Moderniser of Russia

Andrei Vinius, 1641–1716

Kees Boterbloem

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Also by Kees Boterbloem

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DE LOTGEVALLEN VAN JAN STRUYS IN RUSLAND EN IRAN

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Andrei Vinius, 1641–1716

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Note on Transliteration

As a rule the modern versions of names and words have been used when transcribing them from the Russian language (that is, their twenty-first century Russian version has been followed), while the transcription used is otherwise a version of the Library of Congress system. The main exception is that of the letter "ë" (often rendered simply as "e" in English), which has been transcribed as "yo." Thus, Fyodor instead of Fedor, Semyon instead of Semen. In addition, I have followed long-standing tradition for names commonly seen in their anglicized versions, thus Tsar Peter I instead of Tsar Pyotr I.

Introduction

First of all, this book presents Andrei Andreevich Vinius's marked significance as a historical actor (as is widely recognized by Russian and Dutch historians) before an English-language audience that is rather less familiar with him. His life's story is one that provides valuable insights into Russian cultural history, which was already in 1913 perceived by I.P. Kozlovskii, who subtitled his work on Russia's first postmasters (among whom Vinius is given pride of place) as an "[attempt] at an investigation of several questions regarding the history of Russian culture during the second half of the 17th century."[1]

Secondly, Vinius's life and work attest to the considerable role played by career bureaucrats in Moscow's central government agencies in ushering Muscovy to a seat at the table of Europe's Great Powers.[2] Until now, the individual clerks involved in this process of Europeanization have not been systematically investigated by Western scholars. Although it is not my intention to overly focus on what is a long-standing historiographical debate in the following pages, exploring the activities of one of their most outstanding representatives, Andrei Vinius, does indicate greater continuity than was traditionally thought to exist between the pre-Petrine (1645–89) and Petrine (1689–1725) eras of Russian history. Vinius and some of his colleagues link Aleksei (1645–76)'s, Fyodor III (1676–82)'s, and Sofia (regent 1682–89)'s reigns to Peter's radical efforts at Westernizing, or modernizing, Russia.[3] This essay therefore joins the current scholarly consensus that, despite the undoubtedly radical nature of Peter the Great's policies after 1694, the tsar did not break wholly new ground.[4] Perhaps Daniel Waugh sums it up best when he writes that "[t]he reign of Aleksei Mikhailovich in some ways marks a turning point

in Russian cultural development, not only because of the church schism [of 1666–67] but also because of the fascination of the Tsar and his advisors with things western ...."[5] To which Paul Bushkovitch adds that the period between 1650 and 1680 was "a period of rapid change," that could "profound[ly]" transform people such as one of Vinius's early supervisors, Luk'ian Timofeevich Golosov (d.1683), who evolved from a hidebound xenophobe into an accomplished Latin poet.[6] Vinius's clout confirms that the tsarist servitors of the *Posol'skii prikaz*, the foreign chancellery of the Muscovite government, played a particularly crucial role in nurturing the saplings of Westernization in Muscovy during the last third of the seventeenth century.[7] My treatise therefore dedicates considerable space to this transition period, virtually coterminous with Vinius's first quarter century in government service (1664–89). During this time, he was employed in the *Posol'skii prikaz* (mainly as interpreter, translator, clerk, surveyor, and envoy), in the closely related *Aptekarskii prikaz* (the "Pharmacy Office"), as well as working as Russia's postmaster, formally a venal office.

Thirdly, this study suggests how some phenomena that we associate with mature capitalist economies and their impact on the "developing world" originate rather earlier than the Industrial Revolution: Vinius's father and he himself were key conduits in transferring technology and expertise to an economically underdeveloped part of their world. As scholars recently remarked about technology transfer in the Early Modern Age, "intermediaries were crucial not only because they transmitted techniques, but also because they interpreted and transformed these techniques according to local needs and constraints."[8] The Viniuses were such intermediaries par excellence, and the fruits of their labor enabled Aleksei, Peter, and Russia to withstand, and eventually get the better of, long-standing foes such as Sweden, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire.

While contributing to Russia's technological modernization through his development of mining and the manufacturing of arms, Andrei Andreevich Vinius was, fourthly, a crucial figure in less evident respects in modernizing Russia. He stood at the cradle of Russia's educational transformation and oversaw the introduction of scientific methods and concepts in metallurgy and medicine. Vinius proposed plans to regulate society in a more orderly manner through the foundation of hospitals and homes for the indigent as well as

prison-labor schemes. He ran for more than a quarter century a postal system that maintained regular contact between Russia and Europe, thereby positioning Russia as a constituent part of Europe for the first time since the High Middle Ages. He also provided the tsar and his closest collaborators with an uninterrupted and regular stream of information about developments in Europe through his synopses of the news published in European newspapers and other printed matter.

Observing closely the prosperity and disproportional power of the world's "first modern country," the Dutch Republic, Andrei Vinius gauged how a steady stream of data about the most varied developments made it thrive. He realized how important this enhanced flow of information could be for Russia.[9] He understood the general significance of the modernizing leap made by the country of his ancestors. And he occupied a sufficiently high position within the government to outline its importance to Aleksei Mikhailovich, Fyodor Alekseevich, Sofia Alekseevna, and Peter the Great, the four Russian rulers whom he served between 1664 and 1716. Through the information that reached each of them from servants such as Vinius, the tsars eventually came to recognize that Russia needed to meet the Western challenge in determined fashion, a process that was in full force by the end of Vinius's life. As a result, in 1716 a government and an elite led Russia in a manner wholly comprehensible to the rest of Europe (rather than the country being seen as an exotic oriental despotism, as it had been), with an economy that was in many respects as developed as that of her neighbors directly to her west, and exhibiting an interest in science and education that guaranteed her place among the leading European states for a while to come.

Finally, Vinius's role in Siberia concomitantly helped Russia to exchange her previous guise as colony for that of colonizer in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, firming up the largest global empire (in terms of the landmass that fell under tsarist rule). The Russian central leadership extended its control over this imperialist expansion, and met the Western challenge that confronted it during the seventeenth century (or between 1613 and 1725) as successfully as Japan was to do in the nineteenth century. Japan's or China's seventeenth-century response to the Westerners by closing the country off was not an option for Russia, for she was located too closely to the burgeoning global capitalist core that began to forge ahead in an

arms race that has never ceased since. As in the case of nineteenth-century Japan, twentieth-century Soviet Russia, or post-Soviet Russia in recent years, this defiance of the West could not be accomplished without the aid of foreigners, specialists who taught the Russians how to beat the Westerners at their own game. Vinius was among the first of a long line of expatriates and immigrants who aided Russia in reinventing herself to help her survive in an ever faster changing world.

Obviously, Vinius's path from interpreter to member of the tsar's advisory council was unusually successful for a late-Muscovite bureaucrat, albeit not uniquely so.[10] His particular mindset and significance, however, make him especially a fascinating subject. Maureen Perrie reminds us that "given the virtual absence of sources such as private letters, diaries, or memoirs" in Muscovite history, no historian will ever be able to claim to have written a fully comprehensive biography of one of its actors, even of a man such as Vinius.[11] But she nonetheless adds that "the genre of historical biography is a literary device, which, by following the life and career of an individual actor, provides a useful narrative path through the often complex and confusing events of 16th- and 17th-century Russia."[12]

* * *

Since the days of his famous contemporary polymath G.W.F. Leibniz (1646–1716), scholars have been interested in Andrei Vinius's activities, but no English biography has ever been written of this compelling historical figure.[13] Almost exactly one hundred years ago, his first book-length biography appeared in Russian.[14] In the last decade, three other lengthy works about him have appeared in Russian and one in Dutch.[15] Paraphrasing his first biographer's words, then, Vinius has not received proper recognition in the English historiography about Russia.[16]

The reader of English has never been treated to a biography of Vinius for a number of reasons. Firstly, biographies of pre-Petrine historical figures are almost exclusively those of Muscovite rulers.[17] This itself may be traced to two causes. On the one hand, adequate and sufficient sources exist for only a few Russians who did not belong to the court (such as the merchant Vasilii Shorin or the archpriest Avvakum).[18] Exceptionally high levels of illiteracy among

the Muscovites play their part in this, as do successive waves of documents' destruction through the ever-present scourge of fire in a country where almost everything was built out of wood before 1700.[19] Sources that have survived are (primarily monastic) chronicles, in which few events, and especially few people, are depicted in any life-like manner; hagiographies that often consist of series of tropes with little if any verifiable fact in them; or government documents which dryly record the business of the growing tsarist empire's administration.[20] These have all been fruitfully mined by English-language historians in writing the history of Muscovy, albeit much less to depict the lives of individual Muscovites.[21] Judicial records have been among the most useful sources for Russian cultural history, as the work by Daniel Kaiser suggests, as are certain church records, as Gary Marker's work on literacy indicates.[22]

While it is difficult to paint a three-dimensional portrait of a government official merely from the documents he generated for his work, the tsars' practice to rotate personnel additionally impedes presenting a well-rounded portrayal of individual tsarist servitors. Actors in Russian history before 1700 haphazardly appear and disappear from the central government's records. Through investigating the documents that bear someone's imprint (which in itself is hard to identify), we normally catch no more than a mere glimpse of him (women were not employed in the Muscovite bureaucracy), a snapshot of a period of his life working in a particular government office. Furthermore, the surviving reams of paper produced by Muscovite clerks are chaotically deposed in archives and, despite the fires, vast: A painstaking search for, and a meticulous study of, those created by any single bureaucrat might take a group of scholars a decade. And even then, such a sisyphean labor would mainly yield an overview of the clerk's job, and little about the rest of his life. With the exception of most tsars and a few ranking boyars or clergymen, it is therefore very tricky to develop a coherent narrative about even those at the very center of power before Peter the Great's reign (1682–1725).[23] Luckily for the purposes of this monograph, Vinius was never merely a bureaucrat, and his private affairs can be traced, complementing the evidence of government records.

On the other hand, the unwieldy nature of the evidence does not fully explain the absence of English-language biographies about those outside the tsarist court (and there are precious few biographies about

Muscovite courtiers). Thus, Russian historians have written about fascinating historical characters such as the former slave and rebel Ivan Bolotnikov (d. 1608), the upstart boyar (peer) Afanasii Lavrent'evich Ordin-Nashchokin (1604 or 1605–1680), or the *d'iak* (clerk; chancellor) Ivan Timofeev (d. 1629; women, again, have clearly received less scholarly attention).[24] In the historiography of the pre-industrialized age in other parts of the world, scholarly biographies of those outside the various royal houses have been common; some of the most fascinating recent works of history are biographies such as Carlo Ginzburg's *The Cheese and the Worms*.[25] But Western historians of early Russia appear to limit themselves to recounting the lives of her monarchs, thereby oddly reflecting her long history of autocratic rule.

* * *

Andrei Andreevich Vinius, then, is one Muscovite figure for whom the sources are sufficiently accessible and plentiful to render an account of his life in plausible fashion. But the existence of ample source material is hardly a convincing motive to write a book. My quest to write this biography was triggered by its subject's life's fascinating trajectory. During the half century that was the watershed in which Muscovy metamorphosed into Russia, Vinius's versatility, occasional pivotal role, and omnipresence inside and outside of the offices of Russia's central government are astounding. Vinius was a jack of all trades, a translator-clerk-diplomat-prospector-businessman-governor-postmaster-industrialist-bibliophile-courtier-teacher-traitor-spy. On top of this, he bridged the gap between cultures that were vastly different, one of which clearly pollinated the other thanks in some measure to his activities.

Although there is more to him than his significance for Russia's transformation, he indeed stands out in particular for his considerable part in transforming remote and obscure Muscovy into a much more European and far more familiar Russia. That Russia had changed so profoundly was plainly apparent to those who remembered the 1640s (when Vinius was born) in the middle of the 1710s (when Vinius died). Vinius was one of the key conduits who helped to make a(n early) modern state out of an obscure and struggling country in Europe's remote borderlands.

Using a term that was popular in the Russian Federation in the 1990s and 2000s, Vinius was a "New Russian" *avant-la-lettre*. In his attitude, he resembled a modern man who lives by the self-help philosophy as propagated by Samuel Smiles (1812–1904) in the nineteenth century or Dale Carnegie (1888–1955) in the twentieth, following the adage that God helps the man who helps himself.[26] Indeed, his distant cousin Nicolaas Cornelisz. Witsen (1641–1717) was to express this very thought at the end of his notes regarding a trip to Muscovy, during which he had met Andrei Vinius for the first time. Witsen's Latin motto applies as much to Vinius's life as to that of the Amsterdam mayor and gentleman-scholar himself: *Dii omnia laboribus vendunt*, or "the gods sell everything in exchange for one's work."[27] In this sense, Witsen, Vinius or indeed Jan Struys, men cut from the same cloth, appear all at the same time Dutch seventeenth-century clichés, modern *homines economici*, or emblematic exponents of the world's "First Modern Economy."[28]

Their behavior has sometimes been linked to the Calvinist collective mindset (even if the attitude may predate the arrival of Protestantism in the Low Countries) prevalent in the northern Netherlands (and elsewhere).[29] According to this thesis, the pursuit of worldly success is incumbent upon the Calvinist, because it may present a hint that one is predestined for an afterlife in heaven. The link between Protestantism and capitalism has been challenged ever since the German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) suggested it, and perhaps can no longer be upheld, but it may at least be said that the seventeenth-century Dutch behaved far less passively and fatalistically than another historiographical generalization about pre-modern human beings suggests.

A different angle (and stereotype) may nevertheless be more enlightening in explaining the fascinating path Vinius traversed in the course of his life. He resembles in a compelling manner (the *ideal-typus* of) many modern-day immigrant children. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, in many of the Anglo-Saxon immigration countries (and probably in others), immigrant children are often said to excel in their careers, becoming overachievers who far surpass the station in life associated with the often basic, back-breaking menial jobs that was their parents' lot on arrival in their adopted country.

Vinius's father A.D. Vinius was far from a poor immigrant, but he was an indefatigable (overcompensating) worker who remained an outsider. A.D. Vinius's fate was wholly dependent on the tsar's

whim. In 1648, he became a Russian in an unusually modern way when he formally asked the tsar to accept him as a subject, as if he was requesting permanent-resident status. Seven years later, circumstances made it seem imperative for him to adopt Orthodoxy as well. Only in his fifties, A.D. Vinius died soon after his conversion, leaving his widow and children (Andrei being in his mid-teens at the time) without much of an inheritance, an uncertain future awaiting them. As an adult, Andrei Andreevich Vinius exhibited all the signs of the immigrant-overachiever, spurred on by a profound ambition both to become more fully accepted as a Russian and to do better than his father in material terms. Despite some startling ups and downs, he succeeded in this quest for social recognition and economic security, albeit not without experiencing ups and downs, partially because he was an upstart and lacked an old boys' network.

His escape to the land of his ancestors at the time of his greatest personal nadir (when he was already 65 years old!) fits a reading of Vinius as an early example of another type of the modern second-generation immigrant. Faced with bouts of obsession with the land his parents left and plagued by pangs to return there, he actually went back to seek his luck there. In this sense, then, Vinius's story is that of the modern immigrant man in an unexpected setting, that of pre-Petrine Russia.

Vinius's liminal identity between Russianness and Dutchness allows us to ponder concretely the meaning of cultural exchange or cultural encounters, to fathom them at the individual, or human, level. Historians' use of these concepts, which are often associated with the equally vague term "globalization," is increasingly frequent, but their meaning remains sometimes lofty and abstract. Andrei Vinius's life, however, strikingly illustrates such cultural cross-fertilization in a concrete manner. Through studying him, one encounters the diffusion of Early Modern capitalism, the Military Revolution, and of the Scientific Revolution beyond Europe's inner core, as well as providing insights into the "Revolution of Peter the Great" and the "Modernization of Muscovy," topics that have long preoccupied historians.

Whereas Vinius cannot be called Dutch, the impact of the land of his ancestors and relatives on him is palpable in all of this. His words and deeds reflect the United Provinces' contemporary power and influence in the world, the product of his Dutch parents' influence

and the Dutch-style humanist education they gave him. Lastly, he was a sort of modern imperialist administrator, subjugating Siberia not just by enforcing Moscow's rule using tried-and-true strategies, but by developing her mines and industry and by mapping her, filling in one of the largest remaining blank spots on the globe at the time of his birth. In this he was not unlike his cousin Witsen, who served as one of the Dutch East India Company's directors when Vinius ran Siberia.

* * *

The absence of an original biography in English might of course be overcome by a translation of the best foreign version. Andrei Vinius jr has been drawn into the historiographical limelight in recent times in Russia and the Netherlands; after a long spell of comparative silence about him stretching across much of the Soviet period, much has been published about him to complement the pre-1917 work. But all biographies (all but one written in Russian) remain unsatisfactory, and difficult to understand for a reader who is not a scholar of late Muscovy-early Imperial Russia (i.e., Russia during the years 1613–1725). I.P. Kozlovskii's older work primarily attended to Vinius's role as postmaster.[30] Besides that, Kozlovskii's writings concentrated on his work at the side of Peter, and said little about Vinius's earlier career, except for some brief remarks about Vinius's diplomatic journey to Western Europe during the 1670s. Both of Igor' Iurkin's treatises are written from an overly optimistic assumption regarding even his Russian readers' familiarity with the historical context.[31] His 2007 biography is by far the most comprehensive text on Vinius's life, but its poor presentation and haphazard organization make it a difficult read, flaws that also plague his second book on Vinius. Iurkin is frequently highly critical of the candidate's dissertation by S.G. Miliukov, which is said to engage in unwarranted speculation and often omitting sources for its arguments; whether or not this criticism is justified remains difficult to assess as long as Miliukov's thesis is not published.[32] Savel'eva's biographical notes limit themselves almost exclusively to Vinius's book collection in a purely technical manner.[33] In terms of appreciating the first Russian libraries in general and that of Vinius in particular, I have nonetheless very much profited from various other articles by Savel'eva, as I have from the

other works.[34] Finally, the Dutch-language (published) dissertation by Wladimiroff concentrates more than anything else on Vinius's link to Witsen and on cartography, and contains too many overly speculative and erroneous assumptions.[35] Just before this book went to press, Robert Collis's article was published, constituting the first English-language article wholly dedicated to Vinius, which had added some valuable insights to my discussion of Vinius's worldview.[36]

A great variety of shorter publications (journal articles, encyclopedia entries) on Vinius have appeared as well since the early 1990s, and Bogoslovskii's and Kazakova's Soviet-period works highlight certain key moments of Vinius's career.[37] Daniel Waugh was probably the first Western scholar who explored elements of Vinius's key role in the Russian metamorphosis, but his efforts have virtually remained singular.[38] In a marvellous way, Ingrid Maier has established through a variety of works the context of the translation work conducted in the *Posol'skii Prikaz* in which Vinius was involved, and her efforts have recently been admirably complemented by Stepan Shamin.[39] Finally, Natal'ia Demidova's astounding listing of all the data about seventeenth-century Muscovite bureaucrats that she could gather has allowed for a very helpful clarification of certain key details.[40] Whereas these are by no means the only authors who have written about Vinius at some length, they are the most significant ones.

No one then, in my view, has attempted to present a comprehensive and accessible account of Vinius's eventful life and its significance in any language. Nevertheless, all of these authors (as well as others who do not write directly about Vinius or merely touch upon his activities) have contributed important points that inform the following pages and have allowed me to develop a roadmap to write this book without being overwhelmed by the vast amount of documents associated with Andrei Vinius.

* * *

The sources to reconstruct Vinius's life and work are comparatively plentiful and accessible. In the first place, historians use the records of the *prikazy* where he was a leading figure for a long period. These were the *Posol'skii prikaz* and *Aptekarskii prikaz*, as well as the *Sibirskii prikaz*. Material can be found about the various capacities in which Vinius worked for the government toward the end of his life, and,

for the decade when he was in the tsar's confidence (1693–1703), his correspondence with Peter the Great is an additional asset.[41] Further evidence derives from the extensive contacts Vinius maintained with Western Europe, especially with Witsen, whom he met in Moscow in 1665 (and under whose protection he lived during his exile in Amsterdam in the 1700s).[42] As an interpreter and leading official of the foreign office, we also encounter Vinius in Western-European ambassadorial accounts.[43]

I.P. Kozlovskii wrote in 1911 that "we can safely state that the materials [necessary] for the biography of Vinius have already appeared in print in such quantity that further archival investigations can only yield minor additional details about his biography."[44] Although one is perhaps confounded by this pre-revolutionary historian's premature confidence, today one is once more inclined to make the same bold assertion in reviewing the evidence about Vinius that is readily available (and fears that a hundred years from now historians will condemn one's presumption again). The printed sources about Vinius are so rich that a full-bodied portrayal can be rendered without a painstaking and time-consuming investigation in the collections of the Russian State Archive for Ancient Acts in Moscow (where most of the archival evidence about him is located).[45] For, since Kozlovskii's writing, various Russian researchers have added some telling detail regarding Vinius.

In terms of the great variety of (primarily printed) sources about Vinius, several items stand out. His correspondence (not in the least that with Peter the Great) offers one key avenue into his mind.[46] Several lengthy petitions (or quasi-petitions) contain autobiographical accounts of his life. He wrote poems for the tsar and translated fables. In one report presented to Aleksei, he analyzed the governments of England, France, and Spain. There are maps extant on which he wrote and newspaper translations that can be traced to him. Western diplomats reported their impressions of him. Finally, we have another remarkable (albeit complicated) source that allows us to ponder Vinius's world: Russian researchers have identified and described in great detail 313 of the more than six hundred books he owned in the early eighteenth century.[47] The very fact of his collecting as a Russian lay commoner stands out as a pioneering feat; after his death his books became part of the very first scholarly and scientific library in Russia, that of the Academy of Sciences in St.

Petersburg.[48] The texts he owned are extremely varied, and attest to Vinius's erudition, exceptional for a layman in the Russia of the first Romanovs. These texts offers some telling clues about Vinius's professional and private activities and his kaleidoscopic interests. In addition, he owned a great number of drawings and prints by Dutch masters, and thus was one of the first private Russian art collectors as well.[49] This collection of books and pictures will be the topic of a special chapter, but evidence gleaned from these sources will be used throughout the following pages.

A similarly rich and varied source base can seldom be found for other leading contemporary figures (except the tsars themselves), boyar, *d'iak* or otherwise, especially for those who played an evidently leading role in nurturing the reforming spirit of the last decade of Tsar Aleksei's reign and passing it on to his youngest son Peter.[50] The great amount of sources that are extant for Vinius's life, however, might lead one to exaggerate his importance. As evident from his relatively tardy elevation to *dumnyi d'iak* in the 1690s (when he was already in his fifties), his significance should not be compared to that of A.L. Ordin-Nashchokin, A.S. Matveev (1625–82) or V.V. Golitsyn (1643–1714).[51] But Vinius did move in Russia 's highest circles for half a century, rather than the decade or less each of them was the ruler's favorite. Indubitably, a study of his life yields valuable and unique insights into the contemporary mindset of the more imaginative scions of Russia's elite and the time and place in which he lived in general.

Compared to the information about Vinius's professional career, details about his personal life are far less comprehensive, even if Igor' Iurkin has made a brave attempt to unearth as much as possible.[52] This is a significant lacuna, but this was a man who lived to work rather than worked to live; Vinius spent months and sometimes years away from his family, even if he was a loyal father and, perhaps, a dutiful husband. Still, parts of his youth can be sketched with some conviction, for his father's actions as a leading merchant and entrepreneur in Russia are well documented and have been charted since the days of the great historian S.M. Solov'ev (1820–79).[53]

Nonetheless, the lack of a continuous set of biographical data that link his birth in 1641 seamlessly with his death in 1716 has led me to divide the chapters of this book into chronologically delineated thematic chapters, rather than a straightforward narrative that follows

the progress of time. To a degree themes and chronology align, for it seems logical to link his early years to background and *bildung*, for example. Three chapters are strictly thematically organized, about modernization, about his book collection, and about his religious views. The second and third chapters, on Vinius's twenties and thirties, have a particular focus on his activities as foreign-intelligence analyst, translator, postmaster, and traveling diplomat. His work as chief of the Apothecary Office coincided with his middle age, when (with some luck) he evaded falling victim to court intrigues that were a hallmark of the unsettled spell between Aleksei's and Peter's rule. His later middle age was a period during which he rose at Peter's side to a far more powerful position than ever before. In the mid-1690s, he also became the ruler of the world's largest colony of the time, Siberia. This role deserves treatment in a separate chapter, for the creation of Russia's Early Modern colonial empire bears far more investigation than it has received in the historiography. Vinius then quickly fell from grace, and was given far less prestigious tasks after 1703, to which I dedicate the penultimate chapter. In his final years, he was reduced to a sort of *éminence grise* of Peter's bureaucracy (which was fortunate again, given Vinius's odd defection to Holland in 1706). He was in his very last years also beset by personal tragedy, almost Job-like in his misfortune. Vinius's fall bespeaks not merely Peter's restless search for inspirational people, among whom Vinius could no longer be counted after 1700. For the twilight years of Vinius signify how Russia had changed during his lifetime, in no small measure thanks to Vinius, even if it had left him behind.

Notes

1. I.P. Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty i pervye pochmeistery v' Moskovskom' gosudarstve: Opyt' isledovaniia nekotorykh' voprosov' iz' istorii russkoi kul'tury vo 2-i polovine xvii veka*, vol. 1, Warsaw: Tipografiia Varshavskago uchebnago okruga, 1913.
2. On the bureaucracy and "bureaucratisation," see for example D.K. Rowney and W.M. Pintner, "Officialdom and Bureaucratization: An Introduction," in W.M. Pintner and D.K. Rowney, eds, *Russian Officialdom*, Chapel Hill, NC: U. of North Carolina P., 3–18: 9, 12–14; and Borivoj Plavsic, "Seventeenth-Century Chanceries," in ibid., 19–45: 20.
3. The terms "Westernizing" and "modernizing" will be further defined in the first chapter; I explicitly do not intend to use them "as a measure of

normative development" (see Simon Dixon, *The Modernisation of Russia, 1676–1825*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999, 7).

4. Perhaps the most persuasive recent case has been made by Paul Bushkovitch's biography of Peter, but the extent of pre-Petrine modernisation is equally evident from several recent essay collections (see P. Bushkovitch, *Peter the Great*, New York: Cambridge UP, 2001; J. Kotilaine and M. Poe, eds, *Modernizing Muscovy*, London: Routledge, 2004; M. Poe and E. Lohr, eds, *The Military and Society in Russia: 1450–1917*, Leiden: Brill, 2002. See also E.A. Zitser, *The Transfigured Kingdom: Sacred Parody and Charismatic Authority at the Court of Peter the Great*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2004, 4–5, 12; and M.P. Romaniello, *The Elusive Empire: Kazan and the Creation of Russia, 1552–1671*, Madison, WI: U. of Wisconsin P., 2012, 208.
5. Daniel Clarke Waugh, "The Publication of Muscovite *Kuranty*," *Kritika: A Review of Current Soviet Books on Russian History* 3, 1973, 104–20: 110; see as well Paul Bushkovitch, "Cultural Change among the Russian Boyars 1650–1680: New Sources and Old Problems," in H.J. Torke, ed., *Von Moskau nach St. Petersburg: Das Russische Reich im 17. Jahrhundert*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000, 91–111: 91.
6. Bushkovitch, "Cultural Change," 96.
7. See Peter B. Brown, "Early Modern Russian Bureaucracy: The Evolution of the Chancellery System From Ivan III to Peter the Great, 1478–1717," unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1978, 481; N.M. Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz: Kolybel' Rossiiskoi diplomatii*, Moskva: Mezhdunarodnaia otnosheniia, 2003, 81, 162–4. Rogozhin shows how the intensification of contacts with Europe is evident from the growing quantity of files on the region generated by the Foreign Office (Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 162–3). See as well the essays on various chiefs of this *prikaz* in E.V. Chistiakova, ed., *"Oko vsei velikoi Rossii." Ob istorii russkoi diplomaticheskoi sluzhby v xvi–xvii vekakh*, Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaia otnosheniia, 1989.
8. Liliane Hilaire-Pérez and Catherine Verna, "Dissemination of Technical Knowledge in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Era: New Approaches and Technological Issues," *Technology and Culture* 3, 2006, 536–65: 546.
9. See especially S. Schama, *The Embarrassment of Riches*, Berkeley, CA: U. of California P., 1988; and J. de Vries and A.M. van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.
10. Brown, "Early Modern," 84. See also M. Poe, "The Central Government and Its Institutions," in *The Cambridge History of Russia*, ed. M. Perrie, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006, 435–63.
11. Maureen Perrie, review of V.N. Kozliakov, *Mikhail Fyodorovich*, V.N. Kozliakov, *Marina Mnishek*, and V.N. Kozliakov, *Vasilii Shuiskii*, *Kritika* 2, 2010, 411–22: 421.
12. Ibid.
13. See P. Pekarskii, *Nauka i literatura v Rossii pri Petre Velikom*, vol. 1, Sankt-Peterburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1862, 29.

14. See I.P. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius', sotrudnik Petra Velikago (1641–1717g.)*, Sankt-Peterburg': Stoikova, 1911.
15. I.N. Iurkin, *Andrei Andreevich Vinius, 1641–1716*, Moskva: Nauka, 2007; I.N. Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada Moskvy. A.A. Vinius v Moskve i Podmoskov'e*, Moscow: Moskva iazik, 2009; S.G. Miliukov, "Dumnyi d'iak Andrei Andreevich Vinius: Gosudarstvennyi deiatel' Rossii vtoroi poloviny xvii–nachala xviii vv.," *Kandidat* diss., Moscow State University, 2000; I. Wladimiroff, *De kaart van een verzwegen vriendschap: Nicolaes Witsen en Andrej Winius en de Nederlandse cartografie van Rusland*, Groningen: INOS/NRCe, 2008.
16. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 1.
17. Some of the best scholars in the field of medieval and Early Modern Russia have tried to make up for this lacuna by presenting an intriguing series of essays about fictional characters based on the historical evidence available: Donald Ostrowski and Marshall Poe, eds, *Portraits of Old Russia: Imagines Lives of Ordinary People, 1300–1745*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2011. One of the better insights into the mindset of the Russian elite at the time of Peter's reign can be gleaned from M. Okenfuss, ed. and trans., *The Travel Diary of Peter Tolstoi: A Muscovite in Early Modern Europe*, DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois UP, 1987.
18. See Samuel H. Baron, "Vasily Shorin: Seventeenth-Century Russian Merchant Extraordinary," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 4, 1972, 503–48; *Archpriest Avvakum: The Life of Archpriest Avvakum Written By Himself*, ed. and trans. K.N. Brostrom, Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1979.
19. N.V. Rybalko, *Rossiiskaia prikaznaia biurokratiia v Smutnoe vremia nachala XVII v.*, Moscow: Kvadriga-MBA, 2011, 18.
20. Note for example how Dukmeyer concurred in 1910 with a fellow historian's remark about the massive amounts of Muscovite government records that had survived in the archives: They were written in a uniformly formal tone without any individual coloring (see F. Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium itineris in Moscoviam und Quellen, die es ergänzen*, vol. 2, Vaduz: Kraus reprint, 1965 [Berlin, 1910], 57).
21. See for example P. Bushkovitch, *Religion and Society in Russia*, New York: Oxford UP, 1992; P. Bushkovitch, *The Merchants of Moscow*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980; Brian L. Davies, *State Power and Community in Early Modern Russia*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994; M. Poe, "The Military Revolution, Administrative Development, and Cultural Change in Early Modern Russia," *Journal of Early Modern History* 2, 1998, 247–73; Jarmo Kotilaine, *Russia's Foreign Trade and Economic Expansion in the Seventeenth Century*, Leiden: Brill, 2005; Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change*, Chicago: U. of Chicago P., 1971; R. Hellie, *Slavery In Russia, 1450–1725*, Chicago: U. of Chicago P., 1982; N. Shields-Kollmann, *By Honor Bound*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1999; V. Kivelson, *Cartographies of Tsardom*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2006; M. Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 2002; J. Cracraft, *The Revolution*

of Peter the Great, Boston, MA: Harvard UP, 2006; Brian Boeck, *Imperial Boundaries*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009; Chester E. Dunning, *Russia's First Civil War*, Philadelphia, PA: Penn State UP, 2001; Peter B. Brown, "The Military Chancellery: Aspects of Control During the Thirteen Years' War," *Russian History* 1, 2002, 19–45; M. Perrie, *Pretenders and Popular Monarchism in Early Modern Russia*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002; Carol Belkin Stevens, *Soldiers of the Steppe*, DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois UP, 1995; J.T. Fuhrmann, *The Origins of Capitalism in Russia*, New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972; Isolde Thyret, *Between God and Tsar*, DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois UP, 2001; Russell E. Martin, "Choreographing the 'Tsar's Happy Occasion': Tradition, Change, and Dynastic Legitimacy in the Weddings of Tsar Mikhail Romanov," *Slavic Review* 4, 2004, 794–817; Ann Kleimola, "Hunting For Dogs in Seventeenth-Century Muscovy," *Kritika* 3, 2010, 467–88; L. Hughes, *Sophia, Regent Of Russia, 1657–1704*, New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1990; Robert O. Crummey, "Muscovy and the 'General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,"' *Journal of Early Modern History* 2, 1998, 156–80; C. Witzenrath, *Cossacks and the Russian Empire, 1598–1725*, New York: Routledge, 2009. See as well Val Kivelson, "Culture and Politics, or the Curious Absence of Muscovite State Building in Current American Historical Writing," *Cahiers du Monde Russe* 1–2, 2005, 19–28.

22. Gary Marker, "Primers and Literacy in Muscovy," *Russian Review* 1, 1989, 1–19; Gary Marker, "Literacy and Literary Texts in Muscovy," *Slavic Review* 1, 1990, 74–89; Daniel Kaiser, "Discovering Individualism Among the Deceased: Gravestones in Early Modern Russia," in Kotilaine and Poe, eds, *Modernizing Muscovy*, 433–60; D.H. Kaiser, "Quotidian Orthodoxy: Domestic Life in Early Modern Russia," in V.A. Kivelson and R.H. Greene, eds, *Orthodox Russia*, Philadelphia, PA: Penn State UP, 2003, 179–92; Daniel Kaiser, "'Whose Wife Will She Be at the Resurrection?' Marriage and Remarriage in Early Modern Russia," *Slavic Review* 2, 2003, 302–23.
23. By way of exception, Ruslan Skrynnikov's work has been regularly translated; he is one of the few recent Russian-language historian of Muscovy who has been thus distinguished; see for example R.G. Skrynnikov, *Ivan the Terrible*, Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1981; R.G. Skrynnikov, *Boris Godunov*, Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1982; R.G. Skrynnikov, *Time of Troubles*, Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1988; Joseph T. Fuhrmann, *Tsar Alexis: His Reign and His Russia*, Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1981; M. Perrie and A. Pavlov, *Ivan the Terrible*, London: Longman, 2003; P. Longworth, *Alexis: Tsar Of All the Russias*, London: Martin Secker and Warburg, 1984; Isabel de Madariaga, *Ivan the Terrible*, New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2006; and Okenfuss, ed., *Travel Diary*. Meanwhile, Val Kivelson has sketched in an evocative manner the world of the seventeenth-century Russian gentry as a group (see V. Kivelson, *Autocracy in the Provinces: The Muscovite Gentry and Political Culture in the Seventeenth Century*, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1996).

24. R.G. Skrynnikov, *Smuta v Rossii v nachale xviii v.: Ivan Bolotnikov*, Leningrad: Nauka, 1988; I.V. Galaktionov and E.V. Chistiakova, *A.L. Ordin-Nashchokin: Russkii diplomat xvii veka*, Moskva: Sotsial'no-ekonmicheskoi literatury, 1961; P.G. Vasenko, *D'iak Ivan Timofeev, avtor "Vremennika." K istorii perloma v razvitii dreveruskoi istoricheskii mysl'*, Sankt Peterburkh: Senatskaia tipografiia, 1908. Marina Swoboda has written about Timofeev in her dissertation, which has never been published (see M. Swoboda, "Tradition Reinvented: The Vision of Russia's Past and Present in Ivan Timofeev's Vremennik," unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Montreal: McGill University, 1997). See for example Rybalko, *Rossiiskaia prikaznaia biurokratiia*, 10.
25. C. Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1980. It is obviously very difficult to recreate the individual lives of the great majority of the world's population, particularly since most people were illiterate before 1800. Once in a while the historian strikes gold, as Le Roy Ladurie did in encountering the Inquisition's documents (see E. Le Roy Ladurie, *Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error*, New York: Vintage, 1979); although Ginzburg's miller Menocchio is literate, the Italian historian was, like Le Roy Ladurie, greatly aided by the Inquisition's records in writing his compelling work.
26. Samuel Smiles, *Self-Help, With Illustrations of Conduct and Perseverance*, first American ed., Boston, MA: Ticknor and Fields, 1860 [London, 1859].
27. N. Witsen, *Moscovische reyse 1664–5. Journaal en aentekeningen*, eds P. de Buck and Th. Locher, Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1966–67, 465.
28. Schama, *Embarrassment*; de Vries and van der Woude, *First Modern Economy*; R.H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, London: J. Murray, 1926; M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1930; K. Boterbloem, *The Fiction and Reality of Jan Struys: A Seventeenth-Century Dutch Globetrotter*, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; Marion Peters, *De wijze koopman: Het wereldwijde onderzoek van Nicolaes Witsen (1641–1717), burgemeester en VOC-bewindhebber van Amsterdam*, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2010.
29. This has especially irked medievalists. In particular, Jan Luiten van Zanden has challenged the concept that Dutch economic (early) modernity only begins after 1500 (see for instance J. Luiten van Zanden, "The Revolt of the Early Modernists," *Economic History Review*, New Series 4, 2002, 619–41: 635, 638). For the limitations of Weber's view, see for instance *Weber's 'Protestant Ethic': Origins, Evidence, Contexts*, eds. H. Lehmann and G. Roth, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987; Luciano Pellicani, *The Genesis of Capitalism and the Origins of Modernity*, New York: Telos Press, 1994, 49–50.
30. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*; Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*.
31. Iurkin, *Andrei*; Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*.
32. Miliukov, "Dumnyi d'iak." I have, however, been able to use S.G. Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie A.A. Viniusa k Petru Pervomu," in

Dokument, Arkhiv, Istoriia, Sovremennost: Sbornik nauchnikh trudov, vol. 10, Ekaterinburg: Ural'skoi universitet publishers, 2009, 241–81.

33. E.A. Savel'eva, "Vvedenie," in E.A. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi iz sobraniia Andrei Andreevich Vinius: Katalog*, Sankt-Peterburg: Al'faret, 2008, 7–32.
34. E.A. Savel'eva, "Biblioteka Aptekarskogo Prikaza: Knizhnoe sobranie boiarina B.I. Morozova," in V.P. Leonov et al., eds, *Kniga v Rossii xi–xx vv.*, vol. 21, Sankt-Peterburg: Biblioteka Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, 2004, 322–33; E.A. Savel'eva, "Andrei Andreevich Vinius: Ego biblioteka i al'bom," in *Rossiia-Gollandiia: Knizhnye sviazi xv–xx vv.*, ed. N.P. Kopaneva, Sankt-Peterburg: Evropeiskii dom, 2000, 103–23: 109; Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*.
35. Wladimiroff, *De kaart*.
36. My thanks are due to one of Palgrave Macmillan's anonymous reviewers in alerting me to this article; see Robert Collis, "Andrei Vinius (1641–1716) and Interest in Western Esotericism in Early Modern Russia," *Aries* 2, 2012, 191–220.
37. See for example the entry on him in *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti Drevnei Rusi*, vol. 3, part 1, 175–81, St. Petersburg: Pushkinskii dom, 1998. Bogoslovskii frequently mentions Vinius in the first four parts of his *Petr I*, although his short biography appears primarily based on Kozlovskii's work (see M.M. Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 4, Moskva: Ogiz, 1948, 199–201). N.A. Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius i stateinyi spisok ego posol'stva v Angliiu, Frantsiiu i Ispaniiu v 1672–1674 gg.," *Trudy otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* 39, 1985, 348–64: 364.
38. D. Waugh, "Seventeenth-Century Muscovite Pamphlets with Turkish Themes: Toward a Study of Muscovite Literary Culture in its European Setting," unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1972, 66–70.
39. S.M. Shamin, *Kuranty xvii stoletiia: Evropeiskaia pressa v Rossii i voznikovenie russkoi periodicheskoi pechati*, Moskva-S.-Peterburg: Al'ians-Arkheo, 2011; Ingrid Maier, "Zeventiende-eeuwse Nederlandse couranten vertaald voor de tsaar," *Tijdschrift voor Media Geschiedenis* 1, 2009, 27–49: 30–2, 35; *Vesti-Kuranty 1656 g., 1660–1662 gg., 1664–1670 gg.*, vol.1: *Russkie teksty*, eds Ingrid Maier et al., Moskva: Iazyki slavianskikh kul'tur, 2009; and Ingrid Maier, *Vesti-Kuranty 1656 g., 1660–1662 gg., 1664–1670 gg.*, vol. 2: *Inostrannye originaly k russkim tekstam*, Moskva: Iazyki slavianskikh kul'tur, 2008. Ingrid Maier and Daniel C. Waugh, "How Well Was Muscovy Connected with the World?," in G. Hausmann and A. Rustemeyer, eds, *Imperienvergleich* (*Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 75), Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 2009, 17–38.
40. N.F. Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii xvii v., 1625–1700: Biograficheskii spravochnik*, Moskva: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2011. In order to distinguish this text from her 1987 book that has an almost similar title, it will be indicated below as Demidova, *Spravochnik*.
41. The *Posol'skii prikaz* was among the three foremost central-government chancelleries (with the *Razriadnyi* and *Pomestnyi*); it had been in

operation since the late 1540s (see Brown, "Early Modern," 162, 262, 480–1; there were a total of some 68 offices around 1670, see ibid., 357). For his diplomatic activities, see for example *Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov* (*RGADA*; Moscow) *fond* 32, *delo* 18 (1672–73); *fond* 35, *delo* 16 (1672–74); and *fond* 50, *delo* 9 (1675–76). He frequently surfaces as translator in the records of two Dutch embassies that visited Moscow in 1664–65 (Boreel) and 1675–76 (van Klenk), for which the printed and manuscript materials are particularly rich; he also appears in the correspondence of the Dutch resident in Moscow from 1676 to 1699, Johan Willem van Keller (see Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*; B. Coyett, *Historisch Verhael of Beschryving van de Voyagie gedaan onder de Suite van den Heere Koenraad van Klenck*, Amsterdam: Jan Claesz. ten Hoorn, 1677; *Nationaal Archief, Archief der Staten-Generael* [The Hague; from here *NA SG*] 8586 [*Verbael* van Klenk]; *NA SG* 8523 [*Verbael* Boreel]; *NA SG* 7364–6, 7397; *NA SG* 3540, 372 and 373 [archive of Casper Fagel, Grand Pensionary of Holland]). For the correspondence between Vinius (in Moscow) and Peter (traveling through Europe), see *Pis'ma i bumagi Imperatora Petra Velikogo*, vol. 1 (1688–1701), St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1887. His first surviving correspondence with Peter dates from the summer of 1694 (Iurkin, *Andrei*, 215).

42. Peters, *wijze koopman*, 99–122. For the familial ties, see ibid., 101.
43. The Dutch ambassadorial accounts are deposited in the National Archives at The Hague (see above). Witsen's diary is now available in Russian, while Coyett's travelogue has been reprinted in Russia (see note 41 above and *Posol'stvo Kunraada fan Klenka k tsariam Alekseiu Mikhailovichu i Fyodoru Alekseevichu*, Riazan': Aleksandriia, 2008). See below for Korb's diary. None of these sources has been translated into English.
44. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 5. He reiterated this two years later, see Kozlovskii, *Pervya pochty*, 182.
45. Even for senior Russian researchers residing in Moscow such as Igor' Iurkin it proved impossible to inspect certain documents because of their advanced state of decay (see Iurkin, *Andrei*, 33n21)
46. Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 84–7.
47. See Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*. The original collection consisted of 662 or 663 volumes, see Iurkin, *Andrei*, 341; see as well ibid., 355–6, 441; Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 19, 105–7. See also Peters, *wijze koopman*, 106.
48. In Western Europe, (printed) book collectors can already be encountered in the late fifteenth century (see W. Heijting, "Private Libraries (Bibliophily)," in *Bibliopolis: A Concise History of the Printed Books in the Netherlands*, available at: http://www.bibliopolis.nl/index/zoeken/all/Book+collectors/database/HBB+BBB+ALFABET+ALF1851+ADRES+THESAUR+PICATHES+BKVB+DOCUBOEK+REPCOL+REPVEIL+DBSC+VERZCAT+TERMEN/page/51/maximumRecords/1, accessed 7 October 2010. Vinius's correspondent Nicolaas Witsen was an art (and curiosities') collector as well.
49. See for a description Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 234–58.

50. Brown traces the *d'iak*s to household slaves of the Muscovite Grand Prince who transformed into state secretaries running the tsarist bureaucracy between 1450 and 1550 (see Brown, "Early Modern," 63–73). They became an administrative version of the military servitors, or *dvoriane*, who emerged in the course of the sixteenth century (ibid., 73–4).
51. The promotion from *d'iak* to *dumnyi d'iak* only occurred in 1694 or 1695 (Iurkin, *Andrei*, 224–6).
52. Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 29–64.
53. See Iurkin, *Andrei*, 47, for instance, for A.D. Vinius's influence in the early days of Aleksei's rule.

1
The Disappearing Dutch and Russia's Modernization

Historians agree that backward Muscovy, a country with a virtually natural economy where most people eked out an existence at subsistence level and with an utterly fragile military defense (as had been proven by the Polish occupation of Moscow from 1610 to 1612), became Russia, an expansionist European power and colonial empire (even if the standard of living remained low), under the rule of the first three generations of Romanov tsars (1613–1725). This resulted from a strenuous effort on the part of the Russian government during this (and subsequent) period(s). Russia's rise is often contrasted to the the fate of Poland-Lithuania, which fell into a rapid decline by 1700 and had disappeared from the map of Europe a century later. Whether the goal of the Russian state's prospering justified the means used to reach it remains an open question; in becoming a Great Power, the exploitation of the tsars' subjects was extreme.

In ever more determined fashion, the tsars and their advisors pursued a policy of modernization under Mikhail (r. 1613–45; he co-ruled with his father Patriarch Filaret from 1619 to 1633), Aleksei (r. 1645–76), Fyodor III (r. 1676–82), and Sofia (r. 1682–89), culminating with Peter the Great's reign (r. 1689–1725). It is true that Peter was the great reformer of the line, possibly a revolutionary enthroned, but Romanov Russia's modernization began under Mikhail, and always involved the advice and aid of foreigners. Its focus was predominantly militarily, but it was not just (modern, military) technology that made Russia into the ranking Great Power of Christian Eastern Europe. From the days of Ivan III (r. 1462–1505), her armed forces needed to be maintained on the basis of

an agriculture struggling to yield a surplus and on the proceedings extracted from the trade in various scarce goods in high demand in Europe, such as animal pelts. And her military required a bureaucratic infrastructure to collect revenue to pay for its personnel, as well as for the costs deriving from its muster, training, and dispatch on campaigns from the Caucasus to Kyiv and Riga.

Andrei Vinius was a bureaucrat who helped to sustain this military, but in novel ways. He was a Russian with Western roots who was highly sensitive to the epochal changes developing capitalism triggered in Western Europe. He involved himself in importing foreign technology, adopted foreign (modern) innovations to Russian circumstances, introduced Western ways by sluicing ample information about them to the tsar, and facilitated the acceptance of the ever-increasing Western presence in Russia. It bears first of all investigation what this modernization meant in Vinius's Russia, and what role Vinius played in this process.

Vinius concomitantly exemplifies a typical European seventeenth-century figure, a representative of an era of sustained contact and cultural exchange that went far beyond the chance meetings that characterized the first European attempts to explore a world beyond the narrow confines of Latin Christendom.[1] Before 1600, Columbus had accidently "discovered" the Americas, and Richard Chancellor had accidentally landed at the mouth of the northern Dvina in 1553. Flemish pioneers such as Filips Winterkoning, Jan van de Walle, and Olivier Brunel also were looking for China rather than Russia when they reached the White Sea in the late sixteenth century.[2] But as much as the Americas proved an unexpected opportunity for the Spaniards, so was Russia for the English or Dutch. The seventeenth century became one of "genuine communication" between northwestern Europe and this territory, remote and exotic prior to 1600.[3] Or, as Timothy Brook says it most eloquently, after 1600, "people of different cultural origins . . . banded together to journey through a dim landscape toward the promise of a future that remain[ed] unrevealed."[4]

* * *

Meanwhile, his Tsarist Majesty sent his chancellor Emel'ian Ukraintsev, previously envoy of his esteemed Tsarist Majesty in

> Holland, to our secretary [*Geheim-schrijver*] and several others from among the lord ambassador's retinue who observed the ceremony from the other side of the river . . . accompanied by his Tsarist Majesty's translator, Mr. Andreas Winius, to ask after their health and whether they had enjoyed a good journey. When this was translated by Mr. Winius, the translator [Abraham] van Asperen replied in the name of everyone that they prayed to God that He would keep his Tsarist Majesty healthy . . . [5]

Unfortunately, the Omnipotent did not answer the pious Dutchmen's prayer in January 1676: Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (1629–76), who seemed robust attending the Epiphany ceremony of consecrating the river Moskva's water, was dead three weeks later. In contrast, Emel'ian Ignat'evich Ukraintsev (1641–1708) and Andrei Andreevich Vinius truly enjoyed a boisterous good health. Each was in the midst of a successful career in Muscovy's central government that was to span half a century; it allowed them an extraordinary affluent life during which they eventually became in-laws.[6] By the 1690s, they ranked among the leading bureaucrats of the tsarist empire, and proved instrumental in helping Aleksei's son Peter the Great unleash his radical reforms. During his apprentice years (that came to a close with his return from Western Europe in 1698), Peter seems to have seen in these expert diplomats and government administrators the sort of model aides he needed to transform Russia.[7]

The long careers of Ukraintsev and Vinius show the influential role played in modernizing their country by these Russian chancellery bureaucrats, contemporaries of Patrick Gordon (1635–99), Nicolae Spafari-Milescu (1636–1708), Frans Timmerman (1644–1702), and François Lefort (1656–99), key expatriates equally instrumental in steering Peter to his embrace of Western-European ways.[8] Vinius's and Ukraintsev's particularly crucial role between 1689 and the early 1700s suggests that in launching his great reforms Peter did not merely rely on those boon companions to whom he took a shine because of their attractive personalities (a topic to which we will return in a subsequent chapter).[9] Indeed, the main catalyst for the early modernization of Russia, the Military Revolution, was as much as elsewhere underwritten by "bureaucratization," and bureaucrats.[10]

Since at least the days of V.O. Kliuchevskii (1841–1911)'s lectures in Moscow, especially the Foreign-Office supervisors Afanasii

Ordin-Nashchokin, Artamon Matveev, and Vasilii Golitsyn have been singled out as the leading forerunners of Peter in advancing this modernization offensive between 1667 and 1689. But they could not have used the *Posol'skii prikaz* (Foreign Office) as a conduit for the introduction of modern ideas and technology in Muscovy if it was not for the help and advice they received from career officials such as Vinius or Ukraintsev.[11] "Modernization" is a complex and much debated concept, but I will understand it here through Geraldine Phipps' definition, which posits that the introduction of "technological, procedural, and practical innovations in important areas" of the economy, government, and military, led to "changes in significant areas of society, as in social and cultural mores, political and religious ideology and practices, law, language, and national character."[12] In addition, Phipps suggests, some of these innovations derived from adopting "directly foreign techniques, [producing] native versions of foreign models, and [creating] new national institutions and technology."[13] Virtually all these foreign novelties originated in Christian Europe west of Muscovy, and I will therefore use "modernization" interchangeably with "Westernization" in the following pages.

As a caveat, it should be stressed that this modernization was not a continuous, smooth process, and that, even if it profoundly affected the lives of Russia's elite, it often altered very little in the lives of the peasantry, whether Slavonic and non-Slavonic, and whether Orthodox or not. In fact, it may have worsened their condition, to which I already referred in the introduction of this chapter. For most of them, some sort of bondage remained the norm until the nineteenth century. Almost until 1905, the Russian rulers found it difficult to boost this predominantly rural economy to higher production levels. Instead, they reverted to intensifying their extraction of the meager surplus generated by the tillers of the soil, an effort which Vinius pursued as well with some vigour late in life (see Chapter 9). Since serfdom was entrenched long before its definitive promulgation in the 1649 Law Code, the greatest change that confronted the Orthodox peasants during Vinius's lifetime was that of the reforms of religious rituals introduced during the 1650s, which was confirmed in 1667. Those reforms, though, can only with difficulty be grouped under the rubric of "modernization."

"Elite" is a vague term; perhaps "hegemonic class" in the Gramscian sense is a more illuminating term because it conveys

better how the Russian court and aristocracy comprehensively dominated the country politically and economically.[14] Despite Peter's alleged support for a meritocracy, joining this elite remained a tall order for any commoner in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. This class was composed of both the upper nobility (the boyars) and the middling and lower nobles (the *dvorianstvo*), with a sprinkling of non-noble clergy and merchants added to it. Those commoners (among them many foreign mercenaries but also some government clerks are encountered) who did rise to the top were eventually bestowed with noble titles, either in haphazard manner before the introduction of the Table of Ranks in 1722, or by the formalized manner it mandated thereafter. Vinius himself provides an interesting instance of this pre-1722 ennoblement.

It may surprise today's reader that someone from Vinius's humble background (his grandfather first settled as a tailor in Amsterdam) aspired to be a member of this exclusive group rather than to exhibit egalitarian convictions, since Vinius appears so Dutch in his outlook (more about this in the next chapter). But the United Provinces, despite being a republic and its small hereditary aristocracy, was a country run by and for an upper crust that began to behave more and more as an upper class, once the most profound shocks of its revolt against Philip II (1527–98) had abated.[15] It is not wholly coincidental that during the eighteenth century the Dutch patrician spoke his French as well as the Russian noble. Already in the seventeenth century, many among the elite in Holland acquired landed estates with their accompanying title, and tried to suppress as much as possible the humble station from which their fathers or grandfathers had risen.[16] The contempt for the underclass was as profound in Holland as it was in Russia. From our perspective, it appears that the Republic's laborers' legal freedom was merely convenient to Dutch capitalists in their exploitation of them rather than born of a desire to grant them a human dignity to which all were entitled. Similarly, the unfree status of peasants suited Russia's aristocrats best in her differently organized society and economy.

There were nonetheless some profound differences between the Republic and Russia, and one of them appears not to have been overcome until industrialization affected Russia in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Most of the (male) population of the Republic (and especially in the Western provinces of Holland and Zeeland as

well as perhaps Friesland) seems to have been touched by the enterprising spirit that had made a few of them wealthy and powerful. The Russian serf, in contrast, seems much more passive and resigned to his fate. This contrast is perhaps, though, more apparent than real. Apart from the massive peasant rebellions (and other minor uprisings), the incidence of flight by Russian peasants to remote regions where no lord might find them was significant.[17] Such flight bespeaks considerable enterprise, and such rebellions belie any passive resignation. Still, such actions appear to indicate human desperation; a modern spirit that one can better oneself in life given sustained effort was much more diffused across Dutch society than it was in Muscovy.[18] Even Tsar Peter failed to understand that merely forcing the elite to become Westernized was insufficient if he wanted to truly modernize all of his subjects. In the Dutch Republic, the capitalist ethos trickled down, but in the Russian empire the modern mindset remained limited to its upper class.

But one cannot deny that Russia's technological and military modernization at least allowed the tsars to maintain their state's independence and expand its size. Andrei Vinius's activities to help accomplish this feat are especially intriguing, inasmuch as they consistently show him to be someone wielding an unusual creative imagination for his time. His initiatives may have inspired some of Peter's actions. Vinius was much more than a mere loyal and competent servant as were other top-level bureaucrats such as Ukraintsev, Nikita Zotov (1643–1717; the tsar's sometime tutor and the chief of Peter's mock court), or Prokopii Bogdanovich Voznitsyn (f. 1698; one of the leaders with Lefort of the Grand Embassy of 1697–98). Vinius developed several bold plans to modernize Russian society's organization along Western-European lines long before the advent of Peter's personal reign in 1689.[19] He audaciously submitted them to Muscovy's rulers, who before Peter's time were reluctant to adopt such schemes (and perhaps taken aback by a subordinate chancellery clerk conjuring up such proposals). Igor' Iurkin notes, with a slight bit of exaggeration, that Vinius can therefore be deemed one of the new Russia's architects.[20]

Several of Vinius's proposals anticipated those of Peter, only for Peter to implement them. One can only speculate about how far Peter was inspired by Vinius's galleys and their convict oarsmen, his hospitals or workhouses. The young Peter was certainly enthralled

by a subject who knew how to find iron ore and transform it into a firearm, as Vinius could. An unusually high proportion of the novel systems or technology used in Russia's modernization before 1725 originated in the Dutch Republic, which make Andrei Vinius seem an even more pivotal figure. It does not seem to be overly essentialist to suggest that Vinius's actions betray an ancestral Dutch penchant for innovation, experimentation, opportunism, and profit-seeking. That such qualities were associated with the Dutch is evident when Ukraintsev, Russia's ambassador to the sultan in 1699, heard in Istanbul how the Ottoman rulers "upbraided the Dutch that they taught the Russians things maritime and reprimanded the Dutch envoy for this, who responded to this that his people were free" to do as they pleased.[21]

As I have already mentioned, seventeenth-century Muscovite modernization was almost wholly driven by the demands of the Military Revolution, which in the bold phrasing of Michael Roberts forms the "great divide separating medieval society from the modern world."[22] Whereas before his 1697–98 Grand Embassy Peter stood in awe of Dutch shipbuilding and maritime power (for which his father and his grandfather had shown at least a passing interest), the first two Romanov tsars had been particularly keen to capitalize on the technological prowess of the Dutch in other respects.[23] As arms traders and manufacturers, the Dutch supplied Muscovy with crucial strategic weapons, which helped the Russians gradually gain the upper hand in the long-standing conflict with the *Rzeczpospolita* (even if this victory was possibly more a diplomatic than military triumph).[24] The denizens of the United Provinces therefore played a remarkably prominent role in guiding this revolution in Russia.[25]

Until the fall of the Soviet Union, most historians of Muscovy underestimated this Dutch role. Since then especially Russian historians have begun to recognize this critical influence, perhaps in conjunction with the development of much closer economic (and perhaps cultural) ties between the Netherlands and Russia after 1991.[26] It appears that historians often mistakenly equated the word *nemtsy* in the sources with Germans when Dutchmen were described by it; in the seventeenth century, neither Russians nor Dutch clearly distinguished *Diets* from *Duits*, *Nederduits* from *Hochdeutsch*, or *nemets* from *galandets*.

It is notable in this regard how reluctant the Dutch themselves have been in tooting their own horn (even if about their ancestors' prominence rather than their own significance) since the days of Jacobus Scheltema in the 1810s: Scheltema grossly exaggerated in painting in euphoric terms the Netherlands as "the cradle of the power and greatness of Russia," under the heady influence of Dutch independence's restoration (and a newfound Romantic nationalism) and the marriage between the Dutch crown prince William and the Grand Duchess Anna Pavlovna.[27] But perhaps in Bruno Naarden's unforgiving dismissal of Scheltema's fantasy one discerns a Dutch predilection to swing the other way toward extreme modesty, and downplay the astonishing Dutch ascendancy during the "long seventeenth century," recognized by Israel, de Vries, Schama, and others who are not burdened by Dutch self-consciousness.[28]

The Dutch cannot but be modest about their economic power or political influence in the world today, but they were far more significant in both respects during the seventeenth century. Their Republic may have harbored one fifth of the number of inhabitants of Muscovy around 1670, as I have noted in *Fiction and Reality*, and their economic clout can still be traced even on today's maps on which one may find New *Zealand*, Cape *Horn*, or the *Tafelberg*.[29] Militarily, too, battle was not only joined at sea with the royal navies of France and Britain, but Louis XIV's land forces met their match in those of stadtholder William III of Orange (who was greatly admired by Peter the Great). The current upsurge in studies of the Dutch Republic and its empire has begun to make itself felt as well in the greater attention paid to the strong Dutch presence in Russia from the late sixteenth to the early eighteenth century, to which the works of Veluwenkamp, Demkin, Orlenko, Wijnroks, Kotilaine, and others attest.[30]

In the middle of the seventeenth century, the Republic stood at the apex of its economic and political power. At Münster in 1648, the United Provinces received its formal independence from the Habsburgs as part of the Peace of Westphalia. They ruled at that juncture (parts of) Brazil, Taiwan, the New Netherlands and New Amsterdam, Batavia, the Spice Islands, and parts of Sri Lanka and India. The Dutch East India Company's warships had defeated the shah of Iran's navy in the early 1640s. This Company's officers were the only Europeans allowed to trade with Japan. In the 1650s Dutch embassies visited the new Qing emperor at Beijing in search of even

more trade. In 1652 the Cape Colony was founded in southern Africa, and the Dutch Trans-Atlantic slave trade was burgeoning even after the Dutch outpost in Brazil was definitively recaptured by the Portuguese in 1654.

The skyline of Holland's countryside was dominated by the versatile wind and water mills, one of the most ingenious sources of mechanical power used by human beings before the steam engine. Before Andrei Andreevich was born, Andries Denijszoon Winius (1605–c. 1657) had already built a water-powered mill at Tula, transferring the era's most advanced power-driven technology to Muscovy. Dutch printing presses accounted for much of Europe's book printing. The Dutch manner of warfare on land and at sea had made school in Europe, including in Russia, where Dutch drill manuals and Dutch mercenary officers refurbished the manner in which the Muscovites waged war. Dutch arms dealers sold superior weaponry to all and sundry, including the Swedes, Russians, and Poles.

But the Dutch primacy was being challenged soon after 1648. Cromwell's England was the undisputed victor of the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–54), and Dutch trade on Britain was heavily curtailed by the terms of the Treaty of Westminster, which confirmed the 1651 Navigation Acts. In 1661, Louis XIV took personal control over the affairs of France: the long-standing friendship between the Republic and the Most Christian Kingdom was thereby entering its twilight as well. Whereas the Dutch role as a leading European power faded in the last decades of the seventeenth century, this was at first only true in relative terms, when compared to the growing power of England and France. Only during the War of Spanish Succession (1702–13) did it become evident that the Republic had fallen far behind England and France, especially in military-political terms.

But before that, between 1603 and 1703 approximately, it was particularly the Dutch presence in Russia that was instrumental in the transformation of the tsars' realm. Whenever historians acknowledged the Dutch impact before 1990, they implicitly suggested it to have been brief, limited to the decade of Peter's apprentice years, from about 1687 to 1698. The end of this Dutch moment could easily be identified: Peter's discovery that the Dutch way of shipbuilding was "unscientific," relying on the individual shipwright's skills rather than on uniform abstract principles that could be expressed in blueprints, as was the custom in England (about which more will

be said below). Given Peter's actions after his return from the Grand Embassy, it continues to ring true that the heyday of Dutch influence was largely over by 1698, even if the tsar continued to hire Dutch experts and to use bits and pieces of the language for his naval project and in his correspondence.

But Dutch paramountcy as conduits of matters Western-European began much earlier than 1687: In Peter's father Aleksei's early years as tsar, for example, one of the key figures at the tsarist court had been Vinius's father. And Winius (Andrei Denisovich Vinius)'s Muscovite activities can be traced to the middle of Mikhail Romanov's rule (1613–45), when he had been one of many Dutch merchants capitalizing on the opportunities the restoration of the Muscovite Empire offered after 1613. Winius played a crucial role at Tula in the technology transfer from the West to Russia.[31] The armaments works he founded were the cradle of a native Russian arms industry. While the father was responsible for establishing Russia's first real iron forges and arms factories (which used domestic resources and foreign blueprints to make their products), his son, during a crucial period, drastically increased their scale as manager of the tsarist Siberian province by developing its mines and forges.

* * *

Despite Peter's infatuation with things Dutch, the tsar eventually tired of Andrei Andreevich Vinius. It appears symbolic that Vinius's star began its eclipse in the year 1703, when Peter embarked on his most radical reform: the foundation of his new capital of St. Petersburg. The tsar had by then acquired full confidence in the wisdom of his actions and was no longer in need of any mentors who provided a link between the old Muscovy and the new Russia. The transition seemed complete. By the early 1700s, the sexagenerian Vinius appeared a relic of bygone days.[32] Ingrained obsolete work methods adopted during a long tenure as high-ranking servitor and old-fashioned ideas diminished his value as executor of Peter's ever bolder plans, while corrupt habits provided a convenient pretext for Peter to reduce his role, after he gave Vinius a public dressing down. Perhaps, too, this elderly man (certainly for those days!) could no longer handle the feverish pace of work that Peter expected from his underlings. Vinius was pardoned for his misdeeds, however, and

called back to serve in lesser capacities; a few years later, the tsar forgave Vinius for even worse misconduct, behavior that was tantamount to treason. Indeed, for a similar act of betrayal, the tsar had his own son Aleksei (1690–1718) executed a decade later. Vinius had contributed far more to the New Russia Peter envisioned than Aleksei in his shortened life ever would, however, and the tsar's indulgence in the curious defection of his old servant seems to express profound respect for the old man's services.

Although Vinius returned to the fold in 1708, more innovative scions of a younger generation replaced him at the highest level of the Russian government after 1703. Vinius and his in-law Ukraintsev were among the most outstanding representatives ever produced by the Muscovite chancellery system, but by the first decade of the eighteenth century this traditional organization of the central government had outlived its usefulness for the reforming tsar.[33]

Coincidentally, Vinius had become staid at the same time that his native country, the Republic of the United Provinces, ceded its leading position at the cutting edge of capitalist entrepreneurship and technological innovation. The Dutch Moment in World History, if we call it that, borrowing a concept recently applied to Russian history by Marshall Poe, had entered its twilight by 1700, as reflected by the great speed with which the Dutch influence on Russian historical development began to diminish.[34] In the end, it vanished so quickly that it was hardly remembered by historians of Muscovy in the nineteenth and twentieth century, who often conflated the feverish activities of Dutch merchants, entrepreneurs, and artisans with those of other *nemtsy* in Russia, of "Germans" from the Holy Roman Empire.

Notes

1. Timothy Brook, *Vermeer's Hat: The Seventeenth Century and the Global World*, New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008, 19.
2. See Marijke Spies, *Bij noorden om: Olivier Brunel en de doorvaart naar China en Cathay in de zestiende eeuw*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 1994, 3–12.
3. Brook, *Vermeer's Hat*, 19, see as well ibid., 21, 123, 126.
4. Ibid., 215.
5. See Coyett, *Historisch Verhael*, 69–70.
6. See further on Ukraintsev, N.M. Rogozhin, "Emel'ian Ukraintsev," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* 11, 1999, 55–64; Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 79.

Their relation (by marriage) is apparent from *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, 89 (letter from Peter to Vinius, 15 July 1696), and ibid., primechaniia, 591. Ukraintsev's most renowned feat is concluding as the tsar's envoy a peace treaty with the Ottoman Turks in Istanbul in 1699 (see M.M. Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 5: *Posol'stvo E.I. Ukraintseva v Konstantinopol', 1699–1700*, Moskva: Ogiz, 1948).

7. For the genesis of the Muscovite bureaucratic system Peter B. Brown's dissertation remains essential reading. Brown argues that the departmental (*prikaz*) system ballooned under Ivan IV (r. 1533–84) in the 1550s in response to various challenges, especially those of warfare against a variety of long-standing foes; the process resembled the growth of the bureaucracy in other Early Modern European states, such as Tudor England, even if warfare especially informed the creation of a "fiscal-military state" (Brown, "Early Modern," 40, 60, 164, 194, 208; see also Poe, "Central Government," 457; and a recent Russian work, N.V. Rybalko, *Rossiiskaia prikaznaia biurokratiia v Smutnoe vremia nachala XVII v.,* Moscow: Kvadriga-MBA, 2011; for the concept of "fiscal-military states," see Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe*, New York: Routledge, 2002).
8. The mercenary officer Gordon entered Russian service in the 1660s and was key to introduce Peter to the finer points of modern Western warfare. Entering Russian service in the second half of the 1670s, Lefort was another soldier of fortune who introduced Peter to the delights of Western ways, and was to head the Grand Embassy to Western Europe in 1697–98. In the late 1680s, the merchant-enterpreneur Timmerman instructed Peter in mathematics and physics, and introduced him to sailing. Gordon and Lefort were related by marriage (they both married girls from the van Bockhoven clan, a family of Dutch mercenary officers who came to Russia in 1647). The Romanian Milescu became a translator in the *Posol'skii prikaz* in 1671, and was dispatched as Muscovite envoy to China in 1675, from which journey he only returned to Moscow in 1678; he also wrote a Russian textbook for arithmetic used by the courtiers' sons in the 1670s and 1680s (see for example A.V. Postnikov, "Kartografirovanie Sibiri v xvii-nachale xviii veka. Semen Ul'ianovich Remezov i ego rukopisnye atlasy," in L.I. Zinchuk et al., eds, *Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri, sostavlennaia Tobol'skim synom Boyarskim Semenom Remezovym v 1701 godu*, vol. 2, Moscow: Kartografiia, 2003, 7–19: 11).
9. See Chapter 7 ("Peter's Confidant").
10. Cracraft, *Revolution of Peter*, 29; see also ibid., 56–7; and Kivelson, *Autocracy*, 243, 249–50, 256. Marshall Poe suggests that this central administration exhibited a Weberian modernity (see Poe, "Central Government," 454; see also ibid., 457). See further Michael Roberts, "The Military Revolution (1560–1660)," in M. Roberts, *Essays in Swedish History*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967: 193–225; G. Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800*, second ed., Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. See also Glete, *War and the State* and Brown, "Early Modern."

11. Apart from Brown, "Early Modern," see also Poe, "Central Government."
12. G.M. Phipps, "Britons in Seventeenth-Century Russia: A Study in the Origins of Modernization," unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 1971, 4–5. Kotiliane and Poe's definition of modernization is narrower, see J. Kotilaine and M. Poe, "Modernization in the Early Modern Context: The Case of Muscovy," in Kotilaine and Poe, eds, *Modernizing Muscovy*, 1–8: 3–4. As Simon Dixon points out, modernization theory derives much of its outline from the writings of both Max Weber and Ferdinand Tönnies (see Dixon, *Modernisation*, 1–2, 112; see M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, eds G. Roth and C. Wittich, New York: Bedminster Press, 1968 [1922]; F. Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, Leipzig: Füs, 1887).
13. Phipps, "Britons," 4–5.
14. See particularly David Forgacs, ed., *The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916–1935*, New York: New York UP, 2000, 194; see also N. Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, rev. ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, 20, 421–2. Elias writes of an "upper class" and a courtly society imposing their habits on the rest of society; in Muscovy, it was not held in check by a rivaling bourgeoisie. For the Russian case, see Isabel de Madariaga, "The Russian Nobility in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in H.M. Scott, ed., *The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, second ed., vol. 2, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 311–76: 332, 358, 360.
15. A.Th. van Deursen, *Plain Lives in a Golden Age: Popular Culture, Religion and Society in Seventeenth-Century Holland*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991, 155–61; H. van Nierop, "Similar Problems, Different Outcomes: The Revolt of the Netherlands and the Wars of Religion in France," in *A Miracle Mirrored: The Dutch Republic in European Perspective*, eds K. Davids and J. Lucassen, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995, 26–56: 28.
16. M. Prak, *The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005, 127–8.
17. In Vinius's life, two peasant rebellions broke out along the southern Volga (although far more groups than peasants alone participated in them).
18. See for the Dutch enterprising spirit the example of Jan Struys in Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, *passim*; for another example (among several in Koot's book), also note the blacksmith Cornelis Clopper, who came to New Amsterdam in the 1650s and had branched out into transoceanic trade by the 1670s (Christian J. Koot, *Empire at the Periphery*, New York: New York UP, 2011, 166).
19. One might want to follow Marshall Poe in suggesting that the result of such modernization attempts was that Russia became an *Early* Modern state and society, a country still at some remove of modern mass society (Marshall Poe, *The Russian Moment in World History*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2003: 59–60).
20. Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 4.
21. Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 5, 14.

22. Roberts, "Military Revolution," 195. Officers and drill masters like the van Bockhoven family, fortress builders like Cosmo de Moucheron, arms dealers such as van Sweeden, Swellengrebel, or van Klenk, and entrepreneurs such as Vinius sr and A(c)kema were all Dutch, as were the shipwrights and crew of the doomed ship *Oryol*, designated to police the Caspian Sea in the 1670s (see Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 68–70).
23. E.J. Phillips describes the Holsteiner effort to build a ship (the *Friedrich*) to sail on the Caspian Sea built by predominantly Dutch shipwrights (see E.J. Phillips, *The Founding of Russia's Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet, 1688–1714*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995, 14–18).
24. See J. Kotilaine, "In Defense of the Realm: Russian Arms Trade and Production in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century," in *Military and Society in Russia*, eds Poe and Lohr, 67–95: 74–7, 94. One needs the military muscle to back up diplomatic demands, of course.
25. It is telling that in a listing of resident foreigners in Russia using the Vinius-led Post Office in Moscow to send letters and packages abroad between 1699 and 1701 half of the names are of Dutchmen (Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 364–6).
26. Of course, in the past, too, there were exceptions such as Inna Liubimenko, who charted the fate of both Dutch and English commerce on Russia; see for instance I. Liubimenko, "The Struggle of the Dutch with the English for the Russian Market in the Seventeenth Century," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 7, 1924, 27–51; and I. Liubimenko, "Trud inozemtsev v Moskovskom gosudarstve," *Arkhiv Istorii Truda v Rossii* 6–7, 1923, 52–74.
27. See B. Naarden, "Nikolaas Vitsen i Tartariia," in B. Naarden et al., eds, *Severnaia i Vostochnaia Tartariia*, vol. 3: *Nauchnye materialy*, Amsterdam: Pegasus, 2010, 35–137: 85. See especially J. Scheltema, *Rusland en de Nederlanden*, 4 vols, Amsterdam: H. Gartman, 1817; see as well J. Scheltema, *Peter de Groote, keizer van Rusland in Holland en te Zaandam in 1697 en 1717*, 2 vols, Amsterdam: Hendrik Gartman, 1814.
28. See de Vries and van der Woude, *First Modern Economy*; Schama, *Embarrassment*; J. Israel, *Dutch Primacy in the World Trade, 1585–1740*, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1989; J. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477–1806*, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998.
29. Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 30. See also Lisa Jardine, *Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland's Glory*, New York: HarperCollins, 2008.
30. See J.W. Veluwenkamp, *Archangel: Nederlandse ondernemers in Rusland, 1550–1785*, Amsterdam: Balans, 2000; A.V. Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo v Rossii v xvii v.*, 2 vols. Moscow: Institut Istorii RAN, 2004; S.P. Orlenko, *Vykhodtsy iz Zapadnoi Evropy v Rossii XVII veka*, Moskva: Drevlekhranilishche, 2004; E. Wijnroks, *Handel tussen Rusland en de Nederlanden 1560–1640: Een netwerkanalyse van de Antwerpse en Amsterdamse kooplieden, handelend op Rusland*, Hilversum: Verloren, 2003; Kotilaine, Russia's Foreign Trade; and J. Kotilaine, "When the Twain

Did Meet: Foreign Merchants and Russia's Economic Expansion in the Seventeenth Century," unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2000.

31. See A.P. Trapeznik, "The State as an Agent of Industrial Development: The Tula Imperial Armamants Factory in Russia," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 4, 2009, 549–73; Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 4, 199. The year of his death remains unclear; because he disappears from Russian records, Iurkin suggests that 1657 may be plausible (Iurkin, *Andrei*, 73–4). He is certainly dead by the middle of 1660, when Jan van Sweeden is designated by the Amsterdam merchant Justus Baeck to demand from Vinius's heirs payment of debts owed by A.D. Winius (*City Archive of Amsterdam, Notary Archive* 1134, 6verso [2 July 1660, Notary J. van der Ven]). The statement by Wladimiroff that A.D. Vinius lived until the 1670s and died in the Dutch Republic seems made in error; it derives from an ambiguous statement made by his son regarding his family's noble status (the phrase is *[i] nyne roditeli moi v Rechi Pospolitoi Nederlanskoi*, see Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 208 and 208–9n94; M.V. Dobroklonskii, "'Kniga Viniusa'. Pamiatnik russkogo sobiratel'stva xvii–xviii vv.," *Izvestiia AN SSSR, otdelenie gumanitarnykh nauk* 3 (1929), 215–29: 227–8). The likely explanation is that the meaning of either *nyne* or *roditeli* was somewhat different; within the context *nyne* may possibly indicate "hence," but it is likelier that *roditeli* in the statement means "relatives" (the equivalent of *rodstvenniki* in Russian today).
32. See for an insightful portrayal of Ukraintsev as one of the last representatives of the Muscovite school of diplomacy which was rapidly doing out of fashion, Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 5, 247–8. Bogoslovskii may draw too sharp of a contrast between Ukraintsev and the new crop of emissaries Peter dispatched, who Bogoslovskii considers a prime example of overly officious and cumbersome "Muscovite" diplomats of the past, but his point is worthwhile.
33. See Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 11.
34. Poe, *Russian Moment*.

2
The Young Vinius

Andrei Vinius spent most of those formative years in Russia (mainly in Moscow, although he stayed in Tula on occasion) before he joined the staff of the tsar's Foreign Office in 1664. But he undoubtedly visited the Dutch Republic, where he was probably born; thus, in 1653, his father and stepmother were portrayed by the painter Luttichuys in Amsterdam, during a trip in which the 12-year-old Andrei and his siblings likely accompanied them. It seems evident that his father, mother, and stepmother endeavored as much as possible to provide Andrei with an upbringing and education that stood in the Dutch tradition, based on humanist learning and interests. Following a rather novel fashion, his father had Vinius learn the basic theories and concepts of the sciences and their practical applications as well as written Russian, probably with a view of his son succeeding him in the armament plant at Tula (even if Vinius sr was eventually deprived of its ownership), or undertaking similar ventures in mining and manufacturing in the future.

Russia was a volatile country during Vinius's younger years. In 1645 Mikhail Romanov was succeeded by his son Aleksei, who was a mere 16 years old. Aleksei soon faced violent social unrest in his capital and other towns that only was suppressed with some difficulty. The 1649 promulgation of a new codex (*Ulozhenie*), drafted by an Assembly of the Land (*Zemskii Sobor*) that had gathered in Moscow the previous year, helped to quiet things down. During the early 1650s, Patriarch Nikon (1605–81) introduced religious reforms in a sort of revivalist wave, which was accompanied by growing xenophobia. It reached its

climax in 1654, in which year foreigners were barred from residing in Moscow, and, not coincidentally, war was declared on Poland.

The pretext the Russians found to attack the *Rzeczpospolita* (Polish Commonwealth) was the allegedly unjust Catholic oppression of Orthodox Ukrainian Cossacks. Tsar Aleksei was never inclined to grant the Cossacks independence. He saw a chance to best the Poles and expand his territories into regions to which the Russians held long-standing historical claims. Soon after this Thirteen Years' War broke out, plague visited Moscow (in 1655 and 1656). By 1658 the tsar had fallen out with Nikon, who had personally baptized Andrei Vinius as an Orthodox believer in 1655. Moscow's military fortunes went into reverse by that time, with the Poles recovering much of the terrain lost in previous years and Sweden, with which war had broken out in 1656, also gaining the upper hand over Muscovy. In 1661 the Swedes forced the Russians to confirm Swedish control over the Baltic littoral and sign the Peace of Kardis. Finally, another wave of domestic unrest rocked Moscow in 1662, when riots broke out in protest to hyperinflation after the introduction of copper coins as legal tender went awry. Whereas the Poles failed at recouping all of their losses (and were forced to give up significant territory at the 1667 Andrusovo Truce), another round of plague added to Russia's misery at the moment when Andrei Vinius entered government service in 1664.

* * *

According to his own testimony, Vinius was born in "the Batavian lands," that is the United Provinces, to Andries Denijszoon Winius and Geertruid van Rijn (1611–46), who had married in Amsterdam in 1628.[1] In 1632, after several years of trading on Moscow, A.D. Winius, an Amsterdam merchant of Frisian heritage, branched out from the import-export business he conducted in Muscovy to develop the first homegrown Russian fire-arms manufactories in the vicinity of Tula. Eventually, the plant produced both muskets and cannon. The works used water-powered mills and forged their own iron from locally found ore.[2] Substituting for Swedish-cast iron, this was a pioneering venture using state-of-the-art technology, and operated for more than a century after issuing its first output in 1636.[3] Vinius's enterprise was undertaken in partnership with the Frisian Tieleman Lucaszoon

A(k)kema (d. 1676) and Peter Marselis (d. 1672), a member of a cosmopolitan family of merchant-entrepreneurs who had offices in the Dutch Republic, Denmark, Hamburg, and Muscovy.[4]

In the final years of Mikhail Romanov's rule and before the plant began to show consistently high returns, Winius fell out with his partners and lost control over his venture. In 1646, the Russian envoys Ivan D. Miloslavskii and Ivan Baibakov presented Winius's complaints about Akema and Marselis to the Dutch Estates-General in The Hague; since Miloslavskii was soon to be the tsar's father-in-law, Winius's star was evidently on the rise.[5] Winius gained the upper hand in the quarrel. After in 1647 a government investigation decided to expropriate Akema and Marselis, Winius began to render numerous other services to the young Tsar Aleksei (r. 1645–76).[6] Winius was clearly on close terms with the tsar from 1650 onward, although Aleksei's acquaintance with him was of earlier date, for it was made through the tsar's former tutor and brother-in-law, Boris Morozov (1590–1661), whose role strongly diminished at the court after 1648.[7]

Winius began to identify with the Russian rather than the "Dutch" cause in these years. It is symptomatic that already in 1646 he was accused by his compatriots of designs to convert to Orthodoxy.[8] Andries Denijszoon became Andrei *Denisovich* (the Russian patronymic replacing the Dutch one) Vinius, after officially changing his allegiance from the United Provinces to the tsar in 1648 and subsequently, in the middle of the 1650s, converting with his children to Orthodoxy.[9]

Winius's decision to convert was probably a response to an anti-foreigner offensive that had begun to gather momentum in the early 1650s, leading to the banishment of the tsar's non-Orthodox subjects from Moscow in 1654.[10] This fate was thus avoided by Winius; how far he genuinely became an Orthodox believer remains moot. Almost a decade later, Nicolaas Witsen was told that A.D. Vinius had beaten his wife when at first she refused to convert, but the Dutch community in Moscow that supplied this information to the young visitor from Amsterdam in 1665 did not remember Vinius sr very fondly.[11] Some of the expatriates held A.D. Vinius to be a traitor to country and church, as well as an unscrupulous competitor who had played the system. One surmises that Witsen's sources for this story were close to Marselis and Akkema.

Just prior to his conversion, A.D. Vinius had returned from an expedition to the Dutch Republic, buying arms for Tsar Aleksei who was preparing for war with Poland.[12] During this trip, Vinius's portrait was painted by Isaack Luttichuys (1616–73) as well as engraved in Amsterdam; the etching was printed over a poem composed in his honor by the premier Dutch poet, Joost van den Vondel (1587–1679).[13] Such trips were lucrative ventures, and the proceeds of this one may have helped Vinius's convince himself that he did not want to jeopardize his privileged position in Moscow by stubbornly remaining Calvinist.[14] By converting, Vinius sr could maintain his residence in the city and remain one of the tsar's confidants.

Andrei Denisovich Vinius was at one time granted the title of *gost'* ("elite merchant") by Tsar Aleksei, undoubtedly a great honor, even if historians debate what this title means in his case.[15] After his conversion, he was ennobled (a rare feat for Westerners in the pre-Petrine age) as *moskovskii dvorianin* ("Moscow courtier"), and thereby immediately catapulted into the highest ranks of the aristocracy.[16] It should be noted that the title was non-hereditary, for his son Andrei was ascribed to the merchant ranks, rather than the nobility, as a young man.

We will return to the question as to how far the Calvinism of his youth influenced Andrei Andreevich Vinius's Orthodoxy, but some initial remarks about it are pertinent here. While it undoubtedly left some traces in his religious thinking, this was not Calvinism of a puritanical sort. Vinius was raised in a Reformed religion that was laced with the traditions of humanism that had been so prevalent across the Netherlands in the sixteenth century (of which Erasmus was the greatest representative).[17] This upbringing informed his great appetite for knowledge and understanding of the world around him. One wonders, too, whether Vinius's openness toward other Christian denominations may hint at a Remonstrant (Arminian) quality to his Calvinism.

Despite his conversion and the honors he received from the tsar, A.D. Vinius cultivated close ties with the Dutch Republic until the end of his life, and his son Andrei was to remain in touch with relatives and friends there after his father's death.[18] A.D. Vinius may thus have been a reluctant Russian, and his son proved to be somewhat less than an unconditionally obedient subject of the tsar. Throughout his life, Andrei jr resembled in various ways more a Dutchman

than a Russian, perhaps because Andrei Denisovich's conversion had been obtained under duress in a move intended to survive the anti-foreigner mood that was spreading in Muscovy and led to the banishment of Westerners from central Moscow to a suburb in the winter of 1654. As the Dutch Ambassador Boreel later complained:

> [The Dutch] were chased as criminals and evil men from their own houses and herded outside of the city of Moscow, and were subject to a number of dangers, on the one hand of freezing to death through the extreme cold, and on the other hand of being robbed of all their goods since at the time of this extradition no one could safeguard their houses and warehouses against violations or fire . . ..[19]

Given the timeline (the foreigners' banishment preceded the family's conversion almost by a year), it is likely that the conversion followed the temporary sequestration of the Vinius family's house in Moscow or, at least, the threat of such a move by the tsarist authorities. Even if they were allowed to stay because of a pledge A.D. Vinius made to become Orthodox, the hounding of their acquaintances out of the city must have been a chilling experience. There were far too many of such episodes in the Early Modern Age not to worry about an even worse fate, and one can imagine that, even after their conversion, the fate of the Marranos or Moriscos in Spain (well known in the United Provinces during the Eighty Years' War) haunted the Viniuses' mind.

Witnessing this ugly mood as a teenager, Andrei jr never quite forgot what must have been a harrowing episode (in which he may have also witnessed the violent quarrels between his father and stepmother to which Witsen referred), and was troubled by this coerced conversion. The non-conformist streak Andrei Andreevich exhibited as an adult might be traced to this experience: he investigated Orthodoxy's tenets on several occasions. Certainly before 1706, he flirted with the idea of being at least half-Dutch. Altogether, then, father and son Vinius appear to have been quite alike in their opportunism. They cared as much about their private interests as about those of their Russian sovereign.

* * *

Since Muscovy was a country without institutions of formal (lay) education, Andrei Andreevich Vinius enjoyed a private education (as did his brother Pieter or Pyotr, who worked as a clerk in Russia's Foreign Office in 1672).[20] He spoke Dutch and Russian fluently as an adult, and he also wrote as easily in Russian as in the language of his ancestors: he had evidently been educated in a bilingual fashion.[21] Young Andries may have intermittently been schooled in the Netherlands, but most of his education was overseen by his father in Russia. Besides reading and writing, Andries Winius made sure that his sons learned arithmetic, some mathematics and physics, chemistry (or more precisely assaying), geography, Latin, and religion.[22] When he was a mere 5 years old, Andrei Andreevich lost his mother, Geertruyd Willemsdochter van Rijn, another scion of a privileged Amsterdam family of Frisian stock.[23] It was therefore his stepmother Gertrud "Meijer" [Maier?], a native of the Holy Roman Empire, who probably versed him in German.[24] As a teenager and young adult, Vinius maintained and improved his German (*Hochdeutsch* was then closer related to Dutch, which was often still called *Niederdeutsch* or *Diets*, rather than *Hollands* or *Nederlands*) and Dutch by his contacts with the Western-European expatriate community that primarily resided in the "German" suburb (*nemetskaia sloboda*) near Moscow to which it had been banished in 1654.

It is less clear how Andrei Andreevich learned his Russian, but he likely first mastered the then widely diffused printed primers and glossaries (*bukvar'*, *azbuka*, *azbukovnik,* and *azbukovi-proposi*); after this basic ABC, he must have received the far more intensive training required from a government scribe and translator, if he was well enough schooled to be hired by the *Posol'skii prikaz* in 1664.[25] His Russian tutors were in all likelihood learned clergymen, since it was the Muscovite clergy who were primarily involved in education.[26] Since the Vinius family was baptized by the Russian Patriarch Nikon himself, one can surmise that they cultivated very good ties with some of the erudite priests and monks close to the court. Among them, Andrei's Russian teachers will have been found.

The evidence about Andrei Andreevich's multilingual abilities supports the theory that early exposure to different languages predisposes children to the easy acquisition of other foreign tongues. For, as an adult, he read French, Polish, English, and Latin, besides Russian, Dutch, and German. The study of Latin was a normal component of

the education of the affluent mercantile elite's children in Erasmus' native land, even if few could boast of really mastering the language after many years of its study. Like his Dutch peers, he learned the Latin versions of Greek originals. As an adult he was clearly steeped in the "Classical heritage," such as Aesop's fables as well as Tacitus's and Livy's histories. Classical tropes sometimes pervade Vinius's correspondence, and classical imagery is especially evident in the triumphal poem he composed for the victorious Peter the Great on his return to Moscow from Azov in 1696.[27] How well Vinius knew either French or English is hard to assess, but his library contained a number of books in both languages. He also seems to have traveled and acquired information without much difficulty in both France and England in 1673, which was unlikely to have merely been due to the aid of competent assistants, even if his brother and a(nother) translator were part of his small retinue.[28] Knowledge of French was even rarer than knowledge of German among the Muscovites, while they knew English less well than Dutch. Exceptionally few Russian bureaucrats commanded any of these Western-European languages in the 1660s and 1670s. Vinius boasted of some scarce skills that were heavily sought after by the government.

When (in 1673 as well) Vinius visited Spain, he evidently did not know Spanish (and there is no Spanish book in his library, although he owned a few Spanish novels in translation). He probably got by in Madrid through using a mixture of English, Latin, and the Spanish regent Mariana of Austria's German mother tongue. His proficiency in Polish was probably middling, for his library contains quite a few Polish phrasebooks and grammars, but they were printed when Vinius was already of middle age. He may have acquired them at a time when Muscovite ties with Poland became closer as reflected by the "Eternal Peace" with the *Rzeczpospolita* of 1686.[29] Vinius was dispatched late in life to liaise with Ukrainian Cossacks, who maintained intensive contact with the Poles. But virtually all Polish books in Vinius's library were for language acquisition: this was not likely a language he commanded with great ease.[30] The one Greek-language book in the collection was given to him by an Anglican bishop in 1673: it was a segment of the Bible published at Cambridge in 1665.[31] Perhaps, as with the Russian texts that were part of his book collection, other Greek books were separated from the rest of his library (either when his books were confiscated in the 1700s or after his

death). But great proficiency in Greek was rare among the Dutch and in Russia was only encountered among a few churchmen. It is unlikely that Vinius knew the language very well.

Altogether, though, Andrei Vinius was given a "good education," that gave him "the possibility of a good career," while his Orthodox baptism "eliminated . . . those barriers that could hinder a foreigner to become successful in Russian state service."[32] As Kozlovskii added in 1911, he went on to surpass his father by far in his significance for the history of Russia.[33] To reach such heights as a transplanted foreigner was not unique in early Romanov Russia, but Vinius's career presented nonetheless somewhat of a twist. Early Modern Russia was not an immigration country in the vein of the modern United States or Canada, even if Vinius was certainly not the first Russified "foreigner" who made a career serving the tsar (or the Russian Orthodox Church). Before him, however, it had been offspring of Tatar, Greek, Polish-Lithuanian, or Caucasian immigrants (apart from those with Eastern Slavic parentage) who had become important figures in the Russian state and church.

* * *

Although, upon his sudden death around 1657, his father left behind a few debts in the Dutch Republic, Andrei Andreevich may have had sufficient means at his disposal in Russia not to have to worry immediately about his livelihood.[34] Before he joined the Foreign Office in his early twenties, he is likely to have overseen some of his deceased father's business ventures, perhaps together with his stepmother. Possibly the prominent Dutch entrepreneur Jan van Sweeden served as his patron. In those days, van Sweeden was another another one of the rare Westerners who, like A.D. Vinius, enjoyed the privilege of living in Moscow proper rather than in the Western suburb.[35]

Andrei Vinius's name is already encountered among names identifying the members of the first and second merchant hundreds of 1662, undoubtedly a sign that the young man had been quickly making a name for himself as a businessman.[36] When he joined the Foreign Office in 1664, Vinius was described as a *gostinnoi sotni torgovi chelovek*, a trading man who belonged to the second-tier of the Muscovite merchants' communities.[37] This was an exclusive and privileged group whose members were often quite affluent, even if wealth

was not necessarily a precondition for belonging to this quasi-guild of tradesmen.[38] It seems that Andrei Andreevich inherited this membership from his father. It sometimes functioned as a sort of junior rank that prepared merchants for entry into the *gosti*, to which his father had belonged before Aleksei created A.D. Vinius a noble.[39] Young Vinius's rank entitled him to this caste's considerable privileges (such as exclusive trading rights), but also made him subject to its duties (which often included the collection of various fees and taxes on behalf of the tsar).[40] Vinius jr did not, however, inherit his father's noble title. If Andrei Andreevich had been considered part of Russia's "gentry," the aristocratic *dvorianstvo*, he would not be identified in contemporary records as holding the inferior status of merchant.

It is therefore safe to conclude that, during the seven or eight years that separated A.D. Vinius's death from his employment as interpreter in the Foreign Office, the young Vinius most likely worked in his father's surviving Russian-based business ventures and was apprenticed with people like van Sweeden: thus his ascription to the merchants' ranks, which was forfeited if a member did not actually involve himself in trade.[41] He may have traveled on business while continuing his academic formation. And, obviously, he had to grow up fast after his father died, but one surmises that even as a teenager he showed pluck and imagination.

* * *

In March 1664, Andrei Vinius was hired to work as an interpreter (and soon translated written texts as well) in the "Germanic tongues" in the *Posol'skii prikaz*.[42] Vinius was an obvious candidate as the polyglot son of a father who had given the tsar advice, and had been baptized by the Russian patriarch.[43] He was nevertheless subject to an examination of his linguistic abilities by a senior official.[44]

Even if hiring members of the merchant hundreds was not uncommon for the *Posol'skii prikaz*, Vinius's linguistic skill rather than any knack for business caused his initial employment by the Foreign Office.[45] Still, Vinius's business *nous* was to his advantage in his new position, for, rather than being fully salaried, servitors in the chancelleries were expected to withhold a percentage of the fees they charged supplicants for their efforts.[46] In other words, a premium was placed on profitability in acquitting oneself well of one's tasks: the more

fees one collected, the more one earned, although the Foreign Office was perhaps the least lucrative among the major government departments. Still, even when a mere translator, he lent money to people, indicative of some means. In most *prikazy*, a talent for business could be minted into substantial profits, and Vinius certainly exploited the opportunities offered by the jobs he subsequently held: dispensing medicine in the pharmacy office, collecting fees in kind and money from Siberia, and running the foreign mail (almost wholly a private venture in any case) all yielded him a tidy sum.[47] Vinius, too, was for lengthy periods of his government service in a position that gave him access to rare information, whether about Siberian developments or the flow of trade with Western Europe. On this he could cash in as well. And the experience he gained during his late teens and early twenties added to Andrei Vinius's innate aptitude for making money, a quality that he seems to have shared with his father.

If more than forty years later his recollections were still accurate, the question why Vinius became a government servant has a simple answer: Tsar Aleksei (or, rather, one of his advisors) had decreed his employment, an order impossible to refuse.[48] Andrei Andreevich may not have rued this new job, however, for it offered the kind of security that work as a merchant did not: some Russian merchants' dynasties may have lasted three generations, but the great majority of them could not hold on their status, debilitated by overbearing government demands on them or falling victim to bankruptcy through business mishaps.[49] Meanwhile, he was by Russian standards an erudite young man, and his work allowed him to use many of the languages which he had learned. Finally, his father's estate still owed money to Dutch creditors in 1660, several years after his father's death; Vinius had first-hand experience of the ups and down of business, and government employment likely appeared a safer option in Muscovy.[50] Thus Andrei Vinius probably welcomed his hiring by the *Posol'skii prikaz*.

Notes

1. He reiterated this in 1708 when he was pleading for mercy from Peter (see his letter in Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 251). In an otherwise reliable biography of Vinius, Igor' Iurkin struggles in interpreting these words in a letter by Vinius from Holland to Peter, written when Vinius had fled to his native country after his conflict with Menshikov (see

Iurkin, *Andrei*, 35–41; see below). During the seventeenth century, the Dutch, steeped in humanism, commonly called themselves Batavians, the name the Romans had used for the people who lived in the Low Countries. Equally immersed in humanism, Vinius used terms from the Classical Age in his correspondence with Peter. Nonetheless, no birth certificate for Andrei Andreevich has been found in Dutch archives. And Gijsbert Cuper believed in the 1710s that Vinius had been born in Russia (see Peters, *wijze koopman*, 111).

2. See M.L. Lahana, "Novaia Nemetskaia Sloboda: Seventeenth Century Moscow's Foreign Suburb," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, NC, 1983, 61–2; Erik Amburger, *Die Familie Marselis*, Giessen: Schmitz, 1957, 97–101.
3. Amburger, *Familie Marselis*, 100. Andrei Vinius jr himself noted in 1708 that his father's products replaced Swedish imports; he was to continue this tradition himself (Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 251).
4. See Amburger, *Familie Marselis*, 97–101; see also B.G. Kurts, *Sostoianye Rossii v' 1650–1655 g.g. po doneseniiam' Rodesa*, Moskva: Sinodal'naia tipografiia, 1914, 51–2. Winius's brother Abraham appears to have been involved as well in the early years; meanwhile, their father Denijs Tjerkszoon represented Andries' interests in Amsterdam (see Amburger, *Familie Marselis*, 103). Andrei jr claimed in 1708 that his father has invested well-nigh 20,000 rubles in the enterprise (see Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 251). This was an astronomical sum, even if this expenditure had occurred over a number of years, representing 500 times the average annual wage of an unskilled worker in the Dutch Republic at the time! The son embellished the efforts of his father a mite, which is no surprise since his 1708 letter intended to show Peter the many services the Viniuses had rendered Russia.
5. Amburger, *Familie Marselis*, 107. The Dutch remained at first non-committal in the matter, but eventually sided with Akema and Marselis after representations by Isaac Bernaertsz. to the Estates-General. It is significant that the definitive choice for Marselis and Akema coincided with Vinius's change of "nationality" in 1648.
6. Amburger, *Familie Marselis*, 105–6, 117, 117n501; Kurts, *Sostoianye Rossii*, 52; S.M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, vol. 5, Moscow: Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1961, 615–17. The factory stood still as long as it was under government administration (Amburger, *Familie Marselis*, 109). Vinius jr, who alternated with father (Peter) and sons Peter and Leonard (Leontii) Marselis as Russian postmaster, later called the unnamed Peter Marselis and Tieleman Akema "evil people" who calumnied his father (Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 251). In March 1665, Akema, in his turn, told the Dutch Ambassador Boreel that, despite the intercession on his behalf by the Dutch government in the late 1640s, he had never received redress in the matter (*Nationaal Archief, Archief der Staten-Generaal* [Den Haag; from here: *NA SG*], 8523 (*Verbael*), 276–7).

7. Samuel H. Baron, "Who Were the Gosti?," *California Slavic Studies* 7, 1973, 1–40: 20n57.
8. Amburger, *Familie Marselis*, 106; Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 5, 616–17.
9. Orlenko, *Vykhodtsy*, 138, (prilozheniia) 287. According to his son, his father converted in 1655 (7163; see Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 232; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 69–71; see as well as the "Rospis' rodu Viniusovykh," in Dobroklonskii, "'Kniga," 227–8; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 8, 50). Geertruid van Rijn had died by then.
10. Lahana, "Novaia," 97.
11. Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*, vol. 3, 411 and 411n1.
12. Amburger, *Familie Marselis*, 117, 117n501; Kurts, *Sostoianye Rossii*, 137–8, 142.
13. For the diptych by Isaack Luttichuys, painted in about 1653, see Bernd Ebert, *Simon und Isaack Luttichuys: Monographie mit kritischem Werkverzeichnis*, Berlin: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2009, 246–7, 544–5. Ebert, however, errs on several counts. The tsar in 1653 is not called "Alexander," and A.D. Vinius's wife is wrongly identified as Geertruijd Van Rijn (see ibid., 221, 545; she has to be Gertrud Meyer, unless Vinius ordered, rather lugubriously, a portrait of his long deceased wife to go along with his own). It is interesting to see Vinius sr portrayed here in a sort of hybrid Russian-Dutch dress, while his wife is dressed as Dutch as can be; one may see a foreboding here of the marital conflict that would soon erupt over the conversion to Orthodoxy. Still, in 1631 Rembrandt had portrayed Nicolaes Ruts, a wealthy Amsterdam trader on Russia, also in Russian dress because of a contemporary fashion for exotic Eastern dress in Dutch art as well as Ruts's likely desire to see the source of his wealth symbolized, not because Ruts was Orthodox. For the poem and engraving (which shows Vinius accompanied by a few more symbols referring to his activities), see *New York Public Library*, *Image ID* 1162097 (available at: http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/dgkeysearchdetail.cfm?trg=1&strucID=461300&imageID=1162097&total=334&num=40&parent_id=440343&word=&s=&notword=&d=&c=&f=&k=0&sScope=&sLevel=&sLabel=&lword=&lfield=&imgs=20&pos=57&snum=&e=w, accessed 13 July 2011).
14. Given the evidence of some of the texts in his son's library and Andrei Andreevich's exploration of the common traits shared by Russian Orthodoxy and Dutch Calvinism during his exile in the Republic in the first decade of the seventeenth century, and given the level of Calvinist allegiance in the province of Friesland, Andries Winius was probably a member of the Dutch Reformed Church. Frisia was of course the native region of Menno Simonsz., and the Akkema family was anabaptist, but Winius probably belonged to the majority in his native province that was Calvinist; that leaves open the question whether or not he sympathized with Dutch Arminianism, condemned by the 1619 Dordt Synod but still popular in the 1630s. Vinius's books do make evident that they cannot have been Catholics.

15. Iurkin argues that the tsar bestowed upon A.D. Vinius the full Russian title (in 1650 or 1651) rather than the largely honorary distinction for foreigners, which he may have already been awarded by Mikhail Romanov in the late 1620s (see Iurkin, *Andrei*, 16–17, 57–8). Being a *gost'* was far more onerous for Russian merchants, who in exchange for their status and privileges were burdened with a great number of duties (for more on this, see Baron, "Who Were the Gosti?," 19–21). In the early 1630s, A.D. Vinius had already received freedom from certain trading restrictions commonly imposed upon Western merchants (ibid., 19). For more on the ambiguous position of the *Moskovskie inozemtsy* (such as A.D. Vinius before 1648), see Demkin, *Zapadnoevropeiskoe kupechestvo*, vol. 1, 32–3.
16. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 71.
17. See W. Bergsma, "Church, State and People," in K. Davids and J. Lucassen, eds, *A Miracle Mirrored: The Dutch Republic in European Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995, 196–228: 196–7.
18. Athough it was probably untrue that A.D. Vinius had died immediately upon beating his wife for refusing to become Orthodox, it does appear as if A.D. Vinius died not long after the family converted in 1655 (Witsen suggests Christmas 1656); Witsen adds that Vinius sr had concomitantly been busy trying to denounce his former co-religionists to the tsar, which probably referred to the dispute between Vinius and Peter Marselis and Tieleman Akkema about the Tula plant (see Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*, 411). It does appear otherwise (given also the portrait by Luttichuys and Vondel's eulogy) that Winius-Vinius remained a well-acquainted and well-connected person in his native country until his death.
19. *NA SG* 8523, 231.
20. See *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh' snoshenii drevnei Rossii s' derzhavami inostrannymi*, vol. 4, S.-Peterburg': vtoroe otdelenie sobstvennoi E.I.V. Kantseliarii, 1856, 810. Besides his appearance in this record, there is little else known about this brother. He appears to have otherwise served on occasion in the Land Office from 1670 to 1673 (where he received no regular wage), and, after his return with Andrei Vinius from abroad, he was an official of the Novgorod Office for about a year (Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 114). Pyotr's further fate is unknown. It is not entirely impossible, albeit highly unlikely, that he was a cousin, son of Abraham Winius who had partnered his brother Andries in the Tula business during the 1630s. Given that Pyotr must also have been an Orthodox believer to be identified as *pod'iachii* of the *Posol'skii prikaz*, he more likely was a brother who also converted in 1655. Apart from his brother Peter, Vinius had at least one (half?-)sister, Anna, who married the clerk and eventual *d'iak* Andrei Ivanovich Gorodetskii; she was still alive in 1717 (Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 114). Gorodetskii worked for decades in the Ustiug Office; his promotion to *d'iak* in 1694 was probably related to his brother-in-law's rise (Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 141).
21. It is curious that in Moscow in the 1690s Vinius marked letters he received from the tsar (who was in faraway destinations) with European-style

dates; this was before Peter's calendar reform of 1700, in other words; this may have been more practical, but it also shows Vinius preserving a certain Western manner that he privileged over Russian-Orthodox tradition (see for example *Pism'a i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 636).

22. Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 210. Wladimiroff seems to interpret his sources freely here, but such a package was the usual fare of a Dutch humanist education for the sons of the better-off, and Andrei Andreevich showed later that he knew how to prospect for ore as well as having an understanding of the principles of mathematics when he founded Russia's first artillery school. At the time of his death, Vinius still owned Wijnant van Westen's *Mathematische Vemaecklyckheden*, the third edition of a Dutch educational work on mathematics and the natural sciences printed in 1644, likely bought by his father for his son's instruction (W. van Westen, *Mathematische Vermaecklyckheden*, 3 vols, Arnhem: Jacob van Biesen, 1644; see Savel'eva, ed. *Knigi*, 225–6).
23. Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 191. His mother's Frisian heritage seems to be conveyed in his plea to Peter of 1708 (Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 251). It was through his mother that Vinius was related to the Witsen family (see Peters, *wijze koopman*, 101).
24. See Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 203. Wladimiroff interprets Witsen's remark on father Vinius's stroke erroneously; Witsen clearly referred to A.D. Vinius, who died not long after his conversion to Orthodoxy by Nikon in approximately 1655 (about which Wladimiroff also errs, see ibid., 201–2).
25. Marker, "Primers," 2–3. Because before 1650 few of them existed and Vinius may have often resided in Tula, he probably did not attend the special primary schools attached to the *prikazy* that began to be established during the second half of the century (see N.F. Demidova, "Prikaznye shkoly nachal'nogo obrazovaniia v Moskve xvii v.," in N.A. Timoshina and I.A. Tikhoniuk, eds, *Torgovlia i predprinimatel'stvo v feodal'noi Rossii*, Moskva: Arkheograficheskii tsentr, 1994, 152–67; Amburger, *Familie Marselis*, 104).
26. See Marker, "Literacy," 77.
27. L. Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1998, 18. Note the exchange between Peter and Vinius of the summer of 1694 when Peter was in Arkhangel'sk, in which he refers to Vulcan (symbolizing fire, which had laid waste to both Moscow and Arkhangel'sk) and Neptune (*Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, 22, and ibid., primechaniia, 497–8).
28. See note 20 above; for more on this trip, see Chapter 4.
29. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 120–1, 128–9. His thesaurus may have been a gift; he clearly did not acquire it firsthand (see ibid., 120).
30. The exceptions are Cesare Baronio, *Rocznedzieie Koscielne od Narodzenia Pana y Boga Iesusa Christusa*, Krakow: Andrzei Piotrkowczyk, 1607; see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi,* 45–6; and Matthia Dobrackj, *Wydworny polityk*, Elbing: Achatz Corellen, 1671. Baronio (Baronius)'s work was a(n early) translation of a renowned ecclesiastical history, which may have been some sort of gift (and was written to serve as a Counter-Reformatory

tract); Dobrackj was a manual about the proper etiquette with which to address the Polish king and nobles. Both may have been linked to Vinius's involvement with the Eternal Peace with Poland of 1686.

31. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 53; *Biblos tis dimosias eikhis kai teleseos*…, Cambridge[?]: Cambridge Academic Tipography, 1665.
32. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 8.
33. Ibid.
34. Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 183; *City Archive of Amsterdam, Notary Archive* 1134, 6verso (2 July 1660, Notary J. van der Ven). It is not clear when A.D. Vinius died (nor from which causes). It is perhaps significant that the family converted at the height of the plague, but one can just as well suggest that A.D. Vinius converted because he was suffering from some sort of long-term illness that might have fatal consequences; afraid to leave his family as outcasts, he decided that they would be better off as Orthodox believers. Witsen seemed to imply some sort of stroke or heart attack, however, triggered by A.D. Vinius's rage about his wife's refusal to convert.
35. Perhaps the reader may object that this would be puzzling because in 1660 van Sweeden was to collect the debts A.D. Vinius owed to an Amsterdam merchant, but he may have agreed to retrieve the money because he was well acquainted with the Vinius family; for van Sweeden, see below in the text and Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 46–7.
36. See Baron, "Who Were the Gosti?," 27. In a note, Baron suggests that this is the only time he has identified a foreigner as being listed among a group of foreigners in the sources he consulted, but he misidentifies this A. Vinius as A.D. Vinius; the list of names he supplies is from a mixed group of both *gosti* and members of the *gostinnaia sotnia*, and he erroneously identifies Andrei Vinus as his deceased father (see ibid., 27–8). Thus, in fact, Baron did not encounter any foreigners on the petitions and statements that he investigated for the seventeenth century.
37. Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 183; see also Iurkin, *Andrei*, 76–8, 85. Iurkin proposes that Vinius may have begun as interpreter (*tolkach'*), a rather humble job which often paid no more than 15 rubles per year, hardly enough to survive in Moscow in those days, but was soon promoted to translator (*perevodchik*), which paid rather better (see Iurkin, *Andrei*, 84–5). Given his pedigree and education, it is likelier that he was immediately made a *perevodchik*.
38. For more on them, see Bushkovitch, *Merchants*, as well as R. Hellie, "The Economy, Trade and Serfdom," *The Cambridge History of Russia*. Vol. 1. Ed. M. Perrie. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006: 539–58: 542–3.
39. See Baron, "Who Were the Gosti?," 7–8.
40. See Baron, "Who Were the Gosti?"
41. Rather breezily, Wladimiroff writes that Vinius "completed his education around 1664," but different from patrician Dutch young men in this era (such as his cousin Nicolaas Witsen), Vinius neither pursued university study nor went on a Grand Tour, both unknown pursuits for Orthodox

believers in Muscovy around 1660 (see Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 211). Wladimiroff conjures up a fairly detailed sketch of Vinius's youth, which, however, is mainly based on conjecture (Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 209–11). Van Sweeden was quite a powerful figure, who set up a postal service (see the next chapter), and was able to persuade the Russian authorities to sequester goods in Arkhangel'sk belonging to the Amsterdam merchants Tensini and van der Raeck, who allegedly owed him money (see for example *NA SG* 8523, 318–19, 346–7, 354). The Amsterdam traders themselves were influential enough to have the Estates-General and their ambassador Boreel champion their cause in 1665. Van Sweeden was a key figure in setting up the tsar's navy project in 1667–68.

42. The plural derives from his letter of 1708 to the tsar; his (High) German, as we saw, was excellent (see Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 252).
43. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 70–1.
44. See Rogozhin's point about this (Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 41; see, too, Shamin, *Kuranty*, 99–100). If Iurkin is correct in noting that there was no Dutch translator working at the office at the time, who could have tested Vinius's Dutch skills (Iurkin, *Andrei*, 85–6)? Perhaps the Angelaers, who had mastered Dutch (they were of German background) were involved (for more on them, see the next chapter). Later, Vinius was to examine new recruits himself in similar manner (see Chapter 9). On the training of *prikaznye liudi*, see Plavsic, "Seventeenth-Century Chanceries," 28–30.
45. Baron, "Who Were the Gosti?," 34; Brown notes how two-thirds of the *d'iak*s hailed from the *dvorianstvo* (Brown, "Early Modern," 86).
46. This was of course the norm in Early Modern Europe (including in the Dutch Republic) with its ubiquitous tax farmers. In Muscovy many employed by the government were unsalaried, such as those in the three merchants' guilds, who often performed work on behalf of the government and who might be assigned to collect tax or toll revenue (see Bushkovitch, *Merchants*, 151–67, 173). This was convenient for a government that was literally cash-strapped.
47. See Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 225.
48. Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 252.
49. See Hellie, "Economy," 542; Baron, "Who Were the Gosti?," 27, 29–31, Table 11, 32–3. Of course, few merchant houses anywhere prosper for more than a few generations.
50. *City Archive of Amsterdam, Notary Archive* 1134, 6verso.

3
At the Foreign Office

Tsar Aleksei's final dozen years (1664–76) were probably the most successful of his reign, even if he faced some significant challenges. Thus the Orthodox Church Council in Moscow of 1666–67 not only deposed Patriarch Nikon but also condemned those who objected to Nikon's reforms of the early 1650s. Ultimately, the Council's decisions were pleasing to the tsar, because they asserted his supremacy over the church. They came at an highly opportune time, for Russia acquired eastern Ukraine and its numerous Orthodox believers (who worshipped according to Nikon's rituals) at the Truce of Andrusovo with the *Rzeczpospolita* in 1667, which also yielded Russia Smolensk (lost to Poland in 1611) and a temporary hold on Kyiv.[1] Still, whereas Nikon accepted his fate, the traditionalists did not accept the Council's reaffirmation of Nikon's reforms. The tsar and his successors were subsequently faced with a growing dissenters' movement collectively known as that of the Old Believers (*staroobriadtsy*). Their militancy was to range from acts of self-immolation to participation in a number of revolts against tsarist authority.

Old Believers participated in the greatest challenge to Aleksei's final years as ruler, the revolt of Stepan Razin (1630–71) of 1670–71. This rebellion stretched out along much of the lower and middle Volga region, from Astrakhan to Kazan, with both sides massacring their opponents at various occasions. One of Vinius's eventual patrons, Iakov Nikitich Odoevskii (d. 1697), earned a gruesome reputation for the retribution he handed out to the captured Cossacks and their allies at Astrakhan. Vinius will have heard first-hand accounts

of the Cossack rebellion from the Dutch sailors of the *Oryol* who were caught in the crossfire (most of them, remarkably, survived it and several returned to Moscow). Previously, he had assisted these Dutchmen in their communications with the tsar.

Vinius's first supervisor was the *dumnyi d'iak* ("duma chancellor" or "duma secretary") Almaz Ivanov (d. 1669), who by 1664 had managed the Foreign Office for more than a decade and was allied with the formal chief of the office, the tsar's father-in-law, Boyar Il'ia Danilovich Miloslavskii (d. 1668).[2] But by early 1667 they relinquished the reins to others, headed by the newly minted Boyar Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin.[3] In his last decade, Aleksei relied heavily on the advice of two favorites, Ordin-Nashchokin (from 1667 to 1671) and Artamon Matveev (from 1671 to 1676), who successively headed the *Posol'skii prikaz* and were thus Vinius's supervisors.[4] Ordin-Nashchokin followed a mercantilist policy aimed at reining in the efforts of Western Europeans (and particularly the Dutch merchants) to dominate the Russian market, or, at least, at reserving a greater share of the proceeds for the Russian government. Indeed, Ordin seems to have tried to fight the Dutch dominance with his own Dutch, by way of the extraordinarily costly attempt to have a Russian seafaring fleet to traverse the Caspian Sea built and manned by Dutchmen. Intended to sharply increase the Russian share in the silk export from Asia to Europe, this project was a grandiose failure, collapsing under the blows of the Razin revolt. Matveev followed his predecessor's direction in economic policy: He dispatched Vinius in search of ore to the Urals, in hopes of finding bullion, or at least bronze and iron, useful for the expansion of Russia's native weapons' industry.

Finally, in Aleksei's personal life dramatic changes occurred that were to have long-lasting consequences, although that only became obvious after his death. In March 1669 his wife Mariia Miloslavskaia (1625–69) died, followed by the 16-year-old heir to the throne, Tsarevich Aleksei, in 1670. In February 1671 the tsar remarried with Natal'ia Naryshkina (1651–94), in part because neither of his two surviving sons (Fyodor, born in 1661, and Ivan, born in 1666) by Mariia was in good health. In the spring of 1672, Natal'ia gave birth to a son, who was baptized as Peter.

* * *

Because of the strategic importance of Dutch trade for Russia and the position of the Republic as a global staple of information and trade in the seventeenth century, the *Posol'skii prikaz*'s hiring of Andrei Andreevich Vinius in 1664 was a logical step.[5] At the time of his recruitment, the Muscovite government had no distinct translator of Dutch on its staff, which at first sight appears odd, given the volume and value of Dutch trade on Moscow. Perhaps the need for an interpreter had for a while remained latent because a number of Dutch merchants, officers, entrepreneurs, and agents residing in Moscow were proficient in Russian. People such as the powerful tycoon Koenraad van Klenk (1628–91) and, before him, Isaac Massa (1586–1643), Peter Marselis, van Klenk's father George (c. 1580–1643), or Vinius's father, provided the tsar with both Dutch translation services and intelligence originating in the Republic.[6] Translators from the German seem to have rendered Dutch texts in Russian. But it was obviously more convenient to have a loyal subject of the tsar work as interpreter and translator, who could monitor Dutch designs on behalf of the government more closely.

Two acutely imperative reasons explain the government's motivation in hiring Vinius at that particular time. In the first place, the Russians were awaiting a Dutch embassy led by Jacob Boreel, which was to spend considerable time in 1664 and 1665 in the country.[7] The embassy as such, meanwhile, was not much of a success. At one point the Russians believed that Boreel would mediate in the war between Poland and Russia, which was not part of the Dutchman's assignment. This disappointed the Russians; meanwhile, conflict erupted over protocol on several occasions, especially since in their formal response to Boreel's mission the Muscovites did not want to address the Dutch Estates-General with a sufficiently honorable title.[8] Finally, while Boreel was mainly interested in resolving a number of grievances of Dutch merchants against the Russian authorities (and the tsar's subjects), the Russians made few concessions in this regard.[9]

Among Boreel's retainers was Nicolaas Witsen. This young son of one of Amsterdam's mayors had chosen to visit Russia in a sort of exotic version of the Grand Tour. He was, in fact, a distant relative of the tsar's translator, Vinius, although the two were unaware of being family at that time. Witsen, too, interviewed the mercurial and influential Dutch expatriate Jan van Sweeden about the remoter regions of Muscovy.[10]

It is possible that the tsar's government at the time of Vinius's hiring did not yet foresee a permanent role for the young man. Vinius at first may have been considered a temporary addition, who might be dismissed after the Boreel mission had returned home. But Vinius was fortunate, which leads us to the second reason for his employment by the tsar. At precisely this time, newspapers began to arrive in Moscow with great regularity through the establishment of a regular postal service with Western Europe.[11] Half of the newspapers that reached the Russian capital were in Dutch. They were translated into Russian for the tsar's consumption under the name of *kuranty* (in itself a word derived form the Dutch *courant* or *krant*). Ingrid Maier has traced their translation convincingly to Vinius.[12]

The origin of the establishment of a postal service whose primary concern was to purvey Western newspapers to the tsar may have been Vinius's translation of the newspapers that the Boreel Embassy's staff brought with it to Moscow.[13] The Dutch Embassy's staff itself was debriefed by the Russians, but also brought along detailed newspaper reports about peace negotiations between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Ottoman Sultan. This information had bearing on the Russian strategic position, for Russia was still at war with Poland in 1664.

Perhaps from both Witsen and Vinius, van Sweeden learned that the Muscovites had eagerly pumped the Dutch for news. Van Sweeden smelled an opportunity. He submitted a proposal to the tsar to start a regular postal service between Russia and Western Europe through Swedish-held Riga. Vinius's employment as translator from the Dutch in the Foreign Office must have made van Sweeden's proposals even more attractive to Aleksei, who gave the green light to van Sweeden's mail operation at the end of May 1665, right at the moment when the Dutch mission left.[14] The postal service was tasked with the delivery of *vedomosti* (literally, news), in other words, newspapers, to the tsar. Vinius thereby became an almost indispensable specialist to the tsar. From then on, his job at the Foreign Office was secure. It leads one to suspect that Vinius and van Sweeden worked in tandem. We saw earlier how van Sweeden likely stood as Vinius's patron since at least 1660; certainly, Vinius and van Sweeden shared a hostility to the Marselis clan, rivals competing for the tsar's favor.[15]

As translator of newspapers, Vinius became a crucial supplier of strategic information to the tsar, a sort of Muscovite version of a

CIA analyst in the Cold War.[16] His task in this regard included the reading of the news aloud to the tsar and his closest advisors.[17] After he had been given various other responsibilities, he continued to have spells translating and summarizing foreign news for Tsars Fyodor III and Peter the Great.[18] Apart from Russian and Dutch, Vinius's *kuranty* drew on his German and, likely, Latin, given the newspapers' origins and the contents of his personal library.[19] Whereas this information was far from the only data about matters European that reached Moscow, it was crucial. Newspapers provided a continuous narrative, which was superior to the snapshots that the interrogations of those (foreigners and Russians) arriving from abroad, foreign pamphlets, or envoys' reports had previously yielded; and Dutch newspapers were seen as the most accurate.[20] The effect on the Russian government and beyond of this diffusion of the goings-on in Europe was profound. According to its recent Russian historian, the proliferation of this news should be seen as "an aspect of Russian seventeenth-century culture [that aids our] understanding of the mechanism of Russian society's modernization and its integration into the European cultural world."[21]

Since more than half of the newspapers arriving in the mail were in Dutch during the 1660s and 1670s, the government could hardly do without a native speaker assigned to this task in the Foreign Office. Only in the 1670s was another Dutch translator, Leontii Gross, was hired, perhaps because Vinius began to concentrate primarily on other things (such as his first diplomatic trip or the foreign-mail service).[22] Once the compilation of *kuranty* became standardized in the *prikaz* (and this seems to have occurred at least by 1670), Vinius was assisted by others such as Gross who could translate from the Dutch. From the beginning, meanwhile, Vinius collaborated with other interpreters on translations from German newspapers, while those in other languages were translated by other colleagues.[23] After he became Russian postmaster in 1675, he added material to the *kuranty* that was culled from sources other than Western newspapers.[24]

These compilations were prepared at great speed: the translators worked assiduously once the foreign newspapers had been delivered, often finishing their work within a day.[25] The efficiency of the process will have been aided by the fact that Vinius for about two years (late autumn of 1675–December 1677) was both postmaster and *prikaz*

translator. After his departure from the Foreign Office in 1677, no one replaced him as full-time Dutch–Russian translator, although the German-speaker Gross was fluent enough to continue to translate from the Dutch.

It should be noted here that when the opportunity arose Vinius seems to have played the role of an intelligence officer throughout his career. When he was stranded in Riga in December 1672, he immediately relayed news to Moscow about a Polish–Ottoman armistice that had to be ratified by the Polish *Sejm* (the noble parliament).[26] Poland had to surrender Podolia (the Ottoman border thus moved to the close proximity of the town of L'viv-Lwow), and pay a high annual tribute to the Porte, Vinius wrote. But many of the Polish nobles refused to accept the treaty, even considering the organization of a confederation (a sort of legal rebellion) against King Michail (who died a few months later, leaving the issue unresolved).[27] The information Vinius provided from Riga was detailed and precise, and probably as good as anything the tsar received from other sources such as the *kuranty* or his Polish informers. And Vinius directly linked his intelligence gathering to his work in compiling the *kuranty* when he wrote the tsar, "a foreign resident of Riga brought me several newsletters (*vestovye listy*) [about this topic] . . . that I will sent to you with this letter."[28] The Polish–Ottoman conflict was pivotal to Vinius and the tsar, because it was the reason for Vinius's dispatch to the West in 1672. In the same letter Vinius promised the tsar to keep him informed, whenever he had the chance during his mission, about all matters relevant to the Russian interest.[29]

* * *

For almost a decade, Vinius remained the only servitor wholly fluent in Dutch in Muscovy's Foreign Office. A few of the other translator-interpreters (such as the various members of the Angelaer family) knew some Dutch, however, even if that was not the language(s) for which they were primarily responsible in the Moscow *prikaz*.[30] In this period, the government retained in Arkhangel'sk (the White Sea port through which trade with Western Europe was conducted) Roman Spaets as a Dutch–Russian translator, but besides Vinius no chancellery worker in Moscow was fluent in Dutch.

Upon his appointment in March 1664, Vinius became one of a group of 19 translators in the Foreign Office.[31] The department's senior posts were occupied by *d'iak*s ("chancellors" or "secretaries"), who oversaw *pod'iachie* ("vice-chancellors"), translators, and interpreters, while the chancellery further employed *zolotopistsy* (scribes who wrote in gold or silver ink agreements, petitions, diplomas, and letters with foreign countries, etc.), *pristav*s ("minders," of foreign diplomatic visitors, usually temporarily appointed, from the middling aristocracy), janitors, and sometimes artists, including iconographers (as well as Johann Gregory's actors, the first thespians to perform on stage in Russia in the 1670s).[32] As a mere translator, Vinius had a low rank, but his importance was far greater than his formal position in the hierarchy of the office implied.

His place of residence bespeaks his prominence. From 1666 until 1689, Vinius lived in *Zemlianyi gorod* near the *Pokrovka*, a neighbourhood in Moscow for those of some means and status, in which several of the *Posol'skii prikaz*'s *d'iak*s and *pod'iachie* lived.[33] He married in the mid-1660s Vasilisa Kliment'eva Patokina (d. 1691?), who gave birth to at least two children, a boy and a girl, who reached adulthood (although both preceded Vinius to their grave).[34] Patokina, whose father had died as the tsar's envoy in Iran, belonged to an aristocratic family, another sign of Vinius's prestige, for at the time of his wedding he was not yet part of the nobility himself.[35] Vinius's place of residence and his marriage indicate that, already in his early days in government service, he was not considered some low-ranked run-of-the-mill interpreter (of whom there were quite a few), who survived on a meager salary. When he was transferred from the Foreign Office to the Pharmacy Office in 1677, he received more than 1,000 acres of land in conditional tenure.[36] Undoubtedly, with this land came serfs, although their presence remains unmentioned in the record that lists the grant. This reward was added to an annual wage of about 85 rubles, a fairly modest sum, but by then he supplemented his wage with the fees he charged as a postmaster.[37] His salary doubled by 1680, and reached 228 rubles by 1687. It hovered at this level until he absconded to Holland in 1706.[38] Such a salary translates into five times the income the average Dutch artisan made at that time; and he owned in addition ever larger manorial estates, most of them eventually in full ownership rather than in conditional tenure.

In 1689, Vinius received for his years of loyal service a state-owned house with a courtyard in *Belyi gorod* on Bol'shaia Miasnitskaia street, in the vicinity of the *Aptekarskii prikaz*'s botanical (or herb) garden and the Sretenskii monastery, a location closer to the Kremlin than his previous residence.[39] But by then he had been ennobled, and was patronized by several of the highest government leaders, such as Iakov Odoevskii and Emel'ian Ukraintsev (see below).

While he always lived in circumstances that were decidedly comfortable, and enjoyed an affluence that was far beyond the reach of the great majority of contemporary Russians or Dutch, he was as vulnerable to disease as the poorest vagabond. Vinius's life was indeed marked by all of his children's early grave. Some died in their infancy or childhood years, while some passed away as young adults. Fire, the scourge of a Russia in which most dwellings were made of wood, was to have a devastating impact on him at the end of his life as well. Perhaps he had a premonition of the tragedy that would befall him in his dotage when he wrote to Peter the Great in April 1698 that "Vulcanus intermittently roams here and visited my neighborhood already three times, and last week, if it wasn't for a contrary wind, I would also have been buried by him."[40] But he managed at least for almost all of his life to avoid being caught in the crossfire of war or suffer from hunger, the other scourges that made life in the Early Modern Age extremely hazardous even for the affluent.

At the Foreign Office, which was situated on the Kremlin's grounds, workdays started early in the morning and lasted until six or seven at night (with a break for lunch), with Saturday afternoon and Sunday morning off.[41] Hours were, however, more flexible for someone such as Vinius, even if this meant that he could be called in at a moment's notice to read the foreign news to the tsar.[42] The tsar's council (*duma*) usually listened on Monday to reports made by *prikaz* officials, which might include a reading of foreign-news summaries by Vinius.[43] If matters of war and peace required this, the council might summon him on other days than Mondays. His starting wage was probably no more than about ten rubles per year, but likely rose fairly swiftly, because of his special skills.[44] There was the possibility of receiving commissions for services rendered to visitors to the office (such as drafting or processing petitions), but those opportunities in the Foreign Office were comparatively scarce, as we saw. In 1678, the high-ranking bureaucrat Emel'ian Ukraintsev requested a raise in his

base salary for this reason (which he was granted; it made him earn 90 rubles a year as *d'iak* in 1679).[45]

But probably rather more than Ukraintsev, Vinius must have received some remuneration for drafting documents. Most European foreigners fell under the jurisdiction of the *Posol'skii prikaz*. The Dutch expatriate community was substantial (in numbers and wealth), and may have turned to Vinius to draw up petitions and the like when dealing with the government. Vinius was also the beneficiary of special bonuses (for his foreign trip of 1672–74 as well as holiday gratuities, for example) and, as we saw, eventually was granted land with enserfed peasants who were to cultivate it.

* * *

Already in the early days of his service in the office, Vinius rose to "public prominence" in his capacity as the tsar's interpreter-translator assigned to Boreel's Embassy.[46] As I have noted, the embassy accomplished little in terms of its (largely economic) goals, but included Witsen among the ambassador's retainers. The Amsterdammer kept a diary that has remained a valuable source for our understanding of mid-seventeenth-century Muscovy.[47] Witsen and Vinius appear to have struck up a friendship that lasted for more than half a century.[48] They shared an inquisitive mind, which was to make Witsen into a correspondent of the fledgling Royal Society.

Vinius was a key source of information for Witsen's *magnum opus* on Siberia, of which the first edition appeared in 1692.[49] Prior to that, Witsen produced a map of the "Northern and Eastern Parts of Europe and Asia" which is dated 1687, but its dedication (on the surviving copies) to Tsar Peter alone leads to the suspicion that it was actually printed later, or that early versions were destroyed.[50] Its issue certainly delighted Peter, and may have helped to restore Vinius's damaged reputation at a crucial time. The map stood out for its accuracy and detail about a part of the world hitherto virtually unknown in Europe, even if the modern-day reader notes some glaring errors and omissions. They were, however, mainly due to lack of information about some of the remotest parts.[51]

Bruno Naarden suggests on persuasive grounds that Vinius began to sluice information to Witsen in 1665. Evidently, soon after his return from Moscow, Witsen had in his possession copies of both

the diplomatic report of the Muscovite envoy Fyodor Iakovlevich Baikov of his mission to China during the 1650s and a map of the Caspian Sea.[52] If Vinius had indeed transferred these items to Witsen, he played a dangerous game. The Russian government was utterly jealous of its secrets. It would not have been pleased to find out that a recent ambassador's report and a map of a strategic area (where Muscovy clashed with Turks and Persians as well as grappled with unruly Cossacks) had fallen into the hands of one of Amsterdam's powerful mayor's sons!

Indeed, this was tantamount to treason.[53] Even if Vinius might have argued that sharing such information with the Dutch government presented no immediate military danger to Russia, Russians and Dutch were in economic competition with each other in both Iran and China. In Iran, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was attempting to increase its share of silk exports and the Company had dispatched an embassy to Beijing that was at the Qing court at the same time as Fyodor Baikov.[54] The Muscovite and VOC officials were both interested in trade with the Middle Kingdom. Given this state of affairs, it is obvious why Witsen was never to name Vinius in *Noord- en Oost-Tartarye*, even if the book's first edition was only issued in 1692, when Russia's xenophobic cult of secrecy was fading quickly.[55]

Such risky behavior during his early days in the tsar's service underlines Vinius's ambiguous loyalty. This sort of attitude was not uncommon in this age. The Dutch had their share of spies, while, to name but another graphic example of the fluidity of loyalty during this era, a remarkable number of Cromwellians became Stuart supporters overnight in 1660. Vinius never appears to have lost this ambiguity, despite reaping rich rewards from his work in the Russian government across the decades. It explains at least in part his decision to choose Holland as his destination in 1706. Perhaps, too, this fickle loyalty is expressed in Vinius's strenuous efforts to enrich himself somewhat beyond the norm considered reasonable for Muscovite officials. One can point at several moments in Vinius's life that seem to hint that he viewed his work for the Russian government in an instrumental fashion, more or less from the vantage point of the modern-day employee.

Less harmful to the interests of the Russian state was something else that Vinius conveyed to Witsen: his critical commentary on Olearius's famous account of the 1630s Holsteiner embassy

to Tsar Mikhail Romanov, a veritable bestseller in a multitude of European languages since its first appearance in the 1647.[56] The future Amsterdam regent received this critique probably a few years after his visit to Moscow; it attests to the sustained contact between Witsen and Vinius after 1665.[57] Although the review's author is not further identified beyond being an Orthodox convert who evidently reads Dutch, there is little doubt that it was Vinius: few if any other erudite Orthodox-baptized consummate readers of Dutch resided in Moscow.[58] The inquisitive Witsen, who had embarked on the early stages of his *magnum opus* about Siberia, had apparently asked Vinius to verify Olearius's information for him.

Most of the criticism of this commentary is either wrong or misrepresents Olearius's points, as the twentieth-century Dutch editors of Witsen's notes indicate.[59] To a degree, this was due to the errors in the Dutch translation that Vinius used, but one also discerns in the sharp tone of the rebuttal of Olearius a Russian pique with a haughty foreigner who had written *the* book about Muscovy, in which a number of Russian customs had been dismissed as the habits of savages.[60] He thus quibbles over Olearius's observation that fires are a well-nigh weekly occurrence in Moscow, which the Holsteiner believed a result of the city's buildings being almost entirely made out of wood.[61] Vinius laments Olearius's disdain for the crudity of Muscovites, who not only build in wood but lack proper caution with fire. In similar vein, Vinius also condemns as a crude caricature Olearius's portrayal of Russians as inveterate drunks and sodomites, morally depraved liars, and dubious Christians.[62]

That Vinius was indeed Olearius's critic seems to be confirmed by one of the more accurate criticisms leveled at Olearius, regarding the Holsteiner's underestimation of the extent of Russian rule eastward.[63] Precisely at this time, Vinius was writing a treatise that listed the distances between Moscow and various other cities; throughout his life interested in maps, he was better aware than almost any of his colleagues of the location of the Russian realm's borders.[64] In addition, the critic decried Olearius's observation that clerks in the *prikazy* did not write their notes in bound notebooks; as a chancellery worker, Vinius undoubtedly knew that the Russian bureaucracy's traditional manner of collecting paper by glueing together files on rolls was disappearing.[65]

Vinius's contact with Witsen is among the first evidence of Russia's participation in the European Republic of Letters. Their communications heralded Russians' burgeoning interest in the Scientific Revolution (Witsen corresponded with the Royal Society) that eventually led to Peter's *Kunstkamera* and the foundation of the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg more than half a century later, in 1725. Andrei Vinius was predisposed in this direction by his humanist education and his youth alongside a father who had founded an iron forge and arms manufactory at Tula. One suspects, however, that, more than his upbringing, it was van Sweeden's influence and especially Witsen's infectious enthusiasm that saw Vinius drawing maps, translating fables into Russian, and drafting plans for a seaworthy navy soon after the Boreel Embassy's departure from Moscow.

At some early point in their friendship, Witsen gave Vinius a copy of *De iure belli ac pacis* by the legal philosopher Grotius (Hugo de Groot, 1583–1645) in a Dutch translation.[66] This influential pioneering treatise on international law left its mark on Vinius's political thought, and perhaps by extension on Russian foreign policy toward Europe.[67] Grotius's work is considered the first coherent attempt at outlining an equitable system of international law, superseding the medieval theory of Christian unity and the practice of might making right.[68] Of course, many a book remains unread by its owner, and even if Vinius read Grotius (which appears evident from the many annotations that survive in Vinius's copy), we should heed Peter Brown's caveat that "[t]o penetrate the opacity of Muscovite decision-making remains a frustrating endeavor for historians."[69] While a direct link between Grotius and the quasi-*realpolitik* of Aleksei through Vinius's influence is difficult to prove, it nonetheless seems that Vinius supplied an outline of the Dutch legal theorist's ideas to Tsars Aleksei or Fyodor III and their key advisors.

Vinius also may have discerned the emerging idea of the Concert of Europe that was linked to Grotius' ideas. The subtle Muscovite negotiation skills in the discussions with Poland at Andrusovo in 1666–67, the diplomatic feelers put out toward the European Christian Powers in 1672–74, and the deft deflection of European overtures toward Muscovy in 1674–76 seem to betray a notion of Grotius's pioneering work of international relations and international law.[70] Likewise, Vinius may have conveyed something to the tsar or the *prikaz* chiefs about the free-trade philosophy that was in the ascendancy in his

native land. He owned since 1665 a copy of Pieter de la Court (1618–85)'s *Interest of Holland*, a sharply anti-mercantilist book that was published anonymously (and therefore was thought to represent the viewpoint of the Dutch political leader Johan de Witt [1625–72]).[71] The Dutch ambassador Koenraad van Klenk tried in 1676 to persuade Artamon Matveev of the benefits of adopting free-trade policies for Russia, but, a mercantilist like Ordin before him, Matveev remained unconvinced.[72] Thanks to Vinius's rendition of de la Court's arguments, Matveev probably anticipated van Klenk's arguments.

It may seem an exaggeration to suggest that Vinius had enough clout to influence the tsar and his key advisors in such matters as the conduct of foreign policy or mercantilism. But he was regularly in Aleksei's presence because of his composition and presentation of the *kuranty*. His father had been one of Aleksei's favorites: nothing mattered more than kinship and patronage in the Muscovite power structure.[73] Young Vinius was probably appreciated by the tsar in the way he favored the sons of the powerful boyar families. Vinius's bold suggestions for the construction of a galley fleet confirms this unusual influence of someone who was formally a mere translator.[74] In addition, it should not be forgotten that a number of translators did play a crucial strategic role in a country eternally besieged by foreign foes of diverse hue. That Aleksei was impressed by Vinius is also evident from his appointment as head of the postal service in 1672 and again in 1675, and his dispatch in the intervening period as Muscovite envoy to the kings of England, France, and Spain.

In these early years of his work in the Foreign Office, Vinius additionally prepared a cartographic overview of Muscovy and a separate map of Siberia, albeit drawn up in traditional Russian manner, i.e., devoid of the map-making geometrical skills by then developed in Europe (in which the Low Countries had played a marked role).[75] In 1667, he drafted a series of short descriptions of the capitals of the "world" (mainly Europe), to which he added their distance from Moscow (to which I referred above).[76] The work rendered the approximate distance between Moscow and Russian towns as well as listed the major stops along various waterways or roads that led to them. This seems a bit of an amateurish project, but this sort of description of geographical distance (and routes) was often included with accompanying maps in contemporary Western-European geographical or

travelers' accounts. They can even be encountered in a learned treatise such as Witsen's *Noord- en Oost Tartarye*: it details in similar manner the distances between what were to the Western Europeans hitherto unknown locations in Inner and East Asia.[77] In this period, too, Vinius compiled an eclectic series of religious and lay moral tales in manuscript, possibly intended for educative purposes (perhaps to instruct the tsar's numerous offspring).[78]

Vinius liaised in Moscow with the Dutch shipwrights and sailors who were ordered to establish a modern Caspian sailing fleet for the tsar in 1667 and 1668, although the group largely operated without Vinius's mediation after it had left the capital in early 1669.[79] Vinius translated their captain David Butler's ship's regulations and the contracts with the Dutch shipwrights and sailors.[80] In December 1668, Vinius, evidently inspired by plans proposed by Butler to the tsarist government, suggested to his supervisors the creation of a large Muscovite galley fleet on the Caspian Sea.[81] Vinius called for a squadron of galleys (*katorgi*), rowed by convicts, as being better suited to the shallow waters of that sea, able to move forward against the wind, and capable of entering wide river-deltas, while equipped with carrying cannon that could hit long-distance targets.[82] The ships would also carry cargo at the same time. Raw materials for the construction of such ships and weaponry were readily available in Muscovy.

In this way, Vinius argued, prisoners would be deployed usefully rather than idling in prisons. The Ottoman use of galleys rowed by a captive population may have been behind Vinius's idea, but Louis XIV ordered the outfit of convict galleys at this time, too.[83] Indeed, one can read into the proposal an echo of the Dutch Republic's penchant for reformatory and productive capitalist labor by delinquents. The term *katorga* (deriving from the word used for galley) subsequently became a Russian synonym for prisoners' hard-labor regime, a notorious institution in Tsarist Russia, while the tradition of re-education by back-breaking forced labor was writ large in the Russian-Soviet context.[84] Vinius thus was a trail blazer, too, of one of the most woeful practices of modern Russian history.

Nothing came of the suggestion for a galley fleet for a quarter century, but it cannot be wholly coincidental that in 1695 Vinius was involved in the transport of a Dutch-built galley to Moscow. After arrival in Arkhangel'sk, it was taken apart in Vologda and then

reassembled in Moscow. It then served as a model for 20 of the galleys used in the successful siege of Azov in the next year.[85] In his proposal of 1668, Vinius reminded his superiors that the sailship of the Holsteiner Embassy (of which Olearius had been part) in the 1630s had been shipwrecked in a storm on the Caspian.[86] Indeed, given Vinius's knowledge about this disaster, one wonders why Ordin-Nashchokin, who simultaneously supervised the *Posol'ski prikaz* and the ship-building project in 1668–69, did not consider the potential futility of another sailship's construction. Perhaps the *Oryol*, the ship that was brought along the Volga to Astrakhan in 1669, was capable of negotiating the shallows and volatile winds of the Caspian, but we will never know. The ship never reached the sea, as it was abandoned by its crew in the course of the Razin rebellion in 1670.

One final observation should be made about Vinius's unsuccessful proposal of 1668. It does provide further evidence of Vinius's maverick behavior, as Kozlovskii suggests: he begged for forgiveness as the plan was not part of job description, but justified his presumption by claiming that he could not stop himself from drafting it.[87] The plan attests to the enterprising spirit and fertile imagination that Vinius exhibited throughout his life.

* * *

Despite all these activities, Vinius engaged in private business on the side, which is not as surprising as it might seem at first, since the leading Muscovite merchants doubled as government officials, too.[88] Iurkin suggests that Vinius's personal fortune remained modest in his early years in the *Posol'skii prikaz*, but we simply do not know how much property Vinius had inherited from his father.[89] And his job as postmaster was largely a private affair, in which the opportunity to turn a profit was considerable.

In early 1672 Andrei Vinius was appointed head of the Muscovite postal system with Europe, replacing Peter Marselis sr. His initial stint heading this formally private enterprise was brief, however. Already by the fall of 1672 Marselis' son Peter jr replaced Vinius, who was dispatched to Western Europe on a more urgent diplomatic mission.[90] After the younger Marselis proved a poor manager of the mail service, nevertheless, Vinius was reappointed as its head in December 1675, and then held this position for a quarter century.[91] It goes without

saying that the regular delivery of mail enhanced the flow of information that came to Moscow, which included the Western newspapers mentioned above. They now immediately fell into Vinius's hands upon their arrival.[92] According to one observer, the establishment of the postal network may have laid the groundwork for a "communications' revolution" in the Early Modern Era.[93] Whereas this might overstate its importance, it was another instrument that contributed to Russia's modernization.

Part of his task as postmaster was less edifying: he served as censor of the foreign mail as well.[94] In 1682 the boyar regency council headed by V.V. Golitsyn ordered Vinius to intercept any astrological calendars that arrived with the foreign mail.[95] Anyone caught in possession of horoscopes risked the death penalty. Apparently, the leading boyars had been disturbed by a prediction that had foretold the bloodshed of May 1682 that materialized in Moscow. In 1690, Vinius ordered his subordinates at Smolensk to examine all domestic mail with foreign destination.[96] Here, too, he stood at the beginning of a hallowed Russian tradition.

Furthermore, means applied to maintain or improve the postal service were harsh, following tried custom: when, after the disruption caused by the political unrest of the spring and summer of 1682, the delivery of mail from Riga slowed down, tardy postal dispatchers (*iamshchiki*) were threatened with beatings by the knout (a threat subsequently repeated).[97] Given the distances involved, Vinius seems to have run an efficient service: letters from Danzig to Moscow took less than a month, and from Moscow to Danzig a mere three weeks.[98] But he was reluctant to reopen the delivery via Vilnius (Wilno) in the 1680s, which had fallen into disuse, as it complicated his business. He managed for two years to keep the regent Sofia (1657–1704) and her favorite Golitsyn at bay, before he was forced to allow for delivery through Vilnius.[99] It was perhaps a typical sign of a bureaucrat's obstreperous attitude, and it was likely informed by Vinius's feeling that he was already overwhelmed by his workload. Nonetheless, his defiance also bespeaks his independent streak and even audacity in facing down the *de-facto* rulers of Muscovy.

Eventually a postal link with Arkhangel'sk was added. Letters traveled the Moscow-Arkhangel'sk route (more than 600 miles) in fewer than 11 days at any time of the year and were dispatched from the capital twice a week.[100] If we bear in mind that the van Klenk Embassy

took no fewer than four months (September 1675 – January 1676) to traverse the same distance, we may conclude that Vinius set up a very efficient service.

As I noted earlier, Vinius received no remuneration for his work as postmaster; instead, he was paid as a private businessman, receiving fees from those sending the letters, including the Russian treasury.[101] This seems odd to us today, but a similar payment scheme prevailed when he headed the Siberian Office. It reminds of the contemporary phenomena of tax farming both common in Western Europe and Russia or of the French custom of the sale of government offices. The government's risk was thus reduced, while those who failed to pay their dues were subject to severe retribution. But in most places, this system worked both for the state and those who rendered the service, for it usually created a choice opportunity to turn a handsome profit. Still, in Muscovy's bureaucracy circumstances for personal enrichment were not always ideal: thus, while the government assigned or farmed out the collection of indirect (tolls, fees) and direct taxes to private merchants, not all fared well in this business.[102] Vinius, however, seems not to have had to make up shortfalls out of his own pocket, perhaps because his payment system was fairly simple: letters and packages would not be dispatched if fees were not paid. Vinius did not have to pay the postal couriers, who were paid by the *Posol'skii prikaz*, in a typical entanglement of government and private business.[103] The biggest headache was caused by the Riga and Vilnius postmasters, who both took their cuts and might interfere for a variety of reasons with the delivery of mail destined for, or dispatched from, Russia.

Notes

1. For its significance, see Norman Davies, *God's Playground*, rev. ed., vol. 1, New York: Columbia UP, 2005, 263–4.
2. See Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*, 109–10; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 81; Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 76–7. Ivanov's deputy was the *pod'iachii* (undersecretary) Iakov Pozdyshev, while *pod'iachii* Mikhail Postnikov was third in command (Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 45).
3. Miloslavskii suffered a stroke in 1665 (S. Collins, *The Present State of Russia*, London: Dorman Newman, 1671, 106–7; G.K. Kotoshikhin, P. Gordon, J. Streis, and Tsar' Aleksei Mikhailovich, *Moskoviia i Evropa*, Moscow: Sergei Dubov, 2000, 196). See as well Iurkin, *Andrei*, 81–2. On Miloslavskii's important role, see O.E. Kosheleva and B.N. Morozov,

"Sluzhebnaia deiatel'nost' boiar v xvii veke," in C.S.L. Dunning et al., eds, *Rude and Barbarous Kingdom Revisited*, Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2008, 131–53: 139–40.

4. According to Johan de Rodes, Matveev was the stepson of Almaz Ivanov (see "List' Ioganna de Rodesa Koroleve Khristine 20 ianvaria 1654 g.," *Sbornik Novgorodskogo Obshchestva Liubitelei Drevnosti* 8, 1916, 48–50: 49). Since Ivanov had been Vinius's first chief (and had likely played a part in hiring him), Matveev's succession of Ordin probably boosted Vinius's standing.
5. On the volume and nature of Dutch trade on Arkhangel'sk, see Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 44–52. Wladimiroff makes the same point as I do here (Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 210).
6. See for instance G. Edward Orchard, "Introduction," in I. Massa, *A Short History of the Beginnings and Origins of These Present Wars in Moscow* . . ., trans. and ed. G.E. Orchard, Toronto: U. of Toronto P., 1982, ix–xxiv: xix; Shamin, *Kuranty*, 16, 51, 74–5. See also J. Driessen, "Het gezantschap van Reinoud van Brederode in 1615 en 1616 naar Rusland," in *Rusland in Nederlandse ogen: Een bundel opstellen*, eds J. Driessen, M. Jansen, and W. Roobol, Amsterdam: Van Oorschot, 1986, 51–73: 55.
7. See *NA SG* 8523; Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*. The arrival of Boreel's embassy in Moscow was delayed at the border because both Swedes (who ruled Livonia) and Russians feared it would bring the pest that was plaguing Amsterdam; it thus seems that Vinius's employment did coincide with the initially expected time of its arrival (see *NA SG* 8523, 82–91, 126–7). For Vinius's role as translator see, for example, ibid., 214.
8. *NA SG* 8523, 315–19, 329–38, 356.
9. It is particularly interesting for those investigating Peter the Great's biography that among the complainants was Frans Timmerman, who was arrested during a visit to the Siberian Office after the Russians had found out that he had lodged a grievance with Boreel (*NA SG* 8523, 338). He was the same evening released after Boreel immediately protested this treatment. In the 1680s, Timmerman became Peter's mathematics teacher, who facilitated the refurbishing of the first boat Peter was to sail on a lake near Moscow. The incident does show that Boreel did wield considerable clout as representative of the Dutch government. The Russians, too, anxiously inquired with Boreel whether the Anglo-Dutch War that had broken out in early 1665 would mean that the Dutch merchant fleet would not arrive in Arkhangel'sk that summer (*NA SG* 8523, 322).
10. See Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*, 373–88. Van Sweeden's meeting with Witsen is remarkable because Boreel denounced van Sweden on behalf of the Estates-General (at the request of Tensini and van der Raeck, as we saw in the previous chapter; see also *NA SG* 8523, 345–6).
11. Arkheograficheskaia kommissiia, *Dela tainago prikaza*, vol. 1 (Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, vol. 21), St. Petersburg: Glavnoe Upravlenie Udelov, 1907, 1066; Shamin, *Kuranty*, 55.

12. Maier has engaged in an exhaustive study of the *kuranty*: She notes a remarkable uptick for the 1660s, see Maier, "Zeventiende-eeuwse Nederlandse couranten," 30–2, 35; Maier et al., eds, *Vesti-Kuranty 1656 g., 1660–1662 gg., 1664–1670 gg.*, vol. 1; Maier, *Vesti-Kuranty 1656 g., 1660–1662 gg., 1664–1670 gg.*, vol. 2. See as well Daniel C. Waugh and Ingrid Maier, "How Well Was Muscovy Connected with the World?," in Guido Haussman and Angela Rustemeyer, eds, *Imperienvergleich*, Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 2009: 17–38. The first Western scholar to investigate these sources was Daniel Waugh in his dissertation (see Waugh, "Seventeenth-Century Muscovite Pamphlets," 60–1). See also Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 16–17; Shamin, *Kuranty*, 92.
13. Shamin, *Kuranty*, 77.
14. Arkheograficheskaia kommissiia, *Dela*, 1065. Note that the printed page erroneously indicates the year as 1664, whereas the year should be 1665 (7171; see ibid., 1105–6). For the tsar's personal interest, see Shamin, *Kuranty*, 82–4; see for a detailed account about van Sweeden's agreement with Aleksei, Kozlovskii, *Pervya pochty*, 62. On the significance of van Sweeden's mail service in acquiring foreign news, see Waugh and Maier, "How Well Was Muscovy Connected?": 31–2.
15. The Marselis–A.D. Vinius conflict was never quite resolved, while van Sweeden immediately faced a rival for the Post Office in Leonard Marselis, son of Peter Marselis (see Shamin, *Kuranty*, 85–7, 92–3); *City Archive of Amsterdam, Notary Archive* 1134, 6verso.
16. Shamin underscores the special status translators enjoyed in Muscovite Russia (see Shamin, *Kuranty*, 91).
17. Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 220.
18. See Waugh, "Seventeenth-Century Muscovite Pamphlets," 335n6; Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 100; Shamin, *Kuranty*, 117.
19. Likhachev, ed., *Slovar'*, 176. For the library, see below.
20. On these *rassprochnye rechi* etc., see Waugh, "Publication of Muscovite *Kuranty*", 112; see also Shamin, *Kuranty*, 81.
21. Shamin, *Kuranty*, 7.
22. See for him, for example, ibid., 98.
23. See ibid., 98–9.
24. See ibid., 102–3 and Table 9, 103.
25. See ibid.,104, 111.
26. *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 882–3.
27. For more on this see phenomenon of legalized rebellion, see Davies, *God's Playground*, vol. 1, 59–60.
28. *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 884.
29. Ibid., 884.
30. For them, see Amburger, *Familie Marselis*, 136–7 and 136–7n601.
31. The number employed in 1670 (see Chistiakova, ed., *"Oko vsei"*, 139). See also the somewhat dated S.C. Gardiner, "Translation Technique in 17th-Century Russia," *Slavonic and East European Review* 98, 1963, 110–35. Gardiner entirely ignores the significant presence of Tatar translators and of others versed in Asian languages.

32. They were German speakers from the Holy Roman Empire (see Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 42–9).
33. See ibid., 62; Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 48, 65, 73. Iurkin believes that he may have lived until that time in his father's Moscow residence (Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 65). His in-law Ukraintsev's large brick house survives until this very day on the *Khokhlovskii pereulok* in Moscow (see Iurkin, *Andrei*, 194, illustration 11). It appears that toward the end of his life Vinius lived on the *ulitsa Sretenka*; by then, he also owned a house outside the city gates and had a residence on one of his estates, both of which were properties he acquired after 1689 (Iurkin, *Andrei*, 340, 442, 450–1).
34. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 99, 498–504. It is not quite clear when Patokina died; Demidova seems to indicate that Vinius was married to his second wife Matryona Ivanova soon after 1690 (Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 114).
35. Peters, *wijze koopman*, 467n14.
36. This sort of land is called *pomest'e*, see Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 113.
37. Ibid. Plavsic calls this a "generous salary," but I do not quite agree; the Dutch mercenary colonel in tsarist service Cornelis van Bockhoven earned 480 rubles annually, when he oversaw the shipbuilding project at Dedinovo in 1667 and 1668, and the sailmaker Jan Struys was paid more than 100 rubles per year at this time (see Boterbloem, *Fiction*, 69, 74; Plavsic, "Seventeenth-Century Chanceries," 36). In other words, a foreign craftsman such as Struys received more than the department head of one of the government's central offices!
38. See M.T. Poe, O. Kosheleva, R. Martin, and B. Morozov, *The Russian Elite in the Seventeenth Century*, vol. 1, Helsinki: Annales Academiae Scientarium Fennicae, 2004, 333, 337, 341, 344, 347, 350, 353, 356, 359, 362, 365.
39. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 164–7; Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 48, 79–80. He kept his other house (see Iurkin, *Andrei*, 340).
40. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 709 (Vinius to Peter, 15 April 1698).
41. At least until the 1670s, when most government departments moved outside of the Kremlin (see Peter B. Brown, "How Muscovy Governed: Seventeenth-Century Russian Central Administration," *Russian History* 4, 2009, 459–529: 487).
42. Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 55–6; Brown, "Early Modern," 116, 132–3. Once he headed the Apothecary Office, Vinius moved into the tsar's palace itself (see Brown, "Early Modern," 132).
43. Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 57; Maier, "Zeventiende-eeuwse Nederlandse couranten," 32; Maier, *Vesti-Kuranty*, vols 1 and 2.
44. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 84; Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 145–6, 153–6.
45. Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 93.
46. Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*, 109–10, 130n1, 210n3.
47. The diary was rediscovered more than a century ago and published in an annotated version in Dutch in the 1960s and in a Russian version in the 1990s (see Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*; N. Vitsen, *Puteshestvie v Moskoviiu, 1664–65: Dnevnik*, trans. V.G. Trisman, Sint-Petersburg:

Simpozium, 1996). Witsen, Boreel, and Koenraad van Klenk were all leading politicians in Amsterdam in the 1670s and 1680s.

48. See Peters, *wijze koopman*, 103; Wladimiroff, *De kaart*; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 87. Whereas Witsen's diary and notes hardly mention Vinius, one is struck by Witsen's remark that "in the *Posol'skii prikaz* a very old book is preserved about the ancent history and origins [of Russia, which is] falling apart and being lost [;] it is in very old unusual Russian [and t]hey do not want to show or share it with anyone"; how did Witsen find out about this chronicle? (see Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*, vol. 3, 350, see also ibid., 388). The most likely source for this information appears to have been Vinius. Further evidence of Vinius's desire to remain anonymous whilst communicating with Witsen can be found in the critique of Olearius, about which more below in the text.
49. Of which Vinius owned a copy: N. Witsen, *Noord en Oost Tartarye, ofte bondig ontwerp van eenige dier landen en volken, welke voormaels bekent zijn geweest . . .*, Amsterdam: N.p., 1692 (second ed.: Amsterdam: F. Halma, 1705); see Peters, *wijze koopman*, 111–12. See the recent translation Nikolaas Vitsen, *Severnaia i Vostochnaia Tartariia*, ed. B. Naarden et al., 3 vols, Amsterdam: Pegasus, 2010. As Naarden points out, whereas Vinius was a key source for Witsen, he is never mentioned in this vast book (Naarden, "Nicolaas Vitsen," 55, 68). Witsen was discreet in order to spare his distant cousin from potential accusations of treason.
50. Naarden, "Nicolaas Vitsen," 62–3. The Dutch title was *Nieuwe Lantkaarte Van het Noorder en Ooster-deel van Asia en Europa strekkende van Nova Zemla tot China*.
51. Puzzling are the strange proportions of the northern Caspian Sea, as more accurate depictions of it existed, as for instance the map in Struys's *Reysen* of 1676, a book which had been sponsored by Witsen! (see J.J. Struys, *Drie aanmerkelijke en seer rampspoedige Reysen*, Amsterdam: van Meurs and van Someren, 1676, insert between 214 and 215).
52. Naarden, "Nicolaas Vitsen," 57, 109n54; Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*, vol. 3, 337–40, 473.
53. See for example Shamin, *Kuranty*, 165.
54. See Johan Nieuhof, *Het gezantschap der Neerlandtsche Oost-Indische Compagnie, aan den grooten Tartarischen Chan*, Amsterdam: J. van Meurs, 1665. The Dutch tried repeatedly to coax the Russians into opening their borders for Dutch merchants to ship Persian silk via Astrakhan and Arkhangel'sk to Amsterdam, but met every time with a firm refusal from the Russians who had their own designs on the trade in this valued commodity (see for example Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 91–2). In this regard, too, Vinius showed his innate opportunism: He tried to set up a Russian silk-processing enterprise with the help of a Dutch expert in the 1680s.
55. On this as well, see Peters, *wijze koopman*, 111–12.
56. Adam Olearius, *Offt begehrte beschreibung der neuen orientalischen Reise*, Schleswig: N.p., 1647.

57. Naarden, "Nicolaas Vitsen," 57, 109n57.
58. See Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*, vol. 3, 448–66. The "rebaptized Russian" who alerted Witsen about mistakes in Olearius's work can hardly have been anyone else than Vinius (Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*, vol. 3, 448). The editors of Witsen's notes do not identify the first edition published by Hartgers, which was in Vinius's possession at the time of his death (see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 142–3; Adam Olearius, *Persiaensche Reyse*..., Amsterdam: Joost Hartgers, 1651). Vinius may have acquired this copy later, for it is quite possible that Vinius commented on another copy of Olearius's book that Witsen or another member of the embassy brought along from Holland.
59. See the exhaustive footnotes in Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*, vol. 3, 448–66.
60. See ibid. There were at least three Dutch editions published in 1651.
61. Ibid., 455–6 and 455–6n2.
62. Ibid., 458–9, 464–5.
63. Ibid., 450. Or the distance between Moscow and Novgorod (ibid., 463).
64. See below.
65. Witsen, *Moscovische reyse*, vol. 3, 464.
66. Grotius, *De iure belli ac pacis*, rev ed., Amsterdam; Willem Blaeu, 1631; Saval'eva, ed, *Knigi*, 92. Vinius had a 1657 Dutch edition of this work in his library: (Grotius), *Drie Boecken van 't Recht des Oorloghs en Vredes*, Amsterdam: Jan Hendricksz. en Willem van Beaumont, 1657. Wladimiroff erroneously suggest that Nicolaes Witsen's name is on the cover (see Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 249). The copy of the book in Vinius's possession had belonged to Witsen's father Cornelis Witsen and his son may have brought it along for consultation during the Boreel Embassy to Moscow. The first Dutch translation of Grotius's work was *Drie boecken van Hugo de Groot, nopende het recht des oorloghs ende des vredes*, Haerlem: Adriaen Roman, 1635; for Vinius's library, see Chapter 10, as well as Savel'eva, "Andrei Andreevich Vinius"; Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," 364.
67. Other aspects of his thinking informed Feofan Prokopovich's Russian justifications of absolutism in the 1700s (see Barbara Joyce Merguerian, "Political Ideas in Russia During the Period of Peter the Great (1682–1730)," unpubl. Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1970: 268, 285). Grotius clearly influenced the thinking of Russia's burgeoning intellectual elite, but Vinius may have been the first to have perused Grotius's work.
68. See for example "Hugo Grotius," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grotius/#JusWarDoc, accessed 14 July 2010). Grotius's work, too, influenced the Petrine understanding of monarchical absolutism (see Cracraft, *Revolution of Peter*, 67–9).
69. P.B. Brown, "Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich: Muscovite Military Command Style and Legacy to Russian Military History," in *Military and Society in Russia*, eds Poe and Lohr, 119–46: 139. See also ibid., 140, where Brown suggests that Kotoshikhin's testimony clearly indicates deliberations

about military policy between the tsar and his *blizhnye boyare*. For a translation of Kotoshikhin, see B.P. Uroff, "Grigory Karpovich Kotoshikhin, 'On Russia in the Reign of Alexis Mikhailovich': An Annotated Translation," unpubl. Ph.D. diss, Columbia University, 1970.

70. See Kees Boterbloem, "Russia and Europe: The Koenraad van Klenk Embassy to Moscow (1675–76)," *Journal of Early Modern History* 3, 2010, 187–217.
71. See Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 202; V.D.H. [Pieter de la Court], *Interest van Holland, ofte Gronden van Hollands Welvaren*, second ed., Amsterdam: J. Cyprianus, 1662. Vinius noted in the book that he had acquired the book in 1665, the year when Witsen was in Moscow.
72. *NA SG* 8586, 93, 97–8, 358–69.
73. As convincingly detailed by Nancy Shields Kollmann (see N. Shields-Kollmann, *By Honor Bound* and N. Shields-Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics: The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345–1547*, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1987).
74. He never received the rank of *pod'iachii* before he was appointed *d'iak*. There were about 1,000 *pod'iachie* in the central chancelleries during the 1660s, 40 of whom worked in the *Posol'skii prikaz*; they had different ranks of seniority, but the unique qualities of Vinius (and perhaps his father's importance) seem to have allowed him to bypass the usual slow process of promotion (see Brown, "Early Modern," 101–2, 107). See also the dissertation-abstract by Andrei Vasil'evich Beliakov, defended at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Russian History in 2001, available on line (A.V. Beliakov, "Sluzhashie posol'skogo prikaza vtoroi tretii 17 veka, " available at: http://disser.h10.ru/autoref/belyakovAV.html, accessed 24 May 2010).
75. Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 251–3; Peters, *wijze koopman*, 103, 112; Waugh, "Seventeenth-Century Muscovite Pamphlets," 68.
76. V.A. Petrov, "Geograficheskii spravochniki xiii veka," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 5, 1950, 74–93: 91–2; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 45–6; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 360–4; Waugh, "Seventeenth-Century Muscovite Pamphlets," 68, 348n54; Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 252–3. Waugh notes that Vinius also compiled a sort of historical theological-philosophical manuscript that drew upon foreign sources (Waugh, "Seventeenth-Century Muscovite Pamphlets," 67).
77. Vitsen, *Severnaia*, vol. 2, 1177–9. Vinius may have been the source for this information.
78. See V. Fedorov', "Beseda ruskago startsa s' synom's svoim'," *Otechestennyia zapiski* 50, June 1824, 337–45; Likhachev, ed., *Slovar'*, 178. The title of this *khronograf* (a sort of brief world history based on biblical and other sources such as Byzantine chronicles or the Church Fathers) translates as "Selections from Sacred, Divine and Imperial Books to Remember."
79. See Arkheograficheskaia kommissia, *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, 12 vols, St. Petersburg: E. Prats, 1846–77, vol. 5, 214, 233–4, 249, 404–5, "primechaniia," 9. Iurkin gives Vinius too much of a role in this

venture; he did not serve as the interpreter-translator for the group at Dedinovo, where the ship was actually built (see Iurkin, *Andrei*, 88–91, 359; Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 69–70; *Dopolneniia*, vol. 5, 220, 228).

80. *Dopolneniia*, vol. 5, 214–15, 276–7, 404–5; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 91, 93–5.
81. *Dopolneniia*, vol. 5, 404–5; ibid., "primechaniia," 9; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 46; see also A. Philipoff, "Die Strafzwecke in der Gesetzgebung Peter's des Grossen," *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft* 13–14, 1899, 148–219: 211–12.
82. Was Vinius disingenuous when he suggested that sailships could not sail against the wind (*Dopolneniia*, vol. 5, 404)? If he had not witnessed this himself, his father or other Western expatriates surely must have told him about tacking; was this a ploy to make his proposals more attractive? Similarly, did he honestly believe in a river route leading to India that could be negotiated by a galley (ibid., 405)? Apparently, Vinius returned to his plans to staff these galleys with convict oarsmen when Peter was trying to develop Azov and Taganrog as bases for a Black Sea fleet during the 1690s (see Brian Boeck, "When Peter I Was Forced to Settle for Less: Coerced Labor and Resistance in a Failed Russian Colony (1695–1711)," *Journal of Modern History* 80, 2008, 485–514: 500n74).
83. See Paul W. Bamford, *Fighting Ships and Prisons: The Mediterranean Galleys of France in the Age of Louis XIV*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota P., 1973, 139. Both French and Turks primarily used "infidels" as oarsmen, but the French also used Christian prisoners.
84. Boeck notes how this plan constituted the beginning of the notorious *katorga* (hard labor, derived from a word for galley, see Boeck, "When Peter I," 500). See also Boeck's remarks about the modernity of Russian regulatory coercive policies under Peter (ibid., 509).
85. See *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, 44 (Peter to Vinius, 30 July 1695) and ibid., primechaniia, 527–8.
86. *Dopolneniia*, vol. 5, 404.
87. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 47.
88. See Iurkin, *Andrei*, 95.
89. Ibid., 94–5. Iurkin has simply too little evidence about Vinius's private life and personal circumstances to make a convincing case regarding his material well-being.
90. See Amburger, *Die Familie Marselis*, 159, 161; Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 158; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 97.
91. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 131; Amburger, *Die Familie Marselis*, 165; Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 225. It was of course officially a private venture, but Vinius could hardly have taken over without the official support of Aleksei.
92. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 17; Shamin, *Kuranty*, 20.
93. Roland Cvetkovski, *Modernisierung durch Beschleunigung: Raum und Mobilität im Zarenreich*, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2006, 16–17.
94. Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 100; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 17; Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 306. Kozlovskii suggests that the first instance of opening all letters destined abroad occurred in 1690, but that may

merely indicate a lack of sources of about earlier occasions (ibid., 17). How often mail arriving in Moscow was opened is unclear; see the complaints of the Austrian ambassador Guarient in 1698 and of the Austrian resident Pleyer in 1706 (Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 1, 101–2).

95. Shamin, *Kuranty*, 225.
96. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 17; Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 339–40.
97. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 15, 17–18.
98. Ibid., 19.
99. Shamin, *Kuranty*, 128–9; see also Cvetkovski, *Modernisierung*, 97–8, 98n38.
100. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 18–19.
101. Ibid., 18; Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 303. This proves then at least the exception to Plavsic's suggestion that "Muscovy . . . did not know the phenomenon of venality of office" (Plavsic, "Seventeenth-Century Chanceries," 33). Indeed, Vinius, too, "bought" his Siberian office, too, in the 1690s.
102. See the nuanced view by Bushkovitch on this practice (Bushkovitch, *Merchants*, 152, 158–67).
103. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 18.

4
Intrepid Diplomat

> . . . your esteemed envoy Andrei Vinius, whom we could not dismiss from here without bestowing him with dignified praise . . . [1]

Tsar Aleksei decided to seek the creation of a broad-based Christian coalition to come to the aid of embattled Poland in 1672.[2] This was a novel diplomatic initiative for the Russians, who announced thereby their arrival as a participant in the Concert of Europe. Perhaps more than anything recognition of such status was the tsar's aim, for he likely had few illusions that he could persuade his fellow Europeans to end their internecine warfare and join forces with him in a crusade against the Ottoman Turks and their vassals, the Crimean Tatars. The Europeans accepted the Russian application to enter this community of sovereign states, for in 1675 Imperial, Prussian, and Dutch ambassadors joined the Danish permanent resident in efforts aimed at convincing the tsar to invade Swedish-held territory along the Baltic littoral.

Aleksei dispatched three emissaries, one of whom was Andrei Vinius. On his travels to London, Paris, and Madrid, Vinius passed through Swedish-held territory, Poland, and the Holy Roman Empire, and traversed the Dutch Republic, which had barely survived a three-pronged attack by the kings of France and England and a couple of powerful German prelates aimed at crippling it for good. Despite the state of war, Vinius crossed the North Sea from Zeeland to England.

After he had come back from Western Europe, Vinius prospected for ore in an attempt to find Russia's equivalent to the silver mines of

Potosí and Zacatecas. But he abandoned his efforts once easy riches proved beyond his (and the government's) grasp, and returned to Moscow to mind the post office and as well as playing a conspicuous role in liaising with the Dutch embassy that sojourned in Moscow throughout the first half of 1676.

* * *

In the autumn of 1672, Tsar Aleksei sent Emel'ian Ukraintsev (then the *Posol'skii prikaz*'s senior *pod'iachii*), Vinius, and the Scottish mercenary officer Paul Menzies (1637–94) to Western Europe to deliver a proposition for a Christian alliance against the Ottoman Empire that had invaded the *Rzeczpospolita*.[3] While this was an unprecedented diplomatic offensive on Russia's part, Aleksei hardly will have expected the conclusion of an all-Christian alliance against the Turks, who were probing northward and had occupied Polish Podolia in the immediately preceding weeks.[4] But his move undeniably proves that the tsar recognized the existence of a Concert of Europe, for all countries that mattered in this ensemble were paid a visit by one of the three messengers. The Catholic Menzies visited the pope in Rome and the emperor in Vienna, while he also stopped in Venice, which had only recently concluded a peace with the Turks after decades of warfare. Vinius met the English, French, and Spanish monarchs and visited their respective capitals of London, Paris, and Madrid, while Ukraintsev went to the Protestant governments residing at The Hague, Copenhagen, and Stockholm. Menzies visited Berlin and Dresden as well, to meet with two of the ranking Imperial Electors, those of Brandenburg-Prussia and of Saxony.

Before three of Europe's most powerful kings in the spring and summer of 1673, Vinius delivered his sovereign's formal pleas to halt the war raging between the Dutch Republic and a French–English alliance, and for Christian Europe to unite in a latter-day crusade against the Turks.[5] As the Venetian resident in London Girolamo Alberti reported to the Doge and Senate on 31 March 1673,

> An envoy from Muscovy who arrived here lately continues his sojourn at the king's cost. His business is to announce that the Grand Duke is waging war on the Turk and to invite the Christian powers to join him. The English merchants here would fain regain

> the privileges at the port of Archangel of which they were deprived by order of the Grand Duke after the beheading of King Charles I. These have never been given back although the merchants are restored to favour by the reigning king. But the Muscovite minister pretends that he has no further commission, though he is ready to listen, for the sake of remaining on his travels at the cost of this country.[6]

Why, given Vinius's command of the Dutch language, was Ukraintsev dispatched to Holland (as well as Sweden and Denmark), while Vinius himself was sent to England, France, and Spain (or the Scot Menzies to the Empire, Rome, and Venice)? Despite the appearance of some sort of Russian suspicion regarding Vinius's or Menzies's loyalties, this distribution of tasks should be primarily attributed to budget constraints. They mandated the cheapest possible journeys rather than security precautions: ranked as *gontsy*, mere messengers, the trio was ordered to deliver the tsar's letters and receive the response to them without entering into any negotiations (for which they lacked the diplomatic status); according to the Venetian Alberti's account, Vinius adhered to his brief in London.[7] As a Catholic, Menzies was better suited to visit the three Catholic capitals, for among the trio he would encounter the least suspicion (and thus avoid being stalled for too long). Vinius knew better than Ukraintsev how to persuade the Dutch to allow him to cross the North Sea on his way to his first destination, London.[8] Due to his mercantile background and humanistic education, Vinius was also the better candidate to travel to remote countries such as France and Spain, with which monarchies the Muscovites did not regularly communicate. Ukraintsev's destinations of Holland, Sweden, and Denmark were more familiar to the Muscovites because of decades of sustained contact. Vinius's knowledge of German also made him a better candidate to travel to Western Europe than either Menzies or Ukraintsev: he was instructed to ask each of the three monarchs for a German version of the written response to the tsar's letter, and to translate it immediately into Russian in order to ensure that the tsar was properly addressed and his titles meticulously rendered by the foreign rulers.[9]

Vinius crossed the Swedish–Muscovite border in Livonia on 14 November 1672, but was then held up as the Swedish authorities claimed not to have been informed about Vinius's impending arrival;

they thus could not supply him with means of transport to Riga.[10] Only on November 18 could he leave in a western direction. He arrived in Riga on November 24 (early December according to the Gregorian calendar), which is not a propitious time of the year to travel the Baltic Sea.[11] Once he had reached Riga, its Swedish governor declined Vinius's request to requisition a ship to transport him and his assistants to Western Europe (which Vinius claimed he was due under the terms of the Peace of Kardis of 1661); nor could he even rent one, because the harbor was beginning to freeze over.[12] To add insult to injury, he and Menzies had to bunk in a common travelers' inn together with their companions, having been refused permission to rent a separate lodging.[13] This was a calculated Swedish humiliation of representatives of the Muscovite state, underlining Swedish domination over all and sundry in the Baltic region.

It is unclear whether Vinius was deliberately bluffing or misinformed in demanding a ship from the Swedish satrap (the granting of which would have been a rather unusually generous gesture); the relation between Sweden and Russia was prickly, for the Peace of Kardis had left some territorial issues between the two countries unsettled.[14] Rather than wait in Riga until the 1673 spring weather made sailing possible again, Vinius proceeded to show his enterprising spirit: he successfully approached the Duke of Kurland, Jacob Kettler (1610–82), for a passport in order to continue his journey overland, after which he departed for Prussia; for this he was scolded by the *Posol'skii prikaz*, which had not authorized such a move, but he could hardly be recalled.[15] Thus his mission had started inauspiciously. But Vinius's tenacity was ultimately to impress his superiors.

After passing through Kurland, Vinius reached Prussian Königsberg, and proceeded overland via Danzig and Hamburg to the Dutch Republic: in light of the iced-over harbors and wartime conditions, the four-month journey that brought Vinius to England in February 1673 can be considered speedy.[16] In the Dutch Republic he embarked at Brielle on the package boat to Harwich, which sailed despite the ongoing war between the two maritime powers.[17] His travels continued to be complicated (although some parts were rather pleasant, as when Charles II granted him the use of the royal yacht to cross the Channel to France), but Vinius managed to deliver the tsar's message personally to Charles II, Louis XIV (in May), and the Spanish

queen-mother, Mariana of Austria (1634–96), who, together with with a regency council, ruled her country together in her son Carlos II (1661–1700)'s name.[18]

But Vinius's strenuous exertions bore no apparent fruit. The Venetian envoy cited above had correctly perceived the English reluctance regarding the anti-Turkish coalition (even if King Charles supplied Vinius with a royal declaration about Vinius's exemplary conduct[19]). Near the Flemish town of Kortrijk, the campaigning Louis XIV dismissed Vinius quickly. The French monarch was on good terms with the Ottomans, and preoccupied with his war against the Dutch (in which the English were allied with the French).

Vinius will not have been surprised about the attitude of the French king and his British cousin. Even in inhospitable Riga in December 1672, Vinius was able to inform himself utterly accurately about the progress of the Western-European war, as well as the attempts by the pope to forge an anti-Turkish alliance on behalf of Poland.[20] One surmises that throughout his travels Vinius was well aware how the stars aligned in the European political firmament and that his mission was therefore doomed to fail. It was not for him to doubt, however, for he was under strict orders to limit himself to delivering the tsar's missive and refrain from any meaningful follow-up discussions toward an alliance or any attempt to mediate in the Western-European conflict.

In France (like in England), Vinius did not forget about himself. Perhaps he was inspired by the Grand Tour when he decided to visit the town of Amiens. He viewed its famous Gothic cathedral, taking notes about the relics of John the Baptist housed there, which had been a gift from the Byzantine Emperor Alexius Comnenus (1056–1118) to the crusader Godefroy de Bouillon (c.1060–1100).[21] Vinius continued on to Paris, where he waited for two weeks for Louis's official answer to the tsar's letter.[22] He described the city as large and densely populated and as an international center of learning (harboring a welter of foreigners trying to learn the French language).[23] The latter remarks pique our interest, for even in 1673 Muscovy lacked any formal educational institution: as we saw earlier, elementary teaching (through primers and breviaries) was haphazardly undertaken by priests or monks, while merchants' sons possibly acquired somewhat more advanced arithmetical, reading and writing skills, whereas some of the tsar's chancelleries taught budding scribes.[24] Because he was a key organizer of one of such schools in Russia

a generation later, Vinius, himself exceptionally well educated for Russian standards, may thus have hinted in his report at the urgent need for formalized courses of study in Muscovy by emphasizing the French penchant for education.

Vinius's familiarity with Western Europe from his readings and his personal travels in his youth probably explains why, unlike his peers who went on diplomatic trips to Europe around this time, he did not enter much in the log of his travels about peculiarities regarding the natural environment, the sights to see, or people's daily lives.[25] He simply did not register many of what were for him unremarkable things, for they did not strike him as extraordinary as they would have some of his born-and-bred Muscovite counterparts. P.A. Tolstoi (1645–1729), who was of Vinius's generation, traveled to Vienna and Rome over a quarter century later (from 1697 and 1699) and kept a detailed diary. As Max Okenfuss noted about this diary, "it is the changelessness in European culture that Tolstoi captured so well, better than more knowledgeable and sophisticated European diarists: he remarks about things they found utterly unremarkable."[26] Vinius, in contrast, had a rather different sensibility than Tolstoi's, noticing things other than the mundane. Different from Tolstoi, Vinius seems to have pursued to some degree a personal agenda in drafting his report, in which he emphasized Western-European ways which he believed Russia should adopt.

Accompanied by his brother, a translator, and only a few servants (and thereby leaving the puzzled Spaniards unsure about his status), Vinius crossed the Basque–Spanish border with France on 3 July 1673.[27] In Madrid in July, he was once more told that war with the Turks was not the government's highest priority, although the Council of State did point out that Spain supported their king's Austrian cousins in their semi-permanent struggle with the sultan. In late August, Vinius sailed on an English ship from the Port of Bilb(a)o on the Basque coast to England; too late to board a ship for Arkhangel'sk, it took him a further four months to return home via Danzig (and presumably Riga).[28]

His mission had thus ostentatiously failed, but one may doubt that the tsar and his key advisors, such as Matveev, ever believed in the feasibility of a crusade against the Turkish empire. The entire effort was mainly staged instead to underline to Europe's courts that a new star had risen in the continent's eastern extremities, keen to

be accepted as their partner in deciding the affairs of the continent. It deserves notice, meanwhile, that Vinius dispatched fairly detailed letters regarding political and military developments home, reports that were somewhat akin to a brief *kurant*.[29] Bereft of agents in most European cities, such intelligence provided by Russians themselves was a rarity before Peter the Great's rule.

Upon his return to Moscow in early 1674, Vinius composed a treatise that analyzed the prevailing political views of the governments with which he had communicated, as well as the economic activities and military strength of the three countries he had visited.[30] This probably amounts to the first Russian layman's attempt at a serious analysis of the operation of foreign governments.[31] His analysis of England as a limited monarchy was astute. He recognized the Duke of York (1633–1701; the later James II), who was the High Lord of the Admiralty, as the most important official after the king.[32] This was very apposite in 1673, when England was engaged in another maritime war with the Dutch Republic, and York's role was necessarily crucial. Vinius indeed observed how England was a country that primarily relied for its defense on its approximately 880 ships (excluding smaller craft and vessels under repair or being wrought). After the Duke, Vinius ranked the Lord Chancellor and the two Secretaries of State. The latter two he compared to *dumnye d'iaki*, noting how each was responsible for war and foreign affairs in different geographical theaters.

Vinius describes France's borders and size accurately, too, and identified her king's power as absolute (even if that rather reflected the French court's wishful thinking than the practical situation prevailing in France).[33] Vinius suggested that traditionally the king's closest collaborators were the *connétable* for military affairs and the *chancelier* for civilian matters, but (not quite accurately in the second case,[34] whereas Richelieu [1585–1642] had abolished the first function) that Louis XIV had done away with these posts. Instead, a dozen or so marshals commanded the French military, all directly subordinate to the omnipotent king.[35] By the *chancelier*, Vinius meant Richelieu and Mazarin (1602–61) who had occupied a paramount position among the royal advisors before 1661, for Vinius observed that after the demise of the last chancellor (that is, Mazarin), the king ruled with the aid of four ministers of state, for war, finance, foreign affairs, and religious matters respectively. With the exception of the exaggerated

importance given to the religious minister, this reflects the composition of Louis XIV's inner council, the *Conseil d'en haut*.[36] Vinius even referred to the disgrace and exile of the former chief financial officer of the kingdom, Nicolas Fouquet (1615–80). He noted that occasionally other royal councils met, but that they wielded far less power than the *Conseil d'en haut*. He further discussed the role of the *parlements*, the provincial law courts, in which class justice and corruption were said to be rampant. Vinius was meanwhile struck by the French government's custom to sell public offices. He appears to imply that graft and insufficient centralization undermined the king's authority throughout his realm, possibly flattering the tsar as head of a more perfectly absolute system (it is ironic that Vinius was to occupy two venal posts in his career).

Again in remarkably astute fashion, Vinius indicates the salt (*gabelle*), peasant-land (the *taille*), and excise (the *douanes*) taxes as key sources of the French government's revenue.[37] He described the peasants as paying taxes to the king, and surrendering part of their produce to the aristocracy (in exchange for the use of their land) as well as to the clergy. The organization of the French rural economy thus did not seem all that different from that prevailing in contemporary Russia. Betraying his interest in the process of winning raw materials that was to flourish in subsequent years, he outlined the French ways of salt panning. The monarchy's total annual income Vinius estimated at approximately 42 million rubles. Even if Vinius qualified this by observing that much of this revenue was frittered away by the construction of border fortresses and similar defensive expenses, this must have been intimidating to his Russian superiors. The tsar's total annual taxation receipts during this decade amounted to approximately 1.5 million rubles.[38] Although such numbers remain sketchy and should be treated with the utmost caution, the French monarch disposed therefore over almost 30 times as much revenue (even if Louis' twenty million subjects constituted twice as many people as the tsar ruled)![39] Muscovy's economy, clearly, seemed backward in comparison, with many of its economic activities conducted without money being involved. Such a discrepancy cannot have escaped the tsar and his advisors. It will have added to the growing worry about Russia's backwardness, a perception informing many of Peter's reforms.

Vinius's analysis of France's government altogether was again remarkably sharp, even if he may not have not enjoyed the same

quality of interlocutors as in England (where he struck up a friendship with the Bishop of Chichester, Peter Gunning [1614–84][40]). In discussing Spain, Vinius noted the regency of Mariana of Austria on behalf of the young Carlos II, adding that her power was limited by a council of seven "senators," who were consulted about every decision.[41] The use of the term "senator" betrays Vinius's familiarity with the classical-humanist political terminology. "Senator" was not a term traditionally used in Muscovite Russian and Vinius may have had to explain this term after he submitted his report. Furthermore, he noted how each of the Spanish kingdoms (by which he meant Castilia, Léon, Asturias, Catalunya, and so on) was governed through its own chancellery system, engendering in the process more than thirty departments with their staff, whose salaries placed a serious burden on the crown's income. Again, decentralization was thus bemoaned. Was Vinius deliberately obsequious to his monarch?

Meanwhile, Vinius argued that additional high expenses were incurred by Carlos II through the far-flung nature of his empire that included Naples and Sicily, Milan, Flanders, the Franche-Comté, several smaller Mediterranean islands, "India" (America), and much else.[42] Vinius pointed out that this called for the maintenance of a vast military force, but that an "underpopulated" Spain could only maintain 40,000 to 50,000 soldiers and 50 men-of-war, and that merely because of the constant influx of gold and silver from the Americas.[43] He thus hinted at the economic strain that had made Spain become a second-rate power by the 1670s, a country long past the prime of its heyday around 1600. Perhaps here, too, some pride can be discerned about the efficiency of the Muscovite regime, which lacked such riches.

For good measure, as he had visited his native country on his way to England, Vinius also dedicated a few words to the political constellation in the Dutch Republic.[44] He noted how the Estates-General now did the bidding of the stadtholder William III (1650–1702), whereas before 1672 this Dutch parliament had ruled without the Prince of Orange. He depicted William as a sort of absolute ruler who could freely hire his army as the Estates-General subserviently paid his bills without holding him accountable. This was not altogether mistaken as a snapshot of the relation between the parlement and the prince in 1673, when politicking was virtually non-existent in the dire straits in which the Republic found itself. Part of its territory had been inundated to prevent a French occupation, while other parts

were occupied by the French and their German allies. But this was a temporary expedient. The prince's power proved far from absolute, for the Estates-General were to reassert themselves in the following years, and particularly the City of Amsterdam was to place a check on William's authority. One can argue that Vinius again toadied before his boss, in whose eyes a federal republic was an inferior and altogether unstable political entity doomed to make way for an unlimited and ultra-centralized monarchy.

What key influences can be detected in Vinius's examination? As I have argued in the previous chapter, Vinius was influenced by Grotius' work *De iure belli ac pacis*, sign of both his Dutch roots and his humanist formation.[45] Especially in his analysis of the English political system, Vinius applies the Aristotelian distinction between monarchical, noble, and democratic rule to the system of rule in the three monarchies, probably deriving from his (direct or indirect) knowledge of Jean Bodin (1530–96)'s work.[46] Whereas an education influenced by Dutch humanism explained this familiarity with the French political scientist's rendering of these Aristotelian concepts, it is noteworthy that Vinius's account was drafted not long after the manuscript about the Russian political system written in Swedish exile by the former *d'iak* Grigorii Kotoshikhin (c. 1630–67) and at about the same time as the political treatises written in Siberian exile by the Croatian Juraj Krizanic (c. 1618–83).[47]

The sophistication of these three authors' treatises (even if they all remained in manuscript form) attests to the accelerated spread of European humanism in Muscovy during the last decade or so of Tsar Aleksei's rule. Although this constituted a very late arrival of the Renaissance in Muscovy, it laid the groundwork for some of the radical reforms contemplated and implemented by Peter. Together with the rapidly increasing influence of new scientific ideas and technological applications based on the new science, they combined with the demands imposed on Russia by the Military Revolution of the age.

In addition, Vinius's explicit remarks regarding the presence of a navy in all three kingdoms may also foreshadow Peter's later conviction that, if it was to be counted, his country could not do without warships and a merchant marine.[48] Meanwhile, Vinius had himself sailed a fair bit long before his diplomatic trip. In his youth, when his father was conducting a lively trade with the Dutch Republic,

he sailed probably several times to Amsterdam and back (via Riga or Arkhangel'sk). This maritime expertise had manifested itself in his suggestion to Aleksei in 1668 to build a galley fleet (rather than a sailing fleet) to traverse the Caspian Sea.[49]

* * *

Soon after his return to Moscow in 1674, Vinius was granted his father's previous noble rank of *dvorianin*, partially as a reward for his exertions abroad, even if they had ostentatiously yielded no results; Ukraintsev, already a *dvorianin* by birth, who had been equally unsuccessful in swaying the Protestant powers to unite against the sultan, was made a *d'iak* not long after his return, in March 1675 (Menzies, who remained a Catholic, could not be rewarded in such manner).[50] Ukraintsev thereby ranked third in the department after Larion Ivanov and Vasilii Bobynin (f.1655–94), after Artamon Matveev's dismissal in June 1676.[51] Formally, *d'iak* was an administrative rank (state secretary), while *dvorianin* was a noble title (meaning something such as "gentleman").[52] But both "promotions" were given as reward for services rendered to the tsar, and suggest that the distinction between rank and title was not always clearly made any more in 1670s Muscovy. Nor was a standard manner of remuneration observed: thus, on their respective diplomatic trips, Vinius, although a mere translator, had been given a 20 per cent higher salary than *pod'iachii* Ukraintsev.[53]

Vinius's case confirms that by this time administrative service in the Muscovite bureaucracy could yield one the title of *dvorianin*, formerly a title purely associated with military service. Vinius, indeed, seems to have never wielded a sword or gun in battle. This was not uncontroversial. It is enlightening to think of the French robe-sword competition in understanding the complex rivalry and jealousy between Muscovite bureaucrats and warriors.[54] At least until 1700, higher nobles (boyars, *okol'nichie*, and *dumnye dvoriane*) emphasized their aristocratic ancestry to distinguish themselves from the *d'iak*s, who worked rather than fought for a living (and before 1500, had been mere slaves), and whose title was not hereditary.[55] It seems the *d'iak*s had an inferiority complex about their status well into the middle of the seventeenth century.[56] Still, the most important secretaries, the *dumnye d'iaki*, were considered part of the highest circles of

tsarist servitors because of their membership in the "Boyar Duma," an advisory council consisting in theory of all the boyars. And bureaucrats of that rank were rare indeed: in Vinius's time, the *dumnye d'iaki* never numbered more than a handful of people. Meanwhile, some *d'iak*s did sport an additional noble title, either inherited or bestowed on them by the tsar to reward them for services rendered. But they were not of the same distinguished noble stock as the old Muscovite boyar families or the princely clans that traced their ancestry to the days of Kiyvan Rus' (before 1238).

Vinius received further rewards (land and money) for tutoring Tsarevich Fyodor Alekseevich in 1675.[57] In the course of that year, he also translated Joost van den Vondel's Dutch rendition of fables, predominantly Aesopian in origin, which might have been linked to this tutoring.[58] *Vorstelijcke Warande der Dieren* was an early work by this greatest of the Dutch Golden Age's poets.[59] The work was given the title "The Mirror of People's Life" and remained in manuscript, which appears to indicate that it was indeed merely intended for tutoring purposes. Vinius certainly seems to have caught the (European or humanist) zeitgeist here again: this was the age during which Jean de la Fontaine (1621–95) was compiling similar works in France.[60]

In 1675 as well, Andrei Vinius prospected for ore in Western Siberia and the Urals.[61] Although in the government's pay, he may have personally proposed undertaking this venture. He had brought back samples of gold and silver ore from Spain in 1674, apparently to aid himself in assaying ore found in Russia.[62] His father had already taught him some skill in this matter, as one can detect as well from the contents of his library. In the middle of the 1670s, however, finding gold and silver in the vastness of Russia was a tall order; therefore, Vinius emphasized to his superiors the greater likelihood of finding bronze ore, for about its location Russian prospectors had a notion.[63] The tsarist government showed a surprising flexibility in allowing Vinius to leave his normal tasks in the Foreign Office for his explorations in the late winter of 1675.[64] Vinius and his companions Iakov Galkin and Semyon Zakharov were given almost plenipotentiary powers to mobilize people and equipment for their prospecting, which was designated as a state enterprise.[65] Nevertheless, the additional monetary costs were to be borne by the entrepreneurs, which probably led to Vinius's withdrawal from the project, as he quickly ran out of money.[66]

During this venture, the rivalry between the Viniuses and the Marselis clan resurfaced, when, within months after Vinius had been granted his license, the tsar authorized Peter Marselis jr and an old enemy of van Sweeden's, Herman van der Gaeten, to prospect as well.[67] Marselis died within days after receiving this permission, but his son Christiaan joined van der Gaeten instead.[68] In their wake in September 1675, two additional (Russian) teams acquired prospecting rights (to Vinius's dismay).[69] The gold rush ended as suddenly as it began, for neither gold nor silver were discovered by any of the groups. Vinius and company may have been the only ones who made a sustained effort to find ore. They fruitlessly explored an area along the Kama river.[70]

The *Posol'skii prikaz* and its chiefs, the Boyar Artamon Matveev and the *dumnyi d'iak*s Grigorii Bogdanov (f. 1649–85) and Ivan Evstaf'ev, supervised Vinius's endeavor.[71] Previously, Artamon Matveev had asked Paul Menzies to hire metallurgists to work in Muscovy during the Scot's mission to Vienna, Venice, and Rome. Mining and manufacturing preoccupied Matveev (and thus his support for no fewer than four expeditions!), whereas his predecessor Ordin-Nashchokin had emphasized trade, but both adhered to a mercantilistic or protectionist policy aimed at developing the domestic economy. If anyone in the Muscovite government could be called an expert in matters of trade and manufacturing at the time, it was Vinius.[72] We can recognize in this a key reason for his longevity as a high-ranking bureaucrat: he managed to make himself an indispensable specialist in many fields. He only lost his high posts when, in his sixties, people with greater expertise ready to replace him appeared in the various areas where he had previously been the one-eyed man leading the blind.

This rather bizarre addition to the manifold responsibilities of an employee of the Foreign Office underlines how, within the Russian bureaucratic labyrinth, the *Posol'skii prikaz* fostered Russia's modernization as much under Matveev as it had in Ordin's time.[73] But the prospecting trip remained partially a private venture: Vinius withdrew in late 1675 both because funds ran out and he was more urgently needed as postmaster.[74] Besides running the post office, nevertheless, he conducted for decades private business (including money lending) next to his government work.[75] During the 1680s, he thus supervised a silk-processing shop, a possibly mercantilistic

effort at import substitution.[76] Until that time, raw silk was shipped across Russia from Astrakhan to Arkhangel'sk to be processed in Western Europe. Then a leading *d'iak* in the *Aptekarskii prikaz* and Russia's postmaster, Vinius curated a velvet factory managed by Zakhary Pauwels (Abraham Paulson, a Hamburg expatriate employing Western-European specialists), which used northern Iranian raw silk to produce luxury cloths.[77] The enterprise does not seem to have been a great success. It was transferred to the *Posol'skii prikaz* in 1684 and folded altogether after a few years.[78]

* * *

The lengthy travels that took Vinius to Europe may have influenced his apparent love of matters still virtually unknown to the Russians in the 1670s, such as a love of Western-style art, architecture, and literature. He was already brought up with a Western-European sensibility, but the trip probably led him to adopt more consciously a Western guise. In a way, his explorations of the Baltic region, Holy Roman Empire, Dutch Republic, England, France, and Spain may have been not unlike Peter the Great's Great Embassy of 1697–98. By 1673 Tsar Aleksei was watching theater plays, and Vinius could indulge in his pastimes such as book collecting or pursuing his literary talent (even if that had a practical goal) without fear that this was considered anathema. A few years later, he was the first Russian who ordered a wig to be made for him (perhaps having worn out another that he had brought back from his diplomatic tour).[79] Thus Vinius was one of the first examples of a Russian to fall under the sway of Western "court culture," which became more and more centered on Louis XIV's court at Paris and Versailles.[80] Many of its accoutrements were to be adopted by Peter the Great a few decades later. Here, too, then Vinius may have played a crucial role as a conduit.

Notes

1. King Charles II Stuart to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, 9 April 1673 (see *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 924–5).
2. The Muscovites were developing plans to launch a military campaign toward the Crimea to aid the Poles, but they remained on the shelf; until 1676, they limited themselves to defensive actions when faced with Crimean Tatar or Ottoman aggression, and to backing Cossack or Kalmyk raids against the Turks and Ottomans (see A.V. Malov, *Moskovskie*

vybornye polki soldatskogo stroia v nachal'nyi period svoei istorii 1656–1671 gg., Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2006, 556–7).

3. Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 79; see their accounts in *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 754–1078; and, for example, Iurkin, *Andrei*, 97–8. On Menzies' travels to Vienna, Rome, and Venice, see N.V. Charykov, *Posol'stvo v' Rim' i sluzhba v' Moskve Pavla Meneziia (1637–1694)*, St. Petersburg: A.S. Suvorin, 1906.
4. Charykov, *Posol'stvo v' Rim'*, 17.
5. M.I. Belov, "Rossiia i Gollandiia v poslednei chetverti XVII v.," in *Mezhdunarodnye sviazi Rossii v XVII–XVIII vv.*, ed. L. Beskrovnyi, Moscow: Nauka, 1966, 58–83: 66–7.
6. See Allen B. Hinds, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 38 (1673–75), 33.
7. This is Iurkin's point (see Iurkin, *Andrei*, 98). If there was a suspicion that Vinius's loyalties were perhaps divided, he would have been prohibited from traveling through the Republic and possibly even traveling abroad in the first place (see Iurkin, *Andrei*, 99).
8. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 354–5.
9. *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 825.
10. Ibid., 880. The calendar used here and below is the Julian one, so this is in fact 24 November 1672, according to our current time reckoning.
11. *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 881.
12. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 11–12. The names of two of his companions are mentioned: Pyotr Vinius, indicated as being a *pod'iachii* and apparently tasked to be a scribe (*dlia pisma*), and the interpreter Fedot Fedorov (*Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 810). Initially, all three messengers and their retinues traveled together; they reached Novgorod on 1 November; Vinius and Menzies were at November 9 in Pskov, while Ukraintsev had turned northward (ibid., 873, 878).
13. *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 881.
14. Perhaps it was more the result of a lack of communication, for Vinius was to cool his heels for almost a week at Harwich in early March 1673 as well because the English authorities had not been forewarned about his arrival; although Vinius tried to warn the French about his visit when he was still in England, he was also forced to wait in Calais (see *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 926, 931).
15. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 12.
16. *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 887–8; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 99; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 12.
17. See for this Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 250n106; the mail between the two countries apparently did not stop even in wartime (Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 13).
18. *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 870–946; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 9–14; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 99–100; Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," 355. For his Spanish visit, see Francisco Fernández Izquierdo, "Las Embajadas Rusas a la Corte de Carlos II," *Studias Historica, Historia Moderna* 22, 2000, 75–107.
19. *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 924; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 13. Was the English effort to please Vinius linked to some sort of a promise he made to plead for the English mercantile interest in Moscow?

20. *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 814–15, 882–4. See the previous chapter.
21. Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," 356.
22. Ibid., 355–6.
23. Ibid., 356. See also Marianne Seydoux,"Les ambassades russes à la Cour de Louis XIV," *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 2, 1968, 235–44: 237.
24. See Marker, "Learning," 77–9; see also P. Bushkovitch, "Peter and the Seventeenth Century," in *Modernizing Muscovy*, eds Kotilaine and Poe, 461–75: 465; and Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 71.
25. Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," 363. The most complete record of the instructions for his travels can be found in *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 803–946. Indeed, among the books that he owned at the time of his death was a travel account in German (translated from the French) published in 1667, describing England and Spain (see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 34; F. Aarsens, *Reysebeschreibung nach(er) Spanien . . . deren beigefüget eine nacher Engelland*, trans. Johann Ma(c)kle, Frankfurt: Johann Georg Schiele, 1667; see below for more on this work).
26. M. Okenfuss, "Translator's Introduction," in M. Okenfuss, ed. and trans., *The Travel Diary of Peter Tolstoi: A Muscovite in Early Modern Europe*, DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois UP, 1987, xi–xxviii: xiii.
27. Fernández Izquierdo, "Las Embajadas Rusas," 93–4. Judging by his possession of a German-language version of Antoine de Brunel (c.1620–96)'s *Journey into Spain*, which describes the journey by the Dutchman François van Aerssen (1630–58) to Spain in 1655 and 1656, Vinius may have prepared himself for his journey into this least familiar among the three countries (see F. Aarsens, *Reysebeschreibung*; [A. de Brunel,] *Voyage d'espagne curieux, historique et politique*, Paris: Charles de Sercy, 1665). The book dedicates a fair bit to Spanish court and government as well as the road from the Basque border to Madrid. If Vinius did not study it before he went to Spain, he may have used it for his report (see below).
28. Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," 353; Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochti*, 228.
29. Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochti*, 228–9.
30. See Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," passim; Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 225; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 365; Likhachev, ed., *Slovar'*, 178–9; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius*, 47–8.
31. Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," 359–60.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 360–1.
34. Indeed, the *chancelier* was and remained the head of the French judicial system.
35. Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," 360–1.
36. Ibid., 361; the first three, then, being Louvois, Colbert, Lionne (see David J. Sturdy, *Louis XIV*, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, 35–6). Still, the actual *chancelier* Pierre Séguier had died in 1672, so perhaps Vinius referred to him rather than Mazarin. The elder Phélypaux (1598–1681) dealt with Huguenot affairs, and was probably the official whom Vinius had in mind here.
37. Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," 361–2.

38. See Hughes, *Russia*, 460.
39. Pierre Goubert, *Louis XIV and Twenty Million Frenchmen*, New York: Vintage Books, 1972; B.N. Mironov, *The Social History of Imperial Russia*, ed. Ben Eklof, vol. 1, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000, 4, Table 1.1. Neither Louis XIV nor Aleksei Mikhailovich, of course, had any precise idea about the number of subjects they ruled.
40. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 117. Peter Gunning was both a royalist and an Arminian, perhaps further indication that Vinius's father had sympathized with this branch of the Ducth Reformed Church (see "Peter Gunning," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* [Oxford UP, 2004], available at: http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/view/article/11748, accessed 2 August 2011).
41. Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," 362.
42. Ibid..
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 363.
45. See Boterbloem, "Russia and Europe," 198–9; Grotius, *De iure belli ac pacis*; see also Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," 364.
46. Jean Bodin, *Les six livres de la République*, Paris: Jacques du Puys, 1576. It seems unlikely that Vinius read French (or Latin, Italian, Spanish or English) well enough to read it in this language, but he may have studied a German translation; it is, however, more likely that he gleaned Bodin's analysis from a derivative text. His library consisted primarily of Dutch texts, but also contained texts in Latin, German, French, and Polish as well as a few Russian treatises (see, too, *Pis'ma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo*, ed. B.B. Kafengauz, vol. 9, part 2 [primechaniia], Moskva: Nauka, 1952, 544).
47. Krizanic's *Politika* dates from about 1666, see J.M. Letiche and B. Dmytryshyn, eds and trans., *Russian Statecraft: The Politika of Iurii Krizhanich*, London: Blackwell, 1985; Kotoshikhin's work was completed around the same time as Krizanic's, see G. Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha*, ed. Ann E. Pennington, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1980. See also Kazakova's high praise of this part of Vinius's report, Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," 363.
48. Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," 360–2.
49. Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 76–7.
50. I am not sure why Plavsic believes Ukraintsev's rise is so spectacular, given this noble title (see Plavsic, "Seventeenth-Century Chanceries," 41).
51. S.K. Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i xvii veka*, Moskva: Nauka, 1946, 130; Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 214; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 14; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 101; Kazakova, "A.A. Vinius," 353–4. The translator Fedot Fedorov and the scribe Pyotr Vinius received an annual salary of twenty rubles and received also some grain and other goods in kind as remuneration (*Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 860, 862).
52. See Brown, "Early Modern," 72–3, 75, 82.
53. See *Pamiatniki*, vol. 4, 854.

54. There were also court ranks such as *stol'nik* (gentleman of the table), *spal'nik* (gentleman of the bedroom) or *striapchii* (equerry), often given to younger high nobles, who were groomed to eventually succeed their fathers and uncles as boyars or *okol'nichie*, etc. These court ranks were usually held by those who lived in close proximity to a *tsarevich* or young *tsar*. Such individuals often became important advisors to the monarchs at an older age.
55. Brown, "Early Modern," 80, 99–100, 273.
56. Ibid., 275.
57. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 101–2.
58. This identification was recently made by N.M. Mikhailova (see N.M. Mikhailova, "Ob odnom perevode Niderlandskogo poeticheskogo teksta v dopetrovskuiu epokhu. Opyt lingvisticheskogo analiza," *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta*, seriia 9: *Filologiia, vostokovedenie, zhurnalistika*, 1–2, 2008, 167–71). See further Pekarskii, *Nauka i literatura*, vol. 1, 200; Likhachev, ed., *Slovar'*, 179–80; Waugh, "Seventeenth-Century Muscovite Pamphlets," 68–9. Likhachev et al. mistakenly indicate a different source: Aegidius Sadeler, *Theatrum Morum: Artliche Gesprache der Thiere mit wahren Historien den Menschen zu Lehr*, Prag: Paul Gesse, 1608, see Likhachev, ed., *Slovar'*, 179. But both Sadeler and Vondel likely used the Dutch text *De warachtighe fabulen der dieren*, Bruges: Pieter de Clerck, 1567, or its French version, Peeter Heyns, *Esbatement moral des animaux*, Anvers: Philippe Galle, c.1578, as one of their templates, itself a text based on Aesop's fables (see Paul J. Smith, *Dispositio: Problematic Ordering in French Renaissance Literature*, Leiden: Brill, 2007, 163–4).
59. J. van den Vondel, *Vorstelijcke Warande der Dieren*, Amsterdam: Dirk Pietersz. Pers, 1617. It is among the titles of Vinius's library, but only in a 1682 Amsterdam edition published by the partnership of Sander Wybrantsz., Jan Blom, Andries Vinck and Aert Dircksz. Oossaen (see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 210–11). What happened to the copy from which Vinius must have worked is unclear.
60. The first version of de la Fontaine's fables had appeared by 1668 (*Fables Choisies mises en verses par M. de la Fontaine*, Paris: Claude Barbin, 1668).
61. Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 233, 253–4.
62. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 108, 111; Arkheograficheskaia kommissia, *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, vol. 6, St. Petersburg: E. Prats, 1857, 161.
63. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 111–13.
64. Ibid., 113–14, 357.
65. Ibid., 114; *Dopolneniia*, vol. 6, 161–9.
66. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 130–1.
67. *Dopolneniia*, vol. 6, 165–6; van der Gaeten had denounced van Sweeden's brother-in-law, David Butler, for inflating his credentials to the tsar in 1668 (see Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 83).
68. *Dopolneniia*, vol. 6, 166–7.
69. Ibid., 167.
70. Ibid., 168–9.

71. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 114, 120–1. For G.K. Bogdanov's many other roles, see Poe, "Central Government," 450. Estaf'ev appears to have left the office in late 1675; Bogdanov fell with Matveev or was transferred in the early summer of 1676 (or 1674?; see Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i*, 130).
72. See below for the economic works in his library.
73. Brown has detailed the curious intertwining of "regional" and "topical" government offices within the central bureaucracy; he suggests that leading courtiers such as Ordin or Matveev accumulated the supervision over a number of offices because of the favorable light in which they were held by the tsar (see Brown, "Early Modern," 258–60). It appears as if the favorites were often able to develop an ad-hoc system to implement policy initiatives by combining the activities of several departments under their supervision. This happened with the building of the *Oryol* in 1667–68, when revenue collected by the "Novgorod tax-revenue department" (*Prikaz novgorodskoi cheti*) was directed toward shipbuilding by Ordin, a venture that otherwise fell within the purview of the *Posol'skii prikaz* (see Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 62–3). They could also add to the responsibilities or area of competence and responsibility of certain offices, as Matveev did in directing Vinius to prospect for ore.
74. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 130–1. According to Iurkin, in financing his prospecting Vinius lost the lands and serfs he had been awarded in 1674 (see ibid., 133). He seems to have already been in financial trouble in June 1675 (see *Dopolneniia*, vol. 6, 165).
75. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 158–9.
76. Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 136–40.
77. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 151–2; Lindsey A.J. Hughes, *Russia and the West: The Life of a Seventeenth-Century Westernizer, Prince Vasily Vasil'evich Golitsyn (1643–1714)*, Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners, 1984, 39–40. His supervision may have been coordinated with the *Posol'skii prikaz*.
78. Extant records seem to indicate that under Paulsen's management it still operated in 1686 and 1687 (M.I. Avtokratova et al., eds, *Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov SSSR, Putevoditel'*, vol.1, Moskva: Glavarkhiv, 1991, 238).
79. Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 183.
80. Compare Güntzel's description of the noble life style, which goes back to Elias (see R. Güntzel, *Understanding Old Europe*, Marburg: Tectum Verlag, 2010, 89; Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 189).

5
The Miloslavskii Ascendancy: Medicine and Mail

Russia entered a comparatively tranquil spell after the Razin rebellion, which engulfed the middle and lower Volga region in 1670, but abated in the course of 1671. Even so, Poland, formally a Muscovite ally, was attacked by the Turks in 1672. The Polish surrender of the fortress of Kamianets-Podilskiy in that year imperiled Poland's heartland. Poland-Lithuania ultimately held the line, reinvigorated with a defiant spirit that was epitomized by her newly elected king Jan Sobieski (r. 1673–96). Tsar Aleksei made an effort to strike a Christian coalition against the Turks, but, as we saw, was unwilling to challenge the Turks with only the Poles as his ally. Merely in the middle of his forties, he may have been under the impression that he could afford to wait. Unexpectedly, however, in the winter of 1676 the tsar fell ill and died within days. His demise caused an abrupt ending to the peaceful time at the court. His heir, Fyodor, was a mere 14 and in poor health. For the time being, a group of boyars took the helm in his name, among whom Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavskii (1635–85) became the leader. Already in the early summer of 1676, Aleksei's last favorite Matveev was banished from Moscow.

After the sultan and the Polish king concluded a truce at Zurawno in October 1676, in alliance with a Cossack faction the Turks tried to extend their power in Ukraine northward as overlord of the Western-Ukrainian Cossacks. This ultimately forced the Muscovite regents to reject Western-European entreaties to wage war on Sweden. Allied with other Ukrainian Cossacks, the Russians instead attacked the Cossack allies of the Turks. The Muscovites may have aimed at extending their authority over much of western Ukraine (ceded

by the Poles to the sultan at Zurawno, after the Turks had almost entirely occupied it in a 1672 offensive). Although they fought tenaciously, by 1678 the fortified Cossack town of Chyhyryn (which the Russians had captured in 1676) fell to Turkish–Tatar forces. In 1681 the Muscovites signed an armistice, having gained nothing west of Kyiv.

This truce coincided with the moment that tsar Fyodor III truly took the reins of power into his own hands in Moscow. He abolished the cumbersome precedence rules and seemed poised to modernize his military and society further, but he died at age 21 in April 1682.[1] A new succession crisis ensued, leading to a massacre perpetrated by musketeers in Moscow in May 1682, with much of the court fleeing the city. Those identified as supporters of the Naryshkin clan, which had tried to have Peter (son of Aleksei and Natal'ia Naryshkina) proclaimed as sole sovereign, were particularly targeted by rampaging *strel'tsy*. The Miloslavskii clan spread the rumor that the Naryshkins had murdered Peter's dim-witted half-brother Ivan. In an effort to maintain their ascendancy, the Miloslavskii party played up its support of Muscovite traditions, even by making overtures to the Old Belief, popular among the *strel'tsy*. The Miloslavskii faction proclaimed Ivan Alekseevich co-ruler alongside the lively and curious 10-year-old Peter; Artamon Matveev, who had just returned from exile to Moscow, was one of this massacre's victims.

But the Miloslavskiis' scheming was flawed. Even in the May days they had difficulty in reining in the violence (they did not desire the killing of Iurii and Mikhail Dolgorukii, for example). It can likewise be argued that they should have unleashed more violence and made a cardinal error in failing to liquidate all who could be a threat to their power, especially Peter and his mother.[2] Unrest only abated by the middle of the summer of 1682. In subsequent years the rump of the Naryshkin clan was waiting in the wings, looking for an opportunity to oust the Miloslavskii faction, among whom Sofia, an older sister of Fyodor and Ivan, emerged as leader. She was supported by Prince V.V. Golitsyn, who soon eclipsed I.M. Miloslavskii in importance.[3] Given the Russian elite's habit to seclude women and to exclude them from participation in public life, Sofia's role was an unexpected development (even if, for example, at Istanbul, too, the sultan's women were often strongly involved in political intrigue, despite the seclusion of the harem). She probably laid the groundwork for the surprisingly

easy acceptance of the Russian empresses of the eighteenth century. But during the 1680s the odds against her attempts to establish herself as Russian ruler (in which Vinius played his part) were overwhelming. Her fall in 1689 should be attributed in some measure to the unease a male-dominated environment felt with her exploits.

After replacing one of the Marselis clan as head of the Muscovite foreign-mail service in 1675, Vinius ran the Russian post office for a quarter century, playing a crucial role for the Western-European expatriate community as well as the Russian government. Despite his unique talents, Vinius did not move up higher in the Russian power structure because of the lack of a patron who might usher him into an even more powerful post. He was kept at arms' length regarding crucial strategic decisions, once he was appointed head of the pharmacy office in 1677. Nonetheless, in this position, which he held for a dozen years, he made significant strides toward provisioning Russia's elite and military with a more comprehensive Western-style health care.

* * *

Vinius's reappointment as chief of the post office in December 1675 suggests that he was considered a solidly reliable organizer, who could be forgiven the excessively slow pace of his trip to Western Europe or wasting government money in his fruitless prospecting for ore. His work in the post office was highly appreciated, for governmental inertia alone cannot explain that Vinius was allowed to head it for the following quarter century. He expanded external postal traffic significantly, as we saw in the previous chapter. From 1693 (in 1695 Matvei formally took over as chief) to 1701 he was joined by his son Matvei in leading the postal service. Matvei's singular lack of ability contributed to Peter the Great's decision to relieve the Viniuses from this task in 1701.[4] It may be suspected that by then Peter began to suspect that Vinius was collecting too large a share of the fees. Furthermore, the tsar may have concluded that a 60-year-old man could not deal with all the responsibilities which he had assigned to him (which included heading the Siberian department and the production of artillery, while he returned to the Apothecary Office at exactly that time). But the dismissal should not be read as a condemnation of Vinius's entire tenure as postmaster, of course. After all, almost half

of Vinius's stint in this job occurred when Peter was Russia's single ruler (that is, from 1689 to 1701).

In a country with few good or safe roads and a continent bereft of any international postal regulations that could be effectively enforced, it was never easy to run a smooth mail operation. Thus, when Peter was on his way back to Russia in April 1698, Vinius reported from Moscow to the tsar:

> your lordly writings always delight us all, but recently for four weeks we did not receive any and we did not get anything from the ambassadors [the official leaders of Peter's mission, who went home via a different route] for two weeks; I requested the large packages to be marked by numbers in order to know whether they have been received or not, and, according to the numbers given in [Prussian] Memel, one large package from Riga was not among those received, but was [apparently] lost in [Swedish-held] Riga since it did not bear a clear mark, although at the moment I am still investigating.[5]

Since the aforementioned package contained correspondence from the tsar for his closest advisors, such a loss was a matter of state security; if this occurred with such important mail, one can only guess what happened with letters that were of lesser significance. One encounters in these lines the harried worries of an older man, whose once well-oiled machinery was beginning to stutter. Perhaps we find the roots of Peter's decision to oust Vinius as postmaster here.

When he became postmaster again in late 1675, Peter was a mere 3 years old and third in line to succeed to the throne in the event of his father's death. At that very moment, the Foreign Office assigned Vinius as well as the tsar's translator to the van Klenk Embassy, which was slowly descending on Moscow from Arkhangel'sk.[6] The Dutch Extraordinary Ambassador Koenraad van Klenk (1628–91), accompanied by a large retinue, had already arrived in September in the northern Russian port, but was still not in the capital by December. This gave the Russians ample time to say goodbye to Austrian and Prussian delegations that had come to visit earlier, while preparing themselves for a visit by the representative of their most valued trading partner, for whose oddly decentralized republic they nevertheless had contempt. It was, above all, of importance to the Muscovites to

decline Dutch entreaties to join a coalition that included the Austrian Emperor, the Danish king, and the Elector of Brandenburg-Prussia, and declare war on Sweden without causing offence. For at the tsar's court, the Turkish threat was seen as much more acute, as we saw.[7]

Appearances were kept up: led by two ranking nobles, Prince Mikhail Dolgorukii (1602–82) and Boyar Artamon Matveev, in the early months of 1676 the government clerks Ukraintsev, Vasilii Bobynin, and Grigorii Bogdanov conducted negotiations with van Klenk in Moscow, with Vinius serving as the translator-interpreter.[8] To the mutual satisfaction of the negotiation partners, the Russians stayed out of the coalition.[9] Van Klenk himself seemed little interested in a further escalation by way of a Russian entry of a war that had brought his country perilously close to its extinction and had been waged at a crippling cost to the Republic. Rather than pressing the point, van Klenk and his team spent much time on being wined and dined or entertaining the Russians and propitiating their hosts with exquisite gifts. Vinius, too, was not forgotten, it appears, although the official record does not mention how he was honored, probably to avoid any suspicion being cast on a man who was for the Dutch an utterly valuable informant.

We gain a glimpse of Vinius's domestic life in the Dutch ambassadorial retainer Balthasar Coyett (c.1650–1725)'s description of a dinner party, to which he was invited at Vinius's house on the Saturday evening of 11 April 1675:

> We were marvelously received there upon our arrival. This gentleman [Vinius] made his spouse appear as a special favor; she wore on her head an expensive hat embroidered with pearls and was dressed in a white damask dress, with precious bracelets inlaid with pearls and jewels. According to custom, we each received from her hands a cup with drink. Shortly after, the oldest daughter came in, in a red dress with silver lace and an expensive string of pearls and jewels on her head, and wearing a pearl necklace. We were seated at a table and were served multiple Persian, Astrakhan as well as home-made preserves, while his spouse changed her dress twice, showing herself to us looking beautifully each time.[10]

Evidently, Coyett witnessed the loosening of the segregation to which Russian elite women had previously been subject. It was a breech

of tradition to parade one's daughter before guests, or to have one's wife repeatedly present herself.[11] While this was not yet the entry of women into public space as was to occur under Peter a quarter century later, it did signify the end to noble women's full seclusion. Still, Vinius appeared (to avoid suspicion being cast on him?) far more Russian in his manners than Dutch. This sort of display of one's wife or daughter had little in common with the far more participatory public role women played in the Dutch Republic. Coyett's remarks also show that Vinius was affluent by that time, able to serve expensive delicacies, and have his wife and daughter decked out in precious outfits. The magnitude of his losses during his recent prospecting trip may therefore not have great.[12] From another source, meanwhile, we know that he had two sons by his wife Vasilisa as well, Matvei and Fyodor, neither of whom are mentioned by Coyett.[13] Only Matvei reached adulthood.

The Dutch visit to Vinius's house occurred two months after Tsar Aleksei's death. In the name of Aleksei's successor Fyodor III, a regency council of boyars ruled for the next five years. That Artamon Matveev had been Vinius's patron is palpable from Coyett's account, in which the two seem to work hand-in-glove in negotiating with van Klenk.[14] Vinius appears to enjoy a great amount of freedom to parlay with the Dutch, a sign of Matveev's high level of trust in his assistant. But Artamon Matveev, who was seen as an upstart by the older boyar clans, was ousted from the highest circles within a few months after Aleksei's death. Matveev lacked the support of the court faction that was in the ascendancy after the tsar's passing away in February 1676. Even if Matveev was far from the sole Westernizing individual at the court at the moment Aleksei died, he was more than others associated with Aleksei's growing fondness for things Western during the tsar's last years. Sheerly by his heritage and his proximity to Matveev, Vinius could be considered a liability by the more conservative and suspicious crowd that took over and dominated the government until 1681. His close contact with the van Klenk embassy may have caused suspicion about Vinius's loyalties. His continued communication with Witsen shows how Vinius even long before 1676 leaked information to the West; whether this was politically sensitive material or not depended on one's vantage point. At most, though, the Russian regents only suspected something of the sort, for they would have otherwise accused Vinius of high treason. Thus, Vinius survived the fall of his boss in June 1676; suspicion regarding

his loyalties were sufficiently assuaged by his otherwise great track record in the Foreign Office.[15]

I.M. Miloslavskii was the most influential figure among the boyar regents after Tsar Aleksei's death in early 1676. The regents may have distrusted Vinius as Matveev's creature, but the Miloslavskii faction will have considered him as a fairly harmless pawn without much political clout, whose suspect loyalty was offset by rare skills. It was the elderly Prince Iurii A. Dolgorukii (1602–82), a relative of the Miloslavskiis, who officially curated the *Posol'skii prikaz* for the rest of the reign of Fyodor III; day-to-day affairs, however, were placed in the experienced hands of the *dumnyi d'iak* Larion Ivanov (who died with the Dolgorukiis in the massacre of May 1682).[16] Dolgorukii's son Mikhail had already been involved in foreign affairs as his negotiating with the Dutch prior to Aleksei's death makes clear; both Dolgorukiis knew of Vinius's skills, therefore, and understood that the government could ill afford to lose a man of his talent. Larion Ivanov wielded only limited experience in diplomatic matters, and thus at first drew heavily on experts such as Vinius.[17]

But Vinius was relatively soon (about eighteen months after Matveev's exile) transferred to a more senior post in another office further removed from handling matters of the greatest importance to the state's survival. In December 1677, Vinius started to work at the *Aptekarskii prikaz* and was promoted to *d'iak*, which was considered a rank above that of "*dvorianin* and translator."[18] Although the Apothecary Office was closely linked with the *Posol'skii prikaz*, it did not occupy itself with strategic foreign-policy decisions. Even then, he remained indirectly linked to the *Posol'skii prikaz*, not just because his new job was linked to foreign affairs, but through his role as postmaster and occasional service as translator and compiler of the *kuranty* as well. Indeed, his transfer was formally the opposite of a demotion, even if it distanced one of Matveev's clients from foreign affairs to a less politically charged post.

* * *

As the chief *d'iak* in the Apothecary Office, Vinius entered the orbit of the powerful Odoevskii clan.[19] Compared to their peers, Odoevskii father and son were well-educated and open-minded boyars.[20] The *pater familias* was Nikita Odoevskii (c. 1601–89), who

oversaw Vinius's new department. This aged boyar had been close to Aleksei and remained a powerful figure after the tsar's death, but he was not the most influential man at the court. Odoevskii and his son Iakov Nikitich may have been Vinius's key patron(s) in the 1670s and 1680s.[21] Standing aloof from the worst of the factional infighting, they remained immune to its fall-out. This would explain to a significant degree how Vinius escaped in the reckonings of 1682 and 1689.[22] In 1682, the Dolgorukiis (although the Miloslavskiis did not support their killing by the musketeers) and Naryshkins as well as Matveev and, in 1689, the Miloslavskiis and Golitsyns were singled out. In their wake, their clientele suffered.

Both in the reckoning of 1682 and of 1689 the Odoevskiis remained unharmed, as did Vinius, even if in 1682 accusations of witchcraft and poisoning were hurled at his former patron Matveev and one of the doctors Vinius formally supervised, and even if in 1689 Vinius was involved in facilitating the production of a print-run of propagandistic engraved portrayals of Sofia, who lost out to Peter in the course of the summer.[23] Although Nikita Odoevskii on occasion deferred to I.M. Miloslavskii, the leading boyar of the realm after 1676, the Odoevskii clan was able to take an independent stand in the struggle between the Miloslavskiis, Dolgorukiis, and Naryshkins. Attesting to Odoevskii power, Iakov Nikitich appears to have served on occasion as the stand-in of Fyodor III in the tsar's absence, receiving the mail and the *kuranty* as head of the boyar commission substituting for the absent tsar.[24] Even if they were more pro-Miloslavskii than pro-Naryshkin, the Odoevskii network was too powerful to be challenged once the latter was in the ascendancy in 1689, and could thus shield their client from full disgrace (or worse), despite Vinius's undeniable services to Sofia.

After he moved to the Apothecary Office in 1677, Vinius did not advance further up in the hierarchy until 1689, a sign that while the Odoevskiis' patronage protected him, they did not have sufficient clout to help Vinius enter the highest circles as a member of the tsar's council (sometimes called the *boyar duma*, in which the handful of *dumnye d'iaki* joined the boyars in advising the sovereign). Still, he was more than a mere cipher wholly ignored by the court after Matveev's departure. In the first place, Vinius remained postmaster. Secondly, he continued to oversee some of the translating of the news on behalf of Tsar Fyodor III, the latter's sister Sofia, and their

entourage. Thirdly, he had at one time tutored young Fyodor (likely when Aleksei was still alive). But he nonetheless hit a sort of ceiling in his career. He was not made a *dumnyi d'iak*, whose role was not unlike that of the contemporary English secretaries of state. He seemed to have been consigned to the second top-tier level of the bureaucracy, with far less access to the court than the *dumnye d'iaki*. And at exactly both moments when further promotion to the ranks of the handful of top-level secretaries seemed within reach, Fyodor and Sofia each left the scene. Fyodor was overshadowed by the regents until the second half of 1681. He then seemed poised to unleash a genuine reform program, but died the following year. Had Fyodor lived longer, Vinius might have risen to greater heights. For, as a token of his great appreciation, not long before his death the young tsar presented him with a precious icon (see below in this chapter).

After Fyodor's death, Vinius performed competently in his government job, but was barred from the inner circle of Sofia and Golitsyn. His eager mediation in getting Sofia's portrait reproduced in Amsterdam in 1689 appears a move by someone who finally saw a chance to reach the upper tier by ingratiating himself with the regent. His transfer to the *Posol'skii prikaz* in 1689 may have been a sign that Sofia was indeed contemplating moving Vinius to the highest echelons. But Sofia, like Fyodor seven years earlier, departed at the moment that Vinius seemed poised to join the in-crowd. At last, under Peter, Vinius achieved the highest bureaucratic rank of *dumnyi d'iak*, but by that time this distinction had lost some of its former shine because Peter began to phase out the old titles and ranks.

* * *

The original brief of the *Aptekarskii prikaz* had been to guard the health of the tsar and his family by providing them with the latest Western-based medical care. The most skillful personal doctors that could be hired in Europe attended to the sovereign. In the course of the seventeenth century, however, the office became responsible for the (Western-style) healthcare of most of the elite residing in Moscow, and of others who could afford Western medication or treatment by Western doctors.[25] The department even looked after the war-wounded: in the fall of 1678, for instance, the tsar ordered it to administer the free treatment of officers wounded at the defense

of Ukrainian Chyhyryn against Turkish–Tatar forces.[26] The office's Western doctors trained Russian apprentices. As department head, Vinius was instrumental in expanding its role in these directions further. Under Vinius's management, the group of beneficiaries of the Apothecary's services (both in terms of dispensing medicine and having access to Western-trained medical personnel) increased steadily, albeit cautiously. The Pharmacy Office became a sort of ministry of health in embryo.

Vinius's transfer in 1677 was accompanied by a promotion to *d'iak*, the second highest formal rank in the bureaucracy.[27] It was customary to have government offices managed by officials of that rank, and by 1675 Vinius had been a government bureaucrat for more than a dozen years.[28] Formally, however, most offices were headed by nobles from the leading boyar families, and the Apothecary was no exception, headed as it was by Nikita Odoevskii.[29] The delicate issue of the monarch's health made traditionally one of the most trusted boyars (the so-called *blizhnye boiare*) serve as official chief of the department (or *sud'ia*, as his official title was in Russian). The choice for Nikita Odoevskii to execute this task upon Tsar Aleksei's death followed this tradition, for here was a man who had already occupied the highest posts of the administration in Tsar Mikhail's final years.[30] The aged Odoevskii was more of a diplomat and soldier than an office manager, and remained a key adviser to the young Tsar Fyodor in the realm of foreign affairs. Assisting his grandfather and Vinius was the *kravchii* ("table servant") Vasilii Fedorovich Odoevskii (d. 1686), but his role may have been likewise more formal than practical, even if the younger Odoevskii was officially second-in-command of the office.[31] Instead, Vinius served as the Apothecary Office's effective head until 1689.[32]

By 1681, more than one hundred people were on the *Aptekarskii prikaz*'s staff. Six of them Muscovite records identify as (foreign-educated) doctors, four as pharmacists, ten as "foreign" surgeons, twenty-one as Russian surgeons (*lekari*), thirty-eight as apprentices, and twelve as clerks (*pod'iachie*).[33] The department further employed several gardeners in the herb gardens, while a few more people served as interpreters or janitorial personnel. Among its doctors was Andrei Kellerman, son of the merchant (and eventual Russian envoy) Thomas Kellerman (or Kelderman).[34] Andrei Kellerman's intermediate position in Muscovite society as the Russified son of a privileged

merchant shows how Vinius was not the only second-generation Western immigrant who was assimilated into Russia's elite in the seventeenth century's last third. The office's leading foreign surgeon in 1681 was the Frisian Jan van Termund (Termond). Van Termund had been among the Dutchmen caught up in the Razin rebellion at Astrakhan in 1670 and would become an intimate friend of Peter the Great.[35] Both Kellerman and van Termund are examples of the sort of blending of Russian and Westerner on which Peter the Great was highly keen in his personnel. Such hybridity evidently could be found among the personnel of Vinius's department already around 1680. And Andrei Vinius truly straddled two cultures. Before its disappearance in the 1700s, Vinius frequented the foreigners' suburb near Moscow. This was not merely because it housed many of his personnel, but he also became good friends with the highest-ranking mercenary officer in tsarist service during the 1680s, the Scot Patrick Gordon, who was one of the leaders of this expatriate community.[36] Both in his professional capacities and in his personal life, Vinius connected Western-European and Russian culture in various ways. Peter the Great, Russia's sole ruler after 1689, was to pursue this linkage with alacrity.

The Pharmacy Office's annual revenue and expenses amounted to about 10,000 rubles around 1680, slightly less than 1 per cent of the total government budget.[37] This may seem insignificant, but it was not inconsiderable for an office that was not immediately associated with military matters, toward which most Muscovite revenue was spent. The Austrian diplomat Johann-Georg Korb recorded how, a decade after Vinius's departure from the office, Apothecary officials praised the efficiency of Andrei Andreevich's management of the *prikaz* as unsurpassed.[38] Informed by the usual European sense of superiority over the reputedly savage Muscovites, Korb exaggerated Vinius's talents, but Vinius discharged his duties in this office well, for he would not otherwise have been kept there for such a long period.[39] Within mere weeks after Vinius's appointment in 1675, the regents, in the name of Tsar Fyodor, issued a decree to accompany the opening of a new Apothecary dispensary that called for much more precise record-keeping by the Pharmacy Office.[40] The ruling was inspired by a drive for greater efficiency and accountability, a hallmark of Vinius's activities throughout the tsarist bureaucracy, and may have been issued on Vinius's request. And other evidence

appears to indicate that Vinius's management was sound: in 1681–82 the department's income was 20 per cent higher than its expenditure.[41] Still, he may not have always been the best personnel manager, as his subordinates evidently intrigued against him.[42]

Vinius, too, oversaw a systematic organization of the office library, the collection of which became quite large.[43] Its books transcended merely medical tomes alone; by 1706, the library's collection had acquired a "universal character."[44] It became a key constituent part of the very first Russian public library founded in 1714. The provenance of most of its texts were the Western-European printing presses. Not merely its book collection made the *Aptekarskii prikaz* another channel through which Western influence penetrated Muscovy, as it dealt primarily with Western medicine and its practitioners.[45] Their rising popularity reflects how the Muscovite elite was losing its strong distrust (or even fear) of matters Western. At the end of 1678, an emissary was sent westward to hire an additional 10–12 Western-trained doctors, as well as to acquire a long shopping list of medicine, indicative of the Apothecary's expansion.[46] The wages of Western-European doctors were high: Vinius reported in 1679 how the head physicians, Lorenz Blumentrost and Simon Zomer, earned the equivalent of 10,000 guilders per year, about fifty times the wage of an unskilled worker in the Dutch Republic at the time, and about three times that of a mercenary colonel in the service of the tsar.[47] Such numbers go a long way to explain the steady stream of foreign medical staff interested in joining the tsar's service in the Early Modern era. Russian employees, usually in lower positions, made substantially less. But it should be noted that Russian students (both in medicine and in pharmacy) were also paid a stipend by the Pharmacy Department. It thus followed the model known from so many other walks of Russian life, then and at other times (and long predating Peter): foreigners were hired abroad not only to provide the country with skills that it lacked but to train Russian young men, who could eventually step into the shoes of their teachers.

In Fyodor III's reign, Vinius acquitted himself very well of the primary task required from the pharmacy chief (at least in the eyes of his sovereign): the health of the tsar. Out of gratitude, Vinius was given the precious icon of the Savior (*Nerukotvorennyi Spas*), probably of Byzantine origin, which had been a gift from the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II (1552–1612) to Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible

(1530–84).[48] In the early twentieth century it was hanging in a village church near the town of Staritsa (Tver' province); an inscription was found on the back stating that Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich had gifted it to Vinius for his extraordinary services. Besides his care for the tsar's physical well-being, perhaps his previous tutoring of Fyodor was included among these accomplishments. Fyodor was plagued by poor health throughout his short life, and ultimately not even Vinius was able to prevent the tsar's death at 21.

* * *

In hindsight, Vinius recalled that he had made foreign doctors and surgeons swear an oath of loyalty, of a kind that had previously only been demanded from mercenary soldiers.[49] Perhaps in this case his knowledge of languages came in handy, as it allowed foreign doctors, who mostly came from the Empire or the Dutch Republic, to profess their loyalty to the tsar in their mother tongue. Why this pledge was seen as necessary is unclear, but, besides the stronger anti-Western mood prevailing at the court after 1676, it was perhaps, too, a response to the rather candid reminiscences of Dr. Samuel Collins (c.1619–70) that appeared in England soon after Collins's death.[50] Having served as Aleksei's personal physician for several years, Collins's memoirs provided far more intimate details about the tsarist court (and were not exactly positive about Russian in general) than the Muscovite government was willing to publicize. Aleksei personally kept a watchful eye on the portrayal of him and his state in European pamphlets and newspapers, lodging complaints with Western governments about allegedly slanderous depictions, and the regents who ruled Russia after his death were equally sensitive to such utterances.[51] Collins' work was rife with such calumny. The physician may have transgressed in another way, by supplying more specific confidential information: the Russians were notoriously secretive, and many a mercenary was not allowed to leave the country for fear of betraying state secrets.[52]

It is ironic that Vinius boasted to Peter about this enforcement of loyalty to the tsar in a statement drawn up after he himself had defected from Russia. But even when he introduced the oath of loyalty he was rather hypocritical: he had begun to sluice confidential information to Witsen in the 1660s and subsequently became a main

source for the Dutch resident Johan Willem van Keller (who represented the Estates-General in Moscow from 1677 to his death in 1698), who enjoyed exquisite access to secrets originating in the highest echelons of the Russian government.[53] In Vinius's defense, it can be argued that a divided loyalty between Russia and the remote Dutch Republic might benefit both countries. Betraying secrets to the Dutch (or merely supplying scientific information to someone like Witsen) was a relatively harmless offence because the Republic was located far away from Russia and, despite the cultural misunderstandings that emerged during ambassadorial visits, the United Provinces and Muscovy enjoyed an exceedingly cordial relationship during the age.[54]

If one prefers to see Vinius as a merely covetous character, one may conclude that he straightforwardly offered his services to Witsen or van Keller for money or other rewards. But Vinius's motivation was altogether rather more complex. Patriotic or national loyalty was far less an absolute in the seventeenth century than it is in our own days (or its heyday during the twentieth century), and even the most fanatic modern nationalist has loyalties other than to his motherland or fatherland.[55] Van Keller, for example, who cannot be suspected of prioritizing the tsar's interest over that of the Republic, nevertheless lent a hand in trumpeting the Russian military exploits abroad in Western-European publications during the first (rather futile) Crimean campaign of 1687.[56] As an experienced and skillful government agent, van Keller may have immersed himself in the propaganda campaign as a quid pro quo for favors enjoyed in the past or to be received in the future. He was one of a long line of Dutch citizens who rendered the first Romanovs important services, beginning with Isaac Massa and Georg van Klenk, and including Andries Winius sr, Jan van Sweeden, Koenraad van Klenk, Frans Timmerman, and Karsten Brandt. In aiding Muscovy, none of them seems to have harbored misgivings about their behavior being possibly treacherous toward their native country.

Vinius showed throughout his life a fondness for his ancestors' country besides his identification with the tsar's (or perhaps Russia's) cause and, occasionally, that of the Orthodox Church, or the pursuit of his own private enrichment. Similar to his loyalty to the tsar, his Orthodox beliefs were mitigated by traces of his Dutch-Calvinist youth that can be spotted. He sided with the Orthodox Church's

reformers (both those victorious at the Church Council of 1666–67 and with Peter) rather than the traditionalists. Eventually, he went as far as trying to resolve the differences between Orthodoxy and the Protestantism which had been his first religion in a quest toward restoring the Christian churches' long-lost unity. He may have veered into dangerous territory in exploring this topic, as we will see in a following chapter. His religious drifting, too, can be read as a sign of his sustained inability fully to identify with the Russian side.

Together with his wavering political and religious loyalties, Vinius also increasingly identified with the international Republic of Letters (in which name he may have supplied Witsen with information), the forerunner of the global scientific and scholarly community. But before all, Vinius appears loyal to a network of relatives and friends, as Iurkin has suggested, of whom Emel'ian Ukraintsev probably was the leader, and to which, for example, his brother-in-law, the army officer Dorofei Trauernicht (1661–1717) also belonged.[57] Trauernicht was appointed *voevoda* (military governor) of Iakutsk when the Siberian Office was under Vinius's auspices; like Vinius, he was another example of cultural hybridity, for his (German) father had come to Russia as a mercenary officer.[58] Matvei Vinius's employment by the post office was another sign that Andrei Vinius's loyalty to family and friends trumped his championing of the national interest, for Matvei showed little aptitude for this job; he kept his job for six years only because his father constantly watched over him. And it was ties of family and friendship that made Witsen decide to take his distant cousin Vinius under his protection in 1706.

Loyalty to such informal networks, as scholars have argued with ever greater emphasis in recent years, can be discerned in most complex human societies past and present, and was as prevalent in the noble as in the merchant milieu of Early Modern Europe.[59] Apart from this intimate circle of friends and relatives, Vinius, too, was beholden to patrons within the highest Russian nobility, such as Matveev and the Odoevskiis, and in his younger years to van Sweeden. Finally, Tsar Peter the Great was to be Vinius's key protector in the last quarter century of his life, even if that did not mean uncritical indulgence in all of Vinius's behaviour. Only Peter's personal fondness for Vinius can explain the tsar's forgiveness in 1707 and 1708.

Finally, a strong streak of egotism is palpable in Vinius: his greed and opportunism, and his groveling before the tsar reflect keenly attuned survival skills in a hostile and risky world. Perhaps most of all, he was loyal to no one else but himself, a not uncommon and very (post-) modern sentiment. Given that few came to his defense when he was disgraced, and that he owed his ultimate survival wholly to the tsar's whim (both in 1703 and 1707), this was not an unreasonable attitude. Indeed, he died a wealthy man in good standing.

* * *

In his years as the informal leader of the fledgling Russian healthcare system, Vinius showed most emphatically his West-European (indeed, perhaps especially Early Modern Dutch) predilection for *techne*, the Aristotelian idea that man can transform nature and make it do his bidding, or, indeed, the more modern idea that human beings can improve their lives if they put their minds to it.[60] Apart from waging war and making peace or dispensing justice, the "mercantilists" of the day suggested on the basis of this conviction that a country's government could stimulate and sponsor industry and trade. And the first signs of the Russian government's responsibility for the common good (or to phrase it in more cynical terms, of the state's social engineering) can be traced to this period of the seventeenth century as well.[61] In 1682, Vinius floated a proposal for the establishment of two *shpital'ni* (hospitals) for disabled or infirm people (primarily military servitors [*sluzhilye liudy*]) in Moscow.[62] In Vinius's view, government was capable of reforming and regulating society and of transforming people into useful or productive subjects. In this vein, he, like the ruling elite in the country of his ancestors, moved toward the particularly modern penchant to "discipline and punish," as identified by Michel Foucault.[63] Thus convicts could row on galleys (as Vinius suggested in 1668), or be employed in workhouses: Vinius developed another plan to establish two such almshouses in Moscow in this period.[64] The projected almshouses seem akin to Dutch *spinhuizen* and *rasphuizen*, in which vagrants and delinquents in the Republic were confined and put to "useful" work, or their orphanages in which children were taught a trade.[65] The feverish activity of Fyodor Alekseevich's last months, to which

Vinius's projects can be dated, ended, however, with the young tsar's death in the spring of 1682. Neither almshouses nor hospitals were built in the immediately following years, but after 1689 Peter was to take up similar projects in his rule over Russia.

Foucault aside, one cannot but agree with Bennet who suggested that Vinius's projects expressed a modern (or secular) concept of statecraft that holds that the monarch responsible for the general good.[66] Perhaps this aligned with a "more Western-style" state or absolutist ideology that emerged in post-*Smuta* Russia, in which the tsar's law increasingly came before God's law.[67] In 1681, Fyodor III seems to have resumed his father's innovative policies, which included reducing the Orthodox Church's power further after its dressing down at the 1666–67 Council that deposed Patriarch Nikon. Fyodor's half-brother Peter was to chose the secular path resolutely.

Certainly, Vinius's plans can be interpreted as a sign of "aggressive social intervention that characterized humanist reform" of the kind popular in Vinius's ancestral homeland.[68] It moved away from the fatalistic conviction by which one accepted one's lot in life as the inevitable unfolding of God's plan. In other ways, too, Vinius showed that he did not believe himself to be helpless before the whims of fate or predestination. In this respect one might note the complaint Vinius lodged in the early 1690s, when he lamented to have been placed in the *Posol'skii prikaz*'s ranking below *d'iak*s less senior than he was in terms of their experience: he persisted until the tsars issued a decree that promoted Vinius above the others on the basis of his seniority.[69] It shows his belief that people should be given their due for their work, and jibes with Russia's turn toward a meritocracy (and the 1722 Table of Ranks) that is associated with Peter the Great.

* * *

The first quarter century of Vinius's career (1664–89) as the tsar's servitor makes amply clear that, while he drew on the patronage of some of the highest nobles in Russia (and was favored by Tsar Aleksei himself), he was highly valued for his versatility, education, and expertise. This resourcefulness explains why he can be encountered in so many sources, which allow us to conjure up one of the most rounded portrayals of a seventeenth-century Russian government official. It is because of this, too, that so many biographies have

been dedicated to him. But the abundant evidence about his life has greater significance, of course, than allowing historians to make a case study of a tsarist servitor employed in the civilian bureaucracy of late Muscovy. For Vinius, too, was a pivotal figure in ushering in the modernization of Russia.

If we accept Kliuchevskii's idea that Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin's policies and personality presented the golden mean between too much and too little Westernization for Russia, Vinius seems to have similarly approximated the *idealtypus* (or incarnation) of the modernizing Russian official who was concomitantly firmly embedded in the Muscovite traditions, striking a well-nigh perfect (and felicitous) balance.[70] If Tsar Aleksei had lived another twenty years surrounded by people of the caliber of Ordin, Matveev, Vinius, or Ukraintsev, perhaps the modernization of Russia might have been conducted in less of a stop-and-start manner before 1700. Peter's subsequent sudden and hasty transformation afterwards, meanwhile, caused Russia to become an oddly divided country with a fully Westernized or modernized elite, and a fully non-Westernized or traditional mass of the population. Would a more gradual modernization under the guidance of Aleksei with the aid of such able and measured assistants as Vinius have led to less of a chasm between haves and have-nots, which was perhaps the worst consequence of Peter's policies?

Notes

1. The adherence to precedence hindered most when on military campaigns irksome nobles from more prestigious families refused to serve under the command of nobles of lesser status. Fedor abolished this *mestnichestvo* on 12 January 1682 (New Style). In some ways, though, its principles had long been disregarded, while in practice afterwards many boyars remained extremely sensitive to slights against their family's seniority (see further for example A.S. Lavrov, *Regentstvo tsarevny Sof'i Alekseevny: Sluzhiloe obshchestvo i bor'ba za vlast' v verkhakh Russkogo gosudarstva v 1682–1689 gg.*, Moskva: Arkheograficheskii tsentr, 1999, 6, 15).
2. Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 16, 81–2; see also Hughes, *Russia and the West*, 21–6.
3. Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 83. Golitsyn was by late 1682 chief of both Muscovy's foreign affairs and her military apparatus. See as well Hughes, *Russia and the West*, 24, 27.
4. Iurkin, *Ot pervoprestol'nogo*, 17. It seems that Wladimiroff errs in believing that Matvei was Andrei's brother, while Matvei was not likely to have been his father's assistant or successor if he was born in 1686, as Iurkin believes (see Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 226; Iurkin, *Ot pervoprestol'nogo*,

30–1). Given that Vinius's first wedding was concluded in the 1660s, and his second after the death of Vinius's first wife died around 1690, Matvei was likely at least in his early-to-mid twenties in 1695. In his letter to Peter in 1708 Vinius lamented how Matvei had been drafted into the army; Matvei, about whom more below, was a rather dissolute character (see Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 268).

5. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 708 (Viniusto Peter, 15 April 1698).
6. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 131.
7. See further Boterbloem, "Russia and Europe."
8. See Coyett, *Historisch Verhael*, 89bis.
9. See Boterbloem, "Russia and Europe."
10. Coyett, *Historisch Verhael*, 124.
11. For a persuasive analysis of the significance of this "family presentation," see M. Poe, "The Public Face of Private Life: The Family-Presentation Ritual in Muscovite Russia," in Gary Marker et al., eds, *Everyday Life in Russian History: Quotidian Studies in Honor of Daniel Kaiser*, Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2010, 5–22: 10–14.
12. See the previous chapter.
13. See Dobroklonskii, "Kniga Viniusa," 228.
14. See Coyett, *Historisch Verhael*.
15. For an insightful treatise of the patterns behind the infighting between various rival groups at the court, see Marshall Poe, "Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and the Demise of the Romanov Political Settlement," *Russian Review* 4, 2003, 537–64; as illuminating in its rich detail is Bushkovitch, *Peter*, 49–101.
16. It is possible that Dolgorukii shared these honors to some degree with Nikita Odoevskii (see Chistiakova, ed., *"Oko vsei"*, 145–6).
17. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 133. Bushkovitch calls Ivanov "weak" (Bushkovitch, *Peter*, 99).
18. Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 113; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i*, 16; Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 226; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 135–7; Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 111.
19. N. Novombergskii, *Vrachebnoe stroenie v' do-Petrovskoi Rusi*, Tomsk: Tsarovaia tipografiia-litografiia Sibirskaia tovarishchestva pechaticheskaia dela, 1907, 79. On the clan in the 1680s, see Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 87. They were among the ten richest lay landowning families in the second half of the seventeenth century in Muscovy (see Robert O. Crummey, "Origins of the Noble Official," in *Russian Officialdom*, eds W.M. Pintner and D.K. Rowney, Chapel Hill, NC: U. of North Carolina P., 46–75: Table III-4, 60–1).
20. See Bushkovitch, "Cultural Change," 104–5.
21. On them, see Bushkovitch, *Peter*, 31–2; see as well Kosheleva and Morozov, "Sluzhebnaia deiatel'nost'," 140. Odoevskii's son Iakov Nikitich succeeded his father in overseeing the *Aptekarskii prikaz*, but was like his father far too much preoccupied with other political and military affairs to give much attention to the Pharmacy Office (ibid., 139; Iakov Nikitich was confimed in his role by Peter in 1689, see M.M. Bogoslovskii,

Petr Velikii: Materialy dlia biografii, vol. 1, Moskva: Nauka, 2005, 79, 401; Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 111–12). In any event, Vinius worked for only a few months under Iakov Odoevskii (Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i*, 16). Vinius's true successor in 1689 was the *d'iak* Ivan Protopopov (ibid.).

22. See Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 87.
23. Novombergskii, *Vrachebnoe stroenie*, 101–2; see below for the engraving affair.
24. Shamin, *Kuranty*, 115–16.
25. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 140, 145; N. Novombergskii, *Ocherki po istorii aptechnago dela v' do-Petrovskoi Rusi*, Sankt-Peterburg: Tipografiia ministerstva vnutrennykh del', 1902, 20, 24. Vinius's father had procured Western medicine for the tsar in Holland (see Novombergskii, *Ocherki*, 8; Novombergskii, *Vrachebnoe stroenie*, 122).
26. *Dopolneniia*, vol. 8, 20–1; Novombergskii, *Ocherki*, 20; Novombergskii, *Vrachebnoe stroenie*, 147.
27. At least, this is how Vinius remembered it; it was not necessarily a *sine qua non* to be a *d'iak* to lead this sort of smaller office, but in Vinius's memory his appointment as *d'iak* was linked with his transfer (see Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 252).
28. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 133.
29. This was contrary to the initial principle behind the creation of the chancellery system, as Brown notices; see Brown, "Early Modern," 77, 82.
30. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 137–8; for the *sud'ia*, see Brown, "Early Modern," 19.
31. See Iurkin, *Andrei*, 140; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i*, 16.
32. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 136; Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 252.
33. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 145. Perhaps by merely counting the clerks and omitting the doctors, surgeons and other medical personnel, Savel'eva counts a staff of approximately thirty people (see Savel'eva, "Biblioteka Aptekarskogo Prikaza," 323). A list of the Apothecary's chief personnel is supplied in Arkheograficheskaia kommissia, *Dopolneniia k' aktam' istoricheskim'*, vol. 8, Sanktpeterburg': Prats, 1862, 22–3.
34. See Iurkin, *Andrei*, 146.
35. See M.V. Unkovskaya, "Learning Foreign Mysteries: Russian Pupils of the Aptekarskii Prikaz, 1650–1700," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, New Series 30, 1997, 1–20: 17; Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 123–30; N.M. Pogodin, "Petr Pervyi: Pervye gody edinoderzhaviia," *Russkii arkhiv* 1, 1879, 5–57: 33; Novombergskii, *Vrachebnoe stroenie*, 113–14. Termund played (unwittingly it seems) a role in Vinius's fall from grace in 1703 (see Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 216–17).
36. Kozlovskii, *Pervya pochty*, 195.
37. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 145.
38. Joannis Georgius Korb, *Diarium Itineris in Moscoviam*, Vienna: Leopold Voigt, 1700, 187.
39. As Kozlovskii also argued (see Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 19–20). Collis agrees (Collis, "Andrei Vinius," 211–12).
40. *Dopolneniia*, vol. 8, 20–3.

41. Novombergskii, *Vrachebnoe stroenie*, 89. At least if the numbers that were relayed to the government are to be believed; it is also unclear in how far this snapshot of the budget is representative for other years.
42. Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 252.
43. See Savel'eva, "Biblioteka Aptekarskogo Prikaza," 323.
44. Ibid., 324.
45. See on its operation in the second half of the seventeenth century, Unkovskaya, "Learning Foreign Mysteries."
46. *Dopolneniia*, vol. 8, 21.
47. Ibid., 22. He earned 182 rubles and fifty *dengi* per month; he also received an unspecified number of animal furs. Foreign officers made about 60 rubles per month.
48. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 20, 77–8. Peter the Great was fond of a similar icon showing Christ's face from the front, one of the six iconographic standard representations of the Savior.
49. Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 252.
50. Collins, *The Present State of Russia*. On him, see M. Unkovskaya, "Samuel Collins," *ODNB*, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004 (available at http://www.odnb.com.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/view/article/5951, accessed 2 August 2011).
51. Waugh, "Seventeenth-Century Muscovite Pamphlets," 70–1.
52. See Abby Finnogh Smith, "Prince V.V. Golitsyn: The Life of an Aristocrat in Muscovite Russia," unpubl. Ph.D. diss, Harvard University, 1987, 18–19; M. Poe, " *A People Born to Slavery": Russia in Early Modern European Etnography, 1476–1748*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2000, 87–90.
53. Naarden, "Nikolaas Vitsen," 61. Among those agents was Leontii Gross, who apparently received generous payments (see M.I. Belov, "Pis'ma Ioganna fan Kellera v sobranii Niderlandskikh diplomaticheskikh dokumentov," in N.E. Nosov et al., eds, *Issledovaniia po otechestvennomu istochnikovedeniiu: Sbornik statei, posviashchennykh 75-letiiu professora S.N. Valka*, Moscow-Leningrad: Nauka, 1964, 374–82: 378). It has to be said, of course, that Vinius was not directly working in the *Posol'skii prikaz* in from 1677 to 1689, but both pharmacy and post office were closely linked with the Foreign Office.
54. Belov identified three (other) informers in the Foreign Office whom van Keller bribed (Belov, "Pis'ma Ioganna," 380).
55. See the insightful remarks about this by Bushkovitch, who suggests that the concept of "fatherland" (*otechestvo*) only entered Russian (elite) culture through Feofan Prokopovich's writings, around the time of Vinius's death (Paul Bushkovitch, "Fatherland in Russian Culture: Fifteenth–Seventeenth Centuries," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 33–4, 2008–2009, 93–103: 93). But he adds that the concept landed on fertile ground (ibid.).
56. Naarden, "Nicolaas Vitsen, " 61–2.
57. Iurkin, *Ot pervoprestol'nogo*, 29–46.
58. Vitsen, *Severnaia*, vol. 3, 259.
59. Thus the factions fighting for the tsar's favor in Moscow. In the Dutch Republic, too, they played a crucial role (see Julia Adams,"Trading States,

Trading Places: The Role of Patrimonialism in Early Modern Dutch Development," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2, 1994: 319–55; Julia Adams, *The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2005).

60. A. Pagden, "Europe and the World Around," in *Early Modern Europe: An Oxford History*, ed. Euan Cameron, New York: Oxford UP, 2001, 1–28: 15; Merguerian, "Political Ideas," 90–1.
61. This was quite a novelty, see Poe, "Central Government," 436. See, too, Merguerian, "Political Ideas," 2–3; N.V. Kozlova, "Obshchestvennoe prizrenie i ego gosudarstvennoe regulirovanie v dopetrovskoi Rusi," in Iu.M. Eskin, ed., *Paleobureaucratica: Sbornik satei k 90-letiiu N.F. Demidovoi*, Moskva: Drevlekhranilishche, 2012, 153–70: 160–1; I.L. Andreev, "Sluzhebnyi dialog": Ideologicheskie aspekty vzaimootnoshenii vlasti i dvorianstva v xvii veke," in Eskin, ed., *Paleobureaucratica*, 29–55: 51; and Kosheleva and Morozov, "Sluzhebnaia deiatel'nost'," 144–5.
62. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 149; Kozlova, "Obshchestvennoe prizrenie," 160–4, 167–8. Louis XIV built at the same time his famous *hôpital des Invalides* (the hospital for army veterans in Paris, see R. Wilkinson, *Louis XIV*, London: Routledge, 2007, 133). Geoffrey Parker notes that the first of its kind originated in Mechelen (Malines) in the Low Countries (see Parker, *Military Revolution*, 72–3).
63. M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, second ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1995, 149–50, 170 and *passim*. Foucault points out that much of the disciplining first was practiced in the Early Modern armies and their drill; its origins can be traced to the Dutch armies of Prince Maurice of Orange-Nassau and his cousin Willem-Lodewijk of Nassau, as well as the drill books of de Gheyn and Waldhausen which enshrined their training methods (ibid., 150, 170). De Gheyn's drawings and Dutch military instructors also left their mark on the Muscovy of the early Romanovs (see Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 34, 50). For a persuasive critique of Foucault's ideas when tested against the judicial practice of the Dutch Republic, though, see P.C. Spierenburg, *Judicial Violence in the Dutch Republic*, Amsterdam: U. of Amsterdam P., 1978.
64. D.J. Bennet, "The Idea of Kingship in 17th Century Russia," unpublished Ph.D. diss., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1967, 228–33, 232–3n51.
65. See for example A.E. McCants, *Civic Charity in a Golden Age*, Urbana, IL: U. of Illinois P., 1997.
66. See Bennet, "The Idea," 230, 232. See as well Merguerian, "Political Ideas."
67. See Dunning, *Russia's First Civil War*, 476–7. See also Mergeurian, "Political Ideas," 2. She rightfully points out that "the expansion of [Russia] in the seventeenth century accompanied a parallel growth in the role of the central government and of the tsar as the head of the government" (ibid., 2). As Geoffrey Parker and others have pointed out, most of this growth was caused by the "Military Revolution" (see Parker, *Military Revolution*, 62).

68. Schama, *Embarrassment*, 16; see further ibid.,16–24.
69. See Chapter 7 and N.F. Demidova, *Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii xvii v. i ee rol' v formirovanii absoliutizma*, Moskva: Nauka, 1987, 87.
70. "Tsar Alexei and [Ordin] provided wise leadership and a sensible reform program," according to Kliuchevskii (R.F. Byrnes, *V.O. Kliuchevskii, Historian of Russia*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1995, 184).

6
Seeker in an Age of Transition

During the 1930s, the historian Paul Hazard identified a "crisis of the European consciousness" that overtook the continent toward 1700.[1] Religious absolutes were discarded during this intellectual crisis, but nothing replaced them in the minds of the learned until those of the Enlightenment became the norm in the later eighteenth century. People were probing, questioning and pondering around 1700, without finding definitive answers to the fundamental questions that were raised regarding the essence of human existence.

Hazard mainly looked at Europe west of the Vistula river. His estimation of the zeitgeist of the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, however, fits both Andrei Vinius and Peter the Great. They seem to have been affected by the burgeoning challenge to tradition that can be discerned elsewhere in Europe, in which they were joined by younger members of Peter's inner circle who went to apprentice in Western Europe from the time of the Grand Embassy (1697–98) onward. In this respect, Russia's elite was being rapidly Europeanized after 1700. Vinius, as in other areas, was a pioneer in exhibiting a mindset that rejected traditional dogma to such an extreme degree in Russia.

Andrei Vinius was, like most of his contemporaries, a religious man. Although he flirted with heterodox ideas and explored theosophical and ecumenical concepts, he preferred to adhere to a personal pietistic faith, which sometimes awkwardly sat with his scientific knowledge and interests. As a peripheral member of the Republic

of Letters, Vinius did pioneer the sort of open-mindedness that Peter the Great adopted and led to the *Kunstkamera* and Academy of Sciences in Russia.

* * *

As C.R. Boxer noted, "during the first half of the 17th century, religion and theology formed the favourite reading-matter in the United Provinces, followed by the law, politics and classical texts."[2] Vinius's book collection reflects these preferences fairly closely. To a degree, he also partook in the growing appetite for texts in other languages than Latin and in genres such as travel literature, which became especially apparent in the Dutch Republic and elsewhere after 1650.[3] Andrei Vinius grew up in what was still a religious age, when only a few of the boldest of his Western-European contemporaries (such as the Dutch philosopher Spinoza) began to question religious dogma and faith altogether. Vinius did not venture that far, but he was affected by the scientific explanations about the workings of the natural world that began to spread across Europe after 1650. Whereas Vinius flirted with new-fangled ideas about the cosmos, he stopped at crossing the line into deism or atheism. Vinius was versed in the Bible from a young age, and was capable of lacing his language as much with classical as with Scriptural references. In a letter to Peter of 16 July 1695, he wrote, for example:

> for on a hard rock the edifice of the Holy Apostle Peter (with whom your majesty shares his name) is founded . . . against the people of God nothing can stand, [for] the first of their cities Jericho was taken on the seventh day of circling when its walls fell down through the sound of horns.[4]

These were apt analogies to comfort his tsar, who in that year fruitlessly tried to capture the Crimean–Tatar stronghold of Azov.

Vinius ultimately arrived, it seems, at a sort of personalized religion, in which any church organization or priests played a negligible role at best. Vinius's religious convictions (as is evident from his books) resembled contemporary Protestant pietism. A number of texts he owned addressed Christian morality from this sort of perspective.[5] He believed religion above all to be a private matter, and

was inclined to recognize the commonalities of various Christian creeds rather than their differences.[6] The priesthood was more of a hinder than a help in many instances, as is apparent of his explorations into a Calvinist–Orthodox merger in the mid-1700s. As an Orthodox believer, Vinius was the opposite of the stereotypical convert who is trying to be more Catholic than the pope. And he may even have taken an instrumental view of spiritual matters in suggesting an ecumenical unification. Implying that a united church might be headed by the Russian monarch, he used religion as a crutch to curry favor with the tsar.

The roots of Vinius's eclectic or flexible faith might be traced to his father's decision to convert to Orthodoxy (when Andrei Andreevich was already a teenager) out of expedience. This choice indicates that A.D. Vinius's beliefs were not particularly puritan or fanatical (different from those of his second wife, who protested this move, as we saw). His conversion was more a response to the rise of Orthodox zealotry in Muscovy than some sort of religious rebirth. And the father's pragmatic view seems to have rubbed off on the son. As a government bureaucrat, A.A. Vinius had to adhere outwardly to the elaborate rituals and ceremonies observed by the Russian Orthodox Church, but his enthusiasm was probably never profound. He never quite transcended the traditional eschatological Christian worldview, however, nor did he ever openly challenge the church. But it was Vinius's apparent lack of religious zeal that made Peter select him to forge cannons out of confiscated church bells in 1700.[7]

While this radical decree shows the scope of old-fashioned arbitrary autocratic rule to which an embattled tsar could turn, it was likewise a measure that indicates how little Peter, who almost appears a Bolshevik *avant-la-lettre* in this matter, thought of the Orthodox Church. The pious Vinius may have felt pangs of conscience in executing this order. For, although he had been tainted by a Calvinist mindset in his youth, and he was to investigate the possibility of a unification of the Dutch Reformed Church with Russian Orthodoxy, his faith was genuine, as his letters and books indicate. At the same time, iconoclasm was a hallowed Calvinist tradition, while confiscating the church's riches was a tradition in Christendom that went as far back as the dissolution of the Knights Templar and had been rekindled by various monarchs in the Reformation. Already around 1500, a faction of "non-possessors" in Russia urged the Orthodox Church

to renounce its property: the idea of confiscating church property was not just another foreign novelty introduced by Peter.[8]

Even though Vinius was a religious man in this religious age, he had little choice but to stand unreservedly by the tsar's curtailment of the Orthodox Church's power.[9] But Peter's decision to leave the patriarchy vacant after the death of Adrian (1627–1700) in 1700 may have been to Vinius's liking in any event. Even in practical terms, for a patriarch might have countered the rounding up of the church bells more forcefully. Peter was similarly impatient with the opposition to his regime emanating from the Old Believers.[10] The Old Believers rejected the changes made to the liturgy by Patriarch Nikon during the 1650s and registered their protest vehemently in the second half of the seventeenth century, going as far as to burn themselves in their houses of worship. Sympathy for the Old Belief was often encountered in rebellious groups, such as those following Stenka Razin, or the *strel'tsy* in 1682 and 1689. Those who defied the innovations promulgated by the Orthodox hierarchy were often the same who rejected changes in other walks of life instituted by the government.

Among such traditionalists were the *strel'tsy*. In the course of the seventeenth century, the musketeers' significance was diminished by the influx of Western military reforms, brought by Western military officers based on Western ideas about drill, discipline, and tactics. *Strel'tsy* survival as a privileged elite branch of the armed forces was at stake. Feeling increasingly embattled, the musketeers played a leading role in the attempted palace coups of the 1680s and 1690s, invariably clamoring for a return to hallowed cultural and religious traditions. For Vinius, therefore, their continued prominence was undoubtedly worrisome. He had no sympathy for the Old Belief, having been baptized by Nikon himself, the author of the church reforms that had caused the Old Believers to break with Orthodoxy's establishment.

Vinius was particularly vulnerable because of the musketeers' hatred of foreigners and foreign novelties, in which they above all perceived a threat to their privileges and very existence.[11] Until their dissolution in 1699, Vinius was constantly watchful of another *strel'tsy* rising. It seemed likely that the musketeers might not distinguish a "naturalized Russian" and convert such as Vinius from a notoriously hated foreigner such as François Lefort (1656–99), Peter's closest foreign friend, especially when Vinius became a close collaborator of the tsar after 1689. In 1682, Vinius had witnessed how rioting

strel'tsy tore Artamon Matveev, Iurii and Mikhail Dolgorukii to pieces. Although these men were Muscovites of old stock, in the eyes of the musketeers this spotless heritage did not compensate for their fondness for things Western. To Vinius's relief, Peter, after hesitating for a while regarding their fate, responded to the widespread *strel'tsy* mutiny of 1698 by ordering the main culprits to suffer a brutal death and dissolving the corps.[12]

Undoubtedly, Vinius also rejected the Old Belief for its hidebound obscurantism, which believed it heresy if the sign of the cross was made with three rather than two fingers.[13] Instead, Vinius's Christianity combined genuine devotion with a trust in the human ability to alter and improve matters in this life. His was the religion of the intellectual rather than the mystic. The Old Belief was forced to the margins of Peter's New Russia.

* * *

When, from 1706 to 1708, Vinius lived in exile in Amsterdam (and in its surroundings such as Witsen's country house near Egmond at the North Sea coast), he whiled away the time awaiting Peter's forgiveness by investigating the differences between the various Christian churches. He went in search of an ecumenical merger of all Christian creeds, beginning with the Calvinist and Orthodox churches. In investigating the two creeds' merger, he reminds one of the Anglican minister Palmer's search for a unification of the Church of England and Russian Orthodoxy in the middle of the nineteenth century.[14] Certainly, Vinius's Russian book collection reflects a strong interest in comparing the various Christian churches, and it included several works on non-Christian beliefs as well as church histories.[15] Vinius avidly studied the works of the German legal philosopher and theologian Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), who is seen as an exponent of the Early Enlightenment.[16] Both rationalist and pietist, Thomasius argued for religious tolerance and suggested a reunification of all Christians in one church.

In this respect the presence of eight treatises in Vinius's book collection attributed to the German "theosophist" Valentin Weigel (1533–88), all published in 1618, is worth pondering.[17] Even if these books had already been acquired by his father, Andrei

Andreevich's preserving them in his library betrays his own interest in their contents. Weigel's work was an inspiration for Jakob Böhme (1575–1624), whose free-spirited acolyte Quirinus Kuhlmann (1651–89) was burned at the stake in Moscow in 1689 as a heretic, an exceedingly rare occurence in Muscovy.[18]

Kuhlmann came to Moscow in the spring of 1689 believing that he was a latter-day prophet. For several weeks before his arrest in May 1689, Kuhlmann lived in the *nemetskaia sloboda* near Moscow. Almost immediately upon his arrival, this eccentric self-proclaimed prophet quickly alarmed the suburb's German-Lutheran community.[19] Afraid of being accused of harboring a heretical cult, the Lutherans on their own initiative handed Kuhlmann and his liaison, the Uffelt native Konrad Nordermann, over to the tsarist authorities.[20] The Orthodox Church, normally the watchdog seeking out suspicious religious behavior, never had to to lift a finger to unmask this allegedly subversive duo. The *sloboda*'s predominantly Dutch Calvinists (although the German-born Nordermann was also a Calvinist) and its Catholics of various tongues seem to have been little involved in the conflict, which particularly vexed German speakers. Still, Catholics, Calvinists, and Lutherans all got along well in the suburb (which housed not many more than 1,500 people), and given the eccentric behaviour of Kuhlmann, Vinius cannot have been ignorant of his presence. Indeed, Vinius, who doubled as censor in his capacity as postmaster, probably perused Kuhlmann's works when they were sent to the German painter Otto Henin in Moscow in 1688 and 1689.[21] And he knew Nordermann rather well.

Nordermann was a merchant and entrepreneur who was a business partner of Vinius during his prospecting venture in the middle of the 1670s.[22] One might ponder whether Vinius himself belonged to some sort of Böhmian circle that existed among the expatriates living in the foreigners' suburb during the 1680s. Since not even the existence of any such group can be proved, the extent of Vinius's flirtation with such theosophical ideas remains unclear.[23] It is possible that works by both Böhme and Kuhlmann were once in Vinius's possession, but they were no longer among the collection that has been identified as his at the time of his death in 1716. Did Vinius rid himself of these books after Kuhlmann's detention?

Peter's half-sister Sofia still ruled Muscovy at the time of Kuhlmann's arrest, about a month after the latter's arrival in the

Russian capital. Nordermann and Kuhlmann were condemned in late June 1689 (that is, still before Peter ousted Sofia) to be burned at the stake, after they had been made to confess their heresy.[24] Their execution was then postponed because of the intensifying struggle between Sofia's and Peter's followers.[25] Once Peter's faction prevailed, the tsar hesitated to agree to the two Germans' execution, possibly because he saw little danger in their activities.[26] Several weeks after he took over in the late summer, the young tsar nevertheless decided to have Kuhlmann and Nordermann executed, when prompted by Patriarch Ioakim (1674–1690). Rather than becoming suddenly worried about the effect of the German preacher's mystical ravings, however, Peter played it safe for political reasons. In those volatile days Peter sided with the conservative forces at court, against the modernizing faction that had previously been in the ascendancy under Sofia's regency.

Peter's victory over Sofia thus did not mean that Vinius could breathe with greater ease, if he had indeed been sympathetic to Kuhlmann. One of Peter's favorites, Prince Boris Golitsyn (1654–1713), apparently possessed one of Kuhlmann's works, but Vinius was not a grandee and could hardly afford to draw further attention to himself by dabbling in religious heterodoxy in 1689.[27] A pawn on the chessboard of Russian court intrigue such as Vinius might just as well have been sacrificed to placate the conservative party. If he had been interested in Kuhlmann's theosophical creed, once the German mystic was apprehended, Vinius quickly made sure to erase any trace of his interest in Kuhlmann.

An interest in unorthodox ideas (in two senses) does not mean that one accepts them (indeed, sometimes quite the contrary).[28] Kuhlmann confessed under torture that Nordermann was his sole follower in Moscow, which may have been the truth because of his apparent isolation in the *sloboda* and the brevity of his stay there.[29] Perhaps Kuhlmann remained mute about other disciples to protect them from a certain death (or because he was unaware of any further sympathy for his sect), but Vinius is unlikely to have ever been counted among them. While he may have been momentarily curious (and was evidently interested in religious ideas that explored the common traits among Christian religions), Kuhlmann's megalomaniac delusions as well as the dangerous implications of showing an interest in the ideas of this self-styled prophet will have

quickly turned Vinius (like many others) away from the German mystic.

For an Orthodox believer even such curiosity was dangerous, since in 1689 the Russian Church and its patriarch were still under the revivalist sway of the Zealots of Piety. The latter had inspired the purification wave of the 1650s, which had forced foreign residents out of Moscow proper and had made A.D. Vinius and his children convert to Orthodoxy. In the summer and early autumn of 1689 Vinius may therefore have been worried that his high position in the government bureaucracy and his job as postmaster were jeopardized not just because of his involvement in the regent Sofia's propaganda campaign (see the next chapter). If he dabbled in theosophy, Vinius thus rid himself as fast as possible of any of Kuhlmann's or Böhme's works. It is likely that his interest in this sort of Protestant mysticism was never more than a mere flirtation, but he might have been utterly lucky that Peter himself was far from an avid Orthodox believer and proved rather tolerant of other Christian creeds. The young tsar only surrendered to the pressure of his mother and the patriarch in allowing the execution of Kuhlmann and Nordermann to proceed and showed no inclination to order any further investigation. Possibly, Boris Golitsyn's or Emel'ian Ukraintsev's patronage shielded Vinius from any inquiry into his religious convictions.

A less fanatical kind of Christianity than prevailed before 1650 was becoming popular among Europe's elite toward 1700. Tolerance was on the rise, heralding the advent of the Enlightenment. Apart from his pietistic inclinations, Vinius's interest in Weigel was rooted in a desire to resolve the schism among the Christian churches of his day, a project which was shared by the (proto-) theosophists such as Weigel or Kuhlmann. It is not coincidental that such plans to restore Christian unity were also widespread in the tolerant Dutch Republic, where they merged into the evolving scientific worldview.[30] In understanding the room Vinius enjoyed to explore ecumenism, it is likewise apposite that the Russians themselves were rarely given to undertake ruthless religious campaigns against other creeds. In the borderlands of Europe where they resided, Orthodoxy had always been forced to coexist with other faiths, such as Islam. This, too, informed a degree of acceptance of religious diversity and, sometimes, fed an interest in non-Orthodox beliefs. The 1650s wave of religious zealotry was selective, for it aimed at other Christians, while

refraining from any anti-Islamic program against the many Muslims living under the tsar's rule. It did not last long either, even if its effect lingered for about half a century in the Russian Orthodox Church itself. Thus, whereas Vinius was out of step with the patriarch and his faction, his eclectic religious views were not unique among the country's elite, especially in Peter's day. Vinius's multifaceted outlook is underlined by his apparent interest in Stoicism, reflected in his ownership of works by Marcus Aurelius (121–80) and Seneca (4 BCE – 65 CE).[31] Their advocacy of equanimity in the face of happiness and tragedy seems to align with Vinius's introspective religious predilections, even if he hardly seems to have been an introvert who retreated into a contemplative life, but, then, neither were the Senator Seneca and the Emperor Marcus Aurelius.

Besides being confronted with his own mortality at the age of 65 and having for once a lot of time on his hands, his sudden turn to religious study during his exile in Amsterdam underscores the transitionary or insecure position of Vinius in matters of faith. Like his cousin Witsen, Vinius stopped short of becoming the religiously skeptical intellectual typical of the heyday of the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment. Both were still Christians. Their cosmology was an eclectic faith awkwardly married to scientific findings. Their scientific worldview had not yet coalesced into a coherent system that led to doubt and eventually rejection of Scriptural revelation. Scientific discoveries merely testified further to God's wondrous works, although they ended belief in miracles or witchcraft, as Vinius's contemporary Balthasar Bekker (1634–98) argued.[32]

Vinius's interest in Thomasius's works testifies to this type of thinking. Although the German philosopher is seen as a representative of the Early Enlightenment, he was by no means irreligious. Thomasius was, rather, another figure typical of the uneasy and probing transition period between the traditional religious worldview that had made Europeans kill each other in the name of true Christianity before 1650 and the free-thinking mindset that began to reject Christianity altogether of the Enlightenment after 1720. Under the impact of the various scientific breakthroughs that had been made in the seventeenth century, Thomasius, Witsen, and Vinius shared a growing skepticism about the dogmas of the Christian churches (even in their sober Protestant guise), yet refrained from the radical

conclusions that became a hallmark of the generation of intellectuals that came of age after 1700.[33] Instead, perhaps, as Robert Collis argues, esotericism was called in by Vinius to resolve this contradiction between religion and science, as Isaac Newton tried as well.[34]

Perhaps, too, Vinius explored in his religious studies in Amsterdam an avenue that might return him to his tsar's favor by showing that he could once more be of great use to Peter. The tsar refused to have another patriarch elected in Russia after 1700. He eventually placed the Orthodox Church under secular governmental scrutiny. This sort of subordination resembled how Reformed *classes* deferred to Dutch civil authority (even if in the Dutch case this was a highly decentralized phenomenon, and thus the opposite of the Russian system implemented in 1721). Did Vinius adopt the Dutch model in trying to find a theoretical underpinning for the tsar's drive to fully subordinate the church to the state?

* * *

Some of Vinius's actions as Siberian overlord from 1695 to 1703 seem to belie any unease on his part with the Orthodox Church. Attempting to strengthen the Russian toehold in China that the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk had recognized, Vinius cultivated a fledgling Russian-Orthodox community that had established itself in Beijing. Vinius requested the Siberian diocese's Orthodox bishop to send learned clergymen to guide this little flock of believers, and prevent them from falling to the "abomination of the Mohammedanian faith."[35] In the letter in which he mentioned this Beijing parish to Peter the Great, Vinius sketched a strategy to convert the Chinese, Mongolians, and Kalmyks to Orthodoxy. Priests' sons were to study the local languages and, through their prayer and learning, convince these "idolators" of the truth of Eastern Christianity before their enemies could.[36] Vinius had only a vague grasp of the cosmology of the Mongolians and Kalmyks (who were mainly Lama Buddhists) and the Chinese (among whom Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism were most popular). Even for skeptical Christians such as Vinius, these religions or cosmologies were equivalent to paganism.

Orthodoxy was reluctant to proselytize among adherents of organized monotheistic religions, but Vinius's missionary ambitions in China reflect how Russian Christianity occasionally showed an

interest (as it did with the Finnish-speaking peoples along the Volga) in converting pagans.[37] Vinius's scheme fell within the purview of his tsar's initial desire to lead a new crusade against the Ottoman infidels. Vinius's own craving for restoration of an ecumenical Christian unity seems linked to a hope that it would proceed to defeat the House of Islam. In 1699 he wrote a delirious letter to Peter about the construction of a seaworthy navy that would take on the Turks on the Black Sea, advocating the tsar's championing of the cross.[38] But as was the case with Tsar Peter himself, such goals seemed mere pipe-dreams to Vinius in his more sober moments. Again, his religious faith sat awkwardly with more secular notions about the world's workings. Perhaps tellingly, at that very time Vinius applauded the possibility of a crusade, his brother-in-law Ukraintsev was negotiating a settlement in Istanbul with the Porte to end the conflict that had raged for more than twenty years with the Ottomans and their vassals, the Crimean Tatars.[39]

While in Western Europe in 1697 and 1698, Tsar Peter himself lost most of his illusions about any all-Christian project to vanquish the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate, and became ever more secular and pragmatic in pursuing his foreign-policy projects. Thus we can agree with David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye that Peter's support of an Orthodox mission in China was primarily informed by the tsar's interest in developing a greater volume of trade with the Middle Kingdom.[40] The Kangxi Emperor (r. 1661–1722) made this difficult, as he refused to establish normal diplomatic relations with Russia. In Peter's scheme, the Orthodox missionaries would use the cover of religion to advocate greater Russian–Chinese trade. By 1712, the Chinese emperor allowed the establishment of an Orthodox mission, but China was far from ready yet to open its doors to Russian merchants. It is unclear in how far Vinius was aware of the tsar's cynical designs regarding the missionaries, but that he was wholly ignorant of them appears unlikely. Indeed, he might have approved of them as this could be the kernel from which the Chinese would ultimately be led to the light of a scientifically grounded Christian civilization.

Vinius's desire to subjugate the Turkish empire and eradicate Islam may have likewise been in part the result of his general distaste for religious obscurantism or fanaticism. A strong dose of cultural superiority informed the Vinius brand of Christianity, as can be deduced from his contempt for the Chinese worldview. Vinius's Christian

proselytizing intended in part to spread what constituted in his perception a superior degree of civilization exhibited in Christian Europe, as expressed in the scientific analysis of the world in which he became ever more interested. Islam and other world religions began to be seen as backward, not just by Vinius.

Vinius's almost rational faith was that of a man sobered by more than a century of religious wars that had torn Europe apart (and who had witnessed Russia's own schism appear during the 1660s). He hailed from a country which at a time of his birth still fought Catholic Spain in the name of freedom and an exclusive Christian religious truth, a war that lasted more than 80 years (1566–1648). His disenchantment with intra-Christian fanaticism seems evident, but he did support attempts to convert the non-Christian world as Christianity offered its adherents a superior state of being as well as salvation. Besides a crusading and civilizing spirit, however, a purely military-political ground informed Vinius's anti-Turkish convictions, too: Islamic states had historically been among Russia's most inveterate foes and remained so around 1700.

In one of his letters, Vinius's explained that the tsar's military triumphs served three purposes: that of bearing witness to the great glory of God, that of enhancing the tsar's own reputation in the world as a great soldier and crusader, and that of being a benefactor to the Russians.[41] The last part of this triad betrays something of Vinius's conviction that his sovereign had a responsibility to serve the common good. This was an idea about government that was perhaps not always popular in the absolutist era and is unusual (albeit not unique) to find in autocratic Russia before 1700, even if it was a common concept in the Dutch Republic.[42] But it should concomitantly be remembered that this "common good" limited itself to Russia's elite, and excluded its masses. Still, this life for Vinius was not merely a preparation for a better life in the hereafter. Man's existence could be improved, if he applied himself to better his condition.

Notes

1. P. Hazard, *La crise de conscience européenne: 1680–1715*, Paris: Boivin, 1935.
2. C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1800*, second ed., London: Hutchinson, 1977, 168.
3. Ibid., 168–9.

4. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 517; see also the analogy drawn with the prophet Samuel's actions: ibid., 587–8 (letter from Vinius to Peter, 20 July 1696).
5. For example, see Johannes de Mey, *Het Hand-Boeck der . . . spreucken Salomons*, Middelburg: J. Fierens, 1657; Henricus Moller, *Woleggínghe Ofte Verclaringhe der Psalmen van den Coninckłijcken Prophet Davids . . .*, Amsterdam: Cloppenburch, 1617; Franciscus Ridderus, *De Beschaemde Christen door het Geloof en Leven van Heydenen en Andere Natuerlijcke Menschen . . .*, Rotterdam: Borstius, 1669. See Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, and Collis, "Andrei Vinius," 204.
6. The presence of Baronio's history in his book collection may have been another sign of his open mind, although the fact that this was a Polish version of this standard Catholic work likely meant that he read but little of it (and that it was possibly a gift from Polish interlocutors, see Baronio, *Rocznedzieie*; Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi,* 45–6).
7. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 851.
8. For a recent discussion, see David Goldfrank, "Recentering Nil Sorskii: The Evidence From the Sources," *Russian Review* 3, 2007, 359–78. For more, see James Cracraft, *The Church Reform of Peter the Great*, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1971.
9. See further Cracraft, *Church Reform*.
10. The most recent comprehensive treatise is Georg Bernhard Michels, *At War with the Church: Religious Dissent in Seventeenth-Century Russia*, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1999.
11. S.M. Soloviev, *History of Russia*, vol. 26, ed. L. Hughes, Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1994, 121, 162.
12. Ibid., 162–82.
13. Michels, *At War*, 23.
14. W. Palmer, *The Patriarch and the Tsar*, 6 vols, London: Trübner and Co., 1871–76.
15. For example, see *Biblia dat is De gantsche H. Schrifture vervattende alle de Canonycke Boecken des Oude en Nieuwe Testaments . . .*, Amsterdam: Wed. van Someren et al., 1683; *Biblia sacra sive Testamentum Vetus . . . et Testamentum Novus . . .*, Amsterdam: Joannis Janssonius, 1632; *Le Nouveau Testament, C'est à dire . . .*, Paris: Pierre des-Hayes, 1656; Georgius Hornius, *Kerckelyke Historie van de Scheppinge des Werelts tot 't Jaer des Heeren 1666 . . .*, Amsterdam: B. Boeckholt, 1683; Alexander Ross, *'s Weerelds Gods-Diensten, of Vertoog van alle de Religien en Ketteryen . . .*, Amsterdam: Michiel de Groot, 1663; Simon de Vries, *Curieuse Aenmerckingen der Bysonderste Oost- en West-Indische Verwonderens-waerdige Dingen . . .*, Utrecht: J. Ribbius, 1682; Baronio, *Rocznedzieie*. See Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*.
16. He owned 11 books (several of them were double copies of the same text) by Thomasius, all published in the 1690s, see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 189–92; Naarden, "Nicolaas Vitsen," 72, 121–2n119; Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 243–4. That his interest in Thomasius's views was of a later date is obvious from the publication dates of these works; as he

had little time to devote to such issues before 1706, it may indicate that he acquired most of these works during his Dutch exile. The books were Christian Thomas(ius), *. . . die neue Erfindung einer wohlgegründeten und für das gemeine Wesenhöchstnödthigen Wissenschaft das Verborgene des Hertzens anderer Menschen auch wider ihren Willen aus der täglichen Conversation zu erkennen*, Halle: Christoph Salfelden, 1691; Christian Thomasius, *Erinnerung wegen deren über seine Grundlehren*, Halle: Rengerische Buchladen, 1699; Christian Thomasius, *Erinnerung wegen zweyer Collegiorum über den Vierten Theil seiner Grundlehren nemlich über die historische Vorstellung des Kirchenstaats*, Halle: Rengerische Buchladen, 1699; Christian Thomasius, *Summarischer Entwurff deren Grundlehren*, Halle: Rengerische Buchladen, 1699; Christian Thomasius, *Versuch von Wesene des Geistes oder Grundlehren so wohl zur natürlichen Wissenschaft als der Sittenlehre*, Halle: C. Salfelden and Rengerische Buchladen, 1699; Christian Thomasius, *Weiter Erleuterung durch unterschiedene Exempel des ohnlängst gethanen Vorschlags wegen der neuen Wissenschaft andrere Menschen Gemüther erkenen zu lernen*, Halle: C. Salfeld, 1692.

17. In general, see Collis, "Andrei Vinius." On the question of Weigel's authorship of these texts, see ibid., 203. On Weigel, see for example Andrew Weeks, "Introduction," in Valentin Weigel, *Selected Spiritual Writings*, ed. Andrew Weeks, Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2003, 9–50. See also Andrew Weeks, *Valentin Weigel (1533–88)*, Albany, NY: State U. of New York P., 2000. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 223–5. The Weigel texts were V. Weigel, *Drey Theil einer gründlichen, und wolprobirten Anweisung und Anleitung der anfahenden, einfletigen Christen*, Neustatt: Knuber, 1618; V. Weigel, *Gnöthi seauton*, Neustatt: Knuber, 1618; V. Weigel, *Kurtzer Bericht vom Wege und Weise alle Ding zu erkennen*, Neustatt: Knuber, 1618; V. Weigel, *Libellus disputatiorius*, Neustatt: Knuber, 1618; V. Weigel, *Moise tabernaculum cum suis tribus partibus*, Neustatt: Knuber, 1618; V. Weigel, *Principal und Haupt Tractat von der Gelassenheit*, Neustatt: Knuber, 1618; V. Weigel, *Studium universale*, Neustatt: Knuber, 1618; and V. Weigel, *Theologiia Weigelii*, Neustatt: Knuber, 1618.
18. Collis, "Andrei Vinius," 196–7. See especially, too, Sabine Dumschat, *Ausländische Mediziner in Moskauer Rußland*, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 2006, 528–9. Kuhlmann's religious transformation or crisis seems to have occurred during his spell as a student in Leyden in 1673–74, where he became fully acquainted with Böhme's ideas (see Robert L. Beare, "Quirinus Kuhlmann: The Religious Apprenticeship," *PMLA* 4, 1953, 828–62: 851–4). This was not long after Vinius had visited the Republic on his way to England. During the 1670s and 1680s, a group of Böhme adherents could be found in Amsterdam, including Kuhlmann, who began to think of himself as the messiah (ibid., 856–7; Collis, "Andrei Vinius," 196). On Weigel and Kuhlmann, see ibid., 861–2.
19. See L. Foster, "Quirinus Kuhlmann in Moscow 1689: An Unnoticed Account," *Germano-Slavica* 5, 1978, 317–23: 318.
20. Uffelt is located near Kassel in central Germany.

21. Walter Dietze, *Quirinus Kuhlmann: Ketzer und Poet*, Berlin: Rütten und Loening, 1963, 259, 477n192. Nordermann declared under torture that he had notified the *Posol'skii prikaz* about his ownership of Kuhlmann's books and related works; it may indicate that the Foreign Office also played a role in censoring the tsar's subjects (Tikhonwrawow, *Quirinus*, 76). Or did Nordermann mean the postmaster Vinius, who was subordinate in such matters to the *Posol'skii prikaz*? I am not convinced that Vinius had been colluding with Nordermann in shepherding Kuhlmann to Russia, as Collis proposes; I have not seen any evidence that Vinius was indeed in the Republic in 1689, even if it is not beyond the realm of possibilities (see Collis, "Andrei Vinius," 200).
22. Together with Nordermann and Iakov Galaktionovich Galkin, Vinius seems to have sold his claim to iron mines at the confluctuation of the Volga and Kama rivers to Peter [? Vakhromei?] Muller in 1675; this enterprise was linked with Vinius's prospecting efforts of that time (see M.P. Romaniello, "Absolutism and Empire: Governance on Russia's Early-Modern Frontier," unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2003, 50n19; Iurkin, *Ot pervo prestol'nogo*, 13–14, 71, 136n1). Nordermann had apparently been visiting Russia at least since the 1660s, eventually residing in the *sloboda* (see N.S. Tichonwrawow, *Quirinus Kuhlamnn [verbrannt in Moskau den 4. Okt. 1689]: Eine kulturhistorische Studie*, trans. A.D. Fechner, Riga: N. Kummel, 1873, 57).
23. Tantalizingly, Zdenek David wrote in the early 1960s that "Kuhlmann himself sent copies of his writings to Moscow before his arrival and brought more with him [. . . t] hese works were distributed by his friend Otto Henin and a government official Winius, a native Russian" (see Zdenek V. David, "The Influence of Jacob Boehme on Russian Religious Thought," *Slavic Review* 1, 1962, 43–64: 47). Grass wrote that Vinius did not miss an opportunity to spread Kuhlmann's works, which seems unlikely (Konrad Grass, *Die russischen Sekten*, vol. 1, Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1907, 595). But the person most tainted by the affair was probably Arnoud (Zakhary) van der Hulst, the Dutch physician and friend of Vinius (see Dumschat, *Ausländische Mediziner*, 528–9; Tikhonwrawow, *Quirinus*, 66–7; see above).
24. Foster, "Quirinus," 321–2; Dietze, *Quirinus Kuhlmann*, 328. *Strel'tsy* chief Fyodor Shaklovityi was one of the investigators in the case, together with Aleksei Golitsyn (1665–1740), son of Sofia's favourite Vasilii Golitsyn; ironically, Shaklovityi was executed as a key conspirator against Peter mere weeks after Kuhlmann's burning (see Dietze, *Quirinus Kuhlmann*, 315).
25. Dietze, *Quirinus Kuhlmann*, 333.
26. Foster, "Quirinus," 322.
27. See Grass, *russischen Sekten*, 595; Dietze, *Quirinus Kuhlmann*, 333–4. Boris Golitsyn was a cousin of V.V. Golitsyn, but belonged to Peter's adherents in 1689.
28. See as well Collis, "Andrei Vinius," 201.

29. Tikhonwrawow, *Quirinus*, 76.
30. See for example M. Jacob, *The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution*, Philadelphia, PA: Temple UP, 1988, 86, 120–3; M. Jacob, "Introduction," in M. Jacob, ed., *The Scientific Revolution: A Brief History with Documents*, Boston: Bedford-St. Martin's, 2010, 1–41: 12, 26; Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750*, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002, 14–22.
31. See Marcus Aurelius, *'t Gulden Boeck*, Amsterdam: Everhard Cloppenburgh, 1640; Lucius Aeneaus Seneca, *Stoische Leeringen*, Leeuwarden: Claude Fonteyne, 1649; Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 131, 176.
32. But Vinius did not seem to own a copy of Bekker's notorious work (B. Bekker, *De Betoverde Weereld*, Amsterdam: D. van den Dalen, 1691–93). Of course, given its notoriety, it may have been taken out from his book collection at some stage.
33. It is noteworthy that exactly at the time of Vinius's exile in the Dutch Republic, the French exiles Bernard Picart and Jean-Frédéric Bernard pondered there the question whether "not all the religions of the world [were] in some fundamental way alike" (see Lynn Hunt, Margaret Jacob, and Wijnand Mijnhardt, *The Book That Changed Europe*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2010, 9; see as well ibid., 76). But their masterpiece was published some years after Vinius's death.
34. Collis, "Andrei Vinius," 215–16.
35. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 694–5 (Vinius to Peter, 22 April 1698).
36. Ibid., 695.
37. See Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 189–201; M. Khodarkovsky, "The Conversion of Non-Christians in Early Modern Russia," in R.P. Geraci and M. Khodarkovsky, eds, *Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2001, 115–43; and A. Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History*, New York: Longman, 2001.
38. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 784 (Vinius to Peter, 24 September 1699).
39. See Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 5.
40. D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Russian Orientalism*, New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2010, 140–1.
41. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 784 (Vinius to Peter, 24 September 1699).
42. In his *Politika*, composed during the 1660s, Krizhanich, too, emphasized the autocrat's duties in this respect (see Krizanic, *Russian Statecraft*). And, as Charles Halperin points out, already in the sixteenth century Ivan Peresvetov (f. 1549) was not alone in stressing the ruler's responsibilities to his subjects (see C. Halperin, "Brothers-in-Arms: Kinship and Military Service during the Reign of Ivan IV," in Gary Marker et al., eds, *Everyday Life In Russian History: Quotidian Studies in Honor*

of Daniel Kaiser, Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 2010, 169–85: 184). It bears pointing out that Peresvetov's work only became known in the course of the seventeenth century and that Peresvetov defected from the *Rzeczpospolita* (while Krizhanich hailed from Croatia), where the idea of limited monarchy was far more common.

7
Peter's Confidant

In August and September of 1689 the Regent Sofia and her favorite Vasilii Golitsyn were ousted from power after a stand-off in which Muscovy's major stakeholders (the patriarch and the majority of the boyars) chose for Peter.[1] Peter himself, however, remained reluctant to exert power personally in the years immediately following.[2] Together with key boyars, his mother Natal'ia oversaw most of the government's business, while the tsar continued to prepare himself for the job he already had. After his mother's death in 1694, however, Peter finally began to act as an autocrat. He did nonetheless often remove himself from his capital, becoming a uniquely peripatetic tsar, and then left surrogates in Moscow to run the government's operations.

Peter abandoned plans to take on the Turks and Tatars, once a war-weary Austrian Empire ceased fighting the Ottomans (with whom they had been at war since the second Siege of Vienna in 1683). In 1699 the Turks gave the Habsburg Emperor more or less the maximum achievable in the Treaty of Karlowitz, restoring almost the entire territory of the Kingdom of Hungary (lost in the 1520s) to Leopold I (1640–1705). In 1698, Peter had already found out on his Grand Embassy that another potentially formidable ally, the King-Stadtholder William III (1650–1702), remained as uninterested in participating in an anti-Islamic crusade as he had been in 1673 when Ukraintsev had visited the Republic on behalf of Peter's father. King William, allied with Emperor Leopold, was soon distracted by the Spanish War of Succession (1702–13) against Louis XIV (who was least of all inclined to join a crusade, for he was on good terms with the Ottoman Porte).

Peter thereupon turned to the Baltic region, another theater that the Russians coveted. Sweden, the dominant Power along the Baltic shores, seemed vulnerable, as it was led by the young King Charles XII (1682–1718), who had reigned since 1697. Peter saw a golden opportunity to regain the port on the Baltic Sea that Ivan IV (1530–84) once held, but had to relinquish in 1583. The Great Northern War (1700–21) lasted much longer than Peter anticipated (and only ended after Vinius's death), even if the tsar was already bold enough in 1703 to order the construction of a new capital, St. Petersburg, on formally Swedish territory at the entry to the Finnish Gulf. The Russian military performance in this war initially disappointed the tsar who had dedicated a good part of his apprentice years to the development of a crack army, but the 1709 Battle of Poltava seemed a belated vindication for his exertions. It gave Peter the upper hand over the Swedes for much of the rest of the conflict. Ultimately wearing down his opponent, the tsar succeeded in harnessing resources and manpower to sustain his military and navy on the long term; as part of this effort, Russia became self-sufficient in arms manufacturing.[3] Andrei Vinius did not live long enough to witness the final victory, but would have taken some pride in it if he had, for both his father and he himself had significantly contributed to the emergence of this industry.

At the end of his life, Vinius might indeed have looked with some satisfaction at the epochal changes Peter implemented after the tsar's return from the Grand Embassy in 1698. It appeared as if many of Vinius's ideas that he had floated as a government servitor had been put into practice, from galley fleets to workhouses, while the fledgling mining operations that he had patronized began to flourish. And it may have been most pleasing to him that Russia was recognized as a full member of the Concert of Europe. But he may have been astonished at the tempo of Peter's reforms and the changes that they brought to Russia after 1698. From his plea not long before his death to be allowed to live in Moscow rather than in St. Petersburg, it appears as if the pace of the transformation had left him behind.

* * *

Although his fate hang in the balance in 1689, Vinius reached the pinnacle of his career during the first 15 years of Peter the Great's

uncontested rule (1689–1703). It was during this period that the tsar optimally exploited Vinius's great abilities and experience, when Peter prepared for his radical transformation of Muscovy and waged military campaigns against the Tatars and Swedes. Vinius played a versatile role in these years: he remained a crucial purveyor of information about European affairs and (in effect) postmaster until 1701, while he was assigned to the government's Siberian desk in 1695 (about which more in the next chapter). In the early years of the war against Sweden, Vinius restored the depleted Russian artillery arsenal, most of which had fallen into Swedish hands at the disastrous Battle of Narva in 1700. Finally, he briefly returned for a second stint at the Apothecary (which he exchanged for his stewardship over the mail).

Peter relied extensively on Vinius as his liaison in Moscow during the tsar's trips to Arkhangel'sk (1693 and 1694), his campaigns to conquer Azov (1695 and 1696), the Grand Embassy (1697–98), and his work on the fleet at Voronezh, Taganrog, and Azov (in 1699 and 1700). Whenever the tsar was absent in this period, a group of boyars (all of them considerably older than Peter) who stayed in Moscow deputized for Peter in rendering key government decisions; among them, Fyodor Romodanovskii (c. 1640–1717), Tikhon Streshnev (1649–1719), Lev Naryshkin (1664–1705), Boris Golitsyn, Fyodor Apraksin (1661–1728), and Pyotr Prozorovskii (f. 1660s-1690s) were the leading figures.[4] Vinius served as the conduit through which they communicated with the tsar, while the frequency and contents of the correspondence between Peter and Vinius makes clear that Peter also appreciated Vinius's own perspective on matters of state and especially foreign affairs.[5] At the beginning of the Great Northern War in 1700, the tsar ended for a while his lengthy trips to his empire's periphery and abroad, instead often personally participating in military campaigns. This seems to have diminished in part Vinius's contact with the tsar, although other reasons appear to have been more crucial for the growing estrangement between Peter and his aide.

* * *

While he played a very important role in the Russian government during the 1690s, Vinius's career (and possibly his life) had been in serious jeopardy in 1689. During the regency of Peter's half-sister

Sofia Alekseevna (1682–89), Vinius ran the Pharmacy Office and the mail without too much upheaval, as we saw. Vinius had survived the bloodbath of May 1682 unharmed, retaining his posts as head of both agencies.[6] During Sofia's regency, his career flatlined, even if he did receive the standard rewards in land, serfs, and money usual for a man occupying senior posts.[7] Even to merely maintain his high position, Vinius carefully cultivated relations with those placed above him in the Muscovite patronage networks. By the early summer of 1689, Vinius returned to the *Posol'skii prikaz*, an office with which he had preserved close ties throughout the previous years because of his work as manager of the post office and as *d'iak* of the *Aptekar'skii prikaz*.[8] His transfer to his old department may have been intended to make him a foreign-policy advisor of far greater consequence than he had been when he left the *Posol'skii prikaz* in 1677. His old friend Emel'ian Ukraintsev was now his immediate supervisor, running the Foreign Office in the name of Prince V.V. Golitsyn, the Regent Sofia's favourite.[9] After his move to the Apothecary Office in 1677, Vinius had maintained close ties with Ukraintsev, who in 1681 was made a *dumnyi d'iak*.[10]

Immediately upon his return to the foreign office, Vinius joined a team that had unleashed a propaganda drive intended to fortify Sofia's claims to rule in the name of her brothers. Perhaps his transfer had even been made to facilitate his efforts in this regard, freeing him from the heavy workload as senior manager of the Apothecary. The campaign to elevate Sofia to Russian *de facto* ruler went back the May days of 1682 when her Miloslavskii relatives had capitalized on the *strel'tsy* rebellion. Soon after Sofia had come to the fore as head of her clan, and the attempt to have her power formally recognized had been gaining strength from the mid-1680s onward. Its leading ideologists (most of them churchmen) pursued a personal agenda they hoped to realize on Sofia's coattails.[11]

In 1689, Vinius organized the printing of the regent's portraits in Western (realistic) style in the Dutch Republic.[12] Sofia was depicted as Muscovy's de facto ruler in a print by the Amsterdam engraver Abraham Bloteling (1640–90), whom Nicolaas Witsen had selected for this purpose. Vinius had asked this long-time correspondent and distant relative to oversee the Dutch side of this operation.[13] In the events of August–September 1689 that led to Sofia's fall, Vinius somehow largely avoided reprisals for his undeniable role in this

propaganda campaign. In early October 1689, soon after Sofia's fall, Peter's adherents investigated Vinius about his role in this affair. He declared to the investigators that, as a servitor, he could not but obey the tsarist decree (the regent issued decrees in the name of her brothers) to send Sofia's portrait to Amsterdam; above all, he had feared incurring the wrath of the anti-Petrine party's alleged organizer, the head of the musketeers' office, Fyodor Shaklovityi (c. 1645–89).[14] It seems an unconvincing defense, but, like Ukraintsev (the right-hand man of the exiled Golitsyn), Vinius emerged almost wholly unscathed from the mayhem.[15]

Perhaps Vinius benefitted from a suggestion made by the wily monk and courtier Silvestr Medvedev (1641–91), a great booster of Sofia, during his own investigation. Medvedev argued that, except for *Strel'tsy prikaz* chief Shaklovityi who was plotting the murder of Peter's mother and uncle, those involved in the production (another set was actually printed in Moscow) of the portraits planned nothing malicious.[16] After his summary execution in September 1689 (weeks before Vinius testified), Shaklovityi could not be asked for his side of the story any more. Medvedev himself was nonetheless unable to deflect suspicions away from himself. He was sentenced to death in October 1689 and, finally, executed in 1691. Apart from the relatively harmless quality of Vinius's misstep as suggested by Medvedev, Vinius kept his job in the Foreign Office because Peter and his supporters refrained from a full-scale settling of scores with Sofia's adherents throughout the bureaucracy.[17] The tsar was reluctant to sanction the execution of any of the ringleaders except Shaklovityi and eventually Medvedev.[18] Vinius's claim that he had been no more than a cog in the wheel of the campaign to make Sofia Russia's regent, a cipher who obediently executed orders issued by those placed above him, was thus largely accepted.

Emel'ian Ukraintsev's treatment confirms the tsar's reluctance for a widespread purge of the bureaucracy after Sofia's fall; as manager of the *Posol'skii prikaz* he had been the trusted right-hand man of Golitsyn and Sofia during the 1680s, but he was kept in his post in 1689, while Peter's brother-in-law Lev Naryshkin replaced Vasilii Golitsyn as his boyar supervisor.[19] Meanwhile, Ukraintsev became Vinius's brother-in-law, since, a few years after the death of Vinius's first wife around 1690, he married Matryona Ivanova, a sister of Ukraintsev's wife.[20] By then the two men had worked closely together

and resided in the same neighborhood for decades, living in the rather new-fangled stone houses that became the fashion in Moscow after 1650; having a similar social status as well, they were each other's friends long before they became related as brothers-in-law.[21] Ukraintsev's apparent invulnerability (as his survival in 1689 seems to imply) may have given additional cover to Vinius in the "engraving affair," as may have the patronage he enjoyed from the Odoevskiis to which I referred previously.

Ukraintsev's survival as head of the Foreign Office was ensured by his great merit as a government official. He had played a significant role in the tangible successes of Russian foreign policy in the immediately previous years. Ukraintsev had been instrumental in turning the armistice of Andrusovo into the "eternal" peace with the Polish Commonwealth in 1686, confirming the Russian gains of 1667.[22] In this episode, Vinius had played a minor role as well, overseeing the Polish–Russian diplomatic correspondence generated by the negotiations, for which he had been rewarded in money and kind.[23] Since Ukraintsev was not a soldier, he concomitantly evaded blame for the failed Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689, even if both he and Vinius played the role of a sort of quartermasters. The appearance was kept up as if this venture had been a resounding success, and those responsible for its command and its logistics, including Ukraintsev and Vinius, were bestowed with prizes.[24] In reality, the campaign's commander, Vasilii Golitsyn, never engaged the Tatar Khan Selim Girai (1631–1704) in any decisive battles in either campaign. These debacles contributed to his and Sofia's ouster. Ukraintsev and Vinius, however, had not been involved in the purely military side of these operations, and thus escaped blame.

Vinius's involvement in the peace negotiations with the Poles and the military campaign against the Tatars show how his job description was flexible. Boyars as well as senior bureaucrats were used as troubleshooters if the situation called for it. Taking on responsibilities additional to the post office and Apothecary, Vinius clearly was very good at delegating his tasks. He needed to organize his subordinates in such a manner that his absence from his regular offices would not lead to substantial interruptions in their operation. Of course, as we already saw in Chapter 3 with regards to his threats to *iamshchiki* who lost the mail in 1682, he could wield a stick in case his underlings made mistakes or slacked off. But Vinius's ability at multi-tasking was

undoubtedly exceptional. This, too, may explain why Vinius survived in the summer of 1689.

As outlined in Chapter 3, it was right around this time that Vinius underlined his unique value to Peter by presenting the tsar with Witsen's magnificent map of Siberia. It was the first detailed map of the region ever produced that followed the rules of Western map-making, and was dedicated to the tsar personally. By this time, Peter was wholly captivated by Western technological and scientific innovations and was particularly fond of Dutch accomplishments, seeing the Republic's denizens as the vanguard of modernization. The map undoubtedly aided Vinius's cause.

Despite the pleasure Peter took in this map, Vinius did not quite extricate himself unscathed from the engraving affair: for several years, he fought a precedence battle with his colleagues in the Foreign Office that resulted from a subtle demotion, imposed as punishment for his role in Sofia's propaganda campaign. In the last months of 1689 he was placed beneath less senior clerks in the Foreign Office's pecking order, which not only meant he had to defer to men previously subordinate to him, but that he also received less of a remuneration than they did. Only after moving far closer to Peter toward 1693, did Vinius win his precedence case and was he restored to his former seniority.[25] Vinius's initially fruitless petitioning to redress the situation shows how he only entered Peter's circle of intimates by about 1693. If he had been part of the in-crowd earlier, Vinius would not have had to engage in an effort to loudly trumpet his own merits to regain the position that formally was his due. Vinius's tenacity and self-esteem are obvious from his repeated petitions to receive what he deemed proper remuneration for, and restoration of, his status as a senior chancellery clerk. The conflict during the 1680s with Golitsyn about the Vilnius mail-route was an early sign of this self-confidence. It may have developed into hubris after he became a *dumnyi d'iak* and was made department head over various offices besides the post office not long after his 1693 vindication.

* * *

Vinius's petitions of 1689 and 1690 for restoration to his previously held rank are interesting to us for a completely different reason:

he argued his case by providing a sort of autobiography, listing his accomplishments on behalf of the autocracy. This narrative allows us to penetrate Vinius's mind in the middle of his life and career as a high-level Muscovite bureaucrat. In September 1690, exactly a year after Peter had taken the reins from his half-sister, after delivering the customary groveling address to the two tsars (formally, Peter continued to rule with his half-brother Ivan until the latter's death in 1696), Vinius wrote:

> In the past years, sovereigns, my father left the German lands[26] to serve the tsar and Grand Prince Mikhail Fedorovich, the great sovereign of blessed memory, and served him the great sovereign and the great sovereign's son, your father the sovereign of blessed and famous memory, the tsar and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Great, Little and White Russias [and he went on various missions on the tsar's behalf to foreign states], and acquitted himself with the utmost faith and loyalty possible.
>
> And in the past, sovereigns, in 1648, my father petitioned your father the great sovereign of blessed memory, abandoning his fatherland, and house, and parents, to enter his eternal service. And in 1653 he was sent to Holland as commissar to hire officers and other skilled people, and to acquire all sorts of arms for the war with the Polish king and for all sorts of other business. And, returning from that task, he was baptized in the Orthodox Christian faith of the Sacred Eastern Greek Church with all his household, and the most holy Patriarch Nikon baptized my father and me, your slave. And after the death of my father, I was, by decree of your father the great sovereign of blessed memory, in 1662 [*sic*[27]] ordered to work as translator in the state's Foreign Office.
>
> And in the past, sovereigns, in 1672–73, I, your slave, was sent to the great sovereign kings of Spain, France and England. And when I returned from those missions, the great sovereign, your sovereigns' father of blessed memory rewarded me, your slave, with the rank of Moscow *dvorianin*, and in that rank I went on a journey in 1674–75 in search of all sorts of ore and I was then given a travel document with a great red seal, in which I your slave was described as honorable *dvorianin* and in that document was mentioned as *pod'iach'e* the current *d'iak* Boris Mikhailov.[28]

> And in the past, in 1677–78 by decree of your sovereigns' brother of blessed memory, the great sovereign, tsar and Grand Prince Fyodor Alekseevich . . . but not through my own volition, I was ordered to be a *d'iak* and to work in the *Aptekar'skii prikaz*, and in it, sovereigns, I have served and worked for the great sovereigns uninterruptedly until 1689, and in that year I was ordered to work in the state Foreign Office, and in that office, sovereigns, I stood above *d'iak*s who had been *pod'iachie*, because I had been promoted to *dvorianin* and the *d'iak*s had been promoted from the rank of *pod'iachie*.
>
> . . . And in the *Razriad* [Military Office] of your great sovereigns decrees can be found about those who are created *d'iak*s from the ranks of *dvorian'e*.
>
> Merciful great sovereigns, tsars . . . grant me, for my voluntary arrival in the Muscovian state and for the conversion to the Orthodox faith and for the service of my father and me, your slave, a rank according to the existing decrees in agreement with a merciful review so that I, your slave, not just by my brothers, but also by foreigners, will be seen in [the rank that is my right] . . .[29]

Possibly because this petition was rejected, Vinius wrote another one seven weeks later, in which he pleaded more stringently.[30] He clarified that, when he was a mere translator, it had been exceptional that he had held the rank of *dvorianin*, but that this was nowadays far more common in the *Posol'skii prikaz*. He compared his case to that of the *dvorianin* Grigorii Blizniakov, who outranked as *d'iak* in the Land Office (*Pomestnyi prikaz*) other *d'iak*s who had received that rank earlier than Blizniakov had. It is puzzling, meanwhile, that Vinius did not boast of his service as postmaster, for it might strengthen his case for the great services he had rendered the tsars. Perhaps because this office was considered a private venture, it was not deemed germane to his case.

In the verdict about his case that was rendered in 1693, Vinius was vindicated by the *Razriadnyi prikaz* (the Military Department that dealt with government appointments both military and civilian). It unequivocally stated that "the rank of *dvorianin* is higher than the rank of *d'iak*."[31] It furthermore recognized that, after his transfer to the *Posol'skii prikaz* in 1689, Vinius, as a *dvorianin*,

had been wrongly placed below the two *d'iak*s Boris Mikhailov and Vasilii Posnikov.[32] It noted how the latter two had been promoted to *d'iak* from a lower rank (as *pod'iachie*) than Vinius, who had held the title of Moscow *dvorianin* since the middle of the 1670s. The verdict noticed how immediately after his transfer in the spring of 1689 Vinius was (properly) ranked as second *d'iak* in the prikaz, after the veteran Vasilii Bobynin but before Boris (or Ivan) Volkov (who was replaced by Vasilii Posnikov) and Mikhailov; but that, from October 23 of that year onward, Mikhailov's name was written above that of Vinius on official documents, erroneously conveying greater seniority on Mikhailov.[33] This is a telling detail, for in the intervening months Sofia had been ousted, and Shaklovityi and Kuhlmann executed. No word about these events can be found in the 1693 verdict. Vinius was vindicated, and the pretense was held up that he had never committed any faux pas.

As we saw, the fall-out of the scandal surrounding the printing of Sofia's engraved portrait in Amsterdam had damaged Vinius's standing in the bureaucracy. It is not entirely impossible that he also had fall under suspicion of subversive activities in connection with the Kuhlmann case, but no evidence of this has surfaced. His rehabilitation of 1693 and his almost immediate elevation to an even more favored status were due to the ever increasing fondness of matters Dutch in general and of Vinius personally that Peter exhibited in the course of the 1690s. Already by 1695, Vinius carried the title of *dumnyi d'iak* in the *Razriad*'s books.[34] This promotion coincided with Vinius's transfer from the *Posol'skii prikaz* to the *Sibirskii prikaz* in 1695.[35] In the Siberian Office, he became effectively his own boss, even if he deferred to the department's supervising boyar, the ailing Ivan Borisovich Repnin (1615–97), until the latter's death.

As *dumnyi d'iak*, Vinius finally gained formal entrance to the Muscovite leadership's Inner Sanctum, as he was then allowed to attend the meetings of the tsar's advisory council or *duma* (sometimes called "Boyar Duma"). Besides the tsar himself, this assembly mainly consisted of boyars, but had always at least three *dumnye d'iaki* among its membership. Even if it did not meet as frequently as previously (Peter was by then phasing out the traditional ruling bodies of

Russia), Vinius's elevation was a sign of great distinction and formally represented the pinnacle of his career.[36]

* * *

In November 1689, Vinius had provided an earlier autobiography with a slightly different emphasis, aimed at underlining his high birth and distinguished ancestry.[37] It was probably linked to Vinius's grievance about having to serve under those of lesser status. It was useful to have the title of *dvorianin* officially confirmed and give this aristocratic status even greater significance by suggesting that it had been due to him through rights of inheritance. For in this petition he pleaded for the recognition of a spurious Dutch noble status. Vinius lined up a formidable array of prominent expatriates to support his argument of belonging to the Republic's hereditary nobility: Johan-Willem van Keller, Dutch resident in Moscow from 1677 until 1699; the "doctor of his tsarist majesty" Arnoud van der Hulst (d. 1694; in Russian, Zakharii Iakovlevich van der Gul'st), who had been in Moscow at least since 1679; the Swedish resident Christoph von Kochen, who was in Moscow from 1679 to 1690; General Patrick Gordon, a leading military commander in Russian service from 1661 until his death in 1699; and the Danish resident Heinrich Butenant von Rosenbusch, who resided in Moscow from 1679 to 1699, all vouched for the truth of Vinius's statement.[38] In how far they consciously lied on Vinius's behalf is unclear.

In this petition, Vinius's life's description differed in some of its nuance from the outline he later sketched before the *Razriad*. Vinius (and his witnesses) underlined his Frisian (noble) ancestry, and suggested that his father's arrived in Muscovy in 1634 as a denizen of this province.[39] Vinius hailed the Frisians as tracing their ancestry to classical Roman times and as staunch defenders of a proud independence ever since, even preserving their autonomy within the contemporary United Provinces. Vinius's great-grandfather and grandfather had allegedly been among the prominent citizens of the Frisian capital of Leeuwarden, serving as its patricians (*patriki*) and councilors. His relatives were still important people in the Netherlands at that time, he added; for example, he had a brother or cousin who was a "judge" (alderman or *schepen*?) of the City of Amsterdam and another relative was a "state comptroller," who had traveled in the past as

representative of the High Mightinesses, the Estates-General, in the company of the Prince of Orange. There was a grain of truth here, for Nicolaas Witsen had recently represented the Dutch parliament in England at William III's side (and Witsen had been a deputy for the Estates-General with the Dutch army during the 1670s), but Witsen was hardly a close relative. Perhaps the judge that Vinius mentioned was one of Witsen's brothers.

Weak as his case was, it was corroborated by van Keller, who was himself a baron, a fairly rare noble title in the Dutch Republic after 1648.[40] Clearly, Vinius had tailored his statement to a different audience here, emphasizing noble roots as well as his Frisian ancestry. The Russian rulers were in the habit of acknowledging noble status of those who switched their allegiance from foreign potentates to them, as for example many Polish aristocrats did in 1667. Vinius's claim, however, was false. The Winius family did not belong to the Frisian nobility. Perhaps to pre-empt allegations of fraud, Andrei Andreevich claimed the ambiguously glib title of "patrician" for his relatives and ancestors, a term that did not quite connotate "noble" in legal terms. Additionally, his father could only with difficulty be called authentically Frisian, for, prior to his move to Russia, he had resided in Amsterdam. The last true Frisian in the family had been Vinius's grandfather Denijs Tjerkszoon, probably a tailor by trade, who settled in the Dutch capital during the early seventeenth century, and minded his son's Amsterdam affairs after Andries Denijszoon Winius had emigrated to Muscovy in the 1630s. But Andrei Andreevich's claims were almost impossible to verify for the Russian bureaucracy, because of the eccentric complications of the Dutch and Frisian societies' structure and the remoteness of the Dutch Republic.

The affadavit certainly shows the hallmark signs of the *arriviste*, the upstart who wants to belong to the highest circles and inflates his own credentials. His moves resemble the aristocratic aspirations of contemporary Dutch social climbers, such as the urban regents who often bought noble estates to pretend to belong to the traditional native aristocracy and mask their humble origins. Vinius could not really invoke his Muscovite noble roots: the father's title had been personal rather than hereditary, and the son therefore contrived to cook up a sort of hazy account of the heroics of his relatives (to claim Witsen as a close relative was a stretch) and of his own high birth in Dutch terms. Ultimately, any affirmation of his ancestors' noble titles

helped his precedence suit little. It was stalled until 1693, when the *Razriad* decided the case by dryly applying the seniority rules, and probably only after a prompt from a powerful figure, likely Tsar Peter himself.

In his efforts, Vinius was perhaps handicapped by the official abolition of the formal system of precedence (*mestnichestvo*) just before the death of Fyodor III, but pedigree still informally counted for something in 1689 Muscovy (and later). As Marshall Poe remarks, "Much of the lives of 17th-century Russian magnates was consumed by the struggle for honor . . .."[41] Vinius was not a "magnate," but he tried to emulate the court nobility's behavior, for it was the standard of "civilization"; as Norbert Elias has so convincingly argued, such was the case in contemporary France.[42] *Mestnichestvo*'s demise may be reflected in Vinius's modus operandi: before the *Razriad*, he primarily tried to make his case by pointing at his merit rather than merely invoking precedence rules. Rewarding his servants for their achievements eventually became the rule in Peter's Russia, but this principle was only formally codified in Peter's famous Table of Ranks in 1722. And *mestnichestvo*'s abolition was not in the least intended to end the privileged status of Russia's aristocracy. To confirm his noble status thus remained a worthwhile effort to Vinius in 1689. He may have hoped as well to have his sons (who are both mentioned in the document) recognized as hereditary scions of the nobility.

* * *

The Russian historian Mikhail Bogoslovskii (1867–1929) suggested that Peter the Great was above all drawn to Vinius in the early 1690s because of Peter's great interest in matters Dutch, even if his achievements across more than a quarter century of government service may have impressed the young tsar as well.[43] According to Vinius's own recollections, he became Peter's tutor in Dutch (*nederlianskii dialekt*) after Peter's defeat of his half-sister, but exactly when this happened is unclear.[44] Given Vinius's difficulties in receiving proper recognition of his seniority, one is inclined to surmise that this was no earlier than in 1692 or 1693.[45] But prior to that Vinius was occasionally noticed in the tsar's vicinity: by 1691 he occupied a prominent place at certain religious ceremonies.[46] Because of Vinius's expertise and trustworthiness, he might seem an obvious choice as the tsar's Dutch tutor, but

he was not the only one who helped Peter in the latter's singular attempt to learn a foreign tongue. Frans Timmerman and others, such as Karsten Brand, may have instructed Peter as well. Still, Vinius evidently had helped the tsar in firming up his basic knowledge of the language.

Tsar Peter never became fluent in Dutch, although he was certainly capable of conducting a conversation in the language after his stint in Holland in 1697–98.[47] Even earlier, Dutchified Russian was a sort of generally fashionable lingo in Peter's circle, and Peter wielded a respectable passive knowledge of the language. Peter's own correspondence is sprinkled with a variety of Dutch words. This is not as odd as it seems, for Dutch was the lingua franca of the seventeenth-century Baltic world and the Dutch presence among Western foreigners in Muscovy was pre-eminent throughout the seventeenth century.[48] In 1696, the erstwhile Danish *chargé d'affaires* Butenant von Rosenbusch, an intimate of the tsar, wrote a letter to Peter that was half in Dutch.[49] Peter, then, was already capable of reading Dutch *before* any concrete plans were drawn up about the Grand Embassy.

Once he was Peter's tutor, the tsar grew quickly fond of Vinius. Peter dispatched him in 1693 to negotiate with the Ukrainian Cossack hetman Ivan Mazepa (1639–1709) to help coordinate an attack on the Crimean Tatar fortress of Azov.[50] Vinius and his assistants were ambushed by a group of brigands on the way back when they were refreshing their horses; they escaped with their lives though not with their goods.[51] In the same year, Vinius accompanied Peter on his first trip to Russia's northern port at Arkhangel'sk. The journey to Arkhangel'sk cemented Vinius's close ties with the tsar. One wonders if this is when most of the tutoring took place, as Peter was not the patient kind disposed to learn by rote. The port was packed with sailors from Holland who were ideal conversation partners for Peter to practice his Dutch.

Around this time, Vinius resumed on a regular basis his old job of conveying the summary of the foreign news to the tsar, even if it was now in a sort of short-hand; Peter was constantly engaging in myriad activities and had little time to listen to, or read, lengthy newspaper summaries. For example, Vinius dispatched a synopsis of the key foreign news to Peter when the tsar was on his first campaign at Azov in May 1695.[52] As postmaster, Vinius was ideally placed to peruse the

foreign papers immediately upon their arrival in Moscow, although he did not often do so when he was the chief of the Pharmacy Office, as he was too busy. But his renewed regular delivery of the news to the tsar gave Vinius an opportunity to interact closely with his sovereign, in the way he had enjoyed access to Aleksei. The correspondence between the tsar and Vinius that starts in 1694 confirms Peter's fondness of Vinius. It originated in Peter's desire to have another pair of eyes keeping watch on Moscow matters in his absence, but even more so to inform him as quickly and accurately as possible about foreign developments.[53] Letters between the two were exchanged from 1694 to 1714.[54]

Vinius's trip with the tsar to Arkhangel'sk in 1693 remained a singular occasion, meanwhile. Soon after his return to Moscow, he intensively liaised on the tsar's behalf with the Amsterdam mayor Witsen regarding the purchase of the first Russian seaworthy sailing ship, which arrived in the northern port in 1694.[55] When it did, however, Vinius remained in Moscow, while Peter made a second journey to Arkhangel'sk to personally inspect the *Santa Profeetie*, built on Amsterdam's wharves. Vinius's ties with his distant cousin Witsen clearly became stronger, which was to Vinius's benefit. By the early 1690s, Peter was a great admirer of the Amsterdam burgomaster and East India Company director. This admiration had begun when Peter was given Witsen's map of Russia. Subsequently, the tsar read Witsen's manual on ships through the ages, after receiving its second expanded edition together with the rare first edition of Witsen's work on Siberia, both works published in the early 1690s.[56] Witsen proceeded to aid the tsar in his attempts to create a Russian navy by overseeing the building of the *Santa Profeetie* in Amsterdam. In 1694, Peter was wholly obsessed with his shipbuilding project. On 9 July from Moscow, Vinius wrote:

> *Gnaedigste grooten Heer* [this was in Dutch, meaning "Merciful great Lord"]. With yesterday's mail, from overseas, your majesty, Mayor Witsen conveyed to me that he did not write in his book about measurements of ships and yachts in proportion to their keels because he could not discover those dimensions, for it seemed to him that every shipwright does this according to his particular preference, and that as an example of good measurements it would behoove your majesty to measure the ship that has been bought

> on the demand of your great majesties on which Jan Vlam [the captain of the *Santa Profeetie*] will arrive in the city. And [Witsen wrote] that this ship was good and well built according to measurements that make it possible to have other ships made following its dimensions. . . . Your slave Andriushka, who falls on his knees for you and bows to you.[57]

When this letter was written, Vinius stood at the height of his power and influence in Russia. But it was the message it conveyed that sowed the first doubts in Tsar Peter's mind about the Dutch genius and its recipe for worldly success. Around 1690 it seemed as if Peter believed that any problem that ailed his empire could be solved by emulating the United Provinces and their intrepid denizens. Vinius's news of July 1694 forced the tsar to realize that it was difficult to literally copy what the Dutch had accomplished in the course of the previous century. He needed to broaden his outlook and examine other models from which Russia could learn. Eventually, on his Great Embassy in 1697–98, Peter concluded that for the creation of a modern Russian navy, English shipbuilding, which was standardized and used blueprints, provided a much better example.

For the next eight years or so, however, the Vinius remained a crucial aide to Peter. Vinius thus played a prominent role when in 1695 Witsen arranged for ammunition to be shipped to Arkhangel'sk that was destined to aid the Russian siege of Azov.[58] When in 1696 Peter conducted the second siege of Azov, Vinius clearly served as the tsar's main conduit for European news.[59] Thus he wrote to the tsar in July of that year:

> The news, your majesty, from the most recent mail arriving from Riga: The victory of your majesty at sea [against the Crimean–Turkish fleet near Azov] has been celebrated and welcomed; meanwhile, the sultan sent as much maritime help as he had available in response to the many requests from the Crimean khan. And the neighborhood of Galata in Tsar'gorod [Istanbul] has been destroyed by fire, only a few houses remaining. The Imperial armies are still campaigning near Temesvar [Timisoara] and the Turkish army will arrive at Belgrade in the month of July. Between the English king and the French no battle has occurred. And

> with regards to Poland, your majesty, Jakub [Sobieski, 1667–1737], the oldest son of the deceased king has been recognized as new king. The Prince [Eugene] of Savoy [1663–1736] has moved into a formidable defensive position, and the French cannot do much to dislodge him from it. And the Hollanders defeated [the Dunkerque captain in French service] Jan Bart [1650–1702], and burned his ship, and they say that he himself has been captured, although others write that he has been incinerated. And the Dutch captain who battled with him was blown up because of [an explosion] of his gunpowder. And the Venetians, your majesty, claim that the Turks came at them and that they defeated the Muslims; about this, confirmation is needed.[60]

Vinius's role in this regard gradually diminished after the Grand Embassy. This was partially due to the installation of Andrei Artamonovich Matveev (1666–1728), the son of Vinius's patron of the 1670s, as Russian resident at The Hague in early 1700.[61] Matveev translated the news himself and forwarded it as part of his regular reports to Moscow, while he also sent actual newspapers along. The flow of information from the West became a veritable river, and in 1702, as Dan Waugh writes, "Peter took the manuscript *kuranty* out of the closed circles of the court: he ordered that these compilations of news, supplemented by items on Russian events, be published for general distribution."[62] Indeed, the nature of the *kuranty* had changed even earlier, as I noted above; since about 1690, the tsar had been supplied with much more concise accounts of foreign affairs, which had reduced the usual amount of information conveyed to him to a fifth.[63] The news was now heavily summarized, because, as Shamin suggests, Peter had far too much to do to find enough time to read or listen every week to 17 long pages of news, as had been the custom earlier.[64] Vinius's brief notes in his correspondence with Peter reflect this growing trend toward greater conciseness.[65] The end of his crucial role after 1698 as conduit of foreign news to the tsar contributed to the drifting apart of Peter and Vinius.

The transfer of knowledge was essential for Peter's modernization project. Throughout his career Vinius occasionally (and this was all the more so in his final years) undertook the translation of longer texts or textbooks, but it remains uncertain how many, or which, he actually completed. While after Peter's take-over a number of

translators occupied themselves for part of their time with such work, Vinius's activities in this regard can at least be traced back to the *Posol'skii prikaz* during Aleksei's rule.[66] And, of course, Vinius served all his rulers as a specialist in the crucial Western-European languages in which news about many inventions, manuals, theoretical treatises, and so on were published. But in this field of expertise, too, Vinius gradually became part of a team of analysts, among whom his significance for the tsar was declining after 1700.

* * *

Peter ordered an elaborate ceremonial parade to be performed in Moscow after the Russian capture of Azov in 1696. The victors came marching from the south of the city toward the Kremlin, passing just before crossing the river over the Stone Bridge (*Kamennyi Most'*) through a triumphal arch.[67] On top of it stood Vinius, who saluted Peter's arrival back in Moscow by reciting through a megaphone poetry that celebrated the tsar's military feats. Although this bespeaks an intimate relationship between tsar and subject, it is wrong to take this curious episode as evidence of Vinius being a fixture among Peter's boon companions.[68] Vinius's prominence here was the result of his exceptional knowledge about the manner in which classical triumphs unfolded in Roman times, rather than the tsar's extraordinary fondness for him. Vinius's moment in the limelight on this occasion should be considered against other evidence, such as the manner in which Vinius addressed the tsar in writing, in which he remained conspicuously traditional. He continued to follow the traditional groveling style in closing his letters (see above) and referred to himself in his correspondence in general as if he was the tsar's insignificant slave. Peter's true comrades allowed themselves a looser form, addressing their *shkiper* (first mate) or *bombardier* (gunner). Such was not Vinius's habit or privilege.

His participation in Peter's notorious Most Drunken Assembly (*vsep'ianeishii sobor*) was likewise intermittent, although this was partially since he was not constantly at Peter's side. This carnivalesque court came into being in the early 1690s and was to engage in its ribaldry until Peter's death. On the surface, its mockery of the formal government, court, and Orthodox Church appears absurd, but Ernest Zitser, the expert on this mock government, has plausibly

suggested that there was a method behind the madness.[69] Its sessions "expressed [a] belief in the power of a monarch who could turn the world upside down in order to institute a radically new dispensation . . . [because its] flamboyant flaunting of royal charisma helped to promote . . . the ideals of modern bureaucracy."[70] It also reminds of the "Knights of Jubilation" of free-spirited European publishers gathering at The Hague in 1710, or even the Freemasons, who just began to emerge in Western Europe around this time.[71] In the end, the Most Drunken Assembly served to liberate the tsar from observing traditional codes in his interaction with the boyar elite.

Vinius seems to have participated in the debauchery of this assembly only on occasion, and then merely in the years of his ascendancy (1693–1703).[72] Zitser does not identify Vinius as a member.[73] That Vinius is nowhere to be encountered in Zitser's account but for its footnotes shows that Vinius always remained a peripheral figure at the court. This, too, contributed to his fall from grace.

Notes

1. See Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 157–90.
2. It was not as if Peter had always remained aloof from the government's business before, for he paid together with a group of his closest followers a visit to the *Posol'skii prikaz* to the surprise and dismay of the *d'iak*s V. Bobynin, I. Volkov, and B. Mikhailov in early 1688 (see Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 95). And he had supported Vinius in his dispute with his subordinate in the *Aptekar'skii prikaz*, as we saw in Chapter 5. But his interest was intermittent.
3. C. Belkin Stevens, *Russia's War of Emergence, 1460–1730*, Harlow: Pearson, 2007, 236.
4. It is interesting to note that they were all older than Peter, and some even as old as Vinius. They had all vivid memories about Aleksei's rule and were as much as Vinius formed by the transitory decades preceding Peter's take-over in 1689. It is again a sign that Peter only gradually became more of a radical.
5. For the boyars among Peter's inner circle at his time, see further Cracraft, *Revolution of Peter*, 5. Peter was careful not to offend Russian sensibilities and promote upstarts or foreigners to positions of such responsibility. Romodanovskii was the most important among them (see Zitser, *Transfigured Kingdom*, 59).
6. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 154–5. Shamin suggests that much of the government bureaucracy continued to operate as usual despite the bloodshed and the sort of martial law that prevailed for a few months in Moscow; he especially notes the post office and the compilation of the *kuranty* within

the *Posol'skii prikaz* (Shamin, *Kuranty*, 122–3). Vinius, probably, was only sporadically involved in compiling the *kuranty* by 1682.

7. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 155; Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 113. He owned both landed property designated as *pomest'e* (in conditional tenure) and as *votchina* (in full ownership, Iurkin, *Andrei*, 157).
8. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 167–72; Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 111–12; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i*, 131.
9. Ukraintsev had been promoted to deputy chief in May 1682 upon the murder of Larion Ivanov, who had been butchered by the *strel'tsy* and when Prince Vasilii Golitsyn, who was a peer with little practical knowledge about diplomacy, was made the department's chief (see Hughes, *Russia and the West*, 23–4).
10. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 172; Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 79, 85.
11. See Zitser, *Transfigured Kingdom*, 23–6.
12. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 185–91; Likhachev, ed., *Slovar'*, 176; A.P. Bogdanov, *Moskovskaia publitsistika poslednei chetverti xvii veka*, Moscow: Institut istorii RAN, 2001, 394.
13. See Hughes, *Sophia*, 143–5, 169.
14. *Rozysknyia dela o Fedor' Shaklovitom' i ego soobshchnikakh'*, ed. Arkheograficheskaia kommissiia, vol. 1, St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1884, 655; Hughes, *Russia and the West*, 76–7.
15. Around 1 September 1689, Ukraintsev was still counted among Sofia's followers (as was Iakov Odoevskii, but, since he was primarily regarded to be an "independent," he easily survived the demise of the Miloslavskii–Golitsyn faction; see Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 98–9, 111; Hughes, *Russia and the West*, 76). Why Ukraintsev politically survived has not yet been explained by historians (and therefore my suggestions). It bears mention that the death sentences given to Shaklovityi, Medvedev and their (alleged) fellow plotters were signed by four *dumnye d'iaki*, one of whom was Ukraintsev (see I.P. Kozlovskii, *Sil'vestr' Medvedev. Ocherk' iz' istorii russkago prosveshcheniia*, Kiev: St. Vladimir UP, 1895, 36–7).
16. Bogdanov, *Moskovskaia*, 394; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 190–1; Hughes, *Sophia*, 237–40; Hughes, *Russia and the West*, 80. Most elaborate on this is Kozlovskii, see Kozlovskii, *Sil'vestr'*, 28–45; for a more recent discussion, see Bogdanov, *Moskovskaia*, 375–427. And on Shaklovityi, see for example M.M. Galanov, "Fedor Shaklovityi," *Voprosy Istorii* 3, 1995, 155–9.
17. Although an overturn of personnel did take place (see Zitser, *Transfigured Kingdom*, 27).
18. ("Vvedenie"), in Arkeheograficheskaia kommissiia, *Rozysknyia dela o Fedor' Shaklovitom' i ego soobshchnikakh'*, vol. 1. St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1884, i-xii: vi.
19. Brown, "Early Modern," 518; Bogoslovskii, *Petr Velikii*, vol. 1, 2005, 75–7; Lavrov, *Regentstvo*, 189.
20. Ukraintsev's wife's maiden name was Avdot'ia Ivanova (see Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 114). It is not quite clear when exactly this occurred, as Iurkin shows, but, contrary to the bold assertions by Wladimiroff that

this happened in the 1660s, the marriage was likely concluded in the 1690s (see Iurkin, *Andrei*, 189, 189n21, 500; Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 114; Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 212). Both were married twice, but only from the 1690s evidence surfaces in which they called each other *svoiki* (brothers-in-law); Iurkin identifies the first reference in an exchange of letters between Peter and Vinius in July 1696, but Demidova's listing indicates that the two may have become in-laws earlier (Iurkin, *Andrei*, 189, 189n21, 500; Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 114; *Pis'ma i bumagi imperatora*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 591). Then again, Peter did not know Vinius very well before 1693, perhaps, and this may explain the lack of any earlier source mentioning that the two were brothers-in-law. Vinius's second wife died in the house fire in 1712 (see Peters, *wijze koopman*, 108).

21. On the stone houses, see Brown, "Early Modern," 278.
22. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 174. He had further conducted negotiations with representatives of the Holy League about Muscovite entry into this anti-Ottoman alliance, which had not led to any definitive results, and had been Russian representative at the Cossack hetman Samoilovich's camp (ibid., 174–5). Ukraintsev, together with several other *d'iak*s of the *prikaz* such as Vasilii Bobinin and Prokopii Voznitsyn, was richly rewarded for his efforts to forge this Russian-Ukrainian alliance (ibid., 175). This may have been the time when Vinius acquired the few works in Polish in his book collection.
23. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 175, 181–2.
24. Ibid., 180.
25. He then ranked as third in the office, after *dumnyi d'iak* Ukraintsev and *d'iak* Vasilii Bobinin; with both of them Vinius had already minded the van Klenk Embassy in 1676, see "Zapisnaia kniga Moskovskogo stola Razriadnogo prikaza," l. 2 (available at http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Russ/XVII/1680–1700/Zap_kniga_razr_prik_7202/frametext.htm, accessed 14 December 2011).
26. Again, Holland was seen as *Diets* or *Nederduits* even by the Dutch themselves, who remained officially part of the Empire until the Westphalian Peace of 1648.
27. The source says here "171," that is the year 7171 according to the calendar then still in use in Muscovy, which started in 5508 BCE; because the year started on September 1, this may be read as either 1662 or 1663.
28. Bogoiavlenskii's list of *d'iak*s appears to confirm that Vinius's grievance was about the precedence given over him to Boris Mikhailov (who would leave the department in August 1690) and V. Pos(t)nikov (Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i*, 131). Vasilii Bobinin was ranked above him as well, but had been a *d'iak* in the 1670s.
29. See V.N. Storozhev, "Delo d'iaka An.An. Viniusa," in V.N. Storozhev, *Miscellaneous Pamphlets*, various places: 1890–96, 1–11 [original: Tver': Gubernskoi Pravleniia, 1896]: 1–4.
30. Storozhev, "Delo d'iaka," 4–5.
31. Ibid., 8. Demidova's listing indicates 1695, but that seems rather late given that Vinius assumed his role as Peter's confidant earlier than 1695 (Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 113).

32. As was mentioned in a previous note, see Storozhev, "Delo d'iaka," 8–9; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i*, 131. Irina Gouzévich's Petr Menshoi Pos(t)nikov, who held a medical degree from the University of Padua and translated the *Qu'ran*, apparently, was Vasilii Posnikov's son (see I. Gouzevitch, "The Editorial Policy as a Mirror of Petrine Reforms: Textbooks and Their Translators in Early 18th Century Russia," *Science & Education* 7–8, 2006, 841–62: 847–8; Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 449). The *Razriadnyi prikaz* was the office that decided precedence issues before the practice of *mestnichestvo* was formally abolished in 1681 (see Rybalko, *Rossiiskaia prikaznaia biurokratiia*, 36).
33. Storozhev, "Delo d'iaka," 6. Volkov might be equated with Boris Volkov, who translated from French, but it could be one Ivan Volkov who worked in the mid-1680s in the *Posol'skii prikaz* (perhaps a relative, see Gouzevitch, "Editorial Policy," 848; Arkheograficheskaia kommissia, *Dopolneniia k aktam' istoricheskim*, vol. 10, St. Petersburg: Prats, 1867, 474).
34. Storozhev, "Delo d'iaka," 10; Poe et al., *Russian Elite*, vol. 1, 333.
35. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 224–6; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i*, 131 and 162.
36. On this, see for example Zitser, *Transfigured Kingdom*, 72.
37. See Dobroklonskii, "Kniga Viniusa," 227–8. It eventually found its way to the *gerol'dsmeisterskaia kontora*, the office that recorded the noble status of Russian aristocratic families from 1722 onward. Wladimiroff erroneously assumes that this document dated from the mid-1670s (Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 215–16 and 215n130).
38. For the envoys, see Paul Bushkovitch, "Aristocratic Faction and the Opposition to Peter the Great: the 1690's," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 50, 1995, 80–116: 82; for van der Hulst, who introduced Peter to his mentor Frans Timmerman in 1688, see Iurkin, *Ot pervoprestol'nogo*, 34; Dobroklonskii, "Kniga Viniusa," 229; Bogoslovskii, *Petr Velikii*, vol. 1, 54.
39. In fact, 1644 is indicated in the source as the year of arrival of Andries Denijszoon Winius, but since he clearly established his manufacturing plant and iron foundry in Tula in 1634, whereas he only became the tsar's subject in 1648, this is likely a transcription error (Dobroklonskii, "Kniga Viniusa," 229).
40. In 1697, Vinius was to report van Keller's death on 10 July 1697 to Peter, who was, ironically, in Holland, see *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 627 (Vinius to Peter, August[?] 1697).
41. Poe, "Public Face," 13.
42. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 64–5, 324, 435–40.
43. Bogoslovskii, *Petr 1*, vol. 4, 201.
44. Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 252; as Kozlovskii points out, Peter's close companion and brother-in-law Prince Boris I. Kurakin (1676–1727) confirms this role of Vinius (Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 21).
45. Lindsey Hughes suggests 1689–90 in one book and around 1691 in another (see Hughes, *Russia*, 13; L. Hughes, *Peter the Great: A Biography*, New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2002, 30. It is not clear what her source was

in either case, but it was not Pogodin, "Petr Pervyi"). Peter and his close company had breakfast at the " *prikazchik Andrei*" on 24 April 1693; this may have been Vinius (see Hughes, *Peter*, 33).

46. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 21; Bogoslovskii notes that on one occasion in 1690 he was in the tsar's presence before morning prayers, a sign of great favor, to which he was treated more frequently in the next following years (Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 4, 200).
47. See Iurkin, *Andrei*, 208–12; Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 15. Iurkin also suggests that Peter's Dutch was rather less good than is sometimes suggested, but probably relies too much on written evidence of Peter's linguistic capabilities; for the opposite view, see E. Waegemans, "De taal van Peter de Grote: het Nederlands als wereldtaal—een gemiste kans?," In E. Waegemans, ed., *De taal van Peter de Grote*, Leuven: Acco, 2006, 11–15: 12. See also Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 218.
48. J. Kreslins, "Linguistic Landscapes in the Baltic," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 3–4, 2003, 165–74: 169; P. Burke, *Toward a Social History of Early Modern Dutch*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2005, 14.
49. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 562–3 (Butenant von Rosenbusch to Peter, 15 April 1696); see as well ibid., 574–5 (Butenant von Rosenbusch to Peter, 25 June 1696). Butenant, merchant and entrepreneur before he was a diplomat, was also a purveyor of news to Peter.
50. Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 252. That this was Mazepa is evident even if Vinius declines to mention his name (by the time this letter was written in 1708 it had become evident that Mazepa had defected to the Swedes and it was best not to mention him by name; see Hughes, *Russia*, 17, 35–6).
51. Kozlovskii, *Pervya pochty*, 194.
52. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 508–9. Part of the correspondence between Peter and Vinius was published previously already in N.G. Ustrialov, *Istoriia Tsarstvovaniia Petra Velikogo*, 6 vols, St. Petersburg: Imperial Printing House, 1858–63. See for example ibid., vol. 2, 407–8, 417, vol. 4, part 2, 245, 267, 419.
53. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 206–26.
54. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 22.
55. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 213–16: Pogodin, "Petr pervyi," 36.
56. N. Witsen, *Architectura navalis et Regimen Nauticum. Ofte Aaloude en Hedendaagsche Scheeps-Bouw en Bestier*, Amsterdam: Pieter and Joan Blaeu, 1690; Witsen, *Noord en Oost Tartarye*.
57. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 500–1.
58. Ibid., primechaniia, 510–11 (Vinius to Peter, 25 June 1695).
59. Bogoslovskii, *Petr Velikii*, vol. 1, 336.
60. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 587–8 (Vinius to Peter, 20 July 1696).
61. See Shamin, *Kuranty*, 139. After his return from Europe in 1698, when the tsar was repeatedly in Voronezh, Peter at first still relied on Vinius to provide him with European news (M. Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 3, Moscow:

Ogiz, 1946, 124, 165–6, 168; Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 4, 19, 57, 71, 200, 385, 389 and see further below). It is propably germane that the news summaries that were prepared for Peter began to draw less and less on Dutch newspapers (Shamin, *Kuranty*, 134). It seems to foreshadow the general disenchantment with the Dutch at Peter's court that gathered momentum after 1700 (or, conversely, the rapid decline of the Dutch sway in general in Europe).

62. Waugh, "Publication of Muscovite *Kuranty*," 106; see as well, Shamin, *Kuranty*, 140–1.
63. Shamin, *Kuranty*, 131–2.
64. Ibid., 131.
65. Ibid., 137–9.
66. Gouzevitch, "Editorial Policy," 841–62; Gardiner, *Translation*, 111.
67. Bogoslovskii, *Petr Velikii*, vol. 1, 345–6; *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 603; Soloviev, *History of Russia*, vol. 26, 133; Bushkovitch, *Peter*, 186–7; Paul Bushkovitch, "The Roman Empire in the Era of Peter the Great," in C.S.L. Dunning et al., eds, *Rude and Barbarous Kingdom Revisited*, Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2008: 155–72: 169. Likhachev and company doubt Vinius's authorship of this verse (see Likhachev, ed., *Slovar'*, 181–2). Vinius also wrote Peter a delirious letter congratulating him on the capture of the fortress (*Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 597–9 [Vinius to Peter, 1 August 1696]).
68. As Wladmiroff does (see Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 217).
69. Zitser, *Transfigured Kingdom*.
70. Ibid., 6–7.
71. Hunt, Jacob, and Mijnhardt, *Book*, 25–6.
72. Thus see his description of a party thrown by Prince Fedor Iu. Romodanovskii, Peter's watchdog, in June 1697, when Peter was in Western Europe; it lasted until four or five in the morning, and the revelers took three days to recover (*Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 627 [Vinius to Peter, 2 July 1697]). Bushkovitch suggests that he was a more regular member (from 1692?), but Vinius, at least, was frequently not in the immediate vicinity of the tsar (because of this, we can now peruse the frequent correspondence between the tsar and Vinius during the decade of the latter's ascendancy; see Bushkovitch, *Peter the Great*, 177–8).
73. See Zitser, *Transfigured Kingdom*, Table 1, Appendix 2, 186–93. I suspect that Vinius perhaps can be identified as Bishop Andrei or Patriarch Andrei of Palestine, see ibid., Table 1, 189, 192n59, and 192n60. The fact that this character appears so infrequently in the sources about the assembly may be further evidence bolstering my argument.

8
At the Siberian Desk

The Early Modern Russian empire resembled both contemporary European colonial empires and the Mongolian empire created by Chingis Khan's descendants during the thirteenth century, to which it was an heir.[1] Like the Mongolians, the Russians took hostages to enforce the delivery of tribute (mainly in furs), and some of the practices and terminology they used in administering their empire were directly borrowed from the Mongolians, whom they had replaced in less than a century (1553–1637) in Kazan, Astrakhan and in Siberia, but whose subjects they had been for most of the three centuries preceding that conquest.[2] The colonized, in other words, had become the colonizers.

Like the Europeans in the Americas, the Russians were primarily interested in exploiting Siberia and the Urals for their resources, and only interested in the aborigines if they could aid (or threatened to hinder) this exploitation. Like the French in North America, Muscovites' main interest was in animal furs, of which the quantity and quality were higher in Siberia than in New France. The unbridled hunting for animal pelts exhausted this resource toward 1700. Gradually, Siberian mining began to gain in importance (in which process Vinius played a role), but iron and bronze had to substitute for the silver of Zacatecas and Potosí of Spanish America. Russian serfs who had been deported from their ancestral villages worked the mines. Their fate echoes the forced laborers of the native population in Mexico and Peru, even if in the Russian case workers were exploited by mine bosses with whom they shared their ethnicity and culture.

As had been the case in the Mongolian Empire, virtually all industrial enterprises were formally owned by the Muscovite state, or,

to be more precise, the tsar personally.[3] While trade across Siberia was conducted for private profit, the state imposed strict regulations and levied high fees on transactions and trading permits. Formally, this type of economic activity was far more restricted than in the European empires in America and Asia. This stranglehold on private business was negated, however, in practice: most merchants could evade government inspections without much difficulty, because the Siberian department and the governors and their staff lacked the wherewithal to enforce government control, and corruption was universal. The state, too, expected its servants to derive much of their own income from levies imposed on the local population (as it did from officials in the central offices). Even Vinius, as head of the Muscovite operations in the vast colony from 1695 onwards, in effect bought his office. He had to earn his keep from commissions and fees, and did not receive a guaranteed salary paid by the state.[4] To augment this income, for example, he acquired the concession to sell English tobacco in Siberia in 1698 or 1699.[5] As in other areas of Muscovite economic life, the restrictions placed on individual entrepreneurs through a bevvy of state guidelines and regulations were mitigated by the opportunities government service offered to make a profit.

The Russian Empire did perhaps yield a higher sustained profit than the contemporary European empires, because it was run on the cheap. Ensconced in their strongholds, soldiers and officials ensured the regular collection of furs and collection of excises, and protected the local native population and Russian colonists against foreign threats or home-grown brigands. It remains a mystery how much money the government spent on the various Cossack garrisons, local clerks, or the construction and upkeep of fortresses.[6] Nor can a truly reliable estimate be given about fur trappers' evasion of paying government dues, or about the scope of illegal or unreported trade within Siberia and from Siberia with bordering countries such as China, Mongolia, Dz(h)ungaria, or the Kazak nomadic alliances (*ordas*).

Meanwhile, the Russian hold over Siberia was never secure, for a resurgent Qing China cast covetous eyes on this region. A continuously restive Mongolian-Tatar, Kazak, and Kalmyk population roamed the borderlands. There was a constant threat that the native Siberian population might abandon the Muscovites for different overlords. Thus Vinius had to maneuver in a delicate fashion in his

attempts to diffuse Christianity, shore up and shift the region's economic exploitation, and maintain (or even strengthen) Russian rule.

In administering a colonial empire from a distance with the aid of only the most basic means of communication, Vinius faced many of the same challenges as his cousin Witsen did as director of the Dutch East India Company. The Russian historian V.O. Kliuchevsky (1841–1911) aptly suggested the similarity between the Russian colonial empire in Siberia and the overseas empires of the Europeans. Siberia (and here we borrow from Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn) was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries an archipelago of Russian-ruled islands, fortress towns that dotted the map. Mainly populated by Cossacks, administrators, and visiting traders, these settlements were almost lost in an ocean of territory in which Muscovites had little to no presence or authority. Thus this Russian land empire in Asia resembled the Dutch seaborne Asian empire, which had virtually no territorial control beyond its ports from Nagasaki to Batavia, Bengal, South India, Sri Lanka, and Bandar Abbas in Iran.

Vinius managed as overlord to stabilize Russian rule over Siberia. He established ore-extracting industries on a much larger scale, regulated commerce, and enforced Moscow's rule in a much more rigorous manner than previously had been the case. Blatant graft was suppressed, and government revenue was steady even when the fabulous returns generated previously by the fur trade had gone into decline. But Vinius proved incapable of standing above using a system of clients and of refusing to line his own pockets when the opportunity offered itself. Thus he made himself vulnerable to accusations of dishonesty, abuse of power, and corruption.

Vinius ran Siberia more efficiently on behalf of the tsar than his predecessors, even if it is impossible to measure exactly the significance of his role in guiding Siberia's transition from a fur-trading region to a mining territory in terms of its key importance for the Russian state. For eight years (from May 1695 to the summer of 1703), he behaved sufficiently conscientiously and was dutiful in performing his tasks according to the standards then prevalent in Russia. That he eventually went too far in blurring the line between an acceptable cut and outright plunder is understandable.[7] But in 1703 the accusations levelled at him of having mismanaged the Siberian Office appear to have been secondary to his failings as chief of the Artillery

Department. At the time of his dismissal, Vinius had grounds to argue that he had successfully led the state's Siberian fief.

He seems to have been unaware that he had guided the Siberian venture into making a switch that continued to make this vast realm profitable to the state, at a time when the collection of fur sharply began to decline.[8] It is a truism that colonies often cost a government more than they yield. This may have been as true for Siberia after the fur bonanza abated. But Siberia's significance for Russia went beyond sheer revenue after 1700. Her forges constituted the world's largest iron industry in the eighteenth century, for which Vinius had laid some of the groundwork. Irrespective of its price, this was a crucial strategic advantage for Russia, since the country's domestic armament manufacturing could supply most of its often victorious armies' needs during the eighteenth century. Finally, perhaps it is not wholly coincidental (although she does not make this link explicit) that Vinius's tenure came at a juncture which Alexandra Haugh has identified as the moment when "[m]odels of imperialism shifted from pre-modern Eurasian principles of rule to modern Western ones," when "Russia was experiencing an increased Westernization [that] was reflected in its colonial methods."[9] In other words, Vinius's stint came at the turning point when Russian rule over Siberia began to resemble more European colonial rule than traditional Mongolian rule. As a sort of a hybrid European-Russian, Vinius embodied this sea change.

* * *

One of the great strengths Peter I recognized in Vinius was the latter's ability to work incessantly, a match for the tsar's own boundless energy. Vinius's capacity for work was a key reason for Peter to move him to the Siberian desk in May 1695. Almost exactly two years later he became the *Sibirskii prikaz*'s sole head, after the death of the boyar Ivan Repnin, his nominal boss prior to that.[10] From the beginning of Vinius's stint at this office, however, Repnin had been ailing. Thus it was Vinius who managed the office from 1695 until his dismissal in the fall of 1703. He transferred his directorship over the foreign-mail office to his son Matvei in 1695, but this may have yielded him little additional time for his new task, because he continued to supervise his son.[11]

As during his tenure leading the Apothecary Office and as postmaster, Vinius succeeded in improving the order and efficiency of the governance of this huge and thinly inhabitated territory. The nineteenth-century historian S.M. Solov'ev listed a number of instances in which the worst abuses of power by Russian servitors in the region were halted in the second half of the 1690s; without giving Vinius profusely credit for improving the situation, it is evident that Vinius was responsible for the implementation of the tsar's decrees that condemned these misdeeds.[12] The Russian historian Molchanov plausibly argues that Vinius was especially tasked to increase governmental control and to stimulate economic development in Siberia, and that he made some headway in both respects.[13] In retrospect, Vinius himself boasted of having cleaned an Augean stable.[14] But this remained "government light": the state's control over the region by 1703 far from resembled that of the modern Russian or Soviet state with their superior means of transport and communication.

Soon after Repnin's death, Vinius wrote how

> the new [Siberian] governors are [ruling in an] exceedingly peaceful [manner], but against [their predecessors] there are many grievances, and infringements and levies have been unearthed that damaged trade; and [the *dumnyi d'iak*] Danila Polianskoi is investigating this all…. [H]is report has not yet arrived in Moscow.[15]

One of those who fell under suspicion of stealing from the treasury (*kaznokradstvo*) during Polianskoi's inspection tour (which lasted several years) was the Moscow *dvorianin* Mikhail Semyonovich Volchkov.[16] His case illustrates the effect of Vinius's regime. Volchkov seems to have been relieved from his duties as governor of New Mangazei (today Turukhansk), at the outset of Vinius's sole leadership over the realm in 1697, during the height of the latter's anti-corruption offensive.[17] Polianskoi arrested Volchkov once he reached Eniseisk, the administrative center of Eastern Siberia, at the end of 1697. Polianskoi proceeded to allow Volchkov to travel to Moscow in 1698 on his own recognizance to answer the accusations of abuse of power and gross corruption for which he had been indicted. While he denied it, Volchkov had been in the habit

of buying hides cheaply before selling them dearly to the government and pocketing the difference. Furthermore, Volchkov had been taking bribes, and had possibly been plotting with some of the native population against his foes among the Slavic musketeers garrisoning the region. Obviously, all of Volchkov's sins undermined Muscovite authority in the region.

Studying the evidence gathered by Polianskoi, Vinius concluded that Volchkov had undoubtedly been defrauding the government and abusing his power.[18] Volchkov was sentenced to death in late 1699, but Peter commuted the sentence when the noose was already hanging around Volchkov's neck on Red Square; instead, Volchkov was beaten with the knout and branded on his cheeks and brow with the Cyrillic letter v, signifying *vor* (thief). Additionally, he was banished for life to Azov (probably to row on a galley ship).

Volchkov's case shows how in his first years at the Siberian helm Vinius was both determined in acquitting of his tasks and willing ruthlessly to punish officials found out to abuse their power; he would later boast with pride to Peter about ordering the execution of some of the worst offenders among them.[19] Despite such harsh treatment, the replacement of the most notorious offenders among the governors proved to have a fleeting or ephemeral effect, for they were replaced by others who soon adopted similarly flawed ways. Thus, in practice, the local population (native or immigrant) saw little change. And eventually Vinius himself became ever more corrupt.

In his early days as Siberian overlord, though, Vinius showed his customary energy in righting the government's wrongs, while displaying his characteristic initiative in other matters. He sponsored the exploration of the Kamchatkan peninsula led by the Cossack Vladimir Atlasov (1661–1711) in the years from 1697 to 1699.[20] Vinius oversaw Semyon Remezov (1642–c. 1720)'s drafting of Siberian maps, possibly with a view of intensifying the mining of iron ore east of the Urals.[21] The book in which the maps sketched by Remezov declared how,

> On 18 November 1699 by decree of the great sovereign and by Andrei Andreevich Vinius's order from the Muscovite Siberian Office, the boyar's son from Tobol'sk Semyon Remezov was ordered to draw anew in Tobol'sk . . . sketches of the Siberian lands. . . . After completing these drawings, he is to bring them to Moscow

> and give them to the *dumnyi d'iak* Andrei Andreevich Vinius in the Siberian Office.[22]

Drawn in 1700 and 1701, Remezov's maps survive today. The Cyrillic names of their places, rivers, and so on are in many places transcribed into Dutch: it is hard to imagine that someone else than Vinius annotated these maps in such manner.[23] For example, Remezov's legend of the map of Tobol'sk is exhaustively detailed, with an equally precise Dutch translation accompanying it. Both identify all 15 churches in the city in Russian and Dutch, as well as its beer brewery, smithies, fishmarket, and the names of most streets and bridges.[24] Similar detail is supplied in Remezov's and the translator's rendering of Tobol'sk's environs and other regions.[25]

Even though Remezov's maps were not composed according to the rules of Western-European cartography, their exquisite rendering of Siberia made it undoubtedly much more feasible to traverse its vastness for travelers and to assess the extent of their dominion for Russian administrators (although the easternmost parts of Siberia toward Kamchatka and China were poorly depicted).[26] For example, the map that shows the area around Novaia Mangazeia indicates in hand-written remarks the location of those Tungus who are obliged to pay tribute in furs.[27] The link between mapping and power is thus starkly illustrated by Remezov's "Atlas."[28]

The reason for the Dutch translation of the maps' names is not readily apparent. Molchanov suggests that the maps were prepared for print on the orders of Vinius, and that they were therefore transcribed into Dutch.[29] This seems incongruous. The maps are drafted in traditional Russian style, vastly different from the customary map projection in Western Europe. There could hardly have been an interest in the publication of such a map in Western Europe, given the existence of Witsen's earlier map, which had been designed according to all the rules of contemporary map-making.

Instead, one wonders whether Vinius was annotating the maps to dispatch a Dutch copy to Witsen in order to help his cousin fine-tune the second edition of his *Noord- en Oost-Tartarye* (which came out in 1704).[30] One suspects that, because the maps remained in Moscow, Witsen never received them. Indeed, the translations themselves appear incomplete, possibly the result of Vinius's dismissal in 1703.

Vinius had previously overseen the completion of a description of Siberia's most important features, a text in manuscript known as the *Okladnaia Kniga Sibiri*, completed around 1697.[31] The original purpose of this and similar accounts was budgetary: government offices that administered the various territories that made up Russia used them to determine the wages in kind (mainly grain and salt) and money to which the servitors in the region were entitled. In the case of this text, however, the description transcended a mere overview for budgetary purposes: it encompassed the history and geography of Siberia, and included a brief summary of its history as well as sketches of its towns, and in much greater detail than customary surveyed its population, including the serfs and the non-Slavic native population. It also included an account of the defensive capacity of the various (Russian-occupied) settlements.

Together with Boyar Repnin and two further *d'iak*s, *dumnyi d'iak* Vinius is named as one of *Okladnaia Kniga*'s compilers.[32] That in its preface the year of completion was indicated as "1697" suggests Vinius's strong imprint on the production of this text. Before Peter's introduction of the Western Julian calendar in 1700, Vinius was exceptional in already preferring its use, as is evident from the *ex libris* plates in his book collection. Given his attempts to map Siberia cartographically and descriptively, we can agree with Valerie Kivelson and Mikhail Khodarkovsky that Vinius was an instrument of "a new state preoccupation with delineating boundaries, with turning frontiers into borders."[33] Of course, as they and other scholars have pointed out as well, this was not an overnight process.[34]

Vinius fell far short from taming the Siberian "human and natural wilderness."[35] Corruption remained the rule, not the exception, in this immense territory and he seems to have given up his attempts at suppressing it after his initial campaign, indeed falling prey to this vice himself.[36] But he was the first Russian administrator to have made an fairly systematic effort at colonizing Siberia in a sustainable fashion, rather than merely creaming off the fat of its easily accessible riches of animal hides. In Vinius's actions we can recognize traces of the modern professional bureaucrat and his *modus operandi* as analyzed by Max Weber.[37] He made a strenuous effort to increase the central government's power over what had been a seventeenth-century borderland that resembled contemporary New France, or the frontier of the viceroyalties of Peru and New Spain.[38]

Among the feverish activity Vinius exhibited was drafting a 1698 new customs' regulation for Siberia to counter the evasion of fees levied on trade.[39]

The greater Russian control of this territory brought about by Vinius reflected a broader historical trend, in which the age-old struggle between settler and nomadic societies was definitively decided to the former's advantage during the seventeenth century.[40] From Vinius's time onward, no wave of nomadic warriors was to burst into Europe ever again. Shoring up the Russian presence in Siberia was one (of many) contributing factors to this sea change, and Vinius's role had some significance in this process.

* * *

As I have already noted, Vinius's appointment to the Siberian Office coincided with the extermination of precious fur-bearing animals across Siberia and the increasing importance of resource mining and processing in the region.[41] Although some other precious goods arrived in European Russia such as rhubarb (in high demand for its medicinal qualities), transit fees or sales taxes on such rare goods remained no more than a marginal source of income for the government.[42] Vinius's long experience in mining now stood him in good stead. Several new iron mines and arms' manufacturing plants in the Urals (which mountainous region fell under the Siberian Office) were founded under his stewardship.[43] Barely having become Siberia's overlord, in May 1697, Vinius asked Peter to hire artisans in the Holy Roman Empire, "who could make steel [out of ore found in the Urals], and cast cannon and mortars . . . and also make bomb and grenades, and to send them as soon as possible," a request that he repeated regularly until Peter's last weeks abroad in June 1698; the tsar ordered the recruitment of iron forgers in Saxony, after several of his earlier attempts to hire experts in this field had failed.[44] At that very time, Vinius reported on the discovery by local residents of new lodes of magnetic iron ore at the Siberian Tagil river, of which he included a sketch for the tsar (who was in Vienna).[45] Soon after, Vinius reported how Witsen had written to him that one of the Swedish iron mines shut down because of water filling the mines; he suggested to the tsar that iron production in Russia would face none of these problems and stood to grow significantly, a prediction that proved to be correct.[46]

In 1699 the search for experts, either foreign or domestic, remained a high priority for Vinius:

> And about iron masters as mandated by your decree, my lord, I report that from the factories of Lev Kirilovich [Naryshkin] a master of bronze-mining was sent for, but he is old and does not know how to speak Russian, and his son, a forge master, does not want to go, and the old man said that he could not go without his son. At [Vladimir Vasil'evich] Voronin's works, my lord, his wife told us that she is selling the plant and her masters are hired hands, and she reckons that she can spare one or two. Vakhramei [Muller] gave one master, and I expect, will give one more. Kuzma Borin' supplied one master carpenter. And thus we have now a mere two men ready, while we need, my lord, about eight to ten men, and if we merely gather a single one every so often, then we cannot run the works. And they casted, my lord, light [-caliber] cannon; I reckon that it will be very useful against the Tatars who continually wage war against our Siberian settlements.[47]

In March 1700, Vinius reported that experts who had tested the quality of Siberian iron believed it better than the Swedish and well suited to cast cannon.[48] Under Vinius's stewardship and beyond it, Peter placed great emphasis on iron production's drastic increase.[49] The tsar was a strong believer in import-substitution and economic self-sufficiency for his country, and the availability of metal was of crucial importance for Peter's wars. Peter succeeded in forging an arms' manufacturing sector that supplied his army and navy without needing to import foreign weaponry.[50] But long before that moment arrived during the 1710s, Peter had grown impatient with Vinius's progress in developing Siberia's industries and Russia's arms production, and decided that others could improve on Vinius in overseeing the Siberian operations.

Perhaps the tsar's disenchantment with Vinius was aggravated by the Siberian satrapy's curious organization. As we saw, Vinius paid an annual sum to the government's treasury in exchange for the permission to run it. He was to earn his money from tolls and fees on furs and other goods crossing the region or sold in Siberia, such as alcohol and tobacco, after he had paid the government its share.[51] In this

respect he did well, easily collecting the proceeds for his yearly payment and more to the benefit of Peter's treasury.[52] However, "[e]ven [if] the state could turn a blind eye to bending the rules for the sake of results, . . . if some ineffable, tipping point was crossed, . . . scandal" might ensue, as it did in 1703, when Peter began to suspect that Vinius took more than his share.[53] The extraordinarily high bribe a desperate Vinius offered Menshikov cannot but have increased this suspicion.

* * *

The Austrian diplomat Johann Korb (c. 1670–1741), who was impressed with what he learned about Vinius's "German" talents (and heritage) and his loyalty to the tsar, suggested that the Siberian governors trembled before him.[54] Even the Siberian "vice-tsar," its redoubtable governor Prince Mikhail Iakovlevich Cherkasskii (d. 1712), was said to fear Vinius. But whereas Vinius seems to have fought against some of Russian rule's worst excesses in Siberia, he did not stay incorruptible (nor was he likely incorruptible before). Perhaps the purchase of an office inevitably leads one to collect more money than what is one's customary due. Indeed, what is a reasonable margin for oneself when collecting the taxes and fees one "farms"? A certain degree of bribery was considered the norm in Muscovy.[55] Only when officials began to overask (for this might endanger government stability by creating restless subjects), or when they had fallen out of favor, was corruption identified.[56]

Exactly when he started to overstep the accepted boundaries is unclear, but Vinius evidently began to pocket a share of the proceeds for himself that some considered excessive. Furthermore, he engaged in racketeering: local functionaries began paying a sort of protection money to Vinius in order to avoid any investigation into their activities.[57] In governing this vast territory, he patronized a network of clients consisting of friends and in-laws, who were likely not always the most competent officials.[58] Finally, Vinius turned a blind eye to officials' abuse of power when it suited him: in 1700, the Cossack garrison of the fortified town of Krasnoyarsk refused entry to Vinius's henchman Polianskoi, because the government inspector was known to be in league with three previous local governors who had tortured several of the Cossacks on false accusations of rebellion.[59]

Although the officials' fears of Cossack insurrection were understandable, because of a Cossack revolt that had recently engulfed Siberia from Krasnoyarsk eastward, the Krasnoyarsk Cossacks had been made to suffer without grounds.[60] Vinius proceeded to overlook Polianskoi's plotting and held the Cossacks accountable for their insubordination instead. He could, of course, just as little afford to antagonize the government employees who were his deputies in running Siberia as he could run the risk of provoking a Cossack revolt.

Nonetheless, the Cossacks were the thin blue line (to use an anachronistic but illustrative metaphor) of the Russian state's authority in Siberia. During Vinius's tenure, the native population in eastern Siberia outnumbered Muscovites by two to one, while in the western half perhaps as many Russians as non-Russians lived.[61] Altogether, the vast province was home to 600,000 to 700,000 people: one could easily vanish into the forests or tundra. The study of the fate of the many native populations inhabiting Siberia under Russian rule has only recently begun in earnest and has undermined the traditional historiographical image (going back to Solov'ev in the nineteenth century) that the Russians were benevolent overlords, whose rule was to the aborigines' advantage.[62] As James Forsyth writes, "The [Muscovite] methods resemble those of the Spanish conquerors . . . the natives were coerced into submission and then directly exploited as producers of wealth."[63] Many managed to evade Muscovite rule and disappear into the vastness of Siberia, but other groups were forced to do Russian bidding. Native communities had to surrender hostages to the Cossacks. The hostages were confined to the fortresses until their community had remitted its annual tribute, after which the Cossacks confined the next cohort of captives to ensure the following round of payment. How much violence was used to enforce compliance with this practice (or otherwise) is moot.[64] Perhaps it could be argued in defense of the Russians that their rule did not differ much from their Tatar-Mongolian predecessors in the region. And the locals may have to some extent benefitted from the proximity of Chinese, Kalmyks, and Mongolians, who were waiting in the wings, and were quite willing to lend support to an anti-Russian revolt. To avoid rebellions, the Russians could not act too brutally.

Vinius's response to the Volchkov case mentioned earlier indicates that he was initially inclined to respond harshly to power abuse by local officials. He tried to curb the worst excesses of the appalling

treatment of the local Siberian populations by Cossacks, government officials, and clergy alike. When he reflected on this savagery after his dismissal, its extent continued to disturb the otherwise ruthless Vinius.[65] The brutality of the Russians in Siberia is dryly reported by Witsen, who wrote in 1704:

> Russian Cossacks in Nerchinsk and in the Tungus country often attack Mongol hordes, who are their enemies. As a rule, they kill the old people whom they encounter, but they enslave the younger ones, who subsequently are bought for one or two ducats each by the Chinese, or are transported to Russia.[66]

Vinius showed signs of concern regarding the fate of native Siberians, but much of this was rooted in purely Machiavellian calculation.[67] Rough treatment of the native population was not routinely a matter of great concern to European colonizers, nor was it to their Russian counterparts. Since excessively harsh abuse might lead to rebellion, however, Russian overlords were to stay without the bounds of accepted behavior in their exploitation of their colonial subjects (while avoiding Volchkov's sort of plotting with them). It was probably not wholly coincidental that in 1697, the year Vinius became the sole overlord of Siberia, Peter issued a decree that "forbade the Russian colonialists to abuse or enslave the natives, [but it] was as much disregarded in Kamchatka" as similar orders previously issued for other Siberian parts.[68]

Perhaps, though, Vinius harbored some sort of belief in the necessity of setting before the aborigines a civilized, or morally superior, example that went beyond a self-serving concern about keeping them quiet. One can in Vinius's activities sometimes discern the first signs of a new approach, aimed at exerting a Russian "transformative impact" on indigenous communities, a shift from the previous attitude of avoidance of any attempt to "civilize" the native population.[69] He singled out the un-Christian example of the often drunken clergy, undermining any claims to the superiority of Orthodoxy in the eyes of Muslims and pagans.[70] Among other things, Vinius imposed strict regulations on the region's taverns, undoubtedly with little effect. He probably undermined this cause by allowing the sale of playing cards in Siberia.[71] On one occasion, some of the Siberian communities tried to avoid starvation by selling their children, a

traditional last-resort option.[72] Vinius proceeded to prohibit this custom, apparently appalled by this "barbaric" act. But since we have no evidence that Vinius undertook anything to relieve the famine that caused this desperate move, it is likely that he only increased the misery of those suffering from hunger.

The Russian frontiersmen and the native pagans and infidels were not "civilized" by such measures, but Vinius was not easily discouraged in this regard.[73] He ordered a religious educational institution (apparently a sort of seminary) built in the Siberian capital of Tobolsk as part of his "civilization offensive." His aim, so he was to claim, was to nurture a better quality of priest, who would combat paganism by word and deed.[74] He furthermore endeavored to have lay people study secular science (*grazhdanskie nauki*) to aid them in performing better in government service in war and in peace and carry Peter's fame wide and far.[75] This school was built on the premises of the court of the Siberian governor at Tobol'sk, Prince Cherkasskii.[76]

In all Early Modern Empires, meanwhile, the rulers in their capitals might imagine absolute control over their domestic and colonial subalterns, but especially in the colonies themselves their agents were forced to tread on a *Middle Ground*, in which the supposedly vanquished often held their own against their alleged conquerors.[77] Any "civilization offensive" could only be conducted with great prudence. Even the infamously brutal Cossacks (or other military units garrisoned in Siberia) might be incapable of putting down a full-scale rebellion of one of the ethnicities over whom they lorded it.[78] At the same time, the Muscovites' presence was conducive to native trade, diversifying the assortment of goods to which the Siberians (from Tungus to Evenk) had access. This may have helped the aborigines to survive better in this harsh natural environment and accept Russian rule as a sort of lesser evil. Nonetheless, the delicate balance of the Siberian ecosystem was clearly upset by the Russian presence. The excessive cull of animal pelts, in principle a renewable or sustainable enterprise, exhausted its resources. Furthermore, among the consumer goods shipped to Siberia was distilled liquor, and Siberians, Russians and non-Russians, fell victim in great numbers to alcoholism.

Obviously, the Russians' callous attitude toward the Siberian ethnic groups resembled that of most contemporary conquerors toward their subjects, whether Spaniards, Dutch, Chinese or Mughal. Their

imperial cultures prized their superiority over others. The Russians, like European overseas colonizers, adhered to the Classical Greek distinction of civilization versus barbarity: "civilized peoples had permanent homes, cities, and farming districts; they possessed some form of government, law and civic order [while,] barbarian[s lacked] these attributes, [were] unrestrained in their behavior and disposed to violence."[79] This sense of superiority seems somewhat ironic in the Russian case, for it mirrors Olearius' depiction of the Russians as savages to which Vinius took such offense in the 1660s, as we saw in Chapter 3.

Among the European mother countries' residents, sensitivity to non-Europeans' plight is largely a modern, and even twentieth-century, phenomenon. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Solov'ev appraised Vinius positively from the perspective of the Russian state's interests: "a new spirit [in Siberia] was emanating . . ., and the dead letter of the law was given fresh life [;] . . . attentiveness and the speed of orders issued by strong men best explain why the governors of Siberia were doing better than previously."[80] While this undoubtedly reflects some of Peter the Great's appreciation of Vinius, Solov'ev's positive assessment is that of a nineteenth-century historian who unhesitatingly believed, in Hegelian fashion, in the benefits deriving from a strong state apparatus steadily increasing its power over ever more people. The Russian school of historians to which Solov'ev belonged had few qualms about the greater control the tsarist government established over its subjects through mapping and counting accompanied by merciless punishing the disobededient. Still, the least one can say is that Vinius did as well as he could, given the tsar's priorities and the age's utter disregard for the fate of "subalterns."

* * *

To a great degree, Russia's difficult relationship with Qing China also fell under Vinius's purview as Siberian chief. Russia, too, was haunted by "[t]he lure of China's wealth," but the Middle Kingdom remained an enigma as much for the Russians as it was for other Europeans.[81] Trade with China was intermittent, and Moscow and Beijing knew little about each other and understood each other even less well (the same can be said for Japan, whose islands were visited for the

first time by Russian Cossacks during Vinius's tenure[82]).[83] Vinius thus reported to Peter in 1697: "From China a great caravan with raw cotton arrived, and it is said that it included more than 40,000 camels; from the merchants I have heard that they also brought gold and that the gold is of good quality . . . ."[84]

It is intriguing to speculate in how far the Baikov, Golovin or Ides embassies (sent to Beijing during the 1650s, 1680s, and early 1690s respectively) improved Russian understanding of China, or how much Witsen's encyclopedic *Noord- en Oost-Tartarye*, which was in Vinius's possession since 1692, specifically guided him as Siberian chief in efforts to place Russian relations with China on a firmer footing. In particular, Vinius may have gathered a fair amount of strategic information about China from Everhard (Evert) IJsbrandt Ides (1657–1708), who had headed the most recent of the Russian embassies to China. Ides's account of that journey (as that of his companion Adam Brand) eventually found its way to Amsterdam, where Nicolaas Witsen was to ready it for its publication in 1704.[85] Witsen, too, corresponded with Jesuits, such as Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–88), who resided at the Kangxi Emperor's court and may have sluiced some of the Jesuits' information to Vinius in Moscow. Neither Witsen, nor any of the Russian envoys, however, understood the Han-Chinese language.

All sorts of difficulties hindered the Muscovite trade on China. Chinese merchants were only rarely permitted by their own government to travel to Russia.[86] Meanwhile, from 1697 onward the Chinese only allowed Russian traders to trade in China as part of officially state-sponsored caravans, even if illicit private expeditions by Russian merchants did enter China.[87] It took usually two years for a return journey to Moscow, which is no surprise when the shortest route to Beijing was in excess of 8,000 kilometers one way. And communications were impeded by wars that continually flared up among Mongolians and between Mongolians and Kalmyks.[88] The Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689 between Muscovy and the Middle Kingdom had only vaguely defined the extent of the suzerainty of each empire (borders in these remote areas were not demarcated as precisely as they are today, of course), but at least staved off possible war. This was mainly due to the Russian willingness to recognize Qing superiority along the lower parts of the Amur.[89] As we saw previously, Vinius meanwhile attempted to strengthen the Russian bridgehead in the

Middle Kingdom by supporting the Beijing parish, possibly as a front to stimulate trade.

China was led by a vigorous dynasty that expanded its territory markedly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and maintained a position from which it could haughtily turn down Russian proposals for closer contact. Around 1700, Vinius accomplished little in this regard, therefore. Only in the nineteenth century, the Middle Kingdom was faced with an impertinent and impatient modernizing world that could no longer be stopped at its borders.

* * *

The Siberian job was part of Vinius's undoing. In 1702 he made the mistake of going on a lengthy inspection trip of his realm, when he concomitantly oversaw the country's artillery production during this time of war (with which this tour seems to have been linked). In December he was in frosty Verkhotur'e testing metal ore.[90] Thus he was absent from Moscow at a crucial moment, when his foes were aligning themselves against him. He certainly could ill afford to leave his other posts for a long while. The now elderly Vinius was overextended, which informed the criticism he was to sustain the next year.

Vinius's corruptibility appears to have grown apace with a decline in the time he dedicated to his Siberian job. Before 1700, he developed a number of initiatives to strengthen Russian rule in its Asian dominion, but after the turn of the century his sometimes feverish activity in this regard precipitously fell. He became more corrupt, and was less inclined to investigate complaints against local officials. The reasons for this are not wholly evident, but, as we will see, he was forced to delegate more and more of his tasks to others as he received new urgent assignments linked to the outbreak of the Great Northern War. Perhaps Vinius's evident faltering after 1700 proves the wisdom of the early Romanovs, who tried to rotate local governors every few years to prevent them from becoming entrenched and beholden to local (and their own) interest before that of the central government. Most likely, though, Vinius, who reached the age of 60 in 1701, no longer could find the time and energy that he had been able harness for the Siberian job before 1700. As a result, he would not only lose this position in 1703, but also be relieved of his other tasks.

Notes

1. Alexandra M. Haugh, "Indigenous Political Culture and Eurasian Empire: Russia in Siberia in the Seventeenth Century," unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Santa Cruz, CA: University of California at Santa Cruz, 2005, 2, 13.
2. The Russians took hostages from ethnolinguistic groups such as the Chuvash or Mari along the Volga (see Romaniello, *Elusive Empire*, 60).
3. See among others Erika Monahan Downs, "Trade and Empire: Merchant Networks, Frontier Commerce and the State in Western Siberia, 1644–1728," unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2007, 9–10. Unfortunately, Monahan investigates in her dissertation customs books of years during which Vinius was not the head of the Siberian Office.
4. He did receive, however, 250 rubles annually for being a *dumnyi d'iak* (see Poe et al., *Russian Elite*, vol. 1, 333, 337, 341, 344, 347, 350, 353, 356, 359, 362, 365).
5. O.J. Frederiksen, "Virginia Tobacco in Russia under Peter the Great," *Slavonic and East European Review* 1, 1943, 40–56: 45–6. Judging from Peter's correspondence with Vinius, in this matter, too, he began to fumble by 1701.
6. Lantzeff notes that the central government paid Siberia more in money for salaries than it collected in revenue (G.V. Lantzeff, *Siberia in the Seventeenth Century: A Study of the Colonial Administration*, Berkeley, CA: U. of California P., 1943, 151). But this calculation leaves out the 10% fur tithe that the state collected; the table provided by Lantzeff that includes this income shows a surplus of 70,000–80,000 rubles to the government's benefit (see ibid., 153).
7. Monahan Downs, "Trade," 410–14.
8. James Forsyth, *A History of the Peoples of Siberia*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992, 63, 77–8.
9. Haugh, "Indigenous Political Culture," 13.
10. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 227; Likhachev, ed., *Slovar'*, 176; Bogoiavlenskii, *Prikaznye sud'i*, 131 and 162. A good account of Vinius's role in colonizing Siberia is Christiaan Zandt, "Nederlanders en Siberië, 1665–1750," unpubl. MA thesis (*doctoraalscriptie*) Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 1997.
11. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 268, 278, 471.
12. Soloviev, *History*, vol. 26, 207–10.
13. V.F. Molchanov, "Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri S.U. Remezova iz kollektsii grafa N.P. Rumiantseva," in *Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri*, eds L.N. Zinchuk et al., vol. 2, Moscow: Kartografiia, 2003, 20–38: 21.
14. Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 253–4.
15. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 656 (Vinius to Peter, 4 November 1697); see also Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 257. Afterwards, too, Vinius recalled the greater competence of the new governors he appointed (Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 260). See as well M.M. Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 2, Moscow: Ogiz, 1941, 278). See also V.A. Aleksandrov and N.N. Pokrovskii, "Mir Organizations and Administrative

Authority in Siberia in the Seventeenth Century," *Soviet Studies in History*, Winter 1987–88, 51–93.

16. See E.V. Vershinin, "Sysk D.L. Polianskogo: Delo mangazeiskogo voevody M.S. Volchkova," *Izvestiia Ural'skogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta* 39, 2005, 27–35: 27 (available at http://proceedings.usu.ru/?base=mag/0039%2801_10–2005%29&xsln=showArticle.xslt&id=a03&doc=../content.jsp, accessed 3 May 2011); Kozlovskii briefly mentions Volchkov's attempt at slandering Vinius, see Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 23n1. Another suspect of power abuse was the *voevoda* of Yakutsk, Mikhail M. Arsen'ev (for more on him, see below in the next chapter). Danila Leont'evich Polianskii's sweeping investigation (*bol'shoi sysk'*) encompassed no fewer than 15 separate cases, sometimes involving consecutive governors, and ranging from Iakutsk to Irkutsk, Turukhansk, and Nerchinsk; eventually, the inspector himself was accused of abuse of power (N.N. Ogloblin', *Obozrenie Stol'btsov i knig' Sibirskago prikaza (1592–1768 gg.)*, vol. 3: *Dokumenty po snosheniiam' mestnago upravleniia s' tsentral'nym'*, Moskva: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1900, 337–8). For more on Polianskoi-Polianskii, who had a checkered past, see Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 4, 399.
17. Vershinin, "Sysk D.L. Polianskogo," 27–35. His replacement was Iu. F. Shishkin. See also Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 23, 23n1.
18. Vershinin, "Sysk D.L. Polianskogo," 27–35.
19. See Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 254. See also the fate of the senior *pod'iachii* Ivan A. Bogdanov, one of Vinius's assistants in Moscow (Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 76). He had been accused for embezzlement of the state's fur revenue in 1691, but had been apparently acquitted. In 1699, under Vinius's auspices, Bogdanov was convicted of theft and negligence; he was sentenced to beatings with the knout and hard labor, to which he soon succumbed (ibid.).
20. Nikolaas Vitsen, *Severnaia*, vol. 3, 202–3; Forsyth, *History*, 131–5. Witsen notes how Atlasov was formally dispatched by Vinius's in-law Trauernicht, then the *voevoda* of Iakutsk (Nikolaas Vitsen, *Severnaia*, vol. 2, 837).
21. See L.I. Zinchuk et al., eds, *Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri, sostavlennaia Tobol'skim synom Boyarskim Semenom Remezovym v 1701 godu*, 2 vols, Moscow: Kartografiia, 2003; M. Tolmacheva, "The Early Russian Exploration and the Mapping of the Chinese Frontier," *Cahiers du Monde Russe* 1, 2000, 41–56: 49; Kivelson, *Cartographies*, 27–8, 133–45; Likhachev, ed., *Slovar'*, 177; Peters, *wijze koopman*, 105; Zandt, "Nederlanders," 24; Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 255–7; Naarden, "Nicolaas Vitsen," 71–2; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 52.
22. Zinchuk et al., eds, *Chertezhnaia kniga*, vol. 1, 2verso, and vol. 2, 42. There were in fact four resolutions issued by the Siberian Office from 1696 to 1698 that envisioned the mapping of Siberia, all of which seem to have been released under Vinius's guidance (see Molchanov, "Chertezhnaia kniga," 20–1).

23. For an example, see Witzenrath, *Cossacks*, Figure 2, xiv–xv and 201n182. The titles and maps of the *Chertezhnaia kniga* are in many places provided with Dutch transcriptions; the handwriting resembles that of Vinius, but the Russian editors only identify a "Dutch translator" (see Molchanov, "Chertezhnaia kniga," 22). For a further discussion of this atlas, see Kivelson, *Cartographies*, 133.
24. Zinchuk et al., eds, *Chertezhnaia kniga*, vol. 1, 3verso, 4.
25. Ibid., 4verso–28.
26. Ibid., 35verso–36, 39verso–40, 43verso–44.
27. Ibid., 27verso.
28. See further for example Jerry Brotton, *Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1998; Jeremy Black, *Maps and Politics*, Chicago, IL: U. of Chicago P., 1998.
29. Molchanov, "Chertezhnaia kniga," 22.
30. Witsen, *Noord- en Oost Tartarye*, second ed.
31. About this text, which is preserved at Moscow's State Historical Museum (*fond Shukina* no. *shch* 284), see M.I. Navrot, "Okladnaia kniga Sibirii 1697g.," in *Problemy Istochnikovedeniia*, 5, 1956, 184–207, available at http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Russ/XVII/1680–1700/Okl_kniga%20_sibir_1697/frametext.htm accessed 11 March 2011.
32. Ibid.
33. Kivelson, *Cartographies*, 186; Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 5–6.
34. See, for instance, Forsyth, *History*, 111–13; Monahan Downs, "Trade," 382–3.
35. Thus, soon after his initial purge of corrupt officials of 1697, another group fell under suspicion in the spring of 1698; the tsar (who was still abroad) asked Fyodor Romodanovskii to lend his support to Vinius in prosecuting the chief of the tobacco trade in Siberia, Orlenko(a), and his friends, for murder and rape (see Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 2, 393).
36. Monahan Downs, "Trade," 410–14.
37. M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, eds G. Roth and C. Wittich, New York: Bedminster Press, 1968 [1922], 956–8, 975.
38. Many of Vinius's endeavors toward enforcing oversight can be traced in Ogloblin', *Obozrenie*. See as well Monahan Downs, "Trade," 398–9.
39. Ibid., 397; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 51–2. Kozlovski writes 1699, perhaps because the regulations then came into force, although the usual confusion with the older calendar may have been involved. As Raymond Fisher wrote, "The unofficial trade after the Treaty of Nerchinsk [turned] out to be larger than the official trade" (see R. Fisher, Review of *Rossiia na Dal'nevostochnykh runezhakh [vtoraia polovina xvii v.]* by Vadim A. Aleksandrov, *Slavic Review* 1, 1972, 151–2: 152). Lantzeff's *History of Siberia* lists a number of measures overseen by Vinius. Thus, during Vinius's leadership the tenure of *voevoda* was lengthened to decrease transportation costs involved in a transition of power and combat the temptation to smuggle (in 1695); a permanent set of regulations was introduced

delineating the *voevodas'* power in the Siberian towns (also in 1695); *voevoda*s were forbidden in 1697 to leave their towns without receiving a statement from their successors that all had been left in good order; it was stipulated in 1695 that no town in which a *voevoda* resided could be without a clerk (*d ' iak* or *pod ' iachie s pripis ' iu*); the Iakutsk *voevoda* was prosecuted for power abuse; a mining expert was tasked to establish how best to prospect for gold and silver in 1696; and a decree was issued to improve the manner of fur collection and to overcome the continuous wage arrears faced by government servitors in Siberia in 1697 (Lantzeff, *Siberia*, 51, 51–2n25, 53, 56, 61, 80, 103, 149, 152).

40. See Naarden, "Nikolaas Vitsen," 36. One of the pioneering historians who noticed this crucial development was William MacNeill. See especially W.H. McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800*, Chicago, IL: U. of Chicago P., 1964.
41. Vinius referred to this extermination in 1708. The devastation among the fur-bearing animals was already evident when he led the *Sibirskii prikaz* (see Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 259). Among others, see further Mark Bassin, "Expansion and Colonialism on the Eastern Frontier: Views of the Far East and Siberia In Pre-Petrine Russia," *Journal of Historical Geography* 1, 1988, 3–21: 11; Witzenrath, *Cossacks*, 5–6; Kappeler, *Russian Empire*, 35; Forsyth, *History*, 63.
42. Its import through Siberia had been farmed out during the 1680s to Adolf Houtman, one of the last Dutch tycoons who gained fabulous riches with his Russian business, in the tradition of Moucheron, Massa, Marselis, Ruts, De Vogelaer, van Klenk, Vinius sr, and van Sweeden (see for Houtman, as well as further discussion of the rhubarb trade, C.M. Foust, *Rhubarb: The Wondrous Drug*, Princeton: Princeton, NJ, 1992, 49–51; see, too, Monahan Downs, "Trade," 351–78; ibid., 373, identifies Houtman as "Gutman").
43. Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 235; Hughes, *Russia*, 153.
44. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 623 (Vinius to Peter, 7 May 1697); see also ibid., primechaniia, 629–30 (Vinius to Peter, 18 June 1697); ibid., primechaniia, 627–8 (Vinius to Peter, 2 July 1697); ibid., primechaniia, 637 (Vinius to Peter, 6 August 1697); and ibid., primechaniia, 638 (Vinius to Peter, 27 August 1697); ibid., primechaniia, 639–40 (Vinius to Peter, 10 September 1697); and ibid., primechaniia, 722 (Vinius to Peter, [unclear date] May 1698); Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 2, 451–2. Vinius so often begged Peter to hire foreign iron-casters that Bogoslovskii calls it the "theme" of his correspondence with Peter when the tsar was on his embassy to Western Europe (see Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 2, 202).
45. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 732–3 (Vinius to Peter, 29 June 1698).
46. Ibid., primechaniia, 732–3 (Vinius to Peter, 5 August 1698).
47. Ibid., primechaniia, 772 (Vinius to Peter, 29 June 1699). Voronin, a Russian merchant (*gost'*) and entrepreneur, was an old acquaintance of Vinius (see Coyett, *Historisch Verhael*, 147, 153).

48. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 807 (a letter from Vinius to Peter of 8 March 1700 is paraphrased here).
49. Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 235–6.
50. Stevens, *Russia's Wars*, 236.
51. Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 233.
52. See his own recollections, Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 260; see further Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 29–30; Lantzeff, *Siberia*, 151, 153.
53. Monahan Downs, "Trade," 383.
54. Korb, *Diarium*, 225–6.
55. For a discussion on this, see Witzenrath, *Cossacks*, 123–8.
56. Ibid., 12.
57. Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 233. On the actual process of inspections in Siberia (which were a routine part of the rotation system that replaced governors every few years) and the commun occurrence of corruption, see B. Davies, "Local Government and Administration," in M. Perrie, ed., *The Cambridge History of Russia*, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 469–85: 475–6, 479–84.
58. See Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 233; Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo*, 45–52; Witzenrath, *Cossacks*, 122.
59. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 808 (Vinius to Peter, 31 March 1700); as Bogoslovskii remarks, Vinius was by that point nonetheless suspicious of Polianskoi, who had fallen out of favor earlier in his career (Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 4, 399).
60. Forsyth, *History*, 106.
61. Ibid., 101.
62. Ibid., 33–4, 41–2, 67–9, 109–11; Witzenrath, *Cossacks*, 8–9; Kappeler, *Russian Empire*, 35.
63. Forsyth, *History*, 41.
64. Kappeler, *Russian Empire*, 38.
65. Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 255–7, 259–60.
66. Vitsen, *Severnaia*, vol. 1, 319.
67. Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 208, 211.
68. Forsyth, *History*, 135.
69. Haugh, "Indigenous Political Culture," 12. It is a tad odd that Haugh ends her investigation in 1701, in the midst of Vinius's tenure as Siberian overlord (for us, 1695 ot 1703 might make more sense). Obviously, she does not investigate Siberia from the vantage point of the center looking at the periphery, as I do here.
70. Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 211–12.
71. Ibid., 212.
72. Ibid., 211. This was apparently also a habit among the Kalmyks, see Vitsen, *Severnaia*, vol. 1, 361. Vinius may have been Witsen's source here.
73. See Witzenrath, *Cossacks*, 3, 5.
74. Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 255. The letter to Peter of 1708 in which Vinius charts his efforts to spread the Word in detail is heavily laced with religious themes, indicative of the religious spell that seems to have captivated him during his Dutch exile.

75. Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 256.
76. Cherkasskii was appointed Siberian governor in 1699; Tobol'sk was then its capital (see Vitsen, *Severnaia*, vol. 3, 267). In 1708 the Siberian governorship was abolished as part of Peter's administrative reforms of his territory (Bushkovitch, "Cultural Change," 108).
77. See Richard White's work for this concept (Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991). For an outstanding discussion of the limitations of Spanish colonial rule, see Henry Kamen, *Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492–1763*, New York: HarperCollins, 2003; see especially ibid., 239–85.
78. Forsyth, *History,* 81–2, 91; for the complications of the term Cossack in Siberia, see Witzenrath, *Cossacks*, 9.
79. Allan Greer, "Introduction," in Allan Greer, ed., *The Jesuit Relations: Natives and Missionaries in Seventeenth-Century North America*, Boston: Bedford-St. Martin's, 2000, 1–19: 18.
80. Soloviev, *History*, vol. 26, 210.
81. Brook, *Vermeer's Hat*, 19.
82. Some tribute in furs was collected, possibly on the Kurile islands, see Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 261.
83. See also A. Florovsky, "Maps of the Siberian Route of the Belgian Jesuit, A. Thomas (1690)," *Imago Mundi* 8, 1951, 103–8.
84. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 656 (Vinius to Peter, 4 November 1697). For a general overview, see M.I. Sladkovskii, *History of Economic Relations Between Russia and China*, Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1966, 20–3.
85. E. Ysbrants Ides, *Drie-Jaarige Reize naar China*, Amsterdam: François Halma, 1704; see for more, Peters, *wijze koopman*, 118–22; Naarden, "Nicolaas Vitsen," 72. Pogodin suggests that Ides's journey was inspired by a letter from Witsen that Peter received in 1691 (see Pogodin, "Petr Pervyi," 23–4). It is possible that Vinius also used the notes by one member of Ides's retinue, Adam Brand (d. 1746), whose own account of the embassy was published in German in 1697 (A. Brand, *Beschreibung der chinesischen Reise*, Frankfurt: N.p., 1697), and in 1698 in Dutch and English.
86. Sladkovskii, *History*, 19–20.
87. Ibid., 20–2; C.M. Foust, *Muscovite and Mandarin: Russia's Trade with China and its Setting, 1727–1805*, Chapel Hill, NC: U. of North Carolina P., 1969, 9.
88. Vitsen, *Severnaia*, vol. 1, 285–7, 348–51; Sladkovskii, *History*, 19.
89. Foust, *Muscovite and Mandarin,* 4–6.
90. Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, vol. 4, part 2, 245, 267; see as well H.D. Hudson, "Free Enterprise and the State in Eighteenth-Century Russia: The Demidov Metallurgical Empire," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 2–3, 1984, 182–200: 185.

9
Fall, Flight, and Rehabilitation

Fortified by what he had seen and heard on his Grand Embassy, Peter the Great returned to Moscow in 1698 in the conviction that his country needed to change drastically, if it was to become one of the European Great Powers rather than the relic of a once powerful borderland empire. Apart from a host of concrete plans to modernize his country in terms of its politics, culture, economy, and military, he also brought more than six hundred experts back home with him, who were to help the Russians implement their reforms. A steady flow of Western specialists joined them in subsequent years. Their expertise ranged from shipbuilding and seafaring to the study of the natural sciences and the practice of medicine, art, and architecture. Suddenly, Western people and Western ways were no longer a rarity in Russia.

Some of Peter's reforms were less radical than advertised, then and afterwards. He built on foundations laid down by his siblings and father, while Russian society remained in some fundamental ways unchanged: in particular, the elite of tsarist servitors continued to have almost free rein over a mass of unfree laborers. Peter's Table of Ranks seems like old wine in new flasks as well, for his half-brother had made the perhaps even more significant step of abolishing the precedence system in 1681. Peter's new dress code did not mean that the average Russian noble behaved in a more civilized way to his serfs (certainly Vinius did not, as we will see below). Soviet historians emphasized this ephemeral quality of Peter's reforms, which allowed them to stress the continuity of the feudal system under Aleksei,

Peter, and the eighteenth-century tsars and thus remain faithful to the Marxist scheme about history's unfolding.

But in some areas of life Peter's impact was undeniably great. The foundation of the new capital of St. Petersburg in 1703 stands out, as does his creation of a navy and his steps toward the opening of the Academy of Sciences (which was inaugurated just after the tsar's death in 1725). Less novel was the manner in which he conducted his military campaigns (with the second siege of Azov perhaps excepted). But he did reach some milestones in this respect, too. Sweden was comprehensively beaten in the Great Northern War, in which the first Russian naval victory was recorded. Poland was made into a Russian dependency. In 1721, then, it was not without reason that his "grateful" Senate awarded Peter officially the title of emperor and gave him the honorary epithet "the Great." And, although this is harder to gauge, when Peter died in 1725, he had laid the foundation for the further strengthening of his country in military terms and for the further expansion of its already vast territory. On the minus side, he had increased, with possibly fatal consequences in the long term, the chasm between the elite and the masses. But as difficult as it is to lay most of the blame on Louis XIV for the French Revolution, it is even harder to maintain that Peter was responsible for the outbreak of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 or 1917.

* * *

At the turn of the century, Andrei Vinius reached the apogee of his career. But the fundamental cause of his imminent downfall can already be gleaned from my opening remarks in this chapter. Vinius had been the one-eyed man leading the blind before 1698. With the arrival of the multitude of foreign experts, his qualities suddenly seemed everyday and excited Peter far less than before the tsar left for Europe. Even native Russians (several of whom were trained in Western Europe in a variety of trades) bested Vinius's knowledge and expertise after 1700. He began to seem a relic of a bygone age, and the tsar's benevolence toward Vinius after 1703 was rather born of an appreciation of services already rendered than reflective of a conviction that the veteran statesman remained indispensable to him. In 1700, however, it only began to dawn upon Peter that the era of the Viniuses in Russia was coming to a close. Vinius remained a

powerful man, seemingly a fixture in the tsar's coterie of trusted advisors. Before I outline the gathering clouds that led to his fall from grace, a few more examples will attest to the high position that he had reached before the summer of 1703.

We have already seen how Vinius also served as the liaison officer between Moscow and the itinerant tsar during the 1697–98 Grand Embassy, corresponding in cipher with the tsar himself, while zealously attempting to ensure that all correspondence between Peter and his (other) lieutenants in Moscow arrived at its destination.[1] It is intriguing that, immediately upon the tsar's return to Moscow, one of Vinius's residences became the stage for a lengthy discussion between Peter and his wife Evdokiia Lopukhina about the divorce Peter desired (by sending his wife into a convent).[2] One surmises that the tsar was quite familiar with Vinius's home, if he selected it for this difficult conversation. Although word of the rendezvous leaked, little else about it became known. This seems to indicate that the tsar could keep its contents confidential by meeting at Vinius's house, away from the normally busy court where secrets were hard to keep. Lopukhina, by the way, could not be persuaded; ultimately she was dispatched to a convent against her will.

In early 1699 a plan was floated by Peter to have Vinius chaperone the tsarevich Aleksei (1690–1718)'s education in the Dutch Republic.[3] It was abandoned when the tsar's inner circle of advisors voiced its doubts, considering this foreign education too radical a break with past tradition. It was an ominous sign when, rather than Vinius, it was ultimately Aleksandr Menshikov, the tsar's favorite since about the time of the Grand Embassy and Vinius's eventual nemesis, who was appointed as Tsarevich Aleksei's tutor in 1701.[4]

In the early months of 1700, Peter required Vinius to involve himself in a commission drafting an introduction to a new codex that was to replace the *Ulozhenie*, the compilation of Muscovy's laws issued under Peter's father in 1649.[5] Vinius belonged to this team between early 1700 and late 1703.[6] Unfortunately, the manuscript of this foreword was subsequently lost, and the commission seems hardly ever to have met. The law code itself was never drawn up. Clearly, though, Peter firmly believed in Vinius's versatile talents when he appointed Vinius to the legal commission, and Vinius continued to enjoy the tsar's full confidence.

In the course of 1700, Vinius appears to have visited the Republic for the first time since 1673, probably to aid the Russian effort to solicit Dutch support against Sweden, which the Estates-General refused to grant.[7] Nonetheless, in violation of Dutch neutrality in the Great Northern War, Nicolaas Witsen arranged for private arms deliveries to Arkhangel'sk, which sustained Russia during the early phase of that war. Vinius solidified Witsen's support for the Russian cause on this trip, about which we know little else.

At the end of 1700, then, Vinius was appointed chief of artillery-and-ordnance production.[8] The Russian military lost most of her cannon during the fiasco against the Swedes at Narva in November 1700. In order to quickly overcome this deficit, the tsar ordered the melting down of bronze church and monastery bells to forge new cannons.[9] Under Vinius's supervision, more than half a million kilograms of bronze may have been collected, but he had to import higher quality bronze to allow for the production of an alloy strong enough to sustain the firing of shells.[10] As we saw in a previous chapter, neither Peter nor Vinius seemed overly encumbered by a guilty conscience in confiscating the church's property.

In hindsight, Vinius boasted of the fine quality and great quantity of the production of cannon, powder, and shot he oversaw between late 1700 and the summer of 1703.[11] There is little doubt that without such artillery and ammunition the Russian capture after 1700 of Narva, Ivangorod, Dorpat, Iama, Konop'e, Shliuzenburkh (Shlisselburg today), and Shlotburkh, a string of towns and fortresses along the Baltic coast of what is today northern Estonia and the St. Petersburg area (Shlotburkh was an early name for the city), would have been impossible.[12] The emergency production of the weaponry was, however, not as successful as Vinius would argue afterwards: hindered by lack of expertise and drunkenness on the part of the workers, some of the guns cast did not pass the muster and precious materials were thus wasted.[13] Vinius's inability to provide for a consistent output of good-quality artillery partially contributed to the end of his career as a top-level official.[14] Vinius may have been blamed for something he could hardly have avoided, meanwhile. For example, brass cannon tubes tend to get warped through frequent use, which was a problem that plagued armies until the twentieth century. Military hardware in Vinius's days wore out quickly. Embattled

by an unexpectedly formidable foe in Charles XII, Peter raised the bar regardless: better guns should have been more readily available.

Vinius set up an artillery-training school during his spell as armament chief as well.[15] This had become necessary since, as he remembered a few years later, "the majority of the artillery personnel, cannoneers, grenadiers [and] bombardiers, was not up to their task, and they lacked books about the science of artillery."[16] Pupils at the new academy learned to read and write Russian, and studied arithmetic, geometry, and "fortification" (*fortufikatsiia*) before tackling the foundations of ballistics.[17] After a mere few months of the school's operation, seven men graduated as the first class. At the tsar's orders, they were dispatched to Berlin to complete their education in Prussia, by attending either actual battles or military exercises and by training spells at armament plants. The first classes to graduate formed the nucleus of the first Russian army engineer corps.[18]

* * *

When the Austrian and Prussian envoys, among whom was Johann Korb, spent a day at Vinius's manor in 1699, they met him at the height of his career.[19] At his country house, located some forty miles to the north-west of Moscow near Patriarch Nikon's self-imposed place of exile, the New Jerusalem monastery, the foreign diplomats engaged in pastimes quite familiar to the European elite. They engaged in fishing with nets and punting on the estate's pond, and hunting birds (whether through falconry, nets, or by other method is unclear).[20] Korb deemed Vinius's manor house somewhat less than up to snuff, though, because it seemed primarily made from baked clay brick (a very Dutch twist). The bricks were a quirky whim; on his estate, Vinius appears to have manufactured clay tiles and bricks, and perhaps clay slate (for roofs), predominantly for his personal use.[21] Vinius seems as well to have been a partner in a glass-blowing enterprise near his country manor.[22] It had been founded by the Walloon Julius Coyett (a relative of Balthasar Coyett who wrote the printed account of the 1675–76 van Klenk Embassy) during the 1630s (and some of its glass vessels were used in the Pharmacy Office).[23] While he did not like the brick, Korb had to admit nevertheless that Vinius's house had a grand view of a river and a plain.

This sort of romp in the country was a novelty in Russia. Until that point, it had been unusual to enjoy the bucolic pleasures of a rural retreat, but toward 1700 no longer was the countryside seen as an inhospitable and dangerous wilderness.[24] Previously, most Muscovite grandees and high officials had preferred to enjoy the fruits of their serfs' labor in the safe comfort of their Moscow residence; relying on village elders, bailiffs collected the crops and other products in the peasant hamlets and shipped them to the city.[25] Rural life had been unbecoming to an aristocrat. Nature around Moscow was now harnessed to suit the elite's desire for a playground, however, and the first contours were becoming apparent of the manor houses and noble estates that were a typical sight in Central Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Vinius's use of brick makes one wonder in how far he consciously styled his retreat after those owned by the great Amsterdam merchants of the day along the Dutch coast and the Vecht river. One of the scions of his long-time competitors, the Marselis family, owned one of its most famous specimens during Vinius's youth.[26] Located west of Haarlem, it was so renowned that even Sir William Temple (1628–99), the English resident at The Hague, deemed it worth a visit.

Korb's account of a pleasant sojourn at Vinius's *dacha* does not mention that the *dumnyi d'iak* enjoyed the fruits of the labor of more than a dozen villages (in which at least 104 households were counted by 1705), some of which he held in full hereditary ownership (called *votchina*) and others in conditional tenure (called *pomest'e*).[27] Several hundred serfs thus worked for him. He had a further 62 people serving him in his various residences in 1703.[28] They, too, were mainly serfs.

Besides owning two townhouses in Moscow and one country house, as well as land, villages, serfs, and manufacturing ventures, Vinius possessed a fair number of movable goods. They included hundreds of books, mounted maps, icons, painted portraits and cityscapes, jewelry, and more mundane items such as tables, chairs, pitchers, glasses, cups, and mugs, and various services, some being silverware.[29] When he had a wig made for him in Königsberg in 1680, he may have been the very first Russian to do so.[30] In addition, he collected curiosities in emulation of his Dutch cousin Witsen and Tsar Peter himself.[31] As Siberian overlord, he was in a unique position to acquire such things. Some of them were lost when he was forced to

melt down several of his gold and silver objects to pay the formidable fine that he received for his misbehavior in 1703.[32]

The Austrian visit to his estate is another sign that Vinius continued to cultivate his ties with representatives of the European elite, as he did throughout his life. Business, or the interests of the country, usually mixed with pleasure in nurturing such contacts. In this instance, it is unlikely that Vinius liaised with the Austrian envoy Ignatius Christoph Guarient (Korb was his secretary) and the Prussian resident Sadora-Ciesielski just for the fun of it: he was one of the few in Peter's inner circle who was fluent in German and may have been asked by the tsar to pump the Germans for information.[33] Thus, on the eve of Peter's assault on Sweden, he shared some Muscovite secrets with his guests in exchange for crucial information about the Prussian and Austrian positions regarding such a war. It cannot have been too difficult for a slick operator such as Vinius to perform such a delicate task. After all, he can be considered to have served as a kind of double agent from his very first days of his employment in the *Posol'skii prikaz*, when he started to provide the Dutch with sensitive information. It is unclear whether he supplied his guests with intelligence of his own volition (and thus betrayed his country), or as part of a quid-pro-quo arrangement.[34] It is not wholly impossible either that Vinius gave (sold?) the Austrians more secrets than was his brief.

* * *

While Vinius played a positive role in developing the metallurgical industry of the Urals and Siberia and, despite some stumbling, succeeded in refurnishing the army with cannon after the Narva debacle, Peter distanced himself from Vinius after 1700.[35] As Vinius's first biographer noticed, the tone of the exchange in the correspondence between Peter and Vinius changed after Peter's return from abroad in 1698: the letters lost their intimate quality and began to refer solely to government business.[36] Perhaps at first the internal unrest (the *strel'tsy* rebelled in 1698 and were harshly punished, after which their corps was disbanded) troubled the tsar, and then the impending war with Sweden suppressed his customary ebullience altogether for a while. Undoubtedly, the estrangement grew once the Great Northern War broke out because the tsar was ever more absorbed by it, while Vinius's workload left him little or no time to frolic with the tsar

and his favorites, even if, or when, he had been invited. It prevented him from cultivating his ties with the tsar, in whose entourage new favorites were replacing friends from an earlier era. But Peter became increasingly irritated with Vinius because of errors that he made in his work as well.

Peter's disaffection may have been rooted in his visit to Western Europe. He then became aware that Vinius's talents were not as rare as he had previously believed. After he returned in 1698, he could now rely on the many foreign experts he had hired abroad in his efforts to transform his country. He also could increasingly turn to a rising generation of Russian-born younger men, specialists whose abilities in their areas of expertise outstripped those of the dilettantish, or amateurish, Vinius. Peter seems to have begun to associate Vinius with old-fashioned Muscovy and its slow-moving ways and conservative attitude. But Peter only slowly weaned himself from a conviction that he could not do without the old stalwart. This appears evident from Vinius's reappointment as chief of the Apothecary Office in 1701.[37] The tsar's expectation was that Vinius would improve the army's medical service and trigger a greater return rate of the wounded to the battlefield. Clearly, Korb had not just made up a story when he wrote that Vinius was considered a most efficient manager of the Apothecary Department. But once he took up this job again, Vinius likely fell short of (much greater) expectations in executing this task as well.

Undoubtedly, Vinius boasted of vast experience that made him appear eminently well-suited to head the Siberian, Apothecary, and Artillery Departments, but nobody could acquit himself of these jobs equally well all at the same time.[38] When he took over the Siberian office in 1695, he had passed the foreign-mail service to his son Matvei, but the younger Vinius was a dissolute fellow, an alcoholic who left much of the work to his father.[39] After a spell of several months of study abroad in Prussia had failed to sober the young man up, both Matvei and his father were released from their responsibility for the post office in 1701.[40] Andrei Vinius was given little reprieve, however, because he now once again headed the Apothecary. He continued to be distracted, too, by his son's escapades elsewhere. Eventually, the weight of his tasks and the worries of his family life led this now elderly man to make mistakes that could not be covered up.

A falling-out with Peter over some of these errors became inevitable. Things boiled over in 1703: the tsar became frustrated with the halting supply of artillery to the army as well as the army's inadequate medical care.[41] There were grounds to blame Vinius on both scores, even if he appears to have done at least an adequate job in reconstituting the depleted stock of Russian cannon.[42] According to the Imperial envoy Otto Pleyer, after capturing Swedish territory on which St. Petersburg was founded in that year, Peter abandoned an advance on Narva because he lacked sufficient cannon and ordnance.[43] Vinius might nonetheless have avoided the worst of the tsar's wrath (and he offered his resignation as head of the Pharmacy Office, admitting that he lacked time to manage it properly), were it not for Aleksandr Menshikov's intrigues.[44]

Vinius's fall suggests that he now lacked a powerful protector or patron in the tsar's inner circle, such as Nikita Odoevskii had been in the days of Fyodor and Sofia. From correspondence with Peter during the Grand Embassy, Vinius appears having been aware of his vulnerability to courtly intrigues in the tsar's absence (Iakov Odoevskii had died in 1697, eight years after his father). On the last day of 1697, on Vinius's request, Peter personally wrote to Fyodor Romodanovskii (who filled in for the tsar in Moscow) to serve as Vinius's patron, in order to protect him from (unidentified) higher placed enemies who schemed against him.[45] Not long after, in the spring of 1698, when rumors spread in Moscow that the tsar had died abroad, Vinius appeared the most worried of all of Peter's correspondents.[46] Expressing his profound relief upon receiving news that the tsar was alive, Vinius wrote to Peter on 15 April 1698: "Truly, my lord, as the sun after wretched weather, as the rain after a lengthy drought, as food after a long fast and as good health follows illness and man feels happy again, thus your divine letter delighted us all…."[47] Vinius clearly felt dangerously exposed without the tsar's protection. Ironically, it was the very same Romodanovskii who oversaw the specifics of Vinius's disgrace in 1703.

In late July 1703, Menshikov, Peter's closest male companion, wrote a letter to the tsar in which he accused Vinius of trying to bribe him to avoid further investigation into the halting artillery production (apparently provoked by the artillery shortage that had cut short the campaign toward Narva earlier that year).[48] Around the same time, the Prussian envoy Kayserling was among the first to report

rumors that Vinius was held responsible for the inadequate delivery of artillery to the army and had been relieved from his offices.[49] While he practically lost control over most of these offices in the summer, Vinius was in the early autumn officially dismissed as head of the *Aptekar'skii* and *Sibirskii prikazy*, and formally relieved from supervision over Russian artillery production.[50] On 9 October 1703, Peter wrote to Fyodor Romodanovskii, who played the role of police chief in his capacity as head of the *Preobrazhenskii prikaz*, "you should take over the *Siberskii* and *Aptekar'skii prikazy* and audit them [*perepisat' i schest'*] as well as the Siberian governors, and issue a decree to the Siberian factories that they should cast cannon according to the blueprints . . . ."[51]

At some point in the course of 1703, in a statement to the tsar Vinius tried to defend himself by listing his recent accomplishments heading the Siberian and Artillery Offices (omitting any mention of other recent jobs he had performed).[52] He claimed to have generated more than 400,000 rubles of revenue for the government during his eight years as chief of the Siberian Office. This was far more than previous administrators had gathered, he argued, and on his watch strategic resources such as saltpeter and bronze had been collected in significant amounts as well. Additionally, iron ore had been discovered of a quality superior to anything found abroad, from which a variety of side arms as well as cannon and mortars could be manufactured. He had overseen the construction of many stone warehouses and arsenals in the various fortress towns across Siberia, eradicated Siberian governors' abuse of power, and greatly increased the volume and value of trade with China. Heading the artillery branch, he had supervised the casting of more than 400 cannon, mortars, and howitzers, of which the quality had greatly improved because he had engaged far better qualified craftsmen for this work. Thanks to his ministrations, gunpowder had vastly improved in quality and was produced cheaper than previously. By 1703, some 300 young men had completed the artillery school's curriculum. Meanwhile, the silence about any of his accomplishments at the Apothecary suggests that even Vinius himself could think of little to pride himself on in running that department.

But his pleading was to little avail. Even if the tsar apparently considered him too valuable (and had a soft spot for him) to have him executed or banished, Vinius was sentenced to a beating with the

knout and saddled with a hefty fine.[53] Pleyer reported a rumor that Peter became so infuriated when he learned of Vinius's attempt at bribing Menshikov that the tsar ordered the erection of a gallows in the army's camp to hang Vinius; ultimately sparing his life, the tsar instead decided to have the old man beaten until he was half-dead.[54] The Imperial agent, however, was given to hyperbole. Later, Vinius recalled how he had been given a penalty of 13,000 rubles, a princely sum, which he could only pay by selling off one mansion and mortgaging another, as well as borrowing money in addition.[55]

At about the same time, meanwhile, Vinius's brother-in-law Ukraintsev was punished for his own failings as army quartermaster.[56] This almost simultaneous disgrace points at some sort of factional intrigue being the key cause of Vinius's downfall. Because both Ukraintsev and Vinius seem to have been ill at ease with the drunken orgies the tsar enjoyed with his cronies, neither man had ever truly been part of Peter's inner circle of friends. They were from a different generation (even if some of Peter's intimates were older as well), which had emphasized prudence after the example of Tsar Aleksei and sported a more religiously infused morality than the younger men in the tsar's company. Whereas they were not straight-laced men, the debauching excesses of Peter and his boon companions (syphilis was indeed rampant among this crowd) may have been a bit too much for the two veterans, and, as we saw, Protestant pietism guided "that old, energetic workhorse" Andrei Vinius.[57] Vinius's puritan prudishness was offset by overbearing greed, if we believe the notoriously unreliable Menshikov. These two traits almost morph Vinius into a Calvinist caricature.[58]

This leads us to Menshikov. Peter's fondness of Menshikov was resented by many of the tsar's older friends, among whom was Fyodor Golovin (1650–1706), chief of the *Posol'skii prikaz* in the early 1700s.[59] Golovin had been part of the Grand Embassy, and was an important source of information on Siberia for Vinius's cousin Witsen. Golovin and Vinius may thus have been allies who resented the growing clout of the upstart Menshikov. No one could stop Menshikov's rise, however, and he may have singled out Vinius as a good candidate to show the extent of his power to rivals at court.

Menshikov's intrigues against Vinius appear linked as well to Menshikov's alliance with the Arsen'ev family.[60] Mikhail M. Arsen'ev had been governor of Iakutsk when Vinius headed the Siberian Office

and had been caught embezzling.[61] Family connections were likely instrumental in deflecting Vinius's efforts to hold Arsen'ev accountable for his misdeeds. Arsen'ev probably wanted to avenge himself on Vinius, while he was of course privy to the manner in which Vinius ran Siberia. To Vinius's misfortune, Menshikov courted Dar'ia Mikhailovna Arsen'eva, a daughter of the former Iakutsk governor, and Menshikov's wife-to-be.

Peter's *Mignon* may have played up his reputation of being utterly corrupt to frame Vinius.[62] Menshikov possibly signaled a willingness to defend Vinius in exchange for a handsome bribe. It is equally possible that Menshikov deemed it too great a risk to accept the vast amount of gold and rubles that Vinius on his own initiative offered him (and possibly suspected Vinius of setting a trap for him) and instead denounced him. A third scenario, that Menshikov considered Vinius's offer too low and therefore fingered him, seems unlikely.

* * *

Soon after Vinius and Ukraintsev's disgrace, Peter realized that such multi-talented and experienced men were rare among his officials, and forgave both.[63] But both were reappointed to lesser posts, never to return to the high positions they once held. Thus in 1705, Vinius was given the arduous and unusual task to coordinate the supply of the Russian army deployed near Grodno in Lithuania.[64] Why Peter thought Vinius especially suited for such a job is unclear; Vinius had little or no military experience. There is a remote possibility that Vinius participated as a teenager in some of the Thirteen Years' War's campaigns, but evidence for this has yet to be found (if he had been serving as a rank-and-file soldier or a junior officer, any written record attesting to this is unlikely to have survived). If he served, it was only in a junior capacity and at most for a short while. Otherwise he had had a passing involvement in the Crimean campaigns of the 1680s, although he had not accompanied either. And he was now 64. Perhaps the appointment was made because Peter considered him a highly versatile multi-tasker, a disposition useful for a quartermaster.

To Vinius's misfortune, Grodno was surrounded in early 1706 by a Swedish army personally commanded by King Charles XII.[65] Although the siege was broken off and the Russian forces were able to withdraw toward the south-east of the town rather than surrender to

the Swedes, Vinius lost contact with the Russian army when it began to retreat.[66] Believing that the Swedish army stood between him and the Russian army and thus blocked his route to rejoin his troops, Vinius traveled westward and reached Prussian territory. He was later to suggest that the Prussians refused to allow him to cross back into Russian-held territory. Instead, he went aboard a ship to the Dutch Republic, with a view of returning from there by sea to Russia. But rather than embarking on one of the ships bound for Arkhangel'sk in Amsterdam that summer, Vinius was to stay in Holland for two years, primarily living at the expense of his distant cousin Witsen. Besides Witsen, Vinius had other relatives living in the Dutch Republic, which may have made it tempting to prolong his visit and even consider spending his old age there.[67]

The initial decision to travel to Holland was a curious choice on the part of the 65-year-old life-long tsarist employee. The disgrace he had suffered in 1703 and his subsequent reassignment to far less important work likely made Vinius question his allegiance to Peter and Russia. He probably bore a grudge against the tsar for this rough treatment. Perhaps he had convinced himself that all along he had remained a Dutch expatriate at heart rather than a Russian subject. Certainly, Holland, not Russia, was the center of the flourishing Republic of Letters with which he had ever more begun to identify in the course of his life.[68] Finally, Tsar Peter was nothing if not unpredictable. Vinius's escape westward was an odd move, and going back to Russia immediately after reaching Amsterdam might have seemed too risky a proposition to Vinius. He had to make sure that he was not going to be prosecuted for treason.

Fairly soon after his arrival in Amsterdam Vinius seems to have overcome his doubts about his Russian identity and allegiance to the tsar. He then realized that he *was* first and foremost Russian after all. Of course, his dependent existence at the expense of his wealthy cousin, with no chance of acquiring anything approximating the riches he had gathered in Russia, made it easier for him to arrive at this conclusion. Thus both Vinius himself and Witsen proceeded to appeal to Peter to allow Vinius to return to Russia and work once again for the tsar.[69] Since Vinius could indeed be accused of high treason, it is remarkable that those entreaties met with a positive response; Peter was willing to be persuaded by the cousins' pleas that

Vinius had involuntarily fallen behind enemy lines and had faced little other option than to repair to Amsterdam in 1706.[70]

* * *

In June 1707, Peter wrote Vinius a letter in which he forgave the old man for his treasonous behavior.[71] Peter may have reflected on Vinius's many good deeds for Russia.[72] Oddly enough, it took another year before Vinius set foot again on Russian soil, although he claimed that an illness caused him to miss the Dutch fleet departing for Arkhangel'sk in 1707. A return by way of the Baltic region was fraught with danger for a Russian, as most of the coastal areas were under Swedish control and the sea route to St. Petersburg had yet to develop. When Vinius left Amsterdam in 1708, Witsen supplied his cousin with a testimony that vouched that Vinius's road back to Moscow had been cut off in 1706; that his conclusion had been sound that the best possible way to return home was by way of Amsterdam and Arkhangel'sk; and that a long-term illness had prevented him from returning home sooner.[73]

Peter was true to his word: Vinius was wholly rehabilitated after he reached Moscow in the fall of 1708. He thanked the tsar in October 1708 not just for the return of his house, but also of his villages (with their enserfed inhabitants, it went without saying).[74] In how far his own lengthy *apologia pro vita sua* helped restore his good name in full is moot, but Vinius boasted of his manifold accomplishments on behalf of the Russian state and professed his innocence regarding the embezzlement, bribery, and incompetence that had led to his fall in 1703.[75] He argued strenuously that his journey to Holland in 1706 had been the only road open to him in embattled circumstances.

As a loyal patron who took pity on an old client, Peter was willing to forgive someone with such a stellar record of service, even if he was no longer to be given crucial government jobs. Certainly, Vinius cannot be counted as one of Peter's closest comrades after 1708, but he had already lost such status after 1703, before he left Russian soil behind him in 1706 (and even prior to that he was not truly a member of Peter's inner circle).[76] After his return, Vinius could nevertheless still serve as an example of some of the qualities Peter sought in his servants. Vinius's diligence could be held up as the standard to

follow for all of Peter's aides in remaking Russia into a modern state. Vinius now became a sort of elder statesman, instructing and aiding a variety of junior government bureaucrats on their work in the *Sibirskii* and *Posol'skii prikazy*, as well as translating various treatises linked to military matters (on such topics as fortification, infantry regulations, and artillery).[77] These were matters that held considerable importance, for the books allowed for the diffusion of modern technological change in Russia and thus were a significant component of Peter's modernization project.[78] The tsar himself kept watch over these matters even in the busy days of the victory at Poltava (1709) and the defeat at the Pruth (1711).

But Vinius showed his age when he was incapable to deliver a satisfactory translation of a work about mechanics, *Mathesis juvenalis* by J.C. Sturm (1635–1703).[79] Although he complained about the impossibility of rendering the author's lapidary style in Russian, becoming versed in the language of higher mathematics was truly beyond the capacity of a man nearing 70. Yakov Viliminovich Brius (1669–1735), like Vinius son of a transplanted Westerner and cofounder with Vinius of the artillery school, was ordered to take over the translation.[80] Whereas Brius replaced Vinius in many respects as Peter's key technological specialist, in the foreign service it was Pyotr Shafirov (1673–1739) who after 1703 rose to prominence instead of Ukraintsev and Vinius. Shafirov had been examined by Vinius himself in 1691 and passed his language test with flying colors.[81] Exceptionally, Shafirov was a converted Jew, a rare presence in Russia in Peter's time.

Vinius briefly returned to foreign affairs himself as the Russian representative seconded to (or "watching over") Ukrainian Cossack hetman Ivan Skoropadskii's court in 1710–11.[82] This brief stint was the last diplomatic service Vinius rendered Peter. That some 200 Swedish POWs were interned in his Moscow residence during his absence in Ukraine certainly signified his lesser status, even if it also bespeaks ownership of a rather sizable house in the city.[83] Even after his return from the Cossack headquarters, Vinius had to make an effort to have the Swedes transferred elsewhere, another sign that he no longer counted as a very important dignitary. Of note as well about these last years is his involvement in a project to dig a canal between the Volga and Don rivers, which remained in the planning stages.[84] His involvement in prospecting for ore continued, too. Mere

months before his death, Vinius informed the elderly Witsen that significant amounts of ore had been found near Lake Baikal.[85]

* * *

Despite bouts of illness, Vinius remained remarkably active until his final days. In 1709 he penned the first clear surviving instruction by a Russian lay landowner to his serfs on how to cultivate his land.[86] It is a revealing document regarding Vinius's mindset and the institution of serfdom at its height in Russia, and deserves to be quoted at some length:

> 31 March 1709. . . . Orders [*stat'i nakaznye*] of the *duma* [member] Andrei Andreevich Vinius to the baillifs and elders [*prikashchiki i starosti*] of his estates [*votchini*] near Moscow, so that they know in all of my estates throughout the year and specifically during each month about the proceedings on those estates and that they act in all my affairs with all genuine zeal, work assiduously, without any cunning and free of slyness [as God requires from them].
>
> In January
>
> 1. At the beginning of the new year, in the first place you are to give thanks to the Lord in God's church or at home, since God has favored you to end last year peacefully and blissfully. You should fully recognize and repent before the Lord God and before your own lord whatever thoughtlessness and negligence or carelessness you committed, and [promise] to improve [on such behavior] and not to act likewise henceforth, and to do homage in a completely truthful manner to your lord and to serve him to a fault. And to report to him future errors and not to praise bad deeds to him and not to justify deceitful statements, but to act and serve truthfully, as the holy apostle [Paul] orders in Ephesians 6, verse 5 and Colossians 3, verse 22.
>
> 2. To keep throughout the year truthful and correct books of revenue and expenditure for all monetary and grain yields and throughout the year to send the following reserves to Moscow: Hay and wood, and grain . . . . And [he who engages] in selfish idleness, should fear the terrible judgment of the Lord; do not be

selfish, but be content, bailiff, with your lord's salary. . . . And do not conclude an understanding on your own initiative and in collusion with the elders and peasants, so that you, bailiff, live in exemplary fashion in every way and the elders and peasants, in fear of the wrath of their lord and of you, do not laugh falsely or injustly hide or steal their lord's wealth.

3. . . . Also tell all peasants that whoever intends to marry or marry his son will not marry without a permit. . . . And whoever disobeys will be beaten as punishment and ordered to do as told.

. . .

In May

2. . . . And not to allow the sowing postponed because of peasant laziness, not to allow them sleep and break fast for a long while, and go to work but little before noon, because of which, on those days that they work for me, their labor is not undertaken for long periods. Early sowing otherwise does not succeed. And to force them, the peasants, to begin their work for me early [. . . and not to leave work until it is late]. And they can work for themselves two days per week: on Friday and Saturday. And on Sunday they cannot do any work because it is sacred.[87]

The instructions go into great detail as well about the manner of plowing, sowing, haying, harvesting, manuring, preservation and storaging, the care for animals, and the upkeep of stables.[88] His income having been reduced significantly after his return from Holland, Vinius tried to squeeze the utmost from his serfs, providing a prudent but ruthless example of husbandry. The callousness of the age and of the person is palpable: apart from some concern for the spiritual well-being of his peasants (and indeed their duty to honor Sundays), they were to spend two thirds of their time working for their lord during the busiest times of the agricultural year. Beatings with *batogi* (a bunch of short wooden sticks) and lash were threatened for any violations; even weddings could only take place after Vinius's steward granted permission. The bailiffs themselves were expected to obey unconditionally, and Vinius did not hesitate to call upon the authority of the Apostle Paul and God himself in demanding

unwavering dedication and hard work from his deputies and serfs. His study of the Bible during his Calvinist upbringing (perhaps reinforced by the religious exploration of his Dutch exile) unmistakably emerges here, but Vinius's words are most remarkable for their exposition of the unapologetically hierarchical worldview that was typical of his day. He had absolutely no scruples about exploiting serf labor to the hilt, as that was his God-given right. To those who believe in essentialist clichés about Russian nature, this may seem to betray a specifically or typically Russian character trait in Vinius. Even if serfdom had almost disappeared from the Dutch Republic, however, the contempt among the affluent and powerful for their country's plebeians was as deep as that of Russian lords for their serfs.[89]

The instructions, too, seem emblematic of Vinius's pioneering activities as a "New Russian" of Peter the Great's era. One suspects that, upon his return to Russia, Vinius decided to draft these guidelines in an attempt to recover something of the wealth that he had lost in the previous years. He seems in his (typical) drive for efficiency on his estates a sort of early embodiment of the Stolz-like "German" fiction as depicted by Goncharov in the novel *Oblomov*, for which type nineteenth-century Russians had a grudging admiration.[90] Kozlovskii suggested such a "German streak" in 1913, referring to Vinius's remarkably detailed accounting and budgeting, of which the ledgers survived (as did even a sort of household log).[91] Iurkin points out in this regard that it was no coincidence that Vinius owned quite a few books on agronomy and construction, as well as veterinary works.[92]

Whereas Vinius's hand-written instruction about estate management did not become the model after which other Russian landlords styled themselves in the course of the eighteenth century in their efforts to increase their properties' proceeds, in yet another way, even at this late stage in his life, one can read in it the precociously modern (and particularly Dutch) mindset that changed Russia between the Time of Troubles and 1725. It was at this time exactly that an "agricultural revolution" unfolded in the Low Countries and England, leading to higher crop yields and cattle producing more meat and milk. Nonetheless, it is obvious that Vinius knew little about crop rotation, the sowing of clover and turnips on the fallow, intensive manuring, let alone seed drills. But he was at least aware of the value of hands-on management of his farms, unlike most of the Russian nobles of his day.

It cannot surprise that he was ruthless and happily decreed a wide array of corporal punishments for recalcitrant serfs in his instructions to his bailiffs, since he had routinely ordered such penalties to be inflicted on errant subordinates when he managed his various offices before 1703. One should again avoid stereotypes in appreciating this. It had nothing to do with his "Russian" side, for in those days the "civilized" Dutch used beatings, torture, and mutilation as much as others to punish those who had fallen foul of the law, and were as cruel to African slaves on the Middle Passage and their American plantations as Russian landlords were to their servants and serfs. As we can see from the above quotation, Vinius allowed his peasants to work no more than two days per week for themselves; otherwise they were to do *corvée* for their *seigneur*.[93] He showed no scruples in ascribing peasants to join the labor force of the Ural forges.[94] Neither capitalism nor most other economic systems mandate humane treatment of their worker bees.

* * *

Vinius's last years unfolded tragically, as he lost his (second) wife Matryona Ivanovna in a fire in 1712, while his oldest son (and last surviving child) Matvei died a year before Vinius's own death.[95] In August 1712 he was together with Matvei (who eventually was assigned to work as a German translator on behalf of Peter's new Senate) ordered to move to the new capital St. Petersburg, on the island of Kotlin in the Neva's estuary.[96] He tried to evade these orders to relocate and primarily resided in Moscow until his death.[97] He remained an astonishingly wealthy man, the owner of two Moscow residences and 22,500 rubles to his account.[98] In his last months he was on the orders of the tsar assisted by his son-in-law Aleksei Ivanovich Kalitin (whose wife Anna Vinius had died a dozen years earlier), as he was bereft of any other relatives who were still alive.[99] The last notes he made in his household books reverted to Dutch, the language of his childhood.[100]

Notes

1. Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 2, 18–19, 354, 418.
2. *Ibid*., vol. 3, 12–13; Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 1, 365.
3. See Bushkovitch, *Peter*, 219, 219n16, 229 and 229n37; Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 1, 369–70, 381.

4. See also Bushkovitch, *Peter*, 234–5n44; Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 2, 18. In practice, Menshikov supervised first the Danziger Martin Neugebauer and, from 1702 onward, the Westphalian Baron Heinrich Huyssen (see Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 1, 386–90, 427–9; Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 2, 2–12).
5. Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 4, 201, 201n1, 212.
6. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 185; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 27.
7. Peters, *wijze koopman*, 146; Naarden, "Nikolaas Vitsen," 71
8. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 284, 290–2. He was also briefly involved in drawing up army regulations in response to the Narva debacle, but nothing concrete came out of this, it appears (see A.Z. Myshlaevskii, "Predislovie," in *Petr' Velikii: Voennye zakony i instruktsii*, ed. A.Z. Myshlaevskii, St. Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografiia, 1894: i–lxii: iv).
9. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 851.
10. Ibid., primechaniia, 853 (Vinius to Peter, 29 April 1701); see as well ibid., primechaniia, 856 (Vinius to Peter, 26 May 1701).
11. Ibid., primechaniia, 852 (Vinius to Peter, 29 April 1701); Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 263–4.
12. Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 265.
13. *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, primechaniia, 856 (Vinius to Peter, 26 May 1701).
14. As he recalled in 1708 (see Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 262–3).
15. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 296–8; Likhachev, ed., *Slovar'*, 177; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 26–7.
16. Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie," 263.
17. Ibid., 265.
18. Dmitri Gouzévitch and Irina Gouzévitch, "Les corps des ingénieurs comme forme d'organisation professionelle en Russie: Genèse, évolution, spécificité (XVIIIe et XIXe siècles)," *Cahiers du Monde Russe* 4, 2000, 569–614: 582. Max Okenfuss has dismissed this type of "academies" as temporary phenomena, "training camps, consisting wholly of a master and his charges," but admits that evidence is lacking to come to a definitive conclusion regarding their operation and utility (see Max J. Okenfuss, "Technical Training in Russia under Peter the Great," *History of Education Quarterly* 4, 1973, 325–45: 326–7). Since Vinius is unlikely to have taught artillery practice, as he knew nothing about firing cannons, he probably taught mathematics or the theory of ballistics; Okenfuss may have been too disparaging about the ad hoc and purely practical quality of this school.
19. Vinius is profusely praised by Korb, but the Austrian's treatise otherwise was far too critical for the tsar's taste. The Austrian envoy Guarient, Korb's superior, was suspected as well of authoring what were considered calumnies, such as the Russian duplicity in trade, an old trope (see Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 1, 9–18, 395). Guarient appears to have maintained a friendship with Vinius after his departure from Moscow in 1699, and, as is explored further down in the text, may have engaged in the exchange of sensitive intelligence with Vinius.

20. Korb, *Diarium*, 138.
21. Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 141–9.
22. Ibid., 116–20.
23. Coyett, *Historisch Verhael*.
24. For more on this, see Keith Thomas, *Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England, 1500–1800*, London: Allen Lane, 1983. At least Patrick Gordon and Lev Naryshkin owned similar estates at the time (Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 1, 222). It may of course be argued that the tsars themselves had set the example, if one thinks of Aleksei's playground at Kolomenskoe near Moscow.
25. See the changes that occurred during the 1670s and 1680s as noted by de Madariaga (de Madariaga, "The Russian Nobility," 332–3).
26. Called *Elswout*, it is still there today; this was Gabriel Marselis (see S.A. Wilson, *Geschiedenis van Bloemendaal*, ed. C.W.D. Vrijland, Haarlem: Schuyt and Co, 1975, 52–4).
27. Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 113, 116, 174; Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 279. In 1700, he wielded the sceptre over at least 150 households (Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 113). It is likely that he owned fewer in 1705, as he had been forced to pay off the fine for his crimes in 1703.
28. Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 281.
29. Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 177, 179–83.
30. Ibid., 183.
31. Peters, *wijze koopman*, 106.
32. Ibid., 106, 111, 397.
33. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 29; Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol.1, 131–2, 395–9. Ukraintsev, too, maintained cordial relations with Guarient after the latter's return to Vienna, sending him a letter from Istanbul in early 1700 (Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 1, 56, 135–8). Sadora-Ciesielski was to die the next year as a result of a violent quarrel with a Swedish officer that was to occur soon after the visit to Vinius; on Peter's orders, Vinius arranged the funeral of Ciesielski (Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 1, 400).
34. Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 1, 132–3.
35. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 271; Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 88, 90; N.N. Molchanov, *Diplomatiia Petra Pervogo*, Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1984, 160.
36. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 66–9. Peter continued to be often away from Moscow.
37. Savel'eva, "Vvedenie," 18; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 281–4.
38. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 26–7.
39. Sons were encouraged to step into their father's shoes in the tsarist bureaucracy (see Brown, "Early Modern," 99). It seems unlikely that he had been born in 1686, as Savel'eva maintains (see Savel'eva, "Vvedenie," 14).
40. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 278–9; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 26–7, 67; see as well Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 272–7. In this latter text, Kozlovskii lists the

repeated exhortations from Vinius to his son to study rather than fritter away his time and money in Berlin.

41. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 292–5, 299 Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 37. Peter might have believed him a felicitous choice because of his experience in overseeing some of the mines in the Urals in the 1690s, and, as a youth, at his father's enterprises. As Kozlovskii suggests, in a letter to Vinius from January 1703, Peter adresses Vinius coldly as "Mr. Overseer of the Artillery" rather than the more familiar "Min Her" (the Dutch "Mijnheer"), the form of address he had used until that time, see Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 69.
42. Stevens, *Russia's Wars*, 236–7.
43. Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, vol. 4, part 2, 615, 617. The case against Vinius probably can be traced to March 1703 in a letter from Peter to Romodanovskii, followed by a dressing down by the tsar at the place that was to become St. Petersburg in July of that year (see Bushkovitch, *Peter*, 234–5n44; Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 215–16).
44. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 37–9.
45. Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 2, 289.
46. Ibid., vol. 2, 417.
47. Ibid., vol. 2, 417–18.
48. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 302; Zandt, "Nederlanders," 30–1; Pekarskii, *Nauka i literatura*, vol. 1, 203–4n1; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 38–41; Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 25, 60. Graft among the chancellery officials was routine (Brown, "Early Modern," 279–87). Vinius clearly garnered some handsome profits from his various government jobs (Zandt, "Nederlanders," 27–8). Solov'ev, who knew the sources better than anyone, assumes that he was indeed "fiddling the books" (see S.M. Soloviev, *History of Russia*, vol. 28, ed. and trans. L.A.J. Hughes, Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International P., 2007, 105).
49. Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 1, 130.
50. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 295, 310–12.
51. Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, 64 (Peter to F.I. Romodanovskii, 9 October 1703).
52. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 55–7.
53. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 306, 315–16.
54. Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, vol. 4, part 2, 615, 617. Pleyer routinely embellished matters in his reports, according to Kozlovskii and Dukmeyer (Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 41; Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol.1, 134–5, 249–51, 254–5). He resided from 1692 to 1718 in Russia, faithfully informing the Habsburg Emperor about all that might be of interest to Vienna (Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol.1, 242).
55. Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, vol. 4, part 2, 443–4.
56. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 306–7; Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, vol. 4, part 2, 615. Ukraintsev also had a reputation for corruption, but graft was common among all tsarist servitors (Rogozhin, *Posol'skii prikaz*, 89). His gradual fall from favor may be traced to the spring of 1699, when the resident of the

Brandenburg Elector reported that Ukraintsev was not trusted by the tsar, but was tolerated as he was useful to Peter. It may explain why Ukraintsev was soon dispatched on a diplomatic mission to Istanbul, in effect a demotion from his role as manager of the *Posol'skii prikaz* (see Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 1, 124–5, 138–9). One suspects that Ukraintsev could never quite compensate for his previously close ties to V.V. Golitsyn. The Prussian resident Ciesielski additionally mentioned to his overlord in Berlin that Menshikov was one of the schemers against Ukraintsev, which fits with Menshikov's later denunciation of Vinius (ibid., 125, 139; see below).

57. Perhaps a sign of a lingering "ascetic perspective" among the *d'iak*s that Brown noticed in an earlier period (see Brown, "Early Modern, 277)? The phrase is Lindsey Hughes's, from her translation of Solov'ev's history (Soloviev, *History*, vol. 28, 104).
58. Christoph Witzenrath expresses puzzlement that the "son of a Dutchman" proved this greedy, but corrupt officials were legend in the Dutch overseas colonies (see Witzenrath, *Cossacks*, 122). Witzenrath makes it appear as if the scandal had to do with Vinius's running of Siberian affairs; the defective guns etc. presented a much more acute problem for him, however, which is understandable in the time of crisis such as the war with Sweden, the outcome of which very much hung in the balance in 1703; Witzenrath also mysteriously places Vinius's fall in 1701 rather than 1703 (see ibid., 122).
59. Bushkovitch, *Peter*, 237.
60. Ibid., 237n49; Witzenrath, *Cossacks*, 127, 163.
61. Ogloblin', *Obozrenie*, 333.
62. Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 2, 86.
63. Witsen interceded on behalf of Vinius in a letter to one of Peter's companions in 1705, when Vinius already had been pardoned (see Naarden, "Nicolaas Vitsen," 121n118).
64. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 316–17.
65. Ibid., 318.
66. Ibid., 319; Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, vol. 4, part 2, 419. It is perhaps not without significance that apparently in the same confusion caused by the Swedish advance the French "engineer" Lambert defected from the Russian side; like Vinius, he resurfaced in Holland (Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 2, 1–2). They may have aided each other in getting away.
67. Peters, *wijze koopman*, 467n9.
68. The growing number of books in his collection suggests this (see Savele'va, ed., *Knigi*, 326–50; see the following chapter).
69. Vinius and Witsen had sent letters to the tsar in 1706; the tsar wrote a conciliatory letter from Lublin to Vinius in June 1707 (see Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 71).
70. Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, vol. 4, part 2, 419, 443–4; Iurkin, *Andrei*, 320–8; Peters, *wijze koopman*, 105.

71. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 71; Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 245.
72. Soloviev, *History*, 105. Solov'ev's words paraphrase the letter Vinius sent Peter from Holland in November 1706, which is summarized by Ustrialov (see Ustrialov, *Istoriia*, vol. 4, part 2, 443–4).
73. Naarden, "Nicolaas Vitsen," 72–3, 121n118.
74. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 71.
75. See Miliukov, "Neizvestnoe poslanie." He also included the services rendered to Peter by his "*brat*" (in this case meaning cousin) Nicolaas Witsen (ibid., 271).
76. He is thus not named once in Zitser's book! (see Zitser, *Transfigured Kingdom*, 8–9 and *passim*).
77. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 331–2.
78. See I. Gouzévitch, "Le transfert des connaissance et les réformes de Pierre 1er," *Bulletin de la Sabix*, 33, 2003, 2–39: 33 (available at: http://sabix.revue.org.413, accessed 26 July 2011).
79. Gouzévitch, "Le transfert," 33–5: J.C. Sturm, *Mathesis Juvenalis*, Nürnberg: Hoffmann (?), 1701.
80. Gouzévitch, "Le transfert," 35.
81. See Dmitrii Serov, *Administratsiia Petra I*, Moskva: OGI, 2007, 88, 105n7.
82. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 332; Bushkovitch, *Peter*, 295n4; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 42.
83. Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 246; Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 42–3.
84. Peters, *wijze koopman*, 107, 135. We know about this indirectly, from a letter by Witsen to Vinius.
85. Peters, *wijze koopman*, 139–40.
86. This document may be found at http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Russ /XVIII/1700–1720/Vinius_A_A/nakaz_votc_krestjanam_31_03_1709.htm; see also Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 214. See for its original publication I.F. Petrovskaia, "Nakazy votchinnym prikazchikam pervoi chertverti xviii v.," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 8, 1953, 221–77: 269–77.
87. Petrovskaia, "Nakazy," 269–70.
88. Ibid., 270–7.
89. Van Deursen, *Plain Lives*, 157–61. A less cynical viewpoint might argue "that national wealth . . . could come only through the search for private wealth and not from a commitment to community welfare" (Koot, *Empire*, 102).
90. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 483; Ivan Goncharov, *Oblomov*, trans. Stephen Pearl, New York: Bunimand Bannigan, 2006.
91. Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 284–92.
92. Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 133–4.
93. See as well Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 214.
94. See Hughes, *Russia*, 153.
95. Peters, *wijze koopman*, 108.
96. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 43.

97. Iurkin, *Andrei*, 333–4, 340.
98. Demidova, *Spravochnik*, 113.
99. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 43; Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 82; Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 278.
100. Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 292.

10
Vinius's Book Collection

Andrei Vinius was among the first of Russian lay bibliophiles, about whose book collection a great amount of information remains available. The texts provide an insight into his mind. Taking into account his practical activities, he appears to have been a latter-day product of Renaissance humanism, albeit affected by the Scientific Revolution that unfolded in his lifetime. His books link Russia's transformation of the last decades of the seventeenth century and the early eighteenth century to the spread of Western treatises among Russia's elite. As a member of this upper crust, Vinius was a pioneer in exploring the novel ideas that these works expounded.

Andrei Vinius's books were appropriated by the Russian state after his death. They were among the first works deposited in the library of the newly founded Russian Academy of Sciences in 1725. The Academy inherited the library of Peter's curiosity cabinet, the *Kunstkamera* (founded in 1714 and opened to the public in 1718), in which Vinius's books were previously held. Many of these books can be found in the Academy's library today, when 313 of Vinius's titles can still be identified; most of these texts continue to be kept in the Academy's Library in St. Petersburg.[1]

Several reasons may explain why these books survived intact before more modern practices of library collecting became the norm in the nineteenth century. It is likely that those who received and catalogued the collection in 1716 or 1717 judged the contents of many technical works in Vinius's possession as obsolete. The literature and

the discourse on aesthetics of other books were no longer in fashion, while the religious treatises seemed old-fashioned and timid for an age that increasingly questioned God's role in human affairs. In other words, this is another sign how the times had left Vinus behind. Finally, all books that survive of the collection are printed works in languages other than Russian. Apparently, Russian books were separated from non-Russian upon receipt by the (*Kunstkamera* and Academy) library, and the Russian books owned by Vinius are no longer identifiable (or may have been lost).[2] Although the first librarian overseeing the collection, J.D. Schumacher (d. 1761), was a German speaker, the great majority of Russian officials only knew their mother tongue in the 1710s. Non-Russian books thus ended up grouped together and remained identifiable in Russia's first public library, because few showed an interest in them before historians began to investigate Vinius's activities in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Besides the Russian works, other books once owned by Vinius did disappear.[3] At one time, Vinius's personal library consisted of some 500 texts (some sources indicate more than 600), while it is unclear if all the books he owned before 1706 were given back to him after he returned to Moscow in 1708.[4] Upon his defection in 1706 at least 400 of his titles were added to the library of the *Aptekarskii prikaz*.[5] Evidently in 1709, one Veselovskii, the official assigned to take care of the collection upon Vinius's disappearance in 1706, had not yet returned any of Vinius's books, in defiance of an order from the tsar (and, no less, a letter by Menshikov!).[6] While most books were subsequently restored to Vinius, it is possible that a number of his books were directly transferred from the Pharmacy Office to the *Kunstkamera* in 1714.

The exact size of Vinius's collection at its height in 1703 remains unclear, therefore. Scholars have identified only three books published in 1708 or later as having once belonged to Vinius, and only six in total published from 1703 onward.[7] It seems a tad hard to believe that he hardly acquired any books after 1703, especially since he was intensively researching religious matters (albeit living in impecuniary circumstances) in Amsterdam. It seems odd for a bibliophile such as Vinius to arrive with fewer than a handful of books in his luggage in Arkhangel'sk in the summer of 1708. One suspects again that after his death books of recent imprint

in particular ended up elsewhere than in the first Russian public library.[8]

* * *

Concretely, what might have been removed from Vinius's texts in 1706 or 1716? First of all, given the fairly steady production of works in Cyrillic after 1650 (and Peter had some works printed in Amsterdam as well), the absence of Russian-language texts is glaring.[9] This prevents any comprehensive analysis about Vinius's bibliophile interests. In March 1717 Peter the Great's second wife Ekaterina (1684–1727) wrote from Amsterdam to the Russian Senate that the deceased Vinius's real estate and movable possessions should be placed under guard.[10] One surmises that news had reached the traveling couple that Vinius's goods were being plundered. And, by the time his property was sealed off, easily transportable items such as books had already disappeared from it.

It is likely, secondly, that several non-Russian texts were lifted from among the books on the orders of the person who Vinius in his will designated as entitled to them: Peter the Great.[11] Circumstantial evidence seems to suggest that this happened, for example, to Vinius's copy or copies of *Drie Aanmerkelijke en Seer Rampspoedige Reysen*, allegedly authored by Jan Struys.[12] This book's first edition had been published by Jacob van Meurs and Johannes van Someren in Amsterdam in 1676. We can see from the extant collection that Vinius owned several books issued by these two Amsterdam publishers, and we know from his correspondence that he had a special interest in travel accounts.[13] It is highly implausible that he would not have owned at least one copy of *Reysen*, which had appeared multiple times in Dutch, German, French, and English, for Vinius had a personal interest in Struys' tales: he had been involved in assisting the crew of which Struys was a member in Moscow in 1668, and worked together with their captain, David Butler, on drafting regulations for the intended Caspian navy's personnel as well as a proposal to build a galley fleet to sail the Caspian Sea.[14]

In 1701, Tsar Peter had ordered *Reysen*'s translation from a Dutch copy, an effort that was aborted.[15] He ordered another translation (of a French edition) in 1718 or 1719, at a time when the tsar himself was sifting through Vinius's collection. Perhaps this second

translation (by Ivan Zotov) was made from Vinius's copy, perhaps it was based on a copy the tsar had received during his visit to France in 1717, but Peter's curiosity was clearly piqued by *Reysen* on a couple of occasions.[16] Tsar Peter, of course, was greatly interested in his father's attempts at creating a navy, and might have ordered the copies of Struys's book to be taken out of the Vinius collection.[17]

Likewise, it stands to reason that several other books written by the actual author of *Reysen*, Olfert Dapper, were confiscated by the Russian monarch; Dapper was an in-house author of van Meurs, and it is not clear why his richly illustrated and encyclopedic descriptions of Asia or Africa are absent from Vinius's extant collection, given that Dapper's two-volume book on Palestine is among them (as is his translation of Herodotus, which contains Dapper's personal dedication to Nicolaas Witsen).[18] Indeed, engravings for locations in China were in Vinius's "picture album," possibly removed from Dapper's work (or Nieuhof's book, on which Dapper may have worked as well) on the Dutch embassies that visited Beijing during the 1650s.[19] That Vinius's copy of the first edition of Witsen *Noord- en Oost Tartarye* remained within the collection is likely due to Peter already owning a copy of this monumental (and exceedingly rare) work.[20] But a copy of the second edition of 1704 is not among the books identified as part of Vinius's collection. This, too, is curious, given Vinius's crucial role as Witsen's informant.

It all suggests that works that especially interested Peter the Great were lifted from the collection, together with Russian-language publications and manuscripts.[21] It is hazardous to gauge what otherwise struck the tsar's fancy, even if the examples above seem plausible (and I hope the reader can forgive me for this brief speculative exercise). Additionally, others than the tsar may have culled some of the rarer and more expensive works, even if many of those who had access to the books (before or after in 1718 *Kunstkamera*'s library opened), and thus might be able to pilfer them, were likely unaware of their value. Several of what were even then rare works therefore remain part of the collection to this very day.[22] As I surmised above, it appears that, in the early years after Vinius's death, those who looked at the texts that survive in the collection had no interest in them, because they could not read their languages or considered them obsolete. Unless someone happens to come across evidence detailing the works

having once been owned by Vinius, or finds actual further works that can be traced to him, much of the discussion about the missing texts will nevertheless have to remain speculative. What is undeniable is that at least half of his collection entered the forerunner of the Academy of Sciences's Library in 1718.[23]

* * *

The fate of Vinius's book collection after its owner's death shows how, in the course of a mere one generation, Russia's elite moved from a mindset that seems obscurantist and medieval to one that bears the hallmarks of the Enlightenment. During the 1670s and 1680s, Vinius was one of the ranking servitors of the Russian state with the most modern outlook, boasting of a plethora of books on topics with which few Muscovites had any familiarity, indeed a pioneer as a lay bibliophile. By 1716, however, most of his books were seen as obsolete and no longer deemed necessary for the government's exclusive use. Russia had leapt from the Renaissance through the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment within one generation (and I suggest that this occurred from about 1670 to about 1710), rather than in the course of two centuries. It underlines how Vinius himself moved from the cutting edge of affairs to obsolescence during his lifetime. Such a trajectory of one's life is common in our own day, but Vinius may have been among the first human beings to experience this acceleration of the pace of modern life, which leaves people "behind the times" before they die.

As Stephen Greenblatt suggests, "the cultural shift of the Renaissance is notoriously difficult to define, but it was characterized, in part, by a . . . pursuit of beauty and pleasure . . . [a]nd this pursuit, with its denial of Christian ascetism, enabled people . . . to focus on things in this world."[24] Greenblatt's Renaissance is loosely defined in chronological terms, and includes Galileo and Francis Bacon; if we follow his loose temporal boundaries, the humanist learning and worldview that shaped Andrei Vinius can still be included as symptomatic of a Renaissance sensibility. Whereas Vinius did not frequent Peter's bacchanalia, it cannot be denied that he engaged in a modern (or perhaps epicurean) pursuit of pleasure in other respects, as his book and art collections attest. Many of his book acquisitions seem to be rooted in a desire to gratify his curiosity, even if a substantial

number of his books had a utilitarian or practical nature.[25] Thus, many titles seem a sort of reference works for his various tasks, from his translating of fables (for his tutoring) and involvement in artillery warfare to his oversight over Russian mining and medicine. Like Jean-Baptiste Colbert's learning, Vinius's collecting seems derived from "curiosity and an astute recognition that myriad traditions of knowledge that had roots in humanist, ecclesiastical, financial, military and naval culture could be used to build a state."[26]

It is a sign of a "New Russian" emerging in late Muscovy, a person far more "European" than previously:

> [Vinius's] library had . . . many rare books, representing something exceptional for Peter's rule; in the words of the owner himself, they had been collected in the course of fifty years.[27] His many-sided activities did not merely include many areas of government service, such as the postal service, medicine, mining and ship-building, the management over the *Sibirskii prikaz* and the artillery, the establishment of education institutes, the field of diplomacy, scientific and scholarly works, but also stretched into art.[28]

The great variety of these pursuits mark the versatility of modern man, not of a stereotypically narrow-minded Muscovite.[29]

And his modernity is also recognizable in this very bibliophile passion itself. Vinius was among the first (with Artamon Matveev, Vasilii Golitsyn, and Silvestr Medvedev) private book collectors in Muscovy, a pastime that thanks to the invention of the printing press had begun to spread a few generations previously in Europe.[30] This zeal became manifest at an early age, for already in May 1665 the Dutch Reformed minister Sloot, who accompanied Ambassador Boreel to Moscow, gave Vinius a Dutch–Latin dictionary published by Christoffel Plantijn in Antwerp in 1588.[31] The gift was likely a reward for services rendered by the young man to the Dutch mission, and the Reverend Sloot may not have intended beforehand to leave the book behind in Moscow.[32] The dictionary is the only Plantijn imprint among the books Vinius owned. The more prozaic explanation that Vinius lacked a Dutch–Latin dictionary and thus was gifted this precious tome seems implausible (if not impossible). It may be telling that exactly such a precious book was chosen as a gift for Vinius; if

it did not know about Vinius's enthusiasm for books previously, the Dutch delegation must have become aware of it during its visit.

His love of books and language, too, may have indeed been a factor in his employment by the Foreign Office in 1664. When Vinius was attempting to recover his confiscated library in December 1708, he claimed himself that he had begun to acquire books fifty years previously.[33] Thus, as a young man he developed a passion for collecting books, which was an exceedingly rare phenomenon among lay Russians during the 1650s. He began to add titles to those he had inherited from his father. Among the books the latter left him were for example Georg Agricola's *Bergwerck Buch*, a work on mining and extracting metal from ore, which Vinius owned in a 1621 edition.[34] This must have been one of the manuals A.D. Vinius consulted in setting up his iron forges near Tula in the 1630s. Among his father's acquisitions, too, belonged van Westen's textbooks from which his sons learned about mathematics and the natural sciences.[35]

Despite the revealing quality of several books in A.A. Vinius's collection, it is obviously difficult to use this sort of evidence to ponder the owner's mindset. A number of historians has engaged in the analysis of private libraries, among whom François Furet and Robert Darnton have rendered some of the most perceptive insights.[36] Both warn about the difficulty of hypothesizing reading habits on the basis of book collections. Interesting for our purposes is Valentin Boss's scrutiny of Iakov Brius's (James Bruce's) library.[37] Rather than evaluating all of Brius's collection (as far as it is known), Boss, though, concentrates on Brius's scientific works in establishing Newton's influence in Russia. Brius was in some ways Vinius's successor as technological expert in Peter's entourage, but Brius was a genuine scientist, whereas Vinius always remained a sort of dilettante. Vinius resembled the Dutch shipbuilders bemoaned by Peter the Great, who knew how to build ships but could not supply him with standardized drafts of their work. Not quite a modern scientist in the image of Boyle, Huygens, Leeuwenhoek, or Newton, Vinius remained in this sense also a typical representative of the seventeenth-century amateur, sampling science's discoveries (and serving as a key conduit in facilitating or stimulating scientific study in Russia), but unwilling or incapable to fathom the theory behind it.[38] At the same time, of course, Vinius knew a lot about the practical application of science, as in the assaying of ore, or the use of ballistics in warfare.

It is more useful to compare the evidence on the Vinius's collection with Marion Peters' research into Witsen's private library than with any of the elaborate investigations of French reading culture. Vinius appears to have modeled his collecting habits after those of his Dutch cousin and the latter's peers. Those Dutch habits did not develop in a vacuum, of course, but followed the Western-European fashion of collecting books. Thus Witsen's library was organized according to the guidelines of Gabriel Naudé (1600–53), one of whose works, albeit on the art of statecraft, can be encountered among Vinius's collection.[39] There is one advantage that investigators of the Vinius library enjoy over those pondering Witsen's: at least more than half are still identifiable, while Witsen's collection wholly disappeared in the course of the eighteenth century. The latter can only be analyzed by way of auction catalogues.

In the absence of any knowledge about the Russian tomes once owned by Vinius, it is even more hazardous to reconstruct Vinius's mindset from the evidence of his book collection than it normally is if the historian knows all the titles (beyond the question whether or not an owner reads [all] the works in his possession). Nevertheless, the books that have been unequivocally identified as part of the collection allow for some key insights into Vinius's worldview. Whereas a book collection may convey little about its owner's reading habits, some of the collection's texts were clearly marked up by A.A. Vinius (and one note in Russian even tells us flat-out that he read a Dutch translation of Caesar's works in November 1712).[40]

Among the books that have been identified as belonging to Vinius, twelve were printed before 1600. That represents fewer than 4 per cent of the total. Perhaps others of this vintage were taken out of the collection, because they seemed valuable curiosities; this may especially have been the case with manuscripts or incunables, of which there is no trace among his texts, besides, perhaps, the Siberian maps of Remezov.[41] Those maps, though, were likely not ever to have been considered Vinius's personal possessions.

The greatest number of Vinius's books was published in the 1650s (40), 1660s (77), 1670s (49), 1680s (60), and 1690s (40), with only a few printed after 1700.[42] Of course, year of publication does not mean year of purchase, and only in the case of a few gifts can we determine when exactly Vinius acquired certain works. He seems to have gathered books primarily between his late teenage years and his fiftieth

birthday. Still, the reason behind the ebb and flow of the purchases of works printed in Europe is impossible to establish. His marked possession of works from the 1660s compared to his smaller collection of books issued in the next decade may not have been due to any drop of desire on Vinius's part. Vinius, as head of the post office, was in fact better positioned after 1675 than before to purchase books abroad. Perhaps the smaller number of 1670s imprints was caused by the fall in the production of Dutch printing presses during the 1670s. This was a decade of economic hardship in the Republic, which fought for its survival against Louis XIV's France and her allies. Vinius likely acquired many books during his 1670s diplomatic trip, which therefore cannot have been printed later than in 1673 (and thus many of those acquisitions were printed in the 1660s). Altogether, meanwhile, it should be noted that the great majority of the books in the collection originated in the Dutch Republic, which is unsurprising given its leading role in this industry in Europe and given Vinius's linguistic abilities and heritage.

Among the notable older works that he owned were a 1571 copy of Sigismund von Herberstein (1486–1566)'s account in Latin, the *Iconologia* of Cesare Ripa (c.1560-c.1622), and the *Cosmography* of Sebastian Münster (1488–1552).[43] The Imperial ambassador Herberstein had provided the first comprehensive account of Muscovy in the mid-sixteenth century, and it remained standard fare for continental European readers, at least until Olearius's work began to replace it in the middle of the seventeenth century. Aimed at Western Christendom's audience, Herberstein's work was a partial eyewitness account about a hitherto almost unknown monarchy on Europe's fringe by someone who understood some Russian. The book was seen as the authoritative work on Muscovy in Central and Western Europe. Ripa's was a key manual for the symbolism used in Europe during the Mannerist and the Baroque periods. The aesthetic principles of these movements dominated European art and literature from the late sixteenth century onward and only lost popularity toward the time of Vinius's death. Münster's cosmography was a sort of pioneering world history that took into account the newfound lands of the Age of Discovery.

These were wildly popular works in Europe before 1700, a sort of Early Modern foundational printed texts about their respective topics: the tsar's empire, the use of symbols in art and artifact, and a

description of the post-Columbian world.[44] No self-respecting book collector could do without them, or the Bible. Vinius seems to have at least partially emulated his Western-European contemporaries in acquiring these texts, even if some of the books may have already belonged to his father. Their popularity faded with the onset of the Enlightenment, which may explain that after his death a "changed Russia" left them within the collection.[45] They do attest how Vinius, despite his new-fangled mindset when measured against Russian standards, remained an "Early" Modern person, captivated by the tropes of the European seventeenth century. Ripa's descriptions of iconographic metaphors as used by visual artists likely influenced Vinius's aesthetic sensibility, reflected in his album of plates. He used this knowledge to sketch figureheads symbolizing the ship's names when Tsar Peter was building a fleet at Voronezh in 1699.[46]

We saw how, during his exile in Amsterdam, Vinius occupied himself with the study of comparative religion, investigating the similarities between Russian Orthodoxy and Dutch Calvinism.[47] Apart from religion, Vinius had a great interest in contemporary history. He owned the entire series of volumes of the Dutch-language *Matters of State and War*, a contemporary history concentrating on the United Provinces, began by the Frisian Lieuwe van Aitzema (1600–69) and continued by Sylvius (Lambert van den Bosch, 1610–98) and others for the period from 1669 onwards.[48] It covered seventeenth-century history from 1621 to 1698 in significant detail, covering some 200 pages on average per year and thus amounting to more than 10,000 pages in total. The fact that Vinius owned the second edition of Aitzema's section of this work indicates that he came late to it. He may have indeed acquired it only after the intensification of his contacts with Holland (and especially Witsen) during the late 1680s. Other historical series similar to *Matters of State and War* were in Vinius's possession. They underline how this was a sizeable private library, even if ownership of a few hundred volumes seems perhaps a paltry number to the modern reader (Peter the Great, though, only possessed about two thousand titles by the time of his death).[49]

Vinius owned a Dutch translation of Richard Baker's chronicle of the kings of England.[50] He acquired 30 years (1660–89) of the *Holland(t)se Mercurius*, a sort of year book enumerating the major political and other remarkable developments and one of the first of its kind.[51] It is not clear when he exactly began to acquire them,

but it was the sort of work that presented a longer-term overview of current events than newspapers did, and was a logical purchase for someone who was involved in composing the *kuranty*. Indeed, the Casteleyn family of Haarlem published both the *Mercurius* and the most renowned Dutch newspaper, the *Opregte Haerlemsche Courant*, which was routine fare for the composers of the *kuranty* in the *Posol'skii Prikaz*.

And Vinius liked the Classics: he owned texts by many of the historians of Greek and Roman Antiquity in Dutch translation, such as Herodotus, Livy, Caesar, Plutarch, Tacitus, and Flavius Josephus.[52] The Caesar text seems to have only been acquired by Vinius after 1682, and seems to truly represent the purchase of a bibliophile, as from the notes in the book it is evident that it had several owners before him; as we saw, Vinius only read it in 1712, almost 70 years after it was printed.[53] He owned Dutch translations of key Stoic works by Marcus Aurelius and Seneca. His humanist education left an unmistakable imprint here, and he evidently read the Classics throughout his life.

Travel accounts were popular at the time across Europe, and texts written by diplomatic visitors about Muscovy were of course of great interest to those dealing with them, such as Vinius.[54] Vinius owned two copies (one Dutch, one German) of Olearius's description of Muscovy during the 1630s, as well as Guy Miege's account of Carlisle's Embassy of 1663–64.[55] Even if Vinius heavily criticized Olearius's text in his correspondence with Witsen, the German's work was a much more precise and elaborate description of Muscovy than Herberstein's, and to some extent replaced it as the master narrative Europeans read about the tsar's realm in the seventeenth century. Just as puzzling as the absence of Struys's book among Vinius's texts is that of Coyett's *Historisch Verhael* about the van Klenk Embassy, for Vinius himself is depicted in it.[56] Did he not know about its existence? Perhaps not, for print-runs were often quite small. Coyett's book was never reprinted and, when it appeared in 1677, Vinius's contact with the Dutch Republic was less intensive than in subsequent years. But he was friendly with van Keller (who was van Klenk's deputy on the Embassy) and other Dutch expatriates in Moscow, and still read most of the Dutch newspapers as Russia's postmaster. Once again, one suspects that the book was taken from among the rest of Vinius's books in the 1700s.

Vinius also owned travel literature that was of somewhat less direct interest to him: he owned a heavily annotated first edition of François Caron's description of Japan and Hendrick Hamel's account of his shipwreck and captivity in Korea.[57] He also owned Jean-Baptiste Tavernier (1605–89)'s *Voyages* in their first edition, both in the French original and in a 1682 Dutch translation.[58] If one wants to appraise his collection as utilitarian in character, one might suggest that Korea, Japan, and Tavernier's descriptions of Iran or India were of interest because of Vinius's role as Siberian chief, and the French Protestant's account of the Ottoman Empire, one of Russia's inveterate foes, was pertinent to a clerk in the *Posol'skii prikaz*. Tavernier and Vinius might have met, were it not for the Frenchman's death en route to Moscow in early 1689, where he was to stop while on his way to Iran. For it was Vinius, who had just assumed his duties as *d'iak* in the Foreign Office, who arranged for the passport that allowed Tavernier to cross the border into Russia and travel to her capital.[59]

There were accounts of areas far away in Vinius's collection, however, that defy the notion of having a direct bearing on Vinius's work and must have been read for pleasure. Among these were two copies by P.v.d.B. (the VOC merchant Pieter van den Broecke [1585–1640]), of a work on south Asia, and a number of other works, bound together, on Asia and Africa.[60] Schouten's journal of his circumnavigation in the 1610s is one of the rare works in the collection that pays attention to the Americas (and even then merely their southern extremities).[61]

Elsewhere I have argued that Muscovy's New Commercial Code of 1667, which circumscribed the activities of Western merchants in Russia, betrays the influence of mercantilist ideas.[62] It is certainly significant that Vinius in 1665 acquired the most coherent Dutch account advocating the benefits of free trade, penned by Pieter de la Court.[63] Vinius was in close contact with Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin and his assistants who stood at the helm of the *Posol'skii prikaz* when the new Code was released in 1667: De la Court's arguments apparently did not convince the Russians to give the Dutch a free hand in capturing and dominating the Russian market. The Muscovites thus followed in the footsteps of the English and French governments, who had exhibited similar skepticism and had restricted the Dutch ability to trade with their countries.

One can find fiction, poetry, and drama among Vinius's books as well, including picaresque novels such as Miguel de Cervantes (1547–1616)'s *Don Quixote* and Mateo Aleman (1547–1614)'s *Guzman D'Alfarache* in Dutch translation.[64] Such evidence of the great variety of the books that he owned (and undoubtedly read in part) is the clearest indication that Vinius emulated in this pastime a Dutch bibliophile such as Adriaen Pauw (1585–1653), or, of course, Nicolaas Witsen.[65] One could argue that his collection was modest in size compared to their vast private libraries, but if Vinius perused the majority of the books that we know to have been in his possession (which may only be half of what he once owned), and if we consider that he also widely read in Russian (primarily religious texts for there were few others before the 1690s) and for decades skimmed through numerous foreign newspapers, he comes across as a highly versatile polymath and polyglot, not just in the Russian context. He thus was a latter-day *uomo universale*, and perhaps should, rather than M.V. Lomonosov (1711–65), be considered Russia's first lay learned genius. And then he was far from just a bookish individual: after all, his work for the government took him from Madrid to Verkhotur'e.

Part of the collection that survives is incontrovertibly linked to his practical work as the tsar's servitor: a host of books are found in it that address medicine, mining, and artillery, together with dictionaries and Wicquefort's *L'ambassadeur*, which outlined the latest version of diplomatic theory and practice.[66] The presence of works of "professional interest" among the books was common in most private libraries, as one can see as well from Witsen's collection.[67] Perhaps most intriguing among this material is his heavily annotated copy of a Dutch edition of Grotius' *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*. As I suggested in Chapter 3, he may have conveyed key points from this work to his bosses in the *Posol'skii prikaz*, and even Tsar Aleksei, introducing them to some of the fundamental concepts about international law and the conduct of diplomacy.[68] The book is among the most annotated texts in the collection, with parenthetical markers, Nota Benes, the Russian word *zri* ("see"), and at the end of the book handwritten notes indicating the page numbers of their sources.[69]

It is remarkable (especially when only slightly more than half of Vinius's collection survives) that Darnton's words about the interests of French readers and collectors can just as well apply to Vinius's interests; in his books, we can recognize "the decline of Latin, the

rise of the novel, the general fascination with the immediate world of nature and the remote worlds of exotic countries that spread throughout the educated public between the time of Descartes and Bougainville."[70] Predisposed through his humanist education, Vinius became a bibliophile who, judging from the sort of texts we know he owned, enjoyed exactly the type of works his Western-European counterparts collected. Savel'eva seems to agree when she states that most of Vinius's books had a "humanities' profile."[71]

If one takes this large private library owned by a high-ranking servitor into consideration, Peter's quantum leap from obscurantist Muscovite to sophisticated European becomes less of a thunderclap in a blue sky. Others traveled the same route in late Muscovy, even before Peter started his *Bildung* somewhere during the 1680s. Indeed, we can apply Frank Brechka's words about Peter's own library to that of Vinius: "the overwhelming preponderance of nonreligious works is striking [; even if religious books were present, such as Bibles or theological works, but] the technical, the practical, and the didactic" works dominate.[72]

Vinius's reputation as a *znatok* ("learned man") spread far and wide toward the end of his life, perhaps because of his assistance to Witsen in supplying the Amsterdam mayor with information about Siberia. Thus the German polymath Leibniz, albeit uncertain whether Vinius was still alive, suggested in a letter to Stefan Iavorskii (1658–1722; then a rising star in Peter's entourage), that the old man should be asked for his knowledge about Japanese explorations in Kamchatka in which the German scientist was interested.[73]

* * *

Andrei Vinius also collected art, and owned an album of sketches and engravings by Dutch masters.[74] Foremost among the drawings were works by Jan Lievens (1607–74), who had studied together with Rembrandt and enjoyed a similar reputation in those days.[75] In his later years, Lievens was popular as a portrait painter and engraver among the Amsterdam patriciate. Much remains mysterious about the manner of compiling this album: Savel'eva suggests that the album may have been gathered by Vinius's son Matvei, given the random and untidy appearance of its plates (even if they were made by highly acclaimed Dutch masters!).[76] Some of the prints were cut

out of printed books, such as its Chinese cityscapes.[77] The hand of a young boy thus seems to betray itself, but who he was and when he would have compiled it is unclear.[78] Indeed, given the pictures' artists, who, besides Lievens, included Jacob de Gheyn the Elder (1565–1629), Jan van der Velde (1593–1641), and Ro(e)land Savery (1576–1639), one can suggest that it was Andrei Denisovich Vinius who with his sons began the album's compilation during the 1640s or 1650s.

The collection of drawings in such a manner was in fact a rather widespread custom in the Dutch Republic, as H.C. Meyer explains. There was a

> burgeoning market in seventeenth-century Holland for drawings, *Papierkunst*, whose subjects embraced natural history as well as genre scenes. Falling into a price range between prints and paintings, they were collected by wealthy burghers (such as Andrei Vinius, . . .) and discussed at art viewings in private homes . . .[79]

Perhaps both Savel'eva and Meyer are right: as a boy, Vinius may have started to collect the drawings, and eventually had his children enjoy the pictures for their edification, in emulation of the Romanov children in those days.[80] Peter and his siblings had a great number of similar *Amusement Books* (*poteshnye knigi*) available to them in their youth.

As we saw previously, Andrei Vinius translated works into Russian with some skill, such as the fables of Vondel, and he composed at least one poem that hailed Peter's triumph at Azov. We know virtually nothing, however, about the number of manuscripts in his own hand and that of others that he may have possessed. One surmises that he was like many learned contemporaries in taking notes and keeping notebooks, but they, too, have disappeared.[81]

Notes

1. I.M. Beliaeva, "Ot redaktora," in Save'leva, ed., *Knigi*, 5–6: 5. Forty-six volumes were donated in 1829 to the library of the University of Helsinki, but they are listed in Savel'eva's catalogue (see S. Havu and I. Lebedeva, eds, *Collections Donated by the Academy of Sciences of St Petersburg to the Alexander University of Finland in 1829*, Helsinki: Helsinki University Library, 1997, 143–51; Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*). Scholars who have identified

the books are helped by the often clearly identifiable mark (often an *ex libris*) in Vinius's books.

2. Beliaeva, "Ot redaktora," 5.
3. Although we cannot quite discard the possibility that those who composed the inventory of his books in the 1700s or 1710s counted each volume of publications separately that are today grouped under one heading. If all volumes bound together (including books that had appeared in multiple volumes) are counted separately, one reaches a number of approximately 460. For example, rather than the *Hollantse Mercurius* being counted as one title, it would then have been counted 29 times, once for each issue of these yearbooks in Vinius's possession. This may explain some of the seemingly much larger size of the collection before 1703, but 150 volumes, nonetheless, would still be missing. Most of them were works in Russian, one surmises.
4. The book historian Savel'eva suggests that some 500 were in his possession at the time of his death, but the evidence seems murky (see Savel'eva, "Vvedenie," 20). Were some of those listed by Savel'eva and her team in Vinius's possession before 1706, but not afterwards? (see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi)*.
5. Savel'eva, "Vvedenie," 19, 21; E.A. Savel'eva, ed., *Katalog knig iz sobraniia aptekar'skogo prikaza*, Sankt-Peterburg: Al'faret, 2006, 29; J. Driessen-van het Reve, *De Kunstkamera van Peter de Grote: De Hollandse inbreng, gereconstrueerd uit brieven van Albert Seba en Johann Daniel Schumacher uit de jaren 1711–1752*, Hilversum: Verloren, 2006, 178.
6. Pekarskii, *Nauka i literatura*, vol. 1, 206; Kozlovskii, *Pervyia pochty*, 265, 293.
7. See Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 350. In fact, the two volumes of the collector Levinus, *Wondertooneel der Nature*, a work describing flora and fauna, are among these six, so strictly speaking Vinius owned only five titles published after 1702 at the time of his death (V. Levinus, *Wondertooneel der Nature*, 2 vols, Amsterdam: Halma, 1706).
8. See as well Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 106–7.
9. See for this Marker, "Literacy." I do not agree with Robert Collis that the absence of Russian-Orthodox work indicates that Vinius never owned any such works; instead, as Beliaeva argues, they were merely removed from the collection, together with all other Russian texts Vinius may have owned (see Collis, "Andrei Vinius," 202; see Beliaeva, "Ot redaktora," 5).
10. Kozlovskii, *Pervia pochty*, 293–4.
11. Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 107–8. Vinius promised Peter his books out of gratitude for his pardon. On Peter's library, of which at least 1,663 manuscripts and books have been identified (estimates are that he may have owned a total of 2,000 or so), see Frank T. Brechka, "Peter the Great: The Books He Owned," *The Journal of Library History* 1, 1982, 1–15: 7; and for a detailed study, E.I. Bobrova, *Biblioteka Petra Pervogo: Ukazatel' spravochnik*, Leningrad: BAN, 1978. Peter owned at least 125 Dutch-language works, but most of these works appear to have been acquired

late in Peter's life by his librarian Daniel Schumacher (Brechka, "Peter the Great," 8–10). It is not impossible that Schumacher earlier selected books from Vinius's collection for Peter.

12. Struys, *Reysen*.
13. Peters, *wijze koopman*, 106.
14. *Dopolneniia*, vol. 5, 404–5 and ibid., "primechaniia," 9.
15. See Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 161–2; N. Novikov, *Drevnaia rossiiskaia bibliofika* 1, January–June 1773: 18–23; N. Novikov, *Drevnaia rossiiskaia bibliofika* 2, part 3, 1788: 463–71; P.O. Iurchenko, "O puteshestviia po Rossii Gollandtsa Striusa," *Russkii Arkhiv* 2, 1879: 265–9; Gouzévitch, "Le transfert," 17–18.
16. The former Imperial Library in St. Petersburg owned at least 22 different editions, most of them having been released during Peter's life, which appears to indicate a very high level of interest in this book (see Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 1). Gouzévitch suggests that Peter's interest in this work was caused by his drafting of the seafaring regulations: Although Peter probably used Butler's (and Vinius's) 1668 rules in drawing up his statute, *Reysen* has nothing to say about this that would have been germane (see *Kniga ustav' morskoj o vsem' tsjto kasaetsia dobromu pepravlenijoe, v' bytnosti flota na mor'*, St. Petersburg: Sankt' piterboergskaia Tipografija, 1720).
17. That Peter's interest in the matter remained considerable is evident from his Naval Statute in which he refers to his father's project, and of his request to Lodewijk Fabricius, another Dutchman at Astrakhan in 1669 and 1670, to record his recollection of Razin's rebellion for him in 1721 (see *Kniga ustav' morskoj*, 28–9, 34–41; S. Konovalov, "Ludwig Fabritius's Account of the Razin Rebellion," *Oxford Slavonic Papers* 6, 1955, 72–101; A.G. Man'kov, ed., *Zapiski inostrantsev o vosstanii Stepana Razina*, Leningrad: Nauka, 1968). Struys's fellow sailor, Karsten (Christiaan) Brand(t), had restored or built Peter's naval prototypes between 1688 and 1691 (see Boris Raptschinsky, *Peter de Groote in Holland, 1697–1698*, Zutphen: Thieme, 1926, 31–4).
18. Savel'eva, ed. *Knigi*, 78–80; O. Dapper, *Naukeurige beschryving van gantsch Syrie en Palestyn of Heilige Lant…*, Amsterdam: van Meurs, 1677; O. Dapper, *Asia of Naukeurige Beschryving van het Rijk des Grooten Mogols en een groot gedeelte van Indiën behelsende de landschappen van Kandahar, Kabul…beneffens een volkome Beschryving van geheel Perzie, Georgie, Mingrelie en andere Gebuur-gewesten*, Amsterdam: J. van Meurs, 1672; O. Dapper, *Naukeurige Beschrijvinge der Afrikaensche gewesten*, Amsterdam: van Meurs, 1668. Dapper's translation of Herodotus is also in the Vinius's collection (see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 98–9; *Herodoot van Halikarnassus Negen Boeken der Historien*, trans. O[lfert] D[apper], Amsterdam: Hieronymus Sweerts, 1665). He owned Ross, *'s Weerelds Gods-Diensten*, a lengthy book about world religions, as well as J. Sanderson, H. Timberly, and J. Smith, *Seer gedenckwaerdige Vojagien*, Amsterdam: Jochem Van Dyck, 1678, a book in which three English sailors describe their travels, that included a

description of the Holy Land of lesser scope than Dapper's work. He did not lack interest in such, for him more remote, parts (see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 174–5).

19. See Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 250; Nieuhof, *gezantschap*; O. Dapper, *Gedenkwaerdig bedryf der Nederlandsche Oost-Indische maetschappye*, Amsterdam: Van Meurs 1670; see further for Dapper, John E. Wills, Jr, "Author, Publisher, Patron, World: A Case Study of Old Books and Global Consciousness," *Journal of Early Modern History* 13, 2009, 375–433.
20. Witsen, *Noord en Oost Tartarye* (see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 227–8). Remarkably, the book was preserved as two scrolls (*stolbtsy*); this probably had something to do with the cautious and tentative manner in which Witsen published his first edition (see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 227; Peters, *wijze koopman*, 185–6). Peters writes how only four copies of the 1692 edition are extant today; likewise, a copy nowadays kept at the University of Utrecht is unbound as well (Peters, *wijze koopman*, 185–90). One Russian copy is kept in the former Imperial Library (and thus was likely Peter's at one point), the other among the books identified as part of Vinius's collection (ibid., 187). Bruno Naarden suggest that neither edition of Witsen's text was ever sold by booksellers, see Naarden, "Nikolaas Vitsen," 42.
21. For Peter's use of books owned by assistants such as Vinius, see Irina Beljaeva and Irina Lebedeva, "L'histoire de la bibliothèque de Pierre le Grand et de ses catalogues," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 3, 2006, 459–65: 463.
22. See for this early library Pekarskii, vol.1, *Nauka i literatura*, 46–7.
23. Ibid., 47.
24. Stephen Greenblatt, "The Answer Man: An Ancient Poem Was Rediscovered—and the World Swerved," *The New Yorker*, 8 August 2011, 28–33: 28–9.
25. Savel'eva suggests that most of the works were utilitarian, related to his activities as translator, head apothecary, prospector, map-maker, gun-manufacturer, and so on (see Savel'eva, "Andrei Andreevich Vinius," 109; see also Savel'eva, "Vvedenie," 20).
26. Jacob Soll, *The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert's Secret State Intelligence System*, Ann Arbor, MI: U. of Michigan P., 2009, 3.
27. In fact, according to Iurkin, this should be 662 or 663 (Iurkin, *Andrei*, 341; see as well ibid., 355–6, 441; Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 19, 105–7). See also Peters, *wijze koopman*, 106.
28. These words were spoken by M.V. Dobroklonskii on the occasion of Academician S.F. Platonov's deposition of the *kniga Viniusa* in the library of the Academy of Sciences in the 1920s (see Dobroklonskii, "'Kniga Viniusa'"). See also Kozlovskii, *Pervye pochty*, 245; Bogoslovskii, *Petr Velikii*, vol. 1, 338–40, 342–5; Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 105. For a comprehensive overview of this collection, see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*.
29. And thus a "precursor" of the Enlightenment in Russia, as Colbert was in France (see Soll, *Information Master*, 5).
30. For Matveev's, Medvedev's, and Golitsyn's collections, see for example Hughes, *Sophia*, 159, 170–1; as well as Bushkovitch, "Roman

Empire,"167–8. Dan Waugh has analysed Tsar Aleksei's collection: see Daniel Clarke Waugh, "The Library of Aleksei Mikhailovich," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 38, 1986, 299–324. Of course, what has been identified as belonging to Vinius at the time of his death only represents a part of what he read; for example, he knew Olearius's work long before he owned a copy of his book on the Holstein embassy (if he was Witsen's critic in 1665, as was argued in Chapter 3).

31. See Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 119. The Russian editors seem to have misspelled the name of the author, Corneille van Kiel (1528–1607; they identify him as "Keil") or Cornelis Kiliaan (Corneille van Kiel, *Dictionarium Teutonico-Latinum*, Antwerp: Plantijn, 1588). The first print was of 1574.
32. It seems likely that he also received another book from the Dutch delegation, as it carries as handwritten note in Russian: "[7]173 [1664], May 10. Book of the translator of the *posol'skii prikaz* Andrei Andrei's son Vinius," see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 116; Jaques Joosten, *De kleyne wonderlijke Werelt*, Amsterdam: Marcus Doornick, 1662. This was a 72 page booklet in quarto, written by an interpreter, and likely intended as an amusing souvenir.
33. Kozlovskii, *Andrei Vinius'*, 71–2.
34. Savel'eva, ed., Knigi, 35–6; Georg Agricola, *Bergwerck Buch*, Basel: Ludwig König, 1621.
35. van Westen, *Mathematische Vermaecklyckheden*; see Savel'eva, ed. *Knigi*, 225–6.
36. See for example F. Furet, *In the Workshop of History*, Chicago, IL: U. of Chicago P., 1984, 111–23; R. Darnton, *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1982, 174–8; Peters, *wijze koopman*, 341–66.
37. Valentin Boss, *Newton in Russia: The Early Influence, 1698–1796*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1972, 33–44.
38. The Imperial ambassador Guarient thus recommended Franciscus Aemilianus (Francesco Emiliani) to Vinius in August 1699 by emphasizing the Jesuit father's mathematical skills (Jesuits were looked upon with great suspicion in Russia, even if Aemilianus was not the first to be admitted; see Dukmeyer, *Korbs Diarium*, vol. 1, 183)
39. Indeed, he owned two copies of the German translation of a treatise on politics, published posthumously (G. Naudé, *Considérations sur les coups d'estat*, Paris[?], 1667; G. Naudaea, *Politisches Bedenken über die Staatsstreiche*, Leipzig; Johann Fritsch, 1672); see further G. Naudé, *Advis pour dresser une bibliothèque*, Paris: F. Targa, 1627; Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 51, 139; Peters, *wijze koopman*, 353. Close to Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655) and François de La Mothe le Vayer (1588–1672), Naudé was a "free-thinker," and a supporter of Galileo's theories (see E.L. Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980, 644, 644–5n26; Hunt, Jacob, and Mijnhardt, *Book*, 39; Ann M. Blair, *Too Much To Know: Managing Scholarly Information Before the Modern Age*, New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2010, 119–20; Soll, *Information Master*, 39–42).

40. Cajus Julius Caesar, *Wyt beroemde Commentarien, ofte Corte Historische aenteyckeningen*, 2 vols, Delft: Adriaen Gerritsen, 1643; Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 68.
41. See Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 326–7. On the liminal border between rare book and curio (worthy of the Peter the Great's *Kunstkamera*, perhaps), see Peters, *wijze koopman*, 353.
42. See Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 334–50.
43. Ibid., 96–8, 136–9, 155–68; Savel'eva, "Andrei Andreevich Vinius," 118, 121; Iurkin, *O pervoprestol'nogo grada*, 110. See S. von Herberstein, *Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii . . .*, Basel: Oporinus, 1571; Sebastian Münster, *Cosmographei*, Basel: Henricus Petrus, 1561; Cesare Ripa, *Iconologia, of uyt-beeldingen des Verstands, . . .*, trans. D.P. Pers. Amsterdam: Dirck Piersz. Pers, 1644. Ripa's work was highly popular in the Netherlands (and Vinius owned the Dutch translation); his influence waned after 1700, even if allegorical images remained of some importance in the Rococo period.
44. Baronio's work was another, but Vinius owned a Polish version, as we saw, a language of which he had at best a halting command; he probably did not consult it much (Baronio, *Rocznedzieie*).
45. See for this "new Russia," F.C. Weber, *Das veränderte Rußland . . .*, Frankfurt: N. Förster, 1721.
46. Bogoslovskii, *Petr 1*, vol. 4, 18–19.
47. See Peters, *wijze koopman*, 105–6.
48. See Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 36–40. L. van Aitzema, L. Sylvius, and others, *Saken van Staet en Oorlogh*, second ed., The Hague: J. Velly, J. Tongerloo, and J. Doll, 1669–71; Amsterdam: Jan ten Hoorn et al., 1685–99. He owned a number of other works written by Sylvius, the alias of Lambrecht (Lambert) van den Bos (see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 59–61). The Russian editors of Vinius's catalogue proffer erroneous years of the life of this author.
49. See Brechka, "Peter the Great."
50. Richard Baker, *Cronyke van het Leven en Bedryf van alle de Coningen van Engeland*, Amsterdam: Cornelis Danckertsz., 1649; Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 43–4.
51. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 103–13. For example, *Hollandse Mercurius, Verhalende de voornaemste Saken van Staet, en andere Voorvallen . . . 1688*, vol. 39, Haerlem: Abraham Casteleyn, 1689. Abraham Casteleyn succeeded his father Pieter as printer during the 1670s.
52. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 68, 98–9, 116, 126, 152, 183–4. *Herodoot van Halikarnassus*; Flavius Josephus, *Des wijdt-vermaerden Joodschen Historie-schrijvers Boecken*, Dordrecht: Jacobus Saury, 1665; Caesar, *Wyt beroemde Commentarien*; Titus Livius, *Romeinsche Historien, Sedert de bouwing van Rome*, Amsterdam: Jan Jacobsz. Schipper, 1646; Plutarchus, *T'Leven der Doorluchtige Grieken ende Romeynen*, Delft and Utrecht: Adriaen Gerritsen, Felix van Samblix and David Van Hoogenhuysen, 1644; Cajus Cornelius Tacitus, *Van de ghedenkwaerdige geschiedenissen der Romeinen*, Amsterdam: Joost Hartgersz., 1645.

53. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 68.
54. See among others Justin Stagl, *A History of Curiosity: The Theory of Travel, 1550–1800*, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1995.
55. Iurkin, *O prevoprestol'nogo grada*, 109. The Dutch edition of Olearius was likely one of the three published around 1650, whereas the German version indicated in the 1717 listing of the collection was a later edition of 1669 (A. Olearius, *Beschrijvingh vande nieuwe Parciaensche, ofte orientaelsche reyse, welck door gelegentheyt van een Holsteynsche ambassade, aen den koningh in Persien geschiet is . . .*, trans. Dirck van Wageninge, Amsterdam: Jacob Benjamyn and Adriaen Roest, 1651; A. Olearius, *Beschrijvingh van de nieuwe Parciaensche Ofte Orientaelsche reyse, welck door gelegentheyt van een Holsteynsche ambassade, aen den koningh in Persien gheschiet is . . .*, trans. Dirck van Wageninge, Utrecht: L. Roeck, 1651; Olearius, *Persiaensche Reyse uyt Holsteyn*; Guy Miege, *A relation of three embassies from His Sacred Majestie Charles II, to the great Duke of Muscovie, the King of Sweden, and the King of Denmark*, London: John Starkey, 1669).
56. Coyett, *Historisch Verhael*.
57. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 69–70, 91, 148; Françoys Caron, *Rechte Beschryvinghe van het Machtigh Koninghrijck van Japan*, 's-Gravenhage: J. Tongerloo, 1661; Hendrick van Hamel, *Journael van de Ongeluckige Voyagie van't Jacht de Sperwer*, Rotterdam: J. Stichter, 1668 (he had two copies of this work, one bound with a number of other travel accounts).
58. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 185–9; Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, *Les six voyages de Jean Baptiste Tavernier*, Paris (Leyden: Elzevier), 1678; Jean Baptiste Tavernier, *De zes Reizen van de Heer J. Bapt. Tavernier*, Amsterdam: Weduwe van Johannes van Someren, 1682.
59. The passport was issued in early February 1689 (i.e., mid-February in the modern calendar), indicating how Vinius already worked in the Foreign Office by then (see C. Joret, *Jean-Baptiste Tavernier: Écuyer, Baron D'Aubonne, Chambellan du Grand Électeur*, Paris: Librarie Plon, 1886, 405; Charles Joret, *Le Voyageur Tavernier*, Paris: Vieweg-Bouillon, 1889, 31–2, 36–7).
60. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 47, 147–8, 199; P.v.d.B., *Curieuse Beschrijving van de Gelegentheid, Zeden, Godsdienst, en Ommegang*, Rotterdam: I. Naeraneus, 1677; for the identification of van den Broecke as author, see J.I. van Doorninck, *Vermeende en naamloze schrijvers*, 2 vols, Leiden: Brill, 1883–85. For example, Willem Lithgouw [William Lithgow], *Willem Lithgouws 19 jaarige Lant-Reyse, Uyt Scotlant nae de vermaerte deelen des Werelts*, Amsterdam: Jacob Benjamin, 1653; Vincent le Blanc, *De Vermaarde Reizen Van de Heer Vincent le Blanc*, Amsterdam: Jan Hendriksz en Jan Rieuwertsz, 1654.
61. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 148; Willem Cornelisz Schouten, *Journael Ofte Beschryvinghe van de wonderlijcke Reyse*, Amsterdam: Jan Janssen, 1632.
62. Boterbloem, *Fiction and Reality*, 57–60.
63. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 202; [de la Court], *Interest van Holland*. It was published anonymously.

64. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 40–1, 71. Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, *Don Quixote de la Mancha*, 2 vols, Madrid: Juan de la Cuesta, 1605, 1615; Miguel Cervantes, *Den verstandigen Vroomen Ridder, Don Quichot de la Mancha*, trans. L. van Bos, vol 1: Dordrecht: Jacob Savry, 1657, vol. 2, Dordrecht: Jacob Braat, 1657; Mateo Aleman, *Het Leven van Gusman d'Alfarache*, 2 vols, Rotterdam: Abraham Pietersz, 1655; Mateo Aleman, *Vida y hechos del picaro Guzman de Alfarache*, 2 vols (Madrid: Varez de Castro, 1599; Lisboa: Crasbeeck, 1604), the Dutch translation of which had at least seven editions; two Dutch plays were inspired by it (see J. te Winkel, *De ontwikkelingsgang der Nederlandsche Letterkunde*, second ed., vol. 4, Haarlem: F. Bohn, 1924, 303–4). The Russian who made the first inventory of Vinius's collection thought that Aleman's was a book about an actual politician (see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 41).
65. See for instance Marika Klebusek, *Boeken in de hofstad: Haagse boekcultuur in de Gouden Eeuw*, Hilversum: Verloren, 1997; J.A. Gruys, "Particuliere bibliotheken (bibliofilie)," in *Bibliopolis*, eds M. van Delft and C. de Wolf, Zwolle: Waanders, 2003, 104–5.
66. [A.] de Wicquefort, *L'ambassadeur, oder Staats-Bothschafften*, Frankfurt-am-Main; Friedrich Knochen, 1682; Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 226. The first edition had appeared with the fictive Cologne publisher Pierre Marteau (possibly a cover for an Amsterdam publisher), L.M.P., *Mémoires touchant les ambassadeurs et les ministres publics*, Cologne: Pierre du Marteau, 1676. Wicquefort was at that time incarcerated in the Dutch Republic on accusations of espionage. For Wicquefort's treatise's importance, see H.M.A. Keens-Soper, *Abraham de Wicquefort and Diplomatic Theory*, Leicester: U. of Leicester P., 1996. Among many other professional treatises were those by Goossen van Vreeswijk (although his work was a heady mix of alchemy and science) on assaying minerals (Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 214–17; Collis, "Andrei Vinius," 212–14; Goossen van Vreeswyk, *De Groene Leeuw*, Amsterdam: J.J. van Waesberghe, 1674; Goossen van Vreeswyk, *De Goude Leeuw*, Amsterdam: J.J. van Waesberghe, 1675); by Cornelis van de Voorde on surgery (Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 211; Cornelis van de Voorde, *Lichte Fakkel der Cheirurgia*, Amsterdam: Jacob Vinckel, 1668); by David Lipsius on medicine (Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 205; David Lipsius, *Rathschlag und bericht*…, Erfurt: C. Mechler, 1624); by Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban on fortifications (Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 203; S. Vauban, *Nouvelle manière de Fortifier de Monsieur de Vauban*, Paris: Sebastien Mabre Cramoisy, 1692); and by Buchner on artillery (Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 64–5; Johann Siegmund Buchner, *Theoria et Praxis Artilleriae, Oder Deutliche Beschreibung der Bey itziger Zeit bräuchlichen Artillerie*, 3 vols, Nürnberg: Johann Hoffmann et al., 1685, 1695, 1706).
67. Peters, *wijze koopman*, 353.
68. Hugo de Groot [Grotius], *Drie Boecken*; Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 92; Boterbloem, "Koenraad van Klenk," 196. See also Chapters 3 and 4. The book had belonged to the Amsterdam regent Cornelis Witsen (1603–69), the father of Nicolaas, judging by the Russian description of its current

condition, for Witsen had signed it (Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 92). Perhaps Nicolaas Witsen gave it to Vinius when he visited Russia as part of the Boreel Embassy of 1664–65, or when Vinius visited the Netherlands on his way to England in 1673 (this might explain why it says somewhere on the front or back pages of the book "33 A.W." in Roman script, for Vinius returned to Russia in 1674, when he was 33). Cornelis Witsen would hardly be interested in hanging on to a later edition of Grotius' *magnum opus*, of which he likely owned several editions; this edition may have been a gift from the publishers. This explains why it could be given by his son to Vinius. Again, such a gift is even more likely if Nicolaas Witsen gave the book to Vinius in early 1673, when Cornelis Witsen had been dead for several years (see Chapters 3 and 4 and Boterbloem, "Koenraad van Klenk").

69. Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 92.
70. R. Darnton, *The Kiss of Lamourette*, New York: Norton, 1990, 158; see as well, Furet, *Workshop*, 122–3.
71. Savel'eva, "Vvedenie," 20.
72. Brechka, "Peter the Great," 8.
73. Pekarskii, *Nauka i literatura*, vol. 1, 29.
74. See Arno Haijtema, "Bijzonder kunstalbum ontbreekt op expositie over Peter de Grote," *De Volkskrant*, 18 December 1996, available at: http://www.volkskrant.nl/archief_gratis/article704192.ece/Bijzonder_kunstalbum_ontbreekt_op_expositie_over_Peter_de_Grote, accessed 6 August 2010; and "Vinius-album wordt toch gerestaureerd in Amsterdam," *De Volkskrant*, 24 April 1997, available at: http://www.volkskrant.nl/archief_gratis/article718739.ece/Winius-album_wordt_toch_gerestaureerd_in_Amsterdam, accessed 6 August 2010); Wladimiroff, *De kaart*, 250.
75. For more on Lievens, see Jardine, *Going Dutch*, 90, 126–32, 143.
76. Savel'eva, "Vvedenie," 25–30.
77. Their probable provenance is Dapper's work, although Vinius may have owned either Ides's book or Nieuhof's work on the Dutch embassies to China (see Savel'eva, ed., *Knigi*, 250; Dapper, *Gedenkwaerdig Bedryf*; Ides, *Drie-Jaarige Reize*; Nieuhof, *gezantschap*). Nieuhof was a trained artist who produced excellent drawings of Chinese cities and landscapes. Both Johan Nieuhof and his brother Hendrik (who was mainly responsible for the publication of his brother's work) were patronized by Nicolaas Witsen (see Peters, *wijze koopman*, 320–1, 325–6). Neither Nieuhof's nor Ides's book is among the known works of Vinius's library, but they may have disappeared like Vinius's copy of Struys's book, whereas Ides's work was published when Vinius's fate hung in abeyance (see above).
78. Matvei's age remains a mystery: Savel'eva believes he was born in 1686, but he could scarcely have taken over the post office in 1695 if he was a mere nine years old (see Savel'eva, "Vvedenie," 26).
79. H.C. Meyer, review of Renée Kistemaker et al., eds, *The Paper Museum of the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg*, in *Slavonic and East European Review* 3, 2006, 555–6.

80. N.P. Kopaneva, "The Paper Museum: Its Aims and Uses," in Renée Kistemaker et al, eds, *The Paper Museum of the Academy of Scinces in St. Petersburg, c. 1725–60*, Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005, 77–103: 79–80. The question remains how and when Vinius would have bought Lievens's drawings. In 1673 he may neither have had the opportunity nor the money to purchase them on his diplomatic tour, but Matvei was too old if his father bought them in 1700 (if he was indeed in Holland then). He probably used a broker or other intermediary (after all he had shepherded Sofia's engraving in 1688–89). It may be, then, that some of this collection, too, originated with Andries Denijsz. Winius and his trade with the Netherlands.
81. On this, see Blair, *Too Much*, 85–116.

Conclusion

During Andrei Vinius's life, Muscovy became Russia. Ever since, she has remained a permanent fixture as the largest country on the global map. That was by no means a foregone conclusion in 1641, a mere generation after Poles occupied the Kremlin and Swedes held Novgorod. It is simplistic to attribute Russia's rise merely to the wisdom or foresight of her rulers, Aleksei Mikhailovich and his children, but their sustained effort at expanding and modernizing their country between 1613 and 1725 was key in laying solid foundations for the Russian state's survival for a lengthy period of time. The previous pages have made clear that throughout most of his adult life Andrei Vinius played a remarkable part in this build-up.

Vinius fit like a glove the time and place in which he lived and he optimally used his considerable talents for the Russian and his own cause. He was the first Russian administrator of a type: people with "Western" roots who were thoroughly acculturated as Russians, to which group for example Iakov Brius or Andrei Osterman (1686–1747) belonged in the next generation. Even Catherine the Great (1729–96) can be seen as a latter-day Vinius in some ways: of German roots, she converted at about the same age as Vinius had a century earlier and became as much (imperfectly?) Russified as Vinius. Like him, she also helped Europeanize Russia.

But Vinius's time was a probing age, less convinced about the blessings of the modern age, science, or progress than Catherine's was to be. Vinius developed a variety of plans to better his country (and in the process better himself in material terms), but many of them were a bit amateurish or crude, advocating the copying of foreign

models without much thought of calibrating them to the Russian environment. His initiatives did not meet a sustained receptive audience until Peter arrived at the helm of his country. Vinius's elevation after 1689 was due to Peter's infatuation with everything Dutch and the lack of trustworthy experts of Western technology and culture during the 1690s.

In addition, Vinius appeared to be a uniquely efficient bureaucrat in the tsar's eyes. Peter gave Vinius the Siberian satrapy as a result of this conviction and asked him to overcome a crucial shortage in military hardware in 1700. But the tsar's fondness of Vinius began to decline after Peter had visited Western Europe and brought back hundreds of specialists, who made what had appeared to be Vinius's rare skills seem rather ordinary. Peter was intrigued by the sort of modernizing ideas promoted by Vinius, but gradually realized that such plans and their creator belonging to a vanishing age. Peter's transformation of Russia, which took off in earnest after 1700, called for far greater experts than a multi-talented Man Friday such as Vinius.

Peter's benevolent response to Vinius's pleading to be allowed to return to Russia in 1707 does show that the modernizer enthroned understood that Vinius had been a trail blazer, without the likes of whom Peter may never have been able to undertake his radical program to reform his country. In addition, Peter must have admired the (Protestant?) work ethic of this intellectual, who had donned at various times of his life (and often at the same time) the guise of merchant, translator-interpreter, tsarist tutor, poet, postmaster, prospector, businessman, departmental manager, pharmacist, spy, information analyst, weapons' and bricks' manufacturer, colonial administrator, estate manager, and landlord. Indeed, Peter still found work for Vinius after his return in 1708, even having him liaise with a vital ally in the crucial war with Sweden. And Vinius once again threw himself into his work. One does not often encounter in the history of Russia, or of any other country, people who leave their imprint on such a great number of activities.

Although one would like to admire Vinius, any such admiration is tempered by the realization that he was a ruthless man in a cruel age. He capitalized on opportunities to change his country and better himself materially at a time when such chances were still exceedingly rare in Russia (and only open to a select few, among whom Vinius was lucky enough to count himself as a young man), but in order to

succeed he needed to be unscrupulous. He allowed himself throughout his life little compassion for the downtrodden, although he was eminently skilled at lamenting his own fate in his letters and petitions as if he was a poor beggar who deserved charity (even if abject grovelling before the tsar was to a great degree the habit in Muscovy). Thus he tried to exploit his serfs to the hilt and cracked the whip over his subordinates in the post office or the Siberian department.

It is unclear in how far he had any real friends, but he seems to have concluded a close alliance with Ukraintsev in his early days in the Foreign Office and was able to call on Witsen during his exile (even if Witsen had a sense of *noblesse oblige* and helped out many others throughout his long life). From all the sources about him, Vinius comes across as having had a predominantly instrumental view toward his acquaintance with others in the circles in which moved. He associated with them, or used them, when it was to his advantage, thus parading his wife and daughter to impress his Dutch guests, even if this went against Russian traditions (and may have made those women feel rather uncomfortable). Perhaps his behavior constituted enlightened self-interest in its crudest form, but despite all his reading of moral tales he did not set himself much of an example for others in search of a righteous life to follow. His exhortation, delivered via his bailiffs, to his serfs to lead a Christian life is loathsome.

In advancing his career, Vinius did find patrons, from van Sweeden to Matveev, Odoevskii, Ukraintsev, Fyodor Golovin, and Boris Golitsyn, as well as Peter the Great. But Vinius cannot be easily identified with any faction, which bespeaks a wily operator. Such isolation could leave him dangerously exposed, however. He may have survived in 1676 and 1689 because of his neutrality, but he lacked a champion in 1703. Even so, he died a fabulously wealthy man, the equivalent of a (dollar or euro) millionaire today.

In the end, Vinius stands out a fascinatingly complex character, whose life tells us not just about the time and place in which he lived, but also about the human condition, or, at least, the human capacity to thrive in the face of difficulties. Such success, unfortunately, does not always make for the most virtuous people.

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