained its generalist colonial (and neo-imperial) features and resolutely sees Africa as a self-contained continent." See Giles Mohan and A. B. Zack-Williams, "Globalisation from below: Conceptualising the Role of the African Diasporas in Africa's Development," *Review of African Political Economy* 29, no. 92 (2002): 213. For the most recent statement of the conventional view, see: John Parker, "The African Diaspora," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History*, ed., John Parker and Richard Reid (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 132–48; John Parker and Richard Rathbone, *African History: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 32–37, 82–86. For more on so-called "imagined" identities, see Sidney J. Lemelle and Robin D. G. Kelley, *Imagining Home: Class, Culture and Nationalism in the African Diaspora* (New York: Verso, 1994), and, on the African side of the Atlantic equation, see V.Y. Mudimbe's *The Invention of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988) and *The Idea of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

Atlantic Creoles: Creolization in the Atlantic Diaspora and Africa

Though the concept of 'Atlantic creoles' came out of linguistics in the late 1960s and 1970s, especially Ian Hancock's work around 'Negro English' of West Africa and the Americas, the current iteration of the concept was adopted by North American scholars who fell in love with the postmodernist ideas of 'hybridity', 'fluidity', or 'plasticity' as applied to cultures and identities.[3] Chief among the targets of these postmodernists are the ideas of race and 'blackness', both squarely rooted in the politics of knowledge and in the cauldron of US racial politics and violence. To many scholars, 'blackness' is a commodity that is fluid and permeable, though without the distinct burden of 'living-while-black'. A survey of the literature reveals an increased use of the terms 'creole' and 'creolization' during the very height of the Black Power movement and the use of 'Africa' in the 1960s and 1970s, but a sharp downward trend in the use of 'Africa' in the late 1970s and the equally steep over-the-cliff descent in 'Black Power' by 1980. What does this mean? Scholars peddling the 'creolization' idea (as a framing device) were pushing back ideologically against what they perceived as Black Power interpretations of and claims to African cultural history and identity. The year 1980, not surprisingly, witnessed a parallel but sharp rise in the use of 'creole' and 'creolization', peaking in the late 1990s and into the early 2000s.[4] The normative skill set and lives of most Africans, with or without contact with Europeans, constituted a history for which scholars deeply shaped by the politics of knowledge and race in twentieth-century North America were not writing about. Instead, their preoccupations with the present moment framed narratives of a past in which the key categories and logic at play had little to do with the African lives at stake.

In the early twentieth century, the idea of 'acculturation' occupied the intellectual space that 'creole' and 'creolization' would assume. Both the category of creole and the process of creolization took off during the socio-political context of the 1960s, and both were shaped by white anthropologists working on 'black people' at the nexus of Africa and the Americas. Between the publications of *The American Negro: A Study in Racial Crossing* (1928), *Acculturation: The Study of Culture Contact* (1938), and the

[3] See e.g. Ian F Hancock, "A Provisional List of English-based Atlantic Creoles," *African Language Review* 8 (1969): 7–72; idem, *The Relationship of Black Vernacular English to the Atlantic Creoles* (Austin: African and Afro-American Studies and Research Center, University of Texas at Austin, 1978).

[4] I have used Google's Ngram Viewer (https://books.google.com/ngrams), an online graphing tool, that shows the usage or trend of a word or phrase by searching over 5 million books, or some 500 billion words, published in North American English (and other languages) between the years 1500 and 2010. My Ngram search settled on the years between 1900 and 2010, using the terms "creole," "creolization," "Black Power," and "Africa."

Myth of the Negro Past (1941), anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits became the 'authority' on African and African diasporic affairs and on race in North America. Though W.E.B. Du Bois's trilogy (*The Negro* [1915], *Black Folk: Then and Now* [1939], and *The World and Africa* [1946]) and Carter G. Woodson's *The Negro in our History* (1922) covered much of the ground on which Herskovits's 'authority' rested, it was Herskovits's ideas about race and culture that came to shape the study of Africa and its diasporas. It is no surprise Herskovits had an adversarial relationship with leading intellectuals such as Du Bois and Woodson. Herskovits feuded with Woodson and, through his influence amongst corporate funders and politicians, he sabotaged Du Bois's *Encyclopedia Africana* project. (Herskovits considered Du Bois's project an instrument of 'racial uplift' propaganda.[5]) Armed with the financial and political means to control the study of Africa and its Atlantic diasporas, Herskovits institutionalized his ideas of race and culture (framed around African studies) through the African Studies program established at Northwestern University in 1948 and the African Studies Association (ASA) founded in 1957.[6] To be sure, Herskovits built his ideas of race and culture around interracial ideals shaped by the racial politics of US society. In spite of Herskovits's later attention to African cultural 'retentions', his linear and teleological conception of acculturation was to be understood as 'Negro acculturation to European patterns'.[7] Other anthropologists working in the turbulent decades of the 1960s and 1970s, notably Sidney Mintz and Richard Price, assumed much of the content and context of Herskovits's work on acculturation, replacing it with a linguistic brand of 'creolization' that served to 'underemphasize the African past' in the study of African cultures in the Americas.[8]

In *Anthropological Approach to the Afro-American Past: A Caribbean Perspective* (1972–1973), Mintz and Price stipulated their essay was written 'in the immediate aftermath of the Civil Rights [and Black Power] struggle and the swift establishment of Afro-American and Black Studies programs in U.S. universities'. The provocation, then, for the essay was 'certain polarizations emerging

[5] Jerry Gershenhorn, *Melville J. Herskovits and the Racial Politics of Knowledge* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 106–7, 147–56.

[6] Readers need to be reminded or made aware that the first African Studies Program in the USA was founded at Fisk University in Tennessee in 1943 with the help of linguist Lorenzo Turner, and the first such program to grant a Bachelor's and Master's degree was the one at Howard University in 1954. See Margaret Wade-Lewis, *Lorenzo Dow Turner: Father of Gullah Studies* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 140.

[7] Melville J. Herskovits, *The Myth of the Negro Past* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941), 114; Gershenhorn, *Herskovits*, 65.

[8] Sidney W. Mintz and Richard Price, *Anthropological Approach to the Afro-American Past: A Caribbean Perspective* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1976), reprinted (with a new preface) as *The Birth of African-American Culture: An Anthropological Perspective* (Boston: Beacon, 1992), 95 n. 16.

in Afro-American Studies' such as 'ideological preoccupations might deflect the scholarly quest'.[9] In the 1960s, African and African diasporic scholars fought to interrogate the reigning paradigms and personnel exercising hegemony over the study of Africa(ns) and its worldwide diasporas. This intellectual fight erupted in the very organization Herskovits helped establish (the ASA) at Montreal in 1969 and in elite (historically white) universities such as Northwestern, Cornell, and Columbia.[10] When the aforementioned hegemony and the subjugation of (diasporic) African claims to African studies were challenged in 1969, entrenched stakeholders in ASA framed the issue as one of 'untrammeled scholarly inquiry' with respect to whites studying Africa against 'black interests' driven by 'strong emotion' and 'progressive politics'.[11] Nothing short of invoking Herskovits's spirit, ASA stakeholders had no ambiguity about what was at stake; 'the future of African studies in the United States'.[12] The intellectual ownership of a discipline and a continent were also at stake, and so those principally white stakeholders in elite US universities and in the US State Department acted as Herskovits did against Du Bois and Woodson, ceding little control in the study of the African world. In response, some African and diasporic African scholars created their own professional organizations (e.g. the African Studies Heritage Association and the National Council of Black Studies) and established several African/a studies programs, departments, and centers at principally white universities and colleges. These individuals were the targets of Mintz and Price. Both anthropologists assumed their posture against such 'black interests' with abiding 'ideological preoccupations' would not expose their own 'ideological preoccupations', namely propagating a 'miracle of creolization' theology in a society where Americanization was the end game and where Africans were destined to acculturate to 'European patterns'.[13] Insofar as Mintz and Price's essay 'built on and extended

[9] Mintz and Price, *Birth of African-American Culture*, iv.

[10] Among others, see Iris Berger, "Contested Boundaries: African Studies Approaching the Millennium," *African Studies Review* 40, no. 2 (1997): 1–14. On the Black Studies/Power protest movement on historically white colleges and universities, see: Joy Ann Williamson, *Black Power on Campus: The University of Illinois, 1965–75* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003); Noliwe M. Rooks, *White Money/Black Power: The Surprising History of African American Studies and the Crisis of Race in Higher Education* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006); Fabio Rojas, *From Black Power to Black Studies: How a Radical Social Movement Became an Academic Discipline* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Stefan M. Bradley, *Harlem vs. Columbia University: Black Student Power in the Late 1960s* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009); Ibram X. Kendi, *The Black Campus Movement: Black Students and the Racial Reconstitution of Higher Education, 1965–1972* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Martha Biondi, *The Black Revolution on Campus* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); and Delores Aldridge and Carlene Young, eds., *Out of the Revolution: the Development of Africana Studies* (New York: Lexington Books, 2000).

[11] Benjamin Nimer, "Politics and Scholarship in African Studies in the United States," *African Studies Review* 13, no. 3 (1970): 353, 355–56.

[12] Nimber, "Politics and Scholarship," 353.

[13] See Richard Price, "The Miracle of Creolization: A Retrospective," *New West Indian Guide-Nieuwe West-Indische Gids* 75, no. 1–2 (2001): 35–64; idem, "African Diaspora and

the ideas of Melville J. Herskovits', so too did it fail to consider the profound cultural and socio-linguistic mutual intelligibility amongst African societies or the systemic racialization and colonial regimes that forced diasporic Africans to fight against 'social death' through life-sustaining institutions that affirmed their humanity and shaped their lives.[14]

In 1992, Mintz and Price 'republished [their] original essay largely unchanged'.[15] The essay contained a new title (*The Birth of African-American Culture: An Anthropological Perspective*) with no reference to an under-emphasized 'African past' or the 'Caribbean' (the locus of their research). The essay was strategically reprinted in a socio-political climate where ideas of 'biracial', 'mixed race' and 'creolization' were on the rise with a steep decline in the 'Afrocentric' idea. It is in this climate that historian Ira Berlin published an essay and then a monograph outlining his version of the 'Atlantic creole' idea; an idea appropriated, once more, from the study of languages. Following Mintz and Price, Berlin eschewed the 'African past' and the African continent, claiming, 'Black life on mainland North America originated *not* in Africa or in America but in the *nether world* between the two continents'.[16] Berlin's teleological thinking is yet another installation of the inexorable procession toward Europeanization and Americanization in arguing the first generation of Africans in British North America were 'Atlantic creoles' because of their acculturation to European cultural norms.[17] Berlin uses particles of evidence about a minute cast of 'creoles' granted legal emancipation as representation of a people and their predicament; in his parallel universe, these outliers become the norm. Berlin eschews African cultures and histories, statistics for these 'Atlantic creoles', and focuses almost exclusively on a distinct minority rather than the bulk of Africans because it is impossible for him to specify how prevalent 'Atlantic creoles' were in seventeenth-century North America. To be sure, there was little that was 'creole' about the 20

Anthropology," in *The African Diaspora and the Disciplines*, ed. Tejumola Olaniyan and James H. Sweet (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 67.

[14] Price, "African Diaspora and Anthropology," 57.

[15] Mintz and Price, *Birth of African-American Culture*, xi. Price, as recently as 2007, amended his perspective on the "creolized" nature of African diasporic cultures: rather than "continuous creolization," he has opted for the unfolding of "creolization-like process." See Richard Price, *Travels with Tooy: History, Memory, and the African American Imagination* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 299.

[16] Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone*, 17 (emphasis added); idem, *Generations of Captivity: A History of African-American Slaves* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2003), 23; and Alison Games, "Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities," *American Historical Review* 111, no. 3 (2006): 752.

[17] Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone*, 18. The same argument (that is, "Atlantic creoles" only become so upon contact with Europeans) formed the foundation of Berlin's *Generations of Captivity*, which can be read as an abridged version of *Many Thousands Gone*.

or so captive Africans from West-Central Africa brought to the Jamestown colony in 1619.[18] Those Africans brought to the colony were too atomized to constitute a community or self-identify as 'Atlantic creoles'. Unlike so-called 'Luso-Africans' who traded in captives but whose numbers were also very small, the mass of captive Africans from West and West-Central Africa had trivial exposure to European culture and were involuntary parties, for instance, to the bureaucratic mass baptisms (e.g. naming, salt on the tongue, water on the head) that some scholars parade as 'creolization'. Most Africans, however, interpreted this baptismal ritual as witchcraft and as preparation for consumption by European witches![19]

In 2007, Linda M. Heywood and John K. Thornton published their *Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas*, adopting Berlin's 'Atlantic creole' idea but in a historical moment punctuated by the profusion of 'creolization' and 'black Atlantic' verbiage and by Barack Obama's presidential candidacy and its 'post-racial' outgrowth. If Berlin sought to make a handful of 'quasi-black people' originating from an imaginary 'nether world' the founders of African-American culture, Heywood and Thornton simply shifted the locus of Berlin's personnel from West to West-Central Africa. Using the updated Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, Heywood and Thornton argue large parts of West-Central Africa had developed an 'Atlantic creole' culture by the early seventeenth century and it was an 'Angola wave', and not those from Berlin's West Africa, that were the 'charter generation' of Africans in the early Americas.[20] Their ambitious project, however, is less insightful than it is a symptomatic chorus where 'creolization' translates into Europeanization and where 'Atlantic creoles' corresponds to 'Europeanized Africans'. Claims of pervasive Catholic influence saturate their work. Whatever the innermost content of some expressions

[18] James H. Sweet, "African Identity and Slave Resistance in the Portuguese Atlantic," in Peter C. Mancall, ed., *The Atlantic World and Virginia, 1550–1624* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 225–47.

[19] Joan Cameron Bristol, *Christians, Blasphemers, and Witches: Afro-Mexican Ritual Practice in the Seventeenth Century* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), 73; and James H. Sweet, *Recreating Africa: Culture, Kinship, and Religion in the African-Portuguese World, 1441–770* (Chapel-Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 197.

[20] Linda M. Heywood and John K. Thornton, *Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas, 1585–1660* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2, 236. This work builds upon an earlier volume: Linda Heywood, ed., *Central Africans and Cultural Transformations in the American Diaspora* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For doubts about the 'creolized' nature of those from Angola, see Roquinaldo Ferreira, *Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil during the Era of the Slave Trade* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 247–48. For non-creolized views of the culture and identities of West-Central Africans, see Christina F. Mobley, "The Kongolese Atlantic: Central African Slavery & Culture from Mayombe to Haiti" (PhD dissertation, Duke University, 2015); Barbaro Martinez-Ruiz, *Kongo Graphic Writing and Other Narratives of the Sign* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2013); and Maureen Warner Lewis, *Central Africa in the Caribbean: Transcending Time, Transforming Cultures* (Mona: University of West Indies Press, 2003).

of faith, the records make it clear those expressions were linked to political expediency, operating through the machinations of ruling elites, persistent warfare, acute slaving, and exile. Viewed from this perspective, it is no wonder the authors *cannot* show how most West-Central Africans, especially those (to be) enslaved, became seduced by Portuguese and Catholic ideals and how 'creolized' their daily lives became. Efforts to elucidate African ideas and intra-African histories are aborted in favor of fervently seeking to prove the existence of 'Atlantic creoles' and to minimize the extent of fraudulent baptisms received by captives prior to embarkation. Rather than lay bare the processes by which Africans incorporated or rejected Portuguese cultural or religious ideas, the authors quantify 'creolization' through a set of maps scaled from 'no creolization' to 'most creolization'.[21]

If, as they argue, 'Atlantic creoles' from West-Central Africa were the 'most homogeneous group of Africans to enter the Americas in the whole history of the slave trade' and they were 'culturally much closer to the Europeans', then how do we explain their short-lived social compatibility and how quickly their 'race' mattered in the inchoate European overseas colonies?[22] They tell us it was only in the late seventeenth century that English and Dutch colonists came to view Africans as 'slaves' in the strictest sense, but this explanation fails to integrate earlier Anglo-Dutch understandings of race and caste appropriated from their Iberian slaving partners and competitors. The English learned much of the racial and economic contours of Atlantic slaving from the Iberians and then the Dutch. Early English merchants in Iberia and English privateers regularly plundered Iberian ships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and readily adopted the racial category 'negro' and expelled undesirable 'negars and blackamoors' through a series of edicts.[23] Indeed, there is little evidence for their interpretation of Anglo-Dutch racial thinking, 'Atlantic creole' influences on Anglo-Dutch colonies, or for the culture of Africans of the late seventeenth century being 'different and more alien to Euro American expectations' than 'creolized' Africans.[24] The absence of significant evidence, especially for the bulk of common folks among a 'most homogenous group', severely undermines the 'Atlantic creole' argument.

It is difficult, therefore, to figure out how scholars can measure the sincerity of one's conversion or the adoption of European culture among socio-political elites much less the commoners cast as political subjects, social undesirables, and converted souls. Matthew Restall has lamented the same

[21] Heywood and Thornton, *Atlantic Creoles*, 227–35.

[22] Ibid., 238, 293.

[23] Peter Fryer, *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain* (London: Pluto Press, 1984), 10–2; Steven A. Epstein, *Speaking of Slavery: Color, Ethnicity, and Human Bondage in Italy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 108; and April L. Hatfield, "A 'Very Wary People in the Bargaining' or 'Very Good Merchandise': English Traders' Views of Free and Enslaved Africans, 1550–1650," *Slavery and Abolition* 25, no. 3 (2004): 1–2.

[24] Heywood and Thornton, *Atlantic Creoles*, 331.

in his study of Africans and their descendants in the Yucatan under Spanish colonial rule: 'It is thus hard to determine whether professions of faith were sincere or whether Africans slaves paid lip service to the religion of their [Spanish] masters'.[25] We can apply these same misgivings to the claim of 'significant acculturation' to European values, especially Catholicism, and the claim that what mattered 'was the assertion of a Christian identity rather than a sectarian Catholic one'.[26] The repetition of an argument does not make it more convincing. We are told many times that 'Atlantic creole' culture was 'best represented by the profession of Christianity', among other features, but *how* an Africanized form of Catholicism found expression in the lives of those who allegedly had a substantial impact on African-American culture formation, or in the embryonic Anglo-Dutch colonies, is left unattended.[27] To their credit, Heywood and Thornton skillfully lay out the context of warfare and disintegration that produced West-Central African captives in stunning detail, but their sources say comparatively little about the 'creole culture' these captives supposedly transferred to the Americas. Ultimately, they are unable to demonstrate the 'ways in which this generation of Africans helped lay the foundation for the subsequent development of African American culture'.[28]

Rather than assume, at face value, the categories and content of the European-supplied sources, teasing out the broader historical patterns central to the formation of African diasporas requires a pan-European approach instead of a 'national' one for those sources. The very networks of merchants, clerics, capital, and commodities that would seriously contest Iberian quasi-monopolies in the constant but shifting relations between European partners and competitors sustained the Iberian presence in Africa and the Americas. Thus, for instance, the English colony in Virginia or in Barbados would have been established earlier and with enslaved labor if the Iberian slaving monopoly had been broken sooner. Once the Virginia colony was established and tobacco became a profitable staple crop, its colonial elites, planters, and the gentry 'began purchasing slaves as soon as they could get them and continued to buy more as fast as the limited supply and their individual resources would allow'.[29] As early as 1637, officials of the Company of Adventurers of London Trading to the Ports of Africa, 'to whom the King has granted a patent for the sole to trade to Guinea, Binney [Benin], and Angola', began 'to trade upon

[25] Matthew Restall, *The Black Middle: Africans, Mayas, and Spaniards in Colonial Yucatan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 235.

[26] Heywood and Thornton, *Atlantic Creoles*, 272.

[27] Ibid., 67.

[28] Ibid., i.

[29] John C. Coombs, "The Phases of Conversion: A New Chronology for the Rise of Slavery in Early Virginia," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 68, no. 3 (2011): 347; Douglas M. Bradburn and John C. Coombs, "Smoke and Mirrors: Reinterpreting the Society and Economy of the Seventeenth-Century Chesapeake," *Atlantic Studies* 3 (2006): 131–57. See also Edmund Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), whose ideas about the rise of slavery Coombs challenges.

the coasts of Guinea, to take "nigers," and carry them to foreign parts'.[30] The number of enslaved individuals soon surpassed indentured servants by end of 1650s, but this would have been quicker had greater supply reached the colony through Dutch and other foreign traders. In 1664, the English capture of New Netherland ended the Holland–Virginia–Barbados trade link and the capture of Carolusborg (Cape Coast) in Gold Coast established direct supply lines between West Africa and the English plantation colonies, especially Barbados.[31] Settled in 1627, Barbados became a fully fledged slave society within a generation, punctuated by laws enslaving Africans for life (1636) and a slave code (1661).[32] By the late seventeenth century, Barbados was 'a laboratory of labor [and racialized slavery]', diffusing its racialized ideas and plantation practices through planters who left the island with their captives and settled in the Carolinas, the Chesapeake region, Jamaica, and other islands.[33]

These developments in the Anglo-Dutch Americas, however, came after a century of Iberian plantation slavery and where an 'Angola wave' allegedly responsible for the foundation of African-American culture was preceded by dominant patterns of Senegambia importation into Spanish America. The Spaniards had virtually no presence in West-Central Africa. But under a united Iberian crown (*c.*1580–1640), Portuguese merchants had access to Spanish America, while other Europeans attacked Iberian ships and settlements (from 1581), (re)sold captives to Spanish settlers in the Caribbean, and adopted sugar production techniques (from São Tomé to Brazil to Barbados) and ideas about racialized slavery. By 1640, the Spanish Caribbean was flooded with other Europeans through *asientos* granted by the Spanish Crown. Between the 1660s and 1670s, Genoese merchants procured enslaved Africans in the Caribbean from Anglo-Dutch traders, and resold them to major Spanish American ports. Late seventeenth and eighteenth-century Dutch and French merchants supplied Veracruz, Havana, Cartagena, and Panama with captives from their West African enclaves, while English merchants and loggers remained active in the Yucatan and Belize between 1655 and 1722.[34] Until the mid-seventeenth century, the idea that an almost

[30] W. Noël Sainsbury, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 1, 1574–1660* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860), 1: 260.

[31] For some contemporary accounts of Anglo-Dutch wars and English activity in Gold Coast, see UK National Archives at Kew (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO), Colonial Office (CO) 1/19, no. 5 (1665), "A Breife Narrative of the Trade and Present Condition of the Company of Royall Adventurers of England Trading into Africa;" CO 1/17, no. 60 (1663), "An Extract of Letters from Cormantine and Other Places in Affrica;" CO 1/17, nos. 110–1 (1663), "The Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa to [the King]."

[32] Simon P. Newman, *A New World of* Labor*: The Development of Plantation Slavery in the British Atlantic* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 250.

[33] Newman, *A New World*, 251. For accounts of early English sugar plantations, see TNA: PRO, CO 1/22, no. 20.

[34] Restall, *The Black Middle*, 19–20.

exclusive West-Central African cast was trafficked to the early Americas is deeply at odds with the statistics for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially for the major Spanish American slaving hubs in Cartagena, Veracruz, and Buenos Aires.[35] Between 1525 and 1640, the vast majority of slaving voyages and the number of captive Africans went to Spanish America, with peaks between 1586 and 1640.[36] Between 1595 and 1640, half of all recorded captive Africans to Spanish America came from Senegambia with some 4000 per annum to Cartagena alone.[37] The year 1640, of course, corresponds to the end of the united Iberian crown and the lost of an Atlantic monopoly, illustrated by some two-thirds of all recorded captives flowing from Angola to the region between 1626 and 1640.[38] From 1641 to 1650, the largest number of slaving voyages went to Brazil and Barbados.[39]

Until the early or mid-seventeenth century, transatlantic slaving was largely an Iberian affair when we look at the numbers, though we should be very much aware of the multitude of hands that stirred this transatlantic pot. In Linda A. Newson and Susie Minchin's *From Capture to Sale*, the authors show the value of kin networks for Portuguese slavers who used kin and compatriots in Senegambia and Angola and in negotiating the imperial South American bureaucracy to further their commerce in 'pieces of slaves' (Span. *pieza de esclavo*). To this, we must add what the available databases do not account for concerning any 'wave' of captive Africans: contraband trafficking, bribes to royal and other officials, and intentional concealments of arrivals and departures to bolster self-interest in Atlantic Africa and in the Americas. Lastly, we must reckon with the perception of slavers in their procurement of captive Africans. In 1622, royal officials in Bogota wrote:

> The black slaves that are brought to Cartagena and sold are of three types – the first and most esteemed are those of the Rivers of Guinea [i.e. Senegambia], who are also called *de ley* ['authentic' or 'top-quality']. They have different names, and their common price is 200 pesos of assayed silver. The second type is that of the Ardas or Ararás [i.e. Allada]. These are brought with least frequency, and are sold at 160 *ducados* of 11 *reales*. The third and worst is that of the Angolas and Congos, who are infinitely numerous in their lands, and who commonly sell for 150 *ducados* each.[40]

[35] Linda A. Newson and Susie Minchin, *From Capture to Sale: The Portuguese Slave Trade to Spanish South America in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 153.

[36] Data from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade database, accessed December 3, 2014, www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces.

[37] Newson and Minchin, *From Capture to Sale*, 62, 66.

[38] David Wheat, "The First Great Waves: African Provenance Zones for the Transatlantic Slave Trade to Cartagena De Indias, 1570–1640," *The Journal of African History* 52 (2011): 4, 12, 14–15.

[39] Data from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade database, accessed December 3, 2014 www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces.

[40] Cited in Wheat, "The First Great Waves," 19.

Captive Africans from Senegambia also reached a price double the value of Angolan counterparts in Africa.[41] Taken together, these factors and their numerical support point to a composite African (rather than an 'Angolan' wave that reached the shores of the Americas) with an equally composite culture that looked inside to their foundational understandings of life to deal with external forces they could not fully control. The countervailing fight for life against such forces was neither a 'miracle' nor a function of 'creolization'. It is what humans held captive on land or at sea do.

'Black' Atlantic Histories

For millions of captive Africans dispatched to what became worldwide African diasporas, the Atlantic Ocean was experienced as a medium of alienation from natal kin and community. Between 1400 and 1900, this was true for the vast majority of Africans evicted from their homeland and from humanity en route to the Americas or Eurasia. Framing devises such 'Atlantic creoles' and 'creolization' remain out of sync with their lived experiences, languages, and ideas. As Pier Larson has shown for Madagascar and the western Indian Ocean, in *Ocean of Letters*, 'creole' ideas and cultures have been overvalued at the expense of indigenous cultures among captive Africans in the region.[42] Wherever supposed creolization occurred, it grew out of conquest, rupture, displacement, and in moments of asymmetrical power relations. Proponents of 'Atlantic' or whatever creoles have a difficult time substantiating the latter's existence in specific human details and cannot show beyond reasonable doubt how a 'creolized culture' operated in their daily lives because of weak evidence and a view of the Atlantic as a transformative portal that hollowed out Africans' ancestral inheritances. Rather than view the Atlantic as some magical threshold that miraculously created new peoples and cultures, an integrated space where power relations among the participants was symmetrical, or a transfer point for 'creolized' cultures, we need abstinence from grandiose claims framed by contemporary politics. What did imprisonment in one dungeon, stepping aboard yet another (floating) dungeon, estrangement from kin and community, and faced with perpetual incarnation in a foreign land and religion mean to those who followed the characteristically one-way Atlantic route? Diasporic scholarship might be served better by focusing on the lives, experiences, and ideas of Africans. In so doing, we would elucidate contemporary socio-political contexts borne out of transatlantic slaving and against their deep histories, rather than be guided by fashionable trends.

[41] Newson and Minchin, *From Capture to Sale*, 300.

[42] Pier M. Larson, *Ocean of Letters: Language and Creolization in an Indian Ocean Diaspora* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Scholars are, in fact, 'creatures of fashion and this … affects the fate of ideas. The ebb and flow of fashion is, at least, exhausting and, at worst, quite pernicious'.[43] Most fashionable ideas have a shared storyline. Take, for instance, the 'invention of the tradition' idea popularized in an edited volume by historians Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger in 1983. Though a volume largely unconcerned with Africa (except one chapter by Ranger), the 'invented tradition' idea became contagious, reaching epidemic proportions with new articles and books donning titles such as 'the invention of Africa' and hundreds of books whose titles contained 'The Invention of'.[44] In the end, Hobsbawm and Ranger's argument about culture change, packaged in the distinction between 'invented' and 'genuine' tradition, was pointless because all human traditions are innovations with specific durability. and culture change is not the only outcome of encounters. The fashion of 'creolization' (Atlantic or otherwise) followed an identical trajectory: a linguistic concept applied to historical processes by anthropologists unconcerned with the 'African past' became a popular explanation for African cultures in various diasporas. One of the latest kindred fashions, in this genealogy of vogue ideas, is the concept of Atlantic history.

Like 'creolization', Atlantic history is a multicolored world unto itself (with red, black, green, and white Atlantics) that stubbornly eschews Africa and African histories. To be sure, 'Atlantic Africa is largely ignored in all [current] schemas [of Atlantic history]', but Atlantic history falters as a 'discrete unit' of inquiry by its wholesale obsession with Western Europe and North America and in circumnavigating most of the global systems of exchanges that flowed through Africa, Eurasia, and the Americas, especially 'non-Atlantic' parts.[45] For many, Atlantic history had its origins in the 'sudden and harsh encounter between two old worlds [i.e. indigenous America and Western Europe] that transformed both and integrated them into a single New World'.[46] Although some have disputed this framework by pleading the 'most urgent and immediate challenge is to restore Africa to the Atlantic', such well-intentioned appeals concede to, rather than seriously confront, a white/European constructed 'Atlantic world' in which Africa(ns) might be

[43] Quoted in Paul J. Cloke, Chris Philo, and David Sadler, *Approaching Human Geography: An Introduction to Contemporary Theoretical Debates* (New York: Guilford Press, 1991), 93.

[44] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 211–62; Derek R. Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, c. 1935–1972* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3. See also Terence Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa," in Terence Ranger and Olufemi Vaughan, eds., *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa: Essays in Honour of A. H. M. Kirk-Greene* (New York: Palgrave, 1993); Valentin Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).

[45] Jack P. Greene and Philip Morgan, eds., *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 18, 21 (quotation), 339, 345 (quotation).

[46] Bernard Bailyn, *Atlantic History: Concept and Contours* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 55–56; Donald W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, Vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 4.

integrated.[47] The challenge for scholars of the 'Atlantic world', in whatever hue, is to comprehend that significant parts of 'Atlantic history' are sub-plots of larger (intra)African historical processes for which the Atlantic was a marginal frontier. For many Africans, the Atlantic was peripheral and remained so even with increased European contact.

Atlantic history can only be 'Atlantic' and a human history when we engage Africans in the full profile of *their* own world(s) and lived experiences. Ironically, most of the sixteenth to eighteenth-century travel accounts, however exoticized and problematic, did place Africa(ns) at the center of their 'Atlantic' narratives. But since the eighteenth-century era of racial science and slavery, there has been an explicit if not coordinated 'straw man' argument made (Africans are 'black-unchristian-slaves' and slavery was justified by this racial profile) as if Africans ever opted out of their humanity for any slaving nation, merchant company, or planter. Too many scholars have taken quite literally the enslaved or the emancipated Africans' appropriated use of non-African categories of being and belonging to affirm their humanity as evidence of the Africans' self-understanding.[48] In what seems like an out-of-body experience, scholars seek distance rather than the discovery of African understandings of self, kin, and society, embedded in the violence and trauma that birthed the 'modern' world. African experiences of the Atlantic were ones of permanent alienation from place of birth and socialization and from those who mattered in their life (kin and community). To them, this Atlantic world was neither a stable concept, theoretical frame, nor a 'master text' made intelligible through literary criticism and racialized hermeneutics. Regardless of whether we 'whiten' or 'blacken' the Atlantic, we would still miss the opportunity to take our cues from their lived experiences.

The 'Black' Atlantic idea is therefore woven from threads of a falsely perceived shared geography that did not exist in either the minds or the archived experiences of most Africans who traveled as prisoners on the Atlantic. The root problem is that the conjoined histories of Africa *and* the Atlantic region has been hijacked, first, by a cast of anthropologists and, more recently, literary critics who collectively have little desire to seriously engage the 'African past', the Africans' foundational self-understandings accessed through *their* languages and cultures, and *their* categories of family and community rooted in bio-genetics and ancestry. It is not that historians are the only ones capable of producing such histories; their record is at best mixed and at worst makes

[47] Games, "Atlantic History," 754.

[48] Ironically, the "face value" approach rarely occurs or is taken seriously when Africans and their progeny self-identity themselves using one or several toponyms/ethnonyms, such as "Congo," "Angola," "Mina," etc. In a recent and otherwise exceptional book on revolutionary Haiti and Cuba, the author describes one Juan Bautista Lisundia as a practitioner of "Afro-Cuban religion," a drummer, and one who identified himself as "Congo." The author, however, categorized him as a "creole." See Ada Ferrer, *Freedom's Mirror: Cuba and Haiti in the Age of Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 298.

them accessories to a protracted crime against African historicity by reducing them to supporting cast or invisibility in their own histories. Regardless of who researches and writes, we need context, not simply the interpretation of text! This is even truer for Africans who dictated or created some archived remembrance calibrated to specific economic and socio-political contexts: they cannot engage in nor protest our interpretations of their lives!

In the current 'Black Atlantic' fashion, the multiplicity of these lives, especially for the vast majority who were either illiterate in European languages or lacked the opportunity for documentary representation, matters little. Instead, what seems to matter is the autobiographical anxiety or 'the special stress' these literary critics-cum-intellectuals feel about *their* own 'African' ancestry and *their* own 'striving to be both European and black'.[49] Not unlike the travel accounts of earlier centuries, travelogues of the tourist kind produced by 'black' scholars, especially those inclined to literary criticism, have come to stand in place of deep contextualization and an engagement with historical processes in Atlantic and non-Atlantic Africa over time.[50] Rather than sober us by charting how race was ideologically determined in fifteenth and sixteenth-century Iberia and grafted onto human bodies (especially African ones) by so-called Enlightenment thinkers, these literary critics and their theorizing peers have reified the very thing that triggers their anxiety and which they persistently argue against: the idea of 'blackness'.[51] This ironic and intoxicating trend has led to the branding of a 'black Mediterranean', a 'black Pacific,' and a 'black Indian Ocean'.[52] Perhaps there is some meaning in following today's or tomorrow's fashion. In either case, this much is clear: neither 'blackenizing' an ocean nor intellectual voyeurism (where there

[49] Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1, 3. For a thorough and largely accurate critique of Gilroy, see chapter three ("Gilroy: Neither Black nor Atlantic") of Don Robotham's *Culture, Society, Economy: Globalization and Its Alternatives* (London: Sage, 2005), 43–61.

[50] Specimens of this anxiety can be found, for instance, in Henry Louis Gates's *Wonders of the African World* video series and the book of the same title; idem, *Tradition and the Black Atlantic: Critical Theory in the African Diaspora* (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2010); Saidiya V. Hartman, *Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route* (New York: Farrah, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

[51] On locating "race" in early Iberia, see Francisco Bethencourt, *Racisms: From the Crusades to the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). On science and race-making related to African bodies, see Andrew Curran, *The Anatomy of Blackness: Science and Slavery in an Age of Enlightenment* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2011), 6, 168.

[52] Jay B. Haviser and Kevin C. MacDonald, eds., *African Re-Genesis: Confronting Social Issues in the Diaspora* (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2006), 251; John Parker and Richard Reid, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 144; Seifudein Adem and Ali A. Mazrui, *Afrasia: A Tale of Two Continents* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2013), 261; Heather Smyth, "The Black Atlantic Meets the Black Pacific: Multimodality in Kamau Brathwaite and Wayde Compton," *Callaloo* 37, no. 2 (2014); 389–403; Yasuhiro Okada, "Gendering the 'Black Pacific': Race Consciousness, National Identity, and the Masculine/Feminine Empowerment Among African Americans in Japan Under

is only the 'idea of Africa') will allow us to see the stories that need telling, especially the ones creolization and Atlantic perspectives obfuscate.

Movement People

Since antiquity, there has been a series of human movements in and outside of Africa and at various scales, but in the past five centuries we have witnessed unprecedented forms of forced migration and dispersal of peoples outside of Africa. This outflow of diverse yet overlapping cultures and histories was coalesced into servile and racialized categories, settling in (slave) societies bordering the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. For scholars who have focused on parcels of the past half millennium, the locus of inquiry has been the Americas. Understandably, most scholars of a singularly constituted 'African diaspora' are based in the Americas (the region most transformed by captive African labor, ideas, and cultures) and so African diasporic research and writing have been stubbornly centered on the Atlantic basin. A few scholars who are proficient in African and Asian languages and cultures bordering the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean have begun to address this imbalance in the study of African diasporas in Asia. In the case of either the Americas or Eurasia, however, even fewer scholars have sought to bring these diasporic strands into a cohesive and broader history of the ways in which African cultures and histories took shape in and outside of Africa. Though a modest attempt, my *Transatlantic Africa, 1440–1888* provides a number of methodological tools and substantial storylines that push us toward that cohesive and broader history. The sources and narrative in the book spanned the past 500 years, geographically integrated the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Trans-Saharan, and Mediterranean worlds, and told a composite story that foregrounded global African voices and perspectives.[53] This kind of history offers a crucial turning point in how we can think and write about global African history and African diasporas as integral perspectives on world history.

U.S. Military Occupation, 1945–1952" (PhD dissertation, Michigan State University, 2008); Wanni Wibulswasdi Anderson and Robert G. Lee, eds., *Displacements and Diasporas: Asians in the Americas* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005), Chap. 7; Robbie Shilliam, *The Black Pacific: Anti-Colonial Struggles and Oceanic Connections* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015). On the different "colored" Atlantics, see, more generally, Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, eds., *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal* (Oxford University Press, 2008), and more specifically works such Jace Weaver's *The Red Atlantic: American Indigenes and the Making of the Modern World, 1000–1927* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014).

[53] Kwasi Konadu, *Transatlantic Africa, 1440–1888* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

In the past twenty years, the study of African diasporas has provided a wealth of new information and interpretations. However, very little research and analysis have been devoted to studying the interconnections between worldwide African diasporas. We need to know more than just the statistical evidence for Africans transported to the Americas, the personal story of exceptional yet less than representative enslaved Africans who attained notoriety in Asia or Islamic empires, or the silence that surrounds the lives of enslaved Africans brought to Czarist Russia or imperial China. We need to understand the relationship between these various facets of a composite African diaspora as strands that constitute a quilt rather than discrete and isolated phenomena unto themselves. Consequently, emergent scholarship on African diasporas may need to adopt a global framework (as a prerequisite methodology) for specific and broader diasporic strands studied in isolation or in comparative perspectives.[54] This way, we firstly lay bare the processes by which the types and formation of African diasporas relate or diverge and what, for instance, the endurance and transformation of African cultural forms (in response to mechanisms of socio-political inclusion and exclusion) reveal about the substance and inner corridors of diasporic lives. Secondly, we need a critical assessment of how the global forces at play and local conditions, such as the population density and range of Africans within specific regions of the world, influenced the content and course of memory, culture, and identities. Finally, we need, on the one hand, to account for the presence or absence of so-called 'back-to-Africa' and 'black consciousness' movements in specific times and regions of the world, socio-political movements that invariably engaged in and promoted the very idea of African diasporic scholarship and networks across boundaries that human movement created. On the other hand, we also need to account for intra-African dispersal as well as transborder circulations within Africa, especially after the decade of African political independence from formal colonial rule, and the inflow of peoples of African ancestry in West, East, and Southern Africa during the same historical moments.[55]

[54] Though focused on the Atlantic, a number of methodological questions raised by James Sweet may have broader salience. See James H. Sweet, "Mistaken Identities? Olaudah Equiano, Domingos Álvares, and the Methodological Challenges of Studying the African Diaspora," *The American Historical Review* 114 (2009): 279–306.

[55] On internal circulation of peoples in continental Africa in the contemporary moment, see, for instance, Aderanti Adepoju, ed., *International Migration within, to and from Africa in a Globalised World* (Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2009); Victor Agadjanian, "Research on International Migration within Sub-Saharan Africa: Foci, Approaches, and Challenges," *Sociological Quarterly* 49, no. 3 (2008): 407–21; Giles Mohan and A.B. Zack-Williams, "Globalisation from Below: Conceptualising the Role of the African Diasporas in Africa's Development," *Review of African Political Economy* 29, no. 92 (2002): 211–36. On the historic inflow of diasporic Africans to various parts of Africa, see Kwame Essien, *Brazilian-African Diaspora in Ghana: The Tabom, Slavery, Dissonance of Memory, Identity and Locating* (East Lansing: Michigan State

Pioneering scholarship on African diasporas in Asia offers a striking contrast to trends that privilege an Atlantic or North American ownership of the 'African diaspora'. During the past three decades, several important monographs and edited volumes have appeared. These include the likes of: Joseph Harris's *The African Diaspora in Asia*; Shihan de Silva Jaysuriya's *African Identity in Asia*; Edward Alper's *East Africa and the Indian Ocean*; Shaun Marmon's *Slavery in the Islamic Middle East*; Paul E. Lovejoy's *Slavery on the Frontiers of Islam*; and John Hunwick and Eve Troutt Powell's *The African Diaspora in the Mediterranean Lands of Islam*. Taken together, these studies focus on excavating silenced African and African-descended histories and adding other integral strands to our worldwide diasporic knowledge base. These works and others have made concerted efforts to create new ground for research, but underlying both this and the Atlantic history/creole development is the tendency to concentrate on specific historical topics, peoples, and places without pushing us toward a cohesive and broader history of African diasporas. Whether the loci have been the Americas or Eurasia, these studies have illuminated some of the key socio-political and cultural underpinnings of studying African diasporas, and so have provided a nascent framework for interpreting diasporic histories in specific nation-states and regions. However, historians have not traced the historic and cultural links between African diasporas or their relation to broader patterns at the level of world history. By taking a holistic and global view of historic Africa and its diasporas we can perceive, for example, how the memory and culture of a 'homeland' affected the outcomes of diasporic (trans)formation in 'foreign' lands. This perspective might prove fruitful in framing the ways in which cultural identity, memory, and production proved crucial in how dispersed and forced migrants within and outside of Africa dealt with mechanisms of socio-political inclusion and exclusion in host societies. Thus, by analyzing the connection between African diasporas, a more developed interpretation of how African peoples, ideas and cultures moved (in all their various forms) through their global histories. In 1946, W.E.B. Du Bois published *The World and Africa*, and, in it, he argued for the contributions made by Africa to world history, but for reasons of funding and what was known said little about diasporic African histories throughout the world. With our current tools and state of knowledge, our understanding of 'Africa' and 'the world' should coalesce around a field of knowledge and perspective we might call 'African world histories'. African world histories attuned to the specifics of local communities, their self-understandings and optics, and the flow of global exchanges (where Africa is porous and an integral part of those exchanges) seem to be where diasporic approaches to African history should take us.

University Press, 2016); Kwasi Konadu, *The Akan Diaspora in the Americas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Nemata A. Blyden, *West Indians in West Africa, 1808–1880: The African Diaspora in Reverse* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2000).

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CHAPTER 38

Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa

Marloes Janson

Sub-Saharan Africa is frequently, but unjustly, seen as the periphery of the Muslim world, in terms of both geography and religious influence. By contrast, North Africa is considered to be directly linked to the alleged center of the Muslim world; that is, the Arab Middle East. In fact, Islam has had a presence in Sub-Saharan Africa since the earliest days of its history. This chapter tries to redress the periphery bias in the analysis of African Muslim societies; a correction that, as Loimeier points out,[1] is long overdue. After all, Africa is home to one of the largest agglomerations of Muslims in the world today.[2]

Stretching south across the Sahara, the vast savannah zone (known as the Sahel) is Muslim until it reaches the forest belt of West and Central Africa. Moving south, the Horn of Africa represents a second major zone of Muslim influence. Via contact with seafaring traders in the Indian Ocean, Islam came to dominate in what is now known as the Swahili coast, stretching as far south as Mozambique and the island of Madagascar. From these areas, the religion spread gradually over the centuries, moving south and west into more tropical zones, and the expansion continues today.[3] At present, Muslims constitute a majority in North Africa and in most of the countries in the Sahel. In Sudan, Chad, and Tanzania, Muslims are the largest group. The population is almost equally divided between Muslims and Christians in Africa's most populous country, Nigeria. Even where Muslims are a minority, they constitute large majorities in certain regions, as for example on the Cape

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in South Africa,[4] northern Benin, northern Cameroon, northern Ghana, and in highland Ethiopia and coastal Kenya.[5] Although being a minority, Muslims are nevertheless important in politics in Uganda,[6] and are a force to be reckoned with at the national level in Malawi and Mozambique.[7] This chapter begins by mapping historical processes in the expansion of Islam in pre-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa, before moving on to the colonial and post-colonial periods. The focus is on West and East Africa; regions that have been well documented in the literature.[8] Compared with the study of Muslim societies in West and East Africa, the topic of Islam in Southern Africa is still in its infancy.[9]

Scholars studying Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa have long written about an 'African Islam', reflecting the Sufi bias typical of scholarship on Islam in Africa.[10] This chapter aims at demonstrating that the recurrent idea of an 'African Islam' hampers a better understanding of the emergence of Islamic reformist-oriented movements.[11] I conclude by pointing out new approaches to the study of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa that capture the complexity and fluidity of the different ways of 'being Muslim' in everyday living, thereby challenging ingrained analytical binaries such as an 'African Islam' versus 'Arab Islam', and an accommodating Sufi Islam versus an orthodox reformist Islam.

History of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa

The Muslim penetration of Sub-Saharan Africa has traditionally been associated with conquest, trade, migration, and missionary activities, occurring in four main phases.[12] The first phase dates to the seventh and eight centuries, with the military conquest of much of North Africa, where political submission and conversion to Islam were considered one and the same act.[13] Converted Berber-speaking nomads were well positioned to mediate Islamic influences between the Maghreb and the Western Sudan. The Almoravid movement, translated as 'the movement of those who engaged in holy war', originated in the desert space between North and West Africa in the eleventh century.[14] It initiated the implantation of the Maliki law school (*madhab*),[15] thus giving the region a shared intellectual-legal frame of reference.[16] The Almoravid movement is also held responsible for conquering the Ghana Empire in the eleventh century, resulting in its Islamization.[17]

During the second phase, Islam spread across the Sahara into West Africa along the trans-Saharan trade routes. From the tenth century onward, North African Muslim merchants settled in the main towns along the trade routes.[18] In addition to goods like salt, merchants brought Islamic ideas and practices to West Africa. Due to its central location on the rim of the Indian Ocean, trade was also the avenue through which Islam spread in East Africa. Whereas in West Africa Islam expanded gradually from the Sahel toward the tropical forest belt of the Guinea coast, Islam in East Africa remained confined to a chain of settlements on the shore of the Indian Ocean and the islands off the

coast until the nineteenth century.[19] A second difference was that whereas the spread of Islam in East Africa went hand-in-hand with linguistic and cultural 'Arabization',[20] in West Africa Arabic failed to achieve the status of a vernacular language and became the lingua franca only in scholarly circles; the 'Latin of Africa'.[21]

During the third phase, the influence of Muslim traders along with Muslim scholars was instrumental in the formation of states ruled by Muslims. 'It is not always easy', writes Lewis, 'to distinguish between the Islamizing role of Muslim traders, on the one hand, and of teachers and holy men, on the other, since these two activities are often associated in Muslim communities and regularly combined in the same person'.[22] Traders and Muslim clerics propagated Islam under the patronage of local rulers. In the thirteenth century, Islam became the religion of state in the Mali Empire, by then the dominant political and commercial power in the Western Sudan.[23]

Here it should be noted that throughout the third phase of the Islamic expansion, Islam remained a court religion. Because only the king and his immediate entourage came under the influence of Islam, the ruling aristocracy adopted a middle position between Islam and the traditional religion, patronizing both Muslim clerics and traditional priests.[24] Both categories provided services to local rulers, in the form of amulets, prayers, blessings, healing, and other supernatural means at their disposal to guarantee the prosperity of the polity as well as of its king. The symbiotic relation of Islam with traditional religion was attested by the Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta when he visited the Malian court in the middle of the fourteenth century. He attended two Islamic festivals, and in his book *Travels* he condemned the 'vile practices' of the Malian participants, who mixed Islamic practices with traditional ones.[25]

Despite its expansion, Islam remained marginal in Sub-Saharan Africa until the time of the jihadist movements in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which were motivated by the desire to eliminate *shirk* (idolatry) at chiefly courts in order to establish systems of government based on Islamic principles. The most prominent was Usman dan Fodio's jihad in Hausaland (modern Northern Nigeria), which resulted in the creation of the Sokoto caliphate in 1809; the largest state in West Africa until it was conquered by the British in 1903.[26] While the Sokoto caliphate determined Islamic practice in West Africa, the Zanzibar sultanate became the focal point of the religious and cultural life of the East African coast in the nineteenth century. The bombardment of Zanzibar by British naval forces in 1896 sealed its transformation into a British protectorate.[27]

Loimeier concludes that the Muslim caliphates and sultanates resulting from jihadist movements in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries constituted an important political experience, because for the first time in Sub-Saharan history Islam became the only source of political legitimacy.[28] Jihadist movements were, however, crucial not only in the expansion of Islam

as a political force, but also in anti-colonial resistance. For example, the man whom the British characterized as the 'mad Mullah' (Sayyid Muhammad Abdallah Hassan) of Somalia conducted a jihad between 1898 and 1920 to resist the territorial ambitions of the British, Italians, and Ethiopians. The Sayyid (an honorific title for the alleged descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) belonged to the Shadhiliyya Sufi order and confronted the Qadiriyya, who collaborated with the European rulers with the aim of establishing an independent Islamic state for Somalis.[29]

The final phase of the Islamic expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa began in the nineteenth century under the influence of the Sufi orders (*turuq*). Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, the Tijaniyya, under the leadership of al-Hajj 'Umar Tall (d. 1864), gradually superseded the Qadiriyya (which had originated in Baghdad in the thirteenth century) as the largest Sufi order in West Africa. Al-Hajj 'Umar Tall led a large-scale jihadist movement in the area of present-day Mali, resulting in mass conversion.[30] Popularly based Sufi orders reached the East African coast much later; only near the end of the nineteenth century did the Qadiriyya, Alawiyya, and Shadhiliyya become active and trigger a movement of conversion to Islam.[31] But although they had a much shorter history than the Sufi orders in West Africa, the East African Sufi orders played an important role in bringing newcomers to Islam. Their egalitarian attitude attracted migrants, marginalized upcountry converts, and (ex-)slaves who had been routinely excluded from power.[32]

Remarkably, although none of the European colonial powers developed a coherent Muslim policy, the colonial period (i.e. the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) saw the large-scale conversion of Africans to Islam.

The Colonial Period

The relationship between colonialism and Islam was a complex one. Although colonial rule put an end to the jihadist movements and colonial governments attempted to prevent Islam from expanding, the process of Islamization accelerated during the colonial period and the number of converts increased due to colonial policies and activities. According to Launay and Soares,[33] the rise in the number of Muslims during the colonial period can be explained in terms of developments within the 'Islamic sphere'; a Muslim public arena that existed separately, though not detached from, the colonial public sphere. Muslims throughout Sub-Saharan Africa took advantage of the new possibilities created by colonialism, thereby expanding the Islamic sphere.

In order to be better able to control their Muslim subjects perhaps, colonial officials maintained close contacts with local Muslim rulers and religious scholars. Only a minority of Muslim leaders resisted colonialism or tried to avoid conquest by making the *hijra* (migrating beyond the reach of colonial authorities)[34]; the majority chose accommodation or collaboration.[35] For instance, Senegalese *marabouts* (Muslim clerics) collaborated

closely with the French colonial rulers, for whom they mobilized support and collected taxes, in return for some level of influence on the shaping of Senegalese society and polity.[36,37] In neighboring Gambia, the British colonial rulers acknowledged the centrality of Islam by making room for some elements of the Sharia law in the legal system.[38] Likewise, the *ulama* (Islamic scholars) of the East African protectorates were coopted into the regime's service as salaried *qadis* (Islamic judges) and other 'native' officials.[39]

Second, new means of communication and transport facilitated travel and the flow of ideas among African Muslims and between African Muslims and their counterparts elsewhere. The explicit aim of the improved infrastructure was to stimulate the flow of raw materials (peanuts, palm oil, cotton, wild rubber, coffee, and cocoa) and labor to support the colonial enterprise. By building roads to previously inaccessible areas of the country and opening the hinterland, colonial rulers unwittingly enabled Muslim clerics and traders to communicate with one another and expand their spheres of influence.[40] Moreover, by putting an end to jihads and local warfare, colonial governments were able to guarantee safe travel over long distances.[41] Africans from the countryside migrated to the growing urban centers, where they came under Muslim influence. Mobility thus facilitated the expansion of Islam. As a result, more standardized ways of being Muslim emerged during the colonial period. In this context Eickelman speaks of a 'generic Islam' that centered around the assumed universals of Islam.[42] This new trend was reflected in the increasing number of African Muslims who were able to set out on the *hajj*, the pilgrimage to Mecca. It is here that Muslims were brought face-to-face with a diversity of their fellow Muslims. As such, the hajj is a tool to integrate the worldwide community of Muslims, the *umma*.[43]

The advent of Islam in South Africa also occurred in conjunction with colonialism. The first Muslims in South Africa, the 'Malay', were taken from Southeast Asia by the Dutch colonists in 1658. A second group (1860–1911) came from India as indentured laborers to work on Natal's sugar plantations. The 'Malay' and Indian Muslims make up the two largest groups among the Muslim population of South Africa today.[44] Under British rule, the Cape Muslim population gained religious freedom and the number of mosques increased. However, the growing size of the Cape Muslim community triggered a number of communal disputes over the leadership of mosques, as a result of which it was never able to achieve the kind of political unity that would have been necessary to influence Cape Town's political development in decisive ways in the late nineteenth century.[45]

While colonial attitudes towards Muslim subjects remained ambivalent, Islam turned into a majority religion in large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa in the twentieth century. At the transition to independence, a new wave of Islamic reform erupted.

The New Wave of Islamic Reform in Postcolonial Africa

Despite the colonial impetus to the expansion of Islam, Christian missions spread throughout Sub-Saharan Africa in the twentieth century. While many Africans acquired literacy and formal Western education and became Christian, Muslims (who continued to follow their traditional Islamic system of education) had less access to formal education and less opportunity for development. Consequently, Christians came to have a 'privileged position' in society.[46] With the rise of a class of literate African Christians, Muslims became less important to the colonial administration, and Muslim communities tended to become marginalized from the modern economic sector. The imbalances created by these unequal circumstances make up much of the legacy being experienced by Muslims in postcolonial Africa.[47] Thus began a wave of Muslim emancipation with Muslim parties and pressure groups calling for a Muslim equivalent to the Christian mission schools established in the colonial period. Money coming from oil-producing Muslim countries since the 1970s has facilitated the implementation of these demands.[48]

From the 1970s onwards, an increasing number of African students also received scholarships to universities and colleges in Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Upon their return to Sub-Saharan Africa, they attempted to reform Islam by purifying it from local traditions. Their attempts resulted in local disputes about the 'correct' practice of Islam. An example is the *qabd-sadl* dispute; that is, the dispute over the position of the arms in prayer in parts of West Africa. Whereas the Maliki school of law recommended *sadl* (arms outstretched), new Muslim movements of reform affiliated with the Saudi-oriented Wahhabiyya and the Indo-Pakistani Tablighi Jama'at insisted on *qabd* (arms folded over the chest).[49] Other forms of ritual practice over which conflict broke out in East African Muslim communities were the celebration of Muslim holidays and in particular the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, the *maulidi* (*mawlid* in Arabic [Ar]). Although maulidi is celebrated by significant parts of the Muslim population of the Kenyan coast (and elsewhere in Africa), the form of the celebrations (the use of musical instruments, textual recitation in either Arabic or Kiswhahili, etc.) is highly contested from within. The strong influence of Islamic reformism over the last few decades has largely rejected *maulidi* as undue religious innovation in Kenya.[50]

Due to the importance of proper ritual, ritual practices have often been at the center of local disputes in African Muslim communities.[51] These disputes touch on questions of education, authority, and religious identity. On the grounds that they were educated in formal institutions in the Arab world, reformist Muslims claimed to have more insight into the proper interpretation of Islam than scholars who were trained in the traditional Muslim education system. Owing to the new Afro-Arab cooperation in the

1970s, a number of international Muslim organizations involved in both *da'wa* (mission) and development-oriented activities capitalized on this new interpretation of Islam.[52]

Under the influence of the Iranian Revolution, with the increased presence and resources of the Arab Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, the exposure to a more reformist type of Islam stirred up an Islamic revival in Sub-Saharan Africa.[53] This resulted in an increased visibility and assertiveness of Islam in society, as manifested in the mushrooming of mosques, Islamic schools, and clinics, which identify much of the public (and especially urban) space as Islamic. Since the 1990s, media-savvy Muslim intellectuals have captured the media. They publicly called into question the religious authority of the established Muslim scholars, the *ulama*, leading to a fragmentation of religious authority.[54] The spread of new media technologies thus set in motion the process of the democratization of religious knowledge. No longer are the ulama regarded as the sole guardians of Islam; religious authority is now in many hands. Islamic radio and television broadcasts, as well as audiotapes of preaching and religious pamphlets, have brought about a public debate on what 'true Islam' involves.[55]

Transnational movements such as the Jamaʿat Izalat al-Bidʿa wa-Iqamat as-Sunna (the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of the Sunna, or Izala for short) in West Africa,[56] and the Tablighi Jamaʿat (a missionary movement that originated in India and that has made inroads in West Africa,[57] East Africa,[58] and South Africa[59]) fed on and contributed to increasing internal debates about Islam and Muslim subjectivity in Sub-Saharan Africa. The efforts of (trans)national Muslim movements of reform to popularize religious knowledge by offering Muslims autonomous access to the sources of faith have created the basis for a new interpretation of Islam and a novel understanding of 'being Muslim'.[60]

(Trans)national reformist Muslim movements shed light not only on the divergent opinions of what being Muslim means, but also on the interconnections between Muslims in Africa and elsewhere. They offer African Muslims the means through which to surpass local identities and local modes of belonging and to identify instead with the umma. As such, these movements connect the local with the national and the global, and open up an avenue for mapping the complex articulations between religion and politics.[61] The emergence of a 'transnational Islam'[62] thus helps us to think beyond binaries such as an allegedly tolerant and 'traditional' local Islam versus an orthodox and 'modern' global Islam, which for a long time have dominated the study of Islam and African Muslim communities.[63]

Since the 1990s, increased global interconnections, along with economic and political reform, liberalization, and the weakening of the postcolonial state, have played major roles in the transformation of the religious landscape in Sub-Saharan Africa.[64] In virtually every Muslim community on the continent, the decades since the 1990s have been marked by heated debates about

who is authorized to speak in the name of Islam and for whom. In many cases these debates have taken the form of increased tensions between reformist Muslims and Sufi practitioners. In countries as diverse as Niger and Ethiopia, religious disputes resulted in reformists accusing Sufi Muslims of not being 'true Muslims'.[65] *Bid'a*, 'innovation' or deviation from the Prophet Muhammad's path, is in the opinion of reformist Muslims largely related to the Sufi practice of Islam. By attacking 'superstitions' such as the veneration of Sufi saints and the trade in amulets and other manifestations of Sufi Islam, reformist movements thus represent a 'de-mystifying trend in religion'.[66]

But Islamic reform not only resulted in religious disputes; the new possibilities for claiming religious authority also had the effect of empowering marginalized groups in society, including women and youth. Most significantly, political liberalization in African Muslim societies has given voice to Muslim women's organizations, which have played an active role in redefining notions of family life, sexuality, and moral self-fashioning.[67] Furthermore, Muslim women nowadays take an active part in movements of popular learning and piety in many parts of Africa.[68] Not only women, but also young people have gained a greater and more visible role in religious life in present-day Africa. Inverting intergenerational relationships, young people are now assuming positions of religious authority for themselves, leaving the established Muslim elders in a state of powerlessness; a position normally associated with youth.[69] For example, the Durban-based Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa (MYMSA) played a pivotal role in disseminating reformist ideas, thereby carving a niche for Muslim youth in politics.[70] Many Muslim youths have made use of South Africa's new political freedoms and its liberal constitution to pursue their distinctive rights. For many, this is part of a broader reformist program of introducing stricter Islamic codes in public and private spheres.[71]

It can be concluded that although most Sub-Saharan independent nation-states (with the exception of Mauritania, set up as an 'Islamic Republic' at independence[72]; Ethiopia, which historically has been identified with the Coptic Church or Orthodox Christianity; and the special case of South Africa under apartheid rule) started off with secular constitutions, the efforts of postcolonial governments served to foster the spread of Islam. With religion becoming politically salient, a heated debate erupted between different religious communities about who 'owns' the state. Indeed, much of post-independence history has been a conflict over the control of the state. A case in point is Tanzania, where religion constitutes a platform of political mobilization for both Muslims and Christians, and where historical legacy and postcolonial policy have led to the emergence of religious disputes over development and national political leadership. The number of Muslims in Tanzania has grown considerably since the late nineteenth century. Yet this growth has not been translated into a corresponding increase in the number of Muslims holding positions in the political, educational, and economic arenas. In the eyes of many Muslims, Tanzania has become a Christian country. The Baraza

Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania (BAKWATA), that is, the National Muslim Council of Tanzania, was established in 1968 to serve Muslim interests. Nevertheless, Muslims increasingly became dissatisfied with the Council, seeing its role as representing the government instead of representing Muslim aspirations for political development. To redress the structural imbalance between Muslims and Christians, several new Muslim organizations proliferated in Tanzania in the 1980s, with the aim of opposing state-informed concepts of 'true Islam' as presented by BAKWATA and developing modern Islamic education. Since then, Muslim-Christian disputes have dominated public debates in Tanzania, with Muslims and Christians attacking each other's faiths in their public preaching, resulting in religious violence.[73]

Contradicting the typical image promulgated in the Western media of the radicalization of African political Islam and deteriorating Christian-Muslim relations (a tendency that has gained more currency since 9/11 and the recent upsurge of Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria),[74] many African Muslims emphasize the significance of individual reform rather than political struggle in bringing about social transformation. Moreover, a striking feature of interreligious relations in several African countries is their peaceful nature and their relative lack of political cleavages.[75] Although conflict and violence are closely associated with the image that people (both outsiders and Nigerians themselves) have of Nigeria, religious clashes are just one aspect of manifold Christian-Muslim relations in the country. Christians and Muslims have long lived side-by-side in southwestern Nigeria, often in harmony with 'traditional' practitioners; the boundaries between the three are not always sharply demarcated.[76] In a similar vein, the East African upcountry regions are informed today by a multitude of interfaces between Islam, Christianity, and African religions.[77] These interfaces have inspired Africanists to adopt a comparative approach that focuses on how Christians and Muslims align with and copy each other, sometimes in interaction with so-called traditionalists.[78] Where Christian-Muslim conflicts prevail,[79] it would be better to describe the causes of these conflicts as a mixture of different factors, with religion being only one of them, and many of them rooted in postcolonial development.[80]

'African Islam' Versus 'Islam in Africa'

Despite the long history of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa, the study of Islam has long been neglected by Africanists. They considered Islam not 'authentically' African and therefore not a legitimate subject of study. Conversely, Sub-Saharan Africa is often perceived as peripheral to the field of Islamic studies. Somewhat ironically, whereas Islam has not been 'African' enough for some, Africans have not been 'Islamic' enough for others.[81]

As Triaud points out,[82] the scientific partition between African Studies and Islamic Studies (or its predecessor Orientalism) superimposed itself over an

epistemological divide between an 'African Islam' (referred to as *Islam noir*, literally 'black Islam', by French colonial authorities),[83] which is inherently syncretic, and an 'orthodox' or 'Arab Islam.' The idea that there is a specifically 'African Islam' formed the basis of colonial policy with regard to Islam from the second decade of the twentieth century onwards. Although the concept of Islam noir has been severely criticized,[84] there is still a tendency to depict Islam as practiced in Sub-Saharan Africa as less orthodox than that which is practiced in the Arab Middle East. For example, in their edited volume *African Islam and Islam in Africa*, Westerlund and Rosander describe 'African Islam' as more flexible and adaptable than what they portray as 'Islam in Africa', thereby reviving the colonial tradition of Islam noir.[85] Another example of the endurance of Islam noir is Robinson's *Muslim Societies in African History*, in which one chapter is devoted to 'The Islamization of Africa' and the subsequent one to 'The Africanization of Islam.'[86]

Following Geertz's lead, who in his pioneering book *Islam Observed* compared Moroccan and Indonesian cultures through the lens of Islam,[87] social scientists finally started dealing seriously with Islam as an object of study. But once again African Muslim societies were analyzed along contrasting paradigms as either 'Sufi' or 'reformist.' A major concern in the Africanist study of Islam has been how to document the diversity within Muslim communities without violating the religion's universal features.[88] Or, in the words of Launay, 'how can the very diverse (if not diverging) religious beliefs and practices of Muslims be comprehended within a single idea of "Islam"?'[89] The contrasting and competing Islamic discourses and practices in Muslim Africa are often studied in terms of a distinction between a Sufi and a reformist tradition; a distinction that is redolent of the earlier 'African Islam' versus 'Arab Islam' contrast.

In the so-called Sufi understanding of Islam, Muslims treat certain charismatic persons (living or deceased religious leaders, saints, or marabouts) as intermediaries between ordinary believers and Allah. Such charismatic religious leaders, their descendants, and their followers are organized into Sufi orders (Ar. *turuq*, singular *tariqa*), which have become one of the main organizational forms for the practice of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa.[90] Adherence to a Sufi order is expressed through a special litany of prayers as well as by engagement in Sufi practices, including the consultation of religious specialists for divination, healing, and the request of amulets, pilgrimages to Sufi shrines, and the performance of religious festivals commemorating the birth of the Prophet or a Sufi saint. Largely because of the prominent position that Sufi orders occupy in the religio-political landscape (mainly in Senegal), they have attracted a great deal of scholarly tradition.[91]

The Sufi tradition is often studied in opposition to a reformist tradition, which is believed to call much of the former into question. As we have seen above, reformists condemn Sufis' 'incorrect' practice of Islam and seek to reform the way Islam is practiced locally by modeling themselves on the Arab Middle East. Through trade networks and education, reformist ideas reached

Muslim communities in Sub-Saharan Africa.[92] Starting in the 1970s, with money coming from the oil countries, an increasing number of Africans have received scholarships to study at universities and colleges in the Arab world. Upon their return to their home countries, they spread a reformist interpretation of Islam.

Although the binary between a Sufi and reformist Islam is challenging, it oversimplifies the fragmented and fluid nature of religious practice in Muslim Africa. Most Muslims in Sub-Saharan Africa today are neither members of Sufi orders nor self-proclaimed reformists.[93] During my ethnographic field research in the Gambia, it struck me that the majority of my interlocutors identified themselves as 'ordinary Muslims'; they did not affiliate themselves officially with any of the Sufi orders, and since the term 'reformist' is associated with religious 'radicalism' they did not call themselves reformists either.[94] A second flaw, as outlined above, is that the analytical model that opposes Sufism and reformism implies a hierarchical structuring of Islam in that Sufism is often believed to be less 'orthodox' than reformism, which is termed a 'purer' form of Islam. A related shortcoming is that the Sufi-reformist dichotomy frequently involves a teleological perspective in which Sufi Islam eventually gives away to a version of 'true', reformist Islam. For instance, Umar claims that Islam in Nigeria today has to be understood as a historical transformation from Sufism into anti-Sufism or reformism.[95]

In practice, however, Islamization does not proceed along a unilinear path from an accommodating, syncretic religion to a pure, orthodox one. Recent scholarship has illustrated that the moral and spiritual transformation Muslims go through in ongoing Islamization processes is often filled with temptations and struggles.[96] Finding ways to cope with these challenges, they move in and out of religious movements, often shifting their religious allegiances. Muslims' shifting allegiances explain why the study of new formations of Muslim identity in Africa (and beyond) should take into account not only the cultivation of piety, but also the imperfection and failure of everyday living. According to Marsden, studies of Muslim societies that focus narrowly on moral self-fashioning are 'unable to confront the ways in which Muslims are called upon to face, explain and contend with inconsistencies and complexities in their attempts to live virtuous lives'.[97] I would therefore like to conclude with a plea for a study of Islam that takes lived religiosity as its starting point and that warrants against the essentialism encapsulated in many of our analytical concepts, including an 'African Islam' versus 'Arab Islam' or a 'Sufi Islam' versus 'reformist Islam.'

Living Islam

The commonplace approach to Islam in social-science scholarship is as a 'discursive tradition.' According to Asad,[98] Islam needs to be interpreted as a tradition consisting of discourses that seek to instruct Muslims in the

correct form and purpose of a given practice. In this view, a practice is Islamic because it is authorized by the discursive traditions of Islam as represented by the Quran and *hadith*; the accounts of what the Prophet Muhammad said and did. Although the interpretation of Islam as a discursive tradition sheds light on the interplay of its singular terms and its universal, global import, it also has certain shortcomings because it passes over the fact that for many Muslims Islamic tradition is not merely discursively shaped.[99] In fact, many Muslims put more emphasis on religious orthopraxy (emphasis on correct religious practice) than on orthodoxy (emphasis on correct belief and doctrinal conformity). This prompts us to search for an approach to Islam that is more perceptive about everyday religious practice.

The current focus on 'living Islam'[100] resulted from a shift in scholarship whereby Islam was no longer studied as another aspect of social structure in the same way as, for example, kinship,[101] but as a part of the actual world in which Muslims live. As Seesemann points out, a focus on the quotidian may facilitate a deeper understanding of how Islam operates in a particular social setting.[102] Taking such a course shifts the emphasis from the narrowly political, macro-oriented analysis in studies of Muslim societies towards a perspective that focuses on how ideas, doctrines, and practices related to Islam undergo a process of contextualization in specific localities.

Drawing upon Haenni and Holtrop, Otayek and Soares capture Muslims' everyday experience of religion in the notion of *islam mondain*, that is, 'Islam in the present world'.[103] Islam mondain helps us to apprehend the variety of Muslim identities and the porosity of boundaries between these identities in the contemporary world in which Muslims find themselves, making efforts to produce themselves as modern religious subjects within contexts of considerable political and economic uncertainty, as well as increased global interconnections.

One can see this way of 'being Muslim' especially among mainstream African Muslims,[104] like the Nigerian Muslim youths cited by Masquelier, who ask themselves, in media outside the control of established religious authorities and the state, 'what it means to be Muslim, a citizen, or simply a youth with moral convictions'.[105] The Islamic revival in African Muslim societies needs to be interpreted in terms of these questions rather than in normative categories or unhelpful binaries, including 'African Islam' versus 'Arab Islam' or 'Sufi Islam' versus 'reformist Islam.' Indeed, questions about what it means to be Muslim challenge us to shift the attention from a narrow analysis of Islam in Africa as a coherent belief system towards a perspective that focuses on how Muslims actually live religion in their daily lives, and the ambiguities, contradictions, and aspirations as the constitutive moments in their lived religiosity.

Notes

1. Roman Loimeier, *Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), ix–x.
2. According to the CIA World Factbook, about half of Africa's population professes Islam, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook.
3. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels, "Introduction: Patterns of Islamization and Varieties of Religious Experience among Muslims of Africa," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 1–18; and Roman Loimeier, *Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).
4. As Abdulkader Tayob, "Counting Muslims in South Africa," *Annual Review of Islam in South Africa* 5 (Cape Town: Centre for Contemporary Islam, University of Cape Town, 1998) observes, although Muslims form less than 2% of the South African population, statistics do not reflect their religious experience. Residential concentration of Muslims in racially segregated areas in Cape Town means that many of them live in proximity to mosques and Islamic schools and have a strong sense of being Muslim. See Goolam Vahed and Shamil Jeppie, *Multiple Communities: Muslims in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (2005), 252–53, www.hsrcpress.ac.za.
5. René Otayek and Benjamin F. Soares, "Introduction: Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa," in *Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa*, ed. Benjamin F. Soares and René Otayek (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 1–24, 2.
6. Abdin N. Chande, "Radicalism and Reform in East Africa," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000).
7. Edward A. Alpers, "East Central Africa," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 315–19.
8. Given the sheer number of countries and their diversity in these regions, individual cases cannot be described but I will point out broad patterns with reference to some key examples.
9. But see Abdulkader Tayob, *Islam in South Africa: Mosques, Imams, and Sermons* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999).
10. Sufism (Ar. *tasawwuf*) refers to the mystical tradition in Islam characterized by esoteric practices, special litanies of prayer, and techniques of invoking Allah's names as ways of approaching Him.
11. These movements are variously known as Wahhabi, Salafi, Islamist, or simply Sunnite Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, see: Lansiné Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya. Islamic Reform and Politics in French West Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974); Elizabeth Hodgkin, "Islamism and Islamic Research in Africa," *Islam et Sociétés au sud du Sahara* 4 (1990): 73–130; Roman Loimeier, "Patterns and Peculiarities of Islamic Reform in Africa," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 33, no. 3 (2003): 237–62; William F. S. Miles, "West African Islam: Emerging Political Dynamics," in *Political Islam in West Africa: State-Society Relations Transformed*, ed. William F.S.

Miles (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 1–18. What these movements have in common is what Roy calls "a quest to define a pure religion beyond time and space;" and Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam* (London: Hurst, 2004), 11. They aim at purging Islam of unlawful innovations (*bid'a*) by returning to the purported origins of Islam.

12. For example, see: John S. Trimingham, *Islam in West Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959); John S. Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); Peter B. Clarke, *West Africa and Islam: A Study of Religious Development from the 8th to the 20th Century* (London: Edward Arnold, 1982); Mervyn Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa* (London: Longman, 1984); Randall L. Pouwels, *Horn and Crescent: Cultural Change and Traditional Islam on the East African Coast, 800–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Nehemia Levtzion, *Islam in West Africa: Religion, Society and Politics to 1800* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994); David Robinson, *Muslim Histories, African Societies: The Venture of Islamic Studies in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Roman Loimeier, *Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).
13. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels, "Introduction: Patterns of Islamization and Varieties of Religious Experience among Muslims of Africa," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 1–18, 2.
14. Peter B. Clarke, *West Africa and Islam: A Study of Religious Development from the 8th to the 20th Century* (London: Edward Arnold, 1982), 13.
15. The majority of Muslims in Africa are Sunnis belonging to the Maliki (dominant in North and West Africa) and Shafi'i (predominant on the East African coast) legal schools of thought. Exceptions are Shi'i Muslims in parts of West Africa, Ahmadis (a Muslim movement with a strong missionary component going back to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908) from Punjab in India) and Isma'ilis in East Africa and in areas of Asian Muslim immigration in South Africa. For Shi'i Muslims, see Mara A. Leichtman, *Shi'i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa: Lebanese Migration and Religious Conversion in Senegal* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015). For Ahmadis, see Humphrey J. Fisher, *Ahmadiyyah: A Study in Contemporary Islam on the West African Coast* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).
16. Peter Von Sivers, "Egypt and North Africa," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 21–36, 25–26.
17. Nehemia Levtzion, "Islam in the Bilad al-Sudan to 1800," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 63–91, 64.
18. Peter B. Clarke, *West Africa and Islam: A Study of Religious Development from the 8th to the 20th Century* (London: Edward Arnold, 1982), 10–12.
19. Roman Loimeier, *Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 239–40.
20. Randall L. Pouwels, *Horn and Crescent: Cultural Change and Traditional Islam on the East African Coast, 800–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 129–31.

21. John O. Hunwick, "West Africa and the Arabic Language," *Sudanic Africa* 15 (2004): 133.
22. Ioan M. Lewis, ed. *Islam in Tropical Africa* (London: International African Institute, Oxford University Press, 1966). See also: Lamin Sanneh, *The Jakhanke Muslim Clerics: A Religious and Historical Study of Islam in Senegambia* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1989); and Nehemia Levtzion, *Islam in West Africa: Religion, Society and Politics to 1800* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994).
23. Nehemia Levtzion, "Islam in the Bilad al-Sudan to 1800," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 63–91, 66–68.
24. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels, "Introduction: Patterns of Islamization and Varieties of Religious Experience among Muslims of Africa," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 1–18, 3.
25. Nehemia Levtzion, "Islam in the Bilad al-Sudan to 1800," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 63–91, 67–68.
26. Murray Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate* (London: Longman, 1967).
27. Randall L. Pouwels, "The East African Coast, c. 780–1900 C.E.," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 251–71, 265; and Roman Loimeier, *Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 229–34.
28. Roman Loimeier, *Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 291.
29. Lidwien Kapteijns, "Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 227–50, 235–37; and Roman Loimeier, *Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 202–9.
30. David Robinson, *The Holy War of Umar Tal* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
31. Anne K. Bang, *Sufis and Scholars of the Sea: Family Networks in East Africa, 1960–1925* (London: Routledge, 2003).
32. Roman Loimeier, *Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 237.
33. Robert Launay and Benjamin F. Soares, "The Formation of an 'Islamic Sphere' in French Colonial West Africa," *Economy and Society* 28, no. 4 (1999): 497–519.
34. A prominent example is Shaykh Amadu Bamba M'Backe, the founder of the Senegalese Muridiyya Sufi order, who was sent by the French rulers into exile twice: to Gabon from 1895 to 1902, and to Mauritania from 1903 to 1907. Bamba's vexed relationship with the French has prompted later followers of the Muridiyya to praise him as a hero of the anti-colonial struggle. See Cheikh Babou, *Le Jihad de l'âme: Ahmadou Bamba et la fondation de la Mouridiyya au Sénégal, 1853–1913* (Paris: Karthala, 2011).

35. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels, "Introduction: Patterns of Islamization and Varieties of Religious Experience among Muslims of Africa," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 1–18, 13.
36. Although borrowed from the French colonial lexicon, the term *marabout* is widespread in local discourse in West Africa and has grown into a self-designation. It refers to a wide range of religious specialists, from head of a Sufi order to Islamic healer and Quranic teacher. See Benjamin F. Soares, *Islam and the Prayer Economy: History and Authority in a Malian Town* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 30–32.
37. Leonardo A. Villalón, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
38. Marloes Janson, *Islam, Youth, and Modernity in the Gambia: The Tablighi Jama'at*, International African Library (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 41.
39. Lidwien Kapteijns, "Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 227–50, 238–39.
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CHAPTER 39

The Unfinished Business of Postcolonialism: Theological Perspectives

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In this chapter, I argue that postcolonialism argument is a discourse and practice that has two aims. Firstly, it denounces and rejects imperial domination. Secondly, it turns a critical gaze on the new configurations of power in former colonies that are now independent, and thus postcolonies. I work with a loose definition of postcolonial to refer to the shadow and effects of the imperial colonial order on nations around the world, and to the lingering effects of colonialism that continue to shape global relations. This short working framework derives from Pramod K. Nayar who states: 'Postcolonialism is the academic, intellectual, ideological and ideational scaffolding of the condition of decolonization (the period following political independence for nations and cultures in Africa, Asia and South America)'.[1] Postcolonialism is a multidisciplinary inquiry and practice that debunks the views that colonial societies did not have any histories before the birth of the imperial age and that rejects colonial domination.[2] In this chapter, I focus briefly on the religious dimensions and within that field of study I will reflect specifically on the theological perspectives of Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, referring only in a tangential manner to philosophical arguments. This is a simple division of labor that allows me to focus on one line of argument and should not be seen as neglect of the rich literature on postcolonialism in the social sciences and the humanities, or more broadly, African studies. For example, I do not specifically address postcoloniality in literature, where African writers like Ngugi wa Thiogo, Chinua Achebe, Mongo Beti, Mariama Bâ, Cheikh Hamidou Kane

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Calixthe Beyala, and more recently Chimamanda Adichie, have been some of the most creative interpreters of the postcolonial condition and the postcolony.[3] Therefore, my goal is to highlight and reflect on theological perspectives on the African postcolony.

The Political Philosophy of Decolonization

To begin with, postcolonial discourses and criticism reject the imperial order because what masqueraded for many decades as cultural diffusion, religious benevolence, or an intellectual and educational project was a practice of domination. Ali Mazrui described the colonial aptly:

> God, gold and glory! Captured in a slogan, these are in in fact the three basic imperatives in the history of cultural diffusion. Why do men burst forth from their boundaries in search of new horizons? They are inspired either by a search for religious fulfillment (the God standard) or by a yearning for economic realization (the gold standard) or by the passion for renown (the quest for glory).[4]

Mazrui captured the essence of the imperial project, but the task was to name and overcome it. Here the postcolonial project was articulated from many perspectives, but one of the predominant modes of discourse was what Toyin Falola has called cultural nationalism.[5] Falola covers a wide timeline and includes intellectuals like Edward Wilmot Blyden, but he maps out the ideas African intellectuals deployed to counter imperialism. However, many of them focused on identity politics in writings and pronouncements that reclaimed and affirmed the African personality that had suffered ignominy under colonialism. The Négritude movement promoted black thought that was grounded in African cultural and social realities.[6] Writers like Aimé Césaire and Léopold Séda Senghor carried their epistemological project from a solid grounding in black identity and African thought systems. This approach did not ignore rationality, but instead asserted the African *will* to think and theorize, hence the term Négritude. Both Césaire and Senghor used their poetry to reaffirm Africanness and blackness.

Such a project was not without its critics. For example, Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze has argued that postcolonial critique must 'adopt an explicitly philosophical standpoint' to analyze and articulate morality and politics. He laments the fact that ideas like *ubuntu* dominate contemporary philosophical discourses and scholars have ignored other rational approaches in postcolonial critique. He argues that ubuntu as a philosophical category is not helpful and does not serve a useful function because it is grounded on luck, miracles, and is largely 'an aestheticized, quasi-religious political thought for a particular place and time'.[7] Cultural nationalism and a short essay like this cannot do justice to the amount of literature that discusses and assesses the postcolonial project in the African context.

In politics, one of the clearest statements on postcolonialism came from Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, arguably one of the most distinguished intellectual and active politicians in Africa.[8] Nkrumah, whose statue stands outside the African Union buildings, in many ways remains the 'Patron Saint' of African Unity and one of its most eloquent critics of colonialism. In his book, *Consciencism*, Nkrumah provided a philosophical and ideological perspective with the goals of effecting the decolonization and reconfiguration of socio-political practice in the postcolony.[9] Other African politicians articulated positions on their own thought and direction in which they would go such as Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon in *The Political Philosophy of Ahmadou Ahidjo*, and Julius Nyerere's widely studied *Ujamaa*.[10] Nkrumah constructed his text carefully, beginning with a long section in which he interpreted the history of philosophy, making his case that philosophy is a contextual activity which offers critical perspectives on understanding and responding to reality and the social world in which people live.[11] Nkumah argued that early philosophical thinking focused on society, politics, sociality, and the natural world. Philosophical positions that serve the society always have an ideology that unites people and provides the justification for the kinds of institutions and structures that would work for a revolution to change things. For Nkrumah, ideology unites the actions of people, orders the life of the society, and manifests itself in political theory as well as in moral theory. Nkrumah described ideology as 'a network of principles and rules for the guidance and appraisal of conduct'.[12] Ideology embraces all aspects of life and 'manifests itself in their class-structure, history, literature, art, religion'.[13] Nkrumah argued that ideology should also aim for social control in a context that should allow for unity and diversity without foregoing the need for coercion. Establishing coercion, as envisaged by Nkrumah, did not mean brute force, but included the use of different instruments such as legislative action because a society 'must count among its instruments of coercion and cohesion, prohibitions and permissions which are made explicit in a statutory way'.[14] To articulate an ideology that would serve Africa, Africans ought to appreciate African history but also consider the impact of Western and Islamic thought.[15] Nkrumah argued that philosophical studies did not help Africans very much because the universalist perspective of philosophy lacks the kind of specificity needed to address the concrete realities of Africans.

Nkrumah grounded his revolutionary project on the presupposition that Africa faced competing ideologies: traditional beliefs and way of life, Islamic thought, and Christian thought.[16] Africans needed a philosophical idea that would galvanize the fight against the imperial order and he named that idea philosophical consciencism. Nkrumah grounded consciencism on materialism because matter has power to move. Additionally, he argued that this would enable Africans to change their perspectives on ethics and morals. The weapons of the philosophy lay in the 'living conditions of the African people'.[17] Its project would restore egalitarianism and mobilize African resources

to attain the objectives laid down by African leaders emerging from colonialism. Consciencism had to combine action with promoting egalitarianism at the social level and was therefore ethical, requiring human conduct that conformed to this philosophy. Nkrumah argued: 'The cardinal ethical principle of philosophical consciencism is to treat each man as an end in himself and not merely as a means'.[18] Nkrumah distinguished his perspective from Kant's categorical imperative by arguing that his perspective was grounded on materialism and African perspectives on personhood, life, and reality.

Nkrumah condemned the exploitation of people. He argued:

> By reason of its egalitarian tenet, philosophical consciencism seeks to promote individual development, but in such a way that the conditions for the development of all become the conditions for the development of each; that is, in such a way that the individual development does not introduce such diversities as to destroy the egalitarian basis.[19]

Nkrumah tied the notion of individuality to the idea of African personality, which is a broad term that is difficult to determine because various scholars and politicians have used it, but there are two possibilities. The idea of African personality referred to the personality of individual Africans or referred to a collective African personality.[20] Olúfémi Táíwó has argued that scholars like Blyden, and politicians like Nkrumah and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, adopted the latter view of African personality, thus promoting a view of personality that assumes a common Africanness. Táíwó argues for an African personality that promotes individuality to refer to difference and 'individuality that gives full scope to agency and its occasional display of caprice'.[21]

The imperative task for Africans was to end colonialism and the economic exploitation of Africa. Therefore, acting to emancipate Africa was the first step to securing economic independence. It was important for people to choose between positive and negative actions.

> Positive action will represent the sum of those forces seeking social justice in terms of the destruction of oligarchic exploitation and oppression. Negative action will correspondingly represent the sum of those forces tending to prolong colonial subjugation and exploitation. Positive action is revolutionary and negative action is reactionary.[22]

He argued that the implications for politics are that there is always tension in plurality. He called for institutions that would monitor the behavior of individuals in the community and recognize that each individual has worth.

Nkrumah argued that consciencism faced colonial and imperialist forces of disunity, as well as lack of development. In order to get rid of these problems, it was necessary to end the colonialism that existed to extort Africans' raw materials. He contended that both social forces and matter must be changed through positive action. However, the problem with Nkrumah's thesis was that

all along he privileged socialism. In addition, he called for the establishment of a one-party state, claiming it would enable people to express themselves and follow their common aspirations more effectively than would a multi-party democracy. Since colonials were not happy to be booted out, Nkrumah argued that they would do all they could to stay in charge through the project of neo-colonialism. Africans struggling for liberation ought not to take advice from them. Instead, Africans needed to carry out an objective analysis of the situation as they prepared for positive action that would lead to liberation.

One wonders if Nkrumah thought about the political dimension of his project carefully, especially since he was also appealing for an African individuality. Proposing a one-party state indicates that Nkrumah actually conceived of African personality as a collective at the expense of individual thought. The one-party structure in most countries actually eliminated free thought. Nkrumah argued that the colonialists would fight back through the more dangerous practice and tool of neo-colonialism, which divides the people and causes leaders to ignore the those who elected them, preferring the neo-colonialist. It was necessary then to use positive action to bring people together to promote development and unite forces to prevent it from collapsing.

Positive action needed an ideology that would unite the masses, offer a regenerative view of their life-world, and help them to perceive the past, present, and future. Ideology was important because it set criteria to evaluate positive action and make sure that it was rooted in the life of the people. Nkrumah called for Africans to practice socialism.

> When socialism is true to its purpose, it seeks a connection with the egalitarian and humanist past of the people before their social evolution was ravaged by colonialism; it seeks from the results of colonialism those elements (like new methods of industrial production and economic organization) which can be adapted to serve the interest of the people; it seeks to contain and prevent the spread of those anomalies and domineering interests created by the capitalist habit of colonialism; it reclaims the psychology of the people, erasing the 'colonial mentality' from it; and it resolutely defends the independence and security of the people.[23]

Nkrumah understood this to involve a dialectical process that would let the forces and tensions play out and introduce change through materialism. Nkrumah had thought through his ideas carefully, defending what some would have called totalitarian rule by arguing that even in ancient Greece the well-articulated ideals of democracy were left to the sophist to execute and society was never as democratic as one thinks because there were class factions and even slavery. However, I should emphasize that the African thought and ideals to which Nkrumah appealed were not as conclusive on one side as Nkrumah assumed. Kwasi Wiredu has argued that although the Akan chiefship was hereditary, decision making was representative and included the building of consensus through persuasion.[24]

Nkrumah was also criticized by one of Africa's leading postcolonial scholars, Ali Mazrui, who himself rejected the colonial project and focused his intellectual and scholarly output to articulate Africanness and the African will to be different. The temptation of the one-party system and its practice in Africa was detrimental, and Mazrui argued that most African countries that gained independence failed to sustain democratic rule by the end of the first decade of independence. 'Within the first decade either the military captured power or the elected president became a dictator, or a civil war broke out, or the ruling party outlawed any rival political party and turned the country into a single-party state'.[25] Mazrui also bemoaned the strivings and conflicts in Africa and argued that Africans should work for solutions that required looking inward (drawing from Africa's own ancestral resources) and looking outward to other parts of the world.[26]

According to Mazrui, Africans continued to live through a set of paradoxes, which included the paradox of habitation in which Africa is seen as the ancestral home of humanity, but many see it today as the least hospitable place. There is the paradox of humiliation that Africans have suffered through the ages; slavery, colonialism, and racial discrimination. Ali pointed to the paradox of acculturation because foreign cultures, political, economic, and social models have been imposed on Africa, creating conflicts with identities. Africa also suffered from the paradox of fragmentation because capitalist exploitation disrupted Africa. Africa had the paradox of retardation, seen in the fact that it could not seem to act as single continent due to national, ethnic, ideological, and religious differences make it challenging for Africans to do so. The final paradox was that of location, because Africa was on the margins of global politics, even though it seemed to be located at the center of the map.[27] Therefore, the task of postcolonial scholars and actors emerged in different forms and there was never unanimity. Even Mazrui himself at some point argued that using non-Africans to commit atrocities could be a way of achieving peace in Africa.[28]

The Malaise of the Postcolony

If the second goal of postcolonial theory is to focus on the postcolony, then its task involves not only the ability to redefine Africa and Africans on their own terms, but to provide a diagnosis of the Africa that was invented through Western discourse and colonial practice. V. Y. Mudimbe has clearly demonstrated this in *The Invention of Africa*.[29] The act of invention was an obsession which Achille Mbembe argues marked out Africa as a space of 'absence, lack, non being, of identity and difference, of negatives—in short of nothingness'.[30] Postcolonial discourse, then, would address what Lewis R. Gordon has argued, is the way Africa has been 'invented by systems of knowledge constituted by the processes of conquest and colonization … always erupted … [through] the processes of resistance borne out of those events'.[31] In exposing colonial invention, postcolonial critique and practice intended to

create new spaces, redefining identities with an enabling and ennobling discourse. This would assert the African will to be and act in political communities that were always global, but were being dragged into a globalized world not merely by neo-colonial forces which continued to serve as bastions of domination, but by postcolonial regimes that were a disappointment to many Africans. That is why the discourse of postcoloniality was as concerned with the postcolony as it was with imperial forces.

What is significant about postcolonial studies is that while the authors in different fields held the searchlight and deployed their critical tools to examine colonialism beyond the struggles of the postwar era and the influence of Marxist critiques, it was also clear that postcolonial studies, while not establishing a deceptive time line, has also turned its critical gaze on the postcolony. From a theoretical perspective, one could argue that postcolonial theories and the scholars who articulated them had become self-reflexive to the extent that much of the discourse focused on the postcolony itself.[32]

While there are numerous examples here, in the social sciences it was Achille Mbembe's 1992 essay 'Provisional Notes on the Postcolony' that set the gold standard for this type of critique.[33] For Mbembe, the postcolony referred to the countries that had just emerged from the barbarism of colonialism and demonstrated what he called a chaotic pluralism but also ironically demonstrated 'an internal coherence'.[34] Describing the postcolony as a system of signs for mirroring and imagining power, as he said at the beginning of the essay 'The Banality of Power', Mbembe provided an apt description of the postcolony that remains hauntingly true today. He argued: 'the postcolony is characterized by a distinctive style of political improvisation, by a tendency to excess and a lack of proportion as well as by distinctive ways in which identities are multiplied, transformed, and put into circulation'.[35] Mbembe's analysis of the banality of power, which he would further flesh out in his book *On the Postcolony*, gave robust postmodern 'position' to his analysis of power which other scholars had discussed, especially if one thinks of the critique of power by Robert Jackson, Carl Rosberg, and Jean-François Bayart.[36]

Some critics suggested that Mbembe's characterization ought to be matched with ethnographic realities from Africa. Yet what is clear to many readers is that Mbembe had landscaped nearly all the features of personal and presidential governance in Africa to present a purposefulness to it when he conceptualized the postcolonial exercise of power not merely as a continuation of colonial abuse but as a groomed aesthetics and stylistic approach to power which he would also call the 'vulgarity of power'.[37] In his *On the Postcolony*, Mbembe broadened his analysis of the brutality of power as he painted the portrait of 'big man' politics in Cameroon, which he laid out in 'provisional notes' which raised many concerns because critics thought he had painted such a bleak portrait of Africa and left no room for optimism. In a response to Mbembe's essay on the banality of power, V. Y. Mudimbe argued that Mbembe had an excellent grasp of 'the economy of life and its

exploitation by demagogic politicians', adding that Mbembe had left readers with a depressing portrait of the continent: 'either to confirm Africa in an absolute status of incompetence … or to claim that the whole scandal going on right now might be a regrettable accident of the extension of capitalism'.[38] However, in what clearly was a call for Africans to go beyond pessimism, Mudimbe asked:

> Could not we go further? Should we not add to what Achille has provided (and most of us have done rather poorly) a paragraph, a chapter, a book or (why not?) a political engagement that might indicate how to save the African Continent? I believe the masochist period has lasted long enough. Let us remain critical and, at the same time, try to balance our critiques with concrete and programmatic projects.[39]

In effect Mudimbe agreed with the portrait of the postcolony painted by Mbembe. Africa is at the crossroads, and those who control the traffic lights are its leaders, who must give their citizens the green light to action that will lead them out of despair. In the next section, I will discuss how Fabien-Eboussi Boulaga's postcolonial discourse frames a way out.

Conditions for Vibrant Postcolonial Praxis: Theological Perspectives

Postcolonial discourses on religion and theology developed multiple themes that centered on colonial abuse and neglect of African cultures and religions, the imperative of liberation, and a critical political theology that addressed the human condition in Africa. Beginning with the significant text *Des Prêtres Noirs s'Interrogent*, African theologians criticized missionary practice for ignoring African cultures and passing on Western culture to Africans as authentic Christianity.[40] One of the major responses to the crisis of religion and culture came from John Mbiti of Kenya and E. Bolaji Idowu, who as Christian theologians popularized the teaching of African religions in schools and universities through their publications, bringing to the scholarly world a systematic organization of the themes that constitute the idea of religion in Africa which at that time had become part of the standard social-scientific studies of Africa.[41] These studies concretized the study of African religions in the postcolony and were in themselves a potent critique of colonial and Christian attempts to wipe African indigenous religions off the map. Idowu also argued: 'There are in Africa men of faith who are finding the prefabricated theology imported into Africa inadequate for her spiritual and academic needs … [They are] advocators and promoters of theology which bears the stamp of original thinking and mediation of Africans'.[42] The scholarly output of African theologians focused on articulating liberation on the continent, but more especially in Southern Africa, where colonial domination remained in Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique.[43] In calling for a complete

liberation, theologians like Jean Mar Ela focused on poverty and hunger as part of their greater concern for liberation in Africa. From his ecclesial assignment in North Cameroon, Ela, using African metaphors, argued that for many in Africa, 'the granary is empty'.[44] Discussing the food situation in Africa in light of the Christian experience, Ela stated: 'our churches today expose us to the dangers of atheism each time we celebrate the Eucharist in areas where no one is working to create conditions that would allow hungry people to feed themselves'.[45] It is important to note that by 1988, Ela was highlighting the seriousness of the situation because Africa was experiencing phenomenal Church growth, even when its masses were going without food. Ela argued that the poor must be part of the process of change. In order for Africans to bring about the plan of God in their context they must start a 'ministry of the granary' to address the food situation. 'Today the question of food must again become the center of daily life—starting from an African culture that is based on granaries and dynamics of the revelation as it is read in Genesis through Mathew.'[46] In the African postcolony, Ela asked the haunting question: '[H]ow can we speak of the Lord of life, knowing full well that famine is the messenger of death?'[47] Food security remains a huge problem in the African postcolony, and it has been compromised by land and boundary disputes, farmer–grazier problems, and a growing *latifundia* which has arisen in the wake of the expansion of large agro-pastoral projects which have initiated a new land grab on the continent.[48]

One of the most devastating critiques of colonial practice came from philosopher and theologian Fabien Eboussi-Boulaga, who prosecuted that criticism in what is one of the most creative theological treatises in Africa, *Christianity without Fetishes: An African Critique and Recapture of Christianity* (CWF).[49] Eboussi-Boulaga's agenda involved four critical questions:

1. Can Western dogmas of Christianity and its civilization remain the same when transmitted to other places?
2. Can the identity of Christianity remain the Western experience?
3. Can other societies whose cultures have been criticized and rejected and lived the death of their own myths 'seriously accept Christianity's pretensions to be the foreordained truth and norm of all authentic existence …?'[50]
4. Does God's identity as proclaimed by Christians not suffer because he is presented as a partisan who privileges others and excludes others?

Eboussi-Boulaga asked '[H]ow is it possible to take the metaphors of revelation and word of God literally when they authorize a like human conception, too human a conception, and make of monotheism a political problem?'[51] These questions frame what was intended to discard fetishes of Christianity, but it was also an itinerary that provided one of the strongest criticisms of the colonial Christian project. He discussed the worldwide spread of dogmatic Christianity as an untouchable tradition, carrying with it a 'form of certitude'

grounded on the claims that Christianity was revealed by an almighty God, although each Church presents its own interpretation of that revelation:

> Revelation rests on the premise that there are empirically observable realities that are substantially sacred and afford direct access to God—that symbols exist expressing God's nature, symbols of God. From these one can ascend toward him, know what he is, know what he wills and what he does. They can occur in the form of persons, words, formulas, books, defined behavior, on inward sentiments or certitudes.[52]

This view of revelation is grounded in a belief that would be transported to all parts of the Earth, and those people who accepted it were supposed to give up their own myths. In Africa it perpetuated an alienating practice which classified Africans as pagans who lived in evil, were not part of God, and suffered intellectual and moral regression. This justified the exercise of authority over them by colonials and missionaries. Even when individuals changed, they were not equal to Western colonials.[53] These proclamations extirpated Africans, stripped them of their space, rendered them naked and despoiled. In terms of time, conversion was supposed to wipe away the past of the pagan and lead to a situation where 'faith finds its phenomenological locus in the manifold renunciation of the presence of inculturation'.[54] In other words, the doctrine of revelation presented the absoluteness of Christianity and removed (or at least so the missionaries thought) Africans from their worldviews and their cultures.

To effect that kind of domination, missionary discourse involved the language of derision, which mocked to death the gods of the locals. It employed the language of refutation, and rejected pagan beliefs because they emerged from 'unbridled silliness'. Missionaries also employed the language of demonstration, through which they explained 'the Christian faith in all its order, coherence, and transforming power'. They considered what they taught truths Africans had to believe, commands they were to obey, and the sacraments they were to receive. Missionaries also employed the language of orthodoxy, which emphasized the difference of the Christian faith which ought to be received as truth. Finally, they employed the language of conformity through which African lives, social time, and spaces were remodeled through rites and works they were to perform. The missionary promoted might, which sometimes permitted violence if it would lead to conversion, and its theological pronouncements about a strong and vengeful God dissuaded other spirits from intervening. It promoted a rationalism which militated against indigenous beliefs and thought systems, since it was assumed the missionary message was grounded on natural reason. In running away from other myths, Christianity created its own myths and called them history. They promoted miracles, prophecy, and stressed the historicity of Christian myths and, in what appears as a commentary on Rudolf Bultmann, Eboussi-Boulaga argues that the search for something that distinguishes Christianity as the supernatural and exceptional constituted fetishes.[55]

The messengers of the Christian tradition imposed Western ways of perceiving divinity and divine beings. Their presentation not only privileged but also imposed a Western rationalist perspective which ignored the symbolic world to which they had taken their message. The personalist ethos of the new religion was troubling to Africans because it championed individualisms and disassociations. Eboussi-Boulaga then proposed a recapture of Christianity through what he described as the Christic model. A clear understanding of the Christic model called for rethinking the Christian message in the postcolonial context in a way that would entail going back to the beginning of the Christian mythos in order to reinvent Christianity, transform it, and give it a local name and habitation. Eboussi-Boulaga then reviewed the different movements and schools of thought that offered alternative teachings at the time of Jesus, who for the most part had some version of the reign of God. The vision of Jesus was distinct because its eschatological component stressed (and required) actions through which one would integrate 'historical conditions into one's own lot, for receiving one's self from others … a realistic horizon of collective and individual self'.[56] The eschatological activity thus relativized ideologies, institutions, and privileged actions in the tradition of Jesus who in his lifetime associated frequently with the outcasts and those who lived on the underside of society. The eschatological vision of Jesus made explicit that those in need are my neighbors. The eschatological engagement takes care of the people and the things that have been ignored or neglected by the system. In this view of eschatology, God is initiated by the actions of other human beings for others. 'The God who begets is the God who arrives, who supervenes. He is the Ancestor'.[57] Therefore the Christic model requires a theology of God who should be seen as a parent of all who live in relationship with one another and guardian of the institutions that preside over human relations.

The Christic model is not grounded primarily in the imposition of Western myths over African myths and worldview but is the habituation of love which makes the faith community one of love, a communion of brothers, sisters, and friends. It is a self-limiting community which underscores its radical openness to others. In such a community, miracles are a product of faith and are analogous to what we see in the African context, and the stress that there are verifiable practices is beside the point of miracles themselves. The only difference is the cultural conditioning of the message about miracles. Most of them were used in liturgy, hence they were stories meant to encourage and serve the believing community. These activities reflect Christ, whose life was filled with mythic symbols and had a destiny that was concerned not with one's self but with the community. Eboussi Boulaga's probe lays bare the historical record on Christianity in Africa to highlight not only a methodological blunder but also a serious flaw in its anthropological vision, since they articulated an ethic that ignored the Christic model and mission.

Prior to *Christianity without Fetishes*, Eboussi Boulaga defined the African condition as *La Crise fu Muntu*, which he called a moral imperative that

must be addressed by Africans by drawing from Africa's cultural and intellectual system which had been undermined by the global system of domination. Such an intellectual and moral vision called for perspectives that would effect a critical reconstruction of the self in light of African traditions, and respond to the distortion caused by international imperial forces.[58] Such a self is one who thinks broadly about the past, the present, and the future of Africa but does not dwell in the past.[59] That subjectivity would deliver Africans from captivity within European thought. Eboussi Boulaga rejects domination and invites Africans to assume responsibility, take charge of their affairs, and face the future in the grand task of reconstituting the self, whose success depends on Africans. Therefore, an appropriate postcolonial posture placed African traditions at the center of the process that required a critical rethinking and reorientation of all notions of self. Rethinking the idea of Muntu was a critical engagement that required that each individual reorganize his or her mentality and make critical choices to sift through and recover African traditions and the self-awareness compromised by colonial domination. For Eboussi Boulaga, this called for a self that would think and act like a subject on his or her own terms, whose self-determination would give a clear message that he or she is not an object but an individual who can act decisively in search of self-fulfillment. Eugène Didier A. Goussikindey is correct to argue that in posing the question of identity in relation to the idea of a subject, Eboussi-Boulaga prioritizes responsibility of the subject to determine the self.[60]

Taking such a posture required a deconstructive process that would place everything Africans had received from the imperial and its religious traditions on the table for scrutiny, appropriation, or rejection. Eboussi-Boulaga offered a more thoroughgoing deconstruction in light of the fact that what appeared to be African tradition (modern, Christian, or even African) was actually constructed by forces of domination both in and outside Africa. In light of this, Eboussi-Boulaga argued that from the colonial perspective, there was no African tradition because the colonials did not believe in those things or there were no Africans (only people to be dominated).[61] This was not a denial of the view that there was something in Africa which colonial forces destroyed, nor is this a claim that Muntu culture lacked ideals, but a recognition of the falsehood that had been perpetrated about Muntu which now required revolutionary thinking for Africans to overcome falsehood. The task for Muntu called not only for a restart, or reform, but for what he described in different places as a fresh start, or new beginning.[62]

The goal of such revolutionary thinking in the postcolony was to offer a critique of practices that did not work to the benefit of Muntu and their communities. This critique would focus on imperial domination, thoughts, and ideas that have distorted Muntu, but the critique would reaffirm Muntu. This required a new perspective on tradition from Africans which would reject all notions that their traditions were static or locked somewhere in the past. The traditions of Muntu and their communities were active and alive and what we see is an appeal to employ those to create viable communities.[63] This theme

of transformation and change has remained a constant in the thought of Eboussi Boulaga. During the movement toward democracy in Africa, when the Catholic Church helped establish National Sovereign Conferences all over the continent, Eboussi Boulaga argued that what was needed was the emergence of a superior engagement that would overturn completely the previous economic (and we might add, political and social) system.[64]

Seeing local traditions as creative forces would turn away negativity and replace it with a bold assertion of the self. Postcolonial discourse ought to be liberating discourses which would reject the negativity of the imperial world which constrains the creativity of Muntu.

A liberating discourse should unleash Muntu to become engaged in the creative process that not only interprets the individual's being but asserts it as a subject on his or her own terms. This requires a love experience whose phenomenology involves *being* and *doing* as practices which rethink and redefine the historical process and articulate a vision not concerned primarily with survival, but with self-creation in an authentic dialectical engagement of being and doing. One may be tempted at this point to think that Mobuto Sese Seko, the disgraced dictator of Zaire, might have read Eboussi Boulaga, but Mobitu's *authenticité* was self-serving and meant to promote his vision of the Congo, then Zaire.

This search for authenticity is a complex process, which according to Eboussi Boulaga should also be seen as a communal project because it involves all black people. Like some of the early thinkers such as Aimé Césaire who previewed postcoloniality, he viewed blacks as sharing a common and varied experience of marginalization, and believed fighting it would require the contribution of all black people. Such a communal project could not be used to eviscerate individual subjectivity, which was and should remain a cardinal virtue of the process to reclaim the black self and restore African communities from the doldrums of imperial domination. Self-affirmation called for a critical evaluation of what had been taught to Africans by the forces of destabilization. Muntu had an obligation to search and affirm what liberated Muntu from the clutches of destabilization, even when those clutches masqueraded in the guise of modernity. In order to succeed, Muntu had to reject negative priorities used by colonials and postcolonial forces who had acted as if they owned other people and as if the postcolony was a private estate to be managed or destroyed at will. Eboussi Boulaga's call for a strong self of individuality was not a descent into solipsism, but a recognition that change only happens when all recognize who they are and work to reject imputed identities that have been a hindrance to the realization of the *sommum bonum*. The activities of the self in this regard should complement the activities of the other. Rebuilding the authenticity of Muntu called for the marshaling of mutual interest that drew from local resources to mount critical perspectives on reconstruction and development.

Eboussi Boulaga offers solutions that emphasize Muntu's self-assertion because Muntu faces crisis in all areas of life. It is a political crisis because of

the abuse of colonial and postcolonial domination. It is a social crisis because Africa's march from colonial times to the postcolonial era has been marred by inequality and inequity. It is an intellectual crisis because colonial thought denigrated African thought as irrational. Georg W. F. Hegel, talking about the development of philosophical thinking, argued: 'Africa is no historical part of the world: it has not movement or development to exhibit'. He also argued that Egypt did not belong to the African spirit.[65] Muntu's crisis is also a cultural crisis because Muntu has been told his or her culture is backward and primitive and needs to be transcended by a cultural outlook brought to Muntu by the forces of domination. Finally, and for our purpose, it is a theological crisis because Muntu, who like the Western missionary is a bearer of the *imago dei*, has been told that he has to ignore all of that cultural baggage and become a Christian, especially a Western version which contributed to the loss of African subjectivity.[66] The significant theological move here is that the recovery of African subjectivity is grounded on the self and the culture in which the self is located. The recovery of lost or shattered subjectivity, especially in the postcolony, must prioritize the self in community.[67] One would think this is something that could be taken for granted, but that is not the case because there is always a debate about the place of individuality and community in African life and worldview. A recovery of subjectivity does not doom community; if anything, it enhances it because the self exists in dialogue with other selves in community.

Responsibility in the Postcolony

Responding to the crisis of Muntu and recapturing Christianity for Africans was more than a philosophical and theological project. Eboussi Boulaga departed from dominating discourse, and engaged in rigorous thought analysis and critique to invite Africans to think and act ethically against the most devastating projects of the colonial and postcolonial abuse of power. Africans must assert the will to be now in the postcolony. Postcolonial discourse must be about the postcolony and must be about liberation and reconstruction.[68] The postcolonial project today implies several things. First, in religious language, it is an ongoing revelation which opens the mind and the eye of the African on a daily basis to practices that incapacitate people from reaching their full potential. Such a revelation calls on Africans to speak the truth to those who currently dominate Africans and the global forces which colluded with African leaders to hijack market forces to deprive Africans of resources to sustain life and participate meaningfully in the global economy.

In this respect, postcolonial discourse proclaims the rejection of the world constructed by the political and economic practice of the postcolony described by Achille Mbembe as 'necropolitics', a term he coins to explore 'the ultimate expression of sovereignty [which] resides to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die'.[69] Notice that Mbembe's terminology refers to necropolitcs as those practices

in which some 'must die' and some 'may live', suggesting the inevitability of a culture of death as a calculation of the modality of power in the postcolony. Thinking and speaking in that context is an act of resistance that for the African postcolony has so far proved futile for many, but such thinking and acting are perhaps an indication that dictators will not have the last word.[70]

In religious language, one could argue that what is revelatory here is the reaffirmation that Muntu is a thinking and acting subject. Africans have been misrepresented in all ways, and Eboussi-Boulaga argues that Christianity and the missionaries who were its messengers did everything for the blacks (negroes) but they did not do anything for the Africans who started to question their paternalism, context of ignorance, and the violence with which this was carried out.[71] Africans should take up the responsibility to reclaim themselves in their own space and context and resist the culture of death that surrounds them. Africans must decry and reject the crises of today which include political prisoners, torture chambers, the mixing of the state of Africans today with that of the victims jailed by colonials.[72] In other words, the urgent task of today is to speak up for the freedom of all people, especially members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community (LGBT), defined as undesirables in many African communities.[73]

Second, the postcolony requires responsible actions to overcome the despoliation that has been meted out and create a new society. Those responsibilities are varied and contextual, but share one common feature: the rejection of political anachronism and the building of a vibrant political community that is open to all persons and not just the ruling class. Africans today face issues of domination and abuses of power that have exploited them for many generations. All concerned, like Eboussi Boulaga and Frantz Fanon, must raise critical questions about what it means to be human and part of the human family in the African context, making the major postcolonial task today a recovery of humanity in Africa.[74] In the 'post-neo-colonial' state, that idea of restating the subjectivity of the African is urgent because the political elite have taken over. If we remain in the field of theology, a new responsibility must rethink the imperatives of living in a political community. In addition to the political theologies of Africa, two developments of the last four decades remain crucial to the kind of ecclesial community.

The Circle of Concerned African Women Theologians (Circle) launched, by Mercy Amba Oduyoye of Ghana, has carried out research, published, and carried out activism for gender equality and justice in Africa. Their first publication, *The Will to Arise*, articulated the quest for justice in three areas: African culture, sexuality, and women in the Church. They raised their voices as women in 'a call to action … to wholeness that challenges the will and the intellect'.[75] The Circle has published many studies on the status of women and the ongoing quest for justice in Africa, including insightful analysis of the HIV and AIDS pandemic.

Another development in Africa is critical perspectives on postcolonial biblical interpretation designed to critique the past and transform the present.

Musa Dube has championed this theoretical orientation in biblical studies in Africa, and has argued that African readers of the Bible must engage in several key areas in the postcolony such as land, race, power, readers, internationalism, the history of liberation, and gender. Since Africans claim the Bible, Dube calls for new scrutiny of it from a postcolonial perspective. According to Dube:

> The postcolonial landscape is drawn with colors of western imperialism, depicting inclusive histories of unequal geographies, unequal races, unequal distribution of power, denial of difference, and silencing of women. Simultaneously, the postcolonial landscape is flashed with the riotous colors of resisting African voices and others of the Two-Thirds World, who assert the dignity of the lands, cultures, races, and differences, and challenge Westerners to ethical distribution of power over the globe.[76]

Because patriarchy remains a hindrance in the struggle for emancipation in the postcolony, the African community has a lot to learn from a feminist reading of the sacred texts that continue to hold sway over it. Outside religious communities, women have risen to leadership positions in several African countries and even at the African Union. Yet African women do not yet enjoy full rights human rights, and until that happens the postcolony will not experience total liberation and engage in long-standing reconstruction.

In addition, one cannot stress enough the responsibility of deconstructing the Bible in light of postcolonial projects. The Bible remains one of the most authoritative texts in Africa, and has been widely received and explored by both experts and members of the ecclesial community.[77] It has had a complex history and been used to justify colonial practice and compel obedience to coloniality, abused by postcolonial leaders who claim they should be obeyed because the Bible commands that all should be subject to the powers that be, and has also been used to subjugate women and justify inequality. It has received a new sense and purpose in the rise and growth of Pentecostal/Charismatic Churches whose members have returned to the Bible in ways one would not have anticipated, with mixed reviews. While others may condemn the uncritical use of texts, and application of the Bible in magical terms, there is no doubt that it is central to the worldview that defines contemporary Pentecostal/Charismatic Churches in Africa.[78] Ogbu Kalu has argued that their turn to the Bible is generating a new public persona that is attuned to the individual's world and needs, and generates a sense of *Tembisa*, hope.[79] Pentecostals ignore criticism that the claims they make about miracles reflect a world that we do not inhabit anymore. Nimi Wariboko points out that when you confront them with such a worldview, they respond, quoting the biblical text that Jesus promised that later disciples would perform more miracles than he did.[80] One cannot deny that the Bible has been used by many Pentecostal Christians to find support, healing, engage in ethical practices that range from works of charity to entrepreneurial activities such as the broad

ministries of Mensa Otabil in Ghana. However, one must not forget that in terms of the impact on the postcolony, people influenced by commitment to the Bible in the Pentecostal tradition still leave a lot to be desired in terms of public-policy actions that transform Africa and ensure that all experience full rights and equality. While one cannot dismiss the strength of the Pentecostal/Charismatic movement which is exporting its 'brand' overseas, I still think that Mbembe was correct when he argued in *Afrique indociles: Christianisme, pouvoir et état en société postcoloniale*, that Africans were turning to Christianity (and here one should add Pentecostalism) as a recourse to meaning in the wake of the disappointing project of the postcolony.[81] If anything, one worries that the Bible has just become a drug for the people and is less effective in curbing political excesses and ushering in justice. A postcolonial responsible reading of the Bible must continue to work for justice for all.

Finally, a postcolonial reading of the Bible is needed to articulate an appropriate political theology and social praxis. Churches have played a significant role in social transformation in Africa. The transformation in Southern Africa enjoyed wide support from the denominations whose members fought racial injustice and illegal regimes. Religious communities have contributed significantly to conflict resolution on the continent.[82] A political theology using biblical insights must recognize the realm of the secular, with citizens as democratic subjects who are members of religious communities and are committed to public discourse and practices intended to facilitate social change. Democratic values incorporated into a political theology would give members of the political community the basis to work for freedom and economic justice for all. Unfortunately, the literal reading of the Bible on many issues allows Churches in Africa to appropriate many biblical texts that do not speak for the times. But such use of biblical texts allows some politicians to claim they are the ones who have been appointed by God to lead the 'chosen nation', as Laurent Gbagbo has done in Ivory Coast.[83]

In closing, I want to return to the idea of a Muntu who thinks and acts. Such a person is what is needed today in the postcolony. In addition to economic and political challenges, Africa has lived for more than 30 years under the scourge of HIV and AIDS, which continue to devastate many communities, and the Ebola Virus Disease has wreaked havoc in several West African communities, exposing the vulnerabilities which are still prevalent in the postcolony. This calls for a sustained postcolonial critique which removes vestiges of postcolonial ineptitude and engages in a critical reconstruction and transformation of the postcolony. Muntu must find ways of achieving autonomy, knowing that governing forces at home and international market forces that continue to abuse the prospects of globalization may stifle such a search. The excessive, bloated bureaucratic nightmare of the postcolony, as exemplified by the Cameroon state with over 40 ministers, is a telling sign that autonomy still eludes the postcolony and it is of our own doing.

In a previous argument in *The Dialectics of Transformation in Africa*, I have called for an intersubjective approach to postcolonial politics. The crisis

of the postcolony is largely a crisis of intersubjectivity, and members of African political communities could begin to treat politics as an intersubjective practice. At the end of *The Dialectics* I discussed what I called 'beyond pessimism to optimism: in love with Africa', in which I argued that transcending the postcolonial nightmare which I had portrayed as the privatization of power, the pauperization of the state, the prodigalization of the state, and the proliferation of violence, which were rooted in the manifestation of personal political will, required not only transformative programs like democracy and an African renaissance, but the cultivation of an intersubjective political community animated by love which, among other things, prioritizes others and 'translate[s] into specific political behavior that is consistent with the ideals of a democratic and free society'.[84] This would be one example of how individuals' and groups' discussion of the postcolony could lay out paths and actions that could lead to the transformation of the postcolonial condition and the postcolony.

Notes

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4. Ali A. Mazrui, *Cultural Forces in World Politics* (London: James Curry, 1990), 1.
5. Toyin Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals* (Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press, 2001).
6. See C.V. Michael, *Negritude: An Annotated Bibliography* (West Cornwall: Locust Hill Press, 1988).
7. Emmanuel C. Eze, "Hume, Race, and Human Nature," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 61, no. 4 (2000): 234.
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9. Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism: Philosophy and the Ideology of Declonization* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964).
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11. Nkrumah, *Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology* 1, 30.
12. Ibid., 1966, 58.
13. Kwame Nkrumah, 1966, 59.
14. Ibid., 61.
15. Ibid., 68.
16. Ibid., 70.
17. Ibid., 78.
18. Kwame Nkrumah, 1966, 95 use ibid.
19. Ibid., 98.
20. Nkrumah's critics, raised questions and doubts about what seemed to be a broad sweep of individualism in the project of consciencism.
21. Olúfémi Táíwó, *How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 86.
22. Kwame Nkrumah, 1966, 99.
23. Ibid., 1966, 106.
24. Kwasi Wiredu, *Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 174.
25. A.P. Ali Mazrui "Pro-democracy Uprisings in Africa's Experience: From Sharpeville to Benghazi" (paper presented at the African Studies Centre, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, 2011), 1.
26. A. Ali Mazrui, *The Africans: A Triple Heritage* (London: BBC Publications, 1986).
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35. Ibid.
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38. V.Y. Mudimbe, "Save the African Continent," *Public Culture* 5, no. 1 (Fall 1992): 61.

39. V.Y. Mudimbe, 1992, 62.
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43. For a recent discussion of the work of these theologians see: Bénézét Buho and Juvénal Ilungu Muya, eds., *African Theology: The Contributions of the Pioneers*, Vol. 1 (Nairobi: Paulines Publication, 2003); Bénézét Buho and Juvénal Ilungu Muya, eds., *African Theology: The Contributions of the Pioneers*, Vol. 2 (Nairobi: Paulines Publications, 2006). See also Canaaan Banana, "The Case for a New Bible," in *Rewriting the Bible: The Real Issues*, ed. I. Mokunyora, J.L. Cox, and V.J. Verstraelen (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1993).
44. Jean Marc Ela, *My Faith as an African*, trans. from the French by John Pairman Brown and Susan Perry (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988), 87. Part of this discussion is taken from a keynote address I presented at a conference at the University of Zambia and Justo Mwale University, April 7, 2016.
45. Jean Marc Ela, 1988, 87–88.
46. Ibid., 92.
47. Ibid., 93.
48. Elias Kifon Bongmba, "Land and Authority in Postcolonial Cameroon" Inaugural lecture at "Africa at Crossroads Trans-Institutional Program" Vanderbilt University, September 28, 2016.
49. Fabien Eboussi-Boulaga, *Christianity without Fetishes: An African Critique and Recapture of Christianity*, trans. Robert Barr (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981).
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51. Ibid.
52. Fabien Eboussi-Boulaga, 1981, 11.
53. Ibid., 21.
54. Ibid., 26.
55. Ibid., 53.
56. Ibid., 104.
57. Ibid., 110.
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60. Eugéne Didier A. Goussikindey, "The Christic Model of Eboussi Boulaga," 1997, 12, 14 ff.
61. *La Crise du Muntu*, 145.
62. The term he uses is "*un autre commencement*."
63. *La Crise du Muntu*, 156.
64. Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, *Les Conférences Nationales en afrique noir. Une affaire à suivre* (Paris: Karthala, 1993), 89.
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CHAPTER 40

South Africa: Apartheid and Post-Apartheid

Nancy L. Clark

The South African government enforced a policy formally known as 'apartheid' for 50 years, leaving the country scarred by this ordeal and still searching for ways in which to understand, remedy, and overcome the events of this period. The history of apartheid was not isolated; it was in fact preceded by nearly 300 years of imperial and colonial rule as was the rest of the continent, and it was initiated through a settler regime spawned by conquest. In 1994, this history ended with the country's first democratic elections and the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as president. And yet despite this historic shift in power from the white minority to the black majority, the political transition was an isolated event that left the overwhelming legacy of history (inequality, poverty, violence, and suspicion) to be solved by the new electorate. South Africa, like most of postcolonial Africa, gained political power but remained tied to its historical legacies.

Prelude to Apartheid: Establishing a Pattern

From the first landing of Europeans at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, Africans had been coerced, bullied, and finally conquered and dispossessed of their land as the European settlers and their descendants spread eastward.[1] Even in the earliest settlements, Europeans had defined a hierarchical set of legal rights based on race, with those of Europeans at the top and Africans at the bottom.[2] When the most valuable mineral discoveries of the nineteenth century were made in Kimberley (diamonds, 1869) and Johannesburg (gold, 1886),

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the serious conquest of remaining lands and peoples commenced under the British flag, culminating in the devastation of the South African War (1899–1903), leaving Dutch-speaking white settlers as well as Africans destitute and virtually landless.[3] The British left the country in the hands of the whites, including the descendants of the early Dutch settlers as well as more recent immigrants from England. Equipped with a racial franchise that made small concessions to property-owning 'non-whites' in the former Cape colony, South Africa entered the twentieth century with a firm framework of racial separation and discrimination.

Many of the most devastating restrictions on African freedoms and rights were legislated early in the twentieth century. Labeled as 'segregation', the new laws enacted under successive administrations robbed Africans, Coloreds, and Asians of most basic freedoms. Africans were barred from skilled jobs (Mines and Works Regulations Act, 1912), from purchasing land outside 7% of the land area of the country (Natives Land Act, 1913), from residing outside 'native' locations in the cities (Natives Urban Areas Act, 1923), from negotiating wages (Industrial Conciliation Act, 1923), from speaking freely (Native Administration Act, known colloquially as the 'hostility law', 1927), and from staying in urban areas for more than 14 days (Native Laws Amendment Act, 1937). With a firm framework for discriminatory racial separation established in both urban and rural areas well before the institution of apartheid policy, what more could be enforced and why?[4]

The Apartheid Framework: From a Segregationist State to a Police State

When the National Party took control of the South African government in 1948 on a platform of 'apartheid', neither its leaders nor its critics knew precisely what to expect. The term 'apartheid' had served as a potent rallying cry for the party during the 1948 election but beyond its Afrikaans translation (apartness) there were few concrete plans attached to the concept.[5] Initially, apartheid policies that elaborated on the preceding period of segregationist legislation were enacted through laws and were enforced through the power of the courts. One of the first pieces of apartheid legislation, the Immorality Act of 1949, outlawed extramarital sexual intercourse between whites and Africans and was in fact an extension of a similar Act of 1927 which was itself an extension of previous laws from 1902 and 1903. Other legislation consolidated laws and policies that had previously been enacted and enforced through the provinces and municipalities including the classification of individuals by race (Population Registration Act, 1950), use of identity documents known as 'passes' (Natives Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act, 1952), restriction of access to public areas and services by race (Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, 1953), and provision of education for Africans (Bantu Education Act, 1953).[6] It should be noted that

policies and enforcement varied widely throughout the provinces before the imposition of apartheid, and that the centralization of control over these practices allowed the Union government to override local concerns and in most cases to increase the severity of implementation.

The 1913 Natives Land Act began to elaborate on the system of 'Native Reserves', seeing them less as reserves for Africans than as their permanent dwelling place. Prior to Union, various laws in each of the provinces had already limited African ownership of land and designated areas for African 'communal' settlement.[7] In 1913, the Natives Land Act consolidated the situation, restricting African purchase of land to only 7% of the country, labeled Native Reserves. In 1927, the Native Administration Act took legal responsibility of the Reserves away from Parliament and instead stipulated that the Governor-General could rule in these areas by Proclamation. In 1951, the Bantu Authorities Act established 'tribal authorities' in each Reserve to implement the policies of the Governor-General. Finally, in 1959, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act stipulated that these Reserves, now seen as 'homelands' for ethnically defined groups of Africans, would be developed as separate and independent nations providing citizenship rights in these areas for designated ethnicities. These 'homelands' would form the centerpiece of the Grand Apartheid scheme to fully disenfranchise Africans within South Africa.

But the most dramatic change under apartheid was the increasing power of the police. Beginning in 1950, the government began to institute laws which progressively took powers of arrest and conviction away from the courts and put them in the hands of the executive branch, especially the Governor-General, later to be State President, and the Minister of Justice. In 1950, amid concerns over popular agitation against the new government, the Suppression of Communism Act was passed, giving the Governor-General the power to declare any organization deemed to support political change unlawful and to seize its property as well as to 'ban' any individual pursuing similar aims. While earlier legislation (Native Administration Act, 1927) had outlawed the promotion of hostility between whites and Africans, the Suppression of Communism Act greatly expanded the scope of the law and added for the first time punishment for organizations as well as the new category of 'banishment' for the accused. In 1956, the Riotous Assemblies Act allowed the Governor-General to outlaw any public gathering; in 1962, the Terrorism Act allowed police to detain suspects without a warrant; and in1963, the General Laws Amendment gave police the power to detain anyone suspected of a political offense for 90 days without allowing contact with a lawyer. The power handed to the police progressively expanded over the years, and by 1965 they were allowed to hold anyone without charge for 180 days, to be renewed indefinitely.

The police were not the only ones responsible for security. In 1963, the Defense Amendment Act stipulated that the South African Defense Force

(SADF) was tasked not only with the defense of the country, but also with combating 'internal disorder'[8] at the direction of the Prime Minister. For the first time, the military would be asked to fight South African citizens, and they would be used relentlessly to quell protests throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, leaving little doubt that the country had indeed lost all semblance of a legitimate state, the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) was established in 1969 under the Public Service Amendment Act as a body responsible only to the Prime Minister with a secret budget, legal protection, and freedom from accountability to the public or even Parliament.[9] Under a cloak of secrecy, the apartheid regime would commit unspeakable violence against its disenfranchised citizens.[10]

No Political Solution

Although political organizations representing all races existed in 1948, many rising to challenge the ongoing decimation of freedom, only whites could vote. In most cases, political groups representing Africans, Coloreds, and Indians were punished and destroyed in the first two decades of apartheid rule, leaving the strictly political realm to those parties able to operate inside South Africa. Initially, the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Communist Party (SACP), and others challenged the apartheid spate of legislation before being successively outlawed, forcing them to work outside the country or underground and leaving the parliamentary debates to the National Party (NP) and its white opposition.

By 1948, the National Party had split with its founder, J.B.M. Hertzog, and had become, if possible, even more stridently pro-Afrikaner. Shocked by its victory in the election, especially since the party had polled fewer votes than the United Party but had prevailed through the apportionment of seats, the NP quickly set to work passing legislation under the belief that they would soon be voted out of office. In terms of parliamentary action, the Official Opposition Party, the United Party, and later its successors, the Liberal Party (1953–1968) and the Progressive Party (1959–1975) tried to block the litany of apartheid laws but increasingly lost both power and direction as the NP began to capture majorities of the white vote.[11]

The ANC was in the midst of transitioning from a delegation of petitioners asking for protection of their remaining rights to a popular mass protest movement in the 1940s. Not long after the NP took power, the ANC launched a 'Programme of Action' to challenge earlier apartheid restrictions, for the first time attempting to engage in widespread resistance. The ANC was quickly joined by the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), which had been actively representing workers' rights, since its founding in 1921, and by 1948 pledged a firm commitment to ending racial discrimination albeit through the establishment of a socialist state. The party worked closely

with the ANC in the 1940s, but was one of the first political organizations 'banned' by the apartheid government in 1950. Thereafter, the party worked primarily through the ANC until that organization was also banned in 1960.[12]

In the first decade of apartheid rule, political opposition to apartheid became intense. As the imperative for mass action grew, political organizations representing all racial groups rose to challenge the government including the ANC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), the African People's Organization (APO), the Congress of Democrats (COD), and the South African Coloured People's Congress (SACPO). Following a successful 'stay-away' protest in 1950, the anti-apartheid groups called on the government to repeal 'unjust laws', or face mass civil disobedience. With the government's refusal to do so, the constituent groups launched the Defiance Campaign in June of 1952. Over 6000 people were jailed for breaking the new apartheid laws. Despite the police crackdown, the opposition groups formed the Congress Alliance and planned for a 'Congress of the People', which in 1955 adopted the Freedom Charter calling for non-racial democracy. Over 150 activists were arrested and charged with treason, with most opposition political leaders banned or arrested. It was clear that the government would not yield to or even engage with the peaceful demonstration of opposition used by political groups in the 1950s.[13]

A decisive political turning point came in 1960 following the police massacre of over 69 Africans in Sharpeville. The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) had recently split from the ANC over ideological issues and organized a demonstration against the laws that required Africans to carry a 'pass' to prove their right to work and reside in South Africa. Police fired on the crowd, resulting in the most shocking show of police force to date. The government declared a state of emergency, detained thousands of people, banned all public meetings, and outlawed both the ANC and PAC.[14] From this time until 1990, strictly political African organizations were banned, forcing them to operate from outside the country or, even more riskily, underground. Both the ANC and PAC established offices outside the country and also created military organizations (Umkonto we Sizwe and Poqo, respectively) to initiate sabotage inside the country and to prepare for an armed struggle.[15]

In the political vacuum created in the aftermath of Sharpeville, the political realm was reserved for whites and eventually the homeland leaders and other groups involved in the creation of separate representation for Coloreds and Indians. The NP garnered increasing percentages of the white vote while the liberal parliamentary opposition dwindled. The government pointed to the creation of Urban Bantu Councils in the cities and administrative offices in the homelands as providing some political power for Africans; however, these offices operated at the government's will and none was viewed as legitimate by its constituency or the rest of the world. It was in this environment that

the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) first emerged in 1975 as a Zulu cultural organization headed by Gatsha Mangosuthu Buthelezi, a former ANC Youth League member and later Chief Executive Officer of the Zulu 'homeland', KwaZulu. Although Buthelezi never acceded to accepting 'independence' for the homeland from the South African government, he nevertheless cultivated an ethnic base of political support that was at odds with the goals of those African political organizations that had been banned and which he later attempted to use as leverage against the ANC after that organization was unbanned.[16]

Successive South African prime ministers pursued increasingly draconian policies, earning larger margins of victory with every election; the most serious political challenges came from even more conservative segments of the Afrikaner electorate while the English-speaking whites appeared increasingly irrelevant to the country's political life. Both D.F. Malan (1948–1954) and J.G. Strijdom (1954–1958) were responsible for laying most of the early framework for apartheid. H.F. Verwoerd (1958–1966), commonly referred to as the 'architect' of apartheid, indeed elaborated on the initial version, leading South Africa out of the British Commonwealth and introducing the plan for 'separate development' that the party would follow to the end of apartheid.[17] While these first three administrations had all but destroyed legal protest and freedom of speech, South Africa entered into a phase of security control that was unprecedented under B.J. Vorster (1966–1978) and P.W. Botha (1978–1984), both of whom had supported sabotage against the government during the Second World War in opposition to its support for the British war effort. Vorster had served as Minister of Justice responsible for sending Nelson Mandela to prison, and was Prime Minister during the national crackdown following the Soweto uprising. In addition, he created the Bureau of State Security. Botha had served as Minister of Defense for 14 years, and as Prime Minister he oversaw the expansion of 'counter insurgency' efforts including the creation of the infamous Vlakplaas unit responsible for the torturing and deaths of thousands of South Africans.[18] Whether through willful ignorance or misguided self-interest, white South Africans supported these administrations at the polls.

The turnaround in policies granting African political rights came finally under the presidency of F.W. de Klerk.[19] Taking office after Botha suffered a stroke, de Klerk followed up on overtures that Botha had already made to the ANC and to Mandela. Within six months of taking office, de Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, and other political organizations and the release of Mandela and other political prisoners. His decision opened the political scene wide, revealing serious splits within the white electorate as some die-hard conservatives threatened violence; more importantly, his decision restored a political voice to all South Africans. In unleashing these forces, he felt that he could control the situation and negotiate an end to the tension and international condemnation that was hurting the

South African economy. During the negotiations toward the 1994 election, Mandela accused de Klerk of duplicity and of attempting to destabilize the situation as violence spread throughout the country. Indeed, responsibility for arming opponents of the ANC was later traced to de Klerk and his government. Nevertheless, once the negotiations toward democracy began, South Africa was on the path to a political, not a military, solution.[20] But how could African organizations barred from the political structure for nearly 30 years finally force the end of this government?

Popular Protest and the Collapse of Apartheid

Apartheid finally collapsed, forcing a political change through massive popular protest and resistance to the country's discriminatory system. The constant challenge to apartheid that reverberated throughout the country eventually provided the pressure that would force the government to concede the impracticality, if not the immorality, of apartheid. It is difficult to find an area of South Africa that was not affected by resistance to apartheid as it became an all-encompassing system of repression. In the cities, women protested against the pass laws, Africans protested against bus fares, and homeowners and renters alike tried to challenge 'removals' to urban locations. Workers formed their own unions and went out on illegal strikes, and students questioned the entire system of oppression for even the most educated.

But in 1948, most Africans still lived in the rural countryside, trying to eke out a livelihood. Once the Native Reserves had been demarcated through the Natives Land Act in 1913, a process of restricting Africans to ever more crowded land began, which by the 1940s had reached crisis proportions. At that time, the government embarked on a policy of rehabilitating the soil, later known as 'betterment', forcing Africans onto smaller plots of land as well as culling their herds to limit animal grazing. The results of these policies were disastrous, leading to impoverishment and famine. In addition, under apartheid appointed 'chiefs' were designated to carry out government policies. leading to resentment over the usurpation of traditional leaders. And even worse, these rural policies were undertaken while the government was busy removing Africans from the cities to their official 'homelands', the overcrowded and impoverished reserves.[21]

Outbreaks of localized resistance took place throughout rural areas as the policies of land rehabilitation, administration of the reserves, and the extension of the pass system to women took hold in the 1940s and through the 1960s. The most famous and widespread rural revolt took place in 1960 in the Transkei among the Pondo, who formed their own political organization (Intaba, meaning Mountain) and organized store boycotts as well as attacks on government-appointed chiefs. This movement was so serious that the government declared a state of emergency as the power of the Bantu Authorities completely collapsed. In the end, over 5000 Pondo were arrested and the

uprising was crushed. Grievances over restrictions on farming and grazing likewise led to the physical intimidation of officials in Witziehoek in 1950, leading to government retaliation that left at least 14 Africans dead. Women took center stage in Zeerust in 1957, boycotting local stores and schools in protest over new laws requiring them to carry passes and limiting their ability to move between the cities and the rural areas.[22] Similar movements continued throughout the countryside, driven and organized by local residents who refused to accede to apartheid.

While resistance in the countryside took place in obscure areas that garnered little attention, the activities of urban workers and their labor unions could not be ignored. Over 70,000 mineworkers staged a dramatic strike in 1946 demanding better wages and working conditions, only to be crushed by police action with 12 killed and 1200 injured. With the accession of the apartheid government, African unions united to form SACTU in 1954, joining with the Congress Alliance and adopting the Freedom Charter. Nevertheless, the labor movement was hamstrung during the 1960s as SACTU was decimated through arrests and the banning of its leaders under the Suppression of Communism Act.[23] When a spontaneous strike erupted at the Coronation Brick and Tile Company in Durban in 1973, it became clear that South African workers were still ready to risk imprisonment and even death to fight for better conditions. Within one month of the first strike, workers at 29 firms in Durban were on strike followed by similar strikes on the mines in Johannesburg.[24] The power of workers (and pressure from their employers) finally forced the government to allow Africans to form legal unions in 1979.

Throughout the 1980s, labor unions applied crucial pressure on the government to improve wages; significantly, unions also came to play a major role in political negotiations to end apartheid. During this period, the line between worker action and political goals unavoidably became blurred with labor unions increasingly taking on some of the responsibility for those political leaders in prison or exile. The considerable leverage held by the unions (representing a majority of African wage earners who drove the profits of South African industry) was not lost on various political actors who were themselves divided on the best strategies to end apartheid; and, more importantly, on which ideologies should guide post-apartheid South Africa. With the formation of the umbrella Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985, many of these differences were subsumed under a generalized 'anti-apartheid' goal.[25]

Another group that would play an increasingly political role under the severe restrictions of the 1970s and 1980s was African students. Under Bantu Education, all facets of education had not only been segregated but also significantly downgraded for Africans. While expanding the number of state schools available for African students, the government had also effectively ended the type of private, mission education that had previously been available. African leaders including Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukwe, and

even Steve Biko had received at least primary education through the mission schools' mix of the classics imbued with the superiority of Western 'civilization'.[26] Bantu Education skipped the humanism of mission education and focused instead on minimal skills necessary for the limited careers available to blacks under apartheid. While more students attended schools, they were receiving a minimal education. By the late 1960s, black university students began to speak out, forming their own organization, the South African Students Organisation (SASO), in 1968. SASO's manifesto set out the doctrine of Black Consciousness, most famously articulated by Biko, stating 'We, the Black Students of South Africa, believing that the Black Man can no longer allow definitions that have been imposed upon him by an arrogant White world concerning his Being and his destiny and that the Black Student has a moral obligation to articulate the needs and aspirations of the Black Community …'[27] While certainly political by implication, the government initially believed Black Consciousness was in alignment with 'separate development' for the races.

But Black Consciousness energized students and communities alike to oppose rather than join apartheid institutions. Most famously, students in Soweto used Black Consciousness slogans while protesting against the circumstances of their education, leading to the historic student uprisings in 1976. Staging a well-organized protest against the use of Afrikaans in schools, Soweto students were quickly set upon by police and later the South African military with over 170 losing their lives in one day. Protests spread throughout the country, and within three months had affected over 50 additional municipalities. In effect, the country was experiencing over 50 Sharpevilles in this short time period.[28]

In the wake of Soweto, the government swept in once again and banned, imprisoned, or outlawed all leaders and organizations remotely opposed to its policies; but much of the work accomplished through the Black Consciousness Movement and its affiliates would spawn the next phase of opposition. Many young people fled the country, joining one or other of the exile political organizations; others turned to community work, choosing a grass-roots rather than structural approach to change. For those inside the country, P.W. Botha's announcement of a new constitution in 1983 (granting limited political rights to Coloreds and Indians and relegating African political rights to the homelands) galvanized their efforts within an umbrella organization, the United Democratic Front (UDF). The sprawling organization of over 600 'civics' formed a visible public focus for the widespread localized rebellions against apartheid restrictions. While UDF leaders admitted that they were 'trailing behind the masses' in the widespread efforts to resist apartheid, the UDF could articulate grievances and demands that would otherwise have been characterized by the government as local, random, and illegitimate.[29] Regardless, the country was wracked by revolt throughout the late 1980s, matched by the increasingly militarized response from the South African

state. The country was at one more turning point: more violence, or more rights?

The groundswell of resistance and ever increasing levels of violent government repression throughout the 1980s drew the attention and alarm of the international community; by 1990, all factors combined to convince the government to begin negotiations with the opposition. Unrest continued unabated throughout the late 1980s, with the country under almost continuous States of Emergency with SADF troops stationed in the townships. The Anti-Apartheid Movement based in London had led consumer, academic, and sports boycotts against the country since the 1960s, and in the 1980s a serious divestment campaign began in the USA. By 1989, over 100 cities, counties and states in the USA had divested pension funds from companies doing business in South Africa. The 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act passed by the US Congress over President Ronald Reagan's veto banned new investment, bank loans, and certain imports. In 1987, the Act was extended to deny tax reimbursements for companies doing business in South Africa, cutting into their profits by 72%. International companies fled South Africa, resulting in an estimated R5.5 billion in capital flight from the country.[30] Combined with the tremendous costs (human as well as financial) involved in the continuous suppression of opposition, international pressure delivered the *coup de grace* to the continuation of apartheid.

The Role of Ideology: Past, Present, and Future

The forces supporting and contesting apartheid were driven by a variety of concerns and interests that manifested themselves in differing ideologies and visions for the future. The ideology of the ruling government itself had evolved over time from an inchoate vision of 'apartheid' into the hypocritical policy of 'separate development', a fiction which argued that everyone in South Africa would exercise rights in their home areas and which, for Africans, meant the impoverished 13% of the land allocated for homelands.[31] The far right in the white electorate held on to that vision as protests intensified, while what was left of a parliamentary opposition vigorously but fruitlessly opposed it. Some white academics mooted the possibilities of a sort of consociational power-sharing which appealed to neither pro- nor anti-government forces; others worked tirelessly to support trade unions, the grass-roots movements, and the exile community at great risk to themselves.[32] In retrospect, most of the discussion that tried to justify or at least salvage the political status quo resembled the colloquial metaphor of rearranging deckchairs on the *Titanic*.

While much of white South Africa was looking toward continuing domination, the rest of the country had quite different plans for the future. All parties wanted to see the end of apartheid; but within the spectrum of opposition there were serious differences about the future. Over the course of

the twentieth century, the ANC itself had divided between accommodation and outright change, but with the advent of apartheid, it was clear that the government had no interest in any accommodation for Africans.[33] The ideology of the SACP (founded in 1919, banned in 1950, and resurfacing again only in 1990) identified South Africa as 'colonialism of a special type', where oppression was exerted both along racial lines within the country and externally as part of the international capitalist system. Even with the end of racial domination through apartheid, the SACP saw capitalism as an enduring threat.[34] The workers themselves had formed their own unions (finally legal in 1979) and more firmly focused on issues of wages, benefits, and social services.[35]

The argument over how to achieve the end of apartheid had revolved around race, creating divisions within the liberation movement. As early as the 1930s, leaders who questioned whether a multiracial leadership could ever work to the advantage of Africans challenged the accommodationist forces within the ANC. Anton Lembede and Peter Mda, among others, began to advocate an African Nationalism not tied to ethnicity but rather to assert the rights of Africans to rule their own country.[36] This strain of nationalism would weave variously over the next five decades through the ANC Youth League, the PAC, and the Black Consciousness Movement and its affiliates.[37] Whether advocating Africa for Africans or questioning the role of whites in a movement that sought ultimately to destroy their privilege, ideologies of African nationalism raised crucial questions about the future nature of South African society. What would be the role of race in the future? And coupled with socialist ideologies, how would race and class intersect?

In the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising of 1976 and the severe repression that followed, ideology began to take a backseat to urgent calls for the end of apartheid. The local civic organizations had various interests, claims, and concerns, but shared few ideological positions other than to end their specific forms of oppression. As local activism gathered steam and the UDF began to advocate for these groups, a Charterist ideology took hold roughly based on the aims of the Freedom Charter drawn up in 1955 by a group of now banned and defunct organizations including the ANC, South African Indian Congress (SAIC), Congress of Democrats, and SACTU. The document had reflected the aims of all of the constituent organizations and therefore included a laundry list of demands. Notably, the Freedom Charter stated 'that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white', reflecting the multiracial composition of the Congress of the People. It also declared that 'The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole', giving rise over successive decades to fears of a communist takeover of the economy. And workers' concerns were specifically addressed: 'There shall be a forty-hour working week, a national minimum wage, paid annual leave, and sick leave for all workers, and maternity leave on full pay for all working mothers'.[38]

Thus, the Charterists of the 1980s followed the Congress Alliance strategy of the 1950s by subsuming individual ideological differences between opposition forces within the imperative of doing away with apartheid.

Whereas Black Consciousness of the 1970s had energized and reinvigorated the opposition, the turn to Charterism was successful in organizing concrete demonstrations of opposition. Whether protesting against rents, low wages, poor education, or the tri-cameral parliament, Charterism as espoused through the UDF succeeded in providing a united opposition to the overriding ideology (and practice) of one basic enemy: apartheid. In that respect, Charterism provided a crucial organizing force against apartheid. At the same time, however, it provided only a vague and soon to be contested vision of the future.[39]

The End, and the Beginning

On February 2, 1990, South African President F.W. de Klerk announced the unbanning of anti-apartheid organizations and the release of political prisoners, naming Nelson Mandela in particular. He was clear: 'I wish to put it plainly that the Government has taken a firm decision to release Mr. Mandela unconditionally. I am serious about bringing this matter to finality without delay'.[40] Identifying Mandela as the leader with whom the government would negotiate, de Klerk acceded to the drumbeat of the international 'Free Mandela' campaign that had identified Mandela as the voice of the opposition and gave the ANC predominance as its representative. Thus began the process of negotiation that would last nearly four years until the country's first multiracial elections were held in April 1994.

But the negotiations did not halt the violence, which in fact increased over this period. It became clear that de Klerk and his party were playing for time, trying to divide the fragile coalition built up by the UDF, and hoping to turn international support back to the status quo ante. Almost immediately following Mandela's release, police attacked residents in the township of Sebokeng who were protesting against high rents, killing 14 and wounding more than 300. At the same time, 'war' broke out between Zulu followers of the UDF and those of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in KwaZulu-Natal and nearly 200 died. It was later revealed that the IFP forces were armed and aided by the police. The government, clandestinely supportive of if not instigating the violence, argued that the country would soon fall apart due to ethnic rivalries and unrest. The right wing, as represented by the Afrikanerweerstandbeweging (AWB), added to the chaos, staging its own 'Battle of Ventersdorp' when de Klerk came to the hometown of the movement's leader, Eugene Terreblanche, resulting in the deaths of three of its own members. Township violence escalated again in 1993 when the IFP attacked ANC supporters in Boipatong, allowing police to open fire on residents and resulting in a total of 45 deaths. The last straw for many came soon after with an

attack by homeland troops killing 28 protestors at Bisho, capital of the Ciskei homeland. As the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation later concluded, political violence between 1990 and 1994 was fueled by a 'third force'; that is, the South African military in an attempt to promote fighting between members of the black political parties (ANC/UDF vs IFP). Although government officials consistently denied the presence of a 'third force', weapons used by the IFP were traced to the South African Police and SADF. Between the time of Mandela's release and the elections in April 1994, over 14,000 people had been killed in political violence.[41]

What did the National Party hope to achieve, and what did they finally get? In short, NP proposals envisioned a country with guaranteed rights for minorities (in this case meaning whites) and a government run by consensus between the three parties earning the most votes. In effect, de Klerk sought a veto power for whites in any new government. But the ANC, the dominant party in negotiations that included a total of 19 political parties, turned the suggestion down flat.[42] The Record of Understanding that finally emerged in 1992 proposed elections to a Constitutional Assembly tasked with writing the new constitution, and a 'Government of National Unity' to last five years made up of the three top polling parties that would rule on the basis of that electoral strength rather than consensus. When elections took place in April 1994, the ANC won 62% of the vote, the National Party 20%, and the IFP 10%. In the end, the NP got a seat at the table, but not at the head of the table.

The New South Africa: Post-Apartheid Realities

When Nelson Mandela was sworn in as the President of South Africa on May 10, 1994, he stated, 'Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another'.[43] The country was now ruled as a democracy, all citizens were entitled to vote, and the rule of law was reinstated after nearly a decade of martial law. In 1996, the new constitution was implemented with a Bill of Rights detailing over 25 general rights protected for South African citizens including equality, human dignity, security, privacy, religion, speech, movement, access to courts, etc. No longer would South Africans face random arrest and imprisonment, state-sponsored discrimination, or the overall brutality of the apartheid state. The notorious prisons including Robben Island and the 'Fort' in Johannesburg were closed and turned into museums recalling the injustices of apartheid. South Africa's future was now in the hands of all citizens. What would that bring?

The transition to democracy embodied a purely political solution to dismantle a system (apartheid) which touched every aspect of South African life far beyond the political. Nelson Mandela and the ANC had emerged during

the negotiations as the country's presumptive dominant political leadership and therefore inherited the responsibility for formulating policies that could address the overwhelming task of reshaping South Africa. The legal framework of apartheid had quickly been dismantled; most apartheid laws were repealed even before Mandela took office. But control over the government and the repeal of legislation could go only so far. What were the party's priorities? Following the unbanning of the political opposition, the UDF had disbanded and the ANC joined with the SACP and COSATU in a 'Tripartite Alliance' to put forward a unified slate of candidates for election. While the three groups represented a broad range of interests and shared a vision of economic transformation within a democratic South Africa, what would that mean and how could it be achieved within the economic and social frameworks left behind by apartheid?

Mandela and his government inherited a country rent by division with very few available resources to meet the need or expectations of its citizens. Four years of internecine violence preceding the elections, on top of decades of state repression, left a deeply divided electorate as evidenced by election results. While the ANC earned 62% of the vote (presumably representing a large segment of the African population as well as a significant percentage of whites) the NP got 20% of the vote from whites and some Coloreds who feared radical change, and the IFP got 10% primarily from Zulus. These parties had fought bitterly prior to the elections over the very issues they would now need to resolve. Within the ANC itself were a wide variety of organizations and ideologies united primarily by their opposition to apartheid. And the government had few resources to meet the demands of all of these groups, discovering that the NP had left the government accounts in the red by $25 billion, with government debt equaling 50% of gross domestic product (GDP). The country's credit rating had dropped to BB, or junk status.[44] Even if the government could find consensus on priorities among the differing parties, where were the resources to fund new goals?

Mandela began by preaching reconciliation, in line with the Charterist ideology that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it', and also from a recognition that the country could little afford further violence and bloodshed.[45] Reconciliation was quickly addressed through the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, which established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Following similar efforts to uncover human rights abuses in countries such as Argentina and Chile, the TRC held public hearings for victims and perpetrators alike beginning in 1995. Over 20,000 people gave testimony of over 35,000 human rights abuses. Although the commission had no judicial power, perpetrators could request amnesty for crimes, but out of 7112 applications for amnesty, only 849 were granted.[46] In the wake of the TRC's final report in 1998, criticism has arisen over perceptions that justice was denied or, alternatively, that the hearings did not reveal a complete truth.[47] Nevertheless, much of the information

concerning the government's attacks on the opposition (the murders of Steve Biko, the Craddock Four, the Guguletu Seven, and many others) was revealed through the TRC hearings. The most shocking truths were now in the open.

South Africans also had a pressing need for basic services denied under apartheid. The new constitution guaranteed these rights, including access to basic education, food, water, health care, and housing. But the shortfall in services was overwhelming. Out of a population of 40 million in 1996, 17 million people lived below the poverty line, 12 million lacked clean drinking water, and 4.3 million were without housing. During the elections, the ANC put forward a broad plan, the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) that proposed to address these issues. While less than 60% of South Africans had access to clean water in 1994, by 2010 the government claimed that figure had risen to over 90%. Likewise, in 1996, less than 50% of South Africans lived in a 'formal dwelling'. Since then, 3.7 million houses have been built, housing approximately 12.5 million people. The percentage of South Africans who are illiterate has dropped from 25 to 10%.[48] While the success of these measures is often criticized in terms of the remaining needs of the population, the situation has materially improved for many.

The problem that has proven most difficult to solve is the continuing level of poverty and the attendant inequality gap that is still largely defined by race. In 1994, approximately 92% of the African population was classified as 'poor'. The economy has grown since 1994 as investment came back into the country, national debt decreased, and GDP increased over 200% by 2014. At the same time, however, unemployment has remained at approximately 25%. The result is the continuation of staggering poverty among Africans, 85% of whom remain classified as 'poor', or 'below poverty datum line'. In comparison, 67% of whites are classified as 'middle-class' and 20% as 'upper class'.[49] Although poverty has been reduced slightly due to increased levels of government support through social grants, continuing unemployment, especially among the youth, suggests that poverty will remain a long-term problem.

When Nelson Mandela stepped down after one term as president in 1999, his administration had already pivoted away from the RDP, deferring many of its goals in favor of policies that were oriented toward market-based strategies. In particular, rather than promoting growth through the redistribution of wealth, new policies as embodied in the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Program (GEAR) sought redistribution through growth. GEAR policies focused on a smaller role in the economy for the government and gave greater leeway to the private sector, pursuing the privatization of government assets and reining in wage increases. One reason for this change was pressure from the IMF and World Bank to reduce South Africa's debt burden with nearly 18% of the government budget spent on debt servicing. Under President Thabo Mbeki, who became president in 1999, market-oriented policies continued with mixed results: while foreign debt dropped from

nearly 50% of GDP to less than 30% by 2007, both unemployment and South Africa's personal debt jumped. The redistribution of wealth had not only failed but inequality appeared to be worsening.[50]

Although Mbeki was re-elected to a second term of office in 2004, his popularity waned as a result of controversial statements and policies. Most famously, his lack of action on the HIV/AIDS epidemic was blamed for soaring infection rates that were one of the highest in the world.[51] But he was also perceived as seeking a role as statesman for all of Africa, ignoring his own country's problems. And his continuing adherence to market-friendly policies, including the perceived creation of a wealthy 'black middle class' through his policies of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) smacked of favoritism and corruption to many. Increasingly seen as remote and unengaged in the many continuing problems of poverty and inequality, Mbeki was voted out as President of the ANC in 2007 and stepped down as President of South Africa shortly thereafter in 2008.[52]

Under Mbeki's administration, fissures also began to appear in the political landscape. The ANC's formidable ally COSATU had locked horns with Mbeki over what the unions saw as an increasingly market-oriented approach to the economy at the expense of workers. In particular, the unions worried over the new government's willingness to continue the apartheid government's privatization of government assets which COSATU, as well as the SACP, saw as dangerous. During Mbeki's presidency he also came in for heavy criticism from the unions over his policies towards the HIV/AIDS crisis and his initial refusal to fund the antiretroviral drug treatments that could have prevented so many deaths. When Mbeki attempted to run for a third term as president of the ANC, being constitutionally barred from a third term as president of South Africa, the COSATU president Zwelinzima Vavi formally opposed him, easing the path for Jacob Zuma. Vavi has since expressed regret for the move, but he was also expelled from COSATU in the 2015 purge of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). The disagreement within COSATU over police violence during the Marikana platinum mineworkers strike fractured the trade union federation and strained relations between the ANC and its labor allies.[53]

Mbeki had been forced from office by his successor, Jacob Zuma, who became President of South Africa in 2009. Unlike Mbeki, Zuma was outgoing and personable; but he carried considerable baggage including multiple accusations of corruption and an indictment on a charge of rape. Zuma had no formal education, but he was seen as a party loyalist, having served time on Robben Island and with the ANC's armed wing (MK) in Mozambique. He was also instrumental in defusing some tensions between the ANC and IFP in the run-up to the 1994 elections, and in winning over many Zulu (his own ethnic affiliation) to the party. Following his election, he pledged to address many of the problems facing the general populace including the HIV/AIDS crisis, job creation, health care, and land redistribution. Although

the government succeeded in halting the rise in HIV/AIDS infection, most other areas of concern remained problematic.[54]

By 2016, the ANC faced serious but still not threatening opposition at the polls.[55] From the left, the former president of the ANC Youth League, Julius Malema, formed the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in 2013 to challenge the government's economic policies, calling for nationalization of the mines and radical land reform. Although he (like Vavi) had been one of Zuma's active supporters in the rivalry with Mbeki, Malema was expelled from the ANC in 2012 over a host of incidents that embarrassed the party. The EFF has garnered notoriety but more importantly votes, holding 25 seats in Parliament. Also making inroads on ANC hegemony is the Democratic Alliance (DA), an heir to the white liberal parties of the apartheid period including the United Party and the Progressive Party. Attacking from the right of the ANC, the DA proposes smaller government and charges the ANC with gross corruption and incompetence. The DA has operated as the Official Opposition party in Parliament and polled approximately 22% of the vote in the 2014 election. In 2016, the EFF successfully petitioned the Constitutional Court to hear a case against President Zuma for misappropriation of state funds to refurbish his private residence and won the case in 2016 initiating a political crisis. An increasingly divisive figure, Zuma refused to step down from office as the ANC faced growing electoral challenges.

Conclusion: The Long Walk

While the country was briefly united in a spirit of hope under Nelson Mandela in 1994, the many divisions and injustices sown over the centuries proved difficult to overcome in the first 20 years of the 'new' South Africa. The traces of the ideological differences which emerged under the stress of apartheid remain between and within racial and ethnic groups. More than 80% of the population, overwhelmingly black, remains mired in poverty. And the government is now accused of personal corruption, rather than the moral corruption of apartheid. Yet all South Africans exercise their freedom of speech, are not imprisoned or detained as a result of the color of their skin or their political beliefs, and do not disappear to be tortured or killed by the state. The country has earned many freedoms, including the freedom to determine its own fate.

Notes

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6. Immorality Act of 1927. See Muriel Horrell, *Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa to the End of 1976* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1978).
7. In the South African Republic, Resolution 159 of 1855, Occupation Act of 1886, Squatters Act of 1887; in the Cape Colony, the Glen Grey Act of 1894.
8. Defence Amendment Act, No. 77 of 1963.
9. For a complete compilation and explanation of the evolution of apartheid legislation, see Muriel Horrell, *Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa to the End of 1976* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1978).
10. These crimes came to light during the investigations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) following the transition to democracy. See: De Wet Potgieter, *Total Onslaught: Apartheid's Dirty Tricks Exposed* (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2007); Bill Minter, *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique* (London: Zed Books, 1994); Eugene de Kock, *A Long Night's Damage: Working for the Apartheid State* (Saxonwold: Contra Press, 1998); Jacob Dlamini, *Askari: A Story of Collaboration and Betrayal in the Anti-Apartheid Struggle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Antjie Krog, *Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa* (New York: Crown Books, 1999).
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CHAPTER 41

The Pan-African Experience: From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union

Horace G. Campbell

The Pan-African World We Want: Building a People's movement for a just, accountable and inclusive structural transformation. A united and integrated Africa; an-Africa imbued with the ideals of justice and peace; an interdependent and virile Africa determined to map for itself an ambitious strategy; an-Africa underpinned by political, economic, social and cultural integration which would restore to Pan-Africanism its full meaning; an-Africa able to make the best of its human and material resources, and keen to ensure the progress and prosperity of its citizens by taking advantage of the opportunities offered by a globalised world; an-Africa engaged in promoting its values in a world rich in its disparities.
(Constitutive Act, African Union website)

When the call was made in May 2013 for 'a united and integrated Africa' by the African Union (AU) in its roll-out of Agenda 2063, it was then a major restatement of the goals of the emancipation of the African people at home and abroad. In keeping with this emancipatory aspiration, one year after the launch of Agenda 2063, the AU signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the global Pan-Africa Movement. This MoU was a major admission that if the AU were to achieve its goals, it would have to be grounded

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in the ideas of African freedom as articulated by progressive Pan-Africanists at the grass roots through the ages. In fact, when the AU Constitutive Act was ratified in 2000, its preamble stated explicitly that the AU had been 'INSPIRED by the noble ideals which guided the founding fathers of our Continental Organization and generations of Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African States'.[1]

It is from this consideration of the need for an AU grounded in the principles of the most progressive aspects of the Pan-African Movement that guides this intervention. In this sense, the chapter will seek a longer historical overview of the movement than the empiricism that does not draw from the founding principles of Pan-African struggles. It should be stated from the outset that there are as many definitions of Pan-Africanism as there are different factions of this movement. This writer, as a scholar and activist in the movement, has been partial to the definitions of Pan-Africanism by thinkers such as Kwame Nkrumah, Marcus Garvey, Eusi Kwayana, Wangaari Mathai, Tajudeen Abdul Raheem, Micere Githae Mugo, and Walter Rodney. Within this movement, however, there is unanimity about the origins of this Pan-African movement among the enslaved Africans after the fifteenth century. From the time of the 1829 David Walker appeal in the USA, the orientation of the movement has been internationalist. David Walker had defined the tasks of Pan-Africanism by declaring that 'it was an unshakeable fact and forever immovable fact that your full glory and happiness, as well as that of all other coloured people under heaven, shall never be consummated without the entire emancipation of your enslaved brethren all over the world'. The concept of emancipation of all had been a key aspect of Pan-Africanism. Independent Haiti had lent support for the anti-colonial struggles all over South America, and black soldiers had been prominent in the armies of Simon Bolivar.

This chapter is divided into seven parts. The first will deal with the background to Pan-Africanism and the short transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the AU. It is here that there will be an explicit explanation of what is meant by the Pan-African experience. The second section will interrogate the context of the epistemological questions that arise from an engagement with the AU in the present and the OAU in the past. The third section will draw from the traditions of vindicationism and the long historical background of the Pan-African movement, drawing from the traditions of Ethiopianism and Pan-Africanism at the grass roots. The fourth section will provide the immediate background to the link between Pan-Africanism and the OAU (drawing out the tensions that came out of the birth of the OAU at the height of the Cold War). The fifth section interrogates the strength and weakness of the Pan-African movement at the moment of the intensified drive for freedom in Southern Africa and the intervention by the World Bank to entrench structural adjustment and economic retrogression in Africa.

The sixth section examines the revitalization of the ideals of Pan-African solidarity and cooperation which emerged after the military defeat of the apartheid army and the independence of Namibia. The seventh section will draw out the lessons from the birth of the AU and the tensions generated by the struggles by Africans outside of Africa to be central to the planning of the AU. The establishment of a sixth region of the AU was an elementary concession, but the urgent questions that were thrown up in the international Black Lives Matter movement brought renewed attention to Pan-Africanism's core challenge of how to guarantee the dignity of the African at home and abroad.

With the dominance of neo-liberal thinking internationally, the bureaucratic sections of the AU Commission fiddled with ideas of a Peer Review Commission and a Standby Force while the USA organized to deploy a new military and ideological force under the US Africa Command. In this era of neo-liberalism, the European Commission established its own center for Pan-Africanism to tap into the intellectual energy of this historic movement. Constant meetings about the protocols of Peace and Security had substituted for a clear agenda for the all African army until 2011. African leaders who had equivocated about calls for the full unification were given a rude awakening by the NATO intervention and destruction in Libya. In the conclusion, this chapter will underline the tenacity of the cultural and grass-roots forces of Pan-Africanism and the Pan-African movement that placed questions of reparative justice at the forefront of the movement. In the process of the struggles for reparations, the progressive tendencies within the Pan-African movement (especially from the African descendants in South America) linked once again to the world revolutionary trend and connected the ideas of Pan-Africanism to the collective struggles of humanity.

What Is Pan-Africanism? Background from the OAU to the AU

Pan-Africanism arose as a philosophy to restore the humanity and dignity of the African person and indeed all humans. The concept of dignity and humanity has gone through many iterations from the period of enslavement to the current period of biotechnology when corporations have given themselves the right to patent life forms. African–Americans, Caribbean persons, and African descendants in Europe and other parts of the world have always been at the heart of Pan-African thought and action. This point has been articulated by many of the leading scholars on Pan-Africanism. The violent separation and oppression of the transatlantic slave trade lent urgency to identification with Africa. The idea of Pan-Africanism emanated from the enslaved person who wanted to develop a larger conception of reality than the village and the clan from which he or she had been taken into captivity. The transtlantic slave trade had captured the bodies of the Africans but could not capture their minds. The concept of shipmate helped to foster a new kind of

familyhood or kinship in a period when the forms of bondage denied Africans the right to organize in family structures. The Pan-African idea and movement grew out of black people's desire to rediscover their identity and dignity and to fight for their liberation from colonialism and racism. As the Pan-African thinker St Clair Drake observed, the ideology of Pan-Africanism began:

> with a political concept developed by men of action not scholars, by a group of American Negroes and West Indians between 1900 and 1945 – Pan-Africanism – the idea that Africans and peoples of African descent in the New World should develop racial solidarity for the purpose of abolishing discrimination, enforced segregation, and political and economic exploitation.[2]

Though this author would take issue with the dates mentioned by Drake and the idea of 'men of action', the important point was that Pan-Africanism did not emerge out of the brains of intellectuals, but out of oppressed people who were engaged in concrete struggles. Hence, in the literature on Pan-Africanism, the words 'community', 'struggle', 'survival,' 'solidarity', 'cooperation', and 'emancipation' keep reappearing. 'Pan' means all, so Pan-Africanism includes all people of African ancestry living in continental Africa and throughout the world. At the period of slavery when the ideas of inferiority of black humanity became one component of Enlightenment thinking, Pan-Africanism emerged as a complex set of ideas and ideologies containing social, cultural, political, and spiritual aspects of dignity and liberation.

It was in the struggles against slavery that the ideas and principles of Pan-Africanism were refined. C.L.R. James made this point eloquently in his book *A History of Pan-African Revolt.* Drawing from the rich traditions of self-organization and self-expression that arose in the varying black revolts such as the successful Haitian Revolution, James pointed out how the success of the Haitian Revolution dominated Pan-African thinking in the nineteenth century.[3] Toward the end of that century, especially after the partitioning of Africa, black intellectuals began to give clearer meaning to the body of ideas that was later to be called Pan-Africanism. The first Pan-African Conference was called in London by H. Sylvester Williams in 1900.

Kwame Nkrumah had been one of the foremost thinkers and activist in the Pan-African movement in the twentieth century and he worked very hard for the goal of the unification of the people of Africa at home and abroad. On May 25, 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the 32 African states that had achieved independence at that time agreed to establish the OAU. A further 21 members joined gradually, reaching a total of 53 by the time of the AU's creation in 2002. At the founding meeting of the OAU in Addis Ababa, Nkrumah stated clearly that:

> No single part of Africa can be safe or free to develop fully and independently while any part remains unliberated or while Africa's vast economic resources continue to be exploited by imperialist and neo-colonialist interests. Unless

> Africa is politically united under an All-Africa Union Government, there can be no solution to our political and economic problems.[4]

At that moment, many of the leaders who were present had thought that the aspiration of an All-Africa Union government was unrealistic, but by the start of the twenty-first century, the massive push from below rose all around the Pan-African world and the leaders returned to the goal of uniting all of Africa. The goal was for an independent and free Africa that would offer support to dispersed Africans. Julius Nyerere, who was an earlier supporter of gradually working towards a Union government, later recanted and in 1997 declared in Ghana that, 'without unity there is no future for Africa … My generation led Africa to political freedom. The current generation of leaders and peoples of Africa must pick up the flickering torch of African freedom, refuel it with their enthusiasm and determination, and carry it forward'.[5]

Nkrumah had been a major historical figure in this movement and the Agenda 2063 of the AU subscribes to many of the goals of economic independence that had been articulated by hundreds of meetings and conferences by Pan-African thinkers and activists. The Pan-African goal of freedom, independence, and unity had been compromised in the founding of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, and for thirty eight years the progressive wing of the Pan-African movement pushed for realizing the goals of freedom, independence, unity, and an end to racial discrimination.

It was on May 26, 2001 that the Constitutive Act of the AU entered into force. This dream of uniting Africans had taken legal form and the Constitutive Act of the AU had been drafted, circulated and completed for adoption at the thirty-sixth summit of the OAU on July 11, 2000. The first formal meeting of the AU took place in Durban, South Africa (July 2002) and at that moment the OAU ceased to exist. The speed with which the African states adopted and signed the Constitutive Act of the AU had emanated from the appearance of new social forces that had emerged in a revitalized Africa after the defeat of apartheid at Cuito Cuanavale in 1988.[6] The end of formal apartheid, the World Conference against Racism in South Africa in 2001, and the birth of the AU were episodes in the revitalization of Africa reflecting the emerging social forces that wanted a break with the old forms of politics. These forces were carrying forward the call of Frantz Fanon for the creation of a new Africa with new ideas. In a major sense, the conjuncture of the formation of the AU reflected the aspirations of Pan-Africanists over the centuries who had believed that the freedom of black people everywhere was linked to a free and united Africa.

In the process of calling for change, the voices of truth across the Global Africa had made an impact to the point that the energies behind the formation of the AU represented a contested turning from the state-centered concepts of unity. This contestation remains manifest in the efforts to give meaning to the representation within the AU of the millions of Africans dispersed outside of Africa. Temporarily, these Africans have been grouped in

the sixth region of the AU. The idea of an African Parliament representing peoples is one new aspect of Africa that is slowly emerging from the exhaustion of the old patriarchal models of politics. The other idea that is most profound is the mandate of the AU to intervene in the internal affairs of member countries in the event of cases of gross violation of human rights, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The AU is a body that represents the interests of all Africans on the continent of Africa. This organization is to be the core of a number of institutions such as the Pan-African Parliament, the African Court on Human and People's Rights, and the Central Bank.[7] (See Appendix on the Objectives of the AU.)

While academics, social scientists, political careerists, and legal experts had been toiling to give juridical meaning to the Constitutive Act, new social forces had been active in the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC) as well as the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), seeking to formulate a clear and consistent position on a new thrust for Pan-African unity. Starting from a position of validating the life and dignity of all humans, the dominant forces in the CSSDCA sought to make a break with the conception of the state as the key force for Pan-African Unity and reconstruction in Africa. This position on Pan-Africanism had been reinforced by the outpourings of popular artists who had participated in the major Pan-African cultural activities such as the World Negro Art Festival (Dakar, April, 1–24, 1966), the Algiers Pan-African Cultural Festival (July 21–August 1, 1969), FESTAC (Art and Culture Festival, Lagos, January, 15–February 12, 1977) and other festivals with more limited scope such as the Ouagadougou Pan-African Film Festival (FESPACO), the Pan-African Music Festival (FESPAM, Brazzaville, 1987), and the Julius Nyerere Cultural and Intellectual Festivals in Tanzania. These festivals increased the range of Pan-African activities that were deepening the Pan-African experiences across the planet.

In this contribution by Pan-African experience, we mean the process of getting knowledge or skill from doing, seeing, or feeling things associated with the emancipation of Africa. In this case, the getting of knowledge and skill came from the differing Pan-African activities that were undertaken to advance the cause of freedom. St Clair Drake had succinctly outlined what was meant by a Pan-African activity. 'What makes the activity Pan-African is the conceptualization on the part of the participants in their local struggle of their being a part of a larger world, involving black people everywhere with various segments having obligations and responsibilities to each other.'[8]

The centrality of cultural artists in the Pan-African activities and the experiences in the transition from the OAU to the AU were manifest in the cultural outpourings from all corners of Global Africa. After the explosive interventions of Bob Marley, Fela Ransome Kuti, Tupac and countless others who pushed the progressive consciousness in the era of corporate globalization, there were efforts to depoliticize the cultural front by commodifying and

linking Pan-African culture to saleable commodities. Thus, a tug of ideas emerged between neo-liberal Pan-Africanism and that tradition that was working to build new social relations. Hundreds of Pan-African artists continued to surge, using new technical means to bypass corporate-controlled sources of information and communication. This tenacity was underlined by the legendary Hugh Masekala. Internationally acclaimed for decades, this trumpeter, bandleader, composer, and lyricist created a sound that was part of the global anti-apartheid culture. At the launch of the AU he was at the forefront of composing its theme song. The song that underlined the depth of the feeling of the mass of the people of Africa was the song entitled *Everything Must Change*. This involvement of cultural artists at the forefront of strengthening progressive consciousness was not new; Tony Martin has reported Trinidad's entertainment icon Lord Kitchener being commissioned to compose a calypso for Ghana's independence.

This intervention on the Pan-African Experience and the AU draws inspiration from the cultural artists and village dialecticians from across Global Africa who are searching for new standards of human dignity and the validation of human beings.[9] The Garveyites in the early twentieth century had been clear that the struggles were global when they adopted the chant, 'Africa for the Africans at home and abroad'. It was the genius of the Garveyites that they had recognized the strategic spaces occupied by African descendants in Brazil, Costa Rica, Jamaica, the USA, Haiti, and other parts of the world. Mobilizing around a Global Pan-African ideal had connected dispersed movements in the last century and signaled that strategically any struggle for liberation in Africa must be linked to the conditions of the lives of Africans everywhere. After the OAU abandoned this global outlook and sought to domesticate Pan-Africanism as a vehicle for solidifying the power of a small clique, mainstream social scientists had heralded the death of the Pan-African movement. However, the seeds of the ideals of Pan-African liberation had, as it were, hidden in the mountains and valleys awaiting the right conditions for germination. These conditions are sprouting in a reenergized youth and in every village and township. The lyrics of Bob Marley have been a constant reminder of the need for an emancipatory approach to the Pan-African movement. This chapter will seek to elaborate on the emancipatory traditions of Pan-Africanism in order to distinguish this movement from the intellectual traditions of oppression that dehumanizes Africans.[10]

Epistemological Questions and Grasping the Emergence of the AU

A theory is a statement of how and why processes work or the world operates. Within the social sciences, theories attempt to explain why groups of people choose to perform certain actions and how societies function or change in a certain way. Western social sciences have sought to place a

dominant theoretical stamp of positivism in the study of Pan-Africanism. This theoretical perspective promotes the view about the appropriate methodology of social science, emphasizing empirical observation. With claims of being scientific, positivism is associated with empiricism (the view that knowledge is primarily based on experience via the five senses), and it is opposed to metaphysics. Roughly, the philosophical study of what is real is on the grounds that metaphysical claims cannot be verified by sense experience. This theoretical outlook was developed at a time when social scientists had embraced eugenic thinking and believed that ideas about African emancipation were metaphysical dreams that had no relation to reality. So far, as for the Western social scientists, the logical step for Africa was to be guided out of backwardness and superstition by modern Western intellectuals.

Western social scientists in the main understood the world based on the belief that Europe had reached the highest pinnacle of human civilization and that Western norms were universal. This position was clearly articulated in the book by Walt Rostow, *Stages of Economic Growth*. It followed then that the expansion of European social, economic, and cultural domination was necessary to facilitate the spread of civilization. Many Marxists also internalized this linear understanding of human societies and the French communists held onto this to the point of opposing the anti-colonial movements in French colonies. Many of the educated Africans who had sought to place themselves at the head of the Pan-African movement had internalized varying aspects of Western intellectual culture. Michael West had designated the nineteenth-century aspiring Pan-African thinkers as 'redemptionist and vindicationist'. In his analysis:

> [the] redemptionist project had as its principal objective the rehabilitation, regeneration, and development of Africa and its inhabitants – spiritually, materially, and culturally. The exponents of African redemption were motivated by deep Christian convictions, largely Protestant. They accepted the view, then dominant in the White Atlantic, that Africa was a benighted land, in dire need of the transformative powers of that alchemic nineteenth-century trinity: Christianity, Commerce, and Civilization; that is, Protestantism, capitalism, and North Atlantic bourgeois culture.[11]

He continued by explaining the vindicationist traditions within Pan-Africanism.

> Redemption, in this vision, amounted to a civilizing mission in which Africans from the west bank of the Atlantic would become the vanguard. Vindication complemented redemption. Whereas redemption championed the modernization of the African continent, vindication constituted the intellectual armor of an emerging global Africa. The vindicationists sought to valorize the African past, if not the African present. Theirs was a search for a usable past, a quest for a historiography to disprove White supremacist notions that Africa and Africans had played no part in the development of world cultures and civilizations.[12]

The Positivist Approaches to Pan-Africanism

Positivism and individualism dominated the writings on Pan-Africanism and coincided with the popularity of the ideas of realism in international-relations theory. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, especially after the partitioning of Africa, black intellectuals began to give clearer meaning to the body of ideas that was later to be called Pan-Africanism. As stated in our introduction, the first Pan-African Conference was called in London by H. Sylvester Williams in 1900 in the period when the European armies were plundering Africa after the European leaders had partitioned the continent at the Berlin Conference (1884–1885). Vincent B. Thompson has been among those intellectuals who have chronicled the evolution of the OAU and the Pan-African movement from the activities of vindicationists such as Edward Blyden and J.H. Casley Hayford down through the Garvey movement to the advocacy of Kwame Nkrumah and the birth pains of the OAU.[13] Peter O. Esedebe, in the book, *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement 1776–1963*, also linked the formation of the OAU to the long history of rebellions in the era of revolutions through the contributions of Blyden, Garvey, and those who came together for the Fifth Pan-African Congress in 1945.[14] Michael West in his contribution to the study of the idea of Pan-Africanism had also grounded the evolution of the idea to the quadripartite revolution at the end of the eighteenth century as manifest in the abolitionist movement, and the American, French, and Haitian Revolutions. Michael West then divided the emergence of the Pan-African idea into four moments: (a) 1776–1900, (b) 1900–1945, (c) 1945–1963; and (d) 1963–present.[15] West elaborated on how the Pan-Africanist project in this era was both a racial and a gendered one insofar as the struggle to redeem Africa was associated with the struggle to redeem black manhood.

For West, the idea of redeemed black manhood was replaced by the push for 'sovereign African statehood' by the time of the partitioning of Africa in 1885. Implicit in the push for African statehood was an accommodation with global capital. Booker T. Washington of the USA was the figure associated with this accommodationist outlook, but the imperatives of imperialism, racism, war, and Jim Crow eroded the appeal of accommodationism and birthed the Garvey movement that took a more militant approach to Pan-African self-reliance and self-organization.

Negro intellectuals, then, and indeed up to the present were dismissive of Garveyism and thus confused the personality of Garvey with the mass movement that represented one of the highest points of Pan-African activity. Instead of grasping the conditions of Jim Crow, eugenics, and the Klan that produced a wave of white racist violence, Western scholars denigrated Garvey and focused on the differences between him and W.E.B. Du Bois.

In this positivist tradition, there has been a major emphasis on the seven congresses that were held between 1900 and 1994 prior to the formation of the AU. W.E.B. Du Bois had been associated with the five major congresses

up to 1945 and has often been referred to as the Father of Pan-Africanism. In the literature, the work of Du Bois and the International African Service Bureau (IASB) are usually highlighted as one of the high points of Pan-African organization. This focus on individuals has dominated the scholarly and Western academic approach to Pan-Africanism with the study of the lives of major figures such as Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore, Marcus Garvey, Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, Bob Marley, Malcolm X, and Walter Rodney. One significant text in this tradition was that of Immanuel Geiss, *The Pan-African Movement: A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe and Africa*. This book drew heavily from the study of great individuals and centralized the role of black males, especially educated black males. It is this body of scholarship that focuses on events, conferences, and great individuals that is emblematic of the positivist intellectual traditions of Pan-Africanism.

One of the major limitations of this positivist tradition is the fact that many African intellectuals had sought to challenge Europeans on their own terms, especially with respect to recreating nation-states in Africa. This was manifest in three areas. The first was from those Pan-African intellectuals who accepted the pseudo-science of social Darwinism and believed that the leadership of the Pan-African movement required a cadre of intellectuals who were as rational and learned as Europeans. This belief emanated from Africans who had been educated in missionary schools. These African leaders wanted to inherit the colonial state without a fundamental transformation of the social and economic relations.[16]

The second challenge for the Pan-African idea was how to navigate the ideas of nationalism and Pan-Africanism. Within the ideas of Western social science, the 'nation' had been the core intellectual concept within which the ideals of sovereignty and self-determination were embedded. Social formations that had existed with millions of people were dominated by external forces at the end of the nineteenth century when European nationalism had propelled capitalist societies in Europe to embrace national boundaries with national language, customs, currency, and national 'market.' In Africa, the great social formations of Ghana, Mali, Songhay, Egypt, the Hausa states, Abyssinia, and Zimbabwe were states with differing nationalities. The transatlantic slave trade disrupted the paths of evolution of these societies. The Pan-African movement was faced with a struggle for self-determination by Africans who lived in multinational and multiracial societies and in Africa where the colonial boundaries had lumped differing nationalities and ethnic groups into one polity. The question of how to organize politically within territories that were not 'nations' posed a daunting problem for the Pan-African thinkers. None of the African states after independence developed a class that could fashion a national project in the form of organizing an economy with backward and forward linkages between production and consumption. Up to the present, when the idea of the nation has been undermined by the

powerful forces of global capital, sections of the intellectual cadre still hold on to this concept and in reality linked up with ethnic chauvinism in the struggles for political power, especially in the era of multiparty democracy. The challenges of managing linguistic and ethnic differences offered new possibilities for real democratic management of societies within Pan-Africanism. The goals of Agenda 2063 unleashed new possibilities to transcend the colonial borders with the economies of scale that could compete in the emerging multipolar world, but most of the leaders who are bent on power within nation-states conceive of the AU as a union of states, in part because they believe in nineteenth-century concepts of nation-state.

The third strand of this positivist tradition was represented by members of a variant of Pan-Africanism that was called Négritude. This Négritude movement was a powerful one among French educated individuals such as Aimé Césaire, Leopold Senghor, Jean Price-Mars, and Leon Damas. Inspired by the black intellectuals of the US-based Pan-Africanists, the writers of this movement dug deep into the African past to celebrate the richness of African cultures in order to oppose French colonial racism. In the words of West:

> Négritude – the fourth agency that helped to cohere pan-African consciousness during the second moment of the global Africa idea was a reaction to what may be called the French imperial quandary. That is the chasm between France's preachment in its colonies and the treatment accorded colonial subjects in the métropole. Brought up to believe they were French citizens who only incidentally happened to be Black, as Blaise Diagne liked to boast, elite Francophone colonial subjects from Africa and the Caribbean – the évolués – often experienced a different reality on arrival in France. Their brushes with racial exclusion were not consistent with previous assurances that color bar was an Anglo-American injustice, in contrast to France, with its meritocratic non racial culture.[17]

After the end of the Second World War, when there were young intellectuals searching for alternative platforms to the French Communist Party and the French socialists who supported colonialism, a number of African students in France formed study groups and organizations dedicated to understanding African history. Cheikh Anta Diop of Senegal and Samir Amin of Egypt were two outstanding Pan-African thinkers who were seeking to develop new methodologies at that time. It was in this environment that Alioune Diop's *Présence Africaine*, was born and published in Paris from 1947. This bilingual journal brought together writers, politicians, and thinkers across the language barrier and served as a platform for Pan-Africanists for over 50 years.

Some of these Négritude intellectuals, however, had been constrained by their emotive link to the French language. This movement was very significant in the period of colonialism and there were many intellectuals who were introduced to the black intellectual traditions of the Pan-African world through this movement but later moved beyond this brand of seeking to solve the identity crisis of individuals. Cheikh Anta Diop, Amilcar Cabral,

Mario Andrade, and Frantz Fanon were among the notable intellectuals who started out in this Négritude tradition but who broke with the romantic notions of the African.

Both Fanon and Cabral later made sterling contributions to a new materialist methodology for analyzing Pan-African questions. They both decried the theoretical deficiencies of the Western traditions of history and the accompanying conceptions of unity. Fanon was especially scathing in his critique of the intellectual and political orientation of the new political leadership after independence. Coming from the deformed racial ideas of Portuguese colonialism, Amilcar Cabral elaborated the need for re-Africanization of the assimilated for cultural liberation. This process was not simply an intellectual exercise since a reconversion of minds—of mental set—is thus, indispensable to the true integration of the people into the liberation movement. 'Such conversion re-Africanization, in our case may take place before the struggle, but it is completed only during the course of the struggle, through daily contact with the popular masses in the communion of sacrifice required by the struggle.'[18]

Here Cabral was putting forth a version of Pan-Africanism that was based on concrete struggles for liberation. The process of liberation was one that required political clarity, organized political activity, and theoretical rigor. Cabral warned about the necessity to move to the level of engagement to be able to give a clear political content to the responsibilities devolving to Pan-Africanists who move from the level of analysis of skin color to grasping the necessities of the struggle against imperialism. It was this struggle against imperialism that influenced the Marxist analysis of Pan-Africanism.

Marxism and Pan-Africanism

This particular epistemological approach to Pan-Africanism had been refined in the period of behavioralism when the Western social scientists wanted to diminish the impact of the anti-imperialist ideas that had been embedded in concepts of self-determination. Pan-Africanism as a body of thought had been influenced during the period of the Great Depression by ideas of class struggles and struggles against imperialism. Thinkers and activists such as Samir Amin, Amilcar Cabral, W.E.B, Du Bois, C.L.R James, Claudia Jones, Kwame Nkrumah, Walter Rodney, Tomas Sankara, and Ngugu Wa Thiongo were Pan-Africanists who sought to use a class analysis to grasp the struggles of Africans and to consider paths forward. We have already referred to the importance of C.L.R. James as a Pan-African activist who was also a Marxist. James had been initiated into the socialist movement and was sensitive to the need to grasp the class and racial content of the Pan-African struggle. His understanding of the interplay between race and class remains one of the clearest formulations of the period of the Pan-African Marxist intellectuals. James had noted: 'The race question is subsidiary to the class question in politics, and to think of imperialism in terms of race is disastrous. But to neglect

the racial factor as merely incidental is an error only less grave than to make it fundamental'.[19]

This formulation was written in the context of the class and racial struggles in revolutionary Haiti. Other Marxists who did not comprehend the centrality of race in the lives of African people dismissed nationalist and Pan-African formations and promoted a dichotomy between nationalism and Marxism. This dichotomy was particularly present in the period of the struggles in Southern Africa where many of the liberation movements identified themselves as Marxist. In the particular case of the liberation movement in South Africa, because one of the movements had explicitly labeled itself as the Pan-Africanist Congress, the ideological and intellectual struggles over the definitions of Marxism and Pan-Africanism were very protracted inside the debates on liberation in Southern Africa. It was only after the African National Congress acceded to political power in 1994 that the leadership embraced an explicit Pan-Africanist outlook and proposed ideas about the African Renaissance.[20] The dichotomy between race and class played itself out in political terms and was fought out practically in the struggles for independence in Angola and Mozambique.

This dialectical interplay between race and class had dogged the Pan-African movement and exploded when the African leaders turned their backs on the struggles of the peoples after independence. Walter Rodney summed up this position of the leaders of the OAU at the time of the Sixth Pan-African Congress in Dar es Salaam when he wrote:

> Pan-Africanism has been so flouted by the present African regimes that the concept of 'Africa' is dead for all practical purposes such as travel and employment. The 'Africanisation' that was aimed against the European colonial administrator soon gave way to restrictive employment and immigration practices by Ivory Coast, Ghana (under Busia), Zaire, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and others, aimed against Dahomeans, Nigerians, Burundi nationals, Malawians, Kenyans and all Africans who were guilty of believing that Africa was for the Africans.[21]

It was only later after the intervention of African feminists that it was understood that Pan-Africanism had to address the intersections of race, class, gender oppression, religious alienation, and sexual identity. However, this is to anticipate. What is important is to grasp the limits of those who attempted to reproduce a brand of Marxism that linked the ideas of Karl Marx to the European Enlightenment and Western social science.

George Patmore's *Pan-Africanism or Communism*, written at the height of the Cold War struggles between Western capitalism and the Soviet conception of communism, sought to define a path for Africans which was independent of both sections of the Cold War.[22] However, because of the racism of many of those who called themselves Communist, George Padmore opposed parties allied to the USSR and became a staunch anti-communist. Ultimately, Padmore became prey to anti-communist sentiments to the point

of supporting the government of Forbes Burnham in Guyana. This was especially significant because this regime assassinated one of the foremost Pan-African thinkers of the twentieth century, Walter Rodney. It was Walter Rodney who sought to bring back the emancipatory ideas of Marx as articulated in the idea of self-emancipation.

Feminism and Pan-Africanism

The third analytical approach to the study of Pan-Africanism has been offered by African feminists who have critiqued the patriarchal basis of previous Pan-African writing and thinking. These African feminists come from a broad range, from liberal feminists and womanists to Marxist feminists and radical black feminists. By the end of the twentieth century, African women had emerged with a new definition of Pan-Africanism that emphasized the humanity of Africans and not simply the independence of states. At the seventh Pan-African Congress in Kampala, Uganda, the women who were present formed the Pan-African Women's Liberation Organization (PAWLO). The struggles against violence, warfare, destruction, and violation had taken the Pan-African discussion to a new level. Feminists or womanists such as Ifi Amadiume, Ulla Taylor, Micere Mugo, Ama Atta Aidoo, and Nawal El Saadawi were developing a radical brand of feminism that was different from liberal feminism. Pan-Africanists such as Ifi Amadiume and Micere Mugo sought to, as it were, reenvision Pan-Africanism. Micere Mugo in her essay on 'Re-Envisioning Pan Africanism: What is the role of gender, youth and the masses', noted that:

> … though not cited in intellectual discourses that have so far come to be the literary canon on Pan-Africanism, in their activism, as well as participation, women were and have always been the heart of the Pan-Africanism's essence, or if you like, substance. My point is that Pan-Africanism may be seen as manifesting itself in two major ways, which are equally important: through the movement itself and through its lived aspects. As a movement, Pan-Africanism has been characterized by fluctuation, registering bouts of life and dormant lulls. On the other hand, its lived aspects, actual substance, or essence, have always remained alive and persistent over historical time. Ordinary people, or the masses, including the majority of African women, have been the key keepers or carriers of this essence.[23]

Mugo's grasp of the lived experiences of the masses within the Pan-African movement builds on the insights of radical black feminists who had theorized the idea of intersectionality; that is to say, the framework that can be used to understand how systemic injustice and social inequality occur on a multidimensional basis. Intersectionality holds that the classical conceptualizations of oppression within society (such as racism, sexism, classism, ableism, homophobia, transphobia, xenophobia and belief-based bigotry) do not act

independently of each other. Instead, these forms of oppression interrelate, creating a system of oppression that reflects the 'intersection' of multiple forms of discrimination. Kimberle Crenshaw and Patricia Hill Collins were two radical feminists who had critiqued the invisibility of black women in classical feminism and brought to the fore the impact of multiple oppression of women of color.[24] Their scholarship critiqued the intersectionality of Pan-African scholars such as W.E.B. Du Bois who had linked class and racial oppression but had omitted gender oppression and oppression of persons of differing sexual orientation. Radical black feminists had critiqued both masculinism in the Pan-African movement and the liberal feminism that preached equality on the basis of the capitalist market. Through the NGO movement and Western foundations this liberal feminism was promoted within Africa and finds expression within the AU in the policy that decided on gender parity for all of the important posts within the Commissions of the AU.

Constructivism

While African intellectuals had deployed the approaches of liberalism, Marxism, and feminism in the era of capitalist globalization, a new approach emerged that was labeled as constructivism. This approach, which starts from an examination of the new 'norms' in international relations after the Cold War, seeks to highlight questions of human rights, peace, good governance, and security without reference to the unequal economic relations of the international capitalist system. For example, Akokpari, Ndinga-Muvumb, and Murithi's book *The African Union and its Institutions* gives some of the background to the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty, but books on the institutional approach diminish the important struggles that had gone inside the movement of the people to reach the point of the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980. Makinda, Okumu, Wafula, and Mickler's *The African Union: Addressing the challenges of peace, security, and governance* deploys the constructivist and institutional approach, comparing the AU to a supranational organization such as the United Nations. The most explicit constructivist study is Edozie's *The African Union's Africa: New Pan-African Initiatives in Global Governance*. The author explicitly stated that she wanted to underscore 'the cultural elements of constructivist international politics.' Constructivists have also noted the role of international institutions as actors in their own right. Hence, there is an inordinate emphasis on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and discourses on civil society.

After the end of the Cold War, US-backed foundations had expended over a billion dollars to shape the intellectual culture of the post-apartheid society in projects to 'aid democracy.'[25] Aiding democracy and 'good governance' were promoted within South Africa and from there to the NGO consultants across Africa. This conception of good governance was to take institutional form in the Peer Review Mechanisms of the AU. Good governance emerged

from the postmodernist intellectual networks and found its way into the documents of the AU. Afro pessimists who wrote reams of books and articles on 'failed states' in Africa influenced a new school of what this chapter will call neo-liberal Pan-Africanism. Primitive accumulation and theft were not seen as aspects of global capital formation and the role of transnational capitalism but presented as aspects of 'politics of the belly'.[26] From this analysis it was concluded that good governance could only come from outside from 'credible' institutions such as the Bretton Woods Institutions. Constructivism as a methodological framework for understanding contemporary Pan-Africanism 'provided the moral and intellectual foundation for the development of a set of doctrines, policies and principles formulated and implemented by various international actors to manage specifically the Third World States and Third World people'.[27]

Other pillars of constructivism and its handmaiden neo-liberal Pan-Africanism were to be found in the articulation of the New African Partnership for Development (NEPAD). NEPAD was presented to Africa after the World Conference against racism in Durban as a product of the initiative taken by four African presidents: General Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of the Republic of South Africa, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria. Pan-African scholars and activists critiqued the assumptions and content that informed the framing of NEPAD in so far as it reflected the mistaken view that the continent's leadership needs to take an accommodative approach to world politics, and to adjust to the realities of neo-liberal globalization. Just as constructivism had emerged as a post-Cold War construct, so neo-liberalism presented the view that Africa needed 'partnership' with 'donors' in order to tap into language of foreign direct investment and capital flows. African scholars, progressive NGOs, trade unionists, and cultural workers distanced themselves from this neo-liberal Pan-African platform that was linked to the Washington consensus.[28]

Ubuntu and the Emancipatory Approach to Pan-Africanism and the AU

The final methodological approach worth considering is that of the emancipatory framework for analyzing society. Walter Rodney had been the foremost theoretician of this position in his work on the self-emancipation of the working peoples. As a scholar, Rodney had been focused on the dignity of labor and elevated the questions of liberation beyond the capture of state power by political parties. He was explicit in his critique of vanguardism; that is, the idea that had developed among Marxist parties that an advanced sector of the intelligentsia and workers should lead the revolutionary struggles. In uniting theory and practice in the Caribbean, Rodney called on the intelligentsia to use their knowledge and skills to advance the struggles of the working peoples. For this task there had to be an explicit history of the working peoples.[29]

In practice, Rodney had demonstrated that Pan-Africanists cannot be racialists and that in order to struggle against racism, one had to be an anti-racist in word and deed. They must become members of social-movement organizations and work with the people in building their capacity for self-organization or self-emancipation. It was the view of Rodney that working people, through the process of struggle, would take themselves from one level of consciousness to the next. This was the core of his conception of self-emancipation.

It is the oppressed who are responsible for liberating themselves. If liberation is conceived, directed, and executed by the usurpers-cum-vanguards of the people and their struggle, the people will end up with new masters on the morning after the 'successful' revolution. Tajudeen Abdul Raheem deepened this conception of self-emancipation when he continuously wrote of liberators who later became dictators. He had written of the leadership of Uganda, then the supposed headquarters of the Pan-African movement that:

> They have stayed so long in power that they have all forgotten their previous jobs, values and visions. From heralding 'fundamental change' they have become apostles of 'no change'. They have become reactionaries, tired revolutionaries exhausting the country they claim they have liberated. The challenge now facing Ugandans is similar to what is facing Zimbabweans, Ethiopians, Eritreans and other post-liberation societies: how to liberate themselves from their liberators. The liberators have become establishment reactionaries blocking future changes … they are no longer changing the system because they are the system. The burden of change is now squarely on the shoulders of another generation. They are no longer part of the solution but very central to the problem.[30]

Here Tajudeen was signaling the need for a new emancipatory basis for Pan-Africanism. Wangari Maathai and Thomas Sankara took this emancipatory framework further by linking humans to nature and saving the planet.

This emancipatory framework has been most manifest in the freedom and creativity of cultural artists such as Fela Ransome Kuti, Paul Robeson, Hugh Masekala, John Coltrane, Aretha Franklin, Tupac Shakur, Tikhen Jah, Alpha Blondie, and Bob Marley. It was Bob Marley who, through both the medium and the message, called for a conception of African unity and human freedom which was linked to the emancipation from mental slavery. Bob Marley, the Rastafarian cultural leader, was another notable Pan-African spokesperson of the century, who wanted to transcend racial divisions with a universal message of African unity, love, peace, and human emancipation. Africans and non-Africans alike embraced his music and ideas and his message of Pan-African emancipation was an inspiration to all of humanity. The challenge for Pan-Africanism in the twenty-first century is to take the conception of emancipation beyond the material plane to grasp the limits of the human potential imposed by the eugenic civilization of the contemporary period.

It was within the anti-apartheid struggle that the articulation of the ideas of dignity along with the identity of personhood brought the philosophy of Ubuntu onto the international stage. There is no literal translation for Ubuntu, but it means 'I am a person whose personhood is achieved through others'. Ubuntu elevated the discourses above the individualism and competitiveness of Western liberalism and conveyed ideas of sharing, reconciliation, and forgiveness.[31] Under the leadership of Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu there had been an effort to take the concept of Ubuntu from the philosophical level to the practical level in the promulgation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

These ideas of sharing, reconciliation, and forgiveness did not come out of an intellectual vacuum but were direct responses to the ideation system that celebrated apartheid, individualism, patriarchy, and domination over nature and the ability of science and technology to solve humans' problems. Liberalism with its handmaidens private property, competition, and survival of the fittest form the core of the philosophy that emanates from the dominant European knowledge system. The progressive Pan-African movement was seeking to inspire a body of ideas that is embedded in values of justice, spiritual health, sharing, truth, and healing. It is at the philosophical level that there are new breakthroughs in grasping the 'Politics of Memory' as a core element in making the break with huge historical atrocities. Wole Soyinka raised fundamental questions on the importance of memory in the pursuit of truth. He addressed the fundamental issue of memory in a collection of essays on the *Burden of Memory and the Muse of Forgiveness.* Here Soyinka was linking the concept of infinity to the concept of memory by arguing that memory is not governed by statutes. However, he pointed out that while memory is not governed by statutes, humans have the capability to lay down the prerequisites for breaking the simplistic narrowness of historical memory as represented in the written texts available at present. This theme of the politics of memory is reinforced in the essay on 'Facing Truth, Voicing Justice', edited by Ifi Amadiume and Abdullahi An-Na'im in the book on *The Politics of Memory: Truth, Healing and Social Justice.*

Background to the Pan-African Movement

> The Africans who came to the United States as slaves started their attempts to claim their African heritage soon after they arrived in this country. They were searching for the lost identity that the slave system had destroyed. Concurrent with this black man's search for an identity in America, has been the search for an identity in the world. Which means, in essence, his identity as a human being with a history, before and after slavery that can command respect.[32]

Thus wrote the historian John Henrik-Clarke in his summation of the importance of grasping African thought and the survival of the philosophies of Africa that maintained a balance between humans, the natural world, and the

wider universe. This balance framed the ways in which Africans understood the universe as a unified spiritual totality. This unified spiritual totality was very different from the crude materialism that was reproduced in the so-called Cartesian rationality of Western European thought.

St Clair Drake had linked the question of history to economic exploitation in his definition, which noted that, 'the idea that Africans and peoples of African descent in the New World should develop racial solidarity for the purpose of abolishing discrimination, enforced segregation, and political and economic exploitation of Negroes throughout the world'.[33]

At the period of slavery when the ideas of inferiority of black humanity became one component of Enlightenment thinking, Pan-Africanism emerged as a force to oppose oppression. These ideas inspired the organized and spontaneous rebellions for liberation. Pan-Africanism was therefore associated with struggles for self-development, emancipation, and freedom from bondage. Thus, in all parts of the planet, Africans responded to the ideas of 'liberty, equality, and fraternity' with a larger vision of liberty and equality than the philosophers of the French and European revolutionary processes. Whether it was within the Maroon communities, in the Quilombos of Brazil or other liberated spaces, the concepts of freedom and liberty were written in the struggles. C.L.R James documented the spontaneous and organized resistance of the rebellions in *A History of Pan-African Revolts.*

The term 'Pan-Africanism' first entered the political lexicon in 1900 when the Trinidadian lawyer Henry Sylvestre Williams, then based in London, called a conference of black people to protest against stealing of lands in the colonies, and against racial discrimination, and to deal with all other issues of interest to blacks. This is the period that Michael West has designated as the second period of the Global Africa idea. However, long before, the intellectual understandings of Pan-Africanism and the spirit of freedom had been manifest in Pan-African movements such as the movement for freedom, anti-slavery, and independence in Haiti. The leaders of the Haitian revolution wanted to organize an expedition to Africa to end the slave trade. The leadership of the Haitian revolution was killed and there was an international conspiracy to crush Pan-Africanism in Haiti which continues to this day. Anti-slavery fighters such as Martin Delaney, Harriet Tubman, Frederick Douglas, Sojourner Truth, and Rev. Richard Allen of Philadelphia linked the future dignity of Africans under slavery to freedom in Africa. In fact, the dominant force that arise came in the form of religious Pan-Africanism in the formation of the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME). The AME became a force although other nineteenth-century Pan-Africanists such as Edward Wilmot Blyden did not believe that Western Christianity could be a vehicle for Pan-Africanism and liberation. Blyden, who was from the Danish colony in the Caribbean that is now called the US Virgin Islands went back to Africa, embraced Islam, and was an organizer for African independence in West Africa. His writings and advocacy influenced many educated Africans who

were mobilized to oppose colonial rule after the Berlin Conference of 1885 to partition Africa. During the nineteenth century, Ethiopianism was the dominant variant of Pan-Africanism. This was the view that the independence and liberation of Africans throughout the world was linked to the continuing freedom and independence of Ethiopia.

Ethiopianism and Vindicationism

Pan-African intellectuals at the turn of the nineteenth century had argued that Africa had its own history, its own past, and its own civilizations. Prior to the twentieth century, this vindicationist tradition was called Ethiopianism. After the defeat of Italy at Adowa (Abyssinia) in 1896, this brand of African vindicationism developed and inspired confidence among Africans at a moment when the eugenic ideas of white superiority represented a dominant stream of Western European thought.[34] Vindicationism, in brief, was a project to negate the whiting out of the African past by European intellectuals. Time and space do not allow an in-depth analysis of Ethiopianism and vindicationism here, but it is important to locate this movement as one of the precursors to the contemporary Pan-African movement. According to William G. Martin and Michael West, 'the vindicationist tradition had its origins in attempts by black intellectuals, writers, pamphleteers, and memorialists to vindicate Africa and Africans, to defend them against their traducers in Europe and the Americas who hurled calumnies about a dark Africa devoid of the African past'.[35] Those who were steeped in the Bible used the words of the Psalms, ('Ethiopia stretches forth her hands unto God') to mobilize a study and celebration of Ethiopia and the great kingdoms of Africa. The writings of St Clair Drake on the vindicationist traditions provide one consistent thread in linking the traditional Pan-African activities of leaders and the mass uprisings of the peoples. In my own text on the Rastafari movement, I have been able to distinguish between the vindicationism of great men and vindicationism at the grass roots.[36]

Garveyism and Vindicationism in the Background of the OAU

As Tajudeen Abdul Raheem observed, in the book that came out after the Seventh Pan-African Congress, that while the years 1900–1919 can confidently be cited as important reference points for the Pan-African movement, the movement stretches back further into the distant history of our people. Indeed, the roots of the Pan-African movement can be traced right back to the ravages of the first European slave ships to touch the African coast, some 500 years ago.

The first Pan-African Conference took place in London, from July 23 to July 25, 1900. Nevertheless, far more important that the meetings were the

organized and spontaneous Pan-African revolts against European colonialism and occupation. Whether it was the resistance of the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik at the Battle of Adowa (1896), the Bambata Revolts in South Africa (1906), or the resistance of Simon Kimbangu (in the regions of Angola and the Congo), Pan-Africanism at the grass roots flourished all over Africa. In the Americas, the highest expression of the Pan-African movement emerged in the forms of Garveyism and the Universal Improvement Association (UNIA). In 1914, Marcus Garvey popularized the ideas of African liberation among the poor and oppressed workers from the banana plantations in Costa Rica to the elevator operators and domestic workers in New York. The Conventions of the UNIA were major milestones in the Pan-African movement. It was at the 1920 Conventions that the Garveyites issued the 'Declaration of the Rights of the Negro People of the World'.

It should be stated that the kind of vindicationism that emanated from intellectuals and religious leaders had been different from the yearnings among the poor share croppers and workers in the USA who yearned for a social power to challenge the oppression of eugenics and Jim Crow. Before travelling to the USA, Garvey had been in communication with Booker T. Washington and had journeyed from Kingston, Jamaica to Harlem, USA to seek support for the UNIA that had been formed in Kingston in 1914. In the USA, the black working population had the social weight, organizational capabilities and political autonomy to elevate any yearning for kings and kingdoms into a concrete social movement based in a specific class. Marcus Garvey, coming from a British colony where anti-colonialism had taken the form of rejecting British imperialism represented by the British monarch, had linked his organization to the need to create an alternative government for Africans.

Garvey had asked himself, he later recalled in his famous book *The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey, or, Africa for the Africans*: 'Where is the Black man's government? Where is his king and his kingdom? Where is his president, his country, and his ambassador, his army, his navy, his men of big affairs?' 'I could not find them', Garvey lamented, 'and then I declared, 'I will help to make them'.[37] This call for a government to defend black people is very different from the present governments in Africa and the Caribbean that do not defend black lives. Garvey's call for the organization of the blacks was what distinguished the Garveyite movement and separated vindicationism at the grass roots from Vindicationism of the current leaders of Africa. This kind of organization was different from the organization of the black educated who had organized in Blue Vein Clubs and looked down on Marcus Garvey because he could not pass the brown paper bag test.

Not only was the UNIA the most efficient organization among Africans at home and abroad, but the *Negro World* newspaper was the most widely circulated African publication in the world. Within a few short years, the Garveyites had built a Pan-African organization with branches in the Americas,

Africa, Europe, and Australia. The Negro Factories Corporation employed over a thousand people in New York. The Black Star Line Steamship Corporation sailed the seas. It hoped to facilitate trade and travel within the African diaspora. 'Negro producers, Negro distributors, Negro consumers!' Garvey exulted, 'The world of Negroes can be self-contained. We desire earnestly to deal with the rest of the world, but if the rest of the world desire not, we seek not'.[38]

Influence of Garveyism on Kwame Nkrumah and the OAU

The Garvey movement was the most vibrant international movement among dispersed Africans in the twentieth century. This global African movement had more than four million members and 400 chartered divisions in over 40 countries. Each local organizing committee had the autonomy to deal with the principal issue in their area or locality. The UNIA was based on the principle of the self-organization of the working people, as an organization developed a militant brand of Pan-Africanism that stressed self-reliance, self-defense, and the liberation of the African continent. The most organized divisions were in New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Detroit, and Chicago. These were sites of intense class and racial struggles, and the Garveyites were organizing at every level of the society. Through the newspaper, the *Negro World*, this organization was able to develop the ideas of African redemption (liberation) in a language that was accessible to the mass of the working people. Africans in Harlem had come from four corners of the African world in the period of the Great Migration (the era of great outpouring that is sometimes referred to as the Harlem Renaissance) and the energies of that political moment created a worldwide movement. The economic activities of the UNIA were based on the right of the poor black workers to control their economic livelihood. Only UNIA members could own stock in UNIA companies.

There are many who associate the Garvey movement with the individual Marcus Garvey and this is consistent with the individualism and nature of celebrity politics in the USA. Hence, in the literature, there are those who will refer to Marcus Garvey as the Black Moses, Redeemer and Uplifter of the Race. There are many who denigrated the Garvey movement as a simple back-to-Africa movement, but the dynamism of this organization transcended the simple proposition of setting up a place for Africans in Africa. The point was that a Garvey settlement in Africa represented a threat to the colonial authorities, especially the French and the British. These governments paid very close attention to the activities of Garveyites and the *Negro World* was banned in most colonial territories. The UNIA was an illegal organization in French-occupied territories and those caught with a copy of the *Negro World* faced life imprisonment. The UNIA searched diligently for a base in Africa

to promote the ideas of African liberation and African unity. The foreign policies of the USA with respect to the UNIA plans for Liberia have been documented extensively. The UNIA called for decolonization in a militant fashion and this inspired anti-colonial forces all over Africa.

Kwame Nkrumah wrote of how the UNIA inspired him and spurred the Pan-Africanist activities in his lifetime. At the All-African Peoples' Conference in 1958, he said, 'Many of them have made no small contribution to the cause of African freedom. Names which spring immediately to mind in this connection are those of Marcus Garvey, and W.E.B. Dubois. Long before many of us were even conscious of our own degradation, these men fought for African national and racial equality'.[39] Nkrumah had spent ten years in the USA and had learnt practically from the organizational capabilities of the Garveyites. One of the important aspects of Nkrumah's contribution to Pan-Africanism was his independence at the intellectual level. Nkrumah was able to draw from the positive contributions of George Padmore, Du Bois, James, and the Garveyites without being dragged into the sectarian debates that were common among those who did not have to grapple with fundamental questions of social and economic transformation.

Influence of Dubois on the Pan-African Traditions

W.E.B. Du Bois had not been shy to embrace Marxism and his epic study of *Black Reconstruction in America* had alerted him to the implications of racism in the USA and how this racism and eugenics held back the economic potential of the country. His tireless activism with the Pan-African movement and his massive intellectual output placed him in the ranks of those who grasped the need for world peace as one component of Pan-African liberation. Even before Lenin had written the pamphlet on imperialism, ('Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism') Du Bois had written on the African roots of the First World War, elaborating on how this war emanated from the unfinished questions of the imperialist rivalries in Africa. Du Bois had noted, 'We, then, who want peace, must remove the real causes of war… We must extend the democratic ideals to the yellow, brown and black people'.[40] Du Bois's contribution to Pan-Africanism and world peace is one aspect of the global Pan-African movement that has not received adequate attention.

Although the first Pan-African Conference had been held in London in 1900, in 1919 Dubois organized what he determined to be the First Pan-African Congress in Paris, February 17–21, 1919. The meeting was held on the sidelines of the Versailles Conference which repartitioned Africa at the end of the First World War. (The former German colonies of Cameroon, South West Africa, Tanzania, and Togo were given to Britain and France under a League of Nations Mandate.) Dubois and the first Congress demanded:

> The Land [in the colonies] must be preserved with its natural resources for the natives, their working conditions must be regarded by the law, and slavery and corporal punishment abolished, as well as forced labour except for criminals. The natives of Africa must have the rights to participate in governments as rapidly as their development will permit with the goal that in due time Africa will be governed with the consent of Africans.[41]

This theme of independence and self-government for Africans dominated the meetings that Du Bois called the Second Pan African Congress of 1921 with sessions in London, Brussels, and Paris; the Third Pan-African Congress held in London and Lisbon, November and December 1923; and the Fourth Pan-African Congress was held in New York in August 1927.

The Fifth Pan-African Congress and the Decolonization Process to the OAU

During the worst years of the capitalist depression, there were many organizational forms of Pan-Africanism; the Rastafari and Kimbangist movements were expressions of Pan-Africanism at the grass roots. Among intellectuals such as C.L.R James, George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumah, Paul Robeson, and W. Alphaeus Hunton, Jr., there were formations such as the International African Service Bureau (IASB) and the Council on African Affairs (CAA). The Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 elicited a wave of Pan-African response all over the world and the Fifth Pan-African Congress grew out of the galvanized and organized Pan-African forces. That Congress had taken place in Manchester, October 15–19, 1945. It took a decisive stand on colonialism and the racism of that period and set in motion the networks for the independence struggles all over Africa.

Amy Ashwood Garvey and Amy Jacques Garvey provided the crucial links between the forces of the UNIA conventions and the intellectuals who had been organized in the Council for African Affairs, the West African Students Union (WASU) and the International Africa Service Bureau (IASB). Shirley Graham Du Bois was another such force who went on to serve the movement with distinction for decades. At the 1945 Congress, the major forces of decolonization were represented. Along with the above named women were such IASB luminaries such as Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore and Du Bois. There was Wallace Johnson (Sierra Leone), Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), Ken Hill and Dudley Thompson (Jamaica). Hasting Banda (Malawi), Peter Abrahams (South Africa), Ako Adjei (Ghana), Jaja Wachukwu (Nigeria), along with D.M. Harper and Ras T. Makonnen (Guyana). There was a very strong representation of trade unions at this meeting.

One of the limitations of the representation of the Congresses up to 1945 was the silencing of the frontline role played by progressive women. Two Africans who were children of one of the main organizers of this meeting

have written a book about the male-centered narrative of the five Congresses. In their book, *In Search of Mr McKenzie: two sisters' quest for an unknown father*, these Pan-African women highlighted the limitations of the male-centered movement when the men were involved in Progressive Pan-African politics in public but in private neglected their families and children. The story of Ernest McKenzie Mavinga, who was a key organizer of the 5th Pan-African Congress, has been repeated by Pan-Africanist women since the publication of this book in order to highlight the fact that in the written narratives of the Pan-African Movement, women have been excluded. Books on the history of the Pan-African Movement by scholars such as Immanuel Geiss wrote black women out of the movement. Women, with the exception of Adelaide Casely-Hayford, Shirley Graham Du Bois, Amy Ashwood Garvey and Amy Jacques Garvey, were virtually invisible in this history, particularly for the first five Congresses. There were, however, several forthright women who participated in these. Some of the black women participants in the early Congresses included Annie J. Cooper, Jessie Faucet, Ida Gibbs Hunt and Mary McLeod Bethune. A group of 21 women of African descent were the main organizers of the Fourth Pan-African Congress held in New York, 1927. Many of them were members of a women's organization called The Circle of Peace and Foreign Relations. Dorothy Hunton, who was the president of this organization, was involved in the struggle for Pan-Africanism for many years.

The Road to the OAU

Vincent B. Thompson in the excellent book *Africa and Unity* outlined in great detail the organizational forms of Pan-Africanism that had emerged in the period of decolonization. In 1957, when Ghana became independent, Kwame Nkrumah sought to give Garveyism and Pan-Africanism a base and on independence night he proclaimed, 'the independence of Ghana is meaningless if it is not linked to the total liberation and continental union of the whole of Africa'. In order to pursue this goal, one year later in April 1958, Nkrumah along with George Padmore called the All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra, Ghana. Pan-Africanism had finally returned home to Africa. At this meeting, 62 nationalist and liberation movements were represented. Among the major Pan-African forces and individuals to be represented at that meeting were Frantz Fanon and Ahmed Ben Bella (representing the Algerian liberation struggles), Tom Mboya and A.M. Babu (representing East Africa and the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa, PAFMECA), T.B. Makonnen, Félix Moumie of the French Cameroons, Roberto Holden of Angola, Modibo Keita (Mali) Joshua Nkomo (Zimbabwe), Oliver Tambo (South Africa), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), and Sékou Touré (Guinea). It was at this meeting that Patrice Lumumba was introduced to the wider Pan-African world by A.M. Babu and the delegation from East Africa that had organized PAFMECA. These delegates from East Africa had stopped off in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) and sought out the Pan-Africanists in the

Congo. When they were introduced to Patrice Lumumba, the delegates from East Africa paid the fare for him to travel to Accra.

Nkrumah had been supporting the idea of positive action in the decolonization process in Ghana but at the All-African Peoples' Conference in 1958 the representatives of Algeria (Fanon) and Kenya (Tom Mboya) argued that the Pan-African movement must support those waging armed struggles for independence. It was at this meeting that the Pan-African slogan emerged that independence would be achieved by any means necessary. Malcolm X popularized these ideas in the context of the Civil Rights struggles in the USA, where he argued that the principles of peaceful non-violence should be replaced with the posture of freedom 'by any means necessary'.[42] In the speech he had said,

> The purpose of our Organization of Afro-American Unity, which has the same aim and objective [as the OAU] to fight whoever gets in our way, to bring about the complete independence of people of African descent here in the Western Hemisphere and, first, in the United States. And bring about the freedom of these people by any means necessary. He called for freedom, justice, and equality "by any means necessary".

Many of the luminaries of the 5th Pan-African Congress went home to join the decolonization struggles being borne by market women, students, workers, poor peasants, traders, ex-soldiers, and intellectuals. Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), Hastings Banda (Malawi), Obafemi Awolowo (Nigeria) were among the more famous of the activists of the Pan-African Movement. It was the expectation of W.E.B Du Bois that once Ghana was independent the Sixth Pan-African Congress would be called in Ghana. At that time Du Bois could not travel because of the harassment and impounding of his passport by the US government. Western imperial forces did not sit idly by as the Pan-African forces deliberated on the full decolonization of Africa.

In the face of the independence of Ghana and the liberation struggles in Algeria and Kenya, France worked hard to break up the Rassemblement Democratique Africaine (RDA) which addressed itself to the independence of French West Africa. After the defeat of France in Vietnam in 1954, the leaders of France decided to make a stand in Africa in order to maintain the prestige of France as a 'world' power. Areas of West and Central Africa which experienced French colonial rule as a unified bloc witnessed the shameless dismantling of those colonial politics which had a large territorial base. Whereas the French had maintained unity for exploitation, the African petty bourgeoisie lacked the capacity to demand both unity and freedom. In 1958, in the face of Ghana's independence, President Charles de Gaulle of France toured the French colonial territories with his famous oui-ou-non (yes-or-no) offer. The offer gave the African colonies a choice; become autonomous states in the French Union or become immediately and fully independent. De Gaulle actively campaigned for the colonies to join the Union, and only Guinea chose immediate independence. However, by 1960 the French Union had failed and the other French colonies soon gained their independence as well. This independence was granted on the condition that

the societies would remain under French cultural, linguistic, military, commercial, and monetary domination. From that time to today these former territories have not been allowed monetary independence and their reserves have had to be kept in France. The Francophone leaders on the whole accepted French domination and they accepted the Balkanization which led to fragments called Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, the Central African Republic and so on. Since independence, little or no progress has been registered with respect to reversing this Balkanization. Leaders such as Félix Moumie and movements such as the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon were eliminated.

Imperial Machinations to Divide the Pan-African Movement

Ghana had become a magnet for Pan-Africanism and leaders such as Martin Luther King and Malcolm X made pilgrimages to Accra. Maya Angelou was another of the Pan-African forces that moved to live in Ghana. While the Nkrumah forces sought to build a coalition for the total independence of Africa, the experience of Britain and France after the Suez Canal nationalization and the subsequent Suez crisis led them to expand their military relations with former colonies. Conferences in Dakar and Nairobi had laid the framework for the constant deployment of imperial troops in Africa, a situation that continues to this day. Nkrumah had been calling for an African High Command and this call ensured that Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, and the USA were committed to a political and diplomatic posture that opposed Kwame Nkrumah and the Pan-Africanists. There was thus realignment among Pan-Africanists in what was to be called the Monrovia Group.

The Monrovia Group had convened in Liberia after the radical call of the meeting of African leaders in Morocco in December 1960. The Casablanca Group had met in Morocco in December 1960, the year of African independence, and called for the immediate political union of Africa. This group included leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Gama Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Sékou Touré of Guinea, Ben Bella of Algeria, King Mohamed V of Morocco, and Modibo Keita of Mali. They met in May 1961 in response to the December meeting of 1960 and their group included leaders from Nigeria, Liberia, Togo, and observers from the French-speaking areas. They argued for slow steps to be taken to lead to African unity. One of the primary aims of this group was to oppose the mobilization of an all-African army after the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in January 1961. Inside the USA, the anti-Communism of the Cold War had created a rupture among Pan-Africanists such as Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois on one side and others such as Alphaeus Hunton who became rabid anti-communist. Patrice Lumumba was also characterized as a communist and Britain, Belgium, and the USA conspired to eliminate him. The USA, France, Belgium, Portugal, Germany, Italy, and South Africa worked hard to break the cohesion of the Pan-African forces and unleashed intellectuals and operatives to undermine the Pan-African movement. It was in the wake of this imperial resistance that leaders such as Ben Bella, Nkrumah, and Keita were removed.

The OAU After the Elimination of Patrice Lumumba

In the spirit of compromise between the groupings dedicated to Pan-Africanism, the OAU was officially launched in May 1963 in Ethiopia. The momentum and energy of the poor ensured that despite the compromises, the one fact that held the Global Pan-African movement together was the commitment to end colonial rule in Africa. This took practical form in the establishment of the OAU Liberation Committee with its headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The OAU, through the Liberation Committee, supported the process of decolonization in Southern Africa but for all intents and purposes, the OAU after 1963 acted against the interests of African Unity. This is obvious in the compromise of the different groups which could not agree on how to respond to the clear external manipulation of the Congo after those representing the interests of Western mining capital murdered Patrice Lumumba in 1961. Kwame Nkrumah in his book *Challenge of the Congo* exposed the work of imperialism to derail the efforts of the progressive forces in the embryonic OAU to come to the support of the people of the Congo, which was destabilized and later renamed Zaire.

When Patrice Lumumba was waging the heroic struggle against imperialism, it seemed as if those governments which supported real independence would form an alliance to remove the stooges of external control. It was in response to the imperial military activities in the Congo that Nkrumah called for an Africa High Command. The Western intelligence agencies stepped up their activities against Africa and Pan-Africanism to the point that they conspired to undermine the very efforts of the Pan-Africanists to support Patrice Lumumba. Major General Alexander, the British officer who commanded the Ghanaian troops in the Congo had been deployed by the government of Kwame Nkrumah to support the United Nations against the rebellion from Katanga and the Belgian military that had opposed independence. General Alexander has written for posterity the intrigues between the British and US diplomatic personnel in the Congo to ensure that Lumumba was not supported. His memoirs pointed out that he responded to the dictates of the British government rather the government of Ghana that he was supposed to serve.[43] Not only did the Ghanaian troops oppose the Pan-African ideas of the Nkrumah Government but the officers who served in the Congo were identified as future allies of the West and were recruited to be the lynchpin of the military coup that removed Kwame Nkrumah in February 1966.

At the time of the coup, many on the left had blamed Nkrumah for the deterioration of the internal political situation, but after US documents on the coup were declassified, it became clear that the US government had been determined to depose Nkrumah before he managed to achieve a united African government. As it turned out, the US government and some of its allies, including Britain, had financed, masterminded, and guided the coup from a distance.[44] Recent research work and the findings of three commissions of investigations have shown the depth of the West's hostility towards decolonization efforts. This hostility had resulted in the killing of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold. The book by Susan Williams (*Who killed Hammarskjöld?*) provides a clear analysis of the range of powerful forces in the USA, France,

Portugal, Britain, Belgium, South Africa, and the Congo who were complicit in the conspiracy to eliminate the Secretary General of the UN. This same alliance was strengthened to oppose the OAU and this was manifest in the wave of coups d'état to extinguish leaders and organizations supporting genuine Pan-African freedom. Younger scholars can juxtapose the history of Patrice Lumumba and Kwame Nkrumah against the elevation of Mobutu, who was supported by Western powers to play an influential role in the OAU for over thirty years.

After the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the poor of Africa were very willing to lend support to those who were fighting the white mercenaries backing Mobutism. Malcolm X, Mohamed Babu, and Che Guevara had met at the United Nations in November 1964 and agreed to mount an international campaign to reverse the imperial domination of the Congo, which was being stabilized and renamed Zaire. The landing of US, French and Belgian troops in the Congo in 1964 at Stanleyville (present Kisangani) was an affront to those seeking liberation everywhere. By the time assistance was forthcoming from as far away as Cuba to avenge the murder of Congolese independence, the OAU was crippled by the idea that no popular movement could receive support from other African countries. This was expressed in the idea of 'non-interference in the internal affairs of a member state'. In practical terms, this protected African dictators from criticism and ensured that the basic rights of the African people were trampled upon from Malawi to Chad and by the rule of the Emperor of Ethiopia.

Because the Congo in the heart of Africa was so strategic for the freedom and independence of Africa, imperialism used this territory as a base for destabilization in North, East, West, and Southern Africa. While the OAU spoke of non-interference, the Zairian army invaded Angola in 1975 along with the South Africans to prevent the full decolonization of that society. The legacies of Mobutism are still being felt by the people of Angola, who have not seen peace in their society for 500 years.

Mainstream Efforts to Discredit Pan-Africanism

The speed of the decolonization exercise had caught the Atlantic planners by surprise and for a short while, these planners and intellectuals from the North sought to define Pan-Africanism and determine who could articulate clear Pan-African ideas. When Joseph Nye, Dennis Austin, Colin Legum, and David Apter turned to writing about Pan-Africanism and the Pan-African project at the height of the Cold War struggles, it was the view among mainstream scholars that Africans were too emotional to write 'rational' accounts of the Pan-African movement.[45] Immanuel Geiss went so far as to note that studying Pan-Africanism from authorities such as George Padmore and W.E.B. Du Bois would lead to confusion. Geiss, the German authority on Pan-Africanism, maintained, 'Any attempt at theorizing without a more detailed or objective knowledge of its history than offered by the subjective

accounts and interpretations by Padmore and Du Bois is bound to increase the prevalent confusion or even malaise about Pan-Africanism'.[46]

Western Intellectual Onslaught Against the Pan-African Project

Although the formation of the OAU had demonstrated that Africans could work together and speak with one voice on questions such as the future of colonialism and apartheid, the voluminous literature that was produced in the 1960s was dominated by the recurring theme of the OAU as a failed institution.[47] The standard texts that had been produced by mainstream academics used the structural functional approach to provide detailed assessments of the OAU structures: the Assembly, Council, Commissions and Secretariat along with the legal implications of the Charter of the OAU. A 700-page bibliographical work on the OAU by Gordon Harris on *The Organization of African Unity*, in the International Organization Series, exposed the intense effort of Western societies seeking to understand the OAU. Foundations and think tanks in North America and Western Europe expended millions of dollars seeking to define the frameworks and standpoints for African and Pan-African studies. The recently published 9 volume study on Southern African liberation struggles has now provided new resources to grasp the depth of the work of the liberation forces from 1960 to 1994.[48] Pan-African scholars and activists who had taken an even-handed approach to the limitations of the OAU were always aware that the real demands and sacrifices of the freedom struggle were the glue that held the OAU together.

The Pan-African intellectual contribution complements the earlier struggle that had been undertaken by that generation of scholars who had been able to influence UNESCO to undertake the General History of Africa project. These fronts in the Pan-African struggles provide an antidote to the Afro pessimism that had been peddled by Western intellectuals and their financiers. As Michael West and William G. Martin observed, the growth of the Africanist establishment in the USA and the downgrading of the organic Pan-African intellectual culture in African communities in the Americas were not accidental. They drew attention to the role of the Federal government of the USA and intelligence agencies in seeking to delegitimize the study of Africa from the point of view of those dedicated to ending racism in education and the role of specialists who were to be later called, Africanists. West and Martin argued that:

> in the United States the prevailing school of Pan-Africanist scholars was denied access to the fruits of the growth of support for the study of Africa. This devolution of Africa into the hands of 'Africanists' was by design and not as many have recounted the result of the natural growth of a new school of thought. This hidden history is easily illustrated: take for example the actions of the renowned founding father of African Studies, Melville Herskovits. While his

> early work could engage Pan-African scholarship, he was later to boast of his role in helping to deny funding to 'negrophile' W. E. B. Dubois's Encyclopedia Africana project, while offering the ASA's full assistance, in his capacity as its first president to the CIA's Allen Dulles.[49]

Embedded in the body of scholarship that examined legal questions concerning the efficacy of the OAU were issues of method and orientation. Western foundations supported methodological workshops and conferences to provide resources for intellectuals who could and would proclaim that Pan-Africanism was narrow and not objective. Mainstream academics differed with Pan-Africanists over whether the struggles of that period were over communism or the institutional and structural racism of international capitalism. These differences exploded at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association in Montreal in 1969.[50] Progressive Pan-African scholars were very aware of the *Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum 39* (*Secret*) (NSSM 39), that had recommended that the, 'whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists'.[51]

This secret analysis, which served as the basis for the extended review of Southern African policy which went on in Washington between April 1969 and February I970, had been a direct response to the black liberation struggles in the USA and the intensified anti-colonial struggles in Southern Africa. While scholars such as Anthony Lake had critiqued the racist assumptions of NSSM 39, they had failed to grasp the significance of Kissinger and his entourage on the academic work and methodological frameworks for engagement with Africa.[52] For US policymakers, the OAU was being misled by Pan-Africanist and communist sympathizers, thus the full range of US policy whether in areas of commerce, culture, education or finance was to isolate those supporting the liberation movements and stepping up engagement with the white regimes. This option was carried to its dismal failure under Chester Crocker, who had been one of the members of the staff of the National Security Council when NSSM 39 was being crafted.[53]

In this context of overt racism in the foreign policy of the European powers, the Pan-African forces aligned with the anti-racist and peace forces that had formed the rump of Afro-Asian solidarity following the Bandung spirit. Africans spoke with one voice at the United Nations on questions of racism and colonialism, and Pan-Africanist forces assumed moral and intellectual leadership within the OAU so that, despite impressive investments in the intellectual output of Western scholars on the OAU, comparatively small efforts such as those of practicing African diplomats like Salim Ahmed Salim, Mohamoud Sahoun, and C.O. Amate served to provide valuable information on the OAU and Pan-Africanism. *Inside the OAU*, *Pan Africanism in*

Practice was an early insider account and since the 1980s Salim, who had served as the Secretary General of the OAU, has written his memoirs.[54]

Militarism and the OAU

Not only did the leadership of the OAU support dictators who were able to sit and drink at so-called summits with impunity, but also the ordinary African was punished for believing that Africa was for the Africans. By 1975, the OAU summit had been dominated by military men who had seized political power from the first independence leaders. After 1960, there had been about 21 military transfers of power with soldiers holding the reins of power in societies such as Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Gabon, Congo, Congo Brazzaville, Central African Republic, Libya, Burundi, Somalia, and Uganda. The clause of non-interference allowed the militarists to consolidate the colonial frontiers while defending the interests of foreign monopolies. Virtually all of the leaders of the independence movement had paid lip service to regional freedom and unity of the whole continent. However, in the process of negotiating independence, these leaders reneged on a cardinal principle of Pan-Africanism, namely, 'that the people from one part of Africa are responsible for the freedom and liberation of their brothers and sisters in other parts of Africa, and indeed, black people everywhere were to accept the same responsibility.'[55]

The interests of French capitalism, which became important in the Congo, had prevailed in West Africa when France sought to create non-viable entities that required French military presence to maintain the ruling elements in power.[56] French military bases dot the African continent and continue to prevent the consolidation of the independence process. It was in East Africa that the legacy of the failure of the OAU was to be the most profound, with Kenya chosen as the beachhead for Western security interests in Africa. Ex-ambassadors of the USA have boasted in their memoirs about how they worked to undermine the OAU committee, which had been created to mobilize support for the Lumumbist forces.[57] Idi Amin of Uganda had emerged from the machinations of the British and US Americans to prevent the consolidation of the Lumumbist forces. As a military leader who had fought against the Land and Freedom Army in Kenya, Amin (like Jean Bedel Bokassa and Mobutu Sese Seko) extended the role of force in politics inside Africa. The election of Idi Amin to become the chairperson of the OAU in 1975 was one of the lowest periods in the history of that organization. When Ugandan forces under Amin invaded Tanzania in order to divert attention from the wars of liberation in Southern Africa, the other dictators were silent. However, when Tanzania acted to repel this incursion and to support the removal of Amin, the dictators invoked the clause of non-interference in other states to tie the hands of Tanzania. The struggles for liberation and independence had reached a decisive stage in 1974 when the struggles for independence

in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau had forced dynamic changes in Southern Africa and in Europe.

Dar es Salaam 1974 and the Turning of the Tide for the Full Unification of Africa

Every major study on the OAU reiterates the mantra that it was formed in 1963 as a compromise between the Casablanca and Monrovia Groups. Whatever the differences, there were a number of issues that kept the global Pan-African movement together. Two of these issues were the outstanding struggles against racism, apartheid, and colonialism and the struggles against Jim Crow and apartheid in the USA. From the moment of the Brown vs Board of Education decision until the COINTELPRO efforts to crush the black liberation movement in the USA, the struggles for basic rights in the USA became a focal point of the international Pan-African Movement. By the year 1970, the forces of African Liberation in Africa and in the global African family coalesced to organize the 6th Pan-African Congress in Dar es Salaam in June 1974. The themes around which the 6th Pan-African Congress was called included total independence and self-determination, unity and self-reliance of Africans in all parts of the world. Central to the theme of self-reliance and self-determination was the question of advancing a command of science and technology. At that historical moment, Tanzania was the headquarters of the OAU Liberation Committee and Tanzania represented the principal example of self-reliance. The largest delegation of Africans outside of Africa at that Congress was the North American delegation and the forces of the black liberation movement in the USA that had been organized under the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC).

The ideological leadership of the liberation movements from Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, and South Africa ensured that the outcomes of the Sixth Pan-African Congress were focused on material, military, financial, and moral support for the last struggles against colonialism and minority rule. Henry Kissinger, Chester Crocker, and France colluded with Portugal and the racist apartheid regime to break the solidarity of the Sixth Pan-African Congress. States such as Ivory Cost under Félix Houphouët-Boigny along with Zaire coordinated support for the apartheid regime in South Africa and promoted the diplomatic spin of 'dialogue' with South Africa.

From the proxy states allied to Washington and Paris came spokespersons who wanted to speak for the liberation movements. The declaration of the Sixth Pan-African Congress on the support for armed struggles exposed the ideological lead taken by the liberation movements. However, the anti-communist position promoted by France, the USA, and South Africa sought to create deep divisions and the depth of this division was manifest in the position of the Pan-African Movement over the question of the independence of Angola. Sections of the Pan-African Movement carried a racial line

and argued after 1975 that the Angolans should not ally with the Cubans to fight against the invading South African Army. The battles for the independence of Angola had threatened to split the OAU. When an extraordinary meeting of the OAU was called to decide on the recognition of the Angolan government after November 11, 1975, the decisive intervention of Nigeria to rebuff Henry Kissinger and the USA moved the question of solidarity among Africans to a new level. At the emergency summit of the OAU on January 11, 1976, the Nigerian head of state delivered a moving speech arguing that Africa had come of Age. In his analysis of this decisive moment in Pan-African history, Patrick Wilmot noted that 'This was the most militant speech ever delivered by a Nigerian Head of State, and contributed significantly to the eventual recognition of the Angolan Government by the OAU later in the spring of 1976. It also situated apartheid not just as an emotional bogeyman but as part of western imperialist strategy on the rest of the continent'.[58] When Kissinger had undertaken a tour of Africa to persuade African societies to support the position of the apartheid state, Murtala Mohammed humiliated Kissinger by refusing to see him on his African tour or even to give his plane permission to land when it was already on its way. A few weeks later on February 13, 1976, Murtala Mohammed was assassinated in an attempted military coup.

In the period between 1976 and 1980, the foreign policy of Nigeria decisively supported the front-line states of the OAU to the point that the government of Nigeria nationalized the assets of British Petroleum to intensify pressures against Britain to end support for the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia. After the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the African leaders convened in Nigeria to hammer out the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) incorporating programs and strategies for self-reliance development and cooperation among African countries. In response, the World Bank issued the Berg Report in 1981 and went into overdrive to obstruct economic integration. Elliot Berg, the World Bank functionary, argued in this report that the reason why African economies were in difficulty was the role of the state in the economy. It was argued that there should be an emphasis on 'liberating the forces of the market' in order both to revive exports and to improve the incomes of the rural agricultural populace. Structural adjustment and IMF conditionalities strengthened foreign capital to the same extent that they weakened African governments.

The Defeat of Apartheid and the Revitalization of Pan-Africanism

The defeat of the apartheid army at Cuito Cuanavale in 1988 laid the foundations for a new lease of life in the Global Pan-African Movement. The end of apartheid coincided with the fall of the Berlin Wall and a wave of struggles to end military dictatorship across Africa. In 1990, Namibia acceded to

independence, and in 1990, the apartheid regime unbanned the liberation movements (the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress) and released Nelson Mandela. This was the context in which the 7th Pan-African Congress took place in Kampala, Uganda, April 3–8, 1994. It was originally scheduled to take place in December 1993 but had to be rescheduled due to lack of sufficient funds to host the meeting and the logistical problems that arose from that lack of funds. More important than the shortage of funds were the ideological differences over the future of the Pan-African movement.

There were questions as to whether it was possible to hold a Pan-African Congress in Uganda. Should African governments be invited? Who was an African? Could activists and opponents of governments take part in the Congress? In fact, there were two motions for the 7th Pan-African Congress. Apart from the Kampala Initiative that was driven by A.M. Babu and Karrim Esack, there was the Lagos Initiative for the 7th Pan-African Congress spearheaded by Naiwu Osahon of Nigeria. Tajudeen Abdul Raheem, who had been recruited by Babu to serve as the core organizer for the Congress, has written about the twists and turns between the varying factions that dogged the event. This Congress had been called under the broad theme of 'Facing the Future of Unity, Social Progress and Democracy'. Those who believed that governments should not be invited to the Congress stayed away. However, the very same governments, except for 17 of the 53, boycotted. Ghana, Libya, and Namibia provided important resources for the 7th Pan-African Congress. Most of the governments that had leaders such as Mobutu of Zaire feared that the Congress would be dominated by revolutionary groups opposed to dictatorial governments.

Once the Congress convened in April with over 2000 delegates, the ideological and political struggles in the wider Pan-African world exploded at the plenary sessions. The government of Sudan sent one of the largest delegations and sought to direct the proceedings by opposing the participation of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). Joseph Garang of the SPLM represented the ideas of self-determination that was coming out of that section of the Pan-African movement.

The other major question that was hotly debated was the question of who is an African. There was one tendency within the Congress that argued that Pan-Africanism should only include black Africans along with the African descendants in the wider African family outside of Africa. This tendency opposed what they called continentalism and the inclusion of Africans, for example, of Indian descent (such as Gora Ibrahim, who was the spokesperson for the Pan-African Congress of Azania). However, in the final declaration it was agreed that all those who accepted the goals of African freedom and were committed to this while living in Africa were Africans. In many ways this was a reaffirmation that the Pan-African movement could not oppose racism and replace the opposition to racism with anti-white ideas. In this sense the Congress reasserted positions taken earlier by Kwame Nkrumah and Nnamdi

Azikiwe. At the 2004 Pan-African intellectual festival, Professor Tony Martin reasserted this position by quoting Azikiwe.

A multiracial politically unified continent is an inescapable goal in the twenty-first century and one that Nnamdi Azikiwe endorsed. In a 1961 speech reprinted in *Présence Africaine*, Azikiwe asked, 'When we speak of Pan-Africanism, what do we exactly mean?' He answered, 'I would like to speak of the peoples of Africa in general terms to include all the races inhabiting that continent and embracing all the linguistic and cultural groups who are domiciled therein'. He continued, 'It is true that the roots of Pan-Africanism are, to a large extent, racial, but the evolution of the idea itself took different forms in the last four centuries so that today Africanism cannot be restricted to racial factors.'[59] Progressive women who had understood how women's bodies became markers of race and ethnicity were at the forefront of ensuring that the Progressive Pan-African position entailed an intersection of oppressions, race, class. gender, economic exploitation, and sexuality.

The Pan-African Women's Liberation Organization and the 7th Pan-African Congress

Many of the discussions of the 7th Pan-African Congress were recorded in the book *Pan-Africanism: Politics, Economy and Social Change in the Twenty First Century*. Tajudeen Abdul Raheem, who was elected as Secretary General of the Secretariat established in Kampala exposed the differing ideological positions of the members who comprised the International Preparatory Committee of the Congress. He and A.M. Babu had worked diligently to ensure that despite wide differences, the Congress could accommodate those who supported the progressive traditions of Kwame Nkrumah, Malcolm X, Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney, Amy Jacques Garvey, Bob Marley, and Patrice Lumumba. Betty Shabbazz, the widow of Malcolm X, was one of the many prominent leaders who articulated the need for women's leadership in the Pan-African movement. This Congress reaffirmed the question of the full unification of Africa and established a permanent secretariat of the Pan-African movement to advance the cause of African liberation and the total elimination of colonialism. The Congress took place in the same month that the historic elections took place in South Africa in 1994 to end formal colonial rule and elect Nelson Mandela as president.

In the meetings of the preparatory committee there had been intense debates about the history of the Pan-African Movement and the silencing of women within the movement. Progressive women reminded the participants of the history of women in the movement and the lessons that should be learnt from the continued exclusion of women from political spaces. Questions of citizenship, inheritance, bodily integrity, rape, child marriage, domestic violence, and the brutalization of women using ideas about tradition were mooted and many of the women present were involved in the

preparatory meetings for Beijing 1995. The progressive forces of the IPC and the progressive women worked hard for the convening of the Women's Congress within the Pan-African Congress. This Women's Congress was held for one full day at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda and out of this women's meeting emerged the Pan-African Women's Liberation Organization (PAWLO).

Organizing women in the context of Pan-Africanism was not new. On July 31, 1962, the Conference of African Women (CAF) was created at Dar es Salaam in Tanganyika, now known as Tanzania. Out of that meeting emerged the first Pan-African Women's Organization (PAWO). In July 1974, one month after the 6th Pan-African Congress, there was another Conference of African Women which was held in Dakar (Senegal). It was in Senegal that July 31 was designated African Women Day. This division between Senegal and Tanzania in 1974 represented some of the same divisions that had existed between the Casablanca and Monrovia Groups. In Senegal at the time, there were leaders who were unsupportive of armed struggles against apartheid.

The major limitation of PAWO, however, was that by the time of the growth of the international women's movement, it had become the forum for the wives of the very same repressive leaders who were oppressing African women. Miriam Babangida, wife of the dictator Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria, was the poster child of the first wives club that sought to speak on behalf of oppressed women. Her organizational vehicle for manipulating the principles of women's liberation was Better Life for Rural Women. PAWLO emerged from the ranks of the progressive women and men at the 7th Pan-African Congress. Fatima Babiker Mahmoud from Sudan was elected PAWLO's first president, and in her address to the Congress she held that, 'As African Women, we share a common history. We have similar challenges to face and a better future to look forward to. On this basis, it is important to stress our similarities rather than differences if we are to achieve any meaningful change'.[60]

PAWLO was established to implement the women's action plans that had come out of the resolutions of the Congress. PAWLO brought together African women from the continent, from the oppressed societies in the USA, Europe, and Asia in a forum of their own for the first time in the history of Pan-African Congresses. The resolutions of the PAWLO Congress agreed to bring together women with the objective of liberation in a common program and sustained action of work for improving the situation of African women.

OAU, Pan-Africanism, and Genocide

If the OAU had been founded on the principles of Pan-Africanism, it soon forgot the history of the Black Holocaust which dispersed millions of Africans across the Americas, Europe, and Arabia. The OAU had neglected to fully represent the interests of the Africans overseas and this silence was to repeat

itself with the holocaust that took place in Rwanda. It was significant that during the ninety-day period of genocide, not one African leader spoke out or condemned the mass killings.

Two issues are worth examining in this respect. In the first place, the OAU had allowed international non-African bodies to make millions of dollars out of a new humanitarian industry called 'looking after refugees'. Under the principles of Pan-Africanism, it is impossible for an African to be a refugee in the continent of Africa. One of the future tasks of the AU will be to ensure the free movement of people across Africa. The problem of refugees had simmered in Central Africa for more than thirty years and the dictatorship in Rwanda had kept power by violence and manipulating ethnic identity. When a guerilla force took up arms against this dictatorship in a just war, it was the very same Mobutu (of Congolese infamy) and France which moved to save the murderers. In April 1994, when organized genocide was going on and the bodies of over a million persons appeared on TV screens across the world, the OAU called upon those fighting to end genocide to enter into dialogue with the authors of the genocide. This would be similar to the forces fighting in the Second World War being told to make peace with Hitler and Hitlerism. No serious person would have made or heeded such a demand. What was required was the removal of the genocidists. However, at the moment when the murderers were facing defeat, France intervened in a so called humanitarian mission (amply supported by puppet states) to protect the murderers.

The second issue relates to how the new discourses on conflict management were used as a cover to embolden repressive regimes. There were scholars who became experts at conflict resolution in Africa and produced reams of papers on Africa as a conflict zone.[61] African scholars grouped around the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) responded to alert policymakers that the conflicts had arisen from the very nature of Africa's Balkanization and the inherited social and economic structures. From the outset, the OAU had incorporated mechanisms for mediation, arbitration, and conciliation. During the anti-colonial struggles, the OAU liberation committee distinguished between conflicts in societies such as Burundi, Rwanda, and Chad and the wars of national liberation in Angola, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. It was in the closing days of apartheid when the OAU formally strengthened the Commission for the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993). This apparatus was severely tested by wars in the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Sudan, and the Central African Republic.

On his attendance at the first meeting of the OAU, Mandela spoke firmly of the need for Africa to act more decisively:

> Even as we speak, Rwanda stands out as a stern and severe rebuke to all of us for having failed to address these interrelated matters. As a result of that, a terrible slaughter of the innocent is taking place in front of our very eyes. Thus

> do we give reason to the peoples of the world to say of Africa that she will never know stability and peace, that she will never experience development and growth, that her children will forever be condemned to poverty and dehumanisation and that we shall forever be knocking on somebody's door pleading for a slice of bread. We know it is a matter of fact that we have it in ourselves as Africans to change all this. We must, in action, assert our will to do so. We must, in action, say that there is no obstacle big enough to stop us from bringing about a new African renaissance.[62]

Pan-Africanism and the Reparations Question

The release of Nelson Mandela from incarceration in 1990 had been a major milestone in the global anti-racist struggles and it was in this international context that the OAU took up the issue of reparations. The global African community had always linked reparative justice to African freedom, but the majority of leaders of the OAU were fearful of the repercussions of calling for reparations for the transatlantic slave trade. In 1991, for the first time, the issue of reparations was placed before the OAU with Resolution 1339, approved by the Council of Ministers of May 27–June 1, 1991. By this resolution, the OAU (under the chairpersonship of Salim Ahmed Salim) had decided to establish a group of eminent Africans and Africans of the diaspora in the relevant fields to set out clearly the extent of Africa's exploitation, the liability of the perpetrators, and the strategies for achieving reparation.

Between February 24–28 of the following year 1992, the Council of Ministers of the OAU adopted Resolution 1373 and mandated the Secretary General to form appropriate sructures to support the committee of eminent personalities. The same Resolution thanked Chief Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola of Nigeria for his commitment and its shares in favor of reparations. With Resolution 1391, adopted by the Council of Ministers of June 22–28, 1992, it calls on the committee of eminent personalities and the member states to give their full support to the measures undertaken by the OAU in reparations for the wrongs done to Africa with the exploitation and the slave trade. This was the genesis of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) of 12 appointed by the OAU to mobilize and organize educating Africans at home and abroad about reparations and reparative justice. The original chair of the EPG was the Nigerian politician cum businessman Chief Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola, who was later elected president of Nigeria. Other members were the Nigerian historian J.F. Ade Ajayi; Professor Samir Amin of Egypt; US Congressman R. Dellums; Professor Josef Ki-Zerbo of Burkina Faso; Mme Gracha Machel, formerly first lady of Mozambique and later wife of Nelson Mandela. Others were: Miriam Makeba; Professor M. M'Bow, former director-general of UNESCO; former president A. Pereira of Cape Verde; Ambassador Alex Quaison-Sackey, former foreign minister of Ghana; and the Jamaican lawyer/diplomat Dudley S. Thompson. Of these twelve eminent persons, the three who were the most active and attended international meetings and conferences such as the World

Conference against racism were J.F. Ade Ajayi, Ali A. Mazrui, and Dudley Thompson.

The momentum for reparative justice had taken the form of a major Pan-African Conference on Reparations in Abuja (April 27–29, 1993) sponsored by the Committee of Eminent Personalities and by the Reparations Commission of the OAU. After deliberating, the Abuja Proclamation called 'upon the international community to recognise that there is a unique and unprecedented moral debt owed to the African people which has yet to be paid the debt of compensation to the Africans as the most humiliated and exploited people of the last four centuries of modern history'. It further urged:

> the Organization of African Unity to call for full monetary payment of repayments through capital transfer and debt cancellation … Convinced that the claim for reparations is well grounded in International Law, it urges on the Organization of African Unity to establish a legal Committee on the issue of Reparations … Serves notice on all states in Europe and the Americas which had participated in the enslavement and colonisation of the African peoples, and which may still be engaged in racism and neo-colonialism, to desist from any further damage and start building bridges of conciliation, co-operation, and through reparation …',[63]

These demands for capital transfer, debt cancellation, skills transfer and direct power transfer formed an important component of the scholarly activism of Ali A. Mazrui in the 1990s.[64] This reparations campaign was so feared by the international powers that when the chairperson of this group, M.K.O. Abiola, was elected president of Nigeria in 1993, he was prevented from taking office. He was to die in custody in Nigeria five years later in 1998. The death of Abiola like that of Murtala Mohammed, derailed Nigeria and prevented it from playing its real role in the Pan-African movement.

Ali Mazrui, a member of the Committee of Eminent Personalities and a Pan-Africanist who had become embroiled in the debates about Afro-Arabs with Professor Wole Soyinka, was one who drew from the Rodneyite tradition and became a force in the Global Pan-African Movement. Mazrui had this to say of his involvement in the case for reparative justice: 'In 1993, I embraced the reparations cause seriously not only as an assignment of the OAU entrusted to us but also as an intellectual challenge. After all, issues like colonial damage-analysis or comparative slavery were of academic value independently of any activism'.[65] One of the limitations of the work of this period was the paucity of real scholarly work on reparative justice. Two main publications by Ali Mazrui about reparations did not reflect deep and committed research.[66] These texts however served to inspire wider research and scholarship that later appeared in books by Hilary Beckles (*Britain's Black Debt: Reparations for Slavery and Native Genocide*) and Edward E Baptist (*The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism*). What has emerged from these new studies is the major work that still

has to be done to roll back the ideas about 'modernity' and the civilizing role of Western capitalism. It was this global pressure for reparative justice that pushed the South African leadership to host the World Conference against Racism (WCAR) in Durban in 2001.

Imperialism became alert to the progressive character of the Pan-African movement that was informed by reparative justice and Pan-Africanism of the people. Using pliant citizens of African descent within the imperial centers (especially Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell),[67] the USA worked hard to oppose the World Conference Against Racism and to ensure that the program of action would not be supported among governments. It was in Latin America that the reparations forces among the Africa descendants' caucus inspired new forms of mobilization within the politics there. There were many efforts of the opponents of Pan-Africanism in Africa but by far the most far reaching was to co-opt the young and articulate in the NGO fad that became the weapon of neo-liberalism in Africa. Neo-liberalism opposed governments of all kinds and this anti-government position served those who wanted to end state expenditures on social services.

Within the Pan-African movement, the question of how to organize against oppressive governments gave way to the call for an end to big Congresses and instead to support the people's movements in the streets, the villages, and townships all over the Pan-African world. By the end of the twentieth century, the progressive wing of the Pan-African movement had merged with the reparations movement, progressive workers' movements, the anti-dictatorship movement, the peace movement, the anti-globalization movement, progressive women's forum and the environmental justice movements. The HIV/AIDS pandemic dictated that there would be a strong movement for health care in the Pan-African world and organizations such as the Treatment Action Campaign developed new techniques of mobilization and organization to oppose the Western pharmaceutical companies that wanted the HIV/AIDS virus to be a death sentence for Africans. Pan-Africanists such as Wangari Mathai of the Green Belt Movement embodied the maturation of such forces and one new Pan-African front that emerged in the twenty-first century was the Pan-African Climate Justice Movement. It was in Latin America in societies such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Brazil that the anti-racist and climate justice forces were making an impact on the progressive movements internationally.

In the period after the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the necessity to intervene to stop genocide gained momentum and this was reflected in the speed of the formation of the AU after the leader of Libya took the initiative in September 1999 to call an extraordinary summit for its creation. After the Congress in 1994, Tajudeen Abdul Raheem had worked in the Secretariat at Kampala and organized initiatives for peace and unity. Mobilizing around the Nkrumah's principle of Don't Mourn, Organize, Tajudeen travelled up and

down the continent calling for implementation of the Congress resolution that Africa should be united now.

End of Apartheid and the Pan-African Movement

The Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi had been a direct beneficiary of the changed political circumstances in international politics after the end of apartheid. Nelson Mandela, then the president of South Africa, had intervened directly to end the diplomatic and political isolation of Libya in the aftermath of the controversy over the bombing of a Pan Am plane in 1988 (over Lockerbie, Scotland). It was at the extraordinary meeting of the OAU called on September 8, 1999 at Sirte, Libya that African leaders committed themselves to the formation of the AU. The Sirte Declaration had been the culmination of several efforts and actions undertaken by those forces in Africa which had been pressuring the OAU Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the General Secretariat of the OAU.

The formation of the AU has rekindled conceptions of reconstruction and renewal that had been derailed by the neo-liberal policies of structural adjustment after 1980. Strident efforts towards unity had been undertaken with the boldest articulated in the Lagos Plan of Action, adopted in April 1980. Elsewhere, African scholars have painstakingly outlined the reality that the structural adjustment programs of the international financial institutions emerged as a direct response to the elaborate plans for African economic recovery that had been premised on the establishment of an African Economic Community by the year 2000.[68] Working under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Africa, CODESRIA and other authentic bases of intellectual inquiry, African scholars outlined the destructive impact of the World Bank policies. These intellectuals sought to reflect their concern for the toiling masses and identified with their aspirations for a better life. It was within this context that economists worked hard to pose alternative conceptions of economic cooperation and reconstruction. This had culminated in the signing of the Treaty in Abuja, Nigeria, establishing the African Economic Community (June 3, 1991). This reality that the Abuja Declaration (African Economic Community Treaty) formed the background of the AU is restated in Article 1 of the Lome Treaty establishing the Constitutive Act of the AU.

The Abuja Treaty had spelt out the framework for the mobilization of African human and material resources to break the cycle of plunder and exploitation. The Abuja Treaty had come into force in May 1994 when the required number of instruments of ratification had been deposited. It was the convergence of the Abuja Treaty along with the African Charter on Human and People's Rights that emerged in the Constitutive Act of the AU. Even though there is no explicit reference to the Charter in the Constitutive Act, legal scholars and human-rights activists have been at the forefront of the call of the OAU to intervene to prevent the violation of humans in Africa.

The OAU Charter on Human and People's Rights and the Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action on Human Rights were among the instruments adopted by the Organization to promote human rights. Underlying these instruments was a determination to ensure that Africa responds to the challenge of observing, promoting, and protecting human rights and the rule of law.

Thus far, the dominant literature on the birth of the AU has used the laundry list and institutional approach that does not adequately chronicle the long historical struggles inside the Pan-African movement. Even with this institutional approach, there is clear effort to exclude the work of the struggles for reparations. The AU represented the culmination of decades of struggle and work after the formation of the OAU in 1963 that had gone into the following plans:

- Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (1980).
- The African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Nairobi 1981) and the Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action on Human Rights.
- Africa's Priority Program for Economic Recovery (APPER)—1985: an emergency program designed to address the development crisis of the 1980s, in the wake of protracted drought and famine that had engulfed the continent and the crippling effect of Africa's external indebtedness.
- OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes.
- The Charter on Popular Participation, adopted in 1990.
- The Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC)—1991: commonly known as the Abuja Treaty.
- The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993).
- Cairo Agenda for Action (1995): a program for relaunching Africa's political, economic, and social development.
- African Common Position on Africa's External Debt Crisis (1997): a strategy for addressing the continent's external debt crisis.
- The Algiers decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (1999) and the Lome Declaration on the framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes (2000).
- The 2000 Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation: establishes the fundamental principles for the promotion of democracy and good governance in the continent.

The Libyan Question, the Unification of Africa and the Pan-African Movement

Nelson Mandela worked hard after 1994 to oppose genocidal violence and genocidal politics in Africa. As a leader, who had been designated as a 'terrorist', Mandela mediated to end the sanctions against Libya. In appreciation,

the President of Libya called the extraordinary meeting of the OAU at Sirte in 1999 and decided to set in motion the number-one resolution of the 7th Pan-African Congress that there should be an AU. Within two years, the Constitutive Act of the AU was written and ratified, and the AU came into being in 2002. The major difference between the AU and the OAU was the right of the AU to intervene in cases of genocide, gross violation of human rights, and crimes against humanity. By 2004, there was the establishment of the Pan-African Parliament but the main political leaders of Africa were afraid of this becoming a representative body.

One of the major advances of the AU over the OAU was the incorporation of the Global African Family (called the diaspora) as the 6th region of the AU. There were mechanisms set in motion to work out representation for the African descendants outside of Africa in the AU. The AU Commission's Citizens and Diaspora Directorate (CIDO) was the institutional body where the AU was supposed to manifest its diaspora initiatives. CIDO's goal is to hold regular dialogs with diaspora communities around the world.[69] This question of the African descendants outside of Africa became an avenue of intense struggle. The AU operatives in their preoccupation with the remittances sent back to Arica decided to make a distinction between the 'historic' diaspora and the 'contemporary Diaspora.' For the AU bureaucrats, there was a distinction between Africans who migrated as students and economic migrants and decided to settle in foreign lands. These 'diaspora' Africans were to be distinguished from those children of Africa who had been kidnapped from Africa and made chattel slaves and victims of other forms of servitude. Those who supported neo-liberal Pan-Africanism only viewed Africans overseas as the source of remittances and remained silent when Africans were killed on the streets of Brazil and the USA. It was in this new situation of global capital where the Pan-African voices inside Africa for free movement and for a full unification converged.

The Pan-African movement of the streets and villages did not wait on governments to give them the rights of freedom of movement. Traders and workers all across Africa claimed freedom of movement and opposed the maintenance of the borders erected at Berlin. Ngugi Wa Thiongo gave coherence to the ideas of Pan-Africanism calling for the unity of the people when he drew on the long traditions of the emancipatory framework and echoed the call that the united Africa must be a union of African peoples and not just of heads of states. The peoples and their respective languages and culture which are arbitrarily separated by colonial boundaries should be united internally. This idea of internally borderless continent becomes even more necessary when border communities are closely examined. The finds from such examination would show that a considerable number of border communities on either side of borders within Africa have a common spiritual leader, history, and culture. With this understanding, it is easier to observe, for instance, that the unification of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia is a union of cultural

relatives. This idea of shared community can be extended 'from the Cape to Cairo' and 'from Kenya to Liberia'.[70]

Beyond the Grand Debate

Cultural workers and creative artists from Africa and in the global African family strengthened the bonds of the Pan-African Movement. The enemies of Pan-Africanism and reparative justice went overboard to demonize the leader of Libya and to represent the goals of African unification as if this came from the head of Gaddafi, discounting the long struggles for African redemption and unity since the period of Marcus Garvey and Kwame Nkrumah. The demonization and opposition to the unification of Africa was seen on full display in 2007 when there was the grand debate about forming the Union Government and the United States of Africa. Under the Constitutive Act of 2001 there had been timetables for the development of an African Monetary System, the African Central Bank and the Common Currency.

Just as in the division between the Casablanca and Monrovia Groups, there were some leaders who called for a gradual approach to establish the Regional Economic Communities (REC) as opposed to continental Communities of Africans. This faction of the African leadership argued for gradual unity. Whatever the differences, however, the political leaders of Africa were brought to an awareness of the plans of external forces when NATO invaded Libya in 2011 under the pretext of humanitarian intervention. The military destruction of Libya and the assassination and humiliation of President Gaddafi created a new sense of urgency for the rekindling of a strong Pan-African movement. From 2012, there were meetings and consultations about the strengthening of the AU. The AU Commissioner Jean Ping was replaced by Dr. Nkosasana Zuma of South Africa, and it was the energy from the new leadership that produced Agenda 2063, the bold plan for the full union government of Africa.

Pressures for Clarity of the Goals of the Pan-African Movement

Just as how, at the 7th Pan-African Congress in Kampala, there had been other initiatives such as the Lagos Initiative, so after 1994 there were parallel initiatives for the Pan-African Congress movement. The governments of South Africa, Brazil, Nigeria, Ghana, Jamaica, and Senegal held numerous meetings that brought together intellectuals, economists, and other branches of the Pan-African Movement. The government of Senegal hosted a major meeting of intellectuals and thus was followed up in Brazil in 2006. It was at that meeting that the African dignitaries came face to face with the militancy of the Brazilian youth. For over 50 years, Abdias Nascimiento had been toiling within Brazil to expose the fallacies of racial democracy there. By the time

of the World Conference against Racism in 2001, the Brazilian delegation had matured to be one of the most militant fronts of the Pan-African movement. No government could ignore the potential of over 100 million African descendants in Brazil. The Workers Party under Lula da Silva attempted to make small concessions by establishing quotas and affirmative action policies, but not even these concessions were bold enough. In 2016, the hard right and racists in Brazil mounted a movement against any concessions to blacks and called for the affirmation of the most retrograde forms of white supremacy.

The AU and the Call for Agenda 2063

In 2009, Tajudeen Abdul Raheem, the General Secretary of the global Pan-African movement passed away. Even before his passing, the future of the Pan-African Secretariat was in limbo because of the nature of the politics of Uganda. This politics polluted the goals of the movement and diminished the global Pan-African movement in the eyes of many. Wars in the Congo and military clashes between the armies of Rwanda and Uganda in the Democratic Republic of the Congo exposed how far these leaders had departed from the goals of peace and reconstruction. At the 2012 meeting of Pan-Africanists to remember Tajudeen Abdul Raheem in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, there was a committee established to work to build the 8th Pan-African Congress in Accra, Ghana and to link the movement back to the Nkrumah goals of full unification and emancipation. This goal was reaffirmed in 2013 when the AU celebrated its 50 years of unity and explicitly determined to bring back the Pan-African Movement and Pan-African agenda into the AU. These meetings in Addis Ababa brought out the reaffirmation of the vision of the AU as that of, 'An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena'.[71] A series of meetings were held with the surviving members of the International Governing Council and it was agreed to request the government of Ghana to host the 8th Pan-African Congress and for a relocation of the Secretariat to Accra, Ghana. By June 2014, there was an agreement on the Call for the 8th Pan-African Congress emanating from the International Governing Council (IGC).

Stressing the mantra of the 7th Pan-African Congress that there should be mass-based organization, the call went out to all organizations and individuals to participate at the Congress scheduled to be held in Accra, Ghana. In the new push for remobilization, there was a definite effort to build on the most radical aspects of the Pan-African experiences, noting that in keeping with the broad character of all previous congresses, from 1900 to 1994, this one would be open to all shades of opinion, groups, and individuals in the whole Pan-African world. In addition, African governments on the continent and in the diaspora would participate on an equal footing with other delegates. The AU and its organs and institutions as well as regional economic blocs and platforms would also participate.

Recognizing the AU vision of 'Peace, Prosperity and Unity', the broad theme of the Congress was 'The Pan-African world we want: building a people's movement for just, accountable and inclusive structural transformation'. Although there were 19 different agenda items mentioned in the call, there was considerable overlap. Democracy, governance, popular democracy, African citizenship, justice, social justice, reparative justice, ecology, and environment are all mentioned in at least two separate agenda points. The Pan-African Agenda can be broadly clustered under four themes. At the top is the political unity of the African continent under a union government. The global rights for African peoples within and outside Africa is another consideration. These rights encompass: basic necessities of life, for instance, housing and education; freedom of religion and expression; freedom from racism; reparative justice; and gender equity of women vis-à-vis the humanization of the male gender. The agenda also seeks to end imperialism and all forms of colonialism in Africa and its diaspora such as the Caribbean. The agenda also seeks to demilitarize Africa and its peoples. Further, it strives to project progressive Pan-Africanism as opposed to neo-liberal Pan-Africanism which invariably strengthens the marginalization of the bold efforts of African peoples towards self-determination and self-governance. Additionally, the Agenda promotes sustainable infrastructure for the transformation of Africa and environmental repairs. The focus on infrastructure comprises canal systems, roads, bridges, ICT connectivity and energy. Environmental repair concerns the elimination of every form of environmental racism of the current social system and seeks to reverse the destruction of Planet Earth.[72]

This position of seeking to safeguard the progressive cultural heritage of the African peoples came up against the realities of leaders who were bent on suppressing that same progressive tradition. The signing of this MoU with the Pan-African Movement had come one year after the same AU embraced the European Union (EU) Pan-African Program because despite signing the MoU with the Pan-African movement, the AU Commission was dominated by operatives of states who paid lip service to the goals of Agenda 2063. After the global capitalist crash of 2008 and the downturn in African economies subsequent to sharp decreases in commodity prices, there were stirrings of the people all over Africa with the uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan opposing neo-liberalism. The peoples of Africa were responding every day to the global capitalist crisis by stating that the goals of Agenda 2063 cannot be achieved with the crop of current leaders. Some youths sought to flee Africa by crossing the Sahara Desert and embarking on an even more dangerous journey across the Mediterranean Sea.

Genocidal economic relations in the South Sudan, presidents for life, idle threats to withdraw en masse from the International Criminal Court (ICC), war as a business in the so-called war against terror, and the illicit capital flight from Africa preserved the interests of a class in Africa that opposed

real progressive Pan-Africanism. Non-payment of dues by member states of the AU represented a statement about their loyalties. Working together with the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the AU had established the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa headed by former South African president Thabo Mbeki. This panel in its Report found out that in the previous thirty-year period, Africa had lost about $1 trillion in capital flight and that illicit financial flows were draining the continent of needed resources.[73] Instead of seeking to implement the recommendations of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, the operatives of the African states signed a partnership agreement with the EU for the EU to promote its Pan-African program. The fact that over 70% of the AU Commission is funded by imperial states was one indication of the infrastructure of capital flight. These 'donors' actually have the intelligence on how much money is being shipped abroad by African leaders, hence they seek to keep up the fiction of providing 'aid' to Africa.

In 2014, the EU brought out their own program for Pan-Africanism and launched the EU-Pan-African partnership. This partnership is downplaying the aspirations of Agenda 2063 and in its place organizing meetings all over Africa on 'good governance' and 'security sector reform.' According to the EU Commission:

> The Pan-African Programme provides dedicated support to the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership and is the first ever EU programme in development and cooperation that covers Africa as a whole. It supports projects with a trans-regional, continental or global added-value in areas of shared interest, and offers new possibilities for the EU and Africa to work together.[74]

This EU Pan-African program constituted a major front for neo-liberal Pan-Africanism. African leaders who were afraid to establish a Specialized Technical Commission on Reparations were only too ready and willing to embrace programs for 'partnership.' In the process of coordinating plans for a joint EU–Africa partnership, the conservative forces within the AU pushed for the readmission of Morocco into the AU. Morocco had departed the OAU in 1984 over the question of the recognition of the Polisario movement by the OAU. However, after the Eurozone crisis, Morocco launched a diplomatic and political offensive to rejoin the AU, using its allies in France, Senegal, and Ivory Coast. In January 2017, Morocco was readmitted to the AU.

Conclusion

After the 1935 invasion of Abyssinia by the Italians, there was urgency within the Pan-African Movement to build the independence movement. The 5th Pan-African Congress brought an alliance between the differing forces to inspire the decolonization process. Many of the leaders of the 5th Pan-African Congress went home to their societies and reneged on one of the cardinal

principles of Pan-Africanism, the free movement of people and the goal of uniting Africans at home and abroad. In his document written on the eve of the Pan-African Congress, Walter Rodney wrote that the 'African petty bourgeois leadership since independence has been an obstacle to the further development of the African revolution'. Rodney himself was assassinated in Guyana by a political leadership which claimed to be at the forefront of Pan-African ideals. By 1980, Walter Rodney had made the clear point that Pan-Africanism could not be based on exclusion, because everywhere in the Pan-African world there were Africans living in multiethnic and multiracial societies.

In South Africa, a new philosophy of Ubuntu emerged to anchor the Pan-Africanism of the twentieth century to affirm the position that Pan-Africanism was linked to human emancipation. This concept of the liberation of humanity became even clearer with big companies claiming the right to patent life forms and the convergence of biotechnology and nanotechnology giving corporations power to invent life. The South African leadership had claimed moral and intellectual leadership of the Pan-African movement after 1994 but the euphoria about an African renaissance had been overtaken by xenophobia when the South African state demonized other Africans who moved to South Africa after 1994.

At the end of the Cold War there had been a resurgence of radical Pan-Africanism with the progressive African women at the forefront. The struggles against gender violence, warfare, destruction, sexual harassment and violation had taken the Pan-African discussion to a new level. With the emergence of fundamentalist forces which wanted to control the minds and bodies of women, there was also the clarity of the need for a secular Pan-African movement that was rooted in deep African spirituality. When a militarist group such as Boko Haram emerged in Nigeria and promised to sell young girls into slavery, the progressive women were reenergized and began to build new Pan-African networks against oppressive governments and the men and women who legitimized them. It is this emancipatory approach to Pan-Africanism that is informing one section of the forces that carry forward the Pan-African movement. The challenge for Pan-Africanism in the twenty-first century is to take the conception of emancipation beyond the material plane to grasp the limits of the human potential imposed by the eugenic civilization of the contemporary period.

In 2011, the people of Egypt and Tunisia launched a new phase of popular struggles for global rights. Since these interventions, external forces have doubled down to hijack the liberating processes in Africa. War situations, the arming of militias, and external forces plundering Africa dominated the news out of Africa, while among Africans overseas the rise of racism, xenophobia, and exclusion demanded new forms of solidarity in the struggles for peace and social justice. The call for the 8th Pan-African Congress offered new opportunities to rebuild the emancipatory traditions.

There were many new and creative forms of organizing and communicating that emerged in the period of the information revolution. After the destruction of NATO, the imperial forces doubled down to harness the tools of social media to create confusion, doubt, and insecurity among young people. Conservative and militaristic leaders employed tools of regionalism, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation to disorient the producing classes. Schools and places of learning became centers for intimidation and obscene competition while religious zealots tormented communities with divisive energies. It was from Latin America, with more than 150 million Africans, that there came a call for a new movement for emancipation and transformation. The social forces that are coalescing for the rebuilding of the Pan-African Movement and Pan-African Congress are seeking to learn the positive lessons of the movement in order to build a strong force for the full freedom of Africa in the twenty-first century.

Notes

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74. See the Pan African Program of the European Union, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-cooperation/pan-african-programme_en.

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CHAPTER 42

Africa and Human Rights

Edward Kissi

The historiography of 'human rights' is a catalogue of debates over some contentious issues. They include the definition of human rights, the history of human rights thought, the historical experiences and cultural traditions from which our contemporary ideas of human rights come, the degree to which human rights are universally shared values or the extent to which they are specific to each human society, the circumstances under which human rights became the cornerstone of today's international laws, and how human rights laws are applied in global affairs.[1] While this chapter draws upon some of these debates, it takes a different approach to its study of human rights in African history. It focuses rather on how human rights ideas were used as the frameworks of protest against colonialism and the organizing principles to promote social justice and racial equality, in the early years of political independence in Africa. It also looks at how human rights were perverted for political and ideological purposes in the early postcolonial period, and how human rights are viewed and discussed in contemporary Africa.

This chapter argues that despite claims by some scholars that Africans have their own separate concepts of human rights, human rights are actually universal ethical values that exist in all human societies. The current global human rights narrative, often presumed as a Western liberal ideology, gained global prominence in the aftermath of the state-organized atrocities that characterized the Second World War. As this war, in which colonial subjects from Africa had participated, exposed 'national sovereignty' as the legal refuge of totalitarian states, 'human rights', codified in legal documents, became the

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moral and juridical guardian of the vulnerable and powerless. The postwar internationalization of human rights had a catalytic effect on the transition from colonial statehood to postcolonial nationhood in Africa. African nationalists protesting against the inhumane character of colonialism drew upon global values of human dignity now validated in international human rights declarations to make their voices heard. However, no sooner had the euphoria of political independence subsided than the nationalist leaders who came to power on the crest of human rights advocacy began to violate the norms they had previously upheld. That is Africa's paradoxical embrace of human rights ideas.

Human Rights and Their Defenders and Critics

There is no consensus among scholars and activists about what human rights are by definition, although there is broad agreement about their significance in human societies. The Ghanaian philosopher Kwasi Wiredu has described 'human rights' as 'claims that people are entitled to make … by virtue of their status as human beings'.[2] In his book *Human Rights*, the British political scientist Michael Freeman identifies human rights as a set of norms outlined in international documents for the protection of vulnerable groups against all forms of violence and 'unjust customs'.[3] The Canadian human rights activist Michael Ignatieff sees human rights as 'the language through which individuals have created a defense of their autonomy against the oppression of religion, state, family, and group'.[4] The debate over the definition of human rights tends also to devolve into ideological controversies over whether the idea of human rights as claims that people make or entitlements that their humanity grants them is shared across all cultures in the world (universal) or is peculiar to particular groups and their historical experiences (relative).[5]

At the heart of this ideological tussle is the claim by some scholars that today's global human rights norms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of December 1948, for instance, emerged from 'Western' (that is European and US) 'liberal values' and that these values emphasize the freedom or 'autonomy' of the 'individual' human being over the aspirations and prescriptions of the larger society or ethnic community upheld in 'African culture' as more important than the individual. In an influential paper written on this subject in 1982, the US political scientist Jack Donnelly argued, controversially, that 'the concept of human rights is an artifact of modern Western civilization'.[6] In Donnelly's view, respect for the 'dignity' of human beings (human dignity), an ethic that all societies share, is not the same as individual liberty, freedom, and autonomy (human rights), a fundamental norm that exists only in Western cultural and political traditions.

Those who have disagreed with Donnelly's arguments have often offered their own equally controversial claims that since every group has its own culture and values there could be no common or 'universal' ideas of human

rights that all human societies share.[7] The Kenyan political scientist Makau Mutua has described human rights as a Western liberal canon masquerading as universal values. He sees human rights as 'a philosophy that seeks the diffusion of liberalism and its primacy around the globe …'.[8] Mutua argues that in the historical experiences of Europe and the USA, 'the language of rights' developed in the context of 'claims against the state' for the purpose of seeking 'individual remedy for a wrong'. That, in his view, contrasts sharply with the 'African language of duty' of the individual to the community or larger society of which that individual is a part.[9] On this basis, Mutua concludes that the 'Western' notion of human rights as 'individual rights' is 'ill-suited' for Africa because it originated from 'a specific historical context in the Western world' that was different from the historical, political and social realities of Africa.[10] The Ghanaian philosopher Kwasi Wiredu and political scientist Josiah Cobbah agree with Makau Mutua on the issue of 'rights' accruing to a 'human' or 'person' by virtue of that person's membership in an ethnic community to which that human owes duties. Cobbah has argued that human rights should be discussed 'within a cultural context'.[11] On account of that, Cobbah shares Mutua's view of human rights as a set of values rooted in Western liberal cultural thought. Like Wiredu, the cultural context in which Cobbah discusses human rights is the Akan people of Ghana's subordination of the rights of individuals to 'the requirements of the [ethnic] group'.[12]

The Nigerian political scientist Oritsegbubemi Anthony Owoye has, however, expressed great skepticism about 'the claim' that a unique or distinctively 'African' concept of human rights exists. In his view, human rights are ideas about human nature and 'human nature is universal'.[13] While one cannot make sense of human nature without paying attention to the 'elements of culture' and the 'various contingencies of human life' that shape human dispositions, there is almost universal agreement 'among many human rights theorists' that 'human rights are basic entitlements owed to human beings simply because they are human beings'.[14] Owoye laments the tendency in the literature on 'African perspectives on human rights' to present 'a family of practices and ideas' held by one ethnic group in Africa, in one part of the continent, as the 'African' 'conception of human rights'.[15] What is odd about this approach to human rights thought, in Owoye's view, is that if one looks at notions of humanity and dignity solely in terms of one's existence in one's ethnic community, then what happens to the status of that person if he or she moves outside of the community of which he is a part to another place or different community? Owoye wonders whether under the so-called African conception of human rights 'human beings who have relocated to unfamiliar cultural terrain thereby lose their standing as human beings'.[16] It appears from this critique that the more important debate over human rights is not necessarily what they are and where they come from, but why they are important. As Owoye notes, we care about human rights because they protect us against policies and practices that infringe on our human dignity.[17] This

author agrees with Owoye and adds that different people in different societies may place different emphases on what they need to maintain a functioning human community. Central to this universal desire for social order is the recognition of and respect for the humanity and dignity of all human beings irrespective of where they may live. Any act that tramples upon the dignity of any human being, individual or group, anywhere, is a violation of human rights.

Scholars may disagree over the centrality of the 'individual' or 'group' in human rights theory. However, even those who argue that there are different ways in which 'Africans' and 'non-Africans' perceive and promote these rights agree that human rights are values that confer dignity and respect on every human being and, therefore, should be guaranteed in every human society. In fact, while Mutua contests what he calls the 'singular obsession with the universalization' of Western cultural models in human rights thought, he concedes that at its core, human rights are about 'the reduction' or 'elimination of conditions that foster human indignity, violence, poverty and powerlessness'.[18] Michael Ignatieff is therefore correct in arguing that human rights have become a global phenomenon 'not because [they serve] the interest of the powerful', but 'because [they have] advanced the interests of the powerless'.[19] As a value system, human rights in all their manifestations (right to life, right to work, freedom of speech, respect for one's identity, etc.) offer a secular alternative to often discriminatory religious beliefs and social traditions in a culturally diverse world.[20]

Colonialism as Perversion of Human Rights

An historical understanding of human rights in postcolonial Africa should not be rooted in a conceptual debate over what human rights are, and which cultural traditions produced them. Rather, it should start with analyses of the continent's collective experience of the most egregious violation of the human rights and dignity of people (colonialism) and how colonized peoples used human rights norms as instruments for their own liberation. Historian Dennis Laumann has offered one of the clearest definitions of colonialism and examined its abusive features in African history. Colonialism, Laumann argues, is 'the seizure and occupation of territory … belonging to one group of people (the colonized) by another group of people (the colonizers)'.[21] As Laumann observes, this seizure and occupation of territory also led to the settlement of the colonizers on the captured territory. In many parts of Africa, from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth, the colonizers were Europeans who not only seized and occupied African lands, but also administered them for the principal purpose of exploiting their natural resources. It was in that process of conquest and exploitation, and resistance to both in Africa, that European colonizers unleashed the gravest of human rights abuses on their colonial subjects.

Colonialism is a central theme in Raphael Lemkin's original idea of genocide as the gravest threat to human rights.[22] The architect of the concept of genocide saw colonialism as involving the deliberate destruction of the economic existence of a subjugated group, its political institutions, religious beliefs, languages and other ways of life and the replacement of these foundations of the subjugated group's dignity, identity, and survival with the colonizers' culture and social, political, and economic institutions. Lemkin, therefore, viewed colonialism as a form of cultural genocide; a permanent destruction of a group's culture or way of life even if the colonized group that embodied that culture was not physically annihilated.[23] He believed that genocide, fostered through colonialism, was the ultimate threat to human dignity, the essence of human rights.[24] Thus, notwithstanding what some scholars might celebrate as the benefits of colonial rule in Africa (the introduction of European languages as a means of unifying diverse ethnic groups around common languages, the introduction of roads, railways, telegraphy. and missionary schools as 'modern' infrastructure, among other things) European colonialism in Africa was marked by relentless assaults on the dignity of colonial subjects and their identity as human beings.[25]

Scholars of African history have long documented the violent wars and other forms of physical killing and oppression that characterized European colonial rule in Africa, as well as that of the white settler regime in South Africa. However, it is only in recent years that those who have studied colonial violence have started to draw instructive connections between these atrocities and human rights. Colonial atrocities that have received this kind of analytic attention include the genocide perpetrated by the German colonial administration against the Herero and Nama ethnic groups in the German colony of South-West Africa, the organized and deliberate killing and maiming of individual colonial subjects in the Congo Free State (administered as the personal property of Belgium's King Leopold II), and the brutal suppression of anti-colonial protests in the British colony of Kenya, among many abuses of the dignity and humanity of colonial subjects.[26]

Scholars who see genocide (the intentional destruction of a group) as the gravest assault on the right to life as a fundamental human right agree that the first genocide of the twentieth century took place in the German colony of South-West Africa in 1904. Since 1884, when Germany laid claim to South-West Africa as a colonial possession, German settlers had seized the land and cattle of the pastoralist Herero population and constructed railway lines through Herero pasturelands and arbitrarily captured and imprisoned Herero men. As these colonial policies undermined the foundations of Herero humanity and dignity, the Herero people rose in armed rebellion in January 1904. Historian Benjamin Madley has noted that the subjugated Herero rebelled 'in an attempt to end their dispossession, impoverishment, and political subordination'.[27] The German reaction, as Laumann has characterized it, was 'comprehensive and vicious'.[28] In the racial mindset of colonial

administrators, in the age of empire building in Africa, the African was viewed as a savage bordering on subhuman. The German authorities in South-West Africa saw their response to the Herero rebellion in such racial terms. With about 10,000 European recruits, led by Lieutenant General Lothar von Trotha, this mercenary force hunted down and annihilated the Herero as a group. Von Trotha's army chased the Herero into the Omaheke desert, with deadly consequences of starvation and poisoned lakes and rivers that could give the fleeing Herero any chance of survival. The Herero suffered these outrages against their dignity with the Nama pastoralist community in the colony who had also rejected German colonialism and resisted 'European religious, cultural, and political influence'.[29] When the German response to both the Herero and Nama protests was over, 'up to 60,000 Herero and 10,000 Nama [had] lost their lives'.[30]

The German annihilatory response to colonial subjects protesting against inhumane conditions was no different from the British reaction to the Kikuyu protest against the seizure of their lands in the British colony of Kenya, in East Africa, in 1954. The British East Africa Protectorate, as Kenya was initially called, had become a British colonial possession in the late nineteenth century. British men and their families saw this East African colony, a prized colony of fertile lands, as their home. This idea required an appropriation of land, much of it belonging to the predominantly peasant Kikuyu ethnic group, for the benefit of British settlers. It was this colonial policy of land grab and forced labor that brought British settlers and the Kikuyu people into what Caroline Elkins has described as 'one of the bloodiest and most protracted wars of decolonization' in the twentieth century.[31]

British colonial policies in Kenya affected many individuals and groups but, as Elkins has observed, no group experienced so intense a 'transformation' of its dignity and identity that colonialism engendered as the Kikuyu of Kenya.[32] The dispossession of the Kikuyu of their land undermined the foundations of Kikuyu individual and group survival. In human rights terms, the Kikuyu notion of personhood and dignity that revolved around land possession took a severe hit. A Kikuyu needed land to cultivate and obtain the necessary wealth to marry, have a family and be able to perform his duty to his society and, thus, maintain a dignified status. A Kikuyu woman too needed land to grow food-crops and sustain her family without which no Kikuyu woman could be deemed 'an adult'. In short, 'A Kikuyu could not be a Kikuyu without land'.[33] It is worth emphasizing that the Kikuyu of colonial Kenya shared their conception of human rights and dignity in relationship to land ownership with many ethnic groups in other parts of colonial Africa, including the Akans of the British colony of Gold Coast.[34]

For the British, colonialism preserved the rights and dignity of British settlers in Kenya and Britain's status as a global power. For the Kikuyu, the preservation of British rights and Britain's status meant an assault on theirs. The advancement of the dignity of British settlers in East Africa at the expense of

the Kikuyu on their own land provoked what has been called the Mau Mau rebellion. The Kikuyu rebels or their sympathizers had burned, mutilated and hacked some British settlers and their Kenyan allies to death in a manner that, by any understanding of human rights, constituted a grave infraction on human life and dignity.[35] Mau Mau killing methods with machetes and other tools had inflamed British settler anxieties and driven 'local Europeans into a frenzied state of terror'.[36] As Elkins has noted, Kukuyu resistance to British settler colonialism and the response of the settlers 'left blood on the hands of all involved'.[37] Historian David Anderson has also described the Mau Mau rebellion, and the British response to it, as a 'story of atrocity and excess on both sides'.[38] Nonetheless, in 'scope and scale', Kikuyu atrocities paled in comparison to the response the British colonial authorities unleashed.[39]

Colonial violence revealed the limited value that European colonial administrators placed on the dignity and humanity of their colonized subjects. In Africa, these kinds of violent assaults on the dignity of the colonized also took place in 'Southern Rhodesia, British Natal, the Belgian Congo and Italian Ethiopia'[40] Colonialism's 'wholesale condemnation of everything African', its inherent racial discrimination and 'constant humiliation and oppression' of Africans generated, as Adu Boahen has observed, 'a deep feeling of inferiority' and 'the loss of a sense of human dignity among Africans'.[41] Viewed against this 'psychological impact' of colonial atrocities, resistance to colonial rule, in all its forms, could be understood as political and social protests undertaken to restore the human rights of colonized subjects.

Anticolonialism as Restoration of Human Rights

Opinions differ among scholars about the extent to which decolonization represented a continental social movement for human rights.[42] Nevertheless, because colonialism in practice represented an assault on the human rights of the colonized, resistance to colonial rule should be understood as a struggle of the colonized for human rights. Certainly, 'white racial supremacy' in colonial Kenya had expressed itself in a host of unjust treatment of Africans 'including public flogging, beating deaths, and summary executions'.[43] It was therefore not surprising that African nationalists, and their global sympathizers, spared no opportunity to invoke universal human rights ideals in their anti-colonial activities. They sought, as Meredith Terretta has noted, to define and also uphold rights for people who were not deemed 'citizens' on their own lands, but rather as 'subjects' by European settlers who had taken over ownership of land, monopolized economic privileges, and determined access to political and civil rights.[44]

The colonial 'trial' of the alleged masterminds of the Mau Mau rebellion that preceded the annihilatory phase of the rebellion itself revealed the disjuncture between British conceptions of justice and Kikuyu notions of human rights. Caroline Elkins has chronicled the British trial, in December

1952, of Jomo Kenyatta and five others as the leaders of a creeping Kikuyu revolt against the British colonial administration. In the post-Second World War atmosphere of rights talk and self-determination discourse, Kenyatta and his colleagues accused of instigating the Mau Mau rebellion appropriated the language of 'justice' and 'rights' in their defense. Although Kenyatta denied any involvement in the Mau Mau atrocities against British settlers and their families, the future leader of an independent Kenya attributed Kikuyu anger to colonial 'injustices' and the desire of the Kikuyu people to 'establish' and also 'demand the rights of the African people as human beings …'.[45] Opposition to colonialism in Africa gave human rights values concrete and universal meaning. Kenyatta, and many African nationalists who were arrested, tried, flogged, or imprisoned for protesting against degrading colonial policies invoked prevailing universal ideas of human rights (self-determination, freedom, and racial equality) to expose the 'contradictions' between the inhumane nature of colonial rule and the European justification of it as a 'civilizing mission'.[46]

Kwame Nkrumah best summed up the frustrations of the colonized peoples of Africa when he chose the evocative statement 'We prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquility' as the motto for a newspaper (*Accra Evening News*) he founded in 1949 as the vehicle for anti-colonial resistance in Gold Coast.[47] Independence was achieved in Gold Coast (renamed Ghana) on 6 March 1957. The sigh of relief was prompt and noticeable in Nkrumah's proclamation, as leader of the new nation of Ghana, to a cheering crowd, at the dawn of independence, that finally 'the battle has ended' and Ghana, their 'beloved country is free forever'.[48] For Nkrumah, 'freedom' from colonialism also meant the rebirth of 'a new African … ready to fight his own battles'.[49] That also required, as Nkrumah put it, a degree of self-reliance that permitted the 'new' and independent African nations to 'create [their] own African personality and identity'.[50] This anti-colonial and self-determinationist principle was reechoed, in 1958, by Patrice Lumumba, the future leader of an independent Congo, when he explained that the fight of his people for independence from Belgian colonialism was nothing more than a restoration of 'a right that the Congolese people have lost'.[51]

The meanings that African nationalists attached to human rights shifted throughout the decolonization process.[52] For Nkrumah, human rights meant self-determination and the creation by Africans of their own distinctive identity. Julius Nyerere, the future leader of an independent Tanganyika (Tanzania), saw human rights in the colonial context as a struggle for racial equality.[53] Nyerere's framing of the human rights discourse in racial terms (more than Nkrumah's cultural construction), in the early post-independence period, became the framework for the critiques of apartheid South Africa that led to the isolation of the white minority government in Africa and in much of the world.[54] Notwithstanding their various and shifting interpretations of human rights, by appropriating and applying prevailing global human rights ideas of

self-determination, racial equality, and political and civil rights to advance their anti-colonial and anti-apartheid causes, African nationalists such as Kenyatta, Nkrumah, Lumumba, and Nyerere appear, initially at least, to have embraced the universality of human rights principle. That embrace was, however, short-lived. The cracks in the African nationalist subscription to a universalist human rights ethos were apparent in Nkrumah's advocacy of a new African personality and identity. That signified an emerging desire for a particular conception of human rights in postcolonial Africa with an African imprint.

Ironies of Human Rights Observance in Postcolonial Africa

The transition from colonial statehood to postcolonial nationhood in Africa was initially marked by human rights-based political expressions and commitments. They included the emergence of constitutions as the new criteria of national identity with guarantees of human rights such as freedom to speak, assemble, and enjoy due process in courts of law denied to Africans in the colonial period. Added to these marks of postcolonial nationhood were ratifications of international and continental human rights instruments. The adoption, in June 1981, of an 'African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights' (ACHPR) by member states of the then Organization of African Unity was a substantive affirmation of the universality of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the UDHR. The 68 human rights articles in the ACHPR may be larger in number than the 30 in the UDHR, but they are consistent with the rights to life and freedom from persecution that the UDHR grants to every individual human being. The African Charter affirms these as fundamental human rights to which '[e]very individual' in Africa is 'entitled' without discrimination on the bases of 'race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status'.[55]

The extent to which the postcolonial African states and their guardians promoted human rights or perverted them, and why, is one of the disturbing ironies of the history of postcolonial Africa. As Meredith Terretta, and Kwasi Wiredu, have accurately noted, in separate publications, human rights talk and guarantees had a short lifespan in independent Africa.[56] Politics in Ghana, under Kwame Nkrumah, Tanzania, under Julius Nyerere, and Cameroon under Amadou Ahidjo, highlighted the promise and contradictions of postcolonial Africa's perplexing embrace of human rights. What Nkrumah had advocated as a 'new African personality and identity' found disconcerting expression in arbitrary 'preventive detention' legislations that granted his own government in Ghana, and others in independent Africa, broad authority to clamp down on 'ambiguously defined' subversive acts.[57]

After political independence in December 1961, the new leaders of Tanzania did not hide their intention of defining and implementing their own conceptions of human rights. Ironically, Tanzania invoked, in July 1965,

a colonial-era Preventive Detention Act to justify the detention of about 126 people on alleged espionage activities.[58] Cameroon's new leader Amadou Ahidjo used similar methods after independence in 1960 to destroy all political opposition to his government. Preventive detention, censorship of the press, shutting down of opposition newspapers and imprisonments of political opponents in the name of maintaining public order became the juridical tools Cameroon's new leader amassed to crush civil and political rights in the new nation.[59]

Certainly, the universalist ethos in which the first generation of African nationalists had understood human rights gave way to self-serving appeals to 'national sovereignty' and African cultural uniqueness. In many cases, this particularist notion of human rights served two key purposes, among others. First, it provided a perverted basis for holding on to political power. Second, it served as a means of deflecting international criticism of the creeping authoritarianism in the newly independent nations of Africa.[60] The era of 'Preventive Detention' (the incarceration of political opponents without trial) in early postcolonial Africa (late 1950s and the end of the 1960s), was soon followed by the period of military coups, extrajudicial killings, and more violations of human rights (post-1970). As Claude E. Welch, Jr, has noted, 'between 1965 and 1980' the continent of Africa experienced '75 successful seizures of power'.[61] Some of the most abhorrent human rights abuses, including summary executions of people in postcolonial Africa, took place in Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, and Ghana, under military regimes, in the 1970s and 1980s.[62] Between 1977 and 1978, the new military government in Ethiopia arrested, tortured, and killed a wide range of civilians in the government's infamous Red Terror campaign of murder of alleged political subversives.[63] In Ghana, in 1979, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings's Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), that had also seized power in a military coup, followed the Ethiopian example by summarily executing three former heads of state.[64] The AFRC's human rights abuses, and those of Rawlings's second coup-based Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) military administration of the 1980s, featured the humiliating stripping and torture of imprisoned people, extra-judicial executions, and harrowing assaults on the dignity of Ghanaians reminiscent of the treatment of colonial subjects in the colonial era.[65] This catalogue of infringements on human dignity is by no means exhaustive on a continent that also witnessed harrowing atrocities, including genocide, committed in the context of wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and the Central African Republic, to mention but a few, between the 1990s and the present.[66] Wiredu is therefore correct in observing that 'apart from the vexatious case of apartheid, the encroachment on human rights in postcolonial Africa has come from African governments'.[67] While the requirements of national liberation and rapid postcolonial economic emancipation could partially explain some of these authoritarian curtailments of human rights, they

cannot adequately justify them. Postcolonial Africa's paradoxical embrace of human rights is, perhaps, best illustrated by the presence of 'few human rights NGOs [non-governmental organizations]', and, therefore, fewer human rights advocates, on a continent whose history has been forged in the furnace of human rights atrocities.[68]

Human Rights and Their Discontents in Africa Today

The end of the 1990s, and the beginning of a new century further exposed postcolonial Africa's complicated dalliance with human rights. The self-serving appeals to African culture and identity as the refuge for human rights discussions coincided with the post-1970 drift towards dictatorial military and civilian regimes and their opposition to criticisms by Western governments and foreign NGOs of the human rights record of African governments.[69] Today, in contemporary Africa, human rights have become the means through which governments and the public debate with the industrialized West on moral values. Nowhere has this become much more evident than on discussions relating to sexuality.[70] Yet, it is one of contemporary Africa's distinguishing accomplishments in human rights values (democratization) that has created and also limited the political and social spaces for discussions of rights for sexual minorities.[71] Human rights discourse that came in the wake of democratization in Africa, after 1990, have reignited the debate over the autonomy of the individual in contemporary Africa. Amid this progress, there still exist, in some parts of Africa, the misconstrual of human rights as an ideological cover for a Western gay rights agenda. In Uganda, Malawi, Nigeria, and Ghana, interpretations of human rights that include respect for the way that individuals wish to live their lives have come up against a popular urban and pulpit discourse about the place of sexual diversity in Africa and the rights of sexual minorities in Africa's democracies. Central to that discourse is the idea that no social order (that is the stability of society through the absence of anarchy) can endure when individuals and groups are permitted to do what they wish; that unrestrained autonomy in all matters of human conduct is a form of moral license, deviance, or perversion that can threaten the very social fabric that nations exist to build.

Certainly, integration of human rights principles into national constitutions and affirmations of support for them became, initially, the criteria of postcolonial nationhood. Today, opposition to human rights and the misconstrual of them as Western neo-colonial millstones have cast a gloomy shadow on how human rights are discussed and pursued in some parts of Africa. Perhaps the fairest assessment of contemporary Africa's complicated history of human rights observance is to underscore not only the continent's rhetorical embrace of human rights, but also its symbolic observance of them. On a more hopeful note, the African Union's 'resolution' in 2004 (on the tenth anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda) to build a 'continental human rights memorial',

close to the site of its new headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, is the boldest recognition by African leaders of the checkered record of human rights observance in postcolonial Africa. The human rights memorial idea aims at addressing some disturbing ironies and some lingering memories in African history. The objectives of the envisioned memorial are 'to honor the memory and dignity of those Africans who perished in genocide and human rights violations …' on African soil, and 'to educate young Africans' about these atrocities in the hope that they will 'denounce and confront human rights crimes' in the future.[72] A human rights memorial is also projected to memorialize those who resisted apartheid, genocide, and other human rights abuses on the continent.

The necessity for such a human rights memorial is also the result of an instructive irony. The 'new headquarters' of the African Union, in the Ethiopian capital, is located on the grounds of 'the notorious Alem Bekagn [Maximum Security] Prison'. It was here that, in 1937, the Italian fascist war criminal General Rodolfo Graziani tortured and killed thousands of Ethiopians during the Italian occupation of Ethiopia before the outbreak of the Second World War. It was also the place that, in 1977–1978, Ethiopia's authoritarian military government under Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam tortured and killed tens of thousands of Ethiopians during the regime's infamous Red Terror campaign of murder of suspected political opponents. This irony was not lost on Ethiopia's late President Meles Zenawi, who led the liberation movement that helped to overthrow the Mengistu regime in 1993. President Meles reportedly noted the irony that the new Pan-African headquarters and conference center symbolizing 'hope for a brighter future' was also, for many years, 'the site of despair, doom, and death in his speech in January 2012 to inaugurate the new AU headquarters'.[73] Advocates for an African Union Human Rights Memorial (AUHRM) hope that it will 'inspire … emergent generations of Africans … to resist any infringement on the fundamental human rights of Africans, especially infringements through the agency or complicity of African states and leaders as well as through the misdeeds of militant, politicized faiths that have taken root in Africa'.[74]

Conclusion

The post-Second World War global human rights revolution witnessed two similar revolutions in Africa. First, the ingenious appropriation of human rights ideas by African nationalists as a rhetorical critique of colonialism's human rights infractions. Second, textual affirmations of the need for human rights observance in the new nations of Africa as emblems of modern nationhood. However, the contradictions of postcolonial Africa's paradoxical embrace of human rights as an organizing principle too soon became evident. Awareness in Africa of Nazi and colonial atrocities had made the rights and dignity of oppressed groups the subject of human rights laws and discussions.

That reality had a catalytic effect on the transition from colonial statehood to postcolonial nationhood in Africa. Today, the unyielding chorus in urban and elite circles in many nations in Africa is that the continent's priority should be on 'economic development' rather than on 'human rights' while, at the highest levels of continental diplomacy, the idea of a human rights memorial has gained symbolic attention. It is, therefore, apt to end this chapter with the instructive thoughts of the Cameroonian opposition leader Bebey-Eyidi, victim of Amadou Ahidjo's political repression, on what political independence should mean for Africa:

> Wouldn't it be normal for the liberated African countries to prove to the world that their liberation engenders a complete restoration of the personhood and dignity of African mankind? It is right to work to accelerate economic development. But of what good would the greatest wealth be for us if it did not have as its foundation and its purpose the person worthy of being called human?[75]

Perhaps the envisioned African Union Human Rights Memorial might stand as an eternal monument to the admonition and also aspiration embodied in Bebey-Eyidi's thoughts.

Notes

1. For detailed examination of these major debates in human rights literature, see: Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im and Francis M. Deng, eds., *Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990); Makau Mutua, *Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), especially Introduction and chap. 1; Peter N. Stearns, *Human Rights in World History* (New York: Routledge, 2012); Kwasi Wiredu, *Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996); Michael Ignatieff, *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Michael Freeman, *Human Rights* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2002). This chapter also draws upon ideas and analyses in a position paper on Human Rights I wrote in 2015 on behalf of the International Institute for the Advanced Study of Cultures, Institutions, and Economic Enterprise (IIAS), a think-tank in Ghana. For that position paper, see "Human Rights as a Global Conversation on Human Dignity," http://www.interias.org.gh/sites/default/files/Position%20Paper/IIASPositionPaperHumanRights.pdf.
2. Kwasi Wiredu, *Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 157.
3. Michael Freeman, *Human Rights* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2002), 1–2.
4. Michael Ignatieff, *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 83.
5. For some analyses of this debate, see IIAS Position Paper on Human Rights, http://www.interias.org.gh/sites/default/files/Position%20Paper/IIASPositionPaperHumanRights.pdf.

6. Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights," *The American Political Science Review* 76 (1982): 303. See also Jack Donnelly, "In Defense of the Universal Declaration Model," in Gene M. Lyons and James Mayall, ed., *International Human Rights in the 21st Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 26. For further analyses of this approach to the discussion of the history of human rights, see Freeman, *Human Rights*, chap. 2.
7. Josiah A.M. Cobbah, "African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective," *Human Rights Quarterly* 9 (1987): 309, 310, 320, 321, 322–23, 324–25. See also Amy Gutman's "Introduction" to Michael Ignatieff's book *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*, viii., and Peter N. Stearns, *Human Rights in World History*, xi, 5–8.
8. Makau Mutua, *Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique*, 3.
9. Ibid., 73, 77.
10. Ibid., 71.
11. Cobbah, "African Values and the Human Rights Debate," 310.
12. Ibid., 321. See also 322, 323, and Kwasi Wiredu, "An Akan Perspective on Human Rights," in *Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*, ed. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im and Francis M. Deng, 247.
13. Oritsegbubemi Anthony Owoye, "An African Conception of Human Rights?: Comments on the Challenges of Relativism," *Human Rights Review* 15 (2014): 329.
14. Ibid., 331.
15. Ibid., 330.
16. Ibid., 334–35.
17. Ibid., 338.
18. Mutua, *Human Rights*, 5.
19. Ignatieff, *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*, 7.
20. See IIAS Position Paper, "Human Rights as a Global Conversation on Human Dignity," http://www.interias.org.gh/sites/default/files/Position%20Paper/IIASPositionPaperHumanRights.pdf.
21. Dennis Laumann, *Colonial Africa, 1884–1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), xi.
22. See Michael A. McDonnell and A. Dirk Moses, "Raphael Lemkin as a Historian of Genocide in the Americas," in The Origins of *Genocide: Raphael Lemkin as a Historian of Mass Violence*, ed. Dominick J. Schaller and Jurgen Zimmerer (New York: Routledge, 2009), 57–58. For more information about Lemkin's association of genocide with colonialism, see Michelle Tusan, "Crimes Against Humanity: Human Rights, the British Empire and the Origins of the Response to the Armenian Genocide," *American Historical Review* (February 2014), 50.
23. Schaller and Zimmerer, eds., *The Origins of Genocide*, 5–6.
24. Tusan, "Crimes Against Humanity," 50.
25. Laumann, *Colonial Africa*, xi. See also Benjamin Madley, "From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe," *European History Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (2005): 429.

26. For a detailed study of colonial atrocities and infractions on the human rights of colonized peoples in Africa, see: Laumann, *Colonial Africa, 1884–1994*, chap. 3; Adam Hochschild, *King Leoplold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999); Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005); David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005): Madley, "From Africa to Auschwitz," 437, 441; and Dominik J. Schaller, "The Genocide of the Herero and Nama in German South-West Africa, 1904–1907," in *Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, ed. Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 4th ed. (New York: Routledge 2013), 92.
27. Madley, "From Africa to Auschwitz," 430.
28. Laumann, *Colonial Africa*, 48.
29. Schaller, "The Genocide of the Herero and Nama," 92.
30. Ibid., 90.
31. Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*, 28.
32. Ibid., 12.
33. Ibid., 14.
34. Wiredu, "An Akan Perspective on Human Rights," in *Human Rights in Africa*, ed. Ahmed An-Na'im and M. Deng, 245, 253–54. See also Cobbah, "African Values and the Human Rights Debate," 323.
35. Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*, 32–43.
36. Ibid., 47.
37. Ibid., xv.
38. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, 2.
39. Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*, xv–xvi.
40. Madley, "From Africa to Auschwitz," 430. For a comprehensive study of human rights atrocities and genocide in King Leopold's Congo Free State, and later Belgian Congo, see Hochschild, *King Leoplold's Ghost*.
41. A. Adu Boahen, *African Perspectives on Colonialism* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 108.
42. Meredith Terretta, "From Below and to the Left?: Human Rights and Liberation Politics in Africa's Postcolonial Age," *Journal of World History* 24, no. 2 (2013): 394–96. See also Jan Eckel, "Human Rights and Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open Questions," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 1, no. 1 (Fall 2010): 113, for summaries of this difference of opinion.
43. Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*, 47.
44. Terretta, "From Below and to the Left," 394–95.
45. Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*, 45.
46. Terretta, "From Below and to the Left," 396. See also Tusan, "Crimes Against Humanity," 51.
47. Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 184. This book was first published in London, UK, in 1957, by Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd.
48. Quoted in Laumann, *Colonial Africa*, 62.

49. Ibid., 62.
50. Ibid.
51. Eckel, "Human Rights and Decolonization," 116.
52. Ibid., 120.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21. L.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986, at http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf. See also IIAS Position Paper on "Human Rights," http://www.interias.org.gh/sites/default/files/Position%20Paper/IIASPositionPaperHumanRights.pdf.
56. Wiredu, "An Akan Perspective on Human Rights," 256. See also Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Human Rights NGOs and the Rule of Law in Africa," *Journal of Human Rights* 2, no. 3 (2003): 318.
57. Terretta, "From Below and to the Left?," 398.
58. Ibid., 401.
59. Ibid., 413.
60. Ibid., 398.
61. Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Human Rights NGOs and the Rule of Law in Africa," *Journal of Human Rights* 2, no. 3 (2003): 318.
62. Eckel, "Human Rights and Decolonization," 121.
63. Ethiopian Red Terror Documentation & Research Center (edited by Anne Louise Mahoney), *Documenting the Red Terror: Bearing Witness to Ethiopia's Lost Generation* (Ottawa: ERTDRC North America, Inc., 2012), chaps. 1 and 3.
64. See Jeff Haynes, "Human Rights and Democracy in Ghana: The Record of the Rawlings Regime," *African Affairs* 90 (1991): 408.
65. See Mike Ocquaye, "Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy under the PNDC in Ghana," *Human Rights Quarterly* 17 (1995): 563–64.
66. For a detailed discussion of war and its effects on human dignity in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).
67. Wiredu, "An African Perspective on Human Rights," 260.
68. Welch, Jr., "Human Rights NGOs and the Rule of Law in Africa," 321.
69. Eckel, "Human Rights and Decolonization," 122.
70. For more analyses of this aspect of human rights discourse in contemporary Africa, see Edward Kissi, "Obligation to Prevent: (O2P): Proposal for enhanced community approach to genocide prevention in Africa," *African Security Review* 25, no. 3 (September 2016): 249–50; Alicia C. Decker and Andrea L. Arrington, *Africanizing Democracies, 1980–Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 56, 70–71.
71. Decker and Arrington, *Africanizing Democracies*, 70. See also: Ronald Louw, "Advancing Human Rights Through Constitutional Protection for Gays and Lesbians in South Africa," http://www.haworthpress.com/web/JH; Kristen Cheney, "Locating Neocolonialism, "Tradition," and Human Rights in

Uganda's Gay Death Penalty," ASR Forum, *African Studies Review* 55, no. 2 (2012): 78–79.

72. The intent of the African Union Human Rights Memorial is outlined in the "Executive Summary" and "Foreword" of the *African Union Human Rights Memorial Project Report on In-Country Consultations 2013*, written by Professor Andreas Eshete, Chair of the Interim Board of the AUHRM, in July 2014. This is a primary document that is not widely distributed. For a published version of this report, see Justice Africa [a human rights NGO], "African Union Human Rights Memorial Project for Dignity, Rights and an End to Atrocities," 2014, www.justiceafrica.org. See especially 1–2, 9.
73. Justice Africa, "African Union Human Rights Memorial Project for Dignity, Rights and an End to Atrocities," 1. www.justiceafrica.org.
74. Ibid.
75. Terretta, "From Below and to the Left?" 414.

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CHAPTER 43

Education in Postcolonial Africa

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Introduction

The development of education in postcolonial Africa has witnessed tremendous expansion at all levels despite mixed economic growth in various African countries and diminishing educational returns. The last six decades have seen various African countries undertake several educational reforms and experimentations with the aim of addressing their social, political, and economic needs. Some of these reforms and experiments have been internally led, and some have been externally steered. In order to understand the complex educational developments, reforms, and experiments that have taken place in Africa in the postcolonial period, their successes and challenges, it is vital to examine the historical happenings that have influenced and shaped the process. Drawing from my educational biographical research work in Kenya, where I have studied Kenya's educational development in the postcolonial period using historical frames, this chapter seeks to examine how the development of education in Africa has been influenced by its historical events, the progress that has been made, challenges that have been witnessed, and what the future holds.

Given the contextual educational differences that exist among the 55 African countries that are rooted in their colonial and postcolonial experiences, this chapter focuses mainly on Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. In this regard, the ideas advanced in this chapter must be regarded as broad generalizations and tentative hypotheses to be studied critically by the reader in the light of his/her personal knowledge as he/she seeks to relate them to

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particular SSA countries and the African continent in general. Having said this, however, it is vital to note that there are indeed several educational characteristics that are common to most SSA countries, sufficient to justify the approach this chapter takes and the conclusions it makes. Specifically, this chapter examines: educational trends in postcolonial Africa; education in postcolonial Kenya; African-centered educational biographies and their contributions to the understanding of Africa and its historical developments in the postcolonial period; and what the future holds for education in Africa.

Survey of Educational Trends in Postcolonial Africa

Educational Trends 1960s to 1980s, External Influences and Frameworks

Research on education in postcolonial Africa has received minimal scholarship. Peter Kallaway observes that research on the history of education is in a dire state. He posits that:

> Attempts to convene panels on postcolonial education in Africa at various educational conferences in recent years have demonstrated that only a few young scholars are committed to this important field of research. This has undermined the capacity to understand the roots of African educational problems and possible solutions to them.[1]

Most of the written works on education on the African continent in the postcolonial period illustrate that much of the African educational historiography is dominated by the seminal studies of the formal history of colonial education systems for particular colonies or regions up to the independence period. There is very little in-depth work on the history of education in the post-independence era, and even less in the way of comparative studies between African national educational systems and other Third World regions. Even within the British, French, Portuguese, Spanish colonial, and postcolonial contexts, comparisons between educational policies in Africa and other parts of the world (for instance, India in the case of the British) are lacking. Therefore, this presents a challenge for educational researchers that is of utmost importance for a deeper understanding of the roots of African educational reforms and policies and their correlation to societal reconstruction and change process, something that would make a vital contribution to the solution of the numerous intractable problems currently facing modern African education.[2] It is against this backdrop of the dearth of scholarship on education in postcolonial Africa that this chapter is framed.

In postcolonial Africa, no other field of national development has invited as much criticism, scrutiny, and experimentation, or needed such constant innovation and reinvigoration, as its educational systems. Affirming this, Simeon Ominde, one of the pioneer Kenyan educators, writes that 'indeed such frequent reforms and restructuring have raised the fear that African nations may be missing the more difficult challenge of understanding education as an

essential dynamic area of human activity and its role in the societal reconstruction process'.[3] It is in this context and setting of thought that this chapter examines the framework of educational development and change in Africa in the postcolonial period, its milestones, challenges, and future prospects.

In the first decade after independence, many African countries placed considerable importance on the role of education in promoting social, political, and economic development. The education system was expected to fulfill two main objectives: the technical and the social objective.[4] The technical objective was concerned more with providing the future manpower with requisite skills and knowledge. The social objective on the other hand was more concerned with the inculcation of values that could enrich people's lives and maintain a cohesive society. Summing up the educational focus and reforms of most African nations in the first post-independence decade, Abdelhag Rharade states:

> The 1960s can be justly described as the decade of great expectations, and optimism about the developmental potential of education in Africa. It began with the historic 1960 Ashby Report on education in Nigeria and the equally widely quoted 1961 Addis Ababa conference of African Ministers of Education. Before the decade was over some 40 manpower education plans had been published, not to mention the reports of a host of commissions of inquiry and academic studies. In the first five years alone, school enrolment in Africa rose by almost a half; the average proportion of the government budget spent on education jumped from one-seventh to over one-sixth—the highest for any continent except North America—and the proportion of national income devoted to education increased from 3 percent to 4.3 per cent, exceeded only by Europe.[5]

Education in Africa during the first decade of independence was shaped by several external forces. First was the *Report of the Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa* that was held in Addis Ababa in May 1961, under the joint sponsorship of UNESCO and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The central aim of this conference was to provide a forum for African states to prioritize educational needs that could promote their economic, political, and social needs. Emphasis was placed on educational reforms and training that could produce the required manpower essential for the new, independent African nations.[6] Much emphasis in educational development during this period was given to secondary and postsecondary education rather than universal primary education. Effecting the proposal required massive national budgetary allocations and external aid from UNESCO, several developed nations, and non-governmental bodies. In line with the resolution of the conference, African ministers of education met in Paris in March 1962 to discuss further the implementation of the Addis Ababa plan. The meeting underscored the need to set up firm structures in African countries.

The African educational framework for higher education during this period was also built on *The Tananarive Conference on the Development of Higher Education in Africa* deliberations that were held in September 1962 under the leadership of UNESCO and the ECA as a follow-up to the Paris meeting. The conference adopted the Addis Ababa Conference plan in estimating the qualitative and quantitative educational changes necessary to meet the manpower requirements of African nations. It established targets in higher education and made recommendations for the overall planning, financing, curriculum, and staffing of higher institutions in Africa. In addition, it also indicated the responsibility of higher educational institutions in the advancement of development of African nations in all spheres. The report recommended high enrolments of students in science, technology, and agricultural courses. Cooperation among African countries and aid from external agencies were seen as vital to the future development of the continent.[7]

The Tananarive Conference was followed by a Kinshasa meeting in February and March of 1963. The Kinshasa meeting reaffirmed the resolutions of the Paris and Tananarive meetings. It advocated for the provision of more funds from UNESCO and other agencies to help African nations meet their educational mandates and expenditures. Another conference held during this early period that spearheaded education in Africa was the *Abidjan Regional Conference on the Planning and Organization of Literacy Programs* of March 1964. It reviewed educational regional targets that were set up at the Addis Ababa, Tananarive and Kinshasa conferences. It accentuated the need for African countries to use targets of these conferences as a guide to their educational expansion and future development depending on their resources and human-resource capabilities. It put emphasis on the role of education in the economic and social progress of African rural communities. It encouraged the establishment of more institutions of higher learning. This conference was followed by two central conferences: *The Teheran Conference of September 1965*, that emphasized adult literacy; and *The Lagos Conference on the Organization of Research and Training in Africa in Relation to Study, Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources*, that was held in July 1964. These two conferences addressed the organization and financing of scientific and technical training in African nations to enable them to utilize their natural resources and human personnel for industrialization purposes.

These conferences set the stage for educational development in Africa and influenced the educational frameworks and strategies of most African nations in their first and second decades. In line with the Addis Ababa Conference, the orientation of African education shifted towards training Africans to fill high-level positions in the public and private sectors. Although other aspects of education were considered, this was to a minimal extent. In order to achieve this, priority was put on secondary and higher education. To meet public demand pertaining to more manpower development, many African nations began to devote large portions of their national budgets to education.

For instance, in Ghana's Second Development Plan (1959–1964), projected investment in education was £27.8 million, 11.4% of the total expenditure; this later rose to £17.3 million, 13.4% of the budget in 1961–1962 recurrent expenditure. In Nigeria's six-year Educational Plan, £32.8 million, three-fifths of the federal expenditure on education, was earmarked for higher education. In Tanzania (mainland) the Three-Year Plan proposed that a high proportion of the central government budget available for education be devoted to secondary school expansion. Between 1961 and 1962, £30.5 million was spent on education, 16.5% of the national budget.[8] Similar plans were made in the French-speaking countries. Mark Bray, Peter Clarke, and David Stephens postulate that 'there were no marked differences between the Anglophone and the Francophone countries regarding the problem of manpower development during this period and large investments were put in the education sector'.[9] Due to these massive investments in education in the postcolonial period, primary-school enrolments rose from 12 million in 1965 to 50 million in 1983, and the number of students in higher education increased from 21,000 in 1960 to 430,000 in 1983.[10]

During the first two decades, the rate of education expansion within African schools outstripped the possibilities for employment that once existed for school-leavers. New job creation proved difficult, slow, and expensive. Nevertheless, the kind of employment which school-leavers and particularly their parents expected remained constant; the desire for wage-earning employment, especially pertaining to white-collar employment. The quest for modern employment of this nature led to considerable migration of young people from rural to urban areas. In the late 1960s, African governments began questioning the continued rapid expansion of formal educational systems that had minimal societal returns. It was clear during this period that the small, modern sector of the economy had been Africanized much more rapidly than most educational observers had forecasted, and jobs had already become scarce. The consequent frustration among the youth who had expected that more years of formal secondary education would provide automatic access to wage employment and a better life led to serious doubts among African leaders about the direction education in their various countries was expected to take in the second decade. It was clear to most of them that the postcolonial educational systems that were inherited from the colonial regimes were too academic and examination-centered, and not tailored to the needs of rural African societies.

It is important to note that Africa's educational developments in the 1960s conformed to United Nations strategies for development in Third World countries. The so-called First Development Decade of the 1960s accentuated the importance of education in the production of highly skilled manpower and the larger national development. By the end of the First Development Decade, educational results, though quantitatively impressive, were unsatisfactory. The unemployment problem was crucial in many African countries.

This prompted the United Nations resolution on the strategies of the Second Development Decade. The Second Development Decade placed greater emphasis on social factors in development, the reduction of social imbalances, and structural change in education and basic education. The *UNESCO General Conference of 1970*, that was held during this period, formulated a set of recommendations which placed emphasis on the need for long-term educational reforms and approaches that could mitigate unemployment challenges and critical societal needs of African nations. To achieve this, the *International Commission on Educational Development* was established. Its report, *Learning To Be*, became the seminal guide on the importance of universal education for African development.

Education policy evolution in various African national educational systems in the first two decades must be interpreted in the context of funding constraints and the relative economic frailties of most African states during this period, rather than their rhetoric of nation building, democratization, community development, or manpower development. In the heady atmosphere of independence there was a danger of overloading African schools with tasks of transformation beyond their capacity to deliver, and then blaming them for the failure. The ambiguity and quagmire of the situation lay in the pressing desire for change and for the expansion of the state education systems to offer mass education to all citizens while at the same time dealing with the demand for the best that the traditional colonial system of secondary education had offered in terms of a literary education. The new political leaders and educated elites, like the reforming missionaries or colonial officials before them, soon discovered that there were limits to the kinds of educational innovation possibilities that could be undertaken, given the high demand for formal education. Attempts to introduce a richer and innovative curriculum that could marry indigenous education with vocational and technical programs in the 1970s did not garner much support.[11]

It is in this vein that Daniel Sifuna asserts that it is important to examine the dramatic rhetoric of mass education for democracy that was prevalent in many African nations in the first decade-and-a-half of independence within the context of the perception by communities, parents, and students that a formal curriculum opened the door to the formal job market, especially in the new bureaucracy that was being established at the time.[12] This weighed the balance of education reform in favor of existing structures, which emphasized formal education and continuity with earlier perceptions of colonial schooling rather than contributing to the radical innovation that was required at the time and the national and global trends that demanded moving away from colonial educational postulations, theoretical frameworks, and approaches. There was an urgent need for more diversity and innovation in educational programs to enable them to address their critical societal needs. Many of the educational plans associated with the United Nations First Development Decade (1961–1971) can thus be interpreted as having been strong on rhetoric, hopes, and beliefs about the transformative power of education to African nations, but weak on a detailed historical educational analysis of

the realities in most African nations in the postcolonial period that required a comprehensive and robust education system that could spearhead national development.[13]

World Bank and International Monetary Fund Impact on African Education in the 1980s–2000s

From the end of the 1980s to the early 2000s an examination of national educational systems in several African nations showed that they were heavily influenced by the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and UNESCO. Peter Kallaway states that:

> By the end of the 'eighties the milestone report of the WB on *Education in Sub-Saharan Africa* (1988) signaled a new phase in African education that was heavily influenced by neo-liberal policies of the West that flowed from major economic changes in the world system that attempted to steer away from the welfarism focus of education that had emanated from the post-War era towards an education that could meet the demands of the new emerging global economic order that was dominated and driven by the new market demands.[14]

This report, together with Philip Coombs's *The World Crisis in Education* (1985) and the 1990 report for the Jomtien conference on a sustained campaign for *Education for All* (EFA), signaled a 'deterioration of educational services' in various African countries within the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s that was evidenced in enrolment stagnation, poor-quality schooling, non-completion, and gender bias among other educational challenges. These weaknesses were attributed to a combination of factors, principally unprecedented population growth, a context of weak political and administrative institutions, and mounting fiscal austerity. In this context, the WB's influence on Third World policy development, especially on the African continent, was pervasive in the 1980–2000s era. A key element of African educational policy during this period was 'a redefinition of the notion of equity in education that was marked with a dramatic shift from government responsibility for delivery of quality equal education for all, to increasing emphasis on the responsibility of parents, community, and private control in the education sector'.[15] This emphasized 'cost recovery', or the freedom to purchase quality education in the marketplace for those who could afford it. The overall effect was to make it increasingly difficult for minority groups such as the urban poor, rural youth, minority ethnic groups, or women to access quality education, especially at the secondary and tertiary levels. These policies, developed in an era of financial stringency and fragile African economies, gave rise to a range of responses to address the consequent fall in student enrolments, equity, physical facilities, and quality areas through new programs and approaches, and the increasing agency and NGO intervention.[16]

Through the SAPs, African governments were urged to seek to 'improve efficiency' through 'adjustment, revitalization and selective expansion' of

their education sectors.[17] The WB recommended that, in order to lower the cost of mass education, African governments be required to introduce 'user charges' and cost-recovery or cost-sharing arrangements by passing a substantial amount of the responsibility for schooling to parents and communities and allowing more scope and room for the privatization of education. Several recommendations were made for selective expansion, particularly regarding Universal Primary Education that had been begun in the 1960s and later developed in the 1970s and 1980s. Vocational education in schools was seen as expensive and often ineffective in creating jobs and employment opportunities. While there was an emphasis on improving quality and academic standards, the climate of economic austerity along with poor and fragile economies in most African nations left little room for maneuver and innovation. The role of donors in effecting SAPs was identified as central to promoting equity and 'African nations catch-up' with other developing nations.[18] The research of the WB and IMF policy prescriptions was often controversial and the source of national resentment and suffering of many poor African parents who could not afford the new costs of education because the insights and opinions of the WB and IMF were not based on ordinary research findings and actual economic conditions within African nations but were one significant part of a series of conditions and negotiations about loans to education in the developing world that entailed complex and exorbitant repayment mechanisms. These recommendations were often a product of reports by foreign experts who had minimal knowledge of African conditions and realities.[19] The question of external aid to education in Africa remained controversial during this period and has remained so to date, as attempts to restructure African education systems more often have experienced ambiguous objectives, visions, implementation, and learning outcomes.

Alternative Forms of Education

Beyond the internal and external forces that have shaped education development in postcolonial Africa, there have been a variety of educational initiatives that have been undertaken by several African governments during this period to complement their formal education. These alternative forms of education have paralleled the global-education, radical reform movements of the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, for instance: the Deschooling Movement associated with Illich, Goodman, and Kohl in the USA; Student Rebellions of the 1960s; the Chinese Cultural Revolution; the Cuban Revolution; and the challenges set by Paulo Freire in his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* in Latin America, and by Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnos*t and *perestroik*a tenets in the USSR of the 1990s, among others.[20] These alternative forms of education have also in part been influenced by the works of Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and other scholars who have provided a trenchant critique of the African nationalists' endeavors on the role of education in shaping

Africa's social, political, and economic structures in the post-independence period.[21] Several terms have been used to describe some of these alternative forms of education, namely: 'basic/fundamental education', 'lifelong education', 'recurrent education', and 'continuing education', among others. Some of these alternative forms of education have fallen under the general umbrella of 'non-formal education' and 'mass education'. Alternative forms of education have a substantial history on the African continent in the postcolonial period. They were developed because of the growing recognition by most African governments that formal education was not adequate in serving the bulk of the population, particularly in rural areas; and because there was a need for greater equity of participation in education and national development.

Alternative forms of education in Africa have taken a variety of forms. Examples in the postcolonial period include: self-development programs; rural or village polytechnics; rural education development and cooperative programs; the brigades; mass literacy programs; the National Youth Service schemes; agricultural extensions and farmer training programs; pre-employment programs and multipurpose programs.[22] *Self-development programs* were common in Ethiopia, Benin, Tanzania, São Tomé and Príncipe, Ghana, Guinea, and Zambia. They sought to promote the capacity of local communities' self-development. *Rural or village polytechnics programs* were evidenced in Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, Guinea, and Gambia. They strived to offer cheaper programs that were closely related to the needs of the rural villages. *Rural education development and cooperative programs* were run in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Liberia, Kenya, and Zambia. They entailed artisan, craft vocational and pre-vocational preparation programs. *The Brigades programs* were conducted in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Benin, Ivory Coast, and Mozambique. They were conceived as a means of providing more appropriate forms of postprimary education and training than what was offered in conventional secondary schools. They offered both general and skill-based training. They sought to promote rural development both indirectly through training activities needed in specific areas and directly through undertaking contracts for government, local people, and organizations. Some brigades also offered *in situ* programs that were closely related to job creation. *Mass literacy programs* were conducted in Algeria, Guinea, Tanzania, Malagasy, Ethiopia, Mali, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Sudan. They provided rudimentary general literacy that was essential for national development.

Examples of *The National Youth Service schemes* in Africa included Ghana Young Pioneers, National Youth Service Corps of Nigeria, Malawi Young Pioneers, Kenya National Youth Service, and Zambia Youth Service Corps. Their purpose was to mobilize unemployed youth to undertake projects that could promote national development. They sought to inculcate in the youth an ethos that could promote national unity, a strong work ethic, and a spirit of service. They emphasized rural development. They offered courses

in masonry, carpentry, motor vehicle maintenance, electrical installation and repair among others. *Agricultural extensions and farmer training programs* included young farmers' clubs, youth land settlement schemes, and cooperatives' farm learning centers. They were common in Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Mauritius, Lesotho, and Botswana. Similar to these programs were *animation rurale* programs in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Mali, Senegal, and several other French-speaking African countries that combined agricultural extension programs with training activities.[23] Their aim was to harness the energy and resources of local communities for societal development. The *pre-employment programs* sought to service urban industry. They were mainly vocational training or industrial centers. They offered courses in motor-vehicle mechanics, furniture making, building, carpentry, and electrical installation. They were common in Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia. Several of their programs sought to encourage the growth of small-scale industries and self-employment. Some of their programs offered skill-upgrading courses for industry. This was evidenced in the courses that were offered by the National Vocational Training Institute in Ghana, and the Industrial Development and Vocational Improvement Centers in Kenya, Nigeria, and Ethiopia.[24] *Multi-purpose programs* were common in Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria, and Cameroon. Several of them were single-purpose projects. They endeavored to utilize the meager resources of various African nations. Many of their programs were determined by local communities, had great flexibility, and drew their resources from various sectors. They included literacy and school equivalency progress, youth clubs, sports, cultural programs, and guidance activities.

It is important to note that, on the whole, alternative forms of education have been attempts at providing micro-solutions to macro-problems of development in various African nations.[25] They have challenged the formal education of various African nations and proposed various kinds of interventions aimed at rural-development strategies, skills, and vocational training. Most of them have been centered on immediate production and application. They have been viewed as 'tending to be part of life, integrated with life and inseparable from it. They are designed to change society and make it self-reliant, self-sustaining. They answer to the aspirations and needs of their clients and are relevant to national goals'.[26] In some ways these alternative forms of education have reflected a range of missionary and colonial endeavors of the colonial period, and in many instances they have repeated their failures, as the formal education set in place during the colonial era has proved to be an endurable legacy in the postcolonial period. Lacking an industrial base, the lessons of the Asian Tigers regarding vocational and technical education entailed in these programs failed to attract the imagination of African governments in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. The conservative model of education in most African nations remained the high road to jobs in the formal, government, and private sector.[27]

The general experience in various alternative forms of education that have been undertaken in Africa in the postcolonial period is that many of them have been viewed as being expensive compared to formal education and that they have seldom attracted large numbers of students. It is important to note that some of them were pushed by education scholars like Illich, Reimer, and Freire who felt that efforts to reform school systems were futile and there was a need for a fresh start. This is clearly seen in the influence of Freire's literacy work in Tanzania, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Guinea. In most African countries the alternative models of education discussed above remained a second choice for the majority of students and in many cases their results were disappointing. This was attributed to many factors such as: poor instruction, lack of adequate teachers and funds, lack of appropriate teaching materials, lack of motivation for taking the programs (as many of them were seen as inferior in comparison to formal education), and lack of immediate practical benefits.[28] These educational approaches and alternative models of education that were carried out in several African countries as noted in this section were also evident in Kenya, a country on which my larger research work on Africa-centered educational biographies has focused. It is to this that I turn in the next section to illustrate some of these educational trends.

Education in Postcolonial Kenya

Kenya's Educational Developments 1960–1970

In the postcolonial period, Kenya's long and bloody struggle for political independence served as a major impetus for her educational development. During the struggle for independence, the nationalists' main educational aim was to provide Africans with an education that could serve the immediate needs of the country. In 1961, when independence was imminent in most African countries, a conference on the development of education in Africa was held in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and Antananarire (Madagascar) in 1962. At these two conferences, representatives from all over the continent set educational priorities that sought to foster economic and social development in Africa. It was on this framework that Kenya formulated its educational policies and programs. The expansion and reform of the education system in Kenya during this period was also motivated by political pressures. Almost every politician and election manifesto leading to the independence elections called for more educational opportunities of all types, cheaper or free education, universal primary education.[29]

There were also external forces which partly contributed to the expansion of Kenyan education especially at the higher level during this period. Among the important ones was the *Report of the Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa*, which met in Addis Ababa in May 1961. In addition to this conference, the Kenyan government and the United Kingdom requested the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to undertake a survey of the economic development of the country in

1961. These reports had a significant bearing on the Kenyan government's formulation of its educational policies. Their implementation in the first decade of the postcolonial period saw rapid expansion and enrolments at all levels of the Kenyan education system.[30]

Based on its colonial historical education legacy and these reports, the Kenyan government embarked on various educational policies that could advance its socio-economic development. The first undertaking was the drafting of the *Sessional Paper Number 10* in 1965. It articulated the immediate needs and goals of the nation. It saw education as a key means of alleviating the shortage of skilled manpower and creating equal economic opportunities for all Kenyans.[31] During this period, the government established five major inquiries to look into the development of education: The Kenya Education Commission (The Ominde Commission, Republic of Kenya, 1964); The National Committee on Educational Objectives and Policy (Gacathi Report, Republic of Kenya, 1979); The Presidential Working Party on the Second University (Mackay Report, Republic of Kenya, 1981); The Presidential Working Party on Education and Manpower (Kamunge Report, Republic of Kenya, 1988); and The Commission of Inquiry into the Education System of Kenya (Koech Commission, Republic of Kenya, 1999).

The Ominde Commission was the blueprint of post-independence Kenyan education. It was mandated to survey the existing educational resources and to advise the government on the formation and implementation of the required national education policies. The Commission was strongly influenced by the then existing international opinion on education and the national economic and political factors, and available publications on the importance of education in accelerating national development. These included the reports on *High Level Manpower Requirements and Resources in Kenya 1964–1970*; the *Development Plan of 1964–1970*; and *1965 Sessional Paper No.10: African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*. These publications identified a direct relationship between education, economic growth, and national development. It was on this premise that the organization of education during this period was closely linked to manpower development and labor-market demands.[32] This link led to the growth of enrolment, especially in secondary schools, university, and tertiary education, a growth that continued to be experienced in the 1980s and 1990s.

Although formal education was expanding during this period, it was not directly accompanied by appropriate economic growth. Thus, most school dropouts were left with neither jobs nor adequate training. By 1970, many secondary-school dropouts began to experience a serious unemployment crisis. Due to increased demand for higher education and the need for highly qualified manpower, the government created more acts in the 1980s geared towards the improvement of education to enable it accelerate development. There was also investment in vocational and technical secondary education. By the end of 1970, there were ten vocational secondary schools offering

programs intended to provide students with skills pertaining to specific occupations. By 1970, enrolment in these schools had risen to 2,426. The Kenya Polytechnic, the epicenter of vocational and technical education training, was greatly expanded, partly with a loan from USAID and UNESCO. Courses in this area also began to be offered at Kenya Science Teachers College and Kenyatta College.

The Kenyan government and other organizations responded further to the unemployment crisis by establishing non-formal institutions with a strong vocational emphasis. The first of these institutions was the National Youth Service (NYS). This was a two-year program that linked general education with productive labor-intensive vocational instruction. Voluntary agencies, such as the National Christian Churches of Kenya, began village youth polytechnics that were small, flexible, low-cost, and localized to community needs. Other establishments that operated along the same lines were Industrial training centers, YMCAs, YWCAs, vocational and craft training centers, government youth centers, and rural training centers. A number of these institutions had small enrolments. Although they were aimed at self-employment, there was great desire for wage employment among its trainees.[33]

Kenya's Educational Developments, 1970s–2000s

In broad context, Kenya's educational developments in the 1960s, conformed to the United Nations strategies for development in Third World countries. The so-called First Development Decade of the 1960s underscored the importance of education in the production of highly skilled manpower and national development. By the end of the First Development Decade, the educational results were quantitatively impressive, but were generally unsatisfactory. The unemployment problem had greatly increased within the country.[34] This prompted the United Nations resolution on the strategies of the Second Development Decade. The latter placed greater emphasis on social factors in development, the reduction of social imbalances, and structural changes. They underscored the importance of basic education and universal education. Basic education was seen as an attempt to meet the needs of substantial portions of the population that had no access to education. It was intended 'to provide a functional, flexible and low-cost education for those whom the formal system could not reach or had passed by'.[35]

The employment problem during this period was also taken up by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The ILO World Employment Program was launched in 1969. It sought to understand the causes of unemployment in selected African countries and possible remedies. Kenya was one of the selected countries. The report emphasized the need for basic, free universal education. The school curriculum was expected to be integrated in community activities. There was to be a gradual increase in the proportion of the curriculum devoted to pre-vocational subjects to cater to the interests

of terminal students.[36] The 1975 commission appointed to examine Kenya's educational objectives and policies (*The Gacathi Report*) endorsed the ILO report even though it had not been implemented because of financial reasons. However, there was adoption of some of its recommendations; for instance, in 1979, the Ministry of Basic Education was established, and there was a strong push by the government on pre-vocational subjects in the formal curriculum. *The Gacathi Report* reiterated further the objectives of the Ominde Commission and underscored the role of education in shaping Kenya's national character and development. It recommended the development of vocational, technical, and practical education. In 1975, the government realized that education was not doing much to achieve its stated development objectives. The existing curriculum was viewed as being too academic, narrow, and examination-centered.[37] The rate of unemployment was growing as increasing numbers of school-leavers headed to urban centers in search of non-existent white-collar jobs. These conditions led to the formulation of the Third Development Plan of 1974/78 to address some of these challenges. According to this plan, Kenyan education was required to provide high-level, industrial, vocational, and technical skills necessary for employment and development.[38]

It is important to note that education for manpower dominated Kenya's educational strategies and plans in the 1970s as well. As earlier noted, the Development Plan for 1970–1974 had envisaged massive educational expansion at all levels of the school system, and this was endorsed in subsequent Plan documents.[39] There was expansion in University education, and the government also embarked on an ambitious program of expanding technical secondary schools. The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) provided aid for new workshops, equipment, support services, laboratories, and dormitories in all the 15 technical schools. Earlier in its 1975/1976 plan, the International Development Agency (IDA) of the United Nations had provided a substantial amount of equipment to the technical schools. There was also further funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). It provided grant-in-aid of Ksh. 265 million in 1977 to build the Kenya Technical Teachers College complex and to support technical education in general. During this period, there was also massive expansion of the Egerton College for Agriculture through US aid. Additionally, the Kenyan government established a second Polytechnic in Mombasa. Further, the Japanese government started the Jomo Kenyatta College of Agriculture and Technology. During this period, Kenya was also heavily involved in fund-raising campaigns to establish *harambee* (self-help) institutes of technology that could provide secondary school-leavers with vital technological skills that were required in the labor market and for national development.[40]

In the 1980s, the government changed its policy on education because of the difficulties which were being faced by graduates of its education system at both the primary and secondary levels. Most graduates who were

matriculating from these levels could still not be absorbed into the shrinking labor market as it had been in the previous decade. This prompted the government to set up a Presidential Working Party in 1981. The new education system was expected to equip students with technical, scientific, and practical knowledge vital for self and salaried employment, lifelong skills, and nation building. The Commission was also mandated to investigate the feasibility of establishing a second university that could achieve these goals. The Commission advocated a practical curriculum that would offer a wide range of employment opportunities and equitable distribution of resources. It gave rise to the current Kenyan education system, the 8-4-4.[41] An in-depth examination of the rationale for introducing the 8-4-4 system shows that it owed more to political reasons than to educational needs at the time. The system has faced numerous challenges since its inception, including lack of adequate infrastructure, trained personnel, among others. It was based on these shortfalls that the Kenyan government appointed the Commission of Inquiry into the Education System of Kenya (The Koech Commission) in 1999.

The Koech Commission was expected to make recommendations on ways to provide quality education. It emphasized the need for Kenyan education to become a ticket to national development, equality, social justice, and a better life for the individual, the community, and the nation.[42] Its proposals encompassed important societal ideals that Kenyan education was expected to offer rather than the mere reliance on the number of students who had access to education. It called for cutting-edge educational reforms, including: totally integrated quality education and training, abolition of the 8-4-4 education system and its replacement with a 7-4-2-3 system. Despite its candid report, it was never implemented because of a lack of political will.

In the postcolonial period, one concrete area that the Kenyan government has made concerted efforts to address in its education policy has been Universal Free Primary Education (UPE). It has argued that providing equal educational opportunities to all its citizens is essential for national development. These sentiments have been underscored in all of Kenya's Five-Year Development Plans from 1964 to the present. There have also been attempts since 2013 to offer free Universal Secondary Education (USE). Despite the many challenges that have been experienced in these efforts, it can be argued that Kenya's efforts to offer UPE and USE as vehicles of strong social, economic, and political developments are commendable.[43] The policy has enabled many poor students to access schooling. Within this broad educational policy framework, the expansion of learning institutions and literacy to all its citizens has been one of Kenya's greatest achievements in the education sector in the postcolonial period. This has resulted in increased participation in various societal spheres by groups that previously had little or no access to schooling, such as women and other minorities.

Since independence, the emphasis on Kenya's educational expansion has been complimented by the increasing priority accorded to programs of

quality improvement in education. The Kenyan education expansion has been closely linked to its national developmental agenda and process. Close scrutiny of the educational reforms that have been undertaken in Kenya in the postcolonial period indicate that they have operated under this framework. By any standards, Kenyan educational goals as formulated in numerous reports and commissions are of high quality. Nevertheless, one wonders why they have not brought as much development to Kenya in the last five decades as envisaged. There has been, I contend, a chasm between their theory and practice. A cursory glance at schooling in Kenya today shows that educational practice suffers chronically from what Richard Dore calls the 'diploma disease'.[44] The sole criterion of Kenya's educational quality, it appears, has been high performance in national examinations. This centering of the education process on examinations has tended to obliterate its holistic function. In addition, as earlier noted, there has also been a lot of political interference in the education-reform process.

Since the centerpiece of this handbook is to highlight major themes, research trends, and interpretations that have shaped African history in both colonial and postcolonial period, and how scholars in related disciplines have contributed to the process, in the following section I discuss my research on African-centered educational biographies and its contributions to the understanding of the development of education in Kenya and Africa in general since the 1960s. In my discussion, I weave in examples from my research that speak to how historical methods have shaped my work and what the contributions of my work have been to it as well.

African Educational Biographies and Postcolonial African History

I am an educationist with a training in educational leadership. My larger research work focuses on African-centered educational biographies. This is an area that has received minimal scholarship in both the colonial and postcolonial periods. I recognized earlier on in my graduate studies that although I am an educationist, my area of focus is interdisciplinary and borrows heavily from history. It was in this regard that I was nudged by my graduate advisor to take courses in African history to enable me ground myself in its methodological processes. In this section, I will speak to how these historical methods have enriched my research work in the last decade and greatly clarified the contributions of my work to our understanding of Africa and its larger historical happenings in various spheres in both colonial and postcolonial periods.

The term 'educational biographies' denotes works of biographical subjects who are drawn from the field of education.[45] Broadly viewed, these are individuals who have worked or work in the field of education, or who have made significant marks on it. Educational biographies draw their structures from

several disciplines. One of the disciplines they draw heavily from is history, and in my case (since I examine African educators), African history has been an important portal of my work. Many historians point out several benefits of educational biographies and general biographies that have inspired my research work. Examining carefully the benefits of educational biographies, Ezekiel Adeoti posits that they lead to an in-depth understanding of the complex and fluid historical, social, political, and economic contexts of various societies.[46] This implies that they serve as a focal device when individuals who might be of relatively little importance can be cited as a type or as a useful lead into issues of wider historical importance. The three Kenyan educators whom I have examined in the last decade (Geoffrey William Griffin, Joseph Kamiru Gikubu, and Edward Carey Francis) were men from relatively humble backgrounds who distinguished themselves in Kenyan education. My work has striven to examine their involvement and contributions to the development of Kenyan education as a gateway to understanding the journey of Kenya's educational history and various social, economic, political forces, both in the colonial and postcolonial periods that have shaped it, challenges that have been experienced, and what the future holds. My work has attempted to ascertain how some biographies can rise above the level of providing source material and become important essays in interpretation and analysis of complex historical-societal events.[47] Affirming this, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, in his book *Moving the Centre*, writing on the historical significance of biographies using Nelson Mandela's role in South Africa's democratic struggle as an example, states:

> All these figures are heroic because they reflect more intensely in their individual souls the souls of their community. Their uniqueness is the uniqueness of the historical moment. They make history even as history makes them. They are torches that blaze out new paths. Such a torch has been set alight by the fire of the masses, and every time it seems to fade, the great ones turn to their people for more energy. Mandela has been such a torch for the South African people. The black people of South Africa are reflected in Mandela. In Mandela the people of the world have really been applauding the courage, the endurance, the resistance and spirit of the South African masses. The people of the world, particularly Africans and those of African descent outside Africa, have in turn seen themselves reflected in the struggling South African masses. Or put another way, Mandela is to black South Africa's struggles what black South Africa's struggles are to the democratic forces of the world in the twentieth century. Indeed, South Africa is a mirror of the modern world in its emergence over the last four hundred years.[48]

Edward Carr notes that educational biographies and general biographies affirm that individuals shape history and are also shaped by it.[49] He sees the historical individual as a product and agent of the historical process, at once the representative and the creator of social forces which change the shape

of the world and its thought processes. According to Francis Coker, every biography is seen as representing a survey and scrutiny of the past, compromises, observations, and instructions for future societal changes.[50] They inform us about the specific and unique aspects of the subject and the context in which he/she functioned. It is in this regard that biographical studies lead to an in-depth understanding of the complex and fluid historical, social, political, and economic contexts of their communities. This historical recognition that individuals shape history and are also shaped by it, and examining educational development in Kenya through several spheres and their connections and impact on educational reforms have been beneficial to my research work. They have challenged me to provide in-depth historical analysis and interpretation of various African educators with regard to their involvement and contributions to Kenyan education. This approach has enabled me to collect in-depth data that I would have missed if I had only used educational research frames. In addition, the approach has also enabled me to more deeply understand the breadth of complexities, issues, and challenges of Kenyan education in both the colonial and postcolonial periods. The approach has also enabled me to bring to the fore significant details relevant to my work. It has given me a better understanding of how best to approach solving critical Kenyan and African educational challenges.

Further, my research work has benefited from the historical methods pertaining to the use of archival materials and written documents, as well as the appropriate analysis, interpretation, and triangulation approaches therein. As earlier noted, as an educationist this was a new area for me, and yet it has been a very significant data-gathering methodology for me. It has enriched my research and enabled me to create new pathways for data analysis and presentation in educational biographical works. The approach has enabled me to gather deep data that has benefited the African historical field on educational issues in both the colonial and postcolonial periods and our overall understanding of Africa and its educational history.

My educational biographical works have also benefited from the historical critiques of biographical studies. The critiques have pushed me to interrogate and triangulate several sources in order to authenticate and validate them. For instance, I have taken into consideration the general criticisms of biographical works by various historians who view them as having a tendency to promote the cult of the individual and to make heroes of relatively insignificant individuals in historical terms at the expense of a well-balanced understanding of varied, complex, societal influences. To navigate this, I have taken into consideration their advice that it is vital to apply in-depth critical standards in the analysis of biographical works.[51] This awareness has been seminal in my work and has enabled me to critically analyze much of the historical information on my biographical subjects with regard to their involvement and contributions to the development of Kenyan education, a strategy that has contributed to

a deeper understanding of their engagements and the frequently overlooked historical details on their educational work. A good example that suffices here is my examination of Geoffrey William Griffin's contributions to Kenyan youth education: his work at the National Youth Service entailed a deeper historical engagement of why it was an urgent and first undertaking of the Kenyan government after independence and the enormous development work it did for the country in the first three decades of independence.

My research work overall has striven to contribute to the rapidly evolving field of African-centered educational biographies by elucidating why my earlier mentioned educators became involved in Kenyan education and the circumstances that necessitated their involvement. The studies illuminate the meaning of actions they undertook in addressing Kenyan educational challenges in both the colonial and postcolonial periods, and their insights into the vision and growth of Kenyan education in the past and what the future holds. It is this significance that has guided my work and the possibilities it provides to the understanding of Africa, and its educational history both in the colonial and postcolonial periods.

Conclusion

An overview of education in Africa shows almost definite trends and concerns in Africa's education-reform process during varied periods of its postcolonial history. In the first decade of independence, the main concerns of most African nations were how to use education to create national consciousness, adequate personnel, and to address critical national needs. In the early 1970s, the central concerns were how to improve and enhance the quality of education to enable it to curb the increased levels of unemployment. Between 1975 and 1985, most African nations were preoccupied with revising the previous educational policies and creating new proposals that were relevant to their national needs. This was evidenced in numerous educational experiments in technical, vocational, and non-formal education that were undertaken to meet their sporadic, broad, and complex national and global needs. These efforts indicated a dynamic and rapidly changing African continent that constantly required a dialectical education system. These experiments were influenced by both internal and external forces. The late 1980s and the 1990s were marked by more educational challenges that necessitated more educational reforms, curriculum reviews, and further enhancement of educational quality. This was evidenced in the strong educational focus on commercial, industrial, and technological fields. From 2000 to the present, the main concerns of education have been how to improve the quality, equity, access, and global connectivity. This is clearly seen in enormous investments in tertiary-level education and the diversification and interdisciplinary focus of various educational programs at this level.

This chapter has accentuated the importance and contributions of African-centered educational biographies to the understanding of Africa and its history. It shows that they fill an important gap in the historiography of the evolution and growth of African education both in the colonial and postcolonial periods. The chapter recognizes that this is an underresearched area and there is a need for more research to examine the role and contributions of African educators to the growth of African education in the postcolonial period. The chapter demonstrates that the more we know about the role of these educators, the more we understand in depth the historical, social, political, and economic happenings of African nations and the specific contexts that have shaped them. The chapter argues that by exploring their lives and contributions, we explore the efforts of the African people in history to use their educational systems to shape their destiny.

What the Future Holds Regarding Education in Africa

Adriaan Verspoor's important report on *Education at the Crossroads: Choices in Secondary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa* provides a succinct picture of education's future in postcolonial Africa. He posits that the challenges of educational development in SSA at the beginning of the 21st century and beyond are 'urgent and unprecedented' and there is still a lack of a long-term view of national development in many African countries, as evidenced in the 'firefighting and politics' that have characterized their education sectors and most of their educational policies and frameworks.[52] Most of them are politically driven with minimal input from African educational experts and other relevant stakeholders, as earlier noted in this chapter. In addition, many of them are externally driven, funded, and are not sustainable. Though many lessons can be drawn from the many educational challenges that most African nations have faced in the postcolonial period, it is clear that no one educational policy approach and framework can apply to all African countries given their varied histories, contexts, and needs. As the De Lors Commission points out, educational reforms in Africa can only work if they fit a given country's context, development, objectives, vision, and mission.[53] Such strategies will need to: be parsimonious with resource use and sustainability; recognize the bottom-up sequential nature of educational development; be closely aligned with national development priorities and strengthen autonomy; ensure central direction and support; and build public-private partnerships.[54] All this implies that for education to yield transformative and developmental success in Africa, African government's will have to evolve towards an education-policy formulation that is clearly defined objectively, theoretically, philosophically, and in praxis. The education policy will also have to be legislatively protected from any political dictates, owned by relevant stakeholders, adequately financed, and periodically subjected to technical consultations and reviews to ensure that it is in harmony with both local, national, and global needs.

In addition, African nations are also expected to support a broadly based, equitable expansion of educational provision at all levels, thereby ensuring that the needs of disfranchised and vulnerable groups like the poor,

people with special needs, children, women, and rural populations are adequately met. Such an educational approach will provide hope, empowerment, freedom, social justice, peace, equity, democratic and human liberation, wholeness, and transformation to these marginalized populations. Such improvements are essential for tackling challenges of national development and a new world order. It will be an approach according to Ngugi Wa Thiong'o that uses education as a societal reconstruction and transformative tool. It will be an education:

> That urges men and women to use their seriousness of study, cheerfulness of knowledge, and intellect creatively to fight against all social-cultural, political and economic struggles and various prejudices prevalent in most African nations. It will be a transformative education that is expected to turn various challenges of African nations into spheres of common knowledge and experience and above all justice and societal liberation and development into a passion. It will be an education that should make its recipients and most African nations part of those millions whom Martin Carter once saw sleeping not to dream but dreaming to change the world.[55]

This type of education will enable African nations' developmental agendas and frameworks to take off since it will be rooted in holistic societal reform frames. This approach will necessitate going beyond the current myth of traditional education pedagogy prevalent in most African nations that is examination and career-centered. It will require putting great emphasis on innovative and alternative models of education that permit African nations to utilize modern technological advances. To this end, future transformative African educational policies in the postcolonial period will be expected to transcend mere transmission of factual knowledge to also include knowledge, skills, and values that are liberating insofar as they create new horizons and opportunities that are essential for national development. This will require a paradigmatic shift in the conceptualization and management of the education process. For this to be effective, the education process will need to be multidimensional, broad, explicit, and systematic in its commitment to preparing students who can transform society. In addition, this type of education will be required to have a strong and secure base that links formal and informal education. Further, it will require decolonization that addresses Frantz Fanon's fears of having 'black skins in white skins' epistemological approaches that cannot address Africa's myriad societal challenges. It will have to be an education that is centered on transformative knowledge systems that can address Africa's unique challenges. It will have to be an education that, according to Maya Angelou and Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, can permit 'Africa's caged birds that are stuck in colonial education prisons that cannot solve their societal challenges to be free and sing in their own educational frames.'[56] It will be an education that is conscious of addressing Africa's historical dilemmas. Elaborating the latter point, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o writes:

> The present predicaments of Africa often arise from a historical situation. Their solutions are not so much a matter of individual countries' own decisions as that of a fundamental social transformation of the structures of their societies starting with a real break with imperialism and its internal ruling allies. Imperialism and its comprador alliances in Africa can never develop the continent.[57]

From Ngugi's thoughts, which I strongly concur with, it can be argued that the question of the base is critical in addressing Africa's educational challenges. It points to the need for clarity with regard to the purpose and direction of African education, its relevance, philosophical stands, national objectives, and needs. It points to the path:

> the teaching of African literature, as well as of history, politics, and all the other arts and social sciences, ought to take in Africa today. It is about the inherited colonial education system and the consciousness it necessarily inculcated in the African mind. What directions should an education system take in an African wishing to break with neo-colonialism? What should be the philosophy guiding it? How does it want the 'New Africans' to view themselves in the universe? From what base: Afrocentric or Eurocentric? What then are the materials they should be exposed to: and in what order and perspective? Who should be interpreting that material to them: an African or non-African? If African, what kind of African? One who has internalized the colonial world outlook or one attempting to break free from the inherited slave consciousness? And what were the implications of such an education system for the political and economic set up or status quo? In a neo-colonialist context, would such an education system be possible? Would it not in fact come into conflict with political and economic neo-colonialism? Whether recommendations in the quest for relevance are successful or not ultimately depends on the entire government policy towards culture, education and language, and on where and how it stands in the new anti-imperialist process in Africa today.[58]

The process will require African nations to lead and own their educational reform process. This will require African nations to be self-sufficient in their educational policy, management and implementation process and to ensure that their educational vision and planning are sustainable. Again, here I concur with Ngugi's reflections on this subject in his seminal work *Secure the Base*. He observes:

> Were Africa to examine its history seriously, the continent could learn useful lessons for the present. The most successful struggles, including those of the Haitian Africans in 1789 and the Mau Mau in the Kenya of the 1950s, were based on self-reliance and a belief in their capacity to change the world. However weak it may now appear to itself, Africa has to take Nyerere's credo of self-reliance seriously. A belief in self is the beginning of strength.[59]

This type of education will entail shaking off the colonial groove. It is a type of education that will enable African nations to develop from within and

be independent. This is because development can only come from within. It must be endogenous, thought out by people for themselves, springing from the soil on which they live and attuned to their aspirations, dreams, the conditions of their natural environment, the resources at their disposal and the particular genius of their culture. African education to all intents and purposes will be expected to contribute to its endogenous development. Supporting this view, Julius Nyerere argued:

> People cannot be developed. They can only develop themselves. For while it is possible for an outsider to build a man's house, an outsider cannot give a man pride and self-confidence in himself as a human being. Those things a man has to create in himself by his own actions. He develops himself by what he does; he develops himself by making his own decisions, by increasing his understanding of what he is doing and why; by increasing his own knowledge and ability, and by his own full participation – as an equal – in the life of the community he lives in. Thus for example, a man is developing himself when he grows or earns enough to provide decent conditions for himself and his family; he is not being developed if someone gives him these things.[60]

Education of most worth for postcolonial Africa in the twenty-first century and beyond will also require redefinition and reconceptualization in terms of its philosophy and purpose. It will be required to go beyond being a 'preparation for a career in the civil service or the bureaucracy, but a preparation for life'.[61] It will be an education that develops and nurtures talents in every person that can be utilized to create, invent, invest, and venture into the unknown. Its goal will be to:

> Produce citizens who will invest in the nation by creating wealth (both human and material), economic investment, entrepreneurial spirit, self-help, rather than plunder the people's treasury. Education thus will be a preparation for service to and for the upliftment of the community, not through handouts, but through investment in the economic, social and intellectual needs of the people. It is only then that Education will become a true investment in human capital in Africa.[62]

Additionally, it will have to be an education that lays emphasis on democracy and critical consciousness with a vision of creating wealth for African nations. It will entail preparing individuals for self-sufficiency, risk taking, awakening the moral, economic, political, and civic responsibilities, adventure, and 'creating opportunities and new ideas or something for others where none exists'.[63] Further, it will be an education that has ethical caring and respect at its core. It will be an education that enables people to identify with others' challenges, empathizes with their thoughts and feelings. It will have to be an education that raises people's consciousness and emancipation capacities against the dangers of totalitarianism, oppression, exploitation, kleptocracy, and sexism.

It will be an education that strives to inspire people to find ways to get involved in societal development and reconstruction with an intention of making a difference. It will be expected to provide, according to Paulo Freire, both reflection and action required in tackling critical societal challenges prevalent in African nations.[64] It will be required to be a transformative, citizenship and possibility-centered education that inspires dreaming dreams, exploring them and acting on them for the betterment of society and for all the citizens. Additionally, it will have to be an education that strives to produce informed, active, and critical citizens who are capable of making intelligent decisions about everyday problems. It will be an education that fosters critical consciousness which, according to Paulo Freire, has to be accompanied by active critical thinking and dialogical skills that are vital for inquiry into possible solutions to Africa's societal challenges.[65] These skills will enable African nations to explore, take risks, invent, invest, and create opportunities for others who are less fortunate.

In conclusion, I would like to note that the search for an effective education process in postcolonial Africa is not an easy undertaking, as evidenced in this chapter. It is an intricate, complex, and multilayered process. It requires bold, dynamic, and transformative leadership at the national, individual, and collective levels; and a vision and mission that are clear, holistic, flexible, purposeful, and historically attuned to educational policy development and implementation. African nations must get the process right and recognize the vitality of education to the future survival of their nations. As Dickson Mungazi reminds us, 'human history is a race between education and catastrophe and education is the main spring of all national action and survival. Unless it is right and purposeful the people either crawl or limp along'.[66] African nations must use education to transform their societies the same way other nations in history have used it to transform theirs. This is the challenge of history for African nations in the postcolonial period. This chapter by its eclectic approach does not provide a definitive answer. It merely extends an invitation to African educators, scholars, and relevant education stakeholders to ponder more deeply on this challenge with regard to the purpose and vision of education in postcolonial Africa.

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CHAPTER 44

African Women and the Postcolonial State

Alicia C. Decker

'In our African societies, woman's awakening is not entirely well conceived, although society's progress requires it and a country cannot develop without women's participation in different parts of our rapidly developing age'. So wrote Celestine Ouezzin Coulibaly, a West African activist-turned-politician, in November 1961, in one of the first newspaper articles written by a woman in the newly independent Republic of Upper Volta.[1] Her article, simply titled 'We Women of the Upper Volta', was a revolutionary call to arms, a feminist manifesto that emboldened women to stake their claim on the front lines of national development. Coulibaly was no stranger to the political scene. She had helped to found, and then became secretary general, of the women's wing of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain in Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. The following year, in December 1949, she had organized a large march of women from Abidjan to Grand Bassam Prison (an impressive distance of 30 miles) to protest against French colonial rule. Some historians suggest that this procession and subsequent demonstration at the prison comprised a 'pivotal event' that inspired France to begin negotiations for African independence.[2] Nearly a decade later, after the Republic obtained self-governing status in 1958, Coulibaly was appointed Minister of Social Affairs, Housing, and Employment. The following year, she was elected to represent Upper Volta in the French Community senate, a position she held for the next two years. Given her multiple professional accomplishments, Coulibaly served as a role model for many women, and was someone to whom they would listen. She therefore used her newspaper article to remind them of the

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not-so-distant past, a time when they were not taken seriously as social actors. She explained:

> In those days, not so long ago, women were totally disregarded. She was considered secondary, as an object or a tool in the hands of her husband, whose actions she had no right to control. We had no position in society and we had no political rights whatsoever. Legally, women were considered incapable and therefore unable to consent to their own marriage, so marriage, was rather, a bill of sale agreed upon by the future husband and her own family. The dowry consisted of inconsequential symbolic gifts, rather than gifts of serious meaning for a family one was joining. The dowry became, instead, a display of wealth and false power, no more than a purchase price for a woman. Thus, a woman's safety after marriage was in no way guaranteed, since a husband could send her back at will.

Coulibaly made a point of informing her readers that things had not always been this way, that in the pre-colonial past women had had value and power, and that they could have these things again if they took their role in nation building seriously. 'The truth is that, with independence', she predicted, 'women's real emancipation has begun. With independence, women can once again become full-fledged citizens in an African state'.[3] But could they actually do so? Was 'fully-fledged' citizenship even possible for most African women? Or was 'real emancipation' nothing but a sham?

This chapter takes up these important questions by examining African women's complex relationship to the postcolonial state. More specifically, it explores the ways in which African statecraft has created opportunities and challenges for African women on the continent. This is a complicated assignment because its very title rests on several problematic assumptions. First, it assumes that there is such a thing as 'African women' who will act, or be acted upon, by the postcolonial state. There are fifty-five African nations that are recognized by the United Nations or the African Union, or both. Morocco is a member of the former, but not the latter, while Western Sahara is a member of the latter, but not the former.[4] Morocco claims Western Sahara as a territory; Western Saharans claim they are independent. There are also contested territories, such as the Republic of Somaliland, which operates as an autonomous region of Somalia. Unlike Western Sahara, however, Somaliland is not recognized by the international community. Does an African woman from one of these places have anything in common with an African woman from an uncontested territory? How about women from North Africa, whose ties to the Middle East or Europe might be more salient? Are they just as African as women from south of the Sahara? We could also question the meaning of 'women'. Are we making an assumption that gender trumps other types of difference, such as sexuality, religion, or social class?[5] If we propose that women are women despite all other aspects of their identity, are we including those who identify as transgender? Or do we really only mean those who are

cisgender, or 'normatively' gendered? The point is this: African women are very difficult to categorize and are never simply 'African women'.

The second assumption is that there is something called 'the' postcolonial state. This begs the question: What is postcolonial? South Africa gained its independence from Britain in 1910, but the vast majority of South Africans did not experience liberation until multiracial elections were held in 1994, so is independence really an accurate marker of postcolonial status? Or is postcoloniality contingent on some degree of majority rule? How do we reconcile the temporal aspects of postcolonial status? Is the postcolonial state of Ghana (independent in 1957) really similar to the postcolonial state of South Sudan (independent in 2011)? And what do we make of Ethiopia and Liberia? Can a country be postcolonial if it was never colonized? The state must also be called into question, as there have been a number of different types of states in postcolonial Africa (e.g. single-party 'democratic', multiparty 'democratic', military regimes, and various hybrid models). There have also been weak, parasitic, and collapsed states, so when we talk about African women and the postcolonial state, what do we really mean?

The final assumption rests on the 'and' in the title of this chapter. 'And' assumes that women are not part and parcel of the state, that both terms are not mutually constitutive (i.e. there are women *and* there are states). However, what if we were to work from the premise that women *are* the state or that states *are* women, at least in part? In other words, what would happen if we were to think of states as gendered institutions that shape and are shaped by women (and men), and ideas about women (and men), whosoever they may be? At the very least, we would have a more nuanced understanding of history, one that embraces difference and the complexities that such an analysis brings. This is one of the primary goals of this chapter.

I am certainly not the first to argue that African states are gendered. In 1989, Jane Parpart and Kathleen Staudt published *Women and the State in Africa*, an edited collection that theorized women's gendered relationship to 'the state'. In their introduction, they describe how masculine privilege has been inscribed within structures of the state:

> Whether in its indigenous, colonial, or modern forms, the state has been overwhelmingly controlled by men; this control has translated into laws, policies, and spending patterns which not coincidentally benefit men. Women's seemingly personal, everyday experiences are structured by policies, most of which are apparently 'gender neutral.' But these policies are in fact experienced very differently by men and women.[6]

Historically, African states have been made up of men who have enacted policies that have primarily benefited other men. So what happens to the gendering of African statecraft when more women enter into formal politics? Does the state become less patriarchal if more women take a place at the table? Or would women be better served by refusing to sit at the table in the first place,

by agitating against the state from the outside? If 'the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house', as the late Audre Lorde so eloquently penned more than thirty years ago, then perhaps African women (and their allies) need to continue challenging the very system itself.[7] In the remainder of this chapter, I will consider several historical examples that help us think through these particular questions, as well as those raised above. I begin by looking at the status of women in a number of different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to determine how state policies and practices have influenced their lives.[8] In the next section, I examine the political trajectories of several women who got involved in politics and thus became part of the state. And finally, in the last section, I consider the role of activism as a tool for engaging the state from the outside. I conclude by returning to the gendering of African statecraft, theorizing how and to what extent African women can make the postcolonial state less patriarchal.

The State of African Women

Given that the vast majority of political leaders in postcolonial Africa have been men, it is not surprising that many state policies have promoted and protected male privilege. One way they have done this is by allocating greater resources to issues that are important to men and/or to the celebration of masculinity. Ministries of Defense, for example, have historically enjoyed larger budgets than Ministries of Education, Health, or Labor because security has been defined in militarized terms (i.e. a 'secure' state is a militarized state) and categorized as 'men's work' (e.g. most soldiers and Ministers of Defense are men).[9] Patricia McFadden suggests that 'a clear and unambiguous link has existed between the maintenance and expansion of state power and the growth and use of militarism as an expression of that state power'. Furthermore, male leaders in postcolonial Africa have used the militarized state 'as a site of accumulation' and 'as a vehicle of repression, surveillance, and exclusion of the majority of people, particularly women, the young, and the elderly in working communities'.[10] In other words, they have used militarism to enrich and protect a particular type of power structure, one that is gendered masculine. This does not mean that some women have not benefited from this patriarchal system (or that all men have), but instead, that the postcolonial state has privileged a select few at the expense of many.

Another way that African states have promoted male privilege is by enacting policies that do not take women's domestic and reproductive labor into account, assuming that such labor is 'free' or ancillary to 'real' work. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, global economic crisis compelled many African governments to restructure their economies on the basis of various austerity measures recommended by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In order to qualify for additional aid packages, governments needed to 'balance their budgets, cut social spending, eliminate

subsidies, provide concessions to multinational corporations to encourage investment, privatize government agencies, promote cash-crop production, and retrench redundant public servants'.[11] Such measures, it was believed, would help African governments save money so that they could more readily service their external debts. The problem, however, was that the citizenry had to compensate for the retraction of the state. Much of this labor burden fell on the shoulders of women:

> Since women are frequently responsible for food provision, the elimination of subsidies and the move toward cash crop production made it difficult for many to provide food for their families. The privatization of social services also made health and education unaffordable for the poor. Women's reproductive labor burdens often increased as they attempted to compensate for these cutbacks. In Malawi, for instance, if a clinic was compelled to introduce user fees to offset the loss of government subsidies, a peasant farmer might be unable to bring her sick child to the doctor. She would have to provide care at home, which in turn, compromised her ability to care for the rest of her family and jeopardized her child's chance of recovery. If this same woman was unable to pay her children's school fees, she might decide to keep her daughters at home so that they could help with domestic and agricultural activities. This would significantly decrease their future earning potential and increase the likelihood that they would be married off at an earlier age, a harmful practice for a host of additional reasons.[12]

The World Bank and IMF eventually came to recognize these problems, and began moving away from structural adjustment in the late 1990s. In their place, they initiated poverty-reduction programs, which gave African governments more ownership over the restructuring process. Nonetheless, these programs still reproduced many of the same problems for African women and girls, not counting or compensating for unpaid labor within the household.[13]

African postcolonial states have also protected male privilege by targeting women for social reform. In the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, as newly independent states grappled with the meanings of national identity, morality campaigns became increasingly popular. African leaders used these campaigns to create (the appearance of) a particular type of nation, one that was 'decent' and 'virtuous'. Whether they enacted these reforms to 'establish their superiority over the west in at least one sphere', as Audrey Wipper has suggested, or to cultivate political legitimacy as I have argued elsewhere, one thing is clear: women's bodies were the ones that were policed.[14] In Uganda, for instance, young women were routinely chastised for wearing mini dresses. In one letter to the Editor, defiantly titled 'Minis Not for Us', Peace Nyenga articulated her position:

> To shame a woman is to shame a nation … any woman (and girl) who wears a mini-dress puts the whole nation—Uganda—to shame … The Government should realize that the 'mini' girls or daughters have failed their parents and the

> state of Uganda … Action must be taken to discipline and limit the freedom of mini dressers so that Uganda can unburden *herself* of the mini dress yoke.[15]

The author clearly believed that women (and girls) were important symbols of the nation, and that the nation (at least in its ideological form) was gendered feminine.[16] President Idi Amin also believed that women's fashion was linked to moral decay. On May 27, 1972, he enacted a decree 'to prohibit the wearing of certain dresses which outrage decency and are injurious to public morals'. The decree stipulated that:

> Every person of or above the apparent age of fourteen years who in any public place wears any dress, garment, skirts, or shorts the hem-line or bottom of which is 7.62 centimeter (3 inches) above the knee-line or wears any dress popularly known as a midi or a maxi having a slit on any part of the circumference of such dress the apex of which is above the knee-line [would be in violation].[17]

The decree also banned short, tight-fitting pants that were known popularly as 'hot pants'. Any person arrested for violating the dress code was labeled 'idle and disorderly' and subject to a fine and/or imprisonment. Although the law was supposed to be gender-neutral, the vast majority of those arrested or otherwise punished were women.[18] This pattern was not unique to Uganda as many African states read (and continue to read) morality as a feminine preserve.[19]

African states also codified male privilege within their national constitutions by refusing to outlaw gender discrimination and by exempting family and customary law from constitutional regulation.[20] This meant that women were not considered full citizens of the postcolonial state. Although a number of governments amended or drafted new constitutions in the 1990s, an important response to the international women's movement which gained greater traction in Africa after the Third World Conference on Women was held in Nairobi in 1985, there is still room for improvement. South Africa remains the only country in Africa that has constitutionally outlawed discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and that recognizes the right of same-sex couples to marry.[21] If African women are to achieve the 'real emancipation' that Coulibaly predicted in 1961, then policymakers must work harder at dismantling male privilege within the postcolonial state.

Women of the African State

If the postcolonial state is masculinist *because* most African leaders have been men, what happens when increasing numbers of women become involved in politics? Does the African state become less patriarchal? Since the mid-1980s, six women have served as unelected heads of state: Carmen Pereira (Guinea Bissau, May 14–16, 1984); Sylvie Kinigi (Burundi, October 27, 1993–February 5, 1994); Ruth Perry (Liberia, September 3, 1996–August 2, 1997);

Rose Francine Rogombe (Gabon, June 10–October 16, 2009); Monique Ohsan Bellepeau (Mauritius, March 31, 2012–July 21, 2012 and May 29, 2015–June 5, 2015); and Joyce Banda (Malawi (April 7, 2012–May 31, 2014). In the last ten years, three additional women have been elected president. These include Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia, January 16, 2006–present), Catherine Samba-Panza (Central African Republic, January 23, 2014–March 30, 2016), and Ameenah Gurib (Mauritius, June 5, 2015–present). A relatively small number of African women have also served as prime minister or acting prime minister.[22] Most of these women have garnered little international attention, save for Ellen Johnson Sirleaf because of her role as the first *elected* female president of an African nation and because of the enormous task that lay ahead of her; Liberia had just emerged from fourteen years of brutal civil war and had very little in the way of infrastructure. In her inaugural address to the nation, Sirleaf vowed to root out corruption, restore good governance, and promote national reconciliation. She also promised to promote the status of women:

> My Administration shall thus endeavor to give Liberian women prominence in all affairs of our country. My Administration shall empower Liberian women in all areas of our national life. We will support and increase the writ of laws that restore their dignities and deal drastically with crimes that dehumanize them. We will enforce without fear or favor the law against rape recently passed by the National Transitional Legislature. We shall encourage families to educate all children, particularly the girl child. We shall also try to provide economic programs that enable Liberian women to assume their proper place in our economic revitalization process.[23]

While opportunities for women and girls have increased significantly during Sirleaf's two terms in office, her administration has also been accused of nepotism, patronage politics, and corruption. Perhaps 'old habits' are simply 'intransigent' as Aili Tripp suggests in a blog post about African women and politics.[24] Or perhaps the assumption that women will 'do' politics differently, simply because they are women, is faulty. Until more women have the opportunity to serve as political leaders, we will not fully understand if their political paths are truly different from those of men.

In Rwanda, where women currently hold 63.8% of parliamentary seats (more than anywhere else in the world) we might expect to find a less patriarchal form of politics at play. In some respects this is true. Rwandan women legislators have introduced (and helped pass) legislation that enables women to inherit land, that combats gender-based violence, and that loosens restrictions on abortion. The problem, however, is that they are competing with a larger power structure that can easily undermine their authority. According to April Gordon, 'Real power is invested in the office of the president in most African countries and among a few loyalists at the upper levels of the executive branch of government. In other words, men still hold a monopoly

of power regardless of how many women are in parliament'.[25] So, even in a country like Rwanda where the majority of legislators are women, 'real' power remains largely in the hands of men.[26]

This has not always been the case. In Tanzania, for instance, Bibi Titi Mohamed was known as the 'Mother of the Nation' because of her role mobilizing women during the liberation struggle. She led Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania, the women's wing of the Tanganyika African National Union, and used community dance groups to recruit women to the nationalist cause.[27] After independence, she served as Minister of Women and Social Affairs and as a member of parliament. She resigned from government service in 1967 after the President enacted the Arusha Declaration, a wide-reaching program promoting African socialism and self-reliance. She resented 'the undemocratic manner in which it was being imposed upon us'.[28] Shortly thereafter, in 1969, she was implicated in a plot to overthrow the government, and sentenced to life imprisonment for treason. Although she was pardoned in 1972, she never returned to political life. Despite her lack of education, Mohamed did have 'real' political power and was known as the 'most important politician after [President] Nyerere'.[29]

Another important political figure was Constance Agatha Cummings-John, the first black African woman to run a city government. In 1966, she was elected mayor of Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone. Prior to this historic achievement, she had been elected to the Freetown City Council (1938) and the House of Representatives (1957), although she never had a chance to serve in the latter because of factional conflicts. In *Memoirs of a Krio Leader*, Cummings-John described her first day in office as mayor:

> After the usual swearing-in ceremony, the Town Clerk, J.B. Jenkins Johnston, and the mayor's secretary, Mrs. Cecelia Parkinson, took me into the mayor's chambers where I was robed. Fully robed and wearing my chain of office, I returned to the council hall to conduct the remainder of that day's business. I briefly spoke about the importance of my election for the women of Sierra Leone. *They had been left behind in our politics for some time, but now we would show them that we could hold our own with men*. After the meeting, there was much celebrating.[30]

One of her first official tasks was to appoint a 'mayoress', a position traditionally held by the mayor's wife. Because the mayor's husband was stationed abroad as the ambassador to Liberia and Ivory Coast, he could not undertake the required duties. She therefore decided to appoint her sister-in-law to the position, later noting in her memoir that '[h]er support and assistance during this time was really invaluable'.[31] The mayor appointed a second woman, Lerina Bright-Taylor, to lead the city's women in various self-help activities. Although the women organized a number of successful projects, their efforts were ultimately curtailed by a military coup in 1967.

Cummings-John's decision to appoint another woman as first lady, or mayoress, speaks to the importance of this position within African politics. In addition to ceremonial functions, some African first ladies have attempted to organize and represent the nation's women: Nana Ageman Rawlings led the 31 December Women's Movement in Ghana; Maryam Babangida ran the Better Life for Rural Women Program in Nigeria; and Mariam Traoré headed the Union Nationale des Femmes du Mali.[32] Not surprisingly, each of these organizations have had a close relationship with the ruling party and their politics. Amina Mama describes this system as a femocracy, which is 'an anti-democratic female power structure which claims to exist for the advancement of ordinary women, but is unable to do so because it is dominated by a small clique of women whose authority derives from their being married to powerful men, rather than from any actions or ideas of their own'.[33] Instead of promoting a feminist agenda, elite wives undermine women's interests by supporting a patriarchal political system that enriches but a few.

Although a relatively small number of African women have been active in politics, African statecraft remains highly patriarchal. Until women make up a 'critical mass' within male-dominated institutions (this critical mass being at least 30% according to targets set by the United Nations Economic and Social Council and reaffirmed within the Beijing Platform for Action) they will not likely have a meaningful impact on the political system. At present, only fourteen nations in Sub-Saharan Africa have reached this critical mass within their legislatures.[34] But having a critical mass of women in leadership is not enough. Women in power must also be willing to support legislation that promotes gender equity. Some may not want to 'rock the boat' by going against the mainstream agenda and standing up for women's rights. However, feminist scholars maintain that it is only by 'making waves' that African women can craft a less patriarchal state.

Activism as a Gendered Strategy of Political Engagement

Most African women have interacted with the postcolonial state as political outsiders. Their strategies of engagement have varied, depending on the extent to which they have been compelled, or felt willing and able, to support or confront the state. The state represents different things to different persons. For one woman, it may figure as a drunken soldier, 'manning' a makeshift roadblock along a deserted stretch of roadway. For another woman, it could take the form of a revenue officer who issues her yearly tax stub. And for yet another, it might look like the local magistrate who presided over her son's recent court case. All of these women 'know' the postcolonial state in different ways and have different types of relationships with it. For some women, particularly in rural areas, the state is an abstract entity that rarely enters into everyday life. For others, however, the state is everywhere at all times, and must be constantly negotiated. These negotiations are of particular

interest because they help us to understand the ways in which African women have used activism as a gendered strategy of political engagement.

In the mid-1970s, a significant number of Ugandan women stood up to Idi Amin, one of the world's most notorious dictators. Their husbands, sons, and fathers had been 'disappeared' by the military state, and yet, they had the courage to speak out against the brutal regime. These women agreed to testify in front of a government commission of inquiry that was investigating the 'mysterious stealing and disappearance of people in Uganda' *while* the regime was still in power.[35] In gut-wrenching detail, more than 150 women from across the country described the pain of watching as their loved ones were beaten, bundled into the trunks of unmarked cars, and whisked away, never to be seen again. They recalled the trauma of trudging through the forests and swamps that had become unmarked graves, searching for clues or a body to bury. And they remembered the emotional and financial hardships that accompanied their losses. They framed their narratives in gendered terms, situating themselves as the wives, mothers, and daughters of the disappeared. Although we may not think of these women as activists in the traditional sense of the word, they spoke against tyranny. By testifying about the brutality of Amin's dictatorship, they used their voices 'to counter the deafening silence of disappearance, indelibly recording a crime that was supposed to leave no trace'.[36]

Women in Botswana also spoke out against injustice. In 1982, the government amended the Citizenship Act, denying citizenship to the children of married parents whose mother was from Botswana and whose father was not.[37] According to the new law, citizenship could only be passed down along the 'legitimate' male line. A number of different newspapers published letters to the Editor challenging this narrow definition of citizenship. One such letter, written by six Batswana women, chastised the Attorney General for telling women, 'Don't marry a stranger if you don't want his citizenship'.[38] They warned that 'because the Citizenship Act denies Batswana women the right to marry whoever they love and to live with them wherever they see fit, we are already thinking of how to circumvent its provisions. Your Honour, we shall "live in sin" with the men we love so that our children may retain Botswana citizenship'.[39] They asserted that 'children born to a Botswana parent (irrespective of sex and marital status) have sufficient descent links with this country to be given an option to acquire its citizenship'.[40] They concluded by requesting that the Attorney General and the Law Reform Committee reconsider the 'unjust abolition of dual citizenship', noting that they would be making further recommendations about 'other laws and practices that are unjust'. One year after this letter was published, a group of activists founded Emang Basadi, which means 'Stand Up Women' in Setswana, to fight for women's rights. They legally challenged the amendment and in 1992, the Botswana High Court ruled in their favor, determining that the citizenship law was indeed in conflict with women's rights as articulated by

the constitution.[41] By confronting the state in the court of public opinion, as well as through the formal legal system, these women brought about important change.

The women in Uganda, just like the women in Botswana, used gendered rhetoric in their appeals to the state. They spoke out as wives, mothers, and daughters who had been harmed by patriarchal political systems that were discriminatory and/or violent. On July 12, 1990, a group of women in northwest Soweto removed their clothes to publicly protest the demolition of their homes by the South African police force. Two weeks earlier, the women had put up shacks in an expensive new residential area to raise awareness of the plight of the homeless. Despite the cold weather, and the fact that the women had nowhere else to go, the government moved in with teargas, dogs, an armored vehicle, and a bulldozer to raze their shacks to the ground. Sheila Meintjes, a South African feminist scholar and activist, described the scene: 'As the police moved to dismantle their shacks, the younger women shack dwellers stripped off their clothes, taunted the police, ululated, shouted in anger about their plight and their pain, sang and danced, and held up printed placards demanding homes and security of tenure'.[42] The women hoped that by taking off their clothes, they could stop the police from demolishing their shacks. Meintjes explains:

> The symbolism of their identity as women and as sexual beings was a central aspect of their action. The particularity of their actions drew attention to, was a signifier of and was, at the same time, a challenge to their status as social and sexual dependents. Their action challenged men and the state. The claims embedded in their action were specific—for the substantive right to housing. Access to housing provided the basis on which they would be able to nurture their families and provide a launching pad for them to create sustainable livelihoods. For the women, the right to housing also called for recognition of their specific responsibilities as women citizens.[43]

Although the government demolished their shacks and confiscated all of their personal property, the women were ultimately victorious. The government agreed to release an adjacent plot of land for a new settlement. And yet, stripping naked was not an easy decision for these women. As Meintjes found in her interviews with participants, it was simply a 'last resort', proof that 'their circumstances had driven them into "madness"'.[44]

Because most African women have not had the opportunity to sit at the political table, so to speak, they have been compelled to engage the state from the outside. They have spoken out against violence, injustice, and discrimination, utilizing gendered rhetoric and collective action to get their points across. Sometimes, as the examples presented here suggest, women have been successful in their efforts to confront or challenge the postcolonial state. Other times, however, victory has been more elusive. Indeed, many African women have been taunted, beaten, jailed, and even killed for daring

to take on 'the state'. The risks of engagement are certainly high, but for those who are living within patriarchal political systems that do not work for them, the risks of not engaging are even higher.

Conclusion

It has now been fifty-five years since Celestine Ouezzin Coulibaly predicted that political independence would result in women's emancipation, allowing them to become 'full-fledged citizens' of the postcolonial state. Sadly, for most African women, her prediction did not come to fruition. In fact, in Burkina Faso (the current name of the former Republic of Upper Volta) women and girls are still considered 'second-class citizens'. A recent investigation by Amnesty International UK found that 'women and girls in Burkina Faso are being discriminated against by a system that won't let them make decisions about their education, healthcare and contraception'.[45] As a result, they have one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world, coupled with one of the lowest rates of contraceptive use. Here, and in many other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, sexism remains embedded within the legal code. One of the major problems is that politics remains a male game. Only 9.4% of legislators in Burkina Faso are women; that is significantly lower than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa, which currently stands at 23.1%.[46] We know that having women in positions of power is not enough to create substantive change for gender equality. Such women must also be willing to promote a feminist agenda, and have enough colleagues who are willing to do the same. Women should also have the freedom to engage the state through various forms of activism without the risk of being harassed, jailed, or even killed. Until sexist policies and practices can be safely challenged by women (and men), both within the postcolonial state and beyond, African statecraft will remain highly patriarchal.

Notes

1. Celestine Ouezzin Coulibaly, "We Women of the Upper Volta" (1961), in *Women Writing Africa*: *West Africa and the Sahel*, ed. Esi Sutherland-Addy and Aminata Diaw (New York: The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2005), 225.
2. Kathleen Sheldon, *The A to Z of Women in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2010), 93. See also Henriettte Diabate, *La Marche des Femmes sur Grand-Bassam* (Abidjan: Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1975).
3. Coulibaly, "We Women of the Upper Volta," 226.
4. The African Union admitted Morocco as a member state on January 30, 2017.
5. For an important discussion on the fluidity of sex and gender in Africa, see Ifi Amadiume, *Male Daughters, Female Husbands*: *Gender and Sex in an African Society* (London: Zed Books, 1987). See also Oyeronke Oyewumi, *The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

6. Jane L. Parpart and Kathleen A. Staudt, "Women and the State in Africa," in *Women and the State in Africa*, ed. Jane L. Parpart and Kathleen A. Staudt (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 1.
7. Audre Lorde, "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House," in *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches* (Trumansburg, NY: The Crossing Press, 1984), 112.
8. My focus on Sub-Saharan Africa is not meant to signify that the gender politics of contemporary North Africa are any less important or interesting. Instead, it reflects the primary geographical scope of this particular volume.
9. For a discussion of the links between militarism and masculinity in Africa, see: Nina Mba, "Kaba and Khaki: Women and the Militarized State in Nigeria," in *Women and the State in Africa*, ed. Jane L. Parpart and Kathleen Staudt (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 69–90; Jackyn Cock, "Keeping the Fires Burning: Militarization and the Politics of Gender in South Africa," *Review of African Political Economy* 45/46 (1989): 50–64; Amina Mama and Margo Okazawa-Rey, "Militarism, Conflict, and Women's Activism," *Feminist Africa* 10 (2008): 1–8; Amina Mama and Margo Okazawa-Rey, "Militarism, Conflict and Women's Activism in the Global Era: Challenges and Prospects for Women in Three West African Contexts," *Feminist Review* 101 (2012): 97–123; and Alicia C. Decker, *In Idi Amin's Shadow: Women, Gender, and Militarism in Uganda* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2014).
10. Patricia McFadden, "Plunder as Statecraft: Militarism and Resistance in Postcolonial Africa," in *Security Disarmed: Critical Perspectives on Gender, Race, and Militarization*, ed. Barbara Sutton, Sandra Morgen, and Julie Novkov (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 152.
11. Alicia C. Decker and Andrea L. Arrington, *Africanizing Democracies: 1980-Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 26.
12. Ibid., 26–27.
13. The implementation of Universal Primary Education, which was one of the Millennium Development Goals, had unintended gendered effects in many African countries as well. As girls and boys went off to school, African women often lost an important source of labor within the household and thus experienced a greater labor burden.
14. Audrey Wipper, "African Women, Fashion, and Scapegoating," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 6, no. 2 (1972): 332; Decker, *In Idi Amin's Shadow*, chap. 3.
15. Peace Nyenga, letter to the Editor, *Uganda Argus*, November 12, 1971. [Italics mine].
16. For a discussion of women as symbols of the nation, see Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, "Introduction," in *Women-Nation-State*, ed. Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (London: MacMillan, 1989), 9–10.
17. Government of Uganda, Penal Code Act (Amendment) Decree, Decree 9 of 1972.
18. Decker, *In Idi Amin's Shadow*, 66–73.
19. For discussions of similar campaigns and debates, see: Ilsa Glazer Schuster, *New Women of Lusaka* (Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield Publishing, 1979); Thomas Burgess, "Cinema, Bell Bottoms, and Miniskirts: Struggles Over Youth and Citizenship in Revolutionary Zanzibar," *International Journal of African*

Historical Studies 35, nos. 2–3 (2002): 287–313; Cyprian Kambili, "Ethics of African Tradition: Prescription of a Dress Code in Malawi, 1965–1973," *Society of Malawi Journal* 55, no. 2 (2002): 80–100; Karen Tranberg Hansen, "Dressing Dangerously: Miniskirts, Gender Relations, and Sexuality in Zambia," in *Fashioning Africa*: *Power and the Politics of Dress*, ed. Jean Allman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 166–85; and Andrew M. Ivaska, "'Anti-Mini Militants Meet Modern Misses': Urban Style, Gender, and the Politics of 'National Culture' in 1960s Dar es Salaam, Tanzania," in *Fashioning Africa*, 104–21.

20. Iris Berger, *Women in Twentieth-Century Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 99.
21. Aili Tripp, Isabel Casimiro, Joy Kwesiga, and Alice Mungwa, *African Women's Movements: Changing Political Landscapes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 7.
22. This includes Elisabeth Domitien (Central African Republic, January 2, 1975–April 4, 1976), Agathe Uwilingiyimana (Rwanda, July 18, 1993–April 7, 1994), Mame Madior Boye (Senegal, March 3, 2001–November 4, 2002), Maria das Neves (São Tomé and Príncipe, October 7, 2002–July 16, 2003 and July 23, 2003–September 18, 2004), Luisa Diogo (Mozambique, February 17, 2004–January 16, 2010), Maria do Carmo Silveira (São Tomé and Príncipe, June 8, 2005–April 21, 2006), Cécile Manorohanta (Madagascar, December 18–20, 2009), Cissé Mariam Kaidama Sidibé (Mali, April 3, 2011–March 22, 2012), Adiato Djaló Nandigna (Guinea Bissau, February 10, 2012–April 12, 2012), Aminata Touré (Senegal, September 3, 2013–July 8, 2014), and Saara Kuugongelwa (Namibia, March 21, 2015–present).
23. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, "Presidential Inaugural Address," Capitol Grounds, Monrovia, January 16, 2006.
24. Aili Mari Tripp, 'Women in Politics in Africa Today,' *Democracy in Africa*, December 9, 2013, http://democracyinafrica.org/women-politics-africa-today/.
25. April Gordon, "Women in Development," in *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, ed. April A. Gordon and Donald L. Gordon (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013), 319.
26. Timothy Longman, "Rwanda: Achieving Equality or Serving an Authoritarian State?" in *Women in African Parliaments*, ed. Gretchen Bauer and Hannah E. Britton (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 149.
27. Sheldon, *Women in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 155.
28. Bibi Titi Mohamed quoted in M.M. Mulokozi, "Introduction to 'Bibi Titi Mohamed: Sacrifices for Change,'" in *Women Writing Africa: The Eastern Region*, ed. Amandina Lihamba et al. (New York: The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2007), 229.
29. Ibid., 229.
30. Constance Agatha Cummings-John, "Mayor of Freetown" (1995) in *Women Writing Africa: West Africa and the Sahel*, ed. Esi Sutherland-Addy and Aminata Diaw (New York: The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2005), 234. [Italics mine].
31. Ibid., 235.
32. Tripp, et al., *African Women's Movements*, 47.

33. Amina Mama, "Feminism or Femocracy? State Feminism and Democratization in Nigeria," *Africa Development* 20, no. 1 (1995): 41. See also: Hussaina Abdullah, "Wifeism and Activism: The Nigerian Women's Movement," in *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Local Perspective*, ed. Amrita Basu (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 209–25; Philomena Okeke, "First Lady Syndrome: The (En)Gendering of Bureaucratic Corruption in Nigeria," *CODESRIA Bulletin* 3–4 (1998): 16–19; and Jibrin Ibrahim, "The First Lady Syndrome and the Marginalization of Women From Power: Opportunities or Compromises for Gender Equality?" *Feminist Africa* 3 (2004): 1–14.
34. Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in National Parliaments: World Classification," June 1, 2016, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm. In 2006, this figure stood at five nations, and in 1997 (the earliest year that data is available) no countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had reached this critical mass. See Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in National Parliaments: World Classification," January 1, 2006, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif300606.htm and Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in National Parliaments: World Classification," January 1, 1997, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif010197.htm.
35. "Disappearance of People Will Be Stamped Out," *Voice of Uganda*, December 5, 1973.
36. Decker, *In Idi Amin's Shadow*, 133.
37. Leloba Molema and Mary Lederer, "Introduction to 'Citizenship: An Open Letter to the Attorney General'" (1985) in *Women Writing Africa: The Southern Region*, ed. M.J. Daymond et al. (New York: The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2003), 386.
38. Athaliah Molokomme et al., "Citizenship: An Open Letter to the Attorney General" (1985) in *Women Writing Africa: The Southern Region*, 387.
39. Ibid., 388.
40. Ibid., 389.
41. Sheldon, *Women in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 66.
42. Sheila Meintjes, "Naked Women's Protest, July 1990: 'We Won't Fuck for Houses,'" in *Women in South African History*: *Basus'iimbokodo, bawel'imilambo/They Remove Boulders and Cross Rivers*, ed. Nomboniso Gasa (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007), 348. See also Jacqueline Maingard, Heather Thompson, and Sheila Meintjes, *Uku hamba 'ze: To Walk Naked*, DVD (New York: Third World Newsreel, 1995).
43. Ibid., 348.
44. Ibid., 360. African women have a long history of using nakedness to express anger and to curse perpetrators for unacceptable behavior. For a few examples from colonial and postcolonial Africa, see: Tabitha Kanogo, "Kikuyu Women and the Politics of Protest," in *Images of Women in Peace and War*, ed. Sharon MacDonald, Pat Holden, and Shirley Ardener (London: MacMillan, 1987), 78–99; Audrey Wipper, "Kikuyu Women and the Harry Thuku Disturbances: Some Uniformities of Female Militancy," *Africa* 59, no. 3 (1989): 300–37; Wangari Maathai, *Unbowed: A Memoir* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 220–21; and Leymah Gbowee and Carol Mithers, *Mighty Be Our Powers: How Sisterhood, Prayer and Sex Changed a Nation at War* (New York: Beast Books, 2011), 161–63.

45. Amnesty International UK, "Burkina Faso, Where Women and Girls are Second-Class Citizens," March 21, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/burkina-faso-women-girls-rights-early-forced-marriage. Ironically, Burkina Faso once had one of the continent's most progressive leaders. President Thomas Sankara saw women's rights as part of his revolutionary social vision. Sadly, he was assassinated in a military coup on October 15, 1987, just four years after seizing power in his own coup.
46. Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in National Parliaments: World Classification," June 1, 2016, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm and Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in National Parliaments: Regional Averages," June 1, 2016, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm.

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CHAPTER 45

Young People and Public Space in Africa: Past and Present

Mamadou Diouf

In his review for the *New York Times*, 'Youth with Hopes and Bliss Intact' (May 28, 2011),[1] Ken Johnson writes about the video installation created by the Thai director Apichatpong Weerasethakul. 'Primitive', then at the New Museum of New York, focused upon the men of Thailand, yet the initial sentences of Johnson's review aptly describe the situation of young men in many places:

> All over the world, teenage boys and young men are a problem. With their irrepressible energies and strengths, they are always ripe for industrial, military and other kinds of services. But when they are uneducated, unemployed and unsupervised, many of them get into trouble. They join feral gangs and terrorist groups or become freelance criminals, dissipated addicts, deadbeat fathers, suicides. In stable, wealthy nations, schools and vocational programs provide guidance and protective incubation for many youths during the pre-adult years. But in areas afflicted by war and poverty, they can be exceptionally vulnerable to exploitation and bad luck.[2]

Along with Thailand, Africa is one of many regions of misfortune for youth. During the last decades of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the continent has been shaken by eruptions of violence, social and political movements, and cultural and democratic projects,

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of which young men and women have been both the principal perpetrators and the principal victims.

Formally and informally, African youth occupy a central place within public spaces: in the political realm, in music (as creators and producers), in media, in spiritual sites (churches, mosques, forests and other sacred places), in the street,[3] in the armed forces, and as public servants; whether serving the state, politicians, communities, or themselves.[4] In African contexts today, young people are triply positioned: in environments of crisis (of multiple causes, forms, and consequences), young people have come to constitute significant *actors* and *resources*, as well as the central *concern*, within the social movements that have convulsed African societies.

The course and the detours of youth actions, their formal and informal interventions within available social frameworks (both licit and illicit) concern not only their future, but also the future of society as a whole. African youth (in their expressions of violence, as in their artistic endeavors, musical and visual; in their economic ingenuity and community engagement; and in their religious affiliations and political allegiances) sketch out a multicolored, incomplete, and unpublished mapping of a particular social geography. It is a cartography intent upon conforming to '*le temps du monde*' ('the time of globalization') which, in its brutality, uproots the vernacular temporalities of indigenous modernities.

I define *le temps du monde* as the historical sequences that have brought various communities across the world closer to each other economically, politically, and culturally. This movement was initiated by the profound change in the international geopolitical order that began in the sixteenth century with the shift of the world's geopolitical axis towards the oceans, Atlantic and Indian, and concluded with the conquest of the Pacific in the second half of the nineteenth century. *Le temps du monde* is contained within a movement that begins in America in 1492 and finishes in America, now, in the beginning of the twenty-first century; that of the birth and consolidation of the nation-state, and the progressive turning away of politics from its foundation in religion and the rule of the aristocracy.[5] *Le temps du monde*, according to Tocqueville, captures vernacular temporalities, reenunciating them along lines of generational and gender inequality characteristic of traditional societies. One of the clearest expressions of Africa's intrusion into *le temps du monde* is the album *Positive Black Soul*; Paris and New York become, in effect, *banlieues* of Dakar.

The context of the emergence of youth into the public sphere is connected to the combined effects of economic crisis and structural adjustment policies upon employment, education, and health care in particular, and the crisis of legitimacy of the institutions and of the political class which has begun to irreversibly decline. The consequences of such a situation are numerous. I will mention here only two: the acceleration of a process of depoliticization caused by the desertion of formal institutions and the substitution of a

moral critique for a political critique, driven by a profound disdain for political activities and for politics itself, characterized as 'dirty' and morally fraudulent. In addition, political space and political institutions became the exclusive playground of politicians; new spaces of bricolage emerged; and there was a quest for new codes of ethics and solidarity or a recycling and revival of old ones. Other consequences include: the increasingly central role occupied, or taken, by non-state actors, in particular youth and members of ethnic or community organizations; increasingly widespread police and military repression and abuse; the intensification of criminality, drug trafficking and use, and militia activity (whether the militias of neighborhoods, or of ethnic or religious groups); the strengthening of clientelist networks located outside of the spheres of administration and government, particularly in the domain of security (of people and possessions)[6]; the disintegration of the administrative structure; and, finally, the obliteration of public services. In short, the privatization of previously public functions and the constriction of the space in which the state operates. 'In response', writes Joseph Hellweg, 'ruling elites consolidated networks of support, bought off opponents, commandeered state resources, manipulated markets, broke laws, dismantled bureaucracies, held creditors at bay, and allied with national or international corporations to privatize public services'.[7]

These analyses, which foster a reflection upon the relations between young people and the project of the democratization of African societies, must pay close attention to the conditions of everyday life, to the internal dynamics of these societies, and to the stakes of, and cultural motivations of, their interventions. Furthermore, we must attend to the geographies, ecologies (of the city, the village, the forest, the European and US metropole), and social imaginaries that young people have set in motion in order to produce their own subjectivities. How do they interpret, and how do they act upon, the (dis)continuities and ruptures that emerge in their lives, keeping in mind that democratization is a moment in which public space is reorganized? In order to account for the participation, resistance, or indifference of African youth to the democratic project, one must recognize the border zones of the territories in transition that they have been ransacking, marked by signs of suffering and crisis, and in historical moments that require the reconfiguration of geographies of inclusion and exclusion, public and domestic, communal and private.

Such an analysis requires that we take into consideration the realities (factual and discursive) that recover, under varying circumstances and conditions, ideas about both young people and democratization and the interactions between the two.

While the literature on youth is abundant, much of it addresses employment and work, family, belonging and affiliation, gender, and religion. The dimensions of race, politics, and class, however, are neglected. It is, for example, important to identify the styles (of practice, artistic and rhetorical)

through which young people experience both citizenship and daily forms of belonging (local, national, and global), in relation to democratic principles; in particular to pluralism, tolerance, civility, and gender equality. Such a course is indispensable if one is to understand the process through which young people formulate their responses and if one is to understand their extremely complex critiques of political and domestic spaces and of the forms of identification and belonging authorized by state power.

Youth presence in public space (whether in roles assigned or claimed) and participation in politics (within political parties, armed groups, unions, or associations) is constantly reconstituted through a tumultuous movement of inclusion and eviction which positions them, whether as the agents or the acted upon,[8] according to age and sex, ethnicity and religion.

If it appears simple to identify the expressions for which the population labeled 'youth' is responsible, the realities that are defined by this term are difficult to establish unambiguously. What is the usefulness of the notion for describing and analyzing a heterogeneous social category, one that lacks fixed borders whether in terms of class, interests, worldview, gender, or age? Is it a primary or secondary identity? Does it better account for the experience of men than of women? That indeed would be the case if one were to share the view of R. Waller, who maintains that 'youth' is largely, and implicitly, gendered, a category employed to refer to the conflicts between adolescent and adult men in generational terms, while conflicts between adolescent and adult women are imagined in specifically gendered terms.[9] This situation is reflected in the engagements, and the level of participation, of the two groups in the political and social space. In effect, one can frequently lose sight of the presence of women's associations (the political consequences of their social and economic interventions) that insert themselves outside of the political institutions, that terrain that political leaders have exclusively reserved for men.[10]

Setting aside semantic uncertainties and the absence of a precisely defined age group to which it refers, the dominance of 'youth' is a powerful variable in the demography of Africa. This situation makes generational conflict one of the most dynamic and persistent forces of African history to govern access to power, women, and spiritual authority.[11] Islam, Christianity, and the urbanization that followed colonial domination all intensified generational conflict by fueling it with new opportunities and new constraints, both ideological and material.[12] Religious and urban transformations led to a loss of the authority of the 'elders' upon 'youth', and upon women. Both groups could now migrate, convert, or resist (including through violence) in order to confront the 'generational obstacles' that the colonial and postcolonial transitions, identified respectively by John Iliffe[13] and Frederick Cooper,[14] had unleashed. How to understand youth actions, and the political implications of those actions (ranging from the recourse to violence to efforts to join or abandon ethnic, religious, or regional community institutions, the state,

and *le temps du monde*) without taking into consideration not only the *longue durée* of history, but also local understandings and idioms, and changing, unstable circumstances?[15] The appreciation of youth contribution to, or hindering of, the democratic project depends upon a perspective that recognizes this historical and social context.

In turning our attention uniquely towards the age of the actors, does the analytical category 'youth' help us understand particular social expressions? Is 'youth' not a political category claimed, and a metaphor brandished, by actors seeking to legitimate their interventions into political and social terrain? Challenging the existing order or claiming positions of leadership within their communities, 'youth' are not necessarily defined by age but, instead, by expertise, experience within educational and administrative institutions. For example, the contestation of indirect rule that, within the British Empire gave the 'native elite' – the first generation to receive university diplomas – both the legitimacy and authority to participate in colonial governance and control early postcolonial African states.

It appears, then, that understanding the role of young people in democratic transitions demands a double movement. In the first place, it demands understanding democratic transition as a project located at the heart of social, cultural, and economic claims, tests of institutional and political strength that are inscribed in the *longue durée* and in accretions of experiences and discourses, constantly recycled and questioned within social circuits. These practices are shaped by sequences, the pre-colonial (including certain ideas of modernity and modernization), the colonial (including new national forms of an alternative modernity), and that of capitalist globalization, with its creole logics. This movement is necessary in order to decipher social movements, cultural and political processes that undergird assertions of democracy building or that, by contrast, contribute to resistance or indifference to it. The second movement consists of asking about the continuities and discontinuities between the three temporalities in the representations and roles that are (self-)assigned to youth in democracy building. Several factors, including the political, economic, social and cultural, interact within each of these temporalities and trace the political formation and the type of presence and participation of youth in each of them.

This analysis does not lose sight of a central fact: the terrain of its intervention is that of the last twenty years. It sets out to account for the trajectory of African youth within the context of the varied projects of democratic transition that began in African states during the 1990s, without losing sight of the global context of that trajectory and the historical itinerary that endows it with meaning. This analysis tracks the transformations of the construction of the social category of 'youth'; the roles that are assigned to young people, as well as their practices in the spaces of community, state, and globalization; and the languages, social logics, and resources (material and symbolic) that they mobilize in the three temporal sequences that I identify below.

The first sequence consists of the nationalist years, dominated by the mobilization of youth in order to achieve political autonomy, recover African culture, and reconcile tradition and modernity; the second sequence is that of the intensification of social movements and of a return to violence, a context characterized by an intensification of repression and of demands for democracy. It is a moment that brings together war, the ascent of a libidinal, criminal economy that combines violence, the desire to (merely) appear, and the obscene display of wealth. The third and final sequence initiates (that is, at least, the argument that I defend here) the emergence of the arts of citizenship outside of the political or, in new modes of doing politics. This time is one of moral economies (of mosques, churches, and religious groups) and of a recycling of the effects of globalization on the part of youth who are aware of participating in *le temps du monde*. We could even say that in the course of this final sequence we see the dissolution of the political and the reinvention of the everyday and of history. Are we not in the process of exiting the libraries, both colonial and national? It is a situation that demands that the democratic project, which could not take root, must be rethought in light of the experiences of the past 20 years.

Situations

African demographic research emphasizes the 'bulge' of youth in the population: it is a significant trend that has considerably reshaped the African population and will continue to do so long into the future. Some 200 million Africans are between 15 and 24 years old.[16] Young people represent three-fifths of the unemployed, and 72% of them have an income of under two dollars per day.[17] The following solid demographic factors deserve mention: young people face xenophobia and exploitation, including sexual exploitation; they endure domestic and public violence; they work in the informal sector, one of generally poor productivity and revenue.[18] Relative to rural youth, urban youth have more educational opportunities, stay in school longer and enter the labor market later.[19] Girls are less educated, have significantly reduced access to school, and may experience early pregnancy and childbirth.[20]

The figures are chilling. As Michelle Garvin observes:

> More than 70 percent of all Zimbabweans, for example, are now under 30; the same is true in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Nigeria, among other countries. Over one-third of the entire population of Zimbabwe, and over 56 percent of the adult (over 15) population, is between 15 and 29 years old. In fact, young adults (aged 15 to 29) make up 40 percent or more of the total adult population in the vast majority of sub-Saharan countries; in roughly 30 African countries, they constitute more than half of the adult population.

> In contrast, approximately 40 percent of the population in the United States is under 30, and young adults constitute less than 30 percent of the adult population as a whole.[21]

Meanwhile, these enormous and horrifying figures mask the heterogeneity of the social category that they purport to explain. The relevant age range varies according to country, language, and circumstances, while the common legal situation is that, at age 18 (the age of majority), citizens gain the right to vote and become equal before the law. In West Africa, for example, youth is defined variously: in Ghana, as aged between 18 and 35; in Sierra Leone, between 15 and 30; in Nigeria, between 18 and 35; and in Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Ivory Coast, between 15 and 35. Certain international institutions attempt to establish a common understanding of the age range that 'youth' denotes: the United Nations and the World Bank propose ages 15–24; the Commonwealth, ages 15–29.

The impacts of youth presence on public space and youth participation in politics vary considerably, depending upon what ages 'youth' denotes. These impacts and consequences are forcefully shaped by the distinct historical sequences around which this reflection is organized.

First Sequence: Education and Training

This first sequence, which begins with independence and continues into the middle of the 1970s, is marked by the logic that defined state-education policy: the training and bureaucratization of youth by the ruling party (which quickly became the sole party) and its affiliated organizations of women, youth, workers, and peasants.[22] It is a situation that Achille Mbembe describes well in his analysis of the familial, patriarchal dynamics of political subordination:

> [T]he head of state, titled owner of the wealth that the state constitutes, manages that patrimony in the interest of his children. Through the ideological force of seniority, the younger owes respect and submission to the elder. Obedience is, here, the sign of wisdom, and is rewarded as such through cooptation into the circles that draw on the national coffers. In this way, relations of subjection attempt to work through the channels of familial relationship: and thus, given the character of African family structure, along the lines of inequality likely to evoke the greatest level of consent. Old social categories are thus reinvigorated and endowed with new political ends.[23]

African young people constituted a critical social and political issue because they became the most significant measure of the success or failure of society, state, and nation. Young people were assigned the double function of achieving the emancipation of the continent and of launching African states into development, democracy, and social justice. 'Youth' thus became the agent of

modernization through education. Harboring the double promise of national independence and social and economic development, youth was to be responsible for cultural renewal at the same time as it was to bow before the edicts of ancestral African culture. This doubled force, of both modern temptation and the implacable tyranny of the ancestors, is located at the heart of the paradox of postcolonial African societies from the 1960s until the end of the twentieth century. It finds form in the wave of single-party states and in the logics of command and bureaucratization, especially in the strict control over youth and youth movements. The recourse to force and violence was the dominant form of these modes of political organization.

The period is also characterized by some achievements, such as a steady decline in mortality, increased life expectancy, and verifiable progress in the area of education. In search of legitimacy and a monopoly over political and economic power, political leaders alternated between three strategies: development politics focused upon social services, patronage, and the systematic repression of dissidence. In response, certain segments of the population, youth in particular, called upon alternative, religious or ethnic, forms that offered security and resources, whether through violence or withdrawal.[24]

A triple balancing structured the rhythm of the period in a vacillation between the extension and contraction of the space of citizenship: on the one hand, a state power which provided social services and created networks of patronage and which also resorted to blind repression of dissent; and, on the other, a population that variously feigned adhesion to the state, withdrew into indifference, resisted, or revolted.[25]

A political resource existing on the margins of public space, restricted in the economic realm (young women in particular), African young people were the primary victims of public and private violence during the 1960s and 1970s. Examples include the terrible repression of student movements that reached its apex in the bloody accounting that followed the military (and revolutionary-movement) take-over of power in Ethiopia in 1974; the silent violence to which rural young people are subjected by both the state and traditional authority in most African countries; and the patriarchal authority that seeks to exercise rigid control over African girls and women from the moment that they became an active presence in the labor market and public space.

The absolute and categorical nature of authoritarian rule rested upon a systematic recourse to violence. The failure of the promises of independence, the dramatic vagaries of economic crisis, the massive presence of the 'forces of order', and the everyday harassment that they inflicted, testifies to the extraordinary human and psychological cost borne by youth, in service of every cause or conflict of which they were to be the heroes; whether in the image of the South African 'young lions' faced with the repressive apartheid machine, or as delinquents and vagabonds, as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, or Mozambique.[26] Emerging from these sometimes vain, always murderous, experiences of suffering are dreams of departure for a destination

beyond an Africa that must permit the exit from a continent for which there is no hope.[27]

In the second sequence, the systematic recourse to force, combined with a fascination with the success of 'the West', will often prove lethal. Together, these two tendencies will transform the Straits of Gibraltar and the Sahara into vast cemeteries filled with navigators and wanderers who had sought hospitable shores.

Second Sequence: Nationalist Crisis, Violence and Democratic Transition

Democratic transitions in Africa are inscribed in a particular moment in the history of African societies, a moment marked by a triple transition: demographic, political, and economic. The end of the Cold War, the intensification of structural adjustment programs, and the relaxing of external political constraints and support, all informed a change in the character of conflicts in Africa; they gained a more indigenous dimension. The three transitions signaled a situation of crisis and adjustment that produced multiple options and configurations of power and resource allocations; constraints and opportunities that made African societies vacillate between negotiation and conflict, reform and violent rupture.[28] Civic, political, and public spaces fractured more pervasively along ethnic, religious, and regional fault lines. At the same time, the triple transition pervaded and amplified generational problems (the difficult transition to adulthood involving employment, access to resources, and marriage) as it had done at the end of the colonial period, thus reinvigorating youth contestation and nourishing its increasingly violent expression. More tragically, demographic, economic, and political transitions led young people to experience increasing material and spiritual insecurity.[29] Young people endeavored to open a breach in authoritarian apparatuses, whether through political mobilization and struggle or through violence; they exploited the idioms and networks of multiple ethnographies and geographies, ones through which arms, drugs, and traffickers of contraband of all kinds circulated.[30] Increasingly brutal and murderous conflicts thus multiplied during the course of the 1990s. Their effects, according to F. Cooper, 'have been devastating, undermining more sustainable forms of economic development, destroying hard-built social and economic infrastructure, turning a new generation of potential citizens and workers into youthful soldiers, spreading disease and malnutrition'.[31]

In losing the privileged place that the nationalist narrative had granted them (warriors of the present, crucial actors and resources in the construction of the future and in the restoration of devalued identities) young people lost a place within nationalist time and its missions. They thus also lost their central role as drivers of national projects, and found themselves instead on the margins, feared, disparaged, and held at bay. From these margins, or

in the fallows that the state (now impelled to relinquish its totalitarian grip) had opened, youth set out to create their own geography and narrative. That narrative would give them the meaningful task of radically questioning the nationalist narrative, its imaginary and all of its texts, whether economic, political, or cultural. Confronted with the intention of their elders to dictate the law and ensure their own continued domination of all the registers of social life, youth created dissident and dissonant cultures and modes of civility within the fissures of the social fabric. Socially and ideologically the minority but demographically the majority, youth fractured public space or transformed it, creating alternative spaces that made African cities difficult to govern; whole areas were beyond the reach of the state.

While the interventions and practices of youth certainly play a part in the construction of an open and democratic society, they do so obliquely, a fact which considerably reduces their participation in the consolidation of a democratic space and its attributes: freedom of press and association, respect for the rights of the human person, tolerance, pluralism, and respect for the rights of minorities. Young people were the principal victims of colonial domination,[32] but they were also, at the end of that period, the principal intellectual and 'muscular'[33] participants within nationalist movements.[34] This trajectory, characterized by alternating periods of intensity and ebbing, lasted through the interwar period, the Second World War, and the decades of nationalist awakening, until the Ivorian electoral crisis of 2010–2011. Youth traveled along licit and illicit routes, on paths through the *maquis* and through obscure urban zones, on those of violence as well as those of negotiation.[35] Young people mobilized, as they did in Mali, where, with the decisive intervention of their mothers and sisters, they put an end to the dictatorship of President Moussa Traoré (1991).

A quasi-totality of West African countries has experienced an *année blanche*, a 'blank year'.[36] The recourse to violence, the idiom of purification by fire, and the destruction of sites and monuments of the postcolonial power (as if to de-territorialize its inscription in space) constitute the shared elements of youth-led social movements. The project of 'uprooting', in the literal sense of the word, the legitimacy of postcolonial powers is legible in several events: in the riots orchestrated by Malian students (April 5, 1993)[37]; in the withdrawal of parts of Lagos and whole Nigerian cities from the control of politicians and the administration, except through the mediation of *area boys*[38]; and the crucial role played by 'disaffected youth' in the armed struggles in Liberia and Sierra Leone.[39]

The breaches that African young people have opened in the seemingly impenetrable retaining walls of the state speak to a loosening of the authoritarian vice. This relaxation occurs through several processes: in the opening to democracy (*ouverture démocratique*), the recognition of opposition parties, the establishment of electoral administrations, and in the initiation of economic reform and media pluralism. The organization of national conferences

(Benin, Congo, Togo) and the establishment of commissions charged with constitutional reform (Ivory Coast, Kenya, Cameroon), and growth in the numbers of political parties, unions, and non-governmental organizations, have brought about a reconfiguration of the political landscape.

In a context of resource scarcity and the incapacity of state bureaucracy to respond to social demands for employment, education, and health care, new institutional mechanisms and policies (the principal function of which was to assert and maintain the legitimacy of the ruling power) did not meet their goals. As happened during the transitional period that led to independence, young people were either absent from national conferences or confined to their margins. Young people's abandonment of political space, or their entry into clientelist networks, formal and informal, licit and illicit (especially the militias of political parties, neighborhoods, and religious organizations) were major consequences of their retreat from the national institutions. Once again, Ivory Coast offers us multiple illustrations of this movement in, for example, the armed mobilization of 'young patriots'.

Although they may have succeeded in ensuring a degree of social stability and peace, democratic transitions failed in their primary mission: to consensually renegotiate the political, social, and economic pact. Corruption was not eliminated, nor even managed; governance remained poor; violence and massive fraud continued to characterize electoral processes; and authoritarianism took on new forms, principally that of generalized police repression, just as wealth became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a tiny ruling class.

This restricted citizenship did not prevent youth from beginning new projects and searching for new ways to make its presence felt in the public space. New geographies, charted by war, contraband, delinquency and militia activity, erased or reconfigured old forms of belonging and their public, private, and domestic expressions.[40] The infliction of death, sexual relations outside the bounds of social norms, rites of passage and initiation, all signaled the brutal entry of youth into adulthood: entry in the form of criminal activity and a social recognition gained through the force of muscles and of sex. The low value assigned to human life, the right to mutilate, kill, rape and steal, combined with the appearance of a tiny minority of 'golden boys' of the 'Dot Com Generation', signal a particular conclusion: of the classical anthropological figures of the elder and the youngest, of the orderly and strategic circulation of women in the interest of strengthening social institutions, of community civility, and of an expert mastery of witchcraft and of African, Western, and Eastern spiritualities. There is thus an explosive fusion of the visible and the invisible that signals the emergence of societies abandoned by God.[41]

The scenery and props of this culture of riot and violent protest seem to be influenced by globally circulating images (of rioting South African townships, of the Intifada in Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories) disseminated by news media and by the crude aestheticized violence of *Rambo* and *Terminator*-type films.

Third Sequence: Dissident or Undisciplined Citizenships?

From the turmoil in which Africa is located, and the varied ways in which its youth inscribe themselves in the movement of globalization, with its gaps and disjunctures, new cultures and modes of civility emerge and reorganize social structures and experience: new social organizations, new ways of living and dying, and new forms of sociality propose a detachment from the continent that is not performed simply through physical departure but also through mental disconnections and erasures of African social imaginaries.

These movements come together and produce new rules, articulations of new desires, and the expression of new aspirations of which, for adults, the only legible moments are ones of violence. It is likely that the echo (always a deformation of youth speech and its guises in music, visual arts, sports, and fashion) seems to have favored the emergence of volatile vagabond figures who constantly elide the adult gaze, all the while constructing a shared language. Their discontent is at once a source of creativity and innovation, as well as of violent dissent and destructive currents (such as domestic violence, xenophobia, and homophobia).

Young Africans appear to have exited the logics and representations that define public space and institution-bound politics. Citizenship and national belonging are no longer perceived to hold the civic values of rights, obligations, and responsibilities. Marriage and access to formal employment both appear to have lost their social functions. The ([in]voluntary) confinement of youth to the space between the neighborhood and the world has nourished cosmopolitanism, xenophobia, and the invention of new forms of regional belonging that span state borders, opening the way to a contestation of the nation, its structure of governance and its claim to (national) representation.

In a sense, we are witnessing the end of adult representation of young people. The creations of adults have ceded place to the invention of young people, their own desires and aspirations. In becoming the writers and directors of their own dramas, they open the doors to the world and fill the vernacular national space with practices from elsewhere. In thus widening fissures in the social structure, they offer themselves doubly, as both threat and promise; they definitively place nationalist and Pan-Africanist narratives, and their traits, biographies, and temporalities, for which they substitute a close or faraway 'elsewhere', and the accompanying illusions of economic globalization and the hard reality of African economies subject to structural adjustment: life in a between-geography, between African reality and Euro-American dream. And it is at the precise heart of the tensions of 'off-balance' societies that new political practices and formulations of citizenship emerge, ones that I understand to be both dissident and insurrectional. One wonders if the majority of young Africans recognize themselves in the structures and discourses that democratic transitions promoted. Must not that absence of recognition be the reason for their desertion of public political space and their invention of new practices and expressions that those spaces do not account for? Might

this not be the very reason for the uncertainties and hiccups of the democratic transitions?

The geography of urban violence in particular informs the shattered portrait of an African youth gripped in the double vice of patriarchal, gerontocratic, authoritarian social traditions, and the imperatives of globalization. Their simultaneous declension, in an environment ruled by institutional improvisation, of the disintegration of spaces of socialization and command on the one hand, and the disordered and unstable redefinition of life stages, from childhood to adulthood, on the other, created fresh opportunities to block social norms and prescriptions, and to erase rites of passage and the borders between childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. This situation asks that we investigate the imaginaries at work in the African continent, paying particular attention to their producers, to the images, representations, and desires that they reveal, but also to the shocks that force them to interact on an unstable set jammed with figures of the native and the cosmopolitan, the dissident and the conservative. Invented traditions are located in *le temps du monde*, in the multiplicity of its modernities, in the evident singularity of its sites and the power of its connections and networks. Young Africans today are located between the increasing fragmentation of an African world and the dreams, images, and histories that they themselves bring into being on the stages and screens of the world. There, where a dialogue with others is permanently taking place, the strictures of the continent's geography, history, and imaginary cede to the propulsion of other spaces, the territoriality and historicity of which transform center into periphery, and periphery into center.

Certainly, the African present, in particular that of youth, is marked by the rhythm of other possibilities and by the courses of other trajectories, ones that emphasize different forms of sociality, in sports, music, and dance. These different possibilities and their constraints emerge from a shared condition: the inadequacy of existing political discourses and institutions in the face of social, economic, and ideological realities. The institutional space of the citizen is not the terrain of social practices, particularly not that of youth social practices. Figures of citizenship do not echo their desires and dreams. The failure of contemporary political institutions to produce a civic culture of tolerance, democracy, and respect for pluralism demands a rigorous explanation of social processes and cultural transformations, but also a deep familiarity with the powerful tendencies that structure African societies and social groups. A primary question is this: How should one respond to the disengagement of youth from public space and political expression? Thinking otherwise, we might ask ourselves if it is possible to translate young people's political practices into the institutional space of politics. Youth political practices produce a dissident discourse that challenges the state, its police, its discipline and its pedagogy, its institutions and its nationalist mythology. Young people attempt clumsily to respond to questions of institutional

representation and elections, social justice and human rights, and the role and responsibility of varied actors such as the state, local authorities, ethnic, regional, and religious communities, and family. Violently opposed to the state and its agents, some young people endeavor to replace it by providing their communities with security, hope, and stability.[42] Family, state, and nation, and what they offer (security, education, health care), as well as political parties, have lost their ability to enchant. The dream of the future 'good life' has dissolved. Repeated obstacles in the passage from one generation to the next have obliterated the meanings and value associated with marriage, employment, and a slightly longer lifespan. The attainment of adulthood has become an increasingly distant horizon for African adolescents. We must not, therefore, merely rethink political institutions (of representation in particular); we must also rethink the temporal horizon of politics. In response, as we have endeavored to articulate in this chapter, youth have placed themselves beyond these zones.

This chapter has been translated from the French by Cullen Golblatt, Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow, The Cogut Center for the Humanities, Brown University.

Notes

1. "The Arts Pages," *New York Times*, Saturday, May 2, C1, C5.
2. Ibid., 1.
3. In his novel, *Allah Is Not Obliged* (New York: Anchor Books, [2000], 2007). (Translated from the French by Frank Wynne), Ahmadou Kourouma offers a vivid portrait of the street child, in the context of an African war: «Before I got to Liberia, I was a fearless, blameless kid. I slept anywhere I wanted and stole all kinds of stuff to eat. My grandmother used to spend days and days looking for me: that is because I was what they call a street kid. Before I was a street kid, I went at school. Before that, I was a *bilakoro* back in the village of Togobala (according to the *Glossary, bilakoro* is an uncircumcised boy). I ran through the streams and down the fields and I hunted mice and birds in the scrubland. I was a proper Black Nigger African Savage.» p. 5.
4. A number of researchers, politicians, and activists refer to a "youth bulge" or "youth crisis" that threatens security and stability in Africa. The principal expressions of a youth crisis are chronic unemployment, delinquency, and criminality, the recourse to violence, HIV/AIDS infection, and the exit of family networks and of ethnic, religious, and state inheritances from social institutions. See: Robert Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Frontiers of Anarchy* (New York: Vintage Book, 1996); Michelle Garvin, "Africa's Restless Youth," in *Beyond Humanitarianism*, ed. P. Lyman and P. Dorff (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 2007); and Jon Abbink, "Being Young in Africa: The Politics of Despair and Removal," in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflicts in Africa*, ed. Jon Abbink and Ineke Van Kesse (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005).
5. Here, I am referring to Sudipta Kaviraj's discussion of Tocqueville's "two types of democratic transition," from "non-democratic to democratic forms

of government takes place within the horizons of a more complex, comprehensive, and slow-moving change—from pre-modern to modern forms of politics," "The Empire of Democracy. Reading Indian Politics Through Tocqueville," in *Anxieties of Democracy. Tocquevillean Reflections on India and the United States*, ed. Partha Chatterjee and Ira Katznelson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 21–22.

6. David Anderson, "Vigilantes, Violence, and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya," *African Affairs* 101 (2002): 531–55; Kate Maeger, "Hijacking Civil Society: The Inside Story of the Bakassi Boys Vigilante Group of South-eastern Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 45, no. 1 (2007); *Identity Economics. Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Nigeria* (Woodbridge, Rochester and Ibadan: James Currey, 2010); Mamadou Diouf, "Afterword," in *Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa*, ed. Alcinda Honwana and F. de Boeck (Oxford: James Currey, 2005); and Tshikala Biaya, "Youth and Street Culture in Urban Africa," in *Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa*, ed. Alcinda Honwana and F. de Boeck (Oxford: James Currey, 2005).
7. Joseph Hellweg, *Hunting the Ethical State. The Benkadi Movement of Côte d'Ivoire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 6.
8. See Jon Abbink and Ineke Van Kesse, eds., *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflicts in Africa* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005); and Alcinda Honwana and F. de Boeck, eds., *Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa* (Oxford: James Currey, 2005).
9. Richard Waller, "Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa," *Journal of African History* 47, no. 1 (2006): 82–83.
10. Tomothy Scarnecchi, *The Urban Root of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimba*bwe (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008); and Elisabeth Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939–1958* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2005).
11. John Iliffe, *The Africans: The History of a Continent* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 95.
12. On these questions, see Chinua Achebe, *Things Fall Apart* (Oxford: Heinemann Educational Publishers, 1958); and Chimamanda N. Adichie, *Purple Hibiscus* (London: Fourth Estate, 2004).
13. John Iliffe, *Honour in African History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 203.
14. Cooper observes that the generational blockages of the late twentieth century unleashed "the apocalyptic destructiveness" of young men. "Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective," *Journal of African History* 49, no. 2 (2008): 189.
15. Jay Staker, "Youth, Globalization, and Millenial Reflection in a Guinean Forest Town," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 45, no. 2 (2007): 302, 314–15.
16. The World Bank, *Youth and Employment in Africa. The Potential, the Problem, the Promise. Africa Development Indicators 2008–2009* (Washington DC, 2008), 1.
17. Ibid.
18. The World Bank, *Youth and Employment in Africa*, 5–6.
19. Ibid., 7.
20. Ibid.

21. Michelle D. Gavin, "Africa's Restless Youth," in *Beyond Humanitarianism*, ed. Princeton Lyman and Patricia Dorff (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 2007), 69–70. This article originally appeared in *Current History* 106, no. 700 (May 2007): 220–26.
22. See Achille Mbembe's discussion of the conflation of the state and the single party, *Les Jeunes et l'Ordre Politique en Afrique* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992), 14.
23. Ibid., 15.
24. F. Cooper, "*Possibility and Constraint*," 170.
25. Ibid., 172.
26. K. Peters and P. Richards, «Jeunes combattants parlant de la guerre et de la paix en Sierra Leone», *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* XXXIX, nos. 150–52 (1998): 581–617; I. Abdullah and Y. Bangura, eds., "Lumpen Youth Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leone Civil War," special issue, *Africa Development* 23, nos. 3–4 (1997); and A. Honwana, "Negotiating Post-War Identities: Child Soldiers in Mozambique and Angola," *CODESRIA Bulletin* 1–2, 1999.
27. See "The Hopeless Continent," *The Economist*, May 13, 2000.
28. Nicolas van de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
29. Adam Ashforth, *Witchcraft, Violence, and Democracy in South Africa* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005).
30. Alcinda Honwana and Filip de Boeck, eds., *Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005); William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998); Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy. The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of African Civil Wars*, 2nd revised and updated edition (New York: New York University Press, 2006); and Edna Bay and Donald Dunham, eds., *States of Violence: Politics, Youth, and Memory in Contemporary Africa* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006).
31. F. Cooper, "*Possibility and Constraint*," 188.
32. John Lonsdale considers that colonial domination weakened self-mastery, sapped masculine energy, reduced ethical and political choice, and emphasized women's sexuality, within a context that questioned indigenous rights to their land, material economies, and knowledge. Confronted with the blocked passage between one generation and the next, the available solutions were migration, religious conversion, and revolt against "the elders." See especially some of Lonsdale's contributions to the volume that he co-authored with Bruce Berman, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992). See also John llife, *Honour in African History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Jean and John Comaroff, "Reflections on Youth, from the Past to the Postcolony," in *Makers and Breakers*, ed. Honwana de Boeck.
33. F. Cooper, "Possibility and Constraint," 174.
34. See Jonathan Derrick, *Africa's 'Agitators.' Militant Anti-Colonialism in Africa and the West. 1918–1939* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
35. K. Peters and P. Richards, «Jeunes combattants parlant de la guerre et de la paix en Sierra Leone», *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* XXXIX, nos. 150–52 (1998): 581–617; I Abdullah and Y. Bangura, eds., "Lumpen Youth Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leone Civil War," special issue, *Africa Development*

23, nos. 3–4 (1997); and A. Honwana, "Negotiating Post-War Identities: Child Soldiers in Mozambique and Angola," *CODESRIA Bulletin* 1–2, 1999.

36. An *année blanche* is a "lost" academic year, one that is not recognized because, due to strikes and an insufficient amount of instruction time, exams are not held. The consequence is that the year must be repeated; all students are "held back" one year.
37. On the Malian situation, consult C.O. Diarrah, «Les ambiguïtés et les difficultés de la concrétisation opérationnelle du projet démocratique du Mali», Unpublished paper presented at the workshop on West African cities, Présentée à l'Atelier sur les Villes ouest-africaines, WALTPS, Cinergie (BAD/OCDE, Dakar, 15–17 November 1993).
38. On "area boys," Abubakar Momoh writes: "The area boys as a social category became preponderant, popularised and organised from about 1986 when the Structural Adjustment Programme took its full course. Hence today, any form of crime or criminal in the entire South-Western Nigeria is identifiable or traceable to the area boys. The area boys are the equivalent of "Yanbada" in Hausaland, there are also called *allaayes*, *Omo oni ile* (son of the soil or landlords) sweet urchins, government pickin, untouchables, or alright sir." "The South-Western Nigeria Case Study," Paper presented at the West African Long Term Perspective Study, ADB-CINERGIE Conference, Lagos, 11–13 October 1993, 28.
39. P. Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: James Currey, 1996); Ibrahim Abdullah, "I Am a Rebel: Youth Culture and Violence in Sierra Leone," in *Makers and Breakers*, ed. Honwana, and de Boeck.
40. Mamadou Diouf, "Engaging Postcolonial Cultures: African Youth and the Public Space," *African Studies Review* 46, no. 1 (2003).
41. This is, at any rate, the ironic and tragic reading that Ahmadou Kourouma proposes, *Allah n'est pas oblige*, *Allah Is Not Obliged*.
42. Johannes Harbnischfeger, "The Bakassi Boys: Fighting Crime in Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41, no. 1 (2003): 61–89; Wale Adebanwi, "The Carpenter's Revolt: Youth, Violence and the Reinvention of Culture in Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 43, no. 3 (2005): 339–65; Insa Nolte, "Identity and Violence: The Politics of Youth in in Ijebu-Remo, Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 42, no. 1 (2004): 61–89; and Kate Maeger, "Hijacking Civil Society: The Inside Story of the Bakassi Boys Vigilante Group of South-eastern Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 45, no. 1 (2007): (89–115); and J. Hellweg, *Hunting the Ethical State*, op. cit.

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CHAPTER 46

Colonialism and African Sexualities

Xavier Livermon

The field of 'African sexuality', broadly defined, subsumes a wide range of research foci, including studies directed toward public health, ethnographic studies of sexual communities, studies on the relationship between gender and sexuality, studies on shifting understandings of sexual behavior, and historical studies that situate the political and social production of sexual behaviors and discourses about sexuality within a diachronic and dynamic framework, among other areas. Its theoretical repertoire is no less diverse as it takes inspiration from feminist theory, queer theory, postcolonial theory, theories of gender, transnational theory, and theories of political economy, among others. Indeed, scholars exploring what may be referred to as 'African sexuality', inclusive of not only sexual behaviors but also the identities and communities constructed around these behaviors, are confronted with an analytical and theoretical labor similar to Africanists working on other issues. This includes a critical engagement with disciplinary and analytic terminology, an interrogation of the (often colonial) past in the production of both social and discursive realities, and the ways in which the political and social processes of postcolonial African nation-states have come to reconstitute African bodies in ways in which sexual practices and discourses of sexuality are in states of constant flux and discursive reinscription. But it can also be argued that Africanists working on sexuality may sense their analytic labor to be unique in the sense that the (sexualized) body of Africans was an initial and often central site for constituting discourses of alterity and deviance. In some respects, sexuality represented a key African cultural feature in which foreign

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intervention in Africa (both scholarly and political) was legitimized, for it exemplified much about what needed to be moralized, tamed, and analytically unraveled. To be sure, several scholars note the pervasiveness of such notions even in the scholarship of today, suggesting that such ideas can never really be undone without radical paradigm shifts and sustained critical interrogating of the politics of engagement.[1] Several scholars, both African and non-African, have called for more African involvement in the process of research and theorization, but such inclusion is likely to advance the field rather than reflect any true sense of 'progress' without a program of critical interrogating and evaluation of the terminologies that are deployed in the production of knowledge about the sexual(ized) African body. This is not to suggest that what may be called 'Western theory' has no relevance in the area of African sexuality studies, or that the application of theoretical and analytical concepts from Western discourses lacks richness for illuminating African realities. As several scholars have noted, much of what is discussed as African sexual heritage has not only been filtered through Western notions of Christianity and respectability, but also through the ethnocentrism of academic disciplines, especially anthropology. Such insights reveal the intricate ways in which the colonial heritage is not only interlocked with the production of theoretical knowledge, but also with the production of supposed ethnographic fact. Thus, the programmatic picture becomes a messy one when attempting to understand African sexuality.

In the field of African sexuality, scholars are essentially working to fuse together three broad questions: (1) What is Africa? (2) What is sexuality? (3) How and why are the two brought together to delineate what might be referred to as African sexuality? The notion of a singular African sexuality, not dissimilar to other monolithic notions about African cultural practices, has been problematized in some of the recent literature in the field. Sylvia Tamale's edited collection aims to critique the deployment of African *sexuality* as a singular, generalizing and homogenizing concept for organizing empirical phenomena and theoretical reflection.[2] In considering the notion of African *sexualities* rather than *sexuality*, such studies do not necessarily proceed from the premise that the latter approach elides the variegated sexual subjectivities and expressions one sees on the African continent; but for whatever dismissals are made on the basis that such studies unnecessarily obfuscate unity or seem to be enamored with plurality for its own sake, these works must be appreciated for their attempt to critique long-standing analytic practices which homogenize African experience for the sake of analytical ease. Still, other studies reflect an even bolder approach in their critique of the recursive deployment of sexuality as a totalizing concept. Works in this vein aim to destabilize sexuality as a centralizing analytic in favor of privileging other analytics which sexuality works within, through, and around. For example, Serena Dankwa's study of 'same-sex intimacies' among women in Ghana examines erotic interaction among women and the use of erotic behavior in

the constitution of an alternative community, but instead deploys intimacy rather than sexuality as an analytic tool.[3]

For whatever the rich literature on African sexuality has achieved, its results were not slow to come. Indeed, as both Signe Arnfred and Marc Epprecht discuss in their work, the discursive production of Africa and its socio-cultural dynamics shaped not only the slow growth of the field of African sexuality, but also what were considered legitimate areas of inquiry within the social-science disciplines.[4] As I previously noted, Arnfred argues that the construction of narratives of African 'tradition' have been fundamentally shaped by the Christian backgrounds of those who have structured these narratives. She also demonstrates how the Christian background has led to the pathologization of female sexuality, as well as to the lack of distinction between sex for pleasure and sex for procreation. Christian moralist ideas around sexuality, coupled with the notions of African sexuality as primitive and 'close-to-nature', worked together to establish a false framing of African sexual practice as directed toward procreative pursuits. In highlighting several examples from the southern part of the continent in which sexual practice was conceived outside of a non-reproductive framework, Arnfred challenges the monolithic construction of African sexual subjectivity, agency, and ontology. The theoretical breath of fresh air in Arnfred's continual dwelling on this issue is that it should challenge us to explore how certain forms of heterosexual formation have been historically constituted, rather than assuming such formations as the norm to which other forms represent a deviance; same-sex sexuality, of course, representing the ultimate deviation. Arnfred's argument that most, if not all, pre-colonial African societies made a distinction between sex intended for procreation and sex intended for pleasure not only seems to suggest that pre-colonial Africans had notions of sexual subjectivity (even if they were not articulated through Western-like identity constructs) but it also destabilizes heterosexuality as both an already given as well as an already understood construct.

As Basile Ndjio has pointed out in his study of sexuality in Cameroon, (hetero)sexuality has become standardized in the postcolonial state in a way that enables it to be deployed in various nationalist and nationalizing discourses.[5] In examining the hegemonic construction of African sexuality in a postcolonial and Pan-African context, Ndjio focuses on the normalization of heterosexual identity and how internalized heteronormativity has produced constructions of citizenship that link authenticity to the pursuit of specific heterosexual desires and the disparagement of any alternatives. Focusing on Cameroon, but extrapolating to other African countries, Ndjio's study looks at patriarchy, and the construction of what he refers to as the Muntu: the straight African with a high sex drive who upholds various dimensions of heterosexism. This construction works to normalize heterosexuality and construct non-heterosexualities as betrayals and linked to 'witchcraft'. Such work reveals much about how heterosexuality, patriarchy, and heterosexism have

been implicated in postcolonial political regimes and discourses of identity. What is illuminated in such work is that the process of standardizing African sexuality has been for the benefit of a postcolonial labor of articulating sovereignty and constructing a proper national citizenry. Epprecht illuminates how African societies have been heterosexualized through both the unwillingness to explore non-heterosexual formations and the inability to accurately interpret erotic behavior not structured along gender-normative lines. While he points out that the field of anthropology has been central to the production of knowledge about African peoples and their sexual practices, he argues that this process of knowledge production has been negatively shaped by a number of discursive, methodological, and social practices which have misrepresented African sexuality. This is especially evident in the lack of attention to same-sex sexuality in African ethnography and dismissals of descriptions of some same-sex behavior as bisexual or incidental. For Epprecht, scant references to same-sexual practices without further in-depth investigation reflect not only ideas in the field about what was considered significant for ethnographic exploration, but also notions of respectability and heteronormativity. But, as Arnfred regularly explores, it was also the idea that African people, and thus their sexuality, were 'primitive' and thus only oriented to the baser and natural aims of reproduction that played a role in inquiries about non-heteronormative sexualities and analysis of behaviors which involved same-sex interaction. For Epprecht, it has only been since the 1960s that academic and social changes have helped shape a more accurate and useful production of knowledge around African sexual practices, though these discourses do linger, particularly in the construction of HIV/AIDS in Africa as a heterosexual disease.

Fortunately, the literature on African same-sex sexuality has come a long way. Stephen O. Murray and Will Roscoe's *Boy Wives/Female Husbands* represents the first significant and comprehensive theoretical and empirical look at African same-sex sexuality.[6] Their wide-ranging ethnological survey, divided into geographical regions, not only aimed to dispel the notion that same-sex sexual practice did not exist in African societies, but it also sought to illuminate both the unity and diversity of its social structuring. As a result, this monograph has become a foundational text in the research about the indigeneity of African same-sex sexual practices, though certainly it has not been without its criticism. A number of fruitful ethnographic studies have since entered the literature.[7] These studies have refined our understanding of specific same-sex communities, illuminated local understandings of queer identity and performance, and explored the ways in which local constitutions of same-sex sexuality engage or disengage with transnational and global process. Several historical studies on Southern Africa by Marc Epprecht have helped enrich our understanding of the historical production and trajectory of non-heternormative sexualities in Africa.[8]

Rudolf Gaudio's *Allah Made Us* enjoys the unique status of being the only monograph-length ethnographic study of same-sex sexuality in West Africa. In this work, Gaudio explores the multifaceted lives of the *yan dauda'*: effeminate men who engage in socially constructed 'women's work' and also participate in same-sex sexual practices. His thesis is that the practices of the yan dauda' enable them to access a form of cultural citizenship and construct notions of subjectivity rooted in local cultural and social processes. Through an exploration of various social practices, Gaudio illuminates the interconnection between gender and sexuality, and also provides an example of how religious (in this case, Muslim) moral and sexual ideas structure sexual norms and delineate public discourses.

South Africa has been overrepresented in the literature on same-sex sexuality in Africa, most likely due to its comparative liberalism around such issues (same-sex marriage has been legal since 2006), but also due to the comparatively high visibility of political activities and activism in the country. Andrew Tucker's *Queer Visibilities: Space, Identity, and Interaction in Cape Town* was a critical monograph-length ethnographic work to foreground local South African queer subjectivities and explore how black South Africans deployed Western notions of identity constitution (here, visibility) as a central concept of political and social engagement. Tucker emphasizes the usefulness of the notion of queer visibility as an interrogative tool for understanding how varied practices destabilize heteronormativity. This approach also helps to challenge homogenous representations of queer experience and South African life more broadly. Tucker suggests that thinking about queer visibility should not be limited to queer engagements with public culture; visibility also figures prominently in how various groups construct their identities in relation to each other and in relation to broader structures in society. This work also draws attention to the importance of race and the legacy of apartheid as important factors that have shaped differing practices of visibility in Cape Town.

As a theoretical work, Neville Hoad's *African Intimacies* aims to delineate the central issues at stake in the research on queer African sexualities. This book considers the ways in which the social construction of homosexuality and the social construction of Africa intersect. Focusing on the interrogative concepts that are central to the analytic and theoretical labor of studying African same-sex sexualities, Hoad explores the ways in which 'Africa' and 'homosexuality' are put into a dialectical and confrontational dialogue with each other, and he provides an analysis of the salience of homosexuality in various discourses and public imagery, and how they work to delineate a contemporary African subjectivity. This work also seeks to critique the applicability of the terms 'sexuality' and 'homosexuality' in the African context. For Hoad, the discussions around same-sex sexuality must pay attention to the ways in which public discourse reflects particular aspirations and performances of sovereignty in postcolonial African states. Here, queer bodies

become sites for the construction and manipulations of discourses about African-ness and its precarity in our postcolonial moment.

In addition to the body of works on African same-sex sexuality that dwell explicitly on interrogating the construction of its very categories (i.e. Africa, sexuality, and African sexuality), there are a number of sociological, ethnographic, public-health, and historical studies that look at the construction and semiotics of sexual subjecthood and the symbiotic relationship between these subjectivities and the larger political and social milieus. Several studies explore the ways in which sexuality is implicated in discourses and performances of nationalism. Here, violence provides a means through which certain sexualities become representative of an embodied national subjecthood through their appropriation, promotion, and sanction. For example, Amanda Swarr explores how butch lesbians are often victims of physical attacks and rapes.[9] Central to this discussion is an analysis of South African constructions of masculinity, which butch lesbians subvert through their gender performances and their same-sex relationships. This makes them both unavailable and threatening to men. Theoretically, the author argues that there is a 'tripartite' threat that causes butch lesbians to frequently be the victims of sexual violence: (1) they threaten heterosexuality through their same-sex relationships; (2) they challenge normative constructions of gender through their masculine performances, and (3) their sexual practices disrupt notions of how women should properly use their bodies. The practices of butch lesbians are paradoxical because they ascribe a certain social power to such lesbians while also rendering them vulnerable to sexual violence. Swarr hopes that her analysis can illuminate the ideological basis of 'corrective' rape and murder, and provide a useful theoretical basis for trying to stop its proliferation.

Astrid Reyes situates violence enacted on queer bodies in South Africa within ongoing practices of aggression stemming from the apartheid era.[10] But Reyes sees these historically constituted performances of violence as being intimately linked to social practice of patriarchal masculinity in which violence functions to both constitute and reinforce notions of gender idealism. Reyes argues that this is the reason that many citizens endorse various notions of patriarchal control and gender inequality despite the progressive legislation of the South African government. Thus, discussions about sexual violence and women's rights are tied up with discussions of Africa versus the West; that is, in which efforts to reclaim popular understanding of the 'traditional', especially in regard to notions of masculinity, help in establishing an authenticity and cultural sovereignty to African societies that distinguish Africa and the West, rather than blur the socio-cultural boundaries.

Roderick Brown seeks to disrupt understandings of the 'traditional' in the context of neo-liberal ideals of the postcolonial state.[11] Brown argues that the pervasiveness of corrective rape in South Africa violates international human-rights principles as well as national standards of non-discrimination and equality. South Africa's past may have planted the roots of gender

inequality, homophobia, and violence, but the study argues that these must be transcended by directed legislative action. This may include revising hate crime legislation, educating state agents and schoolchildren, supporting a nationwide campaign for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) rights, and providing support to civil society and attorneys to protect the rights of LGBTI people. The study argues that these and similar actions must be implemented in unambiguous terms if they are to be upheld.

For Thabo Msibi, homophobia thrives on the promotion of certain hegemonic forms of masculinity.[12] Based on research conducted at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban, Msibi demonstrates how patriarchal notions of manhood which are deeply embedded in society produce fears about effeminate men as well as lesbians, thus leading to acts of violence to reestablish an order and exercise hegemonic male power. A national history of violence can produce a feeling of emasculation, which results in strategies of reassertion that employ violence, especially violence that is gender-based. Msibi argues that the problem of sexual violence will only improve when notions of hegemonic masculinity are appropriately addressed. For him, institutions of higher education can play a key role in ameliorating this problem by creating modules on gender awareness and challenging the teachers of these modules to interrogate their own social identities and the social dynamics that inform institutions of higher education.

A number of other studies have been more focused on the ways in which the politicization of sexual subjectivities and communities may be understood through the theoretical framing of 'activism', or on how strategies that are seen to constitute forms of resistance may intervene in the reconfiguration of local social landscapes. For example, in a seminal monograph, Ashley Currier explores practices of visibility (and invisibility) among Namibian and South African lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender organizations.[13] She frames her argument by illuminating an unsettling paradox: while these organizations appropriate Western sexual identity concepts they simultaneously seek to challenge the notion that queer sexuality is incompatible with African culture. The author compares the experiences of each country between 1995 and 2006, noting how Namibian activists worked to challenge political homophobia while South African activists worked to combat homophobia despite progressive legislation. In drawing comparisons with Pan-African LGBTI organizations, the author argues that visibility should be viewed as one strategy among many that queer groups may deploy in negotiating their local societies, rather than simply viewing visibility as the ultimate political aspiration and sexual rights achievement.

Msibi explores the dual potential of language to challenge homophobia and heterosexism but also to reinforce it through the objectification of queer subjects.[14] Based on life-histories of eight men, Msibi elucidates how language functions as a means to resist dominant discourses but also to circumscribe their lives by those very discourses. Focusing on black gay men who

spoke an in-group language referred to as isiNgqumo, Msibi argues that this language may be understood as a tool of resistance, but since it was not spoken by all men and is only employed in certain social contexts, its resistance potential could not be fully realized.

Stephanie Rudwick explored how the isiNsqumo language, as well as other practices inscribed as 'traditional', worked to constitute particular forms of resistant and politicized identities.[15] Discursive and social practices were thus manipulated as strategic choices by a community of gay Zulu men in South Africa to both challenge and resist the argument that homosexuality is 'un-African'. Rudwick argues that her findings both challenge essentialist notions of Zulu identity and show how African ethnicities are malleable and transformable. Participants employed three main strategies in reconciling their queer identities against the discourse that Zulu identity and homosexuality are incompatible: the use of isiNgqumo, which uses ancient isiZulu vocabulary, engagement with the ancestors (*amadlozi*), and the appropriation of the traditional custom of showing respect (*ukulonipha*).

Epprecht is critical of the appropriation of Western constructions in understanding forms of African queer resistance, while also drawing attention to how greater involvement from African scholars may help to refresh some of the stale scholarly practices that informed research on queer African subjects.[16] Epprecht seeks to shift attention momentarily away from representations of homophobia on the continent to look at the grassroots efforts of queer Africans to create a sense of optimism and combat the myriad sexualized and gendered challenges that affect their lives. He also seeks to destabilize the dichotomies that have informed discussions of queer African lives; dichotomies such as modern versus traditional, African communitarian values versus Western individualism, African 'folk knowledge' versus Western academic theory, and so forth. He thus proposes using language centered on 'justice' to avoid the ethnocentric implications of 'rights' language. Such language, he feels, also decenters sex and instead includes the entire body. The study looks at spirituality (noting the contradictions inherent in discussions of traditional spirituality, Christianity, and Islam) and suggests the possibility of the values of Ubuntu in reshaping discussions. In focusing on the state, he looks at the impact of colonial rule in establishing a structure around homophobia that middle-class Africans in postcolonial contexts perpetuate. Finally, he suggests that advocating for health rights may be a more sensitive and welcome approach than advocating for sexual minority rights. Ultimately, the author calls for Africans to be at the forefront of these movements.

The literature on African same-sex sexuality has produced not only a wealth of ethnographic data about the diversity of sexual practices on the African continent, but also reveals an engagement with the discourses that have shaped the sociology of knowledge in the field of African sexuality studies, and the ways in which scholarship on African sexuality may be enacted against and through these discourses. Another important feature of this work

has been how the various facets of the postcolonial state shape and are shaped by queer bodies and the types of discourses that are produced about them. Tamale's analyses of how discourses around non-normative sexualities in Africa are tied in with larger social and political anxieties and visions is especially helpful in this regard.[17] Tamale links the instability of democratic practices and ideals on the African continent to the recent hyper-focus on issues of same-sex sexuality. She critiques the notion that African homophobia is generated by foreigners, and instead argues that homophobic practices work to bolster both local and foreign interests. As mentioned earlier, colonial discourses and practices sought to represent African people as closer to 'nature', and thus their sexuality as oriented toward reproduction. This worked to create suspicions and hostility toward sexualities that did not conform to this model. Thus, it is the religious discourses, rather than same-sex practices themselves, that produce homophobia and represent a foreign influence on African sexualities. Tamale argues that homophobia is strategically deployed, rather ironically so, as a tool by political conservatives. She cautions against uncritically accepting a binarized view of sexuality on a global scale that romanticizes the freedom and equality of Western countries while portraying non-Western countries in a negative light.

Saheed Aderinto's work foregrounds the historical constitution of the intersectionality between sexuality and various political, cultural, and social processes.[18] Focusing on the ways in which British colonizers sought to moralize, police, and punish prostitution in colonial Nigeria, Aderinto highlights the nuanced confrontation between the relative liberalism of African sexual practices and ideation, and European ones. Such issues, however, figured prominently in notions of progress and civilization, and have continued to structure what Aderinto refers to as the 'sexualization of nationalism', in which deviant and marginalized sexual practices, such as prostitution, are constructed as antithetical to proper Nigerian nation building. Aderinto's analysis reveals how the linguistic distinctions and terminologies invoked in describing sexual practice are both historically constituted and embedded. He also demonstrates how competing discourses began to delineate between child and adult sexuality. Finally, as numerous scholars writing about same-sex sexuality in Africa have noted, Aderinto foregrounds how more recent debates in Nigeria about issues such as prostitution seem to index wider political, social, economic, and cultural concerns, anxieties, and visions, and thus, are less about prostitution or deviant sexuality in and of themselves than they at first may appear to be.

Long held notions of untamed African sexuality and excessive liberalism of African sexuality, along with notions of some African cultures as incorrigibly patriarchal and ridden by sexual deviance, helped buttress notions, in the realm of sexuality, that Africa must be a prime target for the *mission civilsatrice* and the lager 'civilizing' mission of the colonial project. In many ways, contemporary discussions around African bodies reflect this 'enlightened' and

'civilizing' position of the West to the 'untamed' and 'primitive' practices of Africa. This dichotomization is especially evident in discussions around female genital mutilation (FGM)/female genital cutting (FGC). Arnfred argues that discourses about FGM/FGC put into competition 'traditional' African culture, which is seen as repressive and patriarchal, with Western culture, which is seen as liberating and progressive.[19] In framing African women as victims of such 'traditional' cultures, the West legitimizes its intervention into African lives. However, Arnfred notes that one of the problems with this view is that this neat dichotomy can only be produced by glossing over the complex nuances of FGM/FGC practice. For example, she points out that in some instances the practice is deployed in performances of female agency and power, and she further notes that the term 'FGM' erroneously subsumes a range of practices, some of which are actually intended to increase women's pleasure. Postcolonial notions of sexual deviance and liberalism have thus been intimately shaped by the colonial encounter. As a few chapters in a volume edited by Felicitas Becker and Wenzel Geissler discuss, in some instances in Africa AIDS is framed as an outcome of sexual liberalism and deviance.[20]

Less historically based studies on African sexuality, and especially those concerned with aspects of public health, seemed marked by an attention to the role of gender and gender ideals in shaping sexual subjectivity and practice. This is especially evident in work that takes the nation-state as its boundary of analysis. This close relationship reveals the ways in which sexuality is centrally constituted through the political, economic, and cultural processes that shape gender subjectivity. For example, Nyokabi Kamau's study of the effect of HIV/AIDS on senior women in Kenyan universities seeks to push the boundaries on the representation of African women in social science research, as well as to illuminate some of the unique dynamics surrounding the experience of HIV/AIDS among senior women.[21] Her study challenges the notions that the experiences of HIV/AIDS among Kenyan women are shaped fundamentally by economic disadvantage; to the contrary, Kamau's study centralizes gender rather than class as a significant determinant of experience. Kamau also seeks to challenge the notion that institutions of higher education are necessarily progressive, for she elaborates on the ways in which these institutions still perpetuate practices of women's marginalization and silencing.

Anthony Simpson seeks to invigorate discussions surrounding HIV/AIDS and its relation to gender identity by focusing on the experiences of men.[22] Simpson critiques the hyper-focus on women in the research around HIV/AIDS in Africa; and while he argues that women are most significantly impacted by the epidemic, he notes that the sociology of HIV/AIDS cannot be understood apart from the vulnerabilities that shape men's lives and the gendered expectations which structure their sexual behavior. To redress this issue, Simpson collected a number of life-stories with a particular focus on how men engaged in the construction of gendered subjectivities, especially in

the face of HIV/AIDS. A unique aspect of Simpson's study is its longitudinal focus: he first interviewed these men in 1983 and 1984 at the culmination of their secondary education, and conducted further interviews in 2002 among those who were still living.

Carolyn Baylies and Janet Bujra seek to revise intervention strategies by complicating narratives linking gender and HIV/AIDS, and by challenging monolithic understandings of vulnerability.[23] They explore how issues of consumption, capitalism, mobility, and the transformation of cultural ideas altered and reshaped gendered vulnerabilities as well as discourses about the symbolism of HIV/AIDS in Tanzanian and Zambian societies In illuminating the shifting discourses surrounding the vulnerability of women, especially as they relate to the pathologizing of women's sexuality, they also seek to challenge homogenous representation of women by looking at how women's experiences are differentiated along various social axes.

While much literature in African sexuality studies links sexuality with gender, Arnfred notes that much of the scholarship of African feminists surrounding gender gave little attention to discussions of sexuality.[24] Thus, she notes that she had to seek inspiration from elsewhere for her interpretation of female initiation rituals in Mozambique. Drawing on the notion of the 'coloniality of gender', Arnfred argues that certain notions of sexuality have led to misinterpretations of these rituals. Working to develop her own theoretical framework for understanding initiation rituals in Mozambique, she argues that these rituals are a key site in which ideas of sexuality are brought together with ideas of gender in an inextricable way.

Some scholars have focused on educational institutions, and on exploring the ways in which such institutions delineate cultural frameworks for young citizens and work to instill certain notions of gender and sexuality. For example, Deevia Bhana examines the regulation of sexuality as it is structured by secondary schools in South Africa.[25] Bhana highlights an incongruity between South Africa's progressive and protective policies around sexual diversity and gender and the lived experiences of its citizens. Focusing on schools as sites in which such incongruity takes on a special significance, Bhana explores how varied forms of violence emerge within a context in which conservative and moralist notions of sexuality and gender are reinforced in the socio-educational process.

Bolder still are studies that centralize pleasure, for they disrupt the idea that pre-colonial African sexuality was too liberal and thus required continuous control in the postcolonial state. Furthermore, they also centralize agency and corporeal meaning, which is sometimes missing from studies oriented toward public health. Rachel Spronk identifies this when she sets out to critique the hyper-focus on public health in the field of African sexuality.[26] She highlights this as a programmatic inadequacy by demonstrating how the semiotics of sexual practices and the ways in which people construct meanings around sexual experience are often lost in the analytic deployment and

overarching agenda of public-health studies. Spronk's analysis focuses on how various sexual practices and forms of sexual interaction among middle-class Kenyans engage with postcolonial understandings of cultural, national, and global identity. She explores how some middle-class Kenyans frame their pursuit of temporary relationships as a pursuit of pleasure, and she analyzes how these notions of pleasure, which seem to centrally inform conceptions of temporary relationships, destabilize certain understandings of Kenyan identity which link stability to marriage. For Spronk, young Kenyan professionals are a unique site for examining the manipulation of postcolonial discourses and the anxieties and ambiguities surrounding notions of modernity, which seem especially significant in the narrative of middle-class Africans.

Shanti Parikh undertook a unique study of how heterosexual desire is constructed and negotiated through the writing of love letters.[27] Focusing on youths in Uganda, Parikh examines how notions of desire intersect with modernist notions of romance, gendered identity, anxieties surrounding HIV/AIDS, and the regulation and policing of young people's sexual behaviors. In looking at how desire is constituted through a literary practice, Parikh illuminates how both postcolonial sexual identity and its performance practices are situated within nuanced intersections between local and global processes.

Conclusion

The body of work that transverses a field which may be referred to as African sexuality represents not only a diversity in topical foci and theoretical orientation, but also in how its objects of study (Africa, sexuality, and African sexuality) are constituted. Most of the historical literature, by nature of its diachronic focus, is confronted with these questions more boldly, since the colonial period marks a central historical period that not only shaped the subsequent and present postcolonial world, but also the discourse through which the postcolonial, colonial, and pre-colonial worlds are investigated. Perhaps this is why African languages' apparent lack of vocabulary for Western concepts of sexuality has seemed to bother or intrigue researchers. What was considered to constitute sexual practices was recorded and judged by Europeans, but they were taken for granted as constituting the very thing that they were said to constitute. In a similar manner, it seems that sexual identity and subjectivity, as categories of interrogation and analysis, only arise through Western framing and inscription. Thus, as I suggested earlier, the variegated practices of heterosexual sex which, as scholars such as Arnfred note, characterized pre-colonial societies, evade being theorized through the lens of subjectivity. Instead, only the more politicized identities, as we see especially in the sexual rights struggles in Southern Africa, enjoy theorization through those lenses.

Perhaps there is some value to this, however, for, as African scholars such as Ifi Amadiume have argued, age and lineage, rather than gender, were more important categories of social organization in pre-colonial African societies.[28] From this perspective, the inscription of sexualized subjectivities could be interpreted as a way to see African realities and practices through Western eyes or, at least, make them intelligible to Western theoretical programs. But this is more symptomatic of a problem rather than the problem itself, for in failing to interrogate the constitution of the categories of analysis, the scholarly project of African sexuality studies remains overwhelmingly indebted to Western notions, even for sexual ontology itself. This, of course, creates a strong emphasis on studies that are not historical, and are thus concerned with contemporary and postcolonial realities, since historical studies must perforce confront these ideas with deeper interrogation.

Studies that look at the ways in which sexual practice and identity are shaped by the political, economic, and social processes of the postcolonial state have done much to not only reveal how African subjectivities are in flux, but also how sexuality becomes a site through which even Africans themselves engage in debates about authenticity, sovereignty, and modernity. A unique value of these studies is that sexuality and its underpinnings are freed from the essentialist motivations embedded in the discursive constructions of Africa and are instead seen to be responsive to the shifting conditions of an ongoing historical trajectory. These studies, therefore, destabilize sexuality as an almost reified and fixed concept that can be interrogated and, instead, suggest that local and continental notions of sexuality are in an elusive state of constitution and reconstitution.

The literature on African sexuality thus must always engage in the constitution of its basic categories. Not only do the socio-political realities of Africa change, but so too do the discourses about Africa, past and present. Not only do notions of sexuality change, but also what does and could constitute sexuality in an African context changes. Moreover, studies of African sexuality regularly wrestle with whether African sexuality should be understood in a totalizing, homogenous manner, or whether it is more fruitful to talk about a multiplicity of sexualities on the continent. The focus on multiple and varied sexualities not only destabilizes ongoing Western discourses about Africa, but also the kind of discourse that, as some of the scholars previously mentioned demonstrate, postcolonial states seem interested in promoting by articulating their contemporary notions of national identity and proper citizenship. But delineating multiple sexualities does not totally free one from this scholarly conundrum if it does not take into account the ways in which African communities understood multiple sexualities, even if one type of sexuality was considered to be dominant or hegemonic. Sexuality, after all, is constituted as an analytic category through discursive practice, and this is why the call by scholars to have more African researchers and theorists is so important. Seemingly liberating models, such as the desire to see a plurality of sexualities

rather than one sexuality, though superficially a 'progressive' analytic framework, is also not discursively divorced from a community of scholarly production. African researchers can help to not only clarify the politics of analytic engagement and production, but also to enrich local understandings which may instead see, for example, a singular sexuality with many manifestations, rather than a plurality of sexualities. Such a perspective could also enrich the literature with more class-based analyses and constitutions of sexuality, and suggest and introduce other categories of social distinction around which sexualities might be differentiated.

HIV/AIDS has occupied a major place in public-health literature because of its devastating impact on the continent, but studies still struggle to delineate to what extent the disease is seen as a sexuality-based illness with social manifestations, or a social illness shaped by sexual practice. This struggle has everything to do with how these analyses engage with shifting notions of African sexuality. A number of public-health studies which have investigated HIV/AIDS issues among African men who have sex with men have, to some extent, it could be argued, responded to the critique by Epprecht and others that public-health discourses have worked to construct HIV/AIDS in Africa as a heterosexual disease. In studies focusing on purportedly heterosexual Africans, investigating the impact of HIV/AIDS has revealed shifts in sexual practices and the reconstitution of sexual subjectivities, and remains a site in which local understandings confront Western notions of illness and propriety. Here, as in related literatures, the interconnection between gender and sexuality remains an inescapable analytic field.

Notes

1. For example see Adrian Flint and Vernon Hewitt, "Colonial Tropes and HIV/AIDS in Africa: Sex, Disease, and Race," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 53, no. 3 (2015): 294–314.
2. Sylvia Tamale, ed., *African Sexualities: A Reader* (Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2011).
3. Serena Owusua Dankwa, "'It's a Silent Trade': Female Same-Sex Intimacies in Post-ColonialGhana," *NORA- Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research* 17, no. 3 (2009): 195–205.
4. Signe Arnfred, ed., *Rethinking Sexualities in Africa* (Upsala Sweden: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2004); Marc Epprecht, "Bisexuality and the Politics of Normal in African Ethnography," *Anthropologica* 48, no. 2 (2006): 187–201; Epprecht, *Heterosexual Africa? The History of an Idea from the Age of Exploration to the Age of AIDS* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2008); and Epprecht, *Unspoken Facts: A History of Homosexualities in Africa* (Harare: Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, 2008).
5. Basile Ndijo, "Post-Colonial Histories of Sexuality: The Political Invention of a Libidinal African Straight," *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute* 82, no. 4 (2012): 609–31.

6. Stephen O. Murray and Will Roscoe, *Boy Wives and Female Husbands: Studies in African Homosexualities* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
7. For example see William D. Banks, "Remembering Okomfo Kwabena: 'Motherhood,' Spirituality, and Queer Leadership in Ghana," *African Historical Review* 44, no. 2 (2012): 1–17; William D. Banks, "'This Thing is Sweet': Ntetee and the Reconfiguration of Sexual Subjectivity in Post-Colonial Ghana," *Ghana Studies* 14 (2011): 265–90; Dankwa, "'*It's a Silent Trade*';" Rudolf Pell Gaudio, *Allah Made Us: Sexual Outlaws in an Islamic African City* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); and Sylvia Tamale, "The Complexities of Subversion: *Kuchu* Culture in Uganda," in *Africa After Gender?*, ed. Catherine M. Cole, Takyiwaa Manuh, and Stephan F. Miescher. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).
8. Marc Epprecht, *Hungochani: The History of a Dissident Sexuality in Southern Africa* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004); Epprecht, *Heterosexual Africa?*
9. Amanda Swarr, "Paradoxes of Butchness: Lesbian Masculinities and Sexual Violence in Contemporary South Africa," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society* 37, no. 4 (2012): 961–88.
10. Astrid Reyes, "Sexual Violence in South Africa: Negotiating Constitutional Rights and Cultural Discourses of Gender" (Thesis, Emory University, 2013).
11. Roderick Brown, "Corrective Rape in South Africa: A Continuing Plight Despite an International Human Rights Repsonse," *Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law* 18, no. 1 (2012): 45–66.
12. Thabo Msibi, "Homophobic Language and Linguistic Resistance in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa," in *Gender and Language in Sub-Saharan Africa: Tradition, Struggle, and Change*, ed. Atanga, Lilian Lem, Sibonile Edith Ellece, Lia Litosseliti, and Jane Sunderland (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2013): 253–74.
13. Ashley Currier, *Out in Africa: LGBT Organizing in Namibia and South Africa* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2012).
14. Msibi, "*Homophobic language*."
15. Stephanie Rudwick, "Defying a Myth: A Gay Subculture in Contemporary South Africa," *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 20, no. 2 (2011): 90–111.
16. Marc Epprecht, *Sexuality and Social Justice in Africa: Rethinking Homophobia and Forging Resistance* (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2013).
17. Sylvia Tamale, "Confronting the Politics of Nonconforming Sexualities in Africa," *African Studies Review* 56, no. 2 (2013): 31–45.
18. Saheed Aderinto, *When Sex Threatened the State: Illicit Sexuality, Nationalism, and Politics in Colonial Nigeria, 1900–1958* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2014).
19. Arnfred, *Rethinking Sexualities.*
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25. Deevia Bhana, *Under Pressure: The Regulation of Sexuality in South African Secondary Schools* (Johannesburg, South Africa: Mathoko's Books, 2014).
26. Rachel Spronk, *Ambiguous Pleasures: Sexuality and Middle Class Self-Perceptions in Nairobi* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012).
27. Shanti Parikh, *Regulating Romance: Youth Love Letters, Moral Anxiety, and Intervention in Uganda's Time of AIDS* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2016).
28. Ifi Amadiume, *Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society* (London: Zed Book, Ltd, 1987).

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CHAPTER 47

Culture, Artifacts, and Independent Africa: The Cultural Politics of Museums and Heritage

Sarah Van Beurden

Upon visiting the museum of Niamey in Niger sometime in the early 1970s, Hugues de Varine-Bohan, Director of the International Council of Museums (ICOM), enthusiastically declared it was the museum of the future because of its wide range of artistic and educational activities, and its ability to represent a large and diverse country. Not only was it financed by the people of Niger, it drew up to 10% of the population in visitors every year. It was, he gushed, 'a real instrument of national unity and national conscience'.[1] De Varine-Bohan perfectly captures the role many African museums were widely expected to fulfill in the postcolonial era: they were seen as places where the objects of ethnographic and art collections, often colonial in origin, could be placed in service of the creation of postcolonial national identities, and serve as tools for a process of cultural decolonization. The history of museums in Africa, and the accompanying struggle over the possession and ownership of cultural heritage, however, demonstrate how fraught with tensions and contradictions these politics often were.

Much has been written about the lives of objects in European collections and museums, both during and after colonialism.[2] Less attention has been given to how the changed status of certain objects as art, heritage, and museum objects influenced the ways in which decolonization was imagined in postcolonial Africa.[3] In their reincarnation as museum objects, artifacts were

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inserted into institutions historically associated with progress and rationality, where the past is represented in order to carve out a present and project into an 'authentic' future.[4] Although marked as being about the past, discussions about art as heritage are in fact cultural processes that make meaning about the present.[5] Because they are so often approached as neutral categories, however, the cultural 'work' these categories do becomes obscured. This chapter demonstrates how the categories of art and heritage, shaped in late colonial contexts, impacted the way in which decolonization and postcolonial cultural sovereignty were imagined and expressed.[6] Specifically, the chapter will trace the ways in which postcolonial states viewed and used ethnographic and art museums to represent cultural sovereignty and how the possession of African art and ethnographic collections in the West became contested through claims for restitution.[7] Although the cultural histories of colonial and postcolonial African countries are incredibly varied, there are nonetheless certain historical developments that are shared across borders, sometimes, for example, because of the similarities across empires in the cultural technologies of European colonial rule, or because of the dominance of the European nation-state model for postcolonial African nations. African dispossession of cultural heritage often came to symbolize larger patterns of dispossession of land, rights, sovereignty, identity, etc. As De Jong and Rowlands have pointed out, museums, like archives, 'are seen to evolve as a privileged space in which the sense of loss and disruption can be contemplated and assessed and finally cured'.[8] As such, museums and the objects in their collections became one of the battlegrounds in the process of cultural decolonization.

This chapter uses my own primary research on museums in central Africa (Congo in particular) but branches out to include the histories of other African countries and institutions. It starts by laying out shifting colonial attitudes with regard to the protection and conservation of particular aspects of African cultures, both in situ and in the context of museum collections. This protection, linked to a particular understanding of colonialism as cultural guardianship, influenced postcolonial constructions of cultural sovereignty, at play in the demands for the restitution of objects and collections from the West, but also visible in the role accorded to museum institutions across the continent.

African Art, Colonialism, and Cultural Guardianship

Colonial attitudes towards African cultures and their material production varied greatly over time and space, and ranged from destruction and neglect to admiration and conservation, but the collection of artifacts formed a part of European imperialism from the very beginning. The deceptive neutrality of the term 'collecting' obscured the reality of a wide range of practices, from plundering and confiscation to commercial exchange and gift-giving, in a variety of settings that ranged from the violent to the commercial, and for

a variety of motivations, including religious, political, and artistic. Objects that initially were considered as trophies or curios gradually acquired different meanings and came to be regarded as objects of science and, eventually, art. Many of these objects ended up in museums and collections in the West. As such, the museum formed part of a larger set of institutions and disciplines that studied, appropriated, and classified African nature and culture.

Attitudes towards this material shifted over time, and objects became increasingly embedded in classificatory and art historical systems. The most important evolution for the purpose of this chapter was the growing acceptance of certain objects as 'art', which also impacted their value as heritage. From the beginning of European–African contacts, certain objects had a clear aesthetic appeal for Western audiences, but the twentieth century saw a significant broadening of the objects included in the category of African art, an evolution pushed in particular by the primitivist modernists' interest in African art. A market for these objects grew in tandem, and gradually the trend also had an impact on museum displays, which more systematically came to include African art displays.[9]

A reflection of changing ways of regarding African cultures, the interpretation of these artifacts as art and heritage, was in fact deeply embedded in colonial systems of thought and knowledge. Although superficially progressive, the reinterpretation of an increasing amount of objects as art in fact underwrote a renewed commitment to colonialism, justified as conservationism and protectionism. This was a characteristic of a shifting interpretation of colonialism that, from the 1930s on, moved away from the civilizing mission towards a 'colonial humanism' or 'welfare colonialism', imagined by colonizers as reformed and 'modern' systems that would prevent the collapse of empires under the pressures of anti-colonial sentiment.[10]

By lifting the objects away from their origin and into the pantheon of art, and consequently human and world heritage, it became the responsibility of the European states to protect the (now economically valuable) collections in the West. The impact of this change also extended into colonial policies directed at the preservation of arts and cultures in the colonies. Growing international attention to, for example, Ife bronzes, fueled a trade in objects from Nigeria, which raised the concern of colonials and led to the creation of the Department of Antiquities, along with museums in Jos (1952) and Esie (1954) and legislation to control art trafficking.[11] As Derek Peterson argues, systems of indirect rule in particular accelerated the interest in African culture as heritages, using cultural justifications in the selection of African intermediary leadership, which the latter exploited in contexts of 'strategic ornamentalism'.[12]

In the case of the Belgian empire, efforts to introduce the protection of African art and crafts as heritage into colonial law started in the 1930s, although these were met with significant resistance from colonial officials on the ground. A government Commission for the Protection of Indigenous

Arts and Crafts (La Commission pour la Protection des Arts et Métiers indigènes), founded in the 1930s, created policies for conservation efforts in the colonies by supporting small museums in the colony but also with initiatives to encourage local artisanal production and bring it under the control of the colonial state.[13] A similar concern animated some of the activities of the Institut Français d'Afrique Noire (IFAN) in French West Africa, created in 1936 and headquartered in Dakar. Several of the IFAN-associated research and museum institutions displayed a concern with the advancement and control of artisanal production. In the museums in Abidjan and Niamey, for example, objects were displayed to serve as models for artisans, who at times were also housed in workshops connected to the museums.[14]

The logic of decolonization translated to the field of cultural production, and conservation projected the recovery of a sovereign way of life onto the possession of culture, literally and metaphorically. Its literal sense will be explored in the next section, which examines the emergence and persistence of claims for the restitution of cultural property, particularly in the form of art and museum collections, to the African continent. Second, this chapter will explore the history of museums on the African continent. As the institution that housed objects, the museum became the metaphorical location of cultural sovereignty, which it exercised via the possession and display of collections and via the creation and representation of knowledge about African cultures.

Artifacts and Art on Display: Museums in Africa

The museum landscape in Africa still consists overwhelmingly of museums that have their origin in the colonial era. Yet because of their perceived roles as key elements in landscapes of modernity, many of these museums became national institutions after independence, a transition that confirmed the transformation of their collections into national patrimony, and connected them to the cultural politics of the independent state.[15]

Museums in the colonies were, like their counterparts in the metropole, heavily embedded in the theory and practice of colonial sciences, both in terms of the systems of classification and the interpretation that guided their display and collecting practices, but also in literal terms; they often originated in the collections of colonial research institutions.[16] For example, the core collection of today's National Museum of Rwanda in Butare was gathered by the researchers of the Belgian colonial Institute for Scientific Research in Butare (then Astrida) in the course of their ethnographic research.[17] This is also the case for former French West Africa, where the IFAN founded research institutes and museums throughout the region.[18] Most of these have had long histories as postcolonial national museums.[19]

Schools were also common places for small museums to emerge, particularly in British West Africa, where the British colonizers felt a certain competition with the French creation of the IFAN. In Nigeria, the development

of museums was championed by British art teacher Kenneth Murray, who was appointed to the new department of Antiquities in 1953 as Surveyor of Antiquities. Together with Bernard Fagg, his efforts led to the creation of museums in Jos (1952) and Esie (1954). While a formal, national, museum opened in Gold Coast in 1957, it was based on a collection started at Achimota College in Accra in the 1920s, which occupied a small museum on campus. The hope was that the college museum, led by a British archeologist and located on the campus of a school created to educate a local elite, would contribute to a feeling of pride and ownership of local culture.[20]

The creation of these museums and research institutes manifests shifting attitudes towards the value of African cultures in the late colonial period. A sense of custodianship over African cultures came to permeate colonial policies, replacing some of the earlier emphasis on the erasure or destruction of local cultures in the context of the 'civilizing' mission. This did not mean, however, that these institutions could all be considered blank technologies of power. Often being the initiatives or pet projects of small elites, these projects were contested,[21] as were interpretations of colonialism as cultural guardianship in general. Nonetheless, they were part of the infrastructural and institutional inheritance of newly independent African states.

Political independence did not automatically entail a process of cultural decolonization. Although museums (and the possession of cultural heritage more broadly) were imagined as avenues for the creation of cultural sovereignty, in practice, it turned out to be difficult to transform the structures of knowledge, practices of preservation, and patterns of possession that formed the cultural pillars of colonialism. Cultural politics were commonly seen as an avenue for the strengthening of the nation in the postcolonial period, taking the shape of cultural festivals, the creation of cultural infrastructure (in the form of libraries, archives, museums, etc.) and organizations (in the form of dance and music troupes, for example). Museums in Africa were seen both as the targets of processes of decolonization, and as tools for said processes in the postcolonial period, although the implementation of these desired changes was highly uneven and depended greatly on local and national political trends.[22] Making national museums out of colonial institutions without replicating colonial structures of knowledge and representation was (and continues to be) no easy feat. Colonial interpretations of museums as places of conservation in the face of the disorientation of modernity continued, although postcolonial modernity was also regularly imagined around a core of so-called traditional or 'pre-colonial' cultures. Displaying a variety of local cultures while promoting a national identity was also a delicate line to walk, particularly when Pan-Africanism was also added to the agenda. By and large, however, many museums continued to focus their collections on the cultures that fell within the territorial boundaries of the state.

The history of the National Museum of Ghana is instructive here. Although it opened after Ghanaian independence in 1957, like many African

museums, it was in essence a colonial project that was adapted to postcolonial political purposes. While its collection dated back to the 1930s and had been located on the campus of Achimota College, its conception as an independent institution was the culmination of changing attitudes toward African cultures in the late colonial period. It was conceived of as an institution where a deeper, pre-historical past could provide the backdrop for a contemporary, aesthetic, appreciation of local cultures, and the education of an elite upper class and their role in a common future for the country. As such, the museum not only had a cultural purpose, but also a social and political one: it could help anchor a society facing the impact of colonial modernity and provide a backdrop for the projection of a colonial sponsored nationalism, while being a place where colonial administrators and an upper-class elite mingled. These views did not disappear with independence. On the contrary, they seeped into postcolonial ideas about the role of the museum for the state of Ghana, although attitudes toward the museum were often ambiguous.[23]

The issue of national coherence was a prime concern for the Nkrumah Government. Ghana's first post-independence government was faced with the prospect of uniting regions that encompassed different local cultures but had also been subject to different systems of colonial rule. This deeply marked the state ceremonialism of Ghana, which integrated 'traditional' artifacts (such as Kente cloth and Asante stools) while emphasizing their role in *national* politics. The same concern applied to the objects in the country's museum collections and displays: their identification with local cultures had to be in the service of a national culture and identity. The displays at the National Museum in 1957 however allowed for multiple readings. One curatorial strategy, influenced by Pan-Africanism, was to refer to cultures and histories from across the continent. Nonetheless, the main focus was on local cultures, which were generally represented as elements of the national. However, as Mark Crinson describes, the dominance of Asante material, which dated back to the creation of the collections during the colonial period, had an impact on the post-independence displays, making it loom large within the representation of the nation. Postcolonial collecting practices of the 1960s also replicated the collection's existing strengths, reinforcing certain cultural hegemonies.[24]

As opposed to the Ghanaian national museum, the Institute for National Museums in Zaire (Institut des Musées Nationaux du Zaïre, IMNZ) focused exclusively on local cultures. The Institute was created between 1969 and 1971 through a collaboration between the former museum of the Belgian Congo (now the Royal Museum for Central Africa) in Belgium and the presidential office of Mobutu (who had come to power in 1965 through a coup), in part because of restitution demands for the collections of the Belgian museum by Zaire. By the Zairian side, the IMNZ was envisioned as an element in the quest to reclaim cultural sovereignty, by creating a national collection and using the latter in national and international exhibitions, and

by educating a young generation of Zairian museum professionals in order to reclaim the production of knowledge about Zairian cultures from Western academia.

Cultural politics came to the forefront of Mobutu's national politics in the 1970s under the state ideology of *authenticité* (authenticity), which envisioned a new, national, 'authentic', Zairian nation, born out of the values and traditions of pre-colonial Zairian cultures. Although this led to a 'Zairization' campaign to downgrade the influence of the Belgians at the IMNZ, the Museum Institute failed to develop much of an approach to the decolonization of representations and knowledge. Despite organizing a number of well-received international exhibitions in the 1970s (notably to France and the USA), it, like other African museums, relied heavily on modes of visual and knowledge representations developed during the colonial era (particularly the emphasis on objects as art). The IMNZ also never succeeded in developing much of an audience nationally. Although a lack of exhibition space certainly played a role here, so did the increased authoritarianism of the Mobutu regime, which resulted in a decline in state interest and support of cultural technologies of power like the museum. Despite this distancing, the population continued to see the IMNZ as a Mobutist institution.[25]

As colonial institutions, many of the museums discussed here had only limited local audiences, a problem that continued into the postcolonial period. Museums were considered to be spaces for tourists and privileged elites. Their location in major cities, often centers of state power, also served as an impediment to developing a broader local audience. This was compounded by the fact that many museums were located in the administrative quarters of town previously less accessible to Africans, which often continued to be spaces of exclusion.[26] The West African Museum Program (WAMP) attempted to counteract this in the early 1980s by promoting the establishment of smaller, local museums in towns far from the capitals, a program that met with modest success.[27]

With the continent-wide economic downturn of the 1970s came an era of structural adjustments programs and global financial and economic interference, the impact of which fully took hold of the African continent by the 1980s, with serious financial consequences for many of the continent's cultural institutions. As Claude Ardouin, long-time director of the museum in Mali, observed, culture continued to be a 'strategic issue for policymaking in Africa', but development institutions became key players.[28] With state support in decline, the help of non-governmental organizations and collaboration with Western institutions and international cultural organizations (such as UNESCO and ICOM), became a matter of survival for many. With this shift, the realm of culture became fully integrated into the development paradigm. Like postcolonial states, development and international agencies were interested in the educational potential of museums as political tools, this time

as promotional institutions for democracy. The 1991 ICOM meeting of African museum professionals described the museum as 'a tool for cultural pluralism, national development democracy [as well as] public education'.[29] As in the post-independence period, the desire was to see museums become relevant to society, but the ambitions for a decolonization of representation and knowledge faded into the background. Some of the initiatives that started as development projects became quite successful. Notably the West African Museum Program (WAMP), which was started by the International Africa Institute in London in 1982, developed into an independent West African institution that, through its workshops, publications, and grants, worked to battle the institutional fragility of West African museums across former British and French imperial boundaries.[30]

The more recent revival of the museum and heritage scene in South Africa forms a hopeful note in the history of African cultural institutions. The developments in South Africa are part and parcel of a wider movement for the decolonization of public culture. The fall of the apartheid system, combined with the existence of an already extensive network of heritage sites and museums this political system had generated, created the conditions and the urgent need for a decolonization of the country's cultural infrastructure.[31] This led to the (at times contested) reimagining of existing sites, but also the creation of new institutions, such as the District Six Museum in Cape Town, with considerable grass-roots support.[32] The questioning of museological strategies was more successful in some cases than in others. Particularly older institutions, such as the MuseumAfrica in Johannesburg, had a more difficult time separating themselves from a colonial and apartheid apparatus, both in practice and in perception.[33]

Decolonization: Heritage and Restitution Claims

Heritage protection had been the provenance of international organizations for a number of decades by the time decolonization swept the African continent. The decolonization wave of the mid-twentieth century, however, had a profound impact on the role of heritage in global relations. As a consequence of the colonial thirst for collecting, large collections of cultural artifacts were now housed in museums in the West. With the advent of decolonization, these objects had acquired meaning as the national heritage of newly independent nations. In a context in which past colonial practices were now the subject of public and widespread criticism, questions arose about the ownership of these objects and collections. It soon became clear that the international protocols for the protection of cultural property and heritage were woefully inadequate to deal with discussions about objects moved during colonial rule.[34]

Although discussions about the return of cultural objects have been part of international relations for several centuries, the Second World War was a

watershed moment for the emergence of international agreements about the role and protection of cultural property. Conceived of in the aftermath of Nazi art looting, the Hague Convention and protocol of 1954; the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, gave shape to the idea that cultural property ought to be protected from wartime destruction and maintained in its culture of origin.[35] Given the difficulties adapting such agreements to the context of mid-twentieth century decolonization, UNESCO organized the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property in 1970. The convention demonstrated an evolution in the views on heritage policies by explicitly addressing the needs of former colonial states to prevent cultural heritage from leaving their territories. Its policies, however, focused largely on the prevention of illegal trafficking of heritage objects. So, while it addressed continuing loss, its regulations did not allow for a frank discussion of the material that left former colonies before 1970. In other words, the topics of colonial collecting or plundering were off limits. A preliminary draft of the convention did address the issues of restitution of property removed before 1970, but many former colonial powers objected, and the final text was explicitly non-retroactive.[36] Widespread dissatisfaction with the 1970 Convention among former colonies resulted in resolutions from several political bodies, among which was *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries*, which affirmed 'the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the African Cultural Convention on the rights of states to recover the art treasures and manuscripts looted from them'.[37] Zairian dictator Mobutu also raised the matter in front of the Assembly of the United Nations in 1973 by condemning 'colonial pillage' and emphasizing the need for postcolonial cultural restitution by arguing for the national importance of the possession of an 'authentic' heritage for the viability of the future of new nations. The proposed resolution was received enthusiastically by most African nations, but was strongly opposed by Western countries, which rejected the emphasis on colonialism as a cause for the absence of heritage objects in former African colonies, instead placing blame on art trafficking and African collaboration with the latter.[38] The resulting resolution had lost most of its teeth, although its existence does attest to the urge of newly independent countries to push back against the non-retroactive nature of the 1970 UNESCO convention.

UNESCO responded with the establishment of an Intergovernmental Committee, although the debate about the name of this committee (which had to be changed from the 'Intergovernmental Committee Concerning Restitution or Return of Cultural Property' to the clunky 'Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation', ICPRCP) continued to underscore the contentious nature of its subject.[39] Its first session took place in 1980, and it continues to meet. In essence, what the committee

does is encourage and facilitate discussions about potential cases for restitution in situations where bilateral contacts have been unfruitful, usually in a context of preservation and development. Of the mere six cases which have been resolved before the ICPRCP, only one includes an African country. Tanzania filed a claim in 2006 for the return of a Makonde mask from the Barbier-Mueller Museum in Geneva, Switzerland. The mask, which was stolen from the Museum in Dar Es Salaam in 1984, was returned in 2010. Negotiations had in fact been going in since 1990, but had broken down several times.[40]

Clearly the cases the ICPRCP treats are the very top of the iceberg when it comes to objects that African cultural institutions and states would like to see returned, which begs the question: Why so few? The Tanzania–Switzerland case had several elements that help us understand why so few cases have been brought before the ICPRCP: it had clear indications of a relatively recent theft; it concerned only one object; Tanzania possessed a respected national museum to return the object to; the Tanzanian state made the claim; and Switzerland was willing to enter into talks. The very structure of the process for filing claims and its administrative requirements necessitate the involvement of the government, and these might have more pressing concerns than the recovery of an object in a process that could become tendentious and cause tension with the West. Nor is it always easy to clearly lay out how objects disappeared, which certainly applies to material that was moved during the colonial era. This brings us to an argument often made by museum curators in the West: not all removal of artifacts from Africa during the colonial era can be considered plundering: some instances were the result of regular commercial transactions or exchanges in the context of the establishment of a relationship, for example. Or sometimes locals colluded in the removal or sale of objects to their own benefit. Often, the scientific value of keeping collections together and in good conditions of conservation are also raised in the context of requests for return.

The focus on conservation and preservation is inevitably used to draw attention to the limited opportunities many African museums have to maintain the same standards, or the ability of African nations to enforce protective measures against illegal trade; an argument that conveniently neglects the colonial roots of much of this illegal trade.[41] Recently, the focus on the value of heritage for a nation is also questioned by depicting local communities and cultures (and not African states) as the rightful originators of claims for return. Or the concept of cultural belonging is undermined completely from a postmodern perspective that recognizes objects have multiple lives and meanings to multiple audiences. While on an academic level this questioning of identity politics and its ties to an essentialized idea of culture certainly has merit, its underestimation of the historical inequalities that led to particular patterns of movement and possession of these objects, and their continued impact today, can feel jarring.[42]

The emergence of the idea of a heritage of mankind, and an emphasis on the universal value of heritage, has also had mixed effects on the ability of African nations to claim a national heritage. On the one hand, a recognition of a heritage site as a UNESCO World Heritage Site can create access to financial resources for preservation and protection, and stimulates these locations as tourist destinations.[43] On the other hand, as heritage scholar David Lowenthal has written: 'universalism endows the haves at others' expense'.[44] Once objects are considered universal heritage, it becomes easier for museums in the West to argue against restitution because of the relevance the objects have for their audience, as well as their duty to help preserve the objects.[45]

The universalist approach has recently found expression in the cosmopolitanism argument, advanced by Kwame Anthony Appiah, who laments the equation of patrimony with *a* culture and with the nation, questioning, for example, the link between a Nok sculpture and the contemporary nation of Nigeria.[46] Instead, he reminds his readers of the positive effects a global audience being able to experience African art has on people's sense of cosmopolitanism, allowing them, as he puts it, to experience a connection 'not *through* identity, but despite difference'.[47] Appiah doesn't deny that there are cases in which repatriation makes sense (particularly in the context of theft from African museums), but argues we do not need the concept of cultural patrimony to make this happen.

Regardless of the limitations of approaching culture through the possession of cultural property, it is clear that desires for restitution were and are a part of the way in which African nations, people, and cultural institutions imagine a redressing of the relation with the Global North. It is also clear, however, that the regulative framework UNESCO offers, and the administrative path available through the ICPRCP, are not able to address the deeper motivation behind desires for restitution. The history of these demands, then, is not limited to the cases discussed before the ICPRCP; quite the contrary.

The majority of the cases in which some form of return or restitution occurred actually took place outside the international legislative framework provided by the UN and UNESCO. The example of Zaire is instructive here. Mobutu's intervention at the 1973 UN Assembly meeting was no coincidence. Demands for the restitution of the museum collections of the Museum of the Belgian Congo near Brussels had accompanied the negotiations about Congolese independence from the very start, since they were envisioned as part and parcel of the riches of the country, much like its mining resources. The debate over their rightful ownership continued through the 1960s and led to a Belgian–Congolese collaboration in the creation of a National Institute for Museums in the Congo. Part of the motivation for Belgium's participation was the desire to deflect attention away from the collections in Belgium by helping Congo (which was renamed Zaire in 1971) to create its own national collection of art and ethnographic artifacts. When

Mobutu settled into power after his second coup in 1965, he resurrected the debate over the collections in Belgium in the context of what was described as an unfinished process of decolonization. The conflict between both countries partially resided in a disagreement about the language in which a return of objects was to be discussed: while Zairian officials insisted on using the word 'restitution', which implied they saw it as a correction to a wrongdoing of Belgium during the colonial period, the Belgian side preferred to address the matter as 'development cooperation' or 'gift', concepts that carry very different implications about the nature and meaning of the initial collection and the possible return of the objects. When a return of objects (1042 in total, 896 of which were actually already the property of Zaire, and 114 from the Belgian museum's collection) did take place between 1977 and 1981, it was after Zaire had explicitly distanced itself from the language of restitution and a demand for the return of the full collection of the Belgian museum.[48]

The Belgian–Congolese example is not the only case of repatriation that took place outside the confines of the UN and UNESCO regulative conservation regimes. Other examples of object repatriation to Africa include the return of sculpture, originally from the Great Zimbabwe site, from Germany to Zimbabwe in 2003, and the repatriation of an Axum obelisk from Italy to Ethiopia after decades of negotiations.[49] Other highly contested objects and collections, notably the many Benin bronzes in the West, the result of looting during the Benin Punitive Expedition by the British in 1897, remain the subject of continued and frequent debate.[50]

Conclusion

This chapter has considered the impact of the colonial transformation of objects from African cultures into art and heritage, on the role these objects came to play in processes of decolonization aimed at establishing or reclaiming cultural guardianship from former colonial powers. One avenue through which this could be achieved was the development of ethnographic and art museums as national and postcolonial institutions, although in practice decolonizing both the infrastructures and the epistemological structures that were central to those proved a difficult and at times contentious process. The other avenue through which these objects (and the sovereignty they stood for) were reclaimed was that of the politics of heritage possession.

As this short foray into heritage politics and restitution cases demonstrates, the multiplication of parties (be they individual, commercial, or government and state representatives) and interests (be they commercial, scientific, national, cultural, or global) make the issue of restitution a difficult one. The growing presence of UN and UNESCO in heritage debates means that, on the one hand, UNESCO has created global constituencies but, on the other hand, its regulative framework does not fully support conversations about restitution, while its policies encourage the use of heritage policies in state

ceremonialism.[51] While the regulative framework has expanded tremendously in the postcolonial era, it has produced very few results from the perspective of the many African parties seeking redress for the large stream of objects that left the continent during the colonial era. It can be argued, in fact, that the heritage regime is premised upon certain principles of preservation (scientific value of collections, legal chains of custody, integrity of the objects, etc.) that reproduce late colonial interpretations of cultural custodianship. This means that although it allowed for international discussions to take place, it failed to provide a powerful enough framework to support the repatriation demands of former colonies and thus, perhaps inadvertently, served to reinforce existing structural inequalities.

Like museums elsewhere in the world, the decolonization process of museums on the African continent remains unfinished. The search for alternative models of representation and display for local audiences, and for financial stability, continues. More than 50 years after independence movements engulfed the continent, however, museums continue to be seen as relevant by a variety of communities, from the local to the international. In the Global North, the discussion about the future of ethnographic museums is gaining speed, with a growing choir of voices advocating in favor of a post-ethnographic age of museums.[52] The way in which these questions impact museum institutions on the African continent has been all but neglected, often in favor of (admittedly pressing) concerns about financing and audiences.[53] We are, however, seeing a resurgence of decolonization language in the context of educational and cultural institutions, both on and off the African continent, a trend that will perhaps reignite a debate around African museums.[54]

Notes

1. De Varine-Bohan, quoted in *Les musées dans le monde* (Lausanne–Paris: Grammont-Robert Laffont, 1975), 73.
2. For the relation between anthropology, colonialism, and museums, see e.g., George Stocking Jr., (1985 and 1991), Sally Price (1991), H. Glenn Penny (2007) on Germany, Annie Coombes (1994) on the UK, Nélia Diaz (1991) and Maureen Murphy (2009) on France and the USA.
3. Of course, a wide variety of African art and artifacts continued to be produced and consumed for a variety of reasons, including local use, during the period discussed here.
4. The word 'authentic' appears in quotation marks here in order to acknowledge its constructed nature and avoid essentialized references to the past. As Sidney Kasfir explains, ideas about the 'authenticity' of African art are based on flawed assumptions about pre-colonial African societies as homogeneous and isolated, and African artists as controlled by tradition. See: Sidney Littefield Kasfir, "African Art and Authenticity: A Text With a Shadow," *African Arts*, 25, no. 2 (1992): 41–53.
5. Laurajane Smith, *The Uses of Heritage* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 44–83.

6. This does not imply, however, that African cultures and societies did not appreciate these objects for their aesthetic appeal. It merely means that the particular category of art in which they became inserted was in origin a European one.
7. This chapter is not intended as an exhaustive overview of the history of museums in Africa. For a more comprehensive overview, see Anne Gaugue, *Les États Africains et Leurs Musées. La mise en scène de la Nation* (Paris-Montréal: Éditions l'Harmattan, Gaugue 1997). This chapter is focused on national museums with what were considered to be ethnographic and art collections, and relies mostly on examples from West, Central and Southern Africa.
8. Ferdinand De Jong and Michael Rowlands, eds., *Reclaiming Heritage. Alternative Imaginaries of Memory in West Africa* (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2007), 17.
9. This trend occurred at various speeds in different places. In French museums, for example, African art displays were common by the 1930s, while in Belgium this trend was not institutionalized until the 1950s. See Sarah Van Beurden, "The Value of Culture: Congolese Art and the Promotion of Belgian Colonialism (1945–1959)," *History and Anthropology*, 24, no. 4 (2013): 472–92.
10. On colonial humanism, see Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Négritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). On welfare colonialism see Sarah Van Beurden, *Authentically African. Arts and the Transnational Politics of Congolese Culture* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2015), 28–29.
11. Okechukwu Nwafor, "Culture, Corruption, Politics," *Critical Interventions: Journal of African Art History and Visual Culture* 4, no. 2 (2010): 118–19.
12. Derek R. Peterson, Kodzo Gavua, and Ciraj Rassool, eds., *The Politics of Heritage in Africa. Economies, Histories and Infrastructures* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 7.
13. Van Beurden, *Authentically African*, 63–72.
14. Agbenyega Adedze, "Symbols of Triumph: IFAN and the Colonial Museum Complex in French West Africa (1938–1960)," *Museum Anthropology* 25, no. 2 (2000): 52; and Julien Bondaz, *L'exposition postcoloniale. Musées et zoos en Afrique de l'Ouest (Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014), 64–71.
15. David Lowenthal, *The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
16. The first museums on the African continent were founded at the start of the twentieth century in the British and Portuguese empires and were focused on the collection and display of geological and mineral specimens. The collection and display of ethnograhic material only appears in the 1930s. Gaugue, *Les États Africains et Leurs Musées*, 7.
17. Laura De Becker, "Imagining the Post-Colonial and Post-Genocidal Nation in the National Museum of Rwanda, Butare," *Critical Interventions: Journal of African Art History and Visual Culture* 10, no. 3 (2016): 293–308.
18. Philip L. Ravenhill, "The Passive Object and the Tribal Paradigm: Colonial Museography in French West Africa," in *African Material Cultures*, ed. Mary Jo Arnoldi, Christaud M. Geary, and Kris L. Hardin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 265–82; and Adedze, "Symbols of Triumph".
19. Bondaz, *L'exposition postcoloniale*.

20. Sophie Mew, "'Universal Museums' in West Africa," *Critical Interventions: Journal of African Art History and Visual Culture* 4, no. 2 (2010): 101–17; and Mark Crinson, "Nation-Building, Collecting and the Politics of Display—the National Museum, Ghana," *Journal of the History of Collections* 13, no. 2 (2001): 231–50.
21. Paul Basu, "A Museum for Sierra Leone? Amateur Enthusiasms and Colonial Museum Policy in British West Africa," in *Curating Empire. Museums and the British Imperial Experience*, ed. Sarah Longair and John McAleer (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), 145–67.
22. Alexandre Adande, "L'impérieuse nécessité des musées africains," *L'Art nègre* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1966), 163–66; Agbenyega Adedze, "Museums as a Tool for Nationalism in Africa," *Museum Anthropology* 19, no. 2 (1995): 58–64; A.E. Afigbo and S.I.O. Okita, eds., *Museums and Nation Building* (Imo, Nigeria: New African Publishing Co., 1985); and Flora Edouwaye S. Kaplan, "Nigerian Museums: Envisaging Culture as National Identity," in *Museums and the Making of 'Ourselves': The Role of Objects in National Identity*, ed. Flora Edouwaye S. Kaplan (London: Leicester University Press, 1994), 45–78.
23. Crinson, "Nation-Building, Collecting and the Politics of Display—the National Museum, Ghana," 236 and 239–47.
24. Ibid., 242–45; and Arianna Fogelman, "Colonial Legacy in African Museology: The Case of the Ghana National Museum," *Museum Anthropology* 31, no. 1 (2008): 19–27.
25. Van Beurden, *Authentically African*, 127–207.
26. Gaugue, *Les États Africains et Leurs Musées*, 139–43.
27. Claude Daniel Ardouin and Emmanuel Arinze, eds., *Museums and the Community in West Africa* (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press—James Currey, 1995).
28. Claude Daniel Ardouin, "Culture, Museums, and Development in Africa," in *The Muse of Modernity: Essays on Culture as Development in Africa*, ed. Philip G. Altbach and Salah Hassan (Trenton, NJ, Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press, 1997a), 181.
29. International Council of Museums (ICOM). *What Museums for Africa? Heritage in the Future: Benin, Ghana, Togo, November 18*–23, 1991 (Proceedings of the Encounters [Paris?]: International Council of Museums, 1992), 371.
30. For the results of some of the WAMP workshops and conferences, see e.g., Claude Daniel Ardouin, ed., *Museums and Archeology in West Africa* (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press—James Currey, 1997b); Claude Daniel Ardouin and Emmanuel Arinze, eds. *Museums & the Community in West Africa* (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press—James Currey, 1995) and ibid. *Museums and History in West Africa* (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press—James Currey, 2000).
31. It has also resulted in a critical mass in terms of scholarship. See e.g., Ciraj Rassool, *Recalling Community in Cape Town: Creating and Curating the District Six Museum* (Cape Town: District Six Museum, 2001); Sara Byala, *A Place That Matters Yet: John Gubbins's Museum Africa in the Postcolonial World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); and Annie Coombes, *History After*

Apartheid: Visual Culture and Public Memory in a Democratic South Africa (Raleigh: Duke University Press, 2003).

32. Rassool, *Recalling Community in Cape Town*.
33. Byala, *A Place that Matters Yet*.
34. What this chapter does not address, given its focus on cultural artifacts, but which is nonetheless an important element in the discussions about restitution, are the debates over human remains in Western museum collections. See e.g. Legassick and Rassool on museums and the trade in human remains from South Africa. Ciraj Rassool, "Re-Storing the Skeletons of Empire: Return, Reburial and Rehumanisation in Southern Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 41, no. 3 (2015): 653–70; and Martin Legassick and Ciraj Rassool, *Sketelons in the Cupboard: South African Museums and the Trade in Human Remains, 1907–1917* (Cape Town: South African Museum, 2000).
35. Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, *International Law*, *Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
36. Lyndel V. Prott, ed., *Witnesses to History. A Compendium of Documents and Writings on the Return of Cultural Objects* (Paris: Unesco Publishing, 2009) 12–13. It should be noted here that conventions are only effective if they are ratified by individual governments. In the case of the 1970 UNESCO convention, this occurred only slowly. To date, 131 countries have ratified or accepted the agreement (For a full list, see, consulted April 18, 2016, http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E).
37. Prott, *Witnesses to History*, 13.
38. Van Beurden, *Authentically African*, 116–18.
39. Prott, *Witnesses to History*, 15; and Vrdoljak, *International Law*, *Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects*, 211–12.
40. ICOM, *Dossier de Presse: Masque Makonde. Signature d'un accord pour le don du Masque Makondé du Musée Barbier-Mueller de Genève au Musée National de Tanzanie* (Paris: ICOM, 2010). The international regulative framework on restitution continues to expand, for example by the reccomendations made by the 1982 World Conference on Cultural Policies, held in Mexico and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects. The emphasis on bilateral negotiations and the reluctance to engage with potential claims about material removed in a colonial context also continue. For details see: Jeanette Greenfield, *The Return of Cultural Treasures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 222–37; and Lyndell V. Prott, "Saving Heritage: UNESCO's Action against Illicit Traffic in Africa," in *Plundering Africa's Past*, ed. Peter R. Schmidt and Roderick J. McIntosh (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 29–44.
41. Van Beurden, *Authentically African*, 103.
42. For more on the perspectives of Western museums and curators on restitution, see John Henry Merryman, ed., *Imperialism, Art and Restitution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
43. Being a UNESCO World Heritage Site does not necessarily provide protection against theft and art smuggling of course. On the contrary, it can even make a site more of a target, since it can have a positive effect on the value of objects from these sites, as is the case with the Kilwa Kisiwani site on the Tanzanian coast, for example. See: N.J. Karoma, "The Deterioration and Destruction of

Archeological and Historical Sites in Tanzania," in *Plundering Africa's Past*. 194–95.

44. Lowenthal, *The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History*, 242.
45. For an account of how the technical process of world heritage recognition and management is biased against non-Western locations, see chap. 3 in *The Uses of Heritage* by Laurajane Smith (Smith, *The Uses of History*, 87–113).
46. Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism. Ethics in a World of Strangers* (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2007), 199.
47. Ibid., 135.
48. For a complete history of the Congolese–Zairian restitution demands, see Sarah Van Beurden, "The Art of (Re)Possession: Heritage and the Cultural Politics of Congo's Decolonization," *Journal of African History* 56, no. 1 (2015): 143–64; *Authentically African*, chap. 3.
49. Dawson Munjeri, "The Reunification of a National Symbol," *Museum International* 61, nos. 1–2 (2009): 12–21; and Haile Mariam, "The Cultural Benefits of the Return of the Axum Obelisk," *Museum International* 61, nos. 1–2 (2009): 48–51.
50. Sylvester Ogbechie, "Give Me What Is Mine (Apologies Burning Spear)," consulted May 10, 2016, http://aachronym.blogspot.de/2010/12/give-me-what-is-mine-apologies-burning.html; and Okechukwu Nwafor, "Culture, Corruption, Politics," *Critical Interventions: Journal of African Art History and Visual Culture* 4, no. 2 (2010): 118–31.
51. Ferdinand De Jong and Michael Rowlands, eds., *Reclaiming Heritage. Alternative Imaginaries of Memory in West Africa* (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2007), 13.
52. See e.g. Clare Harriss and Michael O'Hanlon, "The Future of the Ethnographic Museum," *Anthropology Today* 29, no. 1 (2013): 1–32; and Clémentine Deliss (2015) "Collecting Life's Unknowns," *L'Internationale*, consulted March 12, 2016, http://www.internationaleonline.org/research/decolonising_practices/27_collecting_lifes_unknowns.
53. This continues the trend of the ICOM and other conferenecs of the 1990s. See e.g. Anne Marie Bouttiaux, ed., *Afrique: Musées et patrimoines pour quels publics?* (Tervuren–Paris: RMCA-Karthala, 2007).
54. For example in the context of campus protests against the presence of colonial monuments in South Africa, a debate that is also taken up by the Black Lives Matter movement in the USA.

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CHAPTER 48

Building the African Novel on Quick sand: Politics of Language, Identity, and Ownership

Mukoma Wa Ngugi

Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* has been translated into over 50 languages, making it the most translated African novel. But almost 60 years after it was first published, there is no authoritative translation into Igbo, Achebe's mother tongue.[1] An equivalent would be if Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* had not been translated into Polish. But even then, the comparison would not work. As the late Obi Wali noted, 'Conrad's works, as we know, are considered part of English literature, not Polish literature, and the sole criterion for this is that his works are in English, not in Polish'.[2] Achebe, on the other hand, understood himself, and is read, as part of the African literary tradition. Indeed, *Things Fall Apart* has been translated into Polish at least two times while there are three competing translations in German.[3] To be sure, it has been translated into ten or so African languages, but considering there are over 2000 languages on the continent, that is still a tiny number. And, more generally, other novels considered seminal in the African literary tradition such as Ngugi Wa Thiong'o's *A Grain of Wheat*, Bessie Head's *A Question of Power*, and Soyinka's *The Interpreters* fare much worse in terms of translation into the author's mother tongue and the wider African languages index.

This chapter is based on my forthcoming book *The Rise of the African Novel: Politics of Language, Identity and Ownership* (University of Michigan Press, 2018).

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To answer the question of why there is no authoritative Igbo translation of what is understood as Africa's most famous novel, one has to go back to the 1962 'African Writers of English Expression' conference convened at Makerere University, Uganda. In 1962, Africa was in the throes of decolonization, and for the group of young writers attending the conference anything was possible. Their goal was to define, or at least agree upon, the parameters of an African literary aesthetic that would also be in the service of political and cultural decolonization. Reading their post-conference write-ups in the *Transition Journal,* the excitement with which they greeted their role as the instigators and vanguards of an emerging literary tradition is palpable.

The writers in attendance, Chinua Achebe (age 32), Christopher Okigbo (age 32), Wole Soyinka (age 28), James Ngugi (age 28),[4] Bloke Modisane (age 39), and Ezekiel Mphahlele (age 43)[5] set in motion, within a few years, a literary tradition that would engulf subsequent generations in debates around the definition and category of African literature, the languages of African literature, the role of writers in political change, the writer in continental Africa versus the diaspora, and the relationship of African aesthetics to European aesthetics. They would in just a few short years run against the repression and violence of post-independence African states. Disillusioned with the promises of decolonization, they would turn their pens against their neo-colonial governments and pay the price of death, detention, and exile. Achebe became a spokesperson for Biafran independence from Nigeria, doing ambassadorial work in both Africa and the West. Okigbo was shot dead fighting for Biafra's independence in 1967, five years after the conference. The Nigerian military government of General Yakubu Gowon detained Soyinka for his peace activism in 1966. In 1977, the Kenyan government of Jomo Kenyatta detained Ngugi for his political writing and theater work in Gikuyu, his mother tongue. Both Mphahlele and Modisane, coming from apartheid South Africa, were already living in exile at the time of the Makerere Conference, Mphahlele in France and Modisane in Britain. Achebe, Soyinka, and Ngugi each wound up in political exile, ultimately joined by writers like Micere Mugo from Kenya and Nawal El Saadawi from Egypt. The Makerere generation of African writers would suffer death, exile, and detention for not separating their literary aesthetics from the material work of politics, for not separating the author from the citizen.[6]

The young and optimistic Ngugi captured the excitement when he enthusiastically concluded in his post-conference write-up, 'With the death of colonialism, a new society is being born. And with it a new literature'.[7] Yet, even as they were heralding the new society,[8] the conference had declared boldly in its title that this was a gathering of 'African Writers of English Expression'. As Obi Wali asked in an essay published the same year as the Makerere conference, entitled 'The Dead End of African Literature', why was it so important to signal to the attendees that African writers using African languages were not welcome? One cannot conceive of English writers today writing English

national literature in French, or the Chinese writing in Japanese, or the French in German. But for African writers, writing in an imperially enforced foreign language was taken as the starting point. The question for the Makerere writers was not how to write, translate, and market books written in African languages. Rather, it was how best to make English work for the African literary imagination.

Early South African Writing: A Missing Literary Epoch

It was not for the lack of examples of literature written in African languages. In the early 1900s, South African writers were writing in Xhosa, Zulu, Sesotho, and other African languages, with translations into English: Thomas Mofolo's *Moeti oa Bochabe*la (published in 1907, later translated into English as *Traveller to the East* in 1934); *Chaka,* written in 1909 but published in 1931[9]; R.R.R. Dhlomo's *An African Tragedy* (1928) and *UNomalanga kaNdengezi (*1934); Samuel Mqhayi's *Ityala Lamawele* (*The Lawsuit of the Twins*) (1912); and A.C. Jordan's *Ingqumbo Yeminyanya* (1940), translated as *The Wrath of the Ancestors* in 1964. Sol Plaatje's novel, *Mhudi* (1930), was the first full-length novel in English by a black South African writer.

James Currey, the editorial director for *Heinemann's* African Writers Series (AWS) from 1967 to 1984 was well aware of early writing.[10] In *Africa Writes Back* he noted: '[t]he historic contribution by the mission presses in the early part of the twentieth century was later to be reflected in two novels. Lovedale had published Thomas Mofolo's *Chaka* in Sotho in 1925 and the quaint translations published in English and French had an international impact, especially on the writers of negritude. Heinemann commissioned an unexpurgated translation from the academic and poet Dan Kunene'.[11] However, it was not the 'quaint' early writing that really interested Currey; it was more the political writing and contemporary literature produced by politically conscious Makerere writers. Currey. on commissioning books from apartheid South Africa. was very clear about this, saying he wanted books that 'reflected first and foremost the realities of life suffered by the people oppressed by the laws of colour'.[12]

But just like the Makerere generation, these South African writers and intellectuals belonged to their times, and as apartheid became entrenched so did their resistance. For example, the national anthem of the first African National Congress (formed in 1912) was a song of mourning to which Mqhayi added seven nationalist verses. Sol Plaatje, a nationalist and one of the founding members of the ANC, 'arranged for the recording of "Nkosi" in London'.[13] In his essay 'Retracing Nelson Mandela through the Lineage of Black Political Thought from Walter Rubusana to Steve Biko', Xolela Mangcu talks about how, as a young student, Nelson Mandela was influenced by Mqhayi's 'cultural nationalism'.[14] Ntongela Masilela, who has done major work on these early South African writers, sees them as a movement not only

conscious of each other and immersed in their political and cultural contexts, but aware of and influenced by and influencing black Americans and the black diaspora in general.[15] In other words, they saw themselves in the larger context of a Pan-African network.

The point I want to make here, though, is that this early South African literary history provided an alternative path to the 1960s African literature in English consensus. Instead, the Makerere writers were like a literary tsunami that came and immersed early South African writing beneath a torrent of realist novels written in English. They derailed the African literary tradition from one of writing in African languages and subsequently getting translated into other languages, and started us on the path of the realist African novel in English. And they were so thorough that African literary criticism has failed to recover the missing literary epoch.

For example, in the authoritative and groundbreaking anthology of literary criticism, the 2009 *Cambridge Companion to the African Novel*, there is no sustained discussion of the early South African writing in African languages or English. In the *Cambridge Companion*, the chronology of literary events starts with the *Egyptian Book of the Dead* (*c.*1500) and ends with Achebe winning the Man Booker International Prize in 2007. In that chronology, the only mentions of the early South African writing are Mofolo's *Chaka* and Sol Plaatje's *Mhudi*. Mofolo's name is misspelled, rendered as Mfomo, and his earlier two titles are not featured. Instead of giving the 1925 original publication of *Chaka* in Sesotho, it gives the English translation publication date of 1930. Dhlomo and A.C. Jordan and others are nowhere to be found. The equally authoritative 2007 *African Literature: An Anthology of Criticism and Theory,* edited by Tejumola Olaniyan and Ato Quayson, has no essays on pre-Makerere writing, in African languages or in English. To put it another way, imagine an English-literature anthology missing a literary epoch like modernism, for example. W.B. Yeats, Ezra Pound, D.H. Lawrence, T.S. Eliot, or James Joyce would be absent; the English literary tradition would be unrecognizable.

The Publishing Industry and the Rise of African Aesthetics in English

Missionary presses in general were central to establishing early South African writing. Oyekan Owomoyela, in his essay 'The Literature of Empire: Africa', credits Lovedale Press with establishing isiXhosa literature, saying that it 'owes its birth to the Lovedale press; one of the earliest products of the Lovedale mission school, Tiyo Soga, translated John Bunyan's *The Pilgrim's Progress* into Xhosa as *U-hambo lom-hambi* (1868), and also played a central role in the translation of the bible into the same language'.[16] Lovedale Press first published A.C. Jordan's *Ingqumbo Yeminyanya*, and in fact two of the main fictional characters in Jordan's novel, Mphuthumi and Thembeka, attend Lovedale College.

Lovedale was founded by the Glasgow Missionary Society in 1823 with a mission to 'promote Christian knowledge in Southern Africa and to propagate 'civilised norms of conduct and moral behaviour'.[17] Even though it specialized in educational and Christian books, starting in 1932 it branched out to publishing general literature books under the directorship of R.H.W. Shepherd. Shepherd believed that a 'mission press needed to exercise a more creative responsibility and that it should provide more general reading matter for the African public'.[18] Shepherd himself did not believe that blacks and whites were equals; he saw himself as gently guiding Africans from heathenism to civilization.

With Lovedale largely having a monopoly there was pressure to write books sympathetic to the Christianizing mission, and sometimes outright censorship as Jeffrey Peires shows in his essay 'Lovedale Press: Literature for the Bantu Revisited'. And that pressure might explain why in *Traveller to the East*, Thomas Mofolo created an Africa straight out of the myth of the noble savage. And it very well could be that the writers at that time could not see the coming apartheid and just how far it would go in denying Africans their humanity. For the revolutionary Makerere writers writing in a time of decolonization, Fekisi, in *Traveller to the East* in his journey toward Christian enlightenment, would have appeared a caricature, a confirmation of internalized racism. It would have appeared antithetical to the struggle for political, economic, and cultural independence. It was not a literature one could take seriously enough to be studied as an integral part of the African literary tradition.

The Makerere consensus would not have survived and thrived without active participation by British publishers. They too were invested in propagating the myth of African literature beginning with their intervention. For example, James Currey in *Africa Writes Back* titled the opening chapter 'The Establishment of African Literature', with the subtitle 'The Starting Line'. And he begins the chapter by quoting a 1998 Achebe Harvard Lecture in which Achebe celebrates the AWS. In fact, it is Achebe who uses the phrase 'starting line' in a lecture that takes the myth of the beginning of African literature for a fact:

> [t]he launching of the Heinemann's African Writers Series was like the umpire's signal for which African writers had been waiting on the starting line. In one short generation an immense library of writing had sprung into being from all over the continent and, for the first time in history, Africa's future generations of readers and writers—youngsters in schools and colleges—began to read not only *David Copperfield* and other English classics that I and my generation had read, but also works by their own writers about their own people.[19]

So here is the publisher using the writer, and the writer using the publisher, to justify an African literary clock that starts with the AWS. In the same opening page, after using the Achebe speech to show the AWS as the

start of African literature, he goes on to justify the use of English. Currey writes, 'English was the lubricant of the English-speaking world. It was not only how authority was imposed but it was also the way in which the subject peoples reacted to that imposition of power. Writers in India, the Caribbean and Africa came to take advantage of the language they shared, but they had to have publishing opportunities'.[20] It is the sentence 'English was the lubricant of the English world' that is the most arresting because it starts with the fact of an English-speaking world, not a world in which thousands of other languages, literatures, and writers in those languages existed. The British publisher of African fiction was so thoroughly educated in the myth of the English metaphysical empire that even those pronouncements that would otherwise be seen as presenting two opposed truths pass for a fact: English is the language of the English-speaking world.

The decision to publish the African novels through its Heinemann Educational Books (HEB) imprints was a practical one. The colonial cultural machinery had not been interested in cultivating African literary culture or reading for pleasure. Publishing was for educational books. It was easier for Hill to push books written by African writers through the educational publishing model. And this meant publishing African literary books with the idea that they would in turn become set books in Kenyan primary and high schools. As Hill explained, HEB was the only firm with 'the faith—the passion almost—and the will to do the job' and they had the 'necessary business set-up to sell the books' in a continent where the 'book trade … was almost entirely educational'.[21] The idea was that the books that sold well would support newer and even experimental works.

But it did not work that way. The model for the hard fought for but lucrative educational books market took over. There was no market-driven incentive effort to develop a general readership because the goal was to have novels become exam-set books. In a 2015 interview aptly titled 'We'll stick to creative works, but textbooks bring in cash', Kiarie Kamau, the chief executive at East African Educational Publishers, said that:

> [t]he demand for a generous return on investment is there. The competition is stiff, and one must keep raising the bar in terms of strategy to perform better and better … What I mean is that there is that book that reads so well, has a strong message, and has an almost eternal shelf life. But it just doesn't sell in huge quantities. What the shareholder wants to hear about is the percentage of dividend that has been declared, and that's only possible if you have a mass market product, bringing home a generous turnover. Often, that's a textbook.[22]

Like any other business, publishing has to be profitable in order to be viable. But when the managing director starts calling novels products, it is clear that the institutional orientation is towards the profitable; to stick with what has always been working with general readership, books being secondary.

Because the educational system is in English, books written in English get priority. Walter Bgoya, the publisher at the Tanzanian-based Mkuki na Nyota Press, said in a 2013 essay, 'Publishing in Africa from Independence to the Present Day', gave the example of a bilingual textbook that Mkuki na Nyota submitted to the Committee of the Ministry of Education. He narrated:

> … Mkuki na Nyota Publishers submitted the first of four bilingual Swahili/English textbooks, covering the equivalent of the O-level chemistry syllabus, to the Educational Materials Approval Committee of the Ministry of Education for evaluation. Although the material in both languages adequately covered the chemistry syllabus for Form 1, it was rejected solely because it was bilingual. The publisher was informed that approval would be given if the Swahili pages were removed.[23]

Only colonial education and its vestiges can explain why the committee would reject such a painstaking and creative solution. The high premium is on English. African languages are not only unequal but also not worthy of being taught. An opportunity to grow Kiswahili chemistry vocabulary was lost. Novels follow the same model: they are more likely to be taught if in English.

What Is African Literature? Then and Now

The Makerere Conference of 1962 is also important because it was there that the question of what constituted African literature was discussed.[24] As per Chinua Achebe's account in his 1965 essay, 'English and the African Writer', the participants spent considerable time debating and eventually failing to agree a definition of African literature. Was African Literature to be limited by being:

> … produced in Africa or about Africa? Could African literature be on any subject, or must it have an African theme? Should it embrace the whole continent or South of the Sahara, or just Black Africa? And then the question of language. Should it be in indigenous African languages or should it include Arabic, English, French, Portuguese, Afrikaans, etc.?[25]

The conference failed to answer the question, but one year later a conference held at Faculté des Lettres of Dakar University in Senegal succeeded in 'tentatively' coming up with a definition. Ezekiel Mphahlele in a conference report for *Transition* recorded the definition:

> … as creative writing in which an African setting is authentically handled or to which experiences originating in Africa are integral. This therefore includes among others, writing by white Africans like Nadine Gordimer, Dan Jacobson, Doris Lessing, Elspeth Huxley, Alan Paton and so on, and that by non-Africans

> like William Plomer (a man of many fascinating worlds), Joyce Cary and Joseph Conrad (specifically, *The Heart of Darkness*). Graham Greene's *The Heart of the Matter* could have been given any setting outside Africa, and so it does not qualify.[26]

This definition raises many questions. Who defines what is an authentic African setting? And with regard to these experiences originating from Africa, what is the appropriate length of time for a character to experience them? Achebe pointed out the difficulty of limiting African literature. In the same 1965 essay, he wrote: 'I could not help being amused by the curious circumstances in which Conrad, a Pole, writing in English produced African literature! On the other hand if Peter Abrahams were to write a good novel based on his experiences in the West Indies it would not be accepted as African literature'.[27] Is the African novel an extension of the African writer so it qualifies no matter the setting and content? Or is it the setting alone that matters? This definition of African literature, that could allow for the inclusion of Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* as an African text, while a novel by an African writer set outside the continent could not, led Achebe to conclude that '… you cannot cram African literature into a small, neat definition. I do not see African literature as one unit but as a group of associated units—in fact the sum total of all the national and ethnic literatures of Africa'.[28] National literature for Achebe was 'literature written in English; and the ethnic literatures are in Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba, Effik, Edo, ijaw, etc'.[29] By raising writing in English to national and major literature, and relegating African languages to producing ethnic literature, Achebe contributed to a language hierarchy that still undergirds and informs African literature today. But language hierarchy notwithstanding, for Achebe, the term 'African literature' could carry within it an immediately assumed diversity[30] in the same way that when one says 'European literature' a diverse history and array of writers is assumed.[31]

More than 50 years after the Makerere Conference the debate continues. But whereas in 1965 the argument was for the recognition of African literature as diverse, the debate today is around whether the category of African literature has any meaning at all. Taiye Selasi, a contemporary African writer and the author of *Ghana Must Go*, delivered a keynote speech at the 2013 Berlin Book Fair titled, 'African Literature Doesn't Exist'.[32] Selasi was being deliberately provocative, stating, 'I'm sure I'll regret having given this talk once the scholars swoop in, but for now, I'm young and idealistic enough to relish the risk of defeat', and terming her own paper an act of 'blasphemy'.[33] Her main argument, that in the West, the category of African literature has come to mean one kind of writer and one kind of writing, has resonated with the younger generation of African writers. For her, ignoring Africa's diversity, where there are 'over two thousand languages spoken', or 'dismiss[ing] this linguistic complexity as a symptom of primitive clannishness, as if these two thousand languages were spoken by one hundred people apiece',[34] can only see a singular Africa. In addition, she argued, there is a tendency to see

African writers as 'sociologists in creative writers' clothing' which 'betrays a fundamental disrespect for those writers' artistry'.[35] She used Achebe's 1965 essay to make her point that the category of 'African literature' itself was the problem. For her the term is simply too opaque to allow for a diverse catalogue of literature and writers to shine through. But whereas for Achebe the point was to have the term 'African literature' carry the complexity that came with it, Selasi argued for the bankruptcy of the term itself; the category could not help but carry within it a simplified sociological/anthropological reading of African literature.

The African Political Novel

When Taiye Selasi in her Berlin lecture called for the abolition of the term 'African Literature', she was eliding two central realities. First, the category of African Literature was a creation of Western critics that they then imposed on writers from Africa. Africans actively and consciously courted it as part and parcel of cultural and intellectual decolonization. Secondly, while African literature was not necessarily seen as a rejection of European literature, it was understood that while European literature was the center during colonialism, African literature would become the starting point for postcolonial African students embarking on literary journeys whether as writers or critics, all within a Pan-African literary identity that was decidedly political in nature; so political that Alan Hill could write:

> Our involvement in African writing introduced me to a new aspect of publishing—the author in prison. At one time or another our African authors have become political prisoners … In fact at one time, our weekly in-house circular which lists forthcoming visits by authors carried a column headed 'Authors in Prison' which we updated each month.[36]

Thus, the novel, by being born of an imagination formed by colonialism and anti-colonial struggles, was simply political because it worked on Manichean ever-present contradictions. These African writers had a clear duty to expose those contradictions through their art. And this is what their publishers expected of them. James Currey, for example, in *Africa Writes Back,* explained, 'The South African books chosen for the African Writers Series reflected first and foremost the realities of life suffered by people oppressed by the laws of color.[37] The writers as a matter of principle were political. Wole Soyinka, in a 1967 essay titled *The Writer in the African State,* argued that African writers had undergone three stages: the first, during decolonization, required that the writers contribute to the nationalist cause toward independence, meaning that they had to 'postpone that unique reflection on experience and events which is what makes a writer and constitute himself into a part of that machinery that will actually shape events'.[38] In the second stage, the writers now became part of nation building and put 'energies

to enshrining victory, to re-affirming his identification with the aspirations of nationalism and the stabilisation of society'.[39] And in the third stage the writers found themselves in a state of 'disillusionment' leading to Soyinka calling for 'an honest examination of what has been the failure of the African writer, as a writer'.[40] He concluded his essay by asking writers to reengage with the material reality of their societies:

> Where the writer in his own society can no longer function as conscience he must recognise that his choice lies between denying himself totally or withdrawing to the position of chronicler and post-mortem surgeon. But there can be no further distractions with universal concerns whose balm is spread on abstract wounds, not on the gaping jaws of black inhumanity. A concern with culture strengthens society, but not a concern with mythology.[41]

Soyinka was decrying Négritude and the concept of a return to a mythological past, 'the myth of irrational nobility' and 'racial essence', but it is clear that he recognized the existence of the African writer who, then, for better or worse had a duty to society. Indeed, while African writers in the 1960s debated what constitutes African literature, that they had a duty to society was never really in question.

Ngugi, a Makerere University alumnus, was still a student at the time of the 1962 conference. In 2013, 51 years later, he returned to give a keynote address in which he reminisced about the conference, the role it had played in African literature, and what Achebe (who had just died) and the other writers had come to mean:

> These writers would later give us what's the nearest thing to a genuine Pan African intellectual article: the book, African literature. When Achebe passed on recently he was mourned all over the continent. His novel, *Things Fall Apart,* the text most discussed at the conference alongside that of Dennis Brutus of South Africa, is read in all Africa. The work of others like Okot p'Bitek and Wole Soyinka, and that of the generations that have followed, Dangarembga, Ngozi Adichie and Doreen Baingana are equally well received as belonging to all Africa. Thus if Makerere was the site and symbol of an East African intellectual community, it also marked the birth of literary Pan-Africanism.[42]

Along the same lines, even though Simon Gikandi in his essay 'Chinua Achebe and the Invention of African Culture', first lamented 'the institutionalization of *Things Fall Apart* and the wisdom of using it as supplement for African culture or the authorized point of entry into Igbo, Nigerian, or African landscapes', he also recognized it for its Pan-African historical moment:

> It is not an exaggeration to say that my life was never to be the same again. For reading *Things Fall Apart* brought me to the sudden realization that fiction was not merely about a set of texts which one studied for the Cambridge Overseas exam which, for my generation, had been renamed the East African

> Certificate of Education; on the contrary, literature was about real and familiar worlds, of culture and human experience, of politics and economics, now re-routed through a language and structure that seemed at odds with the history or geography books we were reading at the time.[43]

He added that, 'there is consensus that *Things Fall Apart* was important for the marking and making of that exciting first decade of decolonization'.[44] And with an emerging Pan-African literature, it was only a matter of time before the role of English literature (though not the English language) in African education was questioned.

In a 1968 essay titled 'On the Abolition of the English Department', three professors at the University of Nairobi (Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, Henry Owour-Anyumba, and Taban Lo Liyong) argued that in the teaching of literature was a 'basic assumption that the English tradition and the emergence of the modern West is the central root of our consciousness and cultural heritage' in which 'Africa becomes an extension of the West'. 'Why can't African literature be at the center so that we can view other cultures in relationship to it?' they asked. They called for the abolition of the English Department and in its place a Department of African Literature and Languages. They were clear that they were not 'rejecting other cultural streams, especially the Western stream'.[45] The ideal curriculum would constitute the oral tradition, Swahili literature (with Arabic and Asian literatures), a selected course in European literature, and modern African literature, and knowledge of Swahili, English, and French would be a must.[46] They concluded that:

> … with Africa at the center of things, not existing as an appendix or a satellite of other countries and literatures, things must be seen from the African perspective. The dominant object in that perspective is African literature, the major branch of African culture. Its roots go back to past African literatures, European literatures, and Asian literatures. These can be studied meaningfully in a Department of African Literature and Languages in an African University.[47]

Their goal was to change the curriculum from a British-based one to one that reflected world literature with African literature at the center. For Amoko Apollo Obonyo in *Postcolonialism in the Wake of the Nairobi Revolution: Ngugi Wa Thiong'o and the Idea of African Literature*, the document was contradictory. For him, 'To the extent that the movement sought to uncouple the study of literature in English from the nationalist history of England, it represented a radical contestation of the ideology of English literature to date'. But he went on to argue, 'the movement embodied powerfully contradictory impulses, at once rejecting and reproducing the cultural nationalist fallacies of colonial discourse'.[48] But in my reading of the document, its authors were very careful to say their revolution was not reductionist and essentialist; European literature and languages were going to be part of the curriculum. The contradiction was that in calling for the Department

of African Literature and Languages, they did not mean African literature written in African languages. Rather, they meant linguistics. That is, African languages should be taught within the Department. The only African language literature mentioned was Kiswahili.[49]

Early South African writing in African languages, in translation or written originally in English, was not mentioned at all. What it did call for was a study of orature to 'supplement (not replace) courses in Modern African Literature'. This document that was going to change literature departments throughout the postcolonial world also cemented the myth that before the Makerere writers there was only orature. And even though the call for orature meant there was a place for African languages, the caveat of supplementing showed that they would play a junior role. But still the document showed that the Makerere writers understood right from the beginning their written work as contributing to political and cultural decolonization. And when decolonization turned into a mess of neo-colonial authoritarian military and civilian regimes, they saw their work as contributing to egalitarian and democratic societies. And they saw themselves as African writers contributing to African literature.

Frantz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth* outlines several stages that the African intellectual would have to go through in order to become useful in the anti-colonial struggle. The first stage was complete identification with colonial culture.[50] The second stage found the intellectual trying 'to remember what he is'.[51] (222). In the second stage, the dissociation starts and the intellectual 'sets up high value on the customs, traditions, and the appearances of his people; but his inevitable painful experience only seems to be a banal search for exoticism. The sari becomes sacred, and shoes that come from Paris or Italy are left in favor of pampooties'.[52] In the last stage, 'which is called the fighting phase, the native after having tried to lose himself in the people and with the people, will on the contrary shake the people'.[53]

The novel, and novelists, in the fighting stage had to do the work of decolonization by contributing to national consciousness and by carrying dynamic African culture. No matter where one stood on the question of writer as a revolutionary versus writer offering a mirror to society, it was a given that literature as well as the writer had a duty to 'shake the people'. In his essay 'The Novelist as Teacher', Chinua Achebe argues that for him, his role as a writer is to 'help my society regain belief in itself and put away the complexes of the years of denigration and self-abasement'.[54] A little later, he argues that the 'writer cannot be excused from the task of re-education and regeneration that must be done', and then concludes that, 'I would be satisfied if my novels (especially the ones I have set in the past) did no more than teach my readers that their past—with all its imperfections—was not one long night of savagery from which the first Europeans acting on God's behalf delivered them'.[55] In other words, for Achebe, rolling back the myths used to justify colonialism was an integral part of the African writer's mission. The writer in

short had a duty to speak out against the sort of internalized racism and belief in cultural inferiority that Africans had inherited from colonialism. In *Writing Against Neocolonialism*, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o argues that African writers had gone through 'the age of the anti-colonial struggle; the age of independence; and the age of neocolonialism'. The African writer:

> … was born on the crest of this anti-colonial struggle and world-wide revolutionary ferment. The anti-imperialist energy and optimism of the masses found its way into the writing of the period … It was Africa explaining itself, speaking for itself, and interpreting its past. It was Africa rejecting its past as drawn by the artists of imperialism. The writer even flaunted his right to use the language of the former colonial master anyway he liked. No apologies. No begging. The Caliban of the world had been given European languages and he was going to use them even to subvert the master.[56]

In this context, writers like Mofolo and his cannibals were not political writers. *Mhudi* and *Wrath of Ancestors* were not written with the ideologies of the third stage, the fighting stage. With their calls for synthesis, they would have been somewhere between the first and second stages, caught between identifying with African and European cultures. In short, for the Makerere writers, early South Africans would have seemed blind to the political contradictions sharpening around them.

Conclusion

African writers and critics have suppressed early South African writing for a number of reasons. First, at a time of decolonization, early South African literature with its call for synthesis would have been seen as another way of collaborating with the colonizer. Second, the writers and their critics believed that they had a duty to contribute to decolonization. Third, publishers like Heinemann saw themselves as also contributing to decolonization but with English as the language of that decolonization. What ultimately united the publishers, writers, critics, and readers was the belief that the language of decolonization was English. We are dealing with a literature and literary criticism that has ignored time and space; time because of the ahistorical nature of the criticism, and space because the literary criticism has been confined to continental African writers of the decolonization era.

Part of my argument then is that the question about what constitutes African literature cannot be answered outside the question of how and why African writers and critics from former British colonies and their Western publishers created an African literary aesthetic that centered on the realist novel in English, and away from the example set by early South African writers. And why these same African writers and critics, after finding themselves in the peculiar position of producing national and Pan-African literatures

and criticism in English, became the biggest defenders of English while condescending to African languages.

Literary scholars had a responsibility to take into account early African writing for no other reason than that it existed, instead of dismissing it as precursors to the modern African novel. But more than that, there were real questions to be asked. Can a failed synthesis in early South African writing lead to hybridity in the literature of decolonization? Under the guise of agreeing with the noble savage myth, yet writing for a people who know they were not, could Mofolo be subverting colonial racism as in mimicry with a wink to the audience? And what of the writing in Africa do these books reveal when analyzed within an African literary tradition that allows them to be in conversation with Makerere and Post-Makerere writers? But they did not ask these questions. That early writing in African languages or in English has no place in the African literary tradition points to the tragic state of an African literary criticism that begins the clock in the wrong literary era.

Notes

1. There are mentions of possible translations online, but as far as I can ascertain they have as yet to be published in any meaningful sense. In any case we should be talking about competing translations as opposed to whether a single translation might exist.
2. Obi Wali, "A Reply to Critics from Obi Wali," *Transition*, no. 50 (1975/1976): 46–47.
3. See D. Goluch, "Chinua Achebe Translating, *Things Fall Apart* in Polish and the Task of Postcolonial Translation," trans. Chinua Achebe, *Cross/Cultures*, no. 137 (2011): 197–219; and W. Kolb, "Re-Writing, *Things Fall Apart* in German," *Cross /Cultures*, no. 137 (2011): 177–96, 219.
4. Ngugi would later decolonize his name and drop the Christian name James to become Ngugi wa Thiong'o in 1977.
5. Mphahlele would later drop Ezekiel to become Es'kia Mphahlele to reflect his growing black consciousness in 1977, the same year as Ngugi's name change.
6. The Makerere Conference was not the first literary event to involve the African continent and diaspora. The First Congress of Black Writers and Artists was held in Paris in 1956, organized by *Presence Africaine*, a Paris-based literary journal, with a second in 1959, featuring writers such as Aimé Césaire, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Richard Wright, James Baldwin, George Lamming, Frantz Fanon, Édouard Glissant, Josephine Baker, and Jean-Paul Sartre (who had declared solidarity with Third World revolutionary causes).
7. James Ngugi, "A Kenyan at the Conference," *Transition*, no. 5 (1962): 7.
8. But as enthusiastic as he was, the young Ngugi also noted the apolitical nature of the conference. In the same write-up he observes that, "Although there were at times violent and deep differences of opinion on particular issues, for instance on the question of whether there was such a thing as African writing, yet the whole conference was almost quiet on such things as colonialism, imperialism and other isms. In this it differed from the 1956 and 1959

World Congresses of Negro writers where political discussions clouded the atmosphere" ("A Kenyan at the Conference," 7).

9. See Thomas Jeffrey, "A Hundred Years of Thomas Mofolo," *English in Africa* 37, no. 2 (2010): 37–55.
10. In a section subtitled, "A Long Tradition of Writing by Africans," Currey writes about publishing Lalage Brown's *Two Centuries of African English* that in passing also discusses the early South African literature.
11. James Currey, *Africa Writes Back: The African Writers Series and the Launch of African Literature* (Oxford: James Currey, 2008), 187.
12. Ibid., 189.
13. David Copland and Bennetta Jules-Rosette, "'Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika': From Independent Spirit to Political Mobilization" *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 44, nos. 1–2 (2004): 343–67.
14. Xolela Mangcu, "Retracing Nelson Mandela through the Lineage of Black Political Thought," in "The Django Issue," special issue, *Transition*, no. 112 (2013): 101–16.
15. Ntongela Masilela, *An Outline of the New African Movement in South Africa* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World, 2013).
16. Oyekan Owomoyela, 'The Literature of Empire: Africa'. *Empire Online* (Marlborough: Adam Matthew, 2004), 7.
17. Tim White, "The Lovedale Press during the Directorship of R. H. W. Shepherd, 1930–1955," *English in Africa* 19, no. 2 (October 1992): 69–84.
18. Ibid.
19. James Currey, *Africa Writes Back: The African Writers Series and the Launch of African Literature* (Oxford: James Currey, 2008), 1.
20. Ibid., 2.
21. Ibid., 6.
22. Sigei Julius, "We'll Stick to Creative Works, but Text Books Bring in Cash," *Nation*, August 22, 2015, http://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/weekend/Well-stick-to-creative-works-but-text-books-bring-in-cash/1220-2840110-format-xhtml-plhluez/index.html.
23. Bgoya, Walter, and Mary Jay. "Publishing in Africa from Independence to the Present Day."*Research in African Literatures* 44, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 17–34.
24. A question that for my generation of writers and scholars remains as central as it is divisive and that I discuss in greater length in chap. 6, "Toward a Rooted Transnational African Literature: Politics of Image and Naming."
25. Chinua Achebe, "English and the African Writer," *Transition*, nos. 75/76, The Anniversary Issue: Selections from Transition, 1961–1976 (1997), 342.
26. Ibid.
27. Chinua Achebe, "English and the African Writer," 343.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. The poet John Pepper Clark, writing in 1965, had also called for African literature to be recognized as a body containing different identities and cultures. He argued that he places "high premium on difference of identity": "… because there is the need to do this so that we do not fall into the popular pastime of indiscriminately lumping together African peoples. The truth is that these differences do exist among the numerous peoples of Africa, forming for each that special cultural make-up and sensibility of which any artist anywhere must partake and be impregnated with before he can bring forth any work

of meaning to his people and mankind in general" (18). Clark, John Pepper. "Poetry in Africa Today." *Transition* No. 18, 1965.

31. There is the question of an established European literary canon and the "minor" writers who have been cast to the margins, but even then European literature is not immediately understood as a singular aesthetic, produced by the same kind of authors for a functional project such as nation building or to carry and showcase a singular European culture and history.
32. Taiye Selasi, *"Opening Speech", (GB /I): African Literature Doesn't Exist*, (September 4, 2013).
33. Ibid., 1.
34. Ibid., 6.
35. Ibid., 8.
36. Alan Hill, *In Pursuit of Publishing* (London: J. Murray in Association with Heinemann Educational, 1988), 127.
37. James Currey, *Africa Writes Back: The African Writers Series and the Launch of African Literature* (Oxford: James Currey, 2008), 189.
38. Wole Soyinka, "The Writer in the African State," *Transition*, no. 31 (1967): 11.
39. Ibid., 12.
40. Ibid.
41. Wole Soyinka, "The Writer in the African State," 13.
42. Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, "Makerere Dreams: Language and New Frontiers of Knowledge." University of East Africa 50th Anniversary Celebrations. Makerere University, Kampala. 29 June 2013. *Makerere University*. Web. 24 June 2014.
43. Simon Gikandi, "Chinua Achebe and the Invention of African Culture," *Research in African Literatures* 32, no. 3, Nationalism (Autumn, 2001): 4.
44. Ibid.
45. Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, "On the Abolition of the English Department," in *The Post-colonial Studies Reader*, ed. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin (London: Routledge, 1995), 445.
46. Ibid., 440.
47. Ibid., 441.
48. See Amoko Apollo Obonyo's *Postcolonialism in the Wake of the Nairobi Revolution: Ngugi Wa Thiong'o and the Idea of African Literature*, 4–5.
49. Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, "On the Abolition of the English Department," in *The Post-colonial Studies Reader*, ed. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin (London: Routledge, 1995), 440.
50. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove, 2004), 222.
51. Ibid.
52. Fanon Frantz, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 221.
53. Ibid.
54. ChinuaAchebe, "The Novelist as Teacher," in *African Literature: An Anthology of Criticism and Theory*, ed. Tejumola Olaniyan and Ato Quayson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2007), 105.
55. Ibid.
56. "Writing Against Neocolonialism," in *African Literature: An Anthology of Criticism and Theory*, ed. Tejumola Olaniyan and Ato Quayson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2007), 158.

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CHAPTER 49

Music and Postcolonial Africa

Eric Charry

A stunning newsreel showing Presidents Kwame Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, and Modibo Keita together in Conakry in December 1960 working on the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union provides a vivid entry point into some of the issues covered in this chapter. It was a historic meeting, with what seems to be the whole nation mobilized for the occasion, including a motorcade passing by crowds lining the streets singing and dancing, processions of the military and the youth wing of the revolutionary party, speeches in a stadium, and a formal signing of documents. One scene in the silent newsreel shows the three leaders sitting together (along with Touré's wife Andrée) in a concert hall watching a drum and dance performance, probably a regional Guinean ballet. The recently nationalized Les Ballets Africains was abroad, on its second tour of North America performing in over a dozen cities, including a one-month run on Broadway in New York City. Touré was a pioneer in state patronage of the performing arts, and both Nkrumah and Keita would establish their own national dance company and ballet, respectively, within a few years.[1]

Within several months (in April 1961 in Accra), the three leaders agreed on a charter for a Union of African States, which was to form the nucleus of a United States of Africa. Article 4 of the charter laid out the fields of activity of the Union, with section 'E' devoted to culture: 'The rehabilitation and development of African culture, and frequent and diversified cultural exchange'.[2]

Their Union was short-lived, superseded by other larger factions (Casablanca, Brazzaville, and Monrovia Groups) and ultimately the Organization

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of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 with 32 member states.[3] State development of culture had more concrete results and promise, although with its ups and downs and uneven deployment throughout the continent. The notion that African culture needed to be rehabilitated, however, speaks to a gap between the political elite, many of whom were battling a pernicious legacy of European colonial education, and musicians working on the ground, many of whom either had not been indoctrinated into that system or took what they could from it and forged new forms of cultural expression. Understanding this gap, and how it was bridged, is crucial for contextualizing African music discourse and performance.

The generation of early ballet and theater troupe directors, including Mawere Opoku (b. 1915, Ghana), Fodeba Keita (b. 1921, Guinea), and Maurice Sonar Senghor (b. 1926, Senegal), each of whom had a colonial-style formal education, played a major role in bridging the divide, the first to choreograph African culture for the international stage. The generation born in the 1930s and early 1940s, who grew up under a colonial regime and matured in the first decade of postcolonial fervor, offered their own individual solutions in the 1960s and 1970s, independent of, and sometimes in opposition to, the state, including Miriam Makeba (b. 1932, South Africa), Manu Dibango (b. 1933, Cameroon), Fela Kuti (b. 1938, Nigeria), and Joseph Shabalala (b. 1941, South Africa). The generation born in the 15 years between the end of the Second World War and 1960 offered yet other solutions, thoroughly and comfortably reconciling some of the most deeply rooted traditions with the most modern global sonic currents, including Thomas Mapfumo (b. 1945, Zimbabwe) and Salif Keita (b. 1949, Mali) at the early end, and Youssou N'Dour (b. 1959, Senegal) and Angelique Kidjo (b. 1960, Benin) born right at the moment of political independence.[4]

Three Legacies

The musical legacies of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali show some of the varied results of postcolonial government intervention in the arts, drawing on them, especially music and dance, to help establish a national identity and cohesion. Touré, largely self-educated, invested heavily in state-supported regional and national music and dance groups.[5] Les Ballets Africains, founded by Guinean Fodeba Keita in Paris, toured the world as the premiere African drum and dance troupe before settling in Conakry after independence. A second Guinean national ballet (Ballet Djoliba) trained and supported Mamady Keita, now Africa's most globally known drummer and a primary force for helping to establish the *jembe* as the most visible African drum on the planet. Guinea's 1970s orchestras, in particular the nationalized Bembeya Jazz, are legendary for their electric guitar-based transformations of local traditions. Touré also established a national record label, Syliphone.

Nkrumah invested in the arts through the educational system, establishing the Institute of African Studies (IAS), which housed the new National Dance Company (later called the Ghana Dance Ensemble) and new School of Music and Drama, all in 1962 at the University of Ghana. As a result, music within the borders of Ghana is probably the most well researched and documented in print in all of Africa, due in large part to the academic leadership of musicologist J.H. Kwabena Nketia, who directed the School, co-directed the Dance Company, and would soon head the IAS. Drummers associated with the university-based company migrated early on to North American universities, establishing the canonical status of their traditions there beginning in the 1960s and continuing unabated to the present day. That early cohort of Ghanaian drummers is now seeing retirements after more than forty years of teaching at universities such as UCLA, UC Berkeley, CalArts, and Wesleyan.[6]

Landlocked Mali, with its northern border deep in the Sahara, had less European traffic to contend with and has a reputation for retaining its venerable musical traditions outside of government support, stemming from lavish noble patronage during the days of the gold-rich ancient Mali empire. That history proved fortuitous at the Pan-African cultural festival in Algiers in 1969 when the national instrumental ensemble won a gold medal, and when a commercial world music market opened up in the 1980s seeking its own brand of authenticity. In the largest music industry in the world (the USA), Malian artists have captured more Grammy Award nominations in the World Music category than any other country (23 in all since 1992), competing in a field with major contenders such as Brazil and India having ten, or even seventy times its population. The 21-stringed kora, played by Malian Toumani Diabate and others, is rivaling the Indian sitar as the most globally known non-Western string instrument. The government also sent a group of students to study at the conservatory in Havana in the mid-1960s. One of them, Boncana Maiga, would direct a national orchestra after he returned to Mali and in the 1990s found Africando, an extraordinary New York-based salsa band that featured guest African vocalists.

Colonial Education

The growing body of literature on colonial education, especially its relationship to the arts, is a rich resource for music studies. Nkrumah, who attended Gold Coast's prestigious Achimota College, posed one kind of impact as follows:

> We were denied the knowledge of our African past … We were taught to regard our culture and traditions as barbarous and primitive. Our text-books were English text-books, telling us about English history, English geography, English ways of living, English customs, English ideas, English weather.[7]

Newly elected President of the Republic of Tanganyika Julius Nyerere, who attended the select Tabora School, articulated some of the despair of Africa's elite in his inaugural address in 1962. Announcing the formation of the Ministry of National Culture and Youth, he took note of the worst crime of colonialism, which was:

> the attempt to make us believe we had no indigenous culture of our own; or that what we did have was worthless—something of which we should be ashamed … Some of us, particularly those of us who acquired a European-type of education … abandoned everything connected with our own past and learnt to imitate only European ways.[8]

On the other hand, Achimota, as well as its Francophone colonial equivalent, École William Ponty in Senegal, made room for students to connect with their cultures of origin, no matter the motivations, whether benign or to better control them. Achimota had a mission to produce a type of student who was: '"Western" in his intellectual attitudes towards life, with a respect for science and capacity for systematic thought, but who remains African in sympathy and desirous of preserving and developing what is deserving of respect in tribal life, custom, rule and law'.[9] Ghana Dance Ensemble artistic director Opoku recalled African nights at Achimota with 'tribal' drumming and dancing of four principal groups (Twi, Fante, Ewe, and Ga), which took place on two Saturdays each month.[10]

École Ponty required students to write up summer research projects on some aspect of their culture, which Conteh-Morgan suggests, was intended in part, to 'give them an intellectual rootedness into their traditional cultures at a time when they ran the risk of total alienation from them as a result of their new French education'.[11] Their theater program supported plays on African topics, which would have a decisive impact. Within a few years of leaving Ponty, Fodeba Keita, who attended from 1940 to 1943, would begin publishing his poems and dramatic presentations, which would form the nucleus of his Ballets Africains programs that would gain such world renown the following decade.[12]

European Time Frames, Ethnicity

A singular focus on the European impact only tells partial stories about how music lives in Africa. The impact of Islam and the Arab culture that is carried with it, for example, has also been critical.[13] The historical markers 'precolonial', 'colonial', and 'postcolonial' can sometimes be counter-productive in musical contexts. Colonization as the overriding standard and narrative (before, during, after) for understanding how Africans create and respond to

music can miss the mark in many cases. Specifically, it does a disservice to the historical depth and power of some traditions and it removes agency from artists; labeling these traditions 'pre-' anything denies their status as classic (and even classical) art forms and grafts them onto a European political time frame.

Furthermore, the unit of the single ethnic group (or people) and nation, while remaining viable and valuable, can occasionally obscure African creative life. As Chikowero recently noted, using the example of the 'composite identity' of vocalist Dorothy Masuku [Masuka]:

> to Zambians, Masuku is a Lozi; to South Africans, she is Zulu; and in Lesotho and Zimbabwe, she can answer to both Sotho and Ndebele, and compose Shona songs … Her multilingual repertoire, transterritorial belonging, lived experiences, and standing as a heroine of regional liberation all underscore the need to rewrite the stories of African self-making and cultural consciousness beyond the alienating colonial boundaries, taxonomies of 'tribes,' bounded nation-states, and codified official languages.[14]

Nevertheless, state boundaries are very real, and ethnic boundaries can at times be just as real, with some foundations before colonial era reification, and can serve as helpful guides for how to hear (and not to hear) African sonic expression. I am just suggesting that the terms pre- and postcolonial, and the historiographic framework imposed by them be handled with care. It would be a cliché to warn about the historical reality of ethnicity, but also irresponsible to ignore its contemporary significance. Many excellent studies in the past two decades have done the exhaustive research necessary to carry out the requisite balancing act between the historical past and ethnographic present with regard to music and ethnic identity.[15]

Musical Instruments and Their Stories

The vast majority of scholarship on African music is organized and bound within national contexts, but there are other important perspectives. The extraordinary number and diversity of music cultures, mirrored in a similar diversity of spoken languages, defines the African landscape, oftentimes spilling over national borders.[16] Uniquely marked musical instruments alone probably number in the thousands. No single musical system (or even tuning system) sets the standard as it does in Europe or large parts of South or East Asia, for example, although strong cases can be made for broad aesthetic affinities. The European system of tonal harmony has had a broad impact in colonial and postcolonial times, but it has by no means wiped out systems and traditions that predated contact, and it has opened up new avenues of musical expression.

Instrument tunings may be likened to language dialects ('tongues'), and so different tuning systems (or dialects) may coexist, and typically be embraced in a single ensemble. Similarly, many languages may be embraced within a

national culture: Mali's Counsel of Ministers recently reaffirmed the promotion of its 13 national languages, for instance, 'as part of the protection and development of linguistic heritage and cultural diversity'.[17]

This diversity, as well as the embrace of difference, has been one of the main driving engines of nation building in postcolonial Africa. Faced with disparate musical traditions housed within arbitrary national borders, postcolonial national music and dance ensembles forged new multiethnic mixes for presentation on the domestic and world stage. Music here acts as both a unifying force and a differentiating one at the same time. Two key approaches can be discerned. Les Ballets Africains arranged the music and dance of diverse peoples for a set of predominantly Mande musical instruments, including jembe, *dundun* (double-headed cylinder-shaped drum), *bala* (xylophone), and *kora* (harp). The Ghana Dance Ensemble used different sets of instruments to represent the diverse dances and ethnicities within its borders (e.g. Akan, Dagbamba, Ewe, Ga).[18]

The esoteric work of studying musical instrument morphology, tuning systems, and playing styles can lead to insights that are among the most powerful in shredding outdated notions of jigsaw puzzle-like, bounded, immobile ethnic groups populating a pre-colonial African landscape. Such work includes mapping out the wide distribution of lamellophones (known locally as *mbira*, *kalimba*, *likembe*, among others), xylophones, fiddles, lutes, and harps. These studies, which have their roots in colonial-era research, all point to generations-old, rich, expansive, supraregional cultures which persist to the present day, transcending ethnicity and nation-state.[19]

Yet, they also point out unique identifiers that mark instruments as belonging to one or other group of people. These identifiers can be as subtle as several millimeters on the neck design on wooden pegs that fasten the skin head to a drum. As Anku has shown in Ghana, Akan and Anlo Ewe drum pegs differ primarily by an asymmetrical neck that protrudes on one side of the peg.[20] One of the oldest surviving Akan drums, an apentemma collected in the American colony of Virginia in the early eighteenth century, suggests that its peg construction has not changed in centuries.[21] Musical instrument morphologies contain hidden stories, known well by practitioners and overlooked by outsiders, that can point to deep histories without uttering a single word.

The frame xylophone band that stretches across the West African savanna is another fascinating case, demonstrating both the futility of ethnic categorization and also local recognition of difference. Atta Annan Mensah provided a detailed comparative analysis of the three principal xylophone traditions in northern Ghana, using the ethnonyms Dagaba, Lobi, and Sisala.[22] Since Mensah first began publishing about these traditions, well over a dozen others have followed.[23] Most recently, master xylophone (gyil) player Bernard Woma tried to come to terms with the diversity of ethnonyms within this compact region, providing an insider's perspective.[24] This is no mean feat.

Outsiders naming ethnic groupings where they previously did not exist only tells part of the story. 'Ethnic distinctions and commonalities' in this region, anthropologist Lentz notes, were 'created and continually re-defined' also by 'chiefs, migrant workers, catechists, peasants, and educated elites'.[25] I would add musicians and dancers to this list. The power of ethnicity, she continues, rests on an 'inherent contradiction':

> ethnic identifications claim to be primordial, dictated by birth, and are thus non-negotiable, creating permanent bonds, stability and security … At the same time the boundaries of the communities created and the specific traits and practices associated with them are malleable and can be adapted to serve specific interests and contexts.[26]

In short, ethnicity is not simply a product of colonization, but rather is rooted in a deeper past and remains a contested living concept. What a rich field music makes for understanding how such boundaries can be understood; communities of people in close contact with each other have defined, and continue to define themselves, through music (especially through funeral rituals in this case). And what goes for northern Ghana goes for much of rural Africa.

Urban Africa provides other kinds of cases of the contemporary life of ethnicity. When rural migrants flood African cities, they reconfigure not only their own cultures, but also the soundscapes of those cities. Polak has studied how urban professional jembe drummers in Bamako shape their repertories so they can successfully play for marriage celebrations for migrant communities coming from various regions of Mali. They refer to some pieces in their repertory simply by the name of the ethnic group: Fulafoli (Fula music) and Maraka don (Maraka/Soninke dance/rhythm). Given the pervasive soundscape blanketing the city on Sundays when those celebrations are held, urban jembe drumming could be considered a popular music, rendering the description 'traditional' inadequate.[27]

But this particular drum, like many other African instruments, lives in multiple worlds: in village life-cycle ceremonies, in urban manifestations of the same, as part of an electrified band that travels the world (e.g. in Salif Keita's regular line-up), in world tours of concert-hall ballet performances, and in master classes around the world and cultural study tours at home. The same might be said of the *sabar* drums that are so important in defining the Senegalese identity of Youssou N'dour's band, or the Yoruba dundun in the bands of Nigerians King Sunny Ade and Lagbaja, or the Shona mbira in Zimbabwean Thomas Mapfumo's band.

Those cultural study tours to Africa (the most prevalent being jembe camps in Mali, Guinea, and Senegal, and semester or other study-abroad programs in Ghana) may be stimulating interest at home.[28] This is to say that, rather than fading into irrelevance as Africa urbanizes and modernizes, some of its long-held traditions continue to revitalize as their practitioners transform their contexts.

Nationalization

What happens when colonial boundaries are layered on top of these regional traditions? Colonial and subsequently national identities then become a polyglot project. Musical instruments and dance movements can stand in as metonyms for ethnicity and be used as tools for nation building. The efforts of state leaders to put music and dance into such service has received significant scholarly attention over the past few decades, and here I sample two of the more well-documented ones.[29]

Sékou Touré established the model for regional and national performing groups. Les Ballets Africains, formed by Guinean Fodeba Keita in the late 1940s while he was a student in Paris, went on world tours over the course of the 1950s.[30] When Guinea gained independence, the Ballet moved to Conakry, and was nationalized. Their first two tours of North America in 1959 and 1960 were major events, covered by the *New York Times*, *Time*, and *The Nation*.[31]

Touré established three kinds of state-supported performing groups within a sophisticated regional and national political network: ballets (drum and dance troupes); ensembles (traditional instruments playing local repertories); and orchestras (brass and electric guitar-based groups playing modern international dance music).[32] Guinea's national ballets put the nation and its drummers on the global map. Lead jembe drummer Ladji Camara moved to New York in the mid-1960s and became an initial catalyst for the later worldwide popularity of the jembe. Mamady Keita, lead drummer of Guinea's second national ballet, Ballet Djoliba, took the jembe to an unprecedented level of visibility. At the age of 12 (in the early 1960s) he was recruited into Touré's performing arts system, soon joining the national Ballet Djoliba where he remained for 22 years, eventually becoming the artistic director.

After Sékou Touré died in 1984, state patronage dried up. Keita moved to Abidjan and then Belgium, where he established a school for jembe drumming, began releasing CDs of his music, and gained a significant following of students. In 1991, a documentary about his life, *Djembefola*, proved to be an important stepping stone to becoming the most well-known African drummer in the world after Nigerian Babatunde Olatunji, who had gained a Columbia Records contract in the early 1960s.[33]

Touré's legacy, one part of which is the revolutionary hero of the decolonization era and a generous patron of the arts, is a painful one, given his ruthless turn not long after he ascended to the presidency. Les Ballets Africains founder Fodeba Keita and member Marof Achkar, who both took up major posts in Touré's government, were eventually imprisoned and executed.[34] In *Djembefola*, Mamady Keita seemed ambivalent about Touré's system of state patronage. The performing arts had become a revolutionary duty for those capable enough:

> [Mamady Keita:] Around 1964–65 Sekou Toure built a stage in the president's palace for our rehearsals … [He] was our father; he considered us as his

> children. We were like robots, like people drugged by the revolutionary mentality. We each considered ourselves to be true and honest revolutionaries. We could not imagine quitting the Ballet to go somewhere else, because to flee the Ballet would have been to betray the nation and the Revolution … The training was hard, very very hard … Balanka Sidiki [the director] was terrible. He gave 50 lashes for the slightest reason. We formed a delegation to tell the governor that he was too tough. The delegation was immediately arrested and handcuffed, and the rest of the troupe—both girls and boys—was thrown in jail!
>
> [Balanka Sidiki:] Real performers aren't lazy. They were well trained … But our duty, was to develop the national spirit. Like the army. Yes, like the army.
>
> [Mamady Keita:] It was terribly hard training. But if the revolution hadn't taken me from the village, I would still be scratching the earth with my brothers.[35]

This dedication and rigorous training of Guinean state-sponsored ballet drummers and dancers seem remarkably similar to their counterparts in Ghana, minus the revolutionary rhetoric: 'We are like soldiers. When they call us into battle, we must go'.[36] Nkrumah invested in the arts too, but unlike Touré, he was highly educated with two Bachelor's degrees (Lincoln University) and two Master's degrees (University of Pennsylvania). Nkrumah's establishment of the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ghana was key. As Chancellor of the University, Nkrumah appointed Kwabena Nketia as Deputy Director. Nketia had a degree in music from Trinity College (London), had been a research fellow at the university since 1952 with a significant body of publications on music in Ghana, and had travelled the USA on a Rockefeller grant studying ethnomusicology and composition with Henry Cowell at Columbia, Charles Seeger and Mantle Hood at UCLA, and Melville Herskovits and Alan Merriam at Northwestern.[37]

Choreographing National Unity

As director of the new National Dance Company, Nketia enlisted Mawere Opoku as artistic director. Opoku had Asante chiefs on both sides of his family, had attended Achimota College (1931–1934), and had received a Rockefeller fellowship to study in the USA, working with Martha Graham and at Julliard.[38] Opoku's approach was to aestheticize ethnicity, identifying and working with ethnically marked body movements.

> Ashanti … often has the body tilting, swaying to a different time count, while the arms and legs may be moving in counter rhythms … the steps of the women suggest gliding. The Anglo [Ewe] dances show the main action in the upper torso in a series of contractions and releases, with a downward thrust of the arms …The Gas favor stamping and skipping with body sways and rotations from side to side along with bent elbows. They love the staccato type of jump and the occasional thrust of the fist into the air. The Fantis tend to run for short spells, stagger, pause, and leap, or turn somersaults, or sway on the spot with sliding and clapping arm movements.[39]

Opoku did not mix dance traditions, but rather presented them as sequences of ethnically distinct pieces in a program. One effect was to freeze in time, for what would turn out to be a canon, the products of culturally fluid practices.[40] Each member of the company performing all the dances in the repertoire, regardless of ethnic or regional origin, embodied the political ideal of unity in diversity.[41]

The process of choreographing outdoor dance events for the stage necessarily involved compromises, or, looking at it another way, innovations. Fodeba Keita understood this early on:

> On the stage new conditions have to be created by means of different devices in order, on the one hand, to retain the freshness and reality of the dance and, on the other, to destroy the monotony which is quick to arise due to the non-active participation of the audience.[42]

The official inauguration of the Ghana Dance Ensemble (GDE) included the following statement:

> Truly, if our traditional arts are to survive and be meaningful in present day Ghana … they must be kept alive not just by mere repetition of the same age-old traditions or by a museum approach to the art, but by artistic imagination which clarifies their aesthetic values and renews their vitality.[43]

Francis Nii-Yartey, GDE's artistic director from 1976, called these forms *new traditional*.[44]

Ambassador Marof Achkar's spoken introduction for a United Nations General Assembly Hall performance claimed authenticity, using the term 'faithful' for these new traditions as national culture.

> Les Ballets Africains of the Republic of Guinea and the National Ensemble of Guinea, are one of the most faithful and perhaps the most eloquent expressions of Guinean culture, certainly, but also of African culture.[45]

Guinean historian Lansiné Kaba further clarifies the nature of Keita's authenticity with regard to his work in the 1950s:

> Fodéba Keita appeared to be a classic example of a 'popular' artist, this word suggesting a patient search for the best interpretation of the folklore and soul of the people, in a repertoire consistent both with old norms and modern play techniques and language. The songs and dances of the Ballets attempted to convey an authentic expression of the traditional musical heritage, as well as of the changing image of modern Africa.[46]

Nii-Yartey introduced changes and mixed ethnic styles together in the GDE, but that format would be called 'contemporary African dance' or 'creative

dance'.[47] This seems similar to procedures in the early days of Senegal's national ballet.

> The day would start with a class taught by Sonar Senghor. Then every dancer, from Dakar or from elsewhere, would take turns to teach the others some of the steps they knew from home. Sonar Senghor would then select and re-arrange the moves into a choreographic sequence. Later in the day, we'd rehearse for the shows.[48]

President Nyerere may too have had a similar vision for his Tanganyikan Ministry of Culture: 'I want it to seek the best of the traditions and customs of all our tribes and make them part of our national culture'.[49] The government newspaper even suggested that ethnic origins should be attenuated in favor of a singular national culture:

> no ngoma should belong to one tribe. What are called tribal dances now should be transformed into national ngomas. They must be made to belong to the people as a whole. With a national language—Kiswahili—at the nation's disposal, this should not be difficult to do. The singing can be done in Kiswahili while the dancing can remain in original tribal style.[50]

Deciding which traditions should stay and which should be rejected can be a dangerous business, pointing to a clash between Pan-Africanist and socialist thought. Nkrumah posed it as follows: 'Within a society poising itself for the leap from pre-industrial retardation to modern development, there are traditional forces that can impede progress. Some of these must be firmly cut at their roots, others can be retained and adapted to the changing need'.[51] Nyerere echoed this in his 1967 Arusha Declaration: 'Only cultural practices considered progressive in an overtly socialist sense would be retained'.[52] Touré went so far as to carry out an eradication campaign aimed at some of the polytheistic religious and cultural practices of non-Muslim minority ethnic groups.[53] Ugandan Prime Minister and then President Obote sacked the King of Buganda's palace (and its musical instruments) in 1966 and abolished kingdoms the following year, including Buganda and Bunyoro. Centuries-old royal court music was silent until the kingdoms were restored, beginning in 1993.[54]

Pan-African Arts Festivals

Three Pan-African arts and culture festivals, which took place within a decade-and-a-half of the founding of the OAU in 1963 provide another focal point for understanding the role of music in postcolonial Africa. National ensembles figured prominently, as did extended conferences to hash out competing philosophies.[55]

Pan-Africanism can refer to a political movement and also a more general attitude toward cultural unity. In the latter sense, it is intertwined with the

ideas of an African Personality, initially postulated by Edward Wilmot Blyden and later picked up by Nkrumah, and Négritude, which Léopold Senghor himself, one of its primary exponents, has noted 'is nothing more or less than what some English-speaking Africans have called the *African personality*'.[56] As a movement, Pan-Africanism can be dated to the First Pan-African Conference (London, 1900) and the subsequent series of five Pan-African Congresses held between 1919 and 1945.[57]

The founding of the journal *Présence Africaine* in 1947 in Paris by Senegalese Alioune Diop (with Senghor and Aimé Césaire among the patrons), their sponsoring of the First International Congress of Negro Writers and Artists in Paris (1956), at which Diop founded the Société Africaine de Culture (SAC), which sponsored a Second Congress in Rome (1959), ultimately led to the first festival in Dakar. The Commission on the Arts at that Second Congress issued a resolution:

> to institute as an essential part of its activities, a celebratory festival during the meeting of the next Congress … The festival should include song, drums, and dance, and perhaps also readings of dramatic pieces and poetry.[58]

The First World Festival of Negro Arts (*Festival Mondiale des Arts Nègres*, FESMAN) was held in Dakar, Senegal in 1966 under the sponsorship of the SAC and Senegalese President Senghor.[59] Twenty African countries sent their national ensembles. Reiser has suggested that these national ensemble performances might be described as 'authentically modern' in that 'presenting a collective performance of multiple ethnicities on the same stage at such a pan-African arts festival was a distinctly modern phenomenon … represent[ing] the current postcolonial environment'.[60] Senghor's vision of Négritude did not include North Africans, at least as full participants in the weeklong colloquium. Guinea boycotted the festival.

Three years later, Algeria hosted the First Pan-African Cultural Festival in its capital Algiers. The term 'Pan-African', rather than Negro or Black, highlighted the break with Senghor's Négritude, which was widely denounced at the daily Symposium on African Culture.[61] One speaker from Sudan rejected the negativism of racial philosophies which only 'serve the interests of the colonialists who have worked for two centuries to characterize people of different continents according to racial criteria'.[62] Stanislas Adotevi, Commissioner General for Culture and Youth from Dahomey (renamed Benin in 1975) delivered an especially well-received and harsh paper. Noting that 'Negritude today fixes and coagulates … the most well-worn theories about African traditions', Adotevi, reflecting the time and place of the festival, proclaimed, 'There is no further place in Africa for literature other than that of the revolutionary combat. Negritude is dead'.[63]

Revolutionary politics ruled the day, with the host President Boumediène stressing 'the struggle against imperialism, rather than simply racial solidarity, to be what unified the continent', as Reiser suggests.[64] Medals were awarded

for the best performances and Guinea, one of Africa's most potent symbols for revolution and for state support of the performing arts, won a gold medal for its national ballet, and four silver medals for drama, traditional instrumental music, modern instrumental music, and choral and solo singing. Mali received a gold medal for its National Instrumental Ensemble.[65]

In 1977, Nigeria hosted the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in Lagos. Nigeria was oil-rich at the time and spent lavishly. New venues were built and the official cost was estimated at $213million–$225 million; other estimates had the cost much higher. With 15,000 participants from 70 countries, 100,000 people attending the opening ceremonies, and a new FESTAC Village built to accommodate 45,000 international visitors, it turned out to be Africa's biggest cultural event in the twentieth century.[66]

Lagos 1977 differed in part from Dakar 1966 in that an important theme was contemporary African life. In his opening address, Nigerian Head of State General Obasanjo (under whose watch Fela Kuti's Kalakuta Republic compound was burned to the ground just after FESTAC ended) noted:

> The occasion will surely lead to the abandonment of the 'museum approach' to our culture by which men of other cultures consider our culture only in terms of pre-historic objects to be occasionally dusted, displayed and studied instead as a living thing containing and portraying the ethos of our peoples.[67]

A Third World Black Arts Festival (FESMAN 3) took place in Dakar in 2010, with national ensembles playing a much smaller role, yielding to urban culture/hip hop (organized by Didier Awadi) and world music artists, including Salif Keita, Toumani Diabate, Habib Koite, Ladysmith Black Mambazo, Hugh Masekela, Seun Kuti, King Sunny Ade, Angelique Kidjo, Youssou N'Dour, and Manu Dibango.[68]

Colonial Imports: Brass Bands, Christian and Art Music

Brass bands, including trumpets, trombones, and percussion, as well as drum and fife bands, were an important aspect of the British and German colonial and missionary presence in West and East Africa. Missionaries in the 1880s saw marching-band music as a tool for instilling discipline. They felt that the rhythms of hymns and band music could introduce African children to a European worldview, including industrial time that was measured by the clock. For the missionaries, European music represented a world of order in contrast to what they perceived to be frenzied drumming and dancing that they encountered. The military style of dress and marching were also an important symbol for projecting colonial authority.[69] By the early twentieth century, Africans were fully participating in brass and drum and fife bands, either via military, missionary, or school activities. These bands would not only continue, playing their own local styles of Christian hymns and military

music, but would lay an important foundation for dance orchestras that emerged after the First World War, including Ghanaian highlife.[70]

One impact of missionary activity was the planting of the European system of tonality, with its 12-tone, equal-tempered tuning system and goal-directed chord structures, not to mention style of singing, onto African soil. These roots branched out in several directions. Through mission schools and church attendance an appreciation for European art music was instilled in some, giving birth to a small number of composers who wrote in European styles, but drew on African melodies, rhythms, and other techniques. African composers in this style typically came from Anglophone countries, especially those that offered post-secondary-school training in Western music: Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda. Despite the hostile conditions for European wood and string instruments built for more temperate climates, several tropical African cities have symphony orchestras, including Accra, Kinshasa, and Luanda. At the more temperate northern and southern ends there are orchestras in Cairo, Morocco, and at least six in South Africa.[71]

A much larger part of the population took to heart Christian hymn singing and began to reshape Christian religious music in their own styles. Gospel music, with its world of solo singing stars, positive uplifting messages, and music that draws on local popular styles is probably Anglophone Africa's fastest growing musical genre, and it can be a lucrative profession. In Ghana and Kenya, gospel music has the largest share of the commercial market.[72] The fact that it can draw on a variety of local styles has only broadened its appeal.

Archives

One result of government patronage of music is the production of a rich body of recordings preserving and stimulating the cultural heritage. Some of this material, initially made for radio or television broadcast or release on vinyl LPs, has been released on CDs or in more piecemeal fashion online. Some recent efforts have resulted in the extraordinary digitizing of archives, making them widely available.

Guinea's state-funded Syliphone label released 82 long-play albums and 75 singles from about 1967 to 1984, and Radio Télévision Guinée (RTG) made many recordings that were never released commercially. The whole Syliphone catalog as well as RTG's archives (over 1000 reels of tape) have been digitized with support from the British Library's Endangered Archives Program. Over 7700 of these recordings are available for streaming online on the British Library's website.[73]

British Library Sounds has made available online over a dozen more collections from Africa. They are not alone. The French Center for Research in Ethnomusicology (CREM), an outgrowth of the Ethnomusicology Department of the Musée de l'homme (1929–2008), has tens of thousands of recordings in their digitized collection available for online streaming,

including commercial and field recordings. Furthermore, they have made available a variety of modes for viewing waveforms, spectrograms, and pitch while the recording is playing. They are also experimenting with various modes of multimedia analysis of the recordings.

The Ghana Broadcasting Corporation has digitized its collection of commercial and field recordings, although they are not yet available online. Cameroon Radio Television (CrTV) has done the same with its collection (over 10,000 items). The Digital Namibian Archive is making available recordings, photographs, and films from Namibia's national archives. Similar efforts are underway in South Africa and surely other places in Africa. Repatriation of recordings (that is, bringing them back to the communities in which they were recorded) has recently received significant scholarly attention.[74]

Intellectual Property and the Internet

Virtually any musical tradition can be found on the Internet nowadays. Beyond simple access, two case studies demonstrate some powerful new developments. A YouTube clip of Tofo Tofo, a relatively unknown Mozambican dance trio, was seen by US pop superstar Beyoncé, who wanted to use their choreography for her video 'Run the World (Girls)'. Her autobiographical documentary *Beyoncé: Year of 4* shows scenes of Beyoncé and her dance crew unsuccessfully trying to replicate their moves. 'What country was it?', someone asks. No-one on camera could recall. The group was eventually found and flown to Los Angeles to teach their choreography, and they made a cameo appearance in the video. When they first meet in the dance studio, one of the members of Tofo Tofo asks, 'What's your name?' 'I'm Beyoncé', she responds, as they realize that this is the person who summoned them there, taking her celebrity in stride.

Here is a case of African dance moves (more specifically, a South African township style called *pantsula*), interpreted by neighboring Mozambicans, making their way into one of the more visible pop culture products on the planet, recontextualized and rendered generically diasporic.[75]

When Colombian pop superstar Shakira released 'Waka Waka (This Time for Africa)', which became the official 2010 FIFA World Cup song, some noted a similarity to 'Zangalewa', a 1986 song by the Cameroonian group Golden Sounds. The chorus is the same in both. Negative online publicity, including the easy online availability of the original version, forced FIFA to make the following acknowledgement: 'The chorus is similar to that of a popular Cameroon song made famous by Golden Voices [sic] in particular'. Her record label Sony negotiated an out-of-court settlement with the group.

Not only did the Internet facilitate the clear connection between the two songs, and provide a forum for protests, but it also provided a forum for identifying a probable path to Shakira, a Dominican merengue version ('El negro no puede' by Las Chicas del Can, released in 1988). A press

conference (online as of 2016) in which she discussed the inspiration behind the song with no mention of any prior sources did not help her reputation.[76]

Independent Artists

The most audible stream of music in postcolonial Africa, at least since the 1970s, comes from independent artists, outside of government intervention. Their sources of inspiration are global, although one can pinpoint the Caribbean (Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad), the USA, and the former metropoles (France, Britain, Spain, and Portugal). The sheer size of Africa suggests that each country has its own story to tell. Two important keys to the stories are Cuba and the guitar.

Urban Senegalese and Congolese musicians embraced Cuban music in the 1950s and 1960s, as did those in many Francophone regions of Africa, and came up with their own unique transformations, based on their own local cultures. Some of those cultures, such as sabar and *tama* drumming and Islamic-tinged Wolof singing in the case of Senegal, which stretch back to pre-colonial times, continue to maintain relevance, both in their own musical worlds and as part of modern Senegalese bands. There are few such visible references in the *soukous*/Congolese rumba bands of Kinshasa. Perhaps this is because of the size and polyglot colonial legacy of Kinshasa, the largest Francophone city in the world (including Paris), and third largest city in Africa. Rather, it is in the guitar playing exemplified by Franco Luambo (1960s–1980s) and Diblo Dibala (who teamed up with Kanda Bongo Man in the 1980s), in which deeply rooted aesthetic sensibilities get repurposed to provide a soundtrack for the continent.[77]

The guitar took on this role throughout Africa. In Guinea, *bala* (xylophone) styles were grafted onto the guitar by Mande jelis. In Mali it was *ngoni* (lute) and kora (harp) styles. In Senegal, sabar drumming rhythms made their way to the guitar. In Kenya, it was the *nyatiti* (lyre) that informed *benga* guitar playing. In Zimbabwe, guitarists learned to play mbira music on their instruments.[78] The list can go on to include almost every African nation.

Senegalese assimilation of Cuban music allowed a group like Orchestre Baobab to present a kind of national identity that was an alternative to that of national ensembles. Baobab's three vocalists were each rooted in three major Senegalese cultures: the southern Casamance region; the predominant Wolof; and Tukolor in the north. 'Being grounded in the Afro-Cuban tradition', Shain proposes, 'allowed the band to sample Senegal's varied musical traditions without being too closely identified with any particular ethnicity or region'. This was an alternate, modern, and more global vision than the French-African model of exchange that was associated with President Senghor, and they opened up a different brand of authenticity and cosmopolitanism that bypassed Europe and the USA, reaching out to a distantly familiar diasporic current.[79] It is a similar strategy to that used by Breakdance Project

Uganda, but in a very different context: American breakdancing was used to heal youth in a war torn nation, in part because it was not associated with any particular Ugandan ethnicity; all could freely participate.[80]

'Independence Chachacha', the 1960 hit by the Congolese band African Jazz, highlights the importance of Cuban music at the time. The 1970s can be viewed as a decade when artists worked to shed those Cuban influences in favor of more local influences. This is one key to the emergence of Youssou N'Dour's mbalax style.

Digging deep into their own singular local cultures—rather than sampling the whole nation—marked the efforts of many. For example, in Zimbabwe, Shona mbira music informed Thomas Mapfumo in the 1970s to the point where he eventually added an mbira player to his band in the 1980s. Oliver Mtukudzi also drew directly from Shona culture, but rather from concepts of personhood and practices of social relationships in his lyrics, as well as ngoma drumming and dancing. Any concert of Youssou N'Dour, whether in Dakar, Paris, or New York, is marked by extended periods of Wolof sabar and tama drumming, accommodating audience members who jump the stage to engage in expressing their culture through dance.[81]

In Mali, Salif Keita publicly reconciled with his father Sina, addressing Maninka social codes including father–son competitive relationships, via his first album on a major international label, *Soro*. Keita records and travels with a jembe player, who similarly invokes Maninka identity in his rhythms and dance invitations. Oumou Sangare updated ancient hunter's harp music, using a modified new youth's harp, guitar, and violin, addressing issues of concern to women in the musical and sung language of the Wassoulou region in southern Mali. From Guinea, Mamady Keita turned Maninka village jembe drumming into a solo concert genre. In Ghana, Obrafour drew the admiration of his peers and elders alike for his use of Akan libation formulas in a tribute to Nkrumah using a hiplife format. Second and later generations of hip hop artists in Africa are increasingly coming to terms with their relationship to local music culture, just as previous generations of artists have done in relation to Cuban and other foreign imports.[82]

Shared Aesthetic Sensibilities

Finally, a search for shared aesthetic sensibilities, not only across the continent but also farther afield across the diaspora, marks one corner of African music scholarship.[83] Shared sensibilities are especially remarkable in light of the great geographic, topographic, and ethno-linguistic diversity, overlaid by differing colonial and religious proselytizing histories. Among them are the high value placed on participation (including hand clapping, dancing, or vocally responding), buzzing devices on musical instruments which give life to the sounds coming from them, forms based on steady rhythmic cycles requiring improvisation, the use of polyrhythms and offbeat phrasing, and the tight link

between drumming and dancing. The ways in which these aesthetics play out, from the obligatory responders in Malian hunter's music (with jingling rings on their harps) to the horn section and vocal chorus engaging in a three-way dialogue with vocalist Fela Kuti (e.g. 'Zombie') to the built-in polyrhythms of Shona mbira music (with jangling bottle caps attached to the instruments) make for a wondrously multifaceted realm of experience.

Not all African music is open like this, however. Hunter's music from Mali, for example, is only for hunters who have proven themselves, and only hunters can dance to certain pieces. Secretive power societies, which often use drumming, may also restrict who can be present and participate. But these are exceptions to a more general rule.

Conclusion

With such a vast and diverse African soundscape, it would seem to be impossible to find common ground. But that is part of the beauty and joy in listening to (and participating in) African music, which is finding that common ground, from the most micro to larger and larger levels. It may also seem just as impossible to find a center of discourse about African music. But it is just that breadth of African music discourse, only a small part of which has been reflected here, that speaks to the vitality of the field.

Notes

1. 'President Nkrumah Visits Guinea, 1960–1961,' http://www.britishpathe.com/video/president-nkrumah-visits-guinea. The concert begins at 8'43". The North American tour of Les Ballets Africains, from at least September 1960 through February 1961, can be tracked via *Variety* magazine and local newspapers in online databases.
2. Nkrumah (1963, 142).
3. African Union, 'History of the OAU and UA,' http://www.au.int/en/history/oau-and-au.
4. See their autobiographies and biographies: Sonar Senghor (2004), Makeba (1987), Dibango (1994), Fela (Veal 2000), Shabalala (in Erlmann 1996), Mapfumo (Eyre 2015), Keita (C. Keita 2011), N'Dour (Cathcart 1989), and Kidjo (2014).
5. Touré did not complete his secondary-school education; he was expelled from professional technical training school for insubordination by leading a protest (Lewin 2009, Vol.1:37–38).
6. For information on these and other African drummers at US universities, see http://musc265.blogs.wesleyan.edu/drumming/. See Patterson (2007) for their history at UCLA. Dor (2014) provides an important study of West African drumming ensembles in North American universities.
7. Nkrumah (1963, 49).
8. Nyerere (1967, 186); also see Askew (2002, 171).
9. Achimota College, 1932, in Coe (2005, 59).

10. Coe (2005, 60).
11. Conteh-Morgan (1994, 51).
12. What may be Keita's (1944) first publication has the look of what his Ponty assignment may have been. For his early creative work, see Keita (1945, 1948a, 1948b, 1949, 1950, 1952). See Cohen (2012, 21–25) for further references about École Ponty, Sabatier (1980) for a tighter focus, and Conteh-Morgan (1994) for a broader window on Francophone theater. President Modibo Keita was a product of École Ponty (Cutter 1971, 253). See Askew (2002, 161–95) and Turino (2000, 34) for other examples.
13. Charry (2000b).
14. Chikowero (2015, 301).
15. For example, Kisliuk (1998) on BaAka, Askew (2002) on Swahili, Meintjes on Zulu (2003), Reed (2003) on Dan, Nannyonga-Tamusuza (2005) on Baganda, Ampene (2005, 2016) on Akan, C. Keita (2011) on Maninka, Omojola (2012) on Yoruba, Kidula (2013) on Logooli, and Kyker (2016) on Shona. Earlier examples are too numerous to list, but Berliner (1978), Euba (1990), and Waterman (1990) stand out.
16. Recent estimates put the number of distinct African languages at over 2000, notwithstanding the problems involved in distinguishing languages, dialects, and varieties (Heine and Nurse 2000; Lewis, Simons, and Fennig 2016). See Irvine (2008) for a critical review of colonial-era research in African languages and the delimitation of linguistic boundaries.
17. N'Diaye (2016).
18. For Les Ballets Africains, see their 1967 performance (Sarma 1967). For the GDE see Opoku (1968?) and Younge (2011).
19. See Kubik and Cooke (2016), Blench (1982, 2014), Charry (2000a), Djedje (2008, 2015), and Baroin (2011). Early examples are: the work of Boone (1936, 1951) and Laurenty (1960) mapping out xylophones, drums, and string instruments in Central Africa; Jones (1959) mapping out vocal harmonies; and Wachsmann (1964) mapping out harps. The five volumes covering Africa in the series *Musikgeschichte in Bildern* (1961–1989) continue this work. See Wegner (1984) for string instruments and Meyer (1997) for drums. Kubik (1998, 296–98) notes four means of musical instrument diffusion: human migration, contacts between neighboring groups, long-distance travel, and diffusion through media.
20. Anku (2009, 44–45).
21. http://www.britishmuseum.org/whats_on/all_current_exhibitions/akan_drum.aspx. See also the British Museum number: Am,SLMisc.1368.
22. Mensah (1982, 140).
23. Mensah (1965). An Internet search (adding 'Ghana xylophone') should provide full details for the following. PhD dissertations: Larry Godsey (1980), Mary Seavoy (1982), Francis Saighoe (1988), Michael Vercelli (2006), Brian Hogan (2011), Julie Beauregard (2012), John Dankwa (2017); Masters theses: Sidra Lawrence (2006), Corinna Campbell (2006), John Dankwa (2012), Bernard Woma (2013); articles and chapters: A.A. Mensah (1967), Mitchel Strumpf (1970), Saighoe (1984), Godsey (1984), Ben Aning (1989), Trevor Wiggins (1998, 1999, 2011), J.P. Kuutiero (2006), Peter Cooke (2013); and book: Trevor Wiggins and Joseph Kobom (1992). I thank John Dankwa,

whose 2017 Wesleyan University PhD dissertation (*When the Gyil Speaks*) attempts to clarify much of this material. Julie Strand (2009) has done a PhD dissertation on a neighboring Burkina Faso tradition, and Hugo Zemp (2001–2002, 2006, 2010) has published documentary videos and articles on neighboring Senufo traditions in Ivory Coast (http://www.der.org/films/masters-of-the-balafon.html).

24. Woma (2013).
25. Lentz (2006, 2–3).
26. Lentz (2006, 3).
27. Polak (2012).
28. For the worldwide dispersion of the jembe and African study tours, see Billmeier (1999), Polak (2000), Raout (2009), Flaig (2010), and Gaudette (2013). For a similar phenomenon with the mbira, see Muparutsa (2013).
29. Important recent studies on nation building and music and dance have been done on Angola (Moorman 2008), Ghana (Schramm 2000; Schauert 2015a), Guinea (Cohen 2012), Senegal (Castaldi 2006; Neveu Kringelbach 2015), Tanzania (Lange 1995; Askew 2002; Edmondson 2007), and Zimbabwe (Turino 2000). See Rubin (1997) for information about various national dance ensembles throughout Africa. For recent work on the contemporary musical life of two cities, see Perullo (2011) and Skinner (2015).
30. For further information, see Charry (2000a), Straker (2009), Cohen (2012), and Counsel (2009, 2015, 2016). The US entertainment industry magazine *Variety* reported on Ballets Africains performances in Paris (12/4/1957, p. 72), Buenos Aires (6/18/1958, p. 60), and Edinburgh (10/9/1957, p. 2). For sources on Keita's impact in the 1950s, see Gnaoulé-Oupoh (2000, 138–42). For a report on the abandoned state of Les Ballets in 2015 see Juompan-Yakam (2015).
31. *Time* (3/2/1959, p. 60), *The Nation* (3/7/1959, p. 215). The *New York Times* devoted four articles to their debut tour (February 8, 17, 22, and March 1, 1959). Touré was *Time* magazine's cover story while Ballets Africains was in New York (2/16/1959). A Broadway Database lists four runs there: February 16–March 28, 1959 (48 performances); September 26–October 22, 1960; November 16, 1966–January 28, 1967 (85 performances); and February 20–April 6, 1968 (https://www.ibdb.com/broadway-show/les-ballets-africains-9983).
32. See Ministry of Information, Guinea (1979). In the 1970s UNESCO published similar policy reports for Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, and Zaire, which are all available online. Search: Cultural Policy in [country] UNESCO.
33. Chevalier (1991). See Keita's Wikipedia page for details about his extensive performance and instructional CDs and DVDs, and his films: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mamady_Keïta. See also Billmeier (1999).
34. David Achkar's film *Allah Tantou* (1991) tries to makes sense of his father Marof Achkar's life, imprisonment, and execution (in 1971). See Kaba (1976) for an analysis of Touré's reign and the arts, and Diawara's film *Conakry Kas* (2003), which explores the conflicted legacy of Sékou Touré among elder artists and intellectuals in Conakry in the early 2000s.
35. Chevalier (1991).

36. Ghanaian dancer Atsikpa quoted in Schauert (2015a, 122).
37. Trinity College has since been renamed Trinity Laban Conservatoire of Music and Dance. For biographical material on Nketia see Djedje and Carter (1989), Akrofi (2002), Nketia (2005), and Nketia Music Foundation (2016), which lists 218 of Nketia's publications.
38. Kwakwa (2015, 496), Schauert (2015a, 52–60). Writing about the National Dance Company, officially inaugurated as the Ghana Dance Ensemble in 1967, is especially rich. Primary sources by those in the ensemble include: Opoku and Bell (1965), Opoku (1968?, 1976), Adinku (1994), and Kwakwa (2015). Other sources include July (1987), Schramm (2000), Hirt-Manheimer (2004), Botwe-Asamoah (2005), and Schauert (2015a, 2015b), whose book has the most comprehensive listing of references.
39. Opoku (1964, 52–53).
40. Schauert (2015a, 64–69).
41. Schramm (2000, 343).
42. F. Keita (1957, 207). This quotation also appears in the translations and reprints listed under this entry (1958, 176; and 1959, 23).
43. Deku, 1967, in Schram (2000, 347).
44. Schauert (2015a, 108–9). Also see US dancer Drid Williams's specific objections to calling the early GDE dances traditional (the music is traditional, but the dance and costuming is not) and response by Nketia, 'our goal was not to present an anthropological specimen. It was to create art' (Schauert 2015a, 105–8).
45. Marof Achkar in Sarma (1967). My translation from the French.
46. Kaba (1976, 203–4).
47. Schauert (2015a, 66–67).
48. Ousmane Noël Cissé, interview, in Neveu Kringelbach (2014, 234).
49. Nyerere [1962] (1967, 187).
50. *The Nationalist*, November 10, 1967, in Lange (1995, 32, 100).
51. Nkrumah (1963, 83); Schramm (2000, 22).
52. Arusha Declaration, 1967, in Askew (2002, 178).
53. McGovern (2013).
54. Kahunde (2012), Kafumbe (forthcoming).
55. Documentaries of the festivals were made in Dakar in 1966 (Greaves, Borelli), Algiers in 1969 (Klein), and Lagos in 1977 (Gaunt, Penna). For online links, see http://musc265.blogs.wesleyan.edu/pan-african-festivals/.
56. L. Senghor (1970, 179).
57. See Diagne's (2014) analysis of Césaire's 1956 Paris Congress lecture ('Culture and Colonization'), in which Césaire postulated a horizontal (political) and vertical (cultural, through time) solidarity of people of African descent. The former was based on a common experience of colonialism and racism; the latter 'is the way people of African descent manifest different faces of an African *civilization* … Césaire's distinction between cultures (characterized by difference) and civilization (defined by the existence of commonalities) would mean that the 'vertical' dimension of Pan-Africanism is what could be identified as Négritude'. For more on Négritude, see L. Senghor (1970), Irele (1981, 2010), Diagne (2011), and Jaji (2014). For Pan-Africanism see Ratcliff (2009), Haynes (2010), and Ki-Zerbo (2013).
58. Commission des Arts (1959, 417).

59. For more on FESMAN see Fuller (1966), L. Senghor (1966), documentaries by Borelli (1966), Greaves (1967), and Dagan (1987), Reiser (2014), and Murphy (2016).
60. Reiser (2014, 139).
61. Sources for the Algiers festival includes Klein's (1969) film, Hadouchi's (2011) analysis of the film, Lindfors (1970), and Ratcliff (2009).
62. Lindfors (1970, 6) quoting Osman.
63. Adotevi (1969, 28, 30). This echoes Lenin's 1905 essay 'Party Organization and Party Literature'. For a related discussion of Guinea's 1968 Cultural Revolution under Sékou Touré, see Kaba (1976). Part of Adotevi's lecture is shown in Klein's (1969) film.
64. Reiser (2014, 192).
65. For recordings celebrating the medals of Guinea and Mali, see Bembeya Jazz National, 1970, *Regard sur le passé, médaille d'argent, orchestre moderne, premier Festival Culturel Panafricain à Alger*, Syliphone, SLP 10; and L' Ensemble Instrumental du Mali, 1973, *Première anthologie de la musique malienne*, Vol. 4, *Médaille d'or au festival culturel panafricain d'Alger*, Bärenreiter Musicaphon, BM 30 L 2504. For links to film of Les Ballets Africains (or possibly Ballet Djoliba), a Senegalese troupe (probably its national ballet), the all-star Guinean Syli Orchestre National, and Miriam Makeba, see http://musc265.blogs.wesleyan.edu/postcolonial/pan-african-festivals/.
66. Apter (2005, 47–49, 202), Falola (2005, 281, 288).
67. International Festival Committee (1977, 7), quoted in Falola (2005, 283).
68. For information on the Third World Black Arts Festival in Dakar in 2010 see Reiser (2014) and the program of events: https://www.sangonet.com/eventc/Exposition/Fesman3/program_french-fesman-MAJ2dec2010.pdf.
69. Ranger (1975, 12–13), Rumbolz (2000, 44–45).
70. Plageman (2013). The Gangbe Brass Band from Benin has a unique mix drawing from African and New Orleans brass bands, jazz, funk, and traditional *vodun* drumming (Ojo 2007).
71. See Sadoh (2010) for a guide to art music in Nigeria. A sampling of other sources includes Mensah (1998), Omojola (2009, 2012), Agawu (2016), and Terpenning (2016). For links to African symphonic orchestras, see http://musc265.blogs.wesleyan.edu/postcolonial/orchestras/.
72. Kidula (2000), Collins (2012).
73. Counsel (2015), who carried out the RTG project, provides full details. Counsel's website *Radio Africa* contains a listing of the complete Syliphone discography: http://www.radioafrica.com.au/Discographies/Syliphone.html. Direct links to all of the following archives have been gathered here: http://musc265.blogs.wesleyan.edu/postcolonial/sound-archives/.
74. See Kahunde (2012), Lobley (2012), and Nannyonga-Tamusuza and Weintraub (2012).
75. The video has over 330 million views as of 2016, five years after it was released, https://youtu.be/VBmMU_iwe6U. For *Year of 4*, see http://www.vevo.com/watch/beyonce/year-of-4/USSM21101099; Tofo Tofo references begin at 7'05" and continue at 13'28". For more on pantsula, see http://www.okayafrica.com/tag/pantsula/, especially the article 'Five Reasons We Love the New Basement Jaxx Video' (8/12/2013) by Alyssa Klein.

76. Tande (2013), Mackey (2010). For more on music and copyright in Africa see Collins (2006) and Perullo and Eisenberg (2015). A well-known case of trying to recoup royalties (Malan 2000) concerns Solomon Linda's 1939 'Mbube' and its subsequent use by Pete Seeger ('Wimowe'), The Tokens ('The Lion Sleeps Tonight'), and Walt Disney Corporation (*The Lion King*).
77. See Stewart (2000) for a history of Congolese popular music; for the early history of Cuban records in Africa, see Fargion (2004).
78. Charry (2000a), Cathcart (1989), Durán (1989), Eagleson (2012), Turino (2000).
79. Shain (forthcoming, 110, 143).
80. See the documentary by Elderkin (2010).
81. Turino (2000), Eyre (2015), Kyker (2016, 13, 46). See Ba's (1994) documentary of N'Dour's African tour: 'I am much more sure of people's reaction at the end of a concert in Africa than in Europe or the United States … In Africa, if you manage to move an audience, people get up, cheer, shout or come up on the stage to dance, and there you know you've got to them'.
82. C. Keita (2011, 43–57), Durán (2007), Odamtten (2013). Hip hop in Africa is the most recent genre to undergo large-scale scholarly analysis, with about a dozen books devoted to it already. See the edited collections by Saucier (2011), Charry (2012), and Clark and Koster (2014).
83. Two early surveys are Bebey (1969) and Nketia (1974). A sample of work on music theoretical aesthetics includes Arom (1991), Nzewi (1997), Locke (2009), Polak and London (2014), and Agawu (1995, 2016). See Nketia (1998) for an extended survey of African music scholarship by Africans. For recent general bibliographies, see Oxford Bibliographies Online.

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CHAPTER 50

Sports and Politics in Postcolonial Africa

Hikabwa D. Chipande and Davies Banda

As many African states were gaining political independence in the 1960s, one major problem most states faced was how to unite local people of diverse ethnic backgrounds and political interests into nations, and how to maintain the colonial borders of their new nations. Scholars have argued that some postcolonial African political leaders adopted sport as a form of 'neutral culture' that they could use to create a sense of nationhood, recognition, and Pan-African solidarity.[1] New African states played soccer matches against other independent African states, providing African leaders with occasions to display their newly imagined nations in front of thousands of their people, showcasing independence, nationhood, and unity.[2]

This chapter explores the interplay of the complex relationships between sports and politics in postcolonial Africa. It examines how sport was used to assert political independence, project positive images of newly independent African states, foster Pan-Africanism, and fight racial segregation. The chapter further explores how postcolonial African leaders attempted to use sport as a tool for controlling their citizens to achieve their political goals, and how ordinary people and fans resisted such attempts. Conversely, the local populace also used sport politically to express their discontent against their new

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indigenous governments. Therefore, the chapter discusses the salient role played by sport in confronting colonial legacies, forms of imperialism, and domination of sports governance structures.

Sports and Independence Celebrations

While agents of imperialism introduced modern sports in Africa as a source of leisure, scholars argue that sport was also used in the pursuit of broader imperial motives, such as 'civilizing', disciplining, and controlling Africans to realize and maintain the colonial order.[3] John Bale and Joe Sang postulate that the '… Europeanisation of African movement culture has been viewed by many observers as a form of social control—that is, behavior of individuals regulated by groups in dominant positions'.[4] Regardless of the motives behind the introduction of modern sports in Africa, recipients of this new culture such as athletes and fans quickly adapted sport to suit the cultural and political interests of the localities in which they were introduced.[5] Towards the end of the colonial era, Africans in Algeria, Congo Brazzaville, Eritrea, Egypt, Zanzibar, South Africa, Nigeria, and Zambia used sport as a means to reinterpret their colonial relationships, to challenge colonial oppression, and as an avenue for expressing their desires for political independence.[6] Sport was part of a range of different groups, associations, and organizations that played a crucial role in fighting colonial domination in different parts of the continent.[7]

As African countries were gaining independence in the 1960s, sports such as soccer became a big part of independence festivities. For instance, in the British Central African Federation, Malawi was the first country to gain independence from Britain and invited neighboring Tanzania and Zambia for a three-nations independence football tournament that was held in Zomba and Blantyre.[8] The final of the independence tournament was played on July 6, 1964, the day that was chosen as Malawi's Independence Day. Zambia spoiled Malawi's political-freedom celebrations by beating the hosts 5–0 in a thrilling match played at the Central Stadium in Blantyre.[9]

Sports stadia on the continent were common places for political festivities that included sporting activities, particularly soccer. It became part of a larger trend which saw many newly independent African nations build soccer stadiums in their capital cities as 'symbols of modernity and pride'.[10] Similarly, upon gaining political independence, Zambia invited Kenya, Uganda, and Ghana for a four nations *ufulu* (independence) football tournament. Zambia's ufulu celebrations started with the lowering of the Union Jack (British flag) and raising of the new Zambian flag at midnight on October 23,1964 at the newly constructed Independence Stadium in Lusaka.[11] The climax of the celebration was an electrifying ufulu football tournament final between Zambia and Ghana on October 24, 1964 in the Independence Stadium. The hosts scored the first two goals, and the Ghanaians, who were then African Cup of

Nations football champions, responded by silencing the 8000 Zambians in the stadium that included their first president Kenneth Kaunda by thrashing Zambia 3–4.[12]

Political-freedom football tournaments were also common in West African independence celebrations in the 1960s. Tongo invited Nigeria for a football contest to celebrate her independence in 1960. The match, which was played before a full capacity crowd in the Municipal Stadium in the capital Lomé, ended in a 1–1 draw.[13] Later, Nigeria also hosted Ghana in the Nkrumah Gold Cup played in the National Stadium during similar independence celebrations, where the hosts lost 3–0 to Ghana in the final. Other countries, such as Uganda and Kenya, also organized football competitions to celebrate their political freedom from European colonizers, making football an important part of independence festivities and Africa's postcolonial, urban popular culture.[14] Following independence, many African athletes were now eligible to represent their new countries in international sports contests such as the Olympic Games. For example, Northern Rhodesia marched through the opening ceremony of the Tokyo Games as a colony of Britain but later marched as Zambia, an independent state, at the closing ceremony of the same Games. Using the platform of major events, the newly created state chose not to miss the opportunity to proudly assert its political freedom to the audience of a major sporting event.[15]

Sport and a Positive Image of Africa

The performance of African athletes on the international scene can be traced as far back as the 1920s, when boxers such as Senegalese Louis Phal (popularly known as 'Battling Siki') won the world light-heavyweight title.[16] Later, Ghanaian boxer Roy Ankrah won the British Empire featherweight title in 1951.[17] Footballers such as Senegalese Raoul Diane and Moroccan Larbi Ben Barek were superstars in the French national team in the 1930s.[18] However, the majority of these sportspersons of African descent did not represent their countries of birth until after the 1960s, when most countries gained independence from European colonizers. Sixteen African states gained independence in 1960, leading to the naming of 1960 as 'the year of Africa'.[19]

As already mentioned, the independence of many African states in the 1960s triggered a swift increase in the number of Africans who represented their countries in international sports competitions such as the Olympic Games. Before the 1960s, only 11 African nations had been members of the International Olympic movement; the following decade, the number increased to 28, which also increased the number of African athletes participating in the Games.[20] Remarkably, African athletes performed very well in these international events, which resulted in global familiarity with the names of both the athletes and their countries of origin, which had recently acquired their new political freedom. For instance, Abebe Bikila, an Ethiopian athlete

who was a member of the last Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie's Imperial Guard, was among the first to put Ethiopia and postcolonial Africa on the sporting map by winning the Rome Marathon, running barefoot in 1960. Second to Bikila was another African, Rhadi Ben Abdesselam Randi of Morocco.[21] Ghanaian boxer Ike Quartey also won a silver medal at the 1960 Rome Olympics.[22] Interestingly, Bikila won the gold medal in Rome, the capital city of Italy, which had invaded Ethiopia a few decades earlier. Belachew Gebrewold argues that athletic performance became an important function in the realization of Ethiopian nationalism. Bikila's 'victory became not only a sporting event but also a political event, implicitly indicating that Africans were ready for the big time'.[23] These victories announced the emergence of Africa on the international scene.

Following the successful performance of Africans at the 1960 Rome Games, further sporting successes by Africans in track events followed at the 1964 Tokyo Games. Bikila went on to claim another gold medal, Mohammed Gammoudi of Tunisia a silver medal in the 10,000 m, and Wilson Kiprugut of Kenya a silver medal in the 800 m race. In 1968, at the Mexico City Games, 13 African athletes performed even better, winning a total of fifteen medals, five of those being golds. These victories marked the beginning of Africans' dominance in middle and long-distance events with athletes such as Abebe Bikila, Haile Gabresellasie, Miruts Yifter, Wilson Kiprugut, Kipchoge Keino, Filbert Bayi, Frank Fredericks, Maria Matola, Genzele Dibaba, Asbel Kiprop, and many others dominating world sports.[24] Beyond Olympic track and field events, African national football teams were attaining positive results too. For example, Ghana reached the quarterfinals of the Tokyo Games football competition in 1964; Nigeria drew with South American football powerhouse Brazil at the 1968 Mexico City Games; and Zambia defeated European football giants Italy 4–0 at the 1988 Soul Korea Olympics.[25] Nigeria defeated Argentina in the 1996 Olympics, and Cameroon beat Spain in the 2000 Olympic Games.[26]

Other major sporting events such as the football World Cup finals attracted the attention of African sports administrators, particularly highlighting the absence of African independent nations at the finals. The formation of the Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF) in 1957 provided a lobbying body to exert pressure on the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) world football governing body to give the African continent slots for participating in the football World Cup finals. When the CAF threatened to boycott the 1966 World Cup finals, Africa was finally assured a slot in the world football competition in 1970 and was first represented by Morocco. At the 1974 West Germany World Cup finals, Zaire represented the continent, losing all three group stage matches. However, doubts regarding the quality of African football were challenged during the 1978 World Cup finals, where Tunisia defeated Mexico 3–1, and went on to register a remarkable goalless draw with the world champions West Germany after narrowly losing to

Poland. At the 1982 football World Cup finals in Spain, Africa's lobbying for more teams had paid off with one more slot awarded to the continent. Algeria and Cameroon went on to prove that postcolonial African football was making progress both on the continent and during international major sporting events. The two countries' performances at the 1982 football World Cup proved that African national football teams could proudly compete and gain good results against other teams at major events. Such sporting trajectories were also evident during major youth-football events, where African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, and Egypt[27] continued to perform exceedingly well.

The successes of individual African athletes and national teams on the international scene not only proclaimed the arrival of Africans on the international sports scene but also implicitly meant the realization of African nationalism. Similar to the role sport played in African-American society after emancipation, postcolonial African sportspersons used sport as a vehicle for 'social mobility, self-definition and cultural expression'.[28] Sport offered a 'place where ideas of [colonial] order [could openly] be contested', proving that Africans can hold their own after generations of colonial racism and domination.[29] As the international media shared these successes of African athletes and national teams worldwide, it painted positive images of newly independent African states and the continent as a whole.[30] William Baker argues that these sports victories 'provided instant recognition for new African nations, serving as an informal, unofficial, but highly visible corollary to the transnational activities of official diplomats and formal negotiations'.[31] Sports, therefore, contributed towards projecting positive images of the African continent.

In the newly independent African nations, successful performances in international sports not only created a sense of triumph, but also of nationhood among numerous ethnic groups that formed the new nations. The victories of athletes and teams, particularly against former European colonizers, served as national symbols displaying the power of African states. For instance, when Ethiopia emerged as the best African country at the World Athletics Championship in 2003, emerging third overall behind the USA and Russia, the victorious athletes in Addis Ababa were welcomed with 'a famous Ethiopian song against the Italians' evoking the victory of Emperor Menelik II against the Italians at the Battle of Adwa in 1896.[32] In line with Pan-Africanism, the victories of African athletes on the global sporting stage were also seen as victories of the African continent as a whole.

Emergence of Pan-Africanist Sports Bodies

The peak of Africa's decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s saw an emergence of a number of continental sports bodies whose aims were to develop sports on the continent and to foster Pan-Africanist ideals among newly independent African states. By the 1960s, it was clear that football had become

the most popular sport on the continent, as it was even spilling out of the major cities and towns to the countryside where herd-boys adopted it as their pastime activity.[33] Despite this popularity, FIFA, which was dominated by European and South American administrators, did not recognize this development of the game. This compelled African football leaders to seek a united and well-coordinated African football confederation that would promote the development of the game on the continent and help in making their voices heard in the governance of world football.[34]

The aforementioned lobbying resulted in the formation of CAF in Khartoum, Sudan in 1957 by representatives from four independent African states: Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Africa.[35] Abdelaziz Abdallah Salem from Egypt, who was a member of the FIFA executive committee, became CAF's first president. Committee members included Yidnecatchew Tessema of Ethiopia, Abdel Halim Mohamed of Sudan, and a white South African, Fred Fell. CAF became the supreme body of football and a pioneer Pan-African sports institution on the continent.[36] Paul Darby argues that CAF gave 'a considerable weight to the use of the game as a tool for asserting national and pan-African identity … [making it a] highly visible podium for mediating that identity throughout Africa and on a global basis'.[37]

The establishment of CAF in 1957 also witnessed the first African Cup of Nations football competition held in Khartoum, where only three of the four founding members competed. South Africa was excluded from participation after failing to feature a racially integrated team inclusive of local blacks as well as white South Africans. Instead, the South African team comprised only white footballers, reflecting an apartheid South Africa. Their exclusion from the African Cup of Nations tournament was indicative of the CAF's strong position against the racial segregation of an 'independent' African state. Like the intentions for the formation of CAF, the main purpose of organizing the African Cup of Nations was to advance the interests of the game on the continent. CAF and the African Cup of Nations both offered avenues for achieving Pan-Africanist objectives and became models for many African sports bodies and contests that followed.

In 1963, an athletics competition called the Games of Friendship was held in Dakar, Senegal, involving France and 24 independent African states, bringing together 2400 track-and-field athletes. The Games of Friendship laid a foundation for the emergence of a Pan-African sports event that came to be known as the All-African Games. Following the planning that was started during the 1963 Games of Friendship; the first All-Africa Games competition was held in Congo Brazzaville in 1965, in which 3000 contestants from thirty independent African states participated in various track and field events.[38] The successful staging of the All-Africa Games led to the formation in December 1966 of a Pan-Africanist sports institution, the Supreme Council for Sports in Africa (SCSA). The SCSA, with its headquarters in Yaoundé, Cameroon, became an intergovernmental supreme body responsible for

promoting, developing, and coordinating all sports on the continent.[39] However, its leadership was composed of representatives from countries above or near the equator, with no representation from politically independent Southern African countries. These were: Andre Hombassa from Congo Brazzaville as SCSA president; Abraham Ordia from Nigeria as vice-president; Badora Sow from Mali as second vice-president; and Jean-Claude Gaga from Congo Brazzaville as the secretary-general.

The continent's sporting confederations shared similar ideological perspectives to those of African states and their Pan-Africanist goals. With political freedom also came the desire to attain economic freedom and break the shackles of imperialism, which many Pan-African leaders acknowledged as still existing within Africa's economic systems.[40] Therefore, establishing governing structures managed by Africans was an expression of the many freedoms from colonial rule. For example, French-speaking African states saw their economic and political connections with Europe, particularly France, as key to their economic development. Conversely, many former British colonies favored a Pan-Africanist approach; a kind of African socialism that encouraged unity and common African markets while avoiding what they perceived as the cunning and exploitative economic relationships with the capitalist West.[41] Despite these ideological differences, the emergence of Pan-Africanist sports bodies on the continent, such as CAF and SCSA, provided a platform for the selection of sports leaders who represented the interests of Africa in global sports. This development also emphasized the use of sport as a medium for asserting the identity of newly independent African states and played an important role in unifying and proclaiming the presence of Africa in global sports. The introduction of continental sports competitions such the African Cup of Nations in football and the All-Africa Games in track-and-field not only fostered Pan-Africanist thoughts but also helped in the development of formalized sports on the continent.

The Fight Against Racial Discrimination

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), an association of independent African states, was established on May 25, 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The OAU as defender of the sovereignty of African states and eliminator of any forms of imperialism recognized the SCSA in 1967 as the official organization responsible for organizing sports on the continent. By so doing, the SCSA and OAU worked hand-in-hand to confront racial discriminations in African sports, particularly that which was prevalent in apartheid South Africa and in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), a country where the decolonization process would not be accomplished until 1980.[42]

While South Africa had been practicing segregationist policies as far back as 1948, in 1956 the Minister of Interior Affairs Theophilus Ebenhaezer Dönges announced that within South Africa sport had to be played

in line with the custom of 'separate development'.[43] Furthermore, the policy prohibited any forms of interracial sports competitions within South Africa and failed to recognize any non-white sports-governing body which did not have the support of white sports-governing bodies.[44] This racial segregation policy contributed to the failure by the separatist South African Football Association (FASA) to send a racially integrated team to the first aforementioned African Cup of Nations in Khartoum, Sudan in 1957. Subsequently, the expulsion of South Africa from CAF occurred in what became 'the first use of sport as a political tool in the fight against apartheid'.[45] This was indicative of CAF's and the African Cup of Nations' political stance as symbols of nationalism and Pan-Africanism.

Thereafter, CAF, SCSA, and other organizations, such as the non-racial South African Sports Association (SASA), formed by Dennis Brutus in 1958, kept on mounting pressure on FIFA to take similar action. In 1961, the FIFA Executive Committee suspended South Africa.[46] However, in the same year, a new FIFA president, Sir Stanley Rous, who was sympathetic to the South African apartheid government, reversed the decision by the FIFA Executive Committee and reinstated South Africa. Despite that, global campaigns for the expulsion of South Africa continued, leading to the 1964 FIFA Congress suspending South Africa again.[47]

Another heated political debate was between supporters of apartheid sports in South Africa and opponents of racial discrimination in sports. Recognizing the importance of the Olympic Games and the potential the Games had to exert external pressure on the apartheid system in South Africa, SASA formed the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee in 1963.[48] This organization worked together with black Africans through the OAU, SCSA, the Communist bloc (led by the Soviet Union), and Caribbean nations in putting pressure on the IOC, resulting in the suspension of South Africa from the 1964 Tokyo Games. As white South African sports also had a lot of sympathizers within the IOC Executive Committee and Western countries, South Africa was readmitted into the Olympic movement in February 1968. African countries were disappointed by this development, and the OAU through the SCSA called for an international Olympic boycott of the 1968 Mexico City Games.[49] Within a short time, all the 32 countries affiliated with the SCSA confirmed their commitment to boycotting the Mexico Games if South Africa was invited to participate. The feelings of most African countries can be summed up in the views of the ruling Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in Tanzania:

> As long as South Africa adheres to its principle of apartheid in sport, it cannot be allowed to take part in international tournaments … Because South Africa insists on categorizing some sportsmen as human athletes and others as subhuman, she should not be allowed to pollute the Olympic atmosphere … It must be hoped that other members will be persuaded to this line of thinking so

> that the pressure against South Africa's obnoxious policy of apartheid may gain further momentum.[50]

The USSR, the Communist bloc, Arabic, and Caribbean countries joined the protest, giving the Olympic movement the strongest opposition they have ever met, forcing them to withdraw their invitation of South Africa.[51]

The white South Africans organized what they called South African games using sponsorship from Shell Oil and invited white teams from Europe and North America to participate. This was in order to appease their disappointed athletes who were excluded from the 1968 Mexico City Games. This shows that South Africa's inability to participate in the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City was putting pressure on the apartheid government and their sports administrators. Some African countries responded by threatening to boycott the Commonwealth Games of 1970 that were to be held in Scotland if any of the members of the Commonwealth attended the South African games. The SCSA also threatened that its members would boycott the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich if West Germany participated in the South African games. In the end, most countries declined South Africa's invitation, making the South African games a failure. This international pressure made the IOC finally resolve to expel South Africa from the Olympic movement in May 1970.[52]

In the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, the thorny issue was not with South Africa, but Rhodesia, where Ian Smith had proclaimed a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of white minority rule in 1965. Rhodesia participated in the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games under the British flag, despite being condemned by most countries for proclaiming UDI; Rhodesia was also invited to the 1972 Munich Games.[53] African countries were outraged. Upon realizing this pressure, the IOC tried to ensure that Rhodesia athletes participated in the games using British passports, and President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere argued that the suggestion was 'nonsense': 'We are not quarreling about passports but about the things which are going on in Rhodesia'.[54] This shows the strong anger that these issues evoked among African political leaders. African countries threatened to boycott the Munich Games; it was only after the IOC cancelled Rhodesia's invitation to the Games that African countries agreed to participate. Rhodesia was finally expelled from the Olympic movement in 1975.[55]

In June 1976, when black schoolchildren were being brutality killed by whites in the Soweto Uprising, tension was also mounting in the Olympic movement because of the All Blacks (the New Zealand rugby team) tour of South Africa. The OAU through the SCSA called for a boycott of the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games if New Zealand were allowed to attend.[56] The IOC tried to downplay the threats; this led to 30 African countries boycotting the 1976 Montreal Games, the largest Olympic boycott.[57] This sent a clear warning message to all sports bodies that African political leaders and the

continent's sports governing bodies were serious about breaking sporting ties with apartheid South Africa.

The boycotts discussed above demonstrate how sport became an important tool for fighting racial segregation in South Africa and Rhodesia. Since events such as the Olympic Games attracted a lot of attention, the media publicity that the boycotts attracted made the Games a powerful weapon to fight colonialism and European racism. As others have observed, economic sanctions were going to affect the young African economies, hence resorting to sport as a tool for political negotiations.[58] Meanwhile, some politicians even went as far as using sport as a tool for controlling their own citizens to achieve their selfish political goals.

Sport as a Tool for Political Propaganda

By the 1960s, when most African states were gaining independence, modern sport had already been appropriated as part of their urban popular culture.[59] Sports such as netball, volleyball, boxing, basketball, cricket (with football as the most popular of all) were played across the continent. Hundreds and thousands of teams emerged with millions of enthusiasts.[60] The popularity of sports attracted the attention of some political leaders who saw it as an opportunity to bolster their political ideologies and power.[61] Many postcolonial African states mainstreamed sports by establishing ministries and enacting pieces of legislation to try and bring sport under government control.[62]

Some African leaders went as far as taking a page out of the British colonizers' playbook by quickly identifying football's value as a tool for nation building and ideological propaganda. For instance, following Ghana's independence from Britain in 1957, first president Kwame Nkrumah ardently believed that football had the 'capacity to transcend ethnic, linguistic, regional, religious and generational barriers'.[63] In line with the colonialists and missionaries who used sport as a tool for social control, Nkrumah felt that the game had potential to help him in the creation of national cohesion, identity, and international visibility of the nation, his ruling Convention People's Party (CPP), and strengthening his power.[64] To achieve this goal, he appointed Ohene Djan in 1958 to reorganize the Ghanaian football league.

Nkrumah and Djan even formed a new club they called Real Republic in 1961, modeled after the Real Madrid FC of Spain to challenge the Ghanaian traditional archrivals Hearts of Oak FC and Asante Kotoko FC.[65] Nkrumah also assigned Djan to improve the international image of the Ghanaian national football team and made sure that he regularly hosted a dinner for the national team before international competitions and encouraged them to 'die for their nation'.[66] Nkrumah identified himself with talented national team players and used the national team as his symbol of success and political power. This explains why the Ghanaian national team was invited to play matches during independence celebrations for countries such as Nigeria,

Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia; they were seen to 'symbolize African freedom and the Pan-African unity' that Nkrumah was preaching.[67] He was not the only African political leader who saw an opportunity in sport to strengthen his power and popularity.

Julius Nyerere's government in Tanzania also attempted to control football. Following Tanzania's independence from Britain in 1961, President Nyerere's ruling Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) passed the Arusha Declaration in 1967, which asserted the country's African Socialism ideology. The party and government formed many organizations to have greater control over different sections of the population. In 1967, they passed the National Sports Council Act that established the National Sports Council and gave it powers to oversee all sports activities in Tanzania.[68] The party and government were determined to control sport, particularly football, and to use it as a tool for implementing their socialistic polices. They tried to bring the Football Association of Tanzania (FAT) under control by ensuring that 'All those who wished to become club officers in the Dar es Salaam region were required to be 'screened' in order, in the words of the Regional Commissioner, 'to bring about Party superiority in sport'.[69] Despite these efforts, the party and government failed to bring football under their control, partly because the people were resistant 'to the political objectives which football was to be used to attain'.[70] Ordinary citizens and sports fans usually managed to find ways of outmaneuvering party and government policies and laws in order for them to remain in control and enjoying their sports. Similarly, first president of Zambia Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) attempted to control football and use it as a tool for propagating their political agendas. Following Zambia's independence in 1964, the UNIP government's popularity started waning as a result of its failure to fulfill independence promises. President Kaunda's government resorted to suppressing opposition political party leaders, leading to the declaration of a one-party state in 1972.[71] However, the successful performance of the Zambia national football team, particularly during the 1974 African Cup of Nations in Cairo, Egypt, saw Zambia emerge as runner-ups to Zaire, the winners of the 1974 African Nations Cup, resulting in a lot of attention from citizens.[72] This popularity of the game attracted political attention and control by state apparatus to propagate Kaunda's ideology of Zambia Humanism.[73] To achieve this goal, UNIP's Central Committee, which was the party's supreme policy-making body, created a Sub-Committee for Youth and Sport that was tasked with governing sport in the country.[74] The political system in Zambia, particularly the declaration of a one-party participatory system by Kaunda, led to interference in sports governance by UNIP officials.[75] For instance, the Sub-Committee for Youth and Sport tasked the Minister of Sport with dissolving the National Football League and the Football Association of Zambia in 1975 and appointing an interim committee, accusing them of underdeveloping the game by constant disagreements and bickering. The minister formed one

football governing body, which was renamed Football Association of Zambia. Interestingly, when it was time to elect new leaders for this football governing body on December 28, 1975, only candidates who were approved by the UNIP Central Committee were allowed to contest the elections.[76] This shows how far President Kaunda's UNIP Government was determined to bring football in Zambia under its political control.

On the other hand, Kaunda was a former football player himself; he even inspired his cabinet ministers to form a football team.[77] The Zambia national team was even nicknamed after him as KK11 (Kenneth Kaunda Eleven), partly because of his enthusiasm for the game. Like his Ghanaian counterpart, Kaunda attended most national team matches and dined with the national team before international competitions. Kaunda significantly invested in the game, despite Zambia's severe economic decline from the 1970s to the 1990s.[78] However, the massive investment in the game did not stop football fans from criticizing his UNIP Government whenever the national team performed poorly. Citizens were also vigilant of how the game was being managed and usually protested and threatened to riot whenever they felt that the game was being mismanaged. While Kaunda's Government controlled the game, it also made efforts to appease the citizens, as seen in how they were quick to dismiss the incumbent national coach whenever the national team underachieved in order to portray their concern for the state of the game.[79]

In Cameroon in 1990, President Paul Biya's ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) (that dominated politics from 1960, when Cameroon gained independence) was experiencing tension, as citizens were demanding democracy and multipartyism. Biya's ruling CPDM attempted to take advantage of the Indomitable Lions' (Cameroon national football team) good performance in the 1990 World Cup in Italy, where they were eliminated by England in the quarterfinals of the competition.[80] Biya tried to use the Lions' successful performance in 1990 not only to promote national unity but also to divert citizens' attention from a highly charged political atmosphere.[81]

In the 1992 elections, Biya faced serious opposition for the first time from the Social Democratic Front (SDF), led by Ni John Fru Ndi. Biya's campaign team tried to paint a picture of him as a lion to associate him with the successful Indomitable Lions. Paul Nkwi and Bea Vidacs argue that this attempt to 'Co-opt the Lions' victory, which was also seen as the Cameroonian people's victory, was immediately turned back against the government by the people to become a term of derision against the government in general and against Biya in particular'.[82] Although Biya won this tightly contested election, citizens believed that Fru Ndi only lost because of fraud and labeled the event as 'The stolen victory', once again proving that the people are capable of verbally getting their own back'.[83]

These examples of African political leaders and their involvement in sport demonstrate postcolonial African leaders' attempts to use sport to achieve

their selfish political goals. Despite some politicians being determined to control and use sport to achieve their goals, ordinary citizens were vigilant and prevented politicians from having total control of sport. Citizens always found a way to circumvent government authority and sometimes used the same sport to challenge government authorities. However, Africans were not the only political leaders in the world who attempted to use sport to bolster their political beliefs, popularity, and power. Several leaders in the world have attempted to use sport as a tool for political propaganda; the most famous were dictatorial regimes in Germany and Italy in interwar Europe. Adolf Hitler's Nazi regime hosted the famous 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin and Benito Mussolini's fascist regime organized the 1934 FIFA World Cup in Italy.[84]

Towards the 1990s, the falling economies in most African countries made it difficult for governments to fully support sport. For example, governments like that in Zambia, which had reverted to private ownership of state-owned corporations, saw the demise of corporate social responsibility programs providing community sport.[85] Banda highlights that the shrinking of local-government provision resulted in the loss of parks and recreational budgets that funded the community welfare sports and facility maintenance. The loss of community welfare provision created gaps in community sports provision, which later contributed to the emergence of the sport-for-development (SfD) sector.

New Wine Skins: Sport-for-Development and the Peace Sector

In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) emerged in Africa, some of which focused on sports. Iain Lindsey and Davies Banda argue that neo-liberal ideology among Western governments and multinational agencies such as the World Bank supported the concept of NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s because there was a perception that '[n]ational governments in African countries were both failing and corrupt'.[86] Therefore, international NGOs were encouraged, following the belief that they stimulated democratic principles and were an effective means of making sure that aid was delivered to poor African communities.[87]

This period coincided with a severe economic meltdown that hit most African countries in the 1980s and 1990s, compelling them to engage the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for support. These multinational agencies urged African nations to implement austerity measures such as the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in exchange for the desperately needed loans to revive their national economies and keep their governments operative.[88] As each affected country struggled to share its meager resources beyond the core sectors of education, health, and agriculture, the 'rollback of government assistance in sport in the 1990s paved the way for nongovernmental organizations … and community-based organizations' to

provide basic social services such as sport and education.[89] The collapse of the economies and the HIV/AIDS pandemic that overwhelmed many African countries resulted in poverty and in many children failing to have access to formal education. NGOs and other development agencies came in and used sports as a means to an end in their implementation of health, education, and development programs, for example[90]: the Mathare Youth Sports Association (MYSA), established in Nairobi Kenya in 1987; Sports Coaches Outreach (SCORE), established in Cape Town, South Africa in 1991; Sports in Action and Education Through Sport (EDUSPORT) Foundation in Zambia in the early 1990s.[91] Intercontinentally, there are hundreds of such organizations, often referred to as Sport for Development and Peace (SDP).[92] We prefer the acronym SfD to refer to the same sector.

Most SfD organizations obtained their funding to implement programs from Western national government and multinational agencies.[93] Therefore, there is a fear that these agencies impose their programs and values that make little sense to the recipient communities.[94] Simon Darnell and Lyndsay Hayhurst argue that there is a need for scholars to explore decolonization of SfD programs because the funding agencies seem to have taken up a role of political and economic stewardship and not solidarity with communities struggling for self-determination.[95] While sport offers a means of achieving particular development goals, it can easily be used as a tool for a politics of social control. 'Sport can be mobilized (and is implicit) within the politics of intranational colonization in which marginalized groups struggle for full representation and access to success within the social political economy.'[96]

Darnell and Hayhurst argue that critical examinations of SfD programs show that they have 'colonizing tendencies and tensions'.[97] Others argue that there are complex local-level experiences and interactions between donor agencies and recipient organizations that should not be simplified.[98] However, contrary to the political struggles and aspirations of Pan-Africanists, these new organizations as providers of community sport have handed the power back to foreign agendas. The governance of such SfD organizations is heavily influenced in agenda setting, decision making, and program implementation by those who financially support them. The postcolonial dream of fighting imperialism has established new forms of shackles on the freedom of local communities to shape their own destinies in accordance with local needs. Instead, foreign agendas are at times pursued due to the heavy resource dependence on Western donors.

While SfD organizations have made huge contributions in terms of developing sports structures in underprivileged African communities and developing young athletes at the grass-roots level, one cannot completely disregard the political influence from Western governments and multinational development agencies that bankrolled the projects.[99] Although there is a need to be aware that SfD is a complex enterprise, it is also important, as Darnell and Hayhurst have argued, not to completely discount the colonizing tendencies

of the movement. Brian Stoddart points out in reference to the British empire that sport's 'Capacity to masquerade as an apolitical agency enhanced its ability to influence; because it appeared as one area of the social arena in which otherwise differing people might meet'.[100] As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, British sports were diffused to Africa as tools for social control.[101] Therefore, sport has continued to play a role in postcolonial African politics.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored some of the complex relationships between sport and postcolonial politics in Africa from the 1960s to the 1990s. When African countries were gaining independence in the 1960s, sports such as football were the main highlights in some countries' independence festivities. Independence made many Africans eligible to represent their countries in international competitions. Victory in these competitions, particularly over Europeans who had colonized them for a long time, became not only sports events, but also political events implicitly demonstrating that Africans were capable of beating Europeans. These sports successes were important because they projected positive images of newly independent African nations. The popularity of sport was also harnessed to pursue Pan-Africanist ideals and to fight racial segregation in South Africa and Rhodesia.

Some postcolonial African leaders also saw the popularity of sport, particularly football, as an important avenue for propagating their political ideologies and consolidating political power. This made them determined to control sports, but they did not find it easy as ordinary people and sports fans were continuously circumventing the laws and sometimes successfully used sport to make their political leaders accountable. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the emergence of SfD projects in Africa that were also not free from Western financiers' stewardship and political agendas. Sports and politics continue to be two sides of one coin in postcolonial Africa.

Notes

1. William J. Baker, "Political Games: The Meaning of International Sport for Independent Africa," in *Sport in Africa: Essays in Social History*, ed. William J. Baker and James A. Mangan (New York: Africana, 1987), 272; Peter Alegi, *African Soccerscapes: How a Continent Changed the World's Game* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 54; Craig Waite, "Ghana's Black Stars: A Fifty-Year Journey to the World Cup Quarterfinals," in *Africa's World Cup: Critical Reflections on Play, Patriotism, Spectatorship, and Space*, ed. P. Alegi and C. Bolsmann (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 100; and Hikabwa Decius Chipande, "Chipolopolo: A Political and Social History of Football (Soccer) in Zambia, 1940s–1994" (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2015), 107.

2. Baker, "Political Games: The Meaning of International Sport for Independent Africa," 283; Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 54–55.
3. J.A. Mangan, *The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal* (New York: Viking, 1986), 191; Anthony Kirk-Green, "Imperial Administration and the Athletic Imperative: The Case of the District Officer in Africa," in *Sport in Africa: Essays in Social History*, ed. William J. Baker and James A. Mangan (New York: Africana, 1987), 81–110; John Bale and Joe Sang, *Kenyan Running: Movement Culture, Geography and Global Change* (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 97; and Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 1.
4. John Bale and Joe Sang, *Kenyan Running: Movement Culture, Geography and Global Change*, 76. For more on how colonial administrators set the tone on sport as a tool for social control in the British empire see the role of sport and physical education in Kirk-Green, "Imperial Administration and the Athletic Imperative: The Case of the District Officer in Africa," 81–113.
5. Brian Stoddart and Keith A. P Sandiford, *The Imperial Game: Cricket, Culture, and Society* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), VI.
6. Phyllis Martin, *Leisure and Society in Colonial Brazzaville* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 100–25; Laura Fair, *Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890–1945* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001), 226–66; Peter Alegi, *Laduma!: Soccer, Politics, and Society in South Africa, from Its Origins to 2010*, 2nd ed. (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2010), 15–135; Gary Armstrong and Richard Giulianotti, *Football in Africa: Conflict, Conciliation, and Community* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 18; Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 14–35; and Chipande, "Chipolopolo: A Political and Social History of Football (Soccer) in Zambia, 1940s–1994," 40–113.
7. Paul Darby, *Africa, Football and FIFA: Politics, Colonialism and Resistance* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 26.
8. *Ufulu* is a term that is used to denote independence among the ba Chewa people of both Malawi and Zambia.
9. Chipande, "Chipolopolo: A Political and Social History of Football (Soccer) in Zambia, 1940s–1994," 110.
10. Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 55.
11. David Gordon, *Invisible Agents: Spirits in a Central African History* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012), 157.
12. Chipande, "Chipolopolo: A Political and Social History of Football (Soccer) in Zambia, 1940s–1994," 112.
13. Alegi, *African Soccerscapes: How a Continent Changed the World's Game*, 55.
14. Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 55.
15. Davies Banda, "Zambia: Government's Role in Colonial and Modern Times," *International Journal of Sport Policy*, 2 (2010): 242.
16. Baker, "Political Games: The Meaning of International Sport for Independent Africa," 279.
17. Emmanuel Akyeampong, "Bukom and Social History of Boxing in Accra: Warfare and Citizenship in Postcolonial Ga Soceity," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 35 (2002): 47.

18. Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 55; Raffaele Poli, "Migrations and Trade of African Football Players: Historic, Geographical and Cultural Aspects," *Afrika Spectrum* 41 (2006): 395.
19. Baker, "Political Games: The Meaning of International Sport for Independent Africa," 275.
20. Tenga, "Globalization and Olympic Sport in Tanzania: A Developmental Approach," 81.
21. Belachew Gebrewold, "Ethiopian Nationalism: An Ideology to Transcend All Odds," *Africa Spectrum* 44, 1 (2009): 79–97; Tenga, "Globalization and Olympic Sport in Tanzania: A Developmental Approach," 81; and Baker, "Political Games: The Meaning of International Sport for Independent Africa," 275.
22. Akyeampong, "Bukom and Social History of Boxing in Accra: Warfare and Citizenship in Postcolonial Ga Soceity," 47.
23. Gebrewold, "Ethiopian Nationalism: an Ideology to Transcend All Odds," *Africa Spectrum*, 83.
24. Baker, "Political Games: The Meaning of International Sport for Independent Africa," 275; Tenga, "Globalization and Olympic Sport in Tanzania: A Developmental Approach," 81.
25. Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 76; Chipande, "Chipolopolo: A Political and Social History of Football (Soccer) in Zambia, 1940s–1994," 180.
26. Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 76.
27. Ibid., 77.
28. Akyeampong, "Bukom and Social History of Boxing in Accra: Warfare and Citizenship in Postcolonial Ga Soceity," 47.
29. Ibid., 46.
30. Tenga, "Globalization and Olympic Sport in Tanzania: A Developmental Approach," 82.
31. Baker, "Political Games: The Meaning of International Sport for Independent Africa," 277.
32. Gebrewold, "Ethiopian Nationalism: An Ideology to Transcend All Odds," *Africa Spectrum*, 83. Ethiopia under Emperor Menelik II defeated the Italians in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa after killing 14,000 Europeans, sending shock waves "throughout the foundations of 19th-century European racism," Teshale Tibebu, "The 'Anomaly' and 'Paradox' of Africa," *Journal of Black Studies* 26 (1996): 414–30.
33. Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 34.
34. Darby, *Africa, Football and FIFA: Politics, Colonialism and Resistance*, 33.
35. Darby, *Africa, Football and FIFA: Politics, Colonialism and Resistance*, 35; Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 64.
36. Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 65.
37. Darby, *Africa*, *Football and FIFA: Politics, Colonialism and Resistance*, 35.
38. Baker, "Political Games: The Meaning of International Sport for Independent Africa," 283.
39. Sendau Titus Tenga, "Globalization and Olympic Sport in Tanzania: A Developmental Approach" (PhD diss., Norwegian University of Sport and Physical Education, 2000), 54.

40. Banda, "Sport and the Multisectoral Approach to HIV/AIDS in Zambia," 49.
41. Tenga, "Globalization and Olympic Sport in Tanzania: A Developmental Approach," 53.
42. Baker, "Political Games: The Meaning of International Sport for Independent Africa," 285.
43. Alegi, *Laduma!* 113; Alegi, *African soccerscapes*, 67; and Darby, *Africa, Football and FIFA: Politics, Colonialism and Resistance*, 71.
44. Alegi, *Laduma!* 113.
45. Darby, *Africa*, *Football and FIFA: Politics, Colonialism and Resistance*, 72.
46. Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 74.
47. Ibid.
48. Tenga, "Globalization and Olympic Sport in Tanzania: A Developmental Approach," 84.
49. Ibid., 87.
50. Dean E. McHenry, Jr., "The Use of Sports in Policy Implementation: The Case of Tanzania," 237–56.
51. Baker, "Political Games: The Meaning of International Sport for Independent Africa," 286.
52. Ibid., 287.
53. Tenga, "Globalization and Olympic Sport in Tanzania: A Developmental Approach," 89.
54. Dean E. McHenry, Jr., "The Use of Sports in Policy Implementation: The Case of Tanzania," 246.
55. Baker, "Political Games: The Meaning of International Sport for Independent Africa," 288.
56. Dean E. McHenry, Jr., "The Use of Sports in Policy Implementation: The Case of Tanzania," 246.
57. See note 55 above.
58. McHenry, Jr., "The Use of Sports in Policy Implementation: The Case of Tanzania," 237–56.
59. Allen Guttmann, *Games and Empires: Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 63.
60. See note 58 above.
61. Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 58–59.
62. Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 58–59; Chipande, "Chipolopolo: A Political and Social History of Football (Soccer) in Zambia, 1940s–1994," 114–40.
63. Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 58.
64. Craig Waite, "Ghana's Black Stars: A Fifty-Year Journey to the World Cup Quarterfinals," in *Africa's World Cup: Critical Reflections on Play, Patriotism, Spectatorship, and Space*, ed. P. Alegi and C. Bolsmann (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 100.
65. See note 63 above.
66. Craig Waite, "Ghana's Black Stars: A Fifty-Year Journey to the World Cup Quarterfinals," 101.
67. Ibid.
68. McHenry, "The Use of Sports in Policy Implementation: The Case of Tanzania," 241.
69. Ibid.

70. McHenry, "The Use of Sports in Policy Implementation: The Case of Tanzania," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 18 (1980): 241.
71. Giacomo Macola, "Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, UNIP and the roots of authoritarianism in nationalist Zambia," in *One Zambia Many Histories: Toward a History of Post-colonial Zambia* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 20.
72. Sam Sikazwe, "Government Honors Our Soccer Heroes," *Times of Zambia*, May 8, 1974.
73. Zambian humanism was an ideology that President Kenneth Kaunda adopted as Zambian national ideology and philosophy after independence in 1964. Similar to Julius Nyerere's *Ujamaa* in Tanzania, Zambian Humanism was a form of African socialism with a combination of African traditional values and Christian values. The ideology put God and the human person at the centre, creating a strong connection between God and humans.
74. Davies Banda, "Zambia: Government's Role in Colonial and Modern Times," *International Journal of Sport Policy*, 2 (2010): 242.
75. Davies Banda, Zambia: Government's role in colonial and modern times.
76. Chipande, "Chipolopolo: A Political and Social History of Football (Soccer) in Zambia, 1940s–1994," 137.
77. "MP's team off to Dar," *Times of Zambia*, July 5, 1974.
78. Chipande, "Chipolopolo: A Political and Social History of Football (Soccer) in Zambia, 1940s–1994," 119.
79. Ibid.
80. Paul Nchoji Nkwi and Bea Vidacs, "Football: Politics and Power in Cameroon," in *Entering the Filed: New Perspectives on World Football*, ed. Gary Armstrong and Richard Giulianotti (New Yourk: Berg, 1997), 127.
81. Bea Vidacs, "Through the Prism of Sport: Why Should Africanists Study Sports?" *Africa Spectrum* (2006): 331–49.
82. Nkwi and Vidacs, "Football: Politics and Power in Cameroon," 130.
83. Ibid.
84. Allen Guttmann, "Sport, Politics and the Engaged Historian," *Journal of Contemporary History* 38 (2003): 363–75.
85. Banda, Zambia: Government's role in colonial and modern times; Banda, "Sport and the multisectoral approach to HIV/AIDS in Zambia," 198.
86. Iain Lindsey and Davies Banda, "Sport, non-government organizations and the fight against HIV/AIDS," *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* (2010), 4.
87. Lindsey and Banda, "Sport, Nongovernment Organizations and the Fight Against HIV/AIDS," 4.
88. Alegi, *African Soccerscapes*, 114.
89. Ibid., 124.
90. Banda, "Sport and the Multisectoral Approach to HIV/AIDS in Zambia," 212.
91. Fred Coalter, "Sport-in-Development: Accountability or Development?" in *Sport and International Development*, ed. Roger Levermore and Aaron Beacon (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 58; Ruth Jeans, Jonathan Magee, Tess Kay and Davies Banda, "Sport for Development in Zambia: The New or Not so New Colonialism?" in *Localizing Global Sport for Development* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 132.

92. Bruce Kidd, "A New Social Movement: Sport for Development and peace," *Sport in Society: Culture, Commerce, Media, Politics*, 11 (2008): 370–80.
93. Jeans, Magee, Kay and Banda, "Sport for Development in Zambia: The New or Not so New Colonialism?" 128.
94. Kidd, "A New Social Movement: Sport for Development and Peace," 377.
95. Simon C. Darnell and Lydsay M. C. Hayhurst, "Sport for decolonization: exploring a new praxis of sport for development," *Progress in Development Studies* 11 (2011): 183–96.
96. Darnell and Hayhurst, "Sport for Decolonization: Exploring a New Praxis of Sport for Development," 189.
97. Ibid., 190.
98. Jeans, Magee, Kay and Banda, "Sport for Development in Zambia: The New or not so New Colonialism?" 129.
99. See note 90 above.
100. Brian Stoddart, "Sport, Cultural Imperialism, and Colonial Response in the British Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (1988): 673.
101. Bale and Sang, *Kenyan Running: Movement Culture, Geography and Global Change*, 76.

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CHAPTER 51

Media, Society, and the Postcolonial State

Sharon Adetutu Omotoso

Conceptual Prologue

Setting out on this project, it is important to briefly consider interconnections of postcolonialism (a key concept in this chapter), postmodernism, and post-independence. Postmodernism is a late twentieth-century movement characterized by broad skepticism, subjectivism, and relativism; a general suspicion of reason; and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology in asserting and maintaining political and economic power.[1] Postmodernism is a basic feature of the modern mind, a deep-seated inquiry of what the real is made of; it is a reaction to the assumed certainty of scientific or objective efforts to explain reality and it emphasizes difference as against uniformity. For postmodern thinkers, reality only comes into being through our interpretations of what the world means to us individually. Huyssen Andreas[2] avers that postmodernism began to compete with modernism in the late 1950s and gained ascendancy over it in the 1960s. Postmodernism holds that an explanation cannot be held valid for all groups, cultures, or races; rather, it focuses on (personalized) relative truth. It means among other things, intense reflections over the foundations of knowledge, epistemological issues, and disciplinary boundaries.[3]

Post-independence can be literally interpreted as the period after which a state has obtained flag independence from colonial powers. It is best understood as a process, rather than a goal. It involves the amalgamation of the knowledge and practices needed in order to bring about the right to decide

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without previous determinism. The mid and late twentieth century is identified as the beginning of the post-independence period in Africa.[4]

Postcolonialism is an intellectual direction that has existed since around the middle of the twentieth century. This direction was created as colonial countries became independent; its major aim is to provide explanations and implications of colonial thinking after independence by deconstructing the prejudiced explanations of sporadic incidences involved in the struggles (socio-political, economic, psychological, gendered) between the colonizer and the colonized. Postcolonialism is a theoretical resistance to the 'mystifying amnesia' of the colonial era[5]; it is meant to succeed colonialism and neocolonialism and to engender a new era in which African societies will finally rid themselves of the lingering political, economic, and ideological trappings that have been imposed by, and are in the interests of, Western imperialism.[6] 'Postcolonial state' is a term popularly used in modern-day intellectual and political spheres to represent varying views regarding societies that have undergone colonial incursions of different kinds. To study postcolonial states is to critically examine the underlying cultural legacies of colonialism, the politics of knowledge creation, control, and distribution and its implications for the colonized as they struggle toward decolonization. It challenges the negative portrayals of the developing world,[7] particularly Africa, on the basis of implied comparisons with the West and other parts of the world. In Africa, postcolonialism is an ideological crusade which condemns the dehumanization of races, distortion of worldviews and the *self–other* mentality; it seeks to establish the uniqueness of the continent and its capability to contribute meaningfully to all spheres of global development.

To summarize, postmodernism, post-independence, and postcolonialism are contemporary intellectual movements developed to question lingering Western influences on Africa in particular and other developing states in general.[8] Connections drawn from the three concepts are as follows. First, the postmodern era is periodized within the late twentieth century; postcolonial states in Africa emerged into statehood during the mid and late twentieth century. In addition, studies and ideologies that have emerged as a result of activities within the postmodern and post-independence eras have brought about postcolonial issues which have lingered into the present. Second, the idea of difference as embraced in postmodernism is an essential content in studies of postcolonial states and their post-independence experiences. Third, discussions surrounding postmodernism, post-independence and postcolonialism include a wide range of issues (social, economic, political, religious, gendered and so on) which are both interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary. This explains why, in the hands of postcolonial writers like Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Abdul Jan Mohamed, Gayatri Spivak (mostly academics in European or North American universities), postmodernism becomes postcolonialism, a discourse which attempts to heal the 'epistemic violence' of imperialism.[9] Seeing that they share the rejection of Western culture as any sort of

cross-cultural paradigm,[10] timelines, ideologies, and objectives, it is evident that there are undeniable senses in which the postmodern connects with post-independence in discussions of postcolonialism. This chapter will therefore approach the discourse on postcolonial states from the communication perspective by critically dissecting issues revolving around African media.

Media are apparatuses that 'come in-between' or mediate between two or more parties. Although 'medium' is a generic term used to describe vehicles of conveyance, 'media' (plural) generally describes means of communication and information; it becomes 'mass media' when it is designed to reach a large and heterogeneous audience via various means including radio, television, Internet, and social media, among others.[11] Certain scholars discuss media using the term 'press', as presented in the classic work of Sierbert, Peterson, and Schramm[12] where the term is more often identified with newspapers, journals, and magazines. Over time, the term 'press' became restrictive of what the print media entails and media was thereafter described as 'mass media', referring to outfits or organizations, modern or traditional, which take up the task of creating and disseminating ideas and information, aimed at influencing or controlling an audience or the institutions that constitute legalized power and authority. For convenience, this chapter will adopt the term 'media' to encapsulate other terms used to describe groups and apparatuses tasked with mass information and communication.

Recognizing the Reithian trinity of information, education, and entertainment, Oso[13] stresses that 'the mass media have become the most important social institution in the construction and circulation of meaning in any modern society', and scholars agree that the media provide essential services to society.[14] This is:

> Based especially on the notion that the media and journalism are key purveyors of information that helps people to make sense of events beyond their sensory experience, information that influences people's daily lives and operations, and information that helps people make sense of their world, and negotiate meaning of events and their society.[15]

McQuail[16] points out that the media are channels of communication which essentially serve to connect the sender and receiver of information while constituting perceptions and definitions of social reality as well as normality for the purpose of a public, shared life. The media provide the platform for discussion and dialogues on economic, political, religious, and social issues (among others) between members of the society. In essence, media can be seen as the fortifier of societies. We may approach media operations in Africa from two perspectives: media in traditional society and media in contemporary society; in other words, indigenous media usage which has been transited into conventional media usage. Wilson[17] describes traditional systems of communication as a continuous process of information dissemination, entertainment, and education used in societies which have not been seriously

dislocated by Western culture or any other external influence. Madzingira notes that:

> Among the inter-personal forms of communication through which traditional societies used or rural people still use to receive and give information are the family and neighbourhood, friends and acquaintances, markets and washing areas, and festival gatherings for the village. Institutional networks involve the church or religious networks, the administrative structure, the political party, the school, police and army, and such government service agents as agricultural extension, health, and family planning among others that may operate in the village.[18]

Wilson[19] aptly asserts that under the traditional system, media ownership lies with the society. This reiterates the importance of the media even in traditional societies. The indigenous media of communication vary among societies, and include: idiophones, membranophones, objectifics, color schemes, music, and so on.

The conventional media could be viewed from two perspectives based on usage; that is, colonial media and postcolonial media. Conventional media include radio, television, newspapers, and magazines; these were introduced during and towards the end of colonialism and have pervaded the communication landscape for decades until the advent of new media in the past two centuries. Responding to the claim that conventional media are superior to the traditional media, Wilson describes it as more rewarding, 'to view this traditional/modern communication dichotomy from the point of view of a series of concentric circles with the folk (or traditional) communication occupying the innermost circle and mass communication the outermost circle' Wilson (1987: 89). This replaces the limiting sense of distance with a sense of convergence and sharing of characteristics. Thus, Wilson advises that it is useful to see the system as traditional from the standpoint of an ongoing, long-standing, and 'modernized' (modified) practice. While appreciating the fact that certain traditional media systems have stood the test of time by defying all efforts by Western media to cannibalize them and perhaps supplant them, the implication for society in the recent past is that the traditional, conventional, and new media have had to coexist in Africa. For instance, while traditional media was and is widely trusted by the majority, community radio (such as *radio trottoir*) can be seen as an improved version of the traditional, while the social media are also beginning to gain acceptance and make waves among the new media. On this, Madzingira[20] avers that the media reflect the continuation of long-standing cultural traditions by combining technology-based change with a long history of cultural tradition, and it is precisely this encounter between the very newest and the very oldest that makes the audio-visual mass media a unique meeting point in the emerging information society.

The term 'society' has been mainly conceived from political and social perspectives, among others. We may describe society as an organized group of persons associated together for religious, benevolent, cultural, scientific, political, patriotic, and other purposes, a politically structured group with shared historical, cultural, or geographical traditions. The society is expected to engage in meaningful participation in processes around them, confronting whatever poses threats to them, ensuring general welfare, and scrutinizing the rules and regulations by which they are guided. These duties are beginning to resemble those guiding civil societies, which are held distinct from society in general and saddled with the tasks of interacting and influencing states, acting as intermediaries between society and states in order to counteract states' excesses.[21] This is due largely to new and recent trends in communication and information landscapes, leaving a thin line between societies in general and civil societies. Having observed the shifting social, psychological, technological, and economic posture of societies, in an earlier work I pointed out how models and theories such as minimal effect, agenda setting, and knowledge gap which used to be popular in media studies are becoming questionable because new media are posing unequalled challenges to them.[22] As against the vertical communication structure of the colonial era via conventional media (which ensured that the media primarily disseminated information on government programs and expectations, and the masses recognized media as a one-way tool of communication, best captured by the Yoruba perception and description of media as '*Asoro ma gbesi*', meaning 'one who speaks without waiting for a response'), Chaffee and Metzger[23] predicted that 'the key problem for agenda-setting theory will change from what issues the media tell people to think about to what issues people tell the media they want to think about'. Corroborating this, Windeck[24] affirms that the introduction of the Internet and mobile telecommunications in Africa at the beginning of the millennium has significantly altered communication structures, shifting them from a 'top-down approach' to a polycentric system, thus promoting citizens' position as equal partners in the communication structure. Thus, 'the traditionally passive role of receiving information and contributing little or nothing that is conferred on citizens, have changed dramatically with the advent of the new media … This passive role has been replaced by an informed and active audience due largely to the introduction of new technology'.[25] Although society is becoming more enlightened, challenging both media and governance, we must inquire if there is sufficient enlightenment, and in the right direction, to enable society to do so for holistic development.

Without ignoring the fact that a discourse on media and society could be approached from several and equally valid standpoints, I shall endeavor to strictly maintain a connection of my arguments in each section with their implications for postcolonial states.

African Media and the Philosophy of Communication

Media in Africa and African media are two closely related but different concepts; I describe media in Africa as all media organizations both local and foreign operating within Africa, while African media are media organizations based in Africa, owned by Africans, and operated to serve Africa.[26] This distinction has tremendous effects on African philosophy of communication, although I shall focus on the latter (African media) in this chapter. With a strong recognition of the heterogeneous nature of the African continent, as exemplified in the works of William Rugh on Arab media, Elizabeth Dadi on media in Ethiopia, and Wasserman and De Beer[27] on media in South Africa, among others, this work will employ the term 'African' not in a strict sense of singularity but as a general term which addresses the struggles for oneness in the midst of diversities. By asserting through careful examination of the nature of the media in Africa that activities in the state gave birth to them,[28] inferences have been drawn that the press (media) has been closely linked with the state and, as such, its role in state organization is fundamental.[29]

Scholars have identified the dynamism which has transformed knowledge into information, that is coded messages within a system of transmission and communication[30] which, in a sense, is an acknowledgement of the media and their epistemic roles, among other roles in societies. The recognition of the media's ability to inform, educate, and entertain spans time and space, as media have been prominent in shaping ideological, political, economic, and religious landscapes. Following Afolayan's[31] assertion that philosophy is a means of interrogating human relationships with their surroundings, together with the various fundamental issues and problems they throw up for them, we may infer that communication raises fundamental issues, as well as problems, within societies. These attributes qualify communication to undergo philosophical scrutiny, which is described as philosophy of communication. Philosophy of communication straddles two important disciplines (philosophy and communication) and has been studied from the perspectives of linguistics and communication itself. Although claimed to be a rather difficult area of study in definition and clarification, it is popularly held that communication underlies all disciplines.

What then is an African philosophy of communication? To begin with, we must note that African philosophy of communication is a sub-set of both philosophy of communication and African philosophy. Given this fact, African philosophy of communication may be defined as critical and systematic reflections, focusing on philosophical issues of pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial communication landscapes in Africa. African philosophy of communication is premised on Africa's concept of a society. By placing a premium on the identities, images, and characters of actors, it is armed with critical and analytic skills to decipher what is being communicated and how such communications could and/or should be interpreted. It is rooted in cultural values such as truth, empathy, self-worth, and human dignity, commonly cherished

by Africans and ensuring that communication promotes the good of the society.[32] The foregoing presupposes that philosophies of communication held by African media require scrutiny. Pre-colonial philosophy of communication in Africa can be described as a philosophy of symbiotic reciprocity, captured in a Yoruba proverb which says, '*bu fun mi, ki n bu fun e ni opolo nke l'odo*', meaning: 'what frogs at the river continually say is: water me and I will water you in return'. This philosophy was developed due to, on one hand, the communitarian and interdependent nature of pre-colonial African societies and, on the other hand, the influences of traders, explorers, and missionaries, whose business relationships raised issues of language and were tackled with traditional modes of communications such as objectifics, signs, signals, and music, among others.[33] Wilson maintains that media in traditional systems functioned as part of the larger sociopolitical organization, reporting on and criticizing organs within the system, issuing directives from the legitimate, or in some cases titular, head, and providing education in the areas of the norms and mores of the society, stimulating the emotions and generally providing the light to innovations and helping their diffusion.[34]

African media in the colonial era were largely designed to serve the colonialists, at the expense of the society (their colonies). Communication in that era was built on the self–other philosophy, which bred complexes in order to achieve conformity with colonists' standards. In his discussion of media in Tanzania during the colonial era, Matumaini notes that 'apart from the missionaries' papers, the government used newspapers to defend their interests. The contents of the papers included weather forecast news, news from their home country with their European neighbors and local news from Tanganyika and Zanzibar'.[35] In Nigeria, among other media, broadcasting began with a radio repeater station established in Lagos as an outlet of the British Broadcasting Corporation, with the primary objective of transmitting colonialists' native programs to their colony.[36] Here also, media failed to serve the purpose of the masses. Similar cases of colonial governments setting up media to communicate among themselves and mobilize for followership are recorded in Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa, among other African states.[37] Also, since not many were literate enough to read newspapers, the colonial press basically served urban elites.

Responding to the postcolonial situation of the media, the Yaounde Declaration[38] affirms that 'the current communication structure still conforms to the old colonial patterns and not to the needs and aspirations of the African people'. In line with this, Momoh maintains that the three traditional functions of the press are, again, a one-way traffic flowing from the direction of rulers and elites towards the ruled and the people.[39] For him, the press in postcolonial times informs, educates, and entertains to shield and protect the governors and elites in a process that mesmerizes the people and hold them spellbound. He avers that: 'the people need bread as they are hungry, but the mass media are standing by to inform the people that there is no bread,

educate them on why there is no bread and how they can cope with hunger, and finally, to entertain them so they'll forget about hunger and bread'. Although Momoh[40] wrote at a period when African leadership was largely characterized by military rule, the situation has not improved much in democratic regimes. However, it is being challenged by the new media, which provide a public sphere for the masses to vent their worries. Sadly, the Internet availability that is expected to aid this movement remains a challenge.

Ideally, globalization should stimulate African media to be guided by philosophies of difference, utility, and analysis, where difference would portray the uniqueness of African media in their obligations to societies both within and outside the continent. In this scenario, utility would present their ingenuity as they explore the gains of technological innovations within the global village, and analysis or scrutiny would come to bear as they carefully evaluate and domesticate information and communication in an atmosphere of freedom as the fourth estate of the realm. However, currently, African media are guided by philosophies of dependence and ego.

On dependence, I have argued that 'the relationship between Africa and the West, implies that (Africa as) the "Other", also variously described as the "world's poorest nations", "the debtors", "the recipients" and "former colonies" are forced to a life that strives to be like the West, replicating what their masters represent, thus promoting Western consciousness as global consciousness'.[41] No thanks to hegemonic influences on African media, this 'dogma of inferiority which pervades the Continent and makes her people revere Western-oriented ideas, products and services among others, above her own is a third culture which must be squarely dealt with'.[42]

The ego-based African philosophy of communication showcases an ethics-based standpoint which manifests in multiple dimensions. First, it defeats the utility principle which operated in the pre-colonial era, as African media organizations struggle to transmit on cable, identifying global audiences as their major target as against their primary objective of serving their local, national, and/or continental audiences. Second, it fails in the promotion of states' cohesion, a duty which African media owe societies. By implication, African media are largely compliant with Western-based principles in the name of civilization and globalization. Considering how 'mediascapes in Africa bring afore, the disjunctures, the separateness and the uniqueness of challenges facing media organizations in various parts of Africa, there is a high tendency that States may vary in their ethical dispositions'.[43]

In view of the necessary connections between language and society (with the characteristic nature of being a culturally conventional tool of power[44]), a major linguistic problem in the African philosophy of communication is that of defining the extent to which meanings can be communicated across cultures without distortion.[45] Observing the operation modes of African media in postcolonial states, based on their strong reliance on non-indigenous language, Hallen surmises that:

> once one recognizes the weakness of the empirical constraints placed upon the communication of meanings between two languages that may historically have no cause to share a single cognate in common, what exactly is the *objective* basis upon which we assign virtually literal accuracy to theoretical translation?[46]

The philosophy of communication currently held by African media is based more on a neo-colonial mindset constituted by relics of colonialism where information, entertainment, and enlightenment standards are set by the 'civilized' and 'developed', rather than the postmodern stance, which criticizes the status quo with the objective of arriving at more pragmatic grounds for African media performance. This in turn calls for a need 'to turn the prison of language to a house of conceptual enrichment' via 'conceptual decolonization',[47] a role which African media must play. Thus, an African philosophy of communication is central to understanding communicative actions in postmodern culture and has a major task of intellectually strategizing to decolonize concepts, ideologies, and communication itself, seeking to uproot anti-nationalist and neo-colonialist intellectualism for the fulfillment of existential necessities.

African Media Policies in Postcolonial Times

Policies are vital, particularly in terms of long-term goals and objectives, although they may have operational implications of short-term significance. Tony Momoh clarifies that a media policy is embedded in communication policy of states.[48] Communication policies are a set of principles and norms established to guide the behavior of communication systems.[49] While communication policy involves the total mobilization of all structures of human interaction, information exchanges, and sharing of life experiences in a society, media policy includes all kinds of proposals and strategies used by governments, media corporations, international policy institutions, as well as organizations and individuals in the media sector. Despite marked differences among states, all media policies possess a set of elements such as goals and objectives, values, or criteria by which they are recognized and defined, content and communication services to which the policy applies, the different distribution services, and policy measures or means of implementation. Thus, a media policy is a coherent set of principles and norms established to provide guidelines to relate the principles and values of the societies to existing and prospective opportunities of communication in those societies.

Focusing primarily on media policies of African states in postcolonial times, trends have shown that in most parts of Africa media-policy formulations have not followed patterns and definitions of the kind of society hoped to be built. Consequently, Mailafiya claims that 'for the mass media in developing countries to play their proper roles in preserving the cultural identity of their nations and to curtail the threat from foreign media, they must be guided by well-articulated principles'.[50]

Matumaini[51] notes three main phases in the evolution of media policy in Africa.

The first was an emerging communication policy from 1920 to 1945, which was characterized by a transition from a period of virtually no official guidelines where anyone could establish a press outlet and say whatever they wanted. The period had a general policy of media freedom interfered with by the emergence of electronic media which gave rise to the worrisome need to define media ownership, control, and benefits to society. Media policies of this period were characteristically technology-driven rather than public-oriented.

The second period, from 1945 to 1990, was guided by the public-service media paradigm, dominated by socio-political issues, questioning the roles of the media and how media were used as a catalyst for the Second World War. The third period, the1990s, was characterized by convergence and the interlinking of different forms of media, concentration of ownership, and increased toleration of monopolies.

A fourth phase[52] which has emerged since the end of the 1990s is the globalized and hegemonized one in which African media policies were designed for global markets as against local markets and in the interest of hegemonies in international politics. While not ignoring the necessity for states to factor in globalization in their activities, the local has been widely trampled, thereby rendering the objectives of media policies in Africa useless.

Across Africa, there are similar records of media policies void of public interest; for instance, in Tanzania, lack of clear-cut media policies, press censorship, ownership issues, lack of philosophy (whether to prioritize profit or social responsibility), regulation issues, and legal prescriptions have been presented as banes behind society-oriented media policies.[53] Opubor, Akingbulu, and Ojebode present the Nigerian situation, stating that 'broadcast media policies and their impact have not played out precisely in line with theoretical expectations as the authoritarian dispensations have brought greater diversification than civilian dispensations'.[54] Chibita[55] reports on the Ugandan situation, where militarized media policies, unethical operations due to political vacuums caused by power struggles, strong government reliance on the media for political opinions, complications of media policies within constitution of states and, in the more recent past, a consciousness of the competitive nature of political space and technological development, have resulted in a shift toward firmer media freedom. The Kenyan situation reflects a failure to involve the masses in decision-making processes, problems of legislative melee, problems of window dressing (where policies included in constitutions have not been put into effect), and policy vacuum among others.[56] A strong attachment to colonial heritages, cultural impoverishment, a marginalization of local languages, technological incompetence, and a lack of public accountability are presented as obstacles to people-centered media policies in Ghana.[57]

Indeed, 'many African national leaders are quick to say they favor liberating communication policies, however, in practice, the broader environment does not match the rhetoric'.[58] Zambia is faced with a number of challenges, including a lack of policy clarity, lip-service to media freedom, public interest, and the downplaying of the welfare of women, among others. Recognizing that even silence is itself a form of communication,[59] Chibita notes that 'sometimes not articulating a policy is in itself policy'.[60] Contrary to the needs of society, African media have followed one or more of these principles on various occasions and leadership dispensations. Accordingly, Berger,[61] like other scholars, clearly identifies major trends in media policy across different political dispensations, namely: a lack of consistent, clearly articulated and documented policy; a level of ambiguity in the wording of legislation; a tendency to retain outmoded colonial legislation and to recycle aspects of repealed laws; deliberate efforts to curtail editorial independence in the laws; inadequate provisions for converting the state broadcaster into a public broadcaster; and so on. These are clear indications of how legacies of colonialism continually determine media policies from the Horn to the Cape of Africa. The foregoing completely neglects what previous centuries have taught, according to Dunn and Boafo,[62] who posit that communications policy making should not be primarily driven by the inexorable roll-out of technological innovations, but should be needs-based and should emanate from conscious critical analyses of the strategic needs of people within their policy environments.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter began by establishing the similar features of three terms: 'post-independence', 'postmodern', and 'postcolonial', arguing that they are periods of contemporary intellectual movements developed to question lingering Western influences on Africa's social, political, economic, and ideological spheres, in particular in developing states. By clarifying that media in Africa differ from African media, the chapter diagnoses a lack of well-grounded philosophy of communication and a media-policy vacuum as the fundamental problems hindering African media from serving the society as they ought to. It was also argued in this work that a philosophy should underlie policies and as such African philosophy of communication (made up of basic components and shared values cherished by Africans) should be the basis for media policies in the continent. Arguments raised in each section of this work show clearly that conventional media across African regions have succeeded only in limited ways to bridge the communication gaps between the elites and the grassroots. This is due to difficulties faced in mobilizing for social and political development. Conversely, as a public sphere that is powered by individuals in societies, new and social media are beginning to bridge such gaps left by conventional media and have been impactful as regards the economic,

political, and moral life of societies in postcolonial states, despite marked shortcomings (of new and social media) which will be subject to scrutiny in future researches. While McQuail raises uncertainties in the future because of the new social phenomenon in communication policy derived from advancement in technology and the impact of globalization,[63] Matumaini argues that the current general goal of communication policy is still the same as has emerged since the 1930s; that is, to serve the public interest.[64] Matumaini nonetheless argues that the content of the public interest has changed as economic welfare has become more important than political and socio-cultural welfare. A careful observation of the content of the public interest in the twenty-first century shows that it has witnessed dramatic transformations which not only include economic welfare, but also a combination of political and socio-cultural welfare, among others. The argument here is that all forms of welfare are interlinked as politics, which have been seen as a great determinant of social, cultural, and economic welfare; in the same vein, societies and cultures have also largely influenced politics and the economy. More than in the past, societies in this century are faced with security challenges which ultimately define directions in other sectors of their lives. Thus, African media must take into account these challenges if they are to carry out their duties to society as expected.

Notes

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7. For details on this, see Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 1985 [1978]).
8. The following publications explicitly address the issues: Gayatri Spivak, *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics* (New York: Methuen, 1987); Vumbi Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Kwame Appiah, *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); and Homi Bhabba, *The Location of Culture* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).
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10. Barry Hallen, *African Philosophy: The Analytic Approach* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc., 2006), 303.
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13. Lai Oso, "A Political Economy of Indigenous Language Press in Nigeria," in *Indigenous Language Media in Africa*, ed. Abiodun Salawu (Lagos: Center for Black and African Arts and Civilization, 2006), 175.
14. For further details on media and society see David Swanson and Dan Nimmo, *New Directions in Political Communication: A Resource Book* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1990); Paul D' Angelo and Matthew Lombard, "Power of the Press: The Effect of Press Frames in Political Campaign News on Media Perceptions," *Atlantic Journal of Communication* 16 (2008): 1–32; and Vian Bakir, *Torture, Intelligence and Surveillance in the War on Terror: Agenda-Building Struggles* (Famham: Ashgate, 2013).
15. George Nyabuga, *Mediatising Politics and Democracy: Making Sense of the Role of the Media in Kenya* (Nairobi: Media Focus Foundation in Africa, 2012), 8.
16. Dennis McQuail, *Mass Communication Theory*, 5th ed. (Los Angeles: Sage, 2005), 81–83.
17. Des Wilson, Traditional Systems of Communication in Modern African Development: An Analytical Viewpoint, *Africa Media Review* 1, no. 2 (1987): 89.
18. Nyasha Madzingira, "Culture, Communication and Development in Africa," A paper prepared for the African Itinerant College for Culture and Development (African Institute for Economic Development and Planning, 2001).
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20. Nyasha Madzingira, "Culture, Communication and Development in Africa," 10.
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22. See Sharon A. Omotoso, "Political Communication in Africa: Towards a Peace Policy," in *Communication, Peace and Conflict*, ed. Isaac Albert, Olusola Isola, and Oyewo Olusola (Institute of African Studies: University of Ibadan, 2015), 329–30.
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24. Frank Windeck, *Political Communication* in *Sub-Saharan Africa and the Role of New Media* (Berlin: International Reports, 2010), 19.
25. Sharon A. Omotoso, "Deploying African Philosophy of Political Communication for Functional Leadership in Africa," *Journal on African Philosophy* 8 (2013): 56.
26. My definition of African media here is postcolonially oriented and does not follow literal descriptions of African media as the traditional means of communication.
27. These cited works are samples in recognition of the existence of multiplicity of media experiences in Africa. William Rugh, "Do National Political Systems

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30. See Jean F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*: *A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984 [1979]).
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33. See Dennis L. Wilcox, *Mass Media in Black Africa*: *Philosophy and Control* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975); Frank Ugboajah, "Oramedia," in *Mass Communication*, *Culture and Society in West Africa*, ed. F.O. Ugboajah (Oxford: Hans Zell-Saur, 1985); Ernest Mrutu, *Media and Society in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Ecoprint, 2003); and Joseph Faniran, *Foundations of African Communication* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2008).
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35. Joseph Matumaini, "Research on National Communication Policy in Africa and Tanzania," *African Communication Research* 3, no. 1 (2010): 11.
36. Atilade Atoyebi, "The Origin of Radio Nigeria," in *Radio Nigeria: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, ed. T. Amadi and A. Atoyebi (Abuja: Northwood Resources Ltd, 2001).
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42. Ibid., 120.
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51. Joseph Matumaini, "Research on National Communication Policy in Africa and Tanzania," *African Communication Research* 3, no. 1 (2010): 7–8.
52. This phase was not captured by Joseph Matumaini; it is my intervention in the light of observed recent trends.
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CHAPTER 52

Between Diaspora and Homeland: The Study of Africa and the African Diaspora in the USA

Michael O. West

Diaspora studies is in vogue. Perusal of the literature on diasporas over the past quarter century reveals a pattern: diaspora studies is not an equal-opportunity investigator. Some diaspora communities have received more scholarly attention than others. The better studied ones include the Armenian, Chinese, Greek, South Asian (mainly Indian), and Jewish diasporas.[1] The African diaspora too has been a major beneficiary of the emerging intellectual trend.[2]

The renaissance in diaspora studies (and it is just that, a rebirth, not a birth) is not just a function of intellectual abstraction.[3] Diaspora studies, rather, has also been driven by events outside the academy, notably the affairs of state. The end of the Cold War, which is to say the defeat of the USSR by the United States, albeit without a military showdown, was an indispensable precondition for the diaspora studies renaissance. In this, as in other matters, the rising of the one was accompanied by, and indeed predicated on, the falling of another. To be precise, the rise of diaspora studies coincided with the decline of area studies. These two (area studies and diaspora studies) are veritable bookends of the Cold War,[4] which, one South Asian writer has astutely noted, was 'cold for only the rich in the privileged places of the planet'.[5]

Area studies emerged hard on the heels of the Second World War, in the context of both the Cold War and the decolonization of empires, notably in Asia and Africa.[6] It followed, willy-nilly, that area studies was based in the

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USA, rather than in the old imperial centers of Europe.[7] In and out of the US state apparatus, the Cold War and decolonization highlighted the paucity of knowledge about the non-Western world. This intellectual deficit was further highlighted by the rise of the Third World, so conspicuously announced by the Asian-African Conference of 1955, better known as the Bandung Conference, which the USA opposed as an anti-Western conclave.[8] Two years later, in 1957, Ghana became independent.[9] The Ghanaian example proved to be politically contagious, and within a few years colonial rule had formally ended in the greater part (although not all) of the continent.[10] Against this backdrop, it is hardly accidental that the African Studies Association, the leading professional body of area-studies scholars specializing in African affairs in the USA, was also founded in 1957.[11] Indeed, 1957 was a red-banner year for area studies, which was a partnership between the state (the US state), foundations and the academy, politically, financially, and intellectually. Spectacularly, the year 1957 also marked the launching, by the USSR, of Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite. The response to Sputnik, especially, was immediate in the USA, with equally immediate benefits for area studies.[12] Among other things, Congress passed the National Defense Education Act of 1958, which greatly increased state subsidies to area studies under the Title VI program.

Meanwhile, area studies specialists in the academy had decisions to make. Those decisions included, crucially, the relationship between area studies and the disciplines. Bluntly stated, it came down to a choice between autonomy and appendage. Would area studies become an autonomous academic unit in its own right, akin to a department? Or, would area studies become an appendage, more or less a fully owned subsidiary of the disciplines? The decision was not preordained. The tale of the post-Enlightenment Western academy is a tale of fragmentation in the organization of knowledge. It is a story of philosophy seceding from religion, of the natural sciences disaffiliating from philosophy, of the social sciences taking leave of the natural sciences, and of the emergence of the humanities. These divisions, in turn, begat the disciplines: biology, sociology, history, and so forth.[13] In fine, the academic past suggested the possibility of autonomy for area studies, if autonomy from the disciplines was what the founders of area studies desired. But it was not. In the end, the area studies founders opted for appendage over autonomy. In so doing, they reaffirmed the hegemony of the disciplines within the academy.[14]

Within area studies, the Africa section stood out on several counts.[15] One is that African area studies (or African studies, for short) did not exactly pioneer the study of Africa in the USA. Long before the advent of African studies, the study of Africa had gained some traction in the USA, but under Jim Crow or apartheid conditions. The US pioneers of the study of Africa were largely black, and they were based largely in the historically black universities, or else were independent scholars without academic affiliations. These

predominantly black pioneers were also largely excluded from the new, Cold War-inspired field of African studies, which was centered largely in historically white universities.[16]

Significant, too, were the epistemic differences between the black pioneers and the African studies specialists, dubbed 'Africanists', a term the black pioneers never used. In effect, the pioneers practiced what is now called African diaspora studies. Theirs was a transcontinental undertaking that linked the study of peoples of African descent outside of Africa to the study of the African continent. By contrast, the Africanists took as their assignment the African continent, and more particularly Sub-Saharan Africa. Peoples of African descent outside of Africa figured only marginally, when they figured at all, in the new Africanist scholarship. The same was largely true of Africa north of the Sahara, which the black pioneers had claimed as African patrimony, especially ancient Egypt.[17] Conversely, the Africanist paradigm (if not all Africanist scholars) conceded North Africa to the Orientalists, members of an older academic guild that served as something of a model for the Africanists.[18]

The epistemic exclusion of the African diaspora from African studies was rather curious, given the intellectual genealogy of some of the Africanist founders. Consider, for example, Melville J. Herskovits. A white anthropologist, Herskovits became, in 1957, the founding president of the African Studies Association (ASA), which, for all its waxing and waning, is still the foremost professional body of Africanists in the USA. Formerly based at historically black Howard University, Herskovits was a leading scholar of the African diaspora.[19] His 1941 publication, *The Myth of the Negro Past*[20] (originally written as one of several monographs for *An American Dilemma*, Gunnar Myrdal's summative wartime work on the black condition in the USA[21]) remains an iconic text of African diaspora studies.[22]

Seen in this light, another scenario was possible. Indeed, the reality of Herskovits's own past was suggestive of such an alternative scenario. In this imaginary world of US African studies, the ASA would not have been formed. Similarly, the journals that emerged alongside the association (like the *African Studies Review* and the *International Journal of African Historical Studies*) would not have been created. In short, the postwar interest in Africa would not have resulted in something new. Rather, it would have resulted in a revitalization of something old. The outcome would have been a new lease on life for a black-created body, the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, which had been formed back in 1915, more than four decades before the ASA.[23] Likewise, the *Journal of Negro History*, the house organ of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, would have become the outlet of choice for the postwar renaissance in the study of Africa. But this alternative scenario was not to be. Instead of continuity, there was discontinuity. The resulting rupture epistemically separated the study of continental Africa from the study of peoples of African descent outside of Africa, the study of the African homeland from the study of the African diaspora.

Into this broken household ethnic studies was born, a decade after the consolidation of African studies and area studies more broadly. Ethnic studies amounted to an indictment of the academy in general and area studies in particular. Ethnic studies moved in sync with the Revolution of 1968, that catch-all moniker for the global revolts, insurgencies, and antinomian tendencies so manifest in and around the year 1968. It was a year of momentous marches, 1968, including on campus. Figuratively, and literally too, black studies marched at the head of ethnic studies, helping to make straight the way for such academic coadjutors as Latino(a), women's, gender, and sexuality studies. Student-led, insurgent, irreverent, black studies embodied everything that African studies, still striving for academic respect under the yoke of disciplines, was not.[24] Invoking that dreaded epithet of the Revolution of 1968, the black studies militants announced that African studies was not relevant. (Everything, and everyone, was judged by their relevance; relevance to the anticipated revolution.) For the most part, the African studies specialists responded to the black studies challenge with scorn. The Africanists looked askance at the non-degreed autodidacts who, academic lore had it, were swarming into black studies with the avowed aim of ending the 'cultural genocide' against African peoples.[25] Overlooked amid the sophistry were the very accomplished scholars, most of them black, who were attracted to black studies.[26] The result was alienation between African studies and black studies. Rare though the occasions were, however, the African studies and black studies twain did meet.

Predictably, almost inevitably, in the fateful year of 1968 a black studies caucus emerged within the ASA. (Black caucuses were also formed in this period in most of the professional associations centered on the social sciences and humanities.) Throwing down the gauntlet to the ASA, the black studies caucus demanded (what else?) a relevant African studies. A relevant African studies meant two things, one intellectual and the other political. Intellectually, a relevant African studies meant putting the diaspora back into the study of Africa, which is to say repudiating a key pillar of the Africanist paradigm. Politically, the black caucus argued, the ASA could make itself relevant by supporting African liberation, most notably the armed struggles then being waged against white-settler colonialism in Southern Africa (in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia) and against Portuguese colonialism (in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique). To top it off, the black caucus also called for a racial redistribution of power and resources, which would have meant more positions and research funds for black scholars, within the ASA as well as in the individual African studies centers in the universities.[27]

The Africanists, most of whom were white, rejected the demands of the black caucus, taking refuge behind the veil of scholarly objectivity and dispassionate research. The rejection meant that the Africanist center, or the ASA, would barely hold. Indeed, it almost fell apart, to paraphrase Chinua Achebe, author of the novel *Things Fall Apart*, the title of which drew on a line by

the poet W.B. Yeats.[28] (Achebe's subsequent career in the US academy was made possible by the black studies and African studies phenomena, hard on the heels of his participation in the failed attempt to carve out an independent nation-state, Biafra, from Nigeria.[29]) Incensed by the rebuff, a large part of the black caucus walked out of the ASA and formed a rival body, the African Heritage Studies Association.[30] It is noteworthy that, instead of joining forces with an established formation, namely the Association for the Study of Afro-American Life and History (as the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History was now called), the black caucus followed the ASA in staking out an autonomous existence. The black studies founders would similarly shun the Association for the Study of Afro-American Life and History, now thrice spurned, and form a separate professional body, the National Council of Black Studies. Thus were African studies and black studies solidified for a generation, separately, and indeed unequally too. Until, that is, the end of the Cold War, which had served as the glue to the area studies coalition of state, foundation, and academy.

In the new world order, it seemed that area studies, rather like the Soviet Union, was also coming to an end, its raison d'être now in question, its funding equally questionable. The US state, as befitting its increasing neo-liberal orientation, was retreating from area studies, with foundation and academic officials showing corresponding signs of weariness, epistemic and fiduciary.[31] Entered diaspora studies. The new world order, with its emphasis on globalization (which is to say the expansion of the capitalist mode of production and exchange into formerly restricted territories) was more receptive to diaspora studies than area studies had been. These, then, were among the conditions that gave rise to the renaissance in diaspora studies.

To a large extent, the renaissance is a function of the rediscovery of diasporas by area studies, in the new post-Cold War environment. That certainly seems to be the case with African diaspora studies. Not for nothing did so many in the forefront of African diaspora studies come out of African studies, as evidenced, for instance, in the founding of the Association for the Study of the Worldwide African Diaspora (ASWAD). In opting for an independent and separate existence, ASWAD too followed a well-trodden path, once again bypassing a potential amalgamation with the Association of the Study of African American Life and History, the latest nomenclature for the scholarly body founded in 1915.

Meanwhile, events outside the academy seemed to offer a flicker of hope to a declining area studies. The war on terror, launched in the wake of the 2001 attacks with hijacked planes on US civilian and military facilities, created new demands for specialized linguistic and cultural knowledge of selected world areas, with a focus on those with large Muslim populations. The resulting reopening of the monetary spigot was instrumental in helping area studies to regain some of its former balance. Even this unexpected bonus, however, was highly contested. Some area studies scholars decried the fact that much of

the new money emanated from the military and intelligence branches of the government, instead of the Department of Education, previously a key disburser of government funding for area studies. Yet for all the florid rhetoric, including talk about a clash of civilizations,[32] Al Qaeda is no Soviet Union. The same is true of the Islamic State, or ISIS, which at the time of writing has overtaken Al Qaeda as a focus of US (and more broadly Western) political, military, and intellectual wrath. In sum, the windfall for area studies from the war on terror is unlikely to last. Projecting forward, the general trend likely will be one of diaspora studies gaining at the expense of area studies.

Ethnic studies, which necessarily is about the study of diasporas, even if only within a national framework, never shared area studies' epistemic aversion to diaspora studies. Left to be determined is the nature of the relationship between these three (area studies, ethnic studies, and diaspora studies) and whether, or in what form, each will survive.

So far as the African diaspora is concerned, the question inevitably arises: Which one? It is a very pertinent question because, in truth, there is not one but multiple African diasporas. Among spatially dispersed communities, the African diaspora is among the most disaggregated and diverse. Historically, there are two great branches of the African diaspora. One in the East and the other in the West; East and West, that is, of the African continent. The eastern branch is in Asia and the western one in the Americas and, to a lesser extent, Europe. The African diaspora in the East is much older than the one in the West. Both branches are further sub-divided along various national, regional, linguistic, cultural, and religious lines. The study of this very diverse African diaspora is also very uneven, with the western branch receiving far more scholarly attention than its eastern counterpart. To be sure, a number of scholars, over many years, have labored in the vineyard that is the study of the eastern African diaspora.[33] However, the ranks of such scholars are rather thin. The obstacles are numerous, among them a dearth of competence in various Asian languages.

In recent decades, the western African diaspora has become even more complex with significant migrations from Africa to Western Europe and North America. Today, for example, visitors to certain parts of Houston, Texas may be forgiven for mistaking it for a Nigerian city, say Lagos, or Enugu. Just in the last decade, or so, large numbers of Zimbabweans have migrated to Britain in the wake of the implosion of their country's economy.[34] In France, African migrants and their scions, from south and north of the Sahara, now pose what some (xenophobic observers) describe as an existential crisis for the French Republic.[35] There is also the question of relations between the new African migrants to the West and older and more long-standing African diaspora communities in the receiving societies. Often, those relations have been marked by social distance, and have even been known to be strained.[36] Relevant too is the connection, which again is often difficult, between the new migrants and their respective national homelands.[37] In fine,

the African diaspora is diverse, very diverse. So diverse, in fact, that there is a real sense in which one can speak of the African diasporas, in the plural. Even so, the singular (African diaspora) has a certain heuristic value, historical continuity, and political imperative that I wish to maintain for the purposes of this chapter.

The African diaspora has never possessed the shared social artifacts around which many diaspora communities traditionally cohere; namely, a common language, religion, or culture, or an actual or imaginary national homeland, as distinct from an entire continent. The African diaspora has always lacked a spatial entity akin to, say, Armenia, Greece, Palestine, or China. It is, and has always been, a genuine Babel, the African diaspora. Yet amid all this multifariousness, a unifying theme, if not a unifying tongue, would emerge. In the form it has come down to us, the story of this unifying theme, this Pan-African concord of modernity, began with the first western African diaspora. It is the story, in other words, of the African diaspora that was called into being in the Americas, largely by plantation crops, which is to say the crops of modernity and some of the key drivers of the Industrial Revolution, chief among them sugar, rice, tobacco, cotton, coffee, and cocoa.[38]

Whatever it may have lacked (which was most things, beginning with freedom) the first western African diaspora possessed, and that in abundance, the crucial element in the making of diasporic consciousness: adversity. Above all else, adversity (oppression, exclusion) is the glue of diaspora. It is a sorrow song, the song of diaspora; at once a popular conveyor of oppression or exclusion and a call to action. It often doubles, the diaspora song, as a nostalgic tune of homeland lost and a concomitant yearning for return, physically or spiritually, or both. One encounters such a phenomenon in the biblical psalms, a trope originally associated with the Jewish diaspora but one that would later be adopted by other diasporas, including the first western African diaspora:

> By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept, when we remembered Zion. We hanged our harps on the willows in the midst thereof. For there they that carried us away captive required of us a song; and they that wasted us required of us mirth, saying, Sing us one of the songs of Zion. How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?[39]

Set to music by reggae artists, spiritual descendants of Rastafari and iconic purveyors of the story of global black adversity, this particular psalm would gain great currency worldwide.[40] A key twist was that the reggae songsters replaced the biblical 'Lord's song' with 'King Alpha's song', a reference to the Rastafarian deity, the late Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie.[41]

The Guyanese-born Walter Rodney, eminent scholar of the African world, offered that 'the West Indies has made a unique contribution to the history of suffering in the world'.[42] (He had in mind Caribbean people of both African and South Asian descent.) Of course, comparative suffering is not

a recognized field of study, and probably ought not to be. Another Caribbean organic intellectual, Aimé Césaire, posited that 'no race has a monopoly on beauty, on intelligence, on strength'.[43] Césaire's list could have been expanded to include suffering. But while all may have suffered, they have not all suffered equally. It is probably not altogether unfair or inaccurate to say that, in the making of the modern world, the first western African diaspora (not just in the Caribbean but everywhere in the Americas) has suffered more than most. It is this shared suffering that provided the raw material for the making of modern African diasporic consciousness. Instead of linguistic, cultural, or religious concordance (which was largely absent, at the outset, anyway) the first western African diaspora was distinguished by common experiences of oppression, and the cultures of resistance fashioned from those experiences.

Ideologically, the defining contribution of the first western African diaspora was an African worldview. Postmodernist scholars now call it the 'invention' and 'imagination' of Africa.[44] It was a spatially unbounded project, the African worldview. It conceived of peoples of African descent not in ethnic, national, imperial, regional, or even continental terms, but in global ones. Thus was born the idea of Africans as a global people with a set of congruent interests. This was a novel conception of international black solidarity, one centered on common African ancestry and shared historical experiences of enslavement, colonialism, and racial oppression; that is, the degradation of blackness and Africanness. In a sharp riposte, the African worldview envisioned a world free of human bondage and racial oppression.

The African worldview emerged during the second half of the eighteenth century, amid the interstices of two other iconic intellectual and cultural movements of that era, notably the Evangelical Revival and the European Enlightenment.[45] For better or worse, in its foundations the African worldview betrayed deep Anglocentric Protestant biases.[46] From the Evangelical Revival, the African worldview derived an essential principle: monogenesis. That is to say, the oneness and equality of the human family, a principle for which its exponents found support in biblical scripture, most tellingly the passage declaring that God 'hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth'.[47] Declarations like these were a severe rebuke to polygenesis, the notion, born of the Enlightenment, that the various 'races' of mankind have different, and unequal, origins. Despite its association with such 'scientific racism', the Enlightenment also became a source of wisdom for the African worldview. Natural law, derived from the Enlightenment and deemed to be timeless and universally valid, emerged as a bulwark in support of human equality across the board, including racial equality.[48] It was the peculiar genius of the founders of the African worldview to fuse these two systems of thought (the Evangelical Revival and the Enlightenment, the sacred and the profane, the two at once contradictory and complementary) into a vision of universal black emancipation unbounded by space and time.

Such, then, are the origins of the political and intellectual projects that would later assume such appellations as Pan-Negroism, Pan-Africanism, and Black Internationalism.[49] The story of these projects is a saga of interlocution, much of it fraught and contested (as such encounters inevitably are) within and between the African diaspora and the African homeland. Over the past two centuries or so, since the emergence of the African worldview, these interlocutions have unfolded in and around various events, movements, and organizations. Some of the more iconic ones, to name a few, are the Haitian Revolution, the Universal Negro Improvement Association, the Pan-African Congresses, Négritude, the Communist International (which, although not a black or African-led movement, served as a important platform for Pan-African emancipatory thought and action in the years between the two world wars), the Organization of African Unity turned African Union, the global Black Power movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the South African-focused global anti-apartheid struggle in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Hip-Hop culture of the 1990s coming into the twenty-first century.

Historically, a distinguishing feature of the movements associated with the African worldview has been an insistence on a close correlation between political struggles and intellectual pursuits. This has never been, one should hasten to add, a demand that research should subserve the political agenda of any particular organization or individual, which would be a travesty, propaganda masquerading as scholarship. It is to say, rather, that over time exponents of the African worldview have, in their varied literary expressions, forcefully and consistently called attention to the oppression of African peoples, with an explicit or implied demand for their liberation. In other words, the African worldview seeks to give voice to revolutionary and prophetic traditions of freedom inherent in the struggles of African peoples across space and time. These are the traditions to which well-known Pan-Africanist intellectuals like Edward Blyden, W.E.B. Du Bois and Kwame Nkrumah belong. They are also the traditions of less well-known and less well-published, but no less astute, Pan-Africanist intellectuals like Amy Jacques Garvey, Adelaide Caseley-Hayford, and Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti. 'They fought, they suffered—they are still fighting.'[50] Such was C.L.R. James's pithy summation of the modern experiences of African and African-descended peoples globally. Such, too, has been the leitmotif of much of the scholarship produced by exponents of the African worldview.

Historically, some of the key literary exponents of the African worldview were based in the USA. In the nineteenth century, these individuals mostly labored alone. However, as that century (which was so momentous in the modern global African experience, witnessing as it did the end of the Atlantic slave trade, the end of African slavery in the Americas, and the colonization of the greater part the African continent) drew to a close, new institutional networks focused in part on the African worldview began to emerge. One of the first such organizations was the American Negro Academy, founded

by Alexander Crummell, former missionary to Liberia, leading promoter of the African worldview, and mentor to the young W.E.B. Du Bois. Alas, the American Negro Academy did not long survive Crummell's death in 1898.[51] The most enduring institutional repository of the African worldview in the USA would turn out to be the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, under its original nomenclature. But, as we have seen, from the 1950s on the founders of both African studies and black studies studiously avoided institutional amalgamation with the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, and instead went their separate ways.

Times, however, have changed. The new academic order, with its emphasis on globalization, is less amenable to traditional area studies (including African studies), and perhaps ethnic studies, too (including black studies), and more accommodating to diaspora studies, including African diaspora studies.[52] For sure, the academic upheavals and contestations are far from over (they never are) and at this point there is no clear vision of what the future holds.[53] What is clear is that in the study of Africa, Africans and their far-flung descendants throughout the world, particularism, exceptionalism, and national historiography are no longer tenable. Equally untenable are elitist conceptions of black liberation struggles and androcentric narratives that elide the centrality of women in those struggles.[54] In all probability, the future study of Africa, homeland and diaspora alike, will be transnational, transcontinental, and transoceanic.[55] It will be, in the language of St. Clair Drake, one of its outstanding practitioners, the study of 'black folk here and there'.[56]

Notes

1. These trends can be followed in the journal *Diaspora*, which began publishing in 1991, but has since gone out of business. The generically titled *Diaspora Studies*, which is still being published, is largely (although not exclusively) concerned with the Indian diaspora.
2. In addition to an ever increasing number of monographs and edited collections, the renaissance in African diaspora studies has spawned a number of new journals, including *African Diaspora*, *Black Diaspora Review*, and *Contours: A Journal of the African Diaspora*. While most of these new journals focus on the humanities and social sciences, not all do. Thus, there is an *African Diaspora Journal of Mathematics.*
3. For a useful introduction to the new literature on diaspora, see Ato Quayson, and Girish Daswani, eds., *A Companion to Diaspora and Transnationalism* (Chichester, UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2013).
4. Masao Miyoshi, and Harry Harootunian, eds., *Learning Places: The Afterlives of Area Studies* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).
5. Cited in Pankaj Mishra, "Pakistan's Writers: Living in a Minefield," *New York Review of Books*, October 13, 2011, 39.
6. Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).

7. Wendell Clark Bennett, *Area Studies in American Universities* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1951).
8. Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference* (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1994, first published 1956); G.H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966); and Christopher J. Lee, ed., *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010).
9. For a personal account of the Ghanaian nationalist struggle by its best-known leader, see Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York: Nelson, 1957).
10. Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
11. William G. Martin, and Michael O. West, eds., *Out of One, Many Africas: Reconstructing the Study and Meaning of Africa* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999).
12. Zuoyue Wang, *In Sputnik's Shadow: The Presidents Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008).
13. Open the Social Sciences, *Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).
14. David Szanton, ed., *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Robert H. Bates, V.Y. Mudimbe, and Jean F. O'Barr, eds., *Africa and the Disciplines*: *The Contributions of Research in Africa to the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Toyin Falola, and Christian Jennings, eds., *Africanizing Knowledge*: *African Studies across the Disciplines* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002); and Tejumola Olaniyan, and James H. Sweet, eds., *The African Diaspora and the Disciplines* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).
15. On the emergence and evolution of African studies, see: Jane I. Guyer, *African Studies in the United States: A Perspective* (Atlanta: African Studies Association Press, 1996); Tiyambe Zeleza, *Manufacturing African Studies and Crises* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1997); Martin, and West, eds., *Out of One, Many Africas.*
16. Martin, and West, eds., *Out of One, Many Africas.*
17. The Egyptology strain was always a key one in the insurgent black history movement. For a summation of this considerable and uneven literature, in time and space, see St. Clair Drake, *Black Folk Here and There: An Essay in History and Anthropology*, 2 Vols. (Los Angeles: Center for Afro-American Studies, University of California, 1987 and 1990). The black Egyptology demarche would ultimately find its highest expression in the work of the Senegalese historian and polymath Cheikh Anta Diop. The most readily available précis of Diop's work in English is Cheikh Anta Diop, *The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality*, trans. Mercer Cook (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1974).
18. The iconic critique of Western Orientalist thought is Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).
19. Jerry Gershenhorn, *Melville J. Herskovits and the Racial Politics of Knowledge* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004).
20. Melville J. Herskovits, *The Myth of the Negro Past* (New York: Harper, 1941).

21. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, 2 Vols. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944).
22. One of the first issues of the journal *Diaspora* carried an article about Herskovits. See Andrew Apter, "Herskovits's Heritage: Rethinking Syncretism in the African Diaspora," *Diaspora* 1, no. 3 (1991): 235–60.
23. August Meier, and Elliott Rudwick, *Black History and the Historical Profession, 1915–1980* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); Jacqueline Goggin, *Carter G. Woodson: A Life in Black History* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993); and Pero Gaglo Dagbovie, *The Early Black History Movement, Carter G. Woodson, and Lorenzo Johnston Greene* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007).
24. Stefan M. Bradley, *Harlem vs. Columbia University: Black Student Power in the Late 1960s* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009); Martha Biondi, *The Black Revolution on Campus* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); and Ibram H. Rogers, *The Black Campus Movement: Black Students and Racial Reconstruction in Higher Education, 1965–1972* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
25. Yosef Ben-Jochannan, *Cultural Genocide in the Black and African Studies Curriculum* (New York: The Author, 1972).
26. Armstead L. Robinson, Craig C. Foster, and Donald H. Ogilvie, eds., *Black Studies in the University: A Symposium* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); John W. Blassingame, ed., *New Perspectives on Black Studies* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Rojas Fabio, *From Black Power to Black Studies: How a Radical Social Movement Became an Academic Discipline* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); and Stanlie M. James, Frances Smith Foster, and Beverly Guy-Sheftall, eds., *Still Brave: The Evolution of Black Women's Studies* (New York: Feminist Press, 2009).
27. Martin, and West, eds., *Out of One, Many Africas.*
28. Chinua Achebe, *Things Fall Apart* (London: Heinemann, 1976, first published 1958).
29. On Achebe's account of his Biafran experience, written late in his life, see Chinua Achebe, *There was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra* (New York: Allen Lane, 2012).
30. On the intellectual and political journey of a leading architect of this breakaway, see James L. Conyers Jr., and Julius E. Thompson, eds., *Pan-African Nationalism in the Americas: The Life and Times of John Henrik Clarke* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2004); and Ahati N.N. Toure, *John Henrik Clarke and the Power of Africana History: Africalogical Quest for Decolonization and Sovereignty* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2009).
31. Miyoshi, and Harootunian, eds., *Learning Places.*
32. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
33. See, for example: John Hunwick, and Eve Troutt Powell, *The African Diaspora in the Mediterranean Lands of Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Marcus Wiener Publishers, 2002); Shihan de Silva Jayasuriya, and Richard Pankhurst, eds., *The African Diaspora in the Indian Ocean* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003); and Edward A. Alpers, *East Africa and the Indian Ocean* (Princeton, NJ: Marcus Wiener Publishers, 2009). For a comparison of slave trading, the key factor

in the making of both the eastern and western diasporas, see Patrick Manning, *Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental, and African Slave Trades* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

34. A recent issue of *African Diaspora*, 7, 1 (2014) was devoted to the Zimbabwean diaspora. Several other issues of this journal, which began publication in 2008, carry articles on the new Zimbabwean diaspora.
35. Trica Danielle Keaton, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, and Tyler Stovall, eds., *Black France/France Noire: The History and Politics of Blackness* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).
36. Alusine Jalloh, and Toyin Falola, eds., *The United States and West Africa: Interactions and Relations* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008).
37. Bahar Baser, *Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts: A Comparative Perspec*tive (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015).
38. The classic statement on the relationship between the enslavement of Africans and the first industrial revolution in Britain is Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). For a more recent statement on the relationship between slavery and capitalism in the USA, see Edward E. Baptist, *The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 2014).
39. Psalms 137:1–4 (King James Bible). Also called the Authorized Version, the King James Bible has always been the authorized version of pan-Africanist Bible thumpers, including the Rastafarians.
40. On the political roots of Rastafari, see Horace Campbell, *Rasta and Resistance: From Marcus Garvey to Walter Rodney* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1987). For the biblical basis of Rastafari, see Ken Post, "The Bible as Ideology: Ethiopianism in Jamaica, 1930–38," in *African Perspectives: Papers in the History, Politics and Economics of Africa Presented to Thomas Hodgkin*, ed. Christopher Allen, and R.W. Johnson (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970), 185–207.
41. The Rastafari quest for Zion, as seen in the experiences of those Rastafarians who have emigrated to Ethiopia, has fallen short of expectations, as such journeys almost always do. None of which, of course, makes them any less appealing or worth the going. See Erin MacLeod, *Visions of Zion: Ethiopians and Rastafari in the Search for the Promised Land* (New York: New York University Press, 2014).
42. Walter Rodney, *The Groundings with My Brothers* (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications Ltd, 1969), 26.
43. Aimé Césaire, *Notebook of a Return to the Native Land*, trans. Clayton Eshleman Annette Smith (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2001), 44.
44. Zine Magubane, ed., *Postmodernism, Postcoloniality and African Studies* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003); and Kwaku Larbi Korang, *Writing Ghana, Imagining Africa* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2009). In Africa, as elsewhere, the literature on communal "imagining" and "inventing" has been greatly influenced by Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991).
45. Adam Potkay, and Sandra Burr, eds., *Black Atlantic Writers of the Eighteenth Century: Living the New Exodus in England and the Americas* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Henry Louis Gates Jr., and William L. Andrews,

eds., *Pioneers of the Black Atlantic: Five Slave Narratives from the Enlightenment, 1772–1815* (Washington, DC: Civitas Counterpoint, 1998); and Joanna Brooks, and John Saillant, eds., *"Face Zion Forward": First Writers of the Black Atlantic, 1785–1798* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2002).

46. Edward Blyden, Presbyterian minister and key nineteenth-century elaborator of the African worldview, was among the least chauvinistic in his Protestantism, writing sympathetically about Islam, especially on the question of race. Yet even he exhibited a certain Anglocentric Protestant bias. See Edward W. Blyden, *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967, first published 1887).
47. Acts 17:26 (King James Bible).
48. Anthony Bogues, *Black Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals* (New York: Routledge, 2003). See also Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, ed., *Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1997); and Andrew S. Curran, *The Anatomy of Blackness: Science and Slavery in an Age of Enlightenment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011).
49. The literature on this subject is vast, and increasing rapidly. One of the best summaries on its origins and development up to the middle of the twentieth century remains Imanuel Geiss, *The Pan-African Movement: A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe and Africa*, trans. Ann Keep (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1974).
50. C.L.R. James, *A History of Pan-African Revolt* (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr Publishing Company, 1995, originally published in 1938), 118.
51. Alfred A. Moss Jr., *The American Negro Academy: Voice of the Talented Tenth* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981). On Crummel, see Wilson Jeremiah Moses, *Alexander Crummell: A Study in Civilization and Discontent* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
52. A seminal work in African diaspora studies, in its post-Cold War incarnation, is Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). Gilroy's book on the "Black Atlantic," like Benedict Anderson's on national "imagination," would spark many similarly titled works.
53. Neil L. Waters, ed., *Beyond the Area Studies Wars: Toward a New International Studies* (Middlebury, VT: Middlebury College Press, 2000).
54. Judith A. Byfield, LaRay Denzer, and Anthea Morrison, eds., *Gendering The African Diaspora: Women, Culture, and Historical Change in the Caribbean and Nigerian Hinterland* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).
55. As could be expected, there has been pushback from defenders of nation-bound studies and national historiography. See, for example, Adolph Reed Jr., and Kenneth W. Warren, eds., *Renewing Black Intellectual History: The Ideological and Material Foundations of African American Thought* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2010).
56. Drake, *Black Folk Here and There*.

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