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The Past, Present, and Future

Akira Iriye

Global and Transnational History

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

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Foreword

This small book discusses the emergence, growth, and future possibilities of global history and transnational history, two interrelated approaches to the study of the past that have become more and more visible and influential in the last quarter century. I should note that the presentation is more personal than comprehensive, and I refer only to a limited number of examples from the growing body of scholarly publications that exemplify the historiographic transformation. Moreover, all the books and articles cited have appeared in English. While I have consulted a small number of works in several other languages, I have felt that the book would become longer and more cumbersome if I intertwined them with those in English. It is my hope that, limited as the presentation is, this account will be useful to readers interested in the recent trends in the study of history, in particular the remarkable development of global history and transnational history.

Jenny McCall, who first suggested that I write an introduction to transnational history, and others at Palgrave Macmillan have been consistently supportive of this project. To them and to Rana Mitter, with whom I co-edit the series in transnational history and who has kindly read my earlier draft and made useful suggestions, I owe my special thanks. I am also indebted to my "transnational" wife and family who have been an unfailing source of inspiration and support.

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The Rise of Global and Transnational History

Abstract: *This chapter outlines the "historiographic revolution" since the 1990s, with a focus on the rise of global history and transnational history. Prior to the late 1980s and the early 1990s, historical writings had been presented primarily in the framework of nations or regions: American history, European history, and the like. During the last 20 years or so, a more global approach has become influential, along with a stress on transnational actors (e.g. races, non-state organizations) and themes (e.g. migrations, human rights). I pay particular attention to international history, traditionally conceptualized as a study of interrelationships among states, which has been increasingly put in the context of, or in juxtaposition with, transnational history.*

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There has been a sea change in the way historians understand, teach, and write history during the last 25 years or so. This may be more a personal observation of a historian who has been reading and writing on subjects and themes in modern history, focusing on international affairs, than a widely applicable generalization. But all historians, like scholars of other disciplines, have an obligation to relate their work to that of those who have preceded them and to locate themselves in the past, present, and possible future of their fields. As someone who has been studying history since the 1950s, I feel I have personally witnessed and been involved in some of the historiographic changes during the last six decades.

The recent historiographic transformation is evident in the frequency with which words like "global" and "transnational" have come to be used as part of titles of books and articles. Prior to the 1990s, few historical publications, if any, had made use of such adjectives, whereas they have since become common place. Such a phenomenon seems to reflect a significant new development in the way in which historians conceptualize and seek to understand the past, especially in the modern period.

Modern history till recently used to be studied in terms of the nation-state as the key framework of analysis. The scholarly discipline of history, after all, began in nineteenth-century Europe, when the nation-state emerged as the key unit of human activities, political, economic, social, and at times even cultural. History was a study of how a nation emerged and developed. Political, constitutional, and legal issues were examined in close detail, but at the same time, people's lives, activities, and dreams were considered a vital part of the national past for, as Hegel asserted, there was no such thing as history apart from national consciousness. Such an approach to history spread to countries and people outside the West as they, too, developed as modern states and engaged in nation-building tasks.

As an undergraduate (at Haverford College, Pennsylvania), I concentrated on British history, studying in close detail the constitutional developments under the Tudors and Stuarts and writing a senior thesis on the Anglican clergy in eighteenth-century England. In retrospect this was essential training for a would-be historian. I learned such basics as the reading of primary sources, the review of the scholarly literature, and the writing of a monograph that might potentially be considered for publication. Above all, my principal teacher (Wallace MacCaffrey) taught me and my fellow students that the study of British (or, by extension, any country's) history was an open book regardless of one's personal

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background. There were methodologies and generalizations available to all students and applicable to all countries. This was particularly encouraging advice to a foreign student like me, whose command of the English language was less than satisfactory. Having thus been initiated into the world of history study, I went on to graduate school, at Harvard University, where I was trained to become a professional historian. My field of specialization switched from British history to US history as well as to modern Chinese history, but there was no significant change in methodology or approach in the transition. History, in particular modern history that my fellow graduate students and I studied, still consisted of national histories. In each national history, themes like political unification, constitutional and legal developments, economic modernization, and cultural pursuits (including religion, education, and popular entertainment) were subjects of research, writing, and teaching, all pointing to the emergence of the nation as it came to exist at a given moment in time as well as to its subsequent development. Such a perspective may be termed nation-centrism, or the nation-centered understanding of modern history. Inevitably, the nation-centered historical study tended to accentuate the uniqueness of each country's experiences, ideas, and institutions. A country's past was a precious heritage passed on from generation to generation and constituted the shared memory of all its citizens. The historian's task in such a context, we learned, appeared to consist of exploring that heritage in all its nuances and then to pass it on to readers. "Exceptionalism" was thus a tendency that frequently characterized the way any nation's past was studied and understood.

Of course, as would-be scholars of history, we learned that a rich historiographic tradition existed so that one generation of historians would not just repeat what their predecessors had accomplished. A professional historian's task was to make an "original contribution" to the scholarly literature, such as adding new data, a fresh methodology, or even a controversial perspective on a country's past.

For those of our generation who were trained as historians during the 1950s and the early 1960s, several fascinating shifts would occur in the study of the past, albeit still within the larger framework of national history. In the case of Chinese history, for instance, for a long time the country's "response" (or lack of response) to the West was a standard framework for understanding its modern experience, but then some scholars began to emphasize China's indigenous ideas and institutions that had prepared it for its modern nationhood. The focus on the nation

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as the unit of analysis remained, however. In US history, political developments interested most professional historians till the 1960s when a "social turn" emerged, with scholars emphasizing the need to pay closer attention than in the past to women, racial minorities, and others who had not been the primary actors in the political drama. Social historians were eager to bring these outsiders into their study of the American past. Women's history, African-American history, ethnic history, and the like were among the most interesting subfields of history in the last decades of the twentieth century. Rather than focusing on the "establishment," the new turn sought to incorporate the disenfranchised, the minorities, and the marginalized as authentic actors in the reconceptualized history of the American nation. This was still nation-centered history, but with a greater emphasis on the country's social groups and local scenes than on national politics. But the "social turn," if anything, accentuated the exceptionalist interpretation of the nation's past. For, to the extent that social history encouraged scholars and students to examine the nation's history "from the bottom up," as it was said, minute details and local developments came to claim their attention as much as, or even more than, broader themes and larger questions. The attention paid to local history was an important corrective to nation-centered generalizations, but it could also keep the historian's attention narrowly focused. If the larger national picture was sometimes lost sight of, even more so were other countries, not to mention the whole world. Without some examination and knowledge of concurrent developments elsewhere, it was easy to dwell on the local scene and emphasize its uniqueness. Cultural studies that gained influence simultaneously with social history may have accentuated this tendency through its emphasis on the text, i.e. the authenticity of the spoken or written word grounded on each individual circumstance. It was very difficult to generalize about written texts or works of art because circumstances of their creation were all different. At the same time, the "cultural turn" often implied a shift away from the study of elites (in the history of art, of literature, of music, and the like) toward a concern with mass consumption and popular culture. These phenomena, too, were seen as unique, both to the local scene and to the nation at large, reflective of national habits of mind, or "mentalities."

Needless to say, neither in their research nor in teaching, could historians just deal with one country and entirely ignore other countries or the wider world. A small number of scholars compared such phenomena as feudalism and nationalism across national boundaries. This was what

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came to be called comparative history. However, unlike comparative literature that grew in a very short period of time (mostly in the second half of the twentieth century) into a major field, often with its own separate department, comparative history was not practiced widely and often consisted of scholars of different nations' histories comparing their notes, so that their nation-centrism remained. It was primarily in the framework of a country's foreign relations, or diplomatic history, a genre that had its venerable beginning in the nineteenth century and persisted through most decades of the twentieth, that historians were obliged to familiarize themselves at least with the decision-making processes of a plurality of sovereign states. This was a field of history that examined how nations dealt with one another through diplomacy, trade, and at times through military conflict. Foreign policy was the key framework of study; each nation had its own definition of national interest, which it sought to maximize by utilizing all means, through peaceful diplomacy if possible but through military force if necessary. Since no pair of nations shared identical interests, there was always a potential conflict between them, which they sought to reconcile through treaties and agreements. When they failed to do so, war could result, and when it ended, the new circumstance compelled the belligerent nations to redefine their interests, sometimes leading to the establishment of a postwar arrangement. The process would go on ad infinitum so long as there existed separate nations.

Diplomatic history, the field in which I wrote my dissertation, required that the historian develop some knowledge of the countries whose mutual relations were being examined. That would include multiarchival research and an intimate knowledge of decision-makers in the countries involved. (In my own case, the dissertation dealt with international affairs in the Asia-Pacific region during the 1920s. Subsequently published as a book, *After Imperialism*, this was essentially a traditional monograph in which interstate policies were examined on the basis of published and personal documents of decision-makers in several countries.[1]) The "social turn" in the 1960s and the subsequent decades served to broaden the scope of inquiry, and diplomatic historians began exploring wider circles of people as they affected the decision-making processes: public opinion, party politics, interest groups, and the like. The "cultural turn" encouraged the study of popular images and perceptions: how people looked at other nations, what they thought their country stood for, or how they defined the national interest. Even in such situations, however,

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the nation remained the key unit of analysis. In the case of US diplomatic history, the framework was American foreign relations, whether "American" meant the decision-makers, public opinion, or both. (It may also be noted that most studies of US foreign relations remained monoarchival, based entirely on English-language sources. Even books and articles on Cold War history tended to be written without reference to Russian, not to mention Chinese and other language material.)

Diplomatic history, or the history of foreign affairs, increasingly came to be called "international history" during the 1970s. *The International History Review*, established in 1979, became a major organ of the field, together with *Diplomatic History*, launched by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) in 1977. While the founding editors of this latter journal chose to call it "diplomatic history," the articles it published frequently discarded this traditional phrase for others, including "international history." (This was a term familiar to British scholars and students, but in the United States and other countries "history of international relations" was more common.) "American foreign relations" probably remained the most widely used expression in college courses dealing with the subject, notably in the United States, and "international history" may initially have meant no more than a sum of the foreign relations of all countries, or at least of the major powers. (I, too, changed the title of the principal courses I taught from "foreign relations" to "international history" in the mid-1980s.) At least, the increasing popularity of "international" as against "diplomatic" history suggested that scholars were becoming interested in going beyond examining how nations devised their policies and strategies toward one another and in conceptualizing some sort of a world order in which they pursued their respected interests.

The field of international history, nevertheless, was still focused on the nation as the key unit of analysis. In terms of the larger world, the "great powers" almost always took center stage. This can best be seen in the fact that major diplomatic and military events continued to determine the chronology of international history. It was virtually universally accepted that the world went from the Napoleonic wars and the consequent "Vienna system" (the European order that was established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815) to the First World War and the "Versailles system," defined by the victorious powers at the Paris Peace Conference, and from there to the Second World War (usually characterized as the breakdown of the Versailles system, although the Asian part of the global

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conflict entailed the collapse of the "Washington system" that had defined regional affairs during the 1920s). But, as virtually every historian noted, the Second World War somehow led to the US–USSR Cold War, a condition of "neither peace nor war" and maintained by a system of "bipolarity." This was a chronology defined by interrelations among the great Western powers in which small nations of Europe and virtually all countries and people in other parts of the globe counted for little. William Keylor's *The Twentieth-Century World* (1983), a widely used and very helpful survey, followed such a sequence of events, as did Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1987), arguably the best study in the genre of international history published before the 1990s.[2] The book offered a systematic analysis of the ways in which the major powers had risen and fallen since the sixteenth century, a history that traced the emergence and eventual decline of the Austrian empire, the Dutch empire, France, Britain, and Germany, until the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two superpowers to determine the fate of the world. Kennedy might have discussed the possibility of the eventual decline, if not the demise, of the Soviet Union, but in the 1980s such a prediction would have seemed premature. In any event, the author concluded by speculating on what great powers in the future might come to challenge the United States: China, Japan, a united Europe, or some other country? The book caught the attention not only of historians but of the public at large, especially those in the United States who were keenly concerned about the their country's future position in the world. In examining international history through an analysis of the relative military and economic strengths of the great powers, the book typified the nation-centric approach to international history that prevailed at that time.

The study of imperialism that flourished from the 1960s through the 1980s may also be fitted into this general historiographic phenomenon. William Langer's *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* (1935) was probably the best example of diplomatic history writing before the Second World War.[3] As a multiarchival, extensive study of the imperialistic rivalries from the 1880s through the First World War, it had no equal. And its scope was global, covering Africa, the Middle-East, Asia and the Pacific—but curiously not Latin America. Nevertheless, as the title of the book indicated, Langer was primarily interested in following the ways in which the great powers of the West, which were by definition empires with extended colonies all over the world, vied with each other for greater weight in world politics. This was geopolitics on a grand scale.

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One studied imperialism as an extreme form of national history as each country struggled for regional or even global hegemony. (Recall A. J. P. Taylor's masterpiece in the old genre: *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe* published in 1954).[4] Even when historians paid attention to domestic political and social forces that supported, or opposed, imperialism, as Walter LaFeber and Ernest May, among others, did in their studies of the US emergence as a colonial power after the Spanish–American War, their focus was nation-centric.[5] While there is little doubt that influential monographs by Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, notably *Africa and the Victorians* (1961), as well as those by others who followed in their wake, helped broaden our understanding of the origins of modern European imperialism, we should note that they did not alter the basic focus on decision-makers and their presentation of data in the framework of geopolitical struggles for power.[6]

When such a nation-centric and the overwhelmingly geopolitical character of the scholarly literature in international history began to change is difficult to determine precisely. But it seems clear that by the 1970s, more and more historians were coming to view international relations not simply in diplomatic and political terms but also in the context of economic, social, and, of particular importance, cultural developments. In 1978, I felt comfortable enough to speak, as SHAFR's outgoing president, of "international relations as intercultural relations."[7] The idea that nations were both political entities and cultural communities and so interact with one another at these two levels did not seem so quaint by that time. In the late 1960s I had published *Across the Pacific*, tracing changes and continuities in the mutual images that Americans, Chinese, and Japanese had held of one another since their initial encounter (both actual and virtual) in the nineteenth century.[8] I further elaborated on the "cultural approach" to international history in *Pacific Estrangement* (1972) and in a number of essays written in the 1970s, and in 1981 I published *Power and Culture*, a study of the Pacific War (1941–1945).[9] By the dichotomous title I tried to convey the sense that the key Pacific rivals, Japan and the United States, dealt with one another during the war at two levels, geopolitical and cultural, and argued that these two levels were not always congruent. Cultural relations, it seemed to me, often developed with their own momentum, not just as an appendix to power-level rivalries. The book was still nation-centric, but such a dual perspective on international history may have had the potential to develop into a less geopolitically oriented study of international relations.

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When a more openly transnational approach to the study of international history emerged is difficult to say, but it seems that some time during the 1980s the word "transnational" began to be used by a small number of historians. To cite a personal example, I used the adjective twice in my presidential address at the 1988 meeting of the American Historical Association.[10] Entitled "The Internationalization of History," the presentation reiterated the importance of the cultural dimension of international relations, but this was by then nothing new. What is interesting in retrospect is that I seem to have used the adjective "transnational" rather un-self-consciously. If I had been actually trying to promote a novel, transnational way of studying the past, I would have entitled the talk "the transnationalization of history." But I was not aware at that time that there was a big difference between "international" and "transnational." In any event, what I tried to suggest in this presentation was the need to "denationalize" the study of history in order to explore "historical themes and conceptions that are meaningful across national boundaries." I could have said "transnationalize" rather than "denationalize," but at that time I must not have come across such an expression. I did mention several examples like "human beings' relationship to nature, the definitions of beauty and truth, social justice, freedom against power, and the struggle to preserve memory" as worthy subjects for historical inquiry. Above all, I argued that all history was "human history" and that historians must explore the existence of a "world cultural outlook" at a given moment in time.

Such ideas, expressed in vaguely global and transnational terms, seem to indicate that I was taking tentative steps toward global and transnational history but that I was not yet aware how potent a force the new perspectives would prove to be in the last years of the twentieth century, or that there was a sharp contrast between them and not only the traditional national history but also the existing literature in international history. In 1992, I published a book entitled *The Globalizing of America*, and followed it with *China and Japan in the Global Setting* in 1993.[11] The use of terms like "global" and "globalizing" suggests that I was beginning to notice what in retrospect was the growing popularity of such adjectives in journalistic and scholarly circles, but they did not result in any reconceptualization of the past, at least as far as my own work was concerned. The former was a survey of US foreign affairs from Woodrow Wilson to Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the latter a brief history of China–Japan relations from the late nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth

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century. Despite such titles, neither book mentioned, let alone analyzing, the phenomenon that more and more writers were beginning to discuss: globalization. Initially, I did think of calling the US foreign relations survey "Globalization of the United States," but that would have been the only place in the book where the term "globalization" appeared. This was not a study of globalization at all. Besides, my editor told me he was not "comfortable" with the term, perhaps reflecting the still existing gap between historical study and the scholarly trends in economics, anthropology, and other disciplines where globalization had become a subject of scholarly inquiry by the 1980s, if not earlier. A study of history couched in the framework of globalization would have entailed a serious confrontation with global forces that transcended national boundaries. But my work, along with the bulk of studies published by historians in the early 1990s, was still nation-centric, whether the subject be national, imperial, or international history. Despite my call for "denationalization" and for exploration of themes that transcended local boundaries, I was not exactly practicing what I preached.

By then, on the other hand, a handful of historians were already engaged in the study of what they called "global history." They were becoming keenly aware of developments throughout the world that transcended and breached national boundaries, such as communications technology, the growth of multinational enterprises, and population movements. And they believed that traditional nation-centered framework for understanding the past, in particular the recent past and the contemporary world, was no longer helpful in comprehending such phenomena. Global history would have to be the way. Arguably the first systematic exploration of the genre, something akin to a historiographic declaration of independence, was *Conceptualizing Global History* edited by Bruce Mazlish and Ralph Buultjens and published in 1993. In the introduction to the volume, which contains essays by eleven scholars, Mazlish pointed to recent global developments and declared, "A new consciousness is needed to help view these developments… A new subfield of history… must be created."[12] That subfield he would propose to call "global history"—or, "new global history," as he would soon come to prefer to name it. He would distinguish global history from world history, a field that had existed for a long time as a subject for teaching and for public edification. In Mazlish's conception, the new global history would focus on cross-national phenomena such as economic globalization, migrations, environmental issues, and human rights, subjects that

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had been treated, if at all, in the context of national histories or else of international relations. But, according to Mazlish and his colleagues, these were truly global developments so that to confine them into national or even international frameworks would be inadequate. Thus from the beginning global history was distinguished from, and posed a challenge to, the nation-centered historiography. The latter continued to provide the bulk of research and writings in the general field of history, but even they increasingly became aware of the new challenge and began to seek ways to meet it, as will be elaborated upon in chapter 3.

The emergence of global history as an alternative to national history had the effect of encouraging a number of historians to delineate "transnational history" as yet another subfield. As noted above, the adjectives "global" and "transnational" had begun to be used by historians by the late 1980s, so that it is not surprising that some began speaking of transnational history as a subcategory of, or a fresh approach to, the study of history. The distinction between global history and transnational history, to be sure, was often tenuous and remains so. In this book, therefore, these two genres are treated interchangeably. However, if they were entirely identical, there would be no need to use two different words where just one should suffice, and so some differences in their objectives and approaches will have to be noted. Most fundamentally, global history and transnational history share two characteristics. First, they both look beyond national boundaries and seek to explore interconnections across borders. Second, they are particularly concerned with issues and phenomena that are of relevance to the whole of humanity, not just to a small number of countries or to one region of the world. They are anxious to confront the conventional wisdom that prioritizes the West and tends to view world history through themes and chronologies that are only, or at least primarily, applicable to Europe and North America. Scholars of global history and transnational history have continued to exemplify these two perspectives on the study of modern and contemporary history.

Why, then, did some historians begin to identify their work as transnational history rather than global history? In part this was because they called for a transnational approach to the study of a nation's past. Some of the pioneers in this regard, such as Ian Tyrrell, Thomas Bender, and Frank Ninkovich were historians of the United States, and they began to argue, already in the 1990s but especially after the turn of the new century, that the nation's history had too often been studied in isolation from the

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rest of the world and that its past could not be fully understood unless its political, economic, social, and cultural developments were examined as an integral part of world history, in particular of humankind's emerging hopes and fears in an increasingly interdependent globe.[13] Because there had been a strongly exceptionalist bent in the traditional study of US history, the writings by these and other scholars had the effect of reminding their readers and students that a transnational approach to the nation's past was the only way to comprehend its legacy. Historians of some other countries likewise began to accept and apply such a perspective to their studies. At this level, therefore, transnational history was akin to a transnational understanding of national history. The nation as the key unit of analysis still remained.

Others, however, were incorporating non-national entities in their studies. Perhaps the best example in the 1990s was Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*, published in 1996.[14] The author was a political scientist and perhaps for this reason was bolder than most historians in asserting that civilizations and not nations were likely to be the principal actors in the coming century. Although Huntington was forecasting the future direction of the world, his emphasis on a non-national entity like a civilization, coming from a prominent scholar of a discipline that had traditionally focused on the nation as the unit of analysis even more consistently than the study of history, made a profound impact on historians as well as on others. The assertion that the coming global conflict was likely to pit Islam and other civilizations against the Christian civilization of the West sounded novel to those who had been accustomed to think of world crises in terms of clashes among powers, not religions. Historians knowledgeable about the Middle-East or Asia, however, were quick to point out that there was much that Christianity and other religions, notably Islam, shared, and that it would be wrong to view the development of civilizations in the framework of the West versus the non-West. They noted, on the contrary, that all regions of the world had developed through their interactions and intermixing so that there was nothing pure and unchanging about Christianity or Western civilization, or for that matter any religion or civilization. One sees here the critique of the traditional West-centric scholarship that grew more vocal during the 1990s and constituted part of the historiographic transformation of the decade.

Civilizations and religions, however, were not the only examples of non-national entities to which historians were increasingly paying attention. There were other identities of people, including races, tribes,

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and ethnic communities that were not interchangeable with nations and had their own agendas. The traditional historiography had treated such groups in the context of national affairs, but now they began to be seen as having their unique histories that were not identical with, or subsumable under, national histories. Indeed, their past could best be understood if they were recognized as transnational existences. In a way the emergence of "whiteness studies" at the turn of the century, unlike "black studies" that had primarily meant "Afro-American studies," suggests that race was beginning to be seen as a subject that should be examined across national boundaries. Noticeable, too, was a renewed interest on the part of scholars to consider racism a transnational phenomenon, viewing the relationship between various races not simply as a national problem. By the turn of the new century, these and other non-national entities were beginning to be seen as equally important components of history as nation-states.

By coincidence, an increasing number of historians were turning their attention to what political scientists and sociologists had identified as non-state actors. Eric Hobsbawm's 1994 publication, *The Age of Extremes*, a survey of "the short twentieth century" (from 1914 to 1991), discussed "transnational firms" or what some called "multinational corporations" as a key aspect of the "increasingly *transnational* economy" that had begun to emerge in the 1960s.[15] It may well be that as a historian trained in Marxist historiography, Hobsbawm had been more aware than most others of worldwide economic phenomena. Indeed, Marxist theory had always stressed the cross-border solidarity of capitalists, workers, and other classes and in that sense been an inspiration to those seeking to get away from the nation-centric framework of historical study. It must be noted, at the same time, that as Marxism turned into Leninism, and Leninism into Maoism, the classical formulation of global linkages had often to compete with, and even been superseded by, nationalistic perspectives. It would be fair to say, then, that while potentially a pioneering conception of transnationalism, Marxism did not directly lead to the transnational historiography of the recent decades.

In any event, multinational enterprises were non-state actors in that they were not interchangeable with any given state but combined the capital, labor, and markets of many countries. They were profit oriented, and in order to increase productivity and market share, they were increasingly "out-sourcing" their products as well as service. "Out-sourcing," sometimes called "off-shore procurement," was a typical

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instance of a globalizing economy. Although multinational enterprises were never completely free of regulations and taxes imposed by states, they functioned with their own agendas and momentums. Even in a government-regulated economy such as China's, they were not identical with the governmental apparatus and so qualified as non-state actors, with greater freedom to work for profit than the majority of the population who were not involved in such enterprises. It is not surprising that, just as historians were beginning to take the phenomenon of globalization seriously as a theme in recent and current history, they were becoming fascinated by the emerging visibility and influence of multinational enterprises as non-state actors.

Likewise, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) began to attract the attention of historians. Political scientists had been studying these institutions since at least the 1970s, but historians had been rather slow to turn their attention to them, especially to international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). To be sure, important historical studies of peace movements, women's rights advocacy, educational exchange programs, and other activities in which private organizations in various countries had played major roles had been published before the 1990s, but most of them were thematic treatments and were not treatises on non-state actors as such. Historians of international relations, in particular, had virtually ignored INGOs. (For that matter, they had not even incorporated intergovernmental organizations—IGO—such as the League of Nations and the United Nations into their work except as arenas in which big-power diplomacy took place.) But the awareness grew that one could never develop a fuller understanding of world affairs so long as one focused on individual states and unless both IGOs and INGOs were brought into the picture. Part of this was because "world affairs" involved such issues as environmentalism, prevention of diseases, human rights, and cultural exchange—all transnational subjects in which NGOs had been seriously interested. To cite a personal example, when I began collecting data in the early 1990s on international educational exchange and related programs for the enhancement of what I called "cultural internationalism," I was struck with the roles played by INGOs whose number and scope of activities seemed to have grown impressively throughout the twentieth century. I eventually published a small book on the subject (*Global Community*)[16]. But I was far from being alone. A growing number of historians were also beginning to pay attention to INGOs in their studies of international affairs.

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Multinational enterprises, non-governmental organizations, religious establishments, and many other institutions are all non-national, non-state entities, and for this reason the term "transnational" may be applied to them. They exist as separate identities from states and nations, and they establish connections with one another across national boundaries. In order to stress that these, along with civilizations, races, and other categories that are not identifiable with separate nations, the examination of their history would deserve the term "transnational history." If global history considers humans as a universal category of being, concerned with the question of what it means to be human, transnational history looks at individuals in various contexts, including nations.

The transnational approach to the study of history, in other words, does not deny the existence of nations and the roles they play in contributing to defining the world at a given moment in time. The intricate interrelationship between nations and transnational existences, between national preoccupations and transnational agendas, or between national interests and transnational concerns is of fundamental importance to the study of transnational history. This may be seen in the relationship between international history and transnational history.

As noted earlier, international history deals with relations among nations as sovereign entities. World affairs are the sum of all such interstate relations, and the globe is envisaged as the arena for the interplay of independent nations. Transnational history, in contrast, focuses on cross-national connections, whether through individuals, non-national identities, and non-state actors, or in terms of objectives shared by people and communities regardless of their nationality. The globe is seen as being made up of these communities that establish connections with one another quite apart from interstate relations. International and transnational phenomena may sometimes overlap, but often they come into conflict. For instance, historians have had trouble understanding why Woodrow Wilson, the leading champion of national self-determination, rejected the idea of global racial equality, as shown when he refused to consider an additional statement in the preamble of the League of Nations charter that would affirm that principle. But we would be able to understand such a seemingly contradictory stance by Wilson if we recognized that he was an internationalist but was never a transnationalist. In other words, his vision of an ideal world was one in which all people aspiring to national independence would be given a chance, but never one in which all races were given the same rights.

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Wilson had an internationalist vision, but he was a nationalist and an anti-transnationalist when it came to conceptualizing a globe in which all races enjoyed equal freedom. History is full of examples of such a disparity between internationalism and transnationalism, a phenomenon one could only comprehend by introducing the idea of a transnationally defined world, as against a nation-based international order.

On the other hand, international and transnational affairs can, and have sometimes come together. Educational and cultural exchange programs may offer a good example. In most cases, initiatives for promoting understanding by bringing individuals, works of art, or theater groups into contact across borders come from private sources, such as educational institutions, museums, and foundations, but official agencies, too, frequently become involved, as do intergovernmental organizations. As I tried to document in *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (1997), there was a vigorous engagement with cultural, as against political, internationalism since the late nineteenth century, and a large number of national as well as international organizations, both public and private, played their roles.[17] In such instances, it is impossible to distinguish international and transnational agendas. (I might have entitled the book "cultural transnationalism and international order," which might have better described the coincidence of transnational and international endeavors in the field of cultural exchange.) Likewise, the environmental movement can be both international and transnational. A world conference on the environment may be attended by representatives of both governments and of non-governmental organizations. A history of environmentalism, then, would have to be understood both in international and transnational frameworks. These two frameworks would be difficult to separate, but it would be wrong to merge them into one, for that would make it easy to obscure the important roles played by numerous NGOs and private individuals who dedicate themselves to the cause. In other words, international history has its own chronology, and transnational history another. An event such as the UN-sponsored conference on the natural environment convened in Helsinki in 1972 may have been a minor footnote to the geopolitical story of the Cold War, but in transnational history, it was a landmark, a defining moment in the history of environmentalism. In the chronicle of international history, moreover, the year 1972 may best be remembered as a major turning point in US relations with the People's Republic of China, as seen in President Richard Nixon's trip to Shanghai in February. In the history of

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the Cold War, the same year may also be seen as marking a significant phase in the reduction of tensions, the year when Nixon met with the Soviet leaders for limiting the two countries' nuclear arsenals. The transnational significance of the Helsinki conference on the environment was of a different character and cannot be submerged under the story of the Cold War. An interesting question would be to explore the connections between these two sets of historic events, one international and the other transnational. What impact did the US–PRC rapprochement or the US–USSR détente have on the natural environment and the environmental movement? Conversely, can it be said that the transnational momentum as exemplified by the Helsinki meeting made an impact on geopolitical developments? The latter interpretation would be possible if we note that environmental questions have remained serious for all nations and have compelled the "powers" to seek to find areas of cooperation and accommodation even as they may pursue their respective geopolitical agendas. Through some such inquiries and observations, we should be able to amplify our understanding of the past and go beyond standard accounts of historical developments.

A crucial contribution of transnational history, then, would be to enrich our understanding of both national history and international history. Global history, of course, serves the same purpose, so that together the global and transnational perspectives challenge the existing historiography. It is in this sense that we may speak of a major historiographic transformation since the 1990s.

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2
Historians Falling Behind History

Abstract: *The historical scholarship clearly lagged behind history in the sense of the world "realities" that began to change dramatically after the 1970s (some would say the 1960s.) The Cold War no longer shaped world affairs, if indeed it ever had. The pace of globalization began to accelerate, with the implication that US economic hegemony was increasingly challenged and undermined by the European community, Japan, and later by China and other countries. New developments such as transnational concerns with environmental disasters, energy shortages, and human rights abuses came to eclipse geopolitical vicissitudes. The authority of the central government began to diminish, as did the idea and practice of the modern welfare state. Multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations proliferated. Despite this, historians were very slow to recognize the passing of an ear. It took them two decades to bring these recent developments into their conceptions of history. Why was this time lag? The chapter suggests that it was due both to the continuing preoccupation of historians with national and international (geopolitical) affairs, and to the still predominant influence of the West in scholarly pursuits.*

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Before we discuss some examples of scholarly works in global and transnational history during the last quarter-century, it would be pertinent to note that there was a significant lag between "history," on one hand, and "historiography" on the other, that is, whereas global and transnational developments and forces were becoming increasingly evident by the 1960s and confirmed during the subsequent decades, the majority of historians remained wedded to their traditional perspectives and conceptualizations till toward the end of the twentieth century or the early years of the twenty-first century.

Most scholars today would agree that economic and technological globalization emerged as a major force in shaping the world in the second half of the nineteenth century, and that, although this development was interrupted by a long period of what some call "deglobalization" lasting from the onset of the First World War to some time after the Second World War, the globe had once again, and even more extensively than earlier, become interconnected by the mid-1960s and the subsequent decades through trade, investment, and expanding networks of communication and information-sharing. Simultaneously, the power and authority of the state began to weaken in many parts of the world, challenged by various kinds of mass movements as well as activities by non-state actors. Thus, even if we confine ourselves to contemporary history, global and transnational tendencies were becoming confirmed by the time the twentieth century entered its last third. And yet, historians were rather slow and hesitant to recognize these changes and incorporate their understanding of them into their research agendas. In other words, there was a time gap between "what happened" and what historians recognized as having happened. The contrast between the "realities" and their perception is an age-old phenomenon, but in this instance the historiographic continuity amidst rapid global changes is particularly interesting because these changes were taking place right in front of their eyes. The historical scholarship until the 1990s did not reflect these changes to the extent that scholars would take them seriously enough to consider reconceptualizing their perspectives on history, whether contemporary or earlier. To put it simply, historiography lagged behind history by two or three decades. This chapter will briefly outline the world's transformation after the 1960s and then speculate on why historians were very slow to catch up with such "realities" that amounted to the passing of an era and continued in their traditional ways of understanding the past.

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That the world was changing in some fundamental ways already became clear in the mid-1960s when citizens' movements against the Vietnam War and against racial discrimination and other injustices engulfed the United States and Western European countries, eventually producing a worldwide wave of protest against "the establishment." Few, if any, observers, however, saw these phenomena as indicative of an emerging worldwide development in which the centrality of the nation-state would become challenged by global, human concerns. At first, historians and other scholars understood the tumultuous events of the 1960s in the context of separate national affairs and were slow to develop a new conception of the world or of humanity. Even when, in July 1969, an American astronaut, Neil Armstrong, became the first person to set foot on the moon, and a great deal was made of "planet earth" or "spaceship earth," somehow this did not translate into a less nation-centric view of the world or of contemporary history. At the same time, political turmoil in many parts of the world may have prevented historians as well as others from noticing another, in retrospect even more significant development of the 1960s, namely the expansion of the world economy to such an extent that the "advanced economies" grew with unprecedented speed, much of it spurred by an expanding export trade. The Western European countries as well as Japan accumulated huge balance-of-trade surpluses, whereas the United States, hitherto the undisputed leader in the world economy, lost its hegemonic position, recording trade deficits for the first time since the 1890s. An inevitable consequence of these developments was the decline in the relative value of the dollar, ushering in a period of "floating" rates of exchange among the leading currencies. This was the beginning of the end of a world economy that had for a long time depended on the financial and economic resources of the United States. Instead of the Bretton Woods system of international trade that had been essentially upheld by one nation, an era of globalization was arriving, characterized by a free flow of goods and capital across national boundaries, and by an expanding number of multinational enterprises that were establishing networks of producers, financiers, and consumers throughout the globe.

These trends continued in the 1970s, but they were joined by other developments that, too, pointed to the end of an era and the beginning of a new one. It was in that decade that the concern with environmental and human rights issues became manifest throughout the world. Hitherto such problems had been overwhelmingly dealt with within

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the perimeters of separate states, each country trying to solve them through its own political and social mechanisms. Now, however, there developed a global awareness of the hazards of polluted skies and waters, and of abuses of human rights. These were increasingly believed to be transnational problems, which therefore must be solved through cross-national cooperation. As if to demonstrate the truth of such thinking, non-governmental organizations mushroomed, now numbering in the tens of thousands with branches in all parts of the globe. One implication of the growing number and influence of multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations was that the relative power and authority of the nation-state began to decline. The 1960s had already presented a serious challenge to the "establishment," and the following decade confirmed the trend. The authority of the government visibly declined in many countries, while "civil society" was on the rise.

The decade of the 1980s confirmed all these developments. Globalization became more truly global when the Chinese government under Deng Xiaoping decided to adopt a policy of economic growth and open trade. Other Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore expanded their economies spectacularly during the decade, while in Europe the Economic Community continued to enlarge its membership, becoming the European Union in 1990. The Plaza Accord of 1985, in which the major economic powers of the world officially sanctioned the policy of unrestricted currency exchange, confirmed the liberalization of monetary transactions and had the effect of bringing into question the traditional role of the state in regulating the national economy. The political leadership of "neo-liberals" such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher challenged the long standing framework of the welfare state as the norm and began calling for "small government." In the meantime, the Chernobyl (in Ukraine) nuclear disaster of 1986 demonstrated that such a crisis knew no national or ideological boundaries. It was a tragedy not just for the Soviet Union but for all human beings—as well as for animals and trees. Equally significant, educational and cultural exchanges began and grew between US allies and their Soviet counterparts. Rock music, for instance, was now heard on both sides of the geopolitical divide.

Such a cursory summary is sufficient to indicate that the world transformed itself fundamentally during the 1960s through the 1980s. It was no mere continuation of the trends that had been set in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The decades from the 1930s through

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the 1950s had seen horrendous events, from the Depression to the totalitarian challenges to democracies, from the Second World War to the Cold War. The generation of leaders in various countries had sought to deal with these crises, some more successfully than others, but their status and influence were eroding in the subsequent decades as the postwar "baby boomers" came of age and began looking for alternative ways of defining political, economic, and cultural affairs. It could reasonably be said that the world in 1990 was even more different from what it had been 30 years earlier than the world of 1960 was from that in 1930.

These changes could have called for new perspectives and fresh approaches to the study of the past, at least of the recent past. And yet the majority of historians at that time ignored them or misread their significance when they taught or wrote about current history, or about the history of the modern world of which the recent past was an integral part. This was particularly the case in the field of international history. Historians of international relations continued to present postwar history through the 1960s, the 1970s, and even the 1980s in the conventional geopolitical framework of the Cold War. They stuck to the standard chronological scheme in which they spoke of the "high" Cold War during the 1950s and 1960s, as exemplified by the wars in Korea and Vietnam, and of the "détente" when the United States and the Soviet Union entered into several agreements in the 1970s to limit nuclear armament. But when, in the late 1970s, Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan, while Chinese forces invaded Vietnam shortly after the withdrawal of US forces from the latter, it appeared as though the Cold War had returned with a vengeance. Historians now wrote about the demise of the détente and the coming of "the second Cold War." Such a chronology was of little help when the Cold War came to an abrupt end by 1989–1991. Historians, no more than political scientists, were prepared for the fall of the Berlin Wall or the reunification of Germany—except that they would now add "the end of the Cold War" to their chronology. There was no logic or explanatory device to account for the rapid turn from "the second Cold War" to "the end of the Cold War," any more than there was for the shift from the "high" Cold War to the détente. Scholars, like journalists, were beholden to constantly changing international events. Lacking an alternative conceptual framework, they continued to focus on big-power rivalries as the key theme.

It would be only fair to note, however, that some scholars of international (and national) history had sought to broaden their approaches

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in the direction of what would later be called global and transnational perspectives. To take a few examples from the bibliography of US foreign relations, Felix Gilbert's *To the Farewell Address* (1961) pointed out the ideological and intellectual connections among policymakers across the Atlantic during the late eighteenth century.[1] (The book probably serves as an example to show that intellectual historians, who often trace the evolution of ideas across borders, may be more attuned to a transnational approach than most others.) John Diggins' *Americans and the Mediterranean World* (1972) added North Africa and the Ottoman Empire to our understanding of international history through a detailed study of America's private individuals and their organizations, as well as officials, as they interacted with their counterparts in those regions.[2] The field of US–East Asian relations produced a number of important monographs that focused on the personal and non-state involvement by Americans in the affairs and lives of people on the other side of the Pacific. Notable examples of this genre would include Paul Cohen's *China and Christianity* (1963), Warren Cohen's *The Chinese Connection* (1978), and Jane Hunter's *The Gospel of Gentility* (1984).[3] The first examined anti-missionary riots in China during the 1880s, the second focused on three Americans with deep, and varying, connections with China during the first decades of the twentieth century, and the third examined the lives and ideas of American woman missionaries in China at the turn of the century. All contributed immensely to unearthing non-state aspects of US–East Asian relations. Emily Rosenberg's *Spreading the American Dream* (1982) was a pioneering study of the contributions made by American non-governmental organizations such as churches, foundations, and civic organizations to linking the country to the rest of the world.[4] Several specialists in US foreign relations, such as Warren Kuehl and Dorothy Jones, published studies of American (and other countries') contributions to the evolution of internationalism, including conceptions of a just world-order.[5] All these works, to which many more could be added, showed that at least some historians of US foreign relations were moving in the direction of global or transnational history. It would probably not be difficult to find their counterparts in other countries.

Despite such notable beginnings, however, few of these scholars, if any, embraced the notion of global history or transnational history when they published their studies. Why was it that most scholars of international history, or of national history for that matter, before the 1990s hesitated to reconceptualize the past in these newer frameworks? One might

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cite several reasons. First, quite evidently, the majority of historians of international relations continued to be preoccupied with the vicissitudes in the Cold War that coincided with their own lives. Even when they paid attention to non-state actors or to cross-national engagements, they were not ready to embrace a non-geopolitical approach or to give such themes as globalization and the global concerns with the environment and human rights their focused attention. But this seems to have been only one factor behind the slowness with which historians, in particular those writing on the twentieth century, began to embrace global or transnational history. An equally important reason may have been that, as late as the 1980s, scholars of the recent past were still traumatized by the wars, atrocities, and economic crises of the twentieth century, so that they could not believe that such a disastrous era was being challenged, if not replaced, by a new era in which other, perhaps less tragic developments could come to determine the shape of the world.

To cite one example from personal experience, in 1983 I participated in a conference in Japan that brought together scholars from the United States and Europe as well as from the host country for a discussion of major themes in twentieth-century history. The choice of the year 1983 for such a conference reflected the organizers' perspective; they wanted to trace developments that seemed to have led to "1984," the symbol of modern political evil, particularly the vile practices of the totalitarian state that George Orwell had described shortly after the Second World War in his novel, *Nineteen Eighty-Four.* Not surprisingly, the conference participants were virtually unanimous in presenting a dark, pessimistic view of twentieth-century history. The conference volume, entitled *Experiencing the Twentieth* Century (1984), recounted the horrible events of the century in an overall tone of pessimism in that those developments all appeared to have been inevitable—virtually predictable consequences of the development of technology, the concentration of power in state authorities, or the fanaticism of utopian dreamers that culminated in totalitarian dictatorships, destructive wars, and genocides.[6] Notable by their absence from this collective discussion of twentieth-century history was a sustained attention, rather than passing references, if at all, paid to such themes as globalization, human rights, environmentalism, and the roles played by non-state actors. These transnational phenomena were not yet within the purview of the bulk of historians. Instead, their preoccupation remained with nations and their interrelations. The recent past could be understood as an unprecedentedly brutal epoch in

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human history, but the agents of brutality were the totalitarian states. They were not considered to be exceptions but only extreme forms of the nation-states that had emerged in early modern Europe and had steadily amassed and concentrated their authority and been increasingly willing to use all technology and resources in their power to achieve their ends, even resorting to massacring, destroying, and dehumanizing humans. The political, in that sense, had suppressed the economic, the social, and the cultural. There seemed little hope of escaping from this fate—unless the economic, the social, and the cultural reasserted themselves. However, none of the participants at the conference developed this theme, another indication that they were still operating within a nation-centric conceptualization of history.

The reality, however, had been changing far more rapidly than these scholars realized. During the 1960s through the 1980s, the authority of the nation-state, the key entity through which historians had viewed and examined the modern past, steadily eroded, and, as if to usher in a new age of "small government," rapidly increasing numbers of multi-national enterprises and non-governmental organizations began playing larger and larger roles in a country's economic and social affairs. Under these circumstances, to continue to focus on the nation as the key unit of analysis was no longer adequate, and yet historians did not visibly change their perspective before the 1990s. National history and international history remained the most prevalent ways of writing and teaching history. Given that so many tragedies of the century had been brought about by totalitarian states—in Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, China, and elsewhere—and by horrendous wars as well as armament races (in particular, in nuclear weapons) that had involved democratic countries as well, it is not surprising that historians of the recent past should have continued to be mesmerized by the story of what a state did to its own people and how nations had brutally sought to destroy one another.

It would be difficult to determine precisely when either the Cold War-centric view of the world or the pessimistic reading of twentieth-century history began to give way to broader themes and alternative conceptual frameworks. It would be too facile to say that the majority of scholars, historians included, had to wait till the ending of the Cold War before embracing a fresh, alternative outlook. That would make them passive chroniclers of contemporary affairs, not very profound observers of global and transnational developments that had been there for quite some time. Economists seem to have been among the first to begin noticing

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and generalizing about those developments, in particular the globalization of economic transactions since the 1960s. The liberalization of foreign exchange, or the rise in economic productivity and export trade on the part of some Asian countries that involved the mushrooming of systems of "off-shore" production, marketing, and consumption could all be understood as aspects of globalization, and soon anthropologists and sociologists began writing treatises on the subject. They were becoming fascinated by the fact that economic changes as well as technological innovations were bringing all parts of the globe into closer contact than ever before.

Historians, however, were very slow to catch on, and few, if any, of them began stressing non-geopolitical themes till after 1990. In other words, even if globalization had been apparent for everyone to see for more than 20 years, historians hesitated to make that a central theme in their understanding of the recent past or to utilize it as a conceptual framework for interpreting the history of the twentieth century. Among the first to speak of globalization, as noted in chapter 1, was Eric Hobsbawm, but his widely acclaimed history of the twentieth century, *The Age of Extremes* (1994), did not go beyond 1991.[7] But by the early 1990s, it was evident that more and more historians were becoming fascinated by globalization and related phenomena and seeking to incorporate them into their study of recent and contemporary history.

In 1993, when some of the same scholars who had convened in 1983 in Japan to discuss major themes in twentieth-century history were joined by others and attempted a fresh look at the same subject, a major change in their outlook was evident. In just a span of ten years, those same scholars who had been virtually unanimous in presenting a pessimistic and, it must be said, for that reason conventional account of the century's various developments were now fascinated by what they took to be new perspectives that were opening up alternative perceptions of recent and contemporary history. At the 1993 gathering, for instance, a great deal of discussion was held on such topics as globalization, human rights, and environmental disasters, topics that had hardly been touched upon ten years earlier. A cursory look at the indices of the volumes that collected the papers presented at the two symposia makes this quite evident. The first volume, *Experiencing the Twentieth Century* (1985), had no index entry for "environmentalism," just one on "globalization," and four on "human rights," whereas the second, rather ostentatiously entitled *The End of the Century: The Future in the Past* (1995), contained 13, 18, and 35

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index references to the three topics, respectively.[8] Even taking into consideration the fact that the two lists may have been produced by different indexers, the contrast is remarkable. It seems to indicate that within ten years the attention of historians and other scholars of twentieth-century developments had shifted dramatically. By giving the second volume the subtitle, "The Future in the Past," the organizers of the 1993 symposium raised an intriguing question as to which "past" was more suggestive of "future" trends, indicating that more than one reading of twentieth-century history was possible. The participants all recognized that, compared to the dark, pessimistic view of the recent past, the world of the early 1990s looked more hopeful, or at least drastically different from the crisis-driven years that had dotted the twentieth century. And it was clear that the main factor behind the contrast was the growing awareness of global interconnectedness, accompanying a shift away from the world hitherto dominated by nation-centric and geopolitical issues. At least, an academic gathering such as this—and it was undoubtedly duplicated all over the world—showed that historians, no less than scholars of other disciplines, were beginning to be fascinated by global developments outside the framework of international conflict and wars.

Besides the continuing preoccupation with the vicissitudes of the Cold War till its ending became clear around 1990, another important reason why historians were so slow to recognize the salience of non-geopolitical phenomena and themes may have been that till the 1990s at least, they had been so conditioned by the traditional Euro-centric historiography that a global, transnational perspective could not easily be fitted into their familiar conceptual frameworks. Even Hobsbawm's *The Age of Extremes* was no exception. The majority of events described by him in the book took place in Europe or North America, or else in a world in which those countries exercised overwhelming influence, militarily and economically. The author's characterization of the period from 1945 to the 1970s as "golden years" was typical. Hobsbawm was impressed and pleased with Western European recovery after the Second World War, the US leadership in the postwar world, and the steadily improving economic and social opportunities in the West. From the perspective of people in Eastern Europe, the Middle-East, Southeast Asia, and many other parts of the world, however, it would be difficult to view those decades as having been "golden." For many countries in these regions, notably China, the "golden" years lay ahead, and the very period that Hobsbawm described as having been that of a "long slide," namely

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the 1970s and the 1980s, actually saw improvement in the lives of the majority of humankind. The "human rights revolution" became a global force only after Hobsbawm's "golden years," as did international and transnational efforts to protect the earth's environment.[9] In other words, the popularity and influence of a book like Hobsbawm's suggests that historians were overwhelmingly guided by West-centric perspectives as late as the early 1990s.

This had always been the case. Academic and professional historians just about everywhere had understood world history through the lens of European history and sought to fit the histories of other countries and regions into conceptual schemes that had been applied to the West. For instance, the chronology of history in terms of the ancient, medieval, early modern, and modern periods was of European origin and served as a broad framework in which to trace the evolution of Western society. However, it made little sense to consider such periodization for other regions. What, after all, is the point of distinguishing ancient from medieval history of pre-Columbian America, or medieval from early modern history of China, or early modern from modern history of Turkey? Such a periodizing scheme was a typical example of a Euro-centric understanding of the human past. Arguably the most widely used guide to the chronology of world history in the second half of the twentieth century, William Langer's *An Encyclopedia of World History*, is divided into "the pre-historic period," "ancient history," "the Middle Ages," "the early modern period," "the modern period," "the First World War and the Interwar period," "the Second World War and its aftermath," and "the recent period."[10] Such a scheme would force Asia and Africa into a "middle ages" that their own historians might never have recognized. Likewise, the notion of "early modern" history would be meaningless in most parts of the world except insofar as this designation is taken to refer to a specific time period into which the histories of all regions and countries are fitted. In this *Encyclopedia*, "early modern" designated roughly three centuries, from 1500 to 1800, so the chronologies of all parts of the globe are presented together. That, of course, would be a Euro-centric understanding of the past, for neither 1500 nor 1800—nor for that matter, the Christian (or Gregorian) calendar itself—meant anything for most people outside Europe (except where Europeans went and lived, such as the American continent). Langer's periodizing scheme is also blatantly Euro-centric when it ends the "modern period" with 1914 and treats the years 1914 through 1939 as a separate historical moment. Why should

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one study the history of China, Turkey, Mexico or any other country in terms of such a chronology? In Chinese history, 1912, the year the Manchu dynasty was replaced by a republic, would be of far greater significance than 1914, and for Turkey the rise of the Young Turk movement in the Ottoman empire in 1908 marked a major turning point. Likewise with Mexico, whose history entered a new phase after the 1911 revolution against the Diaz dictatorship. These are all nation-centric chronologies, and it is understandable that each nation, or each region of the world, should cherish its own periodizing priorities. But once we shift our focus from national entities to non-nation-specific phenomena and agendas, such as the movements for women's rights, drug control, prevention of diseases, and the like, it is obvious that neither 1914 nor 1939—nor, for that matter, 1910, 1911, or 1912—meant anything. One would need not just a less Euro-centric but also less nation-centric chronology, something that historians would begin to be concerned with only toward the end of the twentieth century.

Despite these and many other instances where 1914 did not mean much, historians for a long time persisted in pointing to that year as the end of "the modern period," the terminal point of the "long nineteenth century," or the beginning of "the short twentieth century," designating something momentous in human history. Somehow it was believed that the "modern" world had come to an end with the eruption of the European conflict. Of course, to assign the adjective "modern" to the period roughly from 1800 to 1914 assumed something about the nature of modernity. Not just the above *Encyclopedia* but virtually all historians till recently shared a certain conceptualization of what constituted modern history: scientific and technological progress, industrialization, urbanization, secular and representative government, middle-class living, and the like. The theme of "modernization" that became popular among social scientists as well as historians in the middle decades of the twentieth century was then applied to non-Western countries to test the degrees of their "modernity." Because these developments took place in Western Europe and North America, they were seen as the most "modern" of nations, whereas other countries, lacking some or most of these characteristic traits of " modernity," were considered "premodern." A key concern of historians then was to determine how and when these non-Western societies became "modern," and to search for factors in their respective traditional cultures that had impeded, or to the contrary facilitated, their modernization. In such conceptualization,

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it is not surprising that 1914 was virtually universally taken as the tragic moment when the most "modern" of nations that were considered to be so civilized as to exist in a state of peace with one another instead started engaging in brutal mass slaughtering. Modern, civilized people were not supposed to behave that way, but they did, under the banner of nationalism and patriotism, and so the Great War marked the end of a century-long era of European optimism and the sense of Western superiority as the center of civilization. Or so it had been believed. In that sense, it could be postulated that the "modern" period had ended.

But it was not necessarily the case for people in other parts of the world. For them, the "modern" era lay ahead. Many of them would undertake modernization schemes only after the First World War. To them 1914 could mean the beginning of modern history, not its end. Likewise, whereas for the West the period 1919–1939 might appropriately be termed "interwar," for the rest of the world it was nothing of the sort. The bulk of them had not been participants in the Great War to begin with, and even the year 1939 did not mean another war was coming, so that to consider the 20-year period a separate epoch in their histories made no sense. 1917, the year of the Bolshevik revolution, would be much more significant for some countries, such as China and Vietnam, as a major turning point, and, it may be added, in the perspective of Marxism-Leninism, revolutionary anti-colonial movements all over the world would have their own chronology apart from the standard chronicle of great-power relations. It would seem, nevertheless, that before the 1990s, few historians let such conflicting chronologies alter their fundamentally West-centric conception of the past.

A conceptual decentering of the West, as well as denationalizing of history, had therefore to take place before historians would embrace an approach to history that was more global and transnational than hitherto. Instead of assuming that what happened to some countries in Europe and North America would sooner or later come to other lands, a more inclusive view of the globe in which human diversity was a given fact, as well as a conception of the unity of humankind that shared the same aspirations and dilemmas throughout the world, had to be accepted. It is in this sense that the 1990s marked a historiographic transition, long after signs of significant change had become visible in the world's economic, social, and cultural affairs.

To be sure, studies of non-Western societies and histories had existed long before then. "Area studies" or "regional studies" had flourished in

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the United States and other Western countries after the Second World War, and historians had joined cultural anthropologists, ethnomusicologists, comparative literature scholars and others in deciphering ancient texts and "decoding" traditional civilizations of Asia, Africa, the Middle-East, and Latin America. American, Canadian, Australian, and European expertise in Ottoman history and Chinese history, to take some notable examples, was considerable and would make a significant impact on the scholarship in Turkey, China, and elsewhere. It should be noted, however, that all these "area studies" did not quite add up to world history, to a sense of global, human development. Non-Western histories had continued to be understood in the Western-centric conceptions of modernization, imperialism, and the like, or else treated as instances of exoticism, or "essentialism" as some called the tendency to emphasize the uniqueness of each culture and each society. Only a global, transnational perspective would rescue non-Western studies from such conceptual isolationism.

World history, to be sure, had been a category of historical writing that had existed for some time. Made famous by Arnold J. Toynbee's *A Study of History*, a monumental 12-volume work that was published during a span of 30 years (1934–1961), this was a perspective that had not entirely disappeared even during the heyday of nation-centric history.[11] Unlike others, such as the nineteenth-century sociologist Herbert Spencer who had tried to recount the history of the world as a teleological process, Toynbee may be considered the first professional historian who was anxious to write a comprehensive account of how humans had evolved without presuming a West-centric triumphantalism. His vision was worldwide, not limited to the West, and he saw history as an ongoing process in which civilizations succeeded one another. His overall conceptualization was religious, spiritual, and philosophical rather than material or economic, and he examined the "challenges" confronting each civilization and the "responses" they made, arguing that those who made viable responses survived—until they eventually fell because of their inability to cope with a fresh challenge. This was pioneering work, but in part because of its bulk and in part due to its strongly personal take on the past, *A Study of History* did not make much of an impact on professional historiography. Even more pertinent may have been the fact that the volumes were published before historians were ready for them. They were still entrapped in their nation-centric studies, and the "social turn" during the 1960s and beyond certainly had little room for a highly speculative presentation of the whole of human history like Toynbee's.

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William McNeill's *The Rise of the West*, published in 1963, was arguably the first and probably the only successful attempt by a professional historian at presenting a history of the world before the 1990s. The author, who had worked with Toynbee during the 1940s and the 1950s in editing the annual *Survey of International Affairs* for the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, had published, and would continue to write, a number of important books on global and transnational subjects—except that neither he nor reviewers of his writings used such adjectives in describing his work. His studies of Venice, for instance, were presented in a larger framework of the relationship between the Ottoman empire and the Mediterranean, while his accounts of diseases, dancing, and the like dealt with themes that transcended national boundaries. McNeill was clearly seeking to move the study of history in a less nation-centric tradition. Unfortunately, the title of his first attempt at writing world history, "The Rise of the West," gave the impression that it was still a West-centric presentation of world history, a celebration of modern Western civilization. But that was not what the book showed. McNeill took pains to emphasize that the West "rose" only around 1500 and that this had been preceded by an "era of Middle Eastern dominance" (to 500 BC) and by a period of "Eurasian cultural balance" (500 BC to 1500). The implication was that the era of Western domination must be historicized, that is, understood as a phase in human history and that it might be followed by another era in which the non-West might "rise" again, or in which some unforeseen circumstances might envelop the whole world. Many reviewers of the book, however, seem to have missed McNeill's attempt at putting Western history in the context of world history and instead were fascinated, even complained, that the author allotted less than 100 pages of the 800-page volume to describing developments after 1850. But this was clearly the author's intention. He was eager to show that one needed to put modern history in the context of the long evolution of human society, politics, and culture. Such a message may have come too soon to make an immediate impact on historiography. The big book was followed by a shorter *World History*, a survey suitable as a textbook, as well as by volumes containing primary material in English translation, to serve as supplementary reading. Unfortunately, during the 1960s through the 1980s, historians mostly continued to go their own ways in studying the past in nation-centric frameworks.

In the 1990s, however, world history found more welcoming reception. Professional historians were now ready to embrace at least the

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vision of world history as a plausible, even an ideal, way in which to understand what transpired in individual countries and societies. They began to try to conceptualize world history in such a way that it could be usefully adapted to their respective research agendas. The World History Association, founded on the campus of the University of Hawaii in 1982, was now viewed as an important institutional expression of the rising tide of historical rethinking, not merely as a worthy but lone voice. Like McNeill's book, which too seems to have made a come-back in the 1990s, the Association served to put European and American history in the context of world history, and soon other works appeared to confirm the trend. By the time Bruce Mazlish published his co-edited volume, *Conceptualizing Global History* in 1993, other historians were ready to enter the fray. Although some called the new (or resurrected) perspective global rather than world history, the field was now wide open for any and all efforts at introducing a fresh perspective to the study of history that would embrace the whole of humanity. It may be said that by the early 1990s the decentering of the West, both conceptually and geographically, in the study of history was starting to be viewed as at least an ideal, a vision, if historians were to make a fresh contribution to the understanding of the past.

Here again, one wonders why it took historians so long to start decentering the West. After all, decolonization of European colonies had been virtually complete by the end of the 1960s, while some Asian countries had begun playing key roles in the international economy by the following decade. Universal human rights, environmental, and other concerns had become common place by the 1970s. Still, the West continued to provide the key conceptual framework as well as research agendas for the study of history. Most fundamentally, perhaps, historians first had to develop a serious scholarly interest in tracing cross-national movements of people, ideas, and cultures, all subjects that would necessitate a global category of thinking. Transnational themes, in other words, had to be embraced as worthy subjects of study before the conceptual decentering of the West could take place. In any event, whatever the reason, those committed to globalizing the study of history would now, in the 1990s, have a field day. They would find much friendlier reception than before and often find that when they spoke about the importance of world history, they were addressing the already converted, or those who were ready for the challenge. The remarkable historiographic transformation was under way.

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Notes

1 Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, 1961).
2 John P. Diggins, *Mussolini and Fasciem: The View from America* (Princeton, 1972).
3 Paul A. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860–1870* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963); Warren I. Cohen, *The Chinese Connection: Roger S. Greene, Thomas W. Lamont, George E. Sokolsky and American-East Asian Relations* (New York, 1978); Jane Hunter, *The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the Century China* (New Haven, 1984).
4 Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York, 1982).
5 Warren Kuehl, *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organizations to 1920* (Nashville, Tennessee, 1969); Dorothy Jones, *Code of Peace: Ethics and Security in the World of the Warlord States* (Chicago, 1989).
6 Nobutoshi Hagihara, Akira Iriye, Georges Nivat, and Philip Windsor, eds, *Experiencing the Twentieth Century* (Tokyo, 1985).
7 Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991* (New York, 1994).
8 Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, ed., *The End of the Century: The Future in the Past* (Tokyo, 1995).
9 See Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and Will Hitchcock, eds, *The Human Rights Revolution* (New York, 2012); John McNeill, *Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World* (New York, 2001).
10 William L. Langer, ed., *An Encyclopedia of World History*, fifth edition (Boston, 1972).
11 Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 12 volumes (London, 1934–1961).

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3
Global/Transnational Historiography

Abstract: *The chapter cites some notable examples in global and transnational history and discusses how they reshape our understanding of the past. The 2009 publication of the* Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History *is a good illustration of the way historians are thinking globally and transnationally. The chapter focuses on the recent scholarship in such topics as environmentalism, inter-racial and inter-cultural encounters, migrations, human rights, economic and cultural globalization, cultural dimensions of geopolitical phenomena such as wars, regional communities, and non-governmental organizations. The chapter concludes by discussing how such new works add to the more traditional perspectives in national and international history and help reperiodize the past.*

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The publication, in 2009, of *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* showed that the time had come to take stock of what had thus far been achieved in global and transnational history. Although called a dictionary of "transnational" rather than "global" history, neither the volume editors nor the contributors made a sharp distinction between these two categories. Their concern was with taking a look at what historians had been doing with transnational themes, which were mostly, if not always, global in scope. Besides, both editors and contributors came from various countries; some 25 nationalities were represented, suggesting that the time had arrived when historical study was becoming a global enterprise and that transnational scholarly cooperation was both a necessity and a realizable goal.

The *Dictionary* had its inception in the initiative taken by Pierre Yves Saunier at the turn of the twenty-first century to compile a reference guide to the growing body of scholarly writings on transnational themes. I joined him in the attempt, and, after Palgrave Macmillan endorsed the idea and accepted the proposal in 2004, we convened a meeting of several scholars whom we invited to join us in the editorial board. These scholars, including the two of us, came from Argentina, Australia, Britain, France, Switzerland, South Africa, and the United States, a cross section of scholars working in global and transnational history. The editors then selected some 500 topics for possible inclusion in the dictionary and approached potential contributors. We were not able to find appropriate authorities or willing collaborators on all 500 possible entries, but, even so, we were impressed that so many historians around the world expressed their eagerness to join the enterprise. After matching a topic with a contributor, it took several additional years for the essays, numbering 450 in the final count, to be written, edited, and proofread. The volume was finally published in early 2009. As there was no antecedent publication like this to serve as a model, from beginning to end we had to grope in darkness—but also in hope, as we had high expectations. We kept reminding ourselves and our contributors that this was not another encyclopedia of world history or a straightforward chronology but a thematic treatment of some of what we considered major transnational subjects and themes. But by the time the volume was released, the field seemed to have further matured so that the publishers felt justified in launching an additional project, the Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History series, to be co-edited by Rana Mitter and myself and assisted by a board of advisors whose membership was quite similar to the editors of the *Dictionary*.

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Looking at the scholarly references appended at the end of most of the *Dictionary*'s entries, one becomes aware that so many of them were of recent origin. For instance, Dirk Hoerder's article on "human mobility" lists ten references, all but one of which were published after 1988. The entry immediately following this is on "human rights," where Tom Buchanan appends eight relevant studies, all published after 1999. Such examples reveal that historians had only recently become interested in topics like migrations and human rights. A historiographic transformation had clearly taken place, and, it may be said, it is still going on. We are right in the middle of it, so it is not easy to decipher its nature or direction clearly, but this chapter will attempt, by citing some examples from the growing corpus of scholarship, to mention several key themes and approaches that have emerged since the 1990s and to discuss how they challenge the traditional historiography.

Before doing so, however, it is only fair to note that by the time we decided to compile a guide to transnational history, a number of historians had already made significant contributions that helped move the literature in the direction of global or transnational history. Patrick Manning, for instance, a specialist in African history, put the subject of slavery in a worldwide perspective in his *Slavery and African Life* (1990), while André Frank, an economic historian, warned against viewing the past through West-centric biases in *Re-Orient* (1998), a book that spoke of the coming of "the Asian age" in the wake of Columbus' "discovery of America."[1] Ian Tyrrell, an Australian scholar of US history, in addition to contributing an essay in the *American Historical Review* in 1991 in which he called for putting that history in a comparative, global perspective, published *Woman's World, Woman's Empire* (1991), a study of the global activities by the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, one of the earliest and most active transnational advocacy organizations in modern history.[2] Michael Geyer and Charles Bright co-authored what in many ways was the first scholarly treatment of the modern history of globalization in their 1995 article, "World History in a Global Age," for the same journal.[3] Among their important contributions was the suggestion that "[world] history has just begun," that is, globalization since the mid-nineteenth century had fundamentally altered the human community.

Such perspectives had the effect of compelling historians to reconsider familiar chronologies and the ways in which they had traditionally characterized them. In the framework of "new global history" and of transnational history, the twentieth century would not just be comprehended

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in terms of its wars, large and small, or of anti-colonial struggles and nation-building, but in relation to global and non-state themes, such as those listed in the *Dictionary of Transnational History*. It is interesting to note, for instance, that historians have begun to pay particular attention to the 1970s as a major landmark in recent history. In more conventional accounts, the decade might be put in the context of the Cold War détente and its breakdown, the oil shocks and energy crises, or the US rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. But by focusing on globalization, human rights, and other transnational themes, it is possible to argue that the 1970s marked a clear beginning of a new age, what we may call contemporary history. Such a perspective has been presented by the contributors to the volume, *The Shock of the Global* (2010) and, even more directly, by Thomas Borstelmann in *The 1970s* (2012).[4]

These and other publications indicate that something new was afoot in the study of history around the turn of the twentieth century and that the same phenomenon has persisted. It should be noted that while the bulk of studies in global and transnational history has focused on the period since the mid-nineteenth century, the same perspectives have informed some works that go back to the eighteenth or even earlier centuries. For instance, both Manning's *Navigating World History* (2003) and John and William McNeill's *The Human Web* (2005) clearly reflect the authors' eagerness to get away from a nation-centric narrative and to emphasize transnational connections, or "webs" in the McNeills' expression.[5] Christopher Bayly's *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (2004), arguably the most influential general history of the world from the mid-eighteen century to the First World War, makes a conscious effort to conceptualize local, national, imperial, and world histories as interrelated not only geopolitically but also transnationally.[6] It is true that the author's choice of the period from the 1780s to the Great War echoes the traditional periodization to which an allusion was made in the preceding chapter. But the book clearly aims at decentering Europe and at comparing developments there and in the Ottoman empire, the Qing empire, and elsewhere in order to show how they interacted with one another. There were, the author notes, certain global trends (such as the secularization of the state) that cut across national and imperial boundaries and affected all people regardless of where they lived. It may be safely predicted that such an approach will be increasingly emulated by other historians eager to consider the whole of humanity, rather than segments of it, in their study of the past.

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A good indication of this is the growing popularity of thematic studies, that is, an interest in illuminating historical developments through certain subjects rather than in terms of time frames or geographical units. To go back to the two examples cited above from the *Dictionary of Transnational History*, human mobility (or migrations more generally) and human rights have been among the most popular themes for historical research and writing during the last two decades or so. Migration, of course, is as old as history, and world history books such as McNeill's *The Rise of the West* had taken due note of it. In modern history, however, this phenomenon had mostly been understood in the framework of national history. Millions of European migrants to the American continent, of Africans to the West Indies and the United States, and of Chinese from southern provinces of the country to Southeast Asia, had been documented and studied in separation from one another, as aspects of US immigration history, the history of slavery and slave trade in North and South America, and the history of Chinese emigration policy, respectively. In the more recent past, the Turkish exodus from Greece to Turkey and the Greek exodus from Turkey to Greece in the aftermath of the First World War were seen as essential aspects of the history of the two countries. Likewise, such phenomena after the Second World War as the waves of German refugees returning to their now shrunken homeland from Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, the Arabs expelled from Palestine after the creation of the state of Israel, and the population exchanges between the newly independent states of India and Pakistan, all became part of postwar national histories. Obviously, in the majority of these cases the origins and destinations of such migrants were nations, or some identifiable political entities (empires, colonies), so at one level their stories were part of national histories.

Toward the end of the twentieth century and beyond, however, historians such as Wang Gungwu and Dirk Hoerder began to view these migrations as a global phenomenon, a worldwide movement of people whether as immigrants, refugees, or laborers who crossed borders in search of better economic opportunities. Dirk Hoerder's *Cultures in Contact (*2002) offered a monumental, comprehensive history of world migrations from the eleventh to the twentieth century.[7] As is evident in the title, the author viewed migrations as a cross-cultural phenomenon, bringing people from all over the world into closer contact with one another. Hitherto treated in the framework of imperial histories (the Ming Empire, the Mongol Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Byzantine

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Empire, and the like), Hoerder sought to emphasize the economic, cultural, and demographic dimensions of global population movements. Although more focused on the recent period, recent works such as *Outcast Europe* (2012) by Sharif Gemie and others, and *The Lost German East* (2012) by Andrew Demshuk add fresh perspectives on transnational movements of people during and after a war.[8] The former documents how millions of Europeans were evacuated from their homes to presumably safer areas in their own countries or abroad, in the process becoming less national than transnational beings. The latter traces an equally large number of Germans who were expelled from their residences in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states and resettled within the newly defined boundaries of the two Germanies after 1945. The book examines the memory of the *Heimat* retained by the expellees and discusses how images of the land from which they had been driven changed over time. Similarly, scholarly attention has begun to be paid to "internal refugees" and stateless persons after the Second World War, the former referring to people who are driven from their homes due to civil war, religious conflict, poverty, and other reasons and living in camps within their own countries, and the latter to those who for one reason or another have lost, or do not possess, national identities.

All these studies give rise to the question of what a nation is—and what an individual's relationship to it entails. It was reported that at the end of the twentieth century almost 5 percent of the world's population consisted of various types of migrants and refugees. They had in common the fact that they had left their birthplaces and that, although many of them found new homes, others continued to live in temporary spaces. Because their number and conspicuous presence challenge the geographical as well as historical borders of nation-states, it is not surprising that historians have come to see them as a key phenomenon whose importance surpassed that of the destinies of separate states. Globalization, of course, entails the movement of laborers as well as capital and goods, so that to consider migrations is also an imperative requirement for any study of modern global history. In the sense that migrants, including refugees and stateless people, are not identifiable with an unchanging national identity but constitute subnational and supra-national entities, they exemplify a subject of study in the emerging field of transnational history.

Human rights history was another subject that began to attract the attention of historians virtually overnight as the twentieth century

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entered its final decade. There had earlier been a small number of books and articles tracing the evolution of the idea of human rights in modern history, but now scholars began paying particular attention to the most recent past. Although the United Nations adopted the universal declaration on human rights in 1948 and passed during the 1960s a number of resolutions on the rights of specific categories of people—women, racial minorities, the colonized, the disabled—it was only in the 1990s that notable scholarly publications began to appear. This development, too, cannot be separated from the rise of global and transnational history, for the concept of human rights suggests the rights of people all over the world irrespective of nationality. Till then, the rights of women had tended to be studied as a subject in national history or in the history of women, just as the rights of minorities had been examined in the history of civil rights in specific countries. The rights of the disabled had hardly been explored as a subject of national history, let alone of global or transnational history. Moreover, the bulk of the existing scholarship had been West-centric, tracing the idea of universal human rights back to the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century and ignoring other areas and countries where similar notions might have existed: China, India, Persia, the Ottoman empire, and others. Once historians began to pay attention to human rights as a global, transnational theme, therefore, they had to start virtually from scratch to incorporate non-Western conceptions of man and to trace human rights movements that crossed borders defined by geopolitics. In short, the rise of human rights history occurred in tandem with the growth of global and transnational history.

A few examples will illustrate why the history of human rights has already significantly challenged the traditional understanding of history presented in national and international frameworks. Because a human right is a global and transnational right, it can never be comprehended within a nation-centric framework. As Samuel Moyn notes in his *The Last Utopia* (2010), the history of human rights had little to do with nationalism or with internationalism.[9] While specific civil rights issues—slavery, racial discrimination, gender inequality—had been dealt with within national frameworks, and while internationalist thought that emerged in the nineteenth century promoted intergovernmental cooperation, world peace, humanitarianism, and the like, the rights of individual human beings came to be recognized as a universal principle only in the 1970s. This was a momentous development, indicating, as Moyn argues, that individuals as individuals, not as citizens of a particular nation or

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as members of an ethnic or other community, became aware of their rights, rights that were seen as universal and therefore lying at the core of humanity. Human rights now were seen as a moral, not a political, issue. In a sense, morality became separated from politics. That this shift took place, according to Moyn and others, only in the 1970s can be attributed to various factors, but clearly it had much to do with the accelerating tempo of globalization and of transnational network construction in that decade and beyond. Here is another instance to show that a global or transnational history perspective would be far more appropriate than national history for an understanding of a significant contemporary phenomenon.

Only within that framework, it becomes possible to take into consideration non-Western traditions and cultural trends. Although Moyn's original reconceptualization of human rights history was still largely based on Western material, *The Last Utopia* contains important material on the subject as it developed elsewhere, such as East Asia and Latin America. Others have begun to consider how non-Western regions and civilizations have defined humanity and human existences. Bruce Mazlish's *Ideas of Humanity in a Global Age* (2008) was a first step in this direction.[10] He understood that at the basis of the idea of human rights was the conception of a person as a universalizable being, not beholden to any national or other category of existence. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that historians have begun to examine various non-Western traditions to see how they have developed ideas of universal humanity in a world consisting of a diversity of races, religions, nations, and other subcategories. Specific examples from South Asian history on this question are cited by Kris Manjapra and others in *Cosmopolitan Thought Zones* (2010), who argue that South Asian thinkers combined a regionally specific self-definition with a cosmopolitan awareness of the whole of humankind.[11] Likewise, Hamid Dabashi's *Persian Literary Humanism* (2012) unearths a rich tradition of both humanism and humanitarianism in Persia, and Elizabeth Thompson's *Justice Interrupted* forthcoming) traces the history of the struggle for justice in the Middle East during the last century and a half.[12] We shall need more studies like these to gain an understanding of the full range of ideas about human beings, as existences beyond, or prior to, states and nations, in order to gauge a global, transnational understanding of human rights. The conventional scholarship in national or international history would fail to point to the pivotal importance of human rights in recent history. A chronology that

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privileged geopolitical relations among nations could not even begin to suggest the powerful presence of human rights in today's world. Here is an excellent instance where international history and transnational history develop with their respective agendas and chronologies so that to conflate the two in an overarching framework would be a serious distortion.

The same observation may be made with regard to other themes that have attracted the attention of historians in the recent decades. Environmental history is a good example. Best exemplified by Lynton Keith Caldwell's *International Environmental Policy* (1996) and John McNeill's *Something New under the Sun* (2001), scholars have explored the question of environmental degradation as well as worldwide efforts to deal with it.[13] The subject of environmental disasters and responses to them can, of course, be treated in the context of specific countries' histories, but, as is clear from a book like *Minamata* (2001), Timothy George's careful study of industrial pollution in postwar Japan, so many issues involved in such disasters, from mercury poisoning to bureaucratic ineptitude in coping with it, are of transnational relevance.[14] Narrowly nation-focused analyses would be clearly inadequate when the planetary and earthly beings—the sun and stars, air, water, animals, fish, and plants—do not recognize national boundaries. The sun, which provides the key energy to humans, is something they all benefit from and are affected by, along with the air, water, and land. The environment is humans' geological reality that knows no artificial boundaries. While the impact of modernization, urbanization, nation-building, and wars on the environment may be examined in specific national contexts, they will need to be compared, contrasted, and interconnected across boundaries to get at a full understanding of the interaction between man and nature. It may even be said that there is no such thing as a national or even international history of the environment, only a transnational history. It is true that excellent studies of international efforts to preserve the natural environment and rare species exist, but virtually all of them suggest that such efforts are not just international in the sense of being intergovernmental but are transnational in that private organizations have actively participated in promoting the cause of environmentalism.

Closely related to environmental history is the history of energy. All human activities, of course, require energy, whether bodily or natural, and, as McNeill shows, till toward the end of the twentieth century, there had been more than an adequate supply of natural energy to enable all

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interesed countries to undertake "modern" transformation or, for that matter, to fight wars. But as economic globalization grew more and more global, shortages of energy began to alarm all people. For instance, it was said that if the Chinese should aim at attaining the same level of economic development and life style as Americans, there might not be enough electrical power available in the entire world. The search for alternative sources of energy intensified toward the end of the century and into the new. Historians, fascinated by such phenomena, began to seek to trace the energy issue back to its historical development. Scholarly writings on solar energy, nuclear energy, and related topics are still in their infancy, as revealed in the fact that the *Dictionary of Transnational History* does not even contain a separate entry on "energy" and refers an interested reader to a short article on "electricity infrastructures." But this subfield can surely be expected to grow in the coming years and decades, and the small number of studies that have appeared all seem to stress the transnational nature of the supplying of power, in particular of electricity. Even during the Cold War, a recent study suggests that there was a great deal of energy interdependence on both sides of the geopolitical divide in Europe.[15] On the other hand, both nuclear armament and nuclear energy generation result in radioactive waste, and how to dispose of it has become a major issue in national and international affairs. But, as Jacob Darwin Hamblin's *Poison in the Well* (2008) documents, not just governments but individual scientists and many private organizations are involved in dealing with the question.[16] Here is another clear instance where international history must be augmented by transnational history for a balanced, fuller understanding of the past.

In the meantime, studies of globalization have continued to grow, as exemplified by such works as Alfred Eckes and Thomas Zeiler's *Globalization and the American Century* (2003), and Jeffry Frieden's *Global Capitalism* (2006).[17] These books have made the conception of economic globalization accessible even to non-economic historians. It is true that most writings on the subject deal extensively with the United States' role in the world economy, but what they describe is the growth of intricate networks of capital, goods, and markets throughout the world. Likewise, Emily Rosenberg's *Financial Missionaries to the World* (1999), while examining the question of exchange stability as promoted through US governmental initiatives during the first decades of the twentieth century, recounts activities by individuals such as Edwin Kemmerer and J. P. Morgan who served as "financial missionaries" to help create

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a "rationalized, global financial structure."[18] A good sequel to the book is Mira Wilkins, *The History of Foreign Investment in the United States, 1914–1945* (2004) that gives massive documentation to show how foreign investment in the United States served to globalize the world economy, in the process turning the nation into its principal buttress after the Second World War.[19]

From the 1990s onward, historians became increasingly interested not only in the economic but also in cultural and social aspects of globalization. An excellent example is Victoria de Grazia's *Irresistible Empire* (2005), a study of how American consumer culture spread to, interacted with, and bounced back to its home throughout the twentieth century.[20] Globalization, the author notes, was promoted by "globalism," a vision to connect North America and Europe—and by implication other parts of the world—through marketing devices, business organizations, material goods, and capital. Many writers on the subject have put the phenomenon in the framework of Americanization. Several studies of trans-Atlantic cultural relations—such as Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War* (1994)—have familiarized the notion of cultural globalization through Americanization in the second half of the twentieth century.[21] Liping Bu's *Making the World like Us* (2003) likewise recounts US initiatives to transform the world through educational and cultural exchanges. Cultural Americanization has remained a popular subject of study, which for some writers implies relentless energies emanating from North America, frequently threatening to undermine or even obliterate local cultures. That, of course, fits in with the vocabulary of "American empire" that was popular in some quarters at the end of the twentieth century. According to this view, the United States exerted its power and influence not just through its military might but also through cultural influence, be it manifested in popular music, television and film, or consumer goods. Such a tendency to conflate globalization with Americanization produced a spate of writings on "empire" at the end of the twentieth century, but they were harking back to a traditional historiography rather than charting a new course.[22]

An increasing number of studies have put cultural Americanization in the framework of global cultural developments. "Global culture" is a subject that scholars have found particularly fascinating. In one of the earliest essays on the subject, John Joyce wrote in 1993 that "as we approach the year 2000, we may already have entered a global society through the world of music."[23] Jonathan Rosenberg agreed, writing in *Dictionary of*

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Transnational History, "From the mid-19th century to the present day, transnational forces have powerfully affected the course of Western classical music, shaping the creative activities of performers, composers, and performing institutions, along with the experience of listeners."[24] An excellent demonstration of this is provided by Jessica Gienow-Hecht in her *Sound Diplomacy* (2009), which traces the trans-Atlantic movement of classical music during the decades before the First World War.[25] While her book, as well as Rosenberg's observations, are primarily applied to Western musicians and audiences, others have noted the global spread of both classical and popular music, thanks in part to technological devices such as the gramophone, tape-recorders, compact discs, and personal computers that enable people all over the world to listen to and enjoy the same works of music. These are all aspects of an emerging global culture that is daily being constructed and reconstructed through the coming together of individuals across national borders to create and share cultural products together. Indeed, few phenomena are as striking as the networking of musicians all over the world to construct, in essence, a global community of their own apart from the world of political and economic affairs.

Of course, cross-cultural interchanges and cross-fertilizations have long been a subject of study by historians of art, of literature, and of music. Specialists in comparative literature and comparative culture have, at least since the end of the Second World War, been tracing cross-national and cross-regional interactions and intermixing among different cultural traditions. Departments of history of art, comparative literature, and ethnomusicology have flourished in US and European universities, training specialists who master several languages and are able to examine diverse cultural traditions and their interactions. And their scholarship has almost always been transnational, bringing specialists and students from various countries for collaborative research and education. Historians had not always made use of such corpus of scholarship, but at the end of the twentieth century and into the new, they, too, became interested in these subjects as they began to embrace global, transnational perspectives in their own work. These perspectives seem to have fostered a new generation of cultural historians who have sought to understand global cultural phenomena as being central to modern and recent history—and who often come together for conferences and for joint publications. *Culture and International History* (2003) edited by Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, and *Decentering America* (2007), also edited by

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Gienow-Hecht, are good examples of the formation of a transnational community of scholars keen on adding a cultural dimension to the study of international history. Their emphasis on the transnational nature of musical, artistic, literary, and other products as well as social movements and scholarly activities may be seen as a healthy counterpoint to the traditional preoccupation with particular "identities." Instead of each culture and each tradition being viewed as unique, the stress now seems to be on the sharing and generating of multinational, even worldwide experiences. One can only welcome such a trend.

At bottom, in the phenomenon of transnational cultural experiences, is the possibility of shared emotions. By giving her book the subtitle of "music and emotions in trans-Atlantic relations," Gienow-Hecht is indeed postulating that emotions generated by music are shared across national boundaries. The same would be true of artistic and literary works. To look at a Raphael or to read a Shakespeare is a transnational experience that creates a global community of lovers of art and literature. Their community is no less a reality than a political or an economic assembly of individuals constituting a nation or a market. Transnational history recognizes this fact and emphasizes the importance of networks of people connected through cultural threads. In a book published in 1997, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, I argued that the development of such networks was promoted by people and organizations that believed in an internationalist alternative to the nation-centered definition of human destiny.[26] Although I called the phenomenon "cultural internationalism," the term "cultural transnationalism" might have been more appropriate. Here is another instance where these two words are used interchangeably. But we may choose to distinguish the two conceptually, as I am trying to do in this book. For internationalism implies cooperation among nations, whether in political, economic, or cultural affairs. International organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations are the best known examples of political internationalism, but they were also engaged in a multitude of cultural activities. The League of Nations, for instance, established a Committee on Intellectual Cooperation in order to promote cross-border dialogue and exchanges. This committee was the predecessor to UNESCO, with its unabashedly straightforward proclamation that peace among nations hinges on cross-cultural understanding. Cultural transnationalism would endorse such an assertion, but it would not necessarily depend on policies by individual governments or acts of intergovernmental

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organizations for its implementation. Collaboration among non-state actors in different lands in pursuit of cultural objectives, the nourishing of universal human aspirations and emotions, cultivation of mutual understanding among races, religions, and civilizations—these characterize cultural transnationalism. In reality, of course, often cultural internationalism and cultural transnationalism come together—as happened, for instance, when so many private foundations, universities, and research organizations worked with various governments in promoting the League of Nations' project on intellectual cooperation. But conceptually the two should not be combined or confused. And it would seem that the study of emotions would be an excellent way to examine the relationship among the national, international, and transnational. What Gienow-Hecht and others have demonstrated seems to be that some human emotions—particularly those generated through a musical experience—are more adequately to be seen as transnational because they are human, not national or international.

As cultural transnationalism intensifies, historians have joined sociologists and anthropologists in examining the age-old question of the relationship between the global and the local. What would cultural globalization do to indigenous cultural traditions? To cite an example that commentators have frequently cited, globalization has seemed to promote, and to be promoted by, the near universal use of English as the language of communication. It has become the language not only of diplomatic negotiations and transnational business transactions but also of cultural activities. An orchestra composed of musicians from many parts of the world—a phenomenon that was by the 1990s becoming commonplace—would communicate with one another in English, and art museums all over the world would have explanatory statements in that language posted alongside works of art. Above all, English has become the chief medium of scholarly production and communication. Academic conferences of scientists as well as humanities scholars, regardless of where they are held, are usually conducted in English. Universities are ranked by the number of English-language publications by their faculty, and courses are frequently taught in countries such as China, Korea, and Turkey in English—even by instructors whose native language is something else. What would happen to local languages in such circumstances? The same question could be posed about other aspects of cultural globalization. Interestingly, however, most scholars seem to have agreed that globalization is not bringing about cultural

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uniformity or homogeneity throughout the world. Local traditions—of food, music, and whatever else—have remained, and in most instances coexisted with global cultural products. In the process, however, both the global and the local have undergone transformation. The picture is thus never that of one winning over the other. The "survival of the fittest" model does not work here, since both global and local cultures have survived through interacting with one another. Some sociologists and political scientists have called this phenomenon "glocalization." Most historians would hesitate to embrace such an infelicitous expression, instead employing terms like "accommodation," "convergence," and "hybridity" to describe various cultural encounters and their consequences. There seems little doubt that the thrust of scholarly work in this field has been to shift the emphasis away from local identities to transnational intermixture. Global culture is literally a mixed bag in that sense, but what is in the bag is constantly being blended and reblended. Nothing purely local or national remains intact, if indeed there ever was a "pure" existence anywhere.

A good example of such a perspective, in the context of the history of the United States, is a volume edited by Andrew Bacevich and entitled, *The Short American Century* (2012).[27] The essays in the book examined the legacy of the "American century," the term that referred to the second half of the twentieth century when the United States wielded undisputed military and economic primacy in the world. This was a rather nation-centric perspective, but some of the contributors to the volume have understood that the so-called Americanization, in particular cultural Americanization, could only be discussed in the context of global and transnational history. To Emily Rosenberg, for instance, the American century was essentially a "consuming century" in which the American people, and then steadily others around the world, increasingly focused on acquiring (i.e. rather than producing) goods, in the process calling forth a global market place for material and non-material commodities.[28] But she would not call this an instance of imperialism; rather, she stresses how, as they spent more and more on consumer goods, Americans came to accumulate huge trade deficits and credit card indebtedness. Most important, as consumerism spread around the world, the distinction between the United States and other countries began to diminish so that it may be said that the "American century" became less and less a US-centered or US-dominated moment in history and grew into a transnational century. In an essay for the same volume, I take note of the

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old-fashioned debate as to what would follow the "American century" and conclude, "If the Short American Century is to have a successor, it will not be a Chinese century or an Indian century or a Brazilian century. It will be a long transnational century."[29] The age of globalization, understood in the cultural context, really has no hegemonic presence. Geopolitical contests and issues will undoubtedly remain, but global cultures will develop with their own momentum. Even if geopolitics were to keep sovereign nations separated, the process of cultural encounters and transnationalization would continue. Such would seem to be the findings of the work thus far undertaken by historians of globalization. The implication might be that, as transnational cultural forces inevitably transform nations, the traditional distinctions among territorial states might eventually be expected to diminish.

Such observations might strike readers as being too naïve or optimistic, or at least premature. After all, at the turn of the twentieth century, many observers confidently asserted that the age of international peace and interdependence was just around the corner. Gustave Hervé, the French publicist, boldly announced in 1910, "The nineteenth century was a century of nationalism. The twentieth century will be a century of internationalism."[30] Internationalist thinking such as this has attracted the attention of some historians in the recent decades, in the wake of the ending of the Cold War. But we would need to understand the dichotomy between nationalism and internationalism in the framework of transnational perspectives, as some scholars have begun to do.[31] In the old-fashioned dichotomy between nationalism and internationalism, the sort of optimism demonstrated by Hervé would be proven wrong. But if we accept the above-noted distinction between internationalism and transnationalism, there would be some justification for believing that the twenty-first century would be a century not so much of internationalism as of transnationalism. It is interesting to note that Hervé followed the above statement with a prediction that there would "eventually be a United States of Europe and of America, perhaps a United States of the world." This was still a vision of world order on the basis of "states," not of people, religions, and cultures. If we consider these and other non-state entities, it would be possible to postulate a future in which state sovereignty and national rivalries would be mitigated by transnational networks and agendas.

This has been seen in various transnational developments in different parts of the world, as historians have demonstrated. Indeed, an

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interesting historiographic development recently has been that the themes of cultural encounters and networks have been applied to wide areas of the globe such as the Atlantic, the Pacific, and South Asia. Of course, there has always been a "European" history, from the medieval (if not the ancient) times to the present in which local developments as well as interrelationships among different countries and people in the geographically specific region are described. But the traditional work in "European" history, especially of the modern period, hardly went beyond the sum of national histories and of their state-level relationships. More recently, however, scholars have begun considering Europe as an indivisible unity of study and to view specific countries' domestic and foreign affairs only in relation to the whole. *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century* (2009), edited by Martin Conway and Kiran Patel is a good example.[32] In it several authors examine how Europe became Europeanized, that is, emerged as an inseparable community, a community that shared the same past. Instead of just adding Russian history, Polish history, French history, and so on and calling the sum European history, the authors study how a European past has begun to be shared by all people in the region. This is a very valuable perspective, one that may be applied to other parts of the world. Is there a "community of shared memory" elsewhere? The Atlantic Ocean suggests itself as one possibility. Pan-Atlantic studies, of course, have existed for some time. The Atlantic has in a sense been always seen in the context of global history, due to the European "discovery" of America as well as the influx of African slaves and European immigrants into the Western Hemisphere. But other networks and linkages have been explored since the 1990s. For instance, Daniel Rodgers' *Atlantic Crossings* (1999) carefully traces the links between the ideologies and activities of political and social reformers on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean around 1900, showing that the two-way traffic of ideas created what in essence was an Atlantic community where certain visions were shared and produced what the author calls "international consciousness" but would, in our discussion be actually "transnational consciousness."[33] Likewise, Kenneth Weisbrode's *The Atlantic Century* (2009), while focusing on US officials who dedicated themselves to the creation of an Atlantic partnership throughout the twentieth century, documents innumerable informal networks across the Atlantic that promoted the cause. Like many recent works, it exemplifies a productive marriage of international history and transnational history.[34]

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In parallel with the further growth of new pan-European and pan-Atlantic studies, historians have begun to examine other regions of the world to see if they, too, may be viewed as transnational existences. The framework of the Asia-Pacific region is a particularly fascinating example. "Asia" has long been an ambiguous term, both geographically and historically. Stretching from Asia Minor and what used to be called "the Orient" or the Near East all the way to Japan, "Asia" can include Western Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Historically, the region has fostered a variety of religions, languages, and civilizations, to such an extent that it would be impossible to think of all "Asians" sharing some historical memory. Indeed, the very term "Asia" was initially a European conception. As Edward Said famously asserted in his *Orientalism* (1981), people in "the Orient" did not even know there were "Orientals" till the Europeans told them so.[35] Nevertheless, people east of the Suez have, on their own will, so to speak, identified themselves as "Asians," as part of the "non-West." This is a transnational perspective that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century. The idea that all "Asians" had something in common in that they were non-Westerners was tautological, but some thinkers in Turkey, India, China, Japan, and elsewhere believed that something pulled them together. As Cemal Aydin notes in his *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia* (2007), this pan-Asianism initially was too impotent to challenge the Western domination of world affairs, but the idea nevertheless survived the two world wars and even gained fresh impetus as many countries in the region gained independence.[36]

Essays in the above-mentioned *Cosmopolitan Thought Zones* suggests that South Asia may also be considered a "community of shared memory." The book examines anti-colonialism as a unifying theme for the region, which is in turn put in the framework of the "global circulation of ideas." In other words, while South Asia was united conceptually in terms of anti-colonialism, this was also part of a global phenomenon. That way, not just nationalism but also cosmopolitanism informed the region's history. In the meantime, Tao Demin and his colleagues from East Asia, North America, and Europe have launched the *Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia* with a view to exploring the history of cultural interactions among different parts of East Asia and beyond. There is clear awareness here that East Asia must be studied as an entity rather being divided into its separate national components, and that the region then should be put in the context of global developments. Such an

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enterprise clearly shows that East Asian studies specialists are establishing connections with the global development of transnational history.

Some historians have even begun conceiving of a Pacific history that would cover the whole region, from Siberia and China and the Antipodes (Australia, New Zealand) to the western part of the American continent, including the Pacific coast of Canada and the United States as well as Mexico, Peru, Chile, and other countries. This is a gigantic region, and it remains to be seen whether a trans-Pacific perspective would be as viable as a trans-Atlantic or a pan-European conception. Nevertheless, it offers a refreshing insight to consider Canada and the United States, for instance, as Pacific nations, and China, Korea, and Japan as belonging in the same conceptual universe as Australia and New Zealand. A step in this direction was taken by the pioneering work by Walter McDougal in his *Let the Sea Make a Noise* (1993).[37] The book aimed at incorporating the wide arc from Siberia to North America as a distinct region with its own history apart from the Atlantic world. André Frank's *Re-Orient,* already cited, looks at the whole region of the Pacific and East Asia as the lynchpin of the world economy since the sixteenth century. More recently, Bruce Cumings' *Dominion from Sea to Sea* (2009) sought to present a fresh perspective on US history by connecting its western states to the wider Pacific.[38] Although the focus is on the rise of US power in the region, a nation-centric topic, the book suggests possibilities for reconceptualizing not just the nation's past but also the histories of all other countries bordering on the Pacific. It may be expected that historians from China, Australia, Mexico, and other countries will join in the collective effort to develop Pacific history as a key example of how transnational history may be studied in a regional framework.

Going beyond such region-specific studies of transnational history, one may note other themes and approaches that have enriched our understanding of global history. In the realm of what we may call social globalization, it is interesting to note that historians since the 1990s have shown a renewed interest in interracial relations and, as a consequence, in the development of racism and anti-racism. These are subjects that had long been examined in relation to separate national histories, but during the last 20 years they have also been put in a global context. Given that globalization brought people of diverse backgrounds together in many parts of the world, it is not surprising that historians should have begun to reexamine such topics as racial discrimination and race prejudice as transnational themes. Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, for instance,

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have been pioneers in bringing together the ill treatment of native people in Australia and the race prejudice against Chinese immigrants there and elsewhere in the second half of the nineteenth century as related topics.[39] Likewise, John Price, in *Orienting Canada* (2011), has integrated his study of Canada's anti-Asian movements into the history of pan-Pacific race prejudice, while Nico Slate has demonstrated the close connection that existed between the struggles for equality and justice in India and in the United States.[40] An earlier work by Yukiko Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (1999), a study of racisms (in the plural) in Japan and the United States during the occupation period, may also fit into the same historiographic trend.[41] Sebastian Conrad, on his part, has pointed to debates in late nineteenth-century Germany on the wisdom of bringing in Chinese immigrants to supplement domestic labor.[42] It is not surprising that anti-Chinese prejudice was just as strong there as elsewhere. Both Chinese migration and the racist responses to it were part of a global development in interracial relations which at that time were characterized by extreme hostility on the part of the white race, whether in the Antipodes, North America, Europe, or elsewhere. That had not always been the case, nor would racism in its blatant form remain in the second half of the twentieth century.

Somewhat narrower in focus but nevertheless of equal importance have been studies by Americanist historians who have shown how US foreign policy was affected by considerations of "the color line." Thomas Borstelmann's *The Cold War and the Color Line* (2008) is a good example.[43] As the subtitle of the book, "American race relations in the global arena," suggests, the study seeks to connect national and global history—or rather, international and transnational history, for interracial relations are an apt topic of study in transnational history. This is clearly indicated in Gregor Benton and Edmund Terence Gomez's *The Chinese in Britain* (2008), a careful study of Chinese migrants who reached and lived in Britain from the nineteenth century to the present. Like other similar stories of emigration and the consequent mingling of divergent racial groups, this is first and foremost a transnational subject of study. To begin with, the majority of Chinese in Britain had originated outside of China. In other words, they were already transnational beings by the time they got to Britain. That also attested to their diversity, not homogeneity. Besides, this study shows that these Chinese defined their relationship to the Chinese state in a number of ways, as they did toward the British nation. Unquestionably, their experiences

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would be duplicated by Indians, Arabs, and other population groups. In this regard, Adam McKeown's *Melancholy Order* (2008) is particularly notable as it reexamines the history of Asian migration and its control by various nations in the Pacific region by putting them in the context of globalization and national sovereignty.[44] Migrations, a quintessentially global and transnational phenomenon, had, at the same time, the effect of strengthening border control on the part of sovereign states. It may be said that this twin development characterized the relationship between transnational history and international history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. "Identity documentation" such as a passport defines an individual at the national level, while the same person is also a global being, with a transnational identity in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, and other categories.

In connection with the interplay between migration and national sovereignty, an intriguing question is that of population control. A notable recent achievement in this regard has been Matthew Connelly's *Fatal Misconception* (2008).[45] The book traces the evolution of birth control movements throughout the world in the twentieth century. The subject naturally touches on all humans, but given their diversity not only physically but also intellectually, the questions of how many children one should have, whether additional births should be prevented, and, if so, how to abort a baby involve decisions at every level, individual, social, national, global, and transnational (religious, ideological, and otherwise). Although population control has been a matter of national policy in some countries, notably China, where the state imposes its authority to mandate a small family (the "one child one family" policy), the implications of such an approach transcend national boundaries. Chinese families, for instance, have been known to go abroad to have their second and third children, while families in other countries have been interested in adopting children from China and other countries. Moreover, the question of birth and death is intimately connected to medical issues. Every family yearns for the arrival of a healthy baby, but so many are born with various kinds of problems. Particularly disturbing has been the issue of the so-called "disabled," who are sometimes referred to as "handicapped," those who are apt to be considered not "normal" physically or mentally. Should they be allowed to live? Are there different categories of disadvantages, from blindness to mental retardation, some of which are more acceptable to the community than others? Who should look after those who are considered severely

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handicapped? Does the state have the right to dictate certain categories of humans as unworthy of life? How can "healthy" and "disabled" people live together? These are serious questions that affect a significant portion of humanity—some would say as much as one-half of 1 percent of a given national population—and so all these issues are of transnational significance with economic and cultural implications. How to treat the "disabled" is an age-old question, and here again the nation provides just one framework. Physical and mental disabilities are found everywhere and are quintessentially transnational phenomena, and so a subject like eugenics, the "science" of "race improvement," is best studied as a topic in transnational history. Connelly's book is among the first to do so.

As befitting a transnational study of the population control question, Connelly's book looks at the activities by a number of non-state actors, including the Catholic Church, various foundations, and international non-governmental organizations such as the International Planned Parenthood Federation. Historians have been paying increasing attention to such entities, another notable feature of the scholarly literature in global and transnational history. This is no mere coincidence. To the extent that transnational history goes beyond or even underneath national entities in search of themes and connections that are not nation-specific, non-state actors are some of the easiest to find. And among non-state actors, those organizations that are non-governmental and non-profit seeking are particularly conspicuous. Millions of non-governmental, non-profit organizations exist worldwide, and their activities range from humanitarian and medical services to educational and social welfare programs. Those that have branches in various countries are recognized as international non-governmental organizations, and their number expanded phenomenally toward the end of the twentieth century. They are quintessentially transnational organizations in that they are non-state initiated or controlled and have their own structures apart from public institutions, whether national or international. (Many of them do receive public subsidies, so that few non-governmental organizations can boast complete fiscal independence. The implications of this for their non-governmental identity as well as public accountability is a subject that has begun to attract a number of scholars, few of them historians thus far.) The vocal, visible, and largely successful efforts by these organizations to promote a cause that is not dictated by the state or by considerations of national interest, again defined by government authorities, can be seen in some notable examples. The Women's Christian Temperance Union, the

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subject of a transnational historical analysis in Tyrrell's 1991 monograph, is given fresh treatment by Rumi Yasutake in *Transnational Women's Activism* (2004) as she examines how Japanese and Japanese Americans became involved in its activities not only in North America but also in East Asia.[46] Amnesty International, founded in 1961, soon developed as a major force behind the emergence of human rights as a non-nation specific universal rights, as Samuel Moyn has shown in *The Last Utopia.* In the sphere of environmentalism, it would be difficult not to note the pivotal roles played by transnational organizations such as Friends of the Earth and Green Peace in alerting people and governments all over the world to the danger of carbon emission, nuclear pollution, and other hazards. David Zierler's, *The Invention of Ecocide* (2011), a study of physicians from the United States and elsewhere concerned with the environmental and human damage caused by Agent Orange during the Vietnam War, is an excellent example of how a transnational history perspective enriches our understanding of a more traditional subject like war.[47]

Indeed, the study of war will never be the same now that transnational history has made its inroads even into such a geopolitical subject. We may end this quick historiographic survey by looking at some examples from transnational studies of wars, as they provide excellent examples of the productive relationship between the international and transnational history perspectives. That relationship is evident even in a limited war between two countries, as demonstrated by recent studies on the Spanish-American War by such works as Kristin Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood* (2000) and Paul Kramer, *The Blood of Government* (2006).[48] The former puts the debate on the war in the United States in the context of gender history, a transnational subject, while the latter shows how the racial aspect of the US fighting in, and eventual control over, the Philippines had global implications. As seen in such examples, international history, when combined with transnational data and insights, produces the best accounts of wars.

This seems especially the case in studies of global wars. Michael S. Neiberg's reexamination of the coming of the First World War, *Dance of the Furies* (2011), provides an excellent example. The book approaches the July crisis that ultimately led to the European-wide war in 1914 in the framework of "the European world," not in terms of the military power and strategies of individual states that are usually presented as having been potentially in conflict and inevitably led to the conflagration.[49] What the author does, instead, is to look at the whole of Europe

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in which there was a great deal of shared thoughts and emotions, and where class, gender, and ethnicity were just as important as nationality as determinants of individuals' attitudes . An account based on power-level analyses would blind us to the fact, according to Neiberg, that "Prior to August 1914 there were no nationalist hatreds or suspicions sufficient to cause Europe to go to war." War does come in August 1914, but even here the book stresses similar responses—admittedly nationalistic and xenophobic—among the combatants. War, as is often said, obliterates differences among nations, but such a generalization is provided with fuller documentation in this study. At the same time, a book like Xu Guoqi's *Strangers on the Western Front* (2011) enriches the usual Euro-centric presentation of the Great War by examining the Chinese workers who were employed in non-combatant roles by Britain and France during the war.[50] Numbering about 14,000, their experiences add a non-European and non-geopolitical dimension to the study of the war. Moreover, the episode also fits into such transnational themes as international migrations, racism, and cross-cultural encounters. In this context, monographs like Daniela Rossini's *Woodrow Wilson and the American Myth in Italy* (2008) and Erez Manela's *The Wilsonian Moment* (2007) show how Wilson and Wilsonianism came to stand for transnational symbols, whether justified or not.[51]

So much has been written about the consequences of the First World War, and yet much of it has been put in the framework of the "interwar years," as if to anticipate, in 1919, what was to come in 1939. That is, of course, pure geopolitical analysis and is of little use when we try to understand significant global developments during the 1920s and the 1930s. Much new insight would be gained if we examined transnational linkages and non-state networks. Tomoko Akami's *Internationalizing the Pacific* (2002), for instance, offers a glimpse into interpersonal connections across national boundaries that were established through the Institute of Pacific Relations, dedicated to defining a transnational regional order, while Rana Mitter's *A Bitter Revolution* (2004) recreates a world imagined by Chinese intellectuals during the postwar years. China, like all other countries, was "part of an international culture."[52] We need such a perspective in order to understand not just the "interwar years" but also what happened during and after the war.

Studies of the Second World War have likewise been enriched by non-power oriented and non-geopolitical approaches. Of course, it was a brutal "total war," in which powerful states mobilized their resources

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to the full and in which virtually all personal concerns of individual men, women, and children were subordinated to military objectives. Still, there were innumerable instances of transnational interactions on human, not nation-specific, levels. For instance, in *The Damned and the Dead* (2011), Frank Ellis presents a fascinating study of how Soviet soldiers encountered their German counterparts in the Eastern front, not in terms of military strategies and tactics but as private, emotional experiences through novelists' writings.[53] A book like this, combined with arguably the most influential study of the Russian treatment of Germans during the war, Norman Naimark's *The Russians in Germany* (1995), adds immeasurably to our understanding of the transnational aspect of the war.[54] Even more transnational and equally tragic were the experiences of the "death marchers," prisoners of many nationalities and faiths released from German camps and ordered to march aimlessly in France and other areas as the tide of war turned against the Nazis. The story is described vividly in Daniel Blatman and Chaya Galai, *The Death Marches: The Final Phase of Nazi Genocide* (2010).

In the Pacific theater of the war, Roger Dingman's *Deciphering the Rising Sun* (2009) adds an important, "human" dimension to the bitter fighting in the jungles.[55] It traces the initial encounters between US servicemen and Japanese prisoners of war, their individual contact as the latter were interrogated, and even the development of something akin to a personal, often friendly, relationship that would be carried into the postwar years. Also interesting is the suggestion by T. Fujitani in his book, *Race for Empire* (2011), that while using often rabidly racist language toward one another, US and Japanese authorities were also trying to redefine interracial relations in the direction of accommodation and even justice.[56] Part of this was wartime propaganda, but, as the author argues, one can view this as a transnational awareness at that time that something had to be done to rectify the long-sanding animosity among races, in particular between the white race and Asians. It may even be said that the war marked an important, albeit limited, first step toward dealing with antagonistic race relations that had been part of global history since the nineteenth century. Likewise, Matthew Briones' *Jim and Jap Crow* (2012) goes much beyond an examination of the relationship between African Americans and Japanese Americans during the war, a fit subject of study in US history, but connects an emerging multiracial America with the ethnically diverse world, a process that would soon come to be comprehended as two sides of the same coin.[57]

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Among the allied countries, in the meantime, there were also interpersonal, non-state relations, some of which have been studied in the framework of transnational rather than international history. David Reynolds' *Rich Relations* (1995) is a good example.[58] In this massively documented study he details the encounters and experiences between American GIs and the individual British hosts they met when they were stationed there. They were of more than fleeting significance in that such interactions served to construct a transnational memory to an extent that would outlast geopolitical expediencies. No such lasting memory seems to have been produced among the Axis partners, in particular Germans and Japanese, in part because their direct contact was extremely limited. Even so, the study of Japanese in wartime Germany, or of Germans in wartime Japan (including Japan-occupied Manchuria and elsewhere in Asia) promises to be a fruitful area of historical inquiry. Somewhat different in category but nevertheless of equal transnational significance were the efforts by private individuals as well as government officials in the allied countries to promote the idea of human rights as the foundation stone of the postwar world. As noted earlier, human rights history has mushroomed during the last quarter century, and many of them document the wartime origins of the United Nations' 1948 "universal declaration on human rights." Elizabeth Borgwardt's *A New Deal for the World* (2005) is a good example. Although primarily focused on the United States, the study also traces trans-Atlantic initiatives on this important project.[59] Here again, the distinction between international and transnational developments seems useful, for, while the governments in Washington and London cooperated with one another, and with other states, in trying war crimes trials, codifying the idea of genocide, and supporting human rights agendas, these did not lead to much international cooperation in world affairs after the war. Considering that interstate relations made so little progress in the immediate postwar decades, the triumph of transnationalism as exemplified by human rights was a major contribution to the making of an interdependent global community. Here, too, is another example that shows that a transnational perspective is imperative in any broad study of a war and its aftermath.

That even the Cold War, a geopolitical phenomenon par excellence that lasted longer than the two World Wars combined, is susceptible of transnational treatment is exemplified by a number of recent historical works. Once we get away from a preoccupation with power balances and tensions as the key themes during the post-1945 years, it becomes

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possible to explore so many global and transnational phenomena that were of equal, or even greater, relevance to the majority of people on earth. One of the important developments in the world after 1945, decolonization and nation-building, properly belongs in the categories of imperial, national, and international history. Even so, an imaginative historian should be able to provide a more global and transnational reading of such events. For instance, *Staging Growth* (2003), edited by David Engerman and others, contains essays that seek to delineate the transnational, as against geopolitical, significance of modernization and development that happened to coincide, at least temporarily, with the Cold War.[60] Likewise, Michael Latham's *Modernization as Ideology* (2000), while discussing ideological underpinnings of US Cold War strategy, is also a study of social science theories that were presumably of universal applicability. Modernization and economic growth, of course, were themes that long preceded the geopolitical crisis and had developed with their own momentum till they were hijacked by international conflicts from time to time. David Ekbladh's monograph, *The Great American Mission* (2010), while focusing on one country, the United States, reminds readers that developmentalism long predated the Cold War and had always been part of the vision of a world order that the nation had sought to construct.[61] Moreover, as Engerman's *Modernization from the Other Shore* (2004) demonstrates, modernization was not just a liberal US or Western idea but had its counterpart in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.[62] Even Ron Robin's *The Making of the Cold War Enemy (2001),* although ostensibly a study of the US "military-intellectual complex," makes a contribution to a transnational understanding of international affairs by comparing the ways in which different countries portrayed Cold War antagonists.[63]

Our understanding of the relationship between international history and transnational history in the early Cold War years is also enhanced through monographs dealing with the allied occupation of former enemy nations after the war. Wagnleitner's study of the US occupation of Austria has already been noted. Accounts of the personal interactions between US soldiers and German and Japanese women by Petra Goedde and Naoko Shibusawa, respectively, not only contribute to the study of the transition from the war to the Cold War, but also enrich the study of post-1945 global history at the social and cultural level.[64] Hiroshi Kitamura's *Screening Enlightenment* (2010) serves to connect the US occupation of Japan to the wider world of Hollywood films.[65] Many

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writers, to be sure, offer descriptions of cultural activities in the early postwar years essentially as a dimension of the geopolitical conflict. Volker Berghahn's *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe* (2001) is a good example.[66] Even here, however, as the subtitle "intellectual cold wars" suggests, the author is interested as much in trans-Atlantic cultural relations—even including a strain of anti-Americanism in Europe—as in US–USSR propaganda activities. Walter Hixon's *The Parting of the Curtain* (1997) documents how Americans and Soviets gained a sense of each other in the cultural sphere during the 1950s.[67] That there was significant transnational cultural contact across the geopolitical divide has been amply documented by several young historians who have unearthed an array of transnational activities and networks during the Cold War that had little, if anything, to do with the US–USSR contest for power. For instance, Martin Klimke's *The Other Alliance* (2010) offers a superb study of the anti-establishment movements in the West during the 1960s, pointing in particular to the close ties that connected the student radicals in West Germany and civil rights activists in the United States.[68] This and other monographs, such as those Klimke and Joachim Scharloth put together in *1968 in Europe* (2008), clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of the international history framework for understanding the world of the 1960s and beyond.[69] Transnational connections, it may be said, proved far more decisive in changing the world than international affairs, a perspective that was already suggested in a 1998 study of the Peace Corps by Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, *All You Need Is Love*.[70] As she notes, the Peace Corps, while an official program of the US government, had the effect of linking countries of the world through volunteers who exemplified the "spirit of the 1960s" which united people much more across nations than divided them.

Perhaps the best recent example of the coming together of international history and transnational history would be Sarah Snyder's *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War* (2011).[71] This is a study of how the "Helsinki network" of human rights activists on both sides of the Iron Curtain succeeded in bringing down the geopolitical divide through their appeal to shared human rights. Among other contributions, the book demonstrates that no conventional international history would henceforth be acceptable as definitive until it were informed by insights gained from transnational history. Even more important, the various studies of post-1945 human rights, environmentalism, cultural exchange, and other subjects suggest that transnational themes developed with

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their own momentum, not simply as mere footnotes to the geopolitical drama of the Cold War. In the world after the Second World War, there were parallel, or simultaneous, histories of national, international, and transnational affairs. Even if we accept, for the sake of argument, that during the 1950s into the early 1960s the Cold War trumped all other phenomena, after the 1960s transnational forces would begin to develop with their own momentum, in time overshadowing what was left of the dwindling vicissitudes of the Cold War. If the Cold War continued to divide the globe, even if nominally, transnational forces were steadily making for a different world. The transnational history perspective has made us aware of this fact, which is one of the significant historiographic achievements of the last two decades.

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4
Where Do We Go From Here?

Abstract: *This concluding chapter considers the future of global and transnational history. It discusses what new subjects, themes, and approaches may further enrich the study of global and transnational history. Among them, the chapter mentions the growing importance of the study of different age groups and activity associations (professional, artistic, sporting, etc.), historical memory, and the coming together of individuals of diverse backgrounds so as to form hybrid communities and cultures. Lastly, the awareness of sharing the planet with all people and with all animals, plants, and other objects may lead to the idea of planetary history, a culminating point in the long journey away from nation-centric histories.*

Iriye, Akira. *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. DOI: 10.1057/9781137299833.

I have briefly sketched the rise and growth of global and transnational history on the basis of my limited knowledge. Even on the basis of the small number of examples cited, I believe there has been an important development in the study of history, thanks to the new global and transnational perspectives. At least in the area of my special interest, modern international affairs, every new publication seems to offer something exciting and innovative, and it would be safe to predict that scholarly writings would never go back to the pre-global, pre-transnational days. Of course, traditionally oriented and conceptualized studies might continue to be written, but the authors of such work would still have to show some awareness of the new developments. For instance, studies of diplomatic relations between two or more countries would not disappear, but they would no longer be adequate unless they were put in the context of global affairs and touched on transnational, not just national, questions.

But it may well be asked how long such a historiographic "revolution" may last. Will it prove to be a temporary phenomenon so that historical study will take another drastic turn in the near future, or even go back to the pre-1990s stress on the nation as the core entity of analysis? It would be premature to predict, although such a national revival would be highly unlikely, if only because national identities and distinctions would likely continue to erode in the coming decades. In any event, before forejudging the eventual fate of global and transnational history, it might be worthwhile considering what topics and themes this field might further explore in the immediate future. For, to the extent that such topics and themes are of interest to the present and future generations of historians, it could safely be asserted that global history and transnational history would be around for a long time.

For instance, because global and transnational history seeks to focus on subjects that are not nation-specific, we may expect that non-national identities and groups such as various age categories, professional and leisure associations, and physically or mentally "disabled" persons will continue to attract the attention of historians. Youth groups, for instance, may have transnational as well as national identities, and some of their cross-border activities have begun to be examined—especially by young historians in several countries. Not just in the familiar framework of "international understanding"—although this is itself an important subject—but also of the making of transnational identities with their own agendas, be they human rights, drug control, or peace, would

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such work make a valuable contribution to global history. Likewise, older generations of men and women may be studied as a transnational category of people sharing their life experiences. It may be suspected that older people, however each generation defines "old," have a great deal in common regardless of where they live: their health, memories of their lives, their anticipation of death. The increasing longevity of people everywhere have inevitably resulted in larger numbers of senior citizens with memory loss, dementia, and other problems. (The World Health Organization reported in 2012 that there were 3.5 million people worldwide who were suffering from Alzheimer's disease and that their number would triple by 2015. This is clearly a transnational phenomenon.)

Generation-focused studies of young people or those suffering from senility, among other things, may be expected to enrich our understanding of the subject of historical memory. Traditionally, memory has been seen as a quintessentially national phenomenon. A nation, it has been said, is an assembly of people sharing certain memories about their past. That is essentially what is meant when some scholars, notably Benedict Anderson, call the nation "an imagined community."[1] Such memories may be more "myth" than "fact," but every country defines itself at least in part through the sharing of images about the past that are inculcated in each new generation at home, at school, and in public events such as holidays. Memories of wars play particularly important roles because they recall heroic deeds of citizens, those who sacrificed themselves for the nation so that it might continue to exist and prosper. That may be why national holidays in so many countries commemorate founders' days, armistice days, veterans' days, memorial days, and so forth.

Put this way, it might seem that national memories make poor candidates as subjects for transnational history. Countries often have conflicting memories about their past, especially about the wars they have fought against each other. To cite a recent example, *Arc of Empire* (2012) by Michael Hunt and Steven Levine reminds us that Americans and Filipinos have sharply conflicting images of the Spanish–American War, just as Americans and Japanese do about their war in the Pacific.[2] (The year 2012 has presented an interesting example of how sharply contrasting images the Canadians and Americans have of the War of 1812.) Such memories are in part transmitted from one generation to another through literature and art, including movies and television dramas. Countless films have been made, for instance, of the Second World War, but very few of them are transnational, collaborative products. One

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such example would be "Tora, Tora, Tora" (1970), a cinema about the Pearl Harbor attack. The movie was a product of collaboration between American and Japanese writers, directors, and actors and was quite even-handed in that it did not blame Japan wholly for the attack; it even showed the Japanese admiral who planned the strategy as a pro-American individual who agonized throughout the episode about the wisdom of the surprise assault. Two recent, acclaimed movies on the battle of Iwo Jima in the spring of 1945—"The Flag of My Father" and "Letters from Iwo Jima"—show an attempt at presenting parallel stories, one focusing on US fighting men and the other on the Japanese defenders of the island. Their common humanity comes out quite clearly, suggesting that the experience of fighting a deathly battle could also reveal what the soldiers on both sides shared. That would be conducive to generating a sense of transnational memory.

Of course, as Hunt and Levin point out, "the contest over memory" can exist domestically and become a political issue pitting conservatives against radicals, for instance. As Martin Harwit documents in *An Exhibit Denied* (1996), a planned exhibition of the US atomic bombings of Japan at the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum in 1995 became so controversial that he was forced to resign as museum director.[3] There also exists "a collective national amnesia" among people who would rather forget about the past than confronting the reality, be it a humiliating defeat, disgraceful wartime behavior, or anything that tends to divide national opinion.[4]

These very instances, however, cry out for a comparative look. Do all countries manifest similar tendencies with respect to their past? In the field of war and other instances of international affairs, do nations sometimes succeed in developing shared or overlapping memories, such as those revealed by the above-cited movies as well as some others that have depicted the European battles during the Second World War? These are interesting questions, and perhaps for that reason historians have become interested in memory as a subject of study in transnational history. After all, transnational history both deals with cross-national comparisons and with non-national entities. The simultaneous presence of universality and humanity, on one hand, and diversity and individuality, on the other hand, is a key theme in global history, as noted in the preceding chapter. Thus even personal recollections will mean something significant when connected to similar, or contrasting, memories across national and geographical boundaries. Given that an

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individual is defined by one's nation, religion, ethnicity, gender, and the like, one's memory becomes bound up with the collective memories of all such groups. How, in such circumstances, countries may develop a sense of shared memory is a question to which historians have been paying increasing attention. The construction of "a community of shared memory," to borrow a phrase from the earlier cited book, *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century*, would seem to provide a useful framework for the study of transnational memory, for instance between the French and the Algerians, the Chinese and the Japanese, or the Americans and the Mexicans.

In this connection, too, a focus on generational memories may yield interesting data. For instance, are there transnational memories of a war shared by older generations across borders? With regard to wars that are no longer within living memory—say, the Franco–Prussian War—such an inquiry may be of interest only to those studying French–German relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but most wars of the twentieth century and their consequences are still vividly "remembered," and it would be interesting to compare, for instance, what those in their eighties and nineties today "remember" about the Second World War, on one hand, with the "memories" of the war held by people in their seventies and younger. The same, of course, goes for other historic moments such as a civil war, a social upheaval, an economic crisis, and the like.

Apart from establishing transnational connections among certain age groups, historians might also explore the transnational coming together of individuals and groups of people pursuing their shared avocations, be they scholarship, music and other cultural activities, sport, or traveling. To the extent that scholarly, artistic, mountain-climbing, and other pursuits steadily gained in transnational membership, that, too, would be an important aspect of global history. The American Historical Association, for instance, boasted a membership of 13,000 in 1988, the majority of whom came from the United States, but they were joined by several hundreds from scores of other countries. (In 2012 the membership stood at 14,000.) Who the members were, how their annual gatherings changed their character over time, and what scholarly activities the association sponsored are all important subjects of study in transnational history. Already in 1981, Bernard Bailyn, the AHA president, was speaking of the "transnational communication of parallel information."[5] Such communication would increase phenomenally after the 1990s, thanks to

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the internet and other technological innovations. How such expanded contact altered the scholarly world, of any field, would be an extremely interesting question. But one should not limit one's horizon to the recent past or the present. Similar questions could be raised with regard to the transnational gatherings, for instance, of anthropologists, economists, and others since the nineteenth century. A particularly fascinating subject to explore would be the ways in which scholarly disciplines were transformed through increased contact among specialists in different countries. The transnational development of the field of psychoanalysis, for instance, is examined by several authors in a collection of essays edited by Joy Damousi and Mariano Plotkin in their collected volume, *The Transnational Unconscious* (2010). The studies offer fascinating examples of those trained in psychoanalysis in Europe, North and South America, and Australia whose exploration of the unconscious is informed by their initial training and by their experiences abroad where they practiced it.[6]

Transnational encounters of people in pursuit of music, art, literature, and other cultural fields would also seem to be waiting for historical treatment. Some of the encounters would be direct and personal; people get together at Bayreuth to share the experience of listening to Richard Wagner's music; millions of people pass through the corridors of great art museums of the world to admire famous paintings or sculptures; and just about every educated person in the world reads Shakespeare and attends some of his plays. If nothing else, such experiences create transnational communities of individuals connected through cultural products. The nationality, religion, gender, age, and other existential identities would be of much less significance than their willing exposure to things of beauty. Such communities had their origins centuries ago, but their number has exploded thanks to computer technology. Whether this phenomenon enhances transnational communication and "mentality" is, of course, a separate question that needs exploration.

Likewise with mountain-climbing, sports, and other physical exercises. Few historians have traced the ways in which such activities helped develop private worlds quite apart from political groupings or economic associations. Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu's *Transpacific Field of Dreams* (2012) is one of the first attempts at showing this. The book notes how rapidly baseball, which had been introduced to Japan at the end of the nineteenth century, returned to the country after the Second World War, no less through professional and amateur American ballplayers than through the reestablishment of professional baseball in the defeated country.[7]

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The key here is the construction of a transnational community through sport. It is not so much that baseball and similar activities trump geopolitical affairs, or vice versa, in defining US–Japanese, or by implication other international, relations, but that multiples of communities exist together, some of which might be more conducive to creating a sense of global humanity. Two recent studies of the Olympics, by Barbara Keys and Xu Guoqi, help elucidate the fascinating relationship between the national and the transnational.[8] What we desperately need may be a historical treatment of the "other" Olympics, namely Paralympics that bring together physically handicapped athletes from all over the world, who compete immediately after the regular Olympics are concluded.

The steady growth in number of cross-border travelers would also be an important transnational subject to which historians can be expected to pay increasing attention. Recently, excellent monographs have appeared in print, such as Harry Liebersohn's *The Travelers' World* (2006), a study of European, American, and other travelers through the modern ages.[9] One would expect more such studies in the future in view of the fact that the age of globalization has brought about mass travels. By the ninth decade of the twentieth century, some 278 million people were said to be visiting other countries as tourists, and the number continued to expand, till the end of the century when 687 million people were crossing borders for visiting friends, sight-seeing, and other engagements.[10] This accounted for about one out of every ten individuals in the world. Despite such an impressive statistic, few scholars seem to have examined this quintessentially transnational phenomenon in historical perspective. Students of global history would be particularly interested in this topic inasmuch as an increasing number of cross-border travelers began to originate in non-Western parts of the world such as the Middle-East and East Asia in the last decades of the twentieth century. What such transnational experiences do to individual tourists' views of themselves, of others, and of the world is a fascinating question to explore, the more so since the tourism industry in all countries has assumed a position of great significance in their economic affairs. Economic globalization in a sense goes together with social globalization.

Altogether different communities of individuals consist of those who are called "mentally disabled" and by other expressions, indicating people with intellectual, psychological, and other problems, making them "different" from "normal" persons. Usually hidden from history books, they are as global and transnational a presence as other

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categories of individuals. Their number has been increasing throughout the ages, in part because the "disabled" have become increasingly more visible as societies in which they live have come to recognize their existence and their humanity, in part because they themselves have increasingly voiced their right to live with dignity. Their nationality is of far less relevance than the fact that they share certain "disabilities." Of course, they and their guardians try to surmount them, some more successfully than others, and this may in part reflect different approaches adopted in the countries in which they live. But one wonders about those who are profoundly handicapped mentally so that they are not capable of oral communication. Yet they are no less human than "normal," healthy beings and constitute the world community as much as anyone else. A history of the "handicapped," whether physical or mental, is very much part of world history, and yet few have written about them in connection with such themes as globalization, migration, environmental issues, human rights, and the like. A discussion of such people in the context of human rights history would be a good beginning and would vastly expand our horizon. They may even be included in a study of memory. To be sure, people with mental disabilities may not articulate their memories, but who is to say they have no memory?

Speaking of various groups of people and their memories, the recent development of "whiteness studies," even studies of "Britishness," may be considered another promising instance of transnational history. Historians have explored "whiteness" in a transnational framework in part in order to make history less dominated by what has happened in the West. In their global conception, white people have been a race among several races, so that history may be studied in terms of how different races have constructed their own ways of life, including their own collective memories. In a similar vein, "Britishness" serves as a category to point to shared memories on the part of Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, and others whose national communities are constructed on that basis. As essays in *Britishness Abroad* (2007) suggest, those who consider themselves descendants of Great Britain have a cohesive memory of their national existences.[11] To the extent that more and more non-British, and especially non-white, people move into these countries, the "Britishness" factor may become weaker, and it will be an interesting question how there will develop new national memories on the part of ethnically diverse groups of people.

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The list of groups and communities susceptible of analysis in a global, transnational framework is limitless, but here one other category of such people may be mentioned: terrorists. They may have sprung from local roots and pursued their objectives in domestic-national contexts, but some of them are clearly transnational beings. In today's world one tends to focus on a particular group, Islamic fundamentalists, but it will be important to put them in some historical context and understand their ideologies and movements in relation to other terrorists in the past. For instance, Jonathan Gantt has shown in *Irish Terrorism in the Atlantic Community* (2010) that the threat of transnational terrorism is not of recent origin but goes back to earlier periods. In the case of Irish terrorism, the books shows that there were clear connections among terrorists, whether actual or potential, in the United Kingdom and the United States. One could extent this perspective to other regions of the world and trace the ways in which those dissatisfied with, offended by, or abusive of, the existing authorities would come together and form a global anti-establishment force, which in turn would provoke transnational responses on the part of the establishment. More studies along these lines would add a fresh perspective on global history.

Such a perspective would make an important contribution to the study of historical memory. Does one "remember" world history, not just national history, as a shared experience? That would be an ultimate question one may ask as part of the evolution of developing "global consciousness" or "global awareness," to use two of the more popular phrases in public discourses today. Ultimately, that would lead to the idea of global memory, or some common understanding of how humans have evolved over time, in particular how they have behaved toward one another and toward other begins with whom they share the planet. But since memory is not an automatic given but is inculcated through education and socialization, historians may make a contribution to the study of the subject by examining how history, in particular world history, is taught at the schools and universities in different countries and parts of the world. Here Dominic Sachsenmeier's pioneering study, *Global Perspectives on Global History* (2011), shows one excellent way to research such a question.[12] The book compares how world history is conceptualized and taught in the United States, Germany, and China and shows that there are significant differences as well as shared characteristics among historians and educators of the three countries in their understanding of world history. If more examples from other countries can be added, we shall gain an important insight into the sharing, or

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the difficulty in sharing, ideas about the development of world history. It may be added that the scholarly publications in environmental history and human rights history have contributed significantly to developing shared perspectives on how humans have treated non-humans on the planet and on how they have developed a sense of common humanity, both subjects whose understanding would be vital to developing transnational memory.

Ultimately, we may be speaking of transnational memory as a hybrid formulation, a product of the blending of all sorts of experiences and recollections. Indeed, it seems possible to say that one transnational phenomenon to which scholars may be expected to pay increasing attention would be "hybridity." Anthropologists have for some time been using the term to refer to the existence of multiple identities and their blending into something new, but historians have not quite embraced such an approach. The scholarship in global and transnational history, however, will almost inevitably come to include studies of hybrid phenomena. Among the earliest works (published in the last 20-odd years) that call our attention to hybridity has been Martin Bernal's *Black Athena* (1991), a controversial study of the ancient Mediterranean world in which the author argues that the ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome, universally considered to be where Western civilization originated, were in fact hybrid products, a result of the intermixing of people from North Africa, the Near East, and the Mediterranean.[13] In a way Bernal was describing a "transnational" world that existed in that part of the globe more than 2,000 years ago. Although not all specialists have accepted his interpretation, he performed valuable service in calling our attention to the importance of hybridity, indeed in noting that virtually all human communities are hybrid products. In other words, he notes, and it is easy to agree, that there is no such thing as a "pure" race, culture, or nation. They are all products of the comings and goings of people in all periods of time. Encounters and interactions among groups of people, of course, are among the key themes in global and transnational history, so it may be expected that historians will be increasingly applying such a construction to the phenomena that they study, including migrations, cultural transfers and interchanges, as well as to religious, literary, musical, culinary, and other human activities.

One could go a step further and say that all individuals are hybrids in more than one way, products of diverse biological and cultural influences. Some are transparently hybrid in the sense of being of "mixed blood," and in the age of globalization their number is clearly on the rise. Biracial

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and multiracial individuals are no longer a rare phenomenon, if they ever were. It would appear that the global community has been much more familiar with, and tolerant of, such people than individual nations. That may suggest that one distinguishing aspect of a globalizing, transnationalizing world is the increasing evidence of hybridity. But this phenomenon is not limited to interracial persons. That even those who are presumably less hybrid—those whose immediate forebears are not of mixed blood—are exposed to, and transform themselves through, hybrid experiences becomes evident in studies of "transnational individuals." For example, the study of several such people in *Transnational Lives* (2010) shows that, while they were not of mixed-blood parentage, they not only crossed borders and oceans more than once during their lifetime but also that in the process came to experience, blend, and exemplify a mixture of influences.[14] We can go further and say that even those who never go abroad or establish close relations with foreigners are heirs to cultures—including language, food, and ways of life—that have increasingly become hybridized.

It is possible that as a consequence of the development of such perspectives, nations, too, will come to be seen as equally hybrid products and that in this sense sharp distinctions among them would dissipate. Studies of international relations, in such a context, would not deal with sharply divergent identities and struggles to preserve their respective traditions and ways of life, as they have traditionally tended to do, but with themes and problems that cut across territorial boundaries. In such a way, international history would become transnational history. Instead of examining clashes of divergent national interests, scholars may focus more on relationships, sometimes harmonious and cooperative, but at other times conflictual, among non-national entities and non-state actors. Further studies of the process of personal and national "hybridization" will be among the contributions that global and transnational history can make.

Just as the concept of hybridity enables us to see all humans as interblended and interconnected so that there is no such thing as a "pure" existence, we may expect to see in the near future the increasing awareness that the traditional distinction between human beings and other beings must be abandoned for a perspective in which they all blend into the wide world, into the whole planet. Historians, no less than scholars in other fields, start nowadays with the perception that humans have always shared the earth with other living things, even that our planet has shared the universe with all other stars since the Big Bang millions of years ago. That is why some speak of "planetarity," the idea that human

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history must be put in the context of planetary and cosmic evolution. The study of the natural environment on this earth is in its infancy but has already made much progress. It may be expected that many more scholars will be including in their studies of the past the question of how humans have interacted, indeed often blended, with the animals and plants that share the same space. Global history and transnational history may both in time move in the direction of planetary history. That may signal the last stage in the long journey away from nation-centric histories.

Notes

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4 Hunt and Levine, *Arc of Empire*, pp. 112–113.
5 See Akira Iriye, "The Internationalization of History," *American Historical Review*, February, 1989, p. 1.
6 Joy Damousi and Mariano Ben Plotkin, eds, *The Transnational Unconscious: Essays in the History of Psychoanalysis and Transnationalism* (London, 2009).
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9 Harry Liebersohn, *The Travelers' World: Europe to the Pacific* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2006).
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11 Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw, and Stuart Macintyre, eds, *Britishness Abroad: Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures* (London, 2007).
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