

SLAVERY IN THE SUDAN

History, Documents, and Commentary

Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud
Translated by Asma Mohamed Abdel Halim
and Edited by Sharon Barnes

Slavery in the Sudan

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By

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

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This translation is dedicated to the memory of
Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud
who dared to bring slavery to a wider Sudanese audience

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Preface

Any job of translation or editing a translation is, by its very nature, fraught with opportunities for misunderstanding, not only of the intent of the original author, whose language the editor does not understand, but also between the translator and the editor, who, while both are working toward the same goal, are attempting to bridge gaps of linguistic, social, historical, and cultural traditions. In the case of this book, *Slavery Relations in the Sudan,* we as translator and editor had to address many questions, since the book was written mainly for a Sudanese audience. While the translation is intended to include English speakers from different parts of the world, our primary target audience is university students. We had to work through the significant problems of presenting terminology and history that are largely unknown to our target audience. In doing so, we sought to produce a translation that answers questions without invasive changes to the text; the only alterations are reorganization of minor sections without any change to the meaning.

We have, to the best of our ability, preserved not only the unique language and flavor of the voice of the author, Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud, with its occasional biting sarcasm or humorous rebuttal, but also the structure of his thought and arguments, with a few, mostly minor exceptions, for the sake of clarity, where we felt the gap between the original document and the expectations or knowledge of the intended audience might be too wide. Only one of these exceptions is worthy of mention. In chapter 1, the introduction and critique of four documents of the Meroetic government were merged, instead of treating them separately, so as to move the critiques of each document closer to the description of the document itself, expressly for the purpose of ease of understanding the critiques.

Parts of the original book that are not included in this translation include the extra material annexed as further explanation. Four examples from correspondence regarding slavery during the Mahdiyya era were also not included as they were a repetition to prove the same

point. Most of the material in the annexes is already available in English in the Encyclopedia Brittanica, parts of this book, and other historical publications. We hope that we have been successful in providing a clear translation in our effort to bring this important book to a wider readership.

SHARON L. BARNES
Toledo, Ohio

Glossary

Adamiyya	Female human being
Ahl albeit	Relatives of the Prophet Mohamed
Al-abb	Father
Al-ubouah	Fatherhood
Aqd	Indenture or contract
Awadim	Human beings
Awlad al-Arab	Men of Arab origin
Bait almal	Treasury
Bait alnnar	Kitchen
Bandaga	Soldiers carrying guns
Bawaboon	Door guards
Daftar sadir	Dispatch ledger, correspondence is filed in dispatch or received ledgers
Daim	Neighborhoods for discharged and sometimes active soldiers' residence
Dobait	Short poem couplet, sung in a melancholic tone
Dongolawi	Pertaining to the city of province of Dongola
Durrah	Sorgum; Grain that is the staple food in the Sudan
Fallata	West African people in the Sudan
Faqih plural f*uqaha*	Jurist, Muslim scholar
Farkha plural *farkhat*	Female slave
Fatwa	Religious opinion
Fay'	Property gained other than in war
Fidya	Amount of money paid by a slave to get his/her freedom
Futra	Zakat, given after Ramadan
Gazwa, plural *ghazwat*	Raid
Hajj	Pilgrimage to Mecca
Hoshe	Courtyard

Hujja	Charter
Hujja shar`aiyya	Legal charter of ownership
I`alam shara`ai	A document issued by the court stating the heirs and their shares in the inheritance
Jihadiyya	Slave soldiers
Kara	Living quarters for active *jihadiyya*
Khadim	Arabic for servant, in the Sudan it is a female slave
Khalwa, plural *Khalawi*	Qura'nic school
Khut	An area of a province presided over by a sheikh
Kisra	Sudanese thin bread made out of sorghum flour
Madhab	A school of Islamic interpretation and jurisprudence
Madhun	Court officer who presides over marriage contracts and divorce. Sometimes spelled mazun
Malaki	Royal
Mamaleek	Plural of Mamluk
Maqtou`iyya	A certain amount of work to be done in a day
Markaz	Police station
Mulazmeen	Free soldiers
Murhaka	An instrument for milling or grinding grain. It is made of two pieces of stone, a long, oval, stationary piece that holds the grain and a small, oval one to grind it
Nazir	Overseer, the title of a tribal chief or leader
Quntar	One hundred pounds
Radeef	Discharged soldiers' neighborhoods
Rahat	A skirt-like garment made of leather strips
Raqeeq al`aayan	Slaves of the elite
Raya	Flag or banner, each battalion had a flag of a certain color and referred to as a Raya
Ruba`eya	A slave girl of four *shibrs* of height, a *shibir* is 20 centimeters
Sa`aidi	A person from upper Egypt

Saqia	Water wheel operated by oxen used for irrigation
Sawaqi	Plural of *saqia*
shadouf	An ancient tool to lift water from the Nile into the irrigation system. It is one container tied to a rope unlike the *saqia* that has many containers around the wheel.
Sidag	*Mahr*, amount paid to the wife at the conclusion of a marriage contract
Sit	A title given to an upper-class woman or a teacher
Tekaki	Singular *tekiyya,* a long piece of cotton cloth.
Tukul	Hut, in some areas it is a kitchen
Turuq	Plural of *tariqa*, literally path, Sufi sects follow a *tariqa* of a sheikh
Umda	Mayor
Umodiyya	Part of a district presided over by an *Umda*
Waqf	Trust of property arranged to benefit a certain person or entity
Wazeer	Minister, for example, minister of finance
Zakat	Alms paid by Muslims
Zariba	A fence or paling, made of thorny branches to keep animals; it also refers to a fortified camp where slaves are kept. Merriam Webster Dictionary defines it as, "an improvised stockade constructed in parts of Africa especially of thorny bushes."

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Translator's Note

Reading and translating this book has been an intensely valuable educational experience. It has also been an emotional experience, both personally and professionally. The narratives I have read and the sad stories and anecdotes I have encountered here have made me angry at the kind of history taught in schools in the Sudan, bitter at how human beings were treated as chattel for centuries, and frustrated at the slow pace of change in Sudanese society in breaking away from that ugly history. At a personal level, this book has brought back childhood memories of people I loved as relatives, only to find out the shameful truth of how those close bonds were created. Professionally, I have found that most of the Sudanese writings on slavery are historical in nature. Perhaps the exception to this general observation is the research and writings of Ahmed Sikainga. His book, *Slaves into Workers*, is in a league by itself, and will remain a classic among the strong references on the subject. This is not to discount the works of the Sudanists on the subject.

Two personal encounters with those who once were slaves occurred when I was a child. The first was when I knew Mustoura, a disabled old woman who lived in my grandmother's house. My grandmother would take food to her, and would tell all of us children to give her water whenever she asked for it. I pitied Mustoura; I would sit by her side for hours listening to the horrifying stories about *Katlat* al-Metamma (the battle of Metamma) when she was attacked with the spears that left her disabled.[1] She told me, "*Sitti* [my mistress] came and collected me." How did she end up at my grandmother's house? I asked. "*Sitti* gave me as a gift to your great grandmother." I asked her the only question I could think of, "to do what?" "To serve her family," she said.

I remember leaving her thinking not about her ordeal, bad as it certainly was, but about the possibility that people could so easily be given away as gifts. What would prevent my parents from giving me

away to serve others? I lived with that fear for days. One day I asked her if it were possible that girls like me could be given away. She smiled and said, "No, not you; only a *khadim* (Sudanese word for a female slave) could be given away. Besides, people have stopped giving away people as gifts to others." Her assurance that people were no longer given away as gifts left me still unsatisfied, so I turned to my grandmother and begged her not to give poor Mustoura away. She was amused. So were other members of my family, especially when they saw how persistent I was. However, grandmother put me at ease, assuring me that Mustoura was not going anywhere; she would surely be staying with her for old time's sake. "She served your great grandmother faithfully when she was young," she noted. "Besides, she has nowhere to go," grandmother added. Mustoura appeared to be satisfied with her situation. She never complained to me about anything.

The other encounter was at school. I was in the second grade. One day, after a fierce fight between two older girls, the headmistress asked all of the students to stand and be silent as she ordered one girl to step to the front of the class and apologize to the girl she had offended. Meanwhile, the ruffled girl was sitting next to one of the teachers crying. The offending girl apologized as ordered and promised, "Never again." The headmistress then turned to us and said that the girl standing in front of class had called the crying one a "*khadim,*" an offensive word that meant slave. I was confused. Unlike Mustoura, the girl who was abused in class was neither old nor disabled. So why was she given the same attribute? I discovered when I grew up that the answer was because she was a descendent of slaves. Since then, I have learned to tell if a person or his or her descendent was once a *khadim* and why should such a designation make a difference. Remembering these encounters brought to chilling reality the fact that slavery as described and discussed in this book is not old or forgotten history.

As an adult I have come to know more about slavery and its importance as an indicator of one's class in contemporary Sudanese society. Slavery was as brutal among the Sudanese as it was elsewhere. Slaves were to serve their masters, be mercilessly separated from their own children and the homes they knew, and sold like other goods, while their descendants were condemned to the status of second-class citizens even if they live as free citizens who are educated and may hold any job. Not only that, but it is clear how color and ethnicity became a mark of slavery. In this book I have come face to face with receipts and bills of sale of humans counted in ledgers as part of the revenue of the state. It has become clear to me that the often-cited difference

between slavery in America and Europe and in Africa is a myth. I believe that anthropologists who made such claims were trying to sugar the pill; perhaps the paradigm of black slaves and white masters was not that easy to shatter. Not being analytically able to accept an all-black slavery institution, some scholars have tried to explain it as a different institution in which African enslavers are seen as "different" masters. Indeed, that was how some Sudanese notables talked about slavery in their correspondence with the colonial government of the Sudan.[2] That way of thinking earned them a sarcastic remark from Mr. Nugud, the author of this book.

To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, slavery *is* slavery *is* slavery. In bondage, one human being's suffering is the same as that of any other. Differences may be seen after the slaves attained freedom. In some areas, they could return to their place of birth and be accepted as human beings. In other places, such as northern Sudan, Egypt, or Arabia, slaves were removed to faraway places and could not return to their places of birth, as indeed was the case of slaves taken to the Ottoman Empire, America, Britain, and other countries. It is amazing how the legacy of slavery persists and endures throughout time.

In doing research for writing this book, the author, Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud, strove to find original and official documents on the subject. He also found many other written accounts of slavery. Clearly, he was frustrated by the lack of documents from certain eras of the history of the Sudan, but he was even more frustrated by the unjustified censorship practiced by the Egyptian authorities regarding Ottoman documents about the Sudan. However, denial of access to critical documents on slavery is not limited to Egyptian authorities. Mr. Nugud would perhaps be utterly shocked to know that the National Records Office (NRO) in Khartoum is now not only staffed by historians and other professionals conversant in the history of their country, it is also staffed by security monitors who may deny researchers access to documents. While the staff was willing and accepting of my application for documents, they came back to tell me that for security reasons it was not possible to peruse documents dealing with the subject of slavery in the Sudan.

Slavery and the State

Slavery in different eras of the history of the Sudan was a state affair, whether it was the ancient kingdoms, the nineteenth-century Turco-Egyptian, or the national government of Mahdiyya that succeeded the Turco-Egyptian rule in 1885. The Anglo-Egyptian government (the Condominium) that was established in 1899 by an agreement

between Britain and Egypt, which left the British the de facto rulers of the Sudan, danced around the issue of slavery for a long time.[3] Although it was private individuals who raided innocent villagers in the Nuba Mountains, South Sudan, and Southern Darfur to capture slaves, the sultans and kings of ancient and medieval kingdoms invariably got the lion's share of the hunt. Slaves were sought to fulfill gender roles, men for the army and women for domestic labor and sexual pleasure. The Turco-Egyptian invaders eyed the Sudan for strong men to serve in the empire's army and embarked on state-funded raids to get them. Robert S. Kramer wrote,

> The Turco-Egyptian conquest of Nilotic Sudan (1820–1822) had its express purpose the acquisition of slaves to serve as soldiers in the new modern army envisioned by the Egyptian ruler, Muhammad Ali. An exceptionally high mortality rate among the slaves doomed this enterprise to failure: perhaps most died en route to Egypt as a consequence of arduous marches and harsh treatment, and those who did reach Cairo quickly succumbed to disease.[4]

Mohammed Ali Pasha of Egypt had to abandon his dream of building an army of Sudanese slaves after only two years because of the high mortality rate among the slaves, due to harsh treatment during the long trip to Egypt. His appointed government in Khartoum, however, continued to recruit slaves into the local army for many years. Historian Kramer states, "His [the Pasha] provincial administration at Khartoum continued to acquire slaves to serve the Turco-Egyptian regime in the Sudan. Branded with the Arabic letter *Jim* (for *Jihadiyya*), these slaves were organized into regular military units and garrisoned throughout the state, which by 1874 covered most of the territory of present day Sudan."[5]

Though prevalent during the Mahdiyya where, as slave soldiers, they played an important military role, the *jihadiyya* as a military group were created and named by the Turco-Egyptian government. They were used both as soldiers and laborers. As they grew old, they would be replaced. The government, for this reason, continued to confiscate young, able-bodied male slaves from slave raiders and enlist them, while discharging others to work at various government departments or in farms belonging to senior officers. The Mahdiyya continued the practice of enlisting slaves into the military. Both the Turkiyya and the Mahdiyya left these slaves in a precarious legal status. They were neither slaves nor free men. As soldiers, they were paid salaries regularly and allowed to have their own slave-servants.

During the Mahdiyya they were even allowed to marry and keep their wives and children. However, they were not allowed to leave military service on their own initiative and were counted among the slaves in government registry.

During the Turkiyya, slavery was practiced as openly as any other economic activity. The Sudanese authorities paid lip service to its prohibition, but, as a matter of record, some officials were paid in slaves. How the authorities of the Ottoman Empire felt about slavery has been recorded in many places. E. A. Wallis Budge gives an apt description of this official ambivalence. He writes,

> In 1863 the Turkish officials pretended to discountenance the slave trade, yet the officers were paid in slaves! And every house was full of slaves, and nearly every European merchant was engaged in the slave trade. The slave raiders sailed their boats flying the English, French, Austrian, Turkish, and even the American flag. This picture is a gloomy one, but the witnesses to the appalling condition of misery in which the Sudan was in 1863 are so numerous, and the agreement in their evidence is so universal, that there is absolutely no reason for doubting their testimony.[6]

The Mahdiyya did not mince words about its adoption of slavery as a legal or even a religious institution. Although al-Mahdi sought to "wash his hands" of the dirt of slavery, he was not at all reluctant to tolerate the institution. His successor, Al-Khalifa Abdullahi, enslaved members of any Sudanese group that opposed him. After his victory over the *Ja`alyyin* ethnic group at al-Matamma he seized their women as war booty[7] and took men as well. However, he had to let them go because their enslavement would have brought upon him and his government the wrath of the formidable *Ja`alyyin* of central Sudan, an outcome he would rather avoid, especially with the rising opposition to the Mahdiyya in that area.

One interesting story deserves special mention here is the one involving al-Zubair Pasha Rahma, the man who became the most famous slave owner in nineteenth-century Sudan. His slaving activities spanned the Turkiyya and Mahdiyya eras and his name became almost synonymous with the slave trade. He established himself in the south during the Turkiyya, survived the Mahdiyya, and posed a challenge to the Condominium government. Despite an army of over 20,000 slaves that he bought for himself, he insisted that he was not a slave master because he was not a slave trader. For him, there was a difference; a slave trader hunted and sold slaves. He bought

and enlisted them. With this slave army and his familiarity with the geography of Southern Sudan and the habits and traditions of people there, al-Zubair Pasha Rahma was able to achieve his political ambitions and to rule a large part of the south, mainly the Bahr-al-Ghazal region. He amassed great wealth by selling ivory and other products from the south to merchants in Khartoum, Omdurman, and beyond. Indeed, he managed to bring some stability and governance to many parts of the south. For example, he successfully secured the routes of trade so well that other traders in the south accepted his leadership and protection. At one point in 1872, he defeated an expedition sent to take Equatoria province. Two years later he changed sides and supported the government in its bid to conquer Dar Fur. Al-Zubair's political ambitions posed a threat to the government, which gave it good reason get rid of him. Eventually al-Zubair was lured into visiting Egypt following his complaint to the Khedive over the seizure of some of his property. He was never allowed to return to the Sudan. After a brief period of exile at Gibraltar he was brought back to Egypt, where he died in 1913.

In 1877, Flora Shaw, a journalist, met and interviewed al-Zubair in his exile at Gibraltar. He told Shaw the story of his life, which she eventually published in "The Contemporary Review."[8] Al-Zubair insisted then that he had bought people in Southern Sudan to train them as soldiers or even to save them from being eaten by cannibals. The author of this book, Nugud, read this supposed benevolence on the part of al-Zubair differently. He accused al-Zubair and Nothern Sudanese like him, of twisting the ugly facts about slavery in an unsuccessful attempt to represent slave hunters as saviors, and slavery as salvation. This confirms the disparaging comments by the author of this book about how the Sudanese tend to twist slavery into appearing to be a benevolent institution. His enslavement of the natives was unique because, as an individual, he managed to achieve what governments, both the Turkiyya and the Mahdiyya, attempted to do with limited or no success. He managed to buy over 20,000 slaves without getting them out of the southern provinces. The majority were men whom he trained as soldiers in a strong army; he had Bahr-al-Ghazal, a vast area of the south under his authority, and he successfully secured the routes of trade. His story is unique because some researchers are impressed with his political success and they articulated his enslavement of the natives as a benign or even a beneficial endeavor, but they did not voluntarily enlist in that army; they were forced into it as slaves.

Surprisingly, Izzeldin Ismail, an Egyptian researcher, tried to refute the notion that al-Zubair was actually a slave trader. He asserted in his writings that al-Zubair "bought" or hired natives only to guard and protect his merchandise. He further claimed, rather naively, that the majority of the traders in the south did not mean to enslave the natives; they only employed them as guards and porters.[9] If this was the case, as Ismail contended, how can historians then account for the thousands of Southerners who ended up in Northern and Central Sudan and on the Red Sea coast?

The status of slaves and the minimum rights reluctantly granted them were influenced by the general policies of the different governments in Khartoum and Cairo. The case of a white Muslim female slave owned by an Egyptian Copt is typical. Eve Trout Powell tells the story of a white slave in Egypt during the reign of Ismail Pasha who complained to a local sheikh that her Coptic master had demanded her sexual services. Since she was a Muslim and her master was not, she refused to submit to his demands. The sheikh agreed that the slave woman was within her religious right to refuse her master's sexual demands because of his faith. The sheikh seized the slave woman. Being a Muslim was sufficient to give this slave woman a voice within a Muslim community, but only on religious grounds. Had the sheikh been the owner, he would have unlimited rights to her sexual service. The Coptic slave master did not budge, and sued the sheikh in the government's court and the court upheld his right to his slave. Frustrated, the sheikh enticed Muslim residents in the city to rise against the government's ruling, and they did. The government sent in troops, including *jihadiyya*, to quash the demonstrations, and many individuals were killed as a result. Historian Trout Powell sums up the political ramifications of what was in essence a personal issue that quickly evolved into a dangerous state affair. She writes,

> After decades of secular education, a new socioeconomic class of native-born Egyptians was rising to the top of society. Egypt's elite looked increasingly to Europe as a model for scientific, legal, and cultural progress, while also patterning their advancement along Ottoman cultural practices. And within this massively changing system, a Coptic Christian could appeal to the government to uphold his legal rights as a slave owner, and a slave could use public opinion and the sanctuary of a self-elected holy man to uphold her inviolability as a Muslim woman. But solving the murky problem of who could legally be a slave, and of whom, sometimes was decided in different ways in the court of public opinion and in the official courts in the village of Gaw in 1865.[10]

Slavery, as an institution, was not a problem for the Ottomans, whether in Egypt or Sudan. The official attitude toward slavery was to accept it as normal, even inevitable. How to deal with disputes arising from the institution was difficult, however. No one, not even the sheikh from whom the Muslim slave woman sought council and protection, addressed the legal issue of this Muslim slave living in an Islamic state, an Islamic state where enslaving a Muslim was illegal and should have been prohibited. Individual Muslims and their governments are required by the dictates of Islam to spare no endeavor or resource to free Muslim slaves. This was and still is an established rule that should have made "Muslim slave" an oxymoron. Islam declares that all people are born free and provides many religiously sanctioned methods by which slaves can gain freedom. The case mentioned here illustrates the failure of the Ottoman Empire to live up to the principles of the religion of the majority of its subjects. Rather, it was the desire of the leaders of the empire to appease Western countries by trying to show that all its subjects, Muslims and Christians, were equal before the law. If appeasing Western countries meant permitting non-Muslim subjects to own Muslim slaves, that was a price the Ottoman authorities were willing to pay in the nineteenth century. On its face, it is equality and justice for all that Islam seeks, and the pursuit of equality by the Ottomans was a prerequisite to European approval. However, equality and justice for all simply cannot be gained under the institution of slavery.

The behavior of the Condominium administration in the Sudan was even worse. Instead of enacting clear and enforceable laws and policies of slave emancipation, government officials busied themselves with the consolidation of colonial rule and the exploitation of the resources of the Sudan. They treated slavery as a benign customary tradition inseparable from the Sudanese Muslim beliefs and ethos. In time, they even formulated their own understanding of slavery in Islam. In a draft memorandum, parts of which were adopted in subsequent memoranda, the civil secretary tried to reconcile *Shari`a* norms and civil laws promulgated by the administration. The draft was entitled "The Status of Slavery in Islamic Law."[11] The civil secretary exposed his insensitivity to and lack of understanding of Islam by calling *Shari`a* courts "Mohammedan." He also made incorrect assumptions about Islamic law when he stated that

- Islamic norms were immutable, "not susceptible to change";
- If *Shari`a*, or Mohammedan courts were left to decide on the issues of slavery, they would be inclined to keep the institution.

The *qadis*, the *Shari`a* court judges, were practically usurped of any power to decide on the status of an enslaved person, much less to work on emancipation. Nonetheless, the administration hid itself behind the *Shari`a* norms and the customs of the people to drag its feet on abolishing the institution of slavery. They did everything they could to make slaves stay with their masters. Like slave masters, they believed that if slaves were to become free, the men would resort to idleness and drinking while the women would become prostitutes. They were also careful not to upset the free population by ordering the rapid end of slavery, with the ludicrous decision that slavery should be allowed to die a "natural death," as if without lifting a finger to end it, slavery would just disappear.

The stain of slavery followed the descendants of slaves for generations, particularly those descendants involved in political activism to liberate their country. This is especially true in the case of Ali Abdellatif, whose name in the Sudan is never uttered without being prefaced by the word "hero" (*al-batal*). He nominated himself to preside over the White Flag Society, an association of educated men and soldiers of different ethnic and educational backgrounds who opposed the Anglo-Egyptian occupation of the Sudan. Because of his tireless and courageous opposition to colonialism and the respect he deservedly gained among colleagues, he was unanimously elected president of the association. Sadly, not all intellectuals in the Sudan stood by him and the association. Indeed a few began to question the legitimacy of his leadership by pointing not only to his non-Arab ancestry, but also to the fact that, as a negro he had no tribal belonging; "negroid but de-tribalized origin,"[12] as if such was a prerequisite for political leadership in the Sudan. Anonymous articles attacking Ali Abdellatif began to appear in the newspapers, belittling his military education and raising questions about his origin, even alluding to slavery in his ancestry. None of these attacks weakened his resolve or made him change direction, and the respect and admiration he already had among most intellectuals remained strong. In 1924, he led an unsuccessful revolt against the Condominium government in Khartoum in a bid to forge unity with Egypt under the grand scheme of the "Unity of the Nile Valley." He was vilified by the administration in an effort to make him look like a token Southerner alien to the White Flag Society and unrepresentative of Northern Sudanese. This was a clear attempt on the part of the administration to use racism to undermine the political image of the White Flag and its leadership. Once the revolt failed, the administration quickly removed Ali Abdellatief from the Sudan to Egypt

and put him in a psychiatric hospital, claiming that he suffered from incurable *grandiosity*.[13]

No doubt the efforts of the administration to dry up the sources of slaves and to promote emancipation through "freedom papers" helped some men and women leave bondage. However, pushing the emancipated slaves back into the hands of former masters, because of lack of job opportunities, lack of farm land, or limited shelter did not help former slaves to stand on their feet as quickly as they had hoped. The stain of slavery continues to affect the lives of descendants of slaves long after the Sudan became independent in January 1956. Below are a couple of court cases that illustrate this point.

Cases of Ex Slaves

Ahmed Suliman and Others v. Madena Abdel Safi and Others
Case No.: AC-rev-161–1962. The High Court

The above case, brought in 1962, was a land prescription case (ownership through peaceful uninterrupted possession and use of land or real estate).[14] The plaintiffs were two women who petitioned the court to rectify the land register and to declare them the legal owners of the house they had occupied for 40 years. The defendants (descendants of a slave master) objected on the grounds that the requirements of prescription did not apply here because the ancestors of the plaintiffs were slaves owned by the ancestor of the plaintiffs. They argued that the slavery relationship should preclude the plaintiff's claim to a quiet peaceful possession. The property in question should thus belong to them, regardless of the fact that they had not occupied it.

It did not take the court long to dismiss the defendants' claim that slavery was a legal relationship. Accordingly, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed the case to the high court. Each of the three judges of the high court circuit concluded his ruling on this case as follows:

Judge Dafalla El Radi Siddig, after dismissing any legality of slavery said, "As far as I can see things from the evidence adduced, the factum of prescription is abundantly established, and on the other hand, there is not a shred of evidence to disprove the peaceful possession for over 40 years." Judge A. M. Imam said, "As I see it, this application must fail for two reasons. First, by the internal laws of the Republic, slavery is prohibited. Some of these laws are penal, e.g., Sudan Penal Code, s. 313, and similar sections. Again, by International Law adopted by the Republic slavery is condemned, e.g., the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices similar to Slavery (Ratification) Act, 1957. To allow defendants-applicant to plead this relationship is to allow them to plead an illegality. They cannot benefit from an illegality."

The third judge, Babiker Awadalla, apparently saw the claim of slavery not even worthy of discussion as he wrote, "Application for review has no merits and is hereby dismissed."

The second case was in the 1970s, with the final decision being delivered in 1974.

In the Sharia Supreme Court, Cassation/41/73[15]

The respondent in the high court appeal was the plaintiff in case No./800/1972 in the Khartoum North *Shari`a* District Court. She petitioned the court for permission to marry her fiancé because her father had refused to give consent to her marrying that individual. The father objected, claiming that the man was not suitable (*kuf'u*) for his daughter because of his slave origin. The court of first instance weighed the evidence and dismissed the case. On appeal, both the province and the high court dismissed the case because slavery is an illegal institution and no legal action can be based on an illegal claim; thus the woman was granted permission to marry.

Fortunately, raising the issue of slave ancestry in marriages is dying out in the Sudan, and descendants of slaves were never precluded from education or holding any official positions. Nevertheless, slavery in the Sudan has not yet been entirely put to rest. The Sudan can easily relapse into slavery, or slavery-like practices, especially during times of war. This was what happened in the south in 1983–2005. Granted, there was neither slave trade, unlike the situation in the past, nor any declaration of enslavement per se. Nevertheless, many people from the raided villages in Southern Sudan were forced to work for their captors, and women and children were captured.[16] The media and civil society organizations may have exaggerated the numbers of the victims of forced labor, and the Khartoum government was quick to exploit the discrepancy in its favor. As Douglas Johnson, the well-known historian, said, the unwarranted exaggerated numbers of slaves enabled Khartoum "to give plausible rebuttal to the existence of slavery."[17]

Another factor that weakened critiques of slavery during that civil war in the Sudan were the fraudulent claims of slavery uncovered by journalists and others. Karl Vick of the *Washington Post's* Foreign Service wrote an article in the *Washington Post* stating,

> But in some cases, according to witnesses and rebel officials, the slaves weren't slaves at all, but people gathered locally and instructed to pretend they were returning from bondage. An aid worker told of recognizing several children in such a group in the village of Turalei in late

> 1998. Two of them were still wearing plastic wrist bands that entitled them to meals from the local feeding center, the worker said.[18]

The above quote does not disprove the fact that slavery or similar practices reappeared in the border lands between the north and the south, the same area that had suffered continued raiding during the nineteenth century. The civil war in the south that resulted in the cessation of South Sudan also awakened racial prejudices. The newspaper *al-Intibaha* is a good example of that awakening of racism in the country, as it uses ethnicity and race to label and demean people. *Al-Intibaha* is a newspaper established by the uncle of the president of the Sudan, Al-Tayeb Mustafa. He expressly called for giving up the south. The famous lampoonery of the Arab poet al-Mutanabi, who in a long poem stated, "Don't spare the rod when you buy a slave, slaves are dirty and give you grief," surfaced when politicians mentioned carrying a stick to bring South Sudanese politicians in line.[19]

In Nugud's words, the Sudanese people, north and south, need a "deep understanding of their shared history, in order to move through the shared present to build a shared future." The future must be "equally" shared. The heavy historical burden of slavery was one of the main causes of the cessation of the south in 2010 to form an independent state, South Sudan. Lifting the long shadow of the past requires both great effort and trust. Admission of Sudanese slavery's tragic and ugly past is necessary for the shared future.

Introduction

> "Wide-sounding Zeus takes away half a man's worth on the day when slavery comes upon him."
>
> —Homer, *The Odyssey*

> "A freeman is half-enslaved when he marries a slave woman."
>
> —Omer Ibn Al-khattab

A strong desire, almost an obsession, for more knowledge of the Sudan of 1500–1900 has occupied my mind for decades. That was the time of its conception and formation, the time of the founding of the Funj and Abdallab states and of the defeat of the Mahdiyya, both as a revolution and a state. My desire and obsession ultimately lead to the question: What effects, factors, and institutions contributed to the chemistry of the Sudan's conception and formation? Out of that question emerged a somewhat vague hypothesis that the following four institutions played an active role during that time:

- Land relations;
- Slavery and enslavement relations;
- Sufi thought and the Sufi *Turuq*[1]; and
- Ethnic entities, the social formations and belief systems of the Nilotic groups and the relationship of those systems with monotheism.

Whether this hypothesis withstands or ends like the tracker's effort at the bank of a river, it has driven a focused, but sporadic and partial perusal of references on the history of the Sudan, and, in a way, confirmed the idea that knowledge on any issue is attained not only by reading and research, but also by writing about it. Exploring this history through writing has resulted in a rediscovery of the basic mathematical given that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line. That straight line guided me to the Mahdiyya documents pertaining to the practice of slavery that are housed in the National Records Office (NRO) in Khartoum. Those documents contain an abundance of credible and succinct information and descriptions of

events that shortened both my time of perusal and of writing. Writing is difficult and particularly important in the circumstances of the Sudan. The local saying that likens reading to a beating neglects to mention that writing is not *like* a beating; it *is* a beating.

WHY THE DOCUMENTS?

Certain circumstances motivated my heavy dependence on the documents in Khartoum:

Personal motive: In seeking answers to perplexing questions, some of which are confusing and murky, like seeking explanations of certain events and phenomena that have lost connection to their history, I wanted to pursue the knowledge available in primary sources.

Personal circumstances: The loneliness of detention, the desolation of forcible confinement[2] made it difficult, actually impossible, to exchange opinions and views with experts and knowledgeable scholars who may have reduced or completely spared me the effort of finding and digging through the best references. Under such circumstances, the documents were the only available alternative. Deliberating the contents of those documents, day in and day out, I was half seeing and living in those times. The text of those documents became a controlling and organizing factor for my analysis and for the conclusions I've drawn.

Developing a research method: Perusal of the documents provided a temporary disengagement and some relief from referring to travelers' books and that suffocating, excessive amount of writing that dominates texts about different eras of Sudanese history, including the eras of Meroe, Maqarra, Alawa, Sinnar and Qarri, al-fashir, *Albuq`a*,[3] Yambio, and Khartoum. The only option was to wait patiently for the dryness of the archival documents to change and turn into a flood that would, one day, yield bountiful fruit.

Travelers' books gain great weight in the absence of historical documents, but they are no substitute for musty, worn out historical texts. Such documents outshine and minimize traveler's dairies, revealing the traveler's observations, impressions, and analysis to be that of a tourist with nothing more than the superficial experience of a foreigner who concentrates on the indigenous people's familiar scenes, scenes that neither arouse curiosity nor disturb those people.

This book is an attempt to collect, compile, and use the "local resources" and historical references without isolating or adding an ideological touch that may distort their contents, whether the local resources are documents, archeological items, or anecdotes.

Dissemination of information: I want to expose and release the historical documents of Sudanese society from their local, traditional, and contemporary storehouses and widely distribute them. I want people to have confidence in the sources of their history, and I hope that the unknown intelligent sons and daughters of the Sudan, of whom there are many, will one day examine these sources with a new language, vision, and discourse that does not redundantly repeat what has already been done. I hope that they examine this history as part of a voluntary and freely chosen atonement of a society that has ignored its history. These scholars should participate in protecting and invigorating Sudanese history from decay in a dry, hot, dusty climate. It is most important that they pursue the legitimate human goal of catching up with modern information technology. Future generations of Sudanese researchers should be free from the agony and exhaustion of the medieval methods that currently dominate documentation and research centers in Khartoum. This generation should join the electronic revolution of digital memories, scanners, microfilm, and electronic storage and retrieval of information and documents; as the publication *Ieda`* noted,

> An author should be equipped with information technology to assist his authorship. The amount of information an author needs has become so large that human memory and manual means are incapable of coping with it . . . Information technology provides instant retrieval of information and knowledge from thesauruses, dictionaries, encyclopedias, and information banks in addition to many scientific methods, such as classification, organization and mixing of information ingredients.[4]

Methodological imperative: I would like to skip the ubiquitous motto often created in a moment of enthusiasm, although made with good intentions, that is, "Rewriting the History of the Sudan!" It would be right, best, suitable, and closer to sound historical methodology to set aside this and every other slogan, and instead, proceed to focus on research that contributes to the various fields of the history of the Sudan, so as to weed out slanderous statements, rectify skewed, unauthenticated anecdotes, and provide sound analysis to replace unworthy secondary ideas. We should attempt research that refutes unfounded arguments and weak findings, and prepare the field for the independent thinking of every researcher who ventures into unexamined areas to review the uncontested opinions that are shrouded, for the sake of adherence to accepted narrative, in sanctity and

majesty. We need researchers who will examine documents, antiquities, and archeological discoveries, whenever available, quench their thirst from the wellspring of human thought, and guard themselves against bias or any claims to having the "final word" on the history of the Sudan. As a guard against bias, I shall adopt the statement made by virtuous historians who always end their writing with a token of humility: "Allah knows best." Whoever does not say it will be struck where it hurts.

The irresponsible liberal use of the slogan, "Rewriting the History of the Sudan" may lead to burning or banning of books, removal of some references and resources from library shelves, and deletion of electronic information. Such a process will end up in a cycle of censoring material and replacing it with officially sanctioned resources, references, and electronic data that have been sterilized and tamed. The cycle continues when each new era follows this process. My motives above focus on the desire for knowledge and the methods of documentation, but my focus in this book is on documentation and commentary on the institution of slavery and enslavement relationships.

Documents are both the source and the body of this book, despite the absence of many resources, as in the case of Meroe, or their scarcity, as in the case of the Christian Nubian kingdoms, or their brevity, as in the case of the sultanates of Darfur and Funj. The absence of some of these documents leaves a void, but, like empty spaces left on astronomers' charts that are filled in later when new planets appear through stronger telescopes, these voids may be filled later with further research and discovery.

Comments are footnotes on and branching from the main text. Sometimes the commentary is an effort to emphasize the meaning of the documents as in repetitive work of elementary academic explanation. At other times, the commentary may look like an intrusion on the text and its meaning.

Strong, well-founded research [on slavery in The Sudan] is not attainable unless it is centered on the Turkiyya era, from 1821 to 1885. Mohamed Ali Pasha brought the institution of slavery to its height, and to see a full picture one has to climb that pinnacle. Slavery during the Turkiyya inflicted the same effects on the Sudan as did the transatlantic slave trade on West Africa. Enslavement and the procurement of slaves were the main strategic objectives in both cases. Mining gold and discovering the source of the Nile were secondary goals. The contents of the documents of that era should be the decisive historical tools, rather than the analysis or speculation of historical diarists, or the hypocrisy of Mohamed Ali and his successors. The

Pasha stated in his own words in letters to his sons that the main objective of bearing the exorbitant expenses and the hardships was not to amass wealth, as he told them before. It was to get the largest number of slaves who might serve them and were capable of achieving his purposes. The aim of sending well-armed forces to those areas was to obtain slaves and safely send them to Aswan. Slaves who were suitable for military service were as valuable as precious gems or even more valuable.[5]

The list of Turkiyya documents I obtained, perused, reviewed, and combed consists of available writings of Sudanese, Egyptian, British, and some European historians; the Nile Almanac (*Taqweem Alneel*); the rubrics, symbols, and titles of Turkiyya from the National Library and Archives (NLA) in Cairo; and scanned copies of the full text of two documents in Zeinab Bashir Fadul's *daftar ma`aiyya*.

In my desire to remain focused on historical documents, I have sometimes been thwarted. Most of the Turkiyya documents are not found in the NRO in Khartoum; where may they be found? It is no surprise that the bulk of these documents is at the NLA and Abdin in Cairo; some are found in the British Colonial Office in London and in the Sudan Archives at Durham University. It is a surprise, though, that the authorities in charge of the NLA in Cairo have banned the perusal of the Turkiyya documents. The Turkiyya era is a prominent historical moment in the Sudan. One cannot fathom the secret behind this ban. Is it a security or political issue? Maybe they are closed for the purposes of annual inventory!

This is not a complaint; complaining is the crutch of the powerless. Neither is it an appeal to the authorities at the NLA or the power that authorizes them, the power that has had a vice grip on authority since the Pharaohs. This is, rather, a notice to all Egyptian historians, especially to those concerned with the Turkiyya era, and a reminder of a recent incident that all or some of them might have heard of. The Sudan Archives provided, almost foolishly, the irrefutable document that Egypt depended on in its dispute with Israel over the land of Taba. The Sudan Archives should have practiced its duty and academic right, by raising the stakes and asking for accessibility to the Turkiyya documents at the NLA in return.

The Turkiyya documents at the British Colonial Office and the Sudan Archives at Durham, as important as they are, cannot substitute for the documents at the NLA. Quotes from those documents, no matter how lengthy, found in many Arabic and English works, are no substitute either. Therefore the chapter on the Turkiyya will not be included in this book; it will await the lifting of the NLA's ban.

It wouldn't hurt to make some other observations and comments in the context of this introduction. The first observation regards the diverse attitudes of French and American historians, sociologists, and anthropologists regarding the characteristics of slavery and enslavement. Lidwien Kapteijns's discussion of two approaches, in her book on the history of the Masalit, has attracted my attention; she points out the interconnectedness between slavery in the Sudan and slavery in Central and West Africa.[6]

Kapteijns mentions two approaches to African slavery; the first is "the functionalist or 'absorptionist' interpretation of the American historians Miers and Kopytoff." The second is "the neo-Marxist approach of Meillassoux and other French anthropologists." She states that the first approach

> regarded the concept of African slavery as essentially different from Euro-American conceptions of slavery. They argued that in Africa, transactions in the rights-in-people were an integral part of the systems of kinship and marriage, and that slavery was part of the continuum of the social relationships involving such rights. While in the West the antithesis of slavery was freedom, in Africa it was not freedom as autonomy, but belonging, that is to say membership in a local community, e.g., a kin group. A slave (or acquired person) was by definition not belonging when he first arrived. Yet, normally he was gradually absorbed into the kin system of the host society.[7]
>
> This absorptionist approach argued that the continuous absorption of slaves in the host tribe or clan minimized the events of slave mutiny.

The second, neo-Marxist, approach mainly criticized the absorptionists on the basis that their theory of assimilation separated the phenomenon of slavery from its historical reality and ignored socioeconomic relations. In Kapteijns's words, this approach

> looked upon African slavery as an exploitative relation of production, and upon the slave as a means of production in the hands of his master. They advocated a class analysis—the slaves being an "objective" class without historical or political vocation in most African societies—and criticized Miers and Kopytoff for failing to analyze, for being too much concerned with the jural status of slaves, and for neglecting the costs of obtaining slaves and the effect of slaveholding upon the distribution of wealth and power.

Kapteijns noted that the American historians Klein and Lovejoy believed that "the functionalist or assimilation interpretation divorced

the discussion from historical reality," and that Mier and Kopytoff argued that slavery was a mode of production, and were unwilling to "appreciate the economic basis of social relationships and the importance of slavery as a source of labor"

The absorptionists picked one mode of enslavement that existed in a particular African country during the early days of its development and generalized that to all African societies in all of their historical eras. Admittedly, there were African tribes and clans that practiced the assimilation of slaves, especially those of the same ethnicity as the enslaved. According to Kapteijns, Dar Masalit harbored the abandoned and the homeless. However according to the Fur and Mahdiyya documents and Kapteijns, Dar Masalit did practice slavery; they bought and sold slaves, including those taken as wards. Within the close-knit kinship relations in these Bedouin, clan-organized societies, such as the Masalit, there was no clear difference between the slaves, the abandoned, and the homeless.

The first absorptionist approach unsuccessfully juxtaposed the concept of freedom in Europe to the same concept in Africa, and diminished, if not eliminated the latter altogether. The individual within the tribal structure is free to find an identity and to express that identity through belonging to the tribal structure. Individuals express themselves as they express tribal identity. The individual may be the poet, the knight, the enlightened one, or the son or daughter of the tribe. That is why a person may be incensed on behalf of the tribe; protection is mutual between the individual and the tribe. The tribe would fight for a member who was enslaved or held captive. The concept of freedom has evolved within the development of human societies. Numerous connotations of self and belonging have emerged due to that evolution. The fate of an American, British, or German citizen abducted in Beirut would not depend only on his family, his ethnic group, or the organization that sent him on the mission to take up his case; the state would adopt his case. The state would be concerned, despite the fact that the citizen is a person deeply invested in his own individuality in a society that cherishes individual freedom and independence as a civilized virtue. Furthermore, the proponents of this approach ignore the historical facts of slavery and enslavement in Africa when they base a denial of slave revolts in Africa on this flimsy theory.[8]

The findings of the second approach, that slavery and enslavement in Africa was a system of a slaving society and that slaves were purely a means of production, were also not founded on facts, evidence, or analysis. This approach simply utilizes the mechanisms and tools of

analysis of the historic class theory. What is the value and efficacy of this particular method, which is inherently critical, if it is employed to prove or support a preconceived vision?

Research on slavery and enslavement relations in Africa are still far from achieving diverse hermeneutic scholarship. African slavery is a unique historic and social phenomenon. It should neither be merged with studies of the transatlantic, Cross Desert, and Cross Red Sea slave trades, nor should it be annexed to those studies as if it were a side effect of those practices.

The second observation pertains to the elaborate studies and analyses produced by historians and sociologists on the origins of many forms of slavery relations and their development in ancient civilizations, such as Pharaonic Egypt, Persia, China, Athens, and Rome. Except for the classic Roman example, those studies rarely follow the disintegration and dwindling or demise of slavery in those civilizations. It is not expected of Dark Age thinkers to care about the disintegration and demise of slavery that was going on under their noses; after all, the riddles of the Dark Ages are yet to be solved. However, there were detailed and focused studies of slavery between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. Abolition campaigns and conventions, and covenants and treaties regarding slavery that were supported by the principles of the Industrial and French Revolutions took the foreground in the first quarter of the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century.

The advent of the twentieth century witnessed abolition movements in the colonies, struggles against racial discrimination, and confrontations with colonial settlers. The energy of those struggles has obscured the unique nature of the genesis of slavery and enslavement in Africa that existed before the continent was consumed by European colonization, which included trading slaves and drawing maps according to colonial political and administrative needs. It is not only the beginning that has been obscured; the African nationalist struggles have also obscured the unique patterns of the disintegration and decay of slavery and enslavement relations. That disintegration was merged into and mixed with the effects of colonial policies. Perhaps this is why the political aspect of slavery floated to the forefront and the social, psychological, and economic aspects sank to the background.

The scarcity of well-researched, nongeneralized studies of the decay and disintegration of slavery and enslavement relations in Africa, and in the Sudan specifically, has led to many complex problems. For example: There is a consensus between the various schools

of sociological theory on the historic fact that slavery and enslavement, as socioeconomic relationships, as a class, did not turn into a force that lifted slaves to a higher status or created a new form of human social relations. Enslaved people led furious and destructive revolts and mutinies; however, they did not organize, lead, and achieve revolutions that engendered political power and a new social order to replace the one they sought to abolish.

The enslaved attained neither consciousness of being a distinct class or social power that had grievances, nor a stake in power in a systematic way that led to even a loose type of association that might have been a suitable tool for organization. The enslaved did not reject their existing status so as to reframe society according to a new vision. Even when they had the tools to organize, as in the case of the *Zinj*, Negro Revolution[9] and in the unique experience of the *Mamaleek* (Mamluks) in Egypt, they reproduced slavery and enslavement relations. Leaders promised their followers enslavement of the masters and freedom of their women. Once they took power, the *Mamaleeks* imported slaves from the Caucasus and Africa. They remained a closed, isolated group until the massacre of *Alqala`a*.[10]

All of the above facts and findings raise questions. What were the subjective and objective elements that prevented the development of the institution of slavery into a better, more sophisticated form of social relations? Why was slavery destined to disintegrate, instead of a more active transformation?

History has recorded the success of exceptional individual slaves. The great historian Sheikh Mohamed Abdelrahim recorded examples of such success in Arab-Islamic history, especially in the Sudan. During a trip to Egypt in the mid-1930s, he conducted general research on the phenomenon of slavery as it was practiced by ancient Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Hebrews, Chinese, Greeks, Romans, and Muslims. He looked for references and resources in the collections of the NLA on the history of the Sudan after the invasion by Mohamed Ali Pasha up to the turn of the twentieth century. He explained, "I collected material from major newspapers and from what I found of the reports compiled at the time by the Governor and Provincial Commissioners on the political, military, economic and literary news of the Sudan"[11]

The ascendance of slaves to positions of power was not based on having social power. The slave's rise is different from the case of a tribal chief surrounded and protected by the tribe and succeeded by his sons or someone chosen by the tribe. A slave would not pass his position on to his sons, because he was appointed by the authority of the ruler, the sultan, the *khalifa,* or the king. He was empowered by

the confidence of the master in his obedience. The right of the master to employ the talents of his slave was considered an extension of the master's talents. The ruling master could elevate his slave to a certain position to spite his kin or to protect against their evil deeds. No matter how powerful a slave was, that slave remained a slave. If the slave was freed, he or she remained an emancipated slave, unable to cross the impenetrable barrier between master and slave. There remained a barrier between the one who has the power to own and emancipate and the one who was enslaved and then emancipated.

The reproduction of slavery relations after a slave mutiny or disobedience deprived those newly empowered slaves of the consciousness to call for the abolition of slavery. That call was adopted by social reformers among the slave masters, who perceived the inhuman, tragic situation of the slaves, or who realized through clear consciousness that the labor of slaves had lost its economic value, or who sensed that a fiery explosion was smoldering under the ashes. Their endeavors were not so much a call for reform as they were a warning to the masters.

The third observation raises the question of why the revolutionaries of 1924[12] were silent about slavery in the Sudan. Why was the Graduates Congress, 15 years after the 1924 revolution, silent? After all, the 1924 revolution was not simply a heroic scene in a queue at the military school, or a military clash between the River Hospital and the Blue Nile Bridge. It was a chain of events and scenes involving secret societies, political programs, dispatches to Egyptian newspapers, political pamphlets, and public demonstrations. The period 1918–1924 was a critical time that made slavery a priority in the agenda of the Condominium government. Why were they silent, although descendants of slaves were among the nationalist political leadership of the 1924 revolution, in both its military and civilian wings? How can we explain the silence of the Graduates Congress and the 1936 agreement on the issue? The years between 1936 and 1938 were a time of reckoning on the issue of slavery, particularly in the memoranda of the governor general and the administrative secretary, which followed up on the results of Kitchener's policy memorandum on slavery in the Sudan issued at the turn of the twentieth century. At that time, there was a feeling that the problem of slavery or some of its effects were real. Proof of that was seen in the establishment of organizations such as the Piaster Orphanage Project. The orphanage was established as a reaction to the activities of missionaries who housed orphans and homeless and abandoned children, the majority

of whom were children of slaves. Even the songs and poetry of that period expressed sentiments about the problem of slavery.

The fourth observation regards the folkloric heritage of the slaves; had it become extinct along with the names given to slaves by their masters, names that burned like a brand on cattle or on the side of a camel?[13] The written and oral folklore of the masters is kept and circulated; some of it is even broadcast as in the song, "He Delivered a Slave to the Hair-Braider."[14] Some documents record the slaves' depiction of their villages, rural areas, and settlements; they gave them obscene names that insulted their masters. Some of these names have survived until recently in the Geziera areas.[15] Some anecdotes indicate sarcastic songs and poetry about inheritance, such as the heir inherits from the same place he urinates. A slave woman lampooned another by slandering her mistress. Yet there are no anecdotes or documents that record their feelings, lamentations, longings, or hopes for a better future. Perhaps such information was kept inside the slaves' circles and secretly passed through generations to be seen through bitter, melancholic eyes, but was never uttered for fear of shame and humiliation.

The fifth observation: Sudanese society has been cured of the ostensible socioeconomic relations of the institution of slavery and enslavement; however, it is still burdened with the psychological, cultural, and behavioral residual effects. It is no consolation that slavery is a past event; sometimes residue from the past may be more painful than the pressures of the present.

A pasture may grow on a garbage dump, but it is still a garbage dump under the grass. The psychological pain of slavery relations remains in the Sudan. The Sudan is not alone in struggling with the pains of the past; there are African countries and other places that live with the same consequences. The United States has been living with this pain for over one and a half centuries. Between Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, the word "nigger" was replaced with "African-American," without equality with Irish-American or Euro-American.

Abdelkhaliq Mahjoub[16] took a brave stand in confronting the residue of the past and attempting to overcome it in a paragraph in his address before the Round Table Conference, held in March of 1965 to seek a solution for the Southern Question.[17] He said,

> We were hoping to see some of our brothers here, who call us the grandsons of Alzubair Pasha,[18] to show a change of attitude. We say

> frankly to them, yes, we are the grandsons of Alzubair Pasha. We are not avoiding our history. But we take a critical, objective look at it and learn our lessons and take examples with no bitterness. The slave trade was driven by the European colonizers for their benefit; it is their disgrace, and the disgrace of all those who participated in it. These are simple facts for those who know the history. We remind those who see only the dark side of our history, of thousands or rather millions of our African brothers who were transported to cultivate cotton in the southern states of America . . . Alzubair's grandsons are changing with time and are building the new Sudan.[19]

More than a quarter of a century, a time that has been filled with the winds of October,[20] has passed; the Sudanese Crisis, or what came to be known as the Southern Question, has been exacerbated and has become a problem for the whole country, a problem of identity, unity, governance, wealth, culture, and status in the contemporary Sudanese world.

The heavy burdens of the past have been exacerbated by the corruptions of the present to form a powerful, towering challenge. It is the responsibility of the Sudanese people to face and overcome that challenge with strength. The Sudanese who are the grandsons of al-Zubair and of those enslaved by him are a noble populace united in a citizenship unimpacted by race, sex, or religious discrimination. We are neither humbled by the servility of slavery, nor are we privileged by the master status of our ancestors. We are citizens who vow to liberate ourselves from the complexities and residues of the past. We will liberate ourselves from physical exile and spiritual desecration. We shall struggle until we defeat the persistent arrogance, inferiority complexes, ostentatious displays of lineage, malice, and revenge. We will struggle to shed the comfort we find in forgetting this history and rid ourselves of the uncomfortable stinging memory of hidden disdain, hypocritical poise, arrogant carelessness, false confidence, and suspicion we practice.

That is the mission of the current generation, a giving generation who will carry out this mission, fully aware of its weight, without injustice or ignorance.

This benevolent generation should not underestimate the difficulty of this generative work or think that there is an easy way to go about it. All endeavors are charged with tension and demand hard work.

Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud
Khartoum, October 1993

1

Slavery in Ancient Kingdoms of Sudan

I

Meroe[1]

Both inexperienced and expert researchers alike find accessing particulars of the Meroe civilization to be a difficult endeavor; experts such as P. L. Shinnie confirmed this difficulty, stating,

> The discovery of palaces, temples, and cemeteries provides important artistic and historical information, but tells little of the life of the people, of their homes, their agriculture, or their social organization; we can only guess at this from the scattered remains that have come to us from the past.
>
> If we do not know how the Meroitic state was organized, nor how its kings and queens maintained their rule, we do know that it was a monarchical state, and we can assume that, as in Egypt, the king was regarded as divine.[2]

A novice scholar researching Meroe, Napata, or Kush, or all three kingdoms, would be particularly interested in people's daily lives, their agriculture, social order, government, and whether the state was a monarchy or not. That researcher might look into whether they had slaves, how and who enslaved them, as well as the role of those slaves in the state, society, and people's lives in general. A correlation between events in one of those kingdoms with events in another may not be useful. For example, stating that slaves built the pyramids of Egypt; therefore, it must have been slaves who built the pyramids of Meroe at al-Bajrawiyya, Naqa`a, Albarkal, and Faras, under Pharaonic supervision or influence, may not be a valid theory.

What kind of workforce in Meroetic society built the pyramids and temples of Meroe? What type of workforce logged the forests

and worked the furnaces to smelt iron? What human power was used to mine the iron ore that gave Meroe the name "the Birmingham of Africa?" These projects required extensive and continuous manual work indicative of the presence of social forces that enjoyed stability and cohesive social structure and organization, social forces that reproduced and remodeled its structure; the strength and power of that structure was a formidable base that supported Meroetic experience and skills.

A consistent social, economic, and political process may allow inferences from some events. However, inference as a source for documentation of the history of the Sudan falls in an area somewhere between the forbidden and the detestable. Inference calls for caution and is best avoided. Documentation of history is best done through a reading of the archeological sites or a patient and intelligent reading of the Meroetic language found in sites that are currently being buried under fine dust or threatened by creeping desertification.[3]

The story of slavery in Meroe is scattered across the references of researchers who quote each other. Some fleeting observations are recorded in discussions of topics such as follows:

- The commercial relations between Meroe and Egypt, Aksum, the Arabian Peninsula, Persia, India, and the Mediterranean states, which included export of hides of lions, cheetahs, and tigers, in addition to ivory, ebony, ostrich feathers, and slaves.
- News about Pharaonic raids on the Nubian kingdom that destroyed, looted, took prisoners, and stole slaves.
- Roman campaigns against the Nubians, which were launched out of Egypt, and the countercampaigns lead by a Nubian Kandake[4] that seized a Roman garrison in Aswan. Or attacks lead by the Roman governor of Egypt who destroyed Napata and sent 1,000 slaves to Caesar.

The scattered mention of slaves above does not give any clear idea about systems of enslavement, slavery relationships, or any domestic trade or sources of slaves that satisfied the local demand and exported the surplus. The slaves may have been prisoners of domestic or external wars; they may have been free people whose shoulders were burdened with the yoke of slavery after invasion.

The same possibilities may apply to what al-Shātir Busaylī[5] narrated about land and slave relations in the Christian Nubian kingdoms. He indicated that systems of slavery may have been transferred to those kingdoms from Meroetic societies. He hypothesized that the head

of state owned the land and the citizens who worked for him were slaves. In the case of lands endowed to temples, the temple replaced the head of state and the citizens worked for it. Once more, we see the tendency to draw conclusions under the pretense of finding the roots and source institutions of slavery relations, that is, the king, the land, the temple, the clergy, and the slaves in Meroe, and implying that the same systems were simply transferred to Christian Nubian kingdoms. Alshatir al-Busayli Abdeljalil, however, did not expressly state that he took those social relations as a given in Sudanese life in his work. He claimed that those relations did not change until the seventh-century migration of Muslim Arabs to the Sudan, who initiated a new system of land distribution. The land was distributed among group members who would use the land and pay rent, in-kind, to the tribal chief; this system allowed individuals to have a stake in the land after paying a tax.[6]

Our knowledge of the civilization of Meroe is superficial thus far, and has not penetrated the core of that civilization. It is knowledge of antiquities, art, language, and technologies, not knowledge of the society and the people who built those buildings, created that art, spoke and wrote their language, and invented the technologies that built the civilization. Sudanese historiology ought to be allowed to research these facets of Meroe.

II

Slavery in Sudanese Christian Kingdoms

Four documents shed a faint light on slavery and enslavement institutions in the Christian kingdoms of the Sudan. The first one is the Peace Covenant extended by Amr bin al-`Aas[7] to the Egyptians. The covenant stipulated in its last paragraph that the Nubians who accepted the Peace Covenant should give a certain number of slaves and horses; in return, they would not be conquered or prevented from the commercial activities of import and export. In this first document, Ibn al-`Aas treated the Nubians with his well-known shrewdness. He implied to the Egyptians that it was their responsibility to see to it that the Nubians guard the southern border. The Nubians were to be convinced of that or pressured to honor the peace agreement and give slaves and horses, so as to avoid invasion and secure the flow of commercial activities. The second document is known in history as the "Bakt Treaty." It was an agreement negotiated by Abdullah ibn Abi Sarh and the Nubian king. Scholars have attributed

different meanings to the word *bakt*. Some say that it is from the Latin word *pact*, meaning agreement or treaty; others say it is a pure *Dongolawi* word pronounced *bakit*, which means a share in the field produce. I am inclined to use the *Dongolawi* origin until the word's true origin is revealed.

This part of the Bakt Treaty is relevant to the research on Christian enslavement and slave relations,

> Ye shall give up the slaves of Muslims who seek refuge among you, and send them back to the land of Islam; and likewise the Muslim fugitive who is at war with the Muslims, him ye shall expel from your country to the realm of Islam; ye shall not espouse his cause nor prevent his capture. Ye shall put no obstacle in the way of a Muslim but render him aid till he quit your territory . . . Every year ye shall pay 360 head of slaves to the leader of the Muslims [i.e., the caliph], of the middle class of slaves of your country, without bodily defects, males and females but no old men nor women nor young children. Ye shall deliver them to the governor of Aswan . . . If you harbour a Muslim slave, or kill a Muslim or an ally, or attempt to destroy the mosque which Muslims have built in the outskirts of your city or withhold any of the 360 head of slaves—then this promised peace and security will be withdrawn from you and we shall revert to hostility, until God decide between us and He is the best of umpires.[8]

The second document shows the skillful drafting that the Romans, Persians, and Muslim Arabs are known for. It contains examples of what constituted a breach of and conditions for termination of the agreement. The Bakt Agreement draws parallels between instances such as withholding slaves, failure to extradite runaway slaves, and harboring Muslim slaves and crimes such as killing a Muslim or a protected non-Muslim or demolition of a mosque.

The third document is not part of the collection of actual paper documents, and it is found outside of the Sudan. It is engraved on the monument commemorating the triumphant campaigns of Ezana, the king of Aksum (300–350 AD), against the Nubian kingdom. Ezana's army descended on the Nubians through the Atbara River Valley and reached Alkadro on the Nile. They continued to follow the Nubians as they fled north to Abu Hamad; they looted 9,000 head of livestock and took 3,000 prisoners, 6 of whom were kings.[9]

There is no express mention in the third document of King Ezana enslaving prisoners of war; however, on the one hand, according to custom, such enslavement was valid. On the other, he could have left all—kings, citizens, and slaves—in their land and subjected them to

taxes. A third choice would have been to take some of them as war booty to parade as a show of victory and leave the rest of them to pay taxes. Regardless, he did enslave the whole Nubian kingdom and turned it into a subservient state. These options are just possibilities derived from the customary norms of the times. They remain interpretations by analogy, floating somewhere between fact and fiction, until documents from the period surface in modern-day Aksum or Nubia or in the archives of countries that stole documents, antiquities, and the economic surplus of those kingdoms.

The fourth document may easily be considered the polar opposite of the Bakt Treaty; there is no mention of slaves in this document. On the day of his coronation, the Nubian king Shekanda swore allegiance to the sultan of Egypt. He swore to be faithful to Sultan al-Dhahir Baybars *Rukn ed-Din wa ed-Duniya* (the cornerstone of faith and worldly affairs). He vowed to deliver to the sultan the same share of wealth his predecessors did; that is, he would give half, free of any claim, to the sultan, and keep the other half to develop the country and protect it from its enemies. He vowed to give, over and above, three elephants, three giraffes, five female cheetahs, one hundred horses, four hundred of the best cows, and to charge every adult citizen one dinar. He also promised to give the highlands to the citizens.

As for our brother Shekanda, may God never forgive him; this yielding, meek man disgraced us by being a party to this fourth document. It is a disgrace, despite the fact that it is free of the stain of slavery. Although he was the descendant of the Piankhy and Taharqa and the grandson of *rumat alhadag* (eye archers),[10] he fell at the feet of the Mamluk state in Egypt.[11] He succumbed to his sick ambitions and dethroned his brother. He delegitimized the interdictions of all customs and religions, including the Christianity he followed. He persecuted his brother, mother, and other relatives who did not surrender to his rule, when they had honorably withdrawn southward into the Nubian lands, where they continued to resist. His submissiveness to the Mamluks' leader knew no limits; he added insult to injury when he bestowed on Baybars the inflated titles of *al-Zahir* and *Rukn-al-Din wa al-Dunia*.

A perusal of the slave trade papers uncovers the history of Baybars as a slave. According to Ali Ibrahim Hassan,[12] he was a slave from the Caucasus. His master offered him for sale in Aleppo, but no one would buy him because of an eye infirmity. Finally, a prince bought him for 800 dirhams and took him to Egypt, where he was bought by Prince al-Salih Ayyub[13].

The omission of the commodity of slaves in the fourth document, as part of a royalty to be paid to the Muslims, cannot be traced to any express reason. However, this omission indicates two things: the first is that the Bakt Treaty changed with the times and with the changes of the ruling dynasties in Egypt. The second is that the omission of mention of slaves does not reflect a lack of flow of slaves from Nubia to Egypt during the Mamluk era.

According to the scarce documents and the limited light they shed, we may see some of the features of the institution of slavery and enslavement. All in all, there is modest information that has been repeated over and over again in a way that has led, in the words of Ibn Qutaiba, to, "the grim boredom brought about by elaboration and proliferation." Nubian history is alluded to in the lengthy narration of Egyptian history, the Eastern church, and later on in the history of the Arab-Islamic Empire and the Ottoman Empire.

My basic sources for this research are documents. Narratives of historians are of secondary importance; they are "circumstantial evidence" or a replacement for a lost source. This will continue to be the case until the ancient and middle history of the Sudan recovers from the absence of inscriptions and carved writings.

Mohamed Mustafa Musa`ad quoted from al-Baladhuri's *Fotouh al-Buldan*,

> When the Moslems subdued Egypt, 'Amr ibn-al- 'Aasi [*sic*] sent to the surrounding villages, in order to overrun and pillage them, a detachment of cavalry under 'Ukbah ibn- Nafi' al-Fihri (Nafi' being a brother of al-Asi on his mother's side). The cavalry entered the land of Nubia as the summer expeditions of the Greeks do. The Moslems met in Nubia determined resistance. They were subjected to such severe showers of arrows until most of them were wounded and had to return with many wounds and blinded eyes. Therefore were the Nubians called the "archers of the eyes."
>
> *The terms made.* This state of affairs continued until 'Abdallah ibn-Sa'd ibn-abi-Sarh ruled over Egypt. The Nubians asked for peace and conciliation from 'Abdallah, who granted their request, the terms being that they pay no tax but offer as a present three hundred slaves per annum, and that the Moslems offer them as a present food equivalent to the value of the slaves.[14]
>
> Yazid ibn-abi-Habib narrated, "Between us and the black tribes (*al-Asawid*) no treaty or covenant exists. Only a truce was arranged between us, according to which we agreed to give them some wheat and lentils, and they to give us slaves. It is all right to buy their slaves from them or from others."[15]

Al-Baladhuri also narrated,

> The caliph al-Mahdi ordered that Nubia be held responsible every year for 360 slaves and one giraffe, and that they be given wheat, vinegar, wine, clothes and mattresses or the value thereof. The Nubians recently claimed that the tribute is not due on them every year, and that it was demanded from them in the caliphate of al-Mahdi, at which time they told the caliph that the tribute was a part of what they took as slaves from their enemies and therefore they had, if they could not get enough slaves, to use their own children and offer them. Al-Mahdi ordered that they be tolerated, and that the tribute of one year be considered as if for three. No confirmation, however, could be found in the registers of al-Hadrah but it was found in the register in Egypt.[16]

In his *Muqaddimah,* Ibn Khaldun recorded that the Nubians were burdened by the Bakt Treaty after a series of war losses; they got out of it by converting to Islam.

As we looked at 'Abdallah ibn abi-Sarh and his role in the history of the Sudan and the institution of slavery and enslavement, it is pertinent to look at his own history. Al-Qurtubi narrated part of the biography of this controversial character. Surat *al-Ana`am,* verse 93, addresses the behavior of ibn Abi Sarh,

> Who could be more wicked than someone who invents a lie against God, or claims, A revelation has come to me, when no revelation has been sent to him, or says, I, too, can reveal something equal to God's revelation? If you [Prophet] could only see the wicked in their death agonies, as the angels stretch out their hands [to them], saying, Let out your souls. Today you will be repaid with a humiliating punishment for saying false things about God and for arrogantly rejecting His revelation.[17]

The gist of the story, as told by al-Qurtubi, is about when the Prophet peace be upon him (PBUH) was dictating to 'Abdallah ibn-abi-Sarh [who was among the writers of the revealed Qura'n] the verses about the creation of the human being.[18] 'Abdallah was fascinated with the description of the creation and he exclaimed, "Glory to God, the best creator!" The Prophet said that those were the exact words revealed to him. 'Abdallah then said, "If Mohamed is truthful then I am getting the same revelation he is getting: if not then I uttered the same words."[19] When the Prophet (PBUH) conquered Mecca, he ordered that 'Abdallah ibn-abi-Sarh and two others be killed even if they were holding onto the covers of the *Ka`aba.* 'Abdallah sought the

protection of his brother, Osman ibn Affan,[20] who kept him hidden for a while; he then surfaced and asked the Prophet for forgiveness. The Prophet sat silent for a while, then forgave him. The Prophet told his companions later on that he was silent, waiting for one of them to kill him; one of them said, "You should have given a signal." The Prophet said that a prophet should never signal; he should speak straight.

Another controversial person in the history of the Sudan and the institution of slavery and enslavement was the first Christian Nubian eunuch mentioned by Father J. Fantini. He was one of the eunuchs of the Kandake of Meroe around 37 AD, a slave from the institution of slavery in the Christian Sudan. He was a minister and a treasurer for the Kandake. He studied the principles of Judaism in Egypt, and made the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, where he met Christians and studied the Book of Isaiah. Fantini quoted a well-written story of his christening from the Acts of the Apostles (8, 26, 39) and added that the eunuch apparently had some knowledge of Greek, as he was able to read Isaiah.[21] Greek may have been known in the royal court of the Kandake or spoken by merchants.

Historians of the Abbasid era, such as al-Mas`udi and al-Maqrizi, have communicated some facts and testimonies about the flow of slave caravans from Christian Nubia into Egypt. The Nubian kings were in a fierce competition to win the support or avoid the wrath of the sultan of Egypt. For example, Semamun, the Nubian king of Dungula, sent 190 slaves with his delegation to the sultan of Egypt. Al-Maqrizi relayed that there was an abundance of slaves after the campaign waged against the Nubians as a result of the collusion of Shakenda with Sultan Baybars. The price of a slave plummeted to three dirhams. What was left after selling and killing [during that campaign] was 10,000 slaves.

Musa`ad[22] narrated from Al-Mas`udi the story of the people of Aswan who bought a place called al-Maris, a vast area of the adjacent Nubian lands.[23] When the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'moun entered Egypt in 819 AD, the Nubian king sent a delegation to inform him that the land and other property in that area belonged to him and the people there were his slaves and had no right to sell any of it. He requested that al-Ma'moun return the land to him. Upon hearing that the land was about to be seized, the buyers told the Nubians to deny any enslavement status. The governor of Aswan was charged with resolving the case. When the governor asked the Nubians, they denied any slavery status and said that their relationship to their king is akin to that of the Muslims to their caliph.

People follow the ruler's religion and slaves follow the master's. Isn't it noteworthy that neither Amr ibn al-`Aas nor 'Abdallah ibn-abi-Sarh ever mentioned, in the texts of the covenants they made with the Nubians, emancipating Christian or animist slaves if they converted to Islam, or allowing them to return to their homeland to herald Islam instead of declaring them runaway slaves? The answer may be found in what was relayed from Yazid ibn Habib and al-Laith ibn Sa`ad, that Amr and 'Abdallah, who were the solid seed for the Umayyad dynasty, audaciously refused to absolve converts who took refuge in the mercy of Islam from *jizzya*.[24]

III

Slaves of Sudan and Mamluks of Egypt

The Mamluks had a tight grip on political power. They dominated the social, economic lives and customs of their masters. Holding high rank in all aspects of life paved their way to taking over their masters' power. The Mamluks took over Egypt in the mid-thirteenth century. They had no qualms about enslaving their kinfolk and others from the Sudan and East Africa. The slave trade boomed and expanded to include new areas. They had transactions with a wide network of slave markets in the areas east and west of Egypt, Asia, and the Mediterranean Basin. The Mamluks took over the Nubian kingdoms in 1315. They surrounded Nubia from the north and east until it was totally weakened and lost its contact with the church in Alexandria.[25]

Although the rise of the Mamluks may seem surreal, it did not come out of a vacuum; it was not a peculiar incident. It had its deep roots in the Arab-Islamic Empire (Abbasid) that took over the Roman and Persian Empires (Umayyad); they enslaved men and women who were taken as war booty. In addition, they imported slaves, men and women, from adjacent areas.

The power struggle between the Abbasid and the Umayyad facilitated the phenomenon of bringing slaves into power. Each side used slaves as organizers, fighters, and heralds [of their right to rule] to tip the scale and usher in new rulers. The historical references recorded that the first caliph to bring the Mamluks into power was the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'moun, who reigned during the period 813–833 AD. Caliph al-Mu`tasim, 833–843 AD, depended on Turkish Mamluk troops to support him when he lost confidence in the Persians.

Hassan Ibrahim Hassan[26] conveyed from Adam Mez[27] that slaves were a huge class among the groups in the Islamic society that existed

at the beginning of the Abbasid dynasty. Enslavement was widespread; Samarqand had one of the largest slave markets [in the Islamic Empire] and provided a good environment to groom slaves brought from *Ma wara' al-nahr*.[28] The slave trade was how the people of Samarqand made a living. Clearly, the Abbasids did not shun slaves. They fathered children with slave women; actually many of them were the sons of slave women. Some of Abbasid elite had an infatuation with non-Arab slave women; they preferred them to the free Arab women.[29]

Ibn Khaldun detailed, in his *Muqaddima*, the property brought to *bait almal* (the treasury) in Baghdad, including slaves, during the reign of al-Ma'moun. He stated, "There exists in the handwriting of Ahmad b. Muhammad b. 'Abd-al-Hamid a list showing the receipts of the treasury at Baghdad from all regions (of the realm) in al-Ma'mun's day . . . from Khurasan 1000 slaves . . . from areas around Euphrates . . . 1000 slaves."[30]

The status of slaves and *mawali*[31] in Egypt differed from their status in Baghdad. Slaves and *mawali* in Baghdad used some of the Abbasid caliphs as a front and dominated the government without removing them. In Egypt, they dominated the state system, then usurped authority and removed the Caliph to become the actual rulers. They managed to infiltrate every part of that system and its secrets; over and above, they were the weft and warp of the army and the guards of the palaces and the treasuries. They were the confidants of the sultan and his wives and courtiers. Presumably, it was impossible for Arab-Islamic society to accept the provocation of *mawali* and slave sovereignty over the caliphate and the caliph. Their shock at the Mamluks' sovereignty in Egypt might have been absorbed by the Mamluks' declaration of allegiance to the central caliphate, yet, that region was Egypt, a place that is incomparable to other regions!

There is a wealth of information in Ali Ibrahim Hassan's *Tārīkh al-Mamālīk al-Baḥrīyah*[32], about the beginning and the rise of the Mamluk phenomenon.[33] Their fingerprints could be seen on Egyptian society and the Arab-Islamic state throughout the Middle Ages and the Ottoman invasion in 1516. The Ottomans allowed the Mamluks to maintain their grip on Egypt, which they retained even during the French invasion in 1798. That authority ended when they were Massacred by Mohamed Ali Pasha [in what was written in history as "the *Qala`ah* Massacre"].[34]

The Tulunid, Ikhsheed, and Ayyubid eras of Egyptian history witnessed centuries-long extensive import of slaves into Egypt for the purpose of strengthening armies. Traditionally, slaves chosen for state

service were brought in at a young age and subjected to the training, education, and discipline fit for a soldier. Ibn Tulun brought Mamluks from the Daylam,[35] south of the Caspian Sea. During his reign, Ibn Tulun brought in 24,000 young males. During the Ikhshidid era (935–969), 400,000 Turkish and Daylam young males were brought into Egypt and Syria. The [sultan's] personal guard was formed of 8,000 Mamluks. The Fatimid Mamluks were mainly Kurds, Turks, Ghuz,[36] Daylam, and Moroccans, including the Masamda [a Moroccan ruling family].

The term *Mamaleek Bahriyya* was coined during the Ayyubid era, because the barracks and camps were built for the Mamluks on al-Raouda [an island on the Nile].

The Egyptian elite increased their buying and enslavement of Caucasians, from the Volga and Caspian Sea and from Asia Minor and Turkestan, in addition to the remarkable ethnic mix of Romans, Russians, Tatars, Circassians, Armenians, Arnouts, Caecilians, Croatians, Hungarians, and Serbs. Al-Termanini said that Salaheddin al-Ayoubi bought 12,000 Turkmen and Circassian Mamluks, trained them, and used them to defeat the crusaders. Salaheddin's sons quarreled after his death and each one took over a certain area. His son Al-Salih Najm al-Din Ayyub, known as al-Malik al-Salih (the good king) reigned during the last ten years of the Ayyubid era in Egypt. Upon his death, Shajarat al-Durr, his wife, who was an Arminian slave, hid the news of his death and took over the throne.[37] She ruled for a while, then married Izzeddin Aibak, a Mamluk.[38] Aibak became the first Mamluk to sit at the peak of power; the takeover of Egypt by the Mamluks had begun.

Edward Gibbon discussed the outstanding performance of the Egyptian army against the crusaders in the battle to recapture Damietta (Dimyat).

> In a soft and luxurious climate, the degenerate children of the companions of Noureddin and Saladin were incapable of resisting the flower of European Chivalry: they triumphed by the arms of their slaves or Mamalukes, the hardy natives of Tartary, who at a tender age had been purchased of the Syrian merchants, and were educated in the camp and palace of the sultan.
>
> But Egypt soon afforded a new example of the danger of praetorian bands; and the rage of these ferocious animals, who had been let loose on the strangers, was provoked to devour their benefactor. In the pride of conquest, Touran Shaw [*sic*], the last of his race, was murdered by his Mamalukes; and the most daring of the assassins entered the chamber

> of the captive king, with drawn cimetars, and their hands imbrued in the blood of their sultan.[39]

Ali Ibrahim Hasan notes, "It was relayed that the people of Turkstan heard stories about the Mamluks of Egypt and what was circulating about the riches of Cairo, which prompted many of the people in that land to sell their sons and daughters to have them be in the retinue of the Sultan."[40]

No wonder the slave trade flourished and its numbers of European middlemen increased. The average number of people enslaved annually from those areas was about 2,000. Often the slave at the slave market would be named after his price; for example, if the price was 1,000 Dinars, the slave would be called *alfi* (thousander). If the slave was chosen to be delivered to the sultan, he would be called *malaki* (royal). A slave and his family would carry the name of the first owner even after emancipation. Tulun was enslaved at the time he was captured in one of the battles. He was the descendant of a family that lived between Turkstan and Siberia. Nouh ibn Assad gave him, among a number of slaves, as a gift to the Caliph al-Ma'moun.[41]

Despite their power and influential positions, the Mamluks lived in closed quarters. They monopolized the army and exclusively hired newly arriving Mamluks as soldiers. They put their sons into administrative jobs. They led a schizophrenic life, as they practiced pious acts of prayer and other religious acts in public, while living the worst types of sin in private. They were united against the "other"[42] and never jeopardized this unity by resorting to violent struggle. Mohamed Ali [Pasha] knew their strength and penetrated it to deal them the fatal blow in the *Qala`ah* massacre.

Sudanese slaves found a place [as soldiers] within the Mamluk state; Al-Maqrizi recorded that ibn Tulun increased the import of black slaves and massed them in special battalions in the army, a move that boosted trade and the organization of hunting groups that acquired black slaves. It was known that he sent disciplinary campaigns of Guhaina and Rabie`a Arabs from upper Egypt to attack the Nubians and the Bija.[43] He enslaved the war prisoners so as to keep the slave trade routes safe. The number of black slaves in the army reached 40,000.

The Mamluk era brought about a new group of slaves known as al-*kushaaf*. They were of Bosnian and Ghuz descent. They fought in the campaigns of ibn Salim that were dispatched to punish the rebelling Nubians. Ibn Salim put them in charge of the land between Aswan and Dungula. They mistreated the inhabitants and enslaved

them, which resulted in a loss of population as people left the area to escape the tyranny and exorbitant taxes.

There are stories about [black slaves who attained high ranks in the army] such as Gohar the Caecilian, the Fatimid military leader, who sent ibn Salim to the Christian Nubian king Zachariah to demand slaves to strengthen their army.[44] Those slaves became the core of the Fatimid military. The number of those slaves was reported at 50,000.[45] They were said to have fled to the Sudan upon the fall of the Fatimid rule. As the Mamluks climbed the ladder of authority and power, so did some individuals among the Sudanese slaves. Among those who had power were Yazid ibn Habib, who was a jurist, and Dhul-Nun al-Misri, one of the pioneers of Sufi thought. History narrators also mention Tahiyya al-Nubia, a descendant of a Christian Nubian family.[46]

The lampoonery of Kafour by the Arab poet al-Mutanabbi must have discouraged the Sudanese from looking into the Nubian ethnicity of his mother. The fact that Kafour sat on the throne of Egypt was no consolation for the Sudanese slaves; it will never remove the stain of ownership between the owner and the slave.

The Mamluk state received the lethal blow that did away with their state from an army of other Mamluks. The modern historian Mohamed Abdelrahim identified them in his lecture "Arabism in the Sudan" as the Inkishariyya battalion. Supported by evidence from publications from Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya, he reported that the Inkishariyya were a military battalion formed by the Turkish sultan Orkhan. Orkhan enlisted the sons of war prisoners taken as state slaves. He continued to strengthen his army, adding about 1,000 men every year. This practice survived for three centuries. Throughout this long period of time, the Inkishariyya continued to gain power until they became a state within the state. The Ottomans depended on this group in the sixteenth century to defeat the Mamluks and conquer Egypt.

2

Pioneers of Enslavement and the Slave Trade in Africa

I

Portugal—Spain—England—France—Denmark

Humanity saw its greatest tragedy when the exploration ships sailed out of Lisbon, the capital city of Portugal. Spreading their sails to the friendly wind and ocean tides, they scoured the West African shores looking for profitable human catch. They continued to sail southward looking for safe harbors and secure central markets for 30 years. They arrived in Guinea in 1446, Cape Verde in 1460, and Sao Tome in 1471. The Portuguese led the way to enslavement and the slave trade in Africa. They crossed its center from the west to the east, from Angola to Mozambique, and crossed the Atlantic to Brazil and the Caribbean islands.

Portugal started its activities with a small endeavor that was limited to hunting and transporting slaves to islands near the African coast where the climate was fit for planting sugarcane. That small endeavor quickly scaled up and branched inland as the demand for slaves increased in Brazil and the Caribbean, not to mention America. Portugal secured its hold on the land that is modern-day Angola and made it the warehouse for hunted slaves brought from the inlands or otherwise acquired. Angola's geographical location made it the nearest African port to dock ships coming from or leaving to Brazil and the Caribbean. That was how Angola got the name "Black Mother."[1] The islands near the coast became harbors, maintenance depots, fresh water sources, and transit stations.

The number of slaves exported via Luanda, Angola, tripled between 1475 and 1575. The ships' ledgers during the following century, 1580–1680, showed that the number of slaves exported through Luanda had reached 1,000,000, added to that 500,000 brought from

Congo. Most of the slaves were unloaded in Brazil, about 8,500 slaves per year, followed by the Caribbean islands at 5,000 slaves per year. A popular saying at the time was, "Without sugar, no Brazil; without slaves, no sugar; without Angola, no slaves."[2]

The huge demand for slaves and the practice of bartering slaves for European manufactured goods had developed into a full military invasion and complete domination over vast areas and many villages. The invaders imposed a tax, to be paid in slaves, on the chiefs of those villages, which prompted the chiefs to wage attacks on neighboring communities to obtain slaves. If the captured slaves fell short of satisfying the number demanded, chiefs had to deliver their own people to meet the demand. African agents were appointed to organize raids and collect and arrange slaves according to the categories of male, female, young, and child. They supervised feeding them in fenced areas on the coast and transporting them to the islands to wait for the ships to unload European goods that the agents would market or exchange for slaves. The ships would then load their human cargo. The annual average of shipped slaves during the seventeenth-century reached 18,000 from Angola, and 10,000–15,000 from Mozambique on the East Coast, which witnessed raids all the way to the Cape of Good Hope. The estimated number of slaves transported out of Africa, from the mid-seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century was 3,500,000, 2 million out of Angola, 1 million out of Congo, and 500,000 from Mozambique.

The fact that Portugal was the first to enslave and open markets for the slave trade should not eclipse the leading position of England as the number one slave market. England was the leading international carrier and provider of insurance for the loading and safe arrival in the rest of the colonies of the European countries in the West and East Indies and in the Americas.[3] They owned a huge commercial fleet guarded by an equally huge military fleet [the Royal Navy], both protected by the blessing of Queen Elizabeth I. The military fleet that was once used against pirates and adventurous merchants had been turned into a force to protect the slave trade.

Liverpool was the location where the maritime lines met and diverged, and slave trade transactions were made. Its stockyards that were as big as Angola's were filled with "the black commodity." England kept its prominent place in the high seas and the slave trade for two and a half centuries. Its underwriting of the hunting, shipping, and insurance for importing slaves, at the dawn of the eighteenth-century in 1713, insured 144,000 slaves, that is, 4,800 per year for 30 years. During the last quarter of the century, around 1788, England

brought 38,000 slaves to its colonies in the West Indies, despite the loss of its colonies in North America. England transported 10,000 slaves to the Portuguese colonies, 4,000 to the Dutch colonies, and 2,000 to the Danish colonies. Jack Gratus gave an example of the number of slaves in transactions by one agent, Alexander Lindo, during the period from January to August 1877. He stated that Lindo received 1,934 slaves shipped on three ships owned by three British companies: Brooks and Company, Cannon and Calvert, and Jill Slater and Company.[4]

Spain played a dual role in the tragedy of enslavement and slavery. It crushed the indigenous inhabitants of its occupied Caribbean islands and the Americas and devastated their civilizations and their time-honored traditions; then it brought in the Africans to do what the Indians did not survive to do. Devastated by what happened to the Indians, the priest Bartoleme de las Casas, suggested to the king of Spain that he import African slaves to take the place of the Indians in agriculture and mining. Some clergymen opposed this suggestion and asked whether Jesus Christ would accept transferring one people's devastation to others. But the Spanish colonial interest transcended the spiritual reservations of the clergy. During the last quarter of the sixteenth-century, 1575–1600, the number of slaves in the Spanish colonies reached 40,000, and the ships continued to sail across the Atlantic to bring more slaves.

Three gloomy, grim centuries of the transatlantic slave trade drained Africa of 40 million human beings, 90 percent of whom were young. Africa was robbed of its future, and the institution of slavery and enslavement was turned into a global social system in Africa, the East and West Indies, and in the Americas. That social system paved the way for the Industrial Revolution and anchored the capitalist system that enabled Europe to dominate four continents.

The slave's work started out as support for indigenous workers and later replaced it. Later on, slavery's unlimited productivity, low costs, and surplus profits led to waged work in capitalism. It led to denying slaves work, though not freeing them, as freeing them was not economically viable. Gratus notes the following example from Captain Canot's memoir,[5] from the accounts ledger of slave and ship owners to show the accumulation of their capital (see table 2.1).

At the appointed day [in March 1827], La Fortuna sailed with 220 human beings packed in her hold. Three months afterwards I received advice that she safely landed 217 in the Bay of Matanzas and that their sale yielded a clear profit on the voyage of forty-one thousand four hundred and thirty eight dollars.

Table 2.1 Expenses and profits of the ship La Fortuna

1. Expenses out	Dollars
(Including cost of ship, fitting out, provisions,	20,742.00
wages, cargo, and hush money)	6,430.46
Add 2. *Expenses home* (including provisions, wages, etc.)	27,172. 46
Add 3. *Expenses in Havana*	12,808.00
(Including commissions, 217 slave dresses at 2 dollars each)	39,980.46
4. *Returns*	3,950
Value of vessel at auction	77,469.00
Proceeds of 217 slaves	81,419.00
Total	81,419.00
Resume	39,980.46
Total Returns	41,438.54
Total Expenses	
Net Profit…	

Source: Gratus, *The Great White Lie*, 106

The last quarter of the eighteenth-century witnessed four events that turned the history of humanity toward a new age: the American Revolution and independence in 1776, the French Revolution in 1789, James Watt's invention and copyrighting of the steam engine, and the publication of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*. The effects of these four events on the institution of enslavement and slavery may be seen in the following:

- Africa was needed with Africans left in it [to consume produced goods]. The Industrial Revolution caused a leap in the productivity of the hired workers that surpassed the productivity of serfs and slaves; the barriers between the job market and the workers were torn down; the abundance of manufactured goods needed wider markets and sources of raw materials, as well as cheap labor in all continents.
- The analysis and findings of "the Godfather of Economics," Adam Smith, concluded that slave workers cost more and yielded lower productivity in the long run.
- The Constitution of the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1791, the abolition of slavery and the declaration of slaves as free French nationals, regardless of color, sex, or religion.
- The expansion of the abolitionist movement in the British public and the outlawing of slavery in the British Parliament.

On the fringe of the above events and their effects, the Industrial Revolution witnessed its first slave revolt, influenced by the French Revolution, in Saint-Domingue [Haiti] in 1791.

Conflict between the abolitionists and slave owners and traders in England flared in 1780. The conflict spread to include newspapers, humanitarian organizations, and religious leaders and thinkers. The spread of the conflict compelled the Parliament to consider a request to investigate the slave trade in 1788. Despite the momentum of events and their deep effects, Africa continued to bleed, and the slave trade continued. During the three revolutionary years in France and Europe (1789–1791), British ships continued, with cold confidence and indifference, to carry 75,000 slaves; 45,000 were taken to British colonies and 30,000 to Saint-Domingue. Slave hunting became widespread, resulting in African people moving out of their ancestral lands until some areas were completely deserted. African peoples and tribes were thrown into a hysterical exodus, as if they were a herd of cattle threatened from all directions by wild animals. They moved from the west toward the east, only to be met by hunters on the Eastern Coast. They tried to settle in the middle but were faced with crossfire. When they moved north they fell into the traps of the cross-Saharan invaders and caravans of slave traders on their way to the Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts. It was a universal destruction resembling an earthquake or an epidemic. These events wiped out the productive forces of the continent and wasted its human abilities and talents for centuries. The cycles of life of human beings, agriculture, and livestock were ruined; the sites of civilizations and cultures were no more; the altars of religious beliefs were annihilated; centuries-long ties were disintegrated; the slow, serene, spontaneous development of Africa collapsed, and the ethnic tribal map was shredded to pieces.

The abolitionist campaign gained new support after the requested investigation by the British Parliament. It was not a weak, broken voice overwhelmed by the blaring voices of slavery's beneficiaries, slave owners and traders, plantation owners, and owners of ships that transported slaves. The elements of this abolitionist movement were neither restricted to the conflict between economic and social interests brought about by the Industrial Revolution, nor were they solely based on the expansion of international markets, the invention of the steam engine, the international division of labor, or the loss of the value of the slave and serf work. The incentives for

this movement were humanitarian, moral, religious, cultural, and civilized values.

The abolitionist campaigns surged ahead when the ideological mask worn by the British policymakers and its beneficiaries, in the name of Christianity, fell. Britain had always claimed that its intention was to "civilize the savages" and spread Christianity in the colonies. They disseminated the myth that a slave who professed Christianity would be set free once that slave reached Britain. Christian brotherhood was the equalizer of all brothers in Christ, and the personal freedom of a human being of any race, ethnicity, or sex was a ruling principle in Britain.

Those myths were challenged by slavery's beneficiaries, who invoked the English law that protected personal property generally and the property of British citizens especially. Slaves were the personal property of British citizens who paid taxes and other fees on them. Their ownership did not end just because the cargo moved from sea to land, or from the West Indies and America to England; furthermore, they argued that conversion to Christianity did not negate ownership rights, but supported them.

Despite the efforts of slavery's beneficiaries, the abolitionist movement grew and gained momentum with new slogans and perspectives. One perspective called for the abolition of slavery without dealing with existing slavery; this was thought to lead to a gradual disappearance of slavery. Another perspective called for better treatment of slaves and better conditions on the ships that transported them. Ship owners should provide better food and more room for the slaves on board the ships, that is to say room to turn when they were lying; any ship that did not conform to those rules should not be registered or licensed. A third perspective called for the abolition of slavery and enslavement, with compensation for owners.

Slavers were not deterred by these slogans and perspectives; instead, they started looking for new ammunition and tactics for their battle with the abolitionists. They launched a vicious ideological war on antislavery activists and accused them of being members of the Jacobins, the extremists of the French Revolution. They claimed that the antislavery movement had incited the slave revolts in Saint-Domingue, Jamaica, and Brazil and emboldened slaves to kill owners, burn their immovable and moveable property, vandalize their crops, and rape their wives and daughters.

However, those benefiting from slavery were swimming against tide of history and against the path of progress of societies in Europe, England, and the rest of the world beyond Europe. Gratus noted, "Britain had also started to move with a vengeance, into the industrial

nineteenth century." The prices of coal and iron soared; the textile industry developed, and "the most important agent of the innovation had already made its first appearance—the railways."[6]

II

The Abolition Act (1807)

In March of 1807, the British Parliament passed the Abolition Act, which, inter alia, stipulated:

- The illegalization of slavery and a ban on the transportation of slaves by British ships. Any ship contravening that law would be punished by confiscation of the ship or fined £ 100 for each slave transported, or both. Ownership of slaves in the ship would be forfeited. They would serve His Majesty as soldiers or marines without entitlement to pensions.
- Incentives for the British navy ships to monitor and punish ships that contravene the Act, with a fine of £ 13 for each male slave, £ 10 for each female, and £ 3 for each child. This incentive became a financial resource for the navy.
- Requirement that slave owners must register their slaves for purposes of control of trade transactions.

The Church of England and other denominations had different positions on slavery, except for the Quakers, who took a firm stance against all forms of slavery. Those who were benefiting from slavery took the requirement of registration as recognition of ownership. This ownership meant more influence and richness. They claimed that if the government were to legislate against slavery, then the owners were entitled to compensation for loss of property.

The Abolition Act charged the abolitionists with new energy, and they moved to say that the prohibition of slavery was not enough; a law had to be passed to prevent enslavement and to emancipate the existing slaves. They also called for ending the sugar monopoly and allowing the import of sugar from the French colonies, as it was produced by free laborers. England had laws that restricted commercial transactions to its colonies and levied heavy custom fees on imports from other parts of the world. The movement against that monopoly and for free trade and competition also gained momentum, and its ideals and slogans interlaced with the antislavery movement.

The beneficiaries of slavery raised their voices once more to call for a moratorium on the Abolition Act to enable them to compete with

the French colonies, Cuba, and Brazil, which continued to import slaves from Africa (700,000 slaves in the period between 1815 and 1830, since Napoleon reinstated the slave trade to overcome the low returns of the French colonies). Due to the flow of slaves in those countries, the price of a slave went down to £ 40 while it soared to £ 100 in the British colonies after the act; in addition, the productivity of new slaves was higher than old ones.

However, the new atmosphere created by the French Revolution created public opinion that was not receptive to the claims of slavery's beneficiaries. The productivity of slaves, even in domestic work, declined. The international free labor market expanded and had the capacity for mass production. A feverish race started, where raw materials and means of production were plenty. An active, popular, antislavery movement led by abolitionists called for new legislation to complement the 1807 Act, in order to abolish slavery and emancipate all slaves. They continued to pressure Parliament until a new bill was put before it. A long deliberation, from 1831 to 1833, ensued. That deliberation reflected all opinions within the antislavery movement, from its radical to moderate to right-wing sides. The Abolition of Slavery Act of 1833 was passed, to come into force in August of 1834.

The number of slaves emancipated in 1834 was 800,000. The registers of the House of Commons show the list of slave owners who received compensation in 1837–1838 and the amounts received; for example H. M. Bunbury received £ 24,169 for 478 slaves; H. D. Baily received £ 23,024 for 456 slaves.[7]

The Church of England suffered great embarrassment when the argument was no longer an interpretation of the Holy Book or a reconciliatory middle stance, such as good treatment for slaves or an obligation of slaves to faithfully serve masters. The issue moved from theory to practice. It turned out that the church had plantations in Barbados that were tended to by 300 slaves who converted to Christianity and were baptized by the church. After the abolition of slavery and the passage of rules for compensation 450 slaves were added. The bishop of the church at Exeter received £ 12,700 for 665 slaves. Conflicts between churches and denominations surfaced. It became known that the Catholic Church in Portugal had expelled the Protestants on accusations of heterodoxy and prevented them from owning slaves for fear that they might emancipate and baptize them to increase the numbers of Protestants. Newspapers published the names of members of Parliament who received compensation and those who owned ships and traded in slaves. Later in the nineteenth

century, the United States applied similar compensation rules. The northern states offered masters 300 dollars for one slave's emancipation. The state of Pennsylvania declared every child born after March 1870 to be free at age 28! West Virginia opted for the gradual abolition of slavery; it declared all children born after July 4, 1863, to be born free.

The page of slavery seemed to be turning; a reverse migration started in 1848, when free slaves decided to move to Liberia and Haiti in 1859. But, alas, hopes were dashed when the slave trade continued to flourish, despite the first and second acts passed by Parliament. The 1840 British Parliament's reports revealed that 140,000 slaves had arrived in Brazil, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Buenos Aires, and the southern coast of the United States.

The last third of the nineteenth-century witnessed the largest campaign in the history of the antislavery movement. The American president Abraham Lincoln emancipated the American slaves despite the fierce resistance of 300,000 white slave-owning families in the southern and bordering states. That step was the apex of the struggle that had brewed since the creation of the American Constitution. There was a distinction between the free northern states and the southern states that practiced enslavement and the slave trade. Each state had the right to abolish slavery within its borders.

Thomas Jefferson, the engineer of the Declaration of Independence, was a slave owner. In 1793, the southern states were able to enforce laws that protected their right to have slaves. They had a right to chase their runaway slaves into the northern states and put a duty on northern states to assist in the capture of runaway slaves, an American version of the Bakt Treaty. In 1850, they pushed through a law (The Fugitive Slave Act) that allowed courts to admit the sworn statement by a master that a certain person was his or her slave and must be returned to him or her. During the Civil War, slaves who fought against the southern states were offered their freedom, and freedom for their families.

3

Slavery and Enslavement in Funj and Darfur Sultantes

I

Slavery and Enslavement in the Funj Society

The single document that deals with slavery and enslavement in the Funj society dates back to 1754; it is part of the Sheikh Khojali documents.[1] According to Spaulding and Abu Salim,[2] that means it was written about 280 years after the establishment of the Black Sultanate, and three decades after the very first document issued by the sultans of Funj, dated 1724. Following this document in importance are the books of the traveler Krump from 1701,[3] James Bruce from 1771[4] and J. L. Burckhardt from 1819.[5] Their observations and impressions cover a good deal of the eighteenth century and two decades of the nineteenth-century. All of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries remain in the dark, with no coverage by travelers to illuminate that period. The documented history of slavery and enslavement started after al-Tunisi and Burckhardt, in the documents of al-Turkiyya, al-Mahdiyya, and the Condominium era through 1936, which include the memorandum by the Civil Secretary, dated May 8, 1936.

The scholar (*faqih*) Abdelrahman ibn al-Sheikh Khojali issued a charter (*hujja shar`aiyya)*,[6] a fatwa, and judgment on a case presented by his brother Taha. Taha impregnated a slave woman he co-owned with others. His co-owners were not happy with what he did, and they refused his offer to pay her price in settlement of the dispute. He consulted Abdelrahaman ibn al-Sheikh, who advised that the co-owners accept the settlement, but they refused. Al-Sheikh sent to other knowledgeable sheikhs who, in the tradition of scholars at the time, followed Imam Malik's *madhab,* quoted in the abridged version of that *madhab* and *aqd* al-Sheikh Salim. He then advised that Taha should pay the price of the slave before pregnancy, not

counting the value of the fetus. They all agreed and signed a *hujja* to that effect.[7]

Tabaqat Wad Dayf Allah,[8] which included biographies of the prominent Sufi sheikhs at the time, included 30 remarks on slavery scattered throughout the biographies on pages 59–361. The following is a compilation summarizing those remarks, without elaboration on the original.

Al-Sheik Idris wad al-Arbab used to receive his disciple al-Sheikh Mohamed wad Fayid from the Red Sea area. Wad Fayid would be accompanied by tribesmen; some of them brought honey, some cloth, and others slaves. Al-Sheikh Idris would distribute all the gifts among the needy. A story was conveyed about a man from the Hawara tribe who came from Egypt, sold some goods to a man from Arbji, and deferred payment. The Hawari went to Western Sudan and bought slaves, but his slaves died, and he died afterward. His son came to the Arbji merchant and asked for payment of the deferred amount. The Arbji merchant asked al-Sheikh Idris to intervene on his behalf and ask the son to accept ten slaves in payment. The son agreed, but gave the slaves as a gift to al-Sheikh Idris who returned them to the merchant.

It was narrated about al-Sheikh Hassan wad Hisouna that he acquired slaves whom he taught horseback riding in order to guard his livestock. He was known to own five hundred slaves armed with swords with silver handles and silver decorated sheathes; they had a *sid qum* (a leader and soldier), and they carried big sticks. Al-Sheikh Hassan owned so many slaves that they had villages around the residence of al-Sheikh. A magnificent description is given in *al-Tabaqat* of processions by a huge number of the slaves he owned and who served his guests. It was conveyed that in such a procession, one could see 120 female slaves (*farkhat*) carrying big plates of *kisra;* each one was followed by another *farkha* carrying a plate, and in turn, followed by one carrying a calabash. Al-Sheikh Hassan was aware of his vast property of slaves; he used to say that people came to him just to see his male and female slaves.

Wad Dayf Allah continued to narrate stories such as the one about giving away slaves. When wad Hissouna's sister Fatima got married to a man from the Shukriyya tribe and moved to her husband's home, he gave her four female slaves to serve her. On his deathbed, he bequeathed that one-third of his property be given to five poor men. Each man then got 36 slaves, some of whom were domestic servants and others who were administrative staff, known as slaves of dignitaries (*raqeeq al`aayan*).

The biography of al-Sheikh Hamad al-Nahlan recorded his statement to another, "You said you would kill me, you slave of Kazgail, you lizard eater." The editor of *al-Tabaqat* explained that Kazgail was a place in the Kurdufan province where some slaves with no masters lived. They were considered of a lower status, since they did not have a master.

The city of Sinnar was also mentioned as a home to a large number of Nuba slaves, who were taken prisoners during the Funj attacks on Kurdufan. The Funj sultans used them as special guards after the reign of Badi Abu Shloukh. They used the Nuba slaves to repel the attacks of those competing with them for power. There was also a mention of the emancipated slaves of Berta al-Qurashi, who were the cheapest among the slaves of the Bert tribes inhabiting the southern parts of the Funj sultanate.

People used to promise or make offerings of slaves to the holy men if their blessings helped them achieve their endeavors. For example, a woman named Fatima bint Obeid vowed to give her slave Gasmallah to al-Sheikh Khojali if she was cured of her sickness. People often resorted to holy men to help retrieve their lost or stolen goods, as in the case of a man who asked al-Sheikh Khalil al-Roumi for help in locating a lost female slave. Al-Sheikh Khalil saved Sultan Badi al-Ahmar during the mutiny of his slave soldiers. *Faqih* Musa al-Ja`ali pleaded with al-Sheikh Mohamed wad Doleeb to retrieve his female slaves captured by Osman wad Mohamed al-Shaiqi when the latter raided the homeland of al-Jamou`iyya. Al-Sheikh ordered Osman to return the slaves and he did.

In another example, al-Haj Saeed built a mosque and dedicated it to the memory of al-Sheikh Dafa` Allah wad al-Sheikh Mohamed Abu Idris. He designated a trust (*waqf*) of 12 slaves, male and female, to serve the mosque. Slaves were a commodity that was given as a gift by commoners to sultans and Sufi sheikhs. Some sheikhs kept slaves for domestic service, as agricultural workers in the fields and pastoral lands, as guards of other property, and to serve their guests and followers.

Some of the Sufi sheikhs used to free the slaves given to them as gifts or use *zakat* money given to them by followers to buy slaves and set them free, as in the case of al-Sheikh Hamad al-Mushaikhi of Bani Jarrar. When the Fur attacked Bani Jarrar, the latter took 70 Fur soldiers as prisoners, enslaved them, and gave them to al-Sheikh Hamad as a gift. The sheikh called them to Islam, then emancipated them and told them to return home.

Al-Sheikh Dakeen sent 50 slaves to al-Sheikh Ziada wad al-Nour to assist in serving his disciples. King Zumrawi gave Sigayroun four water wheels (*sawaqi*)[9] and four slaves. Sigayroun said he did not deserve the gift and suggested that it be given to al-Sheikh Ziada wad al-Nour, due to the large number of disciples he housed and others attending his *khalawi*.[10]

Some Sufi sheikhs practiced concubinage; they produced children from their concubines, some of whom, albeit a small number, became sheikhs in their own right. Al-Sheikh Rabbat wad Ghulam Allah was tricked into marrying a slave woman who bore him his son Saleem. When he found out, he took his case to the judge who held that Saleem was a free person and the sheikh was to pay the price of the slave woman. Saleem's request to marry his cousin was refused, for he was considered a slave, but when his spiritual powers were seen and people gathered around him, his cousin married him, and his offspring became the fathers of prominent ethnic groups.[11] Some of the most prominent Sufi sheikhs were known to have slave mothers; for example, Sheikh al-Nour wad al-Sheikh Musa, al-Sheikh Ismail Sahb al-rababa, and al-Sheikh Abdallah Saboon were sons of slave women. When Sheikh Saboon was offered the hand of the daughter of his teacher, he declined and said, "A slave should not marry his mistress."

Al-Tabaqat also mentioned the sheikhs living in hardship who had very few or no slaves; for example, dinner and supper were late at al-Sheikh Abdelrahman wad Tarraf's home because the only slave who helped his wife by getting water had escaped. Al-sheikh Ali al-Liboudi had only one female slave. Al-Shiekh Suleiman al-Tawaali was a degenerate before he took the Sufi path. The Tabaqat notes that before his Sufi days, he seized a female slave from her master and would give her a drum and call her the servant of Allah who was not owned by anyone; he then would wear a *rahat*[12] and dance to her drumming.

Some sheikhs had a huge number of slaves within their property. For example, al-Sheikh Abdelrahman wad Jabir owned 40 slaves armed with swords. Sheikh Mazari al-Tingari's home thronged with slaves who were in the kitchen (*bait alnnar*)[13] helping women to prepare food for students and guests.

Features of enslavement and slavery in Funj society appear in the written *hujjas*. Some of those features were specific and unique; others were public and shared with other enslaving societies. For example, co-ownership was an old practice known in ancient and intermediary societies of Athens and Rome, as in the societies of the Arab-Islamic

Empire. Both Roman law and Islamic jurisprudence, in their different forms, dealt with co-ownership of slaves as a known practice.

Domestic slaves had effected and colored Funj society at its core, the family. Families would share a slave for certain chores such as fetching water or wood or grinding grain and preparation of food, because they did not have the financial means to own a [whole] slave. The *hujjas* show another feature of Funj society; although the records show regulations derived from local customs and Islamic jurisprudence, the practice was unique in being governed by fatwa and adjudicated upon by local the *faqihs*, whose religious authority they adhered to more than tribal or central authorities. Parties disputing a matter would usually comply with Sheikh Abdelrahman's opinion on the disputed matter, although he was not a representative of any tribal, local, or central authority.

The above variety of anecdotes related by wad Dayf Allah shed a shining light on enslavement and slavery relations within the Sufi tradition in the Funj sultanate. What is noticeable about how the Sufi sheikhs acquired slaves is that they never organized raids to hunt slaves and never frequented slave markets [to buy or sell slaves]. They obtained slaves through their relationships with their followers who hoped for their spiritual blessing as they sought tranquility, mental balance, and guidance on the right path. Those followers gave slaves at will; there was neither financial necessity or political or administrative coercion that dictated giving slaves as gifts, nor requirements in the way that authorities levied taxes and royalties and benefited from slavery. People at that time felt and had a deeply held belief in the social necessity of the institution of Sufism. They recognized that the sheikh's *khalwa* and his village were gathering centers for people. People came for education, cures, refuge, mediation, security, counseling, hospitality, and performance of collective religious prayers and rituals. People knew that all of those services were provided by the sheikhs, and knew that the disciples living at the sheikh's abode would not be able to provide more than what was needed for their own consumption. In many ways, slaves were a necessary and available means for the development of productive forces in the Funj society.

Sufism fulfilled many social and spiritual functions that effected cohesion and harmony in Funj society. For example, the villages and areas of Sufi sheikhs were autonomous and independent from the sultanate; such autonomy may be seen in how *faqih* Hassan wad Hisouna presided over the wad Hisouna area, and al-Majadheeb over Eddamir.[14]

Slaves served as a token payment for keeping order and security. The spiritual authority of the Sufi sheikhs extended to securing caravans and trade transactions in their areas, which helped in curbing robberies and pillaging. Many murderers and thieves shuddered and confessed when they had to take an oath before a sheikh. People who came to markets as sellers and buyers left their goods by the *khalwa* or the tomb of a sheikh, knowing that they would remain untouched until they returned to the market the next week.

Asceticism, impartiality, monasticism, education of their students, and admonishment of people in their worldly and religious lives were spiritual exercises that were much needed in Funj society. People needed role models to exemplify ethical behavior and relationships. It was logical that people adhered to the example of al-Sheikh Idris wad al-Arbab as he distributed gifts and slaves to the needy, or to the model of al-Sheikh Hamad al-Mushaikhi, as he bought slaves with the *zakat* money sent to him by Bani Jarrar and emancipated them. Such use of *zakat* was the duty of the treasury, but in his use of that money he returned *zakat* to its original religious and social role.[15] He also called upon Fur prisoners to enter Islam when he emancipated and returned them to their homeland. There was also the story of Sheikh Sigayroun who passed the gift of slaves to another sheikh because that sheikh cared for a large number of disciples and guests.

In starting this chapter with *hujjas* and Tabaqat wad Dayef Allah, although they are historically more recent than Krump's travels, I was not being a biased nationalist or a "resource chauvinist." The decision is part of the process dictated by my unrelenting effort, not an idle wish, to make searching for Sudanese resources from all over the country a civilized endeavor that might lead to the writing of original history not based on hearsay. That original history may then be supported by travelers' written materials and contributions and additions by respected historians of all nationalities, cultures, and languages, who enrich Sudanese studies. This is done with the intention of turning the Sudan Archives, the Sudan Museum, and the College of Performing Arts into cultural palaces instead of stagnant, lifeless governmental departments that are burial grounds for talent.

In the English digest of Krump's book compiled by J. Spaulding,[16] Krump recorded his observations and findings about slavery and enslavement relations in the Funj era. He recorded impressions about

the large number of slaves in the sultan's palace and with his courtiers; he noted:

- Groups of slaves, male and female, who performed services as caretakers, educators, and wet nurses.
- Groups of slaves, about six hundred, male, female, and eunuchs, serving the wives, concubines, and favorites of the sultan.
- Groups of slaves, male and female, who were confined to the palace from a tender age, "locked up tighter than the cloistered nuns of Christendom," as Krump put it, serving the children of the ruling elite, the children of the sultan, his ministers, heads of provinces, and the rest of the court dignitaries, for education, guidance, training, and discipline.

In his book, *The Heroic Age of Sinnar*, J. Spaulding gave an interpretation of the Funj traditions of confining the princes and children of the elite; separating males from their mothers; and confining the mother, the wife of the sultan, in a status of provisional retirement after giving birth to her first son, so as not to have another son who might compete with the first. There is a tradition of a sultan's court choosing his successor, killing all other princes, and pursuing those who escaped until they were all killed, and of a midwife or a wet nurse hiding a child to spare his life, or doing the opposite and suffocating the infant at the time of birth.[17]

Spaulding speculated that those traditions had their roots in ancient Nubia. He may have the right analysis; however, the same traditions were practiced by the Ottomans. Salah Salim Zartuqa[18] found that, when Mohamed the Third came to the throne in 1595, he killed his 19 brothers according to the custom of hunting and killing of siblings at that time. Princes could be confined and not allowed to marry. If they procreated, their male offspring would be eliminated by midwives.

Krump then moved from describing the vast number of slaves at the sultan's palace to a detailed description of Sinnar's market, particularly its slave market,

> One should know that in all of Africa, as far as the Moorish lands are concerned, Sinnar is close to being the greatest trading city. Caravans are continually arriving from Cairo, Dongola, Nubia, from across the Red Sea, from India, Ethiopia, [Dar] Fur, Borno, the Fezzan, and other kingdoms. This is a free city, and men of any nationality or faith

> may live in it without a single hindrance. After Cairo, it is one of the most populous cities.

Krump continued to give a detailed description of the market in Sinnar. It had a meticulous transaction system and a separate space for each commodity such as ivory, camels, horses, donkeys, firewood, dates, cereal, cane, meats, and poultry.

> Furthermore, every day at the public market human beings who are slaves—men and women of every age—are sold like cattle. Every day two or three hundred of them are led out onto the square. Turkish merchants, with the permission of their law, make them serve their wantonness, and then sell them to other lands such as Egypt and India; great are their ill-gotten gains! Those under twelve years of age are as naked as God sent them into the world; the older ones have an old rag about the body to cover their private parts. When they are sold, people say to the responsible party, "Bring me those slaves." Then the purchaser, without shyness or shame, looks them over like cattle, at their mouths and teeth, and the whole body. If one pleases him, he lays out the value, for in this land it is not the custom that one offers one's wares [at a set price] but rather that the purchaser must say how much he wants to give for them. If the seller is not satisfied with that price, and thinks it too small, he says, "Iftah Allah," that is [in Arabic] "[May God] open (your hand to give more)." This goes on until the seller is satisfied, or until another purchaser offers more. The ordinary price of a male fifteen-year-old slave is thirty florins, or if he is well-formed, [p. 286] forty. A female slave of this age, if she is of clear complexion, is sold for fifty or sixty. At times, especially in the case of Ethiopian girls, they are sold for eighty. In Egypt such a boy will be sold for sixty, eighty or even one hundred guilders, and a girl, if she is pretty, goes for about one hundred, depending on the quality of her beauty.[19]

Krump continued to give a live vivid and moving description of the slave caravan's journey through the Bayuda desert on its way to Egypt,

> On the tenth [of August 1702] we arrived safely at Bayuda, which is the place where one finds water. A ciceronian orator could not have expressed the great heat we have endured on this journey . . . the poor slaves, who had to go on foot. Many of them, already in ill health as a result of this long and difficult journey, died. They are bound and fettered together with great heavy chains, like dogs. They must march behind the camels to which they are fastened for the whole journey. Others were fastened with wooden poles hanging from the neck,

> about ten feet long and as thick as a slender arm. These are bound behind with thongs of camel leather so that they cannot slide their heads through . . . The poor wretches must follow after the camels over hill and vale, through bushes and brush, thistles and thorns, whether the camel goes fast or slowly, stands still or runs. They [are] barefoot, with uncovered heads and wearing nothing on the body except a rag to conceal somewhat the private parts—this in the greatest heat [p. 371] and dying of hunger and thirst at the same time. At night they are without pity locked up tighter than by day. If a slave falls sick along the way they throw him or her over a camel no differently than a butcher throws a calf across his saddle bow, until they finally go to pieces and are abandoned half dead in the desert.

Another dramatic portrait is drawn through Krump's observations conveyed by Spaulding[20] of the festival held by the sultan of Sinnar for the *manjil* of Qarri. The chief of the Abdallab paid a visit to show his allegiance to the sultan of Sinnar.

> A great solemnity was held on account of the arrival of the shaykh of Qarri. He had under him the whole kingdom of Nubia up to the Red Sea, and was bringing the king many hundreds of slaves, horses, camels and a large sum of money as his tribute to Sinnar. The ceremony was as follows. The king rode out of the city to meet him accompanied by his court, numbering about one hundred, partly shaykhs, partly soldiers on horseback, along with several hundred slaves on foot and armed with lances . . . In front of the king went three hundred slave girls who served him and his concubines. They had covered their hips with a silk scarf but all the rest was bare. They wore silver bands on their arms, and their hair was decorated with very many silver coins, and also some Venetian sequins, all of which rustled . . . The slaves . . . divided themselves into two parties and marched toward each other with dreadful cries as if they were going to fight.

The best of Krump's observations and impressions were on slavery and enslavement in Funj society, from the dense presence of slaves in the sultan's court, the Sinnar market, particularly the display of the seasonal raids' harvest at the slave market for foreigners who exported slaves, to the slave caravans crossing the desert to Egypt and the sultan's festive reception of the *manjil*.

Dr. Spaulding has a respected research methodology and contributions to Sudan studies. With all due respect to his expertise in research, some of his findings on slavery and enslavement in the Funj society raise more problems and questions than they give answers or solutions. An example is the finding in his book *The Heroic Age in*

Sinnar, that slave labor in agriculture resulted in freeing the land and the slave owner from entering into partnerships, be it in the production process or the production relations that prevailed before slave labor, as well as changing the shares in partnerships.

The above finding may hold as a general theoretical hypothesis in the sense that bringing in slaves availed owners of extra manpower. The owner would not need to have laborers who would take a certain share of the profit that was recognized by custom and law. However, the slave labor went only to their owner. He got all the produce; slaves cost him only the expenses of keeping them alive and reviving their energy to produce, just as the field animals and the ox for a *saqia* would cost him. Spaulding's finding may be true of agricultural production on the banks or islands of the Nile where the *saqia* and *shadouf* were used. Yet, even this type of production would not free the owner of the land and slaves from paying the makers of *saqia*s and *shadoufs* and the expenses of maintaining both. There were also expenses of those hired to harvest, whether they did it by hand or used animals and tools. There is also the general feature of ownership of land on the Nile. It was a family ownership and the whole family participated in the production process. Furthermore, slave labor did not drive away or eliminate the economic feasibility of the labor of small owners and producers. Finally, the hypothesis presumes that the landowner was also the slave owner, but the realities of that time were open to more than one possibility or hypothesis; for example, the landowner could enter into a partnership with a slave owner, or the landowner might hire the slaves, or one of the big slave owners might rent out his excess slaves to a small landowner. In the end, the dialectical relationship between slave labor and the labor of small owners and producers rendered slave labor futile. The cost of slave subsistence exceeded production. The small and big landowners on the Nile, in Egypt and the Sudan, did not need Adam Smith's theories, as they discovered by sheer addition and subtraction, and without the abolition movement, what Adam Smith found in his *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776.

Slave labor, no doubt, contributed to the expansion of arable land, and, in turn, affected the harvest and resulted in surpluses. It was possible for the owners and their families to enjoy some leisure time, not just as individuals but as a class, an elite that took other social positions such as governance, administration, commerce, and education. Slave labor also helped rural communities increase the area of rain-irrigated lands, as well as increased livestock and pastoral land. Slavery helped the Rezaigat tribes of Darfur in the west and the Shukriyya and Rufa'a of the Funj sultanate in the middle and

southeast in their seasonal nomadic movement in search of pasture and water. They also supervised the expanding agricultural areas. Slave work played a role in the creation and settlement of tribal aristocracy in their villages of origin. Those were villages that had historically been in particular places within the vast area claimed by the tribe; it was usually a place around a source of potable water or close to it. That place would have acquired natural, social, and spiritual characteristics that qualified it to be the embodiment of the tribe, home of the court, festivals, the market, and the slave market. In the words of Ibn Khaldun, "The dynasty is the greatest market, the mother and base of all trade."[21]

The ancient and middle sultanates and kingdoms of the Sudan increased the size of their armies by enlisting slaves, especially in the Funj era, and afterward, the Fur. The number of fighters in tribal areas increased, as did the centers of authority, and the tribe and central authorities were relieved of the burden of supervising infantry soldiers and were able to increase horsemen. They undertook a reorganization of the army that allowed for more people to attend to military affairs, training and fighting without adding a burden on the tribal and central limited foodstocks. Many of these groups were producing their own food. The sultan's guards in the Funj sultanate lived in designated villages with designated fields for agriculture and animal husbandry to satisfy their and their families' food needs. The sultan of Fur provided his guards with land plots in strategic places around the sultanate.

Spaulding mentioned in one of his analyses some of the aspects of what he called the time of "self-consciousness," which included the spread of *khalawi* and education; respect for the profession of *faqih*; rituals of coronation of the sultan; attention to the human being by showing interest in documenting ownership, gifts, and expansion of commercial transactions with Egypt, both as a market and as the home of al-Azhar; as well as keeping the same relationship with Hijaz, also as a market and as the place of pilgrimage (*hajj*). Self-conciousness was also evident in receiving knowledge from scholars; and widening horizons and expanding domestic and international markets. Spaulding's analysis is comprehensive and sound; however, that self-consciousness would not have crystalized in the way he described it without the labor and contributions of slaves. They defended the sultanate and increased its size. Slaves—males, females, and eunuchs—efficiently executed the jobs in the positions they took in the sultan's court. They administered the palace and its storage; participated in education, entertainment, and the arts; and extended the royal family

through slave wives and concubines. Not only that, they were excellent fighters, military planners, leaders, and organizers.

Slaves were not just a supply of muscles and dull feelings. They were a group rich in talents and innovative energy. They were the cradle of the mixing of African and Arab-Islamic cultures that gave birth to the Sudanese personality, culture, and identity.

Spaulding paid special attention to the importance of lineage, which is a common characteristic shared by the social, tribal, ethnic, and racial formations of society during periods of mixing and migration for natural reasons such as drought, starvation, pandemics, wars and raids, urbanization, rise of markets and trade transactions with far away parts of the sultanate, and the relative stability of the ruling dynasty and its administrative structure. A unique characteristic of the Funj was a false consciousness, caused by psychological and civilizational motives, namely, the desire to distance themselves from any connection to their Negro African origins, in particular the origin of the enslaved tribes or areas that were sites for hunting slaves. This inferiority complex led to an exaggerated rush to link with Arab-Islamic ancestry, particularly to its best, Quraish [the Prophet's tribe] with its ten branches; they would link to the Umayyad if they could not reach the Hashemite. Some of them were not even embarrassed trying to link to the highest summits [of the Arab race], only to find themselves hanging in the air without evidence.

If we could go back in time and the scales were turned in favor of the slaves, the lineage of some families, clans, branches, and even tribes, would have disappeared and the names changed from al-Abbas to Isagha, Deng, Bilal, and Antara.[22] The Funj brand that branded their cattle and slaves with a drum and a stick might have had another brand that came close to Spaulding's interpretation that attributed it to be the symbol, the hieroglyphic sign of life.

Another traveler was James Bruce, who came after Krump. Bruce recorded his observations and memoirs during his travel through the Funj sultanate in 1772–1773. He discussed slavery and enslavement through his estimate of the number of slaves in the sultan's army. He stated that there were 14,000 Nuba slaves.[23] Yet, whether his estimate was right or wrong, his diary did not address it further, such as commenting on the overall number of the army in the capital city or other provinces. He did not tell us whether the sultan had garrisons outside the city, or battalions that were fighting in faraway places. Nor did he record the significance of the size of the garrison compared to the number of slaves in the sultan's court, the homes of the elite and merchants, and in the zaribas of the slave traders before they put them

on sale at the slave market. The numbers remain subject to Bruce's credibility. Within half a century, in 1825, other travelers raised the number to 30,000 slaves [in the army]. This last number is easy to prove, as it has been recorded in the Turkish documents.

Four decades after Bruce, in 1814, J. L. Burckhardt started his journey from Egypt to Shendi and ended it at Sawakin; he did not reach Sinnar. The phenomenon of slavery and enslavement was prominent in his notes and observations throughout his journey. He estimated the number of black slaves in Egypt to be 40,000, two-thirds of whom were male and one-third female. He estimated that, in Cairo alone, 8,000 slaves perished during the plague epidemic that swept Egypt in 1815.[24] He recorded his observations on the arrival of slaves to the slave market in Asyout, and about the castration that became a job of two Coptic monks, who would castrate boys between the ages of eight and twelve.

> The operators, during my stay in that part of the country, were two Coptic monks, who were said to excel all their predecessors in the dexterity . . . the boys chosen, are between the age of eight and twelve years, for at a more advanced age, there is great risk of its proving fatal.[25]

The boys chosen were "the strongest and best looking." Of those whose handsome looks brought misfortune upon them, Burckhardt learned that, "two years ago, Mohammed Aly Pasha caused two hundred young Darfour slaves to be mutilated, whom he sent as a present to the Grand Signor."[26] Burckhardt continued his observations of slaves in the area from the borders of upper Egypt to the city of Shendi in the Sudan. He recorded that between Berber and Shendi, every household had between three and five slaves for domestic, agricultural, and pasturage. The estimate of the household slaves in that area is credible because it would be noticeable even if the traveler stayed for one day. However, his estimate that the area between Berber and Sinnar housed 12,000 slaves should be taken with a grain of salt as he did not reach Sinnar.[27] Burckhardt's description of the city of al-Damir, its scholars, merchants, and slaves, remains the most circulated in history books.

Burckhardt attained knowledge of slave markets and traders and areas of slave hunting and the ethnicity of those slaves[28] through his long stay in Shendi and through his ownership of a female slave and other slaves to serve him. He monitored and followed what he heard about slave hunting raids of the Benda, Aforjy, and Firteet in western

Darfur and southern Kurdufan. He followed the circulation of slaves, on foot, from one market and trader to another market and trader until they reached Shendi, one of the central markets during the Funj era. The slaves would continue on another miserable journey, shackled in wooden yokes, like a herd of cattle, to Sawakin, then to Asyout. Burckhardt drew a picture of the most wretched scene in that journey when he described how water was poured in a small pond or a big container and the slaves had to go on their knees and drink like animals. Other terrible scenes included bathing or setting up tents at night after a journey that started at dawn.

Burckhardt said,

> I calculate the number of slaves sold annually in the market of Shendy at about five thousand, of whom about two thousand five hundred are carried off by the Souakin merchants and fifteen hundred by those of Egypt; the remainder go to Dongola, and to the Bedouins who live to the east of Shendy.[29]

When the slaves were brought to the markets, they were classified, male and female, according to age,

> into three classes: namely, Khomasy (خماسي), comprising those apparently below ten or eleven years; Sedasy (سداسي), those above eleven and below fourteen or fifteen; and Balegh (بالغ), or grown up, those of fifteen and upwards. The Sedasy are the most esteemed…A male of this class was worth fifteen or sixteen dollars…A female was worth from twenty to twenty-five Spanish dollars.[30]

The merchandise should be free of disease and disability. An adult, older female slave was bought for her efficient domestic service; pregnancy brought down the price of a young female. "The merchants take great care to prevent any improper intercourse between the slaves themselves, always separating the boys from the girls at night."[31] Some of the beautiful slaves were used for prostitution, and some masters appropriated some of their gains in prostitution.

Burckhardt described Sawakin as being one of the first slave markets in Eastern Africa. He estimated the annual number of slaves brought into Sawakin to be 2,000 to 3,000. It was a market that was as important as the markets in Asyout and Isna in Egypt and Massawa in Ethiopia.

Burckhardt recorded that there were 15,000 to 20,000 slaves from East Africa and the Sudan exported annually across the Red Sea, through Sawakin and Massawa, to Hijaz and Egypt. According to Burckhardt's remarks on what he saw in Berber and Shendi, despite

the large number of exports, the number of slaves left behind in the Sudan was larger. He referred to the abolition movement in Europe, but he thought that even if all the means of export were eliminated, there would be still slavery in the Sudan. He based his argument on two factors: the first was the domestic need of the society for slaves to tend to agriculture, livestock, and domestic work, and that slaves were a valued commodity and recognized by all to the extent that they were negotiable like currency. Although he ignored the army as one of the largest fields employing slaves, his argument still had weak support. External demand was the factor that increased the slave trade to a level that surpassed local needs. Furthermore, the last decades of the Turkiyya had eliminated sources of slaves and decreased the slave trade. The second factor seems to be a misunderstanding by Burckhardt; he thought Islam mandated Muslims to enslave animists. Whether his source for this information was European, which is likely, or the slave traders in Shendi with whom he mingled and got most of his information, Islam does not allow enslavement of animists or other non-Muslims, just because they are that. This is the rule, even if the assumption that the African ethnic groups were animist was true. Islam mandates that people be called to Islam first.[32] Spreading Islam among the Sudanese people was not the intention of Muslim Arabs who organized the slave raids. It was likely that they would not welcome Africans into Islam, as they would have to stop raiding them. The presence of scholars or Imams accompanying those raids was unheard of. The travelers never recorded that they saw or met a scholar or an Imam in the slave market in Sinnar, al-Massalmiyya, Arbiji, al-Obayyid, al-Fashir, Kobbe, Berber, Shendi, or Sawakin.

No one ever saw a slave trader stopping the caravan to say prayers with the slaves. The slave traders and masters went only to the extent of circumcising the boys chosen to serve their families and giving them Arabic names that branded them as slaves like a brand made on the neck of a cow or a camel. The slave raids were, from beginning to end, an economic endeavor. It was like the gold or silver rushes in California. The place was bled until it dried out.

II

Slavery and Authority in the Sultanate of Darfur

Enslavement patterns in Darfur were akin to those in other African kingdoms. Slavery was a fundamental element of the social

organization. It was a special economic segment that complemented the socioeconomic structure of agriculture, livestock, and domestic trade. Slavery in the sultanate of Darfur did not get its status and effectiveness with the formation of the sultanate of Darfur; rather, it had its roots in the kingdoms and sultanates of Keira on the slopes and plateaus of Jebel Marra, the Tunjur kingdom in the north, and the Dajo in the south. Darfur took over all the areas of these kingdoms to emerge in the 1600s.[33] People of the former kingdoms used to enslave each other, but after being in one sultanate, they started to enslave other African ethnicities from their neighboring areas.

The customs and rules that governed enslavement due to raids (*gazwa*), capture, abduction, and demand as royalty or barter dated to a time before Dali law[34] that predated the Islamic law that was adopted by Suleiman Solong in 1640. Those customs and rules were similar to those adopted in the neighboring African savanna belt, from the Ethiopian Highlands in the east to the coast of the ocean in the west, a belt that was known as East Sudan, Mid Sudan, and West Sudan, and later on as the Anglo Sudan and Franco Sudan.

A certain practice ran like a thread through the fabric of those kingdoms; it gradually and smoothly developed into a legislative process that ruled slavery and enslavement. The rules developed from customs and norms into domestic law and ended with the adoption of *Shari`a*.

The sultanate of Darfur, due to its geographic position and history, became a center; it was the intersecting point of commercial caravan routes from all directions, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea into Hijaz [in the Arabian Peninsula], from the equator to the Mediterranean. It was the resort for Muslim pilgrims from west and Central Africa taking the long, seemingly unending journey to the Holy Land. Two caravans that had strategic significance beyond local relations and ties started out of Darfur every year. The first one was a caravan that carried the covers of the *Ka`aba*[35], a gift indicating charity, hope for blessings, and a sign of belonging. It was accompanied by a group of slaves and eunuchs to serve the pilgrims. The second one was a caravan delivering the royalties from the sultan of Darfur to the sultan of Muslims at The High Porte (*al-Bab al-Ali*).[36] This caravan carried sacks full of the best and most precious natural products of Darfur: ostrich feathers, ivory, ebony, the hides of lions, cheetahs and leopards, and a select group of young male and female slaves. The strong, fierce slaves were for the royal guard, including eunuchs to serve the harem, and beautiful women to warm the sultan's bed and bring into his crew of female slaves the vibrant African blood.

Documentation of slavery and enslavement in Darfur is not any better than that of the Funj sultanate. Of the 29 documents collected by Abu Slim in his book *Darfur wa al-Ardh,* the one that most accurately explores Darfur's past is the eleventh document, issued in 1799. Beyond Slim's text, R. S. O'Fahey[37] found documents that recorded the era of Sultan Abu al-Ghasim, from 1764 to 1768. Those were the documents that historians and travelers from Naom Shogair to Browne in 1794, al-Tunisi in 1803, and Nachtigal in 1874, overly relied upon in their research.

Slavery in Darfur was consistently mentioned in the documents of the Turkiyya, Mahdiyya, and the Condominium eras, starting with the document (SAD BOX 249/18) in which the government in Khartoum discovered that Sultan Ali Dinar's agents were selling slaves at the slave market in Omdurman in 1903. Also found [in the SAD] was a seven-point plan that the government formulated to eradicate slavery and the slave trade in Darfur after the defeat of Ali Dinar in 1916 and the freedom papers issued by the authorities in Darfur in the mid-1930s. The twenty-fifth document in the book *al-Fur wa al-Ard*[38] records the grant of land with the slaves living on it from Sultan Mohamed al-Hussein al-Mahdi to his father–in-law, al-Haj Ahmed ibn al-Hajj Isa. The sultan declared in that document that the grant was "an absolute grant with full possession and unfettered ownership. The land and the fifty slaves on it are his [Haj Ahmed ibn al-Hajj Isa's] to use or dispose of. He may cultivate it, rent it to others to cultivate, build on it, or demolish any building on it, and give any of it to charity. The land and the slaves shall belong to him and his descendants; no Sultan after me, should change this ever. It is exempt from all taxes and royalties."[39]

The document shows one of the many types of slavery and enslavement relations in the sultanate of Darfur. The ownership of 50 slaves moved with the land they worked on as slaves. They were not serfs; they were owned as property in the same way the land was owned. They were simply transferred to another owner as a gift or charity. A serf may be forced to stay on the land with or without a contract, but a serf was not owned by the landlord, and no ownership of serfs could be transferred with the land.

Raids were the most effective tool of enslavement in the sultanate of Darfur. Raiding was a self-determining financial activity that formed part of the economy of the sultanate; it was deeply entrenched and incorporated social groups that existed all over the sultanate. Some of those groups issued licenses; some financed the transactions; some initiated, organized, and created plans; and some executed

those plans. They divided the profits according to strict rules framed by custom and law and governed by supply and demand in domestic and international markets. They decided whether to flood the market or dry it of certain tools and sources of enslavement such as prisoners of war or slaves paid as royalties by neighboring tribes. It is not surprising that travelers such as Browne and Nachtigal gave descriptions of slavery raids a lot of attention in their records. The testimony of al-Tunisi has special value because he actually participated in one of the raids that lasted three months. He said that he went on the raid with a king named Abdelkarim ibn Khamis Arman. O'Fahey reported this story as follows,

> The slave raid, involving as it did the Sultan, the notables of the state, the freemen, the traders and the unfortunate victims, was crucial to the economic life of the state, and in the organization of the raid can be seen those elements of military predominance and political "know-how" which kept the state in being. The slave raid was, in effect, a mobile Sudanic state.[40]

The largest raids that covered wide areas were those licensed by the sultan; he would issue 50 to 60 written licenses annually. The license would indicate the path of the raid and the place to raid so as to avoid conflict between raiders. Sometimes the licensing could be for the purpose of protecting places that were already paying royalties in slaves. The sultan of Fertit paid the sultan of Darfur two hundred slaves every year.[41] A raid could be stopped by the elders of the raided tribe, to spare the lives and structure of the tribe, by an agreement to pay the raiders some slaves, livestock, and other products. A licensed raid paid one-fifth to the sultan; if the raid was organized by the raiders without license, they paid one-tenth to the sultan. Browne stated that the sultan was the biggest slave master and trader. Al-Tunisi mentioned that the sultan's tax collectors would collect from the harvest of the raid in addition to what they collected as tax at the slave market and from slave caravans leaving the sultanate. All of those slaves ended up in the *zaribas* of the sultan, together with all abandoned slaves from all over the sultanate. One way or another, the elite also took their share after the sultan got his direct and indirect shares.

Second in size were the raids organized and financed by the traders, and when a raid leader [known as sultan *al-ġazwa*][42] became famous for his skill and honesty in his deals and the number of hunted slaves he brought, traders would shower him with food, supplies, and other goods as consideration for a share in the harvest that could reach five

hundred to six hundred slaves. A trader's share would be larger if he accompanied the raid; if he waited for it to return, his share would go down to one-sixth. Traders had their own cunning ways of discovering the leader's manipulations and his shrewd ways that surpassed others. The leader was actually a sultan in the way he controlled the raid from beginning to end. He was the one distributing power and defining roles and functions. He distributed shares to those under his command according to their roles, functions, and the standards of execution of those functions. There were *zariba* builders and guards; food preparers and water fetchers; horsemen who executed the raid; carriers of ropes, shackles, and yokes; and arsonists to set villages that resisted on fire. The leader supervised classification of the slaves in the *zariba*. There were children, adolescents, youth fit for military, and the sultan's guard; obedient, patient ones to be used for agriculture and domestic service; and the handsome glabrous who would end up as a eunuch. The leader selected his share of this harvest without any objection from anyone.

The travelers recorded different estimates of the number of slaves in the sultan's court. Browne's estimate is not dependable. He visited Darfur during the reign of Sultan Abdelrahman al-Rasheed, who was suspicious of him and prevented him from traveling in the sultanate. Browne did not show how he decided the census of inhabitants of Darfur to be 200,000 and the slaves 20,000, one-tenth of the population. Had he stated those numbers for the city of al-Fashir, his estimates might have been accepted. Further, this estimate contradicted the figure of 5,000 slaves he saw exported to Egypt.[43] He also estimated the number in another caravan at 12,000 slaves. Browne's estimates are similar to estimates found in French sources, which claimed that in the period between 1798 and 1801, Darfur exported 5,000 to 6,000 slaves to Egypt every year.

The large number of slaves in Darfur and the number exported may be drawn from Napoleon Bonaparte's letter sent from Egypt to Sultan Abdelrahman of Darfur,[44] who welcomed Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt to spite the Mamluks who were harassing caravans from Darfur. Bonaparte wrote,

> In the name of God the Compassionate the Merciful. No God but Allah. To the Sultan Abdelrahman the sultan of Darfur. I received your letter and understood its contents. Be informed that your caravan arrived while I was in Bilad al-Sham punishing our enemy and annihilating them. Now I ask you to send me, with the first caravan two thousand slaves, of the strongest who are over sixteen years of age, I

> would like to buy them for myself. I hope that you instruct the caravan to start out quickly and maintain a fast pace. I have commanded that it be safeguarded and protected wherever it may be. Signed Bonaparte Commander in Chief of the French Military.[45]

Nachtigal visited Darfur in 1874, where he spent six months during the reign of Sultan Ibrahim ibn Mohamed Hussein. He explained how he estimated the population of Darfur.

> To get an estimate of population I have noted down and added together as many villages as I could get information about in every administrative district and in every province. For the twelve districts in the Northern Province, I got 5,900 hamlets, which, at ten houses to a hamlet, and five inhabitants to a house, would give a total population of approximately 300,000.
>
> Similarly for the eastern province I get about 200,000 inhabitants, for the fairly well populated southern province 500.[46]

Using the same process, he ended up estimating Darfur's population at 3,500,000. We have to bear in mind that about a quarter, maybe even one-third, of the districts were not included in this method of estimation. This was an effort that assumed certain facts, and we have no more than a guess as to whether it was an estimate of free people or included slaves.

Al-Tunisi provided detailed information about eunuchs in Darfur; he estimated their number to be around 1,000. He wrote a whole section on eunuchs.[47]

Al-Triminani wrote about castration and eunuchs, explaining that the pharaohs used castration as a punishment for fornication and sodomy; *Sabeans*[48] castrated themselves to devote themselves to worship. Some Christians castrated boys by the *jeb* method and put them to service in churches. Islam prohibited castration. Al-Triminani mentioned two methods of castration, one is *jeb,* which is cutting off the testicles and penis. The other is *wajr,* which was cutting off the testicles and leaving the penis. In the latter case, a male may engage in sex, but could not impregnate a woman.[49]

Al-Tunisi conveyed that el-Sheikh Mohamed Kurra had castrated himself to avoid an accusation, such as the one lodged against another man, that he frequented the residence of one of Sultan Tairab's wives.[50]

Slaves in Darfur served as barter items, as did the *Tekaki*[51] in Darfur's natural economy. Export of slaves dictated acceptance

of different prices in many currencies in transactions, such as dollars, Maria Teresa dollars, and the Majidy riyals. Specialized studies in pricing and control of negotiated value, whether it be barter or monetary, of products of the natural economy or simple goods in domestic and international trade, may be able to translate all of these figures into the currency negotiated in the Sudan today. This may help in understanding the value of the commodities. But at this point we are still repeating the same currencies and values given by the travelers. O'Fahey created a table in an attempt to compare prices of slaves, horses, and other commodities that he found in the writings of Browne, Felkin [a German traveler] and Nachtigal. He also perused documents from Abdin Palace in Cairo and Mohamed Abdelrahim's articles, which covered the period from 1793 to 1914. Despite the structure and comparisons in that table, it remains a copy and repetition of previous sources. This effort awaits specialists who may bridge the knowledge gap.

Continuing the tradition of copying and repetition, I convey that the price of a slave in 1793 in Kobe [a city in Darfur] was 15 piasters. The price of a *sudasi* in 1805 was equivalent to 10 Maria Teresa dollars or 30 *tekaki*. The price of a horse in 1837 was 10–30 slaves. In 1900, a female slave to be taken as a concubine ranged between 50 and 150 dollars. In 1910, the price of a female slave was 12 riyal Majidy; in 1914, this price was 72 dollars.[52] Nachtigal wrote that the abundance of camels in Darfur caused the price to plummet to 20–30 Maria Teresa dollars, yet the scarcity of horses raised the price of a good imported horse to 150 Maria Teresa dollars. Al-Tunisi stated,

> The top value commodities [in Darfur] were paid for in slaves. They say a horse is equal to two or three sudasis. A sudasi is said to be a slave who measures, from his heal to his earlobe, six ashbar.[53] A female is called sudasiyya. A sudasi is worth 30 tekaki.[54]

Mohamed Abdelrahim conveyed that during the reign of Sultan Ali Dinar, two slaves were traded for two cones of sugar. The price of a female slave was between 50 and 150 riyals. Slaves were a valued commodity that were given as gifts by the sultans of Darfur to scholars and religious men. For example, Sultan Mohamed al-Fadhl gave a scholar in the city of al-Debba a gift comprised of 60 slaves, 140 cows, and 4 horses.

The socioeconomic factors that made it possible for slaves to access the highest positions, other than the position of sultan, in Darfur, were not different than the same factors in other sultanates and

kingdoms of the Sudanic savanna belt or their counterparts in Mid Sudan. Those factors were as follows:

- gathering a large number of slaves to serve and administer the sultan's palace and serve the courtiers and women;
- dominance of slaves in the military and the sultan's guard, and their efficient organization and leadership in war and military affairs;
- power struggle within the ruling family, and between that family and governors of districts and their tribal armies, causing the sultan to augment and expand a military service that was loyal to him, in order to quash conspiracies and overcome conflicting loyalties. To that end, a sultan would enlist his personal slaves to serve in the palace guard and serve in administrative positions; and
- there was a slight ethnic difference between the masters and slaves in Darfur.

The presence of slaves in the sultan's guards and military was inherited from the sultans of Keira, Tunjur, and Dajo. It was systematically practiced by all the sultans of Fur from Suleiman Solong to Ali Dinar, from the days of guards armed with spears to the days of guards with firearms. Slaves were the guards of the sultan's gate and throne; they were the sultan's storekeepers, and they were responsible for burning incense in his bedroom. The slaves were horsemen, infantry soldiers, and gun carriers (*bandaga*). The slaves were reconnaissance troops. They were found in all the garrisons throughout the sultanate, under the command of other slaves who took their orders exclusively from the sultan and his royal slave, known as the king of *`abidiyya* (*malik al-`abidiyya)*; local authorities did not intervene with the orders of a royal slave.

The term *`abidiyya* was coined after the formation of the military groups of strong slaves by Sultan Tairab, and then by Sultan Abdelrahman of the Nuba Mountains. Al-Tunisi explained the position of *malik al-`abidiyya*, "It is a high ranking position, the holder of which supervises all of the Sultan's slaves in the garrisons and supervises the Sultan's cattle, the equipment and tools such as, tents and water skins for the Sultan's travels."

Al-Tunisi noted that of two high-positions of *al-ubouah* (fatherhood), al-Sheikh al-*abou* or *al-abb* was the highest rank. Al-Sheikh *al-abb* had the same authority as the sultan; his commands were to be obeyed by all, and he had the best land and ruled over a large region. He had unfettered authority to kill without the sultan's permission, and all the population in his area were under his authority. He was

the great minister (*wazeer*) and the general commander of the army and the competent authority on Dali law. "No one but an eunuch can occupy this post, because it is feared that whoever occupies it may be induced to conspire to raise himself to the throne."[55] The *bawaboon*[56] were also eunuchs who guarded the doors of a sultan's wives. Al-sheikh *al-abb* supervised the *bawaboon* and acted as the wrath of the sultan. Whenever the sultan was outraged by someone, he would send him to *al-abb* to keep him in his jail.

The crack in the sultan's authority, caused by infighting and struggle for power and conflicts between the sultan and district governors, turned into a political catapult that threw slaves, concubines, and eunuchs into the most effective power positions under the throne of the sultan. O'Fahey succeeded in deducing the reasons for the rise of slaves to positions of weight and power in the sultan's court, army, and administration, as well as having influence in politics and the power struggle in the sultanate.[57] Some of those reasons were as follows: the expansion of the state in the mid-eighteenth century, the increase of the central control of taxes and royalties, disappointment at unsatisfactory revenue from raiding the Wadai and Musabba`at sultanates, and the demands of sheikhs and elites in the provinces for a share of the central treasury. Actually, those provinces had influence and power, but the sultans started to enlist slaves and people who were not Fur to secure loyalty to the sultan.

4

Slavery in the Mahdist State [1885–1898]

The Mahdist state, known as the Mahdiyya, pertaining to its founder Mohamed Ahmed ibn Abdallah who claimed to be *al-Mahdi al-Muntadhar* (the awaited guided one), reigned during the last quarter of the nineteenth-century. It was the first Sudanese state to have comprehensive and complete documentation of its history. That documentation, in some parts, was superior to the documentation of other states that owned, by the standards of that time, modern media, updated equipment, and qualified specialized human resources in Cairo and London that made thorough documentation easier. Perhaps Mahdiyya's superior documentation was a result of its ability to harness what it had of media, equipment, and qualified human resources.

Slavery occupies a vast and diverse amount of attention in the Mahdiyya documents. A researcher would find more than one option to categorize these documents according to his or her intentions and purposes. However, categorization can serve its role as a preliminary tool for study and research only if it is objective and unbiased. Categorization should distance itself and avoid describing documents in ways that support preconceived ideas, conclusions, or inferences that may change the meaning of the documents. This is especially important for documents issued by a state administration and statesmen regarding the affairs of that state, its nationals, and their livelihood. Slavery was pivotal in the Mahdist state's affairs and the livelihood of its nationals, as it was entrenched in the weft and warp of society, and it was also a remnant of the Turkiyya [Turco-Egyptian era], who conquered the Sudan for the purpose of getting men for its military. To that end, the Turkiyya had no qualms about turning the Sudan into a land of conquer, hunting, and markets for the sale of slaves—a land of slave traders and caravans of slaves.

It is not surprising, then, that slavery and enslavement preoccupy the Mahdiyya documents in whatever shape or form they are classified. Of the many options available, the documents on slavery may be categorized and classified into 15 subjects, based on the trends of slavery in the Mahdiyya. Some categories are interrelated and may be merged and fused, while some stand alone. This categorization and classification depends on monitoring the recurrence of a certain issue and on the details embedded in the many documents issued by al-Mahdi, al-Khalifa, the *amirs*, *'amils,* and secretaries. Categorization also depends on follow-up, inquiry, and holding those responsible accountable before and after adoption of regulations and rules on issues of slavery or any other related issues. The following is a categorization of these documents.

PROHIBITION OF SLAVE EXPORT

Al-Khalifa Abdullahi[1] realized that slavery was a strategic commodity and a source of soldiers for the military forces of both the Turkiyya and the Mahdiyya, as well as a source of labor for production and services. Without equivocation and with straightforward steps, he took the initiative to put slavery in its natural and real place. He formalized slavery policy through procedures that did not resort to half-hearted solutions. He dealt with the knotty issue and unraveled it with his unique talent for meticulously formalizing important issues during one of the most tense turning points of the Mahdiyya. It was a time of preparing and equipping al-Nijoumi's[2] campaign and mobilizing it toward the Egyptian borders. In one important instance, in one of his letters, al-Khalifa called on al-Nijoumi to be alert when he passed through Dungula because he might find some firearms, *jihadiyya,*[3] and slaves to take as war booty.[4] Al-Nijumi was instructed to collect all three commodities that might have reached Dungula through smuggling, robbery, or escape. "Collect all you may find of all types of slaves, and let us know the details about each type, since one or more type of slaves is found in that place." In a few days al-Nijumi wrote back stating that he had received the message and that he had seized large numbers of slaves who were enslaved at al-Obayyid, Altayara, Bara, and Khartoum, and those found around the city of Berber, awaiting pending litigation and investigation [around their ownership]. Al-Khalifa and al-Nijumi continued to exchange letters about litigation and appointment of judges.[5] Al-Khalifa accepted al-Nijumi's advice that it was wise to leave some of the Kurdufan and Khartoum

slaves in the hands of the citizens who lived between Berber and Dungula "by way of being merciful to them [the citizens] and trying to recruit them as they are new-comers into the Mahdiyya."[6]

Al-Khalifa then turned his attention from the far northern areas to the far western part of Sudan. He sent a letter to his *`amils*, Kergasawi and Karamallah al-Sheikh Mohamed, reminding them of the order regulating dealings in the commodity of slaves because the infidels were eyeing them, especially the male slaves: "the infidels are lurking around to ambush slaves from the Sudan, especially the glabrous[7] males. They have spies to hunt and buy them for a high price . . . Many slaves have entered the Sawakin *gagra*[8] and some are on the road to Berber . . . Weakening Allah's enemy is required and the slaves benefit them, as they take women for commercial purposes and men to help in the military"[9]

Al-Khalifa also issued an order to all the *amirs* and *`amils*—Abu Garja on the road to Sawakin on the Red Sea, Mohamed Alkhair in the Berber area, and Abdelrahman al-Nijoumi in Dungula—to prohibit the sale of male slaves. The same order was sent to Kergasawi in Bahr al-ghazal the southwest area and Osman Adam in Darfur, western region, historically the largest source of slaves. They were to send any surplus of slaves to *bait almal.*

Al-Khalifa's prohibition on the export of slaves could imply a restriction on the domestic slave trade, an attempt to affect supply and demand, that is, raising the prices in external markets to encourage stimulation of the domestic market. However, the prohibition was not a result of a domestic plan to develop the Sudanese economy and its domestic markets as much as it was forced by necessity and a military strategy to conquer Egypt. Nor did it result from al-Khalifa's policy to end slavery and enslavement. This order and other measures were dictated by the military strategy of the Mahdiyya, including enlisting slaves in the Mahdist military as *jihadiyya*, with promises by al-Mahdi to emancipate those who enlisted in the *jihadiyya* and to compensate owners for slaves who joined the *jihadiyya*. Those promises were not kept due to the poor economy of the Mahdist state. All of these measures reduced the volume of the slave trade that had prevailed during the Turkiyya.

Al-Khalifa took the next logical step in the context of his policy when he ordered a domestic centralization of the slave trade under the auspices of *bait almal* in Omdurman and a strict prohibition on the slave trade in other areas. He proclaimed that after the prohibition, all sales that were not validated by *bait almal* were void. He persistently

addressed his *amirs* and *`amils* on this issue. To that end, he sent messages to the *`amils*, including a message to Kergasawi informing him that the proclamation strictly forbid all the *Ansar*[10] from selling male slaves and to sell female slaves only by permission and arrangement of *bait almal* in Omdurman. That measure was aimed at "depriving the infidels of a source of soldiers that would help their military establishment. All the *Ansar* and *`amils* have stopped dealing in slaves that belonged to *bait almal* after the prohibition. Despite the prohibition many slaves were sold under your name and that of Karamallah Alsheikh Mohamed. Those slaves spread in the area till they reached Sawakin. The *Ansar*, who knew about the prohibition, accosted those slaves wherever found, so as to verify their status." Al-Khalifa continued to reproach Kergasawi, "As long as trade in this commodity [slaves] is prohibited except under the auspices of *bait almal* in *Albuq`a*,[11] it is not to be sold and may be seized to stop its sale. It is profitable and easy for you and the buyers to sell slaves through *bait almal* in Albuq'a. Buyers without *bait almal*'s validation are bound to be accosted by whomever finds them. As for the male slaves, send the ones that you do not prefer to keep, from *khumasi*[12] and up; to this end, they should never be sold by you."[13]

Al-Khalifa's anger is heightened in his letter to Osman Adam, in which he sympathized with the difficulties that Osman was facing due to breaches of the prohibition in the western region. Osman complained of the frequent arrival of slaves from western areas such as Shakka, by traders who held permits issued by Kergasawi and the *A`mil* of Shakka. He informed al-Khalifa that 236 female slaves and 30 glabrous male slaves were delivered to Ali Alhashmi and held, awaiting Al-Khalifa's directions. Al-Khalifa answered Osman's letter stating that illegal importation of slaves would increase with the onset of autumn and the cooler weather. Some of the slave traders who worked for Kergasawi, the *Ansar* under his command, and some nationals were involved in the trade. Al-Khalifa issued his orders to Osman to confiscate the slaves and inform him of the results, "As we are not permitting anyone to sell slaves without *bait almal* that is located with us in Albuq'a." He further ordered that all confiscated slaves be sent to *bait almal* with lists that showed names and sex of slaves and names of the owners.[14] At the time, Anglo- Egyptian Intelligence in Cairo was closely monitoring what was happening in the Sudan in preparation for reconquering the country. They reported in their report no. 23 in volume one of their three volumes on the Sudan that Al-Khalifa had prohibited the trade of male slaves.

Enslavement of War Spoils

Two compatible and consistent standpoints are significant in the Mahdi's proclamations regarding war spoils. The first one was his effort to define spoils according to the rules of *shari`a* (Islamic law) and to differentiate it from *Fay'* (property taken by Muslims without war) and confiscation of property, or divestiture of certain goods or property as punishment for crimes or misdemeanors. The second one was the consistency of his own behavior with the text and meaning of the above definition and his effort to admonish the *Ansar* to temperance regarding spoils despite their legally stipulated right to them. His consistent stance appears in the exchange of letters below.

In his letter to Mohamed Sharief, he said, "Dearest, we have written before, while still at al-Obayyid, alerting all loved ones to return to the people of Bara[15] their property, except for the Turks and those who assisted them"[16] In his letter to Ahmed Suleiman, treasurer of *bait almal*, he stated, "As I mentioned before, the gold I gave you was a payment to *bait almal* for the full price of the three female slaves and was intended to clean myself of the dirt [impurity] of the spoils."[17]

Al-Mahdi's subsequent proclamations were consistent with the definition and stands above. Many of his proclamations contained strong reproaches. He admonished the *Ansar* in al-Obayyid to shed their preoccupation with spoils, and warned of punishment for touching any of them. Even when he, grudgingly, confirmed the disposal of spoils by one of his *amirs*, he repeated a reproach for this behavior. In his answer to al-Nijumi's letter telling him that he gave away 15 female slaves to the brothers [*Ansar*], Al-Mahdi confirmed the giving, but added, "Despite that, preoccupation with such matters would engage their hearts with matters other than what you are striving for. Remind the brothers of Allah"

In another proclamation he warned, "All shall be informed that whoever hides any part of the spoils, no matter how small, is not our companion but the companion of the devil"[18] In his letter to his *a`mil* Mohamed Alkhair Abdalla Khojali, he narrated how the *Ansar* were attracted to worldly goods when they entered al-Obayyid and how, after he gathered and admonished them, they returned a lot of property, slaves, and gold.[19]

Al-Khalifa strived to follow in the footsteps of al-Mahdi and to propagate his teachings and behavior regarding war spoils. He preached to the *Ansar* and treasurers of *bait almal* that they should not be preoccupied with the transient world that was not worth the wing of a mosquito. However, some factors and personal elements such as his personality, the expansion of the war and the resulting strife and conflict, the huge number of those enslaved, the restriction and centralization of the domestic slave trade in the hands of *bait almal*, the watch over the borders to prevent the infiltration of enemies who might fight against the Mahdiyya, and the enlistment of slaves as *jihadiyya,* all impeded al-Khalifa's efforts to adhere to al-Mahdi's teachings. Those factors were not the only impediments in the sociopolitical arena; other necessities, such as financial distress, intervened and forced *bait almal* to sell slaves.

Al-Khalifa stipulated a strict method for following and controlling every detail about slaves; he reviewed every case of those enslaved as war spoils. There are innumerable examples. Al-Khalifa ordered a merger of the lists of slaves brought as spoils of war received from Mohamed Abdelrazig, Hamdan Ab Anja and Osman, the Amir of Qitaina and the Amir of Wad Shala`i[20] The total was 14 heads, including a glabrous, a female who was married before, two young females, and a young male. He responded to Abu A`qla about the latter's letter showing a letter from Abu A`qla reporting the total number of slaves they obtained "of the war spoils and unclaimed slaves, sixty eight heads, males and females." Table 4.1 shows the spoils in the hands of the *Ansar* who were with Mohamed Fadlalla.

Another document listed the spoils handed over to Obaid al-Haj as follows (table 4.2).[21]

Table 4.1 List of spoils in the hands of the Ansar residing with Mohamed Fadlalla

Commodity	Quantity
Slaves, 6 males and 8 females	24
Cows	25
Donkeys	28
Goats	121
Total	**198**

Source: NRO Mahdiyya 7–1-4 Finance-4.

Table 4.2 List of spoils delivered to Obeid al-Haj

Commodity	Quantity
Male slaves	1
Female slaves	119
Cows	209
Donkeys	264
Camels	1
Total	**594**

Source: NRO Mahdiyya 7–1–4 Finance-2.

Enslavement and the *Jihadiyya*

In societies that practiced slavery and enslavement, military service was one way for slaves to attain emancipation. It could be a personal inner sense or feeling that they had earned their freedom, or their emancipation was a matter of fact. In the majority of cases, enlisting in an army was not voluntary, even though it was a conscious intentional act by all slaves. Political and social necessities compelled the slave owners and the states to amass slaves into an armed force, and to, grudgingly, submit and accept the bitter medicine of their slaves taking their freedom. This emancipation would have been real, were it not for the political and social changes put in place to keep the emancipated slaves as workers after they completed their military service.

The Mahdiyya was no exception; al-Mahdi made a promise to free slaves who joined the *jihadiyya*; however, he tried to keep a social balance by compensating the owners.[22] Some sources mention that 30 riyals were given by the state to the owner for a slave conscripted into the *jihadiyya*. When compensation was not paid, some sources justified the nonpayment by the financial distress, or the huge number of slaves enlisted in the *jihadiyya*.

Al-Mahdi coupled his promise of compensation with practical steps toward reform; he encouraged people to allow the *jihadiyya* to marry and care for their families. Al-Khalifa continued this policy and decided that the *jihadiyya* should share military camps with the *mulazmeen*[23], "for purposes of education." This policy gave the *jihadiyya* a feeling of some equality, as well as new moral and spiritual values. Al-Khalifa went a step further when he gave a fatwa allowing the *jihadiyya's* limited testimony in courts of law. Al-Khalifa wrote to

al-Nijoumi, "Since the mentioned are now among the companions of Al-Mahdi, Peace be upon Him, their testimony for each other in cases concerning them and those concerning their women is admissible when rules of admissibility are satisfied. So hear their testimony and admit it"[24] This step should not be underestimated as one that restricted the *jihadiyya*'s testimony to disputes concerning only them and their women; often a case might include an Arab as a party to a case, or a *jihadi* may be a witness in a case by an Arab against a *jihadi*; in such cases, their testimony would be admissible. Such cases and other unforeseeable incidents created precedents and opportunity for analogical reasoning [within Islamic jurisprudence].

The significance of *Jihadiyya* as a military phenomenon dictated by strategic necessities had a strong presence in the Mahdiyya documents that were concerned with slaves and the problems of slavery. Al-Khalifa addressed, with utmost deference, the strategic tenor of those problems, when he dealt with the complicated dilemmas they created. For example, he issued his order to all his dearest *Ansar* to gather all the *jihadiyya* at Albuq'a for education.[25] He also ordered the gathering of those scattered in different places, and threatened punishment for whoever kept any *jihadiyya* or male slaves carrying arms. He sent a letter to Haseeb Ahmed Jamaleddin to send to *bait almal*, "all male slaves qualified to carry arms and any slaves that you get from now on."[26] He responded to Kergasawi's request of a fatwa regarding inherited slaves, "As for the slaves of a deceased who left no heirs, deliver male slaves who are qualified to carry arms to *bait almal*; females may be sold." He repeated his threat in a letter to Mohamed Arabi, "We have confirmed to all companions that whoever had *jihadiyya* or male slaves carrying arms should bring them to *bait almal*; it is mandatory that if you find any of the *Ansar*, be he a *Muqaddam*,[27] an Amir or of any official capacity, holding *jihadiyya* or an armed male slave, you should arrest him and take what he has and tell us about it; do not favor anyone"[28] On page 13 of a letter sent to all his *`amils*, he ordered them to gather the *jihadiyya* and male slaves who were qualified to carry arms found in the hands of the *Ansar*, *amirs*, and *naqeebs*.[29] He confirmed the steps taken by his *`amil* Mohamed Alkhair Abdalla Khojali, who confiscated goods belonging to the Arabs from the eastern region together with 13 male slaves, young and old, and put them with the *jihadiyya*; "since no one has permission to trade in slaves at the far areas, because the enemy wanted to buy them at a high price."[30] A message to Al-Khalifa asked al-Nour Ibrahim, a representative of *bait almal* in Berber, to pay attention to the *jihadiyya* and male slaves, to gather the *jihadiyya*

who were scattered around Berber, and to send lists of their number and arms.[31]

In his messages to his *`amils*, al-Khalifa then moved from orders to gather slaves to the tasks of organization, discipline, and control. In his letter to Younis Aldikaym, he dealt with bringing back discipline to the ranks of the *jihadiyya*. The supervisors had neglected to take attendance, which allowed more than 50 members of the *jihadiyya* to slip into Omdurman and stealthily take their women. Al-Khalifa coupled that message with a reminder to be read to the supervising *mqadeem*.[32] That reminder stated in strong terms that any of them who should lose one person or one gun must be sent to him for chastisement. He ordered Aldikaym to take steps to restore discipline. Supervisors were to provide Aldikaym with daily attendance and number of arms in the morning and evening, and to account for those who were missing. He also told Aldikaym to alert the *bandaga*[33] to come line up with the *jihadiyya* whenever they heard the horn. He then ordered that the soldiers be divided into groups of 50 and an Arab be appointed to head each group. That grouping should facilitate their discipline and taking attendance. Further, he explained, "Once they are taught that behavior, we can be reassured that they will be secured and not lost; do not leave them in an unruly state."

Al-Khalifa confronted another serious disturbance in the discipline of the *jihadiyya* presented in a letter from Osman Aldikaym. Aldikaym complained that the wives of the *jihadiyya* were arriving at the *daim* (discharged and serving military residence) and their owners came after them with documents proving purchase of the women from *bait almal* for a meager price of 12 riyals. The price rose to 30–40 riyals as the women were exchanged at the market. The problem was further complicated by the fact that while male slaves were emancipated if they joined the *jihadiyya*, female slaves did not have that advantage; they remained slaves. Women took advantage of being married to emancipated men and left their masters to join their husbands and get protection as wives of *jihadiyya*. The *jihadiyya* insisted on keeping their wives once they entered the *daim* and the owners insisted on taking them back. Aldikaym repeated his complaint about the arrival and exchange of Bahr al-ghazal slaves in the markets with documents authenticated by Kergasawy, showing that the slaves were not war spoils. Al-Khalifa answered, "As for those slaves, they are within the jurisdiction of our dearest Alnour Ibrahim; he is to look into the case and take the necessary steps, at his discretion and according to what pleases Allah and his Prophet, and be absolved in the hereafter. Should he face any problems, the matter is to be referred to us."[34]

The letters exchanged between al-Khalifa and his *`amils* on the *jihadiyya* problems, and al-Khalifa's opinions, advice, fatwa, or decisions, reveal the ongoing transformation of the *jihadiyya* phenomenon and their move from slaves to soldiers, organized in disciplined armed groups of fighters. They were a social group undergoing transformation that engendered social, cultural, and personal complications that required specific policy. As a group existing outside the known and accepted social parameters, they required special and new treatment. The status of the *jihadiyya* caused a clash of authority between military and political leaders. A letter from Hussein Ibrahim Alzahra, the *`amil* of Kasala, posed some problems, dilemmas, and questions, and thus serves as a good example of the web of problems to be confronted. He presented what appeared to be a clash of authority between Alzahra and Idris Abdelrahim, the *jihadiyya* leader, and Osman Digna, a respected personality and political and military heavyweight within the Mahdist revolution in the eastern region. Al-Khalifa was not reluctant at all to confront that hurdle! He presented his administrative, jurisprudential, financial, political, and social solutions in his response to Alzahra, especially in regard to the slaves:

- He respected the powers and jurisdiction of the three men. Regarding Alzahra's accusation of laxity about Idris [in matters of the *jihadiyya*], al-Khalifa advised Idris to listen to Alzahra's guidance and advice, especially on the slave dilemma, while at the same time he confirmed Idris's leadership of the *jihadiyya*.
- Idris should be the one to deal with the *jihadiyya's* illegal behavior, such as pillage or physical assault.
- Alzahra should be the one to meet the needs of the *jihadiyya* for food, clothing, and their share in spoils. Costs should be met by spending the spoils found in the hands of Alzahra. Such expenses were to be set off against the fifth [of spoils] allotted to *bait almal*.[35]
- Regarding Alzahra's complaint that the *jihadiyya* had brought their own slaves and that it became difficult to separate their slaves from the slaves that arrived at the *kara* (living quarter of the *jihadiyya*) as spouses or relatives of the *jihadiyya*, al-Khalifa gave wise advice, "If the slaves are married or of kin, they should be allowed to stay with them. If not they should be taken to *bait almal*." He added, "Allowing them to keep their relatives brings them closer and is a conciliatory act. They share interests with all the believers and that is a promotion and support for religion."

- Regarding Alzahra's complaint that the local slaves who joined the *jihadiyya* were not qualified to function as *jihadiyya*, al-Khalifa recommended keeping the qualified ones, young or old, and taking the unqualified or those unrelated to the *jihadiyya* to *bait almal*.
- Alzahra submitted a request from al-Khalifa's delegates in Kasala to have some slaves to serve them; al-Khalifa responded positively, but warned against excessive giving.
- Emancipation documents of the male and female slaves [who were not *jihadiyya*] residing in the military camp were voided, and they were returned to slave status. In the case of concubines who had their children with the *jihadiyya*, the older women were to be set free and the younger ones to be married off to the *Ansar*, who desired to marry them; otherwise, they were to be held until they were married to men who may desire to marry them.
- Alzahra raised the question of whether the children of the slaves at the military camps were war spoils or property gained without war (*fay'*). Al-Khalifa responded that they were *fay'*. He saw it appropriate to give them to the besieged, "because of the conditions of the besieged[36] and for the purposes of bringing them closer. One fifth of slaves taken [as *fay'*] should be entered into *bait almal*."
- Alzahra complained that the Khatmiyya slaves were scattered all over the place because the *`amils* sold them as they sold the slaves of the military camp. Al-Khalifa ordered that they be brought back and counted. The males were to join the *jihadiyya* and the females distributed as part of the spoils.[37]

Al-Khalifa's frustration reached a peak over the dilemmas of the *jihadiyya* when he tried to overcome the shock of the mutiny and disobedience of the *jihadiyya* at al-Obayyid. Some sources attribute the mutiny to lack of food, irregularity of salary payment, and erratic delivery of food provisions. According to Slatin[38], a *jihadi*'s salary was half a Dervish riyal per month, and the provision was one-eighth *ardeb durah*[39] every two weeks. The rebelling *jihadiyya* occupied al-Obayyid city first, then withdrew and barricaded themselves in the Nuba Mountains. Amir Ab Anja went after them until he defeated them and executed their leaders. Al-Khalifa wrote an excited message to al-Nijumi,[40] telling him about the quelling of the mutiny,

> The jihadiyya, enemies of Allah, who fled Kurdufan through the mountains, were met with our dearest Hamdan Ab Anja…He killed the slaves to the last one…He executed their three leaders, Ali Mulla, Suroor Alfour and Bashir Ali. He beheaded them and sent their heads

> to us in Al-buq'aa; we ordered that they be hung up at the mosque. Then we ordered the heads sent to Khartoum to be thrown with the carcasses of the infidels, for they had earned Allah's wrath. We sent them away from Al-Mahdi's (peace be upon him) Buq`aa, to be with the lot of the damned who perished in Khartoum.[41] Since this news will delight you and your companions, we wrote you this message for your information. Prostrate in gratitude to Allah and thank Him."[42]

The *jihadiyya* continued to play an important role, and they bore a huge and decisive weight in the military machine of the Mahdiyya, before and after the mutiny. Some sources reported that, despite al-Khalifa's fears of the Ashraf[43] conspiracy and the seed of suspicion toward the *jihadiyya* sown by the mutiny, and despite seeking help from his kin in the west, the *jihadiyya* continued to have the same weight as or close to that of his kin. The *mulazmeen* comprised 4,000 *jihadiyya* and 5,000 of al-Khalifa's kin.

THE SLAVES OF *BAIT ALMAL*

Following the fall of Khartoum at the hands of al-Mahdiyya troops in 1885, *bait almal* appropriated a huge number of slaves when it took over the Turkiyya's property and institutions, including public government property, the property of its prominent figures and individuals who fled with the defeated forces, the property of those who just left the city [due to the war], in addition to the confiscated property of those who remained. During the time between conquering the city of al-Obayyid and the battles that followed, until the siege and fall of Khartoum, *bait almal* gained experience and articulated a method for dealing with slavery as a steady monetary and in-kind source of revenue, as well as one of its spending sources. They benefited from the Turkiyya's system of accounting and hired a number of its employees. *Bait almal* imposed a strict control over the slave trade until the end of the Mahdiyya. *Bait almal* organized and supervised the slave market, notarized sale contracts, took over abandoned slaves, and owned, in the name of the state, the slaves serving in state institutions, public entities, and works, that is, in contemporary terms, public sector slaves. This was a shared trend between all societies and states that practiced slavery and enslavement in all its forms since ancient times.

There were exaggerated estimates of the number of slaves in Omdurman; one estimate suggested that the slaves constituted half of the 150,000 people in Omdurman. Suspicions raised around this

estimate may be cleared by the second of three letters exchanged between al-Mahdi and Ahmed Sulieman, the treasurer of *bait almal*, who took the initiative and sent the first letter to al-Mahdi, presenting to him the weak resources of *bait almal* and his inability to meet the *rayat* (flags)[44] needs for two consecutive days. He said that he delivered only to widows and those with urgent needs, which meant "disadvantaging the brothers at the Rayat."[45]He suggested, by way of alleviating the hardships and showing sympathy, taking an inventory of all slaves owned by *bait almal* and distributing them among the 50 *rayat* at a price lower than the market price, "for example one that is worth 30 be given for 20," so that the recipients may use the difference in price to meet their needs. Al-Mahdi agreed and responded, "May Allah guide you to the right decision; give generously, fear not and expect Allah's benevolence as our affairs are in His hands"[46]

Ahmed Suleiman wrote in his second message, "The slaves obtained in those days, from the spoils of Khartoum, have grown in numbers. People have put a great effort in keeping them. Under the current circumstances, their maintenance expense is over two thousand Riyals, in addition to the anxiety caused by keeping them." He further suggested to al-Mahdi "selling or distributing [slaves] to other regions; as every *bait almal* in those regions might increase revenue by selling those slaves and spending that revenue to improve the financial status of the people in the region. This would be better than keeping them in a way that leads to their destruction and burden *bait almal* with excessive spending"[47]

Al-Mahdi responded to Ahmed Suleiman through al-Khalifa, instructing him to "write to Ahmed Amin, the treasurer of *bait almal*, and order him to distribute the slaves he has among the military members, even if ten or twenty individuals share one head. Giving slaves to the military dictated recording the *mujahedeen* in the ledgers or any suitable record. I think such distribution is better than selling slaves or finding other means."[48] In the third letter, al-Mahdi responded to Ahmed Suleiman's complaint about the weak resources of *bait almal*, and how hardly anything was left after spending 18,000 riyals, the proceeds of selling slaves, on military and additional expenses, plus the pressure exerted by the demands of some of the *Ansar* working at *bait almal*. Al-Mahdi responded advising him, "Do what you can and be of good manners. Give them what you have and be charitable; when you are left with nothing more to give, tell them in the best way; say, 'Dearests, I spent what I had; be content with Allah's test of you and his will to uplift you'."

Al-Khalifa devised a strict method, marked by sharp punishments, to monitor accountability, a method that knew no lassitude, let alone negligence and leniency, to govern his *`amils* presiding over the slave affairs at *bait almal*. He stuck to the language of his periodical circulars to his *`amils*.[49] He required all *`amils* to record what they had of Allah's rights (charity and *zakat*) and to send all records to *bait almal*. He sent a letter to Mohamed Fait warning and threatening him, "You have been delegated to collect Allah's rights [*zakat* and charity]; it behooves you to report whatever you collected of money, commodities, slaves and grains."[50] On another occasion, he ordered al-Nour Anqara to revise the distribution of the captives from Abyssinia and send one-fifth to *bait almal* and distribute four-fifths among the warriors. However, after exchanging letters on the issue, a decision was made to cancel the distribution and let the female captives go with their husbands, in a gesture that might attract them to Islam.[51]

Al-Khalifa continued to be attentive to *bait almal*'s share of slaves. He issued a fatwa about inherited slaves. Karamallah al-Sheikh Mohamed asked for a fatwa from al-Khalifa regarding the estate of those killed by the Mahdiyya sword,[52] such as Alshallali and Imouri and others. Their estates comprised a number of slaves. Al-Khalifa responded that, Heirs of those who died during the Turk's time and left slaves to be taken and possessed by the Turks may not claim any of them during the Mahdiyya and may not take them; they are the property of *bait almal*. Slaves in the hands of the *jihadiyya*, be they escaped, seized, or taken and possessed in any manner at the advent of the Mahdiyya, are the right of *bait almal* and cases by their previous owners may not be heard. Slaves who were entrusted to others by the deceased and ended up seized by Turks in their attempt to stop the slave trade, may not be inherited by heirs and must be sent to *bait almal*. Slaves who were seized and put with the *bazingir*[53] or given to serve followers, may not be reclaimed by previous owners, as they had become property of the Turks and are now property of *bait almal*. The children of people killed in the Jangi land[54] and other areas, under the rule of the Mahdiyya, as well as their property, are spoils and rightfully belong to *bait almal*. *Bait almal* was to look into their status before the victory of the Mahdiyya. If their children were owned as slaves, they should go to *bait almal*; if they were free, they should be freed as a charity. Regarding female slaves who were taken from their owners, if one of them was pregnant or had a child by her free owner, and she wound up with another owner who also had a child with her, then if her first owner came to claim her, she should

be returned to the first owner if he submitted legal proof. Each man should have paternal rights to his child.

The dilemmas presented by letters from Alzahra and Karamallah did not detract al-Khalifa's attention from the smallest daily administrative details regarding *bait almal*'s slaves. In a letter to Ali Ahmed Alhashmi in al-Obayyid,[55] he ordered Alhashmi to count the slaves seized from *bait almal* by Ibrahim Ramadan, who was one of *bait almal*'s treasurers, and his followers, and to confiscate Ibrahim's property in al-Obayyid and *Albuq`a*. He told him to confiscate eight slaves from Ibrahim's house in *Albuq`a*.[56]

Al-Khalifa sent a letter to Ab Anja, telling him that Salih al-Jahdi arrived and delivered the dispatch of slaves in full, to Osman Adam.[57] In another letter to ab-Anja, al-Khalifa acknowledged receipt of ab-Anja's letter dated the fourth of Muharram,[58] and informing him of a dispatch of "275 heads of slaves, 217 of cows and 108 horses." He detailed to Ab Anja what was received: "231 heads of the slaves, 44 did not arrive because Daldoum left 18 slaves with Ali Muneer, who gave him a receipt, the whereabouts of the rest was unknown. This is to inform you of what arrived and what was delayed en route." P. S. "Our dearest Omer Daldoum is returning to you with the people who accompanied him, peace."[59]

Al-Khalifa wrote to Karamallah al-Sheikh Mohamed, acknowledging his gift to *bait almal* of 20 slaves carrying arms, and their wives, a total of 40 males and females. He requested that Ibrahim Adlan[60], one of *bait almal*'s treasurers, receive one hundred ounces of gold and twenty heads of slaves that Abdelrahman Khojali, the *`amil* of Bani Shangoul[61] sent with Naqeeb (captain) Ahmed Mohamed Abu Altahir. Adlan responded to Abdelrahman Khojali, informing him that he received only 95 ounces of gold perhaps because of the different scales used to weigh the gold. As for the slaves, one had died, another ran away, and 17 were sold for 360 riyals to cover the trip expenses. Expenses were also detailed. Thirty-two riyals were spent for the upkeep of the slaves, including clothing and presale expenses. They distributed 28 riyals among those present and delivered the rest to *bait almal*.[62]

Al-Khalifa responded to a letter from Mohamed Ali Alameen concerning abandoned slaves. Al-Khalifa said that abandoned slaves rightfully belonged to the Muslims and therefore belonged to *bait almal*. Al-Khalifa answered all letters concerning slaves; for example, his letter to Alawad Almardhi, a senior clerk of the Turkiyya, hired by the Mahdiyya, acknowledged receipt of the latter's letter concerning revision of lists in the hand of Mohamed Osman Khalid and taking

20 slaves, 10 male and 10 female, to *bait almal.* Al-Khalifa answered a letter from Omer Haj Saad regarding the battle at Jabal Nazeela, between Khalil Habeeb and the *Ansar* on one side and Hamdan Bashir and his followers on the other, and the reasons for that fight. He (Omer Haj Saad) had sent three hundred heads of slaves. Al-Khalifa ended that message stating, "Those considered dignitaries by their people who are now among the slaves may be set free for a *fidya*."[63]

Bait almal treasurers in the other regions stayed bound by the same system of accounting and bookkeeping of *bait almal* in Omdurman. They kept the system using accountants and clerks from the Turkiyya, or by just copying the format in those books. Slatin recorded that al-Khalifa insisted on the regulations. Al-Khalifa dismissed Ahmed Suleiman and appointed Ibrahim wad Adlan and asked him to open an account for incoming revenue and expenditures. He asked Ibrahim to keep the books ready for review at any time, to clarify their financial status, and to keep a list of the names of recipients of any amounts from *bait almal*, as well as those who received salaries. Wad Adlan did not let al-Khalifa down, but the virtue of honesty let wad Adlan down.[64]

Leafing through the books in Omdurman, Berber, al-Obayyid, or the eastern region, one may easily see their financial situation. A perusal of files of spending vouchers and receipts shows those who received money or salary from *bait almal.* One finds a record of the incoming numbers of slaves and a listing of the outgoing numbers, whether they were sent to join the ranks of the *jihadiyya,* sold, sent to serve in public offices, delivered to their masters, or given as gifts or charity. The record also lists the slaves who perished, ran away, became sick, were entrusted to others, and children, infants, and pregnancies. Over and above what is registered in the books of *bait almal* and al-Khalifa's letters and sale contracts, slave supervisors also kept their own books.[65]

TRANSFER OF SLAVES FROM ONE *RAYA* TO ANOTHER

It is not surprising to see that the Mahdiyya documents monitored the movement of the *jihadiyya,* cavaliers, leaders, and administrators from one *raya* to another; such monitoring is understandable as a measure of control and discipline of military forces. The army was divided into flags and brigades and often rearranged according to new weapons, technologies, and war tactics. It is also understandable in the logic of the development of the Mahdist state and the perfection

of its accounting and administrative systems, without neglecting the influence of the inherited Turkish systems. Such documentation also matched the standards of census developed by the state[66]; there are books for census, arable lands, waterwheels (*sawaqi*), harvest, *zakat*, and after-Ramadan alms (*futra*). For example, a census of Umbakole *khut*[67] in the year 1308 Hijri, recorded 4,595 persons; there were 8,214 persons in Argo *khut* in the year 1313 Hijri. What is really surprising is to find Mahdiyya documents meticulously accounting for slaves moving from one *raya* to another, even if the slave was a young female.

However, this meticulous recording is not that surprising once we realize that slavery and enslavement were not passing marginal phenomena that stuck to the "immaculate, pure" Sudanese society, but were a fundamental element of the society's formation, production, services, trade, war, peace, psychological, and moral values. Slavery was part of the social structure, the social division of labor, and the attitude toward manual labor in the system and patterns of earning a living and having a family life. The following examples exemplify this situation:

Altahir Ibrahim sent a letter to Magzoub Abubakr[68] to tell him that Alnayir Obiedallah bought a young female slave (*ruba`eya*) from the Omer of their *raya,* "she was for our family that would be hosted by Alnayir Obeidallah." (This short paragraph of the document is an example of how slave movement between brigades and *rayas* was controlled and documented within the military in the same way it was done in civil society; it is proof that the military, as part of that society, carried all of its features and behaviors, including the treatment of slaves.) Together with other documents, this letter shows the function and structure of slavery within the Mahdiyya military, without the added confusion of the position and role of the *jihadiyya* in the military. The *jihadiyya* acquired some of those traits as they enslaved others by stealing and seizing them, or through proving an uncontested possession for a long time.[69]

Some sources reported that wad al-Nijumi's forces heading toward the Egyptian borders had more slaves than soldiers. Other sources reported the same about al-Mahdi's camp during the siege of al-Obayyid. Despite the contributions of al-Mahdi, al-Khalifa, and the *amirs* to the advancement of the military, the Mahdiyya army shared this phenomenon [prevalence of slaves in the military], with traditional armies that mirrored society and the state. Slaves in those societies performed amended roles to fit military characteristics; they were treated as auxiliary weapons or units.

The number of female slaves might be greater than that of males, because the *jihadiyya* wives were more likely to move with their husbands and suffer the discomforts of the campaign and fighting, than to stay behind and suffer being sold by owners in the slave market, being married to another slave, or being in service as concubines to one of the master's sons or relatives.[70] The fighters who left their wives behind increased the number of slave women in military campaigns, by bringing female slaves for service and pleasure.

REGULATION AND CONTROL OF SLAVE MOVEMENT AND SALES

Osman Digna [the influential Amir in the eastern region] issued and signed a permit for Osman walad Annan, stating that the latter was "going to Toker with four *awadim*[71] (female slaves) to sell [in Toker]; do not accost them on the way there or back."[72]

It was normal for people to seek the protection of al-Mahdi, al-Khalifa, or Osman Digna for traveling or moving from one place to another. Permits gave them protection and secured their movable and immovable property [against bandits, *Ansar* transgressors, tax collectors, and greedy people]. But it was not normal for a military and political leader of the caliber of Osman Digna, who was situated in a dangerous conflict area that was exposed to the enemy by land and sea, to sign a protection order for four female slaves taken to be sold in Toker. Apparently this was a protection motivated by the value of the property rather than the dangers of the road.

Al-Khalifa sent 15 consecutive letters to al-Nour Ibrahim in the Berber area ordering him to monitor slave movement and delegating to him exclusive authority over "all slavery issues." He told al-Nour over and over again to continue to resist slave traders in Berber, Abu Hamad, Sawakin, and the Egyptian border, so as to stop the illegal export of male slaves. He confirmed his endorsement of all steps taken to confiscate traders' goods and slaves as spoils if they broke the prohibition.[73] Al-Khalifa responded to a letter from Mahmoud wad Ahmed[74] that contained several topics, amongst which was a message sent to Abbas wad Doleeb and his followers of *Maqadeem,* together with a slave, to lead them to one hundred slaves hiding or being hidden in a place called Alhijleeja. In regard to selling slaves, for fear of disease and death, Mahmoud was to consult with the treasurer of *bait almal* and follow his instructions.

The slaves brought from Metamma[75] were subjected to meticulous administrative and financial regulations, due to the huge volume and

their arrival in large groups. The account books showed the numbers of those enslaved and sent to Omdurman. The expenses of one group amounted to 75 riyals spent on those accompanying 75 slaves, cattle herders, and cattle feed.[76]

Abandoned Slaves

The abandonment of slaves is a mark of all societies that practiced slavery and enslavement. Similarities exist, despite differences in the rules and customs of dealing with this phenomenon; for example, local or central authorities may detain abandoned slaves for a certain time. Owners claiming a slave would have to pay a fee to cover the expenses of maintaining the slave during detention. Such claims had to be made within a specific period of time or the slave would be sold. The slave's identity as abandoned would be announced at the auction and stated in the sale contract. The status of being abandoned often lowered the price of a slave, in addition to the already low price of *bait almal*'s slaves. Another factor lowering the price of *bait almal's* slaves was the fact that public employees, who run *bait almal,* were not as motivated to bargain on the price as individual owners were. The price was also affected by the large number of abandoned slaves that *bait almal* brought to market to alleviate the burdens of living and guarding expenses. A buyer would insist that the identity of the slave as abandoned appear on the sale contract to protect his ownership in any possible dispute that could ensue with the original owner.[77]

Throughout the Mahdiyya, the zaribas[78] of *bait almal* kept abandoned slaves.[79] Despite their low price, this category of slaves was a lucrative resource for *bait almal.* Abandoned slaves received a daily mention in dairies, files, and settlements of accounts. For example, Ali Ahmed Alhashmi, treasurer of *bait almal* in Kurdufan, produced a list of cash that recorded 1857 riyals as revenue from auctions of abandoned slaves and cattle and 1212 riyals as fees paid by owners retrieving abandoned slaves and stray cattle.[80]

Seized and Stolen Slaves

The six examples below are a small part of many documents showing that the most stolen and robbed property, next to gold, was slaves. They were preferred for their monetary value and free services of carrying and guarding other stolen property. Although the *Ansar* were a common factor in most of the robbery and seizure cases, al-Khalifa closely followed robbery cases with his *`amils* and would not rest

until he found and punished the culprits—who rarely got away with their crimes—and returned the stolen property to its rightful owners. Al-Khalifa sent the following letters:

- A response to Mohamed Saad, Hamdan, and others confirming receipt of their complaint about a group of *Ansar* that had robbed their property and wealth, including 35 slaves. He wrote to his *`amil* Osman Aldikaym to return all their property.[81]
- A letter to Osman Adam with instructions to return to Omer Sultan eight female and three male slaves and two concubines who were taken by robbers. The letter included an order to investigate the complaint of Hamad Alasakra's community, who suffered a robbery of their property, including five hundred slaves, while they were migrating to Omdurman with al-Khalifa's consent.[82]
- A letter to Kergasawi informing him that one of the *Ansar* had accosted Mohamed Fazari and his brother while they were on their migration trip to Albuq'a, despite the permit they had from Kergasawi. The *Ansar*i took camels, goats, and 18 slaves, despite the letter they had from Kergasawi. He requested Kergasawi to finance the rest of their trip from *bait almal* and assist them in recovering what was robbed from them.[83]
- A letter to Asakir Abukalam to recover property taken by one of his men, Ibrahim Almuqaddam, and others when they launched an attack on the people of Alaftteh. They robbed camels, cattle, money, and 50 slaves. Asakir was to find and punish the robbers and return all property to its owners.[84]
- A letter to Abdalla Ibrahim and others about a battle at Jebel Almazmoum; he told them to follow and find the enemy and seize four hundred slaves, males and females, that belonged to the Saleem tribe.[85]
- A letter to the people coming from Hijaz[86] to join the Mahdiyya, who were attacked by a group of *Ansar*, who took all their property, including 35 male and female slaves. He assured them that he wrote to his *A'mil* in Berber, Osman Aldikaym, to find and return all their property.[87]

RECOVERY OF RUNAWAY SLAVES

Return of Slaves Mistakenly Entered into *Bait Almal*

Never was a more important issue raised in appeals, supplications, or requests for intercession brought before al-Mahdi and al-Khalifa than

the request to return slaves unlawfully taken by *bait almal*. Except for military matters, no other issue occupied such a large space in the letters of al-Khalifa to his *`amil* than this one. The complainants were not only slave traders, but also members of other social groups, such as paupers trying to cross the distance between rags and riches by co-owning one slave, male or female. A dispute over the ownership of the child of a female and a male slave owned by different co-owners would sometimes bring in three or four co-owners. Middle-class slave owners also appear as complainants in the documents, as their stable lives allowed their slaves to increase in numbers through reproduction. The rich, whose property grew and enlarged through the use of slaves in different activities such as agriculture, cattle herding, pastoral work, transport of goods, domestic service, and "sets" of concubines, were a third category raising complaints.[88]

Al-Mahdi stipulated the rule of returning slaves wrongly entered in *bait almal* in a letter to Mohamed Sharif, "We wrote before, when we were at al-Obayyid and alerted our dearests to return the property of the citizens of Bara . . . We ordered the return of all the slaves belonging to them."[89] He also ordered Mohamed Sharif [his cousin] to ask all the brothers to return the property of Bara citizens, or pay, willingly or by force, full compensation. He pointed out that Bara citizens, some of whom were al-Mahdi's relatives, *ahl albeit,*[90] were to be approached and shown cordiality. Al-Mahdi blamed his cousin Mohamed for taking the slaves of a woman called Roqaia bit Alfaki; he happened to see the slaves at Mohamed's home, but did not know whose they were. He ordered the return of those slaves to their owner.

Al-Khalifa looked into the case of a woman, Shaima bint Mohamed, who complained that the *Ansar* took her *adamiyya* Hawwa, who breast fed for her. Hawwa later escaped from them and returned to her, and she asked that her slave be left with her as a charity. Al-Khalifa ordered, "Since the mentioned is a weak woman and the adamiyya is breast feeding for her, she is to be left alone and all should refrain from accosting her."[91]

In another case, al-Khalifa wrote to Mudawi Abdelrahman instructing him not to claim a slave who ran away from a woman called Altoma. She came to al-Khalifa with the slave in her hand; she said the slave returned to her and was staying with Mudawi. Al-Khalifa asked Mudawi to let the slave go by way of taking pity on the weak owner. A seemingly never-ending chain of letters from al-Khalifa granting and following up petitions about slaves taken into *bait almal* is found in the records in Daftar al-Sadir 6: 15,16,17, 20, 32, 33, 55, 57, 58, 59, 61 . . .

SAFE PASSAGE (ROAD SECURITY)

Despite the similarities and overlap of procedures to control slave movement, to secure roads from the danger of robbery, and to recover runaway slaves, one procedure, the permit for a safe passage, had special importance. Every permit given by al-Mahdi or al-Khalifa or any of his *`amils* for an individual or a family that was moving from one place to another included the number of slaves, their description, and names. Such records facilitated the search for and finding of slaves lost in robberies. The permits also allowed passage through the *Ansar* check points and assured documentation if the owner needed to sell some of his slaves during the trip.

Al-Mahdi issued a permit for two Moroccans, al-Haj Altayeb Albnani and Assayed Idris Abughalib, when they decided to return to Morocco accompanied by a number of Sudanese and Ethiopian slaves. Al-Mahdi required his *`amil* at the Berber and Dungula regions to "move them all, under your auspices, from one place to another and give them secure company until they leave the borders of your region. *Bait almal* is to finance their move; don't spare any effort to fulfill their orders and needs."[92]

Another example is al-Khalifa's permit issued to Zeinab bit Ahmed [a slave owner] to go to Omdurman according to al-Mahdi's order that pardoned her. The permit instructed that no one should accost her or take her property until she reached Omdurman.

SERVANT—MISTRESS—CONCUBINE—MOTHER OF A CHILD—EMANCIPATED

Within the general framework of what is legally allowed under the Qur'anic statement "ma malakat aymanakum" [literally: "those whom your right hand owns," meaning slaves] and according to the customs adhered to by societies practicing slavery and enslavement, each of the five terms in the title above expresses a certain type and degree of relationship between the [male] owner and the owned woman. The type of relationship had far-reaching consequences for the family, children, and inheritance of the slave and the owner. This is why Islamic and customary rules surrounded and protected that relationship with a wall of circumspections and regulations. Despite the efforts of al-Khalifa and other knowledgeable scholars to follow the divine orders regarding slavery, the divine orders often took a back seat to the owner's right to dispose of his property as he wished.

The following cases demonstrate the issues raised by slave owners:

> Mohamed Suleiman married bint Alkhabeer Idris in Darfur while on his way to meet Al-Mahdi in Omdurman; he asked Al-Mahdi for a fatwa on his marriage because he was already married to four wives, two free women and two emancipated slaves, Fadl Alkareem and Tam Zaino. Mohamed Suleiman knew the marriage rule in Islam that allows only four wives; nevertheless, he asked whether he had to let go of one of his four wives.[93] He voluntarily emancipated the two slaves and married them of his free will; therefore, he should have known that he could not take a fifth wife. He either wanted to shield himself from embarrassment before the wife he had to divorce and make her divorce look as if Al-Mahdi ordered it, or he wanted to find a loophole to retract the emancipation of one of the ex-slaves and keep her as a concubine instead of a wife. Al-Mahdi ordered him to divorce one of the emancipated slaves.[94]

Al-Khalifa wrote to Osman Aldikaym informing him that he had released Asakir Abu Kalam from prison in order to attract him to the Mahdiyya; Asakir asked for the freedom of his daughter, who was taken as a spoil and made a concubine by Osman. Al-Khalifa asked Osman Aldikaym to turn the concubinage into a marriage and contract the marriage as one of a free woman. She would then become his second wife if he had one wife, or the third or fourth, according to the number of wives he already had. If he preferred to separate from her, he should do so without clamor and send her to al-Khalifa's house, where all people take refuge.[95]

Al-Khalifa ordered Osman Digna to return 17 females out of the slaves confiscated from one Alawad Almardhi. He told him to follow the *hadith*[96] that admonished Muslims to honor a humiliated noble.[97] But Osman Digna did not abide. Al-Khalifa then wrote to Mohamed Ali Digna stating, "This is to notify you that we addressed our dearest Osman Abibakr Digna to return the concubines of Alawad Almardhi; they have to be the same slaves no changes or exchanges, because the owner kept them as his own concubines; he even emancipated some and married them according to the Holy Book."[98] Al-Khalifa justified that strict order as one way to attract Alawad Almardhi to the Mahdiyya. It came to al-Khalifa's knowledge that the slaves were disposed of; some of the cavaliers and *Ansar* leaders had taken those slaves and kept the females as concubines. Al-Khalifa repeated his order to return the slaves even if one or more of the concubines were impregnated by those who took them. He ordered the return of all of Almardhi's slaves who were disposed of by way of sale

or gift, including the males who were made *jihadiyya* and the females who joined a *jihadiyya* camp.

SLAVERY AND CHARITY

Al-Mahdi gave slaves as charity to serve many purposes in his strategy to unite people and bring dignitaries and upper-class personalities close to the Mahdiyya. He also gave slaves to alleviate injustice done to an individual or a family, as well as to support orphans and widows of martyrs. Al-Khalifa followed the same course, but he expanded the practice of returning slaves unlawfully entered in *bait almal.* He also followed the cases of confiscated or stolen slaves and returned them to their owners.

Babiker wad Alrayis complained to al-Mahdithat that he had had two houses, one in Kamleen and the other in Khartoum. He left both to join al-Sheikh Albaseer, where he paid allegiance and participated in jihad. He told Albaseer that his family had left Khartoum. After the fall of Khartoum, he returned to find his children stripped of all property and left empty-handed after 23 slaves were taken from them. He petitioned al-Mahdi to return what was taken from him by way of charity and gift, for he lost an eye in the jihad and was destitute. Al-Mahdi wrote back admonishing him to shun this world and hope for what Allah had; then he replied positively to his request, "Our treasurer Ahmed Suleiman will take the steps necessary for your comfort."[99] Then he wrote to Ahmed Suleiman, "Dearest, implement what the concerned regional treasurers write to you about this case. Peace."[100]

THE SLAVE MARKET

Omdurman accommodated the central authority of the Mahdiyya and became its seat. It also held the central *bait almal* that had the central slave market attached to it. The same system of connecting *bait almal* to the slave market was followed in the other regions.

Slatin described the central slave market,

> In Omdurman itself, in an open space a short distance to the southeast of the bait el Mal, stands a house roughly built of mud-bricks, which is known as the Suk er Rekik (slave-market)... and as the trade is looked upon as a perfectly natural and lawful business, those put up for sale are carefully examined from head to foot, without the least restriction, just as if they were animals. The mouth is opened to see if the teeth are

> in good condition. The upper part of the body and the back are laid bare, and the arms carefully looked at.[101]

Slatin's disdain for the "quality control" practices at the slave market was hypocritical and malicious. His deep-seated belief in the deficient traits of the Negro race was recorded in his writings when he was appointed general commissioner of slavery affairs during the Condominium.[102] "We are in a futile pursuit to lift them to our standard. These Godforsaken swine do not deserve treatment as free independent men."[103] The slave market in the Mahdiyya was no different than the one in the Sinnar kingdom as described by Krump,[104] the market in West and Central Africa as described by Nachtigal,[105] or the one in the Islamic Empire as narrated by Altirmanini.[106]

Egyptian intelligence was closely monitoring the daily activity of the Mahdiyya slave market. One of its documents reported, "Every slave owner should carry a certificate that proved that he bought the slave from *bait almal*. In the case of buying from another owner, two witnesses should attest [the contract]."[107] The report went on to observe that the female slave trade increased after al-Khalifa's prohibition of the sale of male slaves. The average supply of slaves at the slave market near *bait almal* was 60 females, and the average monthly sale at the Berber market was 150 slaves; six times this number was sold at the Omdurman market. Mohamed Abdelrahim[108] reported on the slave market in the southwest, "When Kergasawi occupied Bahr Alghazal in 1886, 1303 Hijri [lunar Islamic calendar], he sold 300 slaves at an auction. The successful bidder was a man named Mohamed Salih Alja`afari, who paid 25 Riyals."

Slavery, Prices and Currency

According to Al-Mahdi's proclamation, dated 12 Safar, 1302 Hijri (November 10, 1884), currency was as follows: (see table 4.3).

On 5 Rajab 1303 Hijra, al-Khalifa issued a proclamation adding a new measure, he stipulated that 4 *Dhra`a* of *Damour* was equivalent to one-fourth riyal. Slaves continued to function as currency, barter instruments, and mortgage collateral. Wording such as "as for the one who borrows against a mortgage of his slaves" appear in many of the documents.[109] Slave prices remained variable and unstable, despite their stable supply at the markets. That instability was not only due to elements of supply and demand, but also due to the unstable and economically unsound standards of deciding the price of Mahdiyya

Table 4.3 Currencies and equivalent in riyals

Currency	Equivalent in riyals
Faragallah	10
Egyptian and *Afranji* Pounds	6
Meskoui and Mejidi Pound	5
Pinto Pound	41/2
Bundugi and Himouri	3
Mejar	2 1/2
Al-Khairyya al-Seeny	1
Egyptian Kairiyya	1
Al-Khairyya al-meem	1/2
Al-Saadiya, al-bargouta, and quarter of Egyptian	1/4
Majidi Riyal	20 Piasters

Source: Al-Mahdi's proclamation dated 12 Safar, 1302 Hijri, November 10, 1884.

currency. Many states knew such instability when they first issued their national currencies.

Dr. Algaddal cited Slatin on the following list of slave prices:

Working old slave	50–80 riyals
Average age woman	80–120 riyals
Girl 8–11 years	100–160 riyals
Concubine	180–700 riyals.[110]

The Intelligence in Cairo monitored the prices at the Omdurman slave market as follows:

Beautiful female	120 dollars[111]
Child 6 years	80 dollars
Female above 30 years	60[112]

In their report no. 28, Egyptian intelligence followed the rising price of exported slaves after the prohibition, and attributed it to the difficulties the Rashaaida tribe[113] met in transporting slaves to Saudi Arabia. The report quoted the prices as being:

Young male slave	150–250 dollars
Female slave	300–400[114].

SLAVERY AND THE MAHDIYYA REFORMS

The *jihadiyya*, as a phenomenon and an institution, necessitated reforms in slavery's norms, without which this institution would not function. The effect of those reforms eventually reached the general

population of slaves. Some of the slaves had an ambiguous feeling about the reforms, especially the *jihadiyya* families. The *jihadiyya* camps offered a type of safe refuge, even if for a short time. Furthermore, the *jihadi's* salary and his monthly food provision secured a living; the young male slaves felt that enlisting with the *jihadiyya* would save them from enslavement even if it was only a facade.

At another level, military strategy dictated a prohibition on exporting slaves and avoided opening new battle fronts for hunting slaves in the south and southwest. That strategy further dictated central monitoring and authentication of sale contracts.

Socially and from an Islamic jurisprudential standpoint, the Mahdiyya prohibited castration of slaves and separation of families, especially mother and child. It encouraged the marriage and settlement of slaves. Mahdiyya made a legal reform that allowed the *jihadiyya*'s testimony before courts of law. However, slaves remained slaves despite the reforms. As important as the reforms were, a slave's function remained the same, and a slave never recovered his freedom.

One of seven issues that al-Mahdi was requested to give a fatwa on was about a slave woman married to a slave man. The couple was separated for a long time when the ownership of the slave man was transferred to another owner. The issue for the fatwa was whether they should be divorced. Al-Mahdi advised that "if the wife is patient and remains chaste, no divorce should take place, but if she is not chaste, as chastity is not a trait of slave women, and commits zina, her punishment is half of that of a free married woman."[115]

5

The Condominium: Disintegration of Slavery and Enslavement Relations

General Policies

The policies pursued by the Condominium administration regarding slavery and enslavement in the Sudan were not wholly formulated or initiated by the Condominium government. The elements of those policies were informed by and extracted from previous experiences and strategies that were shaped in London and Cairo seven decades earlier. They were policies that paved the way for reconquering the Sudan under the guise of ideological justifications that hid the real motives and blurred the objectives of the colonizers. The Condominium policies were affected by the following:

- British policies and practices regarding slavery and enslavement and the slave trade in Africa, the West Indies, and the southern states of the United States of America;
- the conflict within British society between abolitionists and the supporters of slavery, coupled with the Industrial Revolution and free trade;
- the greedy, feverish rush [of Europeans] to obtain colonies;
- the treaty that Egypt signed, or actually was forced to sign, with Britain in August of 1877 that stipulated in its first article that Egypt should prohibit slavery and the export of slaves from Egypt. Accordingly, a high order was issued prohibiting the movement of slaves from one family to another within Egypt, but not its annexes, seven years from the date of the order. As for the Sudan and other annexed areas, the order was operational 12 years after promulgation of the order, in August of 1889; and

- the Condominium Treaty between Egypt and Britain, to rule Sudan, stipulated in Article 11, "The importation of slaves into the Soudan, as also their exportation, is absolutely prohibited. Provision shall be made by Proclamation for the enforcement of this Regulation."[1]

A confidential memorandum, issued in March of 1899 by Kitchener, the chief officer of the conquering army and the first governor general of Sudan, from January to December 1899, after only six months of reoccupying the Sudan, should be read in light of the above-mentioned elements. He directed that

> slavery is not recognized in the Soudan, but as long as service is willingly rendered by servants to masters, it is unnecessary to interfere in the conditions existing between them . . . I leave it to your discretion to adopt the best methods of gradually eradicating the habit of depending upon slave labor which has so long been part of the religious creed and customs of this country, and which it is impossible to remove at once without doing great violence to the feelings and injuring the prosperity of the inhabitants. Without proclaiming any intention of abruptly doing away with all slave-holding, much can be done in the way of discouraging it and teaching the people to get on without it.[2]

The literature of the nationalist movement in the Sudan, and other countries, has spared us the trouble of unveiling the hypocrisy of the colonial mentality and its deceitful ideology, in what Kitchener termed, "great violence to the feelings and injuring the prosperity of the inhabitants." However, we cannot avoid the question: if enslavement and slavery practiced in the Sudan was rationalized as being "part of the religious creed and customs of this country," how was it rationalized and justified in British society? What educational processes had the religious, highbred British people utilized to teach the sons of slave owners and traders to give up that objectionable practice? Was it allocating 20 million sterling pounds to compensate slave owners?

Kitchener might have been right in believing that it was impossible to immediately eradicate slavery, but his justification was imbalanced. The problem was not the feelings of the free inhabitants and their prosperity; it was a two-pronged problem:

1. The Condominium administration lacked the resources and capacity to employ the freed slaves in any business or service, and

2. The cautious approach that feared a flare-up of slave owners, the violence of which they experienced in the wars with the Mahdists.

The Condominium administration extracted from Kitchener's memorandum and the memoranda of his successors, especially circular number 22,[3] a plan of action that adopted one version or another of the provisions of those memoranda in their agendas for two decades. Those provisions may be summarized as follows:

1. Prevention of gatherings of runaway slaves around cities.
2. Prohibition of enlisted slaves from enticing or forcing female slaves out of the owner's homes by claiming kinship. A soldier was to raise his claim before his supervisory officer to be put before the governor of the province.
3. Accounting for and registration of slaves.
4. Keeping a regular relationship with the Abolition Office in Cairo.

Along with this plan of action, the administration inherited three problems from Kitchener and his successor Wingate's memoranda regarding its general policy toward slavery. The first: The confidentiality of the memoranda, correspondence, and reports regarding slavery, including the emancipation policy. The second: The conservative, cautious, and reluctant implementation of the policies and execution of resolutions. The third: Various levels [and contradictory political agendas] of discourse around the problem, starting with contradictions in the logic of the discourse that did not recognize and did not directly and openly target slavery. One level of discourse started with Kitchener's contradictory statement recognizing and discouraging, but not outright condemning slavery, "Without proclaiming any intention of abruptly doing away with all slave-holding, much can be done in the way of discouraging it and teaching the people to get on without it." Other contradictions may be seen in the discourse in the reports and memoranda sent by the government in Sudan to the Condominium governments; the discourse adopted under the pressure and influence of abolitionists in Britain, who had leverage in public opinion, Parliament, and the government; and, finally, the discourse used to address the League of Nations and international media.

The memoranda issued by Kitchener and Wingate show that slavery became a regular chapter in the governor general's annual report.

The material in the report was compiled from the province governors' reports and their annual meetings with the governor general at the palace in Khartoum. The report would then be sent to the consul general—Lord Cromer—who in turn would send it to the Condominium government. The annual and supporting reports, as well as internal memoranda between administrative officials, reveal the dilemma between the general policy regarding slavery and the methods and procedures for the gradual eradication of slavery, that is, the plan for its "natural death." The administration anxiously vacillated whenever its policy conflicted with incompatible interests and objectives. The philosophy of the emancipation of slaves faced many obstacles; it conflicted with the owners' interests; it was hampered by lack of financial resources to employ slaves in production schemes and other institutions; it raised the problem of dealing with emancipated and discharged soldiers who wreaked havoc and threatened security either by taking the law into their own hands or by being vagabonds[4]; and there was a conflict between civil procedure and *Shari`a* norms that dealt with emancipation.[5] To top it all, the government insisted on tackling slavery as if it were a civilized humanitarian endeavor that was absolutely dissociated from the British schemes of imperialist domination of the Sudan, which was achieved through diplomacy and military buildup.

Lord Cromer succeeded in articulating the dilemma in two paragraphs that were 15 years apart. The first was a statement in his address to the elite of Omdurman on January 5, 1899, when he told them, "There will be no interference whatever with your religion."[6] The second was what he told Wingate, the governor general of Sudan, in his letter of December 21, 1914, "We run Sudan largely by bluff."[7]

Part of the dilemma, which perhaps lay at its core, was the delusion of the government that its pure, well-drafted, timely stipulated, measured, and carefully executed administrative policies and procedures were sufficient to solve a multifaceted social, economic, ethnic, religious, cultural, and psychological societal problem.

The government underestimated, actually minimized, the problem; therefore, it did not explore it thoroughly enough. Soon enough, it was surprised and shocked by its complexities, magnitude, and entrenched deep roots. [Difficult questions arose], such as how would the slaves live after emancipation with no means of subsistence? How would the masters live after losing a production and service tool and sign of social status? How would the society plan its daily life without using the power of its internal tools of production to a level that

would make slave labor economically obsolete, even if it did not lose its social viability?

The Annual Report of 1903 compared Egyptian and Sudanese people. According to the opinions of the administrators, "the local officials are well-nigh unanimous in their opinion that, as a general rule, the Sudanese are not industrious. In this respect they are the very reverse of the Egyptians, who are singularly industrious race."[8] Further discussion in the same report confirmed that unlike Egyptians, Sudanese slave masters were never used to work, and that many slaves thought that the best thing to do after emancipation was to rest and minimize hard work. The slavery problem continued to be present in the annual reports for the following five years. The 1908 Annual Report stated,

> The question of gradual abolition of domestic slavery presents greater difficulties, but progress, though slow, is undoubtedly being made to give effect to the government's policy of steadily carrying out the substitution of paid labour for domestic slavery.[9]

In his efforts to remove obstacles to the government's policy, Wingate instructed the grand *qadi*, Sheikh Ibrahim Muddathir al-Hajjaz, to send a memorandum to the Condominium governments through Lord Cromer in support of the gradual eradication policy appeasing the abolitionists in Britain.[10] Sheikh al-Hajjaz wrote saying that slaves should not be allowed to leave their masters unless there was proof of ill-treatment. In dealing with cases initiated by slaves, the government should employ this philosophy, for at least seven years, in order for the Sudanese to prepare themselves for the gradual end of slavery.

The British were optimistic about their policy, but destiny was laughing and the Sudanese reality was arrogantly dismissing it. The administration remained stuck for decades, to the contradictions within its policy regarding slavery and enslavement. For example, the way they dealt with the multifaceted problem of runaway slaves during the period from 1901 to 1924, the discharged soldiers and active soldiers who incited their female relatives and wives to move out of the masters' homes (*sel al-yed*),[11] in addition to those who got out of slavery and wandered aimlessly.

The administration drafted the first paragraphs of its policy in the decree issued by order of the governor general and signed by G. F. Matthews, assistant civil secretary, on May 18, 1901, entitled "Colonists." The circular ordered that the discharged Sudanese

soldiers living as "colonists" should devote the *dhurra* (sorghum) rations given to them for subsistence of their families, rather than being content with a life of idleness in cities. Accordingly, His Excellency the governor general directed that grain rations should not be disbursed to men who were idle and without means of livelihood. The ordinance ended with an amendment to the policy that would reduce the number of discharged soldiers allowed to live in the *daim* or *radeef*.[12] The number was to be increased only after consultation with the financial secretary. The order also limited the time period for receiving grain rations.[13]

Between the first memorandum of 1901 and the Confidential Circular Memorandum No. 22, dated January 4, 1907, entitled "Regulations as to Sudanese Who Leave their Masters, 1907"[14] (Circular 22), the government took a more practical step to implement its contradictory policy; it legislated the Vagabonds Ordinance in 1905. It was hoping to use the law and prisons to inhibit what it could not restrain by emancipating and amassing the discharged soldiers in the *daims* and *radeefs* and ending subsistence provisions. The first two articles of Circular 22 contradict each other. They provided the following, among other rules,

1. Those who are still in slavery have the right to leave their master, if they so wish.
2. Of the Sudanese who leave their masters and come into the towns in expectation of obtaining an easy living, many are reduced to want. Others, being unwilling or unable to obtain regular employment, take, the men to thieving and the women to prostitution.
3. The Vagabond Ordinance 1905 may apply to Sudanese who are not earning an honest living. Such persons may fall under the definition of idle persons in that ordinance . . . They are "required to provide a surety for good behavior for one year;" failing that they may be imprisoned.
4. If a Sudanese applies for freedom or a master claims that a Sudanese has recently run away from him, an investigation should be started and both be asked questions.
5. If the magistrate finds that the Sudanese is an idle person with no honest means of living, he may apply the Vagabonds Ordinance. However if he finds that "the Sudanese has been with his or her master since before the conquest and the magistrate is satisfied that he or she has been well-treated and that he or she has no honest means of subsistence, the magistrate may recommend that the Sudanese return to his or her master upon such terms as may seem fair."[15]

With a little attention and clarity, Article 1 could have been drafted to remove the contradiction. It could have stated that a person who is still in slavery has the right to leave his master if he or she wishes, provided that he or she finds an honest means of living. The same provision could have been added to the article governing applications for emancipation, to spare the former slave from falling into want.

Circular 22 included a second section, "Sudanese Soldiers Enticing Girls from the People of the Country." This section comprised five ramified articles to tackle the problem of soldiers enticing female slaves to leave their masters. The order to raise the matter before a commanding officer of the army failed to stop such incidences. The administration found itself compelled to contain the problem with a multitude of legal constraints. It used civil law and *Shari`a* restraints.[16]

The Red Sea province shed the administration's mask of hypocrisy, solidifying the official policy for the international world in contrast to the domestic policy that adapted to the realities of the situation. On January 26, 1915, the province governor issued a memorandum to the commissioners, entitled "Runaway Servants." The administration used this tamed phrase to smooth the sharp-edged word "slave" to suit the taste of British public opinion. The memorandum told the commissioners to spare no effort in urging slaves to return to their masters, especially if the bond between them had existed since the Mahdiyya. That straight talk could have been prompted by the practice of transporting slaves to the Arabian Peninsula and to Egypt to a lesser degree, via the Red Sea Coast and other traditional outlets, a matter that aggravated the slavery problem. Large numbers of slaves were amassed on the Red Sea Coast due to the tricks of the traders who circumvented all laws, rules, and regulations to reach the Red Sea.[17]

At one time the Red Sea authority levied a heavy surety on travelers taking a minor into Egypt as a servant or son, to be refunded only when the traveler brought the minor back. The surety was higher than the price of selling the minor in Egypt. The governor had no qualms about allowing servitude and unpaid labor that other provinces were embarrassed to allow. He requested his commissioners to impose a strict monitoring system on the slaves during working hours, to ensure that they worked all day, lest they should think that their stay in the *dhabtiyya* (custody) was a temporary one.[18] It was a way to keep the pressure on them so as to return to their masters instead of the hard work in sea salt production, paving roads, and hauling stones for construction. He also ordered that slave women were not to marry

while they were in custody, to spare the administration the cost of pregnancy, delivery, and feeding children.

A sequence of major events took place during and after the stipulation of the memorandum. Some were far away, such as the First World War and the birth of the League of Nations; some were close enough to move the stagnant social policy in the Sudan. One was the 1919 revolution in Egypt; another was inside the Sudan, the 1924 revolution. Without implying a systematic link between these events, in the end, they both left their mark on the British administration's policy on slavery and enslavement, but they were not the only happenings to have an effect. Preceding these events and concurrent to them, capitalist investments were active in building infrastructure, workshops, and service entities that ended up producing a market that paralleled [and rivaled] the slave markets. It was the manpower market, the waged labor market as an alternative to slave labor. The former was cost-effective, more profitable, and generally a more productive alternative. The waged labor market, to some extent, eliminated the efficacy of slave labor. By alternative, I do not mean a total replacement of slave labor, but rather, a labor that was, together with other types of labor, a better alternative to slave labor. A third factor that had an effect was the cumulative knowledge that the administration had gained, through time, about the problem of emancipation and its magnitude, and what it learned through the experience of implementing various policies. It could have learned from its experience in the West Indies and saved itself time and effort. The fourth factor was the stability and confidence gained by the administration in managing governance in the Sudan.

Despite its innovation in procedures and programs to eradicate slavery, the administration remained shackled to its contradictory policies and troubled by its three inherited problems [confidentiality of all documents; conservative implementation of the policies; and various levels of discourse]. The civil secretary issued Confidential Circular Memorandum No. 33, on May 1, 1919, (Circular 33), entitled "Regulations as to Sudanese Servants,"[19] which repealed Circular 22 of 1907. It was comprised of 15 articles, 7 of which were amendments to Circular 22; however, it did not go beyond it.

Circular 33 merged the terms (domestic slave) and (house servant) into "Sudanese servant," and defined this phrase as "persons who were in a state of slavery or considered as such by natives and apply to both sexes and the word 'master' includes 'mistress.' " Circular 33 merged the two terms despite the fundamental difference between the master-slave and employer-servant relationship. The circular

took half a step in giving the slave the right to leave his employer. It created contractual relationships such as partnerships or agency contracts between the master and the slave. Article 3 states, "Every Sudanese servant not under contract has the right to leave his master if he wishes and may not be compelled or persuaded to return against his will." Article 13 adds, "As the government does not recognize the status of slavery it follows that any claim by a master to the property of a servant who has left him must be based on contract or agreement such as agency or partnership." Article 4 of the circular updated the taxonomy of the problem of runaway slaves, "It is not desirable in the interest of the community that Sudanese should through leaving the homes in which they have been brought up and finding themselves without work take to thieving or prostitution." In Article 9, the circular added, "As not infrequently it happens that Sudanese servants who have lived many years with their masters are really happier and better off if they still remain part of the masters' family." In a rare moment of clarity, the circular came closer to addressing the magnitude and complexity of the problem that it was attempting to address when it clarified in Article 4 the intention of the regulations in the circular, "They are not intended to enable masters to retain Sudanese in slavery but for the protection of Sudanese themselves and in the interest of the whole community." The new additions in the circular were Articles 11 and 12 that protected children and women from titular marriage contracts made by masters to keep them in bondage.[20]

Governor General Wingate's confidential assessment conveyed to the grand *qadi* and included in the above memorandum, namely, that slaves should not be allowed to leave masters except in cases of abuse, were said [in the grand *qadi*'s memo] to apply for seven years, but in fact, enslavement continued without limitation.

The civil secretary expressed some concerns about the implementation of Circular 33, in an internal memorandum dated April 14, 1924 (C.S. 60/A/1). He directed that a new memorandum be issued to ensure that a well-treated servant who wanted to leave his master might reach a voluntary settlement with his master. Further, commissioners should not take the initiative in starting any actions regarding slaves who continued to live with their masters; however, the slaves should be issued freedom papers if they requested such documents.[21]

The voluntary settlement referred to above was called a *fidya*.[22] It was a commitment, a judgment, a punishment, and a duty. The word "voluntary" was used figuratively. The circular required that a servant desiring to leave a master who was treating him or her well, commit to a voluntary settlement that required the slave to pay a part

of his wage to the master as a *fidya*, which was actually compensation to the master. This settlement was said to be voluntary and not subject to any judicial procedure or forced in any way.

The settlement process was introduced earlier by the governor of the Red Sea province. He directed that a servant who refused to return to his or her master must pay a *fidya*. He further clarified that *fidya* as a reconciliation payment was not intended to help runaway slaves gain freedom, if there was a way to return them to the masters. It was intended to deal with incidents where the specific slave refused to return to his master; in such a case, it was better for the master to get some compensation than to just lose his "servant" and get nothing. The governor differentiated between *fidya* and royalty; *fidya* was a one-time lump-sum payment, not a periodical or installment payment. A slave who could not pay it might provide a surety or risk being rearrested.

What a miserable destiny awaited the slave who worked hard to provide part of the *fidya* and ended up a loser, either under arrest, or again a slave due to his or her inability to pay all of it! Which one of the two states would have been the hardest on him? When Prometheus stole fire from the Gods and gave it to humans, he was crucified on a rock and left for predatory birds to devour him. When Zeus asked for repentance in exchange for setting him free, Prometheus defiantly chose the misery of torture to the humiliation of slavery.

The governor continued his stern regulations; a slave who refused to return to his master and agreed to pay *fidya* should pay as soon as possible and be removed from custody, lest his refusal to return to his master entice others to follow suit. He stated that *fidya* should be between two and ten pounds, depending on the amount of service the master had extracted from the slave or the estimated loss of expected benefits from future work. The low *fidya* amount was intended to encourage masters to keep slaves and spare the government the burdens resulting from their breaking away from slavery.

Apparently the *fidya* as a means of emancipation was not universally applied; documents do not show any enthusiastic follow-up, especially the general policy documents that continued to state the basic rules with a mention of changes and incidents. The lack of enthusiasm could be attributed to the scarcity of waged labor that slaves depended on to pay *fidya*. Or it could have been one of those compromises that the Sudanese society has regularly mastered in the face of conflict. The majority of masters became content with a serfdom relationship, so as to keep the slaves' labor in production and services in exchange for a share in the harvest, livestock, or seasonal work.

Equally, the documents show no follow-up on any of the compensation processes for the masters who freed their slaves, despite the official stipulation of that policy in the Governor General's Report of 1908. That report dealt with the obstacles hindering the gradual eradication of slavery. It mentioned that the only way to replace slave work with waged work was the implementation of a compensation process. That process was expected to cost the government, as it had to compensate current owners as well as former owners whose slaves chose to leave.

The abolition organizations in England were eager to critique the vague statements and memoranda of the Sudanese government. Expressions such as "the masters were a minority" and that "slaves would voluntarily remain with masters," or that "the slaves were aware of their legal rights and some of them obtained their freedom."

All documents that created policies regarding slavery in any form included, from the beginning, a declaration of the intent to "emancipate the slaves." This became a constant in all documents. From the human rights document issued after the French Revolution to Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, to the resolutions of the British Parliament, those documents declared that children born on and after the day of the declaration were born free.

From the time of the release of the Kitchener Memorandum, Sudanese children born on or after January 1, 1898 were said to be free, which means the child could not be bought or sold; however, the contradictions in the administration's policy continued. Policies such as the Red Sea governor demanding a surety to be paid on a child taken across the Red Sea were a clear contradiction that the child was born free. Of course the slave traders were shrewd enough to claim that the child died or was kidnapped during the trip, and were willing to lose their surety. The punishment should not have been the loss of the surety but enforcement of Article 4 of the 1877 Agreement that equated trading children and murder, and prescribed a court martial to try such a person.

A second dilemma resulted from the status of children born to slave parents. A third was the status of a child born to a free man and a slave woman without a marriage contract. A fourth was the difference between the rules in civil and *Shari`a* laws. A fifth arose from the memoranda that declared children to be free after they were able to take care of themselves. The last would have been reasonable except for the fact that the majority of the slave population in the custody of all provinces, males and females, was comprised of teenagers or youth in their twenties. Despite the complexities, the policy memoranda

continued to insist that "no person born after the reoccupation of the country in 1898 is otherwise than free."[23]

If this were true, the institution of slavery would have stopped reproducing itself after the abolition of the slave trade. That trade was instigated by a low fertility rates among slaves that reduced supply and raised demand. When the slave trade was abolished, and every child born to slave parents was declared "born free," the institution of slavery should have been severed from history; it would become sterile and not able to renew itself. It would have died sooner or later depending on the efficacy of policies, procedures, and programs.

In 1925, the governor general directed the civil secretary to issue another memorandum on slavery.[24] Articles 9 and 10 of that memorandum attest to its weight and importance. Article 9 mandated that "duties arising under this circular shall not be carried out by any official of lower rank than an Assistant District Commissioner, but it is the duty of every official to assist any Sudanese servant to obtain access to the District Commissioner and to report cases of hardship and cruelty that comes under his notice." Article 10 held the governors and district commissioners responsible to the governor general "for carrying out of this circular in the spirit of the letter."[25] So what was new in this circular and its spirit regarding general slavery policy? Article 3 was the new piece in the circular; it hinted at the lack of clarity in the government's policies "in view of the time that has elapsed since the reoccupation of the country, the time has come for the Government to restate its policy in clearer terms."

The first article of this memorandum showed a candidness that was lacking in the previous memoranda; it stated,

> The policy of the Sudan Government has always been that all slavery in the Sudan should in due course come to a natural end. Its aim therefore has been to do nothing that will delay the natural ending of slavery, but it was not desirable and would not have been fair to other classes of the people of the Sudan to take active steps to produce that result in too short a time.

Article 2 gave the government two tools to use to achieve its fixed policy, "the natural end would be brought about by the decision of the Government that no person born after the reoccupation of the country in 1898 is otherwise than free and by the recognition of the principle that no master has the right to retain Sudanese servants against their will." However, the article consisted of policies, regulations, and general directions, rather than executive tools. They were

not the tools required to transform policies into real possibilities or action, or to move from vision to change.

The memorandum contained express directions to province governors and district commissioners to remove obstacles facing slaves who were applying for freedom papers. However, the commissioner should not "take the initiative except on application of the servant." Yet, the district commissioner was allowed to "attempt a reconciliation if he considers it to be in the interest of both parties, but in so doing he shall not only bear in mind himself that the servant has an absolute right to freedom but make it quite clear to the servant that he has this right and abstain from putting any pressure on the servant." The memorandum directed that the commissioner should not attempt reconciliation in three cases:

> Where the master has hired out the Sudanese servant to another which is an offence under Sec. 311 of the Penal Code.
>
> When the Sudanese servant was born since 1898.
>
> Where the master has ill-treated or neglected to support the servant.[26]

Those were very clear terms; they were so clear that they absolved those enacting the general policy memoranda from any critical evaluation of them as an afterthought or biased. These terms prove rather than rebut that the policy was still plagued by its intrinsic problems, especially, the issues of confidentiality and the conflicting simultaneous discourses addressing the problem of slavery. Where do I see these two problems?

1. Archer, the governor general, drafted a memorandum on May 6, 1925, during his summer vacation in England, to be delivered to the League of Nations![27]
2. The province governors did not see the memorandum until 1928, when the governor general allowed it. This was mentioned in the civil secretary's letter, which was attached to the memorandum.

The Prussic discipline of the British administration and the ignorant wall of confidentiality did not protect the policy from the vacillations of conflicting opinion. Three events clearly prove the conflicts:

1. The Blue Nile province governor sent a memorandum dated December 22, 1924 to the civil secretary stating some of his views on the general policy to be discussed in the governor general's

meeting with province governors (C.S. 60/1/3). He made it clear that he would like to see a nonconfidential memorandum on the matter of slavery. As long as the differences of opinion between officials who were favoring the Arab masters and those who would like to end slavery remained, and the memoranda remained confidential, it would be extremely difficult to overcome the impression that there was a secret policy behind those memoranda. He expressed his solid conviction that it was about time that the policy on slavery be addressed in a public memorandum to be viewed by everyone. Failing that, he said, it would not be possible to give any satisfactory response to criticism built on a misunderstanding of the government's regulations.

2. C. A Willis's 1926 Report on Slavery[28] stated that "the debate on concubinage would not have been necessary, had there been a publicly-announced, clear decision that everyone born after 1898 was free; that would have eliminated concubinage as the 'Arabs' were not interested in taking old women as concubines, only young girls, fifteen years old or younger." Willis became the director of intelligence and prepared the report at the request of the governor general, who was fulfilling a request of the British government. Without exaggeration, the Willis Report was the most comprehensive report on slavery to be issued by the British administration. He was right on the fact that females born after the reoccupation were 26 or 27 years old in 1926 and should have been classified among the free.
3. Captain Diggle, an agricultural inspector in al-Bawga, resembled the Prophet Salih in Thamoud;[29] in other words, he was marching to the beat of a different drum. He was a foreign body within the physique of the British administration in the Sudan and the colonial office in London. He was closer to the conscience of the abolitionists in Britain. During the seven years he spent in the Sudan, he showered the administration with a barrage of memoranda about slavery and the inadequacy of the general policy and its conflict with the official policy of His Majesty's government policy. Once he left the Sudan, he delivered a memorandum to the secretary of The Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade to be presented to the Slavery Committee at the League of Nations. He reported his experience in the Sudan; he said he went to the Sudan without any knowledge of slavery; however, after spending four of his seven years there, in close contact with the people, he could not fail to notice the horrifying status of the slaves. He refuted the Sudanese government's justifications of its deficient

> policy and indicated that he raised the points in his memorandum with the administration in the Sudan. He continued to narrate his experience of slavery in al-Bawga and the Berber province and to undermine the foundations of the administration's policy. Diggle's memorandum was a tidal wave of noble human fury, a document condemning slavery generally, and a loud, defiant protest against slavery and enslavement in the Sudan. He expressed his willingness to appear before a truth-finding committee of the League of Nations to testify about his personal experience in the Sudan. He got his wish, to the embarrassment of the Sudanese government.[30]

Thirty-seven years had passed between the May 6, 1936, memorandum issued by the British administration[31] and the first memorandum issued by Kitchener that laid the foundation for the administration's policy on slavery. (After that, Kitchener departed to look after the Boer War in South Africa). The year 1936 was loaded with events happening on the Sudan's doorsteps: the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, harbingers of the Graduates Congress, the Italian-Ethiopian war, the approaching Second World War, and the declaration of abolition in Saudi Arabia. Did these events bring any changes in Sudanese policy?

The 1936 memorandum ended up reiterating, "But to have uprooted at once all the incidents of the institution . . . would have caused great hardship, and brought about a public danger through the creation of a large class of ex-slaves without employment and helpless to secure an independent living." In Article 3 another justification was offered, "The Sudan Government has therefore permitted some of the unobjectionable incidents of slavery to persist in so far as they are not harmful to the servant and only so long as he consents to it." This is a belated admission. After much beating around the bush, the government admitted that it allowed some incidents of slavery; slaves have no secure independent living and there was a danger of creating a large class of ex-slaves unable to secure an independent living. All three are accurate expressions of the real situation, rather than Kitchener's memorandum that expressed no intention of immediate eradication of all forms of slavery.

Census—Remnants of Slave Trade—Registration of Slaves

The Condominium administration planned three foundational and strategic long-term tasks considered necessary for a modern state,

namely, census, the eradication of the slave trade, and accounting for and registration of slaves. The administration did not start the census afresh, but used the records of the Turkiyya, documents and ledgers of the Mahdiyya, and the intelligence reports in Cairo. The Annual Report of 1903 included the census done at the end of the Turkiyya and the numbers kept by the Mahdiyya. In his annual report, the governor general addressed the first task, the census, thus,

> In connection with matters of population, it may interest Your Lordship to examine the following table which gives in only a very rough form, the approximate census of the Sudan before the advent of the Mahdi in 1882, and the present number of inhabitants. An attempt has been made to discriminate between deaths which have occurred on account of war, and losses on account of famine and disease, but it will be readily understood that these figures have no pretence to exact accuracy, they have been compiled after careful consideration and enquiry and they represent in the opinion of Sir R. von Slatin, Father Ohrwalder and others who have been intimately connected with the Sudan for the last twenty four years a fairly correct estimate.[32]

Table 5.1 shows the total population of 8,525,000, before the Mahdiyya era. Of those, 3,451,000 died of disease and 3,203,500 died in wars.[33]

Table 5.1 Total population before the Mahdiyya era

Province	Population Prior to Mahdia	Approximate Loss during Mahdia		Present Population
		Disease	Warfare	
Bahr el-Ghazal	1.500.000	400.000	700.000	400.000
Berber	800.000	450.000	250.000	100.000
Dongola	300.000	110.000	80.000	110.000
Gezira	550.000	275.000	125.000	150.000
Halfa	55.000	12.000	13.000	30.000
Kassala	500.000	300.000	120.000	80.000
Khartoum	700.000	400.000	210.000	90.000
Kordofan	1.800.000	600.000	650.000	550.000
Sennar	1.100.000	500.000	450.000	150.000
Suakin (Town)	20.000	4.000	5.500	10.500
Suakin (Arabs)	300.000	100.000	150.000	50.000
Kodok (Upper Nile Province)	900.000	300.000	450.000	150.000
Approximate Totals	**8.525.000**	**3.451.000**	**3.203.500**	**1.870.500**

Source: Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan, 1903, XIII.

Many factors affected the figures presented by the governor general and are the cause of some reservations. Some of these factors were as follows: the deficiency of modes of census in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; disparities in the amount of control the government had on various provinces; displacement; migration and flight on the part of the free and enslaved population to escape the dangers of war and excessive taxes imposed during the Turkiyya and Mahdiyya; and the movement of armies. Governor General Wingate admitted that "these figures have no pretence to exact accuracy." However, figures show some bias as they ignored the losses due to the slave trade that bled the country and those who were killed in the slave raids (*ghazwat).* The "war" figure clearly failed to state the dates of the wars and to indicate the numbers killed during the reoccupation and during disciplinary expeditions. No doubt famine, disease, and tribal fights did eliminate hundreds of thousands of people, as was the case in many African countries, but the slave trade was the plague that was most destructive to the population. Slave traders selected the strongest and best of Africa's population.

Census figures were more accurate in later years; however, the old uncertain figures were never revised or corrected and they cast a murky shadow over subsequent censuses. The censuses done in 1897 and 1903 in Dongola and the adjacent areas of Sikkote, Mahas, Argo, Urdi, Khandag, old Dongola, Dabba, Umbakole, and Upper and Lower Meroe were examples of how the uncertain previous figures affected later censuses. Mr. Hunter, the governor of Dongola, prepared a general report about the state of the province in 1897. The census shows the number of the indigenous population at 48,477—5,860 slaves, 3,389 Arabs, for a total 57,726. The slaves were 8.9 percent.

In 1903, the census showed the population of Dongola before the Dervishes'[34] rule at 300,000. During the era of the Dervishes, of whom 110,000 died of disease and 80,000 in wars, the population in 1903 was 110,000. Mr. Willis's Report entered in the 1915 census was 133,646; the slaves were 15 percent, that is, 11,224. It is not odd that the population of Dongola increased by 23, 646 in eight years, as the displaced and migrants had returned home, in addition to natural reproduction. What makes the other province's numbers doubtful is the fact that the census for other provinces, such as Bahr al-Ghazal, was based on Dongola's census. The population was said to be one and a half million; 400,000 died of disease and 700,000 in wars, and only 400,000 were left in 1903. The tables were silent on the numbers that fell prey to slave *ghazwat* and trade during the Turkiyya, when Bahr al-Ghazal was the favorite arena for slave hunting and

was never a site of Mahdiyya military activities. A look at the Upper Nile census increases doubts about these figures. Out of 900,000 people, only 150,000 were left in 1903. Under the Dervishes rule, 300,000 died of disease and 450,000 perished in wars. At that same time the British government's documents and abolitionists reports were uncovering the tragedy of the slave trade in the Shilluk lands during the Turkiyya, a trade that eliminated half the population after the opening of the White Nile Road.

One may find justification for the skewed statistics in the deficient statistical tools and the inability of the government to find all the details about an underdeveloped country, but the inefficient accounts extended to include the general state of the inhabitants. Any objective report would not expect affluence in a country devastated by wars. The annual report generalized the state of the inhabitants when the governor general said, "One has only to travel through the country to realize the terrible ravages of the Dervish misrule." This statement contradicts the facts stated by Hunter in the table he produced about Dongola, or what may be deduced from it according to simple economic assessments of the gross domestic product. He stated that the population was 58,000 and the number of date palm trees was 357,836, which is 6 trees per person. There were 1,548 *saqias*, and 37 individuals or six families shared a *saqia*; 60,914 heads of goats, sheep, and cows, an average of 1 head per person. The area of arable land was 79,143 acres, of which 19,610 were cultivated, meaning that each individual had 3 acres, of which 1 acre was cultivated. Dongola had 5,860 slaves working in production and services. This was not a pretty [economic] picture but it was not as grim as the report made it look. The inhabitants of Dongola were in a better shape within their natural economy before the Turco-Egyptian *bashbuzuq*[35] descended on them. At the hands of the Turkiyya and its *bashbuzuq,* they suffered loss of lives, crops, and livestock. The Dervishes had their injustices and contraventions, which should be neither justified because they were rebels against Turkiyya, nor because they urged the people who fled the pressure of Turkiyya taxes to return to their lands and rebuild their *sawaqi,* and implemented some reforms to help them. Their injustices should not be excused because al-Khalifa had ordered his *Umal* not to usurp people's rights and admonished them to urge the inhabitants to develop the land. However, the inexcusable injustices of [the Dervishes] were not the first or only factors behind the "the terrible ravages" suffered by the people.

The second task was proportionally easier to handle and execute; it was like removing the debris and putting the final touches on a

building. It was easier because the international slavery market, the main incentive behind slavery in the Sudan, was dwindling, and the abolition movement was gaining ground in the world. The Mahdiyya had already restricted export and enlisted slave males into its army, and finally, the British had consolidated their power over Egypt and the Sudan. Most of the attention to the abolition efforts had turned to the Sudan. The Governor General's Report of 1903 indicated that the slave trade in Egypt was, if not already dead, certainly coming to an end, and the tools employed against it would bring it to a quick end.

The slave trade did not die in the Sudan, despite the restrictions of the Mahdiyya on exports.[36] It had a temporary revival after the defeat of the Mahdiyya, when the Riverian tribes appropriated the slaves of the *Ta'aysha* and *Ansars*, who fled westward after Karari battle.[37] Slave traders returned to slave markets in the areas, such as the shores and docks of the Red Sea, which swarmed with slaves to be exported to the Arabian Peninsula. Amid the chaos after the Mahdists' defeat, the slaves took the opportunity to raise havoc in Omdurman and Khartoum; they took authority and freed their kin and mistresses and for days enjoyed the status of masters, not just freed slaves. People who lived those days in Omdurman told about the rowdy African carnivals held by the slaves, including the singing, dancing, mirth, and drinking binges on locally made liquor, which they emancipated from the prohibition of Mahdiyya.

The administration started the task of ending the slave trade with the deputy civil secretary's circular issued on July 11, 1900. The circular required province governors to provide the names of slave traders in their provinces. The civil secretary's office was concerned about a telegram sent from Ali Dinar who harried to Darfur, after Karari, and took the throne to become the sultan of Darfur. Ali Dinar told the sirdar that Abdelrahim abu Dugul had looted 290 slaves and other property. Abdelrahim was dispatched by the administration to track down the fleeing *Ansar* who were heading west and confiscate their slaves and keep them until the administration made a decision about them. Frequent complaints were aired about him stealing "public slaves"[38] and trading them for his personal interest. Before the reoccupation, he was a Mahdiyya employee.

On September 11, 1903, Governor General Wingate wrote to Cromer[39] in Cairo about the difficulties facing the administration's efforts to abolish slavery. He said that Ali Dinar's agents came from Darfur and sold slaves in the Omdurman market and were not detected by the authorities.

Intelligence Report No. 104–1903—reported that Ali Dinar, anticipating a confrontation with the Sudanese government, ordered a halt on trading male slaves. Even a male child was not to be sold with his mother or allowed to follow her; only female slaves were to be traded. Export of females required permission from the sultan. The administration executed the slave trader Ibrahim wad Mahmoud as he emptied Gombaila, a city on the Ethiopian border, of its inhabitants through ferocious *ghazwat*.

The slave trade subsided and its markets were stagnant except in some cases in the peripheral regions. Measures taken were encircling the raids in Bahr al-Ghazal, during the period from 1905 to 1915, and the execution of 15 slave traders. In the southeast, the Funj province on the Ethiopian southern borders, two persons continued to trade in slaves into the late 1920s. One was a woman known as Sit Amna, who administered an independent district *(umodiyya)* on the Sudanese-Ethiopian border and traded slaves from both countries. The other was Sheikh Khojali and his family. The Funj province governor sent a letter dated February 24, 1929, to the civil secretary telling him that the slave trade was monopolized by Sheikh Khojali and that Sit Amna was tried, convicted, and stripped of her *umodiyya*; her family retreated across the Ethiopian border.

It is worth mentioning that the statistics regarding the number of slaves found in some of the Condominium government documents that have been circulating in some studies and publications without scrutiny were exaggerated. The Mangala Province Report[40] to the civil secretary conveyed that the province was clear of slaves and the slave trade. The governor wrote about the history of slavery using reports compiled by his predecessors. He said there might not be an accurate record of the number of slaves transported annually to Khartoum, but there were hints that put the number at 200–300, and according to Gessi's estimate there were 80,000 slaves taken annually from Bahr al-Ghazal for 14 years.[41] The figures of 200–300 in one caravan, by land or river, are reasonable, especially for Bahr al-Ghazal where the traders were equipped with all trade tools, zareebas, guards, boats, and food preparation supervisors, that is, all preparations for transporting the slaves perhaps for more than one trip annually. However, Gessi's estimate about the size of the trade during Turkiyya is not believable. The report assumed that a total of 1,120,000 slaves were transported during a period of 14 years. Even an estimate that 8,000 were transported annually from Mangala alone, a total of 112,000 in 14 years is not accurate. Such numbers exceeded the capacity, means, and tools of all slave traders, from al-Zubair Pasha, Imouri, and Abtar

to Vasier and Ghattas.[42] It also exceeded the capacity of the local and international markets. How could there be such a huge number of slaves while Mohamed Ali Pasha was unable to satisfy his need for 30,000–40,000 strong slaves for his army?

The administration's tool for ending the slave trade was the Office of Abolition of Slavery that was moved from Cairo to Khartoum in 1903, where it became the Slavery Department (the Department). It was supervised by a commissioner and had a director. It was then reorganized as a department that had police powers and a quasi-judicial authority. The governor general praised its officers and other staff in his Annual Report of 1905, for vigilance that contributed widely to success in stopping the slave trade, "The British Inspectors of the Slavery Department have shown untiring energy in finding out and becoming acquainted with the devious and intricate routes used by the slave-traders to convey their victims through the vast maze of the Sudan."[43]

The department established branches in the areas of Atbara River, the Red Sea, Sinnar, al-Rosairis, Kurdufan, and the Upper Nile provinces. The Sawakin office [a city in the Red Sea province] had 90 officers and Sinnar had 120, the majority of whom were discharged soldiers. Kurdufan started with 50 *hajjana*[44] officers, hoping to add 40 more; in addition, the report suggested adding a local militia of 2,000 men armed with rifles.[45] The militia would have the authority to occupy large tribal areas in the mountains. The governor general asked the consul in Cairo to raise the matter of the Funj province, the Upper Nile, and other areas adjacent to Ethiopia's border, which were lucrative slave areas until the end of the 1920s, under Menelik, king of Ethiopia.[46]

The third task of accounting for and registering slaves met some obstacles. It turned into a headache that plagued the administration until the 1930s. The administration's undertakings were met with the same difficulties that hindered the registration of livestock. The devious tactics the nomads used to hide their livestock, thought to be related to fear of the evil eye, but actually to avert taxes, hindered accurate registration of livestock. The same trickery was used by nomads and urban slave owners to avoid registration of their slaves, as it was rumored that every registered slave would be granted a freedom paper.

In his 1903 confidential circular, the civil secretary alerted province governors and district commissioners to the necessity of finalizing slave registration as soon as possible. It is worth mentioning that this task was achieved by Hunter in Dongola in the early days of the

reoccupation. Some provinces succeeded in achieving the task and sent their reports to the civil secretary's office. The governor general used those reports to support his 1905 Annual Report, "The introduction of a system of registering Sudanese is continued wherever it is feasible, and in this respect the statistics of the Dongola Province show a total of 19,632 Sudanese registered and living with the riverain [*sic*] population."

The civil secretary intensified his control of the task of registering slaves in the provinces in the period 1905–1907. The assistant civil secretary wrote to the governor of Khartoum on April 19, 1905, referring to Article 3 of the Confidential Circular Memorandum No. 22 of 1907, regarding the re-registration of slaves. He requested information about copies that were sent to civil workers from Registers No. 1 and 2, their distribution, and whether the forms were filled out. At the same time, the government of Sudan ran out of the forms sent by its agent in Cairo before the transfer of the Office of Abolition of Slavery to Khartoum. The administration asked its agent to send more forms. When the latter contacted the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior requesting the same, the latter apologized, stating that they had sent 159 copies of the register to the Sudanese government. Since the Sudan had 80 registration centers, each center should have received two copies and that was enough to register 5,000 slaves, a total of 400,000 in the country. The Egyptian director doubted that 1/40 of that total were registered, which indicated a weakness in the registration process. He added that the government of Sudan might purchase registers from a commercial place he named for 330 Piasters (P.T.) per 100 copies. The last sentence indicates that the Egyptian Ministry had sent the registers during the early days of the administration in the Sudan, and that since the administration had taken control, it should bear the cost.

The governor general and the civil secretary sent several memoranda urging province governors to attend to the registration of slaves and finish it as soon as possible. This matter became a constant part of all the Circular Memoranda. In January 1907, the governor general ordered all provinces that did not finish slave registration to finish it as soon as possible, and the registration had to be on the forms provided by the Department of Slavery. They had to ensure that the information on the register was accurate by including the *umdas* (mayors) and sheikhs and other authorities. In Article 14 of Circular Memorandum No. 33, issued on May 1, 1919, the civil secretary repeated, "The registration of Sudanese is as far as possible to be kept up to date but it must be remembered that the register is for

the protection of Sudanese." In 1926, the civil secretary sent a letter to the governor of Kurdufan questioning the final numbers obtained through the registration process. He referred to the doubts and comments stated by Mr. Willis.[47] He asked the governor to confirm or refute Willis's remarks so he could inform the governor general. The Kurdufan governor sent a detailed, documented report in December 1928, stating inter alia, details such as, "The Kennana Kawatil have only produced five slaves one of whom was left with the tribe after being given a freedom paper." On March 15, 1929 the governor of the White Nile sent a memorandum to the civil secretary stating that, in order to guarantee registration of all those newly enslaved, the province was registering all descendants of Sudanese slaves.

Thus was the control and follow-up at the administrative level, but what were the outcomes? There is no trace of those registers at the NRO. They could be somewhere in a documentation office between Cairo and London, or not. The fate of those documents is as puzzling as the fate of the Mahdiyya registers. This matter remains open for more research.

The lone document, of the Condominium papers found at the NRO that came close to accounting for slaves, was the Willis Report of 1926.[48] Some provinces contributed figures and statistics that varied in their accuracy from one place to the next, except for Kurdufan, which sent a full report that started a debate within the administration when its facts were questioned by Mr. Willis, the intelligence director at the time.

Willis's Report gave a limited presentation of the size of slavery in five provinces: Berber, the Geziera area, the Blue Nile, Halfa, Khartoum and Kurdufan; he ignored, for unknown reasons, the Red Sea, Funj, the White Nile, Darfur, and the southern provinces. He stated that it was difficult to make an accurate estimate of the number of slaves in Berber province during the early years of this administration. However, the register accounts for 2,281 in Shendi, 3,394 in Berber[49], 1,943 in al-Damir, and 2,606 in Abu Hamad, a total of 10,215. He confirmed that the actual number far exceeded that total. He presented the situation in the Geziera area by comparing the numbers in the years 1905 and 1912.

The report prefaced the statistics from Halfa with a historical summary. The slave trade during the Turkiyya played a role in helping the locals own slaves and expand their agricultural production. The slave numbers ranged between 6,000–7,000. During the Mahdiyya, some of the inhabitants sought refuge across the border in Egypt. The free people were pressed to earn a living doing domestic work in Egypt

Table 5.2 Comparison between the number of registered slaves in Geziera in 1905 and 1912

Area	1905	1912
Rufa'a	4,900	5,311
Al-Hasahiesa	5,969	7,065
Medani	–	5,867
Al-kamlin	–	4,383
The total of Rufa`a and al-Hasahiesa in 1905 = 10,869, and all four areas in 1912 = 22,526		

Source: *Willis Report*, NRO Civsec 60/2/7.

while the slaves joined the army and formed a Sudanese battalion in Korsko. The report noted that after reoccupation there were incentives for agriculture, and the locals and their slaves were flourishing. Yet with the advance of the troops, commerce deteriorated and the slaves deserted agriculture to work on the railways. No statistics were collected during that period. The registration in 1903 found 734 slaves in the Sikhote and Mahas areas. It was believed that half of this number continued to stay in the area and were assimilated and picked up the language; they were differentiated only by their color. One hundred slaves remained in Halfa working as domestic servants without compulsion by their masters.

The inhabitants of Khartoum fled and were scattered in all directions; then they started to return and their slaves followed.[50] The slaves found a refuge in the cities from the harsh work in agriculture. The number of slaves in Omdurman was estimated at 9,000–10,000, with a similar number in the suburbs of the city. The report added that the current number of domestic servants in Omdurman was between 3,000 and 4,000; the number in Khartoum was estimated to be 3,000 and in the suburbs 2,000. Mr. Willis estimated that of the 18,000 slaves thought to be in Khartoum province, only 6,000 remained. Table 5.2 shows Willis's estimates for some of the towns in the Geziera area.

Documents other than the Willis Report show the number of inhabitants of Khartoum estimated at 100,000 in 1900 and slaves at 25,000. In 1926, the estimate was 250,000 inhabitants and 6,000 slaves. In its early days, the administration returned 1,000 slaves to their homelands. Twenty percent of students in schools were children of ex-slaves. Robert Baum stated, "The Condominium absorbed many former slaves into its military and police forces; their children were some of the first students at the new government schools and eventually found their way into the civil service."[51]

The Willis Report stirred a controversy around the statistics from Kurdufan in a paragraph that questioned the estimate of the number of slaves in that province at 25,000 compared to 40,000 in 1900. Willis thought that both figures were wrong, as the inhabitants in the area confirmed that the number of slaves did not change, although it might have increased through reproduction. However, the governor of Kurdufan insisted on the accuracy of his estimates and prepared a memorandum dated November 27, 1926 (C.S. 60/2/8) in response to the civil secretary's memorandum regarding the figures questioned by Mr. Willis. He followed with another memorandum on January 15, 1927, confirming his and his commissioner's insistence on the estimates with some reservations regarding the 40,000 figure in 1900. He said that there were no documents to prove that figure and added that he had depended on the percentage of the falling numbers of slaves as estimated by district commissioners since 1900. The commissioner of western Kurdufan estimated it to be at 23 percent; the commissioner of the Baqara region gave an estimate of 14 percent. The commissioner of northern Darfur reported a 40 percent increase caused by reproduction and newly enslaved individuals. The governor explained his estimates by taking the average of the commissioners' estimates, which was 18 percent. Applying that estimate meant that if the number of slaves in the province was 25,000 in 1926, the number in 1900 would have been 30,487. The mathematical formula adopted by the Kurdufan governor was not of much help for an accurate gathering or computing of the number of slaves according to percentages for calculating subtractions or additions due to death and birth statistics. However, his and the commissioners' efforts must be commended, as Kurdufan was one of the largest depots of the slave trade, not only in the Nuba Mountains, but also for those sent from Darfur and the south who either stayed or crossed toward the central and northern areas. The report went beyond statistics to record a sociological study of slavery as a component of the life of Kurdufan's society, and a contrast between the life of slaves in urban environments, sedentary villages, and rural areas. The governor gave detailed examples of the method he and the commissioners used to arrive at the results, achieved through accurate computation or by estimates and approximation:

- Al-Obayyid area: The number of inhabitants was 72,000, the number of slaves 3,000, that is, 1 slave per 24 inhabitants. Many slaves were not registered.
- Umrawaba area: Inhabitants numbered 114,000, slaves 2,000–2500, that is, 1 slave per 38 inhabitants.

- Al-Nihoud and al-Idhaiyya areas: 110,000 inhabitants, 5,000 slaves, that is, 1 slave per 22 inhabitants.
- Abuzabad and Mujlad areas: 66,000 inhabitants, 3,641 slaves, that is, 1 slave per 20 inhabitants.
- Bara and Sodari areas: 171,000 inhabitants, 22,416 slaves, that is, 1 slave per 7 inhabitants.

One of the commissioners said that his records were not accurate due to the varying numbers of slaves in the *umodiyyas* of Jawam`ah, Wad Hamid, and Bara. He depended on the estimates arrived at by comparison to the areas above. The same was done with estimates from Kababeesh, Kawahla, Hawaweer, Majaneen, and Habbaniyya. The commissioner added that he did not add those who were known among inhabitants as *`abeed*;[52] had he done that the number of slaves would have jumped to more than half the inhabitants of those areas. He added that Sir Ali al-Tome told him that he considered half the Kababeesh to be of slave origins.[53]

The final registered and estimated numbers showed that the total number of inhabitants of Kurdufan province was 533,000; the number of slaves was 36,807, that is, 1 slave per 11 inhabitants. The governor explained that when he received that total, he considered the figures received from all areas to be accurate, except for the Bara and Sodari areas, which estimated the number of slaves at 22,416. He brought that number down to 12,000 to bring the final count to 25,000, which was still an astonishingly high figure, as it indicated that 1 in 21 persons was in the status of domestic servant. The governor said that he put in a great effort to work with the figures he had. He said his estimate might have been high to some extent, despite the fact that the presence of 21 slaves in a village of 141 inhabitants was not unusual.

The governor ended his memorandum by rebutting Willis's presumption that ending the miserable state of slaves in Kurdufan would take an action akin to a social revolution. He said the problem did not need a social revolution. He thought that slaves would gradually break free as incentives to spread awareness of their status and their rights increased.

The White Nile province, which was ignored by Willis, had an important position in slave ownership and trading. It was an intersection for caravans from the south heading north and from the west going east, and sometimes from the Ethiopian Plateau to the Angsana Mountains. The slave trade flourished in the southern part of the province through smuggling and hiding slaves in valley enclaves,

caves, and forests. In March of 1929, the authorities discovered five hundred slaves from the Berta of Ethiopia in the Southern District. A trial was held and a judgment passed against hundreds of slave traders from different parts of the province. In the memorandum issued on March 15, 1926 (C.S. 60/7/20), the White Nile governor indicated that in order to ensure registration of the newly enslaved, he decided to register all blacks who were descendants of slaves. According to this policy, out of the 20,000–30,000 slaves registered, about 5,000–6,000 were descendants of slaves.

Was the Condominium administration any closer to discovering the size of slavery in the Sudan? That number remains a mystery; despite the appeal of the figures, the total of the numbers in the administration's documents do not solve the mystery. The figure in the registers that are nowhere to be found to this day.

A legitimate question may be: What kind of technical and political elements were the British administration in the West Indies acting on that allowed it to register slaves in reliable credible documents that are a source for studies now and then, but were lacking in the Sudan at the advent of the twentieth century? The oversimplified and weak justifications for the lack of records ignores that slave traders, owners, ship captains, middlemen, and agents at seaports were experienced in keeping their books of property, expenditures, and income.

Verification of Terms

Slave—Serf

The language of the Condominium documents was direct and precise, simple English, the English that teachers advise students in high schools to use before their Cambridge exams. The teacher may be graceful enough to explain the different syntax in Arabic and English sentences, in addition to teaching letter writing and "Common English Idioms and Errors." Some of the administrators published well-written articles in the periodical Sudan Notes and Records that used rich vocabulary and dealt well with terms according to each writer's discipline.

In some documents, there was confusion between the words "serf" and "slave." The confusion would not have called attention to itself if it were due to a linguistic error or daily usage. It was a deliberate confusion intentionally done by Governor General Maffey[54] during his talks on the Nile steamer Dal with the civil secretary and the governor of the White Nile province. In January of 1927, the governor

general requested replacing slave with serf to indicate that "so-called slaves" meant slaves who had been living with their masters for years and were in a position to petition for freedom, if they were made to serve against the law. He recommended that the term be used to indicate that distinction in all memoranda and correspondence.

That was an arbitrary definition sociologically and historically. Linguistically and logically it was closer to tautology. It may be soothsaying to accuse Mr. Maffey of ignorance of the difference between the meaning of serf and slave as they appear in a dictionary or their original meanings as given in an encyclopedia. It might have been just a continuation by Mr. Maffey, of the administration's custom of avoiding the term slave, which was repulsive to the British public opinion.

A slave is chattel; he, his personal property, his wife and children are the property of his owner. He does not possess any part of what he produces and does not get paid for his service, other than food to keep him on his feet. The owner may sell, buy, or rent him or her to others.

A serf is free and is not owned; he may not be bought or sold. He has a right to his property, wife, children, and shelter. The land on which he serves may be sold and bought by another; however, the new landowner does not own him. A serf serves according to a written or verbal contract with the landowner and he may leave only with the permission of the owner. The landowner may demand a certain portion of the product, and the serf takes the rest. The landowner may assign the serf a certain piece of land to cultivate for his own benefit in consideration for serving the rest of the land. Or the owner may demand a monetary or in-kind tax for allowing the serf to use the land. Different societies have different types of serfdom contracts concluded according to climate, geography, and type of products and animals on the land. It is also affected by the economic activity of the local or external exchange of products and the social and historical roots of serfdom. It could have been the result of the dwindling of slavery relations, as was the case in Rome, or due to invasion, as was the case in Sparta after the Dorian invasion. The invaders took the land and divided it between the invaders who made the locals work the land and deliver certain amounts of cereal, fruits, and wine and live on what was left. The owners were prohibited by law from agricultural work, as it was, first, considered demeaning, and second, expected that they would be devoted to military tasks and war. The law also prohibited the sale of land; it should be inherited by family members. Historically, serfdom was not practiced by societies as an

independent or a fully integrated system; it existed before, during, and after slavery. It was part of the feudal system and its remnants. It occupied a place with similar systems that preceded capitalism in some capitalist societies.

This is not to say that the Sudan of the twentieth century was free of serfdom or its overlap with slavery relations. It is to preclude and "condemn" the selective definition concocted by the governor general. Change from slavery into serfdom or formation of serfdom independently from slavery is a social change, not an administrative action. It is not a gradual career structure devised in a secular or religious institution. It is an interaction of many direct and indirect factors. The most important factors were the emergence of waged labor; the recruitment of slaves into the army, as well as their discharge; the prohibition of the slave trade; the registration of slaves; the pressure mounted by abolitionists; the hidden official policy of the Condominium administration regarding emancipation and granting freedom papers; the opening of the doors of courts for slaves to sue their masters; the development of living areas, known as *radeef* and *daim*, where slaves could congregate in one place; the expansion of the commercial exchange of money for products; and the variety of exports and imports. All these were factors that forced owners to relinquish [their right to own them] so as to keep the slaves as workers. They were content with giving yesterday's slave and today's serf a certain right in the harvest or the livestock or accepting a certain payment from him if he worked for someone else or worked for the master on certain days of the week or the season. He may contract his marriage, name his children, and own a place to shelter them. He may cohabit with a female slave and have children and take her and the children wherever he might make a living, as long as he paid the master an agreed-upon amount of money.[55] He owned his personal property and the tools of his trade, and his widow and children may inherit that property. In some rare cases, the owners felt that keeping a slave cost more than what he produced. All the above and other changes were like a *senddah,*[56] a stopover in the long journey toward the abolition of slavery and enslavement relations in the Sudan. In that same Sudan, some slaves fled slavery to waged labor; others took the bad option of staying with their masters. In today's Sudan, not far from Khartoum, there exist cases of groups of free descendants of yesterday's slaves. The land owned by eight free families throughout the Turkiyya and Mahdiyya is now cultivated by those free descendants, who take all the revenue and share nothing with the grandchildren of the owners, not even the alms from the harvest.

During the 1928 slave registration campaign in Darfur, the district commissioner of the Baqara region wrote that 6,000 of the offspring of concubines decided to stay with the tribe and did not respond to the temptation of the freedom paper. It was not unusual for some of them to lose purpose and enthusiasm and become content with and accustomed to slavery. But those were unique cases; the majority, or the wise ones no doubt, had thought about and considered their future, including practicing their rights without freedom papers. They might have wanted to avoid the stigma of being equated with those who got their freedom on paper, or they saw an opportunity to get their rights to inheritance and through time a chance to a social status through intermarriage or ownership by long occupancy. It could very well be the brilliant idea of the tribe's elders, who fathered the concubines' children. They would be setting their own children free.

Let us go back to the verification of terms. The commissioner of the Baqara region described the ethnic groups of the Baqara, in a letter dated March 4, 1929, as nomads who moved with their livestock to find rich grasslands and water. They left their slaves to tend agricultural land. The slaves became sedentary and had freedom to live independently during the absence of masters. A slave would own his home and was a guardian of his wife and children. He worked five days on his own land and two days on the master's land. That was a case of overlap between slavery and serfdom, which carried a seed for slavery's disintegration and the development of serfdom, and probably sharecropping or emancipation.

The governor of the White Nile province, who participated in the talks aboard the steamer Dal, stated in his memorandum of March 1929, to the civil secretary, that the status of a serf in agriculture is worse than that in pasturing because the farmers were poor and gave the slave just enough for his subsistence, but the livestock owners were rich and would allow the slave to take from the meat and by-products such as milk and butter.

The commissioner tried to obey the wish of his superior, the governor general, and use the term serf, but the innate behavior prevailed over the acquired and the terms slave and master surfaced again. What he said about slavery and serfdom in pasturing was confirmed with the behavior of livestock owners in Kurdufan and Darfur, where they gave the cattle herders a certain number of kids according to the type of animal, whether cows, sheep, goats, or camels and whether the kid was male or female.

The League of Nations and International Journalism

The Condominium administration was under pressure after the First World War from two institutions; the first one, the abolition societies in Britain, were present and effective before and during the war. The second was the League of Nations, which was created after the war when the atmosphere was saturated with slogans of peace and liberty. Apparently the administration was not ready for the pressure, which took it by surprise. Its policy was settled on the gradual eradication of slavery and the wait for its slow death. The administration was shocked to the core by the high voltage pressure from centers of the international campaign.

The League of Nations resolved to put the issue of slavery on the agenda. The secretary general requested that member states provide the assembly with information on the issue.[57] The bureaucracy of the administration put this resolution in a file numbered C.S. 60–1–3; no other documents that indicate a response to the resolution were found in that file.

In the same file was a letter from the Sudan Office in London, dated July 6, 1925, about the following questions posed from a correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* who wanted to write an article about slavery in the Sudan:

- What is the status of the slaves emancipated after the reoccupation?
- What are the steps being taken to implement the law regarding emancipated slaves to prevent a setback that may return them to slavery?
- What is the punishment for owning slaves?
- What is the system followed to prevent slave trading or ownership?
- Is the government of the Sudan ready to receive the Fact Finding Commission suggested by Mr. Diggle?

A short memo indicated that the London Office had answered the questions, but the text of the answers was not included.

Two weeks later Mr. Lyall, the legal secretary, received a telegram from McMichael in London stating that the League of Nations had sent Diggle's memorandum to the governor general, who was in London, and asked for his comments. The governor general sent a comprehensive response on the issue and attached the 6 May Memorandum on

slavery. He renewed his commitment that the issue would receive his utmost attention upon his return to the Sudan. He would take all politically feasible steps for total eradication of all forms of slavery in the Sudan.[58]

The language "total eradication of slavery" was meant for international public opinion. "Natural slow death" remained the guiding theory of domestic policy. International public opinion seemed to have taken the governor general's bait since the *Yorkshire Evening Post* was a spokesperson for it.[59]

MEMORANDUM OF SECTARIAN NOTABLES

The institution of enslavers did not hide its grudges for long; it expressed them in various ways. Some repressed their anger and craftily circumvented the problem. They claimed concubines as wives to keep them and their children in slavery; they accused male slaves of theft. They threatened to take away children, especially from mothers, and they used the bias of *Shari`a* courts in favor of the masters, before the limitations on *Shari`a* courts' authorities regarding slavery.

Some voiced their opposition by protesting and threatening "to take positive steps." Slave owners in Abu Hamad sent a telegram to the governor of the province saying that their slaves left the *sawaqi* and fled to the *markaz;* they asked for the slaves to be returned or the owners be exempted from paying taxes.[60] The government granted their request and ceased issuing freedom papers for three months.

Some used their social and spiritual status and knowledge of the art of political maneuvering to create a political and legal platform so that the rest of the owners would not be embarrassed or afraid to join in defending the legitimacy of their interest without fear of confrontation with the law.

Sayyid `Ali al-Mirghani, Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi, and `Abdel Rahman al-Mahdi presented the director of intelligence with a letter dated March 6, 1925, stating that it was their duty "to point out to you our opinion on the subject of slavery in the Sudan with the hope of drawing the attention of the government to it."[61] The director of intelligence commented on the letter from the three notables; he indicated that as far as he knew, the letter was the result of extensive negotiations among the three of them. He said the sheer fact that those three agreed on any issue made the letter worthy of attention.[62]

The letter writers assured him that they "cannot criticize a matter which the whole civilized world has combined to stop and is one of

the most important matters under the consideration of international law."[63] But,

- Slavery in the Sudan is in no way related to what the world came to know it.
- The Sudanese agricultural workers are really partners of the landowners; they enjoy many privileges and rights that set them apart as a class.
- Sudanese people treat servants as members of their families as they need their work.
- The shortage of labor made the government, companies, and individuals seek every working man; success of their schemes depend on the labor of the Sudanese.
- The freed Sudanese took the freedom paper to be a license to laziness and to avoid any responsibility; they took up prostitution and drinking.

Arguments flowed calmly, respectfully, and composedly to a crescendo. The notables' letter continued,

> Since these Sudanese are not really slaves in the sense understood by international law, there is no need to give freedom papers to them than to the landowners for whom they work. But it is in the best interest of all those concerned that the Sudanese should remain on the land and work, and if the policy of encouraging them to leave the land to loaf in the towns is maintained, nothing but ill can ensue.
>
> We hope that the Government would take this matter into earnest consideration and will issue its orders to all officials not to issue any freedom certificates unless the Sudanese can prove ill-treatment.[64]

The letter sank low when it claimed that those held in bondage were not slaves and did not need freedom papers any more than the landowners. Then what was their identity? Are they partners of landowners who have rights and privileges? They quoted ill-treatment as a reason to give freedom papers; one would think that ill-treatment of a party to a contract should call for dissolution of the contractual relationship or amendment of the contract. If they were truly free, why should they be given a freedom paper? If it was in the interest of the owners and the government and companies that the slaves keep working, then that same interest should call for changing the slavery relationship into waged labor or serfdom. What logic or standard allowed

the writers to admit ownership of the land and deny ownership of the slaves?

The letter had that purely Sudanese smell when it stated, "Since these Sudanese are not really slaves in the sense understood by international law." Oh yes, even slavery in the Sudan is not really slavery. It might have been understood and even closer to an accurate statement if it was said that slavery or any other human social behavior had exceptional Sudanese traits that differentiated it from the same behavior in another nation. But it is that arrogance of the Sudanese who are delusional descendants of Muslim Arabs who think they are the chosen ones even within the best people in humankind. If in the last day they were asked about their sins and wrongdoings, they would start by saying, "Well, actually . . . " The Sudanese sins and wrongdoings are not really sins and wrongdoings in the sense understood by others and may not be classified under the meaning ascertained in the Holy Book and *sunna* as committed by other Muslims.

The problem of reconciling slavery and *Shari`a* norms on slavery and enslavement was a dilemma that exhausted both sides of the judiciary [common law and *Shari`a*] during the Condominium administration.

The administration returned to its reluctant, anxious policy after receiving the notables' letter. The civil secretary wrote to the legal secretary stating his opinion that it was advisable to move cautiously on the matter of slavery. It would be premature to declare everyone free; such a declaration would cause much discontent and exasperation. He continued that as far as he knew, the governor of the Nuba Mountains was apprehensive about the effect of such a declaration on the Arabs in his province. He recommended that the Circular Memorandum that was about to be issued be amended, issued in English, and kept confidential.

The fast response of the civil secretary cast a shadow of doubt and speculation that there was a previous agreement between him and the three notables about protecting the interests of slave owners, expressed by them as an interest in the country, its people, and economy, and in finding a solution for the problem of slaves leaving agricultural activities. They were thinking alike. The daily reports of Khartoum noted the departure of the slaves to waged work in construction and irrigation schemes in al-Gaili and other places. Since the intelligence director knew about the letter, why didn't he urge or order the three notables not to write it because it might embarrass the administration or be a source of nuisance for it? Would the notables have written the letter if they were not sure whether it would be welcomed?

The top authority in the administration, the governor general, was looking for an excuse to stop or delay a public circular memorandum to be issued in Arabic and English. Such a document had been debated since 1919. The circular was supposed to declare everybody born on or after January 1, 1898, free and that every slave had the right to get a freedom paper.

Had the 1924 revolution injected some courage in Sudanese society? Slim chance that it did. A gloomy, dark mood dampened political, social, and cultural life after the bloody defeat of the revolution. Or was it in the mutual interest of the administration and the notables that the slaves remain on the land and taxes be paid; consequently, there would be discipline, organization, and work? The letter might have been an echo of the treacherous rumors, as the intelligence reports put it, that the battalions of slaves would be disbanded and all would be sold in an open auction, coupled with another rumor that no more freedom papers would be issued due to the failure of the emancipation policy.

Legal Mechanisms of Eradication of Slavery

The administration faced a predicament in adapting civil law and *Shari`a* mechanisms to implement its general policy of the eradication of slavery and enslavement relations to attain its gradual natural death. Was there anyone who could feel the heat more than the legal secretary and the grand *qadi*? The grand *qadi* sent a memo dated February 14, 1925, to the legal secretary saying that slavery was entrenched in the country, and if the government wanted to eradicate slavery, it would be useful to go slowly about it. "This was our experience in the past. We issued the legal Circular number 7 that did not recognize slavery and allowed a slave to inherit and be inherited whereas in *shari`a* slavery a slave could do neither."

As for the legal secretary, the heat was intense; he exchanged messages, on March 30 and April 4, with the civil secretary about the grand *qadi*'s message and the relationship between civil and *Shari`a* courts. The legal secretary responded by stating that his main difficulty was how passage of time would end slavery without the government taking any practical effective steps toward that end.[65]

The grand *qadi* was there from the start of this predicament; in his Circular No. 2 he directed the courts to aspire for excellence, attend to details in hearing cases, and issue judgments after the necessary investigation of disputes between masters and female slaves, regarding their relationship and the children in that relationship.

He ordered courts to be guided by the following regulations: first, any man claiming that his slave was actually his wife should present evidence of her manumission and that the marriage was concluded according to *Shari`a* rules. Further, he had to prove the agreed-upon *sidag*,[66] both its paid and deferred parts. If the court found in the plaintiff's favor, it should order him to treat her well and estimate the cost of her maintenance according to *Shari`a*. Second: In the case of a man who claimed custody of a child because the slave was disobedient, the court was to make the necessary investigation of the case. If the slave refused to return, the court should give custody to the father.[67]The first paragraph of the circular clearly protected the woman, but the second paragraph left her without a solution; she had to choose between slavery to keep her child and losing the child to gain her freedom.

The destiny of the woman would be clarified later by looking into the intrinsic and extrinsic meaning of the text. However, the circular was a preliminary step toward a fundamental change in the relationship between the civil and *Shari`a* courts.

The legal secretary issued a confidential memorandum in 1905 in which he stated,

> The Mohammedan Law Courts have orders that slaves are not to be included by them in the valuation or division of a deceased man's estate.
>
> If on the death of their master slaves prefer to continue serving in the family and any question arises as to which of the heirs they are to go to, the matter should be settled by the master or an inspector, and should under no circumstances be referred to the Kadis.[68]

The Intelligence Department evaluated the above circular in its report as a strict order to the *Shari`a* courts not to bring slaves into the estate of a deceased; therefore, matters concerning slaves were no longer within the jurisdiction of *Shari`a* courts. Intelligence went a bit too far; the *Shari`a* courts kept, or were allowed by the government to keep, jurisdiction over many issues concerning slaves, even when it denied them jurisdiction over issues of enslavement and emancipation. Many men occupied the grand *qadi*'s position; however, none of their circulars and memoranda ever mentioned the religion of the slaves, whether they were Muslims or not, nor was there any mention of a person emancipating a slave because of the latter's Islam.

The issuance of the 1905 memorandum and the circulars from the grand *qadi* or the *Shari`a* High Court, served as a cover for the

policies, laws, and decisions of the administration regarding slavery. On March 19, 1908, a detailed judicial circular was issued addressing several issues, among which included, "Property of Those Enslaved Prior to This Administration." It was complimentary to and a continuation of the circular prohibiting the inclusion of slaves as property of the owner mentioned above. The circular stipulated that if a slave died and left property, which was a rare case, and the master petitioned for a share in the property, there were three possibilities and options. First, the governor of the province was to look into the matter and decide whether the master had a right in the property. His decision, positive or negative, should not be issued in any legal declaration (*I`alam shara`ai*). Second, if the governor declined the master's petition, the property was to be declared unclaimed by heirs. Third, if the deceased had heirs, the *Shari`a* court should distribute shares according to *Shari`a* rules. Whatever was left afterward should be delivered to the governor to decide on the right of the master.

Along the lines of this issue, more regulations were issued in 1907. The regulations defined which *Shari`a* courts' jurisdictions were subject to civil courts or the commissioner or the governor. In the cases of soldiers taking female slaves from masters or anyone else, Article 2 of Memorandum 22 stipulated,[69]

> All cases in which it is alleged that a soldier has taken away a girl from any person, or in which a soldier complains that his sister or relative is the slave of someone, will be sent by the commanding officer in his battalion to the Governor. The Governor, or an inspector appointed by him, will hear the case personally. The case itself will not be referred to the Kadi, but if the question of the validity or non-validity of a marriage arises in the case, that question should be referred to the Kadi, and his decision as to the marriage, subject to the rights of appeal to the Grand Kadi, will be accepted as final.

The above regulation was followed by more regulations in the Confidential Circular Memorandum No. 33,[70] "Regulations as to Sudanese Servants" regarding custody and guardianship of children, Article 11 of which stated,

> The right to their custody is to be given first to their parents or other natural guardians but in the event of their being without such they are not to be taken out of the custody of their de facto guardians except for the same reasons that natural guardians would be deprived of their custody, viz. that the children are ill-treated or the guardians are unfitted for their post.

Article 12 governed the status of women,

> As regards women difficult questions sometimes arise by reason of Moslem Law. The Mohammedan Law Courts will follow the Egyptian practice and administer the law of marriage and guardianship on the footing that the status of slavery does not exist and if there is necessity will apply to the administrative authority for the issue of freedom papers in order to render their decision formally correct.
>
> As in some parts of the country it appears to be a practice to make marriage with Sudanese women a pretext for their enslavement; such cases should be carefully watched, but the decision as to whether any particular marriage is valid or not is for the religious court to say, and in any case it may be remembered that if a woman is a wife she must under Moslem Law be a free woman.

The circles of this predicament are getting tighter and more unbreakable. *Shari`a* courts were called upon to take jurisdiction over marriage and guardianship because slavery did not exist, but when slavery refused to go away and screamed that it was there, a *Shari`a* court should apply to the administrative authorities to issue a freedom paper in order to legitimize its decision and in the process stifle slavery, history, and reality.

What an overwhelming argument and a proficient administrative maneuver! But it was no match to the ability of the grand *qadi*. He could settle the issue on the basis of the intrinsic meaning of the text. He continued to tell the legal secretary, as in his message mentioned above, "*Shari`a* courts would not allow the master of a female slave, who is carrying a freedom paper any leeway to own her." He continued to justify his attitude toward the gradual process. Trying to persuade the legal secretary not to issue a declaration that every person born since September 1898 was free. He said, "We can build most of our work on account that a human being is free in all his actions and behavior." He made that statement as if human freedom was a matter still being researched or debated among Muslim philosophers, or it was an argument in the teachings of churches that condoned slaves by saying they were free and equal to their masters before God.

The grand *qadi* continued to narrate some examples from court cases where a judgment of freedom was prejudicial. He gave the example of a master who claimed paternity of his concubine's children; the woman admitted that he was the master but denied his paternity of the children. In this case, under *Shari`a* norms, the court would take the master's word and the children would become free,

and the woman would become free upon her master's death; no one else could claim her. Under civil law, the master's claim would not be accepted unless he produced evidence and documentation to prove emancipation and marriage and that the children were born in wedlock. The man who had no such evidence might be forced to lie; if the court accepted his lie people would be encouraged to lie. If the court refused his claim, the children would be lost and become bastard with no lineage, which would corrupt the society.

Another example he gave was of a female slave who consented to her master marrying her to another man. The latter consummated the marriage and they had children. She then quarreled with the man and got a freedom paper; her marriage would then be voided despite its validity under *Shari`a*. Say she married another man. The second marriage would not be valid under *Shari`a,* and would be repulsive to society. "It would be grave for the society to think that the government or *Shari`a* norms allow an illegitimate marriage and hinder a legitimate one."

The grand *qadi* concluded his message stating that in order to avoid such dangerous results, practical eradication of slavery and its effects should be done within what was possible in the current circumstances. He included a semi-warning in the second paragraph of his message when he said, "I know people who find it painful that the government is getting between them and their slaves; issuing a circular [declaring freedom of slaves] will increase and multiply that pain and spread it around."

The legal secretary commented, in one of the messages exchanged with the civil secretary, that if the Arabs of the Sudan followed the ethical and legal norms that their Prophet proclaimed, a lot would have been said to support the grand *qadi,* but regrettably they did not. The legal secretary did not ask himself whether colonizing a whole nation with its slaves and masters was according to what Jesus Christ proclaimed. After making his critical observation on the grand *qadi*'s message, he reached the conclusion that disputes over child custody in the country were not expressions of merciful and loving concern, but competitions over who should appropriate the male's work or females *mahr* (dowry). He finished his response with a bold statement, more bold than the government's, when he said that he was of opinion that the administration should invade family relations as it did with inheritance issues before. A public declaration should be made that both civil and *Shari`a* courts should presume that parties to any case were free and had always been free, at least since

September 1898. He said he could foresee a state of disgruntlement, but they should confront it.[71]

The exchanged memos and messages during the period between 1919 and 1925 resulted in *Shari`a* Circular No. 28, dated February 16, 1927. Three articles in that circular, 9, 10. and 11, dealt with the dilemma of slavery in a textual form that reconciled the *Shari`a* and civil norms. It started by stating that "the following rules are to be followed by *Shari`a* courts. All previous rules on the matter are hereby repealed. In cases of contradiction with any other law, this circular prevails." The rules dictated the following:

- The freedom papers issued by the administrative authorities do not affect a marriage concluded before such papers. However, a woman with such papers should be considered free and accorded all the rights of a free woman before a *Shari`a* court.
- *Shari`a* courts or court officers (*madhuns*) shall not conclude a marriage contract between a woman and her master, unless she is consenting, present in person or through her agent.
- A court shall not entertain a claim of marriage by an owner to his enslaved woman except when the marriage is evidenced with proper legal documents.

Another ten years passed, 1927–1936, and the administration continued its adaptation of *Shari`a* and civil norms, trying to maneuver its policy to achieve the slow death of slavery. Despite the achieved success of this adaptation, the predicament persisted and was criticized by people such as the legal secretary, the governor of the Blue Nile province, and the director of intelligence. They insisted on a public memorandum in English and Arabic that made a frank and clear declaration of the government's policy that all people born since September 1898 were free.

The new idea of issuing a comprehensive memorandum came up. It would include all the *Shari`a* circulars that dealt with the status of the enslaved. The legal secretary sent, on February 27, 1936, a draft memo and an explanatory note from the grand *qadi* to the civil secretary for his comments. In his cover letter, he made seven points that included some observations. In paragraphs two, three, and four, he pointed to the administrative procedural efforts to surround and overrule *Shari`a* courts' judgments concerning slaves. He added that such maneuvers happened, for example, in the case of a woman sued by her husband for obedience. She claimed that she was someone else's slave. The grand *qadi* told the legal secretary that such an

admission was conclusive. The legal secretary overcame this problem by asking the commissioner to issue a decision that the woman was not a slave. In paragraphs five, six, and seven he renewed his insistence on declaring all people born since 1898 free, and his discontent with the justifications given for the government's backing off from issuing a memorandum to that effect. He added that he had talked to the grand *qadi* enforcing that the government would not allow anyone born since 1898 to be enslaved. The circular refrained from mentioning that point, but Article 7 gave a suitable assurance as it provided that all people were free in many cases. Article 9 asserted that a decisive slavery issue should be referred to the grand *qadi.* Then he summarized the adaptation and circumvention issues by stating that the grand *qadi* indicated that this circular was a big movement forward from the current situation. On his part, the legal secretary thought it was the best they could achieve, unless they were ready to issue a declaration to restrict *Shari`a* courts in the spirit of paragraph 5 of his message.

The High *Shari`a* Court issued, with the consent of the civil secretary, Circular No. 46, on April 25, 1936, under the grand *qadi*'s signature. It consisted of 11 articles that summarized previous circulars, with some clarity in the text and meaning. For example, Article 3 expanded the mandate of proof of marriage of a master to a female slave to include his sons, grandsons, or any men who were his ex-slaves or his relatives. Any claim by any of those men became subject to the conditions that the woman be present and willing and conclude the contract herself. Also Article 8 stipulated that *Shari`a* rules governing personal status that applied to free persons should equally apply to slaves. Article 9 directed that all judges who received cases not included in Article 8 and in which one of the parties was an ex-slave should refer the matter to the grand *qadi* before passing his judgment. The gist of this judicial circular was included in the civil secretary's Memorandum issued on May 8, 1936, in which he presented the government's policy on slavery.

Without attacking any unknown efforts or speculating on people's beliefs, one would ask, why were the judges and scholars silent and not practicing *ijtihad*?[72]

Islam gave priority to all means that gave slaves ways to be free. It made the emancipation of slaves a way to pay for crimes or misdeeds and as a means to cleanse oneself from the stain of slavery. It made a slave's conversion to Islam a mandate for the master to grant freedom to that slave. Islam allocated funds in *bait almal* to pay *fidya* for the manumission of slaves. It is true that Islam did not immediately

uproot slavery under the social conditions existing at that time of history; however, it clearly regulated slavery to reach its eradication. The masters made an ideological cover of those regulations as they took half of the norms to defend their interests and dropped the half that compelled them to emancipate slaves as expiation (*kaffarah).*

What kept them from taking the initiative, as one grand *qadi* stated in a letter to Cromer, was that slavery would be eradicated, gradually, within the seven years they asked for. Another *qadi* advised that it was better to proceed slowly to end slavery in line with what was possible in the existing circumstances. The notables admitted that they were not criticizing a matter that the whole world had united to end. All statements point to the disintegration of slavery relations and its near extinction. Was it logical or sensible or serving public interest to freeze Islamic jurisprudence and twist its arm to go along with the adaptation of rules to keep slavery and hang on to its remnants for the sake of written regulations? They had more than one option; they could do what pleased Allah, or go with the conscience of the judge and the ruler. Or take the option of what pleased Allah, the conscience of the judge, and the interest of the poor, oppressed people, even if it displeased the ruler. The judges missed a chance to pioneer Islamic rules as their predecessor thinkers had done.

RENTING OUT SLAVES AND FEMALE SLAVES PAYING MASTERS[73]

Renting out slaves to work for others and taking all the proceeds was not a Sudanese invention; it was the practice of all enslaving societies. Yet the Condominium administration treated it as a terrible, obscene surprise, especially slave women working as prostitutes and paying a certain sum to their owners. The administration was furious at the sums paid by the women rather than at prostitution as a social vice, even though it is the oldest profession in history. Prostitution should be stopped or eradicated by social reform, raising awareness of ethics and morals, family and religious principles, and law. There were administrators who were aware of this hateful practice, such as Slatin who wrote,

> In Mesallamia, which is a large town situated between the Blue and White Niles, and a considerable trade centre, I found an immense collection of young women, the property of the wealthiest and most respected merchants, who had procured them and sold them for immoral purposes, at high prices.[74]

It is also possible that some of those administrators had read what Krump wrote about the same practice in Funj's Sinnar.

The civil secretary issued a strict directive on April 14, 1924, stating that the widespread practice of renting out slaves to others and taking all or part of their earning must be strongly condemned, as it was a crime. Freedom papers should be issued to all slaves who were subjected to this practice without them applying for the papers. The matter intensified and the administration moved from directives to issuing a circular memorandum by the acting legal secretary on April 24, 1926. The memorandum clearly stipulated that it had come to the government's knowledge that some people employed the practice of hiring slaves and paying their wages to others who claimed to be their masters. That was not only a crime under section 313 of the penal code, but payment of wages in that way conflicted with the servant's right to compensation; accordingly, the servant might seek compensation from his or her employer, regardless of the claim that he paid the master of the servant. The Willis Report noted the unique status of slaves in the Blue Nile province. Masters renting out their slaves to others and collecting compensation was a widespread practice. That behavior motivated issuance of a circular memorandum and a judicial circular. The warning in the circular memorandum addressed government officials who were utilizing that practice. They were warned that their punishment would be severe, and they would also be disciplined under the Employees Code of Conduct.

The practice was taking root in Kurdufan province; letters were exchanged between the civil secretary, the governor, and the commissioners, trying to stop the masters from taking the proceeds of renting out their female slaves for domestic work and prostitution. The administrative and legal measures, such as awarding freedom papers to every slave woman hired as a prostitute, in a way that would encourage all slaves to get them, failed to stop the practice. The governor suggested supporting the legal and administrative procedure with a shaming tactic. He suggested publicizing the names of those who were benefiting from the practice. They were notables and merchants who were keen on keeping their good reputations. Publication of their names would put political, social, and psychological pressure on them. The province administration prepared a list of about 30 names and published them in al-Obayyid and other cities.

In his noble fury, Captain Diggle noted in his memorandum that he had heard about how emancipated slave women ended up as prostitutes. But he said in his personal experience those women would remain prostitutes as long as their masters were living off their

earnings from prostitution. In his opinion, such a practice was a crime, and British law provided a harsh punishment for it. He added that had those women been free, they would have at least been able to keep the proceeds of their prostitution.

MANPOWER AND LABOR MARKETS

The administration embarked on the task of providing manpower for building infrastructure, factories, and public service utilities. They thought of bringing in workers from Egypt, Yemen, India, and even black Americans. Perhaps they were following in the Turkish footsteps of providing their army with various skills and importing those skills whenever needed. The administration was, of course, familiar with Britain's technique of transferring skillful laborers across its colonies. In the end, they settled for skilled labor from Egypt and the Sudanese who were starting their first turn in the paid labor market. The administration's documents show how they handled that task.

The 1903 Annual Report summarized the labor experience as follows,

> In making the canal at Fadlab this year, some 100 Egyptians and 700 natives were employed at one time. The latter did about half the work per day of the former but their work was cheaper. They were quite ready to take on piece-work at 1 piastre per metre cube, when once they understood the system and at this they made about PT. 3½ a day on the average, and some gangs up to PT. 4½. Labour, both native and Egyptian, is entirely a personal matter with the employer. Though at first suspicious, when once they know the man with whom they are dealing and see that the money is all right, and that they are fairly treated, they will come in numbers.[75]

There was an assumption that the nomads of eastern Sudan were not suitable for work in constructing the Berber Sawakin Railway. The 1903 Report revealed,

> Until recently it was thought quite impossible to get the nomad Arabs to work. It had been intended, in default of an adequate supply of Egyptian fellahin, to import Indian coolies. Arrangements, having this object in view were made with the Government of India. It was, however, ascertained that a few Bedouins had been employed in some recent mining operations, and that they had given satisfaction.[76]

Colonel Macauley reported, "They are working more steadily than I expected, but their work is not good as regards quantity, and their

rate of pay is very high. They have given very little trouble so far, and they are anxious to come. There are always about three applicants, for one vacancy." This experience refuted the allegation in the report that "the Sudanese are not industrious"[77] and the justification of such statement by saying that "their wants are few and simple. They scarcely need any clothing. Their houses need not be built to keep out cold. They only require a small amount of fuel for cooking purposes. Education has not as yet stimulated in them any desire to improve their position in life" It is true that the needs of people living in desert or equatorial climates are simple compared to those who live in less temperate climates. It is also true that where there is natural economy, people depend more on nature's abundance and less on physical and intellectual effort. The economy depended mostly on barter; exchange of goods for money was marginal in their market activity. They needed money only to pay taxes. Above all was the heavy intellectual and mental legacy of the division of labor; there was work fit for the masters and work that was fit only for slaves. Despite all of the above, former slave workers descended on the labor market and put in much effort to increase their income.

Five years later, the overall picture started to show in the Annual Report of 1908.

> The demand for labourers necessitated by the inception of the Public Works and buildings essential for the establishment of a system of civilized Government attracted, from the agricultural districts, a large number of slaves, to whom the advent of the new Government had given freedom.
>
> The Urgent nature of this demand, coupled with the impetus given to private enterprise by the ensuing land boom set up competition and wages rose immediately to a rate that the native agriculturist could not afford to pay.[78]

The reason for this state of affairs was stated as follows,

(1) The exorbitant rate of wages, which enables a man whose expenses are from ten to fifteen P.T. a month, to earn—as an unskilled labourer— for the same period, anything between ninety and one hundred and thirty piastres.

(2) The natural indolence of the Sudanese ex-slave who, under the peculiar conditions of the country, finds himself invested with the rights of a free man but without those bonds and incentives to work which in more civilized communities are demanded by the struggle for subsistence.

> It is an undoubted fact that a total working population of Sudanese never exceeding 6,000 in number has maintained, principally around Khartoum, but also in a lesser degree in the larger towns such as Berber, wad Medani and Dueim, a population of ten or twelve times its number in a state of compete idleness; whilst at the same time the agricultural districts at a short distance from these towns have been unable to get the necessary labour to cultivate their lands, even at prohibitive rates of wages.
>
> It is obvious that the present state of affairs in a country economically dependent on agriculture is very serious and, though the increase of population will do much eventually to remedy the evil, some steps must in the meantime be taken to ensure that the future agricultural prosperity of the country is as little as possible endangered by allowing land hitherto cultivated to become waste.[79]

Once more the annual report returned to the "natural indolence of the Sudanese ex-slave," ignoring what was mentioned in a previous paragraph about the same slaves who were, "attracted, from the agricultural districts, a large number of slaves, to whom the advent of the new Government had given freedom." It is strange that the report was surprised at the imbalance of supply and demand for manpower and the tens of thousands of idle workers in the provinces' cities, while the administration knew the experience of and economic history of England during the Industrial Revolution. At that time, the capitalists and landowners possessed the lands to raise sheep so as to supply wool for industry. The farmers moved in droves toward the cities and vagabonds and beggars were all over the cities; despite this, the wages of laborers did not decrease. There was an excess of workers at that early stage in the development of the capitalist markets. The laws of supply and demand did affect the labor markets; however, those labor markets were not born ready and complete to feel the full effect of those laws. If that was the case in England, what about the labor market in a colony that was by and large decades behind the Industrial Revolution and whose capitalist economy was deformed and stifled? There is a huge difference between a capitalist market and the bazaar of the Middle Ages. The slaves, whose income in three days would keep them for a week, were still moving around lost and torn; legally, they were not slaves, but they were still neither free people who owned their own businesses, nor were they workers. Through experience and discipline and a choice between life and death, they turned into workers on whose shoulders stood production, service entities, and

factories. They became the nucleus of the Sudanese working class that gained importance and status in the life of Sudanese society.

Those slaves who gave birth to the working class blasted the racist attitude of the governor of Kurdufan who thought that a black man at his best was a slave or a soldier.

The labor market grew above rhetorical speeches into wider horizons and a more diverse presence in daily life. The administration initiated the Labour Bureau in 1909 with the following objectives in mind: (1) To guide and advise on the migration of workers from agricultural areas to cities; and (2) To find a solution for the problem of slave throngs in the cities. The idea of registering slave workers was one way to achieve those objectives, to control the movement of slaves, and to get accurate statistics. Those were clear objectives that paired with modern workmanship and the duties of a civilized state, except for the problem of confidentiality that plagued them. The administration issued a confidential memorandum to explain and detail those objectives: (1) To discourage slaves' desertion of their masters for no good reason; and (2) To estimate the size of work done by an individual so as to differentiate between those who were able and desirous to do work and those who did not desire to work.

The Labour Bureau took up the task of registration and was able, within eight years, to register a total of 11,037 workers. They registered 5,000 in Khartoum and 6,000 in other provinces. Yet both the Labour Bureau and the provinces failed to comply with the monthly follow-up of working and idle slaves and the classification of Arab and slave workers. In May 1916, the registered workers were 3,986 slaves and 2,829 Arab workers employed in Halfa, the Red Sea, Sinnar, and White Nile provinces. They were working in the departments of forestry, military workshop, province of Khartoum offices, post and telegraph, works, railways, river transport, and supplies. If the broad spread of sharecropping between middle and small landowners and slaves were added to the above numbers, a complex, diverse picture of work relations would emerge, a picture that included the following:

1. The traditional work of slaves; the administration sought to prevent its transformation because there was no infrastructure to employ slaves as waged workers and the master's endeavor to keep the slaves.
2. Waged labor, the growing new relationship that had a future in the economy of the colonies.
3. Transitive forms of labor in an underdeveloped country, temporary or permanent, such as serfdom in all its many forms.

4. Free labor performed for the state (state corveé) by runaway slaves in custody or residing in a *radeef*.
5. Labor of poor and small business Arabs, who were forced by their circumstances to join the workforce.
6. Seasonal labor, for example, in construction and then a return to the original source of income, that is, agriculture and pastoralism in the rural areas or cities.
7. Labor of the *fallata*[80] groups that filled the gap in "menial work" that used to be done by the slaves who moved to the new opportunities in waged work after emancipation and discharge from the army. The migration of *fallata* to the Sudan had been known since Islam entered their homelands and they started to fulfill the religious duty of *Hajj*. Their migration increased, to some extent, during the Mahdiyya. It witnessed a great increase after the fall of Sokoto at the beginning of the twentieth century. The governor of Khartoum wrote in the daily report that slave masters were happy with the arrival of the *fallata* and considered their arrival a gift from God to replace the slaves. Khartoum province recorded 5,000 *fallata* in 1908. The Labour Bureau and the civil secretary's office statistics showed 80,000 *fallata* in 1925. Those who stayed were about 40,000; 25,000 passed through to perform *Hajj*. Some of them were involved in the slave trade in the Arabian Peninsula.

Perhaps the most wonderful part kept as folklore was the *Dobait*[81] that was full of expressions of pain and injustice felt by *awlad al-Arab* because they had to hire hands, a lamentation over the loss of slaves.

The problem of scarcity of manpower increased in the second decade of the twentieth century and especially during the First World War, for many reasons. There was a famine after the low level of the Nile in 1914 because there were no floods. Jackson[82] wrote to the civil secretary on June 29, 1914, telling him that 6,000 slaves perished because of the famine in the northern part of the Northern province. The masters rid themselves of another number of starving slaves. Work came to a halt in construction sites such as the Sinnar Dam and the agricultural scheme of Geziera. There was an erratic movement of workers between construction and agriculture. The administration requested intelligence to report on the problem, give an estimate of its magnitude, and suggest solutions.

The assistant director of intelligence presented a report on February 12, 1918, on the state of manpower generally. He came up with a project that was close to declaring an emergency. He stated that he

was receiving requests for workers from government offices, agricultural schemes, and others. He did not have any excess manpower. Any pressure on the existing workers would have dire consequences on service entities such as health services. He said it would not be an exaggeration to say that all workers in Khartoum were employed.

The state in other provinces was as follows:

Provinces north of Khartoum: In Halfa, men were employed in domestic services; those unemployed were not fit for hard labor. In Dongola, the governor decided that all workers should stay there for agricultural work and production of grains. In Berber, the pump irrigation schemes took in all the available manpower. In the Red Sea, the Toker Scheme had hired all available workers.

Provinces south of Khartoum: In Kurdufan, it was the season to harvest gum Arabic and afterward prepare for farming. In the White Nile, the majority of the people worked in agriculture until the end of the first quarter of the year if the arable land was flooded; if there was no flood, the majority of the inhabitants of the White Nile, the Blue Nile, and the Sinnar provinces stayed idle from January to May; however, they would not leave their land voluntarily, because they had already harvested enough to keep them for the rest of the year. In addition they found jobs in the gum Arabic harvest, cotton farms, and other types of work. A large number of workers were available for employment in the Southern provinces, but the administrations of those provinces were not equipped to gather and transport large groups of workers without leaving an impression that they were being taken as slaves in the same pattern that had existed since the Turkiyya. The assistant director of intelligence added a question of whether the government would want to expose large numbers of Southerners to Islam because this would happen if they moved north.

With the exception of a small group of daily workers who worked throughout the year, the bulk of the need for manpower was restricted to certain provinces for certain months of the year. Seasonal work was not satisfactory for any stable project; it was expensive and undependable.

It was clear that it was necessary to plan a project to seek suitable and flexible manpower. Such an endeavor meant that the project ought to earn the support of the inhabitants. He continued to present an outline of that project. The government had to determine the number of workers needed at government offices, then divide that number by provinces; each province, subject to its ability, should then provide the requisite quota. The governor of the province would then determine the number to be sent by each district. The district would,

in turn, determine the share of each *umodiyya* and village. The elders of the villages would choose the suitable workers and send them in groups. Upon the return of one group, another would be sent. They should be paid the current per *daim*.

The signs of the "closed districts" policy and the isolation of the south for naive reasons are quite obvious in that report, as if the administration's imagination went bankrupt, and they could see no other way to get workers from the south to work in the construction of the Sinnar Dam, except in the Turkiyya style. And just where did the administration get the power of guardianship over people's conscience, to determine whether they converted to Islam or not? Was the administration neutral toward the Christian missionaries in the south?

The scarcity of manpower branched out and affected many places, as well as the infrastructure. It moved to the top of the list of priorities, to the extent that the problems of slavery were pushed aside and were about to be forgotten; this last statement finds support in the following:

- The letters of the governor of Berber up to 1918 confirmed that, in his opinion, there was no doubt that the government's policy of allowing the gradual, natural death of slavery was the right policy. But that should not preclude the question, "Was there no way to speed up that end?" He did not believe that speeding up the end was possible, as it was not politically or economically wise to emancipate the slaves without the ability to employ them in stable, honorable jobs. Despite this report, a few years later, that same governor of Berber was looking for manpower from outside the province to cover the increasing demand for labor. Workers were needed to increase the areas of pump and canal-irrigated agriculture, to extend the railways as the railway battalion was being discharged, to serve the merchants since trade was developing and merchants were allowed to hire servants, and to satisfy the increased demand of freed slaves to work as domestic servants in the residences of government officials.
- A telegram sent from the Intelligence Department to the governor general, dated February 6, 1920, was a complaint from the director of irrigation at the Works Department that Meroe commissioner refused to allow workers who were contracted with the Works Department in the town of Debba to travel. That was illegal, as some of the workers had received a down payment. The governor general answered that the needs of agricultural areas should not

be ignored in a way that might affect the harvest. He added that the local authorities had the right to keep manpower and that the recruiters should contact the province governor before contracting any workers.

- A telegram from intelligence to the governors of Diwaim, the White Nile, Talodi, Malakal, and Sinjja dated September 27, 1921, asked for a prompt response to an inquiry about the number of workers a province might be able to send between October and May to work at the dam and irrigation system in Mukwar.[83] Terms of employment were eight P.T. per day and up to ten P.T. for a certain amount of work per day (*maqtou`iyya*),[84] in addition to a paid round trip to and from Mukwar if the worker completed the season. The types of work were digging, moving building rocks, and wood, and so on.
- A letter from the assistant inspector of irrigation to the Labor Bureau and Intelligence Department dated September 14, 1921, reported that the company building the dam had ordered the contractor to stop contracting workers because they could not find workers who would accept work for less than a per diem of six P.T. They wanted to get *maqtou`iyya* workers, as the amount of work done as *maqtou`iyya* was of better quality and justified payment of higher wages. The cost of living in Mukwar did not go down with the reduction in wages. The prices of meat, bread, sugar, and tea remained as they were last year. The monthly rent of a *tukul*[85] was between 40 and 50 P.T. The price of a piaster remained 50 percent of its price before the war; therefore, the per diem of six P.T. was equivalent to three P.T. It would not be possible for the company to bring Egyptian workers at the rate of 11 P.T. per day; the loss here would be borne by the government. He suggested a scale of wages similar to the European one, linked to three indicators: the cost of living, the nature of the work, and the scarcity or abundance of manpower. The Labour Bureau and intelligence rejected the company's decision and turned down its request to bring three hundred workers from the abu Hamad area where there were workers qualified for the work required. The company responded that it would bring in Egyptian workers if the rejection of its request was final.
- A telegram from the governor of Meroe dated December 5, 1922, stated that the *sawaqi* irrigated lands had employed all local workers, and it was not in the interest of the province to attract workers to another area until the end of the wheat season. It was better if the recruiters would stop coming to this area to contract workers now, although there were no restrictions on workers' ability to travel.

- A telegram from the governor of Dongola to intelligence dated December 17, 1923, addressed 50 workers who left Karima by train, with travel permission given by contractors who did not get permission from the district. He said that they received complaints that work had stopped in some agricultural areas and complaints from families that they were left without a breadwinner. Those who departed left their families to be cared for by Allah and the government. It was the time to sow the major crops and the suitable time to prevent the migration of manpower from agriculture, or the cultivated area would be reduced and consequently taxes would follow. Therefore, it was imperative to implement the regulations governing the migration of manpower stipulated by the governor general in 1918. Scarcity of manpower in that province could result in halting *sawaqi*. When a *saqia* was not in use, it would be difficult to maintain. That was why employment of workers in this province was restricted to the construction of railways. Contractors should be prohibited from entering the province, and every worker wanting to look for work outside the province should present the commissioner with a clearance certificate from the sheikh.
- The administration confronted the shortage of manpower in the private sector by meeting with businessmen. A meeting was held with Aziz Kfouri on February 7, 1921. A summary of the minutes of the meeting included the following: the per diem for a cotton picker ranged between 8 and 10 P.T., in addition to the commission paid to the sheikh who recruited them and received their wages in advance. Most of the time the workers would refuse to work or sneak out after the start of their task. The paid wages and commissions would then turn into a loss. Picking of one *quntar*[86] of cotton cost one Egyptian pound; it was 40 P.T. the year before and 25 P.T. before the war. Per diem for ploughing, which was three P.T. before the war, went up to 4–5 P.T. Cotton picking needed 300 workers, but only 130–140 were available; as a result, the cotton area was reduced by 75 acres and wheat by 40 acres. The total area for cotton was 400 acres, for wheat 150 acres, and for vegetables 50 acres. Kfouri was planning to increase the cultivated area to 800 acres and would need 1,000 workers in the beginning and 700 workers afterward.
- Using pumps to grow cotton in Khartoum and the Northern province was untenable because of the high cost of fuel and labor, and Kafouri[87] could not bring workers from nearby villages anymore, because workers preferred to take construction work in Khartoum

that paid a per diem of 13 P.T. They also took jobs at the supplies department farm in Shambat or brick making in Geziera. Kafouri thought that the main reason for the scarcity of manpower was the huge construction projects that were beyond the manpower available in the country. He suggested that the government either arrange for groups of workers to assist those investing in agriculture or import workers for government construction schemes, leaving Sudanese manpower for private companies. He said it was the government's duty to protect investors who were investing their capital in the Sudan.

- The second meeting, on the same day, was with Elisatadrini about his efforts to contract 11,000 *sa`aidi* Egyptians, for six months, to work on the Sinnar and Jebel Awlia dams. He would bring them in groups, the first comprised of 1,800, to arrive in January and return in June–August; the next to arrive in October to reach a total of 2,000 by January. He already had 1,500 Yemeni workers and was working to bring 3,500 on two-year contracts. He expected the number of Egyptian and Yemeni workers to reach 25,000. He also anticipated difficulty in bringing in Egyptian workers if they found better pay at construction sites in Egypt, in which case he would use Sudanese workers. The wage for *maqtou`iyya* of digging work of an unskilled Egyptian worker would be 15–18 P.T.; a Yemeni worker would take 14 P.T. and may be paid the same as an Egyptian *maqtou`iyya* worker. A Sudanese worker's wage would be 10–12 P.T. and would not be given a *maqtou`iyya*. The number of Sudanese workers including *fallata* was 5,000 in Sinnar and Jebel Awlia; they were paid a per diem or a *maqtou`iyya* wage. There were groups on the fringes who made an income by providing services to the workers; they were not paid by the company. The numbers in these groups could reach 10,000 after the harvest season. Sudanese manpower was essential for logging, production of wood charcoal, and brick making.

A barrage of letters and meetings showed that scarcity of manpower had affected a market that was far from the construction of dams and agriculture, which was archaeological excavation. Mr. Welcome started his excavation in Jebel Moya in 1910; he stopped because of the war and returned after it. He sent a letter dated April 11, 1927, to the Blue Nile province governor asking to employ 3,000 workers. The governor apologized because sparing that number of workers was not possible due to the expansion of the Geziera Scheme. He told him that the per diem for workers was 7 ½ P.T. and advised him to

get Egyptian *sa`aida*. Welcome was not convinced and sent another letter dated September 15, 1927, insisting that finding those workers was possible, as he had hired 3,500 during the 1913–1914 season and rejected about double that number of workers. His camp's reputation, he said, attracted workers from faraway places, even from the cannibal Niam Niam![88]

Apparently, the administration's heads were spinning from its policy of the "gradual, natural" death of slavery on the one hand, and the scarcity of manpower on the other. It tried to regain its balance by issuing a questionnaire on December 19, 1925[89] and distributing it to the provinces. It included the following questions:

1. What is your estimate of the number of slaves and domestic servants in the province or district?
2. What is the history of its size from 1900 to date?
3. What is your comment regarding the increase or decrease in numbers?
4. Are there any settlements for freed slaves? Are they successful in their lives? Have they multiplied through reproduction or increased by new enslavement?
5. How do slaves improve their lives? Is it possible to develop means to improve their lives? If a slave wanted emancipation, what procedure is followed to grant it?
6. Do slaves who leave their masters pay compensation to the master or mistress? If they do, how much do they pay, and how is the amount decided?
7. When a slave is awarded a freedom paper, does he easily find work in the area, or does he have to migrate to another area, for example, to cities? Or does he become idle or return to be a domestic servant?
8. Did the last Circular Memorandum uncover any situations that need to be dealt with? What was the effect of the circular, generally?
9. What is the number of freedom papers issued during recent years? If none were issued and slaves got their freedom without such papers, how many got their freedom without the papers?
10. Do chiefs, governors, or any superior authorities force any part of the population into any type of work?
11. It happens that African leaders may look at their subjects as slaves or treat them as such; are there any such cases in the province? Do you think that slavery is fading? Can you speed up its end?

On the one hand, it was a good questionnaire for a sociological study of the outcomes of the administration's policy since the reoccupation and the "closure" of the ledgers of slave registration. It was also useful for adjusting and improving administrative procedures regarding emancipated slaves and work opportunities for them. On the other hand, it could be seen as an attempt to bring forward the dilemma of slavery to the administration's agenda after it had almost gotten lost under the pressure of the scarcity of manpower. It was a belated response to the abolition movement and the resolutions of the League of Nations. Another perspective is that it was an expression of the administration's perplexity over the surprising contradictions existing in Sudanese society, a society that exported slaves to work in production, service, and as strong bodies to be groomed for the military, but ended up facing a scarcity in its labor markets and importing manpower from beyond its borders. I wish the administration had added a question about its responsibility for this disparity. The slaves who were "lazy by nature" were the descendants of those who built the civilizations of Meroe, Maqarra, and Alawa.

Disintegration and Decline of Slavery Relations

Two paragraphs in Willis's Report uncover two traits of the disintegration of slavery and enslavement relations, a socioeconomic trait and a psychological one.

The first paragraph stated that some masters started to or almost recognized the fact that the upkeep of a slave for a whole year was not economically feasible if compared to hiring a worker who would diligently work for a short time.

The second paragraph stated that slavery became a matter of color and social status rather than an ethical issue or a lawsuit that the owner could initiate.

Masters' recognition that slave labor was losing its economic value offered an early alert to society and history that slavery and the enslavement relationship was on its way to extinction. It was on its deathbed; however, being on a deathbed is not death. There is a period of time between being on a deathbed and actually dying, between socioeconomic factors being indicators of death and their actual exit from the body of society. A time period, whether it is minutes, hours, days, or centuries, could pass and some remnants may still be there in the corners of an underdeveloped society.

One would wish that the matter had stopped at color and social status; those differences are also found among masters and free people. People are of many colors, green[90], wheat-like, ebony, and everything in between. There are rich and poor, those who pay *zakat* and those who receive it; some live in mansions and others in huts, and there are those with tribal roots and others who are tramps. But slavery is not a differentiation mark; it was a curse inherited by generations. It penetrated color and social status to poison the entire body of society. Society will not be cured by ignoring or forgetting about it, but rather, by a process akin to hemodialysis to be embarked on by the grandsons of the masters. The grandsons should collect their moral courage, admit their history, and indict themselves publicly. The admission and indictment need a positive response from the grandsons of slaves, a response that accepts the apology and has a deep understanding of their shared history, in order to move through the shared present to build a shared future, a future that does not allow "guilt" to paralyze the innovative imaginations of the masters' descendants and prevent them from producing creative work such as novels and poetry or paintings about the suffering of the slaves in the heat of Bayoda Desert. By the same token, an "inferiority complex" should not prevent the descendants of slaves from taking after Alex Haley, the author of *Roots*.

Three other phenomena showed in the documents and registers of the Condominium administration:

1. Disputes between masters and slaves in courts of law, both *Shari`a* and civil courts. They reached 3,156 cases during 1911–1912. There were 943 cases in Dongola province, 480 in Berber province, and 388 in the Blue Nile province.
2. Granting of freedom papers. 4,654 papers were granted during the 11 years between 1911 and 1922. They were granted to 1,726 male slaves and 2,928 female slaves.
3. Creation of *daims* and *radeefs*, colonies for discharged soldiers and emancipated slaves who could not find work. They were also a refuge for runaway slaves in Khartoum, Kosti, Halfa, al-Gadharif, al-Gallabat, Port Sudan, and al-Obayyid. These colonies left their fingerprints on the planning and constitution of Sudanese cities. The Intelligence Department thought it was the right plan to send runaway or emancipated slaves to a colony, *radeef,* or *daim,* that was as far away as possible from where the slave got his or her freedom paper.

In short, these were the main traits that indicated the decline of slavery relations. Several secondary traits emerge when the decline of slavery relations is pursued in various provinces:

- In Khartoum province, it was estimated that 75 percent of the slaves left town and groups of emancipated and bonded slaves in the *daim* area were living an independent life. The district commissioner of Khartoum estimated that 15,000 ex-slaves were living in complete freedom in the city. But a number of older domestic servants did not want to leave their masters because they did not have an alternative abode or family to take them. Some were working and paying part of their wages to their masters as a form of insurance against unemployment. When they got older, they could go back to the *hoshe* of the master. Others left their masters and became domestic servants in merchants and government employees' homes for a monthly wage of 100–160 piasters. Their cost of living was no more than 10–20 piasters per month. The Khartoum authorities and intelligence estimated that three quarters of those slaves were women; the same percentage was common in other provinces.
- Halfa provided jobs in railways and markets from the early days of the administration. The authorities issued about 93 freedom papers during the period 1918–1924. Fifty-four slaves were emancipated without freedom papers. In Egypt, the government issued 155 freedom papers for Sudanese slaves during 1911–1922. Many of them had deserted Halfa during the Mahdiyya and sought protection by crossing the border to Egypt.
- In the Blue Nile province, as the governor of the province indicated in his letter dated February, 24, 1929,[91] to the civil secretary, there was "no trace of slavery" due to the big influence of the Geziera Scheme that became an incentive for seeking emancipation, as it provided a good living for those discontent with their existing living conditions. The governor was not exaggerating; the largest labor market in the Sudan of that period was in the construction sites of the Sinnar Dam, irrigation facilities, and the Geziera Scheme. The governor pointed out that slaves in the province were inclined, generally, to get their freedom. He gave some examples from the province's daily report. For example, 40 cases were brought before the authorities and 35 slaves left their masters in Medani. The same took place in Kamlin, where slaves were known to migrate from early times. In 1908, slaves refused to crush *durrah* on a *murhaka;*[92] this protest ended up in bringing a

mill of 30 horsepower. The effect of the Geziera Scheme reached the eastern bank of the Blue Nile, home of the Bataheen tribe. The elders of Bataheen complained that their slaves were leaving them. The commissioner noted that digging wells in the Bataheen area was being done by waged laborers instead of slaves.

- The intelligence report quoted from the records of Rufa`a that only four hundred slaves, the majority of whom were women, remained in the town. In another letter dated February 8, 1931, the governor confirmed the inclination of slaves toward freedom and the role of the Geziera Scheme in that behavior. Forty-three freedom papers were issued to slaves from the district of Qitaina, in the White Nile province; they came to work in the Geziera Scheme. They applied for freedom papers there, in anticipation of any circumstance that might make them return to the White Nile province. The governor told of freedom papers granted in Rufa`a to five females. He said that in Rufa'a female slaves always insisted on freedom papers, which added some magic to it. Eighteen male and female slaves with eighteen children petitioned for freedom papers in Hasahiesa and all thirty-six were granted freedom papers. The governor reconfirmed his opinion in a third letter dated February 6, 1932, saying that a large number of slaves just leave their masters without requesting freedom papers. Others may request the papers after living independently of their masters for years. Thirty-eight freedom papers were granted in the irrigated area, one in Rufa`a and seven in Medani and Managil without objection by masters, despite the fact that they complained publicly about their slaves living parasitically on them.
- A letter from the White Nile governor to the civil secretary dated March 15, 1929, stated that it might be difficult to summarize the results of the registration and blanket amnesty, but when the registration was finished, the province would have a clear idea of the status of blacks who were descendants of slaves. He thought it would be evident that very few would need protection. The province had to revise its policies and weigh the status of the slaves when it was found that slave traders were active in the province's southern part.
- He added that a decision was made to grant freedom papers to persons in need of protection and to everyone who requested them. Preliminary estimates showed that 150 blacks were granted freedom papers and such grants did not affect the economy of the province. Neither did they result in ex-slaves moving out of the province, but rather, it forced the Arab masters to treat their slaves better.

- The Funj province kept vacillating between disintegration and renewal of slavery relations. Slave traders continued to bring new slaves from Ethiopia, in total disregard of the government's rules. The Arab groups hid the real number of slaves in the province. Three letters were sent by the province governor to the civil secretary during 1928–1929 addressing this complicated issue. A letter sent at the end of November 1928, summarized a meeting between the commissioner of Sinjja in Mezmoom with the *Nazirs* of the Rufa`a, al-Hoy, and Bani Hussein tribes to identify the slaves they had acquired fewer than ten years ago. They presented 140 slaves. Seventy-five slaves were removed from the custody of their masters; the rest were given freedom papers and allowed to stay with the Arabs upon their request. The children who were enslaved at an early age were relocated to the Munsoorab area for a study of their life histories. The commissioner would continue to interview slaves of the Kinana tribe. The discovery of the activities of slave traders in the southern White Nile resulted in the arrest of Sit Amna on November 25, 1928, with the help of the assistant commissioner of Kurmuk and the artillery squad; no injuries resulted from that action. It was quiet on the border. In the province diary there is information recorded in December 1928, about the Kawatil of Kinana, who brought five slaves; one of them remained with the tribe after getting a freedom paper. In Rosieris, 13 slaves were granted freedom papers, as were 77 in the Kurmuk area. He reported that the inhabitants along the borders who were semi-slaves did not believe that it was possible to get a freedom paper upon request. In a letter dated February 24, 1929, he clarified that he expected the list of 527 slaves, enslaved for less than ten years, brought by Rufa`a and Bani Hussein, to be important for monitoring and preventing future cases of enslavement. He relayed the surprising incident of the slaves of Berta origin not wanting to leave their masters, which caught his attention. Finally, the governor confirmed that all slaves staying with Arabs in rural areas knew that they could earn their freedom upon request. The northern district received 80 requests for freedom papers, and in the southern district, 90 were received.
- The disintegration of slavery relations took longer in Kurdufan province because of the large number of slaves in that province. It was everywhere and comprised various types of work. There were city slaves, sedentary village slaves, and nomads' slaves. The intelligence report described the nomads' slaves as thick-skinned, and it discouraged their emancipation without a guarantee of their ability to make a living, lest they should be reenslaved or die of hunger. The

province issued 999 freedom papers in the 15 years between 1910 and 1925. Al-Obayyid issued 87 papers, while 169 were issued in Bara, 117 in Sodari, 206 in Eastern Kurdufan, 322 in Dar Hamar, and 97 in Dar al-Baqara.

- The Nuba Mountains were a big source of slaves and a place for enslavement, which made disintegration a slow, mixed process. Emancipation was not an action simply to free slaves from Arab masters, but included emancipation of those enslaved by some Nuba groups, as they enslaved each other. There was also the problem of returning the emancipated slaves to their villages, which had been emptied by slave trade. The intelligence report tried to confront the problem by noting the evident increase in the number of freedom paper petitioners who would immediately get them. There was also an effort to explain to the Arab sheikhs that the solution lay in the masters' good treatment of slaves. He reported that some enlightened sheiks started to accept that explanation; however, the majority would not heed it. There were also efforts to convince emancipated slaves to return to their villages as free men, with the needed support to make their freedom a reality, especially with the large number of so-called slaves who intermarried with their masters' families. The freed slaves usually ran away on a whim or because they were angered. The mistrust barrier had to be broken for this solution of repatriation to be accepted.
- After the defeat of Ali Dinar in May of 1916 and the annexation of Darfur to the Condominium, the administration issued a plan of seven points to deal with slavery and started to encourage slaves and masters to use *fidya* as a means of emancipation, but the slaves were not able to pay the *fidya*. Ali Dinar's defeat resulted in the escape and migration of thousands of slaves westward and southward, especially those who were in Ali Dinar's army. The majority of his 6,000 infantry soldiers armed with guns, were slaves, in addition to slave soldiers in other army units, those in the sultan's court, and slaves of the elite in various parts of the sultanate. The sultan, by virtue of his status, was the largest slave owner; accordingly, it could be said that the institution of slavery that was attached to the sultanate's state apparatus had been defeated and scattered with the sultan's defeat. Despite that defeat, the deeply entrenched social roots of slavery remained. Slavery's disintegration was slow due to intrinsic factors within the Darfurian society itself. A letter from the governor of Darfur to the civil secretary dated January 17, 1935, contains a special, suggestive observation; he stated that no petitions for freedom papers were received in Dar Masalit and

> western Darfur, as the racial composition of slaves and masters was of the same Negro origin. In other words, the slaves had returned to their tribes and were harmoniously assimilated. The governor stated in his letter that he had declared, since 1932, that the number of slaves petitioning for freedom papers was decreasing because few slaves complained of their status. The governor attached to his letter numbers that showed 60 freedom papers had been issued, 18 of which were issued in northern Darfur, 22 in the central and eastern areas, 7 in Niyala, and 13 in Buram. Willis attached to his report a table extracted from the records of Darfur province for the period between 1919 and 1925. The table showed that of 770 petitions for freedom papers, 531 were granted.

The administration tried, in one of its last circulars on slavery and enslavement dated May 8, 1936, to confirm the basics of its policy and to account for the outcomes of its implementation and practice. It tried to lay down indicators and directions for the future; however, it ultimately went back to Kitchener's memorandum and failed history. It did not declare, actually it did not dare to declare, that any person born on or after January 1, 1898, is a free person, and it was not able to issue an obituary for the natural death of the last pulse of slavery and enslavement relations.

The Sudan had just missed a chance to celebrate the emancipation of the last slave;[93] will it ever celebrate the literacy of the last illiterate?

Notes

Translator's Note

1. The battle was between Mahmoud wad Ahmed, a Mahdiyya Amir, and the *Ja`aliyyn,* who were and still are the inhabitants of Matamma, in July 1987. The Mahdist Amir wanted the inhabitants to vacate the town for his troops, which they refused. They ended up murdered and enslaved by the Mahdists. See Mohammed Said Al-Gaddal, *Tarikh al-Sudan al-Hadith 1820–1955* (Cairo: al-Amal for printing and Publishing. 1992), 208.
2. See chapter 5 in this book.
3. See the Encyclopedia Brittanica Online, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/25025/Anglo-Egyptian-Condominium, where it is stated that "the governors and inspectors were customarily British officers, though technically serving in the Egyptian Army, and key figures in the government and civil service always remained graduates of British universities and military schools." However, de jure (legally), the Sudan was never a British colony.
4. Robert S. Kramer in Junius P. Rodriguez, *The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery*, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1997), 381.
5. Ibid.
6. E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan, Its History and Monuments*, 2 vols. (New York: AMS Press, 1976), 225.
7. See Mohammed Said Al-Gaddal, *Tarikh al-Sudan al-Hadith 1820–1955* (Cairo: al-Amal for printing and Publishing, 2002), 209.
8. Flora Shaw; Khalifa 'Abbas al-'Ubayyid, trans., *al-Zubayr Pasha* (Cairo: Sudanese Studies Center, 1995). A translation of Flora Shaw's interviews with al-Zubayr Pasha in Gibraltar published originally in "The Contemporary Review."
9. Izzeldin Ismail, *Al-Zubair Pasha Wa Dawrihi Fi Al-Sudan Fi Asr Al-Hukm Al-Misri*, Tarikh Al-Misriyyin, edited by Mahmoud al-Gazzar (Cairo: al-Hay'aa al-Misriyya al-Amma Lilkitab, 1998), 310–312.
10. Eve Troutt Powell, *Tell This in My Memory: Stories of Enslavement from Egypt, Sudan, and the Ottoman Empire* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 31–32.

11. Sir James Robertson, *The Status of Slavery in Islamic Law- Draft.* DMH Evans Papers. SAD/ 710/11/23–5.
12. Yoshiko Korita; Magdi An-`aim, trans., *'Ali Abdullatif and the Revolution of 1924: A Study into the Origin of the Sudanese Revolution* (Cairo: The Sudanese Studies Centre, 1997), 29.
13. Ibid.
14. The majority of cases that involved slavery relations were land ownership cases. Slaves who stayed with masters were given land and/or houses that continued to be occupied by their descendants, who sought to register the property in their names. A person may acquire land by prescription if he or she has public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession for ten years. See Saeed Mohamed Ahmed al-Mahdi, "Concept of Ownership of Land in the Sudan," *The Sudanese Judgements and Precedents Electronic Encyclopedia,* 1971. http://sjsudan.org/index.php?lang=en
15. Names of the parties in Personal Status cases in *Shari`a* courts are withheld and do not appear when the cases are reported in the official "*Sudan Law Journal and Reports.*"
16. See Jok Madut Jok, *War and Slavery in Sudan*: *Ethnography of Political Violence* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 20–40.
17. See Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, African Issues (Bloomington; Kampala: Indiana University Press; Fountain Publishers, 2003), 158.
18. Karl Vick, "Ripping Off Slave 'Redeemers' Rebels Exploit Westerners' Efforts to Buy Emancipation for Sudanese," *Washington Post*, February 26, 2002. A01.
19. "al-Bashir promises to take back Hijlij and 'discipline' South Sudan Government," *ASharq al-Awsat*, April 20, 2012.

INTRODUCTION

1. *Turuq* is the plural of the Arabic word *tariqa* which means path. There were, and still are, many Sufi sects that follow certain Sufi leaders in a specific *tariqa*.
2. The author was in hiding for 14 years during the military government in the Sudan that lasted from 1969 to 1985. And again during the current military government he was in hiding from 1992 to 2005.
3. *Albuq'a* or *buqa`at* Almahdi is modern day Omdurman; it was the capital of the Mahdist state. *Buq`a* is a place or space.
4. *Ibd`a Journal*, December 12, 1992. Cairo. s.n.
5. See Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, "The Strategy, Responses and Legacy of the First Imperialist Era in the Sudan 1820–1885," *The Muslim World* 91, no. 1–2 (2007): 209–228.
6. Lidwien Kapteijns, *Mahdist Faith and Sudanic Tradition: The History of the Masalit Sultanate, 1870–1930,* Monographs from the African Studies Center Leiden (London; Boston: KPI, 1985), 4–6.

7. Ibid., 4.
8. Ibid., 4.
9. An Arab free man, Ali bin Mohamed, lead a slave revolution in 1871 in Southern Iraq to free the slaves and change their status according to the Qur'an. He succeeded in defeating the Abbasid armies and was said to have threatened the whole Abbasid Empire. However, he replicated enslavement of Abbasid women and men and treated them the same way the black slaves had been treated. For more on the *Zanj* revolution see Ahmed Olabi, *Thawrat Al-Zanj wa qa`idiha Ali bin Mohamed (The Negro Revolt and Its Leader Ali Bin Mohamed.*) (Beirut: Dar al-Farabi, 2007).
10. For details of the Mamluk's rise and demise, see A. A. Paton, *A History of the Egyptian Revolution, from the Period of the Mamelukes to the Death of Mohammed Ali; from Arab and European Memoirs, Oral Tradition, and Local Research*, 2nd ed. (London: Trubner & Co.), 1870.
11. Mohamed Abdelrahim, Arabism in the Sudan, lecture in Cairo, February 23, 1935.
12. For more on the 1924 Revolution, see Mohamed Omer Beshir, *Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan* (London: Collings, 1974).
13. Actually slave men and women did not have names; they carried descriptions of their masters or their good deeds as names; they were human advertising banners for the masters. Sometimes they were given names to send a message to an enemy. For example, *Dukhrey Azzaman*, literally meant "One who is saved for time." It indicated that the master was someone to depend on during the hard times. Slave names such as *al-hay yishouf* meant "he who lives will see." It has a meaning close to the English idiom "as I live and breathe." That was a statement indicating surprises in life. It was a message sent to someone whom the master or mistress did not like and their behavior was something to be noticed as bad or not impressive.
14. This is an old song usually performed to praise the groom on his wedding day. Part of his praise is mentioning his wealth.
15. Geziera is the fertile land that lies between the Blue and White Nile.
16. The secretary general of the Sudanese Communist Party, who was executed by the military junta in 1971.
17. The war in the southern part of the country (now a separate state known as South Sudan) between the rebels and government forces was often referred to as the "Southern Problem or Question."
18. Al-Zubair Pasha was the most famous Sudanese slave buyer. See the translator's note.
19. Abdelkhaliq Mahjoub, in the Round Table Conference on Southern Sudan, Khartoum, March 16–25, 1965.
20. In October 1964, the Sudanese civilians managed to overthrow the military government that had ruled from 1958 to 1964, through civil disobedience similar to what took place in North Africa in 2011.

1 SLAVERY IN ANCIENT KINGDOMS OF SUDAN

1. Also spelled Meroë and Meruwe.
2. P. L. Shinnie, *Meroe; a Civilization of the Sudan, Ancient Peoples and Places*, vol. 55 (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1967), 153.
3. Although the Meroetic alphabet was deciphered, the language is still not understood. See Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mukhtar and UNESCO. International Scientific Committee for the Drafting of a General History of Africa, *Ancient Civilizations of Africa, General History of Africa* (London; Berkeley: Heinemann Educational Books; University of California Press, 1981), 37.
4. *Kandake* or *kandace* means "great woman" in the Meroetic language. For more information on the *kandakes* of Nubia, see Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, "Nubian Queens in the Nile Valley and Afro-Asiatic Cultural History," a paper presented at the Ninth International Conference for Nubian Studies, August 20–26, 1998, at Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, MA. The paper may be accessed at http://africanhistory.yolasite.com/resources/Nubian%20Queens.pdf
5. Al-Shaṭir Buṣayli 'Abd al-Jalil, *Ma'lim tarikh Sūdan Wadi al-Niil: min al-qarn al-'ashir ilá al-qarn al-tasi' 'ashar al-Miladi* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Sharif al-Akadimiyah, 6th ed. 2009).
6. Ibid., 182–192.
7. Amr bin Al-`Aas lead the campaign to conquer Egypt in 639–642.
8. For more information about the Bakt Treaty, see P. L. Shinnie, "Christian Nubia," *The Cambridge History of Africa: Volume 2,* c. *500 B.C.—A.D. 1050,* edited by J. D. Fage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 556–588; For a translation of the Bakt Treaty, see Stanley Lane-Poole, *A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages* (London: Methuen & co., 1901); also see, Jay Spaulding, "Medieval Christian Nubia and the Islamic World: A Reconsideration of the Baqt Treaty," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 28, no. 3 (1995): 577–594.
9. See J. D. Fage and Roland Anthony Oliver, *The Cambridge History of Africa*, vol. 2 (Cambridge Histories Online: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 260. www.scribd.com/doc/63535157/19/THE-RISE-OF-AKSUM
10. Literally, *rumat alhadag* means "those who aim and hit in the eye." When the Arabs came to invade Nubia, they were kept away by the skillful Nubian soldiers, who were so skillful with their weapons that they could aim and hit an enemy in the eye.
11. The *Mamaleek* (Mamluks) who took over the state of Egypt were slaves before; hence the description "*Mamaleek*," literally, "the owned ones."
12. Ali Ibrahim Hassan, *Tarikh al-mamaleek al-bahriyya* (Cairo: maktabat al-Nahdha al-Misriyya, 1967).
13. Al-Salih Ayyub was the last of the Kurdish dynasty that ruled Egypt, among other territories in the Middle East. He formed the first slave battalion known as Sea or Navy Mamluks (*al-mamaleek al-bahriyya).*

Baybars, his slave, became the first Mamluk in the dynasty of the Mamluks that reined from 1250 to 1517.

14. Ahmad ibn Ya hya Baladhuri and Philip K. Hitti, *The Origins of the Islamic State, Being a Translation from the Arabic, Accompanied with Annotations, Geographic and Historic Notes of the Kitb Futuh Al-Buldan of Al-Imam Abu-L Abbas Ahmad Ibn-Jabir Al-Baladhuri*, Studies in History, Economics and Public Law (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 379.
15. Ibid., 380.
16. Ibid., 381.
17. Translation of verse 92:6 is from M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, *The Qura'n: English translation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
18. Qura'n 23: 12–14.
19. Al-Qurtubi, *Al-Jami li-Ahkam al-Qur'an* (Beirut: Dar Al Fikr, Biuret, 2008).
20. They were considered brothers because they were breastfed by the same woman.
21. Giovanni Vantini, *Christianity in Medieval Nubia*, Quaderni Dell'istituto Italiano Di Cultura Per La R a E (Cairo: Istituto Italiano di Cultura per la R.A.E., 1976), 40.
22. Mustafa Mohamed Musa`ad, *al-Islam wa-al-Nubah fi al-'uṣur al-wusṭá: baḥth fi tarikh al-Sudan wa-ḥaḍaratuhu ḥatta awa'il al-qarn al-sadis 'ashr al-Miladi* (Cairo: Anglo Egyptian Library, 1960), 267.
23. Al-Maris is a medieval name for lower Nubia, adjacent to Egypt.
24. *Jizya* is a poll-tax levied on non-Muslims in return for freedom of religion and exemption from armed service. For more details see Eli Alshech, "Islamic Law, Practice, and Legal Doctrine: Exempting the Poor from the *Jizya* under the Ayyubids (1171–1250)," *Islamic Law and Society,* 10, no. 3: 348–375.
25. Arnoldus Mauritius Preller, "Present and Future Challenges to the Church in Africa—with Special Reference to the Church in Sudan," University of Pretoria, 2006, 97–99. http://dcommontest.bu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/2144/901/PrellerArnoldusMauritius-2007.pdf?sequence=5
26. Ḥasan Ibrahim Ḥasan, *Tarikh al-Islam al-siyasi wa-al-dini wa-al-thaqafi wa-al-ijtima'i* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-Miṣriyah, 1961), 398–399.
27. Adam Mez, *The Renaissance of Islam*, 1st ed. (New York: AMS Press, 1975).
28. Ehsan Yarshater, "Ma Wara᾽ al-Nahr," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, 5 (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1992), 169. Encyclopedia Iranica defines *ma wara' al-nahr* as, "(lit. "What lies beyond the river"), the classical designation for Transoxania or Transoxiana. It was defined by the early Arabic historians and geographers as the lands under Muslim control lying to the north of the middle and upper Oxus or Amu Darya [river]."

29. For details see Bernard Lewis, *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Enquiry* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
30. For the full tables, including the number of slaves among other property delivered to the caliph in Baghdad, see Ibn Khaldun and Franz Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah,* n.d. 225–228. http://www.scribd.com/doc/45373360/al-Muqaddimah.
31. *Mawali* is plural of *mawla*, which refers to an emancipated slave who continues to have ties to or relationship with his former master. Sometimes it referred to non-Arab Muslims. For more see Khaldun and Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah,* Chapter 2, section 14.
32. Ali Ibrahim Hasan, *Dirasat fi tarikh al-Mamalik al-bahriyah, wa-fi asr al-Nòsir Muhammad bi-wajhin khass, yabhath fi al-tarikh al-siyasi wa-al-alaqat al-kharijiyah wa-nizam al-saltanah wa-al-bilat wa-al-khilafah wa-nuzum al-hukm al-idariyah wa-al-harbiyah wa-al-maliyah wa-al* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdah al-Misriyah, 1944).
33. Ibid.
34. The *Qala`ah* Massacre (Citadel Massacre), 1811, was the final attack on the Mamluks that ended what remained of their authority over Egypt.
35. "Daylam," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. Brill Online, 2013. Reference. January 22, 2013. http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/daylam-COM_0158 states, "Daylam is, geographically speaking, the highlands of Gīlān [q.v.]. In the south, the lowlands of Gīlān proper are bounded by the Alburz range; the latter forms a crescent, the eastern horn of which comes close to the Caspian coast (between Lahidj̲an and Calus). In the center of the crescent there is a gap through which the Safid-rud, formed on the central Iranian plateau, breaks through towards the Caspian Sea."
36. Ghuz refers to nomadic Turks; for other meanings see Mas`udi, *Historical Encyclopaedia: Meadows of Gold and Mines of Gems*, trans. Aloys Sprenger (London: Harrison and Co, Printers, 2007), 239.
37. Izzeldin Aybek was the first Mamluk sultan in Egypt. Shajarat Eddur abdicated the throne to him after marrying him. Despite her efforts, she was not acceptable as a ruler because of her gender. See Abdelsalam al-Termanini, *Al-Riq Hadirihi Wa Madhihi*, Aalam Al-M`Arifah, edited by Ahmed Mashari al-Adwani (Kuwait: al-Majlis al-Watani Lilthaqafa wa al-Finoon wa Al-Adab, 1979), 110.
38. Ibid.
39. Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, 6): 36. http://www.scribd.com/doc/45488570/Edward-Gibbon-The-Decline-and-Fall-of-the-Roman-Empire-Vol-6.
40. Ali Ibrahim Hasan, *Tarikh al-Mamaleek al-Bahriyya*, 24.
41. Since he was gifted to the caliph he became a royal slave.
42. "Other" is anyone who was not a Mamluk.
43. See MacMichael, *A History of the Arabs in the Sudan,* 138.
44. Mus`aad, *al-Islam wa-al-Nubah.*

45. See Yaacov Lev, "Army, Regime, and Society in Fatimid Egypt," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, no. 3 (1987): 337–66.
46. Mus`aad, *al-Islam wa-al-Nūbah.*

2 Pioneers of Enslavement and the Slave Trade in Africa

1. Angola was called Black Mother of the Americas as it was supplying the largest number of slaves to that part of the world.
2. Stuart B. Schwartz, *Slaves, Peasants, and Rebels: Reconsidering Brazilian Slavery.* Blacks in the New World (Urbana; Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 12.
3. See Stephen Evans, "Slave Owner Insurance—200 Years On," BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3581815.stm
4. Jack Gratus. *The Great White Lie: Slavery, Emancipation and Changing Racial Attitudes* (London: Hutchinson, 1973), 106.
5. Theodore Canot and Brantz Mayer, *Captain Canot, or, Twenty Years of an African Slaver: Being an Account of His Career and Adventures on the Coast, in the Interior, on Shipboard, and in the West Indies* (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1854).
6. Gratus. *The Great White Lie.* 122.
7. Legacies of British Slave-Ownership, "Hugh Mill Bunbury Awardee British Guiana 2288 (Devonshire Castle) £24169 1S 3D [478 Enslaved]." http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/search/. Accessed May 5, 2013.

   The University College London (UCL) compiled all the names of British slave owners and the amounts they received as compensation.

3 Slavery and Enslavement in Funj and Darfur Sultantes

1. Sheikh Khojali ibn Abdelrahim was a famous *faqih* (a religious scholar) during the Funj era.
2. See documents of Sheikh Khojali, documents 12 and 16 in Jay Spaulding and Muḥammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, *Public documents from Sinnar* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1989), 80–88 and 109–118.
3. See J. Spaulding, *The Sudanese Travels of Theodoro Krump*, compiled by J. Spaulding, 1974. http://www.kean.edu/~jspauldi/krump2home.html; also see Scribd, http://www.scribd.com/doc/39174472/The-Sudanese-Travels-of-Theodoro-Krump
4. James Bruce, Pre-1801 Imprint Collection (Library of Congress), and Thomas Leiper Kane Collection (Library of Congress. Hebraic Section), *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile, in the Years 1768, 1769, 1770, 1771, 1772, and 1773*, 5 vols. (Edinburgh: Printed by J. Ruthven, for G. G. J. and J. Robinson, London, 1790).

5. John Lewis Burckhardt and Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa, *Travels in Nubia; by the late John Lewis Burckhardt*, 2nd ed. (London: J. Murray, 1819).
6. For further explanation of *hujja,* see Spaulding and Salim, *Public Documents from Sinnar*, 12.
7. See document 9 in Muḥammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, *Al-Funj wa al-Ard watha'iq tamlik* (Khartoum: Shu'bat Abḥath al-Sudan bi-Jami'at al-Kharṭum, 1967).
8. Muhammad al-Nur Ibn Dayf Allah, Ibrahim Abd al-Dafi, Ahmad ibn Muhammad Salawi, Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, and Yusuf Fadl Hassan, *Tabaqat Wad Dayf Allah. Dhayl wa-al-takmilah*, Silsilat al-dawriyat (Khartoum: Ma`had al-Dirasat al-Afriqiyah wa-alAsiyawiyah, University of Khartoum, 1982).
9. *Saqia*, plural *sawaqi*, may refer to the water wheel used for irrigation or the land irrigated with a *saqia*
10. *Khalawi*, singular *khalwa*, is a traditional school for learning the Qura'n and the Arabic language.
11. For the lineage of those prominent clans, see Yusuf Fadl Hassan Ḍayf Allah Muḥammad al-Nur Ibn. *Kitab al-ṭabaqat fi khusus al-awliya' wa-al-saliḥin wa-al-ulama' wa-al-shu'ara' fi al-Sudan.* (Khartoum: Qism al-Ta'lif wa-al-Nashr, Jami'at al-Kharṭum, 1971).
12. *Rahat* is a skirt-like garment made of leather strips, usually worn by women.
13. Literally, the house of fire, the Sufi sheikh's homes had huge kitchens in which more than one fire is lit, one to cook the stew, another to make bread, and more than one for tea and coffee.
14. See F. Lorimer, "The Megadhib of El Damer," *Sudan Notes and Records* (Khartoum: Philosophical Society of the Sudan, 1936), 335.
15. One of the purposes and uses of *zakat* is to buy and free slaves, or pay any dues to the owner so as to emancipate a slave. Chapter 2 verse 177 in the Qura'n, 2:177, states:

    > It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces Towards east or West; but it is righteousness—to believe in Allah and the Last Day, and the Angels, and the Book, and the Messengers; to spend of your substance, out of love for Him, for your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for those who ask, and for the ransom of slaves; to be steadfast in prayer, and practice regular charity; to fulfil the contracts which ye have made; and to be firm and patient, in pain (or suffering) and adversity, and throughout all periods of panic. Such are the people of truth, the Allah fearing.

16. Spaulding, *The Sudanese Travels of Theodoro Krump.*
17. J. Spaulding, *The HeroicAage in Sinnar.* Red Sea Press ed. (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, Inc., 2006), 20.
18. Ṣalaḥ Salim Zartuqah, *Anmaṭ al-istila' 'alá al-sulṭah fi al-duwal al 'Arabiyah: dirasah fīal-asalib: al-namaṭ al-wirathi, al-namaṭ al-inqilabi, anmaṭ ukhra 1950–1985* (Cairo: Madbouli Bookshop, 1992), 166–167.

19. Spaulding, *The Sudanese Travels of Theodoro Krump*, 45.
20. Ibid., 45–46.
21. Khuldun and Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah,* p. 343.
22. Isagha is a Western Sudan version of the name Ishag [Isaac] and Deng is a common name in Southern Sudan [now South Sudan] especially among the Dinka. Bilal the name of the freed slaves whom the prophet designated as *Adhan*. Antra was a strong brave slave in pre-Islamic Arabia.
23. Bruce and Kane, *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile,* 399.
24. Burckhardt, *Travels in Nubia,* 307.
25. Ibid., 294.
26. Ibid., 330.
27. In Burckhardt's *Travels in Nubia*, Shendi is spelled Shendy and Sinnar is spelled Sennarr.
28. Ibid., 283.
29. Ibid., 290.
30. Ibid., 290.
31. Ibid., 302.
32. Conversion to Islam was a strong incentive to enslaved people, as they would be emancipated; those who were enslaved after wars would rather take Islam than remain in bondage.
33. For a timeline of the sultanate of Darfur see, R. S. O'Fahey and Jerome Tubiana, "Darfur Historical and Contemporary Aspects" (Bergen: University of Bergen, n.d.), http://www.smi.uib.no/darfur/A%20DARFUR%20WHOS%20WHO3.pdf
34. Dali law is the penal law of the sultanate of Darfur applied in addition to *Shari`a* norms. For more, see, Uthman Dayfi A`bd al-Na`im, *Iqlim Darfur kama ra'ahu al-Tunisi* (Googlebooks.com and Kotobarabia.com. n.d.), 58.
35. The covers for the *Ka`abah* is a cloth, known as *kiswa,* of the best material, embroidered with gold thread that covers all of the *Ka`aba*.
36. *al-Bab al-`Ali* is a reference to the famous gate of the palace that was the court of the Ottoman Empire in Constantinople.
37. O'Fahey referred his readers to the Arabic version of this book by M. I. Nugud for "a balanced assessment" of slavery in Darfur. See R. S. O'Fahey, *The Darfur Sultanate: A History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 241–244.
38. Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, *Al-Fur Wa-Al-Ard* (Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1975).
39. Ibid.
40. R. S. O'Fahey, "Slavery and the Slave Trade in Dār Fū," *The Journal of African History* 14, no. 1 (1973): 29–43.
41. For the relationship between Darfur and Fartit, see O'Fahey, *Darfur Sultanate*, 248.
42. See John Ralph Willis, *Slaves and Slavery in Muslim Africa,* 2 vols. (London, UK/Totowa, NJ: F. Cass), 1985.

43. William George Browne, *Travels in Africa, Egypt, and Syria, from the Year 1792 to 1798* (London: Printed for T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1806), 343.
44. Elie Kedourie and Sylvia Kedourie, *Modern Egypt: Studies in Politics and Society* (London/Totowa, NJ: F. Cass, 1980). Kedourie did not mention the letter above, but mentioned the order of Bonaparte to buy slaves from the sultan of Darfur.
45. Muhammad ibn Omer Tunisi and Mustafa Mohamed Musaad, Khalil Mahmoud Asakir, and Mohamed Mustafa Zyada, eds., *Tashheedh al-adhhan biseerat bilad al-Arab wa al-Sudan* (Cairo: al-Dar al-Missriyya lilta'leef wa al-Nashr, 1965), 383.
46. Gustav Nachtigal, *Sahara and Sudan, vol. 4, Wadai and Darfur*, trans. Allan G. B. Fisher and Humphrey J. Fisher with Rex S. O'Fahey (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 358.
47. Muhammad ibn Umar Tunisi and Bayle St. John, *Travels of an Arab Merchant in Soudan (the Black Kingdoms of Central Africa)* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1954).
48. The Sabians were followers of a religion that preceded Christianity. They were mentioned in the New Testament as well as in the Qur'an. Paul Carus said, "The word Sabian means 'baptizer.' It is derived from the Hebrew *tsaba'* and ought to be pronounced *Tsabian,* with a sharp German *z* as initial. Baptism was a prominent rite among the Sabians, and we have good reason to assume that the Christians adopted baptism from them. We read in the Gospels that Jesus himself was baptized by their head, John, who lived as a hermit in the wilderness on the Jordan. Judging from their frequent mention in the New Testament, they must have been very numerous in the dispersion and were mainly distributed all over Asia Minor, having a great congregation at Ephesus." Paul Carus. "The Sabians." *The Monist* 25, no. 2 (Aril 1915): 294–229.
49. Abdelsalam Al-Termanini, *Al-Riq Hadirihi wa Madhihi*, edited by A. M. al-Adwani (Cairo: *`Aalam al-m`arifah*, 1979), 92.
50. Humphrey J. Fisher, *Slavery in the History of Muslim Black Africa* (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 286.
51. Singular *tekiyya,* a long piece of cotton cloth.
52. See Willis, ed., *Slaves and Slavery in Muslim Africa*.
53. Plural of *shibr*, a *shibr* is the farthest distance between the little finger and the thumb, about 20 centimeters.
54. Tunisi and Musaad, *Tashheedh al-adhhan biseerat bilad al-Arab wa al-Sudan*, 298.
55. Tunisi and Bayle St. John, *Travels of an Arab Merchant in Soudan,* 48.
56. Plural for *bawab* (a guard at the door)
57. See O'Fahey, "Slavery and the Slave Trade in Dār Fū."

4 Slavery in the Mahdist State [1885–1898]

1. Al-khalifa is Arabic for successor. When Abdullahi Alta`aishi succeeded al-Mahdi, al-Khalifa became his official title.

2. Abdelrahman Alnijumi was the Amir dispatched by al-Khalifa to conquer Egypt.
3. The term *jihadiyya* was used to indicate slaves turned soldiers during the Turkiyya. The Mahdists continued to use the same term for the same group.
4. Daftar Sadir 13:15. Daftar Sadir is the outgoing ledger; the first number (13) refers to the ledger. The following number is the page number. Within the text a number within parentheses, for example. (14) refers to the page in the ledger.
5. Daftar Sadir 13–15:41.
6. Letter from al-Khalifa to Abdel Rahman al-Nijumi. P. 166 of the Khalifa Letter Collection.
7. A glabrous is person with a smooth, hairless body.
8. A *gagra* is a barracks.
9. NRO Mahdiyya Daftar Sadir 10:184.
10. Literally, *Ansar* means supporters; those who followed al-Mahdi and supported him were called *Ansar,* as were those who followed the Prophet Mohamed.
11. *Albuq'a* is another name for Omdurman. Al-Mahdi called it Albuq'a al-Mubaraka (the blessed place).
12. *Khumasi* is a description of the height of a slave, about 5 *shibirs*. A *shibir* is about 20 centimeters.
13. Daftar Sadir 10–171.
14. Ibid., 10–174.
15. Bara is a town in the province of Kurdufan, in western Sudan.
16. Abu Salim Collection, al-Khalifa's letters are collected in one volume, Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, *Muḥarrarāt al-khalīfa ʿAbd Allāhi. Mujallad al-awwal, 22 Muḥarram 1301—ākhir dhī'l-hijja 1302/23 November 1883–9 October 1885* (Khartoum: Markaz Abū Salīm li'l-dirāsāt, 2001). See O' Fahey, *Some Recent Publications from and about the Sudan*. www.smi.uib.no/darfur/SomeRecent.doc
17. NRO Abu Salim Collection, Mahdiyya 8–1-4.
18. Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, *Mansurat al-Mahdiyya*, vol. 2 (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press. 1969), p. 51.
19. Ibid., p. 207.
20. NRO Mahdiyya—Daftar Sadir 2:60.
21. NRO Mahdiyya—Daftar Sadir 3:340.
22. Compensation of owners may be seen as buying the slaves for the purpose of enlisting them.
23. *Mulazmeen* were the free soldiers who followed and stayed with al-Mahdi. The area they occupied is now an upper-middle-class neighborhood that carries their name, *almulazmeen*.
24. Daftar Sadir 19.
25. Daftar Sadir 3:351.
26. Daftar Sadir 10:213.
27. *Muqaddam* is an army major.

28. Daftar Sadir 11:2.
29. *Naqeeb* is an army captain.
30. Daftar Sadir 3:237.
31. Daftar Sadir 14:14.
32. *Maqadeem* is plural of *Muqaddam*.
33. Daftar Sadir 11:136. *Bandaga* are riflemen.
34. Daftar Sadir 13:3–43.
35. According to Islamic law, *bait almal* takes one-fifth of the war spoils.
36. The large cities such as Alobayyed and Khartoum were under siege during the war against the Turks; people loyal to the Mahdiyya in those cities suffered hardships during the siege. They were given slaves to appease them.
37. In such divisions, *bait almal* took one-fifth, and four-fifths were distributed among the warriors.
38. Rudolf von Slatin was an Austrian hired by the Turks to govern parts of Sudan; he was imprisoned after the fall of Khartoum. He continued to provide some services to al-Khalifa and allegedly converted to Islam. He was imprisoned by al-Khalifa. Upon the defeat of the Mahdiyya, he was rescued and hired by the Anglo-Egyptian administration. He was inspector general of the Sudan until the First World War. He detailed his views of the Mahdist state and the Sudan in a book. See Rudolf Carl Slatin and F. R. Wingate, *Fire and Sword in the Sudan; a Personal Narrative of Fighting and Serving the Dervishes. 1879–1895*, 4th ed. (London, New York: E. Arnold, 1896).
39. Ardeb equals 150 kilos; *Durah* is sorghum, a staple food in the Sudan.
40. Daftar Sadir 13:1–50.
41. "the lot of the damned" is in reference to the Turco-Egyptian forces who were defeated in Khartoum.
42. Daftar al-Sadir 13:254.
43. The Ashraf (nobles) were the Mahdi's cousins who mutinied against him.
44. Rayat is plural of raya, Arabic for flag. The military was divided into flags (military units), each unit had a flag of a certain color; e.g., the green raya, black raya; each raya was headed by an Amir.
45. NRO *Abu Salim Collection* Mahdiyya 8–1-4.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Daftar Sadir 3, 7, and 22.
50. Daftar Sadir 3:362.
51. Daftar Sadir 9:275. The rules were relaxed if that would bring people closer to Mahdiyya or Islam.
52. Those who resisted the Mahdiyya were killed, even if they were Muslims.
53. *Bazingir* are the slaves seized by slave traders to form armed militias.

54. Jangi is an ethnic group in Southern Sudan.
55. Daftar Sadir 10:25.
56. Daftar Sadir 10:25.
57. Ibid., p. 62.
58. Muharram is the first month of the Hijri (Islamic) calendar.
59. Daftar Sadir 10–85.
60. Daftar Sadir 11–4.
61. Bani Shangoul was a place in eastern Sudan where gold was mined.
62. Daftar Sadir 10:25–183.
63. Ibid., p. 57.
64. NRO Mahdiyya 7–2-9:9. The statement that "the virtue of honesty let wad Adlan down" made by the author was in reference to the conspiracy that lead to the execution by hanging of Wad Adlan when one of the *amirs* accused him of nepotism and misappropriation of the property of *bait almal*.
65. NRO Mahdiyya 7–3-10:42.
66. NRO Mahdiyya, 4–3-5.
67. *Khut*, literally means "line;" each area or region was divided into *khtout* (plural of *khut*); a *khut* would include several villages and each *khut* had a sheikh who presided over *omdas* (mayors), who in turn presided over village sheiks.
68. NRO Mahdiyya 5–7-57–59 Finance 25.
69. This is similar to prescription in land law where one may own land by proving possession for a certain length of time; here it is transferred to owning slaves through the same process.
70. This was one of confusing situations created by the emancipation of men who joined the military, but that act was not followed by the emancipation of women, who remained slaves. Allowing them to be with their husbands was a privilege guaranteed to the men as promised if they joined the army.
71. *Awadim* is plural of *adamiyya*; it pertains to the name Adam. A male slave is *adami*; *adamiyya* is the feminine form; it is used to mean human, but used only for slaves.
72. NRO Mahdiyya 5–7-57–59-1.
73. NRO Daftar Sadir 13:3.
74. NRO Daftar Sadir 15:35.
75. For details of the battle of Metamma, see Mhammad Said al-Gaddal, *Al-Siyassa Al-Iqtisadiyya Lil Dawla Al-Mahdiyya* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1986).
76. NRO Mahdiyya 7–3-10-Finance. The 75 slaves is one-fifth of all people captured after the battle; *bait al-mal* takes one-fifth of all war spoils and the rest goes to the warriors.
77. Sometimes the original owner or his heirs might contest the buyer's ownership and claim the slave. The document issued by *bait almal* is a declaration that the slave was abandoned and the first owner had lost

any right to reclaim the slave after the lapse of a period within which the owner could have claimed the slave and paid the fees. The document served as a statute of limitations that relinquished any rights of the first owner.

78. The word zariba, also zareba is entered in the English dictionaries; The Random House dictionary defines it as (in the Sudan and adjoining regions) a protective enclosure, as of thorn bushes. Also see Merriam Webster Dictionary Online.
79. For a description of how and where *bait almal's* slaves were kept, see Slatin and Wingate, *Fire and Sword in the Sudan*, 555.
80. NRO Mahdiyya 7–1-6 Finance 38.
81. NRO Daftar Sadir 3: 36.
82. NRO Daftar Sadir 6:15–61.
83. NRO Daftar Sadir 10:199.
84. NRO Daftar Sadir 11:140.
85. NRO Daftar Sadir 11:277.
86. Hijaz is a province in the Arabian Peninsula.
87. NRO Daftar Sadir 11:177.
88. It was not only the number of slaves that was increasing, but also the number of owners that was increasing through the practice of co-ownership of one slave. This increase, both in owners and numbers of slaves, created confusion that allowed slaves to run away and leave owners to dispute their ownership.
89. See Abu Salim Collection published as Muhammad Aḥmad Mahdī and Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Abū Salīm, *al-Āthār al-kāmilah lil-Imām al-Mahdī*. al-Ṭab'ah 1st ed. (Khartoum: Dār Jāmi'at al-Kharṭūm lil-Nashr, 1990).
90. *Ahl albeit* (family) are the family of al-Mahdi, so called to equate them with the family of the prophet Mohamed.
91. NRO Daftar Sadir 4:4.
92. NRO Mahdiyya 8–2-4.
93. Muḥammad Aḥmad Mahdī and Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Abū Salīm, *Manshūrāt al-Mahdīyah*, 3 (1969): 79
94. He would have no right to reenslave her.
95. NRO Daftar Sadir 3:317.
96. Hadith, a saying by the prophet Mohamed (PBUH).
97. NRO Daftar Sadir 9:232.
98. NRO Daftar Sadir 9:367.
99. NRO Mahdiyya 8–1-4.
100. Al-Mahdi was keen to keep his followers happy, especially those who fought with him, and he was not reluctant to reward them by returning their slaves and other property.
101. Slatin and Wingate, *Fire and Sword in the Sudan*, 557.
102. The Anglo-Egyptian invasion that ended the Mahdiyya and ruled the Sudan until 1956 was known as the Condominium.

103. SAD/438/653/3. Slatin to Bigge, September 6, 1897.
104. Spaulding, *The Sudanese Travels of Theodoro Krump.*
105. Nachtigal, *Sahara and Sudan.*
106. Abdelsalam al-Tarmanini, "*Alriq Madhihi Wa Hadhirih*" (Kuwait: Almajlis Alwatani Lilthaqafa wa Alfunoon wa Al'aadab, 1979).
107. NRO Intelligence Report vol. 2: 32.
108. Abdelrahim, Arabism in the Sudan Lecture, 86.
109. Abu Salim, ed. *Manshurat al-Mahdiyya* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1969), 16.
110. Mhammad Said al-Gaddal, *Al-Siyassa Al-Iqtisadiyya Lil Dawla Al-Mahdiyya* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1986), 229.
111. The prices in the Sudan were quoted in riyals, while in Cairo they were quoted in dollars.
112. Intelligence Reports, Cairo.
113. Al-*Rashaaida* are an Arab group that migrated to the Sudan and still lives there as a nomadic pastoralist group. For more on this group see, Young WC, "The Effect of Labor Migration on Relations of Exchange and Subordination Among the Rashaayda Bedouin of Sudan," *Research in Economic Anthropology,* 9 (1987): 191–220.
114. Intelligence Report No. 28, Cairo.
115. Zina in Islamic law is fornication; when fornication constitutes adultery it is punished by death. Two questions were not answered here: (1) How could this capital punishment be halved? and (2) If a slave woman who was married to a slave man had sexual relations with her master, would that be *zina*?

5 The Condominium: Disintegration of Slavery and Enslavement Relations

1. For full text of the Condominium Agreement of 1899 see, "Agreement between her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Highness the Khedive of Egypt, Relative to the Future Administration of the Soudan," *The Sudan Gazette* March 7, 1899, 1–4, and Arthur Silva White, *The Expansion of Egypt under Anglo-Egyptian Condominium* (New York: New Amsterdam Book Co., 1900). http://archive.org/details/cu31924028724205
2. As quoted in Paul E. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 262.
3. Sudan Government Confidential Circular Memorandum No. 22, "Regulations as to Sudanese who Leave Their Masters," January 4, 1907, SAD 280/1. See full text in Ahmad A. Sikainga, *Slaves into Workers: Emancipation and Labor in Colonial Sudan,* Modern Middle East Series, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 196.
4. The Sudan Penal Code of 1899 defined a vagabond as, first, any person found taking precautions to conceal his presence within the limits of such officer's jurisdiction under suspicious circumstances, and

second, any person within the limits of such officer's jurisdiction who has no ostensible means of subsistence, or who cannot give a satisfactory account of himself.

5. See Ahmed A. Sikainga, "Shari`a Courts and the Manumission of Female Slaves in the Sudan," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 28, no. 1 (1995): 1–24.
6. Arthur Silva White, *The Expansion of Egypt under Anglo-Egyptian Condominium* (London: Methuen & Co., 1899), 427. Also see G. A. Lutfi, "The Future of English Law in the Sudan," *Sudan Law Journal and Reports* (1967): 222.
7. McMichael reported that "[Wingate said] It must now be realized, that the Sudan was governed by 'bluff'." MacMichael, *A History of the Arabs in the Sudan,* 205.
8. Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan, 1903, 5. These are reports presented annually by the governor general of the Sudan to the consul general in Egypt. The reports, published by Durham University, Sudan Archives, may be accessed at http://www.dur.ac.uk/library/asc/sudan/gov-genl_reports/.

   All governor generals' reports, under the above title, may be accessed at http://www.dur.ac.uk/library/asc/sudan/gov-genl_reports/
9. Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan, 1908, 136.
10. Lord Cromer's memo to Lord Salisbury 11/14/1898 in Musa, Osman Omer Ali. "Elements of Ethnic Conflict in the Sudan and the Future of Unity," *SudnNile.* http://www.sudanile.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18543:2010-09-09-05-59-15&catid=51:aaaaaa&Itemid=55
11. *sel al-yed* literally, means pulling out one's hand, a metaphor for mutiny or leaving without permission.
12. *Daim* and *radeef* are names of neighborhoods housing former enlisted slaves referred to as "colonists."
13. NRO Pub.3/2/7. Circular Memorandum No. 22, dated May 18, 1901, ordered,

    > His Excellency [the Governor General], directs, therefore, such colonists should be warned to the effect that, if they are found in towns in a state of destitution & without employment, they will forfeit their right to be considered colonists and any assistance that the government may be affording them will be discontinued.
    >
    > In discharging policy, the recommendation that a man may become a colonist should be sparingly made, as there are limits to the period in which free *dhurra* will be issued. In any case no addition should be made to the number of the Colonists without due references to the Financial Secretary.

14. NRO Civsec 60/1/1 Circular Memorandum No. 22 (1907).
15. See Sikainga, *Slaves into Workers*, 196.

16. Article 2 of this section prescribes a different procedure for the cases of soldiers claiming women.

    > All cases in which it is alleged that a soldier has taken away a girl from any person, or in which a soldier complains that his sister or relative is the slave of someone, will be sent by the commanding officer in his battalion to the Governor. The Governor, or an inspector appointed by him, will hear the case personally. The case itself will not be referred to the Kadi, but if the question of the validity or non-validity of a marriage arises in the case, that question should be referred to the Kadi, and his decision as to the marriage, subject to the rights of appeal to the Grand Kadi, will be accepted as final.

17. The Red Sea was the gate to exporting slaves to Egypt, Arabia, and beyond, therefore a more lucrative trade was achieved by reaching the Red Sea.
18. If the slaves felt that they were in custody forever, they would be inclined to return to their masters, which was the administration's plan all along.
19. SAD.542/21/35 Confidential Circular Memorandum No. 33, Regulations as to Sudanese Servants. Articles 3 and 33.
20. See Sikainga, *Shari'a Courts and the Manumission of Female Slaves in the Sudan, 1898–1939*.
21. The civil secretary issued Memorandum, No. C.S. /60-A-1, on May 6, 1925, entitled "Slavery." Article 3 stated, "In view of the time that has lapsed since the reoccupation of the country, the time has come for the Government to restate its policy in clearer terms." The relationship between domestic servants and their masters was revisited.
22. *Fidya* was defined as money payable in a lump sum or by installment, but never in monthly payments, to be continued indefinitely, and assessed on the basis of the owner's estimate of the value of the slave. Also see Sikainga, *Slaves into Workers*, 48.
23. C.S. /60-A-1 dated May 6, 1925, Sudan Government Circular Memorandum titled "Slavery" issued by C. E Lyall, the civil secretary.
24. Circular Memorandum dated May 6, 1925, NRO. C.S. /60-A-1.
25. Ibid. Article 11 canceled all circulars regarding "this subject," slavery.
26. Ibid. Article 4.
27. This point proves the conflicting discourses; one of them is the discourse used to address the United Nations.
28. NRO Civsec 60/2/7, Report on Slavery, by C. A. Willis, 68.
29. In the Qura'n the Prophet Salih was ignored by his people.
30. Captain Diggle did testify against the administration's policy before the League of Nations Committee.
31. Civil Secretary's Strictly Confidential Memorandum 60/A/1 dated May 8, 1936, entitled "Slavery in the Sudan."
32. Governor General's Report in the Reports on the Finances, Administration and Conditions of the Sudan, 1903, Durham University Library, XII–XIII.

33. The governor general added "that the loss of life under these two headings [disease and war] should represent upwards of 75 per cent of the total population seems almost incredible, but from my own personal experience I can vouch for the comparative correctness of these figures."
34. Most of the British administration's documents refer to the Mahdists as Dervishes, a term that al-Mahdi did not like and prohibited.
35. The *bashbuzuq*, sometimes spelled as two words *bash buzuq,* were the tax collectors notorious for their harsh methods of forcing people to pay taxes. See Gabriel Warburg, *Islam, Sectarianism, and Politics in Sudan since the Mahdiyya* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 7.
36. As stated in chapter 4, the domestic trade was very active and the treasury of the Mahdiyya was an active participant.
37. Karari is an area north of Omdurman, where Kitchener defeated the Mahdists and took Omdurman the seat of the Mahdiyya in September 1898. See al-Gaddal, *Tarikh al-Sudan al-Hadith 1820–1955*, 221–223.
38. Public slaves belonged to *bait almal*, that is, they belonged to the Mahdiyya government.
39. Lord Cromer was His Majesty the king of England's agent and consul general of Cairo.
40. C.S. 57–35–131.
41. Romolo Gessi was the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal, in 1879, during the Turkiyya. For more see Romolo Gessi and Felix Gessi, *Seven Years in the Soudan; Being a Record of Explorations, Adventures, and Campaigns against the Arab Slave Hunters* (London: S. Low, Marston & Co., 1892). Also see Edward Thomas, *The Kafia Kingi Enclave: People, Politics, and History in the North-South Boundary Zone of Western Sudan. Contested Borderlands* (London; Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2010), 35.
42. al-Zubair Pasha, Imouri, Abtar, Ghatas, and Vasier were famous slave traders.
43. Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan, 1905, 36–38.
44. *Hajjana* are horsemen.
45. Reports on the Finances, Administration and Conditions of the Sudan, 1905, 38. The report on slavery quoted what Captain McMurdo wrote; he suggested that the government take a firm hold of semi-independent areas where inhabitants "like fighting for fighting's sake" and further said, "I fear that there will be no absolute security and durable peace in this country until a local militia of at least 2,000 rifles has been raised and placed in occupation of the various big tribal mountain strongholds."
46. Reports on the Finances, Administration and Conditions of the Sudan, 1905.
47. Charles Armine Willis was "appointed special commissioner to collate information on slavery and pilgrimage in the Sudan." See M. W. Daly,

Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898–1934 (Cambridge Cambridgeshire; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 63. Also see Sikainga, *Slaves into Workers*, 102.

48. C. A. Willis-OBE, Report on Slavery, 1926, National Records Office Civsec 60/2/7/24.
49. Berber city was the capital of Berber province.
50. They fled after the defeat of the Mahdiyya army in the face of the advance of the reoccupation forces.
51. See Robert Baum, "Sudan," in *Encyclopedia of Africa* vol. 1, edited by Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 431. *books.google.com/books?isbn=0195337700*
52. *`abeed* singular *`abid* is a derogatory word indicating a slavery status.
53. Sir Ali al-Tome was the *nazir* of the Kababeesh. *Nazir* literally means overseer; as a tribal rank it means chief or leader.
54. Sir John Maffey was governor general of the Sudan from October 31, 1926, to January 10, 1934.
55. This payment by the slave is different from *fidya* discussed earlier. This type of payment is continuous and is considered a move toward serfdom, not emancipation.
56. A *senddah* is minor stop of the train at a small town or village that lasts for a few minutes.
57. League of Nations, Motion Proposed by Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, Delegate for New Zealand, on September 7, 1922, Third Assembly of the League of Nations, September 7, 1922, LofN Doc. 23253 (A/47/1922). See Jean Allain, "Slavery and the League of Nations: Ethiopia as a Civilised Nation," *Journal of the History of International Law,* no. 8 (2006): 213–244. Jean Allain stated, "In 1922, Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, the Delegate from New Zealand submitted two Resolutions to the Assembly of the League of Nations, the first requesting an inquiry into slave-trading in Ethiopia; the second with slavery in Africa, more generally. Ultimately, a single, rather general, resolution was adopted: 'to refer to the appropriate Committee the question of the recrudescence of slavery in Africa in order that it be considered and propose the best methods for combating the evil'."
58. See Sikainga, *Slaves into Workers*, 100 and 102.
59. The Yorkshire Evening News, October 13, 1933, published an article titled "4,000,000 slaves in the World" in which it mentioned that all slaves entering Sudan from Ethiopia were turned back.
60. See Sikainga, *Slaves into Workers*, 101.
61. Sayyid `Ali al-Mirghani, Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi, and `Abdel Rahman al-Mahdi to the director of intelligence, March 6, 1925. NRO Civsec 60/1/3. The three gentlemen headed religious (Sufi) sects. Also see Amir H. Idris, *Sudan's Civil War: Slavery, Race and Formational Identities* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), 52.

62. NRO Civsec 60/A/1
63. Sikainga. *Slaves into Workers*, 207–208.
64. Ibid., 208.
65. Letter from Civil Secretary to Legal Secretary, dated April 11, 1925. L.S./S.C./9.2.
66. *Sidag* is *mahr* known by some as bride wealth.
67. Judicial Circular No. 2, September, 1902. The Judicial Circulars were issued by the grand *qadi* to explain a rule or change it. Up until 1991, circulars were the source of personal status law for Muslims. In 1991 a law was stipulated and most of the circulars were repealed.
68. C.S. 60/1/3.
69. Confidential Circular Memorandum No. 22, January 4, 1907.
70. Confidential Circular Memorandum No. 33, May 1, 1919.
71. Letter from the Civil Secretary to the Legal Secretary, dated April 11, 1925, regarding the letter from the notables.
72. *Ijtihad* is the effort of a scholar to derive a rule from the Qura'n and Sunna, regarding a certain matter where there is no previous rule.
73. See Stephanie Beswick and Jay Spaulding, "Sex, Bondage, and the Market: The Emergence of Prostitution in Northern Sudan, 1750–1950," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 5, no. 4 (1995): 512–34. Also see Willis Report, 54–55.
74. Slatin and Wingate, *Fire and Sword in the Sudan*, 5.
75. Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan, 1903, 5–6.
76. Ibid., 6.
77. Ibid., 5.
78. Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan, 1908, 70–71.
79. Ibid.
80. West African migrants into the Sudan are collectively known as *fallata*.
81. *Dobait* is short songs performed mainly by men to express love, pain, injustice, and other feelings.
82. Sir Herbert William or Jackson Pasha, served as the governor of Dongola during 1902–1922.
83. Mukwar is another name for the city of Sinnar where the first dam in the Sudan was being built.
84. *Maqtou`iyya* is a certain amount of a certain type of work per day rather than a per diem for any work done in a day.
85. *Tukul* is a hut.
86. A *quntar* equals 100 pounds.
87. Aziz Kafouri (1874–1942) was a Syrian businessman and farmer; born in Beirut. For a biography see http://kfourigroup.com/
88. NRO C.S. 3–1–5.
89. NRO C.S. 60–2–5.
90. In the Sudan, the color of a dark person who is not a slave or descendant of a slave is called "green." See Francis Deng, "Green is the Color of

the Masters: The Legacy of Slavery and the Crisis of National Identity in Modern Sudan," Yale University. http://www.yale.edu/glc/events/cbss/Deng.pdf.

91. NRO C.S. 60/7/20.
92. *Murhaka* is an instrument for milling or grinding grain. It is made of two pieces of stone, a long, oval, stationary piece that holds the grain and a small, oval one to grind it.
93. In reference to December 2, The International Day for the Abolition of Slavery, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted "the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others," Resolution 317(IV) of December 2, 1949.

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