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American Anti-Nuclear Activism, 1975–1990

The Challenge of Peace

Kyle Harvey



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Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements

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The Challenge of Peace

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

© Kyle Harvey 2014
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 978-1-137-43283-4

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First published 2014 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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ISBN 978-1-349-49251-0 ISBN 978-1-137-43284-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137432841

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Harvey, Kyle, 1983–
American anti-nuclear activism, 1975–1990 : the challenge of peace / Kyle Harvey, Casual Tutor and Research Assistant, Macquarie University, Australia.
pages cm — (Palgrave studies in the history of social movements)

1. Antinuclear movement—United States—History—20th century. 2. Peace movements—United States—History—20th century. 3. Pressure groups—United States—History—20th century. 4. Nuclear disarmament—United States. I. Title.
JZ5584.U6H37 2014
327.1´747097309048—dc23

2014026516

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

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Acknowledgments

This book has been long in the making, and I owe a great deal to many people whose guidance and inspiration were invaluable. Most of all, Michelle Arrow and Robert Reynolds were unwavering with their consistent support and sound advice. I would also like to thank Mike Foley, Robin Gerster, and Doug Rossinow for their encouragement and guidance in making this book a better piece of scholarship. I am grateful for the support of the series editors Holger Nehring and Stefan Berger, for the hard work of Jen McCall and Holly Tyler at Palgrave, and for the comments and valuable criticism from my anonymous reader.

Due thanks are extended to my current and former colleagues at Macquarie University—and elsewhere—for their assistance and good humor as this book took shape; in particular, Lisa Featherstone, Michael Roberts, Margaret Sampson, David Christian, Bridget Griffen-Foley, Matt Bailey, Mandy Kretzschmar, Elisa DeCourcy, Andrew Dunstall, Julia Miller, Sophie Loy-Wilson, Nick Irving, and Prue Flowers.

This book was also made possible due to the generous financial support of the Faculty of Arts at Macquarie University. The Australia & New Zealand American Studies Association, the Film and Television Archive at the University of California–Los Angeles, the Sophia Smith Collection at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, and the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC, were also generous sources of funding and helped make overseas research trips both possible and worthwhile. A research fellowship at the State Library of New South Wales also provided valuable time for additional revision and writing.

I am grateful for the assistance of the many archivists and librarians whose expertise ensured my many research trips to the United States were worthwhile. In particular, Wendy Chmielewski and the staff at the Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Harry Miller and staff at the Wisconsin Historical Society Archives, Amy Hague and staff at the Sophia Smith Collection of Smith College, and Mark Quigley and staff at the UCLA Film and Television Archive were very generous with their time and insight. Many thanks are also due to colleagues and friends who offered advice, put me up while on research trips, and generally made overseas research a rewarding experience: Larry Wittner, Steve Milder,

Bill Knoblauch, Lee Smithey, Aaron Dembe, the late Paul Boyer, and many others too numerous to list here.

I owe a deep gratitude to the many interviewees who took time out of their busy lives and schedules to share their thoughts and memories of the anti-nuclear movement with me. Bob Swan, in particular, opened up his home and his personal files and gave me my first Thanksgiving dinner. In Lawrence, Kansas, I am grateful for the time and assistance of all those who assisted with the 25th-anniversary screening of the 1983 film The Day After and the oral history project that took place alongside it. In particular, I am indebted to Nick Meyer, Bob Papazian, Jon Niccum, Jeff East, Jack Wright, David Longhurst, and everyone else who took the time to reminisce about the film.

I am also grateful to all those who kindly granted permission to reproduce copyrighted material that appears in this book: Helen Caldicott, Dan Coogan, Tom Cushwa, the Lawrence Coalition of Peace and Justice, Jeff Share, the Swarthmore College Peace Collection, the War Resisters' League, and Sylvia Hart Wright.

Finally, to my parents for their unwavering support, and to Kate, for everything else.

List of Abbreviations

AFSC	American Friends Service Committee
AUP	Athletes United for Peace
CALC	Clergy and Laity Concerned
CNNW	Coalition for a Non-Nuclear World
CCNV	Community for Creative Non-Violence
ERA	Equal Rights Amendment
FFL	Fast for Life
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOR	Fellowship of Reconciliation
GPM	Great Peace March for Global Nuclear Disarmament
LCPJ	Lawrence Coalition for Peace and Justice
MFS	Mobilization for Survival
NOW	National Organization for Women
NWFC	Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign
PAC	Political Action Committee
PSR	Physicians for Social Responsibility
SANE	National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy
WAND	Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament
WEB	World Equity Budget
WEFPJ	Women's Encampment for a Future of Peace and Justice
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
WLOE	Women and Life on Earth
WPS	Women's Party for Survival
WSP	Women Strike for Peace
WRL	War Resisters League
USPC	United States Peace Council

Introduction: Dynamics of Anti-Nuclear Activism in the Second Cold War

On June 12, 1982, in New York City, somewhere between 750,000 and one million demonstrators participated in a march and rally calling for an end to the nuclear arms race. The famous event—at the time the largest political demonstration in American history—is widely heralded as a high point of the anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s and 1980s. At the time, the *New York Times* described it as a novel people's movement, "A force that did not exist in America's first three atomic decades." The movement's many goals—a freeze on the nuclear arms race, unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral nuclear disarmament, an end to nuclear power, and the diversion of military budgets to social services, among others—depicted a complex array of interests that formed part of a broader social movement for peace. As the *Times* criticized, "The very size and fervor of this movement make it inarticulate."[1] Indeed, this was a movement with an extraordinarily diverse array of individuals, groups, organizations, collectives, and coalitions, each with different ideas, aims, and strategies about how to confront a nuclear danger.[2]

The sheer size of the 1982 march in New York places it at the apex of the anti-nuclear movement's popularity in the early 1980s and attests to the sway of anti-nuclear sentiment among the American public, as well as to the proliferation of peace groups—both single issue and multi-issue—that existed within the ambit of this broad and diverse movement. However, the development of this movement, and its many diverse components, tells a more interesting story about how many Americans came to be involved in campaigns opposed to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and related social crises. As they confronted government policy, mobilized public opinion, and organized challenges to serious issues that confronted American society, their actions—and interactions—highlight important dynamics in social movement organizing during the 1970s and 1980s.

This is a story that takes place in the wake of the Vietnam War, when activists previously involved in the anti-war movement began to turn their attention to the twin threats posed by nuclear power and nuclear weapons. They shared an affinity with other progressive social movements that emerged in the early to mid-1970s around such issues as environmentalism, gay rights, hunger and poverty, and women's rights.[3] These movements' shared roots lay in the oppositional social movement culture developed during civil rights and anti-war movements of the 1950s and 1960s. This culture, in turn, evolved out of a rich history of pacifism and political dissent that had been developed, experimented with, and refined throughout the twentieth century.

This book is about anti-nuclear activism and how it operated in what is often called the Second Cold War, which emerged in late 1970s with the failure of détente and ended with the dismantling of the Soviet bloc from 1989 to 1991.[4] Of course, such boundaries are artificial, and this book employs a convenient fifteen-year period in which to analyze the rise of anti-nuclear activism in the mid-1970s and the decline of popular anti-nuclear organizing at the beginning of the 1990s.[5] This book explores a variety of campaigns, the ideas driving their protest, and the debates among their participants about matters of style, strategy, image, and agenda. These debates shaped the nature of anti-nuclear activism in the 1970s and 1980s and offer a valuable insight into the operation of social movements as they attempted to mobilize people, money, and ideas in pursuit of a safer world. As this book's subtitle suggests, this struggle was the "challenge of peace" so familiar to all peace activists seeking to bring about and end to war and injustice in modern society.[6]

Just like many activists themselves, this book looks at nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and other related issues that posed threats to human life, health, safety, and dignity. Many activists perceived a complex web of nuclear dangers wrought by the corporate defense establishment, the nuclear energy industry, the Pentagon, and sanctioned by Congress. More tellingly, activists claimed the nuclear threat was related to broader problems of citizen disenfranchisement, the unchecked power of the defense industry, and, in some cases, the patriarchy's "war" on women and on the environment. To many Americans in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the most explicit manifestation of these concerns was the nuclear arms race, and this book explores how anti-nuclear activists discussed tactics and ideas about how best to combat the network of political and corporate forces they opposed. In concert with single-issue advocacy groups dedicated to halting the nuclear arms race, this combination of

activists, groups, organizations, and collectives highlights the diverse array of progressive activism in the United States in this era and what their struggles meant for the wider dynamics of social movement organizing in the wake of the so-called "long 1960s."[7]

Anti-nuclear activists argued that the unwieldy use of state power in the Cold War adversely affected ordinary Americans, irrespective of their political views. The invisible dangers of radiation, a sudden nuclear attack on American soil, a nuclear power plant meltdown, or an out-of-control nuclear conflict between the superpowers would inevitably involve all Americans, and the sheer scope of the nuclear arms race by the 1980s meant, potentially, the end of life on earth. These concerns were not simply aired by progressive activists on the left; anti-nuclear protest was embraced by the middle class, religious figures and institutions, professionals, and others who embraced a holistic concern about the dangers posed by nuclear power and nuclear weapons.

These concerns were confronted in a multitude of ways, ranging from nonviolent direct action to lobbying, from mass demonstrations to public education drives, from expressive personal protests to local ballot referenda. Americans understood the nuclear threat in many different ways—morally, strategically, economically, politically, socially, and personally—as it permeated various aspects of American life. As such, the anti-nuclear movement developed, like most other large social movements, as a pluralistic assemblage of political and cultural actors engaged in various practices of challenge, dissent, and resistance. Taken separately, different parts of this movement offer an insight into the dynamics of progressive social movements in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. Issues of gender politics, conservatism, patriotism, public relations and media coverage, community, and the practice of democracy are intertwined within the histories of the countless different anti-nuclear campaigns that proliferated during this era.

This book examines six of these histories. It looks at how anti-nuclear campaigns faced challenges inherent in bureaucratic organizing and grassroots mobilization, of influencing political elites and blue-collar Americans, of managing the attraction of radical dissent while engaging in liberal advocacy. The politics of professionalization, public relations, and the challenge of mobilizing public opinion are central themes here, and they highlight wider dynamics common to all social reform movements during this era.

In addition, many of the anti-nuclear campaigns examined within this book illuminate broader tensions inherent in social movement organizing. The interplay between local groups and national organizations, the

influence of sex and gender on activists' ideas and strategies, the role of religion and spirituality, and the influence of personal expression within protest campaigns, are each significant themes. They demonstrate a willingness among many activists to challenge ideas and assumptions about protest and how it might be able to bring about social and political change. Most significantly, they show how the ever-challenging relationship between a social movement and the public it attempted to mobilize was a constant feature of activism in the 1970s and 1980s. Understanding the interaction of the many ideas and identities contributing to this relationship is key to understanding the complex operation of social movements and the way they navigated politics and society in the years following the 1960s.

Taken separately, the six histories in this book tell the story of how different campaigns and coalitions agreed and disagreed over strategies and tactics, how they interacted with each other, with the media, and with the public, and how they operated in the midst of a world seemingly on the brink of nuclear disaster. Taken together, however, these case studies offer a broad history of anti-nuclear activism as representative of some deeper challenges facing social movements on the left during the 1970s and 1980s. The so-called "rise of the right," anti-communist suspicion, an unreceptive public, internal division over radical strategies and tactics, and other issues were central to the experience of anti-nuclear activists in this era. While seeking to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, halt their deployment and testing, or simply to bear witness against the wider injustices these weapons represented, activists also drew attention to the perils of affluence and over-consumption, the problems with electoral politics, the decline of liberalism, and other key challenges in American life in wake of the 1960s.

Anti-Nuclear Activism in American History

Opposition to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and host of related threats in the 1970s and 1980s responded to a particular set of historical circumstances. As early as 1974, for example, the pacifist *WIN* magazine warned readers "It's Time to Start Worrying About the Bomb Again."[8] Nuclear arms buildups during the Ford administration, and the Carter administration's interest in newer, more accurate nuclear weapons systems concerned activists who had paid scant attention to these issues during the Vietnam War.[9] With the re-ignition of Cold War tensions, the anti-nuclear movement began to develop a significant public profile stemming from growing popular currents of fear and anxiety.[10] Much

of this was fed by local campaigns opposed to nuclear power plants, nuclear weapons assembly and production facilities, and other such installations, each demonstrating against the local manifestations of what came to be regarded as a global issue.

The immediacy of these concerns to citizens of towns and cities across the United States led to the swift resurgence of moderate and liberal peace organizations, many of which had lain dormant since the ban-the-bomb movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Pacifist organizations, too, returned their focus to nuclear weapons (and, to a lesser extent, nuclear power) in the late 1970s, developing an extensive and varied anti-nuclear mobilization that encompassed many constituencies. Of course, this variety was nothing new. Pacifists, scientists, world federalists, disgruntled New Dealers, socialists, communists, and religious bodies had each aired alternative arguments in favor of nuclear disarmament during the early Cold War.[11] Traditional long-standing pacifist organizations, religious bodies, scientists' groups, and women's groups operated alongside the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), a new membership-based national organization that attracted substantial public support. By mid 1958, SANE had 130 chapters and 25,000 members, making it the largest anti-nuclear organization in the country. It would lead mainstream peace movement thinking on nuclear disarmament for the next thirty years.[12]

The signing of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which ended aboveground atomic testing, diminished the appeal of the anti-nuclear movement, as did the onset of the Vietnam War. Many activists and organizations on the left had also been involved with the struggle for African American civil rights, developing a range of organizing strategies and tactics that would assist the movements against the Vietnam War and the nuclear arms race in later years. Here, too, the meeting of a variety of political, ideological, economic, racial, gender, and philosophical differences meant that both the civil rights and anti-war movements were diverse affairs.[13] As the anti-nuclear movement became reinvigorated in the later 1970s, the allure of different issues again encouraged activists to pursue broader challenges to peace and social justice. Here is what Van Gosse calls a "movement of movements," a useful idea that encourages us to think about a pluralistic assemblage of political and cultural actors engaged in various practices of change, challenge, dissent, and resistance.[14]

In these years, concerns such as the limits of state power, the multitude of dangers inherent in the use nuclear energy and the production of nuclear weapons, and the volatility of Cold War relations between the superpowers didn't just speak to pacifists. They were central to the

actions and organizational philosophies of feminists, religious groups, countercultural communities, environmentalists, scientists, teachers, and doctors, as well as other professional and political coalitions, citizen and neighborhood groups, and local, state, and national organizations of a great variety. The diversity of protest activity is key here, and this book focuses on national membership-based organizations as much as it does on decentralized protest collectives and other smaller communities of resistance. By examining these very different forms of protest, a clearer picture of the scope of anti-nuclear sentiment and activity in the 1970s and 1980s can be gleaned, one that sheds additional light on the changing direction of progressive social movements as they navigated a political terrain dominated by the "rise of the right."[15]

Thinking about Social Movements in the 1970s and 1980s

Although the diversity of anti-nuclear activity covered in this book may appear to place an emphasis on the decentralized nature of anti-nuclear protest in the 1970s and 1980s, my intention is not to do that. This book seeks to evaluate the extent to which activists in this era discussed and debated the nature of their activism within the broad context of a national anti-nuclear movement, as well as how they approached activism in more specific contexts: local, regional, institutional, electoral, legislative, gendered, or religious. This movement of disparate voices and its complexities tells a different story to existing accounts of the anti-nuclear movement as it has hitherto been examined by scholars.

Recent scholarship has tended to look at the explosion of diverse social movements that littered the post-1960s landscape. By turns liberal, conservative, radical, and reactionary, these histories have demonstrated the vibrancy of grassroots activism in the wake of the "long 1960s."[16] In this regard, this book is no different. The varieties of anti-nuclear activism discussed within these pages present a valuable insight into the complex operation of democratic processes as practiced by grassroots social movements in the 1970s and 1980s. Looking closely at how a series of campaigns debated tactics, image, and politics shows us a serious commitment to the philosophy and practice of participatory democracy. As many anti-nuclear groups attempted to affect the course of public opinion and government policy, they also aimed to ensure their own practices were morally sound. Consensus-based decision-making was common, as was the egalitarian attempt to engage with racial and ethnic minorities, and disadvantaged social and economic groups.[17]

This pursuit of a moral standard in social movement organizing owed a lot to the heritage of twentieth-century pacifism upon which most

anti-nuclear activism was built.[18] Radicalizing the potential of pacifism, a wealth of individuals, coalitions, and collectives set their standards higher than conventional peace groups, practicing a kind of identity politics in concert with a radical, personalist commitment to peace and social justice. Real peace, they argued, came from the small-scale individual and communal practice of peace; like the Wobblies, they believed they could build a new society in the shell of the old. This heritage of radical personalism had its immediate roots in the Catholic Worker movement, but its many varieties in the 1970s and 1980s can be attributed to the wide influence of identity politics within the peace movement.[19] Within the broader anti-nuclear movement, practitioners of such ideals occupied the movement's radical fringes, practicing a prefigurative politics while engaging in small-scale yet dramatic acts of resistance.[20] Nevertheless, elements of identity politics and personal protest had a wide audience within larger anti-nuclear campaigns. Its proponents were prominent in feminist and environmental groups, and sympathizers in traditional peace organizations such as the War Resisters League ensured radical activism maintained a presence within the wider movement.

What this book adds to this history of radical pacifism, personalism, and identity politics in the peace movement is its focus on the meeting of radical and moderate voices. In large peace organizations, coalitions, and within campaigns, the interaction of activists with wildly different ideas about how to combat the nuclear threat led to familiar challenges of compromise. Each chapter in this book examines these challenges and how they represented the age-old tension between idealism and pragmatism in social movement organizing.[21] Behind these familiar stories of conflict and compromise, however, lies a history of experimentation with different forms of activism. The monumental challenges posed by the nuclear arms race, an impenetrable political system, and a complex web of industrial and corporate threats to human health and safety influenced the direction of many anti-nuclear campaigns willing to modify their approach to maximize their chances of success.

This book's contribution lies in its claim that varieties of anti-nuclear activism during the 1970s and 1980s illuminate broader dynamics within social reform movements of the period. The challenges of social movement organizing in the wake of the 1960s were diverse. Scholarship over the last few decades has explained these challenges by highlighting a pervasive culture of narcissism or broad trends of civic decline.[22] More recent scholarship has argued against the idea of apolitical selfishness or civic engagement, examining local issues, neighborhood organizing, and the immediacy of what Michael Foley calls "front porch politics"

as cues for examining grassroots activism in the 1970s and beyond.[23] In many ways, this book agrees with these recent histories, focusing on activists who campaigned for peace and social justice in these years of an apparent "conservative revival," focusing squarely on the immediacy of threats posed by nuclear technologies. While some of the best scholarship on anti-nuclear activism in these years emphasizes the international and reformist goals of its most visible campaigns, this book takes a somewhat different approach.[24] It looks at both local and national campaigns, each characterized by a variety of dynamics—personal, political, gendered, and religious. Doing so, I argue, allows us to examine broader challenges that faced other social movements in this complex era.

The politics and processes involved in most grassroots organizing inevitably involve some kind of push-and-pull of ideas, personalities, philosophies, and principles. Within this book's case studies, the allure of many issues—beyond the prominent and popular threat of nuclear weapons—meant that peace campaigns and their targets were never clear-cut and required modification, compromise, and elucidation. This is, in many ways, a more important history than a story of the meeting of radicals and reformers in the anti-nuclear movement. It also moves beyond the idea that the Sixties had a lasting influence on the many social movements that arose in its wake.[25] This book demonstrates that by looking at a variety of anti-nuclear campaigns and coalitions and the many ways they attempted to mobilize opinion and influence, we can gain a deeper insight into the ways progressive social movements navigated the complex terrain of politics, culture, and American life in the 1970s and 1980s.

Spheres of Anti-Nuclear Activism, 1975–1990

Assessing the actions and interactions of anti-nuclear organizations, coalitions, protest collectives, and individuals in such a diverse movement is a complex endeavor. Within the ambit of "anti-nuclear," one could include any number of campaigns, however venerable, or however insignificant.[26] This book does not look exclusively at campaigns opposed to the nuclear arms race or nuclear power plants or nuclear weapons production facilities.[27] Its subjects are individuals and groups whose varied approaches are less easily pigeonholed, and larger organizations and coalitions whose operations were more complex. Within the broad sweep of peace and environmental activism in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, many activists saw related threats stemming from a variety of sources. Power plants, missile silos, army bases, research laboratories, radioactive waste dumps, assembly facilities, and

other such institutions were of interest. Behind these targets were a rich and powerful defense industry, and a belligerent and callous federal government. Echoing earlier opposition to the institutionalized power of the military-industrial complex, anti-nuclear activists in the 1970s and 1980s continued to oppose those establishments that pushed Americans closer to radioactive peril, and whose commitment to a nuclear arms race pushed the world closer to nuclear war.

Present throughout this history of anti-nuclear activism are the traditional pacifist organizations, whose leadership of the peace movement throughout the twentieth century placed them at the center of the anti-nuclear movement as it revived in the mid- to late 1970s. Here, the War Resisters League (WRL), the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), and others played key roles in the development of the movement. Chapter 1 examines their interaction within coalitions such as Mobilization for Survival (MFS), and the efforts to organize the famous June 12 march in New York City tell a fascinating story of conflict, compromise, and the challenges inherent in the maintenance of radical sensibilities in the face of a mass mobilization of American citizens against nuclear weapons. This chapter highlights just how progressive social movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s engaged in a wider debate about the operation of dissent in social movement organizations and coalitions.

Working alongside these organizations were liberal and moderate groups such as SANE, Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND), and others. Chapter 2 looks at how these more "mainstream" groups responded to the challenges of mobilizing an effective and popular anti-nuclear movement.[28] A vital player here was the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC, or simply, Freeze Campaign), whose popularity and scope deservedly occupies a central place in peace movement scholarship.[29] The influence of the Freeze Campaign cannot be underestimated, but its significance here is used to explore the challenges of radical idealism, political pragmatism, and the politics of compromise that were central features of this nascent movement, as it navigated the contested terrain of social movement politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[30]

In Chapter 3, another story of the meeting between radical and moderate activists highlights the complicated role of identity politics within the realm of women's peace protest. Tensions over the meanings of feminism and the suitability of various types of anti-nuclear protest actions meant that quite often, the processes of conflict and compromise that characterized earlier feminist movements—and other anti-nuclear campaigns from

the 1950s and 1960s—were replayed in the 1980s as a particular women's brand of anti-nuclear activism arose.[31] The roles played here by radical collectives such as the Women's Pentagon Action (WPA) and the Women's Encampment for a Future of Peace and Justice (WEFPJ) contrasted greatly with moderate women's anti-nuclear organizations such as the Women's Party for Survival (WPS) and its successor, WAND. I argue here that the meeting of these two diverse strands of activism, within the context of the anti-nuclear movement, was representative of the wider negotiation over the applicability of the feminist slogan "the personal is the political."[32] By adding feminist concerns to the scope of anti-nuclear activism, and by engaging in styles of protest that emphasized the radical, personal potential of women's activism, the subjects of this chapter extended the rich heritage of women's peace activism into a new era of women's politics. Informed and inspired by the experiences of second-wave feminism, these women extended and challenged assumptions about feminism, sexuality, and women's bodies and used these new ideas as a uniquely women's style of protest in the midst of the nuclear arms race.

Chapter 4 extends this focus on activists' bodies to a different extreme. This chapter examines how anti-nuclear pacifists engaged in acts of protest during the 1980s that attempted to apply certain tactics of nonviolent protest to the contemporary danger of the nuclear arms race. By fasting, these pacifists challenged existing standards of civil disobedience, locating their own actions within a far more personal model of confrontational protest, one common among small-scale, "personalist" communities such as Catholic Workers.[33] The group at the center of this chapter is the Fast for Life (FFL), an open-ended fast that sought to halt the nuclear arms race by drawing attention to its economic and social costs. Concerned about affluence and overconsumption, poverty and hunger (especially in the third world), and the personal spirituality innate in nonviolent protest, the FFL challenged the nuclear arms race—and the institutions that sustained it—in a way that was both personal and political.

Chapter 5 investigates the evolution of local anti-nuclear activism in the small city of Lawrence, Kansas, in the early 1980s, which rose to fame at the time as the location for the television movie *The Day After* (1983). This chapter analyzes the local anti-nuclear campaign, its activities, and its response to *The Day After*, alongside local residents' reactions to the movie and the idea of a potential nuclear war. In light of the movie—which achieved immense publicity around the time of its broadcast—I argue that certain notions of localism and the myth of the American "heartland" entered the debate over anti-nuclear politics in Lawrence. Unlike national anti-nuclear organizations or coalitions, local

anti-nuclear campaigns and their understanding of local identity can tell us much more about the operation of anti-nuclear sentiment as it interacted with similar notions of Middle American "ordinariness" and the issue of the efficacy of local anti-nuclear action. Lawrence's experience may not have been typical of other American communities as it dealt with the politics of the nuclear threat, but the way its residents engaged with these politics tells a powerful story about community, identity, and activism in the nation's heartland in the 1980s.

In Chapter 6, this book examines the Great Peace March for Global Nuclear Disarmament, a community of peace activists that walked from Los Angeles to Washington, D.C. over nine months during 1986, advocating an end to the nuclear arms race. As it evolved from a sponsored, celebrity-endorsed, media-savvy venture into a low-key, grassroots affair, the Great Peace March came to embody a kind of egalitarian community where participatory democracy ruled and individual marchers' own personal politics and lifestyle choices could flourish as an expressive style of protest. Managing this diverse community was no mean feat, and the story of the Great Peace March is one featuring the familiar compromise between pragmatic organizing and the expression of political idealism. It is also a story of how anti-nuclear activists engaged with larger processes of social change as they interacted with communities along the route. In the mid-1980s, issues of deindustrialization, farm closures, suburban isolation, and urban decay gave pause to these anti-nuclear activists struggling to engage with a seemingly apathetic and disinterested public. As their efforts attempted to demonstrate what an alternative society might look and function like, the Great Peace March highlights the perennial problem of public engagement faced by the peace movement, made all the more significant in these twilight years of the Cold War.

Within these case studies exists a story about how the anti-nuclear movement attempted to respond to the challenge of peace in the tumultuous years signposted by the end of the Vietnam War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. At its core are the individuals, groups, and organizations struggled to achieve a balance between the pursuit of comprehensive social change and the more immediate political goals of halting the nuclear arms race. This is, ultimately, a story about people and the choices they made in challenging what they saw as serious threats to the sanctity of life, health, safety, and dignity. By looking at this particular variety of activism, this book demonstrates how progressive social activists navigated the complex terrain of politics, social life, and culture at a time when their actions were ostensibly devised to resist those forces that placed the nation—and the world—on the brink of nuclear destruction.

1
Anti-Nuclear Coalitions: Pacifism, Radical Action, and a Rising Atomic Threat

The anti-nuclear movement in the United States in the mid-1970s arose from concerns held by many Americans about the dual dangers of nuclear power and nuclear weapons. With the end of the Vietnam War, a growing interest in modern environmentalism, and the collapse of détente between the superpowers, citizens began to organize themselves in various ways to challenge these dangers. Later in the 1970s, with increased defense spending, accidents at nuclear power plants, and troubling international developments, public concern about these dangers increased dramatically. As activists seized the opportunity to build a nationwide anti-nuclear movement that encompassed the diverse concerns of environmentalism, anti-militarism, and social justice, they also struggled to negotiate just what this movement would look like. New coalitions dedicated to connecting nuclear power with nuclear weapons also attempted to unite different anti-nuclear and environmental campaigns scattered across the nation. The first national umbrella coalition, Mobilization for Survival (MFS, or simply "the Mobe"), also became a key player in the organization of mass demonstrations at three United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament, held in New York City in 1978, 1982, and 1988. This chapter focuses primarily on the 1982 Special Session.

In the early 1980s, as public anti-nuclear sentiment grew and the anti-nuclear movement broadened, traditional radical and pacifist voices clashed with more moderate actors attempting to increase the public appeal and political potential of these mass anti-nuclear demonstrations. Conflict and compromise in these coalitions highlight the challenge inherent in developing a national agenda that was comprehensive in scope with the potential to mobilize what one activist described as the great mass of "typical, uninvolved, unconcerned Americans" into a potent social and political force.[1]

This chapter looks at the nascent anti-nuclear movement as it expanded from its modest roots in the mid-1970s to its peak in 1982. A significant theme in the organizational base of this movement was the tension between radical and liberal activists within movement coalitions and between different organizations. In many ways, the interaction between activists and organizers from diverse backgrounds highlights the broader challenge of negotiating the agenda of anti-nuclear activism itself. Since the anti-nuclear movement developed as a largely middle-class affair, similar to the ban-the-bomb movement of the 1950s and early 1960s, a coalitional effort to galvanize the maximum amount of public support for the movement inevitably encountered division over the goals, strategies, and ideologies behind such efforts.

Organizational tensions in peace activism, as Robert Kleidman observes, are "an interplay between forces pulling campaign organizations in different directions."[2] These different directions had as much to do with strategy as they did with deeper ideas about the nature of dissent and the role of radical thought and action in the peace movement. These issues, as they were debated among progressives in the wake of the anti-war movement and in the beginnings of the anti-nuclear movement, demonstrate an ambivalence about the direction and goals of anti-nuclear activism, as well as an uncertainty about how to best approach the development of an effective mass movement opposed to the prescient dangers of nuclear power and nuclear weapons.

Such tensions are common occurrences in social movements and individual social movement organizations, and various scholars have examined how they were manifested in parts of the broad and diverse anti-nuclear movement.[3] This chapter takes a wider perspective, focusing on several peace organizations central to the story of anti-nuclear coalition building in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a time when public anti-nuclear sentiment signaled to organizers that a mass movement was a real possibility. Despite auspicious beginnings in the early 1970s, public concern over nuclear issues grew dramatically over the following decade. A growing environmental awareness, concerns over safety in the nuclear industry, and what Charles Chatfield calls "an ominous sense of threat" in international relations, each contributed to public disquiet and demonstrated the potential for a large-scale movement opposed to nuclear power and nuclear weapons.[4] Seeking to translate this widespread concern into an effective movement, some anti-nuclear activists sought to maximize the breadth and scope of their constituencies. Others felt such an approach negated the role of radical thought and its place in the goals and strategies of the movement.

As activists of various persuasions came together in broad coalitions designed to mobilize public opposition to the nuclear arms race, these tensions reflected familiar differences among progressives over the relationship between radical thought and pragmatic action.[5] In major coalitions designed to bolster a sense of national cooperation and communication, and to foster increased public involvement in anti-nuclear protest, the influence of pacifism and radical ideas among movement organizers was significant. Many of these organizers came from long-standing pacifist institutions, including the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), War Resisters League (WRL), Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), and others. As these organizers sought to extend their often radical ideas about activism and movement-building into the forging of a broad peace movement dedicated to comprehensive social change, they clashed with other organizers aiming to develop a movement that would be more mainstream, media-friendly, and moderate.

At the heart of this chapter are the several peace and social justice organizations whose involvement in the push for greater public involvement in the anti-nuclear movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s most clearly demonstrates the centrality of these larger challenges to the process of peace movement mobilization. Tensions within coalitions and between organizations highlight the common push and pull of different interests in social movement activism as the surge of certain ideas and the receding of others, as influenced by time and circumstance, produced a wider movement developed by compromise. From the early challenges to link the threats posed by nuclear power and nuclear weapons to the negotiation over the operation of the mass demonstration on June 12, 1982, this chapter explores the fraught nature of coalition building and maintenance. A key theme is the contested nature of activism, as illuminated by the interplay between different actors and their ideas about how best to develop a broad and effective anti-nuclear movement. The story of their debates is one involving the fundamental processes of coalition building, ideological compromise, and public mobilization familiar to social movements and grassroots organizers across the political spectrum in the twentieth century.

Local Hazards, National Consequences

The development of the anti-nuclear movement as a major cultural and political force in the early 1980s began with a series of isolated local campaigns in the mid-1970s. Localized opposition to issues such

as pollution, overdevelopment, taxation, and other affairs dominated citizen politics and reform in the United States in this era, prompting contemporary critics to proclaim a "backyard revolution" in public participation in civil affairs.[6] Increasingly, nuclear power became a divisive issue, as energy crises, soaring costs of reactor construction, environmental concerns, and unease about nuclear safety dominated public debate in many states. Concerned citizens, some of them seasoned activists but many inexperienced in protest of any kind, initiated local campaigns against planned nuclear power plants as well as other nuclear-related facilities that were seen as threats to local health and safety. What emerged, gradually, were campaigns that challenged the safety of nuclear power and weapons industries, as well as their legal legitimacy. Increasingly toward the end of the decade, fears of nuclear war began to play into this web of anxiety and community-based activism.

In the mid-1970s, nuclear weapons played little role in the peace and environmental movements. As activist and writer Ann Morriset Davidon wrote in 1979, "Nuclear weapons are not only largely invisible, but their effects are practically inconceivable, and people prefer not to think about them."[7] Nuclear power plants, on the other hand, *were* visible targets, even if their radioactive dangers were less so. Many opponents of nuclear power also linked the dangers of nuclear power to deeper issues of social decline, government irresponsibility, or corporate wrongdoing. This was not a new phenomenon; as Lawrence Wittner comments, in the late 1960s, "the ruthless military interventionism of the great powers, coupled with their intractable commitment to nuclear weapons, led many anti-nuclear activists to conclude that they faced a deeply rooted, systemic problem."[8] Opposition to rampant capitalism, to US military intervention abroad, and to political systems that encouraged corporate misadventure along with ignoring systemic problems of racism and poverty began to filter into the peace movement as it began to focus more enthusiastically on nuclear power and weapons after the Vietnam War. In local contexts, similar connections were made, and these influenced the growth of grassroots opposition to nuclear power plants and weapons facilities.[9]

This movement of opposition was diverse in its composition, its strategies, and its tactics. High profile campaigns against nuclear power plant construction in Seabrook, New Hampshire, and San Luis Obispo, California, produced diverse alliances of activists whose ideas about civil disobedience, expressive protest, and personal politics were frequently sources of division and confrontation.[10] Other diverse

campaigns emerged in the mid-1970s, opposing nuclear waste dumps, nuclear weapons manufacturing plants, nuclear submarine bases, and plutonium reprocessing plants. Direct action campaigns targeted arms bazaars and uranium mining sites, and by the middle of 1978, Davidon estimated that "there were more local direct-action groups than could be counted."[11] The partial meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in March 1979 succeeded in popularizing anti-nuclear power protest, assisted by an unease about potential links between nuclear power and nuclear weapons and an increasingly unstable international climate that would intensify in late 1979 with the hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. By this stage, the diversity of anti-nuclear action was immense, and activism encompassed lobbying, legal action, public education, public demonstrations and rallies, occupations, and, of course, direct action and civil disobedience.

The timeframe of this surge in anti-nuclear activism is significant. In 1975, the *Directory of Anti-Nuclear Activists* recorded 149 anti-nuclear organizations active in the United States.[12] Nine years later, the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies' *American Peace Directory 1984* counted over 1,350 anti-nuclear and peace groups.[13] A big part of this dramatic expansion was a dramatic proliferation in citizens and professional groups dedicated to education, political action, and liberal reform. Utilizing ideas about citizen involvement in legislative politics, many anti-nuclear and environmental activists began campaigns designed to challenge the legitimacy of nuclear facilities through the electoral processes of ballot initiatives and referenda.[14] Coalitions of activists involved in opposing nuclear facilities were often very diverse, counting environmentalists, scientists, local residents, and community groups in their ranks. Spirited opposition to nuclear weapons facilities like the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant near Denver had demonstrated the grassroots nature of anti-nuclear campaigning since 1974. Similar local campaigns in Barnwell, South Carolina, Amarillo, Texas, and other locations utilized a combination of mass demonstrations and civil disobedience as their causes began to be taken up by national peace organizations as prototypes of a rising anti-nuclear sentiment.[15] The coalitional response to this web of weapons facilities and power plants would challenge the legitimacy of government authority and corporate accountability in matters of local health and safety throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and in the process, began to define the approach to anti-nuclear activism as one whose composition reflected interesting combination of radical activists and political pragmatists.

Along with FOR member Mike Jendrzejczyk, Colorado activist Pam Solo of the AFSC, and Steve Ladd of the Berkeley chapter of the WRL, an intergroup project—the Nuclear Weapons Facilities Task Force—aimed to provide a national source of information, the sharing of tactics, and, of course, national publicity. A widely distributed booklet, *Makers of the Nuclear Holocaust*, published in 1981, demonstrated the anti-nuclear movement's objective of building a sense of a nationwide community of grassroots action that hinged on what Solo called "the vast network of plants, federal agencies, and corporate contractors."[16] The booklet drew attention to the proliferation of nuclear power and nuclear weapons, particularly in what were considered war-making institutions, such as research laboratories, manufacturing plants, missile silos, and storage and waste facilities, presenting grassroots activists with plenty of ammunition for local organizing, but with a bigger picture in mind.[17] Solo and her colleagues envisaged a broader movement where local campaigns against facilities like Rocky Flats would balloon into a mass movement of citizens concerned about the impending threat posed by nuclear facilities, whose purpose was, they argued, to prepare the United States for a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

Defining the Movement

The scattered nature of anti-nuclear activism in the mid-1970s influenced many activists to couch local nuclear facilities in a language of national or global threats. A rhetoric of symbolic dangers characterized the new movement's efforts to galvanize public concern about the extent of these threats and promoted the necessity of grassroots citizen action in order to combat those threats. In these early days of the anti-nuclear movement, it was commonplace for activists to highlight nuclear facilities as both local hazards and symbols of a global threat. The motto Think Globally, Act Locally, for example, was particularly useful for anti-nuclear organizers. The Rocky Flats plant, as Jendrzejczyk and Solo proposed, was "a monument to the dangers of the Nuclear Age [and] a suitable place for Americans to raise their voices against the madness of nuclear war and the hazards of nuclear energy."[18] Although the threats posed by nuclear weapons were gradually beginning to dominate the movement's attention, the means around which activism operated was very much still one dominated by local threats to health and safety rather than a more abstract fear of nuclear war. Power plants, research laboratories, and factories and facilities with Department of Defense contracts were appropriate, popular targets.

While *Makers of the Nuclear Holocaust* explained in explicit terms the interconnected dangers of the nuclear industries, activists produced other tools to bring home local dangers and threats. In 1978, for example, Ed Hedemann of the WRL designed and produced a series of "Nuclear America" maps, showing the location of nuclear power plants, waste facilities, weapons facilities, and other parts of the widespread nuclear danger. They were designed to highlight for local residents the dangers in their own backyards.[19] The Wisconsin-based group Nukewatch had done a similar thing, producing maps and guides to nuclear installations, with a particular focus on inter-continental ballistic missile silos in the Midwest.[20] Each was part of an emerging national campaign to connect the multitude of local manifestations of what was increasingly seen as a national—and global—problem. As Solo explained it:

> The goal was to give people an entry point in their own communities for understanding that the arms race is not something "out there" but an everyday reality with profound impact on our lives. Campaigns began everywhere—from Hanford, Washington, to Amarillo, Texas, from the Draper Labs at MIT in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to Los Alamos, New Mexico, the state where it all began. These local campaigns generated heightened political consciousness and a tidal wave of public concern.[21]

Linking scattered evidence of nuclear dangers around the nation together in a framework of grassroots citizen activism, then, helped to define the burgeoning anti-nuclear movement as one located within those grass roots. That they were spread across the United States demonstrated the potential for a national movement of information and coordination.

Such was the reasoning behind Mobilization for Survival, the umbrella coalition that emerged in 1977 aiming to coordinate anti-nuclear activities around the nation. The inspiration for the coalition came from Sidney Lens, a long-time labor leader, activist, and editor of the *Progressive* magazine. In a lengthy piece for that magazine, entitled "The Doomsday Strategy," Lens catalogued the looming nuclear danger emerging from government defense policy since 1945.[22] Taking cue from the need for a mobilization of an effective peace movement, Lens initiated the meeting of activists from a large variety of organizations, which would result in the formal organization of the coalition in April 1977. Developments in US military policy at the time, such as President Carter's decision to abandon the B-1 bomber program in favor of cruise missile development, prompted activists to encourage a new, national movement

engaged not in piecemeal opposition to military policies, but in opposition to what the *Progressive* called "the whole lunatic rationale of the arms race."[23]

The Mobe, as it would become known, set itself a somewhat grandiose task:

> To reawaken public awareness of the scale of the threat which faces us all; to channel this awareness into dramatic and effective actions; to take the initiative from those with a vested interest in the arms race; to build a truly massive movement which can change the policies and direction of the nation, and to achieve a transformation of consciousness on the international level, in cooperation with groups active in Europe, Asia, and the Third World.[24]

The Mobe (or MFS) was ostensibly working toward the inaugural United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in New York City, to be held in May 1978. Coalescing around four stated goals—Zero Nuclear Weapons, Ban Nuclear Power, Stop the Arms Race, and Fund Human Needs—MFS appealed to a growing conglomeration of peace groups under a very wide banner. This proliferation of many local groups, regional coalitions, and national umbrella bodies—many with radical perspectives on activism—complicated and enriched the diversity of national anti-nuclear organizing. There was a recognized need for national coordinating bodies to focus the "fragmented, atomized" nature of local organizing, and the loose conglomeration of activists spurred on by MFS fit the mold in many ways.[25] Yet the challenge of single-issue and multi-issue groups operating in cooperation within national bodies was to prove difficult as movement leaders hoped to define an appealing public face of the growing broad movement against nuclear threats.

Nuclear Weapons and Multi-Issue Activism

As American foreign policy and military priorities altered after the end of the Vietnam War, many peace activists warned about the re-emerging danger of nuclear weapons and the arms race, something that the Vietnam War had obscured for many activists.[26] The failure of détente, high defense spending during the Ford administration, new nuclear missile projects proposed by Carter, and growing suspicions of Soviet nuclear strength each contributed to a sense of unease among peace activists. In addition, many viewed the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks as merely an endorsement for more nuclear weapons for both superpowers, in many

ways an escalation of the arms race.[27] At a WRL executive committee meeting in February 1977, Norma Becker proposed the need for a "long range nuclear disarmament campaign." Educational priorities were a necessity, other members argued: "To most people disarmament is a fuzzy issue; very abstract. People would just as soon leave disarmament to the government and not deal with it." Becker hoped to make the issue as vivid and horrifying as possible, arguing that "the need for people to feel fear and terror" was a significant educational priority.[28] Although the committee could not agree upon a suitable educational strategy, it was agreed that disarmament, of both nuclear and conventional weapons, and on a global scale, would remain a key goal of the WRL for the foreseeable future.

First, though, pacifists argued that other activists—especially those involved in campaigns against nuclear power plants—needed to broaden their outlook. In some cases an "ideological difference in emphasis" led to friction over which nuclear technology deserved the movement's attention.[29] The formation of Mobilization for Survival in 1977 did demonstrate that some movement leaders were interested in organizing some form of structured network of local and national anti-nuclear groups. Although it began with meetings of representatives of the major peace organizations—AFSC, FOR, WRL, CALC, SANE, and others—it soon emerged that interest in an umbrella coalition was much more widely spread. By September 1978, FOR member Tom Cornell estimated about 280 groups under the MFS banner. These included "cooperating organizations" and "supporting organizations," a relatively open committee and conference, a small staff based in Philadelphia, and fifteen task forces. "What this country needs on the way to the 1980s," argued Cornell, "is a multi-faceted disarmament movement that can enlist the support of basically conservative union members, farmers, housewives, people in religious congregations, students, businessmen, the unemployed and political aspirants."[30] The Mobe was in no way the final step in national coalition organizing, but it was an important factor in the development of a mass movement and served to encourage spirited opposition to the arms race through demonstrations and nonviolent direct action.

This was done, primarily, through networking of existing groups and diversifying the MFS platform. As Emilie Schmeidler and Mayer Zald wrote in a 1982 study, "MfS saw itself as the organization which would join together many diverse organizations, and thereby both put more pressure on the government and help reawaken public awareness of the nature and scale of the problem."[31] In the late 1970s, this "problem"

often meant nuclear power—environmental groups were "the media darlings of the season," according to Cornell—input from those activists who saw the benefit in combining nuclear power and nuclear weapons was crucial.[32] Expanding the theoretical premise of the nuclear threat, its implications for the peace movement, and the strategic organization required to build a united anti-nuclear movement meant that MFS emerged as the first national coalition dedicated to a comprehensive program of activism in the movement. This broad scope, however, sowed the seeds of tension among activists interested in developing alternative coalitional responses.

At the onset of the 1980s, the larger peace organizations that had taken part in the founding of MFS became less interested in its operation. Its direction had become, to the unease of these organizations, more about broadening the scope of the organized peace movement than devising a coherent program of activism. As MFS organizer Bruce Cronin later summarized, MFS:

> evolved into a coalition of primarily local organizations. This came about both through a conscious choice to reach out to the grassroots movement and a decision by local groups to affiliate with MFS, eventually constituting the overwhelming majority of affiliates.[33]

While this may have been an effect of an overwhelming interest shown by smaller local groups in joining the MFS network, it was as much a product of a sense among the traditional peace organizations that MFS was not a worthwhile endeavor.

Differences in approach emerged more comprehensively around the UN Special Session of May 1978. As MFS organizers struggled to agree upon the most effective style of protest at the Special Session, pacifists felt the need to engage in civil disobedience was being neglected. "Because MfS had failed to come up with a Civil Disobedience scenario for the UN," the WRL Executive Committee agreed, "the WRL and other interested groups [would] develop such a scenario."[34] The FOR and WILPF, too, were unsure about supporting actions developed by MFS. Traditions developed over sixty years, a strong moderate pacifist heritage, and the concerns of its membership did mean that these older peace organizations refrained from publicly endorsing MFS actions.[35] In any event, the major day of protest surrounding the Special Session—on May 27, 1978—operated in ways that reminded the news media of the anti-war era. Commenting that the protest "seemed almost like old times," the *Los Angeles Times* emphasized the links MFS shared with

anti-war radicals from the 1960s, including activist David Dellinger and folk singer Pete Seeger.[36] Identification with the 1960s for some activists was counterproductive; they wanted to create a new movement with new goals and a new style. Others, however, shrugged off such concerns, happy to bestow the anti-nuclear movement with a much-needed sense of tradition and a set of shared ideals, rather than seeking to forge a new identity independent of the peace movement's recent past.

In seeking to accommodate both of these interests, however, MFS became a complex entity. As organizer Tom DeLuca argued:

> There is a need in this country for a political organization that has a clear and comprehensive left-of-center political perspective . . . without being sectarian or a party, that is militantly antiwar without being exclusively pacifist, and that has a spiritual core without being rooted in organized religion[37]

DeLuca felt MFS had the benefit of youth that the traditional peace organizations did not. As the limitations of the umbrella coalition became clear, smaller local groups began to either affiliate with MFS or work outside the MFS framework, for example, in the newly founded Freeze Campaign. The result was, according to DeLuca, "a genuinely grassroots national network."[38] What this meant for the older pacifist organizations, however, was an attempt at the mobilization of a national peace movement without the direction and focus that these older organizations provided.

Differences arose from factions within MFS supporting confrontational demonstrations, not heeding the links between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, and failing to appreciate the international dimension of the nuclear arms race, preferring instead to focus on unilateral disarmament and the United States' own nuclear arsenal. The FOR, for example, affirmed that it would "cooperate with Mobe where we can, but we must respond to our [own] heritage."[39] David McReynolds of the WRL agreed, also frustrated by many aspects of the operation of MFS, and argued in a 1978 issue of *WRL News* that the task ahead for the peace movement as a whole was monumental. Was MFS up to the task of planning for the long term?

> I think M.F.S. as a whole really has not yet understood that a serious national mass movement must do more than chant "Zero, Ban, Fund, End." It'll have to develop a reasonable network of local groups, build links with the political machinery of the country as we did during the

> Vietnam War . . . see the logic of using civil disobedience and mass legal rallies, and understand the need to educate those not in the movement, and reach out to labor and minority groups.[40]

McReynolds, an experienced pacifist and involved with the WRL and the Socialist Party since the early 1950s, was disturbed by voices within the network calling for "a series of organizational experiments," or advocating a "theory that the revolution will come from spontaneous combustion," rather than solid planning. The anti-nuclear movement, he urged, should not overlook practical and pragmatic issues of policy, of political demands, and of a serious approach to disarmament. A politically responsible movement could not afford to continue to simply demand "Zero Nuclear Weapons." Instead, it ought to offer a set of limited, clear-cut, short-term goals, with a view to the long-term building and maintenance of a mass movement against nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and associated threats to human life, safety, and dignity.[41]

McReynolds's outlook speaks to what was, in the late 1970s, a recognized need for the peace movement to get back on track after its post-Vietnam lull. Moreover, what barriers did exist could be largely attributed to a lack of agreement on appropriate targets for a revitalized movement and also to its decentralized nature. Grassroots activist networks established throughout the second half of the 1970s, each involved in local struggles, nevertheless had a strong sense of solidarity, largely achieved through regional alliances. National groups provided information, news, and contacts for networking purposes, but even this was fraught with difficulty. Geographical isolation, regional differences, and cases of disinterest contributed to a very decentralized peace movement, one that not even umbrella groups like MFS nor national clearinghouses like the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign—to be established in 1981—were able to solve.

There were, however, other attempts at organizing some kind of cooperative networks other than MFS. Buoyed by the momentum of antinuclear activity around the nation in the late 1970s, various coalition groups sprung up attempting to mobilize as much of the wide antinuclear, environmental, peace and social justice movements as they could. The Coalition for a Non-Nuclear World (CNNW), forming in 1978, drew attention to five main demands in its program: an end to nuclear power, an end to nuclear weapons, the development of safe, renewable energy sources, full employment, and the honoring of treaties with Native Americans. "These goals constitute a major change in the way America lives," argued coalition literature.[42] Such an expansive program

ignored the familiar, ongoing debate between idealism and pragmatism, instead preferring to seek support based on a broad array of interests.

At the heart of such coalitions as the CNNW and MFS was a commitment to multi-issue, rather than single-issue organizing. As the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island showed, however, greater public interest in the anti-nuclear movement meant that broad agendas based in pacifist and radical ideals would often be muted, in favor of large, politically moderate campaigns on more specific issues. As the movement got bigger, more popular, and began to entertain the possibility of mobilizing millions of Americans neither exposed to nor receptive toward pacifism or protest, proposals to embrace more moderate agendas and strategies attracted stauncher criticism. The core tensions in the wider anti-nuclear movement can be traced back to the late 1970s, when coalitions—in particular their organizers—recognized the difficulties involved in developing a movement that was at once popular as well as ideologically and strategically satisfying.

Anti-Nuclear Protest after Three Mile Island

The WRL reacted swiftly to the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident of March 28, 1979, with Norma Becker leading WRL members in organizing a rally in Manhattan a mere two days afterward. A larger coalition of environmental and peace groups met in Washington, D.C., a week later to organize a larger, national demonstration, set for May 6, 1979.[43] In less than a month, buoyed by nationwide media coverage and the success of the film *The China Syndrome*, organizers managed to attract 65,000 demonstrators, according to police estimates, or 125,000 demonstrators according to organizers' own estimates.[44] Demonstrations also occurred throughout May and June across the country, including instances of mass civil disobedience at nuclear power plants such as Shoreham, on Long Island, where a crowd of 16,000 braved heavy rain and more than 600 were arrested.[45] This sort of mobilization, especially in such a short space of time, owed much to a growing public concern about nuclear power and, to a slightly lesser extent, nuclear weapons. After Three Mile Island, as surveys have shown, levels of opposition to nuclear power plant construction increased as support fell.[46] The challenge for the movement was to unite its diverse elements, finding a compromise between the galvanizing power of a single issue and the longer-term strategy for more radical change.

Part of the CNNW's strategy was a March for a Non-Nuclear World in Washington, D.C., in late April of 1980. Affiliated with the march were

a wide variety of groups, some connected with MFS, and some involved in the National No Nukes Conference that had run annually since 1978 in Louisville, Kentucky. Even before Three Mile Island, suggested CCNW literature, "there was a sense of urgency that the issues of nuclear power and nuclear weapons needed addressing in a nationally focused demonstration."[47] What organizers for the march hoped to achieve was what the Three Mile Island accident had done in 1979, galvanizing a swathe of popular support against destructive and dangerous nuclear technologies. They also wanted to draw attention to the multitude of challenges faced by the left at the onset of the 1980s. However, problems beset the March for a Non-Nuclear World and its organization, signaling that despite the massive outpouring of support for the anti-nuclear movement in the wake of Three Mile Island, sustaining a similar level of interest would be a substantial challenge.

The first major protest action for the 1980s—as organizers called it—proved a disappointment. Poor weather conditions, "hard working but inexperienced organizers," and a host of other factors were blamed for a turnout that was estimated between 25,000 and 50,000.[48] An aborted raid some days earlier on the US embassy in Tehran, at which American hostages were being held, emerged as yet another facet in the multi-issue demonstration. Speakers highlighted environmental issues, the danger of nuclear weapons, Native American concerns about uranium mining on indigenous land, and the issue of unemployment among African-American and Hispanic communities.[49] Two days later, at a direct action demonstration at the Pentagon, between 300 and 600 protesters were arrested in what the WRL regarded as a "major victory" for the movement: the greatest number of arrests in the national capital since 1971.[50] Yet not all activists saw civil disobedience as the measure of a successful demonstration. As interest in the broader anti-nuclear movement blossomed, and as tentative alliances were built between environmentalists, alternative energy advocates, pacifists, communists, and others, activists began to explore different strategies. Organizing on a national level became an effort in compromise, as well as a struggle to accommodate the interests of various constituencies and advocacy groups.

Within this environment of growing public interest, some coalitions clung to their roots in radical egalitarianism. The CNNW, for example, was designed as an explicitly decentralized group in which grassroots organizational principles would ensure fair and proper representation was given to all interested parties and their constituencies. Elitism, as many in the grassroots anti-nuclear movement agreed, was best combated by a commitment to consensus-based decision-making and

participatory democratic principles. These processes were valuable lessons from key experiments with participatory democracy in the civil rights and anti-war movements, as well as in New Left, countercultural, civil rights, and feminist groups from the 1950s to the 1970s.[51]

In practice, WRL representatives argued that the CNNW "attempted to function within an ideological framework that was hostile to and distrustful of "leaders".'[52] A compromise between the polarities of egalitarianism and effective coalition management, it seems, was never reached. This stemmed from organizational difficulties, communication problems, and a lack of attention paid to established procedure within the CNNW. Yet these difficulties were also derived from the broader challenge of maintaining democratic integrity within anti-nuclear organizations and collectives.[53] As two activists from the Abalone Alliance—the major group opposed to the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant in California—explained, the sheer numbers of people poised to enter the movement in the wake of Three Mile Island posed a challenge to "delicate processes of direct democracy and consensus decision-making," ideals that many in the movement held dear.[54]

In some ways, this challenge emphasized the dangers of popularity for radicals more accustomed to the fringes of political life, where comprehensive multi-issue activism was the norm. Boston-based MFS organizer Frank Brodhead, for example, lamented the effect of the influx of the many new constituencies that were

> swept up in the growing movement against nuclear war . . . the religious community, professionals, women, and some trade unions and Third World organizations [that] have dramatically changed the terrain of peace politics, legitimized and publicized peace concerns, and established new constraints within the peace movement which will affect the ability of socialists to take an active role.[55]

In addition, single-issue organizations focused exclusively on the threat of nuclear war proliferated, helped along by wealthy donors and philanthropists, achieving public popularity and media attention at the expense of more radical multi-issue organizations such as MFS or the WRL. As Brodhead incisively observed, "The predominant view within the peace movement is that nuclear weapons are so dangerous and destructive that the political task of the movement is to mobilize as large a majority as possible to oppose, freeze, and dismantle them."

This much was given; the influx of membership and press attention emboldened activists that a massive demonstration of public opinion

against the nuclear arms race was possible, and would have an extensive impact. However, explained Brodhead, “The corollary to this position is that other issues, as important and pressing as they are, can *only serve to divide the movement* against nuclear weapons.”[56] As the threat of nuclear weapons demanded more and more attention in 1979 and 1980, many groups and organizations pressed for a mass, united movement on that issue; the organization that would become the Freeze Campaign at that time was in its early stages of doing so. Yet older organizations, many of which preferred to see nuclear weapons as a symptom of deeper evils, were worried that a campaign advocating such a narrow single-issue platform might seek to promote itself as *the* answer to the threat of the nuclear arms race, superseding the efforts of longstanding pacifist and radical anti-nuclear organizations and coalitions. It was not just the existence of alternative politics that separated these two approaches, but an uncertainty as to how to most effectively utilize new waves of support and turn them into a powerful force for change.

Negotiating Radicalism: Strategies, Tactics, and the Freeze

In many ways the promise of public popularity and political influence in the early 1980s convinced many organizers that the anti-nuclear movement could not afford to let factionalism or any other kind of ideological difference diminish the reach of a moral, mainstream plea for public support. For some, this meant a concerted, moderate campaign to convince the public that a freeze on the arms race was needed, and the resulting critical mass would ensure that policy would follow suit. Others on the left, however, viewed such an electoral approach as overly cautious and too contingent on a responsive political establishment. Moreover, it hadn’t worked in the past. “The left’s decade-long concentration on electoral strategies and personal issues has been a complete failure,” opined a letter to the editors of the *Nation* in 1981. “We cannot afford to wait until 1982 to act decisively,” the letter suggested; “this is clearly a time for dramatic and coordinated action, not for talk.” An effective national mobilization could inspire the sort of mass civil disobedience campaigns that were utilized so effectively during the civil rights movement, for example.[57] That the burgeoning freeze movement failed to fulfill this role merely further convinced radicals that alternative campaigns were needed to demonstrate opposition to the arms race and its interlinked problems and to bring about social and political change.

Civil disobedience in the anti-nuclear movement was nothing new in 1980. Anti-nuclear activism in western Massachusetts in 1974, for

example, extended and dramatized the countercultural ideals of radical communards in their opposition to a planned nuclear power plant at Montague. Felling a weather-monitoring tower used to gather meteorological data in preparation for the plant's construction, local activist Sam Lovejoy demonstrated that dramatic action was an essential, valuable response to what he saw as an "all-pervading technology that's beginning to drown us."[58] Commitment to these radical, prefigurative, and countercultural ideals of dramatic protest resulted in activist communities that advocated thinking about pressing issues and



Figure 1 Coalition for a Non Nuclear World rally poster, 1980.

concerns—nuclear power and nuclear weapons among them—in wider contexts. They also tended to reject political approaches. For example, as John Wills writes, Diablo Canyon protesters were invited to support the Northern California Freeze Campaign in 1981; but instead, "activists criticized the freeze movement for its overreliance on conventional politics, bilateral rather than unilateral rhetoric, and refusal to take a stand on nuclear power."[59] Adopting a broad platform, many radical activists emphasized, was necessary to combat the pervasive and multifaceted web of threats to life, health, and community.

This comprehensive outlook for radical activists meant, in many ways, a refusal to look to liberalism, politics, or the law for solutions, as many more moderate activists had done with ballot initiatives and referenda. Many local alliances understood this well, as did other, larger coalitions such as MFS. As its national coordinator, Reverend Robert Moore, wrote in 1981:

> We must deal with all manifestations of the Bomb . . . if we are to reach people where these survival issues directly touch their lives. It is only in taking all these survival struggles seriously, and understanding the links between them, that we can build a people's movement that can actually reverse the policies which so imminently threaten us all.[60]

The task, for like-minded radicals, was obvious: a broad movement dedicated to opposing the nuclear menace in its myriad forms was needed. It would define itself by its refusal to be co-opted by politics, by sectarianism, and by its willingness to include a vast array of constituencies, each affected by the multi-pronged reach of the nuclear industry.

Many radicals also saw the Freeze as weak, narrow, and catered to mainstream Americans. A more comprehensive program of social change was needed within the peace movement, they argued, lest new converts fail to develop the social consciousness required for true and lasting change. Beverly Woodward, an experienced pacifist and WRL member, worried that in this way, the Freeze failed to offer a comprehensive kick-start to a movement for social change. Writing to Freeze Campaign coordinator Randy Kehler, she argued:

> The success of the freeze campaign depends, in my view, on whether it (1) really deepens people's understanding of the war system and of how we got where we are; (2) establishes a momentum toward general disarmament (not just nuclear disarmament); (3) builds bridges

> between different groups working against war and militarism both nationally and internationally.[61]

Woodward's concerns speak to a deep divide between liberal and radical anti-nuclear activism. The freeze proposal, radicals argued, was too weak, and not designed to bring about disarmament. Nor were its campaign tactics and organizational strategies very comprehensive. Woodward wrote that some Freeze Campaign volunteers shared her concerns, that "signing a petition or making a phone call to the White House were empty gestures."[62] In March 1981, after much internal debate, the national committee of the WRL rejected endorsing the Freeze Campaign, citing that "to moderate our position by adopting the Freeze is to moderate out impact, not strengthen or broaden it."[63] Opinion was, however, divided. Some activists argued that supporting a movement with the potential to mobilize mass interest in anti-nuclear issues was worth supporting as a "first step" toward more comprehensive disarmament.[64] On the other hand, compromise was not an option for activists dedicated to challenging the authority of the state in a comprehensive manner.

In essence, the Freeze Campaign presented radicals with the familiar challenge of maintaining radical ideals when pragmatic alternatives with a greater public appeal were proliferating in the movement. Steve Ladd, of the Berkeley WRL chapter and later involved in the statewide Freeze Campaign in California, saw the promise of the Freeze in its potential to unite the peace movement. In a forum in *WRL News*, he argued:

> Frankly, if we remain the scattered, small, relatively powerless movement we are now, we will *never* stop these new weapons, or cause the elimination of even one single weapon in our current arsenal. If we are to turn around the arms race and move toward disarmament, our most basic priority must be to build a massive movement that has the active and tacit support of large segments of this society.[65]

Ladd felt that acts of resistance or radical protest, while a necessary part of the peace movement, "will be relatively isolated and ineffective, ignored by most of the public, until there is a much larger movement."[66] The benefit of adopting a "realistic, winnable interim goal" meant that the peace movement's radical vanguard, rather than remaining marginal in their political impact, might be able to provide voice and perspective to a more mainstream, politically oriented movement that aimed not at global disarmament and a more just society, but at a more manageable,

pragmatic goal. According to Ladd, each arm of the peace movement needed to unite in its support of the Freeze, lest the momentum and potential of this new campaign be forfeited in favor of ideological and strategic isolation.

On the other hand, however, WRL members committed to a more radical vision of pacifism rejected what Ed Hedemann described as the Freeze's "limited vision," its "tactical narrowness," and its naïve assumption that "appeals to the establishment *alone* will sustain the movement and create significant change."[67] For Hedemann, while educational anti-nuclear initiatives were by all means beneficial, the fact that the Freeze relied solely on such tactics was detrimental to the anti-nuclear movement as a whole:

> The basic Freeze strategy seeks to create change primarily through the educational means of petitions, referendums, resolutions, letters to the editor, visiting Congresspeople, and ads—*while discouraging direct action*. This is a strategy programmed to fail. Simply persuading the general public is not enough to alter government policy.[68]

What the peace movement needed, Hedemann argued, was a combination of different tactics—both moderate and radical—to expand the scope and reach of the movement. Street demonstrations, a focus on military facilities, and the role played by "imaginative and dramatic projects" would help preserve the WRL's traditionally pacifist vision of global disarmament, both conventional and nuclear. Hedemann's position, while critical of the outlook, strategy, and ideology of the Freeze, also shows how radical pacifists valued the dramatic, sensational nature of nonviolent direct action as a campaign tactic and how unsatisfactory they found less direct forms of activism.

The WRL's refusal to endorse the Freeze Campaign also highlights the weight of historical traditions of nonviolence and civil disobedience to these activists. Hedemann and his colleagues frequently cited the inspiration of earlier campaigns—such as the civil rights movement—where dramatic instances of civil disobedience by large numbers of people had contributed to a change in policy.[69] In the anti-nuclear movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the technologies of nuclear weapons, and national leaders' seeming willingness to use them, indicated that, as Beverly Woodward warned, "we must abolish war or war will abolish us."[70] Liberal reformism in anti-nuclear campaigning, Hedemann emphasized, was insufficient: "Just being polite, and having nice discussions, and running candidates for office . . . isn't going to make the

changes that need to be made."[71] Dramatic action, as a tool to radicalize the more moderate parts of the movement, and to combat public apathy, was essential.

As such, many pacifists refused to formally ally themselves with the freeze movement; although popular, it was limited in scope, failed to address disarmament, and did not include direct action in its strategy. The AFSC, in similar ways to their colleagues at the WRL, agreed that " there is a need to look beyond freezing of nuclear weapons to an alternative structure of security."[72] Others, though, urged that the AFSC get involved. Their organization was well poised, with adequate resources, contacts, and skills, to assist the momentum of the Freeze Campaign. Ed Snyder, for example, suggested that "it was important for AFSC to keep the nuclear freeze from becoming a fad," and that it ought to promote a model of sustained, meaningful action to the peace movement and the wider public.[73] This qualified position, Pam Solo agreed, was necessary. Essentially, it was the role of the AFSC to "deepen" or "push" the Freeze, not to emphasize how it was inadequate as a strategy for disarmament.[74]

This sort of cooperation—between national pacifist organizations and the Freeze Campaign—remained a tentative subject. In a fiery piece in *WIN* magazine, for example, Jon Saxton berated the Freeze Campaign for failing to emphasize the connections between nuclear weapons and other key issues, such as nuclear power, military spending, racism, sexism, cutbacks in social services, and so on. The key issue, Saxton argued, was that the anti-nuclear movement needed to go deeper. "We have got to go to the roots of the problem," he urged, "if we ever hope to see the end of nuclear weapons."[75] Consolidation among the left, not a simplified or abstract appeal to the masses, was needed. With the imminent arrival of the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982, many organizers saw a real opportunity for movement unity. The familiar problems inherent in coalitions, and the clash of identities, priorities, tactics, and agendas, would inevitably challenge such a lofty ideal.

June 12 and the Scope of the Movement

In the autumn of 1981, as the popularity and scope of the freeze movement became clearer, many anti-nuclear organizers began coordination on a variety of protests and rallies to coincide with the second UN Special Session on Disarmament, scheduled to be held throughout June 1982 in New York City. It was apparent to many that this might be a key

moment in the anti-nuclear movement, where public anti-nuclear sentiment would find its most explicit expression. Bringing the peace movement together to help increase the impact of the event was another goal, yet the question of movement unity again proved a sticking point. The ostensible purpose of organizing around the Special Session was a mass demonstration in Manhattan taking place on the first Saturday after the UN convened, June 12. The demonstration would emerge as the largest political demonstration in American history, with estimates of 750,000 to one million demonstrators. Under the auspices of MFS, a June 12 Coordinating Committee and Rally Committee were set up to organize the demonstration, and interested parties from the New York area became involved in a large June 12 Coalition, as did representatives from national peace organizations.

Other events were on the agenda, including "vigils, rallies, cultural and educational programs, civil disobedience actions, forums, and other activities," with the cooperation of not just the major peace and religious organizations, but hundreds of smaller, community-based peace and social justice groups across the eastern states (and beyond).[76] As early discussions in the Coordinating Committee suggested, "Different groups could highlight how they are affected by the arms race and the resultant cutback in social programs."[77] Various constituencies such as workers, women, the poor, and racial and ethnic minorities represented natural allies; organizers expected to develop a broad platform for the rally and other associated activities, linking a myriad of concerns to the oppression and injustice—whether economic, moral, or otherwise—wrought by the nuclear arms race.

For many peace and social justice groups taking part, the occasion was one at which *connections* between nuclear weapons and other social ills ought to be highlighted. For example, a coalition of African American representatives calling themselves the "African-American Executive Committee (SSDII)" saw the potential of the event "to educate our people to see the inter-relatedness of militarism and racism." Black unemployment, federal budget cuts in education, housing, day care, and other social services that affected black families, as well as poor people all over the world, all pointed to the arms race perpetrated by the United States.[78] Similarly, the National Organization for an American Revolution emphasized that its links with the civil rights movement, in particular with black and Hispanic communities and local religious communities in fifteen cities, would be of great benefit to a mass demonstration.[79] The unity of various issues and concerns, then, emerged from the outset as organizational priorities, much like the primary outlook

of pacifist organizations such as the WRL, and of newer entities such as MFS.

In this regard, the popularity of anti-nuclear sentiment offered organizers a golden opportunity. An early draft paper on Mobilization for Survival's position, penned by June 12 Coordinating Committee organizer Leslie Cagan, indicated that the MFS would pursue a policy of mobilizing diverse constituencies, united by "common concerns" of peace, justice, and freedom. MFS would also "seek to unite people often separated by race, sex, or class differences," emphasizing the potential of events surrounding the Special Session for building a truly unified peace and social justice movement in the United States, albeit one centered on the organizational base of an anti-nuclear campaign.[80] Cagan, a New York radical, had been exposed to socialist thought in her youth through her parents. A "red diaper baby," she soon embraced radical feminism and anti-war activism in the 1960s, broadening her concerns to feminism and gay rights in the 1970s. Through her work in Boston MFS, she moved to New York in early 1982 to take up a key role in the June 12 Coalition. Here, Cagan found existing organizational tensions and suspicions, many of which stemmed from the presence of radical voices within the coalition and related ideas about comprehensive social change.[81]

As MFS personnel played a major role in coordinating the June 12 demonstration, their radical leadership exerted what other activists considered undue influence on the event and its planning. Some WRL members complained that "a number of small leftist sects" within the June 12 Coalition were intent on keeping the focus on the United States and not promoting disarmament elsewhere in the world. Disquiet also existed due to the majority of the Coordinating Committee and Rally Committee being white leftists, lacking adequate representation from black and "third world" constituencies. Additionally, some figures within the June 12 Coalition were "irritated" that the WRL had failed to support the Freeze, symbolic of a larger gulf between older, established organizations such as the WRL and younger groups that proliferated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The enormous potential of the UN Special Session not only provided the peace movement with a swath of interest and motivation, it increased the volatility of inter-group conflict; as Norma Becker surmised, everyone aimed for their organization to "get as much credit as possible."[82]

The June 12 Coalition soon realized the massive extent of public interest in the upcoming demonstration. As a result, there were concerns about the Coordinating Committee itself. Cagan saw this as evidence of disquiet about the radical direction of her own leadership; she recalled that "some of the more mainstream forces [within the Coalition] were

concerned that I represented not the MFS but a more radical approach . . . but I think that there was also a kind of homophobia."[83] Division within the June 12 Coalition and concerns from "conservative elements" of contributing peace organizations emphasized the divide that existed over the strategy and tactics of such a large public campaign. As Hedemann recalled, moderates interested in pushing the idea of June 12 as a public demonstration for the nuclear freeze rather than a wider platform, didn't like the "riff raff" or the "sectarian leftist groups" within the June 12 Coalition.[84]

Suspicion of these radical motives spilled over into a wider organizational conflict among the national peace organizations involved in the June 12 Coalition. All agreed that the June 12 demonstration was to be one that could attract as many people as possible. As parts of the peace movement leadership expressed, the June 12 Coalition was the result of keen attempts "to put together a broad-based coalition to attract the widest possible demonstration of public opinion in New York this June." The coalition remained fractured, though, due largely to division over ideology, organizational philosophy, tactics, and occasionally over personalities.[85]

Proposing "a new infusion of energy, funds, and leadership," an alliance composed of several leaders of groups such as the FOR, AFSC, CALC, and SANE proposed the formation of a new "corporation" to "produce" the June 12 demonstration.[86] Such a corporation would remove, or at least render less effective, the contributions of radical voices within the June 12 coalition, such as the WRL, the communist US Peace Council (USPC), MFS, WILPF, and the Black Veterans for Social Justice. Incensed at this development, David McReynolds alleged that Cora Weiss—of the AFSC and the Riverside Church Disarmament Program—saw "June 12th as her personal toy." Her considerable connections with a philanthropic funding base, however, meant she wielded sizeable influence in the peace movement.[87] The idea that money and influence would determine the strategy and direction of anti-nuclear activism was one that radical activists such as McReynolds and Cagan found abhorrent. Nevertheless, it did demonstrate the nature of the division between radical and moderate models of activism within the anti-nuclear movement.

The takeover instigated by Weiss and her colleagues appeared to be some kind of purge of the June 12 Coalition, reminding McReynolds of purge of communists from the ranks of SANE in 1958 at the tail end of the McCarthy era.[88] He viewed the takeover proposal as "arrogant, insulting, divisive, exclusionary, and inexcusable" and reminded its instigators of the longstanding institutional leadership and experience of those

organizers working in the WRL and WILPF and their contributions and commitment to a rich history of mass demonstrations, diverse campaign tactics, and comprehensive approaches to issues of peace and war.[89]

McReynolds felt a coalition of peace organizations—from the communist USPC to the ecumenical pacifist FOR to the professional and secular SANE—could successfully organize June 12 in a manner that had been common for many years. Those attempting to hijack June 12, he argued, saw June 12 as "an event," while the more radical groups excluded from the organizing coalition "see June 12th as part of the process of building a movement."[90] It was this long-range vision that often set radical pacifists apart from their more moderate colleagues in the anti-nuclear movement, who were seemingly more interested in mobilizing public opinion in order to bring about legislative changes to either freeze the arms race or to elect representatives, senators, and a president who would. Such a vision operated within a specific timeframe; the congressional elections of 1982, for example, were used as a platform for nuclear freeze resolutions and referenda in municipalities, counties, and states across the nation, as well as the election of anti-nuclear candidates. Radicals, on the other hand, saw the arms race as a problem with deeper roots. The evils of violence, militarism, and war were not quick fixes, and mere lobbying or electoral solutions could not offer any substantial strategies for fundamentally changing society.

The result of this drama was, expectedly, a compromise. Cagan remained in the June 12 Coordinating Committee, supported by two new coordinators nominated by the moderate "alliance." The WRL, WILPF, USPC, and others continued to have their say in the coalition and continued to organize for their members and friends to get to New York on June 12 but also became more interested in organizing civil disobedience actions on June 14, the Monday following the mass rally in Manhattan. As a divisive protest tactic, nonviolent civil disobedience was not endorsed by many of the mainstream peace organizations, and those that did promote it as a dramatic campaign tactic acknowledged its divisive nature. June 14 emerged as an event titled "Blockade the Bombmakers" and targeted not just the United States but also other nuclear powers. Along with members of other pacifist organizations, including the FOR, Catholic Peace Fellowship, CALC, MFS, and others, the June 14 campaign aimed to do what the mass demonstration on June 12 had not—radicalize anti-nuclear protest.[91]

As a preliminary proposal for the event explained, civil disobedience actions "provide a means for many people to directly pressure the major nuclear powers while demonstrating the depth of their concerns." The

actions intended to bring about the "disruption of diplomacy as usual" at the UN missions of the five nuclear powers who held seats on the UN Security Council as permanent members—the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom. Expectedly, the heaviest emphasis was on the United States. As organizers explained, "We feel as people who live in the United States we have a special obligation to focus on the US government, just as we expect those who live in other countries to strongly protest their governments [sic] nuclear policies."[92] According to organizer Sharon Kleinbaum, the rationale behind the civil disobedience actions was the importance of making a statement, "that we are willing to put our bodies on the line to make as strong a statement that we could."[93] Given the hitherto little concrete success achieved by appeals to reason—such as the Freeze—emphasizing the radical and pacifist commitment to nuclear disarmament was a necessary activity, often as a means of pulling moderate activists in a more radical direction.[94]

What emerged from the June 12 demonstration and the June 14 civil disobedience action is difficult to decipher. The monumental turnout for the demonstration on June 12 was by many accounts the largest demonstration of public opposition to government policy in American history. Such a surge of new interest in the anti-nuclear cause prompted many in the movement to strategize how to retain public support and how to further develop sustained, meaningful action in opposition to the arms race. For radical groups, the way forward for the movement was to develop broad coalitions of support, finding common ground among diverse constituencies to push for an agreed set of goals. For this to happen, though, these constituencies needed to take part, or at least be represented, in coalition politics. Fuming at the proposed "takeover" of the June 12 Coordinating Committee, the WRL National Committee sensed an exercise of exclusionary policy. Contrary to the WRL's aim of including diverse constituencies in its short- and long-term programs and strategies, no women's groups, student groups, black or Hispanic groups, or communist groups were to be included in the new, reorganized June 12 rally committee.[95] It also suspected an attempt at ousting New York metropolitan area groups from the June 12 organizing process, in favor of national peace and social justice organizations, few of which were based in New York City.[96] In the pursuit of the broadest possible unity, it seemed, sacrifices were being made.

Many of these sacrifices related to problems of racial diversity that had beset the peace movement for decades. Irrespective of the differences between McReynolds and Weiss, between radicals and moderates,

there was the problem that the June 12 Coalition was not in its composition a comprehensive snapshot of the peace and social justice communities. Black and Puerto Rican groups, feminist groups, and lesbian and gay groups were left out of the coalition. In effect, many individuals from the WRL, USPC, WILPF, and MFS worried that by streamlining the organization of June 12 within a moderate, homogenous committee structure and without the participation of radicals, the opportunity to mobilize a truly diverse array of constituencies for the rally would be lost. A middle-class march, while surely impressive and media-worthy, would not satisfy the longer-term ambitions of the peace movement to create a broad partnership of minority constituencies agitating for fundamental social change.[97]

This issue of the racial and ethnic makeup of the June 12 Coalition first arose in January 1982. At a coalition planning meeting, more than 200 attendees agreed that "one-third of the participants at all levels of the coalition would be third world groups or individuals chosen by third world constituents." As Cagan later argued, "This was a commitment to break away from the old habit of letting white people set the terms for third world participation [in the peace movement]."[98] In a way, addressing the traditional white, middle class leadership of the peace movement was a means whereby the movement could look at its own attitude to other issues besides nuclear weapons. This broad perspective harked back to the early days of the MFS umbrella group in its efforts to develop a nationwide anti-nuclear movement. Its efforts in 1982 extended this organizing principle, linking the nuclear arms race to a host of other troubling concerns that demonstrated the malevolent, militaristic activities of the state.

Cagan argued that domestic racial issues, along with a concern for third world nations affected by US military intervention, were as relevant as the single-issue consensus on the danger of nuclear war that proliferated in the early 1980s. Postponing the challenge of racial unity within the peace movement in favor of a narrow agenda, she claimed, simply served to create "a false unity."[99] Other issues, including feminism, gay rights, and abortion also surfaced, further complicating the terrain of the anti-nuclear agenda and leading to the challenge of maintaining an effective consensus among participants in the June 12 Coalition. According to Cagan, though, confronting these issues in peace movement coalitions was healthy and resulted in a broader, more comprehensive movement, where diverse interests and agendas made contact, rather than operating in separate spheres.[100]

In any event, as Cagan wrote after the rally, "June 12 became a reality larger than the internal tensions and dynamics of the coalition."[101] It

demonstrated how the left could begin to address wider choices about its direction and strategy. The experience also highlighted serious challenges within the peace movement about cooperation and compromise between socialists, pacifists, and other radicals with liberal and moderate activists, many of whom advocated single-issue agendas. Moreover, it highlighted the need for effective coalitions to organize many diverse constituencies in the form of a mass movement. As the WRL identified, the stakes were too high for radicals to remain isolated:

> When we must stand alone, we will do so. But when we can stand with tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of others—more, when we can be part of the process which mobilizes those hundreds of thousands—then which of us would choose to stand alone?[102]

Unity, rather than elitism, was imperative to maintain this effectiveness. Of course compromises would serve to ensure that an anti-nuclear campaign's integrity was matched by its scope in a way that could successfully mobilize large and diverse numbers of people. But how diverse should these coalitions really be? Patrick Lacefield, a member of the WRL, FOR, and the Democratic Socialists of America, felt the infighting within the June 12 Coalition instructive, insofar as it could teach future coalitions how *not* to operate. Divergent agendas and broad aims were also counterproductive when stretched too far, he argued. "We must be able to co-exist in coalitions with people who hold our position on nuclear arms, but not on Cuba, on the transfer of funds from military uses to domestic needs, but not on abortion."[103] There was a limit, he argued, to how many interests a coalition ought to pander to if it were to remain effective.

Others disagreed with Lacefield's sentiments, contending that a comprehensive vision for social change was what set the left apart from mainstream anti-nuclear efforts like the Freeze Campaign. "We're talking about more than disarmament," argued Jon Saxton, as the Boston chapter of MFS attempted to build on the success of June 12. "What moved people was not only a demand for arms control, but opposition to the budget and intervention. Even those whose sole focus is annihilation need to recognize that the Freeze is a pitifully small step." In short, Saxton emphasized that MFS, and the peace and social justice movement more broadly, ought to try to build a successful coalition of diverse constituencies that could agitate for a set of basic yet radical demands. Saxton maintained that MFS and its allies on the left needed to "move liberals to the left," swinging movement leadership and membership

away from those moderate organizations such as SANE and the Freeze and into center-left coalitions. This way, a more comprehensive program and strategy for social, political, and economic change could be adopted.[104]

Carl Conetta, also of Boston MFS, had similar ideas. The arms race had much deeper implications that a great deal of the public did not yet appreciate, and efforts needed to be undertaken to educate about these bigger connections. “This isn't about the facts of nuclear war of the military balance,” Conetta wrote in early 1983, “but an attempt to help folks start thinking about deeper causes and, indirectly, about the common foundation of the many different forms of oppression.”[105] This spoke to the heart of the radical vision for social change in America, where pacifists, socialists, and anarchists sought to best communicate an understanding of how violence, oppression and war operated in the world, what made them possible, and what could be done about it.

Coalitions and the Challenge of Activism

The efforts at building a mass anti-nuclear movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s stem from the waning of peace activism after the Vietnam War. “Many [activists] went home and became uninvolved,” wrote a Connecticut-based activist to the June 12 Rally Committee. “Nothing fundamentally changed [and] we just had to wait for the next crisis.” That crisis—the nuclear arms race—needed to be met with a level of continuity and organization that could sustain a long-term movement.[106] Building this continuity and organization from initially disparate campaigns around the country, many of them interested in opposing nuclear power, was a slow process. It involved combining concerns about both the environment and disarmament, as well as finding ways in which diverse constituencies could produce the most effective campaign to oppose various nuclear threats. In some ways this was a contest between environmentalism and pacifism, sparked by the accident at Three Mile Island. Both sought to capitalize on the swaths of public support emerging in the spring of 1979, and as McReynolds recalled, environmentalists “thought we were wildly radical, [while] our side . . . thought we ought to bring the two issues [power and weapons] together in an anti-nuclear movement.”[107] As public interest in the dangers of nuclear power waned in the early 1980s, the nuclear arms race became the primary concern of this broad movement. However, struggles over the direction of various coalitions and campaigns remained, presenting organizers with serious challenges about the nature and structure of their activism.

Traditionally, pacifists, socialists, and other radicals had a history of cooperation and an overlapping sense of purpose; the need for fundamental social change was, more often than not, agreed upon. With a new outpouring of interest in disarmament at the beginning of the 1980s came a shift in the constitution of the peace movement—in terms of membership, public support, and profile. As moderate, single-issue groups sprung up and captured the media's attention, radicals fiercely debated the means to best engage with moderate and mainstream public support for a nuclear freeze, and with organizations that championed that goal.[108] Diversifying the perspective of campaigns opposed to the arms race was difficult, despite the widely recognized need for nuclear disarmament. The constitution of the movement and its leadership, for example, was a sore point in coalition building. Should the anti-nuclear movement take a stance on abortion, gay rights, or racism? If it didn't, what did this say about the movement itself, its leaders, and its philosophy? These questions illuminate familiar struggles in coalition building within large social movements, and the anti-nuclear movement's experience was by no means unique in this regard.

Without their idealistic vision of a better world, the anti-nuclear movement's radical voices might have lost sight of deep-seated beliefs in the value of nonviolence, of resistance to the state, and of a refusal to compromise these principles. Connecting these philosophies to a potential gold mine of public support in the early 1980s was, understandably, mired in a complex negotiation of the anti-nuclear movement's broader direction. As McReynolds had suggested some years prior, "What is required by pacifism and what cannot be given up is the ability of people to make individual judgments. But that also mitigates against its becoming an effective political force."[109] In the history of the anti-nuclear movement to 1982, mitigating the demands of individual conscience, radical ideology, public support, and political success, as well as contesting the nature and scope of anti-nuclear action itself, highlights the persistence of the challenges of marrying idealism and pragmatism in social activism. These challenges, as experienced by activists in campaigns and coalitions from the earliest days of anti-nuclear protest in the mid-1970s to the movement's height in 1982, tell us much about social movements and the complex dynamics of compromise. How activists attempted to manage diverse ideals and demands, incorporate multiple issues and constituencies into their campaigns, and achieve some form of success is a fundamental part of the history of anti-nuclear activism in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

2
Building a Mainstream Movement: Advertising, Publicity, and Image

The attainment of mass public support and a favorable response from political institutions has always been a primary challenge for oppositional social movements. As the nuclear freeze movement took shape in 1979 and 1980, its proponents developed its structure and strategy through an institutional approach. Ballot initiatives, educational outreach, and advertising were conventional strategies that had—freeze organizers anticipated—a solid potential to capture public interest. As such, a variety of anti-nuclear organizations and campaigns devoted their energies to mobilizing public opinion through these strategies. Mobilizing favorable public opinion and attracting institutional support for the nuclear freeze proposal were key aims of this polite movement, whose emphasis on political realism and liberal reform contrasted with the pacifist approach of many traditional peace groups.

This chapter examines how the nuclear freeze movement—and other organizations in its ambit—attempted to become a mass movement that was at once a grassroots citizen's movement and an effort in political lobbying.[1] Its populist orientation was crucial in mobilizing public support and involvement, while at the same time demonstrating to elected officials the widespread demand for an end to the arms race.[2] Although it was a decentralized and often uncoordinated movement, its key players demonstrated a willingness to promote the freeze as a mainstream endeavor with a broad appeal. Doing so eschewed a radical analysis of the nuclear arms race in favor of a simple message that would not alienate potential supporters in Congress who were suspicious of the Soviet Union. In presenting this simple message of halting the arms race to the public, organizations in the freeze movement emphasized the liberal nature of the campaign and its mainstream image, attempting to maximize individual organizations' memberships and promote favorable public opinion. Many organizations did so in a professional, corporate manner, hiring lobbyists

for Capitol Hill, and engaging public relations consultants and advertising firms to assist in developing an image and an appeal for the anti-nuclear movement that strayed far from its roots in traditional pacifism.

Such ideas have a substantial heritage but owe much of their style and approach to peace activism in the 1950s and early 1960s. Organizations such as Women Strike for Peace and the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) shared little with the Old Left or the emerging New Left and campaigned for such causes as a test ban treaty and featured a broad-based membership open to both pacifists and non-pacifists.[3] This chapter focuses on organizations updating that heritage in the 1980s, campaigning for an end to the nuclear arms race through public education, lobbying, electoral and legislative remedies, and media coverage. At the center of this story is the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, as well as organizations such as Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND) and SANE. They worked within existing institutional frameworks, adopting a safe and nonthreatening rhetoric and promoting themselves, John Lofland argues, as "polite protestors." In the eyes of the public and through the media, the anti-nuclear movement became defined by this "remarkable degree of genteel civility, restraint, and even affability."[4]

This method of organizing owed a lot to the grassroots nature of much anti-nuclear activism, but it also operated far beyond the grassroots of local campaigning. Most national bodies had a paid, professional staff, sought endorsements, lobbied congressional offices in Washington, D.C., and worked toward increasing their membership base and their numbers of regular donors and benefactors. More money for the movement, organizers felt, could translate to more publicity, which would in turn mean a greater public profile for the movement and assist in its political campaigning. However, when the freeze resolution became stalled in Congress in 1983, and when Ronald Reagan decisively defeated Walter Mondale in the 1984 presidential election, many organizers seriously evaluated their approach to social change. They sought to find out how they could better understand the public mood, exploit popular values, and utilize mainstream media in more effective ways. Other activists retreated from such ideas, radicalizing their strategies and endorsing campaigns of direct action. The fallout from the 1984 elections was enormous and in many ways contributed to the demise of the nuclear freeze movement as a potent social and political force.

What this story of the freeze movement's dramatic rise and fall demonstrates is more than the conventional narrative of an incredibly broad, decentralized, grassroots campaign that lacked the skills for



Figure 2 Peg Averill illustration for *WIN* magazine, October 12, 1978.

effective political negotiation and media manipulation.[5] It emphasizes that the strategies of key organizations contributed to a new type of activism on the left, one that relied less on public demonstrations and rallies and more on media attention, public relations, endorsements, fundraising, and other methods of sustaining a very mainstream, almost corporate kind of organizational model. In developing such a model, the Freeze Campaign, WAND, and SANE worked in a different sphere from their colleagues in pacifist organizations. Largely eschewing direct action, these groups attempted to devise a different kind of civic engagement, one that could operate successfully *within* the system, rather than opposed to it. These attempts, and their fallout, offer a critical insight into the dynamics of public relations and publicity and their inherent challenges to oppositional social movements.

Mass Movements and Politics

As newer, more mainstream anti-nuclear organizations emerged in the early 1980s, many aimed to appeal to the widest possible audience to gain support from liberal and conservative business and media interests

and promote legislative change in Congress. The most obvious example of these efforts is the Freeze Campaign, yet equally significant were other professionally organized anti-nuclear campaigns. SANE had existed since 1957, with its fortunes reviving under the directorship of David Cortright from 1977. WAND was much newer, founded by Australian-born anti-nuclear activist and physician Dr Helen Caldicott as the Women's Party for Survival in 1980 and changing its name a short time thereafter.[6] What each of these organizations aimed to achieve was, essentially, political influence. Using public education and civic engagement as key strategies, they preached a politically safe message of, alternately, bilateral initiatives to freeze the arms race at its current levels, the scientific and medical consequences of a possible nuclear war, and the economic and social cost of the administration's nuclear arms policies.

Initially, these strategies worked. The anti-nuclear movement gained substantial public support in 1981 and 1982 and began to push for nuclear freeze initiatives and referenda electorally in November 1982, on nine state ballots and hundreds of local and municipal ballots across the country. Buoyed by this success, the national Freeze Campaign took the freeze proposal to Congress, beginning a lengthy process of debate and dissection, with numerous amendments, in the House and Senate.[7] At this stage, what had been a largely grassroots movement, propped up by volunteers and characterized by decentralized local organizing, suddenly became an exclusively political campaign, characterized by an involvement in federal politics that was somewhat elitist rather than egalitarian. Such a departure from the movement's grassroots base sat at odds with its rhetoric of building a mass citizen's movement and instead pioneered a strategy of political change that operated independently from those local groups that formed the basis of the anti-nuclear movement.

This involvement in politics, however, was offset by a public image that posited the anti-nuclear movement as one composed largely of mainstream, politically moderate, ordinary Americans. For Helen Caldicott, activism was the "antidote to such terminal ills" as nuclear war. Successful anti-nuclear campaigns in the past, she argued, were not led by "radical kooks," but by ordinary people: "It's more of a conservative movement that's led by doctors and lawyers and the churches."[8] Writing in her autobiography a decade later, Caldicott reiterated:

> The "movement" was really an ad hoc, heterogeneous collection of millions of people across the country arranged in disparate and

> individual units—churches, psychologists, lawyers, real estate brokers, artists, the [SANE] and Freeze groups, and many more.[9]

The movement's leadership saw the movement itself as a reflection or microcosm of American society: conservative, self-interested, patriotic, and with a desire for the preservation of human life, health, and safety. Hence, the challenge facing the anti-nuclear movement was to effectively mobilize this conservative, value-driven public into action against the nuclear arms race.

Initially, this style of polite opposition to the nuclear arms race was practiced in a seemingly independent fashion. Campaigns sprung up across the country to use local and state processes of legislative initiatives, referenda, and town meetings to register their anti-nuclear sentiment with their elected officials in a more formal way. This was rarely a centrally orchestrated strategy.[10] The very first ballot initiatives calling for a "mutual nuclear weapons moratorium" took place in three senatorial districts in Western Massachusetts in 1980, where the Traprock Peace Center led the campaign, describing the ballot initiatives as "a great outreach vehicle."[11] Finding success where anti-nuclear power initiatives and referenda in various states had failed in 1976, the ballot initiatives in Western Massachusetts were, as one organizer later recalled, "the only bright light in an otherwise dark cloud" of the ascent of Ronald Reagan to the presidency.[12]

These strategies were an ideal means for anti-nuclear activists to pursue opposition to nuclear power and nuclear weapons through an accepted, legal avenue.[13] Their popularity soon spread, as local, regional, and state bodies campaigning for a nuclear freeze worked toward introducing ballot initiatives in the 1982 elections, as well as sponsoring state legislature resolutions on the issue. This required money, influence, and a certain level of public appeal, and nowhere was this more apparent than the Californian Freeze Campaign, whose leadership was usurped in 1981 by the Los Angeles millionaire entrepreneur and activist Harold Willens. A fundraiser for Jimmy Carter's 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns, Willens helped the campaign along with substantial reserves of money, media contacts, and public relations expertise but at the same time altered the tone of the campaign in order to bolster its popular support among the public, the media, and the political establishment. As David Meyer has written:

> The nuclear freeze was in this way designed to be as inoffensive as possible to the largest number of people. Discussions of massive

> direct action campaigns or advocacy of unilateral initiatives were purged from the mainstream of the freeze, not only in California, but across the United States, as the Willens style came to dominate.[14]

Similarly, as Willens wrote in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* in May 1982, the broad success of the Freeze, with Congress and with the administration, was dependent on keeping the campaign "as hard-nosed and free from peace-rally rhetoric as possible. Our job is to reach out to as wide a political spectrum as possible."[15]

Nationally, the Freeze Campaign was not so strident in its rejection of traditional "peace-rally rhetoric." It actively avoided the bureaucratic, hierarchical style that dominated the California office, instead allowing its chapters and affiliates a large degree of local autonomy.[16] However, this was not always successful. Often local Freeze groups sometimes had no idea the national Freeze Campaign even existed.[17] Many Freeze groups also struggled to find appropriate methods of organizing in conservative communities where peace activism was not considered "normal or culturally acceptable.[18] Conservative opposition was also common in St. Louis, home of the Freeze Campaign's national clearinghouse; as an anonymous letter to national coordinator Randy Kehler opined, the lower Midwest was hardly a receptive area for progressive activism. "The only 'Freeze' you will experience in this area," the author argued, "is the icy stares from the populace who wonder what your game is."[19] In an environment of political conservatism, the Freeze Campaign ambitiously defined itself as a broad-based movement. Even more ambitious was its attempt to mobilize public opinion and local action to such an extent that the Freeze would dominate local, state, and federal politics.

The ostensible goal of the Freeze Campaign was to turn public concern about the nuclear arms race into a coordinated national movement involving millions of hitherto politically uninvolved Americans. As the Freeze Campaign planned its 1982 strategy, it hoped to "make the Freeze highly visible to a national audience so that it becomes a 'household word' and a clear alternative to the continuing arms race." Achieving this meant much more than continuing to expand the campaign's grassroots base. Mainstream media were needed to "substantially broaden the [Freeze Campaign's] base of support."[20] There were, however, dangers in pursuing a broad base of support, and pacifists, socialists, and other radicals often criticized the Freeze Campaign for its "soft" or "safe" approach.[21] By 1981, the Freeze had become a bandwagon whose popularity had eclipsed other peace and disarmament campaigns. "Its narrow focus leaves no room for these other efforts," said Tony Webb of

the Foundation for National Progress, publisher of *Mother Jones* magazine. More importantly, he argued, the Freeze "focuses on weapons and hardware instead of people," losing the potential impact of a humanist approach. The freeze needed a "backyard" strategy, one "that brings the issue home."[22] At any rate, the Freeze Campaign blustered on, remaining, in the words of its leaders, "a mile wide and an inch deep."[23] Its mass appeal, for instance, minimized its ability to debate more comprehensive arms reduction policies. Yet it did succeed in challenging the idea of anti-nuclear activism as one that existed on the fringes of American political and cultural life, becoming in some ways a mainstream political force.

After the 1982 elections, the Freeze Campaign hoped to further broaden its base of support, extending the promise of a popular grassroots movement into the political arena. In 10 statewide referenda, 37 city and county referenda around the country, and in more than 400 New England town meetings, voters representing approximately one-third of the national electorate had endorsed the Freeze by strong margins.[24] Planning its 1983 strategy, the Freeze Campaign recommended expanding its operations into areas of the country where it had yet to make a mark. The Freeze aimed to "increase support in the swing states and congressional districts and to include the labor, minority and business communities."[25] Gaining the support of these constituencies was key to developing the freeze movement as one that was not just bipartisan, but one that could unite disparate interests and communities. Doing so would increase its political sway; representatives and senators would be much more likely to listen to a campaign that counted labor unions and business associations among its supporters. Essentially, a greater support base around the nation would strengthen the ability of the Freeze to influence the 1984 presidential election, and it was toward this event that the Freeze—and plenty of other anti-nuclear organizations—turned its attention.

In June 1983, the Freeze Campaign established Freeze Voter, an independent lobbying body. Freeze Voter was one of several lobbying efforts on behalf of a peace movement that ostensibly sought to translate favorable public opinion into support in Congress. The national Freeze body would remain nonpartisan; as its coordinator Randy Kehler confirmed in a July 1983 interview, there were no plans for the Freeze to endorse any congressional or presidential candidates.[26] As a result, Freeze Voter began as a means to channel the Freeze movement's success into more specific electoral goals. Phone banks, mass mailings, and door-to-door canvassing were carried out by some 25,000 volunteers in 40 state affiliates.[27] Meanwhile, Freeze Voter became a glitzy Political

Action Committee (PAC), using support from high profile donors to make a very public appeal for voter registration and the election of pro-Freeze candidates. Lisa Weinstein, a film producer from the famous Weinstein family in Hollywood, organized fundraisers that attracted Barbara Streisand, Olivia Newton-John, and the Pointer Sisters, among others.[28] This kind of publicity would help to target those groups of citizens "who have been traditionally excluded from the [electoral] system."[29] In doing so, the Freeze Campaign, Freeze Voter, and associated coalitions with lobbyists and PACs—combined with glitzy publicity campaigns—aimed to turn the Freeze's broad appeal into political success.

Selling Disarmament

Like the Freeze, other anti-nuclear organizations saw enormous potential for increased membership and public influence in the climate of high profile anti-nuclear sentiment that characterized the movement in the early 1980s. In essence, the key challenge for these organizations was to create an effective mass movement through fundraising and advertising. SANE found itself wondering in 1980 how it could go about developing new membership in pursuit of this mass movement. The organization also sought to distinguish itself from the plethora of other anti-nuclear groups, many of which had a similar organizational model of a paid membership, a professional staff, and a high profile board. Organizations such as Common Cause, state and local Freeze Campaign affiliates, Physicians for Social Responsibility, WAND, the Council for a Liveable World, and many others all competed to some degree for membership and influence, even though each worked toward similar goals. Although many of these organizations began as volunteer-run peace groups, they soon evolved into large, national entities with a head office, executive and national committees, and local chapters around the country. Such moves toward a corporate organizational model were not, however, without misgivings. For example, in a 1983 Physicians for Social Responsibility board meeting, Judy Lipton expressed concern about "the problem of eroding the concept of volunteerism in the organization by paying officers of the Board," something not heeded by others invested in steering the peace movement in the direction of corporate America.[30] Uncertain about this new direction, yet very much committed to exploring what a large, successful anti-nuclear movement could look like, organizers engaged in finding the most appropriate way to advertise and promote the necessity of nuclear arms control to the wider public.

SANE's fortunes had not improved substantially by the beginning of 1982. Despite its ability to attract tens of thousands of new members, the organization still struggled to translate those figures into more concrete gains, both in terms of consistent fundraising and in the creation of some form of political influence. SANE's membership rose from 12,000 members in 1980 to 65,000 by mid-1983 and to over 100,000 by the end of 1984.[31] The challenge beyond this process of attracting new members, writes Milton Katz, was whether SANE had the potential to be "a potent political force and one that would have an impact on public policy."[32]

In January 1982, SANE was approached by a direct marketing agency offering to assist with SANE's goal of mobilizing public opinion against the arms race. Rapp & Collins, Inc., a direct-marketing agency with a wealth of experience, suggested that carefully planned advertising be utilized.[33] Stan Rapp recommended SANE initiate a mail campaign "seeking to convert a substantial number of [existing donors] to monthly contributors, for the purpose of financing the expanded appeals for membership from the mainstream of American life." An "all-media campaign for a test market" would be developed, utilizing direct mail and advertising on radio, television, and in newspapers "to recruit members and influence public opinion." Public opinion surveys would help SANE determine the success of the media campaign, and if successful, work toward larger, more ambitious national advertising campaigns.[34] The ideas behind these strategies reiterate the mainstream, national reach that anti-nuclear organizations such as SANE aimed for. By mobilizing members of the public through national marketing and media campaigns, SANE's platform could benefit from a substantial interest in funds, furthering its goals of public and political influence.

Rapp & Collins's proposal suggested that SANE work on soliciting monthly donations from a dedicated supporter list as the best way to raise funds. Prospective direct mail used by peace organizations was cheap, and while it didn't often generate high returns, it usually made back some profit on top of costs. The agency warned that other forms of fundraising, such as paid advertising in newspapers and magazines, and on radio and television, were much less reliable than direct mailing in terms of any guaranteed financial return.[35] SANE's reaction to the proposal was supportive but identified limitations in what it could afford, or achieve. SANE executive committee member Alan Silver, for example, felt that national media saturation was an ambitious goal to set. Instead, he argued, "What seems helpful is the idea of enlisting local chapters in strenuous, continuous activities—thus tapping the great strength

of American social movements, their voluntarism—while developing appeals through relatively inexpensive local outlets."[36] These suggestions appealed to the significant challenge of creating an effective mass movement through media coverage and advertising of national reach. Organizing locally was also much more feasible in terms of finances, word-of-mouth publicity, and affordable access to local media. The big question in any sustained direct-marketing approach, noted SANE staff,

> is how we will put together the political organizing strategy and tactics to activate the people reached by the campaign. It is important to convince people that the campaign is a real, effective, political plan to reverse the arms race and not just a massive advertising of an idea or an organization.[37]

SANE wanted to promote itself as *the* answer to the problem of the arms race on a national scale, and to do so it shouldn't simply advertise to literate, educated Americans. Developing an advertising strategy, then, that could appeal to diverse demographic targets to "build effective political power, [and] not just to popularize a slogan," was agreed upon.[38]

Many of SANE's concerns about effective advertising were based on the challenge of mobilizing politically uninvolved Americans. It wanted to appear to the public as a popular and respectable organization with a concrete political program. The use of celebrities and public figures in anti-nuclear campaigning was one way of promoting the movement to a wider audience. Endorsement by, or involvement of celebrities and public figures was a central part of how mainstream anti-nuclear organizations aimed at maximizing their appeal. "The [anti-nuclear] cause is so broad-based that celebrities can endorse it without losing popular appeal or being charged with engaging in 'radical chic'," *Nuclear Times* observed. "And since the movement makes a point of calling on non-experts, it lets stars speak as average people—who happen to be very visible."[39] Hollywood stars had proven highly successful in popularizing specific anti-nuclear campaigns and organizations and attracting public interest to the movement in general. For example, Margot Kidder, most famous for her role as Lois Lane in the *Superman* films (1978–87), accompanied Harold Willens on a Californian speaking tour in 1982 in the lead-up to the statewide freeze referendum that November, one that passed by a slim margin.[40] Helen Caldicott's publicity agent Pat Kingsley was instrumental in attracting the vocal support of high-profile actresses such as Sally Field, Meryl Streep, and Lily Tomlin to the WAND cause. Field and Tomlin appeared on the *Merv Griffin Show* with Caldicott in

March 1982, while Field and Catholic bishop Leroy Matthiesen of Amarillo, Texas, accompanied Caldicott on *Donahue*. Each generated large responses from viewers, many of them women; WAND received around 6,000 letters from viewers following the *Donahue* appearance.[41]

SANE eventually decided to run a series of one-page advertisements in the *New York Times* in several editions of the paper along the East Coast. These ran in two editions of the newspaper on May 23, 1982—a Sunday—to little fanfare or success. The advertisement generated only 260 responses, with contributions totaling just under $6,000.[42] The advertisements were text heavy, featuring large headlines stating "How to stop feeling hopeless and helpless about preventing nuclear war," and "The time has come for THE GREAT TURNAWAY FROM NUCLEAR WAR." SANE executive director David Cortright felt the campaign was an "abysmal failure" and noted that the experience had "left a bitter taste" within the organization. SANE had lost $22,000, as well as the confidence of some of its financial benefactors. "I personally consider my approval of the ad the greatest failure of my five years at SANE," he wrote to Rapp & Collins, terminating the contract.[43] As SANE organizer Ed Glennon had warned earlier, the allure of high-profile advertising was a misnomer: "Advertising per se does not give you political clout, only organizing does."[44]

Cortright recognized that these sorts of public appeals were a risky endeavor. In 1982, at the height of the anti-nuclear movement's popularity, he argued that SANE needed a new approach:

> We should not be trying to educate people about the numbers and facts of the arms race. It's impossible to communicate substantial information within the narrow time limits of a radio or television commercial. Most important, such an approach is inappropriate to the current political climate, in our view. It appears that substantial majorities of the American people are already deeply concerned about the threat of nuclear war and want to see the arms race stopped. They are not concerned about who's ahead or how many times one side or the other can blow the world up. They want to be told that something can be done about the problem, and that their involvement can make a difference. For these purposes the type of ad we need should be more "personal" and "emotional." As I say, we don't have the magic formula ourselves, but we both agree that the previously submitted concept papers, like the *New York Times* ad, miss the mark.[45]

Tom Collins, whose direct mail letters for the McGovern presidential campaign in 1972 netted about $36 million, felt that SANE's *Times*

appeal had already been "pre-empted by the freeze movement."[46] SANE's program, given the success of the freeze movement, simply didn't "sell" as well as it might have had it been presented differently. Attempting to understand the impact of the *Times* advertisements on the general public, SANE commissioned focus group research, which produced some illuminating results. A general response among participants was that there *was* a strong need in American politics for an organization to take action against any build up of nuclear weapons. Asking the public for financial support to help SANE prevent nuclear war, however, was seen as an ineffective rhetorical strategy.[47]

SANE's efforts to portray itself as different from its earlier, elitist incarnation also hadn't worked. Focus group participants perceived SANE as "rather elitist and more intellectually-oriented rather than activist-oriented." Its history of collaboration with professional and intellectual groups didn't find favor with respondents interested in how ordinary, blue-collar Americans could be involved in SANE activities.[48] Respondents agreed that "the peace movement needs an organization that represents the concerns of the average American. The people need an organization that is for them and expresses their views; a moderate, not a radical or splinter group."[49] Basically, SANE's approach—using text-heavy advertising that offered the public the facts of the arms race and its inherent dangers—wasn't working. As the SANE Executive Committee discussed in an August 1982 meeting, there existed "a need for a rhetorical, image message rather than a detailed rational argument."[50] Updating SANE's advertising strategies would bring the organization into line with other mainstream anti-nuclear groups, where image and simple rhetoric, rather than information, was the focus of publicity campaigning.

In 1983 and 1984, however, SANE's strategies had not evolved considerably. Most of the organization's advertising was informational, "to counter Pentagon propaganda" as one mailing explained. SANE targeted not only the general public, but representatives and senators in Washington, schools, civic groups, unions, and other such bodies.[51] By September 1983, it was producing one-and-a-half million flyers and brochures a year, seeking to extend its paid membership and regular base of donors in pursuit of more concrete political strategies. It had expanded ambitiously, with 40 chapters, a nationwide phone tree and legislative alert system in 375 congressional districts, and a network of doorknockers.[52] As the 1984 elections approached, it sought to expand this strategy further; SANE asked its members for money for "millions of brochures, radio broadcasts, canvassing, [and] press conferences." SANE anticipated

that by saturating its market with advertising, it could further mobilize public opinion and eventually demonstrate its "political clout" by electing, as its legislative director hoped, "a Congress more responsive to our demands."[53]

Professionalization, Lobbying, and National Politics

Expanding its strategies into federal politics, SANE extended its program of organization. In 1984, at the same time it engaged in public education, training for local chapters, and extending its outreach into black and Hispanic communities, it also hired two full-time lobbyists in Washington, D.C.[54] This was another part of its institutional approach, designed to develop national political significance. SANE complemented its rhetoric of citizen empowerment and local organizing with a polite, savvy image in its political lobbying, further removing itself from the popular idea of traditional peace activism. A *New York Times* profile on one of SANE's lobbyists made this abundantly clear:

> Wearing a blazer, grey skirt and blouse, Miss [Beth] Duker hardly fits the stereotype of the disheveled antinuclear activist. Nor is she the exception in the disarmament movement these days. In the last decade, antiwar and antinuclear groups have been struggling to change the radical leftist image that was a part of the demonstrations against the Vietnam War.[55]

While popular memory may have stereotyped activists as radicals, and that image may have lingered throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, peace movement leadership didn't exactly refute the idea of a violent, radical left in the Vietnam War era. As Cortright argued:

> In the late 60's and early 70's the peace movement had an aura of antipatriotism. Our vision is more specific, and we're willing to work within the system, rather than working to bring it down. The movement today is much more unified. Militant and sectarian arguments used to split the movement in those days. Now we are in the mainstream—no longer dominated by the student hippie types but rather more by the middle class, religious groups and women.[56]

This revisionist sentiment not only marginalized moderate, middle-class opposition to the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s, but it also aimed to further promote the anti-nuclear movement in 1984 as a mainstream,

moderate political force, far removed from the radical grassroots or SANE's counterparts in pacifist organizations.

In 1984, as SANE attempted to extend the reach of this new image and style of organizing, its leaders debated how they might go about promoting the idea of a mass movement of middle-class citizen activists. SANE realized that mass media coverage was not simply an expensive option for the movement; it ought to be a central feature of its public relations campaign. As such, it aimed to produce TV advertisements for airing on commercial networks:

> For the first time in the history of the peace movement, we will bring the theme of nuclear arms reduction to the mass media in a controlled, systematic campaign effort. We'll use everything from paid radio and television to full-page newspaper ads, millions of letters, slide shows and films before thousands of organizations, national and local conferences, and put pressure on Congress, both directly and through our many members.[57]

The organization wanted a "serious and well-financed effort," figuring that only this could bring about serious change.[58] With the SANE Associates program, Cortright hoped to bring 10,000 new members into the organization in the coming years. More and more members would produce a "widening circle of influence," which would mean more money, more publicity, and a more discernible effect on Congress.[59] This approach operated on the assumption that more members and more funds would enable SANE to develop a larger public profile through advertising, and a stronger presence in Washington through lobbying. Doing so, Cortright argued, would help the organization realize its aim of becoming a mainstream political force of anti-nuclear reform.

By the time of the 1984 elections, however, neither SANE nor other anti-nuclear organizations engaged in lobbying and electoral campaigning had influenced public opinion to any large degree. A turning point for the movement, the elections saw the Reagan-Bush campaign triumph with 58.8 percent of the popular vote and 97.6 percent of the electoral vote, with the Mondale-Ferraro campaign winning only the District of Columbia and Mondale's home state of Minnesota.[60] According to David Meyer, as many anti-nuclear PACs had actively supported Democrat candidates, the resounding Republican victory "marked the effective end of the movement and the disappearance of the freeze from political discourse."[61] By attempting to influence the course of the election with partisan and non-partisan campaigning, lobbying, advertising,

and membership and fundraising drives, anti-nuclear organizations such as SANE found that a large membership did not necessarily equate with political impact. Its uncertainty regarding political partisanship—a clear departure from its history as a non-partisan advocacy group—also demonstrated the perils of experimenting with a new style of anti-nuclear organizing that identified more with liberal reformism than a heritage of grassroots activism and political confrontation that had defined the peace movement in previous decades.

Defeat in 1984, and the enduring popularity of Ronald Reagan, convinced SANE that it needed to do more. The task ahead, Cortright argued, was massive; in a funding appeal letter sent shortly after the elections, he stressed that "stopping the nuclear arms race will require a quantum leap in the organizational strength and political clout of the American peace movement."[62] Indeed, SANE and its fellow organizations faced considerable challenges in mobilizing enough public sentiment to effectively pressure Congress, something that required more lobbying skills, more advertising coverage, and more media manipulation than it had so far been able to muster. Of course, this meant more money, and the movement would spend the aftermath of the 1984 elections figuring out just how it could begin to raise the necessary finances. "The decision to rely on money as a resource," Oliver and Marwell argue, "propels activists into a world dominated by professionals, moderation, and ritual." For organizations such as SANE, while this world may not have appeared particularly different, the scope of influence it aimed for in the 1980s meant it entered a mode of activism reliant on organizational demands quite different to those practicing more grassroots styles of activism.[63]

In 1985 fragmentation gripped the anti-nuclear movement, as many peace activists turned their attention to causes such as US intervention in Central America and apartheid in South Africa. Organizations continued to compete for membership and funding, and at the same time, media interest was diminishing as public interest in the threat of nuclear war became less and less a noteworthy news story.[64] Cortright proposed that SANE expand its platform, increasing its focus on nuclear testing, the MX missile, and the Strategic Defense Initiative. Cortright also foreshadowed an increasing amount of peace movement attention paid to military spending and conflict in Central America. Anticipated membership numbers, however, spoke clearer than Cortright's "common vision for peace." He ambitiously aimed to increase SANE's membership to 250,000 by the end of 1985 and to one million by the end of the decade, to double the number of SANE offices around the country, and to reach an outgoing mail volume of ten million items in 1985. Collaboration

and sharing of resources between SANE, the Freeze, and groups such as WAND could lighten the financial load involved with such an endeavor, speaking to the need for cooperation and coordination in the building of a mass movement.[65]

Such an ambitious strategy—focused on members and money—meant SANE would adopt a quasi-corporate approach. Suggested budgetary items, for example, included incentives and bonuses awarded to local chapters that performed well with attracting new members.[66] Essentially, SANE hoped to use financial strategies to mobilize an even greater number of people than had been involved in the freeze movement in the early 1980s. Those Americans turned off by protest, or uninterested in peace movement activity and its moralistic, grassroots image, could be persuaded by slick advertising, professionalism, and a white-collar image befitting a serious political advocacy group, rather than the conventional idea of a volunteer-based, idealistic peace group.[67] *U.S. News & World Report* described this approach as "a new drive using Madison Avenue techniques to promote [the peace movement's] vision."[68] Movement organizers hoped that by doing so, they could put nuclear disarmament back on the national agenda and alter the public mood so easily swayed by Ronald Reagan's image and appeal. The way organizations such as SANE and WAND devised public relations and advertising strategies to achieve this aim highlights a substantial removal from their traditional grassroots base, from their radical and pacifist counterparts, and from the popular memory and divisive reputation of "the Sixties." It is the nature of this removal, and the search for a mainstream movement identity, to which this chapter now turns.

Revising Strategies and Tactics

Building the movement in the wake of Reagan's re-election, characterized by a professional image and an ability to successfully mobilize opinion and funds within a conservative political climate, required substantial strategic planning. SANE, WAND, and other organizations hired consultants and conducted extensive interviews to help them assess just how the anti-nuclear movement could rekindle the levels of public support and media attention that it had commanded some years earlier, combined with an effective political program that could make some concrete impact on Congress. In essence, mainstream anti-nuclear organizations sought to further redefine their image and identity as a means of placing themselves squarely in the center of American political life, rather than retreating to its radical fringes.[69] Doing so would help

redefine the nature of the peace movement as one that relied less on traditional grassroots activism and more on revised notions of institutional advocacy and civic participation, bringing these peace organizations into line with larger changes occurring in interest group politics and advocacy organizing in the 1980s.[70]

Cortright argued that the expanded scope of the movement's presence, coordinated through national and regional media markets, would assist in mobilizing extensive public and media interest, akin to the successes of the religious right and the pro-life movement.[71] Ellen Hume, a public opinion reporter for the *Wall Street Journal* agreed. The anti-nuclear movement, she argued, "could learn something from the right-to-life groups. They are tenacious and persistent. They are always there, so they can't help but get coverage, and they continue to work from the ground up."[72] WAND saw the large membership and extensive fundraising capabilities of the "conservative network" as far more advanced than that of the peace movement or of the progressive left more generally. As WAND argued in 1985:

> If progressives want to compete more effectively in the public arena in the years ahead, they must be willing to match or exceed the organizing capabilities of the conservative grassroots movement. To do so, they must recognize certain conditions of American contemporary life and politics which make a strong grassroots fundraising program essential . . . Too many progressive grassroots organizations are wedded to old-fashioned notions about citizen participation. Hoping their organizational missions have sufficient appeal to resist these profound social forces, they continue to believe hundreds and thousands of volunteers can be persuaded to assume a broad range of organizing tasks.[73]

The days of moral appeals to public sensibilities, mass demonstrations, and public rallies were over, it argued. Inevitably, new methods of advertising and increases in lobbying required more money from a larger base of donors, and WAND explicitly recognized that anti-nuclear groups needed to dramatically increase their funding base if they could hope to expand their reach and influence.

Overall, SANE's hired consultants recommended the peace movement adopt a new image, one that offered the public a clear message of stability and security, rather than letting itself be identified as idealistic or weak, appealing to moral issues like fear and helplessness.[74] Movement spokespersons ought to be, according to pollster David Garth, "people

who can't be seen as left, who can't be stereotyped as peaceniks." Campaigning assisted by the star power of personalities with already progressive reputations, such as Paul Newman or Carl Sagan, meant the movement's message became buried. Instead, retired military figures and former government officials ought to be put forward as the face of a movement that desperately needed to attract conservative support.[75] As Garth observed, the public and the media perceived peace groups as too liberal, and recommended SANE adopt a more patriotic image. Avoiding any identification with extremism or unrealistic goals was absolutely necessary; another pollster suggested movement leaders should evoke "images of strength and security" in the minds of the public.[76]

It was a big move, but to achieve success, outsiders all recommended the same thing: the peace movement needed to be more "professional," to remove any identification with its heritage in the anti-war movement of the 1960s, to avoid association with any pacifist and radical colleagues, and to make sure it could not be labeled as a group of unrealistic peaceniks or hippies. Essentially, these recommendations emphasized what many anti-nuclear organizers had long suspected. Making a political impact in the midst of the conservative revival, they felt, warranted a redefinition of the image, identity, and overall strategy of the anti-nuclear movement. As they discussed the implications of revised model of activism after the 1984 elections, movement leaders challenged the accepted notions of protest on the left, and sought to apply new ideas and tactics in attracting new membership and lobbying for political reform.

Assessing the Public Mood

Much like SANE's efforts to understand the implications of this new model of professionalism, WAND also investigated the options for anti-nuclear organizing. WAND interpreted Reagan's re-election as a sign that the anti-nuclear movement required a coordinated communications strategy. In 1985, WAND commissioned a study to gauge what went wrong in 1984 and determine how the peace movement could recuperate and find substantial success in the coming years. Eventually published as *Turnabout: The Emerging New Realism in the Nuclear Age*, the study was the product of a public opinion survey of more than 1,000 registered voters, interviews with one hundred journalists, reporters, and editors in the mainstream press, and talks with about thirty-five members of Congress and their staffs.[77] WAND aimed to use the findings of the commissioned survey and interviews to begin setting up a more stable, more effective organization with a much larger membership, much

like SANE's own informal consultations had suggested.[78] In the process, WAND could learn how to avoid the pitfalls that had befallen the Freeze Campaign in years prior, including its shallow and often insincere treatment by mainstream media, its coopting by Congress, and its decentralized structure and lack of public relations expertise. Furthering the anti-nuclear movement's removal from its grassroots base, WAND and its survey findings emphasized the necessity of a centralized, institutional response to the challenge of political reform.

This process required a primary emphasis on strategic planning, something that the Freeze had avoided with its often haphazard organizational style. As John Marttila, the coordinator of WAND's survey project emphasized:

> I can't stress enough that the key enduring, non-trendy foundation for all communications programs is thinking about strategy that will affect coverage . . . To think that ads can be used to move American opinion is ridiculous. There will never, never be enough money.[79]

As *Nuclear Times* reported, the Marttila-led project, like others commissioned after the 1984 elections, hoped to "provide what many term the 'missing link' in [peace] movement strategy."[80] Not seeking a smoking gun by any means, WAND anticipated that it would find some answers to enable a successful redefinition of the movement's strategy and image in Reagan's second term.

Behind John Marttila's initial proposal was a systematic recruitment drive, which would help WAND build a massive membership to make a serious impact on the 1986 mid-term elections. Fundraising, local and national rallies, and door-to-door canvassing, along with a continued educational focus, would be cornerstones of WAND's operation in this regard. As Marttila argued, "Several hundred thousand dues-paying members expressly organized for political activity has the potential to send shock waves throughout America's political leadership."[81] WAND staff reacted to the proposal with suspicion, arguing that Marttila advocated more of the same, just on a larger scale. They also identified a key problem with the paid membership model: those members who donate money, even on a regular basis, were not the same sort of members who were actually involved with the running of the organization and its chapters. Contributing funds to WAND or through its PAC was one thing, but contributing one's time and energy was certainly another.[82]

WAND staff, with extensive experience in grassroots organizing, worried about the prospect of their organization becoming somewhat corporate.

They expressed concern at the assumption "that we view our members as 'passive' or only giving money or providing 'clout' in the form of sheer numbers for the electoral process."[83] WAND viewed its grassroots base as one of its greatest assets, as this added to the empowering, politicizing nature of women's involvement in organizing against the arms race. To embrace corporate marketing and advertising strategies, therefore, would almost betray the hard work done at the local level by dedicated volunteers. It could also prove a futile attempt to tap into imaginary pockets of financial support, and given WAND's already significant donor list, both for WAND itself and for its PAC, overlap could be significant.

This did not necessarily mean the movement ought to squander its funds in seeking blanket coverage in mainstream media. Paid advertising, WAND argued, was to be a strategy with a limited role:

> The peace movement will never have the money to support a national advertising campaign large enough to move American public opinion on its own . . . Instead, paid advertising should be used tactically to support major public relations initiatives. We must remember the real challenge of this national effort is thinking; i.e., setting into motion a strategic process [that] will understand its primary responsibility is to affect the news coverage of the nuclear arms race.[84]

Such strategic thinking, however, assumed that news media could translate peace movement agitation into a meaningful dialogue in the nation's media, both local and national, alternative and mainstream. Attaining comprehensive media coverage, of course, depended on the success of peace movement media strategies, but also on the newsworthiness of arms control issues. After all, interest groups can only ever hope to mobilize as much news coverage as external circumstances demand. In the case of nuclear arms control, this depended substantially on the administration's actions and rhetoric, which after 1985 was characterized by a much softer approach to US-Soviet relations.[85]

The *Turnabout* project's results didn't instill WAND with optimism; director Diane Aronson found the outlook from the survey and interviews "very sobering." She commented that the conservative mood of the nation was substantial cause for concern.[86] The survey had portrayed a public that was deeply skeptical of mechanisms for managing, or ending, the arms race:

> Our survey reveals a critical realism about the two superpowers, their leaders, the nature of the nuclear dilemma, and the prospects for

> change. Those who have grown up with the threat of all-out nuclear war appear to glance with a jaundiced eye at claim that treaties on the one hand, or more arms on the other, can solve the nuclear problem.[87]

While the report did not identify much evidence of fatalism—the belief that nuclear war between the superpowers was inevitable—it did find that survey respondents lacked much confidence that the arms race could be resolved. To combat this, Marttila & Kiley recommended WAND adopt a coordinated strategic approach toward mobilizing favorable and positive public opinion. "By honing a unified message in this fashion," it argued, "and advancing it in the relentless, disciplined manner so characteristic of the Reagan White House, the arms control movement can claim a larger share of victories in the public debate over nuclear weapons."[88] Of course, matching the resources commanded by the administration's public relations machine was impossible for any progressive interest group. The *style* of a new approach, however, needed to depart from the grassroots activist base that the anti-nuclear movement was built on.[89]

News Media and the Image of Activism

The Freeze Campaign had demonstrated in the years prior to Reagan's 1984 re-election that without serious treatment by mainstream media, no arms control movement could hope to make any impact on public policy. *Turnabout* suggested that the anti-nuclear movement needed to engage in a different way with the media to emphasize professionalism and policy. If the movement could influence news reporting successfully, it could develop a more serious, mainstream image that emphasized the movement's pragmatism and expertise, replacing its reputation as a movement of ordinary citizen activists engaging in moralistic, emotional appeals.[90] Doing so required access to the most suitable arenas of public news and information, where television was perhaps the most significant medium. The *Turnabout* survey found that most Americans relied on television to access news (45 percent), followed by newspapers (30 percent), with 18 percent using both media equally. Viewership of television news and current affairs rose to 61 percent for Americans in a lower socio-economic bracket. Over a third of those surveyed watched television news every night, and a further third watched news most nights per week.[91] At any rate, airtime on television was essential but needed to be utilized carefully for the movement's message to be taken with the utmost seriousness.

In addition, media coverage needed to be carefully refined; after all, it needed to speak "to a mass audience whose interest and knowledge is limited." As Marttila & Kiley suggested, arms control advocates "must simplify their own message, and repeat it in ways that tap those durable beliefs of the average Americans who share that viewpoint, without requiring unrealistic levels of knowledge or information."[92] Gil Friend of a Berkeley-based peace movement foundation agreed:

> People in environmental and peace groups are a subculture. Many of them think TV's tacky. We have to decide if we're committed to this subculture or to changing the world. We can't say that television is sleazy. So what? Eighty-four percent of America gets its election information from TV. If we're too holy to get down in the trenches to do battle, we may as well hand it over to the American Security Council. We ignore TV at our peril.[93]

The movement had not entirely ignored mainstream media in previous years. Helen Caldicott had appeared on a variety of talk shows, managed a grueling publicity schedule, and constantly sought out ways to ensure she, and the issues she raised, remained in public view. Other groups had produced anti-nuclear commercials; California group People Against Nuclear Arms produced television advertisements featuring Liza Minnelli and Leonard Bernstein, while WAND commercials featured Meryl Streep.[94] Each offered very general, nonpolitical statements against nuclear war, keeping away from the information overload offered by other anti-nuclear organizations.

Accordingly, WAND sought to abandon these emotional, humanistic appeals, along with its grassroots image, something that Marttila & Kiley identified as a deciding factor in the declining public profile of the peace movement. It interviewed a large number of journalists, editors, and decision-makers within national media organizations, and its findings hinged on a certain, troubling relationship between news reporting and the initial popularity of the freeze in 1981 and 1982:

> The novelty of the nuclear freeze as a grassroots movement for a ready-made arms control position was what energized the broad popular base whose actions drew the enthusiastic attention of the national media. However, this same novel combination of both a grassroots base and an actual policy proposal was also what eventually made it hard for the nuclear freeze to gain the national media's lasting understanding and respect—even though a majority of leading figures in

> the media do credit the freeze with altering Ronald Reagan's public posture on arms control . . . Freeze supporters didn't explain the policy effectively enough to the national media, and they failed to fully understand just how important the national media was to their ultimate chances for success.[95]

As such, when the Freeze Campaign took the freeze proposal to Congress, anticipating that the wealth of grassroots support it had cultivated would be transformed into a successful binding resolution, it was ill prepared for the political process required for successful action in the Capitol.

Journalists and editors also had differing thoughts on the public face of the freeze movement. Some argued it didn't have any "big name" leaders, and due to its very broad and diverse nature, there was often "confusion as to who speaks for the movement." Joelle Attinger of *Time* magazine stressed that "the press likes to discover new things. They are very elitist and like big names. I want to do a story on the freeze and all I get is a big yawn from *Time*."[96] The freeze's "big name" leaders, however, did suffer from the stigmatization that association with a progressive movement brought. As a reporter from the *Orlando Sentinel* told Marttila & Kiley, the "public and reporters get tired of the same spokespeople and their self-righteousness. I heard someone say: 'I'll throw up if I have to listen to Carl Sagan one more time'."[97] For WAND, seeking to avoid these pitfalls as it redeveloped its profile in the wake of 1984, these comments highlighted the need to redefine the peace movement as a professional, mainstream affair that retained little to no attachment with the idea of grassroots activism that had defined the peace movement in its earlier years.

A New Model for Anti-Nuclear Activism?

As the anti-nuclear movement's mainstream organizations found themselves at a crossroads in 1985, discussion and debate within SANE, the Freeze, and WAND about how best to extend the reach of the anti-nuclear movement demonstrates the struggle of a movement attempting to move beyond its initial wave of popularity. John Lofland, among other scholars, emphasizes that a steep decline in anti-nuclear activity marked the period from 1985 to 1990.[98] Such a narrative of decline might seem simplistic, but it helps to shed light on what many participants and observers saw as a movement making sincere attempts at consolidating strong public support and subsequently attempting to

manage a sharp decline in interest. A drop in funding, the absence of perceived crises to assist with mobilizing support, and skillful maneuvering from the administration to counter Reagan's bellicose, trigger-happy reputation all contributed to the decline of the movement's vitality. What studies such as *Turnabout* and strategies for extending advertising and fundraising campaigns reveal, however, is a genuine belief from many anti-nuclear organizers that a significant reversal in their fortunes was possible. The *Turnabout* findings, on the other hand, described a reality that was much grimmer and in some ways sounded the death knell for organizations such as SANE and the Freeze, which merged in 1987, only to suffer a further drop in income and membership as SANE/Freeze became Peace Action in 1993.[99]

The ability of these organizations' attempts to attract substantial public interest, however, was not so promising. At the time of its November 1987 merger, SANE/Freeze counted a membership of 170,000, still citing a target of one million members by the early 1990s. Others members had split with the Freeze a year earlier to form the American Peace Test, a campaign engaged in direct action at the nuclear testing site in Nevada and explicitly rejecting the Freeze Campaign's bureaucratic style.[100] But with the softening of superpower tensions, and the winding down of the Cold War, many donors and beneficiaries began to abandon their support of anti-nuclear causes.[101] With funding drying up, and other issues vying for attention, many anti-nuclear organizations folded, or changed focus. WAND, for example, changed its name to Women's Action for New Directions in 1992 to reflect a new and wider agenda.

This story of how the Freeze, SANE, and WAND mobilized public interest, experimented with advertising and corporate management, and struggled to achieve beneficial media coverage, paints an illuminating picture of an extremely diverse anti-nuclear movement grappling with the process of adaptation faced by all social movements. Due to the immense variety of attitudes of the movement's innumerable organizers and volunteers, a lack of consensus over direction and strategy was inevitable, *especially* as larger peace organizations took stock of their approach after Reagan's re-election in 1984. Yet the ways in which activists, lobbyists, marketing consultants, strategists, and public opinion pollsters debated how best to mobilize the American public against the nuclear arms race highlights how serious the re-evaluation of the grassroots approach really was. The allure of corporate America, and the promise of mainstream success, no doubt influenced this debate after 1984.

As the 1980s progressed, new models of citizen participation in political life meant that social movement organizations needed to negotiate

Figure 3 Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament directors (from left) Diane Aronson, Sayre Sheldon, and Beverly Droz with WAND advisory board members John Kerry (center) and William Caldicott (far right), [mid-1980s].

new methods of advocacy and agitation. In the twilight of the Cold War, efforts to return the threat of nuclear weapons to the national spotlight might have appeared heedless or hasty. However, with the commitment to idealism a shared trait among the movement's activists, their struggle continued. As SANE/Freeze president William Sloane Coffin argued in 1990:

> If the United States and the Soviet Union decided to eliminate all nuclear weapons, cease their interventions in third world countries and redirect the lion's share of the savings to human and environmental needs, we at SANE/Freeze would eagerly close our doors and look for other work. Until that happens, we can't.[102]

A key theme here is the process of revision and renewal that took place in the anti-nuclear movement as it sought to institutionalize its opposition to the nuclear arms race, combining the ideals of grassroots activism with the professionalism of political pragmatism. Within the Freeze Campaign, an uncertainty about the nature of its grassroots, decentralized base contrasted with the structured network of coordination that other organizations pioneered. SANE and WAND demonstrated that a

new vocabulary of corporate marketing, public relations, and advertising appealed to organizers seeking to move away from an image of moralistic grassroots activism. Influenced by mainstream media coverage, where evening news bulletins described anti-nuclear protests as novelties where "music and rhetoric of the late 1960s returned in updated fashion," organizers began to devise a new model of movement that would not fall victim to such treatment.[103]

Building—and then maintaining—a movement of national scope whose membership base provided numbers, funds, and votes was a difficult endeavor. Ensuring such a movement would retain political clout was perhaps even more difficult, especially considering the nature of local anti-nuclear protest and its treatment by news media. Essentially, the development of a new, professional model of anti-nuclear organizing demonstrates the challenge of political advocacy in the 1980s. The experimentation with media and public relations, a corporate approach to organizing and strategy, and a polished image of pragmatism were important dynamics in social movement organizing. This challenged the role of grassroots activism in the peace movement of the mid- to late 1980s, and highlights the rich complexity that different voices and attitudes brought to anti-nuclear activism in the 1980s. Attempting to define a new model of civic and political engagement for activists on the left, of course, was not the only way to oppose the nuclear arms race, and it is to diverse examples of this opposition that this book now turns.

3

Personal Politics: Radical Feminism, Difference, and Anti-Nuclear Activism

In the late 1970s, as the anti-nuclear movement began its large-scale revival, an array of women's protest collectives and activist organizations formed, aiming to offer feminist perspectives on the nuclear threat and define an appropriate activist response. These new groups built upon, extended, and challenged the legacy of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), formed in 1915, Women Strike for Peace, formed in 1961, and a host of other women's organizations and feminist groups involved tangentially in peace activism, women's liberation, and related activity. In the 1980s, some female activists situated their peace protests within political and legislative institutions, drawing a great deal from the successes of the women's liberation movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Others, more radical in their approach, used ideas about militarism, ecology, and personal expression to oppose nuclear arms as merely one of a myriad of crises threatening women the world over. Mirroring the meeting of women's liberation and radical feminism in the late 1960s, these very different strands of feminist thought—and their expression within the anti-nuclear movement—reflect how much second-wave feminism changed during the 1970s. They also demonstrate the significance of the rise of cultural feminism in the 1970s and the subsequent marginalization of radical feminists from the wider women's peace movement.[1] As female activists in the late 1970s and early 1980s turned their attention to the threats of nuclear power and nuclear weapons, they found themselves engaging in debates that continued to contest the meanings of feminism in ways that offered the larger anti-nuclear movement a series of voices that were both traditional and extreme.

This chapter examines varieties of feminist thought that influenced activism on nuclear disarmament and related issues. Those women and

women's organizations involved were many, and their actions and interactions complex. The story of these groups, and the circumstances in which they operated, sheds light on the ways women involved in antinuclear protest, however tangentially, debated wider issues of the role of feminism in their efforts to bring about a safer world for women, from the threat of nuclear war on one hand or from a web of patriarchal oppression on the other. At the heart of these debates was the contested site of womanhood, and this chapter's focus is on the politics of difference in the women's anti-nuclear movement.[2]

This idea of difference, as expressed in debates over inclusive and exclusive agendas and practices, and as demonstrated in the interaction, negotiation, and tension between and within different women's activist groups, tells a story of women's peace activism struggling with the familiar tussle between idealism and pragmatism. This chapter features radical groups such as the Women and Life on Earth coalition (WLOE), its offshoot the Women's Pentagon Action (WPA), and a peace camp in New York state called the Women's Encampment for a Future of Peace and Justice (WEFPJ). Moderate, liberal organizations such as the Women's Party for Survival (WPS) and its successor, Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND), are also central to this story, and it is the interaction between these groups that highlights the significance of debates over the relationship between feminism, political activism, personal protest, and liberal reform.

What set some of these new women's peace groups apart from their historical antecedents was their exclusive focus on nuclear disarmament as *the* critical issue for women's political organizing. Moderates argued that their view of feminism—based on traditional ideas of gender, femininity, and motherhood—was essential in combating the looming nuclear danger. Nuclear politics, they argued, was men's business, and those men involved in the decision-making process on issues of nuclear security and foreign policy lacked maternal, nurturing, and emotive qualities that women were able to offer. Rather than advocating revolution, however, they recommended a polite women's politics akin to the League of Women Voters, or the National Organization of Women (NOW), and built upon older women's activist traditions from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[3]

Radical and cultural feminists, on the other hand, rejected such political solutions as a compromise, preferring instead to pursue a revolutionary program of feminist activism. The rise in cultural feminism since the mid-1970s and the successes of women's liberation prompted many radical women to redefine what "feminism" meant in the early 1980s and

how it could apply to a program of activism and dissent.[4] For radical feminist collectives, coalitions, and groups, political movements such as those calling for nuclear disarmament were narrow, rigid, political ideas, and ignored the vast and complicated set of crises threatening women and the world in which they lived. As such, they organized around a more challenging politics based on separatism, a rejection of the patriarchy, and the expression of countercultural ideas about ecology and mysticism.

What this meant for the women's anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s was that a feminist coalition against the nuclear arms race would be difficult, if not impossible, to forge. Just as grassroots movements on both left and right fought over the political implications of gender and sexuality in the 1970s and 1980s, the struggles within the women's anti-nuclear movement also show us how these contested meanings were as much about womanhood as they were about politics.[5] Activists attempting to define an authentic anti-nuclear women's politics for the 1980s found themselves embroiled in clashes over the uses of sex and gender as political tools. Radical feminists, rather than settling for compromise, continued their pursuit of a revolutionary alternative to mainstream society, utilizing countercultural ideas about personal, expressive politics and protest. When examined alongside pragmatic efforts at political reform from liberal women's anti-nuclear groups, we can observe how the contested site of feminism operated within the broader anti-nuclear movement.

Feminist Thought, Identity, and Anti-Nuclear Sentiment

These different responses to the nuclear arms race and related threats among feminist activists had shared roots in the social, humanist, pacifist, and liberal politics of both first and second-wave feminism.[6] Historically, as Harriet Alonso writes, feminist peace activism stemmed from "the connection . . . between institutionalized violence and violence against women, whether the institution be slavery, the military, or governmental oppression."[7] This idea of connections grew more complex during the 1970s, when feminists began to link ideas about environment and ecology with other manifestations of violence.[8] Second-wave feminists also developed more radical critiques of Betty Friedan's "problem that has no name," encouraging the emergence of radical challenges to patriarchal systems of oppression, both literal and symbolic. Mobilizing against war—real or threatened—became a cornerstone of many women's peace groups, even those whose platforms included a much broader set of concerns.

The interaction between activists and women's groups with different approaches to politics, protest, and indeed to feminism itself, were

symptoms of the familiar tensions that exist between liberals and radicals in social movements. Varieties of feminism—including those within the anti-nuclear movement—stressed that the loose idea of *difference* drove their activism. This wasn't just difference based on gender: feminists evoked assorted concepts of womanhood, motherhood, and sexuality as they challenged the evils of "the patriarchy" and the oppression of modernity and "the system." Incorporating new ideas about environment, ecology, spirituality, mysticism, and peace, many feminists defined themselves as part of exclusionary communities based on difference, rather than an equal "sisterhood" of earlier feminist culture.[9]

In many ways, as Sara Evans and Stephanie Gilmore have convincingly argued, the division between liberal and radical feminist activism in the 1970s and 1980s was often a blurry one.[10] The application of both liberal and radical feminist ideas to key issues—among them the threat of nuclear weapons—can tell us much about how women's peace activism operated an environment influenced by the complex changes in feminist culture since birth of second-wave feminism. Many women's organizations such as NOW or WILPF were characterized by their focus on liberal reform mixed with what Evans calls the "tactical toolbox of the radicals," such as demonstrating, picketing, guerrilla theater, and so on.[11] Newer groups, however, adopted stricter definitions of their ideological boundaries and organizational style. On one hand, women's anti-nuclear organizations such as Helen Caldicott's WPS and WAND were single issue, policy-focused, and bureaucratic. On the other, collectives of more radical feminists mixed personal expressive protest with a consensus-based organizational style, a commitment to individualism, and a rejection of the oppression of hierarchy.

By the early 1980s, the rise in popularity of the anti-nuclear movement meant that many peace organizations received an influx of new members, and women's peace groups were certainly no different. Dangers of environmental disaster and ecological collapse, a maternal concern for the safety and health of children, and apprehension over the bellicosity of officials—all men, of course—nurtured these impulses.[12] Ideas about motherhood as a rhetorical framework mobilized both moderate and radical feminists in similar ways, even if their identities as feminists differ substantially.[13] Developing a coalitional response among women to the nuclear threat, however, was a different matter. As Anne Marie Pois notes, the scene was littered with potential support:

> Radical, liberal, cultural, peace, and socialist feminists contributed a variety of approaches that they had developed during the 1960s

> and 1970s. Ecofeminism in particular evolved from the environmental, women's health, labor, peace, antinuclear, antiracist, and animal liberation movements, whereas the women's peace movement experienced rejuvenation through the ideas of contemporary women's spirituality and ecofeminist groups.[14]

As pervasive and immense as the nuclear menace was, each arena of feminist thought responded in different ways, using different ideas and tactics. Nonviolent resistance, coupled with ideas of spiritualism, paganism, and magic, emerged as a force in the feminist movement in the late 1970s. Alonso remarks that new organizations interested in such ideas added a "renewed energy" to the women's peace movement.[15] This complex assortment of individuals, groups, and ideas produced a movement at the beginning of the 1980s generally committed to the promise of a community dedicated to peace and organized against oppression against women.

While nuclear weapons were often at the forefront of this loose "movement," women's interest in interconnectedness, diversity, collectivism, and internationalism expanded the scope of their opposition to militarism and war. As a women's peace camp in Seattle saw it, the playing field was suitably vast:

> We believe that feminism implies a total world view rather than simply positions on traditional women's (biological/reproductive) issues. We see no reason why women should limit our struggle for liberation to narrowly defined women's issues. The feminist resistance to war and nuclear weapons challenges the system of male supremacy at least as fundamentally as these struggles . . . Challenging militarism is essential for a feminist revolution.[16]

As such, those feminists who wanted to change the world did not limit themselves to narrow political work on nuclear disarmament, nor did they compromise their worldviews by focusing on individual women's issues such as abortion or the Equal Rights Amendment. Concentrating their activities on the bigger picture of an interconnected web of patriarchal violence, oppression, and militarism on an international scale, radical feminists shunned the view that disarmament was a narrow political issue, and instead devised bold programs of resistance around it.

For those women who saw the nuclear arms race as an inevitable successor to the Vietnam War, anti-nuclear activism in the late 1970s and early 1980s was a logical next step for their activism. As activist and

feminist scholar Ynestra King argued, nuclear weapons demonstrated "a contempt for women and all of life," and as a result, "the issue of disarmament and threat of nuclear war is a feminist issue."[17] As some radical women's groups preferred to concentrate their activities on the bigger picture of an interconnected web of patriarchal violence, oppression, and militarism on an international scale, others directed their efforts in a focused way toward the nuclear arms race. It is this diverse array of feminist opposition to nuclear weapons in particular, and violence, militarism, and oppression more generally, that demonstrates the overlap of—and the difference among—a variety of feminist identities.

"A New Way of Being and Thinking": Radical Feminists, Emotion, and Militarism

Existing on the fringes of the mainstream peace movement, radical feminists were interested in the ability of their political and cultural vision to transcend the limitations of traditional peace groups, hindered as they were by men, hierarchy, and a narrow vision that, as critics argued, "defines peace as disarmament."[18] A notable coalition of these feminists emerged in 1979 when several women from the New York and Boston areas began to organize a regional conference to discuss feminist perspectives on peace, militarism, environmentalism, and ecological concerns in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident. Dubbed "Women and Life on Earth: A Conference on Ecofeminism in the '80s," the conference spawned the coalition Women and Life on Earth (WLOE) and aimed to develop an agenda of political action, combining ecology and feminism in its philosophy.[19] Held in Amherst, Massachusetts, in March 1980, the several hundred women who attended aired a very broad spectrum of concerns. "The political and the personal are joined," wrote Ynestra King, arguing that this variety strengthened the meeting and emphasizing the benefits of a diverse platform of feminist grievances loosely connected to the monolithic military industrial complex and its most deadly product: the nuclear arms race.[20]

The broad agenda of the WLOE did not appeal to all participants. One woman felt that education and discussion about nuclear issues were needed much more than "consciousness raising groups about sexual orientation and violence. We have opportunities to talk about those things at home," she argued, rejecting the nature of the personal politics dominating the meeting.[21] Another conference attendee remarked that, rather than sisterly solidarity, she found at the conference a "lack of clearly shared goals and an appalling lack of trust" among both organizers and

participants. "Animosity and isolation" expressed by participants at an open-mike session were also disappointing and spoke to the larger challenges of building a cutting-edge radical feminist coalition for the 1980s, one that would address the challenge of the nuclear arms race.[22]

Some conference sessions did highlight a more pragmatic understanding of militarism and its significance to women's lives. Speaking at the conference, Randall Forsberg, author of the nuclear freeze proposal, saw "no essential difference between . . . being against militarism and in favor of disarmament."[23] Forsberg felt that working toward halting the arms race was much more sensible than advocating complete disarmament or other grand agendas; while not removing the possibility of a nuclear war, it would at least avoid "scaring off the majority of the American public."[24] Forsberg was an oddity at the WLOE conference, advocating political moderation and restraint amidst a variety of consciousness-raising sessions on issues like lesbianism, rape, racism, and sexism. To many radical feminists interested in these bigger issues, such soft political compromise as Forsberg's nuclear freeze, pandering to the mainstream media and the public, was abhorrent. New and revolutionary feminist thought and action were needed; Ynestra King's solution was a movement built on principles of feminism and ecology—"a new way of being and thinking"—to combat the challenges faced.[25]

The new WLOE umbrella coalition immediately began organizing a program of action around the key conference theme of militarism. Plans emerged for a mass women's protest at the Pentagon, which became the Women's Pentagon Action (WPA), carried out over two days in November 1980 and repeated again in November 1981. Both WPA protests based their agendas on an edgy assumption of imminent calamity that could be countered by effective feminist dissent; in practice, this amounted to expressive, personal protest and acts of civil disobedience.[26] According to organizer Donna Warnock, "We wanted to address a wide range of concerns, pointing to the Pentagon sometimes literally, sometimes symbolically."[27] Some participants felt that an action at the Pentagon was the ideal place to express their opposition to "the system"—a broad definition of establishment oppression.[28] What the WPA intended was to engage, physically and emotionally, in mass dissent against US power and thereby engage in the building of community, expressing personal and political ideas about oppression, and publicizing the role of radical feminist thought and behavior as an ideal model for social change.

While many women were attracted to the WPA as an outlet to express anti-nuclear sentiment, WPA organizers saw single-issue protest as too narrow and ignorant of the idea of connections between their feminist

sensibilities and their concerns of a world in peril from multiple fronts.[29] As such, the protest evolved, like the conference that preceded it, as a broad affair of diverse interests. According to organizer Jan Clausen, liberal approaches to feminist activism were narrow and limiting, and a diverse, comprehensive opposition to women's oppression was needed. While Clausen had come across "frequent disparaging remarks about 'anti-nukers' and 'peace movement types,'" such attitudes were counterproductive. As she advocated, "If anti-nuclear activists are to build an effective, inclusive movement, we will have to address seriously the relationships among all forms of militarism."[30] A potential feminist anti-militarist movement that remained white, middle class, and heterosexual would also be problematic; differences of race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and environment did exist and served to minimize the potential for an effective comprehensive movement.

For other WPA participants, though, the two-day demonstration, consisting of workshops on such diverse issues as racism, the plight of women in the third world, lesbianism, and domestic violence, was unproductive. Many women had initially been attracted to the idea of a women-only protest due to its anti-nuclear stance. As one participant commented:

> The concerns of women attending the Women's Pentagon Action could not have been more diverse, the one exception to this being our common concern with militarism in this country. Had the day been organised around this topic alone, it would have been more productive.[31]

WPA countered by stressing their preferred approach of a broad, multi-issue approach to women's protest, arguing, "We can't ignore the connection between feminism and militarism."[32] This attitude is indicative of the approach of the WPA, where the ideas behind its execution were as important as the actual activity of protest itself. Rather than a conventional protest, which would involve a march, some speakers, and a host of banners with slogans, the WPA was different. The passivity and anonymity of a mass crowd of demonstrators was reconfigured, promoting an empowering personal experience for participants.[33]

Organizing for the event in September 1980, Donna Warnock had raised the prospect of doing something different to other political demonstrations, which had, she felt become tired and cliché:

> And so I said, "Look, why don't we just figure out how we *feel* about all these different issues that we want to address and then try and

> group those feelings together and move through them and within each one deal with the issues that are appropriate to those feelings." And so I thought about it for a second and added, "I know some of the emotions that come up for me are grief, anger and power." That really got us rolling.[34]

This use of emotion had long been a common presence in women's peace activism. For the activists themselves, expressing their emotions enabled them to oppose nuclear weapons in human terms.[35] In some ways, Tina Managhan writes, this was emotionalism expressed within "a prediscursive realm of pure emotion and authentic knowledge."[36] The practice was not universally popular. For example, Lindsy van Gelder remarked that she "was occasionally distressed to hear my younger sisters reinventing the wheel of feminism, grappling with issues and schisms and stereotypes that I'd heard a decade or more before."[37] Participants, though, felt that the expression of their dissent was timely, useful, and functioned most effectively in a women-only space.

The Personal Expression of Protest

The Women's Pentagon Actions of 1980 and 1981 were emotional, expressive, and personal statements of feminist outrage with the system. Symbolic ritual played a large part in the protest, creating a curious spectacle, yet operating for many women as an invigorating, empowering, and moving affair. The events both involved weaving, planting seeds and plants, collective chanting, singing and crying, and a lot of talk about circles, empowerment, and connections. These were realized with symbolic activity designed to highlight themes to the women themselves and not necessarily to onlookers, spectators, or the media. There were rituals involving pentagrams of cornmeal, mirrors to reflect the Pentagon's "destructive energy back into itself," the building of a makeshift women's graveyard, and other such things.[38] Women braided pieces of cloth or fabric together to encircle the entire Pentagon building, they wove various doors and gates together with string, yarn, and ribbons, they baked bread, and finally, many committed civil disobedience.

The first Women's Pentagon Action in 1980 promoted itself as an inclusive project, open to all women, to emphasize sisterhood and solidarity. The reality, however, was somewhat different. A majority of participants were lesbians, and around one-third were under 25.[39] Despite organizers' aims to avoid elitism and promote inclusivity, almost all

were white. At the 1981 WPA, an African American woman raised the fact that she had felt excluded from the demonstration and its planning, an issue that left organizer Rhoda Linton "very disturbed."[40] This question of an exclusive sisterhood of white feminists remained unanswered from the WLOE conference earlier in 1980. Following that event, participants wrote to the organizers, expressing their discomfort that a feminist politics emphasizing diversity and inclusivity was, in terms of its demographic reality, so narrow. One evaluation form stated that:

> The weakest part of the conference was the naïve and middle class assumptions of many of the participants . . . the lack of social connection and economic consideration was appalling; as was the lack of diversity among the participants.[41]

Despite the token presence of several African American feminists, the lack of diversity at the WLOE conference and the WPA highlighted the failure of radical feminist activism to effectively put into practice the ideas of inclusivity it preached. Rather than operating as an open, diverse community of feminists, these gatherings repeated the rhetorical ideas of the New Left's romance with oppressed and disenfranchised members of society.[42] By idealizing a multiracial, international feminist unity but failing to effectively pursue it, radical feminists succeeded in reinforcing their identity as an exclusive community of white, middle-class feminists.

There were additional problems that left the WPA open to accusations of racism. At both protests, women found themselves singing and demonstrating in front of policemen, not Pentagon officials, and most of these police were black.[43] Certain chants and songs also caused concern among some participants:

> Anti-male chants are not appropriate in a black community, nor is the singing of "we shall overcome." The chant "Take the toys away from the boys" is not clear in the setting we were in. Most of the "boys" who heard it were black and hardly have access to the "toys" we spoke of. More emphasis in song, chant, speech and posters should have been placed on the connections between capitalism's "toys" and racism and poverty and sexism, etc.[44]

In addition, the protest was open to women only. For some protestors, this was their contingent on their participation, as they refused to be involved if men were also invited. This exclusion, and the exploration

of connections between militarism, racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression, was an attempt at egalitarianism in theory and practice that, organizers admitted, fell short. In aiming to broaden the spectrum of women's activism, exclusionary notions of feminism and protest had seemingly the opposite effect.

Mother's Day: Conflict, Compromise, and Coalitions

In 1981, before the second Women's Pentagon Action, a coalition emerged proposing a Mother's Day anti-nuclear demonstration at the Pentagon. The idea came from Helen Caldicott, who had formed the Women's Party for Survival (WPS) the previous year in Boston. Caldicott and the WPS were adamantly a single-issue party, devoted exclusively to nuclear disarmament. WPS was a mainstream political party that operated as a grassroots anti-nuclear group, and its organizational philosophy hardly resembled radical feminism. However, it did promote itself exclusively to women, and, while not exclusionary in its membership policy, the WPS used maternal issues in its rhetoric. Working to prevent nuclear war, Caldicott argued repeatedly, was "the ultimate parenting issue."[45]

Mother's Day, therefore, represented an ideal occasion to protest nuclear weapons since such activists felt that "the ultimate mothering issue is life for all children," and that "a nuclear war represents the greatest threat to the future of all children."[46] Annual Mother's Day demonstrations were emblematic of the polite image that the WPS—later the Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND)—projected. Such polite maternal rhetoric, unsurprisingly, did not sit easily with the radical feminists involved in the Women's Pentagon Action, and associated communities and coalitions.

The Mother's Day coalition of 1981, proposed by Caldicott, invited a variety of peace groups to join, including WLOE. After heated debate, WLOE refused to join the coalition, as its members felt that a single-issue demonstration was unsuitable. At a February 1981 meeting, its members stressed that "disarmament is a self-defeating word . . . [the focus] should be Anti-Militarism."[47] Interestingly, the Women's Pentagon Action had sought Caldicott's support in the lead up to its initial demonstration in November 1980, hoping for unity among women's groups. "It's important that our work not conflict in any way," wrote Anna Gyorgy, a WLOE conference organizer, to Helen Caldicott.[48] Caldicott's refusal to endorse the WPA, however, revealed deeper divisions over issues of exclusion and difference.

Since the proposed Mother's Day rally was not to be a feminist action, women involved with the WPA argued that "now is not the time to obscure and compromise feminist issues in order to appeal to the 'average American housewife.'"[49] In a mailing to its members, WLOE explained similar ideas in its rejection of the Mother's Day coalition:

> There are fundamental differences in the politics and process of the two groups. We are committed to a participatory feminist process while in . . . the WPS the decision-making process was not open to all women . . . In addition, WLOE and WPA are committed to keeping our feminist politics foremost.[50]

WPA organizers were put off by the way the Mother's Day coalition "tends to prefer more conservative methods of registering protest, evident in the focus on media coverage."[51] By contrast, WLOE and WPA preferred more organic forms of activism—individual, personal, and expressive—which demonstrated the promise of feminism as a force against systemic violence and oppression. Part of Caldicott's agenda was activism that worked toward political change, but for radical feminists, the process of agitating for a just society, free from oppression, was in many ways the more rewarding part of their activism.

Despite the lack of cooperation from its radical counterparts, WPS stuck to its single-issue platform, fearing that 'if we attempt to address all the issues associated with militarism we are concerned our work will become fragmented and [WPS] will dissipate and we will be written off as another splinter group.'[52] The group was not averse to radical feminists by any means; there were many within its ranks, and one radical lesbian feminist sat on the board of the WPS administrative council. Its overall stance, though, was one that combined traditional values of motherhood and family with "the insight and strength gained through feminism," hesitantly poising itself as an arena for women's unity against the nuclear threat.[53] Achieving this sort unity with radical feminists, so intent on preserving their identities, was near impossible. A letter from Kady Van Duers to Helen Caldicott emphasizes this divide:

> I had hoped to march with you, but I am distressed to hear you say that we will wear our "Sunday best," and that we will bring the children, and that we will talk with our representatives in Congress. I am a radical lesbian feminist. I wear the same clothes every day . . . I have no children. I have no representatives in Congress.[54]

Figure 4 Women erect makeshift gravestones for female victims of violence at the Women's Pentagon Action, November 17, 1980.

Caldicott replied:

> While I personally may share many of your feminist beliefs, I feel that the cause of survival will be better served by concentrating on this issue alone, leaving radical feminism to other groups. In this way we hope to get a broad base of support for the party and effect meaningful change.[55]

Unlike radical feminists, Caldicott aimed to push for an end to the threats posed by nuclear weapons by working toward electoral and legislative change, a foreign domain to many radical feminists. Through WPS and its later incarnation WAND, she also advocated greater political representation for women, but radical feminists were not interested in this sort of compromise. Politics was men's business, they argued, and the few female representatives and senators in Congress in no way represented the interests of female radicals, and Congress was merely another facet of the patriarchal system that oppressed women. As a radical lesbian feminist, it is not surprising Van Duers's perspective clashed with Caldicott's. Her final letter stated that "one issue is not enough for me and I can't work with you."[56]

Operating outside the mainstream women's or peace movements, and distancing themselves from the political left, radical feminists found a

home—and a different kind of sisterhood—in an alternative political culture. As they attempted to radicalize the broader anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s, such activists advocated the practice of direct action, spirituality, environmentalism, and lesbianism as political philosophies tied intimately to a worldview of spiraling militarism, violence, and patriarchal domination of both women and nature. These new ideas, devised and expressed as a kind of personal identity politics, existed at odds with the safe, polite, and maternal image of other women's peace organizations, most of which were dedicated exclusively to nuclear disarmament. As radicals clashed with moderates, and with each other, within the umbrella of the anti-nuclear movement, the idea of *difference* emerged as a key factor in debates over the role of feminism in the personal politics and organizational structures of women's anti-nuclear activism in the early 1980s.

Liberal Feminism, the Mainstream, and the "Female Consciousness"

The challenge of cooperation for radical and liberal feminists, argued Barbara Ehrenreich, required a rationalist approach that featured "a feminist politics that is both revolutionary *and* true to the totality of our experience as women."[57] That is, feminists ought to reject the negative effects of separatists in favor of a unifying feminism that was inclusive, rather than exclusive. More extreme factions of the radical feminist movement advocated political philosophies that were "exotic, spiritualist [and] impossible to connect with ordinary women's needs and fantasies."[58] Caldicott's Women's Party for Survival aimed to be a source of unity in this regard, eschewing debate over the meaning of various feminist identities in favor of an accessible approach that involved all women. The WPS operated as a fairly conservative style of women's disarmament politics. As Caldicott would reiterate throughout her involvement with the organization, "I'm for conserving life on the planet. I'm for conserving God's creation. I'm not a radical—I'm a conservative."[59] As her exposure to feminism in the 1970s was an "awakening" to the possibilities and potential of the women's political activism, her outlook in the early 1980s was one based on ideas of motherhood and traditional concepts of a "female consciousness" in social protest and political action.[60]

Caldicott saw the potential for women to lead the peace movement, due to a series of qualities that set them apart from men. She argued:

> Women have the key to the future. Over the last twenty years in the era of liberation, I have discovered my power and intelligence, and

> I learned eventually to be proud of the innate feminine qualities of passion, nurturing intuition and receptivity. I believe we can teach the men to become more civilized by teaching them to acknowledge and be proud of their own feminine qualities. In fact, as [Riverside Church disarmament advocate] William Coffin told me, the woman most in need of liberation is the woman in every man.[61]

While Ynestra King had argued that using this essentialist idea of biological determinism as a protest tactic was "a dangerous tendency in the women's movement," Caldicott felt women's voices were essential in the insensitive, morally corrupt realm of politics, whose leaders were characterized by typically male traits of insensitivity and aggression.[62] A female perspective in nuclear politics, organized around the innate qualities of motherhood, could bring much-needed sense and stability to national defense; as Caldicott iterated, "I believe women and nurturing men hold the key to survival."[63] Mobilizing women and "nurturing men" were essential to end the arms race—no small feat—but women were to Caldicott an "untapped majority" with so much political potential that, as she repeatedly argued, "if we get moving we can save the earth."[64]

Caldicott felt that radical feminist politics only served to isolate different strands of the women's movement. Ideas of spirituality, mysticism, and personal expression failed to offer women pragmatic choices in political action.[65] Instead, she argued, women should change the system from within:

> It is time then for us to take up the challenge, run for local, state and federal positions and at least acquire 50% representation in government. We must bring with us power, intelligence and [the] precious feminine qualities that are so often abrogated by women as they enter the bastions of the male world.[66]

As such, Caldicott's organizations WPS and WAND—the name changed in 1982—worked through existing political channels. As WAND director Diane Aronson argued in 1982, "The most effective way to stop the nuclear arms race is to remove the people who insist on running that race."[67] Removing the gender imbalance in local, state, and federal politics, stimulating voter registration, and lobbying for suitable political candidates, both women and men, were part of the strategy.

The primary focus of these organizations was be stopping the arms race through political activity. As former WAND President Sayre Sheldon recalled, "Helen's primary goal was to enlist women in working on

disarmament. There were other women's groups working for peace, but none that had the capacity to be as political as WAND."[68] Much like older women's political organizations like the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Women for Racial and Economic Equality, or the League of Women Voters, WAND attracted a largely white and middle-class membership, most of whom had never been involved in political activism before.[69] For example, a Tucson, Arizona WAND chapter estimated that 90 percent of its members were first time activists.[70] Yet what made WPS and WAND so significant in the landscape of women's political organizing in the early 1980s was its exclusive commitment to nuclear disarmament. Caldicott even went so far as to express a willingness to resign if the group's goals were broadened.[71]

Not without their teething problems, both WPS and WAND also experienced division over their nature as women's organizations. WPS chapters in Pennsylvania and California, for example, interpreted the party's name and agenda as sexist and exclusionary.[72] Other chapters stressed that many of their most committed members were attracted to the group *because* it was a women's party and not just any other anti-nuclear group, which could be "male-run and impersonal."[73] Evidently, the issue encouraged different responses around the country, with some chapters uncertain about affiliation with even a moderate feminist identity.

Aiming at inclusivity rather than a narrow, gender-specific politics, members were concerned that WPS "must not eliminate 50% of the population" in its rhetoric.[74] "I would hate to feel that the answer lies only with half of us," a male Vermont activist wrote to Caldicott, questioning the restrictive nature of a women's organization.[75] On the other hand, women involved with WPS and WAND relished their unique political voice; as one agreed, "We DO have a different view of things. We DO think diapering our own babies is more important in the scheme of things than going out to kill some total stranger."[76] The experience of motherhood was so intrinsic to this process of peace, women argued, that it became a cornerstone of WAND's rhetoric. As "mothers of the universe" and with "some degree of common sense" that was shared by all ordinary women, WAND members possessed the biological and emotional goods to bring about disarmament in the political realm.[77]

Caldicott would encourage WPS and WAND members to consider protest tactics that emphasized these ideas, such as flooding the offices of their local representatives and senators with their children, as well as apple pies, since "there's nothing more American than motherhood and apple pie."[78] As Caldicott came out in support for the Mondale-Ferraro campaign in 1984, she emphasized the maternal instinct inherent in her

politics. Appearing in television advertisements, she pleaded, "If you're a parent who loves a child in America, then this election is the most important election of your life," and "As a pediatrician and a mother, I urge you to vote for Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro. For your children's sake."[79] WAND would continue with an emphasis on children and babies, sending boxes of diapers to the White House in 1986 as a symbolic statement of concern.[80]

While the maternal image is paramount here, as Tina Managhan has argued, it is not the identity of womanhood or motherhood that is important in feminist anti-nuclear protest; it is the subversive nature of the symbolic act that is the more significant issue. Motherhood, used by activists as both a political identity and as a site of bodily protest, invoked "historical associations between women, nature, and emotion as a rallying cry to motivate and unit women *as* both biological mothers and symbolic mothers of the earth."[81] While there was little difference between liberal and radical feminists' use of maternal imagery in the way they each posited themselves as nurturing guardians of life and nature, the scope and nature of the protests organized around them exacerbated the familiar liberal/radical divide.[82]

Inclusion, Exclusion, and Feminist Spaces

In the early 1980s, American peace activists began to explore the idea of "peace camps." Largely as a means of maintaining a permanent opposition to nuclear facilities without the risks inherent in illegal occupations, peace camps were also an attractive women-only space where feminist protest and personal politics could flourish. The phenomenon originated in England in 1980 with the famous women's camp at Greenham Common adjacent to an Air Force base in Berkshire, some 50 miles west of London. While the camp began as a space in which respectable white middle-class mothers dominated the image projected to the public, the camp soon transformed into a space for feminists and was dominated by lesbian politics. This radicalization earned the ire of the surrounding communities.[83]

Similar issues characterized the major American counterpart to the Greenham camp. Inspired by the potential inherent in the radical challenge of a permanent site of opposition, and the invigorating, empowering nature of a women-only protest community, US activists hatched plans for a peace camp during an International Feminist Disarmament Meeting in New York City during the 1982 UN Special Session on Disarmament. Organized by the American Friends Service Committee's Disarmament Program and WILPF, the meeting aimed to provide a platform for

feminist peace activists to realize more explicitly the relationship between feminism and militarism and "weave an international feminist web."[84] Feminist activists from the New York area expressed interest in a women's peace camp in the Finger Lakes region of New York state and the Seneca Army Depot (SEAD), near the small township of Romulus, was chosen as a suitable site for a "sister encampment" to Greenham Common.

The depot was a suspected storage site for the United States' nuclear weapons arsenal that was due to be shipped to strategic locations in Western Europe in 1983 as part of NATO's dual-track policy of 1979. Despite a lack of confirmation from SEAD, the Department of Defense, or any local or state governmental authorities, organizers felt there was a "high probability" that nuclear weapons were being stored at Seneca.[85] Unlike the camp at Greenham, which was situated on public land, women from the greater New York area peace community contributed to the purchase of a 53-acre farm next to the depot, saving organizers from the troubles of eviction and police harassment that women at Greenham faced on a regular basis. The farm—dubbed the Women's Encampment for a Future of Peace and Justice (WEFPJ)—subsequently became a permanent symbol of a women-only protest site and the heart of the feminist peace community in the region.

The Encampment eventually opened on the Independence Day weekend in the summer of 1983. This area of New York State was conservative and patriotic, and the relationship between Encampment women and local residents was to prove problematic, and at times hostile, throughout the summer. Initially the focus was on protesting against the imminent deployment of nuclear missiles to Western Europe, but additional concerns emerged as a great variety of activists arrived at the camp over that summer. Radical feminists, politically conservative housewives, nuns, and politically uninvolved middle class women brought to the site a swathe of expectations that the space would be one in which a series of women's concerns could be aired, not only those related to nuclear disarmament.

Organizers from the Women's Pentagon Action were instrumental in the organization of the camp and attempted to promote it as an inclusive space representative of their ideas about feminist unity and inclusivity. They hoped that the Encampment would "reach women of color, trade union women, welfare mothers, the differently abled . . . in short, women outside the traditional radical feminist and peace communities." Organizers also expressed hope that the Encampment would function as an open and diverse women's peace community to which ordinary American women could relate.[86] The Encampment prided itself on its inclusion of "lesbian, anarchist, communist, heterosexual, democrat,

socialist, [and] republican" women, extending its welcome to women who were either "single, married, divorced . . . employed and unemployed, feminists and non-feminists, lesbians and heterosexuals."[87]

The fact that the Encampment was an enclosed, safe space for political expression also encouraged the airing of personal politics, a process many women found to be personally empowering. They saw the Encampment as a secluded women-only space in which they could "strive to shed the old expectations, habits, and systems of oppression" that existed in the outside world.[88] The experience of social protest in the outside world, which was frequently unsatisfying, could be reconfigured at the Encampment. One woman, arrested for civil disobedience at SEAD, argued that

> Writing my congressman is not enough . . . I have to do something in order to live, with my whole body, my mind my spirit, every inch of me. I have to try to live a free and just and loving and life-affirming life. That is the most difficult continuous act in a world which worships death.[89]

The Seneca Encampment, for many of its visitors, was a place in which the *totality* of a separatist feminist ideal could be practiced and feminist life could flourish free from male oppression. Hence, it satisfied many feminists' ideal as both a valuable site of protest and as a space in which their vision of a radical feminist culture could be realized.

"Unaffordable Luxuries"? Personal Protest and Sexual Difference

The permanence of the Encampment as a site of protest enabled a style of political action linked to personal behavior and lifestyle. "People are most empowered when they feel that they can directly affect something in their daily lives which is also linked to a larger picture," argued organizer Andrea Doremus, a year after the camp's founding.[90] For Encampment women, this was the key to a process of feminist resistance that living at the camp on a long-term basis would enable. Nuclear disarmament, starting with the missiles at Seneca Army Depot was not enough to bring about peace. Real peace, women argued, required the realization of economic, racial, and social justice across various boundaries, and this began with a living demonstration of that peace within the small community of the Encampment. Women would, through their experiment in a utopian vision, enact the beginnings of such a "future of peace and justice," which would ideally spread outward from these modest beginnings.[91]

Part of this commitment to a peaceful, feminist lifestyle involved a rejection of authoritarian forms of organizing. Like other grassroots peace groups, communities of pacifists, and other activist organizations on the left, women at Seneca were devoted to spontaneous organizing and activism, respectful of individual political expression, and suspicious of the oppression of bureaucracy, policy, schedules, and planning. This was so much so, that Doremus wrote, "I have seen voices tense and fear rise in wymin's [sic] eyes when these words are proposed."[92] This did, of course, produce tension, and living at the camp became a negotiation between what Doremus called "the age-old philosophical conflict between (1) the oppressiveness of hierarchy and rigid planning and (2) the tyranny of structurelessness."[93] These tensions were instrumental in defining the boundaries of acceptable activism and expression at Seneca. Holding on to the intrinsic value of personal expression, women at the camp did not want their values to be compromised by moderates at the camp, especially those who did not reside there long term.[94] Most women would travel to Seneca County to visit the Encampment for a weekend or a few days, yet only a small number resided there full time. Of course, many women felt that these long-term residents held an undue amount of unofficial authority.[95]

Many of these resident women were also lesbians, and lesbianism held a dominant position in the camp, not as a sexual orientation, but as a political philosophy.[96] The freedom of lesbian expression, often as a political statement, was attractive to many lesbians and bisexual women who visited or lived at the Encampment. Of course, tensions arose when this expression violated the sensitivities of more socially conservative women and the surrounding community.[97] Criticisms from local residents often centered on the alternative sexual and lifestyle politics of the women, rather than the camp's ostensible anti-nuclear agenda. At a parade that passed through the town of Seneca Falls on July 15, 1983, an initially warm reaction to various peace signs and slogans turned cold once onlookers saw some Encampment women carrying a sign stating "Lesbian Rights is a Women's Rights Issue."[98] While supportive of the camp as a safe and welcoming place for women of all sexual orientations, many worried that any overt advocacy of an issue as polarizing as lesbianism, especially in a rural, conservative area, only served to alienate potential support which the peace movement so desperately needed.[99]

Just as some women wanted to expand the boundaries of feminist unity in this women-only space, others wanted to restrict the application of feminism to the exclusive identities of its most radical practitioners. Throughout the development of the camp as a feminist experiment,



Figure 5 Women's Party for Survival poster, [early 1980s].

many women were left disappointed and disturbed by the dilution of the anti-nuclear message in favor of sexual and lifestyle politics. Sue Guist, visiting the Encampment in 1986 on a side trip from the cross country Great Peace March, felt that it was "wrong to mix gay rights with disarmament." Accused of homophobia, she could not grasp the "connectedness" that drove radical feminists to campaign against "the system." Confrontation between Encampment women and local residents over lesbian identity, of "naked swimming parties and carrying on in the woods" served only to highlight the divide between these two

communities of thought, so alienated in their views of sexuality, politics, and lifestyle.[100] Women attracted to the camp were, by and large, quite foreign to the rural world of such areas as Seneca County, a place largely unfamiliar with second-wave feminism. As a correspondent observed, the arrival of the Encampment was "a mass experiment in being forced to accomplish 20 years of social evolution in two months."[101] Organizers were defensive, arguing "It isn't our purpose to shock them with our lifestyle," but polarization remained nonetheless.[102]

These divisions characterized the Encampment's struggle over its image and identity. Other controversial issues ranged from playing loud music at night, public nudity, displays of lesbian affection, smoking in various areas of the camp, and in general respecting the sensitivities of the neighboring farming families, many of whom were Amish and Mennonites. Some women expressed dismay that several women at the encampment refused requests to remain clothed outdoors and indeed flaunted themselves in occasionally risqué behavior with each other in defiance of such requests. Evidently, the freedom that this women-only space symbolized meant different things to different women and further highlights the contested nature of radical feminist activism within the peace movement.

Gender and Exclusion

The exclusion of men added another layer of controversy to the Encampment's already troubled reputation. Much like feminist activists throughout the 1980s, the organizers raised stereotypes of dominating and aggressive male behavior in their wish for the camp to be a women-only space.[103] One separatist phrased her opposition to a non-segregated camp as follows:

> Women who want to hang out with men, sexually or politically, can do so anywhere, and even gain privilege for doing so. Separatists have a hell of a hard time finding harassment-free space. We are a special interest group of wimmin [sic] who deserve outreach as much as women with kids, womyn [sic] of color, differently abled, and lesbians do. Whenever men are invited, separatists are excluded.[104]

Separatism, enabling the empowering practice of expressive politics, was seen by many radicals at the Encampment as more productive and rewarding than mainstream protest tactics.[105]

However, the practical nature of separatism at the camp often led to anguish. Moderate feminists, heterosexual women, married women and

women coming to the camp with young sons often felt maligned by the separatist lesbian contingent that dominated much Encampment policy. Phyllis Sawyer, who had hoped to visit the Encampment with her two teenage sons, wrote that one of her boys:

> . . . was so excited about Seneca. He thinks of peace activists as his friends. And now he understands, there is nothing on earth he can do in some women's minds to be considered a friend. And that is sexism, not women's liberation.[106]

Such tensions speak to the success of the Seneca Encampment in creating a provocative challenge to political, cultural, and sexual conformity. Rather than pursuing a unified vision of feminism in action, the camp's radical vision operated as a space in which extreme expressions of a feminist revolution could be practiced. The Encampment's residents also alienated themselves from parts of the radical feminist peace movement, as well from more moderate women's groups.[107] Internal division over the practice of individuality, separatism, and a lifestyle of anarchistic cultural feminism meant the small community became severely marginalized, existing on the fringes of the peace movement until its closure in 1990.

Overall, what emerged from the Encampment's experiment in a utopian feminist community was, as one woman expressed it, confirmation that "we are too politically different to work together."[108] What would have been, ideally, a "center where the many strands of the women's peace community cross and become visible to the general public," as well as "a place for strangers to come home to" was ruined by squabbling over radical feminist politics and the inability of consensus-based decision making to resolve such issues.[109] Ynestra King concluded that it was impossible to categorize the WEFPJ, as its "enormous ambitiousness" meant that it existed as many different entities and experiments at once. King also acknowledged that this ambitiousness and its practice was unpopular, as "some leftist peace movement activists have criticized the multi-issue countercultural emphasis and visible lesbian presence at Seneca as unaffordable luxuries in the face of the 'really heavy stuff.'"[110]

What the experience of the WEFPJ in the mid-1980s shows most vividly is the challenge of accommodating such a rich variety of feminist identities in a relatively small space. In general, as King suggests, the Encampment was indicative of the problems faced by feminism in the mid-1980s; feminism "as a philosophy and a movement [was] at a crossroad," and

Seneca was the place where problems of utopian feminist idealism and pragmatic peace activism were made apparent.[111] Occasionally these two issues were married in cooperative harmony, with the participation of a diverse group of women; occasionally they were not. The promise of an inclusive feminist project is typical of Ehrenreich's "second generation" of second-wave feminists, but the failure of this promise in Seneca County marked another example of the chasm between women who wanted nuclear disarmament, and women who wanted to change the world.[112]

Personal and Political Feminisms in the 1980s

The politics of difference at the WEFPJ, in the Mother's Day coalition, in Caldicott's WPS and WAND groups, and among radical coalitions such as WLOE, each illustrate the wider challenges inherent in allying the personal and the political in the push for nuclear disarmament that affected many progressive and leftist groups in the early to mid-1980s. Indeed, the peace movement was the site in which the diverse feminisms of radicals and liberals met in the early 1980s. Despite the insistence of radical feminists on broad platforms based on their opposition to militarism—broadly defined—the looming threat of nuclear war galvanized most protest actions or at least stimulated the involvement of a wider cross-section of women. This, of course, led to tensions over inclusive and exclusive practices and behaviors, where pursuits of individual expression clashed with an insistence that an organized and unified sisterhood could arrest the looming nuclear crisis.

Sitting squarely within this story of interacting and competing ideals is the contested site of feminism itself. That many women's dissent was based on gender and sex shows us that the nuclear arms race was not always the site of inter-movement controversy. Issues of sexual difference and the interpretation of the links between womanhood and peace played far more significant roles. The challenge of undertaking meaningful, successful protest actions with an agreed-upon feminism at its center, then, led to a lack of cooperation between radical feminists and their moderate liberal counterparts. Emphasizing the link between the personal and the political in their rhetoric as well as in expressive protest rituals, radical feminists stressed their separation from women's liberal reform, despite common understandings of womanhood and the innate benefits of the female consciousness. Part of the difference was generational; younger women subscribing to radical philosophies had little in common with the middle-aged and elderly women in WAND, whose politics were seen by radicals as non-feminist.[113]

Ideological and generational differences aside, the "difference within," as Louise Krasniewicz describes it, challenged traditional boundaries of femininity and womanhood that had limited the nature and scope of earlier women's peace protests.[114] As *Village Voice* columnist Ellen Willis argued, "the idea that women have a specifically female interest in preventing war," as promoted by women's peace organizations, served to "simply reinforce female segregation."[115] Differences, between men and women, between heterosexual women and lesbians, and between inexperienced female activists and more seasoned feminists, reverberated in this women's peace movement whose ostensible purpose had little to do with gender. Nevertheless, feminism—as a personal and a political idea—did define political activism for many women, in terms of its cultural practices *as well as* its political goals. Different agendas, while proposing radically different solutions to the crises afflicting women in the nuclear age, served to amplify the divergent interpretations ascribed to the scope and meaning of second-wave feminism, and its place within convoluted terrain of the anti-nuclear movement.

4

Prayer or Protest? Fasting, Nonviolence, and Anti-Nuclear Activism in the 1980s

Throughout the twentieth century, Americans interested in nonviolence and pacifism have experimented with innovative forms of protest, linking their ideas about a just and peaceful world to contemporary concerns such as military budgets, poverty and homelessness, environmental devastation, nuclear power, and, of course, nuclear weapons. In doing so, they expanded upon the scope of nonviolence and its application within broader social movements. In the 1980s, campaigns of nonviolent protest forged a polite, morally persuasive image, devised to attract public support. Mindful of the potentially divisive impact of acts of civil disobedience, some pacifists attempted to locate their actions firmly within the model of "polite protest" that characterized much of the peace movement. In the anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s, certain pacifist campaigns sought to blend traditional ideas about nonviolent protest with modern publicity strategies, intending to mobilize public opinion and provoke a favorable response from elites. Doing so updated the operation of pacifism in American social movements and incorporated contemporary trends of mainstream social movement organizing. In the process, some pacifists attempted to unite the tactics of nonviolent protest with modern public relations strategies. Such campaigns also sought to combine nonviolence with ideals of liberal reformism that characterized the nuclear freeze movement, an approach that was out of step with traditional pacifism and radical nonviolence.[1]

This chapter examines the Fast for Life (FFL, or simply the Fast), a campaign devised in the early 1980s by Oregon-based pacifist Charles Gray intended to halt the nuclear arms race through the act of a communal, open-ended fast. The FFL built on a variety of traditions of fasting as an act of social protest. The ancient biblical ritual of fasting had long been used as a tool to enhance spiritual purity, to identify with

the poor, and to emphasize one's commitment to a personal version of religiously disciplined "inner peace." In the twentieth century, however, this idea became politicized. Social activists began to use the religious idea of fasting, laden with the persuasive moral weight of a hunger strike, to dramatize their protests about the immoral or unjust wielding of power. Doing so blurred the line between fasting as an ascetic act, intimately tied to one's spiritual discipline, and fasting as a public act, used to manipulate others in pursuit of a particular goal. In publicizing their suffering, fasters sought public support in their protest against illegitimate authority and injustice.

Whereas radical nonviolent activism was characterized by its adherence to religious ritual and symbolism, campaigns of fasting in the anti-nuclear movement are notable for the fluidity of their ideological approach and their specific political and social contexts. Taking their cue from Gandhi, fasters engaged in campaigns intended to attract public sympathy. Media attention was essential: with skillful manipulation, public opinion could be successfully mobilized, the attention of elites could be captured, and the campaign could move toward achieving its aims. This pragmatic approach is significant for a few reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates the willingness of pacifists to pay close attention to the business of media coverage and public relations in their strategies. Secondly, it shows us how fasting campaigns combined personal ideals and political tactics into a malleable understanding of nonviolent protest. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it highlights just how polarizing an extreme act of nonviolent protest could be and how activists would seek to advertise the extreme act of an open-ended fast in a language of traditional nonviolence and civil disobedience.

The complex nature of the Fast for Life mirrors the operation and motivation of other political fasting or hunger strike campaigns in postwar American history. However, its place in the anti-nuclear movement of the early 1980s is important for other reasons. The fasters and their supporters were convinced that a dramatic act was needed to mobilize public opinion and instigate political momentum toward ending the arms race. The strategy of the Freeze Campaign and other educational anti-nuclear efforts, however broad their appeal, had hitherto not been effective in promoting meaningful political action. Greater acts of sacrifice were needed to intensify the public demand for nuclear sanity. The vehicle of an open-ended fast was, its proponents argued, the ideal way to go about this. Combined with morally persuasive ideas about hunger, poverty, and global inequality, a fast would be able to mobilize public support in pursuit of its political goals. Moreover, since fasting

was not illegal—unlike other acts of civil disobedience—it would not alienate more conservative Americans. Its extended nature, rather than a one-day demonstration or civil disobedience action, would also enable a steady, snowballing accumulation of support and attention as the fasters' health deteriorated.

Within the wider history of nonviolence and pacifism in social movements, these ideas demonstrate the willingness of some activists to steer clear of divisive, confrontational protest. Many pacifists became embroiled in debates over the value of political action and whether their principles ought to be applied, and perhaps compromised, within campaigns geared toward political reform. Often, pacifists interested in social change had neither political experience nor the means to communicate pragmatic political solutions to either the public or to elected officials in an effective manner. More significantly, many were often more interested in engaging with "the transformation of the way people live than with seizing power."[2] As Robert Holsworth argues, these activists showed how "a politics grounded in exemplary communities can become so inward-looking that it loses sight of its political goals."[3]

It is this tension that characterized the Fast for Life, which lasted for forty-one days in August and September of 1983. In its efforts to demonstrate the extent of a few individuals' extreme commitment to political change, the campaign suffered from a confusing combination of religiously inspired ritual, a fluid interpretation of nonviolent protest, and a well-intentioned but somewhat amateurish publicity campaign. Its extreme nature—a protest whose protagonists demonstrated the willingness to die for their cause—was an unusual and controversial component of the anti-nuclear movement. As the fasters attempted to combat the nuclear arms race—and the linked issues of poverty and hunger—it demonstrated how the legacies of radical nonviolence and civil disobedience were malleable. In an era where publicity, sympathetic media coverage, and favorable public opinion were key goals for anti-nuclear campaigns, the Fast for Life existed as a small-scale protest that positioned itself as a bridge between the symbolism of radical nonviolence and the mainstream peace movement's pursuit of legitimacy and popularity.

Revising Gandhi: Nonviolence and Fasting in the United States

American pacifists had long experimented with and revised the idea of nonviolence as a form of social protest. Nonviolence was both an ideal

and a program of activism and, in its older guise, was intimately related to Gandhi's concept of *satyagraha*, a program of nonviolent protest that encompassed notions of personal suffering, love, truth, justice, and the potential for converting one's antagonists.[4] Among pacifists, these ideas had a mixed reception. In the 1950s and 1960s, activists began to mobilize the potential of nonviolent civil disobedience for purely pragmatic purposes, seeking to extent the reach of their movements for change. In movements for civil rights, against the war in Vietnam, and against nuclear weapons and nuclear testing, traditional concepts of nonviolent protest and their underpinnings of personal suffering and enlightenment changed substantially. As Sean Scalmer writes:

> Protests were increasingly large affairs; marked by a sometimes truculent spirit and a merely tactical (and therefore temporary) attachment to the value of peace. Suffering was henceforth repudiated as a duty; a willingness to evade penalties and commit violence instead became the epitome of radical chic. The very concepts that once identified activism—"civil disobedience," "protest," "non-violence" itself—were now increasingly consigned to the past. "Gandhism," it appeared obvious, no longer held sway.[5]

It is this revision—and rejection—of traditional nonviolence that influenced later pacifists attempting to reclaim the role of *satyagraha* in social protest in various ways.

In the wake of the 1960s, pacifists sought to reclaim the earlier spirit of nonviolence that had become marred by violence, countercultural experimentation, and a radical interpretation of the nature and scope of civil disobedience. In doing so, they envisaged a mass movement comprised of ordinary middle-class Americans, a palatable public appeal, and a safe, traditional message of nonviolence and peace that evoked the "moral prestige" of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Gandhi, and, in some ways, Jesus.[6] In many ways, pacifists in the late 1970s and early 1980s envisaged a return to the expression of traditional nonviolence, not for its performative qualities or its newsworthiness, but for its potential to instill a revolutionary spiritual peace in the individual. The performance of *satyagraha* in the early 1980s, argued Joe Peacock of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, "places primary emphasis not on recruitment, but on *speaking the truth* through both words and deeds. Speaking the truth, according to Gandhi and King, is the most effective way (and ultimately the only way) to reach people's consciences."[7] Hence, ideas of asceticism, voluntary poverty, and suffering in solidarity with the poor

and the oppressed became staples of the nonviolent activist's tactical repertoire.

Fasting was an ideal way to achieve this. As acts of protest, fasts can be situated within a global history of pragmatic and largely secular nonviolent resistance; in this guise, "hunger strike" is a more appropriate term. Yet fasting for pacifists was often much more than this; as a personal act of spiritual purification, sacrifice, and penitence, fasting worked on a level much deeper than that of a hunger strike. When attempts were made to combine both the pragmatic and the personal aspects of fasting in campaigns for social change, this divide was amplified and is illustrative of the problems pacifists faced in promoting their cause to the wider peace movement and to the public.

These ideas responded to a rich, yet complex history of social protest that has characterized the experience of Christianity in the United States. More importantly, campaigns of protest involving fasting defined themselves as radical, if not extreme attempts to affect social or political change through a basic, almost primal Christian ritual. Fasts undertaken in the pursuit of social change can be as much about the personal and spiritual effects of fasting than their political consequences. Hunger strikes, on the other hand, often take place outside of the margins of religious life and primarily operate as political campaigns.[8] Within the history of nonviolent action, however, fasting as both a spiritual and political pursuit owes much to the ideas of poverty and suffering popularized by Gandhi. While not a Christian, Gandhi's example inspired activists in the west to experiment with *satyagraha* and its implication for local and contemporary political struggles.[9] His philosophy of nonviolence in the pursuit of social change incorporated both pragmatic and moral agendas, speaking to the potential of nonviolent action to influence public and governmental opinion, while at the same time demonstrating the purity and spiritual strength a commitment to nonviolence could fashion in the individual.

Fasting, Protest, and American Christianity

These spiritual ideals have a deeper history in American Christianity, which is illustrative of the moral value of fasting in religious and public life. Activists attempted to command and manipulate this moral value when fasting for social change. Fasting as an act of social protest is significant due to its unique application; pacifists incorporated elements of theology, nonviolence, and personal spirituality to an act with a pragmatic agenda for political change. It is in this context that fasting as a

form of nonviolent protest can be understood, especially as it sought to promote an act of personal spirituality within the framework of a political campaign.

Theologically, fasting holds a special significance for Christians. It has historically demonstrated a type of sacrificial devotion to God, whereby an individual or community's penitence was enacted; as Vendereyken and van Deth have noted, Old Testament fasting was "intended as a kind of self-humiliation and self-castigation to excite Divine compassion."[10] However, the penitential attraction of fasting usually served more pious Christians. Others practiced fasting in terms of an ascetic pursuit; still others to strengthen the spirit at the expense of the body. The practice is part of religious custom, where asceticism and austerity were pursued as a demonstration of an individual's commitment to God.[11] Historically, pacifists utilized such practices to respond to social and political circumstances that contradicted their senses of right and wrong, leading to the development of an ethic of personal responsibility. Pacifists argued it was the role of the Christian to bring about in contemporary society what Jesus had done during his time. This extended to acts as such as voluntary poverty, civil disobedience, and nonviolent action. Within each of these frames of reference was the act of fasting, which for pacifists retained its ancient qualities of purification and spiritual strengthening but was laden with additional weight in the modern era, being used not just for personal religiosity but also to encourage profound changes in politics and in public life.

In the United States, these ideas about the expression of religious ritual as a public act owe much to the Puritans. In the New World, Puritans hoped to create a new, Godlier type of individual through new behaviors free of excess and the temptations of the flesh. Although Puritan culture was not one of asceticism, it did eschew the trappings of materialism and pleasure that they felt afflicted the Europeans from whom they had fled. Fasting, prayer, and other acts of self-humiliation were used to continually remind them of the perils of failing to meet the standards set for them by God.[12] In later generations of colonial life in America, the religious ritual of fasting would be employed as a reactionary tool, adding more layers to this ancient, almost primitive practice.[13]

In this sense, the use of fasts in American public life, while acknowledging the values on which communal fasting was built, paid little attention to its ascetic heritage. Public fasts were undertaken by the colonies just prior to the Revolutionary War as protests within an environment of deteriorating relations with England.[14] Later, Abraham Lincoln proclaimed three days of "humiliation, fasting, and prayer" during the

Civil War. Edward Tiryakian argues that such a continuation of the ritual can be seen as "a reaffirmation of deep-seated collective values grounded in Puritan culture," emphasizing the endurance of Puritanical ritual in the midst of adversity, as well as the value of collective purification in response to the dangers of materialism and affluence.[15] These ideas were to be diffused throughout various sectors of American life since their Puritan origins: one significant application was within movements of spiritual nonviolence, which rose in significance in the twentieth century.

It was not until the 1920s that American Christians took note of fasting in the context of nonviolent social or political change. They were most likely less motivated by theology than by ideals of Christian pacifism inherited from the peace churches and in response to the Great War, looming crises of democracy in Europe, and domestic industrial turmoil. News of Gandhi's campaigns in India and South Africa hinted to Americans, especially to more radical Christian pacifists, of the potential use of nonviolence as a political tool.[16] While Gandhi fasted as an ascetic pursuit, he also employed lengthy fasting as a tool in his nonviolent campaigns. Many American pacifists felt this too coercive and were reluctant to adopt Gandhian nonviolence, preferring instead conventional, Western methods of protest and resistance.[17] Still, Gandhi's ideas began to gain credence in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s. Due to the efforts of A. J. Muste and his leadership of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, along with Catholic Workers and groups such as the Peacemakers and the Committee for Non-Violent Action, Gandhian nonviolence was, by the early 1940s, as Danielson argues, "an institutionalized component of American pacifism."[18]

Pacifists in the 1950s and early 1960s experimented with fasting as a powerful act of social protest that highlighted individual activists' commitment to nonviolence and peace. Activists in the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Peacemakers, and the Catholic Worker expressed this most explicitly in the 1950 Fast for Peace, a weeklong demonstration of protest and prayer in Washington, D.C. Using the "teaching and example of Jesus" to guide their action, the small group emphasized that the protest was an act of penitence and self-purification, as well as an indictment on the recent decision to develop the hydrogen bomb.[19] They cited a "willingness to give life itself if necessary in the cause of peace," yet having next to no impact on public opinion or military policy, the Fast for Peace was abandoned. While its political aims were fuzzy, it is better seen in terms of a personal expression of faith and inner spirituality than a pragmatic program of political action.[20]

These currents of pacifist thought, utilizing fasting as a public act, also fit within religious—and secular—traditions of austerity and voluntary poverty, which by the 1970s were gaining increasing visibility within alternative social movements. Environmentalists, radical feminists, and other countercultural groups advocated a program of personalism as a critique of mainstream cultures of consumerism and waste while also developing protest cultures of various persuasions. Around these countercultural trends existed communities of religious pacifists interested in an embodied spirituality that also rejected dominant cultural ideals of capitalism, individualism, and upward mobility. In some ways adopting the ritual and custom of earlier proponents of voluntary poverty—Puritans, Quakers, Amish, Shakers, and so on—those practicing simple living as a religious pursuit in the 1970s and 1980s adopted an aesthetic lifestyle removed from the dominant contours of mainstream life. These ideals found expression in a wide variety of personal, social, and political pursuits in the 1970s, and it is in this context that public fasting as a form of anti-nuclear activism reemerged.

Voluntary Poverty as Social Protest

Henry David Thoreau looms large in the background as the most significant figure in postwar American movements of voluntary poverty and alternative lifestyles, but it was figures such as Gandhi and United Farm Workers leader César Chávez that dominated the rhetoric of practitioners of austerity who saw the potential of this type of ethic in social change. Nonviolent action as an outgrowth of the commitment to personalism in this sense meant a combination of the pragmatic act itself with the strength and fortitude of an individual spiritual undertaking. Acts such as fasts, designed to attract mass sympathy and bring about some degree of social change, were combined with a vague sense that the fast also operated as an individual and communal prayer. This was separate from the political realm of the act and existed for fasting activists in a way that supporters, media, and the public could glimpse but not touch. For the most part, the spiritual act of fasting was undertaken for personal reasons—penitence, humility, or purification—and had little to do with the political mission of the act, its appeal to the public, and its effectiveness.

Charles Gray was an advocate of simple living, and his story fits neatly within this context of postwar pacifism that sought to bring about social change via the personalist ethic of social responsibility. A Quaker and conscientious objector, founder of the first Colorado chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, and a member of the World Federalists,

Gray seems like the quintessential pacifist. He had been inspired by the writings of Gandhi, Tolstoy, and Thoreau in his late teens, and for a time, practiced simple living as a means of purifying his personal ideals and solidifying his own "break from the establishment."[21] Gray also developed a long-standing interest in analyzing and rectifying the uneven distribution of wealth in the world, and defined his pacifism in economic as well as social and spiritual terms.[22] Involved in the civil rights movement in Denver in the 1950s and 1960s, Gray would also embrace civil disobedience against the Vietnam War. Relocating to Eugene, Oregon, in the mid-1960s, Gray engaged in tax resistance and was involved in protests against nuclear power plant construction in Oregon in the 1970s.

However, Gray felt burdened by his wealth and lifestyle. His first wife, Leslie Brockelbank, had inherited a small fortune shortly after their marriage, but even through philanthropy and organizing for social justice, Gray was still uncomfortable. The "rather soft liberal pacifism" he practiced with Brockelbank was not enough, nor was their limited engagement with civil disobedience and tax resistance. Inspired by their involvement with the revolutionary anarchism of the Movement for a New Society (MNS), Gray and Brockelbank retreated from comfortable suburban life, living in a collective and dedicating themselves to change in both personal and institutional ways.[23] For Gray, this lifestyle was liberating:

> By 1977, I felt that the all encompassing threat facing humanity demanded a complete reconciliation of our personal lifestyles with our most precious ideas and that such personal change was necessary if essential institutional change was to occur.[24]

Brockelbank refused to join Gray on this personal quest, and their marriage ended. Their differences attest to the divergences in pacifism in the 1970s—one geared toward philanthropy and liberal institutional change, the other dedicated to a personal revolution in lifestyle. Each sought to realize some kind of systemic change but with wildly different strategies that emphasize the attraction of prefigurative lifestyle politics and their expression in alternative social movements in the 1970s.

Gray's interest in a variety of systemic threats to human life and dignity and his desire to do something about it found its clearest expression in what he called the "World Equity Budget" (WEB): a means of living that was both environmentally and socially sustainable, in identification and solidarity with the world's poor. Embarking on the WEB in 1977 at age 52, Gray limited his earnings and his expenditure, scavenging for

food and supplies, living rent free wherever he could, and riding a bicycle. He did carpentry and odd jobs around Eugene and Portland to earn enough to get by, still limiting his spending to a sustainable level, and saving the rest. Limiting spending to $75 per month did not amount to an easy lifestyle, however much satisfaction it may have brought him. In 1989, Gray wrote:

> In a sense, the WEB for me was not my personal ideal, but rather a compromise with my social circle, an effort to establish a principle of equal sharing, a principal less extreme than real identity with the world's poor who had far less than their equal share.[25]

While he did not live in absolute poverty, his identification was at least a partial form of repentance:

> For me the WEB was a morally defensible philosophical position, not a personal preference. My personal preference, my feeling for the poor, my guilt at so long being complicit in oppression pushed me toward a level of consumption at least closer to that of the world's poor than the level of the WEB. The desire to at least partially identify with the world's poor became another reason to push my expenditures further downward.[26]

Gray found poverty liberating, on a personal, ideological, and spiritual level. His alienation from society was offset by him feeling "in tune with a larger humanity and a more nonviolent morality," and reveling in his rejection of the "throw away society" of consumption and waste.[27] There were, however, dangers to such a pursuit larger than social isolation and living at the mercy of the elements. "The danger of practicing what you preach," wrote Gray, "is that it can become an end in itself, a searching for personal purity or salvation."[28] His philosophy was that actions should be more than simply expressions of embodied spirituality; they should have a wider social, economic, and political basis.

Gray's analysis of his experiment in simple living is demonstrative of how pacifists made sense of small-scale challenges to systemic ills. The role of individual action as a form of resistance was often undertaken as a means of escape from institutional structures that were primary causes of violence or oppression. As Gray explained:

> Part of our praxis should focus on our personal relationship to the social systems of institutionalized violence. As we analyze the social

> structures of oppression we do well to reflect on our own participation in those structures. Where are we in the structures of capitalism, consumerism, classism, racism, sexism, and militarism? How extensive is our complicity in them?[29]

For Gray, removing himself from such systems meant a full-scale retreat from mainstream society. His resistance was local, personal, and radical, and it emphasized Gray's commitment to a downward mobility at odds with social trends of materialism and consumption. It was not, he argued, a form of personal witness, nor was it intended as "the way to start a social movement." Rather, Gray's WEB was more like "an effort to reduce the tension between the way we lived and the beliefs we professed. There was a great gap between our lifestyles and our ideals."[30] Gray's ideas correlated with a rich heritage of simple living in the Untied States. Building on the ideas of Thoreau, proponents of simple living, homesteading, and naturalism pursued peace and personal fulfillment through an aesthetic lifestyle removed from the dominant contours of mainstream life.[31]

Retreating from society, though, was not Gray's primary aim. Although the style of his dissent was similar to many alternative movements advocating a communal lifestyle and an escape from the depersonalizing, demoralizing confines of mainstream life, Gray's pursuit was different. He avoided the confines of this rejection of social and political life, he did not move to the countryside, and he did not live on the WEB as to achieve some kind of personal purity. His aims were grounded in his perceptions of global injustice and poverty and his ideas about systemic violence and oppression. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the most pertinent crisis brought about by this system was the nuclear arms race, and it was toward challenging this crisis that Gray turned his attention.

Hunger, Nonviolence, and Political Fasting

Gray felt that several years living on the WEB were a type of practically and spiritually clarifying preparation for his campaign of an anti-nuclear fast. He came to the conclusion that first strike nuclear missiles—those that were eventually deployed in Western Europe in November 1983—must be stopped by a bold and daring peace movement. Inspiration from theologian and pacifist Jim Douglass, himself participating in a nonviolent resistance community adjacent to the Trident submarine base on Puget Sound near Seattle, was pivotal. Gray thought that a campaign of fasting might be dramatic enough a statement to encourage the

reversal of such a development in the Cold War. The same way Gandhi had advocated fasting campaigns as an act of last resort, Gray felt that the peace movement had exhausted its options, and had so far failed to curb the nuclear arms race.[32]

Gray had met his second wife, Dorothy Granada, in 1978 at a blockade of the Trojan nuclear power plant in Rainier, northwest Oregon.[33] Granada, an Episcopalian of Mexican-Filipino heritage, had pursued a life of prosperity and upward mobility, married to a Harvard-trained physician and directing the medical nursing program at the University of Chicago. However, the Vietnam War sparked in her a realization that the white, middle-class world that she had joined was not for her. A "downward mobilization" followed, which led her to join Gray, his life of self-imposed austerity, and the Fast for Life.[34]

In 1980, the pair began planning the fast in earnest. As they explained, the dual targets of the Fast for Life were "the silent holocaust of hunger and the impending holocaust of nuclear fire."[35] They were convinced that their act of protest was appropriate, considering the magnitude of the nuclear threat, and determined that it would be morally persuasive, and above all, nonviolent. Through their fast, an act of "love and moral suasion," they would approach some kind of "truth" as Gandhi had envisaged.[36] In order to succeed, though, it needed to be dramatic. Gray began circulating literature on the Fast for Life in 1980, announcing its seriousness by committing to an open-ended fast, which would begin on the thirty-eighth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima—August 6, 1983—and would end only when the superpowers made "significant steps" toward curbing the arms race. The campaign motto—To affirm that all humanity has a right to live freed from the pain of hunger and the dread of holocaust"—emphasized the link between the arms race and the diminishing of social services and aid to poor nations that bulging defense budgets had occasioned.[37]

Gray and Granada's campaign received a boost with a large relay fast in the lead-up to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982. Groups of fasters in Washington, D.C., Pittsburgh, New York City, and other communities on the east coast engaged in group fasting, from four days to twenty-one days, until the conclusion of the Special Session. Although this Fast for Disarmament received little mainstream media coverage, Gray and Granada nevertheless drew inspiration from its efforts and from the enormous public support for disarmament around the Special Session. They were also inspired by Mitch Snyder's Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) in Washington, D.C., a homelessness advocacy group with a radical Christian background.

The CCNV had engaged in direct action and campaigns of fasting in order to secure access to funds and shelter from city authorities and church groups for the local homeless.[38] "Deeply impressed" with the CCNV's use of protest, the experience for Gray and Granada "deepened our resolve to have the Fast become a symbol of the connection between world hunger and the arms race. The two were bound together and we hoped our fast would be a contribution to the peace movement, symbolizing that connection."[39] Subsequently, they formally announced the Fast for Life on June 19, 1982. Gray and Granada were also joined in Oakland by two others, Canadian forester André Larivière and former Japanese Buddhist monk Mitsuyoshi Kohjima. The campaign stretched to France and West Germany, where Solange Fernex, Jacky Guyon, Michel Nodet, Didier Mainguy, and Johanna Marie Jordan also participated in the campaign. Fernex had previously led the Europe-Écologie party in the first European Parliament direct elections in 1979 and would form the French Green Party (Les Verts) in 1984. Supporting fasts of varying duration were also held in many locations around the United States.[40]

The Fast for Life's ultimatum might seem like a hunger strike in the purest political sense, but as Granada would reiterate, she thought of it "more along the lines of a prayer than a hunger strike with specific demands . . . the Fast will be a plea to reach deeper into ourselves and others to do the same."[41] In essence, it was envisaged as an alternative form of civil disobedience, one that did not suffer from the same marginalization as other forms of resistance that were illegal. The fasters hoped that their own campaign would inspire the public as Gandhi and Chávez had, attracting mass support due to the moral and spiritual weight of their sacrificial act. The Fast for Life envisaged a slow, steady snowballing of public sympathy in support of this group of ordinary citizens undertaking an act of extraordinary commitment. Gray ambitiously predicted an international movement that would gain momentum and support from millions of citizens, until the United States and the Soviet Union were pressured to agree to the Fast campaign's proposals and halt the arms race, eventually disarming their entire nuclear stockpiles by 1989.[42] He also imagined ambitious numbers of active supporters, foreseeing "an international, open-ended fast with 2,000 persons entering the fast in cohorts of a hundred or so every week or two."[43]

Supporters and colleagues within the peace movement were apprehensive about such an ambitious campaign. Many worried that politics did not respond to public demands in such short timeframes; as one correspondent argued, "By the natural timetable of your fast, there is an ultimatum which the political system is not going to meet."[44]

Others expressed concern that an open-ended fast was itself a violent act, and some raised issues of "moral blackmail," arguing the fast was morally coercive, rather than persuasive.[45] Echoing wider rifts between the moderate peace movement and its radical fringes, critics warned that the Fast for Life would damage a peace movement that by 1983 had spent much effort building mainstream public support and harnessing public opinion in preparation for the 1984 elections. An extreme campaign of radical nonviolence—even without the presence of lawbreaking civil disobedience—was out of step with a pacifist anti-nuclear movement interested in developing comprehensive challenges to state power and a mainstream movement that gave scant regard to such extreme acts of nonviolent protest.

FFL supporters, on the other hand, argued that an anti-nuclear movement that did not recognize the value of nonviolence and dramatic action was insufficient. Like Gray, Granada, and their colleagues, supporters felt that the Freeze Campaign had achieved little concrete success by 1983, and more radical tactics were needed to inspire and mobilize a seemingly apathetic public. Similarly, other acts of civil disobedience—including Plowshares actions, mass occupations, and blockades at sites such as Seabrook, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Rocky Flats, and so on—had made few inroads into building a mass movement against nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Hence, the Fast for Life and its morally compelling message might appeal to ordinary people. As campaign member Wendy Tripp observed:

> It is sobering to consider that holding hands around Livermore no longer suffices to express the aspirations of ordinary people, nor going to jail for sundry acts of civil disobedience. The desire to end fear of global murder is now so intense that some people are getting down to the base line of things. They are putting their own lives on that line.[46]

Other activists raised similar issues. They felt that traditional anti-nuclear politics had to date been "routine, uninspired and basically ineffective—except that they registered the breadth of popular sentiment. The fast suggested a more serious/more profound step—one that had a certain daring."[47] The FFL campaign argued that the example of ordinary people, like Gray, Granada, and their colleagues, could appeal to the public via their personal commitment and its corresponding moral value.

For some supporters, the simplicity of the act of fasting carried significant value, due in part to its nature as an ancient religious ritual and in

part to the radical commitment of the fasters themselves. Activist Nancy Hale, who would later coordinate the American Peace Test—a civil disobedience campaign at the Nevada Test Site—felt that "instead of being bombarded with enormous out-of-control facts, we move to the other side of the scale. Here are eleven unimportant people who have thrown in their lot with the poor and hungry of the world, that's all."[48] The public, other supporters argued, could relate to this sacrificial message, as opposed to the alienating, impersonal language of arms control and foreign policy that emanated from both the White House and from many arms control advocates. Hence, many supporters favored an approach that focused "on what really matters."[49] The Fast for Life was a small, yet spiritually pure undertaking, and this was key to its potency and its legitimacy as a pacifist enterprise.[50] Its spiritual and moral dimensions transcended ideology, strategy and policy, both in the religious and secular worlds. As such, the Fast was a more direct campaign, appealing to people's consciences, and could avoid getting mired in politics like the Freeze Campaign.[51]

Pragmatism, Publicity, and Image

To ensure its success in mobilizing public interest, the FFL framed its message and its image various ways. In many ways, its organizers eschewed a comprehensive campaign of public relations, complete with a sound analysis of nuclear weapons policy, and instead promoted the Fast for Life as a spiritual witness, an act of love, and a dramatic statement in pursuit of social and economic justice. Gray also framed the campaign in terms of a radical challenge to the moderate peace movement. As he discussed in a 1981 piece in *WIN* magazine:

> The scenario is pure fantasy, but it may be within the realm of possibility if the peace movement takes itself seriously. That is the big if. Do the people who put out the leaflets about the impending holocaust really believe their own literature—believe it enough that a sizeable number will go for such a high commitment, high-risk tactic as an unlimited political fast? Would we offer our individual lives to save our collective lives?[52]

He argued that the potential for mass dissent existed, if people were willing. It would require "hundreds or thousands of people . . . in both mundane and dramatic acts to put their own lives on the line" before change was possible.[53] Converting people, through a drastic demonstration

of commitment, would put the peace movement one step closer to success.

As the FFL was devised as an open-ended endeavor, likely to result in the deaths of its practitioners, it stirred controversy and divided many activists within the peace movement. Many individuals were forthcoming with endorsements, including Daniel Berrigan, Helen Caldicott, Daniel Ellsberg, as well as members of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the American Friends Service Committee, and Clergy and Laity Concerned. Others refused to endorse the Fast. Most clergy refusing to endorse did so by equating an open-ended fast with suicide; Bishop Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit argued that while Gandhi undertook open-ended fasts, he "never intended to commit suicide."[54] The councils of both the US and International Fellowship of Reconciliation also decided against endorsing the Fast, as did the International Peace Bureau.[55] Activist Shelley Douglass, a member of the national council of the FOR, who presented the Fast for Life's appeal to the council for endorsement, felt that many council members were unsure about a radical action undertaken by a small number of people that was aimed squarely at changing the direction of government policy and influencing mass public opinion.[56] These key questions

Figure 6 Participants in the Fast for Life (clockwise, from top left): Jacky Guyon, Michel Nodet, André Larivière, Dorothy Granada, Charles Gray, Didier Mainguy, and Solange Fernex, April 1983.

about the controversial nature of an open-ended fast in a peace movement committed to nonviolence also reflect the troubled compromise between fasting as a dramatic protest tactic and an ethic of activists' religiosity.

Additional problems with the Fast for Life's campaign strategy were characterized by the melding of the fasters' personal spiritual quests with the more pragmatic task of eliciting public support. It certainly didn't help that none of the fasters were well-known or revered public figures; neither could they claim to command serious political influence nor extensive public support, as did Gandhi.[57] But the Fast for Life stuck steadfastly to Gandhi's understanding of fasting as a moral venture. In contrast to the understanding of nonviolence as a pragmatic tool for social change and political campaigning, the utopian elements of principled nonviolent action aim for the realization of a more pure self and the conversion of society. While alienating for many supporters, the fasters nevertheless felt that combining their act of inner spirituality with a coordinated media strategy, the divide between religious idealism and political practice might be alleviated. It was a curious and often confusing strategy, but for Gray and Granada and their many supporters, promoting themselves as humble, committed pacifists engaged in a selfless quest for peace and justice was the key to public success.

Constructing Public Appeal

Publically, the Fast for Life attempted to straddle two spheres. On one hand, it was an act of personal religious faith for a group of spiritually committed individuals. On the other, it was a political campaign with a core set of goals, however vaguely defined they were. This dual nature of the FFL campaign posed a challenge for Robin Knowlton, hired as the campaign's media coordinator. Knowlton had little prior experience in public relations yet relished the challenge to "translate something spiritual and something political, something Eastern into layman hardened news. Could the Fast translate in writing? In to radio? Over television?" she wrote after the campaign was over.[58] She stressed that from the outset, the credibility of the fasters needed to be established and emphasized for media.[59] This was a serious challenge; they mustn't come across as extremists, she felt, nor should they minimize the nature of their commitment in order to appeal to a larger public.

Gray agreed, but recommended that the key motivation for the Fast—the connection between nuclear weapons and world hunger—be emphasized. Writing later, he remarked that in the Fast for Life, and in

his pursuit of a just lifestyle under the WEB, he and Granada attempted to retain their middle class identity. "We didn't want to come off as fanatical purists. We weren't interested in sack cloth and ashes," Gray wrote.[60] However, he still felt uncomfortable with material expenditure that came with promoting the Fast for Life:

> Somehow the means for organizing the Fast seemed very inconsistent with the ends. I was, of course, caught up in a movement that did not always recognize that disarmament required economic justice. I hoped that the Fast would help symbolize this truth by pointing out the many connections between the arms race and world hunger.[61]

The means by which this would be communicated relied on the words of the fasters themselves and the sympathy of reporters, journalists, and commentators. As a publicity campaign, the Fast attempted to extend the application of polite, nonconfrontational nonviolence to the contexts of the arms race and world hunger, and attract attention and mass support for its premise.

Supporters were divided over this issue. As one wrote, "If a Faster had placed himself or herself in the hands of God, ready to give his or her life, why the feverish quest for media coverage?"[62] Others raised issues of the fallibility of working within the political sphere. According to one activist, depending on the media to convey the urgency that individual consciences are appropriately alerted assumed that "peace can be promoted in the same way as toothpaste or beer."[63] It also seemed to some like a surreal exercise in suicide. FFL correspondent Molly Sandperl felt that such an act of open-ended fasting did not belong in the peace movement:

> It is discouraging to think that the Fast seemed real to so many people while I found it unreal. It was a strange and eerie sight to behold a white-middle-class American church group singing hymns to encourage some one on to a futile and painful death.[64]

Evidently, the moral quandaries raised in the public act of fasting often outweighed questions of its application in the realm of political reform and public relations.

Similarly, Shelley Douglass stressed to Gray and Granada that large numbers of supporters would not necessarily lead to "true" disarmament. "The meaning of peoples' actions isn't contingent upon their numbers," she wrote some months prior to the commencement of the fast. Douglass was "uncomfortable with tying everything to governments or

large numbers," seeing small incidents of activism as "a sort of widow's mite that in my eyes would signify a tremendous change."[65] The Fast would be most useful, she felt, as a small action of individual witness, deepening the commitment of existing activists to nuclear disarmament and strengthening the personalist mission, but Douglass balked at the Fast's grand plans for soliciting millions of supporters and persuading sympathy from governments. The Fast for Life, in this sense, aimed at mainstream acceptance and appeal, an unfamiliar goal for religious pacifists more accustomed to small-scale campaigns of personal and performative nonviolence. Indeed, the specter of Gandhi and his fame hung over the fasters' appeals; they hoped to follow his example and lead mass nonviolent movements for social change through campaigns of political fasting.

FFL organizer Hal Darst despaired at the campaign's attempt to have its message straddle two spheres. "It got caught on the horns between being a political/organizing effort, and a spiritual witness," he lamented. "Trying to be both was a mistake."[66] This dualism encouraged strident criticism from activists who saw any compromise between a spiritual witness and a political campaign as a failure. On one hand, respondents to a post-campaign survey strongly objected to "meaningless, useless sermon-like generalizations," favoring instead coherent, realist strategies from activists.[67] On the other, it was argued that the Fast for Life was small, yet spiritually pure, and this was key to its potency.[68] Helen Woodson, herself a purist in radical Christian nonviolent action, argued that the Fast would only be of value if it were "left in the hands of God . . . To attempt to manipulate it, control it, evaluate it is to place it on the political level, subject it to human terms and become overly concerned with success and effectiveness."[69]

In this sense, pacifists well-versed in the rationale and practice of bearing witness argued that the Fast was much needed in 1983, in terms of its nature as a dramatic, personal prayer. To promote its meaning and significance in any other way, pacifists argued, was useless. The scant notice paid by media to small-scale peace campaigns was a telling sign, argued Dan Lawrence of Clergy and Laity Concerned:

> As I become frustrated over the near-nil effects of peace actions, and as I elate over outwardly effective actions, my inclination, for me as a person is more to do the action; I feel less inclined to notify media . . . I believe very strongly that prayer in my closet (where I can't be seen) is tremendously more effective than if I blow my bugle out on the street.[70]

Some supporters argued that this ethic helped the Fast for Life to "transcend political expediency," while criticisms centered on the way the fasters expressed vague ideas of the "human family," "connection with the spirit," and "chains of human energy," as a *Los Angeles Times* piece noted.[71] The fasters also struggled to promote themselves as credible arms control activists, instead finding themselves alienated as "kooks," "freaks," or "extremists."[72] The difficulty for radical nonviolent pacifists in appealing to the mainstream peace movement, or to the public, was one the fasters hoped in vain to overcome via a strong focus on personal commitment and spirituality. Their attempt alone is significant, as it demonstrates the willingness of activists to extend the application of nonviolence within the peace movement of the early 1980s. Experimenting with strategies and tactics that would succeed in capturing public attention and political support was—for some pacifists—a major challenge of the anti-nuclear movement. For others, such an attitude was folly and only succeeded in compromising the principles of genuine nonviolence, personal protest, and lifestyle politics that operated primarily in individual and communal contexts, with little view to public impact. These two perspectives highlight the tension between "pure" or "true" nonviolence and its reformist impulse.

The Limits of Open-Ended Fasting

By the fifth week of fasting, the four Oakland-based fasters were having second thoughts. Neither mass public support nor an encouraging response from the peace movement had materialized. Moreover, their efforts were severely hampered by the downing of a Korean Air Lines flight by Soviet fighter pilots on September 1.[73] The public outcry and government response fiercely denounced the Soviet Union, while the fasters viewed the incident as "a tragic example of the arms race which the Fast sought to end."[74] In the midst of a lackluster public response, the group felt that their contribution to the peace movement had been significant enough and any sacrifice would be unnecessary. By September 15, after 41 days of fasting, all had broken their fast. Supporters felt alternately confused, relieved, and betrayed by this anticlimactic ending, fearing the Fast for Life had ended in a dismal failure, nevertheless sparing the lives of their colleagues and friends.

The failure of the Fast to bring about serious change prompted some serious reflection by organizers and supporters who had been convinced of its potential for success. Hal Darst felt the implications of this inglorious end were wider reaching, writing to Gray, "The real pain—the

shattering of my spirit, came more from the recognition that, not the Fast but the whole American peace movement, had failed."[75] For Darst, the failure of the Fast for Life was emblematic of the futile pursuit of public success and political reform that characterized most of the anti-nuclear movement's strategies. Robin Knowlton, on the other hand, recognized that while the Fast had failed in real terms, its success as a spiritual witness, and as a "vehicle of hope" to others in the peace movement, was its most lasting gift.[76] Like all forms of nonviolent action, Knowlton acknowledged that fasting remains the more difficult, more moral, and more life-affirming form of protest, although it is certainly a more extreme form of nonviolent action.[77]

In striving for public impact, fasting in the anti-nuclear movement needed to suit that movement's need for publicity, endorsement, and the mobilization of favorable public opinion. Knowlton argues that fasting, while an extreme form of protest, occupies a small but significant place within the wider mélange of ideas, opposition, and action that characterized the anti-nuclear movement in the 1980s:

> Fasting as a public act seems to fit our cultural need for drama and sensationalism. Who can say if one singular action was worthwhile when change happens when you've reached a tipping point; when an accumulation of things finally changes the balance. In that way, the Fast added a few more "pounds" to the scale.[78]

Knowlton's recollections describe the Fast for Life as a "slow burn" process of social change. This fits with traditional ideas about nonviolence and its practice in small-scale peace campaigns. Personal discipline, experimentation with different ways of expressing nonviolence in direct action campaigns, and the building of a community were localized issues that had little to do with organized politics. Like other pacifists, and building upon Gray's ideas about voluntary poverty, the Fast for Life sought to experiment with nonviolence as a means for expressing one's personal commitment against injustice.

In terms of an act of principled nonviolence, or Gandhian *satyagraha*, the Fast for Life also fit within the historical and theological traditions of fasting as outlined earlier in this chapter. With its explicit identification with the issues of hunger and poverty, the FFL fit within theological traditions of fasting as "the faithful person's pathos for and with the poor," rather than "an instrument designed to get desired results."[79] "We're just trying to make the picture sharper . . . by voluntarily making ourselves vulnerable," Gray emphasized.[80] Similarly, Granada stressed her

solidarity with the poor, arguing in an interview that "fasting is a way of holding up the victims of the arms race, and in a small way participating in their suffering."[81] These motivations were spiritual in nature, and the fasters repeatedly iterated their religiosity, promoting their actions as a selfless one, designed to beget a more personal, just, and loving society free from the afflictions of the arms race.

Fasting, Spirituality, and the Meaning of Protest

Within the larger context of radical religious campaigns of prayer and protest, the Fast for Life might seem a typical dramatic statement of personal commitment to peace. It inspired Christian activists that such severe acts of witness could, as one Fast supporter noted, "authenticate my beliefs."[82] This gave the core group of fasters a kind of moral and spiritual authority as prophetic figures engaged in the creation of a more spiritually pure community dedicated to social change. Indeed, supporters observed that Gray and Granada appeared to them as "two saints of Christian pacifism" engaged in messianic acts of "redemptive power."[83] Smaller support fasts, demonstrations, and letter writing campaigns surrounded the Fast for Life, highlighting the nature of this community it had created but also furthering the ideals behind the Fast as "an experiment in truth in the Gandhian sense."[84] These actions, undertaken collectively, brought society closer to a vision of personalism in action.[85]

Indeed, Gray felt the Fast for Life's most substantial contribution to peace was more personal than religious, in the traditional understanding of the term. Asked by a journalist for an Oakland weekly newspaper whether he believed in God, Gray responded:

> I consider myself a religious person in my definition, involving the sanctity of life. I've been affected by many religious traditions, but I feel quite agnostic . . . When I pray, I pray more that *people* will hear and respond than some deity . . . I don't deny that there is a god. But I feel that if there is one, then people are the hands of God.[86]

In this spirit, Gray saw his actions in the same context as other famous religious pacifists who had taken an extreme commitment to protest as an act of prayer. Just like Gandhi, Chávez, Jesus, or the Buddhist monks who had engaged in self-immolation in protest of the Vietnam War, fasting was an act of sacrificial power and spiritual strength.[87]

Gray's religious ideals speak to the broad changes in religious thought and practice that characterized American spiritual life in the 1970s and

1980s. Declining church membership and a change within traditional churches from an emphasis on ritual and dogma to a focus on individual spirituality altered the way Christians interacted with the world around them. This found expression in the rise of transcendentalism, fundamentalism, and various forms of evangelical Protestantism that found popularity in the late 1970s and early 1980s. But at the same time, changes in the role of religion and spirituality in American life prompted progressive Christians to seek more socially oriented expressions of their faith; communal activism, voluntary poverty, and identifying with the poor and oppressed were common examples of these changes. Personal responsibility was advocated, as well as the avoidance of "cheap grace." True discipleship, progressives argued, came at a cost.[88]

The existence of the Fast for Life demonstrates the realization of these ideals within the context of a troubled peace movement. Not quite an intentional community, not quite a group of extreme activists committed to civil disobedience, the fasters aimed for their witness to play two roles. On one hand, their sacrifice would be a model of both nuclear resistance and a vision of a "new life" of community, love, and reverence for a common good.[89] It would inspire others to realize their faith in more active ways, as "a way for people to enhance their spiritual life," due to the penitence and purification demonstrated by the fasters.[90] On the other hand, the fasters hoped to play a role of a more pragmatic political campaign, more akin to a hunger strike than an act of *satyagraha*.

Due to its extreme nature, the FFL occupies an unusual place within the postwar history of radical nonviolent pacifism. Unlike minor fasts, usually designed to accompany larger protest campaigns in imbuing activists with spiritual purity, the Fast for Life aimed at a goal much more grandiose, hoping to follow in the footsteps of other modern religious prophets who used fasting as a key campaign tactic, winning public support and political recognition in the process. In this sense, the means and ends of the FFL campaign were combined in a single public act, built on the complex traditions of Christian pacifism, nonviolent action, and the ancient practice of fasting. The Fast for Life, as with its antecedents, is illustrative of the provocative role of the religious dissent within the history of twentieth-century American politics, as does it demonstrate the presence, and seeming vitality, of the nature of religious ritual within peace movements. As an act of Gandhian nonviolence, the Fast for Life exhibited less rigid ideas about theological ritual and promoted fasting as more of a fluid interpretation of spiritually-minded social activism.

In its attempt to build a mass movement to bring an end to the nuclear arms race, the fasters applied their own understandings of nonviolence to contemporary environment of political protest. In some ways, the Fast for Life tried to have their cake and eat it too; their action was both a spiritual undertaking *and* a public demonstration that very much aimed to set in motion a mass movement of dissent. Because the fasters incorporated elements of nonviolent protest and pacifist thought from such a great variety of sources, their appeal lacked the simplicity they had hoped for. The extreme nature of their tactics, of course, was primary factors behind their lack of support, from both the public and the peace movement. Their optimistic, almost naïve understanding of the processes of public opinion and political response were also based on a somewhat romantic view of nonviolence as a means toward social change.

In undertaking their dramatic action of an open-ended fast, the activists in the Fast for Life campaign are significant for the ways in which they extended the promise of nonviolence, pacifism, and radicalism in the anti-nuclear movement to encompass spiritual ideas about the roles of sacrifice and personal commitments to peace and social justice. However self-affirming Gray's experiments in voluntary poverty and simple living might have been, to extend those ideals to a mass movement went against the tide of unbridled consumerism that characterized American life in the 1980s. Combining the ethic of austerity with an extreme form of activism like open-ended fasting did succeed in contesting the nature of nonviolent action in the 1980s. Like other campaigns in the 1980s that utilized activists' bodies as symbols of the oppression of the state, the Fast for Life also succeeded in combining core moral and spiritual beliefs with a pragmatic strategy geared toward a political solution. However challenging this symbolism was, its role in the anti-nuclear movement highlights the enduring challenges faced by proponents of nonviolence in finding new ways to capitalize on their radical ideals within the larger context of a movement opposed to nuclear weapons.

5
Activism in the Heartland: Local Identities, Community, and *The Day After* in Lawrence, Kansas

In the early 1980s, as the "polite" mainstream anti-nuclear movement grew under the banner of the Freeze Campaign, activists and supporters at the local level strove to achieve much the same thing as the Campaign's national organizers in St. Louis did. Political efficacy, public support, and the registering of grassroots opposition—however small or insignificant it might seem—was sought in order to mobilize widespread opposition to the Reagan administration's nuclear weapons policies. Local freeze activism existed in all fifty states, along with additional campaigns on related issues complementing the wider anti-nuclear movement. Many local groups affiliated with the Freeze Campaign in the early 1980s were established peace groups and found the freeze proposal a simple and effective organizing tool. Lawrence, Kansas, was no different. A medium-sized college town in eastern Kansas, it had a history of confrontation between radicals and conservatives, a progressive spirit, and existed in the midst of the nation's conservative heartland. The major local peace group—the Lawrence Coalition for Peace and Justice—became involved in the freeze movement in 1982, around the same time as local and state freeze referenda campaigns were emerging around the nation. Lawrence's story might seem typical of local anti-nuclear campaigns in the early 1980s, but like most local stories, it offers a unique perspective on the anti-nuclear movement and its operation in the midst of Middle America.

Lawrence's relationship with the nuclear arms race took a rather distinctive turn in the fall of 1982, when ABC Television location scouts chose the town as the site for filming a movie about nuclear war. Titled *The Day After*, the film depicted in graphic fashion the aftermath of a nuclear attack on nearby Kansas City and showed how ordinary people in the area coped with the resulting devastation and chaos. In the

imaginary realm of television culture, then, Lawrence was positioned as an innocent community typical of the nation's heartland. In the realm of the town's residents lives, however, such stereotypes presented residents with the opportunity to offer their own interpretations on what it meant to be a Lawrencian, a Kansan, a Midwesterner, or an American. Politically, the film offered both progressive and conservative residents with an unparalleled opportunity to amplify their views on the nuclear arms race.

This chapter explores how these issues of localism, identity, and nuclear politics resonated among residents of Lawrence in the early to mid 1980s. Moreover, it will help to explain how a modest anti-nuclear campaign operated in the environment created by *The Day After*. This chapter also assesses how anti-nuclear activism operated in the environment of the American "heartland." A cultural idea about the location of archetypal American values in the center of the nation, the mythic heartland was a space in which local identities were often devised, and contested, as local residents engaged in political debates. In 1982 and 1983, one of these key debates was the nuclear arms race.

These issues of community politics, local and regional identity, and the nuclear arms race in Lawrence were tempered—but not radically altered—by the influence of *The Day After* and its vision of nuclear devastation in Kansas. How these issues coincided at this particular historical juncture speak most clearly to the way locals negotiated the idea of "ordinariness." These ordinary Kansan voices were unclouded by the prejudices of establishment politics, scientific debate, and big-city attitudes. Just like Americans in every corner of the nation, these Kansans were also at risk if the nuclear arms race was allowed to continue toward its seemingly catastrophic end, which would spell devastation for all Americans, be they northern or southern, metropolitan or rural, Republican or Democrat. Through the national media attention heaped on Lawrence due to *The Day After*, the conversation about what it meant to contribute a local voice to a national debate asked additional questions: Could nuclear war be considered a "local issue"? What was the role of the local democratic process in this discussion? And could those residents of the nation's heartland offer anything unique to this debate?

This chapter's focus on Lawrence enables us to concentrate on themes of political engagement and anti-nuclear sentiment as they existed in this "microsphere" of local community-based activism. The example of Lawrence demonstrates that community engagement with anti-nuclear activism is significantly more complex than existing scholarship on the anti-nuclear movement has suggested. Compartmentalized

organizational histories, while useful, often neglect the roles played by smaller local anti-nuclear groups as well as individuals working in exclusively local contexts. There are, of course, exceptions here, and specialized studies by Byron Miller, John Wills, and Betty Zisk tell us a great deal about how anti-nuclear activism operated in specific local contexts.[1] For those without the access to establishment politics, just like their counterparts in direct action campaigns against nuclear weapons facilities or nuclear power plants, these "ordinary voices" in Lawrence saw community politics as *the most appropriate* arena in which their opposition to the nuclear arms race could be expressed. Here, grassroots anti-nuclear activists could engage in meaningful ways with citizens on a personal level. Positing themselves as "ordinary" meant these activists could avoid the challenges of alienation that were faced by more radical campaigns. Activists in Lawrence used ideas of localism to promote the town as a "Middle American community of concerned souls," and as "ordinary people in ordinary towns" working against the arms race.[2]

What this meant in the context of the wider anti-nuclear movement is that such instances of "polite" local activism operated in ways similar to the mainstream, politically moderate, national anti-nuclear organizations based in St. Louis, Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C. But unlike national organizations or coalitions, local anti-nuclear campaigns tell us much more about the operation of anti-nuclear sentiment as it interacted with issues of local identity, ideas of middle-American authenticity, and the contest over the efficacy of local anti-nuclear action. Anti-nuclear organizing in Kansas also provides us with an excellent means of understanding the challenges that faced progressive movements in this conservative state. Lawrence was at once a liberal, progressive college town *and* a place where many residents adhered to the state's conservative, moralistic political culture. The issue here is that in such an environment of overlapping identities, the meaning of anti-nuclear action in Lawrence was subsequently contested. Following the progress of anti-nuclear sentiment in this sphere, then, demonstrates just how local anti-nuclear activists positioned themselves in the political culture of the nation's heartland, seeking to add local flavor to an issue of global significance.

Lawrence and the Heartland Myth

Lawrence exists far from the corridors of power in Washington, D.C., and far from the metropolitan areas of the east and west coasts. Sitting forty miles west of Kansas City, it is by no means considered rural or

remote, like most of western Kansas. Historically notable for being an outpost of resistance against the westward expansion of slavery in the 1850s, Lawrence's contemporary political character stems largely from its major economic attraction, the University of Kansas. As "the quintessential college town," according to Blake Gumprecht, Lawrence exists, as do other college towns in parts of the Midwest and the South, as "cultural islands in comparatively conservative states."[3] Such areas are "bastions of liberal politics," boasting an educated community with a large number of young people and a "traditionally left-leaning faculty."[4] As such, Lawrence existed as a unique place in the Kansas of the 1980s, quite unlike its major cities, and certainly unlike the rural areas that dominate the western part of the state.

As Beth Bailey writes, "Kansas is the state that most consistently represents the antithesis of biocoastal sophistication. It is the ultimate provincial place, the ultimate not-New York . . . Kansas is the quintessential heartland state."[5] Within this heartland, Lawrence is the ideal place to study the meeting of social and political activism and its interaction with such ideas about heartland identity. In the 1960s, it was the site in which tensions over race, sex, war, authority, and participation in civic affairs often boiled over. By 1970, Lawrence was not just the home of "an alternative culture of self-styled street people, hippies, freaks, dropouts, and other seeking to escape from Middle America."[6] Activism in Midwestern college towns has not gone unnoticed by historians and its significance in the history of radical activism, violent protest, and contests over the meaning of authority helps to position the study of the anti-nuclear movement of later years.[7] As Victoria Johnson comments, after the 1960s, "the Midwest Heartland was recuperated, popularly, as the place where the traditional American Dream still lived *untouched* by political turmoil. The region was idealized, in this sense, as that which survived the sixties unfazed, unaltered, and in balance."[8] It is in this context that progressive activists in Lawrence in the 1980s worked, drawing from, and responding to, such imagined ideas about the heartland, its identity, and its values.

Geographically, demographically, and politically, Kansas exists in the nation's popular imagination as the epitome of "the ordinary." This ordinariness is closely related to common presumptions of modern Kansas as a state particularly unique in terms of its "averageness."[9] Lawrence, as a sizeable Kansas town but also as an exception to the state's image of bland normality, operated within this paradigm but also consciously skirted around it, particularly when a Hollywood vision of Kansas stereotypes was introduced to its residents via *The Day After*. In a wider sense,

however, Lawrence's image was invoked in historical, social, and political ways by local residents in relation to the issue of nuclear war. Their identity as citizens of a liberal town, yet also as average Kansans was a key theme in their responses to the nuclear threat as it was presented in Lawrence in these years.

Following the social and cultural upheavals of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Lawrence experienced extensive urban and suburban development, prompting concerned residents to organize in less antagonistic ways to resist the corrupting influence of unrestrained commercial growth.[10] Neighborhood associations and grassroots political maneuvering in this era also ensured the maintenance of a progressive City Commission.[11] It is in the 1970s that we can observe distinct changes in the voting patterns of the city; Democratic candidates dominated federal elections in the second Congressional district (where Lawrence sat at the time) from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s, contrasting to the steadfast Republicanism of the state at large, and its realignment to the New Right from 1980.[12]

It is within this climate of moralistic political culture in Kansas, a reconfiguration of the heartland myth in the Midwest, the rise of the New Right, and historical ideas about ordinary or average citizens that anti-nuclear activism in Lawrence developed.[13] A history of oppositional politics in Lawrence did inform political activity in the 1980s, most visibly in the local nuclear freeze campaign. Before such discussion of the prospect of a nuclear war became widespread, however, anti-nuclear activity around Lawrence was perhaps less ambitious in its focus and efforts and certainly more oriented to concrete local issues. The Wolf Creek nuclear power plant near Burlington, 70 miles southwest of Lawrence, for example, drew some spirited opposition from Lawrencians in the late 1970s.[14] The rise in anti-nuclear sentiment that coincided with the freeze movement of the early 1980s, however, shifted the focus of Lawrence's reception of anti-nuclear ideas. By this time, grassroots political participation had ensured the strength of a City Commission sympathetic to liberal concerns.[15] With the emergence of large-scale anxieties over nuclear weapons in the early 1980s, the relationship between local peace activists and City Commissioners would prove advantageous.

The Peace Movement in Lawrence

The organized peace movement in Lawrence, although small, had been consistent since the late 1940s. Begun by a community of Quakers, the group had met regularly in Lawrence to talk, pray, and organize on civil

rights and social justice issues. Designated the Oread Friends Meeting, members of the group were socially conscious, and like many of the traditional peace churches, saw personal faith and social justice as interlocking issues that required attention at the community level. While the Vietnam War dominated the group's attention in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was the looming issue of nuclear tensions in the later 1970s that encouraged the formation of a broader group, the Lawrence Coalition of Peace and Justice (LCPJ).[16] On-again off-again member Howard Baumgartel had met the eminent British Quaker Adam Curle in 1976; Curle stressed to Baumgartel the need to "solve local problems first."[17] As such, the LCPJ held local "peace lectures," and prominent Quaker intellectuals such as Kenneth Boulding, Richard Barnet, Frances Moore Lappe, and Roger Fisher spoke in Lawrence to small but enthusiastic audiences in 1980 and 1981. As a small local peace group, it *was* modest, but then again, the City of Lawrence had a population in 1980 of a mere 52,738, some 78 percent of the population of Douglas County.[18] Although the county counted 35,701 registered voters in 1982, only 61 percent of those cast votes for their congressional representative in the federal elections in November of that year.[19] Hence, the net of politically active citizens in Lawrence was small, and as a result, the LCPJ would deal with problems of lax political participation in its efforts to mobilize locals on the issue of the nuclear freeze.

Individual members of the LCPJ undertook other personal activities to demonstrate their commitment to peace. In 1980, for example, Tom and Anne Moore bought shares in the Kansas Gas and Electrical Co. and presented a stockholder's proposal to the board opposing the construction of the Wolf Creek nuclear power plant.[20] In doing so, Tom Moore argued, "Our religious perspective is to see life as all one piece." The Moores' concern not only encompassed the power plant itself but was part of a larger worldview, in which "concern for nuclear weapons has to do with concern for peace, for future generations for the quality of the environment."[21] Other LCPJ activities included canvassing, fundraising, demonstrating, petitioning, letter writing, and lobbying representatives and senators at both state and federal levels. The explosion in 1981 and 1982 of media coverage of the consequences of a potential nuclear war was picked up by the LCPJ, which produced a comprehensive information packet on the scientific, medical, and political dimensions of the arms race and its associated dangers.[22] Ground Zero Week, a nationwide series of nonpartisan educational symposia devised by former White House National Security Council official Roger Molander, also made its way to Lawrence in April 1982. In conjunction with the events of that

week, the LCPJ accumulated several hundred signatures for a petition for a nuclear freeze, which it sent to Kansas Senator Nancy Kassebaum, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and others.[23]

With the guiding impulse of a religiously motivated commitment to peace, the LCPJ saw the arms race as a local issue. For Lawrence and other areas in northeastern Kansas, the presence of Minuteman II missile silos near Harrisonville, Missouri, the Bendix Corporation plant in south Kansas City (a large manufacturer of nuclear weapons parts), the McConnell Air Force Base on the outskirts of Wichita, and many other missile sites in western Missouri surrounding the Whiteman Air Force Base spelled a uniquely Midwestern nuclear danger.[24] Indeed, the LCPJ group also distributed maps showing "high risk areas in the event of a nuclear war," based on a 1980 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report, showing how the city was sandwiched between nuclear targets in Kansas and Missouri.[25] The headquarters of Strategic Air Command in Omaha, Nebraska, was also "uncomfortably close."[26] Like fellow activist group Nukewatch in Madison, Wisconsin, the LCPJ promoted the idea of the Midwest as a vulnerable region in various flyers and mailings.[27] Since Lawrence was a city of over 50,000 inhabitants, the LCPJ determined that "in an all-out nuclear exchange, Lawrence would in all probability be totally destroyed."[28]

This geographic dimension to a pervasive nuclear fear in Kansas was tempered by its location—both real and imagined—in the nation's heartland. Just as many Kansans saw themselves as ordinary Americans, they also invoked such ideas about rural isolation and insignificance within debates over the wider threat of nuclear war. In Kansas in the 1980s, political debate over an issue so abstract and bizarre as nuclear war might seem odd. For many Kansans, debating such an issue did indeed seem pointless; issues of international diplomacy, defense, and the military were far removed from the lives of ordinary Kansans. This sort of talk was typical of the northeast, or even California, and did not belong in the heartland. Moreover, what could Kansans offer to these debates? How significant were they to their political and social lives? For some Lawrencians, such large issues of war and peace *did* reverberate at the local level. It was the responsibility of all Americans, as potential victims of a possible nuclear war, to discuss the issue—the responsibility of an active democratic citizenry. Such ideas about active citizenship had been debated at length in Lawrence before, and the early 1980s were no different. With these ideas about democratic participation, local identity, and heartland isolationism and authenticity, the LCPJ went about promoting a fiercely local response to the threat of nuclear war.

Contesting the Meaning of "Local"

Like many other cities and towns in 1982, Lawrence became involved in the national Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign. The issue manifested itself much the same as it did in other locations, with campaigners utilizing the idea that ordinary citizens could take part in a national debate over defense policy. Unlike New England town meetings, however, the opportunity for such sanctioned public debate was less marked in Lawrence. Kansan political culture had not developed such an emphasis on public participation, and as such, any meaningful political action needed the involvement, or at least the sympathy, of city commissions, municipal councils, and township boards.

This is exactly what occurred in Lawrence in early 1982, when members of the LCPJ proposed a local referendum on the nuclear freeze in the local elections to be held that May. Members of the group had been aware, through contacts in Boulder, Colorado, of a successful vote that occurred there in the fall of 1981. The Lawrence City Commission ruled that the freeze vote might be more appropriately held in the November 1982 general election, and it was toward this event that a majority of the LCPJ's efforts were directed throughout the year.[29] What the referendum would entail was this: the LCPJ would obtain the approval of the City Commission through the adoption of a resolution to legally allow the issue of nuclear disarmament to be voted on by the public in an "advisory election." The voting public would be supporting or rejecting a proposal for the City of Lawrence to officially announce its objection to the nuclear arms race and voice its support of the Freeze to the Reagan administration and the Kansas congressional delegation. None of this was particularly binding on federal nuclear policy, but it would, proponents argued, highlight the extent of public opposition to the nuclear arms race. City Commissioners unanimously agreed to sponsor the poll, which stipulated that the nuclear freeze issue was "of such vital local concern" that it deserved to be voted upon by local residents.[30]

Despite the willingness of the City Commission to proceed with the matter, some legal controversy resulted. Although the so-called Home Rule amendment to the Kansas Constitution allowed cities to exercise a degree of self-government, the city was advised as early as April 1982 that "home rule" was limited by the constitution to "local affairs."[31] Was an electoral ballot on a nuclear freeze a sufficiently local matter, though, to warrant the invocation of the amendment? One city commissioner, Barkley Clark, argued that the nuclear freeze vote in Lawrence involved "a 'local affair' imbued with a 'public purpose.'" Clark argued that the

polling of public opinion, the availability of federal financial aid to local governments in lieu of increases in defense spending, and issues of local civil defense meant that "the voters of Lawrence have a direct interest, on a local level, in what goes on regarding federal expenditures for nuclear arms."[32] Such ideas reiterated activists' contention that the nuclear arms race was indeed a global issue with local ramifications. Challenging the arms race at the community level, then, utilized ideas about local identity. In Lawrence, activists, residents, and city officials debated the meanings of this identity and their role in challenging—or accepting—the impact of the nuclear arms race on their community and their state.

Objections from some residents also questioned the local nature of the nuclear freeze. Bill Halvorsen, a law student at the University of Kansas, held that the opinion poll would "ruin the sanctity of the polling place" while also creating a legal precedent for other interest groups to hold similar opinion polls.[33] His concerns related to the application of the Home Rule amendment, and he rejected the notion that the nuclear freeze was an issue of local concern.[34] The commission acknowledged his protestation yet still proceeded to adopt Resolution 4616, and Halvorsen subsequently announced his intention to challenge the city in the Douglas County District Court on its authority to sponsor the poll.[35] However, Halvorsen soon found himself in receipt of an anonymous letter, threatening him to abandon his legal challenge to the poll. He had received a number of supportive phone calls following his announcement on August 26, but the letter led him to reconsider in light of the safety of his family.[36] This rather strange occurrence, while seemingly unrelated to the noble intentions of the LCPJ, nonetheless demonstrates the air of controversy that enveloped the nuclear freeze issue at the local level. It also complicates the debate over participatory democracy in Lawrence, one that evidently involved a great variety of actors with differing intentions and attitudes.

Another resident, James Makin, resumed the legal challenge after Halvorsen ceased his involvement. Makin argued that city sponsorship of the freeze poll would damage the sound legal province of the electoral process by allowing the involvement of private interests.[37] The District Court, however, found that Makin could not sufficiently demonstrate that he would suffer any individual harm or damage as a result of the way the freeze poll was to be conducted.[38] Of course, the political views of Makin, Halvorsen, and others who rejected the validity of the freeze poll were also a major factor; these Lawrencians saw the administration's policy of "peace through strength" as necessary to keep the "evil

empire" at bay.[39] Combined with a certain unease about the progressive City Commission, many more citizens rejected the idea of the poll on political grounds, giving credence to the idea that the application of liberalism in local government had its limits.[40]

Meanwhile, Lawrence's city officials sought legal advice from Douglas County to allay local concerns about any undue influence on the freeze poll. Both the county counselor and clerk agreed that the freeze vote could not legally proceed as an advisory election; instead, it needed to operate as an independent public opinion poll, concurrent with the general election but not interfering with it.[41] Like critics and supporters of the freeze poll, Douglas County officials were also committed to preserving the "sanctity of the polling place."[42] As a result, the LCPJ, along with the local chapter of the Kansas League of Women Voters, ran the freeze poll as a separate public opinion vote, with tables and booths set up next to official polling places.[43] The two groups aimed to ensure the integrity of the democratic tradition in Lawrence was respected, lest freeze proponents and their supporters on the City Commission fell into disrepute with the wider community.

The city commission's cooperation with the LCPJ on the matter nonetheless attests to its progressive spirit. It also demonstrates the level of access to local government that was available to Lawrencians. Paul Schumaker has argued that in Lawrence, "most citizens—regardless of ideology—believe that voters should be empowered to decide major issues."[44] Rather than utilizing this ideal of participatory democracy to challenge the legitimacy of local authority, as activists had done in Lawrence (and elsewhere) during the 1960s, grassroots community actors in the 1980s sought to utilize it in pursuit of more moderate goals. Proponents of anti-nuclear action—and their critics—were nevertheless contesting the meaning of local action, insofar as it involved the public institutions of local government. Outside Lawrence, these ideas would gain additional layers of meaning as the involvement of ordinary Americans in the nation's heartland reinforced the role of grassroots voices in the national debate over the nuclear arms race.

The Limits and Boundaries of Localism

Why did Lawrence, like so many other towns, cities, and states in the fall of 1982, strive to demonstrate its opposition to the nuclear arms race through local opinion polls and ballots? There were two primary reasons. First, it gave citizens a voice in matters of state that were traditionally considered matters of high politics and military strategy; matters

that were rarely discussed outside Washington, D.C. Encouraging participatory democracy in the form of officially-sanctioned (or officially tolerated) public opinion polls, ballots, and referenda was evidently a motivation for many local and state politicians, who felt the symbolism of challenging the nuclear arms race in such a way—however small in scope—would send a clear message to the White House from a concerned and engaged citizenry. For citizens themselves, nuclear freeze polls would help to "promote a healthy discussion among citizens on all sides of this debate," and this idea was shared by the LCPJ and local residents alike.[45] Although it provoked the opposition of more conservative residents, the poll in Lawrence still promoted the image of a forward-thinking community making a meaningful statement against the arms race, its threat to world peace and security, and its economic costs.

The second, related reason behind the promotion of the freeze poll in Lawrence was that residents perceived themselves, as Tom Moore noted at the time, as "part of the potential nuclear war victims constituency."[46] This theme of potential victimhood was popular among freeze organizers around the nation, designed to unite concerned citizens in anti-nuclear activity that avoided political partisanship and refrained from complex debates about military strategy, economic policy, and international diplomacy. Taking a stand against the arms race was, for many Americans, a matter of conscience rather than a conventional political statement. For example, the board of Palmyra, a rural township just south of Lawrence, adopted a nuclear freeze resolution in April 1982, basing their decision "mainly out of our own consciences" and not representative of public opinion in the township.[47] This is not to suggest that anti-nuclear activists shunned conventional debate over nuclear policy. To the contrary, the LCPJ amassed a healthy collection of fact sheets, pamphlets, and brochures that kept its constituents updated on key political and military issues. The humanist notion of anti-nuclear sentiment based on conscience, however, ran alongside these issues, occasionally dominating the debate.

In Lawrence, these ideas were aired within the framework of the local community. The primary campaigning slogan used by the group in the summer preceding the November election was, simply, "Enough." Pamphlets promoting the freeze poll also suggested that "in a democracy, we are all responsible for pushing the button," highlighting the equally potent theme of citizen responsibility.[48] But how much did this ideal of a concerned, active citizenry reflect reality? Of the 16,667 residents of the City of Lawrence who voted in the general election of November 2, 1982, only 53 percent of voters chose to participate in the concurrent

nuclear freeze poll along with casting their regular votes. This amounted to just less than a quarter of the registered voters in Douglas County, hardly a resounding statement of local democracy in action and even less one of communal anti-nuclear unity. The poll's outcome was nevertheless considered a success by the LCPJ, with 6,541 voters supporting the freeze resolution, and 2,298 opposed, just shy of a 3:1 success ratio.[49]

Members of the LCPJ realized the limited potential of the freeze poll, however successful it was claimed to be. Public opinion, argued Clark Coan, could only go so far, and public votes in favor of freeze resolutions in Lawrence and elsewhere were only the beginning of what he hoped would be "a sophisticated campaign to influence our Senators and Congressman [sic]."[50] Concerns were raised within the group prior to its work on the freeze vote that preaching to the converted was ineffective. A working paper suggested that talk about nuclear disarmament was the smallest part of their peace advocacy:

> Our task, as I see it, is to being reaching all kinds of people and to get them to ACT responsibly. We need to generate broad based support for a new kind of lifestyle, one that is just, ecologically sound, and socially responsible. Our task only begins with reversing the arms race.[51]

In converting mainstream America to this broad worldview of peace and justice, a comprehensive program of publicity and action was needed. Yet the limitations of citizen involvement in political action posed the greatest challenge to the LCPJ, as statistics on local participation in the freeze poll had suggested.

Experimenting with Cultural Diplomacy

The Day After was an event of local significance in Lawrence that extended far beyond the influence of the relatively minor activities of the LCPJ. Moreover, the film would galvanize progressive thinking about the efficacy of their anti-nuclear message, and how they could mobilize ideas about local identity and heartland authenticity toward a much larger audience. In the twelve months between the end of the filming and the premiere of *The Day After* in Lawrence in October 1983, many residents, including those who had acted in the film as extras, recalled that the issue of nuclear war almost disappeared from public consciousness.[52] This is not to suggest the peace community was not busy at this time; the groundswell of national support for nuclear disarmament that

had reached its peak in mid-1982 had by no means dissipated, and other activities continued to emphasize the link between anti-nuclear sentiment and local identity.

An organization called Athletes United for Peace (AUP), for example, negotiated with Soviet sports and diplomatic officials in February 1983 to bring a Soviet athletics team to Lawrence to take part in the Kansas Relays, a popular annual track-and-field meet at the University of Kansas. Co-founders Bob Swan and Mark Scott arranged a children's letter writing campaign and enjoyed the support of Senators Bob Dole (R-Kan.) and Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) in persuading the Soviet Sports Committee to accept AUP's invitation.[53] Ostensibly an effort of cultural diplomacy aimed "to help improve the present strained relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.," Soviet involvement in the Kansas Relays in Lawrence was laden with added significance, due to the timely issue of nuclear war.[54] Indeed, Swan remarked in February 1984 that the media attention on Lawrence due to *The Day After* had given locals "a unique opportunity to continue our contribution to peace and to improving Soviet-American relations."[55] Swan had been inspired by anti-nuclear activity after attending the June 12 rally in New York City in 1982; the experience "awakened" and "energized" his motivations to become active in the peace movement.[56] As such, through the apolitical, media-friendly AUP, Swan was able to "speak out for peace and against the insanity of further nuclear buildup."[57]

The Friendship Relays, as they became casually known, took place in Lawrence in April 1983. Mayor David Longhurst recalled finding a "feeling of common ground" with the Soviet athletes he met that seemed at the time antithetical to the bitter relations between their respective governments.[58] His welcome to the visiting athletes and spectators at the university stadium the following day stressed to those gathered that the sentiment of mutual understanding ought to be attempted at the highest levels of government, which would be an ideal first step into eliminating the threat of nuclear war. The press interpreted Longhurst's comments as an invitation for President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Andropov to come to Lawrence to begin a dialogue for peace, and this idea was harnessed by Swan and interested members of the City Commission.[59] Promoted as a diplomatic "Meeting For Peace," the invitation to Reagan and Andropov was symbolically significant, situating a small town in the nation's heartland as an exemplar of peace and diplomacy and demonstrating the political currency of ordinary Kansan voices. The principle behind promoting Lawrence as a community of ordinary voices demanding an end to the arms race, Longhurst argued,

was done purely to express communal fears as they reverberated in Lawrence in 1983—that since "each side has enough weapons to destroy the other many times over, every community is a potential target."[60]

After his exposure to the constructive relationship between city commissioners and the local peace movement, Longhurst became inspired by the ways he could promote his support for nuclear disarmament through his role as mayor. Longhurst succeeded in mobilizing heartland myths of quintessential American-ness and a hardworking, honest people as he drew media attention to Lawrence in 1983, especially surrounding the broadcast of *The Day After*. His responsibility in doing so was not only to his community, but to his children; Longhurst argued that the responsibility belonged to all adults to "do everything they can to build a safe tomorrow for our children."[61] Given the involvement of so many local residents in the filming of *The Day After* in the fall of 1982, this self-conceptualized frame of reference of an ordinary community of concerned citizens publicly demanding an end to the arms race gained additional credence as the national broadcast of *The Day After* drew nearer. The larger stage for these demands only served to enhance local activists' attempts to transcend the limits of local organizing, yet at the same time enhanced the "rhetoric of freedom and equality" that Monhollon argues was historically a key feature of local identity in Lawrence.[62]

Mediating Localism on Television

The Day After was a large local production, and filming took place throughout August and September 1982.[63] The television film's premise was fairly basic: confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over troop deployments in Germany leads to a mutual exchange of nuclear bombs. One of the Soviets' targets is Kansas City. The film follows several families in the vicinity as they go about their lives, in a blatant display of middle-American ordinariness, before the bombs begin to fall. In the aftermath of the nuclear attack, the film follows the survivors as they slowly fall ill and die of radiation poisoning and the once-vibrant Midwestern college town of Lawrence, not immediately destroyed in the attack, descends into chaos and anarchy.

The filmmakers intended to film in the nation's heartland to explicitly show the effect a nuclear war might have on ordinary Americans, and Kansas fit the bill "both technically and . . . creatively," according to producer Robert Papazian.[64] The stereotypical image of ordinariness that the film purposefully projected identified Lawrence as a symbol of Middle America, as the *Nation*'s review put it, with "Americana [that] is

even more banal than usual. The film is set . . . smack-dab in the middle of the country and right in the middle of the road."[65] Banality, however, was one of director Nicholas Meyer's main objectives. Describing the film as a "public service announcement," Meyer aimed to prompt public discussion and debate within a package, as he put it, "as banal, and lowly, as a fucking TV movie."[66] The format for this "announcement"—network television—would be matched by the ordinariness of the lives depicted onscreen, so that the film would not be about politics, rather, as Meyer explained, "about the farmer and people like him and what it's like to get bombed."[67]

Filming in and around Lawrence required the participation of locals, in construction, catering, accommodation, and of course, as extras.[68] Jack Wright, a professor of theater at the University of Kansas, was enlisted as local casting director to find locals to fill about sixty-five speaking roles and to help coordinate the several thousand nonspeaking roles for several key scenes. The necessities of shooting on location meant that the town itself was a star of the production, a prospect that many residents found exciting. Other residents, Meyer speculated, were interested in being involved with *The Day After* because "they wanted to be part of an anti-nuclear exercise."[69] Local identity, then, made its way into *The Day After* by design and by default, adding to the many meanings of localism evoked by the film and local residents' participation in it.

Despite ABC's strident attempts to promote the film as free of partisanship or politics, many interest groups felt otherwise. The LCPJ, upon hearing of *The Day After* and its imminent arrival in Lawrence, planned to use the filming as a "propaganda event," and an idea was floated in a meeting to ask extras in the film to pledge some of their earnings from the film to the group's efforts.[70] One of the LCPJ's members, Allan Hanson, noted that the film was fortuitous—the group had been promoting similar issues for some time—but that it was a decidedly ideal opportunity to reach even more local citizens with an anti-nuclear message.[71] As the hype and controversy around the film intensified within local and national media, the potential reach of the LCPJ was even greater. The group proposed that *The Day After* would give them "the chance . . . to voice our commitment to disarmament not just to our fellow citizens, but to the entire nation."[72] The image of Kansans demonstrating anti-nuclear sentiment would ideally inspire similar endeavors of anti-nuclear dialogue and activity around the nation. Heartland activism, then, was cast in an especially meaningful light.

Despite these ideas about mobilizing anti-nuclear sentiment during the filming of *The Day After*, the LCPJ struggled to speak to a citizenry

that largely regarded the filming as a local novelty and curiosity rather than a politically significant production. At the time, the organizational effort to bring November's freeze poll to fruition demanded much of the LCPJ's attention, and the publication of a local FEMA civil defense guide was also capturing public interest. Lawrence resident Anne Marvin recalled being "really appalled at the timing" of the guide's publication as concurrent with the filming of *The Day After* and its vision of nuclear disaster.[73] Marvin argued that the absurdity of this "scaremongering" was offensive and irresponsible given that the alarmist nature of civil defense seemed to have progressed little since the "duck and cover" days of the 1950s. At a time when "everybody is scared enough by all this [talk of nuclear war] anyway," the combination of civil defense guides, nuclear freeze polling, and fictional representations of a nuclear war suggested a mediated environment of nuclear panic and excessive hype.[74]

As these ideas overlapped in Lawrence in late 1982, they accentuated the scope of anti-nuclear thought among the town's residents. By no means isolated to a small group of moderate pacifists and university faculty, the theme of the local response to the nuclear arms race was one that enveloped many aspects of local politics, culture, and industry. *The Day After* had cast the net much wider than the LCPJ could have anticipated, and the local responses to the nuclear arms race, as guided through their experience of the film, would soon have a national reach as the broadcast date drew nearer. Lawrence's experience within the national anti-nuclear movement was, of course, unique, but the way *The Day After* stimulated debate about the role and efficacy of citizen voices in the national debate about nuclear weapons matched the debate that had occurred at the city level with respect to the nuclear freeze poll. The film and its viewership merely pushed this debate—along with the idea of a unique Midwestern identity responding to the threat of nuclear war—into a wider realm.

Mobilizing Fear

Hoping to capitalize on the intense local interest and media attention *The Day After* would arouse when it was seen for the first time later in the year, the LCPJ formed an offshoot group in February 1983 called Let Lawrence Live. The group was formed to coordinate local activities, as well as a media presence, in order to maximize the film's impact on local anti-nuclear politics. Essentially, the Let Lawrence Live campaign aimed at educating local residents on nuclear issues, so that their response to the film, when they viewed it, would contribute to a meaningful, unified

local statement for peace. Proposed activities included everything from restaging scenes from the film, outdoor concerts, children's letter-writing campaigns, and surrounding the city with a human chain, but the eventual schedule included some workshops, a town meeting, and a candlelight vigil after the film finished showing on television.[75] The idea behind these activities was relatively simple: the Let Lawrence Live campaign proposed *active* viewership of *The Day After* in order for viewers to pressure Washington to ensure "that the arms race be reversed and the threat of nuclear war be removed from human existence."[76] This way, local residents would join the already established peace movement objecting to the nuclear arms race.

As the organizers of Let Lawrence Live were at pains to point out, they were no experts in military strategy or nuclear politics:

> Let Lawrence Live is not committed to any *particular* disarmament scheme, such as a test ban treaty, the freeze, or a "build-down" concept. We leave decisions as to the means to world leaders, but we insist on the end: that the arms race be reversed and the threat of nuclear war be removed from human existence.[77]

Emphasizing a generalized perspective enabled the group to reach a broader audience. By virtue of its unique experience with *The Day After*, Lawrence would be ideally poised to register its demand that the events portrayed in the film never occur, not in Lawrence, not in Kansas, and not anywhere else in the United States, or indeed the world. The campaign's voice spoke loudest to the theme of ordinary Americans affected by a nuclear war. This prospective horror, foreshadowed in fiction in *The Day After*, was a repeated focus of local discussion around the time of the November 1983 broadcast. What local voices added to this call for nuclear sanity was—intentionally or not—an authentic heartland rhetoric of common sense, something the film's fictional characters could not offer.

Let Lawrence Live coordinator Allan Hanson recalled that in 1982 and 1983, many people in Lawrence became acquainted with the issue of nuclear for the first time due to their participation in the *The Day After*.[78] Ellen Anthony-Moore, then an eleven-year-old with a speaking role in the film, remarked a few years later, "I didn't really think about these things before I was in the movie."[79] For many, the attraction of appearing in a major television production prompted their involvement as extras or crew; for example, there were huge lines at local casting sessions. But what meanings did locals attach to their participation in the film? It was

true that many Lawrencians were interested in the political and educational aspects behind the production. Harliss Howard, a non-professional actor, felt "pleased to be associated with a film that intends to educate people about the effects of a nuclear war." It was important, he argued at the time, that people realize the nuclear threat was "not a fantasy."[80]

Casting director Jack Wright shared similar sentiments and encouraged his step-daughter Ellen Anthony-Moore to think of her role in the film as a "socially conscious act." As Anthony-Moore recalled, her parents talked about the film as:

> a social project, not "you're going to be in a movie" . . . They talked to me about it as a film about war . . . it was a social issue before it was the idea of a child thinking of themselves as someone "in the movies."[81]

Did participation in the film necessarily represent an interaction with such social and political ideas? Other children and young adults involved as extras expressed a mixture of fear and excitement, owing to their vague understanding of the seriousness of the subject matter alongside enthusiasm about being involved in a film.[82] Viewing the project as a local curiosity, though, was inevitable. The outdoor locations, local landmarks, and the thousands of extras, served to define the film's setting and premise in the minds of locals and outsiders alike.

Other local voices can tell us much more about the many meanings ascribed to *The Day After* and its significance as a local anti-nuclear statement. Anne Marvin felt the fact that Lawrence was the center of attention in the film was a bit of a joke, since Lawrence was not "in the middle of the action . . . not a coastal city." Marvin was, she admitted, "kind of defensive" about her own image of Kansas, and thought the dialogue in the film was a little silly: that was "how [the filmmakers] thought farm people talk." However, Marvin certainly recognized the geopolitical significance of the area within the film. As she recalled:

> There was always a lot of consciousness in this area that we're not that far from the Strategic Air Command base up near Omaha, that Kansas City would be a major target, that there were a lot of missile silos around here. I mean, everyone knew that, and it's not like it was any big surprise to have someone portray the area as a target.[83]

Through her personal interests and her professional life, Marvin had been conscious of the image of Kansas as it was portrayed "in the

popular mind," and the fact that *The Day After* portrayed a very conventional representation of Midwestern stereotypes bothered her greatly. However, Craig Miner has argued that, historically, Kansas's reputation has stemmed precisely from such exaggeration in media and popular culture. Hence, in the 1980s *The Day After* aired a very typical idea of Midwestern ordinariness.[84] Combined with themes of localism and regional identity prevalent in the cultural heartland myth, *The Day After* is significant due to its contribution to this myth, and, alternately, its progressive contribution to political debate.

For other local extras involved in the production, the experience such scenes of imagined devastation was both exciting and chilling. The eeriness and effectiveness of the makeup and set construction encouraged extras to wonder, "What if this were real?" Local resident Beth Myers took part in two large crowd scenes and was fascinated by the process filming a large production, as well as the authenticity of the extras' makeup. However, when she saw the film for the first time, she recalled, "Nothing prepares you for when you sit and see what the realization has been." In eastern Kansas, a nuclear war was "entirely plausible and entirely believable," and Myers considered *The Day After* a seminal representation of nuclear fears that had, at least for her, been reverberating even in the smallest rural Kansan communities since her childhood in the 1960s. Myers' recollections suggest an explicit connection between the "fun, but thought provoking" experience of the filming and the horrifying end product that she still cannot sit through.[85] Other residents recalled similar experiences; while the filming was interesting and fun, the realistic look of nuclear devastation created by the crew was "sobering."[86] It took the transformation of the physical environment by the filmmakers to stimulate among locals the thought of "that whole reality of what was possible," according to another local, Kelly Cooper.[87]

These recollections mirror the local dialogue that emerged around the time of the film's premiere, held at the University of Kansas on October 12, 1983, and its national broadcast on November 20, 1983. The *Washington Post* surmised that Lawrencians watching the film would find it a "bizarre experience of watching as their town is destroyed and they suffer and die."[88] Local resident Mo Gronniger argued that seeing scenes of nuclear war played out locally "woke a lot of people up," as many locals "never really thought about it in terms of our geographic location."[89] The experience moved Gronninger to become more active on the issue, writing letters and urging friends and colleagues to do the same. For such residents, *The Day After* imbued local anti-nuclear politics with a wider significance. At the same time, the film and its

reception invoked ideas of localism and ordinariness and stressed the authenticity of these citizens of the heartland in the midst of the nuclear threat. Hence, their reactions to such issues of national and global significance were characterized as *exceptionally* local in nature.

Similarly, the local newspaper was flooded with letters, most arriving at the time of the television premiere. The *Journal-World* devoted several pages to local reaction to the film, with a majority expressing similar feelings of horror, fear, and cautious hope.[90] However, the newspaper also conducted an informal telephone survey of a two-block area in Lawrence that represented "stable, family neighborhoods." Only one household contacted in the survey supported the anti-nuclear ideas behind *The Day After*, while others rejected it as propaganda and most said it had done little to influence their views on nuclear issues.[91] The issue of citizen involvement in such matters of Cold War policy was also contested. One letter to the *Journal-World* urged greater public participation in nuclear decision-making:

> Some say we should leave the decision-making on nuclear weapons and strategies to the military and high government officials. I strongly disagree. No matter what your theory on how to prevent nuclear war (for that is everyone's goal), the involvement of the populace in the political process and debate is imperative.[92]

Of course, this is what the LCPJ and others in Lawrence had been advocating for some time. But the broad sweep of *The Day After* being delivered through the ubiquitous realm of network television enabled debate of these issues at a much broader level than the LCPJ could have ever reached alone.[93] The intense local interest in the film, coupled with media hype, positioned *The Day After* as a media event, rather than simply another made-for-TV movie.[94]

Following the broadcast, a candlelight vigil was held on the university grounds. Residents hopeful that the film's impact would be more than a transient media affair walked from their homes to the LCPJ-sponsored vigil. As Mayor David Longhurst addressed the crowd of around one thousand, he struggled to find the adequate words to console his community in light of the hopelessness depicted in *The Day After*.[95] "Working to prevent nuclear war is our ultimate duty," asserted Longhurst at the vigil, "as elected officials, parents and citizens."[96] What is significant about this conscious demonstration of local democratic citizenship is the determination that a unified voice from a small Midwestern community might be able to somehow affect the course of foreign policy and

EVENTS SURROUNDING "THE DAY AFTER"

We have tomorrow, bright before us like a flame

L. Hughes

Week Of November 13

Photo Exhibit of the Making of "The Day After", Watkins Museum.

Sunday, November 20

2 p.m. Poetry and Prose Reading, Big Eight Room, Kansas Union By Ken Irvy

7 p.m. "The Day After", ABC-TV

Candlelight Gathering

Immediately following movie, Campanile Hill, KU Campus

HELP BRIGHTEN THE NIGHT OF THE DAY AFTER

Monday, November 21

Noon Town Meeting, Plymouth Congregational Church, Mayor David Longhurst presiding.

8 p.m. Forum on the Ecological and Psychological Effects of Nuclear War, Kansas Union Ballroom.
Speakers: Paul Ehrlich, Stanford University
Robert Jay Lifton, Yale University

Sponsored by the KU Committee on the History and Philosophy of Science

Tuesday, November 22

8 p.m. U.S. Presidential Candidates Forum on Nuclear Arms Policy, Kansas Union Ballroom

Saturday, December 3

10 a.m.-Noon
1-4 p.m.
Workshops:
Despair and Empowerment
Being Nuclear-Free
Activists React
Technology for a New Planet
Welcome to the Nuclear-Free Age
Baptist Student Center, 1629 W. 19th Street

DON'T WAIT UNTIL THE DAY AFTER

Sponsored (except for the Monday evening forum) by Let Lawrence Live and the Campus Coalition for Peace and Justice. Not affiliated with ABC or the production and distribution of "The Day After." For more information call 749-2581.

Figure 7 Let Lawrence Live program of activities coinciding with the broadcast of *The Day After*, November 1983.

nuclear strategy. Again, residents ascribed national significance to local anti-nuclear politics, attaching additional significance to the meanings of localism and ordinariness.

The most important feature of these statements for peace expressed by local residents was their status as an ordinary community. As Bob Swan argued:

> The people of our community, of the "heart of America," are inherently optimistic. We believe that good things happen through hard work, that seemingly insurmontable [sic] problems can be solved by dedicated endeavor. Yet like all humans we often feel powerless in the face of the growing nuclear threat.[97]

Much of this sentiment was reflected in *The Day After* itself. Despite the hackneyed portrayals of Kansas farm folk and the stereotypical rural imagery, the response of concerned Lawrencians almost mimicked the deliberate representation of ordinariness on the part of the filmmakers. What set Lawrencians apart from other viewers of the film was this ready promotion of their Kansan identity, insofar as it enabled them to contextualize their views on the nuclear danger. Surrounding the broadcast of *The Day After*, Lawrencians often expressed the concept of their community's unique identity in both contemporary and historical terms. At a town meeting the day following the broadcast, Swan compared the abolitionist movement of the 1860s to the anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s.[98] Invoking the town's legacy of resilience and a mythic commitment to longevity, Swan and others actively promoted Lawrence's self-perception as an "embattled" community.

Framing Identity: Local and National

The overlapping of local reactions to *The Day After* and outside reports of a unique Midwestern activist community highlight the multiple meanings ascribed to the film, the identity of the community, and the efficacy of local anti-nuclear politics. *The Day After* did provide an astute but fairly conventional outsider's interpretation of heartland imagery and romanticism. Combined with the potent sociopolitical issue of nuclear war, the film, according to *Newsweek*, "removes the unimaginable from the abstract and makes it shatteringly real: this is what a nuclear Armageddon is going to look like."[99] Locally, this reverberated in additional ways when concerned residents pondered how they might respond to the film's message due to their unique experience with *The Day After*.

But beyond these considerations, what can the local response to *The Day After* tell us about issues of community, politics, and the nuclear threat in Middle America?

Many Lawrencians were mobilized by the film to actively respond to the threat of nuclear war in a *political* way. As they viewed the arms race as an issue that transcended the commentary of *The Day After*, concerned residents aired their perspectives accordingly, whether through letter writing, campaigning, or at the polling booth. These activities were mirrored by local peace activists. In early 1984, a newly formed coalition of peace-oriented community groups, dubbed the Progressive Coalition, deemed the film an event that ought to be capitalized on. Their statement of principles emphasized issues of civil responsibility, participatory democracy, and local identity:

> Recent events have thrust the city of Lawrence onto the national and international stages as a symbol of humankind's desire for peace. The visit of Soviet athletes, the Mayor's invitation to President Reagan and Secretary Andropov for a meeting for peace, and the intense debate stimulated by the film "The Day After" have place [sic] the people of Lawrence in a position of influence far in excess of their numerical size. Media commentators frequently allude to our community as being representative of mainstream America. This prominence places on all caring citizens of our community a special responsibility to develop approaches and policies which can enhance an atmosphere for world peace and social justice and this will require on going dialogue among our citizens and particularly among our local organizations and institutions.[100]

Emphasizing a united response to the civic challenges laid down by *The Day After* was in some ways something Lawrence had already achieved. However, not all local residents responded actively to nuclear concerns at all. Many thought the film an overhyped political stunt, some denigrated it as leftist propaganda, and, of course, not all Lawrencians watched it at all.[101]

Within and beyond *The Day After*, the plight of the ordinary Midwestern citizen in the face of the nuclear danger was a popular concept and served to facilitate a wider discussion over nuclear weapons that positioned ordinary citizens at the center of the debate. Fortuitously, Kansans occupied the cultural imagination as archetypes of American ordinariness. Whether they accepted or rejected this cultural stereotype, many Lawrence residents nevertheless felt they contributed an authentic

voice to this national discussion. By virtue of their geographical location, their identity as (real or imagined) Kansans, and their commitment to civic participation, Lawrencians offered the nuclear debate an insight sorely lacking in military and foreign policy.

The Day After certainly tempered perceptions of local identity and the efficacy of local anti-nuclear activity in Lawrence and brought such activism far more attention than, for example, the LCPJ's nuclear freeze poll. Yet much of the local reaction to the film was intrinsically tied to the way the filmmakers deftly and effectively harnessed the heartland myth. At the same time they used Lawrence as a location close to the geographic center of the contiguous forty-eight states that was ideal for filming and served as an archetypal environment to accentuate the dramatic impact of a nuclear war affecting "ordinary people."[102]

Anti-Nuclear Activism and the Heartland Myth in the 1980s

In the American imagination of the early 1980s, Kansas was the exemplar of ordinary.[103] Since the 1960s, the changing meaning of the heartland myth recast the region's history as one that emphasized the idea of a populist Middle America exhibiting traditional American characteristics of hard work, common sense, and traditional values. "Popular imaginings of the Midwest," writes Victoria Johnson, "implied that its historically *mundane* identity was, by contrast to the 'rest' of the nation, now *exceptional*—the average, ordinary, everyday 'square' was also stable, functional, and representative of core, national ideals."[104] Anti-nuclear sentiment in Lawrence simultaneously challenged and embraced this myth, as it existed in the early 1980s, in response to the division and tension of the late 1960s but also as a means to reaffirm local identity and civic engagement on an issue of local, national, and global significance.

It was this imaginary landscape of rural traditionalism, college-town progressivism, and a mythic ideal of grassroots ordinariness and authenticity that best characterizes local opposition to the nuclear arms race. Mobilizing additional local opposition with *The Day After*, however, was slightly more difficult. On one hand, the film's Kansan location provided outside viewers with images of heartland honesty and Midwestern openness that a big city setting would lack. On the other, local interpretation of these ideas was missing; Lawrencians generally found the local setting of the film interesting and curious and only rarely interrogated its contribution to the heartland myth.[105] Those who responded to the film by invoking issues of local identity felt there was more to the

relationship between the heartland and the nuclear threat than merely this representation of ordinariness. Of course, the Kansan setting of *The Day After* "made the tale more representative for what would happen to the average Joe," but this "average Joe" was a construct, providing the filmmakers and anti-nuclear activists with an opportunity to promote the role of the ordinary Midwestern citizen in the national nuclear debate.[106]

Stepping away from the imaginary realm of a television movie, we can see that the less transient aspects of Lawrence's relationship with nuclear war demonstrate how this idea of the ordinary citizen operated. The activities of the City Commission, politically involved local residents, and the local peace community each demonstrate how Lawrencians used their convictions about the effectiveness of local politics to confront the nuclear arms race and its local manifestations. When the opportunity arose to promote these actions to those outside the city limits, the local response to the threat of nuclear war was portrayed as one incorporating notions of the ordinary American community, mixed with a romanticized affection for the fabric of everyday life under threat from an nuclear confrontation that was part real, part imaginary. This was done very consciously, taking advantage of, as well as reinforcing, popular stereotypes of Middle America, of the heartland, and of Kansas.

While the story of Lawrence's engagement with anti-nuclear issues in the early 1980s demonstrates the significance of these ideas of local identity, community politics, and the meanings of the heartland myth, it highlights broader issues regarding the historical trajectory of community social movements in Middle America. The operation of progressive activism in Kansas in the 1980s—an era marked by the extraordinary rise of a conservative moralistic political culture—shows us how the challenge of success for anti-nuclear activists was laden with additional significance.[107] Most significantly, this challenge reconfigured the meaning of localism in Lawrence. While "social movements need communities," as James DeFilippis, Robert Fisher, and Eric Shragge have argued, and community-based political action is always local in nature, it is the "wider vision" of this organizing that matters here.[108] In the 1980s, this wider vision was the nuclear arms race, an international threat of global resonance and local ramifications. In responding to this threat, local organizers placed additional emphasis on its impact at a community level, enhancing the value of ideas of local identity, ordinariness, and heartland sensibilities.

The nuclear freeze poll of 1982 and the impact of *The Day After* the following year highlight how the meaning of localism in Lawrence

politics was challenged. As Paul Schumaker has demonstrated, community political behavior in Lawrence can be characterized by the pluralist interaction of bureaucrats, citizens, elites, mobilizers, and activists.[109] If Daniel Elazar's contention is correct—that in moralistic political cultures such as Kansas, politics is "a matter of concern for every citizen"—we might observe greater public participation in the local political debate over the local significance of the nuclear arms race.[110] However, the local implications of this issue became contested as citizens and local officials debated the limits of localism in responding to the nuclear threat. As Lawrencians politicized ideas about local identity and the meaning of citizenship in the nation's heartland, they illuminated the contested nature of anti-nuclear politics in the "microsphere" of community politics. In the midst of Middle America in the 1980s, this contest gives added significance to the catchphrase "think globally, act locally," as it helped to redefine the overlap of local identity, community politics, and social movement activism.

6

Lifestyle Politics and Participatory Democracy: Communicating Peace across the United States on the Great Peace March

As the momentum of the anti-nuclear movement—and most visibly the Freeze Campaign—began to wane in the mid-1980s, activists throughout the movement argued that the movement needed a change in direction.[1] Ronald Reagan's re-election in 1984 had devastated many within the movement who felt their efforts at public education would make a difference at the federal elections. At the same time, Reagan's re-election demonstrated to others that they were right about the pitfalls of getting involved in electoral politics and only reinforced their beliefs that anti-nuclear action was best undertaken outside the realm of organized politics. These activists also questioned whether mobilizing public opinion through advertising and educational efforts was worthwhile. Some within the Freeze Campaign began to argue for a greater commitment to direct action, and other campaigns, such as the American Peace Test, brought a great deal of public attention to the continuation of nuclear testing in Nevada, and to those citizens engaged in dramatic displays of opposition to it.[2] Such incidences, far removed from the conventional narrative of the anti-nuclear movement's rapid decline, highlight the complex array of ongoing opposition to the nuclear arms race in the mid-1980s.

In the midst of this splintering of the movement and the debates within its key organizations over movement direction, a proposal emanated from prominent gay rights activist and political campaign strategist David Mixner that aimed to reinvigorate the movement and its fortunes among the American public. Dubbed the Great Peace March for Global Nuclear Disarmament (hereafter GPM, the Great Peace March, or simply the March), Mixner envisaged a moving campaign—a "portable city"—of 5,000 Americans, traversing the country and building

momentum for nuclear disarmament everywhere it went on its 3,700 mile journey, starting in Los Angeles and ending in Washington, D.C.[3]

The Great Peace March aimed to take the message of disarmament directly to the American people, mobilize public opinion in its favor, and convert that opinion into a massive oppositional political culture. Such a snowballing of opposition would, Mixner assumed, encourage the Reagan administration to pursue not only a policy of nuclear disarmament, but also a less aggressive foreign policy, and more egalitarian social and economic programs. Its scope and anticipated, Mixner argued, positioned the Great Peace March, and its parent organization PRO-Peace (short for People Reaching Out for Peace) as the catalyst for a revitalized peace movement, one that intended to accomplish all that the existing anti-nuclear movement had hitherto failed to achieve.

This chapter explores how the Great Peace March evolved from its original incarnation as a glitzy, publicity-driven, mainstream affair under PRO-Peace to a grassroots endeavor that displayed a very different character. It looks at the identities of individual marchers and how they interacted in the GPM community, itself a diverse microcosm of the broader peace movement. Within an environment of declining public and media interest in anti-nuclear activism, a diverse array of activism came together in this ambitious attempt at reinvigorating the anti-nuclear movement. How and why activists on the Great Peace March advocated different approaches to anti-nuclear activism within the confines of the March community itself tells us a lot about the nature of participatory democracy and its practice in the context of a large and varied group. Just like other communities of anti-nuclear activism, tensions between organizational strategy and radical idealism were present on the Great Peace March, but their operation in this unique context highlights additional themes. The experience of the March shows that the anti-nuclear movement's relationship with Middle America was complex and multifaceted, due in no small part to the direct engagement marchers had with American communities along the 3,700-mile route. The presence of radical marchers, including those whose commitment to nuclear disarmament was more personal than political, was a challenge for the broader GPM community as it navigated the politics of consensus, individualism, and image.

These debates were by no means unique to the Great Peace March, but their presence within this type of activist community in 1986 raises additional questions about the function of performative dissent in the anti-nuclear movement of the mid- to late 1980s. As the GPM encountered rural communities unfamiliar with progressive forms of dissent,

questions of approach and image were raised by marchers worried about connecting with Middle America. As such, the GPM struggled to devise a united, palatable anti-nuclear message. Middle America, many marchers argued, would all too easily view the Great Peace March as a shambolic gathering of hippies, and promoted the March as a moderate community, comprised of families, grandparents, students, and professionals.

These challenges speak to the complex struggles faced by social movements in finding a compromise between different approaches of protest. Of course, as Francesca Polletta reminds us, participatory democracy is never as simple as the "clash between moral principle and political reality."[4] Within the community of the Great Peace March over its nine-month existence, the practices of egalitarianism and decision-making were debated daily. As the March was in the public eye on a daily basis, its image was a continual matter of concern. And in addition to the practical realities that dominated GPM organization on a daily basis—such as feeding, sleeping, occasionally showering, and transporting equipment for a large group of people—ideas about the practice of democracy and the meaning of peace in such an environment were equally pressing concerns. As a unique anti-nuclear protest in the twilight of the Cold War, the Great Peace March highlights the often troubled and uncomfortable relationship that social activism on the left had with the public it so desperately hoped to reach.

Corporate Peace Organizing and the Beginnings of the GPM

Following Reagan's re-election, some within the anti-nuclear movement hoped to create a new sphere of opposition to nuclear weapons. The disinterest with which the American public viewed the movement would be overcome, they argued, by utilizing a new language and style of protest. Attempting to place itself squarely within mainstream political culture, yet without resorting to the rhetoric of fear that characterized much anti-nuclear activism, these organizers hoped to persuade ordinary Americans that "peace is patriotic."[5] One such organizer was David Mixner, who viewed this approach as the most ideal way to move the peace movement forward in early 1985. Mixner had worked on Eugene McCarthy's presidential campaign in 1968, had been one of four core organizers of the Vietnam War Moratorium in October 1969, and also served as national co-chairman of Colorado Senator Gary Hart's presidential bid in 1984. Mixner devised a movement around his conviction that, by taking the message of nuclear disarmament directly to the people, he could inspire a mass movement dedicated to bringing about

nuclear disarmament and to restoring hope among Americans worried about the seeming inevitability of the nuclear arms race.[6]

Mixner envisaged PRO-Peace as a wealthy, reputable, highly publicized venture, relying on endorsements and donations, with a paid staff and a corporate image. The organization was essentially a "big machine," one "completely oriented to attract media attention" and built on the premise that if such an image were maintained, support could be gleaned from sectors of the public hitherto untapped by the anti-nuclear movement.[7] Through this particular approach, marchers would inspire in ordinary Americans across the nation, "the belief that they can do something about the nuclear arms race," according to Mixner.[8] The creation of this "moral force" of public opinion was ambitious; Mixner intentionally aimed for "something so immense that it would in itself demonstrate what commitment and will can do."[9] Similarly, PRO-Peace literature spoke about "restoring hope" to a world where "a sense of individual powerlessness" contributed to a runaway nuclear arms race. A movement of ordinary citizens on a major peace march would be transformative, as "their courage and dedication will inspire in millions both the renewed hope that the nuclear threat can be removed and the new will to act on that hope."[10]

Various drafts of the GPM statement of purpose reflect the wide scope of the March, its intended impact, and the ideas proffered by PRO-Peace. The statements emphasized the significance of people power and an assumed heritage of nonviolent protest inherited from Gandhi, King, and Thoreau. By claiming, "It is through individual acts of conscience that the movement to abolish nuclear weapons will prevail," PRO-Peace seemed to display a kind of affinity with personalist pacifism.[11] However, as Mixner reiterated, the GPM was "not an act of conscience [or] a symbolic effort."[12] Its aims of a mass movement with a concrete objective—the abolition of nuclear weapons—was far from the broad worldview shared by pacifists in the peace movement. Instead, PRO-Peace anticipated an emphatic scenario that linked peace movement mobilization with volunteerism and community activism:

> The March will spark nine months of grassroots organizing and media coverage which will educate and mobilize millions of people in this country to abolish nuclear weapons. The scope and dignity of the March will draw thousands of new volunteers and donors to the peace movement. Activities and events of the March will affect the lives of us all, and generate a list of millions of people who support global nuclear disarmament. At the conclusion of the March,

> thousands of marchers and those inspired by the March will return home more dedicated to pursuing peace within their communities.[13]

Emphasizing the potential of citizen action and the mobilizing power of a committed community of peace marchers whose "dignity" would attract new support, Mixner's vision of the GPM was particularly unique and, according to anti-nuclear movement leaders, particularly misguided.[14]

With this idea of citizen agency, the campaign of the Great Peace March aimed at involving as many Americans as possible in a renewed climate of anti-nuclear fervor. Throughout 1985, PRO-Peace revealed grand plans for a contingent of 5,000 marchers, a support crew equipped with portable showers, toilets, kitchens, a laundry, and enough comforts to enable middle class Americans to take part. A "hospital unit, day-care center, waste and water recycling facilities, even an internal radio station" were also planned, promoting an image of a wealthy, organized endeavor.[15]

PRO-Peace itself had a salaried staff, a suite of offices on Beverly Boulevard in Los Angeles, and was using computers, "further evidence of a 1980s-style professionalism unheard of in the peace movement."[16] The removal from traditional peace movement organizing seemed dramatic; as the *Washington Post* commented, PRO-Peace's "full computer setup . . . gave a professional '80s aura to the groovy '60s scenario."[17] Just as PRO-Peace intended, this professional image encouraged the involvement of nontraditional peace movement supporters. As staffer Torie Osborn commented, "We tapped people who had never given [money] to the peace movement, people who were impressed by the activity and spirit in the office." Osborn suggested that PRO-Peace's ambitions in soliciting non-traditional sources of financial support "will raise the standard of political organizing on the left."[18] The "feverish intensity" with which PRO-Peace sought support from Hollywood celebrities and others in the entertainment industry further demonstrated this nontraditional approach.[19] However, it also reinforced an underlying goal of appealing to the public independent of partisanship, negativity, the potential "stigma" of the grassroots left, activism based on fear of nuclear war. As *Mother Jones* observed, Mixner's grand ambition and style demonstrated a "rhetoric and delivery [that] drew upon firebrand evangelism as well as the human potential movement."[20] As such, the Great Peace March was borne from a lofty idealism, matched with untested methods that were quite foreign to the anti-nuclear movement, its membership, and its traditional constituencies.

Mixner didn't operate entirely independent of the established anti-nuclear movement. In drafting PRO-Peace literature and promotional material, he sought advice and feedback from key organizers. PRO-Peace aimed at a comprehensive approach to its organizing, soliciting responses on the GPM Statement of Purpose from legislators, academics, and peace movement organizers. It received supportive feedback from Congressman Ron Dellums (D-Calif.), Bishop of Detroit Thomas Gumbleton, the American Friends Service Committee, various state and city Freeze groups, and Norman Solomon of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, among others. Most supported the general premise of the GPM. Some, however, felt its ideas were too narrow and wanted the GPM Statement of Purpose and the ideas behind it broadened to take into account issues such as racism, sexism, conventional weapons, and electoral drives, to name a few.[21]

More tellingly, not all were supportive of PRO-Peace's approach or its language. Randy Kehler, who had recently resigned from his position as national Freeze Campaign coordinator in St. Louis, told David Mixner he felt the idea was appealing in its approach and its attitude toward nonviolence and peace:

> Most of all I like the call for greater commitment, risk-taking, personal sacrifice—the call for unrelenting effort—for this is certainly what it will take to turn the nuclear arms race around. I am convinced that the great volume and variety of educational and consciousness-raising activities of the past four years have brought many people to the point of personal readiness for this kind of effort. Imaginative, dramatic action of the sort you are planning—especially if set in the context of a longer-term, transnational strategy for achieving a meaningful yet realistic goal—may well provide the necessary inspiration for people to make this greater commitment.[22]

The problem with PRO-Peace, Kehler argued, was that it was too vague in the proposed application of these ideas. PRO-Peace literature was adept at mobilizing ideas about citizen empowerment and feel-good activism for middle-class Americans, but as a peace organization, its structure was quite undefined. Moreover, PRO-Peace was an entirely new entity that, although geared toward a relatively short-term campaign—the GPM—hinted at a longer term strategy toward nuclear disarmament and a vague ideal of "world peace."

Kehler also found Mixner's organizational model unsatisfying. The GPM was not to be a democratically run endeavor; PRO-Peace would

operate as a bureaucratic organizing body from Los Angeles, with Mixner as executive director, a paid staff, and a board of directors guiding the promotion, image, and activities of the March. "It seems to me," Kehler responded:

> that at least one of the things needed in order to overturn or transform the attitudes and practices that now push us closer and closer to nuclear catastrophe is, for want of a better term, "citizen empowerment." [. . .] What's needed are actions and strategies that encourage people to become more involved in, and thus more responsible for, important decisions that affect their lives.[23]

For pacifists like Kehler, a former draft resister and war tax resister, PRO-Peace appeared a bit of a contradiction; its leader discussed nonviolence and mass citizen movements, yet still operated his campaign in a bureaucratic organization that failed to allow movement participants to serve "no other role than to courageously provide their bodies for this difficult ten-month trek."[24] Leslie Cagan of Mobilization for Survival echoed these sentiments and worried about Mixer's failure to properly define the relationship between individual and collective action in the peace movement. She also expressed concern that Mixner confused its personal and political aims.[25] The Great Peace March, then, earned a reputation before it even commenced as a flawed, yet unique combination of mainstream, well-financed, professional organizing, and a loosely defined model of grassroots campaigning.

Crisis and Transformation

With its grand plan of a nine-month traveling campaign came PRO-Peace's struggle to raise adequate funds. While funds were pledged from Mixner's contacts in Los Angeles, such as Hollywood celebrities and entrepreneurs, the anticipated $21 million did not materialize. Neither did the 5,000 marchers sought, each of whom was required to raise around $3,700 themselves—one dollar for each mile of the March.[26] To many PRO-Peace staff members, Mixner's failure to raise the necessary funds for the GPM came as no surprise. The illusory promise of a successful March was put down to Mixner's lack of accountability and a certain arrogance with PRO-Peace's style that "turned off many, many people" within the traditional peace movement.[27] Some also felt the ambition of 5,000 marchers crossing the deserts of the Southwest, the Rocky Mountains, and the plains of Nebraska—especially during summer—reflected

PRO-Peace's "logistical naïveté."[28] In any event, the 1,400 accepted marchers arrived in Los Angeles in late February 1986, forming a more modest spectacle than had been advertised. Rumors abounded about PRO-Peace's financial troubles: insurance was not forthcoming, camping permits were denied, donations were lacking, and corporate sponsorship had proved largely unattainable.[29] Mixner's vision of a well-financed, professional campaign, a new model for peace movement organizing, had proven somewhat illusory.

Despite these setbacks, the determined group of marchers departed downtown Los Angeles on March 1, 1986, heading east toward the Mojave Desert. Even at this early stage, a more grassroots style of peace march began to take hold; lengthy profiles in the *Los Angeles Times* stressed the ordinariness of the marchers.[30] A fortnight later, with poor weather, low supplies, and lack of organization leading to an ever-dwindling group of marchers, PRO-Peace officially collapsed. Creditors repossessed vehicles and equipment, and many marchers gave up and returned home. However, a sizeable group remained camped in the small town of Barstow, California, and was determined to continue. It was here that the Great Peace March began to redefine itself in a more modest way, shedding the corporate image devised by PRO-Peace, and characterizing itself as a more traditional peace march. It did, after all, have more in common with the War Resisters League's 1976 Continental Walk for Disarmament and Social Justice than it did with, say, Live Aid. This small group of marchers stranded in the desert was, as the *Los Angeles Times* reported:

> a far cry from the well-financed group of 5,000 that were to leave a star-studded send-off at a packed [Los Angeles] Coliseum and set off for Washington, erecting their movable monument to creative and alternative technology, "Peace City," every night as they marched, financed like the Olympics by an impressed corporate America and an admiring entertainment community.[31]

As PRO-Peace's vision of glitz and glamour disappeared, an authentic grassroots organization took its place. Incorporated as The Great Peace March for Global Nuclear Disarmament, Inc., and free of the top-down organizational hierarchy of PRO-Peace, the remaining 400 marchers resumed their trek on March 28, 1986, headed toward Las Vegas.[32]

Between leaving Los Angeles and being stranded in Barstow, the Great Peace March became, according to former PRO-Peace staff member Howard Cushnir, a "strange amalgam of a mainstream group, a left-wing veneer, a dictatorial structure, and a non-stop media blitz."[33]

It was during the two weeks of re-orientation and re-organization in Barstow that tense debate over the style of the new GPM occurred. Many marchers voiced their dislike of the corporate image that PRO-Peace had cultivated, stressing that a more honest, down-to-earth, grassroots approach would be more effective in building the appropriate levels of support in communities the March passed through on its journey. Field director Tim Carpenter stressed the need for the group to organize itself effectively as a "citizens' educational movement." This would involve a "commitment to coalition work," forging relationships with other peace groups that PRO-Peace failed to: letter-writing, bumper stickers, a weekly fast to "build our spiritual strength," and lobbying city councils and state congresses to pass supporting resolutions. These activities were designed to develop a "recognizable national image" and also as essential steps to test, as Carpenter suggested, "How we can mobilize and agitate more effectively."[34] As such, marchers proposed strategies more familiar to traditional peace activism and pacifism, and in light of the GPM's financial limitations, more realistic.

This re-organization was not without difficulty, and it was during this two-week hiatus in Barstow that key tensions over participatory democracy, identity, and image were first encountered. Part of the new GPM organization was a marcher contract, which forbade drugs, alcohol, and violence, and required marchers to work, keeping the GPM on the road while at the same time preserving the camp as a safe space.[35] Some marchers, committed to ridding the GPM of any form of centralized authority, rejected this contract, yet still remained with the March. Other "freeloaders" who attached themselves to the March also could not be controlled, with the new GPM City Council and Board of Directors powerless to eject any persons from the March. This compromise between an open, inclusive and nonconfrontational community and the need to maintain some kind of "practical and political viability" would color internal discussion and debate for the duration of the March.[36] Despite its ostensible goal of spreading the message of nuclear disarmament, many marchers saw the GPM as an ideal space for the expression of personal or lifestyle politics. Naturally, a group of such size would feature substantial diversity, but the nature of the GPM as a travelling community based on participatory democracy meant that such diversity existed as a challenge for March organization and cohesion. There were also pragmatic concerns, including the crossing of the deserts of southeast California, Nevada, and Utah. In the meantime, though, the March blustered on as a working demonstration of a democratic community, characterized by ordinariness, diversity, and an aversion to corporatism.

Negotiating an Egalitarian Identity

The new Great Peace March was determined to be an egalitarian affair, one that emphasized principles of peace, nonviolence, and equality in its operation and structure, as well as in its message. Some of this was inherited from PRO-Peace, which actively sought a racial, sexual, and geographic balance in its group of 5,000 marchers. PRO-Peace had initially anticipated 25,000 applications, from which the most suitable group would be chosen.[37] To facilitate this diversity, Mixner did insist, as *Mother Jones* reported, "There will be no financial requirement to walk." Mixner also revealed that he planned to offer scholarships to those potential marchers who were less well off, in order to "make the march as representative of society as possible."[38] These ideas purported to present an image of a united citizenry within the GPM community. PRO-Peace's thinking was that the American public, inspired by this demonstration of egalitarianism in practice, would follow suit.

The reality this pursuit of egalitarianism, however, was less successful. Even as it attempted to build a social microcosm of racial, ethic, and socio-economic diversity, the GPM remained, as marcher Gary Stall regretfully admitted, "predominantly and unfortunately Anglo-White."[39] New Zealand marcher Anne MacFarlane agreed, recalling, "There were next to no black marchers, a few Hispanics. I put this down to their day-to-day problems taking precedence over anti-nuclear issues."[40] Some peace movement organizers indicated that sustained peace activism, broader in its approach than the relatively narrow platform of nuclear disarmament, could begin to address the deeper systemic injustices that prevented minorities from taking part in peace activism. Pat Gross, national secretary of Women Strike for Peace, echoed these sentiments, criticizing PRO-Peace's mainstream understanding of the operation of injustice. "White, middle-class people often approach the issue [of human needs] from a kind of cosmic sense of saving the planet," she wrote to Tim Carpenter in December 1985. "But many other Americans think about the killing and destruction going on right now because of this misallocation of resources from human needs to armaments."[41] Despite its lip service to such concerns, the Great Peace March was—in name and in mission—a movement for nuclear disarmament, and its simple message resonated with many marchers untrained in more complex issues of pacifism and egalitarianism.

Marchers' experiences did enliven some hopes the GPM would successfully engage with the poor and the unemployed, as well as with black and Hispanic communities. In its earliest days, as the GPM reached the outskirts of Los Angeles, marchers encountered a welcoming response

from local Hispanic families, contrasting greatly to the indifference of whites, office workers, and commuters in the downtown area. This pattern was to be repeated across the country, especially in non-white enclaves on the outskirts of cities.[42] As *Rolling Stone* later reported: "The marchers, most of whom were white and middle-class, were especially moved by the reactions of poor people—unemployed steelworkers in the mill towns of the Midwest, impoverished blacks living in big cities . . . it seems like the poorer people are, the better they respond."[43] Converting this favorable response into social change, however, was another matter. Moreover, the sparsely populated areas of the Great Plains offered the GPM little opportunity for outreach.

Ordinary Folks and Rural America

As it attempted to connect with ordinary Americans along the march route, the GPM faced challenges of apathy and disinterest. A wider decline in traditional political participation—including voter turnout—did mean that marchers sought to demonstrate to the public that political activity did not necessarily involve partisanship.[44] Marchers such as Dan Weinshekner argued that the combination of "conscience raising, living a peaceful life, and working in politics are not mutually exclusive."[45] Undertaking the three together, and inspiring the same among the public, was the key for a successful peace movement. The environment of the March community, others felt, was a place to which each marcher could "bring not just our political selves or our work selves, but our *whole* selves," as Steve Brigham later wrote.[46] Many marchers were attracted to, and invigorated by, the process of engaging in a politically, morally, spiritually, and philosophically fulfilling activity, while at the same time communicating "peace" to those they came across on their nine-month venture.

In this sense, if peace was to be inspired in the hundreds of towns and cities the March passed through, public opinion would have to snowball against the administration's nuclear weapons policies in the wake of the March. One version of the GPM Statement of Purpose developed in Barstow promised that the March's efforts, "like a pebble tossed into a pond, will generate ripples across the surface of our World to inspire the many people, groups, and existing organizations to embrace each other and work together toward this common goal"—nuclear disarmament.[47] Mixner later admitted such an attitude was naïve:

> From the beginning, I made a classic organizer's mistake: the assumption that I could repeat the [Vietnam] Moratorium experience and

> impose a new organization on an existing mass movement without any clear indication from the people that they desired such an effort.[48]

Additionally, by its very nature, the March would merely exist as a temporary or transient presence in each community it came across. However, with the right effort, marcher Tom Atlee felt "it could provide a quantum leap to local peace activism, energizing existing peace workers and involving in long-term ways people who have never considered working for peace before."[49] What set the GPM apart from previous anti-nuclear efforts in the 1980s was its ability to reach Americans in areas of the country that traditional peace organizations hadn't touched. Rural America was a potential goldmine of public support, but effectively mobilizing this support was suitably difficult, if not impossible. Nevertheless, the GPM was confident it could impress upon these Americans the urgent need for peace, due to its person-to-person approach, ordinary image, and grassroots style.[50]

The compromise over style and tactics reached by the remaining marchers in Barstow enabled the March to enact key outreach activities with America's "common people"—those ordinary folks along the March route who offered shelter, food, and support.[51] Since the route between Los Angeles and Chicago was largely populated by small towns and mid-sized regional cities such Denver and Omaha, most of the March's time would be spent attempting to inspire Americans in rural, conservative areas. The Mormon stronghold of Utah and the farmlands of Nebraska signaled a particularly difficult challenge. Outreach in these areas meant connecting with rural America in the most intimate terms, and marchers realized that this connection needed to be exploited.

In doing so, marchers argued that best challenge to negative stereotypes Americans held of peace activists was to engage with Middle America on a personal level. Marcher J. Walter Cobb felt that engaging with farmers in the Midwest individually was essential; farmers would be "more likely to be influenced by our commitment and personal conversation than by a depersonalized mass march by their homes," he argued. However, the reverse was true in cities, where "urban media people want bigness, numbers, drama, glitter and glare."[52] The spectacle of a mass of committed activists would, Cobb assumed, present to urban populations the appropriate image, in a space where personal contact with local residents was not as practical. In smaller towns, local newspapers, radio, and television were ideal opportunities for effective media coverage.[53] In metropolitan environments with a diverse media landscape,

though, the GPM struggled to make a significant impact; Steve Brigham noted that in contrast to small towns, "the big cities . . . never paid us any mind."[54] These two approaches—catering to rural and urban America—suggest that the March necessarily faced two different challenges in achieving its political goal in areas where vastly different types of social capital and political opportunity existed.

As the Great Peace March slowly made its way toward Chicago, it attempted to combat the political disinterest, isolation, and rural conservatism it encountered in small towns along the route. Marchers appealed to what they thought were core community values, using their own ideas of anti-nuclear humanism to communicate their message most effectively. Marchers interpreted the nature of everyday life in towns and cities of the southwest and the Great Plains as very apolitical. The Mormon farming community of Boulder, Utah, for example, was generally "wary of outsiders." Although local primary school children expressed an interest in the March, local schoolteacher Sue Bassett commented that "parents here have no desire to know what's going on in the outside world."[55] How effective could the March really be in such an environment? A similar mood existed in Rifle, Colorado, where locals disinterested in politics were "resentful of [the marchers'] ability to take off and walk across the country."[56] Further east, in attempting a post-March survey outside a Des Moines, Iowa, shopping mall, Ed Fallon noted that around 70 percent of people approached "flatly refused to even stop and acknowledge our existence." Locals, he surmised, were "so involved with the mundane aspects of day to day living as to feel no strong motivating inclination to become more actively opposed to the arms race."[57] Here, marchers equated public apathy with the pressures of everyday life in the nation's heartland; mobilizing Americans in such areas without a visible oppositional political culture was, admittedly, an experimental and optimistic venture.

This casts the marchers as privileged individuals disconnected from the fabric of social and economic life experienced by the majority of Americans. As many of them were retirees or students, taking a nine-month hiatus from the "drudgery" of everyday life was a feasible option.[58] A common taunt in the blue-collar rust belt of Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania centered on the impression that marchers were "independently wealthy people who could afford to stop working for nine months."[59] Tom Atlee felt that the March could transcend these stereotypes by showing local and national media that:

> the real story in this march is the mothers crying as we pass, the young man discussing bombs with an 87-year old great-grandmother

> on her lonely porch in Nebraska, or the young Mormon couple who joined a demonstration at the Nevada Test Site because they'd talked to marchers and decided to do their part.[60]

Here, ordinariness was used as an inspirational caveat in extraordinary circumstances. "We ourselves are the message" urged Atlee, emphasizing the March's humanism, its eschewing of any alienating strategic or economic analysis, and its attempt at using the medium of the march itself as a message of peace, hope, and an antidote to public cynicism, political apathy, and negative stereotypes about the left.[61] In 1986, striving to avoid identification as a "demonstration" or "protest," the GPM advertised itself as a simple, nonpartisan, and "dignified" statement for peace, thereby redrawing the heritage of activism upon which it was built.[62]

Image, Unity, and Individualism

Within the GPM community, this image of polite, palatable protest did not sit well with all marchers, nor with everyone they encountered along the route. As marcher June Thompson commented, ""People are happy enough to wave and cheer and shout peace slogans, but fewer are willing to hear the message about why global nuclear disarmament is crucial."[63] Most people marchers spoke with raised their doubts about whether the GPM could bring about any form of success.[64] To combat these concerns, marchers reiterated that a comprehensive educational focus was paramount, rather than making any sort of compromise in terms of image or style, or emphasizing vague concepts of citizen commitment and "hope." As Atlee recommended:

> Fear of nuclear war and the almost universal desire to end the nuclear threat provide the basis for getting people's attention, and the Great Peace March is an effective means of doing that. But how effective it will be in actually helping to end the nuclear threat depends very much on how it helps people to understand the real causes of the arms race and how they can actually affect those causes.[65]

Other marchers agreed, emphasizing that the sheer diversity of concerns promoted by various marchers detracted from the effectiveness of the March as a whole. In this sense, argued another marcher, the GPM needed "a singular educational outreach project, properly managed, [which] would restore some semblance of respectability to the March."[66] Doing so might compromise the spirit of openness and egalitarianism

that had developed in the March community since Barstow, but the bigger issue, marchers claimed, was to ensure it would achieve some semblance of success in changing public opinion.

To achieve this, marchers proposed a series of public relations directives. Cobb, for example, argued that minimizing individualistic behavior, coordinating work crews and drivers, and involving local organizers and helpers to march in unison while passing through a town, would help present a unified image to townspeople.[67] Such concerns were often the domain of older marchers, who felt that the GPM ought to adopt a respectable, unified image. The GPM's most senior marcher Franklin Folsom, a seventy-nine-year-old author formerly involved with the Old Left, felt that "we are by and large middle class, and there is merit in that . . . We are a middle-class movement trying to influence members of the middle class."[68] Again, this had much to do with emphasizing the ordinariness of the marchers. According to Sue Guist, "The March'll need people like me in Nebraska. A middle-aged, ordinary grandmother, I looked like Middle America."[69]

Despite this attempted focus, it emerged that local media were not focusing on such "ordinary" marchers but were instead turning their attention to those with a more outlandish dress sense. A follow-up report after the March's activities in Grand Junction, Colorado, stressed that the "lack of ordinary folks (i.e., teachers, families) on TV/press coverage was seen as counterproductive."[70] Similar coverage also transpired in Denver.[71] Although the March prided itself on being a diverse, egalitarian community, March organizers still hoped that it would be portrayed in local media as a white, middle-class movement. This would soften the stereotype of hippie radicals that often preceded the March, something many marchers worried was damaging to their efforts.[72]

Radical factions of marchers approached the Great Peace March with a wholly different perspective. For these largely younger marchers, the GPM was the perfect arena for the expression of personal politics. Here, the attainment of specific goals of mobilizing public support for nuclear disarmament took second place to an experiment with alternative lifestyles. As Folsom *et al*. later explained:

> A sizeable group of Marchers felt that nuclear weapons are but a symptom of society's ills and that peace can only be achieved by each individual searching for and finding inner peace and exemplifying that in his or her daily life.[73]

This commitment to personalism superseded the official GPM goal of nuclear disarmament and demonstrates an individualist pursuit of

personal politics common among younger marchers. As Anne MacFarlane recalled, "Some of the younger marchers seemed to have minimal or fluctuating interest in our aims . . . For those young, minimally–committed 'marchers,' the march was viewed as an escape from perhaps the family, study, the job market."[74] The "spirit" of the march, its escapism, and its countercultural potential were of crucial importance to many younger marchers. According to Martin Sickler of San Diego, the communal aspect of the GPM's experiment was most invigorating. Sickler described himself as "a real-life relic from the sixties" and often went under the name "Born Again Hippie."[75] Describing the GPM as "a neo-60s movement," Sickler's enthusiasm for countercultural expression was curious; at the time of the March, he was only twenty-five years old, hardly a genuine product of the era.[76]

Sickler and other marchers interested in personal expression, countercultural ideals, and the freedom of alternative lifestyles on the Great Peace March were engaging in a type of "lifestyle politics" that William Chaloupka defines as "intensely private personal practices in the name of . . . larger issues of world peace."[77] The ideas behind these practices—rejecting authority, alternative dress codes, an extreme commitment to participatory democracy, and so on—demonstrates a willingness to extend the promises of radical protest into the confines of moderate, mainstream anti-nuclear campaigning. Alternative voices on the March demanded a more comprehensive approach that would be personally, politically, and ideologically satisfying.[78] Moreover, they rejected the idea that the March pander to conservative fears of radical protest or peace activist stereotypes, preferring instead to ignore such concerns about the image of the March.

Who Owns the Peace Movement?

Differing ideas about the definition of "appropriate" marcher activity posed a continual challenge to the consensus-based democracy of the March community. When the New Age philosopher Ram Dass—formerly Richard Alpert, a colleague of Timothy Leary at Harvard University in the early 1960s—visited the GPM camp in Iowa, many welcomed his presence and message. Others, however, considered Dass's ideas about inner peace and faith in the wisdom of the universe an affront to productive GPM behavior. MacFarlane felt this sort of talk detracted from the energizing influence of anger or fear as a motivation for social change. The "woolly thinking" of personal philosophies, she argued, was antithetical to realistic, pragmatic, and political solutions that sought to halt the

arms race, which for MacFarlane were more pressing issues than finding one's own inner peace.[79] Still the lack of hierarchy in GPM organization meant that those intent on enacting these personal practices of peaceful living within the March community could continue to do so, irrespective of other efforts to build GPM unity.

Another faction of marchers was marked by a complete lack of principles or ideology altogether. Described as "freeloaders" or "potatoes," these people would join the March community but refused to adhere to the marcher contract, wear ID badges, or work. Many speculated such "freeloaders" were simply interested in free meals.[80] Affirming their commitment to an open, diverse community, the GPM Board of Directors worried about what to do with such people.[81] Safety was also a concern, especially with a number of young children on the March.[82] Additional problems arose throughout the March that called into question this openness, as well as the idea of a palatable image of March respectability. As the March crossed Pennsylvania, a busload of people from the recent Rainbow Gathering arrived, causing division over drug use and mainstream legitimacy. The Rainbow Gathering was an annual gathering of hippies and counterculturalists that Folsom, Connie Fledderjohann, and Gerda Lawrence described as "a get-together [that] goes on for days and involves alleged dope smoking and spiritual activities that are not in the mainstream of religious life."[83] Similar questions were raised about the support given to the GPM by the Cleveland Communist Party, who

Figure 8 The Great Peace March for Global Nuclear Disarmament, 1986.

walked with the March as a contingent of the annual Cleveland Walkathon.[84] Identifying with such groups, many marchers argued, tarnished their intended image as "ordinary" citizens carrying a simple, nonpartisan message of nuclear disarmament.

Nonviolent civil disobedience at the Strategic Air Command (SAC) Headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, also caused division. The GPM's spirit of tolerance and a rejection of authoritarianism prevailed, but fearing donors would withdraw their financial support, the March refused to officially sanction such marcher behavior. As the GPM's Nebraska spokesperson John Martin stated, "We don't encourage civil disobedience, and a lot of people don't believe in it, but we don't run a concentration camp either."[85] The controversy over the action at SAC was demonstrative over the dispiriting impossibility to achieve consensus on so many issues. One marcher felt that if consensus decision-making was left unchecked, "this noble project may die under the weight of its own bullshit."[86] The idealistic commitment to participatory democracy, with all its flaws, nevertheless placed the GPM's well-intentioned commitment to democracy outside the realm of mainstream political culture. Its unwavering commitment to consensus, however, demonstrates the powerful sway of democratic principle among marchers, and the prickly challenges of individualism the community dealt with on a regular basis.

The controversy over civil disobedience in Omaha marked the zenith of a trying period for the March. The sweltering summer weather and the endless flatness of Nebraska's cornfields had taken their toll. Small, disinterested rural populations in the conservative Great Plains also contributed to the monotony, emphasizing to many marchers that "the novelty [has] sure worn off."[87] One marcher spoke of the depression that the Nebraskan plains had wrought, calling into question the nature of the March itself:

> I'm just really depressed. I cried myself to sleep last night . . . there doesn't seem to be any purpose right now. We're walking through these towns, and they have felt like ghost towns, and I think that is doing something to us also, psychologically. The fact that here we are, walking these long hot days, we come into a little town where hardly anybody is out on the street, we walk by through little residential areas, and you see somebody peering out a window.[88]

The drudgery of rural life on the Great Plains signaled to many marchers that they were facing an uphill struggle. Marcher behavior also

continued to cause controversy: in response to attempts to adopt a marcher dress code, a group of younger male marchers wore women's dresses in protest, donning frocks for a fashion show at a community potluck dinner in Grand Island, Nebraska.[89] As MacFarlane recalled, the nation's conservative heartland was no place for such expression:

> The worst day of the March for me was when young men started to appear, wearing frocks. Some days before, one or two of the seniors had spoken with concern about the dirty, torn and bizarre clothing of some of the younger men. This had provoked the rebellion. "If the seniors want a dress code, we'll give them a dress code," they said . . . Their civil rights were at stake. They were entitled to wear anything they chose . . . We knew people were apprehensive about us and now some of our men were going to march in frocks. I began to feel as though all my efforts were being negated by those who were making us look foolish with their insistence on their right to wear dresses.[90]

The controversy highlights the broader challenge of negotiating the boundaries of social movement behavior in the pursuit of mainstream credibility and success. As the GPM was, by its very nature, in the public eye for nine whole months, the maintenance of its public image was at the forefront of many organizational hurdles.

The dress sense of many younger marchers, along with the "profusion of beards and sandals, braless breasts and denims," earned the GPM comparisons with a stereotype of the hippie counterculturalism among mainstream media.[91] In addition, critics pounced upon the GPM's aims, if not its style, as naïve and misguided: the *Chicago Tribune* thought the March was "out of place in 1986 [due to] its modest scale and its relative obscurity."[92] Onlookers denounced the GPM as "a mob waving signs and shouting at me," while others recommended marchers should "get off the streets and use your time more effectively."[93] Since the GPM failed to adhere to traditional, political recourse, such as lobbying and letter writing, critics argued that it stood little chance of success, and was destined to remain on the fringes of American political life.

The Challenges of Alienation and Apathy

Despite their best efforts at offering a simple message of nuclear disarmament to the American public, critics argued peace marchers' life-affirming positivity was counterproductive. Where marchers promoted

their cause as humanistic and patriotic, they came across as vague, ill informed, and ignorant of Cold War strategy and foreign policy. After a contingent of marchers appeared on the popular daytime talk show *Donahue* as the GPM entered New York City, a supporter wrote to the March "appalled" at their performance. "Your speakers came across as dedicated, sincere, and idealistic," he wrote, but "peace proposals must be realistic and hard-headed . . . It is not enough to hate the bomb."[94] Another commented that "the smiles, peace and love transcended through the television were nice, but not convincing." Constructive analysis of political alternatives to the arms race was needed, rather than the "personal comments and songs" offered by peace marchers.[95]

A common theme in the public response to the *Donahue* appearance was the GPM's visual, stylistic, and political removal from the very mainstream with which it hoped to connect. As a caller to the program argued:

> These people do not appear to be a part of any mainstream that anybody can identify with, with their own styles, with their own way of speaking, with their own language, with their own symbols—they are completely alienated with the mainstream of the United States.[96]

Host Phil Donahue asked the caller, "What is the mainstream?" To which the caller responded, "People who look like you and me, Phil!" A marcher in the *Donahue* studio audience reacted to the caller's statement with a familiar retort, stating that "on the march we have doctors, lawyers, I'm a software engineer. *We are you*." The March did encompass diversity, he argued, and it did have a large number of white-collar professionals among its ranks.[97] Other viewers, though, saw this as further evidence of a peace movement disconnected from American life; one correspondent argued that uneducated, illiterate Americans found it hard to connect with the peace movement, largely comprised of students and educated professionals.[98]

Back in Chicago, famous writer and broadcaster Studs Terkel, referencing Hannah Arendt, had described the GPM's difficulty in mobilizing public support a challenge against "the evil of banality" that existed in everyday life.[99] In many ways, the gulf between the ordinariness of daily routine for city dwellers and the extraordinariness of the peace marchers was almost impossible to bridge. The failure of the GPM to

interact meaningfully with urban populations—especially in Chicago—was symptomatic of the public apathy that plagued the March. As mainstream media described the GPM as "old-fashioned" or "unconventional," the bigger issue was the gulf between the GPM and mainstream life. In the rural areas of the plains states this was easier to grasp, but in metropolitan centers, where established peace organizations and networks already existed, the GPM had hoped for a more welcoming reception.

Anticipating this alienation, the GPM continued to promote its main draw card—the image of an "Ordinary Folks Peace March"—in which ordinary citizens were undertaking a dramatic commitment.[100] Part of this commitment was the GPM's commitment to personalism and participatory democracy that on occasion did succeed in communicating ideas of peace and democracy to those communities it came across. As Lynne Ihlstrom later recalled, "Residents were able to witness not only the broad societal representation by the marchers, but also observe the peaceful processes used by this mobile Peace City . . . The Peace March was able to offer a living model of alternatives."[101] This came about through personal contact rather than media appearances. Many marcher recollections reiterate that contact with residents in small towns resulted in a much greater exchange of ideas. Sue Guist, for example, met people in Iowa who told her, "When we heard you were coming, they said, 'Lock up your chickens and your daughters.' But you turned out to be regular folks, just like us." An Amish woman she spoke with in Indiana expressed similar sentiments, saying, "At first I felt a little strange about talking to you, you look so different. But underneath, it's just the same. We're all the same."[102]

This common ground did not necessarily translate to political support for nuclear disarmament; it did impress upon some members of the public that the peace movement, rather than being "a bunch of rabble-rousers," could be afforded the respect one would give a any social movement with impeccable "conduct, effort, and behavior."[103] Irrespective of the internal division that plagued the March, in the eyes of such citizens the GPM stood as an exemplar of polite grassroots organizing on the left. The interaction between marchers and ordinary Americans in the nation's heartland showed that the process of peace was real and concrete, and the myriad social and economic concerns shared by Americans could fit together in a conceptual framework of peaceful activity.[104] The anti-nuclear movement, marchers argued, ought to integrate itself into common concerns shared by all Americans;

doing so would lose its single-issue focus and educational drive, but it would make its ideas more accessible to ordinary Americans less familiar with the progressive ideals of the left.

As the March approached Washington, D.C. in November, proposals for public relations stunts again reflected the challenge of accommodating the diverse interests of marchers. Some advocated walking into the nation's capital backward, while others proposed a citizen's arrest of the president.[105] In the end, the March finale was nevertheless a fairly conventional affair, with about 10,000 demonstrators joining the marchers at the Lincoln Memorial for speeches and celebrations. It was, admittedly, a far cry from the million protesters envisaged by Mixner. Moreover, as Sue Guist recalled, "President Reagan was out of town. Congress was no longer in session. Nobody was going to be so amazed at our arrival in the Capitol that they would instantly declare Peace on Earth."[106] Nevertheless, marchers were still invigorated by the outpouring of public support at the rally, along with speeches by Jesse Jackson, Carl Sagan, Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), and Representative Ed Markey (D-Mass.). As the experience of the March throughout the nation had demonstrated, its impact could not be measured in political terms.

Reflecting on the GPM's accomplishments and failures at its conclusion, one marcher felt that "the march has given life to the peace movement," while another saw the poor public turnout at the Washington rally, as well as at other events across the country, as a disappointment.[107] Allen Smith, at one time co-director of the GPM Field Department, felt that the March's survival emphasized a kind of "moral capital," which could be used as an empowering device, used to inspire and mobilize what marchers presumed to be a latent anti-nuclear sentiment among the American public.[108] Many marchers echoed this sentiment, citing an altruistic motivation to "work for peace" after the GPM and continue to enact the "spirit" of the March in their lives back home.[109] Overall, marchers emphasized the personal value in taking part in the GPM, irrespective of its effect, however large or small. By combating stereotypes of anti-nuclear protest, by anticipating conservative backlash, and by mitigating charges of impracticality with assertions their activities were apolitical, marchers reiterated the centrality of *personal* behavior as the key to *political* change. Redefining the meaning of anti-nuclear protest in such a public way, the GPM actively challenged the meanings of activism, of citizenship, and of democracy in the twilight of the Cold War.

The Great Peace March and the Anti-Nuclear Movement

The Great Peace March offered an anti-nuclear campaign composed of a loose microcosm of the American left, and its nine-month journey gives us insight into its struggles with a unique form of peace activism. The "glitzy high-tech public relations event" proposed by Mixner and PRO-Peace demonstrated a particularly corporate approach to activism, common in some organizations as they attempted to reverse the anti-nuclear movement's decline in popularity after Reagan's 1984 re-election.[110] However, the GPM's transformation from a failed mainstream affair into an independent grassroots entity is a story of a campaign heavily invested in the expression of an authentic plea for peace. Assuming they represented a diverse, egalitarian community built on principles of participatory democracy, peace marchers attempted to define their interaction with the public in such terms, speaking of "inspiration," "hope" and "ordinary citizens."

As a conglomeration of all kinds of activists, the Peace March unsurprisingly suffered crises of identity, image, and method. These crises, within the finite space of the March community, demonstrate the familiar challenge of the meeting of middle class pragmatists and radical idealists. Examined separately, these voices give us few new insights into peace movement activism in the mid-1980s. Together, though, the "giant

Figure 9 Decision-making on the Great Peace March for Global Nuclear Disarmament, 1986.

division" between the two perspectives offers a story about the challenges of consensus building, public relations, and participatory democracy within a confined community.[111] As one marcher wrote, "There is a vitality that comes from the younger, freer spirits on our march that is irreplaceable, invaluable and it sometimes comes with long hair and sometimes unkemptness."[112] Tom Atlee agreed, appreciating the spontaneity, creativity, and "aliveness" of the less predictable marchers and hoping that this might enrich the outlook of those who favored order and structure.[113] The survival of the GPM in an environment of diversity and dissent served not only as an ideal model for other peace groups, but also as a model of nonpartisan activism that transcended traditional understandings of organization and activism on the left.[114]

In its attempt to pose a serious challenge to Reagan-era conservatism, the Great Peace March operated as both a polite, middle-class, *safe* anti-nuclear campaign and as a grassroots, expressive protest. Due to this odd combination, it was destined to remain outside the realm of professional oppositional movements that found success in the 1970s and 1980s by working *within* the political system. The success of conservative movements in the 1980s such the Moral Majority or the anti-ERA campaign indicate that the GPM's struggle for mainstream success was an overly ambitious endeavor. Touting itself as *the* peace movement of the mid-1980s, and one that would unite all liberals and conservatives alike against the oppressive danger of the nuclear arms race, the Great Peace March inevitably attracted criticism that attacked its naïveté and lack of foresight. In light of such criticisms, however, the March's ambition deserves serious attention, as it demonstrates the deeper challenges faced by progressive social movements in achieving mainstream legitimacy.

That so many marchers felt they were engaged in a larger process of social and political change through their personal activities adds another layer to this story. According to William Chaloupka, this style of activism was global and political in its ideas, but incredibly local and personal in its practice. "With one eye on global, ideological meaning," he argues, "activists move toward utopia indirectly, by expressively redesigning the ordinary matters of life." In their modest, personal approach, these activists had "an immodest goal: to reconstruct world politics."[115] On the GPM, the practice of personal or lifestyle politics and the demonstration of an alternative society were simultaneously pragmatic *and* idealistic. The seemingly endless process of consensus-based decision-making both attempted to ensure the GPM operated smoothly and effectively, *as well as* embodying the very practice of peace itself. In its encounters

with American society from coast to coast, the GPM demonstrated the value of its intensely personal relationship between community, democracy, and a vision of a better world. Rather than by any conventional measure of political impact, the GPM's significance lies in this challenge to social movement activism in the 1980s. It existed as a romantic gesture to personal politics and the value of expressive protest, as it engaged in the complex challenge of peace at the tail end of the Cold War.

Epilogue

From the first murmurs of anti-nuclear campaigns in the mid-1970s to the apex of a very diverse movement in the early 1980s to the petering out of the movement's popularity in the Cold War's twilight years, the story of anti-nuclear activism in the United States was one characterized by experimentation, compromise, and difference. Not surprisingly, as this book has illustrated, anti-nuclear activism comprises a vast array of interests, each contributing to a movement of disparate voices that has, essentially, continued to exist since the first atomic scientists opposed the development of the bomb during the Second World War. In the 1970s and 1980s, from radical collectives of feminist resistance to political lobbying campaigns, anti-nuclear activism was in many ways defined by what Douglas Waller has called "an amalgam of personalities, forces, energies, and activities, which were fomenting, bursting, simmering, diverging, converging."[1]

Indeed, this was a "movement of movements," and its participants responded to core concerns of safety, peace, and stability prompted by threats posed by the unwieldy dangers of nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and the tense relationship between the superpowers. Their efforts, however successful, highlight the vitality of citizen engagement in progressive causes in the postwar era, a period marked by a decline in formal political participation.[2] Of course, the alternative expression of political and cultural ideas existed in an era in which progressive causes and their legitimacy had advanced considerably.[3]

At face value, the history of the anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s and 1980s might appear to demonstrate how a convoluted terrain of actors negotiated the applicability of idealism and realism—sometimes successfully, sometimes not—in engaging in protests designed to combat the threats posed by nuclear weapons and nuclear power. However, this book has agued that there is more to this story. As activists experimented with the most effective styles, strategies, and tactics of protest required to oppose the imminent and dire "nuclear threat," they engaged with dynamics of social activism that were common among social movements in the 1970s and 1980s, and not just on the left. These dynamics, as the chapters in this book have shown, are representative of the wider challenges faced by social movements in these years.

For the anti-nuclear movement, the popularity of anti-nuclear sentiment did result in a large and varied citizens' movement that peaked in the early 1980s. Arriving at this critical mass, maintaining its momentum, and managing its fallout was part of the process that this book's subtitle calls the "challenge of peace." For many anti-nuclear activists, this challenge was at once personal *and* political. At the same time, the "challenge of peace" represented the difficulty in responding *en masse* to the most urgent of threats: a world on the brink of nuclear war. The dynamics of this response, among them matters of political mobilization, public relations and media, sex and gender, religion and spirituality, localism and national organizing, and the relationship between radicals and reformers were as important as its targets. As the anti-nuclear movement dealt with the politics and culture of protest in this crucial period of Cold War history, it illustrated the centrality of these many dynamics to all movements clamoring for social and political change in the late twentieth century.

Notes

Introduction

1 "Beyond Anxiety," editorial, *New York Times*, June 13, 1982, E22.
2 For the purposes of simplicity, this book refers to the assemblage of actors engaged in various types of activism against nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and other related threats as the "anti-nuclear movement." Although I detail individual movements within the larger whole, the existence of substantial cross-pollination among movement organizations and coalitions indicates that a more appropriate term is the singular. On the idea of a "movement of movements," see Van Gosse, "A Movement of Movements: The Definition and Periodization of the New Left," in *A Companion to Post-1945 America*, ed. Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 277–302.
3 On this diversity, see Jo Freeman and Victoria Johnson, eds, *Waves of Protest: Social Movements Since the Sixties* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999). See also Simon Hall, *American Patriotism, American Protest: Social Movements Since the Sixties* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).
4 See Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso, 1983).
5 On beginnings, see Lawrence S. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), Chapter 1. On the dwindling of the movement, see "Movement Gap," editorial, *Nation*, 4 November 1991, 539–40.
6 The phrase "the challenge of peace" recalls the controversial pastoral letter issued in 1983 by the US National Conference of Catholic Bishops' Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace. Entitled "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," the letter attempted to define the Catholic Church's opposition to the nuclear arms race. While this book does not deal explicitly with this variety of religious anti-nuclear sentiment, the premise of the pastoral letter fits loosely within the book's overall argument.
7 On the "long 1960s" and the periodization of the sixties more broadly, see Andrew Hunt, "'When Did the Sixties Happen?' Searching for New Directions," *Journal of Social History* 33, no. 1 (1999).
8 Hendrik Hertzberg, "It's Time to Start Worrying About the Bomb Again," *WIN*, August 1, 1974, 7–9.
9 Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, 9–10.
10 See Paul Boyer, "From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963–1980," *Journal of American History* 70, no. 4 (1984), 844.
11 See Lawrence S. Wittner, *One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,

1993), Chapter 4. On communist opposition to the arms race in the United States, see 202–09.

12 See Lawrence S. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 51–60.

13 There exists an abundance of scholarship on these issues, but for a thorough treatment of the peace movement during these years, see Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990).

14 See Van Gosse, *Rethinking the New Left: An Interpretative History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

15 This "conservative ascendancy" or "right turn" since the 1960s commands a sizeable amount of literature in histories of both politics and social movements. See, for example, William C. Berman, *America's Right Turn: From Nixon to Clinton*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Jean V. Hardisty, *Mobilizing Resentment: Conservative Resurgence from the John Birch Society to the Promise Keepers* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999); Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, eds, *Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).

16 Key examples include Michael S. Foley, *Front Porch Politics: The Forgotten Heyday of American Activism in the 1970s and 1980s* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2013); Hall, *American Patriotism*; Bradford Martin, *The Other Eighties: A Secret History of America in the Age of Reagan* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2011); and Robert Surbrug, *Beyond Vietnam: The Politics of Protest in Massachusetts, 1974–1990* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009).

17 On participatory democracy in social movements, see Francesca Polletta, *Freedom Is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); and on the historical development of egalitarianism and protest on the left, see Richard Ellis, *The Dark Side of the Left: Illiberal Egalitarianism in America* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998).

18 There is a wealth of scholarship here, but for three excellent studies, see Scott H. Bennett, *Radical Pacifism: The War Resisters League and Gandhian Nonviolence in America, 1915–1963* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003); Marian Mollin, *Radical Pacifism in Modern America: Egalitarianism and Protest* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); and the classic Charles Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice: Pacificism in America, 1914–1941* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1971).

19 On the Catholic Worker and personalism, see Patrick G. Coy, "An Experiment in Personalist Politics: The Catholic Worker Movement and Nonviolent Action," *Peace and Change* 26, no. 1 (2001); Robert D. Holsworth, *Let Your Life Speak: A Study of Politics, Religion, and Antinuclear Weapons Activism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989); and Paul Vincent Stock, "The Original Green Revolution: The Catholic Worker Farms and Environmental Morality" (Ph.D. diss., Colorado State University, 2009). On identity politics and activism, see William Chaloupka, "Immodest Modesty: Antinuclear Discourse, Lifestyle Politics, and Intervention Strategies," *International Studies Quarterly*

34, no. 3 (1990); and Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), Chapter 7.

20 As Wini Breines summarizes, "The crux of prefigurative politics imposed substantial tasks, the central one being to create and sustain within the live practice of the movement, relationships and political forms that "prefigured" and embodied the desired society." In the context of the peace movement, prefigurative politics eschewed strategy and organization in favor of living as closely as one could to a peaceful and just world, by enacting its essence in one's personal and communal life. Wini Breines, *Community and Organization in the New Left, 1962-1968: The Great Refusal* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 6. See also Barbara Epstein, *Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in the 1970s and 1980s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 196–97.

21 See Tamar Hermann, "Contemporary Peace Movements: Between the Hammer of Political Realism and the Anvil of Pacifism," *Western Political Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (1992).

22 Classic texts here include Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations* (New York: Norton, 1978); and Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

23 See, for example, Hall, *American Patriotism*; and Foley, *Front Porch Politics*.

24 Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition* is the best and most detailed history in this field.

25 This book deals with this idea sporadically. The argument that the idea and reputation that the Sixties influenced American politics and culture during the 1970s and beyond has been explored in various ways in several volumes, including Dan Berger, ed., *The Hidden 1970s: Histories of Radicalism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010); Van Gosse and Richard Moser, eds, *The World the Sixties Made: Politics and Culture in Recent America* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003); and Surbrug, *Beyond Vietnam*. The latter's chapters on the beginnings of anti-nuclear activism in Massachusetts in the 1970s are particularly instructive.

26 See Lawrence S. Wittner, "Problems and Opportunities in Researching Nuclear Disarmament Movements," *Peace and Change* 36, no. 2 (2011), 285–92.

27 There are many excellent and detailed histories in this field, including Len Ackland, *Making a Real Killing: Rocky Flats and the Nuclear West* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999); Ken Butigan, *Pilgrimage Through a Burning World: Spiritual Practice and Nonviolent Protest at the Nevada Test Site* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003); Thomas Wellock, *Critical Masses: Opposition to Nuclear Power in California, 1958–1978* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998); and John Wills, *Conservation Fallout: Nuclear Protest at Diablo Canyon* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2006).

28 I use the term "mainstream" as a means of identifying those organizations, groups, campaigns, and ideas that did not seek to challenge political authority or the legitimacy of the state in any radical way. The "mainstream anti-nuclear movement," then, operated as a loose collection of organizations, activists, lobbyists, and analysts whose challenge to the nuclear arms race

was one of liberal reform, and sought to achieve political influence through accepted forms of democratic engagement.

29 The literature here is vast, but for essential scholarly treatments, see J. Michael Hogan, *The Nuclear Freeze Campaign: Rhetoric and Foreign Policy in the Telepolitical Age* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994); David S. Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1990); and the essays within Thomas R. Rochon and David S. Meyer, eds, *Coalitions and Political Movements: The Lessons of the Nuclear Freeze* (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1997).

30 Memoirs from NWFC organizers are also illustrative in this regard. See Pam Solo, *From Protest to Policy: Beyond the Freeze to Common Security* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988); and Douglas C. Waller, *Congress and the Nuclear Freeze: An Inside Look at the Politics of a Mass Movement* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987).

31 See Alice Echols, *Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967–1975* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), especially Chapter 5.

32 The most well-known work on this slogan and its origins is Sara Evans, *Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left* (New York: Vintage Books, 1980).

33 On personalism, see Holsworth, *Let Your Life Speak*, especially 7–12.

Chapter 1

1 Alan F. Kay to Helen Caldicott, August 1981, Helen Caldicott Papers, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts, Box 1, Folder 38.

2 Robert Kleidman, *Organizing for Peace: Neutrality, the Test Ban, and the Freeze* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993), 39.

3 See, for example, Robert Kleidman and Thomas R. Rochon, "Dilemmas of Organization in Peace Campaigns," in *Coalitions & Political Movements: The Lessons of the Nuclear Freeze*, ed. Thomas R. Rochon and David S. Meyer (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1997), 47–60; Barbara Epstein, *Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in the 1970s and 1980s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), esp. Chapters 2–4; Kleidman, *Organizing for Peace*, 39–57, 172–182; and David S. Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1990), especially Chapters 9–12.

4 Charles Chatfield, *The American Peace Movement: Ideals and Activism* (New York: Twayne, 1992), 151.

5 For an interesting analysis of this issue, see Tamar Hermann, "Contemporary Peace Movements: Between the Hammer of Political Realism and the Anvil of Pacifism," *Western Political Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (1992).

6 Harry C. Boyte, *The Backyard Revolution: Understanding the New Citizen Movement* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980).

7 Ann Morrissett Davidon, "The U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1979, 45.

8 Lawrence S. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 459.

9 For a brief discussion of the radical beginnings of these campaigns and the background of their leaders, see Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent*, 149–51.
10 See Epstein, *Political Protest and Cultural Revolution*, Chapters 2–3; Lynn E. Dwyer, "Structure and Strategy in the Antinuclear Movement," in *Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies*, ed. Jo Freeman (New York: Longman, 1983), 148–59; and Steven E. Barkan, "Strategic, Tactical and Organizational Dilemmas of the Protest Movement against Nuclear Power," *Social Problems* 27, no. 1 (1979), 19–34.
11 Davidon, "Anti-Nuclear Movement," 47.
12 Dorothy Zinberg, "The Public and Nuclear Waste Management," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1979, 36.
13 Melinda Fine and Peter Steven, eds, *American Peace Directory 1984* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984).
14 See several excellent studies detailing the use of ballot initiatives in citizen campaigns' political reform: David D. Schmidt, *Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); Thomas E. Cronin, *Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); and for a more critical perspective, Richard Ellis, *Democratic Delusions: The Initiative Process in America* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).
15 Two contemporary sources describe the extent of this local activism and its national potential in great detail and are invaluable resources on anti-nuclear activism in these early years: Anna Gyorgy, *No Nukes: Everyone's Guide to Nuclear Power* (Boston: South End Press, 1979); and Harvey Wasserman, *Energy War: Reports from the Front* (Westport, CT: L. Hill, 1979).
16 Pam Solo, *From Protest to Policy: Beyond the Freeze to Common Security* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), 33.
17 Samuel H. Day, ed., *Makers of the Nuclear Holocaust: A Guide to the Nuclear Weapons Complex and Citizen Action* (New York: Nuclear Weapons Facilities Task Force, 1981).
18 Mike Jendrzejczyk and Pam Solo, "Peril at Rocky Flats," *Progressive*, April 1978, 24. See also *Local Hazard, Global Threat: Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant* (Denver: Rocky Flats Action Group, 1977).
19 "Nuke Maps: The Life of the Party," *WRL News*, May-June 1978, 7.
20 Samuel H. Day and John Hooton, *Nuclear Heartland: A Guide to the 1,000 Missile Silos of the United States* (Madison, WI: Progressive Foundation, 1988). See also John LaForge, interviewed by Mary Ebeling, January 3, 2003, Minuteman Missile Historic Site, National Park Service, Oral History #2003-1, Acc. #MIMI-016.
21 Solo, *Protest to Policy*, 33.
22 Sidney Lens, "The Doomsday Strategy," *Progressive*, Februray 1976, 1–35. Lens's essay is often heralded as signifying the beginning of the anti-nuclear movement in the 1970s. See, for example, Farrell, *Spirit of the Sixties*, 246; and Frances McCrea and Gerald Markle, *Minutes to Midnight: Nuclear Weapons Protest in America* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), 93.
23 "Mobilizing for Survival," *Progressive*, September 1977, 5.
24 MFS's "Call to Action," quoted in "Mobilizing for Survival," 6.
25 Andrew Stiller, letter to the editor, *Nation*, February 14, 1981, 179–80.
26 See Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent*, 147.

27 See Matthew Evangelista, "Second-Guessing the Experts: Citizens' Group Criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency's Estimates of Soviet Military Policy," *International History Review* 19, no. 3 (1997), 583–84.
28 WRL Expanded Executive Committee minutes, February 19, 1977, 2, WRL Records, Series B, Box 2, Folder 1.
29 WRL Executive Committee minutes, November 2, 1977, 2, WRL Records, Series B, Box 2, Folder 1.
30 Tom Cornell, "The Mobe: A Look toward the Future," *Fellowship*, September 1978, 18.
31 Emilie Schmeidler and Mayer N. Zald, "Organizations in the Anti-Nuclear Power Movement," in *Working Paper #252* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Research on Social Organization, 1982), 21.
32 Cornell, "The Mobe," 18.
33 Bruce Cronin to Ms. Holdsworth, November 29, 1982, Leslie Cagan Papers, Tamiment Library, New York University, New York City (hereafter Cagan Papers), Box 7, Folder 2.
34 WRL Executive Committee minutes, March 1, 1978, WRL Records, Series B, Box 2, Folder 1.
35 See FOR National Council minutes, April 16–19, 1978, 12–13, Fellowship of Reconciliation Records, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania (hereafter FOR Records), Section II, Series A-2, Box 8, Folder 4. FOR members Tom Cornell and Mike Jendrzejczyk sat on the MFS Coordinating Committee, and remarked that its planning for the Special Session was "somewhat frustrating."
36 Grayson Mitchell and Robert Shogan, "Nuclear Protest in N.Y. Echoes Vietnam Era," *Los Angeles Times*, May 28, 1978, A1, A11.
37 Tom DeLuca, "The Cutting Edge of Survival: Mobe Looks at Mobe," *Mobilizer*, May 1982, 4.
38 DeLuca, "The Cutting Edge," 4.
39 FOR Executive Committee minutes, February 20, 1978, 3, FOR Records, Section II, Series A-2, Box 8, Folder 4.
40 David McReynolds, "From Chicago to Des Moines: The Second MFS Conference," *WRL News*, November-December 1978, 2.
41 McReynolds, "From Chicago to Des Moines," 2.
42 CNNW mail out, [1980], Cagan Papers, Box 3, Folder 10.
43 David McReynolds, "D.C. Anti-Nuke Rally Draws 125,000," *WRL News*, July-August 1979, 2.
44 Wendell Rawls, Jr., "65,000 Demonstrate at Capitol to Halt Atomic Power Units," *New York Times*, 7 May 1979, A1.
45 McReynolds, "D.C. Anti-Nuke Rally," 2. See also John T. McQuiston, "15,000 Protest L.I. Atom Plant; 600 Seized," *New York Times*, June 4, 1979, A1, B3.
46 For a worthwhile summary, see William L. Rankin, Stanley M. Nealey, and Barbara Desow Melber, "Overview of National Attitudes toward Nuclear Energy: A Longditudinal Analysis," in *Public Reactions to Nuclear Power: Are There Critical Masses?*, ed. William R. Freudenburg and Eugene A. Rosa (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 41–68.
47 CCNW mail out, February 13, 1980, Cagan Papers, Box 3, Folder 12.
48 "600 Arrested at Pentagon," *WRL News*, May-June 1980, 2.

49 Paul W. Valentine and Judith Valente, "Nuclear Power and Iran Raid Condemned," *Washington Post*, April 27, 1980, B1.
50 "600 Arrested at Pentagon," 2.
51 The best study of this idea and its application in the 1960s and 1970s is Francesca Polletta, *Freedom Is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
52 Norma Becker and Nora Lumley, "Coalition for a Non-Nuclear World: An Analysis of the April 26 Rally and Coalition Structure," *WRL News*, July-August 1980, 4.
53 This problem was common across the breadth of the anti-nuclear movement. As Robert Kleidman and Thomas Rochon argue, "Many activists saw strong leadership as incompatible with organizational democracy and participation." Kleidman and Rochon, "Dilemmas of Organization," 55.
54 Liz Walker and Marcy Darnovsky, "April 7 San Francisco Anti-Nuke Rally," *WRL News*, May-June 1979, 3.
55 Frank Brodhead, "Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War: The Peace Movement and the Left," [1982], 4, Cagan Papers, Box 38, Folder 1 (unprocessed portion).
56 Brodhead, "Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War," 8. Emphasis added.
57 Andrew Stiller, letter to the editor, *Nation*, February 14, 1981, 179-80.
58 Quoted in *Lovejoy's Nuclear War*, dir. Daniel Keller (Turners Falls, MA: Green Mountain Post Films, 1975). For detailed examinations of Lovejoy's action in the context of countercultural activism, environmentalism, and the very young anti-nuclear movement, see Robert Surbrug, *Beyond Vietnam: The Politics of Protest in Massachusetts, 1974-1990* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009), Chapter 1; and Blake Slonecker, *A New Dawn for the New Left: Liberation News Service, Montague Farm, and the Long Sixties* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), Chapters 9–10. Slonecker's argument also, quite rightly, discusses the development of these ideas within the context of the splintering and decline of the New Left.
59 John Wills, *Conservation Fallout: Nuclear Protest at Diablo Canyon* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2006), 113.
60 Robert Moore, letter to the editor, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October 1981, 62.
61 Beverly Woodward to Randy Kehler, December 5, 1981, Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign Records, Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri-St. Louis (hereafter Freeze Records), Box 2, Folder 25.
62 Beverly Woodward to Randy Kehler, December 5, 1981, Freeze Records, Box 2, Folder 25.
63 Ed Hedemann, "The Freeze: A Step Backwards," *WRL News*, May-June 1981, 6.
64 See Steve Ladd, "The Freeze: First Step Approach to Disarmament," *WRL News*, 4–5; Randy Kehler, interviewed by the author, November 15, 2010, Greenfield, Massachusetts.
65 Ladd, "The Freeze," 4. Emphasis in original.
66 Ladd, "The Freeze," 4.
67 Hedemann, "The Freeze," 5.
68 Hedemann, "The Freeze," 5. Emphasis in original.

69 Ed Hedemann, interviewed by the author, November 14, 2010, New York City; David McReynolds, interviewed by the author, November 12, 2010, New York City.
70 Beverly Woodward, "The Problem of War, and What to do About it," [1981], 1, Wilbur Hugh Ferry Papers (Addendum 4), Rauner Special Collections Library, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, Box 2, Folder 28.
71 Hedemann interview.
72 AFSC Nationwide Peace Education Division Committee minutes, May 14–16, 1982, 6, Cagan Papers, Box 1, Folder 14.
73 AFSC Nationwide Peace Education Division Committee minutes, May 14–16, 1982, 7, Cagan Papers, Box 1, Folder 14.
74 Comments by Pam Solo, AFSC Nationwide Peace Education Division Committee minutes, September 17–19, 1982, 10, Cagan Papers, Box 1, Folder 14.
75 Jon Saxton, "Nuclear Freeze Campaign: Disarmament in a Vacuum," *WIN*, 1 December 1981, 16.
76 June 12 Coordinating Committee organizational letter, February 1, 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 3.
77 June 12 Coordinating Committee organizational letter, October 8, 1981, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 3.
78 African-American Executive Committee (SSDII), information letter and march flyer, April 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 2.
79 Richard Feldman to Bruce Cronin, March 17, 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 8.
80 Leslie Cagan, draft statement, "General Political Overview for Work on UN Special Session on Disarmament," [1982], Cagan Papers, Box 16 (unprocessed portion).
81 Leslie Cagan, interview by the author, November 11, 2010, New York City.
82 WRL Executive Committee minutes, February 3, 1982, 2, WRL Records, Series B, Box 2, Folder 3.
83 Cagan interview.
84 Hedemann interview.
85 One Coordinating Committee member argued that "attitudes of mockery, of gloating [and] the sense of burden and blame" were examples of personal politics that ought not to disrupt the operation of a committee with such great responsibility. Julie Maloney to Leslie Cagan, April 5, 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 8.
86 AFSC *et al*. to WRL *et al*., March 8, 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 10.
87 David McReynolds to Bronson Clark, John Collins and Richard Deats, March 9, 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 10.
88 For an account of this event and its ramifications in the peace movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s, see Robbie Lieberman, *The Strangest Dream: Communism, Anticommunism and the U.S. Peace Movement, 1945-1963* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), Chapter 6.
89 David McReynolds to Bronson Clark, Richard Deats, John Collins, Randy Kehler, and David Cortright, March 10, 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 10. It is important to note here that there did exist a significant history of organizational friendship and unity between these various peace groups. There was also a substantial overlap in organizational membership.

90 David McReynolds to Bronson Clark, Richard Deats, John Collins, Randy Kehler, and David Cortright, March 10, 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 10.
91 The rationale for June 14 was outlined in a comprehensive handbook produced by the June 14 Civil Disobedience Campaign, containing lengthy discussions of strategies, tactics, historical traditions, and logistics. See *Blockade the Bombmakers: Civil Disobedience Campaign Handbook* (New York: Civil Disobedience Campaign, 1982).
92 "Proposal by the Civil Disobedience Task Force," [1982], Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 5.
93 Letter to the author, May 6, 2011.
94 June 14 Civil Disobedience Campaign information booklet, [1982], Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 5; Richard Deats, interview by the author, November 10, 2010, Nyack, New York; Hedemann interview.
95 See WRL National Committee to AFSC *et al.*, March 15, 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 10.
96 See WRL National Committee to AFSC *et al.*, March 15, 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 10.
97 The official response from the WRL, USPC and MFS to the original letter from the "alliance" of the AFSC, FOR, *et al.* identified these aims within the context of its intent to do so within "a commitment to a center-left unity." It was perceived that the "takeover" of June 12 was done so in the name of a centrist, mainstream organizational philosophy that paid scant attention to the left on its role in the peace movement. See Norma Becker, Sandy Pollack, Mike Myerson, Connie Hogarth, Leslie Cagan, Tom DeLuca, and Paul Mayer to AFSC *et al.*, March 13, 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 10.
98 Leslie Cagan, "June 12th: A Look Back, a Look Ahead," *Mobilizer*, September 1982, 9.
99 Cagan, "June 12th," 9.
100 Cagan interview.
101 Cagan, "June 12th," 9.
102 WRL National Committee to AFSC *et al.*, March 15, 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 10.
103 Patrick Lacefield, "Holding Us All Together," *Democratic Left*, June 1982, 4.
104 Jon Saxton, quoted in Boston MFS Coordinating Committee minutes, June 15, 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 19, Folder 6 (unprocessed portion).
105 Carl Conetta, "Course Ideas," January 4, 1983, Cagan Papers, Box 19, Folder 8 (unprocessed portion). Emphasis in original.
106 David Nelson to June 12 Rally Committee, May 10, 1982, Cagan Papers, Box 10, Folder 8.
107 McReynolds interview.
108 As L. Bruce van Voorst wrote at the time, "Older organizations showed a measure of hostility toward groups such as Physicians for Social Responsibility or Ground Zero, which were considered late comers in the national drive for disarmament." Their professional approach and mainstream image also set them apart from older, more radical organizations. I deal with these issues in the following chapter. L. Bruce van Voorst, "The Critical Masses," *Foreign Policy*, no. 48 (1982), 90.
109 Quoted in Charles F. Howlett and Glen Zeitzer, *The American Peace Movement: History and Historiography* (Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association, 1985), 41.

Chapter 2

1 Here, I use the term "freeze" in several ways. "Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign," or "Freeze Campaign" or simply the "Freeze" (capitalized) refers to the national organization that coordinated what I refer to as the "freeze movement" (uncapitalized), which was a wider, decentralized assortment of affiliated bodies, Freeze Campaign chapters, and other groups supporting the "freeze proposal." The composition of this freeze movement was quite fluid. The freeze proposal itself had several incarnations but was originally drafted by Randall Forsberg in 1980 and jointly issued as a four-page pamphlet by the American Friends Service Committee, Clergy and Laity Concerned, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and Forsberg's Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. It has been reprinted numerous times. For the full text, see "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," in *Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Analyses and Prescriptions*, ed. Fred Holroyd (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 208–15.

2 Douglas C. Waller, *Congress and the Nuclear Freeze: An Inside Look at the Politics of a Mass Movement* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987), 37.

3 Noteworthy studies on these organizations include Amy Swerdlow, *Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); and Milton S. Katz, *Ban the Bomb: A History of SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 1957–1985* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986).

4 John Lofland, *Polite Protesters: The American Peace Movement of the 1980s* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993), 7.

5 This narrative is useful in its understanding of the relationship between the freeze movement, mainstream media, and political institutions and how this relationship explains the failure of the movement to directly influence government policy. Examples of this approach include J. Michael Hogan, *The Nuclear Freeze Campaign: Rhetoric and Foreign Policy in the Telepolitical Age* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994); Andrew Rojecki, *Silencing the Opposition: Antinuclear Movements and the Media in the Cold War* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999); David S. Meyer, "Peace Movement Demobilization: The Fading of the Nuclear Freeze," in *Peace Action in the Eighties: Social Science Perspectives*, ed. John Lofland and Sam Marullo (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 53–71; Charles Chatfield, *The American Peace Movement: Ideals and Activism* (New York: Twayne, 1992), Chapter 7; and Thomas R. Rochon, "Three Faces of the Freeze: Arenas of Success and Failure," in *Coalitions & Political Movements: The Lessons of the Nuclear Freeze*, ed. Thomas R. Rochon and David S. Meyer (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1997), 168–77.

6 Others existed, including Physicians for Social Responsibility, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Council for a Livable World, Educators for Social Responsibility, the Lawyers' Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, and many others. For purposes of clarity and length, however, this chapter will focus on the examples of the Freeze Campaign, SANE, and WAND.

7 The history of this process has been recounted, in detail, in Waller, *Congress and the Nuclear Freeze*.

8 Quoted in Gerri Hirshey, "Women and Children First . . . " *Family Circle*, May 18, 1982, 6, 70–71.

9 Helen Caldicott, *A Passionate Life* (Milsons Point, NSW: Random House, 1996), 343.
10 See John Walsh, "Nuclear Freeze Candidates Claim Mandate," *Science* 218, no. 4574 (1982), 776.
11 Randy Kehler to Mark Hatfield, November 7, 1980, Traprock Peace Center Records, Special Collections and University Archives, W.E.B. Du Bois Library, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Box 2, Folder 8; Randy Kehler, quoted in "Happy Birthday: Ten Years of Peace in the Valley," 1989, 3, Frances Crowe Papers, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts (Acc. 95s-64), Box 15.
12 Judy Scheckel, quoted in "Happy Birthday", 5.
13 This continued a tradition of similarly styled citizen-led campaigns that erupted in the 1970s, often on environmental issues. For more detailed discussions, see Lettie Wenner and Manfred Wenner, "Nuclear Policy and Public Participation," *American Behavioral Scientist* 22, no. 2 (1978), 282–287; and David D. Schmidt, *Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), Chapters 4 and 7. The most nuanced examination of the process of ballot initiatives, although it does not discuss the nuclear freeze initiatives of the 1980s, is Richard Ellis, *Democratic Delusions: The Initiative Process in America* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).
14 David S. Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 112.
15 Harold Willens, "California Freeze Initiative," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1982, 64.
16 See Field Organizing Project proposal, [late 1982], p. 1, Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign Records, Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri-St. Louis (hereafter Freeze Records), Box 3, Folder 60; and Rob Bartlett, memorandum to NWFC Executive Committee, other committee leadership, and staff, December 1, 1983, 2, Freeze Records, Box 2, Folder 56.
17 Randy Kehler to Karin Fierke, June 3, 1983, Freeze Records, Box 3, Folder 61.
18 See, for example, Alexia Hunter, "Rural Organizing" segment of Field Organizers Project draft manual, November 2, 1983, Freeze Records, Box 3, Folder 62.
19 Anonymous to Randy Kehler, [March 1982], Freeze Records, Box 5, Folder 137.
20 NWFC, "1982 National Strategy: Broadening the Base and Creating a New Political Reality" (draft), February 8, 1982, 3–4, Leslie Cagan Papers, Tamiment Library, New York University, New York City (unprocessed portion), Box 38, Folder 1.
21 Richard Deats, interview by the author, November 10, 2010, Nyack, New York; Leslie Cagan, interview by the author, November 11, 2010, New York City; Bruce Cronin, interview by the author, November 11, 2010, New York City; and David McReynolds, interview by the author, November 12, 2010, New York City. See also Sidney Lens, "How Deep a Freeze?" *Progressive*, May 1982, 16–17.
22 As paraphrased in Randy Kehler to Tony Webb, November 9, 1981, Freeze Records, Box 5, Folder 137.

23 Kehler interview; Pam Solo, *From Protest to Policy: Beyond the Freeze to Common Security* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), 24; and Randall Forsberg, interview for WGBH (Boston), March 3, 1988, WGBH Media Library and Archives, http://openvault.wgbh.org (accessed Feb. 16, 2011).
24 Lawrence S. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 77.
25 NWFC 1983 strategy paper, quoted in Field Organizing Project, proposal, [late 1982], 2, Freeze Records, Box 3, Folder 60.
26 David Corn, "Doing the Freeze Better," *Nuclear Times*, July 1983, 19.
27 Mark Hertsgaard, "What Became of the Freeze?," *Mother Jones*, June 1985, 46.
28 David Talbot, "Lights, Camera, Activism!" *Mother Jones*, May 1985, 9.
29 National Register for Democracy Mobilization, "Call for National Voter Registration Mobilization," July 1982, Freeze Campaigns Collected Records, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, Box 1, Folder 19.
30 PSR Executive Committee minutes, February 4, 1983, 4, Physicians for Social Responsibility Records, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, Series II, Box 35, Folder 1 (Acc. 94a-073).
31 See William Robbins, "Diverse Antiwar Movement Cites Gains," *New York Times*, July 18, 1983, A6; and Tim Carrington, "Anti-Nuclear Movement Loses Force as Reagan Seeks Arms-Reduction Agreements with Soviets," *Wall Street Journal*, February 5, 1985, 64.
32 Katz, *Ban the Bomb*, 152.
33 Founded in 1965, Rapp & Collins later became Rapp Collins Worldwide, at one time in the mid-1990s the biggest direct-marketing agency in the world. "Rapp Collins Worldwide," *Advertising Age*, September 15, 2003, http://www.adage.com (accessed February 15, 2014).
34 Stan Rapp to David Cortright, January 14, 1982, SANE, Inc. Records, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania (hereafter SANE Records), Series G, Box 65, Folder 1.
35 A direct mail campaign run by Clergy and Laity Concerned in 1981, for example, had a mere 0.42 percent response rate. It did, however, make back its costs for the mailing. SANE's own campaign in the Fall of 1981, costing $70,000 to reach 390,000 individuals, returned those costs with a profit of $30,000. Other direct-mailing lists it targeted generally made back about 50 percent on top of costs. See Rapp & Collins, Inc., "A Plan for a SANE Development Program and Public Opinion Campaign," April 1982, 22–25, SANE Records, Series G, Box 65, Folder 2.
36 Alan Silver, "Understanding the Audience," June 7, 1982, 2, SANE Records, Series G, Box 65, Folder 2.
37 SANE Staff to Tom Collins and Stan Rapp, April 17, 1982, SANE Records, Series G, Box 65, Folder 1.
38 SANE Staff to Collins and Rapp.
39 Cathy Cevoli, "Antinuclear Stars Come Out," *Nuclear Times*, July 1983, 27.
40 Cevoli, "Antinuclear Stars," 27.
41 Caldicott, *A Passionate Life*, 261–62; Helen Caldicott, interviewed by the author, September 20, 2010, Bermagui, New South Wales, Australia.
42 "Results: New York Times Ad," [June 1982], SANE Records, Series G, Box 65, Folder 3.

43 David Cortright to Tom Collins and Stan Rapp, September 9, 1982, SANE Records, Series G, Box 65, Folder 1.
44 Ed Glennon, comments on a sample SANE direct mailing letter, [1982], SANE Records, Series G, Box 65, Folder 1. Emphasis in original.
45 David Cortright to Tom Collins and Stan Rapp, September 9, 1982, SANE Records, Series G, Box 65, Folder 1. Emphasis in original.
46 Tom Collins to David Cortright, September 23, 1982, SANE Records, Series G, Box 65, Folder 1. The $36 million figure is in 2003 US dollars. See Mal Warwick, *Testing, Testing, 1, 2, 3: Raise More Money with Direct Mail Tests* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003), 40.
47 Tracy Research, "Qualitative Evaluation of Two Alternative Print Ads Developed for SANE," June 1982, 8, SANE Records, Series G, Box 65, Folder 4.
48 Tracy Research, "Qualitative Evaluation," 14, 18.
49 Tracy Research, "Qualitative Evaluation," 18.
50 SANE Executive Committee meeting minutes, August 12, 1982, 1, SANE Records, Series G, Box 4, Folder 1.
51 David Cortright, SANE fundraising letter, January 1983, SANE Records, Series G, Box 29, Folder 4.
52 David Cortright to SANE members, September 1, 1983, SANE Records, Series G, Box 11, Folder 2.
53 Michael Mawby, "Moderates, if We Must," *Nuclear Times*, January 1984, 15. Mawby was also the director of SANE PAC.
54 On the range of activities in SANE's 1984 and 1985 programs, see "National SANE Education Fund Progress Report, November 1984–May 1985," 6, SANE Records, Series G, Box 11, Folder 1; Cortright to SANE members, September 1, 1983; and David Cortright to James Kettler and Stewart Mott, SANE Records, Series G, Box 101, Folder 2.
55 "A New Image for Antinuclear Lobby," *New York Times*, April 17, 1984, A18.
56 David Cortright, quoted in "A New Image," A18.
57 David Cortright to SANE members, March 1984, SANE Records, Series G, Box 29, Folder 3.
58 Cortright to SANE members, March 1984.
59 Cortright to SANE members, March 1984.
60 *Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections*, 1984, http://uselectionatlas.org (accessed September 5, 2011). On the Republican victory and its implications for the anti-nuclear movement, see Waller, *Congress and the Nuclear Freeze*, 293–99. On the elections as a turning point, see Solo, *Protest to Policy*, xiv; and Hogan, *Nuclear Freeze Campaign*, 2–3.
61 David S. Meyer, "Institutionalizing Dissent: The United States Structure of Political Opportunity and the End of the Nuclear Freeze Movement," *Sociological Forum* 8, no. 2 (1993), 159.
62 David Cortright, SANE funding appeal letter, [late 1984], SANE Records, Series G, Box 11, Folder 2.
63 Pamela Oliver and Gerald Marwell, "Mobilizing Technologies for Collective Action," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon Morris and Carol Mueller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 259.
64 On diminishing media interest, see, for example, Hertsgaard, "What Became of the Freeze?" 44–47; and Waller, *Congress and the Nuclear Freeze*, 299–301.

65 David Cortright, “Expanding the Peace Movement,” first draft, 1–2, October 11, 1984, SANE Records, Series G, Box 72, Folder 1.
66 Cortright, “Expanding the Peace Movement,” 3.
67 On these differences in organizational style in the 1980s, see Lofland, *Polite Protesters*, esp. 144-153. On professionalism and bureaucracy in social movement organizations, see Robert Kleidman, “Volunteer Activism and Professionalism in Social Movement Organizations,” *Social Problems* 41, no. 2 (1994), 257–76.
68 Steve L. Hawkins and John W. Mashek, “Antinuclear Campaign Reawakens,” *U.S. News & World Report*, January 27, 1986, 22.
69 See Hogan, *Nuclear Freeze Campaign*, 192–94.
70 As Theda Skocpol argues, the massive changes in civic and political engagement in the 1970s and 1980s meant that new models of interest and advocacy groups were being developed. See Theda Skocpol, “Advocates without Members: The Recent Transformation of American Civic Life,” in *Civic Engagement in American Democracy*, ed. Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 487–98.
71 David Cortright and Richard Pollock, “Peace Media Short-Term Project,” meeting minutes, May 17, 1985, SANE Records, Series G, Box 72, Folder 2.
72 Ellen Hume, portion of interview transcript quoted in WAND, “Notes on Marttila & Kiley Interviews—For Press Strategy Article,” [late 1985], Women’s Action for New Directions Records, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts (hereafter WAND Records), Box 2, Folder 1 (Acc. 91s-80).
73 WAND, report on Marttila & Kiley survey, November 25, 1985, Section E-1, 2–3, WAND Records, Box 11, Folder 55 (Acc. 98s-73).
74 For a fascinating discussion of the backlash against such moral appeals, see Hogan, *Nuclear Freeze Campaign*, 73–75.
75 David Cortright and Richard Pollock, “Notes of Meeting with David Garth,” June 27, 1985, SANE Records, Series G, Box 72, Folder 2.
76 David Cortright and Richard Pollock, “Meeting with David Crane and Humphrey Taylor of Lou Harris Associates,” June 19, 1985, SANE Records, Series G, Box 72, Folder 2.
77 The surveys and interviews were undertaken by Boston public opinion consulting firm Marttila & Kiley over a few months in 1985. The *Turnabout* report was published in 1986 by WAND Education Fund.
78 Marttila & Kiley, “A National Organizing Program for WAND,” draft, [early 1985], WAND Records, Box 11, Folder 56 (Acc. 89s-73).
79 Quoted in Renata Rizzo, “The Media and the Movement,” *Nuclear Times*, November–December 1985, 16. Marttila had also run campaigns for Representative Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Vermont governor Madeline Kunin.
80 Rizzo, “The Media and the Movement,” 16.
81 John Marttila, memorandum to Helen Caldicott, Diane Aronson, and WAND leadership, December 14, 1984, 4–5, WAND Records, Box 2, Folder 2 (Acc. 91s-80).
82 “Judy” to Diane Aronson, January 25, 1985, WAND Records, Box 2, Folder 2 (Acc. 91s-80).

83 "Judy" to Aronson, January 25, 1985.
84 WAND, "A National Communications Strategy for Nuclear Disarmament," [Spring 1985], 4, WAND Records, Box 2, Folder 3 (Acc. 91s-80). Emphasis in original.
85 For a recent and comprehensive discussion on the softening of Reagan's anti-communist rhetoric in his second term, see Jon Peterson, "'An Evil Empire': The Rhetorical Rearmament of Ronald Reagan" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio University, 2010), Chapter 8.
86 Diane Aronson, quoted in Rizzo, "The Media and the Movement," 17.
87 Marttila & Kiley, "A National Study of Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control," September 1985, 20, WAND Records, Box 11 (Acc. 89s-73).
88 Marttila & Kiley, "A National Study," 39.
89 WAND developed this new style fairly consistently from 1986 onward, although its institutionalization of political strategy had been developed from 1982. See Melissa Haussman, "From Women's Survival to New Directions: WAND and Anti-Militarism," in *Teamsters and Turtles?: U.S. Progressive Political Movements in the 21st Century*, ed. John Berg (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 113–20. Former national board member Bobbie Wrenn Banks also argues that toward the end of the 1980s, WAND began to successfully organize in a much more mainstream style; its efforts in the early to mid-1980s, by contrast, were very grassroots in nature, even at the level of the national body. Interview by the author, October 28, 2011, by telephone.
90 In this sense, *Turnabout* reacted explicitly to news reporting that had, in the early days of the freeze movement, focused on its participants and their style rather than the issues behind their actions. As Rojecki explains, CBS News "treated the movement as a fun activity, a way for the sixties generation to relive an earlier dream – this time with their children." In humanizing the movement, such reporting also diminished its sense of political seriousness. Rojecki, *Silencing the Opposition*, 157.
91 Marttila & Kiley, "A National Study," 52–53.
92 Marttila & Kiley, "A National Study," 58. Emphasis in original.
93 Gil Friend, quoted in Rizzo, "The Media and the Movement," 18.
94 People Against Nuclear Arms, "Everybody Speaks" advertisement, BAT:56604; and WAND, "Millions of Moms Public Service Announcement," BAT:56587, In-House Collection, Paley Center for Media, Beverley Hills, California.
95 WAND, report on Marttila & Kiley survey, Section B-1, 3.
96 Joelle Attinger, quoted in WAND, "Notes on Marttila & Kiley Interviews."
97 Anne Groer, quoted in WAND, "Notes on Marttila & Kiley Interviews."
98 Lofland, *Polite Protesters*, 234.
99 See Lawrence S. Wittner, "A Short History of Peace Action," in *Peace Action: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. Glen Harold Stassen and Lawrence S. Wittner (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 12.
100 Bruce Ferguson, "Different Agendas, Styles Shape SANE/Freeze," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April 1988, 26.
101 "Those for Whom 'Peace Dividend' Means Deficit," *New York Times*, February 12, 1990, A10.
102 Letter to the editor, *New York Times*, March 24, 1990, 24.
103 *CBS Evening News*, April 10, 1982.

Chapter 3

1 See Alice Echols, *Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967–1975* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 284–86.

2 By a "politics of difference," I am not referring exclusively to the difference between men and women, the subject of much historical and theoretical feminist scholarship—see Chris Weedon, *Feminism, Theory and the Politics of Difference* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999)—but in a wider sense to differences within the women's movement over the interpretation of feminism and the meanings of feminist activism. This was not an entirely new development; radical feminism had undergone a similar "eruption of difference" in the early 1970s, and "difference" continued to provoke debate among feminists in the 1980s. See Echols, *Daring to Be Bad*, Chapter 5; and Lynne Segal, *Is the Future Female? Troubled Thoughts on Contemporary Feminism* (London: Virago, 1987).

3 Melissa Haussman has suggested that WAND combined, "perhaps unwittingly," the liberal feminist method of reformism with cultural feminism's ideas about biological determinism, in that "women differ inherently on some values from men, including being more supportive of peace initiatives." Melissa Haussman, "From Women's Survival to New Directions: WAND and Anti-Militarism," in *Teamsters and Turtles?: U.S. Progressive Political Movements in the 21st Century*, ed. John Berg (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 104. On older women's activist traditions, as they relate to peace activism, see Harriet Hyman Alonso, *Peace as a Women's Issue: A History of the U.S. Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993), Chapter 2.

4 On radical and cultural feminism, see Echols, *Daring to Be Bad*, Chapter 6; Lauri Umansky, *Motherhood Reconceived: Feminism and the Legacies of the Sixties* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), Chapter 4; and Sara Evans, "Beyond Declension: Feminist Radicalism in the 1970s and 1980s," in *The World the Sixties Made: Politics and Culture in Recent America*, ed. Van Gosse and Richard Moser (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 52–54.

5 For an interesting discussion of these issues, see J. Zeitz, "Rejecting the Center: Radical Grassroots Politics in the 1970s—Second-Wave Feminism as a Case Study," *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 4 (2008), 673–88.

6 Like my use of the terms "activism" or "protest," I use fairly loose definitions of "feminism" and its varieties in this chapter. For additional discussion about terminology, see Umansky, *Motherhood Reconceived*, 13–15.

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Chapter 4

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112 Anonymous marcher's letter and journal excerpts, June 30, 1986, GPM Records, Box 19, Folder 2.
113 Tom Atlee, "The Prism of the March," March 8, 1986, GPM Records, Box 19, Folder 2.
114 See Folsom *et al.*, *Great Peace March*, 117.
115 Chaloupka, "Immodest Modesty," 342–43.

Epilogue

1 Douglas C. Waller, *Congress and the Nuclear Freeze: An Inside Look at the Politics of a Mass Movement* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987), 38.
2 See Van Gosse, "Postmodern America: A New Democratic Order in the Second Gilded Age," in *The World the Sixties Made: Politics and Culture in Recent America*, ed. Van Gosse and Richard Moser (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 27–28.
3 Gosse calls this the "legalization" and "pacification" of resistance, while others have referred to it as the "legitimization of dissent." Gosse, "Postmodern America," 29; Jo Freeman and Victoria Johnson, eds., *Waves of Protest: Social Movements since the Sixties* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), xi.

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