THE UNITED STATES AND MILITARY COUPS IN TURKEY AND PAKISTAN

BETWEEN CONSPIRACY AND REALITY

Ömer Aslan

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To my mother, father, and all martyrs of July 15,
the fallen heroes

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Abbreviations

AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe
CMR	Civil—Military Relations
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
DECA	Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
DoD	Department of Defense
DP	Democrat Party
EUCOM	United States European Command
FY	Fiscal Year
GNA	Grand National Assembly
ICA	International Cooperation Administration
IMET	International Military Education and Training
ISA	International Security Affairs
JAMMAT	Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
JUSMMAGG	Joint US Military Assistance Group Greece
JUSMMAT	Joint US Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
LSE	Land Forces Southeastern Europe
MAAG	Military Advisory and Assistance Group
MAP	Military Assistance Program
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NUC	National Unity Committee
PACOM	United States Pacific Command

PME	Professional Military Education
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
RCD	Regional Cooperation for Development
RPP	Republican People's Party
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TGS	Turkish General Staff
UN	United Nations

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Military Coup D'état as a Two-Level Game

Dancing on Two Fronts

While vanishing in several parts of the world (Perkins 2013), military coups continue to loom large in the political life of several countries. The failed July 15 (2016) coup attempt in Turkey has provided the most recent manifestation. Though several observers and experts correctly highlighted several motivations behind the putschists, its external dimension, including alleged US support, was immediately sensationalized. By a nice coincidence, however, the following observations by General Michael Flynn, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (2012–2014) under the Obama Administration and subsequently President Trump's National Security Advisor for a short period of time, on the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey during a campaign speech shows how significant military-to-military relations and professional military education programs may be to understanding the external dimension of a coup attempt:

> Probably most of you do not know but there is an ongoing coup, going on in Turkey right now, right now. There is a coup. And *I was just literally going back and forth with a very great friend of mine, who trained with us, in the Turkish military*. And the Turkish military is, I do not know whether they are going to succeed or not but the Turkish military… they have been excised for many years by… what really became a *secular nation state, then began to turn towards Islamism, that is Turkey, under Erdoğan … I am going to be very fascinated to see what happens because if the military*

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> *succeeds, one of the things that came out of the military tonight… they said, we recognize our responsibilities with NATO, we recognize our responsibilities with the United Nations, and we want to make sure that world knows, we want to be seen as a secular nation*. (italics added) (Mueller 2016)

General Flynn's remarks on a coup attempt in a NATO member in 2016 also underscore the continuing importance of bilateral relations and professional military education programs well after the end of the Cold War. Yet the civil-military relationship (CMR) literature has sorely understudied the role of external actors to explain *why* military coups d'état occurred and left unstudied military-to-military channels in making any sense of the external dimension of a coup attempt. The primary objective of this study is to close this large gap by discussing the US role in four military coups d'état during the Cold War: in Turkey (1960 and 1980) and in Pakistan (1958 and 1977). It asks if putschists considered and estimated likely US reaction to their coup attempts in these cases. It also explores whether US reaction (support or opposition) influenced coup success or failure. If the US reaction influenced the coup outcomes, what was the influence? How did the USA influence coups in these cases? Were there any differences between these cases in terms of US influence? How can we explain these differences?

Students of CMR often provide several 'domestic' explanations for coups and their success or failure. These explanations include factors that are both internal and external to the military, such as political decay, economic backwardness, corruption, factionalism, and the loss of legitimacy and military professionalism, and threats to military's corporate interests respectively (Danopoulos 1992, p. 3). At the cusp of the post-Cold War period, Rice claimed, "any number of factors can go into determining these civil-military boundaries and reinforcing them over time. History and tradition, the nature of the political system, and the relative strength or weakness of civilian and military institutions are all important determinants" (1992, p. 33).

However, in order for a coup d'état to succeed it must be well calculated and planned in advance, as attested by people who joined or watched coups from close quarters (Soyuyüce 2012, p. 35; Faik 2012, p. 10; Seyhan 1966, p. 43; Küçük 2008, p. 84; Aydemir 2010, p. 23; Esin 2005, p. 98). Some scholars have considered coup plotters to be 'rational actors'. "Coup conspirators will carefully evaluate their chances of success and should only attempt a coup when the expected rewards of the maneuver and its probability of victory are high enough to offset the

dire consequences of a failed putsch" (Powell 2012, p. 1019). Coup making is a serious business; severe costs from demotions to death sentence may be inflicted from failed coup attempts[1] (Geddes 1999; Utku 2006, p. 73; Kebschull, pp. 575–577; Subaşı 2004, pp. 92, 108). This book assumes that military officers are not reckless agents; they are, similar to other political actors, rational, calculating, and "thinking and observing" (Subaşı 2004, p. 17) agents, who follow very closely not only intra-military politics and balance but also domestic, regional and global developments to use as inputs in their decision-making processes. As Kaplan, who joined in the May 27 coup as a Staff Major, said, "we used to sit and ask ourselves 'what is going to happen, why the country is in this poor situation, why things have gone wrong'… you cannot cork officers' hearts, feelings; officers do not just take orders and obey. They too ponder, they too have brains" (Kaplan 2012, p. 24; see also Subaşı 2004, p. 91; Elevli 1960, p. 165; Chishti 1989, p. 63; Bölügiray 1999, p. 120). They estimate possible resistance essentially on two fronts: whether or not people and other political actors will welcome them on the domestic front, because if large-scale resistance erupts this may lead to a civil war, which is one of the most threatening outcomes militaries may fear.

Some students of coups d'état claimed that coup plotters are not concerned with popular opposition since people rarely stand up to a coup attempt (Singh 2014a, p. 17). However, others insist that domestic resistance may hamper coup success because "non-state organizations constitute a powerful safeguard against military intervention when they 'talk back' or resist a coup by mobilizing protests or refusing to comply with plotters' orders" (Belkin and Schofer 2005, p. 157; also see Varney and Martin 2000, pp. 53, 61, 65; Bölügiray 1999, pp. 134, 233; Roberts 1975). "Indeed, civilians have the potential to make a polity completely ungovernable in a postcoup environment." (Thyne et al. 2017, p. 4) Popular opposition increases the risk that coup plot will be resisted from within the military as well. If that happens, the military may fall into fratricidal conflict, a war between brothers-in-arms, and may aggravate the risk of a civil war (Singh 2014a, pp. 22–23; Khan 1967, pp. 71–72). This helps explain why some coup plotters before the May 27 coup d'état in

[1] It is for this reason that General Zia sent his wife and family to London until the coup attempt he led was secured. See Hyman's Introduction to Chishti (1989, pp. ix, 63, 73), Perkins (2013, p. 77).

Turkey watched coups in Iraq and Syria with concern in the 1950s (Ilıcak 1975, vol. 2, p. 571; Esin 2005, p. 55; Rapoport 1968, pp. 551–572; Barracca, 2007, pp. 140–141).

The other critical, but neglected front for the officers to care for is the external; putschists often feel they must try to predict possible external reactions to their actions to make sure that they will not be totally isolated from the international community or their attempt will not trigger a foreign intervention.For Luttwak, considerable political independence from the great powers and wide immunity of internal political life to influence of foreign powers is one of the pre-conditions of the coup (1979, p. 44). As Goodspeed (1962) pointed out, "the international situation must be favorable before the rebels strike, unless they are willing to risk their *coup* turning into war." (p. 214) Military coups are therefore "simply too important to be left to the vagaries of domestic politics" (David quoted in Gunn 2015, p. 124). External actors constitute at least one of the reasons behind some failed coup attempts (Kebschull 1994, pp. 571–572; Singh 2014b). As Taylor pointed out, "opportunities definitely matter. Intervention is difficult when structural barriers to coups are severe" (2003, p. 30). Nogaylaroğlu opined that "officers who plan a coup consider external support. They are thinking people like you and me. When they set themselves on such a course, they consider its likely effects, for instance, what the US might say and how Europe might react. Most likely, they also try to get an idea from these people about how external actors will react, perhaps some also directly to talk to foreign actors" (personal communication, June 9, 2015). A powerful external actor such as the United States may play an extremely critical role in coups d'état in other places because external assistance may help coupists decrease the potential external costs of their action (Shah 2014, p. 91). Hilmi Özkök, a former Chief of the Turkish General Staff, did not mince his words when it came to the importance of external actors for the successful implementation of a coup d'état. After saying that he could not confirm US involvement in the September 12 coup d'état because he was not a witness to events as they unfolded, General Özkök continued:

> We may think of the connection between coup d'état and the US in the following way… the US is a powerful nation with a large clout… It has sway over the NATO, the UN, Security Council, wherein it retains the veto power. This is to say that when a revolution [*ihtilal*] is staged, this comes to the agenda in certain international institutions. When it does, somebody has to give you [the putschists] protection, for instance the

> World Bank, IMF etc. If you fail to find someone in these international institutions to protect you, they will immediately bring down your economy and you will therefore fail. (2012, pp. 12–13; see also Abramowitz 2000, p. 263)

When retired military officers such as Ahmet Er, Orhan Erkanlı, who partook in the May 27 coup d'état, thought that there was heavy external involvement in the September 12 coup—ironically not their own coup—it would be a mistake to deny any actorship to the external powers (Er 2003, p. 183; Esin 2005, p. 105; Cotter 2002, p. 38).

Understanding circumstances that *make* a coup *possible* matters as much as the reasons and objectives of coups for democratic theory. The literature on transition to democracy and democracy consolidation is in agreement that though curbing the influence of a military is no guarantee for democratic consolidation, coups and military intervention certainly impede democracy. This is why "… the military is the most consequential actor in post-authoritarian transitions and the success or failure of these processes to a large extent hinges on its political behavior" (Barany quoted in Tusalem 2014, p. 483).

The Arab Spring has provided the most recent manifestation of how important the role of militaries is for and during democratic transitions. Both the July 3 coup d'état in Egypt, the critical role of the Syrian military in what turned out to be a civil war, and the facilitating role of the Tunisian army since the deposition of Zeinel Abidin Ben-Ali underline the crucial role of armed forces in any—democratic or otherwise—transition period in this region as well. In particular, the July 3 coup d'état in Egypt—the first Arab coup in the 21st century—shows that even after an authoritarian ruler is deposed, militaries may remain the major barrier before democracy. Surely, and as stated before, the weakening of a military's political influence is not a sufficient condition for democracy; civilian control of military does not necessarily mean democratic consolidation, as exemplified best by the Soviet Union and China (Aydınlı 2009).

However, the absence of coups cannot be the sole indicator of consolidated democracy. As Koonings and Kruijt state, "political armies have been and still are one of the key variables shaping the origins and the course of democratic transitions. Democratic consolidation depends on, among other things, the manner in which political armies still interfere—or abstain from interfering—in civilian politics" (Koonings and Kruijt 2002, p. 2; also see Desch 1999, p. 5; Diamond and Plattner 1996; Shah 2014, p. 11; Karakatsanis 1997, p. 289). Pakistan and Turkey are two

cases in point. Despite multi-party competition, observers of Pakistani politics doubt country's democratic credentials and point fingers at the continuing high influence of Pakistani armed forces in civilian politics (Cook 2004, p. 4). Understanding the external dimension of coups d'état may produce significant policy recommendations for democratic transitions and democratic consolidation by showing how external actors may help coups d'état and, therefore, directly and indirectly support continuation of military influence and undermine democratic transition. If mechanisms and instruments of external support are grasped this gives policy makers better knowledge and opportunity to adjust and modify, or even resist to, these mechanisms.

Motive vs. Opportunity

A good way of starting to locate the place of external actors in military coups d'état is distinguishing *motives* from *opportunities*, as Finer had done (1988, p. 20) or *need to intervene* from *ability* to intervene (Klieman 1980, p. 143), and placing the external dimension within the realm of opportunities and ability. As Brian Taylor argued, "domestic and organizational structural accounts help explain the opportunities that officers face, whereas the corporate interest and organizational culture perspectives focus on officers' motives" (Taylor 2003, p. 29). Alternatively, as Klieman put it, "military, internal cohesion, skill structure, career lines, social recruitment, and education" may count for a military's ability to intervene but complications arising from martial law declaration may explain a military's *need* to intervene (Klieman 1980, p. 143). To put it more succinctly, militaries may intervene in civilian politics not *because* they enjoy popular support and receive assurances that no civilian and international resistance will follow but rather thanks to the *opportunity,* the latter factors may provide. A military's *disposition* to intervene and *ability-to-supply* a coup are different matters (Piplani and Talmadge 2016, p. 5).

It may be said that the distinction between motives and opportunity or the need to intervene and the ability to do so corresponds to Doty's critical distinction between *why* and *how-possible* questions. Though Doty explained the idea behind this distinction in discursive formations and forming of certain subjectivities in the tradition of *critical security studies in International Relations*, she remains correct to claim that "explanations for why questions are incomplete in an important sense. They generally take as unproblematic the possibility that a particular decision or course of action could happen" (Doty 1993, p. 298). In this sense,

high popular and bureaucratic support, and lack of resistance by political parties and other actors would explain *how it becomes possible* for militaries to take over power (Bou Nassif 2017, pp. 159–161). Praetorian organizational culture, on the other hand, gives us the primary actor's motive, and therefore may tell us *why* militaries seek political influence in the first place. As the retired Pakistani Air-Vice Marshal Shahzad Chaudhry remarked, "the coup planning clique certainly ponder how the United States may react if they manage to overthrow the existing government. However, the trigger is always local; the local trigger is what the coup makers respond to. Everything else comes next" (personal communication, September 29, 2015).[2]

The local trigger—whether corporate interests or organizational culture or something else—may answer the *why* question whereas the international reaction also helps us answer the *how-possible* question. Support or promise of support by the United States may make a critical contribution to a military's confidence and assurance that it has the ability to *supply* a coup. This is to say that it is not only 'domestic' factors—making sure that "all of the right people to be in the right place at the right time" (Piplani and Talmadge, p. 6)—that gives a military the ability and the edge to *produce* a coup. This means that we may explain coups in an *ideal* two-step model, in which a sufficient and strategically placed number of officers first firmly decide to stage a coup and only then they will try to find out about opportunities, both domestic and international, to see if they can pull it off.

The availability of and easier access to archival resources today put researchers in a much better position to discuss the role of external actors on civil-military relations and democratic breakdowns in many places starting from Latin America to Middle East (Forsythe 1992, pp. 387–389; Gott 2005, p. 83). Truly, thanks to archives opened and first-hand accounts of major policy-making actors researchers are more certain of the direct US involvement in the coup d'état against Prime Minister Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 (Kinzer 2003), 1949 and 1951 coups in Syria (Little 1990; Mufti 1996, pp. 49, 55; Copeland 1969, p. 42; Massad 2011; O'Connell and Loeb 2001, p. 19), 1957 coup plot

[2]When General Ayub Khan was asked about the reasons he took over in 1958, he said "the compelling reasons to change a social order or an established government could also be for reckless or selfish reasons, but in our case, it was really the last desperate day to save the country from complete disintegration" (Ghani 2010, p. 99).

in Syria (O'Connell and Loeb 2001, p. 18), and April 12 coup in Liberia (Moose 1980, pp. 26–28). CIA played a crucial role in the Ba'ath coup d'état in November 1963 against PM Qassim in Iraq (Mufti, p. 145), against Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana (O'Connell and Loeb, p. 20), and against Patrice Lumumba in Congo (Haynes 2011, p. 38). Britain and the United States were active in the process starting with supposedly left-wing coup attempt in 1965 to the coup by Suharto against President Sukarno in Indonesia (Hilton 2001; Schonhardt 2012).

Fitch shares similar sentiments on the role of external actors when he claimed that the CIA had a hand in coups in Ecuador in the 1950s and early 1960s (Fitch 1977, pp. 56, 60, 67).[3] The United States was also active in blocking a coup attempt in Jordan in the summer of 1958. As the CIA's covert channel to Jordan's King Hussein, Jack O'Connell, admitted, "had the CIA not intervened, there almost certainly would have been a coup. Given the number of senior officers involved in the plot, it might have succeeded" (O'Connell and Loeb 2001, p. 12). Or, alternatively, scholars are also in a better position to raise a counter-argument, suggesting the non-involvement of United States with regards to the 1964 Bolivian coup (Kirkland 2005) or 1958 coup in Iraq (Karam 2017). Yet again, this study does not seek to research the kind of connection between an external actor (or actors) and other militaries similar to the connection found between the United States and Britain and "devoted royalist and bon vivant" General Zahedi in Shah's Iran (Meyer and Brysac 2008, pp. 334–335; Kinzer 2006, pp. 6, 13).

This study has four objectives: first, by studying the cases of 1960 and 1980 coups in Turkey and 1958 and 1977 coups in Pakistan it seeks to explore whether and to what extent coup plotters anticipated any possible US reaction. Second, it also seeks to explore whether and what 'role' the United States played in those coups. Third, it tries to reveal what differences and similarities there were between the US position toward these particular coups in Turkey and Pakistan, and if there is, how we can explain different US reactions. Last but not least, it brings in 'socialization hypothesis' into the analysis and tests it with the cases of Turkey and Pakistan.

[3] For US efforts to destabilize other governments, manipulate political environment to install right-wing governments and support coups from Greece to Chile, see Schlesinger et al. (2013, p. 434) and Kinzer (2006).

Book Structure and Methodology

This book explores the US role in coups d'état in Turkey and Pakistan during the Cold War through a comparative historical case study. Pakistan and Turkey make an interesting pair of cases to explore the role of a powerful external actor for several reasons. To begin with, during the Cold War both Pakistani and Turkish militaries were powerful political actors in their domestic politics. Here were two 'political armies' (Koonings and Kruijt 2002), dismissing elected government on particular charges but both were hugely popular among their people. When both Pakistan and Turkey made their transition to a democracy at the end of the 1940s, though the dynamics and duration of those transitions were different, they had gotten out of rules under towering leaders, respectively Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Kemal Ataturk, though the duration they spent under these leaders differed as well. Both countries came to acquire strategic roles in the US grand scheme to contain Soviet expansion, though the strategic edge of Turkey and Pakistan waxed and waned throughout the Cold War. Their primary strategic significance derived from their geographical positions as natural barriers in the southern arc to block Soviet's expansion to the south.

> There was a need for something in that area of the world, because on one end you had Turkey, which was a part of NATO, and at the other end was going to be Pakistan, which was a part, I believe, of SEATO. That was to be the connection from SEATO to CENTO to NATO, so you had a security ring of alliances around the Soviet Union… We were trying to connect up the three countries: Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and then the U.S. and the British. We were trying to connect up their communications, transportation, and through any projects that would enable them to cooperate with each other. (Martin 2006, pp. 112–113; Stern 1998, p. 85; Brzezinski 1983, p. 356)

In its ultimate objective to contain and defeat the Soviets, the United States saw Turkey and Pakistan as being part of the same natural defense line (Van Hollen 1998, p. 9). Both countries were close US allies and received a large amount of military, political, and economic assistance and both signed bilateral agreements with the USA ensuring US protection. The origins of internal and external threat perceptions as potential causes of military intervention too were similar. Not only did both Turkey and Pakistan feel threatened by the Soviet Union in their vicinity,

but both also felt very insecure due because of the action of their next door neighbors, Greece and India, respectively. It must be pointed though that while Turkey and Greece, as co-members in NATO, did not fight each other during the Cold War, Pakistan and India, which led the Non-Aligned Movement, fought immediately after Pakistan's independence first as well as in 1965 and 1971. On the domestic political front, neither country felt consolidated at this time. Both perceived acute internal threats to their unities. Yet, notwithstanding these similarities, the nature and channels of their access to the United States had been qualitatively different. Turkey enjoyed denser political, military, social, and economic ties to the United States as a NATO member whereas although Pakistan was referred to as 'the most allied ally' of the USA because it was a member of both CENTO and SEATO, its connection to the USA lacked the content, passion, and access NATO membership provided.

This comparative historical case study employs 'process-tracing' that will allow the author to closely track down through "histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources" (George and Bennett 2005, p. 6) how coup plotters in four coups in Turkey and Pakistan approached the issue of US reaction before, during, and after the coup d'état in question. Concerning the underexplored issue of socialization through professional military education given by the United States since early in the Cold War—underexplored with respect to Cold War period—process-tracing allows "the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events" (George and Bennett 2005, p. 5). When it comes to US support after the coup, I take into account US military, economic, diplomatic, and political support for two years after it but also compare the numbers with data for two years before the coup.

Though a retired four-star Turkish general argued that "coups have no records, just like bribery has none" (Yirmibeşoğlu 1999, vol. 1, p. 413), the data for coup records for this study originate from five sources. To begin with, though not yet fully opened for researchers' perusal, declassified US archives will be the primary and most important source of data. These records, which are available for all three cases except the September 12 coup in Turkey, it is hoped, will help the researcher find out how the USA approached political developments before and after coup d'états in Turkey and Pakistan, and, therefore, what role they played. This study will also utilize electronic telegrams sent from

and to United States embassies around the world for particular years (1973–1979), recently declassified by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The same goes for State Department Bulletins. A significant number of memoirs written by retired Turkish, Pakistani, and US officers, politicians, and ambassadors will complement these archival sources. Feroz Ahmad recently argued, "historians should not take memoirs at face value" because "all memoirs tend to be self-serving and merely justify the author's prejudices" (Ahmad 2015). Truly in using memoirs as a source we need to "consider who is speaking to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances" in order to assess the meaning and evidentiary worth what is conveyed through texts (George and Bennett 2005, pp. 99–100). However, if used with the necessary caution and diligent crosschecking from other sources available, memoirs may prove to be extremely useful. For instance, it is thanks to a memoir written by a former CIA Istanbul station chief that we learn that the CIA was had advance knowledge of the March 12 1971 military coup (Clarridge and Diehl 1997, p. 117).[4]

As for the memoirs of US ambassadors, though no ambassador openly confessed to involvement in military coups d'état, their accounts are still very helpful in deducing certain clues and making more informed analyses. It is important to know what judgment went out from US embassies in Ankara and Karachi and later Islamabad before/after/during a coup because there is a good chance that US policy towards that event may be shaped by the recommendations of US embassies. For instance, when Zeinel Abidin Ben Ali took over premiership from the ailing Bourguiba in 1987, the embassy's judgment of the event was that it was not a coup and Ben Ali enjoyed the support of important domestic political players to keep his rule and therefore the United States should recognize the new government as legitimate. Washington duly followed this advice and recognized the new government (Hull 2009, p. 76). This does not guarantee that all US ambassadors had good command of events in their host country and their recommendations turned into official policy, but

[4] Nazar also claims that Cemal Madanoğlu, one of the leading officers of the 1960 coup, came to him in the wake of the March 12, 1971 military memorandum and asked his help in getting U.S. support for their planned coup. Nazar reports declining his request and implying notifying both Turkish and U.S. authorities, which in turn helped, if not allowed, Turkish Intelligence to know for sure that a leftist coup was in the offing and to prevent it (Altaylı 2013, pp. 359–360).

how they characterized events and what messages they say they relayed to their counterparts in their memoirs still render these worthy resources.

Another precious source of data is the hundreds of interviews conducted under the auspices of Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training with scores of retired officers in US embassies across the world, which are immensely helpful but very little known and explored. The data for economic and military aid provided by the United States to Turkey and Pakistan are fairly accessible. Finally, this researcher conducted twenty-two elite interviews with retired officers, politicians, and expert scholars in both countries. As expected, gaining access to retired officers proved to be an onerous task. Among retired Turkish generals, the researcher contacted in Turkey, the retired generals Tamer Akbaş and Yalçın Ergül turned down our request. Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu and Nevzat Bölügiray could not accept it due to their health issues. Several others in both Turkey and Pakistan did not respond to our requests. The major limitation of this book has been a lack of access to General Staff archives in Turkey and Pakistan. An analysis of these could have given us a better and more accurate understanding of what coup makers thought before the coup, and what negotiations, *if any*, went into their calculations about the likely level of outside support. The cost of this general absence of indigenous archives is that the researcher has not had the chance to learn about their perspective in their own words. Their absence leaves the researcher in a position where we are able to know what coup plotters and military governments thought before and after coups in Turkey and Pakistan only from outside perspectives in external archives and subjective personal memoirs. It needs to be noted, however, that these problems are some of the usual obstacles before research into military affairs (Aziz 2008, p. 83) but should not deter researchers.

A few caveats are in order to clarify the objectives and boundaries of this study. To begin with, this book does not attempt to establish a causal relationship between external actors and coups/military interventions. In other words, the aim here is not to point at the 'United States' as the immediate cause and culprit of military coups d'état in other places. On the contrary, a main premise in this study is that armed forces do *not* take over *because* an external actor or actors (state, state agencies, or non-state actors) force it to do so. It is domestic factors that provide the principal rationales for military coups d'état. International actors may wish that there was a regime change in a country by military takeover, yet a simple external prodding would scarcely be enough to

finalize an event such as a coup. The international environment may be *permissive* of a coup d'état, but it is not likely that any officer would dare to carry out one *just because* the international structure is ripe; it is rare that military generals would be hired or bought off to do US bidding by overthrowing their own government. As Demirel rightly pointed out with regards to US involvement in the 1980 coup d'état in Turkey, "the Turkish Armed Forces did not need US encouragement or instigation to intervene in political processes and abolish the parliament to take things over. For the military had already been disposed to a coup" (Demirel 2003a, p. 272). International structure may only *allow* a coup to take place because the *will to start a coup* may not be sufficient on its own.

The second caveat is that a conscious effort will be made in this study in order not to succumb to the alluring threat of conspiracy mentality. It is therefore important to make a very selective use of existing secondary sources. As an illustration, Mehmet Ali Birand's *The General's Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980* does not appear to be a reliable source to understand the September 12 coup in Turkey. Birand's main argument throughout the book is that the USA had not only known of the coup beforehand, but had also urged the military to intervene. Birand claims that an article written in *Armed Forces Journal International* by a retired senior State Department official under a pseudonym "gave the message that the only exit for Turkey was military intervention" (Birand 1987, p. 127). However, when the reader visits the source given by Birand, the article cited claims in fact that "The Turkish Army is not a cure to Turkish democracy, but rather a major cause of the disease" and "the Army can still play a major stabilizing role as long as it stays out of power" (Galen n.d.).

The same warning about sources to be utilized for this study is valid for Hale's otherwise seminal book on the Turkish military and their role in politics. When Hale discussed the international dimension of the 1980 coup d'état, he writes that "US military chiefs had dropped broad hints to their Turkish colleagues that they were perturbed by the situation in Turkey and expected something to be done", which, if true, would be very significant for the purposes of this study. Such 'hints' are notable as 'signals', and hence may count as external incentives for the coup makers. However, when the reader goes to Hale's references for this rather bold and, if true, important claim, one finds three sources: Weiker's book dated 1963!, Hasan Cemal's *Tank Sesiyle Uyanmak*, and United States Ambassador James W. Spain's *American Diplomacy* (Hale 1994,

p. 323; also see related footnote no. 48, p. 334). The author could not find any such information in Spain's memoirs or Cemal's book.

With these remarks made; the first part of this book will continue with a survey of civil-military relations literature to show the gap related to the role(s) of external actors in military coups d'état. The next chapter elaborates on the argument that external actors have played a significant role in coups d'état during the Cold War. It tries to show that coups cannot be explained with reference only to indigenous motivators and some domestic-level opportunities such as popular support and lack of resistance. It is in this chapter that the researcher broaches an extended discussion of professional military education (PME) programs that Turkish and Pakistani military officers have been attending in the United States for several decades, albeit with brief periods of interruptions. This chapter also brings in'military-to-military relations' as an important but understudied issue to be addressed in a better understanding of civil-military relations. Indicators of US support that this book will look for and three stages of US 'role' are also discussed in this chapter.

The remaining chapters are devoted to detailed discussions of the US role in four cases of military coups d'état in Turkey and Pakistan during the Cold War in the light of theoretical insights given in the second chapter. The third chapter discusses US involvement in two classical military coups in Turkey during the Cold War, namely those that occurred in 1960 and 1980. The fourth, penultimate chapter opens a debate on the US role in another set of two classical coups in Pakistan, in 1958 and 1977. The final chapter provides a brief overview of the USA's continuing role in civil-military relations in general and further military coups in Turkey and Pakistan after the Cold War. The book closes with a comparative discussion of the USA's role across four primary cases from the Cold War period.

A Survey of the Civil-Military Relations Field

The next section of this chapter provides a review of state of civil-military relations literature by dividing it into domestic and external factors. 'Domestic factors' are divided into two subgroups, based on whether these factors originate from the country's armed forces, or from elsewhere. In order to pinpoint the role of external actors in cases of coups d'état in Turkey and Pakistan, it is necessary to start with domestic-level factors that actually provide the indispensable spark for many coups.

Domestic Factors

One strand of thought in civil-military relations regarding the reasons for the military's foray into politics through a coup d'état focuses on the organization itself. The military as an institution may like to preserve and advance its interests by seeking to increase its share from the budget, preserve its autonomy in personnel promotions and improve living and work conditions, protect itself against rival institutions (Danopoulos 1992b, p. 3). "The military [behaves] essentially as a trade union looking out for its own interests. When these are affected—and only then—the officers move to protect their budgets, their autonomy, their promotions, salaries, pensions, and perquisites" (Horowitz, as quoted in Singh 2014a, p. 18). Therefore, armies can be considered as an institution similar to others, and it is important to understand how, at a particular moment, this institution defines its interests, norms and values to understand its behavior (Shah 2014, pp. 25–28). In this regard, the coup is only one of the instruments available to a military to fight for its corporate interests. This does not mean that militaries define their interests, norms and values in a vacuum, in absolute immunity from influence external to the military (Shah 2014, p. 28). However, according to the advocates of this approach, it is still the military-as-institution that needs to be focused on to explain a military coup. In the final analysis, a sustained sharp decrease in their funding or the application of austerity measures may trigger a military takeover (Tusalem 2014, p. 483; Ibrahim 2009).

Corporate interests of a military may have been distended by its deep involvement in economics, as in Algeria, Pakistan, and Egypt. There is a common consensus that a negative correlation exists between economic involvement and military professionalism and civilian control (Springborg 2011, p. 399; Siddiqa 2007, pp. 2, 12).[5] As Mani pointed out, "where a legacy of military entrepreneurship exists, civilians seeking to establish responsible political control over the institution will face the daunting task of eroding a discreet, but nonetheless established,

[5] For instance, some students of CMR have tried to explain recent 2013 military coup in Egypt through a historical institutionalist perspective. According to this perspective, the Egyptian military forsake President Mubarak to protect its institutional interests and privileges it amassed over the years, see Kandil (2014, pp. 2–3, 5). Likewise, with that perspective in mind, Aziz argues that "the military coups in Pakistan are a predictable response of the military to safeguarding of its institutional interests, rather than manifestations of ethnic, religious or regional dynamics" (2008, p. 55).

prerogative to economic power and autonomy" (Mani 2007, p. 592). Economically powerful militaries tend to be politically influential and interventionist.

A low opinion of civilian politicians when contrasted with disciplined, uptight, professional, and patriotic officers usually accompanies interventionist military culture. Distrust against politicians almost invariably accompanied the interventionist culture of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) (Yirmibeşoğlu 1999, p. 33). The same may be said of Pakistan (Khan 1963, pp. 180, 192). We may underline the disdain, low view Pakistan's first military ruler, Muhammad Ayub Khan came to have vis-à-vis Pakistani politicians when he became the local Log Area Commander in what was then East Pakistan (Amin 2012, p. 51; Musharraf 2006, pp. 78–84; Khan 1967, pp. 41–42, 49, 58, 61, 68, 80). In his 'broadcast to the Nation' after declaration of Martial Law on October 7, 1958, Ayub Khan remarked that, "these chaotic conditions, as you know, have been brought about by self-seekers who in the garb of political leaders have ravaged the country or tried to barter it away for personal gains… our so-called representatives in the Assemblies shifted from one party to the other without turning a hair or feeling any pangs of conscience" (Ahmed 1959, p. 237).

The external and internal threat situation and the ensuing predicament for survival may also play a role for a military to become political and see itself as the last line of defense in matters of survival. For instance, the economic, military and political weaknesses of Pakistan from its inception and its perception of imminent, existential threat posed by India, especially given the immediate post-independence conflict between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, may have boosted the Pakistani military's interest in domestic and foreign politics in the absence of a strong civilian leader following the death of *Quaid-i Azam* [Great Leader] Muhammed Ali Jinnah (Khan 1963, pp. 40, 139, 153). Under those circumstances the perception was that the survival of Pakistan hinged on the strength of the army, which was the only 'shield' for the 'fledgling' nation (Ayub Khan 1967, p. 21; also Khan, F.M. 1963, p. 241). This self-perception also feeds into an interventionist organizational culture.

Militaries may dismiss civilian governments not because they would like to conserve their institutional interests but because their 'organizational culture' urges or allows them to (Demirel 2009, pp. 347–348; Sarıgil 2011). Here "organizational culture refers to collectively held

beliefs, norms and ideas that prescribe how an organization should adapt to its external environment and administer its internal functioning and structure" (Schein 1985, p. 6). It provides "the pattern of assumptions, ideas, and beliefs that prescribe how a group should adapt to its external environment and manage its internal structure" (Legro 1994, p. 115). When used in the context of civil-military relations, the concept covers the particular image the armed forces have of themselves, their view of politicians and politics, and their ideological orientation and perception of their roles in their respective political systems ('guardianship', 'ruler', etc.) (Sarıgil 2011, p. 273). A military's organizational culture defines its collective identity, which then affects how the military will see itself within the political system and where it will locate its institutional interests (Sarıgil 2011, p. 273). Having an interventionist organizational culture and looking out for corporate interests may also not be exclusive variables either.

It is equally significant to locate the origin and development of a military's organizational culture. Organizational culture may spring from ideological mission an army attributes to itself. This attribution may stem from the role of the military in state formation. One former Commander in the Turkish Air Force, General Ergin Celasin, referred to the same origins when he talked about the founding ideology of the Turkish state and duty given to the Turkish army to protect Ataturk's revolution. Having such a duty the military saw the regime as its child and showed utmost care necessary to protect it from any danger. "As the military you are the founder and you cannot salute your Chief of Staff or Prime Minister when the apple of your eye [the regime] slips from under feet like a carpet" (personal communication, July 23, 2015; Çelikoğlu 2010, pp. 28, 74).

Organizational culture is sustained and passed over to the next generations of officers through both the system of military education and the impact of previous coups. As Celasin pointed out, "in the military schools you start from physical threats but then the understanding of threat expands: economic collapse, cultural imperialism, for example, also start counting as threats. In other words, domestic issues too are thrust into the circle of threats gradually. And it is your job as a soldier; you have a mission, you get up in the morning and you read newspapers and watch television to see what is going on in the country. You look at the bigger picture. You are programmed to do so" (personal communication, July 23, 2015; Okan 2015, p. 56). On the Turkish and Pakistani

cases, military officers' memoirs and interviews reveal how interventionist organizational culture develops and how important it is to democratize it to liberalize civil-military relations in a coup-prone country (Ergül 2014, pp. 36–38, 57–58; Akbaş 2014, pp. 197, 209; Başer 2014, pp. 307–309; Çelikoğlu 2010, pp. 22, 28, 74; Kıyat 2010, p. 52; Temel 2007, pp. 135, 145, 204; see also related remarks in Pekin and Yavuz 2014, pp. 301–303; Şenocak 2005, pp. 100, 112, 120–122).

Coups themselves have their own impact of aggravating the interventionist organizational culture in the armed forces. Scholars talk about the 'additive impact' of previous military coups. "Countries that have had a recent coup tend to be more vulnerable to another attempt" (Powell 2012, p. 1028). Or, asin the words of Douglas Hibbs, "an 'interventionist' history is likely to develop a tradition or 'culture' that makes current interventions more likely than otherwise would be the case" (Hibbs quoted in Taylor 2003, p. 18). As norms that allow for military coups in a polity and are maintained through repetitive military interventions they may acquire a "'taken-for-granted' character" (Hibbs quoted in Taylor 2003, p. 18) and, therefore, continue to guide action.

Weak Politicians and Regimes

The other domestic-level perspective seeks to draw our attention not to the military but to the weak political and institutional structure of the society at this time. In other words, militaries intervene in politics and dismiss governments due not to "… social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society" (Huntington 1968, p. 194; also see Needler 1966, p. 619; A. Yavuz, personal communication, December 16, 2015). In other words, a military intervenes to eliminate such diseases as corruption, stagnation, stalemate, anarchy, and subversion of the established political system that may afflict the body politic. "Their job is simply to straighten out the mess and then to get out" (Huntington 1968, p. 226; Harris 2011; Perlmutter 1974, p. 13; Heper and Güney 1996, p. 620; Shah 2014, p. 205).[6] These 'diseases' reduce a government's legitimacy, its 'right to rule', which then may provide a toxic environment for coups d'état: "coups occur when a government faces a legitimacy crisis" (Powell 2012, p. 1021).

[6]For a criticism of this perspective see Aziz (2008, pp. 63–64).

Several scholars adopted this perspective to explain military coups d'état in Turkey and Pakistan (Ahmad 1993, pp. 11–12; also Kamrava 2000, p. 73; Schiff 1998, p. 39; Mani 2007, p. 598; Arif 1995, p. xix). A United States National Security Report in 1959 wrote, for instance, that "chronic political instability coupled with persistent economic distress and rampant corruption led to the establishment of an authoritarian regime under army control in October 1958" ("Statement of American Policy", August 21, 1959). General Zia, who took over in 1977, gave the same explanation for his action against Bhutto[7] government (Nawaz 2008, p. 362).

Here it is the vacuum in the political system that the military is forced to fulfill (Diamond and Plattner 1996, p. xxix). The notion of 'political vacuum' filled by armed forces implies that armed forces do not want to involve in politics, but cannot avoid being pulled toward it because of the incompetence of politicians as opposed to the armed forces as a disciplined, well-organized and modern institution (Ben-Dor 1973, p. 58).[8] They are "… propelled into political action because civilian groups have failed to legitimize themselves; thus, the army's presence in civilian affairs indicates the civilian government's inability to control internal corruption" (Perlmutter 1974, p. 5; also Nordlinger 1977, p. 45). As Finer argued, in a country where a government's right to rule is seen legitimate and therefore is obeyed, civilian bodies and organs that form the political system are seen by citizens as authoritative and legitimate, and public attachment to or involvement in these institutions are strong political culture will be far democratic and established to allow military interventions (Finer 1988, p. 18). The levels of popular support behind the armed forces, the continuity of such confidence and absence of protests even after military interventions replace popularly elected governments are taken indicators of political culture. Finer takes 'popular support for armies' as a facilitating condition and its absence a 'moral

[7] Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was "a young lawyer from Larkana in Sindh province, educated at the University of California at Berkeley and at Christ Church, University of Oxford, was inducted into Ayub Khan's martial law government in October 1958 as minister for fuel, power and natural resources. Later made foreign minister[Bhutto] broke with Ayub after end of 1965 war with India that he had helped provoke with the support of guerrilla operations in Kashmir, and set up the Pakistan People's Party. Took over as president on 20 December 1971 after war with India and Pakistan's loss of East Pakistan." See, Nawaz, p. xxii.

[8] For a brief discussion of this argument and its critique, see Ayesha-Siddiqa (2007, pp. 64–65).

barrier': "In countries where attachment to civilian institutions is strong and pervasive, the attempts of the military to coerce the lawful government, let alone supplant it, would be universally regarded as usurpation" (Finer quoted in Nordlinger 1977, p. 93).[9]

It may also be that civilians may *encourage, though not cause*, a military to intervene.[10] This was done several times by civilians, both religious groups and general-turned-politicians, in Pakistan (Shah 2011, p. 137; Akhund 1997, p. 323). It was the Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad[11] himself, who reportedly tried to devolve his authority to General Ayub Khan in 1954 when his health was failing and he disapproved of Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra (Musa 1984, p. 117). Civilian politicians may also inadvertently invite militaries into politics when they seek to use or allow the use of the military in non-military jobs too such as construction, national education and internal security operations or for suppressing riots for the reason that these involvements may harm militaries' professionalization and exacerbate their politicization (Lombardi 1997, p. 210; Ben-Dor 1973, pp. 63–64). There are strong indicators in Turkish and Pakistani history to suggest that non-military tasks may increase the army's interest in non-military issues and realms from economy and national education to foreign policy and social morality (Akbaş, pp. 273–278; Tezkan 2013, pp. 113–114, 162–163, 193–198; Amin, pp. 291–292; Khan 1963, p. 206). Summing up all these domestic factors behind decision to coup, Fitch says that the following set of criteria guide decision-making process behind a coup:

> public opinion against the government and civilian calls for military intervention; widespread public disorders and protests against the government, especially where military units had to be used for riot control; failure to act forcefully against perceived "communist threats;" government actions which benefited or were detrimental to the institutional interests of the armed forces; and for at least a subset of officers the constitutionality of the government's actions. (Fitch 2005, p. 41)

[9] For a recent challenge to this argument linking popular approval of a military and military intervention, see Singh (2014b).

[10] For an excellent example of Turkish politicians involving in the military's day-to-day politics see Demirel (2003b).

[11] Ghulam Mohammad was a bureaucrat in Pakistan in the early 1950s. He later became Finance Minister and was elevated to the rank of governor general in 1954.

The use of the army to suppress civilian disturbances may make a coup more likely. Recent research has shown that using armies to suppress non-violent protests near the capital make military coups more likely both because they make elite coordination easier and diminish chances of any adverse international reaction (Johnson and Thyne 2016, pp. 4–6). For instance, the use of the army to restore order and stability in Pakistan after the Independence created the deleterious effect of "looking for the army for assistance regardless of whether the situation truly required the army to step in or not" (Khan 1963, pp. 178–179). Civilian politicians' call for the military to quell protests in Lahore in 1953 created a huge downside. The military did calm things down (Shah 2014, p. 68) "… but the role of the military expanded so quickly to so many areas that an abnormal situation was created. Army officers started to preside public functions, addressing public gatherings, touring city areas and opening new markets and public buildings" (Hussain quoted in Aziz, p. 65; see also Musa 1984, p. 120; Rıza 1984, pp. 30–31, 75; Ziring 1997, p. 229). Later on, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto did the same mistake when he made the military a party to the civilian conflict between the Pakistan Peoples Party government and the 'Pakistan National Alliance' after the latter accused Prime Minister Bhutto of rigging the 1977 parliamentary elections. While Bhutto's advisers claimed that the army was in contact with some PNA leaders and the intelligence involved itself in inciting the unrest, Bhutto tried to win the military to its side by raising their salaries and eliciting a declaration of loyalty from the army generals to the civilian government (Shah 2014, p. 138). It was however an unwise decision for Bhutto to allow army generals in Cabinet meetings during these convulsions because the generals witnessed the government's frailty (Aziz 2008, p. 72; Klieman 1980, pp. 16–17).

Finally, two new frameworks have been put forward to explain civil-military relations after the Cold War: the principal—agent model and the shared responsibility model. The former is based on a strategic interaction (material incentives, cost—benefit analysis) between civilians, who invent the military to protect the society from external adversaries but also make sure that guardians do not turn against the civilians, (Feaver 2003, p. 54). However, Feaver's model does not seek to explain why coups occur because it takes into account only places where "the players [civilians and military officers] share a common conception of the relationship in which the civilian is supposed to be superior to the military" (Feaver 2003, p. 97). In addition to the comparative disadvantage presented by

this framework, it also presumes that only two actors are involved in this relationship: a civilian principal and a military agent. It therefore disregards the role of external factors, deeming CMR and a military agent's shirking behavior including coup as purely homegrown issues.

The next framework, the 'shared responsibility' model, views civil-military relations as an arena where civilians and military officers cooperate. In this model, 'civilian direction' rather than 'civilian control' is favored and 'healthy frictions' between civilians and soldiers are expected. However, even its proponents argue that this model can only applied to places where the norm of 'civilian supremacy' is accepted as the rule of the land in the first place (Herspring 2013, pp. 1–5). This model does not take into account external actors as a factor in civil-military relations either.

External Factors

The Cold War

While the literature overemphasized domestic-level factors, the external dimension of military coups d'état did not receive the same degree of attention until after the Cold War. Mainstream academic thinking had previously prioritized the domestic over the external. It seems that although the deans of the literature recognized that superpower rivalry/Cold War politics played some sort of role in civil-military relations in general and military coups in particular in other countries, they did not quite try to put their finger on it and remained confused when they tried. To illustrate, although Huntington claimed that the political role of the military as a 'guardian' of the existing regime sounded well to "American opinion leaders" and that "frequently the United States was quite happy to have the military dislodge governments it disliked…" (Huntington 1968, pp. 225–227), he claims that the USA did not foment coups in other countries through military or other assistance. For him, "no convincing evidence exists of a correlation between the US military aid and military involvement in politics… Military aid and military training are by themselves politically sterile: they neither encourage nor reduce the tendencies of military officers to play a political role" (Huntington 1968, p. 193). Huntington suggested that the US foreign aid program can and should earn friends for it and strengthen its bargaining power in international organizations such as the United Nations (Huntington 1970, p. 9), but he refused to consider this as a potential factor in civil-military relations or coups d'état in other places. According

to Nordlinger, "American military assistance to non-Western countries has been undertaken partly to ward off military intervention. With modern weapons, military advisers, and training, non-Western officers were to become more professional."

However, Nordlinger also acknowledges several instances where militaries did not quite become sufficiently professional to respect their civilian superiors and rather chose to take over at the behest of or with the support of the United States against their governments. In brief, he recognized that a powerful external actor such as the USA plays a role in military coups d'état and praetorianism, and speeding up or slowing down processes of post-coup recognition, adjusting the level of aid and stationing US troops nearby for intimidation are all instruments with which an actor can play this role (Nordlinger 1977, p. 9). According to Janowitz, officers trained in the USA played an important role in the modernization of underdeveloped countries as well as the suppression of internal rebellion and communist subversion as in Indonesia and South American countries like Argentina (Janowitz 1960, p. 342). Janowitz also argued that "it also appears that foreign military assistance programs are not decisive or even influential in accounting for a military regime's ability or inability to consolidate its rule" (Janowitz as cited in Maniruzzaman 1992, p. 734; Hyman 1972, pp. 407–408). However, this fact did not become in any way integral to his otherwise seminal analysis of civil-military relations.

Some dissident voices argued that external actors did not necessarily help civilianization, more so in certain regions such as Latin America and Middle East (Danopoulos 1992b, pp. 14–15). Ben-Dor argued that "the impact of outside powers on civilianization in the Arab world has been almost nonexistent. Military regimes gain international recognition very easily—a factor that tends to increase the temptation for the potential coup-makers. International recognition and aid (both military and economic) have not been contingent, as a rule, on the character of the given regime" (Ben-Dor 1975, p. 325). Others quietly inquired about what they named as 'contagion hypothesis'—"whether or not military coups in one country influence in some fashion the occurrence of military coups in other countries". However, "the search for an understanding of military coup behavior need not be conducted exclusively in terms of domestic factors" (Li and Thompson 1975, pp. 64–65).

One particular reason behind this neglect in the mainstream literature may be the belief that mostly Marxist writers chose to discuss the role of external explanations. More mainstream students of CMR thought at most that training and education opportunities, for instance, reinforced

existing ideological attitudes of officer corps (Fitch in Lowenthal and Fitch 1986, pp. 26–55). However, the proponents of the importance of external-level explanations for military coups d'état defended that 'counter-insurgency doctrines' taught by the USA, other ideological indoctrination, and ways of exposure to the West undermined other democracies and countries (North and Nun 1978, p. 168; Needler 1966, pp. 616–626; Wolpin 1973, p. 6; North 1986, p. 179; Etchison 1975). O'Donnell mentioned, however, another impact of the USA, as the USA encouraged adoption by Latin American militaries of the "Doctrine of National Security." According to this doctrine, the local armed forces must be prepared to wage internal warfare against subversive elements on the ideological, economic and political fronts to secure national security, which was defined as "the situation, certainly classifiable, in which the vital interests of the nation are safe from interferences or disturbances—internal or external, violent or non-violent, open or surreptitious—that can neutralize or delay development and consequently weaken the very existence of the Nation or its sovereignty" (O'Donnell 1986, p. 105).

Retired General Ahmet Yavuz believes that these doctrines taught in military schools matter because they shape both the worldview and the actions of military officers. The exaggerated 'Soviet nemesis' pictured through these doctrines taught at the Turkish Military Academy in synchrony with the Western focus on the Soviets, for instance, he claimed, distorts the correct understanding of issues because everything that officers do militarily has to be based on that doctrine (Ahmet Yavuz, personal communication, December 16, 2015). According to Col. Jordan, who taught at the US Military Academy at West Point, the US military training programs deliberately avoided teaching civilian supremacy and respect for democratic values because "…then the U.S. armed services would be committed to a form of political warfare far beyond their traditional role" (cited in Wolpin 1972, p. 64).

According to those skeptical of external input in military coups, the purpose of the foreign aid program during the Cold War was not just championing the causes of freedom and democracy in a hostile environment. Military assistance aimed tangible benefits in return such as "diplomatic support, intelligence facilities, communications installations, and base rights" (Wolpin 1972, p. 7) as well as increasing the recipient military's human capital (Savage and Caverley 2014, p. 2). Others suggest that US military and economic aid turned recipient militaries into

the most powerful political actors in the domestic scene. According to Danopoulos, it was US military and economic aid that "transformed the Greek military into the most potent political force in the country, and provided the basis for a sophisticated mechanism that 'penetrated the Greek military and political policy-making process'" (Danopoulos 1992a, p. 55). In the cases of training and education of officers from former colonies, for instance, in Africa, it was even discussed that the foreign assistance may assimilate these officers into colonizers' norms and values and turn officers against their own rulers (Price 1971, pp. 403–404). The influence of such programs are doubly augmented because "their [officer's] presence [officers from newly independent states] abroad at an institution like Sandhurst or St. Cyr [in France] is viewed as a mark of great personal triumph. Not only are they abroad, which in itself brings great prestige in their home countries, but the successful completion of their course practically guarantees them elite status in their home societies" (Price 1971, pp. 405–406). A report sent by the US Embassy in Khartoum/Sudan to Washington in 1979 may lend support to this argument:

> Several Sudanese officers who have attended U.S. training courses, some of whom are themselves now responsible for choosing new generation of officers to attend, have commented to us that they find IMET training absolutely essential to Sudanese military readiness and security, and also an important contribution to the building of U.S.-Sudanese relations. We have noted that almost invariably, returning Sudanese officers are pro-American and eager to return to the U.S. for more training possible. In Sudanese military, IMET training is a badge of honor and prestige, and a privilege much sought after. (Kirby 1979)

As much as military training in the West may also induce envy by other officers in the same army and suspicion that the trainee was now irreparably afflicted with the Western way of life and thinking, foreign training is a valuable resource and increases an officer's standing at home (Schofield 2011, p. 89).

However, the attempts to bring external-level explanations to the fore were also hurt by the unsubstantiated causal relationship hastily established between foreign training and education programs, military and economic aid, and military coups d'état and military rulers (Cockerell 2012). 'The School of the Americas' has been subject to accusation that

its graduates were the major actors in coups in Panama and human rights violations in other places (Millett 1997, p. 126).[12] Unless coup plotters establish a causal link between US training and their coup motivation, we need to be very specific about what we can glean from knowing the number of US trained officers among coup plotters. For instance, when we know that CIA had developed a list of contacts in the Egyptian military, started a CIA-run military training program for the young Egyptian military officers and the fact that six officers among the fifty that overthrew the King and took over power in 1952 had received US training, this should tell us more about whether the USA would be in a position to signal 'consent' and encouragement to a coup and whether it would be surprised if a coup occurred than about a *causal* relationship between military training and coup d'état. This is correct even though an Egyptian officer named "Aly Sabri, the first official liaison between the RCC [14-member Revolutionary Command Council formed after the Free Officers' coup in 1952] and the United States, admitted—without much elaboration and discussion of mechanisms and process involved—that "the attendance of many Egyptian officers at US service schools during the past two years had a very definite influence on the coup d'état in Egypt" (Kandil 2014, p. 24; also Wilford 2013, pp. 128–129).

Post-Cold War

The level of interest in international actors as a factor in civil-military relations increased with the end of the Cold War. Danopoulos argued that "never before have international developments influenced domestic developments, and vice versa, as they do today" (Danopoulos 1992b, p. 4). Scholars now tried to make sense of the change in the international structure for civil-military relations field. The potential impact of the absence of a 'Soviet threat' with the end of the Cold War and rise of internal threat perceptions took particular attention (Feaver 1999, p. 222). The idea was that ascendancy of external threats during the

[12] For similar criticisms, see Cope (1995, p. 26); Monbiot (2001); Blakeley (2006); Ross (2009); McCoy, Jr. (1994, pp. 9–14). Similar incidents occurred in East Asia as well, see Taw (1994, pp. xiv, 10).

Cold War helped in many places keep officers busy and, therefore, shifted their attention away from domestic politics. As Welch says, "[when] armies are preoccupied in measuring themselves against a foreign foe whose forces constitute a clear and present threat to national security, they are less likely to use domestic politics as an outlet for their energies and ambitions" (quoted in Cann and Danopoulos 1998, p. 277).

With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, a persistent external threat, however, it was claimed that "'the devil finds work for idle hands'", meaning that officers could now find more time and room to interfere with politics (Andreski quoted in Taylor 2003, p. 24). This retrospective view of the dynamics of civil-military relations during the Cold War generated the natural prediction that in the post-Cold War period the quality of civil-military relations will be determined by the balance and degree of internal and external threats. If a military perceives imminent and acute external threat its external focus will keep it busy and away from politics. "In the absence of serious external threats the army is more inclined to use its force internally" (Taylor 2003, p. 24; also Andreski quoted in Taylor 2003, p. 24). According to this perspective, also known as "interest-group or bureaucratic-turf model of coups" (Perkins 2013, p. 75) the decision to intervene cannot be attributed to military's own dynamics (corporate interests or organizational culture) but can be explained "…by structural factors, especially threats, which affect individual leaders, the military organization, the state, and society" (Desch 1999, p. 11). Thus, "wars and periods of heightened international tension, such as World War II and the Cold War, present greater external threats; détentes and periods of peace, including the post-Cold War era, present lower external threats" (Desch 1999, p. 12). Others with a more restricted understanding of how external developments may influence civil-military relations focused on the emergence of 'postmodern militaries' in the post-Cold War period. The new nature of threats and international peace keeping missions abroad required militaries' transformation to adapt to the new conditions (Moskos et al. 2000; Şatana 2008).

In general, the post-Cold War perspective on external actors and CMR assigned a very affirmative role to external actors, including international organizations, and argued that with the Soviet threat gone external actors found themselves in a far better condition geopolitically to use several tools to promote democracy around the world (Bruneau and Trinkunas 2006, p. 777; Michaud-Emin 2007; Sarıgil 2007; for an exception, see also Luckham 1994, p. 28; Souaré, 2014).

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CHAPTER 2

External Support and Military Coups D'état During the Cold War

The External Actor

This chapter seeks to find out, conceptualize, and elucidate the 'role' arguably played by the United States, one of the two most powerful external actors in military coups d'état during the period of the Cold War. This is not to say, however, that the USA was the only actor interested in influencing coups and coup outcomes in other places. Both the other superpower during the Cold War, the Soviet Union (David 1987, pp. 69–105), and regional actors in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia and Libya, supported coups elsewhere. (Tansey 2017, p. 149; "US Embassy Cables: Saudi" 2010; David 1987, p. 3) Without failing to acknowledge that there can be different external actors, this book focuses on the actions of the United States. What this requires in the first place is to clarify what is meant when 'the United States' is referred to as an external actor. However, discussing the role of the USA per se may be a misnomer on the ground that different US agencies may have given different responses to the same event.[1] Conceivably, the way in which the State Department officially responded to an event may have differed from the perspective adopted by the Pentagon or the White House.

[1] Nogaylaroğlu also stressed the plurality of domestic political actors in the United States that vie for power and influence when he said that 'there are 100 Americas. Some people say they talked to America. But we need to ask them who did they talked with? Which America did they meet?' (personal communication, June 9, 2015).

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These clashes of perspectives had become a common feature of successive US administrations, especially since the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency (Clarridge and Diehl, p. 62). For instance, during Henry Kissinger's term as Secretary of State (1973–1977), the power was concentrated in the White House and the National Security Council, which regularly clashed with the State Department and, at times, also with the Pentagon (Bass 2013, pp. 9–10; Inderfurth 2003, p. 22).[2]

Differences of opinion may more likely emerge in cases of coups between different US government agencies. Interestingly, similar to its demands for Turkey to cut down the size of its military early in the military, the USA also wanted Pakistan to reduce the size of its military establishment because there was no point, according to State Department officials, in Pakistan maintaining its large military apparatus. Two departments, the State Department and the Pentagon, did not see eye to eye on this and the general wisdom in maintaining US—Pakistan relations, particularly regarding the substantial economic and military assistance (McMahon 1994, p. 253). Indeed, in other matters and in different time periods the CIA has all too often acted on its own without little or no consultation with other relevant departments.[3] In response to the 1967 colonels' coup in Greece, for instance, the former United States Ambassador to Athens, Robert Keeley, said that the CIA was almost jubilant after the coup and the US military thought the coup makers were worthy of US support because they were pro-US, patriotic officers (p. 103; see also Blood 1998, pp. 34–38).

The Pentagon played a major role in policy-making in Washington at the time, though they deferred to the embassy regarding matters in Athens. But military officers had their own bureaucratic concerns, according to Keeley, especially concerning the suspension of a large part of military aid because it disturbed their relationship with fellow Greek officers, etc. (Keeley 2010, p. 104). And the JUSMAGG (Joint US Military Assistance Group Greece) was actually working under the EUCOM [United States European Command], the head of which was General David Burchinal, approached the post-coup government

[2] For a tight race between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to influence President Carter, see Albright (2003, pp. 87–88).

[3] Writing in a letter in 1977, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., former spy and intelligence analyst for the Office of Strategic Services and later speechwriter and special assistant to US President John F. Kennedy, said that "CIA was a rogue elephant from way back". See Schlesinger and Schlesinger (2013, pp. 453, 491).

favorably because they were pro-US, pro-NATO and EUCOM's policy recommendations to the US government expressed positive sentiments towards the coup (Keeley 2010, p. 104). This shows how different US, and even NATO offices, departments involved in overall policy-making may respond to the same event. Though this does not guarantee that the USA may have followed a similar policy in other places, it is instructive to demonstrate both policy priorities of the US governments during the Cold War as well as differing reactions of its various policy-formulating bodies such as the CIA and the Pentagon. Mindful of a similar scenario in the case of coups d'état in Turkey and Pakistan, this book will pay attention to different US actors involved in policy-making and decision-making processes before, during, and after the four cases of coups discussed here.

Parameters of US Foreign Policy

All that being said, it may be useful to delineate the contours and principles of US foreign policy during the Cold War as regards military coups d'état in the rest of the world. Risking some dose of generalization and simplification across several US administrations and simplification, one may say that US foreign policy during the Cold War was dominated by the doctrine of *realism*, whether the region of concern and that policy was the Middle East, East Asia, Latin America, Africa[4] and South Asia (Abramowitz 2009, p. 92; Djerejian 1995, p. 1; see also Djerejian 2008, p. 25; Rice 2008). "Against the backdrop of the Cold War neither domestic civil society nor the international community valued democracy as unconditionally and was not willing to stand up for it so forcefully as after the Cold War. Hence, the costs associated with the use of force at home were lower" (Hunter 1998, p. 298). The United States applied 'political conditionality' very selectively when faced with extra-constitutional power grabs around the world (Masaki 2016, p. 51).

[4] As William Milam, a retired diplomat, said about the 1968 coup d'état against President Modibo Keita in Mali, the United States did not like coup d'état too much but in this case they did not cut off assistance or their relations did not rupture over the coup. They hoped that the new government would be more pro-western and more sympathetic to the UN than deposed President. Milam 2015, pp. 27–28; see also the account by Thomas Pickering, then US Ambassador to Nigeria (1981–1983), on how the US Embassy dealt with the coups and coup makers in Pickering 2015, p. 153.

What mattered for security relations between the USA and other countries was whether or not that particular country was in the Western camp. Thus, 'stability' entrenched itself as the buzzword. This implied that it was sufficient for the United States if a third country maintained a democratic façade as long as the country was politically stable and posed no risk of sliding to the Soviet camp (Brown 2005, pp. 179–198, pp. 180–181; İlter Türkmen, personal communication, November 16, 2015; Ahmet Yavuz, personal communication, December 16, 2015; Hikmet Bayar, personal communication August 8, 2015). As much as whether or not a country was ruled by democracy, especially if that country was a NATO member, ideally mattered for the USA, deviations from ideal values were tolerable. Recently declassified US archives show that the USA resorted to covert operations and instigated coups against duly elected governments in these regions to advance its geopolitical interests (Masaki 2016, p. 54). A military coup d'état, which sometimes caused blood to be spilt, involved persecutions, and ended in the installation of military dictatorships or authoritarian governments, provided the most accurate litmus test. A former US ambassador, Michael W. Cotter, offers a very succinct summary of how the United States viewed the issue of coup d'état in the context of the Cold War:

> It frustrates me so much when you now see revisionist history, after the Cold War is over, which simply discounts how all of us felt in the early 1970s about the course of the fight against Godless Communism and for domination of the world. In fact, that conflict was in serious doubt in the late 1960s and early 1970s. We were clearly engaged in ideological, and in some places, a shooting battle. There were clearly sides on these things. In Chile, Allende was the wrong side and Pinochet was the right side, with whatever casualties came later as a result. (Cotter 2002, p. 37)

In the environment of the Cold War a military coup d'état could be preferred over the loss of an important ally in a strategically important landscape. This is why 'military coup' clearly existed in the ideational reservoir of top policy officials during the revolutionary crisis in Iran in 1979 (Brzezinski, pp. 373, 379–382, 393). It was also often the case that giving external support to coup makers and military governments was eased by the idea that 'militaries in Pakistan, Brazil, Egypt, Turkey and elsewhere demonstrated that militaries are able to seize power and govern' (Brzezinski, p. 395).

Playing a Role in Three Stages

An external actor may theoretically play 'role' in military coups d'état in another country in three stages. In the pre-coup stage, an external actor may become directly involved in the coup plots, actively guide and support a coup attempt. It is also possible that an external actor may give signals to coup plotters that it would tolerate the coup if it were to occur. In this context, signals can be defined as "actions or statements that potentially allow an actor to infer something about unobservable, but salient, properties of another actor" (Gartzke quoted in Shannon et al. 2015, p. 365). Signals may be given indirectly over how a US government treats an incumbent government. If the bilateral relationship between a government in one country and a US government has gone really sour and hostile messages are delivered, this may send a signal to domestic rivals of that government that the USA may support their anti-coup action. According to Thyne,

> hostile signals channeled from the USA [against an incumbent government] should increase coup plotters' perceived probability of staging a successful coup… because they give the plotters an advantage over the government in solidifying power once the coup is attempted, and deplete the resources available to the government to deter coup attempts by blocking foreign aid or international investment. (Thyne 2010, p. 451)

Signals may matter more in places where regimes have weak or alienated domestic bases, as in the case of Pakistan more: "…[The r]egime in Pakistan have relied on intimacy with governments to bolster their domestic confidence and signal their political opponents that the US is lined up behind them" (Hussain 1990, p. 128). The USA may give such signals in two ways: it may either have a bad relationship with the incumbent government, from which coup planning officers may infer possible tolerance by the external actor. Or, alternatively, the external actor may be in direct contact with the conspiring officers through different means and relay to them that it would understand a coup and therefore promise not to put pressure on them if they were to take action against desired targets.

It is important to note that signals are not abstract things; political actors, whether civilian governments, insurgents, or armed forces, do look out for signals and try to make sense of them before they get

on to their intended action. These actors use signals to "make sense of their relationships. Public naming and shaming, private diplomacy, as well as aid or cooperation measures are all cues sent to partner governments about the dynamics of their mutual relations" (Huber 2012). Signals given by as powerful an external actor as the United States may also have an influence on other issues. For instance, mixed signals and unambiguous US green light partly allowed for human rights abuses in Latin America (Sikkink 2004, pp. 109–110, 111–115). "Decisions about military and economic aid are cues or signals given by one country to another. Policy makers use these cues to make sense of the relationship between two countries. Making sense involves interpreting these cues by linking them to existing, well-learned cognitive structures, such as dominant foreign policy frameworks and perceptions of state identity" (Sikkink 2004, pp. 102–103). Shannon et al. believe that even "cheap signals have important implications, because they signal the tolerance of the international community for coups. Silence or support may inspire coups elsewhere, while widespread condemnation may lead to counter-coups and widespread uprisings" (Shannon et al. 2015, p. 364).

Signals may be given by different persons, ranging from an ambassador to more high-level officials and agencies such as the CIA.[5] They may be sought by not only military officers, but also civilian officials before taking a potentially divisive step or making a controversial decision. To illustrate, before Pakistan's President Farooq Leghari (1993–1997) dismissed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in November 1996, a well-known Pakistani diplomat and former Foreign Minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, who was very well connected due to his previous governmental posts, and Syed Refaqat Khan, General Zia's former Chief of Staff, visited US Ambassador Thomas Simons for tea and looked for signals from the Ambassador to assess the US commitment to Bhutto. They figured that if the USA is not too committed to Bhutto, the likely cost of ousting her would be significantly diminished. Ambassador Simons understood why they came, but still says that if he signaled through his "tepid reaction to the calls of Yaqub Khan and Refaqat Khan" the absence of deep US attachment to her, this was unintentional (Simons 2013, pp. 217–219).

[5] For a directive from President Kennedy to the CIA allowing the latter to give discreet positive signal of support to any potential conspiratorial group against growing leftist current in Brazil, see Weiner (2008, pp. 189, 311).

With the much-needed assurance the visitors must have derived from the Ambassador's comments, President Leghari sacked PM Bhutto in November 1996.

Another example from post-Cold War Pakistan may give a clearer illustration. Nawaz reports that when his brother, the Commander of Armed Services Asif Nawaz, visited the USA for the first time after US sanctions had been imposed on Pakistan due to the development of the Pakistani nuclear program in the late 1980s, he visited the CIA in addition to other high-level Defense and National Security Council officials and asked them if they wanted the military to upend the government of Nawaz Sharif. He based his question upon the *signals* he said he was being given by the USA. Unfortunately, in his report on the episode Nawaz does not clarify what these signals were, however. The General was urged by Yusuf Haroon, a leading Pakistani businessman living in the USA, to dismiss the government and take over and was assured that he would have no problem in garnering the necessary US support for such action (Nawaz 2008, p. 453).

Returning back to the issue of signaling, officers intending to carry out a coup may *demand* these signals themselves or the external actor may want to give hints of these during any ordinary conversation. The previously mentioned example of Zeinel Abedin Ben-Ali consulting with the US Embassy officials and asking for signals if he took over can be characterized as the decisive signal an aspiring Prime Minister eagerly expected to hear before moving on to action. This process of requesting and receiving signals from US administrations may have been more straightforward and direct. For example, the Egyptian Free Officers told the US Embassy their intentions to assume power before the coup in 1952 and promised to honor their international obligations if they managed to carry out the coup (Kandil 2014, pp. 15, 24; see also Meyers and Brysac 2008, pp. 363, 373).

More, as Demirel pointed out in the case of the 1980 coup d'état in Turkey, "if the Western allies of Turkey, particularly the United States, in addition to civilian domestic groups, gave *hints* that they would not support the coup, Turkish military would have thought twice before acting" (Demirel 2003, p. 269; italics added). Lefever says that when military officers planned intervention during the Cold War they approached the US advisers. But these advisers stayed neutral in most cases, except when they considered the coup a 'constructive coup', "those with some chance of correcting gross corruption or subversion" (p. 287). If Washington

thinks, however, that the coup would enhance its interests, a US ambassador may authorize military advisers to give advice to execute the coup more efficiently. This may have what happened with the 1965 coup in Congo (Zaire) (Lefever 1980, p. 288). As important as signals may be, there may also be other mechanisms through which an external actor plays a role. As Thyne himself suggested, signals were important in the Latin American coup cases but there may be other mechanisms to be uncovered (Thyne 2010, p. 460).

The second phase to possibly observe support by an external actor may be during the coup. In addition to giving 'signals', foreign support for military intervention may provide a loose, but essential 'international opportunity structure' (Croissant 2004, p. 364). In other words, if international organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), NATO, the UN and foreign powers support a civilian government against military intervention—they possess the means to do so if they want to—this narrows down political options for the military (Croissant 2004, p. 364). Although military coups d'état typically started and finished quickly during the Cold War (Luttwak 1979, pp. 146–148; Wiatr 1971, p. 64), this second stage is still a *very critical* phase to observe the support or its lack thereof by the external actor. This stage still allows the United States to project its view *despite* the short span of the coup. For instance, when the CIA reported in late April 1963 that a pro-Nasser coup was in the offing in Jordan, US President Kennedy ordered the 6th Fleet to position in the eastern Mediterranean to be ready for action any time (Little 1995, p. 530). In this case, although the 6th Fleet could have not made it to its destination on time to prevent the coup, President Kennedy's decision itself was intended as the decisive signal. In another case, when Colonel Gringo Honasan tried to overthrow civilian government in Philippines in 1989 the US rejected the coup and made sure that the government stayed intact. When there was yet another coup attempt soon after, the USA flew airplanes from Clark Air Base nearby as a *demonstration* to deter the coup (italics added) (Platt 1998, p. 18; Wright and Mann 1990).

The third phase is the final one, where the external support may be particularly important in determining the fate of the coup and its perpetrators. This is related to the fact that the new leaders are at their most vulnerable in the early moments and days of the coup. This explains why, given their concerns about a possible British intervention to reinstall King Farouk in the early days of the 1952 coup, Aly Sabri, the head

of Egyptian air force intelligence and Free Officer's emissary to the US Embassy and his military colleagues remarked to Lieutenant Colonel David Evans III, the US assistant air attaché, that "they wanted to join a US-led military command and acquire new weapons and training" and "promised to escalate their campaign against Egyptian communists" (Sirrs 2010, p. 26). The external actor may influence the success of the coup, especially if we take into account the fact that 'success' here does not end when a military takes over power in a few hours and sends into exile or prison 'pariah' politicians or presidents. As Thyne et al. pointed out, "far from being the end of political turmoil, the putschists' rise to power could merely represent the beginning of a much longer political crisis" (2017, p. 4). If popular support is absent, international support is late, and the coup action stalls or appears close to stumbling, military cohesion may be affected, which may directly influence coup outcome and derail it. After all, the degree of cohesion within military during coups d'état is directly influenced by perceptions of domestic and international support (Barracca 2007, p. 139). External actors matter after the coup also because a horrible example may be made of coups and putschists by domestic and external actors if the new military rulers or the junta fails to *govern*. External support is at least one of the factors that may sustain 'political influence' of militaries that frequently intervene in political processes and eventually cause or sustain 'bad' civil-military relations.

A military government, regardless of how long, needs to *deliver* goods and services to the people. In other words, if it is to be successful, a military coup must survive beyond the initial capture of key places such as the presidential palace, the parliament, the radio station, etc. There are various factors that can render an initially successful coup unsuccessful and unsustainable after a few hours or days. As argued before, internal resistance by different actors ranging from bureaucracy to trade unions may cause huge problems for the putschists (Sundhaussen 1998, pp. 330–331). Yet, it is not only domestic inhibitors in the form of a popular resistance—which is what coup wannabes fear the most, as stated before—that can cause the failure of a coup attempt. International factors and actors with strong linkages and leverages can also make life very hard for the coupists. In countries such as Turkey and Pakistan, where the economy was often in shambles under the periods studied in this book and which developed a serious dependency on US arms, external support (economic aid, erasing or rescheduling debt and military aid) often provides a vital lifeline for the new military rulers regardless of how long these military regimes lasted (they lasted far longer in Pakistan than in Turkey).

> The threat of international retaliation, once a coup has been launched, is likely to have an important impact on its success or failure. Indeed, an important reason cited for the decrease in the number of successful military coups in the developing world over the past quarter century is greater pressure from the West on countries to democratize and stay democratic. However, the willingness of the USA, the EU and Western-led multilateral institutions to use this pressure, as well as the capacity to use it effectively, varies from case to case and from region to region. In terms of capacity, the effectiveness of foreign pressure varies depending upon the degree to which a country is linked to the West. These linkages take many forms, including cultural ties, economic integration, military and political alliances and penetration by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). As a general rule, the greater the linkages a country has to the West, the greater leverage or influence the West has over that country. (Barracca 2007, p. 141)

US leverage would conceivably work best in cases where the USA entertains close ties and various leverages with the country in question. As Thyne pointed out, "signals should have the largest impact as states become heavily dependent upon US assistance… aid provides the USA with long-term leverage over other states" (Thyne 2010, p. 459). Throughout the majority of the Cold War, the USA maintained excellent ties with Turkey and fairly good linkages with Pakistan. This is all the more true in the case of Turkey if 'linkage' is defined as "the density of ties and cross-border flows between a particular country and the US, the EU, and western-dominated multilateral institutions" comprising of five components: 'Economic linkage', which covers subjects such as trade, investment, credit, and bilateral and multilateral aid flows; 'geopolitical linkage', which includes connections with western governments and membership in western-led alliances, treaties, and international organizations; 'Social linkage' through migration, tourism, refugees, and diaspora communities, as well as elite education in the West. 'Communication linkage' or the flow of information; 'Transnational civil society linkage', which covers linkages between local religious groups and NGOs includes and their western counterparts (Levitsky and Way 2006, pp. 383–384).

As argued by Lt. General Asad Durrani, a former Director of Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan, US aid has always had a large defense component which has largely been in the area of hardware, rather than being geared toward building local Pakistani production and infrastructure. This rendered Pakistan dependent on the USA. "The Pakistani

military would get addicted to high-tech equipment, will remain reliant on the US' supply line and will therefore obstruct any effort to change the nature of relationship…" (Durrani 2007, p. 52). This supports the argument that Pakistan's dependency on US economic and military assistance during the Cold War would have forced it to care more for US reaction to a coup.

Indicators of Support or Rejection

Once the coup action is over, and if it has been successful, the types of support an external actor may give or withdraw may range from how the external actor names the event and whether it recognizes the new government to diplomatic, military, and economic assistance, which help sustain the new rulers and the regime.

> Country leaders can try to isolate themselves from foreign pressure by relying on small groups of loyal supporters, but coup entrepreneurs have to contend with an especially precarious domestic situation. Foreign support may co-ordinate expectations among wavering backers and cause them to fall in line, whereas foreign condemnation may undermine domestic confidence in the regime's ability to deliver indispensable outside resources. (Marinov and Goemans 2014, p. 805)

In one such historical instance of a coup d'état, there were several things the USA could do to show opposition to what happened: (a) nonacceptance; (b) withholding military aid; (c) diplomatic action such as recall of ambassador, condemnation of UN and/or NATO, and statement by a high-level administration official condemning the coup was also possible (Keeley 2010, p. 109). To begin with, naming as well as leaving an event unnamed can be a very political act. In fact, as is the case with coups d'état, naming can be a major political issue. In particular, how to name an event mattered tremendously for the United States as well on the grounds that Section 508 of Foreign Assistance Act passed in 1961 stipulated that the USA must stop giving aid to countries where "a "duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup." How the USA and other powerful external actors named an event matter tremendously for the coup makers. Naming affects recognition of new military governments in power after a coup takes places. Receiving recognition from international community also matter for putschists. As Rowell pointed

out, "in those days [during the Cold War] we [the US] regarded every recognition of a new government as a kind of blessing, and we let the public know that it was a kind of blessing. That stretched out the period of awkward communications excessively" (Rowell 2016, p. 48; brackets added).

For instance, in the most recent Egyptian coup in 2013, the United States has carefully avoided calling what happened in Egypt on July 3 a 'coup d'état'; the Secretary of State John Kerry did not even accept calling the event *military take-over*: "the military did not take over, to the best of our judgment—so far. To run the country, there's a civilian government. In effect, they were restoring democracy" (Siddique 2013).[6] This can easily be contrasted with Secretary Kerry's reaction to the 2014 coup in Thailand against pro-Western government of Yingluck Shinawatra: "… there is no justification for this military coup… I urge the restoration of civilian government immediately, a return to democracy, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as press freedoms" (US Embassy in the Philippines 2014). As far as Turkish politics and public perception is concerned, using 'military takeover', 'revolution' and 'military intervention' instead of using 'coup' may come to mean condoning the military's foray into politics. 'Coup d'état' on the other hand carries negative connotations; it is immediately identified with negation of democracy.

Here it may be said that the United States applied four major criteria into its recognition policy after a coup d'état: US administrations first considered whether the coup was bloodless, which also implied if there was—and may still be—civil resistance to the coup action. If the coup caused blood to be spilt on the streets, this shows that there were clashes and, therefore, implies some risk of resistance. For instance, when the USA advised the military and government against implementing Menderes' capital punishment after the coup, it said, the Turkish Army made a beautiful move on May 27, 1960 and executed a bloodless coup and there was absolutely no reason to blemish it with this execution (Karavelioğlu 2016, p. 150). This is how the US Embassy initially approached the colonels' coup in Greece in 1967 (Keeley 2010, p. 102) and Ben Ali's coup in Tunisia in 1987.

[6] Similarly, Secretary of State John Kerry's predecessor Hillary Clinton shunned naming army's overthrow of leftist government in Honduras in 2009 'coup d'état (Ross 2009).

The second factor, not unrelated to the first, was whether the new authority was in full control of the domestic situation. If it lacked such control, the entire effort may have fallen prey to communist subversive activities and leave country defenseless against communism. Hence, the Department of State gave the following instructions in assessing whether or not the USA should support military coups d'état and pursuant regimes early in the Cold War: "the essential test from our point of view should be whether a particular military regime responsibly confronts the problems facing it—security and developmental progress—and, in so doing, successfully resists Communist techniques." According to the State Department, coups d'état in Burma, Pakistan and the Sudan in the 1950s met this requirement. The US Ambassador to Thailand added his host country to that list too ("Dispatch From the Embassy in Thailand" 1959).

The third interrelated factor taken into account was whether or not the coup makers were known to the US Embassy. The chances that an US Embassy would not have any biographic intelligence on the coup makers was high only if the coup was staged by the lower ranks, something which also increased the possibility of resistance to a coup. This is why Keeley said of the feeling of the US Embassy when the colonels took over in Greece that "had the [Colonel's] coup [in Greece] been engineered by the senior generals of the Spantidakis group, our intelligence situation would have been quite good: we had a lot of data on those officers, we knew their orientation thoroughly (basically rightist, royalist, and pro-American), and the leading personalities were well known to our own senior officers of JUSMAGG and the attaché office, who had worked with them intimately for years" (Keeley 2010, p. 90).

The last, but definitely not least, important criterion was whether or not the new government was ready to 'honor international obligations'. John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State (1953–1959), had said during domestic discussions around the issue of recognition, stated this criterion in a real event of US-induced coup d'état in Guetamala. Dulles said that "…we want to feel satisfied that the new regime will be able to and willing to carry out its international obligations. If we are satisfied on that point… we should proceed to recognition" (Dulles quoted in Lafore 1956, p. 155). The United States recognized the coup in Libya in 1969, with a US official paraphrasing the official State Department statement on the issue in clearer terms: "revolutionary council was 'in firm control of the country' and had promised 'to honor international

obligations…'" (Wadlow 1978, p. 22). Secretary of State Christian Herter summed up some of these criteria: "whether the government exercises effective control of the machinery of government; whether it is without substantial resistance; and whether it is willing to comply with international obligations, including not only treaty commitments but also other international obligations" (Wadlow 1978, p. 23). Political orientation of the government and its leaders was no doubt important as well (Wadlow 1978, p. 25) "…for cases outside the Western Hemisphere, the trend is to omit issuing official and formal recognition statements and to say the question of recognition did not arise…" (Wadlow 1978, p. 21). However, it is not so important how the United States thinks about 'recognition' or how it approaches the issue is not too important. What mattered more was the fact that "when the United States eventually did extend recognition to a new government that it was a sign of American approval" (Wadlow, p. 21).

Military, Political, and Economic Assistance

The second instrument of support that is available to the United States to influence the fate of the coup is the crucial military and economic assistance. Military and economic assistance matters because it may create military, political, social, and cultural outcomes in both the short and long term (Gürdeniz 2013, p. 100). Economic aid may make significant impact on domestic political outcomes even during periods of stability. Economic and military assistance may help civilian governments survive longer than they otherwise could (Harris cited in Holmes 2014, p. 51). Thus, whether before or after a coup arms donors do not dole out military assistance without expecting any return, which may be in the form of granting use of harbors, bases, different facilities, and some other rights (Venkataramani 1984, pp. 416–417; Syed 1970, pp. 15–16; Huntington 1970, p. 9; also Abramowitz 2009, p. 94; Brown 2005, p. 181).

In its early years receiving external economic and military aid may even be a matter of survival for a military government. "Outside forces may be unable to intervene quickly enough to forestall a rapid power grab, but foreign donors have ample time to influence the direction of new and vulnerable regimes" (Marinov and Goemans 2014, p. 800). In a review of the role US Embassy assistance played in Pakistan after its independence, the US Embassy in Karachi thought that "Pakistan could

hardly have survived its early years as an independent country if it had not been for substantial US Embassy aid programs. It is, in fact, a measure of the success of those programs that despite tremendous difficulties the nation has been sustained and has maintained, indeed greatly strengthened, its orientation toward the Free World" ("Airgram From the Embassy in Pakistan" 1959, September 23).

Because the primary subject of a coup is armed forces, military assistance may also carry "political symbolism" (Siddiqa-Agha 2003, p. 57; Cohen 1976, p. 55). Military assistance may also help military chiefs regardless of the coup situation. Modernized arms may imply to members of armed forces that their institution, which they see as indispensable to their country and nation's future, is taken good care of. As O'Connell and Diehl pointed out for the effect of transfer of U.S. Embassy arms to Jordanian military, "modern [military] equipment helped keep morale and loyalty high" (pp. 37, 77; see also Tahir-Kheli 1982, p. 89).

The significance attached by the armed forces themselves to US military and economic aid maybe illustrated with an example from Pakistan. The Yahya Khan regime, which took over the government from Ayub Khan in 1969, was desperate for military and economic aid from the USA. The deputy martial law administrator and commander of the navy, Vice-Admiral Syed Muhammad Ahsan, who represented Pakistan at President Eisenhower's funeral in April 1969, deemed the occasion propitious enough to make a case for US assistance to the new military government. He told the State Department officials that "Pakistan could not afford "expensive purchases in Western Europe… going on to argue that this was a psychologically important time for the United States to invest in Pakistan's new leaders, who needed weapons for internal security and to "keep their troops from becoming disgruntled" (Haqqani 2013, pp. 128–129). This shows how important foreign aid becomes for newly-minted rulers. In a way, US assistance became one of the most credible ways for a ruler to claim that he is in charge and control, about which US officials were fully aware (Haqqani 2013, p. 129). In return, General-turned-President Yahya promised visiting Secretary of State William Rogers that Pakistan was fully loyal to its commitments through SEATO, CENTO, and alliance with the USA[7] (Haqqani 2013,

[7]When Nixon administration later extended assistance to Yahya Khan despite Pakistani atrocities in then East Pakistan, at the expense of violating the US sanctions previously imposed, the reason was partly because both Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and

pp. 129–130). According to Venkatarami (1984), in light of the power struggle among the political and military elite in Pakistan between 1955–1958, the US Embassy military aid had greatly enhanced his [Ayub's] image within the armed forces (p. 341).

When delivered after a coup, "arms transfers obviously carry with them important symbolic and overt messages of support" (Cohen 1976, p. 55; Siddiqa-Agha 2003, p. 58). "If one considers foreign aid as a tool to convey international acceptance or censure, then the case of Pakistan is instructive. Thus, out of the 12.6 billion US dollars' worth of military and economic assistance provided to the country between 1954 and 2002, $9.19 billion were given during twenty-four years of military rule while only $3.4 billion were provided to civiilan regimes covering nineteen years" (Aziz 2008, p. 30). This can be attributed to the importance the Pakistani military as the strongest political force in the country for the United States. As argued in an Embassy telegram from Islamabad, "despite frequently heard criticism of United States military assistance to Pakistan, the existence in this country of an efficient military force is an asset which should not be minimized" ("Airgram From the Embassy in Pakistan" 1959, September 23). To cite yet another example, following the overthrow of Liberian President William Tolbert by General Samuel K. Doe in April 1980, the US Embassy increased military and economic aid to the new military regime. The total Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Liberia increased from $26 million in 1979 to $137 million (USD 2011) in 1981 in the expectation of closer policy cooperation between the two countries (Sesay cited in Masaki 2016, p. 54).

The allocation of professional military education budgets after military interventions may also send certain signals to foreign governments. According to a Senate Committee Report in 2001, participation in IMET programs sends a signal to foreign governments: "… rightly or wrongly, many perceive IMET participation as bestowing a degree of legitimacy from the United States on the actions of the foreign militaries

President Nixon enjoyed Yahya Khan's friendship as opposed to their dislike of Indians. In return for the vital assistance of the US administration despite protestations of the State Department, General Yahya Khan was grateful and promised to never do anything to embarrass the United States (Bass 2013, pp. xii–xix, 13).

and governments" (Leahy 2002). US military aid seems to have carried this symbolic importance across the Pakistani political spectrum. According to Siddiqa-Agha, "weapons transfers or any military cooperation with Washington is held as American support for the ruling party in Islamabad… both military and democratically elected regimes have looked outside for support" (Siddiqa-Agha 2003, pp. 57–58). Lefever appears justified in arguing therefore that "the immediate result [of military aid] is to help strengthen the current government, whether it is civilian or military, effective or ineffective, authoritarian or democratic, relatively corrupt or relatively honest. Such aid also tends or reinforce the existing political system… the program tends to reinforce the status quo…" (Lefever 1980, p. 283).

When a significant amount of aid is delivered to the military as a priority client for the foreign donor, this may directly affect the "distribution of political capabilities" among various groups in a society where money and training opportunities are insufficient, and therefore promote the role of the military (Rowe 1974, pp. 241–242; Shah 2011, p. 17; see also Aziz, p. 7). As Ahmad said in the case of Pakistan, "US economic and military assistance has helped the Pakistani security apparatus to expand its capabilities at the expense of its domestic counterparts" (2005, p. 148; see also Cohen 2010, p. 143; Cohen 1976, pp. 53–54). One reason why military aid may strengthen the political position of armed forces overall (Nawaz 2008, p. 200) may be that arms relations foster closer dialogue between officers of two defense establishments (Fakir Syed Aijazuddin, personal communication, September 29, 2015). According to Venkataramani, even if arms relations are started by civilian officials, arms donors may want to anchorite the arms relationship to a more permanent actor in the system, especially in countries where the armies are powerful domestic political actors (pp. 418–419). Bilateral relations formed over military aid foster furthered dialogue and contacts between the US Embassy and Pakistani officers, thereby giving Washington the chance to shape the thinking and tendencies of Pakistan's armed forces (Siddiqa-Agha 2003, p. 58).

The total suspension of economic and military assistance or partial aid penalties too may serve the same function of extracting policy concessions from the target country and preserving US. interests in general terms as extending economic and military assistance. Admittedly, the United States' ability to impose sanctions was circumscribed under the conditions dictated by the Cold War because "withholding aid from

autocratic countries could mean losing clients to" the Soviets (Dunning quoted in Masaki 2016, p. 54). For instance, when King Hussein in Jordan desired more US arms and assistance in the early 1960s but the Kennedy Administration demurred because of lack of support in the Congress, the CIA presented the choice to Phil Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, as between 'rearming Jordan' or leaving the Kingdom to "…Soviet arms–and influence" (O'Connell and Loeb 2001, p. 38). Or, terminating existing aid programs may come to mean in some cases completely wasting what had been accomplished (Syed 1970, p. 16).

However, this should not lead us to discount the weight that penalties on previously committed military and economic aid could carry for the coup makers. For even under the Cold War rivalry, the US administrations were able to enforce sanctions and use various penalties after military coups several times.[8] "Any conspicuous sanction such as the cutting off of aid, can serve to distance the United States from a regime engaged in violation of human rights, and to withdraw from such a regime the possibility of arguing that its policy and acts meet no meaningful objection, have no costly consequences, or are condoned in fact by major democratic states" (Lewis 1980, pp. 197, 198).

Finally, when military officers stage a coup, it makes sense that they will want to be *recognized* as legitimate by external actors as quickly as possible. This may start with recognition, but goes further to include high-level visits by senior officials from powerful external actors and receiving invitations to speak in international forums and platforms. Therefore, 'political support' also needs to be considered in order to understand how the USA approached a coup in its aftermath. Recognition of a new government after a coup may itself be a signal to deter counter-coup attempts. Because those who plan to initiate a counter-coup then know that even if they succeeded, they could face fierce external resistance after the coup (Thyne 2010, p. 452). High-level visits

[8] For the US reaction to the coup in Honduras in 1963 see Rowell 2016, p. 36; for the US reaction to overthrow by Peruvian army of US-favored Fernando Belaunde Terry, see Flanigan 2000, pp. 5–6; When the CIA reported in late April 1963 that a pro-Nasser coup was in the offing in Jordan, US President Kennedy ordered the 6th Fleet to position in the eastern Mediterranean to be ready for action any time, see Little 1995, p. 530.

by generals and other high-status people, and close relations between U.S. officers and ambassadors also signal support (Keeley 2010, p. 198; see also Satloff 2000).[9]

'In highly personal cultures such as that of Turkey high-level visits such as by US Embassy presidents are seen reassuring signs of US support (Makovsky in Abramowitz 2000, pp. 219–266). This is why Prime Minister Menderes insisted on a visit by President Eisenhower to Turkey in 1959 and said that "Your [President Eisenhower's] visit to the CENTO countries would equal sending three American divisions" ("Memorandum of Conversation", 1959, October 9). Visits carried symbolic, but important meaning that it would be a problem for a country's highest officials such as Pakistan to fail to honor an invitation by the Soviets and rather accept the US Embassy invitation to visit Washington. As Ayub Khan said, "the big powers feel very insulted by such behavior, and they never forget or forgive" (Ghani 2010, p. 5). The Pakistani officials attached great importance to high-level visits by US Embassy officials. They took these visits as 'index of American commitment' and 'communiqués issued after these visits' as "signaling U.S. policy not only to Pakistan but also to India and the Soviet Union" (Tahir-Kheli 1982, p. xv).

Due to this symbolic, but empowering effect of high-level visits (both from and to) that Bhutto sought a face-to-face meeting in Washington with President Carter in the middle of raging protests against his rule in 1977. However, Pakistan's Ambassador to the USA, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, predicted that the USA would decline. Ambassador Yaqub thought that "if the American purpose was to engineer Bhutto's exit, then they were hardly likely to provide him with the public relations boost and political support of an invitation from the President" (Akhund 1997, p. 323). The meeting did not actually take place.

The point here, however, is not only that the USA decline to invite PM Bhutto at such a critical time shows US displeasure with Bhutto,

[9] The Afghan Ambassador to Washington, Karim Khalili (1978–1980), said in a meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Kabul on December 1977 that the US invitation to President Daoud was very important for Afghanistan and "Afghanistan receives economic assistance from the USA which is welcome but US moral and political support is of paramount importance to the people of Afghanistan, to president Daoud himself and to the Republican government." See "Afghan Ambassador Karim's Meeting", 1977.

but also that these visits carry additional meaning for the visitors to the US capital and imply support by the United States. When mid-ranking officers staged an unexpected coup in Greece in 1967 and the USA did little to condemn it, some ordinary Greeks pointed at the number of high-level visitors to Greece, including the Vice-President from 1969 to 1973 under the Nixon Administration, Spiro Agnew, who was of Greek-American descent (McCaskill 1998). On another occasion, President Nixon went on an Asia tour, starting on July 23, 1969 and the tour also included a stopover in Pakistan. According to Haqqani, "for Yahya, however, Nixon's arrival in Pakistan amounted to receiving the American stamp of approval. He needed it in order to reassure key Pakistani constituencies—especially the army—that the United States would continue paying some of the country's bills even after Ayub was gone" (Haqqani, pp. 130–131).

The conditions President Bill Clinton set for his short Pakistan trip in 2000 show that top policy aides and bureaucrats are themselves aware of the possible effects of a high-level visit to a place where a coup has just taken place. For example, some of his top policy aides warned President Clinton skip Pakistan in his upcoming tour of South Asia in mid-March 2000 because (in addition to other reasons) "United States should not be the first country to give a coup-plotter and military dictator the political boost of a high-level visit" (Talbott 2004, p. 191). When the burden of the army-dominant regime in Algeria could no longer be shouldered due to its civilian massacres from its coup to 1997, "one concrete result was that Western officials, worried about attracting notice for appearing publicly with Algerian military officials, stopped making official visits" (Martinez 2004, p. 16).

Military-to-Military

Analyses of 'civil-military relations' tend to focus lopsidedly on civilian-to-civilian interactions in domestic settings. Civilian-to-military and military-to-military relationships between respective armed forces and defense officials are sorely neglected. Those who do not neglect the issue fail to discuss its content and form and how and what it may help understand better (Karasapan 1989). It is one of the prime objectives of this study to show the significance of the bilateral relationship on the military plane and the instruments, platforms and mechanisms involved in it.

A recent example has shown clearly how bilateral military connections away from civilian oversight can help armed actors undermine official government policy (Hersh 2016). These channels are important to understand to make sense of external assistance for coups because the military-to-military relationship can be key to elicit understanding and assistance after coups d'état. Given the facts that militaries in Latin America, Africa and Middle East were most powerful actors in their domestic set-ups and coups d'état were primarily led by armed forces during the Cold war, we must consider the relationships between US and foreign militaries and defense establishments as complementary to civilian-to-civilian contacts and relationships (Lefever 1980, p. 277; Edip Başer, personal communication, October 31, 2015.).

In countries where militaries played visibly decisive role in politics, even US embassies were structured accordingly. In such 'high-military influence' places, the US embassies deliberately hosted the position of 'Political/Military Counselor.' Even after the Cold War ended, "the Embassy in Ankara was one of the few that still retained a separate political-military section. And that obviously speaks to the importance of the military relationship, military element in the bilateral relationship" (McKee 2016, pp. 63–64). It may be a good idea here to complement the civilian-to-military relationship with the military-to-military relationship for two particular reasons. To begin with, the Pentagon stood out as a very relevant actor in dealing with other armed forces, including that of Turkey and Pakistan. While the civilian high-level US officials may have at times wavered on the strategic importance of Turkey and Pakistan in the global effort to contain the Soviets early in the Cold War period, American defense establishment did not (Ali Sarwar Naqvi, personal communication, October 5, 2015; Arif Ayub, personal communication; Zafar Iqbal Cheema, personal communication October 1, 2015; Bashir Ahmad, personal communication). "Turkey was important to the US in military/security terms because it controlled the Soviets and it had a border with the then Soviet Union. This perception of Turkey was created in large part because of the influence of the U.S. military" (McCaskill 1998, p. 30).

Military generals did not only influence the policy from the sidelines. In the 1950s and late 1970s, US military officers/generals assumed positions of power within US administrations. When they did so, they brought with them their earlier connections and networks in other

countries. Their previous acquaintance with and view of generals in Turkey and Pakistan colored their later perspective and, therefore, had an influence on US policy toward these places. For instance, General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of NATO forces in 1951, himself became President in 1953. Besides, Henry Byroade, who had "first-hand experience in South Asia, having spent part of the war building airfield in eastern India" became the regional assistant [South Asia] to the Secretary of State in late 1951 (Kux 2001, p. 47). His appointment as the Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East-South Asia-Africa in December 1951 became the crucial facilitator in building US—Pakistani connection. "Byroade's appointment to the State Department facilitated discussion between the higher echelon of civil and military bureaucracies in Pakistan and the Pentagon" (Gardezi and Rashid 1983, pp. 102–103). Henry Byroade later became Ambassador to Pakistan in 1973. When President Nixon appointed Byroade as Ambassador to Islamabad in 1973, he gave the impression that he had handpicked him specifically because he was a former soldier. President Nixon said to PM Bhutto in the White House that "You can talk to Ambassador Byroade. He is a tough, no-nonsense fellow. He is not pro-Indian. He knows the Middle East, and he is totally the President's man. You will have an ambassador who knows what our policy is… He is a military man. He was a Brigadier General" ("Memorandum of Conversation" 1973, September 19).

Admiral Stansfield Turner, NATO Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, later became the CIA Chief (from 1977 to 1981). The Commander of the Turkish 2nd Army, İbrahim Şenocak, felt close and assertive enough to ask Admiral Turner during his visit to Turkey in 1975 to try to influence US politicians and persuade them to stop pressuring Turkey and remove the sanctions (Şenocak 2005, p. 135). Alexander Haig, the Supreme Commander of NATO from 1974 to 1979, also became the Secretary of State under the Reagan Administration in early 1981. His becoming the Secretary of State worked out for the best for the September 12 coup in Turkey. In the words of İlter Türkmen, a former diplomat who also became Turkey's FM after that coup, "We had very good relations with the U.S. after the September 12 coup. One reason behind this was Haig as the Secretary of State. Haig knew Ankara very well. He stayed in Ankara when he was a young officer and he was a very good friend of General Evren. Haig told us that the Europeans were giving arrogant reactions to the coup by preaching about democracy but the U.S. administration will not do that.

They truly did not" (personal communication, November 16, 2015). The military-to-military contacts established between respective generals earlier were therefore carried over to later periods when military officers took up civilian positions of power within respective Administrations.

The second reason why we need to take into consideration the military-to-military relationship is related to the ease with which soldiers communicate with one other. The rapport established between military officers through prior encounters results in more trust and provides a more stable channel for future interactions. Inter-officer friendships forged during joint military education and training and other opportunities or platforms such as joint operations or drills facilitate cooperation (Schaffer and Schaffer 2011, p. 66). As retired Pakistani officer Tughral Yamin told the author of the 1950s and 1960s,

> CENTCOM has always been a very good friend of Pakistani army. Pakistani generals felt very close to CENTCOM [India was in PACOM, Pakistan was in CENTCOM]. The American generals used to come for hunting to Pakistan. Officers find it easier to communicate with each other because they think that generals talk straight and get straight reply. They think they cannot get a straight reply from a politician. For the politician can say one thing one day and change his idea the next day. Generals are more straightforward with each other. In the army, you have very clear lines distinguishing enemy and friendly forces. There is nothing in between. With politicians, you have many shades and gray areas. There is no gray area in the army's playbook. (Tughral Yamin, personal communication, October 10, 2015; Khalid Iqbal, personal communication, November 16, 2015)

Lt. General Asad Durrani, the former Director General of the ISI, said that he does not believe that the USA or its military encouraged, either directly or indirectly, the Pakistan Army to depose a government and assume power. However, when the Army did take over, "its special rapport with the US defense establishment proved helpful". His perception and past experience was that the US did raise concerns about democracy after military coups d'état in Pakistan but always maintained "a policy of engagement" with Pakistan's military governments. He thought the hegemonic powers such as the US enjoyed working with military rulers free from constraints put by parliament or pressure by public opinion (Durrani 2007, pp. 51–52). Military-to-military contacts also worked for gathering information through private channels. It was thanks to such

military-to-military contacts that the United States obtained advanced knowledge that General Evren would succeed General Semih Sancar as the next Chief of General Staff in early March 1978. General Sancar himself told a "CENTO military source" that he would retire on March 6 and that Evren would succeed him ("General Sancar to Retire" 1978, February 27).

The armed forces were the most significant political actors in Turkey and Pakistan during the Cold War. As the retired Pakistani Commander Farooq Lodhi pointed out, "most of the time during the Cold War we, as military officers, did not learn to submit to the civilians. If I was going to receive some ships from the United States, I did not ask parliamentary officials or Defense Ministry people to go to the States, take the ships and give it to my captain there to bring it back. What we did is that we took it upon ourselves, we never let civilians come near us" (Farooq Lodhi, personal communication, October 1, 2015). Since militaries were the most powerful actors, US administrations saw them as the ones who could easily—and speedily—deliver the outcomes most desired by the United States. As Pickering remarked in hindsight, the United States "had a tendency to look at Pakistan as the army state over and that the military would provide what we [the U.S.] needed" (Pickering 2015, p. 519). A US National Security Council Report described Pakistan military in the mid-1950s as "…potentially the most stable and actively the most cooperative element in Pakistan society" ("Statement of Policy On U.S. Policy Toward South Asia", 1957, January 10). When Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (1994–2001) and his entourage tried to reach the Pakistani foreign ministry and prime minister's office for talks but was turned down on another occasion, General Anthony Zinni, an American Marine four-star general and Commander-in-Chief of US Central Command (1997–2000), called Pakistan Chief of Army Jehangir Karamat and reached him right away to clear up obstacles in front of American high-level visit (Talbott 2004, p. 59).

For this reason, it made sense to deal primarily with the soldiers and treat formal civilian interactions only secondary and ceremonial. For instance, after US reconnaissance plane RB-57 crashed in the Black Sea in 1965, NATO SACEUR came to Turkey and appealed to the Chief of Turkish General Staff to apply necessary pressure on the civilian government to resume these flights. He did so because "Americans, similar to many foreign officials in Ankara, used to see the General Staff as above

and more powerful than the civilian authority" (Orkunt 1978, p. 380). The Soviets had the same impression about the balance of powers among domestic political actors in Turkey (Orkunt 1978, p. 384).

The next useful benefit the USA saw in having politically powerful militaries as a safety valve in other countries was that the latter seemed far more conservative and resolute than other domestic actors to fight communism or nip an unwanted event in the bud (Wolpin 1972, p. 13; Y. Tezkan, personal communication, August 6, 2015). For instance, the military in Shah's Iran, the Jordanian army, the army in Thailand (Weiner 2008, pp. 149–150, 148th note on p. 579), Ecuador (Fitch 2005, p. 40), and militaries in Turkey and Pakistan were considered as bastions of anti-communism, and, therefore, were considered as guarantors of the pro-Western position and general stability (Goodpaster cited in Barrett 2007, chap. 8, note 71, p. 400; O'Connell and Loeb 2001, pp. 37, 77; Valley 1983, p. 22; see also Grigoriadis 2009, p. 75; Lenczowski 1979).

General Woods, director of US military assistance in 1965, said during a Congressional Hearing on Foreign Operations Appropriations that the void that exists in the running of Brazil can only be filled by the military, "the only force for stability and orderliness" (cited in Wolpin 1972, p. 50). Even before becoming Prime Minister and President, Bhutto had thought that it was wrong for Pakistan to rely solely on the US with total disregard toward the Soviet Union. He wanted to diversify options available to Pakistan. However, this alarmed the military establishment because "... hob-nobbing with 'godless Communism' was a bad thing in itself and would put ideas in the heads of the lower classes" (Akhund 1997, pp. 295–297). Militaries in Latin America were also more anti-communist than any other group, so much so that "without the armed forces, but with all other things being equal, every republic in Spanish America except Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Cuba would stand politically to the left of where it is now" (Johnson, 1964, p. 144). The main reason why the USA assented to the tossing aside of President Naguib in Egypt, who had also been the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council formed after Free Officers' coup in 1952, and see Nasser take his place was that the USA saw him as soft on communism whereas Nasser demonstrated his resolve to suppress communists in putting down a strike in Kafr al-Dawar (Kandil 2014, p. 26).

Cultivating Other Militaries

The United States was very much aware of the importance of cultivating good connections to politically powerful militaries during the Cold War. The State Department forwarded to forty-two Embassy posts some material related to the role of the military in less developed countries and requested their assessment from each post by October 1, 1959. The State Department assumed that "authoritarianism will remain the norm in Free Asia for a long period", which 'forced' US administrations to work with authoritarian governments in less developed countries. The Department of State material also included enclosed documents, one of which was entitled "Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers". The US Ambassador to Thailand commented in response to State Department that 'Thailand too was not ready for genuine democratic form of government. This was why the USA found it reasonable to work with the then existing authoritarian government that Marshall Sarit took over in a coup d'état in 1958. "The generally conservative nature of Thai military and governmental leaders and long-established institutions (monarchy, Buddhism) furnish a strong barrier against the spread of Communist influence" ("Dispatch From the Embassy in Thailand" 1959).

With the awareness that militaries in several countries were the key political actors on the domestic scene US ambassadors stationed in Ankara and Rawalpindi (later Islamabad as the new capital) paid special attention to cultivate relationship with these militaries. For instance, the US Ambassador to Turkey, Ronald Spiers (1977–1980), said,

> I became good friends with the Turkish military. I left Turkey as a minor hero among the military. The Chief of Staff later became President, so that my contacts were very useful. I sought them out and cultivated them carefully… I did that in Turkey, Great Britain and Pakistan. I had worked with the American military a lot, I liked them and so I gravitated to those connections. In Turkey and Pakistan, of course, they were very important in the political arena. The President of Turkey was a former admiral. I suspect that my predecessors had not made the same approaches as I did. I think the Turkish military appreciated my efforts. The week I left, the four Chiefs of Staff—Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie—gave a dinner for me which I was told was unprecedented. It was noted as such in the Turkish newspapers. One of these officers was Kenan Evren, whom I saw again when I was in Pakistan, by which time he had become President

> of Turkey. As is customary, all Ambassadors go to the airport to meet an arriving Chief of State. When he got to me, he showed great surprise and threw his arms around me. President Zia looked at me with new respect. (Spiers 1998, 76)

Militaries became crucial points of contact for the United States' relations with other countries that were ruled directly or governed from behind the scenes by their political militaries. U.S.' relationships with Pakistan, pre-1979 Iran, and Turkey provide a nice testimony.[10] The US Ambassador to Pakistan Robert B. Oakley (1988–1991) naturally tried to cultivate a good relationship with the Pakistani military:

> Right from the beginning of my tour, one of the techniques I used to improve US-Pakistan relations—in part by reassuring the Pakistanis that their nascent democratic political process could continue without concern of outside interference—was to increase military-to-military cooperation. We accelerated the delivery of end items that were in the pipeline—like self-propelled howitzers, helicopters, naval vessels, etc. Under normal procurement practices, much of this equipment might have taken as much as three years for delivery. We managed to get it delivered immediately. Our Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force paid extended visits to Pakistan in 1989. The Pakistani Navy Chief of Staff spent a prolonged period in the US General [John J.] Yeosock, who later commanded US ground troops in Desert Storm, came to observe Pakistani military exercises and gave some advice. More Pakistani officers went to the US for training. So we worked very hard to establish a close military-to-military relationship and I think it was a very successful program. Prior to this time, the close relationship had only existed between the Air Forces; by the late 1980s, we had done the same thing for the Armies and the Navies. That program became one of the serious negative consequences of Pressler; it had to be completely halted on 10/1/90 when the President could no

[10] Retired Major General Ahmet Bertan Nogaylaroğlu describes the relationship between the US and Turkish, Pakistani and Egyptian militaries as that of 'old friends' [kadim dostlar] and asks why the USA threw aside the Turkish Armed Forces, which it had long seen as the safety valve for the western world. Nogaylaroğlu (2015, p. 272); On the General Headquarters of Pakistani Military being "a port of call for the decision makers and even some foreign dignitaries visiting the country", see Arif in Malik (Ed.) 2001, p. 101; From the US perspective, the military held key importance in the system not only in Turkey but also in Iran, see Haig (1992, pp. 537–538).

> longer certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear device or components. (Oakley 1999, pp. 146–147; added brackets)

Bruce Riedel, a former US intelligence officer and a senior advisor to four US presidents on South Asia, pointed out, "when dealing with Pakistan, Washington has always been tempted to first seek out the chief of army staff (COAS) for a rapid decision", which had the (intentional or unwitting) effect of circumventing elected civilian officials and thus weakening their hand in politics vis-à-vis the army (Riedel 2011, p. 128).

US high-level officials visiting Pakistan made a habit of stopping in Rawalpindi, the initial capital and where the Pakistan military headquarters had been located, and met the Chief of Army Staff there, hoping that if they agreed with the generals, this would be enough to get Pakistani cooperation (Talbott 2004, pp. 58, 110). Several US administrations chose to work closely with the Pakistani military because the military has been in firm control of Pakistan external and security policy and it can deliver what and when they promise. "US administrations prefer to deal with a Pakistani military establishment that is used to giving and having its orders obeyed. Because the United States has worked closely with successive generations of Pakistani military officers, familiar friends are also preferable to unknown civilian partners" (Ahmad 2005, p. 156; see also Shah 2014, pp. 281, 282; Venkataramani, pp. 273–274; Zafar Jaspal, personal communication, October 2, 2015; Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, personal communication, October 1, 2015).

The interest in the military-to-military and military-to-civilian relationship in Turkish—US and Pakistani—US relations was mutual, as was elsewhere during the Cold War. For instance, in the case of the Free Officers' coup on July 23 (1952) in Egypt, the coupists knew how important American support was and selected their air force intelligence chief Aly Sabri as their envoy for contacting the US Embassy. According to Sirrs, "Sabri was a logical choice: not only had he attended an air force intelligence officers' course in Colorado, he also was on excellent terms with the US assistant air attaché, Lieutenant Colonel David Evans III" (Sirrs 2010, p. 25). In both Turkey and Pakistan, army generals were also aware in return that keeping a direct channel to the United States was immensely important. This is why the Turkish military desired to maintain its direct relationship with the United States in prior to the 1980 military coup, which, according to Harris, was neither "strange, mysterious nor unusual." "Not that the military made policy in Turkey,

but that if one were looking at the forces which would be interested in a continuing part of the relationship one might look to the military to find it. It seems to me still that may be true" (Harris 1980, p. 144; Çandar in Abramowitz 2000, p. 133; Nogaylaroğlu 2015, pp. 149, 218, 263; see also Tezkan 2013, p. 9; Ahmet Yavuz, personal communication, December 16, 2015). Pakistani Defense Minister Admiral Afzal Rahman Khan said to Benjamin Oehlert, a former Coca-Cola executive who had arrived in the Pakistani capital as US Ambassador in July 1967 that "next to President Ayub… the military establishment" was America's best friend in Pakistan" (Haqqani, p. 119). For both Turkish and Pakistani generals, maintaining the military institutional link to the United States meant transmitting acquaintances and relationships to the next generation of commanders. For instance, General Asif Nawaz, who took over the leadership of the army in 1991 from General Aslam Beg, who had serious differences of opinion with the US over several issues starting with his eccentric views of Iran, enjoyed close relationship with General Joseph Hoar, who succeeded General Norman Schwarzkopf as the Head of CENTCOM in 1991 (Nawaz pp. 447–448). When General Abdul Waheed Kakar succeeded General Asif Nawaz, who passed away in office in 1993, to become the COAS in Pakistan, one of General Kakar's two concerns was that he did not know how to manage conversations with the Americans (his other concern was that he lacked the same level of knowledge of how the political system worked in Pakistan). However, he thought that General Nawaz had introduced him to CENTCOM Commander General Hoar and the new US Ambassador John Monjo previously in order to prepare him for this post (Nawaz 2008, p. 465).

Military Training and Socialization

The United States possessed a major channel or mechanism to influence a coup—help it succeed by signaling or thwart it—during the Cold War: Professional Military Education and Training. Knowing this understudied system may help understand how the United States may give a green light to a coup and may have prior knowledge of a coup attempt. Understanding this strategic tool may also tell us how the USA may absorb the news of a coup d'état better because military training programs allow it to penetrate the armed forces of a country and find the chance to have deep familiarity with it. There are of course particular cases and time periods when US military attachés thought "training

Egyptian officers in the United States provided an 'invaluable source of intelligence.'" (Sirrs 2010, p. 51). In other cases, even when the United States may not be alerted about an impending coup or may simply miss out on a coup, these channels may help it learn about the political inclinations and possible intentions of the coup makers after a coup happened and hence enable it chart a more informed policy.

Training was seen as a strategic issue during the Cold War; it was a battleground between the Soviets and the USA with each side perceiving the other's education and training of foreign officers as 'win' for one and 'lose' for the other. Providing military education and training to officers of allied and friendly nations was one of the most powerful means of achieving its foreign policy objectives for the United States since early years in the Cold War. When Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State in the Truman Administration, was coordinating with General Marshall, the Secretary of Defense, to better organize the US takeover of the historical British role in the Middle East, he proposed "to make available to the Arab states and Israel small military training missions, an increased number of places for their officers in US military schools, and token amounts of arms and ammunition for training purposes" (Acheson 1969, p. 562). Training foreign officers and getting to know them in the meantime had become a policy instrument in the Cold War politics ("The U.S. Security Assistance" 1985, p. 45).

The case of Afghanistan and US and Soviet competition to offer training may be very instructive. The Eisenhower Administration attached such importance to the issue that the NSC [National Security Council] 5701 report, entitled "U.S. Policy Toward South Asia," dated January 10, 1957 recommended the administration to "encourage Afghanistan to minimize its reliance upon the Communist bloc for military training and equipment, and to look to the United States and other free world sources for military training and assistance" ("Statement of Policy On U.S. Policy Toward South Asia", 1957, January 10). Following up from this recommendation, Undersecretary of State Christian Herter wrote to President Eisenhower that the Department of State and the Department of State shared the opinion that the USA must accept the Afghan government's request for US military training and opportunities to visit the USA for its personnel. Both US departments thought that doing so would advance US policy interests. The background reasoning was that "The presence of more than 400 Soviet bloc technicians, including personnel to train Afghan military forces, has enhanced the Communist subversion potential. This massive program, augmented by official visits

and cultural exchanges, constitutes a threat to Afghanistan's independence." President Eisenhower approved the program to commence ("Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Herter)", 1958, November 8). Herter also said that small-scale preliminary military training given to Afghan officers brought about positive results. "This program [the Pentagon's military training for 41 Afghan officers] has been instrumental in encouraging the Afghan authorities to have confidence in the desirability and practicability of seeking military training assistance in the free world in order to reduce their reliance on the Communist bloc for such training" ("Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State (Herter)" 1958, November 8).

It is for the importance of opportunities provided by military training and education that when the USA cut IMET and foreign military financing for countries such as Uruguay and Venezuela the Department of Defense and Commander of SOUTHCOM objected because the vacuum left by this withdrawal of aid is filled by China (Blakeley 2006, p. 1449). Lt. General Robert H. Warren, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Assistance and Sales, stated that "long experience has indicated that *training* is one of the most productive forms of military assistance investment, in that it fosters attitudes on the part of the trainee which lead to better mutual understanding and greater co-operation…" (quoted in Wolpin 1973, p. 13).

It was not only the United States that appreciated the significance of these training opportunities. When Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto tried to prove his country's strategic importance to the United States in containing communism, he visited Washington and talked to most senior administration officials, including President Nixon in September 1973. Bhutto told his audience that the Soviets had their eyes fixated on capturing more than Afghanistan and India and he had no trust for Afghanistan's new president Mohammad Daoud because the coup brought Daoud to power and "the majors and colonels under him trained in the USSR" (Haqqani 2013, p. 201).

A former American Ambassador in Amman promoted the idea to use IMET funds to start military education and training of Jordanian officers. Otherwise, he speculated in 1979, "… without the IMET-sponsored training Jordanians might well have sought communist-conducted military training." The Ambassador reminded that Soviets had previously trained Jordanian officers and although those Soviet-trained officers did not yet play a significant role in Jordanian politics, one day they may.

Therefore, "the significant role of IMET in influencing Jordanian decision makers could prove to be a valuable asset and counterbalance as the eastern bloc-educated personnel attain influential positions in the years to come." ("Justification for IMET-Congressional" 1979b, November 22). Likewise, the American Embassy in Jiddah (Saudi Arabia) promoted professional courses on the account that "the professional courses contribute strongly toward better understanding of US polices and military professionalism. Generally, courses which last six months or longer benefit the US because families normally accompany students. This leads to a better understanding of the US in a positive way… If the Saudis decide to look elsewhere for training, England, France, and Pakistan probably would be the beneficiaries. This development would sharply retard the development of Saudi military competence and capability, would reduce purchases from the U.S. and would certainly worsen bilateral relations." ("Changes in Foreign Military Training" 1976, April 6).

The US Embassy in Islamabad was not unusual in attaching great significance to offering military training to Pakistani officers. The Embassy advised Washington in 1976 to emphasize 'career development courses' rather than other courses such as technical training. "Embassy believes career development courses give greatest benefit to our national interests in terms of relationship between FMTP [Foreign military training program] and our bilateral relations. The advantage to the us in having PAK military study U.S. techniques and work with us military in the States are considerable." The Embassy also reported that this was the preference of senior Pakistani officers as well. Since the Pakistan Army integrated US techniques, procedures and equipment into their services they want to continue US training ("Foreign Military Training Program" 1976, April 15).

Sometimes the USA subcontracted these military trainings to other countries during the Cold War. For instance, in trying to counterbalance the Soviets' geographic and historical advantage in offering training to Afghan officers, the USA wanted to utilize historical Turkish-Afghani relations by seeking an entry point via US military training programs. This meant that 'the U.S.-educated' Turkish officers transformed into 'the educators and trainers in U.S. methods'. In an Airgram sent from the US Embassy [Headed by Henry Byroade who had been sent in mid-April in 1959] in Afghanistan to the Department of State, the Embassy saw it necessary "to offset Soviet influence within the military" and "attempt to broaden our [American] knowledge as to what is going on within the military itself". To this end, the Embassy suggested, Turks

should be encouraged to open a general staff college to train Afghan officers (NATO 2014; Yamak 2006, pp. 157–164).[11] The USA wished that Turkey would extend these training programs to the Syrian officers as well, without contradicting or rivaling the training given by the French to the Syrian officers. This was not just to militarily strengthen Syria or Afghanistan but also to form ties between the West and these states under the Soviet radar or influence (McGhee 1990, pp. 126–127). In proof of the pro-NATO sentiments prevalent among some officers of the Turkish military and their corresponding hardline anti-Soviet stance, Kemal Yamak, who was sent to Afghanistan with a group of Turkish officers to train Afghan officers, was very suspicious of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and became concerned about the pro-Soviet sentiments and sympathies growing among the Afghan officers. This could have produce dire outcomes because some of these junior Afghan officers had the chance to come to Turkish Military Academy, advanced training courses, and even Turkish Armed Forces College. This created the risk that these pro-Soviet Afghan officers would learn about NATO issues, principles and methods through these courses. Turkish officers concerned about the unwanted Soviet penetration into Afghanistan through training matters duly warned the authorities in Turkey (Yamak, p. 170; Ulay 1996, pp. 41–43).

Professional Military Education

Professional military education (PME) is one of the longest and most extensive channels the United States maintains with armed forces in other countries. The United States has trained 500,000 foreign officers under PME programs since 1950 (Isenberg 1992). The US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania graduated over 700 international fellows from about 100 nations since 1978. The Naval War College in Rhode Island graduated over 1,500 senior naval officers from nearly 90 countries, half of its alumni reached flag rank and 10 percent became chiefs of their navies (Gibler and Ruby 2002/2003, p. 120). 7,500 military officers from allies and friendly nations graduated from

[11] More details about a group of Turkish officers who went to Afghanistan to train Afghan officers in starting from early February can be found in Yamak's memoirs (pp. 157–164).

the US Army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC) from 1894 to 2014.

The number of graduate officers who reached the rank of general was more than half and 253 trainees coming from 73 countries reached the position of chief of staff in their militaries. By April 2014, 28 officers from Command and General Staff College CGSC) went all the way to the top to become heads of their states (Atkinson 2015, p. 22). According to Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, 700 Turkish naval officers received education in Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey/California since the 1960s. The number of staff officers who finished Naval War College in New Port Rhode Island was 100. Among these 100 staff officers 70 percent became admirals and some went on to command the Turkish Navy. The number of other officers and sergeants who used professional military education funds for professional military courses reached thousands over the years (Gürdeniz 2013, p. 225). To provide more exact figures, between FY1950 and FY1983 20,413 Turkish military officers were trained in the United States. (Gabelnik et al. 1999) In addition to more random military-to-military relationship as in between militaries of Pakistan and Turkey, which have had historically very amiable relations, military-to-military contacts are purposefully nurtured by means of military training and education offered, joint exercises held, disaster relief and peacekeeping operations, and NATO posts and duties served (Dennis 2013, pp. 8–9). IMET (International Military Education and Training) is only one of such programs that the successive US administrations have now maintained since 1976. The idea behind professional military education programs is identical with other similar programs run by France to the United Kingdom among others (Gibler and Ruby 2002/2003, p. 123).

The United States pursued some objectives with professional training and education programs. To begin with, the United States governments hoped that with joint military education and training 'interoperability' would be possible during jointly executed operations. Since several militaries around the world adopted US military manuals, tactics and strategies and modified their military academies according to West Point in the course of the Cold War (Tezkan 2013, pp. 111, 221), it was important to teach foreign military officers how to command US military equipment and different weapons, which in corollary allowed for better cooperation with the U.S. army during real military operations (Bernath

1985, p. 10; Drew 1985, p. 33; Wolpin 1972, p. 12). It was with the help of inter-military relationships with Pakistan, Senegal, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt that the international coalition against Iraq in the first Gulf War functioned well on the ground (McCoy 1994, p. 3) "In quickly planning and coordinating Operation Provide Comfort in 1991, both the State and Defense Departments benefitted from close relationships among several U.S. foreign service officers, U.S. military officers, and their Turkish military counterparts, all of whom had met as students at U.S. war colleges" (Cope, p. 28).

Secondly, these programs allowed the USA to display its military equipment and weapons in action to guest officers and allowed them to use so that they could witness their superiority, in the hope that these officers would file a demand for these weapons as they rise through the ranks (Bilget 2002, p. 105; Cope, pp. 32–33; "Security Assistance, Observations" 1990, p. 5; see also Wolpin 1972, p. 28, footnote w).

One of the most important long-term policy objectives, however, was *supposedly* to spread democracy by *showing* foreign officers how democracy works in America, enhancing military-to-military relationships to assist US foreign policy goals, and developing better understanding of US military doctrine and technology by offering this massive training program for varying durations to officers of foreign nations (Security Assistance, Observations 1990, p. 5). However, "American policy makers perceive the MAP [Military Assistance Programs] and especially its concomitant training relationships as a means of maximizing the responsiveness of foreign officers to U.S. policy goals for their countries" (Wolpin 1972, p. 16). As Secretary Nutter, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1969–1973), said about US military training programs, "it is extremely important to maintain our relations with the people who are in positions of influence in those countries so we can help influence the course of events in those countries" (Wolpin 1972, pp. 17, 21–22).

An equally important outcome the United States expected from PME and training programs is establishing rapport and acquaintance between military officers who are very likely to rise up the military hierarchy.[12]

[12]The United States is not alone in thinking this way; Retired Turkish commanders empathize very easily with the objectives of these programs because Turkey too executes similar program at the Turkish Armed Forces College (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetler Akademisi*)

"Military-to-military contacts afforded by the IMET program are particularly important in this region [the Middle East], paying dividends far into the future as students rise up the military and political ranks of their respective countries" (Hellenic Resources Network., n.d.). Officers taking these education and training programs in the USA did rise to prominent positions when they went returned home. When Rtd. General Edip Başer, Commander of the 2nd Army, went to US Army War College in June 1980, two of his classmates were Egyptian Major General Amin Namer and Sultan al-Mutahheri from Saudi Arabia. The former rose to Head of Egyptian Intelligence later while al-Mutahheri became the Commander of Saudi Land Forces (Başer 2014, pp. 154–155). As a retired Turkish Major General pointed out:

> If you are spending huge sums of money on something, making big investments you would expect returns from it. In Middle Eastern countries such as ours the ruling actor is the military; so is in Egypt and Israel… If you tie the military in these places to yourself, not in terms of giving money but in terms of being admired and if they admire and appreciate you, your system, *if you have an army that admires you as a counterpart I would communicate with them more easily, not in the sense of getting them attempt a coup but keeping dialogue, channels of communication*. (Y. Tezkan, personal communication, August 6, 2015; italics added)

A key concept associated with military education and training programs is 'socialization'. Whether the level of analysis is individuals or states, the concept of socialization implies "a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community [of individuals or states]… successful socialization results in the internalization of the prescribed norms and rules. The new norms come to be taken for granted—accepted because they are seen as normal, given "who we are"" (Gheciu 2005,

for the same purposes. When Turkish generals met a foreign officer occupying higher positions and showing extra interest and attention to the Turkish guests during foreign visits, they tended to describe the situation as 'we won him over' (Yılmaz Tezkan, personal communication, August 6, 2015). "Officers who take education here in Turkey come to important posts when they go back to their home countries. For instance, the current Chief of Army Staff in Albania took education here. Hosni Mubarak did the same at some point as well; Qaddafi and Musharraf too" (Ahmet Bertan Nogaylaroğlu, personal communication).

p. 976; Jervis 2015, p. 609; Terhalle 2009, pp. 557–586). Political socialization by schooling, family and other social groupings are important for formation of political culture (Grigoriadis 2009, p. 18). "Social influence refers to a class of microprocesses that elicit pro-norm behavior through the distribution of social rewards and punishments… Punishments might include shaming, shunning, exclusion, and demeaning, or dissonance derived from actions inconsistent with role and identity" (Johnston 2001, p. 499; Keeley 2004, p. 428). The concept has risen to more prominence in international relations after the Cold War ended to describe the process whereby NATO and the West guided and managed democratic transition in the former Soviet space, especially Central and Eastern Europe, by 'changing the way civilian and military actors in these places think' (Gheciu, pp. 986–988). Military-to-military contacts with the Western officers—provided through training and education, joint operations, and NATO ties as stated before—emerged as particular method of de-communizing the armed forces in Eastern and Central Europe through the "socializing environment" NATO provided (Rice 1992, p. 30; Johnston, p. 507; İsmail Hakkı Pekin, personal communication, August 26, 2015; see also Huntington 1996, p. 7; Diamond and Platter 1996, p. xxxiii; Christopher 2001, p. 273; Nye 1996, pp. 153–156; Talbott 2004, p. 110).

Military education programs may particularly work well for purposes of socialization because such programs involve a certain duration of time and involve limited number of people for iteration, which may increase sustained exposure. The PME programs are tailored towards that goal. The US military schools that offer training programs employ, either voluntarily or by formal programs, volunteer people and families from the local area, where the residents in the local area help the incoming foreign officers with tasks such as enrolling their children at schools, offer English language classes, and organize social events (Atkinson, p. 23). The environment as well as the classes offered such as military history, strategic theory, international relations, civil-military relations provide a "common frame of reference". In this sense, professional military education programs such as IMET are different from civilian exchange programs. The differences lie mainly in "how the classroom is organized to the extensive amount of social interaction and experiential learning that is planned outside of the classroom by the military schools" (Atkinson 2015, p. 20). The entire military exchange programs also include 'Field

Studies Program', whereby foreign officers are exposed "to the U.S. way of life, including regard for democratic values, respect for individual civil and human rights, and belief in the rule of law" (Atkinson 2015, p. 24). In the field trips or, 'orientation tours' (Wolpin 1972, pp. 33–34), officers are shown US institutions, society and culture such as Starbucks headquarters in Seattle, facilities for horse riding, the Congress (Atkinson, pp. 24–25; see also Gibler and Ruby 2002/2003, p. 121; Goodpaster quoted in Rowe 1974, p. 240, footnote 3).

As an interviewee said, "all visits arranged for foreign officers to meet U.S. families and travels to various cities in the context of military education and training can be discussed under the concept of socialization efforts. These were all included in the program to disseminate the western values" (personal communication, August 24, 2015). The effects of military training and education programs offered by the United States can also be understood in terms of 'military soft power'. If "soft power is the ability to achieve goals by persuading or socializing others to adopt your own perspectives and preferences", it may be claimed that socialization of military officers may also augment the U.S. soft power. For these exchanges are one way that the U.S. military extends its influence through ideas, beliefs, and norms" (Atkinson 2015, p. 28). As generations of officers receive military training and education in the United States, the cumulative effect of such programs may increase in parallel. It may be natural that after a few generations of officers are trained in the United States, there could emerge a "network of military exchange graduates" in a country and they would like to rely on each other as they get promoted because they received the same education with similar equipment, tactics and strategies. "The network within any one country is important in helping senior officers to update, improve, or reform military doctrine and military operations by providing a support system of similarly trained colleagues who are likely to share the same goals" (Atkinson 2015, pp. 26–27).

These programs aim to show the bankruptcy of communism as opposed to working/functioning democracy in the USA, with the additional benefit of US affluence, could be shown more effectively to foreign officers by hosting them in the United States. According to Lefever, "since military officers are active politically [in the Third World], any democratic ideas they may have gained during a U.S. training tour can have a small positive effect as they become advisors or participants in the top policy-making elite" (Lefever 1980, p. 283; Gibler and Ruby 2002/2003, p. 120; Ruby and Gibler 2010, pp. 347, 359). Hence, these programs provide venues for socializing the trainees into the norms and

values the USA would like to spread. As Secretary of State William Rogers under the Nixon Administration also said to justify military training programs, "whether we like it or not, the military holds political power in many countries and exerts great deal of influence on national policies in others. Our training program affords military leaders from all over the world an introduction to the United States and to Americans, to our free and open society, and to the achievement of our form of government" (Wolpin 1972, p. 25, see also Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara's remarks on p. 28, and General Lemnitzer's remarks on p. 29).

However, showing foreign officers how US society and government operated and was superior to communist/socialist system did not necessarily entail teaching democratic values and in particular civilian supremacy to foreign military officers. It is important to note that in some US military schools foreign officers were taught that "… within a militant cold war context, there are the self-assumed 'responsibilities' of the military to 'society' and the tasks which confront the 'nation.' Attention is focused upon the importance of political knowledge for officers and the legitimacy of their aspirations for national leadership roles to solve socio-economic developments problems and to combat the world wide menace of communism" (Wolpin 1972, p. 63).

According to Brooks, while interaction with professionalized US soldiers during training and joint exercises may exert "socialization effects" on the Tunisian armed forces, they also "afford the armed services some degree of internal autonomy and insulation from regime institutions" (Brooks 2013, pp. 214–215; Bowman 2013). Truly, there had been moments when the USA seriously treated military training as an opportunity to instill professional ethic, respect for civilian government in foreign officers' minds, such as the training and education given to Cuban officers in the 1940s and 1950s (Kirkland 2003, p. 81). Yet, "The United States' primary goal was to foster and strengthen anticommunist regimes in Latin America (Kirkland 2003, pp. 88–99).

One of the best moments to assess the claims that NATO and PME programs such as IMET helped to expose foreign officers to democratic norms and values is attitudes adopted towards to-be-high-ranking officers of military that just carried out a coup. Naming, shaming, and cutting PME funding are also instruments of democracy promotion and socialization. Although Hale argued Turkey's membership in NATO alliance created strong pressures for the policies followed by the [1980] military regime after the coup and for respecting democratic norms (Hale 1994, p. 323; see also Criss 2011, p. 294), NATO and U.S. practice seem

to have been just the opposite. Several retired military officers say that NATO never rebuked Turkish officers about their military interventions, neither did it warn them about the consequences of their actions. Neither NATO nor the US was a force for socializing foreign officers into democratic norms and values. All NATO cared for was Western interests and struggle against communism during the Cold War (Erdoğan Karakuş, personal communication, July 29, 2015; M. Hikmet Bayar, August 8, 2015; A. Yavuz, personal communication, December 16, 2015; İsmail Hakkı Pekin, personal communication, August 26, 2015).

For instance, General Tamer Akbaş was assigned to AFSOUTH Plans and Policy Division three weeks before the September 12 coup. When he heard the news of the coup, he thought that because of the civil war-like conditions in the homeland, the military had to intervene and it was the correct decision. The important point is that NATO Plans and Policies Division Chief Tuğgeneral T. Kelly gave General Akbaş an article on the September 12 coup written by a British writer, in which the writer analyzed the Turkish military and finished the article by saying that "the Turkish Armed Forces is the people" (Akbaş 2014, pp. 118–120).

This does not seem to be a marginal anecdote. Edip Başer became the first cadet to be trained in US War College as of June 1980. On the morning of the September 12 coup, an US colonel named Chuck Westfeeling, who had been to Turkey on military duty, told Başer in Turkish that he should be happy, the Turkish military intervened the night before and he guessed somebody had to do this in order to stop the bloodshed (Başer, pp. 157–158). When Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu was assigned to NATO Headquarters in Brussels in 1971 and the military gave the government an ultimatum on March 12, he reports that some British officers told him that 'they wished they had a similar military and generals" (vol. 1, p. 279).

The same weakness in the argument about democratic socialization by military training programs and NATO is illustrated by the fact that "A young Pakistani major named Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq spent a year at Fort Leavenworth, where he was 'adopted' by a mail carrier named Ed and his wife, Dollie. Years later, Ed and Dollie were invited to the Reagan administration's 1982 state dinner for Zia, who installed himself in a coup and held onto power for over a decade through brutal repression" (Powell cited in Savage and Caverley, p. 6). Any positive effect of exposure to democratic norms taught and preached through NATO and PME programs may be neutered by these practices and reactions. It also

shows that the US generals and officers did not do any public shaming, anything that could show displeasure at the course of action Turkish military chose with military coups d'état.

What military education and training opportunities the USA provided may have conversely done is that they socialized foreign officers into prioritizing *stability* and *order* before democracy. Very strikingly, writing about the establishment and work in Turkey of the *United States Air Force Group* Livingston forwarded a very different understanding of the democratic benefits of US military training. According to him, the start of courses taught by an US detachment at the War Staff College as of 1949, helped teach Turkish staff officers not only about US command and staff procedures, but also Western military doctrine, political, and social thought. As a result, "the subtle transmission of democratic ideals to younger, more progressive officers was evident in the way Turkish officers played their role in the military coups that occurred in Turkey in 1960, 1970 and 1980. Each time they perceived themselves as the guardians of true republican ideology, handing national control over to civilians after resolving the invidiousness that had brought the country to the brink of anarchy" (Livingston 1994, p. 813). This curious idea seems to suggest that infusing democratic norms and ideals through professional military education and training was not meant to curtail the idea of coup per se and eliminate interventionist tendencies but rather to encourage handing over power to civilians after carrying out a military coup d'état.

In addition, as much as foreign aid (military and economic assistance) does not automatically translate into unconditional support/subservience of the recipient country officers (Akhund, p. 242; Cohen 2010, p. 143; Musa 1984, pp. 121–123, 146–150; see also Kıyat 2010, p. 331; see also Tezkan 2013, pp. 221–243, Akbaş, pp. 112–113), teaching human rights, civilian control, and democracy for a year may neither significantly change organizational culture(s) of militaries, especially of those with established record of intervention in politics, nor make them submissive to US or Western demands. As Taw pointed out,

> The few months a foreign military student spends in the United States are unlikely to radically alter his cultural, social, or political views. International military students may acquire an improved understanding of the American political system and social culture, and some may develop affection for the United States, but studies suggest that the majority of

> IMS [International Military Student] will return to their home countries with the same basic *Weltanschauung* as when they left (Taw 1994, p. 10)

International Organizations and Socialization

In addition to military education and training programs the United States (as well as several other countries) offer, international organizations such as NATO may also serve as equally, if not more, efficient platforms and venues for socialization and consolidation of bilateral institutional linkages. International organizations, several scholars argue, especially with reference to the Cold War period, may exert socializing influences on the participants:

> An even stronger impact of regional military organizations on the military and its attitudes toward democracy can come in the form of socialization. Regional alliances and military organizations, especially those that conduct joint training operations or maintain permanent institutions (such as NATO), can help to socialize military leaders in member states as to the role of the military in domestic society. While this may or may not be the goal of membership, this socialization process may occur through interactions in the institution. Socialization amounts to persuading military leaders that the role of the military is not to act as an internal police force, but rather to protect the state from outside forces… By interacting with military leaders of other states who subscribe to these types of doctrines, military elites in autocratic or recently autocratic states are more likely to internalize these doctrines, making them more likely to accept full democracy. This issue may be important not only in the military's acceptance of an initial move towards liberalization, but in completing the transition to democracy. (Pevehouse 2002, pp. 527–528)

NATO, in particular, is put forward as a socializing force because it was meant to be more than a military alliance (İnan 1981, p. 170; NATO 2014). According to Lieutenant General Nogaylaroğlu, "NATO assignments carried the potential to have possible socializing effects because always 2–3 officers from different nationalities work together in a NATO office, decisions are made after due discussions, and in no office military officers of the same nationality work by themselves" (Nogaylaroğlu, p. 169).

As a former Pakistani Ambassador argued to draw a contrast between CENTO and NATO alliances, "NATO was not just a military alliance. It was a multifaceted alliance of most advanced nations in the world having close links of culture, civilization, religion, race, political systems and

values which was in confrontation with another similar combination, mainly Slavic based on Communism" (Koreshi 2012, p. 92). Truly, as a retired military officer noted, NATO membership went beyond being a guarantee for Turkey's security for the ruling Turkish elite in the 1950s (including the Democrat Party). It meant security, westernization, and military and economic progress (personal communication, August 24, 2015; also Yılmaz 2012). As retired Major General Nogaylaroğlu said, "we entered the NATO as a consequence of a threat perception [from the Soviets]. Turkey would either be on its own or pick the Soviet or U.S. side. We chose the west… Although Turkey was on the wrong warring side in the WWI, we then established the Republic and we institutionalized our western orientation by entry into NATO 20–30 years after the independence" (personal communication, June 9, 2015). As much as NATO was seen as a guarantor against the Soviet designs and demands on Turkey, especially the Bosporus (Edip Başer, personal communication, October 31, 2015; Yamak 2006, p. 57), it was also a powerful cultural symbol for the Turkish civilian and military elite at the same time (Gönlübol 1975, p. 15; Baytok 2005, pp. 20, 21; see also İnan 1981, pp. 14–15; Torumtay n.d., p. 20; Erkaya n.d., p. 29).

NATO membership was, therefore, not just a choice of necessity but an outcome of willing participation. In that sense it was not regarded just a military organization but also a cultural alliance (Yılmaz and Bilgin, p. 44). This is why when the Chief of British General Staff visited Turkey in the late 1940s and repeatedly kept referring to Turkey and its environment as "here in the Middle East" during his meetings with the Turkish generals, he was politely warned by the Turkish generals that "Turkey is a European country" (Lewis 1980, p. 17).[13] It is for that additional value of NATO membership that, Karaosmanoğlu argued, the civilian and military leadership spurned the British proposal that Turkey takes up a role in Middle East defense formation early in the Cold War. Instead Turkey wanted to join the European Command (2011, p. 43). When then Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü explained to the Grand National

[13] Even though both Iran and Turkey were members of CENTO, theirs was a "working arrangement" and they distrusted each other. "The Shah said [in 1967 and before] the trouble with the Turks was that they would like to regard themselves as Europeans and not Orientals" (Baxter 2013, pp. 21, 70).

Assembly Turkey's NATO entry he said that the "Atlantic Charter is not a military defense mechanism; it is an agreement for cooperation and solidarity that aims at material and moral progress in the largest sense. The sensitive and dangerous political conditions surrounding us cause everybody to focus disproportionately on the Charter's military dimension" (Türk Atlantik, p. 105).[14] A small booklet, published in 1982 by the Turkish Atlantic Treaty Association [Türk Atlantik Antlaşması Derneği] to celebrate the 30th anniversary of Turkey's NATO membership and featured a celebration message by President Evren showed perception of NATO by political and military leadership. The booklet described NATO as "the largest political, military and civilization alliance in history" (Türk Atlantik, p. vii). According to former Chief of General Staff Özkök,

> NATO became Turkey's and TAF's window opening to the West. We all saw peoples of different countries there, witnessed their values, saw their countries and peoples and knew their armed forces. Thus, these allowed us to understand that the Western values are good enough to suit us. For this reason, I think that external missions through NATO brought great advantages for Turkey. Now civilians and young people go abroad and know the West too but at the time mostly soldiers went abroad for such duties and missions. Therefore, military officers became more western and progressive. (Özkök 2012, p. 5)

"Turkey's "westernness" has been expressed, not only through the transfer of ideas and manners from the West (as happened since Ottoman times), but also through joining Western institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)"[15] (Yılmaz and Bilgin 2005–2006, p. 39; see also Karaosmanoğlu 2011b, pp. 44–46).

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[14] For statements by various high ranking civilian and military officials along the same lines, see Türk Atlantik (pp. 6–20, 51–63, 71–82).

[15] High-ranking Turkish generals were at great pains to show to their NATO colleagues and western counterparts that Turkey was too Western, its women wore modern clothes and its peoples listened to and played modern music. LSE [NATO Land Southeast Command in İzmir] Commander Akbaş recounted a proud story, where İzmir Chamber Orchestra (İzmir Oda Orkestrası) gave a concert at the NATO Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe based in İzmir. Foreign guests were pleasantly surprised because 'they had expected an oriental music with players and singers wearing fez (fes) (Akbaş, p. 126).; As an interviewee told the author, "you can use the concept of socialization for military education and training programs the US delivers. But there is no point in dancing around these concepts so much; the whole thing comes down westernization, adoption and transfer of western values" (personal communication, August 24, 2015).

While Turkey joined NATO and became allies with the USA for both security and identity-related reasons, Pakistan allied with the UAS primarily "to compensate for its economic and military disadvantages" (Haqqani 2013, p. 9; the Soviet threat felt by Turkey was real; Ulay 1996, pp. 32–33, 48). The reason Jinnah thought communism or pro-Soviet stance was not an option for Pakistan was not because they adopted a strictly western identity but rather because of Pakistan's undeniable Islamic identity from the founding (Haqqani 2013, p. 35). In return, as argued before, US devotion to Pakistan was wanting, as many Pakistani officials saw it. Pakistan had only "marginal utility" for US policy-makers in the context of the Cold War. US alignment with Pakistan in the second half of the 1950s and in the 1980s were "temporary security alignment" (Siddiqa-Agha 2003, pp. 91–92).

Here Turkey differed greatly from Pakistan, not only in terms of how Turkish policy-makers perceived the West but also how the UA. perceived Turkish orientation as well. According to John Foster Dulles, Turkey stood out for two main reasons; unlike Pakistan, Turkey felt direct and immediate objective threat from the Soviets because of its geographic location; secondly, again unlike Pakistan, "Ataturk's Western orientation was unambiguous, and the Turks had given military bases as part of NATO and had suffered more than seven hundred fatalities fighting alongside the Americans in Korea" (Haqqani, p. 73). Despite its close relationship with the West, Pakistan's stance was far more guarded, hesitant and reserved than Turkey.

An area this directly became clear was the Korean War and the differing Turkish and Pakistan responses to the US request for soldiers in Korea. Pakistan supported the effort only rhetorically and by lobbying the Arab states on the US' behalf (Haqqani 2013, p. 51) while Turkey officially did not hesitate, sending around 5000 soldiers to Korea. When the USA asked a Pakistani contingent to fight with the UN force under General MacArthur, Pakistan conditioned its support to US assistance and promise to Pakistan against India. In other words, Pakistani governing elite used the US request as a bargaining chip to elicit more economic and military support from the United States. Dean Acheson rejected the Pakistani terms and said that Pakistan should send soldiers to Korea as a responsibility and not hold it as a bargaining chip (Haqqani, pp. 52–53).

The Western commitment to Turkey ran deeper, was more institutional, and was more multilayered. Even when Pakistan was invited to

join SEATO, which was designed as a bulwark and deterrence against communism in Southeast Asia in 1954, Pakistan viewed the alliance as a facilitator of US aid while Secretary of State Dulles told the Pakistani authorities that "it was in Pakistan's own interest to join SEATO but it should not join to force the United States to assist Pakistan" (Sattar 2013, p. 52). According to Nye, [Secretary of State] Dulles turned to these semi-regional replicas of NATO [CENTO and SEATO] because he thought he could sell them easy to the Congress, thanks to the fact that these organizations entailed limited U.S. responsibility and burden (Nye 1969, p. 725).

Neither CENTO nor SEATO provided the same level of military, social, economic, cultural, and political linkages as NATO (Acharya 2011, pp. 55, 102; Brecher 1963, p. 224; Saeed Khalid, personal communication, June 4, 2016). In the case of CENTO, the United States did not even join the bloc but became an outside observer and only remotely associated with the defense and political committees of the alliance (Sattar, p. 55). Several other observers also noted the limited US commitment to both SEATO and CENTO (Rao as cited in Jabeen and Mazhar 2011, pp. 120; also Acharya, p.110; Braibanti 1957, pp. 328, 330). Britain as the other major power in CENTO was also skeptical toward the bloc and members' commitment. According to the British, "Iran was the key country of the CENTO alliance… Turkey was satisfied in military and economic terms with her participation in NATO. Ankara viewed CENTO as a secondary alliance; Pakistan was also a member of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization)" (Dimitrakis, p. 319). The British kept their very reserved attitude until CENTO dissolved in 1979. It remained skeptical of CENTO and for that matter of any moves that sought to transform it into anything more than it could be. CENTO was never to be a military alliance in the way NATO was (Vatanka 2015, p. 132).

Pakistani generals themselves voiced criticism of the US non-committal to CENTO. Pakistan's Commander-in-Chief from 1958 to 1966, General Mohammad Musa, complained, "not being a full-fledged member, they [US officials] attended meetings only as observers and thus remained uncommitted" (Musa 1984, pp. 147, 174, 176). US officials too seem to be disenchanted with the level of willingness CENTO members showed in cooperating. According to a US diplomat working on CENTO issues in Ankara, CENTO members never cooperated in the

NATO scale; they all wanted to take from the pool but did not want to really contribute to it (Vatanka, p. 44). The State Department asked the US President to make clear that the US show of commitment requested by CENTO members would not come. The USA was not going to tie itself definitely to their defense (Vatanka, p. 24). In the perceived absence of US commitment, Pakistan's participation in both CENTO and SEATO remained "pro forma" (Tahir-Kheli, p. 12). The softening US-Soviet relations in the second half of the 1960s rendered "CENTO to an anachronism" as well (*Twenty Years of Pakistan* 1967, p. 158).

As Pakistan—US relations deteriorated after the country's 1965 war with India, Pakistan started to reevaluate the usefulness of NATO and found achievements of SEATO only modest (*Twenty Years of Pakistan* 1967, p. 695). It dawned increasingly on Pakistan that "Unlike NATO, it [SEATO] provided only for consultations, not joint action, in the event of aggression against one of its members. Nor did the treaty envisage the provision of defense and economic assistance"[16] (Sattar 2013, p. 53; Venkataramani, pp. 344—348, 356–358). Both SEATO and CENTO provide a façade that the USA wants to keep in the symbolic sense (*Twenty Years of Pakistan* 1967, p. 158). Vatanka is perhaps correct in this sense to call SEATO "NATO's dysfunctional sibling" (Vatanka, 17). Ayub Khan even questioned in the late 1960s why Pakistan joined SEATO in the first place. He concluded that in retrospect neither SEATO nor CENTO offered any military contribution for Pakistan in its hour of need. The military aspect of these organizations were more irritating than ever helpful (*Twenty Years of Pakistan* 1967, p. 157).

According to the US State Department, "by the close of the Eisenhower Administration", it had become clear to CENTO members that that the organization was a better conduit for economic and technical cooperation than it was a military alliance" (The Baghdad Pact (1955)). Furthermore, neither CENTO nor SEATO was equipped with a NATO-like command structure. General Ayub Khan's desire expressed in a meeting with President Eisenhower in December 1959 that CENTO would remain a "paper tiger" without a permanent military command structure never materialized (see also Campbell 1958,

[16] Pakistan withdrew from SEATO in 1972 but remained in CENTO until its dissolution with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.

p. 193; "Memorandum of a Conversation", 1959, December 8). The steady deterioration in Pakistani—US relations after the early 1960s, closer relations between Pakistan, China, and the Soviet Union to the USA's dismay directly influenced Pakistan's participation in CENTO as it disengaged from it and did not join naval and other exercises until many years later in the 1970s (Dimitrakis 2009, pp. 318–320; Tahir-Kheli, 19; Koreshi 2012, pp. 33, 83). When Bhutto acceded to restart Pakistani participation in CENTO military exercises, this was due to request of the Shah, whom Bhutto valued for its financial and military contributions (Vatanka, p. 93). The Pakistani disenchantment with CENTO became so deep that Ayub Khan said after 1965 that 'they no longer have any faith in CENTO' (Baxter 2013, pp. 16, 170).

The fact that no US Administration was warm to the idea of making CENTO a military alliance led Ayub Khan to say, "the Americans have no intention of putting military life into it [CENTO]. If it has to continue, it should be called what it is: an economic arrangement of a limited type" (Baxter 2013, p. 89). Shahinshah of Iran shared the same feeling about CENTO and complained that CENTO lacked military plans (Vatanka, p. 55). As Pakistan wanted to diversify its policy options after its war with India in 1965, it became increasingly unwilling to do anything to draw the Soviets' ire. When CENTO members wanted to call for a ministerial meeting after Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Ayub Khan rejected the call, saying that the Soviets may find such a meeting as an unfriendly act and it would be unwise to do so before his impending visit to Moscow (Baxter 2013, pp. 112, 165). Ayub Khan wrote in his memoirs that the Shah of Iran was too unhappy with CENTO but just wanted to keep it alive until another similar entity replaces it (Baxter, 19). Ayub Khan then came up with a new regional scheme called 'Regional Cooperation for Development' (RCD) to compensate what CENTO woefully lacked (Vatanka, p. 42). His RCD design purposefully excluded politics and military affairs to enable collaboration in the economic and cultural fields (Ayub Khan 1967, p. 156). Even RCD's modest objectives did not materialize (Arif 1995, p. 281). When Pakistan did show renewed interest in CENTO after 1972 it was because PM Bhutto wanted to send a signal of readiness to cooperate with the USA as well. Yet, this time the USA deprioritized South Asia among its ambit of strategic interests. For the first twenty months of Bhutto government the USA was represented at the level of Charge d'Affaires (Hussain, pp. 235–236).

With the less-than-desired attention given to CENTO as opposed to NATO, its impact on the socialization of Pakistani officers into

democratic norms remained minimal. Sixteen years after its founding, Pakistani military officers unabashedly praised the Turkish military's March 12 military memorandum during a CENTO meeting. According to General Yirmibeşoğlu, who represented the Turkish General Staff in the meeting, "according to Pakistani officers, democracy was only a means to survival of the state, which, when at stake, may require military intervention. This was a military's legal duty even when it went against the constitution" (Yirmibeşoğlu, vol. 2, p. 60).

Discussion

The major effect of international organizations such as NATO and professional military education opportunities in the West on the Turkish officer corps has been confirmation of Turkey's westernness. It also exposed Turkish officers to the greatness of the 'West', the USA, in particular, on social, political, technological, and military dimensions. The program at the NATO Defense College, for instance, included two external visits in addition to the routine college curriculum. Three officers, who later became full generals in the Turkish army, note in their memoirs how impressed they had become with the West after these visits and wished that Turkey would achieve the same one day (Bayar, vol. 1, pp. 519–520, 524; Akbaş 2014, pp. 111–112; Torumtay, p. 69). Some Turkish officers, who later reached higher ranks within the TAF, saw officers and diplomats of some NATO members for the first time when they were sent to NATO Defense College and know them and interact with them, which was an "extraordinary opportunity" (Akbaş, p. 109).

These professional sojourns in the West 'affirmed' officers' western identity (Başer, p. 143; Kıyat, pp. 207, 247–252; Bayar, vol. 1, p. 568; İlter Türkmen, personal communication, November 16, 2015). Turkey's integration into Western socialization structure worked so well overall that Turkish officers were no longer at the receiving end of socialization efforts that sped up after the Cold War[17]; Turkish officers became

[17] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili put forward the concept of the Partnership for Peace in late 1993. According to the proposal, nations of Central and Eastern Europe would be able to sign separate partnerships with NATO and thus participate in NATO training exercises and have the chance to consult with NATO on military strategy and tactics. However, they would only have the chance to consult NATO if they come under attack by any power and not enjoy the collective defense under NATO. This process was envisaged to ease their gradual integration to NATO over the coming years. See Christopher (2001, p. 276).

socializers in programs directed at new NATO candidates in the new era (Nogaylaroğlu, p. 165; Akbaş, pp. 196, 216–217, 231–232; Bir 1998; Bernath 1985, p. 5).

If international organizations and professional military education imbue foreign officers with a deep respect for democratic norms and the principle of civilian supremacy (Correspondence: NATO, p. 225) the density of Turkish—Western ties should have made it more difficult to carry on an illegal act as a military coup d'état (Levitsky and Way 2006, p. 385). However, it may very well be true that the "pro-democratizing effects of military-to-military contacts may be overstated. One pro-enlargement argument is that NATO membership will produce military-to-military contacts that will facilitate the establishment of norms respecting civilian control of the military. The experiences of Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey during the Cold War cast doubt, however, on the veracity of this claim" (Correspondence: NATO, p. 233). As Cizre pointed out,

> Turkey's history with NATO does indeed weaken the thesis that NATO membership helps to spread the reformative norms of Decaf [Democratic Control of the Armed Forces] by either making it a condition of membership or by increasing intergovernmental contacts between member militaries. One explanation for the Turkish situation is that NATO's overarching political objective was containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, which was implemented at the expense of democratization for the then peripheral countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Turkey. (2004, p. 116)

The most significant expectation from such training opportunities was rather rapport with and access to foreign officers, most of whom, as stated above, were very likely to climb up the ladder of position of influence in their own countries in the following years. "The 'Hall of Fame' data (distinguished foreign graduates) maintained by the service schools shows that a large number of foreign graduates become chiefs of their services, militaries, or hold other senior positions in their countries several years after graduating from US PME" (Ruby and Gibler 2010, p. 345). This was the case with Thailand and Philippines where, as of 1994, majority of senior leadership in the Thai military were trained in the USA (Taw 1994, pp. 25, 44). It was for this reason that IMET training seeks to target officers (and also civilians with E-IMET far later) that

are likely to gain positions of prominence after returning their country (Reynolds 2003, p. 94; Savage and Caverley 2014, p. 18; McCoy 1994, p. 4).[18] This is why "the program is also a *long-range investment in many persons, some of whom may later play a significant political role*" (Lefever, p. 291 (italics added); Isenberg 1992; Weiner 2008, p. 150). Karakuş confirmed that military training and education abroad helps relationships to be founded and allows access (personal communication, July 29, 2015; also see Taw, p. 20; Lefever, p. 281). In the case of Turkey, the US Ambassador to Ankara, Ronald Spiers, wrote to Washington in late 1979 the following report on the benefits of IMET program for US interests:

> The IMET program takes on a special importance in Turkey where our influence with the military, perhaps the most stable element in Turkish society today, is crucial to the successful completion of the current defense cooperation negotiations, as well as to the subsequent implementation of these accords… IMET has a long history in Turkey. Since 1950, 40 officers who have attended professional military education (PME) courses in the United States have subsequently achieved general/flag officer rank… These officers represent a nucleus of personnel who have been extensively exposed to United States' training and military doctrine as well as American society as a whole. Many times this number have received similar benefits through other technical or professional training courses in the U.S… According to [TGS Deputy Chief General] Saltık, these officers returned with a good knowledge of the U.S., U.S. military techniques, and the English language, which made them invaluable. ("Justification for IMET-Congressional" 1979a, November 19; brackets added)

The former Commander of the Turkish Air Force, Ergin Celasin, confirms the above-mentioned consequences of the PME programs:

[18] Military Assistance Programs the United States carried out primarily targeted military personnel. As Ronald. I. Spiers said in 1970, "a distinction is rarely made between civilian and military requirements, since local needs are all embracing." See Wolpin (1972, p. 15, footnote a). Therefore, 'Expanded IMET' (E-IMET) program started only in 1991 partly in response to criticisms that US training given to officers of other nations exacerbates civil-military relations in these nations. Training programs would now give more focus to training in human rights, civilian supremacy and democracy.

> Of course you are impressed by the quality of the job done in American military education and training programs such as IMET. These programs provide dialogue and Turkish officers attend these programs in other countries such as France as well. These exchanges allow you to get to know other systems and approaches. The acquaintances and dialogue earned during these programs may later facilitate better bilateral relations. Officers of other countries you take education with come to certain posts and your friendship allows getting things done faster than otherwise would be possible. For instance, when I was occupying an important seat in the Turkish Air Force Command, we had a problem with the parachutes of the F-4 jets and thanks to the fact that a friend of mine from the time of our education back in the US was in İncirlik we immediately solved this problem. American General Myers too was of great help in solving some of problems in NATO as General Myers became an advisor to NATO after his position as the SACEUR. (personal communication, July 23, 2015)

Former Commander of the Land Forces Hikmet Bayar had the same impression about particular benefits of professional education programs. He too suggested that when these programs are opened anywhere, the purpose is to get the brightest officer with the largest chance of going up the ladder in the military hierarchy. Oftentimes a country sends its select officers overseas for training and education. If you form friendships with these officers, you may address problems more easily when they return to his country and assumes larger roles. Bayar had known Joint Chiefs of Staff John M. Shalikashvili as they worked together in different NATO assignments and he used to host him and another general in his house for dinner. As he later became the Joint Chiefs and the Baku—Tbilisi—Ceyhan pipeline was on the national agenda, he saw him in one of my visits to the United States and lobbied him for US help in this project. Acquaintances matter (personal communication, August 8, 2015). Saeed Khalid, a former Pakistani Ambassador to Ankara (1988–1992), shared the benefits of military-to-military relationships. It provided links and easier connections between the two sides. Military training and education facilitated cooperation with the US counterparts as well (personal communication, June 4, 2016). While the former Secretary of Defense in the Obama Administration, Chuck Hagel, admitted the limitations of military training programs, he also pointed out that

> …*what personal relationships do is they provide a lubricant.* And *if that lubricant is not there in relationships, then there is no relationship.* And then it's just a straight kind of factual numbers business. And *personal relationships do sand some things down where at least you can get some antennas turned on.* And your receivers are on both ways, rather than just transmitting, you actually get a country's receiver turned on. (Italics added) (Clemons 2013)

Former Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök agrees with this assessment on the specific angle of these military training and education programs. According to him,

> all countries do this [offer training and education programs]. It was first the Roman Empire, which started this practice. They created the student exchange. They cherrypicked the brightest among the youth in other places, invited them to Rome, make them admire Rome and send them back home. These students were so well educated that when they went back home they rose to most prominent positions. There they observed the Roman interests. Romans sent their own students abroad to learn their characters and peculiarities and readjusted or modified their own politics. That is to say, all countries try to do the same thing. Italian schools, Austrian schools, American colleges have all this underlying rationale. (Özkök 2012, p. 4)

As argued before, creating additional opportunities for informal dialogue between military officers is considered a significant gain in regions such as the Middle East, East Asia, and Latin America, where militaries were important, if not the most significant, political actors. Hammer (2007) reports how Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, who was President Musharraf's press secretary until March 2007 and spent six months in infantry school at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1983, explained the major benefit of US training programs for Pakistani officers. According to Shaukat Sultan Khan, Hammer reports, "it helps you to establish a better relationship and more understanding [of the US perspective]" and "It broadens your outlook" (2007). It is for the importance of training and education for military-to-military contacts that several Pakistani and US officials lamented the fact officers who joined the Pakistani military during Zia ul-Haq's era was cut off from education and training opportunities in the USA because of sanctions enforced on Pakistan. "Not only

was it [officers recruited during Zia period] deprived of advanced overseas training during its formative years, but this officer cohort was also denied exposure to the world outside till late in their careers, by which time their worldview had formed and in many cases become entrenched" (Nawaz in Lodhi 2011, p. 90; also Hammer 2007).

The close military-to-military relationship beyond military matters is at least partly attributed to training, education of senior Pakistani leadership has received in, and large amounts of military and economic aid and assistance it received from the USA. The US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott alluded to this point when he discussed the damage done to military training program by the 'Pressler sanctions' [dated 1985], banning all aid to Pakistan because Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. He said that this military training program had brought several promising young Pakistani officers to the USA and Jehangir Karamat, then COAS in Pakistan, himself had studied at the US Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. General Karamat told him that due to the sanctions he probably was the last Pakistani graduate [with US military education and training] who would reach the rank of COAS in Pakistan (Talbott 2004, p. 110). When Aslam Beg, the Commander of Pakistan Armed Services in 1990, visited Iranian Revolutionary Guards and rejected to cooperate with the United States in the First Gulf War because he thought that all US-friendly countries in the region would fall after the war and Iran and Pakistan would rise, the US Ambassador Oakley attributed this to cutting of US training to Pakistani officers some years before (Oakley 1999, p. 145).

A similar self-criticism was also made by US officials concerning the generation of officers who were left without IMET training due to sanctions enforced on Turkey. The US policy-making circles were worried that that "as we [the US] began our [their] assistance programs again [in 1979], there was a lot of concern expressed about the generation of military leaders in Turkey who reached field grade during that period and didn't have access to US training and US schools" during the embargo period from 1975 to 1979. The concern was that "most of the senior Turkish General Staff people had served in Korea. The Turks had a very big contingent in the Korean War, so the Turkish General Staff in those days felt very close to us. I don't know whether by now the group in the general staff who were at their formative point in their military

careers when we cut Turkey off from military assistance are in positions of authority" (Cotter 2002, p. 71).

Although IMET and other training and joint exercises do not create a subservient generation of officers in recipient countries (Schaffer and Schaffer 2011, p. 64), it does seem to increase the possibility through friendships and connections of earning the ear of these officers. According to Nogaylaroğlu (personal communication, June 9, 2015), "The US executes these [PME] programs all the way since the 1940s and 50s. By way of them it both introduces its country to foreign officers and finds contacts that are closer to itself". According to Taw, exposure to US culture, democracy, values allowed by IMET training may not translate into direct impact but "at the very least it provides a common language for negotiations" (Schaffer and Schaffer, p. 64; Taw 1994, p. xiv). "IMET offers no guarantee of far reaching capacity to alter recipient institutional values or governmental behavior. Practitioners speak instead of access, rapport, and ease of communication, terms used by some synonymously with "influence"… security assistance education and training "gives you access that you wouldn't or couldn't have without difficulty" that is, "access at the senior ranks of host country military establishments" (Cope 1995, p. 25). In other words, previous acquaintance and a history of working together in NATO offices or headquarters should make it more likely that a phone call by a high-ranking US general will be taken by his counterparts elsewhere. "The foreign military education and training experience in the United States builds what retired Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA, has called "subjective ties" with future military and often political leaders in other states. In 1993 Congressional testimony he recounted a personal experience:

> Another kind of desirable influence through IMET is demonstrated by US-Pakistani relations immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. General Zia, the President of Pakistan, was being urged by his foreign minister to scorn US offers of assistance in favor of coming to term with Moscow. Because Zia had attended two US Army schools, and because he had made extremely close friends with ordinary American citizens during those two years, he was subjectively inclined toward the US offer. As a party to the meeting with him in Pakistan when he made the decision to accept the US offer, tying his policy to US strategy for Afghanistan, I gained the impression that his IMET experience was a critical factor in his decision. (Odom cited in Cope 1995, p. 26)

Lt. General William E. Odom reiterated his observations about the impact of IMET training on Zia ul-Haq. "General Zia in Pakistan twice an IMET visiting military student, did not take home great commitment to democracy, but he took back a great admiration for the United States and proved willing to resist advice in 1980 not to turn to the US for aid and foreign policy alignment" (Odom 1992, pp. 221–222). Once again, this link is hard to 'prove', unless there is chance to go back to Zia and ask if IMET made an influence on him to prefer aligning his policies with those of the USA or unless we sometime find in closed Pakistani archives his confession that if he had not been influenced by IMET he would have followed a different policy toward the USA. However, we do have US Embassy reporting on this about two weeks after General Zia took over in July 1977:

> Zia's two major excursions overseas affected him and color his views of the world. He has been to the states twice, attending the command and staff college at Fort Leavenworth and an armored course at Fort Knox. He is unabashedly pro-American and laudatory of many things American. He is not obsequious to the us; rather, he saw much in the states he admires and does not hide his friendship for America and Americans. This is reflected in his emphasis on the desirability of American equipment and technology and his interest in increasing the amount of training Pakistani officers receive in the states. ("A Profile of General Zia" 1977, July 21)

This explains why "success with such a program is very difficult to measure accurately in quantifiable ways" (Cope 1995, p. 42). In the following chapters on four cases of coups d'état in Turkey and Pakistan, this study will show the main benefits of US officials military training programs and where exactly their role should be located in making the sense of the role played by US officials in those military coups.

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CHAPTER 3

Two Military Coups in Turkey and One Unwavering Supporter

This chapter discusses at length the US 'role' in May 27, 1960 and September 12, 1980 coups in Turkey considering the arguments made in the preceding chapters. By engaging in an elaborate discussion of US involvement before, during, and after these two coups in Turkey, it seeks to conceptualize and clarify the 'role' played by the US governments. The sections of both coups start with the existing explanations in the literature, which show an insufficient emphasis on the role played in each of them by the external dimension. It then draws a general picture of US foreign policy toward Turkey before each coup in order to help understand better the general backdrop of US priorities in Turkey and its neighborhood during the Cold War.

By considering US preferences, policies, and bilateral military-to-military relationships, this study then will explore the US role and pinpoint its effect on the outcome of the coup. In the case of each coup, this study will also try to provide an answer to the question posed in earlier chapters, that is, whether the likely reactions of major international actors entered into the calculations of coup makers.

May 27 Coup and the US Role

A novel about the life of Rusi Nazar, a CIA agent in Turkey from December 1959 to 1971, offers interesting insights into the 1960 coup in Turkey. Though Nazar himself claims that the USA had nothing to do with the coup in Turkey and rejects that the CIA knew of the coup in

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advance, his extensive personal network among the conspirators makes his account very interesting. The question Nazar asked in order to refute the idea that the USA was behind the 1960 coup reveals a distinct technique the USA could use if it wanted a coup in a country. Nazar asked that "if we assume that the US desired something like this [coup in Turkey], would it have not insinuated this to the top brass with whom it was in constant contact?" (Altaylı 2013, p. 349). Nazar knew people at the helm of Turkish intelligence (Ziya Selışık, Fuat Doğu) and Alparslan Türkeş from the Pentagon and CIA training and education in the USA. He also knew Agasi Şen, the deputy military attaché at the Turkish Embassy in Washington, who reportedly declined membership in the National Unity Committee after the 1960 coup but became a first aide-de-camp to President Cemal Gürsel (Altaylı 2013, pp. 324, 355, 359).

This shows how integral military-to-military relationships are to achieving an understanding the US's role in coups. It was through soldier-to-soldier relations that senior generals received clear signals from their Western counterparts that if they intervened, the West would understand. It was also the case that familiarity and mutual knowledge provided by US military training and working together in an international organization such as NATO helped reduce mutual doubts and suspicions in both cases, but especially in the May 27 coup as it took place outside the command chain. Having given some glimpses from findings in this study, what follows is a discussion of the US role in the May 27, 1960 coup, the first coup d'état in the modern history of the Republic.

Studies on civil-military relationships (CMR) in Turkey and Pakistan reflect the overemphasis in the literature on the domestic-level explanations at the expense of the external dimension. One reason for this level of neglect in Turkey can be the idea that Turkey's history, strategic location, and geography give it an 'exceptional status' among existing categories in the literature. In other words, Turkey is treated as a *sui generis* case (Erdoğan Karakuş, personal communication; Ergin Celasin, personal communication; Duman and Tsarouhas 2006; Güney and Karatekelioğlu 2005; Sarıgil 2007). The other reason behind the neglect may be that scholars did not have the resources to write authoritatively on the external dimension without stepping on conspiracy mines. Two scholars, for instance, focused solely on the domestic explanations of the May 27 coup perhaps because they both wrote about it a few years after it happened (Özbudun 1966; Harris 1965). Karaosmanoğlu is right to point out that "the mainstream approach to the Turkish case focuses on

internal political factors and ignores the broader security environment and international factors" (Karaosmanoğlu 2011, p. 256).

Several factors have been identified as *causes* behind the May 27 coup d'état in the literature. These ranged from the DP's inflationary policies that put military officers at a disadvantaged position to DP's authoritarian turn in the second half of the 1950s (Karabelias 1999, p. 132; Karpat in Heper and Evin 1988, pp. 141, 142; Ulay 1996, p. 79; Başgil 1966, pp. 25–26, 98–103; Kayalı 2012; Heper and Tachau 1983, p. 21; Hale 1994, pp. 250, 251; Dodd 1983, pp. 54, 58–59). Accounts of the May 27 coup that focused on the external dimension have been few and cursory. Ahmad (1993), for instance, offered very little discussion of the external dimension in his account of the coup, except where he says that NATO assignments and training raised the status of junior officers and opened their eyes to military capabilities and developments abroad (p. 125). As will be discussed later, experience of fighting in Korea side by side with armies from developed countries as well as NATO assignments did indeed acted as an eye opener for many Turkish officers (Subaşı, p. 247; Harris 1965, p. 170; Narlı 2000, pp. 115–116; Lombardi 1997; Heper and Güney 2000; Klieman 1980, pp. 143–163, 145; also Elevli, pp. 159–160; İpekçi and Coşar, p. 149). A recent book on Turkish foreign policy discussed the role of external actors in military interventions during the Cold War in Turkey, yet did so solely by relying on secondary sources (Kösebalaban 2011, pp. 88–115). Armaoğlu and Akalın attempted to understand the US involvement in coups in Turkey, but their use of archival documents remains poor (Akalın 2000). Jacoby discussed the role of NATO and the US in military coups and 'militarized governments' in Turkey without relying on primary resources or engaging in an elaborate discussion (Jacoby 2010, pp. 100–104). Most recently, Gunn wrote about the May 27 coup in Turkey by making extensive use of declassified US records.

However, Gunn considered the US role *only before the coup*. While admirably relying on some declassified US documents to try to see if the USA knew in advance about the coup, he does not consider the US role in the coup once the coup took place. Neither did he cover the considerable number of Turkish sources, first and foremost the large number of memoirs written by retired Turkish officers, and several enlightening interviews available from the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (Gunn 2015). Others discussed the external dimension of the coup without much elaboration (see, for instance, Demirel 2011, pp. 364–368). Other non-scholarly accounts of the coup immediately

point to the rumor that Prime Minister Menderes was about to visit the Soviet Union, which could have been perceived by the United States as the first step toward changing the axis of Turkey's external orientation. Notably, this claim was also voiced by Cemal Gürsel, the leader of the junta and Prime Minister and Chief of General Staff after the coup (Koçak 2010, vol. 1, p. 186; see also Gürdeniz 2013, p. 111).

US Foreign Policy Toward Turkey

The emerging rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and the fear that Turkey would fall into the lap of communism during the Cold War *shaped* US foreign policy toward the country during the 1950s. In the emerging US calculations to contain the Soviet Union, together with Greece, "Turkey was viewed as a barrier against Soviet free access to the Mediterranean" (Dillon 1998, p. 28). US Ambassador Wadsworth (1948–1952) said in his statement to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the issue of Mutual Defense Assistance Program that "Turkey occupies a unique and conspicuous position. It has a common eastern boundary with Soviet Russia and a common western boundary with Soviet-dominated Bulgaria. It controls the strategically important water route from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and flanks the land route from Russia to the oil fields of Iran and Arabia" (1950, p. 1047; see also Harris 1980, p. 118; Bradley as quoted in Uslu 1994, p. 95).

The United States supported the opening up of the regime in Turkey with 1950 elections and the coming to power of the Democrat Party (DP). The Truman Administration congratulated outgoing Premier İnönü as well as the new rulers, the DP (Erkin 1986, pp. 147–148; 'Department Sees Turkish Elections', April 1950, p. 869). The DP victory signalled to the USA that Turkey was evolving from 'absolute monarchy' to 'multi-party system' under a 'benevolent dictatorship.' President İnönü was praised for his courage in facilitating this process so smoothly.

> This government [the Democrat Party], it is expected, will cooperate with the United States and the other western democracies as fully as its predecessor as the two parties are united on foreign policy. There are no fundamental differences in the tenets of the two parties with respect to domestic

> policies. The Democrat Party, however, while admitting the necessity for state enterprise in Turkey, appears to attach more importance to the role of private enterprise and foreign capital in the development of the country than the Peoples' Party and also advocates the right of labor to strike which is now forbidden. ("Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President" 1950, May 22)

The acting Secretary of State felt proud of democratic transition Turkey had made and added that "the election platform of the Democratic Party and the public utterances of its leaders indicate that there will be no change in the foreign policy of the country as a result of the elections and that Turkey remains unalterably opposed to communism" ('Department Sees Turkish Elections', April 1950, p. 870). The change in government also brought with it a change in the upper echelons of the armed forces. This pleased the US "General McBride [who became the chief of JAMMAT in Turkey] felt very encouraged over the effects of the change in Government, resulting from the elections of May 14, 1950. He has a high regard for the new Chief of Staff and considered that a very good job had been done in replacing the 'Balkan war mentality' generals with more progressive ones" ("Memorandum by the Officer in Chargé of Turkish Affairs (Moore)" 1950, September 25). However, the USA still wanted to see the internal and external orientation of the new government in action. In its answer to a memorandum from the Pentagon about the US plan to supply Turkey with jet aircraft, the Department of Mutual Defense Assistance in the State Department recommended a short 'wait-and-see' period: "The exact temper of the new Turkish Government and of its new Chief of Staff remains to be established. Premature announcement of our intention to send jets to Turkey would indicate a confidence in the new Government not yet proven" ("Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense" 1950, March 18). This confirms that the US government was fully aware that providing aid after a political change—be it via elections, coups, or revolutions—imply support.

In terms of US military aid and the functions of the *Joint US Military Mission for Aid to Turkey* the Democrat Party government did not start, but rather maintained the Turkish eagerness in advancing bilateral relations with the USA with new enthusiasm. As early as early 1948, the *United States Air Force Group* (TUSAFG) cabled Washington for advice because Turkish Air Force Generals asked, with the support of President

İnönü, for help to restructure the Turkish General Staff and to form a separate Air Force Command. This request exceeded the assigned duties and functions of the US group but TUSAFG thought that "the Turks and the aid mission stood to lose too much if they remained silent on the subject. Defense Ministry streamlining would impart lasting influence on the various Turkish armed services by enabling them to absorb US equipment more rapidly and to fight a war successfully" (Livingston 1994, pp. 809–810). As Washington approved and with the willingness of General Zeki Doğan, the Commander of the newly-minted Air Force, TUSAFG organized the Air Force Command in such a way that it would manifest an "all-American look" (Livingston, p. 811). In the coming years the USA continued to be a source of emulation for some Turkish generals. For instance, General Doğan's successor, General Muzaffer Göksenin, visited the USA after he became Commander of the Air Force in 1950. On his return, he wanted to open American-style 'PXs' in military bases in order to increase purchasing power of military officers by providing products at discounted prices (Anılar 1997, pp. 370–371).

The Democrat Party willingly continued this deferential attitude when in power. The government paid special attention to appointing army commanders with most cooperative attitude with the United States ("Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Joint Military Mission" 1950, June 28). The United States helped the armed forces financially as well. When the portion allocated for defense purposes from the 1953 budget was 250 million TL short of what was desired by the TAF, the USA contributed 250 million TL after a short communication between the armed forces commands (Bayar 2006, p. 197).

The United States and Turkey enjoyed a very close relationship, which was anti-Soviet in nature. Significant amounts of US military and economic poured into Turkey. The security dimension in the bilateral relationship involved the Pentagon as an actor more than any other US agency. In the 1950s "US—Turkish ties were predominantly military in character. The Pentagon overshadowed normal diplomatic venues" (Karasapan 1989). It is for this reason that Feridun Cemal Erkin, Turkey's Ambassador to Washington from 1948 to 1955, and later Turkey's Foreign Minister, said in his memoirs that "one must care special attention to the Pentagon circles. The Army possesses great influence over the Administration" (Erkin, vol. 2, p. 545). Even the Marshall Plan Aid to Turkey was interpreted by George Kennan as "the Pentagon taking advantage of the favorable conditions so as to get to Turkey some

military aid in what was meant to be a program of economic and political assistance to Greece" (quoted in Taşhan 1979, p. 15). The US defense establishment had been aware of Turkey's strategic importance for US interests more than anybody else. One may only remind that President Dwight Eisenhower himself was NATO SACEUR in 1952. Eisenhower was well aware of Turkey's importance for NATO (Girgin 2007, p. 63).

The anti-Soviet security dimension of the Turkey—USA relationship reached its crescendo after the fall of Nuri al-Said in Iraq in 1958. Turkey and Iraq were on very good terms when Iraq was ruled by a triumvirate comprising the young King Faisal, his uncle Abdulillah and Nuri al-Said (Gökmen 2006, p. 528). The fall of 'Nuri Said Pasha', as he was known to Turkish diplomats, precipitated concerns in Turkey as much as the United States because it was almost certain that the new junta, under General Qassim, would seek Soviet support, which left the future security of the Baghdad Pact uncertain (Girgin 2007, p. 38). The remaining members of the Baghdad Pact, namely Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan now requested US guarantees through bilateral agreements including military cooperation, that it would come to their rescue (Girgin 2007, p. 52). It was in this context that a letter sent by US President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Menderes "guaranteed all kinds of US support in case of an attack against Turkey after the coup in Iraq" (Girgin 2007, p. 39).

The USA signed bilateral defensive cooperation agreements with Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in this new conjecture in the new region. According to the details of this treaty, Turkey received assurances that in cases of direct and indirect acts of aggression against it the USA would come its rescue. It was this clause that worried the coup makers most in their attempt to seize power on May 27, 1960 (Yılmaz 2011, p. 251). This new US commitment to protecting the Middle East from Soviet intrusion became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine (Little 1995, p. 523; Girgin 2007, p. 40; Kuneralp 1999, p. 129). While giving guarantees through bilateral agreements, the US Administration started to look askance at the reckless inflationary economic policies of the DP government that squandered much of economic aid provided to it (Gunn 2015, pp. 125–129; Carver 2011, p. 12). This made the Eisenhower Administration more reluctant to continue to give aid to Menderes. This provides the background of the saga of 'U.S. hand' in May 27 coup upon Menderes' intended visit to Moscow. The evidence, however, belies this saga.

Indeed, it was decided on April 13 that Menderes would visit Moscow around July 1960. However, according to the experienced diplomat Zeki Kuneralp, Soviet leader Khruschev visited the USA in 1959 for the first time, which led Turkey to feel that it may adapt itself to this new situation and perhaps seek a cautioned thaw in bilateral relations with the Soviets. Before approaching the Soviets about a possible visit, Foreign Minister Zorlu accepted the US Ambassador Warren on January 13, 1960 to inform him about the Soviet request for a high-level visit. Zorlu told Warren that the DP government is contemplating the visit to be at the Prime-Minister level and that Turkey has never bought into Soviet approaches. The Ambassador probably took the message back to Washington and relayed the US response to Zorlu on February 8, 1960. According to Kuneralp, the message stated that the USA appreciated Turkey's honest and sincere attitude and Turkey has the right to make decisions on its own on this matter. The USA has full faith in its loyal ally and only hopes that when Turkey makes its decision on the subject it will inform the NATO Council. Zorlu was happy to hear the message and said Turkey will continue to pursue this visit.

Zorlu had another meeting with the Soviet Ambassador Nikita Rijov on March 18, in which Rijov said that Soviet Union accepted Turkey's ties to NATO states and Turkey's NATO membership will not prevent friendly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. He expressed Soviet readiness to extend economic assistance without any political conditions. At least cultural relations may be improved, Ambassador Rijov said. Zorlu agreed as long as the Soviets recognized Turkey's NATO and CENTO memberships. Zorlu accepted Ambassador Rijov on March 27 and April 6 again to conclude Menderes' visit for coming July. According to Kuneralp, Zorlu's approach on this matter was realistic and cautionary; he knew that he had narrow room to operate, was aware of the gentleness of the subject and was extra cautious not to force limits (Kuneralp 1999, pp. 139–142). According to Gunn (2015), since this was not first time the Menderes government had toyed with the idea of receiving financial aid from the Soviets, the US government did not seem particularly dismayed by the possibility of Menderes' visit to Moscow (pp. 134–136). Besides, Menderes, who was firmly anti-communist, sought to use the Soviet visit as a bargaining chip to get more aid from the USA (Demirel 2011, p. 366). In other words, the steps the Menderes government took with the Soviets were taken in coordination with the United States (Altaylı 2013, p. 348).

The Road to the 1960 Coup d'état

The decade of the Democrat Party rule denotes period of great transformation for the Turkish military. This period also marks the start of the US military's penetration of Turkish armed forces and closer relationship cemented over the coming years. This provides the necessary background to making sense of the US role in all coups in Turkey from 1960 to the most recent attempt in 2016. As argued before, the US military found out about Turkey's strategic importance in the 1940s. CIA station in Adana was established in the early 1940s. A memorandum prepared a few years by the US Joint Chiefs, on August 23, 1946, had recognized Turkey "as strategically the most important military factor in Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East". Although Turkey lacked strong air power and navy, it was the only country whose land forces could resist to Soviet expansion (Bölme 2012, p. 160). A large Joint US Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT) was established in 1947 (Bernath 1985, p. 6).

In this transformation it was not only the land forces that made transition to US weaponry and tactics; so were the naval forces, in which inventory US ships and submarines replaced German, British and Italian ones. This transition to US weaponry and tactics required Turkish officers to go to the U.S. for training in large numbers (Büyüktuğrul, vol. 4, p. 672; Gürdeniz 2013, pp. 100, 107; Akyaz 2002, p. 54; see also Orkunt 1978, pp. 35–36). This in turn increased the importance of military-to-military contacts. These trainings in the U.S. weapons and tactics were not always given in the United States. US officers came to Turkey and trained Turkish officers on Turkish soil. They started this program as early as 1948 (Bölme 2012, p. 162; Livingston 1994, p. 778). As of 1950 high-level contacts between the US Army Chief of Staff, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, and the Turkish General Staff were in place and rolling. After his visit in March 1950, JAMMAT started to work more closely with the Turkish military in transforming it in myriad ways from "regrouping of certain units, for doubling the number of non-commissioned officers, and for additional emphasis on training, command inspections, and war and mobilization planning" ("Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary" 1950, September 19).

As US equipment and military experts came in, Turkish military schools were reorganized according to the US system. The US officers

assessed Turkey's military capabilities and watched some military maneuvers in the 1950s (Madanoğlu 1982, pp. 331–332; Seyhan 1966, p. 3; Girgin 2007, p. 305). One of the most important duties of US military attachés in Turkey was to make sure that the U.S. equipment and aid were used effectively and for right and approved purposes and report back their observations ("The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey" 1950, March 1). The Turkish military was in dire need of assistance in the 1950s (Bayar, p. 232; Yamak, 2006 p. 76; Turgut, p. 28). In imitation of the U.S. Land Forces, the Turkish Land Forces formed a Military Supply School in 1949, which was responsible for providing, maintaining and repairing the weapons, vehicles, gas and other equipment of the ground soldiers (Bayar, n.d., p. 141).

The head of JAMMAT, McBride, assisted the Turkish General Staff in changing its strategic war plans. US military aid allowed the Turkish military to change its strategic concepts as well (The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth), 1950, March 20). And the aid relationship with the United States necessarily had resulted in disclosure of Turkish war plans with the US military because then Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, said "the members of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] must know how much money to allot to the Turkish Army, Navy and Air Force respectively and that it was, therefore, necessary to know something of the Turkish plans," to which request President İnönü replied by saying that "we are working with America and have nothing to conceal from you" ("Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of Staff", 1950, March 26). "The end of the 1950s saw Turkey with the military forces modeled on U.S. patterns and thoroughly integrated into the NATO alliance" (Harris 1985, p. 185). The Chief of General Staff Rüştü Erdelhun, who the coup aspirants detested, had said on an occasion to NATO authorities that '[Turkish] army is theirs' (Yıldız 2001, pp. 75–76). Though mid-ranking officers who later involved in the coup was furious with that statement, the army appeared to became a military outpost of NATO. Turkey gladly adjusted itself to NATO standards, changed its German-style uniform to US style (Carver, p.70), and updated its curriculum in its various colleges and academies over decades of its ongoing NATO membership (Kıyat 2010, p. 48; Ergin Celasin, personal communication; Hikmet Bayar, personal communication; Torumtay 1993, p. 55). Kuneralp's account of this burgeoning relationship gives its correct, and bluntly one-sided, nature:

> The main pillar of our foreign policy in those years was reliance on the West. And the West then was the United States of America more than any other actor else. The U.S. was next to us in every field and we stood by it as well. The U.S. was our chief partner in trade; it provided our military equipment. The spring of all assistance coming to Turkey at the time, be it economic, military, bilateral or multi-actor, was the United States. All aid coming to us according to and in the context of Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower Doctrine, NATO, CENTO, and OECD was American in origin and thanks to American encouragement. (Kuneralp 1999, pp. 97, 135–136; see also Küçük, p. 81; also Taşhan 1979, p. 16; Büyüktuğrul, vol. 4, 1970, p. 685; Akyaz 2002, p. 49)

It was this domestic dramatic transformation that provided the backdrop to development of Turkish-US military-to-military relationships. It was through these encounters and bilateral contacts through education, US advisory mission in Turkey, NATO contacts and the Korean war that Turkish officers formed an opinion of Turkey's Western orientation and US connection. US administrations, in turn, formed an opinion and developed knowledge of main currents and thinking as well as quality and training in the Turkish armed forces.

Transformation of the Military

It was almost always the case in the 1950s and 60s that Turkish officers who received education and training abroad on the new US military equipment, tactics, and strategies USA would gain great advantage compared to their colleagues who stayed home. "The Americans had unrestricted authority to select such officers and then employ them as teachers in these schools. Beside the material benefit officers accrued from these courses, the expertise they gained provided a great career surplus." (Seyhan, p. 35). It was the usual practice that returnees from US courses would be appointed as instructors in their fields of newly attained expertise, even if more senior people without the expertise were available to fill the same position (Bayar 2006, p. 392; personal communication with İsmail Hakkı Pekin, August 26, 2015; Batur 1985, p. 57; Turgut, pp. 80, 121–122). This method was known as 'cadre method of instruction', applied deliberately by the US Advisory mission in Turkey. "Under the cadre system, US advisers taught selected Turkish officers and NCOs a particular course. The graduates would in turn instruct

their countrymen" (Livingston 1994, p. 795). For instance, Necip Torumtay, who later became the Chief of the General Staff in 1987, was sent for 'Artillery Transmitter Repair Course' in Army Field Artillery School in Oklahoma in 1948. On his return, Torumtay became a field artillery transmitter repair instructor (1993, p. 34; also see Karavelioğlu 2007, pp. 33–34; also Gürkan 2002, pp. 36–37). Turkish officers trained abroad not only taught others after their return how to use US weapons and equipment but they also translated their classroom notes to be used in training, which must have accelerated the diffusion of effects of U.S. training (Bayar 2006, p. 401; Turgut, pp. 121–122). In fact, since not many officers had good command of English to understand the documents and instructions received from the USA, officers with even little language skills had the upper hand (Baytok, p. 25).

The training and education opportunities brought in phenomenal change in terms of military thinking and beyond for the Turkish military (Küçük 2008, pp. 46–48; Batur 1985, pp. 63–64). It should not be seen as a small matter that thanks to education and training opportunities in the USA in the 1950s, Turkish military officers were struck by how economically developed the USA was (Turgut, p. 79). Some of them drank Coca-Cola for the first time, brought back technological devices, and came back with shiny automobiles that their colleagues envied (Bayar 2006, pp. 357, 372; Turgut, pp. 94–95; Batur, pp. 63–64; Aydemir 2010, p. 116; Husain 2015, p. 176; Bayar, n.d., pp. 294–295; for a similar example see Anılar 1997, pp. 416–420). By 1959 "Over 1,000 [Turkish] officers and 300 pilots received training in the United States under IMET costing about $55 million ('Agency for International Development 1945–1984' cited in Maniruzzaman, p. 744). These impressions confirmed to these Turkish officers that Turkey made a right choice by being on the western camp in the Cold War and that despite US governments' close relationship with the Menderes government, the western orientation was the right one to follow.

While the relationship between *senior* Turkish officers and their US counterparts as well as their perspectives of Turkey's alliance with the USA appeared smooth, some mid-ranking officers developed an ambivalent attitude vis-à-vis the United States. It is important to discuss how this distinct perspective developed in the minds of many Turkish officers because some of these officers later actively involved themselves in the military juntas against the Democrat Party government. To this end,

we must go back to the period of the late 1940s and the 1950s as the military tried to adapt itself to US weapons, education and training as well as accustoming themselves to working with US officers. The period was a wholesale transition the German/Prussian model to the US model (Yamak 2006, p. 52; Güvenç 2013, p. 83; Livingston 1994, p. 813). The Turkish mid-ranking officers as well as senior generals met their US counterparts in this period for the first time. Not only did US military equipment and personnel pour into Turkey but also Turkish officers fought in Korea side by side with their U.S. colleagues. At least at the level of commanding Turkish generals there was some animosity towards the Soviets and somewhat positive relations with the USA (Yazıcı 1963, pp. 63, 326).

The Korean War not only facilitated Turkey's entrance into NATO alliance as several Turkish diplomats and others recounted, (Gökmen 2006, pp. 236, 473; İnan 2010, p. 40; Melek 1994, 1994, p. 43; Küçük 2008, p. 55;) but also presented even better opportunity for Turkish officers to see military combat, during which they could observe U.S. officers and weapons in action. The number of Turkish soldiers, 4500, dispatched to Korea was suggested by the United States through United Nations channel (Gökmen 2006, p. 237; Güvenç 2013, p. 86). In fact, it was General McBride, the head of JUSMMAT (Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey), who determined the number of soldiers requested from Turkey to fight in Korea (The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State, July 24, 1950). Besides, it is highly possible that it was JUSMMAT officials who selected the military officers to lead Turkish military teams heading to Korea (Gürkan, pp. 46–47).

The entire episode of the Korean War left an indelible mark on the mentality and general orientation of Turkish officer corps. Turkish Brigadier General (Tuğgeneral) Tahsin Yazıcı attested to the richness of food offered in food rations in Korea (Yazıcı 1963, p. 104). When Turkish officers made it to Korea, they were equipped with weapons and clothing from their underwear to socks and military cap. Given the dire conditions in the Turkish military in the 1950s (Baytok, p. 21), "they all saw what a modern military looked like" (Y. Tezkan, personal communication, August 6, 2015). It was not only food packets that were rich; the number of bullets that soldiers were allowed, even ordered, to fire astonished the Turkish soldiers as well. The US approach to military education and exercise, known as 'train as you fight', was something

-Turkish officers could not even imagine given the scarcity of ammunition available back home (Güvenç 2013, p. 92). As mentioned before, foreign assistance in the form of equipment and especially training opportunities provided chances of speedy upward mobility within the ranks (Aydemir 2010, p. 19). The Korean War provided the same benefit (Şarlak 2004, p. 36; Başer, p. 142).

All this did not translate into an automatic love affair. Several mid-ranking officers, who, as pointed out before, were active members of military juntas that successfully concluded the 1960 coup, were not happy with the way Turkey entrusted its security against the Soviets entirely to NATO and how one-sided and submissive this looked. When Foreign Minister Zorlu presented the role drawn out for Turkey in NATO plans in case of a Soviet attack and said that in that scenario NATO would be unable to extend Turkey any assistance from the land, air or sea in the first instance, logistical support would only depend on the conditions and Turkish military would be on its own to fight so that it will not be easily swallowed until NATO armies gathered powers to counter the attack, some officers were discombobulated to hear it (Madanoğlu 1982, p. 337; Ulay 1996, p. 33). In fact, Madanoğlu as one of these officers was very critical of Turkey's NATO membership because Turkey would not be allowed to interfere with what U.S. officers and officials would do in military bases to be opened on the Turkish soil. For Madanoğlu, bilateral agreements to be concluded between Turkey and the U.S. sounded like military capitulations (1982, pp. 336–337).

With the total absorption of the US system "the Turkish Armed Forces was no longer a force relying on its own resources and sufficiency; it became an outpost force, of which source of resource supply was in the hands of a country at the opposite corner of the world" (Seyhan p. 102). Seyhan, who viewed positively the US hand now extended to Turkey, which resisted the expansion of communism to the Middle East even at the risk of paying a heavy price, for help after years of US negligence and inertia (Seyhan, p. 31), complained about "the excessive authority and powers given to Americans and overdependence on the US for Turkish arms needs" (Seyhan, p. 34; Gürcan 2005, p. 23). Other officers too raised similar criticisms (Esin, p. 321).

On the one hand, the frequency with which U.S. and NATO military officials visited different military units and their attitudes bothered low-ranking officers, on the other hand new weaponry and all sorts of war material gifted or loaned by the United States pleased them

(Subaşı, p. 64). For several officers that grew critical of the Democrat Party government, the top-ranking generals looked too acquiescent in the demolition of Kemalist Turkey. The Chief of General Staff, Rüştü Erdelhun, received scathing criticism (Ilıcak II, p. 568; Ulay n.d., pp. 23, 85.; Subaşı, pp. 82, 94, 145; Elevli 1960, p. 15). The Eisenhower Administration was not unaware of the change in local Turkish attitudes toward U.S. presence in Turkey, which went from "acceptance to hostility" (Holmes 2014, pp. 56–57).

However, it should be mentioned that at the level of mid-ranking Turkish officers, the dominant feeling was neither smooth love affair nor unadulterated hatred or bitter animosity. It was feeling of 'envy' against the USA caused by witnessing its undeniable military, economic, and technological superiority as opposed to perceived frustration of unrealized high expectations from the young Republic at home (Y. Tezkan, personal communication, August 6, 2015). This is critical to understand how it became possible for the coup-makers to carry on friendly bilateral relations with the West after the 1960 coup. In other words, notwithstanding their skepticism toward the dependency relationship with the United States developed during the Democrat Party, May 27 coupists were largely still very western. They could identify themselves as more nationalist or patriotic than politicians of the DP but their prescribed orientation for Turkey's national identity and vision were firmly anchored in Ataturk's (1966, pp. 45–46; Utku 2006, p. 66; Turgut, p. 208). When Seyhan criticized the Democrat Party government and high-ranking politicians, he said "what Turkey is in urgent need is a team of cultured people who knows Turkey and the West well and has an Ataturkist mindset" (Seyhan, p. 45). When Seyhan introduced Yüzbaşı Süreyya Yüksel to confide with him their revolutionary plans, he approvingly introduced him as "monstrously Western minded, Turkey-spirited, greatly intelligent and capable officer" (p. 46). In a letter sent by Orhan Erkanlı, who was sent to exile after the coup, to Suphi Karaman on 28 March 1961, said that "he was afraid that an authority vacuum may emerge and the country may fall to communists' hands" (Utku, p. 66) It is this ambivalent socialization experience with the United States through various layers of contact in the decade of 1950 that explains the response of the military government toward the United States after the coup. They could not escape from the fact they witnessed that in every aspect from social cohesion and order to military and financial appeal, the West was superior to communism and the Soviets.

Turkey's First Coup D'état

When the Democrat Party was established, its founders were no strangers to the armed forces. 'The Democrat Party was a political party created by the right rib taken out of the Republican People's Party' (Seyhan, p. 21; İlter, p. 69). Families of some of the military officers, who later took part in the coup in 1960, had never felt close to the Republican People's Party and, therefore, were staunch supporters of the DP at its founding (Esin, p. 17; Yıldız, p. 154) Considerable number of military officers did not perceive any danger in the foundation of the Democrat Party and its assumption of power four years later because 'almost all of its founding members worked as ministers and MPs in the ruling cadre when the RPP ruled the country singlehandedly and realized the revolutionary reforms to raise the level of Turkish society to that of modern civilization'. On the contrary, "people found the ballot box in front of them for the first time in 1950. Everybody went and voted. Officers who went from village to village, saying to the villagers that the salvation of the country is at stake and asking villagers to vote for the DP, lectured in us in military school but later they gave up their support for the DP" (Yılmaz Tezkan, personal communication; Esin, p. 37). The financial troubles military officers experienced at the end of World War II created resentment against the RPP rule as well as General Staff. Junior officers felt that they were ignored and neglected (İlter, p. 70; Subaşı, p. 14). Sıtkı Ulay, retired general and member of the National Unity Council, said in his memoirs that a lot of officers supported the Democrat Party early on and they let the founders of the party know that considerable number of young officers were behind them (Ulay, pp. 13, 14; Utku, p. 115; İlter, p. 70). Another officer, who later took part in the coup attempt and became a member of the NUC, had also supported the Democrat Party, though he would have liked İnönü to continue as the President of the country, largely thanks to İnönü inexhaustible charisma within the armed forces. (Esin, pp. 35–36) 1946 election results was hardly free and fair elections because 'açık oy, gizli tasnif' [open vote, secret counting] method was practiced. When the time came for 1950 elections, some officers within the Turkish military was determined to make sure the upcoming elections would not be rigged and they actively supported the DP in the 1950 elections. Of course there were other officers who thought that the decision to have multi-party elections as early as 1950 was premature. Those officers were pro-İnönü and the RPP and wanted

it to continue to rule the country at least until it matured enough (Şenocak 2005, pp. 54, 56–58, 63). One of those officers was İbrahim Şenocak, then a student at the Turkish War College and later a General and Commander of the 2nd Army, and yet he was aware that when İnönü held an election campaign rally in Istanbul before the elections the crowd largely consisted of Democrat Party supporters who were curious to see what İnönü had to say (Şenocak, p. 54). One must mention that 'the left' understood as communism/socialism lacked any follower base within the military. Ataturkism was the common denominator, though this must have been defined differently by different groups, and everybody had respect for İsmet Pasha. Among the cadets at the Military Academy there were pro-DP students but they were the minority. (Okan 2015, p. 56; Erbil 2007, p. 197)

The origins of the coup conspiracies against the DP remain controversial. Although Aydemir found other officers ready to work against the DP government in 1956 (Aydemir 2010, p. 20) and some others talked about the night of the 1957 election as the tipping point for the organized military opposition against the DP (Karavelioğlu 2007, p. 23) it looks like the first anti-DP movements started before 1953–1954. Some officers may have started to doubt whether the DP would deliver what it promised as early as January 1951 (Seyhan 1966, p. 38), these suspicious did not turn into organized effort. Some lieutenant and lieutenant colonels became very anti-DP before the 1954 election campaign and played 'coup games' among themselves (Boğuşlu 1995, pp. 20–21; see also Küçük, p. 63; Yirmibeşoğlu 1999a, p. 315).[1] According to General Kızıloğlu's account during a dinner with US Embassy Minister Counsellor Leon Cowles after the coup secret groups were already born by 1952–1953[2] (Pelt 2014, p. 180). It is very interesting to read in Seyhan's memoir that the new Democrat Party government did several mistakes in the period starting from July 1950, which is when Seyhan departed for his training course in the USA, to January 1951, when he

[1] Mahmut Boğuşlu became member of National Unity Council, Intelligence Coordination Control Board after the May 27 coup.

[2] When Colonel Talat Aydemir and Lieutenant Muzaffer Özdağ discussed over the origin of secret groups that eventually deposed the DP government, Aydemir mentioned 1956 whereas Özdağ took the year as far back as 1952 when Özdağ was still at the War College. Aydemir then chastised Özdağ and warned him not to ever say that anywhere else (Aydemir 2010, p. 53).

returned (p. 38). Soon after the Democrat Party won the 1950 elections, it made clear that it intended some shifts in the General Staff, Menderes divided Ataturk reforms into "'tutmuş' devrimler" [internalized reforms] and "'tutmamış devrimler" [failed reforms], and later adhan was read in Arabic again. Some mid-ranking and senior officers (such as General Necati Tacan) interpreted the latter two developments as "anti-Ataturk" and "anti-Ataturkist" movement (Madanoğlu 1982, pp. 335–336; Yıldız, pp. 108–114; Karavelioğlu, p. 35). What is known with some amount of certainty is that displays of open insubordination of military commanders had already begun at the local level, where regional commanders defied orders by the civilian government in November 1954. when Chief of Staff of the 48th Division stationed in Trabzon, Zeki İlter was ordered by the General Staff in Ankara to transfer Kale neighborhood, where the local officers' club was located, to Trabzon municipality, he defied the order and asked General Nurettin Aknoz, the Commander of the 3rd Army in Erzurum. He was told not to overturn the control of neighborhood (İlter 2003, pp. 65–66).[3] Another illustration of the level of politicization within the TAF in the 1950s is the fact that Şefik Soyuyüce, another participant in the coup, wrote a political party program that included chapters on health, tourism and trade policies in 1957–1958 (Soyuyüce 2012).

The coup plotters shared the following grievances: the DP government neglected military's needs, humiliated them, undermined Ataturk's reforms including most-cherished secularism although President İnönü aptly warned the leaders of the Democrat Party not to touch on the revolutionary reforms and the principle of laicism (Küçük 2008, p. 11; also Erbil 2007, p. 197), and became more and more authoritarian while the high-ranking generals were in deep slumber (İlter, pp. 70–73; Ulay 1996, pp. 51–52, 80; Batur 1985 p. 70; Küçük 2008, pp. 11–13; Madanoğlu 1982, pp. 335–336; Yıldız, pp. 108–114; Karavelioğlu 2007, p. 35; Gürcan 2005, pp. 14–15; Elevli 1960, p. 29; İpekçi and Coşar 1965, pp. 27, 33, 50; Kaplan 2012, pp. 10–12; see also Ulay n.d., pp. 32–35; Utku 2006, pp. 113, 140; Seyhan 1966, p. 33; Pelt 2014, p. 180; Subaşı, pp. 213, 214).[4] The prevention of İnönü from visiting

[3] For further petty conduct in the rural areas that further distanced military officers from the government, see Ulay (1996, p. 47).

[4] Colonel Faruk Ateşdağlı from the Talat Aydemir group contacted Tümgeneral Muharrem Kızıloğlu before the 1957 elections. Kızıloğlu told Ateşdağlı for four hours how

Kayseri in early April 1960, his ill-treatment (Ulay n.d., p. 59), and the authoritarian 'Parliamentary Commission' set up on April 18 by the Democrat Party to investigate political activities of the RPP with its very wide powers added grain to salt and became the final straw (Demirel 2011, pp. 315–326). This final step left no hesitation in the minds of the rogue officers that the government must go and a coup is the sole way to do it.

The May 27 coup was the first successful one in the history of the Republic. It was, however, a junior officers' coup. If a coup could happen in the Turkish circumstances of the 1950s at all, it would have had to come from the junior ranks, since the upper ranks supported the ruling government. It was for this reason that Talat Aydemir, one of the most ardent coup plotters in the 1950s and 60s, and his friends as only one of the groups conspiring to overthrow the government, planned to not accept anyone to their group whose rank was higher than a colonel because higher ranks were not safe (Aydemir 2010, p. 25). When young officers feel that senior sources lost the feel for the armed forces, when a significant distance opens between them, secret cliques and juntas may be formed (Johnson 1964, p. 124). The fact that junior officers overthrew the existing government in Turkey was not an unprecedented event. In fact, coups were either led or expected from junior and mid-ranking officers in Egypt, Iraq and Pakistan in the same decade as well (Nawaz, p. 154). The fact that junior officers overthrew the existing government in Turkey was not an unprecedented event. The Free Officers who deposed King Farouk and took over in Egypt in 1952 were mostly junior officers. When General Abdul Karim Qassim carried out a coup d'état in Iraq in 1958, the British government was tipped off by its Defense Attaché to Tehran about the possibility of a junior officers' coup

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the coup should be planned, which methods should be used to succeed but 'he [Kızıloğlu] did not have the energy required to do anything like this (Aydemir 2010, p. 35). Later Lt. Colonel Suphi Karaman visited Tümgeneral Muharrem Kızıloğlu a day before the coup, on May 26th to invite him to join the conspiracy to start the following day. Karaman was unable to convey the message because Kızıloğlu kept talking the whole meeting. Kızıloğlu therefore ended up not being a NUC member but he was in the first government cabinet as the Minister of Interior. Onuş, pp. 136–137. The junta had long planned that if the coup succeeded, three ministries had to be presided by military generals: National Defense, Interior Ministry and Ministry of Transportation. The general to head the Interior Ministry had already been decided: Lieutenant General Muharrem Kızıloğlu (Küçük 2008, p. 107).

attempt because Qassim's coup stirred the streets in Tehran (Barrett 2007, note 42, p. 371). The Free Officers who deposed King Farouk and took over in Egypt in 1952 were also mostly junior officers.

All Turkish military attachés (army, navy and air) assigned to the Turkish Embassy in Germany were thrilled to hear the news of the May 27 coup (Anılar, p. 427). The major problem for everybody with junior officers' coup, however, was that when junior officers stage a coup, you never know who they exactly are, what they will, and can do (Çakır 2010, p. 292; Yirmibeşoğlu 1999a, p. 343). Whether staged by junior officers or in accordance with the military hierarchy, coups often witness divisions (Kandil, p. 17). Several of the conspiring mid-ranking officers in 1960, including its leader General Gürsel, wanted to wait for the 'time become propitious' so that people would find a coup legitimate before they finally intervened. They thought they should attempt the coup either when disruptive events follow the new elections or political developments led to severe chaos (Yıldız, pp. 162–165; İpekçi and Coşar, p. 58; Turgut 1995, p. 111; Aytekin 1967, p. 36). Once they started the action, however, they exaggerated the risk of resistance because there was none (Demirel 2011, p. 359).

The May 27 was the Noah's pudding (Er 2003, p. 27; Talat Turhan, personal communication, September 6, 2015), meaning that different military officers from different ideological backgrounds took part in it to realize different objectives. This explains why soon after the coup was successful, splits and internal controversies sprung (Ulay n.d., pp. 129, 135,136; Er 2003, p. 65; Esin 2005, p. 99). The origins of these deep rifts, however, went back before the coup itself. Separate groups coming together to overthrow the government had different ideas about what would and should come after it (Yirmibeşoğlu 1999a, p. 314; Subaşı, p. 88; Akyaz 2002, pp. 132–134; Deniz 2002, p. 15; Ahmad 1993, p. 126). To make things worse, both groups were divided within themselves over some issues that came up later (Akyaz, p. 141). Intra-junta divisions surfaced the very next day after the coup. It was claimed that the consensus, finalized months earlier, on assignment of officers to different ministries after the coup were ignored by some officers the very next morning, which revealed the very first rift (Küçük 2008, p. 107).

One of post-coup splits concerned the activities of Alparslan Türkeş, one of the strongest inside the junta, and those around him. This group was blamed for forming a group of their own and following their own agenda, which other thought harmful to the objectives of the

coup. (Madanoğlu 1962, pp. 14–15). In justifying the moves, the rest of the Committee did against the group around Türkeş, Cemal Madanoğlu said that they had to take some measures because "the emergence of divisions within the [National Unity] Committee would not look good in the eyes of public opinion. We also had commitments to the whole world" (p. 14). On November 13, fourteen members of the NUC were sent to exile on the orders of the President and Chief of General Staff Cemal Gürsel.[5] Among the people sent to exile was Muzaffer Karan, a radical member of the NUC with bitter criticism of Turkey's dependency on the US, which made Turkey look like a US forward garrison (Akyaz 2002, p. 50). However, although Altaylı too claimed that the USA was behind the purge of fourteen members of the NUC because Türkeş wanted to remove the CIA office from the building of the Interior Ministry after the successful coup (Altaylı, p. 355), there is no other evidence to support this claim. On the contrary, there are more evidence presented in this essay that shows Türkeş being one of the best connected among putschists to the USA.

Only a year after the coup, another group of officers under the name of the Union of Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği) was formed as a reaction and activities of the National Unity Committee (Yirmibeşoğlu 1999a, pp. 342–343). It was too divided between those in the Ankara, İstanbul, Konya, and Erzurum groups. Ankara group was headed by Colonel Talat Aydemir, who later attempted two coup attempts without blessing by other groups (Aytekin 1967, pp. 144–145). In this respect, 1960 marked the beginning of a 'period of coup-making' [ihtilal devri] in Turkey (Aytekin 1967, p. 167; see also Şarlak 2004, p. 61). This coup fever continued well into the late 1960s (Bilget 2002, pp. 11–16).

[5]These were Numan Esin, Alparslan Türkeş, Dündar Taşer, Mustafa Kaplan, Orhan Erkanlı, Muzaffer Özdağ, Rıfat Baykal, Fazıl Akkoyunlu, Ahmet Er, Orhan Kabibay, İrfan Solmazer, Münir Köseoğlu, Muzaffer Karan and Şefik Soyuyüce.

The External Dimension

Pre-coup Care

The distinctly ambivalent attitude that mid-ranking Turkish officers developed vis-à-vis the United States as well as Turkey-US relations may lead us to think that external reactions did not become a factor in their decision-making for the coup. As will be discussed in detail later, the United States seemed to be behind the DP government until the coup. If we take the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting, which convened on May 4 in İstanbul, as a *signal* of support for the Democrat Party government, the junior officers were obviously not deterred by it. Even when PM Menderes was unable to deliver the opening speech of this high-level meeting due to domestic unrest, the Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter gave warm messages of support and longstanding friendship with Turkey both before he departed Washington for İstanbul and on his way back ('Mr. Herter's Departure Statement' 1960, p. 803; 'Statements by Secretary Herter, Arrival Statement' 1960, p. 841). Harkening back to what Thyne said about negative signals as a prelude to messaging external tolerance for a coup d'état, this positive signal Eisenhower Administration gave to Democrat Party government did not stop the conspiring military officers.

The putschists, however, were not reckless agents. Answering one of the main research concerns in this study, the junta cared considerably about external actors' reactions. To start with, they thought out very carefully *when* to stage the coup. They thought that they could not do it during Indian Prime Minister Nehru's visit planned for May 20. They thought they could not carry it out when PM Menderes was out of the country on a visit to Athens on May 26 either because then Menderes could have called for outside assistance or could have installed an alternative government abroad to pose a constant challenge to the government in Ankara even if the coup was successful. They therefore found themselves initially obligated to stage it between May 20th and May 26 when Menderes was in Turkey (Onuş 2003, pp. 89–90; Küçük 2008, p. 89). Yet, they changed their plans again to stage it on May 27. Because they did not know for sure if the Democrat Party had a secret agreement with the United States, which stipulated US support in case of a rebellion or uprising or coup d'état, the junta had arranged Captain Dündar Seyhan's appointment in 1959 to Turkey's Military Representation at NATO in

Washington DC to enable instance communication with the US authorities during the coup. Seyhan demurred when he heard the appointment but his friends insisted because

> According to an agreement between the Americans and the Turkish government [1959 Bilateral Treaty between the USA and Turkey], the United States accepted to stage an armed intervention upon the Turkish government's request under extraordinary circumstances. It was not possible to predict how our revolutionary action [coup] would go. They [coup planners] did not want the coup action to stir an international chaotic situation. They found it beneficial for me to be in Washington in case the government finds an opportunity to call for external intervention during the coup… They followed the same rationale in appointing Sadi Koçaş to London as Turkey's military attaché… (Seyhan 1966, pp. 72–73)

We had mentioned in previous paragraphs that some conspiring officers' feeling that the coup movement needed to be led by a senior general was related to their concerns about the chance of success after the coup. Whether the coup plan required a leader (civilian or military) for it to be successful even after propitious circumstances emerged with the student demonstrations became a point of controversy among the conspiring officers in Istanbul little before the May 27 coup. Though the issue seemed to pertain to 'leadership', the real matter was concern for getting external support for the coup action. Some mid-ranking officers, who thought they needed a leader, believed that

> the objective of the revolution was not only taking over the state, which anybody with enough firepower under allowing circumstances could do. The critical issue was to make sure the state keep its 'state-ness'. It was a bare truth that no country could shut its doors to outside. It was indispensable to get foreign countries recognize the government after the revolution. If Turkey failed to find a place for itself in the world after the revolution, it could make enemies among the neighboring or far away countries, which in turn may turn the Turkish people against us and make us look like traitors. (Subaşı 2004, p. 130)

Post-coup Care

The extent to which coup makers signified the external reaction and gave guarantees to the West accordingly can also be derived from the coup

memorandums read on the radio as the coup succeeded. In their coup memorandum officers addressed their allies, neighbors, and the entire world and declared that they wanted to comply fully with the United Nations Charter and human rights. They professed loyalty to Turkey's previously signed agreements and commitments and underlined their belief in NATO and loyalty to NATO and CENTO' (Akalın 2000, p. 36). Madanoğlu's and Türkeş's claim that they prepared this post-coup memorandum on the night of May 26th to broadcast it on radio (Madanoğlu 1962, p. 5; Turgut, p. 89) should be taken with a grain of salt. These memorandums, treated as the first revelatory text published by the coup makers, are often very carefully crafted and rarely contain random thoughts. Indeed, Sami Küçük, member of NUC, recounts in his memoirs that they came together on May 5 and finalized their plans, including what to announce from the radio.

> In order to prevent any intervention by the Allied Forces, we had to declare to the whole world that we were loyal to NATO and CENTO. The Christian President in Lebanon [Camille Chamoun] had asked for American intervention in the civil war between Christians and Muslims [in 1958]. One night he Americans landed a division of soldiers on the İncirlik base without even informing the Turkish authorities and used the base as a stepping-stone to stage an intervention in Lebanon. [Therefore] It would have been utterly crazy to create an excuse to prompt an external intervention at a time when the revolution [coup] action was weakest and could not yet rule the country. For this reason, it was necessary to declare on the radio broadcast that the revolution would remain faithful to NATO and CENTO. Besides, as stated before and will be elaborated on later, the NATO umbrella worked to Turkey's benefit, not to its detriment. (Küçük 2008, p. 89)

When Sami Küçük (2008) was later asked about their reasons for declaring loyalty to NATO and CENTO, he said that 'coups are most vulnerable in their early hours (p. 206). Indeed, Subaşı (2004), then staff captain, who joined in the coup action from İstanbul, also emphasized the fragility of coup actions in the following sentence: "each night after the revolution [coup] lies another potential revolution [coup]" (p. 165) This shows that the content of the first coup memorandum was consciously written as such and coupists were rational enough to know their vulnerability at early hours of the coup and take sufficient measures.

Once again, the coup makers were aware of western orientation Ataturk drew for Turkey. Küçük said that "Ataturk set Turkey's direction toward the West in terms of social life, law, and politics. No despotic movement can steer it away from this righteous path. Turkey may only take its deserved place among the civilized countries by adopting and enforcing the principles which the west had adopted (p. 207). Trying to explain the declaration of loyalty to CENTO and NATO, Suphi Karaman, another member of the NUC, said that 'this way the outside world would know that the military government will not be communist. The conditions of the mid-1960s made it necessary that we made our orientation known at the outset'. Karaman too repeated Küçük's explanation that the conspirators suspected that the US and Democrat Party government may have signed a secret agreement and, therefore, the US could have come to its rescue (Utku 2006, pp. 113, 148).

In order to be still on the safe side after taking all these precautions, the coupists had Selim Sarper brought into ask him about the real content of previous bilateral agreements with the U.S. These bilateral agreements, especially the one signed on 5 March 1959 in the context of CENTO and Eisenhower Doctrine, had become the bone of contention between the government and RPP opposition. The opposition had claimed that the government could utilize these agreements not only in external relations but also on domestic affairs to secure unfair advantages to itself (Kuneralp, p. 137; Uslu 1994, pp. 98–99). Military officers must have observed these discussions very closely, though they probably were not privy to its content. Indeed, as Tezkan said, 'other officers learned the reason behind the declaration read by Alparslan Türkeş on the morning of the 27—the loyalty declared to NATO and CENTO—later.

Coupists were afraid of US intervention. They thought that there was an agreement between the Democrat Party and the US, a deal that in case of an emergent need US troops would land in Turkey from the south coast" (Y. Tezkan, personal communication, August 6, 2015). They had reasons to have that worry in their chest. "Not long time before the coup there was the nine officers trial, either in 1958. Due to the aborted coup attempt there, it is impossible for the government not to be suspicious of some activity within the military. Hence the government must have wanted to take precaution and make a deal with the Americans" (Y. Tezkan, personal communication). Coupists' worry about a possible US intervention on behalf of Menderes may have been exaggerated (Demirel 2011, p. 364) but for them it was real (Turgut,

p. 90; Yılmaz 2011, p. 251). When Sarper told the coup makers that the USA will not intervene because no such secret clause exists in Turkish—American bilateral agreements, the junta breathed a huge sigh of relief.

When Sarper heard the news of the coup, he told coupists that having been the General Secretary of foreign affairs in prior to the coup he wanted their permission to open the foreign ministry and start communications with the outside world. Sarper still voiced doubts as to 'whether the coup attempt will succeed', implying that without opening communications with the outside world coup success was still not certain at the time (Koçak 2010a, footnote 182, p. 118). Sarper himself said that "he was doubly relieved when he heard the sentence in the memorandum expressing loyalty to NATO and CENTO". He was given the task to tell foreign countries about the objectives of the coup/intervention and make sure that the junta gets fast recognition from external powers (Onuş, p. 166).

Officers considered it so important to get US support on their side or at least ensure their acquiescence that a member of the military junta assured the US Embassy a few hours after the coup at 4:00 a.m. that Turkish Armed Forces was a friend of the United States (Armaoğlu 1996, p. 216; Harris 1972, p. 86). Seyhan, who was sent to Washington for exactly that purpose, says that it was his first job to inform the US officials the very next morning. Since the coup succeeded without letting the government breathe an air, it did not have time to call for external assistance. Even then Seyhan went and informed an US official on duty at the Turkish desk (p. 80).

The post-coup memorandum, which declared allegiance to CENTO and NATO, was repeated in the first Council of Ministers meeting on May 30. It announced that "all military, economic, financial and political agreements Turkey entered into with foreign countries will remain valid and we will show utmost effort to continue friendly relations with all foreign countries" (Akalın, p. 90). The new government was established three days after the coup, on May 30, 1960, and Cemal Gürsel became both the President, Prime Minister and the Chief of General Staff. The first Gürsel government consisted of thirty members, five of which came from the military (Cemal Gürsel, Fahri Özdilek, İhsan Kızıloğlu, Sıtkı Ulay, and Hüseyin Ataman). Three of these, including Gürsel himself, were also members of the National Unity Committee (Koçak 2010a, p. 15). Foreign Minister Sarper reiterated once again the pro-NATO and CENTO orientation of the new government on the Cabinet meeting on

June 1st (Koçak 2010a, footnote 106, p. 97). The government program was read on July 11, 1960 during the General Assembly of the NUC. The program read under the subtitle 'Our foreign policy' that 'for the world to reach fair, sustainable peace on a firm footing, Turkey trusts UN, NATO and CENTO alliances. It declared that

> NATO is a military alliance founded by the Western countries, which were resolute in their efforts to live freely and independently and defend true principles of civilization, in the spirit of the United Nations Charter. It is our principle to maintain and develop our relations with these friendly and allied nations, to which we have historic and powerful ties and we came closer thanks to Ataturk's reforms, on the basis of equality and sovereignty… Turkey is as much close and loyal to CENTO and CENTO members as it is to NATO and NATO members. CENTO is a defensive alliance established in the spirit of the United Nations Charter to bring peace, security and achieve progress in the Middle East. (Koçak 2010a, pp. 97–98)

The Gürsel government was cautious not to deviate from the Western alliance, particularly in its commitment to the United States on specific policy matters.[6] Before delving into discussing alignment of government policies with the USA, the composition and mindset of the Gürsel government need to be discussed.

Some claimed that the junta was socialist-oriented or that left-oriented military officers overthrew a rightist Democrat Party government (Lincoln 1998, p. 39). One may support this line of argument by pointing out that the military junta demanded that all US-Turkey bilateral agreements, including the secret ones, be clarified, regulated and some concessions were lifted[7] (Melek 1994, p. 106). Indeed, some officers such as Sami Küçük, Suphi Karaman, Ahmet Yıldız, Suphi Gürsoytrak were known to have leftist sympathies (Karavelioğlu, p. 90). However, as Sami Küçük (himself named as a leftist member of the

[6]The financial hardships forced their hand anyway; When the Cabinet decided on the price it would pay to buy farmers' grain but projected that *Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi* (Turkish Grain Board) would run a shortage of funds, the shortage would be paid by the US (Koçak 2010a, p. 129).

[7]A member of the CNU, Sıtkı Ulay, later even regretted touching on these bilateral agreements and wished that they never did anything to upset the US (Ulay 1996, p. 84–85).

coup committee), pointed out grudgingly, "two members of the NUC enrolled as members at 'Association to Fight Communism' founded at the Turkish National Assembly and another member disgusted the word 'social' so much that he does not even want to say sausage (*sosis*)" (Küçük, p. 154).

Some Cabinet members had distrust towards the Russians deep-down. When President, Commander-in-Chief and Prime Minister Cemal Gürsel deplored the outgoing Democrat Party administration for financial, economic and moral woes in the country, he thought that if they let the Russians [read communists] take over the country the extent of the damage would be no less (Koçak 2010a, p. 292). Sıtkı Ulay himself told Rijov that Turks' religious beliefs and love for freedom would never allow them to become communists and it is always hard for them to forget the Soviet demands for bases and land (Ulay, n.d., p.183). The Gürsel Cabinet even discussed whether the concept of 'social justice' should be in the new constitution on April 3, 1961. The Justice Minister thought that it may be wise to soften this wording a little, though other ministers and bureaucrats argued against any change and dispelled fears that the concept may lead westerners (inside and outside) to believe Turkey was going communist (Koçak 2010b, pp. 1006–1010).

The new government also realized by the time that some state enterprises were running large losses. Yet, at the same time some large investments could not just be funded by private capital. The state must have sponsored these investments. The second Gürsel Cabinet even discussed among themselves the anxiety this created in the USA and IMF, in particular if Turkey was embracing all-out communist-style statism. In order to resolve issues, the Cabinet also spoke about these fears in the West in its Cabinet Meeting on September 15, 1960. Sarper said that 'when they said they were a 'social state' everybody in the West feared that Turkey was becoming socialist. He advised that they should dispel these fears as soon as possible (Koçak 2010a, pp. 461–462).

Although "for the first time, Turkish policymakers were able to get a handle on the extent of ties with the US" (Karasapan 1989), "the overthrow of the Democrat Party regime in 1960 did not immediately usher in changes in Turkey's foreign relations (Harris 1985, pp. 185–186). Although Numan Esin claimed that Turkey's support for Algeria against France, land reform, and developing relations with the Soviets after the coup show a leftist tendency in the NUC (Esin, p. 138), "the military government which took power in 1960… brought no important changes

in Turkey's relations with NATO except for a change of tone" (Gönlübol 1975, p. 22).

In addition, the land reform itself may point at the opposite of what Esin claimed for the coup and later orientation of the NUC. One must think comparatively here, especially how the United States had demanded from the Free Officers in Egypt a quick land reform so that communism would be stopped from feasting on the deprived peasantry and land redistribution would prevent communism. Only a few weeks after the USA conveyed this wish to the Revolutionary Command Council in Egypt, the military government in Egypt issued an agricultural reform law (Kandil, p. 25). It is interesting in this regard that Minister of Transportation, Sıtkı Ulay, himself a military general before the coup, defended a land reform in Turkey, and while doing so referred to the land reform in Egypt as an example to be emulated (Koçak 2010a, p. 302). In a nutshell, the prevalent mood that characterized the official policy, whether in economic relations or otherwise, of the post-coup government is hidden in the following key sentence uttered by İhsan Kızıloğlu, the Minister of the Interior: "if the offer comes from the United States it should not give us concern for the future. Yet if it comes from the Soviets, it must be feared" (Kızıloğlu cited in Koçak 2010a, p. 551).

The first major policy area in which the post-coup government found themselves in a position to compromise from their stance was the issue of the Turkish contingent in Korea. Several coupist officers had shared the feeling that it had been the past government's mistake to send Turkish soldiers to Korea. In fact, the Democrat Party's decision to dispatch soldiers to Korea had been a dividing subject within the military (Subaşı, p. 17). Therefore, one of the very first moves the new military authorities made was to stop a brigade ready to set sail for Korea. However, as Numan Esin admitted, "since they did not want to harm relations with the USA, which would be a misguided move in terms of the tactic and policy of the coup, they still sent a company to Korea" (Esin, p. 55). This issue appeared on the Cabinet agenda on July 2. Apparently, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had invited the Turkish Ambassador and asked him if the new government's reduction of Turkish troops committed to Korea meant a change of Turkish policy toward the West. Selim Sarper repeated this to the Cabinet and remarked to other members of the Cabinet that "they needed the United States. They had to manage the U.S. demands for at least a while. If they did not satisfy US demands and hurt their

sensitivities at this time, they will be hurting themselves. They needed the US at least until they get ready to stand on their own feet" (Koçak 2010a, pp. 259–260). Luckily for the post-coup government though, the CIA did not think the Turkish decision to decrease Turkey's contingent in Korea to a company as indication of weakening Turkish commitment to the Western Alliance (Short-Term Prospects for Turkey 1960, p. 4).

Soviet Overtures Turned Down

About a month after the May 27 coup, on 28 June, Soviet leader Khruschev wrote to President Gürsel about their bitter frustration over Turkey's NATO membership, the U-2 reconnaissance flights from Turkey, and the agreement over installation of Jupiter missiles in Turkey. He made an indirect threat over the superiority of Soviet military power and invited Turkey to drop NATO membership and approach the Soviets instead. The military government rejected this offer (Girgin 2007, pp. 72–73). The same Soviet invitation was repeated by the Soviet Ambassador Rijov. He visited the head of the NUC and the NUC members, including Türkeş, who he thought was most influential and reiterated the Soviet offer to shift Turkey's axis (Gökmen, pp. 342–343). Turkey's response to Khruschev was sent on July 8. Gürsel wrote that "they were pleased to learn that the Soviets now dropped their claims for bases and Turkish land. He noted that for defense expenditures to fall a comprehensive disarmament was necessary but until that occurred Turkey will maintain its defense alliance with the West. Besides, Turkey's foreign policy orientation was drawn by Ataturk. Balkan and Saadabad Pacts show this very clearly" (Kuneralp, p. 162). On July 18, Kuneralp invited the US Ambassador and gave him copies of these exchanges between Khruschev and Gürsel (Kuneralp, p. 162). Rijov was partly successful in his efforts to access the NUC members. He did have an encounter at a reception with Sami Küçük, a NUC member, who advised Rijov that, if he wanted to normalize Turkish—Soviet relations, which Küçük thought was needed and possible, to invite a Turkish parliamentary group to Moscow. Rijov made the invitation and after some time passed the mutual visits took place (Küçük, pp. 161–162).

This did not mean, however, any shift in Turkey's axis. Several examples may show that the government rejected many Soviet offers and advice in order just not to ruffle US and Western feathers. First of all, although the post-coup financial outlook was dismal, the government rejected the Soviets' US$500 million aid offer (Ulay, n.d., p. 182; Turgut, p. 222). In addition, when companies involved in oil-drilling

around Turkey started to leave Turkey around early June 1960 and US oil advisors advised Cihat İren, the Minister of Industry, not to worry, the Cabinet still rejected the Soviet Ambassador's offer that Soviet experts might come and assist in this venture (Koçak 2010a, pp. 191–192). It is worth mentioning that US experts also advised the Turkish Central Bank (Koçak 2010, vol. 1, p. 193). The Gürsel government was so concerned about the US reaction that when the government rejected a US offer of investment for a second Iron and Steel Industry [Demir-Çelik Fabrikası] because it lacked the resources to pay the amount back to USA in four years, the cabinet tasked the Foreign Ministry to find out the US reaction to such a schemr (p. 127). Moreover, the military regime founded radio stations in Eastern Anatolia to counter the Soviet propaganda. This showed, according to Weiker, that the coup did not pose any threat to the USA (1963, p. 159).

It is also important to note here that the head of *Milli Amale Hizmeti* (the then name of the Turkish Intelligence service) raised the names of seven young captains within the National Unity Committee, who they thought were in contact with the communists, to the committee heading *Emniyet Kontrol Koordinasyon Servisi* (the Security Control and Coordination Service). Although Esin found the accusation exaggerated (2005, p. 137), the incident evidences continuing surveillance activity against communism and communists after the May 27 coup. It can be said that this stance continued into the second Gürsel government. This time the Minister of Industry, Şahap Kocatopçu, paid a friendly visit to his counterparts in four major Western powers (Italy, France, the UK, and Germany). The German Minister of the Economy asked him if the Soviets offered any assistance after the coup. Kocatopçu replied that "the Soviets are offering assistance in ways and amounts we would never imagine. Yet, we give appropriate responses to these offers with the full consciousness and responsibility of our membership in the western world and thus we try to manage the situation. However, in addition to these assistance offers, they are keeping us under perpetual pressure with their radio broadcasts on the north on economic issues and Arabic radios on the religious issues" (Koçak 2010b, p. 984). In the meantime, the first Gürsel Cabinet had complained that the US military aid had fallen from 630 million *lira* in 1959 to 500 million *lira* in 1960 (Koçak 2010a, p. 148). The new Cabinet also criticized the substance of US military assistance, which they claimed consisted of old, worn-out weapons and when, for instance, rifles arrive no bullets existed for them to be operational (Koçak 2010a, p. 154).

However, the USA made this up with a larger amount of economic aid the same year (Koçak 2010a, p. 243). In the Cabinet meeting on July 2, 1960, Cihat İren talked once again the Soviet overtures. The Soviet Ambassador repeated their previous invitation for a trade committee to visit Moscow. They also offered to deliver 1,100 tractors, 2,100 trucks, two ships and some other equipment on long-term loans. İren thought that they would have to reject this offer (the government later rejected it; Koçak 2010a, p. 369), but in doing so they may have to reject the invitation for the ten-member trade committee. Iren thought that such a visit to the Soviets could be the least significant of 'concessions' Turkey can afford to give. The other Soviet offers included sending their experts to Turkey's Karabük Iron and Steel Factory and asking the new government what sort of land regime they were planning. Iren was certain that none of the attendants in the cabinet meeting would agree to allow the Soviet experts to enter the Turkish homeland. He described these Russian offers and invitations as "aggressive Soviet proposals" (Koçak 2010a, pp. 254–256). The Interior Minister, Foreign Minister, Sıtkı Ulay and Cihat İren all thought in the same direction and they were very wary of Soviet intentions. All wanted to draw and maintain a strict line that they would not cross in Turkey's relations with the Soviets (Koçak 2010a, p. 256).

Commitment Proven

A ministerial-level meeting for the reorganization of OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) allowed an encounter with high-level Western politicians and military generals and showed the ease with which Cabinet members communicated with their counterparts and also their devotion to the West. Sarper met NATO General Secretary, whom he had known for the last fourteen years, and NATO SACEUR Lauris Norstad. In his meeting with Spaak, Sarper assured NATO Secretary General about Turkey's Western orientation in external relations. He clarified with him the reduction of troops to Korea and overtures by the Soviet Ambassador. Spaak said that as long as Turkey's relations with the Soviets took place within a NATO framework and were peripheral to its foreign relations, there was nothing wrong with it. Spaak also wanted to meet Cihat İren and Ekrem Alican and advised the three about the merits and advantages of majoritarian election system

as opposed to proportional representation. Spaak advised against partisanship in governmental affairs and suggested that the military regime stays for two years, which was rejected by Sarper. Sarper met Norstad as well upon the suggestions by President and Commander-in-Chief Cemal Gürsel. It was in this meeting that General Norstad wanted to visit Cemal Gürsel and converse with him in person. Both Spaak and Norstad told Sarper that "external impressions about your country, your revolution, National Unity Committee, and your government are excellent Please do not blemish it… The United States would like to help you and it will. Turkey's credibility in the US was higher before and it is high now. This increases your chances" (Koçak 2010a, pp. 409–411). When Norstad came to Turkey and met Gürsel, he promised Gürsel that he would go back to Washington and engage in follow-up meetings with high-level officials to conclude the necessary deals as if he was Turkey's national representative in the country (Koçak 2010a, p. 411).

The new government continued to profess loyalty to the West three months after the coup. Selim Sarper met the US Secretary of State at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly to soothe overseas concerns. An update on Turkish—Soviet relations was asked from Sarper and he told his audience that nothing developed since Khruschev and Gürsel's exchange of letters. The new government thought that there was a safe area where they could have neighborly relations with the Soviets ("Memorandum of Conversation" 1960, September 21). In any case of suspicion of leftism in the post-coup government, "the revolutionary and western attitude of the NUC eliminated the concerns of the western bloc and the fact that May 27 was an expected coup it facilitated relations between the allies" (Karavelioğlu 2007, pp. 90–91).

The process of securing external support was a dynamic one. As the USA was responding to the new rulers, the new rulers tried hard not to break the mood. The second Gürsel government tried hard to not to do anything that could seriously upset the Turkish—American relationship. In the Cabinet meeting on February 13, 1961, Selim Sarper broached an important issue that could sour Turkey's foreign relations with the West and therefore needed to be addressed. He mentioned a radio broadcast titled 'Olaylar ve Yankıları' [Events and their Echoes] ran by a first lieutenant with connections to the National Unity Committee. The government lacked control over its content and style and the issue became a point of contention between the government and the NUC.

The issue continued to occupy the Council of Ministers meeting on February 14. Deputy Prime Minister İhsan Kızıloğlu, who chaired the meeting in the absence of President Cemal Gürsel, said that the foreign-policy related content of this radio broadcast should be reviewed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the show is aired. Kızıloğlu was particularly disturbed by the use of some inappropriate words during this broadcast. For instance, the broadcast declared Turkey's position as "neutralist" toward events in Congo, which was trying to win its independence from Belgium and the nationalist leader Lumumba was later assassinated in Western complicity. Foreign Minister Sarper nodded in agreement: "We may be neutral toward Lumumba but the broadcast went beyond this and said 'Lumumba is now sent to prison as if slurs and tortures done to him until now are not enough'." The broadcast is reported to have said also that "the reconciliation plan offered by Kennedy administration was welcomed by all the remaining neutralist states other than Belgium and the Soviets", implying, according to Turkish government, that Turkey was a neutral state. Cihat Baban, *Minister* of Press, Publishing and *Tourism,* who was responsible from the radio broadcast, said that the person in charge of the broadcast was left-oriented, but should not be allowed to run it as he wished because this could damage Turkey's external relations (Koçak 2010b, pp. 891–897).

The post-coup financial outlook was very gloomy and, as emphatically argued before, the new post-coup government needed to deliver to sustain its legitimacy. Representatives of the National Unity Committee started knocking the doors of State Department officials to request $20 million aid in Contingency Funds as early as June 2, 1960 (Carver 2011, p. 306). The US Ambassador in Ankara recommended the Department to provide $10 million as Defense Support Aid to "show support for the 'interim' government that might provide some measure of economic and political stability… State Department judged the Embassy's recommendations as politically justifiable: a complete rejection of Turkey's aid request might suggest the U.S. harbored no sympathy for the present government and promote resentment. Some measure of aid would 'demonstrate a desire to help Turkey generally and avoid the implication, drawn in the past in Turkey, that we were supporting a just a single political party'" (Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies cited in Carver 2011, pp. 306–307).

The government was also in talks with the IMF, with the full awareness that their relationship with the USA and talks with the IMF and

the World Bank were not mutually exclusive matters.[8] This was crucial because as a former Chief of General Staff Özkök said decades later "… when a revolution [*ihtilal*] is staged, this comes to the agenda in certain international institutions. When it does, somebody has to give you [the coupists] protection, for instance the World Bank, the IMF, etc. If you fail to find someone in these international institutions to protect you, they will immediately bring down your economy and you will therefore fail (Özkök 2012, pp. 12–14). On the Cabinet meeting on July 7, 1961, Selim Sarper informed the Cabinet about the balance of payments deficit the government was running. The government urgently needed US$34 million. And they were in contact with the IMF. But Sarper also met the US Ambassador who told him that "they were getting information about the talks between the government and the IMF. Ambassador Warren said that reducing interest rates would help in the negotiations." Sarper asked if the US directly could give US$40 million to Turkey to cover this deficit; if the IMF gave a similar amount in the meantime so much the better (Koçak 2010a, p. 266). The Minister of Finance, Ekrem Alican, stated that the IMF and the ICA (International Cooperation Administration) requested balance of payment estimates. According to Alican, these two bodies were in complete agreement with the government on the financial measures necessary but "they want to see more of the color of the new government" (Koçak 2010a, pp. 266–267).

In talks with the IMF officials, Cabinet members noted the positive mood these officials had about Turkey and the developments (Koçak 2010a, p. 309). The first Turkish government after the coup wanted complete restructuring of Turkish economy and was more than ready to work on it in cooperation with the IMF. They knew that it was necessary to do this to get financial aid (Koçak 2010a, p. 310). The Cabinet members even agreed among themselves to arrange a meeting

[8]The Cabinet thought that the World Bank was the IMF's 'sister' (Koçak 2010a, p.312) and they were acting as a US tool to either support or punish the new government (Koçak 2010a, p. 267). Şefik İnan thought that it was a big mistake for the Democrat Party to disappoint the World Bank. The new government must not let this new opportunity to slip away and reconcile with the World Bank accordingly, which had enormous advantages to offer (Koçak 2010a, p. 312). Pakistani generals had the same awareness. Because the USA was a superpower during the Cold War, other powers and institutions were attuned to signals emanating from it. If the USA cut military aid and went public with their decision do so, this would generate unfavorable response from other agencies such as the IMF (Ghani 2010, p. 241).

between President Cemal Gürsel and IMF official Ernest Sturc, Deputy Director European Department, International Monetary Fund, so that the latter could see how different Gürsel, and in his personality the new government, was from the Democrat Party leaders (Koçak 2010a, p. 311). Sarper mentioned that he knew that the Chief of the World Bank was very influential in the United States, so much so that "he can hamper or facilitate every interest/work we have with the United States" (Koçak 2010a, p. 313). In the end, the State Department ended up approving the US$34 million requested by the military government in order to "to encourage Turkey to continue pursuing economic policies to promote national development, to create a development planning institution and to avoid requesting bilateral loans from Italy, Germany, and other European powers" (as cited in Carver 2011, p. 307).

Appointment of Foreign Minister

The junta considered it important to appoint Selim Sarper, whose image in military circles in Ankara and diplomatic circles abroad was very positive. Sarper had been head of Turkish delegation to the UN for many years and was a well-known and reputed diplomat (Girgin 2007, p. 70; Yirmibeşoğlu 1999a, p. 303). According to Metin Tamkoç, "the appointment of Selim R. Sarper as the first minister of Foreign Affairs of General Cemal Gürsel implied that the Committee of National Unity was to rely on expert counsel and experience of a well-known and highly respected professional diplomat who has had a distinguished diplomatic career" (1976, p. 62; see also Girgin 1998, p. 62). The very presence of Selim Sarper and his becoming the Foreign Minister helped the U.S. Embassy, which did not immediately figure out the relationship between Gürsel, National Unity Committee and military. The Embassy did not know very well the principal figures involved in the coup either. Thanks to Sarper and information he provided, the U.S. Embassy decided that it had no reason to worry about international orientation of the new post-coup government.

It is also possible that the Committee removed Melih Esenbel from his post as Turkey's Ambassador to Washington four months after the coup because they doubted Esenbel's loyalty to the revolution. Dündar Seyhan, who was a military attaché in the Embassy before the coup, wrote in his memoirs that in addition to the fact that Esenbel was not as likeable as his predecessor Hayri Ürgüplü, he received a letter from

another military attaché colleague of his in the Embassy, who did not think Esenbel was the right person to be 'ambassador of the revolutionary government'. The letter reported Esenbel claiming that the coup government would have hardship in receiving similar amounts of aid from the US as Menderes government had. It also insinuated that if the new government wanted U.S. aid, it better replaced its Ambassador in Washington, which the government did in October 1960 (Seyhan, p. 84).

Sarper was not the only source of the information the US. Embassy Ankara had though. The Cabinet [1st Gürsel Cabinet] accommodated some very good friends of the United States [Cihat İren and Koper] ("Letter From the Ambassador to Turkey (Warren)" 1960, August 11). The British Embassy too were particularly glad that Selim Sarper as a very well-known face was appointed as the Foreign Minister after the coup. The British Under-Secretary of state, Sir F. H. Miller became "delighted that an old friend and trusted colleague should occupy the post of Foreign Ministry in the new government" (Göktepe 2000, pp. 175–176). Sarper's appointment as the Foreign Minister was key because "from the moment he was appointed Sarper became the administrators of NUC's foreign policy in accordance with directives provided by Cemal Gürsel". It was later better understood, however, that Sarper often took personal initiatives on foreign policy issues. There is no doubt that Sarper at the helm of Foreign Ministry provided a big comfort for the shocked U.S. Embassy" (Karavelioğlu, p. 88). The British Embassy in Ankara was able to get "the secrets of the new government" from Sarper, including the rifts and inner conflicts within the National Unity Committee and larger military (Göktepe 2000, pp. 176, 185).

The US Role

Except Sıtkı Ulay, the putschists have always denied US support and encouragement (Akalın, p. 159; see also Yetkin 2006, pp. 87–89; Turgut 1995, p. 207; Kaplan 2012, p. 33; also Soyuyüce 2012, p. 26; Faik 2012; Küçük 2008, p. 156; Esin 2005, p. 91; Karavelioğlu, pp. 66, 88; Erkanlı 1987, p. 223). Only Ulay mentioned in passing in his second memoir that 'perhaps even the Americans knew about the coup' (in addition to some civilians working for Turkish Police) because at a reception hosted by Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu about two weeks in prior to the coup in Ankara the US military attaché told Ulay that 'he

knew something will happen' and 'asked Ulay only when it will happen exactly' (Ulay 1996, p. 57). According to other officers in categorical denial of US fore-knowledge of the coup, the coup caught the USA by surprise because the US officers in Ankara used to be in contact with the Turkish General Staff but not junior and mid-ranking officers. The Chief of General Staff Rüştü Erdelhun and Chief of Turkish Intelligence Celal Tevfik told the US Embassy officials that the coup risk is null. "They did not know that you cannot command a bull by its horns" (Yıldız, pp. 82–83), meaning that US officials were mistaken to think that they could learn about the Turkish army from the senior pro-DP generals only. Only very recently, Yılmaz Tezkan reported that Mustafa Kaplan, one of the NUC members, started to have musings, several decades after the coup, about whether it was the United States that created the political environment that then led us to move against the government (Y. Tezkan, personal communication)

Whether the United States knew about the May 27 coup in advance and, if they did, from which sources, have remained a mystery waiting to be solved still. In this section, we will try to provide an answer based on the declassified US archives and other sources available. The US predictions on the future of the Democrat Party government had changed drastically from 1958 to 1959. In a National Intelligence Estimate in 1958, the Eisenhower Administration did not predict that "… these troubles [in Turkey] will lead to a revolutionary situation between now and the next elections, which are not due before late 1961. Barring drastic economic deterioration or extreme political provocations, the chance of a military coup remains slight" (National Intelligence Estimate 1958, December 30). Yet, the political turmoil got far worse the very next year. In his meeting with PM Menderes on April 23 US Ambassador Warren told 'Menderes that Turkish government did not need US advice on how to handle the escalating crisis and promised to do everything in his power to prevent his administration from getting involved in Turkey's domestic affairs. Warren made it clear to Menderes that he was speaking from the status of a friend of Turkey' (quoted in Pelt 2014, p. 170). Although the US Embassy in Ankara sent out more assuring, Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA, was far more skeptical about the future course of events. He said at the 442d meeting of the NSC on April 28 that

> Since early 1960 the opposition party in Turkey, the Republican People's Party of ex-President Ismet Inonu, has been increasingly oppressed by

> the government. Some questions have arisen as to the validity of the last election in Turkey, although the situation is not as bad as it was in Korea. The Turkish Government has now appointed a committee to investigate subversive activities. This committee, exercising wide powers, has been moving against Inonu and his party. Mr. Dulles felt this problem required careful consideration by the US Government in the future. The Turkish Army was probably behind the government; however, there was a strong popular feeling in favor of Inonu. Unless constitutional procedures are more carefully followed in Turkey, a situation similar to that now existing in Korea might develop. The Inonu Party may attempt demonstrations at the time or the NATO Council Meeting in Istanbul. (Editorial Note 357, p. 1076)

The Department of State sent a cable on May 1 to the acting Secretary of State Christian Herter, who had taken over the post from hospitalized John Foster Dulles on April 1959, came to Turkey to attend NATO foreign ministers' meeting in İstanbul on May 4. While the Western press was far more skeptical of the wisdom in convening the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Istanbul because it would mean endorsement of DP's undemocratic policies (AK Devrim 1960, pp. 13–16, 30, 33–34), the State Department recommended in the cable that the United States government should stay clear of what was Turkey's internal affair and approach the Turkish domestic tumult "… as part of uneven progress to be expected in political evolution of young democracy" ("Telegram from the Department of State to Secretary of State Herter" 1960, May 1).

In probably an in-house evaluation of eventful Turkey, the State Department was worried that the opposition to the DP could decide to underground and destabilize the regime through 'civil disobedience'. The fact that as of May 1, armed forces seemed loyal to the government, it was yet only students who went on streets to protest the government and anti-American element was lacking from the demonstrations assuaged the State Department's fears (cited in Pelt, p. 171). In an interview four weeks before the coup in Turkey, Senator Fulbright, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, showed signs of frustration with the DP's authoritarian turn but not only denied attributing this outcome to the US aid, but was also of the same opinion that the situation did not require the USA to intervene (AK Devrim 1960, pp. 19–20).

Here the acting Secretary of State's visit to İstanbul in the middle of growing unrest in Turkey and when even PM Menderes was unable to attend the NATO meeting for domestic instability may be seen as a

strong signal of support to the Menderes government. Dulles surprisingly thought a week later that the senior military leadership would be able to cool things down in Turkey. His impression may have been strengthened by the discussion of potential asylum for the leaders of the Republican People's Party in the US Embassy (Dulles' remarks in Editorial Note, FRUS: 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, p. 1080). Amid the tensions, Foreign Minister Zorlu met the US Ambassador Warren. The US Ambassador told Zorlu about the Embassy's intention not to get involved in the domestic political affairs (Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State 1960, May 6, p. 1082).

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Charles P. Cabell, said in his presentation to the 406th Meeting of the National Security Council on May 13, 1959 that "the Democratic Party is restricting the activities of the major opposition party, the popularity of which is increasing. Criticism of the government is growing and riots and other disturbances are becoming more frequent. The opposition party maintains that the government is trying to have Mr. Inonu lynched. The Turkish Defense Minister recently remarked that the military leaders may have to intervene if the tension continues. If Inonu were killed, a revolt could take place in Turkey" (339. Editorial Note, FRUS: 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, p. 1040).

The meeting between the RPP representatives and the Embassy as reported by Ambassador Warren was not the only such encounter between the civilian opposition and the Embassy. Warren had already had lunch with İnönü in April. Though we lack the contents of this significant meeting reported by Gunn, we know that the US Embassy learned through these contacts with the RPP that the opposition deemed the two weeks of May to be very critical for the fate of the unrest and that the RPP had expected a positive, *pro-opposition signal* from the Embassy (Gunn 2015, p. 119). The Embassy continued to meet several people from the RPP and deduced from these conversations that "RPP would obviously like some statement from USG [US Government] disassociating itself from present government repressive measures. Kirca proposed suspension economic assistance, while Okyar frankly stated this appeared going too far but he feared for complete harmony future Turk/American relations if the USA would not at least in public statement express (A) concern over recent public demonstrations and (B) hope that solution could be found in free elections" (Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State 1960, May 10, 1960, p. 1084).

Finally, in a telegram to the Department of State, the Embassy in Ankara reiterated the RPP's request for encouraging signals from the Americans. "… the party [the RPP] sought, and anticipated, a statement from the US government condemning the repressive measures of the Menderes government" (cited in Gunn 2015, p. 119). In fact, the opposition had begun its efforts to elicit a positive signal to their efforts months earlier. In a long letter Ambassador Warren had sent Secretary of State Herter on December 16, 1959, the Ambassador said that "[…] The Opposition is unhappy because it has not been able to use advantageously either the close American relationship to Turkey or the US Embassy in an open campaign against the Menderes administration" (quoted in Pelt 2014, p. 165). However, regardless of the Embassy's handling of Turkish opposition requests before the coup, "the [American] decision to stand aside might be interpreted as a tacit green light to the Turkish military" (Pelt, p. 138).

In its reporting from Ankara the US Embassy relied on senior Turkish military officers whose firm support for the Democrat Party continued: "GOT, Turkish people, USA as Turkish ally, and entire West could be thankful for excellent work done by Turkish Army and General Erdelhun. I made clear that without Erdelhun we might have had an entirely different and *most unfavorable* situation existing today" (italic is mine) (Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 1960, May 6, p. 1082). Ambassador Warren met Prime Minister Menderes on May 20 and reported from his conversation that the political situation was under control thanks in large part to the military. The entire show came down to İnönü but, according to Warren, İnönü's term of influence was over. "İnönü too old have anything value offer present Turk Army. Army will not become anti-American or Arabian. It knows its role Turkish society and will play that role to letter" (Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State 1960, May 20, p. 1087).

When the cadets at the War College poured in the streets to protest the government on May 21, this time Warren reported in telegram 2673 from Ankara on May 23 that he had been in daily contact with the Chief of the Turkish Army Staff who insisted that the army was non-political and would continue to support the Government of Turkey (364. Editorial Note, FRUS: 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, p. 1088). The CIA recognized the similarity between the road to the fall of Syngman Rhee in South Korea in April 1960 and the convolutions in

Turkey in a message to the National Security Council. The CIA seems to have been aware that upper ranks were faithful to the Menderes government whereas junior and mid-ranking officers posed a danger. The events themselves could lead, in CIA's estimation, to a situation where the armed forces may be forced to take over (cited in Pelt, p. 172). Allen Dulles was more alerted by the situation as of May 24. He saw it far better that the Turkish Army was divided between senior officers who remained loyal to the government and junior officers some of whom were against the government. The most troubling issue was that PM Menderes did not seem aware of the extent of discontent. It was no longer a remote possibility that the Turkish army would take over (364. Editorial Note, p.1088). Even the very next day, May 25, at a meeting of Operations Coordinating Board, participants was still at a wondering stage if "there is more than meets the eye" to developments in Turkey before they made the decision. They decided, however, that they still did not require to employ assets represented on the OCB still by this date (cited in Gunn 2015, p. 122).

Returning back to the question of US foreknowledge about the coup, although the FBI tapped foreign embassy telephones in Washington in the summer of 1958 and it continued to do so after without admitting to anyone outside the US intelligence circles (O'Connell and Loeb, p. 8), there was little chance that the USA could covertly learn about a coup plot in Turkey this way because neither the Turkish Embassy in Washington was involved in the coup nor Ambassador Esenbel, who was said to be close to Democrat Party government, would conspire with the putschists.[9] There is no information if Ambassador Esenbel's predecessor, Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, was involved at any stage in the conspiracy. It is possible that the United States intensified its intelligence gathering efforts in Turkey after Same Kuşçu, who had tipped off the authorities about a coup plot within the armed forces, ran off from police detention and took refuge in the US Embassy in 1958 (İpekçi and Coşar, p. 84). We lack the records to find this out, however. Even if the US agencies ramped up their intelligence efforts, they may still have failed to learn much about the coup plot.

[9]Turkish Ambassador to Washington Suat Hayri Ürgüplü was transferred to Madrid in December 1959. The new ambassador was Melih Esenbel, whom Seyhan, a military attaché attached to the Embassy at the time, did not like (Seyhan 1966, p. 75).

Military-to-Military Proximity

Several scholars too rejected the claim that the USA knew about the coup in advance (Akalın, pp. 160, 284; Hale, p. 323). Christopher Gunn recently tried to revise this claim in his article. According to him, the USA was not clueless about the coup. The USA was able to guess that something was in the offing and Ambassador Warren was not as ignorant of developments as he is assumed in the literature (Gunn 2015, pp. 103–139). "the United States was advised of the high probability of a military takeover in Turkey" (Gunn 2015, p. 138). Yet Gunn does not cite any document that actually tells us who advised the Ambassador and exactly what was the nature of the advice. In stark contrast, according to Parker T. Hart, who was Deputy Assistant Secretary at the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs (1958–1961) at the time of the coup:

> Turkey in 1960 had an *upheaval*. The military took over the government. *The embassy was caught short on this surprise event and it was realized in Washington that reporting out of the embassy had been very deficient*. Doug Dillon, who was the Under Secretary, i.e., number two in the Department, went out on a special reconnaissance trip to see why we had not had reports of the developing crisis. *Reports had been pretty rosy. He found that, starting with Ambassador Fletcher Warren, all the top positions were occupied by people who had no experience in that area or even in the Middle East…* Doug Dillon, exploring the matter in greater depth, became incensed that we should have such poor representation from the standpoint of experience. *They were perfectly fine officers, but were just out of their depth. Dillon wanted to fire Fletcher Warren but he didn't. Instead he fired his number two, whose name I can't remember*. Fletcher Warren, in due time, was retired and replaced by seasoned veteran Raymond A. Hare. (Hart 1998, p. 67, italics added; see also Helseth 2001, p. 20)

Gunn, probably unaware of the above account by Hart, tried to exonerate Ambassador Warren (2015, p. 120). However, Daniel Newberry, who was Economic/Commercial Officer at the Consulate General in İstanbul (1952–1956) but not present in the Consulate at the time of the coup, said about Fletcher Warren that he "was really a "Latin America" hand… he was really "out of his element" in the Middle East. His idea of being an effective ambassador was to give Prime Minister Menderes whatever he wanted, if it was in the power of the United States government. Ambassador Fletcher Warren did not want

his "constituent posts" reporting things that reflected against Prime Minister Adnan Menderes" (Newberry 2000, p. 39). Gunn also argued that Roger G. Barnes, the counselor at the US Embassy in Ankara, reported *two weeks after* the coup to the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs at the State Department that his group "did not report there was to be a military coup", but somehow they had come to the conclusion that "the Army was fed up and if it had a leader was quite ready to take over" (cited in Gunn 2015, p. 119). Yet he does not cite a single document showing that Barnes and his fellow Embassy officers reported their above assessments back to Washington *before* the coup. Therefore, their post-coup communication to Washington therefore remains more as *affidavits* rather than Embassy notifications about an impending coup.

Truly, the coup potentially carried an element of surprise because it was staged by mid-ranking officers. As a US diplomat observed, "it's hard to get a handle on what is going on in the lower ranks" (Matthews 1998). As Esin argued, "we were very young officers. They did not have relations with us. It was not possible for them to know us. Perhaps they knew the generals but I cannot imagine they would have tight relations with General Cemal Gürsel. General Gürsel did not demonstrate a Western outlook… Perhaps they might have contacted Fahri Özdilek but he had no role in the revolution. From my perspective, the coup came as surprise to the Americans although they were very well established in the country" (Esin, p. 173).

The US Ambassador to Turkey, Parker T. Hart (1965–1968), who was also the Deputy Assistant Secretary at the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs (1958–1961) a few years earlier, enjoyed excellent relations with the top military commanders, especially General Sunay (Deputy Chief of General Staff as of September 1959) and General Tural, *even before he became the ambassador* (Hart 1998, p. 107). Hart does not divulge what he was able and did learn from these generals about the May 27 coup when he was in the State Department's section tasked with watching events in Turkey, but his point supports Esin's that the USA had good access to the senior generals, but perhaps not mid-ranking officers. Even at the level of generals, it seems, the US Embassy enjoyed better relations with the Navy and Air Force but not the Land Forces "because those fellows had more exposure to American training. A lot of their men had gone to the United States and had been trained for periods of a year or more in the United States. Some had been there

longer than that. They usually picked up a lot of English as well as technical education" (Hart 1998, p. 107).

In claiming that the USA had nothing to do with the coup, Nazar claims that as he arrived in Ankara in December 1959, the US Ambassador Fletcher Warren gathered all Embassy staff and asked them temporarily to halt meeting their contacts during disorder in the country lest the USA be blamed.[10] Nazar complied with the Ambassador and did not meet his friends such as Alparslan Türkeş and Agasi Şen. However, he somehow says that he did not contact his friends when in Ankara because he wanted to prevent people to claim that the CIA was linked to the 'event' (Altaylı, p. 351). One wonders how he knew that there was to be an event that the CIA could get linked to even before the 'event', the coup, actually happened? It is certain that Nazar did not show the same level of sensitivity about Warren's request after the coup, as he reported a meeting Alparslan Türkeş ten days after the coup based on some sort of odd coincidence where he ran into Türkeş' daughters when walking near the General Staff Headquarters in Ankara (Altaylı, pp. 353–354). He also reports that he was told in a meeting with some Turkish officers, who had left the army, in the house of "an American lady, who had settled in Ankara years ago, could speak Turkish very well, and was an admirer of Turks and Turkish culture to the point of being Turkified", that it was Türkeş who read the coup memorandum the day earlier (Altaylı, p. 353).

Although we lack definitive archives to confirm, the US reaction to the *identity of the* coupists, however, could hardly have an element of surprise given the degree to which the United States penetrated the Turkish military over the 1950s (Adamson 1998, p. 15; also Gunn, pp. 105, 107–108). This background had already been discussed previously. US officials and officers could and did visit very comfortably every military unit from the late 1940s to the year of the coup (Yamak, 84–88, 133),

[10]A similar warning would later be circulated among the staff in the US Embassy in Islamabad amid chaos in the country with claims of widespread rigging in the 1977 elections and the following nosedive in US relations with Bhutto government. Political officers were ordered to cease seeing and meeting their contacts from the opposition lest PM Bhutto would use them to support his accusations against US government of targeting him and his government. One political officer did not abide by the order and got penalized accordingly while the CIA is reportedly was not a rogue element and followed the order. See Constable (1998, p. 33).

a privilege that sometimes disturbed junior officers (Subaşı, p. 64). As pointed out by Numan Esin himself, "the US had deeply penetrated Turkey with first and foremost Turkey's participation in the Korean war and then Turkey's NATO membership. It cherry picked Turkey's young officers and took them to the States for education and training. US officers were largely active in Turkish brigades and divisions for reorganization and education of Turkish army. The US' area of influence surpassed the military realm in Turkey" (Esin, p. 172; Karavelioğlu, p. 66).

In thinking about whether the USA was caught flatfooted, other factors must also be taken into account. Taking our cues from the level of US involvement in Turkish military education and training in Turkey and the USA as well as what the USA sought from this relationship—biographical information, which was far more significant in those years than we may now imagine with the improvement in media and communication—it is *highly likely*, but not certainly, that they were very familiar with officers involved in the coup. In other words, the coup may have come as a surprise but key figures among the coup makers were not strangers.

A mechanism for the US to have some biographical knowledge of officers involved in the coup was through US officers in JUSMMAT. The Turkish General Staff and JUSMMAT personnel worked in very close cooperation. They had been holding planning meetings over the next year's military assistance since the very beginning of JUSMMAT's mission in Turkey. They would negotiate over what equipment Turkey wanted and needed and what could actually be provided. In at least one of these meetings (in May) before the May 27 coup, the Commander of Land Forces Cemal Gürsel, who was on leave, was replaced by Cemal Madanoğlu and the Commander of the Navy Fahri Özdilek was also present (Girgin 2007, p. 67). Colonel Alparslan Türkeş was not a stranger to the US defense establishment and the JUSMMAT people either. He was one of the sixteen Turkish officers who received US training and education in the United States as early as 1948 and became a 'guerilla instructor' in Gelibolu on his return (Hulusi Turgut, pp. 80–81). Türkeş worked as Director of NATO Coordination Branch in the General Secretariat of the Land Forces Command (Elevli, p. 40). It was Colonel Türkeş who worked closely with the JUSMMAT in establishing the *Tactical Mobilization Group* (*Seferberlik Taktik Kurulu*) in the building of the US Aid Delegation inside the JUSMMAT building in Ankara in the early 1950s (Holmes 2014, p. 53). It would be utterly naïve to think that the US military advisors did not acquaint themselves with Türkeş's ideas when he was entrusted with such a critical task. Whether based on knowledge gained from these interactions,

an official CIA estimate for short-term prospects for Turkey noted about two months after the coup that Türkeş, "the most publicized figure" after Cemal Gürsel in the National Union Committee "has been friendly toward the US and West Germany" (Short-Term Prospects for Turkey 1960, p. 1). We also need to note that all 38 members of the National Unity Committee founded after the coup attended US army schools (Memorandum of Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the National Security Council 1960, June 30, p. 1100).[11] Cemal Madanoğlu, Faruk Güventürk, and Suphi Gürsoytırak joined the combat in Korea and lived and fought side by side with the US officers and soldiers.

In addition, we may make an educated assumption that US officers, who had trained and educated Turkish officers in Turkey since 1948, must have weighed Turkish officers in terms of their political views—pro-West, pro-NATO, etc. Turkish officers who wanted to go to the USA for training and education must have been first bright, second spoken English at least a little, and third passed the interview done by JUSMMAT in Ankara (Bayar 2006, pp. 350–351). When they went to the USA for this purpose, their political ideas and inclinations must also have been noted. As Ergin Celasin (personal communication, July 23, 2015) said, "it was always possible that they could have followed you very carefully. After all, we were all young and perhaps some were approached for certain reasons during education and training. Perhaps they were asked to give some piece of information in return for support during his career. They must have noted our proclivities and weaknesses."

After all, as İsmail Hakkı Pekin, the former Chief of Turkish General Staff (Intelligence Division), argued, "when we offer education and training to foreign officers we try to impart to them our ideology as well. They do the same; this is why they would find foreign officers a sponsor family, that family gives you the U.S. culture. They try to win you over this way but of course the result is not guaranteed in this process. They try to know foreign officers better, get biographic information about you to identify you as *Milli Görüşçü, pro-American, an US admirer* etc., follow you and your later career development and when you return to your country they may visit you here, contact you and they may even try to

[11] Ambassador Warren talked about 12 instances of uncooperative attitude shown by the new post-coup government. See his "Letter From the Ambassador to Turkey (Warren) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones)", August 11, 1960, pp. 1123–1124. This view was reiterated in "Statement Of U.S. Policy Toward Turkey", October 5, 1960, pp. 1138, 1139.

get you dismissed from the corps if they do not find you useful in some position" (personal communication, August 26, 2015). Indeed, William A. Helseth, who was the political officer at the US Embassy at the time of the coup, argued in an interview,

> in Turkey, they [those who took over] were known. They announced immediately who they were and that they were in charge. People knew who they were. The general who was in charge, there was no problem in that sense. So, there was not a question of "Well, who is going to come out on top?" They announced that they were going to maintain basic freedoms in Turkey, that foreign relations would continue as before, they would honor all their commitments, treaties, etc. (Helseth, p. 22)

When probed further by the interviewer with the statement that "we did not have a feeling that here was an unsophisticated bunch of people taking over, which often happens. A group which adversely impacts on international commitments and that sort of thing", Helseth replied that

> No, not in that sense. They might not have been "sophisticated" fully in the international political scene, *but they were people who had been around, who had been involved in the decision making for many years. We knew various ones at different levels from the top general of the TGS down to the middle grade officers. There was some contact, but not a lot at the lower levels, of course. But down to the colonel though, we had good contacts. American military had various entree into these groups there.* (p. 22; italics added)

When asked whether "the US Embassy was watching the Turkish military and what they were going to do" Helseth added that

> very closely at the time. We had the military mission there. We had close contacts with the TGS, the Turkish General Staff, that ran the military. Our military people there at the same level, general to general and on down to colonel to colonel, were in close touch with them. We had military officers, younger officers in a language program, and they would be assigned to the country for a year or two to do nothing but improve their language capabilities. That is, they didn't have straight military functions. They were there in a training capacity. So, we had entree at many levels. This doesn't mean we knew exactly what was going to happen when the coup came in 1960, of course, but we did have good contacts in the mid-50s. That continued into the latter part of the '50s, too, with the Turkish military. (Helseth 2001, p. 18)

As stated earlier in the theoretical session with the caveat that foreign military and education training do not turn foreign officers into servants of US interests and instructions, the May 27 putschists did not surrender to the USA after the coup. The US National Security Council, which convened on June 30, 1960, observed after the 1960 coup that "the regime in power is not as pro-Western as the Menderes regime was. Although all members of the National Unity Council [*Milli Birlik Komitesi*] went to US military schools, the US officials did not succeed in establishing close relations with the new regime. As a result, our sources of information are not as good as the Menderes regime (Akalın 2000, p. 192).

We unfortunately lack the information to definitely conclude whether or not the USA had foreknowledge of the coup, but we do know that even if the coup was staged by junior officers, it was not an overly worrisome situation for the USA because of their familiarity with the key military figures involved. Ironically, this also worked out well for the coup makers, as they had been worried about the US response. The fact that there was no bloodshed during the coup helped the coup makers. What the US tried to do under these attenuating circumstances was to ensure that no bloodshed was spilt after the coup, either with death verdicts imposed on the deposed prime minister and two other ministers.

Political Support

A few points can be made before we delve into the subject of how the United States reacted to the coup and how it developed a policy toward the new military government. The US reaction to be elaborated here underscores the importance for coup makers of getting US recognition as early as possible. The declaration of support by the US President in a letter to the new military authority was taken to provide a much-needed veneer of legitimacy. Regarding US diplomatic and political assistance after the coup, mutual visits were accorded importance and provided relief. Financial assistance, even when in meager numbers in comparison to what the USA had provided to the DP government, was key to preserve the financial balance for the new authority.

The US Ambassador, who, as mentioned before, had had experience with Latin American coups, did not hide his admiration for the way and speed the coup was carried out. In a telegram sent out to Washington on the day of the coup, Ambassador Warren offered his very initial

assessment. In line with how the United States evaluated a coup d'état before it extended recognition, Ambassador Warren remarked

> In unusually well organized coup Turkish military forces took over government 0400 May 27 apparently without serious opposition and loss only about 50 lives Ankara. President Bayar, President GNA Koraltan, members Cabinet, Chief Staff Erdulhun taken into protective custody. Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir quiet; no discernible organized opposition. At this juncture, Embassy believes revolt motivated by purely internal considerations; no evidence any anti-Americanism. On contrary, member Military Council assured Embassy this morning of Turkish Armed Forces friendship for USA and desire fulfill all Turkey's international commitments, especially NATO and CENTO. (364. Editorial Note, FRUS: 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, p. 1089)

Warren thought that the coup met the most important criteria the State Department used to assess a coup. "It was by far most precise, most efficient and most rapid coup d'état I had ever witnessed… revolutionary movement had complete control of entire country. Gürsel nodded his head… people in Ankara were happy with result [no opposition expected]."[12] May 27 coup in Turkey appeared as a 'late item' in the Daily Brief supplied by the CIA for 27 May 1960. In it, it was noted that: "representatives of the "military council" which is in control called at the American Embassy almost immediately to give assurances that the coup was directed only against the Menderes government and that Turkey would remain "a stanch ally of the United States as well as a devoted member of NATO.". . Brigadier General Refik Tulga has taken over as mayor and governor of İstanbul. He is a former military attaché in the United States and is described as "exceedingly pro-American." (Daily Brief, 27 May 1960)

Ambassador Warren met President Gürsel after the coup and told him that he was there to help the new government, rather than cause any further problems (Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the

[12]The US assessment along this criterion later continued: "The military junta which overthrew the Turkish Government in a smoothly executed coup on 27 May appears to be firmly in control of Turkey, and there is no evidence of significant organized opposition to its rule." Special National Intelligence Estimate, July 19, 1960, p. 1106.

Department of State. May 28, 1960). In response, President Gürsel assured Ambassador Warren that Turkey's natural orientation and destination was the West and the USA. Only a day after the coup, "Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador in the United States, informed Under Secretary of State Dillon that the new government intended to honor all Turkey's existing commitments. Dillon indicated to the Ambassador that the United States might prefer, as in other similar cases, to continue relations as usual without a formal announcement" (364. Editorial Note, FRUS: 1958—1960, Volume X, Part 2, p. 1089).

This was in line with the US policy of recognition, later called the "Estrada Doctrine", which called for the "continuation of diplomatic recognition without any statement of opinion as to the origin and nature of the new government" (Wadlow 1978, p. 26). The 1960 coup d'état indeed did not pose a crisis with the United States or NATO (Henze 1993, p. 12). Eisenhower had a calm posture toward the 1960 coup d'état in Turkey, as diplomatic relations were not interrupted (Wadlow, p. 29). The US recognition of the coup marked US approval (Pekin and Yavuz 2014, p. 91; also Erdoğan Karakuş, personal communication, July 29, 2015).

The new government requested a public statement of support from the Eisenhower Administration and conveyed it to both Allen Dulles and also, two days later, to Secretary of State Herter. President Eisenhower issued a statement three days later and appreciated the post-coup government's intention to return to democracy soon and "…to preserve Turkey's ties with NATO and CENTO was also a source of great satisfaction to me and to all those associated with Turkey in these collective security organizations dedicated to the defense of the free world" (Letter from President Eisenhower to President Gürsel, Washington, June 11, 1960). All ambassadors in Ankara started visiting the Cabinet members and asking them what they were thinking and wanted to do. Foreign Minister Selim Sarper said that the Swedes found the new Cabinet very 'Western' and did not even remotely look like the Egyptian coup makers (Free Officers' coup). The Head of JUSMMAT, a US General, also paid a visit and said that "let me say upfront, you can expect all kinds of U.S. support. It is our duty. The faster we work together from now on, the faster the assistance will arrive. We were not too fond of the outgoing government. We will assist you" (Koçak 2010a, p. 177). On November 22, 1961 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff talked to the media and stressed the strategic importance of Turkey for the NATO defense

strategy. They follow political developments in Turkey very closely and want Turkey to have stable, civilian government (Yirmibeşoğlu 1999a, p. 366). In the end, NUC members were surprised at how easily they managed Turkey's external affairs following the coup (Karavelioğlu, p. 89).

One of the most pressing issues was the financial situation in the country. In the very first meeting between the junta leader General Gürsel and Ambassador Warren, General Gürsel broached the issue of Turkey's urgent financial needs as they found themselves unable to pay state employees' checks. Gürsel was himself aware for the fragility of the coup at the time if they failed to pay people's salaries. Gürsel asked for an advance payment to Turkey. Ambassador Warren replied that "he realized very well the importance for government of being able to pay the first payroll. The Ambassador still thought, even under precarious conditions that existed, that certain issues need to be clarified before financial assistance can be considered" (see also Yalman 1997, p. 1701). This fund was eventually made available (Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara, May 28, 1960). This was a critical help, given the fact that "paying the civil servants their salaries on time was a precondition to the success of the coup and its acceptance by the people" (Küçük 2008, p. 104).

Though we lack information as to its content, the day after the coup the Turkish Ambassador in Washington conveyed a message to the State Department, which deserved US recognition of the new military entity in power (Göktepe 2000, p. 173). Gürsel left no doubt about his conciliatory attitude toward the United States in his communications. In his letter to President Eisenhower on June 18, Gürsel shared the information on the committee of legal scholars brought together to write the new Turkish constitution. The committee, he wrote, "will undoubtedly be welcomed by our Allies and, first of all, by the United States" (Letter from Gürsel cited in Carver, p. 308).

The first Gürsel government continued to lobby the USA for urgent financial assistance. The government delivered a note to the Department of State on June 10, reporting that it would soon be running a deficit at the amount of $53.7 million by August 31 (Preliminary Notes of a Meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board, FRUS: 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 2, p. 1099). Being able to raise the living conditions of the armed forces in terms of salaries and other perks was equally important for the new post-coup government. It was no small matter to give the officer corps, which was the

government's primary and most critical constituency, the sense that the new government, as opposed to the DP, cares about their welfare. The matter was discussed in the first Gürsel Cabinet on November 22, 1960 but the government was aware that it lacked the financial means. President Gürsel said in that meeting that the USA calculated that 75 million *lira* would be necessary and they could lend this money to Turkey (Koçak 2010a, p.634).

The U.S. Ambassador in the meantime tried to dispel any potential prejudices that the new military government may have about him due to his dealings with the Democrat Party government. Ambassador Warren visited Amil Artus and told him five weeks after the coup that 'he was rather pro-Turkish [than pro-Menderes]. That he worked hard in cooperation with the Turkish nation. That government is gone. It behooves him to work with you in the same way. It is their duty to deliver to you the largest amounts of assistance that the US government could afford (Koçak, vol. 1, p. 257). As a side note, it may be mentioned that although Ambassador Warren had enjoyed close relations with the Menderes government, it seems that the embassy staff felt very closer to CHP at the junior level and they understood the objectives of the coup ("Letter From the Ambassador to Turkey (Warren)", August 11, 1960; Dillon 1998, p. 19).

American understanding continued in the following months. Ambassador Warren advised Washington and promised "…to be just as helpful to the Gürsel Government as we were to the Menderes Government…". He was aware of Turkey's importance and pledged to be careful in not upsetting the post-coup military government in Turkey so that "…it [Gürsel government] doesn't succumb to Commie blandishments and that it remains loyal to the United States, to CENTO, to NATO" ("Letter From the Ambassador to Turkey (Warren)", August 11, 1960). The only concern US officials had was that relations with the new regime would not be as easy as they were before. "The present regime is not as enthusiastically pro-Western as was the Menderes regime, although 38 members of the Committee of National Unity have attended Army schools in the USA. US officials have not been able to establish close relations with the new regime with the result that our sources of information are not as good as they were under Menderes" ("Memorandum of Discussion at the 449th Meeting", June 30, 1960).

Military and Economic Assistance

One of the most radical and divisive acts the new government undertook was the forced retirement of thousands of officers from different ranks from the military at the cost of 100 million *lira*. Although some NUC members may have not wanted to disclose this intention to the US officials for fear of giving the country a bargaining chip (Seyhan 1966, p. 104), President Gürsel made a presentation to the US Embassy about this project on July 12. He presented the reasoning of the case in terms of the need to revitalize the military because there were too many over-aged senior officers. The military justified the purge in message written by the Turkish General Staff and sent to purged and newly promoted officers and general by saying that "they had to rejuvenate the military, which had been neglected for so long, in the light of current needs" and that "there was a great need to form a young and dynamic force structure" (Utku 2006, p. 92). In the same presentation, Gürsel rejected the idea that any political motivation was behind the scheme. Gürsel promised that "the number of U.S.-trained Turkish officers to be retired under this proposed program would be held to a bare minimum" (Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, July 13, 1960). The US administration dragged its foot for a while before military-to-military connections entered the picture with the intercession of General Norstad, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, who in very early August conveyed the following message to a large group of senior-level administration officials in Washington (including the Secretary, Undersecretary, Deputy Secretary of Defense): "*such U.S. assistance at this particular early stage in the life of the Provisional Government is most important. The group of young officers in charge is well disposed toward the U.S.; many of them speak English, having received training in the U.S. They give the impression of wanting and expecting U.S. leadership and assistance, and it is most important to step in at this early stage*" (italics added). It was also General Norstad, who suggested that the US support for this specific purpose did not have to be direct and through formally established channels; it could be given indirectly by supporting another item on the Turkish budget to allow the Turks to divert it for this particular project ("Memorandum of Conversation" 1960, August 2; see also "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey" 1960, August 4). The US administration agreed and went ahead to fund the project in the way General Norstad

proposed. This shows how military-to-military relationship paid off at a particularly crucial time in the life of a new military government after a coup d'état. It is important to remember that while Ambassador Warren had concluded that the new authorities do not provide as good sources of information as those of the Menderes government, General Norstad's impressions carried the day and made a real impact on the US administration. The military-to-military relationship kicked in where civil-military (US Ambassador-military government) relationship did not suffice.

There are conflicting accounts as to the origins of the idea to undertake such a major overhaul in the armed forces. According to Ahmed Emin Yalman, the need for "fixing the broken pyramid of the military hierarchy and swelling of officers in upper ranks" was first expressed at a NATO meeting by Chief Allied Commander General Norstad. According to Norstad, as Yalman reported, the numbers of officers in higher ranks is normally small but in the Turkish army jobs need to be done by lieutenants are done by colonels. The NUC agreed with this diagnosis and undertook a major purge (Yalman, p. 1700; also Turgut, pp. 213–214; Gunn, p. 131). Whether it was Norstad that made the request first or he was merely notified of the homegrown intention as Küçük claimed (2008, p. 113) remains obscure but the money required was given by NATO (Küçük 2008, p. 112, Karavelioğlu, p. 66), which means the USA for all intents and purposes. Here too military-to-military connection and the weight SACEUR General Norstad's opinions carried at the US decision-making level made a difference.

The motivations behind the purge also remain complicated in spite of President Gürsel's claims otherwise. One may legitimately wonder if the purge aimed at 'weeding out the deadwood', similar to the situation in Greece after the Colonels' Coup, in which purges and premature retirements target those opposed to the coup (Keeley 2010, p. 137). According to Dündar Seyhan, the broken shape of the military hierarchy was indeed one reason for the purge, which he called a 'necessity of mathematics" but they also wanted to get rid of their seniors who would definitely constitute a threat to the rule of mostly junior officers after the coup. (Seyhan 1966, p. 101). Turhan believed that 'soft generals' remained untouched in the purge, implying that those generals who could raise their voice against the move were dismissed (2001, p. 114). Numan Esin explains the need for the purge in similar terms but also implies that at least some of the retired generals could no longer be trusted (Esin, p. 130). Karavelioğlu too said that "…Despite the fact

that the army fed many generals and revolution could not be avoided a lot of generals chose not to heed our invitations to the junta. However, after the coup they could find it unacceptable to see so many kids [young officers] giving orders and think that they should have participated as well" (p. 65 also see Tanç 2017; pp. 186–187). Dündar Seyhan too associates the purge with the NUC's need to feel itself safe in terms of its relationship with the military. According to Seyhan,

> the revolution carried out rested on the army. Was the army, however, strong and safe enough to be a pillar of the Committee that represented the power (*iktidar*)? When viewed in this perspective, it was beyond doubt that the Committee did not feel secure… Jealousy and criticism of the identity of those who founded the Committee emerged among some in the military circles. The revolution relied on the support of the military. However, the force that owned the guns was the most dangerous element against the revolutionaries. Under those circumstances, the force that we relied on in carrying out the revolution must have been made a reliable source of support for the possessors of power after the revolution. (Seyhan 1966, pp. 90–91)

This may be a classic case of rift that may emerge and deepen between "military-as-institution" (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 67) and military rulers after a coup attempt. Notably, Allen Dulles remarked at the 447th Meeting of the National Security Council on June 8 that "the situation in Turkey is characterized by growing resentment on the part of senior military officers against the committee which is in control and which consists largely of junior officers." (Editorial Note, p. 1095). Dulles also noted later that the US Ambassador noted that the forced retirements would have the incidental consequence of permitting the NUC to get rid of those officers whose loyalty to the new order was in suspicion ("Letter From the Ambassador to Turkey (Warren)", August 11, 1960). It was also US Ambassador Warren's belief that the National Unity Committee's real aim with the purge was to get rid of officers who had little faith in the new government (Carver, p. 313).

As stated in the previous pages, the immediate economic assistance the USA extended to the new military rulers was vital for the junta. Not only the new government's ability to pay state employees would otherwise be impaired but also finishing up the project of forced retirements could prove impossible unless the government turned to the Soviets

for good. The forced retirement project seemed to be most critical of it all as it sent shock waves across the armed forces (Aytekin 1967, pp. 70, 75). Even on military terms, the impact must have been so momentous, because once decision for retirement was taken, the entire command in battalions passed on to as low rank as the most senior captain (Bayar 2006, p. 331). Even when the project was underwritten with the US funds and forced retirees were financially compensated, the purge added grain to salt in terms of the surfacing divisions within the National Unity Committee as well (Yirmibeşoğlu 1999a, pp. 287–291). The US assistance on this particular project directly influenced the military's 'ability to successfully execute the coup', as argued earlier, should be distinguished from 'the decision to attempt a coup' (Powell 2012, p. 1036). See Fig. 3.1 for the amount of military and economic assistance the USA gave to the new military government after the coup.

The data for economic aid clearly show how the United States supported the new military government despite a small drop in military aid data. It is important to notice that while the prescheduled economic aid figure dropped between 1959 and 1960, it almost doubled after the coup in 1961. It is important to remember that levels of predetermined economic aid for 1961 was increased in the instance of the May 27 coup



Fig. 3.1 US Economic and Military Aid, 1958–1962 (millions of dollars). *Source* (Uslu 1994, pp. 134–135; USAID, Foreign Aid Explorer)

to specifically keep alive the military government in Turkey. We still do not know if the data for economic aid also includes emergency funds the USA made available to the putschists to fund to the controversial military purge and payment of public servants' salaries.

It was the increasing US aid that made possible purges from the military, without which the junta could be more exposed to counter-coups from senior and opposing ranks, who had been sidelined during the coup and now all suddenly found themselves having to submit to lower-ranked officers. The post-coup economic and military assistance remained critical after such a vulnerable coup because, as was pointed out by Geddes, "the worst possible outcome for the military as an institution is civil war in which one part of the armed forces fights another" (Geddes 1999, p. 126). One possible reason for this assertion is that "once factions of the military take up arms against each other, it takes years or decades to restore unity and trust" (Geddes, p. 127). In other words, coup success and the survival of coup plotters in the short- to mid-term also hinged on securing authority and discipline among the ranks by purging detractors of the coup. Some of the junior military officers who staged the coup were aware of the critical importance of receiving post-coup assistance from abroad. As Aytekin (1967) admitted, "intervening was not the problem. We knew that it would be over in an hour or two. But what about *after* we intervene?" (p. 128). It was the US financing that made possible for the military government to pay its public employees, improve army officers' conditions, and purge high-ranking generals from the army.

Discussion

The case of the May 27 coup in Turkey supports the notion that the trigger for military coups d'état is local. Various domestic grievances provided the spark for the military officers to draw up coup plans against the DP government and join secret military juntas. This should not be taken to mean, however, that the putschists did not care about the US reaction if they executed their plans. They took several actions from sending some of their members as military attachés to Washington and London to appointing well-known diplomat Selim Sarper as the Foreign Minister after the coup and declaring their loyalty to the West as soon as possible to allow to soothe any Western misgiving. They cared about being recognized as legitimate political power after the coup and asked for US recognition and a letter of assurance from President Eisenhower.

Although several officers involved in the coup later wrote that the coup came as a big surprise to the USA, this was not really the case. Truly, with the exception of a modest note from Ulay that the US military attaché told him that he understood that a military action was in the offing, there is no evidence that the USA either fomented or gave positive signals to the conspirators beforehand. The level of US penetration into the Turkish armed forces, however, ensured that whoever engaged in a military action would be no stranger to the United States. This study has shown that several of the military conspirators in the case of the May 27 coup had had key connections to the US defense and intelligence establishment. Most of them had been well known to US circles due to their participation in the Korean War, US military education and training programs, and NATO assignments. Türkeş was among the very first batch of Turkish officers, who were sent to the USA for training and education as early as 1948 (Turgut, pp. 80–81). He established amicable contacts at the CIA, one of which officers had arrived in Ankara a short time before the coup (Altaylı 2013). It is important to remember that in its assessment of the coupists and new military government, the US administration considered how many members of the putschists were trained in the USA. It was these data and the proven pro-Western qualities of the majority of putschists that NATO SACEUR Lauris Norstad presented to Washington so that the letter would let the new military government fail.

Although there is no evidence that any of the putschists talked or received a direct or indirect green light and assurances from their military connections, they must have understood from the US acquiescence on the day of the coup as well as other measures they took and their extensive contacts that the USA was unlikely to show objection to the coup. The archival evidence and information gathered from several sources show that the USA *underwrote the coup financially, politically and militarily* but it neither fomented the coup or nor guided it.

American acquiescence during the coup and its three-legged (financial, military, and political) support for the military government were critical contributions to the coup because in the absence of US support the vulnerability of the putschists, most of whom were either junior or mid-ranking officers, in the early hours of the coup would have been far worse. It would have been very difficult for them to not be able to achieve the massive purge of the military. They could also have been unable to pay public employees' salaries, which would have curtailed

their ability to deliver and, for this reason, dented the legitimacy of the coup. If the USA condemned the coup and refused to assist the new military government, the junta could not just turn to the Soviets for support. The density of the institutional links between Turkey and the West, and the USA in particular, developed over the decade of the 1940s and 1950s would have also hampered the likelihood of the coup plotters changing Turkey's orientation. Such a move would have inflated the already-high costs of a coup attempted by junior officers to the disregard of the military hierarchy. Nevertheless, the fact that the USA did help the coup makers enabled the military to settle in and create a seamless precedent of coup d'état that would continue to be emulated thereafter.

The 1980 Coup D'état in Turkey

Rusi Nazar said about the 1960 coup in Turkey that if the USA wanted to see a coup in Turkey, it would have insinuated this desire to top generals in the Turkish Army. The previous part concluded that there is no hard evidence that any political actor did this in the case of the May 27 coup. However, the US did this twenty-years later with the September 12, 1980 hierarchical coup in Turkey. General Evren himself admitted that they were approached by their United States and NATO military counterparts, who wondered when and if the Turkish military was pondering an intervention. In this case, the USA had prior knowledge that Turkish generals were close to deposing the government.

The following pages provide an in-depth discussion of the US role in the September 12 coup in Turkey. Similar to the previous coup in 1960, the trigger remained local—chaos and disorder at home—but the US role was more accentuated. Even when intervening as an institution in the spirit of the command chain, Turkish generals considered the likely US reaction before carrying out the coup. The fact that the Turkish Army, with a clean record of intervening twice without bloodshed by now, 'proved' that it could take over without stirring any unrest also helped their cause. Mutual visits after the coup proved enormously helpful in reassuring the post-coup military government. Economic and military assistance went up even more visibly in comparison to the record of the May 27 coup. Military-to-military connections paid off both before, during, and after the military coup this time thanks to the increased role of the Pentagon.

Several scholars predominantly trace the causes of the 1980 coup d'état back to domestic factors such as rampant disorder, incompetence

of politicians and their irresponsible behaviors, deepening social divisions, economic breakdown, anarchy, and violence as a result (Harris in Evin and Heper 1988, pp. 190, 193; Ahmad, p. 181; Heper and Tachau, p. 25; Arcayürek 1990, p. 399; Heper and Itzkowitz-Shifrinson 2005, p. 238). Written sources with more historical focus on Turkish-American relations also underestimate the role of the USA. For instance, Türkmen wrote very cursorily about the U.S. involvement in the 1980 coup d'état. She relied only on the memoirs written by the then U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, James W. Spain. According to her, "Turkish Armed Forces have been a significant political actor with strong initiative and thus never needed protection by an external actor" (Türkmen 2012, p. 147). Sunay's book, which is based on his doctoral dissertation, is an extensive study of civil-military relations in Turkey and he did mention the role of external actors, on the 1980 coup d'état especially, but without any archival research or primary data (Sunay 2010, pp. 245–246). There are only a few exceptions that focus on the external dimension of the September 12 but it has almost never been the sole focus in any research (quoted in Hale 1988; Demirel 2003, pp. 253–280).

Turkish—American Relations in the 1970s

The Cyprus crisis and its reverberations dominated Turkish—American relations after 1974. The use of NATO weapons for a non-NATO-sanctioned military attack in Cyprus led to the introduction of a US embargo on Turkey in 1975. Military-to-military contacts helped gradually lift the sanctions in 1977. U. generals, including, in particular, Admiral Stanley Turner, the Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Southern Flank and later Director of CIA under the Carter Administration, had an influence on President Carter's decision to lift the sanctions (Yirmibeşoğlu 1999b, p. 143). In addition to anybody else, it was first and foremost Alexander Haig who suggested to President Carter that the USA should resume military aid to Turkey. This showed the central role played by men in uniform in the development of bilateral relations. In Haig's assessment,

> the ability of the Turks to carry out their NATO obligations and keep order in a country raven by terrorism and subversion (Ankara was reporting thirty terrorist incidents a day) had been dangerously reduced. Within the Turkish military, resentments ran high against the regime that expected it to defend the country with obsolete equipment, insufficient spare parts,

> and weapons left over from the Korean War. In the absence of effective aid, the country would either degenerate into anarchy or declare martial law—*soon*. (Haig and McCarry 1992, p. 533; emphasis added)

According to Haig, the Turkish military was a "force for political stability". He told President Carter that "if the United States does not lift the embargo… there will be martial law in Turkey in a matter of days, and a military coup will inevitably follow… [after President Carter did not accept] the following week, martial law was imposed" (Haig and McCarry 1992, p. 534). It may be said as a reminder that the US policy to Turkey in the late 1970s had become a severe bone of contention between the State Department and the Pentagon. The Pentagon hated the embargo on Turkey from the start and saw the State Department giving into domestic constituency and neglecting immediate security interests (Cotter 2002, pp. 78–79, 82).

The military generals were well aware of the importance of getting more US aid after sanctions were eased, though they were disappointed over the slow pace of incoming aid (Gürün 1995, pp. 126–127). Although Turkey's CENTO alliance and its benefits were questioned in the late 1970s (as was in Pakistan and Iran), especially by the political leadership (Ecevit), the Turkish military leaders had no scruples about their *pro forma* CENTO membership (Gürün 1995, pp. 121–125). The two developments in the region—the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan—skyrocketed the strategic importance of Turkey. With the fall of the Shah in 1979, the Turkish foreign ministry expected that the USA would look to Turkey to prevent Iran falling into the ambit of the Soviet Union (Baytok 2005, p. 248). The regional context made Turkey so important that 'U.S. Embassy officers noticed that even the messages coming out of Washington to the Embassy were 'high priority messages' (White 2001, p. 170). In Washington, there were voices calling for increasing the levels of US aid to Turkey in late 1979 and early 1980. Henze made a pro-aid argument for Turkey in a National Security Council memorandum in November 1979 he sent to Zbigniew Brzezinski, stressing that "..Grant aid continues to be of enormous importance, *psychologically* to the Turkish military leadership. If we press for concessions of them to permit Greece's return to NATO, they will have an additional reason to expect substantial military aid…" (quoted in Okur 2015 p. 205; italics added). Henze continued to vouch for more aid as a carrot to encourage Turkish authorities to consent to Greece's re-entry into NATO's military wing (quoted in Okur 2015, p. 206).

In the meantime, while the Turkish domestic scene was marred by internecine strife, widespread violence on a daily scale that left hundreds of people dead and injured, the regional events and their international consequences further complicated the picture. Especially after 'losing' Iran to Islamic Revolution and invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets the US predicament for the safety of its interests in the Middle East and the Gulf increased. As indicative of the geopolitical thinking that dominated the Cold War, Brzezinski saw the crisis in Iran in 1979 as part of global arena of power politics. If Shah fell, he thought, 'Iran would slide to an orientation like Libya or worse into anarchy, the Soviet influence in southwestern Asia would grow, American position in the Gulf would be harmed' (Brzezinski 1983, p. 386). Brzezinski had drawn a geopolitical snapshot of crises zone: "If you draw an arc on the globe, stretching from Chittagong (Bangladesh) through Islamabad to Aden, you will be pointing to the area of currently our greatest vulnerability. All at once, difficulties are surfacing in Iran and Pakistan, and they are thinly below the surface in India and are very manifest in Bangladesh, and there is reason to believe that the political structure of Saudi Arabia is beginning to creak. Turkey is also becoming more wobbly" ("Memorandum From the President's Assistant" 1978, December 2; see also Gates 2007, p. 118; Weinberger 1990, p. 17). This created an urgent need for US bases to host US soldiers and military equipment and weapons (Bölme 2012, pp. 120–121).

The External Dimension

The Turkish General Staff had already prepared its contingency plans in case it decided to intervene amid disorder. The generals decided to intervene in July 1980, but domestic circumstances did not allow it at that point. The opposition at the time, the Republican People's Party, demanded a vote of confidence in the parliament to bring down the government but failed when Erbakan surprisingly backed Prime Minister Demirel, which allowed the government to survive. The top commanders thought that "if they intervened despite the parliament expressed confidence in the executive, they feared getting blamed for dismissing a government that the RPP tried to but could not. They would have confirmed Demirel's accusation that RPP + Military = Power. Besides, the fact that the Supreme Military Council was scheduled to convene shortly complicated the picture because it would then be hard to retire generals and officers, who would have taken a risk and participated in the coup

action but could have not received promotion in that Supreme Council" (Evren 1994, pp. 184–185). They therefore rescheduled the coup to September. Only four days before the actual date, September 8, all division chiefs were convened by Nurettin Ersin, the Commander of Land Forces and were asked to give their opinions. They were unanimous in their desire to intervene, end terror, and then return power to civilians (Tezkan personal communication).

Nevzat Bölügiray, who was the Martial Law Commander in Adana before the 1980 coup, said that Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren and the rest of the top commanders visited him several months before the 1980 coup and asked him if he expected resistance in the region in case of a coup and whether or not he had enough forces to suppress it (Bölügiray 1989, pp. 577–579). Kemal Yamak, the Commander of the 7th Army Corps and Martial Law Command, was responsible from Diyarbakır, Mardin, Urfa, Siirt, Van and Hakkari. His responsibilities before the September 12 coup also included getting prepared for possible internal resistance in these cities (Yamak 2006, p. 488). The internal front was not the only area where generals was concerned about potential resistance. They made sure that the USA would stamp out a coup if they took over as well.

When senior generals talked among themselves about the need to wait for the right time to strike, the Commander of War Academies, General Bedrettin Demirel opined that "they should be patient for the most appropriate time so that when they intervened nobody inside or outside Turkey should be in a position to say anything" (Bilget 2004 p. 275). İbrahim Şenocak, the Commander of the 2nd Army, participated in probably the same exact meeting as Nevzat Bölügiray some months before the September 12 coup in Adana. The top commanders assigned to commands in the Anatolian heartland had been sent in advance top-secret files containing tentative plans for the coup. They were told in this meeting that the coup may be attempted in July. After hearing this, a question General Şenocak asked Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren demonstrate clearly that generals worry about external reactions to coups and take it into consideration as a factor. General Şenocak asked General Evren 'if they considered how other countries particularly the USA would react and if the coup would not harm the economy. Evren received the question very well and told Şenocak not to worry because they already took care of these issues (Şenocak 2005, pp. 179–180).

Necip Torumtay, later the Chief of General Staff (1987–1990), also remarked in his memoirs that "the 1980 coup d'état was planned and

carried out in a hierarchical manner. They were informed one by one about the preparations and decision for intervention according their ranks a night before the plan was put into action in the General Staff. On September 11, the gates of the General Staff were closed down and entire personnel were informed by proper ranking generals after dinner. At 21:00 hours the top generals met for a special evaluation of recent developments in our region and the world. Potential reactions of foreign states and international organizations were then assessed and questions coming from generals were replied. It was decided in the end that no serious problem would occur in that respect" (Torumtay 1993, p. 78). The reported timing of such an evaluation on the external dimension should be taken with a grain of salt. As General Şenocak's remarks above indicate, certain positive *signals* had been given much earlier (Demirel 2003, p. 269). These signals likely came from high-level military counterparts. Evren said that "they considered what the NATO and other foreign countries would say about the intervention." And they sensed from conversations with high level commanders during NATO meetings that the U.S. would not oppose a military intervention in Turkey, which encouraged them further to step in (Demirel 2003, p. 272).

This assurance mattered because "if the Western allies of Turkey, particularly the United States, in addition to civilian domestic groups, gave *hints* that they would not support the coup, Turkish military would have thought twice before acting" (Demirel 2003, p. 269; italics added). This pre-coup communication between coup plotting military leadership and the United States must have been so familiar that James Spain, the US Ambassador to Ankara (1980–1981) said after hearing reports of an imminent coup that "if a coup were as imminent as he [the military officer reporting the imminence of the coup] said, I thought we would have had some kind of a direct hint from the military leadership" (Spain 1984, p. 18). Even if he may have not, communications seem to have had occurred already at a higher level.

Another Surprise Coup?

It can be understood from Şenocak and Torumtay's firsthand accounts above that the coup could not have come surprising the Carter Administration. Although the USA denied it (Cotter 2002, p. 70; Boehm 1998, p. 96), several other civilian and military accounts, therefore, seem correct in claiming without slightest hesitation that

the September 12 coup was done with the full advance knowledge of the USA (Parmaksız 2010, p. 145; Aslan, personal communication, August 24, 2015). It is important to note that Esin attributed the US foreknowledge to the US penetration into Turkish military establishment through military training (Esin 2005, p. 172). The fact that the September 12 coup was a hierarchical coup organized and led by senior generals, who were in usual contact with the US officials at the top level, it was not necessary for the attachés or JUSMMAT to try to learn about it beforehand. In any case, it is not clear if JUSMMAT was in a position to know about the coup in advance. On the one hand, JUSMMAT seems to have been in a more privileged position to provide more and accurate information about the Turkish military and act as a more useful conduit. "JUSMMAT, the military assistance and advisory group, which had tremendous relationships and access to the Turkish General Staff at the highest levels. It was recognized as the entity that had control of the assistance program, unlike the greatly frustrated defense attaché who didn't have control of much of anything, except an occasional exchange visit or scholarship to a service school. The group had its own legal and training sections, and they were fully involved" (Dworken 2013, p. 108). However, other Embassy officials doubted the amount and quality of information JUSMMAT could have.

> In Latin America we had very large military assistance groups that were all over the country and worked very closely with all of the military and had very clear access to all of the military. In Turkey, it was considerably different. We had a large military assistance team, but they were not out with Turkish units. When we did things socially and professionally, it was with a limited number of Turkish officers. Our access to Turkish officers outside of that circle was really quite limited. The Turks have always maintained a certain distance in terms of a fullness of sharing with us. There were, in those days, those officers on the Turkish General Staff and elsewhere who were clearly designated to work with foreigners. If you met an officer outside the circle and invited that officer to a social event, generally the officer was unable to go. (Cotter 2002, pp. 70–71)

According to General Parmaksız, "everyone is too focused on the expression "our boys did it" [attributed to the US officials hearing the news of the coup in Ankara] but nobody tells how surprised the U.S. officers at the JUSMMAT in Ankara were on September 12" (Parmaksız

2010, p. 145). Though how much JUSMMAT officials knew appears obscure, the military attachés offered very little.

> The senior Turkish military basically ignored our military attachés. They wanted to deal only with the military assistance people for obvious reasons. So, to the extent that you had military to military contact, it tended to be more with the military assistance advisory group—JUSMMAT, or Joint United States Military Assistance Group in Turkey. The attachés really had to fight for what they could get. Some of the attachés were effective and successful, but they were heavily overshadowed by the military aid mission, which traditionally always wanted to stay out of the intelligence field. So not only did our attachés have difficulty talking to the Turks but they sometimes found it impossible to talk to the U.S. military assistance people… The military assistance people wouldn't tell the attachés anything because they wanted to stay out of the intelligence field altogether. (Cotter 2002, p. 97)

The fact that it was a hierarchical coup led by the General Staff made the Embassy's job easier. Ambassador Spain had been close friends with several of the top people in the new military government. Among them was the new PM Bülend Ulusu, Turgut Özal as the deputy Prime Minister, Vecdi Özgül, who retired from the Air Force to become the youth and sports minister, İlter Türkmen as the Foreign Minister, Haluk Bayülken as the Minister of Defense. They seemed so close with Bülend Ulusu that the latter would call Spain 'brother' and when they met, Ulusu made trenchant criticism of the left (Spain 1984, p. 23). General Evren himself was naturally very well known to the Embassy (Heichler 2000, p. 84). Alexander Haig had been the SACEUR from 1974 to 1979, which makes it impossible for him not to have worked very closely with some of the top military generals who captured power in Turkey after the coup d'état. If "the Soviets knew well pro-NATO inclinations of the Turkish generals" (Campbell, p. 63), the USA had been in an incomparably better position to have more complete knowledge of the top military generals' overall inclinations in Turkey.

Courting Western Assent

Although the generals had already been assured of support by the United States, they still made sure to get on well with the USA. A member of the Turkish general staff informed the US officials of the coup even

before they moved into action on September 12 (Spain 1984, p. 18). The post-coup memorandum number six declared that the Turkey would remain committed to all existing alliances and agreements, though that must have been a mere formality (Evren 1994, p. 229). The military government arranged İlter Türkmen, a senior diplomat and soon-to-be Foreign Minister, to brief NATO ambassadors the very next day, which in effect meant soothing any misgivings that may arise with the NATO members (Spain 1984, p. 20). Obtaining both domestic and international recognition was key to the generals taking over power in September 1980. "They wished to preclude later accusations at home that they had seized power unjustly and criticism and punitive action from allies abroad" (Henze 1993, p. 39). Truly, General Evren said after the coup to the US Ambassador that "they needed some time free of criticism to carry out the things that they needed to do" (Spain 1984, p. 24). On the most important foreign policy matter of the time, General Evren himself promised the US Ambassador a month after the coup that Turkey would allow the Greek reintegration into the NATO alliance and they no longer held it as a condition for Greek reentry that Greek and Turkish areas of influence in the Aegean must be defined first (Spain 1984, p. 25).

The military government also observed external sensitivities before taking steps in domestic politics. They wanted to take certain steps to correct the perceived defects in the internal justice system but they eventually did not do so because "around the world but especially in democracies judicial independence matters a lot. If we took on the judiciary at home and embark on certain changes, this could have invited heavy pressures from the outside. We did not want any bickering with the outside world" (Evren 1995, p. 15). Evren himself conceded in his memoirs that he and his friends in the General Staff predicted that regardless of the circumstances within which the coup took place, the European Council could not easily digest a military coup d'état in one of its members. The coup plotters expected that they would have to endure European pressure (Evren 1995, pp. 15–16). Some Turkish diplomats, who viewed the coup sympathetically, had no doubt that the Council of Europe would be very critical of the intervention. It was most urgent therefore to take some steps and necessary precautions (Günver 1989, pp. 110–112, 130–132; İnan 2002, p. 75; Günver 1984, pp. 32–33; Barutçu 1999, pp. 200–204; Erner 1993, p. 224).

Appointment of the Foreign Minister

The appointment of İlter Türkmen as Foreign Minister should also be seen as a soft tool to soothe any concern the United States could have. İlter Türkmen was very well known in Washington circles.[13] Diplomats such as Türkmen and Kamuran Gürün, also well known in NATO circles, were helpful. The military generals cared about encounters between the Turkish diplomat and their Western counterparts to leave a positive image behind (Gürün 1995, p. 172). In domestic politics another appointment made it easier for the post-coup regime to look good to the West. The appointment of Özal could have been the generals' positive post-coup response/signal/blink to the West. The US Ambassador used to warn Turkey's ruling elite, civilians at the governmental level and army generals alike, that statism could be defensible during Ataturk's time, but it lost its validity in the 1970s, and that Turkey needed to update its economic policy, stop import substitution and open itself up to the world. This was done more fully after the 1980 coup with an increased emphasis on the free market (Spiers 1998, p. 92). Evren's statement that they learned the positive sound of appointment of Özal afterwards may be taken with a grain of salt (Evren 1995, p. 12). General Evren and the other senior generals had listened to two briefings on the Turkish economy by Turgut Özal before the coup and were very satisfied (Güreli 1994, p. 133).

The Rogers Plan

The approval of the 'Rogers Plan' by the post-coup regime has been the automatic 'go-to' argument for several authors and officers to claim that the United States was behind the coup. To recall, Greece had withdrawn from NATO's military wing in 1974 after the Turkish military operation in Cyprus, but Greek officers were not actually pulled back from NATO quarters and meetings, except the Land Southeast Command in Izmir (Bayar n.d., p. 310). Since Turkey allowed Greek reentry into

[13] "Turkey had a pretty good reputation in the United States. Some of that went back to Turkish support for the US effort in Korea when the Turks sent troops. They also had a very good top-level Foreign Ministry careerist by the name of İlter Turkmen, who later became Ambassador to France and the UN. I had a very good relationship with him" (Van Hollen 1998, p. 14).

NATO by accepting the Rogers Plan following the coup, several observers claimed that this was how generals paid back their 'debt' (Kıyat, p. 245; see also Gürdeniz 2013, p. 152; Yirmibeşoğlu 1999a, p. 51; Pekin and Yavuz 2014, p. 102; Küçük 2008, pp. 148, 149; Karavelioğlu, pp. 264, 304–305).

The claim became so popular that Evren was forced to explain his reasoning in acceding to the Rogers Plan. In his account, they were aware of the fact that NATO encountered difficulties using the Aegean for military exercises and suchlike due to the lingering issue between Greece and Turkey over command and control lines in the sea and air. All NATO members made constant insinuations and put pressure on the Turkish generals to allow Greece's return to the NATO. The civilian governments were aware of this problem and they had delegated the discussion of the problem to the General Staff because of its military nature. The generals had then met SACEUR Alexander Haig and Admiral Shear, the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) several times. The matter was solved by 'no command boundaries', whereby the authority on the disputed command and control line was given to NATO commanders. With the deal, Evren said, Turkey got rid of accusations that it was preventing Greece's return to NATO and of use of this matter by the US Congress to block military aid to Turkey (Evren 1995, pp. 167–185).

Admittedly, the Greek reentry had been on the negotiations table before the 1980 coup, at a time when no military government was in sight. However, although Pekin claimed that "he did not believe Rogers Plan was accepted on generals' volition without the knowledge or input of the Turkish Foreign Ministry" (İsmail Hakkı Pekin, personal communication), several diplomats and officials privy to negotiations claimed that it was the military government's decision in the end. Bülend Ulusu argued recently that "Rogers Plan was a hasty decision. It was a decision taken personally with no consultations with us. I consider it a hasty decision made so that NATO unity would be restored and it was made because of trust in NATO SACEUR's word" (Ulusu 2012).

This is consonant with how foreign policy decisions were made during the military government. "Foreign policy decisions in the period from 1980 to 1982 were not taken by the government but the National Security Council. The NSC usually invited General Secretary at the Foreign Ministry to these meetings and asked of his frank opinion" (Gürün 1995, p. 183). However, the highest-level civilian officials in

the Foreign Ministry at the time said that the Rogers Plan and Greece's return to NATO were executed by the soldiers alone; they did not leave to the Foreign Office the writing of the final text (Gürün 1995, pp. 201–202). İnan reports that Foreign Minister Türkmen shared with him that "the Americans talked through SHAPE to our generals and concluded the deal about the Rogers Plan for Greece's return to NATO's military wing. General Rogers secretly went to Turkey on October 17 and had General Evren and his friends persuaded about the deal. The government and the foreign ministry were completely left in the dark" (İnan 2002, pp. 90–91; Küçük 2008, p. 149; Barutçu 1999, p. 248). NATO Secretary-General later emphasized to Kamran İnan after a NATO meeting on December 15, 1980 "the understanding Turkish generals showed with regards to Greece's return to NATO's military wing" (İnan 2002, p. 111). James Spain said in his memoirs that while the military leadership after the coup insisted on redrawing pre-1974 command and control lines the US Embassy persuaded them to see that Greece's return was very important for NATO and therefore to leave this opportunity to gain advantage over Greece this time (Spain 1984, p. 55). President Carter himself attributed the resolution of the entire episode to cordial relations between General Rogers and President Evren (Cemal 1992, p. 105).

The US Reaction

Political Support

On October 4, President Carter sent a sympathetic letter to General Kenan Evren who "appreciated Washington's understanding" (Spain 1984, p. 24). US Ambassador James Spain's memoir is very helpful to gauge the initial US reaction to the coup d'état. Though the Ambassador's views do not officially and always reflect what the US government in charge may want and react, an Ambassador knows the general/established US interests in that country and shows his initial reaction accordingly. The US Ambassador heard the news of the coup while the military was still on the move. Spain says that judging from previous military interventions in Turkey, none of which changed the course of Turkey's foreign policy orientation and global alliances, and his knowledge of Turkey's pashas, he did not doubt that security relationship between Turkey and the USA would be hurt by the coup. Some of the primary recommendations the Embassy made to the

State Department in Washington was 'keep aid coming but publicly regret ending of the parliamentary system' (Spain 1984, p. 20). "The Soviet Union saw in the generals' regime a willing collaborator with Washington and doubted that the Turks could resist pressures to cooperate in military preparations for action in the Gulf area" (Harris 1985; Criss 2011, p. 198). Pro-western and pro-US foreign policy sat at the center of the military government's understanding of foreign policy (Harris 1985, p. 198). On September 21, the Secretary of State Edmund Muskie sent a cable to the Embassy in Ankara, telling the Ambassador that Washington understood and felt sympathy for what happened. The Secretary added that it was important for the USA that Turkey returns to democracy soon (Spain, p. 23). However, the fact that the USA, while fully supporting the military's action, wanted Turkey to reinstate democracy after both the 1960 and 1980 coups does not contradict the argument that what the USA cared primarily about was stability and order. The Carter Administration's call for return to democracy in Turkey after the 1980 coup was therefore for the sake of NATO's *image*. As Ambassador Spain admitted, "Turkey's internal form of government might be of no direct concern to us, but NATO was an alliance of democratic nations" (Spain 1984, p. 25).

Paul Henze, who was CIA's station chief in Turkey from 1974 to 1977 and joined Zbigniew Brzezinski's National Security Team for President Jimmy Carter from 1977–1980, praised the military takeover, claimed that a new more viable democratic order was under way and no evidence of political oppression existed in post-coup Turkey. (Henze quoted in Herman and Brodhead 1986, pp. 150–151). According to Henze, "the Carter administration would not have discouraged the takeover, if informed in advance, but it had no objections to the fact that it was not. Given the fears that had developed that Turkey might go the way of Iran and the entire Western security position in the Middle East might disintegrate, there was a great sense of relief throughout Washington when the change occurred" (Henze 1998, p. 104). We understand from the U.S. Ambassador Spain's assessment three months after the coup that while Western Europe was critical of the coup d'état (Dağı 1996, pp. 124–141), especially regarding the deaths from torture after the coup (Bölügiray 1991, pp. 140, 142), the National Security Council of the generals "won tolerance and greater aid than ever from the United States" (Spain 1984, p. 27; Ludington and Spain 1983, pp. 150–168). As James Alan Williams, Turkey desk officer at the State

Department at the time of the coup, said that beset by terrorism and other social and political woes, Turkey's military set in motion a process to restore democracy after the coup in the country. And the general reaction to the news of the coup in Washington was "certainly not one of condemnation. I think there was a lot of understanding and sympathy for what the Turks had been going through, and given the fact that the military had already overrun the government several times before, and had restored democracy, there was a reasonable expectation that it would do so again" (Williams 2010, pp. 76–78).

Diplomatic dispatches that went from the U.S. Embassy to Washington used 'takeover' and 'new regime' instead of coup (Spain 1984, p. 90). The Secretary of States under the Reagan Administration, Alexander Haig did not refer to 1980 as a coup but 'a military council took over the government' in his memoirs. (1992, p. 534). Yet, it seems there was no consistent preference for the word 'takeover' over 'coup. The State Department Bulletin named the event as a 'coup d'état'. Once again the Bulletin did not forget to mention as a helpful note that "… the country appears calm, that there has been no bloodshed, and that American citizens and property are not in danger" ("Coup d'état in Turkey", Department Statement 1980, p. 50). "There was also less reason to be concerned about a military takeover in Turkey than in most other places because the Turkish military had a good record of intervening and getting out in a finite time" (Spain 1998b, p. 43). The Department Bulletin that addressed the September 12 coup, officially reminded that "The United States, along with Turkey's other NATO allies and friends, has provided significant levels of assistance to help stabilize its economy and provide for the common defense" and pledged that "This assistance will continue" ("Coup d'état in Turkey" 1980, p. 50).

The US acceptance of the coup was also enabled by the fact that the environment became even easier for the US Embassy in Ankara to operate after the coup. Even for the US Embassy staff, the 1980 coup did not create any complications. As then Counselor for DECA, Lucian Heichler said in an interview, the military ran the country, he had already met General Evren, who later became President under the new Constitution, and was on well terms with him (Heichler 2000, p. 842). Therefore, they no longer had to go through several layers of government because "The Turkish General Staff ran the country, and the chief of the General Staff, under the constitution that was then adopted, became president of Turkey. This was General Kenan Evren, whom I had met with Secretary

General Luns a year or two earlier, because Evren had invited us to a dinner party at his military headquarters." As argued in the section on the US preference, when possible, to deal directly with politically powerful armed forces, which get things done, the generals' rule resulted in hastened decisions on certain issues the United States wished for. As the US Ambassador pointed out,

> General Evren's decisiveness and reliability on this issue were the characteristic of the military regime… It was equally obvious that the pashas' way of doing things had appeal in Washington. Long-standing debts on military purchases were cleared up. Weapons requirements lists under the security assistance program began to appear promptly and accurately. The US—Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement and "Prisoner Exchange Treaty," which had been waiting before the National Assembly for months, were promptly ratified by the National Security Council and the Council of Ministers acting as parliament. (Spain 1984, p. 25)

NATO is argued to be an international organizational force for socialization into democratic values but it did not act as au upholder of democracy in the case of the September 12 coup in Turkey. NATO Parliamentary Assembly simply did not pay much attention to the fact that After Portugal and Greece, another NATO member had a coup d'état. Turkey's Permanent Representative to NATO, Osman Olcay, had said during a briefing at the General Staff about foreign reactions to the coup and military regime that "regime problems, domestic policies of member states are not that important inside the NATO. These issues are not discussed. NATO Parliamentary Assembly did not really have teeth, was not an influential organ and was not established by the NATO Charter anyway. Turkey was not discussed at the assembly but because being a democracy is a prerequisite for membership in NATO the issue of military regime in Turkey may sooner or later come to the table at NATO organs" (Günver 1989, pp. 140–141; also see Gürün 1995, pp. 257–259).

The Reagan Administration followed even a purer *realpolitik* approach than the Carter Administration. The new administration viewed conflicts in Latin America as well as other regions through the lenses of US—Soviet rivalry (Larrabee 1984, p. 28). US foreign policy was now free from any constraint on *realpolitik* such as human rights discourse, as was in the Carter period (Larrabee 1984, p. 28). In the Reagan era,

the authority of the Pentagon, which "…has always been insistent on the strengthening of the Turkish armed forces as a function of US security interests" (Larrabee 1984, p. 7) grew as well.,[14] Major figures within the Reagan Administration was aware that Turkey stood more important than Greece to Western defense structure thanks to Turkey's location, size and fighting force (Campbell 1987, p. 67). Reagan Administration looked so sympathetic and understanding to what the Turkish military did that when Şükrü Elekdağ, then Turkey's ambassador to Washington, met Secretary of State Alexander Haig with talking cards in his hands to woo the US Administration, he was asked to not bother because both the government and himself as a former general already understood Turkey's strategic importance, what the Turkish military did and why. (Eralp 2017, p.56) The USA did not really try to impose pressure on Turkish military "despite the official tut-tutting about what happened to democracy" Williams (2010, p. 77).[15]

Here the previous acquaintance between Secretary Haig and General Evren from the time when Haig was NATO Commander helped the post-coup situation. It is thus no accident that "Haig, having dealt with the Turkish military as NATO Commander and intimately involved in some of their dealings with the Greeks and the effort to bring Greece

[14]The rise of the Pentagon in the decision-making on the policy toward Turkey in the 1980s cannot be separated from the rise of Richard Perle in the Defense Establishment. According to later US Ambassador to Turkey, Morton Abramowitz, "the major player in Washington in determining our policy toward Turkey seemed to be Richard Perle, then Assistant Secretary for ISA in DoD. He was viewed both in Washington and in Ankara sort of as "Mr. Turkey"". See Abramowitz (2009, p. 116). On Perle's views towards Turkey's role to protect US interests, see Perle in Harris (ed.) 1985, p. 25; see also Perle (2012), Dworken (2003, p. 97) and Rau (2006, p. 71).

[15]Şükrü Elekdağ was one of the first names that came to the mind of the new US Ambassador to Ankara, Ronald Spiers, among the Turks he knew. Their long-time acquaintance went back to the 1960s, when Elekdağ was the head of NATO affairs for the Turkish Foreign Office. When Spiers came to Ankara, Elekdağ was a senior official in the Foreign Ministry. Elekdağ became Turkey's Ambassador to Washington after a short while. See Spiers (1998, p. 75).

back into the military wing of NATO, knew these folks, General Evren and the others, and had full confidence in them" (Williams 2010, p. 78). Indeed, when European officials raised criticisms, senior US officials lobbied to stop Turkey's expulsion from the Council of Europe (Athanassopoulou 2014, p. 32; Dodd 1983, p. 59). In fact, When Ambassador Spain was leaving in 1981 he presented another letter from Secretary of State Alexander Haig. The letter underlined continuing US support for the military regime but also noted that European criticism of the regime's some actions needs to be addressed (Spain, p. 234; see also Sezer in Eralp et al. 1993, p. 221).

Robert Strausz-Hupé, who, Güven Erkaya, later the Commander of the Turkish Navy, saw as a father to the idea of NATO (Baytok, p. 74), was appointed as the US Ambassador to Ankara in 1981. Shortly after the 1980 coup, Hupé, not yet US Ambassador at that time, came to Turkey to talk to Foreign Minister İlter Türkmen. Hupé was aware that US handling of Shah's Iran was disastrous. He now thought that Western interests in this region could only be protected by a triangle of Israel, the USA, and Turkey (Baytok 2005, pp. 252, 253). The fact that his was a 'political appointment' also indicates the importance the USA had attached to Turkey and the need to keep afloat the delicate relationship. As a political officer who worked with Hupe at the US Embassy said, "Ambassador Strausz-Hupé was focused on the strategic picture, the big picture most of the time and on enhancing the value of the Turks and the Turkish military in support of US security policy in the southern flank of NATO" (Schifferdecker 1998, p. 50). "He [Hupe] was a student of geo-politics, very much a believer in the theories that geography dictates your political position and your international political position" and he too, like Richard Perle, did not get on particularly well with the Foreign Service (Karaer 2005, p. 84).

High-level visits by US officials also contributed to the coup's success. Political officer at the US Embassy Arnold Schifferdecker (1980–1983) rematked that "presidential or vice-presidential visit did not occur between 1980–1983 and that may have been because there was a military regime in Turkey", yet he added that "the Turks were very receptive, of course, to just about any official attention from Washington, including the Congress" (Schifferdecker 1998, p. 50). US officials did want to come, however. Truly, Ambassador Spain had to restrain Defense Department Under Secretary Robert Komer and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jones (Spain 1998a), but Secretary of

Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State Alexander Haig still visited Turkey shortly after the military coup d'état "to let the Turks and the world know that America stood behind the new regime" (Campbell 1987, p. 63). "Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, then a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence too visited. The senator got across a brief and graceful statement on the importance the United States attached to a return to democracy. The prime minister got an impression of a courteous and well-informed American lawmaker. It was good for both sides" (Spain 1998a).

In early January of 1981 the military government hosted Admiral Crowe. Admiral William C. Crowe, who was so close to the Turkish generals and was very much admired for the high regard he had for Ataturk, said in October 1980 that "Turkey sits on the flank of any Soviet thrust into Iran or the Persian Gulf and is the only alliance nation which is Muslim and geographically located in the Middle East… No Western or Soviet planner can address the Middle East challenge without considering Turkey's orientation, terrain, airspace, forces and bases" (Karasapan 1989). The embodiment of US support for the military coup in the words of Admiral William Crowe shall be juxtaposed with the close relationship Crowe enjoyed with the Turkish Generals (Ergin Celasin, personal communication).

The attachment to Admiral Crowe went even further. When Turkish officers celebrated the Ataturk centennial at the NATO Headquarters in Naples, they played a film to show 'modern Turkey' and a presentation entitled 'Ataturk and Women Rights' were made. CINCSOUTH commander Admiral Crowe also delivered a speech expressing his admiration for Ataturk, which grew in him after Colonel Yekta Numanoğlu gave him a book about Ataturk. When Admiral Crowe later visited Turkish War Academy in 1983, he made a presentation, underscored Ataturk's statesmanship and said "incontrovertibly, if Ataturk was alive today he would have definitely supported the NATO alliance and Turkey's participation in it" (Akbaş 2014, pp. 126–127).

Only a month later, in February 1982 the US Senator from Texas John Tower, then the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, visited General Evren. Evren told him that they had to intervene military; otherwise, Turkey could have seen a civil war. Tower expressed sympathy and understanding as well as handing him a letter from President Reagan. In response to questions raised with regards to claims of torture in Turkish prisons, Tower said that "these criticisms are heard against any

country where a political transition occurred. These claims never cloud our assistance to Turkey. The current government did not come voluntarily but was forced and it wishes to return to democracy as soon as possible. This needs to be taken into consideration. We believe they will restore democracy" (Evren 1994, p. 295).

This was nothing unexpected though, because "One of the prerequisites for being a member of NATO was that the country must be democratic. There may have been some questions about one or two of the members at one time or another earlier in NATO's history, but at that point that was considered an absolute requirement" (Rowell 2016, p. 188). During the period when the military regime was in power new Foreign Minister Türkmen attended the General Assembly session at the United Nations and met the Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, which showed continuation of usual contacts and international links. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs David Jones also came to Turkey to talk to Evren. The Chairman had come out with a number of things, the Greece/Turkey relationship being one, and the return to civilian government another. I sat in on this meeting for the embassy (Cotter, p. 82). Ecmel Barutçu, a former Ambassador, attributed the USA's understanding to Turkey's leverage thanks to its position inside NATO and its excellent location in the context of the Soviet threat from the North.

> at the time armies of the communist Eastern bloc was sitting in the middle of Western Europe and geographic depth of the Western Europe until the Atlantic Ocean became very thin. In the event of a conflict, the Soviet army could move down to the shores of the Atlantic within 24 hours. In order to defend itself in such a scenario, NATO relied on its "flexible response" strategy but since this could lead to a wholesale nuclear war, which could destroy the U.S. and Europe, the West was very fearful. Under these conditions, Turkey as a wing country was greatly important to NATO and no Western European body/organ/institution was in a position to cast Turkey aside. (Barutçu 1999, pp. 252, 253)

Military and Economic Assistance

Both the Carter and the Reagan administrations openly supported the military government established after the September 12 coup. See Figs. 3.2 and 3.3 for US military and economic aid in the years following the coup.



Fig. 3.2 US grant aid and arms imports, 1980–1982 (millions of dollars) (Gabelnick, Hartun, and Washburn 1999)



Fig. 3.3 US aid, 1978–1982 (in millions of dollars) (USAID, Foreign Aid Explorer)

Both sets of data are taken from different sources confirm financial support for the military government after the 1980 coup. Although the Council of Europe suspended economic aid (Henze 1993, p. 45) the generals realized their goal of receiving US assistance in large quantities. The United States not only directly helped Turkey but, as with the case of the May 27 coup, they also "helped to secure Turkey an IMF credit of

$92 million in 1980 and postponed $350 million Turkish debts for the next year" (Dağı 1996, p. 127).

Washington supported Turkey in 1979 and 1980 at both the IMF and the World Bank. They played an important role in 'discreet' connection to the US Embassy (White 2001, p. 173). It also put pressure Japan and West Germany to give grants and loans at low interest rates to Turkey. And these US efforts continued until 1983. "Turkey managed to get out of its dire economic crisis mainly thanks to Western economic support orchestrated to a very large extent by the Americans" (Athanassopoulou 2014, p. 35). Long-standing debts on military purchases were cleared up. Weapons requirements lists under the security assistance program began to appear promptly and accurately (Spain, p. 25). Finally, surplus US Navy ships were given to Turkey in 1981, which Turkey added to its submarine and destroyer fleets (Spain, p. 46).

Discussion

The case of the September 12 coup shows that even when the coup was institutional in the sense that it was planned and carried out by the general command in unanimity, the coup makers valued US approval. Before the generals finally decided to intervene and on the date, whether there was US support for their actions was a subject of discussions among themselves. As General Evren admitted, they had already received necessary signals from their military counterparts in the USA prior to the coup to make a decision with peace of mind in terms of the external dimension. As Evren admitted, if they found resistance from their counterparts and consistent signals that a coup would be unacceptable, they would have thought twice before acting (Demirel 2003, p. 269). Yet again, in terms of organizational resources and mobilizing necessary domestic factors such as popular support, the Turkish military did not need external support. Nor did they need any persuasion because they had already been convinced of a coup as events developed.

The military-to-military relationships again proved very useful. The US Secretary of State Alexander Haig's personal ties with the Turkish general command and key personalities carried over from his post as the NATO SACEUR. High-level visits from the USA were assuring in the face of a more critical Europe. In this coup also the USA was not caught flatfooted; its prospects of being surprised was very slim given the fact

that even when the USA applied sanctions on Turkey after 1974, there were continuing contacts at the military level.

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CHAPTER 4

Pakistan: Two Coups, a Single Backer for the 'Most Allied-Ally'?

This chapter discusses the US's role in the two coups d'état in the modern history of Pakistan, in 1958 and 1977. Following a similar logic with the previous cases of coups d'état in Turkey, it is an attempt to understand and locate the US role in the Pakistani coup universe. It needs to be noted at the start that both coups were hierarchical ones that strictly maintained the command chain. This, when coupled with the fact that both coups were carried out against weak politicians with no substantial support base, posed less risks to the United States. Both coups in Pakistan also confirm the idea that the trigger for coups d'état remains a domestic one.

In the case of two quick coups in 1958 in Pakistan, the USA's signals were more direct and straightforward. In the case of the first coup lead by both Mirza[1] and Ayub, the former was in constant touch with the US Ambassador and made his intentions quite clear. This was enabled by the fact that the United States was more in contact with a few persons in Pakistan and found it comfortable to carry out its relations with

[1] "Sandhurst-trained officer in the British Indian Army, later joined the civil service. Held many posts (in chronological order): secretary of defence in independent Pakistan, governor of East Pakistan, home minister, governor general (he was the last one to hold this post before it was abolished), and finally the first president of the republic of Pakistan. Overthrown and sent into exile in October 1958 by General M. Ayub Khan. Died in London on 12 November 1969, nearly nine months after Ayub himself was overthrown by General A.M. Yahya Khan" (see Nawaz 2008, p. xxi).

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Pakistan over these people such as Iskander Mirza, who was a former military officer, and General Ayub Khan, who was in command of the Pakistani military. The post-coup US economic and military support was also clearer in the case of General Ayub's coup in 1958. When General Zia deposed PM Bhutto almost two decades later, in 1977, although his coup was again not condemned, US support for him was not as unambiguous as it had been in the previous case. Although the maintenance of Pakistani—US relations under Zia's government is attributed to Zia's military training and education in the USA and the Carter Administration sent enough negative signals to the Bhutto government, issues such as Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons and the Carter Administration's leaning toward India complicated the picture. Having said that, a review of the existing accounts of the first coup in 1958 will follow in the next section. This study will then discuss the US role at length.

Two Quick Coups

A level of neglect similar to that in Turkey for external dimensions can be detected in civil-military relations studies in Pakistan. Several authors prefer to talk mostly about domestic-level explanations of coups d'état, with little exploration or theorization of the external front (Aziz 2008, p. 6; Ziring 1997, p. 227). When they do focus on the internal factors behind military incursions into politics, civilian politicians incur the majority of the blame. According to Schiff, "it was the civilians' inability to construct an effective political decision making process that would protect the military's long-held professional ethic" (Schiff 1998, p. 39). In her view, "this [1958 coup] was not a situation of rogue officers determined to seize power because of their disagreement with the concept of civil institutional control. Rather this was a situation where ten years of political vacuum *forced* professionally trained generals to enter politics" (Schiff, p. 39; italics added). Some observers attribute the political role and interventions of the Pakistani military to the lack of strong civilian institutions and the vacuum that emerges as a result (Choudhury 1988, p. 27; Rıza 1984, p. 52; Baxter 2013, p. 349; Tahir-Kheli 1980, p. 641).

Others may reject the argument that corrupt politicians paved the way for the 1958 coup, but they shift the focus to the military instead, another domestic-level factor (Zafar Iqbal Cheema, personal

communication, October 1, 2015). There are certainly some scholars who recognize the role of the USA in the army's dominance of the political system in Pakistan (Murphy and Tamana 2010, p. 53; Jalal 1999, pp. 31, 286). It is not that other writers, who focus on the domestic level, discount the role of external factors; at times, indeed, they acknowledge that *realpolitik* shaped US policy toward Pakistan both during and after the Cold War. For this reason, the USA eventually recognized the military governments and worked with them at the expense of weakening the civilian parties and institutions. What these writers overlook is a thorough discussion on the mechanisms and instruments involved when the USA played its role in the military coups d'état.

As had also occurred in Turkey, the Pakistani military was politicized several years before the staging of the first coup, in 1958.[2] "The immediate onset of the conflict over Kashmir in 1947–1948 with a militarily and politically stronger India made the military central to the state's survival and placed it above civilian scrutiny" (Shah 2011, p. 71). Pakistan was, therefore, born with an innate sense of insecurity (Cheema in Fleiner et al. 2000). As early as 1952 Pakistan allegedly experienced its first military coup attempt, called the Rawalpindi Conspiracy. Officers who allegedly revolted to take over were frustrated with the way Kashmir war was fought and lost in 1948. They believed that nobody paid enough attention to the Kashmir problem after the war either (Ghani 2010, pp. 70–71).[3]

Pakistan found itself surrounded with its perceived arch-enemy India, which had not abided by the agreement to give Pakistan the agreed assets and money due from the partition agreement. Therefore, Pakistan started out at a disadvantage and had very little means (Mitha 2003, pp. 112–113; see also Yamin 2012, p. 119). Pakistan was in such bad shape at its foundation that it did not have the clerical class that it needed, meaning that the initial administrations had to retain British officials to train the government personnel (Cootes 1998, p. 33). "The Pakistan army was in some ways an admirable outfit, but in modern

[2]When asked if he had thought when he became Commander-in-Chief that he would have to stage some sort of intervention eventually, General Ayub Khan said that when he encountered politicians he did feel that none of them had what it required to fix Pakistan. See Ghani (2010, pp. 69–70).

[3]It needs to be noted that whether there really was a coup plot remains shrouded in mystery. See Venkataramani (1984, pp. 151–152) and Z.A. Khan (2000, p. 24).

terms it was a joke… They didn't have enough supplies to fight more than about three weeks if they had a war" (Bell 1998, p. 33; Arif Ayub, personal communication, October 5, 2015; Bashir Ahmad, personal communication, October 5, 2015; Rıza 1984, pp. 29, 47). The shortage of institutions and manpower forced Pakistan to keep British officers in the military as well. "It was the Royal Pakistan Army, the Royal Pakistan air force and Royal Pakistan navy. All of the commanders were British" (Spain 1998b, p. 6; Mitha 2003, pp. 148, 158, 166).

Although the founders of Pakistan had a secular vision for the country, the narrative concerning the founding ideology of the country shifted over time as Pakistan entered wars and also suffered a series of acute crises, from political ones to floods and droughts. The Pakistani army adopted the symbols of Islam from the beginning in order to separate itself and the country clearly from the Indians. However, the senior echelons of the Pakistani Army had their roots in the British *Raj*, which separated the military from civil society. The Pakistani senior generals were also, initially, largely secular, liberal in outlook and lifestyle and moderate in nature (Nawaz in Lodhi 2011, p. 81; Tahir-Kheli 1982, pp. 8, 106; see Mitha 2003, pp. 123, 132, 229–230; Nawaz 2008, p. xxxi; Haqqani 2013, pp. 16, 47, 69). "Immediately after Independence, social life continued very much the same for the fairly large number of British and westernized Pakistani officers and their families" (Mitha 2003, p. 262). In the formation of the country, the "Pakistan military had British and American generations of Westernized, upper-class officers in its first 20 years and these officers were more secular-oriented. It was only after the 1971 debacle, in which East Pakistan was lost, and after the armed forces opened up to lower classes that the army gradually became conservative" (Shah, p. 163; Riedel 2014, p. 58; Hyman et al. pp. 20–21). While President Ayub Khan as a Sandhurst-trained general represented the first batch of officers (Suleri, pp. 160–161), General Zia is claimed to have belonged to the later batch of ""native" generals, with an indigenous ethos" (Hussain 1990, p. 19), which arguably became more conservative and skeptical of the USA (Hyman et al. p. 21). General Zia, however, as this study will discuss in the next chapters, did not fit neatly into this category. Though he was described as more conservative than previous batch of commanders in chief, he was not as skeptical of the USA or the West as he is usually portrayed.

In contrast to the Turkish case, where there was no civilian vacuum emerging after the death of Kemal Atatürk, there was no civilian

politician who was assertive and competent enough to consolidate civilian supremacy over the army in Pakistan especially after the deaths of both Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Nor was the military itself very open to the idea of a strong civilian leader (Aziz, p. 62). Liaquat Ali Khan held the PM and Defense Minister portfolios but because of his busy schedule he could not attend to matters in the Defense Ministry. This created enormous space for the Commander-in-Chief to fill in decision-making process. With these opportunities, the military disregarded the appropriate procedures in demanding and ordering weapons and other equipment (Shah 2014, pp. 61–63).

Large numbers of military officers looked favorably on the idea of taking over the government as early as 1952. A senior general himself rejected this idea only because "the Pakistani military did not have men knowledgeable about governmental affairs" (Shah 2014, p. 66; also Aziz, p. 10), implying that the army could take over if it had the support of enough men who were expert in government issues. However, the same general, Ayub Khan, assured US diplomats that the "Pakistan army will not allow the political leaders to get out of hand, and the same is true regarding the people of Pakistan" and "the army would declare a military government in order to secure stability" (Shah 2014, p. 67).

It was notably the military that initiated, controlled, and managed the process to ink military alliance with the USA in 1952. In the years of political turmoil that followed Liaquat Khan's assassination in 1951, the first Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan, was also given the Defense Minister's portfolio first and then Interior Minister Iskander Mirza, who had been a military officer, replaced the ailing Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy,[4] the opposition leader (PM a year later) thought that the military's hold over the country now came closer to completion (Musa 1984, p. 119).

[4]Suhrawardy was "the pre-partition [Pakistan] Muslim League chief minister of united Bengal and founder of the opposition Awami League Party… [He] had led political demonstrations against the government in East Pakistan when Ayub was commanding the army's only division there and had once been confronted by Ayub who asked him if he was 'looking for a bullet'". See Nawaz (2008, p. 130).

US Foreign Policy Toward Pakistan

Starting from the time when Pakistan was founded and Jinnah was still alive, Pakistan looked in anticipation to the United States to assist the newborn state (Haqqani, pp. 33–34). Jinnah's special emissary Laik Ali, Mirza Abol Ispahani, who later became Pakistan's first Ambassador to Washington, and Feroz Khan Noon all made contacts with the State Department and the US Embassy in *Ankara* and presented proposals to persuade the Truman Administration to assist the fledgling new nation (Venkataramani 1984, pp. 16–25). However, the Truman Administration bluntly turned down Pakistan's requests. The European continent, the Middle East, and the Asian mainland were all seen as being far more within the US ambit of interests. Not only President Truman had little knowledge about South Asia, major figures within his administration showed very little interest in the region (Venkataramani, pp. 4–5, 21, 29; Haqqani, pp. 38, 44). It was only the Pentagon, which suggested to the State Department that no South Asian country other than Pakistan could serve US strategic interests from the military point of view in 1948, that manifested interest (Venkataramani 1984, pp. 65–67).

Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, travelled to the United States in May 1950, an event which, for some, marks the true initiation of Pakistani—US relations. PM Khan was given a warm welcome in Washington, where he addressed the US Congress. "The gregarious prime minister [Pakistani PM Liaquat Khan] enjoyed entertaining at his home, at times asking American guests to remain for late-night jazz sessions, during which Liaquat enthusiastically beat the drums", which helped the US Embassy staff not to empathize with the Pakistani predicament over the newly formed state and the Kashmir issue (Kux 2001a, p. 26). During Liaquat Ali Khan's term, there was also some cultural affinity between Pakistan and the USA at the civilian elite level in addition to military level (Newsom 1998, p. 9). The Pakistani military wing was onboard with the project to get US assistance to build up the Pakistani powerhouse they dreamed of: "Field Marshall Ayub Khan was already pondering about it [military aid] in August 1951 as he was aware that Pakistan needed a strong and trustworthy friend to counter the Indian threat" (Khan 1963, p. 154).

Pakistan was adamant in proving its worth to received much-needed assistance. The new Pakistani Ambassador to the USA, Muhammad Ali

Bogra, tried to prove to his US interlocutors in San Francisco on June 12, 1952 that Pakistan could also be useful: "do not count Pakistan as a neutral nation of Asia our basic sympathies are strongly with the West" (Akbar 1992, p. 72). "In August 1952, when General Jilani was about to leave for America to take over his appointment as the Military, Naval and Air Attaché in that country, he was briefed by General Ayub to negotiate with the authorities at the Pentagon and impress upon them the desirability of strengthening Pakistan militarily, for the regional security of the Middle East and South East Asia… General Gilani sent periodic reports to General Ayub about his progress with the authorities in Washington" (Yaqub 1986, p. 93). Brigadier Jilani built good relations with the US establishment and was situated in the Pakistani Embassy in Washington to keep General Ayub abreast of the developments (Nawaz 2008, p. 101). However, despite their desire to receive financial and military aid from the United States, Pakistan refused to dispatch soldiers to Korea. The USA interpreted as meaning that "in 1952 in terms of world affairs and such issues as Korea and the gestating Cold War, Pakistanis at all levels were just as neutral as the Indians" (Spain 1998b, p. 9).

The Republicans' rise to the White House in 1953 proved very critical for US—Pakistani relations. Even before Eisenhower had become president, he had promised, in his election campaign, to enlist Pakistan in the fight against communism and opening airfields there for that purpose (Haqqani 2005, p. 57). The Indian neutralism in the emerging bipolar rivalry, which had already created serious question marks in US policy circles, now became truly irksome to the Eisenhower Administration (Haqqani 2005, p. 58). When the Eisenhower Administration won the elections and Pakistan learned the pro-Pakistani sentiments of the new administration, Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad appointed Bogra as prime minister, "hoping that his standing in Washington would help with Pakistan's quest for aid" (Haqqani 2005, p. 59). The USA officially cared very much about helping Bogra as PM because he was a friend (Haqqani 2005, pp. 65–66; Yamin 2012, p. 118). When the United States finally decided to help Pakistan it was largely as the result of that country's strategic location in the emerging Cold War geopolitics:

> Pakistan was seen as one of the key countries in terms of the containment policy against the Soviet Union and the PRC… Pakistan was the only South Asian country which belonged to both the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and SEATO. It was therefore seen as a key country in terms of

> stemming the advance of communism into South and Southeast Asia. For that reason—particularly in the Eisenhower administration—Pakistan rated quite high in terms of American foreign policy interests in that part of the world. (Van Hollen 1998, pp. 9–10; see also Asghar Khan 1983, pp. 203–204; Khan 1963, p. 153; McMahon 1994, p. 213)

Pakistani efforts were gradually reciprocated by the US officials, civilian and military alike. There were mutual visits between the Governor-General of Pakistan and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army and the Vice President of the United States in November 1953 (Khan 1963, p. 154). When Commander of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Arthur W. Radford visited Pakistan in 1954–1955 he found the Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad very sick and thought that power struggle in Pakistan was very near. His favorite candidate to succeed him was General Ayub (Nawaz 2008, p. 125). As General Ayub started to slowly shine as a possible power contender, he had established contact with some senior US officials and he had close relations with Allen Dulles, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (Kux 2001b, pp. 289–290). Ayub's diary shows that, at Ayub's request, Allen Dulles interceded on behalf of Pakistan with the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, his brother. In one of his visits to Washington, Allen Dulles arranged for Ayub to meet the US Chiefs of Services. In his meeting with US generals, Ayub was able to impress upon them that India, which had adopted a neutralist stance in international affairs, would never prove a reliable partner whereas they could count on Pakistan for the preservation of the 'free world' (Gauhar 1996, p. 45; Khan 1967, p. 59).

Military-to-military relationships also began to flourish. Admiral Arthur Radford was very impressed with General Ayub, who he saw as an official "in a position to deliver the goods" and "willing to do so" (Haqqani, p. 66). This connection between the US admiral and General Ayub translated into favorable input by the US military in the American decision-making process regarding US—Pakistan relations (Haqqani, p. 75). The fact that "Radford's favorable personal disposition toward Ayub ensured the Pentagon's support for continuing military assistance" even when the US Ambassador to Pakistan, James Langley, pointed out toward the end of the 1950s the failed returns from US assistance to Pakistan is another testimony to the importance of military-to-military relationships (Haqqani 2013, p. 88). The accession to the premiership of Prime Minister Suhrawardy, a politician from East Pakistan, further

advanced the bilateral relationship. Suhrawardy had been very close to the USA from the time he had become the Pakistani Minister of Law. In fact, whether he knew it or not, he was under supervision and in the close company of two officers from the US Embassy, one of whom was working for the CIA. When Suhrawardy became the PM, his close relationship with the USA continued. As one of the two US officers, John O. Bell, Chief of US Operations Mission in Karachi from 1955 to 1957, said "he wanted to keep allied with America because he knew he was getting money out of it and it was good for Pakistan" (Bell, p. 31).[5]

Face-to-Face in Uniforms

As argued in the theoretical chapter, military-to-military relationship as complementary to civil-military relationship is key to making sense of the US role in coups in Pakistan. This section details how the Pakistani—US military-to-military relationship transformed into a flourishing connection towards the end of the 1950s.

After the United States and Pakistan concluded a bilateral defense agreement in 1954 and Pakistan joined CENTO in 1955, the US aid came in with all dimensions involved but, as repeated before, this was in no way a straightforward process (Venkataramani, p. 324; Mitha, p. 165). US engineers moved to Pakistan to undertake military construction as part of the US military assistance to Pakistan. "The Department of Defense designated this a 'crash' program and assigned the highest priority to improving an existing airfield at *Mauripur*. Members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Pakistan also pressed for quick action by the Army engineers" (Grathwol and Moorhus 2009, p. 97). US military and economic aid kicked in. Very differently from Turkey, where 7454 US personnel were stationed by 1960,[6] however, the number of US military advisors that came to Pakistan to remodel and train Pakistan armed forces remained comparatively small. As Farooq Lodhi, a retired Pakistani Navy general, said,

[5]The same goes for Mohammed Ali Bogra, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali and Firaz Noon as well, see Chishti (1989, p. 202).

[6]According to Gunn, true number is a whopping 13,000 if families are included, see Gunn (2015, pp. 107–108).

> Americans never came in very large numbers, in terms of boots on the ground, coming and training the military. Because we had a British military tradition and all we needed NATO books and weapons. We never needed an American instructor to teach us, unless we were inducting a new weapon to train our soldiers to use it. They came in small numbers only and for a couple of weeks. We traditionally do not like other armies' boots on the ground; there is resistance to it here. We never truly sort of received more than 2–5 instructors at one time. We never had an advisory group such as JUSMMAT. We never had 1000 American officers in Pakistan, unlike Turkey and Iran did.[7] Iran had 8000 officers and 30,000 Americans in total at one point. They even used to operate their own television. (Personal communication, October 1, 2015)

What difference this created is that the USA's penetration of the Pakistani military remained less deep and sophisticated in the 1950s. To recall, Pakistani governments did not dispatch soldiers to Korea either and the institutional links with the United States through CENTO and SEATO remained looser than those provided to Turkey by NATO. Under these circumstances, the US reach to the Pakistani armed forces was restricted to the top level. This made it necessary to influence things from the top and rendered the US role more visible and straightforward than the Turkish case in 1960. In the Turkish case, the US penetration of the Turkish armed forces was far better, so was the corollary US knowledge of it and several entry points.

The limited size of the US Military Advisory Group in Pakistan was also related to the non-institutionalized nature of Pakistani—US bilateral relations. Pakistani governments made little use of the Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) office in Pakistan to relay their requests from Washington. Instead, Ayub Khan, for instance, used its Washington contacts directly without any intermediary (Tahir-Kheli, 6).

> The US Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG) officers interpreted 'assistance' and 'advice' to include close supervision of Pakistani chain of command. They rationalized that they had to submit periodic reports to Pentagon on the proper utilization of aid. Brig Yahya (DCGS)

[7] JAMMAT in Turkey had 1250 military and civilian personnel in 1951 and it was one of the largest American Military Advisory and Assistance Groups around the world (Bernath 1985, p. 6).

> decided that MAAG officers would visit units only after clearance from GHQ [General Headquarters]. They would always be accompanied by a Pakistani conducting officer. The visits would be informatory, and under no circumstances allowed to cut through normal chain of command. Pakistan, perhaps, was the only aid recipient country where MAAG was kept within the provision of assistance and advice. Nevertheless, some US officers tried to trespass the prerogatives of command. In one case the dichotomy led almost to fist-cuffs. (Rıza, p. 47)

A large number of officers, in the hundreds, went to the United States schools for training. On their return, this time MAAG officers wanted to involve in where returning Pakistani officers would be posted. The General Staff turned this down (Rıza, p. 47).

Very much in the spirit of Turkey's approach to officers trained in the United States, the Pakistani officers trained abroad received promotion and became teachers when they returned (Ali 2014, p. xvi). General Zia participated in the US Command and General Staff College in 1963. On his return, he was promoted and appointed as instructor to the Command and Staff College in Quetta, Pakistan (Hyman et al. p. 20). US training efforts included forming a commando/ranger unit for "behind-the-scenes" activities and organize resistance in case Communists took over Pakistan. "The idea was to train a unit which would organize and conduct 'stay behind activities' under the guise of a Commando unit" (Mitha, p. 177; Z.A. Khan, p. 96). This unit was formed in a few months in Cherat with the approval of the highest echelons of the Pakistani armed forces. In order to learn more about behind-the-scenes activities, General A.O. Mitha was sent to the United States, where he was given training and education about guerrilla warfare, mountain warfare training, parachute training and shown the equipment used, which was far lighter than the weapons the USA had given them earlier (Mitha, p. 183).

Several officers still received military education in the UK in the 1950s (Khan 2000, p. 31; Rıza, pp. 35–36, 57). There too, very similar to the US training and education program, they were taken to visit allied countries in Europe to see famous historical battlefields and other touristic places as part of their stay at the school (Husain 2015, pp. 103–107; Ali 2014, p. xvi). With or without the US military advisors visiting Pakistan, similar to Turkey's transition from the Prussian military tactics, strategy and weaponry to the USA, the Pakistani military underwent a

gradual but critical transition from the British tactics, education, and weaponry to the US ones in the 1950s.

With the US aid teams coming to inspect and guide the use of aid, a complete overhaul of the army was carried out. This "involved reformation of field formations, training centers, schools of instruction, static installations, and even GHQ" (Rıza, pp. 36–37). A young Pakistani officer who returned from an Artillery course in the United States in 1956 remarked that "the army was undergoing a major change as US equipment began to flow in under a military aid agreement. I was put in charge of a small group of instructors to develop new military doctrine and procedures that could apply to both the new US weapons and the old British ones we already had" (Ali, p. xvi). While the most senior leadership, many of whom may have fought in World War II, was British trained, the younger ones were overwhelmingly US trained and fared far better than the former (personal communication with Bashir Ahmad, October 5, 2015).

This willing tilt toward the USA created dependence on US weaponry over time that Ayub Khan said in 1966 that "we have in a way adopted their system, their instruments and their methods… ninety-percent of our equipment is American equipment" (Ghani, pp. 240–241; Baxter, pp. 50, 81; also Siddiqa-Agha 2003, p. 98).[8] A powerful military-to-military channel was also established with the essential help of military training and education opportunities abroad. "Between 1954 and 1965, members of the officer corps were routinely trained in the United States until the second India—Pakistan war in 1965 triggered an American military aid embargo" (Shah, p. 70; Z.A. Khan, p. 69). In fact, the United States allocated $12.2 million for Pakistani officers' professional education and training in the United States from 1953 to 1961 (Maniruzzaman 1992, pp. 733–755, p. 742). The study tours and other training visits to allow Pakistani officers to get to become more familiar with US equipment and also learn US techniques largely shaped the officer corps. As Muqeem Khan argued,

> such healthy and friendly contacts [with the American officers during visits and training programs] were bound to have a decisive influence on the

[8] Pakistan's financial and military dependence on the USA was most acute from 1954 to 1962, see Butt and Schofield (2012, p. 5), Syed (1970, pp. 20–22), Hussain (1990, p. 11), and Baxter (2013, pp. 46, 170, 274).

> ideas of the officer corps. They soon made their impact on the thinking of Pakistani commanders and staff. [very similar to Turkey] In the reorganization of the army, American ideas influenced the planners in a number of ways… The impact of new weapons and equipment, combined with American concepts of military thought have had an influence on the army's tactics. (p. 159)

Once again to some extent similar to the Turkish case, US officers were not, at least initially, always welcomed with open arms. Although the Pakistani officers were happy that military assistance came in and they now had the possibility to excel at their job and become powerful enough to stand up to India (Tughral Yamin, personal communication, October 10, 2015), in some locations the relationship between Pakistani and US officers were occasionally troubled (Mitha, p. 178). For instance, when US officers responsible for training with the Special Services Group (SSG) unit tried to live an US-style luxurious life in the Pakistani conditions of the 1950s, this reportedly created several problems between them and their Pakistani colleagues. There was little intermingling between the two, since Pakistani officers were warned not to do so (Mitha, p. 209).

Nevertheless, Muqeem Khan confirms that relations between Pakistani and US officers were rocky in the beginning, mostly because the US officers had come with fixed ideas on the Pakistani armed forces. However, as the time passed, relations became healthier. Pakistani officers were glad to receive US weapons and equipment, which had been the best and most modern available at the time (Khan 1963, pp. 157–159; personal communication with Bashir Ahmad). Rıza counts 'United States Military Assistance' among the three factors that affected the character of the army from 1947 to 1965 (p. 75). "Through the US Military Assistance we obtained more than material. Hundreds of our officers (Lt Col down to Capt) attended courses of instruction in USA. On their return, they exerted considerable influence in reorganizing the structure and training of the Army" (Rıza, p. 76).

The Road to Coups D'état

President Iskander Mirza had long wanted to dismiss the General Assembly and declare Martial Law because he did not believe that the country was yet ready for democratic rule. When he and General

Ayub felt it was finally time they declared the Martial Law on October 7, 1958. Lt. Colonel Thompson of the US Army at the helm of the Military Advisory Group [with small number of US officers; very short term in nature, unlike JUSMMAT] called General Mitha when he learned of the coup to ask him how come he was not told about it in advance (Mitha, p. 215). However, this should not be taken to mean that President Mirza and General Ayub Khan conspired without the knowledge of the United States. Given the closeness of the relationship between Mirza and the US Ambassador, this was highly unlikely.

Indeed, President Mirza and the US Ambassador were so close that the US Department of State wished that instead of always asking the US Ambassador, "this leadership [Prime Minister Suhrawardy and President Mirza] developed capacity and habit make own decisions in important matters national policy with US and other friends playing role occasional counselor rather than constant mentor" ("Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan", 1958, February 4; see also "Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State" 1958, January 31). According to Asghar Khan, the father of the Pakistan Air Force, "Iskander Mirza's pro-Americanism often embarrassed the Americans."[9] One must point out that this rapport between President Mirza and the US Ambassador continued until the coup. In fact, it is reported that the US Ambassador advised President Mirza to replace his Army Chief Ayub Khan because by occupying the same post for so long the latter may have nurtured political ambitions of his own. President Mirza agreed and decided to send General Ayub out as ambassador, but General Ayub struck first (Khattak 2004, pp. 110–112).

When Mirza contemplated making some thorough extra-legal changes to the political system through an unconstitutional act, a coup d'état with the help of the military, the USA was surprised by the level and depth of Mirza's disclosure of information. In a very encouraging note, the Administration hastened to tell him that:

> there may be exceptions which can be justified for limited periods [to democratic form of government]. That decision must be left entirely for Pakistan leaders and people to decide. USG however would hope that as

[9] Asghar Khan (1983, p. 12); Iskander Mirza would not be the last 'civilian' politician asking for advice from the US Embassy in Islamabad. See Chap. 5.

> outsider who respects Pakistan's sovereignty and cherishes its close and friendly bonds with that country, that any decision to set aside Pakistan's long-held aims continuously to work toward the firm establishment of its democratic institutions should be taken only after most serious consideration and, in a sense, only as last resort. ("Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan" 1958, May 21)

Nawaz rightly interpreted this as a 'green light for a change' given to Mirza when appropriate conditions are satisfied (2008, p. 153). The USA had relayed another message to Mirza that too could have been taken as a pending positive signal in case of a takeover as well. The USA had told President Mirza that US interests in Pakistan were not tied to one particular person in Pakistan. What mattered was political stability ("Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan" 1958, February 4). As of September 30, 1958, a report sent out by the US Consulate in Peshawar in case something was done by Mirza and Ayub stated that the Pakistan Army was firmly pro-United States. Most of the military officers were appreciative of US assistance, but they were equally unhappy with how the country was being ruled by politicians at that moment (Nawaz, p. 155). This was a clear in-house affirmative evaluation of a possible military coup d'état in Pakistan.

When President Mirza made up his mind and reached consensus with General Ayub on the martial law, US Ambassador Langley sent an "eyes only for Secretary and Under Secretary" telegram back to Washington 4 October 1958, informing the US Embassy that "he would take over the Government of Pakistan probably within a week and simultaneously proclaim martial law. The constitution will be suspended, a commission created to write a new constitution, and elections now scheduled for February 15 will not be held." ("Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State" 1958, October 5).

The following day the Embassy sent another "Eyes only for Secretary and Under Secretary" telegram on the same issue. The US Ambassador expounded the details of his meetings with President Mirza and the latter's justifications and plans for the imposition of martial law and thereafter. According to the Ambassador's telegram, President Mirza told him that he would consult with the military the next day (October 6) and then shape the date and form of the martial law. In his telegram the

next day, Ambassador Langley opined that they had all indications of full army support behind the plan and said that "Ayub, like Mirza, will support pro-West policies. He will want continued US aid. I believe the military will be united in this" ("Telegram From the Embassy", October 5). The telegram sent by the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, Frederic P. Bartlett, to William Manning Rountree, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, just before the coup hosted a section titled 'foreign policy' and said:

> Foreign policy issues are not directly involved in the present crisis. Mirza and Ayub, who would apparently dominate the new regime, have been architects and pillars of Pakistan's pro-western foreign policy. Our concern arises from our interest in Pakistan's stability, which we are not sure will be enhanced by authoritarian government, and from the fact that we might to some degree be ascribed responsibility, both by Pakistanis and others, for the suspension of democratic processes in Pakistan. ("Memorandum From the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Bartlett)" 1958, October 7)

With the information provided by the US Embassy on these political developments in Pakistan, the Department of State felt that they had three options; either "actively support Mirza—Ayub takeover" or "Actively oppose Mirza—Ayub takeover even to extent of threatening to withdraw or reduce aid" or "While expressing our belief in democratic, popularly based governments as in the long run assuring greatest good to greatest number of people of any country and while making clear we are not convinced of Pakistan's immediate need to depart from democratic institutions, take position, if only by implication, that ultimately final decision must be by Pakistan leaders." The USA chose the third option ("Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan" 1958, October 6). And the "Operation Overlord", planned three weeks in advance and disclosed to only three generals of the General Staff according to Mirza himself, was executed smoothly on October 7, 1958 (Venkataramani, p. 391).

US Reactions to the Coups

In his conversation with the Afghan Ambassador to Washington, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, William Rountree, said that given the past trajectory of developments

in Pakistan the martial law did not come as a surprise. When the martial law was declared and Ayub became the Martial Law Administrator, "Mirza then sent a personal message to President Eisenhower requesting his 'sympathy and cooperation in the difficult period ahead' and assuring him that Pakistan would 'honor all our commitments and will remain loyal to the free world.'" (Nawaz, p. 156). In addition, US officials in charge were happy that "Mirza included the Ambassador of Afghanistan along with the Ambassadors of the United States, Turkey, and Iran in the diplomatic group which he invited to his house on the evening of the take-over to explain his action". The USA felt pleased that Ayub and Mirza had no plan to shift Pakistan's axis in external orientation ("Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Afghan Ambassador" 1958, October 13).

Only four days after the declaration of the Martial law on October 7, President Eisenhower sent President Mirza a letter in which he officially confirmed US support. In the letter the president thanked Mirza for his "assurance that Pakistan will honor its commitments and remain loyal to the free world." President Eisenhower regretted that President Mirza was obliged to "resort to extraordinary political measures to avert a national catastrophe." He emphasized "the bonds of friendship and common interest" which unite the USA and Pakistan and wished Mirza success in redesigning the constitution and working for the welfare of the Pakistani people. When Langley delivered the President's letter to Mirza on October 12, the latter was pleased to receive it and wanted to release the contents of it after consulting with General Ayub. The Department of State informed the US Ambassador that the president did not want disclosure of his letter. ("Letter From President Eisenhower to President Mirza" 1958, October 11). Allen Dulles had the most positive view of the coup d'état as well. "The take-over of political power in Pakistan by President Mirza had so far gone reasonably calmly, said Mr. Dulles, with the Army in complete charge of the country. There had been many arrests. This development in Pakistan, as with earlier the military takeover in Burma, provided further indications of how difficult it was to make democracy work effectively in such underdeveloped countries" ("Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State" 1958, October 15). The latter provided the main ideational justification of coups d'état in different places during the Cold War in the eyes of the US governments.

Allen Dulles' brother, John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, also echoed the US Administration's sympathetic tone in a letter addressed to President Mirza on October 17. Dulles had been very cognizant of the fact that for the sake of stability and American interests in the region, he had to deal with Mirza and Ayub, "the "head dogs" in Pakistan" (Venkataramani, p. 382). Brother Dulles also regretted seeing a constitution suspended, but it would be wrong to generalize about these matters. In the end, he believed the sincerest intentions and dedication of Mirza and General Ayub and therefore what initially appeared hazardous could turn out to be benign. He hoped that a constitutional form of government based on the consent of the governed will be formed soon. He assured President Mirza that what happened in Pakistan would not change the close ties between the two countries and he expressed his deepest sympathies with the heavy workload Mirza and Ayub would have in finding the right government tailored to suit the local conditions in Pakistan. Mirza was, again, happy with the letter ("Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to President Mirza" 1958, October 17).

The honeymoon period for Mirza and General Ayub did not last long, however. Regardless of Mirza's very close relationship with the US Ambassador to Karachi, the army was the most powerful domestic political actor in the country. General Ayub Khan started to become suspicious about Mirza's plans and thought that Mirza was trying to get rid of him. Indeed, this was Mirza's intention. Mohammad Asghar Khan,[10] who was Air Vice Marshall at the time of both coups and accompanied General Ayub in several meetings about military assistance with US officials, claims that General Ayub was informed by the Military Intelligence through a phone call between Finance Minister Syed Amjad Ali and President Mirza that the latter was planning to dismiss General Ayub. The chief generals convened and decided to ask Mirza to resign on October 27 (Asghar Khan 1983, pp. 8–9). This shows that the military had become so powerful that it also tapped President Mirza's phone. After Mirza accepted to resign, General Ayub met ambassadors of foreign nations and notified them of his action. When Ayub ditched Mirza to assume all power there was for himself, he assured the USA

[10]As the Air Chief of the Pakistani army he was replaced by Nur Khan in July 1965. After his retirement he became the President of Pakistan International Airlines and later found his own political party, *Tehriq-i Istiqlal*.

that he could provide stability to the country and Pakistan would be pro-Western in foreign policy.

Aqil Shah says no primary Pakistani or US source exists to support the argument that the USA either fomented or sponsored Ayub's coup (2014, p. 90). However, Ayub's takeover did not come surprising to the United States either. When President Mirza and Ayub took over three weeks ago, the Embassy saw it highly likely that Mirza and Ayub duumvirate may not last long. In the Embassy's calculation, "if one had to pick between Mirza and Ayub as the ultimate top man, latter with his direct control over the army, which is the solid element and undoubtedly the controlling force in Pakistan today, would be the favorite by a narrow margin" ("Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State" 1958, October 8). How can we explain the fact that the United States did not feel too threatened by these convulsions in Pakistan and the reasons behind the US approval of these coups? One unexpected development in the region was also a factor in US calculations. Qassim's coup in Iraq in 1958, one of the rare coups in those decades that worried the West (Parker 1998, p. 23), threatened the strategic balance in the region in favor of the Soviet Union. In particular, it increased the importance of Pakistan, Iran as well as Turkey for the United States. Afraid of Soviet expansion towards the South, the USA saw it fit to increase its military and economic assistance to Pakistan (McMahon 1994, p. 254). What the USA cared most about in the year 1958 in Pakistan was political stability rather than political prospects of any one leader or leaders. This was a message given by the Secretary of State to the Pakistani political leadership facing domestic convulsions (Nawaz, p. 151).

The 1958 Pakistani military coup, led by Chief of Staff Ayub Khan, who was the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief after senior British generals' exit, did not affect these strategic considerations in a negative way. The British envoy applauded the move by an "efficient, honest, and loyal army because only it could bring about 'stability and progress'" (McMahon 1994, p. 255). It is important to see that coup flashed 'stability, predictability' in the minds of US policy-makers in that period of the Cold War. US Ambassador Horace Hildreth had made the same assessment, concluding that 'the Pakistani military was the most stabilizing force' (McMahon 1994, p. 255; Nawaz, p. 149). This meant that what mattered with such unpredictable moves was making sure that these acts went as smoothly as possible, without risking any civil war in an ally or a friendly nation.

US support after the coup was again unwavering. The NSC summarized the US position in the following sentences: "Support the present government of Pakistan so long as it remains friendly to the United States, and seek to insure that any successor is not Communist controlled and is friendly to the United States" (quoted in Shah, p. 90). According to Shah, "given the Pakistani military's critical dependence on US armaments, the military is unlikely to have moved against civilian rule without a green signal from Washington" (Shah, p. 91). According to Shah, this shows that US support played an 'enabling' role but not a 'decisive' one (Shah, p. 92). According to Mohammad Asghar Khan, the Eisenhower Administration endorsed General Ayub. "Since assuming his responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army he had been a frequent visitor to Washington where he went almost every year. He had good contacts with the people in the Pentagon and was well known to Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA and brother of John Foster Dulles, the United States Secretary of State. Ayub Khan's visits to Washington between 1951 and 1958 invariably included a call on Allen Dulles" (Khan 1983, p. 11).

Political Support

Ayub Khan had been worried before intervening that "the outside world was going to interpret the action of the army as a *coup d'état* which frequently occurred in certain other countries. This would have had a damaging effect on the image and reputation of Pakistan" (Ayub Khan 1967, p. 58). His concerns proved unfounded, however. According to Allen Dulles, the coup in Pakistan 'went reasonably well'. The fact that the coup went reasonably well immediately factored into US assessments of it (McMahon 1994, p. 255). Gauhar claims that the US Ambassador to Pakistan Horace Hildreth had persuaded the State Department and the Pentagon that there was a pro-Western group of people in ruling positions in Pakistan. General Ayub Khan was among this group of six people. He had already been at the forefront and was closely known to US policy circles (Gauhar 1996, p. 40). Once again, the USA found it easier to deal with the military and get things done faster (Arif Ayub, personal communication, October 5, 2015; Zafar Iqbal Cheema, personal communication, October 1, 2015). Ayub had made a very positive impression with the Embassy officers before he

took over (Bell, pp. 32–33). Dennis Kux, who then worked at the US Embassy as a political officer, reported that there was sight of relief in the country after Ayub Khan took over. Things started to work much better under the martial law ran by the military. Repeating the Head of CIA, John Dulles' remarks after Mirza's coup, Kux admitted that "there was a feeling at the time that maybe we were too facile in assuming that democracy was the best way for Third World countries. Maybe they [countries such as Burma] needed a period of firmer rule and stability before they could make democracy work" (Kux 1998, p. 27; see also Smith 2003, p. 14).

The US Ambassador saw General Ayub four days after the coup. In their short meeting, the US Ambassador expressed "on behalf of USG sincere good wishes for his success in achieving important goals which he has set himself for promoting welfare of people of Pakistan." The Ambassador:

> "assured President Ayub that wherever appropriate and within its available resources USG desires assist GOP in future as it has in past." In response, "President Ayub said he was not surprised. He had expected such a message from such warm friends as the US. He was much pleased however to receive this expression of good wishes which he heartily reciprocated. He asked me [Robert H. Knight, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs] to assure USG that *recent developments have, if anything, strengthened Pakistan's faithfulness to its alliances. Pakistan is more than ever on the side of the free people of the West. Continuance US aid is matter of life and death to Pakistan*. He stressed his view that *Pakistan revolution unique in recent times in that it was a revolution away from Communism rather than towards Communism*" [italics added]. ("Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State" 1958, October 31)

The same message from the Secretary of Defense for General Ayub Khan had been already sent a day earlier through the US Air Attaché, but the Ambassador delayed the delivery of the message by the Air Attaché for another day (2nd footnote in "Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State" 1958, October 31). The reason why the United States supported these 'takeovers' was explained in an unambiguous and apologetic tone by the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Bartlett) in a letter he sent to the US Ambassador in India:

> the takeover meant that in one more country, and a country which was a good friend of the United States, the light of the democratic ideal had been snuffed out. What made it worse, in my personal opinion, was that because of the larger issue of national freedom versus Kremlin hegemony, we were not in any position to protest. Our belief in democracy as a way of life for mankind had to give way to the stark realities of our own immediate national security interests. ("Letter From the Director of the Office of South Asian" 1958, October 27)

Similar considerations colored one of the messages sent by US Ambassador Rountree about the situation in Pakistan and the state of US interests within the country. According to the Ambassador, the "benevolent dictatorship" that developed in Pakistan after the coup was strong, stable, and enjoyed popular support. Rountree suggested to Washington that "while we should encourage a return to the rule of law and democratic forms appropriate to Pakistan, we should recognize that in present circumstances there is some validity in the regime's contention that a too-early and ill-planned return to democracy might not be in Pakistan's interest, or our own" ("Airgram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State" 1959, September 23).

Despite some tardiness of the post-coup military and economic aid from the United States, it must have been a big boost for General Ayub that President Eisenhower visited Pakistan a year later, on December 7–9, 1959. Concerning the coup a year back, President Eisenhower could not be more forthcoming on US support: "while some of our starry-eyed and academic types of liberals criticized General Ayub when he seized power by a military coup, one can see everywhere in Pakistan improvements and a quite happy attitude" ("Memorandum of Conversation by William N. Fraleigh" in Editorial note, p. 1055).

Though beyond the scope of this research, US relations with Ayub Khan continued to be warm at first under the Kennedy Administration (Van Hollen 1998, 10–11). It was only as a result of Pakistan—India War in 1965 and the relative decrease the U.S. started to attach to its relationship to Pakistan that the relations cooled. The US suspended arms shipments to Pakistan in 1965, but the Kennedy Administration, partly on the insistence of the Pentagon due to US intercept facilities in Badaber, still did all it could to dodge the embargo and help General Ayub (Spain 1998a, pp. 96–98). This did not prevent the emergence of a huge downside for the United States, however, which also shows

why military assistance matters. "…When we terminated aid [in 1965], it was harder for us to learn about mundane things like force readiness, what kinds of small arms they were using, and the state of their supplies. This was because the Pakistanis didn't want to tell us" (Hummel 1998, p. 133).

American reaction to Ayub's coup cannot be understood without remembering the esteem with which the Pakistani military, and especially Ayub, had been regarded in Washington. The high opinion US policy-makers had of General Ayub redounded to his acceptance and recognition. He was at the center stage when Pakistan—USA alliance was cemented and advanced in the mid-1950s (Nawaz, pp. 105, 129). President Eisenhower held General Ayub in such high regard that 'he saw Ayub as the hope for Pakistan' (Goodpaster cited in Barrett 2007, Chap. 8, note 71, p. 400). When Vice-President Richard Nixon visited Pakistan on December 7–9, 1953, he found Ayub Khan, the COAS, as more anti-Communist than anti-Indian compared to other Pakistan high-level officials. Ayub Khan appeared very pro-American and ready to commit to a far closer relationship with the USA (Yaqub, p. 195; Haqqani 2005, pp. 33, 36).

His rise to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army was not predicted by the US military attaché in Karachi. The attaché thought that two most senior figures, General İftikhar Khan, who accompanied Pakistani delegations to Washington and was viewed by the attaché very favorably, and Major General Sher Khan would be the next two Chiefs of the Pakistani General Staff. However, the two favorable generals died in an airplane crash. Looking for a protégé at the top of the military hierarchy who would also be extra grateful for being given the coveted position despite his junior rank, Iskander Mirza, the manipulative Defense Secretary, arranged for Ayub Khan's selection as the next Commander-in-Chief to start on January 17, 1951 (Venkataramani, pp. 145, 146).

When the USA asked the Pakistani government to contribute to the Korean War by sending troops and promised that Pakistani officers would keep the arms and equipment after the war, Colonel Byroade also wanted to mention this request to General Ayub. Though Pakistani Ambassador S. Amjad Ali and Foreign Minister Zafrulla told Byroade that it was up to the government to make a decision on this, "little did they [Pakistani Ambassador and FM Zafrullah] know the strength and

influence of the Pakistan army chief, not only with the government at home but also with his US counterparts."

Previously, it was General Ayub who told US Consul General Raleigh A. Gibson that he urged major Pakistani politicians to come to a decision as soon as possible and to side more decisively with the West. He informed them that the Pakistani military was a friend of the United States. He also assured the Consul General that if there was any stir that could overthrow the government, as happened with the 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy', the Pakistani military would not stay on the sidelines; it would declare martial law and not let the situation spiral out of their control (Nawaz, p. 143). It was also General Ayub who persuaded the government to grant military bases to the USA in Pakistan (Gauhar, p. xiii).

According to Yamin, already four years before he took over and imposed martial law Ayub Khan became "the public face of Pakistan's foreign policy and the architect of its relations with the United States" (Yamin 2012, p. 116). As of 1954, Ayub played a great role in the development of formal military alliance between the USA and Pakistan. He enjoyed the exclusive entrée into intelligence and defense establishment circles duty to his position. He made himself and the availability of Pakistan as a pragmatic partner in that corner of the world known to the War Department as well as the Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, and the latter's brother John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State (Nawaz, p. 101; Sayeed 1980, pp. 49–50). It was thanks to Ayub Khan that Pakistan received Western support: "the United States Military Aid without which the Pakistan Army could not have been equipped and reorganized to its present shape, was made possible through the initiative and efforts of General Ayub. The idea was born in his mind and it was through his negotiations with US political and military leaders that the US Government invited Pakistan to enter into a Mutual Defense Pact" (Yaqub 1986, p. 93; Gauhar 1996, p. xliii).

Post-Coup Assistance

Although General Ayub's takeover was a hierarchical coup US aid still remained very critical to Ayub's success; it was an issue of 'life and death' for Pakistan (McMahon 1994, p. 256). The continuation of military and economic aid was crucial in order for the new government to continue to deliver goods and services and hence, sustain the legitimacy of the coup. When General Ayub handed over to Pentagon a list of military

equipment a year after his coup but had not received a favorable response, he and people around him wondered whether the coup and ensuing undemocratic regime might have been behind it. This shows that they thought the USA might have been punishing them for the undemocratic action which the coup was. They were soothed by the US Ambassador, who said that the US Administration was not considering any such move and the delay had other reasons totally unrelated to the coup (McMahon, p. 256). The US Embassy advised the Department of State to start implementing the US Aid for Pakistan for the FY1959 without delay. It was evaluated in the interest of the USA for the post-coup regime to succeed and "It [the new regime] cannot succeed without continued US dollar aid, both military and economic… US professions of friendship for new regime meaningless without supporting action" ("Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State" 1958, December 16).

In another telegram only about a month and a half (early December) after Ayub's coup, the US Ambassador Langley notified the Department of State about the uneasiness the new regime in Pakistan felt because of the US delay in approving the Military Assistance Program FY1959. According to Langley, the new ruling elite interpreted the US tardiness as a "sign of disapprobation of new regime which belies assurances otherwise given it of US support." We unfortunately do not have the reply sent back from the State Department, but we do know that Ambassador Langley assured the Pakistani foreign minister Manzur Qadir that the reasons behind the delay were not political in nature (footnotes 2 and 3 in "Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State" 1958, December 16). But the aid situation was not clarified for the next month either and Ambassador Langley continued sending telegrams to Washington, citing the effect on impatient Ayub of the delay in extending the MAP (footnote 3 in "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan" 1959, January 9).

When the Military Assistance Program (MAP) for Pakistan FY1959 was finally approved, the underpinning strategic rationale was the same as with the NSC 5701 policy guidelines on Pakistan. An Interagency Committee evaluated the request for continuing MAP to Pakistan. It reached the conclusion that:

> It is in United States interest, in the context of Pakistan participation in the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, Pakistan relations with its neighbors, and in the light of the domestic program being aggressively undertaken by the

> new government, that we take no action which would imply a diminution of United States support; these objectives can be achieved within the limits of economic and military assistance presently proposed for FY 1959 and FY 1960, though they entail a recognition of the fundamental premise of NSC 5701 that United States aid support will be required for Pakistan probably for an indefinite period. ("Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State" 1959, January 7)

In its recommendations on future US military assistance to Pakistan about six months after Ayub's coup, the Interagency Working Group on Future US Military Assistance to Pakistan deemed it "*psychologically very important* that we make available to the new Pakistan Government under President Ayub proportionately the same resources in terms of US aid (exclusive, of course, of the military build-up material) as we provided to prior, and less effective, Pakistan regimes" (italics added). Because, it was suggested, "the Ayub Government… has taken energetic and promising steps in the fields of fiscal, administrative and agrarian reform, which merit our support and encouragement, particularly in this *key, initial period*" ("Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State" 1959, July 2; italics added).

Even when the Pakistani military was perceived to be fat and sucking most of the resources available to government, the US administrations still thought that they could not afford to cut US military aid suddenly. The reason offered was that if aid was halted at a stroke this "could alienate the military, which is potentially the most stable and actively the most cooperative element in Pakistan, and could lead Pakistan to retreat from its present anti-Communist, pro-Western policy" (McMahon, p. 252). "In present circumstances and for the next several years, any effort on our part to bring about an appreciable reduction in Pakistan's armed forces, or any decision substantially to reduce the present level of military aid to Pakistan, would be regarded as a severe blow, not only by President Ayub whose power base is the army, but also by most Pakistanis. The consequences might be seriously adverse to us in terms of the orientation of Pakistan's foreign policy. It would certainly reduce the extent of the influence of the United States in Pakistan which can now be employed usefully in the direction of our objectives in this country" ("Airgram From the Embassy" September 23; see also "Statement of US Policy" 1959, August 21, 1959). According to William M. Rountree, the US Ambassador to Pakistan (1959–1962),

> Ayub, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Army, had taken over in a bloodless coup and had organized his government not long before I arrived. He brought to Pakistan a period of stability and a sense of national direction which had been largely lacking before he took over. Our relations with Pakistan during that period were very good. We had one of our largest economic/military assistance programs in operation in Pakistan. They were listening carefully to the advice of our economic advisors and were making good progress in a number of fields. Generally, things were moving in a favorable direction. There was, of course, criticism in the United States and elsewhere of the revolution which had brought into power a military regime in Pakistan, but at that time no other form of government could have provided the stability and progress which were evident under Ayub. I had tremendous regard for his ability as a leader. (Rountree 1998, pp. 30–31)

The optimum situation for the United States would be achieved if Pakistan was ruled by a popularly elected government. However, as Ambassador Rountree interpreted the US policy objectives in Pakistan, it was far more important to follow three objectives: "continuance of a noncommunist government willing and able to resist communist blandishments or pressures from within and without"; "increased association and identification with other South Asian governments and peoples, and with the Free World community"; and, finally, "a lessening of tensions between Pakistan and its neighbors in order to improve the climate for sound political and economic progress and to strengthen the bonds of these nations with the Free World, thereby augmenting their resistance to communist penetration". "A strong, stable and, *if possible*, a popularly-based government" would be perfect to reach these objectives but only if it was possible" ("Airgram From the Embassy", September 23).

In any case, even if a General-turned-Politician was running Pakistan, US aid made a great difference and therefore must have been continued. According to the Ambassador, US assistance had been given in the first place "not merely because Pakistan desired that aid but because it was important to the achievement of US objectives that Pakistan be helped in the military field." Aid still mattered after General Ayub's takeover. The Ambassador did not believe that his country "could maintain our strategic and policy interests in this country in the absence of continued substantial military support" ("Airgram From the Embassy", September 23). In addition, US Ambassador Rountree added,

> Our aid in the military field has thus not only given us a close relationship with Pakistan in security matters, which is to our benefit, but it has given Pakistan a feeling of confidence which has made it possible for successive Pakistani governments to pursue policies generally in the interest of the Free World. With our help, Pakistan has been able to maintain forces for internal security and with a capability of resisting external aggression. In the international situation which we confront today, it is of very great value indeed to have a staunch ally with the capability of contributing, and the willingness to contribute, significantly to collective security. ("Airgram From the Embassy", September 23)

The National Intelligence Estimate dated May 5, 1959 for Pakistan commended the regime and saw its future prospects as being very bright: "The military regime of General Ayub has, in its first six months, made a start towards dealing with the staggering political and economic problems of Pakistan. The regime has appointed competent ministers and appears to have popular support, and we do not foresee the development of any significant organized opposition within the next year or two." The Estimate predicted that *Pakistan might stray from its pro-Western orientation only in the long term and particularly if civilians become more influential inside the regime*. This assessment was based on the belief that "Ayub and other top military officers are all convinced of the necessity of continued US aid in both the military and the economic fields. *These leaders and most of the officer corps are genuinely anti-Communist and are unlikely to do anything which would adversely affect US and Free World defense interests in Pakistan*" ("The Outlook for Pakistan" 1959, May 5; italics added). To the contrary, strong anti-Western currents were available among the people and once—and if—political parties are left free they could steer Pakistan into a different direction than the West ("Summary of Embassy Karachi's Dispatch" 1959, February 26). The relationship deepened with the signing of the Defense Cooperation Agreement in 1959. With this agreement the United States guaranteed independence and territorial sovereignty of Pakistan and promised to come to its help in case of a Communist attack or threat.

The regional situation in South Asia was not conducive for decreasing aid levels to Pakistan either. Other than Pakistan, all countries in the region adopted a policy of neutralism at a time when Sino-Soviet bloc sought to expand Communist influence in the region. Under these circumstances, the US military suggested against reducing existing assistance levels to Pakistan ("Paper Prepared by the National Security



Fig. 4.1 US Aid to Pakistan 1956–1960 (millions, constant 2009 $) ('Sixty Years of US Aid' 2011)

Council" 1959, May 26). According to US General Twinning, "the Pakistanis were good professional soldiers… the Pakistan forces were a great stabilizing influence in South Asia." Vice President Nixon wanted too hang on steadfast to Pakistan because "Pakistan is the one solid pro-US country in the area" and it would be foolish/premature to consider reducing the US aid to the region in general and Pakistan in particular ("Memorandum of Discussion at the 416th Meeting" 1959, August 6). "The present Pakistani regime is fundamentally anti-Communist and will probably continue to pursue a foreign policy which is essentially pro-West in outlook and pro-U.S. in implementation. Pakistan's role in various UN councils has been helpful to U.S. objectives… Pakistan's forces have been a major factor in maintaining Pakistan's stability and thereby contributing to Free World strength in the area" ("Statement of U.S. Policy" 1959, August 21).[11]

The following charts neatly indicate the level of US military and economic assistance to Pakistan following the 1958 coups. While decreasing levels of military aid was related to keeping military balance between India and Pakistan, economic aid increased exponentially. It should also be recalled that while decreasing military assistance, the US government gave security guarantees through the 1959 agreement against the Soviets (Figs. 4.1 and 4.2).

[11]Also see statement by G. Lewis Jones Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 15, 1960. The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLII, No. 1084, April 4, 1960, p. 615.



Fig. 4.2 US Economic Aid to Pakistan, 1956–1960 (USAID, Foreign Aid Explorer)

Discussion

This section discussed the US role in the first coup d'état following the foundation of Pakistan. The main reasons behind the coup are to be found in domestic perceptions of weakness created by the divided nature of the country as East Pakistan and West Pakistan, intense Pakistani suspicions of Indian designs over their country, and the feeling of acute vulnerability as a result of the dire financial situation in the country. There was, therefore, enough space for the military to fill. Both coups in quick succession indicate that coup makers considered outside reaction. Mirza's close relations with the US government left no doubt as to US approval and thereby role in the coup.

The links founded between the USA and Pakistan in the years prior to 1958 coups were more individual and personal in nature, but still worked to the benefit of General Ayub after he took over. In the case of General Ayub's counter-coup, the USA guessed that either Mirza or Ayub would have to go but when General Ayub survived the silent race, the USA did all it can to support him. The Eisenhower Administration, with all its suspicion toward the Indian neutrality, was convinced that General Ayub was their man in Karachi to work against communism. At least partly thanks to US financial support, General Ayub managed to

deliver when in power, which resulted in increase in the autonomy of the armed forces and created a successful precedent of a coup d'état for later coups.

July 1977 Coup D'état

This final section concerns the US's role in the third coup in the history of Pakistan in 1977. This part elaborates on the major themes of this dissertation and discusses the US role. Once again, the major trigger for the coup was social uprising against Bhutto's rule and the heat of the dilemma the Pakistan Army felt between their dual duties to the government and the people. It appears that they solved this dilemma by deposing Bhutto and taking over. When they did so, they did not need any other actor to ask them to take over. Senior generals cared about US reaction in this case as well. Several archival documents suggest that the USA had kept in mind amid incessant protests against Bhutto that the army could end up intervening but there is no evidence that the USA or any other actor encouraged Pakistani general command to dismiss Bhutto and take over. However, the US Embassy in Islamabad also thought that there was no one general strong enough to lead the action. Because Bhutto remained very popular even after he was deposed and detained, the military authority remained very vulnerable in its early period. The USA did not support military government financially or militarily after the coup and its acquiescence and the absence of support for Bhutto were enough.

A common explanation of 1977 coup in Pakistan flashlight to the conundrum the armed forces found itself in the face of growing protests against Bhutto after the 1977 elections. According to General Chishti, who was General Zia's top aide before the coup, the military was forced to intervene because of ongoing anarchy and chaos within the country prior to it and the military risked destructive divisions from within (Chishti, pp. ix–x, 17, 63–65). PM Bhutto's decision to use the army to suppress the post-election protests placed the army in a deep conundrum, which eventually forced it to take over (Klieman 1980, p. 157; Ali 2014, p. 145; Tahir-Kheli, p. 69; Ziring 1997, pp. 418–419, 422). General Zia had witnessed many years ago after the defeat in East Pakistan in 1971 how junior officers conspired within armed forces to risk breaking the military discipline when higher ranks proved

unresponsive to deep concerns and requests (Ali, p. 34). This meant in no ambiguous terms that "the majors and colonels forced Zia's hand. The generals would either go along with the *coup* or they, too, would be victims in the unfolding drama" (Ziring, p. 422; italics in the original).

Others claim that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was about to request military supply from the Soviets and open Pakistan's Mekran coast for Soviet military use (Arif, p. 52).[12] In fact, it may have been General Zia himself who spread this rumor after he came to power in 1977. Only a month after his takeover, General Zia told the US Embassy that deposed PM Bhutto had informed the Pakistan military that he was about to approach the Soviets if the US officials continued to be negative in their response to Pakistan's plans to open a nuclear reprocessing facility and dragged their feet on releasing economic and military assistance. General Zia made sure to add that his transition government (he promised to hold elections in three months) does not harbor any such intentions to cozy up to the Soviets ("Talk with Crown Prince-Pakistan" 1977, August 24). However, the retired Pakistani diplomat Akhund (1997) rejected these claims, explaining that although Bhutto had full sympathy and support from the Soviets, he had not agreed to allocate *Gwadar* on the Arabian Sea to the Soviet use in return for critical political support (p. 326).

According to Zia ul-Haq's own account in his conversation on July 6 with the Embassy Office of Defense Representative Officer, the army finally saw that the PNA and Bhutto would not be able to reach a settlement and, when they failed to do so, large armed clashes were bound to happen on the streets because the PPP was arming its supporters. In fact, the army had to come out of its barracks to stop rioting that had started in Lahore. "Zia probably believed that the election campaign would be violent even if an agreement was reached. Rather than wait until a deterioration in the security situation necessitated military intervention, he evidently decided to make a preemptive move to save the nation from further turmoil…" ("Why the Army Moved—A Retrospective" 1977, July 12; "Zia Further Consolidates Power" 1977, July 7). The important point here is the disregard for external actors.

[12] US Ambassador to Pakistan Hummel described General Arif as one of Zia's astute aides, who helped him keep the military government running until Zia's plane crashed (Hummel, p. 143).

The Road to the Coup

After Pakistan's war with India in 1965, the US Congress made two amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act limiting or prohibiting aid to certain countries under some conditions. First, the Conte—Long Amendment necessitated the US administration to decrease the amount of aid in proportion to the amount of money countries were able to fund from their own pocket. The other amendment, known as the Symington Amendment, directed the president to stop giving aid to those countries which were overspending on military armament (Haqqani, p. 134). Due to these stiff sanctions, the amount of aid Pakistan received from the United States fell sharply as the generals' rule ended. "Pakistan had received almost $1 billion in US economic assistance from 1972 to 1977, the years that Bhutto governed the country. But military aid during this period stood at a meager $1.87 million, most of it in the form of training for officers and spare parts for US-made equipment" (Haqqani, p. 224). US aid to Pakistan in 1976 dropped to a meager $76 million, excluding shipments of wheat and vegetable oil on concessional terms ("U.S. Relations with Pakistan" 1977, May 14). The turning point igniting the process leading up to the coup came with the popular protests led by the Pakistan National Alliance, a conglomerate of different groups with different agendas, after the alleged rigging by the PPP in 1977 elections.[13]

The unrest completely paralyzed the country. Pakistan International Airlines refused to operate until Bhutto had left office, students protested in the streets, brought public transportation to a complete halt, and also disrupted several other government services to immobilize the government ("Positions Harden" 1977, April 20). While some retired generals serving as Pakistan's ambassadors abroad resigned on protest, others on active duty in Lahore did not comply with the orders to move against the protestors (Arif, pp. 72–73; Chishti 1989, pp. 51, 56, 65). The army became increasingly restless on the one hand but still sided with Bhutto government in the initial stages of the PNA-PPP

[13]Although Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his daughter Benazir Bhutto denied the charges, the then US Ambassador to Islamabad, Henry Byroade, claimed that he was with Prime Minister Bhutto on the election night and when the election results came in from Punjab and Bhutto received 99% of votes there he started to frantically call his people and admonish them for what they have done. See Bhutto (1998, p. 25) and Kux (2001a, p. 229).

government fight on the other. The three service chiefs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee published a joint statement, in which they professed loyalty to the government. On April 28, 1977, "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Shariff, Army Chief of Staff General Zia, Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Shariff, And Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar jointly stated that they "wish to make it absolutely clear that the Pakistan Army, Navy, And Air Force are totally united to discharge their constitutional obligations in support of the present legally constituted government…" They noted that "while the military code prohibits the soldiers, sailors, and airmen to have anything to do with politics, the armed forces who belong to the nation have to remain on call to safeguard the country's integrity when threatened on account of external aggression or internal subversion"" ("Pakistan Political Situation" 1977, April 28). This did not really sit well with the junior ranks within the military who had grown more uneasy with Bhutto.

Yet the US Embassy did not foresee any coup attempt by junior and mid-ranking officers. Although "the Pakistan army is still too dedicated, disciplined and traditional" for such coup to succeed, it undermined the army's morale and cause second thought on the level of senior officers ("The Military's Role in the Political" 1977, April 27). In order to placate his institutional audience and put these undercurrents to rest, the Army Chief Zia ul-Haq circulated a communication around all formations, reminding them of the constitutional place of the military and their duties (Arif, pp. 73–74). In the meantime, opposition politicians, first and foremost former Air Chief Asghar Khan, appealed to the army for it to take over (Arif, p. 86).

The military was caught in a dilemma. It was administering martial law in unsettled regions of the country (such as Lahore and Karachi), which made soldiers appear accomplices of the Bhutto government. "The day before martial law was introduced [when PM Bhutto was still the PM], soldiers were garlanded with flowers in Karachi. The day after, rocks were thrown at them. During the past week, women in PNA-sponsored procession have taunted the soldiers—using colorful and pejorative language so skillfully and imaginatively employed by the Punjabis—accusing them of being polluted by their support for Bhutto" ("The Military's Role" 1977, April 27; see also Klieman 1980; Tahir-Kheli, p. 69). Prime Minister Bhutto had actually been warned by his Intelligence Director Rao Rashid Khan that "the government ran on

very low credibility in the eyes of the people and it was certain that the protests would go on if the impasse in negotiations continued. If the army is called in this scenario this could create serious complications because the army may eventually not want to side with the government" (Wolpert 1993, p. 196)

As the US Embassy repeatedly mentioned in a series of telegrams, the military held the key to bringing the conflict to halt but was reluctant to intervene and desired a constitutional solution. The army would find itself obliged to intervene only if it faced "stark choice of either taking over and declaring martial law or watching a complete breakdown of law and order and paralysis of essential services in the country" ("Positions Harden" 1977, April 20). Although the military seemed to have stood up for the Prime Minister at one point in late April, it still was reluctant to get involved ("The Military's Role" 1977, April 27; "Army's Role in Current Crisis" 1977, April 19). Very significantly however, 'reluctance', according to the US Embassy, was not the only reason why the Pakistan military chose not to get involved. The other reason was that:

> there is no one obvious military officer who could assume national leadership with active army support… Although on paper general Mohammad Shariff as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee may seem a reasonable choice, and is the senior-most general in the army, one cannot readily assume he would be tapped. The logical and traditional choice is the Chief of Army Staff. General Zia-ul-Haq is a bright, aggressive and competent soldier; however, he is seen as Bhutto's man… Two highly respected men in the military with adequate rank to fill that role are general Mohammad Iqbal—Corps Commander in Lahore, and General Jehanzeb Arbab—Corps Commander in Karachi. Both, however, have been placed in charge of the martial law administrations in their areas, thereby coloring them to some degree with the Bhutto brush. Also, the traditions and discipline of the Pakistan Army run counter to corps commanders pushing aside the COAS in a bid for power. ("The Military's Role" 1977, April 27)

Indeed, according to Hussain, General Zia was only the first among equals when the military assumed control after deposing PM Bhutto (Hussain 1990, 127). In the meantime, 'Operation Fair Play' had been prepared in advance in case the military decided to intervene (Hyman et al. p. 30; Chishti 1989, p. 63; "Why the Army Moved" 1977, July 12). The military eventually dismissed Prime Minister Bhutto on 5 July

1977. At the same time, it initially announced its attention to hold elections in the next three months but it changed its mind later when it saw Bhutto was still very powerful and would surely win and seek to take revenge on the army generals (Arif 1995, pp. 249, 413).

A Surprise Coup?

No evidence exists to suggest that the USA had knowledge of the coup in advance. However, the military intervention was already a scenario pondered about by the Embassy. The Embassy in Islamabad was aware as of April 12, 1977, three months before the coup, that "if the Pakistan domestic political situation remains uneasy, Zia's role could well be enhanced" ("Visit of Pakistan Army Chief of Staff" 1977, April 12). On May 26, when PM Bhutto was still negotiating with the PNA about a re-election and other conditions, the US Embassy started to work on possible future scenarios. Besides several other options, military coup d'état and military government emerged as an option. However, the Ambassador wrote that the military leadership did not seem interventionist. His political forecast in that scenario was that if the military left its barracks, their rule would only be short term in nature ("The Alternatives to Bhutto" 1977, May 26). An interesting development occurred in Washington amid raging popular protests in Pakistan. Charles O'Keeffe, a White House staffer, wrote a memorandum to his superiors, stating that 'in his opinion, Bhutto's days were numbered and both State Department and National Security Council supported this idea'. The State Department tried to counter the effect of leaked content to the *Washington Post* and prepared a careful press briefing guidance in advance ("Washington Post Article on Narcotics" 1977, June 1).

Though we do not have any archival document to prove if the United States had known the military's or Zia's move beforehand or it abetted the coup, we know that the Afghan Foreign Minister claimed Afghanistan had advance knowledge of the Pakistan military's intention to take over government ("Afghan View of Military Takeover" 1977, July 10). We also do know that General Zia was not a mysterious figure for at least one US agency: the CIA. General Zia struck the CIA in Jordan as a capable soldier, where he, as a member of Pakistani defense attaché staff in Amman, helped the Jordanian King defeat the Palestine Liberation Organization's Fedayeen in a civil war starting in 1970. Jack O'Connell, the CIA Station Chief in the Jordanian capital

and King Hussein's long-time counsel, wrote that General Zia advised the Jordanian army on the battleground. His critical advice to the King to use the Royal Air Force against the Fedayeen at a very critical hour of the fight helped Jordan turn around the battle in its favor (O'Connell and Loeb 2001, pp. 104–105).

The Jordanian connection starting with this episode was critical for General Zia's career because aside from the fact that Bhutto thought Zia would ever be subservient to him,[14] "King Hussein recommended to Zulfi (Bhutto's nickname) that he promote Zia for his performance in Black September. On the King's recommendation, Zia was promoted from Brigadier to Major General on his return from Jordan. Without the promotion, Zia probably would have retired"[15] (Riedel 2014, p. 58). This rings true because when PM Bhutto appointed Zia as the COAS, "even the comparatively knowledgeable people in Pakistan in 1976 had hardly come across the name of Zia ul-Haq…" (Hyman et al. p. 17). When PM Bhutto picked General Zia as the Commander-in-Chief over several more senior generals in the military hierarchy, he was impressed by General Zia's arrangement of Jordan's Crown Prince Hassan's Islamabad visit (Riedel 2014, p. 58). It remains very likely, but unverified nonetheless, whether Defense Intelligence Agency/Pentagon had tried and managed cultivating a close contact with General Zia thereafter. Strikingly, the US Embassy would later know that "one of the first calls he [General Zia] received from abroad after the army takeover was from the Jordanian Crown Prince [Hassan]" ("A Profile of General Zia" 1977, July 21). Nevertheless, what convinced Bhutto to appoint Zia as the COAS though was most likely a domestic event, a coup attempt known as the 'Attock Conspiracy' exposed in 1973 and Zia's presidency of the court martial that delivered stiff punishments to the conspirators in full loyalty to Bhutto (Abbas 2005, pp. 89–90).

In fact, the Crown Prince became the first dignitary from abroad to visit Pakistan after the coup (Husain 2015, p. 320). General Zia was no

[14] In fact, a US diplomat stationed in Islamabad likened General Zia to PM Bhutto's personal servant named Nura–Noor Mohamad-, meaning that lifted over several more senior generals to become the COAS, General Zia was expected to be as servile to Bhutto as Nura (see Hyman et al. p. 22; Chishti 1989, pp. 24–25).

[15] General Chishti approached this from another angle. According to him, General Zia may have asked by the CIA during his duty in Jordan to approach and win over PM Bhutto, see Chishti (1989, p. 28).

foreigner to the US Embassy and other US agencies before the coup either. In the US Embassy, however, it was not Ambassador Hummel who had known him closely but Arnold Raphel, a political officer at the Embassy and later US Ambassador to Pakistan who was with General Zia in the plane that crashed in 1988. "Arnie had gotten to know him through our military assistance programs and had become really quite friendly with him" (Constable 1998, pp. 38–39).

Generals' Care for US Reaction

Western diplomats assigned to Islamabad certainly felt that Zia would not, and could not, hold on to power for more than a couple of months. Many expected a counter-coup attempt from more senior figures within the armed forces (Hyman et al. p. 17). In his address to the nation on the evening of July 5 General Zia tried to preempt any accusation that the military acted on behalf of other actors, including Bhutto, PNA or the United States. He announced that the Government of Pakistan will abide by its foreign commitments and agreements. Arguably, in a reference to the violently anti-American rhetoric of PM Bhutto, the Embassy reported in connection with Zia's speech that "in terms of our own position, we now have a government in Pakistan which will not be anti-U.S. in the campaign. Anti-Americanism will still play an important role in the PPP campaign, however, and that party may feel even less constrained in its attacks on us" ("General Zia Addresses the Nation" 1977, July 5). The US Embassy had the same impression, on July 19, that General Zia will respect CENTO links and abide by international agreements, treaties and bilateral contracts ("Pakistan Under Martial Law" 1977, July 19).[16]

On July 8, 1977 General Zia, who assumed the title of 'Chief Martial Law Administrator' after the coup, gave an interview to Gene Kramer, the Associated Press correspondent. The Embassy learned the content of the interview through Kramer's conversation with the US Defense Attaché Office. General Zia felt it important to state in the interview that he had an open invitation from General Rogers, Chief of the US Army Staff, to visit the United States and he hoped to accept it after October.

[16]According to Bashir Ahmad, the U.S. Ambassador assured General Zia after the coup that his Administration would understand the takeover (personal communication, October 5, 2015).

The catch here was that General Rogers had invited General Zia *before* the coup; however, the Embassy still advised the Department of Defense Spokesman not to point out that this was an 'old' invitation. They recommended that "if asked, Department spokesmen reply that General Zia has a long-standing invitation from General Rogers to visit the states. A visit planned for the spring had to be canceled, but the possibility of a visit later in the year had been left open. No definite time has yet been scheduled. If asked in what capacity Zia would be visiting the states, we recommend spokesmen respond that the General in the interview talked about a visit after October 'when he would be free.' we assume he meant after the elections when he would still be chief of army staff but no longer chief martial law administrator" ("Zia Says He Hopes to Visit the States" 1977, July 8).

This shows three things: first, General Zia knew how important it was to him for his domestic audience (rivals, foes, friends etc.) to know that he had an open invitation from the USA despite the coup. He may have also wanted to see US reaction to his 'pitch'. Secondly, the United States Embassy was aware of this little game and gave General Zia what he wanted. Otherwise, the Embassy and DOD could leave him in the hanging if they said 'this was an old invitation and that no US official extended any new invitation to General Zia.' Finally, while doing so the Embassy still tried to encourage, even if meekly, transfer of power to civilians through promised elections in October.

In the meantime, the Pakistan Foreign Ministry sent envoys to major Western capitals to explain the reasons for military coup d'état (Ali Sarwar Naqvi, personal communication, October 5, 2015). General Zia used back channels for assuring the United States as well. Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan, with whom General Zia had become close personal friends when Zia lived in Jordan for three years and advised the Jordanian government on military matters during problems with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), talked to the Secretary of State and conveyed Zia's messages to him on 12 July 1977. ("A Profile of General Zia" 1977, July 21) "[the General] reaffirms Pakistan's commitments to traditional close bilateral relations with U.S., urges positive consideration by us of questions of nuclear reprocessing facility, and economic and military aid, indicates desire for creating a 'good link' to U.S. through our new ambassador in Islamabad and repeats Pakistan's invitation to you to visit during expected upcoming trip to South Asia." General Zia sent a letter to Crown Prince Hassan, in which "General

stressed continuity of Pakistan's traditional relations with the U.S. and its intention to honor all agreements and cooperate with the U.S." Zia also made clear that they heard that President Carter was planning a working trip to the region and they were very eager to host him in Pakistan. General Zia also wished to work very closely with the then US Ambassador, as he did with the previous US Ambassador. Crown Prince also threw his support behind General Zia: "Hassan said Bhutto had been considering calling in the Soviets if U.S. was not positive; General Zia has abandoned this idea and wants us to know it. Hassan personally believes Bhutto will not stand for re-election and that General Zia is determined to make elections work in October" ("Talk with Crown Prince—Pakistan" 1977, August 21).

US Involvement

According to Hyman, Ghayur and Kaushik, "some well-founded reports suggested that General Zia and his top commanders consulted with the U.S. Ambassador before they took over, though they do not tell what these reports are and which information they are based on" (1989, p. 24). They do, however, reject the possibility that the CIA may have assisted Pakistani generals at the stages of planning and executing the coup. For Pakistan military was more than capable of planning and carrying out a coup on its own successfully (Hyman et al. p. 24).

Nevertheless, even if the United States may not have had advance knowledge of the coup, it played a very critical, indirect role in it. It influenced the direction of volatile events by sending particular *signals* to the Bhutto government and the Pakistan military (Hussain 1990, 211). According to Thyne, "hostile signals channeled from the USA [against an incumbent government] should increase coup plotters' perceived probability of staging a successful coup… because they give the plotters an advantage over the government in solidifying power once the coup is attempted, and deplete the resources available to the government to deter the coup attempts by blocking foreign aid and international investment" (Thyne 2010, p. 451). Reviewing the events leading up to the coup closely, the USA gave enough number of hostile signals to Bhutto which, knowingly or not, signaled US acquiescence and tolerance if Bhutto fell. Only a day after Bhutto publicly announced that the USA was behind the protests and accused the USA of interfering in internal Pakistani affairs after the elections, the USA completed

the delivery of two destroyers to Pakistan. However, these destroyers had left the US ports and seas to arrive in Pakistan well in advance of the crisis in bilateral relations ("Bhutto's Charges of Interference" 1977, April 29). This was the one and only example of 'positive' signal the United States sent to Bhutto government. Concerning Bhutto's charges, US officials denied Bhutto's charges of US plots against her. Assistant Secretary of State For East Asian And Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke said that the Carter Administration found Bhutto's accusations as "repugnant, wholly distasteful to the administration" ("U.S. Relations with Pakistan" 1977, May 14). Besides this episode there were three other and more distinct signals that may have implied to Pakistan's generals that the USA was fed up with Bhutto and would not try to block or punish his dismissal.

To start with, the USA called off its offer to sell A-7 aircraft to Pakistan in the middle of internal unrest, possibly dangling it to persuade the Bhutto government to halt its efforts to build a nuclear reprocessing plant (Dimitrakis 2009, p. 326), which, nonetheless, Bhutto interpreted as the US government's disapproval of his government at this particular time. According to Hussain, "the message came through in unmistakable terms; basically, the US was telling the armed forces of its total delinking from the Bhutto regime" (1990, p. 238). This was a message to the Pakistani military that PM Bhutto could no longer provide the weapons they wished for (Tahir-Kheli, p. 93). In addition, and of more symbolic importance, the US State Department cancelled its shipment of tear-gas grenades to Pakistan during protests against the government on April 19 after approving the sale a month earlier. According to Akhund, this sent strong signal of support to the political opposition in Bhutto's time of need (1997, p. 320; Dimitrakis, p. 326; Hussain 1990, p. 237).

Bhutto himself went public with his accusation that Pakistani intelligence had intercepted calls between US Embassy officials saying that Bhutto is finished (Shah, p. 136). Akhund, a retired Pakistani diplomat who was very close to Bhutto, added another signal. He said that the USA clearly sided with the PNA coalition against the Bhutto government because the USA did not congratulate Bhutto on (claimed to be rigged) re-election in 1977. However, 'when Mrs. Gandhi were beaten by his competitor in Indian elections the same year, President Carter immediately congratulated the new Indian premier. Akhund interpreted the US Ambassador Byroade's rejection of interference in internal Pakistani affairs as "distinctly pro forma"' (p. 319).

Akhund also saw *Newsweek*'s sudden change of heart about their previous declaration to do a cover story in its international edition for Prime Minister Bhutto amid wide anti-government protests as tacit US support for the PNA opposition movement (p. 320).[17] We should also add that President Carter turned down PM Bhutto's request to visit him in the White House when Bhutto's authority was shaken at home. When the coup eventually took place, the Carter Administration did not have the usual courtesy expressions of regret over ouster of a civilian government (Husain, 238). Of course, these signals do not generate an automatic response; many other calculations and input enter into the military decision-making process behind carrying out a coup attempt. Signals help widen the opportunity before the generals; it allows them more room and air to operate their decision-making. Even as they continued to receive these signals, the Pakistani high command may have waited to see more of how domestic situation would develop and what PM Bhutto would do about it. However, these may well be taken as indicators of likely US acquiescence if the army moved on Bhutto government and dismissed it, instead of triggering an automatic anti-Bhutto reaction.

When Carter became president in 1977, Pakistan did not loom large in US foreign policy. "The new president, Jimmy Carter, did not have any affection for Pakistan nor did the leading members of the incoming National Security" (Haqqani, p. 218; Arif, pp. 317, 332). Pakistan was a country where Carter could demonstrate his defense of human rights, on account of the Pakistani actions in Bangladesh in 1971, its nuclear ambitions, which everybody knew was eventually not for peaceful purposes, and the later coup against Bhutto in 1977. Pakistan's top diplomat, Agha Shahi, complained in Ankara that starting with the Ford Administration the US arms embargo showed that US Administration in government at the time did not give the due importance to Pakistan's

[17] Such a change of heart, if true, could have easily been interpreted as 'disapproval' of Bhutto government by the United States. Previously, at a time when Pakistan continuously appealed to the United States to extend Pakistan some assistance in the late 1940s, Pakistani leaders learned that the journal of *Foreign Affairs*, published by "influential Council on Foreign Relations", decided to publish an article entitled "Pakistan's Claim to Kashmir" in its January 1950 issue, they *received a signal* that U.S. policy makers' opinion became more favorable toward Pakistan (Venkataramani 1984, p. 100).

CENTO alliance (Gürün 1995, p. 44). President Carter's Secretary of State Brzezinski's game plan to defend US interests was forming closer relationships with ""regional influentials." In South Asian terms, that meant India." (Thornton 1982, pp. 959–962) The Deputy Secretary of State Adolph Dubs said in a statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in March 1977, "Direct US security interests in South Asia are limited. We have no military bases on the subcontinent and we seek no bases" (cited in Rubin 2012, p. 49). A string of public comments by leading Administration officials reflecting the US favor for Indians continued with a comment by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher. He said in July 1977 in New Delhi that "Washington expected India to play a "leading" role in South Asia" (Tahir-Kheli 1982, 73).

Still, however, the Embassy in Islamabad sent briefing notes on the day of coup d'état to Washington in case Department Spokesman is asked questions by the media in Pakistan. The Embassy suggested the Spokesman to say that "what has happened is an internal event affecting Pakistan about which we have no specific comment" and since the Constitution was only suspended but no abrogated "the question of recognition does not arise". The Embassy reminded that the State Department uses the same formulation in these kind of situations and it will be better doing the same in Pakistan as well ("US/PAK Relations" 1977, July 5). According to Peter D. Constable, the Deputy Chief of Mission in the US Embassy in Pakistan at the time,

> One always stands back and tries to assess whether a coup is going to be effective, and whether the people who have made the coup can establish order and establish themselves in power. So one tends to avoid taking any steps which sanction the coup. We have gotten away, as a policy matter, from using formal recognition as a step following a coup. We now take the posture that relations are between states, and they're a continuing matter, no matter what government is in office. But at the same time, after a coup, we tend to go rather slowly in developing our relationships with the new government until we come to understand that they're there to stay, that the coup has in some way been accepted and is not a resisted coup or the country is suddenly in a civil war situation. As it turned out in Pakistan, the coup seemed to be welcomed. The opposition that had been badgering Bhutto in the streets certainly welcomed it, and Bhutto's own party seemed quite passive. They did not take to the streets and resist the effects of this. (Constable, pp. 37–38)

The USA naturally watched how the Soviet Union also reacted to the coup. The US Embassy in Moscow reported that the Soviets had adopted a 'wait and see' approach to the coup. They still would have preferred Bhutto to Zia or the military but did not want to rule out the permanent military rule option ("Initial Soviet Reporting on Events" 1977, July 6; "Soviet View on Events in Pakistan" 1977, October 12). On July 7, 1977, Pakistan's Ambassador to Washington, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, visited the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to confirm continuity in Pakistan's foreign policy and present his own view of why the military felt it had to intervene and personal characteristics of General Zia. Secretary Vance assured the Ambassador that "the [State] Department had taken the public line that developments in Pakistan were internal matters on which we [the USA] would not comment" and the Administration too wants to restore Pakistan—US relationship to its previously close levels ("Pakistan Ambassador's Call On" 1977, July 7).

On 11 July 1977, after the coup, the US Embassy in Islamabad reported to Washington that "US foreign policy interests in South Asia are best served by stability and a lack of conflict in the region." As the Embassy reported a week later, the best scenario in which US interests would be served to the optimum would be 'stability based on representative government'. "The military take-over, a seemingly retrogressive step, may further these interests if Zia holds elections as promised and the government returns to civilian control" ("Pakistan Under Martial Law" 1977, July 19). The Embassy was cautious, but did not want to create an impression that the USA could abandon Pakistan. It advised Washington that "a limited security assistance relationship with Pakistan, which emphasizes helping the GOP [Government of Pakistan] to meet its legitimate defensive needs, will enhance regional security and therefore supplement our own foreign policy goals. We also want to prevent any increment of soviet influence in South Asia and believe this aim is best served by stability in the area" ("Assessment of U.S. Security Assistance Programs" 1977, July 11). According to the Embassy, "we [the US] continue to follow our established policy under which we do not sell major offensive equipment to Pakistan nor become the primary arms supplier to the area, but are forthcoming in meeting the country's legitimate defensive needs. Likewise, the modest IMET program should be continued, and increased if possible, reflecting the considerable benefit we gain from having Pakistan military officers take advanced professional training in the United States" ("Assessment of U.S. Security Assistance Programs" 1977, July 11).

The most troublesome bone of contention in Pakistani—US relations was Pakistan's nuclear program, a claim Pakistan always rejected. This also continued to harm bilateral relations after the 1977 coup (Tahir-Kheli, p. 75). Here too, however, the USA did not push Pakistan too much at first. Dr. Joseph Nye, Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology and Chair of the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, was scheduled to visit Pakistan on July 12, 1977 for talks on this issue. The USA originally hesitated for this visit for two reasons: "we wanted to avoid public impression that soon after the new military government is in office we are exerting pressure on Zia to change his reprocessing plans; the visit would have to be carefully handled so it could not easily be used by political parties, especially the PPP, during the election campaign as a means of criticizing the US for interfering in Pakistani affairs." The Embassy addressed these concerns in a telegram and reported that this visit could be managed and that Dr. Nye could meet GOP discreetly ("Visit of Dr. Nye" 1977, July 12).

In some of its reporting from Islamabad, the Embassy gave the image that US support could be conditioned to Zia's keeping his promise to have elections in three months. In its report, sent out on July 19, 1977, the Ambassador said "The acceptability of the military's action is directly related to the temporary nature of the interregnum" ("Pakistan Under Martial Law" 1977, July 19). In the meantime, the Embassy tried to get a deeper understanding of General Zia's character as well. It sent out a major profile of General Zia to Washington on July 21, 1977.

> General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq is a study in contrasts. He is the most powerful man in Pakistan and seems singularly intent on divesting himself of that power. He is a strict disciplinarian who prides himself on his long military career, yet is also known for his informality and indifference to rank outside the military. He speaks with ease, familiarity and confidence about modern military equipment and tactics but is, at the same time, intensely and fundamentally dedicated to Islam and Islamic principles. ("A Profile of General Zia" 1977, July 21)

What is very important here is that the US Embassy attributed Zia's policy proximity with the USA to his education abroad. "Zia's two major excursions overseas affected him and color his views of the world. He has been to the states twice, attending the command and staff college at fort Leavenworth and an armored course at fort Knox. He is

unabashedly pro-American and laudatory of many things American… This is reflected in his emphasis on the desirability of American equipment and technology and his interest in increasing the amount of training Pakistani officers receive in the states." The Embassy believed that Zia genuinely wanted to hold elections promised for October but the Embassy saw major hurdles in front of this goal ("A Profile of General Zia" 1977, July 21). It is useful to remind here that Lt. General William Odom also believed that "General Zia in Pakistan twice an IMET visiting military student, did not take home great commitment to democracy, but he took back a great admiration for the United States and proved willing to resist advice in 1980 not to turn to the US for aid and foreign policy alignment" (Odom 1992, pp. 221–222).

In its uninterrupted observations on the domestic consequences of the coup, the Embassy felt relieved that as of July 7 Zia looked "completely in command" ("Zia Further Consolidates Power" 1977, July 7). This was important for the United States to know that the military leadership was not in disarray and factionalized. Therefore, no counter-coup attempt from within the military seemed likely. In fact, in October 1977 the US Embassy reported that Zia had the unchallenged authority in making decisions, although he consulted military men around him, the commanders of the six army corps being the most powerful after him.

However, the United States did not completely trust that Zia was astute enough to pull off staying for a long time. According to the Embassy, he made decisions impulsively, he lacked "sound political judgment, naively evaluating issues according to their compatibility with Islam and righteousness with no particular regard for their political and economic consequences" ("Who's in Charge Here?" 1977, October 16). As Peter Constable pointed out, "our [the U.S. Embassy's] assessment at the time was that Zia was a soldier and not likely to be very swift as a politician, and that he'd better figure out some way to turn power over to a civilian government, because he was unlikely to be able to handle the thing" (Constable 1998, p. 39). The US Embassy had intimate knowledge of the thinking of highest-ranking military officers in the Military Council formed after the coup. General Shariff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, complained in cocktail parties about not being updated on things going on, the Navy Chief Admiral Shariff left unanswered any enquiries into non-naval matters and the Military Council and directed these questions to General Zia while Lt. General Iqbal, IV Corps Commander in Lahore, "is a man of

strong beliefs, a anti-Bhutto hardliner and pro-military rule advocate, dogged, a firm disciplinarian and not too bright", General Arbab, the Corps Commander in Karachi, who was "Bobby" to his western friends, is a bon vivant, bright, extroverted and voluble and a talented military in-fighter", and finally General Chishti, the Corps Commander in Rawalpindi, "is the quietest and most taciturn of the three, but is also a man of firm beliefs and is considered anti-Bhutto." The Rest of the Corps Commanders did not have much authority in running the affairs of the state ("Who's in Charge Here?" 1977, October 16).

The US reaction mattered for General Zia because when Zia first intervened and then Bhutto was released on bail, *the takeover was still in a very critical condition*. When Bhutto was bailed out first, he toured the country and made a very strong showing, which left Zia feeling very vulnerable. This was why after promising to hold elections soon after his coup, Zia postponed them because, according to the US Embassy in Islamabad, "Zia undoubtedly was afraid Bhutto would win a large number of seats, if not a majority. Bhutto's party did not disintegrate as some predicted when he was jailed, on the contrary, Mrs. Bhutto's fiery demagogy (in her husband's stead) appeared to be winning additional support for their cause" ("Pakistan Under Martial Law" 1977, July 19; "Prospects for Pakistan" 1977, October 13).

The US Embassy officials, however, predicted in mid-October that "Zia could not escape the decision to remain in power. But he does not seem to be a competent administrator, his hold in the military was not assured. So another military man may do a palace coup to dismiss him" ("Soviet View on Events in Pakistan" 1977, October 12). Their prediction was correct, not because another military figure emerged to challenge General Zia but because he decided to remain in power. He fully cooperated with the United States in terms of foreign policy however, though Pakistan's nuclear enrichment was a major headache. In November 1977, General Zia said that "CENTO does not offer any advantages to us because it precludes us from having friendly relations with non-aligned countries but he said his military government would not withdraw from CENTO" ("Pakistan's Attitude toward CENTO" 1977, November 15).

Even after it became obvious that General Zia would not leave power to civilians anytime soon, he continued to court the United States and wanted to establish good relations. In December 1977, the Pakistan Ambassador to Washington, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, was called back to Islamabad for

talks. He reported to the US officials on his return to Washington that local Pakistan commanders in provincial capitals supported the return to democracy and was resolute in their decision to have democratic elections very soon. He also reported that the Soviet pressures on Pakistan was continuing as Pakistan was adamant in its decision not to allow non-scheduled overflights across Pakistani territory. The government wanted to preserve good relations with the USA ("Ambassador Yaqub Khan's Call" 1977, December 22). It may be in the same Envoys' Conference as above that General Zia met A.K. Brohi, who over time would become the chief spokesman of a new ruling elite, and Iqbal Akhund to review foreign relations issues. There Akhund told both that "in the United States the reaction had been mixed. The Carter Administration had put the nuclear issue, and specifically Pakistan's attempts to match India's nuclear capability, on top of its foreign policy agenda. The fall of Bhutto, who was the moving force behind Pakistan's nuclear policy, cannot but have come as welcome news to the administration—whether or not they actually connived at, or engineered his fall. In public they maintained a discreet, one should say, expectant silence" (Akhund, p. 354).

At a lunch given by Jimmy Carter at New York for the Heads of the Asian delegations to the UN General Assembly's 1978 session [October 5], as he went around greeting guests, he stopped to say to Agha Shahi, "General Zia is doing a good job in a difficult situation. Please convey my good wishes to him." This was America's 'Human Rights President'—commending the 'good job' of a regime that was flogging journalists and carrying out public hangings!" (Akhund, p. 354). Indeed, in a meeting with the Afghan Ambassador Karim, US Deputy Assistant Secretary Adolph Dubs said in November 1977 that the United States wants "good, friendly and productive relations with Pakistan" and they are trying to convince the government that nuclear reprocessing facility is neither economical nor helpful to the region ("Deputy Assistant Secretary Dubs Meeting" 1977, November 16).

Political Support

As of 1980 'diplomatic recognition' after military coup d'état was no longer a dilemma for the United States. As Arthur W. Hummel, Jr, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, pointed out the United States solved this problem many years ago and what was known as 'Estrada Doctrine' emerged (Hummel 1998, p. 132). It means in diplomatic terms that the

US administration did not have to make the otherwise difficult decision to recognize the new government or not. It would simply deal with the new entity in power. This US approach was also helped by the fact that "this coup was bloodless. If there had been actual fighting, that would have been something else. Things were surprisingly smooth and calm. Once again, as was the case when President Marcos took over in the Philippines, much of the population heaved a sigh of relief. Things had calmed down, and there was not going to be a civil war. The confrontation was over. Many people believed General Zia's promise that they would have elections. He said, at first, 'By September,' 1977, which, of course, was totally unrealistic" (Hummel 1998, p. 132).

Nevertheless, the Carter Administration was not too warm either. A former diplomat described President Carter's response as "muddled and pusillanimous" (Marker 2016, p. 127). For instance, President Carter scheduled a visit to India only three months after the coup in Pakistan, but to the consternation of Pakistani officials, including Zia, President Carter excluded Pakistan from his trip. This was the first time a US president had visited India without stopping over in Pakistan. Pakistani authorities were very concerned for two reasons: because Carter would not stop by in Pakistan by breaking the previous American policy guiding such visits, Pakistani officials thought this could lead India to think that the USA was withdrawing its support from Pakistan. Besides, such a visit by the president, as in other cases discussed in this research, would empower General Zia to a great extent. It should be recalled that the domestic power balance after the coup was far from being assured in the first months. The PPP was still strong and military generals became sure, especially after Bhutto was left free on bail first, that if an election was held soon Bhutto would certainly dominate.

Concerning the president's trip, the US Embassy reported on September 27, 1977 that "General Zia said that Pakistanis believe they are being ignored when they see a schedule that calls for a stop in Iran and three days in India. Zia said Pakistan is 'proud of its past association' with the USA and would greatly appreciate it if the president's schedule would permit him to come. Zia also said that he hoped a civilian government would be in office by the time of president's trip and that he wanted to extend the invitation on behalf of his successors." "Two hours later, Gen. Zia sent Agha Hilali (now retired but previously long-time diplomat, ambassador to Washington and also Agha Shahi's brother) to see me. Hilali and Zia wanted advice whether a special envoy such

as himself should be sent to Washington to explain the importance of a visit to Pakistan, however brief. Their intention was to underline that this matter has real and long-range implications for Pakistan's attitudes toward the US" ("General Zia's Concern Over Omission" 1977, September 27). The USA was aware of how a visit by US President Carter to the region with or without a stop in Pakistan would sound in Pakistan and how critical it would be for Zia.

After transmitting the above conversation with General Zia, the US Ambassador commented that "the president's itinerary is already the subject of internal political controversy, with PPP spokesmen claiming the US would not have dared treat Pakistan so shabbily were Bhutto still in power. Zia finds himself in an awkward position during an extremely sensitive time. He has clearly and publicly cast himself in the position of desiring close ties with the U.S. but in the public eye here is seen as rebuffed by the USA. However, if an elected government does assume office here prior to the president's trip, it would be advisable to reconsider the possibility of adjusting the president's schedule to permit a brief stopover in Pakistan" ("General Zia's Concern Over Omission" 1977, September 27). Ten days later, Zia kept pressing the USA about a stopover in Pakistan. Agha Shahi, Secretary General of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, met the US Secretary of State and conveyed to him these concerns alongside Zia's personal invitation to Pakistan. "The general looked forward to a visit by the Secretary whenever he was traveling to the sub-continent or at any other convenient time." The Secretary tried to soothe those concerns by denying that the USA intended to downgrade its relations with Pakistan. Shahi said he will make sure that Zia hears these assurances ("Secretary's Conversation with Agha Shahi" 1977, October 7). Under pressure, President Carter still made an overflight statement and the US Embassy found a chance to suggest the specific wording for that statement. The embassy suggested President Carter say that "support for the territorial integrity, development and independence of Pakistan remains an enduring principle of American foreign policy" ("President's Overflight Statement" 1977, October 25).

Military and Economic Assistance

The USA was careful not to take radical steps to undermine Zia's rule. The Carter Administration did not apply sanctions; and it did not try to block loans from international monetary institutions from the IMF, the World Bank, etc. (Thornton, p. 964). "Most of the adverse U.S. actions

took the form of *not* doing something *for* Pakistan, rather than doing anything *against* it" (Thornton, p. 966). "Arms sales had never been banned, and F-5E aircraft had been offered as an alternative to the A-7. Food shipments under PL 480 continued, and significant elements of the administration were poised to resume a substantial aid program if the nuclear obstacles could be overcome" (Thornton, p. 966). But General Zia could not backtrack on the nuclear issue because it had long become a matter of national pride. Therefore, the following year the USA did suspend aid (except humanitarian aid) because Zia made plans to buy nuclear reprocessing plants from France. The military and economic aid did not come back until later, when Reagan assumed the Presidency (Hummel, p. 132).

The revolution in Iran in 1979 and the invasion of Afghanistan as well as the absence of Soviet reciprocation for US restraint in Zaire again increased the strategic importance of Pakistan due to its geographic proximity of new crisis flashpoints in the Persian Gulf in particular (Thornton, p. 969; Asghar Khan, p. 199; Haqqani, p. 240). "Afghanistan proved to be his [Zia's] parachute (Akhund, p. 373). Only after troubles occurred in Afghanistan did the USA give signs of understanding Pakistan and assuring it of the importance to them of integrity and independence of Pakistan in June 1978" (Akhund, pp. 367–369). In spite of his "evangelical policy on human rights" (Haig 1984) the turn of events with the communist coup in Afghanistan and Iranian Shah's demand for stability in Pakistan forced Carter administration to come grips with the reality around it (Constable, pp. 38–41; Arif, p. 314; Chishti, p. 202). The U.S. reaffirmed the 1959 bilateral security agreement against Communist attack (Kux 2001b, p. 302).

The increasing importance of Pakistan in the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan continued under the Reagan Administration. As the Secretary of State Haig said, the fall of the Shah and Soviets in Afghanistan woke everybody up about the strategic significance of the ME (Haig 1984, pp. 88, 168). The fact that Haig, a former General, became the Secretary of State in the new administration worked very well for the military government in Islamabad. "In Haig the Pakistanis had found their new [John Foster] Dulles. In a message to all US embassies titled "U.S. Policy towards Pakistan," Haig declared that "Pakistan's security is inextricably linked to our own security and to that of industrialized democracies, primarily because of Western and Japanese dependence on Persian Gulf oil." The United States, he said, had "concluded that a stronger, more self-confident Pakistan" was "essential for the

enhanced deterrence to Soviet expansionism which we seek"" (Haqqani, p. 258; Arif, p. 339; Buckley quoted in Asghar Khan 1983, p. 203). President Reagan made sure that military assistance flew to Pakistan as well. This was very critical because as Ronald Spiers, the US Ambassador to Islamabad, pointed out, "much of the military assistance was important to Zia to keep his own military commanders pacified. He needed their support. The military is the most coherently organized element of the Pakistan social structure. It is important to understand that in many respects, Pakistan is not one country; it is an amalgam of four distinct linguistic and ethnic groups: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtu and Baluchi. The military were primarily Punjabi. Bhutto was a Sindhi who eventually didn't enjoy anyone's support. Zia was a military officer who had been appointed Army Chief of Staff and then had to run the government after Bhutto's overthrow" (Spiers 1998, p. 106). In any case, the USA was unwilling to cut military aid especially, because when military aid is cut the USA loses the opportunity to know force readiness, the kinds of small arms they have, and their supply levels (Hummel 1998, p. 133).

As Fig. 4.3 shows, US military and economic assistance to Pakistan after the 1977 coup d'état dropped steadily. However, the aid level, which had been decreasing before the coup d'état, plummeted not only because the USA applied sanctions to penalize the coup makers but because General Zia continued PM Bhutto's program to develop nuclear arsenal. In this case, therefore, the US role was more restricted to acquiescence to the coup without active support.



Fig. 4.3 US Aid to Pakistan, 1975–1979 (constant US dollars) ('Sixty Years of US Aid' 2011)

Discussion

This section on the U's. role in 1977 coup in Pakistan showed that although the army moved against PM Bhutto altogether, General Zia cared a lot about getting Carter Administration's blessing after the coup. This was why General Zia was so insistent for President Carter to pay a visit to Pakistan when he planned an official visit to India. This shows the level of importance coup makers attach to high-level visits after coups. General Zia's sudden revival of an old US invitation to visit Washington provides an additional evidence on this score. Similar to other coups discussed in this study, the Pakistani army deposed PM Bhutto out of domestic considerations. Confirming the point made by Johnson and Thyne (2016, p. 9) that "pressure by governments to repress nonviolent movements is apt to generate rifts among loyalists, opening space to be exploited by coup plotters", the Pakistani military was stuck between loyalties to the people and the government when these two fiercely clashed. There is no evidence that the USA bluntly told General Zia or any other military figure that they would understand if they deposed PM Bhutto, but the USA provided enough opportunity and comfort zone by giving very negative signals to the Bhutto government in the weeks and months before the coup.

In the end, the Carter Administration did not condemn the coup but neither did it shower praise and assistance on the new government. Pakistan was low on their radar, especially given Carter's disdain for Pakistan's nuclear pursuit and his sympathies with India. Unlike the case of May 27 coup in Turkey seventeen years earlier, there was no NATO Supreme Commander to go and lobby the Carter Administration to change its tone and give more support to the Pakistani generals. As Tahir-Kheli argued, what haunted the Pakistan—USA relationship from the outset was that "the relationship was based on predilections of a few key individuals who determined both its direction as well as intensity" (Tahir-Kheli, p. 11). CENTO was already moribund by that time and Pakistan's weak to non-existent institutional links to the United States left it prone to be hurt by changes in US governments.

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CHAPTER 5

Conclusion: The United States and Militaries in Turkey and Pakistan After the Cold War

Armed forces continued to ride the crest of power and influence in Pakistan and Turkey after the Cold War. They still made and unmade governments in the 1990s and well into the 2000s (Narlı 2000; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Çınar 2003, p. 321; Shah 2014, pp. 165–203). After Zia ul Haq died in a mysterious plane crash in 1988, the Pakistan armed forces, led by General Mirza Aslam Beg, discussed whether to take over and declare martial law or follow the constitutional road, hand over the presidency to Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Chairman of the Senate, and allow for general elections to take place. Opting for the latter option, the military called Ghulam Ishaq Khan to the General Headquarters and conveyed to him their final decision (Arif 1995, p. 402). In the November 1988 elections that followed, Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Peoples Party emerged as the biggest winners. Yet she was not immediately allowed to form a government. According to Shafqat, "the military made it amply clear that it desired to share power and not transfer power" (1996, p. 659). After Bhutto was allowed to form a government, she still had to appease the military, which she did by retaining Sahibzada Yaqub Khan as her foreign minister, in addition to General Aslam Beg as COAS. She also had to leave the Afghan policy to the army, let it keep its large budget, and not interfere with its internal affairs (Shafqat 1997, p. 227; Shah 2014, pp. 168–169).

In this rather critical juncture in the history of Pakistan, the US Embassy in Islamabad supported PM Benazir Bhutto both before and after the elections, so much so that the US Embassy wrote white papers

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for Bhutto. Robert Oakley, the new American Ambassador after Arnold Raphel died in the same plane crash as Zia ul-Haq, was well aware that Benazir Bhutto would have to leave the Afghan policy, the nuclear program, and internal army matters to the military (Nawaz 2008, p. 414). Ambassador Oakley and other American officials, including Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Richard Armitage and Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia Richard Murphy, lobbied the military to respect the election results and allow Benazir Bhutto to assume office (Kux 2001, p. 293). When PM Bhutto fell out with the military and President Ishaq Khan shortly afterwards, the president triggered the *tutelary power* to dissolve the National Assembly vested in the office of the president by Zia ul-Haq and dismissed the government on charges of corruption and ineffectiveness in 1990. Yet "the decision to sack Bhutto was actually taken in an army corps commanders' meeting held days before the presidential dismissal" (Shah 2014, p. 168).

The US influence was in large part due to the receptiveness and demands of Pakistani politicians of all stripes who were otherwise very vulnerable to military's political machinations. Similar to Benazir Bhutto's relationship with US Ambassador Robert Oakley in the position of her 'viceroy' (Lenderking 2007, p. 145), Nawaz Sharif later sought the mentorship of Thomas Simons, Ambassador Oakley's replacement. Simons reports turning down the request, however, by saying that "well, it's not my job to give you advice. You're the elected Prime Minister of the country. There's no more room for a viceroy" (Simons 2013, p. 220). We should recall that before President Farooq Leghari (1993–1997) dismissed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in November 1996, two Pakistani politicians, the well-connected Pakistani diplomat and former Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan and Syed Refaqat Khan, General Zia's former Chief of Staff, visited the US Ambassador Simons for tea and sought signals from him to assess the degree of US commitment to Bhutto. They thought that if the USA was not too committed to Bhutto, the likely cost of her dismissal would be significantly diminished. Ambassador Simons understood their reason for the meeting but still remarks that if he signaled through his "tepid reaction to the calls of Yaqub Khan and Refaqat Khan" the absence of deep US attachment to her, this was unintentional (Simons 2013, pp. 217–219). With the much-needed assurance Yaqub Khan and Refaqat Khan received anyway, President Leghari confidently sacked PM Bhutto.

The USA weighed heavily in Pakistani politics before and after. In the wake and aftermath of the First Gulf War Pakistan COAS General Mirza Aslam Beg reportedly supported Iraq against Kuwait and the international coalition. He saw the Gulf War as a 'Western-Zionist game plan to neutralize the Moslem World' while PM Nawaz Sharif supported the coalition against Iraq (Nawaz, pp. 438–439). The USA was as much upset with General Beg's connection to Iranian Revolutionary Guards in determining his policy position on the issue (Oakley 1999, pp. 145–147; Dean 2004, pp. 224–225). Yet, in an unprecedented move in Pakistan, with the backing of the Pakistani president and several generals, Sharif named General Asif, who was also favored by the United States (Haqqani 2013, p. 224) as Nawaz Beg's successor two months ahead of his scheduled retirement date. With his name approved beforehand, the next COAS in waiting, General Asif Nawaz, then told the senior Iranian visitors that had been hosted by incumbent COAS General Beg that Beg stood as a lame duck and that when he took the helm of the army he would review all past activities (Nawaz 2008, p. 439). This was not the only time the USA had tried to influence the selection of next COAS in Pakistan. Years later, this time "Washington worked behind the scenes to secure an extension in the tour of duty of Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, which was due to expire in mid-2010. The Gillani government, which had its own reasons for keeping Kayani in office, gave him an unprecedented three-year extension. In a sense, Kayani has become the power behind the throne in Pakistan" (Riedel 2011, p. 121).

The early 1990s were full of events that underlined a continuity in how the USA approached and tried to cultivate the Pakistani military. For instance, US preference for the Pakistan Chief of General Staff as its interlocutor did not change when the issue was additional soldiers and officers needed for the UN Peacekeeping Force in Somalia. The Bush administration (1989–1993) approached Pakistani COAS, General Asif Nawaz, informally first to get an initial feel. General Nawaz told them that this request should be referred to the civilian government rather than the military. Yet he still told them that if provided the right and sufficient equipment Pakistan would be ready to participate (Nawaz 2008, p. 448). Thomas W. Simons, the US Ambassador to Islamabad (1996–1998), reports that he was careful to maintain the best possible relations with the then Chief of General Staff, Jehangir Karamat. William Milam, who succeeded Thomas Simons as the US Ambassador to Islamabad, was also aware that he had to get to know the Chief of Army Staff fairly

well to have influence in Pakistan (Milam 2015, p. 115; see also Talbott 2004, p. 59).

A major contentious point between the USA and Pakistan had long been the latter's nuclear program since Bhutto introduced it. The controversy was temporarily put on the backburner during the invasion of Afghanistan but it was rehashed in the 1990s after India tested nuclear weapons successfully. The US diplomacy to persuade Pakistan to halt its nuclear activities also shows both how important US—Pakistan military-to-military relations and high-level visits were. When Sandy Berger, President Clinton's National Security Advisor, visited Islamabad in January 1996, COAS Karamat was the first Pakistani official he saw to discuss Pakistan's nuclear program, though he also made sure to meet PM Benazir Bhutto (Simons 2013, p. 215). When India declared itself a nuclear power after testing a weapon successfully in 1998, Nawaz Sharif felt that it had to act. This elicited an immediate visit by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, and General Anthony Zinni of US CENTCOM to Islamabad to dissuade Pakistan from doing so. When Talbott and Zinni went to Pakistan's military headquarters in Rawalpindi to see the COAS Jehangir Karamat after first visiting the foreign ministry, the meeting went far more calmly than their initial meetings with the civilians. This was because "Anthony Zinni and Karamat had worked together closely and had a no nonsense, soldier to soldier relationship" (Khan 2009, pp. 39–40) As Talbott interpreted it, General Zinni's presence in the American delegation that visited Pakistan at this time was to signal the USA's intention to augment security ties with Pakistan. As the Sharif government was struggling to make a critical and difficult decision about whether or not to test nuclear weapons as a riposte to the Indians, PM Sharif asked the US delegation something that shows how Pakistani political leadership still looked for signals of American commitment in high-level visits. Sharif asked if President Clinton could skip India leg in his upcoming trip to the region to visit only Pakistan to strengthen his government's hand (Khan 2009, p. 44).

The short episode of the First Gulf War when Pakistani COAS Mirza Aslam Beg entertained pro-Iranian views also demonstrated how crucial it was and what benefits derived from American military education and training programs. US officials attributed what they saw as 'pro-Iranian' General Beg to the fact that "… fewer and fewer officers are US trained—none since 1989. It is one of the consequences of cutting off our ties to the Pakistani military" (Pickering 2015, p. 521; Inderfurth 1999, pp. 3,

13–14). Remarkably, Pervez Musharraf himself would later raise a similar complaint with General Anthony Zinni. General Zinni reported that when Musharraf was the COAS he said that "since the US sanctioned the education of Pakistani officers, Pakistani officers' outlook turned internal and lacked broad, secular international education" (Thompson 2011).

According to Schaffer and Schaffer (2011), the fact that US sanctions on Pakistan in 1990 cut off all military assistance, including professional training, to 'Pakistan's most promising officers' is poised to do more harm to US—Pakistani relations in the coming years. Although, as previously argued in this book, American training do not automatically make Pakistani officers favor US positions on any policy issue, it allowed a considerable degree of familiarity with American society, culture, and politics and provide more effective and durable communication channels. The fact that the top command at the helm of Pakistani military today may still belong to the so-called "American generation", namely those who received training and education in the United States army programs, may only hide future problems (pp. 64–65). When a Senator commented in a Senate hearing that one of the chief reasons for the inadequate handling of the 1999 coup d'état in Pakistan was because the USA drastically cut the number of Pakistani officers trained in the United States after the Pressler Amendment passed in 1985, Karl Inderfurth, then the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, nodded and agreed that the USA needed to restore its relationship with the Pakistani military to "have both a personal rapport with and also to try to influence their direction. It has in the past been a Western-oriented military. There is clearly now a greater degree of influence of some of the Islamic parties and schooling, and to some degree Western orientation may be coming into question" (Inderfurth 1999). This provides another confirmation of expectations from PME programs the USA offers foreign military officers as well as the continuity in importance of these PME programs after the Cold War.

With the exception of a very brief interregnum of four years from 1989 to 1993, during which period President Turgut Özal established a good degree of civilian supremacy over the TAF, the Turkish military continued to enjoy political power after the Cold War (Sakallıoğlu 1997; Mufti 2009, p. 91). As the military remained powerful politically, it also maintained its position as a primary point of contact for the USA. "A strong preference for working through the more 'reliable' military-to-military channel [between Turkey and the USA] was still lingering

in Washington" (Athanassopoulou 2014, p. 171). Military-to-military relationships continued to come to the rescue on serious and mundane matters alike. In the words of Morton Abramowitz, the former US Ambassador to Turkey (1989–1991):

> The Turkish military was not the easiest societal sector to deal with. I don't know whether they ever disclosed much information to us [the Embassy]. I felt, as is true in other similar situations, that its relationship with the U.S. was through our military and not the embassy… Military to military relationships were, as far as I could see, quite good. We were NATO partners; Turkey depended on us for more modern weapons. I think everybody recognized that we were the key component of Turkish security… (2009, p. 124; brackets added)

In striking similarity with the practice of US ambassadors to Islamabad after the Cold War, Abramowitz's successor ambassador to Ankara, Richard C. Barkley (1991–1994), stressed the importance of the bilateral military relationship and did not forget to attribute it to PME programs.

> The United States liked the [Turkish] military because it is extraordinarily professional. Many of them had trained in the United States… Therefore, there had been very close ties. Those play out in different ways. One of the things I can say is during my entire tenure, the U.S. military had been particularly sensitive to the importance of Turkey. Obviously having enormous responsibilities not only in the Med [Mediterranean] but for that segment of a world which had become increasingly volatile, our military components all understood the strategic as well as the regional importance of Turkey. (Barkley 2004, p. 185)

US Involvement

With this level of relationship maintained after the Cold War, the USA continued to be a decisive actor in coups and coup attempts in both Turkey and Pakistan. Notwithstanding the emergence of an "anti-coup norm" after the ending of the Cold War, which meant that international powers are no longer as tolerant of coups d'état as was previously the case (Shannon et al. 2015, p. 365; also Brown 2005, p. 181; also see Marinov and Goemans 2014, pp. 805–806; Hunter 1998), external actors, particularly the United States continued to play a large, and often

critical, role in these military coups and others in several other places, from Algeria and Egypt to Thailand and Venezuela (Barracca 2007; Fitch 2005; Tansey 2017; Aslan and Kıyıcı 2017; Volpi 2006, p. 444; Cavatorta and Durac 2009; Albrecht 2015, pp. 674–675). Several scholars have drawn attention to NATO's evolution to advance the argument for emergence of an 'anti-coup norm' in this regard, with particular respect to NATO's decision to make the 'respect for civilian supremacy' a precondition for membership after the end of the Cold War (Burk 2002, pp. 20–21; Bruneau and Trinkunas 2006, p. 777). Regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States and the African Union, also embraced the anti-coup norm (Tansey 2017, pp. 146–147). However, the past three decades provide ample evidence that "the anti-coup norm" has been "geographically highly contingent" and "championed very shallowly" (Tansey, p. 145).

With continuing American influence on the background, the Pakistani Army deposed Nawaz Sharif's government in 1999 in a hierarchical coup while in Turkey the TAF overthrew the Refah-Yol government, a coalition government between Necmettin Erbakan's Refah Partisi (RP, Welfare Party) and Tansu Çiller's *Doğru Yol Partisi* (DYP, True Path Party), in June 1997. Starting most visibly after the 1994 local elections, in which Islamic-oriented Erbakan's Welfare Party won major municipalities and emerged as a force to be reckoned with, the TAF became most alarmed at the prospect of an Islamist government in Turkey. According to Mildred Patterson, the wife of the then US Ambassador to Ankara, said

> The Islamic party was becoming stronger and the Turkish generals at our dinner table began to say this was very bad, but they would also say they didn't want to take over the country. The Turkish generals were quite conscious of the fact that they were not economic experts, that they didn't have the skills needed to put the country back on a more solid economic footing. On the other hand, they considered themselves guardians of Ataturk's legacy and of democracy. (2003, p. 64)

When the rise of the Refah could not be stopped and it won the largest share of votes in the 1995 general elections, and later managed to form a coalition government with Tansu Çiller's center-right DYP, the military started to think about ways to contain what they perceived as an existential threat by another military coup (Kırca 2009, p. 99). In this process,

it looked up to the USA for a green light for anti-government action. Yet "American officials [under Clinton Administration] issued discreet warnings and privately told Turkish generals that the NATO alliance would have great difficulty tolerating a military-led regime. Albright also noted that all sixteen NATO members are ruled by civilians…" (Aslan and Kıyıcı 2017, pp. 180–181). It was only when the USA became disillusioned with some of the foreign policy moves of the Islamic-oriented government after trying to accommodate it, it gave the green light Turkish generals had been impatiently waiting for. Still having been caught between the principles of 'democracy' and 'secularism' (McKee 2003), however, the US green light translated into a peculiar position that Satloff described as "neither hard coup nor Islamists in power' or 'political change, yes; coup, no" (2000, p. 30). In other words, a new type of coup d'état that did not resemble the former coups became the solution found to this morass of contradicting preferences and principles (Aslan and Kıyıcı 2017). Remarkably, in this interesting case, the US green light on a possible coup, known as the February 27 coup process, therefore, determined the coup style instead of whether or not a coup would happen. "Although it was the US' eventual positive signal that brought Refah-Yol's end, it was again the Americans that prevented a hard coup like old times" (Satloff cited in Aslan and Kıyıcı 2017, p. 181).

The USA continued to favor the TAF as a favored point of contact. Later in the early 2000s, on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq in 2002 under a different Turkish government this time, namely the AK Party government, the USA chose the Turkish General Staff as its interlocutor to persuade Ankara to open a northern front (Türkmen 2012, p. 196). "The fact that this request [for cooperation for invasion of Iraq] was submitted from the US military to the Turkish military was perhaps not an explicit attempt to circumvent the parliament, but it was an indication of the direct contacts and close cooperation between the two defense establishments" (Holmes 2014, p. 173). When the Turkish government's relevant motion presented to the Turkish Parliament to allow Turkish soil to be used as another front in the invasion of Iraq did not pass, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz lamented that "the Turkish military as a strong supporter of Turkish—American relations did not play the leadership role to push the civilian government as they expected" (Lacey 2003).

Despite this setback, however, the AK Party government enjoyed the support of the Bush Administration for a considerable number of years

that followed. In a note underlying the US preference to work with the Turkish armed forces for many decades beforehand, Major General Ahmet Bertan Nogaylaroğlu (Retd.) observes in his memoirs that "for years the CIA, FBI, think tanks and all international organizations used to approach the Turkish military first; they chose to work with the [AK Party] government only recently" (Nogaylaroğlu 2015, p. 218). He further adds, "there are only two periods in the history of the Turkish Republic when the US preferred civilian governments over Turkish military: the Democrat Party period and AKP government… Except these two particular periods the Turkish military retained its power and influence and claimed, first and foremost, the issue of security as its bailiwick. In these periods, the US supported the Turkish military directly or indirectly and used it to put pressure on civilian governments, when deemed necessary" (Nogaylaroğlu 2015, p. 149). In an interview conducted before his retirement, a well-placed mid-ranking officer told the author that when 'Republican meetings', a series of demonstrations by a mobilized group of Kemalist-minded organizations, took place in 2007 as a pretext for some military move against the government, nothing more could be done for three reasons: the country's economic indicators were very good; the government enjoyed widespread popular support; and the USA did not approve any action against the government (personal communication, August 24, 2015).

In the meantime, civil-military relations in Turkey since the early 2000s underwent significant changes in pursuit of EU membership (Sarıgil 2014, pp. 178–179; Bilgiç 2009) When the military top brass resigned in protest just before the annual Supreme Military Council in 2011, one observer of Turkish politics declared it to be "the end of the military's role in Turkish democracy" (Tüysüz and Tavernise 2011). Several other academics and observers argued either that the TAF no longer wanted to be involved in domestic politics or that impediments are so insurmountable that the TAF could not intervene even if it wanted to (Heper 2011; Aydınlı 2009; Aydınlı 2012; Özkan 2011). This led to the expectation that with the 2011 general elections, the final curtain might eventually close for the Turkish military (Gürsoy 2012). However, the failed July 15 coup attempt in 2016 showed most painfully that legal-technical changes in civil-military relations do not automatically correspond to a qualitative transformation of civil-military relations, and that Turkey is far from the ideal point where coups will vanish as a potential course of action. More importantly for Turkish—US relations

though is the controversy triggered by comments NATO SACEUR General Curtis Scaparotti and General Joseph Votel, the Commander of CENTCOM made regarding the purge of NATO officers among those removed from the Turkish military after failed July 15 coup attempt (Paletta 2016; Beesley 2016). This altercation may betoken strains in the military-to-military relationship that otherwise endured several political crises in history.

The involvement of the USA and its importance in the eyes of Pakistani putschists also remained beyond the end of the Cold War. In particular, Pakistani military generals were aware of likely external consequences of their coup in 1999. They predicted that this coup would not be welcomed and they would risk being isolated by the international community. Since the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibited US governments from providing to countries where elected governments are overturned by military interventions, the USA had to cut aid to Pakistan as well (Shah 2014, p. 187). Yet prior rapport established between officers of two armies also helped in this case of coup d'état. When COAS Pervez Musharraf took over the army command in 1998, Anthony Zinni of the US Central Command had paid him a visit and was in return the first person to be called by Musharraf in 1999 when the latter deposed PM Nawaz Sharif. Musharraf called General Zinni to explain the events that had led to the coup and to underscore his determination to bring "democracy in substance and not just in form" (Zinni 2007).

Likewise, high-level visits too seem to have continued in importance and signaling approval after coups. When Bill Clinton accepted an invitation to visit Pakistan after his five-day visit of India in 2000, the American delegation was very specific in its conditions. The president would not be welcomed by anybody in military uniform and would not be photographed shaking hands. This was not what President Musharraf imagined. According to Haqqani, "Musharraf felt he needed the imprimatur of American engagement, if not US support, for his political longevity" (p. 306). However, Karl Inderfurth, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs in the Clinton Administration from 1997 to 2001, offers a different account of President Clinton's visit. As opposed to the claim that President Clinton consciously kept short his visit to Pakistan, Inderfurth states that President Clinton insisted on visiting Pakistan, even for only a few hours, in spite of strong objections given by the Secret Service for security concerns because "he wanted to make it clear that

we have had a longstanding relationship with that country, we have been allies, and we were not about to turn our back on Pakistan even though we had a number of fundamental concerns—like the recent military takeover, Pakistan's support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, the nuclear issue" (Inderfurth 2003, pp. 80–82). Regardless of intentions and deliberations involved, this shows that such high-level visits carry tangible meanings beyond mere symbolism. In any case, managing to stay put until President Clinton finished his term, Musharraf found to the golden opportunity to do so after agreeing to cooperate with the Bush Administration after 9/11. "In return for Pakistan's cooperation, Washington lifted both nuclear- and democracy-related sanctions. The administration also declared Pakistan a major non-NATO ally and pledged $5 billion in military and economic aid" (Shah 2014, p. 189).

Military-to-military relations maintained their importance thereafter. As of the 2000s "most contact between the two countries [Pakistan and US] still occurs behind closed doors between the two militaries or between the CIA and ISI" and "it [the US] still prefers engaging with Pakistan's military over its civilian leaders." (Shah 2011, pp. 80–81; see also Sethi 2015). US attempts to influence events in Pakistan by, for instance, keeping friendly or favored generals in place also continue (Sethi 2015). Whether during the Cold War or afterward, on Pakistan "…American policy has often tilted toward encouraging military interference in the civilian government's conduct of policy and all but encouraged military dictatorship" (Riedel 2011, p. 121). It is very indicative of long-standing American preference for stability over democracy in Pakistan that Robert M. Gates, the former Director of National Intelligence Agency, former member of White House staffs of four American presidents, and former Defense Secretary in the Obama Administration, stated in his memoirs that in 2009 the Obama Administration managed to get passed in the Congress a five-year $7.5 billion aid package to encourage Pakistan to cooperate with the US strategy in Afghanistan after 9/11. However, "some idiot in the House of Representatives attached language to the bill that stipulated that the assistance was conditional on the Pakistani military not interfering with the civilian government" (Gates 2014, p. 372).

An American Ambassador once predicted that "the time would come, some day, when the Pakistani military would say, 'we're not going to play this game any more.'" (Hummel 1998, p. 151). That day may have

already arrived with a civilian government completing its five-year term for the first time as of 2013 and two successive chiefs of the army staff refusing to take over despite various incentives and conducive environments to do so. To understand how this became possible we must start with changes originating from the military itself.

The primary reason for the Pakistani military's unwillingness to take power into its hands any longer is the lessons it gleaned from past coups, especially following the Musharraf coup in 1999. In the words of a former Pakistani Ambassador and Air Vice Marshal, "[the] Musharraf experience was a very bad one in the sense that it was not the time to do that kind of a coup that he did. It was a very unpopular coup, of which the military did not think very high of" (Shahzad Chaudhry, personal communication, September 29, 2015). In other words, the Musharraf era left a very bad taste in the generals' mouth because their public approval ratings fell to new lows, with military officers engaging in the odd practice of visiting shops to collect taxes, the Lal Masjid incident in 2007, and the American war in Afghanistan creating millions of refugees as well as scores of civilian casualties in drone attacks. This did not mean though that Pakistani military, when led by General Kayani or Raheel Shariff, abandoned interest in Pakistani politics. In other words, the military did not disengage from politics. As Shah pointed out, the top command came to think that "…a blunt military coup will likely be a hard sell in the army, domestically unpopular, and externally unwelcome. Also, the army high command would rather not take direct responsibility for resolving Pakistan's complex political, economic, and security challenges" (2014, p. 241).

Having understood the burden that follows from governing a hard country such as Pakistan, the military leadership seems wise enough to exert power from behind the curtain to manage policy on certain issue areas such as the Taliban and Afghanistan. As shown by the large-scale street protests by Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf (PTI) leader Imran Khan and cleric Tahir ul-Kadri, during which Imran Khan said, pointing in the direction of the army, they were waiting for the 'umpire to rise its finger' (Boone 2014), the military has other means to shake down civilian governments without needing to take overt power. For "an outright [meaning classical/old style, 'hard'] coup would—rightly—provoke international condemnation, and cut off American and European military aid, among other funds. It would also make clear, again, that

sustained civilian rule has never been tolerated by Pakistan's power-hungry army" (Fair 2013).

Conclusion

This book has studied the US role in four successful military coups d'état in Turkey and Pakistan during the Cold War. The fact that both Pakistan and Turkey were strategically significant countries in the efforts to contain the Soviets and communism during the Cold War but connected to the USA in different degree and quality of connections guided the selection of these cases. The overriding objective of this study was to unearth the role of an external actor in military coups d'état in a country, which, while understudied in the civil-military relations literature, has been shrouded in conspiracy theories in the popular literature.

This book started with several questions to answer. First, it explored if coup makers consider likely external reactions to their coup attempts or their focus was entirely limited to domestic factors such as the likelihood of public resistance and the non-cooperation of other armed actors such as the police and the intelligence services. Second, this study enquired into the real impact of external actors in relation to the influence of domestic considerations. In other words, did the USA foment or instigate these four coups in Turkey and Pakistan or did it only give green lights before they occurred? Or was it only the case that the USA did not know Turkish and Pakistani militaries were about to depose elected governments, but were not surprised or shocked about once these coups occurred? It was also important for the purposes of this study to find out how the USA supported these coups with its policies both during and after these coups. What mechanisms did the USA possess to put into use in these kinds of possibly volatile situations, especially when junior or mid-ranked officers carried out a coup attempt? How important was the US role for the eventual success of these coups? This book tried to answer some of the latter questions by bringing into the fore military-to-military relationships and U. military training and education programs. These questions are difficult questions with regard to the sensitive nature of the subject but, as the most recent July 15 coup attempt in Turkey have shown, they remain extremely relevant even after the Cold War. The following table shows how the US reacted to four coups in Turkey and Pakistan in three stages (Table 5.1):

Table 5.1 Coups in Turkey and Pakistan and US reaction in three stages

Coups D'état		*Stages of US reaction*		
Turkey	*Pakistan*	*Pre-coup*	*During*	*Post-coup*
	1958	Positive signals to military	Silent	•Economic assistance •Political assistance
1960		Positive signals to government	Let Menderes fall	•Economic assistance •Political assistance
	1977	Negative signals to government	Let Bhutto fall	•Partial political assistance
1980		Positive signals to the military	Silent	•Economic assistance •Political/Diplomatic assistance •Military assistance

In the first place, the most recent July 15 failed coup attempt substantiates the notion above that the external dimension of coup attempt may easily succumb to conspiracy theories. It also showed, however, how some coup attempts, especially when they are carried out outside the command chain, as was the case with the July 15 putsch, may be very fragile and, how US actions may be seen as support for the coup attempt. In the case of the July 15 coup attempt, several actors, including the putschists themselves, were concerned about the US reaction during the most critical hours of the coup. The reaction of the US Secretary of State John Kerry, when he heard of the news coming from Turkey during a press conference, was to express the hope that 'stability and peace' would not be hurt in Turkey (Calabresi 2016). This was not the ideal response expected by Turkish domestic actors involved in this dramatic event.

A blunt rejection of the coup attempt by US officials as it was unfolding could strengthen the hand of the civilian government and may have persuaded other passive and observing actors to become active and join the resistance. Unequivocal rejection of a coup d'état in a NATO member in 2016 by the United States could signal to the coup plotters that even if they succeeded temporarily in deposing the government, they would have had a hard time in remaining in power or executing their program of government in the face of stiff US sanctions. As Shannon et al. argued, "silence or support [by international community] may inspire coups elsewhere, while widespread condemnation may lead to counter-coups and widespread uprisings" (p. 364). It was also instructive how Turkish government officials bewailed the absence of European

and US high-level visits to Ankara once the coup attempt was defeated ('Ömer Çelik: müttefiklerimiz' 2016). High-level visits as soon as the attempt was suppressed would have been taken as a continuation of Western commitment to the Turkish government. Yet the coup attempt also revealed the limited role played by external actors in the outcome of a coup attempt. The failed July 15 coup attempt confirmed that a coup occurs fundamentally for domestic reasons and showed that a coup fiercely rejected by domestic actors has little prospect of succeeding, even when or if it is supported by outside powers. In other words, the supposed US support for the July 15 coup was not a *sufficient* condition for a successful coup d'état in Turkey in 2016.

A US role would understandably be accentuated and be better seen if there was popular resistance to coup attempts in Turkey and Pakistan during the Cold War *and* the USA still supported the coup makers. If the military conspirators overcame popular and armed resistance to the coup attempt in such a scenario, the US role could have been more distinct. However, this was never the case with any of the four cases of coups in Turkey and Pakistan. Strikingly, none of the coup attempts in Turkey and Pakistan witnessed popular or armed resistance before. Pakistan has no record of popular resistance to any coup attempt even after the Cold War. This means that in any evaluation of the U.S. role in coups d'état, other factors may also need to be taken into account.

Nevertheless, this book has reached some important conclusions. To begin with, this study has shown that the triggers for all four coups were local ones. The source and nature of grievances may have differed in each case, but on each occasion the spark was local. Both Pakistani and Turkish armies were powerful enough in terms of resources (organizational cohesion, popular support, strict command-order chain) to conclude a successful coup d'état without organizational instructions or assistance from external actors. They needed neither US operational support behind their coup attempts nor US prodding to plan and start one.

Secondly, all four cases show that coup makers did care about the US reaction to their coup plans. The degree of their concern varied according to whether their coup attempt was outside the command chain or it was undertaken by the entire army machine. This may have also determined the quality and frequency of their access to the United States. While both coup makers in 1960 and 1980 in Turkey worried about the US response, the latter was more comfortable because they had received several signals of support in advance in case they decided to take

the reins of government. Regarding the September 12 coup in Turkey, Evren himself said that they sensed from conversations with high-level commanders during NATO meetings that the USA would not oppose a military intervention in Turkey, which encouraged them further to step in. The higher degree of concern the May 27 junta had led them to take certain precautions before they put their place into execution.

In the case of Pakistan, General Ayub Khan was worried that his action would be seen as a *coup d'état* and that, therefore, it could undermine Pakistan's stature in the international community. The special connection developed between General Ayub and the Eisenhower Administration coupled with effective channels between both armed forces allowed General Ayub to muster US support for his takeover. There is no document indicating US encouragement for General Zia to dismiss PM Bhutto in 1977. Yet the steep decline in the relationship between the Bhutto government and the Carter Administration, which PM Bhutto had made public with his accusations thrown at the Carter Administration, could not escape the generals' attention. General Zia was equally anxious to receive assurances from the United States in the form of visits and verbal pledges, if not military and economic assistance *after* the coup.

Third, all of the cases in this study highlight the importance of military-to-military relationships, which have so far remained a virgin territory. Since the United States acknowledged armed forces as significant political actors in many parts of the world, including Turkey and Pakistan, and used several mechanisms to nurture its relationship with armed forces, we must include the military-to-military relationship in our analysis to understand the US role in military coups. As indicated by the intercession of NATO SACEUR Lauris Norstad at the time of the May 27 occurred or the connection founded between General Ayub and the Pentagon in the years prior to the 1958 coup, military-to-military networks matter.

In turn, US military training and education programs as a part of US. Military Assistance Programs and continuous cooperation through the NATO platform help cultivate bilateral relationships and nourish contacts with armed forces from other countries are highlighted in this book. Though military training and education programs such as IMET had several objectives, both civilian and military US policy makers alike valued knowing promising military officers from other countries and having a lubricant in their bilateral relationship with Pakistan and Turkey.

Knowing foreign officers, many of whom were poised to climb the rungs of power in their armed forces, rather than socializing them to democratic civil-military relations was the preponderant rationale behind US military and education programs. This knowledge and familiarity then paid off during coup attempts by mid-ranking officers. The May 27 coup in Turkey provides a good illustration of how familiarity with even some of the major figures within that military junta ameliorated mutual doubts and allowed for a smoother transition period. It is remarkable how, notwithstanding all the irritants in the Pakistani—US relationship (nuclear program, Carter's cold shoulder toward Pakistan), Zia's proximity to the West was attributed by the US officials to his training and education in the United States.

The differences in the level of US support given to coups in Turkey and Pakistan can be more accurately seen in the last two coups, 1977 and 1980, in Pakistan and Turkey respectively during the Cold War. Admittedly, a few differences in context separate both cases. Pakistani military's dismissal of PM Bhutto lacked the international political context given with the fall of the Shah in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which the September 12 coup in Turkey dovetailed nicely with. If Bhutto was deposed in 1980 instead of 1977, even when Carter was still in the White House, US reaction could have gone beyond acquiescence to turn into vivid and passionate support. This means that the US administration and immediate context also contributed to the difference in the treatment given to the two regimes.

This book argued that Turkey's link to the United States was far more institutional than Pakistan due to the density of relations facilitated chiefly by the NATO connection as compared to what SEATO and CENTO provided to Pakistan. In the absence of the US participation in the Baghdad Pact, later named CENTO, as a member, the Pakistan—US relationship remained bilateral and devoid of a multilateral institutional basis (Tahir-Kheli 1982, p. 6). The consequence was that the Pakistani—US relationship could not go beyond the wishes and ideologies of key individuals in both countries. According to Tahir-Kheli, what haunted this relationship from the outset was that "the relationship was based on predilections of a few key individuals who determined both its direction as well as intensity" (p. 11). This made Pakistani—US relationship more vulnerable to changes in US administration than was the case with Turkey. "There was no institutionalized framework for cooperation, such as active US membership in CENTO might have provided. Key

decisions, on either side, were made by a few personalities" (Tahir-Kheli 1982, p. 25). The same Carter Administration that gave a cold shoulder to Pakistan, which was exacerbated by Pakistan's adamant pursuit of a nuclear program, was willing to end US sanctions on Turkey, which had been in place because Turkey violated US conditions when it had used US weapons in Cyprus in 1974. The density and permanency in Turkish—American relations with institutional links such as those provided by NATO may have allowed Turkey to speak to the United States after the coup from the position of more a peer, from a higher position than General Zia could do after he took over. Owing to familiarity through NATO, even Turkey's mid-ranking officers did not need third-country back channels such as the Jordanian connection to talk to the United States about its friendly intentions. General Zia and friends had kept Pakistan's membership in CENTO but did not have CENTO generals to ask for interceding with Carter government on their behalf.

What these findings mean for the civil-military relations literature is that subject to the US administration in place at that time, its ideology, and type of military coup, external actors' reactions matter considerably for military coups d'état. The literature needs to take seriously the role of external actors. When coup makers themselves pay such attention to external actors' reactions and find ways to manage that aspect, the literature will be remiss if it failed to capture this crucial dimension. More comparative work with different combinations of cases of coups d'état within or across regions based on available and gradually opening archives may also lead to new findings and uncover some mechanisms so far hidden from our sight.

Finally, with respect to the role of US signals sent to actors involved in coups (armies, opposition parties, and incumbent governments) in the outcome of a military coup, this book showed that several positive signals the USA sent in support of the Menderes government *before* the May 27 coup did not deter the coupists. Although it remains true that "many of the signals sent in support of the regime change are clandestine… there are likely mountains of evidence that have been destroyed or remain classified" (Thyne 2010, p. 452), available evidence cited in this book shows that signals are not primers; they are but one among many factors entering into coup calculations. The US acquiescence at the time and right after the May 27 coup, however, was a comforting signal to the disadvantaged and worried putschists.

Signals were more overt in the cases of the 1980 coup d'état and they seem to have provided the Turkish military a comfort zone in making the final decision to intervene in the early hours of September 12. The positive signals the USA sent to the Pakistani military elite in the case of the 1958 coup and negative signals to the Bhutto government before the 1977 coup were also more overt in nature. The Bhutto government was eerily aware of negative signals sent to it by the Carter Administration during incessant protests in the country and assessed correctly that these signals jeopardized the government further. How Pakistani generals made sense of these negative signals to the Bhutto government and the extent to which these signals weighed in their coup calculations remain unknown. However, these negative signals, which were credible enough to raise Bhutto's suspicions about American designs to overthrow him, together with apparent popular discontent with the government, increased the likelihood of a coup.

When compared to US involvement in Latin American coups d'état, where the USA resorted to covert operations in order to have leftist governments deposed and friendly governments installed in their place (Thyne 2010, pp. 449–451), the USA did not need to carry out covert operations in order to manage expected and unexpected military coups d'état in Turkey and Pakistan. In this respect, the USA's role in cases of coups in Turkey and Pakistan was visible, but not as overt and heavy-handed as its concurrent involvement in various Latin American countries. In Turkey, for instance, until a week before the May 27 coup, the Eisenhower Administration was discussing whether they needed to mobilize Operation Coordination Board assets in Turkey. The NATO connection and more personalized military-to-military connections in the case of Pakistan provided enough levers to handle and manage coups in Turkey and Pakistan.

This study did not consider US Army intelligence reports, which might possibly include reports sent by US military attachés stationed in Ankara and military assistance and advisory missions. Army intelligence reports may corroborate the argument made in this study about the importance of military-to-military relations to understand external actors' role in civil-military relations in a country. They can help explore new mechanisms of influence and provide new content to revisit our arguments and revise or substantiate them. Both Cold War and post-Cold War history offers sufficient examples of US military

attachés hovering in the pictures of coups d'état in different places and playing some sort of unexplored role (Gott 2005, pp. 224–228; Kinzer 2003, pp. 170–171, 227; Sirrs 2010, pp. 30–31, 52).[1] A major limitation before this study was the unavailability of Turkish archives in both the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish military. Future researchers may explore these archives when—and if—they are made public. This will allow researcher to discover more reliable accounts of Turkish military generals' and policy makers' calculations about external reactions.

Further research may also delve into US archives, which are still either partially declassified or entirely closed, on the 1977 and 1980 coups in Pakistan and Turkey respectively and revisit the arguments made here. Future research can also do in- or cross-country comparisons and take into account 'successful' as well as 'failed' coups, comparing the US role in both coup outcomes. For instance, the failed 1971 coup attempt in Turkey, which was nipped in the bud with the full knowledge of the CIA, can be a good candidate for such research. On the Pakistani side, the failed coup cases of 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy' in 1951 or 'Attock Conspiracy' in 1973 can be included in such research to pinpoint the US role even better.

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[1] For a Turkish military attaché learning of the impending Free Officers' coup in Turkey and informing the Turkish government see Ulay (1996, pp. 36–38); for the exceptional examples of Vernon Walters and Edward Fox as military attachés to Brazil and Bolivia respectively, see Carlucci III (2000, pp. 44–45) and Kirkland (2005, pp. 474, 480). For other accounts underlining military attachés' role in coups and other events, see O'Connell and Loeb (2001, p. xix), Keeley (2010, p. 90) Meyers and Brysac (2008, p. 357).

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