THE REGENCY OF TUNIS AND THE OTTOMAN PORTE, 1777–1814

Army and government of a North-African Ottoman eyālet at the end of the eighteenth century

Asma Moalla
This study of the Tunisian army and government in the time of the Husaynid pasha-bey Hammūda (1777–1814) stresses the deeply Ottoman character of these institutions and the political and administrative impact of the jurisdictional authority of the Ottoman Porte on the province in general. The research thus initiates a systematic revision of a major thesis that has prevailed in the body of contemporary research on the Tunisian Regency. This book claims that the latter’s administrative and political evolution, from the end of the sixteenth century to the end of the nineteenth, was a process of gradual and irreversible emancipation from the influence and authority of the central Ottoman state. The neglect of the links between Tunis and Istanbul in that historiography has been paralleled, on the Ottomanists’ side, by the virtual exclusion of the Maghrib Regencies from the scope of research on the Empire. This present book fits an emerging trend that brings these provinces back within the Ottoman fold.

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Asma Moalla
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In this study, the transliteration scheme of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (with the exception of the ‘q’ instead of the ‘k’) applies to Arabic words used in the administrative terminology of the Regency (e.g. bayt al-māl, makhzin, jund), including most of the words of Arabic origin passed into Ottoman administrative usage (e.g. amāna, wikāla, jamā‘a, ‘azab), and normally Turkicized in the non-Arab provinces of the Porte. Finally, this transliteration scheme applies also to Turkish terms modified by Tunisian local usage (e.g. bulûk bâshî, ūda).

Many Turkish words relating to the Ottoman administrative terminology also recur in this study. They are often placed between brackets, to indicate the Ottoman origin of Tunisian terms, e.g. bulûk bâshî (Ott.: bölüm başı), or are used in the context of descriptions of administrative usages and practices in the central Ottoman state. Most of these words have been transcribed in the Turkish modern alphabet (e.g. kapı kulu, ocak). I have, however, used some diacritical marks not found in that alphabet, in the case of words of current use in the Ottoman period, but fallen into obsolescence, or for the transliteration of Ottoman words or formulations in a few nineteenth-century texts extracted from the correspondence between Tunis and Istanbul and reproduced in this study (e.g. the petition sent to the sultan in 1816):

- ‘ as in ʿaskeri;
- d as in qâdi;
- ǧ (corresponding to the ‘gh’ of the Arabic transliteration), as in tuğ;
- ğ, or y (corresponding to the ‘y’ of the Arabic transliteration system), as in beği and yaya;
- b (as in the Arabic transliteration system), as in silhdar;
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

- \(\mathbf{b}\) (corresponding to the ‘\(kh\)’ of the Arabic transliteration system), as in \(\textit{hocos}\);
- \(\mathbf{q}\) (as in the Arabic transliteration system), as in \(\textit{muqāṭālu}\);
- \(\mathbf{z}\) (as in the Arabic transcription system), as in \(\textit{mu’azzam}\);
- \(\mathbf{z}\) (corresponding to the ‘\(db\)’ of the Arabic transliteration system), as in \(\textit{žūl qadr}\).
For a revision of the ‘autonomy thesis’

From the conquest of Tunis by the troops of the grand vizier Sinān Pasha in 1574 to the imposition of the French Protectorate in 1881, the Tunisian Regency was, in regard to the international law of the time and in the eyes of its population, a province of the Ottoman Porte. One of the main theses upheld by the vast majority of twentieth-century researchers on that period of Tunisian history is that the country, during those three centuries, had been, in effect, and to a large degree, autonomous from the rest of the Ottoman sultans’ dominions. The ‘autonomy thesis’ is based on two main assertions concerning the political and administrative relationship between Tunis and Istanbul, i.e. first, that the government of the Porte had wielded only a weak, or insignificant authority on the deys and beys who ruled the Regency; and, second, that the Tunisian military and administrative institutions bore little resemblance to those of the heart of the Empire.

Before proceeding to a review and discussion of the themes and arguments linked to these two assertions, it is necessary, first, to study briefly the sources on which the contemporary historiography on the Regency has been based. These sources are varied and relatively abundant. There are, first, European sources including, in particular, accounts of travellers and observers of various origins and outlooks, among whom we may mention: official envoys to the government of the Regency (e.g. Monsieur de Brêves, ambassador for the French king Henri IV in 1628); priests acting for the redemption of Christian slaves in the Barbary region (e.g. Père Dan and Haedo in the seventeenth century); Europeans settled in the capital for varying lengths of stay (e.g. Nicolas Béranger, a trader from Marseilles at the end of the seventeenth century, Thomas
MacGill, an English trader who visited Tunis at the beginning of the nineteenth, and Dr Louis Frank, who was employed as the physician of the bey Ḥammūda Pasha at the same period; scientists and scholars on official or private tours to the Regency (e.g. the French botanists Jean-André Peyssonnel in 1724 and François Desfontaines in 1783, the English cleric Thomas Shaw in 1727, the German prince Pückler-Muskau in 1835, and the French officer E. Pellissier in 1848); military experts recruited by the beys, etc.¹ Another important proportion of European sources is composed of various archival documents, including in particular the official correspondence of European consuls appointed in Tunis, of which a considerable part was classified and edited by French historians during the colonial period (Plantet 1893; Grandchamp 1920–33; Monchicourt 1929). These foreign sources provide some descriptive accounts of the army and government of the Regency, with brief and infrequent references to the relations of the deys and beys with the Porte, and to the latter’s policy in the Barbary region.

Arabic sources include administrative archives, as well as chronicles, a number of which were published after the independence of the country, albeit only partially in some cases. The main Tunisian historiographers of the Ottoman period were: Muḥammad ibn Abī Dīnār (died c.1698–9), Muḥammad al-Wazīr al-Sarrāj al-Andalusī (died in 1736–7), Muhammad al-Ṣaghīr ibn Yūṣuf (died c.1770–1), Ḥammūda ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (died in 1775), Aḥmad ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf (died in 1874) and Muḥammad Bayram al-Khāmis (died in 1889) (see Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6; Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 1970; Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967; al-Wazīr 1985; Ibn Yūṣuf 1978, 1998; Bayram no date). Their writings contain descriptions of the institutions of government of the Regency, although, as in the case of European sources, these descriptions do not refer to a central Ottoman model. As concerns the value of the information they provide on the relations between the Tunisian beys and contemporary sultans, it is necessary to recall that all these authors, with the exception of the colourful janissary – farmer Ibn Yūṣuf, were secretaries in the beylical Chanceries of their time, or, at least, close to the powers that be. Hence, we find in their chronicles relatively few, and often allusive or vague mentions, of the central Ottoman government, evincing the same concern to stress any evidence of good favour shown by the sultans towards their masters, and to hush down conflicts between Tunis and Istanbul. These authors were also anxious to avoid undermining the image of the beys as powerful dynasts in the eyes of the local population,
hence, probably, a tendency to sin by omission about evidence of a strong direct subordination to Istanbul.

In conclusion, therefore, we may consider that the nature of the sources reviewed above accounts, in some measure, for a toning-down of Ottoman influence in the Regency that favoured the success of the autonomy thesis. Other factors and motivations, however, contributed to an important extent to this success, throughout the colonial and post-colonial stages of the twentieth-century historiography on the Regency, as I shall now proceed to demonstrate.

Historical research on Ottoman Tunisia from the end of the nineteenth century and during the first half of the twentieth was carried out by French academics and others, who were concerned to investigate the past of the new country that had been added to French dominions. The sources used by these historians, very few of whom had a real knowledge of Arabic, were predominantly European ones. Among the favourite subjects of colonial historiography, we should mention, first, the corso waged by Tunisian galleys against European fleets or coastal villages, and the slave-trade linked to it. Pierre Grandchamp’s prolific production includes, in particular, a study and translation of the account, by Jean-Baptiste Salvago, of the mission that he undertook in the Barbary region in 1610 (Grandchamp 1937). This Venetian dragoon man was sent to the Regencies under the escort of an Ottoman envoy, in order to obtain the release of vessels and citizens of the Republic of Venice, that had been captured by Algerian and Tunisian corsairs. Salvago, who failed in his mission (the Tunisian corsairs sent a deputation to the Porte to argue their case), denounces the rowdiness of Ottoman officials in the Regency, which he sees as bordering on rebelliousness towards the Porte, and speaks contemptuously of the lowly origins of the Turkish janissaries in the Barbary region who ‘have made (this region) the cesspit of the Ottoman Empire’ (Grandchamp 1937: II, 487). Salvago’s testimony, echoed by other Christian envoys, has led to the widespread assumption that the government of the deys, dominated by the power of the corsairs, was virtually out of control by the Porte. The neglect, or minimal attention, paid by historians to the link between the Maghrib corso and the strategy of the Porte in the western Mediterranean, moreover, has led to the belief that, in encouraging and developing the corso, the rulers of the Barbary Regencies were pursuing purely domestic material and political ends.
Another important theme of twentieth-century historiography on the Regency concerns the links, mainly commercial, established between the latter and the Christian world, and with France more particularly. Grandchamp’s works, among colonial research on that subject, include the publication of a ten-volume compilation of the archives of the French consulate in Tunis and other documents concerning the French community in that city from 1582 to 1705, under the title *La France en Tunisie* (Grandchamp 1920–33). The historian Charles Roux, for his part, has studied the relations between North Africa and France from the tenth to the nineteenth century. The book, published in 1932, is significantly entitled: *France et Afrique du Nord avant 1830: les précurseurs de la conquête* (France and North Africa before 1830: the precursors of conquest) (Roux 1932). It is based on various French sources, including archival ones, and demonstrates the constancy of French military designs on the North African region since the seventeenth century.

Still on the issue of relations with France, there is a marked concern, among the historians of the colonial period, to stress that these relations were not exclusively economic ones. Articles published by Grandchamp include a short study on the life of Don Felipe, who was the scion of a powerful Ottoman official in Tunis, twice converted to Christianity in the seventeenth century, another on the life and career of a Tunisian *mamlûk* (slave) of French origin in the eighteenth century, a third one on the embassy of Sulaymân Āgha to Versailles in 1777, etc. Colonial historians, including their most famous precursor, Alphonse Rousseau, who wrote his *Annales tunisiennes* shortly after the conquest of Algiers by France in 1830 (Rousseau 1985), have also striven to promote the thesis of a long-standing friendship between the beys and the French government – particularly in studies on the nineteenth-century Regency. Colonial historians have presented the policy followed by the Husaynid beys of that period as one of resistance to Ottoman claims on the Regency, by seeking French protection. Their prime aim being, in most cases, to defend the legitimacy of French presence in North Africa, they have striven both to stress the de facto autonomy of the Barbary provinces and to undermine the *de jure* authority of the Porte over them. Their main argumentation was that these provinces had been forsaken by their sultan from an early stage following their conquest. The Ottoman Porte had, therefore, for too long waived its authority on the Tunisian Regency, when it attempted, belatedly, to assert it again in the nineteenth century.
Two studies on this period, published in the first decades of the twentieth century, and illustrating this colonial interpretation of history, deserve to be mentioned. The first of these studies, devoted to a description of the emblems of power of the Husaynid beys, and published in 1913 by Henri Hugon, aimed, as asserted in its preface, at:

(patiently reassembling) all the elements constitutive of the theory of Husaynid autonomy . . . The author shows how the Tunisian princes, in spite of sometimes difficult circumstances, took initiatives that attest to the emergence of a national consciousness. We may see the influence and the example of France present throughout that process.

(Hugon 1913: preface)\(^4\)

The second of these studies, published by Jean Serres, a former consul in the North-African region, is entitled *La politique turque en Afrique du Nord durant la Monarchie de Juillet* (Serres 1925).\(^5\) In its last chapter, the author reviews, with apparent neutrality, the arguments militating against, and those militating for, a *de jure* authority of the Porte on the Tunisian Regency. He stresses, on the one hand, the hereditary character of the beylical office, the fact that the beys signed treaties with Christian powers and had their own flag, and that European consuls were appointed in Tunis. On the other hand, according to the author, the Porte opposed to ‘these marks of power constituting all the features characteristic of complete sovereignty for a European jurisconsult’ (Serres 1925: 375), rituals sanctified by the force of tradition, such as the official investiture granted to the beys by the sultans (an occasion, for high officials in Istanbul to receive periodical tokens of the beys’ gratefulness) and the religious prerogatives of the sultan-caliph. Serres’ assessment of the situation of the Regency by the end of his period of study (1848) leads him to the conclusion that Tunisia finally emerged ‘almost totally independent’ (Serres 1925: 379) from the Porte, after the conflicts that had opposed them since 1830 – a feat to which the moral and military support of the French government had contributed in no small measure.

In the post-colonial period, the research on Ottoman Tunisia has made extensive use of Arabic sources, besides European ones. This research has been carried out either in the context of studies encompassing the whole of the North African region (or, by a return to its Arabic denomination, the Maghrib), or has been limited to the
geographical scope of the Regency. Among the first type of studies, Claude-André Julien’s *Histoire de l’Afrique du Nord*, published for the first time in 1932, then, in a revised version, in 1952, four years before Tunisia’s independence, should be considered as a pioneering work of that historiography (Julien 1952). Julien has elaborated in this book the main arguments and themes related to the ‘Tunisian autonomy’ thesis, which were later taken up, emphasized, or sometimes criticized, by his successors. The second type of studies, limited to the history of the Tunisian Regency, include, in particular, those published, from the 1970s on, by the first generation of Tunisian post-independence academics. The three founding fathers of Tunisian historiography on the Ottoman period have thus each devoted their main academic research to a different century of that period: the seventeenth for Taoufik Bachrouch (*Formation sociale barbaresque et pouvoir à Tunis au XVIIème siècle*), the eighteenth for Mohamed-Hédi Chérif (*Pouvoir et société dans la Tunisie de Husayn Ibn’Ali, 1705–1740*), and the nineteenth century for Khélifa Chater (*Dépendance et mutations pré-coloniales: la régence de Tunis de 1815 à 1875*) (Bachrouch 1977; Chater 1984; Chérif 1986).

In post-colonial studies, the autonomy of the Regency, seen as a constant and increasingly accelerated process, is as strongly stressed as in the colonial historiography, and even more elaborately argued. It is linked to a traditional, nowadays strongly criticized, historiographical model, neatly dividing the life of the Ottoman Empire into the glorious first epoch of conquests ending with the reign of Sulaymān the Magnificent (1524–66), and the latter one, characterized by an irreversible though protracted ‘Ottoman decline’ until the fall of the dynasty in 1918. The implicit acceptance of this model by Tunisian historians underlies their assumption that the authority of the Porte over the Tunisian province was, from the beginning of the conquest (1574), a shaky one. Thence, the prevailing image, in contemporary historiography, of the Ottoman administration in Tunis, especially in its first two decades, as that of a corrupt and inefficient military institution, representative of a debased Ottoman political culture.

As a consequence of the inadequacy of the new ruling power in Tunis, historians have stressed the survival or rapid rehabilitation of administrative practices and cultural values inherited from the Hafsid sultanate, which had governed the country for more than two centuries before the Ottoman conquest. The Hafsid political revival, according to these historians, by breaking the traditional
Ottoman administrative mould, finally contributed to the transition from the deylical corsair state in the Regency to the beylical state, characterized by a stress on trade, rather than jihād, by the end of the seventeenth century. The role of the notables in this evolution, as vehicles of the Hafsid political culture, is stressed (Chérif 1981: 179–80; Bachrouch 1985: 55–6).

It should be noted, moreover, that the political past thus asserting its influence on the evolution of the Tunisian Regency is seen as extending as far back as the eleventh century, which saw the emergence of endogenous Muslim systems of rule in the Maghrib. The policies followed by the Tunisian beys from the end of the seventeenth century, therefore, were, for Julien, ‘a continuation of the policy of the Hafsids, Almohads and Sanhājas’ (Julien 1952: 277), or, for Abdallah Laroui, stemmed from ‘a will for renewal and concern to link with past rules’ (Laroui 1976: 261). The wars waged between the three Maghrib regencies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in particular, are invoked as an illustration of the permanence of centuries-old political concerns and strategies in the Maghrib region. For Julien, these wars, waged perfectly independently of the Porte, were ‘a revival of old greeds and hatreds’ (Julien 1952: 289). Finally, this return of the political past of the country is also seen as part of a general movement of revival of its cultural identity, plunging its roots into the most ancient periods.

The period of the Husaynid beylical dynasty from the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth (1705–1881) has been considered as the decisive and final stage in the uninterrupted and increasingly accelerated process of autonomy of the province. This particular view of the political and administrative evolution of the Regency, linked to a legitimizing quest for the origins of the young Tunisian state that emerged in 1956, has led a number of historians to stress that the Tunisian Ottoman polity, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, had fulfilled some of the prerequisites for statehood in the European nationalist sense of the term. For Mohamed-Hédi Chérif in particular, the Husaynid period marks the completion of the process of peaceful assimilation of the Turkish ‘army rabble’ (Chérif 1981: 197), ethnically and socially through marriages, and culturally, through the fusion of Ottoman customs and practices into what has been described by Fernand Braudel as ‘la fine civilisation tunisienne’ (quoted by Chérif 1981: 195). On the political level, the allegiance of the notables, followed by other sectors of the population, to an increasingly ‘tunisified’
government, ruled by the ‘semi-national dynasty’ (Chérif 1981: 197) of the Husaynid beys has also been stressed.

The prevalence of the autonomy thesis has been both the cause and the effect of a lack of systematic and detailed investigation into the various links between the Regency and the rest of the Ottoman Empire, with the exception of the commercial ones. The attention paid to the subject of trade exchange by several post-independence historians may be explained by the existence of a relatively abundant archival, and particularly European, documentation concerning it, owing to the fact that Christian vessels ensured almost the totality of the transportation of goods and passengers leaving or going to the Regency. All other aspects of the relationship between Tunis and its suzerain, on the other hand, are treated cursorily and without innovation. Islamic solidarity is stressed as being the main reason for the Tunisian participation in wars fought by the Ottoman Porte during the nineteenth century, i.e. the disastrous naval expedition against Navarino in 1827 (Chater 1984: 341–2) and the Crimean War in 1854–5 (with the addition, for the latter conflict, of a desire ‘to play a military role in international affairs’) (Brown 1974: 303). The religious authority of the sultan-caliphs is also seen as informing the persistence of the ‘traditional’ or ‘ritual’ manifestations of the beys’ allegiance to Istanbul (the investiture granted by the Porte, the Friday sermon in mosques preached in the name of the sultan of the time, the currency minted in Tunis bearing his name). Effective political authority for the Porte in the Regency is unanimously denied. Lucette Valensi, for instance, describes ‘the sultan’s suzerainty (over the three Maghrib provinces) in the diplomatic and political realms’, at that period, as just ‘a fiction’ (Valensi 1969: 90). The policy of the Ottoman Porte towards the Tunisian beys, particularly after the French conquest of Algiers in 1830 is, therefore, seen as a futile, doomed effort aiming at re-establishing an obsolete nominal authority. In contrast to colonial historians, however, those of the post-independence period have stressed the strategic concern of the beys to play France and the Ottoman Empire against each other, thus acknowledging that, in many instances, the Husaynids sought the protection of the sultan against French designs (Chater 1984: 453–62).

The numerous post-independence studies on the political institutions of Husaynid Tunisia also stress the Regency’s increased differentiation from the rest of the Ottoman Empire. On the beylical administration, Julien asserts that ‘the use of a few Turkish
terms, and the survival of one or two Turkish customs’ were its only Ottoman features (Julien 1952: 302). Chérif and Chater, though conceding a greater degree of Ottoman influence, succinctly state, for the first, that this administration ‘was based on the military, administrative and, above all, fiscal regulations introduced by the Ottoman conquerors, or their direct successors’ (Chérif 1986: II, 208) and, for the second, that it was ‘inherited from bygone days, when the Ottomans had set up institutions for the government of Tunis’ (Chater 1984: 75). Finally, Leon Carl Brown, in his study of the reign of Ahmad Bey (1737–53), sees in the beylical government of that period ‘a blending of Ottoman rules and practices with an even older Hafsid tradition’, synthesized in ‘simple and despotic’ methods of rule (Brown 1974: 95).

The possible existence of links, or similarities, between other institutions or systems of organization of the Husaynid state, and those of the Ottoman state, has been overlooked or, at best, treated superficially. Although Abdelhamid Hénia, in a number of his studies on the land tenure system of the Regency, has evoked, very briefly, the Ottoman centralizing influence, he has considered that the policies adopted by the beys in that realm in the eighteenth century served their domestic political and economic interests, and were unconnected, or even divergent, from those followed in other provinces of the Empire (Hénia 1997: 135–6). His detailed study on the al-Jarid region from 1676 to 1840 is also based on this assumption, as well as on that of the survival, to an important measure, of Hafsid or earlier usages, in many aspects of the land tenure and tax collection systems in that region (Hénia 1980). As for Taoufik Bachrouch, whose study on the military and religious élites of the nineteenth-century Regency includes a chapter on the Tunisian janissary force before its abolition in 1830 (Bachrouch 1989: 493–514), and particularly on its hierarchical structure, he has not attempted to trace similarities in that aspect of the organization of the corps, created in the period following the Ottoman conquest of Tunis, with those of the imperial janissary corps.

The thesis on the autonomy of the Regency, though dominant, has not gone unchallenged. Since the first decades of the post-independence period, a few historians, and particularly Robert Mantran, have upheld that the imprint of Ottoman rule on the past and present of Tunisia was stronger than deemed by most (Mantran 1962) – a postulate whose corollary was that the Tunisian Regency (and its two neighbours) partook, to a non-negligible extent, of a system of political, economic and social
organization common to all the provinces of the Porte, and should be re-inserted within its Ottoman environment. This view of the Ottoman period of the Maghrib has gained increasing audience in the past two decades, thanks to contacts developed with historians from the Arab world, and from Turkey in particular. It is now emerging among Ottomanist historians, who had formerly almost totally excluded the Maghrib regencies from the scope of their research. Studies, such as André Raymond’s on the Arab dominions of the Porte, from Algiers to the Hijaz (Raymond 1989), and Şevket Pamuk’s on the monetary history of the Ottoman Empire (Pamuk 2000), have recently started to bring back these provinces into the Ottoman fold.

Among Tunisian historians, however, the approach advocated by Mantran has mainly been limited to studies on the architecture of the Ottoman period (Djellouli 1995; Saadaoui 2001). It is, therefore, the ambition of this book to initiate an investigation of the political and administrative links between the Regency and the Ottoman Empire during the period of rule of the pasha-bey Ḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Husayn, from 1777 to 1814, corresponding to the hijra years 1191–1229. The study purports to answer two main questions: to what extent did the specific policies and reforms adopted by Ḥammad Pasha mirror the policies and concerns of the Ottoman Porte at that period; and how closely did the structures, sources of recruitment and organization of the army and administration of the Regency conform to the model represented by those of the heart of the Empire and/or those of other Arab provinces, in particular Egypt? By way of an introduction to this investigation, the first two chapters of the book deal with the political and administrative history of the Tunisian eyālet (province) from its creation in 1574 until the beginning of the period of our concern, mainly from the perspective of its relations with Istanbul. The two chapters include, in particular, brief expositions on fundamental concepts of Ottoman administration and statesmanship, with the relevant terminology, and its Arabized, or Tunisian, variants.

This study is based, on the one hand, on the existing body of research concerning the heart of the Empire and the Arab Mashriq provinces, among which studies on the structures of the Ottoman military and administrative institutions have been especially useful. The findings and results of that research have provided a conceptual framework for the reading and interpretation of various sources on the Regency, the bulk of which, if we except a small set
of archival documents contained in the Tunisian national archives in the Dār el-Bey, is constituted by the writings of local chroniclers and foreign travellers. The accounts and descriptions of the Regency by authors from the time of Ḥammūda Pasha (foremost among whom is Ahmad ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf, who devoted an important chapter of his famous Iḥāf to that bey) have been complemented by the testimonies of sources prior to, and, in some cases, later than, the period of our concern. The comparative method of research used in this study has revealed, in particular, that it was possible to extract precious information from the patchiest of descriptions, or from allusive statements, especially in Tunisian chronicles, when they are read in the light of what we know of the administrative and political organization of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, I hope to have demonstrated that, thanks to this approach, the limits of our knowledge of the Tunisian Regency, based on existing sources, may still, contrarily to the assertion of the historian Taoufik Bachrouch, be extended (Bachrouch 1987: 78–9).
Part 1

PROLOGUE

The Tunisian eyālet from the Ottoman conquest until the end of the eighteenth century (1574–1777)
The corsairs, the Ottoman Porte and the conquest of Tunis

The conquest of Tunis in 982/1574 sealed Ottoman domination of the eastern and central Arab Maghrib, over which the Hafsid dynasty, established in 1229, had extended its influence during the period of its apogee in the fourteenth and part of the fifteenth centuries. The region, which had been plunged, since the end of the latter century, into economic decline and political anarchy, had become the stake of a duel between the Ottoman and Spanish Empires for the control of the southwestern Mediterranean. The confrontation between the two powers pitted against each other the corsair forces affiliated to them – a frequent feature of naval warfare in those times. In the Ottoman camp, an original and far-reaching partnership was struck between the Porte and the Muslim corsairs, of whom the most prestigious was the famous Khayr al-Din Barbarossa. The latter, having succeeded his brother ‘Aruj as ruler of the small coastal town of Algiers, placed himself under Ottoman protection, and received from Sultan Selim I a firman (sultanic decree) investing him with the governorship of Algiers, as well as an important janissary force. The new beylerbey (provincial governor) and his successors were thus provided with the symbols of legitimacy as well as the human and material resources that enabled them to resist Spanish attacks and embark on further conquests along the central coast of the Maghrib (Bona in 1522, Constantine in 1524). Another famous corsair, Dragut Re‘is, who had been operating with frequent success against the Spaniards along the south-eastern coast of the Maghrib, was rewarded in the same way in 1556 by being appointed beylerbey of Tripoli. From there, he was able to conquer Jirba in 1560 and, progressing
in the hinterland, occupied Qayrawân, which had been ruled by the Shâbbiya religious order that had successfully defied Hafsid authority in the region (Julien 1952: 250–75; Barbour 1969: 76–90).

Tunis, the capital of the Hafsid sultans and their last remaining stronghold, did not fall easily under Ottoman domination. The city, twice conquered and occupied by Algerian corsair-beylerbeys: Khayr al-Dîn, from 1529 to 1534, and 'Ilîj 'Alî from 1569 to 1572, was both times surrendered to Spanish troops, who restored Hafsid rule there. Finally, in the summer of 1574, a naval expedition under the command of the grand vizier Sinân Pasha, seconded by 'Ilîj 'Alî who had, in the meantime, been appointed kapudan pasha (grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet) sailed from Istanbul to the Tunisian shores. There it was reinforced by contingents sent from Qayrawân, Tripoli, Algiers and Mashriq provinces of the Porte. The Ottoman fighters first successfully stormed the fortress of Halq al-Wâd, near Tunis, where a Spanish force had been garrisoned for the protection of the Hafsid monarch, Mulây Muḥammad, and then finally secured the capital (von Hammer-Pürgstall 1840–4: II, 191–2; Ibn Abî Dînâr 1967: 287–99). The campaign lasted two months and its victorious outcome resulted in the creation of the third, and last, Ottoman province of the Arab Maghrib, or the Barbary region, as it was denominated by Europeans.

The successive conquest of the eyâlets (provinces) of Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis, known as the ‘western hearths’ (Ott.: ızâr ocaklari) of the Porte, and situated on the western frontier of the Empire, had represented important territorial assets in the war waged by the Ottomans against their main European foe, Charles V of the House of Habsburg, whose dominions extended to Spain in the western Mediterranean. It is interesting to note, however, that this strategic consideration lost most of its importance soon after the conquest of Tunis (or maybe as a result of it): in 1578, the signing of a truce between Murâd III and Philip II, who had succeeded Charles V as king of Spain, led to the definitive cessation of large-scale naval warfare between the two powers (although this did not, for the next century and more, exclude corsair operations). From then on, while Spain turned to its new Atlantic possessions, the Ottomans shifted their attention to the Safawi threat in Anatolia and to their European territories (Hess 1977: 75).

More importantly, the addition of the Maghrib provinces to the realm of the Ottoman sultans represented a further extension of
the latter’s domination over the Muslim Arab world. We may attempt, at this point, to make some conjectures on the effect of the victorious campaign of Sinân Pasha and the solemn institution of Ottoman rule on the minds and perceptions of the Tunisian population. The authority of the Hafsid dynasty had certainly been increasingly eroded since the end of the fifteenth century and, especially, under its last monarchs who could only keep their throne by entrusting it to the protection of a Christian power. To the memory of the brutalities committed by the Spanish army against the inhabitants of the capital in 1534, were added rumours, real or fictitious, probably spread by pro-Ottoman propagandists, on profanations perpetrated after the second occupation of Tunis by Don Juan’s forces in 1572.1 After the city had been snatched twice from the weak control of Khayr al-Din and ‘Ilij ‘Alî,2 the 1574 expedition dispatched from Istanbul and led by the grand vizier Sinân Pasha himself, probably appeared to many as ushering in a new radiant era. The country was now, at last, closely reunited with the dâr-al-islâm (the realm of Islam) under the rule of the Turkish sultans, whose military excellence was seen as evidence of their true Islamic faith, and whose victories proclaimed that God was on their side. We may, furthermore, presume that the setting-up of Ottoman rule in the new province was received by the local ulama (religious authorities and doctors of law), not with the resigned acquiescence reserved to mighty usurpers, but with a measure of genuine enthusiasm. The religious propaganda sanctioning Ottoman rule, amplified and spread in the cities by the ulama’s Friday sermons, would also filter down to the countryside and to the ever turbulent, but not totally impervious, tribes. Furthermore, the population in towns must have welcomed the army and administration of the powerful gunpower Empire as an effective protection against anarchy and Beduin raids.

The beginning of Ottoman rule in Tunis (1574–91)
The Ottoman administrative structure set up by Sinân Pasha in the newly-created Tunisian eyâlet conformed to the general pattern established for provincial governments throughout the Empire. Supreme power in the province devolved on the sultan’s representative, the pasha, or beylerbey, appointed for a limited period. The victorious Ottoman conquest army, or wajaq (from the Ott.: ocak) the greatest part of which remained in the province after their commander’s departure to Istanbul, was now entrusted with
implementing Ottoman law and order in the province, and protecting it from the threat of Christian attacks. The \textit{wajaq}, in Tunis, soon became more commonly designated by the Arabic word \textit{jund} (army). Its members, upholding the Muslim Hanefite rite followed by the Turkish Ottomans, in contradistinction to the local population who adhered to the Malekite rite, formed the privileged tax-exempted group of the \textit{'askeris} of the province. Although the \textit{jund} was formally placed under the supreme authority of the pasha, its \textit{diwan}, constituted by the body of janissary officers who were empowered with prerogatives for settling all legal and administrative matters concerning their corps, enjoyed a large measure of autonomy. Of this \textit{diwan}, and, indeed, of the whole \textit{'askeri} structure of which it was in charge in the Tunisian \textit{eyalet}, the eighteenth-century chronicler Husayn Khûja asserts that ‘it was copied on those of Algiers and Egypt’ (Khûja 1975: 88). The \textit{jund}, in addition to fighters, included various categories of officers principally entrusted with administrative and accountancy duties, since the public service, throughout the Ottoman Empire, was an integral part of the \textit{'askeri} class. The highest-ranking of these officers was the bey. The \textit{jund} also included the Hanefite \textit{qâdis} (judges and religious jurisconsults), who were appointed by the \textit{ser 'asker} (supreme military commander) of Rumelia (Raymond 1989: 351). Finally, a group composed of its highest-ranking officers, to whom were added a few city notables,\(^3\) formed an influential political council, called (like the administrative body regulating the affairs of the \textit{jund}), the \textit{diwan}, which assisted the pasha in making decisions and implementing sultanic orders in the province.

The Tunisian \textit{eyalet} was ruled, at its incipience, by a sort of condominium set up between the Porte and 'Ilij 'Ali, corsair-beylerbey of Algiers and \textit{kapudan pasha} of the Ottoman fleet, until the latter’s death in 1587 (Julien 1952: 265). It is worth noting here, that, since the fifteenth century, the process of extension of Ottoman rule over new territories was almost systematically divided into two stages, as has been noted by Halil Inalcik: ‘[The Ottomans] first sought to establish some sort of suzerainty over the neighbouring states. They then sought direct control over these countries by the elimination of the native dynasties’ (quoted by Holt 1968: 83–4).

This observation applies also to Tunisian \textit{eyalet}, with the difference that, in the first stage, the native Hafsid dynasty, which sank into total oblivion after Sinân Pasha’s victory over its Spanish protectors, was replaced by the corsairs, who had preceded the
Porte in the conquest of the Maghrib. Sources on this brief period, however, have provided no detail on the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of ʿIlij ʿAlī on that province. In order to probe further this issue, it is worth recalling that the supreme commanders of the Ottoman navy, in the fifteenth century, were granted the governorship of some coastal territories in the Greek archipelago as an appanage to their office. To these were added, at least, the governorships of Algiers and of the town of Mahdiyya on the eastern Maghrebi coast, when Khayr al-Dīn Barbarossa was appointed at the head of the admiralty by Sultan Sulayman in 1528 (Ozbaran 1978). It seems, therefore, that as the Ottoman conquest progressed in the Maghrib, coinciding with the period when the first Algerian beylerbeys, from Khayr al-Dīn to ʿIlij ʿAlī, monopolized the command of the Ottoman navy, the coastal territories of Tunis and Tripoli (with the whole of the Algiers province) were integrated into what came to be called ‘the eyālet of the kapudan pasha’. By the end of the sixteenth century, however (presumably from the death of ʿIlij ʿAlī), the domination of the Algerian corsairs over the Ottoman admiralty had been successfully fought off by the government of the Porte, and the territorial scope of that eyālet, in spite of an increase in its geographical dimensions, became, again, limited to the eastern Mediterranean region (Beckingham 1965). The Maghrib provinces, which became directly ruled by the Porte after 1587, nonetheless remained after that date, to an important extent, under the jurisdiction of the kapudan pasha, as we shall see below.

It was also during the years from 1574 to 1587 that the initial territory covered by the Tunisian eyālet in the period following the conquest was, by sultanic decree, considerably extended to the south and east, to cover new regions that had previously been placed under Tripolitan jurisdiction (Bachrouch 1977: 163–4). As concerns Ottoman rule in Tunis in that period (and the few following years, until the military uprising that broke out in 1591), it has been described by Tunisian historiography as marked by acts of exploitation and violence, inherent to any foreign military occupation. Two specific instances of these abuses in Tunis have, indeed, been recorded by sources: first, Rajab Pasha’s policies of extortion (1576–7), which led to complaints being filed against him and resulted in his quick dismissal (Bachrouch 1977: 135, 139); second, the exactions of an Ottoman qādi, against whom a group of local ulama and notables voiced their protests (and eventually probably won their case) (Chérif 1972: 37–50). It is worth noting, however,
that in these two cases, at least, the abuses were stamped out. This, in addition to several admonitory letters sent to high officials in Tunis by the Porte, following reports about abusive practices in the new province at that period (Samih 1969: 261–2; Témimi 1995: 198–207), should therefore rather lead us to infer that the new ruling power and its representatives paid some attention to the rights and grievances of the local population.

In 1591, the uprising of the Tunisian jund led to important changes being made in the Ottoman administrative structure set up by Sinān Pasha in the province. Before studying this episode and its consequences, it is necessary to deal, first, with the origins and composition of the Ottoman army in Tunis on the morrow of the conquest.

**The Tunisian Ottoman army and the 1591 uprising**

The armies of the Ottoman sultans in the sixteenth century were of a heterogeneous composition. There was, first, the prestigious imperial janissary corps, originally exclusively manned by Christian Rumelian youth recruited and trained to follow a military or an administrative career in the Ottoman government, after having converted to Islam. These young men, who enjoyed the envied status of kapı kulus (slaves of the Porte), monopolized, since the fifteenth century, most of the high posts in the army and administration of the Empire. In addition to the janissaries, a variety of auxiliary contingents fought in the sultan’s wars. The greatest proportion of these contingents was recruited among groups of armed Muslim young men from the Anatolian plateau, where they were known as the sekbans. The increasing financial difficulties of the Porte, from the middle of the sixteenth century on, led it to resort increasingly to the sekbans, who represented a cheap fighting force, paid only for the duration of each campaign. The sekbans, who were organized by the Ottoman military authorities into various formations, are mentioned for instance, in sources on Selim I’s campaigns in Syria and Egypt in 1517, or on the wars in Hungary between 1594 and 1607 (Finkel 1988: 37). We may, therefore, presume that there was a number of these contingents among Sinān Pasha’s expeditionary force against Tunis and, thence, among the first Tunisian jund. This fact may also be deduced indirectly by assembling two pieces of information provided by Ibn Abî Dīnār on that army: first, that it included the 101st janissary orta (division), which Sinān Pasha had brought with him from Istanbul and, second, that its
total number was 3,000 fighters (Ibn Abī Dinār 1967: 199 and 301). Since the ortas of the imperial janissary corps, even in wartime, did not, according to the most liberal evaluations, number more than 500 men (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 61n.) this would imply that the Tunisian jund included only a small proportion of regular janissaries, and that the remaining number was made up of sekbans and other auxiliary forces.

Discontented or idle sekbans, disbanded between campaigns, became an increasingly serious cause of social unrest in Anatolia in the second half of the sixteenth century. The Porte, therefore, hoped to alleviate that problem by allowing these young men to settle in the territories that they had helped conquer. Whereas posts in the Ottoman central government and army remained (theoretically) reserved for Rumelians, these Muslim Anatolians of humble origins found an outlet for their ambitions, particularly in the far-away dominions of the Porte. An opportunity was thus offered for the sekbans to begin a new life in Tunis as the ‘askeris of the province. In addition to enjoying the benefit of regular pay, they were granted one of the most strenuously upheld claims of the sekbans across the Ottoman Empire, i.e. their promotion to janissary status (Inalcik 1970: 346, 348): thence their denomination as the kul ‘asker of the province in Tunisian Ottoman documents (see Archives Générales Tunisiennes, Carton 220, Dossier 346, document 3).

The incipient Tunisian jund, placed under the supreme command of an āgha from the janissary corps of Istanbul, was also structured on the pattern of their corps, being divided into sections of 20 to 25 men, placed under the orders of officers called the bulūk bāshis (Ott.: bölük başı, or section commanders), presumably sent from Istanbul, or, at least, appointed from among the small contingent of imperial janissaries that had participated in Sinān Pasha’s campaign. According to the eighteenth-century historian Muḥammad al-Wazīr, furthermore, the jund also included, from its beginning, another category of officers called the deys (Ott.: dāy, i.e. maternal uncle), who were placed in command of divisions of 100 men (al-Wazīr 1985: II, 338). This assertion, however, is contradicted by Ibn Abī Dinār, according to whom the deys only emerged after the revolt of the jund in 1591, as the elected spokesmen of the rebel janissaries (Ibn Abī Dinār 1967: 201). Several historians on Ottoman Tunisia have sanctioned the latter account, thus rejecting, implicitly or explicitly, al-Wazīr’s assertion (Pignon 1950: 102; Bachrouch 1977: 134–5; Raymond 1994:
II, 32). This choice may have been based on the assumption that, since Ibn Abî Dînâr lived at an earlier period than al-Wâzîr, and therefore nearer in time to the 1591 uprising (he died in the last years of the seventeenth century), his account of the circumstances of that event would be more precise and reliable. It may be argued, however, against this assumption, that Ibn Abî Dînâr, being a client and propagandist of the Muradite beys of his time who were engaged in a bitter conflict against the deys, was particularly anxious to deny any formal Ottoman status or legitimacy to his patrons’ enemies. Al-Wâzîr, on the other hand, who was himself a beylical secretary in the eighteenth century, wrote at a time when that conflict had been settled to the beys’ clear advantage, and could therefore afford concessions to truth on that issue. Furthermore, as a piece of deductive argumentation to substantiate al-Wâzîr’s version on the origins of the deys, and in the light of the fact that the sekbans, in Anatolia, were organized in groups of 100 men (Inalcik 1973: 48), we may plausibly suggest that the deys of the Tunisian jund (also commanding 100-men-strong divisions, as indicated above), were the original leaders of the sekban contingents recruited for the Tunis campaign.

The central Ottoman government, thus, officially acknowledged the authority of the Anatolian sekban chiefs, who had acquired ascendancy over their men through years of hardship and semi-vagrancy between campaigns, by integrating them within the hierarchical structure of the jund of Tunis (as well as those of Algiers and Tripoli). This policy was motivated by the permanent concern of the Porte to ensure a system of checks and balances in its provincial armies and governments. Such a system helped alleviate the risk that one particular official or group of officials would succeed in establishing a clear supremacy over the others, and thus monopolize a measure of power that would enable them to challenge the authority of the Ottoman central government. Finally, it should be noted that, although the deys may have appeared for the first time in the junds of the Maghrib eyalets during the sixteenth century, they did not, pace contrary assertions made by some historians, remain an exclusive feature of these provincial corps (Le Tourneau 1965): thus, sources of the end of the eighteenth century report that janissaries, under the leadership of their deys, launched insurrections in Serbia in the time of Sultan Selîm III (1789–1807) (Aksan 1998).

In the Tunisian jund, the deys, plebiscited by the grass-roots janissaries, represented a counterweight to the bulûk bâshîs,
emanating from the powerful janissary hierarchy. The authority of the bulûk bâshîs, however, clearly predominated within the jund. They were four or five times superior to the deys in number, and exercised a harsh rule over the yuldâshes (Tur.: yoldaş, i.e. rank and file janissary) (Ibn Abî Dînâr 1967: 200). We may therefore plausibly presume that the deys’ frustration at having their influence over their men thus thwarted was the underlying cause of the 1591 uprising. This interpretation does not contradict, but rather completes Ibn Abî Dînâr’s assertion that the arrogance and harshness of the bulûk bâshîs had brought to its utmost the exasperation of the yuldâshes, who massacred over 80 of these officers, with the complicity of some officers of the dîwân (Ibn Abî Dînâr 1967: 200). It is, moreover, supported by the fact that one of the consequences of the uprising was the soaring of the deys to political supremacy in the province, as we shall see in the following section of this chapter.

**A new Ottoman policy in the Maghrib**

The 1591 uprising, occurring in the context of the grave political, social and economic crisis that started in the last quarter of the sixteenth century in the Ottoman Empire and was marked by the breaking out of revolts and mutinies led by janissaries and sekban forces in various provinces (Inalcîk 1970: II, 342–8; Inalcîk 1973: 48–51), led to considerable changes in the administrative and political organization of the Tunisian eyâlet. In the new government structure that emerged finally by the turn of the seventeenth century, following a troubled transitional period, on which sources have provided very little information, the three main officials were: first, the dey, elected or chosen by the dîwân among the 40 janissary officers holding that title; second, the bey; and, third, the pasha.

It is important to examine critically, at this stage, the widespread assumption, in the contemporary Tunisian historiography, that the government of the Porte, submerged on all sides by the serious problems of that period, had bowed down to the fait accompli of the 1591 uprising in Tunis and had hastened to ratify the new order that emerged from it (Bachrouch 1977: 51). The fact that Tunisian sources on the period have been totally silent on the subject of the reaction of the Porte to the uprising, admittedly, might be considered as an argument in favour of this assumption. I have already pointed out, however, the possibility that the political biases of
Tunisian chroniclers led them to distort facts, or, at least, to sin by omission, as concerns such issues as the circumstances that led to the emergence of deylical power in the province and the status and relations of the deys with the Ottoman Porte. I would argue, furthermore, that is difficult to believe that the Porte stood utterly powerless in the face of the 1591 events in Tunis, if we recall that a few years later (in 1605), the breaking out of a mutiny in Egypt led to the appointment of an energetic and ruthless pasha who dealt with trouble-makers with an iron hand (Holt 1968: 82). It is, therefore, more plausible to assume that the post-1591 administrative order was essentially devised and edicted by the Porte itself, though it took into consideration the claims of the rebel jund. As, for instance, in the aftermath of the widescale 1524 rebellion in Egypt,7 envoys must have been sent to Tunis, once the storm had started to abate, bearing various amrs (orders) and qānūn māmes (codes of laws), to impose order in the province and reorganize it.

The 1591 events also led the Porte, in particular, to adopt a new decentralized method of rule over the whole of its Maghrib dominions. The three Maghrib provinces were thus each granted the status of eyālet mümtnāzē (privileged province) – a designation corresponding to the term ‘Regency’ in the European diplomatic language (Bachrouch 1977: 139). This new administrative status entailed, first, that the junds of the Regencies became totally independent of the imperial janissary corps, and their āghas and other officers were thenceforth promoted from within their own ranks. Each of the Regencies, furthermore, had its own fleet, headed by a local qubān (the word being an arabized version of the Ottoman ‘kapudan’). Second, in contrast to the Arab Mashriq provinces, the treasuries of the Maghrib Regencies did not have to remit any proportion of their yearly revenues to the central Ottoman treasury in Istanbul (Grandchamp 1937: II, 448). In return for this financial exemption, these provinces were required to fulfil specific naval and military duties, i.e. supplying the Ottoman admiralty with a number of galleys on its campaigns, and waging the corso against the Christian enemies of the Porte. Third, the governments of the Regencies were empowered to sign treaties with Christian powers, within conditions that will be described below.

It should be stressed, however, that the decentralization of Ottoman rule in the Maghrib region, which took on a more accentuated form in the Tunisian eyālet, by no means constituted a radical revolution in the Ottoman order of things. Political,
historical, or geographical considerations had, in several instances, led the Porte to relinquish a number of its prerogatives to provincial governments, including the acknowledgement of the supremacy of local rulers over its own official representatives (Imber 2002: 180–1). This trend was even increasingly asserted from the mid-seventeenth century. In this context, it should be observed that the setting-up of a deylical regime in Algiers in 1672 was no matter of chance, but represented the implementation of the same formula of decentralized government as that inaugurated in Tunis more than half a century earlier.

**The jund: a suggested dichotomous pattern**

Before proceeding to study the powers and prerogatives of the two main officials in the post-1591 Tunisian government, i.e. the dey and the bey, it is necessary, first, to dwell on the evolution of the janissary corps, that was both the cause and the result of the important political evolution of the Regency from the end of the sixteenth century until the mid-seventeenth century. The following suggested pattern of organization and development of the Tunisian *jund* is based on the assumption that this corps was characterized by the same structural dichotomy that constituted a fundamental feature of Ottoman military forces in the Arab Mashriq provinces (Raymond 1980: 354). It is drawn up, in particular, on the model provided by the Egyptian Ottoman army, on which a valuable body of research is today available (Shaw 1962: 190–210; Holt 1993).

In the Egyptian *eyalet*, the bulk of infantry forces were divided into two main regiments, known, respectively, in the Ottoman terminology, as the müstahfızan and the ‘azab. The recurring confrontations between these two regiments attracted the other smaller formations in support of one side or the other, and were at the source of the successive political and civil conflicts that affected the province throughout the seventeenth century. The müstahfızans, who formed what was considered the janissary regiment of the province par excellence, held the exclusive privilege of guarding the citadel of that capital, and their contingents were, at least in part, periodically renewed by contingents sent from Istanbul. I shall therefore assume that the Tunisian *jund* also had a ‘noble’ regiment, entrusted with guarding the Qasbah citadel, at the heart of Tunis. Given, however, the origins of that *jund* and its autonomy from Istanbul, I would suggest that this regiment did not include in its midst janissaries from the imperial corps, but was reserved,
instead, for the *sekбанs* born and recruited in Anatolia. These fighters were considered as the heirs of the glorious conquerors of Sinān Pasha’s army; their deys, furthermore, were the only ones eligible to achieve the supreme dignity of the title dey of the Regency, since this official, according to a European source, had to be ‘a pure-blooded Turk’ (Venture de Paradis 1983: 28). It is worth noting that the dey Qāra Akūz (1665–6), was a former āgha of the Qasbah citadel (Ibn Abī’l-Ḏiyāf 1963–6: II, 40).

The second main Egyptian regiment, that of the ‘azabs, belonged to an auxiliary Ottoman military corps recruited among the population of coastal towns and villages in the Ottoman Empire. The ‘azabs were often garrisoned in sea-shore garrisons, or were in charge of the surveillance of maritime and fluvial waters, as in Egypt. They were included in most, if not all, of the provincial armies of the Empire. In Algiers, for instance, the *zbanūt*, or *zambarūt* (a denomination that was the local distortion of the Ottoman ‘azeban), composed a regiment of 1,000 renegades, who were employed for corso expeditions (Gaid 1974: 94; Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 451–2). Finally, the ‘azabs were present in the Tunisian *jund*, as is attested by fleeting mentions of them in a few sources.\(^8\)

We may presume, concerning the composition of the ‘azab regiment in Tunis, that its members, as in the rest of the Ottoman Empire, originated from coastal regions. This meant that, with the exception of those among them who were recruited from the Anatolian shores, the Tunisian ‘azabs were, in their majority, converts, who gained access to the ‘askeri class in the Regency by serving as *mamlūk* (slaves) in the households of important Ottoman officials. The converts included, first, fighters from the Rumelian coasts and the Greek archipelago. The rest came from the northern shores of the western Mediterranean: young Christians captured by Tunisian corsairs, who, despairing of redemption, chose to convert to Islam, or hardened adventurers attracted by the profits of the corso under the Ottoman banner (Bachrouch 1977: 38–9). Thus, the dichotomy established within the Tunisian janissary corps, between the Muslims and the converts, corresponded to an ethnic–geographical divide between the Anatolians and the Europeans. The ‘azab regiment, whose development was, to a large extent, linked to the activities of the Tunisian corso, gained gradual importance during the first half of the seventeenth century.

The beys who, as we shall see later, were converts (or descendants of a convert), were therefore members of the ‘azab regiment.
Finally, we should mention here a smaller formation within the jund, which was that of the reîses, or corsair captains. We may presume that the corps of the reîses, or an important part of it, at least, emanated from the regiment of the ‘azabs, if we recall, first, the maritime vocation of the ‘azab regiment and, second, the fact that the most prestigious Tunisian reîses in the seventeenth century were European renegades (Bachrouch 1977: 64–5). One of the latter was Uṣṭa Murād Genovese, who had served as a mamlūk in ‘Uthmān Dey’s household (1598–1616). Uṣṭa Murād, abetted by a group of renegades, managed to seize beylical power in 1637 (Pignon 1955: 353; Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 209–10). This coup de force represented the first of a number of transgressions committed in the mid-seventeenth century against the Ottoman stipulation restricting eligibility to the deylicate to members of the Anatolian regiment.

The policies of the deys (1598–1647)

The period of the deys’ effective political supremacy coincided almost exactly with the first half of the seventeenth century, beginning with the rule of Qārā ‘Uthmān (1598–1616), succeeded by Yūsuf (1610–37), then by Uṣṭa Murād (1637–40) and, finally, by Ahmad Khūja (1640–47). The dey is also designated, in Tunisian sources, as the serdār (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 293). The serdārs were the commanders of janissary garrison troops in the capitals of Ottoman eyālets (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 156). They were normally subjected to the pashas’ authority, from which we may deduce that the 1591 uprising in Tunis had led to an inversion of the ranking orders of the pasha and the serdār in Tunis. The dey was also designated by the title of dawlātlī (Arabized form of the Ottoman ‘devletli‘, probably used in the Porte’s correspondence with this official, and meaning: ‘invested with power’) (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 302; Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 19). It is interesting to note that, in the Egyptian province, the honorific epithet ‘devletli‘ applied to high officers of the Ottoman army, in contradistinction to the Circassian beys (Winter 1980: 104).

Historians have acknowledged that the deys’ rule ushered in a period of quiescence and order in Tunis (Bachrouch 1977: 135). This evolution towards greater stability should be seen as evidence that Ottoman authority was restored to greater effectiveness in the Tunisian province, and probably also in the other two
Regencies, after they were granted the status of *eyālet mümtāze*. It is important, in this regard, to mention the role assigned to the *kapudan pasha* in the pattern of decentralized Ottoman rule in the Maghrib. This official, although he no longer exercised an independent jurisdiction on the Maghrib *eyālets*, was thenceforth considered as the main intermediary between the Porte and the Regency rulers. He was entrusted with enforcing and checking the observance of the laws and stipulations laid down by the central Ottoman government. The authority of the *kapudan pashas*, one of whom is reported to have ordered the execution of a recalcitrant pasha in Tripoli at the beginning of the seventeenth century, was not to be made light of (Chérif 1986: I, 79).

The power of the deys, commanders of the janissaries, garrisoned in the capital and a few other cities and towns of the Regency, was essentially urban-based. The public works (constructing covered *sūqs*, or markets, and religious monuments, adducting water, cleaning rubbish dumps) and policing measures implemented under their rule were of benefit to all town-dwellers (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 202–10; al-Wazīr 1985: II, 343–99). Urban development and crafts in the Regency in that period were also stimulated by the arrival of waves of Morisco refugees, who settled in Tunis or created villages and small towns in other parts of the country. They enjoyed the sultan’s special solicitude and were exempted from many taxes (Témimi 1983: 169–80). A number of them, admitted into the *jund*, provided its navy with a new source of recruits whose frustration and desire for revenge probably instilled new vigour into the corso. Finally, important financial and administrative measures to reorganize the *jund* were adopted in the time of Usṭa Murād (1637–40) (al-Wazīr 1985: II, 377–8).

The relations of the Regency with Christian states were conditioned by the policies and interests of the Ottoman Porte. The deylical government had to sign, with a number of Christian powers, treaties and conventions based on the Capitulation agreements previously concluded between the latter and the Ottoman sultan. The signatories on the Regency’s side, referred to as the ‘powers of Tunis’, were the pasha and the *diwān* of the janissaries.9 Thus, treaties were signed, under the Porte’s tutelage, with France in 1605, with Holland in 1622 and with England in 1662. On the basis of these accords, commercial exchange was developed, particularly with France, which emerged as the main naval power in the western Mediterranean. On the sultan’s orders, a French comptoir for coral-fishing and for the exportation of wheat to the
South of France was set up in Cap Nègre (on the northern coast of the Regency) in 1627 (Roux 1932: 114). These exports, however, were stopped during some years of drought, under the rule of Usta Murad (Ibn Abî Dînâr 1967: 210), presumably in conformity with Ottoman orders, since we know that, in the Egyptian province, for instance, the sale of grains to Christian powers during periods of scarce harvests was forbidden by the Porte (Shaw 1962: 84).

The treaties signed between the Regency and European states contained, specifically, clauses guaranteeing the immunity of vessels belonging to these countries from corsair attacks (see Rousseau 1985: 430, 474, 475–80). Transgression of these stipulations was, at times, committed by the Tunisian corsairs, thereby necessitating the sending of deputations from complaining countries, accompanied by emissaries from the Porte (Ott.: kapîcî), for arduous negotiations with the diwân (Grandchamp 1937: I, 315–22; Rousseau 1985: 38–40). The corso, however, thrived during that period, in particular against Spain and the Italian states.

In addition to waging the ‘small wars’ of the corso in the western Mediterranean, the Maghrib fleets were expected to contribute to the sultans’ naval campaigns. Thus, under Usta Murad, the Tunisian navy participated in a joint Algerian–Tunisian expedition under the orders of the qubtân ‘Ali Bitshnîn of Algiers (the ‘Ali Picinino’ of the correspondence of Venetian bailos) against the Venetians (Ibn Abî Dînâr 1967: 209; Rousseau 1985: 48–9). The province even contributed to the Ottoman campaign against Crete by sending war equipment, as well as contingents of Tunisian râîyya for two successive years, during the rule of Ahmad Khûja (1640–7) (Ibn Abî Dînâr 1967: 211; al-Wâzîr 1985: II, 408). The sultans’ military victories were also widely advertised in Tunis. The zîna (illumination of cities to celebrate a happy event or a religious feast) for the capture of Baghdad from the Safawids lasted several days (Ibn Abî Dînâr 1967: 211).

Finally, the first part of the seventeenth century witnessed the beginning of conflict between Tunis and the neighbouring Barbary provinces. In 1613, following an armed clash between the Tunisian and the Tripoli tan junds, the island of Jirba, which had been part of the Tripoli province, was annexed to the Tunisian Regency (Bachrouch 1977: 159–60). From then on and until the end of the nineteenth century, the Tunisian government was under obligation to pay to Istanbul an annual sum known as the qaṭî ‘al-wâlîda (the tribute to the sultan’s mother), deducted from the taxes paid
by the island. The annexation of Jirba by the Tunisian rulers, however, should not be seen as the result of a local armed conflict, whose consequences were imposed on the unwilling Porte. A more plausible assumption is that the conflict and the gain resulting from the Tunisian military victory had been previously agreed upon between the deylical government and the Porte (where the ladies of the harem held sway at that period), according to a recurring scheme in Ottoman policy in the Maghrib, of which later instances will be provided in this study.

Several quarrels also broke out between the Tunisian and the Algerian governments, as to their respective jurisdictions over tribes in the north-western region. In 1614, an agreement delimiting the frontier between the two Regencies was signed, with the mediation of ulama and holy men. More serious trouble broke out around 1628. The Porte sent a mediator, who was not heeded. Although the Tunisians suffered a severe defeat in the armed confrontation that ensued, the treaty signed shortly after that between the two provinces, confirmed and detailed the demarcation delimited in 1614 (Bachrouch 1977: 160–2). This particular fact, therefore, leads me to one last observation concerning the frontier litigations between Tunis and its two neighbours in the first half of the seventeenth century. The geographical limits of the Tunisian Regency, as I have indicated earlier, had been gradually defined, after several additions were made to its original territory, at the expense of the Tripolitan province, during the last quarter of the sixteenth century. The addition of Jirba to the Tunisian dominions in 1613 represented the last of these adjustments. After that date, the frontiers between the three Regencies remained unchanged for the whole of the Ottoman period, in spite of the numerous conflicts that broke out between them during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries and, in particular, between Tunis and Algiers. Thus, the policy followed by the Porte in the Maghrib from the beginning of the seventeenth century, preceding by several centuries that of colonial and post-colonial Europe on the African continent, was one of firm abidance by the principle of the intangibility of frontiers between its provinces.

The bey

The bey belonged to a category of military commanders known, in the Ottoman Empire as the sancak beğis or, in the exact Arabic equivalent of that title, amīr liwā’s (lords of the flags). This
designation drew its origin from the fact that, in the early period of the Empire, these commanders, on being appointed as the supreme representatives of the Sultan in newly-conquered territories, were each given a *sancak*, or flag, as a symbol of that delegation of power. The provincial territories commanded by the beys, which were also designated as *sancaks*, became, from the fifteenth century on, administrative divisions integrated into larger provinces, or *eyâlets*, placed under the supreme authority of the pashas, or beylerbeys (Ott.: *be柢lerbe祗*, i.e. ‘bey of beys’). The respective rankings of the bey and the beylerbey within the Ottoman administration were symbolized by the number of *tuğs* (horse-tails displayed on a pole-shaft) awarded to each of them: one for the first, two for the second. The beylerbeys and, increasingly, the beys, were recruited from among the new military and administrative elite enlisted from the *kapı kulus* of the Porte trained in the sultan’s household, who were rapidly superseding the old aristocracy of the Turkic warlords (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 138–45). The corps of Egyptian beys constitutes an interesting instance of these Ottoman officials in an Arab Mashriq *eyâlet* (Holt 1961 in particular). These beys were entrusted with the governorships of the *sancaks* into which Egypt was divided and with other high offices.

Ramadañ Bey, the first bey of the Tunisian *eyâlet* was, according to some sources, a *kapı kulu* sent from Istanbul in the period following the conquest (Roy 1917: 197). From the beginning, Ramadañ was entrusted with high administrative and fiscal responsibilities in the province, but it was only after the setting-up of deylical rule that he assumed permanently the responsibility of commanding the bi-annual *mahalla* in the Regency. The term ‘*mahalla*’ meaning, in Maghrib usage, ‘a military column, or camp’, also designated the military and administrative expeditions sent to tour the greatest part of the province’s territory lying outside the capital, for tax-raising (Dozy 1881). The *mahallas* were the main source of fiscal revenue in the Regency, and their proceeds ensured in particular the payment the *jund*’s salaries. The bey thus represented, as asserted by a European observer of the period, the ‘Grand Trésorier’ of the province (quoted by Abun-Nasr 1975: 76).

It should be noted here that, in the classical Ottoman provincial administration, the holder of this post of supreme financial and fiscal authority was the *defterdâr*, generally ranking second after the pasha (Gibb and Bowen 1950: 150, 201). In Ottoman Egypt, this post was offered to the most influential beys (Holt 1961: 222).
Twentieth-century historians on Ottoman Tunisia have considered that the beylical *mahallas* were the continuation of an old Hafsid usage, while acknowledging that these fiscal expeditions, in the Hafsid period, were not organized with the regular periodicity that characterized them under the Ottoman administration (Bachrouch 1977: 48; Raymond 1989: 356). It should be pointed out, however, that several Ottoman pashas, in Arab provinces in particular, were responsible for the leading of annual fiscal expeditions (called ‘*dawras*’, i.e. tours, in the province of Damascus, for instance), in the districts of their eyalets (Rafeq 1966: 21–2). In the present state of our knowledge about these Ottoman fiscal expeditions, we should not rule out the possibility that their systematic development and extension across other provinces of the Empire may have occurred after the conquest of Tunis, and may therefore have been inspired by the original Hafsid *mahallas*.

Ramađān Bey, during his *mahalla* expeditions, had to fulfil various duties, linked to his tax-raising functions. He was, thus, probably in charge of surveying the population and the sources of wealth in the rural and tribal regions of the Regency, gradually brought under Ottoman control during the first half of the seventeenth century. It was on the basis of such local surveys that *qānūns* stipulating, in particular, tax-rates imposed on the *rā‘iyya* in each province were drawn up by the central Ottoman administration and sent to provincial officials for implementation. The bey was also entrusted with dividing the province into administrative units, headed by local governors.

Ramađān was the ‘bey of the *mahalla*’ in the Regency until his death, c.1613. By then, several other officials had also been granted the title of bey, although Ramadān seems to have enjoyed pre-eminence among them. The beys – some of whom, at least, were Ramađān’s own *mamlūks* – were granted district governorships, or were appointed as deputies (*kābiyas*) of the ageing bey of the *mahalla* (Ibn Abī Dinār 1967: 227). After the death of Ramađān, who left no son, one of his *mamlūks*, Murād ‘Kursū’ (the Corsican), successfully vied against the ambitions of the brother and the nephew of his former master, and managed to impose himself as the main bey of the *mahalla* in the Regency. Murād, shortly before his death (1631), bought the dignity of pasha from the Porte, and his beylical title was passed on to his son Ḥammūda. The latter, during his long period of rule (1631–66), was able to assert the increasing beylical influence in the province. Having subdued most of the still insubordinate tribes in the province, he completed the
administrative set-up of the province and recruited tribesmen into the standing and auxiliary cavalry corps placed under his command (*ṣubāyhis and mazārgis*). Finally, in his old age, Hammūda, like his father before him, received the title of pasha from the Porte, which he kept for three years (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 239). His prerogatives and privileges were distributed between his three sons, the most important of which – the leadership of the *mahalla* – was bestowed upon Murād, the eldest (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 239).

It should be noted here that the monopolization of beylical power by Murād I and his descendants was not a singular feature of the Tunisian government. By the end of the sixteenth century, the principle of the inheritability of many army and government posts was increasingly asserting itself across the provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Many of these posts were thus held for life by their incumbents, and were next passed to their eldest sons, if the latter proved eligible. The development of this practice, in the case of offices entailing important financial prerogatives, was motivated by particular considerations of Ottoman statesmanship (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 256): it was expected that the Tunisian beys, as the main tax-collectors in the province, would abstain from pressurizing too harshly the tax-paying population and thus safeguard its welfare and material prosperity, in order to preserve the long-term interests of their descendants.

The fiscal organization of the Regency

The fiscal organization of the Tunisian province, since its creation, conformed to the same principles and practices as in the rest of the Empire. We know that the essential aim of taxation in the Ottoman Empire was to ensure a livelihood to the *ʿaskeris* out of the dues and customs paid by the *rāiyya*. By the end of the sixteenth century, this organization was constituted of the juxtaposition of three different taxation systems, introduced successively by the Ottoman administration. The first system, bearing some similarity to the feudal European system, consisted in the attribution of *timars* to the Turkish cavalymen, or *sipāhis*, who had rallied round the banners of the first Ottoman sultans. Each *sipāhi*, in addition to a plot of land for his own cultivation, was granted the right to collect, for his own benefit, taxes from the local population living on a specific stretch of territory, whose size varied according to his rank. From the end of the sixteenth century on, an increasing number of *timars* and *ziʿāmets* (a superior category of *timars*) were converted into
private property, sometimes with the acquiescence of the Ottoman authorities and, at other times, abusively. The second Ottoman taxation system, developed from the end of the fourteenth century, reflected the emergence of an increasingly centralized state, dominated by the salaried kapı kulu army. The coffers of the Treasury were financed by the taxes collected in towns and those collected from the peasants living on the ever-expanding mîrî lands (i.e. lands owned by the state), by agents of the Ottoman administration, who were themselves salaried kapı kulus. From the sixteenth century on, however, the growing need for ready cash led to the rapid development of iltizâms (concessions for tax-farming), whereby the right to collect a given type of tax, whether in an urban or a rural environment, was put up for auction and sold to the highest bidder, who might often be a rich member of the râiyya, rather than an ʿaskeri. The tax concession owner, or multazim, kept to himself the total amount of the dues collected by him, in return for the payment of a fixed annual sum to the state (Shaw 1962: 26–7).

The Tunisian fiscal organization was marked, first and foremost, by the imprint of the kapı kulu system. It was centred around a powerful treasury providing the salaries of the ʿaskeris of the province and controlled by the bey. Ibn Abî Dînâr interestingly reports, in this regard, that the leadership of the mahâllas that provided the bulk of the revenues to the Tunisian treasury, was, in the early period of the conquest, offered as an iltizâm to competing officials. The appointment of the bey as permanent leader of these fiscal expeditions after 1591, therefore, ensured that the most important sources of fiscal revenue of the province were controlled by a kapı kulu official. This measure also put a halt to the abuses of the iltizâm system, which caused suffering to the peasant population in many provinces of the Empire at that period. The fiscal organization of the Regency, nonetheless, included various iltizâms for the collection of a number of other taxes, particularly in the cities, which were held by Ottoman officials and Malekite notables (Pignon 1961: 201).

Finally, we note that the correspondence of the Porte with Tunis in the last decades of the sixteenth century contains severe reproof of some members and officials of the Tunisian jund for having abusively arrogated to themselves a number of timars and ziʿâmets (Téminî 1995: 206–7). It seems, in this regard, that timars were restricted to a very small proportion of the lands of the Ottoman Maghrib: an archival document of the same period, stating that the Ottoman Porte had fixed the number of ziʿâmets in the Tripoli

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province to four (Témimi 1995: 208), provides an indication on their relative unimportance.

As a last point, it is worth quoting, in the context of this description of the fiscal organization of the Regency, two instances of semantic confusion in the writings of Tunisian authors of the Ottoman period, resulting from their ignorance of the Ottoman administrative language. The first concerns Ibn Abī Dīnār’s assertion that ‘a great number of (Ḥammūda Bey’s) mamlūks were zu‘amā’ (plural of zaīm), and were considered as mulūk (plural of malik)’ (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 238). For an Arabic reader (and, very probably also, for the author himself), the two words zu‘amā’ and mulūk would translate, respectively, as ‘chiefs’ and ‘kings’, thus suggesting that Ibn Abī Dīnār wished to establish a striking opposition between the servile status of the mamlūks and their exalted position in the Tunisian government. Placing these two terms within the context of Ottoman administrative usage, on the assumption that the above sentence was copied by Ibn Abī Dīnār from a source written in Turkish, will, on the other hand, lead us to a less lyrical, but more informative statement, i.e. that ‘Ḥammūda Bey’s mamlūks were granted zi‘āmets, which they were able to hold as their mulk (with full property title)’. Thus, timars in the Regency, seem to have been attributed, not to the Turkish members of the jund, but to some mamlūks of the bey, and probably to the latter also. The second example concerns the ‘ašlānīs’ that were, according to al-Wazīr, disbursed to the janissaries who had participated in the conquest of the Tunisian province (al-Wazīr 1985: II, 377). We may observe here a distortion of the Ottoman word ‘salyāne’, meaning ‘annual salary’ into a word of close consonance, current in Tunisian usage, and meaning ‘original, initial’. The apparent irrelevance of this adjective in the sentence is tempered by the fact that the author was referring to a reduction, in Uṣṭa Murād’s time, affecting the (initial) amounts of the salaries paid to the janissaries.
2

HOUSEHOLD POLITICS
AND BEYLICAL RULE
(1631–1777)

The beylical and the deylical households
In the heart of the Ottoman Empire and in its provinces, the numerous households of relatives, followers and servants kept by prominent officials and notables, in emulation of the sultan and the grand vizier, served as foci of power striving to attract a clientele of various social and geographical origins, in order to serve the political interests of their masters. Hence, the term ‘household’, as used in the Ottoman historiography, refers, beyond the physical boundaries of houses and palaces, to the large social and political webs of influence centred around important Ottoman office-holders, and whose development, from the sixteenth century onwards, was linked to the weakening of the central sultanic power and the emergence of harshly competing forces within the Ottoman state. The structures, policies and rivalries of these provincial households have been studied in some detail in the case of Ottoman Egypt (see in particular Holt 1961, 1968, 1982; Hathaway 1995a, 1995b, 1997). The observations and results of this body of research will help us describe and analyse the evolution of the political conflict, reflected in household strategies, that opposed the deys and the beys in the Regency in the middle of the seventeenth century.

The militant core of the Ottoman households in the Regency, as in the other Arab provinces, was constituted by the *mamlūks*. The Arabic term ‘*mamlūk*’ (meaning ‘owned, belonging to’) applied to slaves of Christian origin who, after having converted to Islam, were kept in the service of those officials or notables who had bought them, or otherwise acquired them. They enjoyed the privilege of some education and powerful patronage, which allowed them to hold important offices. These exalted ‘slaves’, who were
expected to devote their life and career to furthering the interests of their masters, therefore stood as the provincial equivalents of the Istanbul kapı kulus brought up and trained in the sultan’s palace. A number of mamluks in the powerful households of the Tunisian Regency originated from Christian communities of the Empire and were bought in Istanbul or other Ottoman cities. The rest, in greater number, came as part of the booty of corsa raids against Christian coasts or vessels. Among the mamluks whose power was nurtured in the shadow of the deys in the first half of the seventeenth century, two in particular played an important political role: Uṣṭa Murād Genovese, from Qāra ʿUthman’s household, and Māmī Ferrarese, from Yūsuf Dey’s (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 205). Tunisian sources, however, have stressed the number and influence of Ramadān Bey’s mamluks (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 227). It is, indeed, plausible that the first bey of the Regency had managed to surround himself with an active and tightly-knit group of mamluks to serve and increase his power. His own ‘slave’ origin, and the training he had received in government circles in Istanbul as a young kapı kulu, had probably provided him, in that regard, with experience that the raw Anatolian deys lacked. This initial advantage was further consolidated by Murād and his son Ḥammūda, who, having inherited the beylical household with the office, were able to assert their leadership over the group of Ramadān’s mamluks, to preserve its cohesion, and to enlarge it. Deylical households, in contrast, were numerous and weakened by mutual rivalries.

The conflict between the beylical and the deylical households, rooted, to an important extent, in the division of the janissary corps into the ʿazabs and the Anatolians, polarized the allegiances of the Ottoman officials at the top ranks of the ʿaskeri structure of the province. Two episodes of that conflict in the time of Ḥammūda ibn Murād (1631–66) reveal the hostility of one of the pashas of that period to the bey. They also illustrate how the giants’ struggle could result in tragically crushing lesser officials, namely, two interpreters (tarjumāns) of the dīwān: the enmity of the first, ʿAlī Huwwā, to that bey, led to his imprisonment and alleged suicide (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 213), whereas the allegiance of the second, Fallārī, caused him to be executed on the dey’s orders (Bachrouch 1977: 171). The influence of the beylical and deylical households also spread to the Malekite rā’iyya. Generally speaking, we may consider that the rural population, and its notables in particular, was the obvious base of recruitment for the beys’
clientele. Ibn Abî Dînâr thus assures us that ‘every shaykh (tribal leader) wished to be (Hammûda Bey’s) mamûlûk’ (Ibn Abî Dînâr 1967: 237). The deys’ constituency, on the other hand, was mainly based among the Malekites of the capital, such as ‘Alî Thâbit, the powerful éminence grise of Yûsuf Dey (Ibn Abî Dînâr 1967: 205).

The policies and tools used by the heads of Ottoman provincial households in order to increase their influence were varied. Among them were marriage alliances, which have already attracted some interest from researchers on the Egyptian province (Hathaway: 1995a). In the Regency, we note that one of Hammûda’s wives was the daughter of an influential tribal leader of the time, ‘Alî al-Hannashî. Hammûda also married his second son, Muhammad al-Hafsi, to the daughter of the pasha ‘Abd al-Rahmân, and, most importantly, sealed an alliance between his household and one of the most important other deylical households in Tunis, through the marriage of his eldest son, Murâd, with the granddaughter of ‘Uthmân Dey (Ibn Abî Dînâr 1967: 212, 214). An even more potent tool in household policies was the material rewards that each of the bey and the dey could grant to his clients and followers in order to attract or preserve their allegiance. This issue is linked to the administrative and fiscal organization of the Regency. We may easily assume that considerable latitude was given to the beys for the granting of iltizâms and other related offices (such as the governorships of some rural districts) to their protégés in the broad and generally prosperous mahalla country lying under their jurisdiction. Similar prerogatives were devolved on the dey, but they extended over a much smaller territory, restricted to the capital and its enviroring district.

Finally, we should point out scattered evidence, provided by sources, of the extension of the policies of Tunisian households beyond the boundaries of the Regency and their intermingling with other interests and rivalries within the Maghrib region. Thus, the Tunisian beylical household in the time of Murâd II (1666–75) was allied to that of ‘Uthmân, the dey-pasha of Tripoli, whose daughter was married to Ahmad, a son of the Tunisian bey. Murâd resisted attempts by some members of the diwan of Tripoli to win him to their side against ‘Uthmân, and, in 1672, invaded that city in retaliation for the latter’s murder (Bachrouch 1977: 174–5). The Tunisian deys, on the other hand, tended to seek support from their western neighbours: during the sharp conflict that broke out between Murâd II and Sha’bân Dey, the latter, according to sources, appealed to Rajab, bey of Constantine, promising him
the Tunisian beylicate in return for his help (Ibn Abīʾl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: II, 44). Finally, we should note that the involvement of the pashas of the Porte in the conflict between the bey and the dey in Tunis, as illustrated by the episode that led to the execution of al-Fallarī, in the time of Hammūda Bey, or during the uprising of the jund against Murād II in 1673 (as we shall see below) suggests the existence of a link between the Tunisian (and other Maghrib) households and the main central Ottoman households in Istanbul.

After this description of the tools of household policies in the Regency, I shall now review the main developments of the conflict that opposed the beylical and the deylical households from the middle of the seventeenth century until 1675, and their final outcome.

The conflict between the deys and the beys (1600–75)

The rivalry between the two main power-holders of the Regency, latent in the first decades of the seventeenth century, took on an increasingly overt character during the long period of rule of Hammūda Bey, who had varying relations with the deys of his time. With Usta Murād (1637–40), who enjoyed uncontested political supremacy over the province, the young bey presumably showed the same prudent deference shown by his predecessors towards Qāra ʿUthmān and Yūsuf Deys. Hammūda also showered gifts on Ahmād Khūja Dey, but a sharp conflict arose between the two men towards the end of Khūja’s tenure (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 211–12). The bey showed even greater generosity towards the third dey of his time, Ḥāj Muṣṭafa Lāz (al-Wazīr 1985: II, 414), whereas his relations with the fourth, Qāra Akūz, were marked by clear hostility. The latter was poisoned, it was rumoured, at the instigation of Hammūda’s sons, shortly after their father’s death, for which they held him responsible (Bachrouch 1977: 171).

Under Murād Bey II (1666–75), the tension between the beylical and the deylical households reached the point of open armed confrontation. After the death of Qāra Akūz Dey in 1666, the new bey ensured the accession to the deylicate of one of his protégés, Ḥāj Ughli.2 A few years later, however, this dey was declared unsound of mind, and the dīwān ruled his deposition. Ḥāj Ughli was succeeded by Shaʾbān Khūja, who managed to supersede Murād’s own candidate. A sharp conflict arose between the bey and the dey’s party in the jund, ending in Murād’s victory, and the
exile of several Hanefite officers in 1672. Muḥammad Mantashālī was then elected to the deylicate, not in the ḏiwrān, according to legal formality, but in the bey’s camp, outside Tunis (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 243).

The jund engineered a second uprising in 1673. The uprising, supported by the pasha ‘Alī Barba (Bachrouch 1977: 175), resulted in the deposition of Mantashālī from the deylical office and his replacement by ‘Alī Lāz. A number of the supporters of Murād Bey in the jund were killed, and ‘Alī Lāz asserted his power in the capital by appointing a new bey to serve in his government. Murād joined forces with his younger brother Muḥammad al-Ḥafṣī, and the Muradites rallied their supporters and armed contingents outside the capital. The bey emerged, once again, victorious from the battle that ensued with the dey’s forces (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 244–6).

Following this victory, a high deputation was sent to Istanbul to submit Murād’s account of the events to the Porte. The ensuing firman issued by the Porte, in the words of Ibn Abī Dīnār, ‘fulfilled (the highest) expectations’ of Murād, who thus ‘reached heights of glory that his father or his grandfather had never attained, nor anyone else in the whole of the Maghrib’ (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 246). The author provides no details on the extent of the political gain scored by the bey after 1675, other than briefly mentioning that ‘qānūn judgements (i.e. judgements on matters of civil and political law, lying outside the scope of the religious šarī’a) were thenceforth issued in the capital on Murād’s orders, or recommendations’ (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 246). Thus, the bey’s already considerable judicial authority was no longer confined to the countryside, but extended now to the seat of the Tunisian government. I would, therefore, suggest that the dey, who had risen to supremacy in the province after the victorious uprising of the Anatolians, was now officially supplanted by the bey, following his defeat by Murād’s forces.

The causes of beylical supremacy in the Regency

Historians on Ottoman Egypt have considered that the supremacy of the beys in that province, which asserted itself during the eighteenth century, was due to the fact that their corps had harboured the survivors of the old elite of the Mamluk sultanate that had developed to highest efficiency the techniques of household politics linked to the mamlūk institution in the pre-Ottoman period of the
country (Holt 1968: 83–4). Yet, in the Tunisian Regency where this political tradition did not exist, the beys were able, by the second half of the seventeenth century, to score a quicker and more complete triumph. This triumph was, undoubtedly, the direct result of the irresistible development of the Muradite household. The real causes for the latter phenomenon, however, should be sought not so much in the superior manoeuvring skills of the beys in household politics, compared to their rivals (even if this may be taken as a reasonable assumption), as in specific features of the beylical office: first, the inheritability of this office, which ensured the cohesion and continuous development of the household headed by the Muradites and, second, the considerable financial and administrative prerogatives devolved to it, which attracted to the beys a large clientele across the Regency.

We may therefore say that, in the administrative structure edicted by the Porte at the end of the sixteenth century, while political supremacy was formally granted to the dey, true power lay with the bey. The reason for this deliberate and subtle Ottoman policy is not difficult to make out. The dey stood, essentially, as the symbol of the Ottoman military institution, which had become a constant source of threat to the interests of the Ottoman state. With his Anatolian followers, he represented, through his ethnic origins, the Turkic timar cavalry and, through his formal status, the increasingly unruly janissaries of the Empire. The bey, on the other hand, representing, with his mamlûks, the Rumelian Ottoman administrative institution, headed by the grand vizier in Istanbul, was the ‘man of the Porte’ in Tunis. We may assume, in this regard, that the status of kapı kulu held by Ramadân, was passed on to his mamlûk Murâd and his descendants, although the latter never set foot in Istanbul. Finally, the granting of the title of pasha to Murâd I and his son Hammûda, was another mark of the Porte’s favour. The conferring of a second tuğ on these beys represented an administrative promotion granted at the close of a deserving career.

On the local front, things appeared even rosier for the Muradites. In the eyes of the majority of the local population, little aware of the suzerainty of the remote Ottoman sultans, the beys, who had taken up their residence in the Bârdû palace where the last Hafsid sultans had dwelt, appeared as the natural successors of these sovereigns. Panegyrist and local poets would also, no doubt, vie to amplify that image and thus pander to the ambition of the Muradites to attain the status of full-fledged dynasts. The
suspicious Porte, instructed by bitter experience in other provinces, particularly in Egypt, could not have been unaware of the temptation of increasing autonomy for these powerful officials. With this concern in mind, the central Ottoman government, since the beginning of the post-1591 administration, had conferred the title of bey to several officials, who stood as counter-weights to the power of the main bey of the mahalla. In the mid-seventeenth century, Ramaḍān Bey, Ḥusayn Bey, Jaʿfar Bey and Muṣṭafā Bey, acted as Ḥammūda’s deputies (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 229) and as his potential replacements or successors, should he step beyond the bounds fixed for a servant of the Ottoman state. These beys, or others probably appointed after them, assumed the same role during the rule of Murād II.

The fratricidal conflict (1675–86)
The conflict that arose between Muḥammad and ʿAlī, respectively the eldest and the second sons of Murād II, shortly after the latter’s death in 1675, ushered in a period of political crisis and civil trouble that lasted until 1686. The two main sources on that period are Ibn Abī Dīnār (whose chronicle stops in the year 1681), and the eighteenth-century historian al-Wazīr. The two accounts appear mostly as a jumble of confused occurrences, occasionally interspersed with brief, or vague explanations. Placing the events of the period within the framework of Ottoman household dynamics will, however, enable us to shed some light on an important aspect of the fratricidal conflict. I shall, therefore, assume that the Muradite household was split, at Murād II’s death, into two warring parties, each headed by one of the rival brothers, and which will be thenceforth designated here as the Muḥammadiya and the ʿAlawiyya households.

Concerning the respective constituencies of the two households, it seems probable that the bulk of the Muḥammadiyya partisans must have originated from the initial Muradite household, whereas the ʿAlawiyya included its former discontented elements, half-hearted allies and opponents. Ibn Abī Dīnār, a clear champion of ʿAlī’s cause, has provided us with the names of the most important members of that bey’s household. These included, first, two prominent personalities linked to ʿAlī by blood ties: his paternal uncle, Muḥammad al-Ḥafṣī, and his maternal uncle, Ahmad Shalabī. The latter, being the son of Yūṣuf Dey, had himself inherited one of the most prestigious deylical households of the Regency. The other
Box 2.1 Members of the household of ʾAlī ibn Murād Bey

ʾAlī ibn Murād’s household (1675–85)

1 His ally in the Muradite family:
   • Muḥammad al-Ḥafṣī, second son of Ḥammūda ibn Murād Bey.

2 Ottoman grandees or officers:
   • Ahmad Shalabī, Yūsuf Dey’s son;
   • Muḥammad Bīšāra, secretary of the dīwān, then dey;
   • Faraj Ṭurkhān, military officer;
   • Muḥammad Ṭābāq, corsair captain, then commander of Muḥammad’s troops, then dey under ʾAlī Bey;
   • Muḥammad Samāya, Kāhiya of Ghār-al-Milḥ (garrison commander);
   • Qāʾid Muḥammad ibn Qāʾid Ḥasan, and his sons.

3 Mamlūks:
   • Muṣṭafa Sbanyūl (i.e., the Spaniard), military commander;
   • Ibn Mūsā Khaznadār (possibly a Jew);
   • Qāʾid Murād ibn ʿAbdallah;
   • his exact homonym, Qāʾid Murād ibn ʿAbdallah (the patronymic name Ibn ʿAbdallah being often attributed to mamlūks after their conversion).

4 Malekites:
   • ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Abīl-Qāsim ibn Khalaf, descendant of the patron saint of Tunis, Miḥrīz ibn Khalaf, kātib (secretary);
   • Abū Mahfūz Miḥrīz ibn Khalaf, probably a cousin, or nephew of the former, kātib;
   • Muḥammad Ṣaddām al-Yamanī, from Qayrawān, kātib;
   • Ahmad Salīm;
   • The son of Khalīfa ibn Zāʾīd al-Warshafānī;
   • Shaykh Sulṭān ibn Munaṣṣar, of the Ḥanānsha tribe, ʾAlī Bey’s father-in-law.
members of the ‘Alawiyya household originated from the three main socio-ethnic groups of the Regency: the mamliks, the officers of the jund, and the Malekites (see Box 2.1).

Tunisian sources are far from providing a coherent or satisfactory account of the role of the central Ottoman government during the years 1675–86. Their accounts, nonetheless, mention several direct interventions of the Porte in the Regency at that period. We may also, at other times, through plausible deductions, perceive in the events of those troubled years the hidden influence of Ottoman interests and policies, as well as the change in these policies. It is, thus, possible to say that the decade of fratricidal conflict in the Regency reflected the fluctuations of the local household conflicts, which were themselves influenced by central household conflicts in that equally troubled conjuncture for the Ottoman Porte. In this regard, it is hoped that Ottomanist research will help shed more light on the rifts and changes within the central government during that period, in order to be able to trace more clearly their consequences on the conflicts in the Tunisian province.

In the light of the factual information provided by sources, and of the hypotheses suggested above, we may thus propose a fairly coherent – though no doubt tentative and incomplete – analysis of the conflict between the two beylical households from 1675 to 1686, considered from the perspective of Ottoman policies in the Regency. The first stage of the conflict covering the years 1675 to 1677, started with the contention raised by ‘Alî against Muḥammad’s investiture as bey of the Regency, although the latter, as his father and grandfather before him, had assumed the functions of bey of the mahalla in the last years of Murâd II’s life. The diwân, acting as referee, called for a sharing of the leadership of the mahalla between the two brothers (al-Wazîr 1985: II, 452). The diwân’s ruling, which broke from the rule established for beylical succession in the Regency may, nonetheless, have been inspired, or dictated, by the Porte itself, in support of ‘Alî Bey and his camp in the Regency. This hypothesis seems plausible, if we examine the role played by ‘Alî Bey’s uncle and ally, Muḥammad al-Ḥafṣî, at that stage. This member of the Muradite family, following Muḥammad Bey’s refusal to share power with his brother, was appointed by the diwân to the beylical office. ‘Alî gave his hearty agreement to the new arrangement, while Muḥammad, having rallied his supporters in the region of al-Ḳâf, prepared to attack the new bey in the capital. Muḥammad al-Ḥafṣî, in the absence of support from the jund, fled to Istanbul. On his appointment to the
title of pasha of Tunis by the grand vizier Fāzil Ahmad Köprülü in 1676, he sailed back to the Regency to assume his new office. Some of the pashas of Tunis, as will be recalled, had, during the conflict between the deys and the beys in the preceding period, managed to cause the latter considerable trouble. Therefore, when Muḥammad al-Ḥafṣī’s ship reached the port of Tunis, his elder nephew, who had regained beylical power, simply refused to let him land, obliging him to return to Istanbul – a gesture of unprecedented defiance to the Porte (al-Wazīr 1985: II, 453–6).

As for ‘Alī, fleeing from his brother’s vengeance, he sought support, first in the Algerian Regency, where he stayed with his uncle Ahmad Shalabī, then among the tribes of the Jabal Wislāt, who had, only a few years before (1674–5), risen in rebellion against his own father (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: II, 50) – a fact that confirms that the younger bey’s household represented a counter-force to the Muradite traditional constituency in the province. Relentless armed confrontations ensued between the two brothers in various regions in the Regency. Each of them went through an alternation of victories and defeats – the latter being often the consequence of the defection, or treason, of the janissary troops under his command. Finally, a decisive battle, fought not far from the capital, in 1677, secured for the victorious ‘Alī a relatively long tenure of power, albeit a troubled one (1677–84).

‘Alī Bey, having exiled the dey Māmī Jamal, who had served the interests of his brother Muḥammad, appointed to the deylicate Muḥammad Ṭābāq. 3 While the fighting continued across the Regency’s territory between the two brothers, the new dey and his men were, for a time, besieged in the Qasbah of Tunis by another faction of the jund at the orders of Muḥammad Bey (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 224–5). During that conflict, food prices soared in the capital, until, according to al-Wazīr, ‘God blessed the population with the arrival of ships laden with wheat from the land of the Turks, which brought prices down’ (al-Wazīr 1985: II, 479). Ṭābāq finally managed to repel his enemies and consolidated his power in the capital.

In 1678, the pasha Muḥammad al-Ḥafṣī came back to Tunis to assume his functions, but soon engaged in a conflict with Ṭābāq Dey. The latter’s supplication to Istanbul led the Porte to act against the pasha; in 1679, a ship sent from Istanbul took Muḥammad al-Ḥafṣī into exile to Crete or to some other obscure fate (al-Wazīr 1985: II, 483). Ṭābāq next turned to confront the bey himself, but his temerity cost him his life; ‘Alī Bey ordered
his execution in 1682 and appointed in his place Ahmad Shalabī. At this stage, however, the young bey’s own presumption and arrogance, or, more probably, the winds of change within the central Ottoman government, which had already caused his uncle’s ruin, led to a reversal in his fortunes. Discord promptly settled between ʿAlī Bey and Shalabī Dey, causing the latter to invite Muḥammad to the capital, where he received the beylical investiture from the diwān in 1683–4. The alliance between Shalabī and Muḥammad Bey led to the military defeat of ʿAlī and the death of the most prominent of his mamlūks, later that year (al-Wazīr 1985: II, 501–12).

Soon after that, however, a new development ushered in the last episode of the conflict. The two brothers, having sealed a mutual alliance and obtained Algerian support, confronted Shalabī Dey. The Algerian army, who had already intervened once, c.1678, as pacific mediator in the conflict between the two brothers by securing the conclusion of a short-lived agreement for sharing power between them in the Regency, this time acted more energetically. Tunis, where the deylical forces were entrenched, surrendered after a long siege in 1686, leading to Shalabī’s execution and the appointment of a new dey, Ḥāj Baqṭāsh. The agreement on the sharing of power between the two brothers was, once again, a brief one. A few days after the Algerian and beylical troops entered Tunis, ʿAlī was killed by a group of janissaries, leaving Muḥammad Bey at the head of the province (al-Wazīr 1985: 513–44). The Algerian dey, presiding, a few days later at the investiture of Muḥammad Bey, solemnly stated, according to a European source in the Regency, that he was the mere instrument of the sultan’s authority on the province:

He appointed Muhammad as the single and only Bey of Tunis, declaring that he was acting on the orders of the Ottoman Sultan, on whose express authorization he had relied in all his actions. After which, he recommended that everyone should strictly observe the limits of his obligations.

(Béranger 1979: 53)

Ottoman legality thus finally prevailed. What were the main features of the new administrative order in the Regency, compared to the old? First, at the top of the Tunisian administrative structure, the supreme authority of a single bey was forcefully asserted.
Second, we note that, on the other hand, the deys continued their struggle to avoid being reduced to mere puppets, as had been the case for many of them since the days of Ḥammūda ibn Murād Bey (1631–66). They seem, at times (as during the quarrel that broke out between Tābāq Dey and the pasha Muḥammad al-Ḥafṣī) to have enjoyed support from the central Ottoman government of that period, or, at least, powerful factions in it – an assumption supported by the fact that, under Muḥammad Bey’s rule, the dey Baqtāsh (1686–7) also held the title of pasha during his short tenure of office (Rousseau 1985: 71). As for the office of pasha of Tunis, we know that it was granted, in 1688, to a semi-disgraced official from Istanbul (Heywood 1993: 225–6) presumably followed by others of relatively modest, or tarnished, standing in the central administration. The issue of the pashalik of Tunis was thus kept in abeyance until the beginning of the eighteenth century, when it rose again to prominence in the three Maghrib Regencies, as we shall see later.

**The last Muradites and Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf (1687–1705)**

Thanks to the elimination of ‘Alī’s most important mamlūks in 1685 and the consolidation of Muḥammad’s rule over the province after 1686, the Muḥammadiya household was probably able to reconstitute the original web of alliances of the Muradite household, with the reintegration, within the winner’s camp, of most of those who had for a time forsaken it. The Porte acknowledged the efficiency of Muḥammad’s rule by granting him the second tuğ to which sancak beys throughout the Empire were promoted at that period (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: II, 63). As a formal sign of additional power accruing to the beylical office, we also note that, from the last decade of the seventeenth century, treaties with Christian powers, formerly signed by the pasha and the dīwān, thenceforth bear the signature of the bey, following that of the sultan’s representative (see, for instance, a treaty signed with France in 1698, Rousseau 1985: 488).

According to sources, Muḥammad Bey enjoyed the support, within the central Ottoman government, of the powerful renegade and former dey of Algiers, Ḥasan Mezzo-Morto. Conflict with other members of the Algerian dīwān had led this official to escape to Istanbul, with the assistance of Muḥammad Bey, and eventually secure the command of the Ottoman admiralty (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf
Muhammad Bey’s relations with Mezzo-Morto’s enemies in power in Algiers, on the other hand, were marked by hostility: in 1694, the Algerians engineered a coup d'état in the Tunisian Regency and brought to power Muhammad Bey’s estranged mamlûk and former āgha of the Turkish şubâybis (a prestigious cavalry corps), Ibn Shukr. The latter’s rule, however, was a brief one; Muhammad, having rallied his supporters, was able to expel Ibn Shukr from the province and reasserted his authority over the Regency until his death, one year later, in 1696.

Two firmans from the Porte, constituting the limited official Ottoman documentation available on that period, give us some insight into the relations of the central government with the Maghrib Regencies, which seem to have reached a low during that period. The first expresses the sultan’s angry remonstrations to the dey of Algiers, for having invaded the Tunisian Regency in 1695 (Samih 1969: 318–19). The second, dated the month of Shawwâl 1106/1695, triumphantly announces the reconquest of Sâkiz (Chios) from Venice to the rulers of the three Regencies, while ominously recalling that they had not obeyed the sultan’s orders to provide their assistance in that naval campaign (Samih 1969: 324).

Muhammad Bey was succeeded by his weak-willed brother Ramâtân, the senior male member of the Muradite family. The imprisonment and physical torments inflicted by this bey on his nephew Murâd, ‘Ali’s son, led the latter to escape for protection, as his father ‘Ali had done in 1676, to the Jabal Wislât. Murâd eventually succeeded in killing his uncle and acceded to the beylicate in 1699. The young bey’s vengeance, which led him, according to sources, to acts of inhuman cruelty (al-Wâzîr 1985: II, 667–72), struck Ramâtân’s close circle of boon companions, and many others. We have no way, however, of determining whether this bey’s policy aimed systematically at rehabilitating the ‘Alawiyya household at the expense of the Muḥammadiyya. The rule of Murâd III was, moreover, marked by wars with the Algerian Regency, in which he was supported by the Tripolitan bey. Finally, the āgha of the Turkish şubâybis of the Regency, Ibrâhîm al-Shârîf, an officer of Anatolian origin who had been sent on a mission to Istanbul, was ordered by the Porte to kill the dangerously unbalanced young bey (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: II, 77). The murder of Murâd and of the remaining male members of his family in May 1702 brought the Muradite dynasty to an end (al-Wâzîr 1985: 673).

The subsequent rule of Ibrâhîm al-Shârîf displays various instances of household politics. The new bey strove, at the beginning
of his rule, to win the allegiance of many of those who had served under his predecessor, with the intention of imposing himself as the new head of the Muradite household. He also married Limbārka (‘al-Mubāraka’), the daughter of a tribal chief, who had been married previously to Murād III and, before him, to Muhammad Bey (Béranger 1979: 124): it seems therefore that ‘inheritable wives’ constituted a feature of the Tunisian beylical household, as was the case for the households of Ottoman Egypt (Hathaway 1995a: 133–49). Finally, by inviting his brother from Anatolia to Tunis, al-Sharīf was planning to add his own family cement to the Muradite household (Béranger 1979: 124).

A short time after his assumption of office, al-Sharīf added to his beylical title the title of dey (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: II, 81). Although Tunisian sources may lead us to believe that al-Sharīf, in adopting this unprecedented measure, had acted according to his own whim (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: II, 81), it is certainly more plausible to assume that he had obeyed in this the orders of the central Ottoman government, particularly in the light of Sultan Mustafa II’s attempt to consolidate the power of the Turkic *timar* cavalry, to serve his own political ambitions (1695–1703). This policy, which had already led the sultan, in 1702, to encourage the Anatolian Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf to seize power in the Regency, and which culminated in the ‘Edirne Event’ in 1703, soon came to a sore end (Quataert 2000: 43). This explains why, in the Regency, the fusion of the offices of the dey, representing the Turkish warlords and cavalrymen of the Ottoman state, and the bey, representing its Rumelian *kapı kulus*, did not outlast al-Sharīf’s short rule (1702–5), and probably ended before it. It was also in the time of this bey, that the Porte inaugurated a more successful and lasting policy that consisted in granting the title of pasha to the rulers of its Maghrib provinces.5

Intense warfare with Algiers and Tripoli, which had started in the time of Murād III, continued with Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf. The lack of available data does not allow us, at present, to study these wars, resulting from household conflicts across the whole of the Maghrib, from the perspective of the probable link between these households and those of Istanbul – although I shall attempt this task in the next chapter of this study, when dealing with the 1807 war between Algiers and Tunis.6 The last battle fought by al-Sharīf against the Algerians in July 1705 led to his capture by the enemy army. The *diwān*, in Tunis, appointed to the vacant beylical office the āgha of the Turkish *subāyhis* of the Regency, Husayn ibn ‘Alī, whose
solemn investiture was celebrated in the Qasbah square, in the month of Rabīʿ al-Awwal 15 July 1705 (Chérif 1986: I, 122–3).

Beylical succession at the end of the seventeenth century

In 1694, 1703 and 1705, respectively, three āghas of the Turkish ʿubayhis: Ibn Shukr, al-Sharīf and Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī, acceded to beylical rank in the Regency. Whereas the seizure of power by the first, with the assistance of the Algerian dey, was condemned by the sultan and was soon brought to an end, the investiture of the other two received the blessing of the central Ottoman government. It seems, therefore, that in the hierarchy of ranks within the Tunisian army and government set up by the Porte at that period, the post of āgha of the Turkish ʿubayhis, which went together with the title of kābiya (deputy) of the bey, could, in certain circumstances, be a stepstone to the beylical post. This official was, thus, an important element in the policy of the Ottoman Porte concerning beylical succession in the Regency, whose evolution during the seventeenth century needs to be briefly sketched here. From Murād I to Ḥammūda and from Ḥammūda to Murād II, the rule of succession within the Muradite family was based on the handing-down of the beylical office from father to eldest son. During that period, the beys appointed as deputies of Ramaḍān I and of the first Muradites represented, for the government of the Porte, potential successors to the bey, should the latter incur the wrath of the sultan, or should he leave no eligible heir at his death – as was the case when Murād I succeeded Ramaḍān Bey in 1613.

After a decade of civil conflict that followed the death of Murād II in 1675, and included two attempts at the instauration of a beylical diumvirate, Muḥammad Bey, Murād II’s eldest son, was finally brought to power in the Regency in 1686. In the new government structure set up for the Regency following these events, the āgha of the Turkish ʿubayhis assumed the same role as the deputy beys of the first half of the seventeenth century. The implementation of this policy, however, seemed to face difficulties at first. One year after Ibn Shukr’s illegal and short-lived coup d’état, when Muḥammad Bey died in 1696, leaving a son in his infancy, the Porte failed to play the card of the āgha of the Turkish ʿubayhis. It had to acquiesce, owing to its weakness, to the rule of succession by seniority among the enlarged Muradite family, presumptuously
adopted by the latter in imitation of the new succession arrangements devised by the Ottoman sultans. The ensuing alternation between the Muḥammadiyya and the ‘Alawiyya to power in the Regency exacerbated and gave permanence to the rivalry between the two households. Furthermore, the licentious Ramaḍān and the sanguinary Murād III were particularly unsatisfactory rulers. All these considerations finally led the exasperated Porte, in 1703, to order the execution of all the male members of the first beylical dynasty in the Regency.

Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī and the continuation of household conflicts (1705–40)

On the origins of Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf informs us, with some diffidence, that his father, ‘Alī al-Turkī, who came from the island of Crete to the Regency in his youth, ‘was, according to some, a mamlūk’ (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: II, 85). The sparse additional information that this author provides about Ḥusayn’s father allows us, moreover, interesting insights into a mamlūk’s strategy for gaining power in the Regency’s spheres of government at the end of the seventeenth century. ‘Alī, who was sent to command garrisons in various cities of the province, married first a woman from the Shannūfī Arab tribe in the al-Kāf region, from whom he begot a son, Muhammad. His second wife, from the Sharnī Berber tribe (living in the region of Qayrawān) gave him another son, Ḥusayn (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: II, 85; Bey 2002: 165).

No details are provided about the social backgrounds of ‘Alī’s wives, but we may presume that this high-ranking janissary could undoubtedly pretend to alliances with influential local clans. ‘Alī’s marriage alliances furthermore seem to have followed a strategy which may be discerned more clearly through the marriages and careers of his sons, and which consisted in cementing links with the two rival beylical households in the Regency, the Muḥammadiya and the ‘Alawiyya, including their tribal constituencies. This would guarantee that, whatever the issue of the conflict, one of ‘Alī’s sons would be on the winning side and would then favour his brother’s fortune. Thus, of Muhammad, the elder son, we know that he married the daughter of Qā‘id Murād, who had been one of ‘Alī ibn Murād’s faithful supporters. As for Husayn, he first served under Muḥammad Bey, and, in spite of a period of disgrace after his participation in Ibn Shukr’s government, was quickly reintegrated in the service of this bey and of his successors Ramaḍān
and Murād III (Ibn Abī’l-‘Umarī 1963–6: II, 86). Husayn was married, first, to a cousin on his mother’s side, then to Fāṭima ‘Uthmāna, the granddaughter of ‘Uthmān Dey (Bey 2002: 170), who had previously been married to Ramaḍān Bey (Chérif 1986: I, 120).

Family solidarity and marked opportunism were therefore two crucial elements in the policy of ‘Alī al-Turki’s household-making. Thus, after Murād’s murder, Ḥusayn found shelter for some time near his brother before being readmitted into the ruling elite (Béranger 1979: 120). The two brothers next cooperated closely and successfully to ensure the fall of Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf. When war broke out between Tunis and Algiers in 1705, Muḥammad escaped across the border with the Drīd tribe to the Algerian camp (Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 1925: 196–7). As for Ḥusayn, the lacunar and ambiguous account left by al-Wazīr on his behaviour during the battle that led to the capture of al-Sharīf near al-Kāf, suggests that he betrayed the latter at that crucial stage (al-Wazīr 1985: II, 740–5).

Ḥusayn, having received the beylical investiture, had to confront the Algerian army, which had penetrated further into the Regency until it reached the outskirts of the capital. The bey and the dey of Tunis appealed to the Porte, who sent a kapıca ordering the three Regencies to stop waging wars between themselves and to punish all those responsible for the persistence of conflicts (Chérif 1986: I, 156). After attempts at conciliation with the Algerians had failed, the Tunisians finally managed to repel the invaders (September 1705). With the establishment of peace, Ḥusayn, thanks to the links woven by himself and by his brother with the two Muradite households, was able to secure the allegiance of the majority in both camps. There lay the secret of the stability of the greatest part of his period of rule, and of his success in overcoming various difficulties and crises that he had to face, particularly at its beginning. The first of these crises erupted, soon after the end of the war with Algiers, between Ḥusayn and the dey Muḥammad al-‘Āṣfar. The latter, striving to restore the sorely diminished deylical authority in the Regency, allied himself with Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf, who had been freed by the Algerians and who, still in exile, was attempting to win back deylical power in Tunis. Husayn rallied the forces loyal to him outside the precincts of Tunis, and besieged the dey in the capital. Al-‘Āṣfar was finally forsaken by the janissaries, who had rebelled on the pretext of delayed payment of their salaries, and was executed by a group of them, on 1 January 1706. Ḥusayn entered the capital in triumph and Qāra Muṣṭafā, who was later
to marry the bey’s daughter, was elected to the deylicate (Chérif 1986: I, 136–40). As for Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf, he was killed a few days later by Ḥusayn’s men as he attempted to land on the Tunisian northern coast (Chérif 1986: I, 141).

In 1708, the Ottoman kapudan pasha Djanim, having landed in Tunis, attempted to replace Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī with Muhammad ibn Muṣṭaфа at the head of the Regency. The latter had been a powerful former mamlūk under the last Muradite bey and under Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf, whom he had betrayed, as had many others, during the last battle fought by this bey against the Algerians (Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: II, 83). Ḥusayn, with the support of the diwān, firmly managed to get rid of the interfering kapudan pasha, whose initiative, it seems, had been taken independently of the Porte (Chérif 1986: I, 157–8). Djanim sailed back to Istanbul with his protégé, who was killed, years later, by Ḥusayn’s men, as he attempted to come back to Tunis from Egypt, where he had sheltered, across the Tripolitan desert (Ibn Yūṣuf 1978: 16–17).

During the period of rule of Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, beylical power was reinforced and increasingly centralized in the Regency. The Porte seized the opportunity offered by Ḥusayn’s victory against al-Asfār to deal another powerful blow to deylical power. The dey’s prerogatives were now drastically reduced. They became limited to police maintenance in the Qasbah and the adjoining districts in the daytime (these functions being transferred to the Malekite shaykh al-madīna at night). The dey’s presidency of the diwān, as well as the latter’s political role, moreover, had a mostly formal character (Chérif 1986: I, 186; Raymond 1994: II, 32).

In the economic realm, Tunis, where commerce with various Mediterranean cities of the Northern shore had gradually developed since the seventeenth century, became an important trading centre in the region. The conclusion of peace between the Ottoman Empire and Austria in 1725 at Passarowitz, on the other hand, affected considerably the corso in the Barbary region, since the jurisdiction of the Habsburg state extended over the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, formerly an easy prey for the Maghrib corsairs.9

The last years of Ḥusayn’s rule were marked by the rebellion of his nephew ‘Alī, son of Muhammad ibn ‘Alī al-Turkī, known in Tunisian historiography as ‘Alī Pasha. This young man had initially entertained strong hopes of succeeding his uncle who, on his accession to the beylicate, had no son. These hopes were crushed as a consequence of the birth of male children to Ḥusayn by his second wife. In 1725, the bey secured from the Porte a firman authorizing
him to delegate the leadership of the *mahalla* to his eldest son, Muhammad, thus designating the latter as heir to the beylical office (Ibn Ḥabd al-῾Azīz 1925: 211). Ḍalī, who had, till then, assumed the duty of replacing his uncle as bey of the *mahalla*, was awarded the title of pasha as a consolation prize. A source of that period asserts that the bey himself – who should normally have received that title – had applied to the Porte to have it granted to his nephew, in order to soothe the latter’s frustration (Gandolphe 1923: 212–13). Ḍalī, however, decided to flee from Tunis and the empty honours of his new office. In 1728, like Ḍalī ibn Murād and Murād III before him, he escaped to Jabal Wislāt, the traditional stronghold of the Ḍalawiyya, and there started an insurrection against his uncle (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 36–42).

Ḍalī Pasha’s contention for the beylicate should be studied in the light of the three different rules for beylical succession in the Regency, described above. One of these, i.e. the candidature of the ṣubāyahs to the post, had become obsolete in Ḫusayn’s period of rule, with the integration of that corps into the beylical official household, which relegated their ṣubāyah to political insignificance. There remained two possible choices for the bey’s successor among the beylical family itself. Ḍalī Pasha upheld the principle of succession by seniority among the descendants of Ḍalī al-Turkī. Ḫusayn ibn Ḍalī, with the support of the Porte, upheld the principle of succession from the incumbent of the beylical post to his eldest son. The new conflict for beylical succession in the Regency, which reopened the rift between the Ḍalawiyya, to which Ḍalī Pasha’s father had belonged, and the Muḥammadīya, the original power base of Ḫusayn ibn Ḍalī, coincided with a period of sharp economic difficulties that affected the whole of the Ottoman Empire. Ḍalī Pasha’s rebellion was, at first, severely defeated: the young man, besieged in Jabal Wislāt for several months by Ḫusayn’s army, managed to escape to the Sāhil, then to the south, and finally to Algiers. There he was held in semi-captivity by the dey Qur Ḥabd, in exchange for an annual sum of money sent by Ḫusayn ibn Ḍalī (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 94–114).

The arrangement, however, soon broke down, and Ḫusayn faced the increasing threat of having Ḥabdī Dey’s successor, Ibrāhim, champion Ḍalī’s cause (Chérif 1986: II, 73). The Tunisian bey appealed to the Porte, who refereed in his favour (Samih 1969: 345). This was of little avail, since in 1735 the Algerian army crossed the frontier and defeated Ḫusayn’s army at Sminja. Ḍalī was invested as bey in Tunis by the dīwān in the month of
Rabīʿ al-Thānī September 1735, while Ḥusayn fled to Qayrawān. For more than five years, the increasingly devastating household conflict continued dividing the Regency. Historians on Ottoman Egypt have noted the intermingling of conflicts in its ṣarkeri structure with deep-rooted divisions in local society, especially in the first half of the eighteenth century, when the rival Faqāriyya and Qāsimiyya households became allied to tribal leaders belonging to the two main tribal confederations, the Saʿad and the Ḥārām (Holt 1968: 86–7). Similarly, the division of the Maghrib tribal society into two rival ṇoffs (moieties) was exploited and exacerbated by the warring beys. The complex web of alliances and oppositions evolving with the extension of the conflict and probably leading to changes in the make-up of the original Muḥammadiyya and ʿAlawiyya households, divided the Regency into two camps, designated, in local history, as the Bāšīs (siding with ʿAlī Pasha) and the Husaynīs (Ibn Abī-l-Diyāf 1963–6: II, 113).

Ḥusayn was finally defeated and killed by Yūnīs, ʿAlī Pasha’s eldest son, in 1740, while his sons fled in their turn to Algiers. The Porte resigned itself to the inevitable and adapted with no qualms to the fait accompli of ʿAlī Pasha’s investiture by the diwān of Tunis after his victory at Sminja. The subsequent Ottoman investiture was sent with remarkable speed to the new bey, owing, according to some, to the support he enjoyed from Djanim Pasha, Ḥusayn’s old foe (Chérif 1986: II, 157).

ʿAlī Pasha and the return of the Husaynids
(1735–77)

ʿAlī Pasha, after having eliminated his uncle’s most prominent partisans and followers probably managed to rally round him the bulk of the former beylical household. Centralization and concentration of power within the beylical office characterized the rule of this bey as much as, or even more than, they had his uncle’s. ʿAlī Pasha also held concomitantly the titles of bey and pasha, a privilege that was thenceforth conferred uninterruptedly on the series of beys who ruled the Regency for the rest of the Ottoman period.

Under ʿAlī Pasha, the island of Ṭabarqa, which had been ceded, since the mid-sixteenth century, by the Ottoman sultan to Genoese interests engaged in coral-fishing and trade with the local tribes, was occupied and annexed by the Tunisian army in 1742. This military action succeeded in pre-empting the ambitions of the French government in the region, following reports that the latter
was engaged in negotiating with the Genoese in order to obtain the cession of Tabarqa. Considering the jealously held prerogatives of the Ottoman Porte in frontier and territorial matters in the Regencies, we may presume that the expedition, commanded by Yûnis Bey, was carried out on the order of the central Ottoman government. The Tunisian troops occupied the island, enslaved the Genoese and, on the way back to Tunis, destroyed the French comptoir of Cap Nègre. After a French attempt to invade Tabarqa, later that year, had failed, peace was finally signed between ʿAlî Pasha and Louis XV (Ibn Yûsuf 1978: 196–208).

ʿAlî Pasha’s relatively long and stable rule degenerated in its last years, when Yûnis Bey headed a rebellion of the jund in 1752, then escaped to Algiers, where he ended his days in confinement (Ibn Yûsuf 1978: 293–312). Finally, in 1756, the Algerian army invaded the Regency, and brought Ḥusayn’s sons back to power in Tunis, probably on the instigation of the Porte. ʿAlî Pasha’s long years of tenure had not, for the central Ottoman government, entailed prescription of his original crime of disobedience. He remained, essentially, a muṭaḡallībe: the term, from the Arabic ‘mutaghallib’, meaning, ‘oppressive ruler’, or ‘usurper’, was also used, in Ottoman usage, to designate rebel local rulers, or any enemy of the Porte, who might be ‘successful for a time’ (Redhouse 1857). After having ordered the execution of ʿAlî Pasha, the Algerian dey presided, as his predecessor had done in 1687, at the investiture of the new bey of the Regency, i.e. Muḥammad, Ḥusayn’s eldest son. But this time, the Algerian army only departed from Tunis after having dictated precise conditions on its government, including the payment of an annual sum to Algiers and the acceptance of Algerian pre-eminence in matters of protocol and in the realm of foreign relations (Rousseau 1985: 157–61, 252–3).

During his short period of rule, Muḥammad Bey, whom some local sources describe as an ailing young man (Ibn Abîʾl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: II, 155), is reported to have entered into secret inconclusive negotiations with France, in order to obtain the protection of that country against Algiers, in return for the cession of Tabarqa to the French king (Roux 1932: 274–80). Muḥammad, who left at his death two infant boys, was succeeded by his younger brother ‘Alî, on 12 February 1759. ‘Alî Bey’s long period of rule (1759–77) marked a new stage in the reinforcement of beylical authority in the Regency. The additional power gained by the bey is reflected, first, in the fact that, in treaties with Christian powers from then on, the only signatory, on the Regency’s side, was the pasha-bey (Rousseau
The anchoring of Husaynid power in the country, moreover, was ensured thanks to the successful quelling of a three-year long insurrection fomented by Ismā’il ibn Yūnis, a grandson of ‘Alī Pasha, which ended effectively the contention of that branch of the beylical family in the Regency. In 1762, the bey’s troops, backed by tribal forces, brought to heel the Jabal Wīslāt, the ultimate refuge of Ismā’il, and, before him, of successive challengers to beylical authority. Ismā’il fled to Algiers, and the Wīslātis were scattered throughout the Regency and forbidden from settling again in their impregnable mountain heights (Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 1970: 47–90). The Regency, in the time of ‘Alī Bey, also enjoyed a period of prosperity and economic growth: demographic increase, abundant harvests that ensured important revenues from wheat exports to the Northern Mediterranean countries, and the development of urban handicrafts and trade (Chérif 1977: 107–8).

In 1759, the fact that the firman bearing the Ottoman investiture (or reconfirmation of investiture) initially intended for Muḥammad reached the Regency in time to coincide with the investiture of ‘Alī by the diwān, in the period following his brother’s death, had already struck many of his contemporaries as a happy augury (Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 1970: 45–6). ‘Alī Bey’s rule, indeed, represented a new stage in the relations between the Regency and the Porte, characterized by reinforced coordination and mutual support. Thus, in 1762, the bey, receiving a kapicī of the Porte sent to announce the birth of a male heir to Sultan Muḥāfīfa III, at a period when the war against Ismā’il had reached its last stages, ordered a sumptuous zīna in the capital (Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 1970: 386). In 1770, the efficient mediation of an Ottoman envoy ended the war that had broken out that year between the bey and the French king. The war, caused by French claims against the Tunisian corsairs, and by difficulties opposed by the bey to renewing commercial concessions formerly granted to France, led to heavy bombardments of coastal positions in the Regency (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: 166–70; Rousseau 1985: 170–85). In the same year, a Tunisian fleet was also sent to assist the sultan in his war against Russia (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: II, 170–1). Finally, the very devout ‘Alī, echoing a similar measure periodically adopted by the Ottoman sultans, decreed, at some undefined date, the closing-down of all wine taverns in the country (Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 1970: 373).

‘Alī Bey was succeeded in his lifetime by his eldest son, Muḥammad, popularly known as Ḥammūda. The Ottoman investiture granted to Ḥammūda ibn ‘Alī on 1 Muharram 1191/9 February
1777 inaugurated a long period of rule that lasted until 29 Ramadān 1229/16 September 1814.

**Conclusion**

During the period reviewed in this chapter and the preceding one, we have seen that armed conflicts involving officials at the top of the Tunisian ‘askeri structure were at the origin of successive changes in the structure of the government of the Regency, as the Porte would sanction the outcome of these conflicts and translate into administrative arrangements the new balance of power within that structure. These conflicts, more often than not, ended with the victory of those who enjoyed the support of the central Ottoman government, i.e. Murād II (against ‘Alī Lāz Dey) in 1673, Muḥammad Bey (against Shalabī Dey) in 1687, or Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī (against al-Aṣfar Dey) in 1705. In opposite cases, as in the aftermath of the 1591 uprising, or following ‘Alī Pasha’s victory over his uncle in 1735, the Porte, as was its wont, in the words of P. M. Holt, ‘recognizing effective power, without prejudice to further action’ (Holt 1966: 177), bided its time until it could seize the opportune moment for putting things to rights.

The last political change brought about by military force in the Regency occurred in 1756, with the elimination of ‘Alī Pasha and the return to power of the sons of Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, championed by the Porte. The power of the Husaynid bey in the third quarter of the eighteenth century was strengthened on the domestic level, but they had, on the other hand, to submit to a partial suzerainty by Algiers. The circumstances that led to this change in the relations between the two Regencies, its influence on the relations between Tunis and Istanbul in the days of Ḥammūda Pasha, and how the latter finally managed to put an end to it will be studied in the next chapter.
Part 2

THE POLICIES
AND GOVERNMENT OF
ḤAMMŪDA PASHA
(1777–1814)
THE WARS AND ALLIANCES OF ḤAMMŪDA PASHA

The successive wars that punctuated the period of rule of Ḥammūda Pasha made him the warrior-king among the Husaynid beys and contributed in no small measure to the greater-than-life stature conferred on him by traditional historiography. They represented, with his military and administrative reforms, the study of which constitutes the main subject of the following part of this book, the most salient features of Ḥammūda’s policies. The present chapter purports to demonstrate, through an analysis of the relations of the Tunisian Regency with the Ottoman and the Christian worlds, that these wars, and the formal or informal alliances concomitant to them, were closely linked to the policies and interests of the Porte at that period.

Estrangement and reconciliation with the Ottoman Porte (1777–95)

Not long after the investiture of Ḥammūda ibn 'Alī as the new pasha-bey of Tunis, the relations between the Regency and the Ottoman Porte seem to have gone through a period of marked coolness. Many episodes provide evidence for this. Thus, in 1777, when Russia (in conformity with the clauses of the Küçük Ḳaynarci treaty) attempted to conclude peace with the Barbary states, the Tunisian and Algerian governments demurred, the second having protested against the fact that Russia had approached Tunis before it (Rousseau 1985: 188). In 1781, Austria, backed by Ottoman emissaries, sought a renewal of her peace treaties with the Regencies; Algiers claimed an excessive sum of money, while Tunis answered that its agreement could only be given after Algiers’ (Rousseau 1985: 192). We should also note that, during the war that broke out between the Regency and Venice in 1782
as the result of financial claims made by the Tunisian authorities, the Ottoman sultan did not acquit himself – even symbolically, during this crucial period when the Empire was fighting for its own survival – of the traditional duty of ḥāna (help, of a military nature, or in any other form, during wars) towards his province (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 29). In 1789, furthermore, Ḥammūda Pasha, by abstaining from sending a delegation to Istanbul to congratulate and pay homage to Selîm III on his enthronement as successor to his uncle ‘Abdu’l-Ḥamîd (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: 29), was guilty of a serious breach in the protocolary obligations of wâlis (governors) towards the Ottoman sultan. Finally, in 1792, when the drawn-out conflict with Venice was brought to a fairly satisfactory conclusion for the bey, this was achieved without any intervention of the Porte – whereas it should be recalled that the latter’s mediation, in 1770, had quickly brought to an end the war that had broken out between the Regency and France.

In order to explain this period of estrangement in the relations between the Tunisian province and its Ottoman lord, it is important to recall that the Algerian deys, since 1756, had been exercising a form of political suzerainty on the Tunisian government, clearly manifested in the first two episodes mentioned above, from which we may infer that the bey’s powerful western neighbours stood behind his alienation from Istanbul. A corollary to this thesis is that the Regency of Algiers had become increasingly defiant towards the government of the Porte at that period, and that, from 1789 in particular, as will be further elaborated in this chapter, it was one among the numerous opponents against which the great and unlucky reformer, Sultan Selîm III, had to wage a relentless conflict.

The relations between Ḥammūda and Selîm III, however, soon underwent a striking change as a result of developments that originated, not in Algiers, but in Tripoli. The political and administrative evolution of the eastern neighbour of the Regency had led to the installation of the beylical Qaramanli dynasty at its head at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In 1793, conflict broke out among the Qaramanli family, leading to intense civil trouble. This situation was exploited by an ambitious Ottoman officer, ‘Alî Burghul, who used his influential connections within the admiralty in Istanbul – his brother was a kâhiya (lieutenant) of the kapudan pasha of the time – to secure a firman entrusting him with the task of restoring order in Tripoli, in return for its
governorship (Médina 1907: 21–32). ‘Alī Burghul, having sailed to the province with Turkish contingents from Istanbul, occupied its capital, while the bey Aḥmad Qaramanli and his two sons escaped to Tunis.

The mission undertaken by ‘Alī Burghul was a continuation of the energetic policy followed by the Ottoman central government during the preceding decades in order to curb the increasingly wayward behaviour of many provincial governors and officials throughout the Empire. The main proponent and executing agent of this policy, under Sultan ‘Abdu’l-Ḥamīd (1773–89), had been the kapudan pasha Hasan Ghāzī Djezā’irli Pasha (Mordtmann-[Kuran] 1971). In 1786, in particular, an expedition led by this official had asserted the sultan’s authority in the Egyptian province, close to the Maghrib regencies: having landed in Alexandria, the kapudan pasha forced the beys Murād and Ibrāhīm to flee from Cairo and restored, for a time, direct Ottoman rule over the province (Holt 1968: 89). Djezā’irli, who died two years before ‘Alī Burghul’s expedition to Tripoli, had been, according to some sources, the latter’s patron (Médina 1907: 22). It is also worth noting that both men, at different times, had been important officials in the Regency of Algiers, from which they fled as a result of internecine conflicts within its diwān, before being appointed to serve the central Ottoman government.

‘Alī Burghul’s expedition did not stop in Tripoli. A few months later, one of his lieutenants headed an attack on the nearby island of Jirba. It is important to note here, that Jirba, which was annexed relatively late to the Tunisian Regency, seems to have constituted the ‘soft belly’ of the beys’ dominions in their relations with Istanbul: thus, in 1713, the kapudan pasha Djanim had used the non-payment of the qatīr imposed upon the island as a pretext for intervening in the Regency’s domestic affairs. ‘Alī Burghul’s troops secured an easy victory over the scanty Tunisian military force in the island and caused its āmil (governor), Ḥīmīda ibn ‘Ayyād, to flee to the capital. Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf’s terse account of the episode of Jirba’s occupation in 1793 is based on the more or less explicit assertion that this was an act of purely unjustified aggression (Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 23). The author describes how ‘Alī Burghul’s lieutenant, having secured the place, summoned the population, and ‘flourished a writ, which he pretended to have been sent by the sultan, although only God knows what was in it’ (Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 23). Yet, in spite of the author’s dismissive tone, this specific detail suggests the possibility, even
the probability, that the Porte had signed a firman authorizing Burghul’s expedition in Jirba. More evidence supporting this hypothesis is provided by the fact that Ḥammūda Pasha, after having reconquered the island in 1794, refrained from punishing the notables who had quickly rallied round the Tripolitan army (Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 27). The bey also proceeded to replace his former āmil in Jirba (Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 27), which suggests that accusations concerning iniquities committed by the latter had provided the legal justification for this military intervention made in the name of the Ottoman Porte.

The occupation of the south-eastern part of the Maghrib by ʿAlī Burghul appeared as highly threatening, not only to the Tunisian bey, but also to the Algerian dey (Chérif 1977: 121). It was, therefore, most probably with the blessing of his western neighbour that Ḥammūda Pasha sent two detachments of troops, respectively to Jirba and Tripoli, in December 1794 and January 1795. ʿAlī Burghul’s men were defeated and driven away from both positions and the Qaramanlis were restored to power in Tripoli. Ḥammūda’s next step, after having first sought and obtained the support of the French and English ambassadors in Istanbul (Plantet 1893: III, 527; Roy 1906: 283), was to send an embassy to Sultan Selím III, in order to justify his behaviour.

The Tunisian delegation, laden with presents and headed by Yūsuf Şāḥib al-Ṭābī, embarked for its voyage to the Ottoman capital in May 1795. According to Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf, whose father had been part of the embassy, the Tunisians initially encountered a none too friendly reception by the Ottoman authorities at their arrival (Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 28–9). By the end of their stay in Istanbul, however, the clouds that had darkened the relations between the Regency and the Porte were totally dissipated. This was achieved thanks to the accord soon reached between Yūsuf Şahib al-Ṭabi and the kapudan pasha of the time, Küçük Hüsayn. This official, who commanded the Ottoman navy during the greatest part of Selim’s reign, i.e. from 1792 to 1803, acted during these years, according to the traditional prerogatives of his office, as a powerful intermediary between the central Ottoman government and the rulers of the Maghrib Regencies. Küçük Hüsayn was, with the reisi-i kitāb (head of the chancery) Rāṭib Pasha, one of the closest collaborators of Selim III; by appointing two staunch supporters of his reform program to these strategic posts, this sultan seems therefore to have ensured coordination, frequently lacking in the past, between the admiralty and the Porte.
In their talks, Şahib al-Ṭābi‘ and Küçük Hüsayn at first vented mutual grievances concerning events prior to the Tripoli expedition. While the Tunisians were reproached for not having sent a deputation and presents to congratulate Selim on his accession to the throne in 1789, Yūsuf Şahib al-Ṭābi‘ reminded the kapudan pasha that the Regency had not received from the sultan the assistance to which it was entitled during its war against Venice (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 29). As regards the Burghul affair, however, the position of the Tunisian bey was not as delicate as might have been feared. It is not implausible to suggest, first, that the precarious power of Sultan Selim and his supporters, especially in the early stages of his reign, was such that, in 1793, the newly-appointed kapudan pasha Küçük Hüsayn had had to agree, against his will, to the expedition that had already been sanctioned by ‘Alī Burghul’s powerful patrons in the admiralty. Furthermore, the population of Tripoli, after the occupation of the city by Burghul’s troops, had delegated a group of notables to Istanbul to complain to the sultan against the exactions committed by the new governor and his men. These complaints, in addition to Ḥammūda’s vigorous reaction, must have definitely convinced the Porte of the unsoundness of a direct military intervention in the Maghrib, at a period when all military efforts should be concentrated against the Christian enemies of the Empire.

Yūsuf Şahib al-Ṭābi‘ stayed several months in Istanbul, during which, in Ibn Abīl-Diyāf’s words, ‘he displayed his munificent generosity and bound to him a great number of officials (by links of affection and gratefulness)’ (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 29). The good impression caused by the Tunisian embassy was such that, still according to Ibn Abīl-Diyāf, Küçük Hüsayn eventually confided to its head that, rather than restoring the discredited Qaramanlis to power, Ḥammūda Bey should have appointed a Tunisian official to rule the Tripoli Regency.¹ Yūsuf Şahib al-Ṭābi‘ sailed back to Tunis in 1795, bearing the sultan’s pardon, the present of a frigate and a firman of confirmation of investiture for Ḥammūda Pasha, as well as a robe of honour for the Qaramanli bey in Tripoli (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 30, 31).

The 1795 embassy to Istanbul, to which Ibn Abīl-Diyāf devotes four full pages in a generally terse account of the main events of Ḥammūda Pasha’s period of rule, represented a watershed in the relations between the bey and the Porte. Both parties were linked by a common opposition to Algiers. The real – and carefully hidden
– aim of the Tunisian embassy, in fact, may well have been to forge an alliance with the Porte against the Algerian Regency, in particular by securing some assurance or promise in that regard. Ibn Abîl-Diyâf – though very briefly – does mention that the relations between Algiers and Tunis were touched upon in the talks between Yûsuf Şâhîb al-Ţâbî and the kapudan pasha (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: III, 29). Sultan Selîm, for his part, had gained an ally in his arduous fight to impose reforms in the Empire. Instead of the use of force, diplomacy had proved a cheaper and more efficient policy for obtaining the collaboration of the Tunisian government. The main agent of this collaboration was the ambitious and zealous Şâhîb al-Ţâbî, whose power in the Regency was on the rise. The next stage of Ḥâmmûda’s period of government was marked by intensive reforms in the military, administrative and economic realms, which, as will be seen in the next chapters, closely aligned the Regency with the administrative practices and policies of the Porte at that period.

The war with Algiers (1807) and the janissary rebellion (1811)

In order to put in its proper context the 1807 war between Tunis and Algiers, it is necessary to go back to the origins of the relations between the two provinces and to study, especially, the particular status conferred on the Algerian province in the Maghrib region since its incipience. As already indicated, the Algerian beylerbeys-cum-kapudan pashas had, in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, exercised some form of jurisdiction over the Tunisian and Tripolitan eyâlets until 1587. Even after that date, when the three Maghrib provinces had been placed under the exclusive authority of the Porte, the warrior eyâlet of Algiers retained a particular prestige which gave it pre-eminence over its two neighbours. During the sultans’ naval campaigns, for instance, the Barbary fleets sent to assist the Ottoman navy were put under the command of an Algerian admiral. Finally, we have also seen that, from the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the Algerian jund was used by the Porte to restore order in the troubled Tunisian province – although the see-saw relations between the central Ottoman government and the often insubordinate Algerian diwân led the latter, as in 1694 for instance, or in 1705, to invade the Regency on their own initiative, or, more precisely, in contravention to the official policy of the Porte.
The 1756 Algerian expedition against the usurper 'Alī Pasha was, most probably, carried out on the instructions of the vengeful Porte. As for the ensuing instauration of a form of Algerian suzerainty over Tunis, we have no way of determining whether it had been negotiated beforehand by the Algerian dey with the Porte, or whether it was imposed by the former as a fait accompli and resignedly sanctioned by the latter. The new status quo between the two Maghrib provinces, in any case, presented at least a material advantage for the Ottoman central government. The accelerated decline of the corso in the eighteenth century had made it increasingly difficult for the Algerian government to finance the pay of its army, since the scarce economic resources and trading capacities of the province could provide no adequate compensation for the loss of that source of revenue. It would, therefore, have been the duty of the sultan to assist the Algerian eyâlet – a difficult task in such times of financial strain, and from which he was thus fortunately discharged by the bey of Tunis. Furthermore, the Algerian threat of a complete annexation of the Tunisian Regency, hanging like the sword of Damocles that only the Porte could prevent from falling on the beys’ heads, still represented an efficient dissuasive tool against the latter’s possible dissidence.

The clout gained by the Algerian province at that period was also reflected, in 1770, in the appointment to the post of kapudan pasha of a former Algerian dey, the formidable leşme Pasha, already mentioned above. This appointment represented a renewed acknowledgement of the particular status enjoyed by the Algerian corsairs among the sultan’s naval forces: thus, the corsair-beylerbeys Khayr al-Dīn and ʻIlij ʻAlī in the sixteenth century, and Hasan Mezzo Morto, at the end of the seventeenth, had been among the most prestigious and successful of the kapudan pashas in the history of the Empire. The loyalty of .googlecode Pasha to Sultan ʻAbdu‘l-Hamīd was rewarded by a constant increase of his influence within the central Ottoman government (Mordtmann-Kuran 1965). This official was responsible, in particular, for the dismissal and execution, in 1785, of the grand vizier Halil ʻAbdūl-Hamīd Pasha, who was indicted for plotting to remove ʻAbdu‘l-Hamīd in order to enthrone his more liberal nephew, Selīm. In 1789, not long after Selīm finally ascended to the throne, دعاء was appointed to the grand vizierate. His short tenure at the head of the government of the Porte might be considered as a forced acknowledgement, by the new sultan, of the power wielded by this representative of the old guard – although it is also possible that,
by alienating Djezâ’irli from the admiralty, Selîm had, in effect, striven to divest him of the influence he had acquired there. Djezâ’irli was in charge of negotiating with the commander of the victorious Russian army, at war with the Ottomans since 1787. In the midst of that bleak period, the only ray of military glory for the Ottomans came from the jund of the Algerian Regency, Djezâ’irli’s original base of power, who conquered Oran and Mers el-Kebir from the Spaniards in 1791. In that same year, however, Djezâ’irli Pasha died, either by sheer providence, or by foul act (it was rumoured that he had been poisoned on Selîm’s orders).

This brief review of Djezâ’irli’s career can lead to interesting hypotheses, if it is examined from the perspective of an important aspect of Ottoman political life, i.e. its division into rival households. These divisions, fed by succession conflicts within the Ottoman dynasty, extended their ramifications to the provincial governments of the Porte, including those of the Maghrib Regencies. I would therefore suggest that Djezâ’irli Pasha assumed an eminent role in an important central Ottoman household that had deep-rooted interests both in the admiralty and in the Algerian Regency, and which, although it managed, at some periods, to bring its own candidates to supreme authority at the head of the Empire, usually acted as a powerful centre of opposition to the sultan and the grand vizier. Thence, the rapprochement between Ḥammûda Bey and the Porte in 1795, made above the heads of the Algerians, aimed at breaking the power of that household and weakening the threat that it posed to the sultan’s reforms policy. Finally, concerning the development of the pro-Selîm coalition in the Maghrib region during that period, we should also note the close relations established by Ḥammûda Pasha with the Tripolitan bey and with the ‘Alawî sultan of Morocco (al-Imâm 1980: 421; Chater 1984: 36). The latter country, on the western border of Algiers, represented a permanent and powerful opponent to that province – and, therefore, possibly enjoyed the tacit support of the central Ottoman state.

The precarious nature of Selîm’s power probably prevented him from standing firmly in support of Tunis against Algerian domination in the Maghrib region. The Tunisians were therefore left, or secretly encouraged, to fight their own war against the Algerians, in order to create a new status quo, which the Porte would readily sanction.2 Ḥammûda, who had been for years engaged in reforming and improving his army, finally declared war on Algiers in 1807. The first battle between the two armies near Constantine, in the
east of Algeria, ended in a shameful rout for the Tunisians. A new expedition was sent to the western frontier two months later, under the command of Yūsuf Şāhib al-Ṭābi‘ī, solemnly invested with full powers by the bey. Yūsuf managed to inflict a severe defeat on the Algerians and came back crowned with glory in August 1807 (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 41–50).

At the time when Yūsuf Şāhib al-Ṭābi‘ī set off with his troops towards the Algerian frontier, in May 1807, however, an armed insurrection in Istanbul resulted in the deposition of Selim and the accession to the throne of Mustafa IV. The latter was replaced, one year later, by Selim’s cousin and confidant, Maḥmūd II. The new sultan, owing to the strength of Selim’s former opponents, was unable, in the first stages of his reign, which extended well beyond the date of Ḥammūda’s death, to pursue any reforms policy, or wield any real power. Ḥammūda, at the very moment of his triumph, had thus lost his patrons in Istanbul. His victory, however, yielded its fruit, since the Regency, from then on, stopped its annual payments to Algiers and regained its diplomatic autonomy (Chérif 1977: 125). The Algerian dey and, particularly, his corsairs, who carried on a war of attrition against the Tunisian navy, however, did not officially admit defeat (Chérif 1977: 125). Until the end of Ḥammūda Pasha’s period of rule, and for many years after it, no definitive reconciliation between the two Regencies could be achieved, in spite of the efforts deployed by the Ottoman Porte.

In 1811, the janissary rebellion which broke out in Tunis, and which represented a local attempt by the vivacious anti-reform forces to seize power in the Regency during the uncertain post-Selim period, should also, like the war with Algiers, be considered from the global perspective of Ottoman internecine conflicts. The rebellion plunged its roots into the irreducible opposition between the deys and the beys, which represented an extension of one of the permanent rifts, fuelled by household politics, within the Ottoman state. The Tunisian beys, in spite of the political supremacy they had quickly secured by the end of the seventeenth century, still had to face the hostility of the disgruntled deys and janissaries of the Regency, which drew strength and support from the latter’s ties with the deylical regime in Algiers. This situation led repeatedly, throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, to the betrayal of the beys by their janissaries during conflicts with Algiers (as, for instance, in the battle that led to the defeat of Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī by ʿAlī Pasha at Sminja in 1735). The ties
between the Algerian and the Tunisian janissaries were not merely the expression of ethnic affinities. Here again, I would suggest that the allegiance of the greatest number, or the most combative group in each of the junds of the two provinces, went to the same powerful household or group of interests, that was headed by Djezā‘irli Pasha at the end of the eighteenth century.

In spite of ʿAmmaḍ Pasha’s efforts to win the loyalty of the jund, the bey was betrayed by his janissaries during the first military campaign against Algiers in 1807 – which led, following the defeat, to the punishment or exile of a number of their officers. For the second, victorious, campaign, of June and July 1807, the bulk of the army was formed of contingents of local origin: there were, according to sources, no more than 1,500 janissaries out of a total of nearly 20,000 fighters, composed in their majority of tribal cavalrymen (Chérif 1977: 124; al-Imām 1980: 204–5). ʿAmmaḍ Pasha thenceforth adopted an increasingly strict attitude towards his jund. His relations with the deys of his time, moreover, had an overtly conflictual character in two instances at least: in 1805, the dey Ibrāḥīm Būshnāq, who had ordered the beating of a Malekite urban notable, was dismissed (Ibn Abīʾl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 36–7), and in 1808, the dey Muhammad Qāra Burnālī was executed, presumably for plotting with Algiers against the bey.3

The crisis that had been building up for several years finally broke out in September 1811, when the janissaries entrenched themselves in the citadel of the Qasbah and declared their revolt against the bey. The uprising was crushed by forces loyal to ʿAmmaḍ, led by Yūṣuf Ṣāḥib al-Tābī’ī, with the assistance of foreign artillermen. The defeated Turks, fleeing in the direction of Algiers, were chased down and slaughtered by the Arab subāyhis (Ibn Abīʾl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 53–6; Rousseau 1985: 270–6).

The Regency, France and England

The tightening of the links between the Tunisian provincial government and the Ottoman Porte under ʿAmmaḍ Pasha is clearly reflected in that bey’s policy towards the Christian world and, particularly, to the two greatest rival powers of the time, France and England. Of these two countries, France, as a consequence of the alliance that had been set up between François I and Sulaymān the Magnificent in the sixteenth century, sealed by the conclusion of Capitulatory agreements regularly renewed by their successors, had enjoyed commercial and diplomatic prominence over other
Christian powers in the Ottoman Maghrib. Frequent official embassies were exchanged between the Tunisian deys and beys and the French kings (starting from the mission led by M. de Brêves, the envoy extraordinary of King Henri IV in 1608, to the embassy of Sulaymân Agha in Versailles in 1777). There was also, in Tunis, a relatively important trading community representing commercial interests in Provence and Marseilles, in addition to the Cap Nègre comptoir that had been granted to the Compagnie d’Afrique in 1627. Finally, in the time of the Husaynid beys, Muḥammad and ‘Alî, French military experts were sent to the Regency to help rebuild and reinforce fortifications in the Regency, such as those of Qayrawân, which had been partly demolished during the civil conflict between Husayn ibn ‘Alî and ‘Alî Pasha (Roux 1932: 224).

In the eighteenth century, however, serious frictions occurred between the Regency and France, which even led to armed confrontations in 1742 and in 1770. The deterioration of relations between the two countries, which had started slowly and sporadically, took a sharper form during the period of rule of Ḥammūda Pasha. This change was reflected, in particular, in the waning influence of Muṣṭafâ Khūja, a privileged friend and client of France, who had been a powerful mamlūk in the government of ‘Alî Bey. Muṣṭafâ Khūja, under Ḥammūda Pasha, was quickly overshadowed, and eventually relegated to political insignificance, by the increasing power of his youthful rival, Yūsuf Şâhib al-Ṭābi’ (al-Imâm 1980: 112, 114), whom the French consul in Tunis considered as ‘the most vehement enemy’ of his country (Plantet 1893: III, 93). It is also worthwhile noting that, while Muṣṭafâ Khūja was put in command of the expedition against ‘Alî Burghul in 1793, Yūsuf Şâhib al-Ṭābi’ was sent at the head of a conciliation embassy to Istanbul a few months later: the opposite stances of these two officials towards French influence in the Regency are thus coupled with their respective positions as concerns relations with the Ottoman Porte.

The sharp turn in the relations with France in the time of Ḥammūda Pasha can be dated from 1798, with the occupation of Egypt by Bonaparte – which represented the first occupation of an Arab Ottoman province by a Christian power. This change may be followed with some precision, thanks to the correspondence of the French consul in Tunis, Devoize, who, on 3 January 1799, was invited to the Bârdu palace, where he was informed that the bey had declared war on France. Devoize, who had previously assured his minister in Paris that the Barbary provinces would remain
neutral in the war that had been declared between France and the
Ottoman Porte (Plantet 1893: III, 367–8, 369), nonetheless found
some consolation in the fact that the bey ‘had observed extreme
prudence of language’ (Plantet 1893: III, 372) during their meeting.
He described the measures that were immediately implemented by
the Tunisian authorities thus:

I was escorted by fifty cavalrymen commanded by two
aghas, in order to protect me from the insults of the popu-
lace, during the one-mile long road from the palace to the
consular house; my papers were sealed, the flag was
hoisted down, and the French citizens in Tunis were
gathered inside the *funduq* (caravanserai), watched by a
numerous guard, for their security.

(Plantet 1893: III, 372)

The consul, however, was unable to keep for long this flippant
attitude. A short time later, the crew of a French warship that had
anchored in Ḥalq al-Wād, unaware of the state of war between
their country and the Regency, were arrested and subjected to
harsh treatment (Plantet 1893: III, 395, 400). The consul’s letters
are also eloquent as concerns the situation of the French trades-
men sequestrated inside the *funduq*. Thus, writing to the bey on
17 June 1799, he asserted that if the shops and selling counters of
French traders in Tunis remained sealed any longer, ‘the rats and
dampness (would) destroy their books completely’, adding: ‘in the
complete absence of trading activities, several traders are in dire
need of retail sales proceeds to cover their daily expenses. They ask
for permission to receive the sums due to them from these sales’
(Plantet 1893: III, 390). One year later, the situation had not
improved. On 19 May, Devoize wrote to the bey:

I was far from imagining that the French people would be
treated with such rigour after the declaration of war on
our country. If they had committed any crimes, I am sure
these would have been atoned for after these seventeen
months’ emprisonment, whereas their fellow citizens in
Algiers and Tripoli were released sixteen months ago.

(Plantet 1893: III, 405)

It is interesting to compare this picture of the situation of the
French community in Tunis during the three years of war between
the Regency and France, as it emerges from Devoize’s correspond-
ence, with that provided by two later nineteenth-century sources. 
The first source is Alphonse Rousseau, who asserts, in his *Annales 
tunisiennes*, published towards 1832, that Ḥammūda Pasha had 
declared war against France under strong Ottoman pressure and 
that he only kept the French under watch in their *funduq* ‘in order 
to protect them from the insults of the fanatic mob’ (Rousseau 
1985: 237–8). By giving this version of events, Rousseau intended 
to promote the image of a constant friendship between the Regency 
and France, who, following the conquest of Algiers, was then 
posing as the ally of the Tunisian beys against Ottoman domina-
tion. It is, however, less easy to guess what made our national 
chronicler Ibn Abīl-Diyāf echo this version of events and even add 
to it, stating that, thanks to Ḥammūda Pasha’s special solicitude, 
French traders were able to pursue their activities and lived in 
perfect security during the years when their country was at war 
with the Regency (Ibn Abīl-Diyaf 1963–6: III, 33). The authority 
enjoyed by Ibn Abīl-Diyāf among contemporary historians 
explains why the version thus presented by him of a lip-service war 
declaration against France by the Tunisian authorities has been 
accepted without discussion.⁴

It may also be observed, admittedly, that – apart from the deten-
tion of French subjects in Tunis – the Regency had no active 
involvement in the war. No attacks were carried out by Tunisian 
corsairs against French ships during the war (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 
1963–6: III, 33), although this might be explained either by the far 
superior naval strength of the French, or by the fact that their ships, 
at that period, were the main transporters of Tunisian trade goods. 
The Maghrib Regencies, however, were asked by the Porte to pro-
vide financial assistance for the war – an application rarely made in 
the past by the central Ottoman government (Plantet 1893: III, 
392). Finally, we note that, in 1800, a short-lived truce was signed 
between France and the Algerian and Tunisian Regencies. An 
embassy was sent by Ḥammūda to Istanbul some time later to 
justify this initiative (al-Imām 1980: 420), which should, here 
again, be attributed to Algerian pressure. Threats from the Porte led 
to the cancelling of the truce and the issuing of a new war declara-
tion by the two Regencies, which remained in force until the sign-
ing of a definitive peace treaty in the wake of the Treaty of Amiens 
signed between France and the Porte in 1802 (al-Imām 1980: 420). 

The Ottoman Porte, during the conflict with France, had been 
allied to Russia (an unnatural, short-lived alliance) and, more
effectively, to England who, according to a treaty signed on 5 January 1799, pledged to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This alliance had consequences on the relations of the Tunisian Regency with the neighbouring Italian states, representing pawns on the chess-board of the intense conflict between Napoleon and England. Thus, in September 1799, the conclusion, under English auspices, of a truce between the Maghrib Regencies and Portugal, Sardinia and Sicily, aimed, in the words of Talleyrand, the French minister of foreign affairs, ‘at guaranteeing greater ease and security to these three European states, engaged in blockading Malta’ (which was at the time occupied by the French) (Plantet 1893: III, 398). In 1800, furthermore, three Ottoman kapıças arrived on board an English frigate to order the unconditional freeing of a number of Christian slaves, in particular Neapolitans carrying passports delivered by Admiral Nelson (Naples being then divided between the French and the English influence) (Plantet 1893: III, 402).

For the five years that followed the end of war with France, the Regency observed a neutral attitude towards the conflict between that country and Britain in the Mediterranean, in conformity with the central Ottoman policy at that period. Dynamic French diplomacy in Istanbul, added to Napoleon’s shining victories at Ulm and Austerlitz in the latter part of 1805, favourably impressed Ottoman statesmen, who seemed tempted to side with the former long-time allies of the Empire. This feeling was certainly shared by Ḥammūda Pasha, who professed a great admiration for Napoleon and used to declare that Muslims would have been in a different situation if they had been blessed with a sultan possessing his courage and qualities (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 33). The signing of a new treaty by the Porte with Britain in 1807, however, led to a change in the bey’s policy towards France. Devoize, in a long letter of grievances addressed to Ḥammūda Pasha on 8 December 1808, deplored that the latter had refused to recognize the annexation of the Ionian islands to the Italian states governed by Napoleon, and complained of the discrimination suffered by French corsairs landing in Tunisian ports, compared to the English (Plantet 1893: III, 478–80). He furthermore observed:

Today, I can no longer congratulate myself for the praiseworthy dispositions of your Excellency towards the French people, which I had been so proud to report to my government in the past. It will be, to the contrary, my unpleasant
duty to inform them of the deplorable conditions of life reserved to those of my fellow-countrymen staying in Tunis

(Plantet 1893: III, 480),

before concluding with a veiled threat: ‘The not so far future will show your Excellency where the true interests of the Regency lie, and how little credit should be given to France’s relentless detractors’ (Plantet 1893: III, 480).

In another letter written in the same month to his government, the consul complained of the irascible character of the bey, ‘who only (showed) some consideration for the English’, attributing his hostility to what he described as ‘libellous pamphlets printed in Seville and Malta, spreading rumours about the setting up (by France) of an African corps for the conquest of the Barbary region’ (Plantet 1893: III, 482).

The ebbing prestige of the French consul in Tunis, whose meetings with the bey tended to be more and more frequently shortened or postponed (Plantet 1893: III, Introduction, XLIV), was further affected by an intense personal enmity between the two men. After Devoize’s departure to France in 1809, ostensibly on leave, a simple chargé d’affaires remained to manage the French consulate (Plantet 1893: III, 482, 483–4). In 1814, however, following the restoration of the monarchy in Paris under Louis XVIII, Devoize was sent again by the new government to Tunis. Ḥammūda Pasha adamantly refused to allow the offensive French envoy to land in the Regency and obliged him to sail back to Toulon. From there, the furious Devoize wrote to Paris, suggesting ‘the sending of a 1,600-strong French force that would land in La Goulette (Halq al-Wād) and attack the bey in his palace’ (Plantet 1893: III, Introduction, XLIV–XLV).

Hostility towards France, generally kept within bounds dictated by prudence, was coupled with an increased cooperation with the English during the last stages of Ḥammūda Pasha’s rule. Active diplomatic contacts between the Regency and Britain took place between 1810 and 1813. There was, first, the important embassy sent in 1810 to London, led by Mahmūd al-Jallūlī (al-Imām 1980: 422–3). The same official was also a residing envoy in Malta from 1810 to 1813, where he supervised the building of ships for the Tunisian fleet, in addition to representing other Tunisian military and commercial interests (al-Imām 1980, 422–3). In 1812, a convention was concluded with Britain, which the French saw as
harmful to their interests (Rousseau 1985: 296). There was also, still under British auspices, a renewal of the truces concluded with Sicily in 1812 and Portugal in 1813 (al-Imām 1980: 410–11). These agreements defined the conditions for ransoming off the subjects of these two countries that had been captured by Tunisian corsairs. The efforts made by the French chargé d’affaires for the conclusion of a similar treaty between the Regency and Naples at the same period, on the other hand, came to nought (Rousseau 1985: 279–83). Such an agreement was only concluded in 1816 under the aegis of Lord Exmouth: thus, Britain scored most of the points in the competition engaged with France at that period for the honour of liberating Christian slaves held in the Barbary region.

**Corso and trade**

The temporary revival of the ‘small wars’ of the corso, under Hammūda Pasha, reflected a strengthening of the jihād ideology in response to the European onslaught on the dār al-islām. This revival, after a long period of almost continuous decline, however, could not have taken place, had it not been for the elimination of the most redoubted enemies of the Maghrib corsairs, i.e. the Knights of St John of Malta, whose Order had been dismantled by Napoleon in 1798. It led to an increase in the number of Tunisian expeditions against European (mostly Italian) vessels and coasts, which rose from 29 in 1784–8, to 75 in the period between 1789 and 1803 (Panzac 1993: 75–6). Only a small proportion of these expeditions, however, was carried out by the state fleet, whereas the remaining three-quarters were carried out by private vessels (Panzac 1993: 77). The most important patrons of the private corso were: Yūsuf Şāhib al-Ṭabī’, the governor of Şafāqus, Maḥmūd al-Jallūli, and the governor of al-A’rād, Ḥmīda ibn ʿAyyād. After 1805, however, the number of corso expeditions, which was 79 in that year, fell to an average of 14 for the remaining years of Hammūda Pasha’s period of rule (Panzac 1993: 78). The reason for this evolution was that the small Italian states, which had been the main prey of the corsairs, passed under the domination of the great European powers.

The corso, indeed, as lucidly acknowledged by Yūsuf Şāhib al-Ṭabī’ to one of his collaborators, was drawing to its end (Chérif 1977: 123), which was brought about in 1816 by Wymouth’s expedition to the western Mediterranean. This awareness led Hammūda Pasha to pursue a policy timidly started, then aban-
doned, under his father’s government, i.e. the development of a Tunisian trading fleet. In the former period, the Tunisian state fleet had been almost exclusively devoted to the corso, and all Tunisian travellers and goods were taken on board foreign vessels, especially French ones. Britain’s imposition of a maritime blockade on France, starting from 1806, allowed the Ottoman trade fleet (commanded by Greek captains) to develop in the new Mediterranean environment (Panzac 1993: 78). The Tunisian Regency also profited by the new conjuncture. A small Tunisian merchant fleet was constituted with vessels captured by corsairs or bought from Europe, and by converting a number of boats formerly used for the corso into trade ships. The results of this policy were clearly reflected by statistics on the number of Tunisian ships landing in European ports. This number, in Marseilles, for instance, rose from 2 in 1802 to 9 in 1809, reached 20 in Leghorn between 1809 and 1814, and 224 in Malta between 1801 and 1816 (Panzac 1993: 78–9). This evolution, however, was sharply interrupted in 1811–12, as a result of the blockade of the port of Ḥalq al-Wād by the hostile Algerian navy. Finally, in 1814, the fall of Napoleon led to the lifting of the English blockade on French ports, and liberated European fleets in the Mediterranean, thus eliminating the weak Tunisian fleet (Panzac 1993: 81–2).

Other aspects of the trading and economic policy of the Regency under Ḥammūda Pasha represented a continuation of this bey’s wars and political alliances with the Christian world. There was a considerable development of trade relations between the Regency and Britain, especially via Malta, which fell under British rule in 1800. Commercial exchange between the Regency and this island quickly reached a level comparable to the level of those established for more than a century with Marseilles, Leghorn and Genoa. Besides the import of English products for its own market, the Regency, owing to its neutrality in the conflict between France and England, also served as a transit place for the cotton and sugar brought to the island by the English, which were re-exported to the European continent (Chater 1984: 33). Wheat and cattle were also shipped from the Regency to Malta and Gibraltar, for the feeding of English troops garrisoned there (Panzac 1993: 79). Commercial conventions with Britain, concluded in the last years of Ḥammūda’s period of rule, stipulated, in accordance with the liberal trading policy of that country, that English goods imported into the Regency would be invariably taxed at three per cent, even if they did not come from English ports, or were not imported on board
English ships (whereas the French, in order to protect their fleet, required heavier taxation if French goods came on board foreign ships) (MacGill 1815: 104).

Hammūda Pasha’s economic policy was, furthermore, characterized by an increasing tendency to concentrate all branches of trade with Christian countries in his own hands and in those of a few government officials (Chater 1984: 31–2). European consuls and traders, complaining about what they described as the bey’s ‘avarice’, were echoing the grievances expressed by their predecessors towards Husayn ibn ‘Alī, who, towards the last years of his rule, had adopted a similar policy (Chérif 1986: II, 88) – although this was, it seems, abandoned in the mid-eighteenth century. The beylical quasi-monopoly of trade, combined to a very high rise in import duties in 1808 (Chérif 1977: 123), deeply affected French and Italian commercial interests in Tunis. It led to the disappearance of 15 out of the 20 French concerns settled in that city (Chater 1984: 31–2). Hammūda’s protectionist policy may be seen as aiming at strengthening the economic capacities of the Tunisian state and limiting European commercial penetration in the Regency. It raises the issue of a possible common economic strategy of the Ottoman walīs at that period and, in particular, of a similarity of policies and objectives between this bey and the much discredited Djezzār Pasha, in Palestine and Syria, who was bitterly criticized in his time, in particular, for establishing an increasing number of monopolies.

The almost total interruption of the importing of luxury products from abroad and the encouragement of local industry, represented other aspects of this defensive economic policy against European economic penetration. Sources have reported, in particular, on the bey’s spectacular gesture of discarding cashmere shawls, replacing them by woollen shawls produced in Jirba (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 78). This type of measure conformed with the implementation of anti-sumptuary laws and a general policy of austerity of the Porte during that period, promoted in particular by the grand vizier Halil Hamid Pasha (1782–5) and by Sultan Selim III (Inan 1976: 72). The bey furthermore strove to encourage inter-Ottoman trade, particularly by bringing down the rate of customs duties on goods sold to, or bought from, the other Ottoman provinces, from eight per cent ad valorem to four per cent (Zouari 1990: 70). In addition to trade with Algiers, carried out via al-Kāf and the al-Jarīd region in the South, the greatest part of the commercial exchanges with the Ottoman Empire was carried on
from the capital and from Šafāqus. From the latter city, situated on the south-eastern coast of the Regency, a consequent community had migrated to Cairo and Alexandria. It played an important role in the development of commercial relations with Egypt, reinforced by strong cultural ties. Merchants from Šafāqus and Jirba also traded with cities in Turkey (especially Istanbul and İzmir) and in the Morea. The goods exported from the Regency to the rest of the Empire included, in particular, the *shāshiyyas* (red bonnets made by the Andalusians), silk, woollen cloth and perfumes, and agricultural products. It should also be noted, concerning the last products, that on some years important quantities of them were shipped out to other Ottoman provinces affected by drought and insufficient harvests, on the instructions of the Porte. Eighteenth-century sources, thus, mention the sending of quantities of oil to Egypt and grains to Tripoli and Algiers in 1724 (Chérif 1986: II, 11), and of wheat to Syria in 1769, 1771 and 1773 (Faroqhi 1994: 546–7). We do not know on what terms, or at what prices, these shipments were delivered.

**Conclusion and epilogue**

The analysis made above of the wars and alliances of Ḥammūda Pasha, stands in marked contrast to the assessment made of this bey’s relations and policy with the Ottoman Porte by contemporary historians, who have unanimously viewed his period of rule as the culmination of a linear and constant process of autonomy from Istanbul, started since the seventeenth century. This view has been summed up neatly by Khélifa Chater in these words: ‘Ḥammūda Pacha gouvernait la Régence “en toute indépendance.” Il ne rejetait guère l’autorité ottomane tant qu’elle le laissait gouverner à sa guise, ne s’immisçait pas dans les affaires de la Régence et n’intervenait pas au Maghreb’ ['Ḥammūda Pasha ruled the Regency “in utter independence”. He did not reject the authority of the Ottoman State, as long as the latter let him govern as he wished, and did not meddle in the affairs of the Regency, or intervene in the Maghrib’] (Chater 1984: 34).

I shall not, however, dispute the second assessment made by contemporary historiography of Ḥammūda Pasha’s period of rule, i.e. that it represented the end of an era for Ottoman influence in Tunis. The succession crisis that followed the death of Ḥammūda Pasha at the end of 1814, at the age of 55, ushered in crucial new developments in the Regency. The bey, whose only son had died
when still a child in 1800, had firmly kept his relatives, and in particular his elder cousin Mahmūd ibn Muḥammad, from exercising any influence within the government of the Regency. The designation of ʿUthmān, Ḥammūda’s younger half-brother, as the new bey by Yūsuf Ṣāḥib al-Ṭābiʿ was, presumably, the one conforming to the interests, or the stipulations, of the Ottoman Porte. ʿUthmān’s rule, however, was a brief one: three months later, a palace conspiracy led to his murder and to the accession to the beyliciate of the ageing Maḥmūd (1815–24). Yūsuf Ṣāḥib al-Ṭābiʿ, in his turn, was brutally executed, less than one year later. It is possible that French assistance, or tacit support, had been secured for the coup d’état engineered by the elder branch of the Husaynid family, since Maḥmūd Bey hastened to ask for the return of the French consul Devoize, who, as indicated above, had been banned from the Regency in the last stage of Ḥammūda’s reign (Rousseau 1985: 296). As for the Porte, according to its usual practice, it bowed down to the fait accompli, and finally granted its investiture to Maḥmūd, but all its subsequent efforts to regain its hold over the Regency were thwarted by increasing French influence in the region. The beginning of the end for Ottoman rule in the Maghrib started with the French occupation of Algiers in 1830. Although the Algiers Regency had been definitively at peace with Tunis since 1821 (Chater 1984: 277), thanks to the efforts of the Porte, the ambiguous stance of the Tunisian government, prompted by vindictiveness and foolish ambitions, impeded desperate attempts by the Ottoman sultan to prevent the loss of the largest of his Maghrib provinces. Half a century later, the Tunisian Regency was placed under the French Protectorate, which was to last from 1881 until 1956.
This chapter on the pasha-bey of Tunis will not deal with the policies or with the functions and responsibilities entrusted to Hammūda Pasha as supreme power-holder in the Regency. Various aspects of the bey’s prerogatives in the army and administration of the province will, in any case, be brought to our attention in our following study of these two institutions. The present chapter will, rather, probe the link between the Tunisian pasha-bey and the central government in Istanbul from the perspective of Ottoman legality and protocol. Following the introductory analysis on the evolution of Ottoman policy as concerns beylical succession in the Regency during the period of our concern, the various sections of this chapter will successively deal with: the ceremony of investiture of Hammūda ibn ʿAlī; his titles, emblems of power and formal privileges; and the organization of his household in the Bārdū palace.

**Introduction: beylical succession after 1756**

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the policy adopted by the Ottoman Porte as concerns beylical succession in the Regency reflected a new ruling strategy that ensured a more flexible, yet more efficient hold, on the province. First, the newly created Husaynid dynasty was provided with stronger guarantees for a secure tenure of power than its Muradite predecessors. This consisted in the granting of the title of pasha to the bey from the time of Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf (although, as we have seen, this measure was postponed for specific political reasons in the case of Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī), and the abolition of the power formerly devolved to the āgha of the Turkish subāyhis, as potential contender for the beylical title. In 1756, furthermore, the Porte fulfilled its obligation of supporting its legitimately acknowledged pasha-beys by ordering
the removal of the usurper ʿAlī Pasha from power. The Porte, on the other hand, was able to intervene more energetically in the process of beylical succession than it had done under the last Muradites. Thus, the central Ottoman government, having excluded the elder branch of the Husaynid family, possibly because Muḥammad Bey (1756–9) had not given satisfaction to his suzerain, proceeded, with the younger branch, to implement two traditional tenets of its policy as concerns beylical succession. The first was the priority given to the principle of inheritability of the office from father to eldest son, if the latter was eligible. The investiture of Ḥammūda ibn ʿAlī in 1777 therefore sanctioned as much the father’s satisfactory record of services, as his son’s merits. We may note that, with this in mind, ʿAlī Bey had provided his scion with a relatively careful education – at least by his predecessors’ standards – which may be seen as the equivalent of the training reserved to young kāpi kūlus in Istanbul. Ḥammūda, in particular, was the first (and probably the last), among the Husaynids to receive a formal teaching in the Turkish language (Ibn Abīʾl-Diyāʾ 1963–6: III, 11). Finally, the young man had been trained in the duties of his office, since he acted as deputy to his father for a number of years, under the latter’s supervision, before his investiture (Ibn Abīʾl-Diyāʾ 1963–6: II, 176–7).

Another tenet of Ottoman policy as concerns beylical succession in the Regency, which had been neglected after the period of the first Muradites, was that if the incumbent bey had accomplished a given length of service or had reached a certain age, his son would succeed him in his lifetime. ʿAlī Bey was thus an official of the Ottoman state, who, after 20 years of office (from 1172 to 1191 hijra), was allowed to go into retirement, leaving his son the one and only pasha-bey in Tunis. This fact has not been acknowledged by twentieth-century historians on the Regency, who have dated the start of Ḥammūda’s rule from ʿAlī Bey’s death in 1782 (Chérif 1977: 108; Chater 1984: 23; al-Imām 1980: 1). Ibn Abīʾl-Ḍiyāʾ, however, makes it very clear that ʿAlī Bey was no longer in power after 1777, describing him thus at the close of the ceremony of his son’s investiture: ‘He retired into his apartments, having unburdened himself of the responsibilities of governorship, happy and content with his deposition’ (Ibn Abīʾl-Ḍiyāʾ 1963–6: II, 177).

As an additional symbolic advantage for the prestige of the Porte in the Regency, the Ottoman investiture given to the son in his father’s lifetime was organized before the local bāʾa (i.e. the public
homage and display of allegiance to the new ruler, given, according to Islamic tradition, by the members of his government and his subjects), whereas the assumption of power by a new bey at the death of his predecessor implied his receiving the bai‘a a long time before the firman of investiture arrived from Istanbul.

The investiture of Ḥammūda ibn ‘Alī

The application to the Porte

In order to obtain the beylical office for his son Ḥammūda, ‘Alī Bey sent a formal application to the Porte, stressing that he was acting in conformity to the wishes expressed by his subjects (Ibn Abī’l-Điyāf 1963–6: II, 177). As evidence of this popular consensus, a petition by the diwān to that intent must have been attached to ‘Alī’s letter. Although the correspondence between the Regency and the Ottoman Porte in the Tunisian archives at the Dār el-Bey does not include a petition expressly drafted for this application to the central Ottoman government, we may reasonably assume that its opening paragraph was similar to that of the petition sent by the diwān to Istanbul and dated on 7 Jumādā 1231/5 May 1816, a few days after the failure of a janissary uprising in Tunis (Archives Générales Tunisiennes, Série Histoire, Carton 220, Dossier 346, documents 3 and 3 bis). The text, written in Turkish and accompanied by the signatures of 51 officials, begins thus:

We, the most humble dāy of the ocaks of Tūnus elmehrûse, dār el-cihad (Tunis the well-guarded, province of the holy war), the qādis (judges) and müftis (theological jurisconsults) of the Hanefite and Malekite rites, upholders of the şerīa, the ‘ulama, the awliyā al-sâlihān (men of holy repute), the imams, preachers and şerîfs (the Prophet’s descendants), the aga (commander) and kāhiya (intendant general) of the janissaries, the yaya başış (a category of high officers of the janissaries), the hocas (secretaries) of the divān, the sancakdār hocas (intendants of the army), the çavuşes, oda başış (two categories of janissary officers), reîses (commanders of corsair or artillery units), serdengeçtis (special assault units), ‘alemdars (flag-holder officers), sipâhis (cavalry), aştis (a category of janissary officers), the ihtiyar and muteqā’id officers (veterans and pensioners) of the ocaks, and all the kul ‘asker (the
janissaries), the ᾃyān (notables) of the vilāyet (province),
the tribes’ şeyhs (leaders) and all the re‘āya and ber‘āya (i.e.
the tax-payers and those exempted from this obliga-
tion) whose names are given below, humbly and sincerely
address this motion to the dust of the august steps
of the most just, magnificent and compassionate Sultan of
the world, the most powerful and awe-inspiring Ḥān
of the world and Ḥāqān of the two Seas and the two
Lands, our master the Sultan, son of the Sultan, may God
make his rule last as long as the stars and keep it as
elevated until Doomsday, Āmīn.

A small delegation, headed by an official chosen from among the
dignitaries of the Regency originating from the Empire, then sailed
to Istanbul, carrying the application documents and laden with
presents (the hadiyya). We have no information on the gift sent
by ‘Alī Bey on that occasion, but we may presume that, as in the
case of the much trumpeted embassy of Hammūda Pasha to the
Porte in 1795, though on a more modest scale, the bey’s offerings
comprised a wide range of the country’s raw materials and hand-
icrafts wares. Among the latter, a huge banner with verses from
the religious poem ‘Al-‘Burdaḥ’, written by the Maghrib poet al-
Buṣayrī in praise of the prophet, embroidered on it with a silken
thread represented an exclusive contribution from the Tunisian
Regency among the offerings by Arab provinces to the Porte (Ibn
Abi‘l-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 28; Bayram no date: I, part one, 134).
Jewels, as well as weapons and curios encrusted with precious
stones were also destined for the sultan and the highest officials of
his sarāy (palace) and of the central Ottoman government.²

In Istanbul, formalities for interviews with officials and for
presenting the bey’s application to the sultan were carried out with
the assistance of the bey’s kāhiya, or deputy at the Porte (Ott.: kapi
kāhya, in Arabic: khalifatu hu bīl-bāb). The latter belonged to a
category of Ottoman officers who were entrusted with representing
provincial pashas in Istanbul and acting to forward their adminis-
After notification was given of the acceptance of the envoy’s
presents by the sultan, the firman of investiture would be drafted
in the Chancellery of the Porte. The envoy was then able to sail
back to Tunis, accompanied by a kapıcı.
The ceremony of investiture

The ceremony of Ḥammūda ibn ‘Alī’s investiture took place on 9 February 1777, following the arrival of the Ottoman kapıcı and his reception in great pomp in Tunis. In the light of the information provided by Tunisian sources of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on this type of celebration, we may reconstruct the formalities of this function as follows.

When all the religious and army dignitaries and officials, and a number of notables had been gathered in the fort’s square of the Bārdū palace, the Ottoman kapıcı (designated, in Tunisian sources, as the qubjī), made his way to the front row and, after delivering the firmans and the robes of honour to Tunisian officials, took the seat reserved for him. At his entry, all present, including the bey, stood up in deference and remained standing for the rest of the ceremony. First, the tarjumān (interpreter) of the dey robed the bey in the sultan’s robe of investiture, a red caftan embroidered with gold and fringed with fur worn by two-tuğ pashas, to the sound of the Turkish military band. The dress of honour, conforming to Islamic tradition, was accompanied by a present from the sultan (such as an encrusted dagger, or a sword). The firman of investiture was then read by the bāsh khūja (head secretary) of the diwān. It appears from nineteenth-century firmans found in the Tunisian archives (Archives Générales Tunisiennes, Série Histoire, Carton 220, Dossier 340, documents 13 and 39), that this was only a short text, containing the declaration of investiture and general recommendations, i.e.:

   to ensure safety and order in the memleket (province),
   protect and safeguard God’s creatures, the reāya, to strive
   to put to execution all (the sultan’s) firmans and take the
   utmost care to avoid trespassing on the limits of justice and
   committing any infringements against the inhabitants and
   dwellers in the country.

   Gunshots were fired at the end of the ceremony from the Bārdū fortress and from all the other fortresses of the country, for the next three days, as a sign of rejoicing.

The confirmation of investiture

The pasha-bey’s investiture was normally renewed every three years (Serres 1925: 87), according to the traditional practice, established
since the reign of sultan Murād III, of three-year mandates for the pashas (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 145) and on the advent of every new sultan. Hammūda Pasha’s investiture was thus renewed – belatedly – in 1795 by Selim III, and was also probably renewed on the enthroning of Selim’s two successors: Mustafa IV (in 1807) and Mahmūd II (in 1808). The application for the renewal of investiture necessitated the sending of the usual presents, with a new petition of support by the dīwān, probably formulated in similar terms to the second paragraph of the petition mentioned above:

Declare that your servant, . . . Pasha-Bey, following the example of his father and his grandfather, has always obeyed the orders and the will of the Sulṭān al-mu‘āzzam and acted zealously to fulfil the noble Caliph’s satisfaction in managing the affairs of the victorious ocak, that he is administering the country in the best way, protecting the poor and taking care of the rā’iya and dwellers in the eyālet, and that we all are content and happy with his deeds and actions.

(Archives Générales Tunisiennes, Série Histoire, Carton 220, Dossier 346, documents 3 and 3 bis)

It appears that the drafting of the firmans of renewal of investiture in Istanbul took place in the first days of the month of Shawwāl. A new robe of investiture might also be sent to the bey: on such occasions, a ceremony was held in Istanbul before the departure of the kapıci of the Porte to Tunis, at which the kapı kāhyası donned the caftan destined for the bey.

**Titles, emblems of power and privileges**

**Titles of the pasha-bey**

Hammūda Pasha was designated by a variety of Ottoman official titles:

- The title ‘pasha-bey’, in Ottoman spelling, following his name, was engraved at the centre of the beylical seals, and was also used in treaties signed with Christian powers (Rousseau 1985: 504, 526, 529, etc.).
The Turkish title ‘beylerbey’ and its Arabic equivalent ‘amīr al-umārā’ recur in the following invariable opening paragraph of the firmans addressed to the bey:

Emīr el-ūmerā el-kirām, kebir al-kubera el fihām, zu’l-qadri vel-ıhtirām, şahībül-izz vel-ihtisām, al-muḫtaṣṣ bi-mazīd ināyet el-melik el-ālā, ḥallan Tūnus beğerlebgisī (X) Paşa, damer iqbalūh.

(Lord of the illustrious Lords, greatest of the great in their glory, recipient of consideration and reverence, full of glory and munificence, distinguished by the special solicitude of the Highest King (God), presently beylerbey of Tunis, (X) Pasha, may his prosperity long last.)

(Archives Générales Tunisiennes, Série Histoire, Carton 220, Dossier 340, documents 13 and 29)²

A third title, ‘mīrmīrān’, representing the Persianized form of ‘amīr al-umārā’, was also commonly used in official documents (Hugon 1913: 83). These three titles designated pashas of the rank of two tuğs in the Ottoman administrative titulature. We may therefore wonder about the use of the title of ‘wazīr’ by the historian Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf, twice, in references to Ḥammūda Pasha (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 28, 83). We know that the title ‘vezīr’, in the Ottoman Empire, applied to pashas of three tuğs, and that, according to some historians, most provincial governors, particularly in the Arab provinces, were granted a third tuğ during the eighteenth century (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 141). There is, however, nothing that suggests that Ḥammūda Pasha had also received that honour, especially as such an event would have been widely advertised and reported by contemporary authors, as was the case when Muhammad Bey (1787–95) was granted a second tuğ (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: II, 63). We may therefore consider the use of the title ‘wazīr’ in a literary source such as Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf’s chronicle, as laudatory exaggeration, or as an ambiguous play on the original Arabic meaning of that word, i.e. ‘assistant, adviser’ (of the Ottoman grand vizier).

Finally, the Tunisian pasha-beys were also designated by two other Ottoman titles relating to pashas. The first was: ‘sāḥib kursī’, meaning: ‘the one holding possession of (the highest office)’ (see Rousseau 1985: 499, 504, 514; Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 1970: 45).³ This title was accompanied by the denomination
of the Regency either as ‘Tūnis al-mahrūsa’ (Tunis the well-guarded), or as ‘memleket Ifriqiya’.

The bey was also designated as ‘wālī’ (Bayram no date: 120), an Arabic term meaning ‘governor’, the use of which had become widespread in the eighteenth century in the Ottoman Empire (Ott.: vālī).

Among his own subjects, the Tunisian bey was designated by a variety of other appellations. Literary sources call him ‘sulṭān al-‘āsr’, which meant ‘the ruler of the time’ (Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 1970: 42). He was called by his servants and the people at large: ‘sīdna’ (i.e. ‘our master’, from the Arabic ‘sayyid’), corresponding to the half-Turkish half-Arabic ‘efendīna’, used in Egypt. And, in the lingua franca used in mamlūk and renegade circles of the Regency, which consisted of a mixture of French and Italian, sprinkled with Arabic and Turkish words, he was ‘il padrone’ (Pückler-Muskau 1989: 175).

Emblems of power and privileges
The emblems and marks of distinction held by Ḫammūda Pasha in the Regency were:

- The flags and banners (in Arabic: ‘alam, band, șanjaq): Ottoman banners were essential symbols of the pashas’ military and civil authority in provinces. Ḫammūda Pasha, thus, had a banner that constituted his exclusive emblem and was displayed on parades, at feasts and ceremonies, and during mahalla expeditions (Hugon 1913: 93; Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 24). Various other banners were displayed from the Tunisian forts and state vessels. Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf has recorded that, in 1795, as the Swedish ship carrying the delegation sent by Hammūda to Istanbul entered the Bosphorus straits, an officer was sent by the kapudan pasha, demanding that the Tunisian flag flying over it be taken down. The bey’s envoy, Şāhīb al-Ṭabī’ refused, declaring that this would be an insufferable affront to inflict on a Muslim banner under Christian eyes – an argument that, according to the author, won the day (Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 28). Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf’s probably deliberately vague account of the incident suggests that the issue of flags was a source of conflicts between the beys and the Porte, but doesn’t enlighten us further.

- The tuğs: the Tunisian bey, like all provincial pashas, was preceded, in solemn ceremonies, by two officers bearing long
shafts carrying the *tuğs* corresponding to his rank (Hugon 1913: 81). Surprisingly, there is no mention in Tunisian sources of the Ottoman period to this emblem of beylical power which was, it seems, called ‘the Turkish *şanjaq*’ and which may be seen in some twentieth-century photographs of beylical processions (Bey 2002: 101).

- **The signets and seals:** Ḥammūda Pasha, according to Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf, ‘used his father’s seal and signet until the latter’s death, out of respect for him’ (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: II, 178). This may suggest that the Husaynids wanted, or were allowed, to maintain, in the eyes of their subjects, the pretense that ‘Alī Bey was ruling for life. All the seals and signets used by Ḥammūda Pasha, in any case, corresponded to his status of two-*tuğ* pasha. The seals, in particular, were of various sizes and shapes, round, oval or eight-sided. On the outer band of some of the larger ones were inscribed two verses from the poem ‘Al-*Burdah*’, mentioned above, on the respect of the *šari‘a* by the ruler. Hugon has noted that the same verses were inscribed on the seal of Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha of Egypt (Hugon 1913: 42).

- **The military music band (nawba):** there was a Turkish band in the Bārdū beylical palace, which played several times a day, including at dawn and nightfall. Military nawbas also accompanied *mahallas* and troops on campaign (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 39; Raymond 1994: II, 81).

- **The pasha’s seat (al-*kursī*):** in the mid-eighteenth century, the arrogant – and eventually ill-fated – ‘Alī Pasha had sat on a throne of unduly majestic proportions (in addition to arrogating to himself exclusively the privilege of wearing cashmere shawls). After 1756, Muḥammad Bey replaced that *kursī* by a simpler one, which local craftsmen carved from walnut wood (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: V, 24–5), thus giving the keynote of a more subdued attitude, that characterized Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī’s scions. For public occasions and ceremonies in the Bārdū palace, Ḥammūda Pasha also had a second *kursī* carved from the teeth of a whale that had been stranded on the Tunisian shore, and which was made on the orders of ‘Alī Bey by a French craftsman (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: II, 177; V, 25). It should be noted that, in North African folklore, fish stand as symbols of fertility and luck.

- **The four-wheeled carriage (al-*karrūsa*, from the Italian ‘*carrozza*’):** it was Ḥammūda’s exclusive privilege to ride a closed four-wheel carriage, although, according to Ibn Abīl-
Diyāf, he never exercised it, declaring that these carriages were more suitable for women (MacGill 1815: 101; Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 39). The pasha-bey’s karrūṣa in the Regency probably corresponded to the closed boats (Ott.: koculu kayık) that only the pashas were allowed to use on river journeys in Cairo, Buda, or Baghdad, for instance (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 153).

- The pasha’s fur (al-farwa): the wearing of a caftan fringed with fur was a privilege which the pasha shared with three other dignitaries in the Regency: the dey, the Hanefite bāš mufti (holder of the highest religious honour in the Regency) and the bāš khāja (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: II, 122).

- The veil (Ḥijāb): Islamic rulers, including the Hafsid and the Ottoman sultans, following a tradition of Persian origin, might hide themselves from the sight of their ministers and subjects by sitting behind a veil or partition (Chelhod 1971; Brunschvig 1947: II, 29). This usage is also noted by a source on Ḥammūda Pasha (Ibn Salāmā 1850?: 37).

The household of Ḥammūda Pasha

The first pashas appointed in Tunis, like those of the Egyptian province, had resided in a house situated inside the citadel that surrounded the capital (Raymond 1989: 346). In the seventeenth century, the dār al-bāšā, or dār al-khilāfa, to which the dīwān of the jund was attached, was transferred to the heart of the city (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 200, 293). In the eighteenth century, the Husaynid pasha-beys kept their residence in the palace of Bārdū, which the first beys of the Regency had inherited from the Hafsid sultans, and which was situated a few miles west of the capital, not far from the starting point of the maḥalla (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 294). The household of Ḥammūda Pasha in that palace, like that of other provincial wālīs, was modelled on the household of the sultan, and the more modest one of the grand vizier in Istanbul, as far as etiquette permitted it.11 Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyaf has stressed the bey’s strict control over the expenses of the palace, as well as his unostentatiousness and the simplicity of his demeanour during the court audiences that he held there (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyaf 1963–6: III, 76, 81). This behaviour conformed to the stipulations of the central Ottoman government to provincial wālīs at that period. The Porte, in the context of its administrative reforms programme, was then striving to restore the simplicity and austerity of the first epoch of
the Empire among its officials and agents, and had, in particular, edicted sumptuary laws to fight the financial excesses of some pashas and their ceremonial extravagance (Aksan 1998).

The inside and the outside services of the beylical household

In the Tunisian beylical household, the harem, guarded by black and white eunuchs, composed the women’s section of the palace. The rest of the household was divided between the inside and the outside service. The inside service included, first, the young pages designated as the muchachi del camera (in Arabic: al-ṣīḥār, i.e. the little boys), in charge of the private chambers of the bey. The muchachi, in Hammuda Pasha’s time, were six young slave-boys captured during corsair raids on the coasts of Italy (Raymond 1994: II, 80); they were supervised by the bāsh qāzāq, whose prerogatives will be studied below in more detail. Concerning the other servants of the inside service, a list of them, designated in the lingua franca in current use in the government circles of the Regency, is provided by a European source of Hūsain ibn ‘Alī’s time (Pococke 1772: I, 314–16). It is worth reproducing this list here, if only to stress how faithfully the Tunisian beylical household was copied on the imperial model, although the household of Hammuda Pasha may have been of a smaller size than his grandfather’s, given the policy of austerity followed by this bey:

- two officers in charge of the bey’s wardrobe and clothing, the first, serving the bey in his palace, called ‘il bashau guarda robe’, and the second, called ‘il bashau guarda robe del campo’, to serve him during mahalla expeditions (corresponding, respectively, to the çokadır ağa and to the cameşûy başı of the sultan) (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 342, 337);
- the kafteji, to serve the bey’s coffee (corresponding to the sultan’s kalveci başı) (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 344);
- the guarda fanali, for providing adequate lighting (corresponding to the mum başı) (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 336);
- the guarda hamam, or guardian of the baths (corresponding to the hammâmcı başı) (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 337);
- the guarda banda and the guarda letto responsible for the supply of water (corresponding to the su kullukcu and the ibrikdâr ağası) (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 336, 342).
As for the outside service of the beylical household, we may include in it, starting from the periphery, servants in charge of the various tasks for the maintenance of the different sections of the palace, such as the cleaners, cooks, stable-boys and supervisors, gardeners, etc., and a small number of distinguished representatives of the learned profession, serving as teachers for the religious education of the princes and mamlûks, and as imâms for the mosque attached to the palace. More importantly, the outside service included a variety of bodyguards, ceremony masters and couriers, whose number was probably strictly determined by the protocolary stipulations set out by the Porte, taking into consideration the rank held by the pashas of Tunis in the hierarchy of Ottoman provincial governors. These officers, chosen for their imposing statures and looks and sumptuously attired in Ottoman costume, attended the bey during processions or at the justice audiences that he held daily in a hall of the Bârdû palace, and during which he examined a variety of criminal cases, including the death penalty, which could only be pronounced by him. Among these officers were:

- the shâtîrs (Ott.: şatur) or footmen, wearing red and silver striped costumes (Bayram no date: I, part two, 131–2): In the Ottoman Empire, two-tuğ pashas were entitled to have six unmounted horses led before them and were accompanied by four of these footmen (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 153);
- the abyâk (only mentioned in the plural form in sources, from the Turkish peyk): in Istanbul, the peyks were one of the guard corps attached to the sultan, and a number of provincial pashas were also entitled to have them (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 87, 153). The Tunisian abyâk are mentioned in sources, together with the shâtîrs, in descriptions of the pasha’s retinue on the occasion of the departure of the mahalla or in the bey’s tribunal (Ibn Abî Dinâr 1967: 303; Ibn ῦAbd al-ʻAzîz 1925: 211; Pückler-Muskau 1989: 177; Bayram no date: I, part two, 131);
- the shîlâqs, corresponding to the Ottoman şolaks, who formed guard units attached to the sultans and to provincial pashas;¹³
- the shâwîshes al-salâm (Ott.: çavuş): as was the case for their counterparts in the service of the sultan and the grand vizier in Istanbul (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 349), these shâwîshes officiated in the bey’s tribunal and acted as masters of ceremonies. They wore red shâshiyyas (fez hats) adorned with ostrich
feathers, with silver discs hanging on their foreheads, and held tall copper canes in their hands. They were commanded by the bāsh shāwish (Bayram no date: I, part two, 121; Pückler-Muskau 1989: 159).

- the ru’asā al-bawwāba corresponded to another group of ceremony masters in the sultan’s household, i.e. the kapıcı başısı (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 355), both denominations meaning ‘head door-keepers’. They were headed by the bāsh bawwāb (first head door-keeper) and served in particular in the bey’s tribunal (Bayram no date: I, part two, 131).

The gates of the Bārdū palace were guarded by 25-men units representing the various formations of the Tunisian army. The study, among these, of three prestigious cavalry corps: the şubāyhis of Tunis, the ḥānbas and the mamlūks, due to their particular link to the beylical household and to the Tunisian central administration, whose offices were situated within the precincts of the Bārdū palace, may appropriately be included in this section of our chapter.

The şubāyhis of Tunis and the ḥānbas

The şubāyhis of Tunis and the ḥānbas were organized in very similar ways. Each of the two corps was divided into two sections, a Turkish and an Arab one (Raymond 1994: II, 11, 84–5). In addition to participating regularly in the beylical mahallas, these cavalrymen were employed for various administrative functions, and particularly that of couriers in the service of the various departments of the Tunisian government. There was, however, in that regard, a distinction between the Turkish and the Arab sections of both corps. The Turkish şubāyhis and ḥānbas, it seems, belonged to the beylical household (and were therefore specifically in the khidma, i.e. service, of the bey). Their Arab counterparts, whom Ibn Abīl-Diyāf describes as ‘the cavalry of the mamlaka i.e. province (from the Ottoman: memleket)’ (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: IV, 30), were in the service of the central administration of the Regency, whose offices were also situated in the grounds of the Bārdū palace. All these cavalrymen were entitled to receive from the persons or bodies to whom they communicated administrative and judicial decisions a specific payment, called the ‘khidma’, which represented an appreciable bonus to the salaries of the lower and middle-ranking among them in particular (Raymond 1994: II, 61–2).
The corps of the şubāyhis of Tunis, who drew their denomination from the Turkish ‘sipāhi’, meaning: ‘cavalryman’, had existed from the beginning of Ottoman rule in the province. The Turkish şubāyhis, who had probably been part of the first jund set up in Tunis in the period following its conquest, had constituted, in the seventeenth century, a prestigious cavalry elite. Their āgha, who played an important role at the end of that century and during the very first years of the eighteenth, lost all influence when the corps was attached to the beylical household in the time of Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī. In the eighteenth century, they served as couriers between the beylical administration and the diwān, and guarded the inner gate of the Bārdū palace. As for the Arab şubāyhis of Tunis, who guarded the outer gate of the Bārdū palace, they constituted the first regiment of Arab şubāyhis of the province, created in the first stages of Ottoman rule in Tunis, half a century before the regiments of Bāja, al-Kāf and Qayrawān were set up under the rule of Ḥammūda ibn Murād Bey (1631–66) (Raymond 1994: II, 84).

The more prestigious hānbas, who guarded the second gate of the Bārdū palace were a later creation than the şubāyhis. The denomination ‘hānba’ probably originated from the Turkish ‘cānbāz’ (i.e. ‘soul-stakers’), designating special assault units in Ottoman Muslim rāiyya contingents and who seem to have been set up on the model of the serden geçtis (i.e. ‘head-riskers’) units of the Istanbul janissary corps. By the end of the seventeenth century, the cānbāz often formed the personal guard of beylerbeyes and beys across the Empire (Gökbilgin 1965). The hānbas of the Tunisian beys, indeed, came into existence at the same period and quickly rose to power and military prestige in the Regency. (Unlike them, however, the corps of the deylical hānbas, whose creation can be more precisely dated to the time of Muḥammad Ṭābāq Dey (1677–82), soon sank, like their masters, into obscurity) (Ibn Abī Dinār 1967: 224). Each of the two sections of the beylical hānbas numbered 100 to 150, and was headed by a bāsh hānba. These two officers are ranked seventh in Bayram’s list of the first 13 government offices of the Regency (see Appendix A, p. 144), with ‘slight precedence for the Turkish one over the Arab’ (Bayram no date: I, part two, 3). The hānbas officiated in the tribunal of the bey, in addition to assuming courier duties in communicating the bey’s judicial decisions. The highest-ranked among them were granted governorships, especially in tribal areas (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 83). The hānbas thus seem to have represented the counterpart of the müteferrikas of the sultan’s household, or his ‘noble guard’,

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also divided into two sections, and whose most deserving members were rewarded with governorships (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 362).

The mamlūks of the bey

The corps of the mamlūks, like those of the ṣubāyḥis of Tunis and the hānbas, had a dual structure. It was divided into two sections of distinctly unequal standing: the Europeans and the Ottomans. The first constituted what was called the group of the mamlūks of the entry vestibule (mamālik al-saqīfa), numbering 100, and divided into four ādas (units) (Raymond 1994: II, 39). Half of its members were kept in Tunis, where one unit was posted on guard in the entry vestibule leading to the palace (hence their name), while the rest acted as couriers for the bey in his court of justice. The other half were sent to provincial garrisons, where they were also employed for administrative courier duties. The European mamlūks were commanded by the bāsh qāzāq (‘kāzāk’ meaning, in Turkish, ‘an aged male slave’), or bāsh mamlūk, as he later became more frequently called. This official, who also supervised the young Italian pages of the inside service (who probably formed the ‘junior’ section of that corps), thus stood as the Tunisian equivalent of the powerful silihdār ağa of the sultan’s and the grand vizier’s households (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 339). He is ranked eighth in Bayram’s list. In Ḥammūda Pasha’s time, the bāsh qāzāq was a Neapolitan slave, named Mario Stinca. Stinca’s functions included those of interpreter and private secretary of the bey, which gave him considerable influence among the consuls of Christian states (Ibn Abī’l-Dīyāf 1963–6: 76).15

The rest of the European mamlūks, however, enjoyed little official power within the government of the Regency. They are also almost totally absent from Ibn Abī’l-Dīyāf’s account of Ḥammūda Pasha’s period of rule, or his series of bibliographies of Tunisian officials and notables under that bey and his successors (‘tarājim al-ʿāyān’), which constituted a sort of ‘Who’s Who’ annuary of the Regency) (see Ibn Abī’l-Dīyāf 1963–6: VII and VIII). The low profile of converts from European countries during the period of our concern in the government and army of the Regency stands in clear contrast to the political power they had enjoyed in the first half of the seventeenth century, when Murād the Corsican, having succeeded Ramadān Bey at the head of the mahalla in 1613, founded the first beylical dynasty of the Regency, and Usṭa Murād, the Genoese, ascended to deylical rank in 1640.
The Ottoman mamlûks, who wielded considerable influence within the Tunisian administration, were known as mamalîk al-sarây, i.e. the mamlûks of the palace – a designation reflecting their more distinguished status compared to the Europeans, relegated to the vestibule. Their group, including the youngest ones still in training, presumably numbered, like that of the Europeans, 100 men, with gaps in that number being periodically filled by new recruitments (Brown 1974: 48). The Ottoman mamlûks were bought at a high price, generally in their adolescence, or even at an earlier age, from slave-markets in Istanbul. Like the young kapı kulüs of Istanbul, who were trained in one of the sultan’s palaces, they were boarded and educated in the Bârdû palace itself, and were generally converted there, which earned them the designation of the bey’s ‘sons’ (‘ibn’, pl. ‘abnā’). During that period of training, whereas the Italian muchachi della camera served as the bey’s valets, young Ottoman mamlûks were put on armed guard in a room adjoining the bey’s own bedroom at night (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: III, 20). Ibn Abîl-Diyâf stresses that during Hammûda Pasha’s period of rule, the language of communication normally used between the mamlûks and the bey was Turkish, implying that this was not the case under the latter’s predecessors (and, probably, his successors) (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: III, 20).

The three most important Ottoman mamlûks in the government of the Regency in Hammûda Pasha’s time were Yûsuf Şâhib al-Ṭâbi‘î, and the older Mustâfa Khûja and Sulaymân Kâhiya, who were respectively the bey’s guardian of the seal, his former tutor, and his delegate in the mahallas. A study of their origins and prerogatives leads us to a series of observations. First, these officials were born, respectively, in Moldavia, Circassia and Georgia (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: VII, 38, 56, 89). Thus, it appears that whereas, during the seventeenth century and most of the eighteenth, the most prominent mamlûks in the beylical government came exclusively from Circassia and Georgia, increasing influence was gained, starting from the period of our concern, by mamlûks from Rumelia and the western confines of the Empire, such as Yûsuf Şâhib al-Ṭâbi‘î, under Hammûda Pasha, and Mustâfa Khaznadâr, from Greece, in the mid-nineteenth century. Second, the different origins of these mamlûks suggest that Hammûda Pasha had been concerned to establish a balanced representation of the various geographical regions of the Empire within his government. Third, the functions of Yûsuf Şâhib al-Ṭâbi‘î and of Mustâfa Khûja may be considered in the light of a privilege that had been, presumably,
reserved for the Ottoman princes who, in the early period of the Empire, were sent to govern some provinces; these princes, in contrast to other pashas, were entitled to have, among their administrative staff, a nişâncı (guardian of the seal) and a lala (tutor), acting as an adviser (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 139). The same concern to restore earlier usages, and more specifically a fundamental, though long-discarded, principle of the kapı kulu institution, i.e. bachelorness, may have dictated the bey’s refusal to allow Yusuf Şâhib al-Tâbi‘ from marrying (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: VII, 97). We note, on the other hand, that Sulaymân Kâhiya and Mustafa Khûja, according to a long-established rule in the Regency, were assimilated into the beylical family by being married to its daughters: the second of them was successively married to two of Ḥâmmûda Pasha’s sisters (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: VII, 39). Finally, the particular judicial status of the Ottoman mamlûks in the Regency will be studied in another chapter of this book.

Conclusion: a kapı kulu pasha-bey

The strict and precise étiquette set out for the bey by the Porte served to codify, as well as limit, symbolically, his power in the Regency. We have seen that the Porte, as in the case of ʿAlî Pasha’s offensive kursî, kept a watchful eye against beylical transgressions in that realm. Furthermore, the legal subordination of the Husaynid pasha-beys to the Porte, underlying the formal and ceremonial aspect of their relationship, was asserted through the periodic renewal of the beys’ investiture by the sultan, which implied that the latter could, theoretically, refuse to grant this renewal to a wâlí whose performance had not been satisfactory.

In the eyes of the Ottoman Porte, therefore, Ḥâmmûda Pasha was, first and foremost, a kapı kulu, son of a kapı kulu, and a member of the kul ʿasker of the province. The scrupulous delivery of the modest salary due to him by the diwân, as to all the janissaries, aimed at stressing this fact (Peyssonnel 1987: 76). There was, in addition, a daily ritual through which the Tunisian pasha-bey publicly acknowledged that he ‘ate the sultan’s bread’, and therefore owed everything to the Ottoman lord’s beneficence. The German prince Pückler-Muskau, who visited the Regency towards 1835, thus reports that Mustafa Bey, before going into his court of justice, was handed by the bâsh khabbāz (chief baker of the jund) four small pieces of bread: ‘representing his daily ration, as a soldier
of the powerful sultan . . . The bey kissed the bread, ate a morsel of it, and pronounced with reverence: “May God bestow this blessing on me every day of my life”’ (Pückler-Muskau 1989: 179).

Finally, it is important to stress that two main marks of sovereignty in Islamic jurisprudence remained the exclusive prerogatives of each reigning Ottoman sultan in the Regency: money coined at the mint (sikka) of Tunis bore the imprint of his name and the date of his accession to the throne, and the khutba (the Friday sermon) in all the mosques of the Regency was preached in his name and included formulas of praise and support for him (Raymond 1994: II, 101). There were also various other occasions for advertising the sultan’s supreme authority over the province and singing his praise. A French visitor to the Regency in the mid-nineteenth century, mentions in particular a daily noon ritual which consisted in heralding ‘the high vertus of the sultan . . . in front of an empty armchair, representing his throne’, (Pellissier 1980: 11), probably taking place in the Bārdū palace. Finally, zīnas (city illuminations) and other forms of public rejoicings celebrated each new birth to the sultan and (a rare occurrence in those times) each Ottoman military victory. In 1814, guns were shot from all the fortresses of the Regency on the announcement of the defeat of the Wahhabis (a religious contest movement in the Arab peninsula) and their expulsion from Mekka by the troops of Muhammad-‘Alī Pasha of Egypt (1805–48), at the service of their sultan (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 60).
Hammūda Pasha’s period of rule was a period of intensive military reforms, within the context of the large-scale policy followed by the Ottoman Porte at that period in order to strengthen the military capacities of the Empire in the face of the growing threat of European expansionism. The bey’s reforms included, as in the heart of the Empire, important military building works, with the assistance of European experts and engineers. A new gunpowder factory was built in Tunis with the help of French technicians, while naval and fortification works in the harbour of Ḥalq al-Wād were carried out under the supervision of French and Dutch engineers. Several new fortifications were constructed: a few Turkish inscriptions engraved on the gates of several forts in the capital have remained until today, to attest that these forts had been built ‘by Ḥammūda Pasha on the orders of Sultan Selīm Khān’ (Ibn Abī’l-Dīyāf 1963–6: III, 38; Saadaoui 2001: 232–7).

Hammūda Pasha’s other reforms in the military field also extended to the administrative, financial and logistical organization of his army. These reforms will be mentioned in the context of the description of the different military corps of the Regency, to which this chapter is devoted. As an introduction to this study, however, it is necessary to note here that chronicles and travellers’ accounts of the Tunisian Regency from the time of the creation of that eyālet, devote a preponderant place to the Hanefite jund, whereas all other military forces, although largely superseding them in number, are only mentioned very briefly. This marked bias, it is true, can be explained by the prestige enjoyed by the colourful janissary corps and the significant role it assumed in the political and administrative evolution of the Tunisian province, as in other provinces of the Empire. The imbalance in the documentation available on the different components of the Tunisian army has necessarily
been reflected in the present chapter, divided into two unequal parts devoted, respectively, to the jund, and to the zuwāwa and tribal cavalry. The conclusion will deal briefly with the structure of the Tunisian army as a whole and the failure of the Turkish rebellion that broke out in the final stage of Ḥammūda Pasha’s rule, in 1811.

The jund

Composition and sources of recruitment

The janissaries of Ḥammūda’s time, often designated, simply, as the ʿasker, differed from those of the deylical period, in that they were, in their overwhelming majority, Muslim-born. As a consequence of this gradual change in the composition of the jund, which will be analysed below, the old dichotomy that had prevailed in the seventeenth century between the Anatolians and the ʿazabs, i.e. the Muslim-born and the converts, had become obsolete. It was replaced by a new one based on the division of their corps into two blocs of equal numerical strength: the janissaries of Ottoman origin, and those of local origin. The former opposition in the respective allegiances of the sekbans and the ʿazabs subsisted, however, with the Anatolians placed under the direct authority of the dey, and the locals under that of the bey. It is worth noting that the same evolution was noted at the same period in the Ottoman army in Egypt, with the emergence of an opposition between the ‘imperial’ and the ‘local’ janissaries, which relegated to a secondary position the opposition between the müstahfizāns and the ʿazabs (Holt 1993). Similarly, in Damascus, a sharp conflict divided the ‘true’ janissaries and the yerliyya (locals) (Raymond 1989: II, 354).

The recruitment of young men from the Ottoman Empire, originating mainly from Anatolia, and, in a smaller proportion, from the Greek archipelago and the Balkan coast, acquired an accelerated and more systematic character during the period of our concern. Ḥammūda Pasha, like other Ottoman provincial governors, had wakīls (chargés d’affaires) representing him in towns of western and southern Anatolia (Izmir, Aydin, Sinop), to levy troops in agreement with the authorities in these districts (Mantran 1959: 326). These levies served the interests and policies of the central Ottoman government. First, the employment of bands of armed and unemployed young Anatolians in the junds of the Maghrib provinces, in particular, had helped eliminate an import-
ant source of social trouble in the heart of the Empire. Second, as a more specific feature to the period of our concern, the increased recruitment of Greeks and Arna‘uts (Albanians) into the Tunisian naval forces, led to an important reduction in the number of the European renegade captains who had held sway in the seventeenth century and in the beginning of the eighteenth (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 51; Chérif 1986: I, 171). The systematic concern to curtail the influence of the European renegades in the late eighteenth-century Regency, which has been already noted in our study of the mamlūk corps, reflected an increasingly defensive stance of the Ottoman Porte towards the Christian world.

The local section of the jund was, in its overwhelming majority, composed of kulughlis (Ott.: kul oğlu, i.e. the sons of the kuls, or janissaries). The emergence of the kulughlis within the Tunisian jund resulted from the implementation of an Ottoman policy adopted since the end of the sixteenth century in the heart of the Empire, which granted access into the janissary corps to the janissaries’ sons (Hale 1994: 7–9). This policy was timidly introduced at first in the Regency but, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the registering of the janissaries’ new-born sons on the rolls of the jund had already become a general and well-established practice (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 219). Only a proportion of the kulughlis, however, was in active service. The rest constituted a reserve force in emergencies, as illustrated by crash recruitment among the Hanefite community by ‘Ali Pasha in the face of the impending Algerian invasion in 1756 (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 364).

The local janissaries also included a Malekite minority that had been admitted into the jund since the early stages of the Ottoman conquest. Sources provide only rare allusions to this group, constituted by the servants and protégés of the bey. These local recruits were, as in the Egyptian Ottoman army (Hathaway 1997: 55), designated as ‘tābi’ (meaning follower), or ‘sarrāj’ (from the Ottoman sarica, a denomination applying, in other parts of the Empire, to Anatolian mercenaries). The group of the sarrājs included, in its upper layers, members of the Andalusian community and urban and tribal notables and, in the inferior ones, orphans from the poorer categories of the population of the capital. The recruitment of this socially disadvantaged Malekite group into the jund, which may have started in Ḥusayn ibn ‘Ali’s time (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 45–6) was intensified in the period of Ḥammūda Pasha, leading to enrolments by guile, if not by force (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 54). It was probably the local equivalent of the
levies carried out among the Anatolian population to man a new corps rival to the janissaries’ in Istanbul, the nizam-i cedid corps, during the reign of Sultan Selîm III (Aksan 1998). The Tunisian bey, however, was concerned to avoid antagonizing his janissaries: according to Ibn Abîl-Ḍiyâf, the new Malekite recruits into the jund were given a fictitious Turkish ancestry. 3

Finally, concerning the janissaries’ numerical strength in the time of Ḥammûda Pasha, all historians have agreed that the jund, as a result of this bey’s intensive recruitment policy, was consider-ably larger than in the preceding period (al-Imám 1980: 190; Raymond 1994: II, 15). Statistical information on this subject by sources of the period, however, is very scanty. The assertion, made by a European observer and taken up by contemporary historians, that the number of the Tunisian janissaries rose from 3,000 in the beginning of Ḥammûda’s rule to 9,000 in 1807–11, is not con-""""firmed by any other source, and should therefore be considered with some wariness. 4

**The structure of the jund: dârs and jamâ’as**

Sources concerning the Tunisian jund include a number of descriptions of this corps by chroniclers and foreign travellers. They also include a set of archival documents, among which, in particular, we need to mention a notebook (35 leaves, pages not numbered, 37 cm by 17 cm), presumably produced towards the middle of this century, on the initiative of the ‘Direction des archives’. The Notebook, as I shall refer to it in this study, appears to be a copy (probably translated from Turkish into Arabic) of the pay-rolls of the jund or, at least surviving fragments of them, under the Tunisian beys, from Ibrâhîm al-Sharîf until Ahmad Bey (1737–53) (see Archives Générales Tunisiennes, Série Histoire, Carton 169, Dossier 895 bis). 5 Comparing these varied, though somewhat patchy, sources, to the findings and results of the considerable research available on the imperial janissary corps has yielded interesting results (see Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 314–28; Unzunçaṛı̈lî 1960, 1965; Bosworth et al. 1995). It has revealed, as will be shown below, that the structure of the Tunisian jund was, to a remark-able extent, a reproduction of its Istanbul model. Differences between the two corps can be attributed mostly to the compression dictated by the smaller size of the Tunisian jund.

There were two kinds of administrative divisions within the Tunisian jund. According to the first, the janissaries were classified,
mostly for bookkeeping and accountancy purposes, within units each grouping 20 to 25 janissaries in active service, in addition to an even more important number (30 or more) of pensioners. This unit corresponded to the orta (i.e. room), of the Imperial janissary corps. It is sometimes referred to in Tunisian administrative documents, as ‘bulük’ (Ott.: bölük, i.e. section), or ‘üda’ (Ott.: ‘oda’, also meaning ‘room’) and, more frequently, particularly in Tunisian literary sources, as ‘där’. The latter term, meaning ‘house’ in Arabic, might thus be considered as an approximate local translation of the term ‘orta’. It is of greater relevance, however, to note that the term ‘där’ also belonged to the Turkish language, being derived from the verb ‘daralmak’, meaning ‘to shrink, reduce’, and therefore designated, in the context of the Tunisian jund, a unit that constituted a given proportion of the total number of the janissaries. More precisely, bearing in mind the reverence in which the number 40 was held by the Ottomans, we should note that the där, numbering 25 janissaries, represented the fortieth part of a classical Ottoman ocak (numbering 1,000). Hammûda Pasha and a number of his mamlûks were registered in the forty-first där (see Notebook) which means that they were inscribed in the first där of the second main regiment of the jund. Each där of the jund was designated by a number (as were the ortas of the Imperial Janissary corps) or, sometimes, by the name of its commander, and invariably included a bulük bâshi at its head, with his lieutenant or intendant, the wakîl (see Notebook).

The second, more important, type of organization of the Tunisian jund was based on a functional classification of the janissaries. Above the mass of the yuldâshes (Ott.: yoldaş, i.e. the rank-and-file infantryman), the jund was divided into units of various sizes, each of them gathering a group of officers of the same specialization, ranked according to their internal hierarchy. These units, commonly designated, in Ottoman terminology, by the word ocak (which also applied to the whole of the janissary forces, or to large regiments of them), were more frequently called, in Arab provinces, jamâ’as (meaning, in Arabic, bands, groups) or tâifas. The two largest jamâ’as in the Tunisian jund were those of the wakîls and the bulük bâshîs, who, as indicated above, were included in every där listed in the pay-rolls of the janissaries. The officers of the other jamâ’as, which were of varying sizes, some of them being of not more than half a dozen members, were scattered, with little apparent systematic recurrence, among the various dârs (see the Notebook).
The jamāʿas may be divided into several categories. Leaving aside the privileged jamāʿas attached to the beylical household, which have already been reviewed in a preceding chapter of this study, i.e. those of the mamlıks, Turkish hänbas, Turkish şubayıhs, şūlaqs, abyāk, šatăirs, etc., we may identify, starting from the periphery, first, the jamāʿas of the imāms, of the dervishes (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 219), the mahtāriyya (Ott.: ‘mehter’, i.e. musician), and the amīns (heads of various craftsmen’s guilds, such as the butchers’, the blacksmiths’, the tinkers’, masons’, tailors’, etc.). Second, there were jamāʿas with precise military specializations, such as those of the re'ises (the corsair captains, who had lost much of their power during the eighteenth century), the tubjiyya (Ott.: topcu, i.e. artilleryman), the bumbājiyya (bombardiers), in addition to special assault units included in all Ottoman janissary corps, called the ser- den geçtis. The most important military jamāʿas, however, were those responsible for catering to the sustenance of the janissaries, or entrusted with provost or accountancy functions within the jund. Their officers, who bore the same titles as those used in the imperial janissary corps – though slightly modified by local usage, or pronunciation – were, in approximately increasing order of prestige:

- The wakils (intendants), more rarely designated also as the yamāqs, or auxiliary cooks (Ott.: vekil el-ḥarq and yamaks). In the Tunisian jund, it appears that the two functions to which these denominations referred were held by one officer, whereas they were held by two different types of officers within the imperial janissary corps.
- The ‘ishshīs, i.e. the cooks (Ott.: ‘aşçi): These officers, at the bey’s death, carried his coffin on their shoulders (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 412; Pückler-Muskau 1989: 159).
- The šauwishes, who, like their Ottoman counterparts (the çavuşes) carried out provost functions. They were entrusted, in particular, with announcing publicly the day of departure of the mahallas and, at the end of such expeditions, gave the signal of return to Tunis. They also announced the date of payment of wages and marshalled janissaries into the paymaster’s presence to collect their dues (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 59, 174, 219, 430).
The ‘alemās, bayraqdārs and sanjaqdārs. Owing to the close similarity of their appellations (‘alem’, ‘bayraq’, and ‘sanjaq’ all mean ‘a flag’, and probably referred, in this context, to military units of different sizes) we may presume that these officers either represented three hierarchical categories within a single jamā’a, or constituted three jamā’as graduated by increasing order of prestige and entrusted with similar functions. These functions related to the administration and accountancy of the jund. The powerful sanjaqdārs, or sanjaqdārs kūjas, in particular, are described, in sources’ accounts of the ceremonies organized periodically for the departure of the mahallas, as surrounding the āgha, with the janissaries’ flags unfurled above their heads (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 303). We note, moreover, that they are mentioned in the Notebook, together with, or as synonymous with, the muqāta‘ājis, a denomination applying, in Egypt and Damascus, to the officers responsible for the accountancy of the main army sections. More will be said about the highest-ranking among the sanjaqdārs, i.e. the kūjas and the kāhiyas, in the following section of this study.

The őda bāshis corresponding to the oda başısı standing at the top of the orta hierarchy in the imperial janissary corps, and the āya bāshis, corresponding to the distinguished ‘yaya başısı’, of superior ranking to the oda başısı).11 I would suggest that, in the Regency, these officers, who seem to have held a special standing among the janissaries, belonged exclusively to the Anatolian section of the jund.

And, finally, the bulük bāshı (Ott.: böyük başı, also called çorbacı in most sections of the imperial janissary corps), whose jamā’a gathered all those officers who had reached the last rung on the promotional ladder of the jamā’as listed above. The rank of bulük bāshı generally entitled its holder to receiving some appanage, as we shall see in more detail in another section of this chapter. A janissary going through the normal cycle of promotion reached the rank of bulük bāshı at the age of 45, thus attaining, simultaneously, the status of veteran officer. Hence, the bulük bāshı was also designated as ikhtiyar.12 This word of Arabic origin (meaning ‘choice, selected’), which came to refer, in Turkish to ‘an old person’, similarly applied, in the Mashriq provinces, to the influential group of veteran officers who played an important role in the army, and in the political
life of these eyalets in general (Holt 1966: 86). The buluk bashis were appointed to the posts of high command in the jund, which I shall now proceed to describe.

The khujas/kahiyas, the aghas and the dey

The high ranks of the sanjaqdars were the recruitment base of the khujas (Ott.: hoca, meaning ‘teacher’, and applying to a wide range of officers in charge of secretarial duties) and of the kahiyas (Ott.: kahiya, from the Persian ket-hudā, meaning ‘intendant, major-domo’). This title applied, in the Ottoman Empire, to janissary high officers, as well as to the important official acting as representative and deputy of the grand vizier) (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 60n., 120). The khujas and the kahiyas (who were also called khujas), performed administrative functions at the highest level of the janissary hierarchy. There was always a khuja and a kahiya in each of the military garrisons scattered around the Regency, whether in the hinterland (al-Kaff, Qayrawān, Tūzur), or in the coastal citadels of Halq al-Wād, Qilībia, Sūsa, Binzart, Ghār al-Milh and Tabarqa, as well as two high officers from these two groups at the head of the diwān. Their presence as an inseparable couple resulted from the dichotomous structure of the jund, divided between Anatolians and kulughlis. The khujas were Anatolian officers, holding non-heritable posts, and included among their number the bash khuja of the diwān, a possible candidate to the post of dey. The kahiyas, on the other hand, seem to have been either mamluks of the bey, or descendants of mamluks, since their posts were inheritable, as was the case for the posts of the muqṭaʾajīs in Egypt and Damascus (Gibb and Bowen 1950: II, 46n.; Shaw 1962: 338). The kahiyas were thus directly attached to the bey, who represented the highest administrative and fiscal authority in the Tunisian government and army, and who was himself the descendant of a mamlūk. They assumed, therefore, both the role devolved to the kahiyas (i.e. intendants) of the Ottoman janissaries, and that devolved to the kahiya (i.e. lieutenant, representative) of the grand vizier.

With the exception of the dār-al-bashā, where the bash khuja enjoyed an important protocollar prestige, the kahiyas’ power and prerogatives were much more considerable than those of the khujas. The main kahiyas of the jund were:

- The influential kahiya of Halq al-Wād, the main port of the Regency, close to the capital, which was considerably developed
and extended in Ḥammūda’s time. This kāhiya was, at the same time, the amīn al-tarsikhāna (i.e. commissioner in charge of the arsenal) – a post also created during the period of our concern, and which was the exact counterpart of that of the Ottoman tersâne emini in Istanbul (Raymond 1994: II, 10). In Bayram’s list, where the amīn al-tarsikhāna is ranked sixth, the latter’s functions are described as those of ‘supervision of all affairs related to the Navy’ (Bayram no date: I, part two, 2). This official, moreover, was in frequent communication with foreign consuls, and thus shared with the bāsh qāzāq of the beylical household prerogatives in the realm of relations with Christian powers. The amīn al-tarsikhāna, in Ḥammūda Pasha’s time, was Muḥammad Khūja, who was later succeeded to this post by his second son, Maḥmūd (Raymond 1994: II, 153–4).

- The kāhiya of dār al-bāshā in Tunis, ranking thirteenth in Bayram’s list of Tunisian government officials, and who represented a counterweight to the influence of the Anatolian bāsh khūja in the diwān of the janissaries. The holder of this office in Ḥammūda Pasha’s time was Yusuf Bābūsh, from an influential kulughli family in the capital, who was later succeeded by his son Muḥammad (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 150). Besides his accountancy functions in the diwān, this kāhiya wielded some measure of judicial power in a precisely defined administrative territory extending from the capital to the Majirda valley (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 82).

- The kāhiyas of the coastal garrisons, who held, as an appanage to their military rank, the post of ʿāmil, or qāʿid (governor) of the towns or cities where their garrisons were based (including the right to collect taxes from the local inhabitants). First among these came the kāhiya of Ghar al-Milh. This kāhiya, in Ḥammūda Pasha’s time, was Aḥmad Khūja, eldest son of Muḥammad Khūja, the amīn al-tarsikhāna. Ghar al-Milh had been, since the seventeenth century, the most important base of the Tunisian navy, but its decline had started by the period of our concern, owing to the ensiltment of its basin and the increasing importance acquired by the port of Ḥalq al-Wād. Aḥmad Khūja was succeeded in his functions by his son Muḥammad at his death in 1828, or possibly before (Raymond 1994: II, 154–5). Another important kāhiya was the kāhiya of Binzart, Muṣṭafa Khūja, a mamlūk.
The āghas (Ott.: ağa, meaning: eldest brother) stood at a higher rank in the military hierarchy of the jund than the kbiyas/kahiyaş, but theirs was a mostly protocolary dignity. The two most important Tunisian āghas were the āga of the Qasbah citadel in Tunis, who was one of the most frequently elected among candidates to the post of dey in the eighteenth century (Raymond 1960: 134–5), and the āga al-kursi, heading the diwân for six months before being automatically replaced by the eldest bulük báshî of the jund. The first was an Anatolian, whereas the second might be either an Anatolian or a kulughli. These two officials rank in the eleventh position in Bayram’s list, with ‘some precedence given to the āga of the Qasbah’ (Bayram no date: I, part two, 3). They were empowered to take decisions in penal and administrative matters concerning the janissaries, after consultations with other officers of the diwân. The āga al-kursi, in addition, settled matters concerning litigations arising from the non-payment of debts in the capital (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: III, 82). There was also an āga appointed at the head of each of the military garrisons of the Regency. These āghas, however, were generally appointed as a matter of pure convention to these posts, and were not required to leave the capital (Raymond 1994: II, 85).

Finally, the dey, an Anatolian elected among the group of deys of the jund, represented theoretically the supreme authority over that corps. The deylical office, ranking ninth in Muhammad Bayram’s list, kept some honorific prestige. The dey presided over the sessions of the political diwân of Tunis, which had ceased playing any effective political role since the second half of the seventeenth century, and exercised a limited judicial jurisdiction in the capital (Raymond 1994: II, 32–3).

**Administrative organization, rights and privileges of the janissaries**

Since the time of ‘Alî Pasha (1735–56), efforts to remedy the disorganization and corruption prevailing within the jund were initiated, although their results were mostly wrecked during the troubled period that ended his rule. A new series of energetic measures aimed, in particular, at reducing the outrageous swelling in the number of the janissaries, as a result of indiscriminate admissions and other abuses, were implemented by Muhammed and ‘Alî ibn Ḥusayn Beys (1756–77) (Ibn Yûsuf 1978: 218–19, 408–10). These reforms, which continued at an accelerated pace in the time
of Ḥammūda Pasha, were carried out through the administrative services of the diwān, whose headquarters were situated in the dār al-bāshā, in the centre of the capital. The staff of the diwān was composed of the āgha al-kursī, the Anatolian bāsh khūja and the kāhiya, assisted by teams of khūjas and shāwishes. The greater administrative efficiency attained by these officers in Ḥammūda Pasha’s time is reflected in the two pages of the Notebook concerning that period, displaying a neat and rigorously mathematical division of janissaries into dārs.

The janissaries were normally paid every two months (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 409). The dār al-bāshā had its own Treasury, fed, in full or in part, by fiscal revenues specifically allocated to the jund, in particular the taxes collected in the district of Māṭir, in the wheat plains north of the capital (Chérif 1986: II, 103). The few data provided by literary sources show that the wages of the jund were kept almost static during the Ottoman period. The starting pay of four nāشری (aspers) for the newly enrolled, for instance, remained unchanged throughout the existence of the janissary corps (Pignon 1956: 311; Ibn Abīl-Ḏiyāf 1963–6: IV, 34; Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 409). In the time of Ḍal Bey, the pension of the rank-and-file janissaries and of the āgha māẓuls (retired āghas) was slightly increased. At the same period, the daily pay of the āghas rose to 29 nāشریs (it was 20 nāشریs under Yūsuf Dey) (Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 1970: 296–7). No pay increase is reported in the time of Ḥammūda Pasha.

The pay of each janissary was regularly upgraded every three years (Raymond 1994: II, 15), probably coinciding with his accession to a new grade in the military hierarchy. Furthermore, since the beginning of the Ottoman conquest, the janissaries were entitled to financial bonuses on various occasions, such as the enthronement of a new sultan in Istanbul, or the arrival of a new pasha in the province (Pignon 1956: 311) and, from the eighteenth century on, to celebrate the Ottoman investiture granted to each new pasha-bey. Gifts in cash and kind were also granted by the diwān, the bey and notables to janissaries on religious feasts, particularly money during Ramadān (the fasting month), and sheep for the closing day of the pilgrimage season (Ibn Abīl-Ḏiyāf 1963–6: III, 57; Bachrouch 1989: 501, 514).

Janissaries were also entitled to a maximum period of leave of three years, to visit their relatives at home, or for a pilgrimage to Mekka, during which period they were entitled to half of their salary (Pignon 1956: 312); the fact that several deys in the Regency
held the title of Ḥāj (pilgrim), provides evidence of the prestige that could be gained by combining military valour and religious piety. Finally, some security was granted specifically to the corsair fighters against the risks of their profession. Those of them who had been captured by the enemy might be freed against the payment of a ransom by the bey, or against Christian slaves detained in Tunis. They would also receive, on their liberation, the total amount of the salary due to them during their absence. This practice, which had existed since the seventeenth century (Pignon 1956: 312), was also observed in the time of Ḥammūda Pasha, as in the case of the bey’s interpreter, Hassūna al-Mūrāli, whose ship was captured by an English pirate, and who had to spend several years in Britain before returning to the Regency (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 79).

The diwān’s deliberating sessions on administrative and criminal matters were open to all the janissaries, but only the high officers of the corps were entitled to take part in them. Promotion was granted to janissaries on the basis of seniority, although assiduity of service was also probably taken into consideration. Among the Turkish recruits, furthermore, some might have been originally recruited into the jund of another Regency before moving to the Tunisian jund (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: VII, 37, 163, 167), and were presumably awarded the rank they had reached in their former post. In judicial litigations involving solely janissaries, the latter were judged and sentenced by their diwān officers. Flogging was a common type of chastisement, whereas serious offences and rebellion were punished by banishment or death. In conflicts between janissaries and Malekites, which involved the jurisdiction of the bey, the need for Ḥammūda to curry favour with the jund, especially in the first period of his rule, often meant that the unruly behaviour of the janissaries and their brutalities towards members of the local population remained unpunished, to the latter’s grief (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 56–7). We may wonder, however, whether sources have not too complacently dwelt on the rowdiness of janissaries, and whether this type of behaviour – common to all pre-modern armies – did not also characterize the other corps.

In Ḥammūda Pasha’s time, five qishlas (i.e. European-style barracks) were built, to replace the former cramped funduqs (inns) used for the accommodation of janissaries (Saadaoui 2001: 243–6). Married soldiers, on the other hand, kept their right of settling independently in town with their families. Ḥammūda Pasha, in
imitation of the Algerians, also decreed that janissaries living in qishlas should each be given four loaves of bread daily (Ibn Abi’l-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 39). They were, however, expected to cater for themselves except in periods of duty in remote garrisons. On state galleys, only fresh water and hard biscuit (bishmāt) were provided free, and the janissaries would each give a sequin to their wakil, who provided the rest of their board (Pignon 1956: 315). A similar arrangement presumably prevailed on mahalla expeditions.

Janissaries may also have been required to buy their own dress and weapons (Pignon 1956: 317). Seventeenth-century sources have described, in some detail, the spectacular costumes worn by janissary officers, which probably corresponded exactly to those of their counterparts in Istanbul (including ostrich feathers, huge turbans and very large sleeves) (Pignon 1956: 317–18; Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 302–3). In the time of Ḥammūda Pasha, the cloth for the janissaries’ battling uniforms was imported from Europe (al-Imām 1980: 189). Foreign observers in the Regency at that period were also struck by the considerable gear sported by each janissary, including firearms imported from England and France (al-Imām 1980: 214; Frank and Marcel 1987: 73). A real improvement in the quality of the jund’s armament therefore seems to have been accomplished, in comparison to the rifles and muskets used in the seventeenth-century Regency, which were described by European sources as heavy and obsolete (Pignon 1956: 319–20).

The janissaries’ pay, with added bonuses, constituting a regular and incremental source of income, however modest, represented a social and economic asset for the Hanefite community in the Regency. Various additional sources of revenue were also available to the common janissaries. It is important to note, before reviewing them, that they did not include the extortion, under a veneer of legality, of various taxes and dues from traders and craftsmen, practised by janissaries in cities such as Cairo and Damascus, and which made them the scourge of the local population there (Holt 1993). This could be explained by the fact that, in Tunis, the Hanefites (who were members of the jund) and the Andalusians (another privileged minority in the Regency), formed the largest proportion of the more affluent categories of craftsmen and shopkeepers. The unruliness of the Tunisian janissaries might lead them to acts of theft and robbery, but they would do so without the justification provided by any pseudo-legal sophistry.

A share in the spoils of the corso was provided to those serving on the state galleys, as well as to those who, during their periods
of leave, were offered the possibility to fight on board vessels owned by private corsairs (Pignon 1956: 316). Janissaries, moreover, were also allowed to engage in tradecrafts, besides their military duties (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: III, 39). Thus, at the end of his career, a janissary, if he was endowed with some ingenuity and practical sense, would have been able to amass enough capital to acquire some property, open a shop (the süq al-truk, or Turks’ market, in Tunis, was famous for its silk and fabric shops), or invest in the acquisition and equipment of a corsair ship (Pignon 1956: 316–17).

Within the military hierarchy itself, as noted above, access to additional sources of revenue to compensate for the scantiness of army wages, was provided to officers of various rankings. The more lucrative of these appanages or rewards, i.e. the governorships of some coastal districts and tribal governorships were reserved for those officers having some link with the beylical household: the kâhiyas, who were mamlûks or kulughlis, the ǧâhîbas, as well as the ʿûdâ bâšîs and šâwishes who had served for some time in the bey’s tribunal (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: III, 83). The more modest amânas, i.e. offices related to the collection of taxes and the administrative regulation of trades and guilds, and the wîkâlas, i.e. the stewardships of mosques, waqfûs (charitable endowments) and buildings belonging to the state, fell to the share of the Anatolians. A discreetly ironical remark by Ibn Abîl-Diyâf on the granting of these appanages to the bulûk-bâšîs in the time of Hammûda Pasha  

— at the expense, he seems to imply, of the Malekites 18 — suggests that these officers were more generously treated, in that regard, under this bey than under his predecessors. We may conclude from this that Hammûda Pasha  

was intent on attracting the loyalties of the Anatolian janissaries, and particularly among them the middle-ranking officers, whose crucial military role had already been acknowledged in European armies.

The zuwâwa and the tribal cavalry

The zuwâwa

The zuwâwa forces, described by European travellers to the Regency, as a ‘Moorish corps’ (Monchicourt 1929: 24–5; Pignon 1961: 144; Peyssonnel 1987: 75), were considered and treated by the Regency’s rulers and by society at large as a cheaper replica of the jund. They may be considered as the equivalent of the Lâz
tribesmen, from the eastern confines of the Empire, who constituted a lower grade, but sturdy janissary corps. The zuwāwa had been recruited among the Berber tribes of that name living in the Kabylia by the first Algerian beylerbeys (Raymond 1994: II, 17). They were among the expedition led by ʿIlij ʿAli Pasha to Tunis in 1570. This official, having conquered the city, left his mamliḳ Ramaḍān to govern it with two contingents of 800 Turks and 800 zuwāwa. When the Spaniards reoccupied Tunis in 1573, the defeated Ottoman troops found shelter in Qayrawān, ruled by Haydar Pasha, and were very probably back in the capital, one year later, under the command of this pasha, who had rallied with other governors from nearby provinces to support Sinān Pasha’s army (Ibn Abī Dinār 1967: 177–8).

The zuwāwa were encouraged to come and settle in great numbers in the Tunisian eyālet. Supreme authority over their corps, which may have been shared between the bey and the dey in the first half of the seventeenth century,19 seems to have been monopolized by the bey, presumably after that official had gained political supremacy in the province. From the eighteenth century on, if not earlier, zuwāwa soldiers were recruited from among various Berber communities other than those of the Kabylia. Among these were the Gharābâ, a tribe of Algerian origin, who were allowed to settle in the region of Binzart in the time of ʿAlī Bey (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 454–5; Raymond 1994: II, 18). There were also the Wislātīs, who had been scattered across the Regency, following the defeat of their insurrection against the same bey (Raymond 1994: II, 18).

The zuwāwa were divided between infantrymen and cavalrymen; they were scattered across the Regency, although their majority was concentrated in the capital. All the zuwāwa were registered in rolls, but only a part of them received regular pay, whereas the rest enjoyed a few exemptions and were recruited for exceptional campaigns. Their dīwān, near Bāb Manāra, and their funduqs, were situated outside the perimeter of the Madīna, considered as the domain of the janissaries. They held in particular reverence the marabout (holy man) Sīdi al-Bāshīr, a native of the Zuwāwa region, who died in 1827, and whose main zāvīya (mausoleum) was erected at a little distance from their dīwān (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: 122).

Although data on the subject of the zuwāwa’s pay are lacking, these fighters were most probably at a clear disadvantage compared to the janissaries in terms of financial reward: according to an eighteenth-century source, for instance, when Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī
decided to grant a bonus to his men on the eve of a battle, he gave one *sultāni* (piaster) to each janissary, and half a *sultāni* to each *zuwāwa* (Ibn Yusuf 1978: 59). The *zuwāwa*’s pay was also irregularly remitted, leading to the coining of a Tunisian proverb, used to illustrate an underdog’s condition: ‘like the *zuwāwa* ’asker: foremost for blows, rearmost for pay’ (Raymond 1994: II, 18). They laboured, moreover, under a notorious reputation for uncouthness and lack of discipline. 20

The *zuwāwa*’s hierarchy was modelled on that of the janissary corps, including the ranks of *āgha*, *kāhiya*, *shāwish*, and *bulūk bāshī*. The *kāhiya* of the *zuwāwa*, although he is not included in Bayram’s list, was an important official in the beylical government. Sources mention three of these *kāhiyas*, all Malekites: Aḥmad ibn Matisha, under Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī (Chérif 1986: II40), Muhammad al-ʿAṣram, under ʿAlī Bey and Hammūda Pasha, until his death in 1806 (Raymond 1994: II, 129), and Ḥammūda al-ʿAṣram, his son (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: VIII, 21). It appears that the office of governor-tax collector among various tribes in the Jabal al-Raqba, in the north-western region of the Regency, was an appanage to the post of *kāhiya* of the *zuwāwa* (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 49; Chérif 1986: II, 40).

*The Arab ṣubāyhis and the mazārgis*

The Arab ṣubāyhis, as already indicated in the preceding chapter of this study, drew their denomination from the Ottoman *sipāhi*, meaning ‘cavalryman’. In Hammūda Pasha’s time, these cavalry-men were, in addition to the regiment of Tunis, which has already been reviewed, divided into three provincial regiments, each numbering, like the first, 500 men (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 85). It is interesting to note that these regiments, in Tunisian sources, are designated by the Ottoman word ‘oçak’ in its Arabized form (*wajaq*), whereas this term is not used in reference to the janissary corps in the Regency (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 85). The Arab ṣubāyhis were recruited from among the common tribesmen of the Regency, generally by an agreement between the beylical administration and the *shaykhs* (leaders) of the various tribes, although individual candidatures could also be accepted. They participated regularly in *māhallas* and acted as the police force of the province. One unit of the Tunis regiment guarded the outer gates of the Bārdū palace (Raymond 1994: II, 85).
The hierarchy of the corps of the Arab șubāyhis seems to have been similar to that of the jund, including the ranks of shāwīsh, ʿalemdār, and with a khūja, a kāhiya and an āgha for each of the four regiments. The āgha of the Tunis regiment was, at the same time, bāsh āgha of the whole corps. The latter office, probably created in Ḥammūda Pasha’s time, and ranked fourth in Bayram’s list, was successively held, during that period, by two Hanefites, Ḥasūna Māriya and Ḥasan Khaznadār – which provides evidence of a structural link established between the Arab șubāyhis and the jund (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 43, 100). These officials, however, do not seem to have wielded much influence in the political life the Regency, since they are not mentioned in any account on the period of rule of Ḥammūda Pasha. The kāhiyas of the Arab șubāyhis, on the other hand, were invariably Malekites. Rajab Abū Nimra, an Arab who had grown up in the service of the beylical household, and Muhammad al-Khammāsī, originating from a Tripolitan tribe, held that post within the wajaq of Tunis, under Ḥammūda Pasha (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 55, 137). The influential kāhiyas of the provincial wajaqs, who were, at the same time, qāids of the districts where the latter were garrisoned, will be reviewed in the following chapter of this study on the central and provincial administration of the Regency.

The șubāyhi was entitled to a regular, albeit modest, pay (rātib), of 33 piasters a year. In the seventeenth century, these annual salaries had been deducted locally from the taxes paid by the population in the provincial districts and paid on the spot to the cavalrymen. From Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī’s time, and as a result of this bey’s centralizing reforms, these amounts were formally disbursed by the central treasury of the Regency (Chérif 1986: II, 96). The beylical government also gave each șubāyhi a horse, for which, in the context of Ḥammūda Pasha’s reforms, a daily quantity of fodder was provided (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 85). As was the case for the sipāhis of the timar cavalry in the centre of the Empire, the Tunisian șubāyhi had to submit, before each mahalla, to a review of his mount and arms. His name was wiped from the rolls and he had to hand back his horse if he was considered unfit for duty. Finally, the șubāyhi, at his death, was normally succeeded by his son.21

The șubāyhis represented the lower category of the Tunisian regular tribal cavalrymen as compared to the mazārgis. The latter (who drew their denomination from the Arabic word ‘mizraq’, designating the lance carried by these fighters) were recruited
among the group of the *rijāl al-kibār* (the elders), also known as the *jamā’a*, which formed the upper social strata in tribes. The *mazārgīs* were settled among their own tribes and performed administrative and judicial functions, assisting in particular the *ʿāmil*, or *qāʿid* in his tax-collaeting rounds (Raymond 1994: II, 19). They also participated in the beylical *mahallās* and, like most of the Ottoman *sipāhis*, who were required to bring with them tents and aides (*ghulāms*) during the sultan’s campaigns (Deny 1987), brought their own tents and mounts, in addition to an infantry auxiliary for each, called *tarrās* (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 85). On the administrative level, their organization was similar to that of the Arab *subāyīs*: their names were registered in rolls kept by the *bash katib* (the head of the beylical chancery), and they were entitled to a modest pay (Raymond 1994: II, 19).

In spite of similarities in the administrative organization of the two categories of Tunisian tribal cavalrmen described above, on the one hand, and that of the Ottoman *sipāhis*, on the other hand, there was a significant difference as concerns their respective sources of revenue. The *timar* system entailed, for the latter, the right to collect taxes from the rural population of the Empire for their own benefit. As for the *subāyīs* and the *mazārgīs*, they were salaried agents of the state serving in the beylical tax-collating tours. It is interesting here to mention that the historian Mohamed-Hédi Chérif has noted that the term ‘*thamra*’ (plural: ‘*thimār*’), mentioned in several Arabic administrative documents of the eighteenth-century Regency, refers to a small bonus added to the pay of the *subāyī* and the *mazārgi* (Chérif 1986: II, 96 and 111). It seems therefore to have represented the cash equivalent of small privileges traditionally enjoyed by the Ottoman *sipāhi* in the territory under his jurisdiction, such as the right to collect the fruit of wild trees – which may, itself, have been at the origin of the Ottoman term *timar*, since ‘*thimār*’, in Arabic, means ‘fruit’!

The *subayīs* and the *mazārgīs*, on the other hand, seem to have shared with the *sipāhis* of the Ottoman Empire the privilege of receiving from the state a plot of land for their own cultivation. Information on these land grants in the Regency is almost totally lacking in sources, except for scattered allusions. The historian Mohamed-Hédi Chérif, in his study of the tribal forces under Husayn ibn ‘Alī, has, however, noted the ‘feudal’ character of land tenure by the wealthy *mazārgīs* (Chérif 1986: I, 233). Second, it is worth dwelling, in this context, on the use of the term *jibāliyya* by a few eighteenth-century Tunisian sources. This word, which has
so far been translated by historians by its Arabic meaning of ‘mountaineers’, or ‘mountain people’, (Ibn Yusuf 1978: 186; Chérif 1986: II, 149) should, rather, be considered as the Arabized form of the Ottoman term ‘cebelis’. The latter were men-at-arms that important sipâhis, such as provincial governors, had to bring with them during the military campaigns of the Ottoman Porte, and whom they provided with dress and armament. The cebelis were, themselves, an inferior category of sipâhi, since they were also granted a small piece of land for their living (Deny 1987). I would therefore suggest that the Tunisian jibâliyya belonged to the common subâybis of the Regency, and included, in particular, the zuwâwa cavalrmen, owing to their close link to the bey.

The semi-`askeri tribes

A number of tribes in the Regency were given the opportunity of engaging in a fruitful cooperation with the Ottoman administration: in return for providing a number of their horsemen to serve as auxiliaries during mahallas and wars. These tribes were granted various advantages, particularly land for pasture or crop-raising, although they were not exempted from tax-paying. It is important to note that the first two tribes selected for the service of the Ottoman administration, i.e. the Ṣarâbulsis and the Dâdd, gathered within their midst clans and families from outside the boundaries of the Regency (Tripolitans for the first, Algerians for the second) – thus providing interesting case studies of tribes as military and administrative creations of the Ottoman period of Tunisia. The Ṣarâbulsis descended from the contingents sent by Muṣṭafâ Pasha from Tripoli to reinforce Sinân Pasha’s army in 1574 (Pellissier 1980: 19). The more powerful Dâdd had been part of the Shâbbiya religious-military confederation established in the west of the country, which had successfully defied Hafsid authority in the sixteenth century. When Sinân Pasha’s army started the siege of the fort of Ḥalq al-Wâd, occupied by the Spanish army, the Dâdd, led by their Shaykh `Abdu’ll Šamad, came to their assistance (Ibn Abî Dinâr 1967: 191). In the time of Ḥammûda Bey the Muradite, the influence of this shaykh declined and the tribe was organized in the service of the bey, under the command of Qâid Hasan (Ibn Abî Dinâr 1967: 236). In this context, we may add to these two semi-`askeri tribes, a third one that had, like them, existed since the beginning of the Ottoman conquest and was scattered across the Regency, i.e. the ‘tribe’ of the zuwâwa, gathering Berber-
speaking communities from outside (and, later, from inside) the frontiers of the Regency. In the eighteenth century, a number of local tribes were promoted to a semi-‘askeri status, such as the Jlāş, who had supported Husayn ibn ‘Alī when he sheltered in Qayrawān for five years after his nephew’s seizure of power, the Awlād ‘Aun, etc. (Chérif 1986: II, 97).

The semi-‘askeri tribes may be compared to the yūrūks, or nomads, who had been employed by the first Ottoman sultans in their wars, and who served in rotation (one man out of six) in campaigns (Gibb and Bowen 1950: II, 97). The French officer Pellissier, in the mid-nineteenth century, informs us that, among the Hamāmmas, the proportion of fursān (cavalrymen) to the total male adult population was one to five (Pellissier 1980: 128). I would tentatively suggest, furthermore, that the lands conceded to these fighters may have belonged to the category of Ottoman benewbet timars, that is to say, lands tilled and exploited in rotation between tribesmen (whereas the şubāyhis and the mazārgis would have been granted lands belonging to the eşkunci category, that is to say, nominal fiefs) (Deny 1987).

Conclusion: the army of Ḥammūda Pasha

In spite of Hammūda’s efforts, the various military corps of the Regency composed an ensemble fraught with weaknesses. The Tunisian army, unwieldy and uncoordinated during wars, had a patchy composition, where relations characterized by long-standing hostility and mistrust prevailed between its heterogeneous elements, in spite of the links established in particular between the jund and the şubāyhis. This structural weakness, however, served the political interests of Hammūda Pasha, by isolating the only real menace to his rule, i.e. the Anatolian janissaries. The other army formations, each and separately, owed the bey some measure of allegiance: the kuluglis, as rivals of the Anatolians within the jund, the Arab şubāyhis who had been, from the start, exclusively attached to the beylical administration, and the zuwāwa, recruited from marginalized communities and devoted to the bey. Thus, the Anatolian janissaries, supporting the toothless deys, stood little chance to win, when they launched their rebellion in 1811.

The uprising, which ended in the killing of a great number of janissaries by the Arab şubāyhis, was an ironical comment on Hammūda’s military reforms. These reforms, like those of Sultan
Selim III, had aimed, in an important measure, at keeping and reinforcing the capacities of the janissary force. Furthermore, perhaps contrary to the central Ottoman government, which a long series of defeats in its confrontations with western armies had made more disillusioned with its janissaries, there was a deeply-anchored conviction among the ruling circles of the Regency, and in the mind of the bey himself, that the Turks formed the only true martial race (Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: 56–7). Ḥammūda’s efforts to ingratiate himself to the janissaries and win their loyalty, however, had only exacerbated the latter’s arrogance without treating the deep causes of their opposition to the bey, which have been studied in our analysis of the extension of central Ottoman household conflicts in the Regency.

The idea of a radical reform of the Ottoman armies, through the setting-up of a standing army integrally composed of levies from all the social categories of the country, on the European model, was not an alien idea to government circles in Istanbul at that period. It was probably envisaged as the ultimate outcome of Selim’s military reforms, but the times were not yet ripe for this. In the Regency, recruitments of Anatolian fighters continued after 1811, during the last years of Ḥammūda Pasha’s period of rule and for more than a decade after, under his successors. The gradual dissolution of the Tunisian jund only started after 1830, following the ‘Auspicious Event’ of the elimination of the imperial janissary corps by Sultan Maḥmūd II in 1826.
The central administration

The Tunisian central administration, whose offices were situated within the precincts of the Bârdû palace, was divided into two sections: the accountancy (diwân al-ḥisbān) and the chancery (diwân al-inshā). At its head stood the bey, as the counterpart of the grand vizier in the government of the Porte. Next to him came the ṣāhib al-tābi‘ (guardian of the seal), a mamlûk, and the bâsh kâtib (head secretary), a Malekite, ranking first and second on Bayram’s list. Before proceeding to study the powers and prerogatives of these two officials, it is worth commenting on the occasional use, by Ibn Abîl-Ḍiyāf, of the term ‘wâžîr’, in reference to them, or to some of their predecessors (Ibn Abîl-Ḍiyâf 1963–6: II, 165 and III, 13 and 78), particularly in the light of the assertion, by his contemporary, Bayram al-Khâmis, that the Tunisian wâlîs were not entitled to have wazîrs (Bayram no date: I, part two, 6). I have already mentioned in this study, furthermore, that, in the central Ottoman government, the title of vezîr applied only to those dignitaries holding three tuğs – a rank that even the bey himself had not attained. We should conclude therefore that the term ‘wâžîr’, whether applied to the bey or to his collaborators, by Ibn Abîl-Ḍiyâf, is to be taken in its original Arabic meaning of ‘assistant, adviser’ and did not correspond to any official administrative reality. It was only in the mid-nineteenth century that the vicissitudes of Ottoman power in the region emboldened Ibn Abîl-Ḍiyâf’s patron, Aḥmad Bey (1837–53), to confer that title on one or two officials in his government; the bey, however, was careful not to use it in his correspondence with the Porte (Bayram no date: I, part two, 6).
The şāhib al-ṭābi‘

The şāhib al-ṭābi‘ was undoubtedly the most powerful man in Hammūda Pasha’s government. This official stood as the exact counterpart of the Porte’s nīşāncı (guardian of the seal), who ranked second in the central Ottoman government, after the grand vizier (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 120–4). We should note, however, that the accession to pre-eminence in the Tunisian government of the şāhib al-ṭābi‘ (who was invariably a mamlūk) occurred during the period of our concern, since this official is only briefly and infrequently alluded to in sources prior to Hammūda Pasha’s period of rule.

The office was held, under this bey, by Yūsuf Khūja, who had been bought in Istanbul by a wealthy notable from Ṣafāqus, Bakkār al-Jallūli, and was presented by the latter to Hammūda Pasha in 1781 (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 89). The promising youth, shortly afterwards, was appointed to the functions of şāhib al-ṭābi‘, and this title was thenceforth used as his patronym (Raymond 1994: II, 12). Like the Ottoman nīşāncı, whose functions were not limited to tracing the Sultan’s tuğra (cipher) on official documents, but extended over various services of the chancery as well as over the accountancy department in the government of the Porte, the affixing of the beylical seal on official documents represented only the smallest part of Yūsuf’s duties – albeit a lucrative one, since it was farmed out as an īltizām.¹

Yūsuf’s functions, as cursorily described in Bayram’s list, included the ‘supervision of functionaries and officials in all matters not tackled directly by the bey’, which meant in practice that he partook of a large share of the bey’s prerogatives in the Regency. The most important missions carried out by Yūsuf Şāhib al-Ṭābi‘ were his embassy to the Porte in 1795, his heading the victorious maḥalla against Algiers in 1807 and his leadership of military operations to crush the Turkish rebellion in 1811. His political influence was combined with enormous wealth derived from trade, īltizāms, and corso activities: this official armed and launched 98 corso expeditions between 1798 and 1805 (Panzac 1993: 77). Yūsuf Şāhib al-Ṭābi‘ also entirely financed the building of a magnificent mosque in the district of Ḥalfāwin in Tunis, where he resided in the last years of Hammūda’s rule. The mosque’s inauguration in 1814, in the presence of the bey and all the dignitaries of the Regency, constituted the ultimate consecration of his unrivalled status in the beylical government. At Hammūda’s death, Yūsuf, upon the formal
solicitation of the bāsh kātīb Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Asram, designated 'Uthmān ibn 'Alī as the new bey. The appointment was endorsed by all present (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 91). This unprecedented practice in the Regency was probably based on new prerogatives devolved on the šāhib al-ṭābi‘ at that period.

Finally, we should observe that Yūsuf’s powers in Ḥammūda Pasha’s government had extended, in particular, over the financial domain, where the second authority after the bey was normally that of the khaznadār. It is worth dwelling here on the office of the khaznadār, which emerged within the Tunisian government in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, following the accession of the beys to political supremacy in the Regency in 1675 – which led the latter to delegate to this official an important part of their original financial functions. The khaznadār was deemed by European observers in the mid-eighteenth century to be the most important man in the beylical government (Pococcke 1772: I, 314; Rousseau 1985: 122). Under Ḥammūda Pasha, however, the office was left vacant, and the bey himself assumed its functions, with the assistance of the šāhib al-ṭābi‘. Although, according to Ibn Abīl-Diyāf, Ḥammūda’s ‘thrift’ had prompted him to adopt that measure (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 92–3), it seems improbable that he could have done so without the agreement of the Ottoman Porte.

**The bāsh kātīb**

The head of the beylical chancery was the ra‘īs al-kuttāb, often designated by the half-Turkish half-Arabic denomination of bāsh kātīb. The bāsh kātīb was one of the most powerful representatives of the Tunisian makhāzinis, i.e. the members of the Malekite community employed in the large web of the central and provincial administration of the Regency. The designation of makhāzinis derived from the Arabic word ‘makhzin’, meaning ‘administration, government’, which had been of current use in the Maghrib in reference to Muslim governments, including the Hafsid one, and which seems to have been re-introduced in the Regency under the Husaynids, after an eclipse of more than a century following the Ottoman conquest. He was the counterpart of the Ottoman reisül-kuttab, who followed the nīşāncı in rank and came under the direct supervision of the grand vizier (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 120).
The most important bāsh kātibs in the time of ʿAlī Bey and Hammūda Pasha belonged to a Qayrawāni family said to be of Yemeni origin, therefore descending from the first Muslim conquerors of Ifriqiya, the al-Asrams. The emergence to power of this dynasty of public servants started in 1756, as a reward for the unconditional support given by the brothers Muḥammad and Aḥmad al-Asrām to the sons of Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī, whom they accompanied to Algiers during their long years of exile there. When the Husaynids returned to power in the Regency, Aḥmad was put in charge of the beylical chancery, an office which he kept until well into the period of rule of ʿAlī Bey (while his elder brother Muḥammad was appointed khūja of the zuwāwa) (Raymond 1994: II, 128–30).

A member of the al-Asrām family was, again, chosen as bāsh kātib by Ḥammūda Pasha, following a vacancy of the post towards the last decade of the eighteenth century. The bey’s choice fell on Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Asrām, regardless of the generally acknowledged precedence of his more competent cousin Muḥammad, whose father, Aḥmad, had been the powerful bāsh kātib of ʿAlī Bey (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 150). Ḥammūda, in imitation of the policy of the Porte towards the Husaynids themselves, had probably aimed at asserting his right to choose any branch of the family for the post and, in addition, introducing rivalries and dissensions within the whole al-Asrām clan, in order to weaken it.

The bāsh kātib’s responsibilities did not only concern the chancery, but extended also to the realm of accountancy. Ibn Abīl-Diyāf describes him as being ‘at the head of an independent accountancy department’ (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 150).2 The bāsh kātib supervised, in particular, the tax-collection in the al-Jarīd region, south of the Regency, during the winter mahalla, and kept the pay-rolls of the Arab ṣubāḥīs and of the mazārgis. Finally, the bāsh kātib also benefited from various opportunities for acquiring lucrative iltizāms, as well as cashing in on his influence among Malekites (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 141). The jurisdiction of the Tunisian bāsh kātib in the beylical chancery, however, exclusively concerned its Arabic section and did not extend to the smaller Turkish one, where one or two Turkish secretaries constituted the few representatives of the Hanefites of the jund in the central administration. This section handled the correspondence with the Porte, as well as the drafting of treaties signed with Christian powers.
The Malekite kātibs

The Malekite kātibs (secretaries) of the beylical administration were generally recruited from among notable families enjoying religious, or semi-religious prestige among the Regency’s population. There were often two members of the same family employed in the beylical administration, and their posts were passed on to other relatives. Tunisian sources have provided us with the names of a number of these kātibs: the Abū Șandals, from the capital, in the first half of the seventeenth century (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 238); the Ibn Khalafs (uncle and nephew), descending from Mihriz ibn Khalaf, the most revered patron saint of Tunis, and Muḥammad Ṣaddām, from Qayrawān, in the time of ʿAlī ibn Murād Bey (1778–83) (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 278, 279); the al-Wislātis (Abu’l ִHasan, Ibn Ḥasan and ʿAbd al-Laṭīf), who served, respectively, under Murād III, Husayn ibn ʿAlī and ʿAlī Pasha; Qāsim ibn Şuşṭāna, from Bāja, al-Şaghīr Dāwūd, from Nābil, and Muḥammad al-Waẓīr al-Andalusī under Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī (II, 116); ʿAbdu’l-Raḥmān al-Baqālta (probably from Baqālta, a small coastal village in the Sāhil region) under ʿAlī Pasha (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 337); and, in addition to the al-Asrams, the Abū ʿAttūrs, from a family of alleged Quaraishi origin settled in Şafāqus, under ʿAlī ibn Husayn Bey and his successors (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 153). The beys therefore recruited their kātibs from a wide array of towns and regions in the Regency. This policy was probably motivated by the desire to provide an equitable share, for Malekite notables, in the stock of political influence and in the various sources of revenue to which the staff of the beylical administration had privileged access. The importance of these considerations of domestic policy for the beys suggests that competence did not rank very high among the criteria for the selection of kātibs. Several scornful allusions in Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf’s biographies of some kātibs in Ḥammūda Pasha’s time confirm this (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 140, 150).

The provincial administration

Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, the beys’ leadership of the maḥallas, which toured a considerable portion of the Regency’s territory outside the capital, was a spectacular manifestation of their fiscal and judicial authority over their subjects in provincial districts. During the period of our concern, however, the presence of the bey in these periodic expeditions was no longer a
rule, but an exceptional occurrence. The famous ‘mahalla of the
five beys’ which included Ḥammūda Pasha with his younger half-
brother, his two cousins and his mother, in 1783, was the last one
placed under the bey’s command (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 13).
From then on, the leadership of the mahalla was delegated to the
kāhiya of the bey (lieutenant, representative), ranking fifth
in Bayram’s list. The office was held, for most of the period of
Ḥammūda Pasha’s rule, by Sulaymān, a Circassian mamlāk. Following
the disastrous outcome of the first military mahalla
against Algiers in 1807, commanded by him, Sulaymān was trans-
ferred to the post of kāhiya of the dār al-bāshā, ranking thirteenth

Next to the bey in the hierarchy of the Tunisian provincial
administration came the governors, called the ‘āmils (an Arabic
term, widely adopted in Ottoman administrative usage) or, even
more frequently in local and Maghrib usage, qā’ids (meaning, in
Arabic, ‘leader, commander’). The ‘āmils may be divided into three
categories: the tribal ‘āmils, entrusted with the governorship of
tribes, in association with the tribal shaikh.; the kāhiyas, governing
important military districts; and the non-military ‘āmils in the rest
of the districts of the Regency. In contrast to the first category of
‘āmil, whose jurisdiction extended over populations, generally of a
nomadic, or semi-nomadic type, the kāhiyas and the non-military
‘āmils governed well-defined territorial divisions, designated by the
Arabic term ‘‘amal’, or ‘‘amāla’.3 Their areas varied greatly, from
the vast districts of al-A’rād and al-Waṭan al-Qiblī, to the small
‘amālas into which the Majirda plain in the north-west and the
al-Jarīd region in the south-west, were broken up. The number of
these ‘amālas seems to have been much the same throughout
the Ottoman period, so that we may presume, on the basis of
nineteenth-century sources, that it was about 20 during the period
of Ḥammūda Pasha (Kraïem 1973: I, 183). In the light of the
striking similarity that has been observed between the military
organization of the Regency and that of the heart of the Empire, a
more detailed study of the Tunisian ‘amālas to be reviewed in
parallel with the 24 administrative divisions of the Rumelian pro-
vince, in particular, might be an interesting area for future research.

Tribal ‘āmils and shaikh.

The numerical and military importance of tribes in Tunisian society
led to the creation and the development of the corps of tribal ‘āmils.
This category of ‘āmils represents a local version of the Ottoman çeri başısı who, in the early period of the Empire, had been sipahi officers rewarded by the grant of zi ‘āmets, later evolving, in their greatest number, into miri çeri başısı paid by the treasury. Like these Ottoman officers, who led the sipahis during the sultan’s campaigns, the tribal ‘āmils in the Regency commanded units of mazârgis and other tribal cavalrymen during the bey’s mahallas. Sources also state that they were assisted in carrying out their functions by the huwâdiks (Ibn Abî’l-Diyâf 1963–6: III, 15). Although no information has been provided on the latter’s origins and functions, we should note that the term ‘huwâdik’ originates from the Bulgarian word ‘haydud’, meaning ‘shepherd’ (Ibn Abî’l-Diyâf 1963–6: III, 15n.), which suggests a similarity between this tribal police force and the Ottoman feudal çeri sürüci (i.e. herd-drivers), who enrolled and policed the sipahis on campaigns (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 51).

The number of tribal ‘āmils, which had always been superior to that of the territorial ‘āmils, was increased under Hammûda Pasha (Ibn Abî’l-Diyâf 1963–6: III, 86). They were mostly recruited from among the ūda bâshîs and the shâwishes who had served in the bey’s tribunal, as well as from the Turkish and Arab hânbas (Ibn Abî’l-Diyâf 1963–6: III, 83, 86). In addition to their salary from the diwân, they received large quantities of food and agricultural products. They were, in addition, like their Ottoman counterparts, entrusted with collecting fines imposed by the government on offenders and received a ten per cent commission on the amount collected. Finally, the difa (i.e. welcome present) representing a sum of money paid by the tribesmen, in varying amounts proportional to the level of wealth of each family, on the qâid’s assumption of office, and the wahba, consisting of yearly gifts in cash or kind, more or less subtly extorted from them, constituted two bonuses for these agents of the Ottoman administration (Ibn Abî’l-Diyâf 1963–6: III, 15).

A small number of tribal governorships in the Regency had been held by dynasties of tribal ‘āmils, whose origins dated back to the time of Hammûda Bey the Muradite (1635–61). The Awdâd Hasan, whose eponymous forefather had been a mamlûk of Husayn Bey (himself a mamlûk of the bey Murâd I), were the main representatives of these dynasties, maybe even their sole survivors. The descendants of Qâid Hasan played an important role in the political life of the Regency under the last Muradites. One of them, Farhät, was executed on the order of Ramadan Bey for having assisted the Algerians against Muḥammad Bey in 1694 (Ibn Abî’l-
Diyāf 1963–6: II, 68). An eighteenth-century source informs us that they monopolized the leadership of various divisions of the powerful Drīd tribe (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 296–7). The Awlād Ḥasan are mentioned in the Notebook of the jund in the time of Ḥammūda Pasha; the colourful Sulṭān Ḥosnī was one of the most influential members of the clan at that period (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 56–7).

The dynasty of the Awlād Ḥasan illustrates an important objective pursued by the Ottoman administration in the rural regions of the Empire. Like the Turkic sipābis, who were made to settle among the rural Christian population in Rumelia, the Hanefite ‘āmils, in the Regency, shared the roughness of tribal life with their Malekite constituencies and cemented paternalistic links with the latter, in particular through marriage alliances. The political vicissitudes of the second half of the seventeenth century, however, probably resulted in the disorganization and decay of provincial administration and in the neglect of these objectives. The administrative reforms of Ḥammūda Pasha aimed at a return to the pristine vigour of the institution of tribal governors; this bey, according to Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf, imposed on ‘āmils the obligation to remain among their tribes (or in their districts) all the year round (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 85). The author was, thus, contrasting this commitment to duty with the casualness of the following period, when ‘āmils tended to spend most of the year in the capital and visited their constituencies once a year for tax-collection (Pellissier 1980: 14).

The most important governorships of the tribal country were those of the semi-’askeri tribes, foremost among whom was the Drīd tribe, divided into numerous communities, each led by a qāīd. The military organization of tribes was also seen as a means towards their settling, or at least towards controlling their displacements, with the aim, eventually, of ensuring the agricultural development of the province – two objectives in which the Porte had achieved a measure of success, at least initially, in its Arab provinces (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 267). The Drīd tribe owned large areas of lands across the Regency, whereas an important proportion of the Tarābulsis, who enjoyed less prestige and wealth, were employed as sharecroppers in the estates of the Majīrda plain (Pellissier 1980: 19). Finally, the increase in the number of Arab šubāyhis and mazārgis during the eighteenth century (Chérif 1986: II, 97), by leading to an increase in the number of land concessions to tribesmen, contributed to settling them with their families and
clans. In this context, ‘āmils were required to take on the role of headmasters or civic missionaries in striving to promote the development of agricultural activities among their tribes. Ibn Abī’l-Dīyāf, speaking of the ‘āmil of the Awlād ‘Aun in the time of Ḥammūda Pasha, describes the efforts of this Turkish hānba to instil the values of work and industriousness among the tribesmen, and thus increase their wealth (Ibn Abī’l-Dīyāf 1963–6: III, 83–4).

Still in the context of efforts to extend the cultivable area of the province, these ‘āmils (as well as the other categories of ‘āmils in the Regency), like all provincial governors and sipābis in the Empire, were granted plots of land, generally carved out of some hitherto untilled territory. Ibn Abī’l-Dīyāf reports that the ‘āmil of the Awlād ‘Aun employed his tribesmen in reclaiming the land owned by him, against a fair reward (Ibn Abī’l-Dīyāf 1963–6: III, 83–4). The author’s aim was probably to contrast the integrity of Ḥammūda’s agents with the exactions of their successors of the mid-nineteenth century, who obliged the local population to provide free labour on their lands.5

Tribal ‘āmils had a more limited role as concerns the fiscal organization of the countryside. In regions difficult to access or in frontier districts, where tribes enjoyed considerable independence, it was sometimes necessary for the ‘āmil to await the passage of the mahalla in order to secure the dispatching of an armed unit to collect the symbolical amount due from them. In other cases, his role seems to have been limited to handing to the bey of the mahalla the amount of taxes owed by the tribe and previously delivered to him by its shaykh.

The shaykhs, who assumed an important role in the Ottoman administrative structure in the rural country, were the endogenous leaders of the tribes. No rule of heredity governed the transmission of the title of shaykh, although it was often monopolized by members of the same family, whose predominance was generally based upon wealth resulting from, or combined with, religious prestige derived from the family’s lineage connected to a revered marabout. The shaykh’s relative power, however, was closely negotiated with his peers from other influential families or clans forming the jamā’a (i.e. council, group), or the rijāl kibār (the elders) of the tribe, including its mazārgis.

The importance of the shaykhs as intermediaries between the central government and the tribes had already been acknowledged by successive ruling dynasties in North Africa. In the eighteenth-century Regency, and even before, the acknowledgement of their
authority went hand in hand with an increasing tendency to insert tribal shaykhs more closely into the beylical administrative structure, within the context of a general Ottoman policy aimed at promoting and using to the government’s advantage the power of the local āyān (notables). Since the time of Husayn ibn ‘Ali, each new shaykh, on the death of his predecessor, had to pay the central administration a due, called ṭariq al-mashyakh, in addition to sending a petition attesting to the tribe’s choice, for final endorsement by the bey (Chérif 1986: I, 211). We should note in this regard that, during the eighteenth century, controlling the appointment of the āyān and exacting payment for it, became a well-established administrative usage throughout the Empire (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 257).

In addition to being free to rule in many cases according to the custom of the tribe, the shaykhs fulfilled an important fiscal role. They had a predominant voice as concerns the sharing among the members of the tribe of the amount of tax to be paid to the bey of the maḥalla, fixed through negotiations with the beylical administration. Tribal shaykhs often held the iltizāms of beylical domains in the countryside, or were sometimes appointed as governors in small rural districts (Chérif 1986: II, 190). The emergence and consolidation of dynasties of tribal notables, such as the Sbü’ís among the Jlāš tribe, or the Qazzūms among the Frāšīsh, was an important social phenomenon in the late eighteenth-century Regency (Chérif 1986: II, 191).

The provincial kāhiyas

Among the territorial āmils of the Regency, a small number, in addition to a relatively limited judicial jurisdiction in qānūn matters and to their fiscal responsibilities (which consisted in collecting a number of taxes from the population in coordination with the maḥalla), assumed an important military role. These āmils were designated as the kāhiyas of their districts. The three Hanefite kāhiyas governing the small coastal districts surrounding the three main naval bases of Binzart, Ghār al-Milḥ and Ḥalq al-Wād, originating from the mamlūk corps, or descending from mamlūks have already been reviewed in the preceding chapter of this study. There were, in addition, three Malekite kāhiyas governing the districts of Qayrawān, al-Kāf and al-Aʿrād, lying on the route of the maḥalla. The first two of these officials had under their authority the Arab šubāḫi force stationed in their districts, whereas the
kāhiya of al-A‘rāḍ commanded an important semi-regular tribal cavalry force (fursān al-A‘rāḍ). These kāhiyas corresponded to a particular category of Ottoman sipāhi commanders ranking immediately beneath the sancak beğ, i.e. the alay beğ, who were chosen from among local feudatories and given insignia of authority, such as drums and flags (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 51). We may presume that there was a hierarchical relation between the kāhiyas and the tribal āmils, as between the çeri-başis and the alay-beyis in the heart of the Ottoman Empire, although no indication of this is provided by sources. I shall now proceed to describe briefly the main characteristics of the three districts mentioned above, and to identify, where provided by sources, the names of some of their kāhiyas before, and during the period of our concern:

• Qayrawān: this town had been the main Islamic stronghold in North Africa at the beginning of the Arab conquest of the region, as well as the seat of the first Ottoman government in what was to become the Tunisian eyālet. The governorship of Qayrawān seems to have always been entrusted to Malekites. Sources mention the tribal shaykh ‘Alī al-Hannāşi, father-in-law of Hammūda Bey the Muradite in the seventeenth century (Ibn ‘Abīl ‘Diyāf 1963–6: II, 36), and ‘Amīr Bey, the Malekite half-brother of Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 148). In the time of Hammūda Pasha, the governor of Qayrawān was ‘Umar al-Murābiṭ, a native of that city, who had followed the sons of Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī into exile in Algiers, and who was a sarrāj (a follower of the bey, admitted into the jund). Ibn ‘Abīl ‘Diyāf informs us that this official was appointed to lead the pilgrimage caravan, ‘which gave him great prestige’ (Ibn ‘Abīl ‘Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 47). When ‘Umar al-Murābiṭ reached an advanced age, he was succeeded in his post by his own son. The father was required, as ‘Alī Bey had done with Hammūda, to supervise and counsel the juvenile kāhiya (Ibn ‘Abīl ‘Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 47).

• al-Kāf: this town, on the western frontier of the Regency, represented a crucial post for its defence against Algerian invasions. Sources have provided the names of two of its āmils in the first half of the eighteenth century, both of whom were relatives of the bey of the time: Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf’s brother, who was appointed on the eve of the war against Algiers in 1705 (Ibn ‘Abīl ‘Diyāf 1963–6: II, 83), and al-Ghazālī, the maternal uncle of Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, in the aftermath of the insurrection
that broke out in the city of al-Kāf in 1728 (Chérif 1986: II, 82).

• The al-Aʿrāḍ district, contiguous to the Tripolitan frontier: this district stretched over almost two-fifths of the surface of the country. Its main town was Gābis, and it was mostly the territory of the innumerable divisions of the Warghama tribe. Ḩusayn ibn ʿAli was governor of al-Aʿrāḍ under the last Muradite beys (Ibn Abīʾl Ḍiyāf 1963–6: II, 86). The prerogatives of his office at that period included the right of pronouncing the death sentence on criminals (Ibn Abīʾl Ḍiyāf 1963–6: II, 86). The suppression of this prerogative in the eighteenth century illustrates the evolution towards an increased monopolization of judicial power in the Regency by the beys (Chérif 1986: I, 216–19). The governorship of the district was later held by Rajab ibn Māmī, a mamlūk, and Aḥmad ibn Matīshā, a Malekite officer, in the time of ʿAlī Pasha (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 283, 339), by Ismāʾīl Kāhiya, a mamlūk, in the time of ʿAlī Bey (Ibn Abīʾl Ḍiyāf 1963–6: VII, 13), and by ʿAlī al-Jazıṛī (a Hanefite officer) and the Jirbī merchant notable Ḥmīda ibn ʿAyyād under Ḥammūda Pasha (Ibn Abīʾl Ḍiyāf 1963–6: VII, 37, 103).

**Territorial non-military ʿāmils**

The non-military districts covered the North of the Regency, as well as the Waṭan al-Qiblī (Cap Bon), the Sāḥil region on the eastern coast, and the oases region of al-Jarīd. The non-military ʿāmils exercised mainly a fiscal jurisdiction, added to a modest judicial one. This jurisdiction was generally limited to the settled Malekite population of their districts. They had little to do with several ethnic or religious communities scattered over the Regency’s territory, who had their own qāʾids, shaykhs, or kāhiyas, as was the case for the Jews, the Jirbīs (many of whom emigrated from their island to settle as petty tradesmen in towns), the Andalusians, the zuwāwa, etc. Similarly, tribes living permanently, or for part of the year, in a given territorial district, might be placed under the authority of a tribal ʿāmil. In the larger districts, the territorial ʿāmils had khalīfas (an Arabic word meaning ‘representative, or delegate’, which was more used in that context, than its Turkish synonym: ‘kāhiya’) to represent them in regions lying far from the main urban entre. These ʿāmils belonged to the most important Malekite ʾayān (notable) families, whose members often held
several governorships and iltizams, and among whom we may mention in particular:

- The al-Jallūlis: historians have noted the emergence of the economic power of this family from the beginning of the eighteenth century, although Ibn Abīl-Diyāf indicates that its notable standing dates back to the Hafsid period (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 43). ʿAlī ibn Farḥāt al-Jallūlī was ʿāmil of the district of Ṣafāqus, situated at the heart of the olive groves of the Regency, in the time of ʿAlī Pasha (Chérif 1986: I, 286). Under Ḥammūda Pasha, Bakkār al-Jallūlī and his son Muḥammad (possibly from another branch of the family) were also ʿāmils of that district. They held, moreover, various iltizāms, in particular for the collection and exportation of olive oil (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 143; VIII, 71).

- The Ibn ʿAyyāds: this family from Jirba extended its influence over various economic sectors and regions in the Regency. In the time of Ḥammūda Pasha, Ḥmīda ibn ʿAyyād was ʿāmil of al-ʿArād and of Jirba. He exercised his jurisdiction in that island in consultation with ten shykhbs, or muqaddams, representing the most important families of the island. He was succeeded by his son at these two posts (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 103; Raymond 1994: II, 136).

- The al-Murābiṭs and the Nuwāras: these two families also held governorships and iltizāms in the Sāhil in the second half of the eighteenth century (Chérif 1986: I, 287–8).

- Local rural and tribal families: shykhbs and other notables, and their relatives, were often appointed to the governorships of the small districts around the Majirda basin in the north, or in al-Jarīḍ in the south-west.

Finally, it is fitting to dwell here on an important feature of the office of the Tunisian ʿāmils as a whole, and of the non-military territorial ones in particular, which set them apart from those of many other Ottoman provinces. In Egypt, in particular, the officials corresponding to the Tunisian non-military ʿāmils were called multazims, since they obtained their office just like any iltizām, i.e. through bidding at a public auction. These multazims were entitled to collect and keep for themselves the amount of a number of taxes paid to them by the local population, against the payment of an annual sum to the province’s treasury (Shaw 1962: 35). As for the Tunisian ʿāmils, they were, before Ḥammūda Pasha’s time,
appointed by the beys, and ‘did not have to pay any sum, whether overtly, or secretly, to the state’, according to Ibn Abīl-Diyāf (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 15). Under Hammūda Pasha, a new administrative practice, called the ittifāq (meaning: agreement, conciliation) was adopted, which involved secret negotiations that Yūsuf Şāhib al-Tābi‘ would carry out on the price of vacant governorships with candidates to the post. Ibn Abīl-Diyāf makes it clear, however, that this still ‘had nothing to do with the iltizām system’ (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 16). It appears, furthermore, that the list of taxes with their different amounts to be paid by each rural community in the districts of the Regency to the ʿāmls was prepared in the accountancy department of the Bārdū palace (Hénia 1980: 35–6). We may therefore conclude, even if tentatively, that the ʿāmls of the Tunisian eyālet were more similar to the Ottoman amīns. The amīns were salaried administrative agents entrusted with collecting taxes and remitting their totality to the central, or provincial treasuries across the Empire but, since the end of the sixteenth century, they had increasingly been replaced by multazims, as in the Egyptian province, for instance (Shaw 1962: 31–2). In the Regency, therefore, the office of ʿāmil was not, primarily, a source of direct revenue to local notables; it served, rather, to confer on the latter a measure of political power that allowed them to consolidate the economic wealth of their families, derived from iltizāms and other economic activities.

The bey and his ʿāmls

This study on Tunisian governorships has revealed the tight control of the bey on the provincial administration of the Regency. First, an important share of territorial governorships, those of a military character, was monopolized by the beylical household: we have seen that the posts of kāhiyas were attributed either to the mamlūks (or their sons), or to the sarrājs of the bey, who represented a local version of mamlūks, whereas tribal governorships were generally granted to those officers of the jund who had served in the bey’s tribunal. The remaining, not inconsiderable, proportion of governorships fell into the share of the Malekite makhāzinis, who formed the true rāiyya of the bey. Although these governorships were inheritable, or transmitted between the members of the same family, it was made clear that the makhāzinis had no vested interests. Hammūda’s predecessors, according to Ibn Abīl-Diyāf, had appointed their ʿāmls, ‘acting on (their) own judgement, or on the
advice of (their) entourage’ (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: 15). After the adoption of the *ittifāq* practice by Ḥammūda Pasha, the power of the bey to preserve, or break, the line of family succession for each governorship remained intact. It is interesting, in this regard, to note the difference between the Tunisian *ittifāq* and a similar practice introduced in Egypt at the end of the eighteenth century, under the name ‘*muṣālaḥa*’ (meaning ‘conciliation, agreement’). The *muṣālaḥa* ensured that the *iltizāms* of governorships were no longer put to auction at the death of *multazīms*, but were legally passed on to their heirs, following secret negotiations between the latter and the *wālī*. This practice, according to S. J. Shaw, strengthened the principle of inheritability of these *iltizāms*, by putting an end to free financial competition for them (Shaw 1962: 38–9). In the Regency, however, where governorships had never been put to auction, the *ittifāq* merely gave the bey a legal pretext for refusing to grant governorships to the heirs of the deceased incumbents, if the latter had aroused his suspicion or dissatisfaction. The aim of the *ittifāq*, in addition to providing a new source of revenue for the beylical treasury, was thus to ensure the zeal, or political meekness of ‘āmilīs wishing that their descendants should inherit their offices.

Finally, the fact that literary sources on the Regency from the Ottoman conquest until the period of our concern hardly mention incidents or episodes related to financial extortions committed by the ‘āmilīs against the local populations, encourages the presumption that such a phenomenon must have been less widespread or deeply rooted than in many other provinces of the Empire. Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf, in particular, stresses the harshness of Ḥammūda Pasha in dealing with dishonest ‘āmilīs (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 17, 82). There was, however, very probably, a gap between the author’s hagiographical account of this bey’s rule and the social realities of the period. It should also be noted that Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf, on the other hand, states, as concerns tribal *shaykhs*, that though the latter were supposed to act as a counterweight to the Hanefite ‘āmilīs, their own opportunistic calculations could lead them to cooperate with the latter, rather than hamper their abuses against tribesmen (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 15). According to the historian Mohamed-Hédi Chérif, the increasing number of assaults suffered at the hands of their own kinsmen by the tribal *shaykhs*, as reported in administrative documents from the second half of the eighteenth century, should be seen as a reaction to this alliance of the notables against the *raḥiya* (Chérif 1986: II, 191–2).
Conclusion: the *mamlûks*, *makhâzinis* and Hanefites

The study of the army and of the administration of the Regency in this chapter and the preceding one has enabled us to roughly evaluate the share held by each of the three social groups represented within these institutions, i.e. the Ottoman *mamlûks*, the *makhâzinis* and the Hanefites, in the stock of wealth and power of the Regency (see also Table 6.1). This concluding section will be devoted to a study of the extent of the judicial jurisdiction of the bey over each of these social groups.

To begin with, the Ottoman *mamlûks*: this administrative elite, placed under the orders of the bey, who was himself the descendant of an Ottoman *mamlûk*, represented a modified version of Rumelian *kapı kulus* sent by the Porte to administer its provinces. In contrast to the European renegades who were the true ‘slaves’ of the beylical household, the Ottoman *mamlûks* therefore remained, to an important extent, under the jurisdiction of the Porte, and enjoyed an important judicial privilege in the Regency. First, they were immune from the risk of having their property confiscated by the beys, whereas the wealth of those of them who died without leaving an heir or who had transgressed the Porte’s interests accrued, not to the beylical treasury, but to the central treasury in Istanbul. Thus, Yûnis Bey, ‘Alî Pasha’s eldest son and designated heir (and therefore a *kapı kulu*, or *mamlûk* of the sultan), spent the last years of his life as a prisoner of the dey of Algiers, where he had escaped after the failure of the janissary revolt fomented by him in 1752; at the news of his death, the Porte claimed his property from the Algerian government (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: II, 142).

Security for the lives of the *mamlûks* was also guaranteed, even if they had incurred the bey’s serious dissatisfaction. Mustâfa Khûja,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social group</th>
<th>Central administration</th>
<th>Provincial administration and army</th>
<th>Other activities (trade, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Mamlûks</em></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Makhâzinis</em></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanefites</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 6.1 Statistics on the most influential *mamlûks*, *makhâzinis* and Hanefites of Hammâda Pasha’s time, based on Ibn Abîl-Diyâf’s *Tarâjim al a’yân* (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: VII and VIII)
having, at some stage, fallen into disgrace, was allowed to leave the country on the pretext of a pilgrimage to Mekka, before being re-admitted in Ḥammūda Pasha’s government shortly after ʿAlī Bey’s death (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: 38–9; Rousseau 1985: 190–1). At the same period, Ismāʿīl Kāhiya, another Circassian mamlūk and son-in-law of ʿAlī Bey, and a youthful rival of Ḥammūda Pasha, was subtly persuaded, through common acquaintances and relatives in the Bārdū Palace, to leave Tunis (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: VII, 14).

Ismāʿīl Kāhiya pursued outside the Regency a distinguished career in the Ottoman administration, first in Egypt, where he was promoted to the rank of bey, then in Istanbul, and finally in Damascus where he was appointed as pasha (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: VII, 14).

Mamlūks, however, could be deprived of their status by the bey himself, who might choose, on his accession to office, to release his predecessor’s mamlūks, according to a practice commonly observed in provincial Ottoman households, and particularly in Egypt. ʿUthmān Bey, in the period following Ḥammūda Pasha’s death, and on the advice of the bāsh kāṭib Muḥammad al-ʿAṣram, exercised this right in order to rid himself of the too powerful Yūsuf Ṣāḥib al-Ṭābīʿ. Yūsuf, unlike many others, did not leave the Regency, although his release meant the loss of his status of mamlūk, and therefore of his office of guardian of the seal, and his relegation to the status of a makhāzini. Owing to his still considerable influence, the former sāḥib al-ṭābīʿ was appointed to the post of khaznadār, which was not restricted to mamlūks, and was, occasionally, attributed to Malekites, and to members of the jund.7 Yūsuf’s murder, a few months later, on the orders of Maḥmūd Bey, therefore did not constitute a violation of the immunity enjoyed by the Ottoman mamlūks in the Regency.8

In contrast to the Ottoman mamlūks, the makhāzinis, whether ʿaskeris or non-ʿaskeris, remained the rāʾiyya of the bey. Those of them suspected of foul play or of treason incurred the full impact of his wrath. Several makhāzinis were executed, or had their wealth confiscated as a consequence of the conflict between Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī and ʿAlī Pasha (Chérif 1986: II, 83–4; Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 220, 226). In the time of Ḥammūda Pasha, Yūnis ibn Yūnis, a Jirbi merchant, with connections in Istanbul, also had the greatest part of his wealth confiscated (Chérif 1977: 124). The growing influence of the Malekites in the government, and probably also a whiff of the winds of social change in the Ottoman Empire, however, seem to have caused the beginning of rumblings among the ranks
of the *makhāzinis* against the harshness of their judicial status. Thus, Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf reports that Rajab ibn ‘Ayyād, of an influential local Malekite family in the time of Ḥammūda Pasha, was asked by a *qādi* (judge) to hand over promptly full payment of a stated sum before any implementation of the terms of a contract signed by him and was not allowed to pledge one of his properties as security of payment. Rajab bowed down to the judgment and wryly congratulated the *qādi* on his wisdom, adding that, indeed, the *makhāzinis*, having no security for their very lives, could provide no valid guarantee of any sort (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: VI, 37–8).

Finally, the Hanefites, until the last quarter of the seventeenth century, had been exclusively under the judicial jurisdiction of the dey and the *diwān*; from then on, they were gradually transferred to the bey’s jurisdiction. The *diwān* was, to a large extent, responsible for settling legal issues concerning the janissaries, although the bey exercised ruthlessly his prerogatives in cases of military treason: hence the execution of the dey Qāra Burnālī in 1808 and of the Turkish rebels in 1811. Political and military considerations, on the other hand, led Ḥammūda Pasha to turn a blind eye on the exactions of the *‘asker* against the local population. It is also probable that the bey’s court judgments were less harsh on *kulughlis* than on Malekites. A few decades later, however, following the elimination of the janissary corps in 1830, the difference between the Tunisian Malekites and Hanefites in the judicial realm was almost completely eliminated. It survived in a small point of etiquette: whereas Malekite plaintiffs, in the tribunal, were firmly held at a distance from the bey by the Arab *bāsh hānba*, who acted as their spokesman, the Hanefites stood at a closer distance, by the side of the Turkish *bāsh hānba* (Bayram no date: I, part two, 131).
THE REVENUES OF THE BEYLICAL TREASURY

The accountancy department and the treasury

The accountancy department in the central administration (divān al-hisbān) appears to have been a reduced version of the offices headed by the bāsh defezdār in the government of the Porte in Istanbul, as it has been drawn out by contemporary research on the Ottoman Empire. In the light of this research, and based on the succinct information provided by Tunisian sources on the beylical accountancy department, as well as on the findings of the preceding chapters of this research, I shall attempt here to identify at least a number of the services forming that department, placed under the supreme jurisdiction of the bey as grand vizier-cum-bāsh defezdār, and bearing in mind the absence of the khaznadār from the government of Ḥammūda Pasha:

• first, the computation and collection of land taxes fell within the province of the bey and the bāsh katib;
• second, the secretariat of the šāhib al-ṭabi’ was responsible for renting tax-farms and for collecting the income resulting from the ittifāq with new governors. (In Istanbul, the registration of tax-farms was entrusted to a specific department of the bāsh defezdār’s office);
• third, collection of the profits of the various institutions dedicated to the keeping up of the Islamic holy places in Mekka and Jerusalem (awqāf al-ḥaramayn), which devolved, in Istanbul, on a particular division of the defezdār’s office, was the exclusive responsibility of the bey himself (Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 86);
fourth, escheated and unreclaimed property of the Malekite ra‘iyya, as in the case of persons who had died without leaving an heir, was placed under the responsibility of an official designated as the baytu‘l-malji (Monchicourt 1929: 28–9). The unreclaimed property of Hanefites went to the treasury of the jund (Hénia 1980: 257);

and, finally, we should note that the beylical administration, like the central government in Istanbul (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 128), provided for the possibility of receiving and settling claims of a financial nature between the state and private persons. Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf thus informs us that the wakīl appointed by the bey to represent him in such cases, ‘as under his father and grandfather’, (Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 87) had to appear before the majlis al-sharī (religious tribunal), either as defendant or as plaintiff, and ‘was treated on an equal footing to the adverse party’ (Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 87).

The treasury of the Regency was composed of two sections, on the model of the khazīna ʿāmira in Istanbul, which included the mīrī treasury, which was the repository of revenues for current expenditure, and the inner one, stored in the harem of the sultan’s palace (Orhonlu 1978). In Tunis, the main treasury, or bayt al-mal, probably situated in the Bārdū palace grounds, was kept under the supervision of an āgha commanding a guard unit. The inner treasury, to which Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf refers as Ḥammūda Pasha’s ‘treasure’ (kanz), was deposited in the ghurfa (underground room) of the Bārdū palace and placed under the custody of a mamlūk officer.

Finally, we should recall that the Tunisian treasury, unlike that of the Mashriq provinces, did not send an annual contribution to Istanbul. This exemption was, I would suggest, justified by the fact that the Regency and its two neighbours carried out military service for the sultan through waging corso campaigns against his enemies. Presents (the hadiyya) were, however, sent periodically to Istanbul, as a sign of allegiance from the beys of the Tunisian eyālet mümtāze to Istanbul. The hadiyya, as already indicated in this study, was composed of natural products and exotic animals from the countryside and the desert of the Regency, craftware from its villages, towns and cities, as well as goods bought in cash, such as precious stones.
Taxation in the rural and tribal country

*The tribes and the maḥallas*

In coastal regions, in the rich plains covering areas of the north and centre, and in the oases of al-Jarīd, settled peasant communities could be surveyed and taxed regularly by the beylical administration. There was, however, a considerable proportion of nomadic, or semi-nomadic tribes among the Tunisian rural population, which contributed to an important degree in forging the character of the fiscal policy of the beys. Beduins, if taxed too heavily, could easily emigrate to the neighbouring Regencies: the 1628 agreement between Algiers and Tunis even provided for the possibility for tribes to emigrate from each one of these provinces and place themselves under the jurisdiction of the other (Rousseau 1985: 45). Dissatisfied tribes, moreover, were armed groups that could easily be tempted to side with a contender for beylical power. The issue of the legality of taxes from an Islamic point of view, in this regard, remained a sensitive one with the tribes. The ‘urfi nature of many of these taxes (which meant they had been promulgated on the strength of the secular authority of the sultan and independently of the stipulations of the *sharīʿa*), had sometimes constituted righteous pretexts for tribal dissidence: thus, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Sulaymān ibn Ramaḍān had led an important rebellion against Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf, claiming that he would impose only *sharīʿ* taxes (i.e. those stipulated in the *Quran*) on the *raʿiyya*, if he took power (Ibn Abīʾl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: II, 81).

All these considerations dissuaded the beys from exacting heavy taxes from their rural population. Fiscal documents of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries thus reveal that various reductions or waivings (locally designated as ‘*tark*’, and ‘*tāyiḥ*’) of the amount of taxes owed by tribes, as well as postponements of the payment of a proportion of the taxes to the following year (‘*muwakhkhar*’), were frequently conceded (Hénia 1980: 305). A number of tribes, furthermore, particularly the poorest or those living in the frontier districts of the Regency were almost exempted from any fiscal payments, except for a symbolical sum (Pellissier 1980: 45, 183). We shall see, however, that the beys had at their disposal the whole array of the Ottoman *sharīʿ* and ‘urfi taxes. In periods of strong beylical power, these taxes, more particularly when dealing with wayward tribes, could be strictly exacted.
The bi-annual fiscal expeditions of the beys in the rural and tribal country were the winter *mahalla*, which started in December, sweeping across the centre to the south, and lasting for almost two months, and the summer *mahalla*, sent to the northern part of the country in July or August, after the grain harvest had been completed, and which lasted about one month. From the last *mahalla*, a column, led by the *khūja* of the *zuwāwa*, would be detached and sent to collect taxes in the north-west of the province, with the specific purpose of financing the pay of that corps (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 436; Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: III, 49). It seems therefore reasonable to assume that the role of each of the other two more important expeditions was also to supply the necessary funds for specific corps of the army. I would suggest, in this regard, that the proceeds of the winter *mahalla* provided for the pay of the *ṣubāybis* (mainly concentrated in the centre and south). Those of the summer *mahalla*, on the other hand, would have been reserved for the janissaries – a presumption supported by the fact that the taxes of the district of Māṭir (in the north of the Regency) were remitted, in their greatest proportion, to the treasury of the *dār al-bāšba* (Chérif 1986: I, 208).

It was the duty of the *kātibs* in the Bārdū accountancy department to draft, every year, the lists with the amounts of the various taxes to be paid by each tribal or rural community in the Regency to the annual *mahalla* or to the *āmils*. These lists have provided the archival basis for an interesting body of research by Tunisian historians on the fiscality of the Regency. Contemporary historiography has divided the taxes and dues paid by the Tunisian population, into two types: ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’. The following study in the Regency will show that these taxes and dues fit perfectly into the established official Ottoman classification, based on four main categories of impositions (İnalcık 1965b).

**Taxes on land and agricultural production**

The main *sharī* tax paid by the rural *rākiye* in the Ottoman Empire was the *ʿushr*, or tithe. In many provinces this proportion was raised to more than one-tenth of their agricultural production, but this does not seem to have been the case in the Regency. The beys, indeed, were concerned to stress to their *rākiye* that the *ʿushr* was one and the same as the Islamic *zakāt*, i.e. the tenth of the crops representing the share apportioned to the state by the
The second tax paid by Ottoman peasants was an urfi one, called the çift resmi, which was a fixed due calculated according to the quantity and quality of land in their holdings. Various sources provide evidence that this tax was imposed on the arable lands of the Regency, such as those of the Majirda Valley, which were, according to the eighteenth-century French traveller Peyssonnel, regularly surveyed by the beys for fiscal purposes (Peyssonnel 1987: 158). The measure adopted for these surveys was the māshiya, which corresponded exactly to the Ottoman çift (see Appendix B).

There were also several other urfi dues paid by the Tunisian rural population, on sheep, camels and oxen, as well as on food products, such as dhān (sheep’s grease), or honey (Bachrouch 1972: 132; Hénia 1980: 34). Just as, in the core provinces of the Ottoman Empire, handicrafts and small industries practised by landless peasants were taxed (İnalçık 1994: 147), so were Tunisian handicraft products, such as those of the al-Jarīd towns and villages (Hénia 1980: 34). Finally, in the Sahl region exclusively, a tax called the qānūn – a clear indication of its urfi nature – was imposed on olive trees (4 nāsiris each). This tax, however, concerned only the trees that had been planted before the rule of Uthmān Dey; those planted after that period were exempted from imposition, so that, in the Ottoman period, according to Ibn Abīl-Diyāf, ‘the blessed tree prospered and multiplied in that region’ (İbn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 130).

The payment of the sharātī tithes was made in kind. It is also possible that other dues, such as the çift resmi and dues on pastoral activities, normally collected in cash, were sometimes converted into kind, in view of the lack of cash among the rural population in the Regency. The mahalla, with its logistical capacities, offered the possibility of transporting large quantities of cereals and other goods from the countryside in order to sell them in city markets. The role of the Drīd tribe in transporting wheat to the south and bringing dates from there is well known (Raymond 1994: II, 17).

Khidmas and ʿādas

Many fees and contributions were paid by the rural population, not to the treasury, but to various army members and officials,
especially during the *mahallas*. These fees and contributions, designated by the Arabic terms of *khidmas* (in Ottoman usage: *khidmet*) and *ʿādas* (in Ottoman usage: *ʿadet*), were paid on the strength of the Sultan’s *ʿurfi* authority. The *khidmas* (i.e. services) have already been mentioned in this study, as being remunerations which the bey’s couriers were entitled to receive from those to whom they communicated government orders. In the context of the *mahalla*, the *khidmas* were payments made by the rural population to members of the *jund* or to the *subāyhis* for specific tasks carried out by them during these fiscal expeditions, or to the *mazārgīs* during the tax-collecting tours made by *qāids* in their districts. The *khidmas* of wheat, of barley, of dates, of camels (Bachrouch 1972: 134; Hénia 1980: 35) were thus presumably paid to officers responsible for the assessment and collection of taxes in cash imposed on these goods and animals, or for the transport of these commodities, if taxes were paid in kind. The Drīd tribe also received a *khidma* from communities in the al-Jarīd region for the transport of dates, but this sum was negotiated directly between the communities and the tribe’s leaders, and was not included in the government’s fiscal assessment.

*ʿĀdas*, meaning, in Arabic, ‘habit’, or ‘custom’, referred, in Ottoman usage, to sums paid by the population to cover expenses or obligations traditionally assumed by the treasury. On *ʿādas*, S. J. Shaw informs us that, in Egypt:

> Many expenditures were made by the Treasury to secure food and other material for the Diwān and the Citadel, to feed the Vāli and principal officers, to provide food for the poor on special occasions. Many of these were special expenditures, made in one or two years, and then abandoned. Others became permanent obligations of the Treasury.

*(Shaw 1962: 232)*

Among dues falling in this particular category, sources on the Regency mention, for instance, an *ʿāda of the khabāʾ* (tents) for the acquisition and maintenance of the tents of the *mahalla* (Bachrouch 1972: 131). There were also *ʿādas* paid for the personal benefit of members of the *mahalla*. The list of these officials and officers during the winter *mahalla* in the al-Jarīd, in fiscal documents of the eighteenth century, for instance, included, besides the bey, the *qāid*,
the kāhiya, the kātib, as well as the shāwīsh and the saqqājī (Hénia 1980: 35–6). Some of these ādas were allocated to officials dead a long time ago (e.g. Ja’far Kāhiya and Ṣaghīr ibn Ṣandal) (Hénia 1980: 35–6): we may presume that, as in Egypt, these payments were remitted to the descendants of the said officials. Finally, ādas were also paid to some categories of the rāiyya population, for instance, to the descendants of holy men: thus, the zāwiyya (religious foundation) of the Abū ‘Attūr family, in Ṣafāqus, received ‘from the government an āda of oil, wheat and money’ (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 53).

Khidmas and ādas were included in the list of taxes collected by the maḥalla, with their beneficiaries, or their specific uses, clearly indicated (Hénia 1980: 35–6n.). In the case of taxes collected by āmils in provincial districts, the latter, or his agents, would pay these fees and bonuses out of the proceeds of taxes he had collected to the entitled person, bearing an assignment to that effect. The assignment, called ‘havale’ (Ar.: ḥawwāla) in the usual Ottoman terminology (Gerber 1993), was designated, in the Regency, by the ubiquitous word of tidhkira (Ott.: tezkere, i.e. note) (Chérif 1986: I, 194; II, 89).

The khidmas and ādas, often paid in kind, complemented the scanty salaries of the āskeris. These additional sources of revenue to the military represented, in the last resort, a solution to the currency problems and shortages of specie that affected the Tunisian treasury (Chérif 1986: II, 84), and prevented any substantial increase in the army salaries. These problems, although it has been argued that they were not characterized with the severity and permanence described by traditional Ottomanist historiography, were common to the imperial and provincial treasuries throughout the Empire (Pamuk 2000: xix).

Other taxes and dues imposed on the rāiyya

There were taxes and dues that applied to the whole of the Tunisian rāiyya, although their bulk was paid by the rural population, which formed the majority of the inhabitants of the Regency. These impositions, paid in cash to the treasury, fell into two categories. The first corresponded to the Ottoman āvariz-bedels (although these terms were not used in the Tunisian administrative terminology). The āvariz (from the Arabic: āwārid, i.e. temporary, exceptional, circumstances) related to certain services which Ottoman subjects
had to provide freely to the state, initially only in emergencies, and for which *bedels* (from the Arabic: *badal*), i.e. cash substitutes, were often paid (Inalcik 1965b). Subsequently, a number of these taxes acquired a regular and permanent character. Among these, sources on the Regency mention, for instance, a tax imposed, since ‘Uthmān Dey’s time, on town-dwellers and tribesmen alike, as a contribution to the pay of the *jund* (Ibn Abīl-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: IV, 46), which was probably the local equivalent of the Ottoman ‘imperial army’, or ‘war-time substitute’ (converted, in periods of peace, into ‘peace-time substitute’). There was also the *diyāfa* (i.e. welcoming feast) of the pasha, which may be considered as the equivalent of the ‘travel substitute’ paid by the sultan’s subjects in lieu of providing accommodation to a visiting high-ranking official. In the Regency, as in the heart of the Empire, the tax had to be paid, whether the official designated effectively visited the region concerned or not (Chérif 1986: II, 127).

The second category of taxes were levied only in special cases. These taxes, called in the Ottoman terminology, the *bād-i hawā* or *ṭayyārāt*, included dues paid while recovering runaway slaves, cattle, etc., as well as fines, penalizing acts of political dissidence or marauding (Inalcik 1965b). Fines represented a form of penalization that was imposed with increased rigour from the reign of ‘Alī Pasha on – whereas the other types of taxes showed no increase, at least until the end of Ḥammūda Pasha’s rule (Hénia 1980: 292; Chérif 1986: II, 185). They were designated by the Arabic word *gharāma* (which had also passed into Ottoman usage), or were referred to, in the local language, by the term *khāṭīyya*, which may be understood as meaning ‘fault, sin’, (from the Arabic: *khaṭṭa*), or ‘written note’ (from the Arabic: *khaṭṭa*, to write). The *fāmil*, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, were traditionally entitled to one-tenth of each *gharāma* imposed by them. We may also include within this category of financial penalizing the *diyya*, which was often imposed collectively on a tribe, or on a town district, for a murder committed by one, or several, of their members. A proportion of the *diyya*, assessed by the Ottoman administration, was paid to the latter, whereas the rest went to the relatives of the victim (Ibn Ṭāhir 1995: 45–97). Finally, the wealth of notables and other subjects of the bey, in towns and countryside alike, could be appropriated by the treasury in circumstances of an exceptional nature, i.e. by the confiscation of the properties of those accused of dissidence or rebellion.
Iltizāms and other sources of revenue for the beylical treasury

The iltizāms

The leases for the iltizāms, in addition to the amounts of the ittifāqs paid by new governors, represented revenues paid to the treasury by rich Malekites and government officials. The iltizāms, commonly designated as lizmas in the Regency, were granted on the same terms as in the rest of the Empire, i.e. as the result of a public auction and in return for the payment of an annual fixed sum to the treasury. In the rural districts of the Regency, iltizāms were granted for the exploitation of the beylical hanshirs. In the cities and ports, they were related to the collection of a wide array of taxes and dues imposed on various goods and economic activities. They included, in particular:

- an iltizām designated as lizmat al-rommāna (from the French ‘(balance) romaine’, i.e. the Roman scales) (Bachrouch 1972: 133), probably corresponding to the kapan tax that was paid, in the Ottoman Empire, on products weighed in the public warehouses (Gibb and Bowen 1950: II, 7);
- another called lizmat-al-sūq (of the market): the price of this iltizām in the capital was paid directly to the dār al-basha (Chérif 1986: II, 190). Although its denomination does not tell us which staples or goods were thus taxed, I would suggest that this iltizām concerned the grain market;
- iltizāms, respectively, for the weighing of silver and gold (Bachrouch 1972: 133);
- and a multitude of others, attached to various professions and economic activities, such as those of attending ladies at marriages, prostitutes (the last being held by the mizwār, who was also entrusted with regulating the activities of this profession), wool-weavers, prison-wardens, etc. (Bachrouch 1972: 133; Raymond 1994: II, 107).

It should be noted, however, that there is no mention in Tunisian sources of any taxes paid for the practise of the most prestigious handicrafts and branches of commerce in the cities during the eighteenth century. These activities, particularly in the capital, were generally reserved to the Turks and to a Malekite minority. The Andalusians, in particular, monopolized, in Tunis, the manufac-
turing of the *shāshiyyās*, or red woollen caps marketed throughout the Empire. It is possible, therefore, that exemption from taxation on industry and commerce depended not on the activity itself but on the social category practising it. To the opposite, in small towns and villages, as in the al-Jarīd region, for instance, products of handicraft activity were taxed (Hénia 1980: 34).

Finally, customs duties were a consequent source of revenue for the beylical treasury. Taxes on imports (*gumrug*) were held as an *iltizām* by Mahmūd al-Jallūlī, a notable from Ṣafāqus, in Ḥammūda Pasha’s time (Raymond 1994: II, 146). Export duties, on the other hand, seem to have been collected directly by the treasury from the traders, who, upon submitting their goods for assessment of the quantity and value of goods to be exported, were provided with a *tidhkira* on which they had to pay the percentage due (Chérif 1986: II, 89). The rate of imposition, as in the rest of the Empire, was of three per cent for products exported or imported from Christian countries that had signed Capitulation agreements with the Porte, such as France, England, and a number of Italian states – to which were probably added various other customary charges which, as in the rest of the Ottoman Empire, would raise it to about ten per cent of the goods’ value (Mc Gowan 1994: 728). Customs duties were between 8 per cent and 11 per cent *ad valorem* for products from Christian countries that had not signed Capitulation agreements with the Porte.

*Economic relations with the Christian world and the corso*

In addition to customs duties, various revenues accrued to the beylical treasury as a consequence of economic agreements and exchange established between the beys and Christian interests. First, a number of *iltizāms* in the Regency had been granted by the Tunisian government to European concerns since the seventeenth century. These *iltizāms* concerned specific products that were the same as those on which an exclusive monopoly was held, in the heart of the Empire, by the central Ottoman government (Inalcık 1965b; Inan 1976: 75). They included:

- The *iltizām* of leathers and waxes, which were sent from all regions of the Regency to the *dār al-jild* in the capital; it was granted to a Leghornese company, with some form of control
exercised by a government official (Chérif 1986: I, 206). The company had, in return, to supply commodities from Europe, including wax for the Bārdū palace, and, in the time of Ḥammūda Pasha, the cloth required for army wear (MacGill 1815: 177).

• The iltizām for the exploiting of salt in the region of Zarzīs, granted to a Genoese group (Chérif 1986: II, 118).

• The iltizām for tuna and coral-fishing, which had been traditionally held by French companies since the seventeenth century. A conflict over the terms of its renewal, however, was partly at the origin of the war between France and Tunis in 1770 under ‘Alī Bey (Rousseau 1985: 170–85). Under Ḥammūda Pasha, French fishermen had to share their previously exclusive fishing rights with other foreign, particularly Italian, concerns. Attempts by the French consul to initiate negotiations aimed at the signature of an agreement for the renewing of the concession to his country from 1806 on were defeated by the bey’s prevarications and achieved no result (Rousseau 1985: 355–62).

• The iltizām for making and selling wine.

• And, presumably, the iltizām for the production of sodas, since this product was also monopolized by the beylical state (Monchicourt 1929: 24).

Second, trade with Europe, favoured, for a time, by the international conjuncture and the new position of Britain in the Mediterranean, was increasingly controlled by the bey. Wheat, the main exported goods to Europe, both through the Compagnie d’Afrique in Cap Nègre (until its disappearance at the end of the eighteenth century) and through European traders, had, indeed, already been largely monopolized by the beys. In addition to the surpluses of tithes, quantities of grain for sale to Europe were secured by the latter through the practice of the mushtarā (meaning bought goods), known, in Ottoman usage, as the ishtira (Faroqhi 1994: 535). This practice, consisting in buying from the rural population at the normal local price, was implemented by Hammūda Pasha during years of abundant harvest (Chérif 1986: II, 188). Sources, on the other hand, stress that, under this bey, as under his father ‘Alī Bey, a more exploitative method of acquisition of grain by the Ottoman administration (known as the ‘sūrṣat’ in Ottoman terminology), and which consisted in buying the grain crop in advance from peasants at a very low price, was abrogated (Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz 1970: 366;
Chérif 1986: II, 188). The trade of grain with Europe was discontinued in years of bad harvests, as happened in 1805 and in the following years (MacGill 1815: 134)⁸.

Third, during the period of rule of Ḥammūda Pasha, the corso, especially during the years from 1798 to 1805 provided, through the marketing of spoils and the redemption of captives, a considerable source of revenue for the Tunisian treasury. If the state corsairs succeeded in capturing an enemy ship, the bey was entitled to the vessel and half of the goods and slaves that it contained. In the case of corso expeditions carried out by private vessels, the bey was entitled to 12.5 per cent of the goods and to one slave out of eight (Sebag 2001: 12–13). Finally, as an indirect consequence of the corso, we should include the presents (often, on the bey’s demand, in the form of military equipment) and sums of money offered to the bey and to his assistants by those Christian states that had not signed capitulatory agreements with the Porte (such as Norway, the United States, Spain), as guarantees against corsair threats to their trade. The decline of the corso from 1805, added to other economic difficulties, resulting in particular from the problems to which trade with Europe was also confronted a few years later, combined to create a difficult economic conjuncture in the last years of Ḥammūda Pasha’s rule.

Conclusion

The almost total absence of the timar system and the relatively limited development of the iltizâm system ensured the control of the beylical treasury on the main sources of fiscal revenues in the Regency. It reflected the influence of the Ottoman kapı kulu political ideal, based on a strong centralized state served by a salaried army and administration. Furthermore, as a result of the power of the beys in the fiscal realm, the latter were able to implement a taxation policy that would antagonise their subject populations as little as possible. Thus, it appears that the financial leniency that characterized the Ottoman administration in its heyday, but which was, according to historians of the Empire, abandoned after that as a result of economic difficulties and rampant corruption, still prevailed in the Regency at the end of the eighteenth century. Among the Husaynids, ʿAlī Bey, in particular, was able, thanks to the considerable income derived from a favourable European trade conjuncture, to display a much-praised fiscal moderation (Ibn Abī’l-Ḍiyāf 1963–6: II, 172).
Changes in the beylical fiscal policies, however, were already slowly under way during Ḥammūda Pasha’s period of rule. First, the adoption of the ittifāq for granting governorships could only induce the āmils to exact payments with greater severity from the raiyya, in order to repay themselves. Second, we may presume that the economic difficulties to which Tunisian trade was confronted, starting from the first decade of the nineteenth century, the heavy cost of reforms and the increased strength of the army, led the bey to tighten his fiscal control of the countryside – although Ḥammūda Pasha seems to have abided by limits that were ruthlessly transgressed by his successors.
CONCLUSION

The evolution of the Tunisian government from 1574 to 1814

In September 1574, the corsair-kapudan pasha ʻIlij Alî, with a small naval force, had accompanied the Ottoman troops sent for the conquest of Tunis under the command of the grand vizier Sinân Pasha. The expedition had thus included the original cores of the three main foci of power in the government of the new Tunisian eyâlet that came into existence two months later: the janissaries, in their majority Muslim-born Anatolians, the corsairs, predominantly converts from Rumelia and from European countries, and the representatives of the Porte. The two most prominent officials within the latter group were the pasha, who was the supreme delegate of the sultan in Tunis, and the bey, in charge of the administrative and accountancy affairs of the province, and linked to the administration of the grand vizier.

The combination of the three ʻaskeri groups mentioned above constituted a distinctive feature, not only of the Tunisian provincial government, but also of those of the neighbouring provinces of Algiers and Tripoli, created earlier in the sixteenth century. There was, however, a difference in the circumstances that led to the creation of the last of the ğarp ocaklari of the Porte, compared to its two older sisters: whereas the latter had been added to the sultan’s dominions thanks to the victories scored by the corsairs fighting under the sultan’s banner in the Maghrib, Tunis had been conquered by an official Ottoman expedition headed by the grand vizier. This fact enhanced the legitimacy of the rights of the Porte over that province, and gave particular leverage to its two main representatives there over the corsairs and the Anatolian janissaries. The small but fairly prosperous Tunisian eyâlet, centred around the capital of the former Hafsid sultanate appears, indeed, to have been selected as the child and client of the Porte in the Maghrib region. Thence, the administrative organization of the new province, which
was supervised by Sinān Pasha, was, in many of its aspects, a close replica of the central provinces of the Porte – a feature that it was to preserve during the whole of the Ottoman period. Owing to this particular bond between province and centre, the changes that affected the nature and structure of the Tunisian government from the conquest to the end of our period of concern were linked, to an important extent, to the policies of the Porte and to the evolution of the household conflicts within the central Ottoman state. At the local level, these changes reflected new balances of power between the corsairs, the janissaries and the representatives of the Porte in Tunis, or within the composition of each of these groups, as well as between the Regency and Algiers.

Considered from this dual perspective, the political and administrative evolution of the Tunisian eyalet may be divided into four stages.1 During the first stage, extending from 1574 until 1591, the Porte proceeded to establish firmly its authority in Tunis, with the widening and almost definitive delimitation of the frontiers of the province and the elimination of the partial suzerainty exercised by the Algerian beylerbeys, before setting up a system of decentralized rule in its Maghrib territories. The second period extends from the turn of the seventeenth century, from the instauration of deylical rule until the establishment of official beylical supremacy in 1675. Several changes within the ‘askeri structure of the province occurred during that period, first among which we should mention the considerable reduction in the prerogatives of the pasha, reduced to a mainly protocolary role. This development seems to point, at the central level, to a weakening of the sultan’s household, which benefited, or at least did not affect the position of the grand vizier’s household.2 Other important local factors contributed more clearly to the rise of the beys and to the transition from a deylical regime to beylical rule, resulting from the constant weakening of the Anatolians. The latter, who stood as the local representatives of the Turkish sipâhis within the Ottoman state, had, since the creation of the Tunisian province, been deprived of the financial autonomy enjoyed by their central counterparts, due to the almost total absence of the timar system there. From the end of the sixteenth century on, moreover, they were, first, confronted to the rise of the ‘azabs, then of the kulughlis (as a result of the implementation of central policies concerning the janissaries) within the jund. Furthermore, the Malekites, placed under the jurisdiction of the bey, soon emerged as an increasingly powerful economic and military force in the province. Finally, the development of the corso,
which was the prime vocation assigned to the ḣarp ocakları as defenders of the western frontier of the Empire, led to the gaining of considerable political influence by the European renegades, whether corsair captains or mamluks. The renegades were allied, and even fused with beylical power during that period, since the founder of the first beylical dynasty in the Regency, Murād, was of European origin. The third stage, extending from 1675 until 1702, was marked by conflicts in the Regency, and between the Regency and its neighbours. Several changes in the Tunisian formula of government, attempted through the active involvement, or the support, of the Porte, or of the most influential factions within it, during that confused period, such as: establishing a beylical diumvirate, increasing the power of the pasha (the Muhammad al-Ḫāfṣī episode) and of the dey, failed.

Finally, the fourth stage, extending from 1702 to 1814, may be divided into two periods. In the first period, ending by 1763, with the quenching of Ismaīl ibn Yūnis’s revolt by ʿAlī Bey, which marked the final triumph of the Husaymid dynasty, household conflicts, resulting in wars and rebellions, strongly persisted, whether at the regional level or within the Regency. This stage, nonetheless, saw the emergence of many important developments affecting the government of the Regency and reflecting changes at the central level. Foremost among them we should mention the fusion between the functions of bey and pasha in Tunis, which had started in 1703 – although the two functions were dissociated again, for reasons dictated by the local political conjuncture, from 1705 until towards 1740 – and suggests the establishment of a stronger coordination between the households of the sultan and the grand vizier in Istanbul. This evolution was reflected in an increasing centralization and strengthening of beylical power, which made the fundamental opposition between the Rumelian bey and the Anatolian dey an increasingly unequal one. Second, it is important to note the weakening of the European renegades within the government of the Regency, which had already started since the end of the seventeenth century, due to the slackening of the corso, as a direct consequence of the peace treaties signed by the Porte with a number of Christian countries. The weakening of the renegades seems to have been also part of a systematic policy of the Ottoman Porte against the frontier culture of which these renegades were a crucial element, and the danger represented by European influence on the Tunisian government. The prestigious status attached to converts was, thenceforth, limited to those originating
from the Empire: by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Muradite beys, of renegade origin, were eliminated, and were succeeded by the Husaynids, descending from an Ottoman mamlick.

The trends described above were intensified and accelerated in the second period, and particularly under the rule of Hammūda Pasha (1777–1814), under the impact of the reforms policy adopted by the Porte, closely copied in the Regency. The weakening of the renegades, which led to their marginalization within the army and government, and, with them, the weakening of the frontier culture went in parallel with the assertion of the Turkish language as the administrative language in one part, at least, of Hammūda Pasha’s government. Furthermore, the growing awareness that the corso was drawing to an end – in spite of a temporary regain of its activity at the turn of the nineteenth century – also led to reforming the Tunisian navy, in the context of the military reforms implemented in the Empire. As concerns the Anatolians, their increased emigration to the Regency suggests a will to intensify and accelerate the mixing of populations within the Empire. The Anatolians, however, although they were allocated a share in the stock of power and wealth provided by the Tunisian administration, resented being systematically excluded from the most lucrative and influential positions in that institution. These posts were reserved for the Ottoman mamlicks and the Malekite sarrājs of the beylical household, and to some makhāzinis, who thus constituted particularly privileged groups within the Regency’s government – as was the case, though possibly to a lesser degree, for the kapi kulūs and other servants of the sultan’s household in the central Ottoman government (Kunt 1983: 250).

Finally, one of the main achievements of Hammūda Pasha’s period of rule was the elimination of the partial suzerainty exercised by Algiers on Tunis since 1756, and which had, for a time, thwarted the relationship between the bey and the Porte at the end of the eighteenth century. The evolution of the Algerian government from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century had been radically different from that of the Tunisian one. Algiers, which had been the starting-point for the conquest of the Maghrib by the Muslim corsairs, beginning with the prestigious Khayr al-Dīn, remained the stronghold of these naval fighters even after the decline of the corso, and managed to preserve, at least in part, its strong connexion with the central admiralty – a centre of frequent dissidence from the authority of the Porte. Furthermore, the deylical regime established in 1670 in that province (where it
continued until the French occupation of Algiers in 1830) was underlain by the power of the Anatolians in the province. These fighters continued to emigrate in great numbers to Algiers, and, in contrast to their Tunisian neighbours, managed to block access to their ranks by the *kulughlis*. The corsair–Anatolian regime, which managed, in 1756, to impose the restoration of the former Algerian domination over Tunis, drew its strength from its alliance with other forces, which formed, at the central level and across the Empire, a strong coalition against Selim III and his reforms policy at the end of the eighteenth century. The defeat of the Algerians by Ḫammūda Pasha’s army in 1807 marked, for the Porte, an important step on the way to subduing traditional centres of opposition to its authority. Nothing definitive, however, had been achieved, as attested by the 1811 Turkish uprising in Tunis.
APPENDIX A

Bayram’s ranking list of government offices in the Regency

*The wāli (pasha-bey)*

1. the šāhiūb al-tābi‘ (guardian of the seal)
2. the ra‘īs al-kuttāb, or bāsh kātib (head of the chancery)
3. the khaznadār (head treasurer)
4. the bāsh āgha of the Arab ṣubāŷbis
5. the kāhiya (main lieutenant) of the bey
6. the amīn al-tārsikhāna (commissioner in charge of the arsenal)
7. the two bāsh hānbas
8. the bāsh qāzāq, or bāsh mamlūk
9. the dey
10. the shaykh al-madīna (mayor of Tunis)
11. the āgha of the Qasbah and the āgha al-kursi
12. the ra‘īs majlis al-tijāra (head of the guilds)
13. the kāhiya of the dār al-bāshā

This list of 13 military and administrative offices in the Regency, probably copied from an Ottoman *salnāme* – the *salnāmes* being statistical and descriptive yearbooks issued by the Porte, containing, in particular, official statistical and administrative information on the various provinces of the Empire – is included in the Ṣafwat al-itibār, written around 1860–5, by the Tunisian scholar Muhammad Bayram al-Khāmis. The list has also often been used by contemporary historians in their studies of the government of pre-colonial Tunisia, particularly from the mid-nineteenth century. The review of the main offices in Ḥammūda Pasha’s government, made in this study, shows, however, that the ranking order provided by Bayram’s list may also be considered as applicable to the period of our concern. Furthermore, based, among other things, on the fact that this list is headed by the šāhiūb al-tābi‘, who only acceded to political supremacy at the beginning of Ḥammūda Pasha’s rule, we may infer that this ranking order for the main office-holders in the Tunisian government was inaugurated at that period.
APPENDIX B

Rural land tenure and taxation in the Ottoman Empire and in the Regency

The division of the arable lands of Rumelia, with their immense wheat-growing plains, and of those of many regions in Anatolia, by the central administration, was based on the unit called çift (Djurdev 1960; Yapp 1987: 19–22; Inalcik 1994: 121–31). This term, of Persian origin, and meaning ‘a pair of oxen’, designated the measure of land that could be cultivated by this animal force during one season, and, by extension, a farm or estate whose boundaries were defined by that measure (çiftlik). The surface covered by a çiftlik, however, varied according to each area and the fertility of the soil, and might thus range from five to 15 hectares.

There were two main categories of çiftlik, according to the type of tenure under which they were held. The privileged category was that of the muqāṭā'alu çiftlik, which enjoyed various exemptions from taxes. They included, first, the 'askeri çiftlik, given to sipāhis for their own cultivation, or granted to the semi-'askeri tribes, such as the yayas and müsellems. Many of them were set up on land that had been abandoned for a long time, or had never been cultivated before (mawāt), and the Ottoman government, anxious to increase the area of arable lands and to develop agricultural activities in the Empire, encouraged their multiplication (Inalcik 1994: 121–31). Those who exploited them were, in conformity with the Islamic tradition, granted the privilege of enjoying full proprietary rights over them (mulk). The other type of muqāṭā'alu çiftlik were those rented by the government to village communities, urbanites or rich peasants, who held these lands as iltizâms, paying in return for them tithes or sums agreed upon with the treasury. All the muqāṭā'alu çiftlik, with the exception of those belonging
to the yayas and müsellems, were generally not directly cultivated by their tenants, but were left to the care of wage-labourers and sharecroppers.

The second, and statistically more important, category of çiftliks was constituted by the ráiiya çiftliks, cultivated by peasants under the terms of what was called a tapu contract. This contract imposed on the peasant the duty of tilling the land and paying taxes on it, while granting him, in return, the right to transmit his çiftlik to his descendants, or to transfer his cultivation rights to another peasant. Many of these çiftliks, in the early period of the Empire, constituted part of the ‘prebendal’ territories of sipâbis, on which they were entitled to collect the taxes paid by peasants. After the decline of the feudal system, the landholder, in the majority of cases, was the state itself. Taxes paid by peasants for the ráiiya çiftliks thus became the main source of revenue for the Ottoman central treasury. A debate is going on, in Ottoman historiography, about the nature and evolution of this çiftlik. Halil Inalcik, in particular, has contested the thesis held by some on the gradual fragmentation of çiftliks between the successive descendants of the original tapu holders. He insists on the Ottoman government’s efforts to prevent this land fragmentation, concluding that, although some peasant households might live off two çiftliks or half a çiftlik, ‘normal-sized ráiiyet çiftliks typically made up the state-owned lands throughout Asia Minor and the Balkans’ (Inalcik 1994: 148).

The main elements of the Ottoman land tenure system described above were rigorously replicated, under a different terminology, in the Tunisian Regency. The close similarity between the two systems is illustrated, first of all, by the perfect linguistic correspondence between the Ottoman word ‘çiftlik’, and the Arabic word ‘mâshiya’, used in the Regency. The term ‘mâshiya’, originally meaning ‘cattle’, came to designate ‘the surface of land that (could) be tilled by a plough’. This surface which, as in the rest of the Empire, varied according to regions and to the quality of the soil, might extend between eight and 12, or more, hectares, in the Regency (Dozy 1881). The term mâshiya was also used to designate, by extension, tax-imposable estates delimited by that measure, and on which different taxation rates were imposed. Fiscal documents from the Muradite period distinguish between three types of mâshiya: ‘arbî (lands cultivated by the Arabs, or Beduins), mulk al-balidiyya (lands owned by rich Malekites from the capital), or mulk al-atrâk (owned by the Turks) (Bachrouch 1972: 130).
In common usage, however, the cereal-growing estates in particular were designated by the term ‘hanshîr’, which appears to be a joining together of two Turkish words, distorted by the local pronunciation: ‘hâne’, or ‘hâne’ (place) and ‘çift’. The hanshîrs were divided, like the çifts, into various categories. There were, first, those corresponding to the āskeri çiftlik, such as the hanshîr offered by Aḥmad Bey (1837–53) to the muftî (supreme religious dignitary in the Regency) Ibrâhîm al-Riyâhî (Pellissier 1980: 195), according to the conditions defined for the granting of waste lands for cultivation to private individuals in the Ottoman Empire. The land granted, on a tax-exemption basis, to the powerful Abû Ghânîm tribe in the first stages of the Ottoman conquest was also, presumably, of a similar nature (Pellissier 1980: 181). These hanshîrs carved out of previously ununtilled and unexploited land seem to have been common in the Regency, thence the coining of the verb ‘hanshara’, meaning: ‘to let a garden, or orchard, go to waste’ (Marçais and Guiga 1960–1: II, 4191, quoted by Valensi 1977: 177).

There were other privileged hanshîrs, cultivated by khammâsa, or sharecroppers, and which paid only minimal taxes. Among them were those owned by rich families of Ottoman (also, of Malekite) origin in the fertile Majirda valley, or the hanshîr that ʿUthmân Dey had seized and appropriated to himself in the Sâhil, after driving away from there the tribe of the Mathâlîth (Poncet 1960: 138). These hanshîrs lay in lands that had been tilled and cultivated since before the Ottoman conquest. In the case of the last of them, at least, the land had been abandoned, or alleged to be so, after the forced departure of its original occupiers, and therefore was considered to be waste land. The amalgamation between abandoned lands and waste land would have thus constituted a legal loophole that enabled some new Ottoman occupiers of Tunisian lands to enjoy full proprietary rights on them. It seems, however, that the illegality of the appropriation of ʿUthmân Dey’s hanshîr, or at least of its subsequent tenure by his descendants, was ulteriorly raised by the beylical government, since in 1724, the dey’s granddaughter, ʿAzîza ʿUthmâna, resorted to an expedient for averting the danger of confiscation by turning the land into a waqf (or, in common Maghrib usage, a habs, or habûs) (Poncet 1960: 147–8). This practice, dating from early Islamic times, consisted in dedicating the usufruct of a land to charitable work, while guaranteeing, in return, that it should remain in the ultimate possession of the descendants of the original owner. The number of waqfs increased considerably
in North Africa during the Ottoman period, as in the other Arab provinces (Yapp 1987: 19–20). There were also the hanshirs of the bey, which were of two types. Some, such as the hanshîr of Wislâtîyya, were cultivated by sharecroppers, while others were conceded as iltizâm to shaykhs, tribal communities, or officials. Among these I would mention the hanshîr of Sîliâna.1

Finally, lands cultivated by tribes, especially in the wheat-growing region traversed by the mahalla (which were probably those designated in fiscal documents as the mâşhiya ʿarbî lands, mentioned above), corresponded to the râiyya çiftliks. We may presume that the collective mode of ownership and land exploitation by tribes ensured that no fragmentation of these mâşhiyas took place. In the case of nomadic tribes living solely by cattle-rearing, they probably also had some rights over the pasture land used by them, in return for the payment of dues, as was the case in the core provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

In addition to the mâşhya, used for wheat-growing lands, other measures were adopted for landholdings, according to the type of crops cultivated, and even according to regions. Thus, the marja’, which was only applied, according to Bachrouch, in the Sâhil region, and which applied in particular to olive or almond groves, is described in an archival document as ‘measured by means of the rope known as the rope of the diwân, measuring 50 Arab elbow-lengths’ (Bachrouch 1972: 132; Valensi 1977: 180). In this context also, the term ‘jidâr’, designating small plots of land in the oases of the al-Jarîd region, deserves some attention. The word occurs in particular in a contract stipulating the transfer of a jidâr from one individual to another, which has been studied by Abdelhamid Hénia (Hénia 1980: 65–6). The contract is formulated in fairly similar terms to another, quoted by Inalcik, on a similar transaction concerning a tapu çiftlik in the heart of the Empire (İnalçık 1994: 109). In both texts, it appears clearly that the transfer was not a sale, and that it implied a transfer of the duty of paying the taxes attached to the land.2 From this, we may conclude that the jidârs were a variety of small-sized râiyya çiftliks. Concerning the etymology of the word ‘jidâr’, I would therefore suggest that it was constituted by joining together of ‘ji’, which represented the local distortion ‘çift’, and ‘dâr’, which I have defined, in an earlier chapter of this study, as the fortieth part of a whole.3 The measure encompassed by a jidâr would stand in that ratio compared to the mâshîya-çiftlik.

In the heart of the Ottoman Empire, the çiftlik underlay the çift-hayâne system, which constituted the basis of the Ottoman taxation
system of the rā‘iya peasant population. According to Inalcik, the çift-hāne was: ‘a combination of three elements: fields forming a certain unit workable by a team of oxen and used to grow grains; the family household which provided labour; and a team of oxen as tractation power’ (Inalcik 1994: 146).

In the Tunisian Regency, the system of zamālas established among tribes appears to be the local equivalent of the Ottoman çift-hānes. Abdelhamid Hénia thus offers the following definition of the zamāla, which includes the three elements listed by Inalcik in his definition of çift-hānes: land, household and ploughing team (or cattle): ‘a fiscal unit aiming at bringing under the same common denominator taxable items of varied kinds: men, households (bayts), cattle (10 cows, or 50 sheep), arable land (1 or 2 māšiyas)’ (Hénia 1980: 75).

The zamālas were not equally taxed across the country, which implies that there were different categories of tribes classified according to their degree of wealth, just as, in the rest of the Ottoman Empire, the population was divided into three groups: rich, middling and poor, for taxation purposes.
NOTES

SOURCES AND HISTORIOGRAPHY ON OTTOMAN TUNISIA

1 A number of these sources have been used for this research. See, for instance, Du Castel 1628; MacGill 1811; Béranger 1979; Pellissier 1980; Frank and Marcel 1987; Peyssonnel 1987; Pückler-Muskau 1989.

2 On these, and other studies by this author, see Pignon 1965: 29–35.

3 Note C.-A. Julien’s warning that Rousseau should be read with ‘great caution’ (Julien 1952: 350).

4 The preface to Hugon’s book was written by Gabrielle Alapetite, who was the French résident-général in Tunis from 1894 to 1900.

5 In spite of its title, Serres’ study deals much more with the diplomatic rivalry between France and Britain in the North African region at that period than with the policy of the Ottoman Porte.

6 Several articles by Mantran reflect this concern to study the links between the Tunisian Regency (and the Maghrib provinces as a whole) and the Ottoman Empire (see Mantran 1957, 1959, 1965).

7 This author states that Tunisian historiography has expounded an interpretative theory on the Ottoman period of Tunisia, centred on the concept of political autonomy and of a dominating social group, adding: ‘If we exclude the – rather far-fetched – assumption that totally new sources might be discovered one day . . ., we may assert that our knowledge of that period has reached a limit’ (Bachrouch 1987: 78–9).

1 FROM THE CONQUEST TO DEYLICAL RULE (1574–1647)

1 Tales of these profanities included: tying the horses of Spanish soldiers to the pillars of the Zitūna mosque, throwing into the streets the book-cases of that venerable institution, and profaning the tomb of the most revered holy man in Tunis, Sīdī Miḥriz ibn Khalaf, who then appeared in a dream to Sultan Sefīm I, urging him to conquer Tunis (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 175–6, 178).

2 Ibn Abī Dīnār thus mentions that Khayr al-Dīn, during his brief period of rule in Tunis, exiled a well-known religious personality of that city.
(Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 163). The same author also states that ʿIlīj ʿAlī’s troops, after being driven out of Tunis in 1572, sought shelter in the small coastal town of Ḥammāmāt, but were denied it by the local population. Later they went back to the town and took their revenge on its inhabitants (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 177). These critical mentions, however brief, contrast with the author’s hagiographic account of Sinān Pasha’s military expedition, aimed at stressing the impeccable Ottoman credentials of the grand vizier.

3 ‘Sinān Pasha appointed some local notables to sit in the diwān, to win their hearts’ (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: II, 27).

4 On that period, sources tell us succinctly that, before the rule of ʿUthmān Dey, which started towards 1598, Ibrāhīm Rüdeslī and Mūsā precariously held the deyllicate for one year each (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 200–1).

5 See the description of the corps of deys by the Venetian dragoman Salvago in 1625: ‘[Le dey] marche avec une suite de quarante à cinquante hommes, tous aimés et tous aspirant au même grade’ (Grandchamp 1967: II, 482). The number of 40 deys within the jund, which had risen, at that period, to 4,000, confirms the assertion by al-Wazīr, mentioned above, that each dey commanded 100 janissaries.

6 The value of the presents sent to the main officials in the Regency – such as those sent by the consuls and magistrates of Marseilles in 1629 – ranged according to that hierarchy (Bachrouch 1977: 47).

7 Following the 1524 uprising in Egypt, the grand vizier Ibrāhīm Pasha paid a visit to the province and promulgated a new qānūnīnāmeh (Holt 1968: 81).

8 Mention of the Tunisian ʿazabs can be found in two eighteenth-century sources: in Ibn Yūsuf’s chronicle (Ibn Yūsuf 1998: 31), and in a popular dirge expressing, according to some, the complaint of the Wislātīs of the brutalities to which they were subjected by the bānbas (guard) of Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī in 1728, in punishment for their support of ʿAlī Pasha (Chérif 1986: I, 67, note 288).

9 The pasha and the diwān were, thus, the signatories of a treaty signed between the Regency and France in 1665 (Rousseau 1985: 480).

10 The assistance was discontinued after two years, according to al-Wazīr, ‘because it was too heavy a burden on this Muslim population of limited means’ (al-Wazīr 1985: II, 408).

11 Some sources confirm that the island was an appanage of the sultan’s mother (Chérif 1986: I, 154).

12 See p. 46, p. 55 and p. 56.

13 This official, in the Ottoman Empire, was called the Surveyor (Inalcık 1994: 135–8).

14 There was also, at the same period, an increase in the number of Egyptian beys, which rose from 12 to 30, then to 40 (Winter 1992: 48).

15 ‘[Before Ramaḍān’s permanent appointment at the head of the mahalla], different successive military commanders obtained the iltizām of the mahalla, which created great confusion’ (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 227).
‘Alī Huwwa, the first of these tarjumāns, according to Ibn Abī Dīnār, ‘had nurtured the vain hope of obtaining the leadership of the mahalla’ (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 213). The author adds that Huwwa had enjoyed the protection of the pasha, although it is impossible to know whether he was referring, by that designation, to Ḥammūda Bey himself (who obtained the title of pasha at some stage), or to a pasha sent by the Porte (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 213). On the second tarjumān, the French consul in Tunis wrote to his government in 1666:

Le Pacha reignant avait attiré le Dey à son parti, et, s’étant plaint à lui d’un ancien truchement, disant qu’il était l’espion (de Hammūda Bey), le Dey lui avait permis de le mettre aux arrêts, de le spolier de tous ses biens et ensuite de le faire pendre, ce qui avait si fort surpris le vieux pacha (i.e. Hammūda Bey) qu’on croit qu’il en est mort d’appréhension.

(quoted by Bachrouch 1977: 171)

This dey was a former corsair captain (al-Wazīr 1985: II, 433). His relation to the bey confirms my previous suggestion about the links between the corsairs and the ḥāṣabs, to which the beys belonged. In addition to this, the fact that he was deposed by the dīwān may be seen as evidence that his appointment to the deyllicate had contravened Ottoman legality, as has been also suggested in the preceding chapter of this study.

Ṭābauq was also a former corsair (al-Wazīr 1985: II, 462). On his appointment to the deyllicate by ‘Alī Bey and his entering the capital, Ibn Abī Dīnār perfidiously remarks that ‘some looked askance at him, while others saw in him the signs of authentic authority’ (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 224).

Baqtāsh Dey was succeeded by ‘Alī Re‘is (1686–94), who was the last corsair-dey of the Regency.

Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf was the first among the rulers of the Maghrib regencies to obtain the title of pasha. The second was the Algerian dey in 1710, and the third was Ahmad Qaramanli, founder of the first beylical dynasty in Tripoli in 1712.

It should also be noted that, at the same period, the post of āgha could also lead to the deylitical title. This was the case for the āgha Deli Muhammad (1699–1701) who had assisted Murād III in taking power (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: 272), and received the title of dey, but was later deposed for trying to increase his authority in the Regency (Raymond 1960: 134), and for Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf who became both bey and dey.

This led to the signing of a peace treaty between the Regency and Austrian representatives, accompanied by two kapicis. The provisions of the treaty applied to all Austrian subjects, ‘Germans, inhabitants of
the Austrian Netherlands, of the Atlantic coast, of the Sicilian, Neapolitan, Calabrese territories and their dependencies, of Fiume and Trieste, along the Adriatic sea, and all the others, whatever their nation or creed’ (Rousseau 1985: 107).

10 On the economic difficulties of that period, which he attributes to an ‘unfavourable Mediterranean conjuncture’, see Chérif 1986: II, 11–12. According to the historian J. Parry, on the other hand ‘[from 1719 on, under the reign of Sultan Ahmad III], there is reason to believe that the Empire had already entered a new cycle of inflation. At Cairo . . . there were serious disturbances in 1721’ (Parry 1976: 216). We should also note that, in 1730, the deteriorating economic conditions in Istanbul were an important factor in the bloody revolt led by Patrona Halil, which resulted in the resignation of Sultan Ahmad III in favour of his nephew Mahmūd I – which sheds a striking light on ‘Alī Pasha’s victory in the Regency in 1735.

11 The historian Charles Roux has reported this information, on the basis of reports sent by a French military expert, named Tringano, to his government (Roux 1932: 274–80).

3 THE WARS AND ALLIANCES OF ḤAMMŪDA PASHA

1 This issue reflected concerns that were contemporary to Ahmad ibn Abīl-Diyāf’s time, since in 1835, the Tunisian government had applied to the Porte to get the appointment of a member of the Husaynid family at the head of the Tripoli administration. The application was turned down (Raymond 1994: II, 89–90).

2 In the meanwhile, the Porte preserved its official neutrality towards the two Regencies. In a firman dated November 1807, the Sultan exhorted the rulers of Algiers and Tunis to put a stop to their quarrels and turn, instead, to holy war against the Infidels (Chater 1984: 36n.).

3 This dey was forced to drink poison (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 50). This was, according to some sources, the mode of execution of Djezārli Pasha in 1791 (Mordtmann-Kuran 1971).

4 See, for instance, Chérif 1977: 121.

5 See a letter sent by the French chargé d’affaires in Tunis, Billon, to his government on 28 August 1810: ‘Le gouvernement tunisien est devenu tout à fait marchand. Il fait enlever aux enchères publiques tous les marchés qui sont à sa convenance et il essaie d’intimider les concurrents’ (Plantet 1893: III, 489).

6 André Raymond, in a very interesting article, has studied the origins and occupations of the Tunisian and Maghrib communities established in Cairo in the eighteenth century (Raymond 1959: 335–71).

4 THE PASHA-BEI OF TUNIS

1 The original text of the petition, written in Turkish (document 3), is accompanied by a translation into Arabic, written at a later period (document 3 bis).
NOTES

2 A document in the Tunisian government archives (Archives Générales Tunisiennes, Série Histoire, Carton 220, Dossier 349, document 1) gives a list of the presents sent by Hammūda Pasha on the occasion of the 1795 embassy to Istanbul, with their beneficiaries. The latter, 34 in number, include the sultan, the grand vizier, the shaykh al-islām (the main Islamic religious authority in Istanbul), the kapudan pasha, the sultan’s sword-bearer, the representative of the āgha of the sultan’s mother, the bearer of the sultan’s caftan and the stables supervisor.

3 See in particular the description of ‘Alī Bey’s ceremony of investiture in ‘Abd al ‘Azīz 1970: 46. See also descriptions of the ceremonies of investiture or reconfirmation of investiture for Hammūda Pasha, Mahmūd Bey (1815–24) and Husayn Bey (1824–35) in Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: II, 177; III, 122, 156, 179.

4 The firmans of renewal of investiture addressed in the nineteenth century to Mahmūd Bey and Husayn Bey (Archives Générales Tunisiennes, Série Histoire, Carton 220, Dossier 340, documents 13 and 29), as well as a letter from the grand vizier announcing the sending of a firman of renewal of investiture to Musṭafā Bey (1835–7) (Archives Générales Tunisiennes, Série Histoire, Carton 220, Dossier 343, document 3) are all dated from the beginning of Shawwāl.

5 This detail is mentioned in the letter from the grand vizier, mentioned in the note above.

6 See the study of the signets and seals of the Husaynīd beys in Hugon 1913: 25–53.

7 The opening formula of the firmans has also been studied by Mantran (Mantran 1957: 343).

8 The title ‘ṣāhib (kursī)’, used in particular in treaties signed with France by ‘Alī Bey and Hammūda Pasha, has been translated in these treaties as ‘Seigneur et Possesseur (de Tunis la bien-gardée)’ (Rousseau 1985: 499, 504).

9 The denomination of Ifrīqiya, originating from the name ‘Africa’ given by the Romans to their colony on Carthaginian soil, was preserved under subsequent rules, including the Ottoman administration, who used it in reference to the Tunisian eyālet. In a treaty signed with France in 1830, the expression ‘ṣāhib memleket Ifrīqiya’, designating Husayn Bey has been translated, pompously (and wrongly) as ‘maître du royaume d’Afrique’ (Rousseau 1985: 514).


11 Gibb and Bowen have provided an invaluable detailed description of the sultan’s household, followed by a briefer one of the grand vizier’s (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 328–64).

12 For a description of the bey’s court of justice, see Bayram no date: I, part two, 131–3.

13 The shūlāqs are mentioned in a seventeenth-century European source, where they are designated as ‘la garde du vice-roi, ou Solachis’ (Grandchamp 1937: II, 481).

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14 The suggestion I make concerning the difference between the Turkish and the Arab sections of the şubâyhis and hânbas is based on information provided by Ibn Abîl-Diyâf: when Ahmad Bey (1837–53) set up a new army corps, most probably in implementation of the Ottoman tanzimât of that period, he integrated within that corps the Turkish şubâyhis, the Turkish hânbas and the mamlûks. The author further states that the Arab sipâhis and the Arab hânbas were not included within the new corps, for ‘they (were) the cavalry of the province’ (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: IV, 30).

15 The English traveller Thomas MacGill describes Stinca as ‘a spy in the pay of the French’ (MacGill 1815: 106).

16 This precision is important. It is mentioned, for instance, in the Notebook of the jund (Archives Générales Tunisiennes, Série Histoire, Carton 169, Dossier 895), to which I shall frequently refer in the following chapter of this study, that Hammûda Pasha was inscribed in the 41st janissary dâr, with his 11 sons. This obviously referred to the bey’s mamlûks, since he only had one son, who died in his infancy. There are several other instances where the mamlûks are designated as the beys’ sons in sources on the Regency.

5 THE ARMY

1 The tâbi’s of the bey are mentioned in a few Tunisian sources (e.g. al-Wazîr 1985: II, 505, and the Notebook of the jund, contained in Archives Générales Tunisiennes, Série Histoire, Carton 169, Dossier 895 bis). As concerns the term ‘sarrâj’, we know at least two Malekite officials who were thus denominated in the eighteenth century: Muhammad al-Wazîr al-Sarrâj al-Andalusî, chronicler and secretary of the bey Husayn ibn ’Ali, and ’Ali al-Murâbi, governor of Qayrawân in Hammûda Pasha’s time (Raymond 1994: II, 155).

2 Thus, in 1605, M. de Brêves, envoy of the French king to the Regency, mentions ‘un régiment d’Andalous grenadins ou tanagrins’ (du Castel 1628: 359).

3 Cf. Ibn Abîl-Diyâf:

If he (Hammûda Pasha) saw a sturdy young man of the populace, he would say to him: ‘Your father is a Turk, and he died without registering you in the jund, and you and your brothers left it that way, in order to avoid serving in the army.’ The young man would answer, ‘My Lord, I am the son of So-and-so,’ at which the hânba officers would pretend that he lied and would testify that his father was called Uzûn Aḥmad, or Deli Bâsh.

(Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: III, 54)

4 Ibn Abîl-Diyâf’s account of the period of rule of Hammûda Pasha contains one single explicit mention of an increase in the numbers of the Tunisian jund: ‘[In 1809], the bey added 100 dârs to the jund, numbering 2,500 men’ (Ibn Abîl-Diyâf 1963–6: III, 50).

5 The fact that the pages of the Notebook are not numbered makes it difficult to use it for precise references. Most of the observations drawn
from it, however, apply to the two pages of that document that relate to the time of Ḥammūda Pasha.

6 The term ‘jamā’ā’, commonly used in Egyptian sources, recurs several times in the Notebook of the jund. All other Tunisian sources use it sparingly (it is mentioned once by Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 202), as is also the case for the term ‘ṭā‘īfa’.

7 The same observation is made by Shaw concerning the organization of the Egyptian Ottoman army (Shaw 1962: 201).

18 ‘The bey almost exclusively reserved the stewardships of religious schools, holy sites, and the amānas of guilds for the bulūk bāshīs, as if there could be no amīns in the land except them’ (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: III, 57). Note the play on the two meanings of the word ‘amīn’ (‘steward’ and ‘honest’).

19 Thus, in the first half of the seventeenth century, a French source described the zuwāwa in Tunis as the dey’s own military force (Abun-Nasr 1975: 73, 77). At the same period, the zuwāwa cavalrmymen in provincial districts were under the command of Ḥammūda Bey the Muradite (Ibn Abī Dīnār 1967: 236).


21 See a letter of application by the named Maḥmūd asking to be admitted into the subāyihi corps as a successor to his father (Archives Générales Tunisiennes, Série Histoire, Carton 169, Dossier 895, document 102).

6 CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

1 Ḥammūda ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (a kātib), Ṣāliḥ Būghdār (an officer of the Arab subāyiḥis) and Qāsim al-Bawwāb (head doorkeeper), were granted this iltizām in Ḥammūda Pasha’s time (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 90, 145).

2 An eighteenth-century source also reports that, in the time of Muḥammad Bey (1756–9), the bāsh kātib Ahmad al-‘Aṣram was sent forward, at the head of a detachment from the mahalla, ‘vested with full powers’, to collect taxes in al-Jarīd (Ibn Yūsuf 1978: 404).

3 The term ‘waṭan’ could also be used to refer to some of these provincial divisions, as in the designations: Waṭan al-Qiblī (the Cap Bon), Waṭan al-Riyāḥ (a tribe whose territory extended south of Ḥammāmāt), or Waṭan al-A’rād (in the south-east of the Regency). As for the word ‘ṣanjaq’, of Ottoman origin, its seems to have fallen into obsolescence after the seventeenth century, becoming restricted to documents of an administrative nature.

4 Ibn Abīl-Diyāf adds, by way of comment: ‘Thus, they would have witnessed the complaints of the rāyiyya from the āmīls, and Hammūda’s harshness in dealing with the latter’ (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: 83–4).

5 In 1735, a visitor to the Regency reports that peasants were forced to work on the land of the qādī of Hammāmāt (Grenville 1835: II, 274).

6 Ibn Abīl-Diyāf thus writes of Ibn ‘Ayyād, the governor of al-A’rād: ‘Drums were beaten in his presence and flags fluttered above his head’ (Ibn Abīl-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 103).
7 One of the *khaznadārs* of Murād Bey III (1698–1702) was Abū’l Qāsim Ṭāhāf, i.e. the Hanefite (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: II, 80). Another Hanefite *khaznadār* was Ḥasan Khaznadār, who was appointed to that office for a brief period in 1815, before acceding to the deylicicate (Brown 1974: 103). His successor was the the Malekite al-‘Arbī Zarrūq.

8 The execution of Shākīr Şahīb al-Ţābi on the order of Muṣṭāfa Bey in 1837, on the other hand, was a clear violation of the immunity granted to *mamlūks* in the Regency, and illustrates the erosion of the authority of the Porte in the province at that period.

### 7 THE REVENUES OF THE BEYLICAL TREASURY

1 Gibb and Bowen’s somewhat intricately detailed description of the offices and services of the *bāsh defeterdār’s* department, nonetheless, remains to date the most complete one of that section of the central Ottoman government (Gibb and Bowen 1950: I, 127–37).

2 This particular group of revenues, in Ottoman usage, were known as the ‘*bayt al-māl*’, whereas this expression, in Arab Islamic governments, applied to the state treasury as a whole. It is therefore necessary, when encountering this expression in Tunisian sources of the Ottoman period, to check which of the two meanings applies to it.

3 In the time of Hāmmūda Pasha, Muṣṭāfa al-Balhāwān was, for a time, ṣāḥba of the *bayt al-māl*. This official ‘could, sometimes, be promoted to the deylical dignity’ (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: VIII, 80). It should be noted in this regard that, in Cairo, the central treasury of the Egyptian province was guarded by a unit composed of fighters from the *müṣṭahfīzān* and the ‘azab regiments (Shaw 1962: 349).

4 In the time of Hāmmūda Pasha, the inner treasury was under the custody of Rashīd Khūja, a Georgian *mamlūk* (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: VII, 130).

5 On this issue, Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf states: ‘This designation (*hādiyya*, i.e. offering, present), was preferred to the term “*adā*” (tribute), which would have evoked in the minds of the local population the *jitāya* (tax paid by the non-Muslims)” (quoted by al-Imām 1980: 355).

6 Speaking of the ‘*usbr* on olive oil imposed under Ḥāmmūda Pasha’s successors, Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf states that a higher proportion of olive oil than the legal tenth was sometimes taken from the producers by the tax-collectors, but describes it as being the result of the latter’s dishonest practices (Ibn Abī’l-Diyāf 1963–6: IV, 45).

7 The detail that only import dues were leased as an *iltizām*, whereas export duties were directly collected by the state is given by a nineteenth-century source (Pellissier 1980: 324).

8 Note that Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (1970: 366) has confused the *sūrsat* with the *istiḥbrā*. This confusion has led M.-H. Chérif to think that there were two kinds of *istiḥbrā*: the first, whereby fairly reasonable prices were granted to peasants for the wheat bought from them by Ḥusayn ibn ʻAlī, the second, of an extortionate nature, practised by ʿAlī Pasha (Chérif 1986: I, 337).
CONCLUSION

1 It is interesting to note that P. M. Holt, in his review of the political history of the Egyptian province, from an internal perspective, has also divided this history into four stages, i.e.: the phase of acquisition (1517–25); the phase of quiescence (1525–86); the phase of internal conflict (1586–1711); and the emergence of locally-based rule (Holt 1968: 79–90).

2 We should not omit, in this context, to mention the intervention of a third party from the central government, i.e. the harem, which led to the transferring of the island of Jirba from Tripoli to the Tunisian Regency, since the Tunisians had to pay, from then, a tribute to Istanbul, called ‘qaṭṭ al-wālida’ (tribute to the sultan’s mother).

3 The attempt to fuse the titles of dey and bey, during the period of rule of Ibrāhīm al-Shārīf was given up after a very short time.

4 This led to a striking situation, whereby, in the Regency, as in the heart of the Empire, being Turkish was a handicap. Thus, the Hanefite janissaries, forming the settler class originating from the heart of the Empire, were not allowed the clear economic and political preponderance enjoyed by migrants from the metropole, when North Africa ultimately fell under French rule.

APPENDIX B

1 I would suggest that the name ‘Siliāna’ drew its origin from the Turkish ‘salyāne’, meaning: ‘yearly revenue’.

2 In the text of the contract reproduced by Hénia, it is stated that Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Wusūwī, having paid the sum of 56 piasters for the transfer of a jidār from Muhammad ibn al-Ḥādī al-Wusūwī to himself, also pledges to pay annually (a given sum) representing taxes and dues imposed on that land (‘mabḍar wa tadḥākir wa lawwāzinuhā’). In the contract reproduced by Inalcık, the peasant whose çiftlik was transferred to another man, declares that: ‘[I, named So-and-So] gave the possession of the çiftlik ... to ‘Alī ... on condition that he shall cultivate it and collect its produce and pay the tithes and dues each year, and received from him the tapu fee in cash.’

3 See p. 91.
ARCHIVAL SOURCES AND MANUSCRIPTS

Archives Générales Tunisiennes, Série Histoire, Carton 169, Dossier 895 and 895 bis; Carton 220, Dossier 340, documents 13 and 39; Carton 220, Dossier 343, document 3; Carton 220, Dossier 346, documents 3 and 3 bis.

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