THE HOLOCAUST AND ITS CONTEXTS

Finland's Holocaust

Silences of History

Edited by
Simo Muir and Hana Worthen

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Finland's Holocaust

Silences of History

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Each individual chapter in *Finland's Holocaust* represents the views and analysis of its writer, who alone is responsible for the content and the way she or he represents its subject.

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1
Introduction: Contesting the Silences of History

Hana Worthen and Simo Muir

Finland's Holocaust: Silences of History pursues two interlocking goals. The first is to trace the implications of antisemitism in Finland from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through Finland's alliance with the Third Reich during much of World War II to the complex negotiation with its wartime past controversially emerging in contemporary historiography. In the second, by taking up a range of issues—from cultural history, folklore, the arts, and sports, to the interpretation of military and national history—this collection examines how the writing of history and modern Finnish memory have both engaged and evaded the figure of the Holocaust since the war. Unpacking the nexus of the German–Finnish World War II alliance, often described as a strategic necessity, and long-standing patterns of German–Finnish cultural affiliation colored by the rhetoric of race in the 1930s and 1940s, the anthology turns its attention to the practices and constructs of Finnish academia and society that have worked to displace the narrative of antisemitism from Finnish history. In an important sense, the aim of the anthology is to analyze these varied modes of displacement; as silent and silenced histories, they, too, sustain a prominent strain of historical writing, or, better, sustain its lack of perceptive models for a more complex understanding of antisemitism in Finland.

Paradigms of *separation*

Aiming to examine historical and contemporary events, institutional and political discourses, censorship practices, and memories as a way to rethink and to particularize the trope of "Finland's Holocaust" in the national and international context, this collection of essays diversifies the terms of the national narrative of modern Finnish history. *Finland's Holocaust* arises from the critique of the normative "separation narrative" of Finland's participation in World War II. With regard to military and political history, this paradigm—having been subjected to critique by professional historians since the 1980s—might seem dated. And yet, as the collection at hand

argues, *separation* continues to provide a significant paradigmatic resource in academic analysis across fields of historical and cultural representation. Although Finland became an ally of the Third Reich during their joint attack on the Soviet Union in the so-called Continuation War (1941–44), Finnish historical culture has conventionally imagined the Holocaust as an isolated event, an affair and an arrangement of the Third Reich *separate* from its military "co-belligerence." This principle of "separation" has had far reaching effects, sustaining the warrant for disacknowledging antisemitism as an element of Finnish culture, for dismissing possible mistreatment of Jews in Finland during the Finnish alliance, including those Jewish refugees extradited to Germany, and for repudiating the entanglement with the racialized *Kultur* promoted by the Third Reich. Rather than merely proposing a corrective to this exclusionary history and historiography, *Finland's Holocaust* proposes an elaboration both of the narrative of Finland's past and of the rhetorical structures of Finnish historiography, aiming to subject the unified national narrative both to a plurality of perspectives and to the heterogeneity of scholarly expertise.

The discourses of *separation* are rooted in the consensual interpretations of Finland's role in the Second World War, which vary from fighting its own "separate war" to being "thrown into the swirl of great power politics *like a piece of driftwood* carried by a surging stream," to the image of a "skillfully *steered row-boat*" managing its direction in the torrent of events (our emphasis).[1] In this patriotic narrative, Finland was involved in a sequence of three conflicts: the *heroic* Winter War (November 1939–March 1940) against the Soviet Union when Finland, *sold by* Germany in the Hitler–Stalin pact of 1939, *abandoned by* the Allies, and *dragged into* the war countered the superior Soviet forces, eventually making a peace treaty ceding considerable eastern border territory to the Soviet Union; the Continuation War (June 1941–September 1944), in which the Third Reich and Finland agreed on *exclusively military cooperation* against the joint Communist enemy; and the Lapland War (September 1944–April 1945), in which a nearly defeated Finland *was pressured* by the Soviet Union to expel the German army stationed there. The circumstances of these wars were, of course, much more complex than this totalizing, neatly aligned oscillation between the heroic victor and hapless victim allows. Indeed, finding the appropriate term for the collaborative relationship of the Continuation War was particularly difficult. Adolf Hitler announced that the German forces were fighting *im Bunde*, *in league* with their Finnish comrades, provoking an immediate, public, denial from the Finnish government, which first declared its neutrality and subsequently maintained it fought a parallel, "separate war" against the Soviets, alongside but not allied with its German "brothers-in-arms." Yet the public declaration of a "separate war" was immediately compromised, notably by Finnish defense propaganda: when Finland entered into Operation Barbarossa, Finland was imagined as fighting to save the New Europe—not

exclusively Finland—from the "Asian plague."[2] Given the paradox of fighting a "separate war" to install the racially privileged New Europe, it is difficult not to see an ideological convergence that goes well beyond a merely pragmatic, military relationship between the "brothers-in-arms."

Redirecting attention away from the ideological interinvolvement of the Finnish–German relationship—a sensitive issue given the powerful Soviet propinquity during the Cold War—in order to forestall both potential Soviet penalties and also national trauma following the gradual disclosure of the Holocaust after 1945, a normative framing of the alliance has been widely accepted both among institutional scholars and (with their help, too) the larger Finnish public. After the Finnish–Soviet armistice of 1944, the Soviet Union wielded direct and indirect influence in Finland, both as the result of its central role in the Allied Control Commission set up in Helsinki to oversee the terms of the treaty, and after the war through official and unofficial channels. It is now generally accepted that scholars toward the political right and center avoided issues that might conceivably damage Finnish interests in the eyes of the Soviets; more critical or left-leaning scholarship was simply denied credibility, as was scholarship arising abroad, which tended to regard Finland's alliance as a tactic of "calculated risk" rather than the pursuit of "separate" political aims.[3] The consensual narrative is reinforced by those (the Finnish volunteers in the *Waffen-SS* or the Finnish Jews, for instance) who participated in the war and under various pressures did not subsequently counter the master narrative. Until very recently, in scholarship and in public discourse the term "co-belligerent" formulaically reiterated *a Finnish sense* that the Finnish–German alliance was for nationally defensive military purposes, and that Finland's parliamentary democracy and liberal institutions were unsullied by the dictatorial model and transnational politics of National Socialism. Notwithstanding casting Finland as having been involved in a mainly pragmatic, "separate war," the notion of *separation* sanitizes the complexities of the alliance, in part by insisting that Finland stood entirely apart from the Reich's racial ideologies and their in/human consequences. This perspective on history dramatizes the interplay between structures of national identification (Finnishness) and the ways they appear to have channeled the interpretation of the historical record—incomplete as it is—toward a specific way of reading the "reality" of Jews in Finland during, before, and after the war.

To be sure, though an ally of the Third Reich, Finland did not enact racial laws on the model of its "brother-in-arms"; yet it cannot be said that Finland or the Finnish state was uniformly opposed to aligning the Finnish people with the "Nordic" (Aryan) racial discourse as a means of improving its standing with Nazi Germany and securing its *Lebensraum,* Living Space, in the prospective New Europe. From the outset, then, *separation* was an emphatically rhetorical screen: while the Third Reich and Finland combined forces against the shared Communist enemy, a pro-German political and

cultural elite was involved in the production and dissemination of racializing discourse for Finnish and German audiences, Finnish government offices produced a potent body of propaganda approximating a racial affiliation between the Finns and their "Nordic" "brothers-in-arms," Finnish art was sent to Germany to represent the soul of a "Nordic"-related people, the Finnish State Police cooperated closely with its German counterparts, Finnish volunteers served in the *Waffen-SS*—all subjects touched on by essays in *Finland's Holocaust*. Particularly from the point of view of Finland's imagination of and participation in the project of New Europe, it becomes increasingly difficult to reiterate the thematics of *separation* in order to stage "Finland" as unequivocally "protecting" Jewish populations.

"Finland's Holocaust" is necessarily a complex ligature, still denied by the consensual narrative, in which Finland not only preserved democracy, but also "protected" its native Jewish community, which in the 1940s numbered about 2,000 persons. One basis for this argument lies in the fact that male Finnish Jews fought in the Finnish army, and as some of them expressed after the war, "We were granted an incomprehensible blessing by our being able to fight for our freedom and human dignity while our unarmed brethren of the same faith were destroyed in neighbouring Nordic countries and elsewhere in Europe."[4] Instead of setting the narrative of the Jewish soldier in the critical context of the Finnish–German alliance, nationalist history turns to this Jewish figure to underline the trope of *separation* in moral terms. As historian Hannu Rautkallio puts it, "considered as a whole, the role played in the war by the Jews of Finland did not necessarily differ from that of the rest of the Finnish population." And yet, the Jews nonetheless occupy for Rautkallio a distinct moral sphere:

> every Finnish soldier of the Jewish faith had to justify to his conscience, in one way or another, his "comradeship-in-arms" with the Germans, no matter how theoretical its basis. As Jews, they had a better grasp than the other Finns of the historical connections of Germany's racial policies. Their own ethnic background made them aware of how the flame of anti-Semitism can be fuelled by the slightest irritants.[5]

Rautkallio here effectively assigns responsibility for the morally compromising alliance: for the Finns, the moral dilemma of the "comradeship-in-arms" is characteristically "theoretical," while the moral consequences of the alliance are charged to the Jews. The war had broken the figurative ghetto, as Finland needed the services of all its male citizens. Nonetheless, Rautkallio returns the Jewish soldiers to a kind of moral ghetto, and scapegoats them as well: given their alleged "better grasp than the other Finns of the historical connections of Germany's racial politics," the Jews bear any moral burden that might arise from the "comradeship-in-arms." Including the Jews in Finland's armed forces appears to mark Finland's ideological *separation*

from the policies of the Third Reich; yet in assigning the primary moral dilemma of fighting alongside the forces responsible for the Holocaust to the Jewish soldiers, Rautkallio effectively scapegoats them, using them to cleanse "Finnish" national identity of the implications of its compromising alliance.[6]

In June 2008, The Woodrow Wilson Center's History and Public Policy Program hosted an international conference in Washington, DC, "Escape From the Holocaust? The Fate of Jews in Finland and other Scandinavian Countries," featuring Rautkallio as principal organizer; Rautkallio also provided a short monograph, *The Jews in Finland: Spared from the Holocaust*, as a "guide to the subject matter."[7] Perhaps not surprisingly in this regard, the conference presented "the findings of recent studies of the exceptional status of Finnish Jews," in the laudatory context of "the rescue of Jews from the Holocaust in several European countries."[8] Reiterating his sense that "The Finnish Jews were, at the same time, both spared from the Holocaust and participants in Hitler's war against the Soviet Union," Rautkallio underlines the implied purpose of the conference: "the systematic destruction of Jews was the central objective of Hitler's eastern campaign. The credit for their not meeting this fate [in Finland] goes to the Finns."[9] Rautkallio's remarks dramatize the extent to which the paradigm of *separation* is used to obscure possible antisemitism in Finnish society, and any possible "Finnish" connection to the Holocaust as well.

While Finnish postwar scholarship worked to install respectable (that is morally virtuous) notions of Finnish national identity and self-esteem, it exiled the subject of wartime antisemitism from the image of Finland. In one sense, boldly displacing antisemitism from the scholarly enterprise can be seen to undermine the development of a *critical sensitivity* toward the *desensitizing* attitudes and practices active within Finnish public discourse. Exiling antisemitism seems to resonate with the contemporary *separation* of Finland from the Holocaust as a European project. As Dan Stone pointedly demonstrates, although directed by National Socialist ideologies and practices, the Holocaust encompasses the "indigenous persecution that burst out under Nazi protection."

> Nazism burst the bounds of German ultra-nationalism and sought . . . to create a pan-European racial community, with the Germans and their racially valuable allies at the top and Slavs at the bottom, reduced to slaves. In this vision of a Nazi empire, Jews had no place at all. The Holocaust, then, was a European project, and the belated recognition of this fact helps to explain why at the turn of the twenty-first century European states finally began to acknowledge that it has something to do with them.[10]

The slow acknowledgment of a possible national implication in the Holocaust in Finland arises in part from the institutionalized uses of "history."

Finland's Holocaust?

Standing at the intersection of several competing models of Finland's relation to the European project of the Holocaust, *Finland's Holocaust* asserts itself against the self-assured production of history. In its mythopoetic dimension, history is a "system of communication" as much by the way it narrates "objects" or "events" of the past as by the way it structures its narrative. As narrative, history inevitably comprises interpretation and embodies values. What *any* history produces is less an unproblematic realization of the past than a provisional model of that reality, which when repeated enough asserts itself in the common memory as a prescribed "fact," a myth. Ordered by written or oral narrative, events undergo *naturalization*: myth "transforms history into nature." Recording and making sense of "objects," animating "facts" "worthy of notice and illustration,"[11] the paradigms of *separation* during and after World War II validate the coercive totality of a national/ist perspective.

The narratives of nationalized history are perhaps the most sophisticated and elaborately instrumentalized of mythologies; since the analysis of the figures of the Holocaust and of antisemitism are both largely absent from the field of traditional Finnish history and historiography, undoing the naturalized myth requires rewriting its plot. As Professor of Nordic, European, and World History Bo Stråth remarks, the "outline of a new past" is conditioned by the present imagining of a new future; both the "cultural turn in the 1980s and the emergence of constructivist methodologies"—led by Foucault—have tended to foreground the "ideological and largely political" structure of making history.[12] In "Nordic Foundation Myths after 1945," Stråth illustrates the difficulty of dislodging a naturalized mythology. Stråth argues that while the postwar historiographies of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland were distinct, they share some larger common patterns. After the "heroic" narratives of survival characteristic of the 1950s, "critical challenges to the heroic narratives" arose in the 1970s, "led by professional historians or, as in Sweden, by media and literary figures"; yet these sporadic "critical challenges" are, for Stråth, characterized as "more-or-less moralistic accounts of collaboration instead of resistance, veiled cooperation instead of neutrality." The 1970s phase was itself displaced by the "emerging master narrative after 1990 . . . built on imaginations of universal values in the name of enlightened liberalism," in which a "*moralist* tendency in the language of tolerance gave it a twist of intolerance in its demarcation of that which was said not to be tolerant and not to belong to the West, in particular Islam" (our emphasis). Stråth is alert to the pluralism of the new history, and alert, too, to moments when historical *revision* appears illegitimately motivated, giving rise not only to unduly "moralized" accounts, but to history "as *kitsch*." In this regard, his concern for the dynamics of historical revision in Denmark extends to a wider concern for the revision of World War II history across

Scandinavia: "Moralism and confrontation, rather than synthesis and critical skepticism, became the carriers of history."[13]

Although Stråth is aware of the reciprocal "moralizing" of both foundational myths and their critique, and recognizes that "history is continuously reconsidered and renegotiated," and so "depends on the context of the present where the narrative is composed," he is concerned that the process of sustaining historical revision too often sustains an illicit "moralizing." While shifts in historical writing have allowed for a greater "self-understanding" and for a widening of nation-state perspectives "toward the language of European diversity," such revision can appear unpalatably relativist: "A new future required new values. Truth became a key word, old truths were renamed hypocrisy." Finally, though, for Stråth, the influence of memory studies has decisively underlined "the constructivist approach," the "growing insight that history is much less about discovering a deserted past waiting for explorers than it is about constructing a past that gives meaning to the present and helps us to imagine the future." Properly concerned that historical inquiry not substitute either moralizing or relativism as its means for interrogating master narratives, Stråth outlines a nuanced sense of the interplay of national identity, moral and ideological change, and institutional participation in the fashioning of history. Given the sponsored frame of the collection, Stråth perhaps inevitably overstates the progress of professional historical revision in Finland, yet he rightly notes the breadth of "public debate" about the wartime and postwar past, "which has not only involved media and politics but has in fact been led by them."[14]

In approaching "Finland's Holocaust," the essays here necessarily claim a critical perspective on the past as a function of current history, one that may have a significant moral dimension and important moral consequences, but that should not reduce itself to mere "moralizing." For much of the past half century and more, institutionalized Finnish history and historiography concerned with Finland's complicity with the Third Reich has enacted a relatively consistent paradigm: instead of setting the projects of history into a dialectical relationship with the national "myth of foundation" (or, for that matter, with the founding myth of national historiography), it preferred the myth of "neutral" or "objective" historical narrative, *separate* from the motives or ideology of historians themselves. Of course, during the Continuation War nearly all aspects of military, social, academic, political, and cultural life were permeated by compromise with the Third Reich, and during the Cold War Finland delicately sought not to antagonize the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, refuting the critique of its specious objectivity, "'professional' historical research" (as opposed to post-modernist ideas of narrating history)[15] has tended to encode the nation-state as inevitably justifying the narrative of history, erasing facts, events, and memories from the historical record to create a master narrative which the essays in this collection typically regard as traditional, conservative, dominant, orthodox,

national/ist, and nationalistic. *Finland's Holocaust* implicitly sets the questions of national identification and nationalist narrative in their own contemporary international and political context, and in the context of an emerging transnational disposition as well.

As Stråth implies, though, to engage with the Holocaust today is to engage with the defining moral instrument of European identification. Outside Finland, the Holocaust and its interpretations have gained a prominent place in European historical culture during the last two decades. Political scientist Claus Leggewie elaborates the idea of the Holocaust as a "negative foundational myth," addressing it as an instrument of European self-awareness, significantly providing a device for Europe to tackle its own contemporary racism, xenophobia, and discrimination.[16] In this regard, the "Holocaust" becomes a figure for the process of European self-reflection, fostering the critical imagination of the sensibilities of its "others," its minorities and immigrants, and leading to the implementation of a more just society in the present. Needless to say, the Holocaust is not a figure enclosed in singularity, but an instrumentalized means pointing both to itself and beyond itself, extending to other genocides, other "holocausts." While the transformative power of this policy on the internalized mythologies of modern history is visible in the inquiry into Holocaust history and memory across Europe, in Finland efforts to frame the Holocaust as part of a shared European legacy in developing a European/Western memory culture—in a continuous process of self-examination—have developed with notable reservations. As historian Markku Jokisipilä saw it in 2010, "Confessing collective guilt for the Holocaust has become a kind of entrance ticket to post-nationalist Europeanness. In Finland the discussion has been different, and the idea of the mass murder of Jews as a base for a common European identity has not really found an echo among us. Nevertheless, the topic is raised in discussion more and more often here, too."[17] Reducing the possibility of reflecting on the complexity of moral and political involvement to the binary assignment of guilt or innocence, Jokisipilä embodies the reluctance that has, for the most part, hindered the anatomy of "Finland's Holocaust."

Pointing to the differences between the development of Holocaust discourse in Finland and in other countries, Henrik Meinander further explains the traditional "delay in the Finnish reception of international ideas and views. However," he says, "a more obvious reason" for Finland's refusal to investigate its potential involvement in the Holocaust "seems to be that Finnish wartime experiences are in some crucial respects more like those in Eastern Europe than in the western parts of German-occupied Europe."

> The substantial human and territorial losses have together with personal memories of the war played such a dominant role in research and public discourse that the idea of a Finnish Holocaust centre could easily be seen as a bad joke. Another, more unique reason for the Finnish reluctance

> to participate in this "Holocaustification" of the Second World War is that Finnish Jews did their patriotic duty, fully taking part in the war despite the military alliance with Germany in 1941–1944. How can such an existential choice be explained in a museum exhibition intended for teenagers and American tourists?[18]

Professor of History at the University of Helsinki, Meinander foregrounds identity politics as the explanatory background for the fortunes of Holocaust discourse in Finland. On the one hand, non-Jewish Finns' memories of the war and territorial losses seem to outweigh the possible involvement of Finland in the Holocaust; indeed their wartime experiences are compared to those of Eastern Europe, which here seems to stand for the territories invaded, occupied, and exploited by the Reich. On the other, Finnish Jews—patriotically fighting in the Finnish forces, and so compromised by fighting alongside the genocidal Third Reich—faced "an existential choice" that is too complex for representation to the general public. Meinander's tone is dismissively *insensitive* to the weight of the issue. Not only is the possibility of establishing a Holocaust center to investigate Finland's involvement nearly a "bad joke," but effort to represent the complexity of that history—a history described, as it is by Rautkallio, as weighing more heavily in moral terms on Finland's Jews—would satisfy only the degraded, and overly politicized, attention of "teenagers and American tourists."

Although Meinander's recent monograph *Suomi 1944: Sota, yhteiskunta, tunnemaisema* (Finnish, Finland 1944: War, society, emotional landscape) decisively pluralizes the homogenous nation-state identity by confronting the dominant "Finnish" imagination with that of the "other," Swedish-language Finns, Jewish experiences are still avoided. Reading "Holocaustification" alongside *Suomi 1944,* one can see Meinander extending Finnish exceptionalism in unsettling ways that illustrate the perils of "moralized" history. For Finland was unique in the terms of its alliance with the Third Reich: "Unlike Germany's other allies, Finland received aid deliveries on credit, so the Finnish war was financed largely by capital coming from the German occupied Europe."[19] Here, the "German occupied Europe" has a very different register than the "Eastern Europe" Meinander uses to portray Finland and its population as a cognate victim of the Third Reich. Nonetheless, although being a client state of the Third Reich might seem to implicate Finland in the vortex of the "complexity of the roots of the Holocaust,"[20] for Meinander this compromised relationship is exculpatory, since without such assistance "the majority of the Finns would die of hunger."[21] After the war, Meinander stresses, Finland did not repay Germany; its wartime debt to the Third Reich was in effect redirected as peacetime reparation to the victorious Soviet Union. Suggesting that there was little to weigh in this choice between "war or peace," Meinander takes Finland's reparations to the Soviet Union as a sign of its commitment to peace,

as a moral choice to protect the nation from further warfare, whereas its joining with the Reich was merely expedient, an act of survival with no other significant moral consequences or liabilities. Finland's payment to the Soviet Union dramatizes Finland's uncompromised, morally correct orientation toward peace, while of course silently displacing the question that might arise for a sensitive reader about the implicit involvement in the Holocaust dramatized by Germany's wartime aid sustaining Finnish lives.

What is performed, then, in Meinander's narrative is still a paradigm of *separation*: in order to forgo critical analysis of the wartime circumstances that would position Finland in a larger European perspective, Meinander chooses to outweigh the compromises of Continuation War history with the ballast of familiar national merits. This reasoning should give us pause, precisely because it reveals Meinander's appeal to the sensibilities of a known nationalized readership. Here, rather than being identified with Eastern Europe's subjection to the Third Reich, Finland benefits from the Reich's exploitation—and, indeed, enslavement—of its populations, used to produce the military equipment deployed not only by German forces but by Finnish forces as well; this dimension of the narrative is, however, overlooked. Published for both academic and non-academic audiences, *Suomi 1944* hews to the arc of patriotic narrative, taking a *separatist* perspective consistent with a misrecognition of Finland's wider implication in World War II. Whether intentionally or not, Meinander reproduces the common notion of Finland's virtuous exceptionality as an ally of the Reich, reflecting rather than inquiring into the readership's nationalized horizon of expectation. Resisting Finland's potential involvement in the Holocaust—under the trivializing label "Holocaustification"—maintains Finland as *separate* from the common history of wartime and postwar Europe, a history which increasingly recognizes that the "collaboration across Europe allowed the Holocaust to occur on a scale that would have been impossible were only Germans involved."[22]

National/ist Finnish historians tend to regard the shared European legacy of Holocaust Studies with suspicion and reserve, especially in its moral dimension. While the discourse of "Holocaustification" aims to arouse a biased anxiety that Finland will be judged, found morally guilty by "teenagers and American tourists" and the broader international public, the trope of the Holocaust is set forward in contemporary political and pedagogical uses with different aspirations: to enable a self-critical discourse prompting the national self-imagination to open a non-discriminatory view of both human interdependency and human vulnerability. Meinander's reasoning is representative of a wider refusal of the intended uses of Holocaust history: to fashion a transnational structure of justice and human rights. Vulnerability to critique is not an end in itself, but the means to diminish the reiteration of humanity's discriminatory practices in the future, a reiteration sustained by legitimized professional history, too.

A concrete example can illustrate the role of professional authority in managing the consensual historical narrative. The reception of American musicologist Timothy L. Jackson's article "Sibelius and the Political" refocused the question of Finnish–German wartime relations and individual moral responsibility on the figure of the great Finnish composer.[23] At the heart of the discussion is Sibelius's 1934 refusal to assist German-Jewish composer Günther Raphael; according to Jackson, Raphael imagined that support from Sibelius might have made it possible to continue his career at the Leipzig Conservatory or to find shelter in Finland. In this context, Sibelius's unwillingness to help Raphael and his compliance with National Socialism in order to obtain his royalties are brought under scrutiny, suggesting that Sibelius did not want to endanger his position in Nazi Germany, which also honored him with the Goethe Medal he received from Hitler in 1935, with establishing the Sibelius Society in 1942, and with a pension. While these circumstances might seem, at the very least, to provide a complicating explanatory context for Sibelius's fortunes in the Third Reich, Markku Jokisipilä dismisses Jackson's arguments for failing to understand the Finnish context, as anachronistically applying contemporary moral standards to the past, and for simplistically reiterating the "absolute evil" of National Socialism in ways that deny historical complexity.

> Accusing Sibelius of Nazism and antisemitism is a typical example of dangers which go with interpreting the past from the perspective of the moral concepts and the knowledge developed after the time of the event. Elevating National Socialist Germany as a historical symbol of absolute evil may serve pedagogic purposes but it makes reaching accurate representation of history extremely difficult.[24]

What is significant from the point of view of *Finland's Holocaust* is that Jokisipilä draws a sharp, and artificial, dichotomy between correct scrutiny of Finnish–German relations and contemporary human rights and moral standards, as though an "accurate" understanding of Finland's political position during the war necessarily excludes the deliberation of human rights. Of course, the 1942 protests surrounding the Finnish extradition of the Jewish refugees implies that a discourse of "moral concepts" was in fact also part of the wartime ideological landscape. Nonetheless, for Jokisipilä, the application of antisemitism to Finland in the prewar and wartime period is anachronistic; "we should, for example, charge the 1956 leaders and citizens of Finland for crushing the Hungarian Revolution, since, after all, our country was in relationship of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with the chief architect of the intervention, the Soviet Union."[25] Jokisipilä's riposte unintentionally opens an intriguing possibility: when the period of Finland's enforced "friendship" with the Soviet Union undergoes the kind of critique just now emerging of its "co-belligerence" with the Third Reich,

we might well anticipate that both individual and collective acts will emerge with a more complex interpretive resonance than they had in the Cold War period and after as well. Given the cult of Sibelius in Finland, the critique of Sibelius's potential antisemitism is particularly challenging. Overcharging Jackson with the fatal failure to understand the Third Reich in complex ways, and so undermining Jackson's scholarly credibility, Jokisipilä's remarks feature a crucial recognition: because Finnish historical consciousness lacks the concept of *Finnish* antisemitism, the antisemitism of the 1930s and war period is exclusively attributed to the Third Reich and its Nazism. Antisemitism is, in this *separatist* view, inherently not a Finnish issue; assigning antisemitism to Finland, then, is predictably taken as a spurious act of intellectual illiteracy, anachronistic fiction.[26]

During the past thirty years, controversies concerning Finnish Jewish citizens, and Finland's treatment of Jewish refugees and POWs have sporadically broken through the silences of history, dramatizing the challenges both to reviewing the predominant currents of modern Finnish history and to conceiving the role of antisemitism in Finland past and present. These disputes, which have preoccupied scholars, the wider public, and governmental institutions, were prompted in large part by two studies, Elina Sana's landmark *Kuoleman laiva s/s Hohenhörn: Juutalaispakolaisten kohtalo Suomessa* (Finnish, Death ship SS Hohenhörn: The fate of the Jewish refugees in Finland, 1979) and *Luovutetut: Suomen ihmisluovutukset Gestapolle* (Finnish, Extradited: Finland's human deliveries to the Gestapo, 2003).[27] Addressing both a general audience and professional historians, Sana raised the issue of Finland's deportation of Jewish refugees and exchange of wartime prisoners and civilians with the German and Soviet authorities. Writing as an "other" outside the prescribed national/ist interpretative framework, she presented an account that evoked, problematized, and pluralized the narrative of Finland's "protection" of Jews. Though neither of Sana's books is available in English, they promoted a much-needed process of historical re-examination in Finland, a process that continues to be embraced by some and resisted by others. Given its widespread influence, and the international controversies it has generated, Sana's work is addressed by several articles in *Finland's Holocaust*.

In *Kuoleman laiva*, Sana takes account of the close cooperation between the Finnish State Police, the *Sicherheitsdienst*, and the Gestapo, leading to the extradition of eight Jewish refugees to Nazi Germany (via Tallinn, Estonia) in 1942, amid considerable public outcry in the Finnish press and especially among Social Democrats. In *Luovutetut*, she argues that Finland, having given 2,829 POWs to the Germans (525 were political prisoners, and 74 were of Jewish origin), may have been preparing for a more extensive handing over of captured Jewish POWs, a plan that was aborted with the controversy that arose over the 1942 extraditions. The nature and scale of the controversy provoked by Sana's *Luovutetut* dramatizes the depth and volatility of issues surrounding Jews and the Holocaust in Finland. As a result of *Luovutetut*,

in November 2003, the Simon Wiesenthal Center urged Finnish President Tarja Halonen to appoint an independent committee of specialists to "investigate the events connected to the deportations," recommending that it include "external scholars with expertise in the history of the Holocaust" because "it would not be appropriate for the state institutions involved in these events to examine their own activities."[28] Quickly responding to the charge, "Jatkosotaa varjonpuolelta: Pakolaisten ja vankien kohtelu Suomessa ja heidän karkottamisensa Saksaan ja Neuvostoliittoon" (Finnish, The shadow of the Continuation War: The treatment of refugees and prisoners of war in Finland and their deportation to Germany and the Soviet Union) was drafted by historian Heikki Ylikangas and submitted to Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen's office in January 2004. Ylikangas's report acknowledged that Sana's book "poses challenges for conventional historical research, which in Finland has been committed, for an exceptionally long time, to defending 'Finland's honour', in other words the decisions of war-time leaders." Yet, "in order to defend the 'honour' of today's Finland, it is essential to address unpleasant aspects of war, too."[29] While the report catalogues the merits of Sana's work, we can also hear defensive overtones throughout: Sana's work is journalistic rather than professional/academic; some of the details it brings to light had already been covered in unpublished graduate theses and in Taimi Torvinen's *Pakolaiset Suomessa Hitlerin valtakaudella* (Finnish, Refugees in Finland during Hitler's reign, 1984). Though Torvinen's book was written twenty years before Sana's, Ylikangas proposes it for translation into English as the standard book for the international community, thus again working to conceal rather than open the debate outside Finland, and continuing the marginalization of Sana's pioneering approach.

Nevertheless, Sana's work, in conjunction with the intervention of the Wiesenthal Center, led the National Archives of Finland to undertake a project, "Prisoner-of-war deaths and people handed over in Finland 1939–1955," completed in 2008 and made available as an internet database "containing information on prisoner-of-war and civilian deaths on both Finnish prisoner-of-war-camps and camps for civilian internees in Eastern Karelia"; the database is accompanied by a "research report," *Prisoners of War Deaths and People Handed over to Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939–55*.[30] This undertaking has prompted scholarship on the treatment of Jewish refugees and POWs and on the plight of Jews in Finland during the 1930s and 1940s more generally; Sana's work, then, is also part of a wider re-examination of the ongoing paradigms of *separation*.

In 2008, participant in the National Archives project historian Oula Silvennoinen, a contributor to this volume, published an influential study, *Salaiset aseveljet: Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933–1944* (Finnish, Secret brothers-in-arms: The cooperation of the Finnish and German security police 1933–1944), unveiling the work of *Einsatzkommando Finnland* and its collaboration with the Finnish State Police; before

Silvennoinen's study, the actions of the *Einsatzkommando Finnland* were absent from Finnish history.[31] Silvennoinen estimates that about 500 Soviet POWs were handed to the *Einsatzkommando Finnland*, of whom ten percent were Jews. Moreover, Silvennoinen's account of Finnish–German cooperation directly challenges the notion of *separation*: "The critical period of German–Finnish security police co-operation began in 1941, as Finland joined the German assault on the Soviet Union. Together with the Finnish Security Police, the RSHA [*Reichssicherheitshauptamt*] set up a previously unknown special unit, the Einsatzkommando Finnland, entrusted with the destruction of the perceived ideological and racial enemies on the northernmost part of the German Eastern Front. Joint actions in northern Finland led also members of the Finnish Security Police to become participants in mass murders of Communists and Jews."[32]

The rhetoric of *separation* essentially implies that Finnish society and culture were insulated from the racial antisemitism of the Third Reich; to be sure, the Holocaust was not merely the result of racial antisemitism, but of a wide range of antisemitic regimes and modern factors including its economic, industrial, technological, and political implementation internationally. Recent scholarship has also begun to document the function of antisemitism in Finland in the prewar and wartime periods, and in the making of postwar history. Simo Muir has shown that antisemitic sentiments influenced the rejection of Israel-Jakob Schur's PhD dissertation in the humanities at the University of Helsinki and at the Swedish-language Åbo Akademi University in Turku in the late 1930s, an argument that has gained wide and controversial attention in Finland and abroad as well.[33] Moreover, Muir's discussion extends the antisemitic judgment against Schur into the present, as a witness to contemporary attitudes.

As the result of Muir's study, in 2008 Helsinki University Rector Ilkka Niiniluoto appointed a committee to review the matter. It made no finding with regard to the involvement of antisemitism in the rejection of Schur's dissertation, asserting instead that the principles of proper scholarly evaluation had not been violated.[34] Although the Central Council of Jewish Communities in Finland asked for a second, "impartial investigation in the matter," the subsequent rector refused the request.[35] Nonetheless, the essays collected in Simo Muir and Ilona Salomaa's 2009 anthology *Hyljättiin outouden vuoksi: Israel-Jakob Schur ja suomalainen tiedeyhteisö* (Finnish, Rejected due to strangeness: Israel-Jakob Schur and the Finnish scholarly community) demonstrate that Schur was indeed the victim of antisemitism and ethnic prejudice, attitudes that—as the palliating rhetoric of the 2008 committee report perhaps implies—are still prevalent in Finland today, continue to "operate in the same way in the official culture" (Silvennoinen), and require a "critical evaluation of the University of Helsinki history of 1930s and 1940s" (Gasche).[36] In June 2010, the newly appointed Rector of the University of Helsinki, Thomas Wilhelmsson, gave

his support in principle to founding a Holocaust and Genocide Studies unit at the University, emphasizing that the University administration wants to promote research into its own "gray" past; as of this writing, though, such a center has yet to materialize.

The national/ist perspective on antisemitism and the Holocaust in Finland has been recently reassessed in English by several authors represented in *Finland's Holocaust*: by Simo Muir's investigation of the role of antisemitism in Finnish academe (2009), by Hana Worthen's, "Tip of the Iceberg? Finland and the Holocaust" (2009), by Antero Holmila's "Finland and the Holocaust: A Reassessment" (2009), and by Antero Holmila and Oula Silvennoinen's "The Holocaust Historiography in Finland" (2011); this critique was inaugurated in the cultural sphere by Worthen's *Playing "Nordic":* The Women of Niskavuori, *Agri/Culture, and Imagining Finland on the Third Reich Stage* (2007).[37] Taking into account Finnish–German and German–Finnish cultural relations, censorship, and propaganda, *Playing "Nordic"* argues that when Finnish drama and other artworks crossed into the Third Reich's domain, they were imagined—with the help of Finland's authorities—in racialized terms. Rupturing the discourse of *separation* imported from the military to the cultural sphere, *Playing "Nordic"* insists that artworks, including theatre and drama, register the conscious effort to form an ideological connection between the two "brothers-in-arms." The extended cultural performance of Hella Wuolijoki's play *The Women of Niskavuori*, understood as written by a "Nordic" author and preoccupied with the dynamics of rural life in an urbanizing world, aimed to inscribe Finland within the agricultural themes of racial and transnationalized *Blut und Boden* (Blood and Soil). The Reich's censors failed to recognize Wuolijoki's leftist reputation in Finland which was brought to their attention by pro-Nazi Finns living in the Third Reich, resulting in the closure of the production in Hamburg in 1938; in other words, the censorship of theatre in the Third Reich was in this case the result of pro-National Socialist Finnish attitudes and actions. Most recently, Antero Holmila's *Reporting the Holocaust in the British, Swedish and Finnish Press, 1945–50* turns a comparative attention to the ways the Holocaust was reported in the popular press, and how Jewish suffering was mediated. Tellingly, Holmila's analysis shows that the Finnish press characteristically "domesticated the Holocaust" within Finnish political concern regarding Soviet "Bolshevism, Jewish-Bolshevik co-operation," or claims of Jewish-capitalist world domination. In this regard, Holmila decisively sets the Finnish marginalization of the Holocaust within a "Cold War metanarrative . . . effectively utilised to portray what the future might hold."[38]

Still, in many respects antisemitism, the Holocaust, and the fortunes of Jews in Finland remain subdued to the "professional historians'" narratives of the Finnish wars. Although the 2011 English language anthology *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited* notes that these issues have "recently been acknowledged by young researchers

critical of a culture of silence in the Jewish question and to some extent also regarding the way history writing and the public more generally have dealt with the neighbouring Baltic states' experiences," it at the same time remarks that these "few historical studies on the Jews in Finland have, however, not had any particular impact on the public debate"; that is to say, the editors of *Nordic Narratives* set these issues outside the confines of the national historiographies their volume revisits (the "young" scholars cannot, obviously, be ignored, nonetheless, they are confined to anonymity as neither their names, nor their scholarship are identified). Restricting the narrative to the voices of "professional historians . . . including the most senior professors," whose "interaction between professional and non-professional history" has "played a crucial role" in Finland more generally, the collection appears both to discount the potential impact of newer scholarship and silently to absorb the work of "young" scholars critical of the dominant paradigms to the work of these "professional historians," extending a generational *separation* in Finnish academic culture.[39]

More recently, the collection *Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations* reassesses both the "political and military history" of the prewar and wartime period, also aiming to consider the "multitude of ideological, cultural and social topics" extending beyond that sphere. Paying repeated attention to undoing the trope of the "separate war," this important collection dramatizes—in dialogue with *Finland's Holocaust*—the ongoing power of the *separation* paradigm in Finnish scholarship, how it continues to influence the structure of historical representation.[40]

The insensitive ethos

The essays in *Finland's Holocaust* bring an interpretive perspective to bear, one that requires an ear for nuance of expression, that moment—Meinander's glib remarks about the "bad joke" of establishing a Holocaust center, and "Holocaustification's" appeal to "teenagers and American tourists," perhaps—when *insensitivity* reveals deeper attitudes extending more widely in Finnish society. Sensitivity, the appreciation of and delicate response to others' feelings and sensibilities, is a willed act of empathy, an achievement. As an accomplishment, it also implies a critical understanding of the consequences of one's position within a social and political order, and so of one's relation to, and possible authority in, the production and reproduction of discriminatory attitudes and behavior. Individuals can be insensitive, but insofar as they implement injurious rhetoric and acts on behalf of those they represent, institutions can behave insensitively as well.

A problematic *institutional insensitivity* articulates with Finland's official demurral from the Holocaust issue. Owing to the professional, conservative, ethos of postwar historiography and to the conviction that Finland did not have *then* and should not have *now* much to do with the Holocaust, Finnish

decision-makers, eager to advance Finland as a sensitive negotiator in global peacemaking, are anxious about international pressures that might promote inquiry into Finland's wartime alliance. Despite the participation of the Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen in the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust in 2000, Finland did not become a member of the intergovernmental Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust (ITF) until 2010. By that time, most European countries were among its twenty-seven members, committed to the Stockholm Declaration, to implementing national policies and programs to promote Holocaust awareness; according to the Declaration's paragraph five and six, "We share a commitment to encourage the study of the Holocaust in all its dimensions. We will promote education about the Holocaust in our schools and universities, in our communities and encourage it in other institutions" and are also committed "to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust and to honour those who stood against it. We will encourage appropriate forms of Holocaust remembrance, including an annual Day of Holocaust Remembrance, in our countries."[41] Maintaining the commitment to these directives has, however, proven both controversial and complicated.

Admission to the ITF required Finland's National Board of Education to add Holocaust and human rights to the National Core Curriculum; this inclusion was perceived with some concern among educators, seen both as imposed from the outside and from above as well. But aside from the perception of twofold interference of an international organization in Finnish national issues and of the state in the authority of the educators, the discussion in the press also illustrates degrees of public resistance to Holocaust memory culture. Indeed, Sauli Feodorow, the Finnish Foreign Ministry's Ambassador for Human Rights and Democracy charged with negotiating Finland's admission to the ITF, considered the accession a crucial means to protecting Finland's reputation, since "abroad one often runs into the idea that Finland had even been involved in implementing the Holocaust."[42] In other words, for Feodorow, membership in the ITF was not driven to uphold the primary objectives of the organization in Finland, but the opposite, to guarantee that Finnish objectives—an "accurate" history of Finland's exceptionality—would be advanced in the ITF. Clinging to Feodorow's statement, the conservative *Uusi Suomi* headlined a news story about the plan to enter the ITF: "Finland is believed to be implicated in the Holocaust."[43] Reinforcing both the anxieties regarding Finland's "guilting" and boundaries between "us" and "them," Feodorow's statement and the *Uusi Suomi* headline deploy the trope of the Holocaust to reinforce Finnish isolation rather than allowing for perception of Finland within a critical framework of self-questioning.

While some saw the addition of the Holocaust to the National Core Curriculum as political lobbying—Israel happened to be the chair of the ITF in 2010—others wondered why the Holocaust was singled out when

there are other genocides to be taught, too; more specifically, attention was directed to the equivalent injustices of the Holocaust and Stalin's purges. According to physician Ilkka Soini, the opportunity to integrate teaching about Stalin's purges with the Holocaust, which he stresses had already been taught in the school curriculum from the 1960s and 1970s, had been wasted; what should concern the Finns more is a self-imposed silence over the murderous history of its "eastern neighbor." For Soini, rather than teaching the Holocaust per se, or comparing genocides, "one should learn about the singular value of human life, so that history does not repeat itself."[44] On the one hand, then, Soini uses the Holocaust in a salutary way, to bring other genocides—other holocausts—into view, as instruments for dialogue and constructive self-critique; indeed it seems Finland might be able to take a visible position here, given its complex history with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, though, Soini's remarks also dramatize both the conflicting memories animating Finnish historical culture and a kind of ethnic privilege. Finland's involvement in the Holocaust is absent; Finnish Jewish reality remains exiled from Finnish history and identity.

The *insensitivity* to the unfolding uses of the Holocaust in European memory culture is exemplified by the fortunes of the International Holocaust Remembrance Day, January 27, which has been publicly celebrated in Finland since 2002.[45] The recondite Finnish name given to the Holocaust Remembrance Day, *Vainojen uhrien muistopäivä*, Remembrance Day for the Victims of Persecutions, tellingly blurs the meaning of the event, apparently taking in not only Hitler's victims, but also Stalin's, as well as victims of other ethnic and political cleansings, while it subordinates the prominence of Jewish persecution understood in the conventional uses of the term "the Holocaust."[46] Although one can understand the Finnish Remembrance Day as salutary in broadening the scope of historical memory and empathy, it may also suggest a problematic attitude toward the specificity of the Holocaust, and its implication for the role of national identity in European memory culture. Indeed, the act of remembrance on Finland's Remembrance Day has been informed by "Finnish" concerns, displacing to some extent the victim-mediated "Holocaust remembrance" event proposed by the ITF. Although written in 2004 (six years before Finland became a member of the ITF), one newspaper article well illustrates the ongoing tensions behind the notion of Holocaust remembrance in Finland, and the anxieties, attitudes, and beliefs congruent with Finnish "accurate" history. According to Saska Snellman, journalist of the *Helsingin Sanomat*, "We Finns have not shared the Europeans' shock over Auschwitz, because Finland departed on its own path when the first bombs fell on Helsinki on November 30, 1939. *Separate war* has been followed by a *separate history*" (our emphasis). Snellman aptly describes the exceptionalism that characterizes the popular reception of Finland's "separate war," noting that (unlike in Finland), "in Europe one cannot talk about collaboration with Hitler's Germany solely as a military

necessity or as a sensible exchange of prisoners as Finnish researchers have explained. The question is also about morality, about the pact with evil."[47] Through Snellman's critical lens one can glance once again at the functioning paradigm of Finland's alliance, reiterated as an exclusively reasonable, sensible response to the political situation of 1941–44, a response that both evokes and delegitimates any question "about morality." Embracing the self-critique implied by a recognition of 1930s antisemitism and by European Holocaust memory culture is difficult or even impossible to imagine as long as the concept continues to reign that Finnish society at large was *separated from,* immune to and devoid of, antisemitic sentiments and that there was no discrimination of Jews in Finland.

The mainstream Finnish press, a reasonable index of popular orientation, provides a central example of both *institutional insensitivity* and a process of *desensitizing*. If one accepts the principle that "democracy is built upon respect and concern," as Martha C. Nussbaum points out, "these in turn are built upon the ability to see other people as human beings, not simply as objects."[48] If a "national" institution, state or mainstream press, rather than cultivating strategies of respectful curiosity, cultivates capacities for "othering," it projects both the imagined insufficiencies of the "other," and more significantly its own processes of manipulation, its own properties of ignorance; with the help of "othering," it makes itself into its own image. In February 2011, the monthly supplement of *Helsingin Sanomat, Kuukausiliite,* published lengthy article by Ilkka Malmberg entitled "Yli-ihmisiä" (Finnish, Supermen; this is the Finnish term translating the German *Übermenschen*). Listing eminent "Jews" in various fields of endeavor world wide and providing over seventy visual and narrative portraits (Iron Man, Daniel Radcliffe, Marilyn Monroe, Leon Trotsky, Monica Lewinsky, Batman, and Jesus, among many others), Malmberg's article asks, "They make up only 0.2 per cent of the world population. Why are they so superior?" Without apparently inquiring whether or to what extent these "Jews" are or self-identify as Jewish, Malmberg retails the stereotypes that fuel antisemitism. Indeed, maintaining that his essay uses "a strict definition, in which Jews are held to be those persons born of a Jewish mother," Malmberg claims to invent for the purposes of his categorization the traditional definition of Jewish descent, of which he seems to be unaware.[49] Although (or perhaps because) the article drew some criticism and letters to the editor in following issues, *Kuukausiliite* published yet another article by Malmberg, "Hyvä juutalaisvuosi" (Finnish, A good Jewish year), which divided the 2010 Nobel laureates again into Jews and non-Jews: "In physics, the Nobel went to Saul Perlmutter, Brian P. Schmidt, and Adam G. Riess. Schmidt is not a Jew." Malmberg remarks of the Luxembourg immunologist, Jules A. Hoffmann, he "is not [a Jew], although his father indeed was," calling the 1935 Nuremberg Laws to mind.[50] Like Malmberg's first article, while this sequel superficially seems merely to recognize Jewish success, this acknowledgement also

screens a deeper insolence and anxiety, which repeatedly breaks through the surface, the sense that Jews have "hijacked" positions of elite and worldwide preeminence.

It is difficult to know what is more disturbing: the content of the essays themselves, or the fact that they appeared in the monthly magazine of Finland's paper of record, the *Helsingin Sanomat*. Furthermore, the insensitivity of Finland's major newspaper to concerns about antisemitism was abetted by another aspect of the *Kuukausiliite* articles. Midway through Malmberg's first, twelve-page article, the magazine included an advertising supplement, a four-page insert. The first full page of the advertisement declares: "Never has the way to the heart been through the stomach as much as it is now: Rapeseed Pork; New, More Heart-Healthy Pork." Adorned with a large drawing of a pig quartered for slaughter and emblazoned with a giant heart, the ad continues over the next several pages to offer pork recipes. Reminding its readers that "Finns' consumption of saturated fat . . . is still over the recommended nutritional level," the ad declares, "Rapeseed Pork: Fed with Rapeseed Oil, Less Saturated Fat, Tastier and More Tender." Recalling National Socialist "studies" taking their religious refusal to eat pork as the sign of the "Jews'" natural enmity to the "Aryans," the placement of the advertisement materializes the attitudes of Finland's unrestrained public culture towards the sensibilities of "others," witnessing at best an ongoing insensitivity to its Jewish minority, and at worst a tactical—deniable—antisemitism. (We should underline that we have no issue with advertising pork; the issue concerns the semiotics of the newspaper's insertion of an advertisement for pork in an alarmist article on "Jews" in contemporary world culture.) Perhaps placing a multipage advertisement for pork products midway through an article highlighting the cultural dominion of "Jews" was just ignorant; and yet, given how haunted this gesture is by history, the conjunction could hardly pass unnoticed.[51]

More disturbingly, noting, "today one should not accentuate ethnic background," Malmberg finds it "impossible not to do so." Listing nearly four dozen "Jews" who have been successful in a wide range of fields, Malmberg finds that "the Jewish people's skills have often been seen as the result of history," usefully quoting a well-known authority in the field without further comment:

> "And what people have finally experienced greater reversals than these people—but even through huge casualties and tragedies, they have always survived unchanged."
> "Given these facts, how extremely tenacious is their will to live, the will to maintain their kind!"
> The writer was Adolf Hitler in 1925.[52]

Perhaps Malmberg intends this citation ironically, but if so, the irony is not palpable here, lost in the breathtaking crudeness of the "joke." Citing Hitler

as an authority on the unchanging character of Jews, and wrapping the article around an advertisement extolling the virtues of pork, the *Helsingin Sanomat* seems to go well beyond mere insensitivity, verging on ethnic assault, the kind of assault that is only possible if it is assumed that any offense given to Jews (if recognized at all) will not be shared by the larger "Finnish" public. Hitler's attitude toward this tenacity is a matter of historical record: the Holocaust is testament to his ruthless effort to extinguish it. Yet Malmberg neither mentions the discrimination against the Jews in relation to Hitler here, nor their destruction, allowing Hitler's comments a decontextualized legitimacy, indeed allowing Hitler not only to speak for an implied scholarly consensus, but to speak for him as well, to address Finnish readers as a benign commentator on the history of Jewish success, their "hijacking" of Western culture at all levels. That is, here both Malmberg and the leading Finnish newspaper publisher express an astonishing insensitivity toward the Jewish diaspora, and toward the Holocaust as a social, cultural, and ethnic experience, perhaps itself stemming from decades of Finland's asserted *separation* from the issue.

Much as *Finland's Holocaust* is written against the background of such insensitivities, the prominence of immigration and national identity in the critical discussion of the Jews' fortunes in wartime Finland summons contemporary immigration debates in Finland into the discursive milieu of the essays gathered here, illustrating "the context of the present where the narrative is composed" as Stråth might note. In this regard, the triumph of *Perussuomalaiset* (Finnish, True Finns, now renamed as The Finns Party) in the Parliament elections of 2011—the party gained nearly twenty per cent of the seats—is especially noteworthy, given its overtly anti-immigration and anti-EU policies, interwoven with racist and antisemitic rhetoric. Although some of the attitudes of The Finns have caused wide indignation and its party and parliamentary members have been brought to court on several occasions (MPs Jussi Halla-aho and James Hirvisaari were convicted of incitement to ethnic and religious hatred), some public statements apparently recalling the racist discourse of the 1930s and 1940s have received less scrutiny. For example, Helena Eronen, Parliament Assistant to Hirvisaari, contributed a blog posting entitled "Ratkaisu poliisin ulkomaalaisratsioihin" (Finnish, Solution to the police raid on foreigners) to the website of *Uusi Suomi* on April 11, 2012. Reacting against concerns expressed by the Office of the Ombudsman for Minorities for the propriety of police raids in which foreign-looking people were asked to show ID without any stated cause, Eronen suggested a solution: "If every foreigner was obliged to wear a sleeve badge identifying his or her background, the police would see immediately, 'aha, there is a Muslim from Somalia,' and 'aha, there is a beggar from Romania.'" Admitting that "perhaps my proposition will generate some negative associations," Eronen went on to suggest similar badges for Finland-Swedes and for people belonging to sexual minorities.[53] The blog might be said to take the line of Jonathan Swift's

1729 *A Modest Proposal*, satirically suggesting an overtly excessive means to ameliorate a problem of public order. But when Swift proposed solving Irish poverty by allowing Irish beggars to sell their children to be eaten by well-to-do English men and women, his satire depicted the current political reality: by systematically impoverishing Ireland, the English landlords were in fact already *cannibalizing* the colony, the landlords, "as they have already devoured most of the parents, seem to have the best title to the children."[54] But unlike Swift's, Eronen's satire does not attack the institutionalized injustice practiced by the police (which is, of course, already figuratively "marking" others for ID screening); it attacks as oversensitive the politically correct sensibilities of those for whom the ID screenings represent unjust racial and ethnic profiling. Indeed, Eronen not only accepts the logic of racial profiling to charge its opponents as excessive, insipid moralists; she insensitively remakes (as the *Turun Sanomat* pointed out the following day) one of the most heinous episodes in modern European history, the Nazis' legislated marking of the Jews with Star of David "badges," as the vehicle of a jesting political commentary.[55] Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen reacted to the matter, expressing concern about "an increasingly common discussion culture in Finland, where, either under the cover of humor or completely seriously, people are put into unequal position."[56] Despite the sensitive critical reaction, Finnish public culture had again been coarsened by an open willingness injuriously to exploit the history and imagery of antisemitism, again on the assumption that Jewish and minority sensibilities are irrelevant within the projected image of the prevailing and future Finnish society.

Finland's Holocaust: silences of history

Given the interplay of academic self-censorship and self-protection in Finland, which has occasionally silenced critique, the essays in *Finland's Holocaust* bring forward a timely reconsideration. Although recent research (much of it by scholars included in this volume) has begun to treat these concerns more rigorously, most of that research is published in Finnish (some in Swedish), and has not—until very recently—reached a wider international scholarly audience. This anthology, then, brings together academic authors whose previous work has already begun the overdue process of historical reexamination and makes them available to the international public, taking analytic perspectives drawn from a number of fields—Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Political Studies, History, Comparative Religion, Social Sciences, Cultural Studies, Scandinavian Studies, Theatre and Performance Studies—to coordinate an overview of contemporary research.

The volume opens with John Sundholm's treatment of history and the cultures of memory in Finnish historiography. His "Stories of National and Transnational Memory: Renegotiating the Finnish Conception of Moral Witness and National Victimhood" argues that national/ist historiography

has positioned Finland as a "moral witness," a subject-at-risk caught between Hitler's Third Reich and Stalin's Soviet Union. Locating his analysis in the contemporary geopolitical pressure of globalization and internationalization, Sundholm suggests that insofar as the Holocaust conditions historiography today, it calls Finland's role as "moral witness" into question, requiring a renegotiation of Finland's self-conception as a nation, especially its image as a moral witness of World War II.

Following Sundholm's chapter, several essays trace antisemitism in Finland in the 1930s and 1940s, setting it in relation to its historical antecedents, to both academic and popular culture, and to the paradigms and practices of contemporary scholarship, which has often worked to erase antisemitism from the record. Simo Muir's orienting essay, "Modes of Displacement: Ignoring, Understating, and Denying Antisemitism in Finnish Historiography" outlines the cultural impact of antisemitism and charts the ways antisemitism has been evaded in academic research and culture. Muir shows how these three rhetorical strategies have animated scholarship on Finland, especially after 1991. Antisemitism, he argues, has been ignored in order to articulate "homogenous" national interests, understated to minimize the impact of National Socialist racial rhetoric in Finland before and during the war, and by historians eager to cleanse Finland from any linkage to the Holocaust. Attending both to specific acts of historical discrimination and their discussion by prominent historians, Muir demonstrates the consequences of the pervasive erasure of a palpable antisemitism from Finnish history.

In "'I Devote Myself to the Fatherland': Finnish Folklore, Patriotic Nationalism, and Racial Ideology," Ilona Salomaa argues that the traditional function of "folk religion" and "folk culture" in the making of Finnish national identity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century underwent a dramatic shift in the late 1920s and 1930s. The indigenous mythologies became inflected by newly xenophobic and antisemitic strains, as a number of institutions—notably the Academic Karelia Society—used the icons of Finnish culture, especially the national epic *Kalevala,* to prosecute an ideal of Finnish national and racial purity. While the antisemitism of Finland's academic culture is routinely denied, Salomaa demonstrates how that culture was influenced by ideological proximity to Nazi Germany.

Hana Worthen's "Towards New Europe: Arvi Kivimaa, *Kultur*, and the Fictions of Humanism" examines the career of a central figure in Finnish cultural history and international relations. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, Kivimaa contributed directly to a racializing discourse in Finnish–German relations, using his cultural work as writer and critic both to represent Finland in relation to the Third Reich's racialized culture, and to affiliate Finnish people with this perspective. Yet after the war, this dimension of Kivimaa's career was effectively silenced, as both Kivimaa and an apologetic cultural scholarship worked to present him as a life-long "humanist," even as a Nazi dissident.

Malte Gasche and Simo Muir then examine "Discrimination against Jewish Athletes in Finland: An Unwritten Chapter." Here, they draw attention to two antisemitic incidents, widely reported at the time, that have more or less disappeared from Finnish memory: Jewish sprinter Abraham Tokazier's erased victory in the 100-meter race held in the Helsinki Olympic Stadium in 1938, and the dismissal of Salomon Kotschack and other Jewish tennis players from the Westend Tennis Stadium Club in 1939. Through a close, original analysis of documents from the period, Gasche and Muir not only expose the antisemitic attitudes behind these events, but argue that their disappearance or denial implies a continuing unwillingness to accept or admit the fact of antisemitism in Finland, both during the 1930s and after.

Given the impact of Elina Sana's work, it is fitting that several essays here engage her two landmark studies of the treatment of Jewish refugees and POWs in Finland during the Continuation War, and their consequences for subsequent history and historiography. Jouni Tilli's "Elina Sana's *Luovutetut* and the Politics of History" considers how a familiar metaphor running alongside *separation* throughout Finnish histories of the war—Finland as *driftwood* driven by the events of the time—is invoked and interpreted to sustain four different "history policies," ways of representing Finland's role in the Continuation War. Tilli shows how Sana's *Luovutetut* altered not only the history of war, but the ways in which that history has been represented politically, undermining the notion of Finland as a passive victim of world politics that had formed a political cornerstone of Finnish historiography.

In "Negotiating a Dark Past in the Swedish-language Press in Finland and Sweden," Karin Kvist Geverts differentiates between the reception of Sana's *Luovutetut* in Finland's Swedish-language press and the book's reception in Sweden. Taking other revisions of Finland's role in the war into account as well, Kvist Geverts both outlines the distinct ways critique has been received in Finland and Sweden, but also the tense dialogue between professional historians and more popular writers, who—lacking academic license—were discredited for questioning the framework of nation-state history.

Oula Silvennoinen's "Beyond 'Those Eight': Deportations of Jews from Finland 1941–1942" shows that "those eight" Jewish refugees initially identified by Sana have become a distracting figure of speech. Rather than homogenizing this group, Silvennoinen closely considers the cases of four of the twelve actually extradited, focusing on the complex network of Finnish legislation, alien policies, and the bureaucracy of deportation, in order to dramatize the complex linkages between institutional antisemitism, deportation policies and practices, and Finland's connection to the Holocaust. Silvennoinen offers an original account of the complex interaction between various levels of the Finnish civil bureaucracy, and between Finnish and German administrative offices during World War II.

Finally, Antero Holmila's examination of "'*Soldaten wie andere auch*': Finnish *Waffen-SS* Volunteers and Finland's Historical Imagination" considers

how the "separate war" thesis has been extended to and by those who volunteered to join the Finnish *Waffen-SS*. While it is commonly claimed that these were "soldiers like any others" in Finland, fighting for Finnish interests rather than those of Nazi Germany, Holmila asks whether they should more fairly be described as "soldiers like any others" in the SS, that is, compared with the Danish and Norwegian volunteer forces who are understood to have participated in the atrocities of the Holocaust. Though historians have not found direct evidence of Finnish *Waffen-SS* killings, Holmila argues that this cleansed practice of portraying the Finnish–German alliance contributes to a misguided view of Finland's role in the war and inevitably in the Holocaust as well.

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As Raymond Williams famously pointed out in connection to Cultural Studies, if "we" want to be "serious" about "*our own* project," "We have to look at what kind of formation it was from which the project . . . developed."[57] The problem of "Finland's Holocaust" is the problem of "we"—of Finnish historiography excluding complementary perspectives on Finnish history, and alternate models of Finnish identity. The essays in *Finland's Holocaust* develop Williams's sense that the writing of history is formed by the values of its moment; in particular, history writing should be more pluralistic, and should articulate the history of "others" to the dominant view. But especially where Finland's alliance with the Third Reich and its consequences are concerned—a field taking in prewar, wartime, and postwar history and culture—Finnish academic research has often expressed a homogenizing national/ist perspective, "by Finns, for Finland." One collateral aim of this anthology is to promote a multi-disciplinary and nationally diverse collaboration, an inclusive orientation to the past and its persistence in the present. In the framework of *Finland's Holocaust* the varied methodologies of several academic fields are all considered equal before the question, none the single, privileged means or method to historical truth.

Beyond that, the contributions in this anthology convert nationalized *silences* into transnational *contestation*. Rather than confirming the use of silence to promote social cohesion and a nationalized scholarly ethics, they work to identify these silences and to use them to open a denaturalizing dialogue about Finland's history and its narrativization, taking a more skeptical regard toward the interplay between disciplinary and national/ist norms. For past discrimination persists in the kinds of authority denied to "outside" voices writing about Finland today, voices from outside the academic realm of professional historians (like Sana), and from abroad as well (like Jackson). As Markku Jokisipilä suggests, specifically qualifying the claims of foreign scholarship where Finland is concerned, "Even when there was something written about Finland, the perspective of a foreign researcher

was often criticized for hopeless objectivity and the blindness toward the specifically Finnish war-time historical context. In many cases, *this criticism has been more than justified*" (our emphasis).[58] Rather than claiming an epistemological objectivity based on the conjunction of national identity and institutional power, this collection assembles a "third generation" of writers, who understand their position as scholars in relation to an emerging reconfiguration of national boundaries, a refiguration of identity, and a reimagining of moral citizenship in a globalizing world.

Haunted by the past, and by its transmission through the last half-century of scholarship, this "third generation"—for better and worse—is "unencumbered by the personal memories that haunted the senior generation."[59] Attempting to come to terms with those memories as part of contemporary history and historiography, the chapters in *Finland's Holocaust* restore important features of the landscape of Finland's social and cultural memory to view, elements of the past that have particular significance in a contemporary inclusive narrative. *Finland's Holocaust* takes a first step in opening the way for a broader discussion of antisemitism and the Holocaust in Finland, and for a more diversified engagement with and by the many "others" of Finland's history.

The myth of an ideologically unified Finland isolated from the attitudes and practices of its ally, the Third Reich, and generally unsullied by antisemitism has become an insupportable burden for contemporary Finnish historical and cultural studies, and indeed for contemporary Finnish society; the *insensitivity* toward these silenced histories provides a condition of continued racism and antisemitism. *Finland's Holocaust* dramatizes the active reassessment of the silences and silencings that have animated professional scholarship. Beyond that, though, the essays also witness a kind of renegotiation of disciplinary hierarchies. As this collection suggests, emerging perspectives originating in a number of fields are helping to overcome a coercive subordination to the authority of conventional historical paradigms and the attitudes toward Finnish society they articulate and support. With regard to antisemitism and the Holocaust, Finland's past may be unique, but its written history is hardly a special case. The difficulty of overcoming the local politics and their encapsulation in professional history is the question of *Finland's Holocaust*. By reading for the unwritten, listening to the silences in the story of Finland before, during, and after the war, these essays dramatize what might be seen as marginal within the national, but also suggest the necessary interplay between national and global perspectives essential to the ongoing interrogation of antisemitism, the trope of the Holocaust, and the legacies of their erasure.

Notes

1. Henrik Meinander, "A Separate Story? Interpretations of Finland in the Second World War," in *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited*,

ed. Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg, and Johan Östling (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011), 58, 59. All translations from Finnish and Swedish are our own.

2. "Puolustusvoimain katsaus [Defense newsreel] 1, 1941," *Jatkosodan katsaukset I: Hyökkäävät kamerat* [Continuation War newsreels I: Cameras on the offensive] (Helsinki: National Audiovisual Archive, 2008), DVD.
3. Oula Silvennoinen, "Still Under Examination: Coming to Terms with Finland's Alliance with Nazi Germany," *Yad Vashem Studies* 37, no. 2 (2009): 77, 72–80.
4. Josef Lefko, Finnish Jewish war veteran, cited in Hannu Rautkallio, "'Cast into the Lion's Den': Finnish Jewish Soldiers in the Second World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 29, no. 1 (January 1994), 53.
5. Hannu Rautkallio, "English summary," in *Suomen juutalaisten aseveljeys* [The gun-brotherhood of Finland's Jews] (Helsinki: Tammi, 1989), 200.
6. Hana Worthen, "Tip of the Iceberg? Finland and the Holocaust," *East European Jewish Affairs* 39, no. 1 (April 2009): 125.
7. Hannu Rautkallio, *The Jews in Finland: Spared from the Holocaust*, trans. Eugene Holman (n.p.: EC-Books, 2008), back cover. This booklet is an abridgement of Rautkallio's study, *Holokaustilta pelastetut* [Spared from the Holocaust] (Helsinki: WSOY, 2004).
8. Video and descriptions of the conference panels have been posted online at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/escape-the-holocaust-the-fate-jews-finland, accessed July 13, 2012.
9. Rautkallio, *The Jews in Finland,* 7.
10. Dan Stone, *Histories of the Holocaust* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 6.
11. Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 109, 129, 119.
12. Bo Stråth, "Nordic Foundation Myths after 1945: A European Context," in *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited*, ed. Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg, and Johan Östling (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011), 150, 167.
13. Stråth, "Nordic Foundation Myths after 1945," 165, 168, 158–9.
14. Stråth, "Nordic Foundation Myths after 1945," 168, 155, 156, 149, 166, 161.
15. Hayden White, "Postmodernism and Textual Anxieties," in *The Postmodern Challenge: Perspectives East and West*, Postmodern Studies 27, ed. Bo Stråth and Nina Witoszek (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999), 33–8.
16. Claus Leggewie, *Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung: Ein Schlachtfeld wird besichtigt* [The struggle for European memory: A battlefield visited], in collaboration with Anne Lang (München: C. H. Beck, 2011), 15–21.
17. Markku Jokisipilä, "Historian katumuspillerit" [Morning-after pills for history], blog entry on the website of *Uusi Suomi*, November 3, 2010, accessed July 5, 2012, http://markkujokisipila.puheenvuoro.uusisuomi.fi/62047-historian-katumuspillerit.
18. Meinander, "A Separate Story?," 74.
19. Henrik Meinander, *Suomi 1944: Sota, yhteiskunta, tunnemaisema*, trans. Paula Autio (Helsinki: Siltala, 2009), 262. The study appeared in Swedish as *Finland 1944: Krig, samhälle, känslolandskap* (Helsinki: Söderströms, 2009).
20. Stone, *Histories of the Holocaust*, 72.
21. Meinander, *Suomi 1944*, 262.
22. Stone, *Histories of the Holocaust*, 15.
23. Timothy L. Jackson, "Sibelius the Political," in *Sibelius in the Old and New World: Aspects of His Music, Its Interpretation, and Reception*, Interdisziplinäre Studien zur Musik [Interdisciplinary studies of music] 6, ed. Timothy L. Jackson, Veijo

Murtomäki, Colin Davis, and Timo Virtanen (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 69–123. See also Rabbe Forsman, "Skyddad och utnyttjad: Jean Sibelius i fosterländsk fångenskap" [Protected and abused: Jean Sibelius in patriotic captivity], *Finsk Tidskrift*, no. 2 (2012): 9–25.

24. Markku Jokisipilä, "Suomi, Kolmas valtakunta ja Sibelius" [Finland, the Third Reich, and Sibelius], in *Säteitä 2010* [Rays 2010], Sävellyksen ja musiikinteorian osaston vuosikirja [Yearbook of the department of composition and music theory] 2, ed. Veijo Murtomäki, Olli Väisälä, and Risto Väisänen (Helsinki: Sibelius Akatemia, 2010), 56.
25. Jokisipilä, "Suomi, Kolmas valtakunta ja Sibelius," 48.
26. It is important to acknowledge that Jokisipilä's research, particularly his *Aseveljiä vai liittolaisia? Suomi, Hitlerin Saksan liittosopimusvaatimukset ja Rytin–Ribbentropin sopimus* [Brothers-in-arms or allies? Finland, the demands of the alliance agreement with Hitler's Germany and the Ryti–Ribbentrop agreement] (Helsinki: SKS, 2004), laid much of the groundwork for the contemporary rejection of the "separate war" thesis.
27. Elina Suominen [Sana], *Kuoleman laiva s/s Hohenhörn: Juutalaispakolaisten kohtalo Suomessa* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1979); Elina Sana, *Luovutetut: Suomen ihmisluovutukset Gestapolle* (Helsinki: WSOY, 2003).
28. Simon Wiesenthal Center, "Wiesenthal Center Welcomes Finnish Decision," November 20, 2003, accessed October 26, 2012, http://www.wiesenthal.com/site/apps/s/content.asp?c=lsKWLbPJLnF&b=4442915&ct=5852889.
29. Heikki Ylikangas, "Jatkosotaa varjonpuolelta: Pakolaisten ja vankien kohtelu Suomessa ja heidän karkottamisensa Saksaan ja Neuvostoliittoon," accessed December 24, 2008, http://www.helsinki.fi/~hylikang/varjopuo.htm.
30. Lars Westerlund, ed., *Prisoners of War Deaths and People Handed Over to Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939–55: A Research Report by the Finnish National Archives* (Helsinki: National Archives, 2008), accessed August 23, 2010, http://www.arkisto.fi/uploads/Palvelut/Julkaisut/POW%20deaths_web.pdf. The database can be found at http://kronos.narc.fi/frontpage.html.
31. Oula Silvennoinen, *Salaiset aseveljet: Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933–1944* (Helsinki: Otava, 2008), 329–30; this study was subsequently translated into German as *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft: Die sicherheitspolizeiliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Finnland und Deutschland 1933–1944,* trans. Klaus Reichel and Kaija Reichel (Darmstadt: WBG, 2010).
32. Oula Silvennoinen, abstract to "Salaiset aseveljet: Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933–1944" (PhD diss., Helsinki University, 2008), accessed August 5, 2012, https://oa.doria.fi/handle/10024/41922?locale=len.
33. Simo Muir, "Israel-Jakob Schurin väitöskirjan hylkääminen Helsingin yliopistossa 1937: Antisemitismiä, kielikiistaa ja henkilöintrigejä" [The rejection of Israel-Jakob Schur's PhD dissertation at the University of Helsinki, 1937: Antisemitism, the Language Struggle, and personal intrigues], *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja* 105, no. 4 (2007): 463–83; Muir, "Anti-Semitism in the Finnish Academe: Rejection of Israel-Jakob Schur's PhD Dissertation at the University of Helsinki (1937) and Åbo Akademi University (1938)," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 34, no. 2 (2009): 135–61.
34. See Olli Alho, Fred Karlsson, and Olli Mäenpää, "Israel-Jakob Schurin väitöskirjan käsittely ja hylkääminen Helsingin yliopistossa lukuvuonna 1936–1937" [The evaluation and rejection of Israel-Jakob Schur's PhD dissertation at the University of Helsinki 1936–1937], April 9, 2008, accessed November 7, 2012, http://www.helsinki.fi/ajankohtaista/uutisarkisto/schur_raportti.pdf.
35. Muir, "Anti-Semitism," 155.

36. Oula Silvennoinen, "Suomalaisen antisemitismin luonteesta 1930-luvulla" [On the nature of Finnish antisemitism in the 1930s], in *Hyljättiin outouden vuoksi*: *Israel-Jakob Schur ja suomalainen tiedeyhteisö*, ed. Simo Muir and Ilona Salomaa (Helsinki: Suomen Itämainen Seura, 2009), 217; Malte Gasche, "Tiedemaailman menneisyyden kohtaamisesta" [On the scholarly community coming to terms with its past], in *Hyljättiin outouden vuoksi*, 221. See also Hana Worthen, "Israel-Jakob Schur and the Finnish Scholarly Community," *East European Jewish Affairs* 40, no. 3 (December 2010): 299–304.
37. Muir, "Anti-Semitism in the Finnish Academe"; Worthen, "Tip of the Iceberg?"; Antero Holmila, "Finland and the Holocaust: A Reassessment," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 23, no. 3 (Winter 2009): 413–40; Antero Holmila and Oula Silvennoinen, "The Holocaust Historiography in Finland," in "The Histories and Memories of the Holocaust in Scandinavia," ed. Antero Holmila and Karin Kvist Geverts, special issue, *Scandinavian Journal of History* 36, no. 5 (2011): 605–19; Hana Worthen, *Playing "Nordic":* The Women of Niskavuori, *Agri/Culture, and Imagining Finland on the Third Reich Stage* (Helsinki: Helsinki University Print, 2007).
38. Antero Holmila, *Reporting the Holocaust in the British, Swedish and Finnish Press, 1945–50* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 190.
39. Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg, and Johan Östling, "Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: An Introduction," in *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited*, ed. Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg, and Johan Östling (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011), 26.
40. See Ville Kivimäki, "Introduction: Three Wars and Their Epitaphs; The Finnish History and Scholarship of World War II," in *Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations,* ed. Tiina Kinnunen and Ville Kivimäki (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 4. Two articles in this collection, Oula Silvennoinen, "Limits of Intentionality: Soviet Prisoners-of-War and Civilian Internees in Finnish Custody" and Antero Holmila, "Varieties of Silence: Collective Memory of the Holocaust in Finland," take up the issues of racism, antisemitism, and Finland's Jews during World War II and subsequently.
41. "Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust accepts Finland as full member," website of Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, December 16, 2010, accessed July 5, 2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentId=208457&nodeId=23&contentlan=2&culture=en-US; "Prime Minister Lipponen to Stockholm," website of Finnish Prime Minister's Office, January 24, 2000, accessed July 5, 2012, http://vnk.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/tiedote/en.jsp?oid=92150; for the Stockholm Declaration, see "Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust," website of the ITF, accessed August 5, 2012, http://holocausttaskforce.org/about-the-itf/stockholm-declaration.html.
42. Feodorow is quoted in Marjukka Liiten, "Holokausti tuli opetussuunnitelmiin" [Holocaust was added to teaching curriculum], *Helsingin Sanomat*, August 14, 2010, A6.
43. "HS: Suomea luullaan osalliseksi holokaustiin," *Uusi Suomi*, August 14, 2010, accessed July 5, 2012, http://www.uusisuomi.fi/kotimaa/99154-hs-suomea-luullaan-osalliseksi-holokaustiin.
44. Ilkka Soini, "Itänaapurista meillä on vaiettu" [There has been silence about the eastern neighbor among us], letter to the editor, *Helsingin Sanomat,* August 16, 2010, C6.
45. The initiator of the Holocaust Remembrance Day, arranging it since the mid-1990s, is The Finnish Society for Yad Vashem, now called *Holokaustin uhrien*

muisto ry (Finnish Holocaust Remembrance Association); see "Vainojen uhrien muistopäivä—Minnesdagen för förintelsens offer" [Remembrance day for the victims of persecution—Memorial day for the victims of the Holocaust], website of Finnish Holocaust Remembrance Association, accessed July 5, 2012, http://www.hum.fi/lisatietoa/vainojen-uhrien-muistopaiva/.

46. In Swedish, the Remembrance Day is called *Minnesdagen för förintelsens offer*, Memorial Day for the Victims of the Holocaust.
47. Saska Snellman, "Ihmisyyden absoluuttinen nollapiste" [The absolute zero point of humanity], *Helsingin Sanomat*, January 27, 2004, A13.
48. Martha C. Nussbaum, *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 6.
49. Ilkka Malmberg, "Yli-ihmisiä," *HS Kuukausiliite*, no. 466 (February 2011), 35. Malmberg suggests that Jews have "hijacked" their fields of success.
50. Ilkka Malmberg, "Hyvä juutalaisvuosi," *HS Kuukausiliite*, no. 475 (November 2011), 86. For letters responding to Malmberg's first article, see Terhi Kokkonen, letter to the editor, *HS Kuukausiliite*, no. 467 (March 2011), 18; Rony Smolar, letter to the editor, *HS Kuukausiliite*, no. 467 (March 2011), 18; Joel Ormala, letter to the editor, "Karhunpalvelus juutalaisille" [Disservice to Jews], *HS Kuukausiliite*, no. 468 (April 2011), 23. Scholars Laura Ekholm, Simo Muir, and Oula Silvennoinen contacted *Helsingin Sanomat*, suggesting a wider discussion of the topic for the culture section; this appeal as well as their submission to the letters to the editor section was rejected.
51. The offensiveness of the advertisement was noted by the former spokesperson of the Jewish Congregation, Rony Smolar, letter to the editor, 18.
52. Malmberg, "Yli-ihmisiä," 36. Much later in the piece, Malmberg does recall that "Hitler decided to exterminate Jews," 45.
53. Eronen's blog originally appeared on the website of *Uusi Suomi*, April 11, 2012, but was removed within a couple of hours; see Helena Eronen, "Ratkaisu poliisin ulkomaalaisratsioihin" [Solution to the police raid on foreigners], preserved online in Janus Putkonen, "Helena Erosen kohuttu 'hihamerkki-blogiteksti'" [Helena Eronen's sensational armband blog-text], April 16, 2012, accessed August 23, 2012, http://www.verkkomedia.org/news.asp?mode=5&id=3332.
54. Jonathan Swift, *A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor People in Ireland, from Being a Burden on their Parents or Country, and for Making them Beneficial to the Publick* (1729; Project Gutenberg, 2008), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1080/1080-h/1080-h.htm.
55. "Eronen: Blogikirjoitus oli tarkoitettu vitsiksi" [Eronen: Blog was meant to be a joke], *Turun Sanomat*, April 12, 2012, accessed July 10, 2012, http://www.ts.fi/uutiset/kotimaa/333413/Eronen+Blogikirjoitus+oli+tarkoitettu+vitsiksi.
56. Ossi Kurki-Suonio, "Katainen puuttui 'hihamerkkiin': 'Aivan käsittämätön'" [Katainen took stand against the "sleeve badge": "Completely inconceivable"], *Uusi Suomi*, April 15, 2012, accessed July 11, 2012, http://www.uusisuomi.fi/kotimaa/121765-katainen-puuttui-%E2%80%9Dhihamerkkiin%E2%80%9D-%E2%80%93-%E2%80%9Daivan-kasittamaton%E2%80%9D.
57. Raymond Williams, *Politics of Modernism: Against the New Conformists* (London: Verso, 2007), 152.
58. Jokisipilä, *Aseveljiä vai liittolaisia*?, 37.
59. Michael Berenbaum and Abraham J. Peck, preface to *The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed, and the Reexamined*, ed. Michael Berenbaum and Abraham J. Peck (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), [xi].

2

Stories of National and Transnational Memory: Renegotiating the Finnish Conception of Moral Witness and National Victimhood

John Sundholm

While the constant avoidance of problematizing nationalist narrativization in Finland ensures a continuing memory practice and commemoration in the name of the nation, since the 1990s academia, politics, and everyday life have witnessed a turn to memory. This overwhelming interest in memory is, no doubt, the consequence of the rise of affordable and cheap technology that has made it easier to store and access material from the past, encouraging everyone to be his or her own archivist; of the end of the Cold War, which has forced nations and political communities to revise their narratives about the past; and of Europe's admission to participating in the Holocaust, which has spawned a variety of commemorations and memorials. Yet in the renegotiations and reinterpretations of the so-called age of risk society, of late or second modernity, memory studies—memory being an ideal object of study for the humanities and social sciences—is afflicted by an increasing strain between what could be characterized as culturalist vs. universalist positions. Arising from a Bourdieuan disciplinary struggle over the right to interpret the past, this tension also sometimes marks a disciplinary divide between historians and social theorists: scholars who stress the necessity of a cultural connection between the past and the present vs. scholars who advocate for memory as a platform for future transnational solidarity.[1]

In Finland, historians have had a privileged position as nation-builders with close ties to the political elite. It is symptomatic that when the President of Finland organized a hearing with selected intellectuals and scholars in November 2009 to reach a conclusion about whether Finland should be considered to have been an allied with Nazi Germany or not, historians had a prominent role. Even though the "turn to memory" has enabled cultural and social theorists to interpret the past in alternative scholarly contexts, many historians see the interdisciplinary opening up of the field as an illegitimate politicization of the subject and its materials. Nonetheless, it is precisely the questioning of memory studies that has turned attention

to the work of Finnish historians themselves, dramatizing a politicized representation of history in the guise of neutral scholarship. This disciplinary struggle over the past recalls Slavoj Žižek's classic point regarding ideological analysis: "[the ideological] content—'true' or 'false' (if true, so much the better for the ideological effect)—is functional with regard to some relation of social domination ('power,' 'exploitation') in an inherently non-transparent way: *the logic of legitimizing the relation of domination must remain concealed to be effective*."[2] Hence, because the historians doing history, "have been lying in the guise of the historical events," the sociologists and the political theorists have been seen as "going political," understood as responsible for the so-called "moral turn" in history.[3] The "conceptual slide from history to memory" has resulted in both a democratization of who has the right to use the past and a growing awareness of the fact that any writing about the past is inherently connected to a present in which the writing takes place; as historian Bo Stråth has claimed, there is no turning back from the cultural turn in history.[4]

The issues of globalization and transnationalism in post-1989 Europe help to contextualize the "political" cast of the "memory studies" debate in Finland; urging the internationalization of memory cultures, Daniel Levy argues, "The memory boom of the late twentieth century coincides with the various effects of globalization on the nation state."[5] Henry Rousso asserts that Pierre Nora's launching of memory studies and the concept of "sites of memory" is a symptom of "the last manifestation of a type of classical national history that arose in the nineteenth century with the emergence of the nation-state"; Jay Winter puts it more bluntly: "The memory boom . . . both announces and hastens the death of the nation-state."[6] As Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad suggest, "the globalization process has placed a question mark over the nation state as the seemingly natural container of memory debates"; "synchronic interactions and entanglements are of increasing importance, as memory debates not only unfold within national communities of pride or attrition but are connected across borders."[7] Hence, the transnational connections of globalization imply encounters between peoples, cultures, and perspectives, which in turn lead to the creation of unprecedented structures of memory and toward a troubling of national myths and hegemonic forms: studying memory in the global age implies a "spatial turn."[8] Whereas the national memory was structured according to a principle of linearity, of temporal relations between significant events, the transnational/global logic stresses vectoral relations between groups, subjects, and events that are beyond the concept of the territorialized nation, beyond a logic of metaphorical "containment" which tends to treat all those who are within the same territory as constituting one coherent subject. As in Michael Haneke's film *Caché* (2005), in which the anonymous videocassettes reveal the dreadful colonial past of its protagonist, the spatial turn implies that different "other" territories and

subjects are reciprocally connected, desiring and enabling the perspective of the "other."[9] In a globalizing world there is always a possibility that transnational memory will challenge the narrative structure of national/ist history.

These tensions—between the transnational/global and the national, between memory and history—are useful for assessing the conceptualization of Finland in postwar historiography. While a critical and questioning position seems to be prevalent in much contemporary memory research, research in which the Holocaust has provoked extensive self-criticism, Finland stands out as an odd case. In a 2009 book that has been highly appreciated by the Finnish public, *Finland 1944: Krig, samhälle, känslolandskap* (Swedish, Finland 1944: War, society, emotional landscape), the renowned historian Henrik Meinander writes that compared to western Europe where immigration, multiculturalism, and global digital culture have "replaced an external enemy with an internal one," in Finland national solidarity prevails.[10] Finnish memory politics undoubtedly is still based on the standpoint that Finland constitutes a special case, "quite apart from others," as Oula Silvennoinen puts it in his comprehensive overview of the current trends in Finnish historiography and memory politics.[11] The view that Finland's situation is an exclusive one—supported by arguments that the nation has been victimized by its peculiar geography, alternatively dependent upon two powers of evil, Hitler's Third Reich or Stalin's Soviet Union—may provide an adequate point of departure for historiography; it is, however, an inadequate basis for memory studies. Finland can no longer stand as a "unique," disconnected, national subject, denying both its responsibility for and its practice of "victim" memory.

The view that every act of memory is of value in itself has resulted in what Allan Megill has termed "postmodern memory studies," in which "memory is an object of value in its own right."[12] Yet critical memory studies is neither history nor a field in which memory as such carries an intrinsic value (as in the memory project "Survivors of the Shoah Visual History Foundation," initiated by Steven Spielberg): its critique focuses on the problems and inconsistencies of memory and history. Whereas Megill insists upon a sharp distinction between history and memory, I take memory studies to be the critical study of the uses of the past in the present. Although the objective of memory studies is not to trace what actually happened in the past, the past or historical events are not irrelevant; indeed, both history and forgetting depend on the necessarily absent figures of memory.[13] Conceiving memory as the study of the uses of the past locates memory studies alongside the traditions of cultural studies, as the study of how meanings are constructed, appropriated, and negotiated in contemporary culture: memory studies engages the politics of memory, how different groups, nations, or communities make use of the past for different purposes. The Finnish case, then, provokes crucial questions. How is the past remembered and narrated in Finland? How does it include Finnish minorities? How does it prepare Finland for an

increasing internationalization and globalization, to participate in transnational memory culture? Considering that international research calls for a study of emerging transnational memories and the socio-political quest for a global community in which the Holocaust plays an instrumental part, how does this narration participate—if it does—in the forging of European post-Holocaust identity?

The Holocaust and the quest for a transnational/global memory

A decade ago Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider suggested that the Holocaust may constitute a model for a common European and transnational memory.[14] In today's society, memory is no longer primarily defined according to national or ethnic belonging; in the globalized age, interconnectivity and mobility forge different forms of transnational memories. Warfare provides one instance of the differential structure of transnational memory. The wars in Finland during the years 1939–45—the Winter War (1939–40), the Continuation War (1941–44), and the Lapland War (1944–45)—involved troops from Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, as well as multinational forces fighting on the German side along with Finland. In addition to the multinational character of these forces, the war's shifting borderlands, due to the various periods of peace with the Soviet Union and the changes of territory due to actual battle, guarantee different forms of war memory, a memory structure typically at odds with national historical narratives.[15] Wars create memory geographies, which are, finally, both individual *lieux de memoire* for the participants, and transnational ones as well, to which all participating countries lay national claims.

The tension between individual war memory and national/ist historiography is stressed in Taru Mäkelä's remarkable 1997 documentary on the situation of the Finnish Jewish soldiers during the wars, *Daavid: Tarinoita kunniasta ja häpeästä* (Finnish, David: Stories of honor and shame).[16] The film makes extensive use of interviews with Jewish Finnish soldiers who, fighting in the Finnish forces allied with Nazi Germany (1941–44), participated in Operation Barbarossa. Mäkelä offers a depiction of the complex situation of the Finnish Jewish soldiers: how they built their own synagogue on the Soviet front, and how some acted as interpreters between the Finnish and German troops. This awkward position of being in-between, characteristic of the situation of the Finnish Jews taking part in battle, received perhaps its most dramatic twist in the expression of one of the Jewish soldiers: if Nazi Germany should win the war, there would be no future for the Finnish Jews and their community. After Nazi Germany faced its first severe defeat at Stalingrad in 1943, though, the imagined future of Jewish soldiers and Jews in Finland potentially changed, although no one could predict what would happen to the nation of Finland.

How, then, to weave the case of Finnish Jews into the fabric of transnational memory? Levy and Sznaider aim to pave the way for a transnational

or global solidarity, rather than merely to position the Holocaust as an event in global memory. Since the Holocaust, as Hannah Arendt argued, was not merely a particular historical event, but a crime against humanity, what Levy and Sznaider call for is the establishing of a wider shared morality, a way of using memory to identify with "distant others."[17] This view, however, does not necessarily imply that national memory should be erased. Like "the global," "the national" is a remote category, a way of connecting the local with other localities, creating a "multiverse of particularities," to use John Tomlinson's phrase.[18] The shift from the national (via the transnational) to the global can be seen as a further step towards an international solidarity, one that bears directly on the practice of Finnish historiography and its relation to memory, and to memory studies.

Nationalist historiography: The nation as agent and moral witness

Most Finnish historiography has been written in the name of the nation, with the objective of creating a coherent narrative and coherent national identity. J. Breuilly has singled out four assumptions that constitute national historiography:

1. The nation is the most important group, binding together sub-national groups such as families and classes while at the same time dividing humanity.
2. The nation is the source of identity and values. The unique nation is the key historical actor, not general human nature or gods.
3. The nation can only be understood from within and that involves study of the actions and products of the nation . . . .
4. History is not just the chronicle of wars and states, of the deeds of great men; these only convey meaning when seen as emanating from the nation.

A national historiography becomes nationalist when, according to Breuilly, "nation-as-frame" is transformed into "nation-as-historical-agent."[19] Instead of actions taking place in a certain territory involving various people and groups, the homogenized nation is seen as the acting subject and the social body. As a consequence, a key strategy for Finnish memory politics, whether in order to avoid the embarrassing question of being allied with Nazi Germany or not, has been to take advantage of an *agential* understanding of the nation, transferring *Finland* from a territorial to a personal category, and so constituting the *nation* as a victim, and even as a "moral witness" along with those extinguished in the concentration camps.

Yet, the notion of a nation as moral witness poses its own challenges. For Avishai Margalit, the "moral witness" has both encountered and suffered

evil, has been at personal risk. Margalit uses "risk" in two senses: "the risk of being a victim and the risk of being a witness."[20] The risk of being a victim implies that the moral witness is someone toward whom the evil has been done and who therefore was himself or herself at risk of being annihilated. The risk of being a witness signifies that the task of documenting evil has involved personal risk or endangerment. In Finland the popular national/ist historiography has been based on the argument that the nation as agent was at risk and that therefore, in the choice between two evils, Finland chose to ally with Nazi Germany (in most Finnish historiography, "Germany" is used instead of "Nazi Germany") to avoid potential invasion by the Communist Soviet Union. At risk, then, Finland as an agent-nation was a victim of this impossible "choice," and so became a moral witness to the crimes of World War II, its fate equated with the fate of the Jews throughout Europe. Finnish historian Henrik Meinander's study—with its revealing subtitle *Krig, samhälle, känslolandskap* (War, society, landscape of emotion)—exemplifies this line of reasoning. While criticizing contemporary historiography of World War II for placing too much emphasis on the Holocaust, Meinander treats the nation as a single agent, a subject at risk, a victim-witness. Anthropomorphizing the nation, then, allows Meinander to claim that for Finland, "the perspective was different," as it was for all "contemporary small nations and peoples in various parts of Europe who also were threatened with extinction."[21]

The emphasis on the nation as agent was an essential element of national mobilization during the war. Far from being the invention of postwar historians, this ideology was recognized and criticized by Finnish novelist Väinö Linna in his 1954 pacifist novel *Tuntematon sotilas* (published in English as *The Unknown Soldier*), which became a bestseller immediately after its publication.[22] Depicting the war through the eyes of a machine-gun platoon, Linna (himself a veteran of World War II) narrates the war from the subjective perspective of each soldier, as primarily a fight for individual—rather than national—survival. Linna's novel both comforts those soldiers who had returned from the front and whose young lives had been marked forever, and criticizes the war ideologues who sent them to war by appealing to a higher order and mission, the survival of the nation. Yet this critique was scorned at the time of the novel's publication: Linna depicted the events from a "frog perspective" and not from that of the nation. Yet, when the blockbuster film adaptation of *Tuntematon sotilas* had its premiere in the Finnish cinemas the following year, the particularity of the soldiers in the novel was ideologically transformed into the collectivity of the nation.[23] Whereas in the novel, the soldiers had fought in order to stay alive as autonomous human beings, in the film they fought as and for Finland.[24] Despite the memory politics of Linna's novel, *The Unknown Soldier* film precipitated a survival story, a founding trauma both addressing and creating the nation-as-subject and a subject-at-risk, a nation sustained as a major victim of the grand forces of history.

Nation is a political project, an imagined site of discourses and acts—such as commemorative rituals—creating a collective and a public. However, the discourses of memory and history often relate in different, contradictory ways to the national narrative, especially in Finland. This tension is visible in Linna's *The Unknown Soldier*, through its intentional blending of archival and fictional footage.[25] In the film, the fictional scenes end in close-up, followed by documentary segments beginning in close-up as well, joining fiction and fact in a seamless stream of sound and images. Blending memory (narrative) with history (factual events) both valorizes memory and uses the power of fiction to position its addressed subject, in effect subordinating the documents of history to the fictions of memory. The audience witnesses the events in "documentary footage," but it is the fictitious narrative that coordinates the acts of emotional and political identification, addressing it as a national subject.

The Finnish renegotiation of the concept of the moral witness sustains the reception of both Mäkelä's 1997 documentary film *Daavid* and of Elina Sana's 2003 monograph, *Luovutetut: Suomen ihmisluovutukset Gestapolle* (Finnish, Extradited: Finland's human deliveries to the Gestapo), both conceptualized around the history of the "other," the Finnish Jews, the Jewish refugees, and Finland's prisoners of war.[26] The opening of Mäkelä's film introduces a palpable shift in the addressing of a subject. While in Finland, the common addressee had been the ethnic Finnish nation, in *Daavid* the Finnish Jews address themselves. An interview with Mary Davidkin recounts a World War II gathering in Israel during which the Finnish Jewish community was accused of being part of the Nazi German war machine and thus of prolonging the war and the Holocaust. The disconcerting question Davidkin faced was: did the Finnish Jews not realize that when they fought as allies against the Soviet Union they also supported the Germans in the Holocaust? Here, Davidkin's address shifts the perspective of the Finnish-Jewish subject-at-risk and the discourse of the nation as victim, compromising the moral authority of both the Finnish nation and Finnish Jews. In this sense, rather than revising the notion of who constituted the actual perpetrators and who the victims, Mäkelä's documentary refuses to establish a specific discourse around one nation-subject and its exclusive position as moral witness. As Levy and Sznaider argue,

> the Holocaust has been inscribed in the historical awareness of West European nations (and increasingly also in Eastern Europe) during the last quarter of the twentieth century, a period characterized by a self-critical narrative of their national past. While traditional and exemplary narratives deploy historical events to promote foundational myth, the critical narrative emphasizes events that focus on past injustices of one's own nation. Cosmopolitan memory thus implies some recognition of the history (and memories) of the "Other." The heroic narrative of First

> Modernity . . . is the narrative of "acting perpetrators." In contrast, the paradigmatic narrative of Second Modernity becomes the narrative of the "non-acting" victim. In First Modernity this distinction between perpetrator and victim constituted a crucial element for misunderstanding and mutual disdain. In Second Modernity we detect a compromise that is based on the mutual recognition of the history of the "Other." It is this act of reconciliation which becomes the central mnemonic event. Half a century after the Holocaust, it is no longer the atrocities themselves that are at the center of attention . . . , but how the heirs of the victims, the perpetrators and bystanders are coping with these stories and the evolving memories. In other words, the recognition of the "Other" diffuses the distinction between memories of victims and perpetrators. What remains is the memory of a shared past. It is not shared due to some mythical desires and the belonging to some community of fate, but as the product of a reflexive choice to incorporate the suffering of the "Other."[27]

The inability to include a variety of perspectives and so to acknowledge the perceptions of the "other," comes to the fore in the Finnish reception of Mäkelä's documentary. While Mäkelä brought the Jewish position into the public sphere, the critics were unable to break out of the normative historiography-driven discourses, in which these memories could not be assimilated to the narrative of the nation's history. The critical reception was dominated by the question of whether Finland was guilty, a perpetrator in the Holocaust, epitomized in Helena Ylänen's comment that "With regard to the Jews, the Finns have quite clean papers." Valuing Finnish Jews for sacrificing themselves to the cause of the nation, Ylänen also—in another representative move—subordinated Jewish to national issues.[28] Like most reviewers, Ylänen came to the conclusion that due to its geopolitical realities, Finns did as much as they was able to, incorporating the Jewish soldiers into the national subject, into the nation. The national narrative remained intact.

A similar dynamic characterized the reception of Elina Sana's *Luovutetut*. The Wiesenthal Center's subsequent request to investigate the wartime renditions resulted in a report written by the historian Heikki Ylikangas. Concluding that Sana's research was not flawless, Ylikangas nonetheless acknowledged that more prisoners-of-war had been handed over to Nazi Germany than had hitherto been known, as Sana had argued. Moreover, Ylikangas encouraged the inauguration of new research projects in order to "attempt to explain the handover of civilian and military prisoners to Germany and the Soviet Union . . . the deaths in prison camps in Finland and . . . the fate of the Ingrians after they had been returned to Soviet Union."[29] Although the Academy of Finland responded positively to Ylikangas's request and several research projects were launched, the discourses established by such efforts as Taru Mäkelä's film, Elina Sana's book

on the renditions, Heikki Ylikangas's report, as well as other current research into the darker parts of the history of Finland, have not been able to mitigate "victimhood nationalism."[30] The persistence of this vision is epitomized by Henrik Meinander's recent essay on Finnish postwar historiography. Entitled "A Separate Story?," Meinander's article at once claims that the established historiography is not the result of a nationalistic perception, while also arguing that the motivating reason for the "indifference toward the Jewish victims is that the Finnish state and its citizens were forced to prioritize their own struggle for national survival."[31]

Victimhood nationalism and transnational memory culture

Attempts to downplay the impact of the Holocaust on the understanding of Finnish history have blocked Finland from establishing a discourse on transnational memory culture. Jie-Hyun Lim introduced the term "victimhood nationalism," which he defines as a moral backdoor bearing on the dialectics between nationalism and transnationalism, and on "over-contextualization" and "de-contextualization." Lim's formulation implies that Finnish victimhood nationalism has become hereditary, since victimhood nationalism "tends to over-contextualize the past, which provides them [victimhood nations] with a morally comfortable position as historical victims."[32] The impulse to victimhood nationalism sustains, for example, Meinander's critique of "the fragmentation of the research on World War II [that] has led to an increasingly narrow and therefore misleading contexts of the issues of morality and guilt"; his objective to study "what contemporary actors knew and felt, what they actually could choose from and what they therefore were responsible for as individuals, groups and nations," is intended to establish a national/ist narrative and to obstruct historical reconciliation.[33] The quest for historical reconciliation is the objective behind positing the Holocaust as a model for creating a transnational memory, a politics of memory that many Finnish historians ignore or downplay. Thus, Meinander may write in 2011 that "the Finnish reluctance to participate in [the] 'Holocaustification' of the Second World War is that Finnish Jews did their patriotic duty, fully taking part in the war despite the military alliance with Germany in 1941–1944."[34] Responding to Meinander's critique that she exaggerated how many prisoners-of-war had been handed over to Nazi Germany and ignored the difficult situation of the Finnish authorities, Sana underscored, "The most important issue in my book is the question why Finland, when it comes to the renditions of people to Nazi Germany, was engaged in—and still seems to be engaged in—mathematics rather than international human rights."[35] That the Holocaust poses questions of acknowledging the suffering of the "other" and therefore is a call for abandoning a nationalist perspective seems to be an unreachable horizon of understanding for the historians trained in nationalist historiography, an ongoing problem illustrated by Meinander's comment: "While they [the Finnish authorities]

did return eight Jewish refugees to the Germans, the Finnish government had refused to hand over its own Jewish citizens."[36]

The Finnish strategy for dealing with the national trauma of the war events during World War II has depended on claiming the position of moral witness as the means to avoiding the question of guilt. Yet the contemporary understanding of the Holocaust as a transnational memory site implies not a turn to collective guilt, a "politics of regret" as it has been called by Jeffrey K. Olick, but a responsibility for (and to) "others," a call to hear, understand, and include them.[37] While a film like Mäkelä's *Daavid* offered such an opportunity, the film was primarily integrated into the common story of Finnish heroism and national victimhood. In terms of transnational memory, it is, notably, foreign criticism that exercises pressure on the idealized survival themes, proving particularly consequential when the Finnish representation of its heroic war past is intended as an instrument of cultural branding. For instance, *Talvisota* (Finnish, Winter War), a feature on Finland's heroic struggle during the World War II, was well received by the Finnish public when it premiered in 1989, and was marketed internationally as a film about "human endurance, about what is called 'The Miracle of the Winter War.' What gave the ill-equipped defenders of a small nation the strength to hold back an awesome enemy in the face of countless odds?" The Finnish conservative press hailed the film during production and expressed that finally there would be a film to challenge the pacificism of Väinö Linna's novel and its "myth of the lost war."[38] Hailed at home, the film was nonetheless not successful abroad, judged in the US as outdated in style and narrative. Similarly, at the press reception during the Berlin Film Festival in February 1990, German critics wondered why Finland stuck to these war stories when Europe, in the aftermath of the fall of the Wall in November 1989, was poised at a new historical moment? When the film was shown on public television in November 1991, Finnish critics seemed to recognize that the film was a national affair of a bygone era, made in order to honor the victims of the war in a conventionally patriotic way.[39]

Yet, while feature films remained tied to nationalist themes, documentary films of the period developed an increasingly critical perspective on history and memory. *Suur-Suomen muisto: Kun Suomi miehitti Itä-Karjalan 1941–44* (Finnish, The memory of Greater Finland: When Finland captured Eastern Karelia 1941–44, 1991), *Hakaristin varjo* (Finnish, The shadow of the swastika, 1991–92), *Viipurin poika* (Finnish, The boy from Viipuri, 1993), *Inkerinmaan lapset* (Finnish, The children of Ingria, 1995), and *Suur-Suomen toiset kasvot* (Finnish, The unknown face of Greater Finland, 1995) dealt with controversial topics such as Finland's collaboration with Nazi Germany, Finland's occupation of Karelia and the forced repatriation of Ingrians back to the Soviet Union in 1944–45. While feature films tended to reinforce the traditional "victimhood" narrative, documentary films introduced an overdue critical perspective on national history.

Victimhood nationalism both has moral shortcomings and is a hindrance to a transnational politics of memory: "If responsibility means answerability to the voices and pains of others, historical responsibility means the responsibility for the present memory of past. We, as historians, are responsible for the apologetic memory of victimhood nationalism."[40] Holocaust research and discourse are necessary for Finland to participate in a transnational culture of collaboration and responsibility, to resist the moral abdication implied by victimhood nationalism. Maintaining the perspective of a victim nation also depends on a specific representation of transnational relations. For Finland, as Silvennoinen has pointed out, the Cold War resulted in the "pervasive influence of the Soviet Union," that "prevented the nation from taking a balanced and honest look at its own past."[41] In effect, the Soviet Union's powerful influence over Finnish foreign and domestic policies enabled Finland to extend its victim nation status into the Cold War era, even receiving sympathy from the West despite the problem of *Finlandization*.[42] Levy and Sznaider have also noted that the Cold War prevented the creation of a transnational memory culture: "Cold War alliances and the reaffirmation of national sovereignties remained the pillars of international relations, rendering the universalistic aspirations of the immediate postwar period largely irrelevant."[43] While, then, the Cold War enabled a culture of forgetting and strengthened Finland's self-conception as a country with a unique position and history, in a post-Cold War world the Finnish self-image as a victim nation and moral witness is sharply confronted by research and by transnational forms of memory culture.

National victimhood may lead to interpretive conflict when this position is replayed abroad, in a transnational arena unfamiliar with its self-justifying reading of history. In November 2007, *Time Out London* announced the screening of *The Unknown Soldier* at the Barbican Centre with a blurb rewriting both the facts of history and those of the film, in which the Finnish soldiers, allied with the Third Reich, fought the Soviet enemy: "Popular WWII feature based on Väinö Linna's novel about the trials of the young Finnish soldiers engaged in the desperate Winter Campaign against the Nazis in the early 1940s."[44] Reinterpreting the compromises of the Continuation War through the rhetoric of Finland's heroic stand in the Winter War, *Time Out London* articulated just the attitude that Finnish historiographical "forgetting" produces: a sense that Finland was, despite its military alliance with Nazi Germany, continuing a solitary war, unaffected by the rhetoric, politics, and antisemitism of its new ally.

The Holocaust figures prominently in the process of forging a contemporary European identity, in a Union in which Finland claims to play a particularly "humanitarian" part. Yet defining the nation as an active and victimized agent, Finnish historiography not only politicizes the historical record, but also sets aside the larger purposes sought by the policy of Holocaust education in the EU. The January 2005 European Parliament

resolution "The Holocaust, Anti-Semitism and Racism" called for a thorough teaching of World War II history and for the use of Holocaust memory as a means to recognize minorities and minority rights.[45] Here, the Holocaust is not merely a question of atrocities committed that should never be forgotten; instead, the Holocaust is constructed as the site of a deliberate European policy and politics of memory, conceptualized as a cautionary example and as a heuristic method for building democratic society within and beyond national boundaries. Refusing to acknowledge the impact of the modern culture of memory with regard to the Holocaust, Finnish historians and historiography take an untenably isolated position with regard to Finland's integration with Europe, sequestered both from contemporary international developments in the practice of historiography and also from the function of "history" in a contemporary understanding of the state, of the legitimacy of pluralistic governance.

Notes

1. See for example Ross Poole, "Misremembering the Holocaust: Universal Symbol, Nationalist Icon or Moral Kitsch," in *Memory and the Future: Transnational Politics, Ethics and Society*, ed. Yifat Gutman, Adam D. Brown, and Amy Sodaro (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Jan Assmann and Daniel Levy are two of the most prominent representatives of the culturalist and universalist positions, respectively. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.
2. Slavoj Žižek, "The Spectre of Ideology," introduction to *Mapping Ideology*, ed. Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 1994), 8.
3. For an overview, see George Cotkin, "History's Moral Turn," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 69, no. 2 (2008): 295–304.
4. Bo Stråth, "Nordic Foundation Myths after 1945: A European Context," in *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited*, ed. Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg, and Johan Östling (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011), 167.
5. Daniel Levy, "Changing Temporalities and the Internationalization of Memory Cultures," in *Memory and the Future: Transnational Politics, Ethics and Society*, ed. Yifat Gutman, Adam D. Brown, and Amy Sodaro (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 16.
6. Henry Rousso, "History of Memory, Policies of the Past: What For?," in *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories*, ed. Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger (Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), 28; Jay Winter, *Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 284.
7. Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad, introduction to *Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories*, ed. Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 6.
8. For the "transnational turn" in memory studies see, John Sundholm, "Visions of Transnational Memory," *Journal of Aesthetics and Culture* 3 (2011), accessed July 23, 2012, http://www.aestheticsandculture.net/index.php/jac/article/view/7208/8556; for the "spatial turn," see Assmann and Conrad, introduction to *Memory in a Global Age,* 6.

9. On the vector, see McKenzie Wark, *Virtual Geography: Living with Global Media Events* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); and John Sundholm, "The Deterritorialization of Film," in *Globalizing Art: Negotiating Place, Identity and Nation in Contemporary Nordic Art*, ed. Bodil Marie Stavning Thomsen and Kristin Ørjasæter (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2011), 53–67. For an analysis of *Caché* in relation to an ethics of transnational memory, see Sundholm, "Visions of Transnational Memory."
10. Henrik Meinander, *Finland 1944: Krig, samhälle, känslolandskap* (Helsinki: Söderströms, 2009), 398.
11. Oula Silvennoinen, "Still Under Examination: Coming to Terms with Finland's Alliance with Nazi Germany," *Yad Vashem Studies* 37, no. 2 (2009): 32.
12. Allan Megill, *Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A Contemporary Guide to Practice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 19.
13. See John Sundholm, "An Ethics of Time: Bo Jonsson and the Aesthetics of Forgetting," in *Nieświadomość i transcendencja* [The unconscious and the transcendence], ed. Joanna Michalik (Warsaw: Eneteia, 2011), 293–300.
14. Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider, *Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001), published in English as *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age*, trans. Assenka Oksiloff (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005); and Levy and Sznaider, "Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory," *European Journal of Social Theory* 5, no. 1 (2002): 87–106.
15. The administration of the Finnish camps for prisoners-of-war estimated that they had people from 87 different ethnic groups; see Silvennoinen, "Still Under Examination," 84.
16. *Daavid: Tarinoita kunniasta ja häpeästä*, directed by Taru Mäkelä (Kinotar, 1997), VHS.
17. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London: Penguin, 1963); Levy and Sznaider, "Memory Unbound," 92.
18. John Tomlinson, "Ubiquitous Locality," in *Globalizing Art: Negotiating Place, Identity and Nation in Contemporary Nordic Art*, ed. Bodil Marie Stavning Thomsen and Kristin Ørjasæter (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2011), 285–90.
19. J. Breuilly, "Nationalism and Historians: Some Reflections; The Formation of National(ist) Historiographical Discourse," in *Nationalism, Historiography and the (Re)Construction of the Past*, ed. Claire Norton (Washington: New Academia, 2007), 2, 18.
20. Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 148–50, 50.
21. Meinander, *Finland 1944*, 86.
22. Väinö Linna, *Tuntematon sotilas* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1954).
23. *Tuntematon sotilas,* directed by Edwin Laine (Finnkino, 2001 [1955]), DVD.
24. See John Sundholm, "'The Unknown Soldier': Film as a Founding Trauma and National Monument," in *Collective Traumas: Memories of War and Conflict in 20th-Century Europe*, ed. Conny Mithander, John Sundholm, and Maria Holmgren Troy (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2007), 111–41; Sundholm, "The Cultural Trauma Process, or the Ethics and Mobility of Memory," in *Memory and Migration: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Memory Studies*, ed. Julia Creet and Andreas Kitzmann (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 120–34. On a theatrical adaptation that takes a critical perspective on both the novel and the film, see Hana Worthen, "'Finland is Dead, Dead, Dead': Ethics and National Identity in

Kristian Smeds's *The Unknown Soldier," TDR: The Drama Review* 56, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 34–55.

25. For an extensive analysis see Jukka Sihvonen, "Tuntematon sotilas/The Unknown Soldier," in *The Cinema of Scandinavia*, ed. Tytti Soila (London: Wallflower Press, 2005), 139–49; Sundholm, "'The Unknown Soldier': Film as a Founding Trauma," 120–36.
26. Elina Sana, *Luovutetut: Suomen ihmisluovutukset Gestapolle* (Helsinki: WSOY, 2003).
27. Levy and Sznaider, "Memory Unbound," 103.
28. Helena Ylänen, "Suomalaisia sankareita" [Finnish heroes], *Nyt-liite*, 7–13 March 1997, 33. The magazine is the weekly supplement of the *Helsingin Sanomat*.
29. Heikki Ylikangas, *Heikki Ylikankaan selvitys valtioneuvoston kanslialle* [Heikki Ylikangas's report for the Prime Minister's Office] (Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office Publications, 2004), 14. Ingria is the area round the easternmost part of the Finnish Gulf. Among the inhabitants in the region were the Finnish Ingrians that Soviet authorities began to deport to Siberia in 1942. Finland in turn evacuated the Ingrians during the occupation of the area. After the peace treaty with the Soviet Union in 1944 most of the Ingrians were handed over by the Finnish government.
30. On the illegal executions of Soviet prisoners-of-war, see Antti Kujala, *Vankisurmat: Neuvostovankien laittomat ampumiset jatkosodassa* [Execution of the prisoners: Illegal shootings of the Soviet POWs in the Continuation War] (Helsinki: WSOY, 2008); and *Sotatapahtumia, internointeja ja siirto sodanjälkeisiin oloihin* [Wars, internees and the transition to post-war conditions], ed. Lars Westerlund (Helsinki: Kansallisarkisto, 2010). An exception to the conventional historians' account of Finland's collaboration with Nazi Germany is Oula Silvennoinen, *Salaiset aseveljet: Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö* (Helsinki: Otava, 2008).
31. Henrik Meinander, "A Separate Story? Interpretations of Finland in the Second World War," in *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited*, ed. Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg, and Johan Östling (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011), 73.
32. Jie-Hyun Lim, "Victimhood Nationalism in Contested Memories: National Mourning and Global Accountability," in *Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories*, ed. Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 141.
33. Meinander, *Finland 1944*, 8.
34. Meinander, "A Separate Story?," 74.
35. Henrik Meinander, "Intressant men bristfälligt om fångutlämningarna" [Interesting but inadequate on the handing over of prisoners-of-war], *Hufvudstadsbladet,* December 14, 2003, 13; Elina Sana, "'Motstridigheter' i min bok dokumenterar varierande historiska sanningar" ["Contradictions" in my book document range of historical truths], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, December 20, 2003, 13.
36. Meinander, "A Separate Story?," 73.
37. Jeffrey K. Olick, *The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility* (London: Routledge, 2007).
38. Tom Kalima, "Talvisota puhuttelee vasta nyt nuorisoa" [The Winter War first speaks to the youth now], *Uusi Suomi,* December 6, 1988, 22.
39. See John Sundholm, "Finland at War on Screen since 1989: Affirmative Historiography and Prosthetic Memory," in *European Cultural Memory Post-89*, ed. Conny Mithander, John Sundholm, and Adrian Velicu (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013), 209–39.

40. Lim, "Victimhood Nationalism in Contested Memories," 159.
41. Silvennoinen, "Still Under Examination," 67.
42. The German conservative politician Franz Josef Strauss originally coined the term during the Cold War. Strauss was critical of the new and soft *Ostpolitik* that, according to him, would lead to a *Finnlandisierung* of West Germany by the Soviet Union.
43. Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, "The Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan Morality: the Holocaust and Human Rights," *Journal of Human Rights* 3, no. 2 (2004): 151.
44. "Sibelius on Film," *Time Out London*, no. 1941 (2007): 96.
45. "The Holocaust, Anti-Semitism and Racism," *Official Journal of the European Union,* no. 48: C253E (2005): 37–8.

3

Modes of Displacement: Ignoring, Understating, and Denying Antisemitism in Finnish Historiography

Simo Muir

> *People in Finland like to claim that antisemitism never existed here.*
>
> *Tapani Harviainen, 2004*

> *"Never mix with a yid, if you can be among Christians," that is my motto.*
>
> *Urho Kekkonen, 1932 (President of Finland 1956–82)*

Although the end of the Cold War enabled the investigation of suppressed questions concerning collaboration, resistance, and the impact of Nazism, until very recently, a general belief has prevailed that Finland was almost entirely free of antisemitism during World War II and before, and for this reason is exceptional.[1] Historian Dan Stone duly points out that although the inquiry into a national mythology is "a potentially dangerous development breeding resentment and reopening old wounds, it also permits a more thoroughgoing critical treatment of the past than has hitherto been possible."[2] For Stone, antisemitism has been among the most neglected topics in Holocaust Studies because historians have taken it for granted that without a history of antisemitism the Holocaust would not have taken place.[3] Yet as historian Klas-Göran Karlsson points out, "the old Cold War structures have been replaced by new or new-cum-old patterns of identity, developments and allegiances," especially in Eastern Europe, where national and nationalist ideas confront demands for an international accounting for the past.[4] Indeed, as social psychologist Florin Lobont, who has researched antisemitism and Holocaust denial in the former Soviet Bloc, explains, "Due to the deeply selective character of collective memory, and the distressing character of a negative past affecting the shaky self-image and self-identity of majority national communities, a proposed vision of the past that obliterates negative aspects is often eagerly welcomed."[5] Many of these countries see themselves as victims of Soviet imperialism, and so both admitting their

participation in the Holocaust or taking the Holocaust as a unique, archetypal genocide would undermine their own self-victimization.

Allied with the Third Reich, ceding its northern territories for German use during the Continuation War (1941–44), but neither occupied by Germany nor later aggrandized into the Soviet bloc, Finland is in many ways unique. During the Cold War, Finland was part of the West but nonetheless vulnerable to Soviet influence and potential aggression. Finland's compromised position is said to have ensured a degree of self-censorship concerning its role in the war and its relationship with Nazism and its atrocities. As historian Oula Silvennoinen shows, "Arguments tackling any facet of these issues tended to devolve either into a defense of the prewar political system dominated by the political right and center, or into vindication of the postwar political settlement, in which the re-emergent extreme left sought to assert its position with the backing of the Soviet Union."[6] During the Cold War, then, historians began to emphasize the "exceptionality" of the Finnish case—disassociating Finnish warfare from that of Nazi Germany—which became especially instrumental when attention was directed at the most morally challenging aspects of the war.[7] Scholars among the political right and center generally avoided themes that might catch the Soviets' attention and ultimately cause damage to Finnish interests. They particularly sidestepped Finnish relations with National Socialism, as this would have lent credence to those who wanted to label Finland as "fascist." According to historian Juha Sihvola, "It was even considered as a patriotic duty to write history so that the chances of the crook state in the east to pressure Finland would not be strengthened."[8] Historians learned to be cautious when dealing with Finland's relation to Nazi Germany, or with issues—such as antisemitism—easy to associate with National Socialist policies. As Silvennoinen puts it, the result of this self-censorship is most evident in the lack of scholarly discussion about the Finnish connection with the Holocaust.[9]

A similar hesitation is palpable in the research on the extent and effects of antisemitism in Finland during the 1930s and wartime. Journalist Elina Suominen (later Sana) was the first to raise the question of the extraditions of eight Jewish refugees to the Germans in 1942, challenging the prevailing conception of Finnish "exceptionality." Although her 1979 book is a pioneer in Finnish Holocaust literature, it rather introduces than analyzes the Jewish question in Finland.[10] Political historian Taimi Torvinen published the first extensive history of Jews in Finland at the end of the 1980s, mentioning the Finnish antisemitism of the 1930s in four brief paragraphs, and clearly underestimating the force of anti-Jewish sentiment: "Some antisemitism had spread in Finland also, but as a matter of fact only among the right and far-right circles."[11] Historian Hannu Rautkallio, who in 1987 published the first English-language narrative of Finland's relation to the Holocaust, goes to the extreme, denying the existence of antisemitism in Finland altogether: "Finland was one of the few European countries in which anti-Semitism simply did not exist."[12]

Considering this pattern of discussion in Finnish historiography, it is not at all surprising that the first extensive analysis of the character of Finnish antisemitism between the world wars, by political scientist Jari Hanski, appeared only in 2006.[13] The study had some immediate predecessors: for instance, political historian Eero Kuparinen's brief account of Finland in his world history of antisemitism (1999), historian Nils Erik Forsgård's essays on antisemitic rhetoric in the Finnish press (2002), and theologians Matti Myllykoski's and Svante Lundgren's chapter about Nazi Germany and Lutheran churches in the Nordic countries in their history of Christian antisemitism (2005).[14]

Yet despite this relatively recent literature, antisemitism is nonetheless addressed marginally at best, or simply denied. The still prevailing silence regarding antisemitism in contemporary Finnish historiography can be seen on the one hand as a legacy of the Cold War and on the other hand as a result of the desire to uphold a positive vision of national identity. Conservative Finnish history writing has repeatedly *affirmed* that there was hardly any antisemitism in the country, and that Finland was different in this respect from other Axis countries. As historian Allan Megill has claimed, the aim of "*affirmative* historiography is to praise the particular tradition or group whose history and experiences it is recounting"; "it lacks a critical stance on the memories it collects and on the tradition it supports."[15] Furthermore, Megill has argued that collective memories are constructed according to already existing social identities, in the case of Finland the persistent belief in the nation's moral superiority and immaculacy during World War II.[16] In his 2003 article about the memory of the Holocaust in Finland, geographer Petri J. Raivo illustratively considered Finns incapable of discriminating against Jews owing to the inequality Finns themselves had experienced or were experiencing because of racial classifications.[17]

Here, I analyze the ways in which antisemitism has been avoided or underplayed in Finnish academic research after 1991. The material includes representative monographs, articles, and academic discussions about antisemitism and Finland's connection with the Holocaust. I structure my analysis by distinguishing three modes of dealing with antisemitism: ignoring, understating, and denying.[18] By *ignoring,* I have in mind the intentional refusal to acknowledge antisemitism in history writing. *Understating* entails marginalizing antisemitism as an insignificant phenomenon and diminishing its impact in the society. Finally, in *denying* antisemitism, scholars dismiss it as an evident motive or fact in the making of history.

Ignoring antisemitism

Ignoring antisemitism is by far the most widespread trope within and without the historical discourse in Finland. Professional Finnish historians who have written about World War II and the preceding years have avoided antisemitism, refusing to take the Jewish narrative into account as well. Nor

has the study of antisemitism and the Holocaust been considered legitimate topics in the faculty of history and social science. As Rautkallio stated in 2004: "In Finland the Holocaust has not been included in the *fixed themes* of the discussion about World War II" (my emphasis).[19] Researchers sometimes provide a misleadingly pragmatic rationale for neglecting antisemitism in their work. At a seminar on nationalisms in 2011, some scholars considered the absence of studies on antisemitism a question of resources, rather than a matter of their intellectual priorities, excusing themselves on the grounds that in a small country such as Finland, with its limited number of scholars, there are more essential topics of national history to be pursued.[20] The small size of the Jewish community is seen as legitimizing the exclusion of the Jewish narrative from Finnish history as well. (At its largest, during the war years, the population of Jews in the whole country, including Jewish refugees, numbered about 2,200.) Indeed, by marginalizing based on quantitative comparison, one can avoid discussing qualitative matters, such as the socio-political circumstances of the Jews, the extent of antisemitism, the treatment of Jewish refugees, and the extradition of Jewish refugees and prisoners-of-war into the hands of the Nazi Security Police. The question, of course, is whose history is being written, the majority's or the minority's?[21] From the Finnish national/ist perspective, antisemitism might be seen as an unimportant theme, but from the perspective of the Jewish community the history of Finland is to some extent the history of antisemitic experience.

The debate around Henrik Meinander's 2009 book *Suomi 1944: Sota, yhteiskunta, tunnemaisema* (Finnish, Finland 1944: War, society, emotional landscape) provides an illuminating example of the consequences of ignoring antisemitism in contemporary Finnish historiography.[22] Meinander is an influential historian and professor of history at the University of Helsinki. His book deals with Finland's situation in 1944, when the country signed an armistice with the Soviet Union and commenced a war against Nazi Germany in accordance with the terms of the armistice. Swedish author and journalist Henrik Arnstad criticized Meinander in the Finnish-Swedish daily newspaper *Hufvudstadsbladet* for paying hardly any attention to the persecution and annihilation of Jews taking place in the Axis countries. Meinander's book received good reviews in Finland, but, according to Arnstad, nobody paid attention to how it dealt with the Holocaust. Arnstad lists three places in which Meinander briefly mentions or refers to the Holocaust, and claims that Meinander seems deliberately to avoid and underplay the topic, suggesting that in Meinander's view the Holocaust has "too big a place in history writing."[23] In his book, Meinander raises the position of the Holocaust in present understanding and seeks justification for the exclusion of the theme from the perspective of small states that were "facing desolation":

> Later generations have increasingly started to see the happenings of WWII as a tragedy, in which Germans were primarily trying to destroy

> Europe's Jews, Roma, and other defenseless minorities. During that time those European small nations and peoples, who were themselves facing desolation, saw the war from another perspective. Generally people did not know what was taking place in concentration camps set up by the Germans. However, people had reason to believe that the conditions in them were certainly more or less as bad as in the concentration camps of the Soviet Union, of which newspapers had been publishing shockers from the 1920s onwards. . . . Therefore it is not a surprise that many paralleled in their minds the camps of the Communists and the Nazis.[24]

In his response, "Comparisons are necessary," Meinander avoids responding to Arnstad's actual point, claiming instead that Arnstad has misread and misquoted his work.[25] According to Meinander his goal was to "analyze the war, society, and emotional landscape in our country and in the northern Baltic region from a broader *European perspective* as well as from a grassroots level" (my emphasis); paradoxically, though, his understanding of the "European perspective" does not include the treatment and fate of the Jews in the region. He makes no interpretive reference to the situation of Jews in Finland—the Finnish Jews fighting in the Finnish army during the Continuation War (1941–44) and the Lapland War (1944–45), or the Jewish refugees who managed to enter the country before the borders were closed to Jews, and who eventually were transferred to Sweden during spring 1944. In contrast to Meinander's conception of a "European perspective," Zdzisław Mach has argued, "[the] Holocaust, like colonialism, is Europe's collective heritage and collective responsibility." Mach further stresses that, "[a] shared memory, developed in open dialogue, is a precondition for the creation of a shared European identity, for understanding between Europeans."[26]

The discussion around Meinander's book illustrates the difference between Finnish and Swedish sensitivity to the use of the trope of the Holocaust. From the 1990s Sweden has taken an active role in promoting Holocaust awareness and education as a European moral duty. In marked contrast, as Silvennoinen has pointed out, a Finnish study about the war can only refer to the Holocaust in passing without stirring up critical reaction.[27] From the Finnish point of view, then, the Holocaust does not really have much, if anything, to do with Finland because of the rather insignificant role the country had in implementing the Final Solution. Meinander continues this interpretive tradition. This attitude becomes problematic, however, when such books are read outside of Finland, as in Meinander's case, since his book was first published in Swedish and thus available to the Scandinavian readership.[28]

In his conclusion, Meinander describes the uniformity of the Finnish collective memory and historiography as compared to Western Europe where the war experience of children, ethnic and sexual minorities, and prisoners, among others, has gained more of a foothold on interpretations of the war.

> It is very likely and even probable that one day this diversity of memories will diminish the ideological charge of the story about the Finnish World War II experience, and it will unravel into small and conflicting, or at least partial, interpretations independent of each other. In Western Europe this kind of transition in the culture of remembering the war has already been evident, especially in countries where national solidarity has been weakened due to immigration, multiculturalism, and the worldwide digital culture. The external enemy has been replaced with an inner one. Finland still has a long way to go, mostly because of geographical distance and a cohesive culture that has remained rather strong.[29]

By saying "one day," Meinander sets the stage for a more diverse, "Western European" perception of World War II in the future. However, recent studies have been made about other experiences of the war, such as the horrific fate of Soviet prisoners-of-war in Finland—one-third perished because of starvation, diseases, and illegal execution[30]—but this story has not yet penetrated the national historiography or the collective memory which tends to see the Finnish nation simply as the victim of the Soviet assault on the country.

Understating antisemitism

Even when brought up in Finnish studies, antisemitism is mostly *understated* or minimized in various ways into an insignificant and harmless phenomenon. This tendency is evident in Jari Hanski's PhD dissertation, "Juutalaisvastaisuus suomalaisissa aikakauslehdissä ja kirjallisuudessa 1918–1944" (Finnish, Antisemitism in Finnish periodicals and literature 1918–1944), in which antisemitism is marginalized into an attitude of the far right only, and the impact of antisemitism in Finnish society in general is greatly underestimated. A pioneering and in many respects meticulous study, Hanski's dissertation concluded with a section entitled "Was there Antisemitism in Finland?" In attempting an answer, Hanski evaluates the extent and character of antisemitism in the society, yet *only* on the basis of periodicals and fiction. Excluding the daily press, he then concludes that antisemitism was a minor phenomenon confined to the far right, which borrowed its material from Nazi Germany, and did not have a wider effect on Finnish society.

> According to the studied data, antisemitism did not gain very wide popularity, because the opinions were published in far-right publications with a limited circulation. Groups that promoted antisemitism most likely were not able to spread their ideology to any great extent among the common people: although those who took a negative stance towards Jews had very different levels of education and very different backgrounds, they were not, however, successful in disseminating their antisemitic ideas

> even in their own reference group. Evidence for this view is the fact that antisemitism, except for the extradition of eight refugees, never became an official policy of the Finnish State. . . . The [Jewish] question does not seem to have interested wider spheres. According to the data the number of visible advocates of Jews as well as their opponents seems to have been small. Therefore one can fairly say that for the majority of Finns the Jewish question did not seem to have any meaning and that the majority held a rather neutral stance towards Jews and Judaism.[31]

Hanski discusses the evident cases of "open" and "race-based antisemitism favored by National Socialist Germany," but disregards the existence of cultural Judeophobia, the widespread and multi-faceted domain of explicit and unspoken acceptance of anti-Jewish attitudes in the society at large.[32] Yet while Hanski finally understates antisemitism, the trade book version of his dissertation misleadingly emphasizes it, replacing "Antisemitism in Finnish periodicals and literature 1918–1944" with a more aggressive title, *Juutalaisviha Suomessa 1918–1944*, "Jew-hatred in Finland 1918–1944." Rewriting *juutalaisvastaisuus*—closer to the English "anti-Jewish sentiment"—as the extreme *juutalaisviha,* "Jew-hatred," the commercial title at once capitalizes on the emotive character of antisemitism and directly misrepresents Hanski's actual conclusions.[33]

Hanski's conclusions are undermined by the evidence he fails to engage. Hanski implies that the antisemitism of the 1930s would have been mostly a Nazi German import. However, this *separation* is only imagined: the ground on which National Socialist racial antisemitism could grow was not an unplanted field, as Finland had its own tradition of age-old Christian antisemitism, as well as the religious-nationalist antisemitism adopted by the Fennomans in the 1880s.[34] The constitution of the Grand Duchy of Finland had several anti-Jewish statutes restricting Jewish residence and commerce in Finland, which were abolished only in 1917 when Finland became independent and Jews were granted civil rights.[35] In addition, the belief in the organic relation between Jews and Bolsheviks began to spread in Finland well before the National Socialists' rise to power in Germany.[36] It is probably true that "open" National Socialist antisemitism as such did not gain wide acceptance in Finland, but nevertheless, the antisemitic propaganda could well have nourished the existing latent suspicion and hostility towards Jews.[37]

Alongside the explicit antisemitic attitudes studied by Hanski, subtle anti-Jewish stances could be found in "reliable sources" of popular enlightenment, such as encyclopedias compiled by eminent academics of the time. For instance, the widely circulating 1926 *Pieni Tietosankirja* (Finnish, The small encyclopedia) justifies antisemitic prejudices, by presenting common perceptions about the racial characteristics of Jews, their moral inferiority, and dominion in Soviet Bolshevism.[38] Also, the 1931 *Otavan Iso*

Tietosanakirja (Finnish, Otava's great encyclopedia) blames the existence of antisemitism partly on Jews themselves: "Due to their particular religion and national characteristics, Jews usually remain as an alien element, no matter among what nation they live, and so their influence has been considered detrimental to healthy national development."[39] Jews were seen as a non-national, even harmful group—a mindset well infiltrated into the sensibilities of Finnish society.

Hanski claims, "It seems that Finnish periodicals did not at all provoke [people] to violence against the whole Jewish community or the majority of it (I mean by this Russian-style pogroms). Except for some singular cases of fights or squabbling, there was no violence against the Jews."[40] Restricting antisemitism to its most violent cases, again, Hanski does not consider other forms of antisemitic discrimination. And yet, as the example of the meritorious conductor Simon Pergament-Parmet, who was unable to get work in the 1930s because of his Jewish origin, shows, Finnish Jews faced discrimination in their everyday lives.[41] Hanski also states that while slurs against Jews were common, "there was no attempt to try to connect [these slurs] to any named Finnish Jew." Setting aside Hanski's insensitivity to the rhetoric of antisemitism, his claim is in fact false, since in the pro-National Socialist *Uusi Eurooppa* (Finnish, New Europe) alone one can find articles attacking Finnish Jews by name.[42]

Although antisemitism never became an official policy of the Finnish state, it does not automatically mean that Finland was devoid of institutional antisemitism. In summer 1938 the Finnish government aimed to stanch the stream of Austrian Jewish refugees to the country. On August 19, 1938, a boat carrying sixty Austrian Jewish refugees with visas to Finland was turned back to Germany. In his statement the following February, when the matter again surfaced in the Parliament, Minister of the Interior Urho Kekkonen gave preference to admitting and protecting ethnic Finnic refugees (*heimopakolaiset*) from the Soviet Union; after all, one should "Never mix with a yid, if you can be among Christians."[43] Ethnicity and "race" also play a role in the Finnish prisoners of war administration, which kept a registry of ethnic grouping beginning in 1942.[44] According to historian Ida Suolahti, Finnic peoples received more favorable treatment than other groups, such as Jews, Poles, and Cossacks. Prisoners of war were extradited to the Germans due to their ethnic background, and Jewish prisoners of war were clearly overrepresented among the extradited when compared to other groups.[45] The most serious consequences of institutional antisemitism were shown in the activity of the Finnish Security Police, Valpo. Silvennoinen has demonstrated that Valpo was more involved in anti-Jewish measures than earlier thought, by assisting the German Security Police in the liquidation of ideological enemies in Northern Finland.[46] In the light of these examples, Hanski's conclusion that antisemitism was limited mostly to the extreme right must seem dubious.

Taking explicit violence as the sole index of antisemitism informs other studies as well, notably American historian Sharon Franklin-Rahkonen's PhD dissertation on Jewish identity in Finland, the only study based on interviews discussing Finnish Jews' memories of antisemitic experiences. Franklin-Rahkonen, like Hanski, disregards discrimination in her conclusions, and clearly underestimates the extent of antisemitism. Early in her thesis, she declares, "I have found no evidence of *violence* toward Jews. For this reason I say that anti-Semitism was never the problem in Finland that it has been in so many other places" (my emphasis). At the same time, she elaborates on antisemitic discrimination in employment before World War II—"Elderly people often tell stories of discrimination in finding and keeping jobs"—and suggests that, "It has only been in the decades since World War II that prejudice and discrimination in employment have practically disappeared."[47] Franklin-Rahkonen's contradictory conclusions imply a false distinction between nonviolent discrimination and antisemitism. The explanation for her conception of what "really" constitutes antisemitism probably lies in an unverbalized comparison of discriminatory antisemitism to genocidal antisemitism; in other words, compared to the Holocaust, everyday antisemitism seems rather trivial.

Although Franklin-Rahkonen collected memories of individuals' antisemitic experiences, she fails to challenge the general assumption that hardly any antisemitism existed in Finland, a myth that the Jewish community itself has been keen to sustain. Traditionally, Finnish Jews have stressed their exceptional situation as Jews in an Axis country; fighting for Finland alongside the Nazis against the Soviets, they redeemed their place in Finnish society. Yet Franklin-Rahkonen overlooks the selective character of collective memory, especially among a population eager to assimilate. As Megill pointed out, remembering and forgetting are closely bound together, "every remembering is also a mode of forgetting and every forgetting is a mode of remembering."[48] By *remembering* the exceptional situation of Jews in Finland, the Jewish community has simultaneously *forgotten* the antisemitism that did not fit the nationalized narrative. By forgetting antisemitism the community has also refrained from challenging the dominant conception of Finnish history during World War II. Since digging up cases of antisemitism would have underlined Finland's potentially "fascist" alliance, it was considered specifically inappropriate in Finnish society during the Cold War and the Jewish community did not want to hazard its position as a minority by reminding the public at large of anti-Jewish resentment.[49]

Denying antisemitism

Explicit *denial* of antisemitism in various incidents with evident antisemitic motives is the most extreme and the rarest of the three modes of historical misrepresentation. In April 2008, the rector's office of the University of

Helsinki declared that antisemitism had not been the motive behind the rejection of Israel-Jakob Schur's PhD dissertation at the University in 1937 (the following spring Schur's PhD was again rejected on similar grounds at the Åbo Akademi University in Turku), challenging the present author's claim that antisemitism had played a central role in the case. The discussion of the case began in January 2008, soon after I published an article in *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja* (Finnish, *Historical Journal*) arguing that Schur's dissertation on Jewish circumcision in the light of the Hebrew Bible and Rabbinic literature had been rejected due to antisemitic attitudes among theologians and ethnologists.[50] Providing an analysis of antisemitic rhetoric in the negative statements made at the time about Schur's dissertation, I underlined the rarity of Schur's situation: during the 20th century only a couple of PhD dissertations had been rejected at the University after passing the pre-examination. After my article was published some academics and a bishop of the Lutheran Church raised the question in the press as to whether Schur should be rehabilitated and possibly granted a PhD degree posthumously.[51] As a result of public pressure, rector of the Helsinki University Ilkka Niiniluoto established a working group to investigate the case. The group consisted of three scholars: chairman Olli Mäenpää, Olli Alho, and Fred Karlsson, representing, respectively, international law, religious studies, and linguistics.[52] The report of the rector's working group concluded that in Schur's case the procedures of good academic practice were not violated, the rejection had been justified on scholarly grounds, and that there was no evidence of antisemitism behind the rejection:

> The massive scholarly critique against the dissertation at the University of Helsinki (and later at the Åbo Akademi University) points, instead, to qualitative problems. Although Schur's dissertation was probably a marginal case in terms of quality, the examination of which was also complicated by scholarly disagreements, the [rector's] working group considers that the rejection of the dissertation was motivated by scholarly arguments according to a diverse and open discussion. . . . The working group did not find evidence of antisemitism in the different phases of the examination and assessment process of Schur's dissertation, except for some biased formulations in [Professor Gustav] Schmidt's language inspection report.[53]

As I argued in *Helsingin Sanomat* (April 18, 2008), the working group did not have expertise in antisemitism, and in their report they did not discuss the question of antisemitism.[54] The working group specifically disregarded the formal statement rejecting Schur's dissertation by Professor of Old Testament exegesis Antti Filemon Puukko, whose research concerned the degeneracy of Rabbinic Judaism. Instead of taking Puuko and his writings directly into account, the working group referred to vicar Pauli Niemelä's PhD

dissertation on Puukko, coming to the view that there was no antisemitism in Puukko's evaluation.[55] By relying on secondary accounts about Puukko rather than analyzing his position directly, the working group failed to consider Christian antisemitism, or as theologians call it, anti-Judaism. Schur's critical analysis of religious practice was not responsibly evaluated in 1937, and was cast by his rivals as both immoral and blasphemous; the 2008 working group did not conduct the research that would have allowed it to rectify this misevaluation. Furthermore, the working group disregarded the impact of Gustav Schmidt's biased language-evaluation statement about the standard of Schur's German, which ultimately sealed Schur's fate.[56] Overall, the working group overlooked the ideological and political climate of the period and rather seemed to support the views of the right-wing professors who opposed Schur.[57]

In earlier issues of *Helsingin Sanomat*, Mäenpää had already given an answer to a reporter's question on why the working group did not deal with and recognize antisemitism: "I don't have experience in assessing antisemitism and I don't think others have either."[58] In a lengthy reply in *Helsingin Sanomat* to my critique, Mäenpää added:

> Simo Muir considers in his article (HS, April 18) that the rector's report was inadequate, because it does not recognize antisemitism in the rejection of Israel-Jakob Schur's dissertation. In fact it is difficult to respond to this kind of criticism other than by admitting that Muir is absolutely right. The working group did not indeed recognize antisemitism in the handling of the matter, and if this is an inadequacy then the report is also inadequate.[59]

Mäenpää admits that there was malpractice (for instance, in the language inspection) in Schur's case, but then advances the working group's hypothesis that Schur's dissertation had been rejected as part of a wider tendency to elevate the standard of research. According to Mäenpää, several other PhD dissertations were rejected for this reason. Mäenpää does not, however, make the fundamental distinction between dissertations that failed pre-examination—something that is not uncommon—and those that were rejected after the public examination, which is extremely rare. Mäenpää continues:

> But this is not enough for Muir. Also, antisemitism should have been detected. According to him, one sign of it is the critique found in Puukko's statement about the degeneration of post-exilic Judaism. This is what Muir considers Christian antisemitism. . . . When assessing Puukko's alleged antisemitism the committee based its opinions on both Pauli Niemelä's PhD dissertation (which Muir mentions) and Heikki Räisänen's account in *The National Biography of Finland*, according to

which in Puukko's case nothing points to Nazi contacts (which Muir does not mention).[60]

Mäenpää confirms that the working group relied on a present-day theologian's one-sided and subjective understanding of Christian antisemitism, and declined to recognize how in Schur's case "harmless" doctrinal anti-Judaism led to discrimination and antisemitism.[61] In addition, the working group failed to consider Finnish theologians' problems in dealing with the antisemitic past of the Church,[62] of which Heikki Räisänen's biography of Puukko is exemplary. Not only did the working group refuse to engage Puukko's scholarship directly, but in relying on Räisänen's work, the committee again accepted a rather sanitized account of his career as authoritative. Räisänen remarks, for instance, that Puukko "had close ties with Germany because of his marriage and studies, but nothing points to Nazi contacts."[63] Obviously Puukko was not involved in politics but he had professional and private contacts with theologians, some of whom were influential National Socialist ideologues.[64] The most important of these is Professor of New Testament exegesis Gerhard Kittel (son of Rudolf Kittel), whose teaching at the Luther Academy was inflected by antisemitism. Gerhard Kittel's notorious 1933 book *Die Judenfrage* (The Jewish question) examined different solutions to the Jewish question and considered isolation as the best alternative.[65] Puukko had already become acquainted with the Kittel family during his studies in Germany and continued to maintain contact with Gerhard Kittel. Räisänen also denies that the Luther Academy, where Kittel was teaching, visited frequently by Puukko and other Finnish theologians, had anything to do with antisemitism.[66]

Stressing that Puukko did not have any "Nazi contacts" Mäenpää succumbs to the erroneous view that in order to express antisemitic ideas, one had to be a Nazi.[67] Ultimately Mäenpää concludes, "Muir is undoubtedly right in demanding the will and the expertise to assess antisemitism. The task of this working group was not an analysis of the whole range of antisemitism. The subject is important and has not been adequately researched." Contrary to this statement and to the malpractice that working group had admitted, the University's press department released a statement that there was "No mishandling of Schur's PhD process," news widely distributed in the Finnish press.[68]

After the rector of the University, Ilkka Niiniluoto, made the decision, based on the working group's report, that no further actions would be taken, the Central Council of Jewish Communities in Finland requested the University to conduct a new inquiry, in which today's human rights standards would be considered and experts on racial discrimination would be consulted. Referring to the lack of expertise in assessing antisemitism, the appeal stated that "it is incomprehensible how the working group could claim in its official report that Schur was not discriminated against because

of his Jewish origin." The letter continues, "the working group seems to accept the mentality of the time, when the discrimination of Jews and other minorities was not considered by any means objectionable."[69] The appeal was, however, declined by Niiniluoto, now the chancellor of the University, and by the new rector, Thomas Wilhelmsson.

In October 2008, the Schur case was discussed in an academic seminar initiated by the Finnish Society for the History of Science and Learning and held at the University of Helsinki. Scholar of comparative religion Ilona Salomaa brought out new evidence about another of Schur's examiners, Professor of Fenno-Ugrian ethnology Albert Hämäläinen. Salomaa discovered antisemitic marginalia in Hämäläinen's copy of the dissertation, where he repeatedly refers to Schur as "*juuti*," Finnish for *yid*.[70] The very same copy of Schur's dissertation had been used by the rector's working group, which evidently disregarded Hämäläinen's marginal slurs as having any bearing on the adequacy of his judgment of Schur. Juha Sihvola, critical of the University's decision, concluded:

> This seminar has provided in my opinion enough evidence that there were obvious antisemitic traits in the examination of Israel-Jakob Schur's dissertation at the University of Helsinki and the Åbo Akademi University. In this respect, the report by the group of experts who investigated the case on the request of the then rector of the University of Helsinki, Ilkka Niiniluoto, is unsatisfactory. The assemblage of the group was unsuccessful from the start because there was not enough expertise on Judaism and antisemitism.[71]

Sihvola, who had discussed the case with the leadership of the University, suspected that behind the decision lingered the problem of "Pandora's Box": if the decision concerning Schur's dissertation were altered posthumously, several other cases might arise. Moreover, Sihvola considered that the difficulties in coming to terms with the antisemitic past of the University lay in the Cold War legacy in history writing, especially concerning research on Finnish–German collaboration, which "still seems to evoke strangely inflamed feelings." According to Sihvola, the University has much to improve in the investigation of the antisemitic legacy, and the University as a "society of truth" has a moral duty to assess its past much more critically.[72] As political historian and *Helsingin Sanomat*'s critic Veli-Pekka Leppänen put it, "At the seminar about ten scholars powerfully demonstrated that the criteria of discrimination were fulfilled. At the same time the stance of the working group and the leadership of the University is that the case shall become void."[73] Since November 2008, it seems that the Schur affair has again been forgotten by the University.[74]

The explicit denial of antisemitism also extends to the foundational incident of modern Finnish Holocaust studies, the extradition of "eight"

Jewish refugees to the German Security Police on November 6, 1942; the refugees were deported to Auschwitz and only one of them survived. In his 2004 book *Holokaustilta pelastetut* (Finnish, Spared from the Holocaust), Hannu Rautkallio argues that the extraditions were a "pure police action," denying any anti-Jewish attitudes behind the deportations, and thus also distancing Finland from the Holocaust. Rautkallio weaves a narrative of the exceptionality of the Finnish case—"it was an incomprehensible exception in Hitler's warfare that among the allies of Germany only in Finland did the Holocaust not take place"—and so claims that Finland does not have any relation to the possible implication of the extraditions in the extended Holocaust: "Therefore elsewhere it has not been possible to understand or even accept the Finnish rescue from the Holocaust. The extradition of the eight Jewish refugees has been seen as an example of Finland's involvement in the Holocaust, which in fact it was not."[75]

Rautkallio's arguments can be divided into three main theses: one, there were no antisemitic motives behind the extraditions and thus Finland did not participate in the Holocaust; two, the Finnish authorities *actively* rescued Finnish Jews and the Jewish refugees from the Holocaust; and three, the eight Jews were themselves responsible for their own extradition. In the beginning of his book, Rautkallio poses the key question of his work: "were 'these eight' really handed over to the Germans due to racial political reasons," which he later answers: "That the . . . Jewish refugees were included in a larger list of extradited non-Jews did not make this extradition race-political because there were other reasons."[76] One of these "other reasons" was that the extradited were convicted of minor offenses, including forgeries, thefts, peculation, and contravening rationing regulations. Rautkallio himself seems to question whether the crimes, which were not at all so rare during wartime, were "sufficient," but nevertheless casts culpability on the extradited as lawbreakers.[77]

Although he mentions the possibility of antisemitism in Finnish society, Rautkallio nevertheless denies the consequences of antisemitic attitudes on the decision-making of Finnish authorities and the Finnish Security Police, and strongly opposes the view held by historians William B. Cohen and Jörgen Svensson that antisemitism would have been an underlying factor in the extraditions. According to Rautkallio, Cohen and Svensson follow "the view accepted by the foreign Holocaust literature that Finns were also clearly 'antisemites'. . . . Cohen and Svensson themselves create a myth about the Holocaust in Finland, where in their opinion what never happened, happened."[78]

As the translated title "Spared from the Holocaust" suggests, the book pursues Rautkallio's belief that Finland *actively* rescued Jewish refugees and foreign Jews residing in the country during the Continuation War, altogether 365 individuals.[79] As Hana Worthen has claimed, Rautkallio has a "fundamental—and controversial—confidence in the government's motives."[80]

In his opinion the Security Police and the government were trying to do their best to secure the safety of Jews: "The only complete and authentic list of Jews produced by Valpo during the war was compiled in order to rescue them."[81] Not only does Rautkallio provide no evidence for this assumption, he blithely ignores the alternative uses of such lists throughout contemporary Europe. In fact, after the extraditions, Valpo sought to transfer Jews to Sweden, finally succeeding in 1944, not in order to "rescue them," but rather to get rid of unwanted and untrustworthy foreigners.[82]

Refusing to see Finnish officials' actions as amounting to participation in the Holocaust, Rautkallio shifts the responsibility of the extradition of "the eight" elsewhere—to the Jews themselves. This practice can be called the *deflective negationism* of the Holocaust. Rather than denying the Holocaust, deflective negationism is a self-defensive and particularistic attitude, which transfers the guilt for the atrocities to members of other nations.[83] The most perverse form of deflective negationism pins the blame for the Holocaust on the Jews themselves. Rautkallio finally focuses responsibility for the extraditions on Walter Cohen (father of the scholar William B. Cohen), who was supposed to be extradited with the eight other refugees. While Cohen, a physician, was ordered to hard labor with the other male Jewish refugees, he successfully petitioned influential persons to liberate him. In Rautkallio's view, Cohen's persistence and "impudence" made him responsible for the extradition plan: "We may even think that his bold behavior [at the Security Police] stemmed from his narcissist self-confidence, of which there are numerous examples starting from his departure from Belgium in 1940. He did not avoid using other people and lying in order to bolster his own position." As Rautkallio puts it, "The idea of delivering Cohen to the Gestapo matured, but now Cohen was himself responsible for it."[84] As Worthen puts it, "Rautkallio's sustained critique of the deceitful apostate Cohen as too wealthy, too privileged, too selfish, and too lazy bears unsettling similarities to familiar stereotypes."[85] Rautkallio does not content himself with blaming Cohen for his own situation, but makes him a scapegoat for the extradition of all eight Jewish refugees: "the tragedy that led to the extradition of the eight Jewish refugees in November 1942 was caused by one Jewish refugee only, Walter Cohen, seeking his personal interests and waving aside the officials' instructions."[86] Again, Rautkallio provides no evidence to sustain this claim. As Worthen concludes, "[the] notion that one individual could provoke the Finnish State Police into a broader policy of deportation is hardly convincing."[87]

Recently, Silvennoinen has shown that antisemitism drove Valpo's decision concerning the extradition of Jewish individuals.[88] Valpo officials were well aware that their decision to hand over Jews to the Germans severely endangered the lives of the extradited.[89] Even Rautkallio notes that Valpo was aware of the murder of Estonian Jewry as early as October 1941, and the chief of the Security Police Arno Anthoni personally visited the Sachsenhausen concentration camp in 1942.[90] As we now know, at that time

Valpo was also aware of the activity of *Einsatzkommando Finnland* operating on Finnish soil in Salla, Lapland, and that a Finnish unit set up by Valpo was assisting in the selection of people to be liquidated.[91]

Rautkallio's view that Finland did not have anything to do with the Holocaust, a view that has persisted in the face of mounting research to the contrary, seems to be based on the presupposition of the Finns' moral superiority and the belief that Finnish officials were incapable of discriminating against others. In the light of contemporary research such a view is insupportable. But however extreme Rautkallio's position may seem, it is not really out of step with dominant perspectives in Finnish history, the practices of *ignoring*, *understating*, or *denying* Finland's implication in antisemitism. In this sense, it is also part of wider, more complex, and more disturbing acts of silencing. Given its precarious social and political position in Finland, the Jewish community itself has been understandably reluctant to restore the history of antisemitism to contemporary Finnish memory. But this unwillingness to jeopardize its tenuous status in Finland says less about the Jewish community than it does about the power of silencing in Finnish culture at large. Maintaining the myth of an undivided Finland innocent of antisemitism requires an active performance of silence among the wider Finnish public, a forgetting rigorously supported by Finnish historical scholarship, and prosecuted by the institutional structure of Finnish academia.

Notes

1. The epigraphs are from the Orientalist Tapani Harviainen, "Juutalainen historia ja länsimainen juutalaiskuva" [Jewish history and the western image of the Jew], *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja* 102, no. 2 (2004): 175; and Urho Kekkonen, *Rakas Häiskä: Urho ja Sylvi Kekkosen kirjeenvaihtoa vuosilta 1924–1945* [Dear Häiskä: Urho and Sylvi Kekkonen's correspondence from the years 1924–1945], ed. Ari Uino (Helsinki: Otava, 1997), 185. Kekkonen's "motto" reads in Finnish, "'Ei koskaan jutin luo, jos saa kristittyjen parissa olla,' se on tunnuslauseeni." In 2010, the student newspaper of Helsinki University, *Ylioppilaslehti* confirmed to the general assumption: "Actual antisemitism in Finland was rare, though people admired Germany and National Socialism." Maria Manner and Ann-Mari Huhtanen, "Natsi-Suomi" [Nazi Finland], *Ylioppilaslehti*, April 26, 2010, accessed August 10, 2011, http://ylioppilaslehti.fi/2010/11/natsi-suomi/. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Finnish and Swedish are my own.
2. Dan Stone, introduction to *The Historiography of the Holocaust,* ed. Dan Stone (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1.
3. Stone, introduction, 2; see also Walter Laqueur, *The Changing Face of Antisemitism: From Ancient Times to the Present Day* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 35.
4. Klas-Göran Karlsson, introduction to *The Holocaust on Post-War Battlefields: Genocide as Historical Culture*, eds. Klas-Göran Karlsson and Ulf Zander (Malmö: Sekel, 2006), 11–12. See also Thomas C. Fox, "The Holocaust under Communism," in *The Historiography of the Holocaust*, ed. Dan Stone (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 420.

5. Florin Lobont, "Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," in *The Historiography of the Holocaust*, ed. Dan Stone (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 450.
6. Oula Silvennoinen, "Still Under Examination: Coming to Terms with Finland's Alliance with Nazi Germany," *Yad Vashem Studies* 37, no. 2 (2009): 74.
7. Silvennoinen, "Still Under Examination," 69.
8. Juha Sihvola, "Juutalaisuutta ja antisemitismiä koskevaa asiantuntemusta ei ollut riittävästi edustettuna" [There was not enough expertise on Judaism and antisemitism], in *Hyljättiin outouden vuoksi: Israel-Jakob Schur ja suomalainen tiedeyhteisö* [Rejected due to strangeness: Israel-Jakob Schur and the Finnish scholarly community], ed. Simo Muir and Ilona Salomaa (Helsinki: Suomen Itämainen Seura, 2009), 211.
9. Silvennoinen, "Still Under Examination," 78.
10. Elina Suominen [Sana], *Kuolemanlaiva s/s Hohenhörn: Juutalaispakolaisten kohtalo Suomessa* [Death ship SS Hohenhörn: The fate of the Jewish refugees in Finland] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1979), 67–73.
11. Torvinen further declares, "There was hardly any Jew-hatred." Taimi Torvinen, *Kadimah: Suomen juutalaisten historia* [Kadimah: The history of Finland's Jews] (Helsinki: Otava, 1989), 118. Human rights activist Santeri Jacobsson's book (1951) about the struggle for civil rights deals extensively with anti-Jewish resentment in the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland, but stops at 1917, when Jews in Finland were granted the rights of citizenship. Santeri Jacobsson, *Taistelu ihmisoikeuksista*: *Yhteiskunnallis-historiallinen tutkimus Ruotsin ja Suomen juutalaiskysymyksen vaiheista* [The struggle for human rights: A socio-historical study of the history of the Jewish question in Sweden and Finland] (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1951).
12. Hannu Rautkallio, *Finland and the Holocaust: The Rescue of Finland's Jews*, trans. Paul Sjöblom (New York: Holocaust Library, 1987), back cover; see also Chapter 1.
13. Jari Hanski, "Juutalaisvastaisuus suomalaisissa aikakauslehdissä ja kirjallisuudessa 1918–1944" [Antisemitism in Finnish journals and literature 1918–1944] (PhD diss., University of Helsinki, 2006).
14. Eero Kuparinen, *Aleksandriasta Auschwitziin: Antisemitismin pitkä historia* [From Alexandria to Auschwitz: The long history of antisemitism] (Jyväskylä: Atena, 1999), 270–7; Nils Erik Forsgård, *Alias Finkelstein: Studier i antisemitisk retorik* [Alias Finkelstein: Studies of antisemitic rhetorics] ([Espoo]: Schildts, 2002); Matti Myllykoski and Svante Lundgren, *Murhatun Jumalan varjo: Antisemitismi kristinuskon historiassa* [Shadow of the murdered God: Antisemitism in the history of Christianity] (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 2005), 359–66.
15. Allan Megill proposes three orientations in history-writing: one position sees "history-writing as having the function of binding together and affirming the community, group, *Volk*, state, nation, religion, political commitment, and so on out of which it arises. The opposing position sees history as having a primarily critical and negating function with regard to the community out of which it arises and the past it studies. Between a historiography that affirms and historiography that engages in critique, there is a third, didactic position that seeks to guide the *Volk*, or the flock in the direction of a better future." Alan Megill, *Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A Contemporary Guide to Practice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 27, 47.
16. Megill, *Historical Knowledge*, 47. In 1987, eminent historian Mauno Jokipii commented on the German–Finnish military collaboration, claiming that it

was "as clean as warfare can possibly be." Mauno Jokipii, *Jatkosodan synty: Tutkimuksia Saksan ja Suomen sotilaallisesta yhteistyöstä* 1940–41 [The origin of the Continuation War: Studies on Finland's and Germany's military cooperation 1940–41] (Helsinki: Otava, 1987), 398–9; see also Oula Silvennoinen, *Salaiset aseveljet: Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933–1944* [Secret brothers-in-arms: The cooperation of the Finnish and German security police 1933–1944] (Helsinki: Otava, 2008), 329–30. Silvennoinen's book has been published also in German, Oula Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft: Die sicherheitspolizeitliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Finnland und Deutschland 1933–1944,* trans. Klaus Reichel and Kaija Reichel (Darmstadt: WBG, 2010).

17. Petri J. Raivo, "Oblivion without Guilt: The Holocaust and the Memories of the Second World War in Finland," in *Gender, Place, and Memory in the Modern Jewish Experience: Re-placing Ourselves*, ed. Judith Tydor Baumel and Tova Cohen (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2003), 111.
18. For instance, in his article "Holocaust under Communism," Fox uses the words "ignoring," "minimizing," "sidelining," "distorting," "understating," and "underplaying" when describing the historiography regarding antisemitism and the Holocaust. Michael Shafir uses in his book *Between Denial and "Comparative Trivialization"* the classificatory scheme: "outright Holocaust negationism," "deflective negationism," (including "deflecting guilt onto the Nazis," "deflecting guilt to the 'fringe,'" and "deflecting guilt to the Jews"), "selective negationism," and "comparative trivialization" of the Holocaust; see Michael Shafir, *Between Denial and "Comparative Trivialization": Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe* (Jerusalem: The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, 2002), accessed November 7, 2011, http://sicsa.huji.ac.il/shafir19.htm.
19. Hannu Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut* [Spared from the Holocaust] (Helsinki: WSOY, 2004), 136.
20. Seminar on nationalisms at the Section of Social Science History, University of Helsinki, April 19, 2011.
21. See discussion in Megill, *Historical Knowledge,* 17.
22. Henrik Meinander, *Suomi 1944: Sota, yhteiskunta, tunnemaisema*, trans. Paula Autio (Helsinki: Siltala, 2009).
23. Henrik Arnstad, "Har förintelsen för stor plats i historien?" [Is the Holocaust playing too big a role in history?], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, October 17, 2009, 13. Arnstad also mentioned that American historian Paul Levine had accused Meinander of Holocaust trivialization, because Meinander compares the six million Holocaust victims with the total numbers of war casualties in various countries and thus understates the position of the Holocaust as genocide. Arnstad quotes Levine, "There is no doubt that Henrik Meinander seriously relativizes the Holocaust. The question is, why does he do it so openly?"
24. Meinander, *Suomi 1944*, 84–5.
25. Henrik Meinander, "Komparationer är nödvändiga" [Comparisons are necessary], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, October 20, 2009, 11.
26. Zdzisław Mach, "Poland's National Memory of the Holocaust and Its Identity in an Expanded Europe," in *The Holocaust: Voices of Scholars*, ed. Jolanta Ambrosewicz-Jacobs (Cracow: Austeria, 2009), 63, 69.
27. Oula Silvennoinen, "En krönika över fortsättningskrigets minne och glömska" [A chronicle of the memory and oblivion of the Continuation War], *Historisk Tidskrift för Finland* 95, no. 2 (2010): 341.

28. Henrik Meinander, *Finland 1944: Krig, samhälle, känslolandskap* (Helsinki: Söderströms, 2009).
29. Meinander, *Suomi 1944*, 397–8.
30. Antti Kujala, *Vankisurmat: Neuvostosotavankien laittomat ampumiset jatkosodassa* [Execution of the prisoners: Illegal shootings of the Soviet POWs in the Continuation War] (Helsinki: WSOY, 2008). See also Sari Näre and Jenni Kirves, eds., *Ruma sota: Talvi- ja jatkosodan vaiettu historia* [The ugly war: The silenced history of the Winter and Continuation Wars] (Helsinki: Johnny Kniga, 2008).
31. Hanski, "Juutalaisvastaisuus suomalaisissa aikakauslehdissä ja kirjallisuudessa 1918–1944," 293.
32. On the definition of cultural Judeophobia, see Saul Friedländer, *The Years of Persecution: Nazi Germany & the Jews 1933–1939* (London: Phoenix, 2007), 56, 347.
33. Jari Hanski, *Juutalaisviha Suomessa 1918–1944* (Helsinki: Ajatus, 2006).
34. Torvinen, *Kadimah*, 32–79; Jacobsson, *Taistelu ihmisoikeuksista*; Vesa Vares, "Meurman, Agathon (1826–1909)," in *Kansallisbiografia-verkkojulkaisu* [*The National Biography of Finland*, Web version], Studia Biographica 4 (Helsinki: SKS, 1997–2011), accessed September 13, 2011, http://www.kansallisbiografia.fi/kb/artikkeli/4569/.
35. Torvinen, *Kadimah*, 100.
36. Eero Kuparinen, *Antisemitismin musta kirja: Juutalaisvainojen pitkä historia* [The black book of antisemitism: The long history of Jewish persecution] (Jyväskylä: Atena, 2008), 278; Oula Silvennoinen, "Suomalaisen antisemitismin luonteesta 1930-luvulla" [On the nature of Finnish antisemitism in the 1930s], in *Hyljättiin outouden vuoksi: Israel-Jakob Schur ja suomalainen tiedeyhteisö*, ed. Simo Muir and Ilona Salomaa (Helsinki: Suomen Itämainen Seura, 2009), 215.
37. See Friedländer, *The Years of Persecution*, 224; Silvennoinen, "Suomalaisen antisemitismin luonteesta," 216.
38. Simo Muir, "Israel-Jakob Schurin väitöskirjan hylkääminen Helsingin yliopistossa 1937: Antisemitismiä, kielikiistaa ja henkilöintrigejä" [The rejection of Israel-Jakob Schur's PhD dissertation at the University of Helsinki, 1937: Antisemitism, the Language Struggle, and personal intrigues], *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja* 105, no. 4 (2007): 474–5.
39. Laura Ekholm and Simo Muir, "Isänmaasuhteen rakentaminen 'kansallisten' nimien avulla: Helsingin juutalaisessa seurakunnassa tehdyt sukunimien vaihdot 1933–1944" [Building a relationship to the fatherland with "national" names: Family name changes in the Jewish community of Helsinki 1933–1944], *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja* 109, no. 1 (2011): 31.
40. Hanski, "Juutalaisvastaisuus," 287.
41. Vesa Sirén, "Juutalaisvastaisuus eli myös musiikkielämässä" [Antisemitism was also alive in the music scene], *Helsingin Sanomat*, December 12, 2008, C 2.
42. For instance, "Suomen juutalaisia syytetään kotirintaman pettämisestä" [Finnish Jews are accused of treason on the home front], *Uusi Eurooppa*, no. 6 (1942): 1; "Juutalaiset muuttavat sukunimiään" [Jews are changing their family names], *Uusi Eurooppa*, no. 13 (1943): 3; "Juutalaiskysymys 'päivänkysymysten kerhossa'" [The Jewish question among "the questions of the day"], *Uusi Eurooppa*, no. 14 (1943): 3.
43. Taimi Torvinen, *Pakolaiset Suomessa Hitlerin valtakaudella* [Refugees in Finland during Hitler's reign] (Helsinki: Otava, 1984), 93, 100. Kekkonen qtd. in Kekkonen, *Rakas Häiskä,* 185.

44. Ida Suolahti, "Prisoners of War Transfers During the Continuation War," in *Prisoners of War Deaths and People Handed Over to Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939–55: A Research Report of the Finnish National Archives*, ed. Lars Westerlund (Helsinki: National Archives, 2008), 153–5.
45. There were approximately 400 prisoners of war registered as Jews during the Continuation War and 49 of them were extradited, constituting over 10 per cent. The registration was based on the prisoners' own declaration and thus Jews were also registered under other categories. Suolahti, "Prisoners of War Transfers," 154, 157.
46. Silvennoinen, "Suomalaisen antisemitismin luonteesta," 217; Silvennoinen, *Salaiset aseveljet*.
47. Sharon Franklin-Rahkonen, "Jewish Identity in Finland" (PhD diss., Indiana University, 1991), 20, 125–6.
48. Megill, *Historical Knowledge*, 73.
49. After a lecture on antisemitism in Finland I was giving at a conference arranged by the Finnish Karmel Association on May 28, 2011, an elderly member of the Jewish community stood up and said that he had not experienced any antisemitism in his youth. The audience burst out clapping. Afterwards the man came up to apologize to me for opposing my approach and added that being called a "kike" and being beaten were not antisemitic but merely "scuffles between boys."
50. Simo Muir, "Anti-Semitism in the Finnish Academe: Rejection of Israel-Jakob Schur's PhD Dissertation at the University of Helsinki (1937) and Åbo Akademi University (1938)," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 34, no. 2 (2009): 150–3; Muir, "Israel-Jakob Schurin väitöskirjan hylkääminen Helsingin yliopistossa 1937." See also Juha Manninen, "Juutalaisen valistusajattelijan väitöskirjan hylkääminen Helsingin yliopistossa" [Rejection of the PhD dissertation of a Jewish Enlightenment thinker at the University of Helsinki], *Tieteessä tapahtuu* 27, no. 2 (2009); Simo Muir and Ilona Salomaa, eds., *Hyljättiin outouden vuoksi: Israel-Jakob Schur ja suomalainen tiedeyhteisö* (Helsinki: Suomen Itämainen Seura, 2009).
51. Veli-Pekka Leppänen, "Voiko tiedemiehen kunnian palauttaa?" [Can the honor of a scholar be restored?], *Helsingin Sanomat*, January 8, 2008, C 1; "Professor Wants to Restore Long-lost Reputation of Jewish Doctoral Candidate Israel-Jakob Schur," *Helsingin Sanomat International Edition*, January 10, 2008, accessed September 21, 2011, http:www.hs.fi/English/print/1135233176461; Pekka Pihlanto, "Väittelijän kunnianpalautus on paikallaan" [The honor of the PhD candidate ought to be restored], *Helsingin Sanomat*, January 12, 2008, C 10; Mikko Heikka, "Israel-Jakob Schurin maine on palautettava" [Israel-Jacob Schur's honor has to be restored], January 11, 2008, accessed February 27, 2008, http://www.pod.fi/heikka/?p=56.
52. "University of Helsinki to Look into Treatment of Israel-Jakob Schur," *Helsingin Sanomat International Edition*, January 16, 2008, accessed September 21, 2011, http://www.hs.fi/English/print/113523332780.
53. Olli Alho, Fred Karlsson, and Olli Mäenpää, "Israel-Jakob Schurin väitöskirjan käsittely ja hylkääminen Helsingin yliopistossa lukuvuonna 1936–1937" [The evaluation and rejection of Israel-Jakob Schur's PhD dissertation at the University of Helsinki 1936–1937], April 9, 2008, accessed November 7, 2012, http://www.helsinki.fi/ajankohtaista/uutisarkisto/schur_raportti.pdf.
54. Simo Muir, "Schur-asiantuntijaryhmän raportti on puutteellinen" [The report of the Schur-expert group is insufficient], *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 18, 2008, C 3.

55. Pauli M. K. Niemelä, *Antti Filemon Puukko: Suomalainen Vanhan testamentin tutkija ja tulkitsija* [Antti Filemon Puukko: A Finnish Old Testament researcher and exegete], Suomen eksegeettisen seuran julkaisuja 74 (Helsinki: Suomen eksegeettinen seura, 1999).
56. See Tapani Harviainen, "Keskustelu juutalaisen väitöskirjan hylkäämisestä jäi kesken" [Discussion about the rejection of the Jewish PhD dissertation remained unfinished], *Helsingin Sanomat*, May 6, 2008, C 6.
57. The professors who defended and opposed Schur's PhD were divided into two camps, the first being Swedish-speaking, leftist-liberal and anticlerical, and the second pro-Finnish, right-wing and supporting the affinity between the church and the state. Besides the faculty of humanities, where the PhD of Israel-Jakob Schur was rejected, antisemitism was also apparent in the faculty of medicine where some Jewish PhD students were dispatched in the late 1930s. Muir, "Anti-Semitism in the Finnish Academe," 143–5.
58. Esa Mäkinen, "Tutkija: Yliopisto sivuuttaa syytökset juutalaisten syrjinnästä" [Researcher: The University ignores accusations of Jewish discrimination], *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 17, 2008, C 1.
59. Olli Mäenpää, "Schurin tapaus tutkittiin reilusti" [Investigation of Schur's case was fair], *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 25, 2008, C 2.
60. Mäenpää, "Schurin tapaus tutkittiin reilusti."
61. This conflict between theologians and scholars over the definition of antisemitism is evident in Niemelä's response to a blog article by Bishop Mikko Heikka, who demanded justice for Schur: "On the basis of my dissertation, I did not recognize antisemitism in Puukko. It was not visible anywhere." In his dissertation, however, Niemelä, discusses the negative view of Wellhausenian theology—which Puukko also represented—on post-exilic Judaism and how Puukko's mentor and friend, professor of Old Testament exegesis Rudolf Kittel, defended antisemitic views in a court case using arguments drawn from the same theology. Pauli K. Niemelä's response to Mikko Heikka's blog, "Israel-Jakob Schurin maine on palautettava" [The reputation of Israel-Jakob Schur has to be restored], January 11, 2008, accessed February 27, 2008, http://www.pod.fi/heikka/?p=56; Niemelä, *Antti Filemon Puukko*, 63.
62. The Finnish theologians' close connection with well-known German antisemites was openly discussed for the first time in 1999 when the Finnish broadcasting company Yle showed a documentary made by investigative journalists, focusing on the relations between Puukko and Rafael Gyllenberg, who were instrumental in the relations between the Finnish church and the German church, Puukko as the chairman of the cooperative organ Luther-Agricola Society and Gyllenberg as coordinator of the visits to the Luther Academy in Sonderhausen. The documentary was severely criticized and condemned by some theologians, and the backlash to the debate informs the narrative of Puukko's and Gyllenberg's biography, published a couple of years afterwards in *The National Biography of Finland*. Olli Ainola and Boris Salomon, *Isä, poika ja paha henki: Suomen kirkkoisät Hitlerin pyhäkoulussa* [Father, Son, and Evil Spirit: Finnish church fathers in Hitler's Sunday school], manuscript of a TV documentary, September 27, 1999, accessed June 3, 2011, http://yle.fi/mot/270999/kasis.htm; see also Myllykoski and Lundgren, *Murhatun jumalan varjo*, 366.
63. Heikki Räisänen, "Puukko, Antti Filemon (1875–1954)," in *Kansallisbiografia-verkkojulkaisu*, Studia Biographica 4 (Helsinki: SKS, 1997–2011), accessed March 14, 2011, http://www.kansallisbiografia.fi/kb/artikkeli/3026/.

64. Muir, "Antisemitism in the Finnish Academe," 146.
65. Gerhard Kittel, *Die Judenfrage* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1933). On Kittel, see Alan E. Steinweis, *Studying the Jew: Scholarly Antisemitism in Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), especially 68.
66. The Luther Academy was a corporation of Lutheran churches in Europe and received funding, for instance, from the German Ministry of Propaganda. Andreas Åkerlund, "Åke Ohlmarks in the Third Reich: A Scientific Career between Adaptation, Cooperation and Ignorance," in *The Study of Religion Under the Impact of Fascism*, ed. Horst Junginger (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 560, 553–70. In the biography Rafael Gyllenberg, Räisänen seems to respond to the antisemitism allegations of the Yle documentary by stating, "One cannot mention antisemitism when talking about its [The Luther Academy in Sonderhausen's] activity"; see Heikki Räisänen, "Gyllenberg, Rafael (1893–1982)," in *Kansallisbiografia-verkkojulkaisu*, Studia Biographica 4 (Helsinki: SKS, 1997–2011), accessed March 14, 2011, http://www.kansallisbiografia.fi/kb/artikkeli/3021/.
67. Some outspoken antisemites opposed National-Socialism; see Fredrik Lindström, "The First Victim? Austrian Historical Culture and the Memory of the Holocaust," in *The Holocaust on Post-War Battlefields: Genocide as Historical Culture*, eds. Klas-Göran Karlsson and Ulf Zander (Malmö: Sekel, 2006), 147.
68. Tapani Sainio, "Schurin väitöskirjan käsittelyyn ei liittynyt väärinkäytöksiä," the website of the University of Helsinki, April 16, 2008, accessed September 23, 2011, https://alma.helsinki.fi/doclink/122899.
69. Rony Smolar and Daniel Weintraub, "Yliopiston häpeäpilkku vielä poistettavissa" [The black mark of the University can still be erased], *Helsingin Sanomat*, May 31, 2008, C 6.
70. Ilona Salomaa, "1930-luvun asiantuntijuuden turhuus: Westermarckilainen koulukunta ja suomalaisen uskontotieteen rooli ja merkitys Israel-Jakob Schurin tapauksessa" [The vanity of expertise in the 1930s: The Westermarckian school and the role and significance of the Finnish study of religions in the case of Israel-Jakob Schur], in *Hyljättiin outouden vuoksi: Israel-Jakob Schur ja suomalainen tiedeyhteisö,* ed. Simo Muir and Ilona Salomaa (Helsinki: Suomen Itämainen Seura, 2009), 112–13.
71. Sihvola, "Juutalaisuutta ja antisemitismiä," 209.
72. Sihvola, "Juutalaisuutta ja antisemitismiä," 210.
73. Veli-Pekka Leppänen, "Yliopisto, tiede ja totuudenrakkaus" [University, science, and love for the truth], *Helsingin Sanomat*, November 16, 2008, C 4.
74. The proceedings of the seminar were published in 2009; Salomaa and Muir, *Hyljättiin outouden vuoksi*. See also Hana Worthen's review article "Israel Jakob Schur and the Finnish Scholarly Community," *East European Jewish Affairs* 40, no. 3 (2010): 299–304.
75. Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut*, 139, 345.
76. Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut*, 149, 399.
77. Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut*, 419.
78. Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut,* 150–1. Rautkallio refers to their article: William B. Cohen and Jörgen Svensson, "Finland and the Holocaust," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 9, no. 1 (1995): 70–92.
79. Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut*, 330, 453.
80. Hana Worthen, "Tip of the Iceberg? Finland and the Holocaust," *East European Jewish Affairs* 39, no. 1 (2009): 122.
81. Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut*, 238.

82. Silvennoinen, *Salaiset aseveljet*, 307.
83. Shafir, *Between Denial and "Comparative Trivialization."* Rautkallio's defensive view falls also into the category of *selective negationism*, which according to Shafir "does not deny Holocaust as having taken place *elsewhere*, but excludes *any* participation of a member of one's own nation in the persecution." As Shafir notes, the categories of Holocaust denial are not mutually exclusive and mobility from one category to another is possible. In 2004 Slavicist Jussi Halla-aho, MP of the populist and nationalist Finns Party, labeled Holocaust remembrance as *holohölötys* (Finnish, Holo-nonsense), undermining the efforts of Göran Persson to promote genocide prevention. Jussi Halla-aho, "Kansanmurhista ja niiden muistamisesta" [On genocides and their remembrance], *Scripta* (blog), January 28, 2004, accessed April 19, 2011, http://www.halla-aho.com/scripta/kansanmurhista_ja_niiden_muistamisesta.html.
84. Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut*, 377–8, 383.
85. Worthen, "Tip of the Iceberg?," 124.
86. Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut*, 346–7. "Cohen's visit to the Security Police triggered a sequence of events that then led to the extradition of five Jewish refugees without Cohen. . . . Walter Cohen's last trick made [chief of the Security Police Arno] Anthoni fix his eyes straight on 'the five' Jewish refugees that Valpo had the most information on."
87. Worthen, "Tip of the Iceberg?," 124.
88. Silvennoinen, "Still Under Examination," 87.
89. Silvennoinen, *Salaiset aseveljet*, 309.
90. Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut,* 300, 303.
91. Silvennoinen, *Salaiset aseveljet*, 208–9, 219–20.

4

"I Devote Myself to the Fatherland": Finnish Folklore, Patriotic Nationalism, and Racial Ideology

Ilona Salomaa

In present-day Finnish academia, it is often assumed that the blatant antisemitism and xenophobia of the 1920s and 1930s never penetrated its institutions or its discourse. And yet, as recent studies have shown, Finnish academic culture was in a variety of ways influenced by the cultural and political proximity between Finland and Nazi Germany, both before and during their formal alliance in the 1940s. In this chapter, I set the manifestly racialized activities of two organizations in the 1920s and 1930s—the *Akateeminen Karjala-Seura* (Finnish, Academic Karelia Society, AKS) and the *Isänmaallinen Kansanliike* (Finnish, People's Patriotic Movement, IKL)—against the background of the predominant instruments of nineteenth-century cultural nationalism: the emerging study of folklore and folk religion. From their earliest moments, these inquiries had a decisively nationalist cast, and the invention of a Finnish mythology not only incorporated a notion of national identity and distinction, but provided an instrument for exorcizing "foreign" elements, notably those of Swedish and Russian culture (Finland was subordinate to Sweden from 1249 to 1809, and a Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire from 1809 to 1917).

As was the case elsewhere in Europe an indigenous mythology was understood to guarantee the "intellectual independence" of a newly cognizable nation, paving the way for the political awakening and a call for "political independence."[1] Yet, by Finland's second decade of independence, the 1930s, xenophobic and antisemitic strains inflected this discourse, especially among groups on the radical right wing. In the new battle over "true Finnishness," any Jewish influence came to represent an external danger. In Finnish research of the 1920s and 1930s, the function of "folk religion" and its sacrificial mythological enthusiasm underwent a shift; instead of defining Finnish national and ethnic history, Finnish research was now understood to *protect* the Finnish nation from other ethnic groups. In this essay, I analyze the patriotic nationalism and the "Finnish issue" of the nineteenth-century movements, and the emerging connection between defining a Finnish cultural identity and proscribing "foreign" elements from it.

The latter part of the chapter then considers the legacy of this "folk religion" and "folklore" research in relation to the emergence, rhetoric, and attitudes of the Finnish radical right, particularly the AKS and IKL.

The emergence of the "Finnish issue"

Whether the early Finnish-minded scholars were romantic patriots, genuine nationalists, or nationalistic dissenters is a contested issue in Finnish historiography. Recent studies have suggested that early scholars interested in "the fatherland" should be considered more informal patriots than true nationalists, since being a romantic patriot and loving Finnish folk culture and folk religion does not necessarily equate with political nationalism, the desire for national advancement and independence.[2] Yet, although the scholars of the eighteenth century had no direct political aims, such as the independence of Finland, their ethnicizing notion of an age-old Finnish civilization and its nobility inspired both cultural and political nationalist tendencies.

In the nineteenth century, Finnish scholars became explicitly associated with political transformations, challenging the conceptual boundaries of the Finnish nation set by Finland's foreign rulers, Sweden and later Imperial Russia.[3] "Genuine" Finnish cultural values were set against those of the Russian oppressor, as well as against those of "the uncivilized people of the East," including the Jews. Complicated by the two distinct liberation movements—the Finnish and the Swedish—these proto-nationalist discourses interweave overlapping impulses of patriotism and nationalism. The tropes of folklore and folk religion resonated with the themes of patriotic nationalism, so that a "passionate love for the fatherland" eventually came to exclude racially impure elements from the Finnish national body. In particular, the trope of "blood" figured in cultural and patriotic nationalism's "kinship awareness," and finally joined with radical strains of ethnic and racial nationalism of the 1920s and 1930s.

While the late eighteenth and nineteenth century saw the rise of a modern conception of a Finnish nation, the beginning of Finnish folklore research dates back to the Reformation in Finland. In his translation of the *Psalter* (1551), reformer of Finland and father of Finnish literature, Michael Agricola (c. 1510–57) published a list of the pagan gods of Häme and Karelia. Although compiled in the spirit of Protestantism, with the aim to decry "shameful ancient Finnish devils," this list constituted the first significant source of ancient Finnish folk religion, influencing future Finnish folklore research by creating an authoritative body of folk poetry for study, one substantiating the "ancient times of greatness" of the Finnish people. Poems, legends, and incantations were taken as documents of the culture, claiming the value of the early Finnish people and laying the groundwork for a national story of *our* people.

The growing admiration for ancient "greatness" led to the founding of the State Antiquarian Archives in 1603 and a Collegium of Antiquities

in 1666. The task of the Collegium was to collect material, "antiquities," which would authenticate Finland's "fabulous" past. The most powerful figure in Finnish folklore research and its growing patriotic tendency in this era was Daniel Juslenius (1676–1752), Professor at the University of Turku and Bishop of Porvoo. In the context of Finland's colonial subordination to Sweden, Juslenius's assertion that the Swedes owed much to the age-old Finnish culture audaciously represented a proto-cultural patriotic nationalism, an archaic *Fennophilia*. In his thesis *Aboa vetus et nova* (1700), Juslenius praised the high intellectual standard of the ancient city of Turku, when all burghers, noblemen, and peasants were collectively engaged in building the magnificent Finnish civilization. Suggesting that the Finnish language was related to the "holy languages," Hebrew and Greek, he also worked to elevate this philologically peripheral language to parity among the dominant European languages.[4]

Juslenius's historical and genealogical interpretations of a unique Finnish culture received a new intellectual impulse in the eighteenth century. Specifically, Henrik Gabriel Porthan (1739–1804), Professor Eloquentiae at the University of Turku, continuing the pursuits of the early Fennophiles, developed the notion that a national prehistory or antiquity would be disclosed in its folklore and folk religion. Porthan divided the Finnish nation ethnically and geographically in two: the civilized Finns inhabiting the coastal regions, and the pagan original Finns living in the interior of Finland. In spite of their different developmental stages these two groups formed one ethnic unit, the Finnish "nation"; the Swedish-speaking Finns, due to their different ethnicity and language, were considered semi-foreign. In his five-part study *Dissertatio de Poësi Fennica* (1766–78), Porthan especially focused on the folk religion, or mythology, of the "original untainted" inhabitants of the interior of Finland. Porthan and his student Christian Lencqvist (1719–1808) believed that by studying ancient incantations representing the oldest strain of Finnish folklore they would discover the cultural origins of modern Finland. Those who feared that ancient incantations might expose the primitive character of the Finns were soon relieved to learn that the incantations represented the Finns as great magicians, providing irrefutable proof of the unique prehistory of the Finnish nation.

Porthan's and Lencqvist's work played a significant part in claiming the historical, genealogical, and cultural distinction of Finland: the Finnish nation was Finnish, not Swedish or Russian in origin. To Porthan and Lencqvist, in a pagan mythical past before the conquest, the Finnish people lived in a noble natural state; later, this ideal state of Finnish purity was disturbed by ethnic mixing. Although Juslenius examined "our people" and "our Finns," he did not consider the Finnic peoples as one ethnic nation; he emphasized the *we* of being Finnish in contrast to the neighboring Swedes. If Juslenius provided the notion of a Finnish *we*, Porthan put forward a more powerful argument for *our* Finnish *nation*, *Finlandiae nostrae*, which

was to have a great impact on the radical right-wing scholars of the 1920s and 1930s.[5]

The study of mythology, folklore, and folk religions in Finland is part of a familiar pattern of development in European cultural nationalism, notably framing concepts of self-identification based on authenticity of lifestyle and idealization of constructed heroes. Porthan's Fennophilian colleague, Christfrid Ganander (1741–90) claimed in his *Mythologia Fennica* (1789) that mythological systems had cultural power: the mythic traditions reflected and revealed an "ancient" and "authentic" Finnish lifestyle. Moreover, myths tended to concentrate their values in an idealized hero, whose exploits could readily be generalized to wider cultural themes. Aspiring to show the connection between national culture, language, and ancient mythological heritage, Ganander's studies were directly connected to another element of cultural revival, his promotion and systematization of the national language in a 1787 project for a Finnish dictionary, *Nytt Finskt Lexicon* (Swedish, New Finnish lexicon), published in facsimile between 1937 and 1940.[6] Appropriated by the Finnish right, Ganander's lexicon was reproduced by the Research Institute of Finnish Ancestry, which was founded by the folklorist Emil Nestor Setälä (1864–1935) at the University of Turku in 1930, who had been a representative of the Finnish radical right movement *Karjalan Liitto* (Finnish, Karelia League) and the *Itsenäisyyden Liitto* (Finnish, Independence League) in the 1920s.

A novel interest in Finnish history, language, folklore, and folk religion also became visible in the meetings of Porthan's circle, the first Finnish academic society, the Aurora of Turku (1770–79), precursor of the Finnish Academy, founded in 1948. Aurora was both secret and devoted to revivifying a living Finnish culture. Members of the society spoke Finnish, took various oaths, used magical symbols, and performed rites as an exhibition of their passionate love of the fatherland; folkloristic knowledge blended into patriotic fervor—the "better you know your country, the more you love it," as Porthan put it. The folkloristic rhetoric of the Aurora society, emphasizing the uniqueness and richness of Finnish ancestral thought, gave the first hint of an idea that one nation is more highly gifted than another. The Finns had an exclusive mythical past, a meaningful and significant history behind them compared with their less illuminated and more chaotic neighbors.[7]

In September 1809, Sweden and Imperial Russia concluded the Treaty of Hamina, which put an end to the violence of the Finnish War (1808–9). Under the Treaty, when Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire, the 650-year relationship between Finland and Sweden came to its end. In this new political climate, Finnish patriotic nationalism and the study of folklore and folk religion took a new tone, as cultural authority in Finland passed from the Swedish church and clergy to Russian state bureaucracy. In this context, the modern cultural and political nationalism of Finnish academia, *Fennomania*, replaced the more docile

Fennophilia. The Imperial censorship law of 1829 considered the ideas of national unity and political independence dangerous; Fennomania was perceived as an oppositional force.[8]

Although academia tried to avoid irritating Tsar Alexander I, the so-called Turku Romanticism continued to cultivate the heritage of Porthan's Fennophilia during the period 1817–27; Antti Juhana Sjögren, Abraham Poppius, Adolf Ivar Arwidsson, Johan Josef Pippingsköld, and Carl Axel Gottlund were affected especially by the German Romanticism of Jacob Grimm.[9] Grimm's 1835 study *Die deutsche Mythologie* (German, The German mythology) aspired to a systematic and analytic description of German mythology as a means to emphasize the conceptual unity of one, unique, nation. Paying attention to the cultural basis of poems, tales, and stories, Grimm suggested that the texture of mythic truth both identified and bound the nation, guaranteeing it an eternal, unique, and transcendent place among other nations. Combining the ideals of national distinction and unity with mythology and folk religion, Finnish scholars appropriated Grimm to erect an immortal, Finnish "model-nation." Mythology inhibited the nation from falling into the darkness of oblivion, defining a historical community with a documented history in ancient texts.

In the work of Adolf Ivar Arwidsson (1791–1858), the exclusive dimension of a nationalizing mythology comes to the fore. According to Arwidsson, the Finnish "resistance to foreign influences" pointed to the distinctive historical, geographical, cultural, and mythological characteristics of the Finnish nation under its foreign oppressors. Introduced in 1819, Arwidsson's idea of "true Finnishness" aggressively drew the line between "them" (foreigners—both people outside the Finnish nation and its foreign oppressors) and "us" (Finnish people), suggesting that the earlier "naïve household patriotism" was behind the times.[10] Arwidsson urged a sacrificial nationalistic dedication to the fatherland, requiring that "one had to be ready to defend the fatherland, risk one's life and property, to stand or to fall on behalf of it, and to sacrifice it all or nothing."[11] To Arwidsson, an ethnic mixture diluted the drive to a single notion and practice of cultural nationalism; therefore, foreigners were the greatest enemy of the nation. Echoing the Biblical language of prophecy, Arwidsson used a rhetoric in which the alternative to a nativist identity is characterized in terms of erosion, pestilence, and disease; becoming familiar with the history of the fatherland revealed the importance of rejecting all that was alien to Finnishness. Although the task of awakening the national character and spirit belonged to the educated class, Arwidsson believed that the Finnish middle class was closer to the "roots of the nation" and "life ground" than the upper class. Indeed, the vital power of the Finnish nation arose from the lower strata, whose way of life simulated that of the precious ancient times.[12] Introducing "blood" into the developing discourse of the "true Finnish nation," Arwidsson foreshadowed eugenic concerns about racial and genetic mixing. While the pure blood

nurtured the holy body of the fatherland, foreigners poisoned and bastardized it, compromising its "purity," and so reducing its "immunity."[13]

After the Great Fire of Turku in 1827, the Academy of Turku moved to Helsinki, the administrative centre of the Grand Duchy. Porthan's heritage was then fostered by Helsinki Romanticism, which more directly deployed Finnish cultural and political power against Russia. Promoting Finnish-language literature and the idea of a monolingual Finland, the representatives of Helsinki Romanticism founded *Lauantaiseura* (Finnish, Saturday Society); its members—Johan Ludvig Runeberg, Zachris Topelius, Fredrik Cygnaeus, Johan Wilhelm Snellman, and Elias Lönnrot—became the symbols of the Fennomanian national awakening of 1830.[14] However, in spite of their joint interest in Fennomanian awakening, Johan Wilhelm Snellman (1806–81) and Elias Lönnrot (1802–84) were like two sides of a coin. Snellman represented Hegelian politico-social awareness, "the philosophy of the state," while Lönnrot advocated Porthan's and Reinhold von Becker's enthusiasm for Finnish folklore and folk religion.[15] Snellman's rational-political idea of the state, presented in *Läran om Staten*, 1842 (Swedish, The doctrine of state), anticipated the idea of the nation-state in which political and cultural entities coincide. The ideal Finnish state manifested itself in a civic belief whose basic element was not religion, Lutheranism, as such but the ethico-rational concept of the national spirit, actualized on three pragmatic levels: the family, civic society, and the state. The family was a primary unit reflecting social morality. Its purpose was to raise offspring with a strong national identity. The national spirit of the children was kindled by teaching them Finnish culture and language; family morality was assigned a wider socio-ethical consequence, incorporated into the morality of civic society and into the legal organization of the state. Allegiance to the law reflected the unity of the nation, and the moral obligations of the individual to the nation paved the way to national independence.

In August 1863, the Language Edict of Tsar Alexander II guaranteed the Finnish language an equal footing with Swedish in matters concerning the Finnish population in Finland. Snellman, a member of the Senate, was accredited with the new legislation, becoming a central figure in the celebration of Finnish national culture. In the 1920s and 1930s, May 12, celebrated as both The Day of Finnishness and Snellman's Day, was also notable in the ritual calendar of the Academic Karelia Society (AKS), which swore an oath on Snellman's statue in Helsinki every year.

Snellman was a skilful propagandist, yet however impressive he may have seemed to his Fennomanian contemporaries, Elias Lönnrot had the ability to "carry into effect what others had been dreaming of," framing the national epic, the *Kalevala,* first published in 1835 (completely revised in 1849), which coordinated and popularized the mythology of a Finnish origin epic, the idea of the ancient heroic past of the Finns. Organizing Karelian oral materials into a single narrative, Lönnrot's *Kalevala* opened

up "dazzling vistas" to Finnish folklore and folk religion, rearranging the language and spiritual life of Finland, evincing that the Finnish nation, its language and mythology were anything but "poor and barren" or "incapable of development." On the contrary, Finnish language, ancestral religion and the whole nation had a rich history, of at least "thousands of years."[16] Although Porthan and Ganander had studied ancient Finnish poems and incantations and had linked them to mythology, the *Kalevala* integrated the narrative and served as the cultural "savior" and "authenticator" of the Finnish nation.

Based on the oral poems Lönnrot collected during his numerous expeditions in northern East Karelia, the *Kalevala* offered to the Finnish what Max Müller's *Vedas* offered to the German nation: an origin and history, a founding mythology. According to Lönnrot, the poems of the *Kalevala* preserved historical truth however displaced into legend; they instrumentalized the endeavor to strengthen the role of Finnish culture in the minds of Finns. Heroic figures like Väinämöinen sustained a sense of cultural ancestry and identity, asserting the immortality of the Finnish nation. Besides defining the Finnish heritage, the *Kalevala* also constituted a cultural demarcation in relation to Imperial Russia. The *Kalevala*'s story of heroic Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen battling against the inhabitants of Pohjola and its female ruler Louhi represented the battle between light and darkness, between good and evil, an allegorical image of the Finnish people in harsh living conditions struggling against the contemporary oppressor, Russia. The historical battles of the *Kalevala* strengthened the identity of the Finnish nation by rendering it cognizant of its resources and possibilities: Finns could be ruthless fighters, not only physically but also intellectually. The Finnish people finally had a totalizing cultural heritage, a proved mythical history to live by.

The *Kalevala* legitimated national quest by locating it within a sacred cultural frame of reference. In this atmosphere Lönnrot's contemporary, Zachris Topelius (1818–98), launched the idea of "Greater Finland," which endeavoured to connect the Finnish-related peoples of the Baltic region into one nation. Related to Fennomania and supporting ties of kinship, Topelius's *Pan-Fennism* wished for a great and wholesome Finland. It drew on Arwidsson's emphasis on "blood" and resembled the German passion to form one Germany during the rising of 1813. As the Germans were too proud to surrender to the Napoleonic power, so the Finns should stand out against the Russians.

By 1850 the *Kalevala* had a far-reaching effect on pro-Finnish attitudes. In the period 1870–90 the new generation of Finnish humanists conferred on the epic the status of a national icon. Finnish writers and artists introduced a style to be known as *Karelianism,* which in the spirit of romantic cultural nationalism emphasized the Karelian origins of the *Kalevala* folklore.[17] In their pursuit of "Karelian primordial Finnishness," they considered Karelia as a "holy land," made pilgrimages to eastern and northern East Karelia,

hailing its poems as historical in character, and imaging its people and landscape in music, poetry, and painting. The Finnish composer Jean Sibelius (1865–1957) composed his *Kullervo Symphony*, his *Lemminkäinen Suite* (both based on characters in the *Kalevala*), and his *Karelia Suite*.[18] Finnish author Eino Leino (1878–1926) wrote the Karelia-inspired symbolical drama *Sota valosta* (Finnish, War for light), portraying an aged Väinämöinen pondering the future of Finland, as the new generation appeared indifferent to the cause of the fatherland. Finnish writer Juhani Aho (1861–1921) was so fervent a Karelianist that he founded the idealist "Kalevala religion." Like the German ethnic nationalism of the *völkisch* movement of the Wilhelminian era (1888–1919), Finnish Karelianism aimed at building a coherent nation-state.[19]

The combination of the *Kalevala* and Karelianism, however, also had an insular, exclusive dimension. In the spirit of Kalevalian Fennomania, Arwidsson's nephew Agathon Meurman (1826–1909) launched a campaign against the local Jewish community. Meurman and other Fennomans approved of the April 1881 anti-Jewish pogroms in the Russian Empire; the Fennoman newspaper *Uusi Suometar* declared that "Russia knows what it does."[20] In his article "Juutalais-asia Suomessa" (Finnish, The Jewish issue in Finland), published in the Fennomanian newspaper *Uusi Suometar* in November 1882, Meurman disapproved of the Finnish legislation allowing the Jews to own land, and to enter the educational system. Meurman proposed that the Jews should be expelled from Finland since they despised Christianity, detested Finnish people, and supported the ideas of liberalism and cosmopolitanism. In Meurman's rhetoric, the Jews were parasites, "worms," threatening a homogenous Finnish identity.[21] Although by the 1880s eighty-five percent of Finnish Jews were born in the country, a fierce campaign against the local Jewish community led to the expulsion of sixteen Jewish families in February 1888 by the Imperial Finnish Senate; again in December 1908, ten Jewish families were expelled.[22] The Meurmanian Fennomans, concatenating antisemitism, Karelianism, and the *sacrosanctus Kalevala,* believed that Jews, as "the uncivilized people from the East," were disloyal to the Finnish nation.[23] When, in the 1920s and 1930s, Finnish scholars became fascinated by the "manly grandness" and "noble ethos" of the neoromantic Karelianism, the *Kalevala* was transformed into an explicit instrument for cultural, religious, and political expression, seen as an impetus and indicator of *Imperium Fennicum*, the "ancient forest realm of the original ethnic Finns."[24] Karelianism and the *Kalevala*, earlier part of an anti-Russian Finnish cultural nationalism, joined with "blood" nationalism, dramatizing the affiliation between folklore and exclusive ethnic and racial nationalism. By the 1920s and 1930s, Finnish folklore studies took on a racialized ethno-political cast, as a considerable number of Finnish folklorists and humanist scholars became members of radical right movements.[25]

Folklore within racial ideology in 1920s and 1930s Finland

In the context of the 1920s and 1930s, the heritage of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—Fennophilia, Fennomania, Pan-Fennism, and Karelianism—evolved into a "kinship awareness" diffused throughout the academic sphere. While the Finnish radical movements varied according to their interest in foreign and domestic policies, the most influential—the Academic Karelia Society (AKS) and the People's Patriotic Movement (IKL)—deployed familiar motifs from folklore as part of an assertion of human hierarchies based on "kinship," on "race." In the 1920s and 1930s, the cultural and political attitudes of the nineteenth century were translated into an ideologically, ethnically, and racially oriented conception of Finnish cultural nationalism.

Founded in March 1922 and based at the University of Helsinki, the Academic Karelia Society was largely composed of an educated elite, numbering professors and students in its ranks, and controlling the student union of the University through the 1940s. Originating in the ideas of the Finnish pastor Olavi Lähteenmäki (1909–2006), AKS was portrayed as a "rebellious, academic paramilitary organization" comprised of "disobedient members" ready to defend the Finnic people against Russians.[26] The initial instigation of the AKS sprang from dissatisfaction with the 1920 Russian–Finnish Treaty of Tartu, which drew the border between Finland and Soviet Russia according to the old border between the Grand Duchy and Imperial Russia. While Finland received Petsamo, the northwest part of the Kola Peninsula on the coast of the Barents Sea, it ceded back parts of East Karelia (Repola and Porajärvi), that some of the AKS founding members had fought for in the East Karelian uprisings of the Viena and Aunus areas between 1921 and 1922, the so-called kinship wars aiming to unite the Finnic peoples.[27] East Karelia was a contested territory, creating a demand for unification, that the whole "Finnic race" should merge into "one noble realm." [28] Despite having its activities publicized in *Suomen Heimo* (Finnish, The Finnish clan), the AKS was in some ways reminiscent of its nineteenth-century forebears: like the Aurora Society of Turku its internal operations were veiled in secrecy, and sustained by mysterious rituals. In its rites of passage, the initiate youth swore an oath, promising unconditional devotion to Greater Finland:

> I devote myself to the fatherland, on behalf of Finland's national awakening, Karelia and Ingria and the ideal of Greater Finland. As I believe in the greatness of God, I believe in great fatherland and its great future.[29]

Required "to devote one's life and blood to the fatherland," members of the AKS were subjected to a strict, quasi-religious discipline, reflecting the "sacred" character they attributed to their work; traitors were punished with dismissal.[30] To reinforce its discipline, the second chair of the AKS Elmo

Edvard Kaila (1888–1935) addressed open letters to the members encouraging proper patriotic behavior.[31] Despite its overt ideological inflection and nationalist-expansive ideas, the AKS was not an institutionalized political party as such. But though members were advised to stay away from "current politics," they were also urged to devote themselves to advancing the ideological issues of "true Finnishness." According to the AKS chair, Vilho Helanen (1899–1952), the authority of the AKS arose from the "common Finns," not from the politicians or party leaders.[32] Nonetheless, despite its "political neutrality," the AKS was not immune to intense racial fanaticism, precisely because its nationalism was rooted in a "kinship superiority" which shunned "foreign enemies," views traceable to Arwidsson's promotion of "blood" kinship and to the ethnicizing folklore of the nineteenth century.

More to the point, during the 1930s, the Academic Karelia Society cooperated with the People's Patriotic Movement (IKL, founded in 1932). An extremist organization whose members stood for election (in 1933, the IKL won 14 seats in the Finnish Parliament), the IKL became a political "backup" to the AKS.[33] It continued the activity of the military *Lapuan liike* (Finnish, Lapua Movement), the Finnish radical right fascist movement of 1929–32, which fanned anti-Russian and anti-Communist sentiments and organized political kidnappings, on occasion resulting in murder. At the outset, leader of the Lapua Movement Vihtori Kosola (1884–1936) was also the symbolic leader of the IKL. Many IKL members adopted Mussolini's ideas of corporatism and leadership, and those of National Socialism as well, ideologico-political affiliations dramatized in the public sphere by the IKL's fondness for the Roman salute and blue-black uniforms reminiscent of the blackshirts. In 1937, for example, depicting the IKL as more "Nazi than the Nazis themselves," the newspaper *Turun Sanomat* reported that the activity of the IKL was financed by the National Socialists. Cooperation with the more populist IKL, then, enabled the intelligentsia of the AKS to reach out beyond academia. In a similar vein, the AKS accepted IKL propaganda, which regarded the Jews as "international capitalists" and the "destroyers of Finland."[34]

In his *Juutalaiset ja me* (Finnish, The Jews and us), the Finnish classical orientalist Knut Tallqvist (1865–1949) had recognized an emergent Finnish antisemitism and xenophobia as early as 1910:

> We, too, have supporters of antisemitism, and there also seems to be open space in the history of antisemitism regarding Finland. . . . Antisemitism, which is based on the most brutal strivings of human nature, will shed blood, and will not only oppose the liberation of the Jews, but the whole humanizing of humanity.[35]

Tallqvist's dark prophecy proved right, as the tone "Jews unwelcome" strengthened in Finland during 1935–38.[36] Finally, as is perhaps implied by the AKS

Figure 4.1 *"Saksan kanssa Suomen puolesta"* (With Germany on behalf of Finland): postcard c. 1941, produced by the right-wing *Sinimustat* (Blue-and-black), of the military flags of Finland and Germany, symbolizing the brotherhood-in-arms. The image also adorned the cover of the pro-Nazi journal *Kustaa Vaasa*. (Courtesy of the Private Collection of Mikko Joutsi, Tampere)

rites of passage, both movements focused their attention on mobilizing a younger generation, developing a sacred veneration of the youth—"youth leading youth"—resembling the ideal of the *Hitler Jugend*, the hard-core supporters or "constituencies" of antisemitism.[37] The students of the AKS were considered ideological trailblazers with a common mission: "The ideology the students stand for today, the nation represents tomorrow."[38]

Indeed, the AKS was the construction of the young Finnish elite who utilized the history of the fatherland in the ideological and political vacuum that prevailed in Finland after the Civil War of 1918. The Finnish Civil War (January–May 1918) was an armed conflict, between the White forces, identified as middle- and upper-class (which would generally include Swedish-speaking Finns), and as politically conservative, and the Red forces, associated with the Finnish-speaking working classes, and identified as left-wing socialist in political orientation. After the Finnish Declaration of Independence in 1917 and the Civil War, the idea of "Greater Finland," and "greater Finnishness" arose again. In the rhetoric of the AKS, however, these initially romantic ideas became entwined with the idea of the hierarchies of race, as AKS leader Erkki Räikkönen (1900–61) suggests: "Tied down with heavy irons, the nation of the Baltic Finns made its doomed way. However, in 1918 it revived from apathy, broke the oppressive chains and started its journey to brighter destinies."[39] Breaking "the oppressive chains" and making for the "brighter destinies" also signalled a desire to mitigate social problems in Finland by directing anger toward the Russians. The Whites' *ryssän viha* (Finnish, Russky hatred) was ideologically strengthened by the Finnish German-trained Jäger troops sent to assist the White forces, who similarly—supported by emerging racial ideologies—despised the Russians.[40] In this spirit, Russians provided the early ideological target of the AKS, conflating a resistance to Communism, "the curse of the East," with a national indignation over the mistreatment of Finnic peoples, who should unite to resist the "heavy oppression and persecution."[41] Hostility towards the Russians culminated in the oft reiterated claim that "the Russian was the Devil." As a founding member of the AKS, Finnish clergyman Elias Simelius (1899–1940), wrote in a special "kinship issue" of *Ylioppilaslehti* (Finnish, Student journal) in 1923, "we have to support the endless and unquenchable hatred of the Russians . . . death to the Russians, no matter the colour of their skin . . . death to the despoilers of our homes." Representing them as criminals tyrannizing the Finnic peoples, Simelius calls for death to all "impure" and "dangerous" Russians.[42]

The Academic Karelia Society and its independent women's organization, the *Akateemisten Naisten Karjala-Seura*, ANKS (Finnish, Academic Women's Karelia Society) fanned the hatred of Russia by undertaking Midsummer excursions to Estonian Ingria and marching in demonstration along the Estonian–Russian border. Symbolically, the "border" represented a confrontation between Finnic peoples and Russia, marking the "terrible death and horror" which lurked on the Soviet side.[43] In this spirit, the authors of the *Ylioppilaslehti* "kinship issue" claimed that the Finnish nation, with its superior cultural and ethnic heritage, should have "a wolf's tooth, a lynx's watchful eye and invincible stamina" in the fight against the mortal enemy, the Russians. In this period, though, antagonism toward the Russians took an ideological coloration, blending with the fearful loathing of the Russian

political order: Soviet Communism. Indeed, the fusion of anti-Russian and anti-Communist hatred melded seamlessly with antisemitism, the word *Jew* readily becoming a commonplace synonym for Bolshevik. *Ryssän viha* intrinsically implied that Finnish blood should also be protected against Jewish influence. Even the President of Finland, Lauri Kristian Relander (1883–1942; served as president 1925–31) suggested that the mixture of Finnish and German blood "gave better results" than the blood mixture of Finnish and Russian.[44]

In the 1920s and early 1930s, the Academic Karelia Society also proclaimed Finnish superiority over the Swedish-speaking Finns. According to the AKS, the Swedish-speaking Finns formed, as in Porthan's thinking, an ethnic group of their own and thereby were considered "semi-foreign."[45] The scholars of the AKS further divided the Finnish nation into the "true Finns," dedicated to an ethnic Finnish fatherland, and the "semi-Finns," defectors taking a sympathetic attitude to the Swedish-speaking Finns. In this context, the idea of a Finnish-Swedish state university, in which both languages, Finnish and Swedish, were represented, was considered antipathetic to "true Finnishness," while the idea of a Finnish-language-only state university ironically represented "democracy and toleration."[46] Pointing out that many Finnish-Swedish family lineages, such as "Hackman" or "Rosenlew," were not Swedish as such, but of German-Russian-Jewish origin, *Suomen Heimo* sought to undermine the "national" pretensions of all Swedish-speaking Finns.[47]

According to the AKS secretary, folklorist Martti Haavio (1899–1973), "free science" implied specifically Finnish learning infused by patriotism.[48] Haavio's "mission of the fatherland" was an intellectual incitement to war against all non-Finnic people, whereupon nations were divided into "friends and foes."[49] As Klinge quotes Haavio, "This is the era of iron. This is the era of civil guards, fascism, dictatorship, the Ku Klux Klan etc. What would be more natural than the foundation of the iron society of students?"—the AKS and the like. Haavio reflects an unquestioning belief in national superiority and glory (chauvinism as nationalism), and—evoking the KKK—an explicit agenda of racial cleansing sustaining the academic organization. The die-hard representatives of the Academic Karelia Society formed a "steel wall" against inferior foreign influences; in its journal, *Suomen Heimo,* the questions of "true Finnishness" and "blood kinship" were heatedly debated.[50]

Developing tendencies of nineteenth-century Fennomania, the scholars of the Finnish radical right of the 1920s and 1930s exalted the peasantry and despised industrialist influences, in ways reminiscent of National Socialist rhetoric, summoned under the slogan of *Blut und Boden* (German, Blood and Soil). Foreign capital would destroy the national heritage and independence; urbanism and the Americanization of Finnish culture (such as 1920s jazz music) were considered unnational. The notions of "Finnishness" (ethnicity), "Mytho-Christianity" (religion), and "Finland" (fatherland) became

inseparable. In the 1920s and 1930s, religiosity was a crucial part of the national ideological mission. Here a certain dualistic "Mytho-Christianity" or "New Spirit" prevailed, terms used by the AKS. According to the Academic Karelia Society, the mythic idealism of the *Kalevala* was not antagonistic to Christianity. On the one hand, the Protestant Finnish nation believed in a Christian "Guardian of the nations" or "great God," and on the other hand it venerated the mythological heritage of the *Kalevala*. The *Kalevala* provided a folkloric orthodoxy, animating the "strong" and "moral" *nature* of the Finns, who, descended from Väinämöinen, fought like infuriated lions against the enemies of the fatherland. The ancestral tenets of the *Kalevala* and Christianity were taken to inform a homogeneous Finnish ethnic state, aligned against the heterogeneous, impure foreign enemies or simply "dangerous foreign junk."[51] Indeed, arising outside the Middle East altogether, the *Kalevala* was, in a sense, more "sacred" and "pure," its immaculate Finnish heritage set against the Jewish, Oriental, implications of Christianity.

Post-Fennomania more vividly expressed an ideological longing for cultural-mythological hegemony. The ideal of the AKS was the cultural dominion of the Finno-Ugric race, which would become a reality if a new Snellman-like national hero, the "awakener," were to emerge.[52] Snellman's ideas of the nation-state and culture were especially influential among the political right. Beyond the AKS, the *Suomen Kansallissosialistinen Työväenpuolue* (Finnish, Finnish National Socialist Labor Party, SKTP) followed the ideas of Jussi Leino, who suggested that Snellman laid the early foundation of national socialistic ideas in Finland. It is perhaps not insignificant that a founder of the SKTP and AKS member, Teo Snellman (1894–1977), the grandson of J. V. Snellman, was overtly antisemitic, calling Rafael Erich, Prime Minister 1920–21, a "Jewish bastard."[53]

In the ideology of the AKS, "blood" was the chief metaphor for "race," associated with "culture" and cultural properties. More than a biological property, race, like the concepts of "kinship" and "peoples," defined the proto-cultural-historic-mythic-linguistic essence of Finnishness. The AKS agreed that Northern Russia down to the White Sea formed the principal area of Finnic languages and that 50 percent of the population of this geographical area were racially Finnic.[54] In the 1930s, radical right-wing scholars, anxious about the "spoiled blood" of the *demos*, urged a demographic homogenization of Finnish peoples and their culture: the Finnish peoples' "deterioration can be explicitly seen in the lower birth rates, in weakened heredity, degeneration, and in the peoples' amalgamation with mentally and physically foreign and unable races." The demographic racially infused homogenization was part of the ideological plan of the AKS to achieve Finnic cultural hegemony. The AKS admired the population growth in Nazi Germany since it was based on the "combatant idealism of a pure and healthy people."[55] The AKS believed, as did the IKL, that the Jews were

pre-empted by their ethnicity from ever joining the Finnish culture and nation.

In order to justify the cultural hegemony of Finnic people, AKS built on the heritage of the *Kalevala*, politicizing the epic in the 1930s and harnessing its cultural heritage to serve the ideals of the Finnish radical right.[56] As compiler of the *Kalevala*, Elias Lönnrot became a canonized figure and the protagonists of the *Kalevala*, Väinämöinen, Ilmarinen, and Lemminkäinen represented the fascinating power and strength of an idealized Finnish race. Admiration for the national epic was also cognate with Arwidsson's legacy, which suggested that national character formed a true national spirit only if the nation remained in touch with its ancient heroic/mythic past. According to the AKS, the *Kalevala* was a profound epic of the "true Finnish nation" and unquestionable proof of the "importance of Finnishness." In typically circular logic, Finland had produced a civilized, high art, which reciprocally authorized the cultivated national status of Finland. The *Kalevala* proved again that the Finns were not a "despised and accursed" nation.[57] In 1924, the AKS journal *Suomen Heimo* expounded the meaning of the *Kalevala* as follows:

> the Finnish nation is not yet what it should be. . . . we wait for the dawn: the emergence of the Finnish Karelian nation. Our generation has to work for the objectives which the *Kalevala* initiated. . . . Karelia donated the *Kalevala*, the greatest product of the Finnish national spirit, to the Finnish nation, and thus our task is to save the unfortunate Karelia. . . . The *Kalevala* is the strongest proof of the fellowship between the Finnic peoples. It evidences that the Finnish people and the Karelian people are of the same essence.[58]

Karelia and its romanticized and racialized culture, including the *Kalevala*, offered Finnish people a magic key to understanding the value of the "kin state."[59]

Along these lines, the Academic Karelia Society prearranged the foundation of the Finnish Cultural Academy, whose task would be to cherish the "precious" peoples' values and the ideal of the Finnish university. The idea of the Finnish Cultural Academy anticipated the founding of the influential *Suomen Kulttuurirahasto* (Finnish, Finnish Cultural Foundation) in 1939, largely motivated by AKS members such as Martti Haavio. The "precious national values" of the early Finnish Cultural Academy pointed to an ideal combination of the *Kalevala* and Christianity that would ultimately lead to a "national resurrection," saving the Finnic nation from "unclean" influences and keeping its blood "pure."[60] The proposal for the Cultural Academy included a tripartite program. First, the Finnish-speaking intelligentsia would campaign for Finnish-speaking education. Second, the Finnish-speaking literati would openly support Finnish national values; and third,

they would name a powerful ideological leader for the Finnish cultural life who would organize large-scale national "mass education," especially developed for the edification of young people, the heart of the nation. The most appropriate age to study Finnish antiquity via the *Kalevala* was after puberty, at the age of eighteen, while pupils between ten and thirteen were supposed to study the epic alongside the history of the fatherland. The ideal teacher would be a "true Finn" who lived a healthy life in the right surroundings.

The expectations for a national transformation were based on a patriotic home scenario: "On a peaceful Sunday morning, a Finnish family, truly aware of its nationhood, sits gathered around the radio and studies the *Kalevala*. The sacred epic lies on the table in front of them while the broadcaster recites and explains the 'holy text.'"[61] Recalling Snellman's projection of family values and education as the foundation of civic and state moral and legal structures, this image also illustrates the fusion of this domestic ideal with the radical right's embrace of syncretistic religious values embracing ancient paganism and Christianity. As this domestic idyll implies, the nation-state would not be produced by the intellectuals but by the "overall will of the nation."[62]

The racialized cultural uses of the *Kalevala* expanded toward the end of the 1930s. In January 1937, the AKS-minded student union of Helsinki University launched a writing competition on the *Kalevala*, receiving nineteen essays endeavoring to explain the meaning of the national epic in the contemporary context. While upholding the ideal of the integrity of the Finnish and Finnic peoples, the essays promoted a resistance to "foreign" influence in Finnish culture; not surprisingly, to the essayists, everything deviating from "Finnishness" was considered "junk."[63] The promotion of the *Kalevala* as an instrument reinforcing the racial purity of the nation also provides crucial background to a signal moment of institutional antisemitism in this period: the rejection of the Finnish Jew Israel-Jakob Schur's (1879–1949) doctoral dissertation. Schur's 1937 thesis, *Wesen und Motive der Beschneidung im Licht der alttestamentlichen Quellen und der Völkerkunde* (German, The character and motives of circumcision in the light of the Old Testament sources and ethnology), was closely related to folklore research. The *Kalevala* had just celebrated its hundredth anniversary and the *Kalevala* writing competition had been launched, when Schur's dissertation was rejected at the University of Helsinki mainly by Finnish nationalist humanists.[64] In the spirit of *Kalevala* consciousness, Schur came to represent an unpalatable foreign element, and consequently was not afforded equal treatment in Finnish academia. In his personal notes, Schur's opponent, Professor of Folklore and AKS-minded scholar, Albert Hämäläinen (1881–1949), viciously called him a *yid*: "The yid must be reprimanded" and "How is the yid able to comprehend this?" Hämäläinen criticized Schur's dissertation by decrying his ethnic origin, part of a wider tendency to emphasize Finnishness at the expense of the Jews.[65] Indeed, in the 1930s, AKS scholars

engaged in restoring the cultural authority of the *Kalevala* took an interest in the Jewish question, in Hitler's "revolution" in Europe, and in the National Socialist ideology of *Blut und Boden*, which was animated by the racialized and mythologized idea of peasant nobility.[66] Drawing support from ideologies of National Socialism, the AKS created its own transnational adaptation: the revival of the *Kalevala* in Finland was not only a national invention but congenial to the rise of the Aryan myth in Germany. "European ethnical egotism" became part of the patriotic nationalism, post-Fennomania, of the Finnish radical right.[67]

Cultural exchange between Finland and Nazi Germany was especially active during 1933–36, continuing through the early 1940s.[68] The one hundredth anniversary of the *Kalevala* was celebrated at the Finnish Embassy in Berlin on February 28, 1935. Later, on March 3, 1935, the German national radio station *Deutschlandsender,* broadcast the "Kalevala ceremony," including commentaries of Finnish folklorists on the Finnish national epic.[69] On the one hand, one reason for Nazi interest in the *Kalevala* was Heinrich Himmler's desire to trace the origin of the Aryan myth to Karelia, the area of the ancient *Kalevala* incantations. On the other hand, the AKS scholars also worked to convince the Germans of the significance of the *Kalevala*, using the epic to prove that the Finns were innately closer to the "Nordic" (Aryan) doctrine than to Bolshevism, closer to the "Nordic" peoples than to the Asian races. From the point of view of their "racial" origin, then, the Finns were predetermined to oppose Bolshevism.

Although AKS members in the late 1940s and the 1950s claimed that their Society was not antisemitic or anti-Jewish, these attitudes are clearly documented. While the lack of historical material makes it difficult to study the AKS in detail—its records were destroyed, perhaps tellingly, by its members after the Society was banned in September 1944—the antisemitism of the IKL newspaper *Ajan Suunta* (Finnish, Direction of time) was regularly on display during 1936–38.[70] Toward the end of the 1930s the antisemitic and xenophobic rhetoric of the AKS became more interlinear, inserted between the lines, since at that time the society, somewhat hypocritically, tried to avoid the official "fascist" label alleged by left-wing scholars. Nonetheless, in *Ajan Suunta,* the voice of both the IKL and of the AKS, the Jews were regularly considered "money cheaters," "murderers" or the "threats to freedom of speech."[71] It also presented the Jews, nationally and internationally, as "dangerous intruders" and "supporters of false internationalism," including Communism and social democracy, which endeavored to destroy Finland and the entire Finnic peoples, an attitude cognate with the belief in an international "Marxist-Jewish swindle."[72]

Significantly, in the 1930s the AKS addressed its attention to the Finnic minorities, folding Jewish refugees into the category of "foreign population": "All Finnic people should be transported to a prospective Finland area [including East Karelia and the Kola Peninsula] . . . while all foreign

population should be expelled from Finland's area due to national unity and racial health."[73] The members of the AKS participated in the activities of Finno-Ugric refugee organizations and were especially worried about the imprisonments and expulsions of the clergy in Russian Ingria.[74] In February 1939, the IKL inquired of the Parliament of Finland how many foreign Jewish refugees had entered the country and how the government would manage their deportation from Finland. The Minister of the Interior, and former member of the AKS, Urho Kaleva Kekkonen (1900–86; Prime Minister 1950–53 and 1954–56; President of Finland 1956–82) replied that some Jewish refugees would be transported "elsewhere." The Jewish question appeared to be settled. Kekkonen was reluctant to accept the immigration of eleven Viennese Jews to Finland in August 1938, considering the destiny of the Finnic people more significant than that of the Jews of Central Europe.[75]

Many members of the AKS participated in the activities of the Finnish pro-National Socialist organizations. The editor-in-chief of the *Suomen Heimo* in 1925–28, Professor Väinö Salminen, belonged to the pro-Nazi organization *Suomen Valtakunnan Liitto* (Finnish, Federation of the Finnish Realm), an alliance known for its antisemitic ideas.[76] The first part-time secretary of the AKS, Erkki Räikkönen, later became the chief editor of the pro-Nazi and antisemitic journal *Kustaa Vaasa* (Finnish, Gustav Vasa), and another AKS member, Elmo Edvard Kaila, contributed to this journal as well (see Figure 4.1).

Kaila later established an official anti-Russian hate group, the *Vihan Veljet* (Finnish, Brotherhood of hate) within the AKS. Both organizations incited their supporters to "mortal hatred" of all enemies of the fatherland, among them the Jews.[77] Moreover, Elias Simelius, founded the *Sinimustat* (Finnish, Blue-and-blacks) youth organization in 1933, which became famous of its fierce cultural and ethnic patriotic nationalism; in its rhetoric, the enemies of the Finnish nation were the Russians and the Jews, the latter despised because of their "Jewish money power."[78] Finally, the chair of the Academic Karelia Society, Vilho Helanen, participated in recruiting the Finnish *Waffen-SS* battalion.[79]

Developing from the increasingly racialized inflection of early Finnish folklore and folk religion studies, the activity of the AKS was legitimized by the idea of a "depressed society" which had to be relieved of its foreign population. Nonetheless, the idea of a depressed society undergoing economic hardship was a façade, which the AKS created in order to promote the conquest of Communist and liberal ideas. Much as at the end of the nineteenth century, the Jews were again considered the advocates of liberalism and thus guilty of national betrayal. The AKS and academic discourses interwoven in the 1930s surfaced in the discussion surrounding the deportation of Jewish refugees in 1942. In this regard, the post-Fennomania of the AKS is inseparable from the National Socialist German Workers' Party ideologies, creating a "Germanic religion" and the idea of the racially pure

Volksgenosse, citizen-by-blood. In the ideology of the AKS, the German ideal of *Volksgenosse* turned into a Finnic national prototype with a desire for a new "Finnic religion," a special Finnic bloodline, and unconditional Finnic cultural hegemony, shunning all foreigners—within and without—as despoilers of and traitors to the Finnic national heritage.

Hitler's New Europe and the *Imperium Fennicum* were to last a thousand years. In the postwar period, though, military-oriented Finnish historiography strove to overwrite "blood"-based points of contact and to represent the connections between Finland and the Third Reich as a strictly military necessity; but as the beliefs and activities of right-wing groups in Finland suggest, there was considerable emulation between Finnish and German notions of racialized culture, and the founding role the folk and its culture could play in defining the nation. These attitudes were pervasive in Finnish academic culture before and during the Continuation War. By an odd twist of history, while the pretensions of that Europe were extinguished with the end of the war, the underlying rhetoric of ethnic, racial, and so national distinctiveness continues to inflect the discourse of Finnish right-wing politics. In the Finnish parliamentary election of 2011, the nationalistic right-wing *Perussuomalaiset* (Finnish, True Finns; since the election the party has changed its name simply to The Finns) won the support of more than 19 percent of the electorate. During its campaign, the True Finns used rhetoric recalling the claims of the AKS and the IKL. Promising to make Finland a great power, the True Finns swore to ensure the economic security and living standards that befitted the "Finnish nation"—not its "parasite foreigners."[80] The conjunction of racial, ethnic, and cultural identity originating in the nineteenth-century Finnish independence movement not only infused the isolationist nativism of the 1920s and 1930s; perhaps due to the policy of silence imposed by academia on itself and on the Finnish public, it continues to exert a palpably similar grip on the imagination of the modern Finnish nation.

Notes

1. Jouko Hautala, *Finnish Folklore Research 1828–1918* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1969), 25. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.
2. Juha Manninen, *Valistus ja kansallinen identiteetti: Aatehistoriallinen tutkimus 1700-luvun Pohjolasta* [The Enlightenment and national identity: A history-of-ideas study of the eighteenth-century Nordic Countries] (Helsinki: SKS, 2000), 207–16; Jyrki Loima, *Myytit, uskomukset ja kansa: Johdanto moderniin nationalismiin* [Myths, beliefs, and nation: An introduction to modern nationalism] (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 2006), 22–43.
3. Erik Ringmar suggests that "our people" or the "people who are like us" theme became powerful in Europe after the French Revolution; "our people" not only defined democracy but also homogenizing nationalism; see Erik Ringmar, "Nationalism: The Idiocy of Intimacy," *The British Journal of Sociology* 49, no. 4 (1998): 534–5.

4. Hautala, *Finnish Folklore Research*, 11–14; Toivo Vuorela, *Ethnology in Finland Before 1920* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1977), 11.
5. Derek Fewster, *Visions of Past Glory: Nationalism and the Construction of Early Finnish History* (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2006), 58, 60; Vuorela, *Ethnology in Finland*, 13–15; Pentti Aalto, *Classical Studies in Finland 1828–1918* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1980), 20–1.
6. Christfrid Ganander, *Nytt Finskt Lexicon* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1938). On Setälä, see Toivo Nygård, *Suomalainen äärioikeisto maailmansotien välillä: Ideologiset juuret, järjestöllinen perusta ja toimintamuodot* [The Finnish extreme right between the world wars: Ideological roots, organizational basis, and forms of activity] (Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto, 1982), 47–8; Satu Tanner, *Salaperäinen Suomen suku*: *Tutkimuslaitos Suomen suvun historiikki* [Mysterious Finnish kin: A history of the Research Institute of Finnish Ancestry], Kotimaisten kielten tutkimuskeskuksen verkkojulkaisuja 3 (Helsinki: Kotimaisten kielten tutkimuskeskus, 2007), 27, 54, accessed July 10, 2012, http://kaino.kotus.fi/www/verkkojulkaisut/julk3/.
7. The organ of the Aurora society was the journal *Åbo Tidningar,* which appeared 1771–78. The aim of the journal was to provide information about Finnish history, language, poetry, economics, and geography; see Manninen, *Valistus*, 198–9, 202, 204.
8. Matti Klinge, "Kansalaismielen synty: Suomen ylioppilaiden aatteet ja järjestäytyminen ilmentämässä yleisen mielipiteen ja kansalaistietoisuuden kehittymistä v. 1853–1871" [The birth of national spirit: The influence of the ideas of the Finnish students on public opinion and national awareness 1853–1871] (PhD diss., University of Helsinki, 1967), xiii; Ilmari Havu, *Lauantaiseura ja sen miehet* [Saturday Society and its members] (Helsinki: Otava, 1945), 17; Olavi Junnila, *Adolf Iwar Arwidsson* (Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 1979), 29.
9. Risto Pulkkinen, *Vastavirtaan: C. A. Gottlund 1800-luvun suomalaisena toisinajattelijana; Psykobiografinen tutkimus* [In the countercurrent: C. A. Gottlund as a Finnish dissident in nineteenth-century Finnish academia; A Psychobiographical study] (PhD diss., University of Helsinki, 2003), 289; Jouko Hautala, *Suomalainen kansanrunoudentutkimus* [A general guide to Finnish folklore research] (Helsinki: SKS, 1954), 88–91.
10. Arwidsson collected folklore in the Savo area of eastern Finland in 1819, where he met people who in spite of representing a different stratum, the gentry or the common people, appeared as the "real Finnish people."
11. Adolf Iwar Arwidsson, *Tutkimuksia ja kirjoitelmia: Suomalaisuuden syntysanoja II* [Studies and essays: Expressions of Finnishness II] (Helsinki: SKS, 1909), 113, 124; Liisa Castrén, *Adolf Ivar Arwidsson: Nuori Arwidsson ja hänen kasvuympäristönsä* [Adolf Ivar Arwidsson: Young Arwidsson and his background] (Helsinki: Otava, 1944), 50, 306–9. For his patriotism, Arwidsson was exiled from Finland, and then lived in Sweden. However, he never lost his interest in Finnish affairs. See Jaakko Ahokas, *A History of Finnish Literature*, Uralic and Altaic Series (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 36.
12. See Arwidsson, *Tutkimuksia*, 112–13, 120, 124, 130, 132, 137–9; Junnila, *Adolf Iwar Arwidsson*, 26, 28, 90, 129.
13. Arwidsson, *Tutkimuksia*, 146, 160.
14. The organ of the Saturday Society was the Swedish-language daily paper *Helsingfors Morgonblad,* which appeared during the years 1832–55. Docent J. L. Runeberg acted as an editor 1832–37. Although the impression may be that the early Fennophiles and Fennomans were Finnish-speaking scholars, in fact they

were almost all Swedish-speaking. The reason for this was the long relationship between Finland and Sweden, which resulted in the Finnish school system being Swedish-speaking. The first Finnish school was founded in 1858 in Jyväskylä, Central Finland. Although the Finnish national movements mostly emerged among the Swedish-speaking scholars, the nationalistic zeal of these scholars was always "Finnish," that is, directed to Finland and the Finnish question. The rulers, whether Swedish or Russian, were considered "foreigners" or "oppressors."

15. Reinhold von Becker (1788–1858) was a Finnish historian at the University of Turku. He specialized in the Finnish language and published an official Finnish grammar in 1824; see Hautala, *Finnish Folklore Research*, 22.
16. Hautala, *Finnish Folklore Research*, 25; Ahokas, *A History of Finnish Literature*, 70.
17. The term *Karelianism* was introduced in 1939 by Yrjö Hirn, Professor of Aesthetics at the University of Helsinki. In his study *Karjalan kuva: Karelianismin taustaa ja vaiheita autonomian aikana* [The image of Karelia: The background and phases of Karelianism during the period of autonomy] (Helsinki: SKS, 1973) Hannes Sihvo uses the term Cultural Karelianism, which emphasizes the cultural aspect of this trend. Politically, the rise of Cultural Karelianism came to reflect the anti-parliamentarianism and the anti-socialism of the Party *Nuorsuomalaiset* (Finnish, Young Finns). See Nygård, *Suomalainen äärioikeisto*, 14.
18. In an article that aroused controversy in Finland, Timothy L. Jackson suggests that Sibelius had Nazi sympathies; see Timothy L. Jackson, "Sibelius the Political," in *Sibelius in the Old and New World: Aspects of His Music, Its Interpretation, and Reception*, Interdisziplinäre Studien zur Musik 6, ed. Timothy L. Jackson, Veijo Murtomäki, Colin Davis, and Timo Virtanen (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010). In Nazi Germany, the admiration of Sibelius's music and the veneration of the *Kalevala* were interconnected. On Sibelius's connection with Nazi Germany, see also Antti Vihinen, *Musiikkia ja politiikkaa: Esseitä Wagnerista Sibeliukseen* [Music and politics: Essays from Wagner to Sibelius] (Helsinki: Like, 2005), 190, 198.
19. For more about the *völkisch* movement, see Uwe Puschner, *Die völkische Bewegung im wilhelminischen Kaiserreich: Sprache, Rasse, Religion* [German ethnic nationalism in the Wilhelminian era: Language, race, religion] (Darmstadt: WBG, 2001).
20. *Uusi Suometar* is quoted in Santeri Jacobsson, *Taistelu ihmisoikeuksista: Yhteiskunnallis-historiallinen tutkimus Ruotsin ja Suomen juutalaiskysymyksen vaiheista* [The struggle for human rights: A Socio-historical study of the history of the Jewish question in Sweden and Finland] (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1951), 193.
21. Meurman is quoted in Jacobsson, *Taistelu ihmisoikeuksista*, 192–3, 195.
22. Taimi Torvinen, *Kadimah: Suomen juutalaisten historia* [Kadimah: The history of Finland's Jews] (Helsinki: Otava, 1989), 59–60, 87; Simo Muir, "'Oh, Language of Exile—Woven of Sorrow and Mockery': The Kalevala Centennial Jubilee as a Bone of Contention between Hebraists and Yiddishists," *East European Jewish Affairs* 39, no. 3 (2009): 350–2.
23. Matti Kuusi, "Mitä Kalevalalla on nykyiselle nuorisolle sanottavana?" [How does the Kalevala speak to the youth?], in *Kalevala Suomen kansan omaisuudeksi* [The Kalevala as the property of the Finnish nation], ed. Helsingin yliopiston Ylioppilaskunta (Helsinki: SKS, 1937), 14.
24. Matti Klinge, *Kaksi Suomea* [Two Finlands] (Helsinki: Otava, 1982), 227; Fewster, *Visions of Past Glory*, 314.
25. Jussi Leino, *Kansallissosialismi maailmanhistoriallisen kehityksen tuloksena* [National socialism as the result of developments in world history] (Helsinki: Otava, 1941), 24; Nygård, *Suomalainen äärioikeisto*, 141.

26. Lähteenmäki quoted in *Ajan Suunta,* see "Satayksi uutta taistelijaa vannoi AKS:n valan" [One hundred and one new fighters swore the AKS oath], *Ajan Suunta*, May 12, 1937, 3.
27. The East Karelian uprisings of 1921 and 1922, the kinship wars for Finnish kinship, comprise six different conflicts; the expedition to Viena (1918), the expedition to Aunus (1919), the East Karelian Uprising (1921–22), the expedition to North Ingria (1919–20), the expedition to West Ingria (1919–20), and the Estonian War of Independence (1919–20). See Erkki Räikkönen, *Heimokirja* [The kinship book] (Helsinki: Otava, 1924), 213.
28. After the vice-chancellor of Helsinki University, Ivar August Heikel, exhorted students at a Karelia festival in 1921 to help the peoples of Eastern Karelia and Ingria, the membership of AKS increased steadily and rapidly; in 1922 the society had 60 members and in 1931 over 1205. The members were mostly from middle-class backgrounds, with one-third upper-class. See Nygård, *Suomalainen äärioikeisto*, 64.
29. Jussi Saukkonen, *Vastuun sukupolvi* [The responsibility generation] (Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 1973), 59–60.
30. "Satayksi uutta taistelijaa vannoi AKS:n valan," *Ajan Suunta*, May 12, 1937, 3; "AKS:n suurjuhla Oulussa" [The great AKS celebration in Oulu], *Ajan Suunta*, May 24, 1937, 1.
31. Saukkonen, *Vastuun sukupolvi*, 60; Martti Haavio, *Nuoruusvuodet: Kronikka vuosilta 1906–1924* [The years of my youth: Chronicle of the years 1906–1924] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1973), 594.
32. "AKS:n suurjuhla Oulussa," *Ajan Suunta*, May 24, 1937, 1; Risto Alapuro, *Akateeminen Karjala-Seura: Ylioppilasliike ja kansa 1920- ja 1930-luvulla* [The Academic Karelia Society: The student movement and the nation in the 1920s and the 1930s] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1973), 151.
33. Nygård has estimated that the total party membership of the IKL was over 80,000; see Nygård, *Suomalainen äärioikeisto*, 99–101.
34. Mikko Uola, *Sinimusta veljeskunta: Isänmaallinen kansanliike 1932–1944* [The blue-black brotherhood: The people's patriotic movement 1932–1944] (Helsinki: Otava, 1982), 159, 44, 162; "Marxilais-juutalaisten provokatorinen peli arabialaisessa maailmassa" [The Marxist-Jewish provocative game in the Arab world], *Ajan Suunta*, January 15, 1936, 5. The titles of articles in *Ajan Suunta* are revealing in this regard: "Juutalaiset huijarit: Onko Suomikin joutumassa juutalaisten suurten finanssiskandaalien näyttämöksi?" [Jewish swindlers: Is Finland also in danger of becoming the theatre of the great Jewish financial scandals?], *Ajan Suunta*, January 18, 1936, 4; "Juutalaisen pääoman kynnet iskeneet englantilaiseen lehdistöön: Uusi lehtimagnaatti—Isaac Elias!" [The claws of Jewish capital have wounded the English press: New media mogul—Isaac Elias!], *Ajan Suunta*, April 12, 1937, 1; "'Vapaa lehdistö': Juutalaisten ja suurkapitalistien temmellyskenttä" ["The free press": A playground of the Jews and filthy capitalists], *Ajan Suunta*, April 30, 1937, 6; "Juutalainen murhapolttoliigan johtajana: Tuomittu pakkotyöhön" [A Jew is the leader of the arson league: Condemned to forced labor], *Ajan Suunta*, May 29, 1937, 3.
35. Knut Tallqvist, *Juutalaiset ja me* (Helsinki: Otava, 1910), 67.
36. The unwelcoming attitude toward the Jews runs throughout *Suomen Heimo* and *Ajan Suunta* during the period. See also Jari Hanski, *Juutalaisviha Suomessa 1918–1944* [Jew-hatred in Finland 1918–1944] (Helsinki: Ajatus, 2006), 355.
37. In fact, sixteen youngsters from the Hitler Youth, led by Dr. Rolf Reuber, visited Finland in the summer of 1937, hosted by the IKL. See "Saksalainen nuorisovierailu Suomeen" [German youths visit Finland], *Ajan Suunta*, April 9, 1937, 2.

38. Supporting the ideologies of the AKS and the IKL, Rolf Nevanlinna (1895–1980), the Chancellor of the University of Helsinki, stated that Finnish youth had to be toughened up by right and honorable ideas. See "Rolf Nevanlinna: Suomalaisen sivistyksen tehtävistä" [Rolf Nevanlinna: On the tasks of Finnish education], *Ajan Suunta*, January 10, 1936, 5.
39. Räikkönen, *Heimokirja*, 252.
40. See Outi Karemaa, *Vihollisia, vainoojia, syöpäläisiä*: *Venäläisviha Suomessa 1917–1923* [Foes, fiends, and vermin: Ethnic hatred of Russians in Finland 1917–1923] (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1998), 213–14.
41. "Bolsevismi ja itä" [Bolshevism and the East], *Suomen Heimo*, August 31, 1937, 213–22; see also Räikkönen, *Heimokirja*, 237, 252; Matti Klinge, *Vihan veljistä valtiososialismiin* [From brotherhood of hate to state socialism] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1983), 60–74.
42. "Ryssänviha," *Ylioppilaslehti*, March 3, 1923, 68.
43. Anne Alasmaa, "'Aikamme amatsoonit': Akateemisten Naisten Karjala-Seura osana oikeistoliikehdintää 1922–1944" [The Amazons of our time: The Academic Women's Karelia Society as part of the radical right movements 1922–1944] (master's thesis, University of Jyväskylä, 2003), 65, accessed July 10, 2012, https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/bitstream/handle/123456789/12028/G0000131.pdf.
44. Wipert von Blücher, *Suomen kohtalonaikoja: Muistelmia vuosilta 1935–44* [Finland's times of destiny: Memoirs of the years 1935–1944] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1950), 40–1.
45. Fewster, *Visions of Past Glory*, 58–60; see also "AKS:läisen ajatuksia" [Ideas of AKS members], *Suomen Heimo*, June 19, 1937, 167.
46. Akateeminen Karjala-Seura, *Suomalainen valtionyliopisto: Helsingin yliopiston kielikysymyksen selvittelyä* [Finnish state university: The language debate at the University of Helsinki] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1926), 33–5.
47. "Kielipoliittista tarkastelua II" [Perspectives on language policy II], *Suomen Heimo*, August 31, 1937, 209.
48. Martti Haavio, *Puheita vv. 1924–1958* [Speeches 1924–1958] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1959), 13.
49. E. E. Kaila, "AKS: Ystävillemme ja vihollisillemme" [AKS: Our friends and foes], *Ylioppilaslehti*, November 3, 1923, 324.
50. Haavio is quoted in Klinge, *Kaksi Suomea*, 230–1, 226.
51. "Suomen kansan tie" [The path of the Finnish people], *Ajan Suunta*, January 4, 1936, 3; "Kalevalan päivä: Suomalaiset ylioppilaat Lönnrotin patsaalla" [The Kalevala Day: Finnish students visit Lönnrot's statue], *Ajan Suunta*, February 28, 1936, 1.
52. Lauri Hakulinen, "Suomen kansan asia: Karjalan eurooppalaistuttaminen" [The business of the Finnish people: Europeanization of Karelia], *Ylioppilaslehti*, March 3, 1923, 62.
53. Leino, *Kansallissosialismi*, 112, 126–37, 210–11; Kulttuurien museo [Museum of Cultures], Rafael Karstenin kokoelma [Rafael Karsten collection], kansio [file] 2.1:1, Teo Snellman's letter to Rafael Karsten, February 27, 1945. The Finnish National Socialist Labor Party was also known as the Finnish National Socialist Labor Organization (*Suomen Kansallissosialistinen Työjärjestö*) and The Labour Organization of the National Reform (*Kansallisen Uudistustyön Työjärjestö*).
54. See Fewster, *Visions of Past Glory*, 317, 319. However, the fact that language and race were not necessarily congruent with each other had become explicit in Germany where "German language had been unable to sustain its clear interconnectedness with race," as Yiddish emerged on German soil. Yet, according to the

AKS scholars, race lines usually followed language lines whereupon race affinity should be seen as some kind of inner part of language affinity. See Hannes Pukki, "Kieli ja rotu" [Language and race], *Suomen Heimo*, May 15, 1937, 139–40.

55. "Väestökysymyksestä" [On the question of population], *Suomen Heimo*, September 15, 1937, 232, 231.
56. Compare Kristiina Kalleinen, *Kansallisen tieteen ja taiteen puolesta: Kalevalaseura 1911–2011* [Taking the side of national science and art: The Kalevala Society 1911–2011] (Helsinki: SKS, 2011). Kalleinen, however, suggests that the *Kalevala* and its "back-up" organization, the Kalevala Society, never became politicized.
57. Martti Haavio, "Kansalliseepos" [The national epic], *Suomalainen Suomi*, no. 1 (1935): 5, 11.
58. Herman Stenberg, "Kalevala ja Karjala" [The Kalevala and Karelia], *Suomen Heimo*, February 28, 1924, 25.
59. "Keskustelua nykyajan suomalaisesta ylioppilaasta" [Discussion about the modern Finnish student], *Suomen Heimo*, January 20, 1927, 7.
60. "National resurrection" was the term used by the Academic Karelia Society and the People's Patriotic Movement, see "Professori Heikki Klemetin 60-vuotispäivä" [The sixtieth birthday of Professor Heikki Klemetti], *Ajan Suunta*, February 14, 1936, 1. It was planned that money for the Cultural Academy, at least one million Finnish marks, would be collected from Finnish right-wing organizations, like the *Suojeluskuntajärjestö* (Finnish, White Guards), a Finnish voluntary paramilitary organization for national defense, and the *Lotta Svärd*, a Finnish voluntary auxiliary paramilitary organization for women.
61. U. U. Seppä, "Miten saisimme Kalevalan lähemmäksi koko kansaa?" [How to refamiliarize Finnish people with the Kalevala?], in *Kalevala Suomen kansan omaisuudeksi*, ed. Helsingin yliopiston Ylioppilaskunta (Helsinki: SKS, 1937), 164.
62. The scholars of the Academic Karelia Society analyzed such national issues in the publication series *Studia Fennica* founded in 1933. The series was a scholarly review of the "kinship issues," "mythology," and "language." See Anna-Liisa Heikinheimo, "Ajatuksia Akateemisen nuorisomme kansallisista tehtävistä" [Ideas of the national mission of our academic youth], *Suomen Heimo*, October 15, 1937, 263–5.
63. Seppä, "Miten saisimme Kalevalan lähemmäksi koko kansaa?," 156.
64. Simo Muir, "Anti-Semitism in the Finnish Academe: Rejection of Israel-Jakob Schur's PhD dissertation at the University of Helsinki (1937) and Åbo Akademi University (1938)," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 34, no. 2 (2009): 135–60.
65. Ilona Salomaa, "1930-luvun asiantuntijuuden turhuus: Westermarckilainen koulukunta ja suomalaisen uskontotieteen rooli ja merkitys Israel-Jakob Schurin tapauksessa" [The vanity of expertise in the 1930s: The Westermarckian school and the role and significance of the Finnish study of religions in the case of Israel-Jakob Schur], in *Hyljättiin outouden vuoksi: Israel-Jakob Schur ja suomalainen tiedeyhteisö* [Rejected due to strangeness: Israel-Jakob Schur and the Finnish scholarly community], ed. Simo Muir and Ilona Salomaa (Helsinki: Suomen Itämainen Seura, 2009), 112–13.
66. Fewster, *Visions of Past Glory*, 319. On *Blut und Boden* in the context of Finnish–German cultural exchange, see Hana Worthen, *"Playing Nordic":* The Women of Niskavuori*, Agri/Culture, and Imagining Finland on the Third Reich Stage* (Helsinki: Helsinki University Print, 2007), 56–86.
67. Kuusi, "Mitä Kalevalalla on nykyiselle nuorisolle sanottavana?," 21, 34.
68. Mauno Jokipii, *Finnland und Deutschland im 20. Jahrhundert* [Finland and Germany in the twentieth century] (Kuopio: Snellman-instituutti, 1994), 17–19.

A teacher exchange between Finland and Germany was active in the late 1930s. In 1937, Finnish teacher and poet Aaro Hellaakoski (1893–1952) travelled to Germany in order to familiarize himself with the Nazi school system; see "Saksalais–suomalainen sivistysvaihto: Ensimmäinen opettajainvaihdon retkikunta lähtee kesäkuussa" [German–Finnish cultural exchange: The first teachers depart for Germany in June], *Ajan Suunta*, May 25, 1937, 4. The Finnish cultural circles participated in the activities of the National Socialist *Kraft durch Freude* (German, Power from Joy), see "Voimaa ilosta" [Power from joy], *Ajan Suunta*, June 23, 1937, 1. In the 1940s, the *Akateemisten Naisten Karjala-Seura* (Finnish, Academic Women's Karelia Society) organized regular cultural events for German soldiers in Finland.

69. In May 1935, the German magazine *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte* (National Socialist Monthly), edited by Alfred Rosenberg, published a special issue dedicated to Finland, including articles by various Finnish scholars, such as the historian and AKS member Arvi Korhonen; see Aarne Wuorimaa, *Lähettiläänä Hitlerin Saksassa* [An ambassador in Hitler's Germany] (Helsinki: Otava, 1967), 60–1; Artturi Vuorimaa, *Kokenut kaiken tietää: Muistelmiani seitsemältä vuosikymmeneltä* [The insider knows: My memoirs of seven decades] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1967), 9.
70. The AKS and the IKL were banned in September 1944, based on Article 21 of the interim peace treaty, which included the dissolution of anti-Communist organizations, see Fewster, *Visions of Past Glory*, 318. Previously, Uola suggested that the antisemitism of the IKL (and of the AKS) was only occasional; see Uola, *Sinimusta veljeskunta*, 94.
71. "Suuri sokeus jatkuu" [Great blindness continues], *Ajan Suunta*, January 14, 1936, 3. *Ajan Suunta*, January 14, 1936, 3; "Juutalaiset huijarit: Onko Suomikin joutumassa juutalaisten suurten finanssiskandaalien näyttämöksi?," *Ajan Suunta*, January 18, 1936, 4; "Juutalainen murhapolttoliigan johtajana: Tuomittu pakkotyöhön," *Ajan Suunta*, May 29, 1937, 3.
72. "Juutalaiset huijarit," *Ajan Suunta*, January 14, 1936, 3; Nygård, *Suomalainen äärioikeisto*, 101–2. In his study, Nygård quotes newspaper *Ajan Suunta*, which in May 4, 1936, opposed the entry of the emigrant Jews into Finland.
73. See Alapuro, *Akateeminen Karjala-Seura*, 160.
74. See Saukkonen, *Vastuun sukupolvi*, 87.
75. Uola, *Sinimusta veljeskunta*, 262; Taimi Torvinen, *Pakolaiset Suomessa Hitlerin valtakaudella* [Refugees in Finland during Hitler's reign] (Helsinki: Otava, 1984), 98, 100–1.
76. The antisemitic ideology belonged to the official program of the Finnish German SS-linked *Suomen Valtakunnan Liitto*. See Mauno Jokipii, *Suomalaiset Saksan historiaa tutkimassa* [Finnish scholars studying German history] (Kuopio: Snellman-instituutti, 1995), 20.
77. See Martti Ahti, *Ryssänvihassa: Elmo Kaila 1888–1935; Aktivistin, asevoimien harmaan eminenssin ja Akateemisen Karjala-Seuran puheenjohtajan elämäkerta* [Dominated by Russky hatred: Elmo Kaila 1888–1935; The biography of the Finnish activist, grey eminence of the armed forces, and chairman of the Academic Karelia Society] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1999), 452–3, 457–8.
78. "Juutalaiset huijarit: Onko Suomikin joutumassa juutalaisten suurten finanssiskandaalien näyttämöksi?," *Ajan Suunta*, January 18, 1936, 4. The People's Patriotic Movement (IKL) was anxious that international Jewish financial "swindling" would reach Finland; see "Juutalaisen pääoman kynnet iskeneet englantilaiseen lehdistöön: Uusi lehtimagnaatti—Isaac Elias!," *Ajan Suunta*, April 12, 1937, 1.

79. Alapuro, *Akateeminen Karjala-Seura*, 161. In a political sense, the Federation of the Finnish Realm was a "kind of 'backup'" organization of the IKL.
80. According to pollster *Taloustutkimus*, the supporters of the right-wing True Finns Party adopted the most anti-immigrant attitude among Finnish political parties; see "Poll: Majority of Finns Opposed to More Immigrants," *Yle uutiset*, May 28, 2010, accessed July 10, 2012, http://www.yle.fi/uutiset/poll_majority_of_finns_opposed_to_more_immigrants/5570738.

5

Towards New Europe: Arvi Kivimaa, *Kultur*, and the Fictions of Humanism

Hana Worthen

> *The New Europe is not and must not be a cold political entity, but a spiritual force that builds from the sufferings of the present time a bridge to a better, more humane future.*
>
> *Arvi Kivimaa, 1941*

> *. . . now for a while, the nations of the world are becoming connected regardless of race and the form of society . . . in the signs of a strenghtening of international mutual understanding and the consolidation of peace.*
>
> *Arvi Kivimaa, 1966*

Let me start with these two *almost* fungible quotes, which, date and context aside for the moment, seem to develop a single, utopian claim.[1] Stemming from the pen of the same Finnish writer, but separated by twenty-five years, the statements make compatible claims for a humane and peaceful world order. And yet, their historical situation—the first delivered for a Europe driving toward racial cleansing, the second for a Europe divided by the Cold War—renders them intrinsically incompatible, even antagonistic. Compatible in their vision of an improved European society, both passages involve an unstated, implied cleansing: in the former, a Europe-yet-to-come of the undesirable bodies of ostracized European populations; in the latter, the Europe-of-the-present of the racializing politics of the recent past. Echoing the themes and attitudes of the earlier remarks, the rhetoric of the 1966 passage silently rewrites it, urging a vision of racial harmony that specifically negates what hardly needed to be mentioned in 1941: the foundational function of race in the Third Reich's, and the Axis Powers', New Europe.

It is a bitter irony of postwar Europe that this 1960s globalizing, peace-consolidating agenda was promoted by the well-supported literary intellectual, theatre and stage director Arvi Kivimaa (1904–84), whose racially inflected wartime writings for both Finnish and Third Reich audiences

Figure 5.1 Artistic administrator, stage director, writer, and self-avowed humanist Arvi Kivimaa (1904–84) now epitomizes the challenges posed by the rhetoric of *separation* in Finnish cultural studies. (Courtesy of Theatre Museum's Archive, Helsinki)

envisioned a New Europe sustained by the *Kultur* of privileged "European" peoples, a vision subsequently disowned by his postwar call for World Theatre Day.

Director of three important venues, the Finnish National Theatre (1950–74; Associate Director 1949–50), the Helsinki Folk Theatre (1940–49), and the Tampere Theatre (1937–40), as Vice-President of the International Theatre Institute (ITI) Kivimaa proposed in 1961 to institute a World Theatre Day, celebrated worldwide on March 27 ever since the opening of the "Theatre of Nations" season in Paris in 1962: "Each year a figure outstanding in theatre or a person outstanding in heart and spirit from another field, is invited to share his or her reflections on theatre and international harmony." In "all corners of the five continents," theatre professionals honor Kivimaa's formative idea of an international, humanist theatre, implicitly honoring Kivimaa himself.[2] Insofar as "we" celebrate Kivimaa, though, we unknowingly corroborate his successful disavowal of the New Europe he

pursued, a Europe that would have proven deadly to many of today's theatrical honorees and celebrants.

Before taking up positions of artistic and institutional leadership in Finland, Kivimaa had already been an established poet, essayist, and writer. While in the 1920s Kivimaa was associated with an intellectual and artistic modernist movement of European culturalism, in the late 1930s and early 1940s Kivimaa incontrovertibly embraced the National Socialist politics of race, "humanity," and "humanism" sustaining the reorganization of Europe: "The New Europe must be a union of such peoples who are vigorous [*lebenskräftig*] and who develop an independent state life within her, peoples who are committed to the principle of mutual trust and the wider European responsibility."[3] Accordingly, Kivimaa not only inscribed the Finnish people into the orbit of the National Socialist worldview, but staged their inviolable virtues—*völkisches Gemeinschaftsgefühl* or racially inflected feeling for the people's community; *Opfersinn* or sense of sacrifice; *grenzenlose Vaterlandsliebe* or unconditional love for the fatherland; *Tapferkeit* or bravery; *soziale Verantwortlichkeit* or social responsibility, proven in their fight against the "Asian masses" in the Finnish Winter War (1939–40)—as having already paved the way for the *new* continent to come.[4] The residual patriotic claims arising from the values of "building the nation" were instrumental here, recalling the national self-determination and self-assertion inherited from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Refigured as self-legitimating vehicles for the transmission of racial values and fantasies, these terms now functioned as devices for imagining the post-Versailles Europe of nation-states as the New Europe of a converging blood-related community.

With the military failure of the Third Reich, in 1943–44, however, Kivimaa worked to affirm his humane public persona. Breaking from the conception of New Europe, he acquired a kind of "contingent humanism"; contingent in the sense that its values could be linked to both his 1920s aspirations and to the humanist universalism of the Western Allies, overtly favoring global human equality in its discourse. Appointed director of the Finnish National Theatre, Kivimaa worked to silence the racism of his earlier writing, recasting it under the protective shield of "humanism," an effort perhaps best captured in the title of his book, *Teatterin humanismi: Avajaispuheita 1950–1971* (Finnish, The theatre's humanism: Opening speeches 1950–1971).[5]

In this essay I attempt to rethink Kivimaa's conceptualization of *Kultur* and "humanism" in the 1930s and 1940s, and to set it both against his later biographical revision and against his treatment in historical scholarship. Rather than commemorating an avowedly prominent cultural figure in ways that fail to fulfill historical critique in order to reinforce a state-sponsored national ethos, my aim here is both to develop a critique of Kivimaa and to incorporate this "other Kivimaa" into the narrative of postwar Finnish academic culture, more specifically into contemporary cultural historiography.

Reconnecting Kivimaa's wartime and postwar rhetoric puts significant pressure both on Kivimaa's reception in Finnish theatre and cultural studies, and on how Finnish conservative war history—when absorbed unreflectively—has exerted an undue discursive hegemony over inquiry into cultural production in adjacent fields, notably in Finnish theatre research.

"Evidence for a literary Nuremberg"

During the Finnish–German alliance (1941–44), Arvi Kivimaa held prominent positions, occupying the interface in cultural relations between Finland and the Third Reich; he was called to military service as well. In 1941, he was one of the constituent members of the *Europäische Schriftsteller-Vereinigung* (German, European Writers Association, ESV), created under the auspices of Joseph Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry as the New Europe's alternative to the "sunken" PEN Club. A signatory to the founding decree, Kivimaa endorsed a "firm belief" that "the spiritual values of our peoples are from common roots and that they have grown from constant interaction."[6] Praised in National Socialist cultural circles—among avowedly Finnish pro-Nazi writers Maila Talvio and V. A. Koskenniemi—for his commitment to the "spiritual exchange which should fertilize the New Europe,"[7] in signing the decree, Kivimaa gave formal support to the racial underpinnings conditioning his role as a Finnish representative to the ESV. Implementing the racial idea of New Europe sustaining cultural production, he also signed away his claim to a racially uninflected humanism.

Shortly after the Winter War (1939–40), Nazi Germany and Finland engaged in a dialogue not confined to the military and political spheres but taking in cultural exchange as well. Including but not limited to explicit propaganda, Finland aimed to communicate a constructed self-perception in its relations with the Third Reich, using art, literature, history, and culture to fashion a state-regulated image of the nation. Undermining a separation between cultural and political spheres, Kivimaa's work for the ESV emblematizes one aspect of the ideological volatility of the relationship between the institutions of Finland and the Third Reich. As Finnish Ambassador to Berlin Toivo Mikael Kivimäki self-consciously recognized, culture was a way to reinforce political aims ("through cultural ties the aim is also to strengthen political ties"), while significantly noting the need to camouflage this ideological support by channeling it through organizations that would not appear to have political affiliations with Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry and its *Kulturkammer* (German, Chamber of Culture) in Finland.[8] One of these organizations was the ESV, charged with producing the *new Kultur* for the *New Europe*. One might, perhaps, argue that the acts of prominent political and cultural figures (such as Kivimaa) should be understood merely as individual deeds; however unpalatable now, though, such "individual" actions performed in the sphere of Finnish–German relations, shaped

transcultural politics and emblematize precisely the interplay of "private" and "public" at issue here.

The Finnish group was among the most active in the ESV, and Finns who were to be honored with membership were scrutinized behind the scenes. Due to the Finnization of the Swedes living in Finland, according to Kivimaa, the Swedish- and Finnish-speaking Finns "*Völkisch* and historically belong . . . to the same people. . . . They are all bound together to a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft,* presupposing to all effects an outward unity."[9] Kivimaa proposed that in terms of Finland's representation in the ESV, the two working groups should be divided according to the two official languages in Finland, but nonetheless united under one national group. While he would be the spokesman for the overarching Finnish (and Finnish-language) group, he eventually proposed the pro-Nazi Örnulf Tigerstedt for the Swedish-language group.[10] In his capacity as spokesman, then, Kivimaa undertook the final nomination of Finnish members as well as the duties of inviting prominent Third Reich cultural figures to lecture in Finland: he coordinated, was responsible for, and partially shaped the cultural exchange between the two "brothers-in-arms."

Kivimaa's understanding of Finland's role in the future of Europe comes into focus in his 1941 travelogue *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta: Runoilijamatka halki Saksan* (Finnish, European brotherhood: A poet's tour through Germany). First appearing in Finnish, Kivimaa's book was rendered (at least partially) into German in 1942, and published by Karl H. Bischoff Verlag (Berlin, Wien, Leipzig) in 1944, under a slightly redesigned title, *Europäische Dichterreise durch Deutschland: Reiseeindrücke eines finnischen Schriftstellers in Deutschland* (A European poet's tour through Germany: Travel impressions of a Finnish writer in Germany). In 1944, Kivimaa's "compilation of evidence for a literary Nuremberg" appealed to a Finnish future already undone by military failure; the Finnish–German military alliance was in ruins, a reality most of the population anticipated as well.[11] Yet the German volume had traced a longer arc during the war years. In June 1942, one of the travelogue's chapters, "Uutta Eurooppaa kohden" (Finnish, Toward New Europe), appeared as "Finnische Betrachtung" (German, A Finnish perspective) in *Europäische Literatur*, directly placing Kivimaa in the most productive period of "gun-brotherhood" propaganda, 1940–42.[12]

The 1941 *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta* represents Kivimaa's German travels as a means of forging a transcultural identification, using both formal and content elements to interpellate his readers, asserting himself as the ambassador of a "Nordic" (Aryan) *Kultur* to Finland. Kivimaa recalls how in 1941 the Third Reich invited a group of European writers to experience the German *Kulturlandschaft* (*kulttuurimaisema* in Finnish), the cultural landscape, where "the great historical tradition vividly unites with the present moment." Invited by the Propaganda Ministry, these "European" writers included several of pro-Nazi inclinations and those who seemed key to winning support

for the Third Reich and its racialized politics in the sphere of culture. They were given lavish hospitality with the aim that their writings would show concern for "the common future of our immortal continent, growing out of suffering."[13] Brought into closer touch with their German colleagues, they spent several days in the city of "European humanism," Weimar, where the trip ended in a climactic conference. Weimar European humanism is a cultural trope here, carrying a regime of subjection: the conception of racialized *Kultur*, life, and Europe bears a cultural reality that encompasses and subordinates its opposite. While Weimar humanism manifests itself as the superior expression of a superior humanity, it is intrinsically marked by the exclusion of inferiority, of any worthwhile creations of those labeled inferior. The Third Reich utilized such cultural tropes, aiming at both foreign governmental institutions and nongovernmental organizations and individuals, to install National Socialist values without the appearance of direct political influence. Under Kivimaa's pen, Weimar European humanism became a source of credibility, both evidence and moral justification for the superiority of German/ic *Kultur*, soul, and race designed to suggest, to the Finnish imagination, the attractive bonds between Finnish and German/ic people, not incidentally inscribing an historically isolated people (Finns) into a transnational and hierarchically conceptualized, blood-based, community.

A deft cultural ideologue, Kivimaa uses a sophisticated range of structural and narrative techniques to stage a proximity between the Germans and the Finns, while also giving himself a leading role, one modeled on the idealized Nazi leadership. Kivimaa travels by ship and by train via Sweden to Germany: from the beginning, his encounter with the German *Kulturlandschaft* is interwoven with the imagery and values of *Blut und Boden* (German, Blood and Soil), a *soil* evidently suffused by, and revivifying, a human essence, or *blood*.[14] Although the decision not to go to Germany by air was enforced by bad weather preventing his flight, Kivimaa's earthbound journey turns this misfortune to advantage, enabling him to open his "study" with the image of a German people ancestrally rooted in the soil they have been destined to cultivate, literally and metaphorically. Guided by Blood and Soil, Kivimaa resolutely opposes modernization in the agri/cultural sphere. At the same time, though, he characterizes the unparalleled Third Reich military and political elite as "*Flugzeugmenschen*," airplane people or airmen, both involved in advanced technology, and (racially) capable of taking in, and acting on, the widest aerial perspective, the eagle-eye view of a Europe they are foreordained to sustain.[15] It is precisely here where Kivimaa's ideology finds its force. The reciprocity between traditional and mystified agriculture and modernizing technology is critical to the National Socialist imagination in terms of both individual identity and the concept of *Lebensraum*, Living Space. For while Blood and Soil conceives a racialized peasantry, it also mobilizes the peasantry as a political mass category and legitimates its expansion to the East enabled by technological progress.[16]

In this sense, Kivimaa's travelogue works to excite his Finnish readers to imitate the sublime German/ic people he portrays, their past and present achievements, and to elicit a transnational bond between the future goals of the Third Reich military and political leadership.

Significantly, on Kivimaa's return to Finland, the weather cooperated. Taking the land route into Germany, he departs at the end of the book by air: having taken account of the rootedness of the German people, Kivimaa now portrays the symbolic superiority of the German airman, adopting his own eagle-eye perspective to end his narrative. Vividly echoing Leni Riefenstahl's framing of Hitler's messianic arrival—by airplane—at the Nuremberg Rallies in 1934 in her *Triumph of the Will*, Kivimaa underscores his swift return to his Finnish *Volk* from above. Delivering *Kultur* of the soon-to-be Europe, Kivimaa the *Flugzeugmensch* looks down on his "soil," fervently redeploying the Latin Christian phrase *O crux ave spes unica* (Hail to the Cross, our only hope) as "*O Patria, ave spes unica*" (Hail to the fatherland, our only hope).[17] Instrumentalizing a racialized nationalism as an authorized substitute for Christianity, Kivimaa's narrative models him on the image of the *Führer*, as a spiritual leader of the Finnish people.

Throughout the travelogue, Kivimaa plays the leading part, dramatizing himself as the hero poet, the spiritual warrior co-creating the New Europe. As a classical hero, he must undergo a dramatic *anagnorisis*, a transformation from ignorance to knowledge that he brings to the Finnish people. This transformation, where the progressive narrative of *Blut und Boden,* the repeated insistence on the inherent value of racialized *Kultur* is given point, occurs midway through *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, when Kivimaa confronts the defining social issue of Nazi Germany, the "Jewish question." The implicit suasion of Kivimaa's personal story of growth and transcendence hinges on this climactic scene, portraying the National Socialist view that the Jewish people needed to be singled out in order to prevent the racial infection of the *Volkskörper*, the organic body of the people. The narrative is apparently sensitive to the prejudices of its readers: in the original Finnish version of 1941, Kivimaa's text accentuates the figure of a Jewish-Bolshevik, effectively appealing to antisemitic and anti-Soviet sentiments, while the German translation more aggressively focuses attention on the figure of the Jew. (I will return to this alteration below.) Interinvolving the private and the public, Kivimaa's personal *anagnorisis* asserts a broader social purpose, exporting the racially conditioned *Kultur*, and the exemplary role of the German racialized people's community, *Volksgemeinschaft,* as an organizing norm for Europe, and for Finland, too.

Observing the outcast Jews in "the heart of Europe," Kivimaa distinguishes them from the "modern dynamic man" who has conquered "time and space":

> This creative man is the Teuton, the member of the ruling race, which with unconditional persistence has particularly eradicated the Jews from

> the German *Volkskörper*. The idea of Man in Germany today is just the opposite of the liberal mindset. As members of a despised, inferior people, the Jews go on the streets of Germany bearing as their cross the yellow star . . . They atone together for the sins of the Jews of the Weimar Republic; in the heart of Europe, the Hebrew race's idea of world domination has become a disappointed wandering in the desert. When a Finn asks about the German attitude concerning the "Jewish question," he gets the answer: [Here, Kivimaa's text multiplies its political complexity, as the Finn receives a different reply in the Finnish original than in the German translation; whether this change is the result of changing "Jews" to "Russians" or not, the entire paragraph is primarily focused on the "Jewish question."]
>
> "Do you love the [Russians]?" [Finnish text]
> "Can it be you love the Jews?" [German text]

The text continues by simulating a "German" reply, followed by Kivimaa's analysis:

> "Human sympathy is a good thing, but one must not confuse it with misplaced sentimentality in such issues as the life of the nation as a whole. The Jews are the main culprits in the collapse of Germany and in the shameful peace of Versailles; the Jews have been among the most central factors of world Bolshevism; they are enemy no. 1 of humanity and culture. The rootless and nihilistic Jewishness must be eradicated from the European community. In his *Dictionnaire philosophique*, the leading spirit of the Enlightenment, Voltaire, precisely and correctly defined the essence of Jewishness. The European fate of the past two hundred years would have been happier if a healthy conception of the nation had led the people instead of the unhealthy international Jew."
>
> The doctrine of the sanctity of Germanic blood and race became a political reality in Germany. One of the leading contemporary German writers, Bruno Brehm, was a war correspondent in Russia last summer. He particularly studied the question of the Russian population. He found that the free peasant had disappeared and the Asian-Slavic-Jewish slave type had taken his place. Bolshevik Russia hates race theory: creating an inferior mixed-type, it aimed to conquer our continent. "Hopefully, all of Europe," wrote Brehm, "has in these times become aware that the idea of race is not an isolated exigency, but an all-European necessity. If we had not quickly embraced this question, the entire Europe would have fallen into ruin."[18]

Situated at the center of the travelogue, in a chapter entitled "New Germany," this brief passage dramatizes Kivimaa's compositional *modus operandi*, the use of ostensibly descriptive paragraphs (and imagined

interlocutors) to depict not only what he saw, but *how he wanted* to see and portray the reality of the Jewish population to Finnish readers. Moreover, rather than explicitly advancing his own views, Kivimaa allows them to be performed by others—the unnamed spokesman for the "German attitude," and Bruno Brehm—whose texts and ideas claim a scientific authority on the "Jewish question." Refusing to distance himself from such comments, Kivimaa constructs the appearance of a racialized consensus, in which the Finnish visitor and the German native arrive at a common agreement based on their aspiration for an emerging New Europe. Playing the part of the common Finn, epitomizing a homogeneous nation, Kivimaa is not merely educated by his German interlocutor, but enacts the desired impact his book should have in enlightening the Finnish readership.

Responding to "a" generic "Finn," "the German attitude" is comparably elevated as metonymy; the generalized attitudes of an entire people register univocally, expressed with the force of the single, powerful voice, the voice of the *Volksganze*. Kivimaa only seems to step away from giving his opinion on the situation of the Jews, for he uses this hypothetical German interlocutor and a leading German writer—who has "studied" the racial question concretely, in the *Lebensraum* field in the East—to explain to the reader why the Jews deserve the harsh treatment they are receiving in Nazi Germany. These two voices reciprocally authorize and extend one another, combining vernacular and more elite perspectives. Kivimaa seems to vanish behind these authorities, but his rhetoric works to the reverse effect, disseminating pro-racist and antisemitic views in Finland under his cultural, ethico-political authority; at least as important, his rhetoric desensitizes his Finnish readers to this conceptual vocabulary, its impact in the Third Reich, and its potential effect in Finland. In the framework of the travelogue, Kivimaa's apparent neutrality is a form of ventriloquism, in which the anonymous representative of the *Volk* and the well-traveled war correspondent (Bruno Brehm) are used to speak for Kivimaa: the portrayal of the Jewish reality finds no respect and compassion from Kivimaa's German authorities and by extension none from Kivimaa, the Finnish representative and citizen, either.

Kivimaa's narrativization of the "Jewish question" is compatible with the cultural and social context of the Third Reich, where the Jew is fantasized and despised as both the innately inferior and the dark "other," too. This racial characterization takes on a politico-religious quality, as the singled-out Jew, wearing the yellow star, must, according to Kivimaa, "atone" for "the sins of the Jews of the Weimar Republic." Kivimaa accentuates the religious tone of this stigmatization further, interweaving the special blending of fear and loathing characteristic of pre-modern Christian and modern politicized anti-Jewish sentiments: he frames the public marking and humiliation of the Jew as a *necessity*, for in attempting to dominate Europe, the conspiratorial "Hebraic race" (*hebrealainen rotu* in the Finnish original) extended its archetypal offence against Christian Europe. In accordance with the cultural

ideologues of the Third Reich, he skillfully rewrites the false liberalism and sympathy of Enlightenment humanism (suggesting that Voltaire shared with the "Man in Germany today . . . the opposite of the liberal mindset"), urging instead a transnational ethics of the "spiritually related peoples" of the New Europe.

The racial theories behind the Third Reich's discriminatory practices are hardly unknown to Kivimaa; they are evinced both by his sense that Jews publicly marked with the Star of David are *atoning* for past crimes, and also by the understanding that Jewish suffering is justified by the "doctrine of the sanctity of Germanic blood and the Germanic race." Here, Kivimaa's travelogue shifts into an explicit antisemitic register, blocking a respect and compassion based on liberal democratic values of citizenship (moral equality) and justifying paradigmatic shifts in the perception of humanity and human suffering in the framework of the racialized state. Less "sanctified" than the Teutons, the Jews are implicitly less human. Rather tellingly, Kivimaa is aware of the obliteration practiced in Nazi Germany. Stating that the Teuton has "*particularly* eradicated the Jews from the German *Volkskörper*" (my emphasis), he sets the Jews at the apex of what seems a more general purge.[19] The word *particularly* might well witness a degree of Kivimaa's awareness that German Jewry was only one among other persecuted groups within the German *Volkskörper*—homosexuals, the disabled, the politically opposed—and without it, such as the Sinti and Roma. When, in the 1960s, Kivimaa calls for "humanism," he precisely reverses the rhetorical strategy of *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*; instead of a racialized polity that displaces respect and compassion, he now calls for a compassionate liberal statecraft infused by Christian sentiments.

Kivimaa's introduction to the "Jewish question" conditions the Finnish reader to receive the Jews in the politics of *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*: a National Socialist perspective favors racial essentialization and objectification of the Jews; it is allied with the discourses of power, affected by it, supporting it, and disseminating it; it reproduces these discourses of power while aiming to educate and interpellate its readers to respond as subjects of those discourses. In this act of reproduction and production, Kivimaa is not a mere observer, describing events in Germany, but writes as a transnational ideologue, both perpetuating antisemitism inflected by the National Socialist worldview, and providing the affective means for its adoption in Finland. Antisemitism is intrinsic to Kivimaa's writing here, writing motivating racial hierarchy as one means of the *new* European humanism.

Although historian Hannu Rautkallio claims in *Finland and the Holocaust* that "Race was not an issue through which the Germans could bolster their position in Finland,"[20] race was literally at the center of Kivimaa's travelogue, which subtly encouraged the Finnish reader's empathy with National Socialist policies, underwriting the performance of the Jew as the *Menschheits- und Kulturfeind Nr. 1* (German translation). Describing the Jew

as the "enemy no. 1 of humanity and culture" (*ihmiskunnan ja kulttuurin vihollinen n:o I,* Finnish original), Kivimaa's essay uses vocabulary historically absorbed into the National Socialist discourse of antisemitism. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler had divided mankind into the *Kulturbegründer* (the founders of culture), *Kulturträger* (the bearers of culture), and the *Kulturzerstörer* (the destroyers of culture), providing a scale for calibrating the value of various "races" according to "their ability or inability to emerge from historical obscurity and by their capacity or incapacity to produce a visible *Kultur.*"[21] In this particular schema, what made a *Volk* a true *Kulturvolk* was its essential opposition to the destroyer of *Kultur*, the *Kultur*-lacking Jew. Kivimaa's endorsement of "the German attitude" is hardly innocent here; it reworks and legitimates the distinctive and institutionalized National Socialist vocabulary of racism for the Finnish audience.

Kivimaa's 1943 volume *Valon ja pimeyden manner* (Finnish, Mainland of light and darkness) contextualizes the ideological and racial underpinnings of his use of the term *Kultur*, further witnessing Kivimaa's application of the principles of racialized culture to the realm of foreign relations. Criticizing the French people for their uncooperative attitudes toward the Third Reich, Kivimaa argued that French "'culture' had changed into 'civilization'; in the most cultivated strata of society, the spiritual atmosphere had become so thin that it could barely sustain its hothouse flowers."[22] Here, Kivimaa deploys the underlying trope of Third Reich racial and cultural policies, a trope asserting a link between "civilization" and "degeneration" and enabling both racial discrimination and politicized censorship in the artistic sphere. Whereas *Kultur* marks—Kivimaa echoes Goebbels and other National Socialist cultural ideologues—a blood-based expression through anti-modernist art forms, "civilization" signifies a society estranged from "the spirit of the Nordic kind," a society aiming at an unpalatable democratic inclusion of diverse ethnicities, art concepts, strains, and forms.[23] With regard to France, then, Kivimaa understood the "frivolity" of the French soul to have overcome the innate virtues of the people—"a sense of warmth, a sensitivity to the beauty of form, spirituality, a beautifully balanced approach to physical strength and intellectual genius"—and so to contribute to the unhealthy spread of racial diversity and degenerate artistic modernism, dragging the nation toward annihilation. By "frivolity," Kivimaa means "The freedom of the individual" in post-Versailles France, which had "developed into a religion," indicating the "quiet degeneration" of the French "lifestyle."[24]

Kivimaa founds *Kultur* on the acceptance of an animating racial hierarchy: the tradition, combining "*Kultur*, art, and spirit" is "eternal, permanent, and enduring,"[25] implicitly juxtaposed to the *Kultur*-lacking "parasitic" Jews of National Socialist propaganda, or of the culture-destroying Bolsheviks, a common trope in Finnish propaganda.[26] This eternal tradition is the expression of the "spiritual force," now building bridges, through the Finnish–German gun-brotherhood, to "a better, more humane future," a "humane"

future where the "humane" is nonetheless restricted to a racially predetermined selection of humanity.[27] Kivimaa's "more humane future" could afford to be compassionate and benevolent only to those selected peoples, into which Kivimaa worked strenuously to assign the Finns. For "a more humane future" implied the victory of the cultivated, sublime spirit of the "Nordic" (Aryan) race that was currently "refining" the Europe in its own, racially imperishable image.

The racism involved in Kivimaa's use of "tradition" stands behind the figure of the "Russians" and "Jews" mediated between the Finnish and German versions of his travelogue. In Kivimaa's account, the Jews are not merely a racialized "other." Citing Bruno Brehm, the Jews emerge obviously as "the most central factor of world Bolshevism," an amalgamation of the "Asian-Slavic-Jewish servant type" ruling the Soviet Union, which "hates the entire race theory"; Bolshevik Russia is the territorialized antithesis to the Europe Kivimaa imagines. Both Hitler and Goebbels had unmistakably imbued anti-Bolshevism with antisemitism,[28] and Kivimaa's anti-Bolshevism is not conceptualized as merely demarcating the border between East and West, but is inseparable from racial antisemitism, blending the inferior Asian and Slavic peoples into the definitively degenerate Jew: "the free peasant had disappeared and the Asian-Slavic-Jewish slave type had taken his place."

The views Kivimaa absorbs into *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta* align with those expressed in a range of German-language books sustained by the Finnish state—many written by academics who, like Kivimaa, resumed distinguished institutional careers after the war—identifying Finland within the rhetoric of Third Reich racial and expansionist ideologies for consumption by readers of both German and Finnish. The specter of an "Asian-Slavic-Jewish slave type" conspiracy on Finland's eastern border aligns with Finland's expansionist rhetoric of *Lebensraum*, the notion of moving the circumference of Finland's Living Space eastward. Although *Suur-Suomi* (Finnish, Greater Finland) had origins in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century cultural and patriotic nationalism, and was identified both with the notion of unifying related Finnic "tribes" and with the desire to create a defensive space along Finland's eastern border, it seems unlikely that this distinction would have been the exclusive connotation for the authors or the readers of the 1941 *Finnlands Lebensraum* (German, Finland's Living Space).[29] Much as *Lebensraum* racially coded and justified German expansion to the East, Jalmari Jaakkola's *Die Ostfrage Finnlands* (German, Finland's East question) offered a comparable justification for Finnish expansion into Soviet Karelia (Finland had lost roughly one-seventh of its territory to the Soviet Union after the Winter War, retaining throughout the Continuation War more territory than it had controlled prior to the Soviet invasion). Jaakkola legitimated the Third Reich's portrayal of the rapacity of Bolshevik Russia by demonstrating the brutal results of its occupation of Karelia and the Kola Peninsula: in terms resonant of the Jews as *Kulturfeinde*, the Soviets Russified

Karelia, raped its nature and economy, forcibly collectivized its agriculture, and planned the elimination of Finnish-related peoples.[30]

From the perspective of Finland's future, the (racially conditioned) concept of *Lebensraum* is telling in its collapsing of the "Asian-Slavic-Jewish slave type" as a racial, political, and cultural threat to the Finnish nation. The Slavs' lack of "organizational ability and therefore state-forming and state-keeping force" is the cause for their enslavement by the Bolshevik Jew; in his travelogue, Kivimaa reproduces this discourse as Brehm's "question of the Russian population." A war to liberate the Russian peasant is pointless, since he has proven unworthy of the cultivation of European soil, of *Kultur*. To save humanity means to install the New Europe, to liberate Europe's soil and culture from parasites—Jews, Bolsheviks, "Asian-Slavic-Jewish slave" types—and to restore it to legitimate cultivation: this is, as Kivimaa puts it ventriloquizing Brehm, an "all-European necessity." In 1941, when Finland's goal was to remain—as the ally of the Third Reich in Operation Barbarossa—on the imagined map of the New Europe, anti-Bolshevism was a useful instrument in Finnish–German relations, as it could be fused to Finland's eternal battle against its archenemy, collapsing Communism, the Soviet Union, Russia, the Russian people, Slavs, Asians. In the vernacular inflections of *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, Kivimaa aligns this common Finnish prejudice, motivating an explicit antisemitism as well. The innately race-driven trope of *Kultur* was an instrument extending beyond the dialectical construction of distinct peoples, opening the linguistic and territorial borders of the Finnish nation to transnational recontextualization.[31]

In its persuasive structure and essentializing vocabulary, Kivimaa's travelogue witnesses not merely Kivimaa's understanding of the delicate, implicit rather than explicit, interweaving of racial ideologies into the fabric of international relations and into the *Kultur*-fabric of transnational New Europe, but also a significant rhetorical effort to transmit these views in affective, even apocalyptic terms.

> Every living and powerful people [*kansakunta* in Finnish, *Volkstum* in German] creates for itself its own form of life, which is tailored to its own spiritual and economic needs of order. If their genesis is not a historical-biological necessity, the state can never be vigorous enough. Sooner or later it [the state] falls into a visible or invisible inner weakness.[32]

Kivimaa's New Europe creates an "historical-biological" link between the peoples worthy of survival and rule; attributing an ethical dimension to the racialized union among the "European" peoples inevitably withholds both a wider *moral* sensibility and the possibility of a liberal-democratic civic understanding from that group. If not discounted as mere propaganda and therefore unworthy of critical analysis, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta* can be seen to enact the working of ideology in the cultural sphere, galvanizing

the reader's pleasure in a mere "travel book" toward the reproduction of a specific vision of the humane world. In the very moment Kivimaa's writing lays the groundwork for consensus, it begins to play a part in the present, providing a specific, racialized form of identification with the image and goals of Finland in the New Europe. The interpellative power of narrative becomes a subtle instrument to racialize the Finnish people, and their state as well. The plot, structure, language, and incidents of the travelogue, particularly Kivimaa's heroic formation into the airborne poet/soldier/messiah of the Finnish *Volk*, are designed to evoke both an identification with Kivimaa and with the policies he portrays, a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*—the feeling of a fateful belonging-together—between reader and narrator, and between the Finnish people and their brethren in the superior race. Taking *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta* and other racially underpinned writings of the late 1930s and early 1940s as a guide, Kivimaa's sense of *Kultur* seems at least to interrupt what cultural scholars celebrate as his life-long and coherent humanism; it may also document, as humanism often does, its power as an exclusionist ideology.

Historicizing Kivimaa in Finnish cultural studies

Kivimaa's humanist canonization in cultural studies demonstrates the struggle to come to grips with the mutual implication of art and ideology in the 1930s and 1940s. Three studies— Reetta Nieminen's 1978 PhD dissertation, *Arvi Kivimaa: Kirjailija ja teatterimies* (Finnish, Arvi Kivimaa: Novelist and man of the theatre), the second volume of Pirkko Koski's 1987 monograph on the Helsinki Folk Theatre, *Kansan teatteri 2,* and Hanna Korsberg's 2008 article "Open the Windows on Europe! Arvi Kivimaa's Work and Literary Production in the 1920's and Early 30's"—take up Kivimaa's postwar "humanist" legacy.[33] For all their value in inscribing Kivimaa into Finland's modern literary and theatre history, such works illustrate how cultural interpretations have been "narrated within a national framework, not necessarily expressing a nationalistic understanding, but certainly operating with the help of [what Ulrich Beck calls] a 'methodological nationalism,'" the notion that "the nation state is the container of social processes, and that the national provides the core order for the analysis of social, economic and political processes."[34]

Taking Kivimaa's personal approval as the measure of her work, Nieminen anachronistically understands Kivimaa's 1920s internationalism according to the terms of his self-avowed humanism in the postwar period, erasing his involvement with the racialized humanism of the Third Reich in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Establishing an unreflective paradigm, Nieminen takes an ahistorical, thematic view of Kivimaa's career, blending literary, politico-cultural, and politico-military concepts in ways that define Kivimaa as representative of a nebulous universalism, "the struggle on behalf of man

and in honour of life." As she suggests in the English-language "Summary" of her project, in the 1930s "the writer appears at his most European," and by the 1940s emerges as an unblemished "humanist":

> In the 1940s. . . . Kivimaa's humanism also comes out more clearly, and he begins to speak out more clearly on behalf of humanity. He does not surrender to pessimism, and the dominant feeling is one of brotherhood and shared suffering. The poet's inner struggle seems to have been bitter, though the surface remains for the most part calm, since as a skilled theatrical man he was also able to "direct" his own emotions. Nor did Kivimaa give in to the occasional desires which he felt to stand aside, but from work to work he maintains the struggle on behalf of man and in honour of life. His Europeanism also became wider, with an emphasis on collective responsibility for the continent which had undergone such sufferings. Although he did not believe it possible to eliminate material misery, he did believe that by means of art it was possible to exert an indirect influence for the creation of the conditions for a better life.
>
> With his appointment in 1950 as the Director-General of the National Theatre, Kivimaa reached the apex of his theatrical career. In his new post he increased his efforts both in directing and in his artistic work, in which he remained true to his humanist and international commitment.[35]

Although Nieminen implies inconsistencies in the homogeneity of Kivimaa's life-long humanism, her narrative cements these fractures into a smooth humanist façade of "international commitment." For Nieminen, in the early 1930s, at just the moment he "turned his back on cosmopolitan culture," Kivimaa "appears at his most European."[36] By the 1940s, Nieminen's Kivimaa is even more assertively humanist, speaking "out more clearly on behalf of humanity." Yet, the vocabulary of that humanism remains unselfconsciously inflected by idioms—"brotherhood," "the struggle on behalf of man and in honour of life," "Europeanism . . . with an emphasis on collective responsibility for the continent"—identified with the racially essentialized New Europe. Ignoring the political history and usage of these terms, Nieminen takes at face value what words like "brotherhood" implied for those privileged by the common interest of transnationalized European *Kultur*, and for those excluded from its embrace. Although Nieminen alleges Kivimaa's sensitivity to the "shared suffering" of Europe, his "theatrical" skill at masking his emotions might give us pause, especially given the extent to which his postwar performance as a humanist reverses the polarity of the prewar and wartime Kivimaa. For in 1944, Kivimaa was turning towards an international humanist image, re-contextualizing his New Europe rhetoric in ways that lend a different valence to that humanist Europeanism of blood-based identity; now, "for Europe's culture, all nations have equal value. Norway, Switzerland, Estonia etc. each of them contributes their value to

European culture. And the state destruction of these nations would at the same time mean the impoverishing of European culture."[37] By the 1950s, then, Kivimaa had *not* "remained true to his humanist international commitment," as Nieminen claims, but had obscured it in order to repurpose the humanism he shared with the Third Reich, the racialized values currently unacceptable to "the continent which had undergone such sufferings."

The evident gaps and contradictions suffusing Nieminen's reading of Kivimaa dramatize the crosscutting ideological tensions besetting postwar Finnish historiography. Reproducing Kivimaa's elision of prewar, wartime, and postwar international humanism, the standard practice of Finnish theatre historiography betrays similar ideological strains. In the late 1980s, Pirkko Koski, at that time Director of the Helsinki Theatre Museum, published a two-volume history of the Helsinki Folk Theatre; not long after its appearance, Koski was appointed to the Theatre Research department of Helsinki University, where she became Professor and led the unit's research program. In the second volume, which covers the period of Kivimaa's leadership of the theatre (1940–49), Koski describes the various productions in the Folk Theatre repertoire (including those directed by Kivimaa), summarizes its financial circumstances, identifies the members of the ensemble, and provides a psychological profile of Kivimaa as an ideologically uncorrupted intellectual, administrator, and stage director. Given the extraordinary political circumstances of Finland in the 1940s—fighting the Winter War against the Soviet Union; subsequently allied with the Third Reich, then at war with it; and finally subject to a punitive "friendship" with the Soviet Union—it is understandable that the political volatility of Kivimaa's situation has been barely opened to discussion: any consideration of writings in which Kivimaa may have sustained a National Socialist-inflected cultural agenda is absent from Koski's account of his theatre work. This inhibiting silence was symptomatic of the national/ist "contractual ethos" of Finnish conservative history in the 1980s, extending the concerns of historians in the immediate postwar period who often "avoided themes of discussion that might have had foreign political repercussions, that is, anything that the Soviets might conceivably use to damage Finnish interests."[38] Koski's narrative provides exemplary illustration not only of how patriotic interpretations can be adjusted "to the existence of a common national interest" legitimating "the post-war politics of the nation-state during the Cold War,"[39] but also of the power they still hold over the imagination of Finnish history.

Underlining Kivimaa's "humanist international emphasis" as the framework of his years at the Helsinki Folk Theatre, Koski asserts a qualitative homogeneity in Kivimaa's discourse of humanism and internationalism, staging Kivimaa as the people's philanthropist on a global scale.[40] Erasing, rewriting, and silencing historical complexity, Koski's narrative depends on three interlocking methodological fallacies. First, using a 1979 interview with Kivimaa implicitly to rehabilitate Kivimaa's racially inflected discourses

of the 1940s, she blends the postwar into the Continuation War period. Second, she collapses Kivimaa's potentially nuanced views developing over the course of the Continuation War into a single ideological trope of "humanist international emphasis." And third, she reduces the period specificities of three distinct wars and the tensions of the subsequent peacetime into one period, stepping away from the social and ideological complexity of the era: the enthusiastic embrace in 1941 of the possibility of co-creating the New Europe; the anxieties of 1943, when the declining fortunes of the Third Reich led to a questioning of the alliance; and the "war" against German forces on Finnish soil in 1944, undertaken as part of the peace agreement with the Soviet Union.

These emblematic fallacies illuminate how the "nationalist methodology" operates as a historically legitimized analytical category. Authorizing Kivimaa's restrospective *separation* of his wartime rhetoric, Koski inscribes the "separate war" paradigm sustaining Finnish military and social history—the fiction of military, political, and cultural separation between the wartime allies—into Finnish *theatre* history. Paraphrasing and emphasizing Kivimaa's claim that he did not use the Folk Theatre stage as the instrument of 1940s Finnish–German alliance propaganda, but instead sought to stage plays from those countries with which Finland was at war, specifically the United States, Koski points to the 1943 Folk Theatre production of A. J. Cronin's *Jumalat hymyilevät* (which had run on Broadway as *Jupiter Laughs* in 1940). Rather than correcting Kivimaa, Koski allows the reader to believe that Kivimaa staged the play at the moment when the US declared war on Finland, reinforcing Kivimaa's self-image as an anti-Nazi dissident, and extending his alleged politics to his theatre, too. (The US never declared war on Finland; Finland was already at war with the United Kingdom, and Cronin was a well-known Scottish writer who lived in the US from 1939 to 1945 and intermittently thereafter.) She brings a fragment of a 1979 interview with Kivimaa to bear: "I am not sure whether this had played a role or whether it was generally noted, but indeed, this sought to be the expression of our separate war." Although Koski seems alert to the possibility that Kivimaa is retouching the past—"One might, of course, think that memories of the events of previous years are colored by later experiences"—she finally asserts his recollections in a way that annuls critique, as objective truth: "Kivimaa's season opening speeches during the war nonetheless prove that the choice of the repertoire shows a deliberate humanist international emphasis."[41] In this view, of course, Kivimaa's season-opening speeches merely confirm what the repertoire already shows for Koski, that the Folk Theatre exemplified the cultural *separation* from the Third Reich.

Nonetheless, in the speech opening the 1941 Folk Theatre fall season, delivered after the fresh alliance with the Third Reich, Kivimaa praised the fact that "The only European empire strong enough to eradicate our centuries-old nightmare, is our ally [*liittolaisemme*] . . . What is certain is

that the vibrant cultural work of this moment, as was the case decades ago, is the ally of the defensive will." He continued, "Now, if ever, the honest, fresh, and rich expression of humanity has to be raised to glory." Drawing the long history of Finnish–German cultural relations and the Finnish admiration of German cultural achievements into the present conflict, Kivimaa joined the military alliance (note he uses the word "ally") to a "vibrant" *cultural*/ideological purpose, explicitly refusing what he would much later describe as "the expression of our separate war." And yet, citing these lines, Koski takes this open joining of Finland's purposes with those of the Third Reich merely as an example of an unexplained, tragic "pathos characteristic of this time," which the Finnish nation simply had to endure. Discounting the ideological appeal of the speech in the context of the alliance with the Reich's *Kultur*, and the sense in which eradicating "our centuries-old nightmare" refers to a mutual desire to extinguish the Russian/Soviet enemy, the "Asian-Slavic-Jewish slave type" of Kivimaa's 1941 travelogue, Koski overwrites Kivimaa's remarks in terms of an "unyielding humanism," one demanding a "continuous requirement for humanity."[42]

The effort to homogenize Kivimaa's humanism also homogenizes Kivimaa's potential responsiveness to the dynamic political change of the period. Koski cites a 1943 letter from Arvid Englind (his Swedish agency was collaborating with Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry, offering Scandinavian drama to the Third Reich) to the effect that it would be diplomatically useful for the Folk Theatre to take on a production of the American play *The Male Animal*, James Thurber and Eliott Nugent's parable of censorship and freedom of speech on an American college campus. Following Kivimaa's retrospective account, Koski understands the suggestion of an American play for the repertoire as a gesture of ideological independence from the Third Reich (though a play about censorship in America might have resonated in a number of ways in this context), disregarding Kivimaa's potential alertness to the changing terms of his (and his theatre's) fortunes in a period of increasing Finnish concern for Germany's failures on the eastern front. Overlooking Kivimaa's political astuteness, Koski's narrative reproduces the dominant patriotic history-paradigm dating from the 1950s, segregating Kivimaa's humanism from ideological implication of any kind. As she summarizes, in 1943 "the significance of the theatre was experienced as the same, but perhaps even more human centered than before."[43]

More to the point, in order to cast Kivimaa as an active opponent of Nazism, Koski emphatically asserts Kivimaa's unproblematic humanism by accentuating the Folk Theatre's production of *Rakkaus* (Finnish, Love; original Danish title, *Kærlighed*) by the Danish playwright Kaj Munk, staged after he was killed by the Gestapo in January 1944; the production was accompanied by an elegy delivered by Kivimaa, a memorial and educational exhibition decorated with Danish and Finnish flags. Koski cites her 1981 discussion in which Kivimaa implied his anti-Nazi orientation by claiming

he had been advised not to put this play into the Folk Theatre repertoire. Since the adviser is not identified, the reader is left with Kivimaa's explanation: he took "orders" only from "the representatives of his own country." Insinuating that this advice was given by German officials, Kivimaa in effect confirms his distance from the Third Reich, stressing his role as an independent-minded Finnish patriot, and implicitly aligning Finnish authorities against Nazi ideology. Molding Kivimaa on Munk's dissidence, distancing Kivimaa from his own racial rhetoric of the late 1930s and early 1940s, and separating culture from its socio-political environment, Koski not surprisingly recapitulates a "separate war" paradigm of the alliance as the background of Kivimaa's humanism: "Since all this was happening while Germany was fighting alongside Finland on the same side . . . the active emphasis on humanity is even more clearly stated as a principle. Arvi Kivimaa stressed the importance of culture in defense of humanity, not only in his speeches; he also realized it in practice."[44] As we have seen, though, Kivimaa had long regarded his cultural work as ideological practice. What changes after the war are the commitments of Kivimaa's humanism: it has become impolitic to cast culture as an effect of "race."

Upholding the national mythology of remaining untainted by National Socialist racial objectives in the period of wartime military alliance, Koski systematically reads Kivimaa's career back-to-front: his status as a celebrated cultural figure in the 1980s and 1970s supports his humanist agenda of the mid-1940s, which is used to reinterpret his remarks at the opening of the period of alliance in 1941, and eliminate his racially inflected cultural and theatrical writings from view. I do not wish to discount Kivimaa's contributions to international work after World War II. However, erasing the writings Kivimaa published as an ideologue conversant in National Socialist concepts of *Kultur* epitomizes the distinctive patterns of historical reasoning common to a self-censoring Finnish academia compliant with state politics both during the alliance and in the postwar era. Although these patterns of national euphemism can now be explained, their force in building and maintaining civic consensus nonetheless remains in play, summoned at precisely the moment when alternative analysis addresses the icons erected by this particular strain of Finnish scholarship.

Although both Nieminen's and Koski's work here dates from before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kivimaa's career continues to be evoked under the arc of a homogenous humanism. Theatre historian Hanna Korsberg's effort to inscribe "Kivimaa's Work and Literary Production in the 1920's and Early 30's" into the discourses of modernism and internationalism celebrates Kivimaa's "Humanist thought" in framing Kivimaa as "one of the first Modernists in Finnish literature and an influential person in Finnish cultural life."[45] Sketching Kivimaa's career through 1937, Korsberg focuses her analysis on the years leading up to 1932, when Kivimaa moved to Greifswald University and served as a lecturer in Finnish language and

culture for two years. In the article, Korsberg suggestively narrows her account to Kivimaa's activities before he returned to Finland from the Third Reich, touching only lightly on Kivimaa's 1932–34 literary production: "During these years Kivimaa wrote articles in Finnish newspapers on subjects such as German literature and culture and the social situation in Germany."[46] Precisely because Korsberg blurs the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich into a benign "German" context, and asserts Kivimaa as a mere observer describing without agency the German reality (he just "wrote . . . articles on subjects"), the periodization of her article appears to restrict the treatment of Kivimaa to the less problematic, early phase of his career. Nonetheless, she concludes the essay by making an ironically significant claim: "Throughout his life Kivimaa was a versatile supplier of cultural influences mainly from Europe to Finnish cultural life, especially to literature and theatre."[47] Gesturing toward an overview belying the essay's explicit focus on pre-1932 Kivimaa, this final sentence seems to suggest the problems opened by subjecting Kivimaa's full career to scrutiny. For Kivimaa's influence as a cultural "supplier" becomes considerably more "versatile" when we consider his writings from the late 1930s and early 1940s as part of the "European" rhetoric of *Kultur* he brought to "Finnish cultural life."

In a 1943 essay, "Ranskan olemus ja tie" (Finnish, France's spirit and its path), Kivimaa treated 1920s Paris—home to jazz and surrealism, Hemingway and Picasso, as well as to a range of sensational and exotic performances across the visual and verbal arts—as the urban epitome of international modernism. Yet here, 1920s Paris principally represents the degeneration that flows from the loss of native traditions. The artistic experimentation and racial tolerance that made Paris attractive to ethnic minorities poses, for Kivimaa, a definitive threat to a French essence: "USA Negroes enjoyed a full draught of those rights that democratic France granted in more and more unlimited ways to the colored as it did to the whites, while French Senegal brought its own blacks into this disparity of races." To Kivimaa, a "Spanish dancer walking arm-in-arm with a Negro" in nighttime Paris exemplifies the loss of an obligation to an inborn French identity, as "the individual freedom changed more and more into a selfish egotism." Since "many visitors gradually lost, in this environment, their own national characters, and began to think and speak in the French manner," an essential "Frenchness"—materialized from the biological, physiological, and mental characteristics of the people—was threatened with dilution.[48] Here, we can see one moment where the assertion of anachronistic coherence is inadequate to account for the intersection of Kivimaa's artistic writings with the more determined political, racial discourses naturalizing and objectifying culture and nation. Kivimaa constructs an ideal, essentialized French community, and rhetorically aims to rebuild—and cleanse—the prevailing French social reality.

A more substantial account of Kivimaa's developing humanism would require consideration of his unpalatable writings from the late 1930s up to 1943–44; yet theatre history of the 1980s and beyond replicates rather than rethinks the rhetorical and interpretive structures of the "separate war" in military and political history. In her 2001 *National Biography of Finland* article on Kivimaa, which continues to appear in a 2011 Web revision, Koski exemplifies the ongoing struggle to revisit uncritical notions underpinning national/ist scholarship. Determined to position Kivimaa among Finland's leading humanists, Koski again recalls the Munk incident and asserts Kivimaa's "devotion to France" as overriding signs of his resistance to National Socialism. Noting that "Kivimaa's relationship to National Socialist Germany has been discussed after the war, and in some estimates he has been attached to the fervent supporters of its politics," Koski nonetheless argues that "His interest in German culture cannot be underestimated, but perhaps still has to be considered alongside his devotion to France."

> Kivimaa hardly aligned himself in the war between the countries as the supporter of Germany; what was political in his position was his fear of Communism. . . . In Kivimaa's agency even direct Nazi resistance can be found. In the spring of 1944, Kaj Munk's play was selected for the Theatre's program and in this connection an exhibition was held honoring the memory of the author, who was killed by the Germans a few weeks earlier. The director responded to the warnings he received, saying that he took orders only from own country's representatives.[49]

The reader never learns who "discussed" Kivimaa's relationship to the Third Reich "after the war," in whose "estimates he has been attached to the fervent supporters" of Nazi Germany, nor any evidence regarding the possible legitimacy of these claims. In line with her previous writings, Koski characterizes Kivimaa's involvement with National Socialism primarily as an enthusiasm for "German" culture blended with a fearful, patriotic anti-Communism. Yet, Kivimaa's "devotion to France" was hardly univocal; in the 1940s, Kivimaa's "devotion" embodied a racialized vision of *Kultur* inseparable from National Socialist ideology.

Spokesman of the *Europäische Schriftsteller-Vereinigung*, Kivimaa complied with the invitation of the Third Reich's Propaganda Ministry; in the later 1930s and early 1940s, he generated writings upholding and disseminating National Socialist ideals; in a period of intense antisemitism in the Third Reich (traditionally denied to have affected Finland's cultural life), Kivimaa inscribed the Jew as "enemy no. 1," as the nemesis of *Kultur*, in a travelogue evidently written to accommodate Finland to National Socialist cultural ideals. To schematize Kivimaa's complex activities as a writer, director, and administrator as "direct Nazi resistance" in the twenty-first century, when the silence surrounding Finland's compromised *separation* from the Third

Reich during the alliance has been questioned and its subsequent subordination to the Soviet Union has waned, is at best to refuse a critical perspective on Kivimaa's cultural work; at worst, it legitimates the silence surrounding Kivimaa's racist writing under the sign of academic authority.

In order to illustrate the conceptual shift in Kivimaa's writing, I bring two articles from the 1930s on the Finnish theatre to bear here, both written for the quarterly *Nordische Rundschau*, published by the Nordic Foreign Institute of the Ernst Moritz Arndt University of Greifswald; the first was published in the Weimar Republic period and the second under the Third Reich. Comparing these two articles reveals Kivimaa's earnest effort both to advance Finnish culture on the international European stage, and eventually to bring it into the orbit of the Third Reich's preferred rhetoric of race.

In his 1932 "Das finnische Theaterwesen" (German, The nature of Finnish theatre), Kivimaa purposely locates Finnish theatre in the European tradition. Upholding the notion of the *possible* German cultural influence on Finnish theatre, Kivimaa's main aim is to assert the distinctive identity, the national "nature," of Finnish theatre, and, tellingly, to elevate it, setting it on a level comparable to the German, French, or Russian stage. Kivimaa suggests that "The organism of any theatre grows and develops only against the background of a national indigenous [*bodenständig*] drama"; the Finnish love for the stage materializes "the aspiration of the Finnish nation for clarity, beauty, and freedom" and works to define the intrinsic elements of this theatre by grounding them in "the Finnish psyche." Kivimaa is occupied with defining the interplay between Finnish theatre and the Finnish psyche, concluding that acting, a Finnish "sense of style," naturally materializes the essential qualities of the national character: "Reliability," "emotional inwardness," "heroic courage."[50] Beyond these qualities, directly attributed to Finnish actors, if one abstracts the moral virtues—practicality, love for large undertakings, loyalty—ascribed to one of the founders of Finnish theatre, Emilia Bergbom, Kivimaa's article encompasses the apparent virtues characteristic of the Finnish people and their culture as a whole.

Although the impulse for Kivimaa's essay was to bring Finnish theatre out of Finland to a position equitably valued with other European theatres, the notion of an ethnic-cultural-national theatre is necessarily traced by an exclusive gesture. On the one hand, the deepest purpose of a national theatre must arise from a national drama, a drama that grows from its mythologized soil, captures the national psyche, and so performs an inherent sense of national identity to the nation from the national stage. On the other hand, marginalized nations cannot assume that the value of their national drama will be recognized abroad, in the centers of European culture: to claim standing as a viable artistic medium among the European cultures, Finnish theatre must become a mediator of the European culture as well, producing both the classic and the contemporary drama of Europe on its stages. Mediating European drama, then, both substantiates the Finnish theatre's claim to

a cultural equality with other European nations, and also validates the Finns as an artistically significant, not a "backwoods," people. Many national theatres emerging in the late nineteenth century felt the obligation to stage European classics—Shakespeare, the Greeks—to gain an international credibility and, not incidentally, to foreground the literary suitability and adaptability of the national language. At the same time, Kivimaa also documents another impulse, the need to situate the new national theatre as *au courant*, part of the contemporary, international discourse of modernist experiment. Here, tellingly, Kivimaa points to the powerful influence of Weimar Republic expressionism—Ernst Toller, Georg Kaiser, Walter Hasenclever—on the Finnish theatre, and to the interests of the Finnish National Theatre's director, Eino Kalima, in moving away from an outmoded realism in favor of staging contemporary French or Slavic drama.

These themes echo in Kivimaa's 1938, "Die finnische Bühne und die deutsche Dramatik" (German, The Finnish stage and the German drama), which reuses and reshuffles some material from the 1932 essay but to a new purpose: to reframe the Finnish theatre in terms of National Socialist cultural values, particularly assigning the Finnish a significant, yet subordinate, relation to the German theatre. The title insinuates a relation between the Finnish and the German theatre, linking the privileged *Kulturländer*, states where culture has been sustained by a common racial essence. In 1932 Kivimaa strove to place Finnish drama among its European peers; in 1938, he foregrounds the interrelations between German and Finnish theatre, suggesting that the Finnish people—due to their racial likeness to the Germans—are predisposed to make the German drama in Finland a success: "The soul affinity between the Germans and the Finns manifests itself, too, in the close relations between the stagecraft of both countries. A sign that the German drama is so well understood in Finland is that *the Finnish audience has always felt itself* in both the soul portrayals of the classics and in the psychological realism of the modern drama" (my emphasis).[51] Watching the German drama, then, what the Finnish audience *always feels* is its essential, racial, relation to the German people, a relation of the "Nordic" (Aryan) blood. German drama is predisposed to succeed in Finland because it necessarily portrays the Finnish people's *way of life* originating in their transcommunal racial essence.

The 1938 essay might be said to turn the themes of national distinctiveness in the 1932 essay toward the more urgently hierarchical race doctrines of National Socialism, a turn vividly captured in Kivimaa's explicit revision of his position on expressionism. While the 1932 article saw the expressionist innovations of Finnish theatre as part of a valuable, modernist engagement with European trends, by 1938 Kivimaa explicitly divorces himself and Finnish theatre from the degenerate aesthetics of this style: "We apparently appreciate the value of expressionism differently than we did before, and claim that most of those works which were seen to be at the peak fifteen years ago are now absolutely forgotten."[52] Kivimaa's "we" expresses

a self-evident ideologico-racial affiliation, one that becomes increasingly pronounced in his later writings. In 1943, Kivimaa significantly depicted the Jewish left-wing revolutionary Ernst Toller's plays and the left-wing avant-gardist Erwin Piscator's political work in the theatre as "subversive elements": "In the theatre, next to Toller's expressionism, the most visible phenomenon was Piscator's sensation-hungry constructivism. The healthy and strongly experimental radicalism became associated with unhealthy and unsympathetic decadence."[53] By 1943, Kivimaa has mastered the implicit undercurrents of the rhetoric of National Socialist cleansing policies, a rhetoric already emerging in his 1938 essay.

Expressionism, though, figures as more than a politicized artistic movement, both in the Third Reich and in Kivimaa's writings: it is a "critical" category used to represent both "un-German spirit" (race) and "un-German concepts," as a means to dispose political opposition. In this sense, insofar as expressionism was used to label "un-German" works of art, Kivimaa's *changing position* on expressionist theatre—which now *fails* to express the Finnish psyche—also aligns him with the discourse of National Socialist cultural politics. Though Kivimaa might well be the first Finnish literary modernist, responsible for bringing a range of modernist forms to Finland as Korsberg argues, by the late 1930s, his internationalism and modernism are clearly involved in the politicized and racialized aesthetic directives of National Socialism. This shift is significant: Kivimaa's "we" points to the construction of race beyond the construction of a people, shattering the linguistic and territorial limits of the Finnish nation. This affiliation—whatever his stand in the 1970s or 1980s—must draw a skeptical regard for the notion that Kivimaa's postwar internationalism and self-asserted humanism merely prolonged his earliest artistic commitments.

Furthermore, Kivimaa's discourse gains historical particularity from the context of its publication. In the 1938 *Nordische Rundschau*, Kivimaa's article was published alongside an essay by Finnish anthropologist and geographer Kaarlo Hildén, with the revealing title "Zur Frage der rassischen Zusammensetzung der Finnen" (German, On the question of the race composition of the Finns). Placed as the opening article in this number, Hildén's piece offered an appropriate framework for the racial understanding of the Finns and so provided the conceptual underpinnings for the articles that followed, including Kivimaa's, laying out the argument for integrating the Finns among the "Nordic" peoples. Hildén categorizes the Finns as belonging to the valuable, European, "East Baltic" race. To do so, however, he must forcefully assert that "*The East Baltic type has nothing in common with the Mongoloid race*."[54] Given the fact that many commentators had associated the "East Baltic" and the inferior "Mongoloid" peoples, Hildén's argument depends on a complex history of racial engineering. Although the ethnic Finns "belong" to the "East Baltic," and the Swedish inhabitants of Finland predominantly among the "Nordic" race, Hildén claims that the prehistoric

predecessors of the modern Finns had already mixed with the Germanic, "Nordic" peoples in their ancient homeland west of the Urals. The Urals function here as a geo-racial frontier: the "Mongoloid," "Asiatic" blood strains are confined to the east of the Urals. On the one hand, then, their ancient genesis among the "Nordic" peoples aligns the Finns with the racial categories preferred in the Third Reich. On the other hand, the intervening history cannot be discounted, and the Finns must be recognized as a branch of "Nordic" descent distinct from the Swedes. Hildén's account both justifies the Finns as an ancient "Nordic" race but also supports the Fennophilic and Fennoman assertion of a specific ethnic identity and its consequent claim on the Finnish homeland. Claiming that the Finnish people were the bearers and transmitters of a prehistoric "Nordic" bloodline into the Baltic territory, Hildén makes a doubly political argument. He aligns the Finns with the "Nordic" race, but counters the sense that the Finns have become "Nordicized" through generations of intermarriage with Finnish Swedes, as a way of preserving Finnish claims to a racialized national sovereignty.[55] Hildén's article provides the context in which later statements in the number—Kivimaa's "soul affinity between the Germans and the Finns"[56]—would resonate with their properly racialized content. Kivimaa's piece needed no further explanation of the racial constitution of the Finns, for Hildén gave "scientific" authority to framing the "East Baltic" Finns as a co-originating "Nordic" people, intrinsically valuable to the New Europe.

While Kivimaa's 1938 article animates the relationship between Finnish and German theatre in implicitly racial terms, his 1939 essay for the Art and Literature Supplement of *Karjala* (Finnish, Karelia), "Nuorisoteatterin ajatus" (Finnish, The idea of youth theatre) pursues another agenda associated with National Socialist policy, asking how theatre could be used to interpellate the youth from its first encounters with this artistic medium. Describing the collectivization of youth in Nazi Germany, where "youth education is directed against free individualism; from the new youth is made a youth group," Kivimaa saw theatre as one of the crucial means a totalitarian state uses to secure its continuity, an instrument for winning ideological influence over the upcoming generation. An important artistic benefit of this politicization of theatre, though, is also to preserve the theatre: indoctrinated *by* theatre, the youth would be in a sense indoctrinated *for* theatre. Attempting to bring Hitler's "struggle for the youth" to the Finnish stage, Kivimaa urgently rewrites the connection between the theatre and Finland's ideals of democracy in the de-individualizing values of educational policy of the New Europe.[57]

The Kivimaa effect

The story of racial aspiration and antisemitism during the Finnish–German alliance cannot be detached from the actions and interests of Finnish

individuals, nor of government institutions. One figure operating at the interface of the individual and the institutional, of the private and the public in this period, was Arvi Kivimaa, a figure who would continue to play a significant cultural role in postwar Finland. Developing the notion of a classicizing, apolitical humanism setting the universal cultural, ethico-moral and ethico-political values for Cold War Europe, Kivimaa's 1960s promotion of humanism had a complex ideological function in Finnish society and culture. On the one hand, it aligned with the conservative perception of the necessity to avow a new kind of *separation* between politics and culture, urging an apolitical art, a culture without politics consistent with the so-called Paasikivi–Kekkonen line, an agenda designed to maintain Finland's sovereignty in the face of a threatening Soviet Union largely by avoiding confrontation with its neighbor's political or ideological concerns. On the other hand, Kivimaa's humanism—including his call for the global humanism of the World Theatre Day—attempted to cleanse the term of its wartime function, especially in regard to the expansionist trope of New Europe, and its service in promoting the discourse of racial hierarchy, "humanist" connotations Kivimaa had been instrumental in advancing both in Finland and in the Third Reich. Kivimaa's postwar humanism is decisively vague, precisely because his previous humanism had been imbued with such explicit value in the wartime concept of race. When humanism resurfaces in Finland as a code word in cultural politics after World War II, it negotiates both between contemporary political structures, and between the past and the present, so that the assertion of political neutrality works to erase the legacy of the earlier uses in the 1940s.[58]

In the aftermath of the war, both the government's assertions of "co-belligerence" and the widespread acceptance of the "separate war" thesis enabled Finland seemingly to stand apart from the trauma of the Holocaust, despite having been materially sustained by and allied with the Third Reich. While the notion of "separation" has been subjected to recent critique in studies of postwar Finnish politics and history, *separation* has, in a range of ways, remained foundational to a visibly national/ist paradigm continuing to inform the cultural studies I have analyzed here. Kivimaa, with the help of compliant scholarship, succeeded in staging himself as the uncompromised voice of the global theatre of international harmony, one innately opposed to the politics of National Socialist *Kultur* and humanity he had propagated as the "spiritual force" of the New Europe. Re-establishing "the eternal order of things," Kivimaa—like his scholarly apologists—simply drops the New Europe of the early 1940s from the narrative of Finnish, European cultural history. Nonetheless, no values—moral, ethical, political, religious—from prewar Europe flow into Kivimaa's 1942 "European" future:

> What was Europe before this war? A pleasure-seeking and faithless continent, becoming ever weaker, scheming, exploited by abused freedom,

> fragmented by artificial border fortifications. Europe had many virtuosos in her cultural life, but only a few were great artists. Its thinkers were sickened by fashionable pessimism and did not see the cause of their illness. The great, simple, essential virtues could not have such significant impact in the life of the people, as should be required by the eternal order of things.[59]

In these lines, Kivimaa's internationalism rejects a weakened Europe of nation-states "fragmented by artificial border fortifications"; to transcend those boundaries calls for a transnational, racialized, European *Volksgemeinschaft*, a peoples' community, which his travelogue opposes to the "Asian masses."[60]

For Kivimaa, the "eternal order of things," *Kultur*, was not a process, but an entity in itself; the *Kultur* Kivimaa preached marked a racial "inequality within the 'European' space," which enabled "forms of imaginary transcendence of the gulf separating intellectuality from the masses, forms indissociable from that implicit fatalism which imprisons the masses in an allegedly natural infantilism."[61] Kivimaa's *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta* locates a *Kultur* animated by racial distinction, hierarchy, and exclusion, acts apparently necessary for social identification and moral orientation. Kivimaa's *Kultur* framed an innate antisemitism as native to the "eternal order" of Finnish identity, and as a rhetorical means of identifying his Finnish readers, and Finnish culture and politics, with the larger aims of the Third Reich and a shared New Europe, attitudes he echoed in his writings about Finnish theatre in the late 1930s and into the early 1940s. Kivimaa's self-avowed humanism participated in a longer-term trajectory that has been symptomatically, and systematically, ignored. As critics, historians, and theorists of modern culture, we cannot fairly—the moral inflection is intended here—represent the scope of Kivimaa's career or the nature of his postwar humanism merely by overlooking their potential complicity in the ideas, rhetoric, beliefs, and actions of the later 1930s and early 1940s. In the moment we discount this body of Kivimaa's writing, the uncritical epistemology of Finnish cultural studies participates in a systematic forgetting inscribed in the humanism that Kivimaa disseminated to Finland, and to the world, after World War II.

Notes

1. The first epigraph is from Arvi Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta: Runoilijamatka halki Saksan* [European brotherhood: A poet's tour through Germany] (Helsinki: Otava, 1942), 8; this line can be found in the subsequently translated German edition, Arvi Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise durch Deutschland: Reiseeindrücke eines finnischen Schriftstellers in Deutschland* [trans. Reimar von Bonin] (Berlin, Wien, Leipzig: Karl H. Bischoff, 1944), 9. The second epigraph is from Arvi Kivimaa's 1966 "Alkusanat Maailman teatteripäivän tervehdyksen esittäjälle" [Foreword to the World Theatre Day's greeting presenter], preserved in Teatterimuseon arkisto

[Theatre Museum's Archive], TeaMA 1404, personal archive of Arvi Kivimaa, box 6. Unless noted, translations to English from Finnish and German are my own.

2. "World Theatre Day—27 March," ITI World Theatre Day, accessed April 15, 2011, http://www.world-theatre-day.org/aboutwtd.html. Pirkko Koski mentions Kivimaa's service as vice president of ITI 1957–65, see "Arvi Kivimaa," in *Niin muuttuu mailma, Eskoni: Tulkintoja kansallisnäyttämöstä* [So the world is changing, my Esko: Interpretations of the national stage], ed. Pirkko Koski (Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1999), 229.
3. Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, 72; Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise*, 95. On Kivimaa's early modernist inclinations, internationalism, and Europeanism, see Hanna Korsberg, "Open the Windows on Europe! Arvi Kivimaa's Work and Literary Production in the 1920's and Early 30's," in *Comparative Approaches to Nordic and European Modernisms*, ed. Mats Jansson, Janna Kantola, Jakob Lothe, and H. K. Riikonen (Helsinki: Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press/Palmenia, 2008).
4. Arvi Kivimaa, "Finnische Betrachtung" [A Finnish perspective], *Europäische Literatur* 1, no. 2 (June 1942): 7. I have translated the Finnish "Aasian massaa" here as "Asian masses," but a more literal translation would be "the mass of Asia"; the German publication uses a more specifically racialized term, "asiatische Rasse," "Asiatic race." See Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, 69; Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise*, 90–1.
5. Arvi Kivimaa, *Teatterin humanismi: Avajaispuheita 1950–1971* (Helsinki: Otava, 1972). On Kivimaa's reconceptualization of "humanism" in the framework of his production of Sophocles' *Antigone*, see Hana Worthen, "'Humanism,' Scenography, Ideology: *Antigone* at the Finnish National Theatre, 1968," in Antigone *on the Contemporary World Stage*, ed. Erin B. Mee and Helene P. Foley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 407–14.
6. For Kivimaa's signature, see the founding document published on a CD accompanying Frank-Rutger Hausmann's *"Dichte, Dichter, tage nicht!": Die Europäische Schriftsteller-Vereinigung in Weimar 1941–1948* ["Write, poet, don't meet!": European Writers Association in Weimar 1941–1948] (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004). In his detailed examination of the ESV, Hausmann takes Kivimaa on the one hand for an active collaborator with National Socialist cultural politics, someone who was "heart and hand by the thing," strengthening "the ESV through building a Finnish national group," and on the other hand, as someone who was seduced by the long tradition of German orientation among the Finnish intelligentsia, who was unable to see through National Socialist cultural politics. As I show here, though, Kivimaa skillfully used National Socialist discourses and rhetorical performatives to inscribe the Finnish people into the orbit of the "Nordic" (Aryan) race, aiming to mobilize them to accept rather than to reject National Socialist policies, including the discrimination of Jews.
7. Wilhelm Ruoff, "Die Stunde des europäischen Geistes: Zusammenschluß deutscher und ausländischer Dichter in Weimar" [The hour of the European spirit: Merger of German and foreign poets in Weimar], *Das Neue Europa* 1, no. 2 (November 1, 1941): 4. Ruoff distances the arising ESV from the "sunken" PEN Club. Tellingly, according to Koski, Kivimaa was the spokesman of the Finnish PEN Club himself in 1936–37 and again in 1953–55; see Pirkko Koski, "Kivimaa, Arvi (1904–1984)," in *Kansallisbiografia-verkkojulkaisu* [*The National Biography of Finland*, Web version], Studia Biographica 4 (Helsinki: SKS, 1997–2011), accessed July 14, 2012, http://www.kansallisbiografia.fi/kb/artikkeli/1134/.
8. Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto [The Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs], Berlin Embassy reports, report number 22, T. M. Kivimäki July 8, 1940. Before and

during his years as the Professor in the Department of Civil Law at the University of Helsinki (1931–56), Kivimäki (1886–1968) served as the Minister of the Interior (1928–29), Minister of Justice (1931–32), Prime Minister (1932–36), and as Finland's Ambassador to Berlin (1940–44); on Kivimäki's ideas of intellectual and cultural relations with the Third Reich, and cultural exchange more generally, see Hana Worthen, *Playing "Nordic":* The Women of Niskavuori*, Agri/Culture, and Imagining Finland on the Third Reich Stage* (Helsinki: Helsinki University Print, 2007), 100–16; on Finnish propaganda in Germany, see Pekka Lähteenkorva, "Saksa" [Germany], in *Ikuisen poudan maa: Virallinen Suomi-kuva 1918–1945* [Land of eternal clear blue skies: The official image of Finland 1918–1945], by Pekka Lähteenkorva and Jussi Pekkarinen (Helsinki: WSOY, 2004), 298–303; on Nazi cultural propaganda in Finland, see Britta Hiedanniemi, *Kulttuuriin verhottua politiikkaa: Kansallissosialistisen Saksan kulttuuripropaganda Suomessa 1933–1940* [Politics disguised in culture: Cultural propaganda of National Socialist Germany in Finland 1933–1940] (Helsinki: Otava, 1980).

9. This letter, containing Kivimaa's administrative vision to the General Secretary of the ESV Carl Rothe, written July 30, 1942, is reprinted in Hausmann, "*Dichte, Dichter, tage nicht!*," 294–95n315.
10. In the fall of 1942, protesting the nomination of Tigerstedt to the spokesman of the Finnish Swedish-language group, and denouncing him for leaving Finland for Sweden during the Winter War, the Finnish-language members (Maila Talvio, V.A. Koskenniemi, and indeed Kivimaa) generated documents which witness the regulatory cultural policies at work in the transnational sphere between the Third Reich and Finland. As the controversy was settled, and Tigerstedt appointed, it was agreed—as was the recommendation of the German Embassy in Helsinki—between Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry and *Auswärtiges Amt* (German, Foreign Office) that at the ESV meeting in 1942, Tigerstedt would be kept in the background, without a function in the executive board or any other post inside the ESV, in contrast to the celebrated senior Finnish writers, Talvio and Koskenniemi. This agreement was also monitored and finally evaluated as well-executed; see Auswärtiges Amt-Politisches Archiv [Federal Foreign Office-The Political Archive], R 60693, Randstaaten 1940–43 (Border States 1940–43).
11. In his review of the 1944 German-language edition, Lawrence S. Thompson notes "Kivimaa made some observations on his trip, but more significant is his compilation of evidence for a literary Nuremberg." Lawrence S. Thompson, review of *Europäische Dichterreise durch Deutschland: Reiseeindrücke eines finnischen Schriftstellers in Deutschland*, by Arvi Kivimaa, *Books Abroad* 21, no. 2 (Spring 1947): 229. In the fall of 1942, 65 to 95 percent of the Finnish population believed in the Axis victory, by February 1943 it was 19 to 50 percent, and by September–October 1943 the percentage ranged from 4 to 38 percent; Martti Favorin and Jouko Heinonen, eds., *Kotirintama 1941–1944* [Home front 1941–1944] (Helsinki: Tammi, 1972), 207, quoted in Heikki Luostarinen, *Perivihollinen: Suomen oikeistolehdistön Neuvostoliittoa koskeva vihalliskuva sodassa 1941–44; Tausta ja sisältö* [Archenemy: The right-wing press image of the Soviet Union as an enemy in the war 1941–44; Backround and content] (Tampere: Vastapaino, 1986), 202n34. The Finnish–Soviet armistice was declared in September 1944.
12. Ralph Tuchtenhagen, "Die Vermarktung des nördlichen Waffenbruders: Finnland in der deutschsprachigen Publizistik 1939–1945" [Marketing the northern brother-in-arms: Finland in German language publications 1939–1945], in *Finnland und Deutschland: Forschungen zur Geschichte der beiden Länder und ihrer Beziehungen*

[Finland and Germany: Research into the history of both countries and their relations]. Protokollband des dritten deutsch–finnischen Historikerseminars auf Schloß Spyker (Rügen) vom 15. bis 19. September 1993 [Proceedings of the third German–Finnish historians' seminar at the Spyker (Rügen) castle September 15–19, 1993], ed. Manfred Menger and Dörte Putensen (Hamburg: Dr. Kovač, 1996), 289.

13. Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, [7], 87; Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise*, 7, 114. The following writers undertook the trip: Svend Fleuron and Ejnar Howalt, Denmark; Fani Popova-Mutafova, Bulgaria; Kåre Bjørgen, Norway; Einar Malm, Sweden; Rintsje Piter Sybesma (Sijbesma), Holland; Ferdinand Vercnocke, Belgium; Alfredo Acito, Italy; Luis Felipe Vivanco and Ernesto Giménez Caballero, Spain; Antun Bonifačić, Croatia; Jacques Chardonne, Ramón Fernández, and Marcel Jouhandeau, France; Arvi Kivimaa, Finland. Among the German accompanying writers were Hans Baumann, Karl H. Bischoff (Veit Bürkle), August Hinrichs, Moritz Jahn, Friedrich Schnack. Nine German officers also escorted the group, among them Paul Hövel from the Propaganda Ministry. For more information on the participants see Hausmann, *Dichte, Dichter, tage nicht!*, 110–16; for a detailed program of their trip, see 117–32. To consult Kivimaa's material from the trip, see "Dichterfahrt durch deutsches Land: Ohjelmia" [A poet's tour through Germany: Programs] preserved in the Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seuran kirjallisuusarkisto [The Literary Archives of the Finnish Literature Society], Arvi Kivimaa archive, box 12.
14. Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, 9–19; Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise*, 11–27.
15. Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, 58; Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise*, 77.
16. See Worthen, *Playing "Nordic,"* 57–78.
17. Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, 92. In German translation, the phrase is translated as "Sei gegrüßt, du einziges Vaterland" (I salute you, my only fatherland); Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise*, 121.
18. Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, 58–9; Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise*, 77–9.
19. In Finnish, this sentence reads (I emphasize the word *particularly*): "Tämä toimiva ihminen on germaani, hallitsevan rodun jäsen, joka ehdottoman jyrkästi on irroittanut *ennen kaikkea* juutalaiset Saksan valtioruumiista"; Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, 58. In German, "Dieser schaffende Mensch ist der Germane, das Glied der herrschenden Rasse, die mit bedingungsloser Schroffheit *vor allem* den Juden aus dem deutschen Volkskörper ausgemerzt hat"; Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise*, 77.
20. Hannu Rautkallio, *Finland and the Holocaust: The Rescue of Finland's Jews*, trans. Paul Sjöblom (New York: Holocaust Library, 1987), 41.
21. Eric Michaud, *The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 76; Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf: A Reckoning*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 290. To consult the Finnish translation, see Adolf Hitler, *Taisteluni: Tilinteko*, trans. Lauri Hirvensalo (Porvoo: WSOY, 1942), 336. *Mein Kampf* circulated widely in Finland; the first part, *Taisteluni*: *Tilinteko* [My struggle: A reckoning] was published on March 2, 1941 by WSOY and in 10 days 8,200 copies were sold. The second part, *Taisteluni*: *Kansallissosialistinen liike* [My struggle: The National Socialist movement] was published two weeks later. In all, 59,150 copies including all or part of *Mein Kampf* were published in Finland; see Kai Häggman, *Avarammille aloille, väljemmille vesille: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö 1940–2003* [To broader horizons, wider waters: Werner Söderström Publishing Company 1940–2003] (Helsinki: WSOY, 2003), 31–3.

22. Arvi Kivimaa, *Valon ja pimeyden manner: Eräiden vaellusten tilinpäätös* [The continent of light and darkness: An account of certain journeys] (Helsinki: Otava, 1943), 19.
23. For an early example of the rhetoric of *Kultur*, civilization, and race rhetoric, which influenced Goebbels's conceptualization and eventual organization of the now famous traveling exhibition, "Degenerate Art," see Wolfgang Willrich, *Säuberung des Kunsttempels: Eine kunstpolitische Kampfschrift zur Gesundung deutscher Kunst im Geiste nordischer Art* [Cleansing of the temple of art: An art-political pamphlet for the recovery of the German art in the spirit of the Nordic kind] (München: J. F. Lehmann, 1937).
24. Kivimaa, *Valon ja pimeyden manner*, 19–20, 16.
25. Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, 38; Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise,* 52.
26. On the "parasitic," "without any true culture," Jew, see Hitler, *Mein Kampf: A Reckoning*, 304–5; for the Finnish translation, see Hitler, *Taisteluni: Tilinteko*, 352–4. For the "Bolshevik" stereotype in Finnish propaganda, see Jalmari Jaakkola, *Suomen idänkysymys* [Finland's East question] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1941), 64–76. Jaakkola's work was translated into German as *Die Ostfrage Finnlands* (Berlin: Alfred Metzner, 1942), 71–82; the German-language publication was printed in Porvoo, Finland, by WSOY, as was its Finnish counterpart.
27. Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, 8; Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise,* 9.
28. The transformation from a "democratic" to "blood" Jew is explicitly explained and stated in Hitler's *Mein Kampf: A Reckoning,* 326–7:

> In gaining political power the Jew casts off the few cloaks that he still wears. The democratic people's Jew becomes the blood-Jew and tyrant over peoples. In a few years he tries to exterminate the national intelligentsia and by robbing the peoples of their natural intellectual leadership makes them ripe for the slave's lot of permanent subjugation.
>
> The most frightful example of this kind is offered by Russia, where he killed or starved about thirty million people with positively fanatical savagery, in part amid inhuman tortures, in order to give a gang of Jewish journalists and stock exchange bandits domination over a great people.
>
> The end is not only the end of the freedom of the peoples oppressed by the Jew, but also the end of this parasite upon the nations. After the death of his victim, the vampire sooner or later dies too.

For the Finnish translation, see Hitler, *Taisteluni: Tilinteko*, 380–1. See also Andreas Hillgruber, "Die ideologisch-dogmatische Grundlage der nationalsozialistischen Politik der Ausrottung der Juden in den besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion und ihre Durchführung 1941–1944" [The ideological-dogmatic foundation of the National Socialist politics of extermination of the Jews in the occupied territory of the Soviet Union and its implementation 1941–1944], *German Studies Review* 2, no. 3 (October 1979): 265–6.

29. Väinö Auer, Eino Jutikkala, and Kustaa Vilkuna, *Finnlands Lebensraum: Das geographische und geschichtliche Finnland* [Finland's Living Space: Geographical and historical Finland] (Berlin: Alfred Metzner, 1941). The publication was printed in Helsinki by the *Finnische Literaturgesellschaft* (German, Finnish Literature Society). All the authors held academic positions at the University of Helsinki and the publication used their academic reputation to enforce its authority: Väinö Auer was Professor of Geography, Eino Jutikkala was Docent in Finnish

History, and Docent Kustaa Vilkuna was a "specialist in philological and ethnographical questions."

30. Jaakkola, *Suomen idänkysymys*, 64–76; Jaakkola, *Die Ostfrage Finnlands*, 71–82; see also Worthen, *Playing "Nordic,"* 100–16.
31. I am grateful for the development of this idea to Andreas Strippel, *NS-Volkstumspolitik und die Neuordnung Europas: Rassenpolitische Selektion der Einwandererzentralstelle des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1939–1945* [National Socialist racial politics and the reorganization of Europe: Race-political selections of the Immigration Center of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service 1939–1945] (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2011), 56.
32. The last sentence reads in Finnish, "Ennemmin tai myöhemmin se hajoaa salaiseen tai näkyvään sisäiseen heikkouteensa"; in German it reads, "Früher oder später verfällt er in den Zustand sichtbarer oder verborgener innerer Schwäche"; Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, 45–6; Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise*, 62.
33. Reetta Nieminen, *Arvi Kivimaa: Kirjailija ja teatterimies* (Turku: Turun Yliopisto, 1978); Pirkko Koski, *Kansan teatteri 2: Helsingin Kansanteatteri* [People's theatre 2: Helsinki Folk Theatre] (Helsinki: Helsingin teatterisäätiö, 1987), 149–276; Korsberg, "Open the Windows on Europe!," 59–78.
34. Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg, and Johan Östling, "Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: An Introduction," in *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited*, ed. Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg, and Johan Östling (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011), 14. Ulrich Beck's remarks are taken from "The Cosmopolitan State: Redefining Power in the Global Age," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 18, no. 3/4 (Spring–Summer 2005): 146.
35. Reetta Nieminen, "Summary," in *Arvi Kivimaa: Kirjailija ja teatterimies,* 191.
36. Nieminen, "Summary," 189–90. Although Nieminen seems unaware of this dimension of Kivimaa's work, anti-Jewish sentiment and the understanding that Jews stand outside the category of the nation can be already seen in Kivimaa's early political novel, *Epäjumala* [The idol] (Helsinki: Otava, 1930).
37. "Arvi Kivimaa: Suomen eurooppalainen" [Arvi Kivimaa: Finland's European], *Aseveli*, June 29, 1944, 9. *Aseveli* was a paper for soldiers on the front lines; the clipping is preserved in Teatterimuseon arkisto [Theatre Museum's Archive], TeaMA 1404, personal archive of Arvi Kivimaa, box 14.
38. Oula Silvennoinen, "Still Under Examination: Coming to Terms with Finland's Alliance with Nazi Germany," *Yad Vashem Studies* 37, no. 2 (2009): 78. On "contractual ethos," see Yael Tamir, "Pro Patria Mori! Death and the State," in *The Morality of Nationalism*, ed. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 229.
39. Stenius, Österberg, and Östling, "Nordic Narratives of the Second World War," 13, 15. Silvennoinen discusses historians' treatments of Finland's alliance with Nazi Germany in terms of the influence of the Soviet Union in the Cold War; see "Still Under Examination," 77–80.
40. Koski, *Kansan teatteri 2*, 156.
41. Koski, *Kansan teatteri 2*, 156.
42. Kivimaa quoted in Koski, *Kansan teatteri 2*, 178–9.
43. Koski, *Kansan teatteri 2*, 156, 179.
44. Koski, *Kansan teatteri 2*, 196.
45. Korsberg, "Open the Windows on Europe!," 68, 59.
46. Korsberg, "Open the Windows on Europe!," 72.

47. Korsberg, "Open the Windows on Europe!," 73.
48. "Ranskan olemus ja tie," in Kivimaa, *Valon ja pimeyden manner*, 13, 14, 16–17, 22.
49. Koski, "Kivimaa, Arvi (1904–1984)."
50. Arvi Kivimaa, "Das finnische Theaterwesen," *Nordische Rundschau* 5, no. 4 (1932): 156, 155, 158.
51. Arvi Kivimaa, "Die finnische Bühne und die deutsche Dramatik," *Nordische Rundschau* 9, no. 3 (1938): 116.
52. Kivimaa, "Die finnische Bühne und die deutsche Dramatik," 118.
53. Kivimaa, *Valon ja pimeyden manner*, 14. Although Kivimaa writes that these revolutionaries abused the Weimar Republic's "democratic freedom," what he means by "democratic freedom" is rather obscure. In his travelogue, he describes the Third Reich both as "the genuine democracy," and as "Hitler's dictatorship." In my reading, this seeming "confusion" implies a pragmatic duplicity, an effort to represent Hitler to the Finnish reader as an appealingly authoritarian element in an apparently democratic structure; see Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, 53, 56; Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise*, 72, 76.
54. Kaarlo Hildén, "Zur Frage der rassischen Zusammensetzung der Finnen," *Nordische Rundschau* 9, no. 3 (1938): 99.
55. Pseudo-anthropological writings such as those of Hans F. K. Günther followed a consensus to the effect that the Germanic people, like the Finns, were not composed as a pure race, but as a mixture of races. In this sense, Hildén's view of the Finns presents them not as an anomaly but as assimilable to the European, German, situation. On the problematic racialization of the Finns, see Hana Worthen, "Finnish 'Blood' in the Anthropology of Race," in *Playing "Nordic,"* 78–86.
56. Kivimaa, "Die finnische Bühne und die deutsche Dramatik," 116.
57. Arvi Kivimaa, "Nuorisoteatterin ajatus," *"Karjalan" Taide- ja Kirjallisuusliite*, February 1939, [1]–3.
58. See Worthen, "'Humanism,' Scenography, Ideology," 407–14.
59. Kivimaa, "Finnische Betrachtung," 7.
60. Kivimaa, *Eurooppalainen veljeskunta*, 69; Kivimaa, *Europäische Dichterreise*, 91.
61. Étienne Balibar, "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?," trans. Chris Turner, in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, by Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991), 25, 20.

6

Discrimination against Jewish Athletes in Finland: An Unwritten Chapter

Malte Gasche and Simo Muir

Even before National Socialism cast its shadow on the field of sports, Finnish-Jewish athletes had faced prejudice and discrimination in Finland. In the 1920s there were cases in which Jews were not accepted into non-Jewish sports clubs, owing to the athlete's ethnic origin. Most of this discrimination took place behind the scenes and was not brought to public attention. There were also discussions of whether Jews could represent Finland in international sporting competitions; for example, the successful bandy players Josef Leffkowitch and Josef Kaplan had difficulty in qualifying for the national team in 1927.[1]

In the late 1930s two antisemitic incidents in the Finnish sports world aroused a great deal of public discussion, forcing contemporaries to reflect on the effects of racial policy in Finland. The first incident, well-known in Finnish sports circles, concerns the manipulated results of the first athletic competitions held in Helsinki's Olympic Stadium in June 1938: Abraham Tokazier (1909–76), the Jewish 100-meter sprinter, crossed the line first, but was officially placed fourth. The second incident, a nearly forgotten episode, was the dismissal of the Jewish world-class tennis player Salomon Kotschack (1915–88) along with five other Jewish athletes from *Westend Tennis Stadion Klubb* (Swedish, Westend Tennis Stadium Club) in May of 1939. In the most far-reaching scenarios some contemporaries feared that elite Jewish athletes would be excluded from competing in Finnish sporting events altogether prior to the upcoming 1940 Olympic Games in Helsinki. Yet, despite the wide media coverage and discussion of the events at the time, the position of Jewish athletes and the discrimination against them has largely been ignored by Finnish scholars. Scandals provide historians with insight into interpretive struggles about what appears to be socially acceptable and what does not. Addressed through the behavior of those who have violated common moral standards, a scandal is subsequently tempered by the media and followed by public outrage and social, political, or moral condemnation.[2] Here, we examine the discussion of these two scandals while addressing the silence and uneasiness surrounding these two incidents in postwar Finnish history culture.

The discrimination against the Jewish athletes took place two years after the Olympic Games were held in Berlin and three years after the decree of the *Arierparagraph*, establishing racial criteria for banishing Jews from governmental and administrative bodies in the Third Reich, and just prior to the scheduled 1940 Helsinki Olympics. In terms of German sports federations, several had already removed Jewish athletes from their membership lists by the spring of 1933. Germany observed with interest the preparations for the Games in Finland. For Finns, the Olympic Games (ultimately cancelled, owing to the outbreak of war) offered a chance not only to elevate their visibility as a nation, but also to demonstrate that they belonged among the athletic, most civilized, western races. The idea that Finns were related to the Mongols had been widely circulated in Germany, Sweden, and the Anglo-Saxon world, but in Finland this idea of "Asiatic" (sometimes "Mongoloid") origin was strongly rejected.[3] Similarly, a political line between the Soviet Union and Finland was drawn, and Professor of philosophy Eino Kaila drew a racial line as well, distinguishing Finns from Russians: "the Finns . . . are racially in most cases part of the blond, tall, physically strong and athletic-minded people of the European North [*Stamm des europäischen Nordens*], that absolutely belongs to the West, not to the Eastern Europe."[4] In this respect, the superior attainments of Finnish athletes served as evidence of the "westernness" of the Finns.[5] In such an atmosphere, the Olympic year 1940 was of particular importance for Finland, offering numerous opportunities to showcase the achievements of the young nation, opportunities potentially undermined, in racial terms, by the successful performance of Jewish athletes. The episodes in the Olympic Stadium and the Westend Tennis Stadium Club examined in this chapter show that toward the end of the 1930s, anti-Jewish discrimination in Finland had visible manifestations, significantly leading—in the case of the Westend Tennis Stadium Club—to the collective exclusion of Jewish athletes.

"Judicial murder" at the Helsinki Olympic Stadium in 1938

Although the Jewish community in Finland during the interim between the world wars was very small, approximately 2000 in number, Jewish athletes were visible fixtures in Finnish sports. Abraham Tokazier, who began his athletic career as a football player and weightlifter in the Jewish sports club Maccabi in Helsinki, reached a high position among elite Finnish sprinters in the late 1930s. Tokazier, who continued to run under Maccabi's banner, won a silver medal in the 100-meter sprint in the national Kaleva Contest in 1938 and represented Finland twice on national teams, against Sweden and Hungary.[6] Tokazier's ultimate goal might well have been the next Olympic Games, planned for the same stadium two years later. Had he competed in 1940, he would have followed in the footsteps of Maccabi runner Elias Katz, who had won both silver and gold medals in steeplechase at the Paris Olympic Games in 1924.[7]

According to Boris Grünstein, a respected member of the Finnish-Jewish community, the sports club Maccabi, founded in 1906, played a major role in raising "interest in physical education among the Jews of our country."[8] At the Second Zionist Congress, held in Basel in 1898, Max Nordau had coined the catchphrase *Muskeljudentum*.[9] In its spirit the Zionist Maccabi associations strongly supported the idea of physical regeneration through body training. Influenced by Friedrich Ludwig Jahn and the German *Turner* (gymnastics) movement, the activities of the Jewish sports clubs in Europe sought to develop a social, religious, and ethnic climate to counteract the stereotype of the "feeble Jew." As was the case with Hungarian Jews, who adopted "the host society's goals and cultural imperatives willingly, absorbing and soaking up national attitudes, temperament and mentalities,"[10] so, too, Finnish-Jewish athletes appeared to emphasize their Jewish identity, while trying to demonstrate their willingness to integrate and show their loyalty as state citizens. Success in the field of sports was a strategy of the Finnish Jews to become fully accepted as members of Finnish society.

As an ethnic sports association, Maccabi should be understood in both athletic and socio-cultural terms. At the time, Finnish sports were separated into a bourgeois faction organized by *Suomen Voimistelu ja Urheiluliitto* (Finnish, Finnish Gymnastics and Sports Association, SVUL), and workers' associations coordinated by *Työväen Urheiluliito* (Finnish, The Sports Federation of the Workers' United, TUL).[11] While the SVUL saw athletic activities as a means of strengthening Finnish defense readiness, the TUL understood the field of sports as yet another arena for working-class social struggle. Maccabi oriented toward the bourgeois camp, a development which was in accordance with other phenomena taking place in the Jewish community. In the increasingly nationalistic climate of the 1930s, Finnish Jews underwent a hasty Finnification process and, by and large, associated with the Finnish-speaking political right and center, the so-called "White Finns." In 1931 the members of the centrist Zionist Youth Association *Hatchijo* (Hebrew, Renaissance), who hoped to become more fully integrated into Finnish society by using the Finnish language, demanded that the language of instruction of the Jewish school in Helsinki be changed from Swedish to Finnish, which was gradually implemented between 1933 and 1941.[12] Besides, several young members of the Zionistic youth associations joined the rightist voluntary militia *Suojeluskunta* (Finnish, White Guards). Participation in the White Guards suited both the patriotic ideals and the Zionist needs as well. The 1932 change of Maccabi's original Swedish name, *Stjärnan* (The Star), to Hebrew *Maccabi* (Maccabee), the name of the international Jewish sports association, could be seen as a sign of this linguistic and political development in the Finnish Jewish community.[13] In Jewish sports circles those clubs with the word "star" in their name generally sympathized with the ideas of the Socialists and the Communists, whereas Maccabi represented the Zionist right wing.[14]

However, not all Jewish athletes were associated with Maccabi. Some also belonged to the ranks of the workers' associations. In an interview given in 2001 the Finnish-Jewish boxer Moses Jankeloff stated that he felt more comfortable in the TUL, especially in the company of Social Democrats. The Social Democrats had an understanding of Jews to whom they were well disposed, according to Jankeloff, while in Maccabi he had never felt really at home.[15]

The "judicial murder" of Abraham Tokazier, as the case was later called, took place during the first track meet in the newly inaugurated Olympic Stadium in Helsinki on June 21, 1938, a contest arranged by *Helsingin Kisa-Veikot* (Finnish, Helsinki Game Boys, HKV) and *Helsingin Poliisi-Voimailijat* (Finnish, Helsinki Police Gymnasts, HPV).[16] The race was neck and neck until Abraham Tokazier, wearing the Maccabi jersey, breasted the tape. Though declared the winner by the competition announcer, Sulo Kolkka, Tokazier was, however, deprived of a medal and historical recognition. Shortly after the initial declaration, a second announcement was made. According to the judges' conclusion, Aarre Savolainen had finished first, Toivo Häkkinen second, and Toivo Avellan third; since there was a three-way tie (all finishing in 11.0 seconds), Tokazier was dropped entirely from the winning triumvirate.

Remarking on the surprising decision in the 100-meter sprint, the independent newspapers *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Hufvudstadsbladet,* the Social Democrat *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*, and the official newspaper of the right-wing National Coalition Party *Uusi Suomi* gave the games extensive coverage. On the day following the race, three of the newspapers published photographs of the finish, clearly showing the injustice that had taken place. According to the *Helsingin Sanomat*,

> There were no mishaps other than determining the order of the men's 100-meter final contest, yet this mishap was a very serious one. The winner of the contest was placed fourth and the third man received the first prize. One reason for the judges' flawed observation was the inaccurate placement of the stand for the finish-line judges. The stand should be at least 5 to 6 meters away from the nearest running lane, not right next to it, as was the case. As a result, the man running nearest to the judges suffered, slipping past without their noticing him.[17]

Along with this account, the *Helsingin Sanomat* published a photograph. Here Tokazier's left hand, chest, and right leg protrude first over the finish line. The caption reads: "PHOTO THAT TESTIFIES TO THE MISTAKE made by the finish-line judges on the 100 meter. Tokazier (the nearest) wins; beside him Häkkinen, Savolainen on the inner track is third, Avellan is clearly fourth, and Ahjopalo fifth."

Hufvudstadsbladet reported the episode under the sub-headline "Winner Placed Fourth!"[18] The newspaper printed two photos, one showing the

Figure 6.1 Photo by Akseli Neittamo of the 100-meter sprint at the Helsinki Olympic Stadium on June 21, 1938. Abraham Tokazier, in the foreground, wearing the jersey of Jewish sports club Maccabi obviously wins but was placed fourth by the judges. The photo appeared in the *Helsingin Sanomat* the following day. (Courtesy of the Finnish Jewish Archives, National Archives of Finland, Helsinki)

judges and one the finish line from the front. The latter witnesses that Tokazier came in first, his chest straining at the tape. The text beneath the image also drew attention to Tokazier's right foot, which in the photo is on the ground across the line whereas Savolainen still has his foot in the air. The article questioned whether the faulty decision was due to the wrongly positioned stand; it appears the placement of the judges' stand was discussed at the stadium, and the poor sight-line could be understood as an

excuse given by the finish-line judges to shift attention away from other, more incriminating reasons for the decision. In fact, the photos of the finish line show that there were finish-line judges on both sides of the track, not only on the side of the stand and Tokazier's lane, as the newspaper reports erroneously claimed.

Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti carried no image. Although its reporter did not give much analytical attention to the 100-meter sprint, he sharply observed: "In the 100-meter sprint Savolainen was deemed the winner, though in the opinion of this reporter the contest was clearly won by Tokazier, who was placed fourth. What will the photo show?"[19] Considering the newspaper reception, no photo was consulted when selecting the winner; the winners were declared very soon after the race.[20] The photos appearing in the newspapers the next day had been taken by press photographers.

Uusi Suomi published a third image of the finish, similar to the one that had appeared in *Hufvudstadsbladet*. Apparently, this photograph was also taken from more or less the same place in the track directly facing the oncoming runners, only slightly earlier. Tokazier's right foot had not yet crossed the line. The text under the image simply gives the names of the runners, from left to right. In the article, the reporter wrote: "It was somewhat surprising that Savolainen, who has rested the last summer, was announced the winner, but it appears that the finish-line judges made a serious mistake in determining the winner. In any case it was completely wrong that Tokazier was judged in fourth place."[21] German sports historian Giselher Spitzer has claimed that the right-wing *Uusi Suomi* "intended to cover up the deceit" by showing an unofficial photo of the finish, in which "the runners were coming into the finish from a completely different angle which would be quite unhelpful to line judges."[22] Yet considering that none of the photos were official photos of the finish—meant to be used by the judges—and the reporter's just comments in *Uusi Suomi,* Spitzer's claim does not appear to hold up. None of these newspapers—ranging across the spectrum from left to right—continued discussion of the incident, nor were any letters to the editor published on the subject.

Tokazier's own club, Maccabi, tried to persuade the organizers to amend the results without much success. The chairman of Maccabi, Mikael Kagan, took up the matter with the legendary long-distance runner Hannes Kolehmainen from the HKV, but Kolehmainen considered the whole matter trivial.[23] When the competition organizers declined to amend the results, Maccabi turned to *Suomen Urheiluliitto* (Finnish, Finnish Sports Federation) and on June 26, 1938, petitioned for "the mistake to be acknowledged and Tokazier recognized as the official winner."[24] No response to this letter was forthcoming. Owing to the lack of archival documents, it is unknown how the matter was deliberated in the Federation. It should be noted, though, that in his capacity as Minister of the Interior, the Chairman of the Federation Urho Kekkonen was simultaneously involved in developing

a strict policy against Jewish refugees from Austria, which led eventually, on August 19, 1938, to refusal of new refugees.[25] Despite Kekkonen's publicly critical statements about National Socialism, references to Jews in his letters from Berlin in the early 1930s document antisemitic attitudes.[26] After World War II, according to Maccabi's 90th anniversary review, Tokazier was to be offered an apology, but he apparently refused to forgive the injustice, declining to accept the medal as well.[27]

It has been debated whether Tokazier's case was the result of antisemitism or of the above-mentioned mistake in the placement of the judges' stand. Spitzer is strongly of the opinion that the only reason could be Tokazier's Jewish origin; the symbolic value of the 100-meter sprint in the games was immense, and a Jew could not be allowed to win because there were high-ranking German guests in the audience. While Spitzer does not provide any source with which to verify the presence or the identity of the German guests, it is true that at the opening ceremonies at the Olympic Stadium, on June 15 and 16, 1938, there were international guests, and thousands of gymnasts from various countries—Nazi Germany included—took part in parades of flags and impressive gymnastic shows; tellingly, the Finnish paramilitary organization *Suojeluskunta* was represented by their gymnasts as was the women's paramilitary organization, *Lotta Svärd*.[28] Whether high-ranking German guests were present at the first track meet a few days later remains unknown. Nonetheless, we do know that the Germans took great interest in the Finnish preparations for the Olympic Games in 1940. According to the historian Janne Mykrä, who has studied the activity of Finland's *Sanomalehti- ja Propagandatoimisto* (Finnish, Newspaper and Propaganda Office) in charge of the public relations activities for the Olympic Games, the Germans constituted the largest group of foreign reporters on the mailing list of publicity materials. Moreover, of the 18,943 press photos distributed to various countries around the world between 1938 and 1940, 3,417 were sent to Germany. Obviously, an image of a Jew winning the 100-meter sprint in the first games to be held in Finland's Olympic Stadium was hardly something that the Third Reich officials would have wanted to see nor, conversely, was it something that Finland's Newspaper and Propaganda Office was eager to distribute. According to Mykrä, the propaganda put out by the Office strove to portray the Finns as a "sportive, upright, and united nation," in other words imaging the "westernness" of Finnish athletes.[29] In a similar vein, the poster of the Helsinki 1940 Olympic Games bore an image of sculptor Wäinö Aaltonen's statue of Paavo Nurmi, the legendary Finnish runner and Olympic medalist. Aaltonen's statue had also been placed before the entrance of the 1935 traveling *Erste Nationale Finnische Kunstausstellung* (German, First national Finnish art exhibition) in Germany, where it implicitly confirmed the purposes of the exhibition, to express the "image of the spiritual type of a to-the-German-essence-related *Volk*."[30] The leading Finnish art critic, Onni Okkonen, saw Aaltonen's sculpture as embodying the best characteristics of

"the Finnish race"; imaged on the poster, the sculpture functioned as a frame for the representation and reception of the Finnish nation.[31]

In the Scandinavian context, despite the usual prestige of the 100-meter race, the 5,000-meter race attracted the most attention because the Swedish runner beat the Finnish athlete in record time.[32] It seems that in the Swedish newspapers the scandal was totally overshadowed by the 5,000-meter race and the discussion in the Finnish press about the line-judges' "mistake" was disregarded. The reporter of *Dagens Nyheter* even missed the amendment in the order of the 100-meter winners because in the June 22, 1938, article Tokazier is placed the first.[33]

At least one contemporary source did discuss antisemitism in Tokazier's case. A year later on June 1, 1939, *Idrottsbladet,* the organ of *Svenska Finlands Idrottsförbund* (Swedish, Finnish Swedish Sports Federation), linked the incident to other discriminatory actions against Jewish athletes and placed the episode in the context of National Socialist racial policy:

> Cases similar to Westend [that is, the 1939 dismissal of Jewish tennis players] have occurred before. One Moses Tokazier, probably Finland's best middleweight weightlifter, has had difficulties in qualifying for the national team. Abraham Tokazier, his brother, was placed fourth at the first track meet in the stadium last year [1938], even though he clearly won the race. Earlier, Jews have been recognized in Finnish sports. . . . But now Aryanization has made itself operative in Finnish sports. What is the purpose of these actions?[34]

Moses Tokazier was among the most successful weightlifters in Maccabi. The weightlifting section had its greatest triumph in the Finnish championships in 1939 in Tampere. The brothers Jakob and Moses Tokazier and Herman Kruk not only won in all their classes, but won the team championship as well. Success also allowed opportunities for close cooperation with non-Jewish athletes and clubs: in January 1938 Maccabi arranged a weightlifting contest in Helsinki with prominent weightlifters from Finland and Estonia.[35]

The Olympic Stadium incident has continued to live in memory. Years later, Sulo Kolkka, the announcer for the contest, considered the displacement of Tokazier "one of the greatest injustices in Finnish sports life."[36] Moreover, *Hufvudstadsbladet's* reporter, Enzio Sevón (alias Kim), who was in the stadium that day, recalled at the turn of the 1970s that people generally saw the incident as an expression of antisemitism. Alluding to the effects of such discrimination, Sevón also stressed the fact that "the results would weigh considerably in the selection for international contests that summer." Although Tokazier personally and the Jewish community generally considered the incident a racist act, the episode did not, however, end Abraham Tokazier's career or hinder him from participating in sports competitions or even from representing Finland in certain competitions abroad.[37]

Was the judges' ruling an act of antisemitism? Spitzer observes that while the motives for discrimination against Tokazier cannot be established conclusively from the written sources, some factors possibly contributed to the course of events: the close sports relations between Finland and Nazi Germany and the concepts of racial hygiene for cultivating a healthy nation.[38] Indeed, according to historian Leena Laine, the concerns about racial hygiene in Finland increased in the 1930s, due to the influence of German science.[39] Several questions may never be answered. What happened during the crucial seconds or minutes when the referees made their decision to deny Tokazier his victory? Could the judges have predicted that the sprinters would cross the line almost simultaneously, and if so, was there a plot or unified strong opinion against Tokazier? And would the outcome have been the same had Tokazier run under a non-Jewish banner? Undoubtedly, Tokazier did not have strong or effective advocates among the fifteen judges (whose identities remain unknown).[40] Whether or not there was more to the course of events, the incident in itself and the reluctance to do justice to a Jewish athlete could be interpreted by Nazi Germany as well as by other countries as a sign of the Finnish readiness to discriminate against the Jews.

Dismissal of Jewish members from the Westend Tennis Stadium Club in 1939

The Westend Tennis Stadium Club, founded in Espoo in 1937 by the influential Finnish tennis champion Arne Grahn, was considered the leading and most exclusive tennis club in the Helsinki region.[41] Among its ranks, the predominantly Swedish-speaking club had half a dozen, well-to-do Jewish members, including Salomon Kotschack, who in 1939 held fifth place in the A-division, and according to contemporary estimates had a chance to be chosen for the national team.

The Finnish sports world was not only divided into bourgeois and workers' factions, it was also divided into Finnish- and Swedish-speaking sports clubs. Despite their ongoing shift toward being Finnish-speaking, Finland's Jews remained predominantly Swedish-speaking until after World War II and several Jewish athletes belonged to Finnish Swedish-speaking sports clubs instead of to Maccabi. Yet, the position of Jews among the Swedish-language sports associations had not been without its problems, which emerge more clearly against the background of attitudes toward language and race in Finnish history. In 1809 Finland had become an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire, providing incentives for a crucial change in state politics which were also motivated by a Finnish-language nationalist movement. The aim of this pressure group, the "Fennoman" movement, was to elevate Finnish to be an official language alongside Swedish; the opposing faction was the "Svecoman" movement. Within the "Svecoman"

movement—which refused to accept the loss of the dominant position of the Swedish language in Finnish state politics—a more radical wing framed the language debate within pseudo-racial arguments. Evoking the classifications of racial anthropology (originating from the enthusiasm in Germany and Sweden for the racial ideas of Arthur de Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain), "non-Germanic" ("Asiatic" or "Mongoloid") Finns could be categorized as "passive," "lazy," "feminine," and "inclined to alcoholism," whereas Finland's "Germanic" Swedes would be described as "born fighters and leaders."[42] Admiration for the "Germanic race" had an impact on some Swedish-speaking circles in Finland, and the segregation efforts of some Swedish-speaking groups were also felt by the Jews; the famous sports club *Helsingfors Idrottsföreningen Kamraterna* (Swedish, Helsinki Sports Association Chums, HIFK), for example, rejected applications for admission by Jewish athletes between the mid-1920s and the 1930s.[43] With regard to the treatment of Jews in the Westend Tennis Stadium Club, it is also important to note that the club maintained close ties with German tennis circles and employed German tennis coaches. Just prior to the dismissal of the Jewish members, the club had arranged an international tennis match with German world champion Gottfried von Cramm as one of the key players.[44]

On May 24, 1939, the board of the Westend Tennis Stadium Club decided to dismiss Kotschack and the five other male and female Jewish members from the association.[45] Besides Chairman Arne Grahn, the board included Vice Chairman Erik Åström, Secretary Helge Packalen, Treasurer Gunnar Sandberg, Torsten Bengström, and Georg Pihl. In their decision the board relied on the fourth paragraph of the club statutes and, in three cases, on the claim that the members had not paid their annual fees.[46] Prior to the dismissal of the Jewish players, no debt collection of member fees had ever been carried out; the dismissed members were given the Board's decision in a letter with these fabricated excuses.[47] Indeed, to judge by the list of unpaid fees in 1939, compiled by the Treasurer Sandberg, one hundred and twenty-two names of the approximately two hundred members were delinquent, but only the Jews were expelled.[48] According to a newspaper account, the Board members were not even fully aware which members of the club were Jews until they went through the list in depth.[49] Boris Grünstein, a member of the club and the ombudsman of the Jewish community, expressed his dissatisfaction in a letter to the club secretary.[50] As a result of the incident, the dismissed members founded a new, "purely Jewish" tennis club called *Tennis Klubb Kadur* (*kadur* is Hebrew for ball), which was eventually accepted into *Finlands Lawntennisförbund* (Swedish, Finnish Lawn Tennis Federation).[51] According to Grünstein, wider tennis circles generally saw the dismissals as an act of antisemitism.[52]

The suddenness of the decision and the fact that all of the dismissed members were Jews captured considerable attention in the press. The first newspaper to react was *Idrottsbladet*, on June 1, 1939. Its short account ends with the sentence cited above, "But now Aryanization has made itself

operative in Finnish sports."[53] The same phrase was echoed in succeeding accounts, in the liberal Swedish *Stockholms Tidning*, and in the Finnish newspapers *Arbetarbladet*, *Helsingin Sanomat*, *Turun Sanomat*, and *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*. The last gave the lengthiest report, featuring the story on the front page with the headline "Persecution of Jews in Tennis Club."[54] The Swedish-language Social Democrat newspaper *Arbetarbladet* wrote on June 2, 1939: "The dismissals have been carried out in circumstances that indicate that the Westend Club conducted a purposeful cleansing of all non-Aryan members."[55] According to *Arbetarbladet*, the club had also discussed dismissing a number of "half-Aryan" members.[56] Disapproval by the club's rank and file members and the scandal in the press probably prevented further dismissals. The existence of an "Aryan paragraph" in the statutes was denied, but as one anonymous member of the club put it in an open letter to the *Helsingin Sanomat*, printed on June 3, 1939, what counted was the "purpose and goal," not the "procedure."[57] From this perspective, whether there was a formal, written "Aryan" policy is rather irrelevant, as the goal of the dismissals seems to have been to cleanse the club of Jewish members.

Idrottsbladet, the organ of Finnish-Swedish "White sports," saw the act as clearly anti-Jewish. Expressing a partial understanding of the decision, the reporter pointed out that the tennis club had the right not to accept *Jews* as members, just as the Jewish sports club, Maccabi, had the right not to accept *Christians*.[58] This stance reflects the idea of Jews as a religious collective (of Mosaic faith), rather than as an ethnic group or "race." The reporter from the bourgeois *Turun Sanomat* expressed his personal prejudice against Judaism/Jewishness, but saw the dismissals as unjust:

> We are not especially enamored of Judaism [*juutalaisuus*], but we consider the action of the Westend Tennis Stadium Club completely unjust, since once the Board of the Association has accepted a policy by voting on the members in question, there is no chance to discharge them due to their extraction. They were already Jews when they applied to the club! Besides, we have to consider the incident as a precedent. Such a procedure may be accepted elsewhere, but in Finland—for the time being—it is absolutely contemptible.

The short caveat—"for the time being"—catches the eye, as if the reporter was saying that in other circumstances, this action might be condoned. At the time the voices of the so-called *aitosuomalaiset* (Finnish, true Finns), who were demanding the supremacy of the Finnish language over Swedish in the land, were becoming louder. Underlining the fact that one minority, Finland's Swedes (whom the club was considered to represent), had discriminated against another minority, the Jews, enabled the reporter to make claims for Finnish Finland, to declare that the Finnish-Swedish culture "has come to its end and is ripe to be cut away."[59]

The second account of the incident in *Arbetarbladet*, on June 9, 1939, brings up several crucial concerns that were being raised, at least in leftist circles. Was the ultimate goal to banish all Jews from the 1940 Olympic Games? Had Nazi Germany presented Finland with conditions to this effect in advance?

> The respectable men of this tennis club, who have earned the dubious honor of launching antisemitism into our societal life, should actually be identified to the general public. . . . Now the Aryan paragraph has been introduced into our sports. Is this possibly to celebrate the Olympic Games, an international fraternal carousing? Who are these gentlemen who tarnish our sports banner with such actions?
>
> The question is not only an internal matter within one association. It has been postulated that an association inscribed in the Association Register of our country, has dismissed members on the basis of their racial origin. As far as is known, this allegation has not been disputed. . . . Our energetic and versatile Olympic commissioner Erik von Frenckell, should perhaps have reason to take some interest in this matter. He is known to possess the genuine spirit of sports and to reject all politics from the Olympic Games. Should it be possible to tarnish our sports with—to us worthless—racial fanaticism without consequences? Should the so-called gentlemen, who are dedicated to tennis, be able to degrade our sports life without punishment? Is the intention to prepare, in all silence, the dismissal of the Jews from the Olympic Games? Have the Germans presented conditions in advance? Have they proposed that Jews be dismissed as a precondition for German participation? As is known, in Germany Jews are not allowed to belong to German clubs or to take part in competitions with Germans. Is the sports club act of dismissal the first sign that these German customs will be launched on Finnish soil?[60]

Since tennis was not included in the Olympic Games between 1924 and 1988, the Westend Stadium Tennis Club incident could provide only an indirect paradigm for the possible treatment of Jews in the upcoming Olympiad. Yet there had indeed been instances in the late 1930s in which Jews had had problems qualifying for national teams representing Finland and the Finnish sporting "race" in international arenas. These concerns were amplified in *Idrottsbladet*'s June 1, 1939 article, which, as we have seen, compared the Westend case to the Tokazier dispute and the obstacles his brother Moses Tokazier faced in qualifying for Finland's weightlifting team.[61]

On June 6, 1939, Arne Grahn responded to the open letter that had appeared three days earlier in the *Helsingin Sanomat* with a laconic explanation of the dismissal of Salomon Kotschack.[62] According to Grahn, he had never invited Kotschack to join the club; furthermore the "Board was

obliged" to make the decision because Kotschack's behavior on the tennis court and elsewhere was unacceptable. The excuse of bad behavior probably arose from an earlier incident: Kotschack had been charged with causing a traffic accident and was found guilty.[63] According to Grahn, the Board had given Kotschack a dismissal notice, which he had disregarded. Significantly, Grahn did not mention the other dismissed Jewish members of the club; by keeping the focus on Kotschack, Grahn avoided the obvious antisemitic dimensions of the incident.

The independent magazine *Tennis* took up the case in an article entitled "Racial Politics in Finnish Tennis." Decrying the actions of the Westend Tennis Stadium Club, "We condemn all politics, be it language or racial politics, in sport," the editor stated that had the case concerned only Mr. Kotschack, it would have remained an internal matter for the club. Furthermore,

> If one member of the Jewish race has conducted himself in an inappropriate manner, it does not mean that all the Jewish members should suffer for it. Until a plausible explanation for this has seen light of day, one, though uninitiated, has to continue to believe that the Westend TSK [Tennis Stadium Club], a member of FLTF [Finnish Lawn Tennis Federation], can pursue racial policy with impunity. The federation remains as silent as a wall; but it may well happen that an even higher authority may have a say in the matter because our tennis federation sits with its hands folded and allows one scandal after another, a situation that cannot continue in the long run.[64]

The discrimination against Jewish members of the Westend Tennis Stadium Club was contrary to the editor's concept of justice; the editor appeals to a higher authority he seems to believe should speak out. However, in light of the available information, it appears that the case ended here.

In 1945, though, the matter resurfaced in Sweden (the possible consequences in Sweden had, in fact, been anticipated in 1939).[65] On February 14, 1945, expressing alarm that Swedish tennis players would have contact with an openly antisemitic association, the Swedish evening tabloid *Expressen* published a lengthy article entitled "Swedish athletes visit an antisemitic Finnish club." The Swedish Tennis Federation immediately disassociated itself from the visit and claimed that the occasion had been arranged by private individuals. The article in *Expressen* went on to describe the Westend Tennis Stadium Club and Arne Grahn as follows:

> This club is actually one of the few in Finland that has been involved in politics for a longer period and has aroused disconcerting attention by adding an Aryan paragraph to its statutes. During 1940 [*sic*]–1944 the club served as a base for the German army, and its chairman, Arne Grahn, has made himself known as an ardent Nazi.[66]

While the existence of an "Aryan paragraph" had been disputed and denied in 1939, some newspapers, like *Arbetarbladet*, made reference to such a paragraph, albeit more metaphorically. Although the Swedish tabloid accused Grahn of being "an ardent Nazi," his purported Nazi sympathies do not come up elsewhere in the contemporary press. His biographical entry by Heikki Klemola in *The National Biography of Finland* does not refer to any political activity whatsoever.[67]

The next day, when the rightist newspaper *Nya Pressen* published a short report on the Swedish debate and interviewed Arne Grahn about the matter, the scandal reached the Finnish press.[68] Reiterating his 1939 remarks in the *Helsingin Sanomat*, Grahn referred only to Salomon Kotschack and to his moral unsuitability as a club member, scapegoating Kotschack alone, at the time a refugee in Sweden, for the whole fuss.[69] Grünstein also took up the case in *Nya Pressen* in an article entitled, "Aryan Paragraph and Dr. Grahn."[70] Agreeing with Grahn that there was no "Aryan paragraph" in the club's statutes, Grünstein nonetheless stressed that Grahn obscured matters by failing to mention the other Jews who were dismissed. For his part, Grünstein did not have much sympathy for Kotschack, in part because he had fled to Sweden during the war, which was considered an act of treason among the Jewish war veterans in Finland. To Grünstein, Kotschack's case was "a case of its own," distinct from the club's blanket dismissal of other Jewish members.

In 1945, the tennis club was also under threat of being closed down for being a fascist organization in accordance with the Moscow Armistice between Finland and the Soviet Union. At the time, the Allied Control Commission, consisting mostly of Soviet members led by Andrei Zhdanov, had settled in Finland to oversee Finland's fulfillment of the terms of armistice and to supervise the so-called war-responsibility trials. According to Sven Åhman, the Finnish Foreign Ministry investigated the dismissal episode in the Westend Tennis Stadium Club, contacting Grünstein as well.[71] The investigation, nonetheless, did not lead to any action being taken, and the club was never officially disbanded.[72]

In his 1989 memoirs, Grünstein recalls how he personally tried to take up the matter with the Finnish Lawn Tennis Federation after the war. Representing Maccabi, he apparently proposed to rectify the injustice and compensate those involved in the incident. The proposal was met with negative reactions, especially from Grahn, who had served as chairman of the federation from 1933 to 1935 and again in 1953. The fact that Grünstein was born in St. Petersburg and was a fluent speaker of Russian made him all the more suspect; some people thought that he had support from the Soviets, meaning members of the Allied Control Commission, which supposedly gave him the courage to act in such an "impudent manner." More threateningly accused of "running errands for the Ruskies and the Communists," he was advised to keep quiet about the incident

at Westend Tennis Stadium Club for his own good. Nonetheless, according to Grünstein's memoirs, his efforts eventually met with some success. Although Grahn is described as staging himself as an opponent of the dismissals, he allegedly admitted that they were motivated by the prevailing antisemitism and apologized for the episode. For Grünstein the matter was then closed: "I had been pleading a case for the Jews and had reached an honorable conclusion."[73]

An unwritten chapter

Against the background of the dominant perspective in the academy and the widespread assumption in the general public that there was hardly any antisemitism in Finland in the 1930s, it is rather surprising to find such explicit and broadly disseminated press discussion of discrimination against Jewish athletes, especially in the incident of the Westend Tennis Stadium Club, which also made headlines in Sweden. Although the impact of sports on the political identity of Finland has been described by the political historian Seppo Hentilä (1992) and more recently by the social scientist Jouko Kokkonen (2008), and the eugenic utopias in the Finnish world of sport have been investigated by the historian Marjatta Hietala (1985), none of these scholars deepens their studies so as to include the situation of the Jewish population in Finland.[74] In fact, it is only in Henrik Meinander's (1993) work on the Swedish-speaking sports culture in the interwar period in Helsinki that the position of Finnish-Jewish athletes receives any attention.[75] While the Berlin Olympic Games in 1936 have been of interest to Finnish sports historians, even here the discrimination taking place in Nazi Germany has been seen as having no bearing on Finnish sports culture, as though Finland remained immune to German influence in this area. Even when the Berlin Olympic Games are discussed in relation to their reception in Finland, or in relation to the Finnish experience at the Berlin Olympics, the treatment of the Jews in Germany and the antisemitic rhetoric surrounding the composition of the German team is mentioned only in passing.[76]

Marginalized in Finnish historical writing, Finnish-Jewish athletes hardly exist at all in Finnish sports history. Despite some publications by the Maccabi organization, there is no history of the Jewish sports association, nor does Maccabi appear in general sports histories.[77] Furthermore, athletes such as Abraham Tokazier and Salomon Kotschack are not even included in the major Finnish sports encyclopedia, *Urheilumme kasvot* (Finnish, Faces of our sport). Tellingly, the only academic publication to address antisemitism in Finnish sports was written by a German sports historian: in 2001 Giselher Spitzer devoted six pages to describing the Olympic Stadium incident in an anthology of Jewish sports history.[78] Meanwhile, the dismissal of the Jewish tennis players in 1938 has not been investigated at all by researchers,

even though it was a well-known scandal at the time and was taken up in over thirty newspaper articles and sports magazines in Finland as well as in Sweden, resurfacing again in 1945.

The fact that the wide press coverage of Jewish discrimination in sports has not received attention in Finnish sports history witnesses the reluctance to deal with the position of Jewish athletes in Finnish society. Seen by many contemporaries as examples of antisemitism, the incidents discussed here led neither to official investigation or apology, nor to institutional consequences. The reasons can be found in the postwar Finnish memory policy. Having fought the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1944 as an Axis ally, Finland fell under the Soviet sphere of influence after the war. In the postwar situation Finland's close relationship with Nazi Germany became a political minefield, digging up cases that could be interpreted by the Soviets as being inclined towards National Socialism could be perilous, as is evinced by Grünstein's silencing after the war.[79] The most awkward moral dimensions, such as the support by Finnish intellectuals for German plans to reorganize Europe and the questions of possible Finnish contributions to Nazi genocide and mass murder, became a source of national embarrassment, both in relation to the Soviet Union and more generally with regard to Finland's moral standing in postwar Europe. For all these reasons, a resonant silence has covered the antisemitism of those years in Finland.

By loyally participating in the Finnish war effort in World War II, Finnish Jews wished to prove themselves worthy of a place in Finnish society. In the eyes of the international Jewish community, however, their wartime loyalty has often been regarded as traitorous. Under these conflicting pressures, the Finnish Jews came to create their own memory culture. Hoping to be seen as loyal Finnish citizens, they have refrained from questioning the possibility of antisemitism in Finland. Yet, as Maccabi was nearing its one hundred-year jubilee in 2006, the club attempted to reinstate Tokazier's victory.[80] Largely sustained by Maccabi's efforts, in the Jewish community the case became a symbol of prewar antisemitism, while in Finnish sport circles there was no desire to set the record straight. Even the chairman of the HKV track club, Aulis Potinkara, averred that faulty results in most cases nevertheless remain valid. Characterizing the finish-line judges' decision as an ordinary mistake, the historian of HKV, Seppo Martiskainen, also rejected charges of antisemitism and discrimination. Finding it "highly unconvincing that all the goal judges would have been antisemites," Martiskainen puts his faith in a kind of statistical unlikelihood, a disbelief that antisemitism could have penetrated any random group of Finns so thoroughly.[81] Stressing "I personally *want to believe* that the case was a normal goal judge's mistake" (our emphasis), Martiskainen not only reflects a desire to protect his club's reputation but also echoes a larger sentiment in Finnish society: the unwillingness to accept or admit the fact of antisemitism in Finland, *what it might*

imply about Finland's political conduct in the international arena from the 1930s through the war years, and inevitably *what it might imply* for Finland's history.

Notes

1. "Tvenne judiska bandykeruber" [Two Jewish bandy cherubs], *Sport och Nytt*, no. 2 (1927): 3; Leif Furman, "Josef Lefko, 95," *Hakehila*, no. 2 (1999): 31. Bandy is a game similar to ice hockey, played on a frozen football-field size rink, using a ball instead of a puck. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are ours.
2. See Wolfram Pyta, "Geschichtswissenschaft und Sport: Fragestellungen und Perspektiven" [History and sports: Questions and perspectives], *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 61, no. 7–8 (2010): 388.
3. The idea of the Asiatic ancestry of the Finns has its origins in the nineteenth century. In Swedish textbooks, for instance, Finns continued to be classified as Mongols until the middle of the twentieth century; see Aira Kemiläinen, *Finns in the Shadow of the "Aryans": Race Theories and Racism* (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1998), 70.
4. Eino Kaila, *Die finnische Staatsuniversität durch dreihundert Jahre* [The Finnish state university over three hundred years] (Helsinki: Otava, 1940), 17. Notably, this publication celebrates the three hundred-year anniversary of the University of Helsinki.
5. Jouko Kokkonen, *Kansakunta kilpasilla: Urheilu nationalismin kanavana ja lähteenä Suomessa 1900–1952* [The nation in competition: Sports as the channel and source of nationalism in Finland 1900–1952] (Helsinki: SKS, 2008), 144.
6. KA, Urheiluseura Makkabin arkisto, box 5, Participants in the Maccabiah Games 1934–83, Helsinki 1983.
7. At the Paris Olympic Games, Elias Katz had won a gold medal in the 3,000-meter steeplechase team competition with Paavo Nurmi and Ville Ritola. He also won a silver medal in the 3,000-meter steeplechase, placing second to Ville Ritola. See Risto Rantala, Markku Siukkonen, and Seppo Tukiainen, eds., *Urheilumme kasvot 2: Suunnistus ja yleisurheilu* [The face of our sports 2: Orienteering and athletics] (Jyväskylä: Scandia kirjat, 1972), 978; KA, Urheiluseura Makkabin arkisto, box 5, Maccabi's 70th anniversary review, Helsinki 1976.
8. KA, Boris Grünstein arkisto, box 1, Boris Grünstein, "Geschichte und Stellung der Juden in Finnland" [The history and position of Jews in Finland], unpublished manuscript, September 30, 1983.
9. Diethelm Blecking, "Jüdischer Sport in Polen" [Jewish sport in Poland], *Sozial- und Zeitgeschichte des Sports* 13, no. 2 (1999): 20.
10. Georg Eisen, "New Historians, New Historicism, and Jewish Scholarship in Sport," in *Sport and Physical Education in Jewish History*, ed. Georg Eisen, Haim Kaufman and Manfred Lämmer ([Netanya]: Wingate Institute, 2003), 19; Hajo Bernet, *Der jüdische Sport im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland 1933–1938* [Jewish sport in National Socialist Germany 1933–1938] (Schorndorf: Karl Hofmann, 1978), 41.
11. In comparison to the SVUL, the TUL was at a disadvantage. In 1931, despite the success of Finnish athletes at the Workers' Olympics, the media took little notice of the event. Moreover, in 1933–34, the TUL received no financial support from the state. The cooperation between the SVUL and the TUL in national sports

ended in late 1959, and athletes of the TUL were no longer allowed to participate in national competitions or to represent Finland in international contests. Owing to this conflict, no athletes from the ranks of the TUL attended the Olympic Games in Rome in 1960; see Seppo Hentilä, "Poliittista urheilua ja urheilupolitiikkaa" [Political sports and sports politics], in *Suomi uskoi urheiluun* [Finland believed in sports]. Liikuntatieteellisen seuran julkaisu 131, ed. Teijo Pyykkönen (Helsinki: VAPK-Kustannus, 1992), 235, 279; Leena Laine, "Järjestöelämän oppivuodet" [Apprenticeship of organizational life], in *Suomi uskoi urheiluun*. Liikuntatieteellisen seuran julkaisu 131, ed. Teijo Pyykkönen (Helsinki: VAPK-Kustannus, 1992), 175, 181.

12. Laura Ekholm and Simo Muir, "Isänmaasuhteen rakentaminen 'kansallisten' nimien avulla: Helsingin juutalaisessa seurakunnassa tehdyt sukunimien vaihdot 1933–1944" [Building a relationship to the fatherland with "national" names: Family name changes in the Jewish community of Helsinki 1933–1944], *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja* 109, no. 1 (2011): 45.
13. The club used both Finnish and Swedish as its official name: *Urheiluseura Makkabi* (Finnish, Maccabi Sports Association) and *Idrottsföreningen Makkabi* (Swedish, Maccabi Sports Association).
14. KA, Urheiluseura Makkabin arkisto, box 5, Maccabi's 90th anniversary review, Helsinki 1996; Diethelm Blecking, "Marxism Versus Muscular Judaism: Jewish Sports in Poland," in *Sport and Physical Education in Jewish History*, ed. Georg Eisen, Haim Kaufman and Manfred Lämmer ([Netanya]: Wingate Institute, 2003), 48.
15. Leif Furman, "Moses Jankeloff aloitti nyrkkeilypiireissä jo pojankoltiaisena" [Moses Jankeloff began as a cub in the boxing circles], *Hakehila*, no. 1 (2001): 33.
16. See Jouko Jounala, "Oikeusmurha Olympiastadionilla" [Judicial murder at the Olympic Stadium], *Ilta-Sanomat Plussa*, December 22, 2002, 18.
17. "Kälarne-Jonsson voitti 5000 m" [Kälarne-Jonsson won 5,000 meters], *Helsingin Sanomat*, June 22, 1938, 14.
18. "Kälarne-Jonsson vann och slog svenska rekord" [Kälarne-Jonsson won and beat the Swedish record], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, June 22, 1938, 11.
19. "Kälarne-Jonsson voitti" [Kälarne-Jonsson won], *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*, June 22, 1938, 6.
20. Photo-finish cameras were first installed at the Olympic Stadium for the 1952 Olympic Games. Vesa Tikander, Sports Museum Foundation of Finland, e-mail message to Simo Muir, September 13, 2011.
21. "Jonsson ja Nilsson olivat suomalaisia juoksijoita nopeampia" [Jonsson and Nilsson were faster than the Finnish runners], *Uusi Suomi*, June 23, 1938, 12.
22. Giselher Spitzer, "Antisemitism in Finnish Sport: The Case of the Runner Abraham Tokazier," in *Sports and Physical Education in Jewish History*, ed. Georg Eisen, Haim Kaufman, and Manfred Lämmer ([Netanya]: Wingate Institute, 2003), 173.
23. KA, Jakob Tokazierin arkisto, "Antisemitism 1938—eller vad? [Antisemitism 1938—or what?]," unidentified newspaper clipping in Jakob Tokazier's scrapbook.
24. KA, Urheiluseura Makkabin arkisto, box 331, Maccabi to the executive board of the Finnish Sports Federation, June 26, 1938.
25. Taimi Torvinen, *Pakolaiset Suomessa Hitlerin valtakaudella* [Refugees in Finland during Hitler's reign] (Helsinki: Otava, 1984), 93, 100. The same year, Kekkonen was the head referee/judge of the Finnish Championship at the Olympic Stadium (August 6–8, 1938) arranged by HKV. Suomen urheiluarkisto, Kotimaiset kilpailuohjelmat 1938–39, "Suomen mestaaruuskilpailut Stadionilla 6–8.8.1938."

The Finnish Sport Federation Archive at the Sports Archives of Finland lacks pre-war minutes and correspondence.

26. Oula Silvennoinen, *Salaiset aseveljet: Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933–1944* [Secret brothers-in-arms: The cooperation of the Finnish and German security police 1933–1944] (Helsinki: Otava, 2008), 73–4.
27. Maccabi's 90th anniversary review, Helsinki 1996; Spitzer, "Antisemitism in Finnish Sports," 175.
28. See, for example, "Suurkisojen toisen päivän päätilaisuudet olivat: nuorisojuhla Messuhallissa ja kenttäjuhla Stadionilla" [Main events of the second day of the grand competition: Youth celebration in the fair center and celebration at the stadium], *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*, June 18, 1938, 8.
29. Janne Mykrä, "Helsingin pitämättä jääneet olympiakisat 1940: Sanomalehti- ja propagandatoimiston tiedotustoiminta vuosina 1938–1939" [The cancelled Olympic Games in Helsinki 1940: Reporting activity of the Newspaper and Propaganda Office 1938–1939], in *Suomen urheiluhistoriallisen seuran vuosikirja 1996* [Annals of the Finnish Society for Sports History], ed. Arto Nevala (Helsinki: Suomen Urheiluhistoriallinen Seura, 1996), 88–7, 90.
30. Hana Worthen, *Playing "Nordic":* The Women of Niskavuori, *Agri/Culture, and Imagining Finland on the Third Reich Stage* (Helsinki: Helsinki University Print, 2007), 97.
31. Riitta Kormano, "Juoksijapatsas nuoren kansakunnan vertauskuva" [The runner statue as a symbol of the young nation], in *Wäinö Aaltonen 1894–1966.* Wäinö Aaltosen museon julkaisuja 10, ed. Heidi Pläffi (Turku: Wäinö Aaltosen Museo, 1993), 52.
32. "Antisemitism 1938—eller vad?"; "Kälarne kunde löpt på 14,25" [Kälarne could have run 14.25], *Aftonbladet*, June 22, 1938, 16
33. "Finlands spurtfenomen räckte ej i finishen mot Kälarna" [Finland's sprint phenomenon was not enough in the finish against Kälarna], *Dagens Nyheter,* June 22, 1938, 17.
34. "Randteckningar" [Marginal notes], *Idrottsbladet*, June 1, 1939, 1.
35. KA, Urheiluseura Makkabin arkisto, box 5, Program of International Weightlifting Contest, January 11, 1938. The greatest Jewish wrestler during the 1930s and 1940s was Eliel Schick. He won the championship of the Helsinki district several times; he won gold medals in the army, represented Finland in national competitions, and earned a bronze medal in Finnish championships. See Maccabi's 90th anniversary review.
36. Maccabi's 90th anniversary review.
37. "Antisemitism 1938—eller vad?"
38. Spitzer, "Antisemitism in Finnish Sports," 173.
39. Leena Laine, "Ruumiinharjoitusten monet muodot" [The various forms of physical exercise], in *Suomi uskoi urheiluun*. Liikuntatieteellisen seuran julkaisu 131, ed. Teijo Pyykkönen (Helsinki: VAPK-Kustannus, 1992).
40. The minutes and correspondence of HKV do not contain information about the judges and time-keepers. The Sports Archive of Finland does not have any holdings of HPV nor does it have a copy of the program of the track meet in the collection of competition programs.
41. On Grahn, see Heikki Klemola, "Grahn, Arne (1902–1989)," In *Kansallisbiografia-verkkojulkaisu* [*The National Biography of Finland*, Web version], Studia Biographica 4 (Helsinki: SKS, 1997–2011), accessed November 19, 2010, http://artikkelihaku.kansallisbiografia.fi/artikkeli/7479/.

42. Artur Eklund, "Ras, kultur, politik" [Race, culture, politics], in *Svenskt i Finland: Ställning och strävanden* [Swedish in Finland: Conditions and aspirations] (Helsinki: Svenska Studenters Partidelegation, 1914), 2.
43. Henrik Meinander, "Bilingual Sportsmen: Swedish-speaking Sports Culture in Interwar Helsinki," *International Journal of the History of Sports* 10, no. 3 (1993): 421–2.
44. Kotschack as a fluent German-speaker did not hesitate to make contacts with athletes from Nazi Germany; for instance, Kotschack had been active in inviting Hans Nüsslein, one of Germany's leading tennis players, to visit the club in 1937. Kotschack had met Nüsslein on a train from Hamburg to Köln in 1937; Salomon Kotschack, "Hans Nüsslein kommer gärna till Finland [Hans Nüsslein willing to come to Finland]," *Tennis*, no. 7 (1937): 42.
45 "Juutalaisvainoja tennisklubissa" [Persecution of Jews in a tennis club], *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*, June 4, 1939, 1. The other members were "law-student Boris Grünstein, Ms. [Lia?] Wainstein, Mrs. [Lea ?] Kotschack, Ms. [?] Pergament and director [Isaac Björn] Gumbler." Boris Grünstein, "'Arierparagrafen' och dr Grahn" ["Aryan paragraph" and Dr Grahn], *Nya Pressen*, February 16, 1945, 2. There are, however, some contradictions in the names and number of Jewish members. In an interview after the war with reporter Sven Åhman from the Swedish *Expressen*, Grünstein stated that five Jews were dismissed, including "Ms Wainstein, Mr Boris Grünstein, director L. Linder and director and Mrs Kotschak." Sven Åhman, "Westend löper risk för fredsfördraget" [Westend in danger due to the peace treaty], *Expressen*, February 15, 1945, 11. The lists of paid and unpaid member fees for 1939 contain only four names: "Kotschack; Kotschack, Mrs; Pergament and Grünstein." The Jewish names were on the list of paid member fees. Suomen urheilumuseo, Westend Tennis Stadion Klubbin arkisto, tiliasiakirjat 1937–47, Gunnar Sandberg, "Förteckning över obetalda medlemsavgifter för år 1939" [List of unpaid member fees for the year 1939], undated, and "Förteckning över betalda medlemsavgifter 1939" [List of paid member fees 1939], May 31, 1940.
46. "Juutalaisvainoja tennisklubissa," *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*, June 4, 1939, 1. The fourth paragraph dealt with the payment of member fees and noted that the members should promote the interests of the association and behave in a manner befitting it. Patentti- ja rekisterihallitus, Yhdistysrekisteriarkisto, yhdistyksen numero 28.406, statutes of the Westend Tennis Stadion Klubb r.f., May 24, 1937. The Westend Tennis Stadium Club Archive at the Sports Archives of Finland contains only account books and receipts from 1937–57.
47. In Grünstein's case, according to his own account, he had contacted the treasurer five days earlier about his member card and was told that it had not yet been produced. Grünstein, "Arierparagrafen," 2; "Arjalaiset nostavat päätään Suomessakin" [Aryans are also rearing their heads in Finland], *Turun Sanomat*, June 6, 1939, 5.
48. Suomen urheilumuseo, Westend Tennis Stadion Klubbin arkisto, tiliasiakirjat 1937–47, Gunnar Sandberg, "Förteckning över obetalda medlemsavgifter för år 1939," undated.
49. "Arjalaiset nostavat päätään Suomessakin," *Turun Sanomat*, June 6, 1939, 5.
50. In *Nya Pressen* Grünstein stated that he did not receive an answer to his letter, but in his memoirs he contradicts himself by referring to a letter stating that the Board had made the decision unanimously and that the members did not stand any chance of being reinstated. Also the time of the dismissal and the number of members dismissed differ; in the memoirs the incident took place during the Continuation War 1941–44 and nine people were dismissed. See Grünstein,

"Arierparagrafen," 2; Boris Grünstein, *Juutalaisena Suomessa*: *Hirtehishumoristisia tarkasteluja* [Being Jewish in Finland: Gallows humor observations], trans. Arvo Salo (Porvoo: WSOY, 1989), 139.

51. "Den vita sportens gentleman rullar upp rasefråga" [The gentleman of the White sports brings up the race question], *Arbetarbladet*, June 2, 1939, 4; Grünstein, "Arierparagrafen," 2. The Jewish sports club in Vyborg was also called Kadur. The Finnish Lawn Tennis Federation Archive at the Sports Archives of Finland lacks documentation from this period. The archive of *Kadur* is not to be found at the National Archives or at the Sports Archives of Finland.
52. Grünstein, "Arierparagrafen," 2. According to Grünstein, other tennis clubs, such as the *Helsingfors Lawntennisklubb* (Swedish, Helsinki Lawn Tennis Club), offered membership to the dismissed, stating that "politics and discrimination on the grounds of race should be kept out of the sports world." Exactly when this took place, whether in 1939 or in 1945, is unclear. According to Grünstein's memoirs, the letters arrived in 1945. Grünstein, *Juutalaisena Suomessa*, 141.
53. "Finsk tennisklubb uteslutar judar!" [Finnish Tennis Club excludes Jews], *Stockholms Tidning*, June 4, 1939, 18.
54. "Juutalaisvainoja tennisklubissa," *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti*, June 4, 1939, 1.
55. "Den vita sportens gentleman rullar upp rasefråga," *Arbetarbladet*, June 2, 1939, 4.
56. In an interview with *Expressen* in 1945, Grünstein said that among the "half-Aryans" the club investigated was an Estonian living in Finland named Kozarowitsky. The club however found him "Aryan enough" to stay in the club; see Åhman, "Westend löper risk för fredsfördraget."
57. "Avoin kysymys Westend Tennis Stadion Klubb'ille" [An open question for the Westend Tennis Stadium Club], *Helsingin Sanomat*, June 3, 1939, 14.
58. "Randteckningar," *Idrottsbladet*, June 1, 1939, 1.
59. "Arjalaiset nostavat päätään Suomessakin," *Turun Sanomat*, June 6, 1939, 5.
60. "I skottlinjen" [In the line of fire], *Arbetarbladet*, June 9, 1939, 2.
61. "Randteckningar," *Idrottsbladet*, June 1, 1939, 1.
62. Arne Grahn, "Westend ja Kotschack" [Westend and Kotschack], *Helsingin Sanomat*, June 6, 1939, 11.
63. "Biologisk kovändning" [Biological flip-flop], *Idrottsbladet*, June 8, 1939, 7. According to Louis Lewinsky, Kotschack made a bet on a car race from Helsinki to Westend; during the race, he caused an accident, which resulted in two casualties. Louis Lewinsky, interview with authors, Helsinki, January 27, 2010.
64. "Raspolitik i finsk tennis" [Racial politics in Finnish tennis], *Tennis*, no. 6–7 (1939): 80.
65. "Biologisk kovändning," *Idrottsbladet*, June 8, 1939, 7.
66. "Svenska idrottsmän gästar finsk antisemitisk klubb" [Swedish athletes visit an antisemitic Finnish club], *Expressen*, February 14, 1945, 11.
67. Some of the biographical entries there, however, seem to disregard unsavory matters; such is the case with chemist Erkki Leikola, whose role in *Suomen Kansallissosialistinen Kansanpuolue* (Finnish, the Finnish National Socialist Folks Party) is missing from his entry, and sculptor Wäinö Aaltonen's membership in the National Socialist *Suomen Valtakunnan Liitto* (Finnish, Federation of the Finnish Realm) is not mentioned either. Anto Leikola, "Leikola, Erkki (1900–1986)," in *Kansallisbiografia-verkkojulkaisu,* Studia Biographica 4 (Helsinki: SKS, 1997–2011), accessed November 18, 2010, http://artikkelihaku.kansallisbiografia.fi/artikkeli/7102/; Leena Ahtola-Moorhouse, "Aaltonen, Wäinö (1894–1966)," in *Kansallisbiografia-verkkojulkaisu,* accessed November 18, 2010, http://www.kansallisbiografia.fi/kb/artikkeli/1267/.

On Leikola's and Aaltonen's political activities, see: Henrik Ekberg, *Führerns trogna följeslagare: Den finländska nazismen 1932–1944* [The Führer's loyal companions: Finnish Nazism 1932–1944] ([Helsinki]: Schildts, 1991), 176, 233. During the Finnish–Soviet War 1941–1944, there was a Finnish–German headquarters in Westend.

68. "Cause célèbre i tennisvärlden" [Cause célèbre in the tennis world], *Nya Pressen*, February 15, 1945, 3. See also "Westend ja 'Expressen'" [Westend and "Expressen"], *Helsingin Sanomat*, February 16, 1945, 8.
69. Finnish Jews fought in the Finnish army and hence were brothers-in-arms with German soldiers. In his memoirs, Kotschack describes fleeing to Sweden during the Finnish–Soviet War, 1941–44, after a fight with a German officer; see Jan Kotschack, *Stig iväg, Jack! Historien om Radio Nord, en älskad och oönskad station och om ett annat Sverige* [Hit the road, Jack! History of Radio Nord, a beloved and unwanted station and about another Sweden] (Stockholm: Premium Publishing, 2010).
70. Grünstein, "Arierparagrafen," 2.
71. Arvo Ääri, "Westend-klubin juttu" [The Westend Club case], *Helsingin Sanomat*, February 19, 1945, 3; Grünstein, "Arierparagrafen," 2.
72. "AssociationNet," National Board of Patents and Registration, accessed November 18, 2010, http://www.prh.fi.
73. Grünstein, *Juutalaisena Suomessa*, 140.
74. Hentilä, "Poliittista urheilua ja urheilupolitiikkaa"; Kokkonen, *Kansakunta kilpasilla*; Marjatta Hietala, "Rotuhygienia" [Eugenics], in *Mongoleja vai germaaneja: Rotuteorioiden suomalaiset* [Mongols or Teutons: The Finns in racial theories], Historiallinen Arkisto 86, ed. Aira Kemiläinen, Marjatta Hietala and Pekka Suvanto (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1985).
75. Meinander, "Bilingual Sportsmen," 421–2.
76. See Leena Laine, "Finland: The Promised Land of Olympic Sports," in *The Nazi Olympics: Sports, Politics and the Appeasement in the 1930s*, ed. Arno Kröger and William Murray (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003); Seppo Hentilä, "'Führer haltiottaa poikiaan': Suomalaisten vaikutelmia Berliinin olympiakisoista 1936" ["The Führer inspires his sons": Finnish impressions from the Berlin Olympic Games 1936], in *Ihmisiä, ilmiöitä ja rakenteita historian virrassa* [People, phenomena, and structures in the flow of history], ed. Jukka Korpela, Tapio Hämynen, and Arto Nevala (Hämeenlinna: Karisto, 2001), 138; Seppo Hentilä, "Suomalaisten kokemuksia Berliinin olympiakisoista 1936" [Finnish experiences of the Berlin Olympic Games 1936], in *Suomi Berliinissä* [Finland in Berlin], ed. Hannes Saarinen (Helsinki: Otava, 2001), 100; Vesa Vares, "Uusia näkökulmia Kolmannen valtakunnan urheilupolitiikkaan" [New perspectives on the sports politics of the Third Reich], in *Olympialapset* [Children of the Olympics], ed. Heikki Roiko-Jokela, Esa Sironen and Ossi Viita (Jyväskylä: Atena, 2004), 93.
77. Maccabi has published several smaller histories, especially in connection with its anniversaries. These are available in the archive of the association. When Maccabi turned one hundred in 2006, the association planned to publish a book about its history; the writing project is still ongoing.
78. Spitzer, "Antisemitism in Finnish Sport"; see also Boris Salomon and Giselher Spitzer, "Warum wurde dem finnischen Makkabi-Sprinter Abraham Tokazier 1938 der Sieg aberkannt?" [Why was the Finnish Maccabi sprinter Abraham Tokazier deprived of victory in 1938?], *Sozial- und Zeitgeschichte des Sports* 13, no. 3 (1999).
79. According to his memoirs, when Grünstein brought up the Westend Tennis Stadium Club incident after the war, it was hinted that pursuing the case

could further lead to the rejection of a business loan; Grünstein, *Juutalaisena Suomessa*, 140.

80. Maccabi contacted the Stadium Foundation, Sports Museum, and HKV. Jounala, "Oikeusmurha Olympiastadionilla."
81. He similarly dismisses the "injustice" of the results by suggesting—again without bringing any new evidence forward—that the "career of the 30-year-old Tokazier was probably interrupted by his age and the war, rather than by the injustice he had confronted." Seppo Martiskainen, "Onko suomalaisessa yleisurheilussa ollut rotusortoa?" [Has there been racial discrimination in Finnish athletics?], *Yleisurheilun kuvalehti*, no. 10 (2005): 55.

7

Elina Sana's *Luovutetut* and the Politics of History

Jouni Tilli

Upon its publication in 2003, Elina Sana's *Luovutetut: Suomen ihmisluovutukset Gestapolle* (Finnish, Extradited: Finland's human deliveries to the Gestapo) aroused a pointed controversy in Finland.[1] Challenging the official figure of eight Jewish refugees handed over to the German authorities, Sana claimed that during the German–Finnish alliance, the Continuation War (1941–44), Finland extradited almost 3,000 civilians and POWs, among them approximately 100 Jews.[2] These extraditions were carried out in cooperation with the Gestapo, even though the discriminatory treatment of the Jewish community in and on the territories of the Third Reich was known by the Finnish authorities. Despite these human deliveries, however, in the aftermath of World War II Finland claimed a non-existing or insignificant role in the Holocaust, asserting it had remained a state governed by the rule of law with respect for human rights. Sana's book dramatized the politics undergirding the "research establishment" and its alleged objectivity, also showing the extent to which academic historiography had been, if not explicitly legitimizing, at least closely related to state politics, not least through its reliance on access to official documentary sources.

Sana's intervention provides an epitome of the interlocking interconnection of the terms of history and politics. In the postwar period, a *driftwood* metaphor was routinely deployed as a way to represent Finland's military and political involvement in the war. Four history policies sustain the *driftwood* debate, ways of conceptualizing, interpreting, and representing Finland's role in the Continuation War. In the first policy, Finland's involvement in the war was literally akin to driftwood on the stream of historical events, and under these circumstances, it was nothing short of heroic of the Finns to survive and stop the onslaught of Bolshevism. In the second, Finland was like a canoe carried downstream by the current; although the boat could be steered, in reality there was little that could be done to alter or direct its course through history, and so Finland was barely responsible for the consequences of the alliance with Germany. In the third, despite limited capacity to maneuver, Finland eventually made the right choices, preserving

itself in a desperate situation. In the fourth, waging war in alliance with Germany was a choice, a politically unavoidable decision, which necessarily had moral and political consequences. Although this *driftwood* metaphor had been in longstanding use, publication of *Luovutetut* at once challenged its value as a means of representing history and dramatized the implications of an ongoing politicization of history in the twenty-first century.

Luovutetut as an act of the politicization of history was two-pronged: while challenging the number of those extradited, it took a critical look at the actions of Finnish officials responsible for human deliveries, revealing that the Finnish historico-political debate has been hampered by an inability and unwillingness to understand how the consequences of a political atmosphere were permeated by profound nationalism, fear of Communism, and ethnic stereotypes—"Russky-hatred." Yet in spite of these indices of Finnish cultural and national investment in this politicized history, the predominant interpretive framework has insisted that Finnish policies were determined by larger, more powerful forces, carrying Finland along like *driftwood* on a stream.

Although the Finnish government made pragmatic, conscious choices concerning cooperation with the Third Reich, invading Soviet territory and building "concentration camps" for political and ethnic POWs, there still seems to be a tendency toward "politicking with possibilities" when the question turns to Finland's role in World War II. The glorious myth of the Winter War has been extended to explain the Continuation War: Finland's alliance with Nazi Germany, its harsh measures against dissidents, the offensive warfare against Soviet Karelia, and the crusade against Bolshevism. Indeed, these policies are understood to have been determined by necessity, acts essential to Finland's survival. Beyond rectifying omissions in the wartime record, then, *Luovutetut* provided a much needed critical perspective on the history-political debate of the post-Soviet era, whose main substance has been that the war was a noble defensive victory against Bolshevism.

History, of course, is always politicized; any act of interpretation that asserts "undeniable historical truths" necessarily represents the past in relation to contemporary interests, intellectual, social, and political. A "history polity" can be understood as a metaphorical sphere in which power struggles over the interpretation of the past take place. Any national history polity consists of divergent, even contradictory themes and perspectives, "history policies" that tactically represent the past in relation to contemporary concerns. Epic national narratives about "us Finns throughout the centuries," for example, are constructed on an internally coherent history policy, emphasizing the importance of commonly shared memories defined as "the national past." Days of celebration, street names, school curricula materialize history policies as well; truth commissions are ways of instrumenting history policy. A politicized history, then, is the result of "history politicking," the deployment of tactical "history policies" in an effort to

dominate the discursive sphere of the "history polity" where debates shape both academic scholarship and effect action in the wider public sphere. [3] Consequently, when the reception of *Luovutetut* is read in the context of the reinterpretation of the Continuation War, Sana's book highlights the ways history is politicized: it becomes a history policy critique that reflects an understanding of the entire history polity related to the Continuation War, the historiographical context essential to understanding Sana's impact in the new millennium.[4]

The politics of the Continuation War: the *driftwood* debate

Although historiography has often presented Finland in World War II in dialectical terms, from being (collectively as a nation) *driftwood* tossed to and fro on the stream of events to being a small country purposefully and pragmatically directed by its political and military leaders, the Continuation War history polity has been dominated by the *driftwood* metaphor; *Luovutetut* was effectively directed against the complex idea of the war this metaphor represents. The *driftwood* debate originated in 1945–46, when leading politicians were tried on the basis of an *ex post facto* law on "crimes against peace" enforced by the Allied Forces.[5] These "show trials" were popularly seen as outrageous, aimed at discrediting Finland's wartime leaders: President Risto Ryti, Prime Minister Jukka Rangell, Prime Minister Edwin Linkomies, Foreign Minister Henrik Ramsay, Trade Minister Väinö Tanner, Education Minister Antti Kukkonen, Finance Minister Tyko Reinikka, and Ambassador to Germany Toivo Kivimäki. The defence of the eight accused politicians univocally argued that they had successfully negotiated Finland's way through a no-win situation, faced by invasion by the Soviets on the one hand and alliance with the Third Reich on the other. The convicted men instantly became national martyrs and heroes, their convictions attributed to the cynical motives of the Soviet victors; critical public assessment of prewar and wartime events was virtually impossible. The war responsibility trials laid the foundation for the key history policy pertaining to the Continuation War: Finland had been a passive object, if not a victim, of world politics.

The history policy embodied by the *driftwood* argument was, however, urgently questioned by foreign research in the 1950s. With the exception of a group of minor, mainly Communist, newspapers, the actual public debate began in 1957, when an American academic, Charles Lundin, published his book, *Finland in the Second World War*, in reaction to Finnish accounts of the political background of the war.[6] Finnish studies like John Wuorinen's collection *Finland and World War II* and Marshall Mannerheim's memoirs claimed that the reasons for the outbreak of the Continuation War were the Winter War and subsequent intimidation by the Soviet Union.[7] Lundin argued that Finnish leaders had shown poor political judgment in

provoking unease in the Soviet Union during the prewar era and in choosing to ally with Nazi Germany.[8] Attributing some responsibility for Finland's wartime alliance to Finnish leaders and politicians, Lundin's book was seen in Finland as inaccurate and moralizing; when Lundin gave a lecture in Helsinki, some of the audience, including Edwin Linkomies (prime minister 1943–44), walked out.[9]

Lundin's book and the public debate surrounding the topic provoked Arvi Korhonen to counterattack in *Barbarossa-suunnitelma ja Suomi* (Finnish, The Barbarossa plan and Finland), published in 1961. The emergence of new material (in part from Lundin) made it impossible to continue to deny that Finland had had alternatives to the German alliance. Yet for exactly this reason it became an imperative "history policy" to assert Finland's fundamental powerlessness; Korhonen claimed that the Germans had taken advantage of the situation and dragged Finland into war, concluding by quoting German Ambassador Wipert von Blücher: "Finland was thrown into the swirl of power politics like a piece of driftwood carried by a surging stream."[10] An image drawn from a wartime memoir swiftly became a defining, explanatory metaphor in the discursive field of "history polity," witnessing the power of rhetoric not only to shape consensus, but an entire field of historical "knowledge."

Nonetheless, Lundin's line was reiterated throughout the latter half of the 1960s, in new interpretations by Anthony Upton, in *Finland in Crisis 1940–1941*, and by Hans Peter Krosby, in *Suomen valinta 1941* (Finnish, Finland's choice).[11] For Upton, most of the Finnish explanations were too deterministic; he emphasized that even small nations can and have to make choices. Drawing mainly on German documents, Krosby's work, for its part, claimed that Finland's *drift* was voluntary, a purposeful alignment with Germany in the unavoidably strong current of World War II. Krosby criticized Finnish historiography as well, seeing it as selective and bent on a patriotic interpretation: for him, if a Finnish memoir and a German official document contradicted each other, Finnish historians usually decided that it was the German version that was inaccurate.[12]

Krosby's and Upton's political and moral criticism was furiously attacked by Finnish politicians and historians. Heated debate of the Continuation War was part of everyday politics in the 1960s, a debate about events in which many of the discussants had been actively involved. The most obvious link to state politics was President Urho Kekkonen's use of a critical interpretation of the war to support his foreign policy, in which friendly relations with the Soviet Union were paramount. Kekkonen agreed with Upton that representatives of small nations have often tried to hide behind their smallness in order to disclaim responsibility; indeed, Kekkonen developed this policy to such an extreme that he warranted the concept known as *Finnlandisierung*, Finlandization. This notion, referring to the influence of the Soviet Union on Finland's policies, resulted in public self-control,

self-censorship, and the promulgation of pro-Soviet attitudes, while claiming a distinct, formal independence. At once seizing and adapting a *driftwood* pragmatism, Finlandization is an example of how a history policy functions as an instrument of both domestic and foreign politics.[13]

At the beginning of the 1970s Colonel Keijo Mikola introduced a slight modification to the original history policy: the *riverboat* metaphor.[14] The riverboat preserved the general idea of Finland as a vessel almost completely at the mercy of powers comparable to forces of nature; yet, in implying a modest ability to steer, the riverboat reflects the impact of new research by historians, political scientists and even philosophers, critically considering not only whether the war could have been avoided but also how Finland might have acted differently. Later, in 1987, the historian Mauno Jokipii published his monumental research in which he presented a detailed analysis of the Continuation War and showed irrefutably how Finland willingly went along with Germany, partly due to the necessities of the political situation and partly in order to regain the territories lost in the Winter War.[15]

The fall of the Soviet empire in 1991 produced yet another extensive revision and re-evaluation of history as the real and imagined political restraints on discussion of the subject were finally removed. The end of Finlandization, though, led to a burst of nationalistic and patriotic emotions that had been constrained for decades, which affected historical research, as well as practices of commemoration, political rhetoric and literature, and forms of popular culture, movies, and plays. In addition, wartime leaders such as President Risto Ryti, who had been sent to prison after the war, were rehabilitated by cultural and official measures, often by claiming that they had been innocent victims of the Soviet Commission and the political machinations of Finnish Communists.[16] Now, "the defensive victory of 1944" became the defining moment of the war: Finland had heroically prevented the Soviet Union from marching to Helsinki, and consequently it was Finland that had successfully protected Western Europe against Bolshevism.[17] In practice this meant a return to the history policy formulated to defend Finland's wartime leaders during the war responsibility trials.[18]

New critical research on the Winter War and the Continuation War more often than not aroused intense debate that usually restated a *driftwood* logic, arguing that Stalin's policies gave Finland no alternative other than to turn to Germany, with the potential consequence, however debatable its extent, that Finland could become involved in German antisemitic sentiment.[19] Mauno Koivisto, Finland's president from 1982 to 1994, also declared that the decisions made by Finland's wartime leaders were correct. In this way the collapse of the Soviet Union paradoxically impelled a return to the past: again Finland was interpreted—especially in popular history—as having been swept up in events with no will of its own, a line of interpretation convenient for endeavors to orient Finland towards the West, especially with regard to EU membership (Finland became a member in 1995) and NATO.[20]

Since the 1990s, the emphasis in popular debate has returned closer to a patriotic interpretation of history, which in practice purports to freeze or de-politicize the polity against critical voices. Although attempts have been made to expand the frontiers of the Continuation War history polity in order to include other themes than traditional military or political history, a wide gulf divides critical academic historiography from popular spheres of history culture concerning the Continuation War.[21] While in 2004 historian Markku Jokisipilä criticized the myth of Finland's "separate war" (which maintained that in World War II Finland was engaged in its own fight and was not involved in Germany's military or political aims), in 2005 President of Finland Tarja Halonen restated the popular view, that the Continuation War was a "separate war" for Finland, as well as a defensive victory.[22] Evincing the persistence of the *driftwood* idea, Halonen's speech was criticized by Russian officials, and among domestic researchers, too.[23] Professor of history Henrik Meinander pointed to twenty-first century research underlining that Finland's cooperation with as well as dependence on Germany renders it impossible to use the concept of a "separate war"; Meinander also demanded that the war should be assessed in relation to the entire European situation.[24] While professional and popular history has been animated by new data and new perspectives, the historical polity is necessarily inflected by its ongoing dialogue with contemporary politics.

Luovutetut and the Finnish postwar history polity

Elina Sana's "documentary book" proposed two different lines of contact between the Finnish and German authorities, especially between the secret state police and the military. The secret police extradited as many as 129 people to the German authorities on a total of 13 occasions; the largest group comprised 99 individuals, all citizens of the Soviet Union. According to Sana, the number extradited might be between 78 and 129, a range highlighting the impossible task of giving both an exact number of those extradited and an exact account of the State Police (Valpo) and its collaborative operations, since essential documents from the Valpo archives were deliberately destroyed in the aftermath of the Soviet offensive in the summer of 1944. After combining and cross-checking preserved documents from different archives, Sana concluded that between 1941 and 1944 the Finnish military extradited at least 2,829 POWs to Germany on 49 occasions; among the military extraditions were over 500 individuals who were defined as "Jewish" or "political" (Communist), or both.[25]

Sana's conclusion that Finland had extradited some 3,000 persons to Germany during the Continuation War enlarged the earlier known number of eight civilian Jewish refugees deported from Finland (via Tallinn) to Germany on the S/S Hohenhörn in 1942, a figure based on her earlier studies.[26] Sana's central claim was that while Finland was waging a war

against a Communist state on the same front as the Axis powers, Jewish and Communist prisoners could be used to secure valuable resources from Germany, such as grain and oil. According to Sana, Finnish authorities knew that Germany was particularly interested in Jews and Communists. Given this awareness, the pragmatic reasons for securing resources for the Finns are inseparable from ideological compliance, because racially and ideologically conditioned groups of people were instruments of exchange.

The spark that ignited the 2003 debate was Sana's suggestion that Finland had extradited POWs and refugees to Germany on racial grounds, a sensitive issue especially for the satellite countries and allies of wartime Germany. However, Sana herself repeatedly stressed that her purpose was not to force Holocaust guilt on Finland by equating Finnish officials with their Nazi colleagues.[27] What she wanted to do was point out that Finland did systematically extradite and deport Communists, Jews, and other groups labeled as possible threats to the nation, and that these actions needed more attention and research than they had so far received. Directly challenging the *driftwood* thesis that had dominated a unified Finnish history polity surrounding the Continuation War, *Luovutetut* resurrected a crucial question: had the cooperation between Finnish and German officials been so close that what Sana described could have happened?[28]

The international media and a request on November 18, 2003 to investigate the matter from the Simon Wiesenthal Center to the President of Finland, Tarja Halonen, amplified attention to Sana's claims. The Finnish government reacted swiftly, appointing Professor Heikki Ylikangas to examine Sana's results and consider how more thorough research on the extraditions should be carried out.[29] In December 2003 *Luovutetut* was nominated by the Finnish Book Foundation for the 2004 Finlandia Literary Prize for Non-Fiction (Tieto-Finlandia); it won the prize. Ylikangas's report in January 2004 drew considerable media attention, as did the acknowledgment of the report by the Wiesenthal Center. While it was publicly recognized that the report did not find conclusive evidence of racially motivated extraditions,[30] the report led to a government funded project, *Finland, POWs, and People Handed Over to Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939–55;* the prize-giving ceremony and the publication of the report marked the decline of the debate in the mainstream media. The results of the project itself did not receive media attention, although collaborative publications, such as Oula Silvennoinen's dissertation, did gain recognition domestically and internationally.[31] What is clear from this national and international controversy is that *Luovutetut* did considerably more than rectify the numbers of the extradited. It challenged the shared "history polity" surrounding the Continuation War, and forced a difficult, wider act of political history revision.

That is, Sana challenged the *driftwood* paradigm as history polity. According to Sana, her original purpose was to alter Finnish self-understanding by changing the Finnish collective memory of the Continuation War, since

"Finland's role in the Holocaust was much larger than has so far been admitted."[32] She states in her introduction that as her research progressed, her focus moved from Jewishness and antisemitism to anti-Communism, and thus the starting-point of the book is that political criteria could have been the decisive factor in both police and military policy. If Finland, then, was a co-perpetrator of the Holocaust, it was for political reasons.[33] Those extradited from Finland were Jewish Russian POWs, Russian POWs, or people who had come to Finland from central European countries in their attempt to escape the war. Sana claimed that Finland was exceedingly pragmatic when it decided the fates of those who had been taken prisoner or those who were trying to seek refuge. Communism seemed to provide *an excuse for not recognizing* that handing over these people to the Gestapo was a deliberate death sentence, since unofficial information about the true nature of Nazi concentration camps was spreading relatively quickly around Europe, as Sana had argued in her previous research on the topic.[34] If a POW was categorized as a Jew and a Communist, his ethnicity and/or ideological orientation conditioned his treatment.

Finnish historians have examined the complexities of the Continuation War almost solely as an extension of the heroic Winter War, thus obscuring the consequences of Finland's political decision to ally with Germany. Arguing that Finnish authorities well knew what had been happening in Germany since the mid-1930s, Sana reinterpreted the alliance as an informed, pragmatic decision, in which officials decided to look the other way. In Finland, as in Nazi Germany, antisemitism was to a considerable degree inseparable from an anti-Communism and so formally anti-Communist policies in the war led in practice to antisemitic actions.[35]

Luovutetut sought to examine Finland's policies on deportation and extradition in terms of this hegemonic, functionally antisemitic, anti-Communist ideology. To Sana, politics dictated who was damned and who was saved. Hitler's notorious order on the treatment of political commissars (The Commissar Order) and the Anti-Comintern Pact influenced Finnish wartime measures more directly than mere racism, in this sense: extraditions were based on political criteria as a way to get rid of POWs and civilians in protective custody who were labelled as dissenters.[36] Anti-Communist policy led to the extradition of POWs and refugees who, given an official projection of the consequences, might have been saved.

Sana's assault on this history polity is dramatized by the vehemence of the media, especially by the claim—which she had been quite careful to qualify—that she asserted a connection between Finland and the Holocaust. This connection was repeated in numerous newspaper articles and public statements: more or less explicitly it was alleged that the motivation for the Finnish authorities' actions had been antisemitism. A leftist newspaper, *Kansan Uutiset,* summed up the view repeated widely in the media: "after all, Finland did not get a clean sheet in relation to the Holocaust" because

Finland systematically extradited Jews and Communists as well as other groups whom Adolf Hitler had chosen for extermination. It is important to note, however, that the *Finland, POWs and People Handed over in 1939–45* project and research associated with it have now shown that Finland's cooperation with the German SS was more intense than previously acknowledged. As Oula Silvennoinen has shown, the Finnish State Police assisted *Einsatzkommando Finnland* (charged with extraditing POWs to Germany) in northern Finland in selecting POWs to be exterminated. Occasionally Finns also took part in the executions.[37]

While in public discussion, Finland became associated with the genocide of European Jewry, the willingness of Finnish officials to take part in resolving the Jewish question remained at the level of speculation. The Holocaust remained a visibly framing issue, and the questions raised seemed often to aim at Finnish guilt. Is anti-Communism used as an excuse, since being labelled a political prisoner was a sentence of death as being Jewish? The brutal and uncomfortable fact is that Finland sent almost 3,000 people to almost certain death.[38] The Holocaust has played a central part in European self-awareness, and indeed in the historical polity of Europe. One consequence of Sana's *Luovutetut* was the possible inclusion of Finland among the *perpetrators* in this discursive field. In this sense, by challenging a dominant history policy for interpreting the Continuation War, Sana upset the history polity itself, the vision of the Continuation War and Finland's "unavoidable" participation in it.

In her speech for the Tieto-Finlandia award Sana pointed out that there had been a mistake in international reports about her results, and she apologized for the fact that the word "political" had been omitted from her sentence "Finland extradited over 500 political and Jewish prisoners of war," which had led to the widespread notion that Finland had extradited more than 500 *Jewish* POWs. Sana found it impossible to correct a phrase that had been repeated by international news agencies, and also regretted the incorrectly reported claim attributed to her that Finland had extradited Jews who were Finnish citizens. A news analyst, Pirkko-Liisa Kastari, also pointed out how misleading headlines had contributed to the heat of the debate—particularly sensitive when the issue relates to the Holocaust.[39] Public debate from the start was blinded by a nodal point of the modern European history polity: the Holocaust.

Sana's revision of history policy brought Finland's history of anti-Communism to bear on its wartime extradition practices. The struggle against Bolshevism constituted an integral, common denominator for cooperation between the Finnish State Police, the Swedish State Police, and the Gestapo. The combination of being a Communist, a refugee, and a Jew was fatal in Finland during the Continuation War—in that very order.[40] According to Max Jakobson, a leading Finnish Jewish intellectual, diplomat, and a war veteran himself, who wrote an extensive review of *Luovutetut*, the cruelties

of the Nazi regime and the violations of international human rights were silenced when Finland followed Germany into the war. For Jakobson, the crucial new information in Sana's book was that in the context of the war, human rights were easily abandoned by Finland, which has often claimed to have been above such actions. Thus, Sana threw one of the key *driftwood* assertions into question: the claim that Finland had remained a democratic state and respected human rights despite being in alliance with the totalitarian Third Reich. Jakobson undermined the answer given by Prime Minister Jukka Rangell to Heinrich Himmler: "*Wir haben keine Judenfrage*"—a reply that ended the allies' discussion of the status of Jews with Finnish citizenship, which is generally taken to mark Finland's unequivocal protection of "its" Jewish population.[41]

In his report to the Finnish government, Heikki Ylikangas supported the notion that anti-Communism was the key criterion for the extraditions, suggesting that there is no evidence that Finland deported or extradited people to Nazi Germany solely on the grounds of race or religion.[42] Ylikangas proposed several research projects, of which the most important was one examining all extraditions of both civilians and POWs to Germany during the war and to the Soviet Union after the war. The Academy of Finland declared this proposal for a major research project on the extraditions and deaths of POWs to be of urgent national importance, not only for historiographical reasons, but also for Finnish culture as a whole, for the openness of political debate, and for democracy. [43] Sana's pressure on history policy affected the history polity: it was the duty of an open and democratic society to allocate resources to research decisive moments in the state's history, even if it revealed uncomfortable information about the past.

But the consequences of *Luovutetut* extended beyond a revision of Continuation War policies; they touched on the deeper role that anti-Communism has played in the national themes of Finland's history polity. The struggle against Communism has been part of Finland's official ideology since the early years of independence, and the mere threat of Communism could be used to justify extreme measures. A consequence of this harsh ideological stance was that leftism could be demonized and Communists could be dehumanized, left without the protection of human rights.[44] During the interwar years (1918–39) Communism was often imagined as a greater threat than war. In this sense, Sana's attention to the political dimension of the extraditions resonates with a much larger history, implying that Finland's involvement in World War II can be explained as a consequence of the country's official foreign policy and a long-standing, prevalent political atmosphere, not in terms of self-victimization and demonization of the Soviet Union.

Sana's impact on the history polity was recognized with the publication of *Luovutetut*, though the nature of that impact has taken some time to emerge fully. Among the Jewish community, Rony Smolar, the biographer

of Abraham Stiller (who actively resisted the extradition of Jewish refugees in 1942), wrote forthrightly that "it is to be hoped that the Finnish authorities will now face facts they have ignored since the end of the war."[45] Jörn Donner, a former Swedish Party MP and Social Democratic Party Member of the European Parliament, said that there are various black holes in Finland's past, and denying them is why he sometimes feels sick in Finland.[46] Later, Green Party MP Irina Krohn declared that the dark sides of Finland's history must be revealed and that the genocide of European Jewry must not be forgotten—especially now [in 2004] when the EU was attempting to create a new, humane constitution for itself, continuing that "one of the key elements of national identity, the Continuation War, has been made into mush, according to which Finland has always only tried to do the honorable thing."[47] To Professor Jukka Kekkonen, *Luovutetut* had touched a sore spot in Finnish history, which has mainly tried to legitimate the success story of a small country surviving in the tumult of world politics; writing history in Finland, it is more common and more applauded to write books that praise great men than to conduct critical research into their actions, with the result that any aspects of the past uncomfortable to those in power are often left undisturbed. This opinion was shared by the historian Jari Sedergren, for whom it is precisely the political task of critical historiography to remember the dark sides of the past.[48]

At the Tieto-Finlandia award ceremony, journalist Hannu Taanila, who chose *Luovutetut* for the prize, remarked that *Luovutetut* had provoked "typical hooray-nationalist mumbo-jumbo" from those people who think that "one should not pry into things that one should not pry into." He suggested that the belief that Finland is never a willing agent but a "virgo semper immaculata" is extremely useful: it relieves Finland of responsibility, both politically and, more importantly, morally.[49] His comments were echoed two weeks later by the President of Finland, Tarja Halonen, at a ceremony on Holocaust Victims' International Day of Commemoration, who reminded her listeners that the day of commemoration exists to reinforce the importance of universal human rights. Referring to *Luovutetut*, she said that the time seemed ripe for a critical examination of the issue, since it was "vital for national self-esteem that its collective mind is not traumatized by unsettled issues." This reexamination is especially "important now, when signs of racism and antisemitism are becoming more visible all the time."[50] Sana had, apparently, altered the history polity of the war, and the sustaining landscape of contemporary Finnish political discourse as well.

Finally, Sana's impact on representing Finland in the Continuation War is visible in another, more direct way: in the accusation that by reframing the dominant history policy she misrepresented the facts, as they had come to be accepted within the polity of conservative professional historians. Even before official publication of the book, Hannu Rautkallio proclaimed that *Luovutetut* could not contain new information, since the material used

for its writing was available in different archives to anyone who bothered to look. Rautkallio's own studies—based mainly on official documents—on Jews in Finland during World War II make a strong claim that apart from the eight refugees who were deported in 1942 (many of whom had earlier criminal convictions), the rest of the refugees as well as the Finnish Jews were saved from the Holocaust. None of the Finnish Jews were deported; moreover, many took part in Finland's alliance with Germany, a sign of their security within the Finnish state. Rautkallio also claimed that Jewish POWs were treated exceptionally well in comparison to other prisoners, precisely because they were kept separate, held in their own group with privileges relating, for example, to religious practices. Consequently, Rautkallio stated that there are only speculative reasons why Jewish POWs were concentrated in certain camps in 1941–42. Rautkallio is adamant: being a Jew was definitely not grounds for extradition.[51] Finnish Jews did fight on the same side with Germany and were protected from the impact of the racial policies of the Nazis; nonetheless, it is not hard to imagine what consequences would have emerged for them had the Third Reich been victorious. The latest academic research has shown that these Jews and political prisoners—contrary to Rautkallio's claims—were not privileged. In contrast, prisoners of Finnic background (Ingrians and Karelians) were located in a separate camp with better conditions and treatment than were to be found at camps for Jews, Cossacks, and Russians—who were at the bottom of the hierarchy.[52]

The more serious effort to discredit Sana's accounts was the argument that she *intentionally* connected Finland to the Holocaust, in spite of the conservative history polity consensus. For Rautkallio, the first and most important research question should be *why no more people had been deported* or extradited from Finland during World War II, and not *why those specific individuals were extradited*. Rautkallio implies that the value of a human being can be measured in quantity, that the fate of those deported or extradited is overshadowed by the majority of those who were not; he criticizes Sana for associating Finland with the Holocaust without understanding the historical reality of the time. Sana's interpretation of the criteria of extraditions—Jewishness, Communism, and their mixture—was simply ignored by Rautkallio, who insisted there was no documentary proof of anyone being extradited due to ethnicity. Rautkallio concluded that Sana clearly had selected her material to support her *a priori* aims, to drag Finland into the sphere of all-European collective guilt for the Holocaust. In this sense, Sana resembled David Irving: by manipulating their sources they have attempted to lead their readers to accept their—for Rautkallio suspicious—points of departure. Finally, Rautkallio claimed that *Luovutetut* had been published exactly at the right time for the Wiesenthal Center because the Center seemed to have run out of targets. Thus, he proclaimed, the request by the Wiesenthal Center to the government of Finland was made only in order to create publicity in international media.[53]

If, as Rautkallio and others suggested, Finnish cooperation with the Gestapo was yesterday's news, then the furor aroused by *Luovutetut* reveals the involvement of the history establishment in constructing and maintaining the history polity.[54] A journalist by profession, Elina Sana made explicit her suspicion of established historiographers in several public comments, suggesting that the extraditions and cooperation with the Nazis had been a topic academic historians had avoided. In her acceptance speech for the Tieto-Finlandia prize she suggested that "this book has touched some kind of crucial nerve of Finnishness: people have sent me mountains of emails, letters, flowers, and their own writing on the topic, and some journalists have even started to conduct local research on extraditions and POWs," implying that academic accounts of the past have detached themselves from reality and from people's own memories of what actually happened.[55] *Luovutetut* was not only a criticism of the alleged ivory tower of established historiography, but also animated the historical silence imposed on individual experience. Sana's book gave voice to those whom the state-sponsored academic history polity disciplined into silence, artificially homogenizing national identity for decades.

Luovutetut, then, touched on many themes of the prevailing history polity: antisemitism, anti-Communism, the role of official Finland in the Continuation War alliance, the impact of the war on the Finnish national self-conception, the role of professional historians in preserving a specific vision of the state. Surprisingly, in the patriotic fervor of the post-Soviet era, Sana was also seen as part of another troubling narrative of Finland's past, not the wartime alliance but as a remnant of the Finlandization era of self-blame and mortification. While leftist newspapers, such as *Kansan Uutiset* and *Uutispäivä Demari*, emphasized the importance of Sana's results, the overtly rightist and moderate press was far more suspicious, discrediting Sana as a human rights activist and a left-wing writer. *Nykypäivä*, the newspaper of the right-wing National Coalition Party, described *Luovutetut* as an example of misleading "Holocaust fiction."[56] In other papers, it was branded as "political," "outrageously biased," "a political pamphlet," "subjective," "leftist," "purposeful," "a jumble of fact and fiction," "manipulative" and "poppycock."[57] Moreover, *Nykypäivä* demanded the withdrawal of the Tieto-Finlandia prize, because Elina Sana's "political pamphlet" had beaten out proper research.[58] Sana, it was alleged, was idolizing those who had fought on the Red side during the Civil War of 1918 and were later imprisoned during World War II, although they were clearly "minions of foreign powers."[59] It seemed to her critics that Sana had forgotten that Finland was at war against the Soviet Union's Communism. The accusation was extended to include Hannu Taanila, also a leftist writer, after he chose *Luovutetut* as the winner of the Tieto-Finlandia, as we have seen.[60] Again, Taanila's labeling of the extradition debate as "hooray patriotic mumbo-jumbo" was seen as typical of the discussion of *Luovutetut*: opposing voices were silenced

or stigmatized in advance. Ylikangas also received his share of ideological criticism: it was claimed that his proposal to start several research projects was the least he could do, but luckily "the mafia behind Elina Sana did not fully have its way."[61] In addition, Colonel Jukka Suviniemi proclaimed that "Sana's and Taanila's bias was understandable based on their previous actions," but the colonel was astonished since it seemed to him that Ylikangas had tactically not acknowledged the existing information regarding the extraditions (for example research by Ohto Manninen) in order to receive governmental funding for "certain research projects."[62] Sana's book, then, was seen by the right as part of a long-term, Communist-inflected effort to undermine the consensual—and correct—history polity. History should be left to the specialists, and amateurs should not intervene in order to "manipulate the past"; a left-wing perspective automatically denotes being dubiously, unacceptably "political."[63]

Luovutetut and its view of Finland as a pragmatic actor politicizes the notion of Finland as a passive victim of world politics. Similar acts of politicization have transpired more recently: a debate took place in 2007–8 when Heikki Ylikangas fairly questioned the existing (low) figures of executed wartime deserters during the Continuation War and the alleged apoliticality of the military institution in the 1920s and 1930s. Again, a group of conservative researchers launched a counterattack—in many cases in order to defend their own results. The Continuation War history polity thus is far from congealed, but in order fully to comprehend the various politicizations and depoliticizations one needs to relate them to earlier history policies constitutive of the polity.

The extent and intensity of the debate imply that the ideological background to the Continuation War and the politico-cultural atmosphere of the 1930s are topics that have been depoliticized after the so-called patriotic turn—a cultural and political revival of patriotic and right-wing themes—of the 1990s, at least in popular spheres of history culture. The repercussions of the rightist hegemony and anti-Communism in Finland during the interwar decades indeed need to be reexamined in terms different from those raised when the matter was aired in the late 1960s and 1970s. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 also affected Finnish history politics; a new consensus emerged among the general public as well as among a considerable number of historians that public recognition of the right-wing hegemony and its consequences before and during World War II was made only for political reasons, to appease Finland's eastern neighbor. In other words, the political character of the initial interpretations of the war has been somewhat neglected and has been used in efforts to restore the boundaries of the Continuation War history polity, often in ways that deny the political character of historiography.

As Hannah Arendt repeatedly emphasized, human rights and dignity are not facts of nature, but political products constantly jeopardized by the

imperatives of national sovereignty or interest.[64] *Luovutetut* and its reception reveal the ongoing force and attraction of the idea that Finland has been heroically exceptional in its wars. At least until recently, Finland has been relatively distanced from the European discussion about coming to terms with the most difficult aspects of its century past. The initial public reaction to *Luovutetut* was dramatic, as the public was asked to question the myth of exceptionality, traditionally one of the main elements in the construction of national identity. However, the media frenzy aroused by the insinuations about Finland's role in the Holocaust overshadowed the more profound ideological critique. The moral and political consequences of Finland's ideological choices were dealt with superficially, since public discussion of *Luovutetut* was already waning when the anti-Communist argument captured the stage. The complex questions concerning Finland's political choices in World War II are far from settled, since precisely such ideological policies often provided an officially accepted façade, obscuring the antisemitic consequences of a shared historical polity.

Notes

1. Elina Sana, *Luovutetut: Suomen ihmisluovutukset Gestapolle* (Helsinki: WSOY, 2003). Unless otherwise noted, all translations into English are my own.
2. World War II in the Finnish context is divided into three parts: the defensive Winter War (1939–40) against the Soviet Union, the offensive Continuation War (1941–44) with Germany, and the Lapland War (1944–45) to oust the German troops from Finland. At the end of the Continuation War almost 200,000 German soldiers were posted in Finland.
3. Edgar Wolfrum, "Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1989: Phasen und Kontroversen" [History politics in the Federal Republic of Germany 1949–1989: Phases and Controversies], in *Umkämpfte Vergangenheit* [The embattled past], ed. Edgar Wolfrum and Petra Bock (Göttingen: Vandehoeck and Rubrecht, 1999), 55–81; Seppo Hentilä, "Löytyykö totuus komissioista? Historiantutkimus ja totuuskomissiot" [Is the truth to be found from commissions? Historiography and truth commissions], *Tieteessä tapahtuu*, no. 8 (2005): 7–12; Seppo Hentilä, "Historiapolitiikka: Holocaust ja historian julkinen käyttö" [History politics: The Holocaust and the public use of history], in *Jokapäiväinen historia*, ed. Jorma Kalela and Ilari Lindroos (Helsinki: SKS, 2001), 26–30; Pilvi Torsti, "Historiapolitiikkaa tutkimaan: Historian poliittisen käytön typologian kehittelyä" [Towards research of history politics: The development of the typologies of the political use of history], *Kasvatus ja aika*, no. 2 (2008): 62–3; Jorma Kalela, "Politics of History and History Politics: Some Conceptuals Suggestions as to Political Aspects of History," in *Ajankohta*, Poliittisen historian vuosikirja 2004, ed. Johanna Valenius (Turku: Helsingin ja Turun yliopistot, 2004), 16–18; Kari Palonen, "Four Times of Politics: Policy, Polity, Politicking and Politicization," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 28, no. 2 (2003): 172–82.
4. Indeed, even the label—Continuation War—dramatizes the rhetoric of history policy. In 1941, the war was initially called the "summer war" since it was expected to be over within a couple of weeks. However, as the war was prolonged,

it was renamed the Continuation War, based on the argument that it was a continuation of the defensive Winter War. "The Continuation War" well suited the official war propaganda, in which Finland was depicted as a defender and an outpost of Western civilization; the term, in this sense, distracted attention from Finland's involvement in an offensive war. The consequences of metaphor, narrative models, and even the genre of national narrative—tragic, comic, ironic—are deeply inscribed into the practices of politicizing history. On the relationship between figural language, the rhetoric of narration, and history, see Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 7–42; Kenneth Burke, *On Symbols and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 77–85; see also Frank R. Ankersmit, *Historical Representation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words,* ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sibisá (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).

5. The 13th article of the Moscow Armistice stated that "Finland shall co-operate with Allied Powers to arrest and pass judgment on those accused of war crimes." Initially, the list of names presented by the Allied Control Commission included only high military personnel, and it was thought that withdrawal from politics would be enough for the war-time political leaders. However, the situation changed after the London Charter in August 1945, which explicated a typology of war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity, to try the Axis Powers. It became evident that the Soviet Union would demand that these principles would be applied also to Finnish politicians—in the light of Nuremberg trials it would not have been acceptable that Finland, an ally of Germany, would not have to bring its wartime leaders into court. Consequently, the Finnish parliament passed an *ex post facto* law in order to enable the prosecution of those deemed responsible for the war.
6. Charles Leonard Lundin, *Finland in the Second World War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957).
7. John Henry Wuorinen, ed., *Finland and World War II, 1939–1944* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948); C. G. E. Mannerheim, *The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim,* trans. Eric Lewenhaupt (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1954). Wuorinen's book was based on a manuscript by Finnish officer and historian Arvi Korhonen.
8. Lundin, *Finland in the Second World War*, 194, 196–222.
9. Edwin Linkomies was appointed as prime minister for the purpose of disengaging Finland from the war. In 1944 Linkomies's government negotiated for peace twice, but on both occasions deemed that the conditions set by the Soviet Union were too harsh. Instead, President Risto Ryti and Linkomies decided to accept German help and thus enhanced Finland's ties to Germany. After the massive Soviet counteroffensive in 1944 Linkomies (and Ryti) resigned and thus the new government led by Antti Hackzell could start fresh negotiations for detaching Finland from the war.
10. Arvi Korhonen, *Barbarossa-suunnitelma ja Suomi* [The Barbarossa plan and Finland] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1961); Wipert von Blücher, *Suomen kohtalonaikoja: Muistelmia vuosilta 1935–44* [Finland's times of destiny: Memoirs of the years 1935–1944] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1950), 237.
11. Anthony Frederick Upton, *Finland in Crisis 1940–1941: A Study in Small-Power Politics* (London: Faber and Faber, 1964); Hans Peter Krosby, *Suomen valinta 1941,* trans. Erkki Ihanainen (Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 1967). The English version of Krosby's research was published as *Finland, Germany, and the Soviet Union* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968).

12. Krosby, *Suomen valinta,* 9–11, 15–23.
13. *Finnlandisierung* (literally, "to become or to be made like Finland") is a concept originally used in German debate of 1950s and 1960s to criticize policies that were extensively pro-Soviet Union. Timo Soikkanen, "Uhri vai hyökkääjä? Jatkosodan synty historiankirjoituksen kuvaamana" [Victim or aggressor? The origin of the Continuation War as described by historiography], in *Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen* [The encyclopedia of the Continuation War], ed. Jari Leskinen and Antti Juutilainen (Helsinki: WSOY, 2005), 28–38; Timo Vihavainen, *Kansakunta rähmällään: Suomettumisen lyhyt historia* [A nation debased: A brief history of Finlandization] (Helsinki: Otava, 1991), 33, 41; Kari Palonen, "The Art of the Possible on the Periphery: J. K. Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen in the Realpolitik Tradition," in *Transformation of Ideas on a Periphery*, ed. Jukka Kanerva and Kari Palonen (Helsinki: Finnish Political Science Association, 1987), 110–15.
14. The idea was supported by one of Finland's most famous historians, Eino Jutikkala. Professor Jutikkala was the so-called grand old man of Finnish historiography, with an academic career spanning more than eight decades and including hundreds of publications. During the Continuation War, Jutikkala worked in the state propaganda unit and published (with two other professors) *Finnlands Lebensraum* in 1941; Väinö Auer, Eino Jutikkala, and Kustaa Vilkuna, *Finnlands Lebensraum* [Finland's Living Space] (Berlin: A. Metzner, 1941). Initiated by the political leaders of Finland, the book was aimed at a German audience and it purported provide a "scientific" basis for Finland's territorial claims in the East after the Third Reich and its allies had occupied the Soviet Union.
15. Mauno Jokipii*, Jatkosodan synty: Tutkimuksia Suomen ja Saksan sotilaallisesta yhteistyöstä 1940–41* [The origin of the Continuation War: Studies on Finland's and Germany's military cooperation 1940–41] (Helsinki: Otava, 1987).
16. This attitude is perhaps still reflected in the outcome of the 2004 "greatest Finn of all time" contest organized by Yleisradio (Finnish broadcasting company): Risto Ryti finished second to another wartime leader, Marshall C. G. E. Mannerheim.
17. The idea of defensive victory is derived from the events of summer 1944, when the Soviet Union, synchronizing its actions with the invasion of Normandy, began a massive counteroffensive against the Finnish troops in Karelia. Although the Finnish army had to retreat in panic, the attack was eventually blocked with German help, and Finland was not occupied by Soviet forces. General, veteran and national icon Adolf Ehrnrooth stated that the Winter War and the Continuation War resembled heroic tales of antiquity, in which a small defender crushes an overwhelming offender. Ehrnrooth also declared his annoyance with interpretations claiming that Finland had lost the Continuation War. He said that such interpretations twisted history, for "how can we have lost if we had achieved the aims we had set for ourselves? By fighting and through heavy sacrifices Finland remained independent and autonomous, which were the common goals of our nation. We achieved these aims, and so we did not lose the war." Adolf Ehrnrooth and Maija-Liisa Lehtonen, *Kenraalin testamentti* [General's testament] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1994), 9, 147–54.
18. For a similar debate in Germany see Ernst Piper, ed., *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? The Dispute about Germans' Understanding of History* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993).
19. For up-to-date presentations of Finland and the Holocaust see Antero Holmila, "Finland and the Holocaust: A Reassessment," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 23, no. 3 (2009); Hana Worthen, "Tip of the Iceberg? Finland and the Holocaust,"

East European Jewish Affairs 39, no. 1 (2009); Oula Silvennoinen, "Still Under Examination: Coming to Terms with Finland's Alliance with Nazi Germany," *Yad Vashem Studies* 37, no. 2 (2009); see also William B. Cohen and Jörgen Svensson, "Finland and the Holocaust," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 9, no. 1 (1995).

20. See Christopher S. Browning, *Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Finland* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2008), 221–70.
21. See Heikki Ylikangas, *Romahtaatko rintama? Suomi puna-armeijan puristuksessa keväällä 1944* [Will the front collapse? Finland under the pressure of the Red Army in spring 1944] (Helsinki: Otava, 2007); Jukka Kulomaa and Jarmo Nieminen, eds., *Teloitettu totuus: Kesä 1944* [Executed truth: Summer 1944] (Helsinki: Ajatus, 2008); Oula Silvennoinen, *Salaiset aseveljet: Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933–1944* [Secret brothers-in-arms: The cooperation of the Finnish and German security police 1933–1944] (Helsinki: Otava, 2008). For example, earlier conceptions related to deserters, conscientious objectors, and Finnish soldiers executed by the military itself have been politicized by challenging the "truths" found in official wartime documents. A similar act of politicization has been made in relation to the cooperation of Finnish State Police and the German SS.
22. Markku Jokisipilä, *Aseveljiä vai liittolaisia? Suomi, Hitlerin Saksan liittosopimusvaatimukset ja Rytin–Ribbentropin sopimus* [Brothers-in-arms or allies? Finland, the demands of the alliance agreement with Hitler's Germany and the Ryti–Ribbentrop agreement] (Helsinki: SKS, 2004). Tarja Halonen, presidential speech at L'Institut français des relations internationales, March 1, 2005, accessed March 31, 2011, http://www.presidentti.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=175255&nodeid=41417&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI.
23. See Markku Jokisipilä, "'Kappas vaan, saksalaisia!': Keskustelu Suomen jatkosodan 1941–1944 luonteesta" ["Germans, how about that!": The debate about the nature of Finland's Continuation War 1941–1944], in *Sodan totuudet: Yksi suomalainen vastaa 5,7 ryssää* [War's truths: One Finn equals 5.7 Russkies], ed. Markku Jokisipilä (Helsinki: Ajatus, 2007), 153–60; Seppo Varjus, "Tutkija ihmettelee Halosen erillissotaa" [Researcher wonders about Halonen's separate war], *Ilta-Sanomat*, March 7, 2005, 11.
24. "Professori hautaisi erillissota-käsitteen" [Professor would dismiss the concept of the separate war], *Helsingin Sanomat*, October 4, 2008, C4. In a survey conducted in October 2008 by *Helsingin Sanomat*, 16 out of 28 Finnish professors of history held the opinion that Finland was Germany's ally, whereas six professors saw Finland as having waged a separate war. Six professors did not give a clear answer. See Esa Mäkinen, "Historian professorit hautaavat pitkät kiistat" [History professors bury old quarrels], *Helsingin Sanomat*, October 18, 2008, C1.
25. Sana, *Luovutetut*, 293, 350–3.
26. See Elina Suominen [Sana], *Kuolemanlaiva s/s Hohenhörn: Juutalaispakolaisten kohtalo Suomessa* [Death ship SS Hohenhörn: The fate of the Jewish refugees in Finland] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1979).
27. Leena Kekkonen, "Viikon hän: Elina Sana" [Person of the week: Elina Sana], *Suomen Kuvalehti*, no. 48 (2003): 53; Hilkka Kotkamaa, "En ole väittänytkään löytäneeni mitään salaista aineistoa" [I have never claimed to have discovered any secret material], *Uutispäivä Demari*, January 5, 2004, 12.
28. Semy Kahan, "Synkkä historia selvitettävä" [Grim history must be investigated], *Keskisuomalainen*, November 22, 2003, 14; Editorial, *Iisalmen Sanomat*, January 17, 2004, 2.

29. Simon Wiesenthal Center, "Wiesenthal Centre Calls for Full Investigation of Finnish Deportations to Nazi Germany and Punishment of Those Responsible," November 18, 2003, accessed September 28, 2006, http://www.wiesenthal.com/site/apps/s/content.asp?c=fwLYKnN8LzH&b=253162&ct=25948; Juha Pärssinen, "Wiesenthal-keskus vaatii tutkimusta natsiluovutuksista," *Iltalehti*, November 19, 2003, 14; Juha Pärssinen, "Suomi selvittää ihmisluovutukset natseille" [Finland investigates extraditions to Nazi Germany], *Iltalehti*, November 20, 2003, 2; "Hallitus selvittää luovutukset Saksaan" [The government investigates extraditions to Germany], *Kouvolan Sanomat*, November 20, 2003, 10.
30. Kirsti Pohjonen, "Ylikangas esittää uutta tutkimusta sotahistorian aukkojen paikkaamiseksi" [Ylikangas presents new research to fill the gaps in war history], *Turun Sanomat*, January 17, 2004, 14; Pasi Jaakkonen, "Ei todisteita!" [No proof!], *Ilta-Sanomat*, January 17, 2004, 8.
31. Silvennoinen, *Salaiset aseveljet.* The report of the project is available online in English: Lars Westerlund, ed., *Prisoners of War Deaths and People Handed Over to Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939–55: A Research Report by the Finnish National Archives* (Helsinki: National Archives, 2008), accessed August 1, 2011, http://www.arkisto.fi/uploads/Palvelut/Julkaisut/POW%20deaths_web.pdf.
32. Unto Hämäläinen, "Enemmän kuin ne kahdeksan" [More than those eight], *Helsingin Sanomat*, November 1, 2003, D3.
33. Sana, *Luovutetut*, 19.
34. See Suominen, *Kuolemanlaiva s/s Hohenhörn*, 23–66.
35. Kekkonen, "Viikon hän: Elina Sana," 51–3.
36. Hitler's *Kommissarbefehl* (issued June 6, 1941) ordered that any Soviet political commissar identified among captured troops be executed immediately as an enforcer of Communist ideology and the Soviet Communist Party line in the military. Finland signed the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 25, 1941. In addition to being in line with Finland's anti-Communist policies, this agreement also guaranteed grain deliveries from Germany to Finland. However, Finland's joining the pact and Finland's advance over pre-Winter War borders in Karelia was the main reason why Great Britain declared war on Finland in December 1941.
37. Kai Hirvasnoro, "Suomi ei selvinnyt puhtain paperein holokaustista" [No clean sheet for Finland in the Holocaust], *Kansan Uutiset*, November 14, 2003, 7; see also Eeva Nikkilä-Kiipula, "Suomalaiset luovuttivat tuhansia ihmisiä Gestapolle jatkosodan aikana" [Finns extradited thousands of people to the Gestapo during the Continuation War], *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat*, November 11, 2003, 7; Antti Hietalahti, "Luovutetut vaatii vastauksia" [Extradited demand answers], *Keskipohjanmaa*, November 23, 2003, 18; Eeva Nikkilä-Kiipula, "Suomalaiset luovuttivat tuhansia ihmisiä Gestapolle jatkosodan aikana" [Finns extradited thousands of people to the Gestapo during the Continuation War], *Länsi-Suomi*, November 11, 2003, 4; Eeva Nikkilä-Kiipula, "Suomesta luovutettiin tuhansia Gestapolle" [Thousands extradited from Finland to the Gestapo], *Karjalainen,* November 11, 2003, 9; Eeva Nikkilä-Kiipula, "Gestapo sai tuhansia ihmisiä Suomesta jatkosodan aikana" [Gestapo received thousands of people from Finland during the Continuation War], *Keskisuomalainen*, November 11, 2003, 8. Silvennoinen, *Salaiset aseveljet*, 219–26, 279, 333–6.
38. Timo Mikkilä, "Suomesta luovutettiin sotavuosina 3 000 ihmistä" [3,000 people extradited from Finland during the war years], *Suomenmaa*, November 11, 2003, 15; Seppo Turunen, "Ei kahdeksan, vaan 2 829" [Not eight but 2,829], *Kainuun Sanomat*, November 12, 2003, 1; Juhana Lepoluoto, "Politiikka saneli luovutukset"

[Politics dictated extraditions], *Keskisuomalainen*, November 20, 2003, 16. Professor Timo Vihavainen in turn pointed out that anyone who considers extraditing POWs to Germans morally wrong or criminal must be able to show that these people were to be treated against international laws. According to him, although some Finns probably knew about Hitler's Commissar Order and the ongoing genocide, research must find out what was known and what was not, though such research would not necessarily liberate Finnish officials from their responsibility. Timo Vihavainen, "Tiedot ja luulot kansalaisten muistissa" [Facts and beliefs in citizens' memory], *Kanava*, no. 1 (2004): 79–80.

39. Elina Sana, speech at the Tieto-Finlandia Award Ceremony, January 8, 2004, accessed November 23, 2010, http://www.kustantajat.fi/kirjasaatio/palkinnot/tietofinlandia/tietofinlandia2004/default.aspx; Pirkko-Liisa Kastari, "Paljon melua Sanasta" [Much ado about Sana], *Journalisti*, no. 5 (2004): 3.
40. Camilla Berggren, "Tretusen utlämnades till Gestapo" [3,000 extradited to the Gestapo], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, November 11, 2003, 5; Eeva Nikkilä-Kiipula, "Suomalaiset luovuttivat tuhansia ihmisiä Gestapolle jatkosodan aikana," *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat*, November 11, 2003, 7; Eeva Nikkilä-Kiipula, "Suomalaiset luovuttivat tuhansia ihmisiä Gestapolle jatkosodan aikana," *Länsi-Suomi*, November 11, 2003, 4.
41. Max Jakobson, "Säälimätöntä peliä ihmisoikeuksilla" [Cruel game with human rights], *Helsingin Sanomat*, November 11, 2003, C5.
42. Heikki Ylikangas, *Selvitys valtioneuvoston kanslialle*, Valtioneuvoston kanslian julkaisusarja 5 (Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 2004), 7–8, 24–6, 33–6.
43. Although the Wiesenthal Centre hoped that Heikki Ylikangas would continue to play a leading role in the investigation of the extraditions and that the research project would be carried out in international cooperation, the project was conducted by an all-Finnish research team led by Lars Westerlund of the National Archives of Finland. See Simon Wiesenthal Center, "SWC Welcomes Call for Full Investigation of Finnish World War II Deportations to Nazi Germany and Urges Finnish Government to Appoint Historical Commission to Do So," January 16, 2004, accessed August 10, 2011, http://www.wiesenthal.com/site/apps/s/content.asp?c=lsKWLbPJLnF&b=4442915&ct=5852157.
44. See Vilho Harle, *The Enemy with Thousand Faces: The Tradition of the Other in Western Political Thought and History* (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 159–86; Browning, *Constructivism,* 129–39.
45. Rony Smolar, "Totuus esiin luovutuksista" [Truth about the extraditions must be revealed], *Helsingin Sanomat*, November 24, 2003, A 5.
46. Jörn Donner, "Mustat aukot" [Black holes], *Ilta-Sanomat*, November 20, 2003, 4.
47. Irina Krohn, "Menneisyyden varjossa" [In the shadow of the past], *Vihreä Lanka*, January 24, 2004, 16.
48. Hirvasnoro, "Suomi ei selvinnyt puhtain paperein holokaustista," 7; Jukka Kekkonen, "Kirja osuu arkaan aiheeseen" [Book hits a sore spot], *Kansan Uutiset*, November 11, 2003, 8; Jari Sedergren, "Historiasta keskustellaan taas" [History under discussion again], *Ennen ja nyt*, no. 4 (2003), accessed August 17, 2011, http://www.ennenjanyt.net/4-03/paak.htm.
49. Hannu Taanila, speech at the Tieto-Finlandia Award Ceremony, January 8, 2004, accessed June 10, 2011, http://www.kustantajat.fi/kirjasaatio/palkinnot/tietofinlandia/tietofinlandia2004/valitsija/default.aspx.
50. Tarja Halonen, presidential speech on Holocaust Memorial Day, January 27, 2004, accessed November 22, 2010, http://www.presidentti.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=174627&nodeid=41417&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI.

51. Juha Pärssinen, "Tutkijat kiistelevät sota-ajan luovutuksista" [Researchers in dispute about war-time extraditions], *Iltalehti*, November 3, 2003, 6; see also Hannu Rautkallio, *Finland and the Holocaust: The Rescue of Finland's Jews*, trans. Paul Sjöblom (New York: Holocaust Library, 1987); Hannu Rautkallio, "Cast into the Lion's Den: Finnish Jewish Soldiers in the Second World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 29, no. 1 (1994); Hannu Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut* [Spared from the Holocaust] (Helsinki: WSOY, 2004); Hannu Rautkallio, *The Jews in Finland: Spared from the Holocaust*, trans. Eugene Holman (n.p.: EC-Books, 2008). There seems to be a personal dimension of the strife between Rautkallio and Sana as well. Hannu Rautkallio was annoyed by Sana's omission of his own research from her sources; under attack, Sana responded that Rautkallio's own initial research on the topic (in 1985) plagiarized her award-winning 1979 study. See Elina Sana, "En kiellä sanomasta" [I do not forbid myself to speak], *Journalisti*, no. 6 (2004): 5; Suominen, *Kuolemanlaiva s/s Hohenhörn*.
52. Ida Suolahti, "Prisoner of War Transfers During the Continuation War," in *Prisoners of War Deaths and People Handed Over to Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939–55: A Research Report by the Finnish National Archives*, ed. Lars Westerlund (Helsinki: National Archives, 2008), 153–4, accessed August 1, 2011, http://www.arkisto.fi/uploads/Palvelut/Julkaisut/POW%20deaths_web.pdf.
53. Hannu Rautkallio, "Manipulointia juutalaisten luovutuksilla" [Manipulation with the extradition of the Jews], *Kanava*, no. 1 (2004): 33–4.
54. Rautkallio's criticism of Sana's work was supported by counsellor and historian Ilmari Laukkonen who stated that Rautkallio's arguments were "so convincing and the issue in question so familiar to him that there is no hesitation that his assessment would not be on the mark." Also, Laukkonen proclaimed that despite all the commotion, one truth remained: the world would not become better by delving in "old, difficult crises." Ilmari Laukkonen, "Tutkijan ankara tuomio" [Researcher's stern verdict], *Pohjalainen*, January 21, 2004, 2.
55. Sana, speech at the Tieto-Finlandia Award Ceremony; Kotkamaa, "En ole väittänytkään löytäneeni mitään salaista aineistoa," 12.
56. Hirvasnoro, "Suomi ei selvinnyt puhtain paperein holokaustista," 7; Rolf Bamberg, "Hannu Taanila antoi asialle arvon" [Hannu Taanila recognized the topic's value], *Uutispäivä Demari*, January 9, 2004, 18; Jarmo Virmavirta, "Sanan pamfletti ohitti todellisia tietokirjoja" [Sana's pamphlet surpassed real research books], *Nykypäivä*, February 6, 2004, 12.
57. For example Martti Turtola, "Sekava kirja vankienvaihdosta" [Confusing book about prisoner exchange], *Kouvolan Sanomat*, November 23, 2003, 24; "Tieto-Finlandia-palkinnon saanut sotavankikirja taitaa olla himphamppua" [Tieto-Finlandia winning book on POWs seems to be poppycock], *Uusi Lahti*, January 28, 2004, 4.
58. Pointedly, Professor Jukka Kekkonen stated that *Luovutetut* is research that fulfils academic requirements, and that it is extremely difficult to reject it based on such criteria. Kekkonen, "Kirja osuu arkaan aiheeseen," 8.
59. Virmavirta, "Sanan pamfletti ohitti todellisia tietokirjoja," 12.
60. Hannu Taanila, "Taanila vastaa Finlandia-päätöksestä" [Taanila is responsible for Finlandia decision], *Aamulehti*, January 17, 2004, 25; Kim Lindblom, "Mihin katosi tuomarin puolueettomuus?" [Where did the judge lose his objectivity?], *Aamulehti*, January 25, 2004, 24; Jukka Suviniemi, "Jatkosodan sotavankitutkimukset" [Research on the Continuation War POWs], *Hämeen Sanomat*, January 24, 2004, 4.

61. Virmavirta, "Sanan pamfletti ohitti todellisia tietokirjoja," 12; Jaakko Puuperä, "Vaietut luovutetut" [Silenced extradited], *Suomen Sotilas*, no. 6 (2003): 68.
62. Suviniemi, "Jatkosodan sotavankiluovutukset," 4.
63. Heikki Ylikangas's report also provoked criticism. Professor Ohto Manninen from the National Defense University in several newspapers repeated the abovementioned argument that Ylikangas also fails to mention the fact that information about the extraditions had been available to both researchers and the general public for some time. In particular, Manninen mentions his own article in the History of the Continuation War anthology. He felt that his article should have been mentioned in Ylikangas's list of references. Thus *Luovutetut* was considered not to have revealed anything new, especially to those researchers whose results Sana challenged. See Ohto Manninen, "Luovutuksia tutkittu ja tieto ollut olemassa" [Extraditions have been researched and the information has existed already], *Kaleva*, January 18, 2004, 4; Ohto Manninen, "Luovutetuista riittää vielä tutkimista" [Still more to research about extraditions], *Helsingin Sanomat*, January 26, 2004, A 5.
64. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, 1994), 267–304.

8

Negotiating a Dark Past in the Swedish-language Press in Finland and Sweden

Karin Kvist Geverts

History is written by historians; but history is also written in a variety of popular media, and across Scandinavia journalists and non-academic writers have often been among the first to unsettle the truisms of professional "history." The challenging interpretive issues posed by the varied "national" histories of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland during World War II have galvanized the unsettled relations between academic historians and journalist provocateurs, a conflict animating the public discussion of Finland's possible role in the Holocaust emerging in the last quarter of the twentieth century. This dynamic is particularly engaging in Finland. Long a colony of Sweden, Finland is an officially bilingual state, and its Swedish-speaking minority (about 5.5 percent of the population) not only maintains a distinct cultural and political identity, but maintains a significant Swedish-language press as well. Here, I examine the treatment of emerging studies of Finland and the Holocaust in Finland's Swedish-language press, placed in dialogue with comparable accounts in the Swedish press. Analyzing articles and reviews in Finland's daily Swedish-language newspapers (*Hufvudstadsbladet, Västra Nyland*) as well as the *Helsingin Sanomat International Edition* and comparing them with counterparts in Sweden (*Dagens Nyheter, Svenska Dagbladet, Expressen,* and *Aftonbladet*), I aim to show how the "dark past of Finland," Finland's link to the Holocaust, has been negotiated in the public sphere, a sphere that once marks and complicates the national borders, and national histories, relating and distinguishing Finland and Sweden today.

Between 2003 and 2009, Finnish and Swedish landmark studies dealing with Finland and the Holocaust generated an intensifying atmosphere of dispute; it was only then that the trope of the Holocaust entered historiography in Finland.[1] The first debate emerged in late 2003 after the release of Elina Sana's book *Luovutetut: Suomen ihmisluovutukset Gestapolle* (Finnish, Extradited: Finland's human deliveries to the Gestapo), which followed from her earlier 1979 study (under her maiden name Elina Suominen), *Kuoleman laiva s/s Hohenhörn: Juutalaispakolaisten kohtalo Suomessa* (Finnish, Death ship SS Hohenhörn: The fate of the Jewish refugees in Finland).[2] The second

debate followed the publication of Henrik Arnstad's *Spelaren Christian Günther: Sverige under andra världskriget* (Swedish, Christian Günther, the player: Sweden during the Second World War) in 2006.[3] Despite being a biography of the Swedish Foreign Minister during World War II, the book also drew conclusions regarding Finland's role in and its connection to the Holocaust, which sparked an inflamed debate in both the Finnish-language and Swedish-language media in Finland.

Most recently, the period 2008–2009 saw an extensive review of Finland's wartime treatment of POWs by the National Archives of Finland. Provoked by the controversies and merits of Sana's work, this research is marked by the effort to come to terms with the past, both the original events of the wartime period and their subsequent treatment in Finnish history. In this context, I concentrate on the newspaper discourses surrounding the reception of two studies, *Salaiset aseveljet: Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933–1944* (Finnish, Secret brothers-in-arms: The cooperation of the Finnish and German security police 1933–1944) by the historian Oula Silvennoinen, and Henrik Arnstad's *Skyldig till skuld: En europeisk resa i Nazitysklands skugga* (Swedish, Guilty of guilt: A European journey in the shadow of Nazi Germany).[4]

The dominant view of Finnish wartime history has been that Finland did not participate in the Holocaust. This vision has mainly to do with the dissemination of the "separate war" thesis—conveying a sense that Finland fought "a parallel operation not subordinated to the German–Soviet War."[5] Rather than questioning Finland's involvement in the Holocaust, historiography—undertaken by conservative historians with political interests to the right—has focused on political tensions between the Finnish left and right. As Antero Holmila puts it, "during the Cold War era, it was very difficult to deal with the darker side of both the Finnish and Soviet conduct of war without the matter being turned into a heated and politicized issue." Moreover, "it was not until the late 1970s that the Holocaust started to take root in Finnish historical consciousness," coinciding with a "period of strong leftist movement in society"; what also set Finland apart from most European countries was the fact that relatively few Jewish voices were raised as part of the public debate.[6] A turning point in Finland, as well as in the other Nordic countries, was the broadcast of the TV series *Holocaust* in 1979.[7] But even then, as Holmila notes, Finland's role in the Holocaust was often toned down, and rather than taking on larger issues of political or moral culpability, much of the public discussion was restricted to determining the comparative number of possible Jewish victims. Later the same year, Elina Suominen's *Kuoleman laiva* (Death ship) evoked a linkage between Finland and the Holocaust, focusing on the deportation of eight Jewish refugees from Finland; of the refugees handed over to the German authorities only one survived the horrors of concentration camps. Despite the furor and embarrassment aroused by Suominen's book, one strain of its

reception is representative of a recurrent pattern: "in a characteristic manner, when discussions steered towards the Holocaust in the early postwar decades, the tragedy was portrayed in a conclusive way that all that there was to know about the Holocaust was already known."[8] According to Lars Westerlund, a few historians had indeed referred to the extraditions in earlier specialized studies, but Suominen was the first to put the Finnish actions into an international context, explicitly connecting Finland to the trope of the Holocaust.[9] Sana's book has been instrumental in firing a number of new investigations; the newspaper reception of her work helped to lay the foundations for an emerging Finnish Holocaust historiography.

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to reassessments of the narratives of World War II and the Holocaust in many Eastern European countries, yet in Finland this reassessment tended to reinforce patriotic ways of writing history; inasmuch as the historian's task was understood as a way to serve the nation, it took until the new millennium for the Holocaust to become a part of Finnish historical culture. One reason for this belated incorporation of the Holocaust into Finnish history was the emphasis on the Holocaust as a global phenomenon; a more pointed stimulus was the publication of Elina Sana's second book *Luovutetut* (Extradited).[10] It might even be said that during the first decade of the twenty-first century "in a global historical culture, the Holocaust has become the entrance ticket to the European community with a notion of guilt at the center of this affinity."[11] But still, unlike other Scandinavian countries, Finland has not yet established a Holocaust research center at its universities, though its recognition of the importance of Holocaust remembrance does locate it within the wider values of the European Community.[12]

Sana and the debate of 2003–2004

The first phase of the Holocaust debate in the press began in late 2003 after the release of Elina Sana's *Luovutetut* (Extradited). According to Sana, Finland had extradited many more prisoners-of-war to Nazi Germany than was previously known, 2,829 POWs of whom 74 were Jews.[13] As the *Helsingin Sanomat International Edition* reported, for Sana "Finland's part in the holocaust [*sic*] is much bigger than has been admitted so far." The author of the article, journalist Unto Hämäläinen, also recalled her 1979 *Kuoleman laiva*, contributing to Sana's recognized authority in the field: "and even now—nearly a quarter of a century later—references are being made to the book." As he put it, Sana's work directly undermined the consensual mythology of the war, putting "something of a crack in this image" of the Continuation War.[14] Iconoclasm is not without consequences: by cracking the carefully constructed image of Finland's "separate war," Sana not only put the "co-belligerent" networks on trial, but also found herself and her research on trial as well.

Two weeks later *Helsingin Sanomat International Edition* wrote a follow-up to the story, interviewing Sana about the "considerable interest abroad," which took her "completely by surprise."[15] After a request from the Simon Wiesenthal Center to Finnish President Tarja Halonen to investigate the deportations and, if possible, punish those who were responsible, two persons gave statements: Interior Minister Kari Rajamäki expected "the Security Police (SUPO) to draft a report on the issue," while the chairman of Helsinki's Jewish Congregation, Gideon Bolotowsky, said "that there had been previous information according to which the number of people extradited to Germany was greater than the eight Jewish refugees previously known." Bolotowsky continued, "the deportations appeared to violate international treaties," adding "that Finland's Jews would like to know if the proportion of Jews among the Soviet prisoners of war sent to Germany was particularly high, or if it corresponded to the proportion of Jews among Soviet Russian POWs captured by Finland during the war."[16] Two points are of interest in Bolotowsky's media statement. The insertion of the Jewish Congregation into the conversation is telling, interweaving the Jewish community's presence into official historical awareness—or at least into the historicized public space of Finland. However, despite this insertion, Bolotowsky's demands slipped into an established discursive trap; his statement—"Finland's Jews would like to know if the proportion of Jews among the Soviet prisoners of war sent to Germany was particularly high, or if it corresponded to the proportion of Jews among Soviet Russian POWs captured by Finland during the war"—cautiously embeds Finland's responsibility for human lives into a quantified, comparative case, almost as if to suggest an acceptable ratio of Jewish deportees. In what sense would the ratio of Jewish deportees equaling the ratio of Soviet Russian POWs excuse or ameliorate Finnish participation in the Holocaust?

The press reception of Sana's book and the attention of the Wiesenthal Center had immediate consequences: on the day following the Center's public request, the *Helsingin Sanomat International Edition* reported that the Finnish government had consequently ordered an "investigation into extradition of POWs to Germany during [the] Continuation War." The paper reported about President Halonen's and Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen's meeting, where the request from the Simon Wiesenthal Center was discussed; a decision followed to ask Professor Heikki Ylikangas to undertake an investigation and submit a report by late January of 2004. According to Secretary of State Risto Volanen, "this was the quickest way to react in an open society"; in a similar vein, professor of political history Seppo Hentilä commented, "the Holocaust is such a sensitive issue in Central Europe, that we cannot just shrug our shoulders." Hentilä saw "Sana's book as merely a first step in the process of investigating the deportations," suggesting "We would need quite a project involving many years of work by several researchers if we wanted to investigate this matter thoroughly."[17]

By having the meeting on the highest political level, the Finnish government attempted to send a strong and clear signal to the rest of Europe that these issues were taken seriously. On the one hand, this decision is in line with the globalization of Holocaust memory and remembrance, incorporating wartime events in Finland into a wider, non-Finnish narrative. On the other hand, though, the Finnish perception of the European Union's system of values clearly recreates the revision of Finnish historiography in the first decade of the new millennium as a way to render Finland an ideologically intelligible, recognizable member of this community of value.

Although many newspaper articles reported on Sana's work quite objectively, historians tended to subject her argument to harsher critique. Henrik Meinander, for example, was more critical in his review, describing the book as "Interesting, but inadequate about the deportations." Although he found the book topical, Meinander was critical of Sana's contradictions and the fact that as a trade publication, her book lacked the normative apparatus of historical scholarship, especially the close documentation of sources in footnotes. Re-categorizing a book written for a larger, popular audience in the terms of professional scholarship, Meinander complained, "a scholarly investigation of the deportations of these prisoners would have demanded an analysis which was more systematic and put into a larger historical context. It is important to bear in mind the utmost strained conditions under which the Finnish authorities acted." Overtly undermining the value of Sana's work for the audience she is addressing, Meinander concluded with a back-handed compliment: "Elina Sana has written a thought-provoking book of a tragic chapter in Finnish history. But those who wish to read a clarifying and balanced analysis of the case need to wait for Professor Ylikangas's investigaton."[18] Sana replied to Meinander's question in *Hufvudstadsbladet* that "the most important part of my book cannot be reduced to the question whether 1 + 1 = 2. The most important [question] in my book is the question why, in the deportations to Nazi Germany, Finland engaged—and seems to be still engaged—in statistical debates rather than in an international human rights debate."[19]

In Sweden, the headlines differed markedly from those in Finland.[20] In Finland's press, most of the article titles emphasized the challenges of the Continuation War and the wartime context of the deportations; only one mentioned Nazi Germany, while none of them used the "official" Swedish term for the Holocaust, *Förintelsen*. Even though Sweden's press mainly avoided the word Holocaust, it more directly referred to "Nazi Germany," to "Gestapo extraditions" or "Nazi extraditions," and also to variations of "Finland comes to terms with its past."[21] Two articles specifically mentioned the Stutthof concentration camp and the Auschwitz extermination camp, while two others talked about "the shadows of the past" or the "dark side of the past" as an implicit wording for the figure of the Holocaust, implicitly inscribing Finland into the European memory landscape.[22] Furthermore, two

articles explicitly used the word Holocaust. Jan Winter, in *Göteborgs-Posten*, quoted Elina Sana, "There is still an ideologically based fear of digging too deep into history. This has to do with the trauma of us being more involved in the Holocaust than we have previously admitted."[23] Dieter Strand in an editorial in *Aftonbladet*—published in February 2004 in connection with the Stockholm International Forum— wrote: "Finland is not the first country you think about when the holocaust [*sic*] is brought up as a topic. But they just had a debate about their role, and as usual it's neglected in Swedish media."[24] Strand is correct here, noting that newspapers in Sweden did little or no reporting of the debates, merely reprinting articles generated by the Swedish News Agency (this was also the case with small papers such as *Hallands Nyheter* or *Borås Tidning*).[25]

In Sweden, Sana was taken for a "political scholar," "author, historian and journalist," or simply "journalist."[26] Stefan Lundberg wrote in *Dagens Nyheter*, "The Finns have for decades believed they had a clean conscience regarding the deportations of Jews and others to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Now history has caught up with the Finnish actions and threatens to cast a long shadow over the events in the forties."[27] The journalist Anna-Lena Laurén interviewed both docent Risto Nurmela of Åbo Akademi University and Ylikangas. According to Nurmela, "Even if we don't want to admit it, we were actually allied with Germany during the Continuation War. If you interact with a criminal regime it is hard to avoid getting blood on your hands." Ylikangas, however, worded his ideas differently; "the continuation war" was a "traumatic experience" interpreted by the Finns as a trope in gaining independence. "The fact that Finland and Germany had been brothers in arms did not fit into the narrative" and therefore "historical research [has] instead concentrated on defending the honor of Finland."[28]

While Nurmela underlined the historians' view that Sana's research was not new, nonetheless "the reactions to her book indicated that we haven't been ready to admit the problems with our cooperation with the Nazis." Discrediting the originality of Sana's research, and attributing its significance not to the work itself but to its embarrassing reception abroad, Nurmela exemplifies an important strand in the Finnish reception of Sana's *Luovutetut*, especially in academia. Nonetheless, for the press in Sweden, Nurmela explicitly acknowledges the alliance between Nazi Germany and Finland, expressing hope for openness about these issues in the future: "In Finland you still prefer to emphasize Stalin's crimes against humanity before Hitler's. It is a collective trauma that we actually gained from the alliance with Germany."[29]

The newspapers in Sweden presented Elina Sana as a plausible authority on Finnish history. The first Swedish reviews of Sana's *Luovutetut* concentrated on her account of the cooperation of the Finnish Secret Police with the Gestapo in their collaborative extraditions, and the fact that Jews were

among the deportees. Tellingly, they saw Sana's book initiating debate in Finland and abroad, and drawing international attention both to Finland's past and to its current historiography. In their view, Sana's work and the attention it gained led to governmental involvement and government-sponsored investigation, dramatized by Ylikangas's report. Later articles reported on the results of Ylikangas's investigation and the conclusion of Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, stressing the lack of information about the extraditions and the consequent need for a research project dealing with these topics.

Henrik Arnstad's *Spelaren Christian Günther* and the debate of 2006

The second phase of the debate followed in 2006, after Henrik Arnstad published a biography of the Swedish World War II Foreign Minister, *Spelaren Christian Günther* (Christian Günther, the player). Although Arnstad's book was not concerned with Finland and the Holocaust *per se*, Arnstad drew conclusions on Finland's role and its connection with the Holocaust, initiating a debate in Sweden that soon hit the Finnish media as well.

Arnstad summarized the consequences of his book in "Finland's cause was not ours" (*Dagens Nyheter*). His argument here was threefold: Finland was the only democracy that voluntarily made an alliance with Nazi Germany; rather than a "continuation war," Finland fought an "aggressive war" not only to get "back territories lost after the Winter War," but more significantly, to "capture even more *Lebensraum*." Finally, Arnstad asserted a connection between the past and the way Finnish history has continued to be produced, characterizing the practice of Finnish history as a "monopoly on Finnish historiography by people with a link to the Finnish acts of war in 1941–44."[30] Though Arnstad claimed that Swedes were not interested in Finland's history, Håkan Forsén took issue with his judgments, finding that "Arnstad has not understood the basic question why Finland entered a new war after the Winter War 1939–40": "the threat was real for Finland in 1940–41."[31] Forsén's account epitomizes the reiterative rhetorical pattern constitutive of debates concerning Finland's role in the Holocaust; emphasizing the apparently objective nature of the "basic question" and "real threat" enables all other questions of historical interpretation to be pushed to the side as merely secondary or just imaginary.

Repeating the unquestioned interpretive "truths" generated to justify Finland's alliance during and after the war sustained much of the critical reception of Arnstad's study. Secretary of State Pertti Torstila, who also served as the Finnish Chair of the European Union at the time, returned to Arnstad's claims in a speech he gave at the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences in Stockholm in November 2006, entitled "Finland's Chairmanship in the European Union; The Middle East, Handling Crises,

Finland and Sweden." Torstila unconditionally discredited Arnstad's insights into Finland's World War II involvement as "sad evidence of [Arnstad's] lack of historical perspective," stressing "that no political agreement existed between Germany and Finland when operation Barbarossa started"; "Finland fought as a co-belligerent with Germany but had no alliance treaty with the country."[32] The fact that Finland did not have a "treaty" or a "written alliance" is hardly exceptional, since other Axis powers did not seem to have treaties or alliances either. Given Torstila's position, his remarks locate a more broadly diplomatic, even national, concern with the historical reassessment of Finland's wartime rhetoric of alliance, and its ongoing consequences.

Arnstad replied sharply to Torstila's speech in "Finland is lying about Nazism." For Arnstad, the Finnish Foreign Office's inability to reconsider the wartime alliance amounted to an act of ongoing historical deception: "61 years after the end of the war," Finland has "still not admitted its close military alliance with Nazi Germany. This is a fact that should be part of common knowledge in Finland." And while Torstila was not able to point to any specific factual errors in Arnstad's work, Arnstad found Torstila's position contradictory, asking, if "Finland's alliance with Nazi Germany was no alliance," how then did "Finland have no other choice?"[33]

The debate in the Swedish media immediately echoed through Finland's Swedish-language press. *Hufvudstadsbladet* brought out both an article by Lena Skogberg and an editorial by Björn Månsson. While Månsson added that Finland was also responsible for ethnic cleansing in Karelia, his opinion was that before Arnstad urged people to learn history better, "he could start by looking at himself in the mirror. Expressions such as 'the Finnish fight for a Nazi victory,' 'Finland's war against the Allies,' even 'opportunistic and criminal aggressive war'" are sensational and do "not exactly bear witness of a deep insight into history."[34] Reiterating the arguments he had already made public in the Swedish press, Arnstad replied in Finland's *Hufvudstadsbladet* with an article entitled, "Torstila and the truth."[35] The next day Sylvia Bjon interviewed Torstila and Swedish Professor at the National Defence College in Stockholm, Bo Huldt, who supported Torstila's perspective: "There was no agreement on the political level. The preparations were military."[36] *Hufvudstadsbladet* then published a review of Arnstad's book by Professor emeritus of Åbo Akademi University in Turku, Sune Jungar. Jungar wrote that it was understandable that Arnstad touched upon Finnish politics in his book but also commented that "this is done in a moralizing tone" and that "it is obvious that he [Arnstad] is not informed of modern Finnish research."[37] Like previous commentators, he stepped away from providing his own understanding of the historical situation, silently materializing Arnstad's sense that "Finland's alliance with Nazi Germany 1941–44 is a sensitive subject."[38]

"The Finnish fight for a Nazi victory," "Finland's war against the Allies," "opportunistic and criminal aggressive war" are discourses rupturing the

rhetoric that Finland's conservative historians had long worked to establish, in both the "separate" and "driftwood" tropes used to represent Finland's conduct of relations with the Third Reich. Henrik Meinander was the most visible Finnish historian taking part in the debate, publishing "Arnstad's book is not serious" in *Svenska Dagbladet*. For Meinander, "Journalist Henrik Arnstad is passing on a heavy, oversimplified image of the nature of the Finnish–German brotherhood in arms," his "tone of argument" making it difficult to engage in an objective discussion about whether the Finns were enthusiastic over Hitler or not. As he had done in his critique of Sana's book, Meinander foregrounded the fact that Arnstad's book lacked footnotes and only had a selected bibliography on a web site. But he found something else more serious: "Arnstad is not building his argument on modern Finnish research and his text reveals that he lacks a wider sense of previous research in his own country." However, while pointing to the missing dialogue with the previous topical research conducted in Finland and Sweden and thus discrediting Arnstad's work from the perspective of the academic discipline of history, Meinander also credited Arnstad, acknowledging he was right about the fact that the Finnish leadership deliberately went into a military alliance with Germany. He found it equally true that "the Finnish leadership looked forward to reconquering territories lost in the Winter War and during the summer of 1941 even dreamed of further territories in the East." However, for Meinander the dream of a Finnish *Lebensraum* should be distinguished from Hitler's*:* he found it an oversimplification to draw the conclusion that the Finnish expansionist dream also meant that the Finns fought, as Arnstad put it, "for a Nazi world domination and the fall of the democracies," including Sweden. Meinander's overall opinion was that "Arnstad's book can't be seen as a serious historical work."[39]

Perhaps Finland did objectively have few or no other options for survival during World War II; where Arnstad parts company with the dominant historical narrative is in his sense that this necessity does not excuse Finland from its role as an "ally"—rather than a "brother-in-arms" or mere "co-belligerent" against the Soviet Union—and so from the potential moral consequences of that alliance, especially when elements of the alliance, such as regaining parts of Karelia, served Finland's national, indeed racialized, interests and national mythology as well. Meinander's exculpatory critique is echoed in Professor Bo Huldt's article in *Svenska Dagbladet*, "Attack was Finland's only choice." Huldt took a comparative approach, looking at "the different fates of Finland and Sweden during the Second World War," arguing that Finland lacked options other than joining Germany against the Soviet Union.

> Once the aggression had started and Helsinki became convinced that the Soviet Union could be defeated, the thought of also incorporating Northern Karelia [*Fjällkarelen*] into Finland found large support in the

> Finnish opinion, especially after Mannerheim's order in the beginning of July 1941. . . . Naturally, it was an unwise program to engage in, especially when the outcome of the war became more evident. On the whole, many unreasonable and objectionable things were done and said in Finland 1941–43.

According to Huldt, there was no other option for the Finnish people, though whether the *Lebensraum* notion would have been seen as "unwise" had Germany won the war seems to remain open to question. But not only did Huldt conclude that Finland became a part of World War II on the wrong side, he also reiterated the familiar trope of what could and could not be known about the conditions of Jews and the developing Holocaust as well: "during spring 1941 the world didn't know much about the Holocaust—that horridness [*förfärligheten*] gained speed only during 1942."[40] For Huldt, then, the Finnish *Lebensraum* policy was simply naive and unwise, however much its achievement might have been abetted by the German alliance.

Finally, journalist Yrsa Stenius's contribution to this debate in Sweden's *Aftonbladet* brought up what is perhaps the most plausible dimension of the accusatory furor arising from Arnstad's claims: the controversy stemmed, she implied, not from the fact of Finland's (now embarrassing) alliance with the Third Reich, but from Arnstad's reminder that since Finland also stood to gain from an eventual German victory in the war, it is not accurate entirely to distinguish Finland's moral and political aims from those of its ally.

> The fact that Finland fought on the side of Hitler's Germany . . . is common knowledge in Finland . . . and to talk about the Finns as the Germans' brothers in arms is not so appreciated but still not that controversial. But, like Arnstad, to drive a thesis saying that Finland voluntarily and without coercion made an alliance with Germany, participated in a criminal aggressive war against the Soviet Union, and stood by Germany's war aims in other cases, for example to exterminate the democracies in Europe: that is going too far.

For Stenius, Arnstad mistakenly believed that the issues he raised had never been discussed in Finland, pointing to a kind of Finnish censorship. Stenius intelligently dwelt on what was known but "not appreciated," and so shifted the debate to its very heart: what has not been discussed, whether "Finns should feel a moral guilt for supporting Hitler."[41] Indeed, as Arnstad himself implied in an interview, the facts of the alliance were not themselves controversial. What was controversial, and what distinguished Arnstad's work both from the conclusions of professional historians and the commonplace views of the broader public, had largely to do with his way of interpreting those facts: "But it surprises me that it was actually me who started the debate.

What I say in my book can be read in the standard works, among those the political history of Finland."[42] Arnstad makes an important, though somewhat misleading point here. Although some of the data can in fact be found in the standard historical literature, it is precisely the *interpretation* of Finland's relationship—ally, brother-in-arms, co-belligerent, even ideological compatriot—that is at issue.

The debates of 2008–2009

The final phase of debate on Finland and the Holocaust regards the reception of both the findings of the National Archives of Finland research project carried out between 2004 and 2009 and published as *Prisoners of War Deaths and People Handed Over to Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939–55*, and the response to Henrik Arnstad's next book *Skyldig till skuld* (Guilty of guilt).[43] In its coverage of the results of the National Archives investigation, Finland's Swedish-language press mainly focused on the World War II POWs, again stressing the fact that the outcomes were nothing new. Nonetheless, the scale of the research project—developing a fully encompassing archival database—and the attempt to approach the nation's past from different interpretive angles ruptured the conservative claims of Finnish history and historiography.

The Director General of the National Archives Jussi Nuorteva's remarks to *Hufvudstadsbladet* were illustrative: "Sixty years after the war against the Soviet Union, Finland finally decides to investigate the shadows of the Finnish warfare. The research is not new, but we have never attempted to see the overall picture." Moreover, Nuorteva stressed that a change in "our" view of history was occurring, taking a global vantage on the national perspective on history: "We wanted to see the events in Finland from an international perspective, instead of the national perspective which has been dominating so far." Following the emphases of the study, which avoids bringing the Jews or the Holocaust directly into discussion, *Hufvudstadsbladet* underlined the high, "almost thirty percent" death rate among the Russian POWs. The high mortality was attributed to a lack of food, but the notion of mortal intentions against the POWs was categorically denied: there was "no intent to kill them."[44] However, an obscure metaphor, perhaps pointing to the proximity of mass destruction, does appear here. While Jeanette Björkqvist mentioned the high death rate among Russian POWs and the fact that they died from starvation, she, too, avoids mentioning the Holocaust, adumbrating instead "the shadow of warfare"—an expression that might refer either to the Holocaust or to Finland's long history of tension with Russia and the Soviet Union, or ambiguously to both.[45]

Tellingly, one of the Swedish-language journalists, Anna-Lena Laurén, played a double role, articulating her responses both as a reporter but also as a reader, a citizen trained in the conventional narrative of Finnish history,

who recognized that her view of the past was being ruptured by this new information: "I am interested because this is about the history of my country. And I can't recall this aspect as something we learned in high school, even though history was my favorite subject."[46] When Laurén interviewed Lars Westerlund, the director of the research project, for Sweden's *Svenska Dagbladet* two weeks later, her tone became provocative, even accusatory:

> Laurén: Today, over sixty years after the end of the war, Finland finally dares to illuminate the shadows of the past. . . . Why this Finnish tardiness?
>
> Westerlund: Today Finnish self-esteem is better. Finland wants to be part of Europe, without any skeletons in the closet.

Westerlund further remarked (contradicting Nuorteva), "there has been research on these issues but it has been scattered and often opposed."[47] It seems that while the development of the archive would enable new research, there was considerable anxiety about the possibility that this research would complicate, or even confute, the dominant perspective of received Finnish history.

In 2008, Oula Silvennoinen's doctoral thesis *Salaiset aseveljet* (Finnish, Secret brothers-in-arms) for the University of Helsinki, undertaken as part of the National Archives project, was made available to the public, evoking widespread comment in the media, and bringing back into the discussion several voices who had participated in the earlier debate.[48] In "Finland participated in the Holocaust," Arnstad seems to have been among the first in Sweden to report on Silvennoinen's "remarkable" study. For Arnstad, Silvennoinen's work revealed Finland's active participation in the Holocaust "through the previously unknown *Einsatzkommando Finnland*, a unit with the task of murdering Jews and communists on the eastern front." He saw Silvennoinen's dissertation as a landmark, which the conservative historians and uninformed public would have to take into account: "If it stands the test, Silvennoinen's dissertation is probably the final blow to the cherished thought that Finland was immune against Nazi ideological influences in 1941."[49]

Within the year, Arnstad published yet another article, "Finland contributed to the Holocaust":

> New research [of the National Archives of Finland] shows that Finland's role as an ally of Hitler during the war was considerably more soiled [*solkigare*] than official historiography has admitted. . . . This [the extraditions of Jewish refugees] has, says the director of the research project Lars Westerlund, been interpreted as if Finland left its own little contribution to the extermination of the Jews [*judeutrotningen*].

Arnstad continued to criticize the previously dominant Finnish historiography which had toned down the cooperation between Finland and

Nazi Germany and refused to call this relationship an alliance, taking Westerlund's utterance as authoritative: "the purpose of the attacks went further than that [of a defensive war] and corresponded in many ways with the German goals of the war." Bringing to the light the Finnish "concentration camps" for civilians, where a fifth of those who died were children, Arnstad claimed that the Commander-in-Chief, Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim—who "personally gave the order to arrest civilians in concentration camps, a principle of ethnic cleansing in what was called Finland's *Lebensraum* in the East"—must be characterized as a war criminal since he did not observe the Geneva convention; to Arnstad, what was going on in these camps was "mass murder by intended indifference [*likgiltighetsuppsåt*]." Referring specifically to Silvennoinen's study, Arnstad pointed out "the final stroke in the myth of Finland as ideologically unaffected by Nazism. . . . Between the facts and statistics in the Finnish research reports is a truth as current in 2009 as in 1941—democracy is not a guarantee against the deepest human darkness."[50]

The Finnish research project evoked widespread interest, but the majority of articles appearing in Sweden's and Finland's Swedish-language press reiterated claims already animated by Arnstad, supplemented by the new research. In both Sweden and Finland, the Swedish-language press questioned the pieties of the now-outdated "separate war" and "driftwood" paradigms. Bjarne Nitovuori reported on "three important and essential books"—the studies by Silvennoinen, Westerlund, and Kujala—"all giving a negative image of the Continuation War in Finland." He particularly noted that "Silvennoinen's revelation of something called *Einsatzkommando Finnland*, which operated in northern Finland, has caught a lot of attention. The German task forces are notorious. They were a central actor in the Holocaust."[51] Jesper Högström wrote about Finland's struggles to come to terms with the past for Sweden's *Expressen*: "Officially it was a separate war. . . . In reality it was proceeded by careful joint planning between the German and the Finnish leadership"; he quoted Professor Henrik Meinander along these lines as well, "To name it a separate war is almost like saying Italy led a separate war . . . Finland never made a political treaty with Germany, but everything regarding the military was synchronized."[52] In addition to criticizing the "separate war" thesis, Högström also pointed out that the "driftwood" idea—that Finland had no choice but to join on the German side—had now been rejected by Finnish historians, though it still enjoyed considerable public acceptance.

Indeed, in October 2009, Arnstad released a new book *Skyldig till skuld* (Guilty of guilt), in which he dealt with Finland, Italy, and Austria, three nations allied with Nazi Germany, in order to investigate how they had come to terms with their past. Journalist Nils Schwartz reviewed Arnstad's new book in *Expressen*: "At least from the Finnish side he [Arnstad] will most likely be given tit for tat [*få svar på tal*]." Schwartz reminded the readers of

the Finnish reactions to Arnstad's biography of Christian Günther three years earlier: "What angers Arnstad's critics is that he does not consider the mitigating circumstances which 'forced' Finland to choose sides."[53] Although concluding that Arnstad must be right, he wished the book had been more elaborate. Journalist Markus West wrote another article in *Hufvudstadsbladet* under the title, "Arnstad attacks Mannerheim," stating, "In a newly released book, Swedish author and journalist Henrik Arnstad compares Gustaf Mannerheim with Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. According to Arnstad, Finland is unique in continuing to celebrate a brother in arms of Germany's dictator Adolf Hitler."[54] West did not omit to remind his Finnish readers of the heavy critique of Arnstad's previous book in Finland and in Sweden as well.

Arnstad's popular books continued to generate controversy. After an October 8 debate about Finland's 1941 alliance and its connection to the Holocaust on Finnish radio Vega, Arnstad's "Is the Holocaust given too much space in history?" appeared in *Hufvudstadsbladet*. For Arnstad, "The Holocaust—is a historical event without counterpart and even today an ongoing trauma of Europe. . . . Henrik Meinander, Professor of History at Helsinki University, is of another opinion . . . [he] relativizes the Holocaust. The question is why he does it in the open?" He continued to criticize Meinander for speaking about "this Holocaust" (*den här Förintelsen*) and saw similarities between the victim-claims of Austrians and Meinander's sense that "the Finnish population was also a victim during the Second World War."[55] The same day, *Hufvudstadsbladet* published an article about the debate that had arisen in the letters to the editor and on the web sites of *Hufvudstadsbladet* and *Helsingin Sanomat*. Annika Rentola reported hundreds of discriminatory and racist comments, on a scale from very pleased to utterly upset, one calling Arnstad, among other things, "a rootless nobody, hypocritical and an ignorant know-it-all."[56]

It is not surprising that Arnstad's comparative approach generated a range of commentary. Henrik Meinander replied in "Comparisons are necessary" (*Hufvudstadsbladet*): "Just like all other exposed peoples in Europe, the Finns were highly occupied with their own destiny. Most people didn't know or didn't manage to see how bad it was for others."[57] Other reviews took more direct issue with Arnstad's tone and conclusions. The reviewer for *Aftonbladet*, journalist Torsten Kälvemark, was ambivalent; on the one hand he found the style problematic, but on the other he saw the book as "an important achievement" when it came to democracy, even though Arnstad would "create a debate and be contradicted, especially in Finland where Mannerheim's equestrian statue marks the Marshal's status as a national icon."[58] Journalist Martin Lagerholm's review in *Svenska Dagbladet* pointed out that the events Arnstad wrote about, while not unknown, had "for different reasons not yet found their place as common knowledge." He found it "an important book about myths, lies and politics, and how difficult

notions such as guilt and responsibility become pawns in the cynical game about the right way to write history."[59]

The report of the National Archives of Finland and the various critical, historical, and journalistic responses to it suggest the complexity of rewriting Finnish attitudes toward the Holocaust issue, captive as they have been to a number of exculpatory rhetorical tropes: the "separate war" thesis, the "driftwood" metaphor, the repeated assertion that new information has always been known and accounted for. The series of debates in the Finnish and Swedish press underscore several features of the construction of Finland and the Holocaust in the popular media. There seems to be a small change from denial to recognition of the need for a more open-minded acceptance of uncomfortable truths about the past. But while historians and journalists seem to be engaged in a mutual dialogue about the Finnish–German "alliance" and its meanings, the same cannot be said among writers of letters to the editor.

Professional academic historians have played a complex role in this journalistic reception. Whenever journalists like Sana and Arnstad entered the arena, their striking new evidence and new interpretations of more familiar materials were almost immediately dismissed as unprofessional and unserious. Of course, journalistic writing has different analytical practices and rigor than academic scholarship; at the same time, sometimes such writing seems to challenge the conventions of academic intelligibility. When historians like Westerlund and Silvennoinen brought forward similar results to those previously advanced by journalistic writers, they drew little protest in the larger public media. Naturally, unpublished or little-circulated scholarship such as master's theses or doctoral dissertations are a convenient site for new research whose conclusions are in a sense shielded from popular media attention by their obscurity and by the stigma that these works are the signs of mastering the craft of scholarship. In this sense, popular books can have the potential to draw the largest readership, and weigh most heavily on the public's imagination of the past. For this reason, popular books and their reception provide a crude but rewarding index to how and when attitudes toward history are, slowly, changing. On some occasions, they clearly provide the incentive to change as well.

Despite some similarities, the Finnish-language and the Swedish-language discourses nevertheless diverged. In contrast to the national defensiveness of the Finnish-language discourse, in the Swedish-language writing there was much less resistance to the interpretation that Finland's alliance, its politics, and its human deliveries to the Gestapo were participatory in the Holocaust; Swedish-language opposition came notably from a Finnish historian, Meinander, debating in Swedish media, and Huldt, who had received a medallion of honor (*kommendörstecknet av Finlands Lejons order*) from Pertti Torstila just a few months before he published his article in Torstila's defense.[60]

Finland's alliance with the Third Reich remains an inflammatory issue, as a flattering image of Finland's coerced and uncontaminated participation in the alliance has been difficult to challenge or shed. Beyond that, "outsider" perspectives—from journalism, from Sweden—have been, and to some degree remain, contested by the "insider" views of Finnish historians. This reception history of controversial studies dramatizes the fragmentary and volatile emergence of a new historical consensus, divided here between different nations (Sweden and Finland), between different language groups in Finland, and among different institutions and practices for the production of knowledge: professional academic historical studies and popular historical writing, the university, and the media. The stakes for resolving this issue are high, and have been negotiated in a visibly public manner, especially in the newspapers. Moreover, what this survey of these debates demonstrates is the fact that a changing understanding of history takes place across several institutions which constitute knowledge in different terms, and takes place across several temporalities as well, as new "facts" and the rhetoric that constitutes them as evidence are engaged in very different ways by different sectors of a single national or regional community. At the moment, while there seems to be general consensus on the more recently discovered historical data, the interpretive burden of that data, what it means as evidence of the nature of Finland's alliance with Germany and its possible participation in the Holocaust, continues to emerge, with different inflections in Swedish and Finnish writings.

Notes

1. See for instance Antero Holmila, "Varieties of Silence: Collective Memory of the Holocaust in Finland," in *Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations*, ed. Tiina Kinnunen and Ville Kivimäki (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 519–60; Hana Worthen, "Tip of the Iceberg? Finland and the Holocaust," *East European Jewish Affairs* 39, no. 1 (2009): 121–33; Antero Holmila, "Finland and the Holocaust: A Reassessment," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 23, no. 3 (2009): 413–40. Throughout the essay, unless otherwise noted all translations are my own.
2. Elina Sana, *Luovutetut: Suomen ihmisluovutukset Gestapolle* (Helsinki: WSOY, 2003); Elina Suominen, *Kuoleman laiva s/s Hohenhörn: Juutalaispakolaisten kohtalo Suomessa* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1979).
3. Henrik Arnstad, *Spelaren Christian Günther: Sverige under andra världskriget* (Stockholm: Wahlström and Widstrand, 2006).
4. Oula Silvennoinen, *Salaiset aseveljet: Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933–1944* (Helsinki: Otava, 2008); Silvennoinen's book was translated into German, see *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft: Die sicherheitspolizeiliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Finnland und Deutschland 1933–1944*, trans. Klaus Reichel and Kaija Reichel (Darmstadt: WBG, 2010). Henrik Arnstad, *Skyldig till skuld: En europeisk resa i Nazitysklands skugga* (Stockholm: Norstedts, 2009).
5. Antero Holmila and Oula Silvennoinen, "The Holocaust Historiography in Finland," in "The Histories and Memories of the Holocaust in Scandinavia,"

ed. Antero Holmila and Karin Kvist Geverts, special issue, *Scandinavian Journal of History* 36, no. 5 (2011): 605–19.

6. Holmila, "Varieties of Silence," 559. The chairman of the Central Council of Jewish Communities in Finland, Gideon Bolotowsky, has debated the issue in the media, for instance opposing the historian Hannu Rautkallio's views. There have been other opposing Jewish voices as well; Serah Beizer and Semy Kahan, Finnish Jews now living in Israel, also published articles in Finland at the time of the Sana debate. Censorship by the *Helsingin Sanomat* has indeed kept the Jewish voice subdued, as can be seen in *Hakehila*, the journal of the Jewish community in Helsinki, which published letters to the editor refused by the *Helsingin Sanomat*. Tellingly, the Jewish community as a whole has kept some distance from these issues and has refrained from questioning the separate war thesis. My thanks to Simo Muir for bringing this information to my attention.
7. For a comparison of the reception of the TV series in Sweden and Denmark, see Ulf Zander, "Holocaust at the Limits: Historical Culture and the Nazi Genocide in the Television Era," in *Echoes of the Holocaust: Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe*, ed. Klas-Göran Karlsson and Ulf Zander (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2003), 255–92.
8. Holmila, "Varieties of Silence," 531.
9. For a discussion of previous research, see Lars Westerlund, "The Mortality Rate of Prisoners of War in Finnish Custody between 1939 and 1944," in *Prisoners of War Deaths and People Handed Over to Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939–55: A Research Report by the Finnish National Archives*, ed. Lars Westerlund (Helsinki: National Archives, 2008), 16–17.
10. Markku Jokisipilä characterized this a "neopatriotic turn"; Markku Jokisipilä, "Finnish History Culture and the Second World War" (paper presented at the workshop "Menschen im Krieg" [People in war], Helmut Schmidt Universität, Hamburg, November, 2007), accessed February 25, 2011, http://jokisipila.blogspot.com/2007/11/sotaa-ja-soumetturnista.html#links. When it comes to the importance of the globalization, Antero Holmila points to two events: the raising of the first public Holocaust memorial in Finland in November of 2000, commemorating the eight Jews that were extradited to Nazi Germany, and the introduction of a Holocaust Remembrance Day in 2002; see Holmila, "Varieties of Silence," 549, 552.
11. Cecilia Trenter, "I mötet med minnet: Historiekulturer i Skandinavien" [Encountering memory: History-cultures in Scandinavia], *Historisk Tidskrift* 122, no. 2 (2002): 300. For a similar argument see also Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 8.
12. National Holocaust research centers were established in Sweden in 1998, in Denmark in 2000, and in Norway in 2001. See Holmila and Silvennoinen, "The Holocaust Historiography in Finland"; Henrik Arnstad, "Finland och alliansen med Nazityskland 1941–44: En nordisk Historikerstreit" [Finland and the alliance with Nazi-Germany 1941–44: A Nordic *Historikerstreit*], *Historisk Tidskrift* 130, no. 3 (2010): 485–92.
13. Worthen, "Tip of the Iceberg?," 123, 129.
14. Unto Hämäläinen, "More than Just Eight Deportations to Nazi Germany," *Helsingin Sanomat International Edition*, November 4, 2003, accessed November 11, 2012, http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20031104IE14. Though the paper apparently saw Sana's gender as worth noting in this context—Sana is described as "a quiet and unpretentious woman"—she was still portrayed as an objective "researcher."

15. Unto Hämäläinen, "Book on Finland's Wartime Deportations Generates Considerable Interest Abroad," *Helsingin Sanomat International Edition,* November 18, 2003, accessed November 11, 2012, http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20031118IE8. On the same date, former diplomat Max Jakobson wrote an article in the culture section of *Helsingin Sanomat International Edition* about Sana's *Luovutetut* where he brought up the argument that Finland's own Jews were protected and he also reminded the readers of the public protests the deportations caused in 1942. Jakobson was presented as a "prominent member of the Jewish community" but he did not make an official statement as a representative of the congregation. Still, this is the first time that a "Jewish voice" was heard in the debate; Max Jakobson, "Wartime Refugees Made Pawns in Cruel Diplomatic Game," *Helsingin Sanomat International Edition,* November 18, 2003, accessed November 11, 2012, http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20031118IE7.
16. "Wiesenthal Centre Wants More Information on Finnish Wartime Deportations," *Helsingin Sanomat International Edition*, November 19, 2003, accessed November 11, 2012, http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20031119IE2. The statements by Rajamäki and Bolotowsky were made in this article.
17. "Government Orders Investigation into Extradition of POWs to Germany during Continuation War," *Helsingin Sanomat International Edition*, November 20, 2003, accessed November 11, 2012, http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20031120IE7.
18. Henrik Meinander, "Intressant men bristfälligt om fångutlämningarna" [Interesting but inadequate on the handing over of prisoners-of-war], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, December 14, 2003.
19. Elina Sana, "'Motstridigheter' i min bok dokumenterar varierande historiska sanningar" ["Contradictions" in my book document range of historical truths], *Agricolan Tietosanomat*, last modified December 9, 2005, accessed February 25, 2011, http://agricola.utu.fi/tietosanomat/luovutetut/sanameinanderille.php.
20. Most of the news articles stem from the Swedish News Agency *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå* (TT) and the TT-journalists Jan Winter and Patrik Edman. They, or TT, stood behind eight of the news articles on Sana's book from November of 2003 to January of 2004.
21. For example, Jan Winter, "Samarbete med Gestapo avslöjat" [Cooperation with Gestapo revealed], *Göteborgs-Posten*, November 11, 2003; Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, "Gestapo-utlämningar ska utredas" [Gestapo extraditions is investigated], *Svenska Dagbladet*, November 20, 2003; Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, "Finland utreder naziutlämningar" [Finland is investigating Nazi extraditions], *Hallands Nyheter*, November 20, 2003; Stefan Lundberg, "Finland gör upp med sitt förflutna" [Finland comes to terms with its past], *Dagens Nyheter*, January 17, 2004. One article mentions "genocide," see Dieter Strand, "Efter folkmord går Persson till Ohly" [After genocide, Persson goes to Ohly], *Aftonbladet*, February 1, 2004.
22. For Stutthof and Auschwitz, see Winter, "Samarbete med Gestapo avslöjat"; and Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, "Finsk utredning om utlämning av krigsfångar klar" [Finnish investigation of the extradition of prisoners of war is finished], January 12, 2004. For the "shadows" or "dark sides of the past," see Anna-Lena Laurén, "Finland skickade tusentals fångar till Nazityskland" [Finland sent thousands of prisoners to Nazi Germany], *Svenska Dagbladet*, January 18, 2004.
23. Winter, "Samarbete med Gestapo avslöjat."

24. Strand, "Efter folkmord går Persson till Ohly." The Stockholm International Forum, "Preventing Genocide: Threats and Responsibilities," was an intergovernmental conference held on January 26–28, 2004, arranged by the Swedish government.
25. Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, "Finland utreder naziutlämningar," *Hallands Nyheter*, November 20, 2003; and Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, "Finländsk expert: Utred utlämningar" [Finnish expert: Investigate the exterminations], *Borås Tidning*, January 17, 2004.
26. For "political scientist" see Winter, "Samarbete med Gestapo avslöjat"; and Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, "Gestapo-utlämningar ska utredas," *Svenska Dagbladet*, November 20, 2003. For "author, historian and journalist" see "Finland deporterade 500 judar" [Finland deported 500 Jews], *Aftonbladet*, January 7, 2004. For "journalist" see Laurén, "Finland skickade tusentals fångar."
27. Stefan Lundberg, "Finland gör upp med sitt förflutna" [Finland comes to terms with its past], *Dagens Nyheter*, January 17, 2004.
28. Laurén, "Finland skickade tusentals fångar."
29. Laurén, "Finland skickade tusentals fångar."
30. Henrik Arnstad, "Finlands sak var inte vår" [Finland's cause was not ours], *Dagens Nyheter*, September 15, 2006.
31. Håkan Forsén, "Tuffa fredsvillkor" [The hardships of the peace treaty], *Dagens Nyheter*, September 25, 2006.
32. Pertti Torstila, "Finlands ordförandeskap i Europeiska Unionen: Mellanöstern, krishantering, Finland och Sverige" [Finland's EU Presidency: Middle East, crisis management, Finland and Sweden], speech by Secretary of State given at the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, Stockholm November 20, 2006.
33. Henrik Arnstad, "Finland ljuger om nazismen" [Finland is lying about Nazism], *Svenska Dagbladet*, November 29, 2006.
34. Björn Månsson, "Behoven av kurser i historia" [The need for a course in history], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, November 30, 2006; Lena Skogberg, "Finland ljuger om nazismen" [Finland is lying about Nazism], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, November 30, 2006.
35. Henrik Arnstad, "Torstila och sanningen," *Hufvudstadsbladet*, December 1, 2006.
36. Sylvia Bjon, "Angreppen på Finland tycks falla i god jord" [The aggression towards Finland seems to be well grounded], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, December 2, 2006.
37. Sune Jungar, "Överskattad Günther-biografi" [Overrated biography of Günther], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, December 3, 2006.
38. Arnstad, "Torstila och sanningen."
39. Henrik Meinander, "Arnstads bok är inte seriös" [Arnstad's book is not serious], *Svenska Dagbladet*, December 3, 2006. Meinander's article was reported the following day as "'Arnstads bok är inte seriös,'" *Hufvudstadsbladet*, December 4, 2006.
40. Bo Huldt, "Anfall var Finlands enda val," *Svenska Dagbladet*, December 6, 2006. The same day Huldt's article was published, Finland's *Vasabladet* reported about the debate; see Kenneth Myntti, "Finland beskylls för naziambitioner" [Finland is accused of Nazi ambitions], *Vasabladet*, December 6, 2006.
41. Yrsa Stenius, "Arnstads teser om Finland håller inte" [Arnstad's thesis on Finland is not valid], *Aftonbladet*, December 12, 2006.
42. Myntti, "Finland beskylls för naziambitioner." The significance of this debate reverberated for some time. In January 2007, Kenneth Myntti wrote an article in *Vasabladet* about the Swedish director Hans Barnekow, making a documentary on Mannerheim. In the article, the debate about Arnstad's book was a reference

point for Myntti's account of the filmmaker, since "unlike Henrik Arnstad . . . Barnekow says he strives to interpret Finland's actions in a historical context" (Kenneth Myntti, "Rikssvensk gör film om Mannerheim" [Swede making film about Mannerheim], *Vasabladet*, January 15, 2007). Letters to the editor also asked whether the debate was important or merely "a storm in a water glass" and some argued Henrik Arnstad should be sent to "courses in logical thinking and Finnish"; see for instance Heikki Niini, "Skicka Arnstad på kurser i logik och finska" [Send Arnstad to a course in logic and Finnish], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, December 5, 2006, and JP Roos, "Finland och Nazityskland: Att dansa med djävulen; Storm i vattenglas" [Finland and Nazi Germany: Dancing with the devil; Tempest in a teacup], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, December 7, 2006.

43. Lars Westerlund, ed., *Prisoners of War Deaths and People Handed Over to Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939–55: A Research Report by the Finnish National Archives* (Helsinki: National Archives, 2008). The sources to this part of the investigation consist of thirteen articles in Finnish newspapers and eight articles in Swedish newspapers.
44. Anna-Lena Laurén, "Staten forskar i fångläger: Sen start för historisk rannsakan" [The state research into prison camps: Late start for historical examination], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, March 15, 2005.
45. Jeanette Björkqvist, "Nya rön om förhållandena i finska koncentrationsläger" [New findings about the conditions in Finnish concentration camps], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, January 9, 2007.
46. Anna-Lena Laurén, "Om detta är en människa" [If this is a man], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, May 8, 2005.
47. Anna-Lena Laurén, "Finlands krigshistoria rannsakas" [Finnish war history scrutinized], *Svenska Dagbladet*, March 30, 2005.
48. Silvennoinen's book appeared alongside Westerlund's *Saksan vankileirit Suomessa ja raja-alueilla 1941–1944* [German prison camps in Finland and border areas 1941–1944] (Helsinki: Tammi, 2008) and Antti Kujala's *Vankisurmat: Neuvostovankien laittomat ampumiset jatkosodassa* [Execution of the prisoners: Illegal shootings of Soviet POWs in the Continuation War] (Helsinki: WSOY, 2008).
49. Henrik Arnstad, "Finland deltog i Förintelsen" [Finland participated in the Holocaust], *Dagens Nyheter*, September 21, 2008.
50. Henrik Arnstad, "Finland bidrog till Förintelsen" [Finland contributed to the Holocaust], *Dagens Nyheter*, January 22, 2009.
51. Bjarne Nitovuori, "Fortsättningskrigets mörka sida" [The dark side of the Continuation War], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, January 25, 2009.
52. Jesper Högström, "Vapenbröder" [Brothers-in-arms], *Expressen*, July 24, 2009.
53. Nils Schwartz, "Brottslingar utan ansvar" [Accomplices without responsibility], *Expressen*, October 16, 2009.
54. Markus West, "Arnstad angriper Mannerheimkulten," *Hufvudstadsbladet*, October 17, 2009.
55. Henrik Arnstad, "Har Förintelsen för stor plats i historien?" [Is the Holocaust playing too big a role in history?], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, October 17, 2009. See also Henrik Meinander, *Finland 1944: Krig, samhälle, känslolandskap* [Finland 1944: War, society, emotional landscape] (Helsinki: Söderströms, 2009).
56. Annika Rentola, "Het debatt om Mannerheim" [Inflamed debate over Mannerheim], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, October 18, 2009. Two other examples of how low and even racist the climate in the debate sometimes was: Arnstad was also

called "*rikssvensken,*" a judgmental way of separating him from Swedes living in Finland, in a letter to the editor by Fred Koroleff, "Ingen erövrare" [No conqueror], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, October 20, 2009; and "*historieskojare,*" "historian crook," in another letter to the editor by Ronny Rönnqvist, "Rövarhistorier från Sverige" [Cock-and-bull stories from Sweden], *Hufvudstadsbladet*, October 20, 2009.

57. Henrik Meinander, "Komparationer är nödvändiga," *Hufvudstadsbladet*, October 20, 2009.
58. Torsten Kälvemark, "De ställde upp för Hitler" [They served for Hitler], *Aftonbladet*, October 23, 2009.
59. Martin Lagerholm, "När skuld och ansvar blir brickor i ett spel" [When guilt and responsibility become part of the game], *Svenska Dagbladet*, October 25, 2009. The suspicion of Arnstad's reliability was raised again with regard to this book, notably by Ulf-Erik Slotte in *Västra Nyland*, who questioned Arnstad's understanding of Finland's wartime predicament: "The reader gets the impression that Arnstad hasn't been able to understand the situation of interwar Finland, when Finland was in a precarious situation. His thesis about how we might have been able to stay neutral does not correspond with facts"; see Ulf-Erik Slotte, "Axelmakten Finland" [Axis power Finland], *Västra Nyland*, November 25, 2009.
60. On Huldt's medal, see Arnstad, "Finland och alliansen med Nazityskland," 487.

9

Beyond "Those Eight": Deportations of Jews from Finland 1941–1942

Oula Silvennoinen

In the chilly early morning hours of November 6, 1942, the German transport vessel *Hohenhörn* left Helsinki harbor bound for Tallinn, Estonia. On board was a group of twenty-seven civilians, all foreigners being deported from Finland. Most were Estonians repatriated either forcibly or voluntarily to their German-occupied homeland. The group also included eight persons registered as Jews: five men, all of whom had been issued deportation orders, and the family members of two of them. The youngest deportee was a child of less than two years of age. As the eight sailed from Finland, Jews from neighboring Norway were already being murdered in the Third Reich's concentration and extermination camps, having been deported *en masse* during the preceding summer. It seemed that the hour had struck for the small Jewish minorities of the Scandinavian countries. While the Jews of Sweden were still beyond the reach of the Nazi regime, the Jews of occupied Denmark were in the immediate danger zone. Were the Jews in Finland next in line? Only one of the eight Jews aboard the *Hohenhörn* survived the war; amid press clamor and much public talk, "those eight" have become a figure of speech in Finnish historiography and public knowledge, the very symbol and measure of Finland's involvement in the Holocaust.

Yet this symbolic perception, no matter how widely held, is too simplistic. Although Finland's connections with the Nazi project of ideological and racial war and the Holocaust were largely hidden from the public eye, constant reference to "those eight" obscures the fact that Finland's involvement in the Holocaust was more complex, and more pervasive, than this single incident implies. By November 1942, when deportations of Jews from Finland first aroused public interest, the Finnish authorities had already been deporting Jews—Soviet prisoners-of-war and foreign civilians—into the hands of German authorities for some time. For this reason, then, Finland's connections to the Final Solution cannot be unveiled through a single analysis of the November event; notwithstanding, even the reference to "those eight" as the total number of Jews deported is a misstatement.[1] In the period spanning from June 1941 to November 1942, twelve Jews were

deported; one should be speaking, at the very least, not about "those eight," but about "those twelve." With the help of available archival material, I concentrate on four of these individual cases, setting them in the context of Finnish legislation and bureaucratic practices concerning aliens and their deportations at that time, in order to expose the complex linkages between the deportation policy and Finland's connection to the Final Solution.

The road to Auschwitz was a twisted one, involving, in Christopher R. Browning's words, a "complex, pluralistic, and unplanned political process" consisting of the discrimination, isolation, expropriation, and expulsion of Jews within the Nazi sphere of power, culminating in a genocide of unprecedented ferocity. What came to be known as the Holocaust did not unfold along some previously concocted master plan carried out synchronously, single-mindedly, and without fail everywhere the Nazi regime set foot. Virtually everywhere, the implementation of a central policy of genocide required local collaboration, and had to be executed according to local circumstances, requiring negotiation by the Nazi hierarchy.[2] Finland, fighting alongside Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union in 1941–44, was no exception. In order to open the link between Finland and Holocaust to critical examination, it is important to analyze the interaction of international, national, and local administrative agencies, and developments within the spheres of legislation and police administration as well as the underlying dynamics of their outcome. Finland could become an accomplice in the Holocaust even without enacting a specific genocidal impulse.

To realize the Final Solution on Finnish territory, the Nazi regime would have needed influential local collaborating partners. Of potential collaborators, the Finnish State Police (*valtiollinen poliisi*) was key, because it acted as the only expert authority in matters concerning foreigners in Finland.[3] Moreover, since the 1930s it had maintained close professional and personal ties to the Nazi security police machinery, incorporated in 1939 into the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (RSHA). It is precisely this collaboration between Finnish and German security authorities, both civilian and military, against which the Finnish participation in the Holocaust must be weighed. Through their participation in the Nazi ideological war of extermination against the Soviet Union, the Finnish authorities contributed to the racial war of extermination against the Jews. To the extent that the Finnish machinery of state is framed by this cooperation, especially between the Finnish and German security police, Finland cannot be classified as a mere bystander in the Holocaust.[4]

Nazi prewar and wartime intelligence efforts established the size of the total Jewish population in Finland as 2,300 persons, a figure also found in the Wannsee protocol. During the interwar years, Finland was home to a Jewish minority of some 2,000 people. When the citizenship rights were extended to Jews after Finland's independence in 1918, the Jewish communities in Helsinki, Viipuri, and Turku were required to act as census

authorities by keeping records of their members. However, a sizable minority within the Finnish Jewish community comprised people who had either not sought or had not been granted Finnish citizenship, but nevertheless resided permanently in Finland. Lacking formal citizenship, these permanent residents must be considered part of the Finnish Jewish community. After the *Anschluss* of Austria and the *Kristallnacht* pogroms in Germany, Finnish authorities had also admitted a few hundred Jewish refugees (mainly from Austria). Most of these refugees did not remain in Finland and continued in due course to other destinations, but some did stay and were granted regular permits of residence. While the Finnish state had no mechanisms with which to lend humanitarian support to refugees, some non-governmental organizations provided assistance. The most important refugee committees were formed by the Helsinki Jewish community and the Finnish Social Democratic Party.[5]

The positions of Finnish and foreign Jews residing in Finland nevertheless differed considerably from one another.[6] No group of foreigners was in greater danger than Jews without Finnish citizenship and without a history of long-term residence and family ties in the country. The State Police in particular saw Jewish refugees and immigrants first and foremost as a nuisance and potential security risk:

> we must, of course, to the extent possible, free ourselves of the Austrian Jewish immigrants. The State Police should interrogate them, and if a subject is then found not to be a political refugee, he must be deported by returning him even to Germany, if he cannot or will not obtain a travel permit to another country. The appeals of those who say they are political refugees and ask for asylum have to be submitted to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to be decided according to the decree regarding aliens' entry into, and residence in, Finland, issued April 15, 1938.[7]

The statement reflects both antisemitism, which formed an inherent part of the officials' outlook, as well as the goal of ridding Finland of "disagreeable aliens," an objective pursued against Jewish refugees by the Finnish State Police with remarkable consistency over the following years.

Legal and illegal immigrants: Interwar immigration policy

The precarious position of foreign Jews in wartime Finland can be traced to Finnish legislation and administrative practices regarding aliens in the country. During the interwar period Finland generally followed a restrictive immigration policy. The basic conditions for entry and sojourn were laid down in the 1933 alien decree, with only minor modifications until the end of World War II. Although the modifications made to the basic legislation were not discernibly far-reaching, over time the State Police assumed a more

central role in everyday dealings with aliens, making policing concerns more central to the consideration of individuals' residence rights.[8]

The basic precondition for entry into Finland was a valid passport. Under mutual treaties between the respective countries, the only travelers exempt from this requirement were Scandinavian and Estonian citizens, who were allowed to enter Finland by presenting a "travelcard" instead. Other reciprocal treaties also freed German, Dutch, Italian, Japanese, and Latvian citizens, as well as the inhabitants of the Free City of Danzig, from the obligation to have a visa for entry into Finland. For the rest, a visa was required in addition to a passport, obtainable either from the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs or the representatives of Finland abroad.[9]

Beyond Finnish legislation concerning aliens in Finland, mutual international treaties also governed policy in regard to foreigners. Most notable are treaties of extradition, such as the treaty Finland and Germany signed and ratified in 1937. The treaty stipulated that the signatories were to give each other judicial assistance by extraditing convicts, and in some cases criminal suspects, along with evidence. However, the text expressly stated that there existed no obligation for extradition (*Verpflichtung zur Auslieferung*) in the case of suspects or convicts in political crimes, if the actual deed under investigation was not a murder or an attempted murder. In this sense, Finland was not liable to extradite, for instance, German citizens convicted of political crimes in Germany.[10] The Finnish–German extradition treaty was rarely referred to, and based on its stipulations, only a few German citizens were extradited to Germany between 1937 and 1944, all of them on non-political grounds.[11]

An alien was allowed to remain in Finland for three months; longer stays called for a residence permit, marked on a "residence charter" attached to the passport. These permits were issued by provincial governments for up to a year, and could be reviewed for renewal pending reapplication. Employment rights were likewise granted by provincial governments after the applicant had been cleared by the Social Ministry. Provincial governments were obliged by law to ask the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for an evaluation of each applicant, but were ultimately free to decide each case. By the early 1930s, then, the immigration process was decentralized, allowing local administrations a decisive role in granting residence permits.[12]

As the 1930s progressed, the rapidly worsening European refugee situation caused by escalating Nazi discrimination, political repression, and aggression, began to put pressure on other states to revise their immigration policy and legislation. In Finland, new guidelines were set down in the 1933 decree on alien affairs, which initiated a process of centralization by curtailing the local administration's powers of discretion in alien matters. The Ministry of the Interior gained the right to deport an alien from Finland if required by "state security or other compelling reasons." A deportation was also in order if a foreigner had no valid residence or work permit, or if his residence permit had been revoked by a provincial government. While a deportation

order was pending, a foreigner could be taken into protective custody or put under surveillance. Given its expertise in overseeing Finland's foreign population, the State Police now assumed a role in formulating and advising the Ministry on alien policy.

The preconditions for deportation were defined to allow the authorities considerable leeway in deciding individual cases. Those preconditions mentioned expressly in the decree included situations in which aliens supported themselves as beggars, itinerant musicians, peddlers, or in some "dishonorable" fashion. This wording meant first and foremost prostitution, but could cover any unconventional means for providing—or the inability to provide—one's livelihood. In addition, as if to underscore the freedom of action the law already granted to the authorities, a provincial government could also initiate a deportation process against a foreigner who "otherwise had through his actions shown that his presence in the country was not desirable"; a deportation order issued by a provincial government could not be appealed.[13]

Tellingly, the formulations reveal a close kinship between the decree on aliens and the Finnish Vagrancy Act, also extensively revised in 1933. The Vagrancy Act was for native Finns what the decree on aliens was for foreigners in Finland: a tool for the authorities to root out undesirable lifestyles, and subject the undesirables either to punitive correction or—in the case of non-Finns—to deportation. The only ameliorating feature of the wide powers granted to the authorities was a call to take into account the personal circumstances of the deportee, and the likely consequences of his or her deportation. Lenience was to be granted on the basis of lengthy residence in Finland, existing family ties, or the economic position of the deportee. This clause, however, was gradually eroded in the subsequent revisions of alien legislation. The decree on alien affairs of 1942 finally did away with it altogether, granting the Ministry of the Interior the right to deport aliens according to its own consideration.[14]

The concept of asylum had entered Finnish jurisprudence in the 1930 decree of alien affairs. While this and the subsequent revisions of the decree failed to define unequivocally the conditions whereby a right of asylum should be granted, Finnish law thereafter at least recognized the principle. In practice it was left to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to decide whether an alien could be granted asylum, or if refusing entry would cause undue difficulty. In any case the law provided only a limited right of asylum, as the authorities could still revoke it, should the alien be deemed undesirable. There was practically no development in the legislation concerning right of asylum during wartime. The aliens' decree of 1942, in line with other centralizing developments in alien affairs, gave the right to grant asylum to the Ministry of the Interior, again increasing the authority of the State Police to preside in questions of asylum.[15]

The legislation betrayed a paramount desire to control the number and kind of foreigners entering and residing in Finland, and a strong drive to

ensure the country would not be saddled with non- or counterproductive immigrants. The humanitarian provisos included in the legislation were vague and non-binding. While certainly not unique in interwar Europe, Finnish policy on aliens was restrictive. It concentrated on preventing the entry, and, failing to do this, ensuring the swift removal, of any person considered—for a wide spectrum of possible reasons—a "disagreeable alien." The law gave the authorities nearly a free hand to act as they saw fit by including vague formulations like "other compelling reasons," "other unacceptable actions," and the subjective "honorable-dishonorable" dichotomy in the legislation. With the wide leeway granted by legislation, actual policy was to be formulated through practical administrative decision-making.[16]

"The Firm": The Finnish State Police and immigration control

The surveillance of aliens residing in Finland was one duty of the Ministry of the Interior. In practice, this monitoring devolved on the provincial governments and further to state and municipal police authorities. The Finnish State Police, in internal discussions sometimes referred to as "Firma" (Finnish, the Firm), was the most important of these authorities. In the early 1930s local police departments in cities and rural police chiefs played a role in both supervising entry into Finland and in registering aliens residing within their jurisdiction. However, as the worsening refugee crisis in Europe led Finland to centralize control and tighten legislation, the provincial governments gradually lost their independent freedom of action to Helsinki-based state organs. At the expense of local administrations, the late 1937 organizational reform defined "the surveillance of aliens in the country and the passenger traffic between Finland and other countries" as one of the State Police's main tasks.[17]

Legislation concerning the status of aliens in Finland underwent a major overhaul in 1938. With its increased role in the surveillance and control of aliens, the State Police was also given the legal tools to act as the sole authority in charge of inspecting passports of incoming travelers. From here on, each point of entry into Finland—border crossings, passenger harbors, and airfields—was manned with State Police officials. The State Police could thus keep tabs on all legal passenger traffic to and from Finland.[18] In another important change to earlier legislation, the State Police was given the power to issue security clearances for residence permit applications. While the Ministry for Foreign Affairs guarded its authority to grant residence rights, the Ministry of the Interior and the State Police accorded themselves jurisdiction over questions of who could stay and who should be deported from Finland. Local administration lost while central administrative bodies gained in influence.[19]

As Europe wound towards war, Finnish authorities envisioned that they would need an even freer hand in dealing with foreigners should war break

out. In September 1939, with the war already in progress, the Finnish government was vested with emergency powers to disregard existing alien legislation altogether when making policy decisions about aliens' entry into and residence in Finland. The Protection of the Republic Act (*tasavallan suojelulaki*) in October 1939 finally gave the authorities further clout to circumvent certain constitutional rights of citizens under circumstances of war or threat of war. The most important power granted by the Act was the right to send individuals into protective custody if the authorities deemed other methods of surveillance insufficient, which meant imprisonment for those considered politically unreliable or to be a security risk.[20] On the basis of the stipulations of the Protection Act, prisons began to take in an increasing number of Finnish Communists and foreigners deemed suspicious by the State Police; the position of foreigners in Finland had become precarious.

By November 1939 the provincial governments had lost what vestiges they had of their earlier role as agents of policy in alien matters. Their last remaining tasks were transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. The State Police and its influential passport office rose to a decisive position in selecting who could enter and who could stay in Finland; the Ministry of the Interior became the principal authority granting residence permits. While it still needed to consult the Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding each individual residence permit application or revocation, the State Police was now in a position to force a decision that adhered to its policy lines by procuring the "valid grounds" without which the Ministry of the Interior could not officially disregard the advice of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The control over foreigners was further intensified by revoking each existing residence and employment permit, effective November 15, 1939. Each foreigner in Finland was thus forced to submit his or her continued presence in the country to renewed scrutiny by the authorities, or risk deportation by failing to reapply.[21]

Attacked by the Soviet Union on the last day of November 1939, the war caught up with Finland and the previous decrees on limitations of individual rights went into full effect. Yet more hardships were on the way. As a result of the Soviet assault and the consequent peace treaty, Finland was forced to cede important territories from the eastern parts of the country. Roughly 400,000 refugees from the ceded area had to be settled and employed. At the same time, Finland's supply problems escalated as the German spring offensive in the west in 1940 cut Finland's foreign trade routes through the Straits of Jutland. Threatened by the Soviet Union, widely believed to be bent on renewing hostilities, Finland in late 1940 eagerly accepted support from Germany, now already preparing for war against the Soviet Union. Such circumstances hardly created an open attitude towards foreigners in general, and no group of foreigners was in a less enviable position than those residing in Finland as foreign refugees. Ethnic animosities were strong, especially against Russians, but also against Jews, who in the wartime propaganda were often represented as the flip side of the Bolshevik coin. Foreign

refugees were viewed at best as unproductive mouths to feed, and at worst as security risks having no business remaining in the country.[22]

The war brought one major modification to the existing alien legislation: the Ministry of the Interior's authority in entry and residence matters was made permanent in April 1942, leaving the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with only an advisory role, confined to those rare cases when entry into Finland was denied to someone in possession of valid travel documents. A synchronous addendum to the law regarding the organization, structure, and duties of the State Police recognized the status of its passport office and the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. The power of the State Police in matters of alien policy reached its apogee.[23]

Disrupting international travel, the breakout of war in Europe affected the ability of foreigners to leave Finland within the limits set by the law. Soon, Sweden was the only non-occupied foreign country to which it was possible to travel directly from Finland. If, as often happened, Sweden refused to allow entry, an alien would be stranded in Finland. Thereafter the choices were stark: one could either strive to obtain the necessary documents granting status as legal alien, or sojourn in the country illegally—without a residence permit and, usually, without a work permit or money. In the absence of other possibilities, the Finnish authorities had to tolerate a number of foreigners remaining in the country without the required permits. Those destitute, illegal immigrants, unable to leave the country on their own and trying to make a living possibly by questionable or downright criminal means, became prime targets for deportation.

The Finnish State Police closely monitored individuals whose continued presence it considered undesirable, scrutinizing their attempts to obtain a visa. To effect a deportation, its standard practice was to ascertain whether the possibility for emigration existed. Almost invariably, the State Police contacted the Swedish authorities and sounded out their willingness to accept an individual into Sweden, either permanently or in transit. Should the Swedes prove uncooperative, possibilities for further action would be exhausted, as people could not be deported from Finland against the will of the receiving country. German authorities, however, were less reluctant to accept non-German deportees into the ever larger areas they controlled. Since they were most likely to be deported to Germany, no group of foreigners was in a more endangered position in Finland than Jews, for whom the consequence of a routine deportation was most likely death.

"A person most disagreeable": The deportation of Meyer Dvoretsky

The State Police began clandestinely deporting Jewish civilians from Finland into the hands of the German authorities. The first victim, Meyer Dvoretsky, was a Norwegian Jew and businessman by trade, born, according to his own

statement, in Grodno in Russian Poland in 1894. To escape the German occupation, he had crossed the Finnish border from Skibotn in northern Norway in late June 1940. At the time, Norwegian refugees were gathered by Finnish authorities in an internment camp set up near the northern Finnish town of Kemi, where Dvoretsky was interrogated. Dvoretsky's family did not or could not follow him, which caused the State Police to be skeptical about him: "As a person of Jewish origin he did not consider staying in Norway, where his family nevertheless did stay." [24] Dvoretsky remained in Kemi with only a tenuous claim to the right of asylum as a political refugee. By January 1941 he was in trouble, taken in by the Rovaniemi police to be questioned over illegal currency transactions being investigated in Lapland. Dvoretsky had sought to support himself by dealing in currencies and by striking deals in the men's restroom of the Klubi hotel in Kemi. Soon afterwards, in March 1941, he came under suspicion of having participated in another crime by selling smuggled razorblades.[25]

Dvoretsky had been monitored by the local criminal police, but the State Police took notice of him as spring 1941 progressed, for his name was coupled with Algot Niska, a notorious smuggler of everything from spirits to people. Whether or not this association was significant was less important in regard to Dvoretsky's continued presence in Finland than the fact that he was apparently becoming a "disagreeable foreigner" in the eyes of the State Police.[26]

> Dvoretsky, who is beginning to be a permanent nuisance to the police through his diverse petty intrigues and crimes, and who has no grounds for claiming the status of a political refugee other than that he is a Jew, and is as a person most disagreeable, should by now be deported.[27]

Although Dvoretsky and his case elicited little sympathy among the State Police officials, he was to some extent protected by his Norwegian citizenship. Any deportation of Norwegians back to Norway, and thus into German hands, would be likely to raise an international outcry, especially as the Norwegian embassy, still operating in Finland, tried to guard the interests of Norwegians, and the Swedish press was keen to monitor and report on developments in Finland. Nonetheless, State Police officials considered getting rid of Dvoretsky, contemplating how best to deport him to Norway. "Is it possible to get him returned to Norway?," scribbled one of the officials on a document margin, "Could we send him unofficially?"[28]

The junior deputy chief of the State Police, Bruno Aaltonen, voiced this policy decision to his colleagues who had raised the question of deporting Dvoretsky to Norway: "Can't send him to Norway, but I'll speak to the [Norwegian] embassy about sending him somewhere else."[29] In practice "somewhere else" would have meant cooperation with the Swedish authorities in sending Dvoretsky either to Sweden or elsewhere via Sweden. Swedish

assistance was not forthcoming, and so by April 1941 the State Police returned to the earlier scheme of deporting Dvoretsky to Norway. The chief of the Rovaniemi branch office contacted his colleague and counterpart, the chief of the northernmost branch office of the German Security Police in Kirkenes, Norway, and struck a deal for a "simplified" deportation process, dumping Dvoretsky into the hands of the *Sicherheitspolizei* without any official paperwork or documentation, contrary to the policy otherwise maintained of not returning Norwegian citizens to Norway against their will.

Dvoretsky was deported by an already tried and true method. There was a precedent to his case, as in August 1940 the Finnish State Police had handed over another Norwegian, suspected Soviet agent Hjalmar Friskilä, to the German Security Police in Kirkenes. What had been remarkable in Friskilä's case was its clandestine nature, which the Finnish State Police indeed admitted in internal correspondence: "the deportation [of Friskilä] will be put through totally unofficially and without respective documentation."[30]

Meyer Dvoretsky was handed over to the German military intelligence in Norway around June 17, 1941. Thereafter he was transferred to the *Sicherheitspolizei* branch in Kirkenes and sent to the Tromsdalen concentration camp; in April 1942 he was transferred to the notorious Grini camp near Oslo. When the extermination operation of Norwegian Jews commenced in 1942, Dvoretsky was among the first victims to be shipped via Germany to Auschwitz, where most of the almost 800 Norwegian Jews perished. Dvoretsky, though, was not among them. The latest information on Dvoretsky dates to May 1944, when he was transferred from Auschwitz and died thereafter. The first Jew deported from Finland into the hands of the Germans, Dvoretsky would soon be followed by others.[31]

Friskilä had been a Communist and a suspected spy; Dvoretsky was a Jew and a suspected petty criminal. Both decidedly personified the "disagreeable aliens" who could, if necessary, be treated as the State Police saw fit, apparently without fear of further consequences, an assumption that proved correct. Traces of both cases were buried in the State Police archives. Neither deportation raised public outcry at the time, and they did not resurface until over sixty years had elapsed.

"A Latvian spy": The deportation of Nikolajs Arnholds

In late June 1941, shortly after the deportation of Meyer Dvoretsky, the German assault on the Soviet Union began. The Finnish State Police soon had a number of new cases of "disagreeable aliens" waiting for a decision. With the rapid German advance through the western part of the Soviet Union and through the Baltics, the line adopted seems to have been simple: the German occupation of, in particular, Estonia and Latvia ensured that their former citizens residing in Finland could be deported and would be accepted there. One of those considered suitable for deportation was

a Latvian Jew by the name of Nikolajs Arnholds, suspected of intelligence activities on behalf of the Soviet Union. The actual evidence was thin, but in the heated atmosphere of late 1941, and with the powers granted by the legislation, Arnholds's deportation was a foregone conclusion. He was arrested in late 1941, suspected of treasonous activities. Because he was a foreigner, there was no need to test the evidence in a court of law. A deportation would be much easier to effect.[32]

While Arnholds was detained in protective custody, in October 1941 a Finnish State Police official, Olavi Viherluoto, visited German colleagues in Estonia, the *Sonderkommando 1a* of the *Einsatzgruppe A*. Inspecting the brutal methods used by the German and Estonian security authorities, Viherluoto also learned that Jews were being systematically killed, which he dutifully reported to his superiors in a detailed memorandum after his return. His report, signed as read by the top leadership of the Finnish State Police, made it clear that Jews deported to German-controlled areas faced the risk of death. Viherluoto's memorandum mentions Arnholds as well:

> I spoke to the Sicherheitspolizei about the possible return of the arrested Latvian spy Arnholds to Latvia. The Sicherheitspolizei advised, after the conclusion of investigations [against Arnholds], sending the protocols to its branch in Riga, which will make a decision in his case.[33]

Deported from Finland and shipped to Tallinn, Estonia in November 1941, Arnholds vanishes from a historian's sight. There are no further clues as to his final fate in Finnish, Estonian, or Latvian archives, nor is his name known to the International Tracing Service of the International Red Cross.[34]

"Partly Jewish blood": Deporting Wilhelm Kernig and Georges Busch

In April 1942, chief of the Finnish State Police Arno Anthoni visited Berlin at the invitation of Reinhard Heydrich. In Berlin, Anthoni was engaged in discussions with the leadership of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*, most importantly with Heinrich Müller, the head of the *RSHA Amt IV*, into which the *Geheime Staatspolizei* (Gestapo) had been incorporated. Müller had been a contact for the Finnish State Police ever since the mid-1930s. As Heydrich himself was absent at the time, Anthoni's interlocutors included Friedrich Panzinger, head of the *RSHA Amt IV A*, charged with the surveillance of Communist activities, and Bruno Streckenbach, chief of the *RSHA Amt I* in charge of personnel matters.[35]

The actual content of the talks is not clear. Anthoni described his visit in a report he drew up shortly after his return to Finland. Interrogated after the war, Anthoni also gave several statements concerning the talks; all of

the statements were circumspect in their description of what was actually said and agreed upon.

> It had been orally agreed that Finland may return to their homelands in German-occupied areas those foreigners deemed unsuitable to keep in Finland, and that Germany would issue a transit visa for those to be returned to their homelands. Anthoni says that he had in this connection remarked that some of the returnees were criminals, whereupon Panzinger and Müller had answered that there was a lack of workforce in Germany. According to Anthoni the question of political persons, such as Jews from Central Europe, had not been touched upon. It was further agreed that Finland will in good time notify Berlin of the return of such persons. In such a note the returnees would be individually named, so the agreement was not of a collective nature. Anthoni says that he himself had initiated the discussions and the oral agreement.[36]

The only contemporary report of the actual contents of the talks in Berlin was given by Anthoni himself to the Ministry of the Interior in December 1942, possibly prompted by negative media publicity surrounding the deportation of Jews in November 1942. Later, Anthoni drew up an even terser report, in addition to his later statements under interrogation. In February 1947, the Soviet authorities extracted a statement concerning the talks from Friedrich Panzinger, imprisoned in Moscow. Panzinger's version was the most aggravating: he claimed that Adolf Eichmann, head of the *RSHA Amt IV B 4* charged with the practical arrangements of the genocide of Europe's Jews, had been present on one occasion. Panzinger's version nevertheless contains factual errors and inconsistencies, suggesting he may have been telling the Soviets what he thought they wanted to hear. None of these descriptions enables much possibility of cross-checking or corroborating the few details Anthoni himself deigned to mention. Whether or not Eichmann was indeed present, no practical consequences can be seen in the extant sources. We must, therefore, attempt to analyze the contents of the talks on the basis of subsequent actions by the State Police.[37]

Anthoni's trip to Berlin seems almost immediately to have caused a mass deportation of "disagreeable aliens" from Finland in June 1942. Among the deportees were two men registered as Jews, Wilhelm Kernig and Georges Busch. Kernig was a German journalist with a chequered career behind him. Born in Berlin in 1902 of a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother who raised him alone, in the mid-1920s Kernig sought his political identity in the National Socialist Party. Expelled from the Party after an internal quarrel, Kernig shifted his political leanings to the left. He became a journalist, and active in the German birth control and sex education movement. After the Nazi regime clamped down on the left-wing birth control movement, Kernig emigrated from Germany to Prague, where he worked for German émigré newspapers.[38]

In the late 1930s, Kernig was recruited by Czech military intelligence and sent on a mission to Sweden to gather information on German activity there. Captured by the Swedish Security Police, he was deported back to Czechoslovakia, which itself fell victim to Nazi aggression. The German Security Police had also learned of Kernig's intelligence activities against Germany, and his name was added to the wanted lists. With increasing uncertainty about his future and livelihood, Kernig was forced to emigrate, this time seeking asylum in Estonia. By now a player of some experience in the *demi-monde* of secret intelligence, he solicited to cooperate with the Finnish State Police in May 1939. Allowed entry into Finland, a series of blind alleys awaited him. The sting operation for which Kernig was originally recruited was soon abandoned, and he attempted to support himself through writing, for which fewer and fewer opportunities were available, by giving language classes, by providing information on émigré and Jewish circles in Helsinki to the State Police, and by drawing a modest allowance from the refugee board of the Jewish community in Helsinki. In desperation, he finally began selling information to foreign intelligence organizations present in Helsinki. This was a fatal error. Kernig's activities did not go unnoticed by the State Police, which took him into protective custody. While Kernig was in custody, Arno Anthoni and Heinrich Müller discussed his case; their correspondence revealed that Kernig, long considered in Finland a "disagreeable alien" suitable for deportation, was also a wanted man in Germany. His case negotiated in advance with the RSHA, Kernig was earmarked for a speedy deportation. Anthoni's description to Müller summarizes his attitude towards Kernig: "an international, immoral spy, and a Jew."[39]

At the same time another Jewish immigrant had also drawn the attention of the State Police. In March 1940, Georges Busch arrived in Finland as a volunteer for the Finnish–Soviet Winter War. By that time the war was already over, but before Busch had time to leave Finland, Germany had occupied his home country, Belgium. Like many other volunteers from countries overrun by the Nazis, Busch told the Finnish authorities he would not return to Belgium as long as the country was occupied; he was stranded in Finland. As the renewal of hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union became ever more likely towards the summer of 1941, the Finnish Army sought to repatriate all the former volunteers from countries hostile to the Third Reich. These included the British, Poles, and Belgians, as they were thought to present a security risk by their anti-German attitudes.

In September 1941 the State Police took a stance in the case of Busch, which clarifies both the antisemitism within the organization, as well as the underlying consistency in its efforts to get rid of "unpleasant" individuals:

> When it is also taken into consideration, that . . . Busch is a penniless man . . . his business has to be considered so uncertain, that the State

> Police does not deem the granting of a work permit advisable . . . to this man of partly Jewish blood, who already is in possession of a work permit for giving language lessons. The State Police considers it all the same whether Busch goes to Belgium or to Sweden. The main issue is that he does not remain here.[40]

While Busch was a foreign volunteer in the Winter War, a status which granted him some forbearance, he was personally on bad terms with his former superior, Major Bertil Nordlund. Nordlund advised that "this Belgian half-Jew now being supported by well-meaning ladies" be sent to his home country as soon as possible. When the Ministry for Foreign Affairs yielded in December 1941, the Ministry of the Interior immediately turned down Busch's pending appeals for residence and work permits, ordering him to leave the country. Busch wished to be allowed to enter Sweden. When Sweden proved unwilling to take him in June 1942, most probably under pressure from the State Police, he agreed to return to Belgium via Germany.[41]

The deportees sailed from Finland in mid-June 1942 aboard the German transport vessel *Neidenfels*. The port of destination was Swinemünde on the mouth of the Oder. The group represented a variety of backgrounds, and their repatriation via Germany was officially voluntary. It turned out that the German authorities were willing to respect the promise of repatriation in regard to those nationalities they did not consider enemies. For instance, the Swiss Winter War volunteer Jean-Pierre Fehlmann arrived in Zürich, but the escaped Polish prisoners-of-war were dumped in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. The two Jewish deportees were clearly in the most danger.

Busch did not end up in Belgium as he had been promised. After his arrival in Germany, he was taken to Sachsenhausen in November 1942, and then transferred to Dachau. Married to a Finnish woman, who remained in Finland, Busch seems to have retained a right to foreign correspondence while in the camp. After Finland severed its diplomatic relations with Germany in September 1944, Busch's wife reportedly decided to travel to Germany to join her husband. Busch survived the war, and was finally able to return to Belgium in the spring of 1945.[42]

Kernig faced a much sterner fate. While on board the *Neidenfels* he attempted suicide, but did not harm himself severely enough. After a brief hospitalization in Germany, he was transferred for interrogation to the RSHA headquarters in Berlin. It is not known what he told the Gestapo. Next, Kernig was taken to Plötzensee prison; due to his intelligence activities, he was accused of treason. Sentenced to death in late October 1943, he was taken to Görden penitentiary in Brandenburg to await execution, and was guillotined there on January 17, 1944. Whether or not Kernig considered himself to be Jewish, Jewish identity was thrust upon him by the provisions of Nazi legislation; even if, in the end, it was his dabbling in the dangerous world of secret intelligence which largely proved to be his

undoing, his Jewish identity was nonetheless significant for his treatment by both Finnish and German authorities.[43]

"Criminal element": The deportation of "those eight"

The mass deportation of civilians aboard the *Hohenhörn* in November 1942 was the last involving Jews, as it drew considerable controversy about the way the State Police operated in both Finland and Sweden. Public attention, together with the visible turn taken by the war in early 1943, caused the State Police to tread more cautiously in deportation matters, and to refrain from deporting Jews altogether. Nevertheless, this particular deportation, in the form it was finally muscled through by the State Police and the Ministry of the Interior, has become a central issue whenever Finnish involvement in the Holocaust is considered, because the deportation included eight Jews: Heinrich and Kurt Huppert; Georg, Janka, and Franz Kollmann; Elias Kopelovsky; Hans Szybilski; and Hans Korn.[44] Technically there were only five legal deportees, the rest being family members voluntarily following their husbands and fathers. All became victims of the Holocaust, except for Georg Kollmann, who survived the consequences of deportation.[45]

A deportation order, however, was not set in stone, but could be voided by resourceful and well-connected individuals. Such a person, for instance, was Walter Cohen, a Belgian Jew who earned his livelihood in Finland as a physician. Anthoni wrote to Heinrich Müller about Cohen's case on September 13, 1942, asking for Müller's agreement to deport Cohen and his family to Germany, ostensibly to return him to his homeland in Belgium. No reason was given, other than that Cohen was seen as an irksome troublemaker quick to resort to his contacts within Finnish society. When the RSHA signalled its acceptance, the deportation process was initiated. Despite having been brought to a Helsinki prison to await deportation, Cohen managed to call on his contacts and mount a campaign leading to the removal of his name from the deportation lists. Cohen's case shows that the State Police was far from omnipotent in terms of individual deportation decisions, and susceptible to political pressures. Nonetheless, in Cohen's case, the State Police was ultimately victorious, for Cohen was eventually forced out of Finland. He moved to Sweden, where in 1945 he wrote scathing memoirs describing his vicissitudes in Finland, including his troubles with the State Police.[46]

The historian Hannu Rautkallio has interpreted the process leading to the deportation of the eight Jews from Finland as something both inspired and set in motion by Cohen and his confrontational style of dealing with the Finnish authorities. There is absolutely no need for such theorizing. While the specific grounds remain unknown due to the largely oral, scantily documented, and brief process of consideration in each case, a simple survey of the extant evidence of the bureaucratic practice is enough to make

visible the often haphazard, unpredictable, and inconsistent nature of the process leading to a deportation order. The factors which increased one's risk of being deported were: suspect political sympathies or suspect ethnic background, of which Jewish origin, alongside Communist sympathies or Russian ethnicity, were among the more aggravating.[47]

The case of one deportee, Heinrich Huppert, illustrates the predicament of the Jewish deportees of November 1942. A Vienna-born businessman, Huppert was one of the Austrian Jews arriving in Finland in August 1938. His wife Elisabeth stayed behind in Vienna, but his teenage daughter Fritzi and younger son Kurt followed their father into exile. In Finland, Huppert managed to support himself as a traveling salesman (selling items he had bought from auctions) and as a representative for an office supplies company. As a foreigner with an obligation to work, Huppert was mobilized for the Winter War and employed as a driver. By mid-December 1939, however, he had for some reason fallen into disrepute. For the remainder of the Winter War, the State Police took Huppert into protective custody, and Fritzi and Kurt Huppert were placed in a children's home.[48] Huppert was released after the Winter War, and resumed his business as a peddler. Already suspicious to the State Police, his case took a turn for the worse when, in the summer of 1940, he became acquainted with a Polish refugee suspected of illegal intelligence activities. Together the two men set up a second-hand shop, apparently used by Huppert's associate as a front for black market activities, which proved to be enough for the State Police (see Figure 9.1). On the road looking for merchandise in Rovaniemi, Huppert was held for questioning in June 1941. Although he was not implicated in any crime, he was nevertheless given a deportation order "for treasonous activities." He was ordered into protective custody, where he remained until November 1942, by which time the RSHA had declared itself willing to receive the deportees Finland might think proper to remove from the country. Fritzi Huppert remained in Finland, while Huppert's son Kurt followed his father to death.

Huppert's case was typical of the November 1942 deportees: none of them were charged with actual crimes. Some were suspected of petty criminal activities, but others were not even criminal suspects, having only, to their misfortune, drawn the attention of the authorities. There is an explanation for why no criminal procedures were undertaken even against those—like Huppert—who probably could have been accused in a court of law; deportation as a "disagreeable alien" did not require anything other than rubbing the authorities the wrong way. Also, unlike a convicted criminal, a deported alien would not remain in Finland as a burden to the prison administration and the country's meager food reserves. The reasons behind the deportation of all the Jews in November 1942, as well as for all the Jewish deportees before that, are threefold: they had been deemed "disagreeable aliens," they were foreigners in Finland and thereby easy to deport, and they were Jews. While the State Police did not attempt a mass deportation of all non-Finnish

Figure 9.1 Tossed by Fate. From the left: Heinrich Huppert, Marian Skwara, Paula Saxell, and Kazimierz Rodziewicz at the door of the Polonia second-hand shop in Helsinki, 1940. Huppert and Skwara were both deported from Finland in 1942; Huppert, an Austrian Jew, died in Auschwitz, while Skwara, a former soldier in the Polish army, survived incarceration at Sachsenhausen. Rodziewicz, a Pole with civilian refugee status, moved to Sweden in 1943. (Courtesy of the National Archives of Finland, Helsinki)

Jews from the country, Jewish origin was clearly a factor leading to greater susceptibility to deportation.

A former State Police official, Kaarlo Stendahl, under interrogation in October 1947, gave a statement in which he analyzed the attitudes within the State Police toward the deportations. According to Stendahl, the State Police was well aware of the persecution faced by the Jews under Nazi rule. What counted for more, however, was the enduring ambition to get "disagreeable aliens" removed from Finland. And because of the deep-seated antisemitism in the State Police, any Jew could be seen as

more disagreeable than members of other groups of people, Russians excepted. As spring 1942 had progressed, Stendahl said, it had been "generally discussed, that one should one way or another get rid of the Jewish refugees, whose entry into Finland had, from the very beginning, not been deemed advisable, if for no other reason than that there were no resources for the upkeep of foreign citizens."[49] In the fall of 1942, according to an interrogation protocol, Stendahl engaged in a brief conversation with Anthoni, sparked by the case of Walter Cohen, about the grounds for deportation:

> Anthoni said . . . that he considered the said Jew [Cohen] so dangerous a person that he could not agree to this proposal. On this occasion the subject [Stendahl] said to Anthoni that in his opinion the Jewish question had already raised so much alarm in the world that he felt it would do more harm than good to send a certain person [Cohen] away from the country. . . . Anthoni then answered that he nevertheless considered it necessary to deport the said person.[50]

Against this background, the report of a later reminiscence by lawyer Lars Hornborg concerning a conversation with Anthoni in early November 1942 about the pending deportation of Jews from Finland rings authentic in its description of the prevailing attitude among the top echelons of the State Police. Although this report points to the less-than-outright-exterminatory intent behind the deportations, it nonetheless identifies a sharply antisemitic undercurrent in the State Police decision-making:

> According to what the subject [Hornborg] remembers, Anthoni said that the authorities had decided to send away all the Jews who had moved to Finland in recent years as refugees or otherwise. At the same time Anthoni explained that if permission for these Jews to move to Sweden could be arranged, they could be sent there, but they had to be deported from Finland.[51]

Those twelve and the Holocaust

Deportation was, then, an expedient way of ridding Finland of foreigners deemed, for a variety of reasons, "disagreeable." By 1941, the Ministry of the Interior and the State Police were in an almost unchallenged position when it came to deciding who to deport, though their authority could be circumvented through appeals to public opinion or contacts within Finnish society.[52] The June 1942 deportation, which included two persons registered as Jews, Wilhelm Kernig and Georges Busch, is exemplary of the way Finnish authorities, through a policy of studied disregard for the individual consequences of deportation orders, performed a more active role than mere

bystanders in the unfolding Holocaust and in other Nazi war crimes and atrocities. In this particular instance, the deportees were all to be repatriated to their homeland through the offices of the RSHA. There is no evidence that the Finnish State Police tried to ensure that the deportees would end up in their homelands as promised. As the April 1942 oral agreement between Anthoni, Müller, and Panzinger demonstrates, the matter would be out of the hands of the Finnish State Police as soon as the deportees were in the custody of the German authorities, and the Germans would be free to dispose of them as they saw fit.[53]

After November 1942, however, the State Police actions regarding Jews in Finland became the subject of considerable and increasing public interest. The German defeat at Stalingrad brought new realities forcefully home to most Finns as well. By early February 1943 Finnish military intelligence arrived at the conclusion, communicated to the political leadership, that Germany would lose the war. While lingering faith in a German victory took much longer to evaporate, the Finnish government saw the writing on the wall and resigned. The new government, chosen from members of the majority parties thought to be more acceptable to the Western powers, took it upon itself to steer Finland out of the war, and a new Minister of the Interior, Leo Ehrnrooth, was appointed. In the words of the incoming prime minister, Edwin Linkomies, the government began to seek a "release from the German influence and a return to Scandinavian, humanitarian-based principles."[54]

The government of Finland never formulated a policy regarding the Final Solution: neither active participation nor refraining from participating ever became a matter pending a government decision. The government in 1941–43 left these matters to be decided by a lower level of administration, comprising the State Police and key army officials. Backed by the State Police led by his protégé Arno Anthoni, Interior Minister Toivo Horelli was left to make deportation policy. His antisemitic bias is unmistakeable: while serving as a minister, Horelli systematically refused to accept pending applications for Finnish citizenship by Jewish applicants. It was not until March 1943, and after the change of government, that something approaching a Jewish policy was formulated and expressly based on the principle of treating all applicants equally.[55]

There is no evidence that the aim of the State Police would have been systematically to deliver any and all Jews from Finland into the hands of the Nazi authorities. Neither is there evidence of a plan to deliver non-Finnish Jews *en masse* to a similar fate. There is ample evidence, however, of the way the pervasive interweaving of anti-Communism and antisemitism among State Police officials caused the organization to perceive Jews in Finland in general, and foreign Jews in particular, as security risks and nuisances to be removed should the opportunity present itself.[56]

Between 1941 and 1944 the Ministry of the Interior deported a total of 135 civilians, twelve of whom were Jews, from Finland into the hands of the Nazi authorities. Until Elina Sana's 2003 *Luovutetut* (Finnish, Extradited), post-war Finnish historiography, when touching upon the deportations of Jews, had almost exclusively concentrated on "those eight," the November 1942 deportation, and on the question of responsibility and guilt. Yet, the dimensions of Finnish involvement in the Holocaust as well as other Nazi atrocities and war crimes are not to be clarified by investigating the deportations of foreign civilians only. What emerges from an inspection of the Jewish deportations is an ambiguous, contradictory picture, in which antisemitism is deeply interlaced into a wider network of developing administrative policies and practices.

The Finnish authorities did not attempt to instigate or produce a Jewish genocide, nor do they appear to have sought the death of Jewish deportees *per se*. Nonetheless, there was an overwhelming desire to remove foreign Jews from Finland, regardless of the consequences to individual deportees—consequences which, for Jewish deportees to Nazi Germany or German-occupied territories, could readily have been anticipated. Although a consciously exterminatory or genocidal policy cannot be discerned, the State Police was nonetheless a collaborator in the Holocaust, and clearly acted on antisemitic impulses, motives unmistakeably revealed in the documents brought forward here. The Finnish State Police was saturated with antisemitism, which gained particular vehemence from the entwining of mistrust and hatred of Jews with radical anti-Communism. Soviet Jews were considered to be a major influence behind the Bolshevik regime, and Jewry in general was believed to be connected to world Communism in complex and profound, if indefinable, ways. Though callousness toward human suffering replaced the clear-cut genocidal intent displayed by their colleagues in the RSHA, Finnish authorities both displayed and acted on a visible antisemitism, which had fatal consequences for its victims.[57]

While it was not the sole cause for any of the Jewish deportations, antisemitism clearly played into State Police officials' thinking and the actions they took in specific cases. The official grounds on which deportations were put into effect were fourfold: suspicion of treasonous activities, petty criminality or suspicion of criminal activity, suspicion of Communist activities or sympathies, or simply being a "disagreeable alien," a status usually conferred to those whose morals were called into question. At the same time, the State Police was predisposed to regard any of these activities more seriously when Jews were involved; in this sense, Jews were categorically "disagreeable." The wartime deportations of Jews exemplifies the many and twisted paths of Finland's involvement with the Third Reich, especially how institutional structures and practices worked, intentionally and unintentionally, to sustain a contribution to the Holocaust.

Notes

1. On "those eight," see Hannu Rautkallio, *Ne kahdeksan ja Suomen omatunto: Suomesta 1942 luovutetut juutalaispakolaiset* [Those eight and Finland's conscience: The Jewish refugees deported from Finland in 1942] (Espoo: Weilin+Göös, 1985). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.
2. Christopher R. Browning, "Problem Solvers," in *The Oxford Handbook of Holocaust Studies*, ed. Peter Hayes and John K. Roth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 128–9. Hannu Rautkallio has put forward an interpretation of the Holocaust contrary to the one I am presenting here, accentuating Finland as a unique "exception to the Holocaust." See Hannu Rautkallio, *Finland and the Holocaust: The Rescue of Finland's Jews*, trans. Paul Sjöblom (New York: Holocaust Library, 1987); and Hannu Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut* [Spared from the Holocaust] (Helsinki: WSOY, 2004).
3. The Finnish State Police (under the name of *valtiollinen poliisi,* or Valpo, from 1938–48), was a predecessor of today's Finnish Security Intelligence Service (*suojelupoliisi)*; until the end of 1937, this intelligence agency functioned under the designation *etsivä keskuspoliisi* (detective central police).
4. I discuss this issue in Oula Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft: Die sicherheitspolizeiliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Finnland und Deutschland 1933–1944* [Secret brothers-in-arms: The cooperation of the Finnish and German security police 1933–1944] (Darmstadt: WBG, 2010).
5. Taimi Torvinen, *Pakolaiset Suomessa Hitlerin valtakaudella* [Refugees in Finland during Hitler's reign] (Helsinki: Otava, 1984).
6. Hans-Jürgen Döscher, *Das Auswärtige Amt im Dritten Reich: Diplomatie im Schatten der "Endlösung"* [The Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the Third Reich: Diplomacy in the shadow of the "Final Solution"] (Berlin: Siedler, 1986), 227–36.
7. KA, EK-Valpo I, XV A 2, State Police to the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, August 11, 1938.
8. Tapio Kuosma, *Ulkomaalaisen maahantulo ja maastalähtö: Tutkimus ulkomaalaisvalvonnan oikeudellisesta sääntelystä Suomessa* [An alien's entry and exit: A study of the judicial regulation of the surveillance of aliens in Finland] (Helsinki: Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 1992).
9. Suomen asetuskokoelma [Finnish Code of Statutes] 1933 (Helsinki 1933). Asetus ulkomaalaisten Suomeen tulosta ja oleskelusta maassa [Decree on Aliens' Entry into and Sojourn in Finland], May 27, 1933, 1 and 4 §.
10. Suomen asetuskokoelman sopimussarja, no 29/1937, Asetus Suomen ja Saksan välisen, rikoksentekijäin luovuttamista koskevan sopimuksen voimaansaattamisesta [Decree on the Ratification of the Finnish–German Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals], Helsinki, September 17, 1937.
11. Oula Silvennoinen, "Transfers of Civilians to German Authorities," in Lars Westerlund, ed., *Prisoners of War Deaths and People Handed Over to Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939–55: A Research Report by the Finnish National Archives* (Helsinki: National Archives, 2008), 168.
12. Suomen asetuskokoelma 1933, Asetus ulkomaalaisten Suomeen tulosta ja oleskelusta maassa, May 27, 1933, 16–23, 29–30 §. The only exceptions to the three-month rule were citizens of the United States, allowed to reside in Finland for six months on the basis of a Finnish–US treaty.
13. Suomen asetuskokoelma 1933, Asetus ulkomaalaisten Suomeen tulosta ja oleskelusta maassa, May 27, 1933, 24–27 §.

14. Suomen asetuskokoelma 1933, Asetus ulkomaalaisten Suomeen tulosta ja oleskelusta maassa, May 27, 1933, 25 §; Kuosma, *Ulkomaalaisen maahantulo*, 91–2.
15. Suomen asetuskokoelma 1930, Asetus ulkomaalaisten Suomeen tulosta ja oleskelusta maassa, February 7, 1930, 11 §; Suomen asetuskokoelma 1942, Asetus ulkomaalaisten Suomeen tulosta ja oleskelusta maassa, January 30, 1942.
16. Kuosma, *Ulkomaalaisen maahantulo*, 88–9.
17. Suomen asetuskokoelma 1937, Asetus valtiollisesta poliisista [Decree on the State Police], December 17, 1937, 1 §.
18. Kuosma, *Ulkomaalaisen maahantulo*, 386.
19. Suomen asetuskokoelma 1938, Asetus ulkomaalaisten Suomeen tulosta ja oleskelusta maassa, April 1, 1938.
20. Suomen asetuskokoelma 1939, Asetus valtioneuvoston oikeudesta antaa poikkeuksellisia määräyksiä ulkomaalaisten Suomeen tulosta ja oleskelusta maassa [Decree on the Right of the Council of State to Issue Exceptional Orders Concerning Aliens' Entry into and Sojourn in Finland], September 1, 1939; Tasavallan suojelulaki [Protection of the Republic Act], October 6, 1939; Asetus henkilökohtaisen vapauden rajoittamisesta [Decree on Limitations of Personal Liberty], November 30, 1939.
21. Suomen asetuskokoelma 1939, Valtioneuvoston päätös ulkomaalaisten Suomeen tulosta ja oleskelusta maassa annetun asetuksen nojalla lääninhallituksille kuuluvien tehtävien siirtämisestä sisäasiainministeriölle [Decision of the Council of State to Transfer to the Ministry of the Interior the Tasks Belonging to Provincial Governments on the Basis of the Decree on Aliens Entry into and Sojourn in Finland], November 6, 1939; Matti Simola and Jukka Salovaara, eds., *Turvallisuuspoliisi 75 vuotta* [The Security Police 75th anniversary] (Helsinki: Sisäasiainministeriön poliisiosasto, 1994), 190.
22. Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 157–8.
23. Suomen asetuskokoelma 1942, Asetus ulkomaalaisten Suomeen tulosta ja oleskelusta maassa, January 30, 1942 ja Asetus valtiollisesta poliisista annetun asetuksen muuttamisesta [Decree on the Changes to the Decree on the State Police], April 2, 1942; Kuosma, *Ulkomaalaisen maahantulo*, 389. Legal protection remained inadequate, as the decree still did not provide an alien the right to appeal a decision made by the authorities.
24. KA, EK-Valpo I, KD 139/921 1941, Rovaniemi, March 22, 1941.
25. KA, EK-Valpo I, KD 93/915 1941, Rovaniemi, February 19, 1941; and KD 139/921 1941, Rovaniemi, March 22, 1941.
26. KA, EK-Valpo I, KD 93/915 1941, Rovaniemi, February 19, 1941.
27. KA, EK-Valpo I, KD 139/921 1941, Rovaniemi, March 22, 1941.
28. KA, EK-Valpo I, KD 139/921 1941, Rovaniemi, March 22, 1941.
29. KA, EK-Valpo I, KD 139/921 1941, Rovaniemi, March 22, 1941.
30. Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 132–4.
31. BA-MA, RH 20-20/133, O.U. (*Ortsunterkunft*), June 17, 1941; Yad Vashem Archives, M 8, International Tracing Service, D 182 Dvoretsky, Meyer; *Nordmenn i fangenskap 1940–1945*, ed. Kristian Ottosen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1995), 170.
32. KA, EK-Valpo I, hmp 11405, Arnholds, Nikolai.
33. KA, Valpo II, amp XXV G 5, "Matkakertomus virkamatkasta Tallinnaan 1.–12.10.1941" [Report on an official journey to Tallinn, October 1–12, 1941], Helsinki, October 21, 1941. What is meant here is probably the *Einsatzgruppe A* (*Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienstes Ostland*) of Walter

Stahlecker, whom the Finnish State Police leadership knew personally, rather than just the Latvian branch of the German Security Police (*Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienstes Lettland*).
34. Yad Vashem Archives, M 8, International Tracing Service.
35. Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 200–4.
36. KA, Valpo II, hmp 4374c Anthoni, Arno, page 43, muistio [memorandum], March 22, 1946.
37. Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 250–2.
38. Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 100–2.
39. KA, EK-Valpo I, hmp 11293 Jaderny, Vilem, page 48, Anthoni to Müller, Helsinki May 23, 1942.
40. KA, EK-Valpo I, hmp 11370 Busch, Georges, State Police to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, September 27, 1941.
41. KA, EK-Valpo I, hmp 11370 Busch, Georges, Bertil Nordlund to the Armed Forces HQ Volunteer Office (*Päämajan vapaaehtoistoimisto*), Helsinki, November 17, 1941; Ministry for Foreign Affairs to State Police, December 4, 1941; and ilm 1356/1574 1942, June 6, 1942.
42. Yad Vashem, M 8, International Tracing Service, B 384 Busch, George.
43. Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 258–9.
44. See, for example, Elina Sana [Suominen], *Kuoleman laiva s/s Hohenhörn: Juutalaispakolaisten kohtalo Suomessa* [Death ship SS Hohenhörn: The fate of the Jewish refugees in Finland] (Helsinki: WSOY, 2004 [1979]); Torvinen, *Pakolaiset Suomessa*; Rautkallio, *Ne kahdeksan ja Suomen omatunto*; Elina Sana, *Luovutetut: Suomen ihmisluovutukset Gestapolle* [Extradited: Finland's human deliveries to the Gestapo] (Helsinki: WSOY, 2003); Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut*; Antero Holmila, *Holokausti: Tapahtumat ja tulkinnat* [The Holocaust: Events and interpretations] (Atena: Jyväskylä, 2010), 195–213.
45. For a recent discussion of the case, see Anton Weiss-Wendt, *Murder without Hatred: Estonians and the Holocaust* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2009), 214–15.
46. Walter Cohen, *Jag sökte en fristad* [I sought asylum] (Örebro: Evangeliipress, 1945); Rautkallio, *Holokaustilta pelastetut*, 356–401.
47. Rautkallio, *Finland and the Holocaust*, 195–6. Rautkallio has returned to the subject and elaborated this interpretation in his 2004 work *Holokaustilta pelastetut*.
48. EK-Valpo I, KD 264/941 1941, Rovaniemi, June 17, 1941; State Police card file, index card Huppert, Kurt.
49. SA, T 16070/18 II, Kaarlo Stendahlin kuulustelupöytäkirja (interrogation protocol of Kaarlo Stendahl), Helsinki October 31, 1947.
50. SA, T 16070/18 II, interrogation protocol of Kaarlo Stendahl, Helsinki, October 31, 1947.
51. As quoted in Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 247.
52. Holmila, *Holokausti*, 204; Silvennoinen, "Transfers of Civilians", 168–72.
53. Silvennoinen, *Geheime Waffenbrüderschaft*, 200–4.
54. Edwin Linkomies, *Vaikea aika: Suomen pääministerinä sotavuosina 1943–44* [Difficult time: Being prime minister of Finland in the war years 1943–44] (Helsinki: Otava, 1980), 233–5.
55. Kauko Rumpunen and Ohto Manninen, eds., *"Faktillisesti tämä tarkoittaa antautumista": Jatkosodan hallitusten iltakoulujen pöytäkirjat* ["Factually, this means surrender": Minutes of informal government sessions during the Continuation War] (Helsinki: Edita, 2009), 78.

56. KA, Valpo II, hmp 4374b Anthoni, Arno, page 9, Yrjö Kares to Paavo Kastari, November 18, 1944. The perception also endured changes of government, changes in State Police leadership and the changes in Finland's position in the whole war. Thus, for instance, the chief of the State Police Information office, Yrjö Kares, could still in November 1944 characterize the 1938 Austrian refugees as "Vienna Jewish refugees who were accidentally let into the country."
57. Oula Silvennoinen, "Still Under Examination: Coming to Terms with Finland's Alliance with Nazi Germany," *Yad Vashem Studies* 37, no. 2 (2009): 87–8.

10

"*Soldaten wie andere auch*": Finnish *Waffen-SS* Volunteers and Finland's Historical Imagination

Antero Holmila

Some years ago in the regional newspaper *Turun Sanomat*, a former *Waffen-SS* volunteer reflected on the experiences of the Finnish contingent, the *Finnisches Freiwilligen Bataillon der Waffen-SS,* on the Eastern Front:

> Nobody talked about politics to us. We were Germany's elite soldiers. . . . *Waffen-SS* had nothing to do with Allgemeine-SS, which was political. Not a single man from the SS Viking division [in which a number of Finnish volunteers had served for a time] was sentenced for war crimes in the postwar trials. It's wrong that we are mixed up with the brutality of Algemeine-SS [*sic*]. We were soldiers under the *Wehrmacht* command and fought against the same enemy as Finland.[1]

The *Waffen-SS* veteran's view illustrates the dominant features of the Finnish postwar narrative: almost without exception, Finnish historiography, as well as the public use of history, has argued that the Finnish Volunteer Battalion of the *Waffen-SS* was an elite force and that it had nothing to do with the Holocaust or crimes committed by other SS units. The participation of members of the Viking division in mass atrocities, which has been well-established by other scholars,[2] has been similarly concealed; as a result there has been no consideration even of the possibility that Finnish SS soldiers could have been involved in the commission of war crimes. In addition to this "writing-out" of the war of extermination from the Finnish war experience, the paradigm of "Finnish exceptionalism" to the normative narrative of Axis history has also been invoked. The core of this "exceptionalist view" rests on the "separate war thesis," the assertion that "Finland fought its war in 1941–44 independently and separately from Nazi Germany and its 'satellites' as the *continuation* of its own Winter War [1939–40]."[3]

Originally coined to justify Finland's alliance on military and political grounds, the "separate war thesis" has been extended to those who volunteered to join the Finnish *Waffen-SS*. Nationalist historiography in Finland stresses that those Finns who served in the *Waffen-SS* fought as

a Finnish formation, distinct in several ways from other *Waffen-SS* formations. For example, the Finnish contingent was not specifically recruited from the country's Nazi circles; it was exempt from the two-month long political indoctrination in Sennheim; in the otherwise atheistic organization, the Finnish battalion had a vicar (although technically disguised as a liaison officer); and unlike other "Western" contingents (Dutch, Flemish, Norwegian, and Danish), it had its own representative body in Berlin.[4] As a consequence, the historiography of the Finnish *Waffen-SS* experience is imbued with a major paradox: the volunteers' involvement in the war on the Eastern Front tends to be understood in the domestic context of Finland's Continuation War—as though the *Waffen-SS* volunteers were in effect fighting on the Finnish front—even though it may be at least as relevant to consider the recruits' experiences in the context of the German-led war of extermination. According to this argument, the fundamental motivation of all the soldiers can therefore be presented as identical: defending Finland in the face of attack by the Bolshevik hordes. Although from a retrospective point of view this re-appropriation of the Finnish *Waffen-SS* war experience might seem plausible, its major and inescapable flaw is its failure to account for the experiences of war as the events themselves unfolded.

This chapter investigates how various standardized narratives and emplotments of the Finnish *Waffen-SS* have created the image of "*Soldaten wie andere auch*" (soldiers like any others): not in the sense of *another* formation of *Waffen-SS* or *Wehrmacht* soldiers, but specifically as *any other Finnish* soldiers who fought for "home, religion, and fatherland" on the extended Finnish front. Although whether the Finnish *Waffen-SS* volunteers participated directly in genocidal acts during the war remains unclear and contested, since the war this perspective has become pervasive. Here, I explore how the dominant view emerged during the postwar decades, what strategies have been developed and accepted in order to shield Finland and the Finns from the possibility of participation in the genocidal impulses present in the German military at large, and assess its relevance to Finnish national identity and historical imagination in the context of the Second World War. In order to do so, I consider not only academic history, but also the cultural production of history through the press and fictional writing. Although defendants of Finland's *Waffen-SS* history claim the volunteers have mainly received negative press and accusations causing deliberate forgetting, this history has in fact attracted a largely positive, even idolizing, reception in scholarly investigations, memoirs, war fiction, mainstream newspaper and magazine articles, television documentaries, as well as on the internet.

The Finnish *Waffen-SS* battalion

The Russo–Finnish Winter War ended in Soviet victory, leaving Finland with over 25,000 casualties (either killed or wounded). As a result of the enforced

Moscow Peace Treaty (March 13, 1940), which was signed in order to avoid military defeat, Finland lost approximately 10 per cent of its territory. In the wake of the Winter War, Soviet pressure was felt in Finland's foreign and domestic affairs, and the country's future seemed anything but secure. Traumatized by the Winter War and by the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries in August 1940, and holding a deeply ingrained anti-Soviet mentality, the majority of Finns looked toward Hitler's Germany (still officially bound by the non-aggression pact signed with Moscow in August 1939). The Winter War had barely ended when popular opinion began to form, holding that a new war would break out and this time Finland would not fight alone.[5]

By early 1941, the Finnish government was increasingly convinced that a German–Soviet war was only a matter of time. In such a scenario, it was unlikely that Finland could remain neutral; Finland had to be prepared to take sides. Spring 1941 was the time when decisions had to be made (as Hitler was also preparing for Operation Barbarossa), and the Finnish government decided to throw its lot in with Nazi Germany. One aspect of this alignment was the establishment of the Finnish *Waffen-SS* battalion. In a sense, it was a quid pro quo solution: the Finnish government showed its tacit support for German aims in the form of the volunteer battalion. In return, should war break out, Germany would offer Finland economic and military support.

From the outset, Finland adopted the approach of sending a politically diverse group of Finnish soldiers, diverging from the German preference for troops with strong Nazi sympathies. Thus, in Finnish historiography it has been paradigmatic to emphasize that the Finns who joined *Waffen-SS* were not "Nazis."[6] Out of the 1,400 Finns recruited, approximately 20 percent could be identified as supporters of the extreme right, though this affiliation with the Finnish right did not automatically indicate direct identification with National Socialism. Nonetheless, support for the extreme right was over-represented among *Waffen-SS* volunteers, compared to its levels of support in wider Finnish society. Of the remaining 80 percent of recruits, it is safe to say that the majority had a conservative outlook with strong sympathies towards Germany. In other words, a Finn who joined the *Waffen-SS* or supported the recruitment process may not have been "a Nazi"; at the same time, his enlistment effectively recognized Nazi Germany as the power that should control Europe's fate. If they were not "Nazis" or "political soldiers" what was their motivation to join?

By May 1941, the government-supported secret recruitment was completed. Most of recruits were young, averaging twenty-one years of age.[7] Although these young men could not know about German military and ideological preparations in detail, many wanted to participate in a German war against the USSR, seeing this conflict as the only way for Finns to re-take the territory lost in the Winter War. As *Waffen-SS* veteran Erkki Heimolainen

Figure 10.1 Approximately 1,400 Finnish volunteers joined the *Waffen-SS* in early summer 1941. (Courtesy of Photo Center, Finnish Defense Forces, Helsinki)

related in an interview, "My father was the commandant of the local civil guards. Through him, I heard about the possibility to enlist for Germany. We were naturally very excited, for we were more than sure that the recent war [the Winter War] against the Soviet Union was not the last one. But now we did not have to fight alone."[8] However, Yrjö Kaila, a disillusioned Finnish *Waffen-SS* officer, who returned to Finland in January 1942, took a different view. According to Kaila, the primary motivation of those who enlisted stemmed less from shared concern about Finland's future than from the prospect of personally fulfilling opportunities, and even adventure: to receive military training in the world's most mechanized army, to achieve advancement in a military career, and to get "a taste of blood."[9] (See Figure 10.1.)

Niilo Lauttamus's popular 1957 *roman à clef*, *Vieraan kypärän alla* (Finnish, Under the foreign helmet), emphasizes the "adventure" theme from the

outset. One exchange between a Finnish recruiter and a young volunteer (the character based on Lauttamus) directly undermines the primacy of ideological motivation:

> Do you belong to any political party?
> No.
> Why did you enlist . . . the desire for adventure, or perhaps for some other reasons, emotional reasons?
> . . .
> I don't quite know myself why I enlisted. Perhaps to have an adventure.[10]

A Valpo (Finnish State Police) transcript record of a former *Waffen-SS* volunteer Erik Savolainen, who was interrogated in February 1947, stated that he "went to Germany for adventure and to receive training but soon he was put off by the German control and the persecution of Jews of which he heard more in detail over there," implying that some knowledge—rumored or otherwise—of Jewish persecution was available to the recruits, no doubt amplified by events unfolding around them at the front. Although we do not know what "more in detail" really means, by juxtaposing various sources, it is likely that it encompasses German acts persecuting the Jews (like the omnipresent "Jews unwelcome here" signs) as well as witnessing and listening to stories about the genocide.[11] In his own account, Kaila picked up on another theme neglected in literature about the *Waffen-SS*. With a keen eye on Finland's socio-psychological situation in early 1941, Kaila observed how "many who served on the home front during the Winter War . . . had started to feel an inferiority complex."[12] As Kaila indicates, the measure of a man's patriotism in a highly militarized society like Finland on the eve of Operation Barbarossa, was one's war service record. In this sense, by volunteering to serve in the *Waffen-SS* many volunteers "wanted to remedy" the fact that they did not serve at the front in the Winter War; indeed, altogether nearly 50 percent lacked military training prior to embarking for Germany.[13]

Whether the volunteers' motivations were opportunistic, national, or pan-German, during the Continuation War (1941–44), service in the *Waffen-SS* was not considered problematic: the volunteers were seen as Finnish soldiers in the German uniform, receiving valuable experience and simultaneously fighting against the same enemy as "any other" Finnish soldiers. This perception, however, changed drastically in September 1944 when Finland signed an armistice treaty with the Soviet Union.

Finnish volunteers in the *Waffen-SS*: Early postwar views

The end of the Second World War in Finland in September 1944 introduced a new political situation in which the Finnish wartime political

elite—like others across Europe—had to make room for "fresh faces." Although the Finnish *Waffen-SS* unit had been disbanded in August 1943 (and former *Waffen-SS* soldiers absorbed into the Finnish Army), in the new political climate the *Waffen-SS* volunteers came under scrutiny, spearheaded by the now-Communist-led Valpo, the Finnish State Police. With a few exceptions, silence set in among those who had served on the Eastern Front:

> After the war the [political] situation changed decisively. The Communists got the power and since we who had fought in Germany were called Nazis—which we never were, or are—we decided to keep our mouths tightly shut about what we did during the war. I told many other brothers-in-arms [SS volunteers]: "don't say anything."[14]

Although the left gained considerable power in the postwar political context, the Finnish Communists did not achieve the level of power suggested by this remark; rather, the *Waffen-SS* veterans viewed the political climate as pervasively "communist." Nevertheless, in the turbulent political climate, Finnish *Waffen-SS* men were often portrayed as "Nazis," and forced to justify their service in the *Waffen-SS*. The campaign against the former SS volunteers began in 1945 when the Communists Eino Pekkala and Hertta Kuusinen introduced the topic in Parliament. Between 1946 and 1948, over half of the *Waffen-SS* volunteers were arrested and released after Valpo interrogations. Similarly, many former SS volunteers had to resign from the army and the police forces. Some trade unions did not accept them as members and in some cases public apologies for their "undemocratic behavior" were demanded. Isolated, tired of Valpo interrogations, and beset by arrests, the denial of jobs, and even forced labor as a potential punishment, most SS veterans chose to remain silent.[15]

The first memory battle relating to Finnish *Waffen-SS* history in the mainstream press, rather than in the Communist press, took place when Unto Parvilahti (Boman) published his memoirs in 1958.[16] Parvilahti's message was clear: the Finnish volunteers were not Nazis, they were heroic soldiers who simply defended their fatherland. The underlying claim that Finnish volunteers were not "political" was not, however, true of Parvilahti himself. Many volunteers accused Parvilahti of being an out-and-out Nazi whose main interest was self-serving.[17] Conservative current affairs journal *Suomalainen Suomi* described Parvilahti's claims as "laudable for it is clear that many former SS men were treated unfairly after the war";[18] overall, the review of Parvilahti's memoirs was cautiously favorable. However, the leading liberal daily paper, *Helsingin Sanomat*, published a more critical account, written by former SS volunteer Yrjö Kaila. Kaila described how his initial "hopes for the book had been high," since the volunteer issue "had remained obscured, save for a couple of

peculiar novels and some odd newspaper articles." Nonetheless, he was disappointed:

> Although one reads the book with interest, one cannot subscribe to all of its views. Parvilahti emphasizes, perhaps, too much patriotism among our SS movement . . . joining a foreign military force at the time when peace was hanging in balance in one's own country seems like hypocrisy.[19]

Parvilahti's response to the review was countered by Kaila, who concluded that "our—your and my—attitudes towards the SS are different. That's where the stone in the shoe lies."[20] In fact, as we have seen, Kaila had already made (highly critical) unpublished remarks about the SS after he had returned from the campaign in 1942:

> political education played a remarkable part and the SS's political orientation was constantly stressed during the campaign [Operation Barbarossa]. . . . In terms of their political orientation and worldview, the SS men were the most homogenous unit. . . . One did not need to inquire after the SS worldview since that particular kind, should I say, of enlightened SS men regardless of their rank . . . were bursting out in their political righteousness.[21]

Ylioppilaslehti, a cultural magazine for university students and the nation's intellectuals, was also harshly critical of Parvilahti's memoirs. According to its reviewer, although ostensibly couched as "objective," the end-result was in fact "full of nonsense without critique, system or style," and of questionable reliability as well: "the writer's attitude is solely glorifying [the SS experience] and so naively one-sided that this cannot be treated as a flaw but is downright dangerous."[22] Indeed, in order to manipulate his narrative, Parvilahti omitted significant information. Early on in his book he recalled, "the first time I got involved with the idea [of the Finnish SS battalion] was at a board meeting of the economic policy association *Samfundet Folkgemenskap r.f.* (Swedish, The Association for People's Community). This "economic policy association," however, was not a political think-tank—as might be assumed from an innocent reading of the text—but rather the leading Swedish-speaking Nazi party in Finland.[23]

Despite—or perhaps because of—Parvilahti's attempts to downplay his Nazi past, a memory battle over the nature of Finnish *Waffen-SS* history continued in the press. The provocative style of *Ylioppilaslehti*—particularly its use of photographs—sparked an infuriated response from one reader, published in the paper's opinion section. Angered by the implication that the *Waffen-SS* committed atrocities, the respondent stated that, "in line with their military duties, the Finnish volunteers participated in the campaigns in Ukraine and the Caucasus. The toughness of these fights can be seen in the high toll of casualties and wounded." Later in the same piece, he argued that "your photo 'from Poland 1940' is totally irrelevant here. It does not

SS-parven tie

Toisessa maailmansodassa taisteli Saksan puolustusvoimien riveissä mm. suomalainen SS-pataljoona, joka oli koottu vapaaehtoisista suomalaisista nuorista miehistä. Pataljoona ehti ottaa osaa Saksan itärintaman sotatoimiin kahden vuoden ajan, jonka jälkeen se kotiutettiin ja sen elossa olevat jäsenet liitettiin suomalaisiin yksiköihin. Tämän pataljoonan olemassaolo on innoittanut Berijan tarhoista tunnetuksi tulleen toimituspäällikkö Unto Parvilahden kirjallisesti muistelemaan toista maailmansotaa ja suomalaisten SS-miesten osuutta sen tapahtumiin. Syntyneen teoksen nimi on TEREKILLE JA TAKAISIN, suomalaisten vapaaehtoisjoukon vaiheita Saksan itärintamalla 1941-43 Otava 1958.

Suta näyttää olevan ehtymätön aihelähde kaikenlaisille kirjallisille yrittäjille, tuopistrategeille, arkihistorioitsijoille ja kolpakkopolitikoille, joiden sodista kirjoittamisen aivujen määrä varmastikin tavallisen jonkin maailman suurista meristä. Varsinkin toisen maailmansodan tapahtumat näyttävät tulleen niin tarkkaan merkityksi kirjoihin, että miltei jokainen tavallisen rivisotilaskin on kerran saanut nimensä julkisesti levitettävään painotuotteeseen. Ja siksipä kai jokainen uusi muistelma tuntuukin jo melkoisen kyllästyttävältä, ellei sillä ole esitettävänään jotakin todella uutta ja merkittävää. Tavallisesti ei kyllikään ole.

Toimitusjohtaja Parvilahti on niitä tavallisia yrittäjiä, jotka suurin huolen omista kyvyistään lähtevät kuljettamaan kynää suurvaltapolitiikassa ja suurstrategiassa varsin estottomasti. Samat miehet, ilmeisesti oman pienuutensa tuntien, pyrkivät antamaan esityksilleen "objektiivisen", suorastaan tieteenomaisen puhuceottoman sävyn ja nimpä tulos sitten onkin kasa kaikenlaista hölynpölyä ilman kritiikkiä, systeemiä ja muotoa. Ja kaiken alla kimmeltää kultevan riviniehen ahdas ja omakeskeinen muurahaisen perspektiivi.

Tavallisesti nämä sotakirjat eivät tuota harmia kenellekään, sillä niiden luvetelu ei juuri houkkaa ja niiden vähäiset asiatiedot ovat suurin piirtein paikkansapitäviä. Pikemminkin voisi muinita niiden puolesta, että tuottavathan ne toki tyydytyksen ainakin tekijälleen ja, jos teos haluaa olla autenttinen, myös niissä mainituille sankarinmuille. Mutta aina ei asia ole aivan näin yksinkertainen. Painettu sana on julkista sanaa ja se vaikuttaa, tahtoipa sen levittäjä tai ei. Niinpä jokainen selvä kanmanotto saa aina äänisä puolesta tai vastaan ja vaikka lukija ei sellaisti ilmaisisiqa mielipiteitä esittäjäkään syntyy hä, nessä automaattisesti reaktio sanotun vaikutuksesta. Vietä vaikuttavampi, kun selvin sanoin ilmaistu kannanmäärittely on sävy ja tapa, jolla teos on kirjoitettu. Kriittilinenkin lukija saattaa tahtomattaan omaksua jonkin esityksen kokonaisasenteen vaikka hän ei tietoisesti hyväksyisi ainuttakaan siinä ilmaistua mielipidettä.

Kirjanen "Terekille ja takaisin" on voimakkaan sodan ja sotimiselle myönteisen hengen sävyttämä. Tekijän asenne on ykäinomaan ihannoiva ja yhtäkaikki, ja niin naiviisti yksipuolinen, että sävyä ei ole pidettävä ykäinomaan teoksen puutteena vaan suorastaan vahingollisena. Varsinkin alaikäiset ja muuten puutteelliset ihmisykslöt ovat herkkiä vastaanottavaisia ajatuksille, joka mukaan sota ei suinkaan ole suurin mahdollinen inhimillinen onnettomuus, vaan sankaritekojen ja sankareiden häikäisevää aikaa. Kas näin:

> Oltakoon sotien tarpeellisuudesta maailmassa mitä mieltä tahansa, niin varmaa on, että sotilaallista kuntoa ja uhrivalmiutta tullaan pitämään arvossa niin kauan kuin kansat tarvitsevat sotalaitosta olemassaolonsa turvaamiseksi.

Eri lähteistä saatiin jo sodan aikana ja varsinkin sen jälkeen lukea loputtomasti sankaristeiden ja mm. SS:n suorittamista puhdistuksista, telotuksista joukkogidatyksistä ym. Unto Parvilahti tietää asiat paremmin. Waffen-SS ei milloinkaan ottaut osaa moisiin törkeyksiin, vaan taisteli aina kirkkain asein oikeutetun järjestelmän puolesta: "Kumniani on uskollisuus". On ilmeistä, ettei suomalainen SS-pataljoona osallistunut maitunlaisiin hirmuteikoihin, mutta muun SS:n osuus jää vielä hiukan epäselväksi.

Epäselväksi jää myös mikai tämä teos on kirjoitettu, mihin se pyrkii ja mitä se tarjoaa? Ja ketä se puolustaa?

Eero Piimies

Vantongerloo 1918

Marssikuva on kirjasta "Terekille ja takaisin". Toinen kuvamme on Puolasta vuonna 1940.



Orenfant 1922

Hauskaa, valitettavasti

Jokavuotisena harminaiheena ovat Lilla Teaternin uudenvuodenspektaakkelit. Bezin kirjoittamat duetteut, jotka säännöllisesti ovat ollect niin hauskoja, että ovat menneet koko kevätkauden. Lilla Teaternin henkilökunnassa on nimittäin muutamia poikkeuksellisen hienoja ja persoonallisia näyttelijöitä, jotka valitsematta halusin rähdä uusommissa rooleissa. Syvämäytäntökauteen ei mahdu monta näytelmää, ja vaikka teatterin terveyssä onkin aina useita mainiosti kirjoitettuja sketsejä, eivät ne vastaa sitä tilaa mikä niiden tähdä näitä näyttelijöitä suuremmissa tehtävissä.

Tämänvuotinen Bez-uutuus on "O" eli Saari, kaksiosainen seikkailu. Ensimmäisen osan aikana alkoi herätä toivekäpinä siitä, että tällä kertaa Bez ei ollutkaan onnistunut, huolimatta muutamista hauskoista kohdista ja siitä, että hänellä on tukenaan Vivica Bandlerin vauhdikas ja varmasti ohjaus, jolla puolestaan on tukemaan Lasse Pöysti ja Birgitta Ulfson, jotka osaavat ottaa kaiken irti materiaalistaan ja esittää älykkään humoristisesti ja antaumuksella tekin kohtauksen, jotka eivät sellaisenaan ansaitsisi. Sitäpaitsi teatterin ruotsinmaalainen vierailija on senlaatuinen huumorinaihinen, jonka viehättyvoima välttää minun silmäni. (Vaikkei minulla muiden, naurunpuuskista päätellen).

Ikävä kyllä toinen osa sitten alkoi Lasse Pöystin esittämällä varhaisdean vahtimestari-numerolla, joka oli nasevasti kirjoitettu ja loistavasti esitetty. Ja jatkoksi seurasi monta riemukasta numeroa, mm. sutjeprinsenttisen suomalaisettu musical-versio Sven Tuuvasta, jossa nuorukaiden nimessä Lotta Svärdinkin kutsuttiin Arpa Miekaksi, tai manneklinitrio, jossa Birgitta Ulfsson oli mavaaberin hurmaava, kuin Tabe Slioorin kouluttama silkkimato. Muutamia vähemmän onnistuneita numeroita mahtui toisenkin osaan, mutta valitettavasti suurin osa oli hauskaa.

tämän arvosta niin kauan kuin kansat tarvitsevat sotalaitosta olemassaolonsa turvaamiseksi.

Eri lähteistä saatiin jo sodan aikana ja varsinkin sen jälkeen lukea loputtomasti sankaristeiden ja mm. SS:n suorittamista puhdistuksista, telotuksista joukkogidatyksistä ym. Unto Parvilahti tietää asiat paremmin. Waffen-SS ei milloinkaan ottaut osaa moisiin törkeyksiin, vaan taisteli aina kirkkain asein oikeutetun järjestelmän puolesta: "Kumniani on uskollisuus". On ilmeistä, ettei suomalainen SS-pataljoona osallistunut maitunlaisiin hirmuteikoihin, mutta muun SS:n osuus jää vielä hiukan epäselväksi.

Epäselväksi jää myös mikai tämä teos on kirjoitettu, mihin se pyrkii ja mitä se tarjoaa? Ja ketä se puolustaa?

Eero Piimies

Karisuomalainen maailma

Kari Suomalainen: HASSU MAAILMA. Sanoma Oy 1958.

Taiteilija Kari Suomalainen on saavuttanut aloissamme harvinaista menestystä päivälehtipiirtäjänä, ja seurauksena tästä ilmestyy jouluisin kokoelma, johon on koottu vuoden ilmeisesti ansiokkaimmat piirrokset.

Viime jouluksi ilmestynyt kirja on edeltäjiensä tavoin osattua taiteilija Suomalaisen pyrkimyksestä ilmentää visuaalisin keinoin suomalaista pakinoitsitraditiota, jonka tunnusomaisimpia merkkejä ovat kansuntajuisuus, pinnallinen kansanomaisuus ja vetoaminen standardihuumorintajuun. Pyrkimyksessään on taiteilija Suomalainen menestäni onnistunut kuitettävästi, mikä ei tarkoita sitä, että tulos olisi jossakin suhteessa onnellinen. Kun otetaan huomioon, että visuaalisen muotoon puetulla kannanilmaisulla on tehokkain mahdollinen vaikutus kohteeseensa, vaatii tällainen ase käyttäjältään omakohtaista vastuuta, mikä taiteilija Suomalaisen tapauksessa tarkoittaa yleisen mielipiteen kehittämistä myöntyteisen asuntaan on kosiskelun sijasta. (Asianomaisella näyttää kuitenkin onneksi olevan kaikki mahdollisuudet kehittyä parempaan suuntaan.)

Kokoelma käsittää pääasiassa keveätä sisä- ja ulkopolitiikka sprakoilitia, tekijän kohta edesmennyttä kissaa ja julkisuuden henkilöitä ilmentäviä piirroksia, jotka sivallisesti tulkitsevat pensevyttä liberalismia, poliittista pitkäjännitteisyyttä, nykyarkkitehtuuria, elokuvaa, politiikkaa ja me kohtaan. Parhaimmillaan on taiteilija Suomalainen kuvahetsaan jotakin toisarvoista tapahtumaa, joilla on sellaisenaan koominen itsearvonsa, niinkuin pilapiirrokuilla yleensä on.

Henkilökarrikatyyrit, selvät kompositiot ja tyhjän tilan tehokas käyttö ovat parasta ja omavaraisinta taiteilija Suomalaisen piirroksissa, jotka tässä mielessä ovat ansiokkaita, mitä pikuleikeistä piirtäjämme ovat esitäneet. Loppu onkin pääasiassa lainatavaraa, mikä on jo aikasemminkin julkinuudessa monesti todettu. Teknikkka, kuhukakarat, ukot, akat, lättähattut ja pimut by Giles ovat kuitenkin niin tehokkaasti haltuunvampia kuin muutamat kirjan kuvista, joissa tait. Suomalainen on käyttänyt naas. Ilmeistämämpää teknikkaansa.

Kaikenkaikkiaan, Hassu maailma tarjoaa hukipäleen useita hupaisia tuokioita.

E. L.

Pahinta asiassa on, että Vivica Bandlerin revyyt "elävät", niinkuin sanotaan, toisin sanoen ikävät numerot kariery t melko pian pois ja tilalle tulee hauskempia. Jiin että lienee aiistuttava siihen, ettei vähään aikaan ole odotettavissa tuosia ensi-iltoja Lilla Teaternin

Esko Elstelä

Juhana Blomstedt

Figure 10.2 The memory battle: the photograph of "The Last Jew of Vinnitsa" accompanying the review of Unto Parvilahti's *Terekille ja takaisin* (To the Terek river and back) upset many readers of the student paper *Ylioppilaslehti*. The photo does not depict *Waffen-SS* soldiers. (Courtesy of *Ylioppilaslehti,* Helsinki)

display SS men . . . but the German gendarmes. . . . With your writing, you have thrown dirt in the eyes of the Finnish volunteers. The majority of them were schoolboys. You have not written a line about their destinies, which is what the book is all about."[24] The image in question was the infamous "Last Jew of Vinnitsa," in which a man sits on the edge of a mass grave, just seconds before he—the last Jew of Vinnitsa—will be shot. (See Figure 10.2.)

Although Unto Parvilahti was not particularly well-liked by other Finnish volunteers, his memoirs, together with Jukka Tyrkkö's *Suomalaisia suursodassa* (Finnish, Finns in the great war), provided the standard interpretation of the Finnish volunteers' experiences until the first—and as yet only—scholarly assessment was published in 1968.[25] In essence, the memory battles of the late 1950s were a response to the dominance of monovocal narrative modes in which the story of Finland's survival, and its distance from the Third Reich, obliterated almost all critical discussion of the negative aspects of the Finnish *Waffen-SS* experience.

The traditional story: Finnish volunteers as "soldiers like any others"

The narrative through which the Finnish *Waffen-SS* experience has traditionally been portrayed has its roots both in national self-perception during the war and in the shock caused by the political landscape of the immediate postwar years. The dominant literature on the Finnish *Waffen-SS* soldiers is remarkably one-dimensional: the same lines of argument are reiterated to the point of saturation. In order to project the legitimacy of their position, commentators repeatedly draw attention to certain aspects of the Finnish *Waffen-SS* experience. In the following section, I consider these key tropes—the Jäger argument, elite soldiers in the elite forces, no participation in atrocities—of the Finnish *Waffen-SS* narrative, analyzing their emergence and usage within Finnish historical culture.

The Jäger argument

Clandestine Jäger activism began to take hold in Finland in 1914, when Finnish volunteers (usually university students) went to Germany in order to receive the military training that would be necessary to secure Finland's break from Imperial Russia. Between 1915 and 1918, Germany trained some 2,000 Finnish activists, who from 1916 onwards formed the Royal Prussian 27th Jäger Battalion, gaining military experience in the northern theatre of operations on the Eastern Front.

At first, there appear to be obvious parallels between the Jäger movement and the *Waffen-SS* volunteers: in both cases, these Finnish volunteers embarked on clandestine journeys to Germany in order to receive military training. In both cases, the common enemy was Russia (after 1917, the Bolsheviks), and both contingents emerged during a period of widespread

European turmoil. Given these similarities, the two cases were equated within Finnish national self-perception (and propaganda) during World War II: historical continuity and a shared sense of purpose conveniently linked the two movements. In August 1941, shortly after the public was told that a contingent of Finnish volunteers were wearing the German uniform, the right-wing *Hämeen Sanomat*'s editorial, "The Jäger Legacy," discussed the issue:

> During the time when the Czarist Russia prepared for the final enslavement, many thought that Finland's lot was hopeless. . . . But a small group realized that Finland's only chance [to survive] would be to cooperate with Germany. . . .
>
> [In the context of 1941] There were men who could go and were ready to follow the road paved by the Jägers. The Jäger legacy had become real through action—and . . . [now existed] only in historical memories and speeches.
>
> The road of young Finns once again led to Germany. They trusted in Hitler's Germany. They were ready to sacrifice for their nation. They represented no political agendas but one unified Finnish nation. . . . It is offering our hand to the German people, who together with us fight to eradicate the Bolshevik plague and to ensure the healthy progress of our nation.[26]

During World War II the use of Jäger legacy discourse was not limited to conservative/right-wing circles. Faced with total war, Finnish society was highly conformist: there was unanimity in words and deeds, political opposition could result in prison sentences. Even the leading social democratic paper framed the story in terms of the "Jäger legacy," although it did not go as far as its conservative counterparts, which claimed that the Jägers and the SS volunteers shared exactly the same roots and goals.[27] Moreover, the fact that seventeen sons of former Jägers were serving in the Finnish SS volunteer battalion was asserted as confirming a bond between Jäger history and the *Waffen-SS* troops. This connection was further highlighted when the SS volunteers took their German military oath: those whose fathers had been Jägers were the first to swear their loyalty. Finally, as Parvilahti approvingly noted in his memoir, the Germans used this link as well, they "also wanted to emphasize the tradition connecting our voluntary movement and the legacy of the Jägers."[28]

After the war, the Jäger legacy was prominently deployed in Finnish accounts as an interpretive model, literally in the subtitle of Jukka Tyrkkö's 1960 memoirs, "SS volunteers following in the Jägers' footsteps," and the vision of the *Waffen-SS* as the Jäger legacy endures to the present day.[29] In early 2011, the Association for Military History in Finland held a series of lectures, "Finland's Path to the Continuation War," in which Ohto Manninen, one of the most respected military historians in Finland, upheld

this linkage, arguing that the *Waffen-SS* troops were following in the Jägers' footsteps.[30]

Elite soldiers in elite forces

Like the Jägers before them, the *Waffen-SS* soldiers have been distinguished as an elite unit, defined by the finest German military training. Virtually all Finnish literature on the *Waffen-SS* mentions this assessment, along with the fact that only the toughest, fittest, and most racially pure were accepted. Tyrkkö's *Suomalaisia suursodassa* (Finnish, Finns in the great war) is a case in point: "These selected and thoroughly trained and equipped troops were famous from the outset."[31]

After having passed their medical examinations the volunteers were shipped to Germany, where they were subjected to hard military training. According to diaries, memoirs, and fiction written by the volunteers, this rigor was seen as a necessary evil, to increase the fitness of the Finnish soldiers: "All of us lost excess weight and only muscles remained and we felt like we were fitter than ever."[32] Despite the fact that the drills did not instill the skills necessary for battle (such as shooting, using the terrain), the strategic value of German methods were rarely, if ever, questioned. Indeed, the value of this training could not have been seriously questioned since to do so would undermine the defining practices of the *Waffen-SS* as an elite force. A fictional character in Lauttamus's novel laconically states, "We've been here for three months and at least I haven't learnt anything else except to duck down quickly, get up even quicker and run faster."[33] In retrospect, the volunteers internalized and justified the gruelling regime by citing the contemporary trope often repeated by the German drill sergeants, "*Schweiss spart Blut*" (sweat saves blood).

Once in battle, the elite *Waffen-SS* troops were better equipped than other forces, finding themselves in the toughest engagements. In *Vieraan kypärän alla*, the military prowess of the Finns was established even before any fighting had taken place:

> Soldiers . . . ! The General's voice was ironclad. – I've been following your exercises and have seen your excellent performance. . . . I wish you the best of luck for the war but I cannot promise that you will all return alive and well, for war takes its toll even amongst the best-trained. . . . I can assure him [Hitler] that the Finnish *Waffen-SS* battalion . . . can be equated with Germany's elite battalions.[34]

The key figure in the "Finnish elite troop" narrative is the first commander of the Viking division, General Felix Steiner, sometimes dubbed "*Unser General*" (our General).[35] A father figure of the division and, without doubt, an untypical *Waffen-SS* commander, Steiner was held in high esteem by the Finnish volunteers. Unlike many of his subordinates, Steiner recognized and

acknowledged the combat skills of his Finnish soldiers. His comments are a mainstay of Finnish *Waffen-SS* literature: "They [the Finnish volunteers] were once again those who . . . on the hot and long battle for 'Hill 701' . . . conquered it, thereby reaping fame far and wide, even outside the division." In his account of the battle for control of the road to Stalino, Steiner states "[t]he Finnish volunteer battalion again was on the crucial spot."[36]

According to Jouni Suistola, "the command of the [Viking] division (starting from Felix Steiner) . . . let alone the rank-and-file was never accused of . . . war crimes."[37] Indeed, as Steiner himself was not indicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity at Nuremberg, Finns have taken this fact as evidence that "our General's" Viking division fought a traditional and honorable campaign. The focus on military elitism, bolstered by Steiner's comments, has meant that the ideologies at work within the Finnish *Waffen-SS* have not been investigated in any great depth. In the now-conventional narrative, the Finnish *Waffen-SS* soldiers were "apolitical" and, in the main, immune to the influence of Nazi propaganda. Yet, though neglected within Finnish SS literature, the effects of everyday indoctrination, "thinking with the blood," permeated everyday life and have become crucial in understanding the culture of the Third Reich.[38] It is rather striking, then, that this ideological linkage has been raised in the Finnish context only in a very few studies.[39] Consequently, an interpretation of military elitism has been attached to the way in which the Viking division as a whole fought a traditional military campaign: it was brutal, but not atrocious. In this regard, Finnish accounts diverge from mainstream scholarly studies elsewhere. Danish scholars have discussed how such tendencies played out in practice: "outside the classrooms ideology was to be found everywhere, as when the men from the Viking division used cardboard figures portraying Jews for bayonet practice."[40] In the same way, referring to pre-Barbarossa military training, Richard Rhodes has cited Günther Otto's testimony at the Nuremberg trial. According to the testimony, the division "had been indoctrinated with anti-Semitic thoughts in Dachau [at the training centre, next to the concentration camp] and Heuberg . . . but we were never told that the anti-Semitic program went as far as extermination—only that the Jews were parasites and responsible for the war."[41] Omer Bartov states, "the powerful sense of abhorrence of war in postwar Germany, following the destruction visited upon it during the closing phases of World War II, has made many Germans view war, any war, as hell. Paradoxically, this view has in turn legitimized the actions of German soldiers in the war as being in no way essentially different from those of all other soldiers." However, as he continues, there were some vital differences and it "is therefore of some importance to point out in what respects the German army's conduct in the war was essentially different than that of any other army in modern history."[42] According to Bartov, the German troops were in a very different position to other armies during the war as they were used as "Hitler's main instrument

in implementing his policies of conquest and genocide."[43] Bartov's view, however unpleasant it might sound, should also be applied to the Finnish *Waffen-SS* volunteers on the Eastern Front.

No participation in atrocities

Although the Ukrainian and Baltic population initially viewed the Germans as liberators, the first weeks of Operation Barbarossa also had a much more sinister side. Large numbers of Germans (and their collaborators) participated in the killing of Jews and others in what Saul Friedländer calls "*Rausch*" (ecstasy or high). During the early phase of Operation Barbarossa (up until the end of 1941), the murder of Jews was being carried out in the open. As Jürgen Matthäus has argued, this period saw "a quantum leap toward the Holocaust."[44] By the end of 1941 between 500,000 and 800,000 Jews had been murdered. Although there are some passing references to killings and the mistreatment of the ethnic population, Finnish discussion of the early months of the war tends to stress its more positive side: "The people like the soldiers like a 'horse likes oats.' Fruit, cigarettes and flowers were raining on the train carriages."[45] Nonetheless, writing in *Viikon kertojat* magazine in 1957, Arno Purola suggested a considerably more tense relationship between the invading Finnish SS troops and local civilians: "We got along with the civilians relatively well. During daylight hours, we were even friends. We exchanged items from eggs, pancake flour and other edibles to soap and petrol. In the evenings and at night our relationship was frailer. This was because they tried to burn our trucks and because our sentries were shot at. We were dealing with partisans."[46] The way in which the SS retaliated here was not mentioned, though of course in other, similar circumstances, the SS responded to partisans with brutal ferocity.

Similarly, an account of an engagement in Tarnopol is equally telling, less for what it says than for the predictable outcome that it leaves in silence: "The battle was short but intense. With others [Finnish SS officer] Ladau gathered to look at the captured POWs. One of them was a *politruk*, a political officer [commissar], who turned out to be a woman."[47] While this narrative implies merely that war is full of surprises, more significant is what it omits: how the *Waffen-SS* was instructed to treat commissars and what their usual fate would have been in the hands of the Germans. In general, the brutal realities of war were either effectively written-out or merely hinted at, but were never discussed explicitly. An extract from a former SS man's diary is another case in point: reminiscing on Christmas Eve in 1941 in Dnepropetrovsk, he wrote, "In truth one saw and experienced many things which cannot be written here."[48] In other words, the absence of "things which cannot be written here" from the historical record has been used to support the view that such "things" did not take place and that Finnish soldiers were not involved in wartime atrocities.

The other story: International perspectives

No matter how unpleasant it may seem to Finland's patriotic historiographical tradition, the context of Nazi Germany's *Vernichtungskrieg* (war of extermination) must be taken into account when grappling with the experiences of *Waffen-SS* soldiers. As Danish scholars have argued:

> Any study of Axis units in action on the eastern front must proceed from these [the war of extermination] considerations, which make it seem very likely that most individual soldiers had a fair picture of the barbarous character of the Nazi war of extermination. The likelihood that they were involved in atrocities is considerable.[49]

Even before Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, there was no doubt that this war would be unlike any other. The genocidal intent was already pronounced on the eve of the *Wehrmacht*'s invasion of Poland in September 1939. "Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?," Hitler exclaimed in a speech to his *Wehrmacht* commanders shortly before the Polish campaign, brushing aside the military elite's concerns that Germany's conduct in Poland would elicit global condemnation.[50] The German troops began to advance on the Soviet Union in late June 1941: the initial decision to outlaw the murder of Jewish women and children had already been reversed by July–August when Heinrich Himmler toured the occupied Soviet territories.[51]

The route taken by the Viking division during the summer was literally paved with Jewish corpses. According to Bernd Boll,

> This [Viking] division was subordinate to the Fourteenth Army Corps of Panzer Group 1. Since July 1, 1941, it had been marching from Lemberg to Złoczów, following directly behind several other divisions, and it seems to have considered the first days of the war in the East a sort of hunting expedition, with people as prey. On July 2 and 3, it blocked the route of advance, apparently intentionally, while several members went "hunting for Jews" and in the process shot "everything and anybody that looked even the slightest bit suspicious, e.g. civilians with shaved heads [Russian soldiers]."[52]

More recently, Peter Longerich has asserted that "In Zloczow at the beginning of July, under the very eyes of Sonderkommando 4b and tolerated by the city commandant, Ukrainian activists had organized a massacre of the Jewish population in which members of the SS Viking Division took part on a huge scale."[53] Some Finnish SS men were in Złoczów (now Zolochiv, Ukraine); in his memoirs, Sakari Lappi-Seppälä describes how a Finnish volunteer, Unto Parvilahti, whom he characterizes as a "National Socialist,"

destroyed a chapel in Złoczów.[54] Nonetheless, in the absence of concrete evidence elaborating their activities, it is assumed that Finnish soldiers did not participate in any crimes.

Some Finnish volunteers also witnessed the German-instigated pogrom in Lvov (Lemberg). According to Parvilahti, "[a]fter the street fighting had ceased, we were forced to witness a terrible pogrom, in which the German army did not participate but could not stop it either." On the next page he states, "The whole civilian population of the city seemed to participate in this mass murder, it was taken by some kind of bloody mass frenzy, and nothing could have stopped it."[55] Parvilahti insinuates that the German troops had nothing to do with the incident; instead, he emphasizes the role played by the local population and the seemingly unstoppable mad frenzy of the moment. Furthermore, he even implies that the Germans might have stopped the pogrom could it have been done successfully. In fact, evidence suggests that although the pogrom was started by the locals, the *Wehrmacht* played a significant role in fanning the flames. After the Viking division had moved on, the *Wehrmacht* finally halted the pogrom after it had raged for two days and claimed at least 4,000 lives.[56] Staging himself and his unit as mere bystanders, Parvilahti's narrative construction was accepted in Finland as the standard view of the Finnish *Waffen-SS* role in war: the troops had to bear witness to some "unpleasant excesses" of German warfare but the war was, nevertheless, conventional warfare.

The other story: Finnish perspectives

Finnish accounts of the events in Złoczów and Lvov are representative in playing down the extent of *Vernichtungskrieg* in general, and its implications for the Jews in particular. However, Valpo interrogation files of former *Waffen-SS* volunteers (largely collected between 1946 and 1948) contain some descriptions and insinuations of war crimes committed by Finnish and other *Waffen-SS* soldiers during their service. Sakari Lappi-Seppälä was questioned about events which unfolded in late July or early August when his regiment took part in murdering an estimated 35 to 40 Jews in an area to the east of Lvov. According to Lappi-Seppälä's testimony, five Finns witnessed the execution but "according to the witness's knowledge, no Finns participated in the execution as they all had refused to take part."[57] Lappi-Seppälä's description was almost a verbatim repetition of the account he presented in his 1945 memoirs *Haudat Dnjeprin varrella* (Finnish, Graves by the river Dnepr). Another Finnish SS volunteer, Thor-Björn Weckström, who was known for his Nazi sympathies, was questioned in November 1947 about the same event. Weckström told how he was one of "six or seven men in the company whom the commander had ordered to participate in the execution. . . . According to the informant, his squad had conducted five executions after which the squad was changed. . . . the task was very

unpleasant but the order had to be followed. The informant wanted to add that he deliberately missed the [Jewish] refugees due to the unpleasant nature of the task. The informant admits that he has never been a philo-Semite, but out of consideration of humanity he could not accept these kinds of acts."[58] Lappi-Seppälä either did not know about Weckström's role or, despite his personal dislike of Weckström, wanted to remain silent about the possible participation of a fellow Finn. There is also another incident in the Valpo files which reveals the nature of *Vernichtungskrieg* and how it affected Finnish volunteers. According to the file, a skilled and admired Finnish officer, Karl-Erik Ladau, was accused of ordering a Finnish military engineering group to shoot seven inhabitants of Tolskum village (Toldzgun, North-Ossetia) and five Russian defectors detained as prisoners of war in December 1942.[59] What actually happened remains unclear: there are no traces of the incident in the Finnish *Waffen-SS* literature, at least in the literature portraying Ladau's experiences in the *Waffen-SS*.

Sakari Lappi-Seppälä's peculiar, much-maligned and belittled memoir is still the only significant Finnish account—even over sixty-five years later—which views the campaign from the perspective of the *Vernichtungskrieg*. From the outset, Lappi-Seppälä was keenly aware of the criticism his book would attract, pointing to it in his foreword:

> I don't want to speak only for those Finns who, once they had seen what the Third Reich really was, realized their mistake, which was due to domestic Nazi propaganda . . . the graves in Poland, Belarus, Ukraine and the Caucasus will always stay as a monument to this fateful mistake. . . . This book will bring me countless numbers of enemies.[60]

In the epilogue, Lappi-Seppälä describes how "I felt great relief when I got rid of it all. That life [in the *Waffen-SS*] had turned into a personal nightmare." In his memoirs, he not only details German brutality and an omnipresent Nazi mentality, but also argues that numerous Finns participated in the campaign in the hope of securing a personal share in Hitler's Europe. Lappi-Seppälä's view of Finnish group harmony suggests that it was not nearly as strong as retrospective accounts claim.[61] Given his views, the author's prediction of countless enemies proved to be accurate. According to Valpo, who monitored Finnish SS men after the war, a group of six former SS volunteers were planning to assassinate Lappi-Seppälä because his book had insulted the SS.[62]

The main response to Lappi-Seppälä's book was a deathly silence in the mainstream press; only the radical left praised it.[63] It was neither advertised nor reviewed in any of the Finland's main literature forums. However, when newspaper and magazine articles about the Finnish *Waffen-SS* history began to surface in the 1950s, implicit references to his account were made (although his book was never mentioned by name): "Apart from one

unfortunate exception they [Finnish *Waffen-SS* volunteers] have not wanted to pick up the pen but have remained silent."[64] Unto Parvilahti resorted to the same kind of damage control when, in his 1958 book, he reflected on the immediate postwar years: "Because of the immediate postwar political currents, very little was written about the vicissitudes of the volunteer battalion, and even less of it was decent."[65] The "little" referred to Lappi-Seppälä's and Eric Nupnau's accounts.[66] Towards the end of his memoirs, Parvilahti returned to the issue again:

> One could also find some amoral individuals among the former volunteers who, despite the careful screening, managed to set out for Germany. Unfit to represent Finnish soldiers in a foreign land, they were released to Finland before the end of their contract. Some of them hoped to work for the Communist minister of interior Yrjö Leino and in order to secure their new position they published mendacious memoirs about their service in the SS, which also were defamatory towards their ex-comrades.[67]

Parvilahti's account represents the dominant historical understanding of the Finnish *Waffen-SS* volunteers. On the one hand, critical voices are derided and, on the other, the brutality of the *Waffen-SS* troops is downplayed. Jukka Tyrkkö's *Suomalaisia suursodassa* (1960) further illustrates these central leitmotivs of the historiographical tradition. While considering events in Lvov, he described how, after the city had been taken, the Finns "had to stop in a town which was only inhabited by Jews. Their life looked incredibly miserable. Their clothes were barely rags; throwing a cigarette butt to the road one could cause a commotion." And again, in reference to Kirovograd: "We stopped on a ridge by the edge of the town where seemingly heavy fighting had taken place. A Jewish body battered by a grenade still lay in an open pit."[68] These are the only references Tyrkkö makes to Jews in his account; significantly, even when he mentions the body of a Jew, he links it to heavy fighting. Yet his description becomes more telling alongside Lappi-Seppälä's more explicit commentary on Kirovograd:

> the Jews were relentlessly persecuted during the two hours we had to stay there. Every now and again, a shot was fired from the platform of a truck, followed by a cry of pain. Motorcyclists demonstrated their skill by running over the old fleeing Jews and when they failed, a round of sub-machine gun gave assistance.[69]

The apogee of the *Waffen-SS* experience: Mauno Jokipii's *Panttipataljoona*

Mauno Jokipii's 1968 study of the Finnish *Waffen-SS* volunteers, *Panttipataljoona: Suomalaisen SS-pataljoonan historia* (Finnish, Pawn battalion: The history of

the Finnish SS-battalion), purported to apply scholarly detachment and objectivity to the history of Finland's *Waffen-SS* experience, despite the fact that the work was commissioned by an organization representing veteran *Waffen-SS* soldiers.[70] As such, Jokipii's work is an embodiment of the positivist historical tradition, the totalizing aim of which is a minute reconstruction in a Rankean fashion of "what actually happened." As far as clear-cut military history was concerned, the approach worked well: the military formations' records allowed for accurate chronological sequencing. Yet, producing a coherent total narrative from the often chaotic, even contradictory, evidence was problematic. Jokipii addressed this challenge through the use of a narrative order that gave his work coherence and a sense of totality. However, as Dan Stone has argued, "the rhetoric of 'totality' and comprehensiveness is shown to be a means of concealing awkward questions."[71] Further, the work is characterized by its distance from the events it describes: subjective agents (the Finnish volunteers) and their motives are forced into the straitjacket of the positivist tradition of historiography, in part by extending the historian's desire for objectivity invasively into the source material.

The challenge—and the concomitant concealment of awkward questions—is most evident in Jokipii's discussion of events in Lvov and Złoczów, his only attempt to address the *Vernichtungskrieg*. For Jokipii, the most obvious problem was how to reconstruct a past that corresponded with the sources, the grand narrative, and the desired goal of coherence. While Jokipii was writing in the mid-1960s, before Holocaust scholarship had been established and before the criminality of German troops (*Waffen-SS* and *Wehrmacht*) had become recognized, he did not modify his views when writing anew about the Finnish volunteers in 2002.[72] In terms of the historian's craft, then, Jokipii's attempt to narrate what happened at Złoczów in June and July 1941 highlights the problem of the empiricist-positivist tradition. Narrating the story from the premise of traditional military history, Jokipii is most concerned with the shooting of the Westland regiment's commander Hilmar Weckerle by a Russian sniper. "The aftermath" turned "nasty":

> The man [the sniper] was caught and killed but according to the Germans that was not enough of a reprisal for killing the regiment's commander . . . the seventh company was sent to avenge the killing, a nearby village was burnt. At the same time, some Russians and Jews who were accused of collaborating with the sniper were executed without a trial.[73]

The narrative can be easily digested and understood by an ordinary reader. However, the problem lies in its distance from the experiences of those who lived through the chaos, experiences which lend a more specific coloration to the events.

Although Jokipii recognizes this problem, he relegates it to a footnote in order to maintain the coherence of his narrative:

> Source information about the event is so conflicting that it makes a good exercise in source criticism. According to *Lappi-Seppälä* p. 86, Weckerle was killed in the evening of 30 June even before arriving at Lemberg, [according to] the war diary of II/Westland the morning of 2 July, Paikkala's diary as well as *Steiner*, Viking, p.109 and *Strassner* p. 25. But *Steiner* Freiwilligen p. 92 refers to the morning of 3 July and Kääriäinen's diary mentions it retrospectively on the 8 July.
>
> According to Parvilahti p. 67, the sniper fired from the field, according to *Lappi-Seppälä* p. 86 from a tree. In Bruno Aaltonen's view . . . from behind a conquered tank, according to II/ Westland's war diary from the village . . . *Steiner*, Viking p. 109 holds that there were several snipers when others talk about one. Everyone knows about burning of the village but *Kaila* p. 13 talks about several villages. According to *Lappi-Seppälä* the sniper was executed by hanging. At the same time other suspects were shot, according to Paikkala's diary 2 July 1941 some Russians and Jews. According to Kihlström's diary entry 2 July 1941 four Jews.
>
> None of the informants were there, hence the diversity in the stories, which circulated orally. Altogether they illuminate that it [the assassination] really happened.[74]

What does this lengthy footnote mean? What is the "exercise in source criticism" that Jokipii mentions? Jokipii's narrative, which amounts to nothing but "determined ambiguity," leaves the reader without an explanation.[75] Perhaps the most troubling aspect is the assertion that "none of the informants were there." It may be the case that none of the informants personally witnessed the shooting of Weckerle, but they all witnessed the aftermath that "turned nasty." Lappi-Seppälä, for example, described the wider shape of events—the killing frenzy of his *Waffen-SS* troops. However, because Jokipii's narrative was emplotted as military history, he was only interested in the killing of Weckerle. As a result, the two lengthiest accounts of the events—one by Lappi-Seppälä and the other by Jokipii—offer contrasting "understandings" of the events. Both writers begin with the shooting of the commander. Jokipii pauses here and seeks to establish how Weckerle was shot. Lappi-Seppälä, however, continues to consider the atmosphere of the war of extermination in his description of the way in which thirty-six Jews were humiliated and then shot in groups of five in the graves they had dug for themselves. Jokipii only notes that the "village was burnt down." Given the fact that Lappi-Seppälä—according to his memoirs—was ordered to participate in the shooting (after he refused, he was ordered to collect watches and other valuables from the victims instead), Jokipii's assertion that no Finns "were there" seems, at best, out of place, and at worst to conceal the

fact that Finnish *Waffen-SS* volunteers were not merely bystanders or witnesses, but—as soldiers—participants in the events.[76] Thus, although presenting a cachet of objective scholarship, "Jokipii could not avoid, wittingly or unwittingly, arrogating the past to his own aims: the work was commissioned by the organization of Finnish SS veterans."[77]

As we have seen, Unto Parvilahti had questioned Lappi-Seppälä's credentials. In the same vein, Jokipii also discussed the possible motives which might have contributed to Lappi-Seppälä's frame of mind. According to Jokipii, the fact that Parvilahti had ordered some of Lappi-Seppälä's belongings in Graz to be seized was significant: "the raid resulted in Lappi-Seppälä being sent back to Finland. This may, in part, be the reason for his embellished negativity towards the *Waffen-SS* which comes through in his memoirs, although there is also a touch of postwar hindsight."[78] Perhaps it would have been equally justifiable to reflect on the possibility that Lappi-Seppälä's distaste for the *Waffen-SS* might have emanated from the sheer brutality he witnessed among the SS ranks. For example, Lappi-Seppälä reflected that the "SS men were the chosen weapon against everyone whom National Socialism considered an enemy, for no other organization had such ruthless methods. The word one heard to be used when [SS men were] talking about action was '*rücksichtslos*' [ruthless] and one did not need to be particularly sharp to acknowledge that everything had happened ruthlessly." Indeed, in Lappi-Seppälä's narrative one can discern a cathartic dimension, which is notably absent in other literature on the Finnish *Waffen-SS* experience. Echoing Camille Mauclair's (Séverin Faust) words, the opening passage of the book includes the following lines: "if I kept quiet, I would lose even more: my self-respect. The worst of all professions is using the pen either for silence or lying."[79]

New millennium: Contested memories

Despite developments in scholarship on the German war of extermination, the framework established by Jokipii in the late 1960s can still be seen as the foundation of present-day explanations of Finnish participation in the *Waffen-SS*.[80] Much of the contemporary literature is still laudatory, habitually downplaying the extensive criminality of the organization in which the Finns fought. Instead, overwhelming attention is given to traditional and unproblematic military aspects of the *Waffen-SS*: its uniforms and insignia, weapons, and vehicles. While this tells much about its "tools," it says little about how they were used or to what purpose.[81] The tendency to ignore the ideological framework in which the Finnish volunteers operated was also evident in Jokipii's final contribution to the debate, *Hitlerin Saksa ja sen vapaaehtoisliikkeet* (Hitler's Germany and its volunteer movements, 2002). Jokipii is aware of the evolution of the field, but his overall premise on how Nazi Germany waged its atrocious war remains troubling; this position is expressed in his summary of the controversial "*Wehrmacht* exhibition."

The original exhibition *Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944* (German, The war of annihilation: Crimes of the *Wehrmacht* 1941–44) was organized by the Hamburger Institute für Sozialforschung (Hamburg Institute for Social Research). From 1995 to 1999 the exhibition toured in 34 German and Austrian cities, attracting an estimated one million visitors. As Jokipii points out, despite the success of the exhibition, "before long the critics were able to show so many mistakes, uncertainties and even forgeries that the exhibition had to be closed for massive examinations. Thus, the organizers' self-confident assertions in the photograph captions came to an embarrassing end."[82] Tellingly, Jokipii—like his conservative German counterparts—describes only part of the story here. In light of these charges, the Institute for Social Research in Hamburg appointed an independent international body of experts to re-assess the photographs. The commission "rejected all charges of falsification and manipulation" as well as noting that "out of the 1,433 photographs of the exhibition fewer than 20 photographs do not belong in the exhibition."[83] Ironically, one of the falsification charges rested on the claim that it was inappropriate to speak of "German atrocities" because some of the photos depicted non-German acts of violence, inflicted by Hungarian and Finnish volunteers.[84] As the independent commission's findings were released in November 2000, they could have been included in Jokipii's commentary.

A few years later Georg H. Stein's work on the *Waffen-SS*, *The Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939–1945*, was translated into Finnish.[85] The Finnish translation also included a sixty-page section on "Finns in the Service of the *Waffen-SS*" written by Finnish historian Jouni Suistola. Since his argument encapsulates the still-dominant mode of thought in Finland, it is worth citing here at length:

> Stein has above paid quite a lot of attention to the criminality of the Waffen-SS . . . it must be mentioned that the command of [the Viking] division (starting from Felix Steiner) . . . let alone rank-and-file was never accused of . . . war crimes. As Jokipii says "the Finnish of the Wiking never, in so far as can be surmised from archival sources and their stories, had to take part in atrocities." The maxim with which the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Konrad Adenauer in 1956 returned the honour of the whole Waffen-SS is fitting for the [Finnish] battalion's soldiers. Those who served were, according to him [Adenauer], "Soldaten wie andere auch"—soldiers like any others.[86]

The statement is paradoxical in many respects. If one were to accept the argument that Finns were never anything other than regular troops who happened to fight for Finland under a foreign banner, there would be no need to consider "returning" their honor; the *Waffen-SS* had the reputation for dishonorable acts during the war, however much disacknowledging

them was seen as essential to the rehabilitation of postwar German morale. Indeed, from the perspective of the politics of memory it is both absurd and telling of Finland's historical self-understanding that a statement made by a West German politician during the 1950s (when the existence of German collective amnesia was at its highest) should be used to legitimize Finnish participation in the *Waffen-SS*. Overall, this confusion seems to exemplify the way in which Finns have still not managed to come to terms with the most fundamental aspects of *Waffen-SS* history.

In the conventional view, the fourteen hundred Finnish *Waffen-SS* volunteers were a microcosm of Finnish men in 1941: anti-Bolshevik, pro-German, but essentially Finnish patriots. Their role in the *Waffen-SS* has been constructed in the same way as the role of their fellow Finns fighting on the Finnish front: they were regular soldiers who fought in a traditional war. However, even a cursory examination reveals that "what actually happened" is far more complex than has been recognized by mainstream Finnish history. At the very least, Finnish *Waffen-SS* soldiers, whether they participated individually or consequentially, were present at operations targeting Jews. Silence, the selective use of facts, a prejudicial treatment of eyewitness accounts, and turning a blind eye towards the brutal nature of war on the Eastern Front have served to maintain the dominant, largely exculpatory discourse. This view glosses over the atmosphere in which Nazi Germany waged its war; it is evident that because virtually all Finnish history writing on the topic (with the exception of Lappi-Seppälä) has avoided any engagement with the Nazi or *Waffen-SS* culture and worldview, the need to explain both the factual and the ideological contours of "what happened" in the field has been considered unnecessary. Yet, clinging to old myths is no longer tenable, particularly when viewed from the German, European, and American historiographical tradition. It is only by ignoring such considerations that Finnish historical culture is still able to entertain the thought that no Finnish SS soldier could have participated in the Holocaust or other brutalities which others, including Danish and Norwegian volunteers, committed. Presenting this exceptionalist view of history—even if it derives from a motivation to cherish and respect the veterans' legacy—distorts our understanding of the experiences of Finnish soldiers during the war and, more significantly, degrades a richer, more accurate understanding of the meaning of Finland's complex relationship with the Third Reich.

Notes

1. The narration by Veikko Nepponen is included in Seppo Posio, "Isänmaan puolesta Saksan ja Suomen armeijassa" [For the fatherland in the German and Finnish armies], *Turun Sanomat*, April 22, 2006. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.

2. Bernd Boll, "Złoczów, July 1941: The Wehrmacht and the Beginning of the Holocaust in Galicia," in *Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Omer Bartov, Atina Grossmann, and Mary Nolan (New York: The New Press, 2002); Peter Longerich, *Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 194; Bernd Boll, "Zloczow, Juli 1941: Die Wehrmacht und der Beginn des Holocaust in Galizien," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 50, no. 10 (2002): 901–16; George H. Stein, *Waffen-SS: Hitlerin eliittikaarti sodassa* [*Waffen-SS*: Hitler's elite troops at war], trans. Jouni Suistola (Helsinki: Ajatus, 2004); and Richard Rhodes, *Masters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003).
3. Ville Kivimäki, "Introduction: Three Wars and Their Epitaphs; The Finnish History and Scholarship of World War Two," in *Finland in World War Two: History, Memory, Interpretations*, ed. Tiina Kinnunen and Ville Kivimäki (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 6.
4. Mauno Jokipii, *Hitlerin Saksa ja sen vapaaehtoisliikkeet: Waffen-SS:n suomalaispataljoona vertailtavana* [Hitler's Germany and its volunteer movements: The Finnish *Waffen-SS* battalion in comparison] (Helsinki: SKS, 2002), passim. See also Mauno Jokipii, "Suomalaisen SS-pataljoonan erikoisuus" [The particularity of the Finnish SS-battalion], *Kanava*, no. 1 (2001): 10–15, esp. 15.
5. For Finland's insecure situation and the development of the Finnish–German relations during 1940–41, see Matti Lackman, *Esko Riekki: Jääkärivärväri, Etsivän Keskuspoliisin päällikkö, SS-pataljoonan luoja* [Esko Riekki: Jäger recruiter, chief of the Investigative Police Bureau, and creator of the SS-battalion] (Helsinki: SKS, 2007), 372–84.
6. Jokipii, *Hitlerin Saksa*, 397–8.
7. Mauno Jokipii, *Panttipataljoona: Suomalaisen SS-pataljoonan historia* [The pawn battalion: History of the Finnish SS-battalion] (Helsinki: Weilin+Göös, 1968), 101.
8. Erkki Heimolainen cited in Seppo Porvali, *Uskollisuus on kunniamme* [Loyalty is our honor] (Helsinki: Apali, 2008), 51.
9. KA, Valpo II, amp IX A 4, Y.P.I. Kaila, "Suomalainen SS-vapaaehtoisliike keväästä 41– talveen – 43" [Finnish SS-volunteer movement from spring 41 to winter 43], 20–1.
10. Niilo Lauttamus, *Vieraan kypärän alla* [Under the foreign helmet] (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1957), 14. Lauttamus's novel was a popular success, selling over 70,000 copies in 13 editions.
11. KA, Valpo II, amp IX A 4, ilm 796, 1.
12. KA, Valpo II, amp IX A 4, Y.P.I. Kaila, "Suomalainen SS-vapaaehtoisliike keväästä 41– talveen – 43," 20–1.
13. See Jokipii, *Panttipataljoona*, 104–5.
14. Porvali, *Uskollisuus on kunniamme*, 64.
15. See Veikko Elo, *Pantin lunastajat* [The claimants of the pawn] (Helsinki: printed by author, 1993), 184–5.
16. Unto Parvilahti, *Terekille ja takaisin: Suomalaisen vapaaehtoisjoukon vaiheita Saksan itärintamalla 1941–43* [To the Terek river and back: The vicissitudes of the Finnish volunteer troops on the German eastern front 1941–1943] (Helsinki: Otava, 1958).
17. Sakari Lappi-Seppälä, *Haudat Dnjeprin varrella: SS-miehen päiväkirjan lehtiä* [Graves by the river Dnieper: Pages from the diary of an SS-man] (Helsinki: AA-kirjapaino, 1945), 177–84; Mauno Jokipii, *Hitlerin Saksa*, 303; Anu Vertanen, "Rintamalta

Ratakadulle: Suomalaiset SS-miehet kommunistisen Valpon kohteina 1945–1948" [From the frontline to Ratakatu street: Finnish SS-men as targets of the communist Valpo 1945–1948] (master's thesis, University of Jyväskylä, 2007). This self-serving image also emerges from the original Valpo interrogation files; see KA, Valpo II, amp IX B2C-B3-B4.

18. Jorma Aaltonen, ". . . kun rauta on kuumaa" [. . . when the iron is hot], *Suomalainen Suomi*, no. 1 (1959): 44.
19. Y. P. I. Kaila, "Suomalainen Anabasis" [Finnish Anabasis], *Helsingin Sanomat*, December 11, 1958, 17.
20. Y. P. I. Kaila, "Unto Parvilahdelle" [To Unto Parvilahti], *Helsingin Sanomat*, December 19, 1958, 30.
21. KA, Valpo II, amp IX A 4, Y.P.I. Kaila's memorandum.
22. Eero Piimies, "SS-parven tie" [The way of the SS-flock], *Ylioppilaslehti*, January 9, 1959, 9.
23. Parvilahti, *Terekille ja takaisin*, 18. For *Samfundet Folkgemenskap*, see Henrik Ekberg, *Führerns trogna följeslagare: Den finländska nazismen 1932–1944* [The Führer's loyal companions: Finnish Nazism 1932–1944] ([Helsinki]: Schildts, 1991), 195–210.
24. Matti Ylikangas, "SS-parven tie" [The way of the SS-flock], *Ylioppilaslehti*, January 16, 1959, 10.
25. Jukka Tyrkkö, *Suomalaisia suursodassa: SS-vapaaehtoisten vaiheita jääkäreiden jäljillä 1941–1943* [Finns in the great war: SS volunteers' vicissitudes following in the Jägers' footsteps 1941–1943] (Porvoo: WSOY, 1960). The only full-length scholarly book examination of the Finnish *Waffen-SS* history is Jokipii, *Panttipataljoona*.
26. "Jääkäri-perintö" [The Jäger-legacy], *Hämeen Sanomat*, August 12, 1941, 2. See also "Jääkärien työn jatkajat" [Successors to the Jägers' work], *Ajan Suunta*, August 13, 1941, 1.
27. "Jääkäriperintö" [The Jäger legacy], *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, August 15, 1941, 1.
28. Parvilahti, *Terekille ja takaisin*, 115.
29. Tyrkkö, *Suomalaisia suursodassa*.
30. Ohto Manninen, "'Panttipataljoona' jääkärien jäljille" ["The pawn battalion" in the Jägers' footsteps], public lecture, Sibelius Gymnasium, Helsinki, February 23, 2011.
31. Tyrkkö, *Suomalaisia suursodassa*, 12.
32. Kalevi Haapaniemi, "Ukrainassa ja Kaukasian vuorilla 1400 suomalaisen miehen vaiheita" [The vicissitudes of 1400 Finnish men in the Ukraine and the Caucasus mountains], *Yhteishyvä*, no. 44 (1957): 3.
33. Lauttamus, *Vieraan kypärän alla*, 147.
34. Lauttamus, *Vieraan kypärän alla*, 32. See also Parvilahti, *Terekille ja takaisin*, 112.
35. Parvilahti, *Terekille ja takaisin*, 238–44.
36. Felix Steiner cited in Parvilahti, *Terekille ja takaisin*, 242, 243.
37. Jouni Suistola, "Suomalaiset Waffen-SS:n palveluksessa" [Finns in the Service of the *Waffen-SS*], translator's chapter in *Waffen-SS: Hitlerin eliittikaarti sodassa 1939–1945* [*Waffen-SS*: Hitler's elite troops at war], by George H. Stein (Helsinki: Ajatus, 2004), 345.
38. For example, see Franz Janka, *Die braune Gesellschaft: Ein Volk wird formatiert* [The brown society: The forming of a people] (Stuttgart: Quell, 1997); Peter Fritzsche, *Life and Death in the Third Reich* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008); Frank Bajohr and Michael Wildt, eds.,

Volksgemeinschaft: Neue Forschungen zur Gesellschaft des Nationalsozialismus [The people's community: New research on the national socialist society] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2009); Boaz Neumann, "The Phenomenology of the German People's Body (*Volkskörper*) and the Extermination of the Jewish Body," *New German Critique*, no. 106 (2009): 149–81.

39. See for example, Antero Holmila, *Holokausti: Tapahtumat ja tulkinnat* [The Holocaust: Events and interpretations] (Jyväskylä: Atena, 2010); Oula Silvennoinen, *Salaiset aseveljet: Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933–1944* [Secret brothers-in-arms: The cooperation of the Finnish and German security police 1933–1944] (Helsinki: Otava, 2008); Hana Worthen, *Playing "Nordic":* The Women of Niskavuori, *Agri/Culture, and Imagining Finland on the Third Reich Stage* (Helsinki: Helsinki University Print, 2007).
40. Peter Scharff Smith, Niels Bo Poulsen, and Claus Bundgård Christensen, "The Danish Volunteers in the Waffen SS and German Warfare at the Eastern Front," *Contemporary European History* 8, no. 1 (1999): 95.
41. Richard Rhodes, *Masters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 63.
42. Omer Bartov, *Germany's War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 12.
43. Bartov, *Germany's War and the Holocaust*, 12.
44. Jürgen Matthäus, "Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust," in *The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939–March 1942*, by Christopher R. Browning with contributions by Jürgen Matthäus (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 245.
45. *Waffen-SS* volunteer Ahti Paikkala's diary entry on June 5, 1941, is quoted in Jaakko Korjus, *Otsassa kuoleman kuva: Raportti suomalaisesta SS-joukosta* [Death's image on the forehead: A report on the Finnish SS troops] (Vaasa: Vaasa Oy, 1981), 57.
46. Arno Purola, "Suomalaiset SS-miehet II" [Finnish SS troops II], *Viikon kertojat*, no. 9 (1957): 58.
47. Seppo Porvali, *Uskollisuus on kunniamme*, 81.
48. Kauko Ala-Ilkka quoted in Porvali, *Uskollisuus on kunniamme*, 20.
49. Claus Bundgård Christensen, Nils Bo Poulsen, and Peter Scharff Smith, "The Danish Volunteers in the Waffen SS and their Contribution to the Holocaust and the Nazi War of Extermination," in *Denmark and the Holocaust*, ed. Mette Bastholm Jensen and Steven L. B. Jensen (Copenhagen: Institute for International Studies, 2003), 70.
50. Cited in Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 4. For the Polish campaign, see Alexander B. Rossino, *Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003).
51. For example, see Christopher R. Browning, *The Path to Genocide: Essays of Launching the Final Solution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. chapter 5.
52. Boll, "Złoczów, July 1941," 75.
53. Longerich, *Holocaust*, 194; Boll, "Zloczow, Juli 1941," 901–16.
54. Lappi-Seppälä, *Haudat Dnjeprin varrella*, 105, 180.
55. Parvilahti, *Terekille ja takaisin*, 70, 71. See also Lappi-Seppälä, *Haudat Dnjeprin varrella*, 92–3.
56. Longerich, *Holocaust*, 194.
57. KA, Valpo II, kuulustelut [interrogations] ko. 2223, ptk. no. 636/47, 4.

58. KA, Valpo II, kuulustelut ko. 2223, ptk. no. 662/47, 5–7.
59. KA, Valpo II, amp IX A 4a3, ilm no. 303/14.2.47. See also Anu Vertanen, "Rintamalta rajakadulle," 20.
60. Lappi-Seppälä, *Haudat Dnjeprin varrella*, 8–9.
61. Lappi-Seppälä, *Haudat Dnjeprin varrella*, 218, 167–8.
62. KA, Valpo II, amp IX A 4, Sotilaalliset järjestöt [Military organizations], SS-miehet [SS-men], kortti 6.11.46.
63. For example, "Hyvä sotakirja" [A good war novel], *SNS* (*Kansan Sanomat*), December 21, 1945, 14.
64. Haapaniemi, "Ukrainassa ja Kaukasian aroilla," 3.
65. Parvilahti, *Terekille ja takaisin*, 8.
66. Eric Nupnau, *Farligt spel: Två års upplevelser i Tyskland under kriget* [Dangerous game: Two years' experiences in Germany during the war] (Stockholm: Fahlcrantz and Gumælius, 1946). Like Lappi-Seppälä's work, Nupnau's book attracted little interest. Since Nupnau was not a *Waffen-SS* soldier on the front line, his book is not discussed here.
67. Parvilahti, *Terekille ja takaisin*, 298.
68. Tyrkkö, *Suomalaisia suursodassa*, 69, 123.
69. Lappi-Seppälä, *Haudat Dnjeprin varrella*, 110.
70. Jokipii, *Panttipataljoona*. The title of Jokipii's study is difficult to translate; the word *pantti* means "pawn" or "downpayment": Jokipii's idea is that the battalion was "pawned," or used as a "downpayment," to secure Germany's military and economic assistance for Finland in the looming war against the USSR, a quid pro quo solution for the Finns.
71. Dan Stone, *Constructing the Holocaust: A Study in Historiography* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2003), 85.
72. Jokipii, *Hitlerin Saksa ja sen vapaaehtoisliikkeet.*
73. Jokipii, *Panttipataljoona*, 192.
74. Jokipii, *Panttipataljoona*, 759–60n29.
75. The term is borrowed from Boll, "Złoczów, July 1941," 97.
76. Lappi-Seppälä, *Haudat Dnjeprin varrella*, 86–91.
77. Antero Holmila, "Varieties of Silence: Collective Memory of the Holocaust in Finland," in *Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations*, ed. Tiina Kinnunen and Ville Kivimäki (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 539.
78. Jokipii, *Hitlerin Saksa*, 309.
79. Lappi-Seppälä, *Haudat Dnjeprin varrella*, 96, 5.
80. See also Åke Söderlund, "Aatteen, seikkailujen vai maanpetturuuden tiellä? Saksan SS-joukoissa vuoden 1944 aseleposopimuksen jälkeen palvelleiden suomalaisten sotilaiden taustat ja värväytymisen vaikuttimet" [Idealists, adventurers, or traitors? The background and reasons of the Finns who served in the German SS after the truce of 1944], in *Sotatapahtumia, internointeja ja siirto sodanjälkeisiin oloihin* [Wars, internees, and the transition to the postwar era], ed. Lars Westerlund (Helsinki: Kansallisarkisto, 2010), 53.
81. See Wilhelm Tieke, *Suomalainen SS-pataljoona* [Finnish SS-battalion] (Helsinki: Wiking-divisioona, 2001); Olli Wikberg, *Dritte Nordland: Suomalainen SS-vapaaehtoispataljoona kuvissa* [Dritte Nordland: The Finnish volunteer battalion in photographs] (Helsinki: Wiking-divisioona, 2001); Olli Wikberg, *Meine Ehre heisst Treue!: Suomalaisten SS-vapaaehtoisten asepuvut 1941–43* [My honor is loyalty: The Finnish SS-volunteers' uniforms 1941–43] (Helsinki: Wiking-divisioona, 1999).
82. Jokipii, *Hitlerin Saksa*, 96.

83. Omer Bartov, "The Wehrmacht Exhibition Controversy," in *Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Omer Bartov, Atina Grossmann, and Mary Nolan (New York: The New Press, 2002), 41–2.
84. Bartov, "The Wehrmacht Exhibition Controversy," 42.
85. George H. Stein, *The Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939–1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966); translated by Jouni Suistola as *Waffen-SS: Hitlerin eliittikaarti sodassa 1939–1945* (Helsinki: Ajatus, 2004).
86. Jouni Suistola, "Finns on the Service of the Waffen-SS," translator's chapter in *Waffen-SS: Hitlerin eliittikaarti sodassa 1939–1945*, George H. Stein (Helsinki: Ajatus, 2004), 345.

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Valpo II (Valtiollisen poliisin arkisto, Archive of the State Police)
Jakob Tokazierin arkisto (Jakob Tokazier Archive)
Suomen juutalaisten arkisto (Finnish Jewish Archives)
Urheiluseura Makkabin arkisto (Maccabi Sports Association Archive)
Kansallisarkiston Sörnäisten toimipiste (SA, National Archives Sörnäinen Office), Helsinki
Sotavankileirien tutkimuskeskus (Prisoner-of-War Camps Investigation Centre)
Keskusrikospoliisi (National Bureau of Investigation), Helsinki
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