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**THE EVOLUTION OF
BRITISH COUNTER-
INSURGENCY
DURING THE
CYPRUS REVOLT,
1955–1959**

Preston Jordan Lim



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To my parents, for teaching me to be curious

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract This chapter provides a survey of Cypriot history during the British colonial period, focusing on the growth of Enosis during that time frame as well as on the limits of British rule. Though the outbreak of the Cyprus Revolt in 1955 caught many government officials by surprise, Greek Cypriot disenchantment with British rule had blossomed in the early twentieth century and found potent articulation through the leadership of Archbishop Makarios III and Colonel George Grivas. Despite the lack of historiographical focus on military developments during the Revolt years (1955–1959), this chapter argues that the richness of archival materials necessitates a new look at the military history of the revolt.

Keywords Makarios • Grivas • British Cyprus • Ottoman Cyprus

On May 23, 1958, Savvas Menicou, a 50-year-old Greek Cypriot laborer, was beaten to death. Menicou had just returned to his home village of Goufes, having spent the day working in the nearby town of Lefkoniko. A mob of local villagers surrounded Menicou as he stepped off from the bus and proceeded to beat him. They eventually bound him to a tree in a nearby churchyard, where they left his body, bloodied and lifeless.

James Trainor, a governmental coroner, in delivering his verdict on June 13, 1958, said that “I have been, I suppose, for the best part of 25 years associated with the law in which time I have met some rather grim cases, but never have I in that period met anything that approaches the savagery and brutality of this case.” Trainor went on to describe the wounds sustained by Menicou, noting that the muscles of his upper arm and back had been “beaten into pulp.” Menicou’s murderers had included not only adults, but as Trainor noted, “among the youths of the age 12 to 20 there are a very large number with this murder on their conscience.”¹

Even before the lynching of Menicou, Lefkoniko had developed a notorious reputation among the Security Forces. In December of 1955, Lefkoniko was issued with the first collective fine of the emergency; the 4000 villagers of Lefkoniko had to come up with £2000 after a gang of schoolboys burned down the local post office.²

More egregious, however, was an attack on British soldiers that occurred on October 23, 1956. A group of soldiers of the Highland Light Infantry had taken to playing football on a certain field in Lefkoniko; after the game, the soldiers walked over to the drinking fountain, tired no doubt from the match. An electronically detonated bomb, placed beside the fountain, disemboweled one soldier immediately; a second soldier would die several days later and another four Highlanders were gravely injured.³ The troops sent into Lefkoniko immediately after the explosion rounded up “more than a hundred people for questioning” and “did not conceal their anger”; Nancy Crawshaw, a journalist based in Cyprus for most of the Emergency, contends that “the incident culminated in the familiar pattern of complaints of ill-treatment and claims for damages on the part of the villagers.”⁴

Such events—the collective fine and the bombing of the Highlanders—fit well into the established paradigm of conflict between the Security Forces on the one hand and the rebels belonging to the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters⁵ (EOKA) on the other. The EOKA was a Greek Cypriot nationalist guerrilla group fighting to achieve Enosis, or union with the Greek mainland. On April 1, 1955, the EOKA launched the Cyprus Revolt, exploding a number of bombs throughout the island. Over the course of the rebellion, the EOKA not only attacked British soldiers but also murdered 187 “traitors”⁶—Greek Cypriots who had worked for the government, had given information to the Security Forces, or ignored the EOKA’s instructions. The death of Menicou was distinct,

however, in that Menicou was neither a member of the Security Force apparatus nor was he a traitor to the Enosist cause.

Instead, Savvas' wife, Rodhou S. Menicou, in a letter to the Human Rights Committee, published in the Greek Cypriot newspaper *Haravghi*, affirmed that Savvas was a nationalist and argued that Savvas had been murdered because of his leftist views:

Those who had killed my husband began to spread the rumor that he was a traitor and this is why he was killed. Do not believe them...my husband was a leftist...he took many hours off his sleep in order to inspire into our children the love for Greece and the freedom of our Cyprus. And yet he was killed.⁷

At the same time, Ms. Menicou praised the Human Rights Committee for having “defended with zeal our people’s human rights which have been violated and trampled upon by the colonialists.”⁸ She was neither pro-EOKA nor pro-British. Likewise, a *Haravghi* op-ed piece congratulated the Committee for “having raised a courageous voice of protest” against the British and entreated the Committee to “raise with the same resoluteness and courage your voice against such horrible crimes.”⁹ The Menicou murder then defies paradigms that cast the Cyprus Emergency as solely a struggle between the British on the one hand and EOKA rebels on the other hand. The Cyprus conflict was multifaceted. Concurrent with that struggle were a series of other conflicts: in this case, the conflict between the Left and Right, not necessarily caused by the EOKA; in addition, the Cyprus Revolt would see the killing of Greek Cypriot ‘traitors’ by the EOKA as well as intercommunal fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

The Cyprus Revolt, which resulted in the end of British rule and the declaration in 1960 of an independent Republic of Cyprus, fit into a larger pattern of power transition that has gripped the island since ancient times. Cyprus lies within 40 miles of Turkey’s southern coast and measures about 150 miles from east to west and 60 miles from north to south.¹⁰ Given its key location with respect to various ancient Mediterranean trade routes, it is no surprise that Cyprus historically enjoyed only fleeting periods of independence. Mycenaean Greeks had settled in Cyprus by the late Bronze Age, but over the next several centuries, Cyprus would endure Assyrian, Ptolemaic, Egyptian, Roman, Lusignan, and Venetian rule, before finally being conquered by the Ottomans in 1571.¹¹

Cyprus never actually belonged to the Kingdom of Greece, Greece only having gained independence in 1830. In 1878, the Ottomans, after three centuries of rule, ceded to the British the right to occupy and administer Cyprus, though the island remained under nominal Ottoman sovereignty. Following the Ottoman entry into the Great War on the side of the Central Powers, the British annexed Cyprus in 1914 and a decade later, in 1925, made it a Crown Colony.¹² Despite the War Office's high hopes for Cyprus' strategic potential, however, the island remained an underfunded colonial backwater. The island had few adequate port facilities and given the excellent facilities available in the Suez Canal zone, there was little need, at least militarily speaking, for the British government to invest heavily in Cyprus.¹³ In practice, Cyprus had only a "negative strategic significance...for the British Empire"¹⁴; it was important to keep Cyprus out of enemy hands because of her proximity to Egypt, but Cyprus herself had little military utility.

On the eve of the Cyprus Revolt, the island was home to roughly 500,000 inhabitants. 79.5% of the population was Greek Cypriot and 17% was Turkish Cypriot, with the remaining 3.5% consisting of smaller minority groups—Maronite Catholics, Jews, Armenians, and British expatriates.¹⁵ Turkish and Greek Cypriots often lived in mixed communities. As David French rightly notes, "there were 112 villages in which Turkish Cypriots were clearly preponderant, 369 in which Greeks were preponderant, and 146 which were labeled as mixed."¹⁶ The British government, in what might be characterized a continuation of the Ottoman *millet* system, did not seek to radically change the educational, religious, and cultural institutions on the island. Schooling continued to be conducted on a communal basis, with Greeks attending Greek schools and learning about Greek history and culture; likewise, Turkish youth attended Turkish schools.¹⁷ Greek Cypriots often traveled to Athens and Turkish Cypriots to Istanbul for their university education. The English School in Nicosia, founded in 1900, was a significant exception to the pattern of communal education, but by and large, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were socialized within their respective communities.

Enosis aspirations ran deep and emerged long before the opening explosions of the Cyprus Revolt. Historians have exposed as fabrication the popular legend that holds that when Sir Garnet Wolseley, the first British High Commissioner, arrived in Cyprus, he was greeted by Archbishop Sofronios, who immediately declared the Greek Cypriots' desire for Enosis.¹⁸ Yet even if nationalist historiography has obscured the

record in certain respects, it is clear that by the close of the nineteenth century, “for the mass of the Greek laboring poor, the desire for freedom came to be expressed in the demand for enosis.”¹⁹ In 1915, in an effort to compel Greece to join the Entente, Britain even offered Cyprus to Greece, but the pro-German King Constantine’s vacillations prevented what might have been an early solution to the Cyprus problem.

1931 marked a turning point in the struggle for Enosis. As G.S. Georghallides argues, the period from 1926 to 1931 as a whole was one of crisis for the administration. In addition to struggling from the worldwide economic crisis, Cypriots—particularly Greek Cypriots—were frustrated by Governor Sir Ronald Storrs’ seeming unwillingness to devolve administrative power. Indeed, the constitution, which Georghallides terms “the main instrument of the autocratic administration,”²⁰ had remained unchanged since 1882. In October of 1931, Greek Cypriots marched on Government House and, in part due to insufficient police protection, managed to burn down the residence. The British reacted harshly, calling in troop reinforcements from Egypt, dissolving the Legislative Council, and imposing a collective fine of £66,000 upon the Greek Cypriot community. Dominick Coyle contends that “by any criteria, the British used a sledgehammer to crack a not too large, if obdurate, nut.”²¹

During the Second World War, thousands of Greek and Turkish Cypriots served in the Cyprus Regiment and many saw combat in France, Greece, Italy, or in North Africa.²² British recruitment appeals to the Greek Cypriots to fight for Greece and for liberty fostered the false expectation that the Cypriots would gain Enosis after the war. Immediately after the war, a plebiscite organized by the autocephalous Cypriot Orthodox Church resulted in 96% of eligible voters favoring Enosis.²³ Though Church bishops undoubtedly compelled many to vote in favor of Enosis, there could be no doubt that a significant proportion of the Greek Cypriot population actively desired Enosis. As the Greek Cypriots constituted a clear majority on the island,²⁴ this was a significant result.

Then in 1950, Michael Mouskos, a bishop who had spent time studying at Boston University, became Archbishop Makarios III. With his assumption to the archbishopric, Makarios also became ethnarch of the Greek Cypriot people, and thus assumed not only a spiritual but also a political role. His fervent stance on Enosis was in many ways inseparable from his belief in God. In their edited volume on Cypriot church history, Varnava and Michael convey the contextuality and uniqueness of Makarios.

They characterize his welding of political and religious power as “ironic,” for Makarios was arguably harking back to long-discarded Ottoman practice, under which ethnarchs had wielded considerable power.²⁵

Of course, the Cypriot Orthodox church had long mixed religious with political responsibilities. Makarios III certainly was not the first archbishop to stray from clerical issues; Archbishop Kyrillos II, who started his primacy in 1910, for example, was a noted “political brawler.”²⁶ As Ioannis Stefanides notes, the Orthodox Church became increasingly wedded to nationalist cause during the late Ottoman and certainly the British periods. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, nationalist ideology had already become part of the “prevailing orthodoxy” of the general population.²⁷ Still, it must be emphasized that Makarios combined and exercised political and religious power in ways that few other ethnarchs had and as such, represented an unprecedented challenge to British rule.

An equally important figure was Colonel George Grivas, a Cypriot who had served in the Greek Army, fighting during the Second World War as well as in the Greek Civil War. Grivas had met Makarios while in Athens; he believed strongly in the value of armed struggle. In June of 1953, Makarios authorized Grivas to ship arms into Cyprus. In January 1955, the British destroyer *HMS Comet* intercepted the Greek boat, the *Ayios Georghios*, as the crew was delivering arms to Cypriot rebels on shore. The interception was brilliantly executed, but by 1955, preparations for an armed struggle were already well in place. Finally, in the early hours of April 1, 1955, a series of bomb explosions rocked Aphrodite’s Island. The Cyprus Revolt had begun.²⁸

Throughout the course of the revolt and particularly between 1955 and 1957, EOKA rebels succeeded in sabotaging military equipment, assassinating and ambushing British soldiers and policemen, and sharply limiting the extent of British prestige and control throughout the island. The EOKA’s tactical success was almost certainly a function of its superb organization. As French notes, the EOKA grew from a “small, militant organization into a mass movement supported by a much larger penumbra of part-timers who fulfilled roles in other parts of the insurgent organization.”²⁹

Under Colonel Grivas, the EOKA adopted a cellular structure. EOKA rebels established cells in Cyprus’ major cities, in the small villages that dot the island, and in the Kyrenia and Troodos mountain ranges. Grivas communicated his orders to each cell leader through courier and placed a premium on maintaining control; horizontal communication, between

different cell leaders, was rare.³⁰ Cell leaders were not granted that much power and generally acted only when Grivas dispatched orders to them. Therefore, as François Crouzet notes, the EOKA from the beginning was characterized by “weak spontaneity” and by its centralized, “monolithic” structure.³¹ Grivas managed to exercise a great deal of personal control over the rebels and despite naming Grigoriou Afxentiou as second-in-command, Grivas maintained singular control of the EOKA until 1959, exercising greater influence over the organization than did Archbishop Makarios.

Individual EOKA cells tended to follow Grivas’ various truce orders and operational commands. Though individual EOKA rebels on rare occasions might turn themselves over to the authorities, rebels tended to remain loyal to the cause and the EOKA cell structure remained functional until the conclusion of the revolt. Critically, in addition to reinforcing a vertical hierarchy, in which EOKA rebels looked to one source, Grivas, for instruction, the cell structure made infiltration by government agents a nearly impossible task. Since individual EOKA rebels only knew the other members of their own cell, the British could neutralize individual cells, but could never hope to destroy the entire organization without capturing Grivas himself.

Estimates of the number of EOKA rebels have varied. Robert Holland contends that the active cadre “never rose above 200,” whereas French describes the EOKA as having had “270 hardcore members in the mountain gangs and town groups, and about 750 members of village groups.”³² Of course, the distinction between hardcore and ordinary members of the EOKA could be relatively blurry, especially as the mountain gangs were forced to reform and take on new, less-experienced members after successful British operations; nevertheless, it is still useful to conceive of the EOKA as composed of 200–300 rebels serving in a fighting capacity, with the rest of the membership focused on complementary tasks. In total, Grivas recorded that the EOKA consisted by February 1956 of “1033 men, organized in 7 mountain gangs, 75 village groups, [and] 47 town units.”³³

Perhaps because of the EOKA’s success in engaging the British Army, the Cyprus Revolt, in public memory at least, has often been outshadowed by the more successful British counter-insurgency experiences in Kenya and Malaya. Despite the limits of public memory, however, there exists a wealth of secondary source histories on the revolt. Robert Holland, Nancy Crawshaw, and Nick van der Bijl all present superb general histories of the

revolt, addressing British military performance, but focusing more on political and administrative developments.³⁴ Similarly, Colin Baker and Andrekos Varnava, while referencing military developments, remain pre-occupied with questions of governance, evaluating the policies of Governor Robert Armitage and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, respectively.³⁵

In recent years, several authors have begun to focus exclusively on the military history of the conflict. David French's recent study, *Fighting EOKA*, makes excellent use of records from the National Archives.³⁶ James Corum's monograph, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies*, though obviously written with the aim of applying lessons learned to modern conflicts, likewise focuses on the British military record.³⁷

The most substantive body of literature, however, addresses the diplomatic history of the revolt, analyzing the conferences and complex negotiations between the Greek, Turkish, and British governments. Thomas Ehrlich and Stephen Xydis have both written fine diplomatic histories of the revolt years, though Ehrlich focuses also on conflict's tempestuous legal history.³⁸ A.W. Brian Simpson likewise focuses on legal developments, writing on the application of the European Convention on Human Rights to the conflict.³⁹ François Crouzet's multivolume *Le Conflit de Chypre* undoubtedly remains the most detailed history of the various negotiations and conferences that occurred during the revolt.⁴⁰

In addition, there exist a number of published primary-source accounts of the revolt—all of which provide the historian with a more nuanced understanding of the conflict. Hugh Foot, Harold Macmillan, and Anthony Eden in their respective memoirs fit the Cyprus Revolt into larger regional and international events, highlighting the shortcomings, but more often the genuineness, of Britain's policies toward Cyprus.⁴¹ Lawrence Durrell's *Bitter Lemons*, Martin Bell's *End of Empire*, and Corran Purdon's *List the Bugle* approach the revolt from a British point of view too, but are intimately connected with events on the ground.⁴² Charles Foley's *Island in Revolt*, though technically a secondary source work, likewise grants the reader a view into the British experience during the revolt and more significantly, highlights the complex strands and differences that gripped British opinion during this time period.⁴³

The *Memoirs of General Grivas*, edited by Charles Foley, as well as Grivas' *Guerilla Warfare and EOKA's Struggle*, provide fascinating looks into the EOKA's structure and strategy, though Grivas' accounts are at times hyperbolic and historically inaccurate.⁴⁴ The memoirs of Ezekias

Papaioannou, a prominent Greek leftist, are useful in providing a measured and often critical take on the EOKA's struggle for freedom.⁴⁵ Ahmet Sanver's and İsmail Tansu's memoirs provide accounts of the revolt from a Turkish point of view.⁴⁶

This monograph aims to interact with both strands of literature—secondary and primary. Although a great deal of work has focused on political, diplomatic, and international aspects of the revolt, few historians with the exception of French and to an extent Corum have commented substantively on military developments. Historians have yet to mine the full gamut of unpublished archival material. In particular, the Imperial War Museum, the British Library, the Archives at King's College London, the Bodleian Library, and the Churchill Archives at Churchill College, Cambridge, hold a great many diaries and reminiscences of British soldiers who served in Cyprus. By interacting with these archival materials, this monograph aims to deepen and complicate understandings of the military conduct of the Cyprus Revolt by providing bottom-up perspectives. This monograph deals seriously not only with the usual source material of military history—that is, the opinions and reminiscences of generals and senior officers—but also analyzes the valuable and often different perspectives of junior officers, National servicemen, and of policemen and auxiliary personnel.

This monograph also expands understandings of the revolt in two ways. Firstly, while most historians have exclusively focused on British and Greek perspectives on the revolt, this monograph makes use of Turkish language sources to grant a nuanced look into the evolution of Turkish Cypriot opinion during these tumultuous years. Instead of focusing simply on the EOKA, this monograph offers a brief, if detailed, look at the growth of two Turkish organizations, Volkan and the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT). Secondly, military history is taken to mean not only the evolution of counter-insurgency tactics between 1955 and 1959 but also to the conduct of what Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Miers referred to as the “war of words,” that is, allegations in the press of military brutality.⁴⁷ Although Susan Carruthers deals deftly with the relationship between EOKA propaganda and governmental counter-propaganda,⁴⁸ the topic of the Cypriot government's attempt to control its image has remained the province of specialist historians.⁴⁹ Yet governmental attempts to deal with EOKA's barrage of propaganda claims ought to occupy a more central role in the narrative.

Chapter 2 examines the conduct of counter-insurgency operations from April 1955 to March 1957, arguing that after a slow start, the Security Forces fought the EOKA to a standstill. The Security Forces were aided by the firm emergency measures introduced by Governor Harding in November 1955 and achieved a stunning string of successes in the opening months of 1957. Through a combination of traditional methods such as cordon and search, as well as innovative measures—namely, the use of helicopters, police dog tracking teams, Q patrols, and X-rays—the British inflicted heavy enough losses on the EOKA that Colonel Grivas was compelled to call a ceasefire in March of 1957.

Chapter 3 examines the period from March 1957 to March 1959, the latter date marking the return of Grivas from Cyprus to Greece as well as the official termination of hostilities. Despite having suffered tremendous losses in early 1957, the EOKA recovered its fighting abilities and switched tactics by commencing a violent campaign of murder and intimidation against leftists and Turkish Cypriots. This chapter will also examine Turkish Cypriot responses to EOKA agitation and will analyze the role of the Turkish Resistance Organization during the intercommunal troubles of 1958.

Although General Kenneth Darling, who took over as Director of Operations in late 1958, contended that the Security Forces were able to beat Grivas to a second standstill in early 1959, particularly because of a reformed intelligence system, this chapter argues instead that the Security Forces met with much less success during this period.⁵⁰ Certainly, the intercommunal fighting that erupted in the summer of 1958 highlighted the Security Forces' overreliance on Turkish Cypriot personnel; of course, since so many Greek Cypriot personnel had links to the EOKA, the Cyprus Police Force had little choice but to recruit from the Turkish population. Furthermore, although the Security Forces undoubtedly reformed their intelligence network, the EOKA in March 1959 was revealed to still have 284 men in hiding,⁵¹ a shockingly high number, especially since British analysts projected that the EOKA was made up of only 200–300 hardcore members.⁵²

Finally, Chap. 4 examines the Cypriot government's attempts to win the war of image and perception by casting governmental forces as in the right and the EOKA as made up of terrorists and liars. The chapter focuses on two incidents: the administration's unwillingness to host an impartial inquiry and its decision to prosecute Charles Foley, editor of the *Times of Cyprus*. The former case centered on the question of torture, with EOKA

alleging that the British had conducted war crimes. Although British troops and in particular, Special Branch officers did often treat Greek Cypriot civilians brutally, British military conduct was by no means marred by widespread torture and brutality. Yet the Cypriot government's prickly and stiff-lipped responses to such allegations were ineffective. As the visit of the European Commission of Human Rights demonstrated, the Cypriot government had less to fear from a policy of transparency and from an impartial inquiry than it thought. The latter case likewise demonstrates the administration's penchant for repressive policies; the decision to prosecute Charles Foley was a particularly grave mistake, not only because of the consequent international backlash but also because the *Times of Cyprus* was not as anti-British as the government contended. This chapter references not only British and Greek press outlets but also Cypriot publications, notably *Halkın Sesi* and the *Times of Cyprus*, the latter often referred to by troops as the *EOKA Times*.⁵³

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25. Varnava and Michael, “Archbishop-Ethnarchs since 1767,” 6.
26. *Ibid.*, 12.
27. Ioannis Stefanides, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 229.
28. The term “Cyprus Revolt” is taken to encompass events occurring between April 1, 1955, when the first bombs exploded, and March 19, 1959, when Colonel Grivas departed Cyprus for Greece. The term “Cyprus Emergency” more precisely refers to events occurring between November 26, 1955, when Governor John Harding declared an official state of emergency, and Grivas’ departure in March 1959.
29. French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955–1959*, 64.
30. George Grivas, *Guerilla Warfare and EOKA’s Struggle*, trans. A.A. Pallis (London: Longmans, 1964), 59.
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CHAPTER 2

Using a Tank to Catch Field Mice: April 1955 to March 1957

Abstract This chapter examines the conduct of counter-insurgency operations between April 1955 and March 1957, contending that traditional interpretations of the Security Forces' strategy as blockheaded are incorrect. The chapter looks at the failings and successes of Field Marshal Harding's emergency regulations, then turns to closely examine the conduct of Security Forces' operations. The Security Forces relied both on traditional methods such as the cordon and search and on innovative measures—namely, the use of helicopters, police dog tracking teams, Q patrols, and X-rays—and consequently inflicted heavy losses on the EOKA.

Keywords Helicopter • Q patrol • X-ray • Cyprus Police Force • Harding

James Corum, in his analysis of British military performance during the Cyprus Revolt, described the conflict as a “war of the blundering elephant versus the gnat.”¹ Despite the “most lopsided ratio of police and military forces to rebel forces ever seen,” the British failed “to suppress the insurgency.”² Such an assessment, while perhaps extreme, is by no means exceptional; most historians have likewise cast the Cyprus Revolt as resulting in British military defeat. Michael Dewar concluded that “Grivas was remarkably successful” in that he tied down 40,000 British troops and

killed 99.³ Andrew Novo too suggested that EOKA rebels gave better than they got; in return for 90 fighters killed, the EOKA managed to kill 156 members of the British Security Forces.⁴ Colonel Grivas used the colorful image of a tank trying to catch field mice to critique his British opponents' heavy-handedness.⁵

That the British Army failed to defeat the EOKA is beyond doubt. Such assessments, however, might be misleading, in that they rely in part on imprecise metrics to measure military success. In counter-insurgency warfare, the initiative often lies with the rebel, who can choose when and where to fight. EOKA gunmen shot down British soldiers as they were shopping on Ledra Street and sipping coffee in cafés; on the other hand, the Security Forces, though certainly more numerous than their EOKA enemies, had enough trouble merely locating the enemy, in an atmosphere in which most Greek Cypriots, because of active support for the EOKA or because of fear, were too afraid to provide valuable intelligence. Measures such as the “body count”⁶ to draw on the Vietnam War era, term coined by the mathematically minded US Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, are methodologically unsound as they imply a level playing field.

For historians trying to evaluate British military performance during the revolt then, a better metric might be to assess how the military improved, adapted, and innovated its tactics over the course of the conflict, rather than to merely portray the conflict as a zero-sum game. Quantitative measures such as the number of enemies killed and captured are useful, but must be constantly contextualized. This study breaks up the military development of the Cyprus Revolt into two sections: this chapter examines the period spanning April 1, 1955 to March 1957, arguing that the Security Forces tremendously improved their performance. The following chapter examines the period spanning April 1957 to the end of hostilities in early 1959.

In March 1957, Colonel Grivas announced the second unilateral truce of the Cyprus Revolt.⁷ In August 1956, Grivas had declared a first truce, ordering his men to go underground and cease hostilities against the British, but resumed terrorist attacks several days later after Harding released surrender terms in response to the truce offer.⁸ The March 1957 truce was different in that it was a face-saving measure, with the intended implication being that Grivas had graciously elected to cease hostilities; the reality was that Grivas, following a string of Security Force successes, had no choice but to order his men into hiding, since most of the EOKA

mountain gangs had been wiped out. The monthly situation reports of Rear Admiral Anthony Miers, serving as Flag Officer, Middle East, attested to the increasing success enjoyed by the Security Forces in the months leading up to Grivas' truce. Miers characterized December 1956 and January 1957 as successful months for the Security Forces and February 1957 as the "first quiet month since I took up my appointment in Cyprus nearly a year ago."⁹ Novo, too, argued that the EOKA in March 1957 was but a vestige of its former self: "by March 1957, of the top half dozen leaders of the organization, only Grivas remained at large."¹⁰

Security Force successes in 1956 and 1957 accrued not because the British Army so outnumbered the EOKA rebels, but because the authorities—Governor Harding and his Director of Operations, George Baker—emphasized the need to reform and improve counter-insurgency tactics. In particular, Harding focused on two objectives: restoring public security while at the same time taking the fight to the EOKA. The first part of this chapter examines how Harding attempted to restore public security through the promulgation of the emergency measures and rebuilding of the Cyprus Police Force. The second examines how the Security Forces went about defeating the EOKA, through a combination of traditional methods like cordon and search and more innovative methods such as the use of the helicopter, police tracking teams, Q patrols, and the X-Ray.

CAUGHT ON THE HOP: APRIL–OCTOBER 1955

The outbreak of the Cyprus Revolt in the opening hours of April 1, 1955, caught the Cypriot government "on the hop."¹¹ Despite the Royal Navy's interception of the *Ayios Georghios* in January 1955, the Cyprus Police Force's intelligence capabilities were so poor that the police had failed to notice the growth of the EOKA over 1954 and the early months of 1955. Of course, such unpreparedness could not solely be blamed solely on Governor Robert Armitage. Andrekos Varnava, in his unparalleled history of British Cyprus between 1878 and 1915, cast Cyprus as an "inconsequential possession" and argued that due to a variety of factors, including the lack of a suitable harbor, Cyprus was chronically underfunded.¹² In the 1950s, Cyprus remained an underfunded colony.

In his 1954 report on the Cyprus Police Force, G.H. Robins, the Commissioner of Police, depicted the police force as ill-prepared, not only for an outbreak of violence but also for the much more basic requirements of ordinary police work. Even in Cyprus' major towns, police garrisons

suffered from an acute shortage of men, with the police force often being unable to perform such basic capabilities as patrol duty.¹³ Thus, policemen had little time to conduct the complex preventative investigations and intelligence-gathering operations that might have allowed the administration to nip the revolt in the bud.¹⁴

Nevertheless, despite the fact that such issues were arguably beyond Armitage's control, perceptions of Governor Armitage as feckless and ill-equipped for the exigencies of the Cyprus Revolt have persisted. Charles Foley, in describing Armitage's September 1955 departure from Cyprus, wrote: "Sir Robert was bundled out of the island even before his successor arrived, as if to underline that his advice was worthless."¹⁵ John Reddaway, Administrative Secretary for the Cypriot government, expressed the typical view that Armitage, while competent and likeable, was not attuned to the specific circumstances of Cyprus and was thus out of his depth.¹⁶ Lord Harding, though respectful, was harsher, describing Armitage as the sort of person who could not "hold out the storm."¹⁷

Yet a more detailed evaluation of Armitage's leadership during the first few months of the revolt indicates that while Armitage did seem out of his depth, many of the measures he instituted laid the groundwork for Harding's more successful reforms. In mid-July 1955, Armitage approved the 18B law, which allowed the governor to order the detention without trial of terrorist suspects.¹⁸ In August, Armitage sought to bolster public security by reforming the police force. On August 6, for example, the government announced that Cyprus was to have an "Emergency Auxiliary Police Force," whereby Cypriots could volunteer for static duties such as guarding government buildings, thereby allowing the regular police to get on with normal police work; several hundred Turkish Cypriots ended up joining the Auxiliary Force.¹⁹ And on August 8, the *Times of Cyprus* revealed that army soldiers were training selected policemen in unarmed combat tactics.²⁰

Indeed, Armitage may have been prevented by the London government from acting firmly and immediately. The *Times of Cyprus*, in reporting the departure of the governor, revealed that he had started to implement firm measures but was ordered to stop by London at the first sign of foreign criticism.²¹ Brigadier Baker, in his report on the first half of the Cyprus Revolt, likewise suggested that London ought to receive its fair share of blame: "In the early stages of the emergency, no adequate arrangements existed in London to coordinate and deal urgently with the

needs of this colonial territory suddenly involved in and almost entirely unprepared for a modern terrorist war.”²²

Armitage’s proposed solution was also too extreme for London’s liking. Colin Baker, in his revisionist biography of the governor, contends that the latter strongly recommended the concession to the Cypriots of the “right to self-determination,” but that London “adamantly and consistently rejected” such a policy, at least during the opening year of the revolt.²³ Of course, even if Armitage had been authorized to offer self-determination, it remains doubtful that the EOKA would have simply lain down its arms. In 1955, Grivas was still confident that full Enosis could be gained through force of arms. Even under an offer of self-determination, it is likely that Armitage would have included substantial minority safeguards for the Turks—safeguards that the EOKA would have been unwilling to accept. The eventual constitution of 1960 bore some broad resemblances to Armitage’s 1955 recommendations, but was also a reflection of the fact that the EOKA, bloodied during the course of the revolt, could no longer push for its maximal aims.

Even Baker, however, suggests that in the final tally Armitage acted “too slowly and too gently in Cyprus.”²⁴ Certainly, when Field Marshal John Harding arrived in Cyprus on October 3, 1955, to assume his duties as governor, the administration was not much closer to defeating the EOKA than it had been in April of 1955. Despite Armitage’s recognition of the need to reform the police, the Cyprus Police Force was still unprepared to take on the EOKA; in various cities, police constables had even refused their paychecks, protesting their low wages in light of the dangers of policing in time of strife.²⁵ As Rear Admiral Patrick Brock noted, the EOKA had managed through intimidation to drastically lower police morale and to convince Greek Cypriots not to cooperate with policemen.²⁶ And in September of 1955, a mob had managed to burn down the British Institute, located in the center of Nicosia. Change was needed.

BACK ONTO THE RAILS OF PEACE: RESTORING PUBLIC SECURITY

Upon his arrival to Cyprus Governor Harding quickly identified the restoration of public security as a key objective. To restore public security, he introduced a battery of emergency regulations, many of which, though unpopular, were effective. At the same time, Harding recognized the

important role of the Cyprus Police Force and thus set about revamping the force. Although many of the emergency measures were, in retrospect, ill-conceived, and Harding never truly succeeded in reforming the Cyprus Police Force, his reforms demonstrate that Corum's description of the Cyprus Revolt as a war of the "blundering elephant versus the gnat" is erroneous. The Security Forces, after the difficult first months of the rebellion and far before Archbishop Makarios' deportation in March 1956, prioritized change and as a result were able to more adeptly battle with the EOKA over the course of 1956.

On November 26, 1955, Harding proclaimed a state of emergency. He had concluded that the collapse of public order necessitated firm security measures.²⁷ Harding extended the death penalty to cover offenses such as the illegal possession of arms, the discharge of weapons, and the throwing of bombs.²⁸ In addition, he introduced firmer censorship laws as well as legislation that allowed for collective punishment, whereby entire neighborhoods or villages would be fined for transgressions.²⁹ Most controversially, Harding introduced legislation that empowered judges to issue juvenile criminals under the age of 18 with whipping as a punishment.³⁰

Many troops and commentators welcomed what they saw as measures that should have been implemented months earlier. Reddaway contended that executions were an effective means of calming the situation.³¹ Sir Patrick Wall, MP for Haltemprice, commenting on the first death sentences to be passed out, likewise defended the administration's harsh measures, arguing that if the death penalty was not instituted, then the administration would be guilty of endangering the lives of British soldiers and loyal Cypriots.³² As David French notes, the death penalty made prisoners more willing to divulge information and thus led to a series of intelligence coups.³³

Yet Harding's emergency regulations also attracted sharp criticism from parliamentarians. Arthur Creech Jones, MP for Wakefield, for example, spoke in the same House of Commons session as Sir Patrick Wall and criticized government policy. Jones' opposition was almost predictable; he had served on the executive of the Anti-Slavery Society from 1938 to 1954, had grown up steeped in a "liberal international faith" and during the Kenyan Emergency had, by virtue of his anti-colonial opinions, gained a reputation as an "unofficial member of the Kikuyu at Westminster."³⁴ In contrast to Wall, Jones argued that "emergency regulations...are not calculated to bring about a settlement conducive to the happiness of the people of the island" and declared that the government was partly

responsible for the “deplorable chapter which has been written in the history of Cyprus.”³⁵

Of course, anti-colonial sentiments had not emerged *ex nihilo* in the twentieth century. Indeed, Robert Schuyler contends that the anti-imperial movement was borne centuries earlier when the “conclusions of the mercantile system” began to be challenged and cites as an early proponent of anti-imperialist views Adam Smith’s contemporary, the economist Josiah Tucker.³⁶

Still, the 1950s did see a flourishing in anti-colonial sentiment. The Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF) was founded in 1954; as Stephen Howe notes, the MCF represented the “culmination of active opposition to colonialism in Britain—the point at which anticolonial feeling on the British Left found its most unified, coherent and forceful organizational expression and wildest base of support.”³⁷ MPs such as Fenner Brockway, Tony Benn, and Barbara Castle, to highlight a few key members of the movement, kept a close watch on government conduct throughout the Cyprus Revolt, tabling questions and criticizing government policy. The MCF also published a journal, entitled *Colonial Freedom News* and organized public protests.³⁸ Thus, Arthur Creech Jones was by no means a voice crying in the wilderness; as early as 1954, members of the MCF criticized what they saw as intolerable and ultimately counterproductive British policy toward the Cypriots.

The anti-colonial lobby’s criticism of Harding’s policies was not entirely misplaced, for not all of the emergency measures had their intended effect. Reddaway, for example, intimated that regulations banning the flying of the Greek flag over public buildings may have been foolish; soldiers and policemen who might have been better used in anti-EOKA operations were instead ordered to control agitation among secondary school pupils.³⁹ Ian Martin, who served as an interpreter with the Ulster Rifles during the emergency, argued that such regulations demonstrated Harding’s “little understanding of Greek susceptibilities.”⁴⁰ Furthermore, Nancy Crawshaw described the fierce reaction to the introduction of whipping for juvenile criminals; Greek Cypriots saw whipping as degrading and were thus aroused to the “greatest anger.”⁴¹

While certain individual emergency laws might have seemed unpopular, however, there is no doubt that Harding’s declaration of a state of emergency signaled to the Cypriot public a willingness to fight back against the EOKA. Furthermore, the Security Forces constantly refined the emergency laws as they discovered which laws worked and which laws did not.

Such amendments demonstrated that the Security Forces were not as static and ineffective as Corum contended; the administration often amended legislation by taking into account factors such as public reception.

Brigadier General Baker, for example, exhibited a relatively nuanced understanding of the various emergency laws in his report. For example, Baker asserted that the public more easily accepted measures that had a recognizable para-operational aspect, that is, measures such as restrictions on movement that clearly hampered “terrorist activity.”⁴² On the other hand, the Security Forces realized that the collective fine, though an efficient method in the early days of the emergency, had lost its effect because the EOKA refunded money to those Cypriots who were fined. The practice was phased out by March 1957.⁴³ Similarly, Baker recalled that closing public buildings in an effort to deprive youth of a meeting place achieved little in practical terms; as with the collective fine, the practice of closing public places was quickly phased out.⁴⁴

THE THIN BLUE LINE: REFORMING THE CYPRUS POLICE FORCE

While Harding’s emergency regulations signaled a newfound determination to maintain public order, they required for their enforcement the aid of the constables and officers of the Cyprus Police Force. Corum declared that there was “no sense of urgency in training police leaders; reforming the police...was seen essentially as something to be dealt with after the insurgency was defeated. In the meantime, the CPF would remain a poorly trained, poorly led force.”⁴⁵ A careful examination of primary source documents, however, reveals that Harding immediately set about rebuilding the police force, which had been rendered almost useless in the opening months of the revolt.

Harding’s decision to develop the CPF was unsurprising. As Thomas Mockaitis has argued, the British way in counter-insurgency was centered upon the “common law principle of minimum force.”⁴⁶ Minimum force “meant what the common law would allow”; the degree of force employed “depended on what was politically acceptable” and varied from conflict to conflict.⁴⁷ As Mathew Hughes has convincingly argued, the minimum use of force could feel quite severe and typically meant “the degree to which maximal force was practicable.”⁴⁸ Still, Mockaitis’ arguments should be

kept in mind. Troops in Cyprus, in fighting Greeks, had to at least maintain a *guise* of conformity with common law principles; outbursts such as Amritsar were to be avoided, not because of a uniquely British sense of democracy and justice, but instead for the simple reason that such outbursts would surely prove unpopular among domestic constituencies.

A central aspect of the common law principle of minimum force was that the local police force ought to take the lead in times of rebellion. Whereas American generals in Iraq and Afghanistan have conspicuously tried to avoid employing their troops in police roles, British strategists showed no such compunctions. When called upon to support the civil power, British soldiers were deployed in characteristic policing roles such as guarding public installations and patrolling urban alleys. The local police force, staffed by officers supposedly aware of local conditions, was to act in a much more targeted fashion than the army, gain timely intelligence, and curry the trust of local civilians.

The Cypriot government proved no different than the colonial administrations in Kenya and Malaya and immediately set about strengthening the police force. In the week before Harding's arrival, the Security Forces had decided to bolster police numbers by creating a Mobile Reserve in late September 1955. Whereas members of the Auxiliary Force had been recruited for static duties—the protection of public sites and government buildings—the Mobile Reserve, which was meant to consist solely of Turkish Cypriots, was designed to deal with riots.⁴⁹ Harding decided to sanction the continued growth of both of these irregular bodies. By 1957, the all-Turkish Mobile Force numbered 580.⁵⁰ The growth of both the Auxiliary and Mobile forces allowed regular police officers to focus again on preventative police work and on criminal investigation. To further lift the strain off of the regular force, Harding underpinned all armed police stations with an army detachment.⁵¹

Harding had little choice but to approve of such reforms, despite the Greek Cypriot backlash. While the provision of army guards to police stations proved uncontroversial, Greek Cypriots criticized the Auxiliary and Mobile Forces as consisting of too many Turks. Yet such criticisms failed to take into account the fact that Harding was forced to increasingly rely on the Turks; many Greek Cypriot police officers and constables, after all, had been intimidated by EOKA rebels and either refused to fulfill their duties or sometimes even clandestinely worked for the EOKA.

At the same time, Harding sought to build up the regular police force itself by providing a spine of UK police officers that would provide a model

for the rest of the force. In October 1955, constables seconded from various UK police forces started serving in Cyprus on two-year service contracts.⁵² Such officers could be counted on, unlike Greek Cypriot and even Turkish Cypriot officers, to administer the law impartially, since they had no communal affiliations; more importantly, unlike Greek Cypriot officers, they could not be bought or intimidated by the EOKA and could thus be counted on to remain loyal to British interests.⁵³ In early 1957, 53 women police arrived as part of the British contingent and undoubtedly aided the Security Forces in searching and handling female suspects on various operations.⁵⁴

As the police force expanded and improved, Harding began to better integrate the force with the army. Upon his arrival, Harding had established in “each of the Districts a Security Committee, on the same principle as that already adopted in Malaya and Kenya.”⁵⁵ District Security Committees were based on a triumvirate principle whereby an army officer, a police officer, and a civil government official would meet regularly to coordinate the Internal Security effort.⁵⁶ Clearly, on at least the most basic level, the committee system demonstrated that the Security Forces sought to apply lessons learned from past counter-insurgency campaigns.

In addition to establishing District Security Committees, the government established a joint army-police staff school in November 1955 to encourage closer cooperation between the army and police and to increase mutual understanding. In early 1957, the school was replaced by a “Training Center,” which operated similarly, running refresher courses for officers and trying to distill experience gained to newly arrived officers.⁵⁷ The benefits of an integrated system were numerous. Namely, as police force intelligence slowly improved, Special Branch officers were able to begin sharing relevant information with their army counterparts.

Nevertheless, despite Harding’s reforms, the Cyprus Police Force remained riddled with issues for the duration of the revolt. The biggest issue was that many Greek Cypriot police officers simply could not be trusted; by 1958, it was estimated that there were 138 EOKA suspects employed by the police.⁵⁸ Even the few Greek Cypriots the British thought they could trust sometimes turned out to be spies. George Lagoudontis, for example, was regarded as “almost the only Cypriot who was ‘all right.’”⁵⁹ But in a *Sunday Express* piece written in 1964, Lagoudontis revealed that he warned his fellow EOKA agents about upcoming operations, placed tape recorders in security offices, stole secret documents, and

supplied information on Special Branch officers to EOKA assassins. Lagoudontis even admitted that he was Grivas' intelligence chief.⁶⁰ Thus, army soldiers remained suspicious of the Cyprus Police Force throughout the conflict. Julian Thompson, an officer with 40 Commando, expressed the typical view that Greek policemen were unreliable and that the Turks were the only effective police.⁶¹

The consequent reliance on British police officers, however, proved problematic. With Greek Cypriot officers rendered useless by the EOKA and with Turkish Cypriots often unable to take advantage of the same intelligence sources available to the Greeks, a great deal of the burden naturally fell on the British spine of the force. Yet most British officers also could not speak Greek and were therefore unable to capitalize on intelligence sources that loyal Greek Cypriot officers might have been able to provide.

Army officers quickly recognized the limitations of the UK Police Unit. John Patterson Carr, for example, an officer with the Norfolk's, admitted that far too many of the police officers were assassinated by EOKA gunmen. Carr went on to suggest that quite a number of the British policemen were "out and out thugs."⁶² Other soldiers likewise shared the belief that various members of the UK Police Unit were unsavory individuals,⁶³ not dissimilar to the Black and Tans who had served during the Irish troubles. Major General Sir John Willoughby, while praising the UK Police Unit in general, held that the "short service opportunists" ought to "go home at once"; Willoughby in particular criticized one "awful officer named Knowles" who "apart from being inefficient and a glib liar has committed every sin known."⁶⁴

Despite the structural limitations and flaws of the police force, however, Harding did manage to get the force functional again. By August 1956, the police were finally able to re-assume responsibility for the towns.⁶⁵ And as the case of the Q patrols will later demonstrate, the police force was not entirely ineffective. On the other hand, however, most of the reforms instituted by Harding were remedial and while they served as effective stopgap measures, such measures could never transform the police force into a well-oiled machine. Harding was hardly to blame for this; after all, the Cyprus Police Force, as Colonial Office Police Adviser, W.C. Johnson put it, was "the Cinderella service in a Cinderella colony."⁶⁶ Reforming such a problematic force in time of uprising was to prove an impossible task.

FIGHTING THE EOKA: THE SECURITY FORCES GO ON THE OFFENSIVE

While prioritizing the restoration of public security, Harding also focused on defeating the EOKA. In order to defeat the EOKA, the Security Forces employed a wide range of tactics. Through large-scale traditional tactics such as cordon and search, the army, often accompanied by police units, aimed to harry the EOKA and to maximize occasions for enemy contact; though General Darling himself, who became Director of Operations in 1958, decried such tactics as “clumsy,” the cordon and search could prove useful, when based on good intelligence.⁶⁷ At the same time however, the Security Forces did employ more nuanced tactics even in the early years of the revolt: the use of helicopters, police tracker dogs, and Q gangs all allowed the Security Forces greater offensive capabilities, while the development of X-ray screening allowed the administration greater defensive capabilities.

The army focused on regaining the initiative early on in the revolt. In December 1955, immediately after the emergency regulations had been announced, for example, Rear Admiral Brock noted that army operations had for the first time resulted in success.⁶⁸ And in January 1956, Brock observed: “EOKA activities in the Troodos areas and the forests generally have been on a much reduced scale, probably due to a combination of counter-measures.”⁶⁹

Army operations in 1956 and early 1957 generally took the form of the cordon and search; the cordon and search was a staple of British internal security strategy and had been employed everywhere from the Transvaal to Palestine. Sir Michael Gray, then an officer with the élite 2nd Parachute Brigade, described a typical cordon and search: “You were given a specific area in which you operated. And you were told then to search the area; you were given some indication as to what activity had taken place...so you could probably work back to a central focal point where things might have been happening.”⁷⁰ Troops would form a perimeter outside a specific house, an entire village or in some cases, an even larger geographical unit, in order to stop EOKA rebels from escaping the ring. Troops or police forming the search party would then enter into the ring and conduct the search. As Rex Cain noted, although the Turkish Mobile Reserve had been formed for the purposes of riot control, Turkish Mobile policemen often took an active role in house searches.⁷¹

The cordon and search did have its drawbacks, of course. John Cormack, in describing the cordon and search of monasteries, contended that since monasteries tended to be situated at the end of long roads, troop movements could be signaled well in advance.⁷² RAF technician Roland Barry likewise recalled that as soon as troops set off from base, the “bush telegraph warned everybody you were on your way.”⁷³ With Greek Cypriots employed in the police and on army bases in Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes (NAAFI) stores, it was difficult to launch large operations without Greek Cypriots finding out. The other problem was that the EOKA rebels became expert at concealing arms and themselves; British troops had to remain constantly aware if they wanted any chance of locating the enemy. William Norman, then a noncommissioned officer (NCO) with the 1st Duke of Wellington, reminisced:

I was searching this house; I'd put a chalk mark on the door to say I'd searched it. I had come to a room, it was a clean floor—an earthen floor—and it had been redone. Something odd about it, but I couldn't see anything so I gave it my mark and came out. Somebody else came in there, a lad from Barnsley, a miner, and he said a terrorist's in here. He looked in the floor and knew there was air underneath by the color of the damp earth...eventually they went down this hide and captured three terrorists.⁷⁴

Furthermore, as cordon and searches involved hundreds, sometimes even thousands of troops, the opportunities for friendly-fire incidents were plenty. Julian Thompson described an incident wherein his commandos were mounting an ambush inside a cordon to catch EOKA rebels when they were fired upon by riflemen from the Argyll and Sutherland Regiment. Platoons had been issued wireless No. 31 radio sets, but Thompson noted that due to Cyprus' varied geography, these radio sets were often useless. As a result, coordinating large-scale operations was difficult and dangerous, especially as troops often moved about at night in order to surprise the enemy.⁷⁵ While Thompson and his commandos escaped from their fellow troops unscathed, other soldiers were not so lucky.

In June 1956, for example, the army mounted Operation Lucky Alphonse in the Troodos Mountains in an effort to capture Grivas; as Grivas himself recollected, an army patrol came within several feet of capturing the rebel leader.⁷⁶ During the operation, soon to be dubbed “Unlucky Alphonse,” a forest fire started, likely caused by mortar shells

fired by the British; the summer heat, lack of water, and abundance of timber on the ground all helped to turn the fire into a massive conflagration that overcame the densely packed British troops. In total, some 20 British soldiers lost their lives to the fire.⁷⁷ John Carr had participated in the opening days of the operation, but was forced to return to base after coming down with a bout of dysentery; when the fire broke out, Carr, still suffering from dysentery, had to guide lorries and medical personnel up to the army site in the mountains. He vividly described the aftermath of the fire, mentioning in particular the burned-out lorries littering the hillside. Carr noted that most of his battalion survived only due to the quick thinking of an officer named Stanley Sutton who ordered the men to lie down and “get through the fire as quickly as possible.”⁷⁸

Evidently, cordon and searches could be clumsy and often required careful and constant attention on the part of the soldiers. Yet cordon and searches could prove successful, especially as troops adapted the tactic to better meet the challenges of fighting in Cyprus. Rex Cain revealed that British troops learned to cordon villages at night: “You want to start in the dark and go in at first light, before everyone in the village has got going. In Cyprus there were dogs everywhere so it was quite a task to do it quietly enough.”⁷⁹ John Carr recalled that his men mounted a night cordon on the hostile village of Khivides and by doing so were able to capture 11 suspects and a quantity of ammunition.⁸⁰

Troops also learned to employ deceit as a tactic. Julian Thompson recalled that instead of mounting night cordons, his commandos would drive into a village as if they were only passing through, abruptly stop their trucks in the middle of the village, and mount a “snap cordon” around several houses. The tactic worked effectively and Thompson remembered capturing an EOKA rebel, caught running from the house under search.⁸¹ Moreover, Michael Gray commented that in order to prevent Cypriots from finding out about upcoming cordon and search operations, army convoys would leave the base at night in different directions.⁸²

Successful cordon and search operations allowed the army to gain intelligence on the EOKA. Cordon and searches were themselves, as Gray suggested, based on intelligence.⁸³ If rebels or EOKA suspects, however, were captured on such operations, the Cyprus Police Force’s Special Branch would interrogate them, often leading to an even bigger windfall of intelligence. Colonel Henry Sweeney, then an officer with the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, recalled that the troops would often be accompanied by an informer, a hooded man, “who would sit behind a

screen and would then pick out certain people whom he suspected of being terrorists.” Sweeney suggested that the intelligence was often not of high quality, but admitted that through such operations, “intelligence was being built up.”⁸⁴ Julian Thompson likewise described the interrogation process, whereby suspects captured in cordon operations would be “whistled away” by Special Branch policemen and questioned in the back of a truck.⁸⁵

As the army gained more and more intelligence, it was able to mount increasingly successful operations against the EOKA. After troops returned from the Suez intervention in late November and early December of 1956, Harding was able to once more put pressure onto the EOKA rebel forces stationed in the mountains.⁸⁶ Miers reported that in December 1956, British forces captured “over forty undesirables” and “a mountain group leader with three of his men.” In January, the army captured an entire mountain group as well as “ten out of twelve members of two other groups”; and in March, the month of the truce, Security Forces killed Grivas’ second in command, Grigoriou Afxentiou, then went on to kill Grivas’ third in command, Droushiotis.⁸⁷

These successful operations in 1957 tended to take the form of cordon and search, or to resemble the cordon and search closely, with troops forming an outer perimeter and other troops moving in to engage the enemy. Furthermore, all of these operations made use of intelligence gained during prior cordon and search operations. Even Colonel Grivas admitted that the British were effectively flushing out EOKA hideouts either by interrogating “liaison and supply agents” or by deftly following those agents.⁸⁸ The March 1957 truce offer was a sign that British tactics—traditional as they were—had allowed the army to regain the upper hand against the EOKA.

BRAINS NOT BRAWN: THE SECURITY FORCES INNOVATE

Although General Darling emphasized how the Security Forces became more agile and innovative in the last two years of the revolt, the Security Forces evidently employed innovative measures from the outbreak of hostilities. To bolster offensive operations, the army began to rely on helicopters while the police developed tracking teams and the more successful Q gangs. To better defend government officials, Major Harry “Bomber” Harrison also developed the use of X-rays to screen suspicious packages and luggage, a practice that remains widespread in modern airports.

Lord Harding, who had previously served as CIC Far East Land Forces, was keen to employ helicopters in Cyprus. Having witnessed helicopter operations in Malaya, he believed that helicopters could introduce an element of surprise to anti-terrorist operations in Cyprus.⁸⁹ Roland Barry, serving as an NCO with the Royal Air Force (RAF) and as Chief Technician, identified Harding's personal role in supplying the Security Forces with helicopters: "It was John Harding who got us there in the first place. He wanted helicopters."⁹⁰

The army and RAF used helicopters—specifically the Bristol Type 171 Sycamore—in a wide variety of roles in Cyprus. John Reddaway, not a military man himself, suggested that helicopters proved useful for the simple reason that the EOKA did not have any anti-aircraft guns.⁹¹ Helicopters improved the army's reconnaissance abilities in that soldiers sitting in helicopters could observe a much wider area. Michael Gray recalled one incident in which one of his soldiers had found an arms cache up in the mountains. Gray flew over the area in a helicopter to get a better sense of landscape: "We started to look much more closely and while flying over in a helicopter, by deduction, [we] found the hide in the side of a hill [where] there was a great hole."⁹²

Sycamore pilots would also deploy small teams of men in hard-to-reach observation posts to keep an eye out for EOKA rebels. As Chief Technician Roper detailed, the army might operate three to four forward observation posts at any one time, with soldiers stationed in each post for two to three days. Helicopter pilots would fly supplies to these men, hovering over the observation post and tossing down tobacco tins or in some cases, handwritten orders.⁹³ With the army's radio sets rendered useless by Cyprus' geography, helicopter pilots thus had to revert to rather archaic methods to convey messages.

Helicopters were also used on cordon and search operations. To befuddle the enemy, helicopter pilots, just like army lorry drivers, would set out in different directions. As Roper recalled, each operation might include up to 14 helicopters, that is, the full squadron. Helicopters would set off from the base in different directions and then converge on a preordained location.⁹⁴ By the time helicopters were in the air, advance troops had already cordoned off the area in question. Helicopters would rapidly carry reinforcements up to the cordoned area and deploy them; indeed, many of the successful operations in 1957 involved troops deployed rapidly by helicopters. Furthermore, as Major General Charles Dunbar, then serving as Brigade Major for 16th Parachute Brigade, suggested, troops in helicopters

occasionally offered fire support. In one case, Dunbar recalled pinning down a terrorist gang by hovering over a hideout in a helicopter, prepared to throw down several Mills Type 36 grenades.⁹⁵

In the 1950s, of course, helicopters were only just coming into use. Harding reflected that helicopters did not truly become widespread “until the American developed, increased, or extended the use of helicopters in land operations in Vietnam, but we’d begun to use them in Malaya for casualty evacuation, communication, reconnaissance, and supply.”⁹⁶ In Cyprus, helicopter pilots likewise extended the use of helicopters; notably, pilots in Cyprus pioneered night flying tactics.⁹⁷ Yet early helicopters were difficult to use and both pilots and their passengers—the troops—faced an array of challenges. Roper described the Sycamores as “unusual aircraft” and contended that pilots learned on the job. Troops deploying by rope out of a helicopter—that is, abseiling—also faced multiple challenges. Roper termed abseiling in the 1950s “monkey trick training”; soldiers deploying from a helicopter would often get their hands trapped between the rope and the side of the aircraft and then fall to the ground below. In one freak accident, a helicopter pilot who was taking off lost control of his craft due to resonance and sliced the leg off of a Regimental Sergeant Major who was standing beside the helicopter.⁹⁸

Despite the challenges faced by pilots and troops alike, helicopters aided the Security Forces in locating EOKA rebels and in expediting troop movement. Lord Harding’s personal role in ensuring helicopters for Cyprus cannot be underestimated. Harding had realized the helicopter’s potential in Malaya and convinced the RAF to send a full squadron of 14 helicopters to Cyprus. Clearly, British forces applied innovations learned in other internal security operations to Cyprus and further pioneered helicopter use over the course of the emergency.

Likewise, the Cyprus Police Force, particularly the Force’s British section, employed innovative tactics. In particular, the Security Forces soon realized that the EOKA rebels, when mounting ambushes on army convoys, would fire a few bursts from their guns then run off, rather than stay and engage British troops. Thus, the police started training dog tracker teams that would try to follow the escaping terrorists. Police dogs were also deployed on large-scale operations in the mountains to help track down hiding EOKA rebels.

Brigadier Baker wrote that six trained police dogs as well as their handlers arrived in Cyprus in December 1955. They “achieved immediate success in an operation then taking place in the mountains.”⁹⁹ Moreover,

Baker held that the dogs proved their value throughout the course of the revolt; tracker teams were particularly effective in cases when human handlers established a close relationship with their dogs. The dogs were not without their drawbacks. In the summer heat, for example, dogs could not work for more than two hours at a time without succumbing to exhaustion.¹⁰⁰ Colonel Grivas argues that the dogs often tracked down “innocent civilians” instead of terrorists and could be misled by confusing stimuli such as the “blood of a slaughtered hen.”¹⁰¹

Yet overall, tracking teams allowed the Security Forces to pursue EOKA rebels much more aggressively. Police dogs almost allowed army soldiers to capture Grivas in the early summer of 1956. Describing these Security Force operations in the Paphos, Grivas himself admits that tracking teams often came within rifle range. Grivas criticized heavily the use of dogs, contending that police tracking teams often entered churches and that dogs sniffed around the Holy Altar; still, the fact that police tracker dogs almost led the Security Forces to Grivas indicates their usefulness.¹⁰²

The Cyprus Police Force’s Special Branch also formed Q patrols, small units centered on a couple ex-EOKA members who had been convinced to work for the Security Forces and also consisting of British police, British Royal Military Police, and Turkish Cypriot policemen. Panagiotis Dimitrakis contends that these mixed squads were named after the Q Patrols of the Second World War—squadrons of British ships, which conducted “deception operations against the German Navy.”¹⁰³ Q patrols operated both in major towns as well as in rural villages. In the countryside, the ex-EOKA members of the Q patrol proved useful in posing as EOKA members to gain the trust of local villagers and thereby find out where the village’s EOKA complement was hiding; in the urban towns, these EOKA turncoats were able to point EOKA suspects out to their British handlers. Although Dimitrakis contends that the Q patrols met with failure in the villages since locals tended to be suspicious of strangers, the Q patrols met with considerable success in the towns.¹⁰⁴

In Nicosia alone, David French noted that the police force operated two Q patrols.¹⁰⁵ Jack Taylor, a British policeman who arrived in Cyprus in September 1956, directed one of these gangs, which he described as an “anti-terrorist squad” with a core group of one or two ex-EOKA men. These ex-EOKA informers proved useful in pointing out individual Greek Cypriots for arrest. For example, in one operation, Taylor recalled that as his squad was driving down Constantine Avenue after a football match, the ex-EOKA man identified a bomb thrower from Ormophita who was

walking along the street. On this occasion, Taylor and his Turkish partner, identified only as Özel, failed to capture the courier, named Ionides.¹⁰⁶

Major McGowan, Taylor's commanding officer, however, instructed Taylor to find Ionides, a task that Taylor likened to "finding a needle in ten haystacks." Once again, the ex-EOKA informer proved his worth. As Taylor was driving to the Santa Rosa clinic in Nicosia, the ex-EOKA man caught sight of Ionides; this time, Taylor managed to catch the EOKA courier. Though Ionides was a relatively inconsequential and low-level member of the EOKA, such captures could lead to major intelligence coups. In this case, Taylor interrogated Ionides and as a result found out the location of Nicos Sampson, who was duly captured by another police squad;¹⁰⁷ Sampson was responsible for over eight murders in Nicosia alone, and his capture constituted a major success for the police force.¹⁰⁸ Thus, while the Q patrols might not have met with as much success in the countryside, they proved useful in the towns, allowing policemen to neutralize notorious urban terrorists such as Nicos Sampson.

DEFENDING AGAINST SABOTAGE: DEFUSING EOKA'S BOMBS

EOKA rebels throughout the Cyprus Revolt proved adept at sabotaging Cypriot governmental facilities and at killing Security Force members with mines and bombs. Major Harry "Bomber" Harrison, of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, served in Cyprus for the entirety of the revolt as the government explosives expert. As such, he conducted forensic reports evaluating each incident involving sabotage or explosives and introduced countermeasures to stem the effectiveness of the EOKA's bombing campaign.

Throughout the rebellion, the EOKA managed to sabotage at least eight aircraft. In one case, EOKA rebels managed to penetrate the barbed wire fence protecting an RAF Hawker Hunter at Nicosia airport and plant a bomb that exploded, damaging the aircraft's wheels. In another incident, at Akrotiri, EOKA bombs left one aircraft "almost in ashes" and three other aircraft seriously damaged.¹⁰⁹ With thousands of Greek Cypriots employed on RAF airfields, the Security Forces had trouble preventing EOKA infiltrators or sympathizers from sabotaging expensive equipment; in late 1958, Governor Foot finally took the decision to expel all Greek Cypriots employed on NAAFI stores on RAF bases, thereby removing opportunities for sabotage.

Early on during the rebellion, however, Major Harrison instituted measures to protect government officials from being killed by EOKA bombs. While sabotage proved costly for the Security Forces, such incidents rarely resulted in actual casualties. The EOKA, however, also started sending parcel bombs to key government figures. A UK Resident District Officer at Platres was killed when he opened a parcel that turned out to be a bomb. As Erik Johnson wrote in his tribute to the Major, Harrison developed the innovative idea of using X-rays to check individual packages for bombs after having his shoes fitted by X-ray in a Piccadilly shoe shop. Harrison had the government order in several X-ray machines and developed the practice whereby “VIP and Police mail was regularly X-rayed, as well as the Government House mail.”¹¹⁰ An indicative measure of Harrison’s success is that following the installment of X-ray machines in key government buildings, no other security officials were blown up by parcel bombs.

Major Harrison was awarded a George medal at the conclusion of the Cyprus Revolt. The citation for his award read: “Major Harrison personally supervised the safe destruction of large quantities of explosives, much of them in a deteriorated and highly dangerous condition. His complete disregard for his own personal safety in the performance of his duty was of the highest order.”¹¹¹ His bomb disposal team was likewise well regarded and was awarded three George Medals, two British Empire Medals, and seven mentions in dispatches (one posthumously); his men suffered four casualties: two dead and two injured.¹¹² In a poem dedicated to Harrison, FW Bird, Chief Superintendent of Police, wrote in the final stanza: “It’s a lonely walk to the UXB [unexploded bomb]/ And many a brave man has found/ This walk to be his last.”¹¹³ Major Harrison and his men had proven that with tremendous bravery as well as innovative thinking, the Security Forces could outsmart the EOKA; their story remains one of the few examples of unadulterated valor exhibited during the Cyprus Revolt.

CONCLUSION

Evidently, starting in 1955, the Security Forces developed new tactics and adapted existing tactics in order to better meet the challenges of waging counter-insurgency warfare in Cyprus. Governor Armitage, by introducing the 18B law and by attempting to reform the Cyprus Police Force, exhibited an early awareness of the vital need to restore public security. Still, it was only under Governor Harding that the Security Forces were able to respond energetically to EOKA attacks. Harding placed a high

premium on restoring public security and by promulgating various emergency measures and rebuilding and reconstituting the Cyprus Police Force, radically improved the security situation. Although EOKA operatives were still able to gun down off-duty soldiers as well as Greek “traitors” in the streets of Nicosia or Famagusta, EOKA rebels were no longer able to carry out brazen, large-scale operations such as the September 1955 burning of the British Institute.

At the same time, the Security Forces refined their tactics in order to engage EOKA rebels more directly and to better protect government officials from EOKA attacks. Army units began to mount night cordons and snap cordons and also took care to deceive possible onlookers by sending lorries off in different directions before any major cordon operation. The arrival of a full RAF helicopter squadron allowed troops to rapidly deploy to hard-to-reach locations and to achieve surprise. The Cyprus Police Force’s use of tracker teams almost led the Security Forces to Grivas himself. The Q patrols, formed around a core of several ex-EOKA operatives, allowed the authorities to identify and capture EOKA operatives, particularly in urban environments. Finally, Major Harrison’s introduction of the X-ray machine proved to be a sound defensive tactic; following the introduction of X-ray screening methods, the EOKA was no longer able to kill government officials with parcel bombs.

Thus, Grivas was compelled to declare a unilateral truce in March 1957 following a string of Security Force successes. While British troops continued to hunt for Grivas and other EOKA leaders, Grivas ordered his rebels to go underground and to reform their respective cells. Far from acting as a blundering elephant, the Security Forces had succeeded in demonstrating and developing tactical finesse and in forcing the EOKA onto the defensive.

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CHAPTER 3

On the Brink of Civil War: April 1957 to March 1959

Abstract This chapter examines the conduct of counter-insurgency operations from March 1957 to March 1959, the latter date marking the official termination of hostilities. This chapter contends that the EOKA switched tactics during this time period; by killing Greek Cypriot leftists and Turkish Cypriots, the EOKA forced the Security Forces to focus on the restoration of public order, thereby providing the EOKA with breathing space. This chapter examines the evolution of Turkish Cypriot opinion during this time period, commenting on the growth of two organizations—Volkan and the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT). With General Kenneth Darling’s assumption to the role of Director of Operations, the Security Forces were able to resume the offensive again, though they met with less success than Darling contended.

Keywords EOKA • Volkan • TMT • Intercommunal violence • Darling

Following Colonel Grivas’ truce declaration of March 1957, Cyprus remained relatively quiet for the remainder of the year and for the first few months of 1958. Archbishop Makarios had been allowed to return to Athens from the Seychelles, after having been exiled from Cyprus in March 1956, following the breakdown of the Harding-Makarios negotiations.¹

During this period, the Security Forces kept up the hunt for EOKA leaders and for Grivas in particular. Security Forces' personnel also achieved a handful of successes, despite the fact that the EOKA had successfully gone to ground. In September 1957, the Security Forces confiscated valuable documents in a set of Nicosia raids on EOKA and PEKA² safe houses and in October 1957, two EOKA mountain group leaders surrendered to Security Forces.³ Besides the attempted assassination of a police superintendent in November 1957 and the successful assassination of William Dear, a Special Branch interrogator, in April 1958, EOKA rebels tended not to engage the Security Forces directly, preferring to plant bombs.

1958, however, saw the emergence of two disturbing trends. The EOKA switched tactics and began to kill leftists as well as Turkish Cypriots; in the latter case, EOKA murders of Turkish Cypriot police officers led to an unprecedented wave of intercommunal killings.⁴ This chapter argues that the Security Forces—in particular, the Cyprus Police Force—were ill-equipped to react to both Right-Left clashes and to Greek-Turkish intercommunal violence. This chapter then examines the sweeping reforms that General Darling implemented when he became Director of Operations in October 1958. Although Darling contended that these reforms allowed the Security Forces to fight the EOKA to a standstill by February 1959, just as they had in March 1957, primary source evidence indicates that this second round against the EOKA generated less success for the government than Darling contended.

A COMMUNITY DIVIDED: THE EOKA TAKES ON THE GREEK LEFT

The Greek Cypriot Nationalist Right had long been at odds with the Greek Cypriot Left. The Progressive Party of Working People⁵ (AKEL) was the main leftist organization and had exercised tremendous influence in the early 1940s, despite being somewhat overshadowed by the nationalist right, which had more firmly championed Enosis, starting with the plebiscite of 1950. Lord Harding had proscribed the AKEL early on and British commentators and officials tended to overplay the Communist threat throughout the revolt. In a December 1955 article, for example, the *News Chronicle* warned that the Communists “will do their best to wreck any settlement favorable to NATO.”⁶ The Cypriot government did sometimes, however, exhibit more nuanced views on the Communists: a

booklet entitled “Why We Are in Cyprus,” designed for distribution to all British servicemen serving in Cyprus, argued that “a number of those who stood as Communists in the Island’s last municipal elections were not, in fact, what we would call Communists. They were progressive reformists.” The pamphlet even contended that “trade unions affiliated to AKEL have done good and sensible work for their members in Cyprus.”⁷

Despite an often-nuanced understanding of AKEL, however, the Cypriot government failed to take advantage of how Right-Left tensions widened into a chasm as the Cyprus Revolt progressed. Initially, Greek Cypriot leftists had appeared eager to work together with Archbishop Makarios to achieve Enosis. Tom Pry, a correspondent for the *Times of Cyprus*, described how leftists at a July 1955 rally in Nicosia waved Greek flags and crosses instead of more traditional leftist banners.⁸ In October 1955, Archbishop Makarios declared to the *Times of Cyprus* that he was anxious to avoid associating the nationalist movement with leftist support and as a result had turned down Communist offers to form a united front.⁹ Leftist leaders had persisted in their support for Makarios, however, and in June of 1957 distributed leaflets calling for the British government to resume negotiations with the Archbishop.¹⁰

Yet in 1957, Colonel Grivas began to turn on the leftists. Major C.R. Butt, an intelligence sergeant, held that:

When Grivas began to realize that the effectiveness of EOKA was beginning to flag against the Security Forces, he was forced to look around for another means of keeping the people aware of his activities and so decided to strike against the left-wing politicians in an effort to bolster up the unsteady right wing union.¹¹

Moreover, Colonel Grivas had long harbored a deep hatred for Communists. During the Second World War, after Greece’s surrender to the Nazis, Grivas formed and directed Organization Khi,¹² a fascist resistance group. In W.M.T. Magan’s personality sketch of Grivas, written in March 1959 for MI6, Magan suggested that Organization X failed to inflict any significant damage on the Germans. Following the end of the Second World War and with the beginning of the Greek Civil War, Grivas and his X-ites took on a more active role and battled Greek Communists. Grivas also returned to Cyprus soon after the end of the Civil War and organized gang violence against the AKEL.¹³ As Magan notes, Grivas

carried out campaigns of violent intimidation of his political opponents and gained a reputation for brutality.¹⁴

In late 1957 and certainly in 1958, Grivas unleashed a wave of violence against Greek Akelists. Rear Admiral Anthony Miers wrote in July 1957 that following increased AKEL activity, Grivas warned his followers to dissociate themselves from the Communists, who he claimed had betrayed the Greek Cypriot cause. In August 1957, Miers reported attacks by nationalists on leftist and “independent-minded” Greeks.¹⁵ Yet Greek leftists remained patient and most refused to hit back, at least initially. The weekly army intelligence report for September 13–20, 1957, noted that thus far leftists had responded to nationalist aggression only with passive resistance.¹⁶

The rift continued to grow, however. In the latter half of January, two leftists were murdered and three others wounded in Famagusta.¹⁷ Leftists around the island reacted actively with a wave of processions, strikes, and open denouncement of nationalist violence; the intelligence report concluded that the “obvious split in Greek Cypriot ranks must be embarrassing.”¹⁸ May 1958 proved a particularly bloody month for the Left; in all, eight Greek and Turkish Cypriot leftists were murdered, with six of these murders—five Greeks and one Turk—occurring in one week alone.¹⁹ Tragically, the Turkish Resistance Organization²⁰ (TMT) seems to have taken the EOKA as a model, murdering both Turkish leftists as well as those Turks who opposed the organization. A pamphlet printed by the Greek Cypriot-funded Public Information Office decried, albeit pretentiously, that the TMT had embarked on a campaign of “murders and intimidation of progressive peace-loving Turkish Cypriots.”²¹ In June, an army intelligence report likewise noted that Turkish nationalists were murdering Communist sympathizers.²²

Despite the increasing internecine violence within the Turkish community, Right-Left violence remained the most pronounced within the Greek community. In early May, Greek leftists responded to EOKA aggression by exploding a bomb in a nationalist football club in Larnaca.²³ On the whole, however, the EOKA fared more successfully in the battles between the Right and Left and continued to retain the initiative; as late as August 1958, the EOKA launched a fresh wave of killings and intimidation of leftists.²⁴

Despite the administration’s recognition of the increasing Right-Left split, evidenced by Rear Admiral Miers’ reports as well as the weekly intelligence summaries, the Cypriot Government failed to take advantage of

this split or to properly protect Akelists from the EOKA. This is all the more surprising in light of the fact that Cypriot government officials had long contended that there existed on Cyprus a body of “moderate opinion,”²⁵ opposed to EOKA excesses and which might cooperate with the government. The only Greek Cypriot political entity capable of opposing the EOKA—that is, the only potential body of “moderate” opinion—was the AKEL; as Nancy Crawshaw argued in the *Manchester Guardian*, the Left “constitutes...the only powerful rival to the reactionary forces of the Church.”²⁶ Although Harding personally had identified the AKEL as a grave threat, various government officials had taken a more conciliatory view toward the AKEL, and as Robert Holland noted, some had suggested that the AKEL work “tacitly with the administration.” Holland suggested that James Griffiths, Secretary of State for the Colonies, had this in mind when he advised Andrew Wright, then Governor, to avoid proscribing the AKEL.²⁷ In other words, the British might well use the AKEL as a counterweight to the EOKA.

Yet if certain Britain officials were eager to work with the AKEL, Greek Cypriot leftists remained opposed to working with the administration. Rear Admiral Miers, in describing an August 1957 bout of EOKA violence against the leftists, reported that the victims, even after having been beaten up, still refused to make complaints to the police.²⁸ In August 1958, after a spate of EOKA killings and notably a violent Akelist reaction, Mr. Ezekias Papaioannou, former General Secretary of the AKEL, pledged the Left’s support for Archbishop Makarios and reaffirmed that the Left had no intentions of cooperating with the government.²⁹ Leftists may have despised Grivas and the EOKA rebels, but they supported the cause of Enosis and Makarios despite the EOKA violence. In a May 10, 1958, leaflet, for example, the AKEL claimed that the EOKA was disobeying Makarios’ instructions and characterized EOKA aggression as contrary to Makarios’ calls for “concord and cohesion” among the people of Cyprus.³⁰ Evidently, Akelists had no desire to cooperate with the British.

Moreover, just as the Cyprus Police Force was ill-equipped to protect Greek Cypriot informers from EOKA rebels, so too was it unprepared to protect Greek Cypriot leftists. By 1957, 51% of the Force was Turkish Cypriot, 2% was Armenian and Maronite, 17% was expatriate, that is, British, and 30% was Greek Cypriot.³¹ By contrast, in 1954, the year before the outbreak of the revolt, Greek Cypriots constituted 850 of a total of 1386 policemen (63%).³² With fewer and fewer Greek Cypriot constables and with the remaining Greek constables largely beholden to

the EOKA, the Cyprus Police Force was incapable of protecting Greek Cypriots from the EOKA, even more so in a situation wherein those Greek Cypriots—Akelists—were unwilling to ask for help.

Generally, British soldiers serving across the island appear to have paid little attention to the Right-Left split and scarcely referred to such violence in their diaries. Silence often speaks louder than words. British troops might have seen such Right-Left violence as none of their concern; after all, if both the Left and Right harbored Enosist aspirations, then the British had little to lose by letting the violence continue unabated. More convincingly, it would appear that British troops were simply too busy to take notice of Right-Left violence, for at the same time, there emerged the real and much more frightening prospect of civil war between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

CYPRIOT AGAINST CYPRIOT: THE ROOTS OF GREEK-TURKISH VIOLENCE

Intercommunal violence did not emerge *ex nihilo* in 1958. In fact, intercommunal tensions had existed well before 1958, although such tensions rarely devolved into open conflict. Turkish Cypriots had often complained of discriminatory treatment by Greek Cypriot employees and criticized what they saw as the Cypriot government's tendency to hire Greek Cypriots; a June 1955 *Times of Cyprus* article, for example, quoted a column in Halkin Sesi which argued that Turks were subjected to discriminatory treatment by Greek foremen in the construction industry and were, unlike their Greek coworkers, often employed on heavier duties.³³ Adrian Seligman, then a retired naval officer, likewise contended that Turks did not receive impartial treatment from selection and employment boards, which tended to consist mainly of Greeks.³⁴ But such employment claims were relatively innocuous in that they rarely led to violence.

One key reason for the lack of violence in the years leading up to the revolt was the poor organization of the Turkish Cypriot community. Throughout the 1940s and well into the 1950s, the Turkish Cypriot community remained poorly mobilized, at least when compared with their Greek counterparts. Marshaled by a panoply of nationalist youth and agricultural groups, the Church, and later the EOKA, Greek Cypriots repeatedly demonstrated their nationalist aspirations through opportunities such as the 1950 Church-organized plebiscite. In response to Greek Cypriot

mobilization, Turkish Cypriot leaders dilatorily established the Federation of Cyprus Turkish Associations (KTKF) in 1949.³⁵ Faiz Kaymak, who headed the organization from 1949–1957, aimed to effectively mobilize broad swathes of the population, but as late as 1957, Turkish Cypriots tended to take a dim view of the organization. Ulvi Keser, in his study of the TMT, quotes Rauf Denктаş, who succeeded Kaymak in 1957; Denктаş in his election speech argued that the Federation had become a “wreck” (çöküntü), evidenced by the fact that its leaders had not met over the past year. While expressing high hopes that the Federation would in the future implement more robust cultural and economic projects, Denктаş articulated the typical opinion that the Federation existed “in name only.”³⁶

While the lack of an effective Turkish Cypriot organization had proved unproblematic in the early 1950s, the EOKA’s push for Enosis soon led Turkish Cypriots to found similar militant organizations. Events in 1956 threatened to engulf the island in mass violence. Colonel Grivas, at least before 1958, had ordered his rebels to avoid killing Turkish Cypriots, arguing that the British would capitalize on intercommunal violence and increase the division between the Greek and Turkish communities.³⁷ With hundreds of Turkish Cypriots employed as Auxiliary, Mobile, and Regular policemen, however, the EOKA sometimes killed Turkish Cypriot constables by accident. In January 1956, the murder of a Turkish police sergeant angered Turks around the island, but intercommunal tension did not devolve into open violence.³⁸ In the latter half of March, however, “a fight developed between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in a village near Kyrenia”; unfounded rumors that three Turks had died in turn inspired trouble among Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia.³⁹ In April 1956, serious intercommunal violence broke out and the Security Forces were forced to erect a barbed wire barricade in Nicosia in order to separate the two communities.⁴⁰

Even though Grivas had ordered EOKA rebels to refrain from killing Turks, the EOKA’s push for Enosis, regardless of means used, drove many Turkish Cypriots to violence. Greek Cypriot leaders often exhibited tremendous ignorance of the Turkish Cypriot position. The Order of the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA), which articulated Enosist views, constantly mischaracterized the Turks. In an op-ed in the *New York Times*, Constantine Verinis, President of the Order of Ahepa, went so far as to argue that “genuine self-government [i.e.: Enosis] would be accepted by the Greek Cypriot majority of 80% and by large numbers of the Turkish minority of 17.5%.”⁴¹

Such views failed to highlight the depth of Turkish Cypriot opposition to Enosis. Ioannis Stefanides, in his analysis of Turkey's reactions to Enosis, argues that Turkish policy alternated between two poles: "distrust of Greek motives" and fears of Greek "territorial aggrandizement" on the one hand and a desire to preserve good relations with Greece, based on recent rapprochement, on the other.⁴² Surely, a third pole must be added: that of Turkish Cypriot sentiments, which in 1957–1958 often differed markedly from mainland as well as British opinions. For while the Turkish Cypriots had initially "acquiesced in British domination," the Greek insistence in Enosis led eventually to a radicalization of Turkish Cypriot opinion.⁴³

Just as most Cypriot governmental officials failed to recognize Greek Cypriots' deep desire for Enosis, so too did Greek Cypriots fail to recognize the Turkish Cypriot minority's deep opposition to Enosis. Lawrence Durrell, a poet turned Cypriot government official and one of the few bureaucrats who had truly immersed himself in local life, realized that the EOKA was successful because it appealed not just to criminals and to wrongdoers, but instead appealed to the spirited and idealistic youth.⁴⁴ Similarly, Turkish Cypriot opposition to Enosis was not just carried out by hotheaded thugs who joined the Turkish underground organizations Volkan and the TMT but was shared by a majority of the Turkish Cypriot population.

Ahmet Sanver, for example, who as a schoolboy joined the TMT in 1959, reflected upon the organization's recruitment process. After taking an oath to dedicate his life to the TMT, Sanver was instructed by his teacher, Niyazi Ali, to recruit four other classmates. Sanver recalled that on his bike ride home, he felt ecstatic, for "I had given myself over to the Turkish nation and my homeland." Naturally, his friends agreed to his proposal and likewise joined the TMT.⁴⁵ Sanver was, for all intents and purposes, an average schoolboy. His deep desire to give himself over to the anti-Enositist cause indicated the broad appeal of the TMT.

Furthermore, just like Enosists, Turkish Cypriots sought to publicize their views. The "Cyprus Turkish Delegation," a Nicosia-based organization, for example, prepared a pamphlet entitled "The Cypriot-Turkish Point of View on the Cyprus Question." The pamphlet affirmed Turkish Cypriots' cultural and racial ties with their compatriots on the mainland and warned that if the EOKA achieved Enosis, Turkish Cypriots would lose their rights, as had happened with the Turks of Crete, the Aegean Islands, and Western Thrace.⁴⁶ Mainland Turkish opinion likewise seized

upon this point, contending that the cession of Cyprus to Greece would complete the Greek maritime encirclement of Turkey.⁴⁷

Turkish Cypriots did not confine themselves to rhetoric, however, and soon moved beyond the limited economic and social goals envisioned by the KTKF to form organizations that directly resembled the EOKA. Volkan was formed over the course of 1955, and by January 1956, Rear Admiral Brock had taken notice of the organization in his monthly action summaries, though he viewed the organization as ineffective, noting that Volkan did not seem equipped for much more than the issue of “bombastic leaflets.”⁴⁸ İsmail Tansu, who served as second in charge of the TMT in its Ankara headquarters, criticized Volkan more heavily and contended that Volkan was not the kind of organization to be associated with, since its members had a reputation for recklessness.⁴⁹

Yet several British soldiers thought Volkan was more capable than it appeared. Major C.R. Butt suggested that Volkan was made up of Turkish Cypriots who had endured national service with the Turkish Armed Forces and characterized Volkan as much more than a gang of undisciplined youth. Butt went so far as to contend that Volkan had more potential than the EOKA as a fighting organization, owing to the Turks’ natural bravery.⁵⁰ John Patterson Carr suggested that Volkan held so much power in Turkish Cypriot villages that it was able to stage dramatic plays and put on other community events. Carr also revealed that the term Volkan referred to the summer rain in Turkey; just as the summer rain, Volkan would sweep its enemies into the sea.⁵¹ Volkan’s members could prove competent and Carr reminisced that “one of my soldiers thought that ammunition had been taken from him...within half an hour one of the Turkish Cypriots said take these and gave him two clips of .303 ammunition; whether he had stolen it and returned it I don’t know.”⁵²

By the intercommunal troubles of summer 1958, the TMT had superseded Volkan in terms of organization and effectiveness. İsmail Tansu wrote that TMT headquarters, based in Ankara, became operational by the end of June 1958.⁵³ The details Tansu included in his account, however, often differ widely from accounts provided by British soldiers and officials. Certainly Tansu was right to identify the Turkish government’s active support for the TMT, but his contention that the TMT was relatively inactive in 1958 and was instead designed to “launch a counter attack...when EOKA commences with its ENOSIS movement,” that is, when the British left Cyprus, is complicated by both British and Turkish Cypriot accounts.⁵⁴ Rear Admiral Miers wrote that by May 1958, the

TMT was already a potent force.⁵⁵ The TMT, according to British soldiers and officials, actively targeted Greek Cypriots in 1958, though typically only in response to EOKA violence. John Reddaway likewise admits that the TMT killed Greeks.⁵⁶ Moreover, the TMT proved adept at assassinating government targets; the Cyprus Police Force report for the year 1958 noted that the TMT had succeeded in murdering a detective sergeant and an auxiliary constable.⁵⁷

Indeed, the TMT appears to have operated particularly effectively in the countryside. Bora Yılmaz, a former operative, recalled that the TMT disguised several military training camps as boy-scout camps and operated such camps at Küçüksu, Yağmuralan, Esentepe, and Kümürlü.⁵⁸ Another TMT operative, Tilki Erdoğan, recalled that while he was training at Yağmuralan, British troops surrounded the village. The boys quickly donned their scout uniforms, while the villagers packed the training weapons onto their mules and dispersed. As a result of such quick thinking, Erdoğan reminisced that the English “could not find a single thing.”⁵⁹ Evidently, the TMT operatives enjoying the support of the local population could hide arms and resources from the British as effectively as their EOKA enemies.

As the emergence of Volkan and the TMT indicated, Turkish Cypriots were prepared to defend their communities against what they perceived to be Greek Cypriot aggression. While intercommunal violence in 1956 and early 1957 remained limited and desultory, intercommunal fighting in late 1957 and 1958 threatened to rend the island apart. The fact that both communities were well organized in 1958 meant that violence was to occur on a heightened and far more deadly level than in the early years of the revolt.

COUNTRY GOING UP IN FLAMES: THE EMERGENCE OF INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE

French suggested that Grivas targeted Turkish Cypriots and Greek Akelists for similar reasons. Attacking Turkish Cypriots, Grivas had realized early on in 1956, would force the army to take the pressure off of the EOKA, for such attacks were “bound to provoke intercommunal violence, which the government could only contain by withdrawing troops from the mountains.”⁶⁰ In 1957 and 1958, however, with Turkish Cypriots organized behind TMT, such tactics were to backfire. In November 1957,

Rear Admiral Miers described how intercommunal violence nearly broke out following the murder of a Turkish Cypriot police officer.⁶¹ Despite a lack of intercommunal violence in early 1958, the Turkish position hardened considerably. Miers contended that the Turks became increasingly suspicious of government initiatives and began to demonstrate in favor of partition. In May 1958, an alarmed Miers warned that intercommunal strife was a real threat.⁶²

Intercommunal violence finally broke out in June 1958. Though intelligence officers had noted the dangerous mood of the island, the outbreak of violence in June seems to have taken many by surprise. Richard Wilson, Brigade Intelligence Officer from 50th Brigade, was spending the weekend in Dhekelia when he was summoned back to Nicosia at 11 o'clock one night:

I had no idea what was going to confront me on the way...it was quite a nervous time. When I got up over the hills, it looked as if Nicosia was on fire. The whole place was ablaze. I can't remember at the time that I realized what it was. The intercommunal thing had been brewing, but I think it suddenly burst on Nicosia.⁶³

John Reddaway likewise described the descent into violence as rapid and commented that by the summer Cyprus seemed to be on the brink of "civil war."⁶⁴ Whereas Turkish Cypriots had remained relatively restrained in 1956, however, in 1958, led by TMT, the Turks fought back effectively. Reddaway described "tit for tat murders in the villages...an old Greek woman murdered here, a Turkish shepherd boy here...Turks killed by EOKA and Greeks killed by TMT."⁶⁵ According to Miers, Turkish Cypriots not only responded to Greek aggression but also actively triggered intercommunal riots and violence.⁶⁶ In all, the Cypriot government reported 56 Greeks killed and 26 wounded and 53 Turks killed and 53 wounded in intercommunal incidents from June to August of 1958.⁶⁷

As the tremendous number of casualties indicates, the Security Forces failed to properly contain intercommunal violence. The army certainly attempted to contain and prevent violence. A.J.B. Walker, in his letter of 19th June 1958, wrote of how the army effectively employed the curfew: "The curfew from 18:30 to 04:30 stops all night-life fairly effectively; we have seen no real trouble: a riot squad, road-blocks, leaflets, crowd noises in the background, burnt out cars, but nothing spectacular."⁶⁸ John Willoughby likewise testified to the army's reliance on the curfew,

describing how the Cypriots were not allowed to talk with each other and were forced to line up against a wall and then lie down on the ground.⁶⁹ An army intelligence report in early June concluded that many Greeks and Turks owed their lives to the “impartial efforts” of the Security Forces and even argued that the army was “popular” in districts where Greeks were afraid of Turkish attacks.⁷⁰

In a sense, however, while soldiers could contain and even prevent intercommunal violence by instituting curfews, the army was arguably confined to reactive solutions in that the true solution to the troubles of 1958 involved cracking down on both the EOKA and TMT. The central issue was that the Cyprus Police Force, responsible for providing timely intelligence, was unable to take proactive measures or to tackle either organization. Turkish and Greek Cypriot police officers remained unwilling to crack down on agitators within their own communities and thus the burden of intercommunal policing fell to the army.

Despite Greek criticism that the army aided the Turks in killing off Greeks, the army did attempt to objectively police both communities. Naturally, many British soldiers felt an affinity for the Turks, who had remained loyal partners for most of the emergency. Jack Taylor even revealed that on some level, the British actively supported Volkan. In one case, the police escorted and covered a Turkish Volkan leader wherever he went because he was “very pro-British” and despite the fact that he was a member of an underground organization.⁷¹ Similarly, Carr attested to the good relations between the Security Forces and the Turkish Cypriot community as a whole. On one occasion, Carr was deputed to greet and protect a Turk visiting from the mainland whom Carr thought was a soldier⁷²; the fact that he was not ordered to arrest or in any way hinder this visitor indicates that the administration often treated Turks and Greeks unequally. If a Greek Army soldier, for example, had visited in similar conditions, there is no doubt that he would have been arrested.

At the same time, however, such friendly incidents had occurred before the descent into island-wide violence that occurred in the summer of 1958. Whereas the Security Forces had either cooperated with or turned a blind eye to Turkish Cypriot activities in 1956 and 1957, the TMT had taken on a more anti-British line by 1958. A TMT leaflet in February of 1958 proclaimed that “the tyrannical rulers have at least realized their mistake and have penitently learnt what sort of a man the Turk is...Have they taken us for loyal and obedient subjects? The Turk has no other friend

than the Turk.”⁷³ An April leaflet went further, criticizing “British rule which has for many years now completely ignored the Turkish rights and has been trying to suppress and silence with bullets our very innocent manifestations.”⁷⁴

Sir Anthony Eden in his memoirs supplied an Orientalist reason for increasing Turkish aggression, explaining that “the Turk is slow to anger, but once roused, he is implacable.”⁷⁵ Increasing Turkish violence was not due to hereditary character traits, but instead due to the very real provocations that Turkish Cypriots had endured since 1955. Regardless of the source of this newfound Turkish staunchness, however, British soldiers operating in 1958 could no longer afford to see the Turks as cooperative but were forced to treat their erstwhile allies as potential threats to public order.

In July 1958, the Security Forces arrested nearly 2000 persons suspected of inflaming intercommunal strife: of these 2000 were about “70 Turkish Cypriot thugs” belonging to the TMT.⁷⁶ Seventy might seem a small number, but given that the army had fairly little intelligence on the TMT, the organization only having become active several months before, these arrests were significant. Miers held that “the operations was instantly successful in restoring confidence to the Turkish minority who proclaimed that they would not attack members of the Security Forces and only act in self-defense against the Greeks.”⁷⁷

Despite the firm action by the British Army, the intercommunal troubles died down in August 1958 only when both the EOKA and TMT suspended terrorist activities.⁷⁸ The army had in many cases acted firmly and promptly, and without British soldiers, the number of Greeks and Turks killed would undoubtedly have been much higher. Yet Sir Anthony Eden was certainly correct in pointing out that “Graeco-Turkish racial conflict on the island was a far greater danger than anything EOKA terrorism could contrive.”⁷⁹ The troubles of 1958 demonstrated that Harding’s police reforms were at best a stopgap measure. In particular, the Cyprus Police Force relied too heavily on Turks, who could be counted on for police work in the early years of the revolt, but who, like their Greek counterparts, could not be counted on to police their own communities in time of intercommunal strife. More ominously, although the British had been present to stop Greek-Turkish violence in 1958, such incidents were but a foretaste of the more serious troubles that would emerge in the decades to come.

DIVIDE AND RULE: RE-EVALUATING HISTORICAL TREATMENTS OF BRITISH CONDUCT

Even though the Security Forces attempted to police both communities objectively during the troubles of 1958, historians have continued to argue that such intercommunal violence was a direct result of, or perhaps even a deliberate aspect, of a broader British policy of divide and rule. Christos Ioannides in his study of communal strife during the Cyprus Revolt argues that “from 1954 onward, London embarked on a systematic policy of ‘divide and rule’ and encouraged the Turkish minority to turn against the Greeks.”⁸⁰ Ioannides cites the noted Hellenophile, Christopher “Monty” Woodhouse, who wrote in 1954 that then Foreign Secretary “Harold McMillan [*sic*] was urging us to stir up the Turks in order to neutralize Greek agitation.”⁸¹ To extend such an argument, one might contend that even if the Security Forces did attempt to police Turkish and Greek Cypriots in 1958, the British still bear the ultimate blame for intercommunal violence because they consistently pitted Turkish and Greek Cypriots against each other in the decades before the revolt.

On the international scene, British diplomats almost certainly sought to play Turkey against Greece. At the various international conferences throughout the revolt years, British and Turkish delegates tended to side with each other, with the Turks initially supporting the status quo, whereby Britain would continue to rule Cyprus. The goal of constantly highlighting Greek-Turkish disagreement was to prove that continued British sovereignty was the best solution possible. As Crouzet notes, for example, at the August 29, 1955, international conference at Lancaster House, convened to discuss the status of Cyprus, it seemed Britain’s main goal was not to find solutions for the crisis but instead to “display the divergence of opinion between the Greeks and Turks.”⁸² Still, it is important to note that British and Turkish policy differences widened, especially as intercommunal violence threatened to plunge the island into civil war. The Turks increasingly began to call for partition, while British officials, with certain notable exceptions such as Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, tended to oppose partition.

Yet on the island itself, the Cypriot Government and the Security Forces do not appear to have implemented a deliberate policy of divide and rule. British officials were aware that divide-and-rule policies might well lead to grave regional repercussions. In a private February 1958 letter to Lord Harding, before the island had descended into intercommunal chaos,

George Sinclair stressed the need to “reach a solution that will not set the two communities in Cyprus at each other’s throats and thus embroil Greece and Turkey in reprisals against minorities and possibly worse.”⁸³

Although the British actively sought to keep Cyprus under their control, the London government remained keenly aware of Britain’s Cold War system of alliances. Greece and Turkey were key members of NATO, and as Crouzet notes, the “greatest danger that could arise from the Cyprus crisis was the possibility of an irremediable quarrel between Turkey and Greece.”⁸⁴ Thus, while British diplomats proved eager to side with their Turkish counterparts at international conferences, where the stakes were lower, British officials in Cyprus were compelled to keep a close watch on facts on the ground, lest chaos on Cyprus result in a hot war between Greece and Turkey—a war that might well lead to the extension of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean.

The British policy that has attracted the most criticism was the administration’s overreliance on Turkish Cypriot policemen. After all, employing the members of one community against the members of another seems standard divide-and-rule practice. For example, the British used Jewish supernumeraries against Arab rebels during the Great Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. Andrekos Varnava expresses the traditional, if incorrect, view that the massive recruitment of Turkish Cypriots into the Cyprus Police Force was “a policy of exploitation of the worst sort.”⁸⁵ The extensive recruitment of Turkish Cypriots, however, stemmed not from an intentional policy of divide and rule, but instead from a lack of alternative options. As late as 1958, John S. Brown, then Chief Constable of Cyprus, noted that “in an attempt to rectify the racial balance, preference was given to Greek Cypriot applicants.”⁸⁶ The British were aware that to police the Greek Cypriot community, they needed the aid of trustworthy Greek Cypriot constables. Having failed to build up a core of loyal Greek police officers in the Cyprus Police Force in the 1940s and 1950s, however, the British had little choice, once the revolt broke out, but to rely increasingly on Turkish Cypriots. As John Reddaway affirms, such reliance on the Turks “was not politically motivated” but did have the negative consequence of making “us more dependent on the Turkish community.”⁸⁷

Moreover, in the years leading up to the revolt, the British had arguably tried to increase cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, not forge divisions. Indeed, Alexis Rappas argued that in the years following the 1931 Greek Cypriot riots, Governor Sir Richmond Palmer had instituted educational, agricultural, and governmental reforms with the

intention of “turning Cypriots into British subjects in the full sense of the term.”⁸⁸ Then, during the Second World War, Greek and Turkish Cypriots served alongside each other in the Cyprus Regiment. Combat forges brotherhood and the British did not organize the regiment into separate Turkish and Greek Cypriot battalions. Institutions like the English School and the British Institute, both in Nicosia, were, it has been noted, meant to instill among the Cypriots a sense of British identity.

Thus, while the Cypriot administration might well be charged with incompetence for having failed to build up a proper police force, charges that local officials deliberately applied the politics of divide and rule are tenuous at best. As the accounts of soldiers attest, the British clearly attempted to police both communities objectively during the troubles of 1958. The increased reliance on Turkish personnel, which had started in 1955, was not the result of a deep-seated British strategy of divide and rule, but instead the consequence of a failure to prioritize Cyprus Police Force funding throughout the entirety of the British colonial period.

THE FINAL ROUND: GENERAL DARLING AND THE REFORMS OF 1958–1959

As August turned to September, the EOKA ceased its attacks on Greek leftists and on Turkish Cypriots and turned once more to target the Security Forces. Miers noted in September a considerable increase in terrorist activity: the EOKA launched a spate of ambushes against Security Force convoys; in addition, the EOKA assassinated a British Assistant Superintendent of Police as well as an RAF Warrant Officer.⁸⁹ In October, the EOKA continued its campaign of violence, mounting rural ambushes against Security Force patrols and launching roughly a dozen attacks a day.⁹⁰ EOKA gunmen also carried out a number of successful killings in towns—the most notorious incident of all was the murder of Ms. Catherine Cutcliffe, a sergeant’s wife, on October 3.⁹¹ In targeting Greek Akelists and Turkish Cypriots over the summer of 1958, Grivas had unleashed an unforeseeable wave of violence, but had at the same time fulfilled his core objective—to distract the Security Forces, thereby allowing the EOKA to obtain the space and time to reconstitute itself. The wave of violence that gripped Cyprus in the fall of 1958 bore testament to how completely the EOKA had reformed its capabilities.

Once again, however, the Security Forces proved themselves up to the challenge. General Kenneth Darling succeeded General Joe Kendrew as

Director of Operations in October 1958 and immediately set about adapting the Security Forces to better take on the EOKA. Most notably, General Darling espoused the use of small unit tactics, calling for the use of “brains not brawn” and also reformed extensively the Security Force’s intelligence setup.⁹² As a result, Security Forces met with increased successes in late 1958 and early 1959, although, just as in March 1957, the Security Forces never succeeded in inflicting total defeat on the EOKA.

General Darling moved quickly to reform the Security Forces and in late October was already pushing his troops to employ small unit tactics. A directive issued to all troops in October 1958 proclaimed that the cordon and search was a clumsy operation and was to be used rarely and only when the chances of success were high.⁹³ In place of the cordon and search, Darling recommended that troops become more like EOKA fighters and learn to operate underground in small foot patrols of two to five men.⁹⁴ Darling also instituted a Battle School where newly arrived troops underwent acclimatization training before commencing anti-terrorist operations; the school also offered refresher courses for officers and NCOs.⁹⁵

Darling pushed his troops hard, especially since soldiers tended to have trouble employing small unit tactics. For example, Darling noted that night ambushes mounted by his men were often unsuccessful: “the main weakness proved to be in the method and timings of the challenge.” Shooting accurately at night is a difficult task; without the aid of night-vision goggles, soldiers serving in Cyprus were unable to fight effectively at night and as Darling admitted, even experienced soldiers were bound to discharge their weapons before the target was within distance.⁹⁶ Martin Bell contended that General Darling’s small unit tactics were ill-suited to the needs of warfighting in Cyprus, noting in particular that small patrols were virtually useless in the towns, where forces had to be deployed in large enough numbers so as to prevent major riots from developing.⁹⁷

In general, however, Darling’s men took a liking to the new commander. Eric Basil Buruni, for example, described Darling as “a very dynamic little man, and I can remember him coming around and telling us that we were doing a good job but we ought to do a better one.”⁹⁸ Moreover, intelligence reports indicate that Darling’s new tactics did effectively stem EOKA violence and even pushed the EOKA onto the defensive. Miers wrote that during the middle of November, the number of EOKA attacks declined sharply and linked this decline to the new countermeasures and tactics adopted by the Security Forces.⁹⁹ Likewise, army

intelligence reports revealed that Darling's tactics were working. The report for November 21–28, 1958, indicated that Darling's reforms had forced the EOKA onto the defensive and also referred to the "marked decrease" in EOKA attacks.¹⁰⁰

At the same time, Darling sought to revamp the Security Forces' intelligence network. In July 1958, General Kendrew had established the Cyprus Local Intelligence Committee, which allowed the "heads of all services" to meet regularly and to share with each other access to all grades of intelligence.¹⁰¹ Darling sought to further integrate the various intelligence organizations and by January 1959, all District Intelligence Committees were passing intelligence directly onto one, streamlined Central Committee.¹⁰² More significantly, Darling strengthened the Security Forces' counter-intelligence capabilities by ensuring that Greek Cypriots were not informed of operational developments. Army units were pre-stocked with reserves and materiel so that they could launch operations without having to inform the Logistics Corps, which employed quite a few Greek Cypriots.¹⁰³ Army unit commanders also increasingly emphasized secrecy, maintaining "need-to-know lists" and telling individual officers only about the parts of the overall battle plan that concerned them.¹⁰⁴ Darling also focused on improving the Cyprus Police Force's intelligence capabilities and thus imported John Prendergast, who had directed Kenya's Special Branch. Indeed, Darling marked November 21, the date of Prendergast's arrival, as a "turning point."¹⁰⁵

Darling's intelligence reforms had an immediate impact, with the cumulative effect that EOKA operatives found it much more difficult to carry out reconnaissance operations.¹⁰⁶ Most significantly, Darling and Prendergast held that by February 1959 they had discovered the site of Grivas' hideout—a house in Nicosia.¹⁰⁷ Darling had Prendergast fly to London to inform Governor Hugh Foot of the update, Foot having departed to London for a final round of negotiations with the Greek and Turkish governments to decide the ultimate fate of the island. As Robert Holland points out, Prime Minister Macmillan was informed of Grivas' detection, but he sent Prendergast back to Nicosia with the instructions that Grivas should be left to "stew in his own juice." Macmillan's rationale was that any move against Grivas would have disrupted the ongoing London conference, which was to end the Cyprus Revolt and lay the legal foundations for the short-lived Republic of Cyprus.¹⁰⁸

In her study of the Cyprus Revolt, Nancy Crawshaw did not recount the story of Grivas' detection. In a letter to General Darling in June of

1979, Crawshaw related that her reason for not including this story was that “I...have not found a published source which I could have used to corroborate this information.”¹⁰⁹ The memoirs of the Greek Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averoff, which Robert Holland quoted in his own study, at the very least indicate that Macmillan did inform Averoff of the discovery of Grivas’s hideout.¹¹⁰

Whether or not the Security Forces did indeed find Grivas’s hideout is likely to remain a matter of scientific conjecture. Grivas contended that the Security Forces had lied about finding his hideout, while Prendergast and Darling both argued that they had indeed found Grivas—one man’s word against another’s or rather, one side’s word against another’s. This author argues, however, that the British had likely located Grivas. Whereas Grivas often falsified and exaggerated claims in his memoirs, Darling and Prendergast’s own reminiscences closely match the historical record. Secondly, Darling and Prendergast had reformed the Security Force’s intelligence so extensively that the intelligence services were wholly capable of as important a find as the discovery of Grivas’s hideout.

To an extent, however, the discovery of Grivas’s hideout had little practical effect. By early 1959, military operations had taken a backseat to political negotiations. More significantly, even if the Security Forces had been given a free hand to kill or capture Grivas, it is unlikely that the EOKA would have collapsed. The EOKA, as Darling himself admitted, benefited from an “unlimited supply” of recruits and a generally cooperative Greek Cypriot population.¹¹¹ Although Grivas was an exceptionally talented guerilla leader, the EOKA eventually could have reconstituted itself because of the depth of Greek Cypriot feeling. Of course, had Grivas been eliminated early on in the revolt, the EOKA might have collapsed entirely. But in 1959, after four years of bitter fighting and the emergence of intercommunal violence and intra-Greek violence, there was no question that the Greek Cypriot population was almost wholly for Enosis. To pretend that killing one man, even a man as important as Grivas, could defeat a movement was jejune.

Ultimately, although General Darling did much to reorganize the Security Forces and to force the EOKA back on the defensive, the EOKA was by no means totally defeated in early 1959. In March 1959, with the London Conference concluded, Grivas finally issued instructions to EOKA rebels to hand over their weapons and to cooperate with the authorities. On March 20, 284 EOKA men who had spent the past several months in hiding traveled to Nicosia and were rapturously received by crowds of

Greek Cypriots.¹¹² British analysts had only ever estimated the EOKA to be made up of 200–300 hardcore members,¹¹³ that 284 were still in hiding as late as March 1959 indicates that the Security Forces were not close to eradicating the EOKA.

CONCLUSION

Over the course of 1957, the EOKA reconstituted itself rapidly and by the end of the year was able to launch a spate of devastating attacks. Due to Grivas' personal antipathy toward the Communists and to the broader history of tension between the Greek Cypriot Nationalist Right and the Left, EOKA operatives demonstrated no compunction in harassing and murdering leftists in late 1957. Though Greek leftists were initially hesitant to respond to such provocations, citing their belief in Enosis and faith in Makarios, Left-Right violence consumed Cyprus in early 1958. Although the Cypriot government failed to respond effectively to this widening split in Greek ranks, there is little the Security Forces could have done to leverage this internecine conflict. With leftists unwilling to turn to the police force for help and with the vast majority of Greek leftists wholly in favor of Enosis, the Security Forces were unable to either stem the violence or use it to the administration's advantage.

At the same time, Grivas decided to commence organized attacks on the Turkish Cypriot community. With the Turks firmly organized under Volkan and later TMT, such a tactic was bound to result in mass violence. Indeed, Grivas' campaign against the Turks led to the onset of intercommunal killing in the summer of 1958. Although army troops energetically erected barricades and announced curfews in the larger towns, Greek and Turkish Cypriot constables proved unwilling or incapable of controlling their own communities, with the result that the Security Forces were limited to reactive tactics and proved unable to prevent the violence. Although the reliance on Turkish Cypriot police personnel hamstrung the Security Forces, the British did their best to arrest TMT members and to administer the law impartially. Overall, the intercommunal attacks of 1958 were to leave an indelible impression on the minds of many Cypriots and arguably set the stage for similar violence in the 1960s and 1970s.

In August 1958 the EOKA and TMT called for a suspension of intercommunal violence, with Grivas' men immediately resuming attacks on the Security Forces. General Darling's extensive reforms to the intelligence network and focus on small unit tactics allowed the Security Forces

to quickly regain the initiative against EOKA fighters and, if Prendergast and Darling were correct, to locate Grivas' hideout. Yet by March 1959 the army had failed to completely eradicate the EOKA, which remained well-staffed and prepared to continue hostilities.

NOTES

1. Andreas Varnavas, *A Brief History of the Liberation Struggle of EOKA, 1955–1959* (Nicosia: EOKA Liberation Struggle 1955–59 Foundation, 2001), 365.
2. PEKA (The Political Committee of the Cypriot Struggle) was the political wing of EOKA and was responsible for issuing propaganda leaflets and tracts.
3. CAC GBR/0014/MIER 2/4. Letters from Flag Officer, Middle East, to CIC Mediterranean, 1957.
4. French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955–1959*, 152–3.
5. In Greek, “Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú.”
6. KCL GB0099 KCLMA Gilbert-Smith, Press Cuttings 1950–1957, “Cyprus Peace in Sight,” *News Chronicle*, December 31, 1955.
7. CAC GBR/0014/AMEJ 1/5 “Why We Are in Cyprus: Background Notes for British Servicemen, 9.
8. British Library, Press Archives, *The Times of Cyprus*, July 18, 1955.
9. *Ibid.*, October 2, 1955.
10. *Ibid.*, June 8, 1957.
11. IWM 3440, Papers of C.R. Butt, 51.
12. French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955–1959*, 46–47. “Khi” is the Greek equivalent of the English letter ‘X’ and thus Organization Khi was known also as Organization X.
13. Papaioannou, *Ευθυμίες από την Ζωή Μου* (Memories from my Life), 86.
14. IWM 13223, Papers of General Sir Kenneth Darling, “Monograph” by Magan (MI6), 2, 5.
15. CAC GBR/0014/MIER 2/4. Letters from Flag Officer, Middle East, to CIC Mediterranean, 1957, August 1957.
16. IWM 4464, Papers of Howell Everson, Weekly Intelligence Summaries, 13 September 1957–20 September 1957.
17. *Ibid.*, 7 January 1958–24 January 1958.
18. *Ibid.*
19. CAC GBR/0014/MIER 2/5. Letters from Flag Officer, Middle East, to CIC Mediterranean, 1958, May 1958; IWM 4464, Papers of Howell Everson, Weekly Intelligence Summaries, 23 May 1958–30 May 1958.

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21. *Turkey's Expansionist Designs on Cyprus—the Role of TMT* (Nicosia: Public Information Office, 1979), 8.
22. IWM 4464, Papers of Howell Everson, Weekly Intelligence Summaries, 6 June 1958–13 June 1958.
23. Ibid., 2 May 1958 to 9 May 1958.
24. CAC GBR/0014/MIER 2/5. Letters from Flag Officer, Middle East, to CIC Mediterranean, 1958, August 1958.
25. IWMSA 9173, John Reddaway, Reel 8.
26. KCL GB0099 KCLMA Gilbert-Smith, Press Cuttings 1950–1957, Nancy Crawshaw, "Mass intimidation in Cyprus: The tyranny of EOKA," *Manchester Guardian*, October 6, 1958.
27. Robert Holland, "Never, Never Land; British Colonial Police and the Roots of Violence in Cyprus, 1950–54," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 21, no. 3 (2008), 159.
28. CAC GBR/0014/MIER 2/4. Letters from Flag Officer, Middle East, to CIC Mediterranean, 1957, August 1957.
29. KCL GB0099 KCLMA Gilbert-Smith, Press Cuttings 1950–1957, "Three EOKA men killed, Load of Arms on bicycles, Cyprus lull ended," the *Times*, August 25, 1958.
30. IWM 4464, Papers of Reverend Howell-Everson, AKEL Leaflet.
31. IWM 2870, Papers of FW Bird, Annual Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1957 by Lt Col Geoffrey C. White, CMG, OBE, 8.
32. Ibid., Annual Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1954 by G.H. Robins, MBE, 4.
33. British Library, Press Archives, *The Times of Cyprus*, June 11, 1955.
34. KCL GB0099 KCLMA Dunbar, "The Turkish People of Cyprus" by Adrian Seligman, 17.
35. In Turkish, "Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu."
36. Ulvi Keser, *Kıbrıs'ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı* (İstanbul: İQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2007), 182.
37. Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 73.
38. CAC GBR/0014/MIER 2/3. Letters from Flag Officer, Middle East, to CIC Mediterranean, 1955–1956, January 1956.
39. Ibid., 16–31 March, 1956.
40. IWM 1779, Papers of Ian Martin, The Cyprus Troubles 1955–60, 2.
41. Constantine P. Verinis, "The Cyprus Question: The Way Out," The *New York Times*, June 29, 1958.
42. Stefanides, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*, 207.
43. Ibid.
44. Durrell, *Bitter Lemons*, 200.

45. Sanver, *TMT ve ÖHD Anılarım*, 47.
46. CAC GBR/0014/AMEJ 1/5 "The Cypriot-Turkish Point of View on the Cyprus Question," by the Cyprus Turkish Delegation, 7 October 1954, 6–7.
47. GF Hudson, "Turkey's Case in Cyprus," *Daily Telegraph*, April 16, 1957.
48. CAC GBR/0014/MIER 2/3. Letters from Flag Officer, Middle East, to CIC Mediterranean, 1955–1956, January 1956.
49. Tansu, *Aslında Hiç Kimse Uyumuyordu*, 47.
50. IWM 3440, Papers of C.R. Butt, 62.
51. IWMSA 33385, John Patterson Carr, Reel 17.
52. Ibid.
53. Tansu, *Aslında Hiç Kimse Uyumuyordu*, 37.
54. Ibid., 28.
55. CAC GBR/0014/MIER 2/5. Letters from Flag Officer, Middle East, to CIC Mediterranean, 1958, May 1958.
56. IWMSA 9173, John Reddaway, Reel 11.
57. IWM 2870, Papers of FW Bird, Annual Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1958 by John E.S. Brown Esq., OBE, 15.
58. Keser, *Kıbrıs'ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*, 436.
59. Ibid. Keser repeatedly uses the plural *İngilizler* synonymously with the singular *İngiliz*. Though Keser uses the singular in this case (*İngiliz suçüstü hiç bir şey bulmadı*), it is clear that he means to refer to the plural British.
60. French, *Fighting EOKA*, 152.
61. CAC GBR/0014/MIER 2/4. Letters from Flag Officer, Middle East, to CIC Mediterranean, 1957, November 1957.
62. CAC GBR/0014/MIER 2/5. Letters from Flag Officer, Middle East, to CIC Mediterranean, 1958, May 1958.
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69. IWM 12980, Papers of Sir John Willoughby, Diary entry 5 June 1958.
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93. Ibid., *Report on the Cyprus Emergency*, Annex U, Directive No. 3.
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CHAPTER 4

A War of Perception: The Cypriot Government and Its Image During the Revolt

Abstract This chapter examines the Cypriot government's attempts to win the war of image and perception. Throughout the revolt, the government dealt with EOKA accusations of torture and war crimes. The government's strategy often tended toward repression, as demonstrated by two examples: an unwillingness to host an impartial inquiry and the decision to prosecute Charles Foley, editor of the *Times of Cyprus*. The government faced unique circumstances in waging the war of words on Cyprus; its overall conduct can furnish modern policymakers with lessons on the importance of press strategy.

Keywords Torture • European Commission on Human Rights • Times of Cyprus • Charles Foley

If the Vietnam War was fought in the average American's living room, with shocking images and clips beamed onto television sets around the nation, then the Cyprus Revolt was fought on the front pages of newspapers around the world. The British government, with its firm democratic traditions, was of course no stranger to press criticism in time of war. As Richard Crossman rightly notes in a 1958 op-ed that appeared in the *New*

Statesman, Laborites had publicly taken an anti-imperialist “and therefore ‘anti-British’” stance during the Boer War and the Irish War of Independence and as recently as the 1946–1948 Palestine troubles.¹

The Cyprus Revolt would witness similar debates played out in the British press, with Labor politicians attacking government policy and Tory ministers countering with their own invective and with a great many press outlets taking sides. Susan Carruthers ably charts London’s responses to EOKA propaganda, demonstrating how the British government as well as Colonial Office administrators crafted their own image of the revolt by producing their own publicity material and attempting to influence how the news was reported at home. Indeed, Carruthers demonstrates that such governmental efforts were not confined to the Cyprus Revolt and were instead a regular aspect of British counter-insurgency efforts.²

Yet missing from historical accounts of the Cyprus Revolt is a truly thorough analysis of local Cypriot news outlets. The revolt was of course distinct in how it captured a wider section of the international press than had most other internal security operations to date. Mainland Greek and Turkish press outlets naturally kept a close eye on events unfolding on the island, but the administration also had to confront a uniquely robust and diverse indigenous press network. Greek-language papers such as *Haravghi*, Turkish-language papers such as *Halkın Sesi*, and the English-language papers *The Cyprus Mail* and the more influential *Times of Cyprus* all catered to a wide variety of audiences.

Since the British government itself viewed the Cyprus problem as requiring an interstate solution, to be negotiated with the Greek and Turkish governments,³ the administration in Cyprus soon found that it could not simply censor or ban the publication of local papers that adopted a critical view of the government. To do so would have incurred the displeasure of Greek or Turkish officials. Thus, although Harding’s emergency laws technically allowed for the censorship of local media outlets,⁴ the government soon discovered that attempts to muzzle local papers resulted in an overwhelming backlash, not only from Greek and Turkish press but also from domestic opinion in Britain.

Instead, the administration, both in London and in Cyprus, found itself compelled to respond to EOKA propaganda with counter-propaganda. Carruthers, in her study of propaganda during the Cyprus Revolt, analyzes the successes and failures of Britain’s overall propaganda strategy. Despite several short-term successes, the Cypriot government often acted in a block-headed fashion; government publicity material, for example, as

well as Tory MPs “constantly reiterated the point that Cyprus had never been Greek.”⁵ Such statements, while perhaps legally accurate, could only serve to further inflame tensions on the island. Yet if government propaganda strategy was at times misguided, it was by no means inactive. The Cypriot government simply could not afford for what it saw as the press’ hyperbolic charges to go unanswered.

This chapter as a whole examines the Cypriot government’s efforts to control and manipulate its own image. Despite several steps in the right direction, the government too often employed repressive policies, demonstrated by its unwillingness to host an impartial inquiry and its decision to prosecute Charles Foley. The first sub-section deals with the matter of an impartial inquiry and thus with EOKA claims that the Security Forces had committed torture. The section determines the actual amount of harsh treatment meted out by the Security Forces, examines the Cypriot Government’s response to such allegations, and analyzes the European Commission on Human Rights’ fact-finding visit to Cyprus of January 1958.

The second part of this chapter revisits the Cypriot Government’s decision to bring Charles Foley, editor of the *Times of Cyprus*, to court, arguing that this decision was a mistake, not only because of the press backlash it elicited but also because the *Times of Cyprus*, while sometimes critical of governmental policy, was not as pro-EOKA as many of its critics maintained.

Lastly, this chapter concludes with a best practices section, highlighting the handful of British press measures that were successful and suggesting what the Cypriot Government might have improved in its conduct of the war of words.

HER MAJESTY’S TORTURERS: BRITISH CONDUCT DURING THE REVOLT

British troops throughout the revolt had to contend with allegations of systematic torture and brutality. The EOKA, always sensitive to its global image, repeatedly cast its fighters as freedom fighters who were resisting tyranny and barbarity. An EOKA leaflet, found in November 1957 in Ormophita, carried the title “The Nazi Tories and We.” The leaflet accused British forces of torturing “detainees with a well-studied system of brutal tortures, for which even Hitler’s Nazi would envy them, and for which they are accused in the world Committee of Human Rights.”⁶ Another

EOKA leaflet, found in March 1958, couched its message in anti-fascist and anti-Nazi language again, proclaiming, “freedom will come out of the Cyprus holocaust.”⁷

Although such appeals were obviously hyperbolic, it appeared, to quote a governmental pamphlet, that “if you throw enough mud, some of it sticks.”⁸ Press correspondents reprinted and repeated EOKA’s accusations. Charles Foley, editor of the *Times of Cyprus*, accused the army of torture in his history of the Cyprus Revolt, contending that troops employed a battery of violent interrogation tactics: beating suspects on the stomach with a flat board, twisting testicles, and suffocating suspects with a wet cloth.⁹ Though his daily, the *Times of Cyprus*, was by no means as anti-governmental in attitude as some soldiers suggested, such personal views on military brutality undoubtedly colored the paper’s approach to the entire question of military conduct. In a June 14, 1957, article, for example, the *Times of Cyprus* criticized a governmental white paper that analyzed Cypriot allegations of torture, contending that the white paper was “for the overseas market only” and that an impartial inquiry was the only “way to Truth.”¹⁰ Though the article did not go so far as to directly accuse the Security Forces of torture, neither did it clear the Security Forces’ name.

Various press outlets in the United Kingdom, unhampered by the emergency regulations present in Cyprus, more directly attacked the conduct of British soldiers. Myrna Blumberg, a correspondent for the *Daily Herald*, in her op-ed “Look Back in Anger,” wrote that far from re-establishing law and order, Harding’s regime had brought “crime and disorder to that sunny isle in an unprecedented degree.”¹¹ And Foley, writing in the *Tribune*, after the end of hostilities, described “a common trick” whereby a subject would have “several of his fingers ... dislocated” or “a string tied around his testicles,”¹² although he simultaneously noted that many officers did not resort to torture. Various Labor MPs likewise seemed keen to uncover evidence of British wrongdoing, with Ms. Barbara Castle, MP for Blackburn and a notable member of the MCF, even visiting Cyprus to make her own assessment of the situation.¹³

Such allegations in the British press and among Laborites resulted in tremendous backlash from readers around the country, many of whom had sons or brothers serving in Cyprus under National Service. A *Sunday Graphic* article, for example, criticized Ms. Castle, arguing: “Mrs. Castle and her friends seem bent on attacking Britain as soon as they leave the country—and are prepared to take the word of the world’s troublemakers

as evidence.”¹⁴ Nevertheless, despite the fact that Labor Party officials were quick to note that Ms. Castle’s views were not representative of the party as a whole, such allegations damaged soldiers’ morale.

The Cypriot government, sensitive to world opinion, focused immediately on countering such claims, characterizing them as wholly false. In a November 1956 statement, Governor Harding proclaimed: “in all the cases so far investigated allegations and complaints of misconduct by the Security Forces have been found to have been grossly exaggerated. In many cases they have been shown to be completely false.”¹⁵ Lord Harding, in his foreword to a governmental pamphlet entitled “Allegations of Brutality in Cyprus,” argued that the courts had never “accepted allegations of torture or systematic ill treatment against the Security Forces.”¹⁶ The pamphlet then went on to analyze individual accusations, conceding that two army officers were convicted by court-martial for “assaulting a prisoner,” but noting that in the vast majority of cases, the courts had not charged individual army or police officers with misconduct. The authors concluded by arguing that many of the police officers accused of torture were members of United Kingdom Police Forces and were thus steeped in “traditions of restraint and humanity.” It was unfathomable that such men, with years of training and experience, should upon their arrival to Cyprus “turn into members of Hitler’s Gestapo.”¹⁷

Evidently, EOKA and governmental authorities advanced radically different visions of army and police conduct; the EOKA as well as hundreds of Greek Cypriots accused the Security Forces of Gestapo-like methods, while the Cypriot government completely disclaimed such allegations. Whose account of events was closer to the truth? The answer, as it so often does, lies not in the extremes, but in the middle. A careful analysis of soldiers’ accounts of the revolt indicates that while the Security Forces generally acted decorously, there were often instances of harsh treatment.

The Cyprus Police Force’s Special Branch, for example, developed a notorious reputation, not only among Greek Cypriots but also among British servicemen, for rough-handling terrorist suspects. Brigadier Michael Harbottle, who served in Cyprus as second in command of 1st Battalion, the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, bluntly characterized Special Branch methods as intolerable and unbecoming since they involved physical violence to gain information. When asked to clarify his meaning, Harbottle said: “there was torture in order to extract information.”¹⁸ Rex Cain, an officer with the Middlesex Regiment, likewise confirmed that Special Branch operators would interrogate suspects “fairly roughly” in order to find information about arms caches and rebel hideouts.¹⁹

Jack Taylor, a Royal Marines veteran who served during the revolt as part of Special Branch, admits that after he captured an EOKA gunman, named Ionides, he declared during an interrogation session that “I would do to him what the Gestapo did to our chaps during the war and would laugh while doing it ... as far as I was concerned the kid gloves were off.” While Taylor may not have personally tortured Ionides, “some of the Turkish Cypriots had a go at him” and “there was rough handling before I spoke to him.”²⁰

Such rough treatment of apprehended individuals, however, was by no means confined to Special Branch; army soldiers did on occasion exceed Harding’s directive of acting “firmly but courteously” and brutalize Greek Cypriots.²¹ Ian Martin, in his unpublished account of the Cyprus troubles, attached in the appendix a July 1958 letter to his mother. In that letter, Martin described in detail an incident that he witnessed during a cordon and search operation. An old man sitting in a holding cage stood up and indicated that he felt sick; Martin’s fellow soldiers punched the man in the stomach and beat him on the head with a baton. Martin dryly wrote: “and we fondly imagine that we are superior and more civilized than the Germans [and] Japanese.”²²

In another instance, Martin quoted a fellow soldier’s letter, describing vividly the army’s conduct following the murder of Catherine Cutcliffe, an army sergeant’s wife, on October 3, 1958. His friend wrote of how “things got particularly bloody and disgusting” and added that “there was wholesale rape and looting and murder.”²³ One regiment in particular, the Royal Ulster Rifles, appears to have acted indecorously and Martin’s friend wrote that though “the R.U.R. did not kill anyone, it was not for want of trying.”²⁴

There was forensic proof of such rough treatment, too. James Trainor, governmental coroner, in assessing the fallout from the Cutcliffe incident, concluded that “there was used on some of those arrested a degree of force that would appear to be entirely unjustified.” As Trainor and many other governmental officials rightfully noted, the mood of the troops was dangerous and to some extent understandable, given the fact that Ms. Catherine Cutcliffe was an innocent army wife as well as the fact that Greek spectators had refused to help Ms. Cutcliffe’s daughter after the murder, one spectator even laughing.²⁵ Still, Trainor noted, “nothing can justify the assaults on persons who had done nothing to warrant them.”²⁶ Clearly, both Special Branch and army personnel did on occasion eschew the common law tradition of minimal force, employing far more force than was necessary or appropriate.

At the same time, such indecent behavior does not seem to have been systematic or widespread in the army. Martin Bell, a National Serviceman, was particularly proud of his own regiment, the Suffolks, and of how his fellow soldiers conducted themselves during the emergency. Following the murder of Ms. Cutcliffe, for example, Bell affirmed that the “steady Suffolks did not rampage. We believed that the Governor [Foot], who had no control over the army’s deployments and operations, wanted more of us and fewer of the others, Scots and Irish especially.”²⁷ Harsh behavior seems to have been confined to a limited set of regiments, with Bell noting that toward the end of the emergency, the Suffolks had to deal not only with rioting Greeks and Turks, but also with “Black Watch ‘on the spree.’”²⁸

Furthermore, the vast majority of soldiers made no mention whatsoever of harsh treatment and instead seemed to enjoy decent relations with local villagers during their time in Cyprus. Life in Cyprus as depicted by multiple soldiers seemed a far cry away from British press headlines that branded Cyprus as “Terror Island.”²⁹ John Patterson Carr, an officer with 1st Battalion the Norfolk Regiment, even recalled how excited he was when he realized there were plenty of ruins to explore, with the ancient city of Kourion situated directly across from his camp.³⁰

Soldiers often got on well with the local villagers. A.R. Ashton of 45 Commando wrote: “our garrison duties continued without incident, our relationship with the villagers being polite but slightly cool.”³¹ Len Townend, a British aircraft assistant serving with the RAF Maintenance unit characterized the local mukhtars as “quite polite.” He reminisced that the mukhtars would offer visiting soldiers a cup of coffee and a bite to eat, though they would remain “pretty non-forthcoming” with valuable intelligence.³² From time to time, though, relations were more than cool and cordial. Commander Peter Corson recalled that he was invited to a Greek Cypriot wedding in 1957: “the friendliness of everyone there made us feel as though we really belonged amongst the guests ... the echoes of the terrorism of the ‘Emergency’ seemed far away indeed.”³³

Thus, through the diaries and reminiscences of Cyprus veterans, a more nuanced and variegated picture of British conduct during the revolt emerges. British conduct during the conflict was generally decorous, but could prove to be brutal and inexcusable. Certainly, Governor Harding’s statement that “I don’t believe there was torture or ill-treatment in interrogation” proved to be incorrect.³⁴ As Brigadier Harbottle notes, the Special Branch did indeed employ torture—though the question of how

regular and systematic that torture was remains unanswered. Jack Taylor's revelation that prisoners were beaten indicates though that torture certainly did happen, at the very least, on occasion. Brutal treatment was not confined to the Special Branch and Ian Martin's descriptions of the Ulsters on rampage are chilling.

Yet on the other hand, brutal treatment and torture were by no means widespread throughout the services. The vast majority of soldiers mentioned neither torture nor rough treatment during arrests and operations, indicating that the excesses described by Harbottle, Taylor, and Martin could not have been as widespread as the EOKA contended. Better proof of good conduct is that the local population often did not treat or view soldiers as Gestapo henchmen; the fact, for example, that Commander Corson could enjoy a wedding hosted by Greek Cypriots in 1957 indicated that Anglo-Hellenic bonds could and often did weather the stormy years of the Cyprus Revolt.

THE STIFF UPPER LIP: THE CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO TORTURE ALLEGATIONS

Regardless of how aware governmental officials were of harsh treatment by the Security Forces, the official response to EOKA and press allegations of inappropriate conduct clearly left much to be desired. Major C.R. Butt, then serving as an intelligence sergeant, contended that the British government fared poorly in the propaganda battle waged in the United Nations and in the world at large, for in contrast to "Greek imaginative hysteria...our statements are too factual to sway emotion."³⁵ Butt also contends that Grivas was able to take advantage of the "silences and almost non-existent and fumblingly stiff upper-lipped British statements" and argue "that we had no answer to...his allegations."³⁶

Butt's description of British conduct during the war of words is perhaps overly harsh; although the British reaction to allegations might well be termed ineffective, it was by no means inactive. From the very beginning of the emergency, the administration as well as the Security Forces focused on addressing allegations of ill treatment. Certainly Lord Harding placed a premium on getting timely and accurate information to the press correspondents, recalling: "we took as many pains as we could to keep them properly informed."³⁷ As Brigadier Baker mentioned in his report on the first half of the Cyprus Revolt, in November 1955, a Director-General of Information Service, responsible for addressing propagandistic claims

and issuing counter-propaganda, was appointed and in the following weeks an "information organization was built up with excellent results."³⁸

Press measures continued and arguably improved throughout the course of the emergency. In 1957, the government issued a pamphlet entitled "Allegations of Brutality in Cyprus," which did systematically address and dismiss various allegations of brutal behavior by the troops.³⁹ In 1958, the Security Forces instituted even more robust press measures. General Darling's report references the excellent work done by the Special Investigation Group (SIG), established in June 1958 to forestall and deny allegations of improper conduct.⁴⁰ The SIG's main function was to forestall "complaints/allegations by timely on-the-spot investigations" and also to publish "accurate facts before any allegations were made." If allegations had already been made, then the SIG would act to investigate allegations and then would issue "prompt, positive and accurate statement or denial."⁴¹

Evidently, the governmental reaction to allegations of harsh treatment was by no means as "silent and non-existent" as Major Butt had contended. Nevertheless, the question remains of the effectiveness of such measures. Despite the plethora of measures introduced by the Cypriot administration, press agencies often did not wait for "confirmation or denial of the report" to flash "its report round the world" and Lord Harding, Brigadier Baker, and General Darling all expressed frustration with the press.⁴² The larger problem was that the situation was one in which EOKA's word was pitted against the government's. EOKA's allegations were obviously hyperbolic, but the government's conclusion that members of the Security Forces were innocent, with the exception of two officers convicted by court-martial, was likewise unsatisfactory.

A variety of press outlets thus took the view that the only way toward the truth was to appoint an impartial inquiry whereby a committee or group of fact-finders would visit the island and determine whether or not Greek Cypriot allegations of mistreatment were accurate. The *Times of Cyprus*, often critical of governmental policy, unsurprisingly called for an impartial inquiry on several instances. On June 9, 1957, for example, in a piece entitled "the Flaw in the Argument," the *Times of Cyprus* criticized John Reddaway's dismissal of allegations of mistreatment and questioned why the government would not "itself welcome [a] public inquiry."⁴³ British papers likewise called for an investigation into troop conduct. A *Daily Mirror* piece entitled "Makarios: Horrible Charges" likewise proclaimed the need for an inquiry: "In the opinion of this paper, these charges are part of a vicious propaganda campaign...the Mirror repeats:

Only an impartial inquiry into the allegations—old and new—can clear the air.”⁴⁴ Perhaps the most surprising assessment came from the *Manchester Guardian*, which had tended to stand by the troops in past op-eds. The *Guardian*’s argument, issued after the murder of Catherine Cutcliffe, was level-headed and indicative of the widely held belief that an investigation ought to be held: “It is not enough for us to say that these are our boys, who do not misbehave, or that their blood was up because one of their comrades had just been murdered...an impartial investigation from outside Cyprus is essential.”⁴⁵

In many ways, the *Guardian*’s call for an impartial inquiry resembled Walter Cronkite’s February 27, 1968, broadcast, issued after the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War. Cronkite said: “We’ve been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders both in Vietnam and Washington to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds.”⁴⁶ President Johnson, watching Cronkite’s broadcast, was said to have muttered: “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost middle America.”⁴⁷ Of course, the *Manchester Guardian* perhaps did not carry the same sway in the United Kingdom as CBS News did in America in the 1960s. Still, the fact remains that a broad section of the British press had lost faith in the Cypriot Government’s denials of Greek Cypriot allegations and in calling for an impartial inquiry demonstrated disbelief in the narrative put forward by the administration.

FIGHTING WITH ONE HAND TIED BEHIND THE BACK: OPPOSITION TO AN IMPARTIAL INQUIRY

The Cypriot Government was hesitant to allow an impartial inquiry into troop conduct. The central issue was that hosting an impartial inquiry would have undoubtedly further damaged troop morale, already low due to certain particularities of waging counter-insurgency warfare in Cyprus. Whereas soldiers in Kenya and Malaya could act harshly or firmly without fear of sparking outrage in the press,⁴⁸ soldiers in Cyprus were compelled to pay meticulous attention to principles such as the minimal use of force and respect for common law traditions.

Major Timothy Ang, in his comparative analysis of the counter-insurgencies in Kenya, Malaya, and Cyprus, briefly notes that the three conflicts featured “fundamental and entrenched differences in their troubled socio-political situations,” while focusing predominantly on the similarities between the three cases.⁴⁹ Ang does not go nearly far enough in emphasiz-

ing the differences between the three conflicts—differences that remain important for policymakers aiming to transplant lessons from past to present. Troops in Cyprus were constrained because of a host of unique reasons, all of which made counter-insurgency warfare particularly difficult and tended to sap troop morale.

Firstly, Cyprus, unlike Kenya or Malaya, constantly basked in the press spotlight. Hellenophiles like Monty Woodhouse and members of the anti-colonial lobby often voiced their opposition to British policy in Cyprus,⁵⁰ but the government had faced domestic opposition during the Kenyan and Malayan emergencies too. The more critical issue was that British press columnists and indeed the public viewed Cypriots—at least Greek Cypriots—as Europeans.⁵¹ In a society still gripped by Orientalist attitudes, this meant that atrocities that might seem acceptable when used against Mau Mau or Malayan insurgents were intolerable when applied to Greek Cypriots. This is not to ignore the fact that British officials and troops often treated Greek Cypriots with racist condescension, but to emphasize the idea that Greek Cypriots were viewed as essentially different from the Kikuyu or Chinese.

Secondly, events on Cyprus had much deeper international implications than did developments in Malaya or Kenya. As has already been noted, Cyprus' strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean meant that local officials had to keep in mind regional dynamics; if events in Cyprus got out of hand, tensions between Greece and Turkey, already high, might well explode.

More importantly, however, the Greek lobby, while strong in Britain, was even more robust in America.⁵² Since the United States had no powerful Kikuyu lobby to speak of and remained ideologically opposed to the Communist Chinese, British troops had enjoyed a freer hand during the Kenyan and Malayan emergencies, respectively. In the case of the Cyprus Revolt, however, prominent Greek Americans tried to persuade the US government to actively support the Greek Cypriot cause. The Order of Ahepa published editorials in publications like *The New York Times*, decrying British conduct. In Congress, Representatives and Senators criticized British imperialism as fundamentally incompatible with the postwar liberal international order, founded as it was on principles such as liberty and self-determination. John F. Kennedy, for example, then still a Senator for Massachusetts, declared the Greek Cypriot claim to be a "claim founded upon the inalienable right of every people to attain their independence and decide their own status and political future."⁵³

Gone were the days when Britain could have acted unilaterally without care for international opinion. The Suez Debacle had already proven that Britain simply did not have the capacity to go it alone. Therefore, British officials could not ignore American sentiment and opinion; given the extent of American identification with the Greek Cypriot cause, British troops were compelled to maintain an appropriate level of decorum, lest a local atrocity spark international furor and lead to a more vigorous American effort to broker a solution on the island.

As a result of such limitations, British soldiers often expressed the sentiment that they were forced to fight with one hand tied behind their backs. A memorandum written jointly by the Chief of Defense staff, for example, noted: "We have had under consideration the question of the effect on the morale of the armed forces in Cyprus that is produced by the slow peace time methods apparently still necessary to bring murderers to justice."⁵⁴ Soldiers were frustrated by the fact that men like Nicos Sampson, who had undoubtedly committed multiple homicides, were tried slowly and in relatively normal judicial procedures.

Furthermore, Major C.R. Butt described how troops felt that there was a notable lack of domestic support for their mission. In one instance, the troops were angered when "the Electrical Trade Union voted £20 towards a fund for gifts of comfort for EOKA gangsters held in detention."⁵⁵ In contrast, troops often had to endure spartan conditions, living in tents wholly unsuitable for the scorching heat of the Cyprus summer. Considering the glaring accusations of torture printed in British newspapers as well as fact-finding missions from prominent Laborites such as Ms. Castle, it is hard to blame the troops for complaining of the lack of support.

Such resentment, however, manifested itself in more than just muttering and grumbling. Separate groups of servicemen came together to form three different organizations in the fall of 1958, which just like EOKA's political wing, the PEKA, issued leaflets and slogans setting forth an institutional point of view. The three organizations were the AKOE (Anti-Killers' Organization of Expatriates), Cromwell, and the ICO (Immediate Counter-Offensive). Each group was composed of a small core of NCOs and national servicemen who secretly printed anti-EOKA pamphlets and kept their officers in the dark. Given the soldiers' fear of discovery by their officers and of possible court-martial, all three organizations were short-lived, operating at most for a couple of months before disbanding.

One AKOE card entitled “The Law is Useless,” asked: “When did the last EOKA murderer hang?” The pamphlet entreated servicemen to “not waste your time capturing butchers. Clever Greek lawyers get them acquitted every time on legal quibbles.”⁵⁶ Another AKOE leaflet, circulated at RAF Nicosia, issued after the Cutcliffe murders, asked “Is it right that ‘innocent Greeks’ should be terrorized and beaten up because of the shortcomings of a few?” The answer: “OF COURSE IT IS...what is needed now is some strong-arm stuff, so we should give it to them, straight to the jaw. These are not people we are dealing with. They are animals.”⁵⁷

Cromwell and ICO leaflets expressed similar views. An ICO leaflet, issued after the Cutcliffe murders, declared that the Security Forces had attempted to respond to violence, intimidation, and force with politeness. The only solution left was to “make this race fear the Security Forces. This can only be done by using violence.”⁵⁸ Harding and other governmental officials by no means condoned such behavior and as David French rightly notes, a Royal Signals Corps Corporal who had led the pamphlet-writing process for Cromwell was promptly court-martialed.⁵⁹ Yet the fact remained that many elements of the Security Forces were, especially in 1958, in a dangerous mood and Harding had good reasons to oppose an impartial investigation.

SILVER LININGS: THE FINDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Despite the Cypriot administration’s opposition to an impartial inquiry, in January 1958, London allowed a sub-commission of the European Commission on Human Rights to visit Cyprus on a fact-finding mission. The commission found in favor of British conduct on a majority of points and though critical of certain measures introduced under the emergency regime, the commission tended to cast security forces in a positive light. Evidently, the Cypriot administration had less to fear than it thought.

The briefing package that Hugh Foot received when he arrived to Cyprus as governor in December 1957 contained a detailed section on the European Commission on Human Rights. The briefing detailed the history of proceedings, recounting how in May 1956, the Greek Government submitted a series of complaints to the commission alleging that British conduct in Cyprus violated various articles of the European Convention on Human Rights. This set of complaints was filed as Application 176/56

and focused its complaints on the various emergency measures that the Harding regime had implemented. The commission eventually decided in September 1957 to carry out an investigation on the spot in Cyprus, with the visit occurring in January 1958.⁶⁰

The Greek Government also lodged a second set of complaints with the European Commission on Human Rights. In Application 299/57, filed in July 1957, the Greek Government alleged “49 cases in which persons had been ill treated.” The commission deliberated on these cases and elected to admit 29 as *prima facie* meriting detailed examination.⁶¹ On this second application, British lawyers were able to delay the commission by employing a battery of procedure-delaying tactics so that the commission had not reached any conclusions by the end of the revolt in 1959.⁶²

Yet while British lawyers were able to slip out of the second application, the European Commission’s September 1957 conclusion concerning Application 176/56 that a visit to Cyprus was necessary put the Macmillan government in a bind. To accept the visit would have been to ignore Governor Harding’s opposition and perhaps to irrevocably damage troop morale. Yet on the other hand, to block the visit would have seemed to the world an admission of guilt. Thus, the Macmillan government decided to allow the visit in January 1958, which meant that Harding had already handed off the governorship to Foot, who, arriving in the closing days of 1957, could hardly have opposed the visit.

Although the Cypriot Government was hesitant to host an inquiry, the European Commission found in favor of the United Kingdom on a vast majority of points. The commission did of course question certain measures. For example, it observed that corporal punishment of young persons and collective punishment raised “legal issues of some seriousness.” Moreover, the commission noted that detention for a period as long as 16 days before a person was arrested constituted a technical breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. But since these measures were no longer in effect in 1958, the report stated that “on no major issue has the commission found against the United Kingdom.”⁶³ The commission recognized that the Cypriot Government was faced with a parlous internal security situation and that an emergency threatened “the life of the nation.” Thus, the British government was entitled to a “certain margin of appreciation”; the report concluded that despite introducing emergency measures, the government had not “gone beyond this limit of appreciation.”⁶⁴

Of course, the visiting jurists could just as easily have ruled against Britain. A.W. Brian Simpson, in his intimate treatment of the commission’s visit, terms the incident “something of a close run thing.” Indeed,

the commission adopted “a more favorable view of the legality of the conduct of the authorities than did their [the Foreign Office’s] own lawyers.”⁶⁵ British diplomats were pleasantly surprised to find that the jurists, with the exception of the dissenting Greek lawyer Eustathiades, had innovatively drawn on the German legal doctrine of a “margin of appreciation” to grant the government more leeway than it otherwise might have enjoyed.⁶⁶

It should be added, however, that the commission was aided by the fact that their visit had come at an aberrant point in the revolt. Significantly, Governor Harding in the last days of his service had loosened a variety of the emergency measures and Governor Foot in the opening days of his had sought to create a climate more conducive to political discussion. By the time of the European Commission’s fact-finding mission, many of the emergency regulations, such as corporal punishment or detention for 16 days before arrest, were no longer in effect. French terms the revocation of such measures by the Cypriot Government “judicious” since the European Commission would likely have criticized many of these measures.⁶⁷ Surely, the fact that the sub-commission described “opinion to-day among the Council of Europe” as “not sympathetic to such forms of punishment” indicates that the revocation of the more egregious emergency measures reaped rewards for the administration.⁶⁸

Thus, the entire episode of the European Commission’s visit indicated that an impartial inquiry could in fact benefit the Cypriot Government. That the commission found in favor of Britain on the vast majority of points indicates that both the Cyprus and London governments had less to fear from impartial investigators than they thought. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the European Commission’s visit came at a specific and even abnormal point of the revolt. With Harding gone and Foot newly arrived, the EOKA had chosen to give Foot a breathing space and a chance to negotiate a solution to the island’s problems; there was, consequently, little need for the harsh emergency regulations that had proved so useful in 1956 and 1957. Had such a visit come in the opening months of 1957, however, when security operations were in full swing, the commission might well have found against the Cypriot Government. Thus, although the European Commission visit showed the potential value of an impartial inquiry, the caveat was that the timing of the visit had been fortuitous.

ALARM AND DESPONDENCY: THE CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT CENSORS CHARLES FOLEY

Throughout the Cypriot Government's campaign to deny Greek Cypriot allegations of brutality, Lord Harding and a great many officials kept a close eye on one particular publication, the *Times of Cyprus*. The *Times of Cyprus* had ranked among the most vocal advocates of an impartial inquiry, but for most British officials and soldiers, the newspaper's calls for an inquiry were but the tip of the iceberg.

Charles Foley had launched the *Times of Cyprus* in May 1955, with an eye to capturing the English-language market provided by the soldiers and staff of Middle East Land Forces, newly relocated from the Suez Canal zone to Cyprus. Foley seemed the right man for the job, at least in theory. Foley had worked at the *Daily Express* and established the *Times of Cyprus* after being convinced by the Conservative William Aitken, MP for Bury St. Edmunds. As Jonathan Stubbs notes, the fact that Foley had been approached by Aitken established the former's "establishment credentials."⁶⁹

Indeed, Foley's May 1955 issue met with congratulations from a variety of government and military officials. Foley published these words of encouragement in an article entitled, "A Bright Future for the Island and the Times of Cyprus!" General Sir Charles Keightley, Commander-in-Chief (CIC) Middle East Land Forces, proclaimed: "I look forward to a long and friendly cooperation and I wish you every success in your new venture." Air Marshall Sir Claude Pelly, CIC Middle East Air Force, wrote: "It is important that Officers and Airmen of the Royal Air Force serving abroad be well supplied with world news and news from home...no better place could be chosen for starting a new newspaper. I feel we shall enjoy and benefit from your enterprise."⁷⁰ With hindsight, such quotes certainly make for amusing reading: the Security Forces were to become the most vocal opponent of the *Times of Cyprus*.

As the Cyprus Revolt picked up and the *Times of Cyprus* began publishing criticisms of governmental policy, the establishment view of the newspaper and of Charles Foley himself changed radically. Lord Harding expressed the widely held view that Foley and his journalists "misrepresented things" and were "strongly Greek partisan in their reporting." Harding even suggested that the *Times of Cyprus* was subsidized by the "Archbishop and his organization," though he added that he had no hard proof of such a connection.⁷¹ John Reddaway likewise opined that the *Times of Cyprus* seemed "wholly sold to the Greek side" and termed it "a nuisance, a thorn in the

flesh.”⁷² Members of the Security Forces likewise tended to criticize the paper. Although Martin Bell expressed a kind of admiration for Charles Foley, arguing that “he had the courage to write against the grain,” the establishment view was heavily critical of Foley.⁷³ Anthony Walker, who served as a corporal in the Intelligence Corps in Cyprus, termed the *Times of Cyprus* “anti-government” and of its writing, declaimed: “better padding I have not often seen.”⁷⁴ Nicholas van der Bijl notes that among the troops, the paper was simply referred to as the *EOKA Times*.⁷⁵

In October 1956, Lord Harding pushed for the prosecution of Foley, after the *Times of Cyprus* carried a series of articles written by Serge Fliegers of the International News Service of America, which Harding contended was likely to cause “alarm and despondency.”⁷⁶ Fliegers had no doubt criticized Harding heavily in these articles. In the article dated October 22, Fliegers wrote: “Harding has tried to find a solution to Cyprus and has failed. He admits this to intimates and makes it clear that it has been one of the heaviest blows to his career.”⁷⁷ In an article dated October 24, in writing on the difficulties facing Harding, Fliegers argued that “for all intents and purposes, every adult Greek Cypriot is either a willing or unwilling member of EOKA.”⁷⁸ Ultimately, however, both Lord Harding and Deputy Governor George Sinclair decided to drop the case after Attorney General James Henry advised against prosecution.⁷⁹

But several weeks later, on November 28, Foley was summoned to appear before a special court, accused of “publishing statements likely to cause alarm and despondency.” On November 21, the *Times of Cyprus* had carried an article written by the *News Chronicle*’s Geoffrey Thursby, described by Foley as a “large hearty Australian who drove groaning fellow-correspondents on to the tennis courts of the Ledra Palace before their morning session at the bar.”⁸⁰ November 1956 had proved a particularly bloody month for the Security Forces; with Harding’s best troops deployed for the Canal Intervention, Grivas had launched a terror campaign, managing to inflict 33 casualties.⁸¹ Thursby’s article, which appeared in the *Times of Cyprus*, articulated the fear and despair undoubtedly gripping broad swathes of the population:

As the hours pass and the autumn nights get colder this lovely island of Cyprus becomes a greater tragedy...many British are beginning to turn on Sir John Harding and blame him for ‘not stopping murder.’ The Greek Cypriots attack him for his attitude that the Constitution cannot be introduced until an end has been made to terrorism and intimidation. The Turkish

population [is] against him for not using sterner measures to stop terrorism...Let me quote another Englishman: 'those who advised the Governor that EOKA was beaten must bear some responsibility for the men who have died since.'⁸²

Thursby's viewpoints could hardly have been interpreted as extreme or exceptional; after all, British press outlets too had criticized the Cypriot Government's handling of what would with hindsight emerge to be the singular worst month of the revolt. But Governor Harding, Deputy Governor Sinclair, and other officials had been out to get Foley for quite a while now. Thursby's article provided the administration with enough of an excuse to launch a prosecution.

The prosecution of Foley was a mistake. Historians of the revolt have tended to decry the decision. Crouzet writes that the prosecution of Foley "provoked vivid emotion from Fleet Street";⁸³ French contends that the prosecution evoked press criticism, awkward questions in Parliament, and complaints from the Commonwealth Press Union.⁸⁴ Sir Frank Soskice, a prominent Laborite and former Solicitor-General, flew to Cyprus to personally defend Foley.⁸⁵ In discussing the trial, Foley recalled Soskice's main argument, that is, that "the *Times of Cyprus* was intended for educated people who could not be thrown into disorder by a recital of events they already knew." The judge who presided over the case concluded that he "could not say for what cause the article is making propaganda," but at the same time criticized Thursby, for "to say that a community is against a Government is to use strong language: there is not the slightest evidence of anything of the sort."⁸⁶ Ultimately, Foley was slapped with a £50 fine, but the fact that such luminaries as Soskice had taken such an active role in defending Foley proved embarrassing to the administration. To add final insult to injury, the Scottish National Party offered to cover the costs of the fine imposed on Foley; Foley contends the ultimate result of the trial was to publicize his cause.⁸⁷

In many ways, the decision to prosecute Foley closely resembled the Cypriot government's decision not to allow an impartial inquiry to visit the island, at least until London forced the issue in January 1958. In both cases, the Cyprus authorities did face vexing problems—hyperbolic allegations of torture or in the case of the *Times of Cyprus*, a constant source of criticism of the government. In both cases, the government reacted similarly, tending toward repression—the government refused to allow an impartial inquiry, for example, and, in the case of the *Times of Cyprus*,

decided to bring Foley to court. But the report of the European Commission revealed that the government had overestimated the damage that might be caused by an impartial inquiry. Likewise, though the government often faced criticism from the *Times of Cyprus*, Harding arguably overestimated the damage done by Foley and his team of writers.

*SINE TIMORE AUT FAVORE: A CLOSER ANALYSIS OF THE *TIMES OF CYPRUS**

Was the *Times of Cyprus* really the anti-government nightmare that its critics portrayed it to be? While historians have largely focused on Charles Foley's trial, there remains a need for an in-depth examination of his work. If the *Times of Cyprus* was as pro-EOKA and pro-Enosis as many soldiers and officials contended, then the government may well have had a good case for prosecuting Foley, even if that prosecution inspired a backlash on Fleet Street. But if the *Times of Cyprus* was far more innocuous than its critics portrayed, then not only did Harding's decision to prosecute Foley lead to unexpected consequences, but his decision was itself founded on tenuous argumentation.

Foley aspired for his paper to be impartial and certainly thought of it as much more than a mouthpiece for Enosis. In its "Second Anniversary Number," the paper proudly proclaimed its impartiality: "We can still say with pride, as we said a year ago, that 'we are nobody's yes-man, not Briton's, Greek's, or Turk's. It shows that we have no one's interests at heart but this island...we have gone ahead, speaking our minds 'without fear or favor.'"⁸⁸ Certainly, the fact that the *Times of Cyprus* had managed to elicit negative reactions from the Greeks, Turks, and British indicates that Foley refused to report on events from any one side's point of view.

The opposition of British servicemen and officials manifested itself most clearly in the prosecution of Foley. Many Turks likewise saw Foley's paper as a mouthpiece of the EOKA. The Turkish-Cypriot newspaper, *Halkın Sesi*, as Stubbs rightly notes, frequently criticized the *Times of Cyprus* for what it saw as its "pro-Greek, anti-Turk, and anti-British position."⁸⁹ In one typical piece, following the August 1958 truce declaration by Grivas, *Halkın Sesi* argued that the *Times of Cyprus* had portrayed Colonel Grivas as a "wonderful kind uncle" in "offering this third truce."⁹⁰ But the *Times of Cyprus* also incurred the wrath of the EOKA. As noted in the "Second Anniversary Number," three members of Foley's staff had been gunned down over a 12-month period.⁹¹ Of course, *Times* staffers

like Angus Macdonald who were shot down by EOKA gunmen may well have been shot down only because they were English, not because of their editorial output. At the same time, however, the fact that three of Foley's staffers were murdered indicates that the EOKA did not take special precautions to avoid killing *Times of Cyprus* correspondents, which weakens arguments that characterize the newspaper as EOKA's mouthpiece. Neither was the *Times of Cyprus*' office considered off bounds: one of Foley's photos shows men of the South Staffordshires guarding the door after a "gunfight in the office."⁹² If the *Times of Cyprus* truly were the *EOKA Times*, it would have enjoyed more of a respite from attacks than it did.

Yet the firmest proof that the *Times of Cyprus* lived up to Foley's goal of reporting the news without fear or favor emerges with a close reading of the newspaper's articles, spanning almost the entirety of the Cyprus Revolt, running from May 1955 to September 1960, after the revolt's conclusion. The *Times of Cyprus* did undoubtedly adopt a critical attitude toward multiple government policies. From the beginning of the Cyprus Revolt, the paper sought to hold the Cypriot administration accountable and sought to ensure that the government, despite terrorist violence, retained democratic values. On July 17, 1955, for example, the paper entreated Cypriots to watch the 18B law "jealously"; the 18B law allowed Governor Armitage to detain without trial any suspect "he is satisfied is a terrorist" and prefigured the more extensive emergency regulations implemented by Governor Harding.⁹³

Foley's criticism of the government grew over the course of the emergency and often lampooned the Harding regime's handling of events. In June 1957, for example, the *Times* reprinted a scathing *News Chronicle* article entitled "What have you to hide, Sir John?" The reprinted article castigated Governor Harding and argued:

Very rarely in the records of British Government anywhere have the existence of a country depended almost wholly on the personality, character and caprice of one man. When that happens—because it is an archaic and dangerous situation, repugnant to our own instincts—the time has come seriously to consider the nature and behavior of that man.⁹⁴

Even if the article had not been written by a *Times of Cyprus* staffer, Foley's decision to reprint the article could not have sat well with Harding.

Yet alongside such allegations, Charles Foley also took extensive steps to represent the government's point of view, often penning articles that

cast the administration in a positive light. After multiple articles describing the potential of 18B to damage democracy on the island, for example, the *Times* printed an article entitled “We were not ill-treated,” in which six men recently released from Kyrenia Castle after being detained there under the 18B detention law agreed that they had been well-treated.⁹⁵ A number of days later, the *Times of Cyprus*’ news editor, in covering a curfew in Famagusta, praised John Weston, the local commissioner, “who knows a great deal about his district and its people.” The editor quoted Weston as saying that “as long as I am commissioner the lives of the people of my district will come first.”⁹⁶

Furthermore, just as Foley gave space to Greek allegations of mistreatment, so too did he give space for op-eds penned by governmental officials and servicemen. On the front page of the June 24, 1957, issue, for example, the *Times of Cyprus* printed a letter entitled “Serviceman challenges the Times.” In his letter, the soldier wrote: “Dear Sir, Your newspaper prides itself on its impartiality and its intention to stand ‘solely for the welfare of Cyprus and the Cypriots as a whole.’ I believe that this worthy aim has not been achieved.” The soldier went on to rebut the *Times of Cyprus*’ criticism of the white paper that the Cypriot Government had written to address allegations of mistreatment issued by the Cyprus Bar Council. He questioned the newspaper’s argumentation, contending that the reason Greek Cypriot opposition to Enosis was silent was that “the Church and the gangsters frighten [the] opposition.”⁹⁷

Evidently, Foley did criticize governmental policy while also giving space to the governmental point of view. As a number of features attest, Foley sometimes even agreed with and praised the government. But such divergent and varied attitudes were reflective of Foley’s background—as a Fleet Street man himself, Foley put a premium on journalistic impartiality, and the *Times of Cyprus* closely resembled the mainstream British press outlets that were operating at the time. The *Manchester Guardian*, *Daily Herald*, and *Daily Express*—indeed most British press outlets at the time—may have had a political bent, but did often try to grant space to multiple perspectives. Foley’s work was no different; although he often pushed the Cypriot Government to retain democratic traditions and to emphasize due process in spite of emergency conditions, by no means could his views have been termed pro-EOKA.

The *Times of Cyprus*’ relatively impartial approach to events on the island helps to explain why Fleet Street reacted so viscerally to Harding’s decision to prosecute Foley. Harding, in clamping down on the paper, was acting out against an outlet that at least in style and tone was similar to

most British press publications. Indeed, Geoffrey Thursby's article, for which Foley was prosecuted, had appeared not only in the *Times of Cyprus* but also in the *News Chronicle*, for which Thursby was a correspondent. The irony was that while such reporting was perfectly acceptable in London, such reporting could be censored in Cyprus, highlighting the disparity in democratic conditions between the metropolis and the colony, to employ Frantz Fanon's terminology.⁹⁸

THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT: AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF BRITISH CONDUCT IN THE WAR OF WORDS

The Cypriot Government overestimated the potential dangers of an impartial inquiry and underestimated the backlash resulting from the arraignment of Charles Foley. Yet while British treatment of the press may have seemed feckless, at least with the benefit of hindsight, it is important to remember that Governors Harding and Foot as well as the entire administration faced unique circumstances in Cyprus.

Cyprus was one of the first modern counter-insurgency campaigns. While British troops had been given a free hand to quell internal rebellions in the past, Cyprus' status as a European island no doubt burdened British conduct of the war effort. Whereas British troops had been able to treat Mau Mau or Arab rebels harshly and sometimes inhumanely, the battery of press organs keeping a close eye on Cyprus made similar brutal conduct in Cyprus more difficult, though not impossible.

This is not to excuse inappropriate British treatment of the press. Lord Harding and the administration should have held impartial inquiries into troop conduct earlier than 1957. Although the term "hearts and minds" was not yet current in the late 1950s, Martin Bell argues that the British Army fought precisely for that. Leaflets in particular were meant to "influence public opinion."⁹⁹ Lord Harding, too, evidently sought to convince Cypriots of the benefits of British rule, announcing an extensive development scheme and spending £12.5 million on aid projects between 1955 and 1957.¹⁰⁰ Yet the goodwill created by such efforts was only damaged by the government's response to torture allegations. Even though EOKA and Greek press claims of harsh treatment by the troops were hyperbolic, there evidently had been more bad behavior than the Security Forces officially admitted. That EOKA rebels committed heinous crimes is beyond a doubt. But by tacitly approving of the Security

Forces' inexcusable reactions to events such as the Lefkoniko attacks on the Highland Infantry or the murder of Catherine Cutcliffe, the government failed to truly fight for Cypriot hearts and minds.

Harding's decision to suppress the *Times of Cyprus* was erroneous, for similar reasons. In many ways, Frank Soskice, Foley's defense counsel, had gotten it right when he said: "the *Times of Cyprus* was intended for educated people who could not be thrown into disorder by a recital of events they already knew."¹⁰¹ Foley, writing in English in an island where Greek and Turkish were the *linguae francae*, never truly reached as many readers as he desired, especially as servicemen began to boycott his paper. But by prosecuting Foley, the Cypriot administration demonstrated its unwillingness to face up to criticism and to grant democratic conditions to the island. Again, the administration failed to fully fight for Cypriot hearts and minds.

Yet at the same time, the British were not entirely ineffective in their handling of the press. Certainly, the creation of the Directorate of Intelligence Services and the Special Investigations Group were steps in the right direction. Furthermore, both General Baker and General Darling organized an embryonic form of the press conference. Foley himself recalls, though disparagingly, that Baker hosted British journalists and would chat with them over tea.¹⁰² General Darling contends that he tried to bring journalists into his confidence by meeting with them from time to time.¹⁰³ Even if such meetings failed to have their desired effect, the practice of talking to press correspondents foreshadowed the media conferences that press corps in armies around the world now regularly host.

CONCLUSION

British soldiers serving during the Cyprus Revolt had to contend with a barrage of press allegations that accused the Security Forces of indecent conduct and torture. Although Greek press allegations were generally hyperbolic, the Cypriot Government's dismissal of such allegations was likewise unbelievable. Generally speaking, British troops acted decorously and in some cases continued to enjoy cordial relations with the local Greek population. At the same time, however, the Cyprus Police Force's Special Branch as well as a number of army regiments appear to have acted harshly—torturing suspects, rough-handling prisoners during security operations, and committing violence against innocent Greek Cypriot villagers. If the Security Forces truly desired to win Cypriot hearts and minds, Harding and his army generals should have more energetically

investigated such allegations, court-martialing those responsible for conduct unbecoming of a gentleman. Although such punishment may have damaged troop morale, Harding would have thereby demonstrated his commitment to treating the local population “firmly but fairly.”

In part because of the administration’s refusal to actively pursue allegations of torture, a number of press outlets, both in Cyprus and in the United Kingdom, called for an impartial fact-finding inquiry. The January 1958 visit of the European Commission on Human Rights to Cyprus demonstrated that the government had less to fear than it thought. The commission found in favor of government conduct on a broad number of points, the caveat being that the commission’s visit occurred during a lull in hostilities, wherein Harding’s emergency measures were no longer necessary. Evidently, however, the Cypriot government benefitted in this instance from pursuing a more open-minded and cooperative policy, rather than continuing on with the inflexible policy of issuing blanket refutations in response to torture allegations.

Perhaps the administration’s most significant mistake during the war of perception was to censor the *Times of Cyprus*. Such a blatant move against press freedom elicited fierce backlash in Britain. Although the judge found against *The Times of Cyprus*, fining Charles Foley £50 and concluding that Geoffrey Thursby’s allegations were groundless, the entire incident only highlighted the sharp disparity in democratic conditions between the United Kingdom and colonies such as Cyprus. Moreover, a careful assessment of the *Times of Cyprus* indicates that Charles Foley, while often critical of the government’s undemocratic measures, was by no means as pro-Greek as his detractors claimed. *Times of Cyprus* writers often cast the government in a positive light and constantly provided space for government spokesmen or servicemen to express their views toward various subjects. In other words, the *Times of Cyprus* for the most part lived up to its declared mission of reporting the news *sine timore aut favore*.

Despite the noted failures of the Cypriot government’s press policies, the contemporary reader must be careful not to criticize the administration’s reactions too harshly. After all, the Security Forces in Cyprus faced unique, and in many ways, unprecedented, challenges, contending not only with an elusive enemy but also with constant press scrutiny. Generals Baker and Darling demonstrated an awareness of the need for organizational reform. The creation of departments and initiatives tailored specifically for the exigencies of waging the war of words demonstrated that the Security Forces, while undoubtedly ineffective in countering criticism and allegations of torture, were by no means inactive.

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Conclusion

Abstract This chapter contextualizes the Cyprus Revolt, commenting upon the birth of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 and on the broader trend of decolonization. Ultimately, although British conduct was not marred by widespread brutality, the British failed to truly fight for Cypriot hearts and minds. By approaching Cypriots through Orientalist lenses and by failing to offer a credible alternative to Enosis, the British could never hope to rule with full sovereignty over the island.

Keywords 1960 • Decolonization • Orientalism

In 1960, after a year of complex negotiations on issues such as the size of the British sovereign base areas, the Republic of Cyprus was finally proclaimed on August 16, with Archbishop Makarios assuming the presidency. Britain was granted the right to a total area of 99 square miles; in certain respects, Varnava is right to have termed Prime Minister Macmillan's government the "real victor" of 1960.¹

No matter how generous the constitution was to the British, however, there was no denying that 82 years of British control over Cyprus had finally come to an end. In so many ways, the 1950s marked the end of an era for Britain. Faced with decolonization movements around the world,

Britain was forced to retreat from her empire. With the end of National Service in 1960, Britain's greatest generation—a generation of citizen-soldiers—quietly went home, their lives no doubt enriched by service in the far-flung corners of the empire.

As the Cyprus Revolt demonstrated, Britain's retreat from empire was often bloody. In certain cases, Britain did choose to stand and fight. Yet although the British Army had cultivated extensive counter-insurgency experience through internal security operations stretching back before the twentieth century, roughly 40,000 British troops were unable to inflict complete victory over a handful of EOKA rebels.

The postwar world had saddled Britain and her fellow European empires with a series of challenges. Martin Bell, for example, cited Cyprus as the first example of the "CNN effect."² Journalists and parliamentary opposition members swarmed to Cyprus, constantly questioning and criticizing government conduct. In a sense, the solution to the Cyprus Revolt and to similar nationalist uprisings had always been obvious. Lord Harding argued the need to "conduct an antiterrorist campaign just as you would conduct a set-piece campaign, and war has to be conducted in a ruthless, arbitrary way."³ Likewise, Martin Ball admitted that "if we had been Russians or Germans the Enosis problem would have been solved in half an hour, by a series of mass murders and deportations."⁴ Similarly, the Turkish Cypriots criticized the British government for being too gentle. Ms. Jean Somerville, wife of Ronnie Somerville, a Major in the Royal Artillery, wrote that the "Turks said the British were too gentle, too democratic. If they were Germans or Turks and one woman [had been] shot... they [would] set fire to Varosha!"⁵

Constrained by public opinion and by the international press, however, the Security Forces were unable to deal with the EOKA as harshly as the British Army had been able to deal with Mau Mau insurgents in Kenya. Nevertheless, the Security Forces could act badly and British soldiers did on occasion beat and even kill innocent Greek Cypriots. The Cyprus Police Force's Special Branch developed a more notorious reputation as interrogators did often employ torture. Still, British conduct was by no means indiscriminate and the majority of servicemen, undoubtedly under enormous pressure, had conducted their duties in a praiseworthy manner.

Even though British servicemen generally conducted themselves well, however, their reminiscences, as well as the reminiscences of British officials, indicate that they viewed both Greek and Turkish Cypriots with Orientalist lenses. Ian Martin confessed that there existed

a “strong element of arrogance, insensitivity and sheer xenophobia in the British attitude to their colonial subjects in Cyprus.”⁶ Lieutenant Colonel A.C. Simonds, living on the island as a retired civilian, recalled that one soldier said to a senior English-educated Turkish Cypriot civil servant named Fuad: “to me you’re just another fucking wog.” Simonds contended that “it is by these methods we have contributed to the loss of our Empire: Fuad swore he would never come to Cyprus again, and that he would resign from the British Crown Service.”⁷ Martin Bell likewise addressed the racism of British soldiers and officials with a pang of regret:

It was our failure to project the British ethos, to make available to the Cypriots the amplitude of our own civic and cultural resources, which had contributed to his sense of neglect...The basic failure lay somewhere in our inability to include him, and his set of values, in the British family...to the British, they were a “bunch of Cyps.”⁸

This is not to imply, of course, that all British officials and soldiers treated the Greek Cypriots in such a fashion. Indeed, many British officials had spent a long time in Cyprus, had married Greek Cypriot girls, and exhibited a genuine care and love for the inhabitants of Cyprus. John Reddaway referred constantly to his “dear circle of friendship among the Greek Cypriots.”⁹ Lord Harding, too, was not alone in contending that the “Greeks are friendly, hospitable people.”¹⁰ Likewise, Greek Cypriots often retained a love or at least an appreciation for the British despite the storms of the revolt. As Lawrence Durrell recalled, the villagers of Bellapais continually reminded him that “we all love the British. There is nothing anti-English in Enosis.”¹¹ The ultimate tragedy, Durrell held, was that “fortune and the demons of ill luck dragged Cyprus into the stock-market of world affairs and destroyed not only the fortuitous happiness of these friendships but, more tragically...the old tried relationships on which the life of this little village itself was founded.”¹²

Yet the majority of British soldiers and officials, bereft of similarly deep understandings of Cypriot life and culture, remained ill-equipped to successfully win over Greek Cypriot hearts and minds. Despite the fact that Security Forces did innovate and evolve their tactics over the course of the rebellion, British troops and officials failed to realize that the EOKA would be able to constantly replenish its ranks as long as it remained popular with the larger population. The Cypriot government never succeeded in

offering a credible alternative to Enosis that would involve continued British sovereignty. Despite introducing economic and developmental reforms and even offering a level of self-government, London's offers fell far short of Greek Cypriot desires for unfettered democracy and for union with the Greek mainland.

Just as British officials failed to understand Greek Cypriot aspirations, so too did Greek Cypriot leaders fail to appreciate the depth of anti-Enosis feeling within the Turkish community. Although Turks and Greeks had generally lived together in harmony in the decades leading up to the Cyprus Revolt, the EOKA's dismissal of Turkish Cypriot views and Grivas' deliberate decision to target Turkish Cypriots led to a rapid descent into intercommunal violence. In developing organizations like Volkan and later the TMT, Turkish Cypriot leaders protected their community but also crossed the Rubicon. Greek-Turkish Cypriot relations would never be the same after the unrelenting violence of 1958.

Ultimately, Martin Bell argued that the British experience during the Cyprus Revolt demonstrated the "inefficacy of force."¹³ Perhaps only time can tell whether Bell was right to characterize force as inefficacious. Certainly, British performance in the Cyprus Revolt resembled the low-intensity conflicts that have proliferated since the 1950s. Just as the British failed to beat the EOKA in Cyprus, so too would the Americans fail to fully defeat the Vietcong in Vietnam, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the insurgents in Iraq. Just as Governor Harding and General Darling reformed the British Army to better fight EOKA rebels, so too would a string of American generals—General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan or General David Petraeus in Iraq—introduce brilliant battlefield tactics only to fall short of complete victory.

In the end, British troops, just like American troops decades later, would return home silently. There would be few victory parades, for victory had eluded the British. Although several thousand British troops remained in the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, the vast majority of troops were to return home only to see their proud and hallowed regiments disbanded and reformed to meet what the Ministry of Defense had identified as the defense needs of postwar Britain. The Cypriots they left behind, of course, had decades more of trouble to live through. The Cyprus Revolt, with its fierce intercommunal episodes, marked the prelude to the more serious troubles that erupted in the 1960s

and culminated eventually in the Turkish military invasion of 1974. Cyprus had been transformed from a sleepy backwater, from Aphrodite's island, to an island filled with hate and despair. Lawrence Durrell got it right in his poem, "Bitter Lemons," which, more than a half century later, remains a chilling testament to the violence and darkness that Cypriots—both Greek and Turkish—have had to endure since the tumultuous years of the Cyprus Emergency. The poem ends—and this monograph too—with Durrell's haunting final stanza: "And the Greek sea's curly head/ keep its calm like tears unshed."¹⁴

NOTES

1. Varnava, "Reinterpreting Macmillan's Cyprus Policy, 1957–1960," 100.
2. Bell, *The End of Empire*, 200.
3. IWMSA 8736, John Harding, Reel 46. 1984
4. Bell, *The End of Empire*, 202.
5. IWM 2573, Mrs. Jean Somerville, Diary Entry, 7 October 1958.
6. IWM 1779, Papers of Ian Martin, The Cyprus Troubles 1955–60, 26.
7. IWM 16075, Papers of A.C. Simonds, "Cyprus: EOKA Rebellion 1955–9," 2.
8. Bell, *The End of Empire*, 136.
9. IWMSA 9173, John Reddaway, Reel 7.
10. IWMSA 8736, John Harding, Reel 46. 1984.
11. Durrell, *Bitter Lemons*, 105.
12. *Ibid.*, 101.
13. Bell, *The End of Empire*, 199.
14. Durrell, *Bitter Lemons*, 252.

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